Special Issue on 'The Ideologies of Youth'

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Guest Editors

Rijk van Dijk
Mirjam de Bruijn
Carlos Cardoso
Inge Butter

Contents / Sommaire
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Introduction: Ideologies of Youth

Rijk van Dijk* Mirjam de Bruijn**
Carlos Cardoso*** & Inge Butter****

Abstract

In a number of countries in Africa, such as Uganda and Kenya, national publics have been discussing whether citizens of age 50 or even 60 should be regarded as 'youth'. Under the current dispensation of donor funding, relief programmes and international aid, these discussions have made the 'youth' the major beneficiary of what these policies offer and imply. There is a general feeling, however, that these policies should target all age groups in their youth-oriented programmes. If the donor-ideology prescribes youthfulness for societal and developmental relevance, it will then dictate practice. This is just one example of what this special issue will address in an attempt to explore what we see as an emerging development in Africa and beyond: the rise of *youth as an ideology*. Whereas Africa has witnessed the rise of a fast-growing study of youth as a *phenomenon* and as a *concept*, the aspect of youth as ideology has, so far, not been elaborated on.

Résumé

Les citoyens dans plusieurs pays africains tels que l'Uganda et le Kenya discutent si oui ou non ceux qui sont âgés de 50 ou 60 ans doivent être considérés comme faisant partie de la 'jeunesse'. Les 'jeunes' sont les principaux bénéficiaires du programme actuel des bailleurs de fonds et de l'aide internationale. Cependant, d'aucuns défendent de plus en plus le fait que ces politiques doivent cibler toutes les tranches d'âge. Si l'idéologie des donateurs est de prescrire la 'jeunesse' pour justifier la pertinence du développement des sociétés, alors nous assistons à un dictat de leur part. Ceci n'est qu'un échantillon des questions que

*   African Studies Centre, Leiden. Email: dijkr@ascleiden.nl

**   African Studies Centre, Leiden University. Email:bruijnmede@ascleiden.nl

***   Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, Dakar. Email: carlos.cardoso@codesria.sn

****   African Studies Centre, Leiden. Email: butteric@ascleiden.nl

cette édition spéciale tente d'explorer. Ce phénomène est identifié comme étant l'émergence *l'idéologie de la jeunesse*, et est de plus en plus remarqué en Afrique et ailleurs. Même si l'Afrique a connu une croissance très nette de sa jeunesse comme un *phénomène* et un *concept*, l'aspect de *l'idéologie de la jeunesse* n'a pas encore été élaboré.

Introduction

Youth has been approached, first of all, *as phenomenon* due to the empirical realities of population growth and the skewed generational composition of many societies whereby the youth, however defined, are by far in the majority (Trudell 2002). The precarious situation of youth in many societies, resulting from poverty, ill-health, lack of education and future prospects, makes youth the subject of a growing research interest. Hence, a great deal of attention is devoted to the question of youth not only *at risk*, but also *as risk*. In that regard, youth is seen as a liability and as a force society should harness (see, for instance, Sommers 2003, 2006a, 2006b). The youth-as-risk perspective presents itself in the person of the child-soldier, the gang member, the religious radical, the hooligan or the criminal (see, for instance, Honwana 2006; Vigh 2006; Lindegaard 2009).

Within this paradigm of the relation between youth and risk, instigated by the sheer size of the problem, an aid-industry has come to fruition. In its many NGO activities and initiatives, this aid-industry apparently has shifted policy-orientations from the 'rural', the 'women' or the 'household', to the 'youth' as the new developmental target and hope for the future (see Garcia and Fares 2008). In some contexts, these NGO activities and their influence on local politics have influenced the manner in which the youth came to be recognised as a category for interventions (Durham 2007, Bourdillon 2008). As a social shifter, 'youth' is in existence endlessly; there will always be new youth to target as older youth supposedly move into adulthood at one point in time (Durham 2000). There can never really be a shortage of young populations as target of policy initiatives.

The academia in and of Africa have been involved in exploring and defining the phenomenon of youth. The growth in published works mirrors the invention of the phenomenon as such. Many of these publications demonstrate the history of the phenomenon of youth, its invention in colonial and sometimes even pre-colonial Africa (Abbink and van Kessel 2005; Last 2005; Honwana and de Boeck 2005). These studies have also particularly contributed to the ways in which youth came to be recognised as a distinguishable group in society, marked by its own problems and tribulations. This is evidenced by the plethora of studies that devote detailed attention to the 'vulnerability' of

the category under study and produce an undeniable record of the youth's precarious condition (Trudell 2002).

The linkage between youth and vulnerability (i.e. youth at risk) has been studied in many divergent directions, each of them of great significance in understanding how complex this situation of vulnerability actually is (i.e. youth and violence, war, soldiers, rebels, crime, radicalisation).

Increasingly, studies of youth in Africa discovered how youth themselves have been voicing their vulnerability to poverty, violence (Jourdan, this volume; Sanni, this volume), AIDS (see Christiansen, this volume) and inequality through such means of expression as rap, gangster music and art, or through their self-organisation in various social or religious movements (see Weiss 2005, 2009; Perullo 2005; Pype 2007; van Dijk 1999; de Bruijn 2007; and Suriano, this volume). Remarkably, in this entire literature, youth is seen as being in an oxymoronic state of 'constant crisis' (Vigh 2008). This is oxymoronic because if a crisis is constant, how can it be experienced as crisis? If the youth themselves reflect on their situation, how then will they be inclined to define that as being in a state of crisis if it is so very much their 'normal' state of affairs? Also, the notion of youth being in crisis obliterates, at least so it seems, the possibility of studying 'ordinary youth'; who is youth that attend school (see, for an exceptional example, Simpson 2003, and see Mokam (this volume)), live ordinary and regulated lives, and do have a caring family and a future to look forward to? Hence, the issue of youth as a phenomenon is in itself (and not because of its subject) problematic by and through some of the common or underlying assumptions.

Youth in Africa has also been studied *as a concept*. The problem here is on the one hand the paradigmatic point of departure as well as the paradigmatic demarcation. In a range of studies, the question is posed: when do we begin and when do we stop speaking of youth, particularly in terms of age? (see Honwana and de Boeck 2005; Christiansen et. al. 2006; Abbink and van Kessel 2005). These studies give different answers to the definition of youth if the social science of Africa intends to do justice to the cultural, historical and political circumstances and developments that have given shape to the idea of youth in local societies. Abbink (2005), for instance, argues that for pragmatic reasons in terms of age, the youth-category can be defined as people belonging to a 14 – 35 years of age-category. At the same time, he admits that this may deny social, cultural and political realities whereby, for instance, in the context of AIDS or violent conflicts, orphaned youth even below the age of 14, may already be having responsibilities in taking care of entire families that otherwise belong to adulthood, or one in which people above 35 years of age remain in a state of dependency and therefore are

categorised as 'children'. The generational perspective, as invigorated and developed by Alber et. al. (2008), also perceives of the differentiation of society into age-categories as a socio-historical construct that of necessity remains 'fuzzy' and actually requires a kind of fuzziness in order to have significance in ever-changing contexts where the meaning of age is continuously in the making – a point also developed by Christiansen et. al. (2006) as an aspect of how youth is a navigating category; i.e., indicating a younger set of people in society that usually is placed in a position where they need to develop their skills to navigate changing societal conditions constantly.

Basically these studies address the question of how we can make sure that we do not superimpose Western categories of social analysis, which may become meaningless in the particular cultural or historical setting. Does African youth exist at all and in whose hands rests the conceptual invention here? Or are we exoticising African youth if we assume that matters must be different in Africa, compared to the West or Asia (for India see Sinha-Kerkhoff, this volume; for Indonesia see Semedi, this volume) when it comes to such delimitations and demarcations?

Classical studies of African societies and cultures appear to have been devoting detailed attention to the formation of youth, their initiation and enculturation, as well as their exploitation in the hands of the elderly or in their introduction to capitalist regimes that turned them into cheap labour for the mines or plantations. The formation of power appears to have put in place its own 'working definitions' of who were and are to be recognised as youths and who therefore can be placed under certain regimes of control, of labour, of exchange and so forth. In African societies, this has been much studied in view of the interplay between gerontocracies (the power and control of the elderly) and the new regimes of production and labour that came about through colonialism and the engagement with capitalist markets (Aguilar 1998; Baxter and Almagor 1978; Bradbury 1969). Social science studies often followed these 'emic' categorisations, sometimes naively, believing that the emic is the royal road to the truth. Yet in addition to this, the missionary endeavour, the colonial apparatus and the independent nation-states all put in place systems of education that to a large extent were capable of capturing youth and which therefore operated on the basis of ideas of what youth is, i.e. what this social category consists of (comparatively see for this process in Asia the contribution in this volume on Scouting by Semedi).

While such an institutional *encadrement* of youth took place (not only in schools, but also the army or political youth wings for instance), an ambiguity remained about the precise 'edges' of the category of youth. In many societies,

the notion of the importance of marriage for entering adulthood means a societal definition of youth that can extend way beyond the school-going age (Johnson-Hanks 2002). In other situations and circumstances, such as that relating to AIDS in particular, orphaned youth are sometimes forced to take on duties and responsibilities that turn them into social adults at a very tender age (Robson et. al. 2006; Dahl 2009; Skovdal 2010). Hence, also the meaning and definition of adulthood can shift easily from situation to situation, making ambiguities even larger. This has particularly acquired traumatic meaning in the context of war and violence which sometimes has made youth commit atrocities that upset and disrupted societies so profoundly that a sense of how and why categories of differentiation in age can be made vanished completely. In this volume, this process has been addressed by the contribution of Jourdan on *mayi-mayi* youth in Congo and by Sanni's contribution on youth movements in Nigeria.

Youth as an Ideology of Becoming

The conceptual fuzziness of the idea of youth has had detrimental effects on the study of youth as a phenomenon. It has become increasingly fuzzier to understand precisely which groups are studied if there is no conceptual clarity of their demarcation, nor conceptual clarity of how their choices, situations and motivations can be understood. The best social science usually offers is the argument that an understanding must be 'situational' and that it must include 'agency' although it remains very unclear where and in whose hands this agency should be located if all is 'situational' to begin with (Christiansen et. al 2006; Cole and Durham 2007, de Bruijn 2007). The diversity of the phenomenon seems to stand in the way of greater conceptual clarity of how structures of African societies can be understood and explored in the way in which a location of youth becomes visible and explainable (Alber et. al. 2008) . As social science in Africa has moved away from conceptualising youth only in terms of time – a passage through the generations – and has included the notion of space – not when one is youth but also *where* one is youth – the 'situational' exploration of youth has at least allowed for the possibility of looking at space and place as new modes of understanding. In addition to the concept of youth as emphasising the 'situational' it has also turned into the 'locational' dimensions. Youth should be understood in their relation to specific spaces and places, which Christiansen et. al. (2006) have termed 'navigation'. Youth is thus a 'navigational' concept as it indicates how and by following which trajectories, a 'certain' group of people in society produce, occupy, or escape from certain spaces and places. Redefining youth as an identity-project of 'becoming

somebody', this becoming is captured in navigating certain spaces and places – the bar, the disco, the funeral, the school, the church, the state, the house and so forth. Youth seem to create their own landscapes of action and interaction, their own sites for being young and for acting out their identities; and situations that seem to fit the idea of the emergence of distinct 'youthscapes' (Chatterton and Hollands 2003), forged as these are by the modern media, migration and new modes of communication.

Maira and Soep (2004) also explore youthscapes in the context of globalisation, as a way of creating a category of youth on the basis of social achievement and not as a psychological stage that children naturally pass through as they grow older. By analysing youthscapes, they are able to demonstrate how youth always occupy an ambiguous space in the interaction between local conditions, national ideologies and global markets. Youthscapes thus indicate the places (local, national or even global) where youth create spaces for becoming, i.e. a 'landscape' of possibilities that specifically mark the social spaces where being young and where living through the new experiences that are giving shape to one's identity, are to be found.

Yet what is lacking in most of these studies is a capturing or rendering visible of a process that is very much comparable to that of the emergence of ethnic identities. In the study of ethnicity as a phenomenon of social, political and economic organisation, and as a concept that serves the analytical distinction of perceiving a distinct process of identity-formation, it became increasingly important to also perceive ethnicity as being a form of *ideology*. We are interested in exploring ideology in the way it covers the pursuit of certain identity-constructs in the defence and enlargement of socio-political, socio-cultural and economic interests in society. That is, in how far is the pursuit of a youth-identity forceful with regard to processes of inclusion and exclusion in the defence of such interests? In how far is it becoming normative for (the control of) behaviour, expression and desires?

By comparison, many factors contribute to the ways in which ethnicity becomes an ideology, particularly for those subscribing to a particular ethnic positioning in any social field. The most important contributing factor to the process by which a particular identity comes to be rendered meaningful in ethnic terms, thereby signalling authenticity and belonging, are socio-political interests and resources. The emergence of the nation-state in many parts of Africa produced new divisions of a socio-political nature that were easily translated into exclusionary rhetoric (translated into autochthony: see Nyamnjoh and Geschiere 2000, Werbner 2002, etc.; but see for an Asian comparative case, Semedi, this volume). Ideas of a primordial nature of belonging somewhere came to be translated into ethnic identities that

functioned to produce exclusionary claims towards the ones that do not belong and therefore cannot be granted the same kind of socio-political resources. In the pursuit of ethnic identity, even old classical anthropological studies could be used as the intellectual resources that provided the evidence for some of the ethnic claims on resources of any kind. In many parts of Africa, the debates on 'autochthony' demonstrate forcefully how the rendering of ethnic identities becomes meaningful and important, but above all, it indicates conflicting arenas where resources are scarce but where the symbolic stuff to generate ethnic identities of any kind are abundantly available (Geschiere 2009).

This production of ethnicity as an ideology by and for the people themselves, who in the process make use of whatever is available, both as phenomenon and as concept for the social construction of such an identity, is what can also be observed in the case of youth. Youth has become an ideological project because an arena of interests and scarce resources has been generated around it (de Bruijn 2007; Moyer 2003; Nieuwenhuys 2001).

This arena is only partially of their own making as it has been produced in the context of post-colonial state-formation, the emergence of civic society organisations, educational systems, foreign NGO-activities and policies, and rapidly changing kinship patterns as a result of rapid population growth. Increasingly, governments and parliaments began to discuss 'youth' as a separate category for policy making but also as a kind of formal representation (see Sinha-Kerkhoff for India, this volume) so that the voice of youth could be heard in the context of national politics and nation-state building.

Youth as an Ideological Force

In some situations, the recognition of youth as an ideological force came to serve national or party politics through the establishment of para-military youth wings and organisations, of which the Ghana Young Pioneers and the Malawi Young Pioneers became well known if not broadly feared post-colonial examples. Through programmes like these, the youth often have become enlisted in the coming into being of the nation-state and the rise of the nation-state as a political project of identity-formation.

While there was on the one hand, increasingly, a formalised ideological positioning of youth in the framework of nation-states and civic organisations, there was on the other hand, also an international influence on the formation of an ideological positioning of youth (Abbink and van Kessel 2005). International youth organisations also began targeting postcolonial African societies and the formation of youth bodies in the form of student organisations, religious youth groups, and associations for care, support, training and so forth were established in many countries.

In addition to the transnational feature of the ideological positioning of youth, more 'ideological material' was rendered meaningful to youth themselves through the media and through migration. The media have also opened possibilities of representation of the youth to the public. This is a representation that goes with the formulation of an ideology, or at least that goes with the sharing of ideology with others. This particular form of exposure to an external, in some cases even global, flow of images and ideas by which the youth acquired the means to formulate ideologies by and for themselves, was in a sense 'free', 'uncontrolled', 'unorganised', 'random' and 'democratic' (Cole and Durham 2007). In principle, any youth could tap into that flow as it usually was able to reach every corner of society easily and randomly through the spread of modern means of communication (radio, television, magazines, mobile telephones, internet etc.). Images such as those relating to rap and other forms of modern youth styles acquired a high velocity of spreading, adoption and adaptation in many African settings (see Suriano, this volume). In other words, while youth as a category of age indicates a life-phase of 'becoming', the whole ideological framing of the term youth indicates a process of coming into being of a specific domain of power that also began to 'prescribe' what these forms of expression should be about. The trope of 'marginalisation', as is often found in such expressions as rap, street-theatre, dance, style and fashion is very much the product of the 'ideolisation' of youth in Africa.

As such, the post-colonial moment became a time in which youth had unprecedented opportunities to present themselves, make their voice heard, organise themselves into movements of a religious or political nature within the context of nation-state projects and make their presence felt through the media. More than ever before, youth could tap into many different types of symbolic, political and ideational resources that allowed for the creation of ideological bedfellows; youth being confronted with an increasing ideological compartmentalisation of the category of youth in the hands of governments, NGO policies, transnational mediation, and religious and political interest, while at the same time becoming agents in their own right in the establishment of a range of social forms of organisations or groupings that make available onto themselves the identities that are relevant. 'Youth' has become a project for youth themselves, and these youth happily make use of all the ideological resources that give the project its distinctive features.

This means that we are talking of ideology in two different perspectives at the same time; while ideologies (such as religious or political systems of thought and practice) define, circumscribe and make use of the youth, and therefore include young people in their ideological projects, this volume intends

to indicate that youth are not passive in their ideological framing. While 'youth' has become a project for governments, religious and political leaders and NGOs in the ordering of society and production and control of interests and resources, youth has become an active ideology for themselves in the pursuit of their own interests; in other words, they have acquired an ideological force of their own. This is the reason why, as Durham (2007) has described succinctly for Botswana, youth can manoeuvre themselves in a position where they control the processes of inclusion and exclusion on the basis of age-categorisation; and ageism that has acquired new and unprecedented dimensions in recent years. The Botswana case that Durham analyses clearly shows how youth, through taking control over youth-programmes, the youth-ministry, the financing of youth-affairs and the gaining of control over important channels for the expression of their desires and identities, do create the means to exclude others, to monopolise resources and establish a kind of political favouritism with regard to their position in society.

In the course of this ideological interlocking between ideologies *for* youth and ideologies *of* youth, 'youth' has lost its naivety; too many interests, resources and contestations are at stake; too many different ideas and political projects are projecting different social orders in which youth take up different positions; and too many attempts are made to streamline the youth's own visions and voices into such contesting notions of the social.

One particular source for youth to become an ideology that is capable of enforcing its own interests or that may support the interests of other groups and institutions in society is and has been religion (see also Sanni, this volume, for the relationship between youth and Islam in this regard in Nigeria). In a number of studies on religion in Africa, the issue has been raised of how and why in specific circumstances and social processes, religious formations became deeply intertwined with youth. These studies have been dealing with the introduction and spread of Islam and particular forms of Christianity and, in fewer cases, has also related to African historical forms of religion. In the work of Parkin (1972), *Palms, Wine and Witnesses,* for instance, the spread of Islam in Kenya is studied from the perspective of how Islam had to become 'youthful' in order to be successful, and how, the other way around, youth in defending new-found positions in society were turning to particular forms of Islam to do so. A similar symbiosis for mutual success can be found in new forms of charismatic Pentecostalism that have been sweeping through many parts of Africa in recent years. Its success in places such as Malawi (see van Dijk 1999) was largely based on the ways in which it connected to the position of youth and, in particular, to those who wanted change in the gerontocratic structures of society. Pentecostalism became a

place for the youthful to be involved and the faith contributes to a youth identity whereby the faith itself also acquired a youthful outlook. In much of the Pentecostal activity in Malawi, the elderly therefore became the target of conversion and purification strategies and rituals, being the ones for whom a 'born-again' ideology was the hardest to muster.

There are also much earlier examples of similar processes on the African continent than the ones referred to so far, which all took place in the 1970s and 1980s. Earlier examples of similar processes of an intertwined relationship between religion and youth can be found in the *Mchapi*-movement that swept through the southern African region in the 1920s and 1930s. As recorded by Audrey Richards (1935) at the time, these were youth witchcraft eradication movements which, in order to be effective, were to consist of youth only. Another historical example of the way in which youth were effective in terms of producing profound religious changes were to be found in the activities of millennial and ecstatic revival preachers, travelling through the southern African region (Fields 1985).

These early examples of youth/religious activities demonstrate one particular feature this interrelationship appears to produce: an easy cross-cutting of all sorts of borders and boundaries, be they social-cultural, economic or geographical. Not only is the active spread of these youthful groups, witch-cleansers, zealous revival preachers and healers over a wider region remarkable, the way in which this combination of religion and youth becomes transcultural and appears to be able to render itself meaningful and effective in very different cultural settings at the same time is truly noteworthy. In addition, in each of these varied settings, their activities cross-cut boundaries of power, age, cultural respect and prestige and for some youth it even means upward socio-economic mobility as they gain access to new resources and opportunities.

This opens-up a perspective which does not only simply state that religion may want to recruit youth for its own prosyletisation. While there is no denial of the fact that in Africa some religious formations indeed have done their best to capture the youth in all sorts of associations or educational programmes and, as such, have been hoping that by doing so, the future of the religious body or particular kind of faith would be ensured, this is not the same as youth-as-ideology, which these early examples appear to have been demonstrating. In these religious forms, the need and ambition to be young created the specific impetus to be involved in border-crossing purposefully. In these groups, to belong to youth created a specific form of power that otherwise could not be attained and that became a form of power which could be understood and negotiated religiously.

In this collection of articles, this process of youth appearing in an ideological (including a politically and religiously inspired) format is being studied in present-day Africa. Due to globalisation, Africa has witnessed the spread of many new forms of Christianity and Islam across various parts of the continent, such as Pentecostal or Islamist movements; while in the domain of African historical forms of religion, new nativist movements have appeared in which youth again play a dominant role (one example of that is the Afrikania Mission in Ghana, see de Witte 2008). In each of these forms, the use of modern means of transport and communication as well as a dominant presence in the public domain through modern media has become important politically. This volume features a variety of examples of these new conjunctures between religion/ideology and youth and the way they translate into modern political contexts of life in Africa. Whereas earlier youth movements cut across regions and more localised social-cultural formations, such as kinship patterns or local forms of authority, in the current context this cutting across borders has acquired new meaning and a new dynamic. One element is indeed the increasing importance of the public domain and the civic sector. In terms of the public domain, being young means to engage in public speech, religiously endorsed in the form of (evangelical) campaigns, rallies, radio and television shows, music, performance and so forth. For these forms of religious and political expression, the element of being 'youthful', of having to transmit a youthful imagery and a youthful identity, appears as of paramount significance for its success. In these ways, often fundamentalist Christian and Islamic movements present a youthful imagery as recipe for success and public appeal.

The important question is obviously why? Why is it that these ideological formations, in the new Africa that we are describing here, must be youthful? Why is youth as ideology so important in achieving public success for many ideologies and policies? What is the inherent quality and nature of the relationship of youth and ideologies that is producing that success or at least that aspiration of public success?

An important dimension to be explored is the extent to which youth connect to ideologies in the way that they are not bound by vested interests. If it becomes ideologically 'better' to be young it might also indicate that in particular circumstances, it is 'better' not to have vested interests in anything. This would mean that we are looking into an ideology that is particularly 'footloose', that depends more on intellectual and social capital than it builds on 'real' capital, that it constructs networks instead of ties and that, because of its fluidity, escapes much of the control of an elderly generation. Examples abound of 'travelling cultures' of the young in religious and public terms,

such as the street-preachers from Malawi, the Rap-groups in Dakar and Nairobi, the Talibe of francophone Islamic Africa, and so forth.

Another element to be explored in this 'alliance' between ideology and youth relates to the fact that this ideology produces new structures which can be appealing in situations where state-decay and crumbling of kinship systems produce a real need for replacements, constructed by the youth themselves. This creates its own counter movements and ideas, attempting to disqualify the structures that were once dominant in their lives by bringing them under new checks and balances, which at other moments reinforce the ideology once more. The youth-as-ideology interpretation allows us to see more of the agency that commonly is attributed to youth (see de Bruijn et. al. 2007) but which turns this agency into a counter-hegemonic force to the powers that be (state, church, party, etc.). Through the various contributions in this volume, we aim to demonstrate how, not only ideology can cover or inspire agency in terms of protest, resistance, alternative choice and so forth for youth, but also how in important ways, ideology itself is part of the inventions that this agency is producing. Youth are the constructors of this ideology that pursues 'youthfulness' and its interests and desires in unprecedented ways in current African situations; a reality which the following contributions demonstrate in their fascinating variety.

The Contributions to this Special Issue

This special issue is the result of a conference that was held in Dakar in 2006. This conference invited scholars to reflect on the relation between youth and ideology: *Youth and the Global South: Religion, Politics and the Making of Youth in Africa, Asia and the Middle East*. By that time, as is also clear from the bibliography in this volume, this was still a topic in its infancy.[2] Though the study of youth is very prominent in Africa, the comparison with the same field in Asia and the Middle East has been revealing. In this volume, we included two studies from Asia (India and Indonesia), and five studies from different countries in Africa (Cameroon, Uganda, Congo, Nigeria and Tanzania). The division between studies from Asia and Africa also reflects the general state of affairs in youth studies in the developing world, which are especially based on research in Africa.

The articles in this volume show how diverse the category of 'youth' is. They all refer to a specific category of youth; in development (Sinha-Kerkhoff, Christiansen), in the nation (Semedi), within the complex chaos of war and violence (Jourdan and Sanni), as public performers (Suriano) or as a schooling youth (Mokam). These categories are often defined from the outside, and then taken up by the youth who become actively involved in a re-definition in

their own terms. Youth as an ideology in the service of states or organisations becomes an ideology-of-youth for the youth itself; an ideological resource. The articles all refer to this latter 'use' of youth. They do not only refer to religion and politics as an ideology of youth, but they refer to a much broader domain of ideologisation by the youth themselves. These domains can be found in music and arts (Suriano), in the history of war, conflict and insecurity (Jourdan, Sanni), in sexuality in relation to HIV-AIDS (Christiansen) and in education (Mokam). Youth either embrace these ideologies or are engaged by them, as in the case of university youth in Cameroon, in policy formation in India (Sinha-Kerkhoff) and in Scouting in Indonesia.

The latter idea of ideologies, with which youth are forced to engage themselves, often takes place in relation to ideologies of youth and the state. Sinha-Kerkhoff provides us with examples from India. In her case, it is the state ideologising the youth; i.e. a state that needs youth to celebrate its own success. This article is set in India, but the process it indicates is very relevant for African situations as well. The article of Semedi, situated in Indonesia, relates to youth and the state in a different manner, namely how through the organisation of youth (scouting) associations the state not only creates an ideology of youth, but also creates youth as a militant organisation. Mokam's article on Yaoundé university youth shows how the state influences youth in their youthful identity. We can question if such movements have an ideology beyond their economic goals? The article of Sanni, on Nigerian youth-organisations, discusses how they act as a protective force. Are they a reflection of how the state forms the youth, of how youth is an answer to the imperfections of the state, and whether this informs policies?

However, youth also creates its own ideology. As the case of Nigeria demonstrates, the youth often create order by basing themselves on an imagined history of their force in moments of violence. In such cases, the youth 'construct' their own ideological practice in relation to an imagined past. Another clear example of youth making their own ideology and making their voices heard is in the realm of popular culture. In Tanzania, music and texts voice the wishes of the youth and give them strength. It is an example of youth culture.

How youth organise and shape social relations in society reflect the presence of new developments in Africa and Asia. In Christiansen's article on youth confronted with the HIV-AIDS epidemic in Uganda, the development of a new categorisation of youth is visible, not imposed by the state, not created by the youth, but created in the interplay between sexuality and sociality. The problematic of illness feeds into ideologies of youth and youth ideology concerning sexuality. Youth then take a social position in how they intend to

(re-)structure sexual and reproductive relations that are important to them, often contradicting the ways in which the older generations want these relations to be.

This is a good note to end on: youth taking a social position by navigating through places and spaces, all linked to new developments that incorporate youthfulness. This is a social position which is reinforced by the way they are either included in an ideology or produce an inclusionary ideology. The question this raises is: who has access to this ideologisation of youth? And who are these youth that are producing ideologies of themselves? In the end, we therefore face the paradox that while youth is often excluded from the formulation of ideologies that shape their lives, this self-ideologisation is at the same time producing new modes of exclusion. This is setting a new agenda for the social sciences of youth in Africa and beyond; an agenda to which this volume aspires to contribute on the basis of a number of well-informed and empirically studied cases.

Notes

1. This is not only an issue of discussion in the African context, as similar patterns can be found in India (see Sinha-Kerkhoff in this volume).
2. The Bibliographic Overview (Klouwenberg and Butter) in this volume reflects the results of literature search carried out in 2005 and is complemented by more recent publications dealing with 'youth'.

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Padvinders, Pandu, Pramuka: Youth and State in the 20th Century Indonesia[1]

Pujo Semedi

Abstract

This article explores the significance of the large and very influential scouting movement in Indonesia, just before and after independence up till the present time. Here again, the emphasis is on the transmission of a very specific set of values and behavioral patterns that not only the scouting movement itself found important, but which became also very much supported by the Indonesian regime. These values entailed a disciplining of youth, a political ensnarement in the preparation of youth for good Indonesian citizenship, an acceptance of the role of the military as well as a civilization mission that embraced many bourgeois middle class values concerning dress, style, comportment, the body, responsibility and so on. Above all, patriotism was greatly valued; and as such, the scouting movement was capable of taking away much of the critical, if not revolutionary, power that in colonial times was kept by Islamic youth movements opposing colonial authority.

Résumé

Cet article explore le sens du grand et influent mouvement du scoutisme en Indonésie de la période juste avant et après l'indépendance jusqu'à nos jours. Ici encore, l'accent est mis sur la transmission d'un ensemble de valeurs spécifiques et d'un comportement qui étaient très importants pour le mouvement, mais qui étaient aussi encouragés par le régime indonésien. Pour ces valeurs, les jeunes étaient soumis à une discipline, à la politisation de leur préparation pour une bonne citoyenneté indonésienne, à l'acceptation du rôle des militaires aussi bien qu'à la mission civilisatrice dont a été sujet une bonne partie du monde bourgeois par rapport à l'habillement, le style, le comportement, le corps, le sens de la responsabilité, etc. Le patriotisme, avant tout, avait beaucoup d'importance. Par conséquent, le mouvement du scoutisme avait repris l'important pouvoir, quelque part révolutionnaire, qui du temps colonial était détenu par les mouvements de la jeunesse islamique contre les colons.

* Dept. of Anthropology, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Email: widuri@indosat.net.id

My curiosity with Indonesian scouts is triggered by the simple fact that since they were introduced in Indonesia in 1912, scouting organisations have come to belong to the most important and biggest youth organisations in the country. Scouting organisations were introduced just a few years after the inception of what was then known as Netherlands India, by the hero of the Mafeking siege, Lord Baden-Powell. From year to year, loads of Indonesian youth have joined the scouts until they reached early adulthood. Some stay on as scoutmasters until or after their retirement age. It is not an exaggeration to say that what Indonesians of any profession, rank and social status – from heroes of the Independence War to executive officers of the country's top private companies, from university presidents to simple vegetable and fruit farmers in remote rural areas – have in common, is that they were or are scouts. The latest reports tell us that by 2002 there were around 16 million Indonesian youth registered as scouts. Members ranged from the third grade of primary school to university.[22] By any standard participation, some would say that the mobilisation of Indonesian youth in scout movement is enormous (Salam 1988:118).

Only a few studies have been addressed to scout movement, especially in Southeast Asia. Katherine Bowie (1997), who works on the Thailand Village Scout – which is actually more of a para-military organisation rather than a scout movement – is among those few. She concentrates her attention mainly on the five days initiation programme of the Village Scouts and comes to the conclusion that the programme is not more than a state ritual through which participants do not gain anything else but euphoria which, 'over the time … dissipated into apathy' (Bowie 1997:282). Perhaps Bowie is right about the initiation programme, but an organisation will not last long and attract huge memberships if all it can offer is merely a feeling of euphoria, resulting from the initiation rite. The fact that the Indonesian scouts are still very much alive, and continues to develop after almost a century of existence, implies that there must be a force strong enough to keep the movement active.

The popularity of scouts among contemporary Indonesians is partly explained by their role as 'character factory', the third ring of education. This ring comes after family and school, and is the time at which youth can learn and develop good character, trustworthiness, discipline, intelligence, skill, handicraft, physical health, and self-care for the good of the community (Baden-Powell 2004:44-6; Rosenthal 1986:4-6; Pramuka 1969:10). Partly, the scouts' popularity is explained by their attachment to larger institutions, be they royal courts, nationalistic movement organisations, religious organisations, political parties, armed forces or government. In return for lavish political support, funding and facilities, the scouts serve their mother

institutions by functioning as seedbeds for raising loyal national cadres and winning popular support (Muecke 1980:408).

Scouting was generally known as an apolitical movement, with the motive behind its inception being mostly social. Closer observation, however, will show us that since its very beginning, scouting could not be separated from politics. Its inception was proposed as an answer to the erosion of the British Empire's power in the early 20th century which, in Baden-Powell's eyes, stemmed from the social decay of the British youth:

> … great waste of human life now going on in our city slums where so many thousand of our fellow humans are living in a misery through being 'unemployable' … simply because they have never been given a chance (Warren 1986:376; cf. Baden-Powell 1930:226).

This problem was to be solved by instilling the value of duty and discipline among the youth so that they would grow up as responsible and patriotic citizens willing to defend their society (Warren 1986:380). In most of the modern 20th century, society referred to a nation which in turn was materialised in the form of institutions. These institutions either ran the state or aspired to gain political power to run the state. It was mainly to these types of institutions that scout movements were attaching themselves. Scouting can be seen as a child of nationalism (cf. MacDonald 1993). Although scout movements often claimed to be apolitical, their everyday practices were caught in thick national political webs. This article is going to explore the role of government and other kinds of organisations which aspired to gain political power in Indonesia along the course of the 20th century in the creation and promotion of scout movements in Indonesia. To what extent were they capable of utilising scout movements as instrument to achieve their political goals and how did the dynamics in Indonesian politics affect the fate of scouting, which according to its founding father, was supposed to be apolitical?

