

**AFRICA DEVELOPMENT
AFRIQUE ET DÉVELOPPEMENT
Vol. XXXVII, No. 2, 2012**

**A Quarterly Journal of the Council for the
Development of Social Science Research in Africa**

**Revue trimestrielle du Conseil pour le développement
de la recherche en sciences sociales en Afrique**

CODESRIA would like to express its gratitude to the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA/SAREC), the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), the Danish Agency for International Development (DANIDA), the French Ministry of Cooperation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Rockefeller Foundation, FINIDA, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Open Society Foundations (OSFs), TrustAfrica, UN/UNICEF, the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) and the Government of Senegal for supporting its research, training and publication programmes.

Le CODESRIA exprime sa profonde gratitude à la Swedish International Development Corporation Agency (SIDA/SAREC), au Centre de Recherches pour le Développement International (CRDI), à la Ford Foundation, à la Fondation MacArthur, à la Carnegie Corporation, à l'Agence norvégienne de développement et de coopération (NORAD), à l'Agence Danoise pour le Développement International (DANIDA), au Ministère Français de la Coopération, au Programme des Nations-Unies pour le Développement (PNUD), au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères des Pays-Bas, à la Fondation Rockefeller, à FINIDA, à l'Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI), à l'Open Society Foundations (OSFs), à TrustAfrica, à l'UNICEF, à la Fondation pour le renforcement des capacités en Afrique (ACBF) ainsi qu'au Gouvernement du Sénégal pour le soutien apporté aux programmes de recherche, de formation et de publication du Conseil.

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Editor-in-chief/Rédacteur en Chef

Africa Development / *Afrique et Développement*

CODESRIA, Av. Cheikh Anta Diop x Canal IV B.P. 3304, Dakar, 18524 Sénégal.

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ISSN 0850 3907

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(ISSN 0850-3907)

The Impact of Non-formal Education on Skills and Knowledge of Community Development Workers: A Case Study

Derica Alba Kotzé*

Abstract

The ultimate route to address the needs of the poor is through a community development process with projects as the main vehicle. The main role player to facilitate this process is the community development worker. This article focuses firstly on the role and importance of non-formal education in community development and, secondly, on the impact of non-formal education and training on the knowledge and skills of community development workers responsible for the facilitation of projects. The article is based on an evaluation of a non-formal education programme that was developed to enhance the knowledge and skills of community development workers involved in the planning and execution of community-based development projects.

Résumé

Une voie ultime pour répondre aux besoins des populations pauvres passe par le processus de développement communautaire, avec des projets comme principal véhicule. L'acteur essentiel pour faciliter ce processus est l'agent de développement communautaire. Cet article met d'abord l'accent sur le rôle et l'importance de l'éducation non-formelle dans le développement communautaire et, en deuxième lieu, sur l'impact de cette éducation sur les connaissances et les aptitudes des agents responsables de la facilitation des projets de développement communautaire. Cet article est basé sur l'évaluation d'un programme d'éducation non-formelle conçu pour développer les connaissances et les aptitudes des agents de développement impliqués dans la planification et l'exécution des projets de développement communautaire.

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Introduction

The focus of this article is the role and importance of non-formal education in enhancing the skills and knowledge of community development workers to execute participatory community-based development projects, to address the needs of the poor in the development process. In this article, the author reports on a research study that was conducted among development facilitators employed by World Vision in Malawi as community development workers (CDWs) and enrolled for the Certificate Programme in Development for Development Practitioners offered by the Centre for Development Studies, University of South Africa (Unisa). Although this programme has been running for a decade, no research has yet been conducted to evaluate the impact of this non-formal training programme on the skills and knowledge of community development workers to successfully design, plan, implement, monitor and evaluate community-based development projects.

Research Methods

For the purpose of this research, two methods were used to collect data. The first method involved a questionnaire consisting of a combination of 15 closed- and open-ended questions (Babbie & Mouton 2001:233). The purpose of this questionnaire was to do a survey of the impact of non-formal education on the skills and knowledge as experienced by community development workers. Closed-ended questions were characterised by a limited number of options. Respondents did not have a 'neutral' option in order to force them to exercise a choice and give an opinion. The completion of questionnaires was anonymous and voluntary. Data from the responses on closed-ended questions was stated in frequency tables while data collected from responses on open-ended questions were analysed and summarised according to specific topics. The sample was extracted from a population consisting of 75 World Vision development facilitators working as CDWs in Malawi and enrolled for a non-formal education programme in community-based development project management. A total number of 36 questionnaires, which constituted 48 per cent of the total population, were received and analysed. The second method involved an evaluation form designed by the 75 World Vision employees enrolled for the programme. The purpose of this evaluation form was to give students an opportunity to decide for themselves which aspects of the non-formal learning experience and teaching process are important to them as CDWs and need to be assessed. A total of 73 evaluation forms, which constituted 97.3 per cent of the total population, were received and analysed. This evaluation form consisted of six topic areas which students had to evaluate indicating their opinion by choosing

from a limited number of options. Students also had the opportunity to give comments on 'areas of celebration' and 'shortfalls' relating to the training programme.

Role of Non-formal Education in Community Development

The realities of the plight of the poor in underdeveloped and underprivileged communities require immediate action to enhance their position in society. The main route to address the needs of the poor is through community development projects. However, these projects are often ill-design and implemented in a top-down fashion, not based on active community participation and empowerment and do not take the needs of the intended beneficiaries into account. The potential of development initiatives can only be realised through people's participation in designing development policies and programmes and their active participation in community development projects. In this day and age with the MDGs closing in on us and the realisation that poverty, food insecurity, gender inequality and economic deterioration are out of control, it is time that we react to this changing world. We need to train and educate development practitioners as 'agents of change' who have the skills and knowledge to facilitate participatory sustainable development and not only as well-educated people within the field of development studies. Agents of change in the development environment must be able to work and operate in poor communities, as well as enhance community participation and should have a broad set of skills that include non-technical skills, such as, negotiation, listening, communication, facilitation, interpersonal, adaptive and problem solving (Hindes & Bakker 2004:77 & 79).

According to Hindes & Bakker (2004:78) 'higher education institutions perform well in the provision of the relevant multidisciplinary knowledge base, but falter when it comes to the development of the competencies essential for effective application of that to the world of work.' In pursuit of effective and relevant community development, educators, students and practitioners in the development field must be continuously engaged in a process where both the teaching process and learning experience address the realities and challenges of poor communities to make community-based development a reality through a process of participation and empowerment. It is within this context where non-formal education plays an important role in addition to formal education to enhance the skills and knowledge of community development workers to equip them to lead poor communities to empowerment and decision makers of their own destiny. AEGEE (nd:34) emphasises that NFE 'is essential to carry through any change that has to

do with peoples' behaviours and their interactions. Especially when it is about the most important values, like freedom, human rights, democracy, peace, respect, diversity or gender equality.' Human development (UNESCO 2006:37) involves a process where people's opportunities and choices are enlarged. According to UNESCO (2006:39) 'Non-formal education has always been part of the solution for marginalised and vulnerable population groups because programmes are based on an integrated approach that takes into account all the factors influencing the opportunities and life-chances of different population groups, and the role played by education systems themselves in the process of social inclusion and cohesion.'

UNESCO (2006:39) defines non-formal education (NFE) as a process of learning 'embedded in planned, organised and sustained education activities that are outside formal education institution, responding to education needs for persons of all ages. The purpose of NFE is to provide alternative learning opportunities for those who do not have access to formal schooling or need specific life skills and knowledge to overcome different obstacles. Non-formal learning is also intentional from the learner's point of view, as opposed to incidental or random types of learning.' Tight (1996:68) also expresses this notion and describes NFE as 'education, learning and training which takes place outside recognised educational institutions.' Non-formal education is associated with the following characteristics (Smith 2009:1):

- Relevance to the needs of disadvantaged groups;
- Concern with specific categories of person;
- A focus on clearly defined purposes;
- Flexibility in organisation and methods.

NFE consists of a wide variety of activities and programmes which include development initiatives to address the plight of poor communities. It is directly linked to the development process which is regarded as an educational process. Faundez (quoted in Smith 2009:4) explained it as follows:

The development process is in fact an educational process, or rather it should unfailingly be viewed as such. We cannot therefore conceive of development in the absence of education any more than education in the absence of development.

Development is about improving the standard of living and quality of life of people and therefore depends primarily on the community people themselves. NFE emphasises flexibility, responsiveness and localness and it is output-centred, environment- and community-based, participatory and learner-centred, and a self-governing, democratic process. NFE should be based on the interests of the learners and has as ultimate goal to empower the

learners (Smith 2009:4 & 5; AEGEE (nd):10). NFE is a planned programme of personal development aimed at improving the skills and competencies of people outside the formal education system (AEGEE (nd):10). AEGEE (nd:14) explains it as follows: 'Personal development refers to the improvement of one's own competencies. ... The outcomes of personal development are self-improvement and personal growth with the purpose of realising one's higher potential...' Competencies refer to attitudes (what we are), skills (what we can do) and knowledge (what we know) (AEGEE nd:14).

NFE makes it possible for development practitioners to enhance their skills and knowledge to take initiative and involve communities in making small steps towards improving their quality of life and addressing their development needs. According to UNESCO (2006:63) NFE has the ability to transform lives not only by improving the knowledge base of people but in terms of skills development and increased ability to respond to changes in society. Participants in NFE interventions gain different skills to 'generate sustainable livelihoods and to cope better with community-related issues. As a result, participants gain confidence and develop positive attitudes about themselves and their role in the community. ...learners develop very valuable "soft skills" such as interpersonal communication, teamwork, leadership, discipline, responsibility, planning, organising and practical problem solving.' The role and importance of NFE in development, especially where international aid can have a dependency effect, is clearly reflected in the following statement:

Through capacity building communities are learning to stand on their own feet. If people discover and develop their competencies – they build self confidence.... This process of empowerment can be successfully initiated with methods of non-formal education (AEGEE nd:35).

It is within this framework where NFE plays an essential role in the training of development practitioners for the facilitation of development projects aimed at improving the life of communities, addressing the causes of poverty, and empowerment and capacity building. However, it is reasonable to ask whether such NFE interventions have a significant impact on the competencies (attitude, knowledge and skills) of development practitioners taking part in such NFE training interventions.

Case Study

This research is based on a case study of the impact of non-formal education on the skills and knowledge of development facilitators of World Vision International (WVI) working as CDWs in Malawi. WVI, founded in 1951, is an international Christian relief, development and advocacy organisation

(NGO) working on six continents. World Vision's purpose is to 'create lasting change in the lives of children, families and communities living in poverty' (World Vision 2009:1). Their mission is to help the poor and the oppressed by providing holistic interventions that promote transformational development, self-sufficiency and dignity through, inter alia, community development projects and area development programmes aimed at uplifting the living standard of poor communities (WVI 1989:4; WVI 1993:1; WVZ 2000:5). The main focus of these efforts is 'transformational development' (where communities are empowered through community participation in the project cycle of World vision development projects to take ownership of local development activities), public awareness, strategic initiatives and emergency relief (WVI 2009). World Vision explains the transformational process as follows (WVI 2009:1):

- Transformational development is the process through which children, families and communities identify and overcome the obstacles that prevent them from living life in all its fullness.
- World Vision partners with communities to improve lives.
- Through these partnerships, communities access the knowledge and resources needed to improve the well-being of children and overcome poverty.
- World Vision provides a range of interventions tailored to the context, including programmes in education, health, economic development, microfinance, agriculture, water and sanitation.
- By helping community members help each other, World Vision ensures that the process of positive change continues long after development staff have left.

According to Swanepoel en De Beer (2006:xiv & xv) development agencies and facilitators, such as World Vision, should fulfil an enabling and supportive role in the development process in order for communities to be empowered and capacitated to take responsibility for their own development through which their human dignity is enhanced. In this supportive role, an adaptive mode of administration should be followed implying that community development is a learning process through which the people become involved in their efforts to break free of the cycle of poverty (Swanepoel & De Beer 2006:33). Furthermore, the development process is political as the taking of power and decision-making process regarding the use of scarce resources are political acts and impact on the lives of the poor. The facilitator-community relationship challenges not only the power relations in the community, but also the traditional way of doing. The goal is to shift the traditional situation

and view of power and decision making so that marginalised social and cultural groups get the position of power and role of decision maker (Narsee 2004:90).

To achieve the above, CDWs are required to have the knowledge, skills, understanding, values and attitudes necessary to perform the development tasks and activities associated with development project management within a holistic and people-centred development approach which enhances participation and empowerment of the intended beneficiaries. World Vision, one of the largest international NGOs involved in development projects to address the needs of poor communities, realised that a vastly different set of skills and knowledge among their development facilitators are needed for the implementation of transformational development, successful development projects and enhancement of poor communities to become self-sufficient and self-reliant. In the light of this World Vision approached the Centre for Development Studies (CDS)¹ at the University of South Africa to develop a non-formal education programme specifically aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the organisation's development efforts in poor communities. Consequently, the programme in Development for Development Practitioners was developed by the CDS to equip World Vision development facilitators, working on grassroots level and involved in development project management, with the skills and knowledge necessary to design, implement, monitor and evaluate people-centred development projects. The objectives of the programme can be summarised as follows (CDS Annual Report 2008:8): to provide development practitioners with the necessary knowledge and skills in the planning, implementation, evaluation and monitoring of community-based development projects through participatory research exercises to contribute to successful and appropriate development initiatives amongst disadvantaged communities.

World Vision development facilitators are trained in poverty and development, participatory research methodology and development project management which consists of the following three phases: project planning for development, planning for implementation, planning for monitoring and evaluation. These are based on what is known as the 'project based approach'. It is also known as ZOPP (Ziel Orientierte Projekt Planung), Logical Framework Approach (LFA or logframe) and Project Cycle Management (Randel & Thaw 2003:11). Development projects are the instrument used to realise this planning method in practice and can be defined as interventions to address and solve development problems. The assumptions of the project-based approach are that a development project is a way of providing external support where it is needed and such an

intervention has as focus the sustainable alleviation of poverty. Furthermore, a project seeks to meet the needs of the people and not that of the outside agency's; the intervention must be well planned and managed; and lastly the intervention or project must come to an end. The aim of these projects/interventions is to bring about an ongoing improvement in the living conditions of people (Randel & Thaw 2003:16).

The instructional methodology used is based on the philosophy of popular education and includes residency training sessions, learning-by-doing techniques, participatory research methodology and open distance learning. Through the use of brain storming exercises, capacity-building workshops and peer-education, the programme fosters the training of development facilitators with the knowledge to develop a critical vision of reality, the skills to search collectively for solutions of identified community problems as well as to design, implement, monitor and evaluate community-based development projects.

Facilitators of non-formal education programmes and capacity building workshops, however, are often unaware of the shortcomings or the areas of excellence of their facilitation, contents and curriculum. According to Van Rheede van Oudtshoorn and Hay (2004:140) 'It is in the best interest of teaching and learning to study the perceptions of students in this regard in order to address possible areas of concern and success.' According to Whitaker and Moses (Steyn 2000:174) 'Being quality and service minded in education means relating to and carrying out the goals, needs, desires and interests of customers and making sure they are met.' It is therefore essential that the programme and the consequent learning process needs to be assessed to determine its impact on World Vision's transformational development efforts where communities are empowered through community participation in the project cycle of World vision development projects to take ownership of local development activities. Another reason is that students' perceptions of content and teaching are central to the evaluation of a non-formal education programme because 'the effectiveness of their learning is not related to the educators' interpretation of the course but to the learners' own experiences.' (Ramsden & Dodds in Steyn 2000:174). This programme also has a large distance education component that has the danger that the 'faceless' numbers of students may become invisible to educators and in pursuit of quality, students and lecturers must engage 'in a process of finding opportunities for improving the learning process, the quality of learning experience and the way it is delivered.' (Steyn 2000:174 & 175). The Centre for Development Studies, as provider of the programme, is concerned with the effects and impact of this non-formal teaching on World Vision's development

practitioners' learning experience and their work and actions to promote transformational development.

In light of the above, the author of this article, in her role as facilitator and lecturer on the programme, decided to study the perceptions of students enrolled for this NFE programme. Subsequently, the following secondary objectives were formulated for this article, namely:

- To determine whether or not students feel positive about the relevancy of the non-formal education Programme in Development for Development Practitioners for the training of development facilitators involved in community-based development projects
- If students feel that the non-formal education Programme in Development for Development Practitioners enhanced their knowledge and skills in the management of development projects
- Students' perceptions about non-formal teaching programmes as an important educational tool to supplement formal school education and/or post-school qualifications to increase practical skills and knowledge for the successful implementation of community-based development projects;
- Students' perceptions about the positive impact of the programme in Development for Development Practitioners for enhancement of community participation in development project management.

Results

The main objectives of the questionnaire were to establish, firstly, students' feelings about the relevancy of the programme for the training of people involved in community-based development projects and whether the programme enhanced their knowledge and skills in the management of development projects; and secondly, their perceptions about non-formal training programmes as an important educational tool to supplement formal degree qualifications to increase practical skills and knowledge of successful development projects. A third objective was to determine their opinions about the impact of the programme on enhancing community participation in development project management.

It is clear from the questionnaire results that the programme is both highly relevant and highly suitable for the training of CDWs involved in participatory community-based development projects for transformational development. Out of the 36 questionnaires, 27 respondents (75%) found the training highly relevant while 25 per cent (8 respondents) found it relevant. No respondent found it irrelevant. A total of 24 respondents (66.7%) found

the programme highly suitable with the balance of 33.3 per cent indicating it as suitable. No negative response was given (see Table 10).

Table 1: Responses to the suitability and relevancy of the Programme for the training of people involved in development projects.

Highly Irrelevant	Irrelevant	Relevant	Highly Relevant
		8	27
Highly Unsuitable	Unsuitable	Suitable	Highly Suitable
		6	24

In response to the questions whether the programme enhanced the student's knowledge and skills for planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating community-based development projects, all 36 respondents indicated positively that the programme enhanced both their knowledge and skills. In response to a statement that the 'Certificate Programme in Development for Development Practitioners is an important educational tool to supplement formal degree qualifications to increase practical skills and knowledge of successful development projects', 24 respondents (66.7%) strongly agreed, 27.8 per cent agreed and only 5.6 per cent strongly disagreed.

On the positive impact of the programme in Development for Development Practitioners for enhancement of community participation in development project management, students answered as follows:

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Community participation in project planning	29	7	0	0
Community participation in project implementation	30	6	0	0
Community-based development	29	7	0	0
Project ownership by communities	32	4	0	0
Community capacity building	28	8	0	0
Participation of beneficiaries in projects	27	9	0	0

In response to a separate question about the opinion of the contribution of the programme towards participation of project beneficiaries in World Vision's projects, 100 per cent of the students indicated that the programme contributed positively to beneficiary participation. It is clear from the above that the participants in this NFE programme are convinced that the programme is relevant and an important instrument to address the development needs of poor communities in such a way that it improves their living conditions. It has as point of departure the participation of communities in identifying, planning and executing relevant development projects. This participatory approach is supposed to enhance community empowerment and capacity for self-sustaining development, leading to self-reliant development as communities become more effective in planning, managing and using resources for community-based development. However, at the end of the day, it is not the opinion of community development workers that matters, but the opinion of the affected communities. Therefore, they should be included as respondents in the research process in order to determine whether NFE actually contributes positively to the skills and knowledge of CDWs to enhance community participation and self-sustaining, transformational development.

Results from the evaluation form which was designed by the students themselves also confirm that the programme and its contents are relevant for the training of CDWs. The largest majority of students are of the opinion that the NFE Programme is excellent in content and relevancy with regard to planning (83.6%), implementation (84.9%), and monitoring and evaluation (82.2%) of development projects. A total number of 48 students (65.8%) indicated that the programme is excellent for improving the skills of development facilitators while the rest (34.2%) indicated that the programme is good for improving the skills of development facilitators. The largest majority of the students gave very positive comments under 'areas of celebration'. These include the following:

- Acquisition of knowledge, skills and expertise on how to do community-based development work;
- Whatever we have learnt is very relevant to our work;
- The content has really helped to open the mind to face future challenges;
- The material is very relevant to our work;
- Be able now to plan well for programme activities and will manage to facilitate development;
- Course content relevant for distance learning

- Modules covered are relevant to the work which we do on the ground
- Capacity enhancement on project planning implementation and management;
- The modules have broadened our horizon regarding development work in rural communities;
- Skills acquired on project planning was great;
- Planning for monitoring and evaluation;
- Have now knowledge in programme/project management;
- The course content and group work;
- The course modules are just very good and an eye opener for the well-being of my job.

The largest majority of students did not have any comments under 'shortfalls'. The few comments that were received had to do with either the venue where the training took place or the short duration of the training which lasted three days. Based on the evaluation done by the students and their comments received, one can conclude that the programme in Development for Development Practitioners is successful in achieving its primary purpose, namely, to provide CDWs with the necessary knowledge and skills in the planning, implementation, evaluation and monitoring of community-based development projects to contribute to successful and appropriate development initiatives amongst disadvantaged communities. It should be noted that this paper focuses on the relation between NFE and developing the skills and knowledge of CDWs. Therefore, in light of the perceptions and evaluations of the respondents, it can be concluded that NFE did contribute towards capacity building among CDWs. It is however ungrounded to make the assumption, based on the opinions of the respondents, that NFE enhances the involvement and participation of local communities and beneficiaries in the design of development projects through their meaningful participation, control and inputs in the development process. It also does not substantiate that the acquiring of skills and knowledge through NFE contribute to transformational community-based development.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper has evaluated the impact of non-formal education on the development of skills and knowledge of community development workers. It is clear from the case study that non-formal education could be one of the most effective instruments to train development facilitators and community development workers in a practical way to master the skills

necessary to manage development projects efficiently and in a people-centred manner. From the study it is clear that the respondents are of the opinion that they (1) experienced a learning process through this NFE Programme and (2) increased their knowledge and skills to implement development projects that enhance the participation, self-reliance and empowerment of poor people. This research article reflects the students' positive perceptions of content and teaching and the effectiveness of learning as related to the learners' own experiences. One can thus conclude that the programme is successful in training CDWs with relevant knowledge and the necessary skills to perform development activities and facilitate development projects. However, it is necessary to expand the research study to include members, stakeholders and beneficiaries of the communities involved and affected by the community development efforts of these development facilitators. This study does not provide any evidence that transformational development of poor communities has taken place. Neither does it prove that non-formal education of community development workers promotes holistic, people-centred and sustainable community development. The question that should be answered is whether non-formal education of CDWs has a positive impact on grassroots level and the lives of vulnerable groups. Only when all stakeholders are involved in the research process can one make an objective ruling about the impact of non-formal education on the skills and knowledge of CDWs in the facilitation of community-based development projects.

Note

1. The Centre for Development Studies (CDS) was established in 1993 with the specific aim to address not only the shortage of skilled development practitioners but also the need for non-technical skills among development practitioners (development facilitators, community development workers, government officials) to respond innovatively and actively to the increasing demand for community development training and capacity building. The CDS is committed to 'supporting training needs, enhancing development skills and promoting a process of participatory, people-centred, sustainable development' through non-formal education programmes (CDS Annual Report 2008:3).

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Critical Reflections on the Joint Africa-EU Strategy

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Abstract

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), adopted at the EU-Africa Lisbon Summit in 2007, is a vision for a long-term relationship between Africa and Europe in which the two should come together in a shared framework for stronger collaboration. I will here critically reflect on the JAES based on developments up to the recent high-level Africa Europe meeting which took place in Tripoli in December 2010. The developments are well documented and debated both on an official level and by the NGO community. The article is based on a literature review.

The findings point at some positive developments, but also on many and difficult challenges met. The historical heritage is very difficult to overcome, but is also a starting point for better and more equal relationships in the future. Very little seems to have been done to meet the new challenges from new actors on the scene and the increased strength of many African countries due to raw-material shortages in the rest of the world and improved economic developments. However, success in implementing the JEAS will, in the final analysis, depend on how well the strategy will be owned by the countries and peoples of Africa and Europe.

Résumé

La Stratégie conjointe Afrique-UE – *The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES)* – adoptée au Sommet UE-Afrique de Lisbonne en 2007, est une vision pour une relation à long-terme entre l’Afrique et l’Europe dans laquelle, les deux continents doivent se retrouver dans un cadre partagé pour une collaboration plus forte. Dans cette article, nous réfléchissons de manière critique sur la JAES l’évolution de la Stratégie jusqu’à la récente réunion de haut niveau Afrique-Europe qui s’est tenue à Tripoli en décembre 2010. Cet évolution est bien documentée à la fois au niveau officiel et par la communauté des ONG. Ce papier est basé sur une revue de littérature.

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Les conclusions montrent certains développements positifs, mais aussi de nombreux et difficiles défis relevés. L'héritage historique est difficile à vaincre, mais il est également un point de départ pour des relations meilleures et plus égalitaires à l'avenir. Très peu semble avoir été fait pour relever les nouveaux défis de la part des nouveaux acteurs en scène et pour la puissance accrue des pays africains du fait de la pénurie en matières premières dans le reste du monde et de meilleures évolutions économiques. Cependant, la réussite dans la mise en œuvre de la JEAS dépendra, en dernière analyse, du succès de l'appropriée de la stratégie par les pays et les peuples d'Afrique et d'Europe.

Background to the JEAS

The relationship between Europe and Africa has a long and complex history where the colonial past still has a great influence. History as well as the geographical proximity between the two continents has created close trade and aid relationships and a tight interdependence on issues such as security and migration. Europe has for long dominated this relationship, labelled 'partnership' in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy from 2007. However, a historically unfair relationship, in which one side has taken advantage of its superior position and exploited the weaker, does not change overnight. EU is still acting as the 'big brother' towards Africa and the African Union (AU); also, as the stronger economic power, Europe has for long set the rules in trade and agricultural policy to mention just two areas. This being said, the relationship is not static and it is today increasingly influenced by shifting international power dynamics. By examining the potential impacts of EU policy on Africa, the factual characteristics of the EU-Africa relationship can be revealed and compared to other emerging players on the African arena, such as China, India and Brazil. The new dynamics between western and non-western actors opens up for increased negotiation power for African states which influences the implementation of EU strategies for Africa.

The predecessor to the Joint Africa-EU strategy from 2007 (JAES) was The EU strategy for Africa from 2005. This strategy aimed to improve EU's relationship with Africa and was supposed to be governed by the principles of equality, ownership and partnership. However, directly after the launching in 2005, the strategy was heavily criticised for a lack of African ownership and involvement of Africa in the creation of the strategy. Strong voices from NGOs in Europe as well as Africa condemned the double standard of claiming mutual ownership and partnership as the basis of the strategy, while at the same time not involving the partner in focus in the construction of the strategy. After a long discussion and major consultations, both EU and AU jointly started to prepare a new strategy that would adjust the deficiency of the earlier one. With this criticism in mind, the ownership and partnership of the 2007 strategy needs to be closely analysed. An unequal relationship cannot change into an equal partnership when the prerequisites

making one side gravely disadvantaged to the other prevails. In that case, all the words about partnership are likely to remain mainly rhetoric. What then is the JAES strategy all about?

Objectives and Priorities of the JEAS

The JAES is a vision for a long-term relationship between Africa and Europe in which the two should come together in a shared framework for stronger collaboration. The partner on the European side is the EU and on the African side, the African Union (AU), created in 2002 as an intergovernmental body with 53 members. Regional actors in Africa are also involved in the strategy.¹ The stated aim of the strategy is as follows:

The purpose of this Joint Strategy is to take the Africa-EU relationship to a new, strategic level with a strengthened political partnership and enhanced cooperation at all levels. ... This partnership should strive to bridge the development divide between Africa and Europe through the strengthening of economic cooperation and the promotion of sustainable development in both continents, living side by side in peace, security, prosperity, solidarity and human dignity.²

The four main objectives of the JAES are to:

- Improve the Africa-EU political partnership;
- Promote peace, security, democratic governance and human rights, basic freedoms, gender equality, sustainable economic development, including industrialisation, regional and continental integration, and ensure that all the Millennium Development Goals are met in all African countries by 2015;
- Promote effective multilateralism;
- Enhance a people-centred partnership, which should involve non-state actors.³

To meet these objectives the strategy aimed to guide the implementation of the following 'strategic priorities':

1. Peace and security: Promoting a safer world, e.g., through strengthening the AU's role in conflict prevention, management, resolution and peace building. AU and EU should also cooperate on trans-national security challenges such as international terrorism and organised crime.⁴
2. Governance and human rights: Upholding our values and principles. Focus on the promotion of democratic governance and human rights. *Weaknesses* ... should be addressed in a dialogue'.⁵
3. Trade and regional integration: Raising potential and using opportunities. That is, improving the climate for investments, developing domes-

tic and regional markets, promoting private sector investments supported by foreign investments, improving South-South and North-South trade relations, making trade rules more coherent and harmonised. In addition, the strategy aimed at reducing 'trade distorting' subsidies and working at promote African goods on the international market. It specifically mentioned that the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) should be supportive of Africa's regional and continental integration. The EPAs should assist African nations to live up to EU norms and productivity. While the JAES views these bilateral agreements as 'development-oriented trading relationships', the strategy did not fail to include Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) into the agreement.⁶

4. Key development issues: Accelerating the progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), including a firmer stated commitment to the percentage of GNI. The Paris Agenda should guide this work and in addition to reducing conditionalities.⁷

The goal of the strategy is long-term, but to facilitate its implementation, short-term action plans are developed to specify what should be done in-between summits. The first plan covers 2008 and 2010. Yearly progress reports are also conducted by the European Commission and the Secretariat of the Council and the African Union Commission. The operational plan is based on eight partnerships approved by both partners. These are:

- Peace and security;
- Democratic governance and human rights;
- Trade, regional integration and infrastructure;
- The Millennium Development Goals;
- Energy;
- Climate change;
- Migration, mobility and employment;
- Science, information society and space.⁸

Challenges and Opportunities Ahead

What then are the strengths, challenges and weaknesses of the JAES strategy, and what are the prospects for revitalising it? Even if the partnership can be questioned on several grounds, one of its positive aspects is that it has emphasised that the donor-recipient relationships should be renewed and Africa should not be looked upon only as a development concern. Another positive aspect is that EU and AU now have structures for dialogue and both partners have permanent representations in Brussels and Addis Ababa. This shows good prospects for improved cooperation; and even if it is only one small step, it has symbolic importance on a political level. In addition, a

greater commitment to make the JAES work can improve a mutual understanding through 'day-to-day' dialogue.⁹ In the strategy, one section also highlights the need to 'promote more accurate images of each other, and fight stereotypes, xenophobia and racism, through enhanced exchanges and contacts of non-state actors, including trade unions, professional associations, the private sector, media, schools, universities, research and cultural institutions...'¹⁰ Whether and how this will be implemented remains to be examined. However, this kind of exchange could create foundations for better understanding and genuine respect between the two continents in the long run. Although, if instead African states perceive this proposal as an attempt only to conceal other interests, the vital respect for the partnership will be undermined.

At the same time roles are changing and Africa is partly in a stronger position today, as Europe is facing competition on the African continent from emerging powers such as China and India. This could push Europe to treat Africa with greater respect in order to win the trust of African partners over other actors. The partly emerging new choices for Africa contain both strengths and challenges. European partners fear that hard-won battles for human rights and democracy can be lost in the relationship with new actors. Europe can also be pushed to create attractive deals compared to competing actors, which can be of benefit to African partners. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that relationships between old or new partners truly benefit the poor people in a country. One also needs to remember the diversity of governments that exists under the umbrella of the AU, where some have become increasingly autocratic compared to others and different motives exist for forging their external relations. According to reviews of JAES, one area that has improved collaboration is security partnerships, where the partners have shared interests, such as combating international terrorism, conflict and instability.

Several reports establish that one of the major challenges of the JAES is that the EU is still using strong pressure in order to enforce some agreements to take place, just as was the case in the EU-Africa trade (EPAs) negotiations, rather than creating a dialogue. This has been strongly criticised by the civil society in both Europe and Africa, since it can have negative impacts on the development process of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP).¹¹ The debate about EPAs has been intense and created a division between EU members. The United Kingdom's Departments for Trade and Industry and International Development was among the critics of EPAs, saying: 'The European Commission clearly wants to use EPAs as a tool to open markets and further its own interests. This is not good. EPAs in their current form would be detrimental to development. They are free trade

agreements by any other name and are currently designed to get the most for Europe without the necessary considerations of the negative effects on weaker developing country partners.¹² Another critique against the EPAs is that it undermines inter-regional integration which is one of the objectives of the Joint Strategy from 2007. Different EPAs are set up with different regional bodies instead of trying to harmonise these regional differences. In this way regional trade, integration and infrastructure is promoted instead of greater integration and coherence.¹³ Commentators such as Kamidza claim that this regional fragmentation can be compared with the Berlin Conference where Africa was divided into 'small but controllable states solely for the benefit of Europe'.¹⁴ This parallel is used to describe the new scramble for Africa in which EU is one of the actors. The negotiation of separate agreements has reduced the ACP countries' 'collective bargaining power' and even weakened existing regional economic arrangements. To dissolve the power of the counterpart is a strategy that has been used for long for domination. Some critics argue that this ongoing process is equivalent to a repartitioning and recolonising Africa.¹⁵

AU and EU: Different Roles

As with the EPAs, conflicting internal views on issues exist both within EU and the AU which complicates the implementation of a joint strategy.¹⁶ Another challenge is how to combine ownership that needs to be in place for a sustainable development with the conditionalities imposed on the weaker partner. Extensive critique has been raised about the gap between the agreed intentions and what the partnership strategy has actually managed to deliver. Global trends such as new emerging powers and the impact of the economic crisis has been two aspects affecting European commitment to funding the implementation of the partnerships. Another weakness that has influenced the implementation of the ambitious strategy is the slow and young process of the continental integration through the AU, coupled with the administrative complex institution of the EU. According to Oladiran Bello, a Nigerian researcher at FRIDE – the European Think Tank for Global Action – Europe does not sufficiently take into account that the role of the AU differs from that of the EU as the AU does not control the agendas of its member states and regional bodies.¹⁷ He further highlights that the pan-African agendas are still at an early stage, which implies that the JAES is not well known outside the higher political circles. He claims this casts doubts upon Africa's readiness and maturity for an 'equal inter-continental exchange' as the one proposed in JAES. His standpoint is that the asymmetry of capacity between the two partners is too large and that JAES therefore is 'ahead of its time'.¹⁸ How to follow up the JAES, in line with the result-oriented approach the parties

have committed themselves to, is another dilemma. In addition, the unclear role of JAES in relation to other treaties limits coherence in EU policies towards Africa and creates competing agendas and channels.

What's in the Bargain?

Without a broader engagement and commitment to the strategy from intergovernmental, governmental and non-governmental actors, such as the civil society and the private sector in both Europe and Africa, the strategy will not have sufficient support base and its politics will therefore be hard to legitimise. To revitalise the strategy, sufficient political will on both sides and appropriate funding from the EU members needs to be in place to enable implementation of the strategy.¹⁹ The dialogue is seen as the central operational method in the partnership, but there are many deficits that threaten these dialogues. If meetings are too seldom and always overloaded with the most pressing issues, such as conflicts, other matters will not be given sufficient space. The recent Africa Europe meeting in Tripoli held in December 2010 is a case in point. There is also a tendency to handle some issues outside the JAES framework which further undermines the strategy.²⁰ One important critique of the relevance of the strategy is that the motives seem unclear. This can cause confusion on both sides and lead to lack of trust and a weak partnership. Africa needs to know what is in the bargain to be able to compare this relationship with other potential partners on the global arena.²¹ With the Asian partners, African nations can more clearly see what should be the give-and-take in the relationship, e.g., natural resources such as oil. This motive that Europe partly shares with Asian actors is a sensitive question for Europe on the basis of its colonial exploitative power in Africa. At the same time underlying intentions needs to be discussed more openly for Africa to believe in the relationship and see the relevance and potential gains on their side. As the EU fails to fulfil its commitments in terms of funding implemen-tations of the different partnerships agreed upon in the action programmes following the JAES, Africa might not find it beneficial to engage in the strategy. If there is too much homework to be done in the form of conditionalities to receive support, countries that want 'quick fixes' such as infrastructure investments and revenues from natural resources can be more willing to enter into deals with other actors. On the other hand, many African leaders do see the importance of cooperating with Europe on broader development issues. Hence, as a way forward, Europe needs to be clearer on what 'added value' the JAES has that other actors do not offer. To analyse why the incentives on both sides are low for engagements in the JAES process, both parties are recommended to make assessments and 'in-depth reflections' on why this is happening and what they think needs to be done to revitalise the strategy and partnership.²²

Underlying Motives?

One reason for AU to be sceptical about the JAES strategy is that it avoids a thorough discussion on interests, motives and sensitive political issues where conflicts exist, such as the EPAs, climate change and migration. These issues need to be handled in some way or another for a genuine partnership to evolve. On the other hand, one major challenge related to this is that views differ a lot within Africa as well as within Europe when it comes to some of the most sensitive issues, leading to compromises and therefore a risk of dissatisfaction from both sides and the enhanced use of parallel channels. Europe and Africa do need each other and even if the policy can be criticised on several grounds it is a step ahead from 'donorship' to partnership, but it also contains so much to be addressed without sufficient capacity or funding to do so. The issues to be addressed take time but the pressure to gain support by showing quick results can push for rushed unsustainable solutions. Another fear refers to the British comment on the EPAs: Is this how Europe tries to get the most out of Africa along other scramblers? If that is partly the case, this scrambling 'with a human face' is more hideous than the scramblers who are more frank with what they are up to. It is of relevance for Africa to know the intentions behind the strategy.

Diverse Voices and Weak Ownership

Finally the JAES have to be further surveyed regarding one of its main objectives: to be people-centric. With awareness of the lack of democracy in many African countries, the representatives active in the JAES have varying degree of legitimacy and many are likely to speak for the interest of few rather for the interest of the broader masses. Another challenge is related to the diversity of development challenges the African continent faces today, which makes it hard for Africa to speak with one voice. (This is true also for EU with vast diversity and internal challenges.) On the other hand, with improved intercontinental commitment, Africa can become a stronger voice that can start to put demands on its partners in the global arena. This would be an achievement that could lead to more equal partnerships.

Notes

1. Wohlgemuth and Wallnöfer In: Odén and Wohlgemuth, ed., 2009, p.82
2. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 2007, p.2
3. Africa – EU strategic partnership official site: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/partnerships/partnership_en.htm
4. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 2007, p.4-7
5. Ibid. p.7-9
6. Ibid. 9-11

7. Wohlgemuth and Wallnöfer In: Odén and Wohlgemuth, ed., 2009, p. 83 http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/partnerships/partnership_en.htm
9. Jean Bossuyt and Andrew Sherriff, 2010, *What's Next for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy? Perspectives on Revitalising and Innovative Framework*, p.5
10. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 2007, p.19
11. Wohlgemuth and Wallnöfer, in Odén and Wohlgemuth, eds., 2009, p.84
12. Lee, Margaret, in Southall and Melber, eds., 2009, p.91.
13. Oladiran W. Bello, 2010, *A Crucial Moment in EU-Africa Relations*, p.3
14. Lee, Margaret, in Southall and Melber, eds., 2009, p.92-93
15. Melber, Henning, 2010, *China in Africa: Any Impact on Development and Aid?* p.221
16. Wohlgemuth and Wallnöfer, in Odén and Wohlgemuth, eds., 2009, p.85
17. Oladiran W. Bello, 2010, p.4
18. Ibid p.5
19. Wohlgemuth and Wallnöfer, in Odén and Wohlgemuth, eds., 2009, p.90
20. Wohlgemuth and Wallnöfer, in Odén and Wohlgemuth, eds., 2009, p.6
21. Oladiran W. Bello 2010, p.2
22. Jean Bossuyt and Andrew Sherriff, 2010, p.8

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Globalisation, Economic Reforms and Democracy in Nigeria

Chuku Umezurike*

Abstract

This article explores how the forces of globalisation have been undermining democratic struggles in Nigeria, particularly through the economic reforms of the Nigerian state. First, the study involves a theoretical demonstration of these relationships. Second, it notes that the relationships between the forces of globalisation and democracy in Nigeria are largely confrontational. This is the case in so far as preindustrial mercantilism, British colonialism, the current transnational effects of foreign direct investment and the multilateral management of contemporary global order have collectively been undermining the democratic struggles of domestic social forces in Nigeria. The study further establishes that there is largely a supportive and reinforcing relationship between the forces of globalisation and economic reform protocols in Nigeria. It finally suggests that although democratic forces in Nigeria have been inducing economic reforms in the country, reform protocols have been reactionary to the forces of democratisation. An analysis of the various economic reforms in Nigeria as a demonstration of this theoretical framework forms the second broad section of the paper. There is also a categorisation of these reforms into two, namely, those that have inadvertently been pursuing economic nationalism of the Nigerian governing elites and those that have directly been structured and oriented towards advancing market liberalisation and state divestiture. Included in the first category are: indigenisation and Nigerianisation; land use; and reforms for poverty alleviation. In the second category are: austerity measures, structural adjustment programme, privatisation and commercialisation which have been embodied in the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) and also in the current practices, the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) and trade and financial liberalisations orchestrated in SAP and post-SAP engagements. The study finally notes that the democratisation of economic reforms in the developing countries is central to genuine global governance.

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Résumé

Cet article examine comment les forces de la mondialisation sapent dans le temps les luttes démocratiques à travers les réformes économiques de l'Etat, en particulier au Nigeria. En premier lieu, l'étude incorpore une démonstration théorique de ces relations. Elle note ensuite que les relations entre les forces de la mondialisation et celles de la démocratie sont largement conflictuelles. Tel est le cas dans la mesure où le mercantilisme préindustriel, le colonialisme britannique, les effets actuels de l'investissement direct étranger et la gestion multilatérale de l'ordre mondial contemporain ont collectivement fragilisé dans le temps les combats démocratiques des forces sociales au Nigeria. Ensuite, l'étude établit qu'il existe dans une grande mesure une relation de soutien et de renforcement entre les forces de la mondialisation et les protocoles de réforme économique au Nigeria. Enfin, elle soutient qu'alors que les forces démocratiques au Nigeria induisaient des réformes économiques dans le pays, les protocoles de réformes leur ont été réactionnaires. Une analyse des différentes réformes économiques au Nigeria comme démonstration de ce cadre théorique forme la seconde grande partie de cet article. Il y a aussi une catégorisation des ces réformes en deux, notamment, celles qui par inadvertance poursuivaient un nationalisme économique des élites gouvernantes nigérianes et celle qui ont été directement structurées et orientées vers le développement de la libéralisation du marché et le désinvestissement de l'Etat. Compris dans la première catégorie sont : l'autochtonisation et la nigérianisation, l'utilisation du foncier, et les réformes pour la lutte contre la pauvreté. On trouve dans la deuxième catégorie les mesures d'austérité, le programme d'ajustement structurel (PAS), la privatisation et la commercialisation qui ont été incorporé dans le PAS et également dans les pratiques actuelles, la National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) [Stratégie Nationale d'Autonomisation et de Développement Economique] et les libéralisations commerciales et financières orchestrées dans les engagements PAS et post-PAS. L'étude note en dernier lieu que la démocratisation des réformes économiques dans les pays en développement est essentielle à une véritable gouvernance mondiale.

Introduction

There is an unsettled gap in the literature on the political economy of Africa, including especially Nigeria. This arises from the dearth of studies on how the forces of globalisation via the economic reforms of the Nigerian state have been undermining democracy in this society. The studies on globalisation in Africa have been lively, progressive but largely generating contentious issues for further enquiry. For instance, studies on the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in Africa, described as emerging under the spell of globalisation, have raised very important issues that need to be further investigated. Specifically, the links between globalisation and the SAPs and the negative implications of the latter for development in Africa, including Nigeria, have been extensively discussed (see for instance Aina, et al. 2004). But the SAPs have only embodied some of the numerous economic reforms in Nigeria as in much of Africa. Despite acknowledged similarities, economic

reforms in Africa have been largely volatile and contradictory primarily because they respond both to the laws of the free market and to domestic social struggle.

Even though dominant, economic reforms may not always be conflated with the free market. This trend may not always conform with the laws of history as it could be expected that reforms could reproduce various degrees of democratic struggles which may run in contrariness to the free market in given countries. So far in Nigeria, even though much of the economic reforms have been reproducing the global requirements of the free market, the cruciality of the democratic struggles of the Nigerian people in characterising these reforms may not be underestimated. Thus, it is important to bring into analysis those distinct economic reforms which had preceded the SAPs, including particularly the indigenisation reforms. Subsequent ones such as the current National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) in Nigeria claim some specificity, especially in the endeavours of sanitising the state, and poverty alleviation. Thus, an appropriate problematisation of economic reform in Nigeria, its links with the forces of globalisation and its negative implications for democratisation requires a compendium of the reforms.

A demonstration of the volatility and contradictions of the economic reforms in Nigeria presents the necessity of their categorisation into two, namely, the direct and the indirect ones. The direct ones are those which have been outrightly structured, and mostly directly foisted by the multilateral institutions to advance market liberalisation and state 'divestiture'. This is the most conventional and numerous of the economic reforms in Nigeria. The second category is the indirect ones. These are those economic reforms which have been ostensibly designed to advance popular struggles but have in practice been advancing petty bourgeois development in Nigeria. The second category is the less conventional and apparently the weaker, even though it has raised such pertinent issues as poverty alleviation.

The major thrust of the study is to problematise economic reforms in Nigeria, first, as being largely shaped by the forces of globalisation and, second, as being largely reversals of democratic struggles in the country. This thrust involves a further demonstration that the gross weaknesses of the reforms for popular struggles correlates positively with the weakness of Nigeria in the global political economy and the limited democratic value of domestic petty bourgeois governance. A combination of these realities underscores the extremely high degree of limitations on democracy by the forces of globalisation in Nigeria.

Through these efforts, it is expected that the controversies surrounding the actual roles of the forces of globalisation in the development of such

countries as Nigeria could have been much more revisited. Moreover, the study would attempt to unmask the obscurantism that have been surrounding economic reforms by establishing that even though economic reforms have been largely informed by the democratic struggles of the Nigerian people, the reform protocols have been irreverently counteracting these struggles. Thus, even when it has been suggested that economic reforms in developing countries such as Nigeria are homegrown, the reform protocols have yet been underscoring reactionary thrust towards the economic lives of the population. This is highly ominous given that economic reforms have constituted a highly significant proportion of the public policy process of developing countries, including Nigeria. It is even all the more ominous in that the limitations of economic reforms for advancing democracy in the various countries of the developing world undermine their prospects of advancing global integration and harmonisation which have been argued to be at the heart of globalisation.

To begin with, there are studies that have raised significant issues bothering on this subject of interest whose brief review facilitates conceptualisation and clarifies the problem. These studies have been classified into four. They include first and foremost those studies that have dwelt on the negative implications of globalisation for the development of the global South. They also include the studies that have characterised and contextualised underdevelopment, particularly in Africa, without necessarily bothering with the global implications of these realities. The third categorisation are those studies which have attempted an exploration of the links between globalisation and the state in a broad analytical framework. The fourth and last category of literature here are those studies that have treated specific economic reforms (with the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the mid-1980s dominating) and the global implications.

Scholars in the developing world, especially those of dependencia persuasion, have been at the forefront of the studies on the negative implications of globalisation for the overall development of the global South. These scholars have been mainly reacting to the postulations and prognostications of the Modernisation School and classical economics. Samr Amin (see, for instance, Amin 1990, 1998) has certainly been one of the greatest influences of this school. Much more recently, the following studies have provided meaningful contributions here: Asobie (2001), Aaron (2001), Offiong (2001), Khor (2001), Mander and Goldsmith (eds 1996). Asobie (2001) clearly hits the nail on the head by noting that the divide on the implications of globalisation for the development of the South revolves around the developmental divide between the North and the South. For the former, globalisation has been necessary especially in so far as it has involved

‘...increasing volume and variety of transnational transactions, in goods and services, in international capital flows, in human migration and through a widespread diffusion of technology’ (Asobie 2001:37).

Intellectual subscriptions of globalisation failures to the development of the South have been suggesting that ‘not only has globalisation divided the populations of many countries into winners and losers, but it has also divided regions of the world into winners and sad losers. Certainly, Africa is a loser region (Offiong 2001:3). Corroborating this stand, Asobie (2001) observes that:

In Africa in particular, workers’ unions are against full scale integration into the process of globalisation. Under the umbrella of the Organisation of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU), African workers have risen against African states’ membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In 2001, African trade unions threatened to disrupt the WTO ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar because of the WTO’s support of globalisation (Asobie 2001:45).

In Nigeria, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) threatened to call out workers on strike to protest against, and frustrate the Nigerian government’s intention to re-negotiate the WTO treaty. The workers’ unions seem mostly poised against the WTO in particular terms and globalisation in general terms.

Scholars on the negative implications of globalisation in the South generally and Africa in particular have noted the unpreparedness of these societies to cope with its requirements. Khor (2001) has thus suggested the reasons to include: weaknesses arising from colonial hangover, heavy external indebtedness, dependence on foreign donors leading to limited capacity to embark on meaningful international bargaining and negotiations among others. These reasons tally with the position of the Malaysian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Razali Ismail:

At a meeting of the UN Economic and Social Council at Geneva on 3rd July, 1997, the latter developed the argument that the issue of globalisation should not be addressed with a view to maintaining the global status quo. Rather, it should be placed squarely in the context of the higher issue of ‘growth and development with justice’. The Ambassador maintained that when this is done, it should be realised that not all developing countries are ready for integration into the globalising capitalist system (Asobie 2001:42).

The second strand of the literature reviewed here has significant relationship with the first. This second strand, as has been noted, deals with those studies which have characterised and contextualised underdevelopment especially in Africa. On Nigeria in particular, serious efforts in this direction have included Nnoli (1981, 1993), Nore and Turner (eds 1980), Turner (1981), Umezurike (2010), among others. The comprador character of the political economy as an undercurrent of underdevelopment in Nigeria has been quite elaborately presented in Turner (1980). For Turner (in Nore and Turner 1980),

from independence, Nigeria has been governed by a neo-colonial comprador state which lacks coherence and stability... Compradors are those professional intermediaries who organise the access of foreign traders to the local market. Nigerian middlemen constitute a comprador class. Representatives of this class occupy government posts and control the state...compradors can be divided into statist who exclude the private middleman from state transactions with foreign firms and collaborators who join with private middlemen in carrying out these transactions (Turner 1980:204).

In agreement with Turner, the Nigerian political economy has been a comprador economy par excellence. It is this condition of existence that largely underscores the crisis of development in this political economy. For in reality, the comprador nature derives 'from its overall orientation towards facilitating commerce, from its domination by representatives of the local middleman class, and from the intermediary role its officers play between foreign salesmen and the local (state and final consumer) market' (Nore and Turner 1980:205).

Despite the persistence of the comprador political economy in Nigeria as in much of Africa, neoclassical economics and the Modernisation school have for long held a wrong perception of the prospects of development. For these analysts, the Nigerian economy has passed the stage of economic take-off and reached that of self-sustaining growth. But this has not been the case. In an edited work entitled *Dead-end to Nigerian Development*, Okwudiba Nnoli correctly observed that:

The oil boom of 1973-1977 created an illusion of national wealth and individual affluence, which we believed would sooner or later burst into the reality of the nation's grinding poverty. However, we did not foresee that the bubble of wealth would burst that early and that by 1982 the country would be pursuing economic policies of austerity (Nnoli 1993:ix).

For Nigeria and indeed much of Africa, the comprador character of development has been historically complemented by the external orientation of such development and the fact that these political economies are tied to the centre of global capitalist development as peripheral appendage of that development. This thrust has been least prepared for globalisation as indeed the latter has been leading to the recompradorisation of development in these societies.

The third classification of literature to be considered here are those studies which have attempted analytical links between globalisation and the state. Particularly notable here are Strange (1997), Keller and Pauly (1997). Indeed these two were the most related out of a whole lot of other incisive works on the subject of globalisation which a particular volume of the 1997 edition of *Current History* covered. Strange (1997) and Keller and Pauly (1997) differed in their analyses of the relationship between globalisation and the

state. While the former submitted that globalisation has actually been leading to the decline of the state, the latter argued in a different direction.

For Strange (1997):

There are three main areas in which state authority has declined...the first is defense: the security of society from violence. The second is finance: the preservation of money as a reliable means of exchange, unit of account, and as store of value...the third is the provision of welfare: the assurance that some of the benefits of greater wealth go to the poor, the weak, the sick, and the old (Keller 1997:368).

The author summed up that the society is at the mercy of big business given that globalisation has undermined 'the state's power to provide economic and financial stability, to protect the vulnerable in society and to preserve the environment' (Strange 1997:369).

In countering the above, Keller and Pauly (1997) observes that 'markets or more precisely huge sprawling commercial hierarchies are not replacing states as the world's effective government, nor are corporations becoming more democratic' (1997:375). The authors illustrate their thesis of persisting state roles in spite of globalisation by noting that the:

...increasing openness of corporate markets must be associated with more deliberate efforts to manage the consequences... and that efficient and stable global markets will not likely evolve through the unhindered competition of globe-spanning firms when national institutions and ideologies remain decisive inside those firms (Keller and Pauly 1997:375).

The disagreement between Strange (1997) and Keller and Pauly (1997) tend to revolve around the trends of disagreement between scholars of political economy on the one hand and those of international relations on the other. While the former has mostly been expounding what has usually been referred to as 'global tyranny', the latter have mostly been persisting in their submission that the state still remains invincible despite globalisation. What is important to this study is to note that even though the barriers of nation-states are being bombarded by the forces of globalisation, the diminishing roles of the state is only state fetishism. The state as a mode of domination and as a social relation has essentially been perpetuating its roles in the global accumulation process. Perhaps this reality would have been more obvious if these studies had concentrated on the links between globalisation and concrete state forms. This is important because both theses of 'global tyranny' and 'persisting state roles' have been representations of specific forms of democratic struggles that are taking place in this contemporary global age.

This leads us to the fourth and last classification of the literature for this study. These are studies which have focused on specific economic reforms including especially the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) of the

mid-1980s in sub-Saharan Africa and their global implications. Prominent here are Asobie (1988), Onimode (1992), Olukoshi (ed.1993), Blomstrom and Lundahl (1993), Shaw (1993), and Aina et al (eds 2004). The study by Asobie (Asobie 1988) is particularly important here because unlike most others it studied the indigenisation reforms in Nigeria. These reforms he noted did not go beyond the reproduction of the Nigerian petty bourgeoisie which really never advanced democracy in the country. But, as he further observed, this trend was even further undermined by the forces of globalisation. Asobie (1988) however has close resemblance with Onimode (1992) and Olukoshi (1993) especially in locating the significant roles of the global political economy in the economic reforms that they studied.

But as has been noted, the SAPs attracted the most attention in this scholarship. A number of reasons could be adduced for this. The first is that out of all the economic reforms, SAPs has been the most universally widespread not just in Africa but across all of the developing political economies. Second, and related to the first above, is that the SAPs had been specifically foisted on these political economies by the Bretton Woods institutions. In other words, the various SAPs had been policy documents of these institutions. Third, in terms of depth, the SAPs would certainly rank topmost especially in the sense that their policy thrust penetrated a wide range of economic issues in the countries in which they have been applied. Fourth and finally, the SAPs expectedly created the most far-reaching political upheavals and of course contentions in the academic circles.

The literature on the SAPs has been appropriately phased:

The first, lasting until 1986-87, was dominated by studies of economic reforms' macro-economic impact. The period 1986-89 saw the publication of a number of works focusing more on their social welfare impact, particularly in relation to what are commonly called the vulnerable groups. From 1989-90 onward sectoral-level economic studies and work on the politics of adjustment became more common, written both from implementation-centered and broader political impact-centered perspectives. Simultaneously, efforts have emerged to think through certain national adjustment processes in relation to broader economic, social and political changes (Gibbon 1993:11, see also Gibbon and Ponte 2005).

These observations on the literature agree with two related contributions to the subject which are contained in Aina et al (eds 2004). These two are Adejumobi (2004) which dwelt on 'Economic Globalisation, Market Reforms and Social Welfare Services in West Africa' and Ndiaye (2004) whose study was 'Economic Reforms and Social Policies in Senegal'. In the judgment of Adejumobi (2004:32), 'the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was the most decisive factor in the reconstitution and decline of state spending in the social sector'. This is collaborated by Ndiaye (2004:114) who noted that '...it is possible to state that Senegalese society

and economy have been profoundly and negatively affected by the continued implementation of SAP, especially its structural reforms implementation component'. Adejumbi (2004) did not fail to make an allusion to the crucial links between SAP and globalisation for the author indeed agrees with Mihevc (1995) in describing SAP as the 'fundamentalist economic doctrine emerging under the spell of globalisation...' (Adejumbi 2004:32).

Relevant as they could be, the studies of the SAPs, as outcomes of globalisation with the due recognition of their negative implications especially in social service delivery in Africa, leave much more to be desired in the problematisation of the links between globalisation, economic reforms and democracy in Nigeria, as even in much of Africa. The first reason for this is that even though detailed in scope, SAP does not cover crucial reforms for economic nationalism whose reform protocols are quite crucial for analysis here. Second, despite the insinuation that the Nigerian SAP has been continuous even till date, sufficient evidence abounds to give benefit of doubts to policy makers in Nigeria on certain peculiarities of subsequent economic reforms, including in particular the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). In summary, therefore, available knowledge on the SAPs in Africa does not solely equip us to deal with the volatility and contradictions underscored in Nigeria's economic reforms, their relationships with the historical forces of globalisation and their overall negative implications for democracy in the country. The study progresses to develop a theoretical framework of analysis.

Globalisation, Economic Reforms and Democracy in Nigeria: A Theoretical Framework of Analysis

The focus of this section is to build a theoretical model for analysing how the forces of globalisation via the economic reforms of the Nigerian state have been undermining democracy in Nigeria. To begin with, the various concepts in use have to be defined. Globalisation here stands for the processes through which capital has been universalised and internationalised, resulting in higher quest for boundary-broadening among agents of production (see, for instance, Rosenau 1997; Asobie 2001; Umezurike 2008). Historically, the forces of globalisation in Nigeria have included the following:

- Mercantilist capital whose phenomenal roles were mostly observable between the mid-15th and late 18th centuries.
- European national capital assisted by multinational corporations whose objects were mostly realised via colonisation especially between the 19th and mid-20th centuries.

- Transnationalism and multilateral institutions, including the World Bank and the IMF. The modus operandi of transnationalism has been via foreign direct investments, including technological transfer and global financial management by the multilateral institutions. Their roles have mostly postdated the Second World War.

The second concept of interest here is economic reform. In this study, economic reform represents broad government policy on the economy designed primarily but not exclusively at market liberalisation. It has also involved variations in those activities related to domestic production, distribution and exchange of goods in relation to internal and external pressures (see Umezurike 2006). Even though definite historical events underscore the character of economic reforms in Nigeria, specific reforms have actually started from the post-independence era. These have included the following:

- Indigenisation and Nigerianisation reforms, 1960s, 1972, 1977 and beyond.
- Land Use Reforms, 1978.
- Reforms for Poverty Alleviation, 2000-continuing.
- Austerity measures, 1982-84.
- Privatisation and Commercialisation Reforms, 1980s, 1990s and beyond.
- Structural Adjustment Programme, 1986-93.
- Reforms embodied in the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), 2004-2007.
- Trade and financial liberalisations producing impetuses for exchange and interest rate regimes and have spanned through numerous reforms far beyond the neo-liberal era. The focus in this paper is however on the neo-liberal regime.

This study also takes into consideration significant macroeconomic policies of the country as integral parts of these reforms.

