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Governing Gender:
Violent Extremism in Northern Nigeria

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Abstract

This article draws on a qualitative study piloted in Maiduguri, Northern Nigeria, to unpack the gender logics that shape why women join Boko Haram, their roles, how they are perceived by their communities on their return and how these dynamics inform the 'deradicalisation' programmes of the Nigerian government and civil society organisations. The study reveals that the absence of a gender power analysis reproduces the dominant tropes evident in radicalisation theories and programmes about who is radicalised and why, thus limiting a holistic response to the factors that drive association with Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. The article points to the opportunities that a more nuanced reading of women's experiences of associating with armed groups and their return to their communities offers to re-conceptualising integration programmes.

Résumé

Cet article s'appuie sur une étude qualitative menée à Maiduguri, dans le nord du Nigeria, pour analyser les logiques de genre qui déterminent les raisons pour lesquelles les femmes rejoignent Boko Haram, leurs rôles, la manière dont elles sont perçues par leurs communautés à leur retour et la manière dont ces dynamiques influencent les programmes de « déradicalisation » du gouvernement nigérian et des organisations de la société civile. L'étude révèle que l'absence d'une analyse de genre et des relations de pouvoir reproduit les tropes dominants évidents dans les théories et programmes de radicalisation pour savoir qui est radicalisé et pourquoi, limitant ainsi une réponse holistique aux facteurs qui poussent à l'association avec Boko Haram dans le nord du Nigeria. L'article souligne les opportunités qu'une lecture plus nuancée des expériences des femmes associées à des groupes armés et de leur retour dans leurs communautés offre pour reconceptualiser les programmes d'intégration.

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Introduction

The implicit construction of men as the most likely targets of radicalisation pervades the literature on terrorism and violent extremism (Borum 2011; Ogharanduku 2017; Schmid 2014). Women and girls are often portrayed as inactive, passive and apolitical, largely experiencing violent extremism through abduction, rape and murder. There is a growing body of literature that has sought to complicate this bias by framing women as agentic, choosing to join insurgent groups for political and personal reasons (Henty and Eggleston 2018). However, most gender and violent extremism programme strategies by state and non-state actors largely engage women as wives and mothers who are mobilised to prevent their children (sons) and husbands from being radicalised. What does a gender analysis of violent extremism that goes beyond framing women as both victims and villains offer? I unpack the gender logics that underpin why women join Boko Haram, their roles, how they are perceived by their communities on their return and how these dynamics inform the Nigerian government and civil society organisation deradicalisation programmes, or not. The absence of a gender power analysis reproduces the tropes evident in radicalisation theories about who is radicalised and why, thereby limiting a holistic response to the factors that drive radicalisation in Northern Nigeria. This article points to the opportunities offered by a more nuanced reading of women's experiences of armed groups to developing comprehensive programmes for countering violent extremism.

This article draws on a July 2019, qualitative pilot study conducted in partnership with Neem Foundation and the African Leadership Centre.[1] Neem Foundation staff are members of the team that established Nigeria's pioneer Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Programme who also run an extensive counselling-on-wheels programme in Maidugiri, to both mitigate and respond to the impact of Boko Haram on the community. Methodologically, this study takes seriously how power relations impact knowledge production on Africa generally, the visibility and impact of African scholarship and how this dynamic also translates to the visibility and impact of feminist scholarship on security studies specifically (Adegoke and Oni 2017; Medie and Kang 2018). Consequently, this article draws on knowledge from below to contribute to a deeper conceptual and practical understanding of how gender analysis generally, and women's experiences specifically, can expand our understanding of the drivers of and responses to violent extremism in Nigeria. The pilot fieldwork was framed by feminist research ethics, which meant paying attention to what it means to do

research on this subject and with research participants implicated in Boko Haram, given the larger political and binary framing of the actors linked to insurgent groups and the impact of asymmetrical warfare (Borum 2011; Berntzen and Sandberg 2014).

We drew on qualitative research methods, specifically focus group discussions to identify the intersections between social norms, socio-economic status, gender roles, ethnicity and religion. Given that this study was informed by feminist research traditions, which seek to destabilise hegemonic and homogeneous categorisations of the social, focus group discussions facilitated a complex understanding of the social context and relationships (Okech 2013). Consequently, the analysis of the data is attentive to contradictions in beliefs, opinions, emotions and discursive relationships between individuals. The focus group discussions were conducted in Bakassi internally displaced people's (IDP) camp in Maiduguri, Northern Nigeria, with women associated with Boko Haram. I draw on reflections from six focus group discussions conducted with women formerly associated with Boko Haram, and community members in Maiduguri. In keeping with research ethics, the participants were anonymised, represented here through numbers and letters linked to different focus group clusters. We met a total of thirty-five people over four days. Of these, twenty-five were women associated with Boko Haram and ten were men community members.

I supported a team of Neem Foundation research assistants in designing the focus group discussion guide, provided training support and shadowed three focus group discussions, given language limitations. Shadowing, as a research methodology, can be described as 'observation on the move' (Czarniawska 2014:43). Shadowing is not limited to understanding the data collection and analyses only, but also offers insights into the research process, which informs how knowledge is produced through research (Cohen and Manion 1989). As a shadow researcher, I had a back-seat view of the process, in terms of observing the research assistants and the interactions between the research participants and their encounters with the research assistants. As an outsider, a Kenyan woman with a language barrier, I was aware that my presence could be a hindrance, therefore we devised a range of strategies to ensure that my presence was not a distraction. The methodological lessons from this process will be explored in a separate paper.

In going to the field grounded in reflexive research praxis, the research team was attentive to how research questions were framed, the environment of the focus group discussions and the importance of creating space for women to engage freely. These decisions were critical given the cultural

context that mediates interactions between women and men. However, the combination of cultural dynamics and insecurity impacted our ability to have a mixed gender team of research assistants who could speak the local language fluently. Consequently, the research assistants were all men, which affected the extent to which some conversations could be pursued. As a pilot study, lessons on the conditions of the research environment are critical to the design of future projects. We were also attentive to the psychosocial issues that might emerge when dealing with survivors of deeply traumatic experiences. In this regard, the partnership with Neem Foundation, a non-governmental organisation whose staff have twenty years of cumulative experience in psychological/ psychosocial support, as well as extensive training and experience in countering violent extremism and motivating community engagement as a direct response to insecurity in Nigeria, was key.

This qualitative pilot study contributes to understanding the experiences of women associated with Boko Haram. I use 'associate' rather than 'join' to highlight the complexity that informs why women align themselves with Boko Haram and the roles they play within the group. The analysis of the conversations with the interlocutors in the focus group discussions is informed by Mbembe's (2003) Necropolitics, which argues for an expansion of how we think about sovereignty, not in the political nation/ state sense, but as the exercise of control over mortality (death) and life (living) as a manifestation of power. Mbembe (2003) argues that sovereignty becomes about 'the generalised instrumentalisation of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations'. Part of this instrumentalisation is what I call the democratisation of violence through urban militias, private armies, insurgent groups such as Boko Haram, and state armies, who all claim the right to exercise violence or to kill. Consequently, according to Mbembe (2003), in a society where the possession and non-possession of weapons define one's social value, all social bonds are destroyed, thus normalising the 'idea that power can be acquired and exercised only at the price of another's life'.

In exercising sovereignty over life and death, one can argue that those who associate with the group are seeking to leverage the sovereignty offered by necropolitics in a context where powerlessness has characterised their lives. This power, as will be shown in the sections that follow, does not necessarily alter gender norms but relies on them to claim certain levers of access and authority that were hitherto unavailable in their 'normal' lives. In the sections that follow, I explore how gender is governed by unpacking women's motivation to join Boko Haram, their roles and how they are received on return into their communities. Governing gender is used as

a framework to examine the terms by which gender is constituted in the context of insurgency. I examine the regulatory forces that define gender relations within Boko Haram camps and therefore become central to systems of governing within the group. I also use governing gender to interpret how women, in particular, shape gender norms outside the modes of regulation by Boko Haram and the Nigerian state. Analytically, I use thematic analysis to make sense of the focus group discussions (Braun and Clarke 2006).

Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria

Maiduguri, the site of this qualitative study, can be described as the epicentre of Boko Haram attacks. As the capital city of Borno State, it joins Yobe, Kano, Bauchi and Kaduna in Northern Nigeria as one of the targets of the Boko Haram insurgency and therefore one of the most vulnerable. Since 2003, Boko Haram tactics across these states have included attacks on military barracks, police stations, raids on communities and abductions, largely of locals and some foreign nationals (Pillay 2018). The 2014 abduction of approximately 276 teenage girls from a boarding school in Chibok in Borno gained global attention. Cumulatively, these actions have led to loss of life, displacement of communities, states of emergency, closure of schools and overall insecurity in the region. Maiduguri has been hardest hit by Boko Haram's activities, and, as a result, the Bakassi camp hosts approximately 34,000 internally displaced people (UNOCHA 2020).

Pereira (nd) notes that discriminatory features of Nigeria's state processes and practices restrict the character of citizenship, thereby discriminating against women. The specificity of discrimination in Northern Nigeria was made palpable by the 2002 case against Amina Lawal. Amina Lawal was sentenced to death by stoning, by a Regional Court in Katsina State, Nigeria, for having a child outside marriage. Her sentence was announced on 23 March 2002, but subsequently withdrawn on 23 September 2003, in large part due to national and international advocacy by women's rights organisations. Pereira (2005) underscores the significance of history and politics in the interpretation of cultural practices, including practices integral to heterosexual culture. Lawal's case above is characteristic of a region where religious and cultural norms intersect to define women's status through social reproduction. Consequently, women's access to education and the formal labour market is restricted, and they do not own land or homes, which increases an overreliance on masculine patronage and, therefore, their vulnerability. These cultural, religious and legal inequalities, combined with poverty, have resulted in low school attendance and high rates of child marriage for women and girls (Imam, Biu and Yahi 2020).

A rapid gender assessment conducted by UN Women, Oxfam and Care in 2020 noted that over 80 per cent of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Northern Nigeria are in Borno State (the epicentre of the crisis) and 79 per cent of them are women and children (Unaegbu, Kimiri and Agada 2020). Vulnerability assessments show that women-headed households are at higher risk of sexual and physical violence, and are more likely to experience rape, sexual abuse and sexual exploitation, such as engaging in transactional sex with humanitarian aid workers, security forces and community members who have access to food, shelter or non-food items (Unaegbu et al. 2020). Northeast Nigeria is still shaped by patriarchal values in which religious and cultural beliefs appoint men as the head of the household, a relationship of power that extends to every facet of women's and girls' lives. The choices and experiences of the women engaged in this qualitative pilot study need to be understood within the context set out above. The section that follows sets out a broad framework for understanding Boko Haram in Nigeria, drawing on scholarship that expands a reading of why and how insurgent groups come to flourish.

In the last two decades, there has been a shift in how conflict and wars manifest. This is evident in a marked decrease in interstate conflicts, the increase of organised violence and the critical role of non-state actors in the emergence and sustainment of conflict and proxy wars, fought over the control of natural resources in sovereign territories. All these developments are profoundly gendered and are linked to the maintenance and or challenging of existing gender regimes that tend to privilege certain forms of femininities and masculinities. Globally, there is a confluence of factors at play. The first factor is the larger geopolitical question, which places state formation and the creation of stable states elsewhere in direct conversation with the sustainment of a global power axis that constructs a few powerful states as arbiters of global political order. The second factor is the privatisation of the state as a cumulative result of externally driven programmes, such as Structural Adjustment and its successor policies, which have foregrounded the advancement of neoliberal globalisation at the expense of a resolution of the vast structural inequalities in the countries where these programmes were implemented. Third, the management, governance structures and opponents in any given conflict involve multilayered local, national, regional and global institutions.

It is in this environment that groups such as Boko Haram emerge. Boko Haram is now understood to be a consequence of overlapping religious, historical and political histories and actors specific to Northern Nigeria. Hansen notes that rather than viewing Boko Haram as new, it is important to root the group in an ongoing history of Islamic phenomena in the region

(Hansen 2017). Declarations of jihad for the purposes of Islamic societal revolution have long been common in the region. Different forms of Islamic practice against the state, advocated by the dispossessed, began to develop based on the central demand for the establishment of a societal order founded on sharia law (Hansen 2017). Pertinent to Boko Haram's history is the normalisation of the denouncement of others as non-Muslims, which emerged in the 1970s. According to Paden, this practice of declaring others to be non-Muslim (takfir) began to be extended by some to anyone outside of their group (Paden 2005). It is also important to consider the intersection of colonial history and religiosity. Hansen (2017) and Musa (2010) note that the core driving force behind the denouncement of Western education in Boko Haram's messaging is inseparable from histories of imperialism in which Muslim knowledge production, literary histories and means of communication were disrupted.

The politicisation of religion is argued to be grounded in structural inequalities. Religion itself has been proven to have less impact on association with extremist groups than other structural issues that dominate lived experiences (Alao 2013; Bamidele 2016). Botha and Abdile (2019) extend this analysis by charting how the division between the Christian south and Muslim north of Nigeria is exacerbated by an environment in which Muslims are politically and economically marginalised. Hansen (2017) continues, noting that the rhetoric of 'evil' or terrorism fails to adequately capture Boko Haram as a logical consequence of the failures of the Nigerian state. The failure of the post-independence state to provide significant infrastructure for healthcare and education, especially in Northern Nigeria, demonstrates how semi-industrial capitalism and the legacies of colonialism have created ripe conditions for corruption, exploitation and extraction. Botha and Abdile (2019), Agbiboa (2014) and Hansen (2013) argue that far more than religious indoctrination, poverty, corruption, unemployment and the unequal distribution of wealth and opportunities were important contributing factors to people's decision to join the group. Boko Haram infuses religion into a history of grievances (Agbiboa 2014). By reframing 'terrorism' in terms of state neglect, a more nuanced picture of the sociopolitical landscape is made visible.

The evolution in the understanding of violent extremist groups such as Boko Haram, in scholarship, is not matched by the literature that engages gender and violent extremism (Giscard d'Estaing 2017). Women and girls are often depicted as solely affected by violence through abduction, rape and death (Gonzalez-Perez 2008). But the idea of violence generated by insurgent groups against women and girls has steadily been challenged by emerging studies. In a study on the gender-based violence perpetrated by

Boko Haram, Oriola (2017) notes that gender-based violence reflects how women are generally treated. The violence perpetuated by Boko Haram on women reflects ongoing and persistent patriarchal encounters within the region. Boko Haram's treatment of women, particularly in their abduction, exposes a deeper, more pervasive way in which women experience the world. Feminist security studies scholarship, complicates our understanding of the role that women play within insurgent groups, and the impact of their association with these groups by moving beyond their historical framing as unagentic, absent and apolitical (ICG 2016).

Associating With Boko Haram

Studies on gender and violent extremism point to how structural inequalities collide with recruitment into violent extremist groups (ICG 2016). Poverty, patriarchy, corruption and state responses (or the lack thereof) to socioeconomic dispossession are key contributory factors for women's association with insurgent groups like Boko Haram (Kessels, Durner and Schwartz 2016). As illustrated below, the discussions with women associated with Boko Haram point to poverty and broader economic inequalities as key drivers for their association with Boko Haram. I distinguish here between association based on coercion and force and association informed by an assessment of where positive outcomes lie. As I will illustrate in the sections that follow, these positive outcomes are shaped by a promise of economic freedom that is accessible to both women and men, which is at odds with a society that provides this option for men only. This is the first mode of governing gender relations deployed by Boko Haram, as the excerpts below illustrate.

> Participant A:[2] Because of the high rate of poverty and hunger during the time Boko Haram were active in our community, majority of goods and property of people had been destroyed by the armed group. That in turn made most of the women and girls become very vulnerable whilst Boko Haram were having abundant food, clothes, shelter, freedom etc. That also made women and girls think about joining Boko Haram and they eventually joined.

> Participant B: I feel that a lot of people, not just women, were very interested in the economic benefits that the group provided at the time; because many people felt that they were going to gain in terms of monetary benefits. Let us not forget that at a time the group were offering financial loans to people. I feel this must have influenced many to join.

> Participant C: Most women that join Boko Haram from the Gwoza community joined for economic benefits. They were lured, brainwashed and radicalised. They voluntarily followed Boko Haram members to Sambisa

Forest. Those women saw that Boko Haram members had money and were very generous at the time. They lured women with food and money so much so that many women in the community wanted to get married to Boko Haram men.

However, all the participants above also highlight how Boko Haram's tactics create the conditions for economic distress, through the destruction of property, frequency of attacks that lead to curfews and the eventuality of a depressed economy. Participants B and C specifically note the connection between causing economic distress and promising economic benefits as a tactic pursued by Boko Haram, which therefore becomes a mobilisation tactic. The research participants' views above connect structural inequalities to the vulnerability of communities to Boko Haram, an observation that is picked up in a range of studies, including those analysing the entry of Al Shabaab in Kenya (Badurdeen 2018a; Okech 2018). Like Al Shabaab, Boko Haram's choice of Maiduguri is linked to the geography and historical under-investment in the region by successive governments, as was pointed out earlier in this article. Consequently, limited economic opportunities make both men and women more vulnerable to choices based on survival.

The conservative nature of the region, shaped by the nexus of gender, class, religion and culture, means that women tend to have limited economic opportunities. This is tied to the reliance on gender stereotypes that see their role as limited to social reproduction—motherhood, wifehood and, therefore, household. This specific vulnerability attached to women creates a desire for economic independence that is utilised by Boko Haram as a recruitment strategy. While this can be read as a gendered vulnerability, it can also be understood as an illustration of how the gender norms governing the society are outwardly challenged by a group whose key interest is in mobilising labour towards its cause. The promise of greater economic freedom therefore becomes an opportunity that women seize.

Additionally, Boko Haram's tactical use of violence in a society where the state is viewed as being on the backfoot of a ragtag group, creates political value for Boko Haram. The group's ability to exercise power over those who live—those who associate with the group—and those who 'die'—who are displaced and consequently die socially—normalises the 'idea that power can be acquired and exercised only at the price of another's life' (Mbembe 2003:11–12). Beyond the economic conditions, the power over life—necropolitics—is a key factor that shapes association with Boko Haram. The choice to associate with a group that is constructed as and appears to be more powerful than the state, due to its ability to take life, is an association with a source of power, as the excerpts below point to.

Participant D: My husband was killed by Boko Haram and I followed my father to live with him under Boko Haram due to fear of soldiers. They wanted to kill my father because one of the Boko Haram members married his daughter.

Participant E: Boko Haram used money and flashy items to influence women and children to join them. They even had more guns than the military. They had a fleet of cars that they used to raid communities and villages, which led them to think Boko Haram was more powerful than the army.

Participant F: In the beginning of the insurgency, the group came into our community and portrayed themselves as Islamic religious scholars; they preached and empowered community members. The group was not violent at this point, which was why it was easy to brainwash the community members to join their cause. When the group later became violent, the community members started to flee from Gwoza.

Participant G: Boko Haram is a religious group that forces their beliefs on people. They forcibly recruit members. Anyone that fails to join gets killed; however, they do not harm women because they are mothers.

It is equally evident from the above that the monopoly of violence exercised by Boko Haram is a tactical tool used to govern gender. The decision to abduct rather than exercise other forms of physical abuse implies the use of violence as a mediating force for gender relations. Women and girls are mobilised for their social reproduction capacities and, as illustrated in the sections below, the gender stereotypes about women's roles serve a larger political purpose for those who are politically aligned to the group.

In the sections that follow, I observe that Boko Haram does not radically alter gender dynamics in the way in which it treats women within the camps. There is a patriarchal continuity in the expectation that women will play domestic roles. However, a range of power hierarchies emerge that are linked to how different women and girls arrive in the camps and their links with key men members of Boko Haram. It is these power hierarchies that illustrate how gender is governed within Boko Haram 'territory' and how positive outcomes for women associated with Boko Haram should be viewed in relation to how gender is governed in society generally.

Reclaiming Agency

A binary approach to understanding power relations is well explored in feminist scholarship, showing that powerlessness is not a useful way to understand women's experiences (Amadiume 1997; Lazreg 1994). Women are not homogenous, which means that various factors such as class, age and reproductive capacity intervene to shape the power that different

women will hold in any context (Pereira nd). Hierarchies of power and powerlessness therefore become the lens through which I view the roles that the women associated with Boko Haram play. In examining these roles, it is critical to retain a focus on the minor structural shifts in the conditions of women who in their societies are considered second-class citizens.

> Participant 1: In my opinion, some of the people including young women join the group to get power. This makes them feel they have a purpose. Because many people who were nothing suddenly had domestic workers for chores and many men obeying them as wives of top figures in the group.

> Participant 2: Let's not forget that some women had important roles in the camp, others served as recruiters and even were trained to preach these ideologies to other women to make it as appealing as possible. These women who are part of this group go further to convince their relatives especially their husbands to join Boko Haram. It depends what kind of role you can play, sometimes some were informants within and outside the camp.

> Participant 3: Women are also used in the combat field more often than before as they commit suicide while attacking/targeting security personnel, community members particularly in very crowded areas. Most are young individuals who are selected for this cause from the beginning of indoctrination, and they include women because they are less suspicious in crowds.

> Participant 4: The women and girls who willingly join the group were kept in a separate place called Parisu, they were enjoying their life very comfortably and they were very happy to be part of Boko Haram. Most of them had the role of service especially cooking roles as the most common work the women did there. When their men return from combat against the armed forces, they will hail their husbands as heroes and support them.

The four participants above draw attention to the hierarchies of power that shape women's roles within Boko Haram and how they establish access to power that most of these women did not have prior to being associated with the group. The first hierarchy is raised by participants two and three, who highlight the recruitment role that women who join Boko Haram willingly play. This is an important subversion of how women are understood as political actors because it points to women as conveyors of political beliefs and ideologies to secure more members. The task of recruitment should not be constructed as a simple task of translating an organisation's view. It indicates an internalisation of the political beliefs to undertake their task effectively.

In addition, a second layer of power lies in the recruitment of family members who are not part of the group. This also illustrates the agency that these women have exercised in leaving husbands and extended families behind to pursue what they construe as better living conditions for themselves.

The third layer of power explored by participant two is the role of women as informants. The fact that women have historically been viewed as good spies in conflicts and world wars is well established (see Amrane-Minne and Abu-Haidar 1999; Higonnet, Jenson, Michel and Weitz 1987). Women's ability to do this work well is based on gender stereotypes of women as apolitical, not threatening and generally invisible, thus making it easier for them to gather information. The reliance on gender stereotypes of women as temptresses, lovers or harmless people is a route that Boko Haram uses to subvert societal governing principles of gender to their advantage. When women's invisibility is enhanced by cultural and religious norms, mobilising these stereotypes as an asset illustrates how Boko Haram uses gender to govern its relationship with women recruits and expand its networks.

Participants one and four draw attention to gender hierarchies that are connected to how patriarchal structures distribute power amongst women. The class differences play out here in relation to who has access to workers and who performs which domestic tasks. These roles are often linked to specific women's proximity to masculine power, such as leaders and or fighters within Boko Haram. This proximity to masculine power offers them privileges, such as domestic support and authority to oversee other women. The importance of this power lies in the fact that these are privileges these women did not enjoy in their communities. Women who join Boko Haram, whether willingly or not, come from lower socioeconomic strata. For them, access to domestic help in the household is a privilege often available only to families with greater economic mobility and social capital, which allows them to either pay for labour or mobilise the free labour of younger relatives.

The power hierarchies above, when framed as part of the broader logics of violence that inform Boko Haram, are therefore not only gendered but also draw a direct link to necropolitics, which has created a divide between those who are protected because they are armed and those who are not. The power that women derive from being associated with those who can exercise sovereignty over life points to a broader layer of power associated with greater societal outcomes, particularly where violence has been democratised due to asymmetrical violence. This broader sociopolitical power that women acquire is connected to necropolitics and is a critical point to bear in mind later in this article, when reintegration for returnees and community responses are examined.

Governing Gender

Access to economic power and its attendant privileges has been illustrated as a core driver for women choosing to be associated with Boko Haram. The allure of these privileges is reinforced by a cultural environment that does not provide these rewards, particularly for women who do not have class privilege. As illustrated above, hierarchies of power across women are made visible by economic mobility, proximity to masculine power within the Boko Haram structures and the nature of political tasks they take on within the organisation. Undergirding their decisions are basic survival concerns such as access to food as well as the power privileges within the camps. If access to and benefiting from new power and privileges frames some women's encounters in the 'bush', how do they navigate their return to communities that remain socioculturally unchanged and their relocation to a transient and economically unstable environment—the IDP camp?

> Participant K (community member): Their families were considered associated with the group, so they were stigmatised.
>
> Participant L (community member): The men are not easily accepted back; they are treated with suspicion. Just recently more than fifty men were brought into the Bakassi camp from the 'Operation Safe Corridor'. Unfortunately they were rejected by the communities because they were still considered to be associated with Boko Haram.
>
> Participant M (community member): The security is getting worse, and most people here are not ready to accept them back, we are hurt, we are also scared, and we just want to move on.
>
> Participant N (community member): At the moment people are not ready to accept those who have returned because they are still considered Boko Haram members. They are likely to accept women and girls more easily.
>
> Participant O (community member): I think we have established there are mixed feeling, mostly women and girls can be easily accepted although not entirely the case but they have high possibility of acceptance than that of male counterparts.

The excerpts above from the focus group discussion with men community members point to stigma and exclusion as a central narrative that shapes how women and men associated with Boko Haram experience their return to their communities. Men are considered more dangerous than women and this is clear from participants six, eight and nine. The fear associated with Boko Haram as a group that has terrorised the community extends to those who are seen as having willingly joined the group, as well as to their families.

Two of Mbembe's ideas are worth drawing on here to understand the stigma and loss experienced by returnees and community members who were displaced by Boko Haram. The first idea is the conceptualisation of triple loss—the loss of a 'home', loss of rights over the body and loss of political status that leads to social death (Mbembe 2003:21). The community members above who are now displaced and living in an IDP camp are faced with multiple losses that are directly attributed to Boko Haram.

The loss and social death described by Mbembe (2003) offers a broader framing of the roots of the stigma targeted at returnees, which is not simply about association with the group and the threat that returnees may pose but is linked to their current social conditions of undignified life aptly captured by participant M. However, social death is shared. Returnees do not necessarily experience greater privilege, since the losses experienced by communities are similar to those that the returnees negotiate, as I will explore below.

The rest of the participants' perceptions and views on risk related to men and women returnees are best understood through Mbembe's second idea (2003:12), which is the articulation of the relation between the state of exception created by violent extremism (curfews, displacement) and a relation of enmity that becomes the norm due to the right to kill and sovereignty over life exercised by Boko Haram as a direct result of necropolitics. In essence, whose lives are worth saving and why frames the stigma experienced by women returnees, as illustrated below. Returnees who 'chose' to associate with Boko Haram are constructed as people whose lives, and therefore wellbeing, hold greater value than those who remained 'socially dead', and this underpins the hostility and stigma they encounter.

> Participant 10: Initially we face a lot of stigmatisation and verbal attacks. People in the camp call us names like bomb makers and all that. Initially, people were sceptical about our presence in the camp, to the extent that they do not sleep at night because of fear. There was no trust, even our friends and relatives who should show love, concern and accommodate us were not forthcoming, and that was how bad it was. But things have changed a little though, not completely because even now, I am suffering from trauma mainly due to attacks from the camp community. Sometimes when such abuses coincide with my children's offences, it affects my blood pressure and makes me sick for some days.

> Participant 11: People who were associated with armed groups go through difficulty from their families and relatives. They are stigmatised and ostracised from their community because their families called them killers and kept a distance from them. Some people will even threaten to take revenge for things that happened to their loved ones, though they were warned not to

> but to clean them off from their previous sins and shelve them from hell fire in the life hereafter. People who have grievances with them will refrain from taking retribution and this is what makes the returnees move away from their families to a place they are not known.

Mbembe's (2003:40) 'death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead' best captures what women associated with Boko Haram encounter on their return. There is a contradictory convergence of interests between Boko Haram's production of large-scale death and disruption of life and the state's response through the sequestering of populations in IDP camps contributing to social death. IDP camps therefore become a space of governing unwanted women where the risk they pose to society can be effectively controlled through re-integration processes that simply write them back into existing gender norms.

In a context where ostracisation and powerlessness—economic, social and cultural—characterises their return, what should government strategies to rehabilitate and reintegrate women associated with Boko Haram look like? How can their sovereignty be renegotiated within a state that has failed them? If a return to the 'bush' is considered problematic given the violence wrought by Boko Haram, how can reintegration strategies reduce the attractiveness of the 'bush' due to the autonomy and sovereignty provided therein? Can the modalities of governing gender in society be fundamentally rewritten due to violent extremism?

Concluding Notes

The Nigerian government's integration strategies have largely assumed a return to normalcy by integrating women into a life they had prior to their association with Boko Haram. Government strategies include providing women returnees with economic opportunities for survival. This economic focus is viewed by community members as being disproportionately aimed at people who contributed to the suspended, undignified life they have to live within the IDP camp. In essence, those who suffered do not receive special treatment but are ranked on par with those they see as having caused harm. The notion of favouritism emerged as a common thread in discussions with community members who now live in IDP camps. The stigma therefore is not simply due to a fear of terror as described in the focus group excerpts above, but to a sense of having been let down by the government.

It is evident that these responses are not responsive to the gender disruption in the 'bush', which women returnees often viewed as positive (see CDD nd). In addition, civil society interventions, such as psychosocial

and economic support, cannot effectively broker a return from the social death experienced by women associated with Boko Haram (CDD nd). Within the community, men in particular view 'marriageability' as an effective indicator of a return from social death. In essence, the fact that men feel comfortable considering marrying women associated with Boko Haram indicates that they are accepted in the community. However, it follows that women who exercised a fair amount of agency in the 'bush' do not necessarily view a return to subjugation as an equitable negotiated settlement for their integration.

This pilot study echoes findings from an International Crisis Group report on Northern Nigeria and mirrors findings from the Horn of Africa in connection to Al Shabaab (ICG 2016; Badurdeen 2018a and b). However, there are two recommendations that I would like to make that are derived from the theoretical framework adopted for this study, which do not necessarily surface in existing work on Northern Nigeria and women associated with armed groups. The first concerns government and civil society interventions. It is evident that a response to reintegrating women returnees has to address the sociocultural context that they return to. The patriarchal conditions that shape the attractiveness of Boko Haram camps create pull factors that drive women associated with armed groups back into the camps or away from the community. The fact that there is a public perception that women's integration is easier than men's does not address the loss of power that women returnees encounter. Marriageability as integration misses the fundamental power fracture occasioned by being in the 'bush' and navigating multiple 'positive' power hierarchies, as articulated by the focus group participants. In addition, providing economic opportunities that are still reliant on a gendered division of labour does not address the situation of 'social death' as articulated by Mbembe. In essence, there is a question here about the reconfiguration of gender power relations, not necessarily gender dynamics, that is missed in ongoing interventions.

Finally, the focus group participants point to their role in indoctrination and recruitment. Integration and deradicalisation programmes directed at people who have played the above roles in insurgent groups seek to shift the ideological base rather than recognise the outcomes derived from these roles, which are not always connected to belief systems. These outcomes are connected, in the case of these women, to accessing power and benefiting from relationships to power based on the roles they perform. Deradicalisation efforts that do not engage with the outcomes derived from doing this work means that the women who are the focus of this paper see the 'bush' as a better option, given the power

outcomes derived from this association. This recommendation speaks to the patriarchal dividends alluded to in recommendation one and the absence of a rewarding economic base that deals with the economic conditions that led to the women's association with Boko Haram.

Notes

1. My fieldwork was made possible by a seedcorn grant from SOAS.
2. The differences in numbers and letters linked to participants denote focus group clusters.

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Transcending the State–Market Dichotomy, Developmentalism and Industrial Change: Learning from Critical African Scholars

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Abstract

Claude Ake presents the study of development as underpinned by Eurocentric teleologism. This refers particularly to how Western social sciences have been shaped around key disciplines that have been designed to restrain the 'dynamic character of reality', with a focus on analysing order as opposed to change. This article demonstrates the intellectual and practical limitations of linear understandings of change and transition that abstract from the 'dynamic character of reality' through disciplinary and other modes of confinement. This has, for instance, underpinned the tendency towards dichotomisation between the state and market across the ideological spectrum, in the study of development. The article responds to this challenge by centring critical African development thought in the work of Claude Ake, Thandika Mkandawire and Adebayo Olukoshi, and shows how conceptual development and analyses that are grounded in empirical experiences of transition problematise strict delineations of the milieus of the state and market, and the limiting of industrial development to particular sectors. In doing so, it showcases how progressing beyond linear analyses of transition, such as through paradigm extension of the developmental state paradigm to the enhanced developmental state paradigm, draws on the work of these key critical scholars.

Résumé

Claude Ake présente l'étude du développement comme étant sous-tendue par un téléologisme eurocentrique. Il s'agit en particulier de la manière dont les sciences sociales occidentales ont été façonnées autour de disciplines clés

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conçues pour limiter le « caractère dynamique de la réalité », en mettant l'accent sur l'analyse de l'ordre par opposition au changement. Cet article démontre les limites intellectuelles et pratiques des conceptions linéaires du changement et de la transition qui font abstraction du « caractère dynamique de la réalité » par le biais de modes de confinement disciplinaire et autres. Cela a, par exemple, sous-tendu la tendance à la dichotomisation entre l'État et le marché à travers le spectre idéologique, dans l'étude du développement. L'article répond à ce défi en se focalisant sur la réflexion critique du développement africain dans les travaux de Claude Ake, Thandika Mkandawire et Adebayo Olukoshi, et montre comment le développement conceptuel et les analyses qui sont fondés sur des expériences empiriques de transition problématisent les délimitations strictes des environnements propres à l'État et au marché, et la limitation du développement industriel à des secteurs particuliers. Ce faisant, il montre comment la progression au-delà des analyses linéaires de la transition, par exemple par l'extension du paradigme de l'État développementiste au paradigme de l'État développementiste renforcé, s'appuie sur les travaux de ces éminents chercheurs.

Introduction

Debates about Africa's place in the world have been closely intertwined with the idea of development (Matthews 2018). As such, it is important to critically understand the underpinning logic of development. Critics of development discourse and practice, including postdevelopment theorists, suggest that the field is set up to maintain global political economy hierarchies that reinforce unequal exchange between parts of the world defined by European imperialism. Nustad (2001:480) summarises this school of thought, viewing development as 'a discourse that orders and creates the object that it pertains to address'. There is a particular critique of trusteeship that presents the notion of progress as exemplified by global North contexts, 'with its necessary vantage point guides' that should be emulated by global South contexts (Nustad 2001:484). Equally, modernisation theories are critiqued by dependency thinkers as valorising such emulation. Ake (1988:1–30) presents the field of development as underpinned by Eurocentric teleologism, with an imagined ideal world that is empirically rooted in interpretations of experiences of the advanced, developed, industrialised, so-called 'better' West. He shows how this view has shaped the social sciences around key disciplines that constrain the 'dynamic character of reality' and focus on analysing order as opposed to change (Ake 1988:3–4).

As a corollary to this, intellectual debates on the role of the state in development have been characterised by the state–market dichotomy

across the ideological spectrum. On the one hand, this dichotomy is viewed as rooted in market fundamentalism and therein used to make the case for the supremacy of the market over the state. On the other hand, this dichotomy is present in more progressive discussions on the place of the state in development, anchored by notions of state autonomy. This can be seen in discussions around developmentalism and the subtheme of developmental statehood.

Mkandawire (2001) elucidates this tendency with his description of the developmental state paradigm as relying on an ideology–structure logic. Here, what informs the state's philosophical positioning and therein (economic) policy direction is engaged in 'ideology', while the construct and functioning of the state, underpinned by political dynamics is addressed in the 'structure'. Tensions emerge also when the empirical realities of interlinkages between economic sectors, such as agriculture and industry, are left out of conceptualisations of change and transition within developmentalism and especially the developmental state paradigm (Ikpe 2018). This article shows how analysis that is grounded in African empirical experiences of transition problematises strict delineations of the milieus of the state and market, and the limiting of industrial development to latecomer industrialisation. It progresses beyond this view as it showcases the enhanced developmental state paradigm's interactions with critical African thought.

This article's objectives are twofold. The first is to demonstrate the intellectual and practical limitations of analyses based on the state–market dichotomy across the ideological spectrum. The second is to examine the ways in which critical African development thought progresses (and enables progression) beyond this dichotomy and engages with broader cross-sectoral understandings of industrial change. After this introduction, the article first reflects on the tensions of the state–market dichotomy and the reality of the interdependence of the two milieus across the ideological spectrum. Second, it shows the ways in which the state–market dichotomy has manifested in thought, policy and practice and the implications that have arisen as a result. Third, the article centres critical African thought, focusing on the work of Claude Ake, Thandika Mkandawire and Adebayo Olukoshi, who have challenged linear understandings of development and change. It does so by elevating the importance of dynamic interdependencies across milieus and dynamism in time periods as well as the intellectual value of interdisciplinary thinking that is underpinned by African empiricism. Fourth, the article showcases how this scholarship has influenced efforts towards transcending the dichotomy and centring an analysis of industrial change that is intersectoral. The article then concludes.

Tensions Between The State–Market Dichotomy and Interdependence Across the Ideological Spectrum

The state–market dichotomy is the tendency to conceptualise the state and the market as separate and distinct entities, with limited reference to how they intrinsically influence one another. Bruff (2011:82) expresses this dichotomy as 'treating these entities as discrete and autonomous parts … containing properties that are intrinsic to themselves … relatively self-organizing elements of society.' The tension between the two entities reinforces and is reinforced by the analytical distinction of economics and politics across the social sciences. Claude Ake (1988) has been clear on the challenge of the limitations of disciplinary boundaries, especially in spaces of constant transition and change, such as on the African continent.

In spite of the prominence of this dichotomy, there is widespread inadvertent recognition of the complex interworking of the state and the market across intellectual traditions. Classical development theory texts across the ideological spectrum allude to the inherent intertwining of these milieus in socioeconomic transformation. Baran (1957) and Myrdal (1968) have argued that the challenge of economic transition in global South contexts is a consequence of states not being able to change historical socioeconomic disadvantages in the global economic system or the dominant interests that maintain certain hierarchies. In theories of economic modernisation, the role of the state is fundamental and seen as: intrinsic to market dynamics in the generation of savings to drive capital investments that support industrial production (Lewis 1954; Gerschenkron 1962); essential for the design and implementation of industrial policy and the creation of relevant institutions that ultimately underscore market structures (Lewis 1954; Hirschman 1958); and, organising and implementing investment in physical and social infrastructure, education and health with a focus on welfare as intrinsic to labour as a factor of production (Rosenstein-Rodan 1946; Nurkse 1953; Lewis 1954; Rostow 1960).

The global economic crisis of the 1970s, which gave rise to criticism about the state and its role in development processes, has been advanced as influencing the discord between the market and the state. Accusations of economic failure were directed increasingly at the state following widespread challenges that Sundaram (2003) and Fine (2007) attribute to the post-Second World War boom collapse and the resulting stagflation of the 1970s. In many parts of Africa, the state was held responsible for the substantial levels of national debt that accrued as governments borrowed to finance their development strategies. Olukoshi (2003) defines the period

as one of declining output and productivity in the real economic sectors of agriculture and manufacturing, and growing domestic and external debt alongside capital flight, among other factors.

In the throes of this period, mainstream development thought advanced a logic of opposition and, indeed, enmity between the state and market. The negative depiction of the state was articulated strongly in intellectual terms by Krueger, as chief economist at the World Bank, and most influentially deployed to underscore the Washington Consensus (WC) in the 1980s. John Williamson depicted a policy set seen as core to the international finance institutions' agenda. This included fiscal discipline, redirecting public expenditure to spheres that offered high economic and income distribution, tax reform, interest rate liberalisation, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalisation, liberalisation of foreign direct investment inflows, privatisation, deregulation and secure property rights (Williamson 2000). The main global development policy outcomes of the WC were the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and the conditions that accompanied the World Bank loans that were issued to African economies during the crisis, with the core agenda of derestricting market forces (Mosley, Noorbaksh and Paloni 2004).

Yet, the SAPs relied extensively on the state apparatus to effect the policies that were seemingly required to unleash market forces. Said Adejumobi (1986:424) and Olukoshi (2003) cite how the World Bank economist, Deepak Lal, noted that '… courageous, ruthless and perhaps undemocratic government is required to ride roughshod over the newly created interest groups'. Formal governance and authoritarianism were seen as intrinsic to the implementation of the derestriction of market forces. Adedeji (1994) highlights the agency of occupants of the state apparatus—the comprador elites—in colluding with their counterparts within the international finance institutions to actualise this market-fundamentalist turn in development policy. At the heart of market fundamentalism lies the complex interactions across the state and the formation of market systems and dynamics.

The limitations of the SAPs period led to failures to improve growth, diversify economies and achieve structural change, and poor human development outcomes (Mkandawire and Olukoshi 1995; Adedeji 1999; Mkandawire and Soludo 2003). This reading has been reinterpreted with attempts to link post-2000 economic growth performances to the Structural Adjustment Programmes, with a focus on correlation as opposed to causality, with limited analyses of policies in the adjustment and post-adjustment periods and disaggregation across various spaces (Archibong, Coulibaly and Okonjo-Iweala 2021). The case studies on Ethiopia and Nigeria evidence some of the noted tensions.

These failures led to a more nuanced aversion to the role of the state, which was most pronounced in the intellectual work of Stiglitz, also a former World Bank senior vice president, which became widely termed the Post Washington Consensus. The impact of this work was the broadening of mainstream development discourse to include debates about political governance, with the outcomes of political liberalisation and attention to electoral democracy alongside a continuation of market-fundamentalist ideas, albeit acknowledging a role for the state in particular areas, such as technology and industrial policy (Saad-Filho 2010; Keller 1996). This discourse was premised on recognising the empirical realities of the interaction of states and markets, even if limited to industrial policy and the procurement and deployment of technology transfer, as seen in East Asian states in their period of industrial growth and economic success (Stiglitz 1998, 2001).

Progressive development thought has engaged with the logic of state–market interactions, with dominant ideas coming from interpretations of developmentalism in developmental statehood. Analyses of the experiences of developmental states, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, have put forward the intellectual position that the state was essential to a socioeconomic change that was steered by industrialisation (Chang 1994; Woo-Cumings 1999; Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990). The conceptualisation of developmental statehood based on examining these empirical experiences through classical economic development theories gave rise to the developmental state paradigm (DSP). It was reinforced by debates about another group of developmental states, namely Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, with varied circumstances, such as resource endowment and the influence of global development policy (see Collins and Bosworth 1996; Akyüz and Gore 1998; Booth 1999).

The DSP has underscored the ways in which states and markets are connected in the control and direction of finance, industrial and trade policy as well as state–business relations. Pivotal texts on developmental statehood make this point as follows. In Amsden's *Asia's Next Giant* (1989), the sixth chapter is titled 'Getting relative prices wrong', with reference to the state overriding the market to get prices wrong. For Wade (1990), the book title *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government* indicates that the state has the mandate to govern the market as a separate entity. In Johnson's 1995 contribution, *Japan: Who governs?: The rise of the developmental state*, he alludes to the state managing the private sector and as such the state is treated with reverence as being strong and independent, able to control the market and its agents in attaining the goal of industrial

development. Fine (2009) is clear on how these views are nonetheless founded on the analytical dichotomy between the state and the market.

Within the field of development there is indirect recognition of the empirical reality of state–market interdependencies across the ideological spectrum. However, there is an analytical tendency to relay these entities as separate and self-contained, thus limiting the understanding of their complex interlinkages and how they impact on development processes and outcomes.

Implications of the State–Market Dichotomy: Thought, Policy and Practice

Shields, Bruff and Macartney (2011) highlight the silence within the social sciences around the analytical dominance of the state–market dichotomy. They argue that a more holistic understanding of the political economy must reject frameworks that 'separate out different aspects of the world in which we live into isolated parts, with their own autonomous, intrinsic properties' (Shields, Bruff and Macartney 2011:5). This perspective raises questions about the extent to which prominent analytical frameworks can address complex questions as well as proffer viable solutions to multi-faceted problems.

The state–market dichotomy manifests clearly within the orthodoxy, especially in economics-related disciplines. Dutt, Kim and Singh (1994) argue that it is rooted in neoclassical economics and has been used to make the case for the supremacy of the market over the state. For them, neoclassical economics has been fundamental in the postulation that the market and the state are rival mechanisms for resource allocation. Fine and Saad-Filho (2017) also support this, in their study on the nature and tenacity of neoliberalism, a philosophy that is reinforced by its foundation in methodological individualism, which privileges individual actors as rational agents within market systems, thus subjugating social structures and dynamics. Social phenomena are understood as impinging upon and undermining the effective functioning of market systems. It is in this regard that Krueger considers state failure to be a worse condition than market failure because of the inherent superiority of market systems to government systems (Krueger 1990). This analysis relies on an explicit state–market dichotomy characterised by enmity, which posits the state as potentially crowding out more efficient market mechanisms.