A Political Instrument

Brought to Indonesia by P. J. Smith and Major de Jager a year or so prior to the outbreak of the First World War, the scout movement aimed to mold the 12 to 18-year-old youth of Netherlands-India into good citizens. Good citizens are those loyal to the Queen, those who ove the Fatherlands, obey and respect the legitimate authority, are responsible to one's duty, gentle mannered, benevolent and helpful, and who love nature. This movement, which P.J. Smith and Major de Jager naively addressed, was supposed to be 'free from any religious denomination and political orientation'.[3] Some years later, on 4 September 1917, with the blessing of the headquarters of the *Nederlandsche Padvinders Organisatie* in the Hague, the Netherlands-India

scout established their organisation called the *Nederlandsch-Indische Padvindersvereeniging* (NIPV)(Abdulmuchni 1951:57).

Somehow, unlike their European progenitor, Indonesian scouts were not born into and raised within a social condition in which the constant threat of war and the poor quality of youths were considered as problems (Baden-Powell 2004:197; Springhall 1987:938). Instead, they underwent their early development in an atmosphere of national awakening, where the air was thick with political antagonism between the natives and their colonial master (Lombard 1990:161).[4] Unlike their colonised contemporaries, such as in Africa, where social life was deeply scarred with racism to the extent that 'Scouting being open to all regardless of class, creed, or colour was found to be impossible in practice' (Baden-Powell 1936:368; Parsons 2001:62), Indonesian scouts were more plagued by acute political fractionalisation. As a result, it was impossible to establish united bodies of scouts open to any youth regardless of their descent, ethnic, political aspiration and religion. The NIPV itself was quite Dutch-oriented. Their members were mostly Dutch youths. Communication, both verbal and literal, was carried out in Dutch, and while they were patriotic they gave their allegiance to the Dutch nation. Although they perhaps tried not to be so, NIPV members were also colonialistic, as reflected in the illustration for the administrative column in their monthly bulletin, *het Indische Padvinders*. It depicts two smart, self-confident Dutch scouts discussing intently the administrative papers laid out on a working desk, while behind them a native in servant attire approaches to serve them with cups of tea.[5]

It did not take long for the nationalistic movements' leaders to find out the scouts' great potential for their own organisation and political struggle. First of all, the scouts' patriotic credo 'Country first, self second' (Baden-Powell 2004:28) fit nicely into the spirit of the national movements. Scouting was an excellent way to cast loyal cadres, because it would allow the movements to educate youths from their late childhood onwards. As Dr Sukiman of the militant *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* PSII executive committee said: '*Bidji jang baik dan koewat betoel itoe ditanem moelai misi ketjil*', a good and strong seedling must be nurtured since they were small (Poeze 1982c:152). Scout membership was open to youth from 12 to 18-year-olds and later on was expanded to the ages 8 to 12 for cubs (Hoofdbestuur Muhammadiyah 1927a:12; 1927b:8).[6] The scouts' code of conduct to respect and obey their scoutmasters as well as the scouting's socio-psychological setting, which places scoutmasters as role models for their troops, are a sure guarantee for the successful transmission of the mother organisation's values, mission and strategy to their scouts cum cadres (Rosenthal 1986:110; Macleod 2001:5).

Scouts also functioned as a great public relations act to win popular support. Healthy and energetic youth with exemplary characters and smart uniforms were certainly a very promising view. This especially appealed to the natives of a colony which had been treated as third class citizen, simply because there was no fourth. '*In de jeugd ligt de toekomst*', in the youth lies the future, thus leaders of SIAP in the 1930s wrote.[7] Establishing scout troops was a sure way to let people know what kind of future the national movement offered them. Last but not least, as scouting quickly spread all over the world and developed into international organisations, the nationalistic movements' involvement in scouting would certainly have opened up the possibility of international recognition.

Almost without delay, Indonesian national movements of any ideological background established their scouts, and the Baden-Powell's scout law of being 'loyal to the King, and to his officers, and to his country' was soon subjected to a very liberal interpretation (Abdulmuchni 1951:31; Pryke 1998:323).[8] The fire was started by Prince Mangkunegara VII who in September 1916 established his principality Javaansche *Padvinders Organisatie* (JPO) (Suharini 2000:18). Just as their name suggested and their oath stated, JPO scouts were 'loyal to the Prince and the beloved Motherlands'. The movement was exclusively opened to citizens of the Principality. Every Sunday, under the fluttering JPO's Pare *Anom* (Golden Green) flag, the scouts gathered at the Mangkunegaran palace front yard to practice marching drills, first aid, map reading, knot tying and other basic scouting skills. It must have been a great view for the Indonesians to see indigenous youth, looking healthy and energetic in their smart uniforms, throwing salute in the way of Roman soldiers – which unfortunately years later was known as a Nazi salute – playing drum band, and marching briskly back and fro at the scoutmaster's command (Pandu Rakjat Indonesia 1951:134). One afternoon on his way back from lecturing, Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of the Muhammadiyah Movement, happened to be among the bystanders. He was deeply impressed by what he saw and decided to bring scouting to his organisation. Ahmad Dahlan was not the only one, leaders of Boedi Oetomo, the first nationalistic political movement, were also impressed by the Mangkunegaran scouts.

Soon, Muhammadiyah and Boedi Oetomo sent their representatives to the principality court to learn the nook and cranny of running scouts troop. Returned to their home base in Jogjakarta, Somodirdjo and Sjarbini initiated *Padvinder Muhammadiyah* in 1918. Two years later, the name was changed into *Hizbul Wathan*, HW (Army of Motherlands) after an Egyptian anti-colonial freedom fighter troop (Raharjendra 1990:28). Boedi Oetomo created their

own *Nationale Padvinderij* in 1921 (Suharini 2000:43). A few months later, the Jogjakarta branch of *Jong Java* (the Javanese Youth) established their Jong *Java Padvinderij.*[9]

Although drawing their inspiration from and bearing clear marks of scouts, from their very beginning HW were not to mix themselves with other scouts, especially those sponsored by the colonial government. HW's goal was to promote education and learning among youth, based on Islamic teaching, in order to make good people out of them with fine characters and healthy physiques (Hoofdbestuur Muhammadijah 1927a:8; 1927b:6; Djoemairi nd:. 9). This, the HW leaders argued, was not in conformity with the NIPV whose ideology was based on Christianity – as reflected in the scouts' three-finger salute – and it was not HW's business to spread Christian teaching, however subtle it was. HW also refused to join NIPV's rank because the NIPV oath implied that the legitimate authority was the colonial government and NIPV scout loyalty was to the Dutch Queen. This was clearly against the HW's aspiration of national freedom (Raharjendra 1990:31-32).[10]

In April 1927 *Komite Persatuan Indonesia,* where Ir. Soekarno sat as first secretary, established the *Nationale Padvindersorganisatie* (NPO). Elected as leader of these scouts was Mr. Sartono while Muwardi sat as secretary and Ir. Soekarno as treasurer. A year later, the NPO was transformed into the *Indonesische Nationale Padvindersorganisatie* (INPO) and declared their aim to be the struggle for Indonesian independence. Also in 1927, during the national congress held from 8 -11 April in Jogjakarta, the militant PSII declared their *Sarekat Islam Afdeling Padvinderij* (SIAP). Moeridan, who was appointed as the scouts' chief leader, stated bluntly that the goal of SIAP was to prepare the youth with a healthy physique and strong character to fight against the enemy of Islam, while Reksodipuro of the PSII executive committee added that the aims of SIAP were to prepare leaders for the independence struggle. Side by side with *Pemoeda Sarekat Islam* (Sarekat Islam Youth), the SIAP were placed under the PSII Youth Department, and SIAP scouts of 18 years old were obliged to take PSII membership (Poeze 1982c, pp.34-7, p. 495).

The use of scouts to prepare cadres loyal to the political struggle of achieving Indonesian independence sometimes proceeded to border on militarisation. In their regular weekly gathering, Hizbul Wathan scouts always spent considerable time on the marching drill. They were so disciplined in the drill that they were known as '*pandoe militer*', militaristic scout (Raharjendra 1990:40). To earn income and strengthen their organisation in 1929, SIAP planned to publish a monthly internal magazine entitled '*Sendjata Pandoe*', 'Scouts' Weapon' (Poeze 1983:15). SIAP also decided to send

branch leaders to Banjarnegara, Central Java, for a three-month camping trip involving a martial arts course (*pencak silat*). Some of SIAP's members in Pacet, West Java, had practised *pati geni* fasting to make them invincible to blades and bullets (Poeze 1983:232, p. 363). Occasionally, this fierce loyalty to the nationalistic goal went against the basic scouting value of humanity. In his closing speech at the Pemoeda Moeslimin Indonesia Conference in Surakarta, 18April 1929, Ramelan, the leader of SIAP, reportedly said:

> SIAP are not really scouts but helpers of our own people, we should not help the whites (Dutch) like what other scouts do. SIAP would not give any help if the European is struck by problems, let them die. But we have to give our hands to our own people, if necessary we must [be] willing to spend our money for them (Poeze 1983:98).

Surja Wirawan, for instance, who were widely known as scouts of the Greater Indonesia Party, in fact labelled their own Wirawans of 12 to 18 years old as *Jeugdstorm*, Youth Storm, who would serve as working troops as they passed 18 (Poeze 1994a, p. LV, p. 239).

Indeed, not all scouts were as militant as SIAP and Hizbul Wathan. There were some, such as *Pandoe Kasoeltanan* (PK) of Jogjakarta Sultanate, *Kepandoean Azas Katholiek Indonesia* (KAKI), *Pandoe Tri Darma* of the Protestant Church, *Kepandoean Masehi Indonesia* (KMI) of the Saviour Church, *Pandoe Anshor* of the traditionalist Moslem Nahdhatul Ulama, *Pandu Organisatie Pasundan*, who were hardly ever mentioned in the reports of the colonial government Political Intelligence Service (PID) – suggesting that they were not considered as a blatant threat to the government (Poeze 1994b:239). Yet, in general, there was a tendency of scout radicalisation during the course of the 1930s of which one would certainly find difficult to judge whether the native scouts were really scouts or youth members of political parties. Most scouting organisations were anti-colonial, which explains why most of them declined the invitation to join NIPV rank in the late 1920s. Doing so would have earned them government blessing and official membership to the World Scout Association. NIPV was the sole scouting body in the Netherlands-India acknowledged by the World Scout Association (Poeze 1982a:LXXXIII). G.J. Ranneft, the chief leader of NIPV replied to the negative response by officially forbidding the native scouts to use 'padvinders' in their organisation's name. In turn, Haj Agus Salim, leader of the board of PSII, responded to the ban lightly and coined a new term 'Pandu', after a hero figure in Mahabarata epic, to replace padvinder. From then on, many native scouts substituted their name from padvinders to pandu.[11]

As the number of scouting organisations grew, an attempt was made to consolidate them into a single body. The first effort occurred in early 1928 in

Bandung where *Pemuda Indonesia Padvinderij* and NPO of the National Party were to unite into the *Indonesische Nationale Padvinders Organisatie* (INPO). Not long after that in Surabaya, INPO, SIAP and National-Islamietischepadvinderij (Natipy) came up with the idea of forming an all-Indonesian scouts federation. It took almost two years for this idea to come close to materialising. On 15 December 1929, INPO, Natipy, SIAP, Jong Java Padvinderij (JJP), Pandu Kebangsaan, Pandu Pemuda Sumatera (PPS), Jong-Indische Padvinders Organisatie (JIPO) held a conference in Jakarta. JPO of Mangkunegaran Principality and HW were invited but did not show up. In spite of this, the conference discussed the establishment of an all-Indonesian scout's federation. They came to the conclusion that if there was a federation, it should be based on nationalism, national unity and Islam which in practice was hard for every scout to accept. INPO, JJP, Pandu Kebangsaan and PPS stuck with nationalism, proclaiming that every scout, regardless of their religious affiliation, might join the federation as long as they carried the flag of nationalism. In turn, SIAP and Natipy stuck with Islam, stating that the federation was open to any scouts as long as they were Muslim. At the end, all the participants could agree on was that the time to establish a true all-Indonesian scout's federation was yet to come. The nationalist scouts, however, were unwilling to step back. Right after the conference they established *Persaudaraan Antar Pandu Indonesia* (PAPI), Brotherhood of Indonesian Scouts (Poeze 1982c, p. 254, p. 277; 1983, p. 273). Apparently, not a single scouting troop was interested in joining the Brotherhood and eventually, in 1930, the Brotherhood transformed themselves into an ordinary scouting troop called *Kepanduan Bangsa Indonesia* (KBI), Indonesian Scouts (Poeze 1983:XXXIII).

The scouts federation was finally established in 1938 and named itself *Badan Pusat Persaudaraan Kepanduan Indonesia* (BPPKI), Central Body of Indonesian Scouts Brotherhood. Around four years later, from 19-23 July 1941, the Brotherhood succeeded in staging the first All-Indonesian Scouts Jamboree, in Jogjakarta.[12] It seems that the willingness of the native scouts to establish the federation was related to the growing pressures from the NIPV. In 1934, the world's chief scout Lord Baden-Powell and his wife visited Jakarta, but NIPV had banned non-NIPV scouts from attending the ceremony. Non-NIPV scouts were also forbidden from joining the Netherlands India contingent to the 5th World Jamboree in Vogelenzang, the Netherlands in 1937. The pressure of these bans in effect blocked the native scouts from international contacts, a cost which the scouts' mother organisations basically could not afford, as one among other important reasons for their investment in establishing scouting organisations was to gain international recognition.[13]

Another form of pressure originated during the 1930s economic malaise which threw the native scouts into difficulty in financing their activities (Setyantoro 2006:91; Suharini 2000:25). Reluctantly, a number of native scouts, including JPO of the Mangkunegaran Principality, bowed to this pressure and joined NIPV, thus allowing them to send members to the international jamboree. Out of 70 scouts who went to the World Jamboree, 29 were Dutch, 14 Chinese and 27 were Natives.[14] In the meantime, native scouts who were determined enough to stand on their own feet had no other choice but to forget some of their differences and tighten their ranks to form a federation.

The native scouts' resistance against unification, even in the face of a common enemy, was mainly rooted in the plurality of the late colonial period of Indonesian society. Far beyond the scouts moral and structural reach, Indonesian society at that time was deeply segmented by different ethnicities, religions, economic activity, local political history and political ideology. A solid middle class, which could socially act as integrator of the society and to whom scouting was basically addressed, simply did not exist. Socially, the native society was polarised into a mass of peasants and coolies and a small group of educated aristocracy, *priyayi* – from amongst whom leaders of national movements originated. As Furnivall (1939:468) has pointed out: 'Nationalism within a plural society is itself a disruptive force, tending to shatter and not to consolidate its social order'. Although they carried a similar goal of achieving Indonesian independence, there was competition among the nationalistic movements, not only on how – once the independence was won the country should be ruled (Ricklefs 1995:268) – but also who would rule her. Of course, every national movement organisation aspired to be the winner of this competition (Kahin1952:230). The future of post-colonial Indonesia was certainly a fiercely contested pie of which every contestant would like to take the biggest, if not the whole, piece. All of this became evident during the independence revolution of 1945-1949 and its subsequent years.

Gentle Patriots

During the period of Japanese occupation, scouts were disbanded. Dutch youths and their elders were put into prisons of war by the Japanese (De Nederlandsche Padvinders 1947), while the Indonesian youth were sent to join the Japanese sponsored *Seinendan*, the Youth Legion, the auxiliary police *Keibodan*, the auxiliary army *Heiho* and the Motherlands Defense Army, *PETA*. Many ex-scouts joined the Japanese sponsored militaristic organisation above, for they saw it as the right way to achieve their aspiration of Indonesian independence (Mertoprawiro 1992:26). Mid-1944, the Japanese

sponsored the establishment of *Barisan Pelopor*, Pioneer Legion, a militia that consisted of nationalist youths and *Hizbullah*, Army of God, whose members were mostly youths of PSII. Appointed as commander of Barisan Pelopor was Dr Muwardi, secretary of INPO and PAPI in the 1930s (Anderson 1961:48). In the wake of an independence war, Barisan Pelopor was transformed into *Barisan Banteng*, Buffalo Legion.

In December 1945, some four months after the independence proclamation, around 300 scout leaders held a conference in Surakarta and agreed upon the establishment of a national scouts organisation *Pandu Rakjat Indonesia* (PRI), Scouts of Indonesian People. Dr Muwardi, Commander of *Barisan Banteng*, whose political allegiance went to the National Party – and the Communist Party of Tan Malaka as well – was elected Chief Scout of PRI (Pandu Rakjat Indonesia 1950:77; Kahin 1952:163).[15] The government approved PRI as the only scouting body in the newly born republic through the Ministry of Education Decree No. 39/1947 and the Indonesian President received an honorary position as the organisation's national patron. The independence war (1947-1949), however, halted the PRI's activities. Indonesia lost most of its territory to the Dutch armed forces, so much so that by the end of 1948, they were cornered into the southern part of Central Java and Jogjakarta. Many scouts joined the Student Army in rural areas to wage guerilla warfare against the Dutch while the younger ones remained in the cities to serve as couriers and information gatherers (Pandu Rakjat Indonesia 1950:14, 66; Winarto 1951; Padmodiwiryo 1995:24). Dr Muwardi himself was killed in confusing armed conflict between troops of Pesindo (Socialist Youth of Indonesia) and Indonesian Navy who put their political allegiance with the Communist Party on one side, against Siliwangi Division of the Indonesian Army and Barisan Banteng on the other side in mid September, 1948 Surakarta (Kahin 1952:289). Meanwhile in the occupied areas, the pre-war Dutch and Chinese scouts had revived their activities. Troop bases were opened again and the Dutch and Chinese scouts happily wandered cities' outskirts or secured plantations, running their scouts games (Leembruggen 2001:97-118). To accommodate the development, G.J. Ranneft the pre-war Chief of NIPV, established the *Centraal Padvinders Kantoor* (CPVK), Central Office of Pathfinders, in Bandung.

When the war ended, in 1949, PRI found that their dream of an All-Indonesian Scout Movement was impossible. The Hague Round Table Conference of August-October 1949 made Indonesia to form a federal state in which the Republic of Indonesia would only be a member of the federation. In the other states, created by the Dutch during the war, the scouts were organised under CPVK who then were transformed into *Perserikatan Pandu Pandu* (PPP), Scouts Union. During the independence war, political parties

who had already been active as national movements during the colonial era, now found a legitimate arena to win seats in parliament as well as in field militia to fight the Dutch. They realised the importance of scout movement in this power play to recruit cadres and to create a bonafide public image. Promises that they had solemnly made in the establishment of PRI were soon broken. Every political party and mass organisation was now eager to revive their scouts. Just a week after the PRI second congress in Jakarta, from 20-23 January 1950, was over; HW raised their flag again, as did SIAP, *Pandu Kristen* and other scouts in the federal states.

Worried that political competition among the scouts' mother organisations would go beyond control and sacrifice the educational function of scouting, some scoutmasters tried to halt the disarray. With the blessing of the Ministry of Agriculture, they conferred in Jakarta, 16 September 1951, to establish *Ikatan Pandu Indonesia* (IPINDO), Indonesian Scouts Association (Muhammad 1952:22). To what extent this federation was capable of accommodating the varied interests and aspirations of its members, is still hard to tell. The fact was that, as years advanced closer to the 1955 general elections, scout troops mushroomed in Indonesia. As if in a race, every political party and mass organisation whose number grew incredibly and who were all fiercely attacking the other to win parliamentary seats (Feith 1962:361-3), established their own scouts. There were *Kepanduan Putra Indonesia* (KPI) of the Communist Party, *Perserikatan Kepanduan Tionghwa* (Perketi) of the Chinese Community, *Kepanduan Angkatan Muslimin Indonesia* (KAMI) of the Muslim Party, *Kepanduan Madjapahit* of a not-so-clear mass organization, and so on and so forth. Even the armed forces did not want to be outpaced. The navy revived the old *Zeeverkenners*, *Pandu Laut*, Sea Scout and the police created their *Pandu Bhayangkara*. By 1954 there were 71 scouting troops, with around 244,000 members officially registered at the Ministry of Education.[16] As the general election day drew nearer, the parties actively staged campaigns, in the form of mass gatherings in city squares or rallies along the city streets, never forgetting to show off their scouts.[17] For big parties who possessed enough funding to buy drums of every size, clarinets and trumpets, the parties' scout troops participating in the campaign played in a marching band. Those who were unable to get expensive musical instruments just lined up their scouts at the head of the rally. Poor parties were to be satisfied with placing their scouts as ceremonial guard in front of the podium on which their party leaders gave speeches.

The deployment of scouts as part of a political machine did not stop with the 1955 general elections. The Communist Party, as third winner of the election after the National Party and Muslim Party, went further to transform Indonesian scouting movements into Pioneers, just like they did in Eastern

European countries (Lembaga Sedjarah P K I 1960:84). The idea was brought up by Dr Prijono the coordinator minister of Education and Culture, 1957-1966, who was allegedly inclined to the Communist Party. For a while, it seemed as if the Communist Party's aspiration had received a green light from President Soekarno. Upon attending scouts jamboree in Ciputat, South Jakarta, in 1959, Soekarno was deeply disappointed. As he saw it, the scouts were acutely disorganised and all they were good at was playing games, singing, dancing and walking in the woods. To the president, and the proponents of the Pioneer idea, Indonesian scouts were thick with Baden-Powellism and unfit to be the spirit of the Indonesian revolution. According to Soekarno, Indonesian scouts should be fitted to the need of Indonesia. They should be active in community development works, such as building small-scale water powered electric stations; they should be engaged in agricultural extension services and so on, just like the party youth the President had met when visiting the socialist countries (Soekarno 1961:191).[18]

Worried about the Communist Party's next move, the nationalist scouts' leaders, led by the Sultan of Jogjakarta, Hamengku Buwono IX, approached Soekarno. They fully agreed with the president's will to organise the country's scouting movements into a single national body, firmly refusing the Communist Party's idea of transforming the Indonesian scouts into Pioneer. To them, the scouts should stay scouts. They should be fitted to the Indonesian societies condition but remain based on Baden-Powell's scouting principle of a semi-formal youth education scheme, including voluntary membership, organisation according to age groups and outdoor living and games. The nationalist scout leaders also tried to consolidate their organisations. On 19 May 1960, leaders of IPINDO conferred with leaders of the Sisterhood of Indonesian Girl Guides, *Persaudaraan Organisasi Pandu Putri Indonesia* (Poppindo) and the Union of Indonesian Girl Guides, *Persatuan Kepanduan Putri Indonesia* (PKPI) in Jakarta. There they decided to unite the three organisations into the Union of Indonesian Scouts, *Persatuan Kepanduan Indonesia* (Perkindo) with Hamengku Buwono IX as the Chief Scout. To avoid friction with the Communist Party, Perkindo opened their door to *Kepanduan Putra Indonesia* – the Communist Party scouts – inviting them to become members. Perkindo, however, did not succeed in carrying out its mission to become the sole national body for Indonesia scouting movement since many refused to join them (Raharjendra 1990:61-63).

Cadres of a Nation

Having failed with the Perkindo project, the nationalist scouts approached the president again to offer their concept of national scouts, apparently leaving the nationalisation process in the president's hands. On 9 March 1961,

Soekarno summoned leaders of all the scouting organisations to the presidential palace and announced his decision to dissolve all scouts in the country, organising them instead into a national scouting organisation called *Pradja Muda Karana*, abbreviated *Pramuka* (Youth Cadres of the Nation). Soekarno argued that he did this 'for the nation's sake', as hence, the scouts leaders had to willingly merge their troops into Pramuka.[19] On 14 August 1961, in a national ceremony on the presidential palace yard, Soekarno inaugurated Pramuka as the sole national scouts movement by handing the movement' *Tunas Kelapa* banner – a lightly ornamented white flag with red silhouette of coconut seedling to symbolise Pramuka as the nation's future generation – to the chief scout Hamengku Buwono IX.

Obviously, Pramuka was the middle way between Soekarno's wish to turn the youths into state cadres and the country's scouting leaders' wish to have the scouts remain as scouts. Literally speaking, *Praja Muda Karana* and Pioneer have the same meaning, cadre of the nation. But as a scouts movement, *Praja Muda Karana* would operate according to the scouting principle of voluntary character building through small group learning. Many were not happy with the presidential decision but no one dared to raise objection. Soekarno, at that time, was just too powerful to be disobeyed. With tears in their eyes, the scouts raised down their old flags. Soekarno's policy to nationalise the scouts into Pramuka signifies that, finally, the forty decades of competition over cadres, access to public support and international recognition amongst government, political parties and mass organisations had been won by the government. This was very like Soekarno indeed who, from his 1957 Presidential Decree until his downfall in 1966, would behave more as a dictator than a leader of a democratic country. Putting Soekarno and competition factors aside, the establishment of Pramuka also signified a change in the Indonesian scouts' position. They transformed from being part of political parties and mass organisations who were operated for the advancement of their mother organisations' interest, political or else, into a means of the ruling government to promote the governments' interests and whatever the government considered good for the nation and state.

The establishment of Pramuka gave the Indonesian government a very wide access into the country's youths, allowing them to instill values that they think fit to the country's need, as well as to mobilise them in implementing these values. Since their very beginning, scouts were already instilled with patriotism. Later on, the national awakening period and independence revolution instilled nationalism in them. Through rites and games, the scouts were taught to love the Motherland and embrace the idea of a nation-state. Both were fine, but not enough, for Soekarno. As his 9 March 1961 speech

indicates, the Indonesian scouts were about to be presented with a new value and role in the development of their country. The scouts were now not only to spend their time playing games, marching to and forth, but were also to be engaged in activities that directly benefited the community. As part of a number of smaller training and community service programmes, for six weeks in July-August 1965, some 2,400 scouts participated in Satya Dharma Camping in Purwakarta Regency, digging a stretch of canal for the Jatiluhur dam irrigation system.[20] Such an activity was not strange to the scouts, many of whom had been busy with illiteracy eradication campaigns in the pre-war era. The difference, however, being that from Soekarno's time onwards, scouts' deployment in community service was organised on a vast scale, from branch quarter to national quarter level.[21] Soekarno's successor, Soeharto, seized the opportunity to exploit the scouts to full extent. From the early days of his presidency in 1966, he started to deploy Pramuka as cadres of development – the sacred credo of his regime. He continued Soekarno's policy of filling the scouts' national headquarters with high-ranking officials. In 1971, he went further by issuing a presidential decree to install cabinet ministers as members of the scouts National Advisory Council. One ladder down, governors were appointed as Head of the Provincial Advisory Council which consisted mainly of a chief of every branch of governmental services and commanders of the regional armed forces. At municipality and regency levels, mayors and regency heads were appointed as Head of the Branch of Advisory Council. This decree had in effect put Pramuka under direct control of the government, as the president, governors, mayors and regency heads possessed direct access into the scouts' organisation in their respective areas.[22]

To boost youth participation in Pramuka at troop base level, in collaboration with the Ministry of Education, the Scouts National Headquarters issued a decree on 25 September 1965, asking students to join Pramuka and directing school principals to coordinate with one another in facilitating the enrollment of their students in scouting troops based adjacent to the schools. Should a community not have a scouting troop base, the principals would cooperate with community members to establish one. In practice, however, most of the principals took a short cut. Rather than talking and cooperating with other principals and community members, they established scouting troops in their own schools and recruited Pramuka members from among their own students. During the colonial era, many schools had already been used as troop bases, but the troops always belonged to political parties and mass organisations, not the school. These parties and organisations cooperated with the principals because schools normally had all facilities needed for scout training, such as open yards and classrooms, and, more importantly, it was the best place to recruit cubs. Yet, as principals started using their schools

as troop bases and recruiting scouts from among their students, scouts in Indonesia became a mass product and as far as people were concerned, a Pramuka was just a student with a dark and light brown uniform, participating in the extra-curriculair school activity of scouting.

A scouts troop, as Pramuka House Rule states, should consist of a *Perindukan Siaga*, a Den of 7 to 10 years old cubs; a *Pasukan Penggalang*, a Troop of 11-15-year-old scouts; an *Ambalan Penegak*, Crew of 16-20-year-old rovers; a *Racana Pandega*, a Clan of 21-25- year-old rangers, and a corps of scoutmaster (Takijoeddin 1968a, 1968b; Abbas 1990:75-7).[23] This structure, the house rule suggests, would allow a thorough scout training from childhood to adult. School based scouting troops, however, prevented this ideal structure from taking place. Primary schools in Indonesia carry out education programmes from grades 1 to 6, holding pupils from 7 years to 12 years old. Junior high school teaches grades 7 to 9, of students from 13 to 15 years old, and senior high school teaches grades 10 to 12, of students from 16 to 18 years old. Every school level constitutes a separated educational body in the sense that a primary school has no administrative relation whatsoever with a junior high school just next door. The result is that there are almost no scouting troop in Indonesia right now with complete memberships from cubs to rangers and scoutmasters. Primary school troops usually consist of cubs and young *Penggalang*. Junior high school troops consist of *Penggalang*. Senior high school troops consists of Penegak, while university troops – if they are willing to establish one – consist of *Pandega*.

Outside school-based troops in 1966, the National Headquarters introduced *Satuan Karya*, popularly abbreviated as *Saka*, akin to the United States Boy Scouts Association's Explorer programme, to provide rovers and rangers with practical and productive skills (cf. Taylor 1995). Satuan Karya are implemented at Branch Quarter, or municipality or regency level under the sponsorship of certain offices of government service or branches of armed forces. There is *Saka Taruna Bumi*, sponsored by Office of Agricultural Service, where the scouts can learn agricultural skills.[24]

There is *Saka Bahari* sponsored by the Navy where the scouts can learn seamanship; *Saka Bhayangkara* of public safety servicing, and *Saka Dirgantara* of airmanship. Later on in the mid-1970s, when family planning programmes and forest management gained importance, two more satuan karya were introduced. These were those of *Saka Kencana* and *Saka Wanabakti* where rovers learned about family planning extension programmes and forest management. Recently, the Ministry of Health sponsored *Saka Bakti Husada* to teach public health promotion skills.[25] In spite of the nice blue print, a lack of funds, skilled trainers and motivation among the staff of the appointed governmental services at regency level has hindered Satuan Karya programmes.

Most of the time, activities in Satuan Karya units are not much different from those of school-based troops, full of rites and games and not as much focused on skill training as they are supposed to be. The rovers come to Satuan Karya more to extend their social network beyond the school's premise and to get closer to the holders of power rather than to learn practical skills.

Until the end of the New Order regime in 1997, the Indonesian scouting movement was very much under the control of government. No single mass organisation or political party dared to challenge the government's domination over the politically potential youth movement by establishing their own brand of scouting like in the pre-1960s. To the New Order, the scouting movement was so precious, if not more as an arena to prepare cadres than as a symbolic asset to tell everybody that they were fully in control of the country. The fall of the New Order was soon followed by the fast growth of political parties. As the government's political grips over the country weakened, leaders of the Muhammadiyah seized it as an opportunity to re-activate Hizbul Wathan in November 1999. Whether this step has something to do with the establishment of the National Mandate Party, which is full of Muhammadiyah functionaries, needs further inquiry. However, when they saw what the Muhammadiyah had done, Nahdhatul Ulama did not want to be left behind, and so reactivated their *Pandu Anshor*. Worried that the development would endanger Pramuka domination in Indonesian scouting, Megawati Sukarnoputri, then the president, issued Presidential Decree No 104/2004 which, among many other things, re-stated Pramuka as the sole Indonesian scouting body. The presidential decree notwithstanding, the Muslim based Justice and Welfare Party established their *Pandu Keadilan*, some environmentalists established *Pandu Lingkungan*, the Association of Islamic Schools established *Pandu SIT* (*Sekolah Islam Terpadu*), and the Democratic Party promoted their own *Pandu Demokrat*. The circle seems to be returning to the 1920s era, although certainly with a different story.

Concluding Remarks

The discussion above pointed out that from time to time, along the course of the 20th century, scouting movements in Indonesia could not be separated from political organisation, whether it was governmental, state agencies or political parties. From time to time, the government kept trying to hold a monopoly power over scout movements by creating a national body of scout movements. Yet, they were not always successful. When the government's political power was weak, political parties and mass organisation would press forward and sponsor their own scouts, which were obviously loyal to their own political causes. Although this fact appears entirely un-scout like, it can be proposed here that it was their involvement in national politics which largely

explains how scout movements were capable of surviving and flourishing in the 20th-century Indonesia. If not for the political institutions, scout movements would not have gained a wide and long enough arena and support to maintain their existence. Certainly this is not the only explanation. Scouting is not just a social institution; it is also based on human experiences which so far have not been discussed in this article. Very likely, another part of explanation on the survival and development of Indonesian scout movement is related to the scouts own interest, experiences and interpretations of scouting.

Notes

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4. Kwartir Nasional Gerakan Pramuka 1987a, *Bahan Dasar Kursus Pelatih Dasar dan Kursus Pelatih Lanjutan*, p. 16.
5. *Het Padvindersblad* 1924, 'Administratie', no. 4, April, p. 59.
6. Kwartier Besar SIAP 1938, *Gedenkboek SIAP-PMI. 1928 -1938, 10 Tahoen Oesianja Pemoeda PSII*, Djokjakarta, Persatoean, p. 4.
7. Kwartier Besar SIAP 1938, *Gedenkboek SIAP-PMI. 1928 -1938, 10 Tahoen Oesianja Pemoeda PSII*, Djokjakarta, Persatoean, p. 35.
8. *Het Padvindersblad* 1923, 'Een padvinders is trouw', no. 10, October; *Sedia*, Madjallah Kepandoean KBI Surabaja 1938a, 'Kim's spel', no. 9., pp. 16-17; *Sedia*, Madjallah Kepandoean KBI Surabaja 1938b, 'Berita dari Kwartier Daerah Djawa Timoer', no. 9, p. 25.
9. Kwartir Nasional Gerakan Pramuka 1987, *Patah Tumbuh Hilang Berganti. 75 Tahun Kepanduan dan Kepramukaan*. Jakarta: Kwarnas Pramuka, p. 13.
10. *Het Padvindersblad* 1923, 'Een padvinders is trouw', no. 10, October, p. 151.
11. Kwartier Besar SIAP 1938, *Gedenkboek SIAP-PMI. 1928 -1938, 10 Tahoen Oesianja Pemoeda PSII*, Djokjakarta, Persatoean, p. 13; Kwartir Nasional Gerakan Pramuka 1987, *Patah Tumbuh Hilang Berganti. 75 Tahun Kepanduan dan Kepramukaan*. Jakarta: Kwarnas Pramuka, p. 15.
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13. Encyclopaedia van Nederlandsch Indie (ENI), 1932, vol. VI, p. 311.
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17. Kwartir Nasional Gerakan Pramuka 1987, *Patah Tumbuh Hilang Berganti. 75 Tahun Kepanduan dan Kepramukaan*. Jakarta: Kwarnas Pramuka, p. 48-9.

