Africa Development, Vol. XXXVIII, Nos 1&2, 2013, pp. 1–24

(ISSN 0850-3907)

Economic Security in an Agrarian Community

Mike Njalayawo Mtika*

Abstract

Free-market capitalism creates great wealth but is disempowering and produces widespread poverty, inequality, and human despair; it generates economic insecurity for the masses. A main reason for this is that free market capitalism operates from an exogenous perspective; it is guided by marginal utility and marginal productivity. What we need is capitalism that integrates endogenous and exogenous processes. This approach focuses on building creativity, innovativeness, and ingenuity in how people use resources to make a living. In this paper, I draw on what is happening in the Zowe community development program in northern Malawi where we have started what I have termed community entrepreneurship to propose a model of this approach to wealth generation and accumulation. The community entrepreneurship process I discuss in the paper is both exogenous and endogenous in that it focuses on (a) building entrepreneurial knowledge, skills, and capacity in communities and (b) propagating innovative, creative, and responsible behavior in the way people make a living. I conclude that following both endogenous and exogenous economic principles is one way for agrarian societies to attain economic security

Résumé

Le capitalisme libéral crée une grande richesse, mais il est paralysant et entraine la pauvreté généralisée, les inégalités et le désespoir humain ; il génère l'insécurité économique des masses. L'une des principales raisons c'est que le capitalisme libéral fonctionne d'un point de vue exogène. Il est guidé par l'utilité marginale et la productivité marginale dans la façon dont le profit est maximisé. Ce dont nous avons besoin, c'est d'un capitalisme qui fonctionne sur la base d'une approche endogène. Cette approche qui met l'accent sur le renforcement de la créativité, l'innovation et l'ingéniosité dans la façon dont les individus utilisent les ressources pour gagner leur vie. Dans cet article, je m'appuie sur ce qui se produit dans le programme de développement communautaire de Zowe, dans le nord du Malawi, où nous avons commencé ce que j'ai appelé l'entrepreneuriat communautaire pour proposer un modèle d'approche endogène de création et d'accumulation de la richesse. Le processus de l'entrepreneuriat communautaire que j'examine dans l'article est endogène en ce qu'elle met l'accent sur (a) le renforcement des connaissances, des compétences et des capacités

* Department of Sociology, Eastern University, St. Davids, PA, USA. Email: mmtika@eastern.edu

entrepreneuriales des communautés et (b) la culture d'un comportement innovateur, créatif et responsable chez les individus par rapport à leur façon de gagner leur vie. Ma conclusion est que l'adoption des principes économiques endogènes est une voie permettant aux sociétés agraires d'atteindre la sécurité économique.

Introduction

It has been argued that the dominant fashion of ordering economic affairs, which involves allocating resources to produce, distribute, and consume goods in a way that maximizes profit, creates great wealth but also 'produces deep and widespread poverty and human despair'; it produces economic insecurity for the masses (Silver and Loxley 2007: 2). This dominant fashion of ordering economic affairs (free-market capitalism) has mainly involved multinational corporations, multilateral institutions, and western educational institutions and governments defining how productive resources are to be used to improve people' lives. Concerned scholars have called for revisiting this ordering of economic affairs, arguing that there is a need for humane capitalism, which would emphasize human welfare, freedom, participation, institutional changes, and frontline activities that target the poor masses rather than maximizing the profits of the wealthy few (see Shumacher 1973; North 1995; Sen 1999; Korten 1999; Myers 2006). With specific reference to community economic development, various authors in a collection of articles edited by Loxley, Silver, and Sexsmith (2007) call for an approach that focuses on creating internal rather than external economic linkages. They term this the convergence approach, convergent in that it focuses on capacity building and maximizing the use of local resources in communities. The authors argue that such an approach would help to address the poverty and human despair that free-market capitalism leaves behind because this convergence approach redirects economic activities from being profit-driven to being needs-driven, from being controlled by multinational corporations to being controlled by the communities themselves, from multilateral institutions and western governments dictating what happens in the developing world to local communities taking charge of their affairs, and from being individualistic in their focus to building people's abilities to improve their economic security collectively.

Free-market capitalism is rooted in marginal utility and marginal productivity. Marginal utility refers to the relative satisfaction a consumer derives from the consumption of an additional unit of an economic good, while marginal productivity is the output that results from the use of an additional unit of a factor of production or resource (labour, technology, capital, and land in the case of farming). Consumers thus have an optimal

point in their consumption of goods. Likewise, producers have an optimal point where they can invest the necessary factors to produce the most at the least possible cost. Based on marginal utility, goods would be priced proportional to the relative satisfaction consumers derive from the consumption of additional units of goods. Following the marginal productivity principle, the market, when unhindered, would allocate resources in a way that generates the most output per additional unit of resources. When economic activities are guided by marginal utility and marginal productivity, the maximum profit is assured. According to this marginalist economics, 'when certain conditions, such as the preferences of consumers, productive techniques, and the mobility of production factors are met, market forces of supply and demand allocate resources efficiently by minimizing resource costs and maximizing consumer utilities thus maximizing profits' (Peet 1999: 34).

Based on marginalist economics, improving living conditions in agrarian communities is an exogenous activity. The factors of production are external to the wealth generation process. This exogenous economics involves identifying these factors of production and investing them into development based on market dynamics. In the exogenous context, the practice of development in agrarian communities, community development to be specific, is controlled by forces external to a community. The agents, the factors, the ideas of how development takes place, what determines the success or failure of development, what are regarded as economically viable goods, etc., are mostly external to community dynamics and to the development process. Shuman (2000: 26) rightly argues that what is needed to bring about sustainable improvements in living conditions of the masses, those in agrarian communities being our concern here, is 'a new economics and a new business philosophy, both based on the conservation of communities'. Shuman calls for community corporations that advance community interests. What Shuman is calling for is an endogenous process in wealth generation.

This paper puts forward a wealth generation approach that advances what is termed community entrepreneurship. A main feature of this type of entrepreneurship is its endogeneity, that is, (i) its focus on building entrepreneurial knowledge, skills, and capacity within communities and (ii) its goal of propagating innovative, inventive, creative, and environmentally responsible behaviour among community members in their production and consumption activities. This does not sideline the profit-making motif pursued by marginalist economics but integrates that motif into the central goal of spreading the wealth among the masses. Based on this approach, what needs to be emphasized in wealth generation endeavours is not marginal utility and marginal productivity but the improvement of internal entrepreneurial

processes within a community and building on the improved processes to spur further entrepreneurial wealth generation activities. The discussion here draws upon the community entrepreneurship initiative being implemented in the Zowe community development program located in northern Malawi.

The Zowe Community Development Programme

The Zowe community development programme emerged out of an educational visit to the community during January 2004 by a group of students from Eastern University in the United States. The objective of the trip was to expose the students to challenges and struggles of people in African agrarian communities. During the visit, the students documented key resources in the community, how people use these resources, the challenges people face and the opportunities they have for improving their livelihoods. Zowe is rich in land, forest, and water resources. The community has no electricity except for solar lights on a health clinic, a school block, and a few other houses constructed through the programme (some community members, only two so far, have installed solar lights in their houses). Zowe does not have running water. People depend on a river that cuts through the area and boreholes installed by government and non-governmental organizations. The water in the river is unsafe for personal use but boreholes provide safe and clean water pumped some twenty to forty feet from underground.

Significant guided discussions ensued among the students during and after the visit. The discussions focused on defining the resources in the community, how these resources can be used more productively, and the possible initiatives that could improve the community and its people's lives. Many initiatives were suggested. They included various capacity, capability, and integrity-building training activities; cattle ranching that would utilize the abundant land, forest, and water in the community; developing cattle feedlots to address the drudgery involved in herding cattle, but also to address the soil erosion arising from the herding of cattle; biogas plants to produce gas for cooking, thus addressing firewood-based deforestation and to provide the needed manure that would improve crop production; various formal and non-formal educational activities to improve the human capital and to build the ability of community members to manage their development; primary healthcare, under-five clinic services, and the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) interventions to reduce mortality and disease morbidity; community income generation activities to provide income to support micro-enterprises and various development efforts; food security endeavours to address the frequent food shortages in the community; and environmental/ resource care initiatives to protect the environment.

A follow-up trip to the community was conducted in June to July 2004 to obtain the community's feedback on the ideas students brought up. While community members found all proposed initiatives necessary, they cautioned against the biogas, cattle feedlot, and cattle ranching. Most members felt that there is need to understand more about how these could be undertaken before starting such initiatives. The programme began in 2005 starting with capacity, capability, and integrity-building training, then getting into a food processing unit and a community grocery shop as community business ventures; a school breakfast programme to offer breakfast to school children who generally came to school without taking breakfast in their homes; a tuition-support initiative for children who could not afford the tuition for their high school education; a health clinic, primary healthcare activities, and AIDS prevention interventions; and food relief for households that had little food.[1] Each initiative involved and continues to involve significant training of community members to build their ability to manage planned activities, be able to think of alternative ways of addressing problems, to innovatively take advantage of opportunities at their disposal, and to ensure the continuity of activities when external help phases out.

The programme started in the twelve villages of Zowe community with plans to contiguously expand to other communities. Six more villages were added to the original twelve by 2008. Thus, the programme currently operates in eighteen villages with a total of 481 households[2] and a population of 2003 people.[3] The eighteen villages cover an area nine miles long and seven miles wide.

The main icons of the community are the Full Primary School that has grades one to eight and a health clinic that provides preventative healthcare services such as encouraging households to install pit latrines (out houses), and AIDS prevention training. The clinic also offers medical services such as treating malaria, pneumonia, wounds, eye diseases, and other diseases. The boundary of the community is based on the eighteen villages that are served by this school and clinic. There is a Junior Primary School (grades one to five) on the western part of the community that caters for six of the eighteen villages. Grades one to five students from the six villages go to this Junior School; students in the six villages who are in grades six to eight go to the Full Primary School.

Funds for the development programme are raised through recycling printer cartridges (both toners and inkjets) and cell phones, through donations, and recently through a household sponsorship programme in the United States.[4] These external sources of funding are to be phased out through community entrepreneurship, which involves initiating and managing community business

ventures which, as Shuman (2000) has convincingly argued, are key to transforming communities and building self-reliance. These community business ventures, which generate income that is re-invested in the community, exogenously create profit and endogenously build up local capability (improving the process of generating income within the community and re-investing that income into the community's development activities); they spur what Silver and Loxley (2007) have termed internal economic linkages.

The Community Entrepreneurship Idea

Entrepreneurs are individuals who engage in some risk-taking behaviour in investing resources to achieve a goal. Literature divides entrepreneurs into two groups.

The first comprises business or economic entrepreneurs whose goal is to organize and manage resources to make profits and add value to their businesses. An interesting example of a business or economic entrepreneur is Brian Scudamore in the United States who dropped out of high school and started the 1-800-GOT-JUNK company in 1989 with an old truck and $700 in his pocket. Today, 1-800-GOT-JUNK is operating in 50 cities of the United States.

The second group comprises social entrepreneurs who focus on particular social problems. These types of entrepreneurs use innovative and sometimes seemingly bizarre ideas to address the problems (Bornstein 2007). Social entrepreneurs have thus been referred to as unreasonable people who shrug off the 'business as usual' attitude and engage in activities that 'generate paradigm shifts in the way social needs are met' (Elkington and Hartigan 2008: 6). Elkington and Hartigan regard social entrepreneurs as disruptive innovators who are insanely ambitious and are motivated by the deep desire to achieve the ideal. They engage in activities that create value in multiple dimensions, refuse to be made into super-heroes, and believe that the way to predict the future is to create it. Unlike economic entrepreneurs who are driven by profit-making interests, social entrepreneurs are driven by the need to improve people's life chances. A popular example of social entrepreneurship is the Grameen Bank started by Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh that has the objective of addressing poverty.

Swedberg (2006) remarks that social entrepreneurship has enjoyed the status of an 'inspiring phrase'; there is no social entrepreneurship theory. Seeking to develop such a theory, Swedberg draws on Schumpeter's general theory on entrepreneurship. According to Schumpeter, as summarized by Swedberg (ibid.), there are entrepreneurial (people of action) and non-entrepreneurial (static) people in society. Entrepreneurial people do not accept

reality as it is. Instead, they engage in creative destruction that arises from intuitive thinking and the willingness to take risks. Where non-entrepreneurs see nothing but routine ways of doing something, the creative destructionists (entrepreneurs) find limitless ways of doing something differently. Because non-entrepreneurs avoid taking risks, the risk-taking entrepreneurs end up buying (using resources they identify through various ways including borrowing) the labour power of non-entrepreneurs and investing it into risky new ventures. By doing so, entrepreneurs convert the non-entrepreneurs' dormant labour into productive labour, of course without the permission of its owners, then use it to implement their innovative ideas. Entrepreneurs are thus one key to wealth generation.

Extending Schumpeter's thinking, Swedberg (2006: 33) remarks that social entrepreneurship 'can be translated into Schumpeterian terminology as *a form of dynamic behavior in one of the non-economic areas of society*' (italics are mine). According to Swedberg, social entrepreneurship involves the same intuitive thinking but directed specifically at addressing social problems. An entrepreneurial activity is social, i.e., a social enterprise, in that it is not concerned about making profits or adding economic value to a venture. Fair Trade Organizations are a good example of social enterprises. The main concern of these organizations is not profit, although they make some, but social justice in trade.

Community development needs both economic and social entrepreneurship as noted by many scholars and community development practitioners (see Shuman 2000; Diochon 2003; various works in Walzer 2007; and Bornstein 2007). Through economic entrepreneurship, wealth is generated and accumulated; through social entrepreneurship, social ills including inequality can be addressed. Community entrepreneurship, as argued in this paper, combines the economic (business) and the social entrepreneurial ventures in a community. Thus, community entrepreneurship involves the intuitive implementation of new and unreasonable ideas that involve the creative utilization of dormant labour but with a two-sided goal of making (a) an economic and (b) a social difference in a community. To attain the two-sided goal of community entrepreneurship demands designing, planning, and managing profit-making community businesses that generate profits which should be invested in further entrepreneurial activities in a community, but that also finance various social development activities in the community.

Drawing on what is happening in Zowe, this paper presents a community entrepreneurship model. A main feature of this model is that it is both endogenous and exogenous in that the main focus in wealth generation is the improvement of how community members make a living while still making

some profit. Before describing the model, it is necessary to lay out the challenges of 'doing' community entrepreneurship in a rural agrarian community, using Zowe as the case story.

Challenges of 'Doing' Community Entrepreneurship in an Agrarian Community

A fundamental aspect of the community entrepreneurship process is that it should plug into the way people make a living. Since the 1960s, there has been little change in the way people make a living in Zowe. Households have three main livelihood domains. The first is agriculture and livestock rearing. Households produce their own food and some cash crops on small (two to five acres) pieces of land. The main food crops are local and composite varieties of corn, peanuts, beans, and millet; the cash crops include hybrid varieties of corn, tobacco, and soybeans. While cash crops are produced solely for sale, a household is supposed to sell only the surplus of the crops produced for food. In most cases, households sell more food crops than they should and run short of food despite adequate harvests in some cases. What is very worrying is that there has been little innovative crop production and livestock rearing in Zowe. Crop yields are low mostly because of little use of yield-improving technologies (improved seed, manure and fertilizer, agro-forestry techniques, etc.) and people's dependency on external support in their economic activities. For example, a main way of improving corn and tobacco yields is to use fertilizer, most of which is imported and expensive. Few farmers in the community can afford fertilizers.

Livestock, though plenty in Zowe, are what DeSoto (2000) would term 'dead capital'; their economic potential is not fully realized. When asked what they use livestock for during visits to households in 2008, respondents indicated that they sell them when they run short of corn, the staple food, and use the income from selling the livestock to buy the corn. They also indicated that they mostly use livestock, mostly cattle, as bride wealth. Livestock are thus (a) a buffer means of livelihood and (b) cultural assets (using them in marriage) rather than outright economic assets. What is so concerning is that the poor livestock husbandry practices (like communal and open field grazing practices) are leading to significant soil erosion in the community.

Because of the low crop yields and the little economic benefit from livestock, the income that households earn from crops and livestock is meagre. In fact, despite the abundant land and livestock, many households still experience critical food shortages. The July 2008 survey found that only sixteen percent (seventy-eight of the 481) of the households in the

community harvest enough food crops to last them until the next harvest. Most households run short of food by January, four months before the next harvest. The food insecurity in the community is connected not to lack of land and livestock but to poor use and care of these livelihood resources.

The second livelihood domain in Zowe is employment within Malawi (at commercial farms or in urban areas mainly in the service industry) and outside Malawi, mostly in South Africa. The July 2008 household survey showed that twelve households had husbands or sons working somewhere in Malawi; their remittance to families was very little. On the other hand, fourteen percent (sixty-nine out of 481) of the households reported having husbands working in South Africa. These migrants work in mines, at commercial farms, or in the service industry as house servants, waiters in restaurants, security guards, and cleaners in shopping malls. These folk engage in circular migration, going to South Africa and staying there for a year, two years, or even three, returning to reconnect with their families for a short period of time (ranging from a week to three months) then going back (Chirwa 1997; Lurie 2000; Mtika 2007). While in South Africa, they send money back home to their households. When they come back for vacations, they bring with them money and goods that help not only their households but others in their extended family systems.

Migrant workers get involved in circular migration as soon as they get married (during their twenties) and continue engaging in circular migration until in their fifties. Earnings during this time have been used to improve houses and to buy more livestock and other assets such as ox-carts and farming implements. Fourteen percent (sixty-nine households out of 481) of households in Zowe have good houses; almost all of these have husbands working in South Africa. These households are food secure; members are much healthier and well dressed. It is not surprising that young men in the community aspire to go to South Africa. Wives encourage their husbands to go. This is understandable because the remittances have been considerable, and many who have had opportunities to go and work in South Africa have accumulated some appreciable financial capital and used it to accumulate wealth. However, there are drawbacks. The AIDS epidemic is fracturing this source of financial capital by weakening and killing the economically and biologically most productive members of households. Since 2000, most of the AIDS-related deaths of adults aged twenty to fifty years old in Zowe have been of those involved in circular migration. For example, in one family[5] made up of four households, two sons (heads of households) involved in migrant work died of AIDS with their wives also dying from the disease.

AIDS is making migrant work a very fragile source of economic security. Migrant work is causing significant strain on families not only by way of spreading AIDS-related illness and death but also by transferring the most productive labour power away from the community as it is the economically productive adults who engage in this work. There is thus a great need to develop alternative economic opportunities in Zowe (basically enhancing entrepreneurial ventures) which, in the long run, must replace migrant work as a main source of economic security (Mtika 2007).

The third livelihood domain in Zowe comprises the various income generating activities people engage in. Some make, buy, and sell such things as clay pots, reed mats, sandals made from vehicle tires, and used clothes or shoes. Others harvest honey from the forests. Some grow vegetables (cabbage, lettuce, onions, tomatoes, etc.) or sugar cane. Some buy livestock in the community and either resell these or slaughter them for sale at a butchery about seven miles away. Some brew and sell local beer. Some have used the money earned from farming or working in South Africa to open small grocery shops or to buy and operate grinding mills for corn or millet. Some practise herbal medicine and are paid for their services. Some are carpenters and others are bricklayers; they provide carpentry and bricklaying services to anyone in the community. Numerous though these income generation activities are, very few people engage in them: there are six people involved in honey harvesting, three bricklayers, two carpenters, one clay pot maker, three who have opened small grocery shops, and only one who is involved in the butchery business. The second shortcoming about these income generating activities, which is more concerning, is that the income these micro-entrepreneurs make from their activities is negligible, mainly because there is no production and marketing help for these micro-entrepreneurs. There is little internal knowledge of the market potential for the various goods and services these micro-entrepreneurs provide.

The three livelihood domains discussed above are the springboard of any community entrepreneurship endeavour if the process is to be endogenously productive and exigenously profitable. Improvements in livelihood activities should be the foundation for any community business venture. This demands both building up and building on people's entrepreneurial abilities (both economic and social) in their meeting of livelihood demands, focusing on agriculture, livestock rearing, and micro-enterprises in a way that feeds into community businesses. Human capital, social capital, and organizational capital are critical in this endeavour. Building up and effectively using these three forms of capital is fundamental to the endogenous improvement of agricultural productivity, to using livestock as economic

assets, to local income generation, to the generation of livelihood-improving ideas, to innovativeness, to better civil and governance processes, to enhancing problem-solving capacity, and to the identification and efficient use of economic and environmental resources in the community. What follows is a description of each of the three forms of capital, how the capital is acquired, and the role of the capital in community entrepreneurship.

Human Capital, Social Capital, and Organizational Capital

Human capital is the stock of productive abilities, technical knowledge, thinking and analytical capacity, moral character, and fitness embodied in labour (see Becker 1993 for some of these attributes). This capital is revealed through the various skills, talents, intuition, health, and integrity in people that make their labour more productive and creative. The capital is acquired through education, through training such as the skills-enhancing and capacity-building type, through healthcare, through involvement in analytical activities, and through character-building exercises. People endowed with human capital are an asset to their households and communities as they can be much more innovative and much more analytical when making decisions. They are also able to make the best use of social capital, defined as the actual or potential resources linked to a network of relationships or that which is in the social structure (network of relationships with social norms defining the nature of these relationships) that facilitates individual and collective action, reciprocity, and trust (Coleman 1988). Putnam (1995) has defined social capital as the collective value of social networks or ties that lead people in these networks to do things for each other or to come to one another's help. From Coleman's and Putnam's works, the two sides to social capital are (a) the networks of ties or relationships, the domain of social capital, and (b) the impact of social capital, that is, the actions arising out of the networks of relationships such as helping behaviour, reciprocity, trust, and the authentic behaviour in any exchange activities including economic ones such as those in the marketplace.[6] There is a need for ties among people and with various entities within and outside the community to facilitate production, distribution (marketing), and consumption activities, which are important in any wealth generation endeavours.

Both human capital and social capital are enacted and re-enacted through organizational capital, the value embodied in the procedures, practices, civil and governance activities, communications, customs, mores, work design, voice or avenues for people to contribute to what is going on (Tomer 1987; Black and Lynch 2005). With specific reference to agrarian communities, the procedures, practices, village governance processes, communication,

customs, mores, freedom of people to express views, freedom to try new things, recognition for innovative ideas, and the encouragement people receive when they take risks is that community's organizational capital. This capital cultivates individual and collective desires to do better; it enhances self efficacy and esteem, it builds up hope, faithfulness, virtue, freedom of thought, trust, diligence, accountability, responsibility in relationships, stewardship over resources, integrity, caring, good governance, blossoming of reciprocal behaviour, and courage. In a community with appreciable organizational capital, decision-making is not driven by nepotism or any form of favouritism but integrity.

The three forms of capital (human, social, and organizational) accentuate each other's effectiveness and play a significant role in increasing innovativeness, risk-taking, respect for one another, and imaginative capacity of people on how they can improve their economic, social, and political well-being, and how they can deal with problems they experience. These forms of capital are invaluable to endogenous entrepreneurial activities, that is, entrepreneurial activities being generated from within the community as a result of improvements in human capital, social capital, and organizational capital, which lead to further and more innovative entrepreneurial activities that would enhance profits in business ventures. Generally, low levels of the three forms of capital reduce innovativeness, and thus compromise entrepreneurship and the process of endogenous community development (community development occurring as a direct result of the development taking place in a community).

Zowe has low levels of these forms of capital. Most of the educated members of the community (to take one aspect of human capital) are not living in the community and are hardly economically involved in the community. The July 2008 household survey revealed that sixteen of the 2003 people in the area had reached the fourth year of High School. Like the others who have attained some education to High School level, the sixteen are actively pursuing ways of leaving the community to seek work in urban areas of Malawi or in South Africa. It is not surprising that Zowe suffers from a significant shortage of human capital and from drainage of the little human capital it has. Social capital (social network of ties, the domain of social capital, and helping behaviour, the product of social capital) in Zowe seems significant. However, this social capital has been used mainly as a vanguard for cultural processes rather than as an asset in economic activities. During illness, funerals, weddings, food shortages, situations of dire need, and entertainment, there is significant helping of one another. People give to one another or through *ganyu* (odd jobs). Giving and receiving are

benchmarks of reciprocity and redistribution of the meagre resources people have. Through this giving and receiving, people develop credit slips that bind them in a network of relationships (Coleman 1988). The challenge is to extend this helping behaviour to entrepreneurial activities.[7] Inadequate organizational capital is making this difficult. Procedures, practices, and governance are gerontocratically controlled (the elderly have a firm grip on acceptable and unacceptable behaviour), which makes it difficult for innovative ideas of the youth to flourish.

There is a need to address human capital, social capital, and organizational capital deficiencies in Zowe. This would move people from being passive and accepting what they are told to being active, engaging, questioning, and generating new ideas; from being naïve to being imaginative and risk-taking; and from being apathetic to being critically reflective. Enhancing these forms of capital would transform the social environment in Zowe to one that is conducive to innovative ideas. Endowed with human capital, social capital, and organizational capital, people in Zowe would be able to deal with the many entrepreneurial challenges of improving productivity, marketing goods and services, and addressing various social ills in the community. Improving these three forms of capital is a most important endogenous entrepreneurial activity for wealth generation in Zowe.

Developing Entrepreneurship in Zowe

This paper advocates the building up of human capital, social capital, and organizational capital for use in both economic and social entrepreneurship, and for engaging in social action. The building of these forms of capital spurs spillover effects (benefits emerging out of changes in people's entrepreneurial behaviour), an argument that Diochon (2003) makes. To implement this endogenous process involves designing and implementing community businesses whose main goal should be to spur ventures that improve livelihood processes. The same basically exogenous principles and approaches used in planning and managing conventional businesses (see Alter 2000 and Davis 2005 for example) are necessary when designing such community businesses. However, the method of operating these community businesses is very different from those of conventional ones; the method must be endogenous. The community business model proposed here has a quadruple bottom line: it addresses financial improvement, social welfare, environmental well-being, and moral integrity. Figure 1 presents a model of this community entrepreneurship process.



This model reveals a number of defining attributes of community businesses. First, the inputs or raw materials used in the business must mostly be produced from the community or the business must supply the type of goods that would improve livelihood processes. In fact, the type of business a community engages in should depend on (a) whether the community can produce the main inputs or raw materials the business needs or (b) whether the commodities a business brings can be used to improve livelihood activities in the community. If packaging and selling mushrooms, most of the mushrooms must be produced in the community; if producing orange juice, most of the oranges must be produced in the community; if making chicken feed, the corn, millet, peanuts, and beans must be produced in the community.[8] Of course the production of these commodities (mushrooms, orange juice, or chicken feed) would require inputs that community members would use; these can be provided through a community business. Linking the community business to livelihood processes is an important element to the endogeneity of the entrepreneurship process and to advancing economic security in the community: it promotes backward integration through which business activities are strongly linked to production activities in the community. The businesses provide a market for the community's goods;

community livelihood processes provide a market for commodities the businesses produce or supply. What is very important is to balance the internal economic linkages that emerge as well as exploring external market potentials for the businesses.

The second defining attribute of community businesses is that they generate profits not for any particular individual or group of people, as conventional businesses do, but for the community. More specifically, as the model shows, the profit the businesses produce should be used (a) for business growth in response to market research and demands (internal, that is, within the community as well as external, that is, outside the community) for goods and services the businesses produce and (b) should be invested into a community fund. This fund has two main uses. First, it is a source of capital to be invested into a revolving Micro-Savings and Micro-Credit Trust. The micro-savings portion of the trust acts as security for savings community members invest in the trust. The micro-credit portion of the trust provides micro-loans to community members, loans that are directed at improving livelihood processes. In engaging in various livelihood activities (crop production, livestock husbandry, and micro-enterprises), community members use the funds to improve productivity. The second role of the community fund is to finance development activities in the community such as improving social services and amenities (physical infrastructures, education, health care, nutrition, water supply, food security, energy supply, and entertainment), which are important inputs to sustainable wealth generation.

The third and final attribute of community businesses is that they should operate not only as a major market for commodities produced in the community but also as a local training institute in (i) entrepreneurship (economic and social) and (ii) social action. Four main areas of training stand out. The first is engaging in processes that build knowledge, skills, capacity, integrity, social networking capability, and organizational abilities. This would involve bringing people together to talk about, for example, what development means and entails; what kind of skills do people need and how can these skills be acquired; how can people in the community help one another in their endeavours to make money; what organizations and institutions are within and outside the community that would be critical in any business venture, and how can the services of such institutions and organizations be harnessed; etc. This first level of training builds up human capital, social capital, and organizational capital for purposes of enhancing generative capacity, important in generating new entrepreneurial ideas and initiatives and following through with the implementation of these ideas and

initiatives among community members. Developing human capital, social capital, and organizational capital builds generative capacity because it improves people's level of critical thinking, analysis, reflection, problem-solving, cooperation in their endeavours, and procedural efficiency in their collective pursuit of economic gain.

The next three levels of training specifically focus on entrepreneurial capability. The first of these three is training in business management skills, including productive use of loans. The second should focus on changing community members' views of assets such as livestock and how to utilize these assets to improve livelihoods. The third should be on how to manage proceeds from livelihood activities to improve health, food security, housing, sanitation, and to engage in more productive livelihood improving activities. The goals of this entrepreneurial training are to (a) advance entrepreneurship in the community, both economic and social, and (b) get community members engaged in social actions that improve the communities. Advancing entrepreneurship endogenously (by way of focusing on improving the processes people follow in making a living) develops the means or resources important in community welfare; this is important in sustaining any entrepreneurial activities that have been initiated. In engaging in social actions, a community addresses collective welfare concerns. Thus the community entrepreneurship model advocated here would achieve its two main goals through people's everyday livelihood activities. Important in this process is the inventorying of resources a community has and utilizing these internal 'means of entrepreneurship', drawing in resources from outside the community only for purposes of enhancing the use of internal ones. It also demands building leadership abilities for managing any initiatives, improving governance processes, and building integrity in ways that enable the community to take over entrepreneurial and social action affairs from change agents. The role of change agents must decline as the community takes over the management of its economic processes.

The community entrepreneurship model described above is being implemented in Zowe. The food processing unit (FPU) was initiated in October of 2006 followed by a community grocery shop in March of 2010. The discussion that follows focuses on the food processing unit because it has been in operation longer than the grocery shop and thus provides a better case story.

The Food Processing Unit

Four ideas for community businesses were initially considered; all were agro-based because of the agrarian nature of the community and all were rooted in Zowe's livelihood activities. The food processing unit (FPU) was

the first and it was to provide pounding, grinding, and packaging services. The FPU, when fully operational, was expected to process a breakfast (soybeans/beans, groundnuts, and maize mix) cereal, chicken feed, honey, and peanut butter. The second business was a commercial 100 to 200 acre farm that would also provide vocational training in agricultural technologies. The farm was to produce (i) field crops (maize, beans, groundnuts, chilies, paprika, cassava, and sweet potatoes) under rain-fed agriculture; (ii) some suitable field crops, vegetables (cabbage, rape, onions, and tomatoes), and possibly fruits under irrigation; and (iii) livestock (chickens, pigs, and beef/dairy cattle). The third business idea was a solar-powered baking oven for baking various items including scones, bread, and doughnuts. The fourth and final business idea was a bio-gas plant to produce gas for energy and manure for farming.

The FPU venture was favoured for three main reasons. First, it had higher backward integration potential than the other three. Making breakfast mix, chicken feed, or peanut butter would lead to higher demand for corn, soybeans, beans, and peanuts that Zowe produces. The business would thus encourage the community members to produce more of these crops.[9] The significant food insecurity in the community provided an opportunity for increasing the production of the crops. The challenge was to identify and make available appropriate and cost-effective technology for improving the production of these crops. Second, there was a high demand for pounding and grinding services in the community that the FPU would provide. Third, the FPU was expected to be an important entity for enhancing honey production, the making of peanut butter, and the production of various grains and leguminous crops as well as mushrooms as it would provide the needed packaging services for these products.