The last concept to be defined here is democracy. By democracy is meant popular power (see Ake 1985, 2003; Umezurike 2006) encompassing the following practices: rights and liberties, series of freedoms, including freedom of speech, association among others, political spaces for interest group negotiations, viable civil society, popular participation in governance, free and fair electoral system. Democracy is here determined in terms of how far these practices emerged from the engagements as well as define the existence of the following social forces:

- The Nigerian peasantry;
- The Nigerian working class;
- The Nigerian petty bourgeoisie;
- Ethnic groups in Nigeria.

There are three clear interpretations of the relationships between the forces of globalisation, economic reforms and domestic social forces in Nigeria. These are as follows:

- Confrontational relationships between forces of globalisation and forces of democracy in Nigeria;
- Supportive and reinforcing relationships between forces of globalisation and economic reforms in Nigeria;
- Inducement and reactionary relationships between economic reforms and democratic forces in Nigeria.


Confrontational Relationship between Forces of Globalisation and Forces of Democracy in Nigeria

As Figure 1 shows, there is a confrontational relationship between the forces of globalisation and the domestic forces of democracy in Nigeria. The proof of the existence of this largely confrontational relationship has been both historical and contemporary. Historically, the forces of globalisation, including in particular mercantilism and British colonialism, created the political and economic structures which have over the years been undermining the forces of democracy in the country. The first salient structure in this regard is the initiation of comprador character of development during pre-industrial mercantilism. This took place mainly between 1500 and 1799. In the various parts of what now constitutes Nigeria, mercantilism stalled the requisite social structures for development. For instance, the key articles of trade that were taken out were slaves, gold and elephant tusks. Even though the economy had not been monetised at the time, there were three key trade routes through which contacts with the outside world were made: Trans Saharan, East African (Indian Ocean) and Trans Atlantic routes.

The data on slave trade for all of Africa (different countries had not emerged at the time) are readily available:

Between 1450 and 1900, a total of 11.7 million African slaves on the annual rate of 26.0 thousand were traded out of Africa. In 1791, a total of 15,108 slaves were loaded out of which 1397 died representing a percentage mortality of 9.2. The profit level of slave trade to the British was as much as 548,769 Pounds (or 8.3 percent profit) between 1761 and 1770. Between 1791 and 1800, it had grown to 1,897,234 Pounds (or 13.0 percent) profit level. In the region of the Bight of Biafra, the estimated slave export by Britain between 1761 and 1810 was 93.0 percent

Figure 1: A Model of the Interactions between Globalization, Democracy and Economic Reform in Nigeria.



Source: The Author

leaving Portugal with 7.0 percent. In the Bight of Benin, British export for the same period was 18.3 percent, France 35.6 percent and Portugal 46.1 percent (see Anstey 1975:45-7 and Austen 1987:275).

The trade in slaves undermined requisite processes for development in all of Africa. Slave raids led to wars and all-round insecurity. Moreover, African development was mortgaged to the advantages of those of Europe and North America. This was further consolidated by British imperial conquest and the creation of a particular character of state in Nigeria which has been undermining the forces of democracy.

Imperial conquest took place between 1800 and 1945. The character of imperial conquest and subsequent colonisation for the period consolidated comprador development through the maintenance-dissolution effects produced on peasant production relations. Thus, there has been a conjunctive exploitation of the political economy by imperial capital, traditional chiefs and mercantile middlemen.

During colonial rule, British imperial capital exploited peasant economy by subjecting it to produce cash crops for metropolitan industrial manufactures. The major cash crops which were produced included palm produce, cocoa, groundnut and cotton. The period postdating the Second World War has been perpetuating the same character of political economy in Nigeria fostered by transnational corporations, multilateral institutions, including especially the IMF and the World Bank. The modus operandi has been via foreign direct investment, foreign technological transfer and effective maintenance of the current global financial order by the Bretton Woods institutions. Nevertheless, the hallmark of Nigeria has remained unmitigated political crisis, economic and technological dependence and debt crisis. While the Nigerian petty bourgeoisie has remained the conveyor belt of this character of development, they have equally fostered incessant ethnic conflicts and undermined the development and political struggles of the working class in Nigeria's postcolony. Invariably, the direction of the largely confrontational relationship has been such that both the forces of globalisation and the forces of democracy have been mutually antagonistic. Part of this era has been the neo-liberal regime in which these antagonisms have been mostly revealed.

Supportive and Reinforcing Relationships between Forces of Globalisation and Economic Reforms in Nigeria

The economic reforms treated here are those that postdate political independence in Nigeria. The principal reason for this is that even though some residuary reforms during colonialism could be deciphered prior to political independence, the form of Nigeria's economy was still emerging largely as an integral part of Europe and did not undergo independent reforms as

such. For all of the colonial era, for instance, and even a little beyond, Nigeria's currency had been tied to that of the British. Moreover, the process of integration of Nigeria to the global political economy under the colonial order was unilaterally done and mostly via political and administrative coercion. Understandably, the form and content of the emerging Nigerian economy at the time were contested seriously at the administrative and political realms. Those were the realms where reforms were taking place.

For sure, there are clear evidence of the existence of the specified character and direction of relationships between economic reforms and the forces of globalisation, as has been clearly shown in Figure 1 above. First, is that the character of economic reforms is informed by the character of the political economy fostered by the forces of globalisation. Second, is that the unfolding developments in the reform protocols have been in conformity with the developments of the global political economy. Third and finally, is that some of the contemporary forces of globalisation have been central to the implementation of a number of these economic reforms. The two arrows in Figure 1 thus show a mutuality of interests and support in that axis.

To begin with the first above, it is important to note that the comprador character of the political economy fostered by the forces of globalisation has dominated the character of economic reforms in Nigeria. The reforms for indigenisation and Nigerianisation were ostensibly designed to create a domestic bourgeois class in contrariness to petty bourgeois domestic governance in the country. But as will be shown later in the study, this never materialised primarily because the efforts did not carry along with them popular struggles of the Nigerian people.

Typical of comprador political economies, the Nigerian economy which a number of these reforms have sought to address has not only been built on narrow resource bases but has been externally oriented with low intersectoral linkages. Too, its manufacturing base has been quite weak and dominated by foreign direct investment and technology.

The major cash crops which have dominated the economy have been palm produce, cocoa, groundnut and cotton. As from 1914 when palm produce, groundnut and cocoa dominated the export earnings of Nigeria at the tune of 69.0 per cent, 3.0 per cent and 2.9 per cent respectively, the dependence on narrow resources shifted to crude petroleum principally in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1966, crude petroleum contributed 43.3 per cent of Nigeria's export earnings but quickly rose to 84.4 per cent in 1975 and 97.8 per cent in 1985. The near-absolute domination of crude petroleum despite these reforms has continued till date (so much of these data are found in the *Annual Abstract of Statistics* of the National Bureau of Statistics for various years).

The second demonstration of the mutually supportive and reinforcing relationships of the forces of globalisation and Nigeria's economic reforms has been from the fact that the reform protocols have been in conformity with the developments in the global political economy. For instance, the post-Second World War quests for transnationalism, multilateralism and the preference for foreign direct investment to the unfettered roles of European national capital and colonisation resulted in the supportive reforms of Nigerianisation and indigenisation of the Nigerian economy. Also, the debt crisis of developing political economies and its negative implications for the global political economy remained at the hallmark of the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the mid-1980s and beyond. Indeed, the SAPs in sub-Saharan Africa emerged from a World Bank document prepared by its consultant, Eliot Berg.

Again, the third and last issue is that some of the more contemporary forces of globalisation, including especially foreign direct investment and the multilateral roles of the Bretton Woods institutions, have been at the heart of the implementations of the economic reforms of the Nigerian state. So far, successful external public debt negotiations of Nigeria, a carrot of economic reform implementations have been hinged on prior negotiations with the Bretton Woods institutions. The Paris Club had in 2006 granted debt concessions to Nigeria on account of its persistent implementation of the reforms embodied in the NEEDS in particular and aggressive deregulations in general.

Inducement and Reactionary Relationships between Economic Reforms and Forces of Democracy in Nigeria

This is the last set of relationships indicated here. It is shown in Figure 1 by two arrows one of which has a uni-dimensional direction while the other has a bi-dimensional direction. In these two reverse directions there is a portrayal that while the forces of democracy in Nigeria produce inducement effects on economic reforms, the latter in the reverse produce reactionary effects on the former. The proofs are germane: the Nigerian petty bourgeoisie solely induced the reforms for Indigenisation, Nigerianisation and Land Use. These reforms came in the aftermath of political independence in Nigeria. The Nigerian petty bourgeoisie not only sought to take full and effective control of the Nigerian public sector but also sought to empower themselves economically. Thus, economic nationalism remained the beacon of Indigenisation and Nigerianisation in particular.

After close to two decades of domestic crisis-ridden political governance, the Nigerian petty bourgeoisie sought to further enhance its economic power by inducing the Land Use reform of 1978. But expectedly, the reform

produced in large numbers urban land speculators and absentee farmers in the rural area. The limited productive capacity of the comprador economy and its historical dependence on peasant agricultural production ensured the failure of the Land Use reform.

Reforms for poverty alleviation and sanitisation of the Nigerian public sector as contained in the NEEDS reforms have been largely informed by the historical struggles of the Nigerian people (the working class and the peasantry in particular) against poverty, unemployment, rising inflationary rates, and public sector corruption. Part of these (especially sanitising the public sector) could have however been facilitated by the heavy presence of retired military personnel in the most recent past of political governance in Nigeria. The military, being an institution of the state, appears to have been producing higher inducements for the sanitisation of the Nigerian state rather than its overwhelming 'divestiture' from the economy.

There is also provenance of the reactionary roles of economic reforms on the forces of democracy in Nigeria. As will be shown, even though the indigenisation and Nigerianisation reforms succeeded in the mass reproduction of the Nigerian petty bourgeoisie, the reforms remained incapable of their reasonable empowerment vis-à-vis metropolitan capital. Their roles in the economy were still restricted to artisanal and agency roles to metropolitan capital.

In consonance with the above, the reforms for privatisation and commercialisation have not succeeded in empowering the Nigerian elites in so far as their roles in global trade, over-reliance on foreign direct investment and technology are still persisting. The growing trends in poverty in contradistinction to the reforms for poverty alleviation have already been documented (see, for instance, Umezurike 2006).

In the light of the above, the study advances to further the enquiry by examining how specific economic reforms in Nigeria have been facilitating differing degrees of global limitations on its democracy.

Global Limitations on Democracy in Nigeria: Analysis of Economic Reforms

An examination of specific economic reforms in Nigeria shows that the extent to which these reforms have been supportive and reinforcing the forces of globalisation has equally represented similar extent to which the forces of globalisation have been undermining domestic democratic struggles in the country. An obverse manner of stating this reality is that despite the inducement of economic reforms in Nigeria by the forces of democracy in the country, the forces of globalisation have rendered these reforms to be largely reactionary to domestic democratic forces. Invariably therefore, the

weight of the forces of globalisation have been responsible for the incapacitation of economic reforms in the advancement of democratic lives in Nigeria.

To demonstrate this overall incapacitation of economic reforms I have, even at the risk of repetition, categorised the reforms into two. The first are those reforms whose orientations and implementations have been shaped by the forces of globalisation in such a manner that their populist democratic posturing has been undermined. The other are those economic reforms which have been directly enforced by the forces of globalisation, particularly the World Bank, the IMF, the Paris and London Clubs of creditors, with the objects of debt repayments, state 'divestiture' and market opening. In the category of the first are such economic reforms in Nigeria as the Indigenisation and Nigerianisation Reforms; Land Use Reform; and Poverty Alleviation Reforms. Included in the second category are the Government Austerity Measures; Structural Adjustment Programme; Privatisation and Commercialisation; National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy. Also included in this second category are the reforms which have over the years been dealing with variations in exchange and interest rates. These practices have received significant impetuses in the trade and financial liberalisations under the aegis of neo-liberalism in Nigeria. The trend here has geared mainly towards advancing the thrust of deregulations of the political economy of Nigeria.

Despite this categorisation, it needs to be pointed out that in the same manner that the forces of globalisation has continuously shaped the creation and implementation of these reforms, domestic democratic forces have continuously intruded into these practices. A clear instance here was the creation of some populist programmes by the military regimes that implemented SAP in order to stem the tide of massive anti-SAP riots in the 1980s and 1990s. But, in the end, governance was neither stabilised nor were the people effectively mobilised. Crisis and chaos took the greater part. Again, even when certain elements of NEEDS had been designed to serve the Nigerian people, the overall weakness of Nigeria in the global political economy has ensured that more attention has still been paid to trade and market liberalisation. The study advances to examine these specific reforms.

The Indigenisation and Nigerianisation Reforms in Nigeria, 1960s, 1972, 1977 and Beyond

Ostensibly, the central objective of the indigenisation reforms in Nigeria was the creation of an indigenous capitalist class (Asobie 1988:48). The central elements of the policy included the following:

- Increased participation of Nigerians in the economic life of the country;
- Increased capital accumulation by Nigerian businessmen and retention of such capital in the country, and finally;
- Acquisition by Nigerians of private entrepreneurial skills and orientation and capitalist philosophy.

The reforms started with the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees (1972, 1977) which have been amended over the years.

Evidently, the indigenisation reforms were quite ramified reforms for petty bourgeois economic nationalism in Nigeria. They owed their genesis to the colonial era where the Nigerian petty bourgeois nationalist leaders were excluded from the scheme of things by the European colonialists. Indeed, the oligopoly which characterised European entrepreneurial activities during colonialism stunted the growth of the Nigerian petty bourgeois class. This trend was observable in commerce and in banking.

With enhanced local governance, one of the most immediate concerns of the Nigerian nationalists was the creation of banks to liberalise credits to the emerging African businessmen. Three such banks had been so created for the three regions of Nigeria. The first was National Bank (Ltd) for the Western Region. This was subsequently followed by African Continental Bank (Ltd) for the Eastern Region and Bank of the North (Ltd) for the Northern Region.

But the indigenisation reforms could not go as far as their stated objectives tended to suggest. The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1972 under Schedule 1 grouped exclusively for Nigerians and other Africans, enterprises which required affordable capital investments. As has been rightly observed,

...those were enterprises which were already enjoying monopoly. These included: assembly of radios, television sets, tape recorders and other electric domestic appliances not combined with manufacture of components; blending and bottling of alcoholic drinks; blocks; bricks; and ordinary tiles manufacture for building and construction works; bread and cake making; candle manufacture; manufacture of jewellery and related articles; ordinary garment manufacture not combined with production of textile materials; rice milling; singlet manufacture and tyre retreading. Others were: advertising agencies and public relations business; radio and television broadcasting; newspaper publishing and printing; municipal bus services and taxis; haulage of goods by roads; retail trade (except by or within the departmental stores and supermarkets); clearing and forwarding agencies; laundry and dry-cleaning; cinema and other places of entertainment; casinos and gaming centres; and all aspects of pool betting and lotteries (FRN 1972:A20; FRN 2002:A19; FRN 2004:M10).

Given limited financial base of the emerging Nigerian petty bourgeoisie and the fact that it latched on the public sector, the peripheral roles which they have continued to play vis-à-vis their foreign counterparts is to be expected. For instance, in all enterprises, foreign dominance for the years, 1971-75 ranged quite high. In 1971 and 1972, foreign ownership was 81.2 per cent and 83.4 per cent respectively. In 1972 foreign ownership in mining and quarrying was as much as 98.3 per cent. Quite ominously related to this weak financial base of the Nigerian petty bourgeoisie have been the eventual corrupt practices which attended the utility of the banks which had been established to provide credit. In Nigeria's first republic, two premiers namely Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of Eastern Region and Chief Obafemi Awolowo of Western Region were indicted for using the funds of African Continental Bank (Ltd) and the National Bank (Ltd) respectively to the benefit of the political parties which they controlled. In any case, these banks all collapsed when Structural Adjustment Programme was introduced in Nigeria.

There was also the Nigerianisation policy, a petty bourgeois political accoutrement of the indigenisation reforms. This policy dates back to the colonial era. According to the statement of policy of the Government of the Federation on Nigerianisation of the public service presented to the Nigerian parliament in 1965, the replacement of expatriates by Nigerians in the public service was Nigeria's number one policy priority. In the statement: the first need of the Federation is for training a sufficient number of Nigerians to man the whole of its public service.

Until the end of the World War II, the Nigerian higher public service was an almost exclusive preserve of expatriates... by the middle of 1948, there were in the senior service of the higher service of Nigeria 3,786 posts... only 245 (of these) posts were occupied by Africans (Ejimofor, 1987:141). When an enquiry into the Nigerianisation of the civil service, conducted by Simeon Adebo and Sidney Phillipson in 1954 was made, it had revealed overwhelming foreign domination of the roles in Nigeria's civil service. Out of a total of 559 senior service posts, 552 (or 93.4 per cent) were occupied by expatriates. Only 37 (or 6.6 per cent) were occupied by non-expatriates (Ekekwe 1986:46 in Asobie 1988:39).

Perhaps, the greatest problem of indigenisation reforms and its Nigerianisation variant was not that it (especially the indigenisation reforms) had been undermined by the forces of globalisation but mainly because the reforms did not meaningfully address the problems of the masses of the Nigerian people. Rather, the interest of the Nigerian petty bourgeoisie dominated the reform protocols and their implementations. For even though the Nigerian petty bourgeoisie mobilised the Nigerian people against colonial rule, the limited democratic value of the emerging Nigerian state undermined

the effective representation of these people in postcolonial governance. In any case, this mobilisation quickly dissipated into ethnic identities thus undermining meaningful thrust of national integration. The thirty-month Nigerian civil war and series of current ethno-religious conflicts have been the most glaring manifestations of this trend.

Nigeria's Land Use Reform, 1978

The Land Use Decree of 1978 which later became the Land Use Act of 1979 is another closely related reform for Nigerian petty bourgeois economic sustenance. This Act vested all land comprised in the territory of each State (except land vested in the Federal Government or its agencies) solely in the Governor of the State, who would hold such land in trust for the people and would henceforth be responsible for allocation of land in all urban areas to individuals resident in the State and to organisations for residential, agricultural, commercial and other purposes while similar powers with respect to non-urban areas are conferred on Local Government Areas (FMJ 2004:M10).

In vesting of land in the State, the Act stipulated that: Subject to the provisions... all land comprised in the territory of each State of the Federation is hereby vested on the Governor of that State, and such land shall be held in trust and administered for the use and common benefit of all Nigerians in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

The Act further provided that: There shall be established in each State a body to be known as the Land Use and Allocation Committee which shall have responsibility for the following:

- Advising the Governor on any matter connected with the management of land...
- Advising the Governor on any matter connected with the resettlement of persons affected by the revocation of rights of occupancy on the ground of overriding public interest under this Act; and;
- Determining disputes as to the amount of compensation payable under this Act for the improvements on land... (FMJ 2004).

The Act also made provisions for the determination of what could be classified as urban lands. In the Act: subject to such general conditions as may be specified on that behalf by the National Council of States, the Governor may for the purposes of this Act by the order published in the State Gazette designate the parts of the area of the territory of the State constituted land in the urban area.

Nigeria's land reform of 1978 made certain provisions with regard to lands in the local government areas. According to the Act: it shall be lawful for a local government in respect of land not in an urban area to:

- Grant customary rights of occupancy to any person or organisation for the use of land in the local government area for agricultural, residential and other purposes;
- Grant customary rights of occupancy to any person or organisation for the use of land for grazing purposes and such other purposes ancillary to agricultural purposes as may be customary in the local government area concerned (FMJ 2004).

Evidently, the land reform in Nigeria whose relevant provisions have been presented above was ostensibly designed to address such issues as the dominance of peasant production relations in agricultural productivity in Nigeria; the persistence of traditional land tenure system in Nigeria and the nagging problems that have emerged in this respect; as well as the irregularities in the development of the local government system in the country.

The returns from the reform have nonetheless remained shortchanged. Over years of programme implementation, rapid economic and social changes in the country through efficient land use have remained a far cry. Unwarranted land transactions, petty bourgeois land speculation among other things have been limiting government roles in land management. Socio-economic inequalities engendered by traditional land ownership have given way to other forms of inequalities namely those fostered by the emergent Nigerian nouveau riche.

Invariably, the land reform was expected to transform the structural practices in peasant dominated economic system to bourgeois realities. The failure of this effort could be found in the fact that similar articulation of social relations of production that are found in the economy equally replicates at the level of political rule. Thus, by making a policy that seeks to transform land ownership and control, the Nigerian state invariably alienates the peasantry who above all depend on land as their principal means of production. The peasantry in Nigeria also lacks the resources to compete for land acquisition from the governments. What perhaps may have been achieved has been some uneasy transformation of the peasantry into petty bourgeois existence in which national development is still largely at risk.

Reforms for Poverty Alleviation in Nigeria, 2000-continuing

This is one of the economic reforms in Nigeria that has apparently responded to popular struggles in the country. It is important to point out from the

outset that Nigeria began to embark more meaningfully in programmes of poverty alleviation only in the aftermath of the excruciating but highly contested Structural Adjustment Programme in the country.

The interest of the Nigerian state in poverty alleviation was started with the Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP) hurriedly put together in the year 2000. In 2001, the programme was repackaged presumably for more sustainable operations. It became the National Poverty Alleviation Programme (NAPEP) with an enabling law and operational structure.

According to the programme documentary, the thrust of NAPEP is to eradicate what it calls absolute poverty. This according to them denotes a condition in which a person or group of persons are unable to satisfy their most basic and elementary requirements of human survival in terms of good nutrition, clothing, shelter, footwear, transport, health, education, and recreation (NAPEP 2001:1).

But the important question to ask is how did SAP become the precursor of the reforms for poverty alleviation in Nigeria? The other question is what have been the inhibitions of the reforms for poverty alleviation in Nigeria in routing the social problem of poverty in the country? To begin with the first, it is to be noted that, first and foremost, SAP unequivocally unleashed magnificent pains on all social categories in the country thus requiring some balm. Second, series of anti-SAP protests could definitely have informed the urgent need to implement a social programme such as the poverty alleviation reforms.

One outstanding feature of SAP is that its pains never really spared any domestic social force in Nigeria. In the volume, *Dead-End to Nigerian Development*, edited by Professor Okwudiba Nnoli, satisfactory analyses of these conditions have been presented.

In an apt summary of the contributions to the volume, the book editor had noted that:

... the socioeconomic crisis which has faced Nigeria since 1980 has given rise to an unprecedented rising level of unemployment including amongst the most energetic, imaginative and highly skilled; a growing poverty rate as reflected in low consumption levels, as well as declining per capita income; a deteriorating standard of living of the mass of the people; growing socioeconomic inequalities; and general insecurity of lives and property. Inevitably, the underprivileged social groups have been the ones most adversely affected. They include the peasants,... blue collar workers,...petty artisans, craftsmen and traders; women and the youth... Apart from these social categories, the petty bourgeoisie has also been adversely affected... (Nnoli 1993:14).

These pains were equally met with resistance by the Nigeria people. In 1989, for instance, there was a general strike (popularly called the anti-SAP riot) that crippled social activities in the entire federation.

The relatedness of SAP with the reforms for poverty alleviation is clear enough. First and foremost, is that there have been policy and programme contradictions between poverty alleviation reforms and the equally gargantuan programmes of privatisation and commercialisation (the latter unarguably rose in the wombs of SAP) both of which have been ongoing. Second, despite huge expenditures and diversified attention, the success level in the alleviation of poverty in Nigeria has been less than appreciable. The *Daily Times* of Nigeria edition of 20 June 2003 had noted that NAPEP gulped as much as N1.02 trillion over its years of existence. The programme itself has been quite diversified involving 37 core poverty alleviation institutions and 14 poverty alleviation ministries.

To further underscore its structural diversity, it is instructive to note that its implementation stakeholders have included the following: President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Vice- President, Members of the National Assembly, Ministries and Agencies, Political Leaders, Organised Private Sector, Labour Organisations, Chairmen of Local Government Areas, Councillors, Traditional Rulers, Community Leaders, Community Based Organisations (CBOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Extension Officers, Women Group Leaders, Women Development Officers, and Local Government Area Cooperative Officers. The related activities of NAPEP are equally overwhelming. They include: Youth Empowerment Scheme (YES), Rural Infrastructure Development Scheme (RIDS), Social Welfare Services Scheme (SOWESS), and the Natural Resource Development and Conservation Scheme (NRDS).

The failures of the reforms for poverty alleviation have been acknowledged. The current reports of the United Nations show that Human Development Index (HDI) in Nigeria has remained less than 50 per cent which places the country among the 25 poorest countries in the world. This is in addition to Nigeria's life expectancy at birth which stands at 48 years, literacy rate was placed at 44 per cent and 70 per cent of the rural population do not have access to potable water, healthcare facilities and electricity.

In a review of the implementation of NEEDS between 2004 and 2007, the implementers have been modest enough to admit that:

...not much seems to have been achieved with respect to efforts aimed at reducing extreme poverty and hunger, reduction in child mortality, and maternal health, general containment of HIV/AIDS-related goals, and environmental sustainability...It appears the nation needs to intensify her efforts towards meeting these goals, without which the poverty alleviation objectives of NEEDS may not be realised (NPC 2008:20).

These views are in consonance with the data from the Millennium Development Goals implementation which show that the population of

Nigerians living in relative poverty moved from 43 per cent in 1992 to 66 per cent in 1996. By 2004 and 2005 the figure hovers around 54 per cent. And yet the target for 2015 is 21 per cent. Despite insufficient data, it has been gleaned that the population of Nigerians living in extreme poverty (i.e., those consuming 2,900 calories or lower daily) constitute 35 per cent for both 2004 and 2005. Also the population of underweight Nigerians under five years of age amount to 30 per cent for both 2004 and 2005.

Again, the explanation for these realities is that the reforms for poverty alleviation have been massively enhancing the development of the Nigerian petty bourgeoisie, the most privileged class in the Nigerian domestic political economy. The weakness of this class in the private sector, a testimony of the comprador character of the Nigerian political economy has made its perpetuation in the public sector a problem for poverty alleviation reforms. Moreover, the reforms have been facilitating brain drain.

Government Austerity Measures, 1982-84

The economic reform package popularly called government austerity measures represented a stop-gap between the overt petty bourgeois economic nationalism of the 1960s and the 1970s and the all-encompassing SAP of the mid-1980s and beyond. Indeed, the stringent macroeconomic programmes embodied in the austerity measures had been blamed on the profligacy of the antecedent reforms for petty bourgeois economic nationalism.

Evidently, the austerity measures were policy responses to the mounting external debt crisis which Nigeria began to experience mostly as from the latter part of the 1970s. While the remote cause is attributable to the comprador and peripheral character of the Nigerian political economy, the immediate causes were the debt bunching arising from the maturity of soft loans granted particularly by the IBRD and other bilateral sources especially in the early years of independence. Other causes include the limited capacity of the 'oil boom' of the mid-1970s to advance national development resulting in the thrust of external borrowing even while oil flowed; the expansion of the sources of external foreign loans to include the highly costly Euro-Dollar capital market and, of course the raising of the huge US\$1 billion Euro-Dollar loan in January 1978; and finally inefficiency and corruption in the country's public sector.

With the coming into being of the World Bank Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa popularly known as the Berg Report in 1981, the IMF began to pressure these countries over questions of national development especially over the issue of huge external indebtedness. The Berg Report

focused on what it described as over-valued national currencies, neglect of peasant agriculture, heavily protected manufacturing sector, and excessive government intervention in the economy (Cheru 1989:9-10). African leaders on their part insisted that the developmental malaise of the period were created by variations in the interest rates and other such financial manipulations by the advanced countries.

This particular face-off became obvious in the loan negotiations between Nigeria and the IMF in the 1980s. Owing to some disagreements, the Federal Government of Nigeria enunciated the Economic Stabilisation (Temporary Provision) Act of 1981. This Act introduced the austerity measures in Nigeria. Indeed, the Act:

targeted the manifest excesses in government spending and tried to curb the persistent deficit in the balance of payments through stringent import and exchange rate controls. The fiscal retrenchment consisted of a freeze on capital expenditure, the curtailment of low-priority public investment projects, an increase in petroleum product prices and utility tariffs, a freeze on wages and salaries in the public sector, and a restriction of foreign borrowing by state and local governments (Herbst and Soludo 2001:661).

The idea appeared to be that of curbing rising extravagance which had been further induced by the 'oil boom' and, by so doing, save foreign exchange earnings.

The specific provisions of the Act included: the limiting of foreign exchange disbursements for imports and other international transactions from N1.2 billion per month during the first quarter of 1982 to N800.00 million subsequently. Basic Travel Allowance was also reduced from N800.00 per annum to N500.00 while Business Travel Allowance was reduced from N3000.00 to N2500.00. This Act also provided for immediate closure of all private jetties in the country and a decrease in petroleum subsidy which resulted in 5 kobo per litre rise in pump price among others (see, for instance, Aribisala 1987:11).

Buoyed by the Berg Report, the IMF was not impressed with the austerity measures of Nigeria. It insisted on a fundamental liberalisation of the domestic political economy. After a few years of prevarications occasioned also by two military coups d'état, the Structural Adjustment Programme was introduced in Nigeria in 1986. It needs only to be noted that during the period of austerity measures, basic household items in Nigeria including especially rice, milk and toiletries had been classified as 'essential commodities' which meant that they had already gone beyond the reach of most Nigerians and were only distributed piecemeal by the government.

The Reforms of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), 1986-93

Perhaps what sets out the reforms of the SAP may not necessarily be that they have been the most wide ranging of all major economic reform protocols

across the globe, nor even the least surprising that their implementations unleashed near-undiscriminatory pains on all domestic social forces in the country. The high point of the reforms in this regard may really be that, so far, it was the first reform protocol that had been most directly imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions and their related bodies without due regards whatsoever to the often noticed collaborations between these institutions and the dominant domestic social forces in these political economies that had to be adjusted.

The above statement is pungent enough but easily understandable especially when the Nigerian situation is put in sharp focus. It is pungent enough because both the IMF and the governing circles in the sub-Saharan African countries (where the Nigerian-type package had been uniformly applied) were fully reflective of the problems of the SAP therapy and sharply disagreed over it. Indeed, it took close to half a decade between the time that the Berg Report recommended SAP in 1981 and the time that the various sub-Saharan African countries including Nigeria finally succumbed to its adoption. For Nigeria, for instance, it took five years, the toppling of an elected civilian administration and a counter coup for the programme to take off. It was nonetheless understandable because as it has become quite clear, SAP was introduced in response to the uncompromising pressures of creditor agencies. It was only incidental that these pressures needed to rub off on all the domestic social forces in the countries, including especially the domestic governing circles.

The implementers of Nigeria's SAP suggested that it had the following objectives:

- Restructuring and diversifying the productive base of the economy in order to reduce its dependence on the oil sector and on imports;
- Achieving in the short- to medium-term fiscal and balance of payments viability;
- Laying the basis for a sustainable non-inflationary growth; and
- Reducing the dominance of unproductive investments in the public sector, improving that sector's efficiency and enhancing the potential of the private sector.

For the implementers, the main instruments for achieving these objectives,

was to alter the system of determining the exchange rate of the domestic currency by replacing the previous fixed exchange rate system with an open bidding system...The other key instruments that were adopted under the SAP included progressive trade and payments liberalisation, adoption of appropriate pricing policies for public enterprises and rationalisation (i.e., commercialisation/privatisation) of public sector enterprises; reduction of government deficit financing

and pursuit of tight monetary and fiscal policies to counter the inherent inflationary pressures that accompany currency depreciation in the short term (FRN 1990:3-4).

Understandably, the adoption of SAP by Nigeria opened the doors for official external debt rescheduling. Three debt rescheduling agreements with the Paris Club had been made: a 1986 agreement that rescheduled/refinanced debt worth about US\$4.6 billion; a 1989 agreement that rescheduled about US\$5.2 billion; and a 1991 agreement that rescheduled about US\$3.3 billion (Ikem 1996 in Herbst and Soludo 2001:667).

As events have proven, SAP was the wrong recipe for resolving the developmental lacuna of Nigeria. In particular, the comprador and peripheral character of the Nigerian political economy could not be reversed by SAP. It wrought poverty on the Nigerian population. 'Composite price index for all items rose from 484 in 1985 to 550 in 1987. In 1988, it rose even further to 850. The rate of inflation rose from 5 to 50 per cent between 1987 and 1989' (Asobie 1993:189). Nigeria's debt crisis even worsened with SAP. 'Its total debt figure experienced a phenomenal growth from N5, 7289.8 million in 1985 to N381,987.4 million in 1990. The total debt stock for 1995 was N1, 057,857.9 million representing an increase of 63.3 per cent over the value for 1990. Against the critical debt ratios, the debt burden became heavier for Nigeria due to SAP' (Umezurike 2004:23).

Nigeria's SAP also created political upheavals in the country. In May 1988, Nigerian workers embarked on a nation-wide industrial action which spilled over to the anti-SAP riots of 1989. The latter embraced students and other urban dwellers. Providers of public utilities including the defunct National Electric Power Authority were equally involved. The Federal Government reacted by placing bans on the activities of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) in 1988. In the inflexible attitude of the military, other organised labour including the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), and the Nigerian Medical Association (NMA) were at one time or the other arm twisted. Dismissal of university lecturers became rampant at this time as university students were murdered in cold blood in their university campuses.

Nigeria's continued dependence on crude petroleum in spite of SAP continued to pitch its governments against oil and environmental activists. The military regime of late General Sani Abacha did not hesitate to hang nine of such activists, including the writer, Ken Saro Wiwa.

Reforms of Privatisation and Commercialisation, 1980s, 1990s-continuing

The policy measures of privatisation and commercialisation have been responses to some conjunctural issues bordering on the limitations of

democratic governance in Nigeria. One of these issues is the inefficiency and ineffectiveness in public governance which have been vivid in the activities of public corporations in the country. Another has been rampant corruption in the country's public sector. Also notable is the related limited accountability of public officials including those of public parastatals. Equally important has been the declining values of governance owing to political instability. Finally, there were pressures from foreign creditor agencies on the Nigerian governments to reduce the size and roles of the public sector.

Invariably, attempts to legitimise the programmes of privatisation and commercialisation have in themselves turned out to be indictments on poor democratic governance in the country. For instance, to initiate one of the programmes, it had once been pointed out that:

it is estimated that successive Nigerian Governments have invested up to N8000 billion in public-owned enterprises. Annual returns on this huge investment have been well below 10 per cent. These inefficiencies and, in many cases huge losses, are charged against the public treasury. With declining revenue and escalating demand for effective and affordable social services, the general public has stepped up its yearning for state-owned enterprises to become more efficient (FRN 2000:4).

In 1998 alone, government sources noted that Public Enterprises in Nigeria had enjoyed the following transfers: N156.5 billion subsidised foreign exchange; N12.5 billion imported heavy waivers; N15.0 billion tax exemption arrears; N29.5 billion unremitted revenues; N16.5 billion loans and guarantees and N35.0 billion grants and subventions. Also these sources reveal that over US\$100 billion had been sunk on the Public Enterprises in Nigeria between 1975 and 1995. In 1999, the sources continue, there was a total of 590 Public Enterprises at the Federal level all of which gave over 5000 Board appointments.

A precursor to privatisation and commercialisation was experienced during austerity measures when the General Buhari administration, apparently in response to the stringent crisis of the Nigerian political economy, curtailed the funding of public parastatals and also withdrew subsidies to a number of products of these parastatals. These trends continued until 1988 when the first privatisation and commercialisation programme in Nigeria commenced. The commencement of the programme was marked by Decree No. 25 of 1988. This Decree set up the Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation (TCPC) with government mandate for managing the exercise. Expectedly, this mandate was in line with the requirements of SAP which had been barely two years old then.

The stated objectives of the Committee, as contained in the Decree, included the following:

- Restructuring and rationalising the public sector in order to lessen the dominance of unproductive investment in that sector;
- Reorientation of the enterprises for privatisation and commercialisation towards a new horizon of performance improvement, viability and overall efficiency;
- Ensuring positive returns on public sector investment in commercialised enterprises;
- Checking the present absolute dependence on the treasury for funding the otherwise commercially oriented parastatals and to encourage their approach to the Nigerian capital market; and finally,
- Initiating the process of gradual ceding to the private sector of such public enterprises which by nature and type of operations are best performed by the private sector.

At the termination of this first exercise, out of the 110 enterprises slated for privatisation, and 34 others for commercialisation, 82 of them were actually privatised. There were a total of 1.5 billion shares sold, 280 board seats ceded by the Federal Government and a reduction of treasury funding. Also, N3.7 billion was raised from the exercise. A total of 800, 000 new shareholders were created with the emergence of shareholders association. This first experience however ended in 1993.

The second experience of the programmes was initiated by the first post-military regime of President Olusegun Obasanjo. Similarly, this was consummated in a legal framework tagged: Public Enterprises (Privatisation and Commercialisation) Act of 1999. It is nonetheless instructive to note that this second experience had similar objectives with the previous. Identified differences could only be that of emphasis of its avowed state-sanitisation endeavours. For instance, parts of these objectives were to:

- Send a clear message to local and international community that a new transparent Nigeria is open for business;
- Raise funds for financing socially oriented (poverty alleviation, health, education, etc) programmes.

The unbridled pursuit of the programmes by the Obasanjo regime was clearly not in doubt. As indicated above, the Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation (TCPC) metamorphosed into the Bureau for Public Enterprises with the enabling laws. It had equally been noted that the second experience saw the privatisation and commercialisation of far bigger enterprises than the first.

But it is also important to explain that the post-military regime of President Obasanjo equally underscored the clear global implications of the exercises. As the President indicated in one of his speeches:

...there are overwhelming facts and figures in support of the absolute necessity to realign ourselves with these global trends...Privatisation is one of the reforms we have to undertake to integrate our economy into the mainstream of world economic order. There are two interrelated aspects to this integration. In the first place, we need the technology; the managerial competence and the capital from the developed world to enhance the performance of our utilities. Second, there are very serious linkages between the efficient functioning of our utilities and our ability to attract foreign investments. We cannot be talking about creating a conducive environment for foreign investments if the performance of our transport, telecommunication, and energy sectors remains dismal and epileptic (FRN 2000:5).

Reforms of the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), 2004-2007

The framers of the NEEDS programme have failed to give it one precise definition. They have described it in a number of forms. First, it has been described as Nigeria's plan for prosperity. Second, it has been described as the people's way of letting the government know what kind of Nigeria they wish to live in, now and in future. Third, it has also been described by the same framers as the government's way of letting the people know how it plans to overcome the deep and pervasive obstacles to progress that the government and the people have identified. The fourth and final description given by this source is that it is also a way of letting the international community know where Nigeria stands – in the region and in the world – and how it wishes to be supported.

The NEEDS framers claim that the process began in 2001 when people from all walks of life and all parts of Nigeria were given the chance to tell the government about their needs and ambitions. Information collected from farmers, labourers, factory owners, teachers and university professors, community-based organisations, charities and other stakeholders was used to draft an interim Poverty Reduction Paper. But its public presentation in the year 2004 put forward the following macroeconomic reform framework: right-sizing of the public sector; restructuring of the various departments within each ministry of government; monetisation of fringe benefits; reform of pension scheme; introduction of due process; intensified privatisation and commercialisation of public enterprises; establishment of anti-corruption institutions; reform of the telecommunication and energy sectors; extensive reform of the financial sector, especially the re-capitalisation of the banking

and insurance institutions; liquidation of a very large proportion of the nation's external debt. And finally, reform of the judiciary, among others.

What is clear is that NEEDS has incorporated certain tendencies in Nigeria's political governance which do not necessarily invalidate the argument that it is a carry-over from the erstwhile SAP but does obviate the fact that the framers of NEEDS benefited from the experiences of SAP implementers. A proof of this is already evident in the reforms for poverty alleviation which forms part of the NEEDS package. The framers of NEEDS also created such anti-corruption institutions as the Code of Conduct Bureau, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corruption (and related) Practices Commission (ICPC).

Indeed, the NEEDS framework provided for a number of what have been referred to as Core Economic Reform Programme initiated by the President Obasanjo regime. According to the regime, some of the objectives of these programme have included: transparency of oil and gas accounts; demonstration of the negative consequences of economic crimes; demonstration of Nigeria's willingness to fight money laundering, show value for money and transparency in government contracting; improvement of fiscal discipline at all tiers of government, and so on.

Much of these state-sanitising projects of NEEDS have unarguably been government propaganda and have characteristically failed at implementation. What is important about them however is that they have represented the disgust of Nigerians about public governance especially under the SAP regime. Moreover, heavy involvement of retired senior military officers in the President Obasanjo regime appeared to have incorporated the relevance of sanitising Nigeria's public sector. Social degeneration of that sector, especially under the SAP regime, almost crippled the military institution itself.

Trade and Financial Liberalisations, Especially under the SAP and Post-SAP Regimes

Trade and financial liberalisations especially since the SAP and post-SAP regimes have been gargantuan. As Black (2002) has observed, trade liberalisation has meant 'the process of reducing or removing restrictions on international trade' (Black 2002:471). On the other hand, financial deregulation has been shown to depict:

the removal or relaxation of regulations affecting the type of business financial firms may undertake, the type of firms permitted to deal in particular markets, or the terms on which dealing is allowed...Regulations which have been relaxed include controls on the interest rates at which banks can lend or borrow, controls on operations by banks outside their country of registration, and restrictions on the types of business particular financial institutions can transact (Black 2002:174).

Export-led developmental strategy which had been strengthened in the regime of Nigeria's neo-liberal reforms terminated the era of import substitution industries which had anchored national development since about 1946. The termination also engendered a condition in which the laws of demand and supply ruled the thrust of foreign trade in the country. In this context, the country became strongly disadvantaged as its export products were minimal and depended mainly on agricultural products in which it even has low competitive advantage in the international market. Thus apart from crude petroleum which has dominated its exports over the years, it has concentrated on meagre re-exports of some manufactures. In the same vein, neo-liberal regime in Nigeria has created unsettling moments in the management of interest rates as the banking system has lacked adequate stability.

At the earliest periods of the neo-liberal reforms as from the latter part of the 1980s, Nigerian governments created foreign exchange markets which replaced the earlier use of import licences for transactions abroad. In the most recent past, there has been official permission for the sale of foreign currencies by banks and bureau de change outfits. The prices of foreign currencies, including especially the dollar, pound sterling, euro, yen, etc., have been floated against the determining forces of the market. Even though some stability has been observed especially with regard to the major currencies for over half a decade now, there is certainly something to worry about the low value of the Nigerian naira against these currencies over these years of neo-liberal reforms. For instance, at the earliest periods of political independence, the Nigerian currency had been officially pegged at par with the British pound sterling. The Nigerian naira was actually officially exchanged at about N0.66 to US\$1 in 1978 when the country raised a jumbo loan from the Euro-Dollar capital market; but is currently exchanged at the range of N153.00 to US\$1.00.

In addition to the above, the country has depended almost exclusively on crude petroleum for foreign exchange. For instance, in 1987, oil exports were N28,154.4 million while non-oil exports were N1,423.6 million; in a year in which domestic exports had been N29,577.94 million. Similar trends repeated themselves in 2005 and 2006. For 2005, oil exports had been as much as N6,252,882.3 million while non-oil exports had been mere N368,421.4million. For 2006, oil exports rose to N7,006,591.1million as against non-oil exports of N548,550.2 million. The domestic exports and re-exports for the years 2005 and 2006 were N6,621,303.64 million and N7,555,141.32 million respectively. The incapacitation of the ongoing neo-liberal reforms in Nigeria to diversify the economy largely explain the heavy dependence on oil for foreign earnings.

Despite current thrust in risk management by the Central Bank of Nigeria especially in response to the global financial meltdown, the banking sector in Nigeria has not quite resonated the agenda of development in the neo-liberal conjuncture. Corruption has been rife in the banks and despite numerous efforts at recapitalisation among other reforms, a number of these banks have not fared satisfactorily:

As at 2006, a total of 25 banks in Nigeria had been capitalised to the tune of N866.40 billion. But in August 2009, the new Central Bank Governor Mallam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi who replaced Professor Charles Soludo had made public a crisis in these banks. A number of Chief Executives of these banks lost their jobs while government bail-out measures had been resumed (Umezurike 2010:90).

Not too long after, that is in 2011, three of the banks that had been recapitalised namely Bank PHB Ltd, Afribank Bank PLC and Spring Bank PLC, became liquidated by the Asset Management Company of Nigeria AMCON, an outfit that had been created by the Central Bank of Nigeria for risk management purposes. Three other new banks were created by AMCON to replace them.

On a general note, however, Nigerian banks have continued to create lesser impetus for advancing national development. Despite the infusion of new facilities and innovations, Nigerians, especially in rural settings are yet to grasp their relevance. Credit facilities have still remained a prerogative of the elites.

Conclusion

The study sustains the thesis that through economic reforms in Nigeria, the forces of globalisation have been negating democracy in the country. The impetus for this thesis has arisen from the need to explore this ominous relationship between globalisation and democracy in Nigeria as in much of Africa beyond the massive intellectual outpouring on the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) foisted by the IMF on the sub-Saharan African countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Even though the negative implications of SAP for development in Nigeria as in the rest of Africa have been examined, this study notes that economic reforms generally have been largely volatile and contradictory that it requires a compendium of these reforms to properly problematise their implications for democracy in Nigeria for instance. The core undercurrent of SAP is the unbridled advancement of market liberalisation and state 'divestiture'. The continuation of this core thrust in the other similarly related programmes such as the current National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) has been significantly affected not only by the volatility and contradictions of global market forces but also by the thrust of domestic social struggles. In any case, the reforms

for Indigenisation and Nigerianisation which preceded SAP had pursued economic nationalism of the Nigerian governing elites which had not been directly related to the thrust of market liberalisation and state 'divestiture'.

The significance of this paper, therefore, is not only in the exploration of the negative relationship between globalisation and democracy in Nigeria but recognition of the significant character and implications of economic reform as the intervening variable. In doing so, it has been suggested that knowledge production on economic reform should not be limited to market liberalisation as its global practices have been interpreted. Rather, economic reform should represent also government policies on the economy that reproduces domestic democratic struggles. Failure to recognise the roles of domestic social forces in inducing economic reforms in Nigeria, for instance, is inadequate not only for understanding these reforms but also for properly situating the possible courses of history in contemporary globalisation.

The study shows that there are similarities in the intensity and character of global negation of democracy in Nigeria on the one hand, and the convergence of economic reform protocols and the forces of globalisation on the other hand. These similarities are more easily provable in the economic reforms embodied in the Austerity Measures of the early 1980s; the SAP of 1980s and 1990s; the reforms of Privatisation and Commercialisation as from the 1980s; the current NEEDS as well as the liberalisations of trade and finance which have had some impetuses for interest and exchange rate regimes under deregulation. Here, the thrusts of market liberalisation and state 'divestiture' have been much more emphasised. On the other hand, the reforms for Poverty Alleviation as from 2001; Indigenisation and Nigerianisation in the 1960s and 1970s; and Land Use in the 1970s, have largely reproduced the inadequacies of the Nigerian governing circles in advancing the democratic struggles of the Nigerian people. Thus the reforms have in this respect been reactionary to domestic social struggles.

The incongruity of the forces of globalisation and domestic democratic forces in Nigeria, as has been effectively orchestrated by the practices of economic reforms in the country, requires urgent global attention. This is even more so now that economic reform remains the most significant thrust of public policy in the developing countries.

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Challenges for the Opposition and Democratisation in Tanzania: A View from the Opposition

Jonas Ewald* & Lennart Wohlgemuth**

Abstract

In the period after 1990, a massive return to liberalised forms of politics has taken place and has been largely centred around the dismantling of one party-regimes, the termination of a large number of military-led or dominated governments, the embrace of a multiparty political framework, the introduction of an independent media, the restoration of some basic freedoms to the people of the countries concerned and the convening of multi-party elections. This development was so widespread and overwhelming that it was seen by many observers as the beginning of Africa's second liberation (Olukoshi 1998; Gyimah-Boadi 2004; Mkandawire 2006).

Potential gains to the peoples from the liberalisation of their national political spaces were undermined since the 1980s by the conditions set by outside suppliers of necessary resources, combined with internal challenges in terms of weak institutions, civil society and media as well as lack of a tradition of multi-party democracy and general poverty. Matters appear to have been worsened by the fact that in many African countries the promise which the opposition once represented as the bearer of the hopes and aspirations of the people has substantially faded away. Several factors have contributed to weaken and, in some cases, discredit the opposition in much of Africa's ongoing experience with multiparty politics.

This is a serious development that begs for further investigation; as the development of a healthy and vigorous opposition is a major part of a democratic framework. In this study, we will see how the situation in Tanzania has evolved over the past 17 years of multi-party development; based on rather unique interviews with Professor Ibrahim Lipumba, leader of one of Tanzania's major opposition parties.

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Résumé

A partir de 1990, un retour massif à des formes libéralisées de la politique à eu lieu. Ceci a été en grande partie centré autour du démantèlement des régimes de parti unique, de l'élimination d'un grand nombre de gouvernements dirigés ou dominés par des militaires, de l'adoption de cadres de politique multi-partisane, de l'introduction d'une presse indépendante, de la restitution de certaines libertés fondamentales aux populations des pays concernés, et de l'organisation d'élections, multipartites. Ce développement était si répandu et impressionnant qu'il fut perçu par de nombreux observateurs comme le début de la deuxième libération de l'Afrique (Olukoshi 1998; Gyimah-Boadi 2004; Mkandawire 2006).

Les gains potentiels que les populations devaient tirer de la libéralisation de leurs espaces politiques nationaux furent sapés depuis les années 1980 par les conditions fixées par des fournisseurs externes des ressources essentielles, mais aussi par les défis intérieurs à l'instar de la faiblesse des institutions, de la société civile et de la presse, ainsi qu'une absence d'une culture de démocratie multi-partisane et d'une pauvreté généralisée. Encore pire, la promesse que l'opposition a jadis représentée dans de nombreux pays africains comme porteuse des espoirs et des aspirations des peuples s'est fortement estompée. Il existe plusieurs facteurs qui ont concouru dans une grande mesure à fragiliser et, dans certains cas, discréditer l'opposition dans l'expérience de politique multi-partisane en cours de l'Afrique.

Ceci est une évolution de grande portée qui doit être examinée plus en profondeur, d'autant plus que le développement d'une opposition saine et vigoureuse constitue une partie majeure d'un cadre démocratique. Nous verrons dans cet article, comment la situation en Tanzanie a évolué au cours des 17 dernières années d'expérience multi-partisane à travers un entretien plutôt unique mené avec Professeur Ibrahim Lipumba, leader d'un des plus importants partis d'opposition en Tanzanie.

Introduction

In the period after 1990, a massive return to liberalised forms of politics has taken place largely centred around the dismantling of one party-regimes, the termination of a large number of military-led or dominated governments, the embrace of a multiparty political framework, the introduction of an independent media, the restoration of some basic freedoms to the people of the countries concerned and the convening of multi-party elections. This development was so widespread and overwhelming that it was seen by many observers as the beginning of Africa's second liberation (Ake 1996; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Bratton 1998; Olukoshi 1998; Ake 2000; Bratton 2004). However this development took place at a time of harsh economic conditions for most African countries leading to rescue operations by the international communities, the so-called structural adjustment programmes (SAP). These operations came only into being after certain rigorous conditions for economic and political reform were fulfilled often leading to situations of non-democracies (Melber 2003; Gyimah-Boadi 2004; Villalón and VonDoepp 2005; Mkandawire 2006).

Potential gains to the peoples from the liberalisation of their national political spaces were thus undermined by the conditions set by outside suppliers of necessary resources, in combination with all the internal challenges in terms of weak institutions, civil society and media as well as lack of a tradition of multi-party democracy and general poverty. Matters appear to have been worsened by the fact that in many African countries the promise which the opposition once represented as the bearer of the hopes and aspirations of the people has substantially faded away (Ottaway 2003; Salih 2003; Villalón and VonDoepp 2005; Mbaku and Ihonvbere 2006; Salih and Nordlund 2007). In some African countries the democratisation process has even been reversed in recent years, e.g., in Ivory Coast, Uganda to name a few. In others, like Tanzania, semi-authoritarian rule under the umbrella of formal multiparty system persists.

Today, few dispute the need for a well-functioning multi-party system to promote democracy, even if the presence of a formal multi-party system in itself does not guarantee a deep, broad and substantial democracy (Abrahamsen 2000; Randall and Svåsand 2002; Ottaway 2003; Ayers 2006; Törnquist 2006; Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler 2007; Tar 2009; Zuern 2009). There are several factors which have acted together to weaken and, in some cases, discredit the opposition in much of Africa's ongoing experience with multiparty politics. In a study of the politics of opposition based on a seven-country case-study edited by Adebayo Olukoshi, the following explanations are given for this deterioration:

- Incumbent governments did only very reluctantly concede to the multi-party framework and stopped at nothing to obstruct, weaken, harass and divide the opposition;
- As part of the strategy employed to weaken the opposition, public sector patronage was withdrawn from anyone that was sympathetic to or identified with the opposition, something that was particularly important for the private business sector representatives. This acted to weaken the financial base of the opposition parties and limit their organisational capacity at the same time as the incumbents freely availed themselves of state resources to finance their bids for remaining in power;
- The opposition did not enjoy a level-playing field with the incumbents against whom they contested. Official, publicly-funded media organisations as well as various state organisations, including especially the security services, were deployed against opposition parties and their activists. Incumbents did also take the opportunity to rig elections in spite of the presence of international and local observers;

- The electoral system operated in most African countries, namely the British first-past-the-post, winner-take-all model worked to the detriment of the opposition. The number of seats won was not proportional to the share of the vote;
- In articulating their demands for multi-party politics, many opposition parties were too quick to allow themselves to be hurried by incumbent regimes into elections without first insisting on the implementation of the far-reaching constitutional changes that were necessary for governing post-electoral political activity;
- In several African countries, opposition political activity came to depend heavily on donor/external support for its sustenance (Olukoshi 1998:29-33).

In most theories on democracy, parties, and in particular an effective opposition, are indispensable for democratic consolidation. Ware defines a political party as an institution with two specific characteristics: (i) it seeks influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy positions in the government; and (ii) usually consists of more than a single interest in the society and so, to some degree, attempts to aggregate interest (Ware 1996).

In the theories of multi-party democracy, political parties are supposed to play a number of vital roles for democratic development, including being a political machinery for the aggregation of interest, representation and governance. In a pluralist democracy the opposition parties hold the ruling party accountable. According to Lipset and Lakin, political parties perform three major functions, namely, (i) the communicative function – to channel communication from the state to the public; (ii) the expressive function – to channel communication from the public to the state; and (iii) the integrative function – to channel communications among different groups within civil society (Lipset and Lakin 2004:64ff.).

Political parties in Africa meet a number of challenges, both in terms of internal capacity, outreach, mobilisation and weak institutionalisation and in terms of external constraint in the form of ruling party dominance and prohibitive legislations (Salih 2002; Olukoshi 1998). The mere presence of political parties does not necessarily indicate more democratic forms of governance. The multi-party systems' democratising role depends on the degree to which the parties manage to fulfil the roles spelled out above and whose interest they represent.

An effective opposition is absolutely indispensable to the emergence and consolidation of a stable democratic order, in liberal democratic theory. In order to be effective, a number of structural and practical conditions must easily be available. Institutionalisation of the parties is crucial for them to develop

democratising capabilities.. The opposition parties need to be distinct from and autonomous of the ruling party. The rules of the political system must allow freedom of organisation by the parties on a level playing field and in a framework that allows the rotation of power based on the free choice of the electorate. The opposition parties would, in the interval between one election and the other, serve as the formal, institutionalised watchdog within and outside parliament, to keep the ruling party in check. At election time, the opposition will provide the electorate with choice, politically and ideologically (Olukoshi 1998; Wiseman 1996; Randall 1998; Salih 2001, 2002; Diamond 1999).

As the development of a healthy and vigorous opposition is a major part of a democratic framework, this is a serious development that has to be investigated further. This paper seeks to demonstrate how the situation in Tanzania has emerged over the past seventeen years of putative multi-party democracy through a specific study of the life of Professor Ibrahim Lipumba, leader of Civic United Front (CUF), one of the major opposition parties in Tanzania. And it is against the theoretical context discussed above that we have tried to understand what concrete challenges an opposition party meet in the process when a single party system is dismantled and a multi-party system is established.

The Political Structure in Tanzania¹

Tanzania is still in transition from a one-party to a consolidated multi-party system. The formal and informal institutions of democracy are still weak compared to the ideal in the liberal democratic models. This is in spite of efforts made to strengthen a more liberal democratic ethos, including change of legislations, reforms of central and local government to make them more transparent and accountable, and various projects aimed at strengthening the political parties and institutions. This section analyses the party system in order to identify some of the major challenges for the opposition.

Tanzania had 18 registered political parties in the 2005 elections. In March 2010, a 19th party was given preliminary registration. This was a splinter party from CCM which later ceased to work. Only five of these parties are, however, represented in the Parliament. The ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has a well-developed organisation with elaborate procedures and structures for (relative democratic) decision-making within the party. But it also contains strong central authority and personal networks, with close links to the administration at different levels.² The one-party culture continues to define parts of the party, the administration and the political culture – not least on local level. Nevertheless, changes are taking place.

Although CCM is formally detached from the governmental structures, ties between the party and the administration still exists both formally and informally (Mukandala, Mushi, Barkan et al. 2005). An example of the existence of these formal ties is that all key government functionaries down to district commissioners and judges are directly appointed by – and thus dependent upon – the Presidency. As most ‘political opportunities’ arise within the government administration – rather than the political structures or the private sector – there are incentives even for strong leaders from opposition parties to join CCM. This could be observed during the preparation and campaign for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2000 and 2005.

With a high degree of fungibility of funds, economic support to the government may be indirectly or directly diverted to the ruling party. The opposition is therefore weakened by CCM’s control of the government, administration and media, even at the local level. The strong donor interests in the managerial issues of the public sector may undermine the efforts to build a strong political community and opposition, due to the informal inter-linkages of the ruling party with central and local government administration.

The Opposition

No real challenges exist to CCM, particularly in rural areas, as the opposition parties have neither the organisation nor the resources to fully develop structures at all district/local levels in the vast country. No strong and well-organised nationwide opposition has emerged – as in most other African countries (Olukoshi 1998; Melber 2003; Lumumba-Kasongo 2006; Mbaku and Ihonvbere 2006; Rakner and van de Walle 2009). Zanzibar, and in particular the small island of Pemba, are however an exception. Here, CUF poses a real challenge to CCM, based on the turbulent history of the islands. It is also at Zanzibar that political conflicts have been most intense and at times fiercely violent, with 45 people killed in the peaceful demonstration for rerun of the elections in 23 January 2001.

Most opposition parties lack a comprehensive and realistic political programme, with the exception of CUF and CHADEMA, and, to a lesser extent, NCCR-Mageuzi and TLP. All parties are, to a large extent, based on charismatic individuals, have a relatively narrow social base, and are mostly urban biased (various interviews and (Mmuya 1998). After the election in 1995, the opposition parties disintegrated and became even weaker in 2000 than they were during the previous election. After the election in 2000, the situation changed slightly for the majority of the parties. The CUF, CHADEMA, NCCR-Mageuzi and, to a lesser extent, TLP and UDP, might be considered more fully developed parties. The remaining 12 parties are very small. The lack of comprehensive policy alternatives to CCM was also

one of CCM's critiques against the opposition in 1995, 2000 and 2005 election. This critique is shared by the media, CSO, key informants and voters interviewed.