The work of Stiglitz builds on this intellectual framing with a more nuanced reflection of states as able to support increased efficiency within market structures. The basis for this view is that markets do not function efficiently due to asymmetric information (Stiglitz 1994). States can potentially mitigate

these challenges through market-enhancing institutional processes and mechanisms. There is some recognition, even conceptually, of the interactions and interdependencies across the state and the market. But this is treated as anomalous and indicative of being in a state of disequilibrium. Fine (2006:13) has shown that, in reality, there remains a commitment to 'methodological individualism of a specific type—utility maximisation, to equilibrium as an organising concept, and to considerations of efficiency'. The result of this reading is that the state is seen as an enabler to address challenges such as information asymmetries and co-ordination failures, but the market is essentially the location for efficient resource allocation. Mazzucato (2021) criticises the endurance of this description of the state as having a fixing role as opposed to being a co-creator of value as well as co-shaping markets.

A generalised understanding is that progressive debates on economic development, as with the developmental state paradigm, move beyond the state–market dichotomy. This is because of their explicit recognition of the interactions between the state and the market within this space as well as to how these interactions are linked to developmental success. Krieckahaus (2002) refers to developmental states as managing a combination of high bureaucratic capacity and autonomy, which simultaneously supports the strategic industrial sector and industrialisation.

However, the state–market dichotomy still manifests within this heterodox space, albeit in more nuanced, less static and antagonistic forms. Shields, Bruff and Macartney (2011) note an implicit acceptance of the state–market dichotomy across critical international political economy (IPE). Watson (2005) argues that critical scholars pay lip service to the rejection of the dichotomy, and suggests that it is reinforced, albeit unintentionally, in their analysis. Despite critical IPE being a field with critical scholarship that draws on the intellectual traditions of Marx, Gramsci and Schumpeter, among others, the intellectual work remains reliant on the framing of the state–market dichotomy.

The DSP's structural roots in two interrelated but distinct schools—the economic and the political schools—are testament to its foundations in the state–market dichotomy (Fine 2007). The economic school is concerned with the workings of the market in the sort of economic policies that are deployed, including industrial and trade policy as well as state control of finance. The political school is focused on the nature and construct of the state, on its autonomy and bureaucratic capacity, almost to the exclusion of its engagement with the mechanism of the market.

The conceptual infancy and growing pains of the DSP are illustrated by the realisation of the need to relate the state–market dichotomy to the state's actions. This is evidenced by the understanding of state autonomy as

a necessary sine qua non for a developmental state. However, it is not clear why state autonomy would result in its being developmental as opposed to, for instance, being parasitic. Within the DSP, Evans (1995) puts forward the requirement of state autonomy for developmental statism with qualifiers for its embeddedness in society. However, the notion of relative or embedded state autonomy risks tautology, with tension between the said autonomy and the conditions for co-operation remaining a persistent challenge regardless of the qualifiers attached to autonomy.

The dichotomy has consequences for robust analysis of economic development processes and outcomes. Fine and Stoneman (1996) point out that it is nonsensical to analyse these entities separately and that this limits comprehension of their interrelationship. Along the same lines, Hattori and Sato (1997) qualify the problem and note that the developmental state paradigm is pitching the argument for a perfect market or a strong and wise state. Underhill (2000) suggests that the structures of the state are dependent on political processes and the resources of various constituencies alongside processes within the market. He adds that economic and political logics may pull in different directions but remain inherent parts of the same whole. Gibbon, Bangura and Ofstad (1992:16) note that this approach is especially inappropriate within African contexts, because class interests are formed and maintained both within the state and the market.

The state–market dichotomy challenges the understanding and explanation of dynamics that are internally consistent, which can entrench contradictory interpretations of empirical realities. For instance, state autonomy is seen as a negative factor for rentier states but is a positive element of developmental statehood. There is no concrete underpinning consistency to this disparity. A failure to understand or explain such significant dynamics undermines resulting policy outcomes. Fine and Van Waeyenberge (2013:19) make the case that using the state–market dichotomy as a foundational analytical basis does not allow for comprehensive policy responses but rather for 'piecemeal, discretionary intervention(s)'.

Radice (2010) notes the difficulty in considering the influence of globalisation in domestic spheres when treating the state and the market as distinct and separate entities. This is because of the enormous power imbalance between global markets and transnational dynamics in relation to many states in global South contexts. This challenge re-emerges with analyses of global value chains (GVCs). The conceptualisation of GVCs can tend to minimise the ways in which states and dynamics in domestic contexts can impinge on the operations of foreign capital, or lead firms, identified mainly in global North contexts.[1] Analyses of global value

chains are rooted in a challenge to developmentalism and the place of the state (Gereffi 2014). But these can be inherently static in the hierarchical treatment of foreign private capital as sitting at the helm of value chains and production networks. Indeed, Oqubay (2016:196) points out the limitations of GVC debates in analysing the dynamism and agency of some global South contexts, since their predominant focus is on lead firms located in industrialised contexts as well as in the global North.

Critical African Thought and Recentring Empiricism: Moving Beyond Dichotomies

Critical development scholarship has offered important contributions on the significance of centring African thought for advancing intellectual depth and breadth through reinforcing epistemic freedom. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018:3) has argued that 'epistemic freedom is … the right to think, theorize and interpret the world, develop own methodologies and write from where one is located and unencumbered by Eurocentricism'. This notion challenges the logic of development as trusteeship and knowledge that has not prioritised global South-centred thinking, theorising and perspectives, as a basis for understanding and explaining the world. Significantly, he goes on to say that 'the liberation of reason itself' is necessary (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018:3).

Three critical African scholars have offered important ideas that can help to centre the value of African empiricism, understanding and interpretation as the basis for theory and concept-building in the field of development. They are Claude Ake, Thandika Mkandawire and Adebayo Olukoshi. Their attention to concept building is pertinent in the field of development, given the tendency towards receiving methodological approaches, theories and concepts and the reverse offerings of African empirical material to which these are applied.

Claude Ake

Ake (1988) has been instructive in reconsidering the utility of inherited traditions for understanding contexts in Africa. He argues convincingly that social sciences rooted generally in Western traditions organise complex and inherently interrelated phenomena into disciplinary silos—sociology, economics and politics. This organisation is evident in the DSP logic of political and economic schools that reinforce the state–market dichotomy. Ake (1988:3) sees this approach as complementing the struggle of the social sciences in the study of non-Western societies because of Western inbuilt biases towards analysing order as opposed to change.

Fundamentally, he highlights the hierarchy inherent in Western social science, with Eurocentric teleologism designating Western realities as 'good' and thus 'trap(ping) Western social science into fixing categories rigidly and minimising the possibility of change' (Ake 1988:3). As a result, political science centres on characterising and maintaining political stability, and sociology centres on how social and cultural roles evolve and how order arises and is maintained, as opposed to centring change and transition. So, according to Ake, the imperialism of Western social sciences means that we have 'inherited knowledge systems of discrete, sharply contrasting and rigidly fixed categories and entities … inadequate for understanding a complex social world of subtle shades in which change is ubiquitous' (Ake 1988:83). In a similar vein, Oyewunmi (1997:179) raises important questions about how these disciplines as so wrought limit the possibilities of research questions that take their starting point outside of this world view.

Ake (1988:1–3) is clear on a degree of economic determinism given the 'primacy of material conditions'. This draws from an understanding that societies are to some extent defined by productive capacities to sustain life. Rodney (2012:4), in defining development, highlights material conditions as reliant also on science and technology and their interdependence with human and social conditions. Discussing socioeconomic dynamics in precolonial Africa, he offers multiple case study analyses on the significance of material conditions in concert with infrastructural development, agricultural development, mining, industrial development and manufacturing, underpinned by institutional structures, science and technology and interdependencies with social, political, cultural and religious dynamics (Rodney 2012:48–68). Material conditions—assets and constraints—are elevated, while impinging and being impinged upon by social, political and cultural dynamics. This introduces a hierarchy with regard to privileging certain factors with an element of permanence across dynamic realities. Ake's argument has been significant in highlighting the complexity of the need to articulate an entry point for analysis, even in attempts to theorise change and transition that are based on the relatedness and continuity of development-related phenomena.

Thandika Mkandawire

Thandika Mkandawire wrote the most significant conceptual contribution on developmental statehood in Africa, making a case for challenging Afropessimism long before it became fashionable to do so (Mkandawire 2001). Importantly, he did not dismiss the DSP out of hand but offered proposals on how it could be engaged with in African spaces, such as

in reflecting on other time periods. He elevated more complicated readings of African experiences of transition and change in his attentive examination of recent history, in contrast to the contemporary (at the time) cynical and reductionist tendencies. This view urged a recentring of different narratives about developmentalism on the continent, focusing on the immediate post-independence period. It emphasised greater degrees of complexity in analysing higher growth levels, industrialisation, bureaucratic capacity, physical and social infrastructural investment and focus on internal markets. This period preceded the onslaught of global development policy that accompanied the debt crises of the 1970s and foregrounded characterisations of the continent based on state failure, which were also linked to the rise of the public choice school and a reversion to the static state–market dichotomy, as discussed earlier.

Mkandawire (2001) provides an opportunity to consider South-South exchanges in reflecting on developmental statehood with reference to the continent. Significantly, he does not subordinate African experiences to Asian experiences. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2020) highlights the need for attentiveness to the hierarchies inherent in South-South knowledge interactions. An important part of this approach is to critique the DSP's analytical utility because of its focus on outcomes of industrialisation—notably latecomer industrialisation—without the associated processes that would enable the exploration of 'trial and error' (Mkandawire 2001:291). A key aspect of Mkandawire's practice is to centre empirical observation of state engagement with development processes beyond outcomes, across time. This approach challenges simplistic reductionist readings of the state and development processes and outcomes in Africa. It encourages considering intention and examining processes beyond the limiting emphasis on outcomes.

Mkandawire also challenged the idea that developmental states are all powerful and autonomous in highlighting that so-called 'neopatrimonial' states have pursued developmental policies successfully in Asia and in Africa (Mkandawire 2001:299). Complex interdependencies across the state and market have been part and parcel of developmental statehood. He expanded his argument further, criticising neopatrimonialism's reductionism, subjective deployment of culture, limited and poor explanatory power, quite aside from its pejorative intent, in categorising states and statehood in Africa. He noted, in particular, neopatrimonialism's contradiction in assuming away the agency of wider society, in line with Mustapha (2002), and yet asserting that the state was overwhelmed by influential elites and isolated from society, with limited evidence (Mkandawire 2015).

Adebayo Olukoshi

The work of Adebayo Olukoshi complicates the discussion on the interactions between statehood and development processes and outcomes in Africa. His was one of the earliest responses to the blanket dismissal of the state in Africa that accompanied the SAPs, by critically analysing the impact of these policies and articulating how this intervention was rooted in limited and problematic understandings of these contexts (Olukoshi 1993). Olukoshi (2003) also has usefully catalogued the various negative terms used to denote the nature and operation of states in Africa by what he calls neoliberal political economy theorists. The labels include: prebendal, parasitic, personalistic, clientelist, kleptocratic, unsteady, over-extended, predatory, crony, soft, weak, lame, rentier, sultanist and neopatrimonial. His analysis highlights the ideological bent of their critique and the range of narratives that were deployed in service to the global development policy discourses.

Olukoshi (2003) reflects on the limitations of the state–market dichotomy alongside several other dichotomies—agriculture and industrialisation, rural and urban, formal and informal and, very significantly, state and civil society. He is clear on how such binaries are especially unable to engage with interconnected and overlapping African realities. He is forthright that 'politics is central to the design and implementation of any economic reform project' and should 'be seen as a legitimate target for contestation and reformulation by social forces' (Olukoshi 2003:230). This problematises the simplistic reversion to neopatrimonialism as an explanatory framework, which is unable to account for the agency and dynamism of social actors (Olukoshi 2003). Olukoshi's views underscore the necessity of transcending the state–market dichotomy within developmentalism, as will be seen shortly.

Olukoshi's ideas contributed to the evolving discourse on statehood, especially as linked to global development policy, and have been significant for heterodox economic development debates. They recognise how global development policy—notably SAPs—influenced the conceptual reflections of African statehood within and outside the continent. They also encourage the location of particular understandings of developmentalism along a trajectory of periods, characterised by prevalent empirical realities and the associated influence of mainstream development thought.

Travelling with Critical African Scholarship Within Developmentalism: Paradigm Extension On State–Market Interdependencies and Industrial Development

Engaging with the challenge of the state–market dichotomy in analyses of socioeconomic change and transition offers an opportunity to recentre African thought, theorising and meaning-making within developmentalism. Drawing on empiricism in this process is also a core element of African intellectualism for knowledge generation and cultivation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018). We proceed to map the journey towards meaning-making in developmentalism and especially developmental statehood that is rooted in African empiricism, referring to the work of noted critical African scholars in two ways. First, by progressing beyond the state–market dichotomy, and second, by recentring complex intersectoral linkages in understanding industrial change. These priorities challenge the confinement of interdependent milieus to disciplinary silos and the restriction of structural change to the industrial sector.

We can enhance the DSP beyond the scope of its predecessor, looking at two main dynamics—*synergies* between fiscal, production and consumption linkages and economic factors that underpin industrial change and transition, and *lines of influence* that analyse the economic, social and political factors that undergird state actions (Ikpe 2018, 2021). This section illustrates these sets of dynamics, drawing on Hirschman's linkages thesis (Hirschman 1981). It analyses empirical realities across key periods of transition and change within two major African economies—Nigeria, the largest on the continent, and Ethiopia, one of the fastest-growing over the last decade.

Underhill (2000) makes the point that it is not enough to invoke or assume a relationship between the state and the market. Fine (2007) argues that it is inappropriate to seek a simple synthesis across the economic and political school literatures on developmental statehood. Ake (1981) suggests a lens that foregrounds the relatedness of different elements of society, in particular economic structures, social structures, political structures and the belief system, for understanding transition and change. This provides a basis for Fine's (2007:3) proposed need to 'reintroduce class, economic and political interests more generally at a higher analytical level in order to examine how these are represented through both the market and through the state'. Olukoshi's (1993:2–5) class analysis of local systems of accumulation reveals the ways in which certain dynamics, such as external orientation, are reproduced across the state and market. He finds also that the characterisation of states by power and exploitation can be extended to civil society spaces (Olukoshi 2003:24). We observe the need to substantially

rework how the DSP has functioned, to strengthen its analytical capability for effectively investigating the role of the state in a broader range of development experiences.

Enhancing the DSP transcends the state–market dichotomy by focusing on *lines of influence* in the economic, social and political factors and dynamics that undergird the state's actions (Ikpe 2018, 2021). In so doing, we draw attention to the intricate and intrinsic interdependence and interrelated workings between the state, market and other entities within industrial development. The role of the state with reference to lines of influence is analysed cognisant of the relatedness of elements across economic, social and political spheres, in line with Ake's arguments and in tandem with the aforementioned calls to analytically comprehend social, political and economic interests across states and markets. Empiricism has presented an opportunity to centre the 'dynamic character of reality', as opposed to assumptions about stability, order and discreteness of these entities (Ake 1988:3). Olukoshi (2003:240) also argues that African economies and societies are characterised by a 'prevalence of grey areas which blur, and sometimes blend the dichotomisations' that oppose the state to the market and indeed society.

In the post-independence 1970s, the Nigerian state channelled fiscal resources into agriculture through credit and input provision as well as infrastructure and provision of land with potential, to contribute to savings, raw material and food supply in support of industrial development (Ikpe 2013). Elements of the agricultural constituency (the private sector), including large-scale farmers and former military members of the political class associated with the military regime, biased these investments towards large-scale interests, disadvantaging the more dominant and expansive small-scale sector, which had limited clout given the decline of co-operative structures (Ikpe 2014). In the same period, contrary to arguments that the private sector was crowded out, the Nigerian state was intent on private sector engagement in industrial development. Its efforts to restructure private capital through indigenisation were intended to disrupt the dominance of foreign capital in the control of finance and technology towards industrial development. Notably, business elite group interests, which had been relatively strengthened in the North and West due to the civil war (1967–1970) that had silenced domestic private capital in the war-affected East (Ikpe 2020), influenced the state's indigenisation policies. This skewed the social make-up of parts of the private capital class and achieved limited outcomes given the continued dominance of foreign capital in technology, as domestic capital expansion did not deepen production linkages but focused on commerce (Olukoshi 1993:3; Ikpe 2020).

Analysis of developmentalism in contemporary Ethiopia acknowledges the value of foreign capital in addressing the savings gap in support of industrial development (UNCTAD 2002). But it recognises a dependence on foreign capital, particularly Chinese capital, vis-à-vis domestic private capital, as a result of the state's wariness about the domestic business elite's stronger societal links (Ikpe 2021; Clapham 2018). Across these studies, the interrelatedness of the economic, social and political spheres, and the interdependencies of the state, market and social spheres and their dynamics, show the necessity of centring these realities in any attempt to understand and explain developmentalism in these contexts.

Mkandawire's (2001) discussions on industrial development in post-independence Africa challenged the summary dismissal of African states as non-developmental. Indeed, Sender and Smith (1986) and Olukoshi (2003), among others, have noted that this period, which has been much ignored in contemporary development discourse, exhibited some success in industrial development. Using an alternative reading of development, which is more sanguine and attentive to structural transformation and centres African empirical experiences, enables a refocus on processes and journeys as opposed to static outcomes. This has been essential for addressing the value of developmental statehood as a tool of analysis, beyond a label for successful outcomes. Insisting on the need to accommodate 'trial and error' within policy-making and implementation, and contemplating influential exogenous factors, reinforces the realities of interdependencies between the state and other milieus (Mkandawire 2001:291). The journey, including its failures and limitations, must be a focus of analysis beyond the destination, for a deepened understanding of developmentalism. This logic helps to explain some contexts in Africa that have been engaged by the DSP discourse though not widely considered as developmental, including South Africa, Nigeria, Angola and Namibia, for instance (Edigheji 2010; Ikpe 2013, 2014; Ovadia 2018; Hope 2019).

The enhanced DSP offers the opportunity to use empiricism to conceptualise industrialisation and industrial development more broadly, as defined by change in the interactions and interlinkages between primary and secondary sectors. This highlights the significance of examining processes towards industrial change beyond industrial outcomes, including such intersectoral linkages. The enhanced DSP relies on *synergies* between production, fiscal and consumption linkages and requirements for structural change, including savings, investments, raw materials, food supply and domestic markets, to understand transition that is associated with industrial development (Ikpe 2018, 2021).

African empiricism broadens the relevance and utility of the DSP in contexts in different phases of structural and economic transformation, including agrarian and resource-rich economies, conflict-affected contexts and bifurcated private capital structures. This enables analyses into the complex processes of industrial development, as defined and shaped by other key sectors, including agriculture, fuels and minerals. Olukoshi's (1993:3) view of developmentalism hinges on intersectoral linkages given the realities of the interactions between fiscal linkages from fuel resources and production linkages in (dis)service to industrial development.

In post-independence Nigeria, *synergies* are evident in how fiscal linkages, accrued from the state's control of petroleum revenue over the 1970s, contributed to addressing the savings gap in efforts to resource industrial development through national development plans (Ikpe 2013, 2014). Expected *synergies* between the agricultural and industrial sectors, in the supply of raw materials and food and production linkages, were challenged by the fiscal linkages from the fuel resource base that rendered the agricultural sector less strategic as a source of savings, due to food import expansion and a decline in exports (Ikpe 2013). There were potential possibilities for agriculture to support *synergies* between consumption linkages and domestic industrial demand. These were limited by the aforementioned public investment in large-scale agriculture at the expense of the more dominant smaller-scale agricultural sector (Ikpe 2018).

In contemporary Ethiopia, the *synergies* between fiscal linkages and addressing a savings-industrial investment gap illuminate the significance of foreign capital from semi-periphery contexts such as China, and how this impinges on developmentalism (Ikpe 2021). S*ynergie*s between raw material supply and production linkages in the agro-industrial leather subsector show the intricate interactions between policy sets across agriculture, in the management of livestock and tariffs that discouraged raw material exports, and manufacturing, including institution-building and training for relevant guilds and the implications for transitions in both sectors (Ikpe 2021; Oqubay 2016:102–103, 236).

The works discussed above contribute to a better understanding of the role of the state as an entry point into understanding change and transition but with cognisance of the reality of the state and market as internally related. The authors have focused on identifying economic, political and social interests across the state and the market that underscore the way that linkages are impinged upon, deployed and utilised to achieve particular outcomes. The structures and essence of the state and market in these contexts have been defined, refined and impacted on interconnectedly

across economic, political and social imperatives. While the contexts investigated lend themselves to narratives of state-led development, deeper analysis that intentionally subverts the state–market dichotomy allows one to undertake analysis that draws on 'the relatedness of different elements of society' (Ake 1988:4).

Conclusion

This article has argued that the state–market dichotomy remains a core organising principle within the study of development outcomes and processes across the ideological spectrum. Its pervasiveness has implications, such as the limited comprehension of the interdependence and internal relatedness of the two spheres. This imbalance can lead to the formulation of development policy based on incomplete or poor analyses and understandings of key development processes and outcomes. It undermines the utility of developmental statehood, a pivotal conceptual intervention that offers South-South learning and analytical exchanges and has the potential to disrupt dominant framings of economic development.

The enhanced DSP offers an analytical framework that will yield more than its predecessor, by recentring the complex interdependencies between the state and other milieus, including markets, and their dynamics. It also relies on empiricism to nuance understanding about industrialisation, by elevating the intricacies and fluidity of sectoral interlinkages, with some focus on agriculture and manufacturing as core elements in African contexts. What is pivotal is that this turn to strengthening the DSP has come from questioning its utility for African contexts. This showcases the ways in which research inquiry relating to the continent offers an avenue for advancing conceptual debates. It is possible to consider South–South exchanges between the African and Asian contexts as progressing theory- and concept-building on the core subject of developmentalism.

The work of critical African scholars—Claude Ake, Thandika Mkandawire and Adebayo Olukoshi—has been significant in this endeavour. The works by these authors provide conceptual and methodological tools that have elevated lived realities in the African context as a basis for a study of the dynamic character of reality, interrelatedness across milieus, processes as well as outcomes, and the temporality that has influenced readings of African development successes and failures. Importantly, these bodies of work have highlighted the reductionism that is intrinsic in the analysis of African contexts, especially within debates on African statehood. They have differed in orientation, as Mkandawire has been less cynical about African

statehood and development trajectories than Ake, especially, but also Olukoshi. These variances are significant in reflecting on how these critical scholars have exhibited a commitment to understanding and explaining these important subjects but have done so with particular predilections. This has reinforced the reality and indeed benefits of pluralism for comprehending the complex, significant and enduring interest in the role of the state in development in Africa.

Note

1. Although with some increasing recognition of lead firms in global South contexts (Krishnan 2018).

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Weaponised and Displaced Women in Mass Atrocities and the RtoP

Cecilia Idika-Kalu*

Abstract

Terror groups, like al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, have emerged in recent years as key drivers of conflict in some African countries, generating mass casualties from routine suicide bomb attacks. The strategies of these groups include the increasing mobilisation and deployment of women in suicide bombing operations. At the same time, women have been among the most victimised by the activities of the terror groups, both as direct targets of attacks and as internally displaced people. The focus of this study is to discuss the twin dynamic by which women are both agents and victims of the terror groups. The study seeks to explore what existing knowledge tells us about possible future trends in the 'weaponisation' of women and mass atrocities. It also considers the place of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) tools in stemming the tide of the weaponisation of women. The nexus of gender, suicide bombing and displacement and what these mean for R2P are the sub-components of the analysis that underpins the article.

Résumé

Les groupes terroristes, comme Al-Shabaab et Boko Haram, sont devenus ces dernières années les principaux moteurs des conflits dans certains pays africains, faisant de nombreuses victimes lors d'attentats-suicides. Les stratégies de ces groupes incluent la mobilisation et le déploiement croissants de femmes dans les opérations d'attentats-suicides. Dans le même temps, les femmes ont été parmi les plus impactées par les activités des groupes terroristes, à la fois comme cibles directes des attaques et comme personnes déplacées à l'intérieur de leur propre pays. L'objectif de cette étude est de discuter de la double dynamique par laquelle les femmes sont à la fois actrices et victimes des groupes terroristes. L'étude cherche à approfondir ce que les connaissances actuelles

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nous apprennent sur les tendances futures possibles de la « militarisation » des femmes et des atrocités de masse. Elle examine également la localisation des instruments de la responsabilité de protéger (R2P) pour endiguer la vague de militarisation des femmes. Le triptyque genre, attentats suicides et déplacements, ainsi que leur importance pour la responsabilité de protéger, sont les sous-éléments de l'analyse qui sous-tend cet article.

Introduction

In the last few years, the world has witnessed an unprecedented increase in the number of female suicide bombers, leading various scholars to suggest that a process of the weaponisation of women is underway by terrorist groups (Monnet 2018). Some terrorist groups, mainly those that specialise in using women for violent actions as an instrument of terror, have gained notoriety in this regard, with Boko Haram and al-Shabaab standing out. This article intends to advance the understanding of the interplay between the victimisation and agency of women in the operations of terrorist groups like Boko Haram, in a broad context characterised by deep deprivation. To do this, the article focuses on the context and specifics of internally displaced women in Nigeria, and shows how displacement connects with Boko Haram activities to pose the question of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as an issue of policy concern.

The questions raised by this study include the following:

- What does existing knowledge tell us about possible future trends in the 'weaponisation' of women and mass atrocities?
- What tools in R2P can be used by state and international actors (development aid and security agencies) to stem or reverse the current tide of women's weaponisation?
- How can capacity-building and mediation be better deployed within the current skewed gender context to help?

In addressing the question around the R2P tools that can be used to halt or stem the rising tide of the weaponisation of women, the study draws attention to the nature of the deprivation that Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) generally, and female IDPs in particular, suffer, and how this intersects with their weaponisation and victimisation.

I theorise that given the historical, cultural and socioeconomic context of IDP women in north-eastern Nigeria, they are likely to be steered towards the exercise of rational choice in their own weaponisation. The resultant exercise of agency by the women perpetuates violence against women. Beyond being victims of the current crisis sustained by Boko Haram,

women are also weaponised as agents of violence. The R2P framework provides avenues through which efforts can be made to stem the deadly tide and cycle of violence that is taking place.

Background Context

Data from research carried out by Mendelbaum and Schweitzer (2018) shows that, in 2017, 126 women and girls, accounting for 92 per cent of female suicide bombers globally, were deployed by the Boko Haram sect. Most of their attacks took place in north-eastern Nigeria. Not surprisingly, on account of Boko Haram's activities, there has been a burgeoning population of IDPs in north-east Nigeria. Primarily made up of women, the IDPs lack the critical infrastructure and support they need to survive. These IDPs are a direct product of terrorist activities carried out by Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa (ISWA).

As terrorist activities have escalated, so too has the number of IDPs recorded in north-eastern Nigeria. Though conscious of its obligation, the government has found it challenging to cater to the needs of the IDPs, especially with regard to providing basic amenities and services, including healthcare and education (Mooney 2005; Deng 1994; Ferris and Winthrop 2010; UNHCR 2004). The level of deprivation in the IDP camps impacts on the physical and mental health of displaced persons, quite apart from undermining their faith in the ability of the government to take care of their core interests as citizens and humans (Loughry and Eyber 2003; Porter and Haslam 2005; Roberts et al. 2008; Getanda, Papadopoulos and Evans 2015; Mujeeb 2015). Other studies have highlighted the negative side effects of the sad conditions in IDP camps, which include the breeding and perpetuation of illiteracy, sexual exploitation and gangsterism (Alobo and Obaji 2016; Deng 1994; Akuto 2017; Madsen 2003).

The *Punch* newspaper of Nigeria (November 2018) published a report that offers a glimpse into the deplorable conditions IDPs live in, the mostly tragic details of their daily existence, and the coping mechanisms they have developed in order to survive. Some of these survival mechanisms include transactional sex to meet their basic needs, as reported by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) (2014). The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) also reports that the Boko Haram insurgency continues to be the biggest driver of internal displacement in Nigeria. The centre reports that as many as 341,000 new displacements were associated with this conflict in 2018. The figure for the total number of people displaced in 2019 was put at approximately 2,216,000 IDPs (IDMC 2019).

In direct contestation of the claims by the Nigerian government that they have defeated them, Boko Haram and ISWA have increased their activities in north-eastern Nigeria since December 2018. Boko Haram, for example, has captured many villages and towns in the area and carries out opportunist attacks across much of the north-east region of the country and beyond. The consequence has been devastating. According to UNOCHA, 1.4 million people remain internally displaced in Borno State, one of the main theatres of the operations of Boko Haram in north-east Nigeria (see Fig.1). An additional 400,000 are displaced in Adamawa and Yobe states as a result of the situation of insecurity caused by Boko Haram. In the face of such a massive humanitarian crisis, the Nigerian government has struggled, with little success, to uphold its Responsibility to Protect the people (R2PMonitor 2019).

Figure 1: ReliefWeb/Google 2016: Conflict Area and Fatalities in Borno State, north-east Nigeria

Figure 1 shows a map of Borno State, in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. It particularly highlights the conflict areas, and indicates that the number of fatalities ranges from less than ten fatalities from Boko Haram attacks in Biu to over three hundred, between Gwoza and the Bama area.

Figure 2: World Bank 2017: Crisis, Conflict Hotspots and IDP Camps

The World Bank crisis and IDP camp map in Figure 2 shows the various IDP camps distributed across north-east Nigeria. The areas around Borno and Yobe states have the highest conflict density, recording between 200 and more than 1,500 fatalities in an attack. These areas also have the highest number of IDP camps.

The Responsibility to Protect, IDPs and the Case for Women and Girls

R2P is an agreed framework for the protection of people from genocide, crimes against humanity, mass atrocities and war crimes. It was endorsed by the United Nations (UN) in 2005 and carries the responsibility of protecting 'at-risk populations', building capacity for them and carrying out various preventive measures (UN 2010). The United Nations recognises the identification of states affected and the execution of an early warning assessment as under its purview.

The recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948). This declaration inspires most of the norms of the United Nations, including the R2P. It is argued by some that the idea of human rights as set forth by international bodies such as the UN is culturally biased in

favour of the Western liberal tradition and lacks enough cognisance of regional differences (Dupre 2011). In spite of this, most countries still make an effort to abide by the norms and standards agreed to within the negotiating framework of the UN, in the expectation of enjoying the benefits that could accrue from them. Such benefits include the R2P if a particular state ever needs it.

Boko Haram has kidnapped over 300 girls and women from schools and villages in north-east Nigeria. Many of them were suddenly and violently separated from their homes and countries, and made to play roles as cooks, sex slaves, wives and housekeepers to the members of the group. Boko Haram's terror activities do not rule out the probability of 'rational choice' by some women who voluntarily opt to join or stay with the group, either because they subscribe to its ideology or are motivated by reasons of socioeconomic survival (Matfess and Warner 2017; Nwaubani 2018). In recent times, some of the kidnapped girls have also been deployed as suicide bombers. In May 2015, Boko Haram abducted and detained 276 schoolgirls, compelling the International Criminal Court's Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, to rule that the crimes committed by Boko Haram fell within the jurisdiction of the Court, which has authority over cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

According to former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, in a 2009 report entitled 'Implementing the Responsibility to Protect', the pillars of the R2P are:

1. First, the state's primary responsibility for the protection of populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.

2. Second, international assistance and capacity-building by the international community as a responsibility to assist and encourage states in fulfilling their protection obligations.

3. Third, timely and decisive response, if a state fails to protect its population from these crimes or perpetrates them, using appropriate diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to protect people. Where inadequate, the international community must take stronger action, including collective enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

According to the UNHCR/UNOCHA, 2004:

> Internally Displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence in particular as a result of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters and who have not crossed an International State border.

Individual nations or states are responsible for the welfare of IDPs under international law; they are required to follow the UN's 'Guiding Principles' in fulfilling their responsibilities. It is worth noting, however, that these principles are not legally binding.

Though similar to the refugee, the internally displaced woman lacks legal status in international law or rights binding on any entity or organisation regarding her situation. The UNHCR points out that the term 'internally displaced person' is descriptive (Ferris and Winthrop 2010). An essential part of being a refugee is going across an international border. Since IDPs are displaced persons within their national borders by choice or otherwise, they are not refugees, regardless of the fate they suffer. IDPs and refugees also differ in that IDPs require a durable solution for their situation; while the return to their homes may be risky, there are no mechanisms for resettlement, monitoring and protection or guarantees by organisations like the UNHCR (Mooney 2005).

Conceptualisation of Weaponisation and Deprivation and their Operationalisation

Suicide bombings carried out by women for terror groups have now generally come to be referred to as the 'weaponisation' of women (Monnet 2018). This applies to the various circumstances under which women put on suicide vests and play multiple roles in Boko Haram's terror activities, either as victims or as persons with agency. The guiding principles and similar tools produced by the UN have defined the groundwork for the treatment of IDPs by states. Continental bodies like the African Union (AU), of which Nigeria is a member, have produced the Kampala Convention on the protection of IDPs among its member states. Article 9 of the Convention lists the obligations of states to protect people from the following abuses:

> States shall protect IDPs against sexual and gender-based violence in all its forms, notably rape, enforced prostitution, sexual exploitation and harmful practices, slavery, recruitment of children and their use in hostilities, forced, and human trafficking and smuggling; and starvation.

The convention states further that:

> States Parties shall:
> a. Take necessary measures to ensure that internally displaced persons are received, without discrimination of any kind and live in satisfactory conditions of safety, dignity, and security;

b.   Provide internally displaced persons to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay, with adequate humanitarian assistance, which shall include food, water, shelter, medical care and other health services, sanitation, education, and any other necessary social services, and where appropriate, extend such assistance to local and host communities.

Several of the key terms used in the convention are germane to this study.

A Tale of Terrorism, Displacement and Deep Deprivation: Boko Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria

By 2018, there were more than 40 million IDPs worldwide and approximately two million IDPs in Nigeria, representing 5 per cent of the global total. The state of IDPs in north-eastern Nigeria is, by all accounts, dire and marked by profound privation. There is a lack in all spheres, including proper sanitary conditions, health and education (Alobo and Obaji 2016; Deng 1994; Akuto 2017). The growth in the number of IDPs in Nigeria is primarily due to Boko Haram activity and the devastation it has produced (Ejiofor, Oni and Sejoro 2017). Madsen (2003), in his argument on the role of IDP economic deprivation as a factor in the dynamics of terrorism, shed some light on the nature of the vulnerabilities to which displaced persons are exposed. The suffering experienced by IDPs includes the unavailability of sanitation, medical care, employment opportunities, nutrition and education. In their seminal work on IDPs and security, Choi and Piazza (2016) suggest that dealing with the challenges that produce internal displacement and taking measures to enhance human rights and access to its basics could help significantly to reduce terrorist incidents.

Development and Socioeconomic Situation

The peculiarity of the environment in which women who are recruited into terrorist groups live may inform their decisions to participate in the activities of groups like Boko Haram because of the benefits they expect to receive. Scholarly works on reasons why insurgency and terrorism may thrive show that the socioeconomic environment is a critical predictor. The response of people, especially women, to prolonged and sustained socioeconomic exclusion and marginalisation is to seek a home with organisations like Boko Haram and to participate in their activities (Meagher 2015; Mustapha 2015). Governance failure, corruption and economic marginalisation leading to poverty, unemployment, inequality and hunger are challenges people in Nigeria face to varying degrees. According to Matfess (2017), and corroborated by Walker (2016), some

Boko Haram women have exercised agency in joining the ranks of the group in order to improve their quality of life. Contrary to the argument of some scholars like Zedalis (2004) regarding this point, poverty does breed terrorism.

Radicalisation is also associated with poverty, in some cases (Shmid 2013). In the context of north-eastern Nigeria, radical groups offer economic prospects. A *TIME* magazine edition (June 2017) devoted to the accounts of victims of Boko Haram tells the interesting story of Fatima G. She narrates how fifteen of her female friends agreed to be suicide bombers after being fêted by the militants and told stories of martyrdom. Amartya Sen (2000: 203), in his seminal work on development as freedom, alludes to the fact that women's agency and wellbeing is critical to political and social action. The study showed that women's agency and voice through independence and empowerment in literacy, education, earning power and property rights are necessary for development. These same factors, or, more precisely, the lack of them, either correlate or can be associated with the exercise of agency in mass violence by suicide bombing.

History, Culture and Colonisation

The history and culture of an area influence the nature of the insurgency that it experiences. A long history of drought, for example, had left north-east Nigeria impoverished long before the Boko Haram insurgency started. Long-term poverty in the area was also built on a history of marginalisation and exclusion that dated back to colonial times. The actions of the British colonial power in north-eastern Nigeria played an important role in the origins and history of conflicts in that part of the country. In handpicking the mountain people from Gwoza and making them the elite class at the expense of the larger Dweghe group, the British left a legacy of social fractures in the north-east. These fractures persisted over the years and proved fertile ground for Boko Haram recruits in the 2000s. It is not surprising that some of the militant Boko Haram fighters are Dweghes who harbour long-held grievances about marginalisation and exclusion (Walker 2016:157).

The Kanuri-speaking people, who are the dominant group in the region, live in Gwoza, Dgwhede and Borno . They also have a culture of *purdah* (seclusion of women) and *mubaya* (oath of secrecy) that feeds into the kind of Islam practised in the area, and which is reinforced by commonly held beliefs around patriarchy, polygamy, divorce and women's work on the farms (Cohen 1967; Matfess 2017). Meagher (2009) argues that the specific interactions of culture, agency and power in various social

contexts, and how they relate to economic networks and political process, affect outcomes in an area. History has evolved with a strong culture of structural violence against women in places like north-eastern Nigeria. This oppression manifests itself in limited opportunities for them and the repressive norms that are commonplace. It informs their participation with radicalised groups in a way that mixes coercion, consent and autonomy (Matfess 2017).

Stemming the Weaponisation of Women, and the R2P

The peculiar and dire circumstances of female IDPs in Nigeria, the state of their wellbeing or lack of it, would seem to be key factors informing their agency or choice regarding terrorism. Rational choice theory, built on an incentive-based model, suggests that terrorists, like criminals, are rational individuals who act in self-interest and on opportunity cost. Like common crime, terrorism is influenced by poverty and lack of education (Atran 2003; Becker 1968). Given the opportunity or offer of safety, protection, provision of income, nutrition, non-food items and some form of religious indoctrination from Boko Haram, there is a likelihood that an IDP will accept and join the group as an exercise of rational choice.

With regard to the R2P, the world polity theory suggests that the global system is one social system with a cultural framework that can be understood as 'world polity'. This takes into account every actor in the world system and the way in which he or she influences international organisations like the UN, participating states and individuals. The global social system is governed by principles and models that shape the course and objectives of social actors and what they do (McNeely 2012; Boli and Thomas 1997). An illustration of the workings of the world polity theory is offered by Berkovitch (1999), with reference to the successes of the international women's movement in affecting the behaviour of actors in the international system. In the same vein, R2P has the potential from the world polity point of view to provide the global norms for dealing with IDPs in places such as Nigeria.

Responsibility to Protect and the IDP Female

The overarching theoretical perspective is the use of a feminist lens to engage with this subject. Studying the IDP situation cannot be complete without attention to the particular challenges faced by the female IDP.

Why does it matter to look at R2P in the Boko Haram crises through a gendered lens? True (2003) points to the people at the margins, like displaced women and non-state actors in world politics, and shows how feminist perspectives bring alternative conceptualisations of power and fresh thinking for inclusion. Accordingly, it has also been shown that the most efficient allocation of international development aid is often to provide women with appropriate socioeconomic infrastructures like health, credit and education resources. Feminist theory can inform ethical guidelines for humanitarian intervention, development aid and human rights protection, among other global norms and values (Benería 1982; Charleton, Everett and Staudt 1989; Tronto 2006; Hutchings 2000).

Normative Feminism, which engages with the process of International Relations theorising as part of a normative idea for global change, is applicable to the nexus of gender equality, peacekeeping and R2P (True 2003; Goldstein 2001; Caprioli 2000; Tronto 2006; Hutchings 2000: 122–3; Mohanty, Russo and Torres 1991). The findings from the studies cited highlight the following key propositions:

1. First, states with greater domestic gender inequality are also more likely to witness the escalation of violence in crises. Nigeria reflects this correlation, ranked 133 out of 149 in the Global Gender Gap Report 2018 (WEF), with gross gender inequality between the sexes on all indices measured.

2. Second, the particular impact of conflict on women, including sexual and gender-based violence, calls for the inclusion by the UN of the state's responsibility to protect women citizens, as part of its R2P goals.

3. Third, a strong case rests for acknowledging geographical, historical and cultural specificities in looking at the 'Third World Woman' (Mohanty et al. 1991). In this case, the experience of the north-eastern Nigerian woman comes with some contextual factors that should be factored into the implementation of R2P by the state and international actors.

Methodology

In the operationalisation of deprivation and selection of the keywords for analysis, I relied on the indices deployed by the UN, IOM and other NGOs in administering humanitarian aid in Nigeria. I conceptualise aid as material help in various forms given to IDPs.

Methodologically, the study is based on the following approach:

Method: I carried out a content analysis of situation reports released by the UNHCR, the IOM, NEMA and UNOCHA between 2017 and 2019. These reports are specifically on the humanitarian interventions in

the north-eastern part of Nigeria where Boko Haram has caused the mass displacement of people. Seven of these reports were selected for the study, and NVivo was the tool used for qualitative analysis. This analysis aimed to find out what the most significant area of deprivation or need is for IDP populations in Nigeria. This will guide future policy in the area, inform interventions and reduce the potential or risks of internally displaced women choosing terrorism because of deprivation. The reports were selected for their representation of UN, NGO and Nigerian government intervention in the IDP crises. These organisations represent consistent supporters of the women in their plight.

Unit of Analysis: The analysis included seven codes—SGBV, Education, Food, Health, NFIs (non-food items), Shelter and Poverty—used to interrogate the seven situation reports from the humanitarian agencies. The data and reports used were retrieved from the available online archives of the organisations, and NVivo helped in coding, building relevant nodes and data analysis. The rationale and primary consideration that went into data selection was a timeframe covering events in the study. Between 2016 and 2019, there was an increase in terrorist activity and a consequent displacement of people that is currently at a plateau in Nigeria. This bears researching. While the data may not be adequate for conclusions, it does serve the purpose of this preliminary study.

Keywords: In this study, the codes represented nodes, which contained the following keywords and which helped organise the unit of analysis: girls, women, sexual (SGBV); blankets, mattresses, sanitary towels, toilet rolls, bathing soap (NFIs); feeding, nutrition, malnutrition (Food); vaccines, immunisation, mental, trauma, treatment, disease (Health); tents, camp, temporary, school buildings (Shelter); teacher, supplies (Education).

Data Analysis and Interpretation: The findings are presented in two parts. First, I detail the results in two tables, as well as a word query map and Pareto chart for visual representation. The second part is a comparative analysis of the coverage of each type of intervention, how it reflects the kind of IDP deprivation in Nigeria, and its meaning for the research questions in this study.

Data Analysis and Interpretation: Part 1

Table 1: Analysis of situation reports released by the UNHCR, 2017 to 2019

Node	UNHCR1 Ref Coded	Cov (per cent)	UNHCR2 Ref Coded	Cov (per cent)	UNHCR3 Ref Coded	Cov (per cent)
Education	2	10.44	0	0	1	6.82
Food	3	15.52	2	5.0	1	6.82
Health	1	5.87	1	2.92	0	0
NFIs	3	14.75	3	9.49	2	12.57
Poverty	1	1.24	0	0	0	0
SGBV	1	3.12	4	11.19	1	6.82
Shelter	4	18.50	3	8.56	1	5.75

Source: Author's own.

Table 2: Analysis of situation reports released by the IOM, NEMA and UNOCHA, 2017 to 2019

Node	IOM1 Ref Coded	Cov (per cent)	IOM2 Ref Coded	Cov (per cent)	NEMA Ref Coded	Cov (per cent)	UNOCHA Ref Coded	Cov (per cent)
Education	0	0	1	25.88	0	0	4	4.13
Food	1	24.58	0	0	4	54.44	6	4.76
Health	0	0	3	86.05	3	35.97	7	6.49
NFIs	2	95.67	0	0	1	7.08	8	7.40
Poverty	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SGBV	0	0	2	42.96	0	0	2	1.80
Shelter	2	47.63	1	10.12	1	7.08	11	9.97

Source: Author's own.