18. Kwartir Nasional Gerakan Pramuka 1986, *Rekaman 25 Tahun Gerakan Pramuka*. Jakarta: Kwarnas Pramuka, p. 13.

19. Kwartir Nasional Gerakan Pramuka 1987, *Patah Tumbuh Hilang Berganti. 75 Tahun Kepanduan dan Kepramukaan*. Jakarta: Kwarnas Pramuka, pp. 50-2.

20. Kwartir Nasional Gerakan Pramuka 1987, *Patah Tumbuh Hilang Berganti. 75 Tahun Kepanduan dan Kepramukaan*. Jakarta: Kwarnas Pramuka, p.72.

21. *Kincir*, Majalah Kwartir Nasional Pramuka 1973a, 'Kegiatan Pramuka Untuk Membangun Masyarakat', no. 1, pp. 3-7; Pramuka, Majalah Kwartir Nasional 1999, 'Bakti Ku Untuk Masyarakat', September, p.6.

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24. *Kincir*, Majalah Kwartir Nasional Pramuka 1973b, 'Taruna Bumi dan Pengembangannya', no 7, Juli, p. 57.

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Institutionalising Terror in the Name of Religion and Polity: The Nigerian Youth and the Cosmos of Violence

Amidu Sanni*

Abstract

Religion and ethnicity are two key issues in the economy of violence with which Nigeria has had to contend in the last twenty-five years. The protagonists of the issues are the state, the aficionados of religious or ethnic idealism and their opponents. The article argues that the culture of denial or marginalisation has largely been responsible for the tradition of violence, which militant and radical elements in religious and ethnic circles have often employed in their systemic campaigns. It concludes by submitting that a proper appreciation of the real causes of violence by the state, and a genuine commitment to their solution through dialogue and interactive means, remains the viable option in the enthronement of world peace and order.

Résumé

La religion et l'ethnicité constituent deux éléments essentiels dans l'économie de la violence à laquelle le Nigeria est confronté depuis vingt cinq ans. Les protagonistes sont l'Etat, les militants de l'idéalisme religieux ou ethnique et leurs opposants. L'article défend l'idée selon laquelle la culture de déni ou de marginalisation a été à la base de la tradition de violence, ce que les militants et les éléments radicaux appartenant aux cercles religieux et ethniques ont souvent employé dans leurs campagnes systémiques. L'article propose pour conclure qu'une appréciation adéquate de la part de l'Etat des causes réelles de la violence, et un engagement sincère dans la recherche d'une solution par le dialogue et des moyens interactifs restent l'option la plus viable pour l'enracinement de la paix et l'ordre dans le monde.

* Lagos State University, Nigeria. Email: amsanni@yahoo.co.uk

Introduction

In his fascinating overview of the impulses and scenarios of terror activities following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack in the United States of America, Heine talks about '*neue Terrorismus*' (new terrorism) operating world wide (Heine 2004:159). The wave of religious revivalism in the major world confessions and of ethnic nationalism, and their capacity to provoke conflict and violence in a globalising world, has been a subject of interest in modern religious and social science scholarship. This is not surprising as there are 'family resemblances' between militant and fundamentalist movements in the various religious traditions (Ruthven 2004). This notwithstanding, the more militant religious and indeed ethnic fundamentalism becomes, the more likely the clashes between rival systems in cognate spheres will be institutionalised (Sim 2005). Shared perception of oppression, exclusion, denial, and marginalisation often breeds radicalism which ultimately promotes the culture of organised and sustained violence, be it in religious or socio-political configurations (cf. Juergensmeyer 2003; Moussalli 1999; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Duffield 2000). The imperatives of modernity, the triumph of Western democracy as exposited by America, and the end of the messy history of clashing civilisations, to borrow from Fukuyama (1992), has inspired new perspectives in religious and ethnic revivalisms under democratic dispensations. But then the geo-political dominance exerted by America in the name of propagating democratic and human values is considered, and rightly too, as an 'imperialist fundamentalism'' 'the mother of all fundamentalisms' (Ali 2002). According to Jacquard (2002), 'violence in the name of religion – of all religions – is as old as history'. Religion and politics are soulmates or bedfellows and the interaction between both creates positive and negative developments. This is the binding link in this study which attempts to examine the imperatives for the reign of terror in the name of promoting or opposing religious idealism as well as in the defence or pursuit of ethnic, political, or primordial institutions and interests.

Background to Conflicts

Bloody conflicts, across and within religious and ethnic groups, have put Nigeria in the spotlight since the beginning of the new millennium. One of the most recent conflicts occurred after local government elections in Plateau State on 27 November 2008. By the following week, hundreds of lives had been lost and many mosques and churches had been destroyed in the paroxysms of violence that assumed both religious and ethnic characteristics. Historically, the mass media has succeeded in mitigating or promoting fits of violence generated by conflicts and their after effects, and this has generally affected post-violence reconstruction efforts and prevention of

future occurrences. As observed by Ojo, a set of public perceptions [I say if not prejudices], guide the media treatment of the subject (Ojo 2005: 245; cf. Umechukwu 1995; Said 1997).

Until the British colonialism of the nineteenth-century, the *Shari'a* (Islamic law) was the operative code in the Caliphate, which later came to be known as Northern Nigeria. The recession, if not the reversal, in the operational fortunes of the legal system has been at the bottom of difficult and often raucous relationships between the Muslims and the Christians in Nigeria (Sanni 2007a; Sanni 2007b). Since 1979, no serious issue has generated greater controversies and blood letting in Nigeria than the *Shari'a*. Ethnic violence has never been an unfamiliar phenomenon since independence, but it has reached a high watermark since the country's renewed experience with democracy in 1999. Agitation and counter agitation for the institutionalisation of the Islamic legal code and the culture of ethnic and state protestation, with regard to natural resources and access to power in all its ramifications, are the major indices of the reign of terror in the Nigerian scene to date.

Shari'a: **Much Ado about Nothing?**

The Islamic legal system is almost as old as Islam in Nigeria. Until the advent of British colonialism in the nineteenth-century, it was the only legal system in northern Nigeria, through which civil, criminal, property, and family cases were adjudicated (cf. Umar 2006; Lydon 2009). The British explorer Clapperton noted that the Islamic law was so strictly applied during the reign of Muhammad Bello (r. 1817 – 37) 'that the whole county when not in a state of war, was so well regulated that a woman might travel with a casket of gold upon her head from one end of the Fellata dominions to the other'. (Quinn & Quinn 2003:37-38). In 1902, however, the first British Governor High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria, Frederick Lugard proclaimed his official policy on the operation of the *Shari'a* in an address delivered in Sokoto (Peters 2005:121):

> The alkali and emirs will hold the law courts as of old, but bribes are forbidden, and mutilation and confinement of men in inhuman prisons are not lawful. Sentences of death will not be carried out without the consent of the Resident. . . Every person has the right to appeal to the Resident who will, however, endeavour to uphold the power of the Native Courts to deal with native cases according to the law and custom of the country (Quoting A. G. Karibi-Whyte, *History and Sources of Nigerian Criminal Law* (Ibadan-Nigeria: Spectrum 1993:177).

The operation of the Islamic legal system in pre-colonial and colonial Nigeria was not, however, limited to northern Nigeria alone, as Kumo claims it was.

According to him, the *Shari'a* was not applied anywhere else but in North-ern Nigeria, in spite of the large Muslim population among the Yoruba in southwest Nigeria and in part of the Midwestern region (Kumo 1993). I have discussed elsewhere with specific examples, instances of the promo-tion and application of the Islamic law in south western Nigeria, particularly by local heads, from the mid-nineteenth century till late into the colonial period. (Sanni 2007a; cf. Salamone 1998). Muri Okunola also gives instances of cases that were settled according to the Islamic legal code among Yoruba Muslims from 1900 onwards (Okunola 1993).

The nostalgia for what was considered the 'golden age' of religious traditions, when scriptural canons held sway, has thrown up new debates about Islamic Salafism and Christian Lefebvrism in modern religious and social science discourses (Netton 2006). Muslim thinkers, and indeed activists, have often argued for the need to have a moral society based on the *Shari'a* as one of the prerequisites for the establishment of an Islamic state (Moussalli 1999). The agitation is intense in countries with a Muslim majority population and in places where Muslims constitute a sizeable minority. For example, on 17 September 2006, large rallies in Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, were held by Muslim youth and people carrying mock guns, calling for the enhancement of the application of the *Shari'a*.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution heralded the implosion and the explosion of global religious politics and introduced new vista on global Muslim popular consciousness (Zubaida 1989). It became a significant reference point for the resurgence of radical Islamism throughout the world, including Nigeria, where it is believed that Islamisation will offer the ultimate solutions to societal problems (Kane 2006). The politicisation of religious institutions, such that it leads to violent dimensions, often builds upon a complex structure of ancient rhetoric and experience. Nigeria has never been short of people and circumstances that could put life into this (Last 2007). Tribute and profits from selling non-Muslims, and of course perceived or real misapplication of *Shari'a* provisions to the disadvantage or rather, the displeasure of non-Muslims (largely Christians), continually stirred a sense of reaction and violent opposition to the Islamic code once it became a subject of national discourse in democratic Nigeria. The constitutional responsibility of the government to maintain law and order has often been cited to justify and rationalise the visitation of state physical and psychological violence on the proponents of the enthronement of the Islamic legal code, even under a democratic dispensation. The 'satanisation' of the Islamic legal system by non-Muslims and Western-oriented analysts ultimately led to the 'sunnatisation' of *Jihâd*, that is, the legitimisation of force, by Muslim proponents of the legal code.

What is said about militant religious activism is equally valid for other forms of activism, they are expressions of 'performance violence' (Juergensmeyer 2003:220). But as rightly observed by Ostien, if the Christians had not created a stone wall in the Muslims' legitimate agitation for the expansion of the spatial authority of the *Shari'a* in the 70s, the revival of the debate in the legal system and the resultant violent dispensation from 1999 would not have occurred (Ostein 2006).[1] In other words, lack of tolerance or shortage of it had been a significant factor in religion-coloured violence since the beginning of the present millennium in Nigeria.

The Genesis of Ethnic Violence

The strong sense of nationalism and the freedom to control the natural resources of the land had been strong among the ethnic nationalities in the various regions that existed before British colonialism in Nigeria. In 1895, for example, the Jaja (King) of Opobo in the Niger Delta protested to the Crown in London, calling for greater access to the resources that had lubricated his traditional authorities before colonialism. For this, he paid very dearly. In the same year, the people of Nenbe, also in the Niger Delta, having failed to achieve their desire for greater economic welfarism and access to resources through peaceful agitations, resorted to violence. So, the campaign by indigenous peoples for greater access to the resources of their native lands had been part of the Nigerian history before independence in 1960.[2] But the liberalism of the post-independence era, which of course had its roots in the few decades before that, allowed the political regions a far greater control of their affairs and resources. The North controlled the agricultural products and its natural resources, for example, the groundnut, tin, cotton, etc. The West was in charge of cocoa, marble, and other items. The East used palm oil and other minerals for its social and developmental needs. The 1966 military incursion into the polity and the resultant centralisation of political and economic control saw the introduction of the culture of marginalisation, denial, and oppression of the Niger Delta area which has been producing about 90 per cent of the nation's revenue through crude oil. All through the military era, the people of the area consistently agitated through peaceful means for a more equitable treatment. A notable effort in point was the 1998 Keyamo Declaration by the Ijaw Youth which called upon the then military government to tackle the issue of environmental degradation of the area and pay better attention to infrastructural and human development, especially of the unemployed and underemployed youth. The government has always responded with brute force either on the individual as arrow heads, as was the case with Ken Saro Wiwa, or on the whole community, as happened with

the Odi people nearly a decade ago. The youth have since then engineered a new economy of violence through economic sabotage of oil installations, the kidnapping of foreign and local oil and construction workers, and very recently, through car bombs. Between 1 January and 8 February 2007, news reports indicate that some 52 persons, largely foreigners, had been kidnapped in the Niger Delta.

Unofficially, the government negotiates and possibly pays ransoms in order to avoid international embarrassment. On the surface, the government plays and talks tough by perpetrating state-induced or condoned terrorism (cf. Combs & Slann 2002). On Tuesday, 15 August 2006, for example, former President Obasanjo gave a new order for a military crackdown in an operation code-named 'fire for fire'. The following day, four members of the so-called militant movement had been arraigned before a court in Abuja, and by Friday over a hundred youth had been detained after what was said to be a raid on a militant slum in Port Harcourt. These extreme measures notwithstanding, the kidnapping of foreign oil and construction workers continued unabated, and the sphere of kidnapping had even been extended to night club houses known to be call points for Western oil and construction workers. So, the triangle of violence, in which the state, the agitators, and the society are players and victims, continues.

Concept of Violence and its Impulses

There is hardly any single, all-embracing definition of violence, for which reason it may be defined, like terrorism, as 'the language of being noticed' (Thackrah 2004). But one definition of it which may be considered here says that it is 'any uninvited but intentional or half-intentional act of physically violating the body of a person who previously had lived in peace' (Keane 2004:6). Anger, alienation and the denial of national or religious rights may lead to the radicalisation of the victims of such deprivations and this radicalisation may find expression in the form of violent actions or reactions. According to the first ever global report on violence by the World Health Organisation, 1.6 million people die violently every year; each day an average of some 1400 are killed, while 35 people die hourly through armed conflict.[3]

In the spiritualisation of violence by religious movements and the indexicalisation of it as a social matrix by peripherised or marginalised ethnic groups, new meanings, perspectives and profiles have been given to the culture of violence, its proponents, its victims, and the society at large. The problem of violence under democracy has been worrisome in Nigeria. Even now that the country is under a new political leadership that gives a more responsive attention to the problems of the Niger Delta, the spate of economic

sabotage and intimidation has barely subsided. Admittedly, the fit of the political killing of opponents has significantly reduced since 2007. Politics in Nigeria, as elsewhere in Africa, is marked by neo-patrimonialism, that is, the interconnectivity between the formal and informal sectors of the polity. The youth in Africa are economically and politically disenfranchised, making them a handy tool for violence and disorder. There is also the issue of state violence; when the state, through the instrumentality of security apparatus, visits brutality on the citizenry in the name of maintaining law and order. There is also the issue of violence in religious groups. On 22 July 2006, for example, one Rev. Kingsley Ezeugo of the Christian Praying Assembly, Lagos, doused some members of his congregation with fuel and got them burnt as a cleansing ritual from immoralities. Similar things had happened in Uganda, Japan, and the US; all pointing to a global trend in spiritual violence. Some have argued that the 'real' or 'ultimate' purpose of violence is to contain the violence capacities of others. How far has this applied to the Nigerian state and what general principles can we draw from the experiences of a multi-ethnic society such as ours?

The Nexus between Resources and Violence

It has been observed, and correctly too, that countries that are overly dependent on exports of natural resources have performed abysmally in all aspects of governance and social responsibility, a phenomenon often referred to as 'resource curse' (Pegg 2005). This is no less true of Nigeria where government (mis)management of crude oil has generated a sustained and unending culture of violence. Development and technology transfer that should have resulted from proper deployment of resources has failed to materialise since independence. A major reason is that the modernisation paradigm on which the processes were based failed to take account of the country's peculiar socio-cultural realities (Dibua 2006:147). Two contemporary theses about the relationship between resources and violence are relevant here. Homer Dixon (1999) is an illustrious exponent of the idea that scarcity of resources is an impulse for conflict. According to him, environmental degradation – the like of which is being experienced in the Niger Delta – breeds 'social scarcity', as people are forced off unviable land to peri-urban areas where they would have to compete for available facilities which are often inadequate. The tensions arising from this encounter becomes violent when crystallised around ethnic divisions. The other thesis links 'abundance of resources' to the generation of wars and conflicts. The abundance of resources insulates rulers from their subjects who would otherwise have been made to pay taxes which would then embolden them to

challenge the authorities in case of failure in the provision of social amenities and infrastructure. In other words, wealth generated through natural resources encourages leaders to employ violence to sustain their hold on power and on the people's psyche (cf. Last 2007). In his exposition of the 'greed and grievance' theory, Collier (2000) examines the relationship of conflicts by studying the link between the drive to control resources and protests by marginalised people striving to access resources. This may well explain the current tension in Nigeria where the central government, having put all natural resources under its control without commensurate socio-economic obligations to the producing areas, naturally provoked the violent reactions of the youth of the area, whose reactions are now visited on all strata of the society. The government, officially and unofficially, realises more revenue from royalties paid by oil companies than it does from taxes paid by the people (cf. Mehler 2006). In this way, the oil industry becomes a legitimate target of attack by aggrieved victims of the social and environmental degradation. These companies have also succeeded in luring the government into institutionalising a state crackdown on agitating youths. Clearly, there is an obvious correlation between scarcity or abundance of resources on the one hand, and the (mis)management of either and violent conflicts on the other.

Chronicles of Violence and Palliatives

Reference was made above to the historical antecedents of violent protestations by indigenous peoples in Nigeria against lopsidedness or outright denial, in terms of their access to resources. I have also discussed elsewhere in some detail the circumstances that had led to the employment of violence in the pursuit of, or opposition to, the s*hari'a* issue by the Nigerian youth (Sanni 2007a; Sanni 2007b). But for now, a short chronicle may not be out of place here.

The hitherto academic and civil dimension to the debate on *Shari'a***,** assumed a new character with Ibrâhîm Zak Zaky (b. 1963) of the Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) in Zaria and Aminud-Din Abubakar of Bayero University Kano. On 4 and 20 August 1980, Zak Zaky led the first public demonstrations outside the university campus as an expression of the rejection of the 1979 Constitution and as a launching pad for a more robust campaign for the recognition of *Shari'a* as a national law (Loimier & Reichmuth 1993). But all the violent and bloody conflicts that took place until 1999, when Nigeria once again returned to democracy, could best be described as an antebellum comedy, if compared to the nature, scope, sophistication and globalised character of what followed the Zamfara declaration of Thursday, 21 January 2000. On this day, Ahmad Sani Yerima, the governor of the northern Nigerian

state of Zamfara signed into law the bill establishing the penal aspect of the *Shari'a* for the state, prohibiting prostitution, gambling and the sale, purchase and consumption of alcohol (A Law to Establish a *Shari'a* Penal Code for Zamfara State, Law No 10, 2000; January 27, 2000).

The first amputation of a convicted thief took place on 22 March 2000 and another one sometime later. On 8 February 2005, the Council of Ulama, which may well be regarded as the 'court of final order', quashed the ten cases of amputation that had been pronounced by the *Shari'a* court in Zamfara State between 2001 and 2004. According to the Attorney General of the State at that time, Muhammad Sani Takori, the two amputations that had earlier been carried out were not in error. More importantly, he claimed that the International Court of Justice in The Hague had, somewhere in 2004, endorsed Nigeria's right to implement any constitutional law of justice. It is worthy to note that regional governments, in whose states the *Shari'a* has operated since 2000, largely draw on the support and backing of young Muslim enthusiasts and activists (*Yan Hisba*), fondly called *Shari'a*, in the implementation of *Shari'a* provisions. The *Hisba* actually sponsored the bill on full implementation of *Shari'a* at the Kano State House of Assembly in 2004.[4]

The series of violent and bloody conflicts that have been witnessed since the other 11 states of northern Nigeria followed the Zamfara model, with regard to the penal aspect of the *Shari'a*, have been quite remarkable in terms of human and material losses. In this regard, the 21-23 February 2000 episode in Kaduna and the 20-25 November 2002 cataclysm over the Miss World show, also in Kaduna, may be mentioned. It should, however, be stated that in a number of cases, the reason for the eruption of bloody conflicts that are associated with religious issues, is traceable to another form of disequilibrium, namely 'structural violence' (Sheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004). This form of disequilibrium represents the violence of poverty, collective denial, social exclusion, hunger, youth unemployment; all of which there has never been a shortage of in Nigeria in the past twenty-five years, specifically after the economic depression that followed the oil boom of the 1970s. Besides, the issue of 'indigene' versus 'settler' divide, which denies access to power and resources to certain categories of people whose ancestors must have come from areas other than where they currently reside, has been a major catalyst for unending socio-ethnic violence which has sometimes assumed a religious character (Harnischfeger 2004; ICG 2006c).

Furthermore, the state and indeed the existing political structures are sometimes targeted in the paroxysm of violence, which has become a familiar feature since the Maitatsine riot of the early 1980s. For example, on 21 September 2004, a group of young men calling themselves the Taliban and

advocating for the transformation of Nigeria into an Islamic state attacked two police stations in Borno State (Northeast Nigeria) and killed eight officers. The group lost 29 of its men. Barely a fortnight later, precisely on Friday 8 October, the militia of the same group, held some policemen hostage at the Nigerian-Cameroonian border, also in Borno State.[5] Its members were also reported to have attacked some Christian villages in Bulama in March of 2005, and to have looted shops and abducted several businessmen whom they had requested to convert to Islam. These incidents underpin the argument that religious diversity does not by itself engender violence 'independent of predisposing social, economic, and political conditions as well as the subjective roles of belligerent leaders' (Carnegie 1997).

Whatever the real or assumed nature of any violence, the government has always adopted a stick-and-carrot approach, either sequentially or simultaneously. Religious leaders and institutions readily come in handy in case of faith-coloured conflicts, while community leaders, local opinion moulders, and youthful 'war lords' become instruments of conflict management or suppression as and when it suits the state. The government sometimes introduces some palliative and superficial measures to assuage the militant youth and wave off international criticisms which are hardly strong enough to expose the brutality of the government anti-violence measures, even under democracy. For example, The Human Rights Watch, a New York-based NGO, released a report on 25 May 2005 criticising the Nigerian government for doing nothing to punish culprits that caused the 2004 bloody 'religious' riots in Kaduna and Jos, while in August 2006, the International Crisis Group (ICG 2006c), passionately requested for more revenue for the Niger Delta states as a way of mitigating the unending crises in the region in particular and in Nigeria in general.

For now, let me just give a chronicle of some of the recent events in the prosecution of the war, or rather, in the enthronement of peace as threatened by religious and ethnic radicalism. Inter- and intra-religious clashes are not a rare occurrence. This goes to show that there are some underlying fundamental issues beyond the level of confessional disagreements. On 13 May 2005, there was a bloody clash at the two main mosques in Sokoto after the Jumat service between Shi'ites and Sunnis, on account of what was said to be mutual denigration of their leaders. Between January and February 2006, there were violent clashes between Muslims and Christians in Maiduguri, Bauchi, Nnewi and Onitsha among other places, arising from protests and counter protests over the defamatory cartoons of the Prophet published by a Swedish periodical in 2005. Mosques, churches, and lives fell in the clashes. This further illustrates the fact that regardless of the location

of events, the phenomenon of a deterritorialised response has become a feature of a new religious public across the world.

Assaults on religious and ethnic or militia groups received a new twist with the 7 February 2006 government's proscription of *Hisba* in Kano and other "*Shari'a* states'', and of vigilante and ethnic militia groups in Abia among other southern states. Consequently, members of the *Hisba* started to be detained, and in April 2006 the Court of Appeal turned down the request for bail on behalf of two detained members from Kano. They were arraigned for belonging to an illegal organisation. On 19 June 2006, a draft bill on violence was presented to the government by an eight-man committee that had been instituted by the Federal Ministry of Justice. The bill aims at preventing, curbing, and punishing violence. Again, this is a purely cosmetic measure that fails to address the real cause(s) of violence. Perhaps one seemingly serious attempt at addressing the Niger Delta issue was the introduction on the 27 March 2007, at the twilight of the rule of former President Obasanjo, of a master plan for the socio-economic development of the Niger Delta. But before this, some measures, fitful and haphazard as they turned out to be, had been taken. On 18 April 2006, former President Obasanjo inaugurated in Abuja, the presidential council on the socio-economic development of the coastal states in the Niger Delta, to study the restiveness of the youths in the area. Immediate, medium, and long-term measures were proposed. These include the creation of special employment opportunities in the armed forces and the oil sector for indigenes of the region. The government also announced the establishment of the National Oil Spillage Detection and Response Agency. All the activities of the Agency were to be co-coordinated by a bureau in the Office of the Secretary to the Government. By the time another round of the quarterly meeting was held on 18 July 2006, it was clear that there was a wide gap between the expectations of the people from the affected area and what the government was prepared to offer.

This reality may well explain why violent activities and adventures by militant groups in the area have not subsided. The Niger Delta Volunteer Force, an offshoot of the Ijaw Youth Council, has been demanding a greater access to power and resources. Its leader, Mujahid Asari Dokubo, a Baptist turned Muslim, has been a pain in the neck of the government for quite a while. This raises the question of whether militants, of whatever orientation, are inspired by religion or ideology. According to Dokubo, his struggle is 'purely national' and not religious. This sounds reasonable; after all, the majority of his fighters or foot soldiers are non-Muslims. Yet again, there is an intriguing twist to the underpinning factor of the struggle. When asked about the reason for his conversion to Islam, he said: 'I became a Muslim

because of the revolutionary spirit of Islam in Iran (...)' (Montclos 2005). The infectious spirit of Islamism, if it can be so characterised, has become a source of worry to the government in its effort to stem the tide of ethnic and religious conflicts. Some of the palliative measures taken so far have not gone far enough to address the fundamental issues that have engendered bitter confrontations between the state and militant, protesting youth.

Since the Yar A'dua government came in place in May 2007, there has been a remarkable shift in attitude on the side of the government and stakeholders in the Niger Delta. For instance, on 12 July 2007 Asari Dokubo, who had been kept in detention under Obasanjo, was able to discuss concrete steps toward solving the crises in the Niger Delta with the then Vice President, Dr Goodluck Jonathan. This was the first high-level government contact and deliberation with any militant group from the area. On top of this, a two-day peace conference was held between 7 and 8 November 2007 at Abuja, at the insistance of Asari Dokubo. Stakeholders, including representatives from the political establishment, called for dialogue and the convocation of a national sovereign conference to discuss all issues affecting all ethnic nationalities in the state. Coincidentally, the government presented to the National Assembly, on the first day of the conference, a budget which increased the allocation to the Niger Delta Development Corporation (NDDC) by about 300 per cent. Perhaps the most eloquent testimony to a new understanding of the problems of the violence-prone area was the establishment by President Umaru Yar'Adua, in September 2008, of a full-fledged Ministry of the Niger Delta, for this resulted in a substantive minister being put in charge by December 2008.

Conclusion

The unending cycle of religious, ethnic, and resource control driven violence is already taking its toll on the Nigerian economy, its corporate existence and international profile. Already, more than 30 per cent of the nation's oil output has been lost since the beginning of 2008. Apart from the loss in revenue, the knock-on effect on micro- and macro-economic and political dimensions is inestimable. The economy of violence in which the Nigerian youth is the active exponent and victim, has raised new questions about the relationship between democracy and violence (Babawale 2003). Since democracy is about choice and respect for the sensibilities of others, one would have thought that the government would frontally address the issues of youth empowerment, environmental degradation, and confessional pluralism, allowing advocates of the *Shari'a* to have their choice within the constitutional provisions, and allowing proponents of an ethnic agenda, to have their problems solved. Omar offers five proposals that could help in overcoming religious

violence. These are developing theologies of religious pluralism, nurturing inter-religious dialogue and solidarity, inter-religious peace-building from the perspective of conflict resolution and conflict transformation, giving life to the prophetic role of religion as the moral conscience of society and inter-religious global action campaigns (Omar 2002).

Anthony Oji, the president of Ijaw Youth Association, Joseph Eva, and other leaders of militia and pressure groups fighting for self-determination and resource control in the Niger Delta areas, have consistently called on the government to sit with the people instead of opting for a military solution or negotiation through crises brokers who, almost invariably, misuse funds and resources that are meant for the development of the area. The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), an ultra militant group, has even threatened to employ a stronger force against the government. This is already manifesting itself in the killing of government security forces that are sent to maintain peace in the area under the acronym JTF (Joint Task Force). The fact that there is always an upsurge in violence and kidnapping whenever the central government announces an increase in revenue allocation to the state governments of the region, or to such parastatals as the Niger Delta Development Corporation (NDDC), clearly indicates that real development has not actually been filtering down to the common people for whom those institutions and systems are intended in the first place. No military or coercive mechanism will solve the restiveness in the area. Not even judicial or quasi-legislative measures. Former President Obasanjo's Prevention of Terrorism Act proposal of 2006, which was sent to the National Assembly, stipulated a maximum jail term of twenty years for a 'terrorist', a euphemism for the militant youth or radical religious enthusiasts. Another bill by former Senator Obi from Anambra State proposes the establishment of an Anti-Terrorism Agency and a life sentence for culprits.[6] The fact of the case is that only a thorough perception of the real problems within Nigerian society, along with the deployment of a political will and the sincerity to solve them, remain the key instruments in the pragmatic interaction with the new culture of violence in the name of religion, politics, resource control and the society.

Notes

1. For more on the shari'a in Nigeria see Ibrahim 2004; Noibi 2003-2004; Marshall 2002.
2. For details of this problem from colonial time to-date see (ICG 2006a; ICG 2006b, ICG 2008)
3. *World Report on Violence and Health* (Geneva, 2002), available on www.who.int/violence-injury-prevention.

4. For more on the *Hisba* visit http//www.hrw.or/reports/2004/Nigeria0903 [released 21 September 2004].
5. *The Vanguard* [Nigerian Daily] 11 October 2004.
6. *The Vanguard* 28 August 2006.

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African 'Youth' since Independence: Notes on a Bibliographic Overview, 1990–2005

Fiona Klein Klouwenberg* & Inge Butter**

Abstract

This short bibliography on 'youth' is the result of a literature search carried out in 2005 in three library collections in the Netherlands. The references to the general literature on youth, politics and religion were found in the library of the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences of Leiden University. For African references on this topic, the library of the African Studies Centre in Leiden was very useful. The Royal Tropical Institute's library in Amsterdam was also used but to a lesser extent. The keywords used for the literature search were 'youth', 'politics' and 'religion' in four different languages: English, French, German and Dutch. This resulted in 270 references addressing the specific topics of youth, politics and religion, which all fall within the scope of the conference.

Résumé

Cette courte bibliographie sur la 'jeunesse' est le résultat d'une recherche en 2005 sur la littérature conduite dans trois bibliothèques au Pays Bas. Les références sur la littérature générale sur la jeunesse, la politique et la religion ont été retrouvées dans la bibliothèque de la Faculté des sciences sociales et du comportement de l'Université de Leyde. La bibliothèque du Centre des études africaines de la même université a été très utile. De même que celle de Royal Tropical Institute à Amsterdam, bien qu'à un degré moindre.

Les mots clés de la recherche sur la littérature ont été 'jeunesse', 'politique' et 'religion' dans quatre langues différentes : anglais, français, allemand et hollandais. Ce qui a donné 270 références couvrant les thèmes spécifiques de la jeunesse, la politique et la religion qui sont aussi des thèmes de la conférence.

* African Studies Centre, Leiden. Email: fionakk@zonnet.nl
**African Studies Centre, Leiden. Email: butteric@ascleiden.nl

Studies on Youth

'Youth' as a category has only been a subject of research in the last two decades. Prior to this, 'youth' was mentioned in ethnology and case-studies as an element that needed to be described in order to understand the main topic, as were labourers, students and women, but it was never the central focus of research as such. A vast amount of research has been done on South African topics, a fact reflected by the large number of references to South Africa, apartheid and its political aftermath.

In their article 'Reflections on Youth', Jean and John Comaroff present a historical overview of the way youth was constructed in the Western context. They remind us of the 'anthropological truism that the way in which young people are perceived, named, and represented betrays a lot about the social and political constitution of a society'.[3]

The social, political and religious fields of African societies concerning youth are disclosed by several excellent contributions on a range of topics in four different volumes. For a political context, *Vanguard or Vandals, Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa*[4] offers readings on youth involvement in conflicts and the controversial role they play. The introduction gives an overview of recent academic debates on youth studies and the 'blocked social mobility'[5] youngsters face.

The paradoxical position of youth is addressed in *Makers and Breakers, Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa*[6] from a cultural/anthropological perspective. *Africa's Young Majority*[7] offers a range of papers on several fields of study. And for readings on generational conflict, see *The Politics of Age and Gerontocracy in Africa*.[8]

'Youth' cannot be studied without considering Western and African notions of childhood and adulthood, and the crossing of the frontier between the two. Research is also not complete without regarding the position of the youth themselves; or as Honwana and de Boeck put it, 'the complex realities of young people's lives: [are] shaping and being shaped by their social world'.[9]

The framework for research on youth includes meta-concepts such as identity, agency, generation and gender, and, given the focus of this special issue, also the fields of study of religion and politics. However the study of youth from a religious perspective seems primarily to be focused on education or the fundamentals of a specific religion.

Children and youth are extremely difficult to grasp and pin down analytically. (…) They may be targets, students, servants, orphans, street children, combatants, healers, onlookers, political activists, entrepreneurs, artists, or witches, and they often occupy more than one position at once.[10]

Who are the Youth?

During the United Nations International Youth Year in 1985, the General Assembly defined youth as those persons who fall between the ages of 15 and 24.[11] The limits of this definition are too narrow in an African context because 'in Africa there are many such people [well in their thirties] who have had to delay their entry into adulthood: they feel excluded and powerless, and struggle to survive'.[12] In his chapter entitled, 'Being Young in Africa: The Politics of Despair and Renewal', Abbink limits the category in Africa to the 14-35 age-bracket for practical reasons.[13] Most Africanists would agree with him. Even though census bureaus use different brackets, he points out that the term 'youth' has a different meaning in a given cultural, social and historical context.