Implementing the FPU involved buying two big mechanical engines, a hammer, and a sheller. The engines are diesel-operated but can also use electricity. Thus, installation of the engines, hammer, and sheller provided for conversion to electric power. So far, the FPU has provided only pounding and grinding services, with plans to move into packaging services later on. There has been appreciable income generated through the FPU, which has been re-invested into the community.

There have been significant hurdles in implementing the community entrepreneurship idea in Zowe. To start with, it did not receive the expected attention as activities were started on the basis of funding opportunities; those that were of interest to our sponsors were funded first. Among the early initiatives were the health clinic built in June 2005 in response to a sponsor in the United States who was interested in raising funds for this specific project. Also, a school breakfast programme to help children was

started in September 2005 again in response to a funding opportunity. Interestingly, the school breakfast programme led to a significant increase in enrolment at the school. To attract new teachers needed because of increased enrolment, teachers' housing had to be provided. Further, the performance of the students was also improving due to the tuition fund that had been established to help students with tuition. Students at the school performed better probably due to the solar lights installed in one school block; the lights provided opportunities for studying late into the night.

Apart from the planning concerns, there have been relief issues. Main ones include the critical food shortages in the community during December 2005 to March 2006 and the washing away of a bridge (an important infrastructure for getting into the community) in December 2005. Thinking of community businesses under these situations was not a priority.

To sum up the foregoing discussion, social services and relief issues took priority in the initial stages of the programme in response to funding opportunities and disasters in the community. Social and relief issues have continued to be priority items. These social and relief activities have been successful but make the Zowe community development programme continually dependent on outside financial support. Even worse, changing the views of community members about community development from a process, albeit exogenous, that is heavily dependent on factors from outside the community and that focuses on social welfare to an endogenous-exogenous process that focuses on both profitable use of resources and building the internal capacity and capability of the community to address socio-economic ills is an extremely elusive endeavour because of the magnitude and immediacy of socio-economic problems (disease morbidity, food shortage, poor education, etc.). When community leaders talk about development, they refer to the building of school blocks and teachers' houses, the installation of boreholes to supply safe water, and the clearing of roads, that is, they tend to think of social and relief services as development. Little is said about economic entrepreneurship as a development activity. This fact underlines the need for training geared at developing human capital (critical thinking), social capital (worthwhile networks within the community and also with key development entities outside the community), and organizational capital to improve governance processes.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the FPU community business faced unexpected competition during implementation. In 2004, there was only one grinding mill in the community. By 2007, there were three grinding mills. Whereas the FPU provides pounding and grinding services, the three mills provide grinding services only. The engines of these three mills are much smaller than the FPUs. Hence, they use much less diesel and charge

much less for their grinding services than the FPU. Also, the expected high demand for pounding services that only the FPU provides is latent. During 2006-2008, the community had a significant shortage of food crops. People chose to spend their money buying food. Rather than spending money on pounding, households reverted to the usual way of pounding corn (women pounding in mortars using pestles). Worsening the situation, while the FPU runs on diesel, there is a mill just eight miles away from the FPU that provides pounding services and runs on electricity, which is much cheaper than using diesel. The FPU loses the few customers who need pounding services to this micro-entrepreneur. To worsen the situation further, recycling cartridges and cell phones in the United States initially brought in appreciable amounts of funds. Since 2007, recycling cartridges has not been raising as much money any longer. The programme has thus had inadequate funds to finance the second phase of the FPU, i.e., extending from pounding and grinding to mixing and packaging, which are necessary to commercially produce a breakfast mix, chicken feed, peanut butter, and package honey. A household sponsorship programme was started in 2008 as another way of raising funds for the programme; its success is yet to be seen.

The lessons learned so far from our experience are many. A few are worth outlining here. First, for agrarian communities, given their subsistence nature, there is need to understand not only the business but also the social aspects of any entrepreneurial venture. Calamities like food shortages in Zowe, for example, had substantial impact on the services the business was able to provide (pounding and grinding). This underlines the importance of backward integration for purposes of helping households to produce more. Backward integration activities (supporting households with inputs and technology to produce more crops, for example) would help in addressing food insecurity and enable the households also to use the services that the FPU provides. Of course, to produce more demands better technology, skills, creativity, knowledge, and resources. This underscores the need of developing human capital, social capital, and organizational capital, which when done as a process of improving livelihood practices makes endeavours but also exogenously productive.

Second, an analysis of competition and how to respond to it is important. The competition from other budding enterprises is welcome. As a development programme, there is a need to encourage entrepreneurial activity. The competition revealed the need for horizontal integration as a marketing strategy. The FPU needs to move quickly into providing packaging services along with products including breakfast cereal, chicken feed, pounded corn, and even packaging of beans, soybeans, peanuts, and ground beans, leaving other services to the budding enterprises.

Third, developing the FPU in stages without a better understanding of the market for the goods and services the FPU was to provide was ill conceived. This is made worse by the fact that community members in Zowe seem to be followers of ideas rather than generators. During 2004-05, there were extensive discussions with the community about the grinding and pounding mill idea in the community. Interestingly, some of the people who ended up investing in grinding mills got the idea from these meetings. This is good for the community, but it underscores the need for people to be innovative, creative, and inventive, not merely followers, something that the building up of human capital, social capital, and organizational capital should achieve.

Despite the hurdles, the FPU is making money for the community because of two main reasons. First, the demand for pounding and grinding services is high and the FPU has been stable in providing these services; other mills in the community have not been as dependable. Second, community members increasingly feel that using the FPU contributes to the community development fund, which is for funding development activities in their community.

A word on the management of community entrepreneurship in an agrarian community setting is in order. There is of course a need for a manager to manage the business ventures. In Zowe, there is a manager who works with the steering committee made up of members elected by the community. The manager reports to the steering committee, which in turn reports to the community council of leaders. The manager plays multiple roles including trainer of the steering committee members and other local leaders, development facilitator, advocate of the community to external powers, counsellor, consultant, and one involved in capacity building as he or she manages the community entrepreneurship process. The bottom line is that the manager is an employee of the community being paid from the proceeds of the community businesses and reporting to the steering committee and local leaders who he is responsible for training. The main responsibility of the manager is the mobilization, building up, and facilitating the use of human capital, social capital, and organizational capital to advance entrepreneurial activities in the community. To carry out this responsibility, the manager needs training in people-centred development communication.

Conclusion

This paper has discussed community entrepreneurship as a means of achieving economic security in an agrarian community. Drawing on what is happening in the Zowe Community Development Programme, the paper has proposed model of community entrepreneurship,that is significantly

endogenous but also exogenous. This model calls for a community to have businesses, or what Shuman (2000) calls community corporations. These businesses must generate profit not for private gain but for (a) advancing further economic and social entrepreneurial activities through a revolving micro-savings and micro-credit facility that benefits community members and (b) financing social actions. The entrepreneurial activities (economic and social) that people are involved in improve livelihood activities through backward integration that in turn leads to more production of raw materials or inputs needed by the community businesses. For Zowe and with particular reference to crop production activities, improving crop production does not only help in ensuring adequate food supply in households but also leads the households to use more of the services of the food processing unit (FPU). Thus, service to households generates income for the community. Both activities (entrepreneurial and social action) substantially benefit from human capital, social capital, and organizational capital, key endogenous factors in the generation of wealth. The development and productive use of these three forms of capital improves (a) the identification and utilization of appropriate technology, (b) effective inventory, mobilization, and use of resources for improving production activities, and (c) social services, environmental stewardship, and governance processes.

What is going on in Zowe and with specific reference to the FPU underlines the importance of focusing not on marginal utility and marginal productivity. Focusing on these attributes of wealth generation, given the socio-cultural hurdles and the 'help-us' development mindset of Zowe people, directs attention to external help. Instead, there is the need to focus on internal processes, particularly the livelihood practices in the community. There is significant internal potential for wealth generation in Zowe, obviously nuanced by social and cultural challenges. This paper has argued that the best approach is to engage people to make the processes of how they make a living, especially in regards to their farming and livestock rearing, entrepreneurial by promoting and integrating exogenous principles into the process of wealth generation. This is the springboard for economic security. If the process is successful in various communities of Malawi, these communities become microcosms of wealth generation that feed into national and regional economic security.

Notes

1. During the follow-up meetings, community members felt that some of the students' ideas called for drastic changes in people's way of doing things and would benefit only a few community members. Introducing cattle feedlots and cattle ranching, for example, demanded some drastic action by those

owning cattle. Some, like the biogas plant, were considered strange. The ideas that community members found pertinent to their situation, such as health and education concerns, pertained to everyday struggles and would benefit, they argued, the whole community rather than just a few.

2. A household comprises a husband, wife, and children who farm the same piece of land and eat food from the same source. Some households include the elderly (husband's father, mother, or aunts) who are unable to take care of themselves.
3. In July 2008, a household survey was conducted. It documented, among other things, household food shortages, assets, and household members' names, sexes, ages, and educational attainment for each of the 481 households in the community.
4. An individual, family, or group in the United States can sponsor a household in Zowe at $360 a year. Plans are to wean sponsored households from external financial support within four years. Within this time, a household should have attained self-reliance. Other forms of relationships (exchange of gifts, general correspondence, etc.), between the sponsoring individual, family, or group and the sponsored household would continue for any length of time.
5. People in Zowe are patrilineal and patrilocal. The term 'family' here is used in an extended family context under patrilineal and patrilocal circumstances. The family referred to here comprised a husband and wife who had four sons and two daughters. Three of the sons were married and thus had separate households. Of the three married sons, two were the ones involved in migrant work and contracted AIDS, passing it onto their wives.
6. Lin (2001) emphasizes the impact of social capital revealed in market dynamics.
7. A group of 15 young men formed a farming club and obtained agricultural loans during the 2007-2008 farming season (November to June). It was a good season in terms of rain. They made good money. Fundamental disagreements led to the breaking up of the group and some members of the club defaulted on their loans.
8. Of course, some inputs needed in the community business would have to be imported from outside the community.
9. There are two breakfast programmes in the community, one at each of the two schools. The breakfast flour mix (corn and soybeans ground and mixed) is prepared using the FPU. During 2008-2009, 530 children were served breakfast at one of the schools every school day and 170 children were served breakfast at the other. Zowe produces enough corn but used to produce no soybeans. During the early stages of the breakfast programmes, soybeans were procured from outside the community while promoting the production of these soybeans in the community. Community members responded positively. The community right now produces all the soybeans needed in the breakfast served at the two schools.

References

Alter, S.K., 2000, *Managing the Double Bottom Line: A Business Planning Guide for Social Enterprises*, Washington D.C: Save the Children, PACT Publications.

Becker, G., 1993, *Human Capital*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Black, S.E. and L. M. Lynch, 2005, 'Measuring Organizational Capital in the New Economy', Discussion Paper #1524, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, Germany.

Bornstein, D., 2007, *How to Change the World: Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of New Ideas*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Chirwa, W.C., 1997, 'Migrant Labour, Sexual Networking, and Multi-Partner Sex in Malawi', *Health Transition Review*, 7: 5-15 supplement number 3.

Coleman, J.C., 1988, 'Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital', *American Journal of Sociology*, 94: S95-S120.

Davis, M.E., 2005, *Managing a Small Business Made Easy*, Madison: Entrepreneur Press.

DeSoto, H., 2000, *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else*, New York: Basic Books.

Diochon, M.C., 2003, *Entrepreneurship and Community Economic Development*, Ithaca: McGill-Queens University Press.

Elkington, J. and Hartigan, P., 2008, *The Power of Unreasonable People: How Social Entrepreneurs Create Markets that Change the World*, Boston: Harvard Business Press.

Lurie, M., 2000, 'Migration and AIDS in Southern Africa: A Review', *Southern Africa Journal of Science*, 96, 343-347.

Korten, D.C., 1999, *The Post-Corporate World: Life After Capitalism*, San Francisco: Kumarian.

Kretzmann, J.P. and McKnight, J. L., 1993, *Building Communities from the Inside-Out: A Path toward Finding and Mobilizing a Community's Assets*, Chicago, Illinois: ACTA Publications.

Lin, N., 2001, 'Building a Network Theory of Social Capital', in Nan Lin, Karen Cook, and Ronald S. Burt, eds., *Social Capital: Theory and Research*, New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Loxley, J., Silver, J., and Sexsmith, K., eds., 2007, *Doing Community Economic Development*, Halifax and Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing.

Mtika, M., 2007, 'Labour Migration, Political Economy, and the AIDS Epidemic in Rural Malawi', *Social Science and Medicine*, 64: 2454-2463.

Myers, B.L., 2006, *Walking With the Poor: Principles and Practices of Transformational Development*, New York: Orbis Books.

North, D.C., 1995, 'The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development', in J. Harris, J. Hunter, and C/. M. Lewis, eds., *The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development*, London: Routledge: 17-26.

Peet, R. with Hartwick, E., 1999, *Theories of Development*, New York: The Guilford Press.

Putnam, R.D., 1995, 'Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital', *The Journal of Democracy*, 6:1, pp. 65-78.

Schumacher, E.F., 1973, *Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered*, New York: Harper Colophon.

Sen, A., 1999, *Development as Freedom*, New York: Anchor Books.

Shuman, M.H., 2000, *Going Local: Creating Self-Reliant Communities in a Global Age*, New York: Routledge.

Silver, J. and Loxley, J., 2007, 'Community Economic Development: An Introduction', pp. 2 -13, in *Doing Community Economic Development*, John Loxley, Jim Silver, and Kathleen Sexsmith, eds., Halifax and Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing.

Swedberg, R., 2006, 'Social Entrepreneurship: The View of the Young Schumpeter', pp. 21-34, in *Entrepreneurship as Social Change: A Third Movements in Entrepreneurship*, Chris Steyaert and Daniel Hjorth, eds., Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd.

Tomer, J.F., 1987, *Organizational Capital: The Path to Higher Productivity and Well-Being*, Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Publishers.

Walzer, N., ed., 2007, *Entrepreneurship and Local Economic Development*, New York: Lexington Books.

Africa Development, Vol. XXXVIII, Nos 1&2, 2013, pp. 25–50

(ISSN 0850-3907)

Recontextualisation of the Concept of Godfatherism: Reflections on Nigeria

Ifeanyi Onwuzuruigbo*

Abstract

Social exchange relations have economic, religious, moral and political implications for both dyadic and group relations. Consequently, some social scientists deploy social exchange theory to explain human actions, behaviour and institutions. The concept of *godfatherism*, as a form of exchange and clientelist relation, has characterized social, political, religious and commercial networks of indigenous Nigerian groups since pre-colonial times. Recent commentaries and analysis of godfatherism, however, erroneously portray the phenomenon as a new form of political interaction, encouraging electoral fraud, promoting intra-party and political conflicts, and consequently stifling the consolidation of Nigeria's extant democracy. This superficial treatment of godfatherism, which presents it in a negative image, has proceeded without emphasizing the socio-cultural origin of the concept and its contribution to the political and commercial growth of pre-colonial societies. The paper re-contextualizes the concept of godfatherism. It captures the positive contributions of godfatherism in entrenching responsive and responsible leadership and promoting development. It also considers the distortions the concept suffered as it evolved from a form of social exchange to a form of political relationship, encouraging political conflicts and corruption in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria.

Résumé

Les relations d'échange social ont des implications économiques, religieuses, morales et politiques aussi bien pour les relations dyadiques que pour les relations de groupe. Par conséquent, certains chercheurs en sciences sociales déploient la théorie de l'échange social pour expliquer les actions humaines, les comportements et les institutions. Le concept de *parrainage politique*, en tant que forme de relation d'échange et de clientélisme, caractérise les réseaux sociaux, politiques, religieux et commerciaux de groupes nigérians indigènes depuis l'époque précoloniale. Cependant, les récentes observations et analyses sur le parrainage politique décrivent ce phénomène comme une nouvelle forme d'interaction politique, qui encourage la fraude électorale, favorise les conflits au sein des partis et les conflits politiques, et par conséquent entrave la consolidation de la démocratie existante au Nigeria. Ce traitement superficiel du

* Department of Sociology, Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. Email: maziify2@gmail.com

parrainage politique, qui en fait un portrait négatif, a été entrepris sans mettre l'accent sur l'origine socioculturelle du concept et sa contribution à la croissance politique et commerciale des sociétés précoloniales. Cet article recontextualise le concept de parrainage politique. Il souligne les contributions positives du parrainage politique dans l'enracinement du leadership réceptif et responsable et la promotion du développement. Il examine également les distorsions subies par le concept au cours de son évolution d'une forme d'échange social à une forme de relation politique, encourageant les conflits politiques et la corruption au Nigeria à l'époque coloniale et postcoloniale.

Introduction

> Men who are anxious to win the favour of a Prince nearly always follow the custom of presenting themselves to him with possessions they value most, or with things they know especially please him; so we often see princes given horses, weapons, cloths of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments worthy of their high position – Niccolo Machiavelli (2003), *The Prince*.

Social exchange and clientelism are not peculiar to Nigeria. The excerpt from Machiavelli's letter to Lorenzo de Medici quoted above makes a veiled reference to the existence of clientelistic relations among social and political actors in Europe (Scott and Marshall, 2005). Elsewhere in Asia and Africa, studies of social and political issues confirm underlying clientelistic networks among individuals and groups engaged in social and political interaction. Scott (1972) elaborates on the patron-client model of association and demonstrates its application to politics in Southeast Asia. In similar manner, Lemarchand and Legg (1972) point to the prevalence of clientelistic networks in West and Central Africa and how these networks relate with ethnic politics in the process of nation-building in Africa (Lemarchand 1972). More recent studies of Africa probe the intersection of clientelism and bureaucracy, democracy, civil society (Lemarchand 1998; Berman 1998 and 2004) and so on.

This paper focuses on a genre of social exchange and clientelism in Nigeria referred to as *godfatherism*. There is a sense in which godfatherism can be said to be the buzzword of Nigerian politics since the nation returned to democratic governance in 1999 because very few concepts, if any, have gained greater currency and popularity in contemporary discussions and studies of Nigerian politics and governance (Nnamani 2006; Albert 2005 and 2006; Onwuzuruigbo 2006; Human Rights Watch [HRW] 2007). Indeed, the activities of political godfathers and their godsons have been implicated in several case studies of intra-party crises, fraudulent electoral results, corruption and political conflicts in many states of the Nigerian federation (Onwuzuruigbo 2006; HRW 2007). The failure of Nigeria to conduct credible

elections since 1999, for instance, has been frequently attributed to the menace of godfathers and their godsons while the politics of godfatherism has remained responsible for the seemingly endemic corrupt leadership and political tensions in states like Anambra, Oyo, Enugu, and Rivers, just to mention a few (HRW 2007). These worrisome developments have stirred up increasing scholarly attempts at defining, conceptualizing and analyzing the phenomenon. The paper therefore identifies, in specific terms, the weaknesses inherent in the treatment of the subject matter and seeks to clarify and shed more light on the concept, its evolution and practice.

The gamut of recent scholarly discourse on godfatherism is characterized by two major weaknesses. First, the discourse merely explores the recent political expression of godfatherism; it focuses on the trajectory of the politics of godfatherism on elections, political corruption and conflicts in Nigeria – thus erroneously conceiving and implying that the politics of godfatherism is, after all, a recent development associated with Nigeria's nascent democracy (Nnamani 2006; Albert 2006). Second, because of its emphasis on the perverse manifestation of godfatherism in contemporary Nigerian politics, the discourse, I submit, presents godfatherism only in negative terms (Joseph 1991; Albert 2006; HRW 2007). Put differently, the treatment of the socio-cultural basis of godfatherism which would have complemented its political dimension and provided a holistic and robust explanation capable of revealing the positive aspects of the phenomenon has received very minimal attention. And so, the contributions of godfatherism in promoting harmonious social relations, achieving rapid and sustainable socio-economic development, entrenching good governance and political tranquillity, especially in pre-colonial societies, have been grossly de-emphasised.

These obvious flaws may have occurred because the godfatherism discourse is to a large extent dominated by political scientists. It is yet to benefit from the contributions of political sociologists and anthropologists whose inputs are urgently required to provide the needed socio-cultural perspective to understanding the concept and its context. If we are to achieve a rigorous treatment and holistic understanding of the phenomenon, then the socio-cultural component and historical evolution of the concept must be interrogated. For it is in doing so that we see in sharp relief not only the positive contributions of godfatherism in raising responsible leaders, entrenching responsive leadership and promoting development, but also the distortions the concept suffered in the process of evolving from a form of social exchange and political interaction – facilitating development in pre-colonial societies and dispensation – to a form of political relationships that encouraged political conflicts and corruption in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria.

Generally, the paper elaborates on the concept of godfatherism. It explores the different levels and stages of metamorphosis, appropriation and incorporation of godfatherism into the political culture, institutions and processes of colonial and post-colonial Nigeria. In addition, it chronicles the alterations, abuses and distortions godfatherism underwent and the potential for generating conflict it acquired in the process. To achieve this task, the paper is divided into three sections. The first section highlights the shortcomings observed in the extant treatment of the concept and the need for a re-assessment. The second part provides a conceptual re-examination of godfatherism. A major concern here is to present an all-encompassing definition and conceptualization of godfatherism among major ethnic groups of Nigeria. In doing so, the historical trajectory of the concept of godfatherism in the social and political relations of individuals and groups in Nigeria is sketched. The third part highlights the alterations that trailed the transformation and incorporation of godfatherism in the politics and administration of colonial and post-colonial Nigeria. Some conclusions are drawn in the final section.

Conceptualizing Godfatherism

Godfatherism has been conceived and defined in different ways. I shall start by considering the following excerpts from previous and recent definitions and conceptions of godfather or godfatherism:

> ... in common parlance 'godfatherism' is the process by which an individual establishes links with a given institutional hierarchy in the expectation of favoured treatment ... An individual seeks the support and protection of an *oga* or a godfather while trying to acquire the basic social and material goods – loans, scholarships, licenses, plots of urban land, employment, promotion – and the main resource of the patron in meeting these requests is quite literally a piece of the state (Joseph 1991: 207).

> ... an impervious guardian figure who provided the lifeline and direction to the godson, perceived to live a life of total submission, subservience and protection of the oracular personality located in the large, material frame of opulence, affluence and decisiveness, that is, if not ruthless ... strictly, the godfather is simply a self seeking individual out there to use the government for his own purposes (Nnamani 2006: 57, 61).

> The 'political godfathers' in Nigeria build an array of loyalists around them and use their influence, which is often tied to monetary considerations, to manipulate the rest of the society. Political godfathers use their influence to block the participation of others in Nigerian politics. They are political gatekeepers: they dictate who participates in politics and under what conditions ... Simply defined the word 'godfather' refers to a person who tries to play God (Albert 2005: 82).

> ... godfathers are not mere financiers of political campaigns. Rather they are individuals whose powers stems not just from wealth but their ability to deploy violence and corruption to manipulate national, state or local political systems in support of the politicians they sponsor (HRW 2007: 33).

> 'Godfathers' are those who have the security connections, extended local links, enormous financial weight, and so on, to plot and determine the success or otherwise of a power seeker at any level of a supposedly competitive politics. The complex process of doing this ... is famously known as 'godfatherism' (Omotola 2007: 135).

As noted earlier, one common denominator in each of these definitions is the emphasis on political expressions of godfatherism.[1] Regardless of the emphasis on the political aspect of godfatherism, the fact that the concept has socio-cultural foundations and relevance cannot be denied. Yet the socio-cultural dimensions of the concept have been often marginalized and trivialized in the various attempts to define and conceptualise it. To this extent the definitions are, in my opinion, superficial and incomplete. In order not to belabour the point, it is my view that godfatherism should be situated in its proper perspective as first and foremost an instrument of social exchange or relation rather than a form of political interaction. Perceiving the concept as an instrument of political interaction is not only reductionist but diminishes our knowledge of the context in which it is situated and practised ab initio. Omotola (2007: 138) drew attention to this very important point when he stated that godfatherism

> ... is a longstanding and deeply rooted feature of the cultural values of Nigerian society, where it is purely socio-economic in nature and mutually productive for both parties; its politicization would appear to have contributed to the criminalisation of politics.

This summarizes the arguments advanced in this paper: to wit, unless we situate the concept in its socio-cultural and historical context which makes the concept and problem clearer, the etymology of the concept will remain elusive, the genesis of its perverse manifestations in Nigeria's political culture will remain vague, and its positive contributions to the growth and development of pre-colonial communities will not be fully appreciated. This is the contention and the perspective I adopt in this paper.

How then do we redefine, re-conceptualise and reconstruct the concept of godfatherism? Generally speaking, the godfather is one who commands respect among his people either through his privileged position, knowledge, skill, wisdom and wealth or on account of his popularity and public acceptance. The godfather, in practical terms, is a father-figure, benefactor

and mentor who trains the godson, guides the godson on the path of achieving success, skill and excellence in the aspirations or professional calling of the godson. The godfather supports his godson, not only with his skills, wealth, might and experience, but also his network of connections. Be it in the realm of politics, business or any other sphere of endeavour, the godfather is always committed to the success and progress of his godson. He shields his godson from policies, plans and emergencies likely to hurt or halt the career goals and life ambitions of the godson. In fact, the greater desire of the godfather is that the godson achieves much more than the godfather has been able to do.

Apart from benefiting from the benevolence, kind gestures and good will of the godfather, the godson, on the other hand, reciprocates by remaining loyal and offering general support and assistance to the godfather. The godfather expects unalloyed loyalty from the godson which could be symbolically expressed through gifts. The godson remains loyal to the godfather by paying regular visits to the godfather, intimating the godfather his future plans and course of action with the intention of benefiting from the godfather's wise counsel, relying on his often wide network of relationships and practical help in achieving them. The godson makes himself and his services available for use – though not abuse – by the godfather and gives gifts, which may not necessarily be monetary in nature, to the godfather, particularly on festive and memorable occasions. Exchange of gifts is fundamental in greasing the relationship between godfathers and godsons. According to Komter (2007: 94) 'mutual loyalty, often supported by gifts, connects those involved in collective hostilities towards third parties as well as those who maintain collective friendships' – reciprocity in other words.

The godfather and godson relationships are both unequal and reciprocal because the status of the godfather is higher than that of the godson and the services or objects exchanged are not of the same order. Similarly, they are not jural but personal and informal. Being personal, the relationships usually evoke strong feelings of closeness between the partners culminating in a wide variety of multiple exchanges between the two individuals over time. All of these heighten the capacity of the ties to increase over long periods with increasing levels of indebtedness and obligation (Barnes 1986) that ultimately benefit the parties and their community.

Although the relationship between the godfather and his godson may be strained when either of the parties falls short of fulfilling his obligations, such situations hardly degenerate to recurring large-scale, violent conflicts that threaten the peace and tranquility of the entire society, or incapacitate the instruments and institutions of governance, or impose the whims and

caprices of the godfather on the entire society as is presently the case. More often than not, the godfather and his godson operate a symbiotic relationship which advances the interests of both parties. By raising knowledgeable and skilled individuals in commerce, religion and politics, the godfather and his godson(s) become critical factors in the development agenda and process of the society. Godfatherism can then be seen as a social relationship involving reciprocal exchange between individuals of unequal social status intended to promote their spiritual, political and socio-economic wellbeing for the overall development initiatives of the society as a whole. What this means is that in its original and unadulterated form, godfatherism transcended the realm of politics to include other vital aspects of societal life – commerce, religion, child rearing and training – and consequently contributed positively to the growth and advancement of the society.

Conceived this way, we are able to establish two important facts vital to our understanding and analysis of the concept. One, godfatherism can be located in a socio-cultural and historical context and cannot therefore be seen as an entirely new phenomenon in Nigeria. Situating the phenomenon of godfatherism in a historical perspective, as will be seen later, brings out clearly not only its origin but also the contradictions, perversions and abuses it suffered as it was transformed, appropriated and incorporated into the colonial and subsequently post-colonial political institutions and culture. Two and more importantly, godfatherism cannot also be seen primarily and only as an instrument of political interaction fostered by the logic and dynamics of politics in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria. It is possible to conceive of godfatherism as a phenomenon practised in the realm of commerce, religion, politics and other fields of endeavour among various ethnic groups in Nigeria since pre-colonial times.

Godfatherism in Igbo apprenticeship, trade and commerce

Godfatherism was, and has remained, central in driving Igbo commerce and merchant apprenticeship. Quoting Eme Awa, Nnamani (2006: 58) argues that 'the normal Igbo family seeks out a guardian, a sort of godfather for the sons who are expected to be inspired and motivated by the streak of perfections, deftness, contact, courage, experiences and accomplishments associated with the ... master'. Exploring the roles of *Nnam ukwu* or *Ogaranya* (godfather) and *Odibo* (godson)[2] in Igbo merchant apprenticeship, Nnamani further states:

> To leave the child to fend for himself or to let him live and grow with the dangers of his father's light-handed upbringing is akin to undue pampering which is like disaster at the commencement of the journey of life for the youngster.

> ... one was not left in doubt about the utility of the master, may be a godfather sort of, who had a challenge in bringing up the child but who must go to sleep in the wake of the exhibition of the prowess he inculcated in the rising star as the kid is under compulsion to bring to play, his own version of life.

The Igbo proverb, *ekpere nna bu na nwa g'aka nwa ya*, meaning that 'the prayer of any man is that the child ascends and surpasses the father or master' best captures the phenomenon of godfatherism in the Igbo worldview. The godfather also exercises social, economic and political leadership which is 'collective, never dictatorial or oligarchic and sometimes almost outrageously democratic' (Uzoigwe 2004: 146).

Glimpses of the practice of godfatherism in the sociology of pre-colonial Igbo society are presented in Pita Nwanna's little book. Written in Igbo language and titled *Omenuko*, the book narrates the story of Omenuko and his apprentices. Omenuko was a wealthy and successful merchant who had many apprentices under his care and training. In one of his business trips, Omenuko lost his entire goods in overflowing river. In order to mitigate his losses, Omenuko sold his apprentices as slaves to another trader and slave merchant in a foreign land. This was a despicable and abominable act that violated the basic principles of Igbo godfatherism and merchant apprenticeship. As such Omenuko's actions were strongly condemned by his kinsmen. Confronted with the severe implications of his actions, Omenuko fled to another land in self-imposed exile (Nwanna 1976). The relevant lesson from *Omenuko* is clear. It is obligatory for the merchant or godfather to equip his apprentice or godson with basic skills and expertise required to excel in his chosen career just as he is expected to protect the life and advance the career of the godson.

This form of godfatherism has continued until modern times and partly accounts for the tremendous success of the Igbo in trade and commerce in Nigeria. Recent research has revealed that many Igbo traders in the city of Jos in Northern Nigeria for instance are in business, courtesy of their '*oga* (godfather) ... who mainly brought them up as apprentice. The key element in this arrangement is trust ... that covers all aspect of life, from politics to business' (Adetula 2005: 225). Both the godfather and his godsons are expected to operate a rewarding relationship that directly and indirectly facilitates the process of development of the community. Neither of the parties is expected to jeopardize the interest of the other. Most of the recent and successful transportation and haulage companies in Nigeria, especially in Igbo-dominated Southeastern Nigeria, are owned by personalities who started as apprentices of the generation of Igbo road transportation merchants like late Augustine Ilodibe, proprietor of Ekene Dili Chukwu Transport Company Limited.