Findings from Tables 1 and 2

NFIs had the highest reference, coded at 19 times, with a coverage of 146.96 per cent in the total overall reports coded. The second highest was Health, reference coded at 15 points with a total coverage of 137.3 per cent cumulative for all reports. Third was the need for Food, reference coded 17 times in all reports with a total coverage of 111.08 per cent. Shelter came fourth, reference coded at 12 points and a total coverage across reports of 107.61 per cent. SGBV was fifth, reference coded at 10 points with a total coverage in all reports of 65.89 per cent. Education was sixth, with a total

reference coded figure of 5 and a coverage percentage of 47.27 per cent. This last was the final code because Poverty (the seventh code) is an overarching theme that embodies all the other six indices.

Figure 3: Word Frequency Query, IDP Deprivation Count

Source: Author's own.

Findings from the Word Cloud Map

The most frequently referenced words by the relevant agencies are 'shelter', 'food', 'protection' and 'camps'. Secondary words that came up are 'kits' and 'care items'. Other words are location and process words, but the most frequent and which are related to human needs align with the Pareto chart representation and numerical findings.

Findings from the IDP Deprivation Pareto Chart

The chart in Figure 4 shows the stark reality in percentages and the poles of the exact priorities and core needs of IDPs in Nigeria at the time of the study. While this is subject to change over time, it must be noted that given the potential for terrorist recruitment for this group of people, NFIs, food and shelter could be baits that would inform agency or rational choice for or against joining the ranks of groups like Boko Haram.

Figure 4: Pareto Chart of IDP deprivation

Source: Author's own.

Data Analysis and Interpretation: Part 2

The findings from this study were informed by multiple sources: literature, analysis of qualitative and quantitative data from previous research, and reports from relevant international organisations and NGOs active in north-eastern Nigeria. In the operationalisation of deprivation and selection of the keywords for analysis, I relied on the indices deployed by the UN, IOM and other NGOs in administering humanitarian aid in Nigeria. I conceptualise aid as material help in various forms given to IDPs.

Although available data on the state of IDPs in Nigeria is not complete due to poor documentation, some reports are available. Organisations such as the UNHCR, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), International Organisation for Immigration (IOM), National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) have been able to put together relevant data on displaced persons. The reports used for analysis cover states affected by the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency in the north-eastern parts of Nigeria.

Figure 5: Weaponised and Displaced Women in Mass Atrocities and the RtoP
Source: Author's own.

Discussion of Findings

A critical need for IDPs, especially women in Nigeria, is the restoration of dignity (picture a girl/woman without any sanitary pads for her period, or people without toilet facilities). Emergency shelter, help for malnutrition, SGBV and NFIs like blankets and beds are the equivalent of lifesavers to these individuals.

Significance

The importance of this preliminary study lies in the fact that it has disaggregated the issues affecting IDPs in Nigeria and through empirical research has been able to arrange these issues in hierarchical order. The findings directly answer the first research question: What does existing knowledge tell us about possible future trends in the 'weaponisation' of women and mass atrocities? Seeing the availability of non-food items as a priority before food and education reflects a very gendered dimension to this crisis. The threat of sexual and gender-based violence, which results from the lack of necessities, creates fertile ground for recruiting, trading

and abusing women and girls. It also makes women and girls more likely to participate in terrorism when the promise of a better life is dangled before them. Women who have already experienced multiple traumas, from terrorist attacks, eviction from their home, the loss of loved ones and loss of income, should not face additional threats of gendered violence. In this case, the lack of sanitary pads and a protective environment given the gendered dynamics could lead to the quest for alternatives to meet these needs. Those alternatives may not be safe or productive for these women.

The findings from the study align with other parts of the UN norms that call for 'immediate, life-saving assistance, to meet the critical dignity needs' of millions of people. Based on the specific needs and situation of IDP women in north-eastern Nigeria highlighted in this study, context-specific R2P mechanisms can be implemented. This relates to the second and third research questions I set out to investigate: What tools in R2P can be used by state and international actors to stall or halt the current tide? and How can capacity-building and mediation be deployed within the current skewed gender context? The limitations that may affect this study include the fact that the content analysis will have to be more robust. However, theoretical underpinnings and the literature reviewed helped to give the study a measure of triangulation and reliability.

Future Trends of the Weaponisation of Women in Mass Atrocities

Future trends in the weaponisation and victimisation of women by violent extremist groups in north-east Nigeria will be informed by the fragmentation of these groups in the area. In the past, a faction broke away from Boko Haram, and was led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi at the time of the study. The original group was still led by Abubakar Shekau. The al-Barnawi faction, commonly called Islamic State West Africa (ISWA), holds divergent doctrines on modes of attack and women's participation. According to Matfess (2019), variations in Boko Haram's levels and pattern of violence may be associated with intra-insurgent dynamics, seasons and political incentives. From Matfess's study, al-Barnawi's faction accounts for just 9 per cent of the attacks attributed to Boko Haram from 2016. But the context is that, from 2014 to 2019, Boko Haram carried out more than 2,800 attacks with over 31,000 fatalities. This places the group among one of the most lethal in the world, and on a trajectory of increased atrocity threats.

Women recruited by Boko Haram may play the role of suicide bombers. Some participate in the group against their will, while others commit to it because they are aligned with the group's ideology. From my research and

interviews with women who have experienced Boko Haram, the preaching of imams and other religious scholars influences women against extremist ideology as offered by Boko Haram. It offers them hope and a positive approach to learning and navigating the future. It is important to address the weaponisation of women using atrocity prevention frameworks that will cater for the direct and structural aspects that may lead to the event of mass atrocities. Recognising the loss and deprivation in the lived experience of IDPs, proposals that offer structural prevention for intervention will be relevant for the future (Jacobs 2020). This is designed to address long-term issues that are associated with latent atrocity crimes. Because structural prevention addresses social justice and human rights, it directly offers this group of people recourse.

The Africa–European Union joint strategy between 2007 and 2015 has been a strategic platform with results for capacity-building and atrocity prevention in the region. This comprehensive peace and security partnership focused on the full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (EU 2017). The ECOWAS ECOWARN early warning and response system collaborates with civil society organisations and covers a spectrum of risk factors related to atrocity crimes, human rights violations, conflict and instability.

Boko Haram's extreme Salafi-jihadi ideology uses women as suicide bombers and to breed future suicide bombers (Bryson and Bukarti 2018). Targeting women with capacity-building that is gender-intelligent and designed to address the push and pull factors of terrorism is important.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) may not offer much by way of contributing to capacity-building, but can lead by example and signal the criminal accountability of individuals involved in atrocity crimes. Its work with agencies to support states with weak judicial systems to prosecute atrocity crimes and draw attention to critical situations that require global attention is significant (Weerdesteijn and Hola 2020). Mediation can be facilitated by religious members of the military involved in peace operations, who can also be an integral part of capacity-building. Studies have shown the part that military chaplains can play a role as peace-builders. It has been advocated that they act as liaisons with local religious leaders. Military chaplains and responsible religious leaders can play a stabilising role between the armed and local populations. An example is the intervention between the US military and local citizens in Operation Iraqi (Arnold 2020).

Conclusion

The result of this study corroborates similar research on the nature of victimhood and agency of women affected by Boko Haram, and the implications for mass violence and atrocity prevention. It adds to previous research on this subject by showing that a country with a large number of IDPs, particularly women, has a high likelihood of producing recruits for terrorist groups and increasing violence. Nigeria is an example, with the critical level of deprivation experienced by IDPs and the current high rate of suicide terrorism mainly perpetrated by women in the country. The study successfully tested seven areas of need, which were operationalised to account for the deprivation in IDPs and indicate poverty and lack. They are education, food/nutrition, health, non-food items, SGBV, shelter and poverty. From the findings, the acute presence of these needs indicates deprivation that informs an association between IDPs and potential recruitment by violent extremist groups.

The expectation is that IDPs may, first, present potential recruits for Boko Haram if the group presents better economic alternatives. Second, an increase in IDP numbers and a reduction in the impact of humanitarian aid with worsening living conditions for them may lead to grievances and support for Boko Haram. Third, the IDP numbers and needs creates the potential to make the regions a challenge to govern, which will aid the activity of insurgents.

A critical component of the R2P framework for protection is the early warning measure taken to stem a crisis when it is still imminent. The case of the Boko Haram crises in Nigeria has been so described by the R2P monitor (May 2019) and has been backed by this study. The UN, in considering the second pillar of the R2P, can pursue capacity-building in the region. The government of Nigeria is making an effort that does not seem adequate for the escalating problems that face women in north-eastern Nigeria. Priority should be given to the following: socioeconomic initiatives; strengthening police, military and other security initiatives in the area; investing in durable infrastructure for elevating the care for women; the implementation of programmes that address the poverty-inducing desertification and drought in the region as a result of climate change; and capacity-building for strengthening governance and its mechanisms.

To conclude, as noted by the UN (2010):

> It is often said, with some justification, that early warning does not always produce early action. But it is also true that early action is highly unlikely without early warning. It is critical, moreover, that early action also is well-informed action. The United Nations needs world-class early warning and assessment capacities, as called for by the 2005 World Summit Outcome, to ensure that it is not left with a choice between doing nothing or taking ill-informed action.

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Disclosure Statement

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The Use of Social Science Research by Environmental NGOs in Africa: Evidence from Morocco

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Abstract

The literature on the use of research is both rich and varied. Yet, little is known about the use of available social research by environmental NGOs in the African context. This paper aims at contributing to the debate on this issue from the perspective of Moroccan civil society. In order to achieve this objective, we have analysed the results of a survey conducted among a sample of Moroccan NGOs working in environmental protection. Overall, it seems that a relatively large proportion of surveyed environmental NGOs receive and understand social research findings, but the process remains incomplete, as the use of these findings tends to diminish during the adoption stage and especially during the decision-influencing stage. Moreover, this conclusion must be regarded cautiously, given the confusion that arises from the lack of distinction between research and consulting activities. Finally, PLS regression reveals that the use of social science research by Moroccan environmental NGOs is influenced by three main factors: research adaptation effort, relational proximity between researchers and users, and the NGO director's employment status.

Résumé

Bien que la littérature sur l'utilisation de la recherche soit riche et variée, on sait peu de choses sur le recours des ONG de l'environnement aux résultats de la recherche en sciences sociales, en particulier dans le contexte africain. Cet article vise à contribuer au débat sur cette question sous le prisme de la société civile marocaine. Pour ce faire, nous avons analysé les résultats d'une enquête menée auprès d'un échantillon d'ONG marocaines opérant dans le domaine de l'environnement. Globalement, il semble qu'une proportion non

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négligeable d'ONG sondées reçoit et comprend les résultats de la recherche en sciences sociales, mais le processus demeure inachevé, car l'utilisation de ces résultats a tendance à diminuer durant la phase de l'adoption et surtout la phase de l'influence des décisions. Aussi, cette conclusion doit être relativisée, compte tenu de la confusion qui découle de l'absence de distinction entre les activités de recherche et de consulting. Par ailleurs, en recourant à la régression PLS, nous avons révélé que l'utilisation de la recherche en sciences sociales par les ONG marocaines de l'environnement est influencée par trois principaux facteurs : à savoir l'effort d'adaptation de la recherche, la proximité relationnelle entre chercheurs et utilisateurs et le statut professionnel du directeur de l'ONG.

Introduction

As in other African countries, responses to environmental problems in Morocco cannot be global and inclusive without the mutual involvement of civil society organisations and social scientists. The reason for this is that both groups are likely to be willing to develop clear visions about environmental issues with no interest-seeking behaviour (Faraco 2006: 72). In the face of various environmental pressures, NGOs and social scientists are gradually being mobilised to conduct their research and co-operate in this field, which was long the preserve of state actors and researchers in soft and hard sciences. While NGOs are directly involved in this arena, social science researchers have increasingly grasped the importance of the need to support them, especially through a process of research production that meets the NGOs' needs. It is high time, therefore, that research and public policy be linked in the environmental arena, with stronger collaboration between social scientists and NGOs. This convergence is crucial as it has the power to improve the required policy design and implementation towards adequate environmental outcomes and standards. As Emile Durkheim (1991: xxxix) rightly pointed out about sociology, 'We would not judge our research to be worth one hour's trouble if it were to have only a speculative interest'.

Research in social sciences is primarily a matter of discussed and shared truth (Favre 2005: 341). It is an inquiry to identify, describe, understand, explain and evaluate social phenomena involving human behaviour, in this case with regard to the environment. Such research seeks to emphasise innovative knowledge and skills for a better orientation of collective action. In addition, it must contribute to raising awareness around sustainable development issues, which includes environmental concerns. While anticipating problems, pointing out issues, exploring research areas and proposing solutions, social science research is not only the basis for acquiring a knowledge of societies, but also an essential mechanism for sustainable development.

Conceptually speaking, the utilisation of social science research by environmental NGOs is an area where neither methodological tools nor theoretical constructions are accurate enough to form specific approaches. Despite the fact that this research field highlights pioneering challenges, it still seems to be under-exploited. While the use of environmental research results by policy-makers has been widely discussed (Weiss 1979; Garrett and Islam 1988; Stone, Maxwell and Keating 2001; Neilson 2001; etc.), the use of these results by civil society organisations is still in its infancy.

Empirically, environmental issues have not only become a real social problem, but also a mobilising topic that has gradually penetrated the associative sphere. The number of NGOs involved in various environmental issues has significantly increased, from 1,468 in 2004 to 25,050 in 2016, thereby signalling a phenomenal increase of 1,606 per cent in twelve years. This shift is mainly due to the seriousness of the environmental problems that have emerged in Morocco in recent years, particularly those tied to water scarcity, soil erosion, desertification, deforestation, biodiversity and uncontrolled urbanisation. The growing size of civil society is also a result of the positive impact of COP7 and COP22, held in Morocco in 2001 and 2016 respectively. Additionally, one should mention the driving role of international financial aid and governmental incentives, namely the National Initiative for Human Development, launched in 2005.

Of course, associative dynamics like this remain politically regulated, but they are more essential than ever regarding the risks of climate change. Even though they are relatively young, many environmental NGOs are extremely engaged not only in lobbying and advocacy among decision-makers, donors and polluters, but also in the accompanying public-policy activities pertaining to environmental issues (education, awareness-raising, expertise, etc.). Whatever their activities may be, these organisations can count on the commitment and expertise of their members, composed mainly of environmental activists, practitioners and university researchers.

The major purpose of our paper is to build up empirical evidence on the behaviour of environmental NGOs in terms of social science research uptake and utilisation. More specifically, we will attempt to answer the following issues:

- How do environmental NGOs in Morocco use social science research findings?, and
- What factors explain the extent of this use?

Answering these questions will help us to develop a deeper understanding of the use of social science research findings by NGOs operating in the field of environmental protection in Morocco, particularly in terms of frequency and content. This will also enable us determine the level of utilisation of the knowledge

produced by social scientists and intended for civil society. Finally, this study will allow us to identify, characterise and quantify a variety of factors that determine the use of social science research by environmental NGOs in Morocco.

Our methodological approach is based on the use of primary data from a survey of sixty-six NGOs effectively involved in the field of environment protection in Morocco. The analysis is organised around two sequences. The first aims at characterising, by means of descriptive statistics, the degree of use of social science research by the surveyed NGOs. The second sequence focuses on modelling the determinants of this use by considering Partial Least Squares (PLS) as an estimation method.

The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical framework that guides the use of social science research including civil society organisations. Section 3 outlines the research design and presents a brief portrait of the environmental NGOs surveyed. Section 4 presents and interprets the results using the PLS model and discusses their potential robustness. Finally, the principal implications of these results for decision-making are presented.

Overview of Theoretical Underpinnings

Several theoretical models have been proposed to understand the process of using research findings (Weiss 1979; Huberman and Gather Thurler 1991; Huberman 2002; Neville and Warren 1986). But considering the nature of social science research[1] and the pressing and immediate needs of civil society in a developing country like Morocco, we believe that only four theoretical approaches are able to guide our research: the problem-solving, institutional, interactionist and integrationist approaches.

The science push approach has been ignored or discredited. In most cases, the knowledge generated therein is not always clear, specific, integrated and popularised enough to respond to the problems facing civil society. 'Because they are disconnected from the definition of the research problem, users will either have little interest in the results or will limit their attention on conceptual or symbolic uses' (Blackburn and Demers 1996:8).

The problem-solving approach

In this approach, the research demand is not driven by the supply of researchers, but by the demands of the economy or society. Research findings are generally used because of the ability of the researchers to transform a complex situation into a real problem that can be solved. In this context, the users of research findings are the main initiators of desired change, as they are responsible for defining the needs and requesting research that identifies

and assesses alternative solutions to specific problems (Neville and Warren 1986). The researcher is then considered as a simple technician who is called upon to satisfy the needs and wants of all possible users (Love 1985).

This approach is similar to a client–supplier relationship, where the users are the clients, who define what research they need, and the researchers are the suppliers, who provide a service in exchange for negotiated remuneration. Research results are used more effectively when their users believe that the research meets their needs and are able to perceive its value in their own context (Bedell, Flom and Barbeito 1985; Huberman and Gather Thurler 1991). Thus, research designed to respond to decision-makers' expectations has more chance of being read, discussed, adopted and valued. To this end, two points of view are considered: the use of research as a product, and its use as a process (Amara, Ouimet and Landry 2004).

According to the first thesis, the results of any research are usually associated with decision-making or a specific user event. In this context, research use can take three forms: conceptual, instrumental and symbolic. The conceptual use involves using research results for general enlightenment; the research outcomes generate new ideas and theories that lead to new interpretations of the challenges and realities surrounding a given problem (Sunesson *et al.* 1989). The instrumental use refers to applying research findings in specific, direct ways that yield concrete actions or decisions (Larsen 1980). Finally, the symbolic use involves using research to support or legitimise certain positions or actions that have already been taken or decided (Amara *et al.* 2004).

Furthermore, research fulfils several functions with respect to societal issues (Glover 1994). The first is to set up the terms of the debate on political and social issues. In that respect, research contributes, through a process of data accumulation, to build a framework for reviewing and evaluating problems. The second function consists in analysing past or present facts in order to draw useful lessons that can enlighten public decisions. The last function is to assess facts, interests and opportunities as they arise. Evidence from studies of the impact of social science research on political and social action in the United States suggests that, in the framework of the first function, research has the most lasting impact, but in relation to the third function, it seems ineffective (Intal and Pociano 1999:280).

The second thesis views the use of research as a process, which involves cumulative and interdependent steps. According to Knott and Wildavsky (1980), actors concerned with the utilisation of research findings face a sequential process made up of several stages of rising difficulty. Six principal stages punctuate this process: reception, cognition, discussion, reference,

adoption and influence. Weiss (1986) argues that research rarely provides a quick answer for research actors to employ to solve problems. The results of research are incorporated into the users' overall frame of reference as part of an incremental process of what the author calls 'enlightenment' (Weiss 1995). Lastly, Lomas (1997) believes that research dissemination depends on a better mutual understanding between researchers and research users. For him, decision-makers must recognise that research is not simply a product, but rather a process in which both the design of methods and the definition of the objects of study take time and effort. Such a process is characterised by ten steps: observation of the decision-makers' environment, identification of priorities, identification of the problem to be solved, inventory of feasible options, evaluation, consultation, selection of options and implementation of the decision, justification of the decision and finally evaluation of the decision's impact (Lomas 1997).

The institutional approach

The institutional approach refers to a system of 'disorderly' interconnections that occur between the producers and the users of research. The two sets of actors together play a major role during the process of designing, producing and disseminating research results. 'The more sustained and intense the interactions and collaborations between researchers and users, the more likely research findings are to be utilised' (NACI 2003:8).

This approach is direct and introduces the idea of regular back-and-forth between the worlds of research and practice. Research dissemination takes an active form that is an educational process through which the researcher communicates the results directly to users. It emphasises the institutionalisation of research acquisition and dissemination efforts by both users and researchers. This institutionalisation aims at combining the concerns of various stakeholders into the choice of research projects, the acquisition of data and the interpretation of results (Faye, Lortie and Desmarais 2007).

The use of research results tends to increase when institutional measures are implemented to support acquisition efforts by targeted groups, as well as dissemination and adaptation efforts by researchers (Huberman and Gather Thurler 1991; Landry, Lamari and Amara 2000). From this perspective, Huberman and Gather Thurler (1991) argue that the user should not be considered as a passive element to be educated, but rather as a welcoming entity with its own dynamics, and that dissemination efforts should come from both researchers and users. These authors also emphasise the need to integrate the efforts of researchers as determinants of the research dissemination process. Such efforts can be measured by the time

spent on dissemination, the level of available resources and the existence of a dissemination strategy, but also the effectiveness and realisability of dissemination strategies.

Other authors, such as Lemire, Souffez and Laurendeau (2009), stress the importance of four factors in the successful dissemination of research results: the research context, the user context, the characteristics of the research and the funding sources. As suggested by Scullion (2002), all key elements of the dissemination process must be carefully examined during the design phase of the research. The prior definition of transfer objectives in the research project, informal personal contacts, participation in committees, adaptability of research and institutional constraints are among the factors that determine the successful dissemination of research results.

On another level, Addis (2002) highlights the importance of mechanisms for bridging the gap between researchers and potential users in terms of priorities, work rules, the jargon used and even work culture. In this sense, users who operate in a context of multiple and diverse sharing mechanisms are most likely to reduce the gaps between the two communities. Furthermore, users who establish proximity links and continuous interactions with research institutions are most likely to access and operationalise research results. In these conditions, it seems that researchers have a strong interest in popularising and disseminating the results of their research in a language that is understandable, digestible, accessible and adapted to the existing real needs of the targeted groups.

The interactive approach

As with the dissemination approach, the interactive approach is based on the idea that the use of research is strongly influenced by the kind of repeated interactions between researchers and users at the different stages of the research process, including design, production, dissemination and utilisation (Landry, Amara and Lamari 2001; Mitton *et al.* 2008). Such interactions boost the development of social capital, which plays a major role in strengthening linkages between these two communities, particularly in contexts where market mechanisms do not work effectively and optimally. The use of research results would be all the more likely, as this capital is very important (Landry *et al.* 2001).

The use of research is also influenced by the contexts from which the researchers and other stakeholders originate. As the people involved in this operation discover the contexts of their interlocutors, they gradually manage to understand the needs, constraints and facilitators of exchanges (Elissalde, Gaudet and Renaud 2010:137).

Researchers are not seen as mere prescribers of solutions, but as true vectors of progress and social transformation. As for the users, they are viewed as co-producers of knowledge. They actively participate in all stages of research by communicating to the researchers not only their priorities, but also their problems and comments, which are integrated into the research issue (Huberman 1987). Based on this information, researchers will then be required to continually adjust their research design. Users also contribute to the validation of data collection tools and/or the validation of results. This dynamism has been described by Lemire *et al.* (2009) as a spiral transfer of knowledge. Thus, ongoing collaboration remains the key to successful research use. On the one hand, the objectives and results of research take into account the real needs of the users. On the other, trust and interpersonal relationships between researchers and users are likely to create synergies and facilitate the understanding of the scope and limits of the results.

The interactive approach can be termed action research. It is a cyclical process of thought and facts in which there is a deliberate action to transform reality. Research comes with a complementary dual objective: transforming social reality, and producing knowledge about these transformations (Hugon and Seibel 1988:13). Action research refers not only to the idea of transforming reality through a research process, but also that of mobilising action towards research development. The result of such a recursive process is conditioned by strong collaboration that must develop and powerfully increase amongst the various stakeholders (Albano 2012:2).

According to the followers of this model (Groulx 2006; Fernandez 1986; etc), there is no simple connection between research and action, but rather a modification of research in many of its dimensions, because society's need is assumed to force research to renew itself and think about new rules. The production of research is developed in and through the action of social groups (Gergen and Gergen 1995). This production is focused not only on a project of construction and the formulation of new knowledge, but also on the development of operational knowledge for practitioners (Goyette and Lessard-Hébert 1985). Its function is to explain, apply and, above all, facilitate involvement. Thus, the status of the researcher must not remain static, but should evolve and adapt to new social demands (Mondada 2003:73).

With particular reference to the interaction between researchers and civil society, Hardt (1995) points out that there is no hierarchy between these two communities; they act as a relay, one advancing the other. For this author, the roles of research institutions and civil society should not be framed in terms of a 'theoretical–practical' duality pattern, but rather as a 'theoretical–

theoretical' paradigm. Indeed, even civil society activists are able to produce theory and are sometimes even ahead of academic researchers in this regard. The most important thing, he stressed, is to observe the theory that evolves in civil society and envision different approaches to the same problems, and thus recognise a crucial role for civil society within the world of scientific research.

The integrationist approach

Inspired by sociology, this approach focuses on the nature of the intensity of the relationship between researchers and civil society activists. It defends the idea of a coalition between these two communities. The separation between research and practice is considered obsolete or fictional in a context where researchers are called on not only to construct theories and achieve results, but also to become directly involved in social and political actions. It is then common to speak of 'committed researchers', 'organic intellectuals' or 'researcher-practitioners', who constitute the very bedrock of the existence and vitality of society. These expressions mean that the dual identity must be verified, and that neither of them should dominate the other.

Gramsci is often mentioned as the precursor of this approach. The author has devoted considerable attention to the role of researchers in society. For him, modern researchers are not only producing discourses, but are involved in the organisation of social practices. In addition, he distinguishes between 'traditional intellectuals' who are engaged in the pursuit of serving the goals of a social movement. In addition, Gramsci made a useful distinction betwen 'traditional intellectuals', who saw themselves as separated from society and incapable of understanding their activity as part of the economical production of the social order, and organic intellectuals, who organised the political and economic interests of a given social class (Said 1994:4). These new intellectuals do not simply describe social life according to scientific rules, but rather express experiences and feelings that the masses cannot express on their own. 'Each social class organically creates one or more groups of intellectuals who give it homogeneity and consciousness of own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields' (Gramsci 1959:429).

Similarly, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (2001) introduced the concept of the 'collective intellectual', which describes the intellectual who offers his or her expertise to the social movement; it is an autonomous intellectual who is able to intervene in the political field and draw on his or her specific skills and moral authority to support a social cause.

Bourdieu maintains an aristocratic distinction between the knowledge of researchers and the know-how of activists, between the science that might

think politics and the practice that carries it out. According to him, the collective intellectual can and must fulfil two main functions: a negative (i.e., critical) function, which consists in criticising and promoting tools against the discourse of the dominant power; and a positive (i.e., constructive) function, which contributes to a collectively perceived political reinvention and to political and economic alternatives. In this context, the intellectual must join forces with the social movement to fight 'neoliberal imperialism' in the strategic field of knowledge.

Croteau (2005) distinguishes between three types of actors: the activist, the researcher and the researcher-activist. The last must undertake to produce two versions of research: a 'popular' version, which will probably not be evaluated or recognised by academic institutions, and an academic version that is fundamental in nature (theoretical research). Hence, research becomes an integral part of the process of understanding and solving society's problems. Alcaras (2012), in turn, refers to the figure of the 'committed researcher', the one who systematically engages in social projects through defending values and goals in line with his or her scientific activities and explicitly establishes the link between disciplinary skills and commitment. This researcher has a very high level of scientific and practical competence in the field of action, in contrast to the committed intellectual. Thus, it seems that the list of committed researchers is less extensive than that of committed intellectuals.

For their part, Kohn (2001) and Albarello (2004) focus on the 'researcher-practitioner', defined as an actor engaged both in a socio-professional field practice and in a research activity (Albarello 2004:5). Research is then embedded in the field of action or intervention. Its role is not only to encourage the exploration of society's reality, but also to help it discover its problems and resolve them. The researcher becomes a strong community organiser, whose research activities reorient his or her actions, and reciprocally, whose professional activities generate and orient continuously his or her research activities. 'Research is at the service of action, as action is at the service of research, mutually discovering and metamorphosing in their most vivid aspects' (Perrault Soliveres 2001:46).

Research Design and Portrait of The Environmental NGOs Surveyed

The data used in this paper was collected through a survey of sixty-six Moroccan NGOs that have been active regularly during the last few years in the field of environmental protection and sustainable development.

Research design

In this paper, we consider research as a process through which results are applied to solve environmental problems or achieve other climate change objectives. For the sake of operationalising this variable, we used Knott and Wildavsky's (1980) scale. This is due to the fact that this scale is multidimensional and widely applied in other contexts. Thus, the use of social research results is based on an ordinal scale that comprises six stages: reception, cognition, discussion, reference, adoption and influence. For each of these stages, respondents (directors of the environmental NGOs) were asked to estimate what had become of their research, using a five-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always). Table 1 provides a description of these items.

Table 1: Scale of social science research use

ITEMS	STAGE	MEANING
USE1	Reception	The director of the environmental NGO receives social research relevant to its work.
USE2	Cognition	The director of the environmental NGO reads and understands the research received.
USE3	Discussion	The director of the environmental NGO engages in meetings, conferences or workshops to discuss the research findings.
USE4	Reference	The director of the environmental NGO cites the research and its findings in reports or documents.
USE5	Adoption	The director of the environmental NGO exerts efforts to adopt the research findings into decisions or actions.
USE6	Influence	The decisions taken by the environmental NGO are effectively influenced by the research findings.

Source: Adopted from Knott and Wildawsky (1980).

Before computing the index to measure the intensity of research use, we tested the reliability of the scale. The purification tests we carried out showed a fairly good reliability. On the one hand, Cronbach's Alpha score is within the order of 79 per cent, exceeding the critical threshold of 70 per cent. On the other hand, the degree of correlation of the items with the overall scale exceeds the threshold of 0.4, which is statistically valid.

In order to construct the composite index that measures the intensity of social science research use, we assumed that each step in the process of this use is more important than the previous one. Because the stages are cumulative, we allocated a score to each stage, with increasing order of weights to each higher stage. The selected items were then weighted by a coefficient ranging from 1 (reception) to 6 (influence). The final index was obtained by adding the scores of the six items, which may range from 21 to 105.

The independent variables were derived from the results of the exploratory study and other similar studies (Huberman and Gather Thurler, 1991; Landry et al. 2000). In this paper, we retained the following eight main independent variables: seniority of the NGO, NGO director's employment status (position held by the director outside the NGO), NGO director's educational level, membership of a research network, relational proximity, research acquisition effort, research adaptation effort and barriers to research use.

As the first four variables are factual in nature and describe some of the attributes of the NGO and its director, we coded them as dummy variables. Thus, seniority takes the value of 1 if the NGO has more than 10 years, and the value of 0 otherwise. The NGO director's employment status takes the value of 1 if the director holds a high-level position (executive or senior manager), and the value of 0 otherwise. The NGO director's educational level takes the value of 1 if the director holds a Master's degree or a doctorate, 0 otherwise. Finally, the network takes the value 1 if one of the influential members of the NGO is also a member of the research community, 0 otherwise.

The other four attributes are intended to measure the perception of the director of the environmental NGO of the conditions under which research results are received and used. Table 2 summarises the items selected to operationalise each of them.

The director of each NGO surveyed was asked to indicate the frequency with which they carried out certain activities, representing the evaluation items of the variables relating to relational proximity, the effort to adapt research, and the effort to acquire research. The possible answers are presented as a Likert scale, ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always). Participants were also asked to comment on the extent of some of the constraints that inhibited the use of research by using a reverse scale, with five possible answers ranging from 1 'strongly agree' to 5 'strongly disagree'. The reversal of this scale is due to the fact that, unlike the other variables, barriers are expected to have a negative impact on social research use.

The reliability analysis showed that the value of Cronbach's Alpha for each construct exceeds the critical threshold generally used in the social sciences, which is 0.70. The values obtained were significant enough to

establish the internal consistency of the scale. Also, coefficients of correlation of items with total score were greater than 0.4, indicating that all the items contributed to the scale.

A simple index was then calculated for each variable by summing up the scores assigned to the different items. This index ranges from 6 to 36 for relational proximity and research adaptation effort, from 8 to 40 for research acquisition effort, and from 5 to 25 for barriers to research use.

Table 2: Operationalisation of independent variables

VARIABLES	ITEMS
Relational proximity	• Delivery of courses or social science seminars at the university • Meeting with social science researchers • Involvement in social research projects conducted by researchers • Conducting social research in collaboration with researchers • Consultation of social science research evidence • Participation in social science events
Research Adaptation effort	• Social science research results are easy to locate • Social science research results are easy to understand • Social science research results are available in a timely manner • Social science research results are reliable and relevant • Social science research results are useful • Social science research results are easy to implement
Research acquisition effort	• Regularly consulting articles published in scientific journals • Regularly consulting papers presented at scientific events • Regularly consulting books or book chapters • Regularly consulting research reports • Regularly consulting specialised websites • Participation in informal meetings with researchers • Discussion with researchers about the research findings • Discussion with researchers about applications and monitoring
Barriers to research use	• Complexity of research language • Resistance of other members of the NGO • Difficulty of access to research results • Lack of financial and human resources • Lack of expertise in translating social science research into useful outcomes

The portrait of the environmental NGOs interviewed

Officially, Morocco has more than 25,000 NGOs working in the field of the environment and sustainable development, which represents 21.24 per cent of all registered NGOs in the country. Nevertheless, only a minority carry out regular activities; the others are registered but, due to a lack of resources, they struggle to carry out their missions and are often condemned to remain at a standstill.

The survey of the environmental NGOs by date of founding reveals that 55 per cent of them were created after 2005, with an age average of fifteen years. This result reflects the relatively young character of NGOs operating in the field of environmental protection and climate change in Morocco. In our view, four factors explain this tardy awareness of environmental issues on the part of Moroccan civil society. First, government incentives, in particular the National Human Development Initiative (NHDI) launched in 2005, offer enormous opportunities for financing and supporting NGOs working in the field of sustainable development. Second, the hosting of COP7 in 2001 and COP22 in 2016 in Morocco inspired Moroccan civil society to work on environmental issues. Third, since 2011, freedom of association has been elevated to constitutional status. The Moroccan Constitution recognises civil society's contribution to policy development, and encourages the action and advocacy role of NGOs, particularly in the field of environment, climate action and socioeconomic development. Fourth, the media, in all its forms, is increasingly mobilised to lead the debate on the pressures on Moroccan natural resources and the main problems affecting the environment in general, while promoting eco-friendliness and greener living practices.

The distribution of environmental NGOs, surveyed by geographical coverage, reveals a domination of local actions. The majority of them, 73 per cent, have a very strong local basis, i.e., the protection of the immediate environment. This can take the following forms: promotion of solar energy, household waste collection, green space development, beach clean-up and environmental education. Fewer environmental NGOs have national coverage, which can be explained by the deliberate choices of their members, but also by a lack of organisational capacity and resources. NGOs with a national scope work mainly in the area of advocacy, and therefore need a minimum critical size to succeed in their mission. Although they are defending the same cause, these two types of organisations are in opposite positions. While local NGOs are real partners of the state, national NGOs prefer to remain autonomous and assume the role of counter-power by seeking to propose new models that are more respectful of the environment.

By activity sector, the environmental NGOs surveyed are far from being highly specialised. More than 80 per cent of them offer a wide range of activities, combining environmental education and lobbying, but also awareness-raising, improving the living environment, solving specific problems and supporting ecological projects (ecotourism, reforestation, waste recycling, renewable energies, etc.). The other NGOs are mainly active in the fields of public awareness around environmental protection issues (9 per cent) and the development of concrete projects in favour of the environment and sustainable development (5 per cent). Issues relating exclusively to lobbying are of interest to only four out of sixty-six NGOs.

The educational level of the environmental NGO directors is high. The majority (79 per cent) have obtained a university degree or equivalent. Only 3 per cent declared having a very low level of education. This profile will certainly help promote good governance within the target NGOs, and will facilitate the task of these NGOs in terms of communication, networking, partnership and advocacy.

Furthermore, most environmental NGOs are networked at the regional or national level.[2] This networking, which is essentially initiated by the public authorities, allows NGOs to break out of isolation and to benefit from mutualised resources. It also allows them to enhance visibility, identify synergies and exchange best practices in the field of environmental protection.

The international partnership also offers promising opportunities for Moroccan environmental NGOs, including those in our sample. Out of the sixty-six, thirty-eight, representing 58 per cent, reported that they maintain partnership relations with foreign NGOs. However, partnership with private companies is still in an embryonic stage, with only eight NGOs engaged in this of the sixty-six surveyed. This last result seems paradoxical, given that the Moroccan government has introduced several fiscal mechanisms to encourage companies to practise environmental responsibility.

According to the surveyed NGO directors, social science research is of real interest in boosting associative action in the environmental field. We asked them: 'In your opinion, what can social science research bring to environmental NGOs?'. The participants focused their responses on five main aspirations: developing new programmes (61 per cent), solving problems (52 per cent), justifying decisions (45 per cent) and understanding the rules of public policy (36 per cent). For 27 per cent of the respondents, research helps to satisfy their intellectual curiosity. Thus, whether it is practical, moral or civic, social science research is generally valued by civil society activists working for environmental protection.

Table 3: Distribution of NGOs by stage of use of social science research

	NEVER	RARELY	SOMETIMES	USUALLY	ALWAYS	INDEX MEAN
Reception	0.06	0.33	0.30	0.20	0.11	2.95
Cognition	0.09	0.38	0.33	0.12	0.08	5.42
Discussion	0.14	0.45	0.23	0.09	0.09	7.64
Reference	0.21	0.52	0.17	0.06	0.05	8.85
Adoption	0.26	0.52	0.15	0.05	0.03	10.38
Influence	0.50	0.42	0.08	0	0	9.45
Degree of use						44.69

Table 3 shows the frequency distribution of stages and level of using social science research by environmental NGOs.

Regardless of the item considered, it appears that reception and cognition of social research are high, as more than half of the responses fell within the range of 'sometimes' to 'always'. In the advanced stages of research use process (reference, adoption and influence), we observed a progressive decrease in the percentage of social research that is never or rarely used. Moreover, the average score of the index measuring the intensity of research use is about 44.69 on a scale ranging from 21 to 105.

Clearly, this is a positive assessment not only since most Moroccan environmental NGOs are young, but also because of the unfavourable conditions in which social scientists work in Morocco. Besides, this result corroborates those obtained by other authors under more favourable contexts. For example, in a study on public and social research in Canada, Belkhodja *et al.* (2007) found that 39 per cent of Canadian administrators use research data to make changes to the services offered by their institutions. Similarly, in a survey of 447 psychosocial workers in Canada, Chagnon and Malo (2006) concluded that only 18 per cent of those interviewed reported frequent use of research results in their professional activities. Furthermore, in a study on the use of university research by government agencies in Canada, Landry, Lamari and Amara (2003) found that the score ranges from 41.03 per cent for municipal and regional affairs, public works and public infrastructure, and 56.62 per cent for education and information technology.

Additionally, four remarks should be made about the results of our survey. First, the use of research by environmental NGOs relates to the quantitative aspect only. We cannot therefore draw any conclusions as to the quality of the research disseminated by social scientists. Second, the issue of research use is fuzzy (Graham *et al.* 2006:13), as many respondents tend to

confuse research with consulting. The needs expressed by environmental NGOs are mostly linked to expert studies (responses to decision-making concerns), which is a soft form of instrumental research. Third, Moroccan environmental NGOs rely mainly on research produced by geographers, economists and sociologists. Fourth, successes in research use are often the result of individual and isolated initiatives taken by the directors of NGOs. The level of institutionalisation and formalisation of the use of social science research remains, in our view, relatively low.

Factors Influencing the Use of Social Science Research

In order to enhance our analysis, we conducted an econometrical investigation of the use of social science by the Moroccan environmental NGOs. The objective was to measure the impact of eight previously identified variables on the use of social science research by sixty-two Moroccan environmental NGOs.[3] This exercise was done using the Partial Least Squares (PLS) regression method.

Why PLS regression?

The main objective of the PLS regression is to predict a set of dependent variable(s) (Y) from a set of predictor variables (X) and to describe their common structure when the number of independent and/or dependent variables is high or when multicollinearity is strong. To do so, the descriptors are summarised in a series of factors, t_h (factorial axes, latent variables, X-scores), which are orthogonal in pairs.

Compared to the PCA (Principal Component Analysis), these factors are constructed in such a way as to best explain Y. Similarly, the target variables are summarised in a series of components, u_h (Y scores). The orthogonality constraint does not apply to them. During the modelling process, PLS regression will allow the factor series to be constructed (t_h, u_h) such that their covariance is maximal. The covariance criteria help to compromise between the restitution of X variability and investigating the relation between X and Y. Thus, it is possible to predict the dependent variable (Y) from the independent variables (X) by separating the signal from the noise, i.e. between what is common to the data and what is more specific to the processed data sample.

There are three main reasons for using PLS regression in this paper. First, this method is well-known to be compatible with cases where we can expect to analyse a phenomenon of complex relations involving a large number of independent variables. However, the conservation of all variables is likely

to minimise the residual variance. The results are therefore closer to the observed reality. According to Sosik, Kahai and Piovoso (2009: 17), the PLS method is more effective in practice because the primary data used in modelling is never perfect. By selecting the best linear combination to predict dependent variables, the PLS method provides more significant structural coefficients than methods based on 'maximum likelihood'.

Second, the size of our sample is not large enough to ensure normal residual distribution, and in this case the application of OLS and parametric tests would yield questionable results. The PLS method was designed to correct this deficiency, since it can be applied to small sample sizes, which may be smaller even than the number of explanatory variables. This method is particularly applicable when the number of variables is greater than the number of compounds in the data sets (Cramer 1993).

Third, some independent variables are highly correlated with each other (multicollinearity), making classical linear regression irrelevant, in the sense that the coefficients that emerge from it become very unstable when trying to noise data. Based on covariance criteria, PLS regression is considered the best response to the problem of multi-collinearity. The coefficients remain stable and better verify statistical significance, even in the presence of strong correlations between the variables.

Results and Discussion

The PLS regression is established using a single component (t_1), which is sufficient to capture the maximum covariance between the eight predictors and the research use index. Table 4 illustrates the quality of the PLS regression as a function of the generated component. The Q^2 index of Stone-Geisser is very high (74.7 per cent). In addition, the R^2Y and R^2X that correspond to the correlations between the independent (X) and dependent (Y) variables with the components are considered relevant. This suggests that the predictive capacity of the model is large.

Table 4: Model Quality Indexes

Indexes	Comp1
Stone-Geisser's Q^2	0.7570
Explanatory power of the component for the dependent variable (R^2Y)	0.7775
Explanatory power of the component for the independent variables (R^2X)	0.4480

Table 5 presents the indicators that assess the contribution of independent variables to the construction of the model. We can see that the correlation of the variables with the selected component is very good. Only one variable, 'seniority of the NGO', has a low correlation coefficient. Similarly, the observation vector w^*, which reflects the weight of the explanatory variables in the construction of this component (t_1), reveals a certain homogeneity. Apart from the NGO's seniority and membership of a network, all the other variables contribute correctly to the construction of the model. Finally, the VIPs (Variable Importance of Projection) reflect the importance of the explanatory variables in the construction of the model and in its ability to predict the target variable. Following Chong and Jun's recommendations (2005), only variables with VIP coefficients greater than 1 are significantly influential. This is the case for the seniority of the NGO and membership in the research community.

Table 5: Relative Contribution of Independent Variables to the Prediction

Variables	Correlation with t_1	Vecteur w^*	VIP
NGO director's level of education	0.696	0.365	1.032
Seniority of the NGO	0.113	0.055	0.154
NGO director's employment status	0.719	0.389	1.100
Membership of a research network	0.469	0.203	0.576
Research adaptation effort	0.879	0.453	1.281
Research acquisition effort	0.769	0.372	1.052
Relational proximity	0.776	0.448	1.266
Barriers to research use	- 0.621	-0.357	1.010

Considering the VIP results, only six variables in eight have a significant effect on the construction of the model. Nevertheless, only two variables, namely the adaptation of research effort and relational proximity, have a strong influence in explaining the use of social science research results by environmental NGOs.

Table 6 presents the standardised coefficients of the PLS regression. Based on the results, it appears that the individual attributes of the NGO director (level of training and employment status outside the NGO) have a positive effect on the use of research by environmental NGOs. Thus, the more educated the NGO's director, the more likely he or she will use social research. Obviously, it seems that the diploma of the director of environmental NGOs is not only a prestigious academic credential, but also a facilitating factor for dialogue and co-operation between the research world and the voluntary sector in the field of the environment.

Table 6: The Regression Coefficients of the PLS Model

VARIABLES	Standardised Coefficients	Standard Deviation
NGO director's level of education	0.170	0.028
Seniority of the NGO	0.025	0.042
NGO director's employment status	0.181	0.023
Membership of a research network	0.095	0.030
Research adaptation effort	0.211	0.024
Research acquisition effort	0.173	0.024
Relational proximity	0.209	0.032
Barriers to research use	-0.167	0.031

Also, the NGO director's employment status is statistically associated with the use of social science research. This suggests that lower-level occupations are a barrier to the dissemination of research results in the associative sector with respect to environmental issues.

The attributes of the environmental NGO, namely seniority and membership of a research network, have no statistically significant effect on the use of social science research. On the face of it, Moroccan environmental NGOs are not yet institutionally and organisationally mature enough to act and build their interventions as a formal legal entity. The NGO director often exerts a kind of informal power that influences strategic decisions and eventually engages the NGO in important acts and events. The weight of the other members of the executive board remains marginal.