The United Nations table below gives an insight into the number of youth worldwide in the year 2000.

Regional Distribution of Youth in 2000 (in millions)[14]

	Total Population	Youth as % of Total	Youth (15-24 years)	As % of World Youth
Asia	3,672	17.8	654	61.5
Africa	793	20.3	161	15.1
Europe	727	13.8	100	9.4
Latin America & the Caribbean	519	19.5	101	9.5
North America	314	13.5	42	4.0
Oceania	31	15.6	5	0.5
Total	6,056	17.6	1,063	100.0

Honwana (2005) points out the contrast between the Western (middle-class) notion of children and childhood as a 'carefree, secure and happy phase of human existence' and the reality of children in many other parts of the world, where young children share the responsibilities of providing food or income, taking care of siblings and (partially) running the household. 'Being a child in this particular context seems to have little to do with age (although people sometimes refer to age limits) but is essentially linked to social roles, expectations and responsibilities. (…) In such a societal context, emphasis is placed on roles rather than on age.'[15] It is in this social role that youth protest gerontocratic rule, social marginalisation, unemployment, etc. A result of this could be their involvement in various degrees of conflict as child soldiers, student protestors or rebels. Creating such a paradoxical situation for themselves, they are the initiate as well as the initiated, the perpetrator and

Africa Development, Vol. XXXVI, Nos 3 & 4, 2011

the victim, the protector and the protected, the maker and the breaker.[16] 'Young people constantly cross the frontier between childhood and adulthood. As they actively create and recreate their roles in the face of changing conditions, they blur that social divide.'[17] And thus '"youth" stand for many things at once: for the terrors of the present, the errors of the past, the prospects of a future'.[18]

Youth in a Shifting Society

Youth movements or associations are a common feature throughout African history. In the first part of the twentieth century, 'the colonial administration did not recognise the youth of the capital as a special age group with specific needs'. In a study of colonial Brazzaville, Phyllis Mary Martin (1992) shows that youth agency and generational conflict in a changing society are of all times.

The period 1924-1940 saw a spread of youth organizations in Brazzaville, influenced by changing attitudes among liberal whites, changing demographic and economic conditions in the city and the initiatives of young Africans themselves. The administration and the Catholic mission set about organizing different sorts of clubs, hoping to control the "ideas of independence and emancipation" spreading among the young people. The views of African adults on the efforts to discipline their youth are elusive, and so are the views of the young people themselves. They had their own agenda, which was not always identical with that of the leaders of the organizations they joined.[19]

Many authors mention the marginalisation of African youth within the context of uncertain social status, increasing unemployment and eroding educational opportunities.

Most African countries became independent during the 1960s, a decade of liberation and decolonisation. Young people were generally seen as the promising generation that held the future in its hands and education would give them an even better chance of reaching prosperity. Young nations had to be built, as Breier (1970) points out in his study on *Sozialund Jugenddienste in Afrika*:

> Die nationalen Jugenddienste letzten rekrutierten ihre Freiwilligen aus dem grossen Reservoir der unterprivilegierten Jugend ohne Schul- und Ausbildung. Diesen Jugenddiensten kommt eine wichtige Rolle beim Aufbau der Nation zu.[20]

> [The national youth service last recruited their volunteers from the large reservoir of underprivileged youth without school and training. These youth services have an important role in the construction of the nation.]

The 1980s can be characterised as the decade of the economic decline of nations and rising unemployment, creating a rich ground for social uprisings

that led to conflict in several parts of the continent, for example, the social political upheaval in South Africa.

The informal youth clubs operating in South Africa during the emergency period in the 1980s provided positive direction for youth who had suffered from disruptions in their education and exclusion from the job market. Such clubs are thought to promote 'fine' youth and they play an important bridging role in assisting young people to adapt to adult life.[21]

The establishment of the New World Order after the end of the Cold War gave way to the liberalisation of African national economies that had been caught up in a socialist rhetoric or political isolation. Where does the youth stand in all this? 'The youthful population of Africa has been growing and their integration into society has had enormous economic, cultural, political and social consequences'[22] but 'too frequently the needs of children, youth and women are only addressed as an afterthought when it comes to political and economic development initiatives'.[23]

The 'promising generation' has become known as the 'lost generation'. Are they really 'lost'? 'The recent rapid growth of the second economy (the informal sector) in many African countries brings opportunities to some African urban youth that are denied to them in the wage and salary sector of the official economy.'[24] Some young people seize the opportunities provided to them by the informal economy, but this does not mean that there is a national policy on youth.

In the formal sector, however, they are not really visible yet. 'South Africa's youth make up 29 per cent of the population, yet there is no comprehensive youth policy to attend to their needs.'[25] This leads to a situation in which 'urban youth in Africa today must struggle to make a living in a context of cut-throat competition, where the exigencies of daily life demand constant resort to illegal activity and erode the functioning of common morality and ethics. Young people seem to need an exceptional degree of strength of character, innovation and endurance to have any hope for the future.'[26] Jeremy Seekings (1996) concludes 'that there was no 'youth crisis' as such, but rather a range of intractable problems within which young people find themselves and that should be addressed in policy'.[27]

Conflict

An anthropological definition of war offered in *No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts*[28] is: 'All war is long-term struggle organised for political ends, and neither the means nor the ends can be understood without reference to a specific social context'.

The specific social context related to the subject of this special issue is that 'African youth are caught in the chasm between childhood and the

unattainable social, political and economic status that would define them as adults. Deprived of educational opportunities and livelihoods, youth are actively mobilised by politicians and armed groups alike, who recognise that their alliance is valuable and their enmity dangerous'.[29]

Even when caught in this chasm as McIntyre (2003) calls it, youth are not only victims, they can be actors too. In her article entitled 'The Pain of Agency, the Agency of Pain', Alcinda Honwana takes the active role of the youngster a step further. 'Within this interstitial space,[30] child soldiers are not devoid of agency. On the contrary, these young soldiers are agents in their own right, but this agency is of a specific type.' Honwana defines it as *tactical agency*: 'a specific type of agency that is devised to cope with the concrete, immediate conditions of their lives in order to maximise the circumstances created by their military and violent environment. Their actions however, come from a position of weakness'.[31] This alone does not explain youth's involvement in conflict or violent situations. 'No "natural inclination" of youth to behave violently can explain their presence in socially destructive movements. The breakdown of a socio-political and moral order in the wider society and the degree of governability of a certain type of state are more likely to precipitate this.'[32] Honwana and Abbink, amongst others, make it clear that a society is still very fragile when internal armed conflict has ended. As Abbink puts it; 'Images and practices of violence among both perpetrators and victims (especially when young) become part of a new *habitus* of violence – an internalised mental response pattern anchored in behavioural routines – and also a template in the collective memory of a society'.[33]

Gender has not been extensively investigated as an element in the study of youth. In the specific situation of child soldiers, where girls are the victims of sexual abuse by the rebel leaders as well as of the child soldiers (mainly boys), gender is involved. In social, religious, and political studies on youth, gender does not seem to be a distinctive element. 'The experience of the female youths should not be ignored because of their lower 'nuisance value.'[34]

Youth Connected

The above has focused on youth within national borders: 'the condition of young people in Africa is heavily influenced by the interaction between local and global pressures: the fragmentation of local culture, on the one hand, and the influences of global culture, on the other'.[35] Given modern means of communication (Internet, e-mail, mobile phone, etc.), globalisation has come closer to African youth. 'In the cyberspace age, juveniles have an enhanced capacity to communicate in, and act effectively on, the world at large.'[36] However, the opportunities available to Western and African youth are not the same and are not equally accessible. Nonetheless 'children and youth are

major players in new informal economies and processes of globalisation, as well as in the delineation of alternative local forms of modernity'.[37]

Religion in Africa is part of daily life one way or the other and new churches are being rapidly established. 'In any event, religious thought and its global resurgence among the young have to be taken seriously. (…) the point is that African youth are greatly attracted by the new religious movements and are joining (in large numbers) a discourse of morality and identity that holds out the promise of regeneration and collective power with transnational resonance.'[38]

The distinction between religion and youth culture is not always clear-cut. When a religion is adapted and expressed in a certain way, it can become a youth culture, like 'the spread of the Rastafarian movement and its attendant forms of cultural expression to West Africa, and in so doing pinpoints the various mechanisms and processes that have contributed to its diffusion among urban-based West African youth'; and 'the specifically religious character of Rastafarianism in West Africa'.[39]

'Forty years of post-colonial history has not shown a takeover of power by the young or a substantial improvement in the life of youth in Africa in general. To be young in Africa came to mean being disadvantaged, vulnerable and marginal in the political and economic sense.'[40]

The study of youth is maturing; theories around youth and who and what youth is/are developing. Nevertheless, studies on gender amongst youth as well as on how religion is experienced and is subject to youth agency are lacking.

De Boeck and Honwana speak of the 'fundamental paradox' in their volume. 'How can we understand children and youth in various African contexts as both *makers* and *breakers* of society, while they are simultaneously being *made* and *broken* by that society?'[41] This seems to be the fundamental paradox of the study of youth.

Recent Publications on 'Youth'

Publications written after 2005 continue along the lines of debates similar to those summarised above. More attention is given to youth in a globalising world, with attention to music and arts, to youth and religion, and to religious movements. Studies have continued to explore those 'youth at risk', emphasising their role as victims in conflict. At the same time, the agency of youth is highlighted as providing an important contribution to this field of studies. This is embodied in the introduction of the concept of *navigation,*[42] where the making of society by youth is emphasised. In 2011, *makers* and *breakers* are thus still seen as two sides of 'youth' in society.

Below, a bibliographic list has been compiled of recent publications dealing with 'youth'. The list should not be seen as complete but rather as tool for future reference.

Suggestions for Further Reading

Youth & Youth Culture in a Globalising World

Cole, Jennifer and Deborah Durham, 2007, 'Introduction: Age, Regeneration and the Intimate Politics of Globalization', in Jennifer Cole and Deborah Durham, eds., *Generations and Globalization: Youth, Age, and Family in the New World Economy*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 1-28.

Nilan, Pam and Feixa, Carles, eds, 2006, *Global Youth? Hybrid Identities, Plural Worlds*, Abingdon Oxen/New York: Routledge.

Perullo, Alex, 2005, Hooligans and Heroes: Youth Identity and Hip-Hop in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, *Africa Today*, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 75-101.

Youth and Conflict: Youth and Agency & Youth at Risk

Alber, Erdmute, Sjaak van der Geest and Susan Reynolds Whyte, 2008, *Generations in Africa: Connections and Conflicts*, Berlin: Lit Verlag.

Bourdillon, Michael, 2008, 'Children and Supporting Adults in Child-Led Organisations', in Erdmute Alber, Sjaak van der Geest and Susan Reynolds Whyte, eds., *Generations in Africa: connections and conflicts, Berlin*: Lit Verlag.

De Bruijn, Mirjam, 2007, 'Agency in and from the Margins: Street Children and Youth in N'djaména, Chad', in Mirjam de Bruijn, Rijk van Dijk, Jan-Bart Gewald, eds., *Strength beyond Structure: Social and Historical Trajectories of Agency in Africa*, Leiden: Brill, pp. 263-284.

Christiansen, Catrine, Mats Utas and Henrik E. Vigh, eds., 2006, *Navigating Youth, Generating Adulthood: Social becoming in an African context,* Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute.

Kelly, Peter, 2006, 'The Entrepreneurial Self and "Youth at Risk": Exploring the Horizons of Identity in the Twenty-first Century', *Journal of Youth Studies*, vol. 9, no. 1, February, pp. 17-32.

Lindegaard, Marie Rosenkrantz, 2009, 'Coconuts, Gangsters and Rainbow Fighters: How Male Youngsters Navigate Situations of Violence in Cape Town', South Africa. PhD Dissertation, Amsterdam, Universiteit van Amsterdam.

Riele, Kitty te, 2006, 'Youth "at Risk": Further Marginalizing the Marginalized', *Journal of Education Policy*, vol. 21, no. 2, March, pp. 129-145.

Sommers, Marc 2006a, 'In the Shadow of Genocide: Rwanda's Youth Challenge.', in Siobhán McEvoy-Levy, ed., *Troublemakers or Peacemakers? Youth and Post-Accord Peacebuilding*, South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press.

Vigh, Henrik, 2006, *Navigating Terrains of War: Youth and Soldiering in Guinea-Bissau*, New York: Berghahn.

Vigh, Henrik, 2008, 'Crisis and Chronicity: Anthropological Perspectives on Continuous Conflict and Decline,' *Ethnos*, vol. 73, no. 1, pp. 5-24.

Youth and the State

Argenti, Nicolas, 2007, *The Intestines of the State: Youth, Violence, and Belated Histories in the Cameroon Grassfields*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Burgess, Thomas, 2005, 'Introduction to Youth and Citizenship in East Africa', *Africa Today* vol. 51, no. 4, pp. VI-XXIV.

Durham, Deborah, 2007, 'Empowering Youth: Making Youth Citizens in Botswana', in Jennifer Cole and Deborah Durham, eds, *Generations and Globalization: Youth, Age, and Family in the New World Economy*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 102-131.

Frank, Kathryn, I., 2006, 'The Potential of Youth Participation in Planning', in *Journal of Planning Literature*, vol. 20, no. 40, May, pp. 351-371.

Garcia, Marito and Jean Fares, eds, 2008, *Youth in Africa's labor market (Directions in Development)*, Washington DC: World Bank.

Honwana, Alcinda, 2006, *Child Soldiers in Africa*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Youth and Religion

Sanni, Amidu, 2007b, 'The Nigerian Muslim Youth and the Sharia Controversy: Issues in Violence Engineering in the Public Sphere', *Journal of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. 16, p. 119-133.

Witte, Marleen de, 2008, 'Spirit Media: *Charismatics, Traditionalists, and Mediation Practices in Ghana'*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Amsterdam.

Youth and HIV/AIDS

Dahl, Bianca, 2009, 'The "Failures of Culture": Christianity, Kinship, and Moral Discourses about Orphans during Botswana's AIDS Crisis', in R. Prince, Ph. Denis and R. van Dijk, eds, *Africa Today, Special issue*, vol. 56, no. 1, Fall 2009, pp. 23-43.

Robson, Elsbeth, Nicola Ansell, Ulli Huber, William Gould and Lorraine van Blerk, eds, 2006, 'Young Caregivers in the Context of the HIV/AIDS Pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa', *Population, Space and Place*, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 93-111.

Skovdal, Morten, 2010, 'Children Caring for Their "Caregivers": Exploring the Caring Arrangements of Orphans and Vulnerable Children in Western Kenya, *AIDS Care*, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 69-103.

Youth and Gender

Pype, Katrien, 2007, 'Fighting Boys, Strong Men and Gorillas: Notes on the Imagination of Masculinities in Kinshasa', *Africa / International African Institute*, vol. 77, no. 2, pp. 250-271.

Sommers, Marc, 2006b, 'Fearing Africa's Young Men: Male Youth, Conflict, Urbanization and the Case of Rwanda', in Ian Bannon and Maria Correia, eds, *The Other Half of Gender: Men's Issues in Development*, Washington DC: World Bank.

Notes

1. http://www.ascleiden.nl/Library/ The Library, Documentation and Information Department of the African Studies Centre has the most extensive and specialised collection on Africa in the Netherlands in the fields of the social sciences, the humanities and law.

2. www.kit.nl

3. Jean & John Comaroff, "Children and Youth in a Global Era", in *Makers and Breakers*, p. 19.

4. *Vanguard or Vandals, Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa*, edited by Jon Abbink & Ineke van Kessel, Leiden: Brill Publishers (2005).

5. As Abbink puts it in his introduction to *Vanguard or Vandals*, p. 16.

6. *Makers and Breakers, Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa*, edited by Alcinda Honwana & Filip de Boeck, Oxford: James Currey (2005).

7. *Africa's Young Majority*, edited by Barbara Trudell, Edinburgh: Centre of African Studies (2002).

8. *The Politics of Age and Gerontocracy in Africa* by Mario I. Aguilar, Trenton N.Y.: Africa World Press (1998).

9. Preface to *Makers and Breakers*, p. ix.

10. De Boeck & Honwana, in *Makers and Breakers*, p. 3.

11. The UN notes that in this definition, children are those persons under the age of 14. It is, however, worth noting that Article 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child defines children as persons up to the age of 18. This was intentional, as it was hoped that the Convention would provide protection and rights to as large an age-group as possible, and because there was no similar United Nations Convention on the Rights of Youth. http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/qanda.htm. See for the UN Youth Agenda http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/agenda.htm

12. Jon Abbink, in *Vanguard or Vandals*, p. 6.

13. Jon Abbink, in *Vanguard or Vandals*, p. 6.

14. Source: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/qanda.htm

15. Honwana, 'The Pain of Agency, the Agency of Pain', in *Makers and Breakers*, p. 35.

16. De Boeck & Honwana, "Children and Youth in Africa, Agency, Identity and Place", in *Makers & Breakers*, p. 3.

17. Introduction to *Makers & Breakers*, p. 4.

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Seeing the State through Youth Policy Formation:[1] The Case of the State of Jharkhand

Kathinka Sinha-Kerkhoff*

Abstract

This article explores the way in which one of the largest semi-autonomous states in India, the state of Jharkhand, is developing policies that target the youth. It also looks at ways in which it is providing room for youths to participate in processes of decision making. Studying the state government's position, ideology and praxis in this regard demonstrates that there is an interesting process of transmission of sociopolitical power into the hands of the young in such a way that the youth is likely to become a supporter and protector of the state. On the part of the government, a great deal of trust exists with regard to youth involvement in policies beneficial to the pursuit of an ideal welfare package for the people. The state makes sure that certain social and economic benefits flow towards the youth, and this certainly helps in securing their support for its notion of a semi-autonomous state, with the belief inculcated in the youth that the future is in their hands.

Résumé

Cet article explore comment l'Etat semi-autonome le plus grand de l'Inde, l'état de Jharkhand, développe sa politique de la jeunesse et comment il crée un espace pour permettre aux jeunes de participer dans les processus de prise de décision. A cet effet, l'étude de la position, de l'idéologie et du praxis du gouvernement de l'état démontre qu'il existe un processus intéressant de transmission du pouvoir sociopolitique dans les mains des jeunes à tel enseigne qu'ils sont amenés à soutenir et à protéger l'état. De son côté, le gouvernement fait montre de beaucoup de confiance à l'endroit l'implication des jeunes dans l'implémentation de politiques en faveur d'un programme idéal pour le bien-être du peuple. L'état s'assure que certains bénéfices socioéconomiques parviennent aux jeunes, ce qui assure certainement leur support pour sa notion d'état semi-autonome avec la conviction bien inculquée dans l'esprit des jeunes que le future est dans leurs mains.

* International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. Email: ksk@iisg.nl

For your country

> If you plan for a year - sow a paddy
>
> If you plan for a decade - plant trees
>
> *If you plan for a future - nurture youth*

(Proverb quoted in the National Youth Policy of India, 1992)[2]

Introduction

In post-colonial India, like in nation-states all over the world, centrally-planned social-engineering projects organise their citizens on the basis of chronological age with corresponding status allocation. In this way, and among others, the category of 'youth' has been differentiated from 'adulthood' and brought under the jurisdiction of the state. Subsequently, states formulated and reformulated youth policies and introduced a standardised and bureaucratic life course where political rights, laws, etc., are based on age and scholars have rightly argued that this is not primarily a social organisational process but an ideological one (cf. Boli-Bennett & Meyer 1978). Yet, 'modern forms of state are in a continuous process of construction' with 'languages of stateness' (Blom Hansen & Stepputat 2001:5) changing. Therefore, whereas the process of differentiation between 'youth' and 'adulthood' might be global, (state-constructed) categories of youth vary in different nation-states and the views of states on 'youth' have been changing. In this article, I argue that the analysis of these by the state constructed categories of youth – as well as policy recommendations based on these constructions – might not say much about young people in these states but certainly is an excellent way to understand (differences among) states.

The category of 'youth' did figure in national policies formulated by the Government of India (hereafter: GoI) since India's independence in 1947. In 1969, a 'National Advisory Board on Youth' was established and in 2003 a 'National Youth Policy' was formulated, followed by a 'National Plan of Action for Youths' in 2005 (Annual Report 1995-1996; cf. Singh 2005). Sharing the 'Nation's commitment towards youth development' but perceiving the inadequacy of these broad policies targeting 'Indian youth', the Government of Jharkhand (hereafter GoJ) simultaneously voiced the need for 'initiating the process of State Youth Policy Formulation'. The help of Population Foundation India (PFI) was sought and a first meeting took place on 21 April 2006 in the state capital, Ranchi. Apart from members of the NGO PFI, the state invited other (non-state) 'key stakeholders' to 'ensure an inclusive policy' (Jharkhand Youth Policy Formulation 2006). I too was invited during this

preliminary consultative meeting where 'key areas to be addressed in the policy' were to be identified and during which sub-groups of experts/ institutions would be identified and enlisted, 'to prepare status papers on the identified areas which would be inputs for a larger and definitive consultation on the Youth Policy'. Subsequently, I was made part of a sub-committee on education and asked to become part of the larger consultation on youth policy. Between April and September 2006, I attended several meetings organised by the Department of Art, Culture, Sports and Youth Affairs (Government of Jharkhand) (hereafter: Youth Department) during which the state was in action making, 'itself real and tangible through symbols, texts, and iconography' (Blom Hansen & Stepputat 2001:5). The final meeting took place on 30 July 2007, when the Youth Department disseminated its Draft Jharkhand Youth Policy in Hindi and English. My presence during these meetings allowed me to study the 'languages of stateness' and 'study the state, or discourses of the state, from 'the field' in the sense of localised ethnographic sites' (Blom Hansen & Stepputat 2001:5). In other words, this youth policy formation process allowed me to 'see' the state of Jharkhand. This article discloses its character.

Relatively young people have played major roles during World War II and other struggles for independence, to which (newly) established nation-states reacted by the creation of ideological rules of differentiated and state-managed 'youth'. In Britain and America, 'Young people' as Christine Griffin described in her 'Representations of Youth' (1997:17) were,

> assumed to hold the key to the nation's future, and the treatment and management of 'youth' is expected to provide the solution to a nation's 'problems', from 'drug abuse', 'hooliganism' and 'teenage pregnancy' to inner city 'riots'.

Relatively young people thus entered the domain of the state as 'youth' and policies were designed with the expectation that these young people would solve the problems of the state (cf. Griffin 2001:158). In 1985, governments around the world, including that of India, celebrated the 'International Youth Year'. Subsequently, a 'World Programme of Action for Youth' (The World Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond)[3] was formulated and subscribed to by several and diverse national governments which all recognised that, 'The imagination, ideals and energies of young men and women are vital for the continuing development of the societies in which they live'. These state governments therefore recognised 'youth' not only as a separate formation that could contribute to social development but also roped in some relatively young people by designing policies for them. Yet since the 1960s many states, and increasingly so, have started expressing their disappointment with this 'coalition' between them and 'the youth'. These

states now view young people with 'mistrust' (Stephen and Squires 2004:351) and in need of 'surveillance' and not only 'protection' and/or 'care' (cf. Griffin 1997:24).

Indeed, studies on Euro American (and Australian) states' attitudes towards relatively young people during the 1990s, conclude that states generally tend to see youth as 'problems' (cf. Sharland 2005) or even as 'inherently deviant or deficient' (Griffin 1997:24): 'young people are beset by predominantly negative images, are seen as either a source of trouble or in trouble' (Roche & Tucker 1997:1). Academic literature then continues to show how these state discourses on youth, in particular in the UK, US and Australia, impact (social welfare) policies and practices in these countries. Engaging with Foucault's theories on disciplinary, sovereign and governmental forms of power as well as of (Neo) liberalism as a problematisation of the practice of liberal welfare governments, these studies show how these 'institutionalised relations of mistrust' (Kelly 2003:165) of the state towards the 'dangerous Other' ['Youth-at-risk'] translate into 'a raft of interventions and strategies and programmes that target young people (Kelly 2003:165). These scholars also show the 'vacuous nature' of these youth constructs, which are 'laid bare as unintelligible and deleterious to fostering any sense of inclusion and social justice' in the lives of (marginalised) young people (Stephen and Squires 2004:351).

Again, often using Foucault's work on disciplinary, sovereign and governmental forms of power (Kelly 2000) or using 'governmentality' as a theoretical framework (Warburton & Smith 2003), such studies therefore aim at showing the (negative) impact these state 'imaginings' of youth have on young people (Riele 2006) and 'explore the dangerous possibilities provoked by the popular and promiscuous construction of the category of 'youth-at-risk" (Kelly 2000:463). This is often followed by a description of 'practice' (if not 'reality') among (various groups of) young people (Bucholtz 2002), sometimes described in terms of resistance' and the formation of 'subcultures' (Muncie 1999:169-171) and elsewhere in terms of 'hybridity' (Nilan and Feixa 2006). By inference, in these studies the state seems to head a 'carceral society' (Muncie 1999:212)[4] and appears strong, authoritarian and overtly concerned with questions of social order and social control (Jeffs & Smith 1994). Besides, these studies show how the state, through its institutions, procedures, calculations, tactics and reflections does target at youth who become 'the most intensively governed sector of personal existence' (Rose 1989:121). However, these studies do not study the reasons for states to define 'youth' as 'the other' of itself, 'the adult'. In this article, I, therefore, explicitly analyse this grammar of 'othering' (cf. Baumann 2004:19) and aim at an ethnography of the state by looking at its 'everyday practices', its

'discursive construction' (Gupta 1995:375-402) and the state's 'image' of itself (Migdal 2001:16-18). Fundamentally therefore, this article is not about young people but deals with the ways in which institutionally structured processes of 'expert' knowledge production on youth actually constructs the state as 'adult' who is at once 'violent and destructive as well as benevolent and productive' (Blom Hansen & Stepputat 2001:5) but also weak, old(er) and most of all insecure.

In this article, I use the concept of 'security'[5] as a key concept to understand the state, its construction of 'youth' and therefore its self-definition as 'adult'. In the first section, I show that by defining the 'youth' as 'the intimate other' the state, roping in others too, defines itself as 'adult'. In the second section, I argue that through adults' construction of 'youth-at-risk', we understand adults' fears, anxieties and their nightmares – in short, the factors that render the state (and other adults) insecure. Conversely, I show in the third section that the state, in search of security, tries to find 'alliances' among people in 'society'. By defining 'youth' as 'the hope of the nation', we see not only a state striving for security but the state's coalition with 'youth'. This is followed by a short conclusion with a speculation of the implications of this on coalition based formulated 'Jharkhand Youth Policy'.

The State's Grammar of Identity and Alterity

As there is no age at which one objectively stops being a 'child' or starts being completely 'adult' and these categories are thus arbitrary, it could be questioned whether the GoJ at all needed specific responses to 'youth'. Yet, as Kamens (1985:9) pointed out:

> State elites are under strong pressures to build institutional linkages between critical population groups and the state. Children and adolescents are two key categories in the nation-building drive. This is particularly true among newer nations, in which nation building and economic development must occur simultaneously and quickly.

It indeed seems that the GoJ has always tried to rope in 'youth' in the realm of the state. With the formation of the new state in 2000, a Youth Department had already been established, initially with the intention to promote and increase participation in the sports activities of the state as well as, 'to offer help and advice wherever possible and to be a link between Jharkhand and the national sports authorities'. With this in mind, the GoJ had even put together 'a comprehensive action plan to enable them to realise *their* [emphasis mine] objectives over the next few years.'[6] Other schemes designed by the Youth Department had thereafter been formulated to induce the 'principles and values incorporated in our constitution in our Youth'. In order to

build even more 'institutional linkages between youth and the state' and to link the motivation of youth 'to the collective goals of the state' (cf. Kamens 1985:11), the NSS camping schemes were organised, covering several aspects like the 'adoption of intensive upliftment works, carrying out medico-social service, setting up medical programmes of mass immunisation, sanitation drive, literacy programmes for the weaker sections of the community, blood donation' etc. Clearly, the GoJ needed 'youth' as part of its 'state-building process'. Indeed, as Kamens (1985:3) stated, though in a different context, a key component of Jharkhand's 'language of stateness' was to separate 'the youth' from 'the adult', which was based on the idea that rational action results from the activities of appropriately socialised individuals. As a result, harnessing the motivation of individuals to collective goals becomes a central concern of modern states.

Moreover, in 2006 the GoJ decided it had to 'reconstruct' (cf. Kamens 1985:6) youth in Jharkhand and the state expressed its need for 'a youth-oriented policy' that would target the 'over nine million youths' residing in the state [7]. The GoJ's main motivation seems to have been that since the GoI had already designed 'local and contingent makers, set up in current law, guidance and practice' the Jharkhand State might as well follow. Besides, a state representative remarked, 'the recent global concern on youths has proved the importance of youths in the development of a society'. The GoJ therefore subscribed to the National Youth Policy 2003 that reiterated the commitment of the entire nation to the composite and all-round development of the young daughters and sons of India and sought to establish an all-India perspective to fulfil their legitimate aspirations so that they are all strong of heart, body and mind to successfully accomplish the challenging tasks of national reconstruction and social changes that lie ahead.

One of the foremost questions during the first meeting organised by the GoJ concerned the definition of youth and, whereas it was recognised that the GoI defined 'Indian youth' as young people in the age group of 15-35 years (Annual Report 1995-1996:5), the question was asked as to what or who was the youth of Jharkhand? Apart from the recognition that different societies do define and demarcate youth differently, it was stated that even within India, people of a wide range of ages were often treated as youth, and people of a wide range of ages claimed the space of youth, at specific times and in specific places. It was also decided that the definition of 'youth' as an age category was somewhat arbitrary as there were no precise moments that marked when the 'youth' period ended and 'adulthood' began. The state therefore recognised that youth was a physiological, psychological as well as a socio-cultural, administrative and political category. Nevertheless, the

state, including those it had roped in, agreed that 'youth' was to be defined first of all in terms of age. Different age categories were thereafter proposed, based on various criteria. Finally, the Secretary of the Youth Department decided that, in order 'to ensure a focused approach, it is always preferable to define the target group with scope of inclusion as well as confining it within a feasible limit'. Yet, while at the end of the discussion it was thus decided to define 'youth' in Jharkhand as 'those young people who fall within the age segment of 13-30 years', other definitions had also gained popularity.

One of the most important definitions was the one in which 'youth' was defined as a category to which the speakers did not belong, i.e. youth was imagined as 'the other'. But youth also was what the speakers once had been (but were no longer). In other words, youth entered the space of the state as the 'intimate other' of the speakers who all once upon a time had been part of the category of 'youth'. Apart from learning that some relatively young people in Jharkhand, namely those aged between 13-30 years, thus entered the space of the state as 'youth', during this first consultation I did not learn anything about these young people in the state. However, I learnt a lot about the (language, grammar of the) state.

First of all, while defining 'youth', the state actually imagined itself as 'adult' (cf. Kerkhoff 1995). Besides, in order to define a policy for this 'youth', the state had expressed its need for 'alliances' and had actually roped in other 'stakeholders' who all entered the space of the state as 'adults'. Indeed, all the speakers during the meeting including the state administrators felt they had passed through the youth stage and now were 'adults'. The 'state' thus consisted of a particular group of adults who had assembled to design a policy for 'the youth' of Jharkhand, defined as their 'intimate others'. The difference between 'the state' and 'society' was therefore blurred, as there were 'key coalitions between social groups and parts of the state' (Migdal 2001:36). This forced me to adopt a 'state-in-society' approach to the state rather than a 'state-and-society' approach.

Secondly, 'youth' was not only defined as 'the other' of the state (i.e. adults) but also as the 'intimate' other. By invoking their own pasts, all 'stakeholders' during the meeting, entering the domain of the state as 'adults', felt that though they were not youths themselves any longer, they nevertheless understood 'the other' who therefore was 'intimate' to them. One speaker argued for instance: 'I have not worked with youths before, yet I think I can become part of one of the advisory committees as I was born and brought up in Jharkhand. *I* therefore know *their* problems'. This 'othering', also allowed these speakers to reaffirm adult status as a former youth, to heighten their own authority and was a 'way to distance themselves from the young people' (cf. Knopp Biklen 2004:716).

Thirdly, I learnt from this first meeting that the state's main rationale for its search for a coalition with the youth was because these adults felt that they had lost something which the 'intimate others' still possessed: their 'youth'. One of the participants during the meeting said, 'We should organise sport events as this is the best way to reach the youth and unite them. Besides, while participating in the events, it will make us young too; we will get back our youthfulness'. Although, these adults knew, of course, that they could not really 'go back' to being 'youth', they expected a coalition with these 'youths' would give them something back, i.e. 'youthfulness' (Knopp Biklen 2004:716). Besides, as I will show below, they hoped a coalition between 'the state' and 'the youth' would return to these adults, particular conditions that had existed in their (remembered) pasts and which were imagined to have been better than the present. One of the participants remembered:

> When I was a student in the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) [Delhi] it was not like that. We were all very close to each other. I do not know what it is but nowadays it is much more difficult to unite young people for a common goal.

Therefore, it was towards the 'youth' that these adults looked to redeem their present. In other words, this initial consultation meeting on Jharkhand Youth Policy Formulation thus displayed insecure adults, who had lost their pasts and were concerned over an uncertain future, striving for security. This reminded me of Griffin (2001:163) who remarked that:

> Dominant representations of 'youth' can operate to calm adult fears over the instabilities of the future [and the present] and of the nation itself, the site of 'home' and therefore of identity.

In conclusion, therefore, during the first meeting I learnt nothing much about 'youth' but a lot about the state, its dreams and nightmares. I understood that the state consisted of a particular group of adults with fears about the present situation in Jharkhand. These fears, among other things, concerned all sorts of securities which these adults imagined had existed in the past but were lost in the present: The educational system had been better; there had been less people, less pollution, less violence and more job opportunities.

Simultaneously, I learnt that these adults dreamt of a different future however and looked upon youth, enrolled in the state as the 'intimate other', to return their pasts for a better future. Indeed, as Muncie (1999:11) argued, these 'intimate others' had to carry 'a peculiar burden of representation' and were seen as the state's future. To secure that future and solve the state's present problems, 'youth' was a consistent referent. In fact, youth was treated as the key indicator of the state of Jharkhand itself and the condition

of these young people was seen as being symptomatic of the health and future of the state. These adults therefore agreed they had to tackle the 'youth problem' in order to cure these adults, the state. The state's next step was therefore to schedule more meetings during which status papers would be presented that described the condition of the 'youth' in the key areas selected (by these adults) and would contain policies that would secure the state.