Godfatherism and Hausa/Fulani socio-political structure

In analyzing the Hausa/Fulani culture of 'given away' children or child rearing and training, Feinstein (1987: 8) refers to 'a practice so widespread that it represents a deep-seated cultural variation' which points to the practice of godfatherism among the Hausa/Fulani group. He states:

> Custom has it that immediately after weaning, at about two years of age, the first born (and frequently other children as well) is given to substitute parents to bring up, usually drawn from those respected in the community, who may be childless or are in a better position to raise the child.

The notion of godfatherism was also well entrenched in the political and social structure of pre-colonial Hausa/Fulani society. The successful prosecution of the Fulani Jihad ensured the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate in Northern Nigeria. Building on the traditional rulership (*saurata*) institution, the caliphate administration introduced more sophisticated hierarchical levels of administration ranging from the Sokoto administration, those of the emirate, the vassalage and the village to ward administration bound by patron-client or godfather-godson ties. In any event, access to political office was almost equally open to the Fulani and Hausa. However, since the Fulani conquerors had the emirate administration under their political grip, almost all important offices reverted to the Fulani while the Hausa became client to the Fulani overlords. The Fulani mainly appointed kin members and close associates to political offices. This practice almost became the acceptable political norm. Overtime increasingly large number of offices became the preserve of particular lineages (Tibenderana 1989; Shenton 1989: 5). It then was the practice for those appointed to positions of authority to have received some forms of training in politics and administration by serving as clients or godsons of Fulani patrons and senior administrative officials (O'Hear 1986). As Tibenderana (1989: 74) observes 'when in office patrons were expected to reward their most loyal clients with administrative positions'.

The practice of godfatherism was evident in Hausa/Fulani trade and commerce. Apart from its literary meaning of landlord or the head of a household, the term *maigida* in Hausa/Fulani also refers to a godfather. In their separate works on Hausa traders and trading activities, Abner Cohen, Polly Hill and Paul Lovejoy applied the term to refer to those Hausa who provided brokerage services to fellow Hausa traders involved in the cattle and kola trades. The *maigida* helped in promoting Hausa trading activities by providing accommodation, storage and brokerage services to Hausa traders at various trading ports where Hausa traders were involved in business transactions in southern West Africa. This practice had its origin in

Hausaland from where the itinerant traders and their *maigida* came. According to Albert (2005: 86):

> In Hausaland when a stranger with kola is staying in the house of one man and a potential buyer is staying in the house of another man they bargain over the kola and on each calabash they set aside two kola nuts, *yan k'ida*, as a gift: one goes to each of the landlords (Ferguson 1972 quoted in Albert 2005: 85).

Many *maigida* became wealthy through the compensation they received from the services they rendered to the traders.

Smith (1960), obviously relying on the workings of his western political system, wrongly described this form of political and commercial clientage among the Hausa/Fulani as institutionalized political corruption. Although it is often difficult to determine the difference between 'gifts given for services rendered' and 'gifts given to induce corruption' or a service in a society where gift-giving and 'generosity is a highly prized quality' (Paden 1986: 61), nevertheless, the Hausa/Fulani has a clear-cut definition and understanding of these two practices in the context of the moral community established by the ideals of the Islamic jihad. Hence, the intention of the gift is important in assessing the gift or any other transaction. In this connection, Paden (1986) asserts that a gift is given to induce corruption, *zalunci* or *ba a hanci*, if it is a 'compulsory gift' given to influence individuals in authority or people around them for the purpose of securing certain favours, services or items, like portions of land. No doubt, these distinctions were not very clear to Smith when he dismissed the Hausa/Fulani commercial and political system as institutionalised corruption.

Godfatherism and Yoruba political institutions

Godfatherism was an integral aspect of Yoruba pre-colonial political structure. The *Baba-ogun* (war patron) played a prominent part in the pre-colonial government and politics of Ibadan. Baba-ogun was a warrior who had distinguished himself in the numerous wars and battles that characterized inter-group relations in Yorubaland, especially in the nineteenth century. He exercised control over numerous peoples of several scattered compounds, collected taxes, tributes and levies from them. In addition he settled disputes in his domain and recruited eligible male members of compounds under his control to be soldiers in his army during periods of war (Falola 1985: 100). Individuals who wanted to become soldiers or pursue careers in the military were usually apprentices (godsons) to a successful Baba-ogun who also served as their patron while he (Baba-ogun) trained them in the art of warfare and soldiering. The Baba-ogun exchange relation was anchored in the military and socio-political structure of Ibadan.

As a military camp, Ibadan attracted not only refugees of the nineteenth century Yoruba wars but young men eager for military adventure and distinction. Most of them settled with the Baba-ogun. Describing the Baba-ogun, Awe (1964:119) states:

> He had under him a host of ambitious young men receiving military training in his army. To keep all these men in trim, he was allowed to go on private expedition with the sanction and approval of the town authorities and to keep part of the booty to feed his soldiers and buy guns and ammunitions for them. During actual warfare, these men knew their own positions on the battlefield and had always to stick as closely as possible to their chiefs.

Beyond providing military training and leadership, the Baba-ogun protected and advanced the interests of his apprentices, soldiers, and members of his compound in the town council. They, in turn, reciprocated by remaining loyal to the Baba-ogun, providing him with military and farming service and gifts such as crops at festive seasons. According to Awe (1964: 109), prominent Ibadan warriors and leaders like Ogunmola, Fijabi and Aare Latosa began their military careers this way.

On the other hand, there was the *Baba kekere* (the small or little father), *Baba isale* (father of the courtyard/quarter or underground world) or *Baba nigbejo* (a great help in times of trouble) who played the role of godfathers in pre-colonial trade and politics of Yorubaland (O'Hear 1986; Albert 2005: 86). *Baba kekere* was used to refer to local community leaders who provided physical, social and political security for people of lesser social status who, in turn, paid their respect, loyalty and tribute to the Baba-kekere. O'Hear's study of political and commercial clientage in the Yoruba town of Ilorin is an insightful discussion of the relevance of the Baba kekere in the political administration and commercial growth of Ilorin town. The Baba-kekere provided a wide range of services which among other things included interceding on his client's behalf with a higher authority or government official and providing access to land and justice to his clients. In all these, the Baba kekere received no salaries but instead received gifts and accepted gratuities for the services he rendered to his clients (O'Hear 1986). Similarly, Barnes's (1986) study of metropolitan Lagos captured the role of the *Baba isale* as godfather in local political administration of Mushin, a suburb of Lagos.

Godfatherism and contemporary religions

In modern times, orthodox Catholics[3] and Anglicans do make reference to their spiritual godfathers (Scott 1972: 94; Scott and Marshall 2005: 484) just as members of the new generation Pentecostal churches have 'Fathers-in-the Lord'. The spiritual godfather or 'Father-in-the-Lord' is a mature and

successful Christian who epitomizes high moral standards such that he can and is expected to guide inexperienced Christians to attain an equally successful Christian life through his conducts. More often these men are instrumental to the 'born-again' experiences of the Pentecostal faithful or adopted as godfathers by young and immature Christians as they pass through baptismal, confirmation, marriage and other religious rites of orthodox Catholic and Anglican denominations. Among Catholics, the child adopts a godfather at baptism who is supposed to ensure his spiritual and economic welfare. In return the godson supports the activities of the godfather when he requires it. At a more inclusive level, the godfather-godson ties established during baptism give the natural parents of the godson the right to look up to the godfather for material assistance. The spiritual godfather thus occupies a central position in the spiritual development and overall growth of the Christian. In fact, most of Nigeria's prominent Pentecostal preachers are spiritual godsons of older generations of Pentecostal Christians.[4]

Godfatherism is not missing in Islam either. In a way, the *mallams* (Islamic scholars) and *almajiris* (Islamic pupils) in Northern Nigeria can be construed as maintaining a godfather-godson relation. The system operates on the Islamic injunction that enjoins the faithful to seek knowledge as well as the philosophy that Islamic learning without rigour and stoic discipline does not develop a wholesome personality. Having been separated from their parents, the pupils are placed under the tutelage of Koranic teachers. The almajiris receive Islamic training while seeking arms to meet their daily needs and those of their mallam (Adewuyi 1998).

Although there may be variations, the concept and practice of godfatherism was not strange among pre-colonial groups and communities. While godfatherism was never really practised in pre-colonial Igbo politics, partly because of its segmentary and non-centralised political structure which stifled the development of large-scale political institutions on which political godfatherism thrives, the same cannot be said of Igbo trade and commerce. Godfatherism appeared to be the hub around which Igbo trade and commerce revolved. However, local groups and communities with centralized or monarchical political structures like Yoruba and Hausa evolved a blend of commercial and political godfatherism in their religious, social and political relations. What is clear in all the cases examined is the positive contributions of godfatherism in promoting the welfare of both the godfather and godson as well as the development, harmony and good governance in the community. Regrettably, the adoption and application of godfatherism in the colonial administrative processes and post-colonial political culture created major flaws in the understanding and practice of godfatherism.

Abuses and Distortions of Godfatherism under Colonialism

The concept of godfatherism espoused so far presents a practice that focuses on stability, growth and development of the community. It seeks to prepare individuals – godfathers and godsons – to be active agents of development of the community. In a social relation characterized by what Durkheim described as mechanical solidarity, the godfather wields power not so much for personal interests and aggrandizement but for the socio-economic wellbeing of individual members of the community and the utmost socio-political development of the community. Benevolence and altruism are basic norms and principles underlining the relationship between godfathers and godsons. The godfather is expected to be a benevolent mentor and patron in the same way the godson is expected to remain loyal and supportive of the godfather. The interest of each of the parties involved in the relationship – the godfather, godson and community – is accommodated and adequately protected. Tibenderana (1989: 74) puts it somewhat differently when he states that 'political clientage (godfatherism) entailed mutually beneficial relations and solidarity of interests of clients and patrons'.

But godfaththerism can be conceptualized in another sense. In *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria*, Richard Joseph defines godfatherism as 'the process by which an individual establishes links with a given institutional hierarchy in the expectation of favoured treatment'.[5] In what appears to be an explanation of the role of godfathers and expectations of godsons, Joseph states that:

> An individual seeks the support and protection of an *oga* or a godfather while trying to acquire the basic social and material goods – loans, scholarships, licenses, plots of urban land, employment, promotion – and the main resources of the patron in meeting these requests is quite literally a piece of the state. Such an argument can easily be made in the case of ministerial appointments or positions on government boards. It also applies however, to individuals within the nominally private sector, since the business world is hemmed in by bureaucratic regulations which derive from the nationalistic and development concerns of post-independence governments (Joseph 1991: 56).

This conception of godfatherism is a departure from the notion of godfatherism identified earlier. It suggests some inherent attributes and motives that differentiate it from the previous notion.

First, Joseph's definition of godfatherism suggests a practice deeply rooted in individualism and selfishness that discounts and subverts the interest of the community. The godfather is perceived as promoting his interests and those of his godson over and above the collective interests of the generality of the public. In other words, the primary aim is the development of the self (godfather) or patron. To achieve this end, the godfather maintains a selfish

and parasitic relationship with his godson and the community. Not only are the interests of the godson and community abandoned in the fulfilment of those of the godfather, but the godson and community are coerced to work assiduously and make sacrifices toward the realization of the supreme interest of the godfather. Hence godfatherism is conceived essentially as a means of competing for, or capturing public resources for the selfish use of the godfather.

Second, rather than the resources of the godfather, the 'piece of the state', community and electorate are mobilized to grease the parasitic relationship the godfather maintains with the community and state. In the words of Albert (2005: 83), 'The relationship between the two of them – the godfather and the godson – has little or nothing to do with the larger society the two of them claim to lead'. This form of godfatherism is oppressive, malevolent and has become the defining characteristics of relations between political actors – political patrons and public office holders or seekers – in Nigeria. It is the persistent demands the godfather makes on the state that imbue godfatherism with conflict-generating attributes and qualities. While the former notion of godfatherism depicts the traditional and conventional conception of godfatherism, the latter constitutes the redefined and distorted version of the concept. What phenomenon and changes initiated the redefinition of the conventional notion of godfatherism? And what process completed the distortion of the concept?

The process of redefining the conventional notion of godfatherism was consummated towards the end of the nineteenth century, and colonialism was responsible for this change. Colonial political engineering fostered its own 'ideas about government and society, superimposed on indigenous political structures which were not allowed to crumble and disintegrate' (Ajayi 1985: 5). Colonial administrators were tolerant and even receptive of the traditional forms of godfatherism. Instead of dismantling the old system and creating a completely new one complementing the strange administrative doctrines and principles propagated by the colonialists, colonialism merely distorted and incorporated it into its repertoire of administrative mechanisms. As a result aspects of indigenous political structure were integrated into the hierarchy of colonial administrative position and authority. In what became known as Indirect Rule, Native Administration was introduced to involve community leaders and village chiefs in the daily administration of the villages and towns in the districts and provinces. This was done to reduce administrative costs of the colonies, spread the burden of leadership among existing native rulers and extract loyalty from the natives with minimal force.

Thus, in Yorubaland, it was needless for the Baba-ogun to prove his military worth before he attracted the attention of the colonial authorities. The Baba-ogun was simply incorporated into the Ibadan Native Administration

and immediately became an adjunct officer of the colonial administration in the maintenance of law and order and production of goods needed for European industries. It became compulsory for every resident of Ibadan to identify with a Baba-ogun through whom he paid his tax to the colonial administration (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007). Like Ibadan, in Ilorin the Baba kekere was used as an agent of tax-collection by the colonial administration. According to O'Hear (1986: 71) 'in 1912, for example, a British official reported that money from compound tax was handed over to the Baba kekere or patron of the 'maiungua' – some slave of the emir'. In Lagos, the Baba isale, having lost their traditional political functions as chiefs, nevertheless served as unofficial advisors to government figures and dispute arbitrators in the new colonial regime (Barnes 1986).

Where traditional godfatherism was found incompatible with the immediate political and economic considerations of the colonial authorities, it was drastically restructured to suit the needs of the colonizing power. Because they found a less centralized but more democratized political structure and communities in Igboland whose administration would require huge financial and material resources from the parsimonious colonial administration, the colonialists proceeded to create Warrant Chiefs, a few selected from the class of existing godfathers and many from personalities with questionable character (Afigbo 1972). Isichei (1976: 142-143) notes that 'the patterns of traditional Igbo government were hopelessly unsuited to the needs of the colonial state. Its system of checks and balances, its consensus by protracted discussion, its use of religious sanctions and especially, its small scale rendered it impracticable'. Corroborating Isichei, Ohadike (1994: 153) stated that the British restructured the traditional Igbo administrative system and by implication the concept of godfatherism 'because they failed to comprehend the workings of the Igbo political system. The Igbo political systems were inconsistent with British notions of governance, and anything that did not meet European standards had to be destroyed not developed'. As it turned out not a few *ogaranya* and other local leaders, including mean and dubious characters, lacking leadership qualities, who collaborated with the foreign rulers,[6] were made Warrant Chiefs and Native Authority officials and included in administering the colonial state at the local level (Afigbo 1972).

In Northern Nigeria, the more stratified and centralized political structure of the Sokoto emirate suited Indirect Rule. Although British colonialism, in accordance with its racial thinking, reasoned that the light-skinned Fulani rulers were a superior race who had allowed themselves to be corrupted by mixing with the inferior Hausa race, it insisted that 'nothing must be done to undercut the position of the indigenous ruling class. Rather, if British rule

was to survive, the position of the Sultan, emirs and *hakimai* must be maintained' (Shenton 1986: 28). Except in cases where a co-operative member of the ruling class was empowered and installed as emir in place of a self-confident figure who resisted or frustrated colonial rule, very minimal changes were effected in the political administration of Northern Nigeria (Shenton, 1986: 25). In the words of Atanda (1985: 25), 'what emerged was neither a total destruction of the old society nor the emergence of a totally new one'. What emerged was a coalition and collision of the 'new and the old, an alliance of persons and political groups; an amalgam or a synthesis of ideas'.

The marriage of convenience between the old and the new went on without considering the degree to which European policies proved compatible with the preservation of traditional principles of godfatherism. Local godfathers – *Ogaranya, Nnam-ukwu, Obas, Baba-ogun, Baba-isale, Baba kekere, Maigida and Emirs* – now became godsons of the colonial administrators. European godfathers were sought after 'not only because of their political "pull" but because they controlled the technical resources and know-how through which the demands of their clients could be met' (Lemarchand 1972: 79). More especially for the local godfather, dealing with the colonial state was a mixture of opportunity and danger – the opportunity of gaining access to the diverse resources of the state and its agents and the danger of running afoul of its arbitrary and capricious actions. The need to shield himself from the dangerous and capricious actions of the system compelled the local godfather to court the protection and support of his European counterpart to whom he became a client (Berman 2004). Soon a hierarchy of power and authority, establishing novel patron-client in the form of godfather-godson relationships between the colonial state, its Resident and District Officers on the one hand and the chiefs, emirs and local godfathers on the other hand was installed. Yet the emirs, chiefs and godfathers, in the context of indigenous political structure, were expected still to perform their traditional positions as godfathers in the society. This contradiction inherent in the dynamics of colonial administration altered and redefined the notion and practice of godfatherism. Above all, it had profoundly destabilizing consequences for the internal cohesion of the society.

In what ways did the distortions and destabilizations express themselves? Emergent godfathers and public authority figures were no longer persons with sterling leadership qualities and excellent character as defined, identified and selected by the local people; rather godfathers were mostly handpicked, based on the possession of qualities considered by the colonialists to suit the colonial enterprise, and imposed on the people. Even public officers drawn from the category of personalities perceived by the locals as godfathers, in no time became more committed to themselves and the colonial authorities

than their communities. For example, encouraged and protected by colonial administrators, Warrant Chief R. A. Idigo of Aguleri in Onitsha Province unilaterally leased communal lands to European merchant companies without remitting the rents to his community (File No. O.P. 505).

The principles and workings of the new form of godfatherism established by colonialism not only marginalized the interest of the local people but in several ways totally discounted the people and further bastardized existing principles of godfatherism. In Northern Nigeria, Paden (1986: 60) notes that the Hausa indigenous culture of gift-giving required both the godfather and the godson to exchange gifts. Thus, an emir gave gifts to the district heads and village heads who were usually the emir's biological sons and political godsons. Paden, however, adds that gifts by persons of lower status and rank (godson) to persons of higher rank (godfather) were essentially 'to get blessing' and not intended materially to enrich the latter. Things changed drastically in the new arrangement, and these principles of godfatherism, leadership and communalism inherited from the era of the Sokoto emirate, Paden points out, were altered, transformed and adapted to the emerging culture of irresponsible leadership of the colonial and post-independence era in which political godfathers and elites became parasites of the commonwealth and collective resources of the people. The result was a shift of emphasis away from the symbolic or affective import of the rewards and gifts to expectations of material benefits by the godfathers (Lemarchand 1972).

This was necessary because the logic of colonialism ensured that the godfathers and local elites created by colonialism were rendered materially weak even though the same class of individuals was required by tradition to be dispensers of patronage. Prior to colonialism, wealth, measured in terms of standard of living, was fairly equally distributed among the people, with the local leaders only enjoying marginal advantage over the rest of the people. Colonialism discouraged this pattern and in its place instituted a structure that ensured the transfer of ownership and control of resources from the people to the colonial state (Ake 1985). In doing so, colonialism reversed the Marxist proposition that control of political institution derived from control of major economic resources (Barnes 1986). The elite and godfathers were therefore placed in a precarious economic situation which fired their desperate quest for the economic resources of the state. Accessing the state and its institutions – an opportunity available only to the leaders and godfathers – became a point of entry to the resources of the state and a matter of do-or-die for the leaders. Accordingly, the only way in which the chiefs, who lacked traditional legitimacy, were able to keep themselves in power was to extract resources from the state and the people for distribution among their supporters (Tignor 1993).

The few who ventured to observe their traditional obligations to the people immediately invited the wrath of the colonial authorities. One instance was that of M. E. Amete, Umuleri member of Umuigwedo Native Court of Appeal in the Onitsha District, who was among these few. In 1950 his community appointed him secretary of Umuleri Emergency Front that was championing the struggles of the community to claim ownership of Otuocha land in Onitsha District. The District Officer interpreted a letter of petition Amete wrote on behalf of his community as unbecoming of a member of a Native Court and threatened to strip him of his post. To retain his privileged position, Amete quickly apologized to the authorities and thereafter isolated himself from the struggles of the community (File No. 1181). At every point and place 'authority in the community began to move away from working for the people to working for the interest of the colonial masters', and their local agents (Njoku 2005: 104). The new chiefs, local leaders and political godfathers cared less about the interests of their communities. Increasingly, they alienated themselves from the people. 'As there were no popularly elected Councils at the time', lamented Awolowo (1982: 9-10), 'the Obas and Chiefs, instead of regarding themselves as being responsible to their people as before, considered themselves responsible to the white man who in the view of the people was unapproachable as well as unassailable and invincible'. Since they were no longer accountable to the people, incidences of corruption and financial malfeasance became rampant.

The process of redefining godfatherism was completed in 1960 when colonialism was terminated and power bequeathed to a new crop of leaders, who were essentially products of the colonial political structure. Apparently, the new but distorted form of godfatherism provided the basis for modern parasitic clientelistic relations and political interactions among political actors on the one hand and between actors and the post-colonial state on the other hand. The benevolent, altruistic and development-oriented essence of godfatherism gave way to egotism, greed, financial corruption and political acrimony. The posture of a benevolent political godfather committed to raising leaders and, in the case of the Igbo, building enduring democratic culture was no longer attractive to the new-breed of leaders, elites and politicians. Hence, the nascent notion of godfatherism in politics and elections portrayed the political godfather as a mercenary politician who was willing to provide mentorship to his godson only to the extent that the latter could be used to expand and consolidate the power and resource base of the of the godfather, and entrench the parasitic relationship the godfather often maintained with the state. Bitter struggles for state power and economic resources by the elites, godfathers and their godsons became rampant and often degenerated into full-blown political crises. These struggles were worsened by the penchant

of the political elite to privatize the public realm of the new but weak post-colonial state bequeathed to it by the departing colonialists.

Despite these glaring weaknesses, Albert (2005: 88) argues that from the First Republic (1960-1966) to the Second Republic (1978-1983), the practice of godfatherism was guided by selfless service to the individual and community. He contends that notable politicians of the periods like Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo and Ahmadu Bello were benevolent and altruistic godfathers and the community and electorate benefited from their benevolence. Albert states further:

> The only difference between these early godfathers in Nigerian history and their contemporary peers is that they supported and nurtured their godsons positively rather than negatively. The emphasis of this generation of godfathers was on developmental issues and not on money. They also did not demand figuratively, pounds of flesh from their adopted sons as the present godfathers do. These godfathers of blessed memory motivated their adopted sons to higher levels of political morality and made it necessary for them to be accountable to those who voted them in office.

But Albert's claims do not seem consistent with historical facts. The godfathers of blessed memory may have motivated their adopted political godsons to higher levels of political positions and responsibilities but certainly not higher levels of political morality.

On the eve of Nigeria's independence, the struggle for state resources between Nnamdi Azikiwe and his godson Eyo Ita promoted conflicts within the Eastern Regional Government, split the National Council of Nigeria Citizens (NCNC), and gave birth to rival political party, the National Independence Party (NIP) (Nnoli 1978: 168-169). Eyo Ita led the NCNC regional government in Eastern Nigeria and was a director of several companies in the Zik Group of Companies. The row between Azikiwe and Ita came to light when Azikiwe tried unsuccessfully to get Ita to deposit some local government funds in the African Continental Bank. Azikiwe and his family members had major controlling shares in the bank. Ita's allegation of financial malpractices against Azikiwe led to the setting up of a Commission of Inquiry into the affairs of the Eastern Regional Government. The Commission headed by Sir Stafford Forster-Sutton, Chief Justice of the Nigerian Supreme Court, indicted Azikiwe for mismanagement of government funds (Tignor 1993: 192). Expelled from the NCNC, Ita along with his sympathizers, mostly members of his Efik ethnic group, formed the NIP.

In the Western Region, Ladoke Akintola, estranged godson of Obafemi Awolowo, led a faction of the Action Group (AG), a political party headed by Awolowo. The submissions of Akintola's faction to the G. B.A. Coker Commission of Inquiry set up in 1962 to investigate the management of six

Western Nigeria public corporations, revealed outrageous levels of corruption allowed by Awolowo and AG politicians in running the government (Osoba 1996). As in other regions, the politics of godfatherism within the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) controlled government of the Northern Region promoted political and financial corruption (Tignor 1993). In doing so, NPC politicians in the region jettisoned the virtues of leadership propagated by erstwhile Islamic leaders of the region. In their case, apart from discouraging leaders from corruptly enriching themselves, it was regarded as special blessing if a leader died without any estate. Consequently, early Islamic leaders of the region earned their living by simple tasks such as rope-making, even while presiding over authoritative positions (Paden 1986: 63). These austere and puritanical principles of leadership opposed and contradicted the corruption and venality engendered by the phenomenon of political godfatherism within the NPC during the colonial and post-colonial periods (Tignor 1993: 197-199). However, British colonial administration collaborated with the authorities of the Sokoto emirate to keep the issue of corruption among political godfathers and their godsons in NPC from the public (Tignor 1993; Osoba 1996).

On resumption of democratic governance in 1979, political godfatherism became a critical factor in electoral and party politics. In the Kwara State gubernatorial election, Olushola Saraki, then a chieftain of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), had helped his political godson, Adamu Attah, to secure victory over Josiah Olawoyin of the Unity party of Nigeria (UPN). Irreconcilable disagreements over sharing of political offices and state resources between Attah and Saraki, whose political profile had grown tremendously to include the Majority Leader of the Senate, strained their relationship (Onwuzuruigbo 2006). In the 1983 gubernatorial elections, Saraki moved his support to Cornelius Adebayo of the UPN against his estranged godson, Adamu Attah. Cornelius won the election. In subsequent years, Saraki would become a powerful godfather with the highest turnover of political godsons, shifting his support from Attah to Adebayo, to Sabbah Lafiagi, then to Mohammed Lawal, all governors of the state in different political dispensations before settling for his biological son Bukola Saraki, the present governor of the state. Political godfatherism has since remained a critical factor of electoral politics, intra-party squabbles and political crises in Nigeria (Ayoade 2008).

Not even the emergence of military rule tampered with the clientelistic character of political ties in the post-colonial state. Indeed, military rule appears to have worsened the situation. As argued by Berman (2004) the destruction of an open political process and effective elimination of freedoms of speech, information and organization left the personalistic ties of patron-client networks as the only available mode of access to the state for ordinary people and the appropriation of the patronage resources of office as the

only source of support and power for politicians and state officials. Long years of military administration created more political godfathers in Nigeria. In Anambra State, for instance, Arthur Eze, a wealthy businessman and staunch supporter of military juntas, emerged as the indisputable political godfather of the state during the military regime of Abacha. His cordial relationship with the Abacha government placed him in a position to influence decisions as to who obtained political appointments and contracts from the state. Arthur also exploited his rapport with the regime to acquire for himself several fat contracts from the state. Other prominent godfathers who maintained strong contact with the military leaders in Abuja and Awka, the capital of Anambra State, included Emeka Offor and Chris Uba (Makwuzi and Aham 2003; Adebanjo 2003). Like Arthur, they too received continuous allocations of contracts from the military government. The military administration of Colonel Mike Attah in the state awarded Uba contracts to build a housing complex, mast and transmitters for the Anambra State Broadcasting Service (ABS), state judiciary complex and the new Government House complex which was awarded for 400 million naira. The contract was later reviewed upwards to the tune of one billion naira (Aiyetan 2003). It is not surprising that both Offor and Uba became godfathers of Chinwoke Mbadinuju and Chris Uba, two former governors of the state since the inception of civilian rule in Nigeria in 1999.

Perhaps no other state in recent times has grappled with the turbulence and instability generated by the politics of godfatherism more than Anambra state. On resumption of democratic governance in 1999, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) won the gubernatorial elections in Anambra State. To win the elections, the elected state governor, Chinwoke Mbadinuju, received financial support and relied on the political network of his political mentor and godfather, Emeka Offor. Attempts by Offor to meddle in the administration of the state, especially the award of contracts and appointment of political officers of the state, led to a bitter quarrel between the two men. Relations between Offor and Mbadinuju degenerated to open confrontation and conflict such that engaged the governor for the better part of his four-year tenure and diverted his attention away from the urgent need to develop the state (Albert 2005). On the eve of the 2003 elections, Mbadinuju's performance rating by the electorate and his party was discouraging. Yet Mbadinuju was relentless in persuading the PDP to adopt him as the party's flag-bearer in the next gubernatorial election in the state. In the ensuing political intrigues and manoeuvres between himself and his estranged godfather, who openly opposed Mbadinuju's ambition, the PDP declined to present Mbadinuju for a second term. Mbadinuju finally decamped to Alliance for Democracy (AD) and contested the election on the platform of the AD (Albert 2005; Onwuzuruigbo 2006).

Mbadinuju was defeated by Chris Ngige, the PDP gubernatorial candidate. Once again Ngige's electoral victory derived from the political leverage and financial clout of his godfather, Chris Uba. Like Mbadinuju, Chris Ngige refused to submit his government to the caprices of Uba, particularly in awarding contracts, appointing political officers and sharing state revenue. Uba's hopes of controlling the government and recouping his investment on Ngige's election from the resources of the state were scuttled. As a result, Uba felt deceived and disappointed in his godson. With the active collaboration of the Presidency, Uba mobilized a team of policemen who arrested the governor and attempted to force him out of office on 10 July 2003 (HRW 2007). The episode sparked a gale of legal actions and altercations between Ngige and Uba. Not satisfied with the outcome of the legal tussle which did not go in his favour, Uba, on November 2004, organized a group of thugs who unleashed violence against government officials, suspected supporters of the governor, government properties and people of the state (Onwuzuruigbo 2006; Ayoade 2008).

All these occurrences suggest that unlike the pre-colonial forms of godfatherism, the contemporary notion of political godfatherism is propelled by the assumption that access to authoritative positions of the state and the personalities occupying such positions translates to access and control of vast public economic resources and power. No wonder post-independence leaders and godfathers are greedy and corrupt.

On account of the politics of godfatherism and the seemingly endemic confrontations between political godfathers and their godsons, Anambra State has never experienced peace and meaningful economic growth since the resumption of democratic governance in 1999. The task of developing the state has been abandoned as administrative ineptitude, infrastructural decay, political and financial corruption resulting from struggles for power and resources overwhelm the entire machinery of governance in the state. As days roll by, so the chances for expanding the democratic space and enthroning democratic culture in the state are frittered away. Anambra is not an exception; it is just a reflection of the political situation in most of Nigeria's thirty six states (HRW 2007).

Conclusion

Godfatherism is not a recent phenomenon as existing literature erroneously suggests; it is rooted in the social and political experiences of many communities and groups in Nigeria since pre-colonial times. Secondly, godfatherism was hardly a source of political crises and conflicts in pre-colonial societies as it is in contemporary Nigerian politics. If anything, it played a prominent role in promoting political stability as well as the

commercial growth of pre-colonial communities. In any case, the virtues of godfatherism came under serious manipulation and subversion in the context of the imposition of colonial rule and subsequent emergence of the post-colonial state. If today political godfatherism evinces evil and negative attributes, it is because of the abuses and distortions it has suffered in the process of its appropriation by and application to colonial administration and governance. These characteristics of manipulative abuses have continued into the post-colonial dispensation, becoming fully rooted in political processes, structures and institutions in Nigeria.

Reducing or eliminating the disruptive influence of godfatherism in Nigerian politics would therefore require entrenching democratic ideals and strengthening democratic processes and institutions. Political parties, for instance, are central to democratic governance. Party management and administrative structures should be democratized in a way that emphasizes the interest of the party over and above the political agenda of individual members of the party. One of the many ways to achieve this is to evolve a viable and sustainable approach to funding parties, particularly their electioneering programmes that could ensure that the rich do not hijack the party organs by way of their financial contributions. In this way the suffocating grip and overarching influence of the godfathers over the parties could be drastically minimized.