In relation to the attributes of social science research (relational proximity, research acquisition effort, research adaptation effort and barriers to research use), we find that they have statistically significant coefficients. The PLS model suggests that environmental NGOs with strong social capital in the research community are more likely to increase their use of social science research than those with little or no social capital. This result seems to make sense since, in the social sciences, knowledge is generally conceptualised as a social construct that must always be linked to existing values and structures. It is perfectly consistent with the conclusions derived in Landry et al. (2000), who emphasise that the relational capital deficit justifies, among other things, the low level of cognitive capital accumulation by potential users.

Moreover, the results show that there is a strong statistical link between the effort to acquire social research and the level of use of such research by environmental NGOs. The relative weight of the variable 'research acquisition effort' is positive (normalised coefficient > 0.1) and statistically

significant (VIP > 1). This result suggests that the greater the effort to acquire social science research, the more intensive will be the use of such research by environmental NGOs. In essence, this can be explained by the fact that at least partial mastery of the aspects of social science research facilitates its popularisation and increases the chance of its application.

Research adaptation effort is the most influential variable in the model (VIP = 1,281). Indeed, it seems that the availability of research is not necessarily conducive to its use by environmental NGOs. NGOs that are confident that the format of the research findings is consistent with reality are more likely to use it. The term 'format' refers here to a set of perceived qualities that social research findings must verify in order to be adapted to the needs expressed by the environmental NGOs. These qualities include: availability, understanding, relevance, clarity, accessibility and practical usefulness. In this sense, the involvement of NGOs in research projects is a factor that could make the operational and realistic process of producing research more fluid.

The last independent variable, 'perceived barriers to research use', has the expected result (inverse relationship) and is statistically significant (VIP > 1). Thus, it seems that Moroccan environmental NGOs are very sensitive to the constraints that are usually imposed on users during the process of exploiting and implementing research results. For instance, we can refer to the language complexity of research, the difficulty of getting access to research results, the lack of financial and human resources, the resistance of other members of the NGO, and the lack of expertise for translating research into useful services. This result largely corroborates predictions derived from early theoretical works on the determinants of research use (Hemsley-Brown 2004).

Conclusion

Moroccan environmental NGOs have gradually established themselves as an important catalyst towards transformation of Moroccan society and the consolidation of sustainable development. Improvements in this arena are closely associated with the democratic and ecological changes that Morocco has undergone during the last couple of decades. Over time, and in response to the intensity of climate-related disasters, these organisations have acquired relative credibility and accumulated commendable experience in all areas tied to environmental issues. They often have been very active to the point that today they represent not only a space for denunciation, alertness, supervision and awareness, but also a force for proposals and a real partner in environmentally friendly development.

This associative dynamism was verified through the results of the survey conducted among a sample of environmental NGOs in Morocco. Contrary to common belief, the use of social science research by Moroccan environmental NGOs is quite promising. However, this use does not yet cover all stages of the research use process. If the reception and cognition of social research findings are generally well admitted, the final adoption and influence are still very little guaranteed.

The construction of a PLS model suggests that the use of social science research by Moroccan environmental NGOs is strongly correlated with two individual characteristics of the NGO (the NGO director's employment status and the NGO director's level of education) and four characteristics of the social research itself (relational proximity, research acquisition effort, research adaptation effort and barriers to research use).

On the other hand, we found no statistically reliable relationship between the characteristics of the NGO, in terms of seniority and membership of a research network, and the use of research. Although this last result goes against our initial assumptions and existing theoretical predictions, essentially it can be explained by the very nature of the Moroccan associative reality. This is characterised by a strong personalisation of power, which remains concentrated in the hands of the director of the NGO. In Moroccan associative practices, informal rules seem to override formal rules.

Following the derived empirical results, questions are being asked about the most appropriate strategies that are likely to intensify the exchange flows between the social science research community and civil society organisations involved in the field of environment. The strength of the exchange flows cannot be assessed without deeper thought on the reference frame of both communities. They need to be engaged in a mutual endeavour to know each other better by reducing their respective cultural gaps in order to pave the way for more robust and sustainable collaborations. Researchers must be prepared to live and work with civil society activists who are taking on responsibilities in the various fields related to the environment and who are re-appropriating certain research results for specific situations and problems.

From this perspective, it seems useful to put in place incentive mechanisms that will reduce the barriers hindering the utilisation of research by the environmental NGOs. This could take the form of partnership or collaborative research structures that involve researchers and civil society activists. The outcomes that would result from such a collaboration would provide a real opportunity to experiment with new ways of thinking about relationships between social science researchers and civil society actors

around environmental issues. However, the success of such initiatives would depend on the legal and organisational upgrading of the target NGOs. Rather than setting up thousands of NGOs, it would be better to start by bringing order to those that exist and improving their capacity.

It is equally important to rehabilitate social science research as it is to set up an interface likely to facilitate the popularisation of the results that stem from that research. Without such a structure, some compelling research results may never find their way into environmental practice. Such a structure would also serve as a platform where social scientists and environmental NGOs could get to know each other better, in order to co-operate in the design and implementation of good practices. It would also serve to reduce the time between the production of social research and the delivery of the resulting knowledge to environmental NGOs.

Finally, it should be noted that the results derived from this research should be put into perspective. First, only the quantitative aspect is taken into account. The directors of environmental NGOs expressed themselves only in terms of the amount of research used. We therefore have no guarantee as to the quality of the research disseminated in civil society in relation to the environment. It is even possible to argue that the quality of scientific production is not always taken seriously. This is all the more true since there is no serious body to evaluate social research work in Morocco. Second, it seems that the work made available to environmental NGOs does not necessarily constitute research in the academic sense of the term, but rather consulting reports. In recent years, the consultancy syndrome has invaded the social science research sphere. Third, we recognise that the 'study effect' may potentially produce biases in the empirical estimates. Indeed, it seems that some respondents tend to be overly optimistic about their accomplishments by overestimating the answers given to situational and behavioural questions. This is particularly true as associative activities carried out in the field of the environment in Morocco have become a source of rent-seeking. In search of legitimacy, some politicians prefer to use the associative label to distinguish themselves from political parties and their bad reputation within a less developed transitional democratic system.

Notes

1. It is commonly accepted that social science research is characterised, among others, by a strong presence of the social variable, the variety of the studied phenomenon, the risk of censorship or self-censorship, the high uncertainty of the results, the strong presence of criticism and the strong interaction between the researcher and their subject.

2. Two major networks of associations are actively involved in the environmental field in Morocco: the Moroccan Alliance for Climate and Sustainable Development, and the Network of Moroccan Associations of the South for the Environment and Sustainable Development.

3. Only 62 Moroccan environmental NGOs were included in the modelling, as 4 of the original 66 NGOs reported never using social science research.

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Nigeria's Foreign and Defence Policies During Babangida's Regime: An Assessment

Dele Jemirade*

Abstract

This article investigates the changes to and achievements of Nigeria's foreign and defence policies from 1985 to 1993. It also examines the economic, political, and sociocultural implications of these policies on the nation. The article argues that despite some identified failures of Ibrahim Babangida's regime, certain innovations and actions, especially the foreign and defence policies that were introduced and carried out by his government, were significant in nature. The article also addresses the interlocking relationship between defence and foreign policy execution and concludes with recommendations on how this can be managed to promote the effectiveness of Nigeria's external relations. The article depended largely on archival materials from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, supported by scholarly journal articles, books and newspaper materials.

Résumé

Cet article étudie les changements et les réalisations de la politique étrangère et de la politique de défense du Nigeria de 1985 à 1993. Il examine également leurs implications économiques, politiques et socioculturelles sur la nation. L'article soutient qu'en dépit de certains échecs palpables du régime d'Ibrahim Babangida, certaines innovations et actions, en particulier la politique étrangère et la politique de défense qui ont été introduites et mises en œuvre par son gouvernement, ont été importantes. L'article aborde également la relation d'interdépendance entre l'exécution de la politique de défense et de la politique étrangère, et conclut par des recommandations sur la façon dont cela peut être géré pour promouvoir l'efficacité des relations extérieures du Nigeria. L'article s'appuie en grande partie sur des documents d'archives de l'Institut nigérian des affaires internationales, que viennent appuyer des articles de revues savantes, des livres et des journaux.

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This article examines the foreign and defence policies of Nigeria from 1985 to 1993, when General Ibrahim Babangida was the military head of state of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It also examines the impact of these policies on the economic, political and sociocultural conditions of the country. A lot of research and studies have been done on the foreign policies of various Nigerian governments, including that of the Babangida administration, but few have shown the relationship of these foreign policies to the defence policy objectives of the government and the overriding effect on the nation. This research is a synthesis and reassessment of the foreign and defence policies of the regime.

Many scholars and researchers, including Iyayi (1989), Ake (1995), Falode (2019), Agbese (2012), McDikkoh (2010), Mimiko (1995a), Bamikole (1995), Ihonvbere (1995), Fawole (1995), G. Ajayi (1995), Sa'id (1995), Kolawole (1995), K. Ajayi (1995), Adekanye (1993 and 2005), Okafor (2006), Bamidele (2012) and many others, have condemned the Babangida government as a failure in terms of most of its policies. But this article shows that despite this being so, the administration's foreign and defence policies were meaningfully successful.

The article is divided into five sections. Section one reviews Nigeria's foreign and defence policies from 1960 to 1985, section two addresses the foreign policy of the Babangida administration, section three examines the defence policy, section four analyses the relationship between the foreign and defence policies and its impact on the nation, and section five assesses Babangida's foreign and defence policies.

Review of Nigeria's Foreign and Defence Policies, 1960–1985

Before independence on 1 October 1960, Britain represented Nigeria's foreign and defence matters, as its colonising power (Ogunsanwo 1985). Even after independence, Britain continued to influence the country's foreign policy through the new ruling elites who inherited Nigeria's foreign policy from Britain. This is the reason why there were no immediate visible changes in Nigeria's external relations after independence (Ogunsanwo 1985).

According to a publication of the Federal Ministry of External Affairs, 1991, 'Nigeria at the United Nations: A Partnership for a Better World', the principles and objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy are:

1. Protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Nigerian state.
2. Promotion of the socio-economic well-being of Nigerians.
3. Enhancing Nigeria's image and status in the world at large.
4. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states.

5. Non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

6. Promotion of the unity and solidarity of African states.

7. Total political, economic, social, and cultural emancipation and rejuvenation of Africa.

8. An unflinching commitment to the elimination of apartheid and racism.

9. Emancipation of countries still under colonial rule as well as the removal of the remaining vestiges of colonialism in Africa.

10. Promotion of international cooperation and understanding conducive to the consolidation of world peace and security.

11. Enhancing the dignity and promoting the welfare of African and people of African descent all over the world.

12. Contributing to efforts aimed at redressing the imbalance in the development and progress of developing countries.

13. Promotion of peace, prosperity, stability, and development of Africa.

14. Promotion of political goodwill and understanding among African countries despite the cultural, linguistic, and economic barriers erected by erstwhile colonialists.

15. The discouragement of international intervention and presence in Africa.

16. The promotion of rapid socio-economic development in Africa through regional economic integration, strengthening of sub-regional economic institutions and the reduction of economic dependence on extra-continental powers.

17. The development of cultural cooperation as a means of strengthening political ties with all African countries.

18. And the eradication of all forms of racial discrimination in Africa.

From independence in 1960, Nigeria had no well-articulated and documented defence policy, until 1979 when Major General Olusegun Obasanjo's administration finally documented its principles and objectives. This document remained in place until 1988, when General Ibrahim Babangida's administration reviewed it. According to Babangida (1988), Abacha (1992) and Osobie (1988), the following is what are generally accepted to be the principles and objectives of Nigeria's defence policy:

1. The defence and protection of the country's territorial integrity, her people, and internal peace.

2. The defence and maintenance of the country's independence.

3. The defence of the economic and social well-being of the people.

4. The defence, preservation and promotion of their culture and way of life, especially their democratic values.

5. Defence of the general development of the nation and the effective management of national energy.

6. Defence of equality and self-reliance in Africa and the rest of the developing world.

7. Promotion of necessary economic and political conditions in Africa and throughout the world that will foster national self-reliance and rapid economic development.

8. Promotion of social justice and human dignity everywhere, particularly for black people.

9. The enhancement of the country's standing and status in world capitals, especially Africa.

10. Ensuring peace and stability in the African continent through mutual collective defence and security system.

11. Commitment to the United Nations and the promotion of world peace and international security.

After independence, Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa presented some cardinal points of the principles and objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy, with Africa as its focal point (Gray 1965; Tukur 1965). The principles and objectives mentioned above still apply today, and most Nigerian leaders have pursued them one way or the other with variations only in style of leadership and implementation.

Under Balewa, Nigeria accepted and honoured all the treaties and agreements signed by Britain; this further increased British influence on the country's foreign policy. Although Balewa declared Nigeria a non-aligned nation, like most of the members of the Non-Aligned Movement, he did not respect the principle behind this statement. It was clear that he was pro-West, certainly because Nigeria was economically tied to Britain and the Western Bloc. When Nikita Khrushchev, the then prime minister of the Soviet Union, demanded that Nigeria should permit that nation to establish its embassy in Lagos in 1960, Balewa replied that 'Application for diplomatic exchange would be considered in order of receipts and would be judged on their merits.' However, the same request was immediately granted to the United States of America (Gray 1965:85).

Balewa was anti-communist, and turned down scholarship awards to Nigerians from the Soviet bloc as well as delaying the opening of diplomatic relations with them. On the other hand, he invited apartheid South Africa to Nigeria's independence celebrations, being an advocate of a gradual approach to Africa's decolonisation. He also rejected the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) plan to break diplomatic ties with Britain because of Rhodesia's (Zimbabwe) Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). And only Balewa supported the unpopular Moïse Tshombe during the Congo crisis (Tukur 1965).

Balewa's administration believed that the West and Britain were Nigeria's best friends. This is seen in his independence speech: 'We are grateful to the British officers whom we have known first as masters and then as leaders and finally as partners but always as friends' (Tukur 1965: 24). Balewa's foreign policy was weak, inconsistent and contradictory. His government was overthrown in the first military coup on 15 January 1966 (Olusanya 1985).

Major General Thomas Aguiyi-Ironsi became the head of state after the overthrow and assassination of Balewa, following the failure of Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu's bid to take power with his co-plotters. Aguiyi-Ironsi was killed in a coup d'état on 29 July 1966, leading to the emergence of Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon as the new head of state (Ogunsanwo 1985). Foreign policy under Gowon was quite different from that of Balewa, but Gowon still maintained some of the essential characteristics of the Balewa government. For example, he held a moderate view towards foreign policy but strongly believed in 'personal diplomacy', that is, personal involvement or intervention in resolving diplomatic issues. His administration also moved closer to the Western Bloc and Britain (Olusanya 1985). The civil war of 1967–1970 brought Nigeria close to the Communist Bloc because Britain and the US refused to supply Nigeria with arms to fight the Biafran rebels, which the USSR did (Ogunsanwo 1985).

Gowon also immediately normalised relations with Gabon, Tanzania, Zambia, Côte d'Ivoire and France in 1971, despite the recognition and support they gave to Biafra during the civil war. With the support of President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, Gowon rallied other West African countries to form the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) in 1975 (Federal Ministry of External Affairs 1991). The leadership role he played at the first Lomé Convention, which was a precursor to ECOWAS, was quite commendable. However, it must be said that, more than any other Nigerian ruler before him, he had the opportunity to make foreign policy dynamic because of the enormous resources and goodwill at his disposal (Akinyemi 1980).

Even though Nigeria received fighter jets and other weapons from the Communist Bloc, the relationship did not progress further after the war, and Nigeria reverted to her old friends, Britain and the West (Akinyemi 1980). Gowon performed better than Balewa on foreign policy. He increased aid to freedom fighters like the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) in South Africa, and others in Zimbabwe and Angola and was committed to decolonisation, ECOWAS and the OAU (Akinyemi 1980).

At the eight summits of the OAU in Kampala, Uganda in 1975, Gowon suggested the formation of the African Task Force to handle military problems in Africa. He warned: 'Let it be known to friends and foes that the historical tide is irreversible. From now on, we can only move forward. Those countries still under control of foreign powers must be liberated' (*The Sunday Guardian*, 2 October 1988). Unfortunately for Gowon, he did not have the chance to prove his words because he was overthrown in a coup d'état before the end of the summit, ending his nine-year rule. Brigadier Murtala Mohammed became the new head of state on 29 July 1975 (Aluko 1977).

Mohammed's administration effected a progressive change in Nigeria's foreign policy implementation, emphasising Africa as its centrepiece more than any other government previously. He pursued a focused and dynamic foreign policy. Unfortunately for Mohammed, he did not live long to execute his plans entirely. He was killed in a failed coup d'état on 13 February 1976 (Akinyemi 1980). Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo, Mohammed's deputy, succeeded him and continued with the administration's policies.

The most important achievement of Obasanjo's administration was decolonisation in Africa, unmatched by any other regime before and after it (Obiozor 1985). It contributed immeasurably to the independence of Angola, Zimbabwe and the struggle against apartheid South Africa, supporting the ANC and PAC, and SWAPO in Namibia (Akinyemi 1980). For the first time in Nigeria's diplomatic history, the government took unilateral decisions without support from most African states (Garba 1981). Nigeria supported organisations and political movements that 'truly represented the true aspirations of African people' (Jemirade 2020: 129). Subsequently, Alhaji Shehu Shagari became the president, on 1 October 1979. He tried to continue the work started by Mohammed and Obasanjo, but the momentum weakened because of the moderate views of his administration (Garba 1981).

Nevertheless, Shagari's administration continued support for anti-apartheid groups and assisted Zimbabwe with funds before and after independence (Ogunsanwo 1983). It was during Shagari's administration that Nigeria witnessed some of the worst border attacks from its neighbours, particularly Cameroon, when Cameroonian troops killed a Nigerian contingent that was patrolling the border, in May 1981. Nigeria did not retaliate, even though Cameroon refused to apologise or pay compensation (Ogunsanwo 1983). Thus, in many regards, Shagari's foreign policy lacked focus and was uninspiring.

Shagari's government was overthrown in a military coup on 31 December 1983, when it was replaced by Major General Muhammadu Buhari's short-lived rule. In pursuance of the country's foreign and defence aims, Buhari introduced the Concentric Circle Policy, which he described as follows:

> The pattern of concentric circles may be discernible in our attitude and response to foreign policy issues within the African continent and the World at large. At the epicentre of these circles are the National Economy and the Security interest of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which are inextricably tied-up with the security, stability, the economic and social well-being of our immediate neighbours (Buhari 1984).

It was later adopted by Babangida (Imobighe 1987), addressed in the next section. Buhari's foreign policy was antagonistic to the West, confrontational and reactionary. Because of his hard posture and the failed Umaru Dikko kidnap attempt, the regime fell out with Western powers, Britain notably, which led to the withdrawal of their respective High Commissioners (Olusanya 1985). Buhari rejected and refused to sign the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Brown Card System of free movement of citizens, goods and services within the sub-region. He also refused to host the 1984 ECOWAS Summit. His rigid attitude towards foreign policy only increased his unpopularity. Buhari was overthrown in a palace coup by General Ibrahim Babangida, his Chief of Army Staff, in 1985 (Olusanya 1985).

Babangida's period as head of state in Nigeria lasted from 27 August 1985 to 27 August 1993. The regime came to power when the economic, political, and social situation in the country had become intolerable under Buhari. Many Nigerians were happy to see the end of Buhari's draconian dictatorship and hoped for a new chapter in the affairs of the country (Osuntokun 2000).

Babangida's Foreign Policy Thrust

The Babangida administration made several changes to the tone of Nigeria's foreign policy. For the first time in the country's history, the emphasis was shifted from Africa as the pivot of Nigeria's foreign policy to issues that were directly related to Nigeria. On coming to power, Babangida appointed people of proven integrity and knowledge in the field, such as Bolaji Akinyemi as the Minister of External Affairs and his adviser on associated issues, which helped in the successful lift-off of the administration's foreign policy (Adeniji 2000). Even after Akinyemi, other respective ministers, such as Ike Nwachukwu and Rilwan Lukman, all continued the active co-ordination of the country's foreign policy until the end of the regime.

By the time Babangida came to power, the relationship between Nigeria and the West, particularly Britain, its traditional friend, had become strained because of the disagreements with Buhari's administration, especially on the prosecution of corrupt politicians. Subsequently, the international community was well disposed to the Babangida regime mainly because of its competent advisers and the policies pursued by the administration. As a result, Babangida received unprecedented support from international financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) (Obiozor 1994).

The boycott of the Edinburgh Commonwealth Games in Scotland in July 1986 was a landmark moment in the success of the regime's foreign policy. The previous year, on 16 October 1985, at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Summit in Nassau, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had rejected sanctions against South Africa because she believed that the effect would be felt more by black people than white. As a result of the ensuing deadlock, the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was established to study the situation and make final recommendations. The EPG, co-chaired by the Nigerian former head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo, and Malcolm Fraser of Australia, later recommended sanctions, which Thatcher still refused to accept (Ogwu 1986) and Britain continued to relate to South Africa on sports and trading matters. Consequently, Nigeria led thirty-two Commonwealth countries out of the forty-nine members to boycott the games (Obiozor 1994), which was described as 'one of the high points of decision-making in Nigeria's foreign policy' (Olukoshi 1990: 448).

Nigeria intensified the struggle against apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa and contributed immensely to the attainment of independence of Namibia on 29 March 1990. It renewed diplomatic relations with Israel on 4 May 1992 (Abiola 1999), a decision all previous governments of Nigeria had avoided because of the controversy it was likely to generate in the country. In the same year, President Frederik de Klerk of South Africa visited Nigeria, the South African leader to do so (Abiola 1999).

The Concentric Circle Policy

The Concentric Circle Policy first introduced by Buhari was continued by Babangida. The policy was applied to both the foreign and defence policies since the two are interrelated. Ekoko, described it as 'the most comprehensive, clear-cut and operationalisable Nigerian Defence Policy ever enunciated since 1960' (Ekoko 1990: 12). Babangida pursued the policy throughout his administration in his relationship with ECOWAS, the Organisation of

African Unity (OAU) and particularly the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), during Liberia's civil war, when Nigeria was not only involved in the peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations but led and financed most of them. Babangida restated this policy in his defence of Nigeria's involvement in Liberia, when he claimed that:

> The foreign policy of Nigeria is built on three concentric circles. The first ring being Nigeria and the defence of its territorial integrity and sovereignty, the second ring comprising its immediate neighbours with contiguous boundaries and the third ring being the ECOWAS Subregion ... and the three elements are obviously interlocking and coterminous (Babangida 1990).

The Concentric Circle Policy was based on delimiting and prioritising the strategic boundaries of Nigeria's national defence. Inside the three concentric circles were three dimensions to note—strategic-military, economic and political (Ekoko 1990). The policy was also based on Nigeria's geographical situation and threat analysis. The threats included border clashes with neighbouring states, particularly Cameroon, French activities in the West African sub-region, and the possibility of a South African attack on Nigeria (Ekoko 1990).

The policy, to some extent, guaranteed Nigeria's safety with Chad, Niger, the Republic of Benin, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. It also worked, to some extent, to improve relations with other countries in the West Africa sub-region (Ate and Akinterinwa 1990). However, one cannot say the same thing of South Africa since Nigeria's foreign policy towards apartheid was not backed by a corresponding defence policy or defence capability. South Africa's defence forces were far more superior and advanced regarding capability and weaponry (Amin 1992).

Economic diplomacy

One of the key themes in the change of focus in foreign policy was economic diplomacy. This was the active pursuit of foreign policy objectives that were designed to promote trade and investment and to complement domestic economic reforms, such as trade liberalisation and the commercialisation of public enterprises (Federal Ministry of External Affairs 1991). It gave backbone and strength to Nigeria's internal economic policy (Obiozor 1992).

Economic diplomacy, according to Osuntokun, means 'tempering our pre-occupation with political issues such as decolonisation and non-alignment with concerns about domestic development' (Osuntokun 2000: 5). Amongst other reasons, Nigeria shifted to economic diplomacy because the end of apartheid in South Africa was then around the corner and the independence of Namibia had been achieved, so it made little sense to continue with

anticolonial policies, previously the preoccupation of Nigeria's foreign policy. Also, the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the USA as the only superpower made non-alignment irrelevant. All these changes made Nigeria decide that economic survival and development should be the focus of its foreign policy without abandoning its policies of the liberation of African people (Osuntokun 2000).

Although the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) pattern of the deregulation of the economy based on economic diplomacy drew much criticism internally, due to the hardship it caused, it also attracted international attention, particularly from Western countries and their investors (Abiola 1999). To facilitate and encourage foreign economic investment, and to aid the registration of foreign companies without the bureaucratic bottlenecks (Osuntokun 2000), the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) was created. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a trade and investment unit to supervise the economic efforts of the embassies and high commissions abroad towards promoting the economic policies and development of the country. Ambassadors and high commissioners were told that their success or failure would be determined by the number of investors they brought into the country from their host nations (Osuntokun 2000). The Indigenisation Decree was abolished to allow foreigners to participate in all business activities within the country. The decree that made the Central Bank the only route for transferring money outside the country was scrapped. Bureaux de changes were licensed to trade in currencies at a controlled rate. This was all made possible to enable freedom of entrepreneurship and make the movement of capital and profit easy (*The Sunday Concord*, 1 October 2000).

The mantra of economic diplomacy was carried to all international forums, including the United Nations (UN), OAU, ECOWAS and bilateral sessions. As a result, the issue of Nigeria's debt was reconsidered; it was later rescheduled instead of cancelled, which Nigeria wanted (Obiozor 1994). However, at the same time, the country was offered a lot of financial facilities. Although the collapse of Communism and the opening of Eastern Europe and China's markets and investment harmed the policy of economic diplomacy pursued by the Babangida administration, it was a new and positive direction for the country (Obiozor 1994).

Apart from its commitment to the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which it belonged to for the protection of its oil interests, the primary foreign exchange earner for the country, Nigeria initiated the formation of the African Petroleum Producers Association (APPA) in Lagos, on 27 January 1987 (Adeniji 2000). Nigeria realised that other OPEC

members belonged to the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporters (OAPE) in the Middle East, the Organisation of Latin American Petroleum Exporters (OLAPE) in Latin America and Asian Countries Petroleum Exporters (ASCOPE) in Asia. Only Africa had no specialised regional organisation to protect its oil interests in the world (Adeniji 2000). This new organisation, with members like Libya, Algeria, Gabon, Angola, Benin Republic, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Congo and Egypt (as an observer), some of whom were not even OPEC members, increased economic co-operation among them, which was beneficial to all, including Nigeria because it gave them the opportunity to review the value of co-operation as a single bloc in protecting their mutual interests in oil revenue (Abiola 1999).

The controversial decision to make Nigeria a full member of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Fez, Morocco, on 6 January 1986, was defended based on economic diplomacy. Babangida argued that Nigeria stood to benefit economically and financially from the membership because of the access it would give to zero-interest loans from the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), financial assistance and insurance coverage, including technical and economic assistance from the richer members of the organisation (Abiola 1999).

Economic diplomacy was pursued based on the economic realities of Nigeria at that time. It was evident that the major world powers, with the USA at the apex, considered economic interests first in their relations with other countries. These went together with security interests and that is why, to date, Western countries control the financial institutions of the world like the IMF, World Bank and IFC, and are ready to defend their economic interests anywhere in the world. This was manifested when the USA led other Western powers to force Iraq out of Kuwait in 1990. General Babangida summed up his strong belief in the policy thus:

> ...it became obvious to critical observers that the ability of a country to attract substantial foreign aid and investment capital for its economic development depended very intimately on the foreign policy orientation of its government regarding many issues (Babangida 1985).

Environmental Issues

Environmental issues constituted one of the new concerns of the Babangida administration. In 1988, radioactive and hazardous toxic waste was dumped in the Nigerian port of Koko by the Italian importer Gianfranco Raffaelli, with the collaboration of some Nigerians (Osuntokun 2000). Later, it was discovered that similar waste had been dumped in South Africa and

the Republic of Benin, where they were told that it could be used for road construction. In reaction, Nigeria established the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) in 1988. With the support of other West African states, the country also established a dump-watch to monitor the movement of vessels suspected of carrying hazardous waste (Osuntokun 2000).

In taking this initiative the country proved its leadership in Africa; it persuaded other countries in ECOWAS to support the protocol against toxic waste dumping in the sub-region. Nigeria also presented its position to the OAU and then the UN. This led to an international treaty, the Basel Convention in Switzerland, which was finally passed and ratified in 1989. The protocol prohibited the transboundary transfer of hazardous and toxic radioactive waste to countries that have no mechanism for handling them (Osuntokun, 2000). The Basel treaty further led to the 1991 Bamako Convention in Mali, which finally prohibited the dumping or transfer of hazardous and toxic radioactive waste to countries. The issue of the environment was a significant foreign policy achievement for Nigeria, increasing its prominence in the international community.

Concept of Medium Powers

The concept of Medium Powers was introduced into Nigeria's foreign policy as 'the coming together of influential medium-income and resource-endowed countries into an informal association to influence the direction of world affairs, particularly the economic aspect of these relations' (Osuntokun 2000: 10). It was meant to be a counterforce by major regional powers, such as Brazil and Argentina in South America, Nigeria and Egypt in Africa, India and China in Asia, against the ideological and economic dominance of the two blocs led by the USA and the Union of Soviet and Socialist Republics (USSR).

Nigeria's foreign policy formulators believed that the non-aligned movement was too unwieldy to achieve this and the Commonwealth was too informal and unsuitable for the purpose. Some of their aims included making sure that the question of international peace would no longer be the exclusive preserve of the two world powers and their alliance system of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact (Osuntokun 2000). The idea was formally abandoned because of a lack of interest; the target countries did not take the idea seriously. The idea of medium powers was not new; there were too many organisations in the international system claiming or wanting to fight the political and economic dominance of the two blocs led by the USA and the USSR, respectively.

Technical Aid Corps

The Technical Aid Corps (TAC) was introduced into Nigerian foreign policy in 1987, designed to provide African countries with a technical workforce to assist their struggle for self-reliance and economic development (Akindele 1990). Internally, the government saw it as an opportunity to settle thousands of unemployed Nigerian graduates by sending them to countries where their skills and knowledge could be utilised adequately. The government believed that the TAC programme could make other countries confident in using Nigerian graduates, and in Nigeria's institutions of higher learning and educational system, by accepting assistance in that form. The foreign policy planners also believed that the programme would boost the country's leadership role in Africa, particularly in the West African sub-region.

The TAC was an expensive venture because people sent to foreign countries had to be paid in US dollars, but it was well regarded, and successive administrations continued it. Countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone and Gambia that benefited from the TAC were so enthusiastic about the programme that they started making specific requests for experts in some fields (Akindele 1990). Many Nigerian graduates applied to join it, including those who were gainfully employed.

Defence Policy Thrust

Every modern nation requires a carefully structured plan of action on how to define its national interest. Babangida's administration did that with the defence of the country. Until 1979, there had been no documented Nigerian defence policy. The British did not leave or hand over any formal document on defence policy (Vogt 1990). The armed forces grew out of the British Colonial Army, which was the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), established in 1890 (Imobighe 1987). The first set of Nigerian officers was trained under the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF). Even after independence, they continued with their inherited British traditions and all the officers were trained in British military institutions, namely Sandhurst and Aldershot. They were trained in British military traditions with British weapons, which made it challenging to eliminate Britain's influence on the country's defence policy (Vogt 1990).

Successive Nigerian leaders—Balewa, Aguiyi-Ironsi, Gowon and Mohammed—operated without a formal written defence policy. Obasanjo documented the first defence policy in 1979, the Principles and Objectives of Nigeria's Defence Policy, which Babangida reviewed in 1988 and gave more focus. Up till then, the full content of the document had remained shrouded in secrecy for security reasons (Vogt 1990).

Every aspect of Nigeria's defence policy and security was reviewed. Since independence, and until then, Nigeria's defence policy had been based on self-defence and defence of the territorial integrity of the country (Ekoko 1990), rather than on territorial expansion or aggression. Babangida continued this policy, but changed its thrust, from a sole or single defence mechanism to a Mutual Collective Defence and Security System (Ekoko 1990). The administration further added the concept of 'Regional Power' (Ekoko 1990).

Concept of a Regional Power in a Mutual Collective Defence and Security System

After the defence policy review, it was decided that other West African states, particularly Nigeria's immediate neighbours, should be brought into the Mutual Collective Defence And Security System. The decision was based on a threat analysis that indicated the possible areas of conflicts that Nigeria could face as a country (Ibrahim 1988). It was also in line with the Concentric Circle Policy, which linked Nigeria's security and defence with that of its immediate neighbours—Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Benin Republic and Equatorial Guinea. This policy was based on the principle that any threat to Nigeria's immediate neighbours, politically economically or security-wise, was a threat to the country (Osobie 1988).

Nigeria had no territorial ambitions. This never manifested in any way in its foreign or defence policy implementation and practice. Abacha (1992), argued that:

> Since Nigeria does not possess and probably will be unable to possess the means to defend herself in isolation against all forms of external aggression, she would have to rely, for strategic reasons, on military interdependence at least in the sub-region to provide security—and it is imperative that Nigeria's defence policy gives priority to the propagation and eventual establishment of a regional and mutually collective security system among African states with a view to warding off any threats to her political and economic independence.

The collective security system would take the form of a bilateral or multilateral arrangement, and would involve the joint deployment of troops from the countries participating at different periods of training and operations. The command would also have a structure, which Nigeria, with its population, wealth, size and geographical location, was able to establish.

This system was quite an innovation in Nigeria's defence policy. For the first time, it showed that there was indeed a serious effort to articulate and execute a national defence system for the country based not on the general notion of Africa as the focus of its foreign policy but on a threat analysis of

the country and other relevant factors. If defence experts formulated a mutual collective defence and security system because the country was not capable of handling her defence problems alone, then a formalised alliance would be the goal of the policy. Ekoko (1990:7) argued that, 'For states unable to achieve their foreign and defence policy unilaterally, alliance formation becomes a national necessity.'

According to Miller (1981:52), 'Alliance formation is based on need, expediency and pragmatism; alliance exists because they have more than compensating advantages because they are believed to add external power to the power of each member, because they deter potential aggressors and because they define the strategic frontier.' (Ekoko, 1990: 8) summed it up by saying, 'An alliance enhances national defence.' Looking at all the advantages mentioned above towards an alliance policy, one can see that to achieve the objectives of its new thrust in defence policy, Nigeria had to formalise it in an alliance.

The formation of ECOMOG forces in 1990 to solve the Liberian problem was an attempt to realise the aim and objectives of the Mutual Collective Defence And Security System. It was a step in the right direction and could be improved upon and adapted to form the nucleus of an alliance based on the new joint defence system in the West Africa sub-region (Olowo-Ake 1996). Nigeria was able to persuade the rest of the countries in the West African sub-region of the need to send troops to Liberia to bring peace and sanity to the war-ravaged country. Although some critics insist that Nigeria's 'misadventure' in leading the ECOMOG troops to Liberia took place because of the personal relationship between Babangida and President Samuel Doe of Liberia, the most important thing was that the decision fell within the Concentric Circle Policy and the Mutual Collective Defence and Security System and it helped to solve the problem in Liberia.

Through the ECOWAS standing mediation committee, Nigeria was able to persuade Gambia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Ghana and Guinea to provide troops for the peacekeeping force, which later changed to a peace enforcement force. Later, even Uganda and Tanzania from East Africa provided troops for the ECOMOG forces (Olowo-Ake 1996). The success of these operations as a step forward in achieving the Mutual Collective Defence and Security System, which could lead to a formalised military alliance in the West Africa sub-region, cannot be underestimated. Babangida (1990) made this clear when he said:

> There is no gainsaying the fact that when certain events occur in the sub-region depending upon their intensity and magnitude, which are bound to affect Nigerian politico-military and socio-economic environment, we should

not stand by as helpless and hapless spectator. We believe that if the events are such that have the potential to threaten the stability, peace and security of the sub-region, Nigeria, in collaboration with others in this sub-region, is duty-bound to react or respond [in an] inappropriate manner necessary to either avert the disaster or to take adequate measures to ensure peace, tranquillity and harmony.

Independent and objective observers were supportive of ECOMOG's efforts. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 'The ECOMOG remained the only example of a Regional Organization with a long term, truly multilateral peacekeeping operation underway' (SIPRI 1995: 77). Salim Ahmed Salim, the former OAU scribe, described it as, 'The first real attempt by African countries to solve an African conflict' (Vogt 1992). President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda praised Nigeria for its 'proper role as peace-maker by being the premier participant in ECOMOG' (Vogt 1992). David Rowson, the Director of the US State Department's Anglophone West Africa Affairs, stated that, 'The US is fully behind the West African states in what we think has been a very successful, though a very difficult and prolonged period of statesmanship and diplomacy' (Vogt 1992). Lieutenant General Teddy Allen, the Director of the US Security Assistance Agency, visited the ECOMOG headquarters and applauded them by saying, 'the World owed ECOMOG a debt of gratitude for rendering service above and beyond the normal call of duty' (Vogt 1992). US President George Bush, with the endorsement of the Senate and House of Representative, praised President Babangida for his efforts to resolve the Liberian conflict (Vogt 1992).

The benefits of ECOMOG, led by Nigeria, cannot be overemphasised given the peace it returned to Liberia. It brought Nigeria high regard and respect internationally and confirmed its leadership role in the sub-region. Although it cost the country material wealth and men, it was one of the sacrifices the country had to make to be a regional power and be successful in its defence policy objective.

External Defence System and the Nigerian Armed Forces

The primary function of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is to defend the physical territorial integrity of the country and its people (Imobighe 1989). Babangida's administration completed the reformation and reorganisation started by Obasanjo's government. Nigeria witnessed unprecedented military training and courses at home and abroad for armed forces personnel, thus improving its quality and modernisation. There was a push to modernise equipment and weaponry, which led to the procurement

of new materials and the service and maintenance of the old equipment (Okolo 2000). The Nigerian Army Resettlement Centre (NARC) and the National Reserve Mobilisation Scheme (NRMS) were established, which dealt with retiring armed forces personnel and the personnel that remained in the strategic reserve (Imobighe 1989). According to Bali (1986: 9), the Minister of Defence, the strength of the armed force was reduced from 150,000 to 120,000 to improve quality in personnel and effectiveness. He noted that, 'Emphasis was now laid on a medium-size, effective, disciplined, educated and well-equipped armed forces than large, illiterate, ignorant and ill-equipped armed forces that lack discipline.'

Another critical innovation towards the strengthening of the armed forces was the establishment of the National Guard. After the first threat analysis and review of the nation's defence policy the armed forces were established, trained and equipped for a large-scale campaign, the type of army needed for a full-scale invasion or defensive war. But it had no capability for small-scale operations like commando operations with swift and effective action and results. Neither were the Nigerian police equipped and trained to handle internal uprisings (Ndiomu 1996). The US has the Marines, Britain has the Special Air Service (SAS), Israel has Sayeret Matkal, France has the Special Operations Command (Commandement des Opérations Spéciales, or COS), Germany has Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (Border Protection Group 9, or GSG 9) and the Dutch have the Royal Marines. Nigeria needed a similar special force.

The National Guard was established under a commander who reported directly to the Commander-in-Chief. Its primary purpose or use was to protect strategic installations in the country and respond quickly to terrorism, mercenaries or commando invasion of any part of the country. Mainly a counter-terrorist force, its members were described as people 'who are supposed to be endowed with certain intrinsic capabilities, such as mental and physical stability, secrecy, speed, adaptability and above-average intelligence higher than the men of regular military units' (Nweze 1990:3).

To effectively handle and implement the new tactical doctrine and strategic planning, the Nigeria Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was set up, as the think tank of the military. All these initiatives were achieved after the first-ever threat analysis was conducted as part of Nigeria's defence policy under Babangida. Votti defined doctrine as 'a body of theory which describes the environment within which the armed forces must operate and prescribe the methods and circumstances of the deployment' (Votti 1974: 3). Marshall Andrei Grechko (Grechko 1972:322), the former defence minister of the Soviet Union, defined military doctrine

'as a national perspective, a product of national goals and objectives.' He argued that a nation's military doctrine must address the following issues:

1. Identification of the potential enemy and his capabilities.
2. The sacrifices the country is willing to make and the price it is ready to pay in a possible war.
3. The national aim and objectives and the force structure of the armed forces to be used in such a war.
4. Military and political mobilisation policy, the means, and methods to be used to prosecute a war.
5. Assessment of threat and the determination of the military measures to counter the threat (Grechko 1972:322).

According to Henry Kissinger (1969:166), 'It is the task of strategic doctrine to translate power into policy whether the goals of a state are offensive or defensive, whether it seeks to achieve or prevent transformation, its strategic doctrine must define what objectives are worth contending for and determine the degree of force appropriate for achieving them.' Summing up all these definitions, one can see that they are saying the same thing in different ways. Right from independence, Nigeria had not incorporated any strategic defence doctrine in her national interest, until the coming of Babangida's regime. Now, for the first time, military commanders had what is known as an operational standing order—that is, instructions for the precise and exact action to take in case some things happened or in reaction to issues that were related to their command. Although the policy of Babangida's administration might not have conformed entirely to the conditions laid down by Marshall Grechko and Kissinger, the effort was made to give the country the best it could afford at that time.

Babangida's defence policy laid the basis for the formulation of strategic, tactical doctrines that were to form the structure and use of the armed forces (Osobie 1988). The office of the Chief of Defence Staff was consolidated and expanded to provide an adequate umbrella for effective strategic planning and action. It may not have been perfect or what could be expected from a country like Nigeria, but it was an improvement and a step in the right direction.

Defence Procurement and Defence Industries Corporation (DIC)

The issue of procurement was an area that the Babangida administration tried to sanitise in Nigeria's defence policy. According to Amin (1998: 25), 'there were two dimensions to acquisition in the armed forces: procurement and production.' Procurement concerned buying directly from many

factories that were mostly foreign, while production related directly to the capabilities and the use of the Defence Industries Corporation (DIC). After independence, Nigeria had depended mainly on the importation of military hardware and software, mostly from Britain and other Western countries. The situation did not change until the outbreak of civil war in 1967, when Britain and the Western allies refused to sell some categories of weapons to Nigeria. This forced Nigeria to turn to the Communist Bloc for weapons that were used to prosecute the war (Amin 1998).

The civil war caused Nigeria's procurement to change from a single client to a multi-client policy. Afterwards, Nigeria possessed two different types of military hardware, one from the capitalist Western Bloc and another from the former Communist Bloc (Amin 1998). Eventually, Babangida's administration organised a procurement policy. Weapons and materiel were no longer acquired randomly without due process and due consideration of the national interest and objectives. The inter-service rivalry for weapons and other hardware procurement was eliminated (Amin 1998). Previously, the three armed services headed by the Chief of Army Staff, Chief of Naval Staff and Chief of Air Staff had usually channelled their demands directly to the Minister of Defence, but Babangida's administration changed this and made all three services send their requests to the Chief of Defence Staff who vetted and made final recommendations to the Defence Minister for proper harmonisation before budget consideration and final approval (Amin 1998). This restructure helped considerably in proper co-ordination, harmonisation and prioritisation to conform to the defence policy and national interest.

The Babangida administration also introduced weapons and ammunition standardisation, to eliminate a situation whereby troops under the same command had different weapons and ammunition utterly different from their colleagues (Ibrahim 1988). With the fall of Communism, the administration decided to concentrate on the Western powers for its weapons procurement. Emphasis was laid on repairs of weapons instead of procurement; new procurement was allowed only under extraordinary circumstances (Amin 1998). The role of intermediaries or defence contractors was abolished and the country decided to buy directly from manufacturers.

The administration encouraged the local manufacture of military hardware for the armed forces. The Defence Industries Corporation, which was established in 1964, had never been utilised for hardware acquisition. It had been entirely neglected in favour of procurement (Ibrahim 1998). The Babangida administration did not do much to change the situation, but an attempt was made to encourage research and development of local

weapons production through DIC; an attempt was also made to encourage indigenous repairs of the hardware acquired through procurement (Ibrahim 1998). 'Despite its failure to ultimately develop DIC, it was the Babangida regime that has shown strong determination to put it on a good footing as a complement to weapons procurement' (Amin 1998).

Defence budget

There was no significant difference between Babangida's overall defence budget and that of his predecessors. Right from independence, the budget had always received a substantial percentage of the total federal budget. Regarding allocation, the defence budget was among the top three, competing mostly with education, agriculture and health (Aderinto 1990; Budget Speeches of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1986—1993). The only noticeable difference in policy change was that the three heads of the armed forces—army, navy and air force—now channelled their various demands to the Chief of Defence Staff for proper harmonisation and control (Imobighe 1987).