The State-at-Risk

Apart from defining 'youth', during the initial meeting, 'key areas' had also been decided upon and sub-committees were constituted with the task to prepare status papers. The status papers were supposed to be prepared by 'experts in consultation with concerned stakeholders'. This should result in 'a preparation of an action plan for the next five years with an elaboration of action points for the key priority areas'. During the follow-up sessions 'adults' thus presented their status papers that encompassed 'Education'; 'Health'; 'Livelihood and Employment'; 'Mission Orientation of Youth'; 'Protection of Youths from Exploitation'; 'Institutional Capacity Building' and 'Art, Culture and Sports.[8] The state's prime objective for asking these 'stakeholders' to produce these status papers, and thus enrolling them in the state (on equal basis as adults) was to get 'inputs for a larger and definitive consultation of the Youth Policy'. Paper writers, mostly representatives of various NGOs in Jharkhand but also a few administrators, had been requested to review the 'status of youth' in their papers.

In the status paper on 'Health', 'the youth' appears as mostly 'dwelling below poverty line' (p. 1), 'falling prey to drugs, substance abuse, mental disorders' and as 'prone to communicable and callous diseases, STI, RTI and HIV/AIDS' (p. 4). They also received 'inadequate nutrition' through which the youth of Jharkhand had become 'vulnerable to various diseases and unwholesome development'. The status paper added that there also was, 'gender imbalance in the status of youth health of Jharkhand' and stated that, 'some of the gruelling indicators like early marriage, anaemia, malnutrition, alcoholism, drugs and substance abuse have become a pervasive threat for the wholesome and equitable growth of female youth in Jharkhand' (pp. 4-5). The report concluded that 'the core problem of Jharkhand is the limited options, especially for the poor, thus leading to utter poverty situations and migration' and the 'implicit consequence in rural-urban flow of the poorest' was 'the problem of trafficking of young girls, who are economically and sexually exploited'. This had resulted in the emergence of the 'sick, unemployed, visionless, impatient, lost, and vulnerable category of population - the Youth of Jharkhand' (p. 6)

The status paper on 'Livelihoods and Employment in Jharkhand' showed that 'the work participation rate in Jharkhand, both in rural and urban areas, is lesser than the all-India average' (p. 1) and argued that 'the main economic challenge for Jharkhand is to ensure gainful and sustainable employment to two lakh people every year'. Besides, the paper continued: 'The challenge is then not just creating two lakh new livelihoods, but to make existing livelihoods more productive so that persons engaged in these can earn a higher income' (p. 5). In particular, 'urban educated unemployed youth' are defined as a vulnerable group in this regard and the status paper also mentioned that, 'the major problem with the youth is the complete lack of vocational training facilities' (p. 25).

The status paper entitled 'Jharkhand – A Cultural Overview', starts with the statement that through the formation of the new state of Jharkhand on 15 November 2000, 'the long cherished dream of forming the state of Jharkhand became a reality when Bihar was bifurcated and Jharkhand became the 28th province of the Indian nation state to coincide with the birth anniversary of legendary Birsa Munda' (p. 1). Yet, the rest of the paper shows that in fact the state is not doing well at all and argues that, 'traditions, ritual and culture are lifelines of these tribal and non-tribal people but old systems collapsed and [left] people who are finding it difficult to adjust to new occasions and new economic situations' (p. 2). The paper concludes that, 'the biggest challenge ahead of the present administration is to effectively address the decades of negligence and genuine grievances of the people, politically tackle the increasing militant activities and general disturbance of the law and order situation in the state' (p. 2).

The writers of the draft-status paper on 'The Protection of Youth from Exploitation' agreed with the government that, 'youth and adolescents will definitely augur well for the future of the state' but they regretted to say that in Jharkhand:

> The scenario is rather bleak because our average adolescent/youth is illiterate, married, working or has migrated. S/he is at risk to contract HIV/AIDS because of migration, lack of awareness and poor negotiation and decision-making skills. The girl is at risk when she is pregnant because she is too young and not mature, she is anaemic and health system is not geared to respond to complications. A pregnant adolescent is more prone to access illegal and unqualified service providers for abortion because of the stigma and discrimination and the poor availability of qualified service providers (p. 1).

In this draft status paper, it is also argued that many youths suffer from 'depression' and from an 'identity crisis' and 'lack proper guidance'. Besides,

one other of Jharkhand's 'problems' is, the paper narrates, the fact that the state is, 'greatly disturbed by the naxalite activities'. The paper adds:

> This social unrest in past decades has severely affected life of people as youngsters are lured and at times forced into joining such extremists groups and as a result there is large-scale migration of youth from these areas (p. 6).

The paper concludes that the 'vulnerability of youth is of various nature':

> The age-old issues like child/early marriage and dowry are still prevalent in the society. Witchcraft and witch hunting are very much practiced in the tribal areas of Jharkhand, which often leads to mental, physical and sexual exploitation of the victim (especially the women and girls). It has been seen that the primary causes of most of the problems are poverty with diminishing livelihood opportunities in Jharkhand. Trafficking of young girls/boys in the form of house servants and youths as labourers has become common. Poor schooling has resulted in [the creation of] illiterate and poorly competent adolescents/youth. Thus, most migrate as unskilled labourers to metropolises [which is] the most risk factor for acquiring HIV/AIDS. Ignorance and paucity of information, health, livelihood options and the absence of supportive environment leads to dissatisfaction and depression among youth and adolescents and in youth indulging in risky behaviour (p. 9).

The picture drawn by the status report on 'Youth Education in Jharkhand' is not much rosier and it for instance mentions that, 'the state is far behind in the literacy drive race' (p. 11). There also is a lack of educational institutions for the youth and the paper writers regret that 'our students of history and culture have only two museums to see and learn the preservation and restoration of rich cultural heritage the state has' (p. 16). Besides, 'Automation and digital computation is a far cry for the state' (p. 16) and it is also felt that, 'our state education machinery at the university/ professional level is quite incompetent and deeply fractured [and therefore unable] to support even one-fifth (or even less) of our educationally ripened youth' (p. 16). In conclusion the report states that, 'a comparative analysis on all-India basis and among the newly formed states shows that we could definitely place Jharkhand as a 'BIMARU' State, which is in dire need and support of the centre and the state both' (p. 21).

Part of the process in developing policies according to Carol Bacchi (1999) is to identify the problem. Clearly in these status papers, 'youth' was supposed to be 'in trouble', 'troubled' and even sometimes 'the trouble'. Therefore, besides the fact that some among Jharkhand's younger population entered the space of the state as 'the intimate other' they also entered this space as 'youth-at-risk' (cf. Armstrong 2004, p. 112). These adults felt that contemporary

society in Jharkhand was inherently more difficult or constraining (i.e. 'risky': cf. Boholm 2003) for youth who are imagined and (re-)constructed as the 'victims of social change'. This 'youth' represents the most at risk group as they have 'less life experience, less exposure to information, resources and power over their lives' than 'adults' and are therefore severely troubled and in trouble. These relatively young people therefore entered the space of the state not only as 'different' from these adults embodying the state but also as 'unequal'. Often the inclusion of 'the other' ('alterity') is done by 'an act of hierarchical subsumption' (we adults know more, have more experience, more knowledge and more power) but sometimes by the creation of a 'negative mirror image' of the other (old against young; tired against energetic; corrupt against honest; secure against vulnerable; mature against immature or past against future) but certainly never on the basis of 'equality' (as adults) (cf. Baumann and Gingrich 2004:47-48).

Various categories of these youths-at-risk were imagined, such as 'deviant youths', 'HIV/AIDS youths', 'the girl-child', 'illiterate or out-of-school youths', 'unemployed youths', 'tribal youths', 'minority youths' 'mentally and physically challenged youths', 'rural youths', 'slum dwellers', 'criminal youths' and 'youth under specially difficult circumstances like victims of trafficking, orphans and street children'. These relatively young people are all depicted as being ill-informed, vulnerable, powerless, poor, unhealthy, ignorant, deprived, frustrated, depressed, extravagant, deficient and exploited (due to land alienation or corruption but also sexually and as migrant labourers). In this way 'youth' is seen by these 'adults' as 'increasingly threatened and endangered' but also as a 'threat to the rest of us' (cf. Buckingham 2000:3) and in need of the state's protection or supervision (negative mirror image), training or surveillance (hierarchical subsumption).

These status papers did not teach me much about young people in Jharkhand. They are clearly modes of 'vulnerable' category construction. Yet, I believe that their value lay somewhere else as well: Through these papers, we see extremely insecure adults (among others, those constituting the state) longing for security but having been so far unable to solve their problems (caused by all age groups: children, youths, adults and the aged). Through these papers, one discovers a *bimaru* (sick) Jharkhand with a state that, adults feel, has failed in all fields (i.e. educational, employment, health, policing, social welfare, sports, art and culture, etc.). Though the state housed over nine million youths, the majority of them were economically, socially and culturally backward. The state, for instance, was found to be 'lagging behind in the employment scenario in comparison to the national average'. Besides, the quality of the state educational system was found to be 'very

low, not related to the job-market and responsible for the creation of social inequalities'. The state had also not been able to keep the youth mentally and physically healthy or able to produce sportsmen or artists. Therefore, the construction of 'youth-at-risk' (or as 'vulnerable' category) in these papers actually shows us a 'crisis of governance' (Armstrong 2004:100). A 'crisis-state' that feels troubled by corruption, violence, communal and caste problems, poverty and pollution in the state and sometimes by the fact that 'youth' are not 'at-risk' but constitute 'the risk' (cf. Giroux 2002:xi).

Through these papers, rather than discovering troubled and troubling youth, I instead discovered insecure adults. During discussions, it became clear that what troubled these adults most was the fact that they had lost their pasts ('when I was young, Ranchi was so clean, so safe and quiet') and were troubled by the present ('Jharkhand is in a mess; naxalites constitute enemy no.1'), which hampered their chances of getting a better future ('it will never be as before anymore'). In this present of 'manufactured uncertainty' (cf. Giddens 1994) these adults therefore counted on the state to find alliances that would redeem their insecurity by giving back their 'pasts' (i.e. certain conditions that existed in the past or even their 'youth').

Coalition between State and Youth

During the meetings organised by the Youth Department, the GoJ unambiguously accepted that the state was at-risk. The adults constituting the state had dreams too, however:

> Our vision for the state in the year 2010 is a Jharkhand free from poverty where every individual is able to lead a comfortable and healthy life. Where basic minimum needs of food, shelter, health, education, drinking water have been taken care of and each individual is able to access all the opportunities for his personal, educational and skill development. Where the environment is clean and the life and property of individuals is safe. A state where there is no hunger, exploitation, discrimination or deprivation (Gupta 2003:251-252).

What is more, the GoJ was also committed to achieve the above ideals:

> The state and its government are committed to accelerat[ing] the pace of development with a view to transform[ing] Jharkhand into a modern state. The development policy emphasises the need for intensifying efforts to achieve development both in the economic and the social spheres so that the state can realise its full economic potential and even the weakest and the most backward can become active participants in the development process (Gupta 2003:250).

Yet, the problem was, as shown above, that the state felt insecure and troubled, among other things by 'youth-at-risk' and most importantly as an 'adult'.

As adults, they, therefore, were in search of their pasts, their lost youth, 'a mythical golden age of peace and tranquillity', 'age-old culture and traditions and 'security' (Muncie 1999:82) when they did not have 'all these adult responsibilities', when there had been, 'less corruption, violence, castism, communal tension' and 'better education, more employment opportunities, less consumerism, individualism and environment degradation'. These adults clearly wanted to return to this 'care-free age' and they now had found the solution: 'youth-at-risk'. Indeed, the status papers all point in that direction and 'the deal' is clear: both state as well as youth had their rights and responsibilities. Says the draft-status paper on 'Protection of Youth from Exploitation' (p. 9):

> It is a well-known fact that the youth and adolescents are the life-blood of any nation, and a vibrant and responsible youth will certainly contribute to a success of the development of a nation. Therefore it is inevitable to focus on promoting a sensitive and enabling environment for the growth and development of individuals of this age group.

These papers thus recommended intervention, protection, regulation and control by social agencies so that the state would be secured (by youth). The 'Mission Orientation for Youth' stated for instance:

> The GoJ should see to it that the 'Jharkhand's youth' gets 'self-respect', attains 'self-recognition', 'self-confidence', 'employment/economic sustainability', 'education', 'good housing, better living conditions and a good wife or partner', gets involved in 'development work' and is provided with 'skill oriented training for self-employment'.

The state therefore should provide this 'youth-at-risk' with an enabling environment that:

1. Reduces their vulnerabilities and increases their capabilities
2. Increases access and opportunities to information and services
3. Enhances their self-respect and dignity and helps to obtain an individual and collective ethnic identity
4. Enables them to live their lives in a fulfilling and creative way
5. Inculcates values, respect for culture, character building.

The GoJ is therefore urged to design youth policies that:

1. Embody instruction in values like respect for teachers, parents, and the aged besides religious tolerance, and compassion towards the poor and the needy.

2. Motivate youth to resist fragmentation of society on the basis of caste, religion, language and ethnicity and for promotion of democratic values enshrined in our constitution.

3. Mobilise youth to create local pressure groups within the community to fight corruption at all levels and to ensure that the benefits of development reach those for whom they are intended and are not siphoned of by middlemen and the powerful.

4. Lay emphasis on the economic and social security of the youth belonging to underprivileged sections of our society and those who are mentally and physically challenged.

Accordingly, and seeing education as part of the social infrastructure which affects economic performance rather than, as it might, analysing the ways in which the economic base is affecting educational provision and performance, the (adult) writers of the status papers recommended policies focusing upon the education of young people in schools and other institutions as well as upon the economic and employment prospects of young people in Jharkhand. Yet, 'mutual obligation' was the term or keyword of the discourses being used by these writers in the rhetoric of values, as there were 'no rights without responsibilities' (cf. Giddens 1998:66). Indeed, these adults argued that if the state would provide these young people with the proper environment, these youths in turn, as 'youth has rights but also duties', would certainly redeem the state. The coalition was thus built of 'trust'.

The status paper on 'Jharkhand – a Cultural Overview', for instance, promises that 'given a chance', 'the youth of Jharkhand responds to anything challenging' (p. 2) and the status paper on 'Youth Health in Jharkhand' mentioned that, 'youth in all ages, has been in the vanguard of progress and social change' (p. 1). The paper writers therefore asked 'Jharkhand as a newly born state' to 'commit to its healthy and vibrant youth as soon as possible', as thereupon these youths would 'fight with its abject poverty, food insecurity and insurgency' as, 'a healthy youth can change the future of this poor state' (p. 10). The status paper on 'Youth Education in Jharkhand' (p. 21) concluded:

> The Youth shall outshine and reflect the overall growth and development of Jharkhand in all spheres of life. The government should take the initiative in their well-being and interest and [the] rest shall be history ... Have faith and they shall repay it with recurring interests.

During the meetings, the Secretary of the Youth Department indeed confessed his belief in this coalition between 'the state' and 'the youth' through which the state's problems would be solved. This secretary mentioned, for

instance, that the nation was passing through 'a phase of demographic dividend where the number of people dependent on productive population is proportionally less' and he urged therefore that, 'The country should capitalise on this dividend' and as youth comprised 'a major proportion of the human resource' they should be provided with 'ample opportunities for self-development' so that they in turn could 'play a vital role in the socio-economic development of the nation'. In the process of social engineering the state therefore constructed the 'youth of Jharkhand' in an attempt 'to 'make up' rational, choice-making, autonomous, responsible citizens within various projects of government (Kelly 2000:464), particularly in employment, education and health. Lines of adults' legendary idol Swami Vivekanand were quoted in this respect: 'My faith is in the younger generation, the modern generation, out of them will come my workers. They will work out the whole problem like lions'.

Indeed, during the last meeting I attended in September 2006, the 'youth of Jharkhand' had become 'the hope of the nation' and for them the state would construct a kind of 'governed freedom' that 'stands as a kind of citizenship school for adolescents to make "good choices"' (Austin 2005:3). These 'good choices' meant that the young people, selected by the state and entering its realm as 'the intimate other' and as 'youth-at-risk', would exchange their identity as 'youth-at-risk' for an 'entrepreneurial self' (cf. Kelly 2006) that would make the state secure. These adults trusted that these 'intimate others' would clear up the mess created by the state or which the state had failed to clear up by itself. As 'youth of Jharkhand' (and in particular the 'tribal youth') these young people were 'energetic, hardworking, honest, simple by heart and living' and had 'sports and cultural activity as a way of life'. They also were 'very much dedicated, idealists, nature loving and loved their cultures and values'. They indeed would therefore be able to return all those aspects the state had lost upon becoming 'an adult' and which belonged to 'youthfulness'. Clearly, this 'youth promise' worked in a present where widespread (adult) anxieties, uncertainties and tensions enabled the articulation of 'youth-at-risk' to function as a powerful truth (cf. Kelly 2000:471).[9]

Will it Last?

In this article, I have subjected 'the state' (i.e. Youth Department of the GoJ) to an ethnographic gaze. By looking at youth policy formation process in Jharkhand, I did not learn anything more about young people in Jharkhand than that some among them (i.e. those aged between 13 and 30 years old) entered the space of the state as 'the intimate other' and as 'youth-at-risk', a 'vulnerable category'. Yet, I learned a lot about the state.

I showed that the state is embodied by 'adults' who are not 'youths' themselves, yet think they know them and understand their problems. Simultaneously, we saw that the state consists of a group of '*insecure* adults' who collaborate with each other on a 'segmentary' basis, all adults, (cf. Baumann 2004:21-24) and strive for security by defining a general plan of action for 'youth-at-risk', structured as the 'hope of Jharkhand'. Therefore, and unlike its Euro-American cousins described in studies mentioned in the introduction of this article, 'youth-at-risk' does not enter the space of the state in Jharkhand as a 'threat' whose behaviours and dispositions have to be regulated unless worse will happen (but cf. Anderson 2004). Unlike in the UK, USA and Australia, the relation between 'the state' and 'youth' in Jharkhand is based on 'trust' (and not on 'mistrust'). In fact in Jharkhand, 'youth-at-risk' are enrolled in the state as 'collaborators', though not on equal basis. 'Adults' in Jharkhand trust that by providing these relatively young people with better means to 'school them, or police them, or regulate them, or house them, or employ them, or prevent them from becoming involved in any number of risky (sexual, eating, drug (ab)using or peer cultural) practices' (Kelly 2000:463); in other words, with more effective socialisation means, they will secure the state. Thus, youth policy in Jharkhand is based on the same rationale as that formulated in the 'Draft New National Youth Policy of India' (United Nations 1999) and in which the GoI states it believes that:

> The development of any country depends upon the ways in which youth are nurtured and [the GoI therefore feels] that youth must find their due place in society to become active and constructive forces of positive change [and therefore] an urgent need is felt for a youth policy which, apart from aiming at youth development, also ensures *partnership* in the process of national development [emphasis mine].

The deal is clear therefore: the GoJ promises 'youth-at-risk' respect, recognition, confidence, employment, economic sustainability, quality education and good living conditions if in turn these youths will secure the state by cleaning up the mess. The state's subscription to this coalition seems to have made the enrolled adults already feel somewhat more secure. We can question whether the state will remain secure however. As shown in this article, this 'coalition' has been planned without the inclusion of 'youth' (themselves) as important stakeholders. Instead, they entered the space of the state as 'intimate others' (non-adults) who the GoJ did not have to directly involve in planning (cf. Frank 2006) as these 'adults' understood youths' problems and their needs. Besides, as 'youth-at-risk', these relatively young people aged between 13 and 30 years were included in the state on an unequal basis. Though adults at times legitimated this 'inequality' with 'ideas of

complementarity' (Baumann 2004:48) (*we* have more experience and *they* have more energy), the 'coalition' was more often established through 'encompassment' where,

> (…) the putatively subordinate category is adopted, subsumed or co-opted (<) into the identity defined and, as it were, owned by those who do the encompassing. Encompassment is thus always hierarchical (Baumann 2004:26).

We can therefore question the chances of success of this 'coalition' as it is not only proclaimed singly and based on inequality but also as it is between 'adults' and 'the youth'. One wonders about the 'duties and rights' of 'adults'. During the dissemination session of the Draft Jharkhand Youth Policy on 30 July 2007, one voice from the public questioned Guest of Honour Shri Bandhu Tirkey (Minister of Art, Culture, Sports, Youth Affairs and HRD Jharkhand) for instance by stating: 'The GoJ promises a lot in the draft policy but can you tell me what are the actual steps taken by the Government to reach poor youths in remote villages?' Most certainly, we can foresee that this alliance would be quite unstable.[10] In order to say more about its outcome however, we need to know for instance how individuals belonging to the relatively younger generation in Jharkhand identify and define 'the other', how they 'see' the state (*sarkar*), how they define their problems, what they provide as solutions and what their dreams are. In other words, in order to answer this question we need to undertake a totally different study than the above, namely one where the ethnographic gaze is directed at these relatively younger people themselves.

Notes

1. This article is a completely revised version of my paper with the title 'The Unsteady Coalition between the State and the Indian Youth in India'. This paper was presented during a workshop on the'''Ethnographies of the State' organised by the Department of Sociology (Delhi University) on 3 and 4 March 2005. For workshop report see: Chatterji, Palriwala and Thapan (2005:4312-4316). A later version of the paper was also presented during a conference on 'Youths and the Global South', organised by ASC, CODESRIA, IIAS and ISIM in Dakar (Senegal) between 13 and 15 October 2006. I have chosen this article's new title in the hope of taking readers back to two important ethnographies of the state with similar titles and with two different approaches to 'seeing' the state, i.e. that of Scott (1998) and that of Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava and Véron (2005). In this article I combine the two perspectives from which the state can be seen, i.e. from within and from without.

2. Quoted in Peter Kenyon's 'Youth Policy Formulation Manual' (International Council on National Youth Policy, ICNYP) of which excerpts are available on: www.icnyp.net/www/files/ypformmanual_excerpts.pdf). See United Nations (1999) for entire Manual.

3. http://www.un.org/events/youth98/backinfo/ywpa2000.htm

4. Following Foucault's understanding of the concept in his *Discipline and Punish* (London: Allen Lane 1977), Muncie (1999:303) defines it as, 'the notion that, as system of surveillance increase, forms of control pioneered in the nineteenth century prison are replicated throughout the social order'.

5. In 2005, my colleague, Dr. Ellen Bal, of the Vrije Universiteit (VU) in The Netherlands, and I embarked on a new project concerning youth and human security in Bangladesh and India. This research is carried out using a theoretical framework under development at the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology of the VU University through a project with the title 'Constructing human security in a globalising world'. In this article, I understand 'security' in the same sense as how we perceive of human security in this bigger project, i.e. as a state of being that can never be reached, as a 'paradise lost' (Cf. Baumann 2000). We use the concept of human security as a perspective or a lens that allows us to understand what makes people tick, without suggesting that everyone, always and everywhere, is driven by this 'quest for human security'. In this perspective of human security, securities and insecurities go together and are understood as two sides of the same medal. It perceives of human security as a goal rather than an end destination, as a driving force for many. And it underlines the significance of an individual and contextual approach (whereby the individual is related to the social).

6. http://www/jharkhand.gov.in/depts/culsp/culspaims.asp (accessed on 7 September 2006)

7. http://www.newkerala.com/news3.php?action=fullnews&id=21978

8. As these papers are unpublished I refrain from disclosing the authors of these papers. However, these papers and their authors as well as other participants during the meetings constitute my fieldwork data and informants for the present study.

9. In this respect Austin (2005, p. 8) argues that 'fidelity to any dream/ideal is shown to be juvenile, immature, 'a passing phase', something to be discarded when one wants to be counted as 'adult'. See also my unpublished paper presented during a workshop on'Youth in the Age of Development (1920!) (Bahia, Brazil: 20-22 June 2004) organized by SEPHIS, the SSRC and the Centro d'Estudos Afro-Orientais of the Federal University of Bahia. My paper was entitled 'Day Dreams and Nightmares. The Indian State and its Youth in Post-colonial Ranchi: An Unsteady Coalition', and it delves deeper into the idea of 'adulthood' defined as the stage in the human life cycle during which people feel they have lost their dreams.

10. Warburton and Smith (2003:772), in an effort to answer the question of whether young people will develop active citizenship through compulsory volunteer-type programmes, show that policies that 'compel individuals to contribute to society weaken their citizenship identities'. Others have therefore argued in favour of the inclusion of young people in youth policy making (Frank 2006). This might guarantee youths' collaboration in adults' projects of nation-building.

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Mayi-Mayi: Young Rebels in Kivu, DRC

Luca Jourdan*

Abstract

Mayi-Mayi militias have played a central role in the Congo war. Mostly active in North and South Kivu, these rural militias are not a unified movement. Nevertheless, they share a nationalist ideology and a number of war rituals centered on the belief that the *mayi*, a specially treated water, can protect warriors from bullets. In this article, I have traced the history of these beliefs and ritual practices that are rooted in the pre-colonial and colonial periods. Far from being a symptom of regression or new-barbarism, I have tried to show that the recourse to war rituals, as well as the nationalistic discourse, were effective in compensating the lack of weapons and military organization, and in mobilizing youth in a context of state collapse. Nevertheless, most of Mayi-Mayi commanders have proved to be opportunists and many young people have become involved in a spiral of violence that needs to be broken.

Résumé

Les miliciens *Mayi-Mayi* ont joué un rôle central dans la guerre au Congo. Plus actifs au nord et au sud de Kivu, ces miliciens de la campagne ne forment pas un mouvement unifié. Néanmoins, ils partagent la même idéologie nationaliste en plus d'un bon nombre de rites basés sur la conviction que le *mayi*, une eau spécialement traitée, peut les protéger contre les balles de pistolet. Dans cet article, je trace l'histoire de ces croyances et pratiques rituelles qui trouvent leur origine dans les périodes précoloniales et coloniales. J'ai essayé de montrer que le recours aux rites guerriers et aux discours nationalistes, loin d'être un symptôme de régression ou une nouvelle forme de barbarisme, s'est montré efficace pour compenser le manque d'armes et d'organisation militaire, mais aussi pour mobiliser la jeunesse dans le contexte d'un état qui s'écroule. Malheureusement, la plupart des commandants Mayi-mayi se sont montrés très opportunistes, et beaucoup de jeunes se sont retrouvés dans une spirale de violence qui doit être arrêtée.

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*   University of Bologna, Italy. Email: jourdan@libero.it

Introduction

Mayi-Mayi is one of the armed movements involved in the war that ravaged
North and South Kivu in the eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of
Congo during the last decade. In Congolese Kiswahili, Mayi-Mayi means
'water-water' which refers to the most important ritual performed by the
movement. This ritual consists of sprinkling young soldiers with 'magic
water', the mayi, which is believed to protect warriors from bullets.

There are at least two reasons for this armed movement: on the first
hand, Mayi-Mayi controlled most of the rural regions in Kivu; on the second
hand, tens of thousands of young people and children enrolled in this
movement. In East Congo, enrolment in rural militias is a response to a
complete lack of alternatives such as social and economic integration and
security. A strong point in the Mayi-Mayi phenomenon is the role of war
rituals and symbolism: the *mayi* is prepared by *docteurs*, who are mostly
children, and the combatants have to respect many rules if they want the
water to be effective. These symbols and practices, widely documented also
in other African contexts, compensate for the scarcity of modern weapons.
At the same time, the ritual discourse constitutes an effective strategy of
mobilisation, which favours the enrolment of young recruits attracted by the
possibility of affirming themselves and gaining access to new sources of
power.

In this article, I will focus on Mayi-Mayi's political history, its symbolism
and role in mobilising the youth in periods of crisis. Starting with Kivu social
history, I will consider what induced many youngsters to enrol in the
movement. Then I will focus on Mayi-Mayi political discourse, its war rituals
and practices which shaped the new identity that emerges from the war.
Finally, I will consider some consequences of the war in Congo where violence
seems to recompense the ones that use it.

Mayi-Mayi: A 'Warrior Tradition'

Between October 1996 and May 1997, Mayi-Mayi appeared in the AFDL
war which put an end to Mobutu's regime. The movement is still active in
the rural zones of North and South Kivu. The term Mayi-Mayi actually re-
fers to a cluster of groups scarcely co-ordinated among themselves, and
often driven by internal conflicts. At the same time, there are some common
characteristics which allowed the construction of a general view of the en-
tire phenomenon. First of all, Mayi-Mayi factions constantly resort to war
rituals, centred on the belief in the power of mayi to protect the combatants
from bullets. Second, the movement articulates a set of common griev-
ances, based on nationalist ideals, in order to oppose Ugandan and Rwandan

military intervention in Kivu. This mix of 'secret power' and nationalism seems to be very attractive to young people in East Congo.

All around the world, when we speak about combatants we refer to young people. Most Mayi-Mayi fighters are very young, often children. From a symbolic point of view, however, the Mayi-Mayi phenomenon is not 'young'. During periods of crisis in Africa, the use of magic water has proved to be an effective tool for organising the new generations into militias and to induce them to fight. Historically, meaningful links can be made between the present Mayi-Mayi rebellion and the resistance and rebel movements, which characterised East Africa in colonial and post-colonial times. From this point of view, the Mayi-Mayi phenomenon speaks to a symbolic continuity with the beliefs and rites related to the invulnerability of warriors widely diffused in many African contexts. The use of 'magic water' to heal people and to fight enemies is well documented in the history of the continent. The anthropologist John Middleton, in an article published in 1963 analysed the Yakan cult among the Lugbara, a population living between Uganda and Congo. The cult, which was centred upon the drinking of a magic water, appeared among the Lugbara at the end of the 19th century but it was already being practised by some neighbouring populations, such as the Dinka and the Mundu that used the magic water to fight against Arabs and the Azande empire. The cult spread among the Lugbara in a period of serious crisis: deadly diseases, such as meningitis, famine and the Mahdi revolt in Sudan contributed to the atmosphere of deep uncertainty. At the beginning of the 20th century, when the Lugbara region was under Belgian influence, the men who had obtained the water from the neighbouring populations were able to increase their status and were often named chiefs.[1] Later on, after 1913, the region became part of Uganda and the cult was promoted again by a prophet named Rembe who, together with his assistants, started to organise groups of young combatants, following a European military model, armed with dummy rifles. In 1919, the police intervened to prevent a big meeting of Yakan adepts and several people were killed. Since then, Yakan has survived only as a healing cult.

Certainly, one of the better known cases of the use of magic water for rebel purposes is the case of Maji-Maji (water-water) rebellion which spread in Tanzania between 1905 and 1907.[2] At the beginning of the century, the German colonial administration had tried to involve the country in the global market, an act that had exacerbated the domination. Vast areas had been transformed into plantations and the old social order had been completely warped. The Maji-Maji rebellion began between the Matumbi, a population settled in the regions west of Kilwa, where German colonisers had introduced cotton plantations and the local population had been compelled to 28 days of forced labour per year.

The initial leader of the rebellion was Kinjikitile Ngwale, a man who lived in a village called Ngarambe. In 1904, Kinjikitile was possessed by Hongo, a spirit linked to the god Bokero, which was venerated in the southern regions of Tanzania. Under the influence of Hongo, Kinjikitile built a big hut where he communicated with ancestors. He began to sprinkle his young fighters with the *maji*, a water prepared with special herbs that was supposed to liquidise German bullets. Combatants had to respect many conditions in order to be protected by the *maji*, first of all sexual abstention. Kinjikitile predicted the union of all Africans and announced that ancestors would return to support the rebellion. A lot of pilgrims started to visit his hut and take the *maji*, becoming invulnerable to bullets. A new cult was born that responded both to the lack of unity between different tribes and to the military gap due to the absence of guns: many youngsters joined the ranks of the rebellion led by the novel prophet of African liberation.

Unfortunately, Kinjikitile was quickly arrested and hanged. Nevertheless, despite the sudden death of the prophet, many clans had already seized the *maji* that was prepared by an apposite figure called *hongo*, who was supposed to know its secret formula. But, the Germans reinforced their colonial army with recruits from Somalia and Guinea and they were able to contain the rebellion. Rebel villages were burnt as well as cultivated land. Hunger started to threaten the country and the belief in the power of *maji* waned rapidly as well as the unity between the different tribes. In 1907, the rebellion came to an end. According to the German authorities, about 26,000 rebels had been killed and more than 50,000 civilians had died because of hunger.

One of the most important aspects of the Maji-Maji rebellion was certainly its inter-tribal character, due to the diffusion of the *maji* cult among different ethnic groups. Besides, the rebels fought against both the external and internal enemy, namely, the Germans and the witches. In fact, after the rebellion, many witchcraft eradication movements emerged in Tanzania inspired by Maji-Maji symbolism. As Terence Ranger (1990:55) has argued, 'after the defeat of Maji-Maji, the cluster of symbols and claims to spiritual power which Kinjikitile had made use of was drawn upon by a succession of prophetic figures who were concerned with the internal purification of African societies, and who led what have been called 'witchcraft eradication movements'. Probably these movements spread out mainly after the Second World War when European colonisers prohibited the killing of witches. Either way, the Maji-Maji symbolism had been tested and it had proved its effectiveness in mobilising youth against invaders. Warriors, once sprinkled with water, fought bravely, scaring the enemy: the *maji* ritual was bound to resurge in future rebellions when it would be necessary to mobilise young people.

Another well documented case of the use of magic water in East Africa is the Simba rebellion (lions in Kiswhahili) which broke out in the Congo in 1964, four years after independence. On that occasion, the ritual of the *maji* resurged again.