There is also the need to reposition the electoral commission to be free from manipulation and interference from parties and politicians. The chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in Nigeria is appointed by the President while the Commission relies on the presidency for funding. As a result, the INEC has remained susceptible to the caprices of the incumbent president and encumbrances of godfathers of the ruling party. For INEC to be truly independent and empowered to conduct free and fair elections, it must be extricated from the stranglehold of the presidency and political godfathers of the ruling party. This can be realized by evolving a framework that guarantees autonomous sources of funding for the Commission as well as incorporating the opinions of political parties, civil societies and pressure groups in the process of appointing members and chairman of the Commission.

Notes

1. We find this vividly displayed in a recent compilation of articles in *The Constitution*. All the authors – political scientists by training and orientation – and their articles glossed over the socio-cultural underpinnings of the concept of godfatherism. See *The Constitution*, Vol. 7 No. 2, June, 2007.

2. The word *Nnam ukwu* (my master or my big father) is used by an *Odibo* (apprentice or servant) to refer to his master. Most Nnam ukwu, especially in olden times were also *Ogaranya* (wealthy, influential or respected people).
3. *Clientelismo* (clientelism) originated from feudal Europe. The European conquerors of Latin America imported patron-client relationship into the political, social and religious life of Latin America. The predominance of Catholicism in Latin America linked this to the system known as *Compadrazgo* (god parenting) which gradually permeated the practices of Catholics in other parts of the world. See (Scott and Marshall 2005: 483-484).
4. Reverend Josiah Akindayomi, founder of the Redeemed Christian Church of God, was believed to be the spiritual godfather of the present spiritual leader of the church, Pastor Enoch Adeboye. See Ukah, A., 2008, *A New Paradigm of Pentecostal power: A Study of the Redeemed Christian Church of God in Nigeria*, Trenton: Africa World Press.
5. See explanatory notes of chapter five in the endnotes of Joseph (1991).
6. The selection and appointment of Warrant Chiefs followed no formal procedure and none was stipulated by the colonial administration. Consequently, the decision to appoint anyone as Warrant Chief depended totally on the whims and caprices of the British colonial officials. Chapter 2 of Adiele Afigbo's work highlights the methods utilised by the officials in appointing Warrant Chiefs.
7. The District Officer considered Paragraph 6 of the petition which stated 'that in the event of unnecessary delay, continued mistake, or refusal to take appropriate actions, we shall not be held responsible for any unpleasant action we may be compelled to take', as 'irresponsible language'.

References

Adebanjo, A., 2003, 'The Godfathers' Red Card', *Tell*, July.

Adetula, V., 2005, 'Ethnicity and the Dynamics of City Politics', in A. Simone and A. Abouhani, eds., *Urban Africa: Changing Contours of Survival in the City*, Dakar: CODESRIA, pp. 206-234.

Adewuyi, S., 1998, 'Sociocultural Determinants of Street-begging in Northern Nigeria: The Case of Sokoto', unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Ibadan.

Afigbo, A., 1972, *Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Rule in Southeastern Nigeria 1891-1929*, London: Longman.

Aiyetan, D., 2003, 'Governor by Proxy', *Tell*, July.

Ajayi, A., 1985, 'Factors in the Evolution of Political Culture in Nigeria' in A. Ajayi and B. Ikara, eds., *Evolution of Political Culture in Nigeria*, Ibadan: University Press, pp. 10-17.

Ake, C., 1985, 'The Nigeria State: Antinomies of a Peripheral Formation' in C. Ake, ed., *Political Economy of Nigeria*, Lagos: Longman, pp. 9-32.

Albert, O., 2005, 'Explaining 'Godfatherism' in Nigerian Politics', *African Sociological Review*, 9 (2): 79-105.

Albert, O., 2006, 'Cost of Prebendal Politics: "Godfatherism" and Intractability of Post Election Crisis in Nigeria since the 1999 "Democratic Transition"', Paper

presented at the Nordic African Institute Conference on Post-Conflict Elections in West Africa held in Accra, Ghana, 15-17th May.

Atanda, J., 1985, 'Collision and Coalition in the Politics and Society of Western Nigeria in the Nigeria', in A. Ajayi and B. Ikara eds., *Evolution of Political Culture in Nigeria*, Ibadan: University Press, pp. 85-100.

Awe, B., 1964, 'The Rise of Ibadan as a Yoruba Power in the Nineteenth Century', unpublished D. Phil. Thesis, Somerville College, University of Oxford.

Awolowo, O., 1982, *My Early Life*, Ikeja Lagos: John West Publications Limited.

Ayoade, J., 2008, 'Godfather Politics in Nigeria', in V. Adetula, ed., *Money and Politics in Nigeria*, Abuja: International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES), pp. 85-96.

Barnes, T., 1986, *Patrons and Power: Creating a Political Community in Metropolitan Lagos*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Berman, B., 1998, 'Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism', *African Affairs*, 97 (388): 305-41.

Berman B., 2004, 'Ethnicity, Bureaucracy and Democracy: The Politics of Trust', in B. Berman, D. Eyo and W. Kymlicka, eds., *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*, Oxford: James Currey, pp. 38-53.

Falola, T., 1985, 'The Political System of Ibadan in the 19th Century', in A. Ajayi and B. Ikara, eds., *Evolution of Political Culture in Nigeria*, Ibadan: University Press, pp. 104-117.

Feinstein, A., 1987, *African Revolutionary: The Life and Times of Nigeria's Aminu Kano*, Enugu: Fourth Dimension.

Human Rights Watch, 2007, 'Criminal Politics: Violence, "Godfather" and Corruption in Nigeria', Vol. 19, No 16(A), New York: Human Rights Watch.

Isichei, E., 1976, A History of the Igbo People, London: Macmillan Press.

Joseph, R., 1991, *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of Second Republic*, Ibadan: Spectrum.

Komter, A., 2007, 'Gifts and Social Relations: The Mechanisms of Reciprocity', *International Sociology*, 22 (1): 93-108.

Lemarchand R., 1972, 'Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building', *American Political Science Review*, 66 (1): 68-90.

Lemarchand, R and Legg, K., 1972, 'Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis', *Comparative Politics*, 4 (2): 149-178.

Lemarchand, R., 1998, 'The State, the Parallel Economy and the Changing Structure of the Patronage System', in D. Rothchild and N. Chazan, eds., *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*, Boulder CO and London: Lynne Rienner pp. 150-1.

Machiavelli, N., 2003, *The Prince*, London: Penguin.

Makwuzi, M. and Aham, U., 2003, 'The Making of a Coup Plotter: The Childhood Story of Chris Uba, His Rise to Fame, His Stupendous Wealth and now His Coup', *The News*, July.

Nnamani, C., 2006, 'The Godfather Phenomenon in Democratic Nigeria: Silicon or Real', *The News*, January.

Nnoli, O., 1978, *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria*, Enugu: Fourth Dimension.
Njoku, U., 2005, 'Colonial Political Engineering and the Genesis of Modern Corruption in African Public Service: The issue of Warrant Chiefs of Southeastern Nigeria as a Case in Point', *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 14 (1): 99-116.
Nwana, P., 1976, *Omenuko*, Ibadan: Longman Nigeria Limited.
O'Hear, A., 1986, 'Political and Commercial Clientage in Nineteenth Century Ilorin', *African Economic History*, 15: 69-83.
Ohadike, D., 1994, *Anioma: A Social History of the Western Igbo People*, Athens: Ohio University Press.
Omobowale, A. and Olutayo, A., 2007, 'Chief Lamidi Adedibu and Patronage Politics in Nigeria', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45 (3): 425-446.
Omotola, J., 2007, 'Godfathers and the 2007 Nigerian general Elections', *Journal of African Elections*, 6 (2): 134 -154.
Onwuzuruigbo, I., 2006, 'Electoral Democracy in Nigeria: The Political Godfather, the Godson and the Party', Paper presented at the Nordic African Institute Conference on Post-Conflict Elections in West Africa held in Accra, Ghana, 15-17th May.
Osoba, S., 1996, 'Corruption in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective', *Review of African Political Economy*, 69 (23): 371-386.
Paden, J., 1986, *Ahmadu Bello: The Sarduana of Sokoto*, Zaria: Hudahuda Publishing Company.
Scott, J., 1972, 'Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia', *American Political Science Review*, 66 (1): 91-113.
Scott, J. and Marshall, G., 2005, *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shenton, R., 1986, *The Development of Capitalism in Northern Nigeria*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Smith, M., 1960, *Government in Zauzzau, 1800-1950*, London: Oxford University Press.
Tibenderana, P., 1989, 'British Administration and the Decline of the Patronage-Clientage System in Northwestern Nigeria', 1900-1934', *African Studies Review*, 32 (1): 71-95.
Tignor, R., 1993, 'Political Corruption in Nigeria before Independence', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31 (2): 175-202.
Uzoigwe, G. 2006. 'Evolution and Relevance of Autonomous Communities in Pre-colonial Igboland', *Journal of Third World Studies*, XX1 (1): 139-150.

Archival Material

Otuocha Land Dispute, File No. 1181, Vol. 1, ONDIST 20/1/322, National Archives Enugu, Nigeria.
Land Dispute: Umuleri and Aguleri Land Dispute, Vol. 1. File No. O. P. 505, ONDIST 12/1/319, National Archives Enugu, Nigeria.

Afrique et développement, Vol. XXXVIII, Nos 1&2, 2013, pp. 51–79

Déterminants de la compétitivité financière des P. M. E. Sénégalaises

Mahmoudou Bocar Sall*

Résumé

L'objet de cet article est de mieux appréhender la réalité de la compétitivité financière dans les P.M.E. au Sénégal. L'article présente les résultats de tests d'hypothèses relatifs aux variables fondamentales susceptibles d'influencer le comportement des PME en matière de compétitivité financière. Par le biais de modèle d'économétrie des données de panel, nous avons observé un échantillon composé de 407 entreprises durant la période 1998–2006. Nos résultats révèlent que les niveaux de compétitivité financière, liés positivement aux variables de masse salariale (main-d'œuvre), de composition des actifs, de l'effort d'investissement varient en fonction de la taille et du secteur d'activité des entreprises. Il est, en outre, intéressant de noter que la variable de politique financière (taux d'endettement) est négativement corrélée à la compétitivité financière.

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to give a better perception of the effective aspect of financial competitiveness among medium sized companies in Senegal. It presents the results of a hypothesis test on basic variables which are likely to be incidental on companies' behaviour, in terms of competitiveness. We have worked on a sample of 407 companies from 1998 to 2006, using econometric models of data panels. The results show that the level of competitiveness positively linked to labour (payroll costs) or assets variables vary in accordance with the very size or the field of activity of the medium sized company.

Introduction

Une étude portant sur treize pays africains, commanditée par la Commission économique pour l'Afrique, a posé en 2004 le problème de la nécessité de renforcer la compétitivité des entreprises africaines. Ces entreprises sont, pour la plupart, des petites et moyennes entreprises (PME) et leurs problèmes,

* Faculté des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar, Sénégal. E.mail : mbsall@refer.sn

selon ce rapport, sont de deux sortes : d'abord, d'accès, ont-elles les moyens de produire pour les marchés ciblés (nationaux ou internationaux) ou sont-elles exclues du processus de libéralisation et de mondialisation ? Ensuite, de modernisation, leur inclusion dans le processus leur permet-elle de se moderniser ? Ou plutôt mène-t-elle à une détérioration ? C'est dans ce contexte que la problématique de la compétitivité est débattue au Sénégal, au motif qu'il est nécessaire pour les entreprises, compte tenu de l'évolution concurrentielle, de mettre en place les conditions requises. Pour les acteurs de l'économie, les facteurs de production doivent être à la base de cette compétitivité : flexibilité du travail, réduction des coûts de production …

Sous un angle financier, l'appréciation de la compétitivité des entreprises dans l'économie suscite aussi un large débat : obstacles à l'obtention de prêts, coût de crédit, niveau des fonds propres, dépendance à l'égard des clients ou des fournisseurs les plus importants, mais aussi dynamisme, flexibilité, potentiel de croissance. Les PME occupent, dans cet ensemble, une place spécifique dans le système productif, avec une position économique, et donc financière, souvent contrainte par la nature des relations avec les clients, les fournisseurs, les donneurs d'ordre.

La compétitivité d'une entreprise exprime ses performances à long terme, c'est-à-dire essentiellement sa croissance (Mucchielli 2002). On peut donc la définir comme la capacité de l'entreprise à réaliser des performances supérieures à la moyenne (en termes de gains de parts de marchés). A.C. Martinet (1981) définit la compétitivité comme une « aptitude à soutenir durablement la concurrence ». La traduction financière de cette définition suppose que l'entreprise soit apte à générer des flux de liquidités tels qu'elle puisse faire face à ses investissements, soit directement, soit indirectement en assumant les services de la dette. Elle doit, par conséquent, être rentable et liquide. Dit autrement, cela suppose également la capacité pour l'entreprise à contrôler ses flux financiers, ce que l'on peut exprimer à travers le concept de flexibilité financière.

En définitive, l'entreprise compétitive devra, sur le plan financier, être rentable, liquide et flexible, ce qui amène Alain Bienaymé (1973) à dire « qu'une entreprise est présumée compétitive lorsque la rentabilité de ses capitaux propres et la croissance de son chiffre d'affaires dépassent celles de ses principales concurrentes. Ces deux indicateurs révèlent quelque chose de plus qu'un simple état de santé : ils manifestent une amélioration de sa position relative sur l'ensemble des marchés où elle intervient ».

Il devient alors impératif de faire un suivi des déterminants de cette compétitivité financière. Ainsi, plusieurs auteurs suggèrent la mise en place

et l'utilisation de systèmes multidimensionnels de mesure de la compétitivité financière (Charreaux 1984 ; Vernimmen 1988).

Au départ, il y a l'idée que la compétitivité dépend des coûts relatifs (coûts de main-d'œuvre, subvention d'exportation …), mais qu'elle ne peut se maintenir par la seule compression chronique des coûts salariaux ou par une série d'aides financières. L'intensification de la concurrence ainsi que l'uniformisation des coûts (prix) font que les entreprises cherchent à asseoir davantage leur compétitivité sur des éléments autres que ceux relevant des coûts. L'une des conséquences de l'importante croissance de la technologie et de l'organisation, au détriment des facteurs coûts, est le glissement observé de la théorie de l'organisation des actifs de l'entreprise : on passe de la notion d'avantage comparatif ricardien à la notion large d'avantages construits. Dans cette perspective, l'activité de l'entreprise intègre non seulement les données de l'environnement, mais peut agir sur celui-ci en élaborant des stratégies de partenariat cohérentes avec ses objectifs de compétitivité. La place particulière des PME dans la mise en place des stratégies de compétitivité (flexibilité, adaptabilité, savoir-faire) est déterminante (B. Paranque 1999).

Cet article tente ainsi d'évaluer la compétitivité financière des PME au Sénégal. Nous examinerons dans un premier temps les indicateurs et les théories mobilisés pour expliquer le niveau de compétitivité financière des entreprises étudiées. Dans un deuxième temps, nous nous efforcerons d'identifier les principaux facteurs qui déterminent la compétitivité financière des PME sénégalaises.

Analyse théorique et empirique de la compétitivité financière

Le début des années 1990 a semblé avoir une dominante : il s'agissait de gérer la complexité. Aujourd'hui, faute d'horizons plus dégagés, il s'agit de gérer l'incertitude, car il est devenu banal de constater les évolutions instables et complexes de notre environnement : mondialisation des échanges, exacerbation de la concurrence, alliances entre les entreprises, mise en œuvre des stratégies différenciées ou globales, changements technologiques, etc.

Confrontées à une instabilité de leur milieu, les entreprises sont amenées à modifier leurs plans, leurs comportements, voire leurs objectifs, le but visé par les décisions prises étant toujours d'assurer au capital investi un profit jugé satisfaisant.

Les critères d'appréciation de la compétitivité financière : utilisation de l'E.T.E. et indicateurs dérivés

La notion de compétitivité, selon Elie Cohen (2001), met en jeu une approche de la performance économique et sociale de l'entreprise plus large et plus riche que celles suggérées par les notions classiques de productivité, de

rentabilité ou d'efficacité. L'appréciation de l'efficacité ou de la productivité met en cause l'aptitude de l'entreprise à valoriser ses ressources humaines, physiques ou immatérielles pour en retirer une production aussi élevée que possible. Elle concerne donc surtout la gestion opérationnelle et, singulièrement, la gestion de la production.

L'analyse de la rentabilité se situe dans une perspective principalement financière, puisqu'elle met en évidence l'aptitude de l'entreprise à rémunérer les capitaux qui lui sont confiés grâce aux bénéfices qu'elle dégage. L'approche en termes de compétitivité financière est manifestement plus large et plus riche. D'une part, elle englobe l'analyse de la productivité et de la rentabilité puisqu'elle s'intéresse à toutes les sources d'avantages concurrentiels, mais, d'autre part, elle dépasse chacune de ses approches spécialisées de la performance, puisqu'elle s'applique à tous les aspects majeurs de la gestion, de l'organisation de l'entreprise et de ses relations avec l'environnement. La compétitivité financière, bien que s'appuyant sur l'ensemble des facteurs de l'entreprise, privilégie l'approche spécialisée de la performance, c'est-à-dire la rentabilité financière.

Selon Gérard Charreaux, l'E.T.E. (l'excédent de trésorerie d'exploitation) est l'indicateur de synthèse qui résume les différentes dimensions de la compétitivité financière : la rentabilité, la liquidité et la flexibilité (1984).

Suivi de la rentabilité

Une entreprise est présumée compétitive lorsque la rentabilité de ses capitaux propres et la croissance de son chiffre d'affaires dépassent celles de ses principales concurrentes (Bienaymé 1973).

Beaucoup de travaux sur la compétitivité financière se réfèrent à la rentabilité financière de l'entreprise, c'est-à-dire à sa capacité à générer des ressources financières (T.T. Nagle et R.K. Holden 1995). Or la compétitivité, si elle est comprise dans le sens strict de prise de parts de marché, ne va pas nécessairement de pair avec la rentabilité. Il faut que les avantages compétitifs soient rentables, que les produits des entreprises en question soient de qualité et qu'ils puissent être fabriqués à un coût inférieur à celui des concurrents. Nagle et Holden (1995) rappellent, à juste titre, que l'accroissement des parts de marché n'est pas une fin en soi, mais qu'elle a pour but de générer des profits.

La confusion entre compétitivité et rentabilité semble ancrée dans la pratique. En effet, dans les travaux de recherche de Nagle et Holden (1995), il ressort que beaucoup d'acteurs de l'entreprise pensent maximiser la rentabilité en maximisant le chiffre d'affaires de l'entreprise.

Selon Gérard Charreaux (1984), l'excédent de trésorerie d'exploitation (E.T.E.) est un des indicateurs aptes à lever la confusion qui pourrait exister

entre la rentabilité et la compétitivité de l'entreprise. Le Boston Conculting Group (1980) propose, d'ailleurs, un critère proche de l'E.T.E. et pose le problème en ces termes : « La véritable mesure de la compétitivité n'est pas le profit comptable annuel, mais le flux net de liquidités qu'une entreprise peut dégager sur la durée de vie de son domaine d'activité ». Cotol et Michel (1996) considèrent d'ailleurs que l'Excédent de Trésorerie d'Exploitation (E.T.E.) est le solde financier le mieux adapté pour apprécier la compétitivité financière de la PME. Il s'avère cependant être une grandeur fortement instable, d'où la nécessité pour établir un diagnostic, de la considérer sur plusieurs périodes.

Si l'E.T.E. rend compte des différentes dimensions financières de la compétitivité financière, il est nécessaire de construire des indicateurs fondés sur celui-ci pour avoir une vision transversale des performances de l'entreprise (organisation, stratégie, etc.). En effet, la maîtrise de la relation avec l'environnement conduit les entreprises à adopter un comportement financier et organisationnel approprié pour rester compétitives et être rentables, car, généralement, la variance des niveaux de performances est imputée à titre principal aux effets des variables de croissance (allocation des ressources et structure d'organisation).

Mais tout d'abord, l'E.T.E. est un agrégat financier bien connu. Il est défini comme la différence entre les recettes d'exploitation et les dépenses d'exploitation. Il représente donc le solde net d'exploitation, c'est-à-dire le surplus (ou déficit) de liquidité généré par le seul fait des opérations liées au cycle d'exploitation de l'entreprise.

La formule de calcul, pour déterminer le niveau de la trésorerie d'exploitation d'une entreprise, en analyse financière est la suivante :

Trésorerie d'exploitation	**=**	**Autofinancement d'exploitation**	**-**	**Variation des besoins en fonds de roulement d'exploitation**

Mais très souvent, l'excédent de trésorerie d'exploitation est appréhendé à partir de la différence entre l'excédent brut d'exploitation (E.B.E.) et la variation du besoin en fonds de roulement d'exploitation (BFRE), c'est-à-dire par l'équation :

$$E.T.E. = E.B.E - \triangle BFRE$$

Selon Christian Guyon (1991), la trésorerie d'exploitation est une notion au contenu informationnel plus riche que les notions traditionnelles, -EBE–CAF–MBA-, du point de vue de l'appréciation de la rentabilité d'exploitation. Sur une moyenne ou longue période, l'E.T.E. permet d'apprécier la rentabilité

d'un investissement ou d'une entreprise. Les flux de liquidité nets positifs mesurent la capacité de l'entreprise à sécréter un résultat positif, d'une part, et, d'autre part, son aptitude à équilibrer sa situation financière globale. L'E.T.E. comme mesure de la rentabilité conduit, selon J. Guillou (1981), à adopter un raisonnement en termes de risque financier, à savoir qu'il doit couvrir les charges financières (dont les dividendes). Sous cet angle, P. Vernimmen (1988) ajoute que la liquidité d'exploitation obtenue par l'E.T.E doit permettre de faire face au paiement des frais financiers, des impôts, des remboursements d'emprunts et de conserver à l'entreprise une certaine autonomie.

L'E.T.E., en tant que flux de trésorerie, possède une justification théorique pour apprécier la rentabilité de l'entreprise. Le rapport de l'E.T.E. aux immobilisations brutes plus le BFDR mesure la récupération des fonds immobilisés dans l'entreprise. L'utilisation du rapport E.T.E. (ou E.B.E.) sur la production de l'exercice pour apprécier la rentabilité sous l'aspect de la marge est plus pertinente. Ce ratio mesurerait alors, par rapport à la production de l'année, quel a été le flux de trésorerie effectivement généré. Plus qu'un indicateur de rentabilité, un tel ratio mesure en fait la capacité à générer des flux, c'est-à-dire à être liquide, au sens de la liquidité d'exploitation.

Selon C. Guyon et O. Gaudry (1987), si l'on considère les ratios

$$\text{T.E.}/\text{CAH.T.} \quad \text{et} \quad \text{E.B.E.}/\text{CAH.T.}$$

il apparaît clairement que le taux de trésorerie d'exploitation généré par le (TE/CA) $\text{TE}/\text{CA})$ chiffre d'affaires est un bon indicateur de crise financière potentielle. L'un des buts fondamentaux de l'analyse financière étant de détecter au plus tôt les signes d'une détérioration possible de la situation de l'entreprise, la notion d'E.T.E semble donc plus adaptée que certains indicateurs (tels que la MBA, l'EBE) pour l'appréciation du contrôle de l'évolution financière.

Le rapport E.T.E./investissements constitue un élément de diagnostic de la compétitivité financière, car il met en évidence le degré d'autonomie de l'entreprise pour décider de ses investissements et constitue un bon critère d'appréciation de la liquidité d'exploitation. Un ratio élevé peut résulter d'investissements très faibles, mais cela signifie que l'entreprise garde une bonne liquidité et peut saisir éventuellement les opportunités qui s'offriraient à elle. Elle conserve donc une bonne flexibilité. A contrario, un ratio faible peut être lié à une phase de croissance de l'entreprise aussi bien qu'à une crise de rentabilité. Bien que les deux cas soient différents, il faut cependant souligner que si le ratio reste faible en permanence, cela implique une

dépendance accrue de l'entreprise vis-à-vis des financements externes et, par conséquent, une forte vulnérabilité.

Structure du capital et flexibilité financière

Selon Hicks, l'entreprise peut choisir entre deux modalités : l'autonomie de financement (« auto-economy ») et le découvert (« overdraft »). Une garantie implicite ou explicite d'accès au crédit courant peut apporter aux entreprises une flexibilité financière équivalente à celle qu'assure la détention d'actifs financiers liquides pour les entreprises autonomes (Hicks 1975). Pour faire image, on peut faire une analogie avec la flexibilité « physique » des entreprises qui peut venir de la disponibilité de biens d'équipements maintenus oisifs en situation normale ou de la sous-traitance.

On peut considérer que les entreprises choisissent entre la disponibilité interne de liquidité ou le besoin de liquidité couvert par le crédit bancaire courant pour financer le cycle d'exploitation, le choix en faveur du découvert dépend positivement du poids des actifs nets d'exploitation. L'étude empirique de Demirgüe-Kunt et Maksimovic (1996) menée sur des données de panel couvrant un grand nombre de pays et d'années conclut à une corrélation positive entre la part des actifs circulants dans le total du bilan et le financement externe. En revanche, la part des actifs fixes dans le bilan est corrélée négativement au financement externe, mais positivement aux bénéfices mis en réserve.

Ces recherches, implicitement et explicitement, font apparaître que la nature du besoin de financement (capital fixe versus capital circulant) et la gestion de la flexibilité financière détermine les conditions de la compétitivité financière. Bernard Paranque (1996) précise, dans ce sens, que la nature de la flexibilité financière coïncide avec des leviers spécifiques de la performance (compétitivité). Parmi ces leviers, la structure du capital de l'entreprise, qui dépend notamment de l'activité et en particulier du besoin de liquidité lié au financement des fluctuations de court terme du cycle d'exploitation, afin de s'adapter aux événements non anticipés. Dès lors, l'entreprise doit maintenir un stock relativement important pour conserver la flexibilité financière nécessaire. Selon P. Vernimmen (1981), les liquidités d'exploitation mesurées par l'E.T.E., permettent d'appréhender la capacité du cycle d'exploitation d'une entreprise à générer des flux de trésorerie. L'E.T.E. constitue ainsi un excellent indicateur de flexibilité interne de l'entreprise. Une garantie implicite et explicite d'accès au crédit courant fournit à une entreprise une flexibilité externe équivalente à celle conférée par la détention d'actifs financiers.

Les entreprises peuvent relever de l'une ou de l'autre de ces flexibilités, mais elles peuvent aussi combiner les différentes ressources selon la spécificité

de leurs besoins de gestion de cette flexibilité financière. Plus précisément, la structure financière d'une entreprise est le produit du mode de gestion de cette flexibilité, en particulier, de sa capacité à obtenir une garantie d'accès au crédit.

L'engagement d'une ressource financière, d'un crédit bancaire pour être plus précis, suppose un pari sur l'activité productive de biens ou de services. Il faut alors organiser la relation de financement de telle manière qu'elle permette d'estimer la qualité de l'engagement de l'entreprise en fonction de critères précis. En particulier, des critères qualitatifs d'appréciation de la situation de l'entreprise et les facteurs déterminants de sa compétitivité.

Pour les PME et les TPE, la gestion de leur besoin de flexibilité financière les rend très dépendantes des banques et les exposent à un éventuel rationnement. Il est nécessaire de réfléchir à une garantie sur le crédit à court terme. Et, il ne doit pas s'agir des besoins en fonds de roulement liés à un investissement.

Pour faire face aux imprévus, l'entreprise peut choisir entre soit l'autonomie de financement à savoir la constitution de réserves sous forme de trésorerie issue de ses résultats non affectés (ce qui peut peser sur sa compétitivité future), soit disposer d'une garantie implicite d'accès au crédit courant (ce qui implique de disposer d'un système d'information adapté). Le positionnement dans l'un ou l'autre dépend non seulement des performances financières de l'entreprise, mais aussi de sa capacité à accéder à un financement externe relativement garanti, s'inscrivant dans une relation d'engagement.

Par conséquent, les PME ne pourront correctement satisfaire leurs besoins que si elles rencontrent des partenaires capables de leur offrir outre du financement, des services destinés à étoffer leur capacité à traiter et à fournir de l'information afin de favoriser la relation de partenariat en permettant au prêteur d'adapter mieux leurs procédures à la diversité des cas. Réduire les risques par le rejet de ce qui n'est pas saisissable statistiquement, c'est prendre le risque de remettre en cause la capacité des PME à entreprendre, c'est-à-dire prendre des paris sur l'avenir, sources d'innovation et de progrès. On rejoint là une des préoccupations formalisées par Hicks (1975) concernant le financement des aléas non anticipés : l'entreprise dispose soit de placement financier de réserves, soit d'une certitude quant à la disponibilité d'accès à la liquidité, à défaut sa pérennité sera remise en cause.

Dans ce contexte, il semble que la situation des entreprises sénégalaises, constituées sous forme de société conjointe, est relativement favorable au regard des critères classiques d'analyse de la solvabilité. Si la principale source de handicap, dans les entreprises sénégalaises, réside dans la difficulté

de communication et d'organisation de la production d'une information pertinente, non seulement pour les partenaires financiers mais aussi pour elles-mêmes pour mieux anticiper et justifier les risques liés à leur politique d'investissement et à leur situation réelle, on peut à juste titre penser que les sociétés conjointes sénégalaises de petite et moyenne taille peuvent être plus compétitives que les autres PME (Sall 1997).

Les différents éléments de la compétitivité dans les entreprises

Michael Porter (1986) donne une position éclairante de l'impératif de compétitivité. Il souligne en effet que l'objectif majeur de la gestion consiste dans la recherche, l'acquisition et la conservation d'un avantage concurrentiel. Sans remettre en cause la nécessité ou l'intérêt de la croissance en tant que telle, Porter souligne l'importance des conditions dans lesquelles elle se déroule. Ce qui conduit à une réflexion concernant les sources et les facteurs de compétitivité.

Trois types de facteurs internes déterminent les aptitudes concurrentielles de l'entreprise (Cohen 2001) :

- le choix stratégique concernant l'offre-produit ;
- la maîtrise des coûts et le maintien d'une norme de qualité ;
- l'organisation générale de l'entreprise.

La compétitivité des entreprises est également déterminée par des facteurs externes :

- l'environnement juridique, socioéconomique et culturel ;
- le réseau de relations (groupes, partenaires, etc.).

L'analyse de l'entreprise met donc en relation les éléments de compétitivité avec l'ensemble de ses fonctions et des facteurs qui touchent à son activité, sa croissance (traduisant son chiffre d'affaires, sa valeur ajoutée, son excédent brut d'exploitation, ses effectifs…) sa rentabilité (bénéfice net, capitaux propres, etc.) son financement (marge brut d'autofinancement, emprunts à court terme, etc.), sa gestion (frais financiers, crédits clients, crédits fournisseurs …).