Imobighe (1987) argued that 'Even though the vast amount was always budgeted on defence, most of the allocation always goes to recurrent expenditure and welfare for the officers and men at the expense of capital expenditure for military hardware and software.' Despite its attempts to present a well-articulated and planned budget, Babangida's administration lacked financial discipline, in implementation and transparency. Cars were purchased and given to officers of the armed forces, but this was not reflected in the defence budget (Imobighe 1987). Also, ECOMOG expenditure of more than USD eight billion was never reflected in the federal defence budget throughout that period (*The Nigerian Tribune*, 9 October 1999), nor in the federal government budget, even as a security vote. This activity was not useful for strategic planning and the administration of defence policy.

Relationship between the Foreign and Defence Policies and their Impact

It is agreed by scholars, experts and defence personnel, such as Osuntokun (2000), Akinyemi (1980), Aluko (1988), Garba (1981), Oyebanjo (1989), Jackson and Sorensen (2003), Sutch and Elias (2007), Webber and Smith (2002), Ojanen (2006), Smith (2003), Palmer (1990) and many others, that foreign and defence policies are interrelated. For the success of all, one cannot be separated from the other. According to Okolo (2000: 162), 'Defence policy is that aspect of foreign policy that deals with the national security because it deals with the very survival of the nation; it is the most important

aspect of foreign policy.' He goes further to say that 'it is the branch of foreign policy which not only anticipates the antagonistic dimensions of inter-state relations but rationalises and prepares the nation's resources especially the military component to ensure the national objective'. For a nation to be prosperous in her foreign and defence policies, the two must be adequately harmonised for maximum results (Okolo 2000).

The inability of Nigeria's foreign policy to be strengthened by its defence policy was a minus for the country. The Concentric Circle theory and the Mutual Collective Defence and Security Systems in the West African sub-region corresponded with each other, and foreign policy was adequately backed by the country's defence policy and capability (except in the case of South Africa, which happened to be one of the main areas of possible threat at that time because of Nigeria's stance on apartheid) (Okolo 2000).

All of Nigeria's donations and contributions to fighting apartheid and colonialism in Africa could not be supported by any credible defence policy towards South Africa, which made the country's activities and speeches look like mere ranting. However, its defence policy was more successful in backing its foreign policy towards its immediate neighbours and the West African sub-region. A good example was the ECOMOG Peacekeeping Operations (Olowo-Ake 1996). Good or bad, the foreign and defence policies of Babangida's regime one way or the other affected the nation.

Assessing Babangida's Foreign and Defence Policies

The foreign and defence policies of Babangida's government had certain impacts in terms of national interest and external relations, which could be considered from multiple dimensions. National interest in foreign policy reflects the interplay of domestic demands and external circumstances (Northedge 1969). In summarising the success or otherwise of these policies, it is necessary to assess its major thrusts, which included Economic Diplomacy, the Technical Aid Corps, the Concentric Circle Policy and the Mutual Collective Defence and Security System.

First, Economic Diplomacy was a great departure in the right direction in the articulation and pursuit of Nigeria's foreign policy. As noted above, through it, liberalisation and other international economic relations were promoted with positive effects on economic diversification. Aside from moving economic interests to the front burner of foreign policy to complement domestic economic reforms, the thrust also encouraged various foreign investors and international partners to engage with Nigeria during this period. The administration used the mechanism of economic

diplomacy to tackle the problems of inefficiency, mono-production, autarky and distribution that seem to be the bane of economic development in the country (Falode 2019: 46).

The effect of economic diplomacy on the country was reasonably positive because of the foreign investment it attracted, which helped in the rescheduling of the country's debt. However, the trade-off was to go along with the internal economic reforms recommended by the Western powers and the world financial institutions they control. The introduction of the SAP, devaluation of the currency, the removal and reduction of subsidies on essential commodities and the streamlining of the civil service (retrenching) had a devastating effect on the poor masses of the country, who did not support these reforms (Mimiko 1995b).

The SAP did not provide the necessary socioeconomic and political cushions that would have made it less disagreeable. For example, among its painful effects were a fifteen-month economic emergency period, a 92.2 per cent economic recovery levy on workers, the removal of 80 per cent of the subsidy on petroleum, a wage freeze, and the rationalisation of parastatals, which led to the loss of jobs. The resulting dissatisfaction provoked widespread revolt against the Babangida government in 1989 (Akinyeye 2003a: 128). Even so, it was under this unfavourable socioeconomic domestic environment that Nigeria gave aid and economic assistance to many African states that cried for help. For instance, Babangida's administration bought Liberia's external debt of USD 313.5 million in December 1989, when Nigeria's external debt was about USD 36 billion (Akinyeye 2003a: 129).

Second, the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) scheme has been judged to be one of the important and long-lasting innovations of the Babangida government's foreign policy, so much so that his successors have continued to implement it as a core instrument of Nigeria's external relations. Fage (2012: 199) notes that from the inception of the programme in 1987, up to the year 2010, 'more than 2000 had volunteered and have been deployed to serve in over 32 countries' under the TAC's arrangements. Among other attributes, it is a testament to Nigeria's contribution to global development. In addition, the programme has contributed greatly to facilitating bilateral relations between Nigeria and other countries in the African, Pacific and Caribbean regions since then.

Despite its praise as a foreign policy instrument, the TAC scheme was not flawless domestically. At its launch, the scheme aimed to pay USD 500 per month and cover other expenses to aid Nigerians working abroad, at a time when the average workers' salary in Nigeria was hardly above USD 50 per month (Lawal 2003). Through the TAC programme and other

elaborate African ventures, Nigeria continued to incur huge costs. Also, many Nigerians questioned the wisdom of sending abroad scarce skilled labour in vital areas, at a time when the country needed them most. On this point, Ogunade argued at the onset of the programme that, 'right now, Nigerians are daily dying from the different epidemics ravaging our fatherland—yellow fever, meningitis, etc, —yet we are busy planning to send to other lands our doctors, who are grossly not enough to meet our basic health needs' (1987: 37).

Over the years the scheme has turned out to be an encumbrance on Nigeria's national budget because of the huge amount of money spent on it annually without immediate visible returns (Fage 2012: 206). Irrespective of its challenges, this tool of foreign policy has brought global recognition to Nigeria. In terms of personal development, it has exposed Nigerian volunteers to the world and to international best practices and has enhanced cultural exchanges among citizens of the participating countries.

The foreign and defence policies of the Concentric Circle and the Mutual Collective Defence and Security System helped to shape many international engagements during Babangida's era. Their impact was felt politically, economically and socio-culturally. Politically, through these initiatives, Nigeria was able to lead other countries in solving Liberia's problem, projected the country as a regional power, and confirmed its leadership in the West African sub-region. The ECOMOG peacekeeping and, later, peace enforcement troops served as a deterrent to any country in the West Africa sub-region wanting to disturb the peace of the area. Babangida was seen as a confident president projecting his nation's power abroad (Vogt 1992).

Since foreign and defence policies reflect the domestic policies or situation of a country, to some degree, Babangida's policies portrayed Nigeria as a country with a strong domestic base. The policies attracted attention and respect for Nigeria internationally; praise was showered on Nigeria and Babangida for his leadership role in ECOMOG's peacekeeping operations (Vogt 1992). For the first time, defence and foreign policies were harmonised concerning the West African sub-region. This enabled Nigeria to successfully project its military power outside its territory and showed that 'a little bit of sabre-rattling does no regional power any harm as long as this ultimate weapon of diplomacy is rarely and wisely used' (Osuntokun 2000).

The two policies also reduced the level of threat to the country from some of her immediate neighbours, particularly Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea (Vogt 1992). The countries in the sub-region realised that Nigeria was the main force to be reckoned with and that its opinions on any issue could not be ignored. The policies increased the influence and prestige of

Nigeria in the sub-region and the whole of Africa. They also meant that troops were kept in shape and acquainted with modern tactics and warfare strategy. They gave some soldiers combat and field experience, which most had not had before ECOMOG (Vogt 1992). Through them, Nigeria acquired new military hardware, updated equipment, and could identify the inadequacies in the armed forces.

On the other side of the spectrum, the deployment of troops to restore peace in Liberia also had a negative effect in the West African sub-region. It led to the coup d'*état* and change of governments in Gambia in 1994 and Sierra Leone in 1996. Both Lieutenant Yahaya Jammeh of the Gambia and Captain Valentine Strasser of Sierra Leone were part of ECOMOG troops on routine rotation when they decided to use their military and field exposure to take over their home governments (Olowo-Ake 1996).

Economically, the ECOMOG operations cost the nation more than USD 8 billion and more than 500 Nigerian soldiers' lives, excluding other losses that cannot be quantified. (Olowo-Ake 1996). Granted, the foreign and defence policies were well articulated, but how the funds allocated to them were disbursed lacked transparency. Substantial amounts went into the pockets of corrupt officials. Some said it was the price of being a regional power, but there should have been accountability for the source of the funds and how they were spent. A great deal of it would have solved many other problems in the country.

The social impact of the policies could be seen in the influx and acceptance of refugees into the country, which increased pressure on the already inadequate social amenities available to the populace (Olowo-Ake 1996). Both soldiers in active service and innocent Nigerians living in Liberia lost their lives. Many soldiers came back infected with the HIV virus and some even with full-blown AIDS, which increased its spread in the country (Vogt 1992). Finally, the loss of lives led to an increase in the number of orphans.

The nature and impact of the Babangida government's major participation in the ECOMOG peacekeeping operations in Liberia through these policies have attracted criticism from various scholarly points of view, too. A central issue is the question of Nigeria's national interest with reference to the Liberia project. Akinyeye (2003b: 249) has argued, for instance, that 'it is difficult to sustain any thesis of national interest as motivating Nigeria's championing peacekeeping exercise in Liberia under the ECOMOG.' While it could be argued that some Nigerians resided in Liberia, Nigeria's interest could have been better protected at a cheaper cost. In essence, the financial and human resource costs were too enormous against the harsh economic

realities in Nigeria during that period. For example, Nigeria contributed 15,000 out of the 17,000 troops deployed to Liberia by 1993 of whom .about 500 were killed or missing in action. Financially, Nigeria spent the whopping sum of over USD $8 billion on the Liberia peace-keeping mission alone (Bukarambe 2000: 114-116; Akinyeye 2003a: 129). The *Guardian* newspaper protested at the incongruity between Nigeria's poor economic situation at home and its peace-making effort in Liberia: 'The cost of our intervention is high. A considerable number of soldiers have died ... not to protect our people or territorial integrity but to help a brother African state ... The financial cost had been enormous at a time when people at home cannot feed' (*Guardian*, 1992).

While committing human and financial resources in the peace-keeping effort, what national interests did Nigeria pursue through her foreign policy in Liberia? Some people said that it was to obtain Big Brother status in Africa and as a result of Babangida's personal friendship with Samuel Doe, the then Liberian leader. In comparison, unlike the United States (US) which participated in peace-keeping either to maintain the balance of power in a particular region or to ensure the uninhibited flow of oil in order to safeguard America's interests, Nigeria's efforts in Liberia did not achieve either of these targets. For example, during that period, the US government under the UN mission invaded Iraq in 1990 during the Gulf War so as to protect its oil investments in Kuwait. But Nigeria's participation in Liberia had nothing to do with that country's diamond business or other economic interests in the area. Also, although Liberia had direct historical links to the US, America abandoned Liberia at its greatest hour of need because it had nothing to gain from the exercise. But Nigeria committed vast resources in the pursuit of the foreign policies of Concentric Circle and the Mutual Collective Defence and Security System with nothing to show by way of its national interest in the conflict (Akinyeye 2003b: 249–250).

Nevertheless, from a regional security perspective, the Concentric Circle Policy and the Mutual Collective Defence and Security System really helped to stabilise Liberia during its first Civil War, through the leading role played by Babangida in the ECOMOG project. This minimised the chance of the Liberian conflict spilling rapidly to other neighbouring and distant countries in the West African sub-region and beyond. Even after General Babangida left power, his successors have used ECOMOG and other peacekeeping operations to rise to the challenge of playing a leading role and assert Nigeria as a regional power. Such efforts have further assisted in promoting Nigeria's foreign policy and projecting the country's image at different levels.

Conclusion

In conclusion, one can see clearly that there was a complete change of focus in the foreign and defence policies of Babangida's regime. The previous policy preoccupation with political issues such as African unity, anti-colonialism and opposition to apartheid was jettisoned and replaced with policies such as economic diplomacy, environmental issues and the concept of medium powers. The Technical Aid Corps also had pride of place in Nigeria's foreign policy. The focus of the defence policy changed to the Mutual Collective Defence and Security System based on the Concentric Circle theory, which also supported the foreign policy.

Summing up, one can say that Babangida's foreign and defence policies were successful to a large extent. The administration gave the two policies new direction from their hitherto moribund positions. For the first time in Nigeria's history, the foreign and defence policies were overhauled for proper articulation and redefinition, which projected Nigeria internationally as a respected regional power to be reckoned with. In comparison to his predecessors, Babangida's administration made great improvements to the foreign and defence policies thrusts.

One of the reasons for these achievements was his choice of officials. President Babangida chose to work with intellectuals and scholars of high integrity to assist him in formulating and implementing these policies. He also allowed his ministers a free hand in the running and operation of their various ministries. Osuntokun (2000) argues that 'One of the hallmarks of the Babangida administration was the freedom and latitude ministers were given to shape the affairs of their ministries.'

Finally, in reassessing the foreign and defence policies of Babangida's administration, it is evident that the implementation of these policies was counter to the national interest in some regards. In spite of this, the policies were really unique in nature. Even though there were lapses and shortcomings in some aspects of their administration, the theoretical underpinnings and practical implementation were sound. These policies were not only a landmark in the Babangida period, but also set the pace for his respective successors to follow.

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Political Science and African Political Epistemologies: The Dialectics of Developmentalist vs. Emancipatory Approaches

Shadrack Wanjala Nasong'o*

Abstract

The premise of this article is that there has been a dialectical duality to the political science study of Africa, in terms of scholars and focus. The duality of scholars is represented by African scholars both on the continent and in the diaspora, on one hand, and Africanist scholars (non-African scholars who study Africa), on the other. Much of the political study of Africa has focused on the problematic of development. This political science research focus on the problematic of development gives epistemological priority to generating empirical political knowledge research. In contrast, research emphasis on the problematic of emancipation from oppression and exploitation prioritises an epistemological conception of knowledge that facilitates radical change as it grapples with evaluative moral-ethical issues. The purpose of the article is to examine the dialectical nexus of development- and emancipatory-focused political study of Africa, and the impact and relevance of the corpus of political science epistemologies thus generated. The central argument is that the relevance and implications of political science epistemologies generated via normative and critical approaches have been more profound than those generated via strictly positivist and empirical approaches.

Résumé

Cet article part du principe qu'il existe une dualité dialectique dans l'étude de l'Afrique en sciences politiques, tant du point de vue des chercheurs que des objectifs poursuivis. La dualité des chercheurs est représentée par les chercheurs africains sur le continent et dans la diaspora, d'une part, et les chercheurs africanistes (chercheurs non africains qui étudient l'Afrique), d'autre part. Une grande partie de l'étude politique de l'Afrique s'est

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concentrée sur la problématique du développement. L'accent mis par cette recherche en sciences politiques sur la problématique du développement donne la priorité épistémologique à la production de connaissances politiques empiriques. En revanche, l'accent mis par la recherche sur la problématique de l'émancipation, de l'oppression et de l'exploitation donne la priorité à une conception épistémologique de la connaissance qui facilite un changement radical en s'attaquant à des questions évaluatives, L'objectif de cet article est d'examiner le lien dialectique entre la recherche axée sur le développement et la recherche axée sur l'émancipation dans l'étude politique de l'Afrique, ainsi que l'impact et la pertinence du corpus d'épistémologies des sciences politiques qui en découle. L'argument central est que la pertinence et les implications des épistémologies des sciences politiques générées par des approches normatives et critiques ont été plus profondes que celles générées par des approches strictement positivistes et empiriques.

Introduction

The main focus of much political science research in and on Africa has been the problematic of development in its social, economic and political trajectories. Yet, the process of development has largely taken place within a context of political, economic and cultural oppression. Focus on the problematic of development gives epistemological priority to positivist approaches that are assumed to facilitate the generation of empirical political knowledge. However, research emphasis on the problematic of emancipation from oppression and exploitation calls for normative political epistemologies that are rooted in interpretivist or hermeneutic theoretical approaches, which prioritise an epistemological conception of knowledge that facilitates grappling with evaluative issues, such as the purposes of African governments, the nature of African regimes, the goals of their political actions and the moral-ethical foundations of African states.

This article explores the nexus of these two broad political science approaches to the study of African politics and the impact and relevance of the corpus of knowledge generated in this way. The article begins with a broad survey of the developmentalist theoretical and conceptual approaches to the study of African politics in the liberal research tradition. This is followed by a focus on the emancipatory theoretical approaches that are essentially critical in orientation. Finally, the article examines the efficacy of the dialectical method in the study of African politics.

The article's objective is to evaluate the relevance and impact of these approaches in terms of their analytical and explanatory potency. It concludes with a brief evaluation of the positivist vs. interpretivist theoretical

approaches and their impact and implications. The main argument of the article is that the relevance and impact of normative political science epistemologies generated via interpretivist/hermeneutic theoretical lenses have been more profound than political science epistemologies generated via strictly positivist-empiricist approaches. The former epistemologies tend to be transformational in their intent and implications whereas the latter tend to be conservative and, ipso facto, pro status quo.

Developmentalist Liberal Approaches

The 1960s were a landmark decade in the political development of the African continent. This was the decade when the majority of African countries achieved their political independence from colonialism. From that point, the political science approach to the study of Africa was dominated by developmentalist liberal theories. Their key assumption was that African countries would develop along the same lines of political and economic development as the Western industrial liberal democracies. Among the most prominent theories in this developmentalist liberal tradition were modernisation theory, political order approaches and public policy analysis perspectives. To evaluate the relevance and impact of these theories in terms of their analytical and explanatory potency, let us focus on each one separately.

Modernisation Theory: The 1960s to the early 1970s

Modernisation theory is based on Walt Rostow's (1960) exposition of the stages of economic growth. All political systems, according to Rostow, develop through the same five stages of growth as leaders strive to transform 'backward' agricultural societies into 'modern' industrial economies. The five stages are:

1. Traditional—characterised by subsistence, barter trade and agriculture, and dependent on a rural economy.
2. Transitional—characterised by specialisation, surpluses and infrastructure, and dependent on the social appreciation of education and skills development.
3. Take off—characterised by industrialisation, growing investment, regional growth and political change, and dependent on a sub-urban economy.
4. Drive to Maturity—characterised by diversification, innovation, investment and less reliance on imports, and dependent on growth and developed economies.

5. High Mass Consumption—characterised by consumer orientation, the flourishing of durable goods and the dominance of the service sector, and dependent on a global economy or 'market managing' economies.

Emerging in the 1960s, the theory assumed that at the time of independence Africa was at the beginning point of a process of development that would enhance education and literacy, mechanise agriculture, industrialise urban centres and facilitate economic growth measured in Gross National Product (GNP) terms. The social trajectory of modernisation theory borrowed heavily from the ideas of Max Weber (1930) and Talcott Parsons (1967, 1951, 1937) in the fields of psychology and sociology. The main concern here was with the social dynamics by which individuals shifted from 'traditional' to 'modern' world views. Modernisation theory viewed ethnic divisions in Africa as obstacles to development and assumed that these would fade away as modernising societies became 'melting pots' in the image of the Western world (Nasong'o 2019:33–40, 2008:21; Schraeder 2004:303; Rostow 1960). At the political level, modernisation theory held that the key to political development was a rapidly growing electorate both willing and able to participate in the political process. As political participation grew, it was expected to generate corresponding growth and the specialisation of government agencies as leaders responded to the legitimate demands of citizens. It was envisaged that the economic, social and political trajectories of modernisation would culminate in the establishment of modern industrial democracies in Africa.

As argued elsewhere (Nasong'o 2018:35–56, 2008:19–44), however, modernisation theory was based on shaky assumptions. First was the a priori assumption that ethnic identity is, in and of itself, a hindrance to development, however defined, whereas industrialisation is the ideal end of a modern political economy (Schraeder 2004: 303; Almond and Coleman 1960). Second was the assumption that modernisation was a unilinear process in which traditional attributes like ethnic affiliations would ultimately erode away to be replaced by modern forms of affiliation to civic and professional associations. The reality, however, is that ethnicity and other forms of ordering societies, including clan and caste systems, are often revitalised and strengthened by the modernisation process. Third was the assumption that the modernisation process was a zero-sum game in which certain social and political advances along the modernity scale would inevitably result in an equal decline in traditional culture and values. On the contrary, it is apparent that traditional institutions often adapt to and co-exist with modern institutions. Whitaker Jr. (1970) demonstrated this with particular clarity in the case of northern Nigeria, where the creation

and expansion of modem political institutions was accompanied by the strengthening of the political roles played by traditional Muslim leaders (emirs). 'Far from modern institutions having simply driven out traditional ones, elements of the institutions of each type or origin coalesced to form a workable system of power and authority' (Whitaker Jr. 1970:460).

Fourth, and finally, modernisation theory assumed that traditional attitudes and institutions are inherently irrational and thus a hindrance to modernisation or development. On the contrary, modernisation revisionists such as Whitaker Jr. (1970) emphasised the importance of building on traditional cultures and values to promote development in Africa. To disregard the significance of such traditional attributes as ethnic affiliations and beliefs, they argued, is to court failure. Indeed, historically, ethnicity provided the basis for the organisation of resistance against colonial rule; it was a basis for adaptation to the uncertainties and insecurities caused by the rapid changes introduced by colonialism, and for the mobilisation of the nationalist struggle for political independence. In more contemporary terms, ethnicity functions to cushion the individual against the deleterious effects of alienation inherent in the rapidly modernising societies of Africa, by providing a sense of belonging and appreciation of one's social roots in a community. Even more importantly, ethnic movements demand justice and equity in the political and resource dispensation of the moment and thus effectively contribute to democratic practice (Nasong'o 2008:24, 2005:97; Nnoli 1998; Nyangira 1987).

Despite its noted limitations, modernisation theory had the impact of facilitating easy advice to African governments on how best to speed up the process of moving up the stages of growth. In doing so, it also justified considerable increase in the allocation of government funds, especially aid money, to social scientists, especially those working in the 'development' sector. Nevertheless, given that the theory drew from the experiences of individual Western states and sought to extrapolate these experiences to the rest, it can be said to amount to atomistic fallacy.

Political order approaches: the late 1960s to the late 1970s

The political study of Africa took a major shift, beginning in the mid-1970s, from the optimistic assumptions of modernisation theorists to a pessimistic view of African politics. This was occasioned by a number of developments in Africa and the US starting in the mid-1960s. First was the rise of secessionist movements and guerrilla insurgencies, which led to frequent military coups—an average of four successful coups annually between 1965 and 1969, compared to only two successful ones before

1963. This violent trend debunked the belief in democratic power transfer associated with the modernisation theorists. Second was the intensification of the Cold War and the commitment of the US to contain the spread of Communism into Africa via means that were anathema to the optimistic assumptions of modernisation theory.

> When the normative goal of modernisation theory, the creation of democratic political systems, clashed with anticommunist national security interests, U.S. leaders often supported national security efforts even when it meant creating unsavory, undemocratic leaders in Africa and other portions of the developing world (Schraeder 2004:308).

Third was the politics of the civil rights movement in the US and its potential for violence as well as the protests against US involvement in Vietnam, both of which led to the mantra of 'law and order' as the political slogan for presidential campaigns in the US, beginning in 1964.

The impact of these three political developments resulted in a shift away from modernisation theory and its belief in benign political development to a pessimistic expectation of 'political decay' in Africa manifested in 'conflict and chaos'. The foremost exponent of this perspective was Huntington (1968), according to whom the modernisation process, instead of contributing to democracy and stability, engendered political instability that endangered US foreign policy interests. It was now contended that democracy was not necessarily a natural or direct end-product of modernisation; that modernising states face six major crises, which, if not dealt with, threaten regime collapse and political decay. The crises were identified as:

1. *The crisis of identity* embodied in the challenge of crafting a common sense of nationality among ethnically, linguistically and religiously disparate peoples.

2. *The crisis of legitimacy* encapsulated in the challenge of creating a broad-based national consensus on the legitimate exercise of political authority.

3. *The crisis of participation* represented by the challenging quest to guide rising public demands for effective inclusion in the decision-making process.

4. *The crisis of penetration* symbolised by the difficulty in creating an effective government presence throughout the national territory.

5. *The crisis of distribution,* which hinged on the quest for balancing public demands for goods and services with the government's responsibility and capacity to provide public goods.

6. *The crisis of integration* embodied by the onerous task of nurturing harmonious relationships among a society's multiple groups and interests who were vying for access to and control of the political process (Nasong'o 2008:26–27; Schraeder 2004:309; Huntington 1965, 1968; Anber 1967).

Faced with criticism of their overly internalist approach and lack of attention to the external forces that African political systems faced, political order theorists added two more crises to the above: *the crisis of national survival*, that is, the challenge of maintaining the territorial integrity of the country as constituted at independence; and *the crisis of foreign control*, i.e., the challenge of securing and protecting political, social and economic freedom from external control (Rothchild and Curry Jr. 1979).

Political order theorists prescribed political institutionalisation as the remedy to these crises. By this they meant the creation of strong governmental structures capable of maintaining political order and stability. Such institutionalisation had to be the top priority of African leaders. Paradoxically, this perspective was the antithesis of the modernisationist approach. Instead of the rising levels of popular political participation envisaged by the latter, the former gave African leaders the licence to curtail popular participation in the name of securing stability and order. Huntington (1968:7), for instance, argued that the most critical political difference among countries was not their *form* of government but their *degree* of government. He admired the Leninist vanguard single party, arguing that though such single parties might not provide liberty, they provided authority and created governments that actually governed. Zolberg (1966) went so far as to argue, in the case of West Africa, that the single-party system provided political order, the prerequisite for the successful modernisation of African societies. This political order perspective provided African leaders with a sound intellectual rationalisation for the establishment of authoritarian single-party states, which were viewed as the most viable political rubric for the onerous task of nation-building and economic development (Nasong'o 2005:7–16; Nyong'o 1992a:90–96).

Public policy process perspectives: the late 1970s to the 1980s

In the mid-1970s critiques emerged to the effect that much of the political science scholarship on Africa was too abstract to be of any practical relevance in addressing the day-to-day policy problems faced by Africans. Scholars were urged to descend from their lofty grand theorising and make their research more policy-relevant. This led to the emergence of two trajectories of public policy research, which drew from political science and economics. First was the political economy approach, whose main assumption was that politics and economics are so mutually interrelated that previous attempts to study each in isolation from the other offered solutions that did not capture real world conditions (Schraeder 2004). This approach appropriated rational choice models from economics, the

essential thesis of which is that individuals are rational actors who make decisions on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis of the trade-offs between a variety of options. As rational actors, they seek to maximise utility and minimise cost. Schraeder (2004: 312) notes that the political component of this approach emphasises the importance of understanding the variety of policy alternatives available to policy-makers and other interests in society as they bargain for an outcome that they perceive to be in their best interests. Bates (1981) applied this approach to explain why food production declined in Africa in the first decades of independence and contributed to vicious cycles of famine and starvation. In other words, why should reasonable leaders adopt public policies that have harmful consequences for the societies they govern? The answer, according to Bates, lay in the political calculations of African policy-makers.

The second trajectory of the public policy process perspective focused on public policy analysis. This entailed evaluating the outputs of government policies and programmes. The approach probed and explored the strategies available to policy-makers for addressing the social, economic and political problems that characterised the quest for development, broadly defined. The approach was action-oriented and aimed at problem-solving. Its main concern was to analyse policy options available to policy-makers and evaluate which one of them was most germane to the development process. Taking this problem-solving approach with a view to assisting African leaders in tackling the constraints presented by inherited colonial institutions, resource scarcity and environmental degradation, Rothchild and Curry Jr. (1979) contended that African leaders were capable of adopting policy options from a variety of strategies, each of which encompassed different trade-offs, depending on the nature of the policy goals desired by the political leaders.

Schraeder (2004) points out that the impetus for the shift towards public policy perspectives, beginning in the late 1970s and continuing through to the 1980s, was an increasing emphasis on the role of the state in Africa. Scholars began to effectively interrogate the relationship between the state and its domestic constituencies, including ethno-regional groups, social movements and classes, as well as the relationship between the state and external forces, such as transnational corporations, international organisations and agents of bilateral and multilateral interests. Hence, by the end of the 1980s, the state had become the focal analytical point for African and Africanist political scientists who were seeking to understand and explain the 'lost decades' of Africa's political independence (Nyong'o 1989, 1992; Migdal 1988; Rothchild and Chazan 1988; Rothchild and Olorunsola 1983; Curry Jr. 1979).

Neoliberal theoretical eclecticism: the mid-1990s to the 2010s

The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of socialist experiments in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia marked a new era dominated by neoliberal ideas. It saw a shift within the liberal political science tradition in theorising about politics in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. The liberal tradition was now marked by a new theoretical and conceptual eclecticism. The first was the study of democratisation, inspired by the so-called second liberation of Africa (Lindberg 2006; Murunga and Nasong'o 2006; Mbaku and Ihonvbere 2003; Nzongola-Ntalaja and Lee 1998; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Nyong'o 1987). These scholars shared with modernisation theorists the optimism of democratic consolidation in Africa. However, they did not assume a priori that such consolidation would be easy or even assured.

The second trend in the liberal tradition, which is a corollary to the first one, focused on the centrality of civil society in the politics of democratisation in Africa. The first crop of scholars who took this approach heralded civil society, defined in terms of social formations such as trade unions, professional associations, community organisations, women's organisations and religious groups among others, as the hitherto missing key to sustained political reform and insurance of political renewal on the continent (Harbeson, Rothchild and Chazan 1994; Kleinberg and Clark 2000). Subsequent scholars in this trajectory took a more critical position, arguing that in spite of civil society's critical role in pushing authoritarian regimes to open up political space to competition, its democratic predisposition could not be taken for granted, as organisations within the realm of civil society exhibit contradictory possibilities (Nasong'o 2004, 2007; Murunga 2000; Callaghy 1994).

A focus on the role of ethnicity in African politics constitutes the third trend in the current liberal tradition. Herein, some scholars contend that the resurgence of ethnic conflicts in Africa was inevitable after the end of the Cold War and that these conflicts constitute the bane of African political development. Other scholars posit that the ethnicisation of politics is inherently positive, as it both engenders and calls for the decentralisation of authority from the contested national centre to the local levels, hence promoting a democratic ethos (Adar 1998; Nnoli 1998; Rothchild 1997; Glickman 1995).

Fourth is the gender approach to the study of African politics. Scholars who take this approach argue that the classic themes of African politics need to be enriched by focusing on women, hitherto marginalised, whose

empowerment has yielded more of their numbers in the political arena with serious implications for the nature of political discourse and policy formulation in Africa (Nasong'o and Ayot 2007; Oyewumi 2005; Boko, Baliamoune-Lutz and Kimuna 2005; Tamale 1999).

The fifth new trend in the liberal study of Africa adopts an individualistic methodology and focuses on the actions of individual African leaders as the critical variable in seeking to understand the continent's socioeconomic problems. This approach tends to be extreme in its pessimism about the nature of African politics. The basic logic herein is that African political classes manipulate the state to pursue illegal activities with the sole purpose of self-aggrandisement. Scholars such as Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1998), for instance, argue that African political elites deliberately perpetrate political disorder and even instigate state collapse in pursuit of political advantage and personal enrichment. Chabal and Daloz (1998:162) go so far as to posit that African political systems embody an inbuilt bias in favour of greater disorder. Although Van de Walle (2001) follows this trend in his explanation of Africa's socioeconomic malaise, in terms of the patrimonial logic of governance that he views as incompatible with economic growth and development, he is more guarded in his analysis. Unlike Chabal and Daloz, Van de Walle contends that the African crisis of governance is neither static nor permanent, nor is it part of the natural landscape of African politics and society, as Bayart et al. suggest. It is, rather, subject to both internal and external forces of change, including the forces of democratisation (Van de Walle 2001).

The sixth and final trend focuses on 'worst-case scenarios' of state collapse in Africa. With Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Congo-Kinshasa as its points of analysis, this approach explores the ability of warlords to use their control of valuable resources—including diamonds and gold—as a source of income to fund illicit activities, especially guerrilla wars against the centralised state authority. Taking this approach, Reno (1998, 1995) notes that historically, external actors—particularly transnational corporations—have shown themselves to be more than willing to enter into financial arrangements with warlords as long as the said warlords control access to a valued resource or territory. Schraeder (2004:317) points out, however, that critics have cautioned that one must be wary of attempts to generalise from Reno's worst-case scenarios to the broader universe of the continent's states, because for every extreme case of state collapse, such as Somalia, there exist other cases of effective conflict resolution and state-building, such as Mozambique (Manning 2002).

The state of the liberal tradition in the social study of Africa in the twenty-first century is thus characterised by a lack of unanimity on the specifics of which liberal theories are most apposite for the analysis of African politics and society. As the above six trends amply illustrate, the liberal approach entails myriad competing ideas, theories and policy prescriptions. These differences notwithstanding, scholars in the liberal tradition are bound together by their common belief in the Western liberal democratic tradition as the model to be emulated by African leaders (Schraeder 2004:318).

Emancipatory Critical Approaches

Informed by the momentous experiences of the Western world, developmentalist liberal theories of African politics assumed that African countries could and should replicate the development models of the Western capitalist world. These approaches were overly internalist in outlook, tending to assume that African politics and development were essentially a function of factors internal to African states. On the other hand, critical theories were inspired by the socialist experiments of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, China and Cuba, as well as the social democratic systems of the Nordic countries. Critical perspectives emphasise the deleterious impact of external forces in African politics and contend that genuine development will be achieved in Africa only through emancipatory revolutionary struggles that facilitate the inauguration of socialist and people-centred modes of governance throughout Africa. Among these emancipatory critical perspectives are dependency theory, world systems theory and Marxism.

Dependency theory: the late 1960s to the early 1970s

Despite the optimistic projections of modernisation theorists, Africa experienced political authoritarianism, economic stagnation and social strife through the 1970s, 1980s and beyond. Modernisation theorists explained these problems in terms of factors internal to Africa, especially poor governance and corruption. Dependency theorists focused on external factors and argued that the problem of underdevelopment in Africa was a product of the continent's incorporation into the global capitalist system from an unequal footing. This resulted in the extraction of resources from Africa and their transshipment to Europe, hence the progressive underdevelopment of Africa.

According to Rodney ([1972] 1982), before the sixteenth century, African countries were developing economically and politically. However, the spread of international capitalism by the end of the sixteenth century

culminated in colonialism and the incorporation of Africa into the global capitalist system. This marked the end of all forms of autonomous development in Africa. European domination, Rodney argued, resulted in the development of underdevelopment, i.e., the gradual impoverishment of the African continent, as previous development was halted, blunted and reversed (Rodney [1972], 1982; Caporaso 1978; Leys 1975; Cardoso 1977; Frank 1967, 1970, 1972). Instead, under the colonial economy, surplus value was extracted from the colonies and shipped to the colonial metropoles. Substandard wages were paid to African workers, while no profits were reinvested in the colonies in the form of social services to benefit Africans. Profits were instead expatriated to the metropoles, where they contributed to the material wellbeing of Europeans, a process that led to the development of Europe and the underdevelopment of Africa simultaneously (Rodney [1972] 1982:212; Schraeder 2004:324).

From the dependency perspective, governance in postcolonial Africa has less to do with the management of public affairs for the benefit of Africans, but more to do with the maintenance of the unequal relations between the postcolony and the former colonial metropoles. The African political elites constitute a comprador class that advertently or inadvertently serves as the political, economic and cultural agents of global capitalism. According to Dani Nabudere (1977, 1979), transnational corporations constitute the neocolonial form of this type of imperialism. The local comprador class, who manage the subsidiaries of these corporations or sit on their boards, benefit from the survival and success of these businesses and thus influence domestic policy-making to protect these foreign interests. Such policies benefit only the foreigners and their local allies (Frank 1972; Leys 1975). Hence, African governments preside over the impoverishment of local majorities and, as Nyong'o (1989) argues, have to be strong enough to master the tensions and conflicts generated among the masses by this process of underdevelopment. Inevitably, therefore, authoritarianism becomes the established mode of governance in this scheme of things, the process of democratisation notwithstanding.

The world systems approach: the mid-1970s to the 1980s

The world systems approach emerged in the mid-1970s and focused on the exploitative nature of the relations between the global North and global South. Wallerstein (1976, 1979), the theory's main exponent, analysed the emergence of the capitalist world system, which he saw as an exploitative global capitalist system controlled by the major powers of the West. This

system was characterised by alternating periods of economic boom and bust in which the metropoles progress and the periphery gets impoverished. According to this perspective, European overseas imperialism epitomised by the scramble for Africa was a consequence of the contraction in the capitalist world economy between 1873 and 1897 (Schraeder 2004: 325; Wallerstein 1976; Nabudere 1979). In place of the centre-periphery dyadic approach of the traditional dependency theorists, like Andre Frank (1967) and Fernando Cardoso (1977), Wallerstein conceptualised an intermediate class between the two, the semi-periphery. Countries in the semi-periphery are neither very powerful nor are they overly impoverished. These are states that wield economic and political power within their immediate regions, such as Nigeria in West Africa, Kenya in East Africa and South Africa in the southern African region.

According to the world systems approach, genuine socioeconomic development in Africa can only occur with a shift from the capitalist ethos of the moment to a people-centred socialist form of governance. Otherwise, attempts by any given country to attain socioeconomic transformation within the capitalist world system are doomed to fail. However, the possibility for the overthrow of the capitalist world economy is complicated by the existence of the semi-periphery. The revolution is supposed to be occasioned by extreme polarisation between a small core of the richest countries and the vast majority of the poorest ones. However, semi-periphery countries delay the process of polarisation by undermining the creation of a unified front against the centre countries. Semi-peripheral states see themselves as better off in economic and political terms than the countries of the periphery and thus wittingly or unwittingly serve as agents of the metropoles by seeking to strengthen their position in an otherwise exploitative global system (Amin 1976).

Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches: the late 1970s

From a materialist perspective, Marx (1992 [1848]) postulated that all societies are divided into two basic classes bound together in a relationship of exploitation. The dominant classes in a capitalist society are the bourgeoisie (owners of the means of production) and the dominated are the proletariat (the working class who sell their labour for subsistence). As more and more profits accrue to the bourgeoisie, the proletariat becomes more and more alienated from the products of their labour and they increasingly become revolutionised. The revolutionary situation is accelerated by advances in the forces of production (technological, scientific, etc.), which outgrow the relations of production (the system of property ownership among classes),

resulting in increasing difficulty for the dominant class to maintain control over society via its traditional means. Since no dominant class is willing to peacefully cede its position of dominance, the growing contradiction between the forces of production and relations of production results in an intensified struggle that culminates in the revolutionary overthrow of the ruling class. According to Marx, this is the essence of dialectical materialism, which has characterised the development of human society from the ancient to the feudal to the contemporary capitalist system, which will eventually transition into the socialist and communist systems as the end product of social development. In this Marxian conception, the established order is the thesis, the contradictions it generates constitute the antithesis and the revolutionary outcome is the synthesis (Marx [1848] 1992).

Drawing from the principles of classical Marxism, neo-Marxism emerged in the late 1970s and affected critical theory on Africa. First, whereas neo-Marxism concurred with dependency theorists that capitalism is inherently exploitative, neo-Marxists contended that individual African countries could achieve 'dependent development' within the capitalist world economy by pursuing autocentric (self-reliant) development (Amin 1990). Neo-Marxists rejected the dependency theory's contention that only one mode of production—capitalism—characterised the international political economy. They posited that the fundamental socioeconomic differences that existed both between and within African economies pointed to the simultaneous existence of both capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production at the international, regional, national and even sub-national levels (Schraeder 2004:330; Amin 1990). Neo-Marxists thus preferred a more nuanced approach that took into account myriad developmental processes and results globally, regionally and nationally. Second, neo-Marxists argued that it was wrong to assume that the spread of capitalism across the globe had had a permanent pernicious effect on Africa. To the contrary, they contended, in line with their classical Marxist precursors, the spread of capitalism to Africa marked a major developmental stage in the inexorable march towards socialism, the ultimate end of sociopolitical development. In line with Wallerstein's postulation (1979), neo-Marxists posited that semi-periphery countries had witnessed rising levels of literacy, urbanisation, agricultural mechanisation and industrial output, all of which constituted the requisite conditions for the crystallisation of a proletariat, the class charged with leading the revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of capitalism and the realisation of a classless society characterised by the equality of all.

In matters of governance and development in Africa, the key issue between Marxists and neo-Marxists was whether the African state merely mirrored the interests of the dominant class in each African country (the viewpoint of classical Marxism) or whether African governing classes could be independent and implement policies that ran counter to the interests of the dominant national economic class (the standpoint of neo-Marxists). According to Schraeder (2004), the most notable contribution to this debate, at least in Africanist circles, was made by Richard Sklar (1978), who contended that, fundamentally, class relations are determined by relations of power not relations of production, as classical Marxists presumed. Central to Sklar's thesis was the argument that the African state was not a mere reflection of the society's economic system, nor should it be viewed as a sheer instrument of its dominant classes. Instead, Sklar posited a perception of African politics in terms of class competition with varying degrees of class competition and conflict. In certain circumstances, the economic elite may control the activities of the ruling elite; in other circumstances, the reverse may be the case. The point, according to this approach, is to eschew the notion that one particular class or combination of classes will always be dominant, nationally and internationally, and to focus on the reality of different class configurations and relationships latitudinally and longitudinally in each African country.

New critical trends: the mid-1990s to the 2010s

In the twenty-first century, following the disintegration of socialist experiments across the globe, a shift occurred in the critical political science tradition just as it did in the liberal tradition. The critical approach largely moved away from prescriptions for the inauguration of socialist modes of governance to the devolution of power to ensure a people-centred mode of governance. In the twentieth century, the Soviet Union had served as an ideological beacon of hope for African Marxists who saws a path to development that was independent of capitalism. Its demise ushered in a period of extreme pessimism among critical scholars (Shaw 1991; Ajulu 1995, 2000). The pessimism engendered a theoretical revisionism that resulted in a number of new research trends and perspectives (Schraeder 2004:333–336).

The first trend is a critical review of the process of democratisation. Focusing on the role of external powers in promoting multiparty democracy in Africa, critical scholars contend that this is a form of neocolonialism that is contributing to the recolonisation of the continent. Claude Ake (1994,

1996) for instance, argues that, for the most part, the adoption of multiparty politics in Africa has contributed to the 'democratisation of disempowerment', in which the essence of electoral contests is the rotation of self-interested elites of different political parties in power while the majority of the citizens remain disempowered from the political system. Ake argues that the true essence of democracy is social democracy, wherein the popular masses are guaranteed concrete social and economic rights beyond the abstract civil and political rights that are the hallmark of liberal democracy (Ake 1994, 1996; Nasong'o and Murunga 2007). Achieving social democracy, according to Sklar (2002), requires the nurturing of 'developmental democracy' in which collective group interests (as opposed to individual self-interest) are protected and promoted, and the pursuit of social justice and the prioritisation of economic rights. Sklar posits that such developmental democracy constitutes the best political option to the prevailing cruel choice between laissez-faire liberalism without social justice on the one hand and authoritarian modes of statist developmentalism on the other.

The second new major trend in the critical political study of Africa is embodied in the political economy approach, which critiques the increasing power and authority of international financial institutions, especially the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, over the economic decision-making of African countries. During the Cold War era, African states enjoyed bargaining leverage in sourcing foreign economic assistance between the West and the East. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, so went this leverage, and IMF/World Bank loans increasingly became tied to the conditionalities of economic liberalisation in the name of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), which were not only rammed down the throats of African leaders, but also required them to use force to implement. SAPs ran counter to the legitimate interests of the masses and, insofar as they were negotiated in closed-door boardrooms and needed force to implement, were inimical to genuine efforts at creating responsive and accountable governance in Africa (Cheru 1989; Mkandawire and Olukoshi 1995; Mkandawire and Soludo 1999; Murunga 2007). Scholars of this research orientation argue the case for Africans to retake the initiative in the SAP debate, otherwise the processes of political democratisation, economic liberalisation and the simultaneous determination of Africa's economic policies by international financial institutions amount to shifting from political dictatorship to authoritarian economism (Nasong'o 2004).