In December 1963 Pierre Mulele, who had been trained for a short time in China, came back to Kwilu, his birthplace, west of Kinshasa, and began a rebellion that aimed at a 'second independence' of the Congo. Some rudiments of guerrilla warfare and two revolvers were the initial means of the adventurous *maquis* of Lumumba's heirs. At the same time, a National Council for Liberation was created in Brazzaville by many nationalist leaders and Gbenye and Soumialot were charged with organising the rebellion in the Eastern regions. The Mulelist rebellion started in January 1964 and initially benefited from popular consensus and support. The reaction of the national army was pitiless: villages were burnt and cultivated land destroyed in an attempt to contain the war. But when the Mulele rebellion seemed to be nearly suppressed, Soumialot opened a new front in Kivu.

Simba was composed of young people, mostly between 12 and 20 years old. According to Benoit Verhaegen (1990, p. 94), it was an age group that 'the failed independence had particularly penalised, depriving them of school and work. They have nothing to lose in the insurrectional adventure and they constituted the Simba forefront'. The initial factors of Simba's success were ethnic homogeneity between the leaders of the rebellion, terror and magic protection (*ibidem*, pp. 94-96). The most important rebel leaders were Bakusu, Baluba and Batetela. Their leadership contributed to the initial cohesion of the movement. Furthermore, Simba made systematic use of terror: state agents, national officers, presumed traitors and simple thieves were tortured and executed in public. Finally, magic practices had a fundamental role: young Simba were first baptised with water and *dawa* (medications in Kiswahili) were given in order to protect them from bullets. Combatants had to observe several taboos such as sexual abstinence, prohibition from stealing, washing themselves, retreating in battle. They also had to follow a lot of food restrictions. The analogies with magic practices of Tanzanian Maji-Maji are evident. Bob Kabamba and Olivier Lanotte (1999:128, note 102) argued that the ritual of *maji* was brought to Congo by Soumialot's Tanzanian advisors who induced him to adopt this practice also for the Kivu rebellion. Even if the historical and political contexts were different, the war rituals were the same: their effectiveness in mobilising young people had already been proven. But the *maji* was not enough for Simba, faced with the reorganisation of the national army. In November 1964, two military operations were launched, supported by mercenary troops. Belgian parachutists conquered Kisangani and that was the end of the rebellion.

Origin and Evolution of the Mayi-Mayi Movement

East Congo began to crumble at the beginning of the 1990s, long before the AFDL rebellion. The first militias active in Kivu were named Kasindien and Bangilima and they were mainly composed of Simba veterans (cfr. Vlassenroot 2001-2, p. 124). The origins of these militias are uncertain. Vlassenroot argues that they had probably been created by Mobutu in order to support the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), a rebel movement active in the Rwenzori massif and hostile to the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. In the same years in Masisi, a region north of Goma, traditional chiefs of the indigenous population, particularly Hunde, began to mobilise young people against Banyarwanda (people from Rwanda), the Rwandan speaking community, a mix of Hutu and Tutsi, living in East Congo[3]. The tensions between Banyarwanda and 'autochthonous populations' increased and soon degenerated into a bloody conflict: at the core of the rivalry there was (and still is) a strong competition over land and an ongoing conflict over nationality which confers the right to participate in political life.

In March 1993, many Banyarwanda civilians were massacred by 'autochthonous militias' composed mostly of Hunde, but also including Nyanga and Tembo elements at the market of Ntoto, a village in the Walikale region (North Kivu). The Banyarwanda reaction was inevitable and the conflict quickly got worse. For their part, indigenous chiefs addressed some Kasindien commanders that came to Masisi to train new militias. These commanders were considered *docteurs*, men who were supposed to preserve the secret formula for *mayi* that would protect Hunde recruits from bullets (Mbindule Mitono 2000).

That same year (i.e. 1993), the new militias started to call themselves Mayi-Mayi, perhaps in an attempt at unification of all the military factions in the indigenous tribes. With the arrival in Kivu of more than a million Hutu refugees from Rwanda in April 1994, the region was definitely destabilised. Despite the Mayi-Mayi declaring themselves a nationalist movement fighting for Congo's integrity, they allied with Interahamwe, the militia responsible for the genocide in Rwanda. The new alliance started to pillage villages and to persecute the Tutsi population in Kivu.

In 1996 the campaign of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo/Zaïre (AFDL) began. The goal of this armed movement, led by Laurent Désiré Kabila and supported by Rwanda and Uganda, was to put an end to Mobutu's regime. Most of the Mayi-Mayi groups allied with Kabila; nevertheless some factions refused to join the campaign which was considered a Tutsi manoeuvre to conquer Kivu.

Mobutu's army was defeated in April 1997 and Kabila took over power; but the new government quickly lost consensus in Kivu. In Beni and Butembo (North Kivu), Mayi-Mayi groups started to attack AFDL soldiers, responsible for atrocities against the population, and in South Kivu general Padiri organised his own Mayi-Mayi group in the region of Bunyakiri (cf. Morvan 2004:104-119). The alliance between Kabila and Rwanda quickly deteriorated. Kabila accused Kigali of pillaging the country and expelled all Rwandans from Democratic Republic of Congo. Soon after, another rebellion started in Kivu: a new armed movement, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), appeared on the scene, supported again by Kigali which aimed to reassert its influence over the Congo. With the second war, which started in August 1998, alliances changed again and Mayi-Mayi opposed the RCD rebellion which was considered a Tutsi attempt to regain Kivu. In this phase of the war, Mayi-Mayi allied with the Kinshasa government which gave them military support. Since 1998, the Mayi-Mayi have controlled Kivu's rural zones while the RCD has settled in urban centres.

After the peace agreement signed in Sun City and the creation of a provisional government, in April 2003, some Mayi-Mayi commanders joined the new national army, which was supposed to be composed of all rebel forces. Till now, a few factions have still not been brought under control.

Youth Marginality and Violence in East Congo

It is important to focus on some aspects of Kivu's social history that are pertinent to this analysis. As many scholars have argued, in Africa there is a strong correlation between the social and economic marginalisation of young people and war. In East Congo, as well as in other war-torn areas, young combatants often emerge as new and leading actors. The progressive social and economic marginalisation of younger generations is the result of complex historical dynamics, such as the erosion of the traditional system of land distribution and the collapse of the state and its institutions, beginning with the school system. These dynamics have dramatically increased the propensity of young people to enrol in the militias. In East Congo, the recourse to violence has become one of the rare opportunities for social mobility as it is one of the rare alternatives to social marginalisation.

In Kivu, a large percentage of young people are predisposed to enrolling in militias. According to Frank Van Acker and Koen Vlassenroot (2000:3), this phenomenon is to some extent connected to a process of social fragmentation tied to land distribution. In pre-colonial times the Bami, the traditional chiefs, were responsible for the distribution of land which was considered a collective property. In exchange for land, the families had to

pay a yearly tribute in kind – a chicken or a goat – depending on the size of land they received. During colonisation, the Belgians set up a system of land registration, thereby introducing private ownership. The colonial administration did not suppress the traditional system but most of the vacant lands, which traditionally constituted a reserve for the communities, were declared state property and then transformed into plantations.

The turning point was the promulgation in 1973 of the Bakajika law during Mobutu's regime. According to this law, all the Congolese soil and subsoil became state property and the traditional system was definitively suppressed. However, the new law was never fully enforced and the uncertainty over land rights brought chaos. According to Van Acker and Vlassenroot (2000:3), the Bakajika law 'allowed the economic control over land to shift from colonial family-held plantations to a new class of urban Congolese entrepreneurs and for it to be concentrated in their hands, save for a limited number of surviving company plantations'. The Mobutu regime was founded on clientelism: the state had been transformed into a predatory machine and the dictator redistributed part of his wealth to a restricted group of politicians and businessmen in exchange for their loyalty. Mobutu's clients seized big plots that in many cases remained uncultivated. In Masisi, where the soil is fertile and the demographic pressure is very high, many people were deprived of their land and some politicians belonging to the Banyarwanda community – such as Bisengimana Rwena, who at that time was the chief of staff of Mobutu – took possession of vast plots which were mainly transformed into cattle farms. The consequence of this process of land spoliation was a dramatic augmentation of social inequality.

These changes, due to the new laws, produced inter-generational effects. In fact, the new generations were the most penalised and soon a new lumpen class made up of young men with no land, emerged on the social scene. The labour surplus could not be absorbed by the Congolese economy, which lacked industry, and the ongoing augmentation of demographic pressure contributed to aggravate the situation. Young people started to move from their villages, looking for jobs in the Congolese informal economy as diamond dealers, gold-diggers, pedlars in urban centres, etc. These new occupations were precarious; besides, most job seekers remained unemployed. At the same time, the public school system completely collapsed leaving only private ones which survived but at a cost too high for most families. The result was that at the beginning of the 1990s, many young men were experiencing a condition of marginality and frustration, living in critical economic conditions. The public administration had completely lost its credibility and Mobutu's soldiers, who were no longer being paid, started to pillage civilians. In this context, the explosion of violence in Kivu represented for many youngsters

an opportunity: the enrolment in rural militias had become one of the rare ways to escape marginality and a chance to gain social mobility, as well as an occasion to take revenge against the Mobutu apparatus of violence.

The Urge to Enrol

As we have seen, in East Congo the new generations face serious constraints which drastically restrict their agency. Even if most of the combatants have joined an armed group voluntarily, we must underline that the choice to enrol is taken in a context of very limited opportunities. In addition, once the conflict has started, the escalation of violence often forces young people to enrol *en masse* given that in a situation of widespread insecurity, enrolment is sometimes the only alternative to death.

The political and propagandistic pressure towards enrolment is high: the military and political leaders often present their communities as victims of a broad conspiracy and on the point of being exterminated. A Mayi-Mayi commander, for example, showed me a document which, according to him, constituted the proof of the existence of a secret Tutsi plan which aimed to conquer Congo and to exterminate all Congolese people. The text was signed by the presidents of Uganda and Rwanda, Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kagame, and was made up of different points in which the two leaders declared their intentions: pillage Congo's resources, sterilise the women, kill all the young men, etc. Despite the fact that this document was clearly a fake, and even full of typographical errors, it summarised a widespread interpretation of the Congolese conflict which is considered a Tutsi attempt, supported by Western countries, to dominate Central Africa. According to this kind of propaganda, and I will come to this point again, the mobilisation of all forces within the community – young men but also women and children – is presented as the only means of survival.

Nevertheless, even though political pressure and propaganda are undoubtedly two important factors, the pursuit of material benefits certainly constitutes another big incentive for enrolment in Congo (actually it is very difficult to establish an order among these different factors). According to a survey carried out by UNICEF in Bukavu, 25 per cent of Kadogo[4] (child-soldiers in Kiswahili) declared they had joined the AFDL of Kabila with the aim of obtaining some material benefits, 28 per cent of them declared that it was a matter of an absence of job opportunities, and 15 per cent wanted to take their revenge on the 'Forces Armées Zairoises', Mobutu's army. Only 7 per cent referred to patriotic motivations such as to put an end to Mobutu's dictatorship and free the country (cited in Van Acker & Vlassenroot 2001:107)

The fact that the search for material benefits often constitutes a major factor for enrolment explains why many combatants easily pass from an

armed group to another. Actually opportunism seems to be at the basis of many choices and behaviours. It is a widespread opportunism that, according to Bogumil Jewsiewicki, is connected to what he defines as 'mobutist habitus'. This habitus has been moulded by many years of the rapacious Mobutu dictatorship that has pushed people to behave on the basis of personal profit and on a symbolic violent definition of the other, as well as on a fear of becoming oneself a victim of this violence (Jewsiewicki 1998:632).

To broaden my analysis, I will now consider some passages from interviews made with several Mayi-Mayi combatants and ex-combatants. The first one is Kakule, an ex-combatant I met in 2003 when he was twenty-five years old; he had joined Mayi-Mayi in 1996 and he got out in 2000. At the time of our encounter, he was living in Lukanga, a village 30 km south of Butembo. Kakule was not married, he had no job and he passed most of his time drinking in the little pubs of the village where women prepare and serve local beer:

> I joined Mayi-Mayi when I was eighteen years old. I had nothing to do in Lukanga and I had a debt of twenty-five dollars. I was in debt to Papi, a little dealer in the village, who had lent me some money to buy myself some clothes. Papi was harassing me, so I went to a friend in Vitshumbi [a village on lake Edouard] to escape my debt. I was not working in Vitshumbi. In that period the soldiers of Mobutu [FAZ] were fleeing Goma; Mayi-Mayi were ousting them. When Mayi-Mayi arrived in Kanyabayonga, the FAZ ran away towards Vitshumbi. I could not come back to Lukanga and in the village there was war. After a week Mayi-Mayi came face-to-face with the FAZ; people in the village were fleeing but I didn't know where to go so I stayed there. I saw Mayi-Mayi beating FAZ who retreated to Niakakoma. I stayed with them [Mayi-Mayi], and I asked to join the movement. (…). I left the movement because I didn't have any more goals; Kabila, our chief, was far away. When I came back to Lukanga I had some bodyguards and everybody was afraid of me. Nobody asked me for money anymore.

According to his explanation, Kakule enrolled by chance. He was fleeing from a debt and he did not know where to go. Becoming a Mayi-Mayi meant turning into a strong man, escorted by bodyguards. His status was completely reversed. From being a passive subject, persecuted by his creditor, he had become a soldier. The decision to enrol seemed to have had only an individualistic dimension: ideology, political aspirations were 'far away' as well as his chief, Kabila.

Another young Mayi-Mayi, called Kasereka, told me:

> I'm from Kanyabayonga but I went to Goma to study at the Institut Supérieur. I joined Mayi-Mayi in 1993. I gave up schooling because I couldn't pay the fees any more. After that I decided to join Mayi-Mayi to liberate the country,

but if I had the means I would have continued studying. Mayi-Mayi were fighting against FAZ. I joined a group called Kifua-Fua. They were fighting naked because to release the country you have to fight naked, it is written in the Bible. We were fighting against Mobutu, but the FAZ beat us. The Kifua-Fua were in the regions of Ruchuru, Lubero, Masisi and also Walikale. After the defeat we retreated into the forest and I went back to Goma, but again I was without money. After that I joined this group [of La Fontaine]. (…). I don't know the causes of this war; I'm not a politician. In Congo there are 450 languages and every dialect wants its own president. Peace is difficult.

Kasereka was twenty-six years old when I met him. At the time, he was in the Mayi-Mayi commanded by La Fontaine, based in the villages of Muhanga and Bunyatenge, about 70 km west of Lubero. He was disillusioned, he had been fighting for a long time and he no longer wanted to talk about the causes of the war, which in his eyes had become something inexplicable. Actually, not only the war but even his life had become senseless and he could not find any reasons for the violence around him.

Sometimes, the choice to enrol is justified simply by the will to pillage and take profit from the situation of disorder. The passage from one armed faction to another is often motivated by the search for money, better food or even a nicer uniform. For example Kavira, a sixteen-year-old girl who had been fighting for three years, told me that she had preferred to enrol in the APC (the Armée Populaire Congolaise, another armed faction in North Kivu) simply because they had better uniforms than Mayi-Mayi. Besides she did not know where the latter had their military camp. When I met her, in March 2003, she had just fought in Mambasa (Ituri region) and she told me her experience:

I joined the APC because I wanted to eat without working; I wanted to go around in a car smoking chanvre [marijuana]. (…). I chose APC because I didn't know where Mayi-Mayi had their camp. I preferred APC because they had uniforms and were better armed. (…). I like war because I can take advantage of the situation and steal things. In Mambasa we took gold in MLC camp. (…). When I go into the houses of people who have run away I change my clothes, take oil and all the products. You have to be quick! If I go into the house and I am not strong enough to carry the television, then I destroy everything and I leave nothing to the enemy. In Mambasa we pillaged a lot. When the enemy flees, we enter the houses and we pillage. In Mambasa I took a mattress, a radio with eight batteries and some money. On the road I sold everything. In APC they give us nothing, so we try to survive by arresting people. They give us enough to eat, but if we want to get money we have to rob people.

Even if Kavira was only thirteen years old when she enrolled, her reasons for enrolling were not significantly different from her older comrades' (she was just a bit more explicit and perhaps naïve). Definitively, most of the combatants find it difficult to make sense of their experience, especially if they have spent many years fighting without the war producing any result. In the end, personal profit becomes the only reason to be a soldier. On the other hand, the leaders of all armed movements in Congo have used violence mainly in order to promote their personal interests and social ascent: on a smaller scale, combatants do nothing more than reproduce this attitude.

A variable that we have to consider carefully while speaking of African conflicts is the long duration of wars. In many regions, such as East Congo, war has lost its character of being an exception; it has become the norm pervading everyday life. It therefore becomes nearly impossible for combatants to formulate an ideological or political explanation of their status which could provide them with a justification for their actions. In this situation, violence seems to become self-validating: killings and destruction motivated by the simple desire for personal revenge, pillaging of villages carried out to satisfy the greed for goods, rape motivated by a momentary desire to possess a woman, and so on. This partially explains why pillage is so diffused and systematically practised: in a war where violence is used in many cases to satisfy the personal ambitions of a leader and his entourage, pillage becomes an indispensable instrument to control and motivate combatants. Actually, for many soldiers it is the only reason to fight.

Mayi-Mayi Rituals and Symbolism

We can consider Mayi-Mayi as an imagined community with seemingly common symbolic signposts (Abdullah 2005, p. 173). The symbolic dimension and ritual practices, as well as the political discourse I will consider later, mark out this community and define a specific 'Mayi-Mayi identity'. To focus on this point is not to portray Mayi-Mayi as an exotic phenomenon, a risk denounced by many anthropologists today (MacClancy 2002); on the contrary it is to recognise the importance of these aspects since, as Arsène Mwaka Bwenge (2003) has observed, «*ces modes de penseés mobilisent des masses et structurent des comportements qui font l'histoire aujourd'hui*». We could add that these masses are essentially made up of young people.

As we already know, the central belief is in the *mayi*, the magic water, a widespread and historically rooted belief. The *mayi* is prepared by *docteurs* (in South-Kivu they are named *nganga*). In most cases *docteurs* are children normally initiated by an older one. Water is put in plastic tanks kept in a *baraza*, a hut in the middle of the military camp accessible only by *docteurs*.

The water is treated in the *baraza* with special herbs mixed with organic substances. A very young *docteur* told me that to prepare the *mayi* he used parts of the human body such as the testicles which are reduced to ashes and mixed with the water. *Docteurs* also prepare medications called *dawa*, made from pulverised herbs, which are supposed to strengthen the power of *mayi*.

According to the fighters I met, Mayi-Mayi warriors are first scarified on the forehead, chest, arms and ankles. The *docteur* puts some *dawa* in the wounds and then he sprinkles them with water. After this ritual, the recruit becomes a Mayi-Mayi and a weapon is given to him (at the beginning of the 1990s Mayi-Mayi mainly used knives or machetes because of a lack of weapons).

When the Mayi-Mayi go to war, they are always followed by a *docteur* with a tank of water. He continuously sprinkles the warriors, repeating the mantra '*mayi-mayi*'. Combatants too have to scream '*mayi-mayi*' when they fight in order to invoke the power of the water.

Mayi-Mayi warriors must observe several rules. During my field research I discovered that they have to abstain from having sexual intercourse, stealing, looking at blood, washing with soap, eating *sombe* (manioc leaves), eating foods cooked with peel, and eating bones. Civilians cannot touch Mayi-Mayi and if they encounter one of them in the street they have to pass on his left. Finally, all objects a Mayi-Mayi touches that have previously been in contact with civilians must be strewn with soil.

When a Mayi-Mayi dies, his death is attributed to the infraction of one of these rules, and this partially explains their complexity (actually it is almost impossible to respect all the rules strictly). Many youngsters, especially children, are deceived and manipulated through these practices. Besides, most of the rules are not respected, especially the rule on sexual abstention: in fact rapes and kidnapping of women are systematically perpetrated by Mayi-Mayi.

Mayi-Mayi: An Identity between Tradition and Modernity

According to Ivan Vangu Ngimbi (1997:44), the youth crisis in Africa can be considered as a «*crise du placement social*», that is «*une crise des mécanismes d'intégration qui assuraient l'insertions des individus dans la societé*». The last resource for many young people to find a space within the society is violence, which is why they are often considered as a threat and a danger. To become a Mayi-Mayi – or a Cobra, a Ninja, a Cosa Nostra and so on – is a way to escape anonymity and to take revenge against a society that relegates the new generations to the margins. Hence, in contemporary Africa,

violence furnishes and shapes new models of socialisation and social asser-
tion. As Mamadou Diouf (2003:9-10) has argued, 'to kill, to experience vio-
lence and pleasure, to move along the obscure path of the night and migra-
tion, of witchcraft, of the urban and rural undergrounds – all these impulses
produce new cultures, new sociabilities, and new meanings of pleasure, life
and death'. In short, new cultures and new forms of identity emerge from
the state of war. On this issue, Achille Mbembe (2002:267) has affirmed that
'the state of war in contemporary Africa should [in fact] be conceived as a
general cultural experience that shapes identities, just as do the family, the
school and other social institutions'.

Starting from the considerations above, we can affirm that the Mayi-
Mayi fighter is a form of identity shaped by the state of war. As I argued
before, the symbolism and ritual practices which characterised this identity
are part of a symbolic corpus which is reactivated in time of crisis[5]. In East
Congo, young people have experienced a double crisis: the traditional culture
and the traditional forms of social organisation have lost their pertinence and
they are no longer able to give sense to and organise reality. Besides, this
'empty space' has not been filled since the project of the modernisation of
the country and the promises of the 'theology' of development have completely
failed, producing only disillusion and frustration. The result is a deep
uncertainty in which the recourse to violence is a means of breaking with the
current situation and at the same time it offers alternative models of
identification and socialisation.

The temporality of the subject can only be the immediate-present, due to
the rupture with the past and to the absence or impossibility of any projection
(into the future). About this issue Jewsiewicki (2002:593-598) has argued
that 'the frame of the subject who lives in Africa is the *présent-maintenant*:
cut out his or her past, the subject is removed from his or her own place
(…). In Africa, where societies have been marked by the slave trade and by
colonisation, indiscipline offers the subject its sole tactical recourse – a negative
one, to boot. Indiscipline makes it possible to resist, to remove oneself from
the actions of the Other'.

In addition, the reduction to a *présent-maintenant* seems to open the
doors to the realm of fantasy and witchcraft – the second world – where
everything is possible. The dialogues I had with Mayi-Mayi fighters were
constantly marked by fantasy:

> (...)Yes the dawa. Dawa was also a magic word. When you pronounced it
> you could disappear.
>
> - You know I do not believe in these things...

It is like that! Among us the ones who did not have sexual intercourse with women had become so powerful that they could fly!

- And how did they do it?

You needed to have five plastic bags, the ones with blue and white strips, not the black ones. To fly you needed to attach two at the arms, two at the calves, and you sit on one. But you did not have to buy the little bags from women sellers. In the group, two were able to fly, they were young and they had not touched a woman yet. To communicate they used the leaves as Motorola but only the *docteur* had this power.[6]

The Mayi-Mayi fighter emerges as a form of identity which imposes itself as an alternative to the chaos and incertitude generated by the crisis and the war; but this alternative seems to be moulded largely by fantasy. If we look closer at this process of identity construction/invention, we can notice its deep ambiguity: on the one hand Mayi-Mayi practices and symbolism refer to an 'African warrior tradition'; on the other hand the figure of the fighter is charged with modernity. In fact the young combatant, by means of pillage, is able to accede to those goods which can be considered as the fetishes of modernity: I refer to sun glasses, mobile phones, smart shoes and clothes, motor cars, motorcycles, etc. These objects are part of an 'economy of desired goods that are known, that may sometimes be seen, that one wants to enjoy, but to which one will never have material access'. In an economy of scarcity, the symbolic value of these objects increases and the only way to have access to them is through occult practices or violence: combatants are among the 'few elects' and through the ostentation of these goods they are able to renegotiate and increase their status.

Global trends are continually domesticated into local forms (Honwana & De Boeck 2005:1). According to Diouf (2003:2), 'the condition of young people in Africa, as well as their future, is heavily influenced by the interaction between global and local pressures: the fragmentation or dissolution of local culture and memory, on the one hand, and the influences of global culture, on the other. In the case of Mayi-Mayi, as well as most militias, a global war-mediated culture is reinterpreted at the local level (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999:329-361). In the little cinemas in Butembo, according to a survey I did in 2003, the five most seen movies were, in order: Delta Force II, with Chuck Norris; My Father is a Hero, interpreted by Jet Lee; Rambo I and II of Sylvester Stallone, and Commando with Arnold Schwarzenegger. The cinemas were assiduously attended by combatants, both APC and Mayi-Mayi,[7] who easily identify themselves with the actors and the plots of these movies[8] and they embody the gestures and the poses seen on the screen by reproducing them in real life with the fetish par excellence: the Kalashnikov.

Nevertheless, Mayi-Mayi is an ambiguous movement: on the one hand it creates new localities through the domestication of global trends; on the other, it proposes a strong rupture with the present, closing down from the rest of the world through recourse to a tradition continuously being reinvented and adapted. It is a continual oscillation between openness and closure. Kakule La Fontaine, a Mayi-Mayi commander who was one of my interlocutors during my field research, told me:

> The Mayi-Mayi do not have international support, they use African tradition. Congo is an ignorant country, annihilated by the white man. Witchcraft (*sorcellerie*) is a science: the leaves give power. Our ancestors were strong but the white man annihilated us with the church. The white men have science, in Africa there is witchcraft. Witchcraft is occult and it is persecuted by Western science, but witchcraft is the same thing as science, but witches do not reveal their secrets. Some doctors learn by practice, others during the dream.

The eternal dilemma between tradition and modernity emerges in Mayi-Mayi: although Mayi-Mayi now has a website[9], in their discourse there emerges a refusal of modernity which passes through the exaltation and the re-invention of African tradition. Thus, witchcraft is sometimes interpreted as a practice of pre-colonial Africa, as an ancient and pure source of power. This process is quite contradictory since Mayi-Mayi, as well as many religious and armed movements in the history of Africa, participate with zeal in the struggle against witchcraft. For example, in Beni and Lubero territories (North Kivu), the Mayi-Mayi killed many people, accusing them of being a *muloyi* (Kinande language for a witch). From these practices emerge an ideology of social purification and revival – typical of many prophetic movements – that at the beginning of the 20th century had already inspired, as we have seen, the witchcraft eradication movements which followed the defeat of the Maji-Maji rebellion in Tanzania.

Once more, the fluidity and the ambiguity of witchcraft discourse is confirmed: on the one hand witchcraft is considered positive when it is interpreted as an ancestral practice, as a source of occult power which survived the colonial domination and post-colonial chaos and now can be used as a weapon to fight the white man who are ultimately responsible for the Congolese war. On the other hand, witchcraft can be used for bad and egoistic purposes: it is the ultimate cause of social crisis and to release the Congolese people, dominated by evil, and create a new order, it is inevitable to eradicate it.

The construction of a Mayi-Mayi identity presents relevant analogies with the strategies of some religious communities which are omnipresent in Congo. For example, Filip de Boeck (1998:21-57) has analysed the community of

Bundu dia Congo which is a healing community based on the idea of rupture with the colonial past and the post-colonial present. To this rupture, the community opposes the cult of the authenticity of the ancestors, practised by its members who live isolated from the rest of the society. Following De Boeck, who has studied the Kikwit (Bandundu) section of the church, 'the community of Bundu dia Congo is closely knit. Most members live together in a large village-like compound, referred to as a *Mbanza Congo*, the city of 'kongo', in which daily life is organised around the figure of a living prophet, present in their midst' (*ibidem*, p. 33). The description is similar to a Mayi-Mayi military camp, most of which are isolated in faraway rural and forest areas. In the case of Mayi-Mayi, the isolation is even corporal: as we have seen, the combatant cannot be touched by a civilian and objects cannot be exchanged directly between a civilian and a fighter.[10]

An interesting point is that the community of Bundu da Congo has transformed Lumumba into an ideal ancestor, actually a model of ancestor. This process of deification of Lumumba is observable among Mayi-Mayi too. A widespread belief is that that the *dawa* are made with the powder of the bones of Lumumba, whose spirit lives in the bottom of a lake where the *docteur* goes to collect the ingredients to prepare the magical protections. Even in this case, Lumumba seems to have been transformed into an ancestor – the chief of the ancestors – and his body has become a source of power as well as the evocation of his name: '*mayi a Lumumba*' (the water of Lumumba) is one of the Mayi-Mayi war cries. Congolese society, disoriented when confronted with an epochal crisis, which is also a crisis of the memory, is trying to reinvent its roots: Lumumba has been transformed into both ancestor and redeemer,[11] an indispensable source of power to rebuild a moral community.

The Political Discourse

The Mayi-Mayi political discourse can be defined as nationalistic mixed with a strong anti-Tutsi feeling. The analysis of this discourse sheds light on the 'techniques of self-representation' which lead to a shared interpretation of the conflict in East Congo. This issue is deeply related to youngsters' involvement in the war since, as Rachele Brett and Irma Specht (2004:36) argued, 'in societies where the military (whether government or armed group) provides status and role model as well as the means of livelihood, and for whom identity (religious, ethnic and peer group) is bound up in the understanding of the conflict, there need to be strong counter-factors if young people are not to become involved'.

In 2000, the commander Mudhou, who was one of the Mayi-Mayi leaders in Beni territory, during a speech to his combatants, proclaimed 'We are here

to rescue the Congolese from the hegemony of a few people, from dictatorship and Western imperialism with the goal of establishing a democratic government with no classes'.[12] This statement is quite representative of Mayi-Mayi political discourse. Generally, Mayi-Mayi present themselves as a popular auto-defence force fighting against Ugandan and Rwandan armies which, according to local interpretation, were able to invade and pillage Congo, thanks to Western support. Many commentators have underlined the vagueness of these arguments. For example, Bob Kabamba and Olivier Lanotte (1999:129) argued :

> En réalité, tous ces groups *mayi mayi* n'ont pas de réel projet politique; leur seul revendication politique est le départ des Tutsi. Autrement dit: *le Congo aux Congolais.* Cette revendication suffit pour susciter l'engouement populaire de tout le Kivu. Les *mayi mayi* symbolisent ainsi l'idéal anti-tutsi dans l'est du Congo.

> [In reality, all these *mayi mayi* groups are not really political projects; their only one political demand is the departure of the Tutsi. In other words: 'Congo to the Congolese'. This demand is enough for arousing the popular desire of all Kivu. *Mayi mayi* therefore symbolizes the ideal anti-Tutsi in the east of Congo].

This statement is perhaps too severe: despite Mayi-Mayi having always been defined as 'negative forces', even by the UN, the weakness of the political project is not a peculiar feature of this movement; on the contrary it is a characteristic shared by all the factions fighting in East Congo where the political discourse seems to be just a matter of propaganda.

Mayi-Mayi political discourse, although confused, is not irrelevant. It is influenced by Marxism and nationalistic ideology rooted in the 1960s and the figure of Patrice Lumumba who, as I will show, has been opportunistically emphasised. Some Mayi-Mayi factions have sometimes divulged their political ideas through manifestos and leaflets. During my research, I collected some of these manifestos which can be useful to our analysis. For example, the document, reported below, was written and distributed in May 2001 by a Mayi-Mayi faction, called Resistance Nationale Lumumbiste. This group was active in the territory of Beni and was commanded by a chief called Lolwako. In the leaflet, the Mayi-Mayi explained the reasons that had pushed them to kidnap 26 workers of the Daraforet, a Thai company which was exploiting the forest near Beni. The Mayi-Mayi, following the UN report on the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources, accused the Daraforet of pillaging the country (cfr. United Nations 2001). The capture of the workers aimed to focus the attention of the international community on the war in Congo and particularly on the fact that some multinationals were making important profits thanks to the protection accorded by Congolese rebel groups and foreign

armies. The document makes public the political goals of this Mayi-Mayi faction. Later on, the workers were released after a negotiation run by Patrice Lumumba's son, François Lumumba, who had been asked to mediate by the Mayi-Mayi commander Lolwako.

From the reading of this document it is possible to define some features of Mayi-Mayi political discourse. The major subject, which is always emphasised, is the resistance to Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian invasions. These states, according to Mayi-Mayi, are supported by Western imperialist countries, above all the USA, and once in Congo they created some puppet rebel movements, such as the Mouvement de Liberation du Congo led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, to preserve their interests. This interpretation of the war, which is very popular in East Congo, can be summarised in the following points: first of all, the war is caused by Western countries, especially the USA, and aimed to pillage Congolese natural resources; second, Rwanda and Uganda, and their pro-Tutsi governments, are considered the armed allies for this operation; third, the international community, since it does not oppose this situation, is an accomplice of the aggressors.

Such an interpretation is not unrealistic but it hides much more than it reveals. As we know, external intrusions, and not only from the USA, are a constant in Congolese history, but this statement cannot justify an interpretation of the Congolese conflict simply as an expression of Western neo-imperialism in alliance with Tutsis. This reductive interpretation, which denies the complexity of the Congolese conflict, is not ingenuous since the emphasis on the imperialistic matrix of the war made by Mayi-Mayi leaders, who refer to Marxist and nationalistic ideals, functions to justify their own actions. This rhetoric covers up the real objectives which move most of Mayi-Mayi leaders to war: personal ambition for power, money, profit, etc. From this point of view, the Mayi-Mayi are another lost opportunity for the Kivu rural population to improve their living conditions: most of the factions have turned into private militias and are paid by big dealers who needed protection for their gold and coltan traffic.

Nevertheless, the political rhetoric sustained by Mayi-Mayi finds a fertile ground in post-colonial Africa. According to Achille Mbembe (2002, p.239-273), Marxism and third-world ideology have led to a self-representation of Africans as victims of external prevarication. Even if this representation finds its justification in African history, it is often opportunistically exploited by political actors in search of legitimisation and consensus. From this point of view, the political discourse of Mayi-Mayi is quite paradigmatic: many commanders have realised their own ambitions while hiding them behind the propaganda of self-defence and resistance to aggression. These arguments have been used to mobilise thousands of young people and children who

actually did fight for less 'noble' purposes, sometimes even opposite to the ones declared by their military chiefs.

Despite the lack of a political project, many young people kept on fighting, taking advantage of their military career which allowed them to pillage and abuse civilians. Nevertheless, many fighters felt betrayed by their commanders. A young man, who had been fighting with Mayi-Mayi, told me: 'Now I do not believe in anything, I do not think about the future. The Mayi-Mayi have become like the other soldiers and they are paid by the traders'. From these words emerges the regret for a failed rebellion and also the drama of a betrayed generation. As Ibrahim Abdullah (2005:184) has argued, 'grotesque appropriation of what constitutes a revolutionary project produces grotesque results'.