Les leviers de la valeur d'une entreprise compétitive

La maximisation de la valeur (richesse) des actionnaires étant le premier objectif de l'entreprise compétitive, toute stratégie de celle-ci intègre une logique financière. La rentabilité de l'actionnaire apparaît comme le résultat de plusieurs facteurs qui ressortent d'une décomposition classique de ratios.

$$\text{Taux de Rentabilité Economique} = \frac{\text{Marge}}{\text{Investissements}} = \frac{\text{Ventes-Coûts}}{\text{Investissements}}$$

Le lien qui existe entre la rentabilité économique et la rentabilité financière peut être mis en évidence par une décomposition de cette dernière :

$$\textit{Rentabilité financière} = \frac{RN}{CP} \text{ ou } \frac{ETE}{CP}$$

$$= \frac{\text{RN}}{\text{AT}} \text{ x } \frac{\text{AT}}{\text{CP}}$$

$$= \frac{\text{RN}}{\text{CA}} \text{ x } \frac{\text{CA}}{\text{AT}} \text{ x } \frac{\text{CP + Dettes}}{\text{CP}}$$

$$= \frac{\text{RN}}{\text{CA}} \text{ x } \frac{\text{CA}}{\text{AT}} \text{ x } (1 + \frac{\text{Dettes}}{\text{CP}})$$

Avec :

RN : Résultat Net ;

ETE : Excédent de Trésorerie d'Exploitation ;

CP : Capitaux Propres ;

AT : Actif Total ;

CA : Chiffre d'Affaires ;

PT : Passif Total ;

AT = PT = CP + Dettes Financières.

Il découle de cette décomposition l'existence de trois leviers de gestion de la valeur, qui correspondent à trois stratégies :

- une stratégie concurrentielle (par les marges) : elle porte sur le coût et la stratégie gagnante est celle qui réduit le coût par la maximisation du volume du produit ;
- une stratégie économique et organisationnelle par le rendement des actifs : le rendement des investissements ne repose pas seulement sur la maximisation du résultat ; il dépend aussi de la minimisation des investissements ;
- une stratégie financière : la structure d'endettement optimale se définit comme la résultante d'un arbitrage entre le gain fiscal de l'endettement et les coûts résultants, d'une éventuelle faillite. Si les PME ont recours à l'endettement, il est intéressant de savoir si les conditions financières fragilisent leur compétitivité, ou si elles entraînent un effet de levier financier favorable. Dans tous les cas, il s'agit d'apprécier l'impact

des variables (ou indicateurs) financières sur la compétitivité dans la PME.

Une analyse se fondant sur une approche empirique de cette problématique et sur une contribution des travaux de recherche sur la PME nous renvoie à cinq variables pour expliquer la compétitivité des PME (Estimé, Drithon & Julien 1994) :

- le rôle du propriétaire/dirigeant (ou de la direction) ;
- la capacité d'obtention et d'utilisation de l'information scientifique et technologique appropriée ;
- la qualité de l'organisation de l'entreprise ;
- l'investissement matériel fondé sur des technologies appropriées ;
- la flexibilité.

Il n'existe pas, selon les auteurs cités ci-dessus, de modèle théorique mettant en relation les variables de compétitivité à celles pouvant fournir une explication de la compétitivité des PME, ne serait-ce qu'en raison d'un manque de données statistiques. Malgré tout, plusieurs recherches essayent de mettre en évidence les éléments et stratégies qui sont à la base d'une compétitivité dans les PME. Pour Sandrine Rol (2002), des pays comme la Corée du Sud ont amélioré de façon structurelle leur compétitivité en mettant leurs efforts sur l'éducation et la recherche-développement. En plus, comme de nombreux pays émergents d'Asie, la Corée du Sud a basé son insertion internationale sur la faiblesse des coûts de sa main-d'œuvre. Les efforts dans l'éducation et la recherche-développement ont permis à ce pays de se spécialiser dans des filières telles que le textile, la production de matériel informatique et de télécommunication ...

La recherche des déterminants de compétitivité dans les PME devient alors multidimensionnelle. Autrement dit, le concept de compétitivité doit être mis en perspectives avec celui de « capacités de l'entreprise », les ressources disponibles ou potentielles, d'ordre matériel, humain, financier et technologique. L'examen de l'état de compétitivité reposera alors sur l'évaluation de chacune de ces capacités ainsi que sur les relations entre ces capacités.

Une stratégie implicite de gestion des actifs d'une entreprise compétitive

Selon Olivier Torres (1997), les comportements stratégiques des PME sont qualifiés de réactifs et non anticipatifs. Les dirigeants des PME emploient peu de techniques de gestion prévisionnelle ou d'analyse financière. Ils préfèrent recourir à l'intuition pour prendre des décisions. Dans les PME, le

processus de décision fonctionne le plus souvent selon le schéma intuition – décision – action, ce qui fait que la stratégie est avant tout implicite et très souple. Les caractères informels et intuitifs qui spécifient la stratégie de la PME trouvent explicitement leurs fondements dans un management de proximité. L'existence de programme de recherche ou de plans de financement, de formation, de commercialisation, d'approvisionnement ou de production est extrêmement rare en PME. Quand de tels plans existent, les horizons temporels sont généralement courts. Les activités de la PME sont donc gérées dans un horizon temporel court. La PME évite, ainsi les engagements lourds et massifs qui sont source de contraintes à long terme et d'irréversibilité. La PME semble donc avoir une inclinaison naturelle à organiser d'une certaine manière ses actifs, ce qui permet de maximiser la rentabilité par une minimisation des investissements.

Beaucoup d'initiatives organisationnelles reflètent la pression à la baisse du dénominateur du ratio de rentabilité économique. Cette baisse passe par la compression des capitaux immobilisés, et/ou par un report de l'investissement sur d'autres entreprises situées en amont. Dans la première catégorie de politiques financières, se rangent l'augmentation du taux d'emploi des équipements productifs (ratio de rotation) ainsi que la réduction du besoin en fonds de roulement (stocks, crédits clients). Dans la seconde catégorie, figurent le recours à la location plutôt qu'à l'achat, le passage d'activités en sous-traitance, l'externalisation d'activités de soutien, et le glissement vers l'aval (Hamel et Prohalad 1990).

La plupart des études empiriques ont consisté à établir des liens statistiques entre l'incertitude et les variables organisationnelles de taille, de technologie et de mode de production. D'après ces travaux, la forme flexible appartient à une typologie de formes d'organisation, et est appropriée à des environnements turbulents. La flexibilité est alors une capacité réactive de l'organisation face à l'incertitude. Les organisations ne sont donc pas des récepteurs indifférents des contraintes externes, mais contribuent activement à la construction de l'environnement. Deux arguments peuvent soutenir cette perspective volontaire. Le premier est attaché à la notion d'équifinalité selon laquelle une organisation peut réaliser la même performance dans des conditions contextuelles différentes et de diverses manières (Dotry, Glick & Huber 1993) ; le second argument consiste dans la notion difficilement traduisible de « Slack » qui ne signifie pas simplement l'existence d'une surcapacité de production (March 1991). Le « Slack » est plus lié à un haut niveau de professionnalisme qu'à un excès de ressources. Il traduit un engagement avec une certaine marge de manœuvre. C'est dans ce sens que Robert Reix (1979) propose une des conceptualisations les plus élaborées

de la flexibilité : « la flexibilité exprime un certain pouvoir d'action de la firme, capable d'utiliser ou de contrebalancer les effets de son environnement ». L'auteur distingue des axes d'une politique de flexibilité :

- le premier concerne la gestion des ressources qui vise à maintenir en permanence un ensemble d'actifs facilement adaptables ;
- le second axe s'applique à la conception et à l'animation de l'organisation.

Sire (1987) résume ces différentes approches de la flexibilité en ces termes ; la recherche de la flexibilité passe par la capacité à mobiliser des ressources financières et humaines.

En définitive, tous les travaux développés autour de la flexibilité montrent que cette notion est à la base de la compétitivité de l'entreprise, surtout lorsqu'il s'agit de PME. Comme nous l'avons déjà évoqué, la plupart des travaux reposent sur l'hypothèse implicite que l'entreprise compétitive doit, sur le plan financier, être rentable, liquide et flexible. Elle pourrait être alors victime du dilemme solvabilité-rentabilité. S'y ajoute que la PME est de nature flexible sur le plan organisationnel. Dit autrement, le comportement en matière de compétitivité financière est-il toujours compatible avec la maximisation des profits de l'entreprise ? En outre, les contributions étudiées semblent considérer que des stratégies réactives sont toujours mises en œuvre.

Partant des éléments discutés, il est clair que la compétitivité peut être étudiée à travers ses différentes composantes, comme la rentabilité, la flexibilité.

Nous proposons sur cette base, de façon explicite, des hypothèses à tester. Ces hypothèses concernent l'influence de variables liées aux caractéristiques de l'entreprise et considérées par la théorie comme des facteurs explicatifs du niveau de compétitivité.

> **Hypothèse 1** : il existe une liaison significative entre les indicateurs de la compétitivité financière et les variables explicatives fondamentales, à savoir les facteurs de production (travail, capital financier …).
>
> **Hypothèse 2** : il n'existe pas de liaisons significatives entre l'indicateur de la compétitivité financière et les variables explicatives de la politique financière, à savoir le taux de l'endettement.
>
> **Hypothèse 3** : la compétitivité financière appréhendée par l'excédent de trésorerie d'exploitation (E.T.E.) est déterminée significativement par la variable explicative, organisation des actifs économiques, C.A.H.T./A.T.

Méthodologie de l'étude et analyse des résultats

La notion de compétitivité financière sera, ici, amenée en termes de rentabilité et de flexibilité.

Les recherches ont fini de caractériser les PME en termes de souplesse et de capacité d'adaptation du point de vue des caractéristiques organisationnelles. Plus fondamentalement, n'est-il pas alors plus pertinent d'aborder le problème de la flexibilité sous un angle financier, c'est-à-dire identifier ce qui du point de vue financier peut caractériser une PME et la rendre plus compétitive financièrement ? En plus d'une flexibilité organisationnelle, dispose-elle d'une flexibilité financière permettant de faire face aux opportunités du marché ?

Pour contribuer à une meilleure connaissance du problème posé, nous allons nous appuyer sur des données d'entreprises sénégalaises.

Les données et les variables de l'étude

L'action de recherche engagée porte sur la compétitivité financière des PME sénégalaises. En d'autres termes, il s'agit de tester les hypothèses formulées à l'issue de notre revue de la littérature théorique et empirique. L'objet, de ce point de vue, consiste donc à poser la démarche conduisant à décrire les données, les variables et les traitements statistiques qui ont permis d'apprécier la compétitivité financière des structures étudiées.

Les données utilisées

Notre base de données est constituée par l'ensemble des entreprises du C.UC.I (Centre Unique de Collecte de l'Information). Le C.U.C.I. recense les informations comptables de toutes les entreprises enregistrées au Sénégal (bilan, compte de résultat, tableau financier des ressources et des emplois).

Pour appréhender le comportement des PME à partir de cette base de données, nous avons retenu les critères suivants pour définir les PME (critères de la charte des PME du Sénégal, annexe 1) :

- effectif : inférieur à 250 salariés, dont moins de 20 salariés pour les petites ;
- chiffre d'affaires hors taxe annuel : inférieur à 15 milliards de FCFA, dont moins de 50 millions de FCFA pour les petites ;
- transparence dans la tenue de la comptabilité : système normal pour les moyennes entreprises et système allégé ou système minimal de trésorerie (SMT) pour les petites ;
- investissement net inférieur à 1 milliard de FCFA, critère applicable uniquement aux moyennes entreprises.

Même si se pose le problème de la définition d'une PME, beaucoup d'acteurs sont d'accord pour accorder à celle-ci une place particulière dans le tissu économique–flexibilité, adaptabilité, savoir-faire sont les épithètes le plus souvent retenues- tout en reconnaissant que la distinction entre PME et grandes entreprises relève alors plus de critères qualitatifs que quantitatifs. Mais ceci dit, dans la plupart des études empiriques, le critère de l'effectif est le plus utilisé. Plusieurs raisons justifient ce choix :

- l'effectif est un critère stable qui détermine la taille de l'entreprise ;
- c'est le critère le plus utilisé par les chercheurs sur les PME ;
- au Sénégal, ce critère a été retenu par la charte des PME qui le considère comme fortement lié à l'investissement net et au chiffre d'affaires.

Notre échantillon se compose de 407 entreprises, de toutes dimensions confondues, observées chacune sur une période de neuf ans (1998 à 2006). La logique d'une démarche de diagnostic nous conduit à analyser la compétitivité financière des entreprises sénégalaises sur un échantillon constant de 407 entreprises. Le tableau qui suit présente la répartition de l'échantillon en fonction de la taille et du secteur d'activité.

Tableau 1 : Répartition des entreprises de l'échantillon par taille et par secteur

Secteurs d'activités	**Effectif moyen permanent**						**Total**
	1 – 20	**21 – 50**	**51 – 100**	**101 – 250**	**251 – 500**	**501 – Plus**	
Industries :							
1. Industries alimentaires	6	6	6	7	4	4	33
2. Industries textiles	1	1	2	2	2	-	8
3. Industries diverses	10	18	11	9	7	4	59
Bâtiment et TP :							
4. Bâtiment et TP	13	8	3	2	1	5	32
Commerce :							
5. Commerce de gros	23	17	5	4	-	-	49
6. Commerce de détail	32	22	-	-	-	-	54
Services :							
7. Transports – Télécommunication	14	8	4	4	1	4	35
8. Hôtellerie – Restauration	6	6	4	1	2	-	19
9. Services divers	56	34	13	9	4	2	118
Total	161	120	48	38	21	19	**407**

A partir de la méthode d'analyse des données de panel, nous tenterons de vérifier l'impact des variables relevées par certaines théories sur le niveau de compétitivité financière des entreprises observées.

Cette technique d'analyse offre une double dimension de l'information disponible : une dimension individuelle qui met en évidence la différence entre les individus et une dimension temporelle qui étudie la situation de chaque individu sur la période étudiée.

Les variables retenues

Les variables sélectionnées sont extraites des états financiers et comptables des entreprises de notre échantillon et choisies de façon à tester les différentes hypothèses formulées. Ces variables doivent nous permettre, après une modélisation des flux financiers, d'analyser la compétitivité financière des entreprises de l'échantillon.

- L'indicateur de compétitivité-flux financier (compfin) permet d'apprécier la compétitivité financière des PME sur le marché sénégalais. La variable expliquée (compfin) est le montant annuel de l'E.T.E. (Excédent de Trésorerie d'Exploitation). La variation de ce solde financier traduit un gain ou une perte de compétitivité financière réelle et potentielle. En d'autres termes, ce solde représente le surplus monétaire généré par le cycle d'exploitation et susceptible d'être utilisé pour le financement de la croissance de l'entreprise (ou, d'une manière générale, pour faire face aux différents besoins de l'entreprise).
- L'influence des facteurs de production sur la compétitivité financière est appréhendée par la masse salariale (msalar), ou par l'effectif (effect). La variable masse salariale (msalar) offre l'avantage d'exprimer aussi un effet de taille. Dans les PME où le niveau des immobilisations est assez limité, la rémunération du travail constitue le principal facteur de production.
- L'effort d'investissement (invest) est représenté comme la somme de l'investissement physique et de l'effort consacré à l'innovation dans les entreprises. Le rapport E.T.E./Invest se trouve être un puissant élément de diagnostic de la compétitivité financière (Charreaux 1984). Ce ratio met en évidence le degré d'autonomie pour décider d'un investissement et c'est un critère d'appréciation de la liquidité d'exploitation. Un ratio élevé peut résulter d'investissements très faibles, mais cela signifie que l'entreprise garde une bonne liquidité et peut saisir éventuellement les opportunités qui s'offriraient à elle. Elle conserve donc une bonne flexibilité, a contrario, un ratio faible peut être lié à une phase de croissance de l'entreprise aussi bien qu'à une

crise de rentabilité (bien que les deux cas soient différents, il faut cependant souligner que si le ratio reste faible en permanence, cela implique une dépendance accrue de l'entreprise vis-à-vis des financements externes et, par conséquent, une forte vulnérabilité).

- Le ratio taux d'endettement (txend) est une variable qui caractérise la structure financière (ou exprime la politique de financement) de l'entreprise. Ce ratio est le rapport de la somme des dettes financières sur le total du passif. Il permet d'apprécier la capacité d'endettement, et mesure donc de fait la flexibilité financière externe.
- La variable explicative organisationnelle : le ratio de taux d'utilisation des capacités (T.UC.) est un indicateur qui traduit le volume des actifs (A.T.) par rapport au chiffre d'affaires hors taxes réalisé (CA.h.t.). Ce rapport CAht/AT permet d'analyser la manière dont l'entreprise a organisé ses actifs dans le but d'optimiser leur utilisation. Il traduit l'effet conjoncturel des tensions sur les capacités de production. Cette variable explicative est très importante dans la mesure où elle influence la rentabilité, mais aussi le niveau de liquidité de l'entreprise.

Les analyses empiriques

Nous présentons tout d'abord quelques statistiques descriptives, puis les résultats obtenus à l'issue des traitements selon les méthodes des données de panel ; enfin, nous procéderons à une analyse des différents résultats obtenus.

Quelques statistiques descriptives

Les statistiques présentent quelques résultats portant sur deux concepts clés de la compétitivité financière : l'excédent de trésorerie d'exploitation (E.T.E.) et la flexibilité financière.

Les premiers résultats montrent une évolution favorable de l'excédent de trésorerie d'exploitation (E.T.E.). Le tableau qui suit met en évidence les taux de progression de l'E.T.E des entreprises de notre échantillon réparties dans les quatre macro-secteurs de l'économie sénégalaise.

En moyenne, sur les neuf années de notre étude, l'E.T.E. progresse d'environ 8,5% pour l'ensemble des secteurs. Si nous considérons le comportement de l'E.T.E pour les différents secteurs, on note des tendances très diverses. Ainsi, pour les secteurs de la confection et des services, l'E.T.E. a une progression supérieure à la moyenne indiquée ; dans le secteur du bâtiment, la progression se situe légèrement en dessous de la moyenne des entreprises étudiées ; alors que les secteurs du commerce et de l'agriculture connaissent des progressions assez faibles.

Tableau 2 : Evolution de l'E.T.E entre 1998 et 2006

Secteurs d'activité	Nombre d'entreprises	E.T.E. 1998	E.T.E. 2006	Taux de croissance (%)
• Industries	100	38711	43280	11,80
• Bâtiments et TP	32	28020	29807	6,37
• Commerce	103	42780	45118	5,47
• Services	172	66120	73783	10,25
	407			Moyenne **8,47**

L'analyse des ratios ÉTÉ/Investissements montre, tous secteurs confondus, que la couverture de l'investissement initial par l'E.T.E. est juste de 1,71 pour cent en moyenne. Le secteur qui s'avère le moins compétitif, vu sous cet angle, est celui de l'agriculture, le plus compétitif étant le secteur des services. Trois sous-secteurs, lorsque l'on considère l'évolution du ratio, recouvrent plus rapidement leur « autonomie » : le sous-secteur des nouvelles technologies et de l'information ; celui de l'enseignement et de la formation ; et celui de la confection. Les contraintes structurelles d'une activité font que ces trois sous-secteurs sont plus ou moins aptes à absorber une politique de développement.

La deuxième catégorie de résultats met en évidence le potentiel des entreprises étudiées en matière de flexibilité financière. Sur la décennie (9 ans) de l'étude, il apparaît une constante : une amélioration de la part des capitaux propres dans le financement global des entreprises et une légère baisse du volume de la dette financière. Entre 1998 et 2006, nous avons observé le renforcement du financement fondé sur l'accumulation des résultats et l'appel aux prêts des associés et partenaires en compensation des concours bancaires, qui font défaut surtout dans les P.M.E. Cette évolution s'accompagne d'un accroissement des liquidités d'exploitation dont le rôle n'est pas seulement d'assurer la solvabilité, mais aussi de permettre à l'entreprise, selon sa taille et sa situation, soit de saisir des opportunités de croissance, soit de pouvoir répondre au motif de flexibilité financière.

Des différences importantes apparaissent selon la taille (voir tableau n° 3 suivant). Les P.M.E. sont plus fréquemment, mais non exclusivement, un mode de découvert bancaire que les grandes qui combinent mieux l'autofinancement et l'endettement.

Tableau 3 : Evolution de la flexibilité interne et externe des entreprises (1998-2006)

Répartition par par source de financement (%)	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
P.M.E. :									
- Autofinancement	63,5	62,7	61,7	64,0	73,9	71,6	69,1	68,4	72,4
- Endettement	9,2	7,2	8,5	8,7	9,8	10,1	10,5	12,8	12,9
- Découvert bancaire	27,3	30,1	29,8	27,3	17,8	16,0	17,9	18,1	18,7
Grandes entreprises :									
- Autofinancement	58,5	57,7	58,5	60,4	62,6	63,3	69,1	68,0	69,8
- Endettement	23,0	22,7	24,6	21,9	20,7	21,5	20,8	19,7	18,5
- Découvert bancaire	18,5	19,6	16,9	17,7	16,7	15,2	10,1	12,3	11,7

Il ressort ainsi que le mode de financement des entreprises en endettement s'appuie, outre les dettes financières à moyen et long termes, sur l'autofinancement. L'effort d'accumulation est le plus élevé, en particulier pour les P.M.E. Mais à ce niveau, il faut noter que le recours à l'autofinancement est fortement lié au problème d'accès aux concours bancaires (financement à long et moyen termes).

Les résultats économétriques

Les traitements statistiques nous ont conduit à utiliser deux types de modèles d'économétrie des données de panel : le modèle à effets fixes et le modèle à effets variables.

Le test de différence des coefficients de ces deux modèles conduit à retenir le modèle à effets fixes comme étant le meilleur modèle, dans le cadre de cette étude. Ce modèle suppose que l'influence des variables explicatives sur la variable expliquée est identique compte tenu de la prise en compte des spécificités (appelées effets fixes) que l'on peut estimer. Quant au modèle à effets aléatoires, il conduit à considérer le phénomène aléatoire des effets spécifiques.

Le modèle à effets fixes nous a permis de tester la fonction de liquidité d'exploitation (cash-flow d'exploitation) dans laquelle chacun des indicateurs, représentant la compétitivité par les coûts (la masse salariale : msalar) ; la compétitivité structurelle (l'effort d'investissement : invest) ; la contrainte financière (le taux d'endettement : txend) et l'organisation des actifs de l'entreprise (taux d'utilisation des capacités : T.UC.), intervient comme variable explicative.

L'équation du volume des liquidités d'exploitation (ou encore des cash-flows d'exploitation) que nous cherchons à estimer est représentée sous la forme suivante :

$$LogComfin = C + \alpha Logmsalar + \beta LogInvest + \gamma LogTxend + \delta Log\ T.U.C.$$

Il ressort des résultats récapitulés dans le tableau n° 4 qui suit que le coefficient de détermination (R^2) est significatif dans la mesure où il est égal à 0,9164, ce qui nous permet de conclure que les variables considérées expliquent à 91,64 pour cent la variable dépendante, qui est ici la compétitivité financière.

Tableau 4 : Estimations de l'équation sur la période 1998 – 2006
(t-Student entre parenthèses)

C	Msalar	Invest	Txend	T.U.C.
1,658188 (4,72)	0,4817214 (18,08)	0,5536735 (12,37)	-0,215857 (-1,14)	0,143269 (1,01)
$R^2 = 0,9164$				

Les résultats des estimations obtenus sur la période 1998-2006 montrent que la valeur de l'élasticité-coûts à l'E.T.E. (0,48) est statistiquement significative et a le signe attendu. Ainsi, un accroissement de 10 pour cent du rapport des coûts relatifs (msalar) stimule le volume des liquidités générées par l'exploitation de 4,8 pour cent. La valeur de l'élasticité-coûts à l'E.T.E. est assez forte et significative. Ce résultat reflète que la concurrence par les coûts est prédominante dans toutes les entreprises, grandes ou petites. En effet, les parts de marché sont âprement discutés, et le coût constitue un facteur déterminant de la compétitivité. Les variables prix et coût, étant les deux facettes d'une même réalité, déterminent le comportement concurrentiel de l'entreprise. Celle qui propose les coûts de fabrication les plus faibles est censée offrir les prix les plus bas, ou alors obtenir les meilleures marges sur

coûts. Le niveau des coûts comme celui des prix joue alors directement sur le niveau de l'E.T.E. (Excédent de Trésorerie d'Exploitation).

Le coefficient estimé, relatif aux efforts d'investissement, est statistiquement significatif. Ce coefficient montre l'impact relativement moyen de l'investissement à la dynamique des cash-flows d'exploitation. L'effort d'investissement supplémentaire (soit 10 %) engendre un accroissement du volume des cash-flows d'exploitation (soit 5,53 %). Ce résultat s'explique par la relative faiblesse de la part de l'investissement des secteurs du commerce et des services dans l'investissement total des entreprises de l'échantillon. Ce résultat est relativement différent si l'on considère le comportement sectoriel et la dimension des entreprises. L'on remarque en effet que ce coefficient est faible surtout dans les secteurs du commerce et de l'agriculture. L'on constate aussi que l'impact de l'effort d'investissement est différent selon la taille de l'entreprise. Autrement dit, si l'on considère la relative faiblesse de leurs investissements, les PME ne peuvent pas jouir d'un effet de compétitivité structurelle favorable, et cela les rend vulnérables aux variations de la compétitivité coûts – marges – prix.

La valeur de l'élasticité – endettement aux cash–flows d'exploitation est significative. La variable txend est reliée négativement aux cash-flows d'exploitation générés par les entreprises de notre échantillon : une hausse du taux d'endettement de 10 pour cent entraîne une baisse des cash-flows d'exploitation de 2,15 pour cent. D'une manière générale, cette corrélation négative s'explique par la préférence des dirigeants dans le choix de leurs sources de financement. Quand la structure génère suffisamment de cash-flows, l'entreprise sénégalaise ne fait pas recours à l'endettement, et inversement. Cependant, il faut là aussi remarquer que la plupart des PME n'ont pas ce choix, compte tenu des difficultés d'accès au financement bancaire. Si l'on considère les PME uniquement, l'on se rend compte que la variable taux d'endettement n'a aucun effet sur la compétitivité financière.

Le coefficient de l'organisation des actifs (tuc) est significatif. L'indicateur (tuc) est relié faiblement aux cash-flows d'exploitation : un accroissement du ratio de 10 pour cent se traduit par une variation des liquidités d'exploitation de 1,14 pour cent, les tensions qui apparaissent sur les capacités de production tendent à limiter la croissance des cash-flows. L'organisation du système productif n'est donc pas toujours perçue comme étant à la hauteur des attentes en matière de compétitivité financière. Dit autrement, le suivi des étapes de la production est considéré comme lourd : un manque de flexibilité. L'organisation des actifs montre en particulier des carences en termes de compétitivité.

Interprétation des résultats

Les résultats obtenus permettent de valider, d'une certaine manière, les trois hypothèses formulées à l'issue de la revue de la littérature.

La variable représentative de la taille explique aussi le facteur coût de production au sein des PME étudiées. la variable taille est significativement corrélée à l'excédent de trésorerie d'exploitation (E.T.E.) au seuil de 5 pour cent pour toutes les entreprises de l'échantillon. Plus l'entreprise est de grande taille, plus le solde de trésorerie d'exploitation est élevé : une augmentation de 10 pour cent de la taille (de la masse salariale) améliore la compétitivité financière d'environ 4,8 pour cent. Les grandes entreprises de notre échantillon réalisent un cash-flow d'exploitation plus élevé que celui réalisé par les PME. Le niveau des coûts de production (masse salariale) influence significativement la compétitivité financière des entreprises de notre échantillon. Cette situation peut s'expliquer par l'impact du volume des capitaux investis, en moyenne, dans les PME sénégalaises. Comme le montrent Diouf et Wade (1992), sur un échantillon de PME sénégalaises, ces entreprises souffrent d'un manque énorme d'immobilisations productives. Le facteur volume de travail semble compenser le niveau d'investissement dans les PME au Sénégal, ce que semble confirmer l'organisation des actifs dans les structures étudiées.

La variable composition des actifs est corrélée significativement à la compétitivité financière des entreprises de notre panel au seuil de 5 pour cent. Cette variable (c.a. h.t. /actif total) représente la rotation des actifs de l'entreprise. Il traduit en termes financiers, et très globalement, le taux d'activité de l'entreprise, qui est une dimension essentielle de la rentabilité financière. Un taux de rotation insuffisant peut être dû à un accroissement des investissements par rapport à l'activité de l'entreprise. Une augmentation de 10 pour cent de la composition de l'actif, qui améliore la compétitivité financière de 1,14 pour cent, dans un contexte de rareté de capitaux investis (Diouf & Wade 1992 ; Sall 2002), nous amène à valider, dans une certaine mesure, surtout dans les PME, l'existence d'une externalisation ou d'une sous-traitance de certaines activités, stratégie d'externalisation qui conduit certaines PME à s'organiser pour partager les gros investissements. Une telle stratégie permet de régler le problème du financement des investissements dans les PME. Les résultats soulèvent, en effet, la question du financement des PME. Les deux variables, composition de l'actif et taux d'endettement, sont les composantes de la rentabilité financière. Si la rotation du capital (ou composition de l'actif) a un effet positif sur la compétitivité financière, le taux d'endettement a un lien négatif avec l'indicateur de compétitivité financière des entreprises de notre échantillon. Si l'on considère

les PME seulement, le taux d'endettement n'a aucun lien significatif avec l'indicateur de compétitivité financière. Ce résultat valide, dans une certaine mesure, les résultats de recherche sur le financement des PME sénégalaises, à savoir les difficultés d'accès aux ressources financières auprès des banques (Sall 2002). Les PME de notre échantillon ne bénéficient donc pas d'un effet de levier financier favorable, ce qui signifie que sur le plan de la flexibilité financière, ces PME ne peuvent bénéficier d'aucune ressource financière externe pour profiter des opportunités du marché.

Selon les estimations, une augmentation annuelle des coûts du facteur travail de 10 pour cent se traduirait, à autres coûts de facteurs donnés, par une variation de la compétitivité marginale de 4,81 pour cent ; tandis qu'une variation positive de 10 pour cent de la composition des actifs et des investissements améliore, successivement, la compétitivité financière de 1,14 pour cent et de 5,53 pour cent. En conséquence, on peut tirer comme enseignement que l'augmentation des coûts, en termes d'exploitation et d'investissement, génère des gains de compétitivité, mais que les gains provoqués par la main-d'œuvre et l'investissement sont les plus élevés. L'organisation des actifs ne semble pas provoquer un gain de compétitivité assez significatif.

Si l'on considère les PME, l'emploi induit un gain de productivité supérieur à celui engendré par les investissements. Ces rendements marginaux des facteurs de production, qui sont intéressants, sont d'abord le signe d'un sous – investissement en matière d'immobilisations corporelles (matériel et installations techniques ; agencements aménagements installations ; matériel et mobilier de bureau…).

Le point le plus délicat est que, l'effet que l'on interprète comme résultant d'une augmentation de certains facteurs de production, résulte(rait) en fait d'autres variables inobservées et corrélées avec la compétitivité financière, telles que l'état de la concurrence … ou encore les pratiques liées à la combinaison des facteurs de production. Les résultats doivent donc s'interpréter avec beaucoup de prudence. Cela étant, notre recherche sur les déterminants de la compétitivité financière a conduit à des résultats assez intéressants.

Le « R squared » ou R^2 est le coefficient de détermination, c'est-à-dire le carré du coefficient de corrélation entre la compétitivité financière et les variables choisies. Il indique dans quelle proportion les variations de l'indicateur de la compétitivité financière sont expliquées par les variations des variables explicatives (R^2 a des valeurs comprises entre 0 et 1). Si R^2 est proche de 1, cela signifie que les points représentant les observations sont proches de la droite de régression ; en revanche, si le R^2 est voisin de zéro, les points sont très distants de la droite. Dans notre modèle ($R^2 = 0{,}9164$),

les variations de la compétitivité financière sont expliquées par les variations des variables explicatives à hauteur de 91,64 pour cent. On peut donc avancer que les variables choisies (masse salariale, composition des actifs, effort d'investissement…) permettent d'expliquer la compétitivité financière des entreprises étudiées. La recherche de la compétitivité financière et son maintien passerait aussi par une connaissance et une maîtrise des variables inobservées.