The third critical trend is rooted in the dependency perspective and has two main trajectories—neoimperialism and postimperialism. Neoimperialism proceeds from the premise that the granting of political

independence to African countries did not alter the exploitative military, economic, political and cultural relations between Africa and the capitalist global North in any meaningful way. Taking this view, Lumumba-Kasongo (1999) argues that, indeed, the exploitation of Africa has increased and intensified in the post-Cold War period. The postimperialism perspective, on the other hand, posits that as agents of global North imperialism, transnational corporations can play both negative and positive roles, depending on the nature of the relationship between the international wing of the corporations' managerial bourgeoisie headquartered in global North countries and the local indigenous wing of the same managerial bourgeoisie in African countries. Sklar and Becker (1999) concur that such relations are not ideologically neutral as they transmit the capitalist values of the global North to African countries. They argue, nonetheless, that such transmission of ideas, attitudes and values is not a unilinear but a two-way process: 'Members of the corporate international bourgeoisie are just as likely to be sensitised to the developmental values of their host country partners as the other way round' (cit. in Schraeder 2004:336; Falola 2002:678).

The fourth new trend in the critical tradition focuses on the idea of engendering the social sciences, which means making gender an integral element of the analytical approach to various themes in African politics and society (Schraeder 2004:334; Murunga 2002; Sall 2000). Parpart and Staudt (1990) and Nasong'o and Ayot (2007), for instance, argue that gender is critical to political development in Africa and to all scholarly efforts to conceptualise and theorise the modern African state, whether in its historical origins, current composition or the management of the extraction and distribution of resources. Some scholars in this realm focus on the collaboration between patriarchy and capitalism and the constraining impact of this on the role of women in socioeconomic development. In this regard, April Gordon (1996) argues that, although patriarchy and capitalism once collaborated to control and exploit women, their interests no longer coincide in contemporary Africa and, accordingly, women have the capacity to design new creative strategies to reform existing patriarchal structures and capitalist development to enhance their own status and improve their opportunities. This eventuality, according to Nasong'o and Ayot (2007), is contingent upon the facilitation of a critical mass of women's representation in key policy-making state institutions.

The study of social movements and their contribution to the struggles for more inclusive governance in Africa constitutes the fifth research trend in the critical tradition. The work of Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba (1995) is emblematic of this genre. These authors adopt a broad definition

of social movements to encompass all group activity independent of the state, a perspective that enables them to examine such varied social formations as national liberation movements, religious revivalist movements, ethnonationalist movements and community-based organisations of self-empowerment, among others. The thread that links the myriad movements they examine in their work is a shared experience of past oppression and the perpetual struggle for survival and inclusion in the political process. The potential for the success of these social movements in achieving their objectives, the argument goes, is dependent upon: the types of objectives they set for themselves and the strategies they devise for achieving them; the quality of their leaderships and followers; as well as the nature of their ideologies or organising principles (Nasong'o 2007:22–23).

Finally, Schraeder (2004) identifies the African nationalist school of thought as the sixth new trend in the critical tradition. According to Schraeder, it is also known as the Dar School on account of the fact that it originally grew out of a small cohort of African scholars based at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, who founded the African Association of Political Science in 1973. The principal premise of this school of thought is that the traditional focus of the critical tradition on the negative impacts of the global capitalist system and national economic classes must be supplemented if not supplanted by a growing cognisance of the immense political power and autonomy enjoyed by African states. 'Specifically, scholarship must reflect the indigenous power of African political institutions and actors in their relationship with domestic and international economic actors' (Schraeder 2004:336). A critical aspect of this scholarship is the promotion of Africa-specific scholarship that builds on African research networks and the interests of African scholars. Accordingly, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research (CODESRIA), headquartered in Dakar, Senegal, has emerged in the twenty-first century as the flagship, premier institution and principal outlet for critical scholarship on Africa by African scholars (see, for example, Hountondji 1999; Ibrahim 1997; Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba 1995; Mkandawire and Olukoshi 1995; Murunga and Nasong'o 2007).

Just like their liberal counterparts, critical scholars are not agreed on any one single theoretical framework as possessing the requisite descriptive, explanatory and predictive potency to serve as the main guiding frame of reference for scholars in this research tradition. Nevertheless, they are united by their common resolve to confront the deleterious effects on African peoples and social systems of the neoliberal models of development imposed by the dominant social classes working in cahoots with foreign capitalist

interests, as well as their commitment to generating knowledge and policy prescriptions that reflect the lived experiences and daily realities of Africans as opposed to those that merely caricature the experience and realities of the global North (Nasong'o 2008:19–44).

The Dialectical Method

A unique and analytically powerful theoretical framework that has been utilised in the study of Africa is the dialectical method. Engels ([1940] 1973) wrote that the dialectical method was principally a science of the general laws of motion and the development of nature, human society and thought. Three laws constitute the dialects. First is the law of the unity and conflict of opposites. This law states that the world in which we live is a paradoxical terrain characterised by a unity of contradictions: we have the integral vs. the differential in mathematics; action vs. reaction in mechanics; positive vs. negative electricity in physics; fusion and fission of atoms in chemistry; spirit vs. flesh in religion; and the elite vs. the masses, rulers vs. ruled, haves vs. have-nots in the political world.

Second is the law of the passage of quantitative change into qualitative change, by which small quantitative changes take place that eventually add up to a major qualitative change. For instance, the loss of a single hair at a time over time leads to a qualitative change called baldness.

Third is the law of the negation of the negation, which states that historical progress is achieved through a series of contradictions. Where the previous stage is negated, this does not represent its total elimination. The new stage does not completely wipe out the stage that it supplants, but represents the original stage at a higher level. A good example is a grain of barley that germinates if planted under the right conditions. The grain ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant that has arisen from it, the negation of the grain. Given its normal life process, the barley plant grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley. As soon as these have ripened, the stalk dies. It in turn is negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirty-fold. The barley thus lives and evolves by means of returning to its starting point—but at a higher level. So do social change and development operate on the same law of negation and counter-negation and spiralling back to the starting point. Hence the common saying, 'The more things change, the more they remain the same.'

Ali Mazrui is the political scientist who has put this method, particularly the law of the unity of opposites, to great effect in his analysis of African political phenomena. As early as 1966, he wrote of Ghana's Kwame

Nkrumah as 'the Leninist Czar'. He argued that Nkrumah strove to be Africa's Lenin, a revolutionary theorist, while at the same time he sought to be Ghana's Czar, an imperial ruler! In Mazrui's view, 'Nkrumah's tragedy was a tragedy of excess, rather than of contradiction. He tried to be too much of a revolutionary monarch' (Mazrui 1966:106).

Similarly, in a comparative study of South Africa and Nigeria, Mazrui (2006) employs the same dialectical law, arguing that the two countries represent alternative faces of Africa, mirroring the political and socioeconomic contrasts inherent in the African condition: Nigeria is the Africa of human resources; South Africa is a land of mineral resources. Nigeria is repellent to European settlement; South Africa is a magnet for such settlement. Nigeria is a monoracial society; South Africa is a multiracial society. Nigeria is grappling with the politics of religion; South Africa is preoccupied with the politics of secularism. Nigeria is Africa's largest exporter of oil; South Africa is the continent's largest consumer of oil. Nigeria is a paradigm of indigenisation; South Africa is a paragon of Westernisation.

Mazrui's penchant for dialectics runs through most of his works, from diagnosing the African condition, to juxtaposing Islam between globalisation and counterterrorism, to analysing the politics of gender and the culture of sexuality (Mazrui 1986, 2004b, 2014). He has analysed the crisis of habitation in Africa—Africa as the earliest habitat of mankind but the last to become truly habitable. He has focused on the basic paradox of Africa's location—the reality that despite the centrality of its geographical and cultural position, Africa remains the most marginal of all of the world's continents. Mazrui has also lamented the humiliation of African peoples, a humiliation that arises from the triple burden of slavery, colonialism and racism (Mazrui 1980, 1986). Mazrui (2004a) has explored the historical, cultural and economic significance of Africa to the development of the United States. He contrasts this demonstrated significance with the combination of neglect and malice directed at the African continent and to peoples of African descent by the West in general and the United States in particular. Throughout this study, Mazrui demonstrates that this is a tale of two Edens: 'Africa as the Eden of Lost Innocence' and 'America as the Eden of Current Power and Future Fulfillment'. People of African ancestry have, he argues, been part of the vanguard for the Edenisation of America. But America is also influencing Africa, the first Eden. He observes that the United States is a major force in the liberalisation of black people in Africa, but black people are also a major force in the democratisation of all people in the United States.

Mazrui's (1995) study of Pan-Africanism is emblematic of his penchant for dialectics. According to him, pan-movements are born out of a combination of nightmare and dream, anguish and vision. He writes that the nightmare and the dream that released the forces that successfully culminated in the formation of the European Union was war and poetry. Poetry provided the vision and the sensibilities of being European. War provided the practical impetus either through conquest—as European nations expanded and contracted—or through a desire to avoid some future war. This was the combination of nightmare and dream, of anguish and vision, that resulted in the consolidation of Pan-Europeanism. The Cold War may have divided Europe—between east and west—but it also united Europe within each camp. Once again, nightmare and dream played their paradoxical integrative roles. On the other hand, Pan-Africanism's impetus lay in the combined power of poetry and imperialism rather than poetry and war. Mazrui delineates two paradoxical forms of Pan-African cultural nationalism that constitute the poetry of Pan-Africanism—what he calls Romantic Primitivism and Romantic Gloriana—both of which were responses to European imperialism. Romantic Primitivism celebrates what is simple about Africa; it salutes the cattle-herder, not the castle-builder. Romantic Gloriana celebrates Africa's legends, heroes and makers of African history. It celebrates the continent's more complex achievements, including '… the pyramids of Egypt, the towering structure of Aksum, the sunken churches of Lalibela, the brooding majesty of Great Zimbabwe, the castles of Gonder. It is a tribute to Africa's empires and kingdoms, Africa's inventors and discoverers, great Shaka Zulu rather than the unknown peasant' (Mazrui 1995:35).

Both forms of poetry (Romantic Primitivism and Romantic Gloriana) were responses to European imperialism and its cultural arrogance: Europeans claimed that Africans were simple and invented nothing (an alleged *fact*), and that those who were simple and invented nothing were, ipso facto, uncivilised (a *value* judgement). Romantic Primitivism accepted Europe's alleged facts about Africa—that Africa was simple and invented nothing—but rejected Europe's value judgement, that having invented nothing Africa was thus uncivilised. To Romantic Primitivism, simplicity was one version of civilisation. African simplicity was a function of the fact that the African lived in a paradise, in a Garden of Eden—where food was provided for by the bounty of nature and where the climate was without winter. For its part, Romantic Gloriana rejected Europe's alleged facts about Africa—that Africa was simple and invented nothing—but seemingly accepted Europe's value judgement, that civilisation is to be measured by

complexity and innovation, hence its focus on Africa's great empire builders, on Africa's legendary leaders, great monuments and extraordinary historical feats. Mazrui notes that the same African country can produce both types of Pan-African nationalists. He gives the example of Senegal, wherein Léopold Sédar Senghor, a major thinker and poet in the Negritude School, belonged to the Romantic Primitivism School, while his compatriot, Cheikh Anta Diop, belonged to the Romantic Gloriana one. Whereas Senghor accepted Europe's alleged facts and value judgements about Africa, going so far as to posit that 'emotion is black and reason is Greek', Diop spent much of his scholarly life demonstrating Africa's contributions to global civilisation and emphasising that Pharaonic Egypt's civilisation was a black civilisation.

Overall, Mazrui argues that the reality on the African continent is a fusion of the simple and the complex, the cattle-herder and the castle-builder. It is much more than Romantic Primitivism and Romantic Gloriana. In his view, real Pan-Africanism must go beyond the stimuli of poetry and imperialism if it is to succeed in constructing institutions to overcome its political, social and economic problems. Towards this end, he delineates, in his dialectical style, what he calls a fundamental duality in the paradigm of Pan-Africanism—the Pan-Africanism of liberation and the Pan-Africanism of integration. Pan-Africanism of liberation is embodied in the solidarity of Africans in Africa and the diaspora who fought against colonialism, who confronted racism and fought against apartheid South Africa. Pan-Africanism of integration has sought regional economic integration, a free trade area, a development alliance, or an economic union or economic community. According to Mazrui (1995), the Pan-Africanism of liberation has been impressively victorious. But the Pan-Africanism of integration has proved a dismal failure. Accordingly, he concludes that Africans are better at uniting for freedom than at uniting for development!

Conclusion: Empiricist Positivism vs. Normative Interpretivism

Underlying the different theoretical approaches to the study of African politics and the epistemologies generated therefrom has been a contestation, albeit latent, mostly, between positivist and interpretivist orientations. Generally, the developmentalist liberal approaches have tended to be positivist whereas the critical emancipatory approaches have tended to be interpretivist. Positivism believes in the unity of social and natural science methodologies and seeks to generate objective knowledge. It is a deductive or theory-testing approach, underpinned by an empiricist or objectivist ontology according to which facts are neutral and the truth lies out there, independent of our consciousness. We can capture it if we use the right

methods. Positivists seek to explain how and why things happen using measurement, correlation, statistical logic and verification. Their typical methods are surveys, questionnaires and random sampling. For positivists, if you cannot measure it, your knowledge is meagre and unsatisfactory. They thus accuse interpretivist approaches of not being 'proper science' methodologically and thus generating illegitimate epistemologies.

Interpretivism or reflexivism, on the other hand, believes in the essential difference between natural and social sciences. It distinguishes between 'brute facts' and 'social facts' and argues that the social world cannot be measured with the same methodological tools as the natural world. Interpretivists thus seek to generate subjective knowledge using an inductive or theory-building approach undergirded by a subjectivist ontology. In other words, the truth is complex since it is socially and intersubjectively constructed and is thus subject to perception and interpretation. Interpretivists seek to elucidate meaning in order to understand how and why things happen the way they do. Their typical methods include ethnographic studies, in-depth interviews, content analysis and participant observation, through which they generate normative epistemologies. They deride empiricist positivism as elevating method above substance and of being epistemologically conservative and thus pro status quo. For interpretivists, the point is not just to explain the political world, but—more importantly—to change it! Arguably, therefore, normative epistemologies generated by interpretivist approaches as demonstrated by the critical school have tended to be more relevant in terms of their transformational impact than empiricist positivist epistemologies, which essentially seek to solve problems within the extant status quo, as the case of the developmentalist theoretical school amply illustrates.

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Confrontations des « grammaires » de la « participation » communautaire en contexte d'urgence sanitaire d'Ebola en Guinée-Conakry

Sylvain Landry Faye*

Résumé

Cet article rend compte de la diversité des manières d'écrire, de faire, de parler de la participation communautaire dans la lutte contre Ebola en République de Guinée, souligne leurs paradoxes et éclaire la compréhension des réactions violentes observées lors de l'épidémie. Les données sont tirées d'une recherche anthropologique sur les expériences sociales de lutte contre l'épidémie d'Ebola (2015 à 2017) à Coyah, Forécariah et Conakry. Les résultats indiquent que les populations ont été mobilisées par les organisations internationales ou par l'entremise d'organisations communautaires pour réaliser des activités d'engagement communautaire. Cette grammaire officielle ne les a pas réellement engagées dans la lutte parce que ses ontologies de base ne favorisent pas les principes de l'agentisation et de la membralité. Elle a plutôt exacerbé les inégalités que contribué à développer leurs capacités d'initiative et pouvoir de résilience. D'un autre côté, diverses communautés ont pris des initiatives et se sont auto-organisées, de manière plus revendicative, critique, que collaborative. Cette grammaire pragmatique est l'affirmation d'un besoin de reconnaissance et les réactions dites de « réticence » rappellent les revendications de pouvoir des malades voulant être des acteurs et non de simples patients de leur maladie.

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Abstract

This article reports on the diversity of ways of writing, acting, and talking about community participation in the fight against Ebola in the Republic of Guinea; it highlights their paradoxes, and sheds light on understanding the violent reactions observed during the epidemic. The data are drawn from anthropological research on social experiences in the fight against the Ebola epidemic (2015 to 2017) in Coyah, Forécariah and Conakry. The findings indicate that populations were mobilized by international organizations or through community-based organizations to carry out community engagement activities. This official grammar did not really engage them in the struggle because its basic ontologies do not promote the principles of "agentisation" (active agents) and "membrality" (solidarity). Rather, it has exacerbated inequalities rather than helped to develop their capacities for initiative and resilience. On the other hand, various communities have taken initiatives and self-organized, in a way that is more demanding and critical than collaborative. This pragmatic grammar is the affirmation of a need for recognition, and the so-called "reluctance" reactions are reminiscent of the power claims of patients who want to be actors and not just patients of their own disease.

Éléments de contexte et questions

L'épidémie d'Ebola, en Afrique de l'Ouest, semble présenter à bien des égards le caractère de la nouveauté en raison de son ampleur, de l'importance des moyens déployés pour lutter contre elle, et du fait de sa résonance internationale. Mais en réalité, elle n'a rien d'une exceptionnalité (Faye 2015) et s'inscrit dans la continuité de l'expérience de cette maladie, dont la première en Afrique date de 1976 (Gasquet 2011).

Dans le cas particulier de la Guinée, à travers le prisme des attitudes de défiance à l'égard des équipes d'intervention, cette épidémie prend aussi corps dans une histoire sociopolitique caractérisée par une crise de la confiance à l'égard des autorités politiques occasionnant des réactions de défiance ayant induit des cas de mort (Faye 2015). Différents événements (rumeurs, violences verbales, physiques, barricades, fermetures de villages, contestations, etc.) ont rendu difficiles, voire périlleuses les interactions entre les populations et le dispositif de la riposte. Ils ont conduit les humanitaires à défendre et réaffirmer les principes de la mobilisation sociale et de l'engagement des communautés (OMS 2014).[1] Que l'on parle de mobilisations sociales ou d'engagement des communautés, ce sont différentes modalités d'un processus général de la « participation communautaire » (Bresson 2014) qui n'est pas non plus une nouveauté (Chauveau 2006), en particulier dans le champ de la santé. Ce concept

désigne un processus dans lequel on fait intervenir et contribuer les «gens d'en bas» aux décisions qui les concernent en premier lieu, afin de leur «permettre d'accéder à un pouvoir ou à une parcelle de pouvoir – ce qui correspond aussi à l'ambition de corriger les défauts de la démocratie» (Bresson 2014) en tant que pouvoir du peuple. Il requiert d'assumer l'idée que les populations ont des connaissances, des capacités, des réponses aux problèmes qui se posent, et qu'elles ont la capacité de contribuer ou d'être des acteurs de leur résolution. Il comporte aussi un autre implicite qui est la notion de bénévolat, supposant le don de soi à la communauté par le biais de la réalisation d'une activité au nom de l'intérêt de la collectivité.

Selon Fournier et Potvin (1995), ce principe est devenu depuis les années quatre-vingt-dix une condition préalable pour les projets de développement durable, un processus et un moyen de réaliser l'implication des populations. Dans le domaine de la santé publique, la participation des communautés s'est aussi imposée comme une composante des soins de santé primaires : «Pour les bailleurs de fonds du développement, il n'est plus question d'aide à des projets sanitaires qui n'énonceraient pas les deux principes de "l'accessibilité aux soins" et de "la participation des populations" (Fassin & Fassin 1989:889). D'abord limitée à l'adhésion aux normes d'hygiène, de bio-sécurité et à la nécessité de l'utilisation des services de santé (Alma-Ata 1978), elle a été investie d'un double sens : participer en payant l'accès aux soins (autofinancement) et participer aux décisions et à la mise en œuvre des activités (autogestion) allant dans le sens de la résolution des problèmes (Fassin *et al.* 1986).

Toutefois, si l'usage du concept de participation communautaire est déjà ancien, si les différents acteurs du monde du développement sont prompts à reconnaître sa nécessité, la manière de la mettre en pratique est souvent inédite (Michener 1998:2109). Par ailleurs, son actualité réside dans le registre et les expériences de l'urgence sanitaire. Elle demeure un puissant révélateur des contradictions de la volonté de faire participer des populations quand elles n'ont pas d'emprise sur le cours des choses, alors qu'elles sont privées de leurs différents droits au nom de la gestion du risque épidémiologique.

Dans le cadre de la lutte contre Ebola en Guinée-Conakry, la plupart des acteurs et des humanitaires ont réaffirmé le caractère central de la participation communautaire. Toutefois, dans les faits, les pratiques ont été diversifiées, renvoyant à des gammes de situations : d'un côté, les populations ont été mobilisées par l'OMS, l'Unicef[2] et les acteurs de la riposte, par le biais de dispositifs préstructurés comme les Comités villageois de veille (CVV) ou par l'entremise d'organisations communautaires contractualisées pour réaliser des activités préformatées. D'un autre côté, les populations ont pris des initiatives d'engagement de manière spontanée et se sont auto-

organisées pour se protéger, proposer une réponse et contribuer à la lutte contre Ebola, sans attendre les injonctions du dispositif de la riposte. Cette diversité de situations n'est pas spécifique à Ebola, car elle a été observée sur d'autres terrains (Cefai *et al.* 2014).

Nous proposons, dans cet article, de rendre compte des diverses grammaires sous-tendant les expériences de la participation communautaire dans la lutte contre Ebola. Les déclinaisons multiples de la participation communautaire justifient amplement l'usage du concept de «grammaire» dans le cadre de cet article. Étymologiquement, ce concept désigne un ensemble de normes, de règles implicites et explicites des manières d'écrire et de parler (actions et usages sociaux). Ces règles conventionnelles sont variables suivant les époques et les contextes sociohistoriques. Elles renvoient ainsi à ce que Bourdieu appelle le «sens pratique». Dans le cadre de cet article, nous n'utilisons pas ce concept seulement dans ses dimensions de règles conventionnelles : il ne s'agit pas ici d'insister sur les seules règles explicites de la participation, telles que la référence permettant d'en identifier les fautes, les incohérences grammaticales, les écarts… Il s'agit d'être aussi attentif à d'autres règles, plus implicites, de la participation, qui se déclinent dans les pratiques des acteurs et les dynamiques communautaires visant à apporter une réponse à l'épidémie d'Ebola. Rendre compte des confrontations de cette multiplicité des manières d'écrire, de faire, de parler de la participation communautaire permet de souligner le paradoxe de certaines d'entre elles et d'éclairer la compréhension des réactions violentes observées lors de l'épidémie.

Plus spécifiquement, nous souhaitons passer en revue les pratiques officielles de participation communautaire promues par le dispositif de lutte contre Ebola, afin de comprendre pourquoi, malgré la volonté d'engager les communautés, elles ont plutôt créé leur défiance (Faye 2015). La raison est-elle à chercher dans les apories de la définition de ce qu'est la «communauté» et dans les ontologies qui fondent l'action dans un contexte d'urgence sanitaire? L'imposition de la grammaire de la participation à travers un dispositif préstructuré est-elle de nature à remporter l'adhésion des populations ou crée-t-elle plutôt les conditions de son rejet par ces dernières? Les pratiques de mise à contribution d'acteurs dits représentatifs de leurs villages ou de leurs communautés nous conduisent aussi à nous intéresser aux processus de représentativité (élection, désignation, choix personnel, etc.) et de légitimation. Cette question se pose d'autant plus qu'en Guinée, les membres des CVV ont été par moments contestés et violentés dans les communautés qu'ils sont censés représenter. Par ailleurs, les tensions entre l'individuel et le collectif dans les pratiques quotidiennes de ces «représentants» sont de nature à souvent créer, au niveau communautaire, les conditions de leur rejet, remise en cause ou contestation.

Une autre question est relative à d'autres manières, plus pragmatiques, qu'ont les populations de prendre des initiatives d'elles-mêmes sans qu'elles aient été suggérées par les acteurs de la riposte. Ces dernières ont été nombreuses au cours de l'épidémie, mais elles n'ont pas été reconnues officiellement, le dispositif les a plutôt qualifiées de « réticences » parce qu'elles renvoyaient à une action publique imprévisible (Neveu 2003). Cefai *et al.* (2014) expliquent que « participer, c'est traverser un processus de prise de conscience collective et publique d'une situation problématique et se lancer dans le travail d'imputation de responsabilités, d'attributions de causes et d'anticipations de conséquences ». En se fondant sur cette définition, on peut alors se demander si les attitudes de prise de responsabilités et de critique du dispositif pourraient être envisagées comme des formes d'engagement participatif pour les populations qui en sont les principaux acteurs.

Sources des données et méthodes

Les données présentées ici sont tirées d'un programme de recherche anthropologique qui porte sur l'analyse des contextes historiques et socioculturels de l'épidémie d'Ebola et de la riposte en Basse-Côte (Coyah, Forécariah) et dans la capitale Conakry. Plus spécifiquement, il s'agit d'une ethnographie de la diversité des formes d'actions sociales allant dans le sens de la prévention de la maladie, pour lutter contre Ebola ou contester/accompagner le dispositif. L'approche ethnographique utilisée a requis, à partir d'observations contextuelles, de situations et de descriptions denses, de documenter les pratiques de la participation des communautés lors de la gestion de l'épidémie. Nous nous sommes intéressés à observer, découvrir et décrire les diverses « grammaires » auxquelles donnent lieu les pratiques d'engagement participatif des populations en analysant leurs confrontations. Les rationalités qui sous-tendent ces mobilisations protéiformes ont aussi été analysées, en tenant compte de la variabilité contextuelle et temporelle de l'épidémie, mais aussi des échelles d'analyse (individuelles et collectives).

C'est pour cette raison, relative à la nécessité de tenir compte des différences de contextes géographiques et temporels, que nous avons aussi mis à contribution les données ethnographiques collectées en Guinée forestière (Guéckedou, Macenta, Nzérékoré). Dans les premiers moments de l'épidémie (juin à septembre 2014), nous avons été impliqués dans les équipes de lutte contre Ebola, en qualité d'anthropologue pour le compte de l'OMS. Notre principal mandat, défini par l'OMS, consistait à accompagner les équipes médicales afin de faciliter leurs interactions avec les communautés, faire de la médiation sociale pour lever les « réticences » dans les villages (ce qui a fait de l'anthropologue un épidémiologiste social d'accompagnement, voir Faye

2015). Cette présence quotidienne sur le terrain nous a permis d'être témoin des interactions lors des réunions de la coordination préfectorale (structure locale de coordination et de pilotage des activités de lutte contre Ebola). Nous avons aussi pu observer les interactions sociales lors du passage des équipes médicales dans les villages affectés (pour le suivi des contacts, pour transférer des cas suspects vers les CTE, pour pulvériser les maisons, pour enlever les corps et procéder aux enterrements dignes et sécurisés). Elle nous a aussi permis de documenter, dans ces localités, les dynamiques sociales relatives aux réactions communautaires – face aux activités proposées par les humanitaires – et aux formes d'organisation locales de la lutte contre la maladie (discours et pratiques). En dehors des observations, nous avons ainsi pu faire des entretiens individuels et collectifs avec les femmes et les jeunes, considérés comme les principaux acteurs des dynamiques sociales face à l'épidémie. Nous avons aussi discuté avec les légitimités classiques (comité des sages, associations de ressortissants, autorités préfectorales, chefs de secteur) et avec les différents membres des équipes de la coordination (médecins, humanitaires, assistants, etc.).

Il est utile de souligner que l'implication dans les équipes de gestion de la lutte n'est pas sans effet sur la pratique anthropologique. En effet, l'anthropologue est d'un côté vu par les populations comme un « passeur » ou un « relais » de leurs préoccupations, ce qui a souvent fait de lui « un défenseur des communautés ». De l'autre côté, le dispositif de la riposte l'a considéré comme un « traducteur culturel », un informateur, un médiateur qui doit aider à « ouvrir » les communautés ou à « éteindre le feu ». Cette présence dans le dispositif a souvent fait qu'il n'était pas suffisamment dissocié de ce dernier et a été considéré comme un de ses alliés. Malgré ces biais, nous pensons que notre implication dans le dispositif a été nécessaire pour mettre en œuvre une approche symétrique (Faye 2015) nous permettant de le prendre comme un objet d'étude. Toutefois, il a été nécessaire de faire usage d'un ensemble de stratégies afin de nous « distinguer » par moments et de poser un regard plus critique sur les dynamiques : prendre des pauses méthodologiques, s'échapper pour questionner le processus, être dans les réunions (mais pas toujours) en réfléchissant sur ce que notre présence produit (souvent un faire-valoir pour les équipes de la riposte). L'expérience montre aussi qu'il est utile que le chercheur ait son agenda de recherche qui soit distinct de celui, interventionniste, que l'urgence sanitaire impose. Il doit éviter de reprendre comme allant de soi les concepts communément utilisés dans le contexte de l'urgence sanitaire et a intérêt à adopter une approche plus critique de ces concepts (par exemple les réticences), tout en orientant le regard vers des questions dissimulées ou négligées du fait de la trop grande focalisation sur le risque médical et l'urgence sanitaire.

Une grammaire « développementaliste » de la participation promue par les acteurs du dispositif de la riposte

Considérant que l'adhésion des communautés est essentielle pour assurer la lutte contre Ebola, l'Unicef, leader des activités de communication et mobilisation sociale,[3] a basé sa stratégie sur la création de structures dites communautaires. Avec la contribution d'autres partenaires (PNUD, FNUAP et Plan Guinée), cette institution a procédé au lancement des Comités villageois de veille (CVV) dans la préfecture de Forécariah, la plus touchée par l'épidémie en fin 2014.[4] Dans la ville de Conakry, ce sont les Comités de veille de quartier (CVQ) qui ont été mis en place. Au-delà des CVV et CVQ, la création d'unités opérationnelles à Conakry et de comités de levée des réticences (Coyah, Forécariah) a été soutenue par les acteurs du dispositif.

Ces structures, créées dans la plupart des préfectures touchées par l'épidémie, sont composées de membres originaires de la communauté, désignés par elle. Ces derniers sont en principe représentatifs des différentes catégories sociales (religieux, femmes, jeunes, comité de santé, agent de santé communautaire, tradithérapeutes). Dans le cadre de la lutte contre Ebola, elles avaient pour mandat de mener des activités de communication et de sensibilisation de proximité, de surveillance épidémiologique (lancer les alertes), mais aussi de médiation afin de faciliter la mise en place du dispositif biomédical de la riposte : identification communautaire des cas suspects et des contacts, promotion des services de prise en charge disponibles au niveau communautaire, facilitation des enterrements dignes et sécurisés (EDS) ; gestion des rumeurs, dénis et réticences ; notification des décès communautaires et surveillance des mouvements de population. Pourtant, ce type de structure n'est pas une nouveauté, car il a existé sous une autre forme en Guinée bien avant l'avènement de l'épidémie d'Ebola, dans le cadre d'activités de développement local : les services à base communautaire (SBC) regroupant les comités de point d'eau, comités d'hygiène, comités villageois de santé (CVS[5]). Selon Hounmenou (2002), « leur émergence a fait suite au constat généralisé du manque de participation des populations villageoises, dans les actions de développement initiées et conduites pour elles par les experts extérieurs à leurs communautés, sans leur implication réelle ».

Dans le cadre de la lutte contre Ebola, en Guinée plus spécifiquement, les CVV sont fondés sur l'idée qu'il serait plus facile de trouver les cas d'Ebola si un groupe de personnes appartenant au village était bénévole pour indiquer les familles où une personne est suspecte d'être malade afin que les agents de santé puissent la transférer au Centre de traitement Ebola (CTE).[6] D'autre part, l'Unicef s'est appuyée sur les réseaux locaux ou les structures déjà existantes pour mener les mêmes types d'activités que

celles confiées aux CVV. Dans cette perspective, le Conseil national des organisations de la Société civile (CNOSC), les ONG locales, les scouts, les OCB (associations de jeunes, de femmes), les syndicats des transporteurs et motos-taxis, les leaders religieux (ligue islamique), traditionnels (conseil des sages) et coutumiers ont tous été contractualisés par l'Unicef pour la communication et la surveillance communautaire.

Cette approche de la participation communautaire promue par le dispositif de la riposte consiste à mobiliser certaines composantes dites représentatives, afin de les amener à faire don de leur personne à la «communauté»[7] et à s'engager à réaliser des activités dont le contenu et la forme ont été pensés par le dispositif de la riposte. Dans ces structures, les publics sont déjà formatés (Dewey 2010) et ne font que prendre des places qui leur sont préattribuées et s'inscrivent dans un ordre d'interaction asymétrique (Neveu 2003). Cette approche rappelle une perspective développementaliste des années quatre-vingt-dix qui visait à impliquer les communautés villageoises dans les programmes liés à leur développement en les mobilisant par le biais de collectifs dont les actions étaient déjà définies par les techniciens (Fassin *et al*. 1986 ; Gomez-Témésio 2014). Toutefois, on peut se poser la question de savoir si les pratiques développementalistes de la participation dans le cadre de l'urgence sanitaire restent pertinentes pour engager les communautés pleinement dans la gestion de l'épidémie.

D'une grammaire de la participation basée sur une idée de la communauté au fonctionnement pratique des communautés

Selon la note circulaire de la Coordination nationale de la lutte contre Ebola en Guinée, «les comités de veille villageois sont constitués des gens de la communauté qui parlent la langue du territoire et qui peuvent sensibiliser sur les conditions de la propagation du virus Ebola». Leur composition a été limitée à sept (7) membres : un représentant des jeunes, un représentant des femmes, un agent de santé communautaire, un représentant des sages, un représentant des hommes, et deux personnes instruites pour faire le rapportage. Au niveau des préfectures et des sous-préfectures, les autorités politiques locales (préfets et sous-préfets) chargées de veiller au respect de ces critères ont fait appel aux chefs de districts pour la désignation des membres des CVV. C'est pourquoi il n'y a pratiquement pas eu de procédures d'élection à travers des réunions communautaires. Cette situation a été justifiée (par les chefs de district) par le fait que personne ne voulait s'engager dans ces structures censées intervenir dans la lutte contre Ebola. Ce «peu d'intérêt» des acteurs à faire don de leur personne s'explique d'abord par l'incohérence consistant à demander à des populations qui souffrent depuis l'avènement des politiques d'ajustement

structurel du sous-financement du système de santé de participer à la réponse contre l'épidémie, une réponse elle-même rendue compliquée par les carences du système de santé.[8] Ensuite, les formes de participation promues par les humanitaires exigeaient des formes d'engagement souvent stigmatisantes pour les populations et contrevenant à ce qui est jugé socialement légitime : dénoncer ses parents, faire la promotion d'un dispositif perçu comme intrusif et violent, bénéficiant plus aux élites qu'aux populations elles-mêmes.

Au-delà de ce faible intérêt des populations pour ces structures, les autorités locales ont quelquefois usé de modes de désignation basés sur des rationalités assez particulières :

- Logique de redistribution : donner le « travail » à ceux qui n'en ont pas encore.
- Logique de paix sociale : acheter la paix sociale en désignant des catégories considérées comme les plus critiques ou violentes (jeunes, femmes) ou celles qui posent des contraintes à la prise en charge d'Ebola (guérisseurs traditionnels par exemple).
- Logique clientéliste et d'économie de la rente : placer ses parents, amis et connaissances pour profiter des retombées de la participation ou pour récompenser la clientèle politique.

Cette situation a d'ailleurs été constatée par Fassin (1996), qui faisait remarquer que les processus de désignation ne font que reproduire les élites sociopolitiques, ceux qui sont chargés de sélectionner ayant tendance à ne désigner que ceux qui leur sont familiers. Finalement, cette approche de sélection et de désignation informe sur la nature relative et segmentaire de la légitimité et de la représentativité dont pouvaient se prévaloir ces membres. Elle explique aussi pourquoi ces acteurs, en réalité représentatifs de certaines enclaves dans les communautés, n'ont pas toujours été reconnus ou ont été contestés dans les villages en Basse-Côte (Guinée-Conakry).

Si ces structures sont globalement plus représentatives de certains groupes sociaux, c'est bien parce que l'action des humanitaires est basée sur une certaine idée de la communauté qui conduit à définir en amont ses catégories représentatives. Dans la pratique, la communauté est perçue comme une entité homogène, composée de groupes fixes de la démocratie populaire ou de figures de la légitimité traditionnelle dont la représentation suffit pour faire sens : jeunes, femmes, hommes, sages, agents de santé, etc. On se situe dans l'idée d'une société indifférenciée, comme le souligne Ferdinand Tönnies à travers la distinction qu'il a établie entre Gemeinschaft/ Geselschaft. La communauté, opposée à la société, est pensée comme une entité homogène où les populations auraient les mêmes besoins, problèmes, préoccupations (Fassin 1996) et fonctionneraient selon un principe de solidarité mécanique, opposée à celui de solidarité organique (Durkheim).

L'expérience guinéenne a montré qu'à Guéckédou, à Forécariah et à Coyah, la seule mise à contribution des jeunes, femmes, sages, imams, n'a pas suffi pour conduire à la résolution des réticences, non plus que pour la mise en œuvre des activités de surveillance épidémiologique. Au contraire, elle a conduit à des violences populaires (Tekoulo) ou des manifestations violentes (centre de Guéckédou) à l'occasion desquelles les jeunes se sont attaqués à des symboles de la légitimité traditionnelle (cas de Kolobengou à Guéckédou, voir Faye 2015). Pourtant, de telles attitudes ne sont pas une surprise, car comme le souligne McGovern (2013), si la hiérarchie gérontocratique fonctionne en temps de paix, ce n'est pas le cas dans les moments de violence ou de crise où la capture entrepreneuriale impose d'autres légitimités anonymes.

Les membres des CVV ont souvent été congédiés à leur arrivée dans les concessions. Les jeunes, qui se sont spontanément organisés pour sensibiliser et protéger «leurs communautés», se sont violemment opposés à eux, allant jusqu'à demander l'arbitrage des autorités politiques locales (préfet, gouverneur.) À Guéckédou, les travailleurs de la santé[9] ont été les principaux vecteurs des rumeurs sur le CTE ayant poussé les jeunes à manifester. À partir du moment où les rumeurs véhiculées à la sortie des réunions de coordination mettaient en accusation le dispositif de la riposte, elles confortaient l'idée d'une théorie de la conspiration (Faye 2015). Ces données montrent bien que les acteurs impliqués dans la lutte contre Ebola ont pu assumer des rôles de passeurs d'idées et de rumeurs dans les communautés, en diffusant des messages allant à l'encontre du dispositif qu'ils étaient pourtant censés promouvoir. Certes, ces conflits de rôles chez certains membres des équipes techniques et médicales locales ne sont pas spécifiques à la situation d'urgence sanitaire et s'observent aussi en temps de paix. Toutefois, ces rumeurs portées par les acteurs de la riposte gênent et retardent le travail communautaire alors que le contexte d'urgence requiert des interventions rapides pour rompre la chaîne de transmission et endiguer ses effets néfastes (contagion rapide et décès en cascade).

Ces développements montrent bien que ceux qui ont été à l'origine de ces réactions contestataires ou revendicatives (Almudena & Borchert 2014) font partie de forces de légitimités diverses (Fribault 2015) non reconnues par le dispositif de la riposte. L'expérience guinéenne montre la nécessité d'écouter les multiples communautés et d'être attentif aux légitimités «au ras du sol» qui s'expriment quotidiennement afin de contester ou engager les moyens locaux pour la résolution de la crise sanitaire. Par exemple, dans certains villages et quartiers, ce sont les entraîneurs de football qui ont été reconnus comme étant les plus légitimes pour les populations, ou les *« Sèrè Kounti»*.[10] À

Nongo (Conakry), un jeune coiffeur dont le salon est un lieu de sociabilité a vu se constituer autour de lui « un staff », [11] ce qui du même coup lui a donné une légitimité importante dans le quartier. Il ne s'agit pas ici de représentants de jeunes ou de femmes, mais de personnes porteuses d'une identité reconnue et promue au niveau local. Cette légitimité peut être conférée par diverses ressources : capital social, capital économique, relations d'alliance, ethnie, charisme, carrière politique, longue durée dans le quartier, etc.

En définitive, la notion de communauté reste une catégorie diverse et très relative, dont la représentation de composantes classiques (jeunes, hommes, femmes, sage) ne peut faire l'économie. Dans la pratique, il y a « des communautés » qui se composent, se décomposent et se reconstruisent au gré des circonstances, des situations, et qui mobilisent différents critères : l'ethnie, la religion, le parti politique. Enfin, la communauté n'est pas seulement vécue en fonction d'une délimitation géographique, ce qui remet en cause la légitimité de certains acteurs désignés à partir d'un territoire comme représentants d'un groupe. Les groupes sociaux basés sur l'ethnie, la religion par exemple, transcendent bien souvent les délimitations géographiques administratives. Dans ces conditions, on comprend bien que le fait de désigner des représentants d'une communauté à partir d'une zone géographique ne donne pas toujours les effets attendus.

Les principes de la contractualisation et du salariat des CVV : questions à propos de leur caractère réellement communautaire

Les différents membres des CVV ont signé un contrat de travail à durée déterminée qui prévoyait leurs charges et conditions d'exercice du travail, mais aussi la contrepartie financière de leur implication (paiement mensuel de 400 000 francs guinéens). Ces modalités indiquent que le membre CVV qui a en principe fait don de sa personne et s'est engagé à agir au compte de sa communauté (bénévolement) a bénéficié en réalité de gains individuels. Cette compensation induit aussi des tensions entre le collectif, au nom duquel les acteurs s'engagent, et l'individuel, au nom duquel ils signent un contrat et reçoivent un salaire. Au niveau collectif, les membres des CVV ont reconnu avoir été stigmatisés par les villageois qui les considéraient comme les nouveaux riches de « l'Ebola Business » en raison des salaires qu'ils recevaient. Cela a eu pour conséquence un refus de coopération dans la conduite de surveillance communautaire et de sensibilisation. Au niveau individuel, les logiques et stratégies d'acteurs ont pris le pas sur le bénévolat et l'engagement pour la communauté. Cette analyse est d'autant plus plausible que lorsque l'Unicef et PLAN International ont souhaité arrêter le salariat au bout de 4 mois, les membres ont réagi par des démissions ou un désintérêt manifeste.

Des acteurs dits représentatifs de la « citoyenneté » collective instrumentalisent leur engagement à des fins personnelles

En Guinée, les membres des CVV ou les acteurs du dispositif de la riposte ont régulièrement usé du discours de la « citoyenneté nationale » (aimer son pays, la Guinée, et donner sa vie pour protéger les siens) pour justifier leur engagement au nom du collectif. Pourtant, à y voir de près, ce discours nationaliste occulte difficilement les investissements à des fins plus individuelles : à Forécariah par exemple, si les guérisseurs traditionnels ont été contractualisés, seules certaines figures « politisées » ont été particulièrement présentes dans les activités menées par le dispositif, cherchant ainsi à se rendre visibles et à renforcer leur position dans le secteur de la tradithérapie. Par exemple, l'activité de mobilisation sociale organisée par la coordination préfectorale de lutte contre Ebola à Forécariah (août 2015) avec les « sortis guéris » fut une occasion pour les tradithérapeutes de se mettre en scène : se couper la langue, percer ses oreilles devant les invités. De leurs avis, de telles attitudes visaient à se mettre en valeur, à montrer le caractère exceptionnel de leur savoir-faire, afin d'élargir leur clientèle et d'intégrer d'autres espaces d'opportunités post-Ebola.

Au niveau des CVV, la quête du profit individuel a poussé par moments certains membres à être les artisans de certaines « réticences » ; à Forécariah, un soignant appelé en renfort pour gérer une contestation communautaire à l'occasion du cerclage d'un village a découvert, en infiltrant une des réunions des CVV, que leurs membres en étaient les instigateurs :

> Comme personne ne savait qui j'étais, j'ai profité de ça pour faire ma petite enquête, et ce jour-là, je suis tombé par hasard sur cette réunion des CVV. J'ai sorti mon téléphone en cachette et j'ai tout enregistré, et j'ai des photos en cachette, et j'ai transmis tout ça. À cette réunion, étaient présents le sous-préfet, la représentante des femmes, le représentant des jeunes, des sages, ils étaient tous là. Au bout de quelques minutes, j'ai compris que c'était eux qui étaient en train de créer le problème. Le sous-préfet disait : « Ils (à Conakry) mangent sur notre dos, normalement on donne plus que ça, mais ils gardent une partie, donc nous aussi on va garder ce qu'ils ont donné et si les gens manifestent, ils vont envoyer plus et on pourra donner à tout le monde ». Donc en fait, ils avaient choisi de détourner et de se partager toute la dotation, bœuf, riz, huile, etc., et ils ont dit aux gens de manifester pour que les gens d'Ebola leur donnent des vivres parce que quand il y a cerclage ailleurs, on leur donne. Et c'est pour ça qu'il y avait la grogne.

Cet extrait montre que ces acteurs, plutôt que de faciliter la collaboration des communautés, ont encouragé les comportements dits réticents. Pourtant, cette grogne avait été présentée par les CVV comme une révolte contre le dispositif, face à laquelle ils essayaient de trouver une solution.