Conclusions

Without doubt, there cannot be peace unless African societies address the needs of young people, and this is particularly true in Congo (De Waal & Argenti 2002:155). The reconstruction of the Congolese state is an indispensable condition to confront some fundamental problems, such as the restoration of a legal system, the re-establishment of a school system, and the restart of a legal economy which could absorb young workers.

Nevertheless, the youth problem is not exclusively material but also moral. The Congolese peace project has followed a perverse schema: many political leaders and military commanders responsible for innumerable atrocities, have been 'rewarded' with honourable posts in the government of transition and the new national army. Many Mayi-Mayi commanders have been compensated for their war efforts and they are now senators, deputies or generals. Nowadays, some of these leaders will present themselves at the national elections, the ones who have funds will likely be elected while the ones who have little chance will try to hinder the electoral process. The point is that in Congo, violence has been shown to work and to recompense the ones that make use of it. What will be the consequences of this affirmation of violence on the new generations? Why should young people not resort to violence if it works? How will this affect the social habitus?

These questions delineate, from my point of view, some serious problems for the future. By now, most of the Mayi-Mayi groups have been demilitarised according to the DDR (Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration) plan which has been implemented in Congo. Mayi-Mayi popularity progressively decreased during the years of the war. If in 1996, during the AFDL campaign, they were considered invincible and fearless warriors, in recent years most of the people started to consider them as simple bandits. If the decrease in their popularity could create some problems for the reintegration of ex-fighters, who risk being stigmatised and pushed to rejoin militias, on the other hand a

demystification of the phenomenon could diminish its attractiveness. Nevertheless, if Congo political leaders are unable to seize the opportunity for peace, it is likely that young fighters screaming '*mayi-mayi*' will run again in the Kivu hills.

Notes

1. The Lugbara men who wanted the water had to pay for it. An interesting fact is that the water circulated through a net created by secret societies such as the Nebeli (Middleton, 1963, cit., p. 84).

2. See inter alia, J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979.

3. The migration from Rwanda to Congo is an ancient phenomenon which was encouraged by the Belgians who needed labour for mines and plantations in East Congo that at the time was under populated. In short, in some areas, such as Masisi, the Banyarwanda became the majority of the population and after independence some members of this community, such as Cyprien Rwakabuba and Barthélémy Bisengimana, turned out to be important exponents of the Mobutu regime.

4. In Kiswahili this term means 'little' and it is normally used when referring to child-soldiers. Most of the child-soldiers who joined Kabila were previously fighting with Mayi-Mayi.

5. Achille Mbembe (2002) has argued that the state of war represents a zone of indistinction, where the boundaries between chaos and order disappear. Furthermore, he affirms that 'Through sacrifice, the African subject transforms his or her own subjectivity and produces something new—something that does not belong to the domain of a lost identity that must at all costs be found again, but rather something radically different, something open to change and whose theory and vocabulary remain to be invented' (Ivi). I partially agree with Mbembe, since, as it is the case for Mayi-Mayi, this war-identities are not completely new but a re-proposal and re-interpretation of 'tested' models.

6. Interview held in Lukanga (2003) with Kakule, 25 years.

7. At that time Butembo was occupied by the Mayi-Mayi, commanded by Modhou and APC soldiers. The two movements had made an alliance that broke out some months later.

8. It is important to consider the plots of these movies. For example Paul Richards has analysed the significance of the plot of Rambo I in the experience of young combatants in Sierra Leone. See P. Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone*, James Currey, Oxford, 1996:57 and following pages.

9. Cfr. www.congo-mai-mai.net. This is the website of the group commandant Padiri, one of the most important Mayi-Mayi leaders who now has been integrated as general in the new national army.

10. I refer here to the beginning of the Mayi-Mayi movement when most of the fighters respected the rules. In the last years, as many people say, Mayi-Mayi have become 'brigands as all the others. They do not respect the rules anymore'. In fact, most of Mayi-Mayi militias have progressively taken part in the war economy, giving protection to some big mineral dealers.

11. In popular painting Lumumba is often represented as a Christ (Cfr. Jewsiewicki 1996:113-142).

12. This speech was pronounced on 25/12/2000 in the military camps of Luotu/ Lubwe (cited Mbindule Mitono 2000:24).

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Hip-Hop and Bongo Flavour Music in Contemporary Tanzania: Youths' Experiences, Agency, Aspirations and Contradictions[1]

Maria Suriano*

Abnstract

The beginning of Tanzanian hip-hop along with a genre known as Bongo Flavour (also Bongo Flava, or Fleva, according to the Swahili spelling), can be traced back to the early 1990s. This music, characterised by the use of Swahili lyrics (with a few English and slang words) is also referred to as the 'music of the new generation' (*muziki wa kikazi kipya*). Without the intention to analyse a complex and multifaceted reality, this article aims to make a sense of this popular music as an overall phenomenon in contemporary Tanzania. From the premise that music, performance and popular culture can be used as instruments to innovate and produce change, this article argues that Bongo Flavour and hip-hop are not only music genres, but also cultural expressions necessary for the understanding of a substantial part of contemporary Tanzanian youths. The focus here is on young male artists living in urban environments.

Résumé

Le début du hip-hop en Tanzanie ainsi que d'un genre musical appelé Bongo Flavour (aussi Bongo Flava ou Fleva, selon l'orthographe en Swahili) date du début des années 1990. Caractérisée par l'utilisation de textes en swahili (avec quelques mots en anglais et en argot), cette musique est considérée comme 'la musique de la nouvelle génération' (*muziki wa kikazi kipya*).
L'objectif de cet article est de comprendre cette music populaire en tant que phénomène contemporain en Tanzanie, sans pour autant avoir la prétention d'analyser une réalité complexe à plusieurs facettes. Vu sous le prisme de la musique, le spectacle et la culture populaire comme étant des instruments d'innovation et de changement, cet article soutient qu'en plus d'être des genres musicaux, Bongo Flavour et hip-hop sont

* University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
  E-mail: maria.suriano@wits.ac.za; dadamfupi@yahoo.it

aussi des expressions culturelles nécessaires pour la compréhension
d'une bonne partie de la jeunesse contemporaine Tanzanienne. Le focus
ici est sur les artistes mâles vivant en milieu urbain.

Young People, Bongo Flavour and Hip-Hop

The beginning of Tanzanian hip-hop along with a genre known as Bongo
Flavour (also Bongo Flava, or Fleva, according to the Swahili spelling), can
be traced back to as early as the 1990s. This music, characterised by the use
of Swahili lyrics (with a few English and slang words) is also referred to as
the 'music of the new generation' (*muziki wa kikazi kipya*).

As far as the concept of 'youth' is concerned, it can be underlined that a
Without the intention to analyse a complex and multifaceted reality, this
article aims to give a sense of this popular music as an overall phenomenon
in contemporary Tanzania. Assuming that music, performance and popular
culture can be instruments to innovate and produce change (see Fabian 1978;
Martin 1995; Akyeampong 1998; Fair 2001), the article argues that Bongo
Flavour and hip-hop are not only music genres, but also cultural expressions
necessary to understand a substantial part of contemporary Tanzanian youths.
The focus here is on young male artists living in urban environments.

As far as the concept of 'youth' is concerned, it can be underlined that a
few years ago, Achille Mbembe questioned whether we should use the term
jeunesse rather than *jeunesses*, or simply *jeunes*. For example, what do a
young man from Bamako who carries water and a student at the University
of Abidjan have in common? (Mbembe 1985:5). Thus, in talking about young
people, it would be more appropriate to 'soften' our affirmations and
considerations, and diversify our approaches. Youths' attitudes, lifestyles, needs,
aspirations and *chances de se développer* can converge or diverge, depending
on historical moments, socio-economic conditions, and numerous other factors.
In other words, youths are a fragmented universe (Mbembe 1985:6).

With regard to the concept of 'generations', a number of scholars of
Africa have questioned whether, among African youths, there is a generational
consciousness, an awareness of the common situation in relation to preceding
generations. Nevertheless, the discussion about generations in Africa still
seems to be in its early days (see O'Brien 1996:57; Burgess 2005). Although
in this article Tanzanian youths are not considered as a fixed and homogeneous
category, I argue that young artists generally reflect their audiences and
speak for them, expressing through songs youthful views and aspirations as
well as agency, contradictions and (sometimes) common interests.

Most of the ethnographic data presented here draws on participant
observation, informal conversations with fans and interviews with artists
based in Dar es Salaam, the main city of Tanzania.[2] Regarding young people
residing in small centres, from my observations in the course of my travels –

i.e. speaking to young people throughout East Africa (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) and attending Bongo Flavour and hip-hop concerts and competitions in many urban areas as well as in semi-rural contexts (such as Mbinga, Ruvuma Region) – I had the impression that they have the same aspirations as their urban counterparts. Those who live in semi-rural areas try to keep well up to date on urban practices through listening to radio programmes, using internet, reading magazines and tabloids on music, attending Bongo Flavour concerts, etc. At the same time, it is undeniable that they lack the same opportunities as their city 'brothers': for instance, the Web is profoundly urban-biased.

In respect to its origins, the word *bongo* (the augmentative form of *ubongo*, 'brain') means 'Tanzania' in Swahili slang, with an allusion to the 'big brain' necessary in order to survive in the country. It should be specified that the first meaning of the word *bongo* was 'Dar es Salaam' (during the economic crisis in the 1980s, one needed wits to survive there).

The early meaning of the term 'Bongo Flavour' was 'hip-hop' (i.e. a foreign genre) with a local, Tanzanian flavour (Nganyagwa 2005). Always carrying lyrics in Swahili, with a few slang and English terms, Bongo Flavour encompasses many genres which partly originated in other countries, such as rap and R&B (for the US),[3] zouk (from the Antilles) and dancehall and raga (from Jamaica). These foreign influences are combined with local rhythms and tastes, and the result is Bongo Flavour, a new and very commercial genre, characterised by the sound of a keyboard.

However, this genre is continuously changing and the issue of which styles Bongo Flavour actually includes is still an unresolved debate in Tanzania. At the time of writing, many Tanzanian 'pure' hip-hop artists argue that Tanzanian hip-hop is no longer part of the Bongo Flavour genre. Some rappers have self-excluded themselves from the category 'Bongo Flavour' on the grounds that hip-hop is supposedly still committed to telling the truth, thus respecting the original function of this style, while many songs in Bongo Flavour style just deal with entertainment issues.[4] It should be added, however, that a Bongo Flavour song can contain a part in 'pure' hip-hop style, and Bongo Flavour artists often sing and rap in the same album. In spite of this fact, in this article hip-hop is treated as a separate genre, in order to respect the wish of Tanzanian 'pure' rappers.

Global and Local Changes and New Opportunities for Tanzanian Youths

Specific global economic and political conditions enabled foreign music to gain popularity in Tanzania, primarily in urban areas. These circumstances were the free market and the privatisation of the media. When Julius K. Nyerere retired from the presidency in 1985,[5] the International Monetary

Fund and World Bank approved the 'Economic Recovery Plan'. Among other things, this Plan included further devaluations, increase in produce prices, and general provision of importation of almost all goods. The Structural Adjustment Programmes forced Tanzania to abandon *Ujamaa* policies ('socialism', started in 1967). The then new President, Mwinyi, brought to an end the Arusha Declaration as a dominant ideological model for the country and its people in 1991. He permitted luxury goods, such as televisions, to be imported into the country. This enabled the images of Western culture to inundate the markets of Tanzania like never before.

Under the pressures of political reforms and commercialisation, hip-hop and other foreign genres started to be channelled through Tanzanian radio stations – until that moment there had only been one, government controlled, radio station functioning in the country: RTD (Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam).

Based in Dar es Salaam, Saleh Ally is a music journalist and former rapper from Mwanza. He argues that many urban youths were creating and enjoying Bongo Flavour (Tanzanian hip-hop) in the 1980s, even before the liberalisation. According to him, Tanzanian hip-hop 'was started by young people with rich parents', such as male youths from Oysterbay and Masaki in Dar es Salaam, where a long-established international school is located.[6] These neighbourhoods are commonly referred to as the white (i.e. posh) areas of Dar es Salaam (in Swahili *Uzunguni*). Since Tanzanian rappers started rhyming in English, people who could manage to rap in this language were the most educated ones.[7] For instance, the first rap album in Swahili, 'King of Swahili Rap', was released in 1991 by Saleh Jaber. Born in Dar es Salaam, son of a Tanzanian father and an English mother, he had a bilingual competence and had some relatives in the UK. Using the instrumental version of American rap hits as his base, Saleh Jaber produced a *bricolage* of popular tunes from the US with his own lyrics (a mix of English and Swahili).

On the other hand, the radio presenter Sebastian Maganga and the singer and rapper Inspekta Haroun, both based in Dar es Salaam, disagree about the 'elite' origins of this genre, arguing that slums such as Temeke, in Dar es Salaam, were 'thirsty for hip-hop', and that 'this area gave birth to many artists'.[8] In my understanding, it cannot be denied that among the first people to come into contact with foreign genres were the most educated and well-off Tanzanian youths. Besides knowing some English and being able to understand song lyrics, they were frequently sent new albums (and even stereos and T-shirts with the images of American rappers printed on them)[9] by their relatives living abroad. Nevertheless, they were not isolated from other youths who lived in the poor urban areas. Rather, they shared music and information on the latest foreign artists and styles.

Regarding the lyrics of the first Tanzanian raps, Inspekta Haroun states that early artists did not talk about 'meaningful topics'.[10] Sebastian Maganga confirms these comments, adding that although artists soon started to express themselves in Swahili, at that time they 'did not compose lyrics', they 'just imitated' their US counterparts.[11]

The beginning of a second phase called 'the official revolution' (*mapinduzi halisi*), characterised by a shift towards more serious and conscious lyrics, can be traced to around 1999.[12] In my view, we have entered a new phase, in which Bongo Flavour has the monopoly over other types of Tanzanian music. Currently, more than 60 per cent of those who record at FM studios are Bongo Flavour and hip-hop artists.[13] Other local genres, for instance *taarab* (sung Swahili poetry), 'traditional' music and dances (*ngoma*), or local jazz (in Swahili *dansi*) have never obtained such coverage in the media (Mangesho 2003:64).

In the past few years, young artists have taken advantage of the commercial potentialities and the unprecedented diffusion of their music in the whole of East Africa not only through radio and TV programmes, the selling of CDs, tapes and Video CDs, but also through live performances, movies and the participation in national and international awards. This music is continuously heard in minibuses, as well as in bars and hotels, and generally young people know the lyrics of the popular hits by heart. It is even not rare to hear people of a certain age singing out loud the chorus of Bongo Flavour hits.

Artists have also taken advantage of the rumours and gossip about their lives, loves, their fancy new cars and expensive clothes. This information is available in local magazines and tabloids both in Swahili and English (see Suriano 2007). The Tanzanian scholar Peter Mangesho pointed out that the print media

> have increased sales of their products through the front coverage of their magazines and newspapers with pictures of these artists, but have also played a pivotal role in spreading the Bongo Flavour music culture. This has never happened for any other kind of music culture in Dar es Salaam, and Tanzania as a whole (Mangesho 2003:62).

Regarding the social composition of artists, they are from different social and religious backgrounds as well as diverse geographic origins. Many of them are born in Dar es Salaam – frequently in its slums – or moved there in order to gain access to recording studios and other facilities related to musical production (the possibility of keeping in touch with radio presenters, studio producers, concert organisers and audiences plays an important role in the popularity of these artists). Some of them are orphaned (sometimes due to AIDS), and have grown up with their grandparents.

They are generally very young, usually in their early twenties, with a certain degree of formal education (they have usually completed the secondary school). Therefore, their prospect of finding formal jobs are very limited, and this music represents a source of revenue for them.

Bongo Flavour and hip-hop artists are using the new opportunities offered by the flourishing market to make money and guarantee an economic security for themselves. Moreover, through this music, artists are able to reach their parents' status and a certain degree of autonomy from the adults.

As far as listeners are concerned, Bongo Flavour and hip-hop music target a mostly youthful audience, of both sexes.[14] In *Darubini Kali* (Sharp binoculars), the popular rapper Afande Sele, featuring Ghetto Boys, complains about the use of many English terms by artists, because they are not understood in poor areas, where this music seems to be more popular. In his words: 'What is the point of foreign languages in local music when *Bongo Flava* is best liked in poor areas [*Uswahilini*]?!'[15] *Uswahilini* literally means 'African areas', i.e. poor areas (as opposed to *Uzunguni*). By highlighting that this genre is widespread, particularly in these neighbourhoods, Afande Sele seems to articulate an important social factor: especially poor and marginalised youths listen to this music, and they do so as a means of acquiring a voice in their society.

In other words, Bongo Flavour and hip-hop allow the articulation of contemporary youth identities. Borrowing a statement made for the case of contemporary Kenya, this music, along with 'the discursive spaces opened by the media', 'do not have the barriers which elsewhere' prevent 'poor people from taking part in debates on key social and moral questions.' (Frederiksen 2000:209). Generally speaking, this music, along with new recording technologies, is contributing in my view to the establishment of a democratic public sphere.

Concerning the potentialities of the Internet as an opportunity for young people to make money and have their voices heard, Mangesho has this to say:

> not only has the internet facilitated the acquisition of special programmes, but it has also enabled local artists to receive deals abroad and even record with foreign artists (…) without having to meet physically. According to OCG (a local rapper), which his famous song about AIDS/HIV called 'Kazeze' was hitting the charts, an American recording firm (which heard the track via the websites) contacted him and wanted to compose a song with him. They sent them back to the United States for their artists to rap or sing in it. This implies that local BF [Bongo Flavour] artists apart from being heard worldwide through their websites, (…) can also interact and make money through it (Mangesho 2003:61).

New techniques of music diffusion mean that even youths from urban slums can use quite cheap recording technologies to express themselves. In other words, the popularity of Bongo Flavour has made music making more democratised. However, it should not be ignored that these young artists experience common problems in payment transactions, due to the fact that they are not well protected by the copyright laws.

Diverse Styles, Lyrics and Aspirations

Bongo Flavour and hip-hop artists do not play any musical instruments. Rather, producers record their voices to a pre-recorded backing track. The display of musical skills, essential in local jazz bands, or *taarab* and *ngoma* groups, does not feature here, just like in American hip-hop or R&B. Most Bongo Flavour and hip-hop artists have been criticised for their inability to play any musical instrument and for their reliance on playback. Jazz musicians and middle-aged people commonly define this music as the 'music of chaos' (*muziki wa fujo*). Others call it the music of layabouts (*muziki wa kihuni*). Usually old generations have a negative attitude toward this music.[16] This parental resistance can also be found elsewhere in Africa (Collins 2002:64).

Hassani Bitchuka, a member of a popular jazz band, says that the way the new generation sings is flat, similar to the sound of a train (*gari moshi*). Other times, the voice modulation is so unpleasant that it seems that 'the singer's hand got crushed by a door'.[17]

However, it is worth noting that Mustafa Ally from Mwanza, who was in his twenties during the 1950s, told me that at that time even local jazz, which is now widely accepted as part of the 'authentic' Tanzanian musical culture, was seen by elders as 'the music of the new generation', which was corrupting young people. Jazz musicians themselves were seen as drunkards and womanisers – precisely as Bongo Flavour artists are seen nowadays.[18]

Bongo Flavour and hip-hop artists (and their fans) frequently blend hair styles taken from American rappers as well as from Jamaican legends such as Bob Marley. They combine accessories in hip-hop style with Rastafarian ones, 'cannibalising' and reinterpreting American and Jamaican culture (for the reasons – 'intensely local' – which make especially poor and disenfranchised youths fascinated with Bob Marley and Rastafarian culture, see Moyer 2005).

As with popular paintings in the DRC (ex-Zaire) which are the result of many cultural borrowings (Jewsiewicki 1988), Bongo Flavour and hip-hop are new and original outcomes of a blend between foreign genres and local styles. It must be underlined that although Haas and Gesthuizen (2000, p. 279)

wrote that 'the influence of the transnational "commodified"' music in East Africa 'goes back to at least the 1950s', the birth of these genres can be traced back much earlier, at least to the early 1920s.[19]

Foreign styles and musical cultures are not appropriated in an uncritical way. Rather, they meet Tanzanian artists' own needs,[20] and artists play an active role in this process. Foreign influences in Bongo Flavour and hip-hop lyrics can be seen as an example of how foreign aesthetics are 'Africanised' and 'Swahilised', as they were appropriated and integrated into various local practices (cf. Askew 2002, pp. 66-67).

Lyrics generally express contemporary local problems, such as unemployment and poverty, as well as hopes and expectations about family life. For instance, in *Je*, *Utanipenda* (Will you love me?), Mike T affirms: 'My best man [representative in the bride price negotiations] and I [came] to your parents' house'.[21] In *Wife*, Daz Baba sings: 'I have become a grown-up man, now I need a gorgeous woman to live with me, to have children with and to bring them up with, to cope with bad and good times with me'.[22]

Here, Daz Baba seems to promote a nuclear family ideal and an image of marital life in which both husband and wife equally share domestic duties. These lyrics are not simply 'aping' Western (Christian) values, but represent in my view new aspirations of Tanzanian youths. At the same time, through these lyrics, he tries to teach fellow young people how to deal with marital life – which after all is the final aspiration of the younger generation. As observed by O'Brien (1996:58), to get 'economic independence, to have enough resources to marry and set up one's own family, is the fundamental aspiration' of the average youth, in Africa as well as 'elsewhere in the world'.

These lyrics might also represent a challenge to old fashioned ideas about gender relations based on authority and hierarchy – which are not necessarily positive for contemporary youths just because they are 'traditional'.

Other songs provide a commentary on love and sexual relations in the era of AIDS, such as '*Alikufa kwa ngoma*' (He died of AIDS), in which the singer Mwana FA tells us about a man who apparently conducted a very sober life, but eventually died because of AIDS.[23] Some songs and raps carry references to God. In *Cheka Kidogo* (Laugh a little), the former 'rough' rapper Dudu Baya declares: 'I thank the maker, God the Father'.[24]

In some way, artists are expected by their audiences to express something about the living conditions of urban youths, as can be seen in the popular motto: 'You cannot say: 'I have a big car' while you do not even have a bicycle!'[25]

There are also songs and raps which deal with political issues such as bribery (in slang *chai*, 'tea'). Generally speaking, the attitude towards state politics is ambivalent, as young artists prefer not to criticise the system. An

exception to this is the case of the popular *Ndiyo mzee* (Yes, sir), and its follow up *Siyo mzee* (No, sir), in which the rapper Professor Jay complains about local politicians who fail to keep their promises made during electoral campaigns.[26] It is more common that during electoral campaigns artists accompany politicians in their tours throughout the country, or are pushed by political leaders to compose songs which aim to encourage people to vote for a certain party (usually *Chama cha Mapinduzi*, CCM, the ruling party, or Civic United Front, CUF), as happened both in 2000 and in October 2005 (for this issue cf. Suriano 2006; Suriano 2007). Hezronie Ndonho, an old man from Mwanza who participated in the struggle for independence in the 1950s, commented that the main problem lies in the fact that 'modern youths are no longer interested in politics'.[27]

On the other hand, recent hits with catchy tunes, but without educational aims, have proved to be very successful. This is partly due to the fact that by 2002 a new album was pretty much being recorded every week. As a result, the issues cannot be predominantly socially conscious. Non-committed lyrics depict the lifestyle of a part of Tanzanian urban youths, who celebrate 'disco-life', drunkenness, marijuana and sex. However, Afande Sele blames those artists, who focus on entertainment, rapping: 'People do want the message, not only to boast about themselves and admire sex and alcohol.'[28]

Apart from what I call the 'entertainment wing', very popular at the moment, I would like to focus here on socially committed lyrics. I would say that the emphasis on learning and education resonates well with post-colonial state policies in Tanzania. First of all, it should be emphasised that even before colonialism in many East African cultural-linguistic groups, songs contained socio-political comments. After independence in Tanzania, as in other African countries, educated leaders promoted popular arts, considering them as educational. For this reason, they were concerned with controlling them.

In search of a national identity in 1962, the new President, Julius Nyerere, established the Ministry of Culture and Youth, which 'conceived literature and art ... as means of educating the masses' (Songoyi 1988:10). Nyerere saw 'traditional' African culture and imported Western culture as opposed and irreconcilable (tradition was seen as a fixed legacy from the past, not as a social construct.[29]

Very recently, some Bongo Flavour and hip-hop hits 'have to some extent captured the feelings of people of a certain age'.[30] This might be due to their social message. At the same time, by listening to catchy tracks with committed lyrics, some adults are beginning to pay attention and take interest in the stories youths have to tell.

Let me take as an example the hit *Ishi* (Live), released in 2004, sponsored by TACAIDS (Tanzania Commission on AIDS), and performed by various artists, both singers and rappers, which is part of a trend towards the HIV/ AIDS awareness campaigns. Its chorus is 'Do not be shy, talk to her/him, about waiting, being trustworthy, or using the condom'.[31] Afterwards, the former President Benjamin Mkapa demonstrated disapproval of the content of this song, more or less on the grounds that, as a Bongo Flavour fan states, 'it ruins people. It tells them to use condoms so it encourages them to have sex'.[32] Although there was no formal censorship, at a certain point the song was no longer broadcast by local radios. However, in August 2004 I was staying in Tongoni, a small fishing village near Tanga (a coastal town), as a guest in the house of a Muslim family. There was a radio switched on and when the song *Ishi* reached the chorus, women of various ages started singing in front of the head of the family. Even when songs contain issues which are 'sensitive' for the Swahili culture, they are able to reach various social strata and environments.

With regard to the ways in which young artists refer to the old generations, they are very ambivalent. For example, during my fieldwork, I noticed that many artists, even the 'toughest' ones, celebrate the figure of the late Nyerere, and consider him a role-model. When in August 2005 the Ugandan artist Chameleon visited Dar es Salaam for an MTV show, he displayed a T-shirt with the image of Nyerere printed on it, while in the outskirts of Mwanza (on the shore of Lake Victoria) I found a painting which represents a contemporary rapper and Nyerere by his side.

My impression is that praising Nyerere can be read as a way to reconstruct bonds between the younger and the older generations. More interestingly, by acknowledging the legacy of Nyerere, these artists seem to say that even youths can be wise and wisdom does not belong only to elders. This sounds like an affirmation of generational autonomy, and an aspiration to redefine their relationship with older people. Even artists' nicknames tell us about this desire: Professor Jay or Mwana FA (FA is the diminutive of *falsafa*. *Mwana falsafa* means the philosopher) are some of the names chosen by artists. Emblematic is the case of Daz Baba, whose previous name was Daz Mwalimu: both are inspired by Nyerere's nicknames *Baba wa Taifa* (Father of the Nation) and *Mwalimu* (Teacher).

On the other hand, the very fact that some artists have decided not to address social issues, but instead focus on fun and entertainment, might indicate that ignoring the dictates of the former educational cultural politics, some of them are trying to detach themselves from the old generations and from their fathers, who failed to be 'real revolutionaries'.[33]

Conclusion

By paying attention to Swahili lyrics and listening to comments made by fans, we find out that, through this post-socialist music, Tanzanian youths are opening a new space to express themselves. The new generation of Tanzanian artists is using Bongo Flavour and hip-hop to affirm their autonomy, articulate their agency, and express a plurality of meanings. This music is utilised by young artists and their audiences as a medium for communication amongst themselves, and as a message to adults. It is also a tool to address broader cultural, social and political issues.

Songs and raps are clearly addressed to a local audience: first because their lyrics are in Swahili, and secondly because most of the time conventionally accepted values in Tanzanian society are substantially reaffirmed, in compliance with a culturally well-established conception of art as educational. Other times, non-committed lyrics depict the insubordinate and defiant lifestyle of certain young people, who in this way might want to be recognised as children of the globalised world.

By reaffirming or rejecting values from the past, young Tanzanian artists show themselves to be complex figures. They embody many ambiguities and contradictions, which are an integral part of contemporary youths in Tanzania, as well as all over the world. If music can be an instrument of innovation and self-affirmation, then Bongo Flavour and hip-hop artists are trying to take part in the re-configuration of public space in Tanzania.

For Tanzanian youths, this music is also a means to become economically independent, reaching the adult status and getting the opportunity to build a family and a future. Most of the time from a disadvantaged social and economic background, these young artists – especially those who became superstars (*masupastaa*) – represent role models for all the poor and marginalised youths, especially in urban areas. Therefore, they have a big responsibility to their own society.

Notes

1. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the XIX Swahili Kolloquium, Bayreuth, 26-27 May 2006 (for the published paper, see Suriano 2007).
2. Dar es Salaam was the capital city of colonial Tanganyika (renamed Tanzania - the United Republic of Tanzania - after its union with the islands of Zanzibar in 1964). Although since 1973 the new capital has been Dodoma, Dar es Salaam has remained the main political and economic centre of the country. I became interested in Bongo Flavour music while conducting my Ph.D. field research in Tanzania on leisure, popular culture, the changing identities of Tanganyikan youths and nationalist politics in British colonial Tanganyika. My research was carried out between 2004 and 2005.

3. Rap originated in the ghettos of New York in the 1970s. This new form of art came to be known as hip-hop, a slang word meaning to challenge oneself through words, paint and action.

4. Interview with the 'old school' very committed rapper Sugu (which means 'stubborn'), also known as 'Mister II' (Joseph O. Mbilinyi), 22 March 2005. Interview with Inspekta Haroun (nicknamed *Babu*, 'grandfather', because he started music in 1992), 10 April 2005. Cf. Anonymous author, '*Kalapina: Bongo Fleva siyo hip hop*' (Kalapina: Bongo Flavour is not hip-hop), *Baab Kubwa*, 8-21 September 2005:5. Kalapina is the name of a local rapper from Dar es Salaam.

5. However, Nyerere remained chairman of his party, CCM (*Chama cha Mapinduzi* - The Revolutionary Party) until 1990.

6. Interview with Saleh Ally, 8 April 2005.

7. Interview with Saleh Ally, cit. See also Haas and Gesthuizen 2000:281.

8. Interview with Sebastian Maganga, 11 March 2005; interview with Inspekta Haroun, cit.

9. Saleh Ally himself received from the US a T-shirt with the face of the American rapper Tupac Shakur (or 2Pac) on it. Interview with Saleh Ally, cit.

10. Interview with Inspekta Haroun, cit.

11. Interview with Sebastian Maganga, cit.

12. Interview with Saleh Ally, cit. See also Mangesho 2003:67.

13. On music production technology, cf. Mangesho 2003:30-65.

14. Although the audience contains both sexes, it should not be forgotten that most artists are men. Women singers, especially rappers, are still few, for reasons which I intend to explore in another project.

15. Afande Sele. 2004. *Darubini Kali*. GMC: Dar es Salaam. Original in Swahili: '*Lugha ngeni za nini kwenye muziki wa nyumbani, wakati Bongo Flava inapendwa zaidi uswahilini*'. All lyrics quoted in this paper are in Swahili and were translated into English by the author.

16. This is the general opinion expressed by my elderly interviewees during my fieldwork on popular culture during British colonialism.

17. Nathan Chiwango. 2005. *Bitchuka – Kushuka na Kupanda kwa Muziki wa Tanzania*. *Bang*! Issue 04, March-May 2005, p. 26. Original in Swahili: "*Anaimba utadhani mkono wake umebanwa na mlango*".

18. Interview with the former guitarist and peasant Mustafa Ally, 7 September 2005.

19. Interview with the former musician and businessman Ally K. Sykes, 3 March 2005.

20. On this point cf. Moyer 2005, 36.

21. Mike T. 2004. *Je, Utanipenda?*. *Bongo Flava* (compilation). Pirated CD, Dar es Salaam. Original in Swahili: '*Mimi na mshenga mpaka kwenu*'.

22. Daz Baba. 2005. Wife. *Elimu Dunia*. GMC: Dar es Salaam. Original in Swahili: *Daz Baba nishakuwa mtu mzima mi, sasa nahitaji mrembo wa kuishi nami, kuzaa na kulea watoto nami, kwenye shida na raha avumilie nami*'.

23. Mwana FA featuring Lady Jay Dee. 2004. *Alikufa kwa ngoma*. *Bingwa za Bongo* (compilation). GMC: Dar es Salaam. It is worth noting that HIV/AIDS in street Swahili is *ngoma* (drum), or *mgeni* (guest/stranger), while *-kanyaga miwaya* (crushing the electricity wires) means 'to get AIDS'.

24. Dudu Baya. 2005. *Cheka Kidogo*. *Zote Bomba* (compilation). Pirated CD, Dar es Salaam. Original in Swahili: "*Namshukuru Muumba Mungu Baba*"

25. Interview with Saleh Ally, cit. Original in Swahili: '*Huwezi kusema 'Mimi nina benzi' wakati hata baiskeli huna*!'

26. Professor Jay. 2002. *Machozi Jasho na Damu*. GMC: Dar es Salaam; Professor Jay. 2003. *Mapinduzi Halisi*. GMC: Dar es Salaam.

27. Interview with Hezronie Ndonho, 5 October 2005.

28. Afande Sele, cit. Original in Swahili: '*Watu wanataka ujumbe, si majigambo tu na sifu ngono na pombe*' (see Suriano 2007).

29. Tradition was embodied by *ngoma* (traditional dances with drums). Nonetheless, it should be said that *ngoma* dress and steps have been subject to continuous innovations, and that modifications sometimes corresponded to the requirements of better accommodating official state ideology and rhetoric (for this issue, see Askew 2002).

30. Innocent Nganyagwa, '*Dira ya muziki*', *Zeze*, 24 February- 2 March 2005, p. 10.

31. Various artists. 2004. *Ishi* (VCD version). I wish to thank Ruquiesh Sharda, production director of the company Benchmark Productions Ltd, Dar es Salaam, for having provided me with the Video CD of this song. Original in Swahili: '*Usione soo, sema nae, kuhusu kusubiri, kuwa mwaminifu, au kutumia condom*'.