A large part of the parties' time and energies are devoted to internal power struggles, quite naturally for newly-formed parties in newly introduced multi-party context. The struggle over who should be chairman and/or presidential candidate, as demonstrated by, e.g., the struggles within NCCR-Mageuzi and TLP, is a case in point. The same is true for the struggles and rivalry with other parties in the opposition. Influential individuals could be attracted to leave a party that does not give them what they (most often) consider the prime position they seek, hence they move over to another party with their followers. That was what happened to the strongest and most prominent opposition party during the 1994-1999 period, the NCCR-Mageuzi. It was split in 1999 when Augustine Mrema, a strong and popular former Minister of Home Affairs, left CCM and joined the NCCR in 1995 to run for the presidency on NCCR ticket, leaving the majority of his followers to join TLP. As a result, both NCCR and TLP became preoccupied by internal power struggles, thereby weakening both parties – and most likely the opposition as a whole. These struggles are often related to which faction of the party has the right to government subsidies to the parties or other assets – or who should be the presidential candidate, MP/councillor or occupy some similar position in the party. The struggle within TLP continued after 2000 election, and the party did not manage to reorganise itself to its former strength before the 2005 election. TLP's presidential candidate got only 0.75 per cent of the vote.

With NCCR and TLP thus preoccupied with internal struggles, CUF emerged as the strongest opposition party during the 2000 election and continued to improve on its organisation and policies in the period up to the 2005 election. The CUF is often accused of being mainly an Islamist party, with its strong base being in Pemba/Zanzibar and along the Coast. The party strongly denied this.³ Several of its leading cadres are Christians and the party also had one of the most developed programmes among the opposition parties. By way of contrast, CHADEMA developed its organisation and changed its leadership prior to the elections in 2005. Its presidential candidate, the young and dynamic businessman, Freeman Mbowe, attracted young and aspiring businessmen and women during the election campaigns. Policy wise, both TLP and NCCR-Mageuzi define themselves as leftist/social democratic parties, while CHADEMA describes itself a conservative party and is a member of the African and international conservative alliance. The challenges for the opposition parties are clearly seen in the election results since the multi-party system was introduced in 1992.

The Union Presidential elections 1995, 2000 and 2005 (Percentage of total votes, mainland + Zanzibar)

	1995	2000	2005
CCM (Benjamin Mkapa 1995 & 2000, Jakaya Kikwete 2005)	61.8	71.7	80.3
CUF (Ibrahim Lipumba (1))	6.4	16.3	11.7
TLP (Augustine Mrema) (2)	27.8	7.8	0.75
UDP (John Cheyo)	4.0	4.2	-
CHADEMA (Freeman Mbowe)		- (1)	5.9
NCCR-Mageuzi (Mvungi Sengondo (2))			0.5

Source: NEC 2001, 2006

- 1) I. Lipumba was a joint candidate for CUF + CHADEMA 2000
- 2) A. Mrema was the Presidential candidate for NCCR-Mageuzi 1995, crossed over to TLP from 2000)

The parliamentary election results show an even more crushing defeat for the opposition. In 2000, the opposition only managed to win 14 (6.1 per cent) of the 181 seats while CCM won in 164 constituencies on the mainland. In the union as a whole, the opposition won 29 seats (12.5 per cent) of the 232 constituencies and CCM 198 seats. In 2005 the loss of the opposition on the mainland continued. It only managed to get seven seats on the mainland (representing 3.8 per cent of the 182 constituencies) and 26 (11.2 per cent) of the total 232 seats in the union. Nineteen of the opposition seats came from Zanzibar, and more over 18 from the small island of Pemba. From the 46 directly elected seats the opposition got in 1995 it was left with only 26 in 2005. In percentage terms, that equals a fall from about 20 per cent of the directly elected seats in 1995 to about 11 per cent in 2005. The deteriorating performance of opposition parties in subsequent elections can be interpreted as an indicator of the weakness or lack of popular support for opposition parties or the increasing capability and expertise of the ruling party and the state to rig elections.

In what follows, we focus on the largest opposition party, CUF, its structure and the challenges it has faced for a proper understanding of why the opposition remains largely marginalised in Tanzania 18 years after multi-party democracy was introduced.

Civic United Front (*Chama Cha Wananchi*)

CUF identifies itself as a social-liberal party, opposing the ruling 'revolutionary' party. CUF is a member of the Liberal International and the Africa Liberal Network (ALN).⁴ It was formed in March 1992 through a merger of KAMAHURU, a pressure group for democratisation in Zanzibar, and the Chama Cha Wananchi (CCW), a human rights-oriented political organisation based on the mainland. The party has its strongest support in Pemba and Zanzibar, along the coast and in the lake region, as well as in Dar es Salaam.

Ibrahim Haruna Lipumba is the national Chairman of CUF. He had an academic career and received a PhD in economics from Stanford University, USA, in 1983 before venturing into politics. Upon his return back home, Lipumba taught and conducted research in economics at the University of Dar es Salaam. He took active part in national policy debates and was appointed Economic Adviser to President Hassan Mwinyi in 1991. From 1993-1995, Lipumba was a Visiting Professor of Economics at Williams College, Massachusetts, USA, and was part of a team that evaluated the crisis of aid donors and Tanzania. Between 1996 and 1998, Lipumba worked at the United Nations University World Institute of Development Economics Research (UNU WIDER) and between 1995 and 2000, he was a member of the United Nations Committee for Development Policy.

Lipumba has held the position of Chairman of CUF from 1999, and was re-elected in 2004 and 2009. He has contested in the presidential elections in Tanzania since the country instituted a multi-party system in the early 1990s. Professor Lipumba is a respected economist and a skilled orator drawing large crowds to CUF's rallies. He still continues his career as a freelance economist on a smaller scale.

Election Results

In the 1995 national election, CUF Presidential national candidate, Ibrahim Lipumba, got 6.4 per cent of the vote, coming third behind Benjamin Mkapa of the CCM and NCCR-Mageuzi candidate, Augustine Mrema. In the parliamentary elections, the party won 24 of 232 elective seats, making it the largest opposition party in the legislature. All CUF seats came from Zanzibar constituencies. In Zanzibar, the CUF presidential candidate for Zanzibar, Seif Sharif Hamad was narrowly defeated by CCM candidate Salmin Amour, winning 49.8 per cent of the vote to Amour's 50.2 per cent. Observers noted serious irregularities in the poll and the CUF rejected the result as rigged. CUF boycotted the House of Representatives and refused to recognise the Salmin government as legitimate. In November 1997, eighteen leaders of the CUF were arrested and subsequently charged with treason. These charges were later dropped.

In the October 2000 national presidential election, Lipumba was a joint candidate for CHADEMA and CUF. He got 16.3 per cent of the votes, second to President Benjamin Mkapa. The party maintained its status as the largest opposition party in the National Assembly by winning 17 of 231 elective seats. In Zanzibar Seif Sharif Hamad won 33 per cent of the vote against 67 per cent for the ruling party's Amani Abeid Karume in elections for the presidency of Zanzibar. In the Zanzibar House of Representatives, CUF won 16 of 50 elective seats. The 2000 elections were considered largely free but not fair on the mainland. However, observers noted serious irregularities in the Zanzibar polls citing widespread irregularities and instances of intimidation of opposition supporters by the security forces. CUF accused the government of rigging the election and called for a complete re-run of the polls. When the electoral commission nullified the results in only 16 constituencies, CUF announced that it would boycott the new elections conducted on 5 November 2000. The Commonwealth Observers concluded that:

The conduct of the elections fell far short of minimum standards. (...) The cause was either deliberate manipulation or gross incompetence. (...) The Group believes that only a properly conducted and fresh poll, throughout Zanzibar, undertaken by a Commission reformed in line with international good practice, with its independence guaranteed in both law and practice and a restructured and professional Secretariat, can create confidence in and give credibility to Zanzibar's democracy (Commonwealth Observer Group 2001)

In January 2001, 45 CUF supporters were shot by Tanzanian Security Forces in peaceful demonstration for a re-run of the election. The event led ruling CCM party and opposition CUF to have a dialogue that resulted in signing of a peace accord named MUAFAKA II, designed to ensure electoral and constitutional reforms. Most of the planned reforms were not implemented by the government, including, crucially, an agreed credible voter's register prior to the elections of October 2005.

In the 2005 national election CUF and CHADEMA did not have an alliance. Ibrahim Lipumba won 11.7 per cent of the vote, a distant second to CCM's Jakaya Kikwete. Out of the 232 National Assembly seats filled through direct election, the CUF won 19. In the 2005 elections for the Zanzibar Presidency and House of Representatives, Seif Sharif Hamad placed second to incumbent Amani Abeid Karume, winning 46.1 per cent of the vote. The party won 19 seats in the House of Representatives. International and domestic observers heavily criticised the conduct of the Zanzibar polls; again CUF disputed the election and refused to recognise Karume as President. The United States boycotted the swearing-in ceremony of Abeid Karume as President.

The Story of an Opposition Leader: Ibrahim Lipumba

The following account is based on a series of interviews over a ten-year period with Ibrahim Lipumba by Lennart Wohlgemuth and Jonas Ewald at different occasions. It is the testimony of a politician in action with all its pros and cons. The series of interviews show that there are capacity and personal commitment in the political opposition in Tanzania. The views presented here are verified in several other interviews we had with several other political leaders in Tanzania, with similar stories on formal and informal constraints (Ewald 2011).

After a long career as an academic and researcher you are now involved in politics in Tanzania. What makes a senior and prominent researcher enter the arena of politics?

I believe that politics is too important for development in poor countries such as Tanzania to be left only to professional politicians. I entered the Presidential race in 1995 to initiate development policy debate. My party was strong in Zanzibar and was expected to win the elections in that part of the country, but weak in mainland Tanzania. I believed that being a mainland I would provide a unifying link if my party won the elections in Zanzibar and the ruling party won the elections in mainland Tanzania. The main opposition candidate in mainland Tanzania was not providing a principled challenge against the past policies of the ruling party and was using the tactic of blaming the Indian business community for the economic problems affecting the majority of Tanzanians. I believed it was my civic duty to accept the challenge and debate the past policies of the ruling party that hindered individual freedom, freedom of expression and deliberately curtailed opportunities for self-advancement and the establishment of a broad-based market economy. I also articulated a socially inclusive market-oriented development strategy that had confidence in Tanzanians' ability to manage their own affairs and establish a vibrant economy.

I did not expect to win the presidential election. My objective was to strengthen democracy by debating and supporting policies that promote an open society, the rule of law, and establishing a socially inclusive competitive market economy. To promote growth requires institutional arrangements that clearly define and protect property rights and encourage the establishment of transparent and accountable government that prioritises its expenditure on education, health, infrastructure and agriculture. As one of the members of Professor Gerry Helleiner's team that evaluated the donor-government relations, I had realised that the level of corruption had reached an astonishingly dangerous level that was threatening political and economic stability. By raising the corruption and governance issues in the campaign I

believed they would be included in the policy agenda by whoever won the presidential elections. After the elections, I returned to the University to teach but I was expelled from the University for political reasons. The official reason was that I had gone to Washington for short-term research without permission from University authorities.

Have you tried to combine your research capabilities with political work?

Yes, I have, for example, spent three months as a guest researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute in late 2002/early 2003 in Uppsala, reviewing and rethinking development policy in Tanzania. I started by reviewing the levels of poverty in Tanzania. My estimates at that time indicated that poverty has increased from 48.5 per cent in 1991 to 75 per cent in 2000. The main cause for the increase in poverty is that growth has been modest; an average of 4.2 per cent per year during 1995-2000, and income distribution has worsened. The fastest growing sector is mining but it is capital intensive, does not generate employment and has displaced artisan miners. The agricultural sector has been neglected. The growth of agricultural value added has hardly kept pace with population growth rate. Although the agricultural sector employs 70 per cent of the labour force, in the past seven years the government has allocated only 4 per cent of its total expenditure to this sector.

An appropriate development strategy in Tanzania must focus on transforming the agricultural sector and promoting labour-intensive industries and services. The government has been successful in reducing inflation from 34 per cent in 1994 to 4.5 per cent in 2002. The success in reducing inflation is largely the result of stringent use of the cash budget to contain aggregate government expenditure. Reducing inflation to single digit levels by itself will not mobilise domestic saving and increase investment. Financial sector reforms that included the privatisation of state-owned banks have not improved the availability of financial services. With inadequate financial services, limited access to credit and the prohibitively high cost of credit, sustained high growth rate of output cannot be achieved. There is an obvious market failure in the financial sector that has to be tackled by government intervention.

In order to address mass poverty, Tanzania needs to move beyond the 'Washington Consensus' policies to focus on an agriculture-led development strategy based on enhancing the democratic rights of the rural population and empowering smallholder farmers to increase their productivity. We need to deliberate on the appropriate institutional and policy framework for promoting broad-based development through learning from our past mistakes and successes.

I also continued to work on globalisation and Africa's development. In this research I attempted to answer key questions on globalisation. Is sub-Saharan Africa being marginalised in the global economy because of bad domestic policies, or because of unequal and exploitative terms of integration into the global economy? Does globalisation give the poor African countries an opportunity to leapfrog several decades of development if they combine their low wages with basic education, technical skills and export-led growth to take advantage of the rapidly opening global markets? Can globalisation be managed to promote pro-poor growth that uses abundant labour, generates employment and avoids ruthless growth that increases income inequality and the ranks of the poor?

Even in the era of globalisation, development is a do-it-yourself process. Africa needs policies to integrate into the global economy while promoting poverty-reducing growth. Broad participation of the population in the market economy by utilising Africa's comparative advantage in agriculture is an important initial step. Policies that support smallholder farmers to participate in a market economy and protect rights of peasants, including women, to access land, credit and improved technology are particularly important for broad-based development. African countries' mineral resources have not been fully utilised. Foreign investment is indispensable for the exploration and exploitation of these resources. It is however important to adequately tax the rents to support human development; that is an end in itself but it will also create new areas of more rewarding comparative advantage. Special efforts are however needed to attract FDI in export-oriented manufacturing. Investment in infrastructure, including telecommunications, power, water supply, roads and ports is a pre-requisite. The private sector may provide part of this investment, particularly in telecommunications, but the public sector will have to be responsible for the other investments particularly road infrastructure. A minimum basic level of human development in the form of universal basic education, health, nutrition and housing is necessary for a sustained integration into the global economy.

How do you see the development in Tanzania in the immediate future? As an opposition politician, do you see a development towards a 'real' democracy?

After forty-fifty years of independence, 75 per cent of Tanzanians are poor, spending less than one dollar a day. Life expectancy at birth has decreased from a peak of 52 years in 1991 to 48 years in 2000. Infant mortality is 104 per 1,000 live births. Tanzania needs to initiate a broad-based growth of output of 8 per cent per year, invest in agriculture and rural infrastructure and improve the delivery of education and health services. Agricultural

transformation is the key to long-term development and poverty eradication in Tanzania. In the past seven years, the government has allocated less than 4 per cent of its total budget directly to the agricultural sector. Tanzania is lucky. It has plenty of land. Nevertheless, land-grabbing is now on the increase and the government has unfortunately ignored the key recommendation of the Shivji Commission, the recommendation on its land policy particularly providing security of access to land by peasants.

Tanzania has important characteristics that make it feasible to establish a democratic society and a broad-based socially-inclusive market economy. First, there is a common lingua franca, Kiswahili, that provides a cultural and communication bond. Second, in many rural areas of the country, almost all households have access to land and we do not have a landed gentry and a landless peasantry. Third, the potential of promoting economic growth based on small-holder agriculture and labour-intensive manufacturing has yet to be fully exploited. The mineral potential that is just beginning to be exploited can provide government revenues to support human resource development, including investment in education and life-long learning, and improvement in health services. Fourth, the potential for increasing living standards by concentrating public resources on basic health and education is enormous. Fifth, Tanzania does not have a history of civil violence and political extremism, and the people have a tradition of tolerance and compromise. It is possible to encourage competitive political processes based on policy issues rather than ethnic, racial or religious chauvinism and character assassination. Establishing a democratic system of government with free and fair elections and where democratically elected governments are transparent and accountable to the electorate will, however, not be easy. The single party system had entrenched itself. The machinery of government was answerable to the ruling party.

The coercive machinery of the state, including the army, police and the security (secret police) were under the party authority. The judiciary was only nominally independent of the government and the party. The present constitution does not allow independent candidates to contest any elective office at all levels from village government, municipalities, and parliament to the presidency.

How is this influencing you practically as an opposition party?

We are constantly harassed and stopped in our work on reaching the electorate. Problems occur in the period leading up to elections, during the elections and between elections. This becomes most evident at times of elections as the following examples among many shows:

In October 2002 we were stopped from holding a public rally in Kigoma town on the shore of Lake Tanganyika. The rally was called according to the rules but 30 minutes before the start thereof police came and stopped the meeting on the pretext that there was an outbreak of meningitis in Kigoma. (But meningitis does not spread in open areas). After the police cancelled the public rally, we organised a meeting with our district party leaders outside their office. We put chairs outside the office for the meeting because meningitis spread easily in closed indoors. Immediately two land rovers with field force paramilitary police drove in and arrested the district chairman and one supporter on the pretext that we attempted to hold a public meeting without the permission of the police.

In September 2002 we had a good rally and public meeting in Igalula in Tabora District. After the meeting some of our supporters and local leaders were arrested on the pretext that they had abused the deputy minister who was the elected Member of Parliament of that area. The name of the minister was not even mentioned. The rally focused on policies, particularly poor quality education, lack of health services particularly for pregnant women and widespread human rights abuses. They were imprisoned for three days before being charged. The case took more than a year before it was dismissed. The accused had to report to court once every month. We had to hire a lawyer at a great expense given our limited resources.

Such behaviours do strangle the opposition and it is no doubt meant to. And what is the evidence that this behaviour is aimed at strangling the opposition?

After the 2005 election, after having obtained some 85 per cent of the electorate, the CCM still did its utmost to bribe members of the opposition to join their party. One example is Tabwe Hiza, a prominent member of our party in Dar es Salaam. He was a parliamentary candidate in 2000 and 2005 for the Temeke constituency in Dar es Salaam. After the 2005 election we had a small reshuffle of the members of the secretariat of our party. I removed Tambwe from the position of publicity secretary of the Party. He continued to be a member of our Governing Council. He was seduced and joined CCM where he was given a position as Head of the propaganda unit in CCM headquarters. In a supposed thriving democracy, why should a party that has gained 85 per cent of all parliamentary seats work so hard to win over a few prominent people from the opposition after the election. Our district chairman and parliamentary candidate for Kondoa constituency was very strong. He has also been seduced by CCM and given a post as CCM party secretary in Bukoba Urban. I had very strong parliamentary candidates in Rufiji and Maswa districts who have been seduced to cross over to CCM. And so on.

This does not only relate to our party but also the other opposition parties. The national vice chairman of CHADEMA was solicited and [he] crossed over to CCM and was elected by CCM-dominated parliament to become a member of the East African Community Legislative Assembly. These are examples that there are no commitments by the ruling party for a real well-functioning democratic system in our country.

More examples of harassments

The opposition is denied by the ruling party and the state any opportunities to develop and expand. Here is an example from a 2007 by-election in Tunduru District in Ruvuma region. CUF is very strong in that district. In [the] 2005 election we believe that we had won the majority. Officially our parliamentary candidate received 45 per cent of the vote. The CCM MP for Tunduru died after he suffered major injuries in a plane accident that led to a by-election in that constituency. A by-election does not receive the same attention as a regular election. However, in Tunduru the by-election attracted a lot of people. The CUF public rallies attracted many people because of the issues our candidate raised. The conditions of roads in Tunduru were extremely bad, probably the worst in the whole country. Many vehicles were stuck on the Masasi-Tunduru road. The government had set a minimum price of raw cashew nuts – the main cash crop at Tshs 600 a kilo. Traders boycotted purchasing cashew nuts from farmers because the government's minimum price was too high. Poor peasants ended up with stocks of cashew nuts they could not sell while they badly needed the cash to pay for school uniforms and medical expenses. Our candidate was driving these issues over the whole constituency and voters were enthusiastic about punishing CCM for the hardship they were suffering. In addition the CCM candidate did not have full support of his party and the chairman of the district council – a CCM councillor – was opposed to him. He was not considered to be a local person and not popular in his constituency. So we had high expectation. But the election campaign led by the CCM party Secretary-General and the Vice-Chairman changed all our expectation. They unashamedly argued that CCM cannot lose the election they own all state instruments and functionaries, including the representative of the National Election Commission, the District Commissioner and other officials and the Police. The condition for us to campaign became increasingly difficult. The police harassed and teargassed our supporters. Many of them were remanded in prison. The CCM as a party does not have any commitment to democratic change in Tanzania. They could lose the Tunduru seat and still retain more than 85 per cent of MPs in parliament but they were still using state resources, including the police and government vehicles, to make sure that CUF does not win a seat in Mainland Tanzania.

What was even worse, very few voters turned out to vote on the Election Day. CCM had a network of its cadres purchasing voting cards from young voters

who were considered potential supporters of CUF for between 1000 and 5000 shillings. In spite of a very high public interest in the campaign because of the important issues affecting the constituency raised by the CUF candidate and a distrust of the CCM candidate, participation in the election were less than 50 per cent of the registered voters. It is illegal to collect or purchase voters identification cards. We reported the allegations to the police and National Elections Commission but the authorities refused to investigate. Our candidate who got 37 287 (45 per cent) votes in 2005 election, according to the official tally, received only 18 182 (37 per cent) in the by-election less than half of the 2005 votes. There is no reason that our candidate should have fewer votes in the by-election than in 2005. If anything he had a better campaign and should have had more votes in 2007.

The harassment of political parties continues in all districts. I have personally been a victim or witnessed several harassments. A very good example of harassment of opposition parties in Tanzania after the introduction of multi-party politics is my experience in party-building activities. In 2000, we went to Newala, a district bordering Mozambique, i.e., as far away from Dar es Salaam you can go. We wrote a letter to the police that we intend to have a public rally. Because of communication problems our local party secretary did not deliver the letter to the police at least 48 hours before a public rally is to be held, as required by law. The police received the letter 24 hours before the scheduled rally. When we arrived in Newala the police said that we could not hold our rally because we had not notified the police 48 hours before the rally. So we proposed to postpone the rally for another 24 hours to allow 48 hours to elapse. They did not accept that and requested us to write a new letter. Then we had to wait for another 48 hours. Waiting for two days in Newala would disrupt our other scheduled meetings. So we decided to have an internal meeting which legally does not require the notification of the police. We rented a school a hall – that we had to pay for, so our members could come there to discuss policy issues and our political programme. We used our vehicle which had a public address system to announce and inform the public that we were going to have an internal party meeting. As our vehicle moved around Newala inviting members to attend our internal meeting, a police land rover full of armed policemen stopped us. They informed us we are not allowed to invite people to attend our internal meeting using a public address system. If there is an internal meeting we should only inform members by letters. Public announcements are not allowed for an internal meeting, the police told us. We asked the police which law prevented political parties from using public address system to invite members to an internal meeting? They threatened to beat and arrest us if we continued publicising our internal meeting using public speakers. I tried to call the Commissioner of Police in Dar but the telephone connection was too bad. So we ended up going all the way to the border of Mozambique but unable to hold a public rally with the people of Newala or an internal meeting with our members. Thereafter, we went to the regional headquarters in Mtwara. We also wanted to hold a public rally on the 10th of January. Our Party Secretary

wrote a letter to the police but was told that we could not hold that rally because 12th of January was the Revolutionary day of Zanzibar and all the police and armed forces in the country were on a standby so there was no police available to come to our rally - to provide security. We told them that there were no security problems that required the presence of police, but they did not accept. So I went to the Nsa Kaisi, the Regional Commissioner to appeal to be allowed to hold a rally. He told me that a Regional Commissioner could not interfere with police decisions. I questioned: how could Revolution Day celebrations in Zanzibar, affect the security situation in far away Mtwara. With a straight face he responded by saying that the situation in Mtwara could easily be unstable because it is so close to the border of Mozambique and you cannot easily distinguish who is from Mozambique and who is from Tanzania. So we could not hold any rally in Mtwara. Amazingly we now consider Mtwara Region particularly Newala and Tandahimba districts as strong areas of CUF. We did well in the 2009 local elections.

During the 2005 election campaign we tried to reach as many places as possible. We could not afford to hire helicopters and therefore only used motor vehicles. In the campaign trail you cannot reach or stop at every village. Sometimes you are stopped to greet people. Most roads are in poor conditions and therefore sticking to time schedule of political rallies is extremely difficult. We travelled to Sumbawanga in Rukwa region after completing our campaign in Mbeya region. We arrived in Sumbawanga late because of the long distance and the bad conditions of the road. I could only start addressing the rally around 17.40 in the evening. Sumbawanga is in the western part of the country the sun sets rather late, so there was no problem of darkness. At 18.00 hours the police approached the platform to inform me that the law states that we had to stop at 18.00 hours. I tried to continue to complete my speech. The police threatened to arrest me if I continued. This was around 18.10. It is clear that the police did not believe that I was a potential president in waiting. This law however only pertained to the opposition parties. The CCM candidate was well known to be extremely weak in observing time and schedules. He regularly continued addressing meetings as late as eight in the evening.

This rule that limits campaign rallies to six in the evening makes it extremely difficult with the long distances and the bad roads. It always takes longer time to travel than you have scheduled and you always arrive late and then the police stop you. We have 60 days of campaign and have to cover so much ground. So this happens again and again. In some cases police allows you to go on to 6.30 but in most cases they do not. We try to appeal to the National Electoral Commission. In most of the areas in the Western part of the country there is sunlight up to seven. The law is set to ensure peace and security but most political rallies are generally peaceful. During the campaign you have to give your campaign schedule to the National Election Commission and then follow it. If your vehicle breaks down on the road and you are delayed for one reason or another you still have to keep to that schedule. Adjusting your schedule even if

it does not conflict with schedules of other candidates is usually not allowed. For example we were late for our campaign rally in Meatu, Shinyanga region. We could not have our rally as scheduled. We tried to have the rally next day because there was no other political party scheduled to have a rally in Meatu that day. The police intervened and refused us to have the rally because it was not in our official schedule. We explained that we were late the day before but the police insisted that the new date was not in the schedule so that they could not allow the meeting to take place. In some cases the police understand your predicament and accept to reschedule. But often the District Commissioners who are members of the ruling party and head of government operation in the district pressure the police to make the environment as difficult as possible for opposition parties. My NCCR colleague who was a parliamentary candidate for Ngara constituency informed me that Kikwete, the then CCM presidential candidate, arrived in Ngara late in the evening. He had a campaign rally at eight in the evening and another one in the morning. So the ruling party do not have those schedule limitations.

Another story from the 2005 elections is from my campaign rally in Kilwa. We were travelling from Liwale, a district that contains a large part of the Selous National Park. We were given a police escort using a vehicle that belonged to Kilwa District council that was driven at a very slow speed. Most members of my campaign team wanted our driver to overtake the escort vehicle so that we can arrive in Kilwa in time. I insisted that we should respect the police and not overtake the escort vehicle. We arrived in Kilwa around 17.45. I immediately started addressing the rally. Kilwa is a CUF stronghold and there were many supporters at the rally. At 18.00 the police stopped me. I did continue to six-twenty and my supporters escorted us to our guest house. Some of our supporters including our district chairman were arrested and charged for illegal demonstration. We then found out that the reason that the police delayed our entry to Kilwa was that the former President and the ruling party central committee member Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who was not even a candidate, had been in town and giving a speech in support of the CCM presidential candidate. All other police vehicles were used to provide security to the retired President. In fact we discovered later that our police escort vehicle was driven slowly purposely so that we arrive late in Kilwa to sabotage our campaign rally and create a pretext for arresting our local leaders and supporters who were jailed and charged for participating in an illegal demonstration.

A final example: Dr Mvungi was the NCCR Presidential candidate in the 2005 elections. He went to cast his vote with his whole family of six persons. When the votes were counted he got one vote in his polling station so he said to me that this result would imply that even his own wife did not vote for him. CCM and the state have become experts at rigging elections. Election observers who come few days before the election cannot understand the rigging process.

This is how it is to work as an opposition in Tanzania. We have to devote a lot of time and money to get lawyers to represent us. When I am touring the country so much time has to be spent on negotiations with the police and local administration officials. It varies from case to case whether the police act locally on their own initiatives, if they lack knowledge of the rules of the game or whether the central government or CCM directs the activities of the police. Overall the conditions facing opposition parties are deteriorating. The 1995 election was a more level-playing field. The government paid for polling agents and there was no harassment during the campaigns. In 2000 election there was much more unequal access to resources and a lot of more harassment and in 2005 even more so.

The most serious problem is that the opposition has no resources to have polling agents to follow up the elections and the counting of the votes.

Can you give examples of how your financial situation affects you personally?

In 1995 when I entered into the Presidential race in the last minute, I was not very well prepared. My colleagues were also not very well prepared particularly in financing the campaign. At that time, I had just returned from my teaching assignment at Williams College in the USA. I had US\$ 40,000 of savings from Williams College. So I used all my saving for the campaign. This was not much but with the help of supporters who provided food and shelter for us during the campaign we managed. After 1995, the government started providing subsidies to parliamentary parties in proportion to the number of seats. The bulk of the government subsidy, more than three quarters go to CCM.

The government subsidy is the most dependable source of financing. In 2000 General Election, we had saved some of the subsidy to finance election activities. During 1996-1998 I was a Senior Researcher at WIDER in Helsinki so I had a small saving from there which I also used to finance our party campaign. So we managed, but with minimum resources. As a presidential candidate I had only one vehicle – a two-door short chassis Land Cruiser – that was packed with a public address system, campaign materials, personal luggage and a five- person campaign team. We travelled around the whole country with this vehicle. So we really lived on a shoestring budget. The most discouraging part of the campaign was that although we attracted huge crowds of supporters and discussed pertinent policy issues facing the country, we received limited media coverage. Many days could pass without any mention of our campaign in the media despite many journalists being present in our campaign rallies.

In 2005 we were a little better organised but we also had some luck. We had been underpaid of our government subsidy. We obtained a sum of 400 million shilling as arrears just before the election campaign. The subsidy is not for the election but rather for the period in between elections and is supposed to help the party in its operations. The subsidy arrears helped us finance our campaign. Although we continued having the problem of not receiving adequate media coverage, we had an effective campaign and trained polling agents for more than half of the 45,000 polling stations. Unfortunately the vice-presidential candidate of CHADEMA died only a few days before the election date. The elections were therefore postponed. If we had an independent electoral commission, only the Presidential election should have been postponed, but the parliamentary and council elections should have taken place as planned. But they postponed all elections for 45 days. That allowed the CCM to be better organised because they had financial resources. For us it was a disaster because we had no more money left to travel around the country campaigning. We had budgeted money for allowances of polling agents. The money had already been transferred to parliamentary candidates. These candidates had to continue with campaign activities for another 45 days and ended up using the money budgeted for the polling day activities. So we really did not have effective polling agents in most of the 45,000 polling stations. This was true for all opposition parties, although, CHADEMA seem to have been somewhat better financed even after the elections were postponed. The ruling party CCM spent more money after the election was postponed and had more campaign activities.

Are there any possibilities to act in parliament for an opposition party in Tanzania today?

The Civic United Front is the largest opposition party in parliament with 32 MPs. We have formed an alliance with other opposition parties in parliament and established an official opposition in parliament. The official opposition has done an excellent job in parliament such as exposing grand corruption involving the external payments account of the Bank of Tanzania whereby phoney companies acting as agents of external creditors collected US\$ 113 million from the Central Bank. The power of the opposition in parliament to hold the government to account is however constrained by the parliamentary rules that have vested authority and powers in the Speaker of the Parliament. The Speaker has to agree before a private motion of a Member of Parliament is brought up for discussion in Parliament.

In August 2007, Dr Slaa, a CHADEMA member of parliament and Deputy Leader of the official opposition in parliament, prepared a private motion requesting the parliament to establish a select committee to investigate allegation of misuse of public funds in the Bank of Tanzania, including stealing of US\$113 million from the Central Bank External Payments Account, the use of half a billion dollars in the construction of Bank of Tanzania twin towers and its office in Zanzibar, providing tens of millions of dollars of guarantees to private companies' commercial debt that increased contingent liabilities of the Central Bank, Bank of Tanzania providing commercial credit to Mwananchi Gold Company, a registered private company contrary to the Bank of Tanzania Act. The motion was planned to be tabled in parliament on August 7, 2007. All parliamentary requirements were met but at the last minute it was blocked by the Speaker and was not tabled.

The Opposition in parliament has contributed to the establishment of the Parliamentary Select Committee to investigate the TANESCO tendering of emergency power generation in 2006 that was awarded to Richmond Development Company LLC of Houston, Texas, USA. Hon. Habib Mnyaa, a CUF Member of Parliament from Zanzibar who is an engineer and has in the past worked for TANESCO was the first to raise his suspicion of a fraudulent contract awarded to Richmond that did not have the capacity to implement a power generating project. He wanted to table a private motion for the formation of a parliamentary select committee to investigate the process that led TANESCO to award the contract to Richmond. But members of parliament from CCM told him, 'If you table the motion, it will be blocked'. They suggested that it should be sent as a recommendation of the Minerals and Energy Parliamentary Committee. And so they did. And then the speaker accepted the motion by the committee to be tabled in parliament. For the first time since the multi-party parliament started in 1995, a parliamentary Select Committee was established chaired by Hon. Dr. Harrison Mwakyembe and included Hon. Habib Mnyaa to investigate the Richmond saga. The Mwakyembe Committee Report showed that the selection of Richmond Development Company to implement a 100 MW emergency power generation project violated the Public Procurement Act and did not follow the legal advice provided by Public Procurement Regulatory Authority – PPRA. The Report was tabled in parliament and led to the resignation of the Prime Minister and two other ministers. After the resignation of the Prime Minister, the President had to dissolve the cabinet and select a new prime minister and cabinet. For the first time the parliament showed that it has powers to hold the government to account.

Are there any formal or informal limitations to act as an opposition today in Tanzania? Any major changes in the past years?

After the 2000 election, President Mkapa stated that CCM had won in a big way; it should be given the opportunity to implement its manifesto. Opposition parties should stop political rallies and demonstrations until the next election campaigns in 2005. In January 2001 we held political demonstrations to demand an independent electoral commission, a new democratic constitution and a re-run of the Zanzibar election. Before the demonstration I was beaten up, arrested and imprisoned. My arrest did not prevent the demonstration from taking place. During those demonstrations more than 45 people were killed by the armed forces in Zanzibar. In October 2001, CCM and CUF reached a political accord (MUAFAKA) on Zanzibar. For the first time since the 1995 Presidential debate in 1995, I met President Mkapa face to face on October 10, 2001 during the MUAFAKA signing ceremony. Since then significant changes have taken place.

The major one is a significant decrease of harassment of the top leadership of opposition parties. As a leader of the largest opposition party I have been invited to major events such as national ceremonies, state banquets and festivities and meetings with visiting heads of government and states. When we had foreign visitors in the country, President Mkapa organised for opposition leaders to privately meet them. I met the President of Germany, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, the President of Kenya and the Prime Minister of Denmark. We freely discussed with these leaders political, governance and development problems of Tanzania. Most of these improvements took place during the last two years of the Mkapa presidency. After 2005, with President Kikwete at the helm, opposition leaders' meetings with visiting heads of government and states stopped. I have been invited twice to state banquets in honour of visiting Head of State. The first was for the President of Burundi and the other was for the President of China.

At the local level there are still big problems with the ruling party and government accepting the legitimacy of opposition political parties.

For example, in August 2009 we went to Kisarawe District some 40 km from Dar es Salaam. We participated in a number of political rallies in the district and then we went to Msanga a larger village to spend the night there. That evening we were informed that our local party leaders in Vilabwa village who had organised the activities during the day had been harassed and arrested by the village and ward executive officer and remanded in prison. We returned to that village to investigate what had happened. We went to the home of the village executive officer who lived with her parents. We were told that she was not at home as she was meeting with the ward executive officer. We later realised that she actually was inside her house. There was a heated debate. When we were leaving the mother of the village executive officer pretended she had been possessed by spirits and held tightly the leg of one of my party officials. It was a struggle to force her to let alone my party official. Apparently our party leaders had been arrested by the local militia who were given the order by the village executive officer and taken to a Division Executive Officer some 10 km from the village. They were not imprisoned but were told report again the next day. We told our party functionaries not to worry about reporting to the Division Executive Officer. It was their constitutional right to participate in our political activities. As we were leaving, a younger sister of the village executive officer threw a stone and broke a window of my vehicle. We stopped. The girl who broke our vehicle was taken away on a motorbike by one of his relatives. We took the father of the sisters who had instructed her daughter to throw a stone to our vehicle to the Kisarawe police station to report what had happened. I explained what happened and showed the car window to the police. The police appeared to be sympathetic, detained the person we had taken to the police and instructed my driver to report the next day to write a statement. When my driver and Deputy Secretary General of our party returned to the police station to write a statement, they were arrested on the charge of having participated in causing havoc and breaking the peace at the house of the village executive officer of Vilabwa village. Our party leaders in Vilabwa village were also arrested. They were taken to court. We sent people to post bonds for them to be released. When the police found out that one of the people arrested was CUF Deputy Secretary-General, he was immediately released and not charged. But my driver who never left his vehicle when we visited the home of the village executive officer was charged for committing a criminal offence. Since September 2009 my driver has been reporting to court every month. They do not charge the top people but in order to disrupt local activities they use court cases to harass our local leaders. In this particular case the prosecutor knows there is no case to answer but wants to be given some money to dismiss and close the case. We had a journalist with us and she wrote a news report but there is no follow up of the issue.

For the national leadership the situation has thus improved but for the local cadres nothing has improved.

In Parliament also some changes have taken place. The public accounts committee has been chaired for a long time by a Hon. John Cheyo a member of parliament for UDP. A common principle among Westminster parliamentary system is for a member of parliament from the opposition party to chair the public accounts committee. Tanzania observes the principle of a member of the opposition chairing the Public Accounts Committee but does not give the opposition members the right to select who will chair the Committee. All members of parliament vote. CCM account for more than 80 per cent of all members and they decide who will be the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee. Since 1997 they have voted Hon. John Cheyo to chair this important committee. Recently he has been extremely supportive of President Kikwete to the extent of discouraging opposition parties not to contest the presidency in 2010. Also the parastatal sector committee is chaired by an opposition member this time from CHADEMA and, through the committee, is able to raise a number of important issues.

Members of Parliament can speak freely within the parliamentary rules on basically any policy issue. During the budget session our members can give comments and alternative ideas on the budget. Their questions, comments and speeches are usually covered by the media particularly radio and television. It is possible for members of parliament to challenge the government and bring up new ideas. The parliamentary Hansard is posted in the Bunge website. The Tanzania parliament website is among the best in Africa. It shows the number of questions and comments contributed by each Member of Parliament. The major problem of most members of parliament is that they lack a professional staff to do research and provide relevant information that can be used to challenge the government.

What about availability of strategic information for the opposition?

We really have major problems in terms of obtaining high quality information. Tanzania statistics are still very poor. National accounts indicate that annual GDP growth averaged around 7 per cent in 2000-08, but head count poverty has decreased from 36 per cent in 2001 to 33 per cent in 2007. Recorded growth seems to have an insignificant impact on poverty. The new national accounts show the share of agriculture in total GDP in 2005 was only 27.6 per cent compared to 46.1 per cent in the old accounts. This 18.5 percentage point reduction in the share of agriculture is supposed to have been absorbed by an increase in the share of services. This is not plausible. The 2007 Integrated Labour Force Survey still shows that 75 per cent of the labour

force depends on agriculture as the main source of income. Other information we get particularly through our member of parliament and the parliamentary web site.

In order to control aggregate expenditure, the government continues to use the cash budget system except for priority sectors. Budgeted expenditure may vary greatly with actual expenditure and it is difficult to get the correct information. The website of the IMF and the World Bank contain a lot of information on economic policy. The letter of intent to the IMF contains most of the macroeconomic and financial policies the government intends to implement.

Dr Slaa, a CHADEMA member of parliament and the deputy leader of opposition in parliament, has been excellent at getting sensitive information particularly related to the Bank of Tanzania. Foreign newspapers that are now available on the web have been a good source of information. We were first informed about possible corruption in the purchase of the BAE radar through reading the UK Guardian newspaper on the web.

What about press coverage?

The media was basically bought by CCM in 2005. The press was almost only covering CCM and particularly Kikwete. CHADEMA got some press but the other opposition parties hardly any. We felt as if our campaign activities were boycotted. It became even worse after the elections were postponed. The Zanzibar election took place on 30th of October 2005 as scheduled. The results announced by the Zanzibar Election Commission did not match with the results we received from the polling stations and we protested vehemently. We just did not accept the Zanzibar results. When the results came out there were a lot of demonstrations at our headquarters in Dar es Salaam demanding that we should do something to get the correct results in the Zanzibar election. We had announced a press conference in our Dar es Salaam headquarters. Journalists came as requested. They came in the midst of a heated demonstration outside our offices and some journalists were beaten up. I went to see one particular journalist that was wounded to apologise, and he told me that the person that beat him and kicked him probably was not a CUF member. The perpetrator had worn army boots and he suspected that he was from the security services. I apologised to the journalists and the media house but after that sad incident, the media particularly the IPP media which is the largest media house in the country, with television station that has widest coverage in the country, radio network and numerous newspapers completely boycotted us. We were only covered when there was something negative to report. For example, they did report that my laptop was stolen although it was not my laptop but a flash disk.

So how do you meet these challenges?

It should be a concrete effort to level the playing field for the opposition and other countries should be aware of that and assist. And we in the opposition have come to the conclusion that without an independent electoral commission and a constitution that calls for an independent electoral commission and an independent anti-corruption board it would be extremely difficult to have a real democratisation process to take place. And now we are focusing on how to obtain such a better democratic constitution and an independent electoral commission. We started by forming a committee consisting of not only political parties but also of NGOs, human rights groups to draft a constitution taking in views from all stakeholders in Tanzania. The committee completed a zero draft of the constitution that was discussed and distributed to political parties and other stakeholders for comments. Lack of financial resources have slowed the process of organising constitutional review meetings and it is unlikely that a final document can be available before the October General Election

We have to organise locally, provide our members with simple messages [with which] they can inform their fellow citizens in their localities. The key issues we focus on include human rights, each individual's right to adequate nutritious food, basic health and education. We tell our members that in a day may be they meet 6 – 8 people and if they manage to give them CUF key policy position we can reach a lot of people without being covered in the press. Tell the people what CUF stands for. Tanzania has been independent for 50 years, but what has the common man got out of it. We receive a lot of aid and where is all that money gone.

It is extremely expensive to keep up the party organisation all over the country. We lack infrastructures, transport and communication. To have meetings with chairmen of the districts is a major logistical problem. To organise a national congress of the party is an effort that requires significant financial resources. We have revised the party constitution to reduce the number of these meetings as well as the number of delegates.

What is your forecast for the election of 2010? Will it be fairer than earlier elections?

We still have problems with the National Electoral Commission. We still think that it is very biased in favour of CCM, the party in power. NEC is not transparent in its operations. As an example, we had received tips that voting identification cards had been burned in one of the Government warehouses. I did not believe it so I went with my party functionaries and journalists to investigate the issue. We found a heap of voting identification cards that had

been burnt. Some of them were only half burnt so we collected them. Some were from Zanzibar; some were from 2005 others from 2008. We had not been informed that the National Electoral Commission would burn voting identification cards. The journalists telephoned the chairman of the Commission but he was not aware of the burning of any voting identification cards. They called the executive secretary of the commission who was also not informed that voting identification cards were being burned. He was more interested to know how we had received that information. When the journalist told him that we had seen with our own eyes a heap of burned voting identification cards in the Government warehouse, he was furious and wanted to know who allowed us to go there. The journalist told him that how we entered the government warehouse was not the issue but rather the burning of the voting identification cards without informing key stakeholders.

After some time, the National Electoral Commission gave a press statement in which they explained that they were burning old voting identification cards which were exchanged with new cards. We are suspicious that there were many CCM supporters who have been registered more than once. The burned voting registration cards were part of the excess of double registered cards. The National Electoral Commission had not provided the required information to political parties. They do not provide us with information that they are supposed to according to the rules and regulations. Most serious opposition parties have no confidence whatsoever in the Electoral Commission and we have called for the resignation of the chairman. It is a problem that the Chairman is selected by the president without any consultation. But the key problem is not the Commission itself but the fact that it does not have any independent structure at the district, constituency and ward level. The officials representing NEC at the regional, district and ward level are government executive officers working under the instructions of District and Regional Commissioners who are CCM party cadres. Therefore we have a lot of problems all over the country. We are not competing with CCM but with the state machinery. President Mkapa was an old-fashioned autocrat and had no commitment to laying the foundation of a democratic polity. President Kikwete has enormous political skills but is completely uninterested in thinking about a development vision that includes building democratic structures for Tanzania.

The CCM's lack of commitment to democratic rule was clearly demonstrated by the way the October 2009 local elections – to elect street and village chairpersons and committees – were administered. The Regulations for these elections were distributed to us only a week before the beginning of the campaign for the elections. To increase the confusion, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Administration introduced guidelines that in important parts contradicted the Regulations. The guidelines introduced many changes that were difficult to implement. Previous elections took place in open general meeting of the village or street without any use of ballot papers. The new regulations introduced the use of ballot papers that were organised by the District Executive Directors. Voters had to write the names and the party for each candidate they voted for. They had to master the names of 25 members of the village committee and their parties. In a country where most voters are functionally illiterate, voting by writing names is just not feasible. CCM and state functionaries organised agents to assist those who could not write. In many areas opposition parties were denied the opportunity to have agents who could assist more than one person to vote. The contesters of the elections were required to have their party seal in their application form. The regulations required just a party seal. The Guidelines required a seal from the lowest organ of the party that is a party branch. Many CUF candidates were disqualified because they followed the Election Regulations and not the Guidelines.

We had contestants in 110 villages from Handeni District who were barred from standing for the elections because their application forms had a seal from the CUF ward office and not the branch office. In all those villages, CCM candidates were declared elected unopposed. In past election when there was a single candidate voters were given the opportunity to cast a 'yes' or 'no' vote. We had not been informed about the new procedures in time. The new rules were thus complicated, but the CCM contestants had been informed far in advance. In fact I 'discovered' the Regulation when I visited the Finnish Embassy a week before the beginning of the election campaign. In the course of our discussion I was told that the Embassy had received the Election Regulations three weeks earlier. Finland was providing funds for local government reform and they were given priority to receive the Regulations. CUF a political party participating in the elections had no information. The Finnish ambassador and his officials were surprised to hear that CUF had not seen them so close to the elections. I called a press conference to complain and the minister for local government and regional administration argued that they had sent the regulations to the Registrar of political parties. However, we had not been informed. In the end we got twenty copies and this was for the whole country. One week before the election campaign began. CCM had known in advance so they could train their people in time. CCM won 90 per cent of the local government seats, over 50 per cent unopposed.

Concluding Discussion

This article is an effort to present the situation of the opposition in Tanzania – a country that has been regarded to be well under way towards a consolidated democracy. Methodologically it is questionable to base any conclusion on interview of only one person, however important and trustworthy. We have however, sought to present, in this article, the opinion of one of the most important representatives of the opposition in Tanzania while still in office. And we use this mainly to illustrate his subjective feelings and understandings of his findings over a long period of years. First, his testimonies do very well coincide with many other documented experiences (Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler 2007; Salih and Nordlund 2007; Menocal, Fritz and Rakner 2008; Lindberg 2009; Rakner and van de Walle 2009). Second, Jonas Ewald has, for his PhD thesis (Ewald 2011), in addition done many similar interviews with other members of the opposition in Tanzania, which give similar testimonies. While our primary aim is to add to the empirical evidence of the situation of the opposition in many African countries in general and Tanzania in particular, we also feel that some of the findings are of a more general interest.

The most important finding is the feeling of hopelessness in a longstanding and active opposition politician; whatever effort is put into making a positive impact on the political map of the country is hindered by the ruling party with the help of state resources, both manpower, such as police and the legal system, and budgetary means. Added to this is the lack of all kinds of resources to build a strong organisation that could compete with the well organised ruling party. This feeling – subjective or not – is a very important limitation for building strong opposition parties that can compete for power and thereby act as a check on the abuse of power by the ruling party. This is of particular importance in a relatively homogenous country such as Tanzania which lacks broader social or ethnic groups competing for power like in more diversified societies such as Kenya and Zambia. In addition, parties in Tanzania must be active and obtain support in many parts of the huge country. The existing rudimentary infrastructure in combination with the limited resources of the parties makes it more demanding for the opposition to build the required organisation and to campaign effectively. Lipumba's description on how the opposition is failing in its work for a more level playing field for the political parties in the opposition is therefore of utmost importance. Apart from the oppositions parties' internal institutional, financial and human weaknesses, the opposition strongly perceives that the state and ruling party use various methods to hinder the opposition from developing. Tanzania has also been one of the larger receivers of development aid,

not the least from the Nordic Countries. Among the donor objectives in the last 20 years has been the commitment to support development towards democracy. Many steps forward have been taken in that direction, but at the same time, the ruling party's grip on the state apparatus is stronger than during its first multi-party election in 1995. It might be that the unintended side effects of large budget support and public sector reforms has strengthened the executive power, and hence the party controlling the executive, relatively more than other institutions of democracy. This calls for a review of how various forms of aid intentionally or unintentionally contribute to the absence of a level playing field.

The testimonies also confirm most of the points made in the literature referred to in our introduction: The difficulties to campaign, the widespread accounts of harassment of all levels of the opposition both in its party organisation work and particularly in connection with elections; the asymmetry in information and of financial resources; and again the non-neutrality of key state agencies and institutions during elections, etc are all well-documented. Here, again, Tanzania is particularly influenced by the very long period of one-party state during which the ruling party became conflated with the state in a way that is very difficult to change.

The testimonies presented above – however subjective in nature – are very important and must be taken seriously if Tanzania is to develop a democracy worthy of note and which will serve the Tanzanian people.

Notes

1. This section is based on a number of interviews made with representatives of different political parties, the media, civil society, researchers and the donor community for Jonas Ewald's doctoral dissertation (Ewald 2011). As well as earlier writings (Ewald 1996; Ewald 2001)(Ewald; 2010).
2. Apart from various interviews in Tanzania, see Mmuya (1998;) Hyden (1999;) and Hyden (2005).
3. Personal interviews with CUF National Party Secretary and Information Secretary, mainland, in October 2000, June 2001, May 2002, and with District Party Secretary and District Chairman Pangani in October 2000, August 2002, December 2005 and May 2006, April 2010. Also with CUF Chairman in 2003, 2006, 2007 and 2010.
4. ALN is made up of 17 parties from 15 African countries and is an associated organisation of Liberal International ALN whose aim is to spread Liberal values across the Africa and facilitate the development and growth of Liberal parties, organisations and individuals in all African countries.

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Afrique et Développement, Vol. XXXVII, No. 2, 2012, pp. 97 – 118
© Conseil pour le développement de la recherche en Sciences Sociales en
Afrique, 2012 (ISSN 0850-3907)

Le développement du sport de performance au Bénin : de l'analyse d'un modèle à un essai de problématique globale

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Résumé

Le seul modèle du développement sportif retenu en Afrique noire francophone a été celui du sport de performance tel qu'il a été proposé par la charte olympique. Cette charte en déclarant le sport au-dessus de la politique et de la religion (et jusqu'à un moment plus récent encore au-dessus de l'économie), introduit explicitement l'idée que le sport peut se concevoir hors de toute contrainte politique, économique et culturelle. Basés sur des modèles d'analyse des résultats sportifs mettant de l'avant les paramètres sportifs et socio-économiques, les auteurs de cette étude tentent de montrer que le développement du sport de performance se fonde nécessairement sur un développement global et harmonieux, c'est-à-dire un développement économique, scientifique et technologique.

Abstract

The model of the sport development kept in French-speaking black Africa countries was the one of the performance as it has been proposed by the Olympic charter. This charter, by declaring the sport above the politics and of the religion (and until one more recent moment again above the economy), seemed to put forward the idea that sport could be conceived without political, economic and cultural constraints. The present survey aims to show that the development of the performance sport founds on a development global and harmonious correspondent to a certain economic, scientific and technological development level that affects the level and the life style of the population in a satisfactory manner directly.

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Introduction et problématique

De la période coloniale à nos jours, l'organisation du sport en Afrique noire francophone s'est mise en place de façon discontinue. La France par son action colonisatrice a tenté d'apporter à ses colonies sa culture dans tous les domaines, y compris celui du sport (Charitas 2009). Les initiatives éducatives et sportives ne reconnaissent pas d'originalité et de valeur aux sociétés indigènes et veulent les faire accéder à la modernité sans respecter leur particularité. Selon Gouda (1984:46) : « la colonisation a opéré et agi comme si ces sociétés étaient sans passé, sans histoire, sans personnalité ni identité ». Le seul modèle de développement sportif retenu en Afrique noire francophone, y compris en République du Bénin, a été celui du sport de performance tel qu'il a été proposé par la charte olympique qui, en le déclarant au-dessus de la politique et de la religion (et jusqu'à un moment plus récent encore, au-dessus de l'économie), avait introduit dans les esprits, l'idée que le sport pouvait se concevoir hors des contraintes politiques, économiques et culturelles.

Ce seul modèle d'organisation du sport de type industriel, technologique et scientifique peut être présenté suivant trois variantes en fonction de ses caractéristiques politiques et idéologiques : le modèle libéral, le modèle étatique et le modèle mixte.

Au Bénin (autrefois appelé le « Dahomey »), pendant la période coloniale, la France avait orienté (comme dans toutes les autres colonies) le développement économique, social et politique suivant ses propres représentations, c'est-à-dire suivant les valeurs occidentales. Le modèle d'organisation du sport français a donc été appliqué pendant la période coloniale, et s'est poursuivi après l'indépendance en 1960 (Gouda 1986:54-82).

Le 30 novembre 1974, le Bénin a opté pour une idéologie officielle marxiste-léniniste. Dès lors, les différents secteurs de la vie sociale ont été influencés par cette option et l'organisation du sport sera de type socialiste à partir de 1976. Mais à partir de 1984, la crise économique, sociale et culturelle va entraîner de nombreuses remises en cause. Le marxisme-léninisme rejeté comme idéologie officielle du pays le 07 décembre 1989 et tous les secteurs de la vie nationale seront réorganisés sur la base du libéralisme et de la démocratie.

La question qui nous a poussés à cette recherche est la suivante : le modèle de développement sportif dominant le sport international peut-il servir de référence, dans une démarche de transposition, à la construction d'un système sportif national au Bénin ? En effet, de la période coloniale à nos jours, le Bénin a connu plusieurs modèles d'organisation du sport : le modèle d'organisation du sport français, le modèle de type socialiste et enfin le

modèle libéral. Malgré toutes ces tentatives, le sport béninois n'a pas connu de grands succès. Dans aucune discipline sportive, le Bénin n'a jamais vraiment émergé et n'a jamais connu le haut niveau sportif (une place mondiale par exemple).

Dans le tissu des relations internationales, que ce soit politique, économique ou culturel, le Bénin occupe une position inférieure, c'est-à-dire une position de dépendance. Le sport serait-il une valeur de civilisation ou un levier de développement ? Développer le sport au Bénin ne revient-il pas à relever plusieurs défis à savoir : éliminer l'extrême pauvreté et la faim, assurer l'enseignement fondamental pour tous, promouvoir l'égalité des sexes et l'autonomie des femmes, assurer l'accès aux soins de santé à tous, moderniser le cadre de vie et enfin mettre en place le partenariat mondial pour le développement ? C'est à partir de ces interrogations que nous avons formulé l'hypothèse suivante : Dans un pays, le développement du sport de performance dépend sinon du niveau de développement économique et technologique, du moins de la manière dont ce développement affecte le niveau de vie des citoyens de ce pays.

Contexte de l'étude

Le rapport sur le développement humain au Bénin (2001) montre que le développement des populations, des individus ou des localités repose sur les potentialités qu'ils détiennent mais aussi et surtout sur leurs capacités à les mettre en valeur pour garantir leur bien être. Selon ce rapport, le Bénin a été lourdement affecté par la crise financière des années 1980 et les effets des mesures drastiques d'ajustement restent aujourd'hui perceptibles sur le plan du développement humain.

Le même rapport (2001) indique que le Bénin fait partie des pays à faible indice de développement humain, soit 0,420 (<0,500). En 2000, le Bénin a été classé 158^e sur 173 pays dans le monde. Une comparaison faite entre 4 pays en matière de développement humain nous conduit au tableau 1.

Pour améliorer le niveau de développement humain (DH), il faudrait agir sur le niveau du Produit Intérieur Brut (PIB) réel par habitant qui est estimé en 2006 à 575 FCFA par jour par individu parce que cette amélioration du DH dépend en grande partie de la croissance économique et de sa répartition dans le pays. Le revenu intervient dans l'Indice de Développement Humain afin de rendre compte de tous les aspects du développement qui ne sont pas représentés par la longévité, la santé et l'instruction. Son montant est corrigé parce qu'un revenu illimité n'est pas nécessaire pour atteindre un niveau de développement humain acceptable. Le calcul se fait donc à partir d'un logarithme de revenu.

Tableau 1 : Indices de développement humain en RSA, au Ghana, au Togo et au Bénin

Libellé	Pays			
	RSA	Ghana	Togo	Bénin
Espérance de vie (année)	53,9	56,6	51,6	53,6
Alphabétisation (%)	84,9	70,3	56,3	39,0
Scolarisation (%)	93	42	62	45
Revenu par tête (US \$)	8908	1881	1410	933

Source : Rapport sur le développement humain au Bénin, 2001, p 8

D'autres indicateurs sont aussi importants pour analyser les résultats sportifs nationaux selon les auteurs socio-politiques et socio-économiques ; il s'agit essentiellement des Indicateurs Sexospécifiques de Développement Humain (ISDH), de l'Indicateur de Participation des Femmes (IPF), de l'Indicateur Régional de Développement Humain (IRDH) ou de l'Indicateur Départemental de Développement Humain (IDDH). Nous retiendrons que le Bénin est un pays pauvre avec des disparités entre hommes et femmes, entre régions et entre ville et campagne. La pratique sportive sera donc tributaire de ces réalités.

Cadre théorique

Dans le domaine sportif, il n'existe pas un modèle d'analyse (ni des critères objectifs) permettant de faire des prédictions sur les chances de succès d'un pays aux compétitions internationales. Il serait donc empirique de vouloir comparer les pays entre eux par rapport aux chances de médailles olympiques. La référence principale reste encore le football international. Toutefois, les travaux du groupe du Conseil de l'Europe dirigé par Castejon Paz et ceux de Lévine Ned, de Donald Ball et Novikov et Maximenko peuvent servir de base à une problématisation de la question, surtout au regard des jeunes Etats à économie informelle importante et des pays émergents disposant d'une politique promotionnelle et de plan de communication en matière de sport qui viennent perturber les vieilles traditions et suggérer un nouvel ordre sportif international.

A travers nos travaux, nous voulons surtout indiquer aux pays africains en développement que le monde sportif a évolué et qu'aujourd'hui il faut organiser le sport, l'intégrer aux politiques de développement afin qu'il contribue au développement économique, social et culturel des jeunes nations.

C'est dans la mesure où les missions assignées aux jeunes Etats africains intégreront les valeurs morales, sociales et culturelles des peuples africains, dans la mesure où les choix sportifs tiendront compte des finalités du développement, c'est-à-dire un mieux-être et un relèvement sensible du niveau de vie des peuples africains, que par leurs apports spécifiques, les sports contribueront à la promotion de l'homme africain et si l'on préfère, au développement durable de l'Afrique tout court.