Dans la réalité, ces membres visaient à augmenter la dotation en vivres mise à disposition par les humanitaires. Ces quelques exemples montrent bien qu'au-delà de la dimension de citoyenneté, la mobilisation des acteurs au nom du collectif a souvent généré surtout des retombées personnelles. On peut dès lors comprendre que les communautés diverses aient violemment réagi à ces acteurs censés les représenter, mais qui ont été perçus comme ceux qui ont profité de Ebola Business en instrumentalisant le collectif.

Former et techniciser les membres des structures créées ou contractualisées fait d'eux plus des exécutants que des acteurs participatifs

À Forécariah, les membres des CVV ont été regroupés en formation afin de les sensibiliser d'abord aux principes et normes de biosécurité. Ensuite, leur coopération était souhaitée dans la conduite des activités de sensibilisation et communication, de surveillance, de contrôle, de recherche et de suivi des contacts et des suspects. En réalité, ils étaient formés pour faire valoir les principes de gestion du risque épidémiologique définis par les opérateurs de la riposte. C'est ainsi qu'ils ont reçu des boîtes à images consignant l'ensemble des messages animés qu'ils devaient partager sur le terrain. Pourtant, cette approche de formation à contenu préformaté était contraire à l'esprit de la participation communautaire pensée comme un processus d'engagement où des individus ou groupes sociaux identifient leurs problèmes, les moyens jugés adéquats pour les résoudre et les mettent en œuvre (Hart 1997 ; Landsdown 2001). Ici, les membres des CVV n'ont pas été des initiateurs et les organisateurs du processus, ils étaient plutôt associés dans la mise en œuvre d'activités qui leur ont été imposées du dehors (Wils *et al.* 1998 ; Bresson 2014). Appelés à coopérer en tant que relais formés pour passer un message ou défendre une politique dont ils ne sont pas comptables, ils n'ont pas eu une grande latitude de prises d'initiatives, celles-ci étant considérées comme une contre-indication de la gestion de l'urgence sanitaire. Celle-ci, au lieu de promouvoir la prise d'initiative communautaire, définit plutôt le champ du possible et de l'acceptable, en raison du risque épidémiologique mis en avant.

Quand les membres des structures mobilisées « résistent à bas bruit » à la participation programmée du dispositif

Il est utile de préciser que les membres de ces CVV ne se conduisent pas toujours comme des agents qui ne font qu'exécuter ce qu'on leur demande. À Forécariah et à Conakry, certains ont eu à délivrer des certificats de « mort naturelle » à des personnes décédées. Il a aussi été noté que les acteurs

chargés de faire « passer le message de la riposte » se sont parfois signalés par la diffusion de messages non homologués : dans la préfecture de Coyah, des membres de CVV ont donné l'information aux villageois qu'Ebola était fini, suite à l'absence de signalement de cas. Toutefois, cette information allait à l'encontre du message du dispositif qui consistait à rappeler qu'aucune zone n'était à l'abri tant que l'épidémie n'avait pas quitté la Guinée dans son entièreté. Dans le village Kobah (Kouria, dans Coyah), certains imams membres de CVV étaient chargés de veiller à ce que les tous les cas de décès soient notifiés et gérés de manière digne et sécurisée par les équipes techniques. Mais au lieu de faire appliquer les normes, ces imams ont plutôt signé avec les villageois un pacte de non-notification des cas.

Ces différentes attitudes renseignent sur le fait que les membres des CVV ou des structures contractualisées sont des acteurs sociaux qui, une fois de retour dans leurs communautés, font face à d'autres enjeux qui influencent leurs attitudes. Elles informent aussi sur l'importance des attitudes de réinterprétation, de débordement tactique, qui peuvent entraîner les dispositifs préformatés à subir des dynamiques (Cefai *et al.* 2014). Ces situations, pensées par le dispositif de la riposte comme des moments « d'incohérences grammaticales », sont en réalité l'expression d'une autre grammaire de la participation à laquelle ils sont restés peu sensibles. Elles illustrent des logiques d'acteurs participatifs qui critiquent les normes techniques qu'ils sont censés promouvoir.

Quand la « grammaire » officielle de la participation échoue à engager suffisamment les populations dans la lutte contre Ebola

À travers la création des CVV et la contractualisation avec les associations de jeunes, de femmes, de ressortissants, la riposte a mobilisé des composantes de la société, en les investissant du rôle d'exécution de certaines tâches prédéfinies. Toutefois, il s'est avéré sur le terrain que les résultats obtenus n'ont pas toujours été à la hauteur des attentes.

Si cette grammaire est restée incapable d'engager réellement les communautés dans leur diversité, c'est en raison de son caractère développementaliste qui n'est pas toujours pertinent dans le cadre de la gestion de l'urgence sanitaire. Comme le soulignait Bayart (1989), cette approche a une tendance à reproduire les catégories fixées comme représentatives de la communauté alors qu'elles ne correspondent pas toujours au réel social. Cela est d'autant plus vrai dans les situations de crises sociosanitaires, où s'opèrent souvent une critique des légitimités traditionnelles et l'affirmation d'autres formes au ras du sol. L'approche du dispositif n'a fait que renforcer les inégalités sociales et les possibilités de contestation sociale dans la gestion

de l'épidémie. Cette idée a déjà été développée par Iman, Mama et Sow (2004) dans l'étude des projets de développement cherchant à impliquer les femmes. Pourtant, le développement perçu comme un processus social doit déboucher sur « l'expansion des libertés réelles dont jouissent les individus » et donc l'empowerment (Sen 2003:15). Mais en Guinée, la grammaire développementaliste de la participation a contribué davantage à maintenir la dépendance des communautés qu'à développer leur autonomie, leur capacité d'initiative, et donc leur pouvoir de résilience, nécessairement à renforcer dans la perspective post-Ebola en particulier. Par ailleurs, l'urgence sanitaire a imposé une souveraineté biomédicale et un refus de l'action collective imprévisible[12] (Neveu 2003), autant d'éléments qui ne sont pas de nature à « engager », à écouter et à responsabiliser les communautés, malgré les pieux vœux et les déclarations d'intention des promoteurs de la lutte contre Ebola. En effet, pour la plupart des médecins, le risque épidémiologique était tellement important que cela nécessitait l'application et l'imposition d'un ensemble de normes de bio-sécurité afin de rompre la chaîne de transmission. Ce paradigme médical a réaffirmé l'approche biosécuritaire qui fait de la biomédecine la seule à avoir la capacité de gestion du risque de transmission. En réalité, l'urgence sanitaire a imposé une grammaire normative et standardisée, impérative, qui légitime le discours biomédical, mais souvent ne prête pas attention aux spécificités contextuelles et locales et ne reconnaît pas la capacité d'acteurs des communautés à identifier le risque et à adopter des attitudes de gestion de ce risque. Elle considère aussi les croyances et les traditions des populations comme des barrières et savoirs rétrogrades à changer et non comme des réponses locales à encadrer et à promouvoir. Cette grammaire fait de la participation un principe de mobilisation de bénéficiaires, et non d'engagement d'acteurs avec une historicité reconnue. Pourtant, sur le terrain, les populations ont été porteuses d'initiatives spontanées allant dans ce sens, visant à prévenir et lutter contre Ebola, et qui se sont souvent confrontées avec celles suggérées par le dispositif de la riposte. À y regarder de près, elles constituent une autre forme de grammaire de la participation, plus pragmatique, fondée sur la prise en compte des réalités contextuelles, des interactions locales et de la production de légitimités qui sont à chaque fois situées.

Une grammaire pragmatique de la participation portée par les « communautés » et diverses légitimités locales

L'observateur averti des dynamiques sociofamiliales remarquera que beaucoup d'attitudes ont été cultivées par les populations elles-mêmes, afin de se protéger, de prévenir la maladie, d'arrêter sa propagation sans attendre

les injonctions du dispositif de la riposte. Si les autorités préfectorales ont été plus actives au moment de l'observation des premiers cas de maladie, les populations se sont organisées à leur manière pour gérer les différents types de risques perçus, parmi lesquels l'épidémiologique. Dans ce qui suit, nous proposons d'abord une ethnographie de ces différentes formes de mobilisation. Ensuite, nous examinons en quoi elles restent une grammaire de la participation communautaire, même si elles n'ont pas été envisagées comme telles par le dispositif de la riposte.

Mobilisations pour se soigner, avec des dynamiques de populations aux implications non négligeables

En tenant compte des temporalités de l'épidémie, on peut remarquer que dans les premiers moments à Guéckédou et à Conakry, les familles se sont beaucoup mobilisées afin d'organiser le retour au village de leurs parents atteints d'une maladie dite « mystérieuse » et quelquefois interprétée comme *« fossi »* ou mauvais sort (Faye 2015). Cette interprétation était d'autant plus féconde qu'on se situait dans un contexte d'impréparation à cette maladie en termes d'information. Toutefois, si ce retour au village est l'expression d'une solidarité et d'une forme de communautarisme dans la gestion et la prise en charge de la maladie, il expose aussi les populations à une plus grande vulnérabilité à la propagation du virus. Le transfert des malades ou des corps de Conakry vers les villages d'origine (pour les soins ou pour les enterrements), considéré comme une règle culturelle à satisfaire (pour la guérison et la paix sociale), a pu occasionner des cas de contamination et de décès évitables. Cette double tension entre les normes culturelles et les risques épidémiologiques a souvent conduit à des incompréhensions entre les équipes techniques et les communautés ou leurs représentants.

En Guinée, les attitudes du retour au village ont connu des évolutions au cours de l'épidémie : durant les premiers moments de l'épidémie, elles ont été principalement soutenues par les familles et les voisins (avec des pratiques de dissimulation de malades). Dans cette perspective, les itinéraires thérapeutiques orientés vers les tradithérapeutes ont été empruntés et soutenus par les familles, entretenant le rejet des injonctions d'isolement en CTE des personnes suspectées. Lorsque l'épidémie s'est déplacée en Basse-Côte, les mêmes comportements ont été observés. Ces attitudes ont beaucoup gêné le dispositif de la riposte, qui a cherché à limiter les déplacements et mouvements de populations et à retirer aux familles leurs droits et devoirs, au nom de l'exceptionnalité du risque biosécuritaire. Toutefois, lorsque l'épidémie a évolué et que les stratégies de communication ont été réadaptées, les communautés écoutées et mises à contribution, les attitudes familiales se

sont davantage exprimées dans le sens d'un engagement communautaire pour une meilleure contribution à la lutte. Par exemple, dans la zone de Macenta (août 2014), les villageois ont systématiquement commencé à appeler le numéro vert ou les équipes soignantes pour signaler elles-mêmes des cas suspects, de décès, ou le déplacement de certains contacts. Dans la préfecture de Coyah, après les premiers mois, le partage d'expériences par les parents ayant séjourné dans les CTE et leurs témoignages ont contribué à rendre ces structures un peu plus acceptables dans les communautés. Ils ont permis de diminuer les rumeurs, d'améliorer l'acceptabilité du recours aux CTE et facilité les interactions avec les équipes de prise en charge. Dans le même sens, à Coyah et Forécariah, on peut évoquer l'implication des mouvements de scouts, contractualisés dans un premier temps par l'Unicef. En raison de divergences sur la stratégie à adopter, cette collaboration n'a pas continué. Cela n'a pas empêché ces acteurs, intervenant depuis longtemps dans les localités, d'entreprendre des activités visant à instaurer des comportements citoyens chez les jeunes : organiser des compétitions de football avec les jeunes des villages, se laisser battre par l'équipe adverse pour gagner la sympathie au feu de camp et créer une harmonie. À travers cette approche, ils ont su collaborer avec les communautés, les écouter, et une fois la confiance établie, les sensibiliser à l'adoption d'attitudes de prévention.

Les analyses précédentes indiquent que le travail nécessaire sur la mise en confiance, le respect et l'engagement des communautés doit aussi s'accompagner d'une communication pertinente, moins sûre d'elle et plus dynamique, éclairée. Cette mise en confiance, associée à la communication dynamique, est utile pour mieux prévenir et gérer les rumeurs. L'expérience montre aussi que l'engagement des communautés et la mise en avant de formes de légitimités identifiées et reconnues par elles sont aussi de nature à réduire les rumeurs.

Des actions de soutien et d'accompagnement collectif organisées spontanément, sans attendre l'injonction du dispositif de la riposte

À chaque fois qu'une sous-préfecture a été touchée par l'épidémie, le dispositif de la riposte a cherché à mobiliser les associations de ressortissants installées dans la capitale ou dans les chefs-lieux de préfecture. Ces structures ont connu des fortunes diverses, certaines ayant été contestées et violentées lors des activités entamées. Pourtant, au même moment, des acteurs plus anonymes de la diaspora ont régulièrement appelé au village pour donner des ordres, des conseils sur la conduite à tenir. Certains ont envoyé de l'argent pour acheter des kits de lavage des mains pour les familles de leurs villages d'origine. Certains «fils du village» moins impliqués dans les associations de

ressortissants ont aussi soutenu leurs parents par des appels téléphoniques pour conseiller, et par l'envoi d'argent pour acheter des réserves de nourriture. D'autres, installés à Conakry, ont usé de leurs connaissances afin d'appeler au niveau des équipes de la riposte pour demander l'envoi d'ambulances pour aller chercher des personnes suspectées dans leurs villages d'origine. On voit ici une confrontation de légitimités qui ne suscitent pas les mêmes attitudes de la part des populations : les membres des associations de ressortissants ont une légitimité conférée par le dispositif de la riposte (qui, reconnaissons-le, peut aussi être le fait des communautés), alors que les « fils du village », plus anonymes ont une légitimité construite et reconnue par les villageois. Dans ces conditions, la légitimité d'un acteur dans sa communauté d'origine tient surtout à sa capacité à se faire reconnaître dans son milieu d'origine et à démontrer l'étendue des liens sociaux qu'il a avec celui-ci : fréquenter régulièrement le village ; y avoir construit une maison, répondre aux sollicitations spontanées du village en cas de besoin, etc.

Aux côtés de l'engagement des ressortissants pour accompagner leurs familles d'origine, des initiatives locales consistant à faciliter l'application des normes de biosécurité ont été notées. En Guinée forestière (Guéckedou, Macenta), certains commerçants se sont organisés spontanément pour mettre en place des dispositifs de lavage des mains. La même initiative a été observée à Forécariah lorsque les femmes se sont cotisées pour acheter des kits de lavage des mains. À Bonfé (Wonkifong), les distributions de vivres organisées par le Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM), envisagées comme accompagnement de la « quarantaine », avaient concerné surtout les familles de victimes, laissant de côté les autres pourtant concernées. Afin de réparer cette « injustice », certains commerçants, pas forcément ressortissants de ces villages ont acheté des vivres pour aider les familles à mieux gérer cette période. La quarantaine a aussi été spontanément soutenue par les autres secteurs du district, qui ont interdit l'organisation des cérémonies et les grands rassemblements. Cela contribuait à limiter les mouvements de population et à faciliter le respect de cette norme de la riposte.

Dans la zone de Macenta, certains villageois ont installé spontanément des barrages temporaires, afin d'obliger les passagers de tous les véhicules passant par-là à descendre, se laver les mains (un dispositif dérisoire, mais similaire dans l'esprit à celui mis en place au niveau des points d'entrée et frontières). On peut discuter de la valeur préventive réelle de ces mesures. Toutefois, elles informent sur le fait que les populations ont voulu aussi contribuer à stopper la progression de la maladie, en contrôlant quelquefois des gens de passage avec lesquels ils n'étaient pourtant pas censés être en contact.

Ces développements indiquent que les populations savent s'organiser et ont les capacités et la volonté de contribuer à gérer l'épidémie. Mieux, elles adoptent aussi des attitudes positives allant dans le sens de la promotion des recommandations du dispositif de lutte contre Ebola. Ces attitudes renvoient ainsi à une grammaire de la participation, parce qu'elles expriment une volonté des acteurs de trouver les moyens pour empêcher que la maladie ne s'installe dans le village. Elles ont été reconnues par le dispositif de la riposte comme un modèle d'action collective parce que les attitudes adoptées étaient assez collaboratives et allaient dans le sens des attentes du dispositif : les populations doivent collaborer pour la surveillance épidémiologique en contrôlant et en dénonçant les personnes suspectées. Pourtant, au lieu de les soutenir, de les renforcer et de les accompagner, le dispositif a plutôt mis les moyens financiers à disposition pour créer des structures communautaires qui n'étaient pas forcément représentatives des populations. Mieux encore, il s'est surtout préoccupé des attitudes de défiance, de nature plus négative à ses yeux : barricades, violences.

Les mobilisations revendicatives et contestataires perçues comme de la «réticence» sont une grammaire de la participation engagée portée par des légitimités «au ras du sol»

Dans les différentes préfectures concernées par l'épidémie, les populations ont aussi réagi par opposition aux injonctions du dispositif, surtout lorsque celles-ci n'allaient pas dans le sens de la «reconnaissance» de leurs préoccupations : refuser de participer à des activités de sensibilisation, réactions contre les enterrements dignes et sécurisés, réactions contre l'installation de CTE à Nongo et à Wonkifong, contre les distributions de vivres, etc. (Faye 2015). Toutefois, une lecture plus ethnographique de ces événements permet de démontrer que ces attitudes, au-delà de leur caractère jugé négatif, peuvent être pourtant envisagées comme une autre grammaire de la participation des communautés.

Dans les foyers de l'épidémie d'Ebola, les populations vont prendre des mesures de prévention à l'égard de tout individu, moyen, ou mécanisme pouvant permettre à la maladie d'entrer dans leurs villages. Par exemple, en Guinée forestière, les véhicules de la Croix-Rouge ou de MSF soupçonnés de diffuser la maladie (surtout en juin et juillet 2014), de même que les acteurs impliqués dans les équipes de la riposte (blancs comme nationaux et africains) ont été rejetés par les villageois. Au fil de l'épidémie, ces attitudes de rejet ont aussi concerné les membres de la famille ou les voisins soupçonnés d'être porteurs de la maladie, ayant séjourné en CTE, déclarés non-cas ou guéri (Faye 2015). Pendant qu'à Conakry, certains jeunes se

sont organisés pour empêcher la mise en place des centres de traitement Ebola (exemple de Nongo), à Kolobengou, Guéckédou et Kabak (Guinée forestière), ces derniers, appuyés par les femmes, ont barricadé les entrées de leurs villages pour empêcher l'entrée de toutes les personnes étrangères. Ces attitudes ont évolué vers une violence physique ayant conduit à des décès, en particulier à Womey (Nzérékoré) : dans le cadre de la lutte contre Ebola, les autorités préfectorales de Nzérékoré ont entrepris, avec l'appui des équipes techniques, une activité communautaire de sensibilisation en septembre 2014. L'équipe était composée de responsables administratifs et de santé, de journalistes et de pasteurs. Toutefois, la présence de cette mission (qui était pourtant la bienvenue pour les villageois) va irriter les jeunes et les femmes, qui vont s'attaquer aux membres de la délégation, soupçonnés d'être venus pour diffuser la maladie dans le village, avec des machettes, des pierres et des morceaux de bois, occasionnant la mort de huit d'entre eux.[13] En raison de l'ampleur du choc que cet événement a créé, les autorités administratives ont ouvert une enquête judiciaire qui a conduit à l'arrestation de 27 personnes. À l'issue du jugement, onze d'entre elles ont été condamnées à la peine de réclusion criminelle à perpétuité et au paiement de la somme d'un milliard cinq cents millions de francs guinéens par la cour d'assises de Kankan. Plus tard, alors que tout le monde s'indignait de la violence de la réaction de ces villageois, un autre événement de la même nature va avoir lieu en Basse-Côte, précisément à Laya (Forécariah) où 4 personnes venues participer aux funérailles d'un proche seront battues aussi à mort par les jeunes. Après l'enterrement, elles étaient allées visiter un guérisseur traditionnel afin de se procurer des médicaments. Ce dernier, souffrant, leur avait demandé de passer la nuit sur place. Un des visiteurs, disposant par-devers lui des comprimés, les lui aurait proposés afin de le soulager. Malheureusement, le vieil homme va mourir suite à la prise de ces médicaments. Son épouse et les villageois, surpris par cette mort soudaine, se sont révoltés contre les étrangers, accusés d'être venus pour répandre la fièvre Ebola. Deux des 4 visiteurs seront tués et leur véhicule brûlé. Les deux autres seront poursuivis par les villageois jusque dans la brousse où ils seront battus, ligotés, puis déposés au village. Il a fallu l'intervention de la gendarmerie pour qu'ils échappent à la mort.

En novembre 2014, la succession de ces réactions violentes va conduire le président guinéen Alpha Condé à imposer le recours à la force contre des populations « récalcitrantes » afin d'enrayer l'épidémie. Pourtant, sur le terrain, ni l'emprisonnement des coupables à Womey ni la militarisation de la riposte n'ont mis fin à ces attitudes. À Kabak (Forécariah), le siège de la sous-préfecture sera incendié en janvier 2015. Tout a commencé

lorsque des membres d'une délégation d'ONG, conduite par un pasteur, ont organisé une campagne de désinfection des puits, afin de prévenir la propagation du virus Ebola. Kabak étant une presqu'île n'ayant pas encore enregistré de cas, la population a soupçonné la mission de propager la maladie. Le pasteur a été battu par des jeunes en colère avant d'être transporté à l'hôpital. L'intervention des militaires va conduire à l'arrestation de certains d'entre eux. En représailles, leurs camarades vont incendier le domicile du sous-préfet et monter des brigades de surveillance quotidienne de tous les puits du village. Quelques semaines plus tard, le dispositif de la riposte va mettre en place les CVV, auxquels les jeunes vont s'opposer énergiquement, leur refusant toute légitimité à conduire des activités de surveillance communautaire. Nos analyses indiquent que ces réactions constituaient une forme de revendication de leur légitimité historique à gérer la surveillance du village. En effet, dans l'histoire de cette île, ils ont toujours été utilisés et organisés en comités de défense et de surveillance des communautés depuis la guerre du Libéria. Avec l'événement d'Ebola, c'est tout naturellement qu'ils se sont sentis réinvestis du rôle de surveillance et de protection.

Ces différents événements, relatés dans un esprit ethnographique, nous permettent d'avoir une compréhension renouvelée de ces actes de violence largement critiqués. Au-delà de l'émotion qu'ils ont pu occasionner, une perspective plus compréhensive éclaire leurs mobiles : une volonté des cadets sociaux (jeunes et femmes) de protéger leurs communautés de toutes les dynamiques susceptibles d'importer la maladie dans le village ; de revendiquer leur place dans la gestion de leurs communautés, bref une quête de reconnaissance (Caillé 2007). Toutefois, nos investigations nous suggèrent d'aller au-delà de la considération des seuls cadets sociaux comme étant les instigateurs de ces actes de défiance : aussi bien à Conakry que dans les villages, l'apparente prise de pouvoir des cadets sociaux est une forme d'illusion. Selon nos interlocuteurs, les aînés ne seraient pas étrangers à ces formes de « mobilisation » des cadets sociaux. Ce point de vue est d'autant plus plausible que les sages ou les aînés ont été peu réactifs face aux attitudes revendicatives des « staffs » de jeunes, donnant l'impression d'avoir démissionné. L'exemple de l'imam engagé dans le CVV à Kouria qui a signé une clause de non-notification des décès révèle que les légitimités classiques mobilisées par la riposte sont souvent elles-mêmes engagées dans des dynamiques critiques et contestataires qui passent par le canal des jeunes et des femmes, dont les pouvoirs de contestation seraient plus acceptables socialement que si elles étaient portées par les autorités gérontocratiques. Qu'elles soient portées par les jeunes, les femmes ou par les séniors, ces

attitudes rappellent les revendications de pouvoir des malades voulant être des acteurs et non de seuls patients de leur maladie (Epstein 2008). Elles expriment aussi une réaction pour exister face à un dispositif de lutte autoritaire qui exerce une violence structurelle (Farmer) et ne reconnaît pas les communautés comme actrices de la lutte contre Ebola. Dans ces conditions, cette grammaire pragmatique de la participation rend compte d'un engagement communautaire dans la lutte contre Ebola de nature plus revendicative, plus critique que collaborative, afin de prévenir, protéger, critiquer. Les manifestations violentes peuvent être appréhendées comme un phénomène social total qui exprime un conflit et une demande pressante de changement social. En tant que critique, elles apparaissent aussi comme un moyen de reconnaissance dans la lutte contre Ebola (Honneth 2006) et une forme de participation, au sens d'engager une réaction ou de s'organiser pour exprimer un problème ou un besoin, de s'autodéterminer pour la résolution de ce problème (Fournier & Potvin 1995). Analyser les violences populaires comme une forme de participation communautaire permet ainsi d'élargir la compréhension de ce concept, inscrit dans un renouvellement permanent (Bresson 2014).

Conclusion

Dans le cadre de la gestion de l'épidémie d'Ebola en Afrique de l'Ouest, les équipes techniques ont reconnu le caractère nécessaire et incontournable de la participation des populations. Toutefois, la grammaire officielle de la participation communautaire, promue par le dispositif, a consisté en la création ou la contractualisation de structures dites à base communautaire, dont les membres ont été chargés de faire passer le message et respecter les directives techniques. Ces mobilisations sociales n'ont pas réellement engagé les populations dans la gestion de la lutte contre Ebola parce que les ontologies à partir desquelles elles sont définies (souveraineté biomédicale, médicalisation et développementalisme) ne favorisent pas les principes de l'agentisation et de la membralité, éléments clés pour que les populations soient au cœur du processus de la lutte. Au contraire, elles ont quelquefois exacerbé les inégalités et renforcé les tensions entre l'individuel et le collectif. Il est aussi apparu que les acteurs dits représentatifs des communautés se sont parfois signalés par des écarts par rapport aux directives techniques de la riposte, exprimant ainsi leur critique de ces dernières.

Pourtant, des acteurs plus anonymes se sont exprimés sur le terrain de lutte, en entamant, sans attendre les injonctions du dispositif, des activités de prévention, de protection, de surveillance, mais aussi de

contestation à l'égard des normes et directives techniques promues par l'OMS et ses partenaires. Ces réactions, qui prennent plus la forme d'un engagement communautaire, n'ont pas été reconnues par le dispositif. Nos analyses suggèrent que les communautés n'ont pas à être traitées seulement comme le lieu des réticences, mais plutôt comme l'élément central de définition de solutions positives. Engager les communautés dans la lutte contre les épidémies nécessite un réel changement de paradigme et une socialisation de la riposte. Il est certes utile de communiquer avec les populations de manière transparente afin de leur donner tous les éléments d'informations utiles pour une meilleure compréhension des risques épidémiologiques induits par Ebola. Il est aussi nécessaire de les amener à réaliser la surveillance communautaire, à avoir des attitudes favorisant la rupture de la chaîne de transmission. Mais cela suppose de sortir d'une logique autoritaire, d'intégrer d'abord l'idée que ces populations ont des ressources, des réponses et des capacités d'agir, et sont porteuses d'enjeux (Fassin 2009). Faire ce travail de reconnaissance requiert que le dispositif s'engage aussi auprès des communautés par le biais d'une socialisation de son approche, à aller au-delà de la souveraineté biomédicale. Ce travail de reconnaissance passe par une attitude compréhensive des mobiles de leurs réactions. Si on considère que l'émergence des attitudes dites « réticentes » correspond à l'expression des besoins des individus qui le portent, il faut les comprendre et proposer les transformations sociales souhaitées. L'expérience montre que dans une situation d'urgence sanitaire, les populations attendent du dispositif une attitude plus respectueuse, un accompagnement pour le renforcement de leurs capacités de résilience communautaire.

Remerciements

Notes

1. L'Organisation mondiale de la santé a d'ailleurs développé dans cette perspective un guide avec des recommandations techniques pour *mobiliser et/ou engager les communautés* dans le cadre d'une riposte aux flambées épidémiques.

2. Aux côtés de l'OMS, l'Unicef a été particulièrement responsabilisée dans le cadre de la communication et de la mobilisation sociale en contexte d'urgence sanitaire d'Ebola.

3. Dans le cadre de la riposte, plusieurs commissions ont été mises en place par la Coordination nationale de la lutte à Conakry, mais aussi dans chacune des préfectures touchées par l'épidémie.

4. Au moment du lancement de cette initiative, 121 comités de veille ont été installés à travers l'ensemble des collectivités de la préfecture de Forécariah.

5. Les CVV ont été, depuis les années 1980, un élément essentiel de la politique des Soins de santé primaires (SSP), basée sur la décentralisation (pensée comme un palliatif de la défaillance de l'État central) et la participation communautaire.

6. Vu le contexte de la prise en charge et le devenir des patients, le dispositif de riposte n'a pas mesuré que cela revenait à inviter à la délation, ou à la « vente » des parents au dispositif, dans une logique assez proche de celle supposée animer les sociétés de sorciers, où l'entrée d'un nouveau membre dans la société est conditionnée par le don d'un parent à « dévorer » aux sorciers que l'individu rejoint.

7. Ce don et l'appel à la mobilisation sont souvent adressés aux catégories dites représentatives de la démocratie populaire que sont les cadets sociaux comme les femmes et les jeunes, qui dans la réalité sont ceux ayant besoin d'une aide.

8. En Afrique du Sud, pendant la période du déni du président Mbeki au début des années 2000, la réponse à l'épidémie reposait sur une logique similaire à l'égard de la mobilisation des jeunes et des femmes contre l'épidémie, alors que ces derniers étaient les premières victimes du virus et que l'État refusait de rendre disponibles, dans le système de santé, les médicaments antirétroviraux (Le Marcis 2010:132).

9. Ces travailleurs, présents tous les matins aux réunions de coordination, donc au courant des flux de malades, et menacés d'arrêt de travail (lorsque l'OMS a décidé d'arrêter de les payer et de passer la main à l'État guinéen), ont eu un impact significatif sur les comportements communautaires.

10. *Séré* vient du mot français « cérémonie ». Il s'agit d'un cadre de sociabilité, d'échange et de solidarité sous la responsabilité d'un *Séré Kounti*, qui est une personnalité respectée, qui inspire confiance. Dans ces espaces d'échanges, les membres partagent des informations et des conseils. Ils bénéficient aussi de soutien dans l'organisation des cérémonies qui rythment la vie sociale des individus : baptêmes, mariages, danses festives dans les quartiers. Des tontines sont également organisées au sein des *SÉRÉ* (cotisations financières des membres leur permettant de recevoir une somme d'argent importante lorsque leur tour est venu).

11. Les *staffs*, appelés clans, sont des groupes de jeunes et d'adultes du ghetto (Philips 2013) qui ne connaissent ni barrières d'âge ni barrières ethniques. Ces groupes polarisent plusieurs sensibilités qui ont en commun le fait de se sentir abandonnés. Ce sont des cadres au sein desquels les membres discutent de questions de la société guinéenne, procèdent à une critique socio-politique qui peut déboucher sur des émeutes. Toutefois, ils peuvent aussi apporter des solutions aux problèmes locaux qui se posent.

12. Celle-ci renvoie surtout aux actions spontanées engagées par les populations en réponse à l'épidémie (Faye 2015)

13. Le sous-préfet de Womey, le directeur préfectoral de la santé de N'Zérékoré, le directeur adjoint de l'hôpital régional de N'Zérékoré et le chef du centre de santé de Womey, un pasteur et trois employés de médias – deux techniciens de la radio rurale de N'Zérékoré et un journaliste d'une radio privée.

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Territoire et déterritorialisation des communautés locales : perceptions des communautés de Luhwindja au Sud-Kivu face à l'exploitation industrielle de l'or

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Résumé

Nous utilisons le concept de « déterritorialisation » pour explorer les perceptions actuelles de la communauté locale sur la stratégie de délocalisation par Twangiza mining dans le « territoire » de Luhwindja au Sud-Kivu, 15 ans après que la compagnie minière a délocalisé les ménages. Un échantillon aléatoire de 250 ménages a été interrogé après 9 entretiens semi-structurés avec des informateurs clés et 3 groupes de discussion en 2019. Nous mesurons les perceptions sur la déterritorialisation à travers un indice. Les résultats indiquent que les ménages de Luhwindja ont une appréciation négative de la stratégie de délocalisation de Twangiza mining. Les perceptions sont basées sur les effets de cette stratégie : accès limité au marché, aux opportunités d'affaires, aux infrastructures de base, ainsi qu'aux réseaux sociaux. La stratégie de délocalisation de l'exploitation minière de Twangiza a permis des différences significatives dans les caractéristiques socio-économiques entre les ménages délocalisés et non délocalisés. Dans le contexte de l'exploitation minière industrielle dans les communautés rurales, l'analyse de la déterritorialisation indique que les aspects socio-économiques des populations sont plus nécessaires dans la perception des communautés que les autres aspects et sont des facteurs sur lesquels toute politique de délocalisation des ménages devrait être basée. Pour la stratégie de délocalisation, nous proposons de considérer le territoire dans sa pluralité.

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Abstract

We use the concept of "deterritorialization" to explore current perceptions of the local community on the delocalisation strategy by Twangiza mining in the "territory" of Luhwindja in South Kivu, 15 years after the mining company relocated households. A random sample of 250 households were surveyed after 9 semi-structured interviews with key informants and 3 focus groups in 2019. We measure perceptions on the deterritorialization through an index. Results indicate that households of Luhwindja are negative on Twangiza mining's delocalisation strategy. Perceptions are based on effects of this strategy: limitations of access to market, to business opportunities, to basic infrastructures and to social networks. Twangiza mining delocalization strategy allowed for significant differences in socio-economic characteristics between delocalized and non-delocalized households. In the context of industrial mining in rural communities, the analysis of deterritorialization indicates that the socio-economic aspects of populations are necessary in the perception of communities than other aspects and are factors on which any household relocation policy should be based. For the strategy of delocalisation, we propose to consider the territory in its plurality.

Introduction

Au cours des deux dernières décennies et dans le souci de restaurer l'exploitation minière et de répondre ainsi aux appels des Institutions financières internationales (IFI) pour les réformes pouvant améliorer la gouvernance du pays, l'État congolais a signé une soixantaine de contrats avec des multinationales (Buraye 2018 ; Mazalto 2008). Les populations des régions à forte potentialité minière ont ainsi observé l'afflux des compagnies minières transnationales apportant dans leur territoire[1] des projets d'exploitation minière à grande échelle. De nombreuses études ont montré que l'exploitation minière à grande échelle a certes été un pilier du développement et de la croissance économique de certains pays (*Ericsson 2019*). Néanmoins, elle est d'une part l'un des moteurs les plus destructeurs de l'environnement, et de l'autre, un facteur important à l'origine des conflits sociaux et politiques (Buraye *et al*. 2017 ; Welker 2014).

En effet, en acquérant des concessions minières en RDC, les compagnies minières transnationales ont eu une mainmise sur les autres ressources du milieu et les ont parfois utilisées à leur gré (Bashizi *et al*. 2018 ; Buraye *et al*. 2017). Dès la phase d'exploration, les compagnies minières ont mis en œuvre des stratégies d'accaparement des ressources des communautés autochtones et d'expulsion de celles-ci en dehors de leur périmètre d'exploitation (Buraye 2018 ; Geenen & Claessens 2013). C'est durant

l'année 2005 que la compagnie Banro, à travers sa filiale Twangiza mining,[2] est arrivée à Luhwindja pour commencer ses travaux d'exploration en vue de produire de l'or de manière industrielle.[3] *En vue de s'installer,* Twangiza mining a évacué la population d'une partie de son périmètre d'exploitation et a suspendu toutes les activités des populations locales sur ce périmètre (Buraye *et al*. 2017). Une mesure dont la mise en œuvre avait suscité l'attention de plusieurs acteurs, dont plusieurs organes de la société civile ainsi que des universitaires.

De manière générale, la présente étude empirique se propose de comprendre les perceptions des communautés locales vis-à-vis de stratégies mises en œuvre par la compagnie minière Twangiza mining afin d'accaparer les ressources des communautés locales et d'expulser celles-ci en dehors de leurs territoires géographique et social. Elle répond ainsi à la question de savoir comment les populations locales perçoivent la stratégie de délocalisation et en quoi consistent ces perceptions. Comprendre la perception de la stratégie de délocalisation présente l'avantage d'orienter les politiques de la grande mine ainsi que celle de l'État afin de faciliter la cohabitation entre la grande mine et les populations locales.

De manière particulière nous nous intéressons donc à la stratégie de la délocalisation mise en œuvre par la grande mine en vue d'une exploitation industrielle de l'or. L'argument central de cet article est que la stratégie de délocalisation a eu des effets sur la perception que les communautés avaient du « territoire » qu'elles occupent, et que les perceptions des communautés vis-à-vis de la stratégie de délocalisation sont différenciées selon leurs caractéristiques sociodémographiques, socio-économiques et selon leur localisation dans leur territoire. Cet argument est ainsi illustré par le cas d'étude de la chefferie de Luhwindja – une collectivité située à l'est de la RDC et où est localisée la mine de Twangiza.

Du point de vue méthodologique, nous mesurons statistiquement la perception des populations locales en rapport avec la stratégie de délocalisation. Sur ce point, notre étude se distingue des études existantes relatives à la délocalisation, qui ont été qualitatives en majorité pour le cas de Luhwindja, au Sud-Kivu (Kabunga *et al*. 2018 ; Bashizi *et al*. 2018; La Maison des Mines du Kivu, 2015; Geenen & Claessens 2013; Namegabe & Murhula 2013).

Du point de vue théorique et comme nous le présentons au niveau du cadre théorique, les études existantes et qui ont abordé la question de la délocalisation des populations autochtones à Luhwindja ont opté pour une démarche juridique (Namegabe & Murhula 2013), socio-économique (La Maison des Mines du Kivu, 2015; Kabunga *et al*. 2018), sociopolitique (Geneen & Claessens 2013) et environnementale avec un accent sur la « political ecology » (Bashizi

et al. 2018). Contrairement à ces études, nous nous basons sur l'approche de l'« écologie politique » vue au-delà de sa composante environnementale. Il s'agit plutôt d'un regard de l'écologie politique basé sur l'approche territoriale, le territoire étant considéré comme un « tout ».[4]

Dans cette étude, la délocalisation est entendue comme une « déterritorialisation ». Entendue sous cet angle, elle permet de comprendre les perceptions des populations locales vis-à-vis de la stratégie de délocalisation qui a produit ce nous qualifions de « déconnexions » entre les individus (les ménages) et leurs territoires.[5]

Notre contribution théorique se forme donc à travers le recours à une analyse basée sur l'approche de l'écologie politique afin de comprendre comment la stratégie de la délocalisation a été à la base de la « déterritorialisation ». Sous l'approche de l'écologie politique, l'étude tente ainsi de comprendre comment la mise en place d'une politique de délocalisation des populations pour une exploitation minière à grande échelle peut permettre d'observer des différences de perceptions vis-à-vis des actions de la grande mine et de la dégradation des vies des gens.

Dans la section suivante, nous discutons du cadre théorique relatif à la stratégie de délocalisation ou à la déterritorialisation sous une approche de l'écologie politique. Dans la troisième section, que nous consacrons à la méthodologie, nous contextualisons notre cas d'étude et nous présentons notre processus de collecte des données, ainsi que la mesure de l'indice de perception des ménages en rapport avec la déterritorialisation. La quatrième section discute les résultats de notre cas d'étude à la lumière de la notion du territoire sous l'approche de l'écologie politique. Enfin, intervient la conclusion.

Cadre théorique et littérature empirique
Cadre théorique : territoire et écologie politique

L'écologie politique,[6] un domaine à la fois des sciences naturelles et sociales, permet de mettre en relation l'économie politique, l'action des acteurs et l'environnement. Parmi ses convictions,[7] Blaikie (1985) indique que les acteurs, ainsi que leurs positions, rationalités, perceptions et intérêts en rapport avec l'environnement, sont nécessaires dans ses analyses. Dans ce papier, nous analysons les perceptions des individus (ou des ménages) en rapport avec les conséquences d'une des stratégies de Twangiza mining, stratégie consistant à délocaliser les populations locales. Nous pensons que la délocalisation, en affectant le *territoire*,[8] peut être vue comme une déterritorialisation.

En fait, pour son applicabilité, l'écologie politique est liée à la notion de *territoire* que nous considérons, lorsqu'il est associé au terme territorialité et au terme *territorialisation*, comme permettant l'application des dynamiques du développement local et des dynamiques conflictuelles d'appropriation de l'espace. Dans ce papier, le *territoire* est compris autant comme étant un « espace socialement construit, qui est caractérisé par ses origines historiques, culturelles, techniques, et politico-économiques » (Bassett & Gautier 2014:2) que comme un « espace géographique ». Pour nous, le territoire est donc autant un « espace géographique » qu'un « espace produit ». Il est un espace géographique qui renferme des lieux qui sont singuliers – au niveau du ménage – et communautaires – les différentes réalités dans la communauté, les voies de communication matérielles ou immatérielles, les forêts, les montagnes, les usines, les habitations, etc. (Requier-Desjardins 2009).

D'une part, Luhwindja est un espace produit, un espace fait des acteurs,[9] ou un ensemble d'individus agissant sur son espace où les uns décident – le *Mwami* (le chef de la chefferie), les chefs des groupements, les chefs de villages, Twangiza mining –, les autres se soumettent, s'opposent, s'imposent, s'allient pour finalement aménager et construire ce qu'on appelle territoire. Il est en même temps un espace fréquenté et parcouru régulièrement par les individus et où se construit un rapport entre le lieu et la société (espace de vie). Il est aussi un espace de vie qui se transforme en espace vécu à partir du moment où des pratiques s'y construisent (espace vécu), et un ensemble de relations interpersonnelles, organisées comme un système de positions sociales qui se définissent les unes par rapport aux autres et qui rattachent l'individu à son milieu (espace social) (Requier-Desjardins 2009).

D'autre part, Luhwindja, comme *territoire*, est un territoire social, car nous le considérons comme étant une représentation symbolique ou idéelle de l'espace. Au niveau communautaire, les populations se construisent alors un sentiment d'appartenance à cette espace commun, et de là, ils se construisent une identité collective.[10] Au niveau individuel, il s'agit plutôt d'un territoire géographique : chaque individu – et même chaque ménage – se sent non seulement appartenir à l'identité communautaire, mais aussi à sa propre identité (identité individuelle ou identité personnelle)[11] ou à l'identité de son ménage, qui est tout naturellement attaché à l'espace occupé (maisons, concession, cheptel, etc.). Sur ce genre d'espace, dans de nombreux villages de l'Afrique subsaharienne par ailleurs, les illustres disparus membres de la famille sont souvent enterrés (Geneen & Claessens 2013). Ces tombes font donc partie de l'identité de l'individu vis-à-vis de l'espace géographique (territoire géographique au niveau du ménage) ou de son territoire social.

Tout détachement des populations, des ménages ou des individus de leur territoire (au sens pluriel) constitue une « déconnexion ». Il s'agit d'une rupture ou d'une déstabilisation des liens existants entre les populations et l'espace, la culture, l'identité, le pouvoir, etc. Prise au niveau individuel, la stratégie de délocalisation que Twangiza mining a mise en œuvre et qui a consisté à déplacer les ménages de leur territoire vers un « autre » territoire peut donc être considérée comme étant une « déterritorialisation ».

D'une part, il s'agit d'une production de la rupture entre l'individu et l'environnement ou entre l'homme et la société, une rupture qui fragilise en même temps les fondements du territoire social – qui détache ou éloigne l'individu de son identité, de sa culture, de son histoire et de son espace produit. Cette rupture conduit à de nouvelles perceptions des individus, déplacés ou non, vis-à-vis de leur territoire (entendu comme territoire géographique), des acteurs qui ont causé cette rupture (Twangiza mining, État congolais, autorité coutumière, etc.) et du nouveau mode de vie que les déplacés et les non-déplacés expérimentent comme conséquence de la délocalisation.

Littérature empirique

Dans divers pays en développement, et plus particulièrement dans les pays de l'Afrique subsaharienne comme le Ghana, la Sierra Leone, la Tanzanie, l'Afrique du Sud du Sud, etc., de nombreuses études se sont intéressées aux conséquences de l'arrivée de la grande mine pour une exploitation industrielle dans les communautés minières (Buraye 2018 ; Geenen 2014 ; Maconachie & Hilson 2011 ; Bush 2009).

Parmi les études qui se sont intéressées à la délocalisation des populations à Luhwindja (en RDC) en vue d'une exploitation minière à grande échelle, certaines ont emprunté une démarche juridique et d'autres ont abordé des questions plutôt socio-économiques.

À travers une approche qualitative et juridique, Namegabe et Murhula (2013) ont analysé la qualification juridique correspondant à cette mesure de délocalisation et ont évalué les conséquences juridiques associées à cette qualification. Ces auteurs ont montré que la délocalisation des populations à Luhwindja relève d'une quasi-expropriation qu'ils ont qualifiée d'expropriation de fait.[12] Ils montrent que le bénéficiaire d'une telle expropriation est l'investisseur privé, un acteur qui s'est imposé – la compagnie minière Banro. Cela justifierait la raison pour laquelle l'État a permis la mise en place d'une telle mesure d'expropriation.[13]

Kabunga *et al*. (2018), avec un regard qualitatif, critiquent quant à eux la procédure de la mise en œuvre de la mesure de délocalisation des populations de Luhwindja sur la base du dispositif de la gouvernance participative locale. Ils montrent que la compagnie minière Banro utilise la « stratégie de la carotte » pour influencer le forum communautaire – une structure de gouvernance participative émanant de la communauté locale – afin d'affaiblir la cohésion discursive des membres, les divisés en les mettant en conflit et ensuite elle profite pour prendre le *lead*. Telle la stratégie de « diviser pour régner ».