32. Informal conversation with Simon Clement, 2 February 2005.

33. For the expression 'real revolutionaries' see Moyer 2005, p. 37.

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Youth Religiosity and Moral Critique: God, Government and Generations in a Time of AIDS in Uganda

Catrine Christiansen*

Abstract

This article stresses the centrality of youth questions in Uganda, whereby HIV, religious and political issues are contributing to changes in the societal landscape. The 'youth question' has become a very important focus in developmental aids, but its conceptualization still remains ambiguous. It is this ambiguity in the conceptualization of young people, as victims and agents, which informs efforts to involve youth in the work towards preventing the spread of HIV and mitigating the negative impact of AIDS. The article demonstrates that young people largely consent to the lower social positioning of youth as they regard themselves as persons still in the making, and they find this positioning a comfortable zone from which to criticise the older generations for not maintaining family solidarity and providing sufficiently for the younger generation. Based on a drama developed by a Catholic youth group, it shows how youth combine cultural values, child rights and Christian morality to present the selfishness and low morals of the older generations, and themselves, as keepers of morality in the interest of the society as a whole. Drawing on the human rights framework, development agencies refer to young people's rights to partake in matters regarding their own lives and entitlement, to grow up in safe spaces of socialization and develop skill. The concept used in this article tends to define 'youth' as a category of social being and social becoming where sexuality is becoming part of political discourse.

Résumé

Cet article met en exergue la centralité de la question de la jeunesse en Ouganda, un pays où la religion et la politique contribuent au changement de la société. La question de la jeunesse est devenue un point très important dans l'aide au développement, mais sa

* Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen, Denmark.
  Email: cac@teol.ku.dk

conceptualisation reste toujours ambigüe. C'est cette ambigüité dans la conceptualisation de la jeunesse comme victime ou agent qui est à la base des efforts qui visent à impliquer les jeunes dans les efforts pour la prévention de la propagation du VIH et la réduction des effets néfastes du SIDA. L'article démontre que les jeunes dans leur majorité consentent à leur position au bas de l'échelle sociale et se considèrent ainsi comme des personnes qui n'ont pas fini de grandir. Ils se cantonnent ainsi dans une zone de confort d'où ils peuvent critiquer leurs ainés pour n'avoir pas maintenu la solidarité familiale et s'occuper suffisamment bien de la jeune génération. Se basant sur une pièce de théâtre jouée par une troupe de jeunes catholiques, l'article montre comment les jeunes combinent les valeurs culturelles, les droits des enfants et la moralité chrétienne pour mettre à nu l'égoïsme et la décadence morale chez les plus âgés, et se montrer eux même comme étant les gardiens de la moralité au profit de la société en général.

Les agences du développement, se basant sur les droits de l'homme, revendiquent le droit des jeunes à prendre part aux actions qui concernent leur vie et leurs droits, leur épanouissement dans des espaces sécurisés de socialisation et le développement de leurs talents. Le concept utilisé dans cet article définit la jeunesse comme une catégorie d'êtres sociaux et socialisables dans un contexte où la sexualité est devenue une partie intégrante du discours politique.

Introduction

Many institutions in Africa today have units for youth. Governments, for example, have established units within ministries that also deal with gender, sports, or social development, and in countries, such as Uganda, the 'youth' have been allocated seats in parliament and youth councils have become part of the government structure. In religious organisations, especially the Christian ones, youth have their own groups to study the Bible, do music and drama, and generate a small income. Most remarkable, since this has greatly promoted youth in both political and religious institutions, is the recognition by development agencies of youth as a target group for aid and the thereof creation of youth projects. Although governments, religious organisations, and development agencies have paid attention to issues of youth for a much longer time, since the 1980s, these institutions have become much more oriented towards young people. This has made ideologies *for* youth much more visible in the public sphere and given space to ideologies *of* youth within these institutions.

The spread of HIV and the consequences of AIDS have influenced the ideologies *for* youth in East and southern Africa. The epidemic emerged in the 1980s, around the time that the UN ratified the Convention on the Rights

of the Child (CRC) spelling out the particular circumstances, needs, and entitlements of any person below 18 years. Drawing upon the CRC, development agencies emphasise young people's rights to take part in matters regarding their own lives and entitlement to grow up in safe spaces of socialisation and develop skills. The developmental perspective often treats youth as constituting socio-culturally reified and autonomous groups, and, as a consequence, HIV/AIDS projects tend to approach youth as 'a parallel stratum that is somehow unattached from the general social fabric and generational dynamics, and whose calamities can be treated in relative isolation and thus with relative ease' (Christiansen et. al. 2006:18). Most HIV/AIDS projects are implemented through government institutions and civil society organisations such as churches. With reference to the Bible, churches integrate HIV prevention into theological doctrines about sexuality and marriage and hence encourage young people to abstain from sexual activity until marriage and be faithful in marriage. Some churches, or priests, also advice young people to use condoms in order to protect themselves from a life-threatening infection. Human rights and Christian doctrines are rather different frames of reference, yet both of them contribute to the ideological basis of development projects that give information, guidance and material support to 'empower' youth to take 'responsible' actions.

In the context of a sexually transmitted disease, the problematic of illness also feeds into ideologies *of* youth and youth ideology concerning sexuality. This article will attend to how young Ugandans navigate political and religious ideologies *for* youth, especially the ideas of making youth 'responsible citizens' by avoiding HIV infection, and show the importance that young Ugandans place on morality and self-control in their ideologies *of* youth. Based on an understanding of youth as both social *being* and social *becoming*; a position in movement (Vigh 2006), the article will underline that young Ugandans view themselves as persons-in-the-making for whom self-control is a key element in the striving for social becoming. To these young Ugandans, growing up in a society marked by AIDS involves finding ways of abstaining from sex until marriage and/or navigating the ideologies between abstinence only and condom use. Is it better to know how to use a condom in case one cannot abstain 'full time' or would that knowledge make one careless about having sex? Should a teenage boy carry a condom in his pocket to protect himself from infection in case he cannot resist having sex with his girlfriend or will the condom itself tempt them to have sex? Different from the developmental and religious perspectives of youth as a social category somehow unattached from the general societal fabric, young Ugandans stress the importance of social relations to help them 'live responsibly'. Similar to

other young Africans, the Ugandans turn to age-mates, not the older generations, but, different from youth explicitly resisting gerontocratic control (see e.g. van Dijk 1992), the Ugandans express a yearning for engaging with the older generations. According to the young Ugandans, the main reason for not turning to older people, especially the parental generation, is that older relatives are unable or unwilling to support their social becoming. The young Ugandans are not rebellious, they are disappointed – about what they see as neglect of family solidarity and care for the younger generation. The weak social positioning leaves few spaces for the youth to voice criticism, but one such space is interviews with a foreign researcher, another one is Christian youth groups. Based on interview extracts and a drama performed by a Catholic youth group, I will illustrate that young people combine cultural values about generational relations, child rights and Christian morality to present the alleged selfishness and low morals of the older generations and themselves as keepers of morality striving for a better society. Within this Christian context, youth perceive of their agency in religious terms, as it is through faith and fellowship, that they negotiate associational life in their own terms and attempt to re-establish family virtues.

This article draws upon ethnographic research carried out in south east Uganda since 1998, especially four months during 2003-2005 where I studied the patterns of bringing up young people in different settings: rural homes, a rural (Catholic) mission, and two boarding schools in smaller towns. I was particularly interested in the care-taking relations between kinsmen in a society marked by AIDS and in the implications of church-based aid projects providing education for young people affected by AIDS on the beneficiaries' kin relations.[1] The study involved about 70 young people in the range of 12 to 20 years of age, living in a rural area or in a small town, and who received financial support for their education from either relatives or an aid project. A closer look at the informants shows that family members paid the secondary education for 20 young people living at (a rural) home and for 18 young people boarding at a low-cost secondary school in the district centre; whereas aid projects gave vocational education and boarding at a Catholic mission to 21 former 'child domestic workers', and secondary education and boarding at a private school to 10 'orphans'. The data collection consisted of a survey among all the students, 10 group interviews with altogether 34 young people staying at the mission or at the low-cost boarding school, 15 individual interviews, and participant-observation, mostly at homes and at the mission. It also consisted of interviews with project staff, local leaders, parents and grandparents and a survey among 21 elderly people about bringing up young people in a time of AIDS. The main research site is Busia District, and the article also draws on a district-wide mapping of development projects in

2004, including government programmes and the variety of non-governmental organisations, as well as on a mapping of the youth activities in the religious institutions in the district in 2006.[2]

The article will first introduce to the political and religious ideologies *for* youth in Uganda and then show how young people navigate the ideological pluralism on sexual behaviour. It then moves on to the expressions of young people's ideology *of* youth and moral critique of the elder generations. The final section will reflect upon the correspondence between the ideologies *for* youth and the ideologies *of* youth that are created in the interplay between sexuality and sociality in the context of AIDS in Uganda. The key argument is that the ideologies *for* youth approach youth as a social category somehow unattached from the general societal fabric and whose calamities can be treated in relative isolation, whereas the ideologies *of* youth stress that they are firmly embedded in society; dependent upon others and keepers of morality, striving for a better society.

Political and Religious Ideologies *for* Youth

The coming to power of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in 1986 and the adoption of a new constitution in 1996 brought marginalised groups political recognition. Youth, like women and disabled people, secured seats in parliament and youth councils were instituted at all political levels. In spite of these actions, young people are not important players in Ugandan politics. Instead, the main reasons why politicians attend to youth issues are the demographic facts that 75 per cent of the population is below 30 years of age, and there is an intersection of demography with social problems. This was clear in speeches and interviews presented in the daily newspapers in relation to the International Youth Day 2006. The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Youth had made the theme for the day *'Tackling Poverty Together: The Role of the Youth in Wealth Creation'.*[3] Politicians associated youth with crime, armed conflict, idleness, gambling, prostitution, high unemployment, poverty, and the continual spread of HIV.[4] 'Tackling poverty together' meant that the government would 'empower' young people through appointing role models, creating jobs, modernising the agricultural sector, training youth to create jobs, and providing information about reproductive health and human rights. 'The role of youth in wealth creation' was to comply with the government programme elaborated for them, which would lead to an adulthood featured by material well-being and a society free from AIDS.

The political ideology *for* youth spells out that youth should protect themselves from infection and, if infected, not spread the virus. There is a perception that young people are 'at risk' of infection as both male and female Ugandans become sexually active during their teenage years and sexual

intercourse is the primary path of HIV infection (Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBS) 2007),[5] and, at the same time, young people are 'a risk' to society because if the HIV prevalence continues into the next generation, it will prolong the immense burden that AIDS places at the level of households and family networks as well as at the level of national resources, capacity and productivity.

While youth have been a key target group for HIV prevention campaigns in Uganda, the fight against AIDS has been framed as a task for the whole nation. When the epidemic emerged in the late 1980s, the country had started recovering from 15 years of armed conflict and the new government proved its worth by uniting the people against the new enemy. Also internationally, President Museveni was praised as the first African leader to publicly recognise the epidemic, and it was with strong financial support from national and international actors that the president encouraged all sectors in Uganda to fight against the spread of HIV and mitigate the effects of AIDS (Parkhurst and Lush 2004, Christensen and Janeway 2005). The multi-sector approach in Uganda proved to be successful as the prevalence rate has dropped from about 14 per cent in 1995 to 7 per cent in 2006 (UBS 2007, Parkhurst and Lush 2004).[6] However, in spite of the success, more than 2 million Ugandans have been infected with HIV, 1 million have died from AIDS, and another 1 million are today living with the infection (UBS 2007).

The prevention campaigns began in the 1980s with the slogan 'love carefully', and the Christian denominations joined hands with the secular campaign under the motto 'love faithfully' (Seidel 1990, Allen and Heald 2004). The principal prevention method was the so-called ABC-model: Abstinence until marriage, Be faithful to your partner or use a Condom. Church leaders further moralised this call for the individual to change behaviour by promoting 'A' and 'B', leaving aside the 'C' (see also Gusman 2009). The religious-moral perception of HIV infection applied to both the unmarried and the married, but young people – almost per definition unmarried – became a main target group in faith-based prevention work.

The political will in Uganda to instigate HIV prevention campaigns is well-known, yet it is less known that the campaigns spread across the country at the same time of a religious ideology, which gained tremendous popularity: Pentecostalism. The links between Pentecostalism and understandings of AIDS in Uganda are significant because the HIV campaigns, encouraging individual behaviour change in relation to sexuality, corresponded with the Pentecostal claims to both individual and social behaviour changes. The key message in the HIV campaigns became a part of the Pentecostal request for breaking away from 'cultural' practices in relation to alcohol, marriage patterns, gender and generational relations, as well as to practices associated with death, misfortune and social discord. Pentecostal pastors requested

members to stop cultural practices that the mission-based churches had tried to change (e.g. funeral rites and widow inheritance) or reluctantly accepted (e.g. polygamy).[7] Both the HIV campaigns and the Pentecostal gospel were based on an orientation towards the ability of every individual to control his or her behaviour – to be physically 'safe' from HIV infection and spiritually 'saved' (Gusman 2009:73). Moreover, the Pentecostal gospel claimed that conversion would enable an individual to control him- or herself. The central tenet of Pentecostal theology is that each individual must accept Jesus Christ as one's saviour, or, as it is also phrased, every individual must become 'born again' (Maxwell 1998:353, Meyer 1998:318). To proclaim salvation is considered an assertion of faith and this 'second birth' promises to transcend the human imperfection that is intrinsic in the human condition (Englund 2007), and strengthen the person's relationship with God. The relationship between the individual and God forms a key for understanding Pentecostal notions that conversion can enable a person to control one-self (see also Christiansen 2009c). In other words, to be 'saved' can make one 'safe' from sexually risky behaviour.

Pentecostals are known as *Balokole*, which means 'the saved ones' in Luganda, and refers to the understanding that conversion to Pentecostalism entails acceptance of Jesus Christ as one's saviour. Across Africa, Pentecostal Christianity has attracted young people with the message of salvation as a break away from tradition, gerontocracy, and poverty; electronic devises and lively liturgy, global connections, and tight fellowships offering urban migrants a new family (van Dijk 1992, Maxwell 1998, Meyer 1998, Marshall-Fratani 1998, Gifford 1998, Diouf 2003, Gusman 2009). Most Pentecostals in Uganda are young people, but, most young Ugandans are not Pentecostal; they are Catholic or Anglican. In spite of the influence of Pentecostal churches, the religious landscape continues to be dominated by the Roman Catholic Church (about 42 per cent of the population) and the Anglican Church of Uganda (about 35 per cent), with about 11 per cent being Pentecostal, and 12 per cent are Muslim. Youth are however very visible in Pentecostal churches due to a combination of demography (youth make of 75 per cent of the population), organisation (anyone can start a church), and liturgy (lay people take up more visible roles than in church hierarchies with ordained clergy).

Writing on large Pentecostal churches in Kampala, Gusman (2009) describes 'the Joseph Generation', the notion of a revolutionary movement made up of young people morally pure and able to reverse the moral 'corruption' of the parental generation. Presenting itself as a revolutionary movement opposed to the older 'corrupted' generation, the Joseph Generation 'is a creative way of interpreting the Pentecostal idea of breaking with the past (van Dijk 1998; Meyer 1998), with the young people's generation charged

with building a new, Christian country, saved both in a spiritual and in a physical sense ('safe,' free from AIDS)' (ibid:68). In the rural east Uganda, there is also a notion that the youth are morally pure and the parental generation is morally 'corrupted', but, as I will illustrate in this article, this notion is shared among young people across the Christian denominations, not confined to Pentecostals, and, more importantly, the youth stress their dependence on, not their independence from, the older generation. Before moving on to the ideologies *of* youth, let us look into how young people navigate the ideological pluralism on sexual behaviour in a time of AIDS.

Moving Between Messages

When some churches promote abstinence only and other churches encourage condom use, they are giving rise to confusion among young Christians on how to be a good Christian and safe from HIV. Further confusion is caused by different views among clergy and lay leaders in some churches.

   As mentioned earlier, I carried out a mapping exercise in order to get an overview of the views on 'appropriate' methods of HIV prevention and of HIV/AIDS related activities in religious institutions in south east Uganda in 2006. In the following, I present one response from each of the main denominations (Catholic, Anglican, and Pentecostal) in a rural parish reflecting the various positions in the local Christian landscape. Responses to how churches encourage young members to avoid infection included the following ones:

> We encourage abstinence from sex until when one feels he or she is ready for marriage. We encourage people intending to get married to be prayerful so that God reveals the right woman for a particular man, but we don't go for blood tests (Catholic lay priest).

> We tell the young people to abstain from sex until they feel ready for marriage, and to those who want to get married we tell them to go for blood tests to establish their status (Anglican lay priest).

> We tell the young people to abstain from sex until they feel ready for marriage. We tell those who want to go in for marriage, to go for blood tests, and stick to the word of God (Pentecostal pastor).

While all churches promote abstinence until marriage, there are diverse views on whether or not young people should be encouraged to use condoms:

> We discourage condom use for it promotes sexual immorality and even for family planning it is not allowed for it is like murdering. It is against Bible doctrines (Catholic lay priest).

> We promote condom use within marriage for family planning purposes and it is allowed for the young people, for it prevents infections and early pregnancies (Anglican lay priest).

> We do not encourage condom use for it promotes sexual immorality, but it is okay within marriage for family planning purposes. We do not inform young people about condoms for this would increase their sexual immorality (Pentecostal pastor).

This mixture of messages brings confusion among young people. Although most Pentecostal pastors promote abstinence only, young Pentecostals hear other clergy encourage condom use, read NGOs advertise condom use in newspapers or participate in some of their activities, and they discuss with friends at school, at work, or in church. As mentioned above, clergy within a church may hold different views on condom use, and, to make matters further complex, the same clergyman may express different views in different situations. During an interview with students in a secondary school, a Catholic female said:

> During mass Father (Catholic parish priest) made it very clear that to use a condom is like to prevent God from doing His work on earth, so we should never use one. Even married people should not use them, but, if they have too many children and they are very poor, then it can be good that they stop producing for some time...after service, when some of the boys from the youth group talked with Father, I saw that he gave them condoms. I know they also have condoms at the (Catholic) clinic (next to the church). Now, I really wonder what to believe...

The incident presents a priest balancing between church doctrine, poverty, and interests in protecting 'his' young members from HIV infection. When I told the story in interviews with other young people, it spurred discussions about responsibility, self-control, and knowledge. Young informants took positions like the following ones:

> The priest has to say that people should not use condoms because that is what the Bible says, but he knows that people die, and he is a good person, so he tells them how they can live and not die...abstinence is of course the best, but who can abstain full time? (Anglican male).

> I think that the priest really wants people to take responsibility. He knows young people just practice sex here and there, so he tells them that such is against God's law. But, he also knows that young people are stubborn, so he gives them knowledge to at least take care of the life that God gave each one of them (Catholic male).

> That is a very bad priest. He is just making everyone confused. How can he go about making everyone confused? No, what he says inside the church is what he should practice outside... otherwise how should anyone know what to do? (Pentecostal female).

> When he gives those young people condoms, he is telling them 'you just go ahead'...he is making them have sex. Those boys will have sex with the first girl who crosses the road. If they stayed away from such temptations, they would not be craving for sex (Pentecostal female).

According to the former two statements, the priest helps the young males to take responsibility of their life and enables them to 'live and not die' whereas the two latter statements stress that young people get confused and see condoms as an encouragement to 'have sex with the first girl who crosses the road'. The difference is to some extent along denominational lines, since Catholic and Anglican churches tend to take the former position whereas Pentecostal churches tend to take the latter one. The Pentecostal idea that ambiguous messages will make young males go astray is not confined to youth or issues about sexuality.[8] However, as Gusman writes, confusion is a recurrent word' in the discourse of the young Pentecostals and they try to follow 'safe guides' for staying free from AIDS (Gusman 2009:79). Below are some examples of how young Christians in a rural context explain try to 'steer from temptations':

> I try to steer from temptations...when I see smart girls in church or in town, I immediately feel like I want to have what they have. Their hairstyle, maybe smart shoes or clothes...the feeling is just there. I pray to God to stay firm, oh God, I hope one day you will give me that...If I am patient, God will reward me with much goodness (Pentecostal male)

> At school some girls are very smart. They have smart shoes, new styles, and they talk about boyfriends or those men who give them these good things. How can I not want that? Of course I do, but if you get pregnant school is over, if you get AIDS, life has finished before you even started it...They say that if you start having boyfriends it is very hard to stop, so, for me, I ask God to help me not walk along that road...my friend helps me to stay firm (Catholic female).

> In town there are beautiful girls, even here at school. I don't speak with them alone, not so much at least, I stay with my close friends, we talk with the girls together...it helps because when they are there you don't suddenly have sex, you can control...if you are alone with one the voice of God disappears, you just hear the heart pumping. It is not good, for you don't know what you may do...okay, it may feel real good, but you just get infected. I try always to listen to what God tells me to do (Anglican male).

The ability to control oneself, to not give in to temptations, is a recurrent theme when talking with young Ugandans about their life situation and their striving for social becoming. For these young people, their personal relationship

with God is key for 'staying firm' and free from AIDS. Yet, as they all describe, desires for material things and physical pleasures make it difficult to 'stay firm with God'. Although conversion ideally transcends the human imperfection that is intrinsic to the human condition, Pentecostals recognise that in practice they are not without fault. It is notable, however, that young Pentecostals (and other young Christians) underline their fears of failure, i.e. not being able to control oneself. This tendency could be related to the widespread notion of youth as a life stage where people are in much need of information, guidance, and material support to live responsibly. Church leaders, NGO staff, teachers, and parents reproduce this notion that young people need guidance and discipline to control themselves, especially in relation to sex.

Although the young Christians accept this ideology *for* youth, I argue that their underlining of fears of failure does not only reflect confusion, uncertainty of themselves or 'flexibility of youth', it reflects a more general critique of the circumstances within which they are growing up: a society marked by poverty, family disunity, weak state institutions, and HIV/AIDS. From the viewpoint of young people, the epidemic is a symptom of the 'moral corruption' of the parental generation (see also Gusman 2009) as is the lack of solidarity between family members. Many young informants express disillusions about absent fathers, mothers caught in strife with co-wives, death of one or both parents, and still relatives do not 'come in' with assistance. Most of the young interviewees said that they only trusted one person who would do everything she could to help: the mother. However, the mother is the principal caregiver, but most women in the parental generation are small-scale farmers unable to give financial support to education, for example. Other family members, who have the financial resources for the younger generation to acquire educational skills that may lead to a salaried income and social mobility, often do not provide what the young people perceive they are morally entitled to (see also Christiansen, Yamba and Daniels 2005). It is in this social context of young people's experience of being left on their own that we should understand their weaving threads about making God present in their lives to safely navigate temptations. Similar to Mats Utas' (2005) research on young people's narratives about navigating social relations during the civil war in Liberia, these Ugandan youth, at one and the same time position themselves as *agents*, responsible for attempting to stay free from AIDS, and as *victims*, exposed to HIV infection due to lack of family unity, mixed messages on HIV prevention, and constrained socio-economic circumstances.

Ideology of Youth: Moral Critique of the Parental Generation

By underlining the notion of youth as victims of circumstances, the young Christians express a moral critique of the parental generation. This critique is a central aspect of the ideology *of* youth in rural east Uganda and very similar to the discourse of the Joseph Generation in urban Kampala. In this section, I will illustrate that the rural youth – contrary to the urban youth who see themselves as a revolutionary force that can build a Christian country in opposition to the father's generation – emphasise their dependency upon the older generation and thereby place themselves firmly within the society; not as a social category whose calamities can be treated in relative isolation.

In group interviews, young people were very critical towards their own parents, as the extracts below attest to:

> My father is polygamous, he has 3 wives and we are 29 children. He is just a farmer, in fact, all the wives are just farmers – they are poor! They can contribute nothing...it is an older sister who enrolled me and pays the school fees (Anglican female).

> My mother left when I was still young...my dad was taking too much alcohol...for me, the stepmother who I'm staying with, she mistreats me...at times she doesn't even give me food, I go hungry...just because you have not worked, you can't eat, and yet in most cases I have spent the day at school...there is no-one I can go to, we migrated from my father's area and the mother is nowhere to be seen (Pentecostal male).

> After my father died, they [the in-laws] chased my mother away from the land...with polygamy there must be problems, all the time...this disease [AIDS] makes them [co-wives] argue over which one to blame for bringing it into the home. We [siblings] all went with my mother and try our level best to survive, but these days she is very ill...we don't see them [paternal in-laws] anymore...I don't think they will come until they smell dowry (Catholic female).

Poverty, unstable conjugal relations, 'bad hearted' step-mothers, and rivalry between co-wives over the scarce resources of a man who took on wives in the hope of prosperity, but failed to produce anything but mouths to be fed, are common elements in young people's blame on the parental generation for creating dissonance and carelessness between relatives today. Young informants told unexpectedly many stories about older relatives whom they suspect wish them to fail, want to cause them harm, chased them away from their home, or took actions towards killing them. As Bledsoe (1995) has argued from Sierra Leone, children are symbols of adult relations and hence taking care of other people's children are barometers of the relations between the children's parents and the care taker. The 'usual suspects' are stepmothers and other kin in the paternal lineage with whom one competes

over resources. In this context, becoming 'saved' is about divine protection from one's own weaknesses as well as from other people's thoughts and actions.

There is a strong sense of injustice among the young people whose lives changed much after one of both parents died from AIDS. It seems a regular occurrence that young people are deprived from entitlement to inherit land, cattle, and other property that should have formed the basis for especially the sons' livelihood. AIDS seems to be a catalyst for domestic conflicts and expose weak relations of social security among kin, which young people take as evidence that 'today, everyone is on his or her own', 'there is no family unity, even clan elders just eat' and that the parental generation is 'wicked and spoiling our lives'. The problems at home and within the extended family make young Ugandans speak of nostalgia for a lost family solidarity – not, as in Kenya, of a lost modernity (Prince 2006). From a youth perspective, the older relatives are selfish, greedy and have low morale; as stated powerfully in the above quotation: 'when they smell dowry, they will come'.

While the weak social positioning of youth does not leave much space to express criticism, young people can give their critical voices public expressions within church contexts. Christian churches are organised into a number of fellowships that meet during the week for prayers, practice or practical work. Youth groups are common fellowships, like the choir, and sites for keeping young people busy with education such as Bible study, life skills or debate as well as with leisure activities, such as sport, music, and drama. These groups can form space for linking youth with local society, the nation-state and Christianity (Bjerk 2005).

Catholic youth groups usually perform a drama for the congregation at the end of a school term. It is a tradition that displays youth are socially positioned to entertain (Durham 2006), and, on a side note, the continuous intertwining of education with religion in Uganda. The priest or another adult leader guides the youth group and may suggest the theme for the dramas. In Lumino Parish, a strong Catholic parish bordering Lake Victoria, for example, the church had external funds to educate 'child domestic workers' and, as part of the church educating the community about children's rights (following the UN Convention on the rights of the child), the priest assigned the youth group to make a drama within the theme. About 20 of the 300 beneficiaries were boarders at the Catholic mission and with time they became part of the youth group. The young people developed a two hour drama, which they performed for about 500 people from the congregation and the local community.

The drama opened with a husband who lives with his wife and three children. They are happy. One day he brings home a second wife and this

woman tricks the husband to chase away the first woman from the house. The children remain in the care of the step-mother. The new wife goes to a traditional healer to buy 'love magic' (herbs) that will make the husband fall so much in love with her, that he will not notice that she mistreats his children. The father is blinded and the children are miserable. The children steal money from him, and they leave home to live in the streets surviving on casual work. The youngest child dies. The new wife then becomes ill from the 'love magic' and she goes to a medical doctor, but he cannot diagnose the illness. The woman is seriously ill and the distressed husband takes her to a pastor, who advices him that the woman will be cured from the witchcraft if he proclaims salvation and apologise to the first wife. The man becomes saved and writes a letter apologising to the first wife and the children. Then he kills himself. After this dramatic end, the young people sang a song about saying 'no' to boy/girlfriends and only saying 'yes' to friends who will help them prosper.

The audience laughed at the scenes where the second wife tricked the husband with love magic and whenever the traditional healer – portrayed as a filthy, uneducated, and greedy man – was on stage. When the child died in the street and, later on, when the man killed himself, the audience was completely quiet. Afterwards the audience applauded the youth for a powerful performance.

In this drama, the youth elegantly integrated children's rights about parental responsibility for their offspring into 'domestic citizenship' (cf. Das and Addlakha 2001), that is, one could recognise that children have rights and obligations by virtue of belonging within a kinship network. The values, resources and expectations within the domestic arena are realised through relationships with kin, rather than through one's rights as an individual citizen of the state. Family support may thus have to be mobilised; it is not based on a legal convention, but on norms that can be disputed or may be difficult to follow for practical reasons (Christiansen and Whyte 2008). By drawing on cultural values of family unity, Christian values of monogamy, and developmental ideas of child protection, the young people dramatised that low morals among parents can have fatal consequences on both children and adults. The husband's recourse to suicide was particularly powerful because there is a taboo against suicide in the local culture and it is considered a grave sin in Roman Catholicism. The young actors did not challenge the parents' authority, but by focusing the drama solely on morality, not social ills like poverty or corruption, the youth conveyed a clear request that parents must change behaviour – possibly the most repeated message at a time of AIDS and Pentecostalism.

The youth ended the performance with a song presenting themselves as morally upright and, as they expressed in the song, it is through faith and friendship that young people try to 'stay firm' and strengthen unity in the interests of society as a whole. By addressing the basis of a healthy society through cultural values, Christian concepts, development and government priorities, the youth appropriate an authoritative voice. The drama can thus be seen as giving young people authority similar to what Bjerk has found in Lutheran youth choirs in Iringa town in southern Tanzania (2005). In the Tanzanian choir songs, however, young people present a new Christian theology in which youth, as youth, have important responsibility to play in society. While youth in Arusha, northern Tanzania, after initiation performed certain social functions, as did youth in other pastoralist societies like the Herero in Botswana (Durham 2005), it is a historical myth that youth in the southern Iringa area were ever assigned roles such as labour force or police of the society (ibid). The young people today are thus constructing a new identity by granting themselves an analogous role to an invented historical memory; a creativity produced during a time of high youth unemployment and in a context of strong notions that unemployed urban youth is a risk to society (ibid). According to Bjerk, it is in response to this social positioning – 'youth are creating a new identity, both in their own eyes and in the eyes of the church elders: as warriors fighting modern social ills rather than enemy armies' (ibid:335). In the Ugandan drama, on the other hand, the youth presented themselves as victims of domestic confusion and mistreatment, and as agents who tried to survive in the streets, but, they only managed to a certain extent as the youngest one died. In the agricultural societies of south east Uganda, young people are expected to take on roles within the domestic sphere; they should obey and assist older relatives as well as work hard to become responsible social persons, but there are low expectations to youth contributing to community life and development (Whyte & Whyte 1998). And rather than presenting themselves as opposed to the older generations, like their urban age-mates in the Joseph Generation, the drama was like one long testimony that young people depend upon the parental generation.

Conclusion

As I have shown, the spread of HIV and the consequences of AIDS have influenced the ideologies *for* youth in Uganda. Institutions of government, development and religion have formulated rather similar positions, which tend to treat youth as constituting socio-culturally reified and autonomous groups that are somehow unattached from the general social fabric, and whose calamities can be treated in relative isolation. From the perspectives of these powerful institutions, youth should be 'responsible' citizens, who

protect themselves from HIV infection and, if infected, do not spread the virus. The compatibility between the political, developmental, and religious ideologies *for* youth have been particularly visible in the HIV campaigns encouraging behaviour change, and these campaigns have fostered one domi-nant ideology *for* youth in the public sphere: young people should keep them-selves physically 'safe' from HIV infection and spiritually 'saved'.

While young Ugandans, perhaps particularly those who are active Christians, agree with this public ideology, they also formulate counter positions criticising the parental generation for low morals and the spread of the epidemic. A second central aspect of the ideologies *of* youth is that youth are not isolated from the social fabric. This has stimulated a counter position in the shape of an urban movement, in which youth oppose the parental generation and see themselves as the builders of a Christian society; a new Uganda. This article has described a second, and perhaps more unique, counter position, as youth in the rural east do not rebel against the older generations; instead, they express a yearning for especially the parental generation to better support their social becoming. Being very much disappointed with the parental support, many rural youth turn to churches for faith and fellowship, and they perceive their agency in religious terms, seeing fellow Christians as the friends who may help them re-establish family virtues.

Notes

1. For a discussion on the dynamics between kinship and religious networks in families affected by AIDS in Uganda, see Christiansen 2009a.
2. The mapping exercise in 2004 covered 645 'projects' (a broad variety of actors e.g. well-funded NGOs, farmer groups, women groups, youth organisations, and burial societies) in the entire district, whereas the mapping exercise in 2006 covered 385 religious institutions (about 365 Christian and 20 Muslim ones) in five out of ten sub-counties in the district.
3. The theme was a slight reformulation of the UN theme for the day: 'Tackling Poverty Together: Young People and the Eradication of Poverty'
4. See the two daily newspapers, New Vision (pages 33-40) and Daily Monitor (pages 9-12 and 25-27) on 12 August 2006.
5. It is notable that every third girl between 15 and 19 years of age is pregnant or a mother (UBS 2007).
6. For a distinction between three phases of the epidemic in Uganda see Gusman 2009.
7. For a discussion on the ways in which a blend of Christian doctrines, public health messages, and cultural practices have also informed the emergence of a new social position for widows, see Christiansen 2009b.

8. During research on connections between faith and health seeking behaviour in 1999, Pentecostal pastors spoke against the use of herbal medicine from the pulpits and when visiting patients. However, when I asked the pastors how come plants, growing in the world that God created, can be sinful, they all said that it is not sinful to pick herbs, mix and drink them in tea. The prohibition was based on a notion that if they allowed Christians to pick and use herbs, Christians would go to 'traditional healers' who mix herbs with ancestral spirits. The pastors thus prohibited universal use of herbs because they perceived Christians could not distinguish picking herbs in the nature from buying at herbalists. In practice, most Pentecostals picked herbs or received from friends when ill, and such practice was only testified as sinful when the symptoms did not disappear.

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