La logique induite par la compétitivité financière entraînerait les entreprises étudiées dans une spirale de coûts fixes (masse salariale corrélée à l'E.T.E.). Et cela pourrait se poursuivre tant que la compétitivité marginale est supérieure au coût marginal. A ce niveau, l'indicateur de la compétitivité (E.T.E.) rapporté à quelques variables organisationnelles (composition de l'actif des entreprises étudiées) pourrait bien refléter l'évolution des rendements à la suite d'une réorganisation des actifs de l'entreprise.

Nos résultats renvoient à des pratiques qui sont des réseaux informels des PME et requièrent un minimum de complémentarité dans l'utilisation des ressources de l'entreprise. Les processus sociaux maintiennent une pratique en vie, par exemple la socialisation d'équipements, où les transferts de connaissances peuvent être organisés.

Le management peut adopter vis-à-vis de ces pratiques une posture claire : organiser et contrôler l'utilisation des équipements investis pour un ensemble de PME. Cette position, qui assure en théorie une création de valeur maximale, consiste à soutenir les pratiques. De plus, le développement d'équipements investis pour une communauté de PME facilite l'accès à un certain nombre de ressources telles que du temps, de la légitimité, des outils de communication et d'échanges d'information. L'accès à des ressources financières, qui constitue une difficulté certaine pour les PME, peut ainsi trouver une solution en partie.

Un dernier point d'intérêt est soulevé par les résultats obtenus lorsque l'on décompose le secteur des services. Certes, l'ingénierie économétrique utilisée requiert un grand nombre d'observations et donc les estimations des sous-échantillons sont sujettes à une imprécision. Il est frappant que pour aucun des quartiles des sous-secteurs de l'hôtellerie et des divers services, l'indice de compétitivité financière ne semble significativement biaisé en faveur de l'organisation économique des actifs (composition des actifs).

Conclusion

Que peut-on conclure de la compétitivité financière des entreprises étudiées à partir des analyses précédentes ?

Il faut d'abord préciser que ces conclusions ne peuvent s'apprécier que relativement à un schéma de développement choisi, à savoir un investissement

de développement. Un diagnostic complet aurait nécessité l'examen d'autres schémas, en particulier des schémas de crise. Toutefois, la compétitivité s'appréciant le plus souvent dans un contexte de croissance, l'option retenue peut apparaître bien fondée.

Notre étude permet de mettre en évidence la compétitivité financière des différentes entreprises de notre échantillon. Un des avantages essentiels de l'analyse proposée est de mettre l'accent sur la « sensibilité » de l'E.T.E. Cela permet de mieux cerner la vulnérabilité des entreprises étudiées.

L'objet de cette recherche empirique était de proposer une étude des liens entre la compétitivité et les variables explicatives que sont la taille, les coûts de production, l'effort d'investissement, l'organisation des actifs, le taux d'endettement. Il apparaît tout d'abord que le taux d'endettement est négativement corrélé au comportement des entreprises en matière de compétitivité financière (liaison absente pour les PME). L'impact des variables de politique financière est donc différent, et est fonction de la taille de l'entreprise. Les autres résultats importants concernent l'existence d'un phénomène d'élasticité entre la compétitivité financière et la masse salariale, d'une part, et, d'autre part, entre la variable de compétitivité financière et les variables que sont la composition des actifs, l'effort d'investissement.

Il convient, bien entendu, de n'accepter les résultats obtenus que dans le cadre des limites de l'étude, qui sont celles de toute étude empirique fondée sur l'observation d'un échantillon. Ces limites conduisent à une interprétation prudente des résultats et ouvrent de nombreuses pistes de recherches. Tout d'abord, il conviendrait d'approfondir l'étude des variables permettant de cerner le concept de flexibilité financière, qui est une composante fondamentale de la compétitivité financière.

Bibliographie

Askenazy, P., 2002, *La croissance moderne: organisation innovante du travail*, Economica, Paris.

Bienayme, A., 1973, *La croissance des entreprises*, Paris, Editions Bordas.

Boston Consulting Group (1980), *Les mécanismes fondamentaux de la compétitivité*, Editions Hommes et Techniques.

Charreaux, G., 1984, *Flux de trésorerie d'exploitation et diagnostic de la compétitivité financière : une application aux PME*, Editions Economica.

Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de Dakar (1994), *La compétitivité : le poids des facteurs de production*, Documents Internes.

Champaud, C., 1985, *Les PME : tiers monde du système industriel ? Les PME dans les systèmes économiques*, Actes du colloque de Nice.

Cohen, E., 2001, *Dictionnaire de gestion*, Coll. Repères, Editions la découverte.

Covin, J.G. et COVIN, T.D., 1990, « Competitive aggressiveness, environnemental context and small firm performance ». *Entrepreneurship theory and pratice*, Vol. 14, N° 4.

Cotol, V. et Michel, P.A., 1996, « Vers une théorie financière adaptée aux PME : réflexion sur une science en genèse », *Revue Internationale PME*, Vol. 9, N°1.

Demingüç-Kunt, A., Maksimovic, V., 1996, "Financial constraints, uses of funds and firm growth on international comparaison", World bank, policy research working paper, October.

Doty, H.D., Glick, W.H., Huber, G.P., "Fit, equifinality, and organizational effectiveness: A test of two configurational theories", *Academy of management journal*, Vol. 36, N° 6.

Eetime, M.F., Drithon, G., JULIEN, P.A., 1994, « Les déterminants de la compétitivité des PME », *Problèmes économiques*, N° 2359.

Germain, C., 2005, « La contingence des systèmes de mesure de la performance : les résultats d'une recherche empirique sur le secteur des PME », *Finance, contrôle, stratégie,* Vol. 7, N°1, mars, p. 33-52.

Ghachem, L., 2000, « La PME et son financement », *Afrique Economie*, N° 303.

Guillou, J., 1981, « Le modèle fitrex d'analyse et de gestion financières », *Rev. Banque*, N° 406.

Guy Van Loye, 1990, « Organisation du pouvoir et financement des PME », *Revue Direction et Gestion des Entreprises.*

Guyon, Ch., 1991, «Pour une nouvelle théorie de l'équilibre financier de l'entreprise », *Revue analyse financière*, 1° trimestre.

Guyon, C., et GaudrY, O., 1987, « La trésorerie d'exploitation : atouts et abus », *Revue Banque*, N° 468.

Hicks, J., 1975, ''The crisis in keynesian economics'', Basic blackwell, Oxford.

Joyal, A., 1997, « PME et développement territorial », in P.A., Julien, *Les PME : bilan et perspectives*, 2° édition, Paris, Economica, p. 41 – 66.

Kaplan et Norton, 1996, ''Using the balanced scorecard as a strategic management system'', *Harvard business review*, Vol. 74, N° 1.

Levet, J. L. et Paturel, R., 1997, « Comparaisons et explications des stratégies des PMI françaises et allemandes », *Rev. Internationale de la PME*, Vol. 10, N° 2.

Lorino, P., 1997, *Méthodes et pratiques de la performance,* Paris, Les éditions d'organisation.

March, J. G., 1991, *Réflexions sur le changement dans les organisations, décisions et organisations,* Paris, Editions organisations.

Marchesnay, M., 1992, « La PME : une gestion spécifique ? », *Problèmes économiques*, N° 2276.

Martinet, A.C., 1981, « Coûts industriels et entreprise compétitive », *Les cahiers lyonnais de recherche en gestion,* N°4.

Mucchielli, J. L., 2002, *La compétitivité : définitions ; indicateurs et déterminants*, Dossiers team. Univ. – Paris.

Nagle, T.T. et Holden, R. K., 1995, « The strategy and tactics of pricing », *Prentice Hall*.

Nakamura, J.L., 1999, « La relation banque – PME », *Revue d'économie financière*.
Paranque, B., 1999, « Flexibilité financière des P.M.E. », Documents de recherche banque de France.
Paranque, B., Rivaud-Danset, D., Salais, R., 1996, « Marchés, organisations de la production et rentabilité des entreprises industrielles », Banque de France T.96/03.
Porter, M.E., 1998, «Localisation et compétitivité », *Sociétal*, N°19.
Porter, M.E., 1986, *L'avantage concurrentiel*, Paris, Inter- éditions.
Porter R, M.E., 1982, *Choix stratégiques et concurrence*, Paris, Economica.
Pralahad, G. et Hamel, G., 1990, ''The core competence of the corporation'', *Havard business review*, Vol. 68, N° 3.
Reix, R., 1979, *La flexibilité de l'entreprise*, Paris, Editions Cujas.
Rol, Sandrine, 2002, « Corée du Sud : quelle compétitivité aujourd'hui ? », *Problèmes économiques*, N° 2757.
Saives, A. L., 2002, *Territoire et compétitivité de l'entreprise*, Paris, L'harmattan.
Sall, M.B., 1997, « Structure financière et performances des sociétés conjointes au Sénégal », thèse de doctorat, Bordeaux IV, Montesquieu.
Sall, M.B., 2002, « La source de financement des investissements de la PME : une étude empirique sur données sénégalaises », *Rev. Afrique et développement*, Vol. XXVII, N°s1 & 2.
Sevestre, P., 2002, *Econométrie des données de panel*, Paris, Dunod.
Sire, B., 1992, « De la flexibilité potentielle à la flexibilité effective par prise en compte des motivations », Mélanges en l'honneur de J. G. Mérigot, Paris, Economica.
Thiethart, R. A. et Vivias, R., 1984, « Stratégie de compétitivité et cycle de vie des activités », in *Entreprise, gestion et compétitivité*, Etudes IAE, Economica.
Torres, O., 1997, « Pour une approche contingente de la spécificité de la PME », *Revue Internationale PME*, Vol. 10, N° 2.
Vernimmen, P., 1988, *Finance d'entreprise : analyse et gestion*, 3° édition Dalloz.
Wade, M.E.B. et Diouf, C.ND., 1992, « La crise de financement de la PME au Sénégal », *Revue Internationale PME*, Vol.5, N° 54.

Annexe

Eléments de définition de la PME selon la charte des PME du Sénégal

Au Sénégal, l'adoption de la charte des PME propose un cadre qui permet de circonscrire cette catégorie d'entreprises dans un cadre bien précis.

Ainsi, au sens de la charte, la P.M.E. représente toute personne physique ou morale productive de biens ou de services marchands. La définition, selon la charte, prend en compte les quatre critères suivants :

- l'effectif ;
- le chiffre d'affaires annuel hors taxe ;
- la transparence dans la tenue de la comptabilité ;
- l'investissement net.

Selon l'article 3 de la charte, sont considérés comme petites entreprises les entreprises qui répondent aux critères et seuils suivants :

- effectif : compris entre un et vingt salariés ;
- chiffre d'affaires (hors taxe) annuel moyen n'atteignant pas les limites suivantes :
    - cinquante millions de francs cfa pour les petites entreprises qui effectuent des opérations de livraison de biens ;
    - vingt-cinq millions de francs cfa pour les petites entreprises qui effectuent des opérations de prestations de services ;
    - cinquante millions de francs cfa pour les petites entreprises qui effectuent des opérations mixtes ;
- tenue d'une comptabilité allégée ou de trésorerie certifiée par une structure de gestion agréée (C.G.A.) selon le système comptable en vigueur au Sénégal.

Et selon l'article 4 de la charte, sont considérées comme moyennes entreprises les entreprises qui répondent aux critères et seuils suivants :

- effectif inférieur à deux cent cinquante salariés ;
- chiffre d'affaires annuel moyen compris entre quinze milliards et les limites fixées ci-dessus ;

- tenue d'une comptabilité selon le système normal en vigueur au Sénégal et certifiée par un membre inscrit à l'ordre national des experts comptables et comptables agréés (ONNCCA) ;

- investissement net inférieur ou égal à un milliard de francs cfa.

On retient que deux types de critères permettent de définir la PME, mais les critères quantitatifs sont plus simples et plus opérationnels que les critères qualitatifs, notamment dans des entreprises où la performance est généralement mesurée par des indicateurs quantitatifs.

Africa Development, Vol. XXXVIII, Nos 1&2, 2013, pp. 81–105

(ISSN 0850-3907)

Assessing China's Relations with Africa[1]

Hany Besada*

Abstract

China's spectacular economic progress has led some security analysts and policy makers to question Beijing's intentions in other parts of the world. This paper examines the extent to which China's engagement with Africa has produced mutual benefits for both and whether Africa is reaping the necessary benefits required for poverty alleviation and economic development. Chinese state-owned enterprises have invested billions of dollars in foreign reserves, construction, and engineering resources assisting African oil-producing exporters. While many in the West have started to question China's extraordinary level of interest in Africa – in particular, its economic engagement with perceived repressive regimes – African leaders view China's entry as a means of pulling Africa onto the path of globalization. It is thus important that African leaders and policy makers ensure that Chinese trade and investment bring reciprocal and tangible benefits for Africans, and contribute to economic stability and good governance.

Résumé

Le progrès économique spectaculaire de la Chine a conduit certains analystes en matière de sécurité et des décideurs dans le Nord et le Sud à s'interroger sur les intentions de Pékin dans d'autres parties du monde. Cet article examine dans quelle mesure l'engagement de la Chine avec l'Afrique a été mutuellement bénéfique et si l'Afrique en tire les avantages nécessaires pour la réduction de la pauvreté et le développement économique. Les entreprises publiques chinoises ont investi des milliards de dollars en termes de réserves de change, de ressources pour la construction et l'ingénierie pour aider les producteurs et exportateurs de pétrole en Afrique. Alors que beaucoup en Occident ont commencé à s'interroger sur le niveau extraordinaire d'intérêt de la Chine pour l'Afrique - en particulier, son engagement économique avec des régimes considérés comme répressifs - des dirigeants africains considèrent l'entrée de la Chine comme un moyen de tirer l'Afrique sur la voie de la mondialisation. Il est donc important que les dirigeants et décideurs africains s'assurent que le commerce et l'investissement chinois apportent des avantages réciproques et tangibles aux Africains et contribuent à la stabilité économique et la bonne gouvernance.

* Development Cooperation at the North-South Institute (NSI), Ottawa, Canada. Email: hbesada@nsi-ins.ca

Introduction

China's meteoric rise over the past two decades from an impoverished developing country to today's second-largest global economy, surpassing Japan in early 2011,[2] and largest world trader[3] has gained considerable world attention, stunning supporters and critics alike, its economy easily outperforming even the most optimistic expectations. With record economic growth rates averaging nearly 10 per cent a year over the past three decades[4] and the economy projected to overtake that of the United States by 2030, if it maintains an annual growth rate of eight per cent.[5] China has become one of the world's largest recipients of foreign direct investment (FDI), having attracted approximately US$106 billion by 2010,[6] up from US$90 billion over the previous year.[7]

This newly acquired wealth, including $US 2.85 trillion in foreign exchange reserves by the end of 2010,[8] has given the Chinese government the opportunity to embark on a military modernization programme, to modernize its space programme, and to rise to world leadership status. As expected, some security analysts and policy makers have begun to question Beijing's intentions not only in regards to its involvement in Africa but also more broadly in the rest of the world. China's position is strategically unique, given its ability to remain involved on issues both as a developing country and a former member of the Non-Aligned Movement and as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.[9] As such, China shares the developing nations' sense of humiliation, a determination to take control of their own destiny, and the need to restore dignity following decades of economic colonization and exploitation. Since the 1970s, China has begun to shape its foreign policy engagement with the world in a way that supports its quest to reclaim its place as an independent and sovereign state among the community of nations. This has entailed the promotion of cooperation rather than confrontation, economic development rather than revolution, and international engagement rather than isolation. China has begun to capitalize on its longstanding linkages with the developing world, particularly Africa, where Chinese interest is taking the form of increased trade, investment, and economic cooperation, and grand pledges of aid by Chinese officials during high-level visits to dozens of African states.

This growing trend in China's foreign policy is increasingly viewed as an important aspect of the government's long-term strategy for the country. This paper analyzes the internal dynamics that have shaped, and will continue to shape, Sino-African relations. It also examines the extent to which China's engagement with Africa has helped alleviate poverty and spur economic development.

China's Africa Policy

China's Africa policy can best be understood from its unique political and economic perspectives. Although China reaps considerable economic gains from Africa, it would be simplistic to regard those benefits as the sole driver of China's policy agenda toward Africa. Media outlets and Western scholars often suggest that China's relationship with Africa is built on its dependency on and demand for energy resources, markets, and investment opportunities for its booming industries and job seeking workers. China has often been criticized for taking advantage of the vulnerability of African economies and the desperation of its people and leaders for increased foreign investment to spur development and growth.

This perception, however, fails to take into account four important points. First, China's more active engagement with Africa is part of its continuing emergence as a truly global player and, as such, is no different from the traditional behaviour of major powers. Second, in its global and regional diplomacy, China, like all great powers, is pursuing multiple objectives, including those that create tensions between values and interests at both the national and global level. China can no more be expected to subordinate its commercial and strategic interests to other considerations than have the Western powers in their policies toward Africa and the world. Third, Sino-Africa relations date back to the early Han dynasty (140-87 BC) when Chinese and African contact first occurred,[10] long before China's rapid economic expansion and its significant demand for the continent's mineral resources. Finally, most African states that have benefited so far from China's increasing trade and investment, as well as from debt relief, are not endowed with mineral wealth and offer few investment opportunities to Chinese enterprises. At the end of the day, it is not the responsibility of China but, rather, of African leaders, to ensure that their respective countries capture the benefits while minimizing the downside of China's interest in the continent – a policy prescription that holds true for defining the terms of engagement of any external power. Thus, China's Africa policy should be viewed not as a mere quest for resources but in the context of its diplomatic strategic pursuits and global foreign policy objectives – namely, to solidify its position as a global power, on a par with other permanent members of the UN Security Council; to sustain its economic and human development; and to ensure Taiwan's reunification while countering secession drives by minority areas within China, including Tibet. In pursuing these objectives, China seeks the political and diplomatic support of UN member countries, particularly from less developed countries. As the largest regional group within the UN system,

Africa is a natural ally on which Beijing has become closely dependent to further its political objectives.

Politically, Chinese engagement with the continent has paid dividends over the past five decades in its diplomatic battle to deny Taiwan international legitimacy in multilateral institutions. For instance, in December 2003, China deployed 90 peacekeepers to Liberia, following that country's decision to switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. In December 2007, Malawi severed its ties with Taiwan after Beijing reportedly offered billions of dollars in aid to the country as an incentive to do so. By January 2008, only four African states – Gambia, Burkina Faso, Swaziland, and Sao Tomé and Principe – continued to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[11]

China has followed up this diplomatic success over Taiwan with cooperation with African countries on such non-traditional security threats as pandemics, terrorism, and transnational crime. Following the fateful 9/11 attacks on the United States and the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003, Beijing sought Africa's support for its effort to play a greater role in the global fight against these emerging challenges. In 2006, China concluded agreements with a number of African states on the deportation of criminal suspects, judicial cooperation, and extradition. It also proposed a strategic partnership with the continent, including a US$38.5 million grant to treat malaria. Some African states have taken part in joint military and training exercises with China. These areas of cooperation offer a glimpse of China's drive to raise its international status.

China's Africa policy places equally important emphasis on its economic objectives – essentially, the need to sustain China's economic development. Given Africa's vast investment opportunities, untapped human and natural resources, attractive markets, and low-cost labour, China has ardently strengthened its long-standing relations with the continent over the past two decades. It is widely believed that China's human development and economic growth hinges on its ability to tap into Africa's plethora of resources while offering tangible benefits to host economies in the process. Forging a mutually beneficial situation, as Chinese officials increasingly emphasize in diplomatic circles, has become a major feature of Chinese economic engagement with Africa.

China's Scramble for Africa's Resources

For more than a decade, China has sought access to Africa's rich energy and raw materials to fuel its surging economy. The Chinese leadership always understood that the country's unprecedented growth required a continuous supply of raw materials, especially hydrocarbon fuels. The country's booming domestic energy demand, coupled with insufficient coal output and falling

domestic crude oil production, prompted China to look overseas for stable supply sources.

The turning point came in 1993, when China went from a net exporter to a net importer of petroleum. By late 2004, the country had become the world's second-largest oil consumer, at 5.46 million barrels a day (bbl/d), outstripping Japan's 5.43 million bbl/d, and placing it behind only the US's 19.7 million bbl/d (Downs 2004; United States 2005). By 2009, Chinese oil consumption had reached 8.6 million bbl/d, accounting for ten per cent of total worldwide consumption.[12] Moreover, the country was importing more approximately 47 per cent of the oil it consumed.[13] It is predicted that China's dependence on crude oil imports will continue to rise, reaching 65 per cent by 2020.[14] Indeed, over the past decade, China has doubled its oil consumption and is largely responsible for increasing the share of global oil used by non-OECD states from 37 per cent in 1997 to almost 43 per cent in 2007 (Monfort 2008). By the end of 2009, China surpassed the United States as the world's largest consumer of energy in 2009, with oil accounting for less than one fifth of that amount.[15] Its energy demands are expected to rise by 150 per cent by 2020 (Luft 2004). Energy experts point out that China's oil imports from Asia's oil-producing states have not been sufficient to meet even its current energy demands, while Chinese officials are certainly aware of the limitation of Middle Eastern oil and gas production given its primary allocation to European and US markets. In fact, in 2006, Angola surpassed Saudi Arabia as the leading supplier of oil in China.[16]

Figure 1: Africa's Share of China's Crude Oil Imports, 1995-2007



Sources: Statistics Canada, 2008

As a late entrant into the global oil industry, Africa is the last major source of oil reserves that are not already managed primarily by major Western energy companies and are thus available to Chinese corporations. In 2009, China sourced approximately 50 per cent of its crude oil imports from the Middle

East, followed by 30 per cent from Africa.[17] As Figure 1 shows, China's crude oil imports from Africa have been steadily increasing. China thus has placed a high premium on strengthening relations with African states through a strict adherence to the doctrine of non-interference in internal affairs, which bodes well for some African leaders, particularly in Zimbabwe and Sudan, coupled with pledges of increased aid, investment, and lower tariffs on African exports. These policies implemented by the Chinese administration have been echoed by officials during high-level visits to Africa.

In recent years, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have invested billions of dollars in foreign reserves and used Chinese construction and engineering resources to assist Nigeria, Tunisia, Angola, Sudan, Gabon, and Algeria, among other African countries, to develop their oil, gas, and other mineral resources. In March 2004, for example, China's Eximbank extended a US$2 billion loan to the Angolan government in exchange for a contract to supply China with 10,000 barrels of crude oil per day (Lee 2004). The loan was designed to be reinvested in infrastructure construction, with approximately 30 per cent going to local subcontractors but the bulk expected to go to Chinese companies. The agreement was part of a reported offer, estimated at US$12 billion, which came with long maturities and low interest rates (Downs 2007). At the time, the government in Luanda had been under intense pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to improve transparency and management issues with respect to its oil revenues, since the poverty-stricken population of Angola had seen very little of the windfall of foreign reserves that had accompanied increased FDI in the oil sector. Since the end of the civil war in 2002, Angola had been negotiating with the IMF to establish a formal financial arrangement designed to give the government access to lending facilities, but the negotiations fell apart over the issue of revenue transparency. Now, the Chinese loan undermined the IMF's leverage altogether.

In Sudan, Chinese companies have invested more than US$15 billion since 1996, largely in the oil sector,[18] helping Sudan to go from a net importer of oil to one of Africa's largest exporters. Given significant discrepancies in Sudan's reported oil revenues, from nine per cent to 26 per cent, it is difficult to say with certainty how much money can be attributed to the country's booming oil industry. However, it is reported that in 2010 alone, the oil industry generated $4.5 billion.[19] With estimated oil reserves of 1.6 million barrels, this impoverished African state is the recipient of approximately seven per cent of Chinese development; China's Sinopec is building a 1,500-kilometre pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

In West Africa, PetroChina finalized a deal in July 2005 reported to be worth US$800 million with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation to

purchase approximately 30,000 barrels of oil per day for one year.[20] The following year, China National Offshore Oil Corporation, following an unsuccessful bid to buy US-owned Unocal, succeeded in acquiring a 45 per cent stake reported to be worth more than US$2.27 billion in a Nigerian offshore oil and gas field. The company subsequently promised to invest up to US$2.25 billion in additional investment for field development (Linebaugh and Oster 2006).

In central Africa, the China National Petrochemical Corporation has announced its intention to explore both offshore and onshore oil deposits in Gabon, which has proven oil reserves of some 2.5 billion barrels (Brookes and Ji 2006). A Chinese consortium has also signed a US$3 billion iron ore deal with the Gabonese government to rehabilitate and extend a railway as well as to construct a bulk commodities and container port.[21]

In early 2008, the Democratic Republic of Congo disclosed a deal reportedly worth US$9.25 billion with the Chinese government that would provide much-needed financing for infrastructural development and renovations, using rights to mineral reserves as collateral. This promises to be one of China's largest investments in Africa yet, providing some 620,000 tons of cobalt and 10.62 million tons of copper for its resource-hungry domestic industries.[22] The agreement is expected to result in an ambitious infrastructure development boom, with the planned construction of more than hundreds of hospitals, schools, clinics, 3,300 km of roads, two hydroelectric dams, and 3,000 km of railway. This is significantly important for one of the world's poorest states, where output per head is a mere US$714 a year and where half the population does not have access to clean water or electricity. In return, China is expected to reap more than US$30 billion in profits at current copper and cobalt prices.

Indeed, energy analysts credit China's success in securing mineral rights in Africa to a wide range of economic instruments; particularly prestige construction projects, financial assistance, and arms sales to cement ties with oil-producing states. In Sudan, for instance, Beijing has used its technical expertise and links to other government-owned companies to transform the country's oil industry into a major export earner for Khartoum. With $519 million in loans from the China Exim Bank, the Merowe hydropower dam was completed in 2009, doubling Sudan's electricity generation, but also resulting in a number of negative social impacts, including the displacement of 50,000 inhabitants.[23] In 2008, China offered the Nigerian government export guarantee facilities reportedly worth US$50 billion aimed at funding projects over the next three years.[24] Analysts contend that this is a strategic decision by Beijing to promote and boost Chinese investment in that continent (Green 2008).

In southern Africa, Zimbabwe and South Africa constitute China's major sources for platinum and iron ore (see Brookes and Ji 2006). Following the imposition of sanctions against Robert Mugabe's regime in Zimbabwe, which is accused of oppressing minority populations, squashing political opposition, and causing the exit of Western mining firms, China used its diplomatic and economic leverage to secure mining rights in that country. In 2004, withstanding an EU and US arms embargo against the regime, China sold Harare military vehicles and fighter aircraft reported to be worth more than US$200 million (McLaughlin 2005). Furthermore, Zimbabwe was able to acquire military-strength radio-jamming devices, which reportedly were used to block broadcasts of anti-government reports by independent news agencies during the most recent parliamentary election campaign, when international election observers accused Mugabe's ZANU-PF party of rigging the vote and harassing opposition candidates.

Aside from providing military hardware to secure rights to mineral deposits in Zimbabwe as well as vetoing sanctions against Mugabe's regime,[25] in June 2006 Beijing threw the country's disintegrating economy a lifeline with energy and mining deals reportedly worth more than US$1.3 billion. While neither China nor Zimbabwe has indicated how the investments will be repaid, the deals gave China access to Zimbabwe's resources of precious minerals, including the world's second largest deposits of platinum, as well as gold, chrome, coal, nickel, and diamonds (see Thomson 2008). Major investment projects include the construction of three coal-fired thermal power stations to aid the state power company, which has been cutting customers' power for seven hours a day,[26] and a deal with China Machine-Building International Corporation to mine coal and aid in dealing with the country's electricity shortages.[27] Chinese investments in other sectors of the Zimbabwean economy remain limited, but interest remains high in the resources sector. In his message to mark his 83rd birthday on February 24, 2007, President Mugabe indicated that Zimbabwe had sizable uranium resources as well as old tin mines in which 'Chinese investors' had recently expressed interest.

Zimbabwe was a keen participant in the much-vaunted November 2006 China-Africa summit. The summit generated much interest and debate among both Western and African analysts about the nature of Zimbabwe's relationship with China. Critics contend that Chinese investors are increasingly given preferential treatment in Zimbabwe over their local counterparts. Attesting to this criticism, the governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Dr Gideon Gono, in a meeting with the deputy governor of the People's Bank of China, was quoted as saying, 'I would like to unveil to the Chinese people the vast

investment opportunities that ... abound in Zimbabwe, including our natural resource endowments'.[28] In return for Harare's guarantees, China's National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation and China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) have agreed to finance multi-billion-dollar expansion projects by both Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority and Hwange Colliery Company. It is worth noting that the US government has sanctioned NORINCO on several occasions for supplying missile technology to Iran.

In addition to reaping Africa's resources to keep its own economy afloat, China's approach could be better illustrated by its emphasis on vertical integration-ownership of production facilities through to transport tankers to secure oil to Chinese consumers below international market prices. Instead of buying rights for future exploration and development, Beijing has concentrated on purchasing equity shares in established oil fields. With a vision of turning themselves into global players in the energy market, CNPC and other Chinese oil companies in Africa have fought to secure equity positions, which have enhanced their ability to learn from established industrial practices, minimized risks, and allowed for technology transfers. This strategic judgment with regard to energy security helps to explain China's long-term vision concerning its engagement with Africa. China maintains that it plans to be in Africa for the long haul, unlike many of the Western multinational and mining firms that have a short-term outlook for the continent. As Wenping (2010) points out, while London-based Shell has a long history in Nigeria, the country continues to export crude oil and import gasoline. Due in part to the role of China, Sudan's oil industry has developed considerably, with oil production increasing from 2,000 barrels per day in 1993 to 500,000 bpd presently.[29]

China's Contribution to Africa's Economic Development

China's red carpet treatment for 50 African heads of state in November 2006 to commemorate five decades of Sino-African relations together with high-profile state visits by top Chinese officials, including President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, to dozens of African states in recent months bears testimony to the continent's strategic importance for Beijing's economic and political growth strategies in a multipolar, post-Cold War environment. These visits came shortly after Chinese pledges to increase aid to the continent from about US$2.3 billion in 2006 (Wang 2007: 22) to US$10 billion by 2009 (Baldauf 2007) and to expand trading ties, which were already worth more than US$73.3 billion in 2007, up from nearly US$11 billion in 2000 (see Figure 2).



Source: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2010-12/23/content_1771603_3.htm

In 2008, trade between Africa and China reached US $106.8 billion, with US$50.8 billion in Chinese exports to Africa and US$56 billion in imports from Africa.[30] In 2010, China-Africa trade volume increased to US$114.18 billion,[31] making China the continent's largest trading partner.[32] In 1999, the share of Chinese imports from Africa was 4.2 per cent, with the share of Chinese exports to Africa at 4 per cent.[33] Chinese FDI outflows to the continent increased from US$1.5 million in 1991 (Figure 3) to US$9.33 billion in 2009,[34] while China's stock of FDI in Africa increased from US$49.2 million in 1990 (UNCTAD/UNDP, 2007) to US$7.8 billion in 2008.[35] China has received praise for its contribution to Africa's unprecedented economic growth.[36] While Africa's real GDP growth fell to 3.1 per cent in 2009, from 5.6 per cent in 2008, in response to the global economic downturn, economic prospects for the future are positive, with a real GDP growth of 5.2 per cent expected in 2012.[37] This is largely the result of riding on the back of high commodity prices and encouraging patterns in the growth of exports to China.