Les modèles d'analyse consultés ne peuvent en totalité convenir à notre problématique. Toutefois, il est possible d'identifier et de dégager des éléments (à défaut de modèle satisfaisant) qui sont susceptibles d'instruire notre question de recherche. Ainsi, quatre modèles d'analyse ont été considérés. Ce sont :

Le modèle de Bénito Castejon Paz (1973)

Ce modèle met en avant quatre concepts fondamentaux à la base de toute interprétation des résultats sportifs d'une nation. Ce sont: *Primo*, le niveau sportif comportant quatre éléments (le nombre de pratiquants, l'élite réelle, les pratiquants possibles et l'élite idéale). *Secundo*, La situation sportive qui équivaut, d'une part à la résultante du niveau sportif donné, et d'autre part à la base sur laquelle la politique devait s'appuyer pour améliorer le niveau sportif en mettant en œuvre les facteurs de développement. *Tertio*, Le cadre conditionnant qui regroupe essentiellement les conditions socio-économiques et géographiques du pays, les coutumes (sociales), les croyances, l'histoire et les caractéristiques génétiques des individus. *Quarto*, les facteurs de développement qui sont définis comme des paramètres permettant, lorsqu'ils sont combinés en programme pour développer les divers éléments de la situation sportive, d'améliorer le niveau sportif existant.

Pour améliorer la situation sportive au Bénin, on peut remarquer que le cadre conditionnant et les facteurs de développement (paramètres non sportifs) déterminent les bases matérielles du développement du sport. Cependant, le modèle de Castejon Paz ne rend pas compte des changements institutionnels et politiques (stabilité ou instabilité) et les forces sociales à l'intérieur des pays, la manière dont la distribution des ressources affecte le niveau de vie et les progrès technologiques et scientifiques.

Figure 1 : Méthode d'analyse de résultats sportifs d'une nation (Bénito Castejon Paz, 1973)



Le modèle de Levine (1974)

Le modèle de Levine associe aux différentes performances nationales des pays, quatre variables dans le but de dégager des éléments explicatifs significatifs. Ces variables sont le Produit National Brut (PNB), l'aire géographique, le système économique et la circulation de la presse. Selon cet auteur, la prospérité économique d'un pays est l'indicateur le plus pertinent de sa réussite sportive aux compétitions olympiques. Ses travaux laissent entrevoir que l'organisation socialiste du sport est préférable à l'organisation capitaliste, si on vise l'obtention de succès olympiques.

En ce qui concerne le modèle de Levine, nous pouvons émettre quelques réserves sur l'usage du Produit National Brut (PNB). Beaucoup d'analystes économiques préfèrent utiliser le revenu national par habitant comme on le verra avec Novikov et Maximenko (parfois le Produit Intérieur Brut - PIB). Avec le PNB, n'entre pas en ligne tout ce qui est produit et consommé en dehors des circuits monétaires. Dans un pays comme le Bénin, l'économie informelle reste encore très importante ; donc le PNB reste sous-évalué. Le PNB ne rend pas compte des conflits et des inégalités qui touchent les institutions sociales et pour cela, Carfantan et Condamines écrivent ce qui suit : « s'il est des façons d'augmenter la production de nourritures qui produisent plus d'affamés qu'elles n'en rassasient, le niveau de développement d'une nation ne peut se mesurer en terme de PNB » (Carfantan, Condamines 1980:180)

Le grand essor des multinationales rend de plus en plus inopérants les indicateurs économiques de type national, surtout pour des pays économiquement dépendants alors que Levine retient que la prospérité économique est l'indicateur le plus pertinent de la réussite sportive d'un pays aux compétitions olympiques. Toutefois ces différents travaux ne manquent pas d'intérêt.

Le modèle de Donald W. Ball (1972)

Le modèle de Ball (1972) vient d'une étude attentive des jeux olympiques de Tokyo (Japon, 1964). À la suite de ces jeux, Ball préconisa un prototype d'Etat sportif dont les caractéristiques peuvent se résumer de la façon suivante : Etat moderne subissant l'influence de l'Europe de l'Ouest ; prospérité économique ; stabilité de la population, homogénéité et alphabétisation ; gouvernement central fort élitiste ; bas niveau de compétition politique et probablement membre du bloc de l'Est.

Il faut réaffirmer ici, que les Jeux Olympiques de Tokyo (1964) étaient, pour les pays africains dont beaucoup ont accédé à la souveraineté nationale en 1960, prématurés pour rendre compte de leur niveau de développement socio-économique et politique et d'ailleurs, afin de tenir la comparaison avec les anciennes puissances coloniales, de nouvelles voies de développement ont été ouvertes; pour les pays des hauts plateaux de l'Est africain, les courses de fond et demi-fond ont été retenues ; au Ghana, au Congo et Cameroun, c'est le football, au Sénégal et en Egypte, c'est le basket-ball pendant que les pays du Maghreb tentaient de promouvoir à la fois le handball, l'athlétisme, la boxe et le football... Il sera donc assez risqué de tirer des conclusions de ces études en ce qui concerne l'Afrique en général.


Le modèle des soviétiques Novikov et Maximenko (1972)

Ce dernier modèle consulté semble plus intéressant que les trois premiers modèles cités précédemment. Sa validité et sa portée pratique militent à sa cause. Par ordre d'importance décroissant, Novikov et Maximenko (1972) tiennent compte des éléments suivants pour expliquer la réussite sportive : le revenu par habitant, la valeur de l'alimentation de la population exprimée en calorie, l'espérance moyenne de vie, le pourcentage d'analphabètes, le pourcentage de la population urbaine et le nombre total d'habitants. Ces six facteurs sont retenus par ordre d'importance décroissante.

L'analyse de la combinaison de ces six facteurs, laisse entre voir un fossé entre pays riches et pays pauvres. On rejoint en quelque sorte le clivage entre les pays du Nord et ceux du Sud. Nous savons que les pays capitalistes ne sont pas homogènes en leur sein. Il en est de même pour les pays socialistes. Nous devons nuancer notre approche conceptuelle à ce niveau. Il est possible, pour un pays pauvre, de développer une stratégie d'accès à l'élite mondiale en y consacrant un pourcentage démesuré de son Produit Intérieur Brut comme un Etat peut faire le choix de renforcer son identité dans quelques rares disciplines sans organiser une pratique de masse. Par exemple, Cuba est un pays socialiste mais appartient au groupe des pays pauvres. Ce pays figure parmi les grandes nations du sport international. A potentiel socio-économique égal, l'organisation socialiste (autoritaire) permet

d'obtenir de bien meilleurs résultats. C'est ce qui ressort par ailleurs, des modèles proposés par Lévine et Donald W. Ball. Le modèle des auteurs soviétiques fait le lien entre développement socio-économique et développement durable du sport et la corrélation a été mise en évidence.

Figure 2 : Méthode d'analyse de résultats sportifs d'une nation proposée par Novikov et Maximenko



Démarche méthodologique

Pour réaliser cette étude nous avons posé un diagnostic à partir des modèles théoriques de Castejon Paz (1973) et de Novikov & Maximenko (1972). Nous proposons une modélisation obtenue à partir de la combinaison des modèles de Castejon Paz et de Novikov et Maximenko.

Nous avons analysé les éléments sportifs à travers les réalisations et les résultats du Bénin, la situation sportive et enfin le niveau sportif comme le propose la première partie du modèle d'analyse de Castejon Paz. Ensuite, nous avons présenté les éléments non sportifs à savoir le cadre conditionnant et les facteurs de développement qui représentent la seconde partie du modèle d'analyse de Castejon Paz ; et c'est à ce niveau qu'intervient le modèle d'analyse de Novikov & Maximenko à travers les six facteurs qui représentent des facteurs non sportifs de développement du sport. Il s'agit du revenu national par habitant, de la valeur de l'alimentation de la population (exprimée en calories), de l'espérance moyenne de vie, du pourcentage d'analphabètes, du pourcentage de la population urbaine et du nombre total d'habitants.

Cependant, malgré sa cohérence, sa richesse et sa souplesse, la combinaison des deux modèles ne suffit pas pour nous permettre de mesurer les résultats sportifs du Bénin. C'est pourquoi nous avons jugé nécessaire de tirer des résultats du recensement général de la population et de l'habitat (RGPH3), quelques critères utiles pour compléter notre outil d'analyse.

Nous avons mené une étude de contenu de nombreux documents, interrogé et entendu 17 acteurs sportifs (présidents de fédérations) au sujet des résultats sportifs béninois et surtout sur l'organisation et l'accès à la pratique sportive au Bénin. Enfin la connaissance du milieu et l'observation ont permis d'affiner notre analyse des données obtenues.

Résultats obtenus

Le construit organisationnel de référence

Le développement sportif en France a connu six étapes dans son évolution. Elles sont caractérisées chacune par un objectif et une logique organisationnelle. Ces étapes peuvent être présentées en deux grandes phases.

Tableau 2 : Organisation de l'offre en produits et services sportifs dans un Etat centralisé : la France

Acteurs	Logiques Organisationnelles	Modèles Sportifs
Société civile : citoyens	Logique associative : Distinction sociale Bien-être Convivialité	Modèle idéologique Clubs Modèle aristocratique
Etat : institutions publiques ou habilitées (fédérations)	Logique de service public : Représentation et délégation de pouvoir Référence administrative Primauté de la puissance publique	Modèle étatique interventionniste (contrôle de l'Etat)
Etat et Fédération : acteurs mixtes	Logique de service public reposant sur des acteurs privés : Logique politique Co-responsabilité Etat/Fédérations	Clubs privés Fédérations privées sous tutelle étatique (contrôle limité)

Ce tableau illustre la situation qui a prévalu en France entre 1900 et 1984. Ce modèle a largement été diffusé dans les anciennes colonies françaises d'Afrique noire (y compris le Bénin).

Tableau 3 : Organisation de l'offre en produits et services sportifs dans un Etat décentralisé : la France

Acteurs	Logiques Organisationnelles	Modèles Sportifs
Communes Etat Citoyens	Logique locale Logique communautaire Logique identitaire	Sport pour tous Sports communautaires Modèle de proximité
Entreprises Fédérations Municipalités	Logique managériale Logique économique Logique financière	Société d'économie mixte Fédérations autonomes Ligues nationales Haute performance
Entreprises/Fédération Municipalités/ Ligues nationales et supranationales Etat/Fédération/ Fédération internationale	Logique de concurrence Logique industrielle Logique de marché	Modèle de marché Ligue nationale Sociétés à objet sportif Modèle de spéculation Haute performance Ligue continentale

Le tableau 3 ci-dessus représente le modèle d'organisation du sport en France à partir de 1984 (les Jeux olympiques de Los Angeles). Ce modèle sera consolidé avec le triomphe du néo-libéralisme et le renforcement du rôle des ligues nationales, continentales et des fédérations internationales.

Les différences entre le tableau n° 1 et le tableau n° 2 montrent que le monde contemporain a hérité d'un système sportif entièrement reconstruit. En effet, le modèle idéologique de la « guerre froide » a progressivement fait place à un modèle segmenté dans lequel il n'y a pas un sport mais des formes et niveaux de pratiques sportives.

A l'objectif social du sport, correspond une stratégie locale, c'est-à-dire un cadre de manifestation d'un modèle comportemental de contre-culture : faire du jogging dans son quartier ne nécessite pas l'adhésion à un club ni à une fédération. De nouvelles organisations (les municipalités) se sont emparées du sport à la base.

A l'objectif économique du sport, correspond une stratégie managériale dans laquelle la rentabilité financière compte pour l'essentiel : le sport devient une marchandise et le club, l'entreprise moderne qui vend du spectacle. Ainsi, la liaison est faite entre le sport et le développement économique et la spéculation boursière.

Aux exigences du marché du sport, correspond une stratégie concurrentielle : plusieurs produits sont proposés aux clients (Gouda 1997:56) par des multinationales qui dominent le champ sportif. Certaines sociétés sportives sont cotées à la bourse des valeurs. L'amateurisme a définitivement explosé. A maturité, le sport est devenu une filière économique.

Le constat actuel fait au Bénin est que le sport est encore géré sur la base des objectifs de la phase où les Etats étaient centralisés, c'est-à-dire des objectifs du sport idéologique et amateur.

Le niveau sportif au Bénin

Il s'agit du nombre de pratiquants, des différentes élites (réelle et idéale) et des pratiquants possibles. L'élite idéale représente selon Castejon Paz (1973) 15 sur 10 000 du nombre de pratiquants classés dans l'élite réelle.

Plusieurs informations demeurent inaccessibles parce qu'elles ne sont pas suivies au niveau des instances fédérales ou sont inexistantes. Néanmoins, nous avons quelques informations concernant les pratiquants possibles.

Le Bénin compte 17 fédérations nationales et si on considère la tranche d'âge de 15 ans à 59 ans (l'espérance moyenne de vie est de 59 ans au Bénin) comme étant la population pouvant pratiquer les activités physique et sportives (APS), le nombre de pratiquants possibles serait de 3 225 990 individus dont 1 491 841 de sexe masculin et 1 734 149 de sexe féminin (INSAE 2003). Cette population représente 47,70 pour cent de la population totale. Le nombre de pratiquants réels n'est pas connu, mais on sait que c'est le football, sport-roi qui retient l'attention. L'élite réelle est constituée des joueurs des équipes nationales et des clubs de 1^{ère} division, des équipes de l'Université d'Abomey-Calavi (UAC) et celles des Forces Armées.

L'élite idéale, c'est 15 pour 10 000 de l'élite réelle or au Bénin, l'élite du football national ne fait pas 10 000 pratiquants. Sur cette base, on déduit que le Bénin n'a pas 15 footballeurs appartenant à l'élite mondiale (équipe nationale).

Les résultats sportifs sur le plan international.

Plusieurs fédérations sportives ont connu des succès éphémères sur le plan international. Voici quelques résultats :

En athlétisme (Fédération Béninoise d'Athlétisme – FBA)

Le Bénin a participé à plusieurs Jeux Olympiques, Championnats d'Afrique et du monde mais n'a jamais pu hisser ses couleurs aux trois premiers rangs. Il était représenté aux Jeux Olympiques (JO) de Moscou en 1980, de Séoul en 1988, Barcelone en 1992, d'Atlanta en 1996, de Sidney en 2000 et c'est en 2004 à Athènes que l'athlète Fabienne Feraez a pu occuper la 5^e place à la finale du 200m. Jusqu'à présent, elle reste l'athlète la plus compétitive du Bénin. Chez les hommes, nous citerons AKPO Romain qui a réalisé un saut de 2,12m en hauteur à Abuja au Nigeria en 2010.

Au basket-ball (Fédération Béninoise de Basket-Ball – FBBB)

En dehors de la participation du Dahomey à la Coupe d'Afrique des Nations (Bangui 1974) où l'équipe nationale de basket-ball s'est classée 8^e sur 9 présentes, c'est seulement les Jeux Universitaires Mondiaux de 1979 à Mexico et les deux grandes rencontres amicales avec l'équipe de France la même année qui attestent que le Dahomey (Bénin aujourd'hui) était sur la bonne voie avec une équipe qui de l'avis de l'entraîneur français Pierre Dao, devrait faire partie des meilleures formations africaines des années 1980. En effet, 18^e sur 32 équipes au plan universitaire mondial, l'équipe de l'UNB était la 4^e sur le plan africain. Le sport béninois manquait d'organisation et de direction. Désormais, on retrouve le Bénin dans des circuits sportifs de seconde zone :

- Jeux de la Francophonie (Dames) à Madagascar : 8^e sur 9, avec la participation du Bénin, du Cameroun, du Canada, de la Côte-d'Ivoire, de la France, de la Guinée Bissau, du Mali, du Sénégal et de Madagascar.
- Coupe d'Afrique des moins de 18 ans (filles) à Cotonou en 2006 : 4^e avec la participation du Bénin, du Mali, de la Côte-d'Ivoire, de l'Angola et de la République Démocratique du Congo.

Au niveau du football (Fédération Béninoise de Football – FBF)

A la coupe du Monde Juniors (Pays-Bas 2005) : c'est la première et seule participation du Bénin à la Coupe du Monde. Le Bénin a enregistré une défaite face aux Pays-Bas et deux matchs nuls face à l'Australie et le Japon. Il a fini 3^e avec deux points comme le Japon mais a marqué 2 buts et le Japon 3, ce qui a permis la qualification du Japon pour les huitièmes de finale au lieu du Bénin.

Tableau 4 : Récapitulatif des résultats obtenus par le Bénin à la Coupe d'Afrique des Nations Seniors (Tunisie 2004)

Date	Rencontre	Score
27/01/04	Bénin – Afrique du Sud	0 – 2
31/01/04	Bénin – Maroc	0 – 4
04/02/04	Bénin – Nigeria	1 – 2

Source : Fédération Béninoise de Football (FBF)

Tableau 5 : Récapitulatif des Résultats obtenus par le Bénin à la Coupe d'Afrique des Nations Juniors (Bénin 2005)

Niveau	Rencontre	Score
1 ^{er} tour	Bénin – Nigeria	0 – 3
	Bénin – Côte d'Ivoire	4 – 1
	Bénin – Mali	3 – 3
½ Finale	Bénin – Egypte	0 – 1
3 ^e Place	Bénin – Maroc	5 – 4 (P)

Source : Fédération Béninoise de Football (FBF)

En ce qui concerne les éliminatoires couplées Coupe du Monde et Coupe d'Afrique 2006, le Bénin s'est trouvé dans un groupe comprenant le Cameroun, la Côte-d'Ivoire, l'Egypte, la Libye et le Soudan. Les pays suivants ont été qualifiés :

- a. Coupe du monde : Côte d'ivoire ;
- b. Coupe d'Afrique : Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroun, Libye et le pays organisateur l'Egypte.

Sont éliminés le Soudan (5^e du groupe) et le Bénin (6^e du groupe)

Tableau 6 : Éliminatoires Coupe d'Afrique des Nations 2008

Rencontre	Score	Type de match
Bénin – Togo	1 – 2	Aller
Bénin – Mali	1 – 1	Aller
Bénin – Sierra Léone	2 – 0	Aller
Togo – Bénin	1 – 4	Retour
Mali – Bénin	0 – 0	Retour
Sierra Léone – Bénin	0 – 2	Retour

Source : Fédération Béninoise de Football (FBF)

Le Mali a été qualifié avec 12 points et le Bénin qualifié comme meilleur deuxième des poules avec 11 points pour participer aux phases finales en janvier-février 2008 au Ghana. Le Bénin a quitté la CAN Ghana 2008 avec 3 défaites face au Mali, au Nigeria et à la Côte-d'Ivoire dès le 1^{er} tour de la compétition.

Au niveau du hand-ball (Fédération Béninoise de Hand-Ball – FBHB)

Les équipes nationales de hand-ball du Bénin ont participé à plusieurs compétitions internationales et les meilleures performances connues sont sans doute celles de la génération présentée aux Jeux Africains d'Alger en 1978 (8^e sur 8 pays).

Au niveau de la natation (Fédération Béninoise de Natation – FBN)

La fédération béninoise de natation est très jeune et comptait en 2005, 150 athlètes. Ces athlètes ont participé à plusieurs championnats internationaux dont les résultats sont les suivants :

- Jeux africains d'Abuja (2003) : sur cinq athlètes présentés, seul Marc Dansou a été classé 8^e sur 42 après avoir participé à la finale des 50 m brasse sans médaille.
- Championnats du monde (2003) : le Bénin a été représenté par deux athlètes (les frères Dansou) ; c'est à ces championnats que Alois Dansou a eu sa qualification pour participer aux Jeux Olympiques
- 7^e championnat d'Afrique (Marco 2004) : A ces championnats, le Bénin a participé à trois finales dont deux masculines et une féminine mais n'a remporté aucune médaille.
- Jeux Olympiques (Grèce 2004) : le Bénin a été représenté par deux athlètes à savoir une fille et un garçon qui ont été rapidement éliminés.

Au niveau du volley-ball et des sports de combat

Les équipes de volley-ball et des sports de combat tels que le Judo, le Taekwondo, le karaté ont aussi participé à plusieurs compétitions internationales et ont eu des résultats acceptables pour le Bénin mais très insuffisants pour une performance internationale à l'exception de la boxe qui a produit des champions d'Afrique ces dernières décennies.

La situation sportive en République du Bénin*La situation sportive*

Au niveau de la formation et de l'encadrement technique, le Bénin dispose d'un important potentiel. Selon les statistiques de 2008 de l'Institut National de la Jeunesse, de l'Education Physique et du Sport (INJEPS), les cadres de l'éducation physique et sportive sont répartis de la façon suivante : 369 professeurs certifiés et 287 professeurs adjoints, soit un total de 656 cadres. En plus de ceux là, il faut ajouter les cadres fédéraux, entraîneurs et quelques personnes formées à l'étranger. L'INJEPS, en son sein, compte 27 enseignants chercheurs dont 01 professeur titulaire et 05 maîtres de conférences. De plus, l'INJEPS a 18 entraîneurs de haut niveau dont 8 de niveau international.

Infrastructures sportives au Bénin

- Hall des sports de Cotonou (3 000 places) : terrains en salle de hand-ball et basket-ball ;
- Stade de l'amitié de Kouhounou (Cotonou) : terrain de football de 35 000 places, terrains en salle de hand-ball, volley-ball et basket-ball de 5 000 places, piscine olympique de 3 bassins, court de lawn-tennis ;
- Stade René Pleven de Cotonou : terrain de football ;
- Stade Charles de Gaulle de Porto-Novo réhabilité : terrain de football, terrain de basket-ball, terrain de hand-ball, terrain de volley-ball, courts de lawn-tennis.

Financement du sport au Bénin

Il faut reconnaître que l'Etat Béninois a investi assez d'argent dans le sport. La participation du Bénin à la CAN junior et à la Coupe du Monde junior lui a coûté 8 milliards de francs CFA. La construction du stade de l'Amitié de Kouhounou a coûté 17 milliards en 1982 et celle du Stade Charles de Gaulle coûtera plus de 15 milliards de francs CFA avant sa livraison au public béninois. Le sport béninois ne bénéficie pas d'un budget conséquent cependant, le peu qui est mobilisé est très mal utilisé.

Le secteur privé béninois n'est pas encore en mesure de soutenir le sport de performance au regard des mauvais résultats de l'économie nationale du Bénin. On peut dire que le football aborde l'essentiel du budget accordé au sport béninois.

Le cadre conditionnant

La République du Bénin se caractérise par la diversité des groupes socioculturels qui la composent. Ni la colonisation, ni l'indépendance n'ont créé comme on semblait l'espérer, un creuset national d'où émanerait une culture nationale. La pratique sportive est influencée au Bénin par l'appartenance ethnique (Cornevin 1980) par les croyances religieuses (Merle 1972) et par les pratiques corporelles (traditionnelles).

Le cadre institutionnel du sport béninois

Les fondements juridiques : On citera :

- La loi n° 91-008 du 25/02/91 portant charte des sports en République du Bénin ;
- Le décret n° 2002-0176 du 12/04/02 portant modalités d'application de la Charte des sports ;
- Le décret n° 2002-223 du 14/05/02 portant approbation des statuts types des Fédérations sportives de la République du Bénin.

Il faut ajouter à ce qui précède les textes à caractère international approuvés et ratifiés par le Bénin (Fédérations internationales, Comité International Olympique, UNESCO, CEDEAO, CONFEJES). Les remarques qui ont été faites au niveau des textes législatifs et réglementaires sur le sport béninois dénoncent généralement leur inapplicabilité, leurs incohérences internes sinon leurs contradictions évidentes. Akpovo V. ancien doyen de la faculté de droit de l'Université d'Abomey-Calavi écrivait ce qui suit : « le cadre juridique sur la base de laquelle fonctionne et s'organise le sport béninois paraît relativement pauvre : une loi et deux décrets au principal » (Akpovo 2007:4). L'auteur indique que, face à une telle situation,

ce cadre juridique devrait s'être enrichi de plusieurs textes nationaux ou internationaux au fur et à mesure que l'Etat béninois a pris conscience, soit à partir d'impératifs nationaux, soit à partir d'engagement internationaux, de la nécessité de s'insérer dans le mouvement sportif international et de faire valoir, comme beaucoup d'autres Etats, les ambitions à la mesure de son génie et de ses potentialités (Akpovo 2007:5).

On peut conclure en affirmant que la constitution du 11 décembre 1990 ne s'est pas expressément référée au sport. Toutefois, les préoccupations relatives à l'épanouissement intégral et à l'éducation de la personne humaine

intègrent le développement sportif et donc les dispositions en la matière (articles 9, 10, 12 et 25) lui sont applicables (Akpovo2007:5).

Diagnostic organisationnel et institutionnel

L'organisation systémique. Pendant longtemps le secteur sportif n'a pas su s'organiser par manque de cadre institutionnel conséquent (cadre instable et inconsistant). La logique organisationnelle du sport béninois correspond à la logique du service public (modèle étatique) avec pour acteurs, l'Etat, les institutions publiques et délégataires – fédérations – (cf. tableau n° 1).

Une stratégie de communication absente et une non intégration au système national de développement ont fait du sport un secteur marginal. Les faiblesses organisationnelles de ce secteur et le manque de résultats satisfaisants en termes de bilan nécessitent un diagnostic scientifique qui sera conçu selon une approche systémique permettant d'identifier :

- l'organisation formelle du système ;
- la stratégie des acteurs ;
- le rapport à l'environnement qui met en relation le système organisé et l'environnement qui le porte : disponibilité de ressources humaines, matérielles, financières puis les processus techniques et de rationalisation (stratégie sociale, stratégie managériale et la culture technologique).

L'objectif recherché dans le diagnostic est d'identifier les signes de bonne santé et de maladie, de les examiner et de les classer en vue de mettre en évidence les dysfonctionnements du système en rapprochant les symptômes, en ressortant les incohérences dans les interrelations. Enfin, ce besoin de disséquer pour analyser et comprendre, débouchera sur la nécessité de normalisation, de réorganisation et de changement en vue de résultats meilleurs.

Structures d'organisation du ministère en charge du sport

L'organisation du ministère en charge des sports avec la position de la Direction Générale des Sports et de ses services déconcentrés révèle que, en tant que direction technique verticale, elle est restée très faible face à l'autorité du cabinet (politique) parce qu'il n'y a ni syndicat, ni associations de la société civile ni leaders d'opinions pour l'aider à mobiliser les moyens nécessaires à son développement.

S'agissant des directions horizontales du ministère, elles sont animées à la fois par des hommes politiques et des cadres techniques choisis par le Ministre ou l'Etat. Elles connaissent de réelles difficultés managériales en dépit d'une bonne répartition des missions et attributions officielles.

Ainsi, sans aucune étude préalable des profils de postes ni des compétences (ou lorsque cela est fait, l'autorité ministérielle n'est pas obligée d'en tenir compte), les membres du cabinet du ministère sont nommés pour apporter plus de notoriété à leur parrain que de participer ou de coopérer à la réalisation des objectifs techniques du ministère.

L'absence de document de politique nationale de sport élaboré, approuvé et adopté par l'ensemble des acteurs se traduit par l'impossibilité pour le Ministre, les Conseillers techniques et les cadres de contrer objectivement la dérive du système ou même simplement son inefficacité (conflits avec les fédérations)

La charte des sports relève-t-elle du domaine de la loi ou du domaine règlementaire ? Les structures qui existent au niveau central (ministère) sont-elles représentées effectivement au niveau des départements ? Les anciennes structures départementales de la Jeunesse, des Sports et des Loisirs sont-elles régionales ou départementales ? Comment travaillent-elles avec les Communes ? Pour leur animation, les moyens humains, financiers et matériels ne devraient-elles pas être définis en fonction des missions et objectifs à elles assignés par le ministère et l'Etat ?

Par ailleurs, le fonctionnement actuel des directions et des services au sein du ministère a répondu plus aux injonctions liées aux différents contextes politiques qu'à la nécessité de rationalisation des processus de conception, de mise en œuvre et de suivi évaluation. Pour maximiser les résultats dans tout système humain, il faut réduire le fonctionnement empirique en renforçant les capacités des acteurs et en définissant les règles et les procédures de façon transparente. Le secteur des sports n'échappe pas à cette réalité.

En définitive, il est à retenir que l'organisation et le fonctionnement des différentes structures ainsi que les interrelations entre les acteurs favorisent peu le développement du secteur des sports. Ce secteur est très peu considéré et ne bénéficie pas toujours des moyens nécessaires pour assurer son développement et sa promotion.

L'insuffisance d'équipement et l'absence de ressources humaines compétentes limitent aujourd'hui les activités des fédérations par rapport aux attentes des jeunes. Malgré le caractère déséquilibré de la répartition des infrastructures dont dispose le Bénin, le constat est que la plupart de ces infrastructures sont mal gérées, ce qui hypothèque l'organisation de véritables championnats nationaux.

Les espaces réservés aux infrastructures sportives au cours des opérations de lotissement sont parfois détournés. Il conviendrait de sensibiliser les élus locaux et les populations sur la nécessité de prévoir des réservations foncières en faveur des APS.

Les facteurs de développement

Le revenu national par habitant

De 1996 à 2006 : PIB = 210 000 FCFA/an/habitant soit 575 FCFA/jour/habitant. En 2004 : PIB = 275 000 FCFA/an/habitant soit 800 FCFA/jour/habitant.

La valeur de l'alimentation (calorie)

La valeur moyenne de l'alimentation au Bénin est de 2 325 calories/habitant/jour. Pour la FAO, la valeur minimale viable de l'alimentation est de 2 400 calories/habitant/jour. Quant à Klatzmann, il se situe entre 5 700 et 2 800 calories/habitant/jour et pour le sportif, la valeur moyenne de l'alimentation serait supérieure ou égale à 2500 calories/habitant/jour.

L'espérance moyenne de vie (année)

Une synthèse de l'espérance est faite dans le tableau 7 suivant :

Tableau 7 : Espérance moyenne de vie selon le sexe et le milieu

Milieu	Ensemble	Masculin	Féminin
Bénin	59,20	57,18	61,25
Urbain	60,72	57,82	64,23
Rural	57,33	57,04	58,11

Source : Rapport de recensement général de la population et de l'habitat (2002)

Le pourcentage de la population urbaine

Il s'élève à 38,9 pour cent.

Le pourcentage d'analphabètes

Selon le rapport de la Direction des Etudes Démographiques de l'INSAE, le taux d'alphabétisation de la population âgée de 15 à 24 ans est de 42,92 pour cent et celui de la population adulte (15 ans et plus) est de 32,57 pour cent. Sept personnes sur dix âgées de 15 ans et plus sont analphabètes et six personnes de 15 et plus sur dix n'ont jamais été à l'école. Une comparaison faite entre le Bénin et quatre autres types de pays suivant 4 indicateurs socioéconomiques a donné le tableau 8:

Tableau 8 : Tableau comparatif de quatre indicateurs socio économiques entre le Bénin et les autres pays

Indications socio-économiques	Bénin	Afrique subsaharienne	Pays moins avancés	Pays plus avancés	Pays industrialisés
Espérance de vie ($\cdot 10^{-1}$)	509	465	504	640	770
Taux d'alphabétisation ($\cdot 10^{-1}$)	386	624	533	745	-
PNB/hbt	380	530	270	1250	20900
PIB/hbt	980	1831	1274	3850	23135

Source : Rapport mondial sur le développement humain, PNUD, 2003

Le nombre total d'habitants

La population du Bénin est estimée à 6 769 914 habitants dont 3 485 795 de sexe féminin et 3 284 119 de sexe masculin.

Discussion

Le sport béninois ne connaît pas un grand succès. D'après les résultats des recherches, le constat fait est que les éléments sportifs sont presque inexistantes. Les ressources humaines en matière de sport sont insuffisantes et cela n'est pas étonnant vu la population du Bénin et les infrastructures sportives disponibles. L'Etat béninois a investi assez d'argent dans le sport mais cela n'a pas servi à la promotion du sport à cause de l'absence de vision politique. Pourtant, le Bénin ne manque pas vraiment de cadres sportifs capables de développer le secteur. Néanmoins, il faut reconnaître que, grâce au sport, le Bénin a quand même eu une certaine renommée sur le plan international sans avoir réellement convaincu.

Le vrai problème que connaît le sport au Bénin est une absence de base matérielle. Les conditions de vie des béninois ne leur permettent pas de pratiquer les APS et d'y exceller. La preuve est que les athlètes béninois qui représentent le Bénin dans des compétitions internationales et qui tendent d'exceller ne vivent pas au Bénin. Ils vivent dans les pays riches (pays d'Europe) ; c'est le cas de Fabienne Ferraez qui vit en France et s'y entraîne dans des conditions agréables, incomparables à celles des athlètes vivant au Bénin. Le Bénin est un pays pauvre et la pauvreté ne favorise pas la pratique sportive. Pour relever le niveau du sport, il faut d'abord éliminer l'extrême

pauvreté, assurer l'enseignement fondamental pour tous, assurer l'accès aux soins de santé à tous, améliorer le cadre de vie, promouvoir l'égalité des sexes et créer un partenariat mondial pour le développement.

L'hypothèse est vérifiée et permet de comprendre que les éléments non sportifs participent au développement du sport en offrant des bases matérielles, financières et humaines nécessaires. Dans ce cas, le Bénin ne peut être l'héritier du modèle français transposé. Il doit inventer son propre modèle de développement sportif à partir de son génie, de ses conditions et de ses ressources endogènes.

Conclusion

Le sport en Afrique n'a pas été une invention, c'est le produit de la diffusion car il s'est d'abord développé dans les nations industrialisées avant de se diffuser ensuite vers les nations non industrialisées. Tel qu'il se présente dans les pays occidentaux, il correspond à un mode de vie. Le niveau de développement du système de production industriel et technologique dans ces pays a permis de créer un environnement capable de servir de base au développement du sport.

Le transfert du modèle occidental dans un pays d'Afrique noire comme le Bénin fait qu'il est appliqué hors de sa logique; il est inadapté au contexte local qui ne peut supporter la charge imposée pour le développement du sport. Ainsi, il nous apparaît important de souligner que le modèle français ne saurait constituer la seule solution et qu'il faudra trouver un modèle de développement sportif propre au Bénin. C'est donc à la société globale qu'il faut penser pour intégrer la problématique de la création d'un système sportif national au processus de construction d'un Bénin émergent.

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Irregular Migration and Vulnerability to HIV & AIDS: Some Observations from Zimbabwe

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Abstract

Mobile populations are at very high risk of HIV infection. At the same time, they can be catalysts in its spread. Migration from Matabeleland region in Zimbabwe to South Africa has several features that increase this dual disposition of those involved. These features include the largely irregular nature of migration, its circulatory nature, increasing feminisation as well as the working and living conditions of the migrants in the host country. Irregular migration exposes migrants to various forms of abuse by thugs, those who purport to assist them on the way and law enforcement agents. At the country of destination, undocumented migrants are often employed in precarious forms of jobs which expose them to abuse by employers and other workers. Female irregular migrants are particularly at risk both on transit and at destination. Although they often spend extended periods of time away from home, migrants occasionally return to their spouses or partners at home. This increases the risk of infection for spouses and partners who are often unable to negotiate for safe sex. Using observations from studies conducted in Ward Seven of Matabeleland Province in Zimbabwe, this article discusses some of the factors that expose migrants, particularly irregular migrants, to HIV infection as well making them catalysts in its spread.

Résumé

Les populations mobiles sont exposées à un très haut risque de l'infection au VIH. Dans le même temps, elles peuvent être des catalyseurs de son expansion. La migration de la région du Matabeleland vers l'Afrique du Sud revêt plusieurs caractéristiques qui accentuent cette double disposition des personnes concernées. Ces caractéristiques comprennent la nature largement clandestine de l'immigration, sa trajectoire circulaire, sa féminisation grandissante, ainsi que les conditions de travail et d'existence des migrants dans le pays d'accueil. La migration clandestine expose les migrants à diverses formes d'abus par les

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coupeurs de route, ceux qui prétendent les assister en cours de route et les agents d'application de la loi. Dans le pays d'accueil, les migrants sans papiers sont souvent embauchés dans des formes d'emplois précaires qui les exposent à des abus de la part des employeurs et d'autres travailleurs. Les femmes migrantes clandestines sont particulièrement à risque, à la fois en transit et à destination. Même s'ils passent souvent de longues périodes loin de leur pays, les migrants retournent occasionnellement à la maison auprès de leurs conjoint(e)s ou partenaires. Ceci augmente les risques d'infections pour ces derniers qui ne sont souvent pas en position de négocier pour des relations sexuelles protégées. Partant d'observations d'études réalisées au Ward Seven de la Province du Matabeleland au Zimbabwe, cet article discute certains des facteurs qui exposent les migrants clandestins à l'infection à VIH, tout en les rendant catalyseurs de son expansion.

Introduction

Studies indicate that the epidemiology of HIV&AIDS is closely linked to migration (Thiam et al. 2004). According to Brummer (2002) migration has been the catalyst for the spread of HIV&AIDS. Despite these observations, few specific studies have been done to link the specific situations of migrants and HIV & AIDS, especially in Southern Africa. This is despite the existence of high rates of HIV infection and an increasing number of people who migrate under conditions that make them vulnerable to infection as well as making them catalysts in the spread of HIV. The highest HIV infection rates in the world are in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, Brummer (2002) describes the sub-Saharan Africa region as the 'epicentre' of the global HIV&AIDS epidemic. AIDS is now a medical emergency of unprecedented proportions that threatens the social economic and cultural framework of Africa.

At the same time the volume of migration, particularly from other countries in the region to South Africa, continues to increase and with it, irregular migration. A combination of factors, including political and economic marginalisation, have contributed to the ever escalating rates of irregular migration from the Matabeleland region of Zimbabwe to South Africa. Despite the magnitude of the HIV&AIDS problem in the region, not much research has been done to link HIV&AIDS to migration. This paper discusses some aspects of migration that take place between an area called Ward Seven in the Matabeleland South Province and the behaviours of migrants that are likely to promote the spread of HIV among the migrants and in their communities back home.

Statement of the Problem

The number of people leaving Zimbabwe to seek employment or refuge in other countries, particularly South Africa, has been increasing over the years. Most of the people, especially those in areas near the border with South Africa, leave the country through irregular means. While studies carried out

elsewhere have indicated a link between population mobility and the spread of HIV&AIDS, no specific studies linking HIV&AIDS and migration have been carried out in these areas.

Aim and Objectives

This article aims at highlighting the circumstances and behaviours of irregular migrants that may contribute to the spread of HIV&AIDS among migrants and their communities back home. Specifically, the paper aims to fulfil the following objectives identify and discuss:

- HIV risk factors for migrants while on transit;
- HIV risk factors for migrants at their destination;
- the factors that might promote the spread of HIV between migrants and their spouses and partners at home.

Literature Review

Migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa has a long history (van Onslen 1976; Paton 1995; Amanor-Wilks and Moyo 1996; Crush 2002). There was, however, a significant increase in migration after Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. Pre-independence migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa took place mainly within the context of the formalised, state-mediated contract labour system and was male dominated. After independence, migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa has become increasingly informal and irregular. Evidence also indicates an increase in the number of women who migrate (Dobson 2000; Zinyama 2000; Crush 2000). The two features of post-independence migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa, namely, its increasing irregularity and feminisation have a bearing on the level of vulnerability of migrants to HIV.

Literature on irregular migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa has, however, tended to focus on the negative impacts of undocumented immigrants to South Africa. Undocumented migrants have been accused of driving wages down and undermining labour standards (Hussein 1996; Ryklief 2003), engaging in criminal activities (Hussein 1996) and putting a strain on social services. The lack of focus on the vulnerability of the migrants to HIV is despite the increasing worldwide acknowledgment that migrants may be more vulnerable to HIV infection than their non-migrant counterparts (ILO 2002; IOM undated; Thiam et al. 2004; Ndiaye 2004).

UNAIDS (2002) asserts that the links between mobility and AIDS are evident in most parts of the world. It reports, for example, that of the Filipinos reported to be living with HIV&AIDS, 28 per cent are workers who have returned home after working in other countries and about 41per

cent of HIV positive Bangladeshis have been migrant workers. It further states that the beginning of the HIV epidemic in rural Mexico can be traced to the return of agricultural labourers who had been working in the United States of America. Bronfman et al (2002) point out that migration and HIV&AIDS have been described as associated phenomena since the early stages of studying HIV&AIDS.

Migrants, especially irregular migrants, are vulnerable to HIV during the migration process and their stay in their country of destination. They encounter situations and engage in behaviours that increase their vulnerability to HIV infection (Thiam et al. 2004). The situations migrants experience and the behaviours they engage in during and after the migration process are influenced by the migrants' characteristics such as sex, age, marital status, educational level and ethnicity. Undocumented migrants are especially vulnerable to HIV infection because of their 'invisibility' during and at the end of the migration process. This state of being 'invisible' or of being 'hidden populations' often translates into exploitation, harassment, exclusion and powerlessness, which increase their vulnerability to the infection.

The migration process leads to changes in the individual's social circumstances which may result in risky sexual behaviours which also increase chances of HIV infection (Brummer 2002; ILO 2002; Ndiaye 2004; Thiam et al. 2004). Brummer (2002) for example observes that leaving their familiar environment with traditional norms and values and the anonymity of being a foreigner can increase risky sexual activities among mobile populations. Thiam et al. (2004) agree with this statement, pointing out that the separation from families and regular partners as a result of migration often leads to risky sexual behaviour. Male migrants are more likely to engage in risky sexual behaviour during migration than female migrants. This is because of traditional and modern definitions of masculinity which usually prescribe early sexual initiation and accept or even encourage many sexual contacts for men (Brummer 2002). Ateka (2001) contends that fidelity is not a virtue among African men. Migrant men are therefore more likely to voluntarily engage in risky sexual behaviour during and after the migration process than their female counterparts.

On arrival in their host countries, undocumented migrants usually want to remain hidden from authorities for fear of deportation and therefore often lack access to information on health including HIV&AIDS and other services (IOM, undated; Thiam et al. 2004). Many undocumented migrants cannot be absorbed into the formal labour market in the country of destination. As a result, they adopt various survival strategies which include informal trading, acceptance of low paid work, marriage and sex work (IOM undated; Maphosa 2004; Eldis undated).

The increase in the number of women migrants is a growing trend in international migration worldwide. Migration in Southern Africa is also experiencing this trend (Dobson 2000; Zinyama 2000). Migrant women, especially the irregular ones, face problems that are compounded by their being both women and immigrants (ILO 2002). Many migrant women fall into the traffickers' trap on the way to their destination (Ndiaye 2004). Brummer (2002) observes that trafficking in female migrants to South Africa for sexual exploitation is on the increase. During the migration process, migrant women, especially irregular migrant women, risk physical and sexual abuse and suffer human rights abuses and violations (ILO 2002; Ndiaye 2004). In their country of destination, migrant women are often excluded from the formal labour market. Consequently, they are often confined to low status, low paid and/or isolated work which increases their vulnerability to HIV&AIDS (Kanyenze 2004; Maphosa 2009).

Labour migration to South Africa is circulatory in character as migrants regularly return home to their families particularly during Christmas and New Year's holidays (Zinyama 2000). Migrants who get infected during the migration process or at their destinations are likely to infect their spouses and partners when they return. Women are more at risk of being infected in this way than men. This is because women still form a large proportion of the population that remains behind. Furthermore, women often lack the power to negotiate safe sex, especially within marriage. Because of prevailing gender ideologies, women often do not have control over their own and their husbands' sexuality both within and outside the home. Women left behind by their migrant husbands or partners are often vulnerable to HIV infection because of their lack of power to negotiate sex, including the use of condoms. Often women do not determine how, when, where and often with whom they have sexual relations (Ndiaye 2004). Thiam, et al. (2004), however, contend that in the context of circulatory labour migration, migrant men are not entirely to blame for the frequency of HIV&AIDS among their wives. In their study in Senegal, they found that sex was often used as a survival strategy by women while their husbands were away especially among those women who did not receive economic support from their migrant husbands. Circulatory migration provides an environment for both men and women, both those who migrate and those left behind, to develop concurrent transnational sexual partnerships thus putting all involved at high risk of HIV infection.

Methodology

This article is based on data obtained in Ward Seven, in Mangwe District in Zimbabwe. Ward Seven is located in the Southern part of Zimbabwe and shares borders with South Africa and Botswana. Approximately 75 per cent of Mangwe District lies in Natural Region Five, a region characterised by a

fragile natural resource base, poor soils and high summer temperatures. The region is therefore of very low agricultural potential, especially crop production. A combination of lack of alternative sources of energy and overpopulation has resulted in high deforestation rates through a high demand for wood fuel from communal areas. As a result of limited employment opportunities and limited livelihood options as well as political violence, a significant proportion of the adult population from this area is employed outside the country, mainly in South Africa.

As observed by Jahic and Finckenauer (2005) numbers are powerful tools that help us quantify and present abstract phenomena in an easy and comprehensible manner. They are an efficient way of conveying information and minimising error. However, quantification does not capture the true nature of a problem. According to Mwanje (2001) qualitative research enables the researcher to obtain responses about what people think, do and feel in the process gaining insights into attitudes, beliefs, motives and behaviours of the target populations and, and gain an overall better understanding of the underlying processes. Qualitative research is grounded in the experiences and voices of the research participants. This prevents the researcher making conclusions that are based on preliminary, often mistaken impressions (Jacobsen and Landau 2003). Irregular migrants fall into the category of 'hidden populations' (Tyldum and Brunovskis 2005). A hidden population is one whose activities are often stigmatised or illegal. It is a population whose size and boundaries are not known, and which therefore does not have a sampling frame. As a result of the clandestine nature of their activities, members of a hidden population are often unwilling to cooperate with researchers. Sometimes they deliberately give unreliable information to protect themselves. In migration studies, 'hidden populations' consist mainly of 'border transgressors' who include human traffickers, human smugglers and undocumented migrants. Studies involving such populations therefore require approaches that are different from those commonly used for more easily observable populations.

Non-probability, namely, convenience or availability sampling was used. This was because there was no sampling frame from which a probability sample could be drawn. Convenience sampling, alternatively referred to as availability sampling or accidental sampling, is where the sample is chosen on the basis of the ease with which members of the population can be accessed. As a result of the unavailability of a sampling frame, it was not possible to have a sample size before the commencement of the study. Data were obtained from 122 respondents. Data was collected using a variety of ethnographic methods including key informant interviews, in-depth interviews, group discussions, observation and informal conversations.

Findings and Discussion

Prevalence of Irregular Migration

A significant proportion of migrants from the southern parts of Zimbabwe to South Africa are irregular migrants. Some migrants enter South Africa with proper travel documents and then overstay. In the process, they acquire South Africa identification documents, usually through fraudulent means. Acquiring South African documents, especially the passport, facilitates the migrants' exit and entry from the country. Besides entering regularly using proper travel documents and then overstaying, migrants also use various irregular ways of entering into South Africa, including being assisted by human smugglers locally known as an *omalayisha*. Irregular migration is generally known here as *dabulaphu*. Although *dabulaphu* traditionally entailed crossing the border through illegal crossing points and walking most or all the way to the destination, the use of the term has gradually become generalised to include all forms of irregular migration which include being assisted by *omalayisha*. *Omalayisha* (singular: *umalayisha*) are informal cross-border transport operators who smuggle people across the borders by bribing border official to allow people without proper travel documents to pass. As a result, *omalayisha* charge very high fess to transport people without proper travel documents whom they refer as *abashisayo* (the hot ones). This is because the fare paid by the traveller without proper travel documents includes the cost of the bribe. For payment, *omalayisha* often use a system of deferred payment known as 'pay forward', which is a payment arrangement that involves a sponsor who undertakes to pay for the travel expenses of a beneficiary after they have travelled. Although sponsors could be people who remain behind such as parents, they are often relatives who are already working in South Africa. On arrival in South Africa, beneficiaries are usually met at the Park Station by their sponsors where the payment is made. Alternatively, they are delivered to their sponsors' residences where the payment is made.

Problems may occur in this process. For example a 35-year-old male informant reported that he travelled from Ward Seven to Johannesburg with *umalayisha* after his uncle had offered to pay for his travel. However, when he arrived in Johannesburg, he could not find his uncle and had to stay at *umalayisha*'s place while trying to locate him. Another male respondent aged 22 said he travelled to Johannesburg with *umalayisha* but for some reason when he arrived in Johannesburg his sponsor did not have the money to pay for his travel. These examples illustrate the fact that after travelling all the way to Johannesburg some migrants have found themselves stranded with

their sponsors either failing to pay or being at large. This exposes them to abuse by transport operators or other people after assisting them with accommodation and food.

Another way of migrating from Zimbabwe to South Africa is by using the illegal crossing points. Those who travel in this manner risk falling prey to *amagumaguma*. These are groups of young men who are often found loitering at border posts and are involved in various, mostly illegal, activities such as foreign currency transactions, theft and assisting people to cross the border through unofficial points. Whatever they are engaged in, the motive of *amagumaguma* is to take advantage of the desperate travellers to steal from them, rob them or rape them. They often offer unsuspecting travellers help in crossing the border using unofficial means and on the way turn around and rob and rape their unsuspecting clients. Alternatively they waylay them and attack them with the same objective. Respondents related shocking stories about the activities of *amagumaguma*. A 21-year-old female respondent said of them:

These are robbers ... these are animals ... these are very dangerous people. They often waylay people who are trying to cross the border illegally and rob them. Many times they pretend to assist but turn around and rob the unsuspecting travellers. They move in groups and are often armed with knives and guns.

Another 26-year-old female respondent described them as '... animals, dogs who rape women and kill for money'.

A 24-year-old male respondent narrated his experience with *amagumaguma* thus:

Around 7 pm the journey towards the border started. Night time is the most ideal time to travel especially when there is no moon and visibility is at its minimum. It is difficult for border patrol officers to detect people in the dark. There were now over 60 of us, about 20 of the travellers being women. The travellers' ages were around 18 and 25 years. We were supposed to walk in single file formation holding hands, with one 'umpisi' (another group of human smugglers, perceived to be friendlier than *amagumaguma*) walking in front of the group, another in the middle and a third one at the back. When we got to the river, we were ordered to take off our clothes and cross the river naked. As soon as we had crossed the river, a group of *amagumaguma* pounced on us. They thoroughly searched us and took away from us anything that was of value. Those travellers who were found with nothing of value were thoroughly beaten up and warned that in future they had to remember to bring something of value for

the amagumaguma. A well dressed young man had his t-shirt, jeans and North Star shoes taken away from him. He was left wearing only a short. The amagumaguma then selected some women from the group whom they raped as the rest of the group watched. Those who tried to restrain them were heavily assaulted and had their clothes torn. One young man had his feet sliced with a knife. The other migrants had to carry him to the pick-up point. During the body searches, women were subjected to all sorts of humiliating touches which amount to fondling... no part of the body remains untouched.

Another migrant, a 27-year-old male believed that such incidents could explain why:

... many young women become mothers less than a year after arriving in South Africa. Some of them could have been impregnated by these thugs. Such traumatic experiences lead many young women to turn to drugs and prostitution because they feel worthless. That is also why many of them die of AIDS.

The vulnerability of undocumented migrants to abuse and HIV infection is clearly depicted by the following story carried by *Zimbabwe Today* entitled, 'The Terrible Price of Freedom' (<http://www.zimbabwetoday.co.uk/>)

Three teenage girls are robbed, beaten and raped.

This weekend, in the Johannesburg offices of SAWIMA, a South African NGO dedicated to helping distressed migrants, I met three girls from Zimbabwe's second city, Bulawayo. They were still dressed in muddy rags, and sobbed as they told officials what had happened to them during their bid to escape from the Mugabe regime. Two of them, aged 12 and 13, were too upset.

But the 15-year-old described graphically how their bid to find a new life in the Republic had gone terribly wrong. She told me that the three of them had managed to collect half the money demanded by agents in Bulawayo, in return for safe passage over the border, and on to Johannesburg. Her brother, who lives in South Africa, promised to pay the balance once the girls were delivered to him.

The girls were collected by a gang of several men who specialise in this trade in humanity. Their fee, an average for the trip I understand, was 1,500 South African Rand.

'When we got over the border,' said the girl, 'they rang my brother on his mobile phone, and he confirmed that he would make the full payment as soon as we arrived. But then the men began to demand we have sex with them. When we tried to resist they beat us, and threatened to abandon us in the bush.'

'It was in the night, we had no money, we were so frightened... They all raped us, over and over again...now I think they may have given me HIV.'

A SAWIMA official told me that the girls had been taken to a Johannesburg address and kept as sex slaves for several days, before being finally abandoned on the organisation's doorstep early one morning. The girls are now undergoing medical examination, and attempts are being made to find the 15-year-old's brother. The official said that almost half of all women who escape illegally from Zimbabwe endure similar experiences, and she believes that many more are killed after being raped, their bodies left in the bush.

'These human traffickers are beasts,' she told me. 'People know this, but they are so desperate they will even risk their lives to come here.'

Back here in Harare the talks on power sharing begin yet again. And while the politicians talk, the rapes, the beatings and the murders continue.

(Posted on Tuesday, 28 October 2008 at 08:48)

The following is an account of a 17-year-old Zimbabwean girl who is among the many whose stories have been reported by Doctors without Borders;

There were seven of us, all girls. We were just friends, not relatives. I was the youngest of them. We got on a bus to Beitbridge and when we got off these men were saying that if we don't have money to cross we could come with them. We opted to go in their cars. They said border jumpers travel at night so we drove around from 6pm to 7am. We went to so many different places I didn't know where we were any more. Then they stopped at one place in the forest and this became our sort of home for the next four months. There were 13 men watching us all the time and they raped us every day. Eventually they started to let go to urinate by ourselves and that is how we escaped. Now I am four months pregnant. I left Zimbabwe because I am an orphan - I am the breadwinner for my siblings and I came to find food and find a way to support them. Now I don't know what I am going to do, how I am going to take care of them.

Such stories lucidly illustrate the vulnerability of irregular migrants to HIV infection. Female irregular migrants are the most vulnerable as the following section discusses. According to UNAIDS (2005) vulnerability is often related to a particular stage in the migration process. It argues that migrants are most vulnerable at their destinations while women face the greatest risk in transit as when they have to trade sex in order to survive or complete their journeys. This study did not establish the stage of migration at which women

are most vulnerable although evidence seems to support UNAIDS observations that women are most vulnerable during transit. The above cases support Bronfman et.al (2002)'s assertion that the epidemic affects those whose dignity and human rights are less respected.

The Increasing Feminisation of Migration

Migration from Ward Seven is still a male-dominated activity, although there are indications of an increase in women migrants. This is an area in which migration was an exclusively male activity for a long time. The increase in female migration can be attributed to a number of factors which include the facilitative role of *omalayisha*, the impacts of HIV&AIDS, the development of migrant networks and the continued decline of the Zimbabwean economy. The impact of HIV&AIDS has led to an increase in the number of widowed women joining the migration trek in order to provide for their families. Over the years elaborate networks linking the migrants and their places of origin have developed, thus making migration in general, but especially the migration of women, easier and less risky than it used to be. These networks facilitate easy migration by providing information about the conditions at destination, such as job opportunities, accommodation and general survival skills in the country of destination. The rising levels of unemployment in Zimbabwe are forcing a lot of people to leave for other countries, including South Africa.

The ILO (1999) states that globally, women are no longer just found among accompanying family members but now make up an increasing proportion of migrant workers. For Jolly and Reeves (2005), contrary to the common misconception that men are the migrants, almost half of the world's 175 million international migrants are women. Adepoju (2004) asserts that the traditional pattern of migration within and from Africa which was male-dominated, long-term and long-distance is changing. Evidence shows an increase in migration by women. A large proportion of such women are those who move independently to fulfil their own economic needs and not simply joining their husbands or other family members. In its country report of Mozambique, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (2010) states that the proportion of migrants who are women has not changed greatly in recent decades. It however points out that women are now more likely to migrate independently rather than as members of a household and they are actively involved in employment. Many are forced to migrate by the loss of their husbands/partners, in many cases due to AIDS-related conditions.

Accommodation Problems

One of the greatest problems faced by immigrants in South Africa, especially in Johannesburg, is the shortage of residential accommodation. As a result undocumented migrants generally live in conditions that expose them

to HIV&AIDS. In some cases a number of people share rooms which are often partitioned into smaller and smaller units. One respondent described the living conditions of migrants as follows:

...you can find up to twenty people sharing one room, both men and women. Some of them would be unemployed and have no papers and have to spend the day indoors. You can imagine what they spend the day doing and the consequences of that in this era of HIV and AIDS.

Such living conditions encourage both casual and transactional sex. For example new migrants may be forced to offer sex in exchange for accommodation, which exposes them to HIV and AIDS.

Employment Opportunities at Destination

Despite the prevalent perception in the migrant-sending communities that there are unlimited employment opportunities in South Africa, there is a significant level of unemployment among immigrants. This is both a reflection of high unemployment rates in the country and the marginalisation of immigrants, especially undocumented immigrants, in the labour market. For example, Milazi (2001:72) points out that:

The high employment rates continue to be a major Achilles heel of the South African economy and the inability to create new jobs in sufficient numbers is a major concern both to business and government.

Maphosa (2009) found that a number of migrants were either unemployed, self-employed or doing 'piece jobs'. Undocumented immigrants are often employed in jobs that are shunned by locals due to harsh working conditions, low pay and status and little protection by labour market institutions. Consequently, they are generally found at the lower end of the job market in their host countries. Most undocumented migrant jobs are in the marginalised categories such as casual work, subcontracting and informal trading (Kanyenze 2004; ILO/SAMAT 1998).

Migrants therefore do jobs described by Stalker (1994) as the 'three D jobs', the dirty, difficult and dangerous. This point is illustrated by the following statement from one of the respondents:

Most of the South Africans live with their families (in Johannesburg). They need to go back to their families after work. This is not the case with us because we leave our families here (in Zimbabwe). We are in Johannesburg to work, so we can accept any job regardless of how difficult and boring it is. What can you do if you are not in your country?

Women migrants are more vulnerable to HIV than their male counterparts. This is because they are more likely than men to experience sex-based gender violence both on transit and at the destination. As stated by Kanyenze (2004), from a gender dimension, the South African labour market is highly stratified to such an extent that it is disadvantageous to women. This is consistent with Chammartin's (2008)'s findings that female migrant workers are mainly in the service sectors. They are concentrated in the female-dominated occupations associated with traditional gender roles. These include jobs in the less skilled and devalued sectors such as domestic work, child care and the care for elderly and handicapped. Jolly and Revees (2005) say migrant women are adversely affected by sex-segregated labour markets, low wages, long working hours, insecure contracts and precarious legal status. IOM (2010) states that coerced sex between the employer and labourer is not unheard of although it is likely to be under-reported. It points out that:

In fact reporting of rape or sexual harassment is very low amongst domestic workers, particularly amongst migrants who may not have legal papers to work in the country (p.15).

Transnational Concurrent Multiple Sexual Partnerships

Cohabiting, referred to as *masihlalisane* is a common practice among migrants. *Masihlalisane* describes semi-permanent sexual relationships that develop between migrants and locals as well as among migrants. Some of these relationships are eventually formalised into long-term relationships or marriages by payment of the bride price (*lobola*) for the woman. Although relationships between migrants and locals exist, most *masihlalisane* arrangements develop among migrants. As explained by Beck-Gernsheim (2007), immigrants who come from the same country of origin often form ethnic communities. It is within these ethnic communities that many kinds of social, economic, political and religious relationships grow. Among them are various types of sexual relationships including *masihlalisane*. Migrant-migrant *masihlalisane* relationships often develop between earlier arrivals, usually male migrants and new arrivals, usually female migrants. Earlier, usually male migrants often take advantage of newer, usually young female migrants whom they offer accommodation, food and even work in exchange for sex. Even married men or those with partners back home enter *masihlalisane* relationships. This results in cross-border concurrent multiple sexual partnerships which create an environment conducive to the spread of HIV. 'Transnationalised polygamy' is a phrase used by Lubkemann (2002) to describe a practice by Mozambican immigrants to South Africa who establish sexual relationships in South Africa despite having left wives back home.