La Maison des Mines du Kivu (2015) et Justice et Paix (2019 et 2015), dans leurs rapports de recherche sur la mesure de délocalisation, ont analysé le processus de délocalisation et de réinstallation des populations. Ces rapports montrent que la délocalisation a négativement impacté les droits des populations autochtones et les droits humains des communautés relocalisées lorsque l'on observe leurs conditions de vie (accès au marché, infrastructures de base, habitat, etc.).

Méthodologie
Contextualisation de notre cas d'étude

Notre analyse se construit autour de l'étude de cas de la chefferie de Luhwindja. Il s'agit d'une zone minière située dans la province du Sud-Kivu, à l'Est de la RDC. Elle s'étend sur une superficie de 183 km² et est habitée par environ 95 101 personnes avec une densité de 519 habitants par kilomètre carré. Luhwindja est subdivisé en neuf groupements dont : Kabalole, Idudwe, Cibinda II, Burembo, Lubuha, Bujiri, Mulama, Karundu, Luciga. Et chaque groupement est subdivisé en villages. La figure suivante présente le territoire géographique de notre cas d'étude.

En 2005, Banro, à travers sa filiale Twangiza mining,[14] arrive à Luhwindja pour commencer ses travaux d'exploration en vue de produire de l'or de manière industrielle.[15] À l'issue des travaux d'exploration, la Twangiza mining *décida d'installer son usine dans ce groupement de Luciga, plus précisément à Mbwega, la mine qui était le poumon de l'économie de la chefferie de Luhwindja. Luciga est le groupement le plus riche en ressources forestières, aquatiques et en sol fertile. Il est aussi le groupement le plus peuplé de la chefferie avec à lui seul* 19 485 habitants.[16]

Figure 1 : Localisation de la zone d'étude
Source *:* Bashizi *et al.* 2018

Pour l'exploitation de la mine à ciel ouvert, Banro a évacué la population de son périmètre d'exploitation et suspendu toutes les activités des populations locales sur ce périmètre (Buraye *et al.* 2017). En 2005, au cours de ce processus d'expropriation des terres, des populations de Luciga ont été dépossédées de leur village, de leurs logements, leur terre agricole, des sites miniers artisanaux, de leurs eaux, etc. Ainsi, dépourvue de son milieu de vie, de son environnement, de son territoire, cette partie de la population de Luhwindja a finalement été soumise à une scène de déterritorialisation. Les statistiques disponibles indiquent qu'environ 800 ménages ont été délocalisés et 12 000 paysans-creuseurs artisanaux privés de leurs activités économiques (Justice et Paix 2019).

La première phase de délocalisation a eu lieu en 2006. Les ménages concernés furent ceux de deux villages du groupement de Luciga (Nyorha et Cibanda Ier) (OGP 2010). Ces derniers ont été installés à Cinjira, un milieu enclavé se trouvant sur le sommet d'une montagne à 2 900 m d'altitude. Détachés de leur réseau social, de leur histoire et finalement de leur identité

(personnelle ou collective), ces ménages devaient s'adapter aux nouvelles conditions de vie sur ce milieu inconnu, nouveau, et apprendre à développer de nouvelles stratégies de survie. Sur le sommet de cette montagne, la Twangiza mining avait construit des logements de remplacement pour ces ménages (Justice et Paix 2019).

La collecte des données

Trois *focus groups* avec les femmes et les hommes de Cinjira et les représentants de Twangiza mining et huit entretiens individuels semi-structurés ont été réalisés à Luhwindja. Dans le cadre des entretiens, nous nous sommes entretenus avec personnes suivantes[17] : le chef de la chefferie de Luhwindja, le curé de la paroisse d'Ifendula, le directeur *ad interim (a. i.)* de l'école primaire de Ciburhi, le médecin directeur *a. i.* de l'Hôpital général de référence d'Ifendula, le chef du groupement de Bujiri, l'ancien président de la société civile de Luhwindja, un révérend pasteur d'une église de la 8ᵉ Communauté des Églises libres pentecôtistes en Afrique (CELPA) et l'infirmier titulaire de Cinjira. Ces personnes-ressources ont été identifiées par effet boule de neige à partir du premier entretien que nous avons eu avec le chef de la chefferie. S'est ensuivie l'enquête quantitative sur la base d'un questionnaire.

Nous avons sélectionné aléatoirement 250 ménages[18] dans la chefferie de Luhwindja dans six villages (Cinjira, Bigaja, Buhamba, Cibanda 1ᵉʳ, Ishongwe et Bulende) de trois groupements (Luciga, Bujiri et Kabolole). Cette sélection s'est réalisée sur la base des listes de ménages que nous avons produites après recensement et en collaboration avec les chefs des villages sélectionnés. Le choix des villages s'est opéré en fonction de leur proximité avec les activités de Banro.[19] Par hypothèse, les ménages vivant proches des activités de Banro (donc dans le groupement de Luciga) sont des candidats ou des victimes potentielles d'une probable délocalisation au cas où les activités minières de l'entreprise le nécessitent.

Dans les analyses, afin de comparer les perceptions en rapport avec la déterritorialisation et les conditions de vie des ménages de Cinjira actuellement, par opposition à ceux des autres villages, nous avons regroupé notre échantillon en deux sous-échantillons : le premier groupe (n_1) reprend les ménages de Cinjira ou les ménages délocalisés et le deuxième groupe (n_2) reprend les ménages non délocalisés ou les ménages vivant dans les villages autres que Cinjira.

L'hypothèse qui se trouve derrière notre analyse de la perception de la déterritorialisation et de la qualité de vie nous conduit à supposer que les ménages de Cinjira soient plus négatifs en termes d'effets ressentis de la déterritorialisation que ceux d'autres villages. Le tableau suivant représente la répartition des ménages par village et par groupement.

Tableau 1 : répartition des ménages enquêtés par village et par groupement

Groupement	Village	Taille de l'échantillon (ménages)	Proximité aux activités de Twangiza mining (en termes de distance[20])	Nature du groupe (n)
Luciga	Cinjira	72	Pas proche	$n_1 = 72$
	Bugaja	39	Proche	$n_2 = 173$
	Buhamba	10	Proche	
	Cibanda 1er	61	Proche	
Bujiri	Ishongwe	31	Proche	
Kabalole	Buhendwa	32	Proche	
Total				**n = 245**

Source : confection des auteurs

Tableau 2 : Les composantes de la perception de la déterritorialisation

Facteurs	Items		Alpha de Cronbach
Accès aux terres arables et pratique des activités agricoles	Item 1	Le milieu dans lequel nous vivons ne nous donne pas d'opportunités en terres arables pour les activités agropastorales parce que Banro occupe les grands espaces de terres arables.	0,65
	Item 2	C'est difficile de pratiquer l'agriculture parce que les champs ne sont plus fertiles suite à la pollution de l'environnement.	
Accès au marché et opportunités d'affaires	Item 3	Banro a souvent eu des initiatives de développement rattachées au commerce pour restaurer nos moyens de subsistance.	0,68
	Item 4	Banro a souvent eu des initiatives de création d'emploi en notre faveur (gardiennage, sécurité routière, etc.)	
	Item 5	Banro a souvent eu des initiatives pour améliorer les voies pour la commercialisation de nos produits agricoles (routes, ouvertures aux grands marchés voisins).	

	Item 6	Depuis que la société BANRO s'est installée, les activités commerciales des biens et services se déroulent mieux (les centres de vente sont pleinement opérationnels).	
	Item 7	Depuis que la société BANRO s'est installée, nous avons plus des clients pour les produits que nous vendons.	
Accès aux infrastructures de base (santé, éducation, espaces de loisirs)	Item 8	Nous sommes carrément dépourvus des infrastructures sociales de base (le marché, le centre de santé ; les établissements scolaires, etc.).	0,81
	Item 9	Les infrastructures sociales de base qui sont disponibles ne sont pas pleinement opérationnelles.	
	Item 10	Le milieu dans lequel les gens sont obligés de vivre actuellement donne moins accès aux services sociaux (hôpitaux, centre de santé) que l'ancien milieu (avant 2009).	
Accès aux ressources minières	Item 11	Nous vivons dans le stress parce que la compagnie peut nous interdire même les petits sites miniers que nous exploitons actuellement.	0,66
	Item 12	Avant l'arrivée de la société, nous travaillions nombreux dans les mines, ce qui permettait d'augmenter la production.	
Perturbation des relations sociales dans la communauté	Item 13	La présence de Banro a accentué les conflits entre les membres de la communauté parce que certains membres de la communauté agissent en notre défaveur pour le compte de la société minière.	0,71
	Item 14	La présence de Banro a dissuadé les exploitants miniers de travailler ensemble (trahisons entre les exploitants proches de la société minière).	
	Item 15	La présence de BANRO a réduit la confiance mutuelle entre les membres de la communauté en général.	
	Coefficient global de fiabilité		0,68

Source : confection des auteurs

La mesure de l'indice

À partir de la notion du territoire et de la déterritorialisation vue sous l'angle de l'écologie politique (voir section II précédente), nous avons regroupé – sur la base des entretiens réalisés – les différentes déconnexions entre les individus (les ménages) et leurs territoires en cinq facteurs théoriques ou dimensions de la perception de la déterritorialisation. Il s'agit de : l'accès aux terres arables et la pratique des activités agricoles (1), l'accès au marché et aux opportunités d'affaires (2), l'accès aux infrastructures de base (3), accès aux ressources minières (4) et les perturbations des relations sociales dans la communauté (5). L'échelle de Likert retenue va du niveau 1 « pas du tout d'accord » au niveau 5 « tout à fait d'accord ». Le tableau n° 2 regroupe les items retenus pour chaque dimension après l'étape de l'épuration des données.[21] Le coefficient de corrélation inter-item (le coefficient de Cronbach) a aidé à réaliser cette étape d'épuration. Le coefficient de Cronbach global qui a été retrouvé est de 0,68 (proche de 0,7).[22] L'extraction de l'indice de perception de la déterritorialisation s'est réalisée à partir d'une simple analyse en composante principale.

En théorie, les conditions de vie peuvent recouvrir trois dimensions différentes : l'éducation, les conditions de l'habitat, et la santé (Alkire & Santos 2010). Alkire et Foster (2010) indiquent que ces facteurs sont mieux adaptés aux pays en développement où les données microéconomiques ne sont ni complètes ni suivies régulièrement. Dans ce travail, étant donné le contexte de Luhwindja, nous avons retenu ces trois dimensions : le niveau d'instruction, l'habitat et la santé. Afin de comparer la population de Cinjira à celle des autres villages de Luhwindja, nous avons, par une analyse en composante principale, calculé l'indice des conditions de vie (Buraye 2017).

Les caractéristiques liées au niveau d'éducation du ménage recouvrent : le niveau d'instruction du père, le nombre de personnes dans le ménage qui fréquentent l'école, la perception en rapport avec la distance qui sépare le ménage de l'école où les enfants étudient. L'habitat comprend : la qualité du mur de la maison d'habitation, le type de toilettes que le ménage utilise, la perception par rapport à la distance qui sépare la maison d'habitation et le point d'approvisionnement en eau, et le type de source d'approvisionnement en eau potable. La santé touche à la perception de la qualité de la santé (satisfaisante ou non satisfaisante) et aux dépenses annuelles que le ménage supporte en rapport avec les soins de santé. Le tableau n° 3 ci-contre reprend les facteurs des conditions de vie.

Tableau 3 : Les facteurs des conditions de vie

Dimensions ou facteurs	Mesure	Source
Habitat		
Type de maison d'habitation.	1 si en dur, 0 sinon.	Buraye (2017), Alkire et Santos (2010)
Type de toilette que le ménage utilise.	1 si toilette privée au ménage, 0 sinon (commune).	Alkire et Santos (2010), Buraye (2016).
Type de source d'approvisionnement en eau potable.	1 si aménagé (robinet ou borne-fontaine), 0 sinon (naturelle...).	Buraye (2017), Alkire et Santos (2010)
Distance entre le point d'eau principale et la résidence (perception en termes de courte ou longue).	1 si longue, 0 sinon.	Alkire et Santos (2010).
Éducation		
Le niveau d'instruction du chef du ménage a dépassé le niveau du cycle d'orientation (2 ans après l'école primaire).	1 si le chef du ménage a dépassé la deuxième année de cycle d'orientation.	Alkire et Santos (2010).
Nombre de personnes dans le ménage qui fréquentent l'école.	1 si Plus d'enfants à l'école primaire.	Buraye (2017), Alkire et Santos (2010).
Distance qui sépare l'école au domicile (ménage)	1 si longue, 0 sinon.	Discussion informelle avec les habitants et observations du milieu par les auteurs.
Santé		
Qualité des services de santé que le ménage reçoit lorsqu'un membre du ménage est malade.	1 si les soins de santé sont estimés de bonne qualité, 0 sinon.	Alkire et Santos (2010).
Dépenses annuelles en soins de santé.	1 si les dépenses annuelles de santé sont énormes (au-dessus de la moyenne).	Discussion informelle avec les habitants et observations du milieu par les auteurs.

Discussion des résultats

La perception de la déterritorialisation

Dans l'ensemble, les ménages de Luhwindja (délocalisés et non délocalisés) sont négatifs (62 %) à l'égard de la stratégie de délocalisation que Twangiza mining a mise en œuvre.

La dimension « accès à la terre arable » indique, à elle seule, qu'en moyenne 60 pour cent des ménages de Luhwindja estiment que la terre arable n'est plus disponible à Cinjira comme partout ailleurs dans la chefferie (figure 2).


Figure 2 : Distributions des opinions par items du facteur « accès la terre arable »

Source : nos analyses des données de terrain

Toutefois, la situation est plus préoccupante à Cinjira – un « nouveau territoire » pour les ménages qui y logent – que partout ailleurs dans la chefferie : les ménages se plaignent des conditions climatiques (le froid et le vent) qui sont défavorables à la pratique de l'agriculture (Bashizi 2020 ; Alert International 2015 ; Maison des mines 2015 ; Justice et Paix 2015).

Un chef de ménage que nous avons enquêté s'est exprimé en ces termes :

> Quand ils nous ont installés ici (Cinjira), nous croyions qu'ils allaient aussi nous donner des terres à cultiver. Mais qui cultive et vit sur un espace de 15 m²? La perte de nos terres suite à ce déplacement rend nos conditions de vie difficiles.

Au-delà des conditions climatiques, dans ce nouvel espace de vie (Requier-Desjaradins 2009) pris comme un espace géographique, l'adaptation à la carence en terre arable, qui s'est traduite par une « expropriation de fait » (Namegabe & Murhula 2013), devient un casse-tête pour les ménages délocalisés. Avec 15 m² d'espace par ménage, il s'agit tout simplement d'une menace à la survie de ces ménages, dont la majorité pratiquaient l'agriculture avant d'être délocalisés. Ainsi, la négativité des ménages de

Luhwindja dépendrait aussi de l'indisponibilité des terres arables. Dans le reste de la chefferie, même les ménages qui n'ont pas été délocalisés ont dû partager le reste de terre avec certains ménages qui sont venus de Mbwega.

Une autre dimension relative à la perception de la déterritorialisation qui entre dans le cadre de l'écologie politique (Escobar 1998) concerne l'« accès au marché et disponibilité des opportunités d'affaires ». La distribution des opinions (figure 3) montre que la très grande majorité (plus de 80 %) des ménages de Luhwindja affirme que Twangiza mining ne leur a pas encore facilité l'accès au marché et ne leur a pas offert des opportunités d'affaires.


Figure 3 : Distributions des opinions par item du facteur « accès au marché et disponibilité d'opportunités d'affaires »

Source : nos analyses des données de terrain

En effet, le marché reste moins accessible, même pour les activités commerciales, dans toute la chefferie. Notre entretien avec un membre de la société civile (annexe I) confirme ce point de vue, selon ses termes :

> Aujourd'hui, je peux vous assurer que beaucoup de nos anciens commerçants n'exercent plus, ils sont à la maison. Ils ont déjà essayé de varier les produits qu'ils vendaient, mais en vain. Ceux qui sont restés dans le business, nous les voyons actuellement en train de moisir et de s'appauvrir. Nous comprenons de plus en plus que c'est la mine artisanale qui faisait vivre notre chefferie.

Les ménages qui ont été délocalisés à Cinjira souffrent encore un peu plus de ce manque d'accès au marché et d'opportunité d'affaires : il n'y a pas de marché à Cinjira. Les entretiens que nous avons réalisés (entretiens 1, 2 et 6, annexe I) ont indiqué qu'il faut se rendre à Luciga ou dans d'autres groupements à environ deux heures de marche en moyenne pour opérer sur un marché qui a baissé d'intensité en personnes et en activités depuis que les exploitants miniers ont été délocalisés du site de Mbwega.

Pour le facteur « accès aux infrastructures de base (santé, éducation, espaces de loisirs) », la distribution des opinions qui se présente dans la figure 4 ci-contre, établit que les ménages de Luhwindja restent partagés en ce qui concerne la disponibilité des services sociaux et des infrastructures tels que les aires de loisirs, les structures de santé, les écoles...


Figure 4 : Distributions des opinions par items du facteur « Accès aux infrastructures de base (santé, éducation, espaces de loisirs) »

Source : nos analyses des données de terrain

Contrairement aux conclusions de Justice et Paix (2015), qui a montré que les communautés de Luhwindja étaient très négatives par rapport à l'accès aux infrastructures, nos résultats indiquent que les opinions sont plutôt partagées. Cela peut signifier qu'au fil du temps, les actions que Twangiza mining réalise dans la communauté (construction des écoles, ambulance médicale, etc.) sont saluées par certains membres de la communauté. Ceux qui donnent une note positive se baseraient sur les quelques projets réalisés, tandis que les sceptiques avancent les arguments selon lesquels ce qui a été fait n'est pas à la hauteur de ce à quoi la communauté s'attendait.

Cependant, la comparaison de ces positions, y compris l'analyse des différents rapports (Maison des Mines du Kivu 2015), permet de mettre en exergue le fait que des projets de développement aient été réellement réalisés bien que n'ayant pas satisfait la communauté dans son entièreté.

En fait, la position sceptique tient des lamentations sur l'accès effectif[23] aux services sociaux représentés par ces infrastructures et sur leur qualité, surtout pour les ménages délocalisés. La déclaration suivante en est illustrative :

> Avoir des hôpitaux ou des écoles c'est bien, mais quand on a perdu l'emploi qui vous permettait de payer ces services, c'est comme si tout ça n'existait pas pour moi. Même les enfants qui étudient, une fois délocalisés, nos enfants doivent marcher pendant plus de 2 heures pour atteindre les écoles.[24]

La faible qualité d'infrastructures et des maisons mises en place par l'entreprise comparativement à celles convenues dans le cahier des charges justifie les plaintes des sceptiques.

En effet, dans le Protocole d'accord signé en 2008 entre Twangiza mining et la communauté de la chefferie de Luhwindja, il a été convenu, par exemple, que la compagnie construise des maisons en briques ayant au moins la même taille que les maisons à remplacer pour les délocalisés (Justice et Paix 2015). Ces maisons devraient avoir les caractéristiques suivantes : une toiture en tôle, des fenêtres vitrées, une unité de cuisine extérieure, des toilettes sèches et aérées, et être à proximité des conduites d'eau potable. Mais les maisons qui ont été construites n'ont pas rejoint ces caractéristiques, d'où les plaintes de la communauté dans son ensemble et des délocalisés en particulier.[25]

Pour le facteur « Accès aux ressources minières », la figure 5 ci-contre, qui reprend la distribution des opinions, indique que la présence de Twangiza mining a réduit l'accès à l'or des exploitants miniers artisanaux à Luhwindja. Ceux qui exploitent encore de l'or de manière artisanale (à Lukunguri et à Kadumwa où ils ont été relocalisés en quittant Mbwega) sont dans une situation instable et de stress permanent sur un « territoire » qui appartient juridiquement à Twangiza mining, le titre minier ayant préséance sur le titre foncier en RDC[26] (Lwango 2016). Ils sont conscients que si la Twangiza mining trouvait nécessaire de faire déguerpir les exploitants miniers du site de Lukunguri et à Kadumwa par exemple, site où ces derniers semblent encore être tolérés, elle n'hésiterait pas.[27]


Figure 5 : Distribution des opinions par items du facteur « accès aux ressources minières »
Source : nos analyses des données de terrain

Contrairement aux opinions des habitants de Luhwindja, les agents de Twangiza Mining avec lesquels nous nous sommes entretenus ont soutenu que la production de l'or par l'entreprise était déjà en baisse depuis un certain temps et que l'entreprise n'exclut pas la possibilité d'élargir son espace de

manière à accroître sa production. Cette information sous-entend que les ménages pourront donc être de nouveau délocalisés et ce processus peut même atteindre les ménages que la compagnie avait installés à Cinjira. Vu sous l'angle du «territoire» et de l'écologie politique (Requier-Desjardins 2009), sur l'espace «Cinjira» comme sur celui de Luhwindja, Twangiza mining apparaît comme l'acteur qui décide et qui s'impose (Namegabe & Murhula 2013) et la communauté comme l'acteur qui se soumet et qui peut s'opposer parfois, mais ne peut pas changer de manière durable l'option prise par la compagnie (Buraye et al. 2017), la loi foncière favorisant le titre minier.

L'on peut en déduire que lorsqu'une entreprise minière est implantée dans un milieu, le processus de déterritorialisation cesse d'être un phénomène conjoncturel pour être un phénomène structurel. Il suffit de la découverte des minerais à chaque endroit pour que les populations soient exposées à la perte de leurs droits et soient en permanence en incertitude quant à leur identité personnelle aussi bien que collective, leur adresse physique exacte et leurs biens.

Enfin, c'est le facteur «perturbation des relations sociales dans la communauté». La figure 6 permet de constater que la majorité des ménages (plus de 50 %) reconnaît que Twangiza mining a perturbé les relations sociales dans la communauté et que l'espace social a été donc touché.


Figure 6 : Distribution des opinions par items du facteur «Perturbation des relations sociales dans la communauté»
Source : nos analyses des données de terrain

En vivant ensemble avant l'arrivée de Banro, la communauté avait construit un capital social assez solide caractérisé par la solidarité, la convivialité et la fraternité. Cependant, une fois une partie de la communauté délocalisée à Cinjira, il eut une

certaine rupture entre la population délocalisée et la population restante. La vie sociale de cette communauté n'a plus été la même (Bashizi 2020). Une interviewée retrouvée sur le site de la relocalisation nous disait :

> Avec mes quatre voisines, nous nous organisions pour aller cultiver à tour de rôle dans les champs de chacune de nous. Le travail en groupe était plus efficace. Mais au-delà du travail, c'étaient des moments agréables de retrouvaille où nous parlions de tout et de rien, nous chantions, nous riions ensemble et nous nous partagions nos collations. Mais malheureusement, cette délocalisation est venue pour nous séparer et briser cette harmonie sociale dans laquelle nous vivions. Ça fait plus 2 ans que je n'ai plus revu mes anciennes voisines. C'est par hasard que nous nous croisons présentement au marché ou lors des événements sociaux.

Caractéristiques des ménages et de l'indice de perception de la déterritorialisation : comparer les délocalisés aux non délocalisés

Quelques caractéristiques des ménages

Le tableau 4 ci-contre permet de comparer statistiquement deux groupes de ménages (les délocalisés ou les ménages de Cinjira et les ménages qui sont dans le reste de la chefferie de Luhwindja) en fonction des caractéristiques sociodémographiques, socio-économiques, et de conditions de vie.

Les différences sociodémographiques ne sont pas statistiquement significatives entre ces deux groupes de ménages.[28] L'absence de cette différence n'est pas surprenante à nos yeux. Il s'agit bel et bien des ménages qui, bien qu'actuellement distants géographiquement du fait de la stratégie de délocalisation, vivent les mêmes réalités et les mêmes convictions (culturelle, religieuses, de procréativité, etc.) sur leur territoire. Ce sont ces réalités et convictions communes qui donnent du sens à leur appartenance au territoire. Comme l'a indiqué le chef de chefferie, « ce n'est pas parce que certains ménages ont été délocalisés que leur mode de procréation, leur définition du ménage, encore moins la taille moyenne de leurs ménages vont changer ».[29] Du coup, leur localisation sur un nouvel espace au sein d'une même chefferie n'indique pas que les caractéristiques sociodémographiques d'un ménage soient différentes de celles des autres ménages de la même chefferie. Autrement, les opinions que nous avons présentées dans la section précédente pourraient ne pas être basées sur les différences sociodémographiques, mais sur d'autres caractéristiques du ménage.

Tableau 4. : Comparaison des caractéristiques des ménages de Cinjira à ceux du reste de la chefferie

	Ménages de Cinjira (n = 72)	Autres ménages de Luhwindja (n = 173)	
Caractéristiques sociodémographiques			
Âge du chef du ménage	43	44	
Taille du ménage	5	5	
Caractéristiques socio-économiques			
La mine est la principale source de revenus.	54 %	37 %	**
Les dépenses mensuelles du ménage sont élevées (par rapport à la moyenne).	20 %	41 %	**
Conditions de vie			
Habitat			
La maison est en matériaux durables.	88 %	63 %	***
Le ménage a au moins une latrine dans la maison.	3 %	2 %	
L'eau potable que le ménage utilise est très proche ou dans la parcelle du ménage.	35 %	60 %	***
Le ménage se ressource auprès d'une source Aménagée.	26 %	55 %	***
Éducation			
Le Chef du ménage a dépassé le niveau du cycle d'orientation (2 ans après l'école primaire).	25 %	36 %	*
Le ménage a beaucoup d'enfants à l'école primaire qu'il prend en charge (plus de la moyenne de l'ensemble).	75 %	68 %	
L'école que fréquentent les enfants est très éloignée.	44 %	67 %	**
Santé			
Le ménage estime que les soins de santé à Luhwindja sont de bonne qualité.	90 %	85 %	
Le ménage a au moins un membre qui a souffert d'une maladie pulmonaire pendant l'année.	8 %	20 %	**
Le ménage estime qu'il dépense beaucoup pour les soins de santé.	93 %	88 %	

Notes : *** $p < 0,01$; ** $p < 0,05$ et * $p < 0,1$

Contrairement aux caractéristiques sociodémographiques, la comparaison entre les caractéristiques socio-économiques et celles liées aux conditions de vie indique des différences statistiquement significatives entre les ménages délocalisés et les ménages non délocalisés. En effet, l'on se rappellera que, venant du village de Nyorha (à Mbwega dans le groupement de Luciga) où se trouvait le plus grand site minier de la chefferie (Bashizi *et al.* 2018), les délocalisés sont principalement des exploitants miniers artisanaux. Par conséquent, en rapport avec la source principale de revenu et le niveau des dépenses mensuelles, la différence (à 5 %) n'est pas surprenante. Comme l'ont indiqué la Maison des Mines (2015), Justice et Paix (2015) et Namegabe et Murhula (2013), la non-exploitation de l'or par les ménages de Cinjira a fait baisser leur niveau de revenu et a rétréci leur niveau de dépenses de consommation. Les opinions négatives des ménages de Luhwindja (délocalisés ou non) vis-à-vis de la délocalisation peuvent donc dépendre des caractéristiques socio-économiques.

La différence entre les ménages de Cinjira et ceux du reste de la Chefferie est aussi significative sur le plan des conditions de vie, comme l'ont indiqué la Maison des Mines (2015) et Justice et Paix (2015). Ces caractéristiques pourraient influencer les opinions des ménages de Luhwindja sur la déterritorialisation. L'habitat – murs de la maison, proximité avec la source d'approvisionnement en eau et qualité de la source d'approvisionnement – (à 1 %), l'éducation (niveau d'éducation du chef de ménage et la distance où se situe l'école que les enfants fréquentent) et la santé (le membre du ménage a souffert d'une maladie pulmonaire) différencient les ménages de Cinjira des ménages du reste de la chefferie.

Indice de perception sur la déterritorialisation et caractéristiques des ménages

En termes d'opinions en rapport avec la déterritorialisation, le tableau n° 5 ci-contre indique que les ménages de Luhwindja présentent deux caractéristiques qui les distinguent statistiquement les uns des autres : la source de revenus, et le nombre d'enfants qui fréquentent l'école et qui sont à charge du chef du ménage.

En effet, 50 pour cent des ménages qui sont négatifs par rapport à la déterritorialisation ont la mine comme principale source de revenus contre 32 pour cent qui sont positifs. Cette perception négative nous paraît normale dans la mesure où ceux qui exploitaient la mine à Mbwega et dont c'était la principale source de revenus devraient naturellement être négatifs vis-à-vis de la déterritorialisation, car cette dernière ne leur a pas permis de poursuivre leurs activités minières (Bashizi *et al.* 2018).

Tableau 5 : perception sur la déterritorialisation et quelques caractéristiques des ménages

	Indice d'opinion sur la déterritorialisation		
	Négatifs (n = 132)	**Positifs (n = 113)**	
Caractéristiques sociodémographiques			
Âge du chef du ménage	42	45	
La taille du ménage	5	5	
Caractéristiques socio-économiques			
La mine est la source principale du revenu du ménage.	50 %	32 %	***
Les dépenses mensuelles du ménage sont élevées (par rapport à la moyenne).	38 %	33 %	
Condition de vie			
Habitat			
Les murs de la maison sont en dur.	74 %	68 %	
Le ménage a au moins une latrine dans la maison.	2 %	3 %	
L'eau potable est très proche ou dans la parcelle du ménage.	55 %	50 %	
Le ménage se ressource à une source aménagée (Robinet, borne-fontaine, puits aménagé).	47 %	47 %	
Éducation			
Le chef du ménage a dépassé la deuxième année de cycle d'orientation.	35 %	30 %	
La distance jusqu'à l'école est plus ou moins longue, distance pour les enfants.	63 %	58 %	
Le ménage a beaucoup d'enfants à l'école, qui sont à charge du chef du ménage.	77 %	63 %	**
Santé			
Le ménage estime que soins de santé sont de bonne qualité.	83 %	89 %	

Le ménage a au moins un membre qui a souffert d'une maladie pulmonaire pendant l'année.	15 %	19 %
Le ménage estime que les dépenses annuelles de santés sont énormes.	88 %	90 %
Caractéristique de localisation géographique		
Le ménage est de Cinjira.	28 %	31 %
Le ménage est de Luciga (autre que Cinjira et que le reste de la chefferie).	63 %	57 %
Le ménage n'est pas de Luciga (donc pas non plus de Cinjira).	24 %	29 %

Notes : *** p < 0,01 ; ** p < 0,05 et * p < 0,1

En outre, de nombreux ménages qui sont négatifs (77 %) vis-à-vis de la déterritorialisation ont beaucoup d'enfants (nombre supérieur à la moyenne) qui fréquentent l'école et qui sont à charge du chef, contre 63 pour cent qui sont positifs. Ce facteur reflète, en quelque sorte, le poids que le ménage supporte pour l'éducation de ses enfants. Logiquement, le nombre d'enfants dans le ménage n'a rien à avoir avec la délocalisation ou le fait de vivre à Cinjira ou pas.

Mais avec la venue de la grande mine, les ménages peuvent s'attendre à une prise en charge des enfants. D'ailleurs, Twangiza mining avait déjà pris en charge les enfants pendant environ 5 ans (Maison des Mines du Kivu 2015).

Conclusion

La présente étude est partie de la notion de territoire sous l'angle de l'écologie politique pour tenter d'explorer, à partir du concept de territoire, les perceptions de la communauté vis-à-vis de la stratégie de la délocalisation que Twangiza mining, une entreprise minière industrielle, a mise en œuvre et a imposée à Luhwindja. Nous sommes parvenus à calculer l'indice statistique captant les perceptions des communautés. Les résultats analysés dans le présent papier permettent de mettre en exergue quatre éléments de conclusion.

Premièrement, la modernisation minière, en contradiction avec le potentiel développeur des compagnies minières industrielles, est un processus ayant la possibilité d'entraîner la confiscation territoriale et les limitations d'accès au marché, aux opportunités commerciales, aux infrastructures

de base et aux réseaux sociaux. Ces limitations alimentent les plaintes des communautés locales qui espéraient un développement local avec l'arrivée de la grande mine. Elles définissent les perceptions négatives des communautés locales. Ainsi, la stratégie de délocalisation que la grande mine a imposée et que les communautés ont subie est un phénomène destructeur du territoire comme espace produit.

Deuxièmement, l'analyse des perceptions des communautés locales vis-à-vis de la stratégie de délocalisation ne permet pas de différencier les ménages selon leurs caractéristiques sociodémographiques, quelles que soient leurs localisations au sein du territoire géographique. Délocaliser un ménage ou pas au sein d'une même chefferie ne permet pas aux ménages de changer leurs habitudes culturelles, religieuses et de procréation, ainsi que leurs convictions communes, qui donnent du sens à leur appartenance au territoire.

Troisièmement, la déterritorialisation a permis d'observer les différences statistiquement significatives, en termes de caractéristiques socio-économiques, entre les ménages délocalisés et les autres ménages. En effet, délocaliser un ménage d'un territoire où les membres du ménage exerçaient leurs activités économiques (exploitation minière, agriculture, petit commerce, etc.), accédaient assez aisément au marché et aux opportunités d'affaires, et avaient déjà constitué de solides réseaux sociaux constitue une rupture qui a des effets néfastes sur les aspects socio-économiques des ménages (habitat, niveau d'instruction et santé). Ces effets néfastes différencient ainsi les ménages délocalisés et les ménages non délocalisés.

Enfin, dans le contexte de Luhwindja, l'analyse de la déterritorialisation enseigne que les aspects socio-économiques des populations sont nécessaires dans la perception des communautés et sont des facteurs sur lesquels devrait s'appuyer toute politique de délocalisation des ménages. Il apparaît donc nécessaire pour la grande mine et pour l'État congolais de concevoir, chaque fois que la situation s'y prête, des stratégies de délocalisation permettant aux ménages de bénéficier dans leur nouveau territoire de conditions de vie égales aux conditions qu'ils avaient avant la délocalisation ou meilleures.

Remerciements

Notes

1. Dans ce papier, nous comprenons le « territoire » à travers la dimension spatiale des sociétés. Nous considérons le territoire comme un système, comme un réseau où l'on retrouve l'espace, la communauté, la culture, l'environnement, etc. (Requier-Desjardins 2009).

2. Depuis 2018, Banro Resource Corporation a été restructuré et appartient désormais à deux actionnaires : le groupe chinois Baiyin Nonferrous Limiter et la société américaine Gramancy. Aujourd'hui il s'agit de Banro Corporation LtD, une filiale de Newco, une société basée aux iles Caïman. Ces informations sont disponibles au : https://www.thierryregards.eu/2019/06/banro-mine-extraction-or-gold-kivu/ (consulté le 28 février 2020).

3. La mine de Twangiza fait partie de quatre concessions minières que Banro Resource Corporation détient en RDC et qui s'étend sur 2 790 kilomètres carrés. La mine de Twangiza couvre 180 km dans les 183 km de la chefferie de Luhwindja.

4. Nous considérons la terre et l'eau, l'attachement culturel, les activités économiques et les infrastructures de base disponibles sur un espace donné ainsi que les conditions de vie.

5. Dans la deuxième section relative à la revue de la littérature, nous discutons de l'approche « *political ecology* » et nous revenons sur ce que nous entendons par « déconnexion » et sur ses différentes formes.

6. Pour des raisons d'harmonisation, nous utiliserons systématiquement le terme français « écologie politique » en lieu et place du concept anglais de « *political ecology* » bien que ces deux termes ne se substituent pas parfaitement.

7. Les autres convictions sont : (1) l'accès et l'utilisation des ressources naturelles s'organisent et se transmettent par des relations sociales qui peuvent exercer une pression excessive sur l'environnement (Watts, 1983), (2) la connectivité à l'échelle du global sous-entend que des processus locaux peuvent à la fois influencer et être influencés par des processus globaux et (3) la marginalité sociale est le résultat des processus politiques, économiques et écologiques qui se renforcent mutuellement (Escobar 1998).

8. Le concept de « territoire » est utilisé dans plusieurs disciplines comme la géographie, l'écologie, les sciences politiques… En géographie, le territoire représente l'ensemble de relations entre une population et l'espace sur lequel elle vit et se développe (Moine 2005). Cet ensemble de relations constitue ainsi un système dans lequel l'un des deux éléments ne peut s'appréhender sans l'autre (*ibid*.). En écologie, le territoire se réfère à la notion d'écosystème qui met en relation des espèces vivantes sur un espace donné (Requier-Desjardin, 2009). Autrement dit, le territoire est un espace où les espèces vivantes trouvent des ressources pour assurer leur survie et leur reproduction (Di Méo 1998). En sciences politiques, le territoire renvoie à un espace délimité sur lequel s'exerce la « violence légitime » d'une autorité politique (Faure 2005:12).

9. Au Sud-Kivu, les autochtones de Luhwindja sont appelés les «bahwindja-hwindja».

10. Comme le pense Wittorski (2008:1), la notion d'« identité collective » est une notion polysémique. Elle est « une intention sociale, venant des groupes qui cherchent à revendiquer une place et à se faire reconnaitre dans l'espace social ». Selon les auteurs, plusieurs concepts sont liés à l'identité collective : « identité sociale » (Haissat 2006), « identité universelle » (Chamarat, 1998).

11. Il s'agit ici de « la pensée sur soi ou le concept de soi qu'a l'individu » (Doise 1999:211). Nous considérons l'identité personnelle comme une représentation sociale ou comme « un principe générateur de prises de position liées à des insertions spécifiques dans un ensemble de rapports sociaux et organisant les processus symboliques intervenant dans ces rapports » (Doise 1999:211).

12. « Celle-ci s'apparente à l'expropriation formelle puisqu'elle a pour effet d'opérer un transfert définitif et forcé de la propriété au profit d'une personne publique ou privée exerçant une activité considérée, à certains égards, d'utilité publique. Elle doit dès lors s'accompagner d'une indemnité juste et préalable. » (Namegabe & Murhula, 2013:150)

13. Article 281 tel que modifié par la loi n° 18/001 du Code minier du 9 mars 2018 modifiant et complétant la loi n° 007/2002 du 11 juillet 2002 portant Code minier. Cet article stipule que : « Toute occupation de terrain privant les ayants-droit de la jouissance du sol, toute modification rendant le terrain impropre à la culture entraîne, pour le titulaire ou l'amodiataire des droits miniers et/ou de carrières, à la demande des ayants-droit du terrain et à leur convenance, l'obligation de payer une juste indemnité correspondant soit au loyer, soit à la valeur du terrain lors de son occupation, augmentée de la moitié. » (Présidence de la RDC 2018:35)

14. Depuis 2018, Banro Resource Corporation a été restructuré et appartient désormais à deux actionnaires : le groupe chinois Baiyin Nonferrous Limiter et la société américaine Gramancy. Aujourd'hui il s'agit de Banro Corporation LtD, une filiale de Newco, une société basée aux îles Caïman. Ces informations sont disponibles au :https://www.thierryregards.eu/2019/06/banro-mine-extraction-or-gold-kivu/ (consulté le 28 février 2020).

15. La mine de Twangiza fait partie de quatre concessions minières que Banro Resource Corporation détient en RDC et qui s'étend sur 2 790 kilomètres carrés. La mine de Twangiza couvre 180 km dans les 183 km de la chefferie de Luhwindja.

16. Rapport annuel de 2019 pour l'année 2018 de la chefferie de Luhwindja.

17. L'annexe n° 1 donne la liste des entretiens individuels semi-structurés que nous avons réalisés à Luhwinja et précise le type d'information que nous avons obtenue pour chacun.

18. Nous avons fixé la taille de notre échantillon à 250 par convenance. Aucun groupement ne possédait des listes des ménages à jour. Selon que le village était peuplé ou non, nous poursuivions jusqu'à atteindre 30 ménages au moins pour les villages les moins peuplés et 60 ménages pour les villages les plus peuplés. Cependant, la disponibilité des chefs des ménages eu pour conséquence que les

effectifs des ménages soient en deçà de 30 dans certains villages. Par exemple, le village Buhamba n'a que 10 ménages enquêtés sur les 30 sélectionnés. Lors du traitement, nous avons constaté que cinq questionnaires n'étaient pas bien complétés, nous les avons élagués de notre base de données et avons gardé 245 ménages.

19. Les villages que nous avons choisis sont les villages les plus peuplés. Après avoir expliqué notre recherche au Mwami, non seulement il a indiqué ces villages comme étant les villages les plus peuplés, mais il nous les a aussi recommandés compte tenu de notre question de recherche.

20. L'estimation de l'éloignement ou du rapprochement d'un village donné a été réalisée en même temps par le chef de la chefferie, le chef de groupement de Bujiri et le représentant de la société civile.

21. L'épuration des données a consisté à éliminer les items qui étaient faiblement corrélés avec les autres au sein d'un même facteur.

22. Carricano et Poujol (2009) recommandent que ce coefficient de Cronbach soit supérieur à 0,7 pour qu'il soit bon (entre 0,7 et 0,8) ou excellent (entre 0,8 et 0,9). Lorsque ce coefficient est inférieur à 0,6 il est jugé insuffisant ; entre 0,6 et 0,65, il est faible et entre 0,65 et 0,70 il est acceptable.

23. L'accès concerne la capacité de payer les soins et les études des enfants, la distance qu'il faut parcourir pour atteindre les écoles et les marchés.

24. Entretien avec le membre de la société civile.

25. *Focus groups* avec les habitants de Cinjira et entretien avec le membre de la société civile Justice pour Tous (2015) et la Maison des Mines (2015), détaillant les caractéristiques des maisons construites à Cinjira.

26. Pour plus d'informations sur la problématique des droits fonciers dans un périmètre minier concédé à la grande mine, lire Lwango Mirindi (2016).

27. Entretiens avec le curé et le pasteur.

28. Pour l'ensemble de notre échantillon, l'âge moyen des chefs des ménages de Luhwindja est d'environ 43 ans (voir la figure n° 7, annexe 2) et la taille moyenne du ménage est de cinq personnes.

29. Interview avec le Mwami de Luhwindja.

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Annexe I : Liste des entretiens individuels semi-structurés réalisés en octobre 2019 à Luhwindja

N°	Qualité de l'interviewé	Nature de l'information
1	Le Mwami, chef de la Chefferie de Luhwindja	Subdivision administrative de la chefferie, peuplement, groupements les plus affectés par les activités de Banro, types d'activités économiques, les perturbations que Banro a impliquées, niveau de satisfaction de la communauté par rapport aux réalisations de Banro dans la chefferie, processus de délocalisation des ménages (y compris l'indemnisation) et le développement de la Chefferie en présence de Banro.
2	Curé de la paroisse d'Ifendula	La venue de Banro à Luhwindja, le fonctionnement du Comité local de développement, rôles de différents acteurs dans le développement de Luhwindja, problèmes que connaît Banro vis-à-vis de la population.
3	Directeur d'une école de Luciga	Actions de Banro vis-à-vis des élèves et des enseignants, perception des enseignants en rapport avec les activités de Banro.
4	Médecin directeur de l'hôpital général de référence d'Ilfendula	Effets sanitaires du Lac de cyanure, conséquences sanitaires de la présence de Banro dans le milieu.
5	Le chef de groupement de Bujiri	Fonctionnement de son groupement, activités économiques dans son groupement, actions de Banro dans différents groupements.
6	Un ancien président de la société civile de Luhwindja	Les accords existants entre Banro et la communauté, les occasions de conflits qui ont opposé Banro et la communauté, les conséquences de ces conflits, le développement de la communauté depuis l'arrivée de Banro.
7	Un révérend pasteur d'une Église protestante	Les différents changements que Banro a impliqués au niveau culturel, religieux, etc., les plaintes de la communauté par rapport aux actions de Banro.

| 8	Un infirmier titulaire à un centre de Santé	Effets sanitaires du Lac de cyanure.
9	Deux agents délégués par Banro pour notre entretien : le responsable des questions de santé, sécurité et environnement et le responsable des relations communautaires.	Bref historique des activités de Banro à Luhwindja, obstacles que Banro a rencontrés lors de son installation et pendant la phase de production, processus de délocalisation d'une partie de la communauté, rôle de l'État, des autorités locales et des organisations de la société civile dans les relations entre Banro et la communauté de Luhwindja, différentes contestations de la communauté et leurs conséquences, la sous-traitance dans Banro.

Annexe II : Quelques statistiques descriptives

Figure 7 : La distribution de l'âge des chefs des ménages