The reorientation of China's economy toward trade over the past decade and a half has dramatically increased its trade-to-GDP ratio in excess of 70 per cent. China has become a major importer of commodities and a significant exporter of manufactured goods. From 1995 to 2009, China's imports from Africa increased by 27 per cent.[38] In 2009, China's top imports from Africa included mineral products (79 %), base metals (5 %) and precious stones

and metals (4 %).[39] The share in total Chinese imports from sub-Saharan Africa of five of the most highly sought commodities – oil, iron ore, logs, diamonds and cotton grew to more than 80 per cent in 2005, up from less than 50 per cent in 1995. The most rapidly growing export was petroleum products.

As of 2008, seven sub-Saharan states source the bulk of their total imports from China. Sudan, as we have seen, has become closely aligned with China due to its expanding energy links with Beijing in recent years and is the largest importer of Chinese products on the continent, accounting for more than 14 per cent of its total imports; next are Tanzania and Ghana with 9.1 per cent each, Nigeria with 7.1 per cent, Kenya and Ethiopia with 6.4 per cent each, and Uganda with 5.1 per cent (Jenkins 2005). Most of these countries' imports consist of manufactured products. Even though Africa remains a relatively marginal player when it comes to China's overall trade with the rest of the world, its trading relationship with China has important implications for both. Africa serves as a low-value consumer market for Chinese goods, particularly for loss-making SOEs, which have set up shop across the continent. The affordability of Chinese products fills an important gap in the market for many

African consumers, who cannot afford more expensive consumer goods from Europe or, given the inability of their own economies to produce local equivalents, do without them altogether.

Equally important, over the past few years, Beijing has pumped millions of dollars into African industries geared to serve markets in the EU and the United States. Using the provisions of the EU's Cotonou Agreement[40] and the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA),[41] Chinese investors have established joint ventures with local investors in a variety of sectors – particularly agriculture, ago-business, textiles, and light manufacturing – to produce goods for export to those markets at concessional rates. In the process, they are helping to build local capacity, boost technology transfers, and raise export levels of dozens of African economies.

However, this expanding Chinese investment has pre-empted the development of African capacity to build intermediate goods and an indigenous capacity for exports, in which there appears to be a limited amount except in the textile and agro-business sectors, and little incorporation of sub-Saharan Africa and China into coordinated global value chains. This might seem discouraging given the need to reduce African dependence on commodity exports to China and elsewhere. Surprisingly, it has helped Africa reduce displacement of domestic production and the negative impact of such displacement on local production and employment, adding to optimism about increased Chinese economic engagement with the continent.

In terms of FDI, China's commercial activities on the continent are qualitatively different from those sourced from North America or the EU. Historically, FDI from the developed world has been driven by privately owned enterprises focused on obtaining maximum profit over a short period of time and with the least amount of risk. Chinese FDI, however, is directed by partially or wholly state-owned enterprises, strategically placed, with the objective of forming long-lasting relationships with the communities and governments with which they cooperate, assisted in part by their accessibility to very low cost capital. In addition, a large number of these investments reportedly are linked either implicitly or explicitly to strategic objectives, principally securing reserves of mineral resources for Chinese industries back home.

This is not to say that Chinese FDI has produced tangible benefits only for Chinese manufacturing and for China's economy at large. Chinese investment not only enjoys the support of African governments – particularly in the agriculture sector, as a way of securing the food needs of their populations – but also is seen as a means of helping Africa get around restrictions imposed by the World Trade Organization (WTO). African governments have repeatedly called for the lifting of market restrictions by the North on their agricultural and textile products where they have a competitive edge. In multilateral trade negotiations, however, African calls for the revision of agricultural subsidies and tariff escalation[42] have fallen on deaf ears. For its part, however, China has earned credit by promoting African exports of both yarn and textiles – in a number of countries, such as Lesotho, it imports yarn to be woven in Chinese industries, while in other countries, such as South Africa, it imports sizable quantities of clothing with the aim of shipping it back to China before re-exporting it to US and EU markets.

Assisted by low labour costs and political connections, as well as assistance from the Chinese government, Chinese companies have been able to outbid Western firms for infrastructure project contracts across the continent, particularly in east and southern Africa. Also aiding the 900 or so Chinese firms operating in Africa is a contracted Chinese labour force numbering approximately 74,000 in 2006, up from 24,000 in 1996.[43]

An example is the investment by Qingdao Municipal Government in Zambia's textile industry, where the newly created Mulungushi Industrial Park in Kabwe aims to take advantage of the AGOA provisions that allow Zambia to export textiles to the United States. Also in Zambia, a Chinese firm has formed a joint venture with a local company to buy a cotton ginnery in the country's eastern province, reflecting China's fixation on its vertical integration strategy.

In neighbouring Mozambique, Chinese companies have invested in building a large shopping centre and industrial warehousing in the capital, Maputo, in a soya processing plant reportedly worth US$10 million, and an estimated US$12 million in the production of prawns (Kaplinsky, McCormick, and Morris, 2006). Some of the most significant Chinese investments in the country have centred on infrastructure projects – already, approximately two-thirds of the country's 600 km of roads have been rehabilitated by Chinese multinationals. On the border between Mozambique and Tanzania, Chinese firms have won a tender to rehabilitate a large bridge deemed vital for cross border trade between the two countries. They have also won tenders to repair water treatment plans in Beira and Quelimane reportedly worth US$15 million and in Maputo worth more than US$30 million.

In January 2008, China signed an agreement to provide Gabon with more than US$83 million to help fund a hydroelectric dam scheme; the loan bears three per cent interest over a 20-year term, including a seven-year grace period.[44] In Sudan, in early 2008, in a deal reportedly worth US$396 million, two Chinese companies won tenders to increase the height of the Roseires Dam, which supplies Sudan with more than 70 per cent of its hydro-power. The dam is projected to increase electricity power generation by 50 per cent.[45]

In Zimbabwe, Beijing's economic support remains strong, and Chinese firms have secured contracts to develop the country's agricultural, mineral, and hydroelectric resources. China already supplies Zimbabwe with expertise, technical assistance, and agricultural equipment, and in September 2006, it announced a US$200 million capital injection into Zimbabwe's farming, manufacturing, and mining sectors. Tobacco is among Zimbabwe's top exports, and China, as the largest importer, has made large investments in tobacco production and processing.

Meanwhile, state-owned China International Water and Electric has been contracted to farm 250,000 acres in the southern part of Zimbabwe. Chinese and Zimbabwean developers believe the project will yield 2.1 million tons of maize every year and require the building of a massive irrigation system.[46] It remains unclear how Zimbabwe will pay for the project, although unconfirmed reports claim payment will be made in tobacco.[47] Through lines of credit at Chinese banks, China also supports Zimbabwe's small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). With this assistance, Zimbabwe's Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises set aside US$10 million in 2005 for disbursement to SMEs in such industries as textiles, soap, tile, and fibreglass manufacturing. Large SOEs, such as the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company, which is presently being refurbished, also receive Chinese assistance; in January 2008, Zimbabwe awarded a Chinese company a US$9.5 million contract to repair a blast furnace (Kadzere 2008).

The growth of Chinese FDI in construction and infrastructure projects reflects China's commitment to a deeper imprint on the continent, with the strategic aim of achieving parity with the West, particularly the United States. China's political agenda is also served by the building of a coalition of partners that views its role in Africa as contributing to South-South cooperation and to harnessing a mutually beneficial relationship with the continent. To a large extent, the Chinese have been successful in meeting these goals, due mainly to their ability to build relatively good infrastructural projects at prices that are reportedly 25 to 50 per cent lower than those of other foreign investors (Corkin and Burke n.d.).

According to anecdotal research, Chinese firms have outbid and outperformed their Western counterparts in Africa due to a combination of factors. These include: their access to cheaper capital than other foreign or even local investors; less pressure from the Chinese government to sanction SOEs to adopt good environmental and labour standards; the use of Chinese materials; the almost exclusive use of Chinese labourers, many of whom live in isolated communities and are often less expensive than African workers; and the Chinese government's ready provision of subsidies for investing overseas.

In addition there are the dozens of mega-infrastructure projects and development initiatives by Chinese SOEs across the continent, even in countries with less than abundant mineral resources. In Guinea-Bissau, China paid for the tiles and marble of the parliamentary building of this impoverished West African state. In East Africa, China financially supported and assisted with the construction of new foreign ministry buildings and stadiums in Djibouti and Uganda. In Kenya, China Development Bank announced in December 2007 that it was providing US$20 million in development credit to build low-cost housing and improve health care and education in the country.[48]

These mega-projects point to a deep Chinese commitment to an expanded foreign policy agenda on the continent. Chinese analysts argue that these projects enable China to exert more pressure on African states to curtail Taiwan's attempts to establish a sizable presence on the continent. In addition, African analysts point out that China understands the challenges of governing in areas where the bulk of the population lives in abject poverty. Thus, tangible examples of modernization, such as Chinese built stadiums, highways, or foreign ministry buildings, resonate well with African leaders who seek to portray their legitimacy to their populations, who are often dissatisfied and frustrated with the slow pace of reform and economic development and have little patience for the rhetorical proclamations of prosperity in the near future.

Technical development assistance to Africa, though still less than official development assistance from the West, is slowly becoming a bargaining chip China can use to further its economic engagement with the continent. Chinese engineering, medical, and agricultural teams have provided technical support to African states since the 1960s; this HIV/AIDS support accelerated from the late 1980s, and covers the spectrum from building schools and clinics to treating patients. In 1963, China sent its first medical team to Algeria.[49] By the end of 2009, the number of medical workers China had sent across the world totalled 21,000.[50] From the 1960s to 2005, China has sent more than 15,000 doctors to work in over four dozen countries, treating more than 180 million cases of HIV/AIDS.[51]

As a developing country itself, with limited resources to invest abroad, China had preferred technical support to Africa over financial aid. It felt better able to address Africa's ills through the 'soft power' flexing of its muscles via developmental assistance programmes. Over the past decade, China has actively encouraged African policy makers and academics to study in China to learn from the Chinese model of economic liberalization and reform and from its communist political ideology and social cohesiveness. China has projected its brand of economic development and its reform model as indications of the 'soft power' it hopes to portray as it seeks new economic partners to help it achieve the scale of industrialization and modernization it wishes to realize in the coming decades.

In its inaugural white paper on its development activities, China reported that it had provided a total of 256.29 billion Yuan (US$38.54 billion) in aid to developing countries by the end of 2009. This included 106.2 billion Yuan in grants, 76.54 billion Yuan in interest-free loans and 73.55 billion Yuan in concessional loans.[52] Additionally, China cancelled 25.58 billion Yuan in debt to the developing world.[53] While the white paper did not specify how much was allocated to Africa, in 2009, 47.5 per cent of China's aid went to Africa.[54] It is reported that from 1957 to 2006, Chinese aid to Africa totalled 44.4 billion Yuan ($5.7 billion).[55] Brautigam estimates that in 2007, China provided $US 1.38 billion in aid to Africa, including debt relief.[56]

In November 2006, at the third summit of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation, China pledged to double aid to Africa to about US$10 billion by 2009, to cancel all debt stemming from Chinese interest-free government loans that matured by the end of 2005 (about US$1.4 billion) for 31 of the most highly indebted and least developed states (LDSs) on the continent that have diplomatic relations with Beijing, and to provide US$3 billion in preferential loans and US$2 billion in preferential buyers' credits to African states.

In Liberia and Mozambique, China signed memos cancelling all debt owing to it by these impoverished states – an amount that jointly totalled more than US$30 billion. In Liberia's case, Beijing introduced a tax exemption policy for all imports from Monrovia. In June 2007, China gave Guinea-Bissau US$4 million as part of a protocol for financial support (Horta n.d.), and later US$400,000 for Guinean refugees residing in the north of the country. In January 2008, the Chinese government announced a donation of some US$500,000 in humanitarian aid to Somalia through the World Health Organization.[57] In both Liberia and the Central African Republic, China provided direct funding for training programmes to strengthen the capacity of the civil service in those countries. In areas of small-scale agricultural production and hydro-irrigation, China has supported training programmes involving thousands of farmers across the continent. In Djibouti and Ethiopia, in the Horn of Africa, Beijing has supplied modern telecommunication equipment, along with maintenance training programmes. During the November 2007 Beijing Summit, China's leadership announced the dispatch of more than 300 volunteers to Africa and a grand pledge to build more than 100 schools across the continent by 2009.

In other cases across the continent, Chinese development assistance has taken different forms. As part of its 2006 economic assistance package, China eliminated tariffs on 190 commodities from the continent's 25 LDCs, increasing the number to 440 a year later (Broadman 2008). In 2006, Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao announced a doubling to 4,000 in the number of scholarships for African students to study in China; that year, 3,737 African students were studying at Chinese higher learning institutes and universities, up from 2,757 the previous year.[58] By the end of 2009, 29,465 African students had received scholarships to study in China.[59]

Challenges of Sino-African Relations

It has not, however, been all smooth sailing for Sino-African relations. China's involvement in Africa has elicited strong criticism, not only from the West, but from Africa as well. Indeed, many in the West, and increasingly in Africa, have started questioning the motives behind China's extraordinary level of interest in the world's poorest region. In the West, Beijing has come under fire in recent years for its economic engagement with perceived repressive regimes in countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe.

China's military cooperation, particularly where African dictators are involved, has been under scrutiny over the past decade. China has traditionally focused its military cooperation on providing basic equipment, arms sales, and training programmes. Indeed, China was the continent's third-largest arms supplier, after Russia and Germany, from 2001 to 2004, supplying

nearly seven per cent of the continent's military purchases (Amosu, 2007). China reportedly sold 12 FC-1 fighter jets and 100 military vehicles to the Zimbabwean government in 2004.[60] Indeed, China has become one of the most important investors in Zimbabwe, following the exodus of Western multinationals in the mid-1990s when the government seized white-owned farms and distributed them to landless peasants and cronies of the regime. Chinese firms have bought a 70 per cent stake in the country's only electricity generation facilities, at Hwange and Kariba,[61] as well as stakes in the national railway. On the streets of Harare, Chinese investors and shopkeepers are prominently visible, competing with local vendors.

In the Horn of Africa, China stands accused of prolonging the violence and civil conflict that took place between Ethiopia and Eritrea during 1998 and 2000 when it sold US$1 billion worth of arms to both sides of the conflict.[62] In Sudan, where civil unrest has claimed the lives of an estimated 10,000 to 70,000 people in the region of Darfur since 2003, and left one million homeless,[63] China has been severely criticized for not pressuring the administration of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to put an end to the conflict. Moreover, in 1997, the United States imposed economic sanctions against al-Bashir's government, accusing it of sponsoring state terrorism and acting as a safe haven for Islamist terrorists, including Osama bin Laden. Yet China has threatened to veto any UN Security Council vote that proposed the use of military force or sanctions against Khartoum, relenting only slightly in 2006, following a backlash from the West and from African leaders who began to question China's sincerity and commitment to the continent's economic development and good governance initiatives. Meanwhile, China has become Sudan's largest arms supplier, providing arms, ammunition, helicopters, and antipersonnel mines that have been used both in Darfur and in the south of the country, where a 27-year conflict between Khartoum and the largely animist and Christian regions ended in 2005 (see Goodman 2004; Luard 2006).

Military cooperation and perceived diplomatic support for dictatorial regimes are not the only two spheres in which China has been criticized as far as its policy towards the continent is concerned. Controversy and public protests have been sparked in both Zambia and Namibia over the alleged poor working conditions and low pay of Chinese firms. Chinese companies have also been accused of selling very cheap and inferior consumer goods to the great disadvantage of local entrepreneurs. In Lesotho, for example, local street vendors attacked Chinese owned businesses in November 2007, throwing rocks and chanting anti-Chinese slogans, and accusing Chinese investors of colluding with the government to force them out of the city centre in the country's capital, Maseru. In 2010, there was public outrage

over the alleged shooting of 11 workers at the Collum Mine in Zambia by two Chinese managers, charges which were ultimately dropped without reason from the government.[64]

In December 2006, South African president Thabo Mbeki issued a stern warning to fellow African leaders not to allow China to become a neo-colonial power and pointed out that relations with Beijing should be built on common interests and lead to mutual benefits for both sides. This came in the wake of a national debate in South Africa on the need to protect the South African textile industry, which has been hit hard by the dumping of Chinese products, forcing the closure of many local textile and garment factories and businesses and the shedding of thousands of jobs (He 2007). That same year, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at restricting Chinese textile exports to South Africa.

Critics of Chinese economic relations with Africa point to the potential long-term negative impact of China's growing interest in the continent. They argue that Beijing's demand for oil and other raw materials inevitably helps to perpetuate Africa's reliance on such exports and impedes the growth of more labour-intensive industries such as agro-business and manufacturing. Critics also argue that Chinese development assistance is intimately tied to the expansion of Chinese multinational companies across the continent and to credits from the Chinese Export-Import Bank, which threatens to perpetuate the continent's vicious cycle of debt for decades to come.

Chinese leaders defend their policies in Africa and try to counter arguments that China's involvement with the continent has led to more harm than good. They repeatedly point out that Western policies and neoliberal economic formulas have not succeeded in alleviating Africa's poor economic growth, poverty, and inequality and that the Chinese model of development, sensitive to Africa's domestic needs, should be given a chance to work. With regard to arms sales to despots and autocratic regimes, China argues that these sales are helping African governments stem the various rebellions that wrack these fragile states, producing the stability that is important not only for China but also for other states whose investors and citizens work in Africa.

In a bid to improve its standing as a responsible economic partner, China recently initiated cooperation with Western institutions, and the World Bank on aid projects on the continent. In December 2007, for instance, Chinese diplomats met with Western donors in Kinshasa to coordinate. In the lead up to the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, China began to apply pressure on the government in Khartoum to bring about reduced violence in the Darfur region in Sudan, although it continued to oppose sanctions by the UN Security Council. China played a vital role in convincing Khartoum to allow a hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping force to be deployed in Darfur, and it sent

some 275 military engineers to the region. In southern Africa, in April 2008, China recalled one of its merchant ships that had been met by the refusal of South African dock workers to unload its military cargo, which had been destined for Zimbabwe.

Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate two key points with regard to China's engagement with Africa. First, China's activity is part of its continuing emergence as a truly global player, and as such is no different from what major powers traditionally have done. Second, in its global and regional diplomacy, China, again like all great powers, is pursuing multiple objectives, with inevitable tension between values and interests at both the national and global level. China can no more be expected to subordinate its commercial and strategic interests than Western powers have done.

Conclusion

Chinese and African government officials often point out that Chinese foreign and economic relations with the continent have been built on mutual respect dating back to the time of China's support for the African independence movement in the 1960s. Its history as a country once subjugated and invaded by the European powers has allowed China to promote itself as sensitive to African needs without carrying political baggage in terms of adherence to good governance and human rights or to prudent macroeconomic stabilization programmes – policies that the so-called 'Washington Consensus' has been championing in the developing world since the end of the Cold War.

Therefore, its no surprise that critics and champions of China's Africa policy have been waging a battle against each other in academic and policy making arenas on how best to evaluate Chinese economic expansion in Africa. Both camps agree, however, on one critical point: it is incumbent on African leaders and policy makers to ensure that Chinese trade and investment promote reciprocal and tangible benefits for the African population as well as economic stability and good governance.

Given China's momentous economic growth, its burgeoning middle class, and modernizing industries, African states have to opportunity to use their low-cost labour and abundant natural resources to export more non-traditional goods – such as processed commodities, food, light manufactured products, agro-processed items, and household consumer goods – competitively to Chinese consumers. To this end, a few large business enterprises from other African states have joined South African flagship corporations in showcasing Africa's entrepreneurship and ingenuity in the world's most populous state.

The ascendancy of China's engagement with Africa seems all but unstoppable. Whether it will prove a curse or a blessing for the continent is unclear, but at this point no region in the world is deriving as much benefit

as Africa from China's economic boom. African leaders view China's entry as a way to pull their continent along the path of globalization, which they have missed thus far. African states must seize the enormous opportunity that China's increased engagement with the continent presents and that their populations expect will help eradicate poverty and disease on the continent in the coming decades. Africa needs to manage and sell its mineral resources to China at competitive prices and to invest the proceeds in its own development – an avenue that offers bright prospects for the continent's ability to end its reliance on Western aid. At the end of the day, African leaders have a responsibility to ensure that all their people, whether in urban areas or remote villages, benefit from China's expanding trade with and economic assistance to the continent, while keeping in mind the history of Africa's engagement with external powers.

Notes

1. The author is grateful to Stacey Gomez for her discussions and assistance.
2. See http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704593604576140912411499184.html?mod=WSJ_hp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsTop
3. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8450434.stm
4. See http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9861591
5. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12848449 and http://www.chinapost.com.tw/business/asia-china/2011/03/24/295816/China-economy.htm
6. See http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-03/16/content_12178330.htm
7. See http://www.uschina.org/statistics/fdi_cumulative.html
8. See http://www.economist.com/node/18560525
9. The term 'non-aligned' was first used by Indian Prime Minister Jahawarlal Nehru in a 1954 speech in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The principles that would serve as the basis of the Non-Aligned Movement were: mutual nonaggression, mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, equality and mutual benefits, mutual non-interference in domestic affairs, and peaceful coexistence. The origin of the Non-Aligned Movement can be traced back to a conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, hosted by the leaders of the developing world, at which they declared their desire not to become involved in the East-West ideological confrontation of the Cold War.
10. See *History and Identify in the Construction of Africa's China Policy*, p. 86.
11. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7186918.stm
12. See *Statistical Review of World Energy 2010*.
13. Calculated from *Statistical Review of World Energy 2010* by dividing imports in crude oil for 2009 (thousand barrels daily) into total consumption.

14. See http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2010-01/14/content_9317926.htm and http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/20/china-energy-consumption_n_652921.html
15. See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/20/china-energy-consumption_n_652921.html
16. See http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aIdwB3BWURDI&refer=top_world_news
17. See http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH
18. See Alden 2007: 61.
19. See http://www.publishwhatyoupay.no/new-analysis-global-witness-oil-transparency-sudan and http://www.globalwitness.org/crudecalculationspress
20. See 'China, Nigeria sign oil supply pact', Xinhua News Agency. July 9, 2005.
21. See 'Africa: Western leaders monitor China-Africa summit', *The Nation* (Nairobi). May 17, 2007. Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200705161110.html.
22. See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5e46bc14-1e29-11dd-983a-000077b07658.html.
23. See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-bosshard/chinas-global-dam-builder_b_522127.html and http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/350
24. See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7a46f5d4-0013-11dd-825a-000077b07658.html#axzz1Kgqppb2x
25. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/11/unitednations.zimbabwe
26. See 'China and Zimbabwe sign technological cooperation agreement', *People's Daily*, July 15, 2003.
27. See 'China Updates', *Mines and Communities*, June 16, 2006, Available at: http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press1109.htm.
28. See 'China Zimbabwe friendship further strengthened: Ambassador', Xinhua New Agency, April 23, 2005.
29. See Harneit-Sievers, Marks and Naidu 2010: 183.
30. See http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2010-12/23/content_1771603_3.htm
31. See http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2010-12/23/content_1771603_3.htm
32. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12069624
33. See http://www.tralac.org/cause_data/images/1694/tralac_Africa-China2010.pdf
34. See http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2010-12/23/content_1771603_4.htm
35. See *World Investment Report 2010*, p. 35.
36. See http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-17/world/razia.khan.africa_1_trend-growth-economic-growth-commodity-prices?_s=PM:WORLD
37. See http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AEO11_OVERVIEW_CHAPTER1_FIG1_EN
38. See Trelac 2010.
39. See Trelac 2010.

40. The Cotonou Agreement was signed in June 2000 between the EU and a group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific states collectively known as the ACP countries. Since the First Lomé Convention in 1975, the EU has granted nonreciprocal trade preferences to these ACP states. Under the Cotonou Agreement, however, this system will be replaced by a new scheme, to take effect in 2008, known as the Economic Partnership Agreements. The new arrangement is expected to provide for reciprocal trade agreements, whereby not only will the EU provide duty-free access to its markets for ACP exports, but ACP countries will be expected to provide duty-free access to their own markets for EU exports.
41. AGOA, which became law in 2000, and AGOA II, ratified in 2002, substantially improves preferential access for US imports from beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries by expanding the list of products those countries may export to the United States duty free under the Generalized System of Preferences from 4,600 items to more than 6,400; the provisions are scheduled to remain in effect until September 30, 2015.
42. Tariff escalation occurs when low tariffs are charged on raw materials imported from the South, higher tariffs are charged on imports of partially processed goods, and much higher tariffs are charged on fully processed products.
43. It is important to note that estimates on the number of Chinese workers in Africa vary from 100,000 to 750,000. See http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=690 & See Chen (2005); and Reilly and Gill (2007). China has more than four million labourers working abroad at any time, mostly engaged in construction projects. South Africa is home to more than 100,000 Chinese workers, and sizable Chinese communities can be found in Nigeria, Algeria, Zimbabwe, Sudan, and elsewhere. The majority of long-term Chinese residents living in Africa are small merchants involved in the retail sector. The continent has also witnessed an influx of Chinese tourists over the past few years; in 2005, Africa welcomed 110,000 Chinese tourists, a 100 per cent increase over the previous year.
44. See http://africa.reuters.com/business/news/usnBAN732858.html.
45. See http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/04/china-sudan-dam.
46. See 'China and Zimbabwe sign technological cooperation agreement', *People's Daily*, July 15, 2003.
47. See 'Chinese demand coal guarantees', *Financial Gazette* (Harare), May 20, 2005.
48. See http://Africa.reuters.com/wire/news/usnL06885098.html.
49. See http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-04/21/content_1849913_5.htm
50. See http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-04/21/content_1849913_5.htm
51. See http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-02/01/content_798163.htm; and http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/yhjl/t404109.htm.
52. See http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-04/21/content_1849913_4.htm
53. See http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-04/21/content_1849913_5.htm
54. See http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-04/21/content_1849913_6.htm

55. Brautigam 2010: 350.
56. Brautigam 2009: 397.
57. See http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-01/22/content 6413076.htm.
58. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/17/content7264552.htm.
59. See http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/subject/minister/lanmua/201102/20110207420901.html
60. See Harneit-Sievers, Marks and Naidu 2010: 44.
61. See http://allafrica.com/stories/200506200960.html.
62. See http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/cb_005_021.pdf; and Eisenman and Kurlantzik (2006).
63. See Harneit-Sievers, Marks and Naidu 2010: 178.
64. See http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE7330I220110404.

References

Amosu, Akwe, 2007, 'China in Africa: It's (Still) the Governance, Stupid', *Foreign Policy in Focus*. Available at: http://www.fpif.org:80/fpiftxt/4068.

Baldauf, Scott, 2007, 'Hu's Trip to Sudan Tests China-Africa Ties', *Christian Science Monitor*, February 2. Available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0202/p06s01-woaf.html.

Blair, David, 2005, 'Oil-Hungry China Takes Sudan Under its Wing', *The Telegraph* (London), April 23, 2005.

Broadman, Harry, 2007, 'Africa's Silk Road: China and India's New Economic Frontier', Washington, DC: World Bank.

Broadman, Harry, 2008, 'China and India Go to Africa', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, no. 2 (2008): 95-109.

Brookes, Peter, and Ji Hye Shin, 2006, 'China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States', Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 1916. Available at: http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2006/02/Chinas-Influence-in-Africa-Implications-for-the-United-States.

Chen, Yi Ding, 2005, 'A Research on Economic Globalization and its Influences on Overseas Chinese Economy', *World Regional Studies*, Vol. 12, no. 3.

Corkin, Lucy, and Christopher Burke, 2006, 'China's Interest and Activity in Africa's Construction and Infrastructure Sectors', Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University, Centre for Chinese Studies. Available at: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/chinese-investmentafrica-full.pdf.

Downs, Erica, 2004, 'The Chinese Energy Security Debate', *China Quarterly*, 1777): 21-41.

Downs, Erica, 2007, 'The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations', *China Security*, Vol. 3, no. 3: 42-69.

Eisenman, Joshua, and Joshua Kurlantzik, 2006, 'China's Africa Strategy', *Current History*, Vol. 105, May: 219-24. Available at: http://www.afpc.org:80/china-africa.shtml.

Goodman, Peter, 2004, 'China Invests Heavily in Sudan's Oil Industry', *Washington Post*, December 23. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21143-2004Dec22.html.

Green, Mathew, 2008, 'China offers Nigeria $50 Billion Credit', *Financial Times*, April 1.

He, Wenping, 2006, 'China-Africa Relations Moving Into an Era of Rapid Development', *Inside Africa*, Institute of South Africa. October/December: pp. 3-6.

He Winping, 2007, 'The Balancing Act of China's Africa Policy', *China Security,* Vol. 3, no. 3: 23-40.

Horta, Loro, 2008, 'Guinea-Bissau: China Sees a Risk Worth Taking', *Africa Policy Forum*.

Hu, Yuanyuan, 2008, 'South Africa to Invest More in China', *China Daily*, March 20. Available at: http://cms.cass.cn/show_News_e.asp?id=23349.

Jenkins, Rhys, and Chris Edwards, 2005, 'The Effect of China and India's Growth and Trade Liberalisation on Poverty in Africa', Department for International Development.

Kadzere, Martin, 2008, 'Zimbabwe: Zisco Awards Chinese Firm US$9.5m Contract', *The Herald* (Harare), January 28. Available at: http://72.3.244.61/stories/200801281058.html

Kaplinsky, Raphael, Dorothy McCormick, and Mike Morris, 2006, 'The Impact of China on Sub Saharan Africa', Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex.

Lee, Don, 2004, 'China Barrels Ahead in Oil Market', *Los Angeles Times*, November 14.

Lennon, J., 2004, 'Overview of Chinese Commodities', Mimeo.

Linebaugh, Kate, and Shai Oster, 2006, 'CNOOC Pays $2.27 Billion for Nigerian Oil Gas Stake', *Wall Street Journal*, January 10.

Luard, Tim, 2006, 'Buyers Line Up for China's Arms', BBC News, June 16. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5086416.stm.

Luft, Gal, 2004, 'Fueling the Dragon: China's Race into the Oil Market', *Institute for the Analysis of Global Security Review*.

McLaughlin, Abraham, 2005, 'A Rising China Counters U.S. Clout in Africa', *Christian Science Monitor,* March 30.

Medeiros, Evan, 2006, 'Chinese Foreign Policy: The Africa Dimension', Paper presented at the FLAD-IPRI Conference on Strategy and Security in Southern Africa, Lisbon, Portugal, October 12-13.

Menen, Rajendar, 2008, 'Withering the Storm', *Gulf News*, April 27. Available at: http://archive.gulfnews.com/supplements/southafrica2008/main_story/10208675.html.

Monfort, Joe, 2008, 'Oil Consumption Continues Slow Growth', WorldWatch Institute.

Reilly, James, and Bates, Gill, 2007, 'The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa', *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 30, no.3: 37-52.

Sandrey, R., 2006, 'The African Trading Relationship with China', Cape Town: Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa, 2006.
Statistics Canada, 2008, World Trade Analyzer, Ottawa: International Trade Division, Statistics Canada.
Thomson, James, 2008, 'Sovereign Risk Realised', *Business Spectator*, March 13. Available at:
http://www.businessspectator.com.au:80/bs.nsf/Article/Sovereign-risk-realised-CP3NH?OpenDocument.
United Nations, 2006, *Commodity Trade Statistics Database*, New York: United Nations.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2006, *World Investment Report 2006*, Geneva: UNCTAD.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2007, *Handbook of Statistics 2006-2007*, Geneva: UNCTAD.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *World Investment Report 2007*, Geneva: UNCTAD.
United Nations Development Programme, 2007, *Asian Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Towards a New Era of Cooperation among Developing Nations*, New York: United Nations.
United States Central Intelligence Agency, 2008, 'The 2008 CIA World Factbook',
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.
United States Department of Energy, 2005, *Country Analysis Brief: China*, Washington, DC: Energy Information Agency.
United States Department of Energy, 2007, *International Energy Outlook 2007*, Washington, DC: Energy Information Administration.
Wang, Jian-Ye, 2007, 'What Drives China's Growing Role in Africa?', IMF Working Paper WP/07/211, Wahington, DC: International Monetary Fund. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07211.pdf.
York, Geoffrey, 2006, 'China, Africa Forging Closer Ties', *Globe and Mail*, November 10.