Fatalism

Hess and McKinney (2007) define fatalism as a belief that everything in a person's life is subject to a superior power or being, or external forces such as luck, fate or God. Fatalism makes an individual believe that such external forces determine their course of life, including conditions such as gender, length of life and level of wealth. A fatalistic attitude is usually manifested in an individual's behaviour which is characterised by a passive resignation to the events of life. For Diaz and Ayala (1999), however, fatalistic responses can range from resignation to rebellion. Fatalism can be acquired from beliefs. For example, Hess and McKinney (2007) point out that in many African cultures people believe that diseases are caused by many things, including God's disfavour, the interplay of mediating spirits or the breaking of cultural taboos and customs. It can also result from negative life experiences. Fatalism can act as a barrier in efforts to combat HIV&AIDS, including the promotion of condom use. Diaz and Ayala (1999) found that fatalism was one of the ideologies of HIV risk among Latino gay men in the United States of America. From focus group discussions, they found that many of these men engage in unprotected anal sex. Such behaviour does not result from lack of knowledge about HIV, including how it is transmitted, but is just a fatalistic response to it.

Life as a migrant, particularly as an undocumented migrant has many risks. These risks include those that migrants are exposed to during travel, such as vehicle accidents, drowning when trying to cross flooded rivers and falling victim to *amagumaguma*. South Africa, especially Johannesburg, is a very risky environment. The sense of insecurity may result in fatalistic responses to problems such as HIV. Such responses can either be resignation or rebellion. Some respondents in this study expressed the view that HIV&AIDS is just one among many risks that one is exposed to everyday in Johannesburg.

A 20-year-old male migrant said:

I am not afraid of AIDS because I will die anyway, whether ... from a gun, a knife, an accident or HIV&AIDS... You can't escape all of them. In fact in Jozi (Johannesburg) there are more chances of dying from a gun or knife than from AIDS.

As suggested by Diaz and Ayala (1999), HIV&AIDS preventive programmes have to take fatalism into account.

Migrants' Access to Health Care

Undocumented migrants often do not have access to health care due to a number of reasons. Writing on access to health by undocumented immigrants

to the United States of America, Kullgren (2003) states that the health burdens of immigrants are sustained and magnified by language barriers, lack of knowledge about the health care system and fear of detection by immigration authorities. In the case of undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants to South Africa, a report by Doctors without Borders (2009) states that Zimbabweans attempting to access the health system by themselves are often either harassed or hindered from obtaining the services they need, particularly in hospitals. A report by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (2010) states that current health care planning in South Africa does not adequately engage with the health of migrants. Researchers have also observed that in particular, HIV&AIDS programming in South Africa overlooks migrants (Vearey et.al 2011). All these factors increase the vulnerability of undocumented migrants to HIV.

Conclusion

Irregular migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa has taken place and may continue for a long time to come. As mobile populations, migrants are both high-risk groups as well as catalysts in the spread of HIV & AIDS. There are various factors affecting migrants' vulnerability to HIV. These are found in all the stages of the migration process. Efforts to deal with the problem of HIV among migrants should therefore take a multi-sectoral approach which links origin and destination areas.

A human rights approach which addresses issues of marginalisation, discrimination and abuse is needed. Human rights organisations, both local and international, should be at the forefront of this campaign. This is because the problem cannot be left to the governments of both the countries of origin and destination. In the first place, people resort to irregular migration as a survival strategy because they have been denied certain basic rights in their country of origin. At the same time in the country of destination these rights are not guaranteed. As observed by Bronfman and others (2002), the HIV&AIDS epidemic affects more those whose dignity and human rights are less respected. The solution, therefore, is to fight for the restoration of their dignity and human rights.

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The Youth and Political Ideology in Ghanaian Politics: The Case of the Fourth Republic

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Abstract

The youth of Ghana have played an important role in both local and national politics since the inception of the Fourth Republic. Among other things, they have served as the foot-soldiers and channels through which party manifestoes have been transmitted to the electorate and polling agents during registration and voting exercises. Through chanting of their party slogans and house-to-house campaign, the youth have often made the presence of their various parties felt across the country. In developed democracies, one key factor that motivates the youth in playing active role in politics is political ideology. This is because political ideology largely shapes the political future of the youth, especially students in tertiary institutions. Unfortunately, a brief survey shows that political ideology, though relevant, contributes little in whipping up support for political parties among the youth.

The article discusses the reasons for the seeming irrelevance of political ideology among the youth. It recommends massive campaign by political parties to educate the youth on their respective political ideologies, their relevance and the need to uphold them. It also stresses the need for party leaders themselves to insist on ideological purity in all their dealings with other parties to serve as an example for the youth to emulate.

Résumé

La jeunesse ghanéenne a joué un rôle important à la fois dans la vie politique locale et nationale depuis la naissance de la Quatrième République. Entre autres choses, les jeunes ont servi de militants, mais aussi on permis la transmission des manifestes de partis à l'électorat et aux agents électoraux au cours des inscriptions sur les listes et des opérations de vote. A travers la chanson des slogans de leurs partis, ils ont souvent rehaussé la présence de leurs divers partis travers le pays.

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Dans les démocraties développées, un des facteurs clés qui motivent la jeunesse pour jouer un rôle actif en politique est l'idéologie politique. Ceci est dû au fait que l'idéologie politique forge dans une grande mesure l'avenir politique des jeunes, en particulier les étudiants dans l'enseignement supérieur. Malheureusement, une brève étude montre que l'idéologie politique, bien que pertinente, contribue peu à encourager le soutien aux partis politique chez les jeunes.

L'article discute des raisons de l'apparente inutilité de l'idéologie politique parmi les jeunes. Il recommande une campagne massive de la part des partis politiques pour éduquer les jeunes sur leurs idéologies respectives, leur pertinence et la nécessité de les maintenir. Il souligne aussi la nécessité pour les dirigeants de parti d'insister eux-mêmes sur l'orthodoxie idéologique dans leurs interactions avec d'autres partis pour servir d'exemple que les jeunes peuvent émuler.

Introduction

Political parties, whether in democratic or authoritarian dispensations always have an ideology that is intended to provide the fundamental policies that will guide them, particularly when they assume the reins of power (Wayo-Seini 2006). Political party ideology sets the beliefs of the party and based on them, the basic rules and regulations that guide its members. Indeed, the ideology of gives an immediate indication as to what the party beliefs are and for that matter its philosophy. In other words, political ideology, to a greater extent, concerns the beliefs, traditions and philosophies of political parties (Wayo-Seini 2006:2).

In many democracies, the ideology and philosophy of a political party are extremely important in attracting the youth to that party. In western democracies, for example, political ideology is particularly important in shaping the political future of the youth and students in tertiary institutions because it sets the tone for their future participation in politics by making them aware of the beliefs and principles of the various political parties (Zukin et al. 2006). The young conservatives, the labour youth and the young liberals in the United Kingdom and their counterparts in the United States are very politically active in tertiary institutions and, through healthy debates and other youth activities, they serve as training grounds for future politicians (Zukin et al. 2006:120).

One is however not sure about the relevance of political ideologies among the youth, particularly in times of voting. The paper therefore seeks to test the relevance of political ideology among the youth in Ghanaian politics under the Fourth Republic.

By Fourth Republic, I am referring to Ghana's fourth attempt at constitutional and democratic rule after independence. The first attempt was in 1960, when the first constitution was drafted by Ghanaians under the presidency of Ghana's first president, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. Following

the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime, a new constitution was drafted in 1969 under the leadership of Dr. K.A. Busia. Busia's regime was also toppled by the military and after close to ten years of military rule, the 1979 constitution was adopted under the presidency of Dr. Hilla Limann. The Limann regime was also toppled by the military and after close to thirteen years of military rule led by Ghana's former President J. J. Rawlings, who was then a flight lieutenant, the 1992 constitution was promulgated. This marked Ghana's fourth attempt at constitutional rule.

Structure of the Article

First, the term 'youth' in this article is defined, followed by a review of the age structure of Ghana. The next section discusses the methodology used in data collection which is followed by a review of the state of current thinking about the youth in Ghana in order to state in clear terms, the contribution of this paper to the literature. The concept of ideology would be discussed immediately after the literature on the Ghanaian youth is reviewed. The background to politics and formation of political parties in Ghana is then given to facilitate the understanding of how various ideologies emerged in Ghana. The role and contributions of the youth to Ghanaian politics in the Fourth Republic would also be discussed. This is also followed by an attempt to spell out the ideologies and philosophies of the two main political parties in Ghana, namely, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The question 'Does ideology matter to the youth?' is then discussed with the aid of empirical data collected from a sample of 200 respondents who fall within the category of youth. This is then followed by some concluding remarks and recommendations.

The Youth Defined

There is no universal definition of youth, given that it is a socially constructed category that enjoys tremendous variability from society to society.¹ Various definitions, however, exist for the term 'youth' in official documents. According to the 2006 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, youth is defined as the age between 15 and 24 years.² The 1992 Constitution of Ghana also defines the youth as 'anyone who is acknowledged by deeds as identifying with and committed to youth development'.³ This definition is shared by the main opposition party in Ghana, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) which has no age limit or barrier for determining who is a member of the party's youth wing.⁴ The ruling party in Ghana, the New Patriotic Party's definition of youth is a person between the ages 18 to 39 years.⁵ Other political parties in Ghana such as the People's National

Convention define youth to embrace persons aged between 18 to 35 years.⁶ The Convention People's Party's (CPP) definition of youth is any person aged between 14 to 38 years.⁷ Again, in the Draft National Youth Policy of Ghana⁸ and in many youth policy documents in Africa such as the African Youth Charter, a youth is a young man or woman who falls within the age group of 15-35 years.⁹

In this paper, the term youth refers to young men and women who fall within the age bracket of 15-39 years. The lower age limit of fifteen years provides a major human – development watershed. That is, it coincides with that period when most children experience puberty. The upper age limit of thirty-nine years is the point when most young men and women fully enter adulthood. It is also in consonance with the cliché in Ghana that 'life begins at 40 years'.¹⁰

Age Structure of Ghana's Population

Ghana, like many other countries in the world, has a largely youthful population (Asante 2006:222). The 2000 Population and Housing Census data estimates Ghana's population at 18,912,079 (Ghana Statistical Service 2002). Out of this, 15,054,015 (79.6%) are less than 40 years old (Table 1).

Table 1: The Age Structure of Ghana's Population

Age Group	Number	%
National	18,712,079	100
Less Than 40 years	15,054,015	79.6
40 years and above	3,858,064	20.4

Source: 2000 Population and Housing Census. Ghana Statistical Service, 2002

The voting age in Ghana is 18 years while the age at which one qualifies to be a Member of Parliament is 21 years.¹¹ The records of Ghana's Electoral Commission in 2005 shows that out of the 10,586,377 who registered for the 2000 elections, the majority of (76.19%) were between 18 and 39 years; with only 23.72 per cent aged 40 years and above. In 2004, the respective percentages were 68.46 per cent and 31.43 per cent (See Table 2).

Table 2: Age Group Statistics of the 2000 and 2004 Elections

Election	Election 2000	Election 2004
Total Registered Voters	10,586,377	10,354,970
Percentage	100	100
18-18 Years	8,065,825	7,089,928
%	76.19	68.46
40 Years and over	2,511,290	3,255,140
Percentage	23.72	31.43
Others	9262	9902
%	0.08	0.09

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana, Accra, 2005

Even though the total number of voters within the age category of 18-39 years in the 2004 elections was lower than that of 2000, the youth still constitute the bulk of Ghana's voting population by a wide margin (Asante 2006:223). Despite this dominance of the youth on the national population of Ghana, the country has no youth policy. Indeed, Ghana has suffered from lack of state-sponsored youth policies right from the regime of Kwame Nkrumah, the first president until 1999 when the National Democratic Congress (NDC) drafted one after coming into power. This policy was however not implemented. Instead, the government of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), after assuming the reins of power in 2001, decided to draft a more comprehensive one which has still not been finalised.¹²

Methodology

Using a combination of different sampling techniques, a survey was conducted between 5 and 27 April 2007 to test the relevance of political ideology in determining the outcome of elections among the youth in the ruling NPP and the opposition NDC. Preference was given to only the NPP and NDC because they both have been in power and have also been in opposition one time or the other. Using the Purposive Sampling technique, 200 respondents made up of 100 from each of the two main parties (See Table 7 at appendix) aged between 15-39 were carefully selected from the Accra metropolis and Tema municipality to represent the southern sector of Ghana and Tamale metropolis to represent the northern sector. The selection of 100 respondents each, to represent the two main parties in Ghana was

done with the assistance of the National Youth Organisers of the two parties who gave hints about where their supporters could be found within the selected areas of study. As shown in Table 3, the respondents comprised 82 females and 118 males.

Table 3: Gender Distribution of Respondents

Gender	No. of Respondents
Male	18
Female	82
Total	200

Source: From the Study

The breakdown of the respondents, comprising 82 female and 118 male respondents is as follows:

- 25 respondents (11 females and 14 males), from the University of Ghana Campus comprising five each from the five traditional halls of residence (Legon, Volta, Commonwealth, Sarbah and Akafo);
- 25 respondents from Tema municipality (11 females and 14 males);
- 50 respondents from Accra metropolis (20 females and 30 males); and
- 100 respondents from Tamale metropolis (40 females and 60 males).

On the University of Ghana campus, only the Volta Hall is a purely an all-female Hall. To get 5 female respondents out of a population of about 1000, every 100th female student was selected. The same technique was used in selecting respondents from Common Wealth Hall of residence which is an all-male Hall and has a population size slightly above that of Volta Hall. For the rest of the Halls of residence, the ratio of male to female residents is about 70:30. In this regard, three respondents were selected at random to represent the male and two to represent the female in these Halls which have both male and female residents (Akafo Hall, Legon Hall and Sarbah Hall).

In the Tema municipality, there are twelve traditional communities with Community One being the biggest. Five communities comprising the first, third, fifth, seventh and nine were selected. Three female respondents were randomly selected from the first community and two each from the third, fifth, seventh and ninth communities. In selecting the 14 male respondents from Tema, six were selected randomly from the first community and another two were randomly picked each of the third, fifth, seventh and ninth communities.

In selecting the 50 respondent from the Accra metropolis, Accra Central, the centre of the metropolis, was chosen. There are three electoral areas here, namely, Kinka, Kolewoko and Ngleshie. In selecting 20 female respondents from the three electoral areas, eight were picked at random from Kinka, the most populated of the three electoral areas; while the remaining 12 were picked randomly with six coming from each of Kolewoko and Ngleshie. The same methodology was applied in selecting their 30 male counterparts. In this regard, 12 male respondents were selected at random in Kinka, and nine each from Kolewoko and Ngleshie electoral areas.

In the Tamale metropolis, a random selection of five major suburbs was done. These are Nyohini, Sabongida, Bulpela, Kakpagyili and Choggu. In selecting 40 female respondents needed from there, eight each were picked at random from each of the towns. The same method was again applied in selecting their male counterparts resulting in 12 male respondents being randomly selected from each of the five major suburbs identified in Tamale.

The age bracket of 15-39 was selected not necessarily in consonance with the ruling New Patriotic Party's definition of the youth; but more to be in line with the definition of youth earlier stated and given this age bracket also covers the bulk of Ghana's voting population.

More respondents were selected from Accra than Tema because Accra, being a metropolitan area, is bigger and more densely populated than Tema. Moreover, more male respondents (118) were interviewed than their female counterparts (82) because they were more easily available and co-operative than their female counterparts. The reason(s) for this may form the subject of another study.

Of the 200 respondents finally selected, Table 4 shows that about 170 at least had some form of education while 30 had no education at all. In all, 28 respondents had basic education, 48 had secondary education while 94 had tertiary education

Table 4: Educational Background of Respondents

Education Level	No. of Respondents
None	30
Basic	28
Secondary	48
Tertiary	94
Total	200

Source: From the Study

The respondents were asked five major questions from which to draw our inferences for the study. Admittedly, therefore, the work is a sample study of the youth and may not necessarily reflect the general attitude of the Ghanaian youth during voting.

With this in mind, we proceed to look at the questions that were posed to the 200 respondents. First, they were asked whether they supported and voted for any of the registered political parties. The second question sought to find out whether they knew the respective political ideologies of the parties. Finally, the respondents were asked to mention the variables that influenced their voting one party in preference to others.

State of Current Thinking on the Youth

There are several extant works generally on the youth, in Africa and in Ghana. Scholars are unanimous about the vibrant and active nature of the youth in the political processes even though they fail to discuss the factors that make the youth active in the political process. Accordingly, Knebel (1937), Miller (1936) and Rivta (1975) have described the youth as active agents in the social and political processes and have, therefore, called for greater responsibilities to be entrusted to them. However, what makes the youth active in the political process have not been looked at by these scholars.

Some scholars in Africa like Diouf (2003), Durham (2000) and Burgers (2003) have pointed out the negative perceptions about the youth. They see the youth as a threat to society; as irresponsible people and a means through which leaders climb to power. Generally, the youth in Africa have been labelled as 'a lost generation' especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone, where civil wars have led to massive population displacement, a social upheaval described by Richards (1995) as a crisis of the youth; and in South Africa, where the 'political' youth generation of the 1980s has had to come to terms with unemployment and social marginalisation in the 1990s. Thus, since the late 1980s and early 1990s, terms like the 'the lost generation', and 'marginalised youth' have gained currency (Ntsebeza 1993). In West Africa, for instance, though the youth constitutes 60-65 per cent of the population, they are bedevilled by apathy, disenchantment, disempowerment and exploitation (Konteh 2007). These scholars nevertheless recognise the contribution of the youth in providing support base to political leaders who seek to capture political power. But they have been silent about what motivates the youth to be active and to provide support for political leaders.

Writing on the youth in Ghana, Chazan (1978) argues that though Ghanaian societies have traditionally allotted a major political role to the youth, their activities at the state level are actually limited to the mere expression of support for leaders. According to her, in the Ghanaian traditional

setting the youth were recognised as active political agents and were legally represented by their leader, 'nkwaakwaahene', in the council of elders. She noted that the youth played the role of pressure groups and approved or disapproved the nomination of rulers and could destool the chief. She also observed that although political parties in modern times stress mass participation in their formative years, once in power, they narrow the opportunities for individual involvement and limit activities of the youth in the central government by shifting them to the local level (Chazan 1978).

Lentz (1995), on her part described the youth in Ghana as very vibrant and noted that even though this characteristic sometimes makes them prominent players during conflicts, it has led to a certain distrust of, if not hostility, towards them by governments. The government shows its discomfort with them by accusing them of parochialism and tribalism. For this reason government is reluctant to take them on as serious negotiating partners, thereby restricting their negotiating abilities and scope of action. Nonetheless, the youths have remained significant actors in various political arenas in the country (Lentz 1995).

Ahwoi (2006) observes that the youth are often manipulated by the adults in the political parties to fight their 'dirty' and unprincipled political wars within and outside the parties. He argued for adequate political empowerment for the youth through sound instructional programmes, including education on party philosophy, criticism and self-criticism (Ahwoi 2006).

Asiamah (2006) largely agrees with Ahwoi but calls for government funding of youth activities in political parties. He is apprehensive that the lack of funding for youth activities in political parties leaves the youth at the mercy of private financiers who then use them for their own interest. He notes that the youth in Ghana have grown in political participation and must therefore be made part of the decision-making process. He cited instances of the youth being told to bid their time to allow their adults whose political tenure was cut short by *coup d'etat* to 'finish their term', as an example of their frequent marginalisation in the affairs of the state. He believes the youth should undergo constant training to and prepare them for the future (Asiamah 2006).

All these works recognise the Ghanaian youth as vibrant but failed to discuss factors that could spur them on to be more supportive of regimes or party ideologies. Also, even though much of the problems and negative perceptions about the youth have been identified in the literature along with solutions on how empower them, the positive contributions of the youth have not been clearly portrayed in extant literature. Furthermore, in discussing measures to empower the youth, there is considerable silence about the role of ideology in development of this corp of loyal and effective core support-

ers of the political process. The role of political ideology in shaping the political future of the youth as well as empowering them is too crucial to be downplayed or treated with significant silence as has been done in existing literature. This is part of the void that this paper attempts to fill. But before then, we need a closer examination of the concept of ideology to be sure that this is what is really needed to liberate the Ghanaian youth and unleash their potentials.

Ideology

The term 'ideology' was likely coined by the French thinker Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1815) at the turn of the nineteenth century. For De Tracy, ideology was the science of ideas and their origins. Ideology understands ideas to issue, not haphazardly from mind or consciousness, but as the result of forces in the material environment that shape people's thinking (Tracy 1815). De Tracy believed his view of ideology could be put to progressive political purposes since understanding the source of ideas might enable efforts on behalf of human progress (Tracy 1815:9).

Ideology today is generally taken to mean not a science of ideas, but the ideas themselves, and moreover, ideas of a particular kind. Ideologies are ideas whose purpose is not epistemic, but political (Bell 2000). Thus, an ideology exists to confirm a certain political viewpoint, serve the interests of certain people, or to perform a functional role in relation to social, economic, political and legal institutions (Bell 2000:278). Daniel Bell dubbed ideology 'an action-oriented system of beliefs,' and the fact that ideology is action-oriented indicates its role is not to render reality transparent, but to motivate people to do or not do certain things. Such a role may involve a process of justification that requires the obfuscation of reality (Grant 1987).

An ideology entails a body of concepts, values and symbols which incorporate conception of human nature and thus indicate what is possible or impossible to achieve; critical reflections on the nature of human interactions; the values which humans ought to either reject or aspire to; and the correct technical arrangements for social, economic and political life which will meet the needs and interests of human beings (Andrew 1995:16). An ideology begins with the belief that things can be done better than they are; it is basically a plan to improve society. It is a verbal image of the good society, and of the chief means of constructing such a society (Downs 1957:96). On his part, Kousoulas (1975:66) defined ideology as 'a cluster of beliefs relating to the basic organisation of society, its core values and man's place in it...it is fairly consistent, pervasive and affect our thinking on questions of social organisation, values, processes, or priorities; it is a mental filter which colours our perception of reality and determines our

reactions to key issues'. Stewart (1962:6) broadly agreed with this, noting that an ideology comprises a set of beliefs and ideas which incline a nation to accept certain reforms and to reject others; it is a product of present needs and facts, and of beliefs, more or less accurate, about the past.

Ideology, indeed, is a ready-made tool which helps the individual, literate as well as illiterate, to make a quick option on major political issues (Bluwey 2002:76). Often, it is spelt out in an elaborate form to serve as a national consensus on basic values and as a guide to rulers as well as followers (Bell 2000). Where this happens, the constitution proclaims the ideology and government and all forms of political activity are expected to be carried out within that framework. In other cases, it becomes a handbook for revolutionary groups who set out to change the very fabric of social organisation (Bluwey 2000:79).

Most ideologies can be traced back to philosophers. Classic liberalism, for example, can be traced back to the seventeenth century English philosopher, John Locke, who emphasised individual rights, property and reason (Grant 1987:54). There are several ideologies. Andrew (1995), for example, gives a straightforward account of eight different ideologies: liberalism, conservatism, socialism, anarchism, fascism, feminism, ecologism and nationalism. He gives an account of the rise of these ideologies in question to describe the variety of ideas that have fallen under a single label. Other ideologies include marxism, capitalism, etc.

Marx and Engels are perhaps the most famous of all the theorists of ideology. Like De Tracy, Marx and Engels (1976) contend that ideas are shaped by the material world, but as historical materialists they understand the material to consist of relations of production that undergo change and development. Moreover, for Marx and Engels, it is the exploitative and alienating features of capitalist economic relations that prompt ideas they dubbed 'ideology.' Ideology only arises where there are social conditions such as those produced by private property that are vulnerable to criticism and protest; ideology exists to inure these social conditions from attack by those who are disadvantaged by them (Marx and Engels 1976). Capitalist ideologies give an inverted explanation for market relations, for example, so that human beings perceive their actions as the consequence of economic factors, rather than the other way around, and moreover, thereby understand the market to be natural and inevitable (Marx and Engels 1976:29).

Preachers and followers of a given ideology, especially when they are in the opposition, argue that if their plan is followed, things will be much better than they are at present. The concept of ideology has therefore been commonly used as a political weapon to condemn or criticise rival creeds or doctrines (Heywood 2002:40).

As a rule, ideology is acquired through the formal structures of socialisation: the family, religious organisations, educational system, political parties and voluntary associations. In totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, the state usually undertakes direct responsibility for the inculcation of the single, unified national ideology. In liberal democratic regimes, the individual acquires the values through the informal and imperceptible influences of the family, peer and other social groups, the school, the church and the press (Bluwey 2002).

Ideologies have been crucial in shaping political events. Just as a ship cannot sail without a rudder, an ideology serves as a plan of action that guides politicians in their endeavours as well as holds together movements, parties or revolutionary groups (Kramnick and Watkins 1979:4). To fight well and endure sacrifices, people need an ideological motivation. Indeed, the founding fathers of the United States, for example, shaped their Constitution as they did because they were convinced of the rightness of the ideas of political thinkers like Locke, Montesquieu, and so on. In the developing world, many young revolutionaries are still fired by the ideas of Mao Zedong, an apostle of revolutionary violence against colonialism (Kramnick and Watkins 1979:8). Andrew (1995) believes ideology has an immense impact on education and argues that if the origin of ideas is understood, then it could be used with great benefit in enlightened education and to diagnose the roots of human ignorance and serve as a foundation for a rational progressive society (Andrew 1995:3).

From the discussion so far, it is clear that the role of ideology in politics cannot be relegated to the background. Indeed, no political analysis can be complete without an examination of the ideology and ideas of the relevant group (Heywood 2002:127).

But even though ideologies help to develop 'immature' societies, it is held that in the industrialised democratic societies, they no longer serve anything more than a decorative role (Andrew 1995:11). Most of the major parties in industrialised societies have achieved, in the welfare, mixed economy structure, the majority of their reformist aims. The Left had long accepted the dangers of excessive state power and the Right had accepted the necessity of the welfare state and the rights of working people (Eccleshall et al. 1998). This reflects a change in the perception of the political terrain by political parties, both of the Left and of the Right. Thus, it is no longer possible to gain political power by appealing to only one section of the community by claiming that the views of the other section are simply false (Eccleshall et al. 1998:14). As Seymour Martin Lipset remarked, 'this very triumph of the democratic social revolution of the West ends domestic politics for those intellectuals who must have ideologies or utopias to motivate

them to political action' (Lipset 1969:406). Several other weaknesses of ideology have been pointed out. In the view of Marx (1972), ideology may denote not only practical ineffectiveness but also illusion and loss of reality. Oakeshott (1962) has also pointed out the fact that ideology represents a simplification, abstraction and an 'abridgement' of social reality. This distorts a much more complex social and political reality. They may be mere theoretical blueprints or ideals that leaders, especially in emerging democracies, sometimes find no difficulty in abandoning after winning elections and to face real or current political imperatives (Heywood 2002). The concept of ideology also denotes a totalitarian mentality which prevents all political discussions other than on its own content, making it quite distinct from pluralist, free and tolerant rational society (Andrew 1995).

The weaknesses of ideology notwithstanding, its essence is of importance to this work because it gives the theoretical base for analysing findings as to whether ideology has a place in determining voting among the youth or not. Many philosophical and scientific ideas have functioned within ideologies, in fact many philosophers and natural scientists have allowed their thoughts to be used in an ideological manner and have contributed willingly to ideological promotion (Andrew 1995:19).

In Ghana, the two main political parties, the NPP and NDC have ideologies that are supposedly used to bind members of their parties together. But are these ideologies of any practical application to the youth, who constitute the bulk of the voting population? (Asante 2006).

The argument of this paper is that ideology plays little or no role in determining which party to support and who to vote for among the youth. Indeed, most supporters of the two parties are either oblivious of the ideology of their parties or do not know their exact meanings and imperatives. For a proper appreciation of this point, it is necessary to first discuss the background to politics and formation of political parties in Ghana. Indeed, it would be quite difficult to grasp the ideology of political parties in former colonies anywhere in the world and for that matter in Ghana, without referring to some historical antecedents dating back to the pre-independence and early post-independence era.

Background to Politics in Ghana

Ghana was a British colony under the name Gold Coast. As the colonial powers receded, new leaders, movements and political organisations emerged in the two decades leading to independence. This happened in an atmosphere of indirect rule which principally relied on traditional political elites under the constant guidance of colonial officials (Awoonor 1990).

Given the background of the gap between the rich south and the poor and underdeveloped north as well as the policy of separate development of the three constituent parts of the Gold Coast, political parties in the pre-independence era were imbued with a very strong character of regionalism (Wayo-Seini 2006). The United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) had its members largely from the South and even though the Convention Peoples' Party (CPP) was more nationalistic in nature, it was regarded as a party committed to championing the course of the ordinary man in the then Gold Coast (Austin 1964). In 1954, the Northern People's Party (NPP) was also established to promote northern solidarity and accelerate development in the north as well as to work with likeminded parties in the south to delay the attainment of self government so that an interim period could be used to rapidly bridge the gap between the north and the south (Dickson 1968). Indeed, the view of the people from the north was that independence should be delayed until such a time that the region was placed on a footing of equality with the south (Ladouceur 1979:93). A strong ally of the NPP was the Moslem Association Party (MAP) which also emerged in the early 1950s and whose strength lay among Moslem immigrant communities in the major towns.

After the 1954 elections, the government of Kwame Nkrumah, the first prime minister and, later, president of Ghana, who led the country to independence, sought to proceed to full self-rule as soon as outstanding questions could be settled. The north, it seemed, stood alone in its determination to oppose or at least to delay independence even though it was considerably weaker politically. Just at that moment when the future seemed bleak to the NPP leaders, there arose a new political movement, the National Liberation Movement (NLM), which became a strong and dominating ally of the NPP (Austin 1964). Essentially, the NLM was an Ashanti movement of political protest against what many Ashantis considered to be unfair treatment in the hands of the CPP government. The protest was primarily over low prices of cocoa the government offered to cocoa farmers, but among the Ashantis, this quickly transformed into a political issue directed against a government seen to be dominated by coastal elements. The NPP and NLM were united primarily in their opposition to the CPP and were joined by a number of smaller parties and groups, such as the Togoland Congress Party (TCP), the MAP, and the Anlo Youth Organisation (Austin 1964:45).

It was not until the attainment of independence in 1957 that regionalism gradually faded away and the parties opposed to the CPP in the legislature merged to form the United Party (Chazan 1983). This effectively established two main political traditions or ideologies in Ghana, namely, the Nkrumah

group (CPP) and the Danquah/Busia (UP) traditions. A striking difference between the two main traditions is that while the CPP aligned itself to the East and therefore favoured socialism, the Danquah/Busia tradition was pro-West and therefore favoured capitalism (ibid). A third tradition which emerged out of a long period of military rule under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) could be described as the Rawlings tradition. This tradition, dependent on the exigencies of time was either pro-East, non-aligned or pro-West (Shillington 1992). While the Nkrumah group is represented in contemporary Ghanaian politics by a number of political parties particularly the Convention Peoples' Party (CPP) and Peoples' National Convention (PNC), the New Patriotic Party (NPP) represents the Danquah/Busia tradition while the Rawlings tradition is represented to a large extent by the National Democratic Congress (NDC).

Having gone through the historical antecedents of political parties in Ghana, one key question that comes to mind is whether they were formed on the basis of any political ideology. This question is pertinent because the historical antecedents of political parties show that parties conformed to the three regions that were administered separately by the colonial government (Austin 1964:318). Thus, it can be argued that the protection of regional interests was the prime motive for the formation of political parties. Though from the outset, political parties like the CPP was seen as an Africanist national movement; it was only when they gelled into post-independent national political parties that their ideologies began to become more apparent.

Ideologies of Political Parties in Ghana's Fourth Republic

In this section we attempt a brief discussion of the political ideologies of the ruling NPP and the main opposition NDC.

Ideology of the New Patriotic Party

The preamble of the Manifesto of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) (2004:1) summarises the party's ideology as follows: 'The party's policy is to liberate the energies of the people for the growth of a property owning democracy in this land, with the right to life, freedom and justice, as the principles to which the government and laws of the land should be dedicated in order specifically to enrich life, property and liberty of each and every citizen'.

This constitutes the guiding ideology of parties that have succeeded the United Party since 1958. The main creed has been the avowal of individual freedom in a liberal democratic state where the development of the individual and of society in a free political atmosphere, under the rule of law, is the principle of the state. Thus, the NPP operates under the liberal democratic

ideology and believes in the market economy, free enterprise, fundamental human rights, and a vigorous pursuit of private initiative without any hindrance. Based on this ideology, the NPP has some fundamental beliefs that are stated explicitly as follows:

- (a) The individual must be enabled to develop in freedom to attain the highest level of their potentials or talents;
- (b) The provision of quality education, further training and expanding economy that creates jobs, as well as the provision of good health facilities and medical care for all Ghanaians form the basis for the development of the individual and the nation;
- (c) A free enterprise economy is the surest guarantee of economic growth and prosperity. Government must create the environment for business to thrive and for efforts and initiative to be rewarded. What a person makes legitimately must never be taken away arbitrarily. The rights and needs of the individual are paramount as enshrined in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and the Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana;
- (d) Individuals and societies make a state – states do not make individuals – therefore the party believes in freedom of expression and association, freedom from oppression, from fear and from arbitrary arrest; and
- (e) Justice is either for all or it is for none. Every Ghanaian is entitled to the protection of the law. The sovereignty of the people and the state should be anchored in the rule of law and independent judiciary.

According to Nana Ohene Ntow (2007), the General Secretary of the ruling NPP, these are the beliefs which successor parties of the UP tradition have always held. They are beliefs which inspired the Progress Party Government of 1969-1972 and informed all the policies and programmes of the government. They are the same beliefs that inspire the NPP government. He asserted that time has vindicated these beliefs as they have become commonly shared by most parties that believe in participatory democracy.

Ideology of the National Democratic Congress

The National Democratic Congress (NDC) has its antecedents in the 4 June 1979 and the 31 December 1981 military coups. It was from the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), which ruled Ghana after the December 1981 coup until January 1992 that the NDC originated. In sharp contrast to the ruling NPP, the NDC has no long history. Its founder, J. J. Rawlings, who ruled Ghana for about twenty years, has been the main pillar of the party.

The NDC's ideology is Social Democracy and is spelt out as follows in 'A Social Democratic Agenda for Ghana' (2006):

- (a) Belief in the equality and egalitarian treatment of all persons with respect to their political, social, cultural and religious relations in a multi-party environment;
- (b) Belief in the principles of development through the united participation of all Ghanaians;
- (c) Belief in the protection of the under-privileged and the upliftment of the socially disadvantaged;
- (d) Belief in the fact that the orderly, stable and prosperous existence of society is a condition for the orderly and prosperous development of individuals within the society; and
- (e) Belief in the free market system but with commitment to the cause of the socially disadvantaged and the principle of equity in the exploitation of the country's natural resources.

Apparently, the kind of social democracy being advocated by the NDC blends the efficiency of the market and private initiative with state's intervention to protect the poor and to ensure justice for all.

With this background of the emergence of political parties and their ideologies, we can now discuss the contributions and role of the youth in Ghana's Fourth and how they were influenced by the ideologies.

The Youth and Politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic

The youth of Ghana have played an important role in local and national politics since the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1993. The youth have served as foot-soldiers and vehicles through which party manifestoes have been transmitted to the electorate, particularly those in the hinterlands. In all elections held under the Fourth Republic, the youth played a crucial role; serving as polling agents during registration and voting exercises. In this role, they have promoted fairness and transparency in the electioneering process especially during voter registration exercises which are crucial for the legitimacy of electoral outcomes and their acceptability. For example, the decision of some parties to use indigenous youth groups to monitor polling centres, especially in the rural communities, has contributed immensely towards the checking of impersonation (Asante 2006:226).

Another key role of the youth in the political process lies in their zeal to make the presence of their parties felt across the country. They are often seen chanting their party slogans and moving from house to house, campaigning for their parties in an attempt to win more supporters. In the 2004 general elections, for instance, the NPP youth used the propaganda that a

vote for Professor Mills of the NDC would mean a vote for former president Rawlings. This propaganda seemed to have worked in almost all the areas that the NPP won the elections in spite of all efforts by the NDC youth to disabuse the minds of the electorate regarding the NPP's propaganda.

Furthermore, the youth have also served as pressure groups within their parties and often brought pressure to bear on national executives over pertinent issues, including matters bordering on internal democracy. Some youth have resisted attempts by party executives to impose parliamentary candidates on them in their constituencies. For instance, in the run up to the 2008 parliamentary elections of Ghana the youth in the ruling NPP embarked on massive demonstrations, which sometimes resulted in violent clash with the security agencies, in an attempt to press home their disapproval of imposition of candidates on them by the party executives. These were the experiences of several constituencies, including Ablekuma South, Abirem, Bekwai, Suhum. In addition, the youth wing of these two main parties sometimes organised press conferences or issued press statements to enlighten voters about their party positions on national issues or to deny allegations made against their party. Furthermore, the youth have been instrumental in organising party rallies and hoisting of party flags in an attempt to promote the ideals of their respective parties. Moreover, usually rally support for their peers who contest parliamentary seats. It is from such support base that Haruna Iddrisu, the National Youth Organiser, and Isaac Asiamah, Policy Analyst of the NDC and NPP respectively, secured their election to parliament (Asante 2006:227).

Fundraising activities for political parties is crucial role in many emerging democracies where the commitment of the state to funding political parties is low. Since no meaningful party activity can be embarked upon without adequate funding, the youth continue to support their parties' fundraising activities through the sale and distribution of party cards and other paraphernalia.

It is also well-known that the youth make up the party stalwarts that get anything done in the interest of the party. They are mostly available for engagement in any violent activities or in settling inter-party and intra-party conflicts. There are several reported cases where the youth of the two leading parties have clashed over the venue, timing for organising rallies and other seemingly petty issues. In October 2004, for instance, supporters of the NDC and NPP clashed in the Yendi constituency during an NDC rally (CDD 2005:30). Again in the Tolon/Kumbungu district during the 2004 elections, the NPP youth stormed an NDC stronghold to investigate allegations of under-aged voting. This led to a clash between the two groups resulting in the death of two persons (Heritage 2005:1-3).

In some constituencies, such as Mion and Tolon in the Northern Region and New Edubiase in the Ashanti Region, ballot boxes were stolen and burnt by the youth of either the NPP or the NDC. The youth activists were also involved in the destruction of bill boards, posters, etc., of their opponents as well as physical assault of their rival contestants (Asante, 2006:229). The youth have generally been identified with the conflicts in the parties – both as causes and factors in the internal and external violence that often engulf the parties. Given that their activities often verge on violence, it is instructive to ask what sort of orientation the parties give their youth, or, to put it more effectively, does ideology matter to the youth?

Does Party Ideology Matter to the Youth?

The result of a mini survey conducted between 5 and 27 April 2007 to test the relevance of political ideology in determining the outcome of elections among the youth of the NPP and the NDC seems to confirm the earlier assertion that ideology does not matter so much to the youth. Admittedly, the findings were based on the mini survey conducted, but could possibly explain some of the features of the Ghanaian youth around the issues being addressed.

The respondents were first asked whether they supported and voted for any of the registered political parties in Ghana. About 158 respondents out of the 200 sampled (79%) answered in the affirmative while 42 (21%) said they did not support any of the registered political parties (Table 5).

Table 5: Do you support any of the registered political parties?

Response	No. of Respondents	%
Yes	158	79
No	42	21

Source: From the Study

This is a confirmation that Ghanaian youth are politically active and constitute the bulk of the voting population in the country. It should be noted however that some respondents were suspicious of the motive behind the survey despite all the explanations given to them and the assurance of confidentiality. Consequently, they gave responses which suggested that they were politically neutral even though there were strong indications and evidence that they were active supporters of political parties. For instance, some of the respondents were personally known to this researcher as party functionaries who even held positions in their respective political parties. Yet, they claimed

political neutrality. In a rather curious twist to the exercise, at least 25 out of the 42 respondents who claimed political neutrality owned up that they were only trying not to jeopardise their political chances and fortunes should the party they did not support assume the reins of power. It follows then that the number of youth party supporters are far more than has been recorded in this mini-survey.

But why would some youth want to be seen as politically neutral? Could it be that their party loyalty is skin deep or that some of them have genuinely lost confidence in the political system? This question is pertinent because it is widely believed that despite the invaluable role they play in bringing political parties into power the youth play little or no role in actual policy making and that still puts them at the receiving end of official policies. It is even known that some youth leaders have expressed disappointment and regret in supporting their respective parties. In other words, two main reasons may account for the lack of enthusiasm on the part of some youth to openly identify with the political parties of their choice. First, it could be a strategy to benefit from any political party that wins power. Second, it could also be that they may have lost confidence generally in the political system and so may be unwilling to identify themselves with any party. Whatever may be the true reasons, it is incontrovertible that the vast majority of the youth sampled were politically active.

The second question posed to the ardent supporters of political parties show that only 21 (13.3%) out of the 158 respondents know anything about the political ideology of their parties. The remaining 137 respondents (86.7%) of the young party enthusiasts have no awareness whatever about party ideology (Table 6).

Table 6: Do you know the ideology of your party?

Response	No. of Respondents
Yes	21
No	137
No Response	42

Source: From the Study

A simple cross tabulation of political parties and awareness of party ideology shows that of the 137 respondents with no awareness of the ideology of the party they supported, 70 were from the NPP and 67 from the NDC. Similarly, of the 21 who claimed to know their parties' ideologies, 8 were from the NPP while 13 were from the NDC. This suggests that most of the youth

who helped the NPP gain political power were not aware of the ideology of the party. The study also shows that, comparatively, there is only a slight difference in the level of youth awareness in both parties (8 in NPP and 13 in NDC) (see Table 7).

Table 7: Political Parties and Awareness of Party Ideology

Political Party	Awareness of Party Ideology		
	Yes	No	Total
NPP	8	70	78
NDC	13	67	80

Source: From the Study

A cross-tabulation of the educational background of respondents vis-a-vis their awareness of party ideology is instructive. Table 8 shows no significant relationship between education and awareness of party ideology. Out of the 21 respondents who claimed to know their parties' ideologies (see Table 6), 10 had no education, 1 had basic education, and another 1 had secondary education while 9 respondents had tertiary education. The table also shows the distribution of the 137 respondents without any awareness of party ideology thus: 20 had no education; 27 had basic education; 40 had secondary education; and 50 had tertiary education.

Table 8: Education and Awareness of Party ideology

Educational Background	Awareness of Party Ideology		
	Yes	No	Total
None	10	20	30
Basic	1	27	28
Secondary	1	40	41
Tertiary	9	50	59

Source: From the study

Table 8 is very revealing. It shows that youth who are clueless about their party's ideology outnumber those who know by nearly ratio 7:1. Furthermore, it shows that the problem of political illiteracy is more with the so-called educated youth than the uneducated; hence they outnumber them 2:1. The figures show at once that there are far more educated youth than uneducated in Ghana but that their education does not translate to

political knowledge or awareness. It stands to reason that if the youth, the real masses that sway electoral victory one way or the other have no understanding of the basic ideology that rules their party, it means they have no idea whatsoever how the parties are run; it also means they are more like pawns in the party and the party leaders are at liberty to use and dump them. It means their position in the party, formidable as it seems by their sheer number, is very insecure. Finally, it also means that the role the youth play in the party is mainly to secure for themselves a measure of relevance – it means the older politicians tolerate and use them; they are not really trusted.

To buttress this point, the NDC hosted an international conference in 2007, which was attended by all parties that subscribed to the Social Democracy ideology. Participants at the conference were made up largely of the party gurus and bosses; the youth were hardly seen. Some researchers have attempted to explain the nature of relationship between the party leaders and the youth. Asante (2006), for instance, has observed a degree of apprehension between the leadership of the parties and the youth. He said most of the adults in the party perceive the youth as half-empty caps (Asante 2006:228). Asante further notes that the older politicians' perception of the youth range from the mildly negative view that young people are a risk and an unknown quantity, to the extreme view that characterises them as potentially dangerous to themselves and society (Asante 2006:230). Could this explain why no conscious effort was made to get the NDC youth to attend such an important conference? Perhaps. But it shows a deliberate failure of the party leadership to groom the young ones for leadership and reveals a more underlying problem, namely, an inclination on the part of the party leaders to be non-ideological in their politicking. It makes the party ideologies look as mere window dressing.

A cross tabulation between gender and awareness (Table 9) shows that more male (18) awareness of party ideology than female (only 3). That is in the ratio of 6:1. But with 67 male and 70 female respondents claiming no awareness of party ideology (Table 9), it means the degree of awareness for both genders is very low – low enough for both genders to be used as pawns despite their overwhelming voting population.

Table 9: Gender and Awareness of Party Ideology

Gender	Awareness of Party Ideology		
	Yes	No	Total
Male	18	67	85
Female	3	70	73

Source: From the Study

The 137 respondents who know nothing of their party ideology naturally have nothing to say about the relevance of ideology to the political movement. But even 12 of the 21 who claim to know say political ideology is irrelevant (Table 10). In between the two parties, the same perception dominates (Table 11).

Table 10: Is the concept of political ideology relevant?

Respondents	Frequency
Yes	9
No	12
Total	21

Source: From the study

Table 11: Political Parties and Relevance of Ideology

Political Party	Relevance of Party Ideology		
	Yes	No	Total
NPP	4	8	12
NDC	5	4	9

Source: From the Study

Remarkably, of the 12 respondents who consider party ideology irrelevant, five said it is too abstract and not practical, and therefore, has no place in modern-day politics. Another four said there is no ideological difference between political parties in Ghana while the remaining three said the attitude of political leaders make any talk of ideology irrelevant. They cited the several defections from one political camp to the other by respected political leaders and argued that if ideology was that important, leaders would not easily defect at will (Table 12).

Table 12: Reasons Why Ideology is Irrelevant

Respondents	Frequency
Yes	9
No	12
Total	21

Source: From the Study

From the study and the preceding analysis, it seems the youth of Ghana are a collective in double jeopardy. They constitute 80 per cent of the national population and averagely 72 per cent of the voting population (Tables 1 and 2). They take the battle cry of the parties to the grassroots, convince reluctant voters, function as electoral officers, fight physical battles to see their party prevail or to defend their party thereby constituting themselves into the party security outfit and so on and so forth. It is therefore an irony that this same youth should be largely uninformed about the ideology and ultimate objectives of the party. What then fuels the fervour of the youth that makes them do so much for so little? What philosophy or worldview defines their voting pattern?

Answers to this question are not easy because they have to balance theoretical postulates with practical experience. For instance, from the theoretical point of view, Heywood (2002) has identified four theories of voting, namely, party identification model, sociological model, rational choice model and dominant ideology model.¹³ For the youth who make up 72 per cent of the voting population and play a fundamental role in deciding who gets elected into what office and yet are not taken into confidence in the party plans and core philosophy, it is irresistible to ask which of these theories inform the voting of youth for election candidates. Interestingly, none of the respondents cited ideology as the reason for voting a party (Table 13). This means there are no thoroughgoing objective principles guiding party activities and election in Ghana.

Table 13: What makes you support or vote for your party?

Reasons	No. of Respondents
Parental Influence	44
Peer Influence	23
Personal Interest	76
Good Policies	15

Source: From the Study

What then can be said to influence youth voting during elections? Personal interest tops the table with 76 affirmations a total figure of 158 respondents. Others are parental influence (44); peer influence (23); and good policies (15). By implication, the 44 who voted for parties based on the influences of their parents and grandparents fit into two main theories of voting – the sociological model of voting (the dominant model) and the party identification model of voting. It means the youth support political parties in keeping with their parents' preferences.

The 23 respondents who voted as a result of peer influence also voted in conformity with both the sociological and the party identification models. Similarly, 76 respondents claimed they supported their parties for their personal gains and interest. Impliedly, they were more concerned about what they can gain from a political system when their parties assume the reins of power than the actual ideology of the party. In this respect, the respondents tend to be more concerned about the improvement in their individual and family well-being regardless of the ideology the parties offer. Again, 15 respondents claimed their vote was in support of the good policies contained in their party manifestoes. This satisfies the rational choice model of voting. In all, 91 respondents were influenced by the rational choice model during voting, which is good.

Discussions and Conclusion

This paper has furnished a sample study of the youth involvement in the political process of Ghana. Though the findings cannot be overgeneralised because of the small sample used, yet it is a valuable indication of the political attitude of the Ghanaian youth alongside their voting preferences and the *raison d'être* for their political choices. With this, it can be concluded that even though the vast majority of the youth are politically active and play a crucial role in the emergence of political leaders in the country, nevertheless, their actions are not guided political ideology. Findings from the mini study show an uncomfortable pattern: that the youth are motivated mainly by what they can gain from the parties and the political process. This self-centred reason for voting and supporting political parties may be the result of poverty and unemployment among the youth in Ghana. It is also the reason why it is so easy for the political class to manipulate and use them for their selfish reasons despite the advantage of number they have over every other segment of the population.

Given the results of the survey, political parties, as key agents of political socialisation, have not fared well in socialising the youth and setting up their organisation firmly on the basis of a strong ideology. For as long as the political class is able to continue running without party ideology, so long will there be no particular destination they are taking the Ghanaian polity to. The damage they do by this lack of ideology is double in that they rob the present of developmental essence and framework and rob the future of developmental vision. The sociologies are not operating within a developmental paradigm and they are not training the youth to develop any. This is a serious challenge not just for the political class but the country and the youth in particular. The youth are the agents of social transformation, but for them

to truly achieve that feat, they need a thorough reorientation and conscious development. They need to imbibe the right philosophical outlook and commit to the historical challenges of their country. The political class has to design this process and see it through for positive change to happen. Without a properly weaned national ideology, it will be difficult to bring to birth the Ghana of its compatriots' dream.

Notes

1. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer of this paper for this view.
2. United Nation Development Programme Report, 2006.
3. Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992.
4. Constitution of the National Democratic Congress, 1992.
5. Constitution of the New Patriotic Party, 1992.
6. Constitution of the Peoples' National Convention, 1992.
7. Constitution of the Convention Peoples' Party, 1992.
8. Republic of Ghana (2004). Draft National Youth Policy of Ghana.
9. I am grateful to Professor Pearl Robinson, Associate Professor of Political Science, Tufts University, Medford, USA, for this view.
10. Republic of Ghana (2004). Draft National Youth Policy in Ghana.
11. Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992.
12. I am grateful to Mr. E.K Adomah, National Co-ordinator, National Youth Council for sharing this view during a discussion I held with him on Wednesday 16th April, 2008 in Accra.
13. According to Andrew Heywood, there are four main theories of voting. These are:

Sociological Model: This model links voting to group membership, suggesting that voters tend to adopt a voting pattern that reflects the economic and social position of the group to which they belong. Rather than developing a psychological attachment to a party on the basis of family influence, this model highlights the importance of social alignment, reflecting the various divisions and tensions within society. The most significant of these divisions are class, gender, ethnicity, religion and region. In simple terms, the model states that people may vote for an aspirant if he belongs to their class, comes from their ethnic group, shares the same religious beliefs, etc. This model allows for rationality insofar as group interests may help to shape party allegiances. The model has however been attacked on the grounds that, there is growing empirical evidence that the link between sociological factors and party support has weakened in modern societies. In particular, attention has been paid to the phenomenon of class dealignment and the need for people to vote on issues and not on class, religious or ethnic grounds.

Rational Choice Model: In this model, voting is seen as a rational act, in the sense that voters are believed to decide their party preference on the basis of personal interest. Rather than being habitual, a manifestation of broader

attachments and allegiances, voting is seen as essentially instrumental: that is, as a means to an end. The model stresses the importance of 'issue voting', and suggests that parties can significantly influence their electoral performance by reshaping their policies. It is generally accepted that one of the consequences of partisan and class dealignment has been the spread of issue voting. The weakness of the theory is that it abstracts the individual voter from his or her social and cultural context.

Dominant Ideology Model: This model stresses the importance of political ideology in influencing the behaviour of voters. The model simply states that the dominant ideology influences voters. Consequently, if voters' attitude conforms to the tenets of a dominant ideology, parties would develop their policies in line with the tenets of that ideology so as to get the support of voters. The weakness of this ideology is that, it takes individual calculation and personal autonomy out of the picture all together. Impliedly, people are not willing to weigh the merits and demerits of policy options being presented to them. Once a candidate or a policy conforms to their ideological persuasion, they would support it (Andrew Heywood, *Politics*, Palgrave: MacMillan Press, 2002, pp. 242-245).

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Oral Interview

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RSE et justice sociale : le cas des multinationales pétrolières dans le Delta du Niger

Hervé Lado* & Cécile Renouard**

Résumé

Dans les pays où les institutions apparaissent encore fragiles, les présupposés sur lesquels a reposé la conception moderne de la justice sociale ne sont pas vérifiés. Les questions de justice ne relèvent pas du seul contexte des Etats-nations souverains, et des distributions à opérer entre citoyens égaux en droit, au sein de sociétés aux revendications relativement homogènes. En prenant comme base d'analyse le contexte du Delta du Niger (Nigeria) et la Responsabilité Sociétale des Entreprises (RSE) pétrolières vis-à-vis des communautés locales touchées par l'activité pétrolière, nous montrons comment la conception traditionnelle locale de la justice liée au droit de propriété conduit à une détérioration du tissu social, alors qu'apparaissent des inégalités économiques, sociales et politiques, qui mettent à mal les conceptions démocratiques de la justice. Puis, en nous appuyant sur une reprise critique des pensées de Michaël Walzer et d'Amartya Sen, nous défendons la thèse selon laquelle un socle d'injustices peut être identifié et reconnu par les différentes parties en présence - communautés et organisations de la société civile, entreprises, pouvoirs publics -, ou au moins par des critiques sociaux en leur sein. Enfin, nous envisageons les conditions d'un ordre social plus juste, adapté aux réalités locales, qui impliquerait les différentes parties prenantes en vue d'une action transformatrice.

Abstract

The assumptions that have underpinned the modern conception of social justice appear irrelevant in the presence of weak institutions. Issues of justice are no longer raised in the context of a sovereign nation-state and of goods being distributed among citizens with equal rights. Nor are they raised in the context of societies with relatively homogeneous claims. Focusing on the context of Nigeria's Niger Delta and on the corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices of oil multinationals (MNCs) vis-à-vis local communities affected by oil operations, we show how the local traditional conception of justice relative to property rights leads to a deterioration of the social fabric, whilst also fostering the emergence of social, political and economic inequalities that undermine

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democratic notions of justice. We then build on a critique of the ideas of Michael Walzer and Amartya Sen, asserting that a set of unjust practices can be identified and recognized by the various parties involved (namely, communities and civil society organizations, as well as MNCs and governmental institutions); or at least by social critics within them. Finally, we suggest the conditions necessary for a more just social order adapted to local realities; one that would bring together the various stakeholders in an endogenous transformative action.

Introduction

A l'instar de nombreux autres pays africains, le Nigeria a connu dans son histoire récente des bouleversements sociopolitiques (décolonisation, indépendance, guerre civile), mais l'originalité du Nigeria tient sans doute à son instabilité politique chronique caractérisée par le passage de quatorze chefs à la tête de l'Etat depuis l'indépendance en 1960, la plupart y étant parvenus par un Coup d'Etat. Si la jeunesse des institutions nigérianes comme celles de plusieurs autres pays africains explique en partie leurs difficultés à relever les défis de la gouvernance (le Nigeria est classé 41^e sur 53 dans l'Indice Mo Ibrahim 2011 de la gouvernance en Afrique), une telle histoire politique aussi tourmentée a sans doute durablement marqué les institutions de ce pays et leur approche des questions de redistribution et de justice sociale. A la suite de la découverte du pétrole en 1956 et du démarrage de la production deux ans plus tard, l'économie s'est profondément transformée, faisant passer l'agriculture jadis principal contributeur aux revenus de l'Etat au second plan ; en 2010, l'activité pétrolière représentait 77 pour cent du budget fédéral (FMI 2011).

Le secteur agricole continue toutefois à occuper plus des deux-tiers de la population active, notamment en zone rurale, mais les questions de redistribution des revenus à l'échelle locale et nationale se posent avec d'autant plus d'acuité qu'un secteur pétrolier aussi imposant, tout en générant l'essentiel des revenus de l'Etat et tout en rémunérant substantiellement ses salariés et contractants, crée finalement peu d'emplois stables, phagocyte les autres secteurs d'activité et tend à induire une augmentation généralisée du coût de la vie (Struthers 1990) du fait du phénomène de la malédiction des ressources. Dans un tel contexte, et alors qu'au cours de ces dernières années, le rôle joué par les multinationales pétrolières opérant dans le Delta du Niger en faveur du développement durable des communautés locales s'est considérablement étendu, comment peut-on envisager leur responsabilité sociétale en matière de justice sociale ?

Ce travail s'appuie sur des enquêtes qualitatives et quantitatives conduites dans le Delta du Niger depuis 2004 autour des installations pétrolières en vue de mesurer l'efficacité des programmes sociétaux des compagnies pétrolières et leur contribution au développement durable des communautés.

La plus récente enquête qualitative a permis de rencontrer 130 personnes dont vingt femmes aussi bien dans les communautés abritant les installations pétrolières, puits, usines, oléoducs et bases vies (*host communities*) de Total, Agip et NPDC/Shell, que dans celles qui n'abritent pas d'installations pétrolières (*non host communities*).

Les personnes qui ont été rencontrées sont membres des communautés (chefs, notables, responsables d'associations de jeunes et de femmes, pasteurs, enseignants, sous-traitants de compagnies pétrolières, agriculteurs, commerçants, ou simples membres de communautés rencontrés au hasard), mais des entretiens ont également eu lieu avec des responsables de départements « développement durables et relations avec les communautés » dans les compagnies pétrolières. L'enquête s'est déroulée dans l'Etat du Rivers au sein du gouvernement local (*Local Government*) d'Ogba-Egbema-Ndoni (ONELGA) et dans l'Etat d'Imo au sein de l'Ohadji-Egbema *Local Government*, en décembre 2010 et janvier 2011. Les zones concernées font partie des trois groupes ethniques *Ogba, Egbema* and *Ndoni*, et représentent au total 30 communautés : 17 communautés Ogba (10 Egi, 2 Igburu, 4 Omogbo-USomini et 1 Omoku); 5 communautés Ndoni ; et 8 communautés Egbema (y compris 5 dans l'Etat d'Imo).

Dans cette région rurale comme ailleurs, la mondialisation des échanges ouvre l'espace sociopolitique et économique local à des interactions qui échappent désormais aux Etats souverains, et qui bouleversent les théories en matière de justice sociale, et en particulier de justice distributive. C'est ainsi que les présupposés sur lesquels a reposé la conception moderne de la justice sociale ne sont plus vérifiés. Les questions de justice ne relèvent plus du seul contexte des Etats-nations souverains, et des distributions à opérer entre citoyens égaux en droit, au sein de sociétés aux revendications relativement homogènes. Dans ce travail, nous proposons un itinéraire vers un ordre social plus juste dans le contexte des communautés étudiées dans le Delta du Niger. Dans un premier temps, nous montrons comment dans ces dernières, la conception dominante locale de la justice liée au droit de propriété conduit à une détérioration des réseaux sociaux, alors qu'apparaissent des inégalités économiques, sociales et politiques, qui mettent à mal la justice sociale. Ensuite, en nous appuyant sur une discussion critique des pensées de Michaël Walzer et d'Amartya Sen, nous défendons la thèse selon laquelle un socle d'injustices peut être identifié et reconnu par les différentes parties en présence – communautés et organisations de la société civile, entreprises, pouvoirs publics – ou au moins par des critiques sociaux en leur sein. Enfin, nous réfléchissons aux façons de définir les conditions d'un ordre social plus juste, adapté à la réalité considérée et nous envisageons différents moyens qui permettent d'impliquer les différentes parties en vue d'une action transformatrice.