Africa Development, Vol. XXXVIII, Nos 1&2, 2013, pp. 107–132

(ISSN 0850-3907)

An Overview of a Regionalist Approach to Tobacco Control in Africa

Edward Brenya*

Abstract

The tobacco control network has been finding ways to prevent a tobacco epidemic in developing countries through the adoption of tobacco control laws. However, their efforts are obstructed by the tobacco companies. Using transnationalism and transnational advocacy network theories, the study examines new strategies adopted by the tobacco control network to obstruct the activities of the tobacco industry network in the African region. The study finds that the tobacco control network is adopting a *continental/regional* approach whereby common tobacco control ideas/strategies are shared with actors from different countries at the same venue to promote compliance with the tobacco prohibition regime. The network is creating and funding regional organizations, which are used to promote a common tobacco control campaign. The study concludes that the promotion of a common tobacco control strategy/message through the *regional* approach may help curtail or proscribe the activities of the tobacco industry in the African region and possibly other regions of the developing world. This is because the strategy used by the tobacco companies to spread their products in the developing countries is similar. The *regional* approach will also ensure that the meagre resources can be spread to promote tobacco control in many parts of the developing world.

Résumé

Le réseau de lutte antitabac a trouvé des moyens de prévention d'une épidémie de tabagisme dans les pays en voie développement, à travers l'adoption de lois sur la lutte contre le tabac. Cependant, leurs efforts sont entravés par les entreprises de tabac. Utilisant les théories du transnationalisme et du réseau d'activistes transnationaux, cette étude examine les nouvelles stratégies adoptées par le réseau de lutte contre le tabac pour entraver les activités du réseau de l'industrie du tabac dans la région africaine. L'étude conclut que le réseau de lutte contre le tabac adopte une approche *continentale/ régionale* par laquelle les idées/stratégies communes de lutte antitabac sont partagées avec les acteurs

* Development Cooperation at the North-South Institute (NSI), Ottawa, Canada. Email: ebrenya@gmail.com

de différents pays au même endroit pour promouvoir la conformité avec le régime de prohibition du tabac. Le réseau est en train de créer et de financer des organisations régionales, qui sont utilisées pour faire une campagne commune de lutte contre le tabagisme. L'étude conclut que la promotion d'une stratégie/ d'un message commun (e) de lutte contre le tabac à travers l'approche *régionale* peut aider à réduire ou proscrire les activités de l'industrie du tabac dans les pays africains et éventuellement dans d'autres pays en voie de développement. C'est parce que la stratégie utilisée par les entreprises de tabac pour répandre leurs produits dans les pays en voie de développement est similaire. L'approche *régionale* veillera également à ce que les maigres ressources puissent être réparties afin de promouvoir la lutte antitabac dans de nombreux pays en voie de développement.

Introduction

The effort to prevent a tobacco epidemic has led to the adoption of a global treaty on tobacco control in the form of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2005. Proponents of the first ever global treaty on public health posit that the signing, ratification and adoption of the FCTC provisions as domestic law are essential to control a tobacco epidemic. Some studies have been done on the activities to transfer best practices of tobacco control to developing countries (CDC 1999; Laugesen 2000). The best practices are tobacco control ideas implemented and found to be effective in other countries. Other studies have examined the activities of individual NGOs or IGOs or collaboration between NGOs, IGOs and/or groups of tobacco control actors to promote the adoption of tobacco instrument in a specific jurisdiction (Asare 2009; Farquharson 2003; Studlar 2002).

Using the transnationalism and the transnational advocacy network theories, this article examines the collaboration between IGOs and NGOs to use a regional/continental approach to promote tobacco control in a group of countries. Specifically, this paper examines the collaborative effort to prohibit the production, manufacture, and consumption of tobacco products in the African continent. The article is an outcome of interviews of 20 officials comprising tobacco control experts, NGOs and IGOs in the African region and in the USA, which was conducted between March 2010 and July 2011 based on a questionnaire approved by the Institutional Review Board of West Virginia University. The interviews were mostly conducted through telephone and emails. There were emails follow-ups in instances where telephone was the primary means for conducting the interview. This enabled some participants to send some relevant information as attachments after the initial interviews. The interviewees are de-identified to comply with the confidentiality promised in the letter approved by the Institutional Review Board.

A triangulation approach that combines data gathered from reviews of existing materials on tobacco control from documentary sources, legal documents, policies, laws and conventions on tobacco control in Africa with that of the interviews is used to analyse and present the findings as means of contributing to public policy and political science literature. In using the transnationalism and the transnational advocacy network theories, the issues the study seeks to address are three fold: (i) how the tobacco control network is promoting the implementation of the FCTC as a prohibition regime; (ii) why the network considers a regional/continental approach to tobacco control as the best strategy to neutralize the activities of the tobacco industry network in the African region; and (iii) the relevance of the regional approach for tobacco control in other parts of the developing world.

History of Tobacco Production and Consumption in Africa

The cultivation of tobacco in the African region dates back to the pre-colonial and colonial period when western settlers/colonial masters introduced certain cash crops such as tea, cocoa, coffee, cotton, cashew nuts, and tobacco, etc., to meet their demand. However, commercial tobacco growing continued after the colonial period to either feed the local tobacco manufacturing plants established during/after the colonial period or as major export communities. Tobacco grown for export and raw materials is often grown on a large scale using mechanization and chemicals. The tobacco leaves are cured before they are exported or sold to local manufacturing companies to manufacture cigarettes. Sometimes, the tobacco is consumed locally by the peasant farmers.

Tobacco, a green leafy plant often grown in warmer climates is either smoked (as cigarette, cigar or pipe), sniffed through the nose (as snuff), or chewed (as smokeless tobacco or chewing tobacco). The consumer of tobacco often feels energized and the body tends to demand for more to keep the energy high. The stimulating effect of tobacco has different uses for different groups and societies – an effective means to relax the nerve, temporary means of generating happiness to address anxiety and psychological trauma, or as means of suppressing hunger. Some religious organizations also believe that the leaf has power that takes you to a supernatural world through meditation. The tobacco leaf is also considered medicinal for the treatment of certain diseases such as toothache or for causing witches to confess their diabolical activities to the public (Personal Communication, 2010). These economic, cultural and religious beliefs have caused the cultivation, sales and consumption to continue even after the end of the colonial rule in spite of the negative cultural and religious perceptions associated with the growing and consumption of tobacco products.

Tobacco Control Efforts in Africa

The effort to control tobacco has been an ongoing practice in Africa since the product was introduced during the pre-colonial and colonial periods. However, the tobacco control attempt has always met resistance from tobacco growers, workers and the manufacturing companies. Different ways have been adopted to treat tobacco smokers and consumers as deviant and isolate them on cultural and religious grounds. Culturally, tobacco smoking or consumption is perceived as an alien behaviour to the practices of many societies of Africa and consumers have been looked down upon and disrespected. The story is not different among the Christians and Muslims who consider smoking and chewing of tobacco against their religious beliefs and practices. Therefore, tobacco consumers have been isolated from society for cultural and religious reasons for a long time. In accordance with the cultural and religious beliefs, governments often impose higher taxes on tobacco products to discourage the consumption of the product in many countries. However, cigarette smokers have reacted by associating smoking with the movement from primitiveness to modernity and affluence as means of offering a different image to smoking. The smokers associate smoking pipes, local cigars and/or chewing tobacco with primitiveness, etc. As a result, smoking is prevalent mostly in cities and urban areas in many African countries where people feel they are away from their relatives and the heavy influence of culture often experienced in the rural areas. In an economic culture where the colonial state and its successors were supportive of manufactured imported goods, the cigarette smokers have emerged victorious in the clash between the locally produced tobacco and the imported manufactured tobacco, and tobacco smoking has been on the ascendancy.

However, since the tobacco issue was internationalized in the 1990s, tobacco control has become a widespread measure adopted in different forms by almost every country (Cairney et al. 2012). It should be noted that while the initial effort at controlling tobacco was due to cultural and religious beliefs and practices, the latest attempts to control the growing, sales and consumption of tobacco products are motivated by economic, health and environmental concerns. The relocation of the activities of the tobacco companies to the developing countries in the 1970s and the experience with the tobacco epidemic in the developed world led to a prediction of a similar epidemic in developing countries (Jha and Chaloupka 1999). However, the active role of the transnational tobacco network in transferring tobacco control ideas has generated a different policy pattern for developing countries, which may be inconsistent with the initial expectation (Lopez et al. 1994). Recent evidence shows that almost every country around the globe

has some tobacco control programmes but the developed countries have more programmes than the developing countries (Mamudu and Studlar, 2009).

The role of the transnational network in transferring tobacco control ideas on the African continent (as against using locally developed measures) became essential because of the involvement of the multinational tobacco corporations to promote tobacco activities in the region. Multinational corporations such as the British American Tobacco (BAT) and Philip Morris have formed an alliance with the governments of some countries to exploit tobacco farmers and distributors. As a result, the governments often fail to adopt restrictive tobacco control laws because of their interest in tax revenue from tobacco activities. In addition, the multinational tobacco companies often use their political influence to block the adoption of tobacco control laws considered detrimental to their activities, in spite of the scientific evidence that tobacco is dangerous to public health.

The tobacco control network believes that it can draw on tobacco control initiatives successfully applied in many western countries to achieve the same result in the African region because of the similarities of the activities of the tobacco companies globally (Asare 2009). Historically, tobacco control gained impetus after the official recognition of the harmful effect of tobacco by the reports of the Royal College of Physicians and that of the US Surgeon General released in the 1960s (Asare 2007). The two reports and recent scholarly research confirming the harm caused by tobacco strengthened the tobacco campaign and the sharing of tobacco control ideas in the developed countries. Subsequently, the campaign has been extended to the developing countries by a transnational tobacco network from the 1970s in response to the increased activities of the tobacco companies in the region. The campaign of the transnational network is aimed at neutralizing the political influence of the tobacco industry network on policy making in developing countries (Cairney et al. 2012).

The tobacco control network promotes tobacco control ideas in a manner reminiscent of a prohibition regime to encourage compliance with the FCTC protocol, which is recognized as measures to prohibit the hazards associated with the production and consumption of tobacco products. A prohibition regime is characterized by the establishment of international institutions and conventions that serve as a coordinating body for the enforcement of the norms of the regime (Nadelmann 1990: 485). The FCTC measures are considered as an international norm for controlling the tobacco epidemic (Mamudu 2005). Therefore, a network of NGOs, IGOs and experts is collaboratively promoting the adoption of the measures as

tobacco control policies in individual countries of the developing world to prevent the negative social, environmental and public health problems associated with tobacco. The actors within the network share a similar commitment to stop the spread of tobacco related health hazards globally (Nathanson 1999). Often, the actors use the Conference of Parties of the FCTC and that of the World Health Organization, the World Conference on Tobacco or Health (WCTOH) as well as GlobaLink (an online forum) as venues to share tobacco control ideas and also to promote the norms of the global tobacco prohibition regime (Mamudu 2005).

However, the activities of the tobacco control network are often countered by the tobacco industry network made up of the tobacco farmers, manufacturing and distributing companies, and their affiliates. The tobacco industry network has substantial resources, which are often translated into political power to influence policy regarding tobacco control in their favour (Brenya 2012c). The industry network usually tries to prevent the adoption of effective tobacco control laws in countries in which its members operate, and enter into voluntary agreements with certain governments to adopt less effective policies as tobacco control instruments instead. The voluntary agreements are measures to control the production, manufacturing, and distribution of tobacco agreed to by the tobacco farmers, manufacturing and distributing companies as accepted instruments for controlling tobacco. The voluntary agreements are not usually legislated by the National Assembly and so often lack legal backing. Therefore, their adoption enables the tobacco farmers and companies to undertake their activities but simultaneously spread the hazards associated with tobacco.

Consequently, the transnational tobacco control network has been promoting ideas to neutralize the political influence of the tobacco industry network and motivate the adoption of stricter tobacco control laws in individual countries. The network uses public awareness around the hazards of tobacco to promote tobacco control in a bottom-up approach in the developing countries (Cairney et al. 2012). For instance, tobacco control interest groups and organizations spread ideas regarding the harm of tobacco and the possible benefits of adopting tobacco control laws. The members of the network from the developed world offer funding and promote skills necessary to influence the outcome of tobacco control in a specific country by using legislative testimonies and legal suits against the government and tobacco manufacturing and distributing companies (Brenya 2012c). The companies are often the target of legal suits because they fund the activities of the tobacco farmers.

The transnational tobacco control network was initially under the umbrella of International Union against Cancer (UICC) and the International Liaison Committee on Smoking Control (ILCSC) in the 1970s and 1980s (Leonard Zahn & Associates 1981). However, the scope has expanded and is currently spearheaded by the American Cancer Society, which advocates the adoption of tobacco control policies, especially in the developing countries (*Observer* 1985). The provision of scientific evidence on the harm of tobacco smoke to non-smokers in the 1990s broadened the campaign of the tobacco control network and also attracted other groups (Nathanson 1999; CDC 1999). Subsequently, health organizations and groups that were already in existence have also incorporated tobacco control as part of their activities to protect public health. In recent times, western donors such as Mayor Michael Bloomberg of New York City, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation have emerged as major financiers of the tobacco control network to promote tobacco control in developing countries (Cairney et al. 2012).

The NGOs of the two donors currently provide funding for the activities of the tobacco free initiative, an umbrella body of the FCTC that oversees the implementation of the FCTC protocol (Personal communication 2011). Currently, the members of the tobacco control network are made up of international and domestic NGOs, IGOs, governmental officials, individual researchers, scientific research groups, and media practitioners who share a common passion of controlling tobacco globally. The members are bonded by their core values to prohibit the production, manufacture and consumption of tobacco products in developing countries because of the health hazards and negative economic and environmental factors associated with tobacco (Farquharson 2003). Tobacco contains several thousand chemicals, one of which is the highly addictive chemical, nicotine. Once nicotine gets into the body through the consumption of tobacco, it stimulates the nervous system, causes the heart to beat faster, and raises the blood pressure. The addictive nature of tobacco is why it has been officially identified as a drug. Recent research has shown that children working on tobacco farms can also be exposed to high levels of nicotine in a manner similar to the chewing, sniffing or smoking of cigarette (Plan 2009). Often, the children working on the farm do not wash their hands or bath after picking the tobacco leaves before eating and so indirectly consume the nicotine on their hands.

Research shows that close to one hundred of the several thousand chemical compounds contained in tobacco smoke are cancer-causing agents or toxic that can cause diseases such as emphysema, bronchitis, and lung cancer (Ali 2012). The chemicals have also been found to be a major cause of the high incidence of cardiac diseases, which makes tobacco an ex-

tremely injurious substance to the health of both smokers and non-smokers. The diseases associated with tobacco have also been identified as a major cause of death in many developed countries and it is estimated that over 350 million tobacco-related deaths resulting from similar diseases will occur in developing countries if action is not taken to prevent such an epidemic (WHO 2008; Lopez et al. 1994).

Tobacco farming is also considered as a major source of poverty for farmers in developing countries because the workers are often paid a meagre income and many of the products are often destroyed when there is a fall in the international tobacco market prices (WHO 2008). Tobacco production also deprives the farmers of the viable land to grow food crops and so the tobacco farmers use their small income to buy food from the market, which results in poverty and hunger. Tobacco growing has also been identified as the major cause of environmental degradation because of the deforestation caused by cutting down trees to grow tobacco and the wood used for curing the tobacco leaf, a process that requires the burning of much fire wood. The wood is used for building curing huts, which is often replaced every one to two years (Madeley 1993). It is estimated that three acres of wood are used to cure one acre of tobacco leaf in some countries. These negative economic, health and environmental concerns have rallied the members of the tobacco control network and their activities are well coordinated. The network promotes the sharing of ideas and also galvanizes support for the tobacco campaign and its other activities through informal and formal means. The members are known to promote specific tobacco control instrument(s) that they consider relevant to solving the tobacco issue. The members also share relevant ideas on innovative ways to control tobacco production and consumption through joint research projects and sometimes by serving on an advisory or expert panel (Farquharson 2003).

The network members believe that collaborative actions involving individuals, communities, countries, regional, and international organizations are effective means to promote tobacco control programmes. Therefore, they collaborate with local tobacco control NGOs and groups and use them to put pressure on policymakers to adopt tobacco control laws to protect public health. Consequently, many domestic NGOs and interest groups who actively promote tobacco control ideas have emerged to champion the adoption of policies to protect citizens from the harm of tobacco through tobacco farming, consumption, or the exposure to tobacco smoke. The domestic tobacco control groups engage all stakeholders in policymaking, including traditional institutions and religious groups who are equally influential in the policymaking process to promote the adoption of relevant to-

bacco control laws (Personal communication 2011; Brenya and Asare 2011). The interest groups educate the traditional and religious authorities and other policy players on the hazards of tobacco to win their support for tobacco control programmes.

Transnationalism and Transnational Advocacy Network

Mamudu (2005: 44), and Keohane and Nye (1972) define transnationalism as the process whereby governmental and non-governmental actors move tangible and intangible items across the boundaries of countries. Usually, the items moved across state borders include money, information, physical objects, people, and other tangible and intangible items (Mamudu 2005: 44; Keohane and Nye 1972). Keck and Sikkink (1998: 2) define a transnational advocacy network as a group of actors bonded by their shared values and common discourse, who use the global exchange of dense information and services on the issue to achieve their common objective. The network members are bonded by the belief that tobacco has a negative economic, social and health hazard that needs to be addressed urgently. This strong shared belief and the prolonged interactions aimed at swaying policy in their favour bind them together (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999).

The advocacy network uses the dissemination of relevant information on tobacco control to promote reform of institutions and the manner of interactions within the international community, which makes them indispensable in the politics of tobacco control in the global scene. The network is further strengthened by the high level of uncertainty of the tobacco issue and the urgent demand for addressing it (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Haas 1992). Keck and Sikkink (1998: 9) identify core actors of the network as (i) international and domestic non-governmental research and advocacy organizations; (ii) local social movements; (iii) foundations; (iv) the media; (v) churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, and intellectuals; (vi) parts of regional and international intergovernmental organizations; and (vii) parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of governments. They note that some NGOs offer training services and provide funds to others within the network. The advocacy network also puts pressure on their target actors as means of promoting the adoption of norms as public policies. For instance, Asare (2009) shows that some anti-tobacco groups collaborated with IGOs and NGOs such as the WHO, WCTOH, World Heart Federation, and the International Union against Cancer to promote the adoption of tobacco control ideas as domestic law in South Africa.

Transnationalism, Transnational Advocacy Network and Tobacco Control

The transnational tobacco control network is characterized by a high level of interconnectedness and interchanges among different actors who promote tobacco control globally. The NGOs and IGOs often translate the vital resources they control into political power and use it to promote major tobacco control policy changes (Piper and Uhlin 2004). They use the political power to persuade and change the behaviour of other actors who may not have active interest in the tobacco issue. In spite of their interconnectedness, the members have some differences, which sometimes affect the nature of policies they promote for addressing the tobacco issue in a specific jurisdiction. For instance, some members of the tobacco control network consider the tobacco issue as local and therefore seek local, culturally sensitive policies to address it. However, others consider the issue as global and push for the adoption of global scientific policies for addressing it (Diani 2000). Irrespective of how the issue is perceived, the policy outcome is often influenced by the interplay of domestic societal forces and the transnational dynamics because of the activities of the multinational tobacco companies and the global nature of the tobacco issue (Cairney et al. 2012).

The tobacco control network helps to resist the distribution and use of a substance considered detrimental to the health of the poor and voiceless by fighting for their rights and interest in the global politics of tobacco control. The concern for protecting the wellbeing of the voiceless motivates the members from the developed countries to offer funding, technical assistance and skills to promote the adoption of appropriate domestic tobacco laws. Therefore, the network act as a channel through which tobacco control policies diffuse to developing countries, which enable them to partake in the administration of global tobacco control (Cairney et al. 2012).

On the other hand, the tobacco industry network is also influential in the politics of tobacco control and it promotes the interest of the tobacco industry. The tobacco industry network resists the activities that seek to end the operations of the tobacco companies, farmers, and businesses in the developing countries (BAT 1980). The members of the tobacco industry network comprise tobacco manufacturing companies such as British American Tobacco and Phillip Morris, domestic tobacco manufacturing and leaf buying companies, international and local tobacco growers associations, farmers, businesses, distributors, researchers, individuals, advertising and hospitality industries (Verkerk & INFOTAB 1985). The network actively supports its members to organize and effectively obstruct tobacco control activities in developing countries through the wealth of the tobacco companies. The net-

work translates its wealth into political power and uses it to organize and adopt effective resistance measures against the adoption of policies that will hamper the successful operation of its members in a specific area.

The tobacco companies often use monetary and employment incentives to win the support of influential policy makers or to penetrate and obstruct or sometimes forestall the ability of tobacco control groups to push for the adoption of domestic tobacco laws in certain jurisdictions (WHO 2008). This wealth also enables the tobacco companies to hire people to conduct research and present reports favourable to the interest of the industry as well as use media propaganda to protect their interest in their operating areas (Mamudu and Glantz 2009; World Bank 1999; Jha and Chaloupka 1999). The network is able to alert its members of unfavourable policies adopted somewhere and motivate them to resist the adoption of similar policies in their areas. Generally, the role performed by the industry network across developing countries includes undermining tobacco control programmes and policies, expanding and consolidating new markets, as well as promoting the cultivation of tobacco leaf and the use of tobacco products (Personal communication 2011).

In spite of this, the transnational tobacco control network still promotes tobacco control based on the belief that they can mobilize norms in different arenas to exert pressure on their targeted actors elsewhere (Trubek et al. 2000). The tobacco control network takes advantage of an increased interdependence, improvement in communication technology, and the desire to cooperate to achieve mutual interest to halt the harm associated with tobacco (Slaughter 2004). Often, the network helps to link tobacco control groups in the south and north to influence policies and actions of individual countries (Hudson 2001). The collaboration between the network members across the globe enables them to move items such as money, information, and people, etc., across boundaries of countries to prevent a tobacco epidemic.

Structure and Operations of Actors

The power structure of the transnational tobacco control advocacy network is not clearly defined because the network members are loosely connected by their common interest and shared belief controlling a possible tobacco epidemic. The members of the network are prepared to incur considerable costs to achieve goals they care about deeply and they use persuasion to influence decision making and also to effect behavioural changes in multiple political arenas (Keck and Sikkink 1998). However, there is no formal mechanism for enforcing the obligations of the members within the network, which makes it difficult to establish a group with total control over the activities of the network (Jordan and Tuijl 2000).

In spite of that, the transnational tobacco control network uses global campaigns that focus on the dissemination of relevant information and transfer of expertise to confront the status quo (Trubek et al. 2000). The members engage in research and the analysis of policies and activities of the tobacco companies and individual countries, which are used to channel relevant information to influence the actions of their target actors. The network also uses awareness-raising, education, lobbying, capacity building, and occasionally, direct action to promote its objectives (Hudson 2001). The transnational advocacy enables it to strategically mobilize relevant information to 'persuade, pressurize, and gain leverage over more powerful organizations and governments' (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 89). The network shapes the structure of policy debate and policy outcome towards its interest in certain jurisdictions through its activities.

The members are convinced that acting in unison to promote the adoption of tobacco control policies in the developing world will leave no place for the tobacco companies to hide. Therefore, they frame their issue to match the correct institutional venue where they can gain an audience to support tobacco control. Additionally, the actors use their access to relevant tobacco control information and ideas to influence the content of tobacco control policies of individual countries. The network also influences the public agenda by creatively reframing old problems and seeking hospitable venues to change the way the target groups understand their interests on the issue. For instance, tobacco control advocates in the US and Canada increased their impact in their campaign by framing the tobacco issues as protecting the right of the non-smokers in the 1990s (Studlar 2002). The framing of the tobacco issue as one regarding second hand or passive smoking changed the focus of the tobacco control campaign from protecting the rights of the smoker to that of protecting the right of a third party who has not consented to consume tobacco but is affected by the actions of the smokers. It also brought to bear the need to protect the rights of non-smokers such as children who are forced to inhale the tobacco toxic because of the unhealthy choices of adults around them (Asare 2007). Similarly, the actors have framed the tobacco issue as poverty and public health to galvanize support for tobacco control in the African region.

Keck and Sikkink (1998) identify four main strategies used by the network to influence the behaviour of their target actors as information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics. The network through information politics transmits politically relevant information quickly and credibly to venues where it will have the most impact. Symbolic politics occurs when the actors use symbols, actions and emotional stories to present

problems of people in faraway areas to draw attention to their issue. In leverage politics, the network uses powerful actors to champion issues in areas where weaker actors may lack the needed influence. Lastly, the network through accountability politics puts pressure on more powerful governmental actors to comply with agreements they have previously sanctioned.

Prohibition Regime in Tobacco Control

The tobacco control regime is influenced by the structure, rules, agents/actors and their impact on the actions of target actors within the regime. Trubek et al. (2000: 1194) define 'a regime as a set of institutions in international space that establishes and reinforces norms or rules of the game for public and private actors'. The tobacco control regime uses laws and norms from the local, national, and international arenas to influence policy outcomes in different countries (Farquharson 2003). The campaigns are mostly influenced by the belief that effective regulatory systems can be created through the mobilization of overlapping jurisdictions and the continued operation of network actors across the borders of individual countries. The tobacco control network promotes the tobacco control prohibition regime – a set of institutions that have emerged globally to reinforce the adoption of the WHO-FCTC measures – as appropriate tobacco control laws at the national level. The members of the network use information dissemination and campaigns, which highlight the FCTC measures as an important international norm to achieve their objectives.

The tobacco regime concentrates on developing countries where the multinational tobacco companies have shifted their attention in recent times despite of the global nature of its activities (WHO 2008). The network operates on the assumption that socially constructed ideas elevated as the core beliefs and practices within a certain structure can influence the adoption of those ideas as policy (See Figure 1). Therefore, they have elevated their shared belief regarding prohibiting the growing of tobacco leaf, sales and consumption of tobacco products because of its harm to public health as the FCTC protocol. Currently, the FCTC is serving as a structure for promoting the adoption of global tobacco control measures as domestic tobacco laws to proscribe the cultivation and consumption of tobacco products globally.

The tobacco control network actors – especially those from developed countries – put social pressure on all countries to acknowledge and enforce the norms of the FCTC, which serves as an umbrella body that coordinates the transnational activities of the network. The actors are seeking to make the FCTC measures a subject of criminal law that will help to restrict the

cultivation and consumption of tobacco globally. The actors engage the developing countries based on the belief that many of the countries are weak and are unable to or do not have the political will to crack down on the violators of the FCTC measures, which is considered an international global norm.

Figure 1: Structure of Transnational Tobacco Control



Source: (Brenya 2012b)

The actors also contact deviant countries such as Malawi and Zimbabwe that have refused to sign and ratify the FCTC protocol because of the dependence of their economies on tobacco sales to offer incentives that will influence them to diversify their economies. These countries have not signed or ratified the FCTC protocol because tobacco production contributes a high percentage of their GDP and they lack alternative major export crop or mineral resource to supplement the contribution to the GDP. Therefore, the signing and ratification of the FCTC protocol will be detrimental to their economies. Many countries in the developing world have mineral resources or other crops such as cocoa, tea, coffee, cashew nuts, cotton, etc., to supplement their main export commodity. The regime believes that once the countries obtain other sources of economic activities and employment that contribute to their GDP, they will be willing to become parties to the FCTC and also adopt tobacco control instruments. In addition, the network also

contacts other countries that have signed and ratified the FCTC protocol, but have not adopted stricter tobacco control laws, to encourage them to do so.

Transnational Tobacco Control Network and Global Tobacco Prohibition Regime

The FCTC is now a well-established prohibition regime. Its establishment finalizes the creation of the global tobacco prohibition regime because the FCTC requires all member countries to translate its provisions into national laws that are effectively implemented (Brenya 2012b). The FCTC places specific regulations on members in a way similar to 'hard law' (Studlar 2002). Moreover, the member countries are obligated by the guidelines set by the Conference of Parties and the FCTC ratification and implementation processes to adopt tobacco control laws and also meet specifics tobacco control requirements. The adoption of tobacco control laws is meant to institute punitive measures and sanctions that will deter the cultivation, sales and consumption of tobacco products. In Africa, the transmission of the tobacco control ideas is used to shape the behaviour of the countries to ensure that they implement effective tobacco control laws to regulate the activities of the tobacco industry (Cairney et al. 2012). In that regard, the WHO Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI) plays a crucial role in achieving this objective. The Tobacco Free Initiative promotes the development of national tobacco control policies and programmes, champions a tobacco free environment, and serves as a clearinghouse for scientific information on tobacco use (WHO-FCTC 2009).

The Africa regional office of the WHO, the TFI, and its country representatives offer advice and technical knowledge for adopting effective tobacco control laws. The TFI also educates the public of the dangers of tobacco consumption to promote the adoption of the FCTC measures. For instance, the celebration of the Annual No Tobacco Day highlights the harm associated with tobacco to curtail the cultivation and consumption of the product. The event is very popular in the developing countries (Cairney et al. 2012). Other IGOs such as the World Bank, United Nations, and the Commonwealth also play key roles to enforce the tobacco control prohibition regime. The World Bank currently prohibits the use of its agricultural loan for growing tobacco in order to promote the economics of tobacco control (Asare 2007). In addition, an Ad Hoc Interagency Task Force on Tobacco was created by the UN in 1999 as a focal point on Tobacco Control (Mamudu and Glantz 2009). The task force helps to familiarize developing countries with the fundamentals of the scientific evidence and arguments associated

with tobacco use and control (Shafey et al. 2009). Consequently, many African countries have increased their interest in tobacco control, especially in the areas of health education, using warning labels and the annual no tobacco day celebrations to create awareness of the health hazards of tobacco (Personal communication 2011).

Other means through which developing countries experience the enforcement of the tobacco control prohibition regime are bilateral and multilateral relations, which serve as sources of learning and channel for diffusing tobacco control ideas. Cairney et al., (2012: 13) indicate that the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has since 1999 collaborated with the WHO and other IGOs and NGOs in Canada, UK, and US to launch the global tobacco surveillance system (GTSS) to systematize tobacco use and control data. Under the initiative, the global youth tobacco surveys (GYTS) were conducted in 162 countries between 1999 and 2008 for all the six regions of the WHO. In addition, a total of 165 tobacco control research projects funded by organizations and institutions based in the developed countries have been undertaken in several countries of the six regions (Warren et al. 2009; Mackay et al. 2006). The activities of the tobacco control network have generated a lot of tobacco control research in developing countries in recent decade and this has given policy makers easy access to local evidence on tobacco use and control. They have also made public health a major concern for policymaking.

In addition, donor organizations and NGOs from the developed countries have been collaborating with the WHO and some organizations to promote tobacco control ideas in many developing countries (Becker 2010). These organizations propagate three main ideas: (i) the shift of tobacco related health hazards and deaths to the developing countries; (ii) socio-economic costs of tobacco use; and (iii) the tobacco industry target of developing countries, to influence their behaviour (Cairney et al. 2012). The transnational tobacco control network is strategically promoting a shift of the focus of policy making on tobacco from political-economic to public health concerns in the developing world (Barnum 1994; Panos Institute 1994; Mamudu and Glantz 2009).

Findings

Tobacco