La conception traditionnelle locale de la justice

Le concept de justice évoque d'abord la notion d'ordre et de sécurité

Essayer d'appréhender la façon dont les populations nigérianes du Delta du Niger appréhendent la notion de justice, suppose d'abord de distinguer différentes formes de justice. Le terme désigne en français ou en anglais à la fois le champ des relations régies par le droit et la loi, et la façon dont sont distribuées les richesses, les positions, les biens sociaux dans une communauté politique donnée. C'est surtout la première acception qui semble spontanément invoquée par les habitants de la zone où nous avons enquêté. On retrouve d'ailleurs, dans l'histoire de ces peuples, de nombreux exemples qui manifestent le caractère prioritaire des notions d'ordre et de sécurité dans le concept de justice. Par exemple, dans l'Etat de Rivers, le peuple *Ogba*, qui a connu de nombreuses et incessantes vagues d'invasions étrangères et de guerres, avec les peuples voisins et le colonisateur, au cours de son histoire depuis le XVe siècle (Ohia et Onyedibia 2003), a pu développer une forte sensibilité à la notion d'ordre et de sécurité, et les événements particulièrement violents enregistrés dans les communautés au cours des deux dernières décennies n'ont pu que renforcer cette sensibilité.

Ainsi, interrogé sur la façon dont la justice est comprise dans sa culture, un chef traditionnel cite essentiellement des exemples relatifs au règlement des différends. Les questions de justice sociale, de répartition équitable des ressources, ne sont pas spontanément mentionnées. Cela ne signifie pas, bien entendu, que ces questions ne soient pas en arrière-fond des revendications de différents groupes vis-à-vis du gouvernement, des chefs traditionnels ou des entreprises. Mais on observe tout de même que les personnes rencontrées s'expriment peu spontanément en termes de justice distributive, mettant ainsi la notion d'ordre et de condition d'un ordre social serein au premier plan.

L'idée de justice défendue par les propriétaires fonciers

Dans le Delta du Niger, la compréhension de ce qui fait une société bien ordonnée apparaît liée à la possession de la terre et aux droits que celle-ci confère. Alors que les compagnies pétrolières ont indemnisé les propriétaires fonciers qui leur ont cédé leurs terrains, ces derniers demeurent aujourd'hui un des groupes d'influence majeurs pour traiter des projets dans le cadre des accords (*MoU : Memorandum of Understanding*) conclus entre compagnies pétrolières et communautés et qui précisent les modalités de la participation au développement, ainsi que pour assurer la sécurité des installations, en particulier dans la zone concernée par l'activité de Total. S'ils n'ont plus accès à la terre pour la cultiver et y vivre, ils estiment devoir être les premiers destinataires des contrats liés à la mise en valeur de cette

terre. On peut alors arriver à la situation ubuesque du site de production de Total sur le territoire du clan Egi (ethnie Ogba) dans l'Etat de Rivers où à la carte des installations est superposé un maillage des familles d'anciens propriétaires fonciers qui ont revendiqué la quasi-exclusivité de l'attribution des contrats de gardiennage, de désherbage, de petit entretien sur les installations fixées sur leur ancienne terre.

Certains propriétaires rappellent d'ailleurs qu'ils auraient dû se constituer actionnaires des puits situés sur leurs terrains grâce à cet apport en nature, si l'Etat n'avait pas institué le *Petroleum Act* en 1969 et le *Land Use Act* en 1978 pour nationaliser l'ensemble des sous-sols et restreindre l'usage des sols regorgeant des ressources nationales. Ils considèrent par conséquent ces contrats obtenus auprès des compagnies comme une juste compensation d'une cession qu'ils jugent aujourd'hui inique maintenant qu'ils réalisent l'ampleur des richesses exploitées par les pétroliers, et par un Etat qu'ils considèrent globalement défaillant dans ses missions.

Il se trouve par ailleurs que les inégalités exceptionnelles de revenus observées dans le secteur privé sont en fait une réalité nationale que l'on retrouve dans l'ensemble des secteurs. Le salaire officiel d'un député nigérian est de l'ordre de \$6 500 par mois (environ un million de Nairas) et les indemnités que les parlementaires se seraient abusivement octroyé avoisinent les \$100 000 (15 millions de Nairas), c'est-à-dire plus de 820 fois le salaire minimal d'un fonctionnaire (\$120/18 000 Nairas par mois). Le juriste nigérian Itse Sagay (2010) montre la cruauté du système en tentant une comparaison avec des pays développés : alors que le revenu par habitant respectivement des Etats-Unis, du Royaume Uni et du Nigeria sont de l'ordre de \$46 350, \$35 468 et \$2 249, les salaires annuels des députés dans ces pays sont respectivement de l'ordre de \$174 000, \$64 000 et \$1 700 000. En 2009, les indemnités des parlementaires nigériens s'élevaient ainsi à quelque 103 milliards de Nairas soit jusqu'à 5 pour cent du budget fédéral. Par ailleurs, dans le secteur pétrolier au Nigeria, les salaires sont extrêmement élevés : de jeunes ingénieurs expatriés sur un site de production, travaillant en 4/4 (4 semaines au Nigeria / 4 semaines de vacances dans son pays d'origine) ont pu confier gagner jusqu'à \$40 000 par mois passé au Nigeria.

Dans un tel contexte, il est peu surprenant que les acteurs locaux – notamment les propriétaires fonciers qui ont cédé leurs terrains – qui sont des interlocuteurs locaux des compagnies pétrolières, cherchent à capter une part de cette manne à des fins personnelles. La surabondance des revenus pétroliers dans une double situation de pauvreté généralisée et de fortes carences démocratiques conduit ainsi à l'installation de situations de rentes exclusives, source de marginalisation et de frustration pour une majorité de la population.

Il s'agit aussi d'une justice vis-à-vis de l'histoire

Rappelons qu'on se trouve ici dans un contexte social particulier où les populations sont encore très marquées par des maltraitances subies de la part des autres tribus du pays tout au long de leur histoire. Au-delà des invasions régulières, notamment des *Igbos*, dont ont souffert les peuples de ces zones, les obligeant souvent à se terrer dans les marécages et forêts de mangroves, la guerre du Biafra, de 1967 à 1970, a constitué une blessure majeure car elle a renforcé le conflit entre les *Igbos* sécessionnistes et les autres groupes ethniques minoritaires de la région, et a été l'occasion pour les groupes ethniques majoritaires du pays (*Yorubas et Hausa/Fulani*) de manifester leur domination en recrutant des soldats parmi ces groupes minoritaires côtiers.

Par ailleurs, avant les années 1960, lorsque les principales richesses du pays (arachides, huile de palme, cacao) étaient produites par les groupes ethniques majoritaires et politiquement influentes, les Etats producteurs avaient droit à 50 pour cent de revenus (Ekpo 2004) selon la règle de « *derivation* ». Une fois que le pétrole – qui provient essentiellement du Delta du Niger (9 Etats sur 36, 35M d'habitants sur 150) et des champs *offshore* avoisinants – est devenu la principale ressource du Nigeria, le montant des revenus pétroliers retournés aux Etats producteurs a chuté : entre 1969 et 1989, il est passé de 50 pour cent à 1 pour cent, pour remonter à 3 pour cent en 1992 puis à 13 pour cent depuis 1999, et le retour aux 50 pour cent de dérivation fait partie des exigences d'activistes du Delta du Niger. Mbanefo et Egwaikhide (1998) attribuent cette baisse des revenus dérivés à la pression depuis les années 1970 des autres groupes ethniques restés politiquement influents mais devenus économiquement marginaux avec l'arrivée du pétrole.

Les populations du Delta du Niger ont ainsi essuyé au fil de leur histoire des humiliations successives (Ekpo 2004, Moro 2006), jusqu'au soulèvement violent des années 1990. Les plus célèbres des mouvements d'activistes (Hanson 2007) dits *militants* étant le MOSOP (*Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People*) et le MEND (*Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta*). Historiquement absentes des sphères économiques et politiques nationales, les populations du Delta du Niger exigent ainsi désormais une répartition plus juste des richesses tirées de leurs sols.

Rappelons que le pétrole représente près de 80 pour cent du budget de l'Etat et 95 pour cent des recettes extérieures du pays. Le partage des revenus pétroliers est effectué de la manière suivante : 39 pour cent à l'Etat Fédéral, 20 pour cent aux Etats, 15 pour cent aux *Local Governments*, 13 pour cent aux fonds spéciaux, et 13 pour cent aux Etats disposant de ressources minérales (Sébille-Lopez 2005) par la dérivation.

Deux problèmes distincts apparaissent, le premier lié à la pauvreté généralisée et à la responsabilité de l'ensemble de la classe politique nigériane vis-à-vis du développement du pays, le deuxième concernant les préjudices environnementaux dont serait victime la région du Delta du Niger. Le PIB par habitant était à peu près le même en 2000 et en 1970, au Nigeria, mais la proportion de la population vivant avec moins de \$1 par jour est passée de 36 à 70 pour cent (Guichaoua 2009:18). Dans ce contexte assez inégalitaire (Indice de Gini officiellement de 0,43 au Nigeria en 2004 mais ne tient probablement pas compte des transactions informelles) et générateur de violences (Oyefusi 2007; Augé 2009), la justice exigée par les populations et activistes, poussée à l'extrême, conduit à une balkanisation du pouvoir (Bach 2006) et transforme le concept du *local content*, qui consiste à réserver un pourcentage des emplois et contrats dans les compagnies pétrolières aux nationaux Nigériens, en *family content*, nationaux étant dans ce contexte pris au sens le plus étroit, c'est-à-dire uniquement entendu comme familles des propriétaires fonciers.


Le soutien massif de la région du Delta du Niger à la candidature de Goodluck Jonathan à l'élection présidentielle d'avril 2011 est, de ce fait, une volonté ferme de ne pas laisser leur échapper cette occasion inespérée de poursuivre la correction des injustices historiques en instaurant un régime plus juste de répartition des richesses à l'échelle nationale. Il se pose à ce titre la question des conditions d'une harmonisation nationale des pratiques de justice sachant que celles qui sont exigées par les populations du Delta du Niger, et consacrées dans les *MoUs*, apparaissent volontairement discriminatoires pour corriger progressivement les déséquilibres historiques de représentativité économique, sociale et politique.

Il se trouve que, depuis les années 1990, les relations avec les communautés sont gérées dans le cadre des *MoUs* négociés avec les représentants des communautés, sous la supervision de l'Etat. Ces *MoUs* indiquent les engagements, légalement non contraignants, des compagnies à mettre à la disposition des communautés d'une part des ressources financières pour les infrastructures routières, sanitaires et éducatives de base ainsi que la formation académique initiale des jeunes, et d'autre part des opportunités en termes d'emplois au sein des compagnies et de formation professionnelle pour engager les populations dans des activités économiques autonomes et génératrices de revenus. En contrepartie, les communautés s'engagent à garantir la paix sociale et la poursuite ininterrompue des opérations de production, et à participer à la mise en œuvre des projets de développement.

Même si les montants négociés et distribués dans le cadre des *MoUs* sont négligeables comparativement aux revenus pétroliers censés être utilisés par les pouvoirs publics au profit des communautés, les conceptions de la

justice en jeu demandent à être clarifiées et débattues au niveau national comme au niveau local. En particulier, se pose la question de la légitimité aussi bien du système de dérivation pour les Etats du Delta du Niger que des pratiques de discrimination positive à l'égard de certains groupes ou communautés du Delta.

Fig.1 : Carte du Delta du Niger avec localisation des principaux champs pétroliers et gaziers



- 75 000 km² ;
- 9 Etats sur 36 : Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, Rivers ;
- Env. 35 M d'habitants et 1600 communautés ;
- La production pétrolière provient essentiellement de ce territoire et des champs *offshore* ;
- Le pétrole représente près de 80 pour cent du budget fédéral et 95 pour cent des recettes extérieures du pays.

Les injustices économiques, sociales et politiques

Afin d'approfondir l'analyse des conceptions de la justice – et de l'injustice – sociale dans les zones touchées par l'exploitation pétrolière, il est intéressant de comparer la façon dont trois des principales compagnies pétrolières présentes dans la région depuis plusieurs décennies ont appréhendé et mis en œuvre leur responsabilité sociétale. Par responsabilité sociétale, nous entendons (Renouard 2007) la façon dont les entreprises gèrent leurs impacts directs et indirects sur leur environnement économique, naturel et humain. Cette responsabilité a deux versants : le premier consiste pour elles à évaluer les externalités négatives qu'elles engendrent et à les minimiser ou réparer, éventuellement avec d'autres acteurs.

Le deuxième consiste à contribuer positivement au développement socio-économique local en maximisant les externalités positives sur l'environnement et la qualité des relations avec les parties prenantes (salariés, sous-traitants, communautés locales). Il faut distinguer l'activité pétrolière *onshore* (installée dans les terres au sein des communautés) et *offshore* (installée en mer) : dans ce dernier cas, l'entreprise n'a pas de contact direct avec les populations mais, au Nigeria, elle doit contribuer au développement des zones côtières touchées indirectement par l'activité (notamment par la pollution côtière due aux fuites de pétrole en mer). Alors que les installations de Shell sont majoritairement *onshore*, celles d'Agip le sont moins, et la plupart des installations de Total sont *offshore*. La principale installation *onshore* de Total couvre le territoire d'un seul clan, le clan *Egi* qui fait partie du peuple *Ogba*. De plus, ce clan *Egi*, comparativement aux autres, est socialement plus organisé avec à sa tête un monarque, l'*Eze Egi*, et avec de puissants relais au sein de l'appareil politique dominant, le People's Democratic Party (PDP). L'étendue géographique des responsabilités sociétales des compagnies est donc très inégale au départ, et les contextes sociopolitiques locaux relativement disparates.

Quelle a été l'approche des compagnies pétrolières Shell, Agip et Total ?

Au lancement de l'activité pétrolière, et dans le contexte particulier de la décolonisation dans les années 1960, les compagnies pétrolières ont considéré qu'elles n'avaient pas de responsabilité sociétale immédiate envers les communautés locales, et qu'elles contribuaient au développement par le biais des impôts, taxes et redevances versés au gouvernement. Elles se contentaient de soigner les relations avec les élites locales, notamment en versant des indemnités (*homages*) aux chefs traditionnels. Face à la montée des revendications dans les communautés touchées par leur activité dans le contexte d'une absence de retombées locales de la manne pétrolière, les

entreprises ont répondu de façon défensive aux exigences locales et ont ainsi progressivement pallié les déficiences et l'inertie du gouvernement fédéral, et des gouvernements régionaux et locaux.

Chez Agip et Shell, le choix a été fait de négocier seulement avec les villages abritant directement les installations. Agip privilégie des négociations directes avec chaque communauté et les *MoUs* sont mis en œuvre directement par la compagnie, qui passe, le cas échéant, des contrats avec des sous-traitants. Chez Shell, des accords sont désormais négociés avec des groupements de communautés voisines dans le cadre de *GMoUs* (*Global MoUs*) et mis en œuvre par des organisations tierces, ONG et Fondations. Chez Total en revanche, la négociation est directe et se fait à deux niveaux : d'une part avec les *Oil & Gas families* (familles anciennement installées sur les sites de production) et *Landlords* (anciens propriétaires fonciers), et d'autre part avec l'ensemble du clan *Egi* (considéré dans son ensemble par Total comme sa *host community*) qui abrite les puits et installations, et qui comprend à la fois les *core communities* (qui abritent effectivement les puits et/ou les pipelines sur leurs terres) et les *non core communities* (qui font partie du clan mais n'abritent pas d'installations). Il existe ainsi dans la perspective adoptée par Total une volonté de compenser la population de la manière la plus élargie possible, et donc de réduire les écarts entre les *host* et *non host communities*. Le budget sociétal de Total au Nigeria – largement défiscalisé – s'élevait en 2010 à 50 M\$, alors que les impôts et taxes versés au gouvernement nigérian étaient de 3,1 M\$.

Deux catégories d'injustices observées et dénoncées

Dans les trois cas analysés (Shell/NPDC, Agip, Total), les populations dénoncent des situations d'injustice à plusieurs niveaux : de la part des compagnies, à l'intérieur des communautés, et entre les communautés *host* et les *non host*.

Premièrement, les communautés estiment que les ressources et opportunités mises à leur disposition par les pétroliers sont globalement insuffisantes au regard des richesses tirées de leurs sols, et qu'elles ne compensent que partiellement les externalités négatives résultant de l'activité pétrolière. Si dans la zone Total, la revendication portant sur l'insuffisance des ressources apparaît relativement modérée, dans les zones Agip et Shell par contre, l'injustice est d'autant plus ressentie que les communautés ont toujours dénoncé le non-respect des engagements pris dans les *MoUs* par les compagnies.

Deuxièmement, à l'intérieur des communautés, les injustices apparaissent, dans la redistribution des opportunités mises à la disposition de leurs représentants. Par exemple, l'attribution des bourses scolaires dans la zone

Total (entre 2008 et 2011, 1 800 bourses ont été attribuées chaque année dans le secondaire, 590 à l'université, 63 en master dont 13 à l'étranger) est supposée se faire de façon tournante et transparente dans les familles -les *Egis* s'étant opposés jusqu'ici à une attribution au mérite au motif que les bourses ne sont rien d'autre qu'une compensation- mais en réalité le système de redistribution apparaît discrétionnaire et largement dominé par ceux qui sont localement les plus proches des circuits de distribution.

Le contexte général au Nigeria favorable à une corruption généralisée induite par l'activité pétrolière (Azaiki 2007) nourrit et renforce l'opacité du système. Par ailleurs, les traditions culturelles dans la région accordent peu de place aux femmes dans les instances de délibération, de décision et de règlement des conflits au sein des communautés. Dès lors, les compagnies pétrolières ont maintenu ou « respecté » ces traditions, se privant, de ce fait, d'une contribution active des femmes à la recherche de solutions, notamment en ce qui concerne le développement de l'agriculture qui, dans la région, incombe largement aux femmes.

Sur ces terres fertiles, une révolution agricole semble pourtant nécessaire pour prévenir des crises alimentaires futures au moment où toutes les communautés évoquent une baisse généralisée des rendements agricoles face à une démographie galopante, ainsi que pour renforcer la diversification des sources de revenus des ménages. Un activiste (homme) dans une communauté de la zone Total déclare ainsi :

Les hommes chassent, pêchent et autres [...] mais les femmes s'occupent de l'agriculture. [...] Les femmes sont notre dernier espoir. Elles seules peuvent encore mener à bien des révoltes dans cette région. [...] Les femmes comprennent mieux les enfants et les jeunes que les hommes car une femme a toujours une fibre maternelle, qu'on le veuille ou pas, c'est pourquoi je les respecte beaucoup. Accordez-leur l'appui dont elles ont besoin, et elles contribueront de manière spectaculaire au changement.

Enfin, les inégalités économiques et sociales se creusent de manière flagrante entre les *host communities*, délaissées, et les *non host communities*, mieux pourvues en infrastructures ; ce qui pose la question du périmètre pertinent d'intervention des entreprises pétrolières, dans un contexte de quasi-absence de l'Etat. Des membres d'une *non-host community* qui ne dispose d'aucun centre de santé rapportent qu'ils ont souvent été violemment expulsés par leurs voisins des campagnes de consultations gratuites organisées par une compagnie pétrolière dans sa *host community* alors qu'ils cherchaient à profiter de cette aubaine pour se soigner. Des enquêtes menées en 2008 dans deux zones touchées par l'activité pétrolière, *onshore* et *offshore*, montrent que si les pétroliers ont contribué à une amélioration des conditions

de vie matérielle autour de leurs sites de production, l'activité pétrolière a favorisé une dégradation du climat social et de la qualité des relations au sein des communautés et entre les communautés (Giraud et Renouard 2010).

Un dernier problème concerne l'impact environnemental des pétroliers et, là aussi, leur périmètre d'intervention. La proximité géographique des *non host communities* avec les zones d'exploitation pétrolière (*host communities*) laisse présager une contamination de fait par l'activité permanente de torchage de gaz mais aussi par des fuites récurrentes de gaz et de pétrole qui se déversent dans les cours d'eau, les zones de pêche, les marécages, les espaces cultivables et les nappes phréatiques.

En réalité, la plupart des programmes sociétaux engagés par les compagnies pétrolières ont relevé de la conception d'une responsabilité sociale restée très proche de la philanthropie, au détriment d'une démarche visant à contribuer de manière holistique au développement durable, alors même que les compagnies en ont les moyens et sont tout à fait en mesure de mobiliser des compétences et des partenariats *ad hoc*. Les questions liées au partage équitable de la manne pétrolière, de la mise en œuvre de réels programmes de sortie de pauvreté, et les enjeux de gouvernance, n'ont toujours pas été traités (Frynas 2005 2009).

Promouvoir des nouvelles conditions de justice

Vis-à-vis de l'idéal démocratique de citoyens égaux, ayant les mêmes droits en termes de participation aux décisions dans leur société politique, on assiste ainsi, dans le contexte du Delta du Niger, à un enchevêtrement d'injustices économiques, sociales, et politiques. D'une part, ces formes d'injustices proviennent du fossé qui se creuse entre les plus riches et les plus pauvres, c'est-à-dire entre ceux qui ont accès à une rente de situation ou à des retombées directes de la manne pétrolière, et les autres. D'autre part, elles découlent de l'exclusion et de la marginalisation de certains groupes sociaux -traditionnellement les femmes, en particulier les veuves, et dans une certaine mesure les jeunes- dans la prise de décisions et la mise en œuvre des projets au sein des communautés ; ainsi que de l'exclusion des communautés voisines qui n'abritent pas d'installations pétrolières.

Comment promouvoir des conditions de justice nouvelles dans un contexte que certains philosophes, comme Nancy Fraser (2008), appellent une situation inédite, anormale par rapport aux cadres dans lesquels ont été élaborées les théories classiques et modernes de la justice ? Nous sommes en effet hors du cadre du fonctionnement normal d'Etats-Nations souverains. De plus, l'idée d'une justice (re)distributrice à promouvoir à partir d'une égale considération de tous les membres rationnels et égaux vient se heurter à la réalité des luttes pour la défense des droits de minorités spécifiques

(luttres culturelles) et à la réalité de l'absence de fonctionnement effectif des règles démocratiques comme la participation de tous aux décisions qui les concernent.

Vers une justice de basse altitude

Un système de représentations partagées entre les parties prenantes

Dans ce contexte se pose la question de la responsabilité des différents types d'acteurs vis-à-vis d'une transformation de la situation contre ces différentes formes d'injustice. Pour y répondre, l'analyse faite par le philosophe américain Michaël Walzer (2002) en termes d'universalisme de basse altitude, ainsi que sa défense d'une critique sociale interne (Walzer 1983, 1987) fournit une base de discussion intéressante. Elle permet de réfléchir à la responsabilité des différents acteurs (communautés locales, entreprises, ONG, groupes de pression, politiciens, etc.) qui participent à la réalité sociale considérée.

La conception morale valorisée par le philosophe américain consiste à articuler deux dimensions, maximale (*thick*) et minimale (*thin*) : l'éthique minimale est le cœur de valeurs et de principes qui font l'objet d'une reconnaissance commune à l'échelle de la planète, telles la vérité, la liberté et la justice. La morale épaisse est l'ensemble des normes, valeurs et représentations partagées à l'intérieur d'une société donnée. Le recours à la morale fine permet de critiquer les pratiques et traditions à l'intérieur d'une société et de discerner ce qui s'oppose au respect de la dignité et des droits fondamentaux de chaque être humain. En même temps, Walzer souligne combien il est nécessaire de réfléchir collectivement à la mise en œuvre des valeurs que l'on défend. Ceci suppose des débats, des compromis, des accords à l'intérieur d'une société donnée. L'enjeu est, finalement, que tous les citoyens et parties prenantes du tissu social puissent jouer le rôle de critiques sociaux et avancer vers la définition d'institutions et de pratiques sociales plus justes et désirables pour l'ensemble de la population.

La perspective de Walzer nous paraît particulièrement pertinente pour réfléchir sur les conditions d'une justice sociale adaptée à la réalité nigériane transformée par la production pétrolière, dans la mesure où le philosophe réfute une conception surplombante de la morale, tout en refusant une perspective relativiste qui pourrait s'accommoder, par exemple, de violations de la dignité de certaines personnes ou de certains groupes. Dans le contexte propre du Delta du Niger, il s'agirait de considérer que ce sont les acteurs locaux qui peuvent trouver les moyens d'une transformation des pratiques injustes, en s'appuyant sur des ressources éthiques et politiques qui peuvent être empruntées à d'autres sociétés mais qui doivent être mobilisées dans un système de représentations partagées.

Il s'agirait aussi de reconnaître que les perceptions et la réalité des frontières entre le juste et l'injuste varient entre les individus et les groupes au sein d'une même zone géographique : ce n'est pas seulement une injustice perpétrée par les entreprises occidentales à l'égard des communautés locales indigènes, ou une discrimination des hommes à l'égard des femmes, ou une inégalité illégitime entre notables ayant part au pouvoir politique ou économique et « hommes et femmes de la rue » exclus de toute participation aux décisions et de toute redistribution. Parce que toutes ces formes sont imbriquées, au niveau local, et impliquent différents types d'acteurs, il paraît impossible d'avancer vers des institutions et des projets reconnus comme plus justes, sans faire participer toutes ces parties prenantes à une réflexion sur les conditions de telles transformations. Autrement dit, il faut se demander quels espaces politiques permettraient un passage vers une société plus juste et durable, à partir de la prise en compte de la réalité complexe et inédite qui existe aujourd'hui.

Partir des institutions existantes

De ce point de vue, nous adoptons vis-à-vis de la réflexion sur la justice une position qui se rapproche aussi bien de la recherche d'un « universel de basse altitude » décrit par Walzer que de la démarche inductive décrite par Amartya Sen (2010) dans son ouvrage *L'idée de justice*. Sen dégage deux lignes philosophiques. La première, celle des théoriciens du contrat (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant), dont John Rawls (1921–2002) est le meilleur exemple contemporain, vise à définir les institutions et les principes universels en vue d'une société parfaitement juste, selon une perspective que Sen qualifie de transcendantaliste. La deuxième, celle qui a sa préférence, réfléchit aux moyens de perfectionner les institutions existantes, pour les orienter vers un meilleur ordre social. Cette approche qu'il qualifie de comparatiste, qui fut, selon lui, celle d'auteurs aussi variés que Condorcet, Bentham, Mill et Marx, est compatible avec les théories économiques du choix social, qui permettent d'envisager des solutions, même partielles, sans avoir une vue exhaustive et surplombante des différents domaines où des questions de justice distributive se posent. Face à la limite d'une construction politique idéale inatteignable, l'objectif d'Amartya Sen est de proposer des moyens concrets pour aller vers des sociétés moins injustes et mieux ordonnées. Il commence par étudier les méthodes concurrentes – contrat et choix social – pour définir des procédures et des institutions (plus) justes. Il analyse ensuite la perspective du choix social et définit les aptitudes individuelles et collectives à promouvoir le raisonnement moral comme « impartialité ouverte » fondée sur l'empathie et l'ouverture à l'autre, fût-il éloigné, avant de préciser le contenu des biens, des capacités et des libertés à défendre, et de terminer par la mise en œuvre

de ces principes démocratiques à l'échelle mondiale. Cette approche a le très grand avantage de proposer un critère éthique lié à un raisonnement collectif afin de comparer les options sociales et d'orienter les politiques publiques. Elle vise à développer les capacités (*capabilities*) des personnes, dans toutes leurs dimensions, et à veiller à ce que la dignité de chacun soit respectée, par le développement de sa libre aptitude à choisir « les formes de vie qu'il a raison de valoriser » (Sen 2000). Toutefois, une approche basée seulement sur le développement des capacités individuelles ne garantit pas une limitation des inégalités. Sen lui-même reconnaît qu'elle doit être articulée avec une critique de l'accroissement des inégalités économiques et sociales et une défense engagée de l'amélioration du sort des plus démunis. En ce sens, il soutient le principe du *MaxiMin* de Rawls (1971), qui invite à maximiser l'utilité des plus défavorisés.

En définitive, les démarches proposées par Walzer et Sen sont convergentes, le premier se situant d'abord du point de vue politique et le deuxième du point de vue économique : il s'agit pour l'un et l'autre de partir des institutions existantes et des valeurs partagées au sein d'une société, tout en mettant en œuvre une délibération critique, en vue d'une reconnaissance partagée des injustices et d'une définition des mesures appropriées, dans le contexte local, pour réduire ces injustices. Les deux conceptions impliquent un espace public, ou des espaces publics locaux qui rendent possible l'expression de la voix des plus défavorisés. Il faut maintenant préciser si et comment ceux-ci existent dans le Delta du Niger.

Vers un idéal partagé de sociétés plus justes ?

On l'a vu, des situations d'injustice observées dans le Delta du Niger sont clairement reconnues par les acteurs du système au sein des compagnies pétrolières et au sein des communautés. D'une part, l'insuffisance des ressources mises à la disposition des communautés dans un contexte de défaillance de l'Etat, et d'autre part l'exclusion ou la marginalisation de certaines communautés et de certains groupes sociaux, les femmes en particulier et, dans une certaine mesure, les jeunes. Ces situations sont vécues et ressenties comme des situations d'injustice par les concernés et jouent un rôle décisif dans la fermentation des frustrations et l'avènement de comportements socialement déviants : violences, criminalité, prostitution, cultisme, etc. Les groupes cultistes étant des confréries étudiantes créées dans les années 1970 dans les universités et soutenues par de grandes figures comme Wole Soyinka. Cercles culturels et élitistes, les groupes cultistes étaient destinés à montrer l'exemple à la société par un comportement exemplaire et l'attachement à des valeurs. Peu à peu, le cultisme a été envahi

par des pratiques ésotériques et violentes, puis quitté les universités pour gagner les zones rurales où des pratiques occultes traditionnelles l'ont transformé en véritable fléau social.

Aujourd'hui, le cultisme est une activité secrète, opérée souvent de nuit, avec des serments devant des gourous, et des rites occultes dans des cimetières. Pour leur pérennité, les groupes cultistes ont installé une véritable économie de la violence, principalement autour de l'activité pétrolière et des opportunités qu'elle peut générer. Nombreux et concurrents, ils ont des allures criminelles avec de fréquents règlements de comptes d'une grande violence. La décapitation d'un jeune à laquelle la communauté Egbema a assisté dans la nuit du 25 au 26 décembre 2010 leur est attribuée, et on estime dans certaines communautés que le phénomène concerne les deux-tiers des jeunes, recrutés dès l'âge de 13 à 14 ans. Le fonctionnement des groupes cultistes, qui sont connus pour alimenter les mouvements contestataires violents et meurtriers, est à l'opposé de la recherche d'espaces publics locaux de dialogue en vue d'institutions plus justes. Comment impliquer leurs participants dans de tels espaces ?

L'Amnesty Program lancé en 2009 par le gouvernement fédéral a apporté une solution partielle à la démarche de réconciliation nécessaire au rétablissement de la confiance par la réhabilitation morale et économique des plus engagés dans la contestation violente. Toutefois, sa portée démocratique est limitée car il n'est destiné qu'à une minorité d'insurgés, tandis que les anciens bastions de ces derniers où se déroulaient divers trafics mafieux (pétrole de contrebande, armes, etc.) sont simplement repris par de nouveaux acteurs dont des officiels fédéraux ou locaux (Nwajiakwu-Dahou 2010).

Ainsi, si les sociétés locales ont du mal à trouver une solution durable à ces fléaux aujourd'hui clairement identifiés et publiquement dénoncés, c'est probablement parce que le *statu quo* profite économiquement, socialement et politiquement à ceux-là même qui sont chargés de trouver des solutions. Il demeure toutefois que toute solution doit s'inspirer de l'expérience locale et tenir compte de la capacité du corps social à la mettre en œuvre par lui-même sur le long terme. Il s'agit de promouvoir une critique sociale interne, mettant en œuvre l'attitude désignée par Sen comme impartialité ouverte et ouverture aux raisons de chaque partie, en vue de définir des solutions collectives allant dans le sens des valeurs partagées et du respect de la morale « fine » de Walzer. Les pistes dessinées ci-dessous sont donc avant tout de la matière à réflexion, dont pourraient s'inspirer les différents acteurs dans leurs débats multipartites.

Quelle justice pour les communautés dans la répartition des revenus pétroliers ?

Une première difficulté est liée au caractère global de l'injustice ressentie par les communautés (non seulement du sud du pays, mais aussi du nord) vis-à-vis du partage jugé inique des revenus pétroliers. A l'échelle nationale, on l'a vu, les clés de répartition des revenus du pétrole ont évolué au gré des réclamations des populations. Si ces clés sont connues de tous, les ressources financières qui en découlent sont largement méconnues par la population, qu'il s'agisse de celles qui transitent par l'Etat et ses démembrements (les Etats fédérés, les *Local Governments*, la *NDDC-Niger Delta Development Commission*, le Ministère du Delta du Niger, etc.), ou de celles que les compagnies versent directement aux communautés dans le cadre des MoUs. On peut espérer que l'adhésion officielle du Nigeria – désigné « *EITI compliant* » en mars 2011 – et des principales compagnies pétrolières occidentales à l'EITI (*Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative*, initiative lancée en 2003 par Tony Blair pour engager les pays à publier ce qu'ils reçoivent des compagnies extractives et les entreprises à publier leurs versements aux pays hôtes) favorise à l'avenir la mobilisation de la population pour faire pression sur le gouvernement, bien que des études estiment que la mise en œuvre de l'EITI au Nigeria depuis 2003 sous l'impulsion du Président Olusegun Obasanjo a jusqu'ici été surtout un exercice de communication et relations publiques pour le gouvernement sans conséquence majeure sur la transparence et le système de gouvernance (Shaxson 2009).

Des pistes techniques de solutions souvent avancées pour associer davantage les Etats fédérés et les communautés à la gestion des ressources pétrolières sont de deux ordres : i) Augmentation des quotes-parts réservées à ces entités dans les revenus globaux à travers la révision des clés de répartition et de dérivation actuelles des revenus ii) Ouverture à ces entités locales de l'actionariat des champs en exploitation situés sur leurs territoires, ou des nouveaux champs à développer, afin que l'Etat fédéral ou ses démembrements (*NNPC-Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation* via sa filiale *NAPIMS* qui détient le portefeuille de l'Etat avec des parts allant jusqu'à 60% dans la plupart de joint-ventures nouées avec les multinationales étrangères) ne soient plus seuls à gérer de manière centralisée les revenus pétroliers. Certains chercheurs comme Udeme Ekpo (2004) voient comme vertu de ces solutions une responsabilisation accrue des populations dans la gestion de leurs propres ressources et une voie vers l'éradication des actes criminels désespérés. Mais, conduites en dehors de débats démocratiques, ces approches pourraient aboutir à l'affaiblissement de l'Etat fédéral et à la déstabilisation de la cohésion nationale.

Toutefois, le contexte sociopolitique local, marqué par une corruption généralisée (Azaiki 2007), n'est pas encore de nature à imposer aux élus une transparence dans la gestion des ressources financières dérivées du pétrole, et la réponse traditionnellement très militarisée de l'Etat (Ukiwo 2009) amène les populations à s'orienter massivement vers les compagnies pétrolières, utilisant tous les moyens (négociation, chantage, sabotage, violences sur les employés et les installations, etc.) pour les contraindre à mettre à leur disposition toujours plus de ressources sans possibilité de fixer un plafond. Ainsi, indépendamment de la question de la dérivation des revenus pétroliers vers les Etats producteurs, le principal problème est lié à la mauvaise gouvernance et à la corruption généralisée aux échelons nationaux et locaux de l'Etat fédéral. En 2010, le Nigeria est classé 134^e sur 178 pays sur l'Indice de Perception de la Corruption de Transparency International, ce qui représente d'ailleurs un réel progrès par rapport à la fin des années 1990 où le Nigeria apparaissait régulièrement à la dernière place de ce classement.

Une seconde difficulté relève de la sous-consommation des ressources disponibles localement. Il arrive souvent que les ressources rendues disponibles par les compagnies pétrolières soient peu consommées au niveau local. Les justifications qu'apportent régulièrement les compagnies sont de deux ordres : l'insuffisance de compétences locales techniques et managériales affectées à l'exécution des projets dans les communautés, et la désorganisation politique ponctuelle ou permanente de certaines communautés parfois en proie à des luttes internes de leadership. Le déficit de compétences locales se résorbera progressivement grâce au progrès du niveau d'éducation dans la région, et aux programmes de formation technique et professionnelle soutenus par les compagnies pétrolières, d'où l'urgence de réformer les systèmes de redistribution des bourses scolaires et opportunités qui s'avèrent complètement inefficaces au sein des communautés. Le problème de leadership n'est pas, quant à lui, l'apanage du Delta du Niger, il relève de dynamiques politiques observées dans toute société à la recherche d'une stabilité institutionnelle de long terme. Il en est ainsi de ces communautés de l'ethnie *Egbema* situées à cheval entre le Rivers State et l'Imo State, qui n'arrivent pas à s'entendre sur le choix de leur monarque, livrant l'espace politique traditionnel local à des luttes intestines meurtrières de leadership, et rendant leur pouvoir de négociation vis-à-vis d'Agip d'autant plus fragile. Dans de telles conditions sociopolitiques où il manque aux compagnies des interlocuteurs crédibles dans les communautés, il apparaît difficile de parvenir à une utilisation efficace des ressources mobilisables et encore plus à une augmentation globale des budgets alloués aux communautés.

Ainsi, stabiliser, d'une part, cette adéquation entre les ressources espérées et celles mises à disposition, et d'autre part cet équilibre recherché entre les ressources mises à disposition et celles consommées, ira de pair avec l'amélioration à moyen ou long terme de la gouvernance globale à tous les échelons du pays. Le premier défi crucial concerne l'implication des pouvoirs publics dans la conception et l'exécution de programmes sociaux, ce qui permettra à l'entreprise de se recentrer à la fois sur ses responsabilités directes concernant les dommages environnementaux et sociaux provoqués par son activité, et sur le développement de ses compétences internes propres en matière de développement socio-économique.

Quelle justice au sein des communautés dans la redistribution des revenus et opportunités ?

En ce qui concerne la redistribution au sein des communautés, le caractère juste et équitable de l'affectation des bourses scolaires dans les familles et des opportunités d'emplois est laissé à l'appréciation des représentants des familles. Ces derniers, désignés par cooptation ou hérédité, siègent au sein des comités locaux de répartition et ont la responsabilité d'affecter aux différentes familles les opportunités et ressources obtenues auprès des comités. Est donc en œuvre ici le phénomène classique d'asymétrie de l'information entre le comité et les familles, et plus largement entre les compagnies et les populations, puisque rendre compte n'est pas une obligation contractuelle contraignante (les compagnies ayant souvent peu de leviers pour l'imposer) et qu'il n'y a pas d'audit des circuits de redistribution. L'audit-évaluation du système local de redistribution, la communication directe aux populations par les compagnies pétrolières sur les ressources et opportunités mises à disposition (site Internet dédié, affichage public, crieurs itinérants, etc.), et la transparence à exiger des relais locaux sur les processus d'attribution seraient susceptibles de limiter les abus.

Au-delà, la question des interfaces entre les compagnies et les communautés apparaît cruciale pour mobiliser les expertises adéquates en matière d'ingénierie socio-économique et politique. On observe que dans les zones où les compagnies ont sous-traité à des tiers indépendants des communautés (ONG ou Fondations) la supervision et la facilitation des concertations locales dans la gestion des ressources et opportunités, il y a un progrès démocratique palpable, une large implication dans la gestion des ressources économiques et environnementales, et une confiance mutuelle qui contribue à la préservation du tissu social local.

Parmi les exemples de mise en œuvre prometteuse bien qu'encore fragile d'une telle approche participative, on peut citer la Fondation locale (EOCDF)

d'Eastern Obolo (*Local Government* de l'Etat d'Akwa Ibom) mise en place par l'ONG Pro-Natura en 2003 et financée par Total (Renouard 2008; Giraud et Renouard 2010).

L'ONG s'est officiellement retirée de la zone fin 2009, laissant la Fondation sur la voie de l'autonomie. Cette dernière vise à développer des projets de développement agricole, économique et social, en impliquant les représentants (élus pour une durée et un mandat déterminés) des différents villages du *Local Government*, et les différentes parties prenantes de la population : ainsi la parité hommes/femmes est assurée dans toutes les instances de décision, et un représentant des pouvoirs publics est également impliqué (Renouard 2007:271-281).

Ce type d'organisation constitue un exemple intéressant en termes de gouvernance : la Fondation locale pallie, dans une certaine mesure, les déficiences des pouvoirs publics et constitue une interface entre les populations et les parties prenantes sur leur territoire : entreprises, Etat, ONG, etc. (Idemudia 2009).

La fragilité de ce modèle, néanmoins, est double : comment assurer les conditions de pérennité de telles initiatives, aussi bien du point de vue économique que politique ? En effet, du point de vue économique, la dépendance d'une organisation à but non lucratif à l'égard des bailleurs de fonds extérieurs est une menace permanente pour sa viabilité : d'où l'objectif à terme de la création d'activités agro-économiques et de formes entrepreneuriales pérennes qui permettent autant que possible d'autofinancer les projets. Du point de vue politique, ce type de Fondation sera d'autant plus pérenne que tout en restant indépendante, elle s'appuiera sur les pouvoirs publics, voire qu'elle contribuera à influencer l'organisation des projets publics de développement communautaire en évitant l'inertie, la gabegie et le clientélisme. Enfin, si le modèle des fondations locales de développement a été officiellement reconnu par les pouvoirs publics nigériens -dans le cadre des projets se déclinant à différents niveaux, depuis les SEEDS (*State Economic Empowerment Development Strategies*), dont les programmes ont été publiés par le PNUD en 2004, jusqu'au LEEDS (*Local Government Economic...*) et aux CEEDS (*Community Economic...*), il faut reconnaître qu'il est beaucoup plus difficile à mettre en œuvre dans les zones de production pétrolière, où les relations entre les parties prenantes ont pris des habitudes bien ancrées qui constituent des freins et des obstacles à des projets plus intégratifs et plus efficaces.

La fondation locale de développement créée par Pro Natura sur la zone *Egi*, avec l'appui de Total, sur le modèle de celle d'Eastern Obolo, fait l'objet de très fortes critiques par la population : ses membres résident en

métropole à Port Harcourt et non dans les villages, et sont régulièrement assimilés à de nouveaux complices des réseaux élitaires historiques locaux. De plus, ses moyens financiers sont très faibles comparativement à l'ensemble des dépenses sociétales de Total dans la région, alors que dans la zone d'Eastern Obolo, l'impact de petites réalisations de la Fondation a été beaucoup plus fort, compte-tenu de l'absence d'autres projets de développement dans le *Local Government* jusqu'à une date récente. Enfin, le défaut majeur du modèle mis en place en zone *Egi* est sa trop grande consanguinité avec l'entreprise. Une organisation de supervision et de facilitation ne sera sans doute crédible sur la durée dans ces zones déjà institutionnellement polluées qu'à condition d'être perçue comme un tiers indépendant à l'égard de l'ensemble des parties prenantes : compagnies, Etat, communautés, etc.

Pour ce qui est de l'exclusivité accordée aux familles des anciens propriétaires fonciers, notamment dans la zone Total, les propriétaires estiment qu'elle relève d'un droit non négociable. Leur intransigeance a conduit Total à négocier avec eux des *MoUs* spécifiques depuis quelques années ; ce qui fait d'ailleurs des émules au sein des communautés Agip et Shell voisines où les propriétaires fonciers demandent désormais le même traitement. On est en présence d'un rapport de forces qui aboutit à un consensus social de fait. Cet équilibre est toutefois constamment menacé par l'inefficacité manifeste de la redistribution interne au sein des familles : on l'a vu, les membres des familles de propriétaires fonciers eux-mêmes dénoncent la captation des bénéfices par ceux de leurs familles qui sont proches de l'entreprise. Cet équilibre social, bien que très fragile, peut toutefois difficilement être remis en cause à court terme par les compagnies pétrolières car la sensibilité de leurs interlocuteurs apparaît aujourd'hui agressive, mais il doit être considéré comme temporaire car il s'agit d'une situation notoirement discriminatoire et génératrice de fortes inégalités, si l'on considère que les propriétaires fonciers avaient déjà bénéficié d'un dédommagement lors de la cession de leurs terrains. Dans l'immédiat, au niveau local, un audit détaillé du système de redistribution au sein des communautés serait utile. La remise en cause par les habitants de l'exclusivité accordée aux propriétaires fonciers sur les travaux réalisés sur leurs anciens terrains sera d'autant plus légitime que les trois conditions suivantes seront réunies :

- i) Lesdits propriétaires et ceux de leurs familles qui ont accès à la rente représentent une proportion marginale de la population ; dès lors, entretenir de telles discriminations favorise durablement l'émergence d'une poignée seulement de privilégiés et déstabilise profondément le tissu social.

- ii) Les revenus distribués par ce canal sont significatifs au regard du niveau de vie dans la région, et ils contribuent à creuser de manière significative les inégalités sociales.
- iii) Les autres familles du clan ou des clans voisins ont peu d'autres moyens d'accéder à un emploi stable et aux contrats de sous-traitance mis à disposition par les entreprises pétrolières : le système serait alors effectivement en train de favoriser, et de manière durable, de graves injustices sociales.

La question de la représentativité des femmes au sein des instances communautaires de décision, est également très délicate car elle bouscule des traditions sociales et culturelles bien ancrées au sein de ces communautés, pour la plupart rurales. Ce qui est perçu comme une marginalisation est la conséquence d'un déficit réel de compétences féminines, entretenu par la sous-alphabétisation chronique des femmes au sein des communautés. Le problème éducatif est renforcé par les pratiques désormais fréquentes de prostitution de la part d'adolescentes, dans les zones d'activité pétrolière, phénomène qui entretient l'absence et l'échec scolaire. Une étude de l'Association des femmes Egi, l'*EWVA-Egi Women Welfare Association* (EWVA 2010), indique que deux adolescentes Egi sur trois de 13 ans à 18 ans ont connu des grossesses précoces. Par ailleurs, les filles sont plus facilement mobilisées que les garçons par leurs mères pour contribuer aux activités agricoles et commerciales, ce qui a un effet sur le taux de fréquentation scolaire. Sans pouvoir lire ni écrire, il est difficile de se poser intellectuellement en interlocuteurs vis-à-vis des représentants des communautés et des compagnies pétrolières. Ceci étant, historiquement, leurs mobilisations pacifiques (marches, *sit-in*, etc.) notamment dans les années 1980 et 1990 aura souvent été décisive pour le succès des révoltes dans les communautés (EWVA 2010 ; Turner & Brownhill 2004), même si leurs manifestations ont parfois pu être perçues par leurs interlocuteurs des compagnies pétrolières comme une arme ultime des hommes pour forcer les compagnies et l'Etat à plier devant les revendications des communautés.

Toutefois, l'expérience des femmes du clan Egi qui ont obtenu de Total la construction en mai 2010 d'un Centre social dénommé « *Women Development Center* » semble prometteuse, à condition que ledit Centre soit un lieu de formation et d'accompagnement pour des femmes de tous les villages de la zone et de toutes catégories sociales, y compris les plus pauvres et marginalisées, les veuves notamment. Il apparaît en effet indispensable de soutenir leur émancipation de différentes façons, notamment à travers une gestion adéquate de ce Centre destiné à renforcer leur autonomie économique par la formation initiale des adultes et la formation professionnelle aux activités génératrices de revenus. Promouvoir par ailleurs par des actions spécifiques

de sensibilisation et de soutien à l'éducation scolaire de la jeune fille contribuera au même objectif. Il est attendu qu'à moyen terme, les femmes développent une autonomie économique et intellectuelle, et se voient contribuer activement à l'innovation dans les modes de management des ressources pétrolières et de production agricole au sein des communautés. Une responsable d'association de femmes dans les communautés dit à cet effet :

Laissez les femmes se servir des mains et de la connaissance que Dieu leur a données. Nous voulons que les femmes prennent part aux discussions concernant le pétrole, parce que jusqu'ici dans nos villages, les femmes ne doivent pas s'y mêler. [La compagnie] doit nous fournir des formations professionnelles, de l'emploi, des bourses scolaires, et des prêts pour financer nos projets. Elle le fait déjà un peu mais je souhaite qu'elle le fasse davantage en augmentant la quote-part pour les femmes...Ce que je sais c'est que les femmes ne sont pas assez associées aux décisions et sont sous-représentées [...]. En ce qui concerne l'agriculture, je pense que [la compagnie] doit nous fournir des fertilisants puisque les rendements ont tellement baissé.

Progressivement pourront-elles ainsi avoir une parole qui compte dans les négociations et dans la mise en œuvre des *MoUs*. Une façon d'appuyer -et d'accélérer- ce mouvement consiste aussi à défendre l'alignement de la représentativité locale des femmes sur la récente réglementation nationale nigérienne sur le genre, le *Gender and Equal Opportunity Bill*, introduit au Parlement en 2010 par le Ministère fédéral de la condition féminine et du développement social, et qui prescrit la parité dans les mesures d'incitation à l'éducation, et un quota minimum de 35 pour cent pour tous les autres cas.

Ainsi, un réajustement de la répartition des opportunités et revenus n'interviendra durablement que de manière endogène. L'augmentation des capacités de la population locale (éducation, revenus stables, etc.) pourra contribuer à démocratiser la prise en compte des enjeux liés à l'activité pétrolière. Mais cet argument ne saurait être invoqué pour admettre la captation du pouvoir par l'élite la plus éduquée, dont il apparaît qu'elle ne joue pas, pour l'instant, un rôle positif en vue d'une meilleure redistribution des revenus et opportunités. Dans l'immédiat, le défi majeur est donc celui du renforcement des capacités individuelles et collectives de résistance et de négociation du plus grand nombre et en particulier des personnes les plus défavorisées.

Quelle sphère d'influence sociétale pour les pétroliers ?

L'attention et le soin dont doivent faire l'objet les *non host communities* délaissées relève de la responsabilité de l'Etat dans son rôle régalien. Toutefois, si dans cette région, l'Etat manque manifestement à ses devoirs au point de mettre à mal les droits humains élémentaires, il est de la responsabilité des entreprises pétrolières, dans leur sphère d'influence au sens des

recommandations de l'ONU et de la norme ISO 26000, de ne pas se rendre passives de complicité indirecte à l'égard de ces violations, et de faire pression sur les pouvoirs publics pour une meilleure distribution des ressources pétrolières. Elles se doivent de réagir car même sans être des acteurs politiques directs, elles jouent un rôle politique, au sens où elles participent à la transformation de la vie locale. Cette responsabilité politique (Renouard 2007) que les compagnies pétrolières exercent déjà au premier plan dans leurs *host communities* doit donc pouvoir être étendue aux *non host communities* voisines où elles interviendraient en suscitant d'une part le leadership des institutions nationales dédiées, et d'autre part en contribuant, de façon ciblée, à la formation des parties prenantes locales au sein des communautés (Renouard 2008). Les entreprises prendraient part ensuite aux projets de développement ainsi définis de manière multipartite. Par ailleurs, puisqu'il apparaît que l'activité pétrolière génère des externalités négatives importantes sur l'environnement naturel et le tissu social de ces communautés voisines, une implication plus forte des compagnies dans ces territoires relève de leur responsabilité directe.

Conclusion

En définitive, nous avons vu comment une meilleure justice sociale locale nécessite une remise en cause partielle, par les différentes parties prenantes, des conceptions prédominantes de la justice : ces dernières font souvent le jeu d'intérêts particuliers et nourrissent des structures et des pratiques inégalitaires, destructrices du tissu social. De plus, dans un contexte politique inédit, au regard des conceptions privilégiées dans les Etats-nations souverains, une piste d'amélioration consiste à valoriser la critique sociale interne, impliquant les différentes parties prenantes au niveau local, en veillant à inclure les personnes et groupes les plus défavorisés.

Du côté des communautés locales, il s'agit de reconnaître les effets pervers des circuits de clientélisme installés et des prérogatives accordées à certains groupes au nom d'un juste accès à la manne pétrolière. A cet égard, la question de l'injustice culturelle à l'encontre des femmes se pose aussi ; du côté des entreprises, le défi est de passer d'une contribution sociétale limitée et défensive à une contribution proactive à un développement local durable dans laquelle les enjeux de gouvernance sont mis au premier plan. Il s'agit à la fois d'éviter le creusement des inégalités, et d'articuler l'engagement sociétal local avec les dynamiques économiques, politiques et sociales nationales. Les pouvoirs publics, quant à eux, font face au discrédit lié à des pratiques généralisées de corruption et à leur contribution marginale au développement socio-économique local. Dès lors sont nécessaires de nouveaux contrats sociaux dans lesquels sont mieux déterminées et assurées

les modalités d'accès des communautés locales aux revenus pétroliers en vue du développement durable, ainsi que celles de la contribution des entreprises à cet égard.

Le projet de loi sur l'industrie pétrolière de 2008, le *Petroleum Industry Bill*, représente à cet effet une avancée certaine en faveur d'une meilleure lisibilité des responsabilités dans le secteur (puisque'il rassemble une quinzaine de textes précédents), et du renforcement de l'indépendance juridique et politique des entités fédérales en charge de l'industrie pétrolière. Il consacre par exemple la création du *Nigeria Petroleum Inspectorate* dont l'une des missions sera de veiller au respect des permis attribués par l'Etat aux entreprises de l'amont. Cette entité contrôlera en particulier les dédommagements liés à l'occupation foncière par les entreprises dans les communautés, la mise en œuvre des programmes sociétaux des compagnies, l'application du *local content*, ainsi que le respect par les compagnies des normes liées à la santé, la sécurité et l'environnement.

Ceci étant, le texte ne garantit pas, en soi, la capacité de ces institutions à s'affranchir des pratiques déviantes d'inertie et de corruption décrites plus haut, ni ne résout les difficultés de coopération auxquelles peuvent faire face des organismes publics opérant dans le même champ sectoriel. L'efficacité du nouveau dispositif dépendra de la capacité du Président Jonathan à coordonner cet arsenal institutionnel afin qu'il produise les effets positifs attendus. Par ailleurs, et de manière symbolique, le terme Responsabilité Sociétale des Entreprises n'apparaît pas dans le texte, et, de surcroît, les modalités d'interaction entre les communautés locales et l'industrie pétrolière ne sont pas abordés, ce qui laisse encore complètement ouvert le chantier institutionnel de la gouvernance locale des ressources et opportunités provenant des compagnies, et donc celui de la justice sociale.

La mise en œuvre de la justice locale ne peut se faire sans une implication de l'ensemble des parties prenantes publiques et privées. Cela suppose sans doute d'accroître les moyens d'un dialogue entre ces dernières, pour un processus participatif ouvert aux plus défavorisés. Dans ce cadre, un défi prioritaire concerne le renforcement des capacités des moins bien lotis – en particulier des femmes- notamment pour faciliter leur prise de parole et leur participation aux décisions qui les concernent. Il reste que toute avancée vers une plus grande justice locale suppose également une forte diminution des inégalités de revenus et de richesses au niveau national, et donc des décisions réglementaires contraignantes -en particulier, la taxation des hauts revenus-, accompagnées de pénalités dissuasives pour les contrevenants. Le besoin de *leaders* éthiques, dont l'absence était dénoncée par Chinua Achebe [1984] il y a presque trente ans, reste criant.

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Participatory Development and Non-Governmental Organisations in Sudan: Expectations and Realities

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Abstract

This article describes and analyses the roles and contributions of non-governmental organisations in Sudan. There is a strong belief that involving local people in development activities would be achieved through community organisations. As a result, when implementing participatory development interventions, there is a tendency to rely on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at national and regional levels, and support the formation of community organisations at grassroots level. To understand the concepts of these practices, this article will provide a brief review of NGOs' theories and in-depth analysis of Sudanese NGOs' performance and contributions. It suggests that there is a need to encourage and support the establishment of effective networks and links between government institutions local community organisations, private sectors and international organisations. Moreover, the article argues that international organisations with genuine intentions to reach the impoverished communities should be aware of their local partners' vision and investigate how genuine democratic and accountable non-governmental organisations are promoting participatory development approaches. Information about NGOs is based on a field research conducted 2007. I used focus group discussion and semi-structured interviews to explore the participants' perceptions and experiences.

Résumé

Cet article décrit et analyse les rôles et contributions des organisations non-gouvernementales au Soudan. Il existe une forte conviction selon laquelle impliquer les populations locales dans les activités de développement est réalisable à travers les organisations communautaires. Ainsi, dans la mise en œuvre des interventions de développement participatif, on observe une tendance à se reposer sur les organisations non-gouvernementales (ONG) au niveau national et régional et appuyer la formation d'organisations communautaire au

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niveau de la base. Pour comprendre les concepts de ces pratiques, cet article offre une brève revue des théories des ONG et une analyse en profondeur de la performance et des contributions des ONG soudanaises. Il suggère qu'il existe un besoin d'encourager et d'appuyer l'établissement de réseaux et liens efficaces entre les organisations communautaires locales, les institutions gouvernementales, les secteurs privés et les organisations internationales. En outre, l'article défend le point de vue selon lequel les organisations internationales, ayant des intentions réelles de toucher les communautés vivant dans la pauvreté, devraient avoir conscience de la vision de leurs partenaires locaux et s'assurer que les organisations non-gouvernementales encouragent réellement des approches de développement participatif d'une manière démocratique et en toute transparence. Les informations sur les ONG sont basées sur une recherche de terrain conduite en 2007. Nous avons utilisé des discussions de groupes et des interviews semi-structurées pour explorer les perceptions et les expériences des participants.

A Conceptual Framework

Many authors and theorists highlight the important role of community organisations as a mechanism for implementing successful participatory development (Uphoff 1991:495-97; Warren 1998; Hailey 2001; Kabeer 2003). Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been seen as participatory development pioneers and have gained the respect and trust of donors and other development agencies. They have been identified as the most qualified instruments that can involve people in development processes (Rahnema 1992). Brohman (1996) asserts that NGOs, through participatory fieldwork, succeeded in providing local communities with some innovative solutions to their problems. Brohman explains that NGOs have advantages over other development agencies because of their flexibility, speed of operation, and ability to respond quickly when there are special circumstances. NGOs were given special status of being non-governmental organisations so that bureaucratic barriers could not trap them (Rahnema 1992). Willis (2005) points out those NGOs that rely on indigenous knowledge are considered more efficient and effective in providing services.

In complex socio-political environments the concept and practice of participatory development calls for including local organisations and civil society in decision-making processes (Warren 1998:122). Moreover, the involvement of local people in various forms of decentralised decision-making has become the focus of the neo-liberal approaches, which dominate the current development trends in many countries. According to Willis (2005:97) this involvement is associated with growth of NGOs. Willis (2005:98) argues that NGOs, whether international or national, are often regarded as channels for facilitating development for a range of reasons. 'Firstly, it is assumed that NGOs could provide services that are much more appropriate to the

local community. Secondly, they relied on local knowledge and used local material; therefore they were able to provide such services more efficiently and effectively.

On the other hand, within the field of development there has been a continuous critique and debate about some groups who have been excluded because of gender, ethnicity, class or religion (Kothari and Minogue, 2002). Chambers (1991:533) suggests that to put people first, and to put poorer people first of all, requires organisations that are strong and sustainable, and policies to support them. In this regards, local community organisations are seen as one of the mechanisms that could give impetus to participatory development (Weekes-Vagliani 1995). Accordingly, the formation of organisations and making reforms within local structures has been extensively highlighted in the literature. However, Black (1991:160) points out that because the current fashion calls for promotion of community organisations and the involvement of communities in the assessment of needs and planning of projects, all development agencies identify this as their objective, but clearly, there are only few that have put this process into practice. Brohman (1996) adds that alternative development programmes and projects had adopted the top-down administrative structure and did not afford any opportunities to local organisations to participate in decision-making processes.

Concerns about NGOs' Structures and Performance

Many development interventions intend to establish community structures similar to the arrangements of bureaucratic structures (Clever 2001:42), which might result in creating a complicated or unproductive system. Rahman (1995:29) points out that NGOs have succeeded in delivering development at grassroots level but in several countries have created new professional elites who enjoy status and benefits, which are equivalent to, or exceed, senior government officials'. Pretty and Scoones (1995:163) point out that many NGOs in the developing world, especially the non-membership organisations, are not accountable. Moreover, it was evident that those NGOs have wasted resources and time of local people (Pretty and Scoones 1995:164).

Involving Women in Community Organisations

As mentioned earlier, the gender dimension of development activities has gained a lot of attention and focus from development agencies. Involving women in community organisations at various levels has received more efforts and inputs. However, whether it is better to form separate organisations for men and women or to have both in same organisation is

still under debate. Uphoff (1991) argues that separate organisations for women would enhance solidarity and outcomes, but in some circumstances, such as the availability of funds, it may not be viable to have separate organisations. However, in this case, there is a risk of placing women's participation under the control of men (Schneider and Libercier 1985). Cornwall (2003) argues that although it might be necessary to open up space for women's voices by installing them in the existing committees, this may not be enough if female participants are not concerned about other women, or their perceptions and concerns are not valued by male members. Clearly, within this framework there would be a power dimension. Evans (2003) notes that any set of organisation includes power relations, which entail a distribution of gains and losses. This means that there is a possibility of emergence of conflict, which requires an understanding of socio-cultural environments and adopting dialogue and negotiations.

The Sudanese NGOs

In Sudan there are no legal obstacles to people's rights of association and the Sudanese law has guaranteed the people's right to create their own organisations. The Societies Registration Act was passed in 1957 and since that time up to the 1980s, the registered NGOs were largely confined to charity and relief works (Sudan Government, 1997).

For the time being, in Sudan, there are different forms of community organisations, which can be classified into five categories according to their ideological background and roles. First are social-oriented organisations, which focus on providing social and public services, such as adult education and health services both in cities and rural areas. Second are politically affiliated organisations which are supported and funded by political parties and operate as social services providers. Third are the trade unions (work-based organisations); fourth are the academic and technically oriented organisations which mainly exist in the capital or some cities where there are research or academic institutions. Finally, there are religious organisations that offer both social services and spiritual support. All these forms of organisation exist at national and regional levels; while social and religious organisations exist only at the grassroots level.

In 1979, the government established the Sudan Council of Voluntary Agencies (SCOVA) to develop voluntary activities; record and exchange information; network between specialised groups, build capacity through training and sensitisation, cooperate with relevant government bodies; and strengthen bilateral relations at the regional and international levels. SCOVA was assumed to embrace non-governmental organisations, foundations and commissions that had been officially registered in the Humanitarian Aid

Commission. This, however, led to conflict of interest among the different NGOs because SCOVA cannot practically represent all the national NGOs since it was initiated and supported by the government. SCOVA records show that about 400 organisations that are registered as members. It thus appears that members of local NGOs have the skills and knowledge of how to attract and mobilise resources and develop connections with donors and development agencies, particularly those agencies that believe in participation and are interested in building relations with local NGOs rather than deal with government institutions. The failure of NGOs in establishing any form of effective networks among themselves has great influence on their performance and outcomes. This results in waste of time and opportunities to make a real contribution in developing and improving the living standard of the majority who lack the skills and knowledge to initiate interventions and access the resources' providers.

According to Sudan's First National Human Development Report (1998), the number of unions decreased from 104 in 1989 to 26 in 1998. In fact, all trade unions were dissolved in 1989 when the present regime took power and a new law governing the structure and activities of trade unions was passed. This would explain why the number of trade unions declined during 1990s. Mohammed (2001:55) asserts that variations and contradictions in interests have influenced the unions and largely transformed them into political organisations controlled, co-opted or suppressed by government. This could be due to the fact that throughout the political history of Sudan trade unions had played an important part in changing the military regimes. The present government has made some protective measures to reduce or control the trade unions' role, particularly in the political arena.

However, other technical and social organisations have a wide space of freedom. The national NGOs have their own linkages with international NGOs, development agencies, and donors. Different organisations are involved in partnership or have relationships with external institutions. In this context the most important issue is freedom of association, which is a condition for successful participatory development (Egger 1995:110).

In 1992, the government launched the Comprehensive Development Strategy (CDS) (1992-2002) with a focus on creating self-reliance, satisfying human quest for dignity and freedom alongside advancement in economic, social and cultural life emanating from Sudan's national heritage. To achieve these objectives, the strategy identified the need to mobilise the Sudanese and forge new partnerships between government, NGOs, grassroots organisations and the private sector. The CDS (Sudan Government 1992:59) also states that 'social development is a joint effort involving the government and citizens, theoretically this means that people have the full right to

participate in decision-making processes through different ways. This strategy calls for more involvement of people in all fields of development'. However, it seems the CDS statement had no room for practical expression. The Sudan's first *Human National Development Report* (1998) points out that the laws governing NGOs made it difficult for them to register, although they managed to survive and make some achievements.

After signing the peace agreement between the North and the South of Sudan in January 2005, the government opened more space for civil society organisations to develop more relationships with international NGOs and donors. It also allowed the political parties to operate and trade unions were formed, in what it appears to be democratic. However, there are concerns regarding the transparency of election process. The critical question relates to whether these NGOs are capable of playing a significant role in any development interventions? In practice, most civil society organisations are not engaged in governance or local community issues and mainly work at a central level. There are negative public opinions and perceptions about NGOs. Many of them have been linked with certain powerful people or political parties during the last three decades and even the professional NGOs did not escape this trap.

Arising from this scenario, therefore, national and regional organisations are almost not existent at grassroots level. National and regional NGOs are simply not available to serve the ordinary people in rural areas where they are mostly needed. During a focus group discussion, a female academic who had previous working experience in rural areas explained:

Rural women are suffering because of illiteracy and lack of services. ... those local NGOs who always talk about gender issues and rural women never go there and make real contribution to change that situation (FA-Al-Azhary University/*Khartoum*).

Hence, despite the large number of national and regional NGOs in Sudan, it appears the rural people are not aware of their existence. People who are not involved directly or indirectly with these NGOs often criticise their orientation, the behaviour of their members and their connection with outsiders. Participants from different backgrounds, journalists, academics and specialists have recorded these perceptions and views, some of which are extracted below:

The civil society organizations are controlled by elites, who seem to be permanent employees with unknown employers, speak foreign languages, stay in the capital or big cities and are very good in organizing workshops and meetings. In fact, being a civil society activist is a very profitable job (Male Journalist-SSI/*Khartoum*).

A gender specialist from the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry commented thus:

Many members of the NGOs are spies, working against their country and looking after their personal benefits. They rent the best houses in the town, drive cars, travel abroad and organize conferences and workshops. They know how to please the donors and the international agencies which finance them. They are just good at complaining and criticizing government, but who is going to criticize them? (GAD-FGD/ *Khartoum*).

Through a semi-structured interview a male academic from the University of Khartoum commented:

One of the problems of this country [is that] most of these NGOs claim that they are concerned about development, but they are not. They are either supporting this political party or that one, or have other hidden agendas. Unfortunately, it becomes a personal business. Many national organisations have been led by the same persons or group of people for the last two or three decades. (MAI-SSI/ *Khartoum*).

Formation of Community Organisations by Development Projects

Based on local practices, local communities usually select their representatives for voluntary grassroots organisations through consultation and negotiation. Through this process no one would be hurt or excluded. This also means that the communities avoid the perceptions of 'losers' and 'winners' in a decision (Burayidi 2000:7). Many international organisations are getting involved in development processes through development projects; these projects place the formation of new organisations, through democratic procedure, at the centre of their interventions. Through this 'democratic process', projects introduced new ways of selecting community representatives rather than following the local selection procedure. It was evident that these new procedures created divisions and tensions in some rural areas as those who were not selected felt rejected and decided to stay away. This raises a concern about how development providers should deal with local systems.

For example the North Kordofan Rural Development project (implemented by IFAD and the Sudanese Government between 2001 and 2008) created new structures, which were called Village Development Organisations (VDOs). These VDOs were formed at village level through general village assembly where, according to the size of the village, six to eleven members were elected to form the executive committee. According to the VDO's

constitution, women should make up 30 per cent of the committees' membership. Each committee consisted of a chairperson, secretary, treasurer and assistant treasurer, nomads' representative, village *Sheikh* (leader) and extension workers. Some of the members who were made extension workers led the sub-committees that dealt with agricultural, livestock, crop production and horticulture, women's development, agro-forestry and rangeland activities. The project fieldworkers were responsible of the formation of VDOs. They followed a democratic process of choosing the members and the president. However, local communities usually selected the members of grassroots organisations through consultations and negotiations, a procedure that protected their internal solidarity.

According to IFAD (2002), the main objectives of the Village Development Organisations (VDOs) were to:

1. Enhance the concept of solidarity, consultation and participation; motivate the community, local and national institutions to contribute to the establishment of social service, protection of the environment and the development of natural resources;
2. Carry out social and economic activities in order to improve the social and economic status of people at the village level;
3. Improve the productivity of crops and livestock;
4. Plan and implement capacity building programmes through self-help and gender mainstreaming approaches;
5. Establish partnership and seek support from the government and other development institutions;
6. Provide its members with loans from the organisation's resources or through the facilitation of banks' loans; and
7. Coordinate the sustainable development efforts provided by different development agencies.

The VDO and its committees are responsible to the general assembly. According to its constitution, the village general assembly, which is formed of registered members, elects the board of directors and the head of the committees, and approves the annual plan, budget and report. The responsibility of the board of directors is to resolve conflicts, maintain solidarity, invite and welcome state officials and other dignitaries, participate in preparing the annual plan and budget, and invite the village assembly for general meetings. The VDO constitution states clearly that only registered members can benefit from the bank facilities and the profits from VDOs' assets. Other people have the right to benefit from other social services according to the conditions that would be specified by VDO committees.

These social services include training, literacy programmes, pest management and health services by trained service providers, such as midwives, and so on.

The VDO's assets are reviewed and calculated at the year end during which profits accruing from the credit fund is shared as follows: 40 per cent for the members; 20 per cent for the board of directors; 20 per cent added to the capital; 10 per cent reserved for the village services; and the last 10 per cent budgeted for unseen services (IFAD 2002:2). Other undeclared benefits are participation in meetings, discussions and selection of community representatives, which are guaranteed to registered members only. The poorest groups, who could not afford to pay the membership fees, have no rights, according to the constitution, to attend meetings, nominate or be nominated for a VDO position in its committees. This means that the poorest are deprived of the right to voice out their opinions, select their representatives, or have a chance to be selected.

These new organisations were to replace the traditional community-based organisations and to take over their responsibility. It was also expected that their members would be empowered through training and interaction with financial institutions. In general, the project has created new complicated structures that were neither understood by the members nor by ordinary people. Moreover, it was evident that it created tension, especially in some villages, where there was more than one leader (*Sheikh*). The VDOs were not represented clearly in the projects Board of Directors; the project had adopted the top-down administrative structure, which did not offer opportunities to local organisations to participate in the decision-making process (Brohman 1996). Meanwhile, it cannot be claimed that the members of these organisations were empowered to criticise or evaluate major decisions concerning project staff, objectives or finance. Moreover, the existence of these new structures neither replaced the old organisations nor empowered its members. Instead, it deprived the traditional organisations of the opportunity to be empowered. Traditional associations, such as education association, native administration and *El-Goodeya* council (mediation and reconciliation council) continued to conduct their duties, while the new village development organisations only dealt with issues related to the project, such as credit, calling for meetings and welcoming missions and project staff.

Moreover, little attempt was made to streamline the operations of the VDO vis-a-vis the traditional societies that preceded it. For instance, even though the *El-Goodeya* was a recognised community-based organisation established through consultation as a mediation and reconciliation council, yet the constitution of VDOs says 'the VDO at the village level will be

responsible for conflict resolution' (IFAD 2002:4). So what was *El-Goodeya* supposed to do after VDO was created – disband?

Also, in reality, these VDOs represent the project' participants who paid the fees and enrolled as members. This means those who are not members cannot be ruled by the new organisation (VDO). Nevertheless, the VDO constitution did not specify whether the VDO would handle conflicts between its members or deal with all the community and what would be the case if there were conflicts between the project participants and non-participants. In view of this confusion, however, the observable pattern has been that the locals remain attached to *El-Goodeya* Council and committed to its rules for the following reasons: (i) the council's members are the most respected and trusted in the community, partly because their selection is not arbitrary but based on certain inherent qualities; (ii) the council represents all the community members without exception. Apparently, many felt shut out by the creation of the VDO membership on subscription basis (Lane 1995).

The VDOs made their alienation of the people keenest by excluding the poorest households. As a result, members of communities kept the project committees and activities away from their traditional institutions. This resulted in clear demarcation between the indigenous or grassroots organisations and the 'project's committees' with one representing the community and the other representing the project. Nevertheless, the project committees tried to rise above this divisive tendency by involving all the people in their general meetings whether they are VDO members or not. In various villages, it was observed that when the project staff asked the members of the VDO committee to invite the members for meetings they tended to send children to call the people. The invitation is always extended to everyone. Even those who are not members can attend. This is a traditional right. Local communities used to organise their meetings in the open air, and everyone who sees people gathering will just turn up and join the group. In fact, the people are the ones who spontaneously brought the project within the communities' indigenous framework.

Reflection on NGOs' Accountability

The national and regional NGOs, at present, are involved with international organisations in shaping development processes. However, most of these NGOs, particularly in Khartoum and the state capitals have failed to implement sound and visible projects or programmes that will alleviate poverty, develop communities and combat corruption. Moreover, these NGOs themselves are not above suspicion. Despite the donor trust and operational freedom allowed them, many NGOs at national or state level apparently lack leaders and members with strong moral commitment to the welfare of the local

people.. Most of the national NGOs engaged in political conflicts, lack co-ordination capacities and good reputation. Overall, the regional and national NGOs lack the requisite values and commitments that are needed to make them truly accountable to those they claim to assist. This proves that freedom of association alone cannot be a sufficient guarantee for acquiring accountable and efficient community organisations. The credibility and commitment of the leaders of the NGOs are also important. Grassroots organisations at the village level may lack the capacity to create changes needed by the local communities, yet most of the voluntary grassroots associations in North Kordofan State where the author conducted this study, have proved to be good at achieving people's aspirations and are more capable of mobilising the local communities. Naturally, people only find themselves in a truly participatory organisation when they share common concerns and volunteer to act collectively (Brohman 1996:265-66).

Challenges Facing NGOs in Sudan

I observed that the national and regional NGOs had intensive presence and publicity. Their large numbers at national and regional levels and their cosy relationship with international NGOs and other development agencies are clearly evident. The signing of the peace process between the North and the South of Sudan appear to have polished up this perception a bit. International NGOs and other development agencies rely very much on these national NGOs to promote their policies, access information and provide services. They are all sold on the assumption that these NGOs are more reliable than the government institutions

The emerging reality seems to show, however, that the credibility of these local NGOs (national and regional) is quite questionable. In contrast to the common perceptions in the literature, the NGOs are facing increasing doubt and distrust. Their members have been accused of mobilising resources for themselves rather than the community they claim to be helping. For example, most people in the villages of North Kordofan State know nothing of the existence or roles of the over 250 regional NGOs supposedly working in that state alone.

All NGOs working in the development sector in Sudan (that is virtually all without exception) need to put their theoretical claim about development into practice. They also need to develop a greater sense of commitment to the communities and be accountable to the people they claim to serve. Likewise they need to build transparent structures and networks as recent evidence suggests that the federation can improve the capacity of local organisations (Mitlin 2004:176). Since existing government policies have opened social space for participation and free dialogue, the NGOs now have all the opportunities they need to develop relationships, attract more resources, and

contribute genuinely to the promotion of a nationwide, participatory development process.

Conclusion

Development theorists (Chambers 1991; Rahnema 1992; Brohman 1996; Cleaver 2001; Henkel et al 2001; Willis 2005) placed emphasis on the importance of civil society groups and their role in providing services and advocacy. Apparently, there is an assumption that local groups and NGOs would respond more quickly to people's needs and mobilise more resources than government institutions. This understanding has opened more space for local NGOs to interact with international development partners and attract more resources.

In practice, however, this participatory development approach has received increasingly strong criticism. Indeed, many have identified key challenges with the participatory development approach especially in the areas of community mobilisation, capacity building, planning, partnerships and sustainability. To overcome these challenges, Kelly and Caputo (2006:234) suggest that greater attention should be directed at the role of government and non-governmental agencies. Based on Sudan's experience, we may include the need to provide financial and technical support to community organisations that represent the diverse interest groups and make them fully accountable to the poor and marginalised people.

The most important role that national and regional NGOs could play in the development process is to help grassroots organisations emerge from their isolation, interact with one another and build allies with other international and state institutions. The Sudanese culture could be described as a 'participatory culture', the values, beliefs and practices encourage cooperation, fellowship and good neighbourliness. NGOs must use these cultural tools to motivate people to participate in development interventions, and raise their awareness about citizens' rights and obligations. On the other hand, the international organisations need to acquire an in-depth understanding of prevailing social, economic, political and physical environments to make maximum impact in their development programmes.

Note

Information about Sudanese NGOs is based on the PhD research which was conducted in 2007 by the author of this article.

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Les extrémismes développementalistes et leurs conséquences sur les pratiques de développement en Afrique subsaharienne

Thierry Amougou*

Résumé

Les études du développement s'inventent en tant que concept distinct de l'objet qu'elles veulent étudier en sélectionnant des faits et en les interprétant. Max Weber a ainsi parlé de types idéaux au sens de tableaux de pensée dont l'objectif est de reconstruire le réel de façon simple et rationalisée. Cet article montre que le processus de développement de l'Afrique subsaharienne est passé par quatre types idéaux déterministes, mutuellement exclusifs et se présentant chacun comme la seule route crédible vers le développement. Il en résulte des acteurs, des territoires et des pratiques à promouvoir, et d'autres à réprimer parce que taxés d'irrationnels par rapport à la logique du cadre interprétatif de l'idéal-type en vigueur. Introduire les dynamiques contradictoires dans l'analyse du processus de développement semble capable d'éviter le caractère mutuellement exclusif des types idéaux.

Abstract

Development studies invented themselves as a concept different of the object that they are studying by selecting facts and interpreting them. Thus, Max Weber created what he called « types idéaux » in the sense of a table of thinking which the target is to simplify and to rationalise the reality. This paper shows that the development process in sub-Saharan Africa has passed through four determinist « types idéaux » mutually exclusive and presenting their prescriptions as the only road to follow in order to achieve development. This situation entails on the one hand rational territories, rational development practices, and rational actors to promote and, on the other hand, irrational territories, irrational actors and irrational development practices to struggle because they are out of the dominant model of the moment. Introducing contradictory dynamics seems to be able to overcome this kind of classification between actors, territories and development practices.

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Introduction

Par *extrémismes développementalistes*, nous entendons des *idéal-types*¹ en matière de développement. C'est à dire, des paradigmes interprétatifs et des modèles d'action singuliers sur lesquels s'appuient, de façon exclusive, les politiques de développement à une période historique donnée, et dont les caractéristiques principales sont représentées par un ensemble de faits stylisés cohérents et rationnels traçant la seule route crédible vers le développement. Un regard critique et interdisciplinaire sur le processus de développement de l'Afrique subsaharienne montre qu'il est passé par plusieurs *extrémismes développementalistes*.

Le premier *idéal-type* (1960-1980) est « le modèle déterministe du tout-Etat ». Il donne naissance à un mode de croissance nationaliste en Afrique subsaharienne. Sa dynamique d'ensemble s'appuie sur le schéma suivi par les pays déjà développés pour définir celui que doit emprunter l'Afrique subsaharienne. La modernisation nationale par industrialisation est l'objectif prioritaire de développement d'un État autoritaire considéré comme l'acteur pilote de celui-ci par ses fonctions régulatrices et (re)distributives [Peemans 1996 ; Assidon 2000]. La démocratie est considérée contre-productive par rapport aux objectifs d'unité nationale et de *nation-building*.

Le deuxième *idéal-type* (1980-2000) est la dynamique de l'ajustement structurel (DAS) qui développe « le modèle déterministe du tout-marché ». Il s'appuie sur une *néomodernisation nationale* [Peemans 1996]. C'est un ensemble d'ajustements dont le rôle est de modifier la logique d'ensemble du « modèle déterministe du tout-Etat » par des réformes institutionnelles consacrant la place centrale des forces du marché, de l'ouverture internationale, de la bonne gouvernance et de la démocratie dans les politiques de développement.

En dehors de ces deux *extrémismes développementalistes* appartenant au paradigme de la modernisation, deux autres *idéal-types* se construisent dans la période 1980-2000. Ils présentent des motivations et des objectifs socioculturels. Ce sont :

- « Le modèle déterministe du tout-culturel » issu du courant *post-développementaliste* [Partant 1982 ; Latouche 1989 ; Singleton 2004]. Ce modèle place la culture au centre de ses analyses et la considère comme un stock inaliénable et non comme un flux permanent. Par conséquent, le développement est assimilé à l'occidentalisation. Il entre ainsi dans un conflit culturel incompressible avec les cultures du Sud en général, et africain-subahariennes en particulier. D'où des conclusions allant vers le refus du développement et sa mort désormais certaine.

- Enfin, « le modèle déterministe du tout-populaire » que certains auteurs considèrent comme *un populisme* et/ou un *misérabilisme* développementaliste (Grignon et Passeron 1989) se développe aussi. Il place l'acteur populaire (associations, acteurs collectifs, paysans, vendeurs informels, coopératives...) au centre d'un *développement réel* en décalage avec le *développement idéaltypique* dominant. Les pratiques populaires et/ou informelles sont ainsi enjolivées à l'extrême, alors que le système national et international (Etats, marchés, institutions financières internationales) est diabolisé et accusé de comploter contre les classes populaires. Cette approche s'inspire des pratiques populaires pour *un aggiornamento* du développement et de ses pratiques.

Dans la mesure où le développement met en interaction plusieurs acteurs, leurs territoires et leurs stratégies, ces *idéal-types* aboutissent inévitablement à des hiérarchisations et à des classifications entre différents acteurs, entre différents territoires et entre différentes pratiques de développement sur le plan économique, politique, financier et monétaire. Quels sont les acteurs nationaux et internationaux privilégiés et/ou discriminés par chaque *idéal-type* ? Quels sont leurs territoires ?² Quelles sont les classifications, les hiérarchies et les rapports entre acteurs et territoires suivant les *idéal-types* ? Quelles sont les pratiques de développement qui en résultent et leurs conséquences ? Comment peut-on mettre fin à leurs extrémismes et exploiter leurs atouts respectifs ? Telles sont les questions auxquelles nous voulons apporter des éléments de réponses.

Dans leurs temporalités respectives (1960-1980 ; 1980-2000), nous présentons de façon analytique la logique de chaque construction *idéaltypique* en matière de développement. Nous en déduisons ensuite des éléments de réponses, non seulement de façon théorique, mais aussi, en utilisant un ensemble d'études empiriques faites en Afrique subsaharienne par d'autres auteurs et nous même. Enfin, nous proposons *une approche néobraudélienne et systémique* (Peemans 2002 ; Amougou 2005) pouvant mettre fin aux extrémismes des *idéal-types* et pouvant exploiter leurs différents atouts au profit du développement en Afrique subsaharienne.

Extrémismes développementalistes et leurs conséquences en Afrique subsaharienne : présentation analytique

Cette partie consiste à montrer comment chaque construction idéal-typique en matière de développement, relie dans une trame commune, des phénomènes potentiellement disparates des expériences de développement en conférant au modèle qui en résulte une cohérence interne exclusive. Il en résulte, tant

des caractéristiques institutionnelles et fonctionnelles à promouvoir sur le plan économique, politique, financier et monétaire, que des comportements d'acteurs à encourager ou à réprimer parce que non conformes aux enchaînements logiques des faits stylisés de l'idéal-type. Chaque *extrémisme développementaliste* est attaché à imposer une conception précise et exclusive du développement, du comportement des acteurs et du chemin à suivre pour y parvenir.

« Le modèle déterministe du tout Etat » : caractéristiques institutionnelles et fonctionnelles (1960-1980)

« Le modèle déterministe du tout Etat » est celui qui prend le relais des administrations coloniales en Afrique subsaharienne après le Conférence de Bandung de 1950, dont le rôle est d'assurer l'émancipation des anciennes colonies par la création des Etats-nations inspirés du modèle occidental. Il place l'Etat au centre du processus de développement. L'aspect déterministe de ce modèle consiste en ceci que sa fonction est de construire et de représenter le seul cadre matériel et institutionnel de référence des politiques de développement, tout en précisant quelles sont les pratiques de développement que doivent avoir les nouveaux pays indépendants et leurs populations, afin de se rapprocher des performances économiques et sociales des pays dits avancés. Cela exige la détermination d'une territorialité politique et une citoyenneté comme nouvelles allégeances suprêmes devant, non seulement remplacer les référents démographiques et territoriaux infranationaux (Badie 1992), mais aussi devenir les seuls paramètres conférant aux pratiques sociales leur crédibilité en matière de développement.

Aussi, alors que l'Etat-nation, avec un système de production keynésfordiste, assure la régulation des systèmes sociaux au Nord et en garantit la cohésion par un ensemble de compromis institutionnels redistribuant la croissance entre capital et travail, en Afrique subsaharienne, c'est *un Etat développeur autoritaire* qui est l'acteur pilote du développement. Le consensus s'établit également ici sur un ensemble de compromis institutionnels, non seulement sociopolitiques, mais aussi, socio-économiques.

Sur le plan socio-économique, le développement est assimilé aux stratégies de modernisation et de croissance économique sur un territoire défini politiquement par l'Etat-nation. L'effectivité de la Guerre Froide fait que les anciennes puissances coloniales sont plus enclines à renforcer le formatage idéologique de leurs zones d'influence, qu'à une analyse des réels besoins de l'Afrique subsaharienne. De ce fait, tous les efforts nationaux et internationaux en matière de développement sont concentrés dans la construction de l'unité nationale devant faciliter la consolidation des


allégeances suprêmes. Dans cette entreprise, la démocratie est jugée contre-productive, tant par rapport aux objectifs d'unité nationale, que par rapport au conflit idéologique international entre les deux blocs (Amougou et Ngo Nyemb 2005). L'Etat-nation qui en résulte en Afrique subsaharienne est majoritairement nationaliste et autoritaire. Il spécialise l'espace politique, le délimite au sein d'un étatisme où seul, le parti unique au pouvoir, joue le rôle d'acteur politique performant sur le plan local et sert de relais aux anciennes puissances coloniales. D'où l'assujettissement de l'ensemble des acteurs sociaux locaux à son action par le déclassement de toutes les institutions populaires héritées des luttes de libération jugées sans objet après les indépendances (Ben Hammouda 1999).

La monopolisation du pouvoir politique par *l'Etat-développeur* entraîne une contrepartie socio-économique basée sur la redistribution communautaire de la prospérité nationale (voir schéma 1). Autrement dit, la cohésion sociale est maintenue par un compromis politique implicite par lequel les pôles performants des Etats subsahariens (industries, administrations, services, partis uniques, villes, secteurs agricoles...) se construisent et redistribuent les fruits de leurs production autour et au sein des « réseaux hégémoniques » et « clientélistes » (Bayart 1989 ; Badie 1992). Cédant leurs droits politiques en contrepartie de la satisfaction de leurs besoins économiques, les populations adhèrent d'autant plus fortement à ce système que la prospérité de *l'Etat-développeur* et sa capacité de redistribution sont grandes : c'est le contrat social auquel la modernisation nationale autoritaire abouti en Afrique subsaharienne de 1960 à 1980.

Ceci dit, malgré leur extrême diversité, les politiques de modernisation nationale se rejoignent en Afrique subsaharienne sur plusieurs faits stylisés considérés comme les seuls moteurs du changement social. Ce sont la construction des Etats-nations comme territoires de gestion des conflits sociopolitiques et comme institutions de régulation macroéconomique ; la mise en place de solides projets industriels dont le but est de mettre fin au retard technologique et d'augmenter le rapport K/L en passant des techniques productives nationales plus travaillistiques, à des techniques productives nationales plus capitalistiques ; un Etat développeur autoritaire privatisant la sphère politique et contrôlant la champ économique ; une redistribution communautaire par des réseaux hégémoniques et clientélistes ; des systèmes monétaires et financiers nationaux réprimés et capables de soutenir le commerce international grâce à une convertibilité des monnaies nationales liée au fait qu'elles demeurent des « sous-multiples des monnaies métropolitaines » par le biais des taux de change fixes [Bekolo-Ebe 1992] ; une coopération internationale paternaliste (les primes géopolitiques de la Guerre Froide en termes d'aides au développement, d'assistance technique et de

prêts internationaux) et enfin un développement entendu comme l'accumulation du capital et l'annulation du retard technologique (voir schéma 1).

Schéma 1 : Articulations du « modèle déterministe du tout-Etat » en Afrique subsaharienne de 1960 à 1980



Source : Amougou T., 2010, *Dualisme financier et développement au Cameroun : une approche néobraudélienne et systémique*, Thèse de doctorat, Faculté des sciences économiques sociales et politiques, UCL, Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Belgique.

Les conséquences sociopolitiques et économiques du « modèle déterministe du tout Etat »

Les conséquences du « modèle déterministe du tout Etat », en dehors de ses quelques résultats économiques positifs, sont de quatre ordres. En premier lieu, la dépendance et l'extraversion du régime de croissance nationaliste mis en place par l'Etat développeur. En second lieu, la philosophie des retombées sur laquelle s'appuie le système. En troisième lieu, des

classifications discriminantes des acteurs, de leurs pratiques de développement et de certains territoires. Et, quatrième, le décalage entre les prédictions théoriques du modèle et les résultats obtenus.

La dépendance et l'extraversion du régime de croissance nationaliste

L'Etat développeur autoritaire et distributeur des fruits de sa prospérité entre en crise dans les années 1980. Les raisons de celle-ci sont largement liées au « dogmatisme de la pensée sur la modernisation nationale autoritaire » (Peemans 2004).

Sur le plan économique, la prospérité des Etats développeurs est artificielle. En effet, c'est plus le maintien de la logique économique du pacte colonial par une demande européenne soutenue par les Trente Glorieuses, que la diversification et la productivité des structures économiques nationales qui l'entraîne. Les économies nationales de l'Afrique subsaharienne restent largement rentières et extraverties en augmentant ainsi leur dépendance extérieure. Les alliances stratégiques construites entre les puissances coloniales et leurs relais locaux pendant la période coloniale, se reproduisent après les indépendances. Qui plus est, elles maintiennent une division du travail où la complémentarité entre matières premières et produits manufacturés, cantonnent des nombreux Etats dans les spécialisations primaires. Comme les colonies, les nouveaux Etats indépendants sont restés de simples maillons dans la chaîne de production des économies métropolitaines sans connaître une croissance autonome basée sur une intégration au marché mondial, le développement d'un marché local et des structures productives capables de la soutenir.

Sur le plan monétaire, le franc CFA restera surévalué artificiellement depuis 1948 par rapport au FF afin de soutenir les exportations françaises dans la Zone Franc.³ De même, les Conventions de Lomé considérées comme un modèle de coopération grâce à l'importante aide que l'Europe consacre à ce continent depuis 1975, associant traitements préférentiels et financement divers, renforcent cette division coloniale du travail. En effet, « seules les produits agricoles et miniers brutes ont longtemps bénéficié des exemptions douanières » (Brunel 2004:55). Cette orientation des structures productives nationales vers des produits primaires soutenus par des monnaies nationales et régionales sous-multiples des monnaies métropolitaines, entraîne des décalages de pouvoir d'achat, de niveaux de vie, de taux de change et des termes de l'échange desquels résultent des ajustements asymétriques par rapport aux économies occidentales.

Par conséquent, de nombreux pays africains connaîtront la crise économique un peu plus tard que leurs partenaires occidentaux en renforçant ainsi, non seulement le caractère artificiel de leurs résultats économiques et

de la valeur de leur monnaie, mais aussi et surtout, les déséquilibres budgétaires et financiers qui en sont le corollaire. A titre d'exemple, alors que la France connaît la crise depuis 1973, un pays comme le Cameroun entre en crise en 1987 soit, théoriquement, à la date où la France, son principal partenaire commercial, en sort (Poulon 1996). Cette évolution contra-cyclique de nombreuses économies Afrique-subahariennes (Bekolo-Ebe 1992) permet au « modèle déterministe du tout Etat » de jouer les prolongations et d'entretenir l'illusion développementaliste quelques années après l'entrée en crise du système keynéso-fordiste dont dépendaient ses quelques résultats économiques positifs.

La philosophie des retombées positives du régime de croissance nationaliste
Par « philosophie générale des retombées positives du régime de croissance nationaliste », nous entendons les différents cercles vertueux exclusifs que promeut « le modèle déterministe du tout Etat ». Ces cercles vertueux sont caractérisés par une hiérarchisation des objectifs de développement suivant laquelle, la réalisation de ceux dits prioritaires, est censée rejaillir positivement sur l'ensemble de la société à moyen ou à long terme et entraîner le développement. Les différents effets qui en résultent sont de plusieurs types.

Sur le plan politique, la concentration de tous les pouvoirs entre les mains de *l'Etat développeur* et du parti unique est censée renforcer la construction de l'unité nationale nécessaire au « nation building », dont le but est de créer un système socio-économique autonome axé sur la poursuite d'un même projet capable de se suffire à lui-même et de survivre une fois que les conseils et les aides étrangères auront disparu (Fukuyama 2004). Les nouveaux pays indépendants, comme les anciennes puissances coloniales, sont convaincus que tel est le préalable nécessaire dont les conséquences, à long terme, sont le développement national et la promotion des Droits de l'Homme.

La démocratie et les autres libertés individuelles et collectives sont donc la résultante à long terme du développement, et non le contraire. De ce fait, la légitimité politique à cette période est acquise sans élections libres. Elle est détenue, soit par des chefs religieux, soit par les pères ou les négociateurs de l'indépendance (cas du Cameroun, de la Côte-d'Ivoire, du Mali, du Ghana), soit par les contrôleurs des économies de rente, soit par des armées (cas du Nigeria). Par conséquent, la territorialité politique et la citoyenneté conçues par *l'Etat développeur* consacrent la centralisation des politiques et des pratiques de développement au détriment des initiatives infranationales et décentralisées suspectées de faire défaut à l'objectif de construction de l'unité nationale.

Sur le plan économique, le cercle vertueux a un aspect technologique, monétaire et financier. Partant d'un développement appréhendé comme

accumulation du capital et rattrapage technologique, « le modèle déterministe du tout Etat » compte soutenir sa croissance, non seulement par les exportations, mais aussi, par des investissements lourds financés par les capitaux internationaux. Partant de là, *l'Etat développeur* promeut la modernisation par l'accumulation du capital à coup d'emprunts multilatéraux et met de côté l'héritage historique des pratiques financières populaires avec lesquelles les populations vivaient déjà avant l'arrivée du projet de modernisation nationale. C'est par exemple le cas en Afrique subsaharienne en ce qui concerne les modes séculaires de mobilisation d'épargne et d'octroi de crédits par cycles rotatifs au sein d'acteurs collectifs (tontines) classés informels par la modernisation financière, et que cherche à réprimer la théorie de la libéralisation financière. La logique financière globale, à cette période, consiste à passer d'une situation de débiteur net, à une situation de créditeur net. Donc, à mettre fin, tant au retard technologique nationale, qu'à l'insuffisance de l'épargne domestique par rapport aux investissements domestiques ($I_d > S_d$). Cette dynamique va se solder par une suraccumulation improductive du capital entraînant une crise internationale de remboursement.

Sur le plan local, cette logique de développement est soutenue par des finances publiques et des systèmes financiers dits de développement. Autrement dit, ce ne sont pas les forces du marché qui vont orienter l'offre et la demande des institutions et des services financiers, mais l'Etat qui, en choisissant quels sont les besoins et les secteurs prioritaires dans lesquels investir, développe *un système de redistribution efficace*.⁴ Par ailleurs, la conception monétaire est d'inspiration keynésienne et met en place « *une politique de l'argent bon marché* » en privilégiant le raisonnement théorique selon lequel l'Afrique subsaharienne connaît, non un problème d'insuffisance de l'épargne, mais plutôt, un problème d'insuffisance des revenus des ménages desquels résulte l'épargne nationale.

En conséquence, alors que l'objectif était d'équilibrer le développement et la répartition des ressources entre les différents secteurs afin de corriger « la myopie sociale des forces impersonnelles du marché », il en résulte l'instauration d'un « Etat obèse », accumulant des dysfonctionnements administratifs (corruption et clientélisme), bloquant l'initiative privée et réprimant le système financier par la fixation autoritaire des taux d'intérêts et des coefficients de réserves obligatoires, la bonification des taux et l'orientation des investissements, sans tenir compte de leurs productivité par rapport au coût des ressources (M^C Kinnon et Shaw 1973).

En insistant, dès 1980, non seulement sur la réduction du rôle de l'Etat par le ralentissement de son train de vie et la limitation de ses sphères d'intervention, mais aussi sur la décentralisation et l'assainissement des systèmes financiers et leur libéralisation, les programmes d'ajustements

structurels (PAS) reconnaissent implicitement qu'un « Etat obèse », l'hypercentralisation des politiques de développement, l'endettement international massif et les politiques de répression financière, caractérisent les impasses du « modèle déterministe du tout Etat » dont il faut sortir.

Les décalages entre les prédictions théoriques et les résultats obtenus

L'idéal-type ne correspondant jamais à la réalité, les résultats prédits par « le modèle déterministe du tout Etat » ne coïncident pas avec ceux effectivement atteints en Afrique subsaharienne.

En effet, la redistribution mondiale des facteurs de production sous l'effet des différences de productivité sur laquelle s'appuie ce modèle se plante aussi (Nème 2001). Il y a bien eu un mouvement de capitaux du Nord vers l'Afrique subsaharienne, mais cela a surtout eu pour effet d'y augmenter l'endettement international sans y créer une épargne locale capable de soutenir le projet de modernisation (Amougou 2005).

Par ailleurs, la corrélation n'est pas toujours positive et automatique entre les transferts internationaux de capitaux et l'épargne locale (Weisskof 1972). Ainsi, non seulement les prédictions de rattrapage de Solow et Swan basées sur les spécificités territoriales de ces Etats (faible niveau de capital, faible revenu par tête, faible épargne, grande productivité marginale du capitale...) ne se réalisent pas, mais aussi le financement du déficit budgétaire par le seigneurage, la surévaluation du dollar à la fin des années septante, la détérioration des termes de l'échange et l'accumulation du capital par emprunts extérieurs qu'entraîne la modernisation, parachèvent les dernières illusions du système de croissance nationaliste. Sa profonde crise économique se traduit par le virement au rouge de nombreux fondamentaux des économies de l'Afrique subsaharienne (chômage élevé, haut niveau d'inflation, haut niveau de créances douteuses dans les systèmes bancaires, hausse de l'endettement international de 15 à 35 pour cent dans les années septante, déséquilibre interne et externe...).

La hiérarchisation entre acteurs, pratiques de développement et territoires

L'échec « du modèle déterministe du tout Etat » a aussi des conséquences sociopolitiques se traduisant par des classifications entre pratiques, acteurs et territoires à promouvoir et d'autres à discriminer.

En effet, avec une approche du développement comme le passage d'une société traditionnelle synonyme de pénurie, de retard et de stagnation, à une société moderne synonyme de prospérité et de progrès (Peemans 1996), les théories dualistes du « modèle déterministe du tout Etat » considèrent et analysent le développement de façon fonctionnelle et divisent les territoires, les populations et leurs pratiques en *formes traditionnelles* à combattre, et en *formes modernes* à promouvoir. Dès lors, le projet développementaliste

mené par *l'État développeur* ignore et réprime toutes les pratiques de développement de la société traditionnelle qui, compte tenu du fonctionnalisme des modèles dualistes, ne sert que de réservoir de main-d'œuvre au secteur moderne. D'après cette théorie, la productivité marginale nulle du travail qui y prévaut, permet de bas salaires dans le secteur moderne et y renforce la hausse des profits tant que le réservoir de main-d'œuvre du secteur traditionnel n'est pas encore épuisé.

Ces taux de profits élevés ajoutés au modèle de croissance de Solow et Swan (1950) stipulant une corrélation négative entre le niveau initial du revenu et la croissance du revenu par tête, sont les conditions de rattrapage des pays du Nord par ceux du Sud en général et de l'Afrique subsaharienne en particulier. L'une des conséquences territoriales de cette stratégie est la négligence des zones rurales et des paysans au profit des zones urbaines, des fonctionnaires et des entrepreneurs, synonymes de modernisation et donc de développement. Le refus de l'héritage traditionnel va entraîner une crise de la reproduction sociale de la paysannerie écrasée par d'ambitieux projets d'agro-industries sans lendemains. L'erreur fatale a consisté à analyser le développement uniquement de façon fonctionnaliste, économique et linéaire en prenant pour modèle la trajectoire idiosyncrasique, c'est-à-dire, singulière et non reproductible des pays dits développés, sans chercher une synergie entre pratiques historiques de développement et critères de la modernisation.

Cette façon de procéder va aussi largement entamer l'efficacité des politiques keynésiennes appliquées en Afrique subsaharienne. Le dogmatisme de la modernisation rendant moins attractives les zones rurales et leurs acteurs par rapport aux zones urbaines et les leurs, de nombreux pays connaissent un exode rural extrêmement développé. Les politiques de développement dualistes sont en effet centripètes par rapport aux villes dans lesquelles, les villages, leurs populations et leurs pratiques de développement, sont appelés à se fondre à long terme. Partant de là, de nombreuses zones rurales de l'Afrique subsaharienne se vident de leur force de travail la plus dynamique que sont les jeunes. Ces derniers sont aspirés par les pôles de modernisation où ils grossissent le chômage structurel (inadéquation entre leur capital humain et la demande de travail parfois ultra technique) et le chômage déguisé (plusieurs personnes gravitant autour d'une tâche susceptible d'être exécutée par une seule d'entre elle). Or, en Afrique subsaharienne, les politiques keynésiennes ne s'appliquent, ni au chômage de longue durée (structurel), ni au chômage déguisé, et encore moins aux bouleversements de structures entraîné par le processus de modernisation initié depuis l'occupation coloniale.

Sur le plan monétaire et financier, la politique d'orientation des crédits vers des secteurs prioritaires par la bonification des taux et le maintien de taux d'intérêts bas et même négatifs en terme réel par rapport au niveau de

l'inflation, réprime le volume et l'affectation de l'épargne vers les pôles et les secteurs de modernisation les plus économiquement rentables (Goldsmith 1966 ; M^c Kinnon 1973 ; Thundjang Pouemi 1980).

Sur le plan politique, les conflits nés pendant la période coloniale entre relayeurs des puissances coloniales et les mouvements de libérations nationales, ne s'estompent pas avec les indépendances. *L'Etat développeur* étant autocratique, ces conflits seront davantage gérés par la répression militaire que par une négociation susceptible d'en exploiter positivement les dynamiques et les stratégies contradictoires dans le processus de développement. Par conséquent, le projet de modernisation va parfois s'orienter de façon partisane sur le territoire national. Soucieux de construire l'unité nationale nécessaire à la naissance d'une citoyenneté que met en place la territorialité politique définie par l'Etat-nation, les gouvernements de nombreux pays vont orienter les investissements publics non pas vers les territoires où ils sont socialement et économiquement plus rentables, mais vers des régions politiquement fidèles à l'élite dirigeante locale. Ce qui entraîne de grandes inégalités de modernisation entre territoires au sein des mêmes Etats. A titre d'exemple, la première république du Cameroun (1972-1982) présente de telles disparités lorsqu'on compare le niveau et la qualité des infrastructures publiques construites dans le Nord du pays, fief du pouvoir en place juste après l'indépendance en 1960, et leur caractère embryonnaire ou inexistant dans les zones acquises à la cause du parti politique révolutionnaire UPC (Union des populations du Cameroun). Il s'agit là d'une reproduction de la stratégie coloniale de choix des territoires les plus accessibles pour servir de soubassement à la mise en valeur dualiste adoptée par la métropole (Marseille 2005).

Ainsi, alors que les espaces, dans le cas de l'Afrique subsaharienne, sont orientés, avant la colonisation, des littoraux vers l'intérieur, les grandes villes et les principaux royaumes se situant soit dans la zone soudanienne, soit dans le Sahel au point de rencontre avec les caravaniers arabes, « le modèle déterministe du tout Etat » renverse cette structuration spatiale en fonction de ses intérêts et consacre la suprématie des littoraux le long desquels se créent des villes aux points de ruptures entre la terre et la mer (Brunel 2004). En conséquence, la grande majorité des capitales africaines sont des ports construits aux points d'aboutissement des voies ferrées drainant les produits de l'intérieur. A l'instrumentalisation politique de la modernisation par les puissances coloniales pour occuper et orienter la création spatiale suivant leurs intérêts, a succédé l'instrumentalisation politique de la même modernisation territoriale par les nouveaux Etats indépendants pour asseoir leur domination et leur pouvoir politique.

Sur le plan international, le manque de synergie entre les différents systèmes de croissance nationalistes africains est dû, non seulement au problème des relations transversales à cause de l'orientation perpendiculaire des transports par rapport aux littoraux dont parle Brunel, mais aussi, aux divisions créées par la Guerre Froide entre de nombreux pays de l'Afrique subsaharienne.

« Le modèle déterministe du tout Marché » : caractéristiques institutionnelles et fonctionnelles (1980-2000)

A la territorialité politique mise en place par un Etat-nation entendu comme un pôle politique performant dont les fonctions politiques submergent les fonctions économiques et définissent le cadre matériel du développement au sein d'un système international d'Etats, « le modèle déterministe du tout marché » oppose ce que nous appelons *une territorialité concurrentielle*.

Elle traduit le fait que ce n'est plus la construction politique qu'est l'État-nation qui donne naissance et légitime le territoire en Afrique subsaharienne et ce qu'on peut y entreprendre en matière de politiques et de pratiques de développement. Mais, d'une part, les principes de concurrence consacrant le libre-échange et, d'autre part, les forces impersonnelles que sont l'offre et la demande transformant le monde en un marché global où les droits que confère la citoyenneté se concrétisent de plus en plus sous contrainte de ceux que la compétitivité et le pouvoir d'achat attribuent aux acteurs suivant l'évolution cyclique de l'économie. Renforçant les principes économiques qui font désormais du marché mondial l'espace matériel et symbolique des politiques et des pratiques de développement, *la territorialité concurrentielle* consacre du même coup la territorialité des lois économiques en Afrique subsaharienne. C'est-à-dire, le fait pour elles de s'appliquer à tous ceux qui vivent dans un continent appréhendé par « le modèle déterministe du tout marché » comme un vaste marché.

De là s'opère le passage d'un « *Etat-nation politique* » à un « *Etat-nation économique* ». ⁵ A l'inverse du premier, les fonctions politiques du second sont submergées et supplantées par ses fonctions économiques orientant majoritairement les besoins des citoyens vers les seuls objectifs de profit, de rentabilité et de productivité. C'est la remise en cause du *keynésianisme spatial* basé sur l'Etat-providence comme moteur de la modernisation nationale (Brenner 2005).

Majoritairement débiteurs et insolubles comme l'indiquent leurs fondamentaux dans les années 80, les pays subsahariens sont obligés d'avoir des comportements institutionnels favorables aux nouveaux acteurs dominants de *la territorialité concurrentielle* que sont leurs créanciers publics et privés dont les orientations idéologiques et politiques ont changé. Dès lors, la contrainte économique, c'est à dire, la poursuite par des Etats, sous contrainte des *trade-off*, des quatre objectifs ultimes de toute politique

économique que sont une faible inflation, une croissance élevée, le plein-emploi et l'équilibre extérieur, va jouer un rôle central au sein du « modèle déterministe du tout marché » et orienter majoritairement les politiques de développement. En effet, dès 1980, le modèle de développement basé sur des réseaux nationaux de redistribution communautaire dont le pivot fut *un Etat autoritaire et développeur*, est remplacé par des institutions économiques et politiques favorisant le déploiement des forces du marché. Elles sont « la locomotive » d'un développement dont les fondements sont l'assainissement des économies par le rétablissement des grands équilibres macroéconomiques, et l'ouverture internationale guidée par le principe des avantages comparatifs, la libéralisation financière et une monnaie saine (Amougou 2005).

De ce fait, *les opérateurs d'action*⁶ (FMI, BM, Etats du Nord) imposent ce qu'on a appelé *la thérapie de choc* : le secteur économique doit se libéraliser et intégrer les prix et la concurrence comme mécanismes de fonctionnement, alors que le secteur politique doit passer des dictatures aux démocraties comme mode de légitimation. Ceci est l'exacte réplique en Afrique subsaharienne de la *révolution conservatrice* initiée par les politiques ultra-libérales de Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher et les économistes de l'offre en 1980. L'État n'est plus considéré comme un stratège rationnel pouvant réaliser le bien-être collectif en faisant des choix inter temporels. Il doit maintenant se désengager et se laisser contrôler par les institutions économiques internationales et la société civile locale et internationale.

La démocratie et les Droits de l'Homme ne sont plus des conséquences à long terme du développement économique, mais des facteurs devant l'entraîner. Ce sont dorénavant des paramètres sociopolitiques à situer, non plus en aval d'un processus, mais en amont des politiques de développement. *La bonne gouvernance* apparaît et exige la décentralisation (qui se confond elle-même à la privatisation), comme préalable à respecter pour avoir accès à l'aide internationale (Amougou 2005 ; Peemans 2004). Le discours de la Baule en juin 1990, au cours duquel François Mitterrand conditionne désormais l'aide de la France, premier bailleur de fonds du continent, à l'instauration de la démocratie, en constitue une des preuves écrites (Brunel 2004). Cette conditionnalité qu'impose « le modèle déterministe du tout marché » est aidée par la fin de la bipolarité du monde. De nombreux pays africains perdent en fait leur prime géopolitique issue jadis du non-alignement. Ils ne peuvent plus ne pas respecter les injonctions d'un des blocs en comptant sur le soutien de l'autre (Amougou 2005 ; Sen 2005).

Ce nouveau modèle de développement exige ainsi le glissement des régimes politiques africains vers la démocratie en supposant une corrélation positive entre celle-ci et le développement économique.⁷ Comme au Nord,

l'usage des instruments keynésiens est en partie jugé responsable de la crise économique en Afrique subsaharienne. La contrainte économique ne doit donc plus être respectée par les politiques d'inspiration keynésienne, mais néo-classique en générale et monétariste en particulier. Cette dynamique va ainsi entraîner des flux institutionnels (réformes institutionnelles) au travers des instruments budgétaires, monétaires, financiers et de change. La fonctionnalité et la rationalité de *la territorialité concurrentielle* nécessitent en effet le changement du profil et des compétences politico-économiques des Etats. Il faut en outre casser les réseaux locaux de corruption qu'ont construits les *Etats autoritaires et développeurs* de la période 1960-1980 (Amougou 2005).

Sur le plan interne, « le modèle déterministe du tout marché » agit sur l'instrument budgétaire en appliquant des mesures d'austérité entraînant le passage des *Etats obèses* de la période 1960-1980, à des *Etats modestes et frugaux* cessant d'être des *vaches à lait*.⁸ Ainsi, le modèle de l'absorption⁹ utilisé par le FMI montre que de nombreux pays de l'Afrique subsaharienne consomment plus qu'ils ne produisent. Il prescrit la réduction du train de vie des Etats par la baisse des dépenses nationales. En ce qui concerne l'instrument monétaire, la conception monétaire de la balance des paiements¹⁰ sur laquelle se base les PAS, arrive à la conclusion que tout déficit externe est d'abord interne et de nature purement monétaire (excès d'offre de monnaie par rapport à la demande).

D'où la mise en place des politiques monétaires restrictives basées sur la baisse du crédit et de la création monétaire internes. La monnaie passe de sa conception endogène du modèle keynésien, à son approche exogène (un voile) des classiques et néoclassiques. Ceci entraîne l'adoption des politiques de programmation monétaire liant le taux de progression de la masse monétaire au taux de croissance réel. D'où l'exigence des Etats peu interventionnistes afin de lutter, non seulement contre le financement du déficit public par la création monétaire (seigneurage et monétisation), mais aussi, contre la répression financière héritée du modèle keynésien de l'argent bon marché (1960-1980). La libéralisation des taux d'intérêts et des systèmes financiers et monétaires en constitue l'instrument politique (voir schéma 2). Le taux de change est aussi utilisé comme instrument de rééquilibrage des balances de paiement.¹¹ Le dernier élément de cette politique monétaire et financière est la construction *des systèmes financiers intégrés* par la multiplication des institutions de micro finance après que le consensus de Monterrey ait insisté sur l'entreprise privée comme instrument central de développement des pays du Sud en général.

« Le modèle déterministe du tout marché » donne donc une nouvelle « posologie du développement » en sacralisant un ensemble de faits stylisés politiques et économiques. Il connaît son couronnement par le rassemblement de tous *les opérateurs symboliques* dans ce qu'on peut appeler la boîte à outils universelle du développement que représente *le Consensus de Washington*. La seule route crédible vers le développement se trace désormais en mettant en place un Etat minimal ; une classe politique tirant sa légitimité et détenant son pouvoir de la démocratie ; un système financier assaini (absence de créances douteuses, usage d'une monnaie saine) et libéralisé (pas de répression financières, pas de seigneurage) ; la bonne gouvernance ; une économie ouverte et concurrentielle (voir schéma 2 : les doubles flèches traduisent des interactions)

Les conséquences sociopolitiques et économiques du « modèle déterministe du tout marché »


Les conséquences du « modèle déterministe du tout marché » sont nombreuses en Afrique subsaharienne. Nous en examinons quelques unes.

Le caractère peu démocratique des réformes

Le premier paradoxe qui apparaît lorsqu'on examine « le modèle déterministe du tout marché » est le caractère dictatorial de ses réformes alors que la démocratie constitue une de ses exigences centrales. Aucun pays de l'Afrique subsaharienne n'a eu la capacité de faire un choix informé par rapport aux politiques des institutions financières internationales (Stiglitz 2002).

Il est important, lorsque s'opèrent des réformes, de bien étudier les rapports et les imbrications entre une matrice institutionnelle, les identités territoriales et démographiques, les modes de vies des acteurs, leurs rythmes et leurs formes d'intégration internationale. « Le modèle déterministe du tout marché » qui construit *la territorialité concurrentielle* en Afrique subsaharienne par la DAS n'a pas respecté les séquences d'une réforme efficace, dont le but est de convaincre et de mobiliser tout le monde. Il n'y a en effet eu ni un constat partagé de la situation des pays entre les institutions financières internationales, la société civile nationale et les dirigeants locaux, ni une discussion conjointe et collégiale des possibilités de décision entre ces différents acteurs, ni une possibilité laissée aux gouvernements locaux d'exercer leurs responsabilités politiques dans l'exécution des réformes. Autant les questions permettant de comprendre l'environnement culturel, l'importance du marché dans le système de médiation et d'allocation de ressources, les institutions historiques de base, les modes d'accumulation, les liens asymétriques ou symétriques avec les ajustements internationaux n'ont pas été posées, autant celles évoquant les caractéristiques des acteurs et leurs modes d'entrer en rapport n'ont pas été abordées en amont de la

Schéma 2 : Articulations du « modèle déterministe du tout marché » (1980-2000)



Source : Amougou T., 2010, *Dualisme financier et développement au Cameroun : une approche néobraudélienne et systémique*, Thèse de doctorat, Faculté des sciences économiques sociales et politiques, UCL, Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Belgique.

DAS. Par conséquent, une réponse optimale à la question stratégique, *comment faire les réformes* (nature, rythme et ampleur), n'a pas été trouvée. Ceci a conduit de nombreux pays et populations de l'Afrique subsaharienne à subir et à adhérer au « modèle déterministe du tout marché » par contrainte et sans grande conviction.

La philosophie des retombées positives de la DAS

La DAS se fait dans un vide social et se focalise exclusivement sur un ensemble de variables macroéconomiques, dont la stabilisation concourant à la relance de la croissance économique à long terme va entraîner le développement.

En conséquence, il s'en est suivi un ordonnancement des objectifs et une affectation des instruments de politique économique ne remplissant pas les conditions de cohérence et d'efficacité¹² (Tinbergen 1961). En effet, la hiérarchie prescrite par le FMI entre le déficit extérieur, l'inflation et le chômage accorde la priorité à la réalisation de l'équilibre des paiements extérieurs qui passe par le contrôle des déséquilibres publics d'une part, et le désengagement de l'Etat d'autre part. De là naissent des dilemmes, car l'ajustement structurel aurait dû prioritairement viser l'objectif de plein-emploi et de stabilité des prix ayant un impact direct sur le renforcement de la santé économique des Etats assistés et le bien-être des populations salariées. L'approfondissement du délabrement patrimonial des Etats et de leurs populations entraîné par cette mauvaise hiérarchie entre les objectifs, a été renforcé par une affectation non rationnelle des instruments.

La politique budgétaire restrictive dont le rôle est la suppression des subventions et la réduction du rôle de l'Etat, la politique monétaire restrictive visant le contrôle strict de la masse monétaire et la politique de change sont des instruments interchangeable, tant pour la stabilisation interne (lutte contre l'inflation et le chômage), que pour l'ajustement externe (équilibre de la balance extérieure) (Ondo 2000). Il s'est, de ce fait, posé un problème de choix et d'affectation optimale des instruments que sont la politique monétaire restrictive et la politique budgétaire restrictive.

Si ces politiques permettent généralement de rétablir l'équilibre interne et externe dans des situations d'inflation et de déficit extérieur, la situation de chômage et de déficit que connaissent de nombreux pays africains n'était pas favorable à leur efficacité. Autant, dans une situation de chômage et de déficit extérieur, l'usage d'une politique monétaire et budgétaire restrictive peut résoudre le problème de déséquilibre extérieur mais va accroître le chômage (Salin 1974), de même, la lutte contre le chômage exige une augmentation de la demande globale à l'aide d'une politique monétaire et budgétaire susceptible de détériorer la balance des paiements. C'est une situation où les pays assistés disposaient *d'un seul instrument*, à savoir une politique globale de demande avec ses variantes monétaires et budgétaires, pour atteindre *deux objectifs de développement économiques*. Et même si l'ajustement structurel se base exclusivement sur une politique monétaire comme c'est le cas depuis plusieurs années, elle ne peut réaliser le plein-emploi que si les capitaux

sont internationalement assez mobiles et attractifs aux variations des taux d'intérêts. Ce qui n'est pas toujours le cas pour l'Afrique subsaharienne, sujette à de nombreux conflits politiques et ethniques.

Sur le plan financier, les résultats attendus n'ont pas été atteints. Alors que la libéralisation et la restructuration des systèmes financiers avaient pour fonction principale d'entraîner une affectation optimale des ressources en laissant les taux d'intérêts se fixer à leur niveau d'équilibre concurrentiel et renforcer ainsi la croissance économique, des effets inattendus sont observés. La gouvernance et la transparence des systèmes financiers ne se sont pas améliorées dans la mesure où les réseaux hégémoniques locaux ont exploité leurs positions stratégiques pour orienter les restructurations des systèmes financiers en leur faveur après le retrait des Etats. En conséquence, le rationnement du crédit frappant les classes sociales pauvres et les petites et moyennes entreprises locales n'a pas été levé au sein des systèmes bancaires de plus en plus sous un contrôle oligopolistique par les élites locales en partenariat avec un secteur privé privilégiant toujours un cycle court du capital et une surélévation du risque-client malgré la hausse des liquidités des systèmes financiers. C'est le cas notamment au Zimbabwe et au Cameroun (Saprin 2002).

Par ailleurs, la liquidation des banques de développement sans la mise en place d'institutions alternatives a eu un impact négatif sur le secteur agricole et sur celui des petites et moyennes entreprises qui en bénéficiaient et dont le coût du crédit avait augmenté avec la libéralisation financière. Plusieurs systèmes financiers sont ainsi passés d'une situation de répression financière (1960-1980), à une structure oligopolistique ne favorisant, ni les ajustements par le marché, ni la baisse des taux d'intérêts, ni la réduction du dualisme financier, ni l'efficacité économique globale par approfondissement financier (Anne 2000 ; Saprin 2002 ; Amougou 2005).¹³

Renforcés par le fait que les privatisations ont majoritairement entraîné la transformation des monopoles publics en monopoles privés, et que l'ajustement n'a entraîné aucune création d'emplois supplémentaires (Saprin 2002), ces médiocres résultats économiques ont entraîné de nombreuses régressions sociales et politiques en Afrique subsaharienne. La hausse des prix des services de première nécessité (eau, électricité, soins de santé, logements), alors que les moyens financiers des populations étaient fortement érodés, a renforcé une baisse de l'accès des couches populaires aux services essentiels et une hausse des épidémies due à l'augmentation de l'usage d'eaux non potables et à la privatisation des hôpitaux. De même, d'anciens conflits ethniques ont resurgi dans un environnement d'extrême pauvreté favorisant les replis identitaires et l'explosion de conflits armés entre de nombreux pays.

L'Afrique subsaharienne est l'exemple type où des dérives sectaires et fondamentalistes se recomposent, s'affrontent et constituent les nouveaux référents et structurants sécuritaires des populations azimutées sans être intégrées dans la modernité (Mbembe 2000 ; Peemans 2004 ; Tonda 2005).

La scène politique n'est pas épargnée. Dans le cas de l'Afrique subsaharienne, de nombreuses révisions constitutionnelles ont en effet eu lieu pour passer *des pouvoirs hérités* aux *pouvoirs élus* (Diop et Diouf 2004). Les partis au pouvoir se sont cependant définis des « agendas politiques souterrains » consistant à se maintenir au pouvoir en instrumentalisant les exigences démocratiques de la communauté internationale au travers de réformes constitutionnelles intégrant théoriquement la norme démocratique, mais prolongeant pratiquement les mandats des partis uniques jadis en place. Ces pays aboutissent ainsi à des pratiques démocratiques sans alternance au pouvoir dans un champ politique où les réseaux locaux dominants privilégient le statu quo par un subtil jeu d'alliances et de clientélisme gardant les mêmes groupes dominants au pouvoir (Amougou et Ngo Nyemb 2005). Les principes démocratiques cessent ainsi d'être des instruments renforçant la promotion du bien-être social. Ils assurent par endroits *une reproduction héréditaire des dictatures* comme l'illustrent les cas de la RDC, du Togo et du Gabon (Amougou et Ngo Nyemb 2005).

Ces multiples défaillances sur le plan politique, économique et social prouvent qu'il ne suffit pas de libéraliser comme l'a fait la DAS pour mener des pays vers le développement. De nombreux pays africains font actuellement face à de nouveaux défis en matière de développement. Ceux-ci sont des conséquences du « modèle déterministe du tout marché » et se déclinent en plusieurs questions : Comment, alors que l'ajustement est toujours d'application, redonner de la substance au rôle de l'Etat dans le processus de développement ? Comment mettre fin aux liens négatifs entre la libéralisation économique et le bien-être social ? Comment redéfinir le développement financier lorsque de nombreuses tentatives d'approfondissement financier se soldent par des structures bancaires oligopolistiques et l'explosion des pratiques financières informelles ? Comment trouver des mécanismes emboîtant les pratiques populaires et les décisions des systèmes nationaux et internationaux ? Comment résoudre le conflit entre la logique de complémentarité pérennisant une division coloniale du travail entre l'Afrique subsaharienne et le Nord au niveau de l'échange international, et la logique concurrentielle qui en constitue le moteur à l'heure de la mondialisation ? Comment des pays dont le développement, processus de long terme, est contraint par des ajustements macroéconomiques et financiers de court terme comme le remboursement de la dette, peuvent-ils se développer ?

La hiérarchisation entre acteurs, pratiques de développement et territoires

Produit de l'économie de marché triomphante, la territorialité concurrentielle ainsi mise en place en Afrique subsaharienne entraîne inévitablement un glissement conceptuel et une hiérarchisation entre les acteurs, leurs pratiques de développement et leurs territoires.

La recherche, par les banquiers et les exportateurs du monde riche, de nouveaux débouchés fait naître le concept de *marchés émergents*. C'est un opérateur symbolique dont les fonctions sont multiples pour les opérateurs d'action. Au départ, un concept de marketing bancaire dont le rôle est de rendre attractifs les produits financiers, le concept de *marchés émergents* désigne en effet l'ambition d'élargir le champ des échanges financiers et commerciaux à des pays jusque-là, exclus de leurs dynamiques. En découle sa fonction, non seulement de remodeler conceptuellement l'unité d'un monde unifié par le marché global, mais aussi d'exclure de l'analyse économique, la diversité et la complexité associées aux concepts plus anciens de *développement* (Dufour 1999). Le but final est de sortir la problématique du développement du champ politique pour l'intégrer dans le champ économique où elle se réduit à la recherche des conditions d'émergences des marchés aboutissant à un modèle de développement linéaire garantissant leur progression continue et conjuguée.

Les territoires qui gagnent ne sont plus les Etats, mais des marchés émergents présentant un ensemble de fondamentaux (faible inflation, système financier libéralisé et assaini, marché du travail libéralisé, un marché financier actif, faible endettement international...).

Le glissement sémantique est explicite : au concept de pays est substitué celui de marché ; à la notion de développement est substituée celle plus économique d'émergence. Ces nouvelles catégories conceptuelles valident les progrès économiques des pays de l'Afrique subsaharienne et suggèrent du même coup qu'il existe une référence unique par rapport à laquelle les économies sont submergées ou immergées, celle constituée par les pays développés d'économie libérale. Sur le plan du développement durable, l'accumulation du capital par les marchés émergents est considérée comme favorisant l'amélioration des aptitudes des pays de l'Afrique subsaharienne à la protection de l'environnement (Schmidheiny et Zorarraquin 1996). Le pays africain le plus cité à cette période par les opérateurs d'action exaltant la réussite de ce nouveau modèle de développement, est la République Sud-Africaine.

Dans le cas des pays ACP, d'autres modifications surviennent. La promotion de la territorialité concurrentielle entraîne le remplacement des règles du GATT par celles de l'OMC en 1994. Il s'ensuit automatiquement une suppression du *système généralisé des préférences* et de la *clause juridique d'inégalité compensatrice* prévoyant des traitements particuliers à de

nombreux pays du Sud dont l'inégalité de fait ne coïncidait pas avec l'égalité de droit des textes internationaux régissant l'échange international (Taxil 1998).¹⁴ En conséquence, les systèmes de compensation que représentaient le Sysmin et le Stabex¹⁵ issus des accords de Lomé sont supprimés dans la coopération UE/ACP qui, elle-même, glisse de plus en plus vers un simple accord de libre-échange. Pour les pays industriels anglo-saxons, l'idéologie politique à la mode dans la coopération au développement avec l'Afrique subsaharienne devient : *trade and not aid*. Celle de l'UE se décline en *trade and aid* (Petiteville 2002). Dans les pays donateurs, l'expertise macroéconomique supplante l'expertise microéconomique et sectorielle dans les problématiques de développement en Afrique subsaharienne. De même, les institutions plus économiques, cas du Trésor français et de la Caisse Centrale de Coopération Économique (CCCE), deviennent prioritaires par rapport à celles plus politiques comme les ministères de coopération au développement (Wilson 1993). La conditionnalité d'accès à l'aide est devenue un instrument de libéralisation des économies. Les accords de Cotonou qui remplacent ceux de Lomé en 2000, intègrent en effet cette nouvelle donne en matière de coopération au développement par les biais des accords de partenariat économiques (APE) en négociation. La bonne gouvernance et l'intégration régionale au centre des APE sont devenues les lignes de conduite normatives que les « bons acteurs » doivent observer pour créer de « bons territoires » et réaliser « le bon développement » (Peemans 2004).

Désormais, les nouveaux territoires performants sont l'international au détriment du national, le secteur privé au détriment du secteur public, le marché au détriment de l'Etat et le régional au détriment du national. Par ailleurs, ce programme novateur entraîne le recul de l'influence de certains acteurs internationaux. Le BIT, le GATT et la CNUCED sont supplantés par la Banque mondiale, le FMI et l'OMC porteurs du seul programme de développement valable en tous temps et en tous lieux. Croyant révolue l'ère des destinées singulières dans les pratiques et les politiques de développement, d'aucuns crurent qu'on est arrivé à la fin de l'histoire, le monde tenait enfin la vérité totale et définitive en matière de développement.¹⁶

« Le modèle déterministe du tout populaire » : caractéristiques institutionnelles et fonctionnelles (1980-2000)

L'idéal-type que construit « le modèle déterministe du tout populaire » s'oppose à la fois, au « modèle déterministe du tout Etat », et au « modèle déterministe du tout marché ». Il trouve leurs approches du développement, non seulement très élitistes et individualistes, mais aussi sans fondement historique correspondant aux réalités africaines pouvant servir de preuves empiriques aux politiques de développement qu'ils promeuvent. Par

conséquent, *l'Etat développeur* qui succède aux administrations coloniales a, au même titre que la DAS, uniquement renforcé la forte hiérarchisation sociale initiée par les régimes coloniaux en reproduisant des pratiques, des acteurs et des territoires dominants et dominés en matière de développement. Il en résulte, tant des sphères politiques, économiques, monétaires et financières déconnectées des pratiques populaires, que des répartitions de pouvoir qui les « snobent » et les marginalisent alors qu'elles sont les plus aptes à satisfaire les besoins réels des populations comme le prouve leur effectivité historique. De ce fait, la participation et l'action populaires, c'est à dire, l'implication d'un nombre significatif de personnes dans des situations ou des actions qui améliorent leur bien-être (Cohen et Uphoff 1980), constituent une approche du processus de développement radicalement opposée à celles technocratiques, individualistes, scientifiques et élitistes de *l'Etat développeur*, de la DAS et des institutions financières internationales où les populations n'ont rien à dire mais tout à subir.


La participation, l'initiative et l'action populaires étant une stratégie de développement plus proche des populations qui savent ce qu'elles veulent effectivement et à qui elles ont affaire, « le modèle déterministe du tout populaire » promeut un développement par le bas dont *la territorialité populaire* définie par les pratiques de même nature, irradie les champs politiques (pouvoir politique populaire), économiques (économie populaire), financiers (finance populaire) et se révèle plus efficace que *les territorialités politiques et concurrentielles* mises en place respectivement par *l'Etat développeur autoritaire* et la DAS dont les initiatives proviennent du haut. Les populations deviennent ainsi maîtresses de leur destin car de la dynamique populaire résulte des *pratiques réelles de développement* différentes et plus crédibles que celles artificielles et sans bases historiques issues du dogmatisme de la modernisation nationale autoritaire (1960-1980), et de la néo-modernisation nationale (1980-2000) (Peemans 2004).

Ceci dit, l'acteur populaire (paysannerie, vendeurs informels, mutuelles, coopératives, tontines, famille élargie, syndicats, groupements et associations diverses) est généralement un acteur collectif au travers duquel, le savoir populaire n'est plus synonyme d'ignorance et de pauvreté (Chambers 1990), mais capable d'un développement réel. Le mode d'entrer en rapport des acteurs qu'il traduit en mettant en évidence une sociabilité solidaire à travers l'histoire en Afrique subsaharienne, n'exclut pas l'accumulation individuelle, mais lie les liens sociaux et les échanges économique-financiers. C'est donc une approche du développement basée sur un acteur dont les pratiques traduisent un rapport social holiste et laissent entrevoir l'hypothèse que la *pure sociabilité*, c'est-à-dire des transactions politico-économiques, monétaires et financières sans Etat et sans marché autorégulateur, seraient

émancipatrices pour les populations qui échapperaient ainsi aux hypothèques que sont l'Etat, les classes et les institutions nationales et internationales dominantes (voir schéma 3).

Par conséquent, en combinant son aspect méthodologique (partir du bas vers le haut de façon holiste) (Chambers 1990), son aspect moral (ignorer et mépriser le peuple est mauvais) (Sardan 1990) et son aspect cognitif (il existe des savoirs populaires performants en matière de développement) (Berger 1978), « le modèle déterministe du tout populaire » construit un extrémisme développementaliste qui se présente comme le seul « cocktail » gagnant pour le développement de l'Afrique subsaharienne par une inversion des logiques et des perspectives des modèles dominants de la modernisation nationale dont il se démarque.

Schéma 3 : Le cercle vertueux du « modèle déterministe du tout populaire »



Source : Amougou T., 2010, *Planification et politiques intégrées de développement*, Faculté des sciences économiques, sociales et politiques, Diffusion Universitaire CIACO, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgique

Les conséquences du « modèle déterministe du tout populaire »

L'application théorique et pratique du « modèle déterministe du tout populaire » a entraîné un ensemble de résultats entamant son efficacité.

L'instrumentalisation des pratiques et des acteurs populaires : de la période coloniale à l'après Consensus de Washington

Même si nous remarquons une réactivation des pratiques populaires et des recherches centrées sur le peuple avec la crise économique de 1980 en Afrique subsaharienne (Peemans 2004), un examen de l'histoire des idées et des pratiques de développement montre que « le modèle déterministe du tout populaire » constitue déjà un aspect de la pratique et du discours développementalistes pendant la période coloniale où la participation des populations locales fut un des pivots des politiques en matière de développement rural (Chauveau 2006). Le même regard historique prouve qu'il existe une espèce de récurrence des préoccupations populaires dès que le modèle dominant entre en crise. Tout se passe comme si les chercheurs, à chaque nouvelle crise du modèle de développement dominant, se rendaient compte que le peuple a une fois encore été oublié et doit être « re-annoncé » et « re-proclamé » (Sardan 1990). Il se développe, de ce fait, une instrumentalisation de la culture populaire par les systèmes de développement dominants successifs dont l'objectif est de réaménager les différents niveaux de pouvoir de façon à assurer l'adhésion du plus grand nombre d'acteurs locaux et nationaux aux objectifs présélectionnés par eux (Lapeyre 2006).

Ceci dit, l'acteur et la participation populaires sont déjà le leitmotiv du modèle participatif du développement rural dans les colonies françaises et britanniques dans l'entre-deux-guerres. Alors que les acteurs locaux sont intégrés par l'*Indirect Rule* britannique dès les premières phases de la colonisation, l'administration française, après l'échec de l'exploitation autoritaire et destructrice des ressources du *pacte colonial*, opte aussi pour la participation des populations locales après la Première Guerre mondiale. Les paysans et leurs associations se transforment ainsi en maillons essentiels d'un système colonial dont le militantisme instrumentalise la culture populaire pour huiler sa machine prédatrice (Philips 1989 ; Henry 1922). En effet, trouver des soutiens locaux aux activités coloniales pousse la France et la Grande-Bretagne à développer des mutualités agricoles par les syndicats soutenus financièrement par des caisses de crédit et des coopératives de producteurs. Même si la métropole reste le principal inspirateur du développement agricole dans les colonies, les supports traditionnels assurant la légitimité de cette politique en Afrique subsaharienne sont la paysannerie, l'institution traditionnelle du grenier, les diverses associations rotatives d'épargne et de crédits (Chauveau 2006).

Dès la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, et jusqu'à la construction des Etats indépendants, se structurent le modèle du « Community Development » dans l'empire colonial britannique et celui du « relèvement rural » dans l'empire colonial français. Cependant, il va sans dire que le caractère

intrinsèquement réprimant et prédateur de l'entreprise coloniale, milite davantage en faveur d'une ustensilisation des ressources et des acteurs populaires par le système colonial, que d'une réelle prise en compte du *capital humain populaire* dans le processus de développement. La preuve en est que les faits stylisés tirés du développement métropolitain restent les références d'une politique de développement dont les objectifs sont fixés par les hauts fonctionnaires et les experts coloniaux. En conséquence, les hiérarchies condescendantes et les dominations discriminantes desquelles « le modèle déterministe du tout populaire » veut extirper le peuple, se sont reproduites au travers d'une bureaucratie technocratique reléguant les acteurs populaires aux rangs d'exécutants.

De nos jours, l'échec de la DAS et les politiques de développement de l'après Consensus de Washington soulignent aussi le renouveau de la rhétorique populaire. C'est le cas dans les documents stratégiques de réduction de la pauvreté (DSRP), où l'on parle de participation des pays pauvres. Or, les pays de l'Afrique subsaharienne et leurs populations ne peuvent en aucun cas s'approprier une démarche soigneusement définie à Washington, où la Banque mondiale et le FMI ont préalablement fixé les règles à travers un ensemble de notes d'orientation et de documents techniques (Lapeyre 2006).

En conséquence, incapable de se construire en un système de pensée autonome, c'est-à-dire dont les mécanismes d'action, la méthodologie et les hypothèses implicites ne relèvent pas d'une inversion des modes de pensée du système de développement dominant, « le modèle déterministe du tout populaire » n'agit que de façon épisodique. Ses phases d'expansion coïncident avec les phases de récession du modèle dominant dont la prospérité relègue en appendices les préoccupations populaires. Dès lors, le système dominant garde toute la latitude d'instrumentaliser *la pensée populaire*¹⁷ une fois qu'il est en difficulté, parce que celle-ci est plus prolifique dans la critique que dans sa construction théorique et pratique en un système de pensée cohérent et autonome. Par ailleurs, il semble que « le modèle déterministe du tout populaire » soit incapable d'éviter la reconstitution des bureaucraties et des dominations qu'il veut éviter ou atténuer.

Les stratégies de défense du peuple et leurs dérives

Alors que la participation au centre de *la pensée populaire* semble montrer que le développement est l'aboutissement d'un long processus cumulatifs des connaissances, des expériences et des savoirs divers, l'idéal-type qui en résulte met en évidence deux logiques qui ne vont pas dans ce sens. Ce sont, non seulement l'usage d'une stratégie d'opposition et non de coopération avec les autres modèles de développement, mais aussi *le populisme et le misérabilisme développementalistes* (Grignon et Passeron 1989 ; Sardan

1990). De même, seules les survivances des mécanismes de survie sont évoquées comme exemples de réussite des pratiques populaires.

La pensée populaire veut protéger le peuple et ses pratiques de « l'ogre capitaliste »

Le mode de pensée du « modèle déterministe du tout populaire » n'encourage pas la coopération et/ou les synergies avec le modèle de développement dominant. Ceci apparaît dans une rhétorique à la fois victimisante et antinomique par rapport au couple pensée/action du système national et international (Etats et marchés). En effet, d'après *la pensée populaire*, les trappes du système dominant adoptent trois stratégies dont la dynamique est tantôt centrifuge (répression et marginalisation), tantôt centripète (récupération et standardisation).

La première stratégie est la répression et/ou la marginalisation des pratiques de développement considérées non conformes à la culture de développement du système dominant. C'est la tactique des contre-cultures à bannir. Y sont rangées toutes les initiatives populaires et associatives qui tentent de s'arracher à l'universel abstrait des codes culturels productivistes et à cet universalisme développementaliste qui s'adressent au monde global, mais ne parlent de personne spécifiquement. Dans ce cas, les analyses du courant dominant utilisent des catégories conceptuelles dont le but est de déclasser ces contre-cultures du développement en mettant en évidence le caractère occulté, illégal et peu porteur de leurs activités (Amougou 2005).

La deuxième stratégie est celle de la récupération des pratiques populaires en les tuant de l'intérieur par extension des « appétits digestifs » du modèle dominant. Les contre-cultures du développement les moins radicales sont alors assimilées, déviées vers une rentabilité immédiate où leurs spécificités et leurs identités sont phagocytées et transformées en gadgets divertissants et attractifs pour le marché global. Le cas contemporain le plus représentatif de cette stratégie de récupération des pratiques populaires par le modèle dominant, est la microfinance.

En fait, après les résultats mitigés de l'ajustement des systèmes financiers de l'Afrique subsaharienne par les prix (libéralisation des taux d'intérêts), la promotion actuelle du microcrédit essaie de palier les échecs de l'ajustement par les prix par un ajustement par les institutions. Le dualisme financier étant resté intact, la vulgarisation actuelle des institutions de microfinance a pour rôle, hors mis le soutien au micro entrepreneur, de transformer les comportements des acteurs populaires tout en récupérant, par mimétisme et par imitation, toutes les caractéristiques des systèmes financiers populaires en vigueur dans ce continent.¹⁸ Aussi, l'entraîne avec lequel les institutions financières internationales et la machine productive mondiale reprennent à

leur propre compte ces pratiques financières séculaires qui leur sont extérieures, dénaturent et désamorcent bon nombre d'expériences et de pratiques de développement originales dont la puissance innovante, la posture dé-constructrice et identitaire est très vite déviée de son axe. Elles sont ainsi assimilées, puis réintroduites dans la logique idéologique et économique de la reproduction capitaliste. C'est comme si, percevant dans ces pratiques ses échecs et des signes de sa propre dégénérescence, le système dominant adoptait une stratégie défensive par récupération.

La troisième stratégie est structurale. Elle se manifeste par la contrainte que l'extraversion des économies de l'Afrique subsaharienne impose à l'orientation de leur processus de développement. En effet, les produits vendus au Nord par cette partie de l'Afrique doivent être compétitifs en répondant aux normes de qualité auxquelles sont habitués les consommateurs du Nord. Aussi, pour peu qu'elle soit ambitieuse en visant l'international, toute initiative originale en matière de développement réintègre, par adaptation inévitable des offres de l'Afrique aux demandes du Nord, les principes concurrentiels desquels elle se démarquait pourtant au départ. Le commerce équitable est l'exemple type d'une initiative subissant ce processus. La solidarité au cœur de *l'humanisme-religieux* (1940-1950) et du *Tiers-mondisme* (1960-1980) qui en constituent les deux courants fondateurs, s'efface progressivement au profit des valeurs liées au marché. Aussi, quoiqu'il ait renforcé *l'empowerment* et l'autonomie chez certains paysans, le commerce équitable connaît, sous contrainte des exigences de *la territorialité concurrentielle*, non seulement une grande érosion de son principe clef de confiance mutuelle entre le Nord et l'Afrique subsaharienne, mais aussi le largage des plus petits producteurs. Du coup, les avantages comparatifs culturels que pouvaient espérer ces pays en termes de labels s'amenuisent et sont sacrifiés par la standardisation des produits aux normes internationales et capitalistes (Bach, Charlier et Yopez 2006).

Pensée populaire et pratiques de survie comme exemples de réussite

Dans la mesure où les forces en jeu dans l'histoire n'obéissent ni à une destination, ni à une mécanique, mais bien au hasard de la lutte pour la conquête de l'autonomie sociale (Foucault 1971), les pratiques de développement tombées dans les trappes du système dominant existent toujours et se reproduisent. Par opposition aux pratiques et aux politiques de développement dominantes qui privilégient les institutions nationales et internationales, ces contre-cultures du développement prennent la place du déviant, du mutant et déploient leurs forces d'intervention en des lieux ordinaires où vivent des populations éloignées des sphères de décisions et des lieux de pouvoir. La rue, la zone rurale, le quartier, la place du marché,

la ville, un appartement, une chambre, une salle de classe ou une ferme rurale, sont autant de territoires susceptibles de servir de bases matérielles au déploiement de plusieurs pratiques de développement en Afrique subsaharienne. C'est le cas des institutions financières informelles et des vendeuses qui, nourrissant certaines grandes villes africaines, ne sont préoccupées que par la reproduction durable de leurs petites activités commerciales et de leurs familles.

En mettant ainsi en pratique, non seulement d'autres formes d'organisation de la vie sociale, mais aussi d'autres formes de structuration spatiale rurale et urbaine en Afrique et en Amérique latine (Lautier 2003 ; Le Bris 2003 ; Montezuma 2003 ; Massiah 2003 ; Peemans 2004), ces groupes marginaux deviennent des acteurs. C'est-à-dire, des *groupes-sujets* (Guattari 1972) non assujettis aux diktats des lois universelles de l'agir valables en tous temps et en tous lieux que construit et impose le modèle dominant.

Choix du peuple comme domaine de recherche : équilibre difficile entre dérives militantes et crédibilité scientifique

Les stratégies de défense du peuple peuvent avoir deux dérives se présentant comme deux pôles extrêmes des analyses issues de *la pensée populaire*. Ce sont, « le misérabilisme » et « le populisme » (Grignon et Passeron 1989). En définissant « le populisme des intellectuels » comme *un certain type de rapport social (idéologique, moral, scientifique, politique) que des intellectuels nouent au moins symboliquement avec le peuple*, J-P. Olivier de Sardan (1990), pose la question de savoir « comment embrasser la cause du peuple sans tomber dans la langue de bois et les illusions militantes ? »

De nombreux résultats de *la recherche populaire* souffrent, en effet, soit d'un enjolivement extrême des pratiques populaires frisant leur idéalisation en matière de développement (populisme développementaliste), soit d'un discours les analysant sous le prisme des stratégies des pauvres, de survie, de débrouille sans lendemains, et ne pouvant en aucun cas être des moyens durables de développement (miserabilisme développementaliste). Si on considère la finance populaire (informelle) en Afrique subsaharienne, ces deux pôles extrêmes font respectivement l'erreur de considérer ce secteur financier comme une alternative viable du système financier formel et comme des pratiques financières exclusives des pauvres. En conséquence, « le populisme développementaliste » a tendance à homogénéiser les institutions financières informelles (pourtant très hétérogènes), pour en faire un système financier populaire cohérent (un acteur populaire), alors que « le misérabilisme développementaliste » les considère comme des caractéristiques d'un système financier sous-développé donc vouées à disparaître avec sa modernisation. Ces deux pôles extrêmes souffrent d'une absence de *vigilance*

épistémologique dont le but est de jouer à l'équilibriste entre les deux en évitant des postures militantes et extrémistes dans l'analyse du dualisme financier africain.

Hierarchisation entre acteurs, pratiques de développement et territoires

A l'instar des autres idéal-types, « le modèle déterministe du tout populaire » n'échappe pas à une classification manichéenne des acteurs, des pratiques de développement et des territoires.

En effet, l'acteur économique classique et néoclassique caractérisé par sa totale déconnexion sociale, sa faible identité territoriale et démographique, son indépendance et son autonomie financière grâce à son pouvoir d'achat, n'est pas celui que privilégie *la pensée populaire* en Afrique subsaharienne. C'est « un mauvais acteur », non seulement parce qu'il ne correspond pas aux traditions de vie africaines, mais aussi, parce qu'il est purement artificiel et fictif comme de nombreuses catégories d'analyse du paradigme de la modernisation n'ayant aucun antécédent dans l'histoire de cette partie de l'Afrique. Le « bon acteur », c'est l'acteur populaire reproduisant les mécanismes historiques de sécurisation des conditions de vie et réinventant continuellement le lien social, identitaire et territorial. De même, les riches et les classes aisées sont soupçonnés d'intelligence avec le système de développement dominant contre les classes populaires, alors que les experts extérieurs sont accusés de se cantonner dans l'analyse de « pseudo-connaissances » qui éloignent du peuple, des paysans et des pauvres au lieu de s'en rapprocher.

Il en résulte inévitablement une hiérarchie entre territoires. La campagne ou le monde rural l'emporte sur la ville, le local sur le national, le national sur l'international et les zones de concentration du travail sur celles de concentration du capital financier. *La territorialité populaire*, c'est-à-dire, le fait pour les pratiques populaires, de définir ce qui se fait et qui est autorisé ou pas en matière de développement, est la seule qui puisse crédibiliser les pratiques de développement et permettre un réel développement en Afrique subsaharienne.

« Le modèle déterministe du tout culturel » : caractéristiques institutionnelles et fonctionnelles (1980-2000)

L'extrémisme développementaliste issu de ce modèle est « le post-développement » ou « l'après-développement ». Contrairement à tous les autres idéal-types sus évoqués, il présente la particularité de n'avoir pas encore été effectif par le passé en Afrique subsaharienne. C'est donc un courant encore purement théorique qui se développe dans les années 1980,

suite aux échecs de la DAS et connaît une grande audience dans les années nonante : c'est plus un jugement de valeur qu'un jugement d'existence.

La mort du développement et son assimilation à une occidentalisation

Si « le modèle déterministe du tout populaire » parle d'un développement alternatif par rapport au modèle dominant et met au centre la participation et l'acteur populaires, « le modèle déterministe du tout culturel » *préconise une alternative non pas de développement mais au développement* (Partant 1982 ; Latouche 1986 ; Singleton 2006).

Le développement, comme toute chose, ne pouvant en aucun cas échapper à la mort comme le dit M. Singleton, « le développement durable », « le développement local », « le développement solidaire », « le développement humain » et bien d'autres concepts ne sont que les signes d'un « acharnement thérapeutique intellectuel » sur une réalité arrivée à la fin de ses jours. Par ailleurs, il est impossible et dogmatique de croire que le développement est une réalité transculturelle, c'est-à-dire hors culture, et qu'il est capable de se reproduire alors que des historiens ont montré que c'est une réalité idiosyncrasique née accidentellement en Europe, et non répétitive à l'identique ailleurs.

En effet, rien ne pouvant se concevoir en dehors d'un *social-historique* et d'un *temps-espace* précis, il est impossible de détacher le développement, même pour un but heuristique, de l'Occident (Singleton 2006). Ainsi, si le changement social peut se faire de multiples façons comme tout construit socioculturel, le développement ne peut être qu'une autre chose, à savoir l'occidentalisation (Rist 2001 ; Latouche 2004 ; Singleton 2004). Ceci étant, sa conséquence inéluctable est de couler les personnalités historiques, démographiques (comportements procréateurs, type de famille...), territoriales et linguistiques de l'Afrique subsaharienne dans un moule spécifique correspondant à une vision occidentale prise pour apogée absolue de toutes choses.

Le développement est un économisme destructeur des cultures et de l'environnement

L'oxymore est le terme utilisé par S. Latouche pour montrer qu'on fait un pléonasme lorsqu'on parle séparément de développement et d'économie, l'un étant nécessairement et exactement l'autre. La destruction des cultures et de l'environnement est de ce fait inévitable car « le développement est constitué d'un ensemble de pratiques parfois contradictoires en apparence qui, pour assurer la reproduction sociale, obligent à transformer et à détruire, de façon généralisée, le milieu naturel et les rapports sociaux en vue d'une

production croissante de marchandises (biens et services) destinée, à travers l'échange, à la demande solvable » (Rist 2001:32).

Ainsi, dans la mesure où l'essor de l'économie est intrinsèquement lié à la modernisation, au déterminisme technologique et à l'arrogance scientifique, le développement ne peut en aucun cas se faire sans mettre en place un langage de pouvoir qui dépossède ceux qu'on appelle les « sous-développés » de leur identité, de leur valeur (retard, inadaptation, arriération) tout en concevant l'organisation de la vie d'une façon scientifique qui envoie aux calendes grecques les populations locales et leurs cultures. Il s'ensuit une hypertrophie de l'importance accordée aux catégories et aux agrégats économiques dans des sociétés où d'autres institutions et d'autres modes d'entrer en rapport (don, contre don, centralisation, redistribution, solidarité, confiance...), ont plus d'importance. On ne peut pas, en effet, ranger des catégories et des réalités extra occidentales par des critères occidentaux sans les transformer en autres choses ou les détruire complètement.


Le développement et la religion : la fin du monde et la pensée unique comme points de confluence

Comme les religions judéo-chrétiennes qui prédisent le seul meilleur des mondes valant la peine d'être vécu (le paradis), le développement se présente comme la vérité ultime de toute organisation sociétale, quelle qu'elle soit et d'où qu'elle soit. Comme les religieux, « les développeurs » se croient investis d'une mission salvatrice universelle dont le but est de fédérer le monde entier et de lui faire partager une chose qui possède un sens en soi et une signification intrinsèque à la portée de toutes les autres civilisations, ne serait-ce qu'au regard de la satisfaction des besoins essentiels. Comme pour le paradis, « les développeurs » se demandent : « qui ne voudrait pas de l'eau propre, des soins de santé primaires, du respect des droits de l'homme ? » (Singleton 2006:3).

Par conséquent, comme après le paradis il n'y a plus rien à chercher pour son bonheur, après le développement, la vie et les choses s'arrêtent car on connaît tout et on gère les acquis. En effet, « le modèle déterministe du tout culturel » critique le développement d'être *un stop à la vie* à telle enseigne qu'on peut se demander si, après le développement c'est la fin du monde parce qu'il n'y a plus rien à chercher. Or, le développement n'est qu'un *conçu occidental* avec ses limites et ne peut cerner tous *les vécus extra occidentaux possibles* qui, eux, sont sans limites. Puisque chaque lieu a sa logique, et toute mentalité son milieu et sa programmation culturelle, « le post-développement » n'est que le commencement de plusieurs modes de vie qui ne sont pas la fin, mais le début d'autres formes de vie et ainsi de suite.

Ceci étant, *la territorialité culturelle*, c'est-à-dire le fait que c'est la culture qui constitue le préalable à toute entreprise sociétale et la crédibilise tout en l'autorisant, traduit d'autres modes d'organisations non seulement possibles, mais qui existent effectivement à travers le monde. Sans promettre un autre paradis, et sans dire qu'il connaît tout à l'instar du modèle dominant, « l'après développement » consiste soit à *chasser* les catégories occidentales des sociétés extra occidentales, soit et les *enchâsser* dans leurs cultures. C'est à dire, les redéfinir sous contrainte des réalités culturelles et historiques locales. A cet effet, le système politique, l'économie, le système financier, l'Etat, le marché et la monnaie ne sont que des manifestations institutionnelles d'une culture singulière (voir schéma 4). C'est la seule façon de mettre fin au productivisme, à l'imaginaire économiste et aux technologies inappropriées afin de construire des sociétés autonomes échappant aux pièges autodestructeurs et homogénéisants du développement. Bref, pour « le post-développement », il y a autant de façons de s'améliorer qu'il y a de modes et de lieux de vie possibles.

Schéma 4 : Le cercle vertueux du « modèle déterministe du tout culturel »



Source : Amougou T., 2010, *Planification et politiques intégrées de développement*, Faculté des sciences économiques, sociales et politiques, Diffusion Universitaire CIACO, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgique.

Des conséquences théoriques et des questions

Même si « le modèle déterministe du tout culturel » attire l'attention, non seulement sur le caractère occidental-centriste du développement et les dégâts humains, culturels et environnementaux de la croissance illimitée et tous azimuts, mais aussi sur le fait que la culture est un paramètre extrêmement important dans les analyses du processus de développement, il entraîne un ensemble de conséquences théoriques et surtout des questions dans le cadre de l'Afrique subsaharienne.

Le culturalisme naïf et l'approche essentielle de la culture

Si « le modèle déterministe du tout culturel » évite de verser dans *une universalisation triomphante* comme le font les analyses néoclassiques du modèle de développement dominant, il tombe maintes fois dans un « populisme développementaliste ». Ceci se passe par un encensement et une idéalisation des pratiques des sociétés traditionnelles africaines. Pourtant, quoiqu'elles aient des organisations sociales complètes et cohérentes en elles-mêmes, ces sociétés traditionnelles sont parfois loin d'être autosuffisantes. D'où le fait qu'en mettant en avant leurs mérites de leur authenticité, « l'après développement » tombe dans *un culturalisme naïf* ignorant le caractère ouvert et dynamique des cultures et des pratiques de développement en Afrique subsaharienne. De cette manière, plusieurs recherches de ce courant sont des analyses embrigadées, soit dans des présupposés ethnocentriques qui s'ignorent, soit dans un fondamentalisme de la différence niant les brassages en se crispant sur l'identité culturelle ou ethnique antinomique aux organisations internationales mises en place depuis 1945.

En outre, ce *culturalisme naïf* alimente une approche *statique de la culture*. Autrement dit, « le post-développement » pêche, autant par une approche essentialiste de la culture, que par une analyse de la culture comme un stock statique de valeurs. Par conséquent, la culture comme flux et reflux de normes, de valeurs et de représentations d'un processus à étudier dans une trajectoire historique où interviennent les conflits entre acteurs et entre leurs stratégies d'accumulation, est évacuée des analyses dont le dessein est d'opposer, de façon essentielle, des cultures du *Sud altruistes et pacifistes en elles-mêmes*, aux cultures du Nord, *prédatrices et colonisatrices par nature*. Cette façon de procéder entraîne qu'on retombe « dans le fonctionnalisme culturel en faisant renaître des polémiques comme celles des années nonante sur les valeurs culturelles asiatiques » [Peemans 2002:246]. Il est donc plus fructueux et utile de considérer la culture comme un mécanisme heuristique utile pour traiter des différences, plutôt que comme un paramètre biologique supposé substantif et représentant une propriété innée et définitive de certains groupes. Ceci est d'autant plus vrai que toutes les cultures semblent être les

résultats d'un processus d'emprunts, d'appropriations, d'hybridations et même de « cannibalismes » entre elles (Bayly 2006)

Des questions sans réponses et la fuite des analyses factuelles

Face au passage de la territorialité politique à la territorialité concurrentielle et à leurs échecs respectifs en terme de développement en Afrique subsaharienne, la tentation est grande de refuser le développement. Cependant, quoique les origines du concept de développement et du projet qu'il porte soient occidentales et se confondent à la croissance économique ; quoique la territorialité politique représentée par l'Etat-nation soit une institution occidentale et qu'elle entraîne une occidentalisation de l'ordre politique et même spatiale à travers le monde, les recherches sur le développement restent d'actualité.

En effet, dire que le développement est mort comme le font entre autres Latouche, Partant et Singleton, consiste non seulement à fuir devant la recherche de solutions aux problèmes que la mise en œuvre de l'Etat-nation et le marché ont causé en Afrique subsaharienne, mais aussi à refuser un effort épistémologique et philosophique dont le but est de redéfinir ce concept afin de permettre à chaque système social de se l'approprier et de lui donner un nouveau sens par rapport à sa culture, son histoire et ses réalités. Si Harry Truman, en parlant en 1949 pour la première fois de territoires sous-développés, pensa sûrement les orienter dans le modèle de vie occidental et permettre ainsi aux Etats-Unis d'étendre leur influence et de s'emparer, au détriment de l'URSS, des nouveaux marchés que représentent les anciens empires coloniaux, cela ne veut pas dire que le développement est condamné à signifier le même modèle de vie que celui auquel pensait le président américain à cette époque. Croire le contraire entraîne une contradiction consistant, d'une part, à reconnaître la force de l'histoire et du temps en affirmant que le développement est mort en même temps que le fordisme aux années septante (Latouche 2004) et, d'autre part, nier la capacité des acteurs, de l'histoire, du temps et des faits sur l'évolution d'un concept et sa mise en œuvre effective.

C'est aussi nier, non seulement toute la recherche scientifique faite depuis des années par les *Development Studies*,¹⁹ mais aussi les résultats de la sociologie de l'action qui confirment que les acteurs ont des capacités d'appropriation et de transformation des phénomènes et des pratiques qui au départ ne sont pas d'eux. Si refuser le développement est la solution, faut-il détruire les Etats africains qui sont des reproductions d'une institution occidentale? Que faire des écoles, des universités, des hôpitaux, des banques, des réseaux téléphoniques, des armées, des partis politiques, des usines, des chaînes de télévisions et de toute l'organisation administrative d'inspiration

occidentale qui fonctionnent déjà dans ces pays ? Existence-ils des moyens de changer les trajectoires historiques qui font que plusieurs pays sont, au jour d'aujourd'hui, embarqués soit dans un processus syncrétique entre valeurs culturelles locales et occidentales, soit dans un processus d'appropriation ?

Observer les problèmes réels auxquels font face les populations et leurs territoires, reconnaître que plusieurs d'entre eux ont désormais, à cause de leurs trajectoires historiques, une dynamique sociale hybride constituée de modernisation occidentale et de pratiques culturelles locales, transforment le développement en un *fait social d'une éternelle actualité* au sens durkheimien du terme. En effet si, selon Badie et Latouche, l'occidentalisation du monde a échoué, alors l'ordre politique, social et territorial en vigueur actuellement dans de nombreuses sociétés extra occidentales n'est plus de *l'occidentalisation pure*, mais un *autre développement* qui se construit par combinaisons de différentes cultures et pratiques. Ceci veut dire que l'identité culturelle des peuples et de leurs territoires n'est pas figée. Elle se nourrit de sa trame profonde, qui transforme en référents locaux plusieurs éléments provenant d'autres cultures.

Sortir des extrémismes développementalistes : l'interdépendance entre les différentes territorialités, leurs pratiques de développement et leurs modes de régulation

Le processus idéal typique que mettent en évidence les différents extrémismes développementalistes présentés dans leurs temporalités respectives, prouve que chaque modèle de développement se présente comme le meilleur, exclut les autres approches possibles du développement et favorise certains acteurs, leurs pratiques de développement et leurs territoires au détriment des autres, alors que des complémentarités inévitables existent entre eux et les modèles qui les classifient. En fait, le marché et ses acteurs, l'Etat, l'acteur populaire et culturel sont tous présents en Afrique subsaharienne.

En effet, souvent liées à des territoires ayant des personnalités historiques précises, les pratiques populaires ne sont pas totalement séparées du système économique officiel avec lequel elles entretiennent tantôt des liens explicites (mêmes monnaies, mêmes espaces, mêmes infrastructures et parfois mêmes acteurs et territoires), tantôt des stratégies de complémentarité et de contournement où s'entremêlent des normes modernes, historiques et culturellement situées (Andriamannindrisoa 2004 ; Amougou 2005 ; Sall 2004 ; Marie et al. 1992). Ces pratiques populaires traduisent, non seulement une demande alternative de développement où coexistent l'initiative économique privée (le marché et l'entreprise), la redistribution, la solidarité

et des régulations nationales et internationales originales au sein des territoires et des réseaux maîtrisés (Peemans 2004 ; Sall 2005 ; Kambale Mirembe 2006), mais aussi la preuve des limites et de la faillite de la mainmise exclusive de l'Etat-nation et du marché sur le projet de développement (Appadurai 2005). A ce titre, *territorialité politique*, *territorialité concurrentielle*, *territorialité populaire* et *territorialité culturelle* sont interdépendantes et simultanément présentes dans plusieurs territoires et leurs pratiques de développement. Elles s'entremêlent au même titre que les pratiques de développement et les acteurs qu'elles autorisent et crédibilisent (voir schéma 5). Il en est de même de leurs modes de régulation (régulation communautaire, régulation bureaucratique et régulation par le marché). Cette interdépendance est prise en compte dans *une approche néobraudélienne et systémique* (Peemans 2002 ; Amougou 2005).

L'approche néobraudélienne et systémique du processus de développement

Dans la mesure où territoires et populations se font et se défont eux-mêmes tout en se façonnant mutuellement, Braudel dégage trois niveaux dont le temps d'évolution explique, dans une certaine mesure, l'articulation entre les systèmes et les sous-systèmes du processus de développement ([Arensberg ; Pearson et Polanyi 1975]). Le premier niveau est celui de la construction matérielle et spirituelle, alors que le deuxième niveau est celui du développement de la production et de l'existence du petit marché entretenu par des rapports sociaux entre campagnes et villes. Ces premier et deuxième niveaux sont donc des temps de construction de l'héritage culturel. C'est à dire, de la construction de la civilisation matérielle et spirituelle et de la réglementation des rapports sociaux qui ont pour but de sécuriser la vie sociale qui intègre aussi les rapports avec l'environnement.

C'est donc aux 1^{er} et 2^e niveaux que se constituent la morale sociale et la sociabilité politique. Les besoins se limitent aux besoins de base et le développement consiste à les satisfaire par des ressources qui ne sont pas rares, car trouvées par des moyens très simples comme la chasse, la cueillette, l'artisanat, la pierre, le bois, etc. C'est la conjoncture historique qui explique le passage du 1^{er} niveau au 2^e niveau. Le troisième niveau correspond à l'espace de l'Etat-nation amené à se construire et à se consolider par l'accumulation capitaliste : c'est le temps du capitalisme où les moyens deviennent rares et les besoins infiniment extensibles pour servir de moteur à l'accumulation capitaliste. Ces trois niveaux correspondent respectivement au local (1^{er} niveau), au régional (2^e niveau) et au national (3^e niveau).

Ce que nous appelons *approche néobraudélienne* est une lecture contemporaine du 3^e niveau par les mécanismes fonctionnalistes et

déterministes du modèle de développement dominant qui conçoivent le développement comme le passage des acteurs du 1^{er} et 2^e niveaux considérés comme « sous-développés », au 3^e niveau alors qu'en longue période, la prise en compte des 1^{er} et 2^e niveaux de Braudel souligne le rôle capital de leurs acteurs et celui des médiations. Dans la perspective du temps long, on se rend ainsi compte que les schémas déterministes du développement du modèle dominant se réfèrent uniquement au rapport du développement tel que le voient les Etats-nation, c'est-à-dire le 3^e niveau. Par conséquent l'accumulation, la différenciation et la centralisation sont au centre de l'analyse, alors que la question fondamentale est celle de savoir quel est l'impact de ce processus de centralisation, d'accumulation et de différenciation sur le milieu de vie où il s'applique (espace local, régional, national, global et leurs acteurs). Ainsi, c'est la prise en compte du 1^{er} et du 2^e niveaux et de la reconstruction de leur temps d'évolution qui pose le problème de l'articulation entre systèmes et sous-systèmes du processus de développement, et fonde le conflit entre Etats et acteurs des 1^{er} et 2^e niveaux.


Ceci dit, les relations entre ces trois niveaux sont toujours conflictuelles et devraient être analysées non en termes d'exclusion comme le font les différents extrémismes développementalistes, mais en termes de *dynamiques contradictoires*. Cela consiste à ne plus considérer que c'est le passage du 1^{er} au 2^e, puis du 2^e au 3^e niveau qui est le développement. Désormais, le problème est de savoir faire la transition entre les niveaux, leurs territorialités et les types de médiations à mettre en place pour assurer cette transition : c'est le rôle du processus historique, des stratégies d'acteurs et des relations entre acteurs et environnement.

Ce regard permet de montrer que l'histoire de la mondialisation du capitalisme (4^e niveau) et des rapports entre centres et périphéries peuvent être lus autrement. Il permet de mesurer l'importance des 1^{er} et 2^e niveaux et de leurs acteurs et territorialités dans le processus vers le 3^e niveau et le 4^e niveau ; de sortir des rapports problématiques entre ces niveaux de développement ; de rompre avec l'analyse discrète, linéaire et donc, déterministe de Rostow pour une analyse en termes de continuité, de rupture (discontinuité) du processus de développement. Ainsi, le rôle des politiques de développement n'est ni d'opposer les logiques de ces différents niveaux, ni de chercher l'absorption de ceux dits traditionnels par ceux dits modernes. Il est question, non seulement d'exploiter de façon constructive, c'est-à-dire comme sources d'informations et d'innovations, les conflits entre ces différents niveaux, leurs acteurs et leurs territorialités, mais aussi de chercher sans cesse les conditions et les mécanismes permettant un emboîtement symbiotique de leurs différents acteurs, de leurs différentes institutions et

de leurs différentes pratiques dans le but de renforcer la capacité de reproduction durable de l'autonomie sociale du système qui en constitue la résultante institutionnelle (voir schéma 5).

La démarche consiste à reconnaître la pluralité des temps, des ordres socio-économiques et des modes de régulation contribuant à la structuration d'un ensemble sociétal à une époque et dans un contexte donné, qui fait que cet ensemble a une personnalité historique dont il faut analyser le caractère plus ou moins intégré, les tendances à la déstructuration ou à la restructuration selon des articulations nouvelles [Peemans 1997].

Schéma 5 : Approche néobraudélienne et systémique du processus de développement (les interdépendances entre les différents idéal-types, leurs territorialités, leurs acteurs, leurs pratiques de développement et leurs modes de coordination)



Source : Amougou T., 2010, *Dualisme financier et développement au Cameroun : une approche néobraudélienne et systémique*, Thèse de doctorat, Faculté des sciences économiques sociales et politiques, UCL, Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Belgique.

Conclusion

En analysant de façon exclusive les acteurs, les pratiques et les territoires performants en matière de développement en Afrique subsaharienne, chaque *extrémisme développementaliste* ne prend pas en compte les atouts analytiques et pratiques des autres. Il en résulte un décalage permanent entre les approches conceptuelles du développement et leur factualisation. L'Afrique subsaharienne a ainsi connu un processus idéal typique ne mettant pas en évidence un ensemble de pratiques et d'enseignements tirés des différents modèles afin d'exploiter leurs atouts respectifs, mais une espèce *de politique de la terre brûlée* où chaque nouvelle approche considère caduque et sans objet celle qui l'a précédée. En effet, si « le modèle déterministe du tout Etat » pondère plus les *market-failures* que les *state-failures* en Afrique subsaharienne dans la période 1960-1980, « le modèle déterministe du tout marché » fait exactement le contraire de 1980 à nos jours. Par ailleurs, « le modèle déterministe du tout populaire » rejette largement la modernisation, alors que « le modèle déterministe du tout culturel » refuse carrément le développement.

L'approche néobraudélienne et systémique du processus de développement semble montrer non, seulement que cette façon de procéder est peu réaliste et inefficace, mais aussi que les différents types idéaux sont interdépendants et existent de façon simultanée dans de nombreux Etats en Afrique subsaharienne. L'étude de l'histoire du développement montre en effet que l'idée selon laquelle une sorte de modèle universel et exclusif de développement, et celle d'un ensemble de faits stylisés et de conditions qui devraient être réalisés par tous les pays pour réussir leur développement, ne correspondent pas à la réalité. Autrement dit, aucun acteur, aucune territorialité, aucune pratique, aucun mode de régulation ne peut être considéré comme détenant la vérité exclusive sur ce qui améliore la vie de tout le monde. Tous les acteurs sont tenus de composer les uns avec les autres afin que leurs oppositions donnent lieu à des dynamiques contradictoires où se forge une démocratie substantive capable d'atténuer les injustices et les dominations dans un processus non déterministe d'organisation et de sécurisation sociales.

Notes

1. Notion développée dans la sociologie de Max Weber (1864-1920). « L'idéal-type est un tableau de pensée, il n'est pas la réalité historique, ni surtout la réalité authentique, il sert encore moins de schéma dans lequel on pourrait ordonner la réalité à titre d'exemplaire. » [Weber 1992:173]. Il est pour Weber une utopie et une représentation non contradictoires. Un même champ d'investigation empirique comme celui du développement peut donc donner

lieu à plusieurs idéal-types différents selon les questions que chaque discipline y considère comme étant fondamentales.

2. Territoire au sens non seulement de lieu d'activité privilégié, mais aussi d'espace institutionnalisé et maîtrisé.
3. On se rend en effet compte que la valeur du FCFA par rapport au franc français n'a pas suivi intégralement toutes les modifications de parité du franc français par rapport au dollar et à la livre sterling dans l'histoire. En effet, après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale le franc français fut dévalué le 26 décembre 1945. Le taux de change officiel du dollar passa de 50 à 119 francs français et celui de la livre de 200 à 480 francs français afin de respecter la dévaluation de la monnaie française pendant la guerre. Mais le même taux de dévaluation ne fut pas appliqué aux monnaies émises dans les différents territoires de la Zone Franc. La valeur du FCFA fut fixée à 1,70 francs « métró » ce qui correspond pour le premier à une dévaluation inférieure à celle du second : le dollar passe de 50 à 70,6 FCFA au lieu de 119 francs « métró » alors que la livre passe de 200 à 282 FCFA au lieu de 480 francs. Une seconde dévaluation du franc français le 26 janvier 1948 s'appliqua au FCFA qui conserva donc sa valeur de 1,70 « métró » mais en perdant évidemment par rapport au dollar et à la livre. Mais lors d'une troisième dévaluation du franc français le 17 octobre 1948 (le dollar passe alors de 214 à 261 francs), le FCFA conserve sa parité du 26 janvier avec le dollar. Il en résulte que la valeur du CFA monte de façon artificielle de 1,70 à deux francs métropolitains. En plus, la réforme qui en décembre 1958 porte en France création du nouveau franc (NF devenu par la suite F) ne fut pas appliquée au secteur du FCFA, si bien que celui-ci jusqu'en 1994 vaut 2 centimes (0,02 F) métropolitains avant que le FMI le juge surévalué et le dévalue de 50 pour cent par rapport au FF dans le cadre de l'ajustement structurel.
4. En économie, *la redistribution efficace* est celle qu'assure un Etat en mettant en place un ensemble de pratiques et de mécanismes volontaristes, afin d'assurer une répartition des ressources ayant pour but d'atteindre certains groupes cibles ou vulnérables. Elle s'oppose à *la redistribution pure*, qui se base sur les forces du marché à travers un système d'imposition traditionnel censé assurer les prélèvements et leurs répartitions automatiques suivant les conjonctures.
5. Cette transformation du statut et des fonctions de l'Etat-nation est désignée de plusieurs manières dans la littérature interdisciplinaire analysant ce phénomène. Ainsi, certains équivalents anglo-saxons de ce que nous appelons « *Etat-nation économique* », sont *competition state*, *workfare state*, *internationalized state*, *catalytic state*, *network state*, *post-Fordist state*, *post-national state* et plus généralement, *post-keynesian state*.
6. Le terme *opérateur* est utilisé ici dans le sens que lui donne les techniques quantitatives où ils sont des instruments permettant la transformation de l'état d'une variable. Par exemple un opérateur de retard entraînant des décalages temporels sur des variables dynamiques sur lesquelles il est appliqué. Nous distinguons ici deux formes d'opérateurs. *Les opérateurs*

symboliques représentent toutes les activités de formation intellectuelle et de formatage spirituel, psychologique et comportemental des acteurs dont le rôle est de déshistoriser, de désocialiser et de dépolitiser le processus de développement par la construction d'une sphère symbolique à travers laquelle la légitimité de la territorialité concurrentielle supplante celle de la territorialité politique et impose la croissance économique comme seul objectif des systèmes sociaux. Par ailleurs, *les opérateurs d'actions* représentent toutes les actions des citoyens, des entreprises, des États, des multinationales commerciales et financières, de certaines universités anglo-saxonnes, des experts internationaux et des institutions financières internationales (FMI, BM), entraînant la factualisation des idées et du monde préparés par les opérateurs symboliques. Ils représentent tous les acteurs institutionnels et non institutionnels qui assurent la matérialisation de la sphère symbolique de la territorialité concurrentielle.

7. Si les recherches montrent que les pays dits développés sont majoritairement ceux-là où la démocratie est en vigueur, aucune recherche n'a pu montrer, économétriquement, une causalité univoque entre démocratie et développement économique. Il en aurait été autrement qu'on aurait déjà élaboré non seulement, une théorie économique de la transition démocratique, mais aussi une théorie politique du développement économique.
8. Ce terme a été employé par le président camerounais Paul Biya lors de son discours à la Nation annonçant l'arrivée de la crise économique au Cameroun en 1987.
9. Soient Y le revenu national, C la consommation, I l'investissement, G les dépenses publiques, X les exportations et M les importations, alors l'équilibre macroéconomique en économie ouverte peut s'écrire : $Y = C + I + G + X - M$. En posant A (absorption) = $C + I + G$ et B (balance commerciale) = $X - M$, on obtient $Y = A + B$ soit $Y - A = B = X - M$. Si $X - M < 0$ comme c'est le cas dans presque tous les pays de l'Afrique subsaharienne, alors $Y - A < 0$ d'où Y (revenu national) $<$ à l'absorption (dépenses nationales). Retrouver l'équilibre consiste à diminuer A à court terme afin d'augmenter Y à long terme.
10. Soient C , le volume de crédit accordé par le système bancaire, M_s l'offre de monnaie et M_d la demande de monnaie, l'approche monétaire de la balance des paiements estime : 1/ la demande de monnaie (M_d) fonction d'une proportion fixe et donnée k du produit P (niveau général des prix) par Y revenu réel ; 2/ L'offre de monnaie (M_s), dépend d'une part, du volume de crédit C , accordé par le système bancaire au secteur privé et à l'Etat pour financer son budget, et, d'autre part, de la variation des réserves de change (R) avec l'extérieur (un apport de devises accroît la masse monétaire) ; 3/ Le niveau général des prix P est égal aux prix extérieurs P_w que multiplie le taux de change (e). D'où $M_d = kPY$; $M_s = C + R$ et $P = eP_w$. A l'équilibre, $M_d = M_s$ entraîne $R = keP_wY - C$. Donc, l'Etat peut rétablir l'équilibre extérieur en réduisant le crédit, en dévaluant ou en accroissant l'offre de biens. Les deux premières mesures sont des mesures de court terme et la dernière, de moyen/long terme.

11. À titre d'exemple, le FCFA jugé surévalué par rapport à son étalon de référence, est dévalué de 50 pour cent en 1994 par rapport à sa parité avec le FF de 1948.
12. La règle de cohérence stipule que chaque politique économique doit avoir au moins autant d'instruments que d'objectifs. L'efficience exige que chaque instrument soit utilisé pour atteindre l'objectif pour lequel il a un avantage comparatif par rapport aux autres instruments.
13. De cette conclusion on peut exclure l'Afrique du Sud, le Kenya et le Zimbabwe qui, ayant déjà des systèmes financiers moins réprimés avant la crise des années 80, ont enregistré une amélioration de ceux-ci après la libéralisation financière.
14. La réforme du droit international réclamée par les pays du Tiers-monde dans les années 1960 exige de passer d'une égalité formelle à une égalité réelle par des correctifs juridiques : au nom de l'égalité souveraine, les pays en développement mettent en avant leur inégalité de fait pour la faire reconnaître et la corriger. Aussi, *le principe d'inégalité compensatrice* repose sur une dualité de normes applicables à des pays dont le niveau de développement est inégal. Pour plus d'informations, voir Taxil B., 1998, *L'OMC et les pays en développement*, Paris, Montchrestien.
15. Le STABEX était un système de stabilisation introduit par Lomé I. Son rôle fut d'offrir des moyens importants aux ACP pour financer leurs secteurs agricoles en difficulté du fait de la baisse des recettes d'exportation, que cette diminution soit due à la baisse des cours mondiaux, à des catastrophes naturelles, ou à une combinaison de ces deux facteurs. Etabli pour la première fois par la Convention de Lomé II, le SYSMIN apportait son soutien aux outils de production de huit produits miniers cruciaux : le cuivre, le cobalt, les phosphates, le manganèse, la bauxite, l'alumine, l'étain et le minerai de fer qui était couvert par le STABEX sous Lomé I. Avec Lomé IV, sa couverture s'est élargie pour accueillir l'or et l'uranium. Il s'appliquait à tous les produits miniers à l'exception du pétrole, du gaz et des minerais précieux autres que l'or. Il fut donc aux ressources minérales, ce que le STABEX fut aux produits agricoles.
16. Toute vérité scientifique est en effet partielle et provisoire tant que l'histoire continue. Fukuyama réfute désormais sa thèse de *la fin de l'histoire* en disant que son argumentation est un essai de théorisation à long terme de la modernisation politique et économique. Dans *State building*, paru en 2005, il va à contre courant de tout ce qu'il a dit sur *la fin de l'histoire et le dernier homme*.
17. Si *la culture populaire* représente les connaissances et les pratiques générales du peuple, nous entendons par *pensée ou recherche populaire*, la connaissance intellectuelle produite par les chercheurs qui choisissent le peuple, ses territoires et ses pratiques comme domaine de recherche.
18. Ces caractéristiques sont, entre autres, la confiance interpersonnelle, la proximité humaine et géographique, la petitesse des crédits, leur caractère rotatif et le monitoring social.

19. Appellation anglo-saxonne des études de développement comme domaine autonome, pluridisciplinaire et affranchi de la dictature de l'économie, de la croissance économique et du fonctionnalisme dans l'étude du changement social tant au Nord qu'au Sud.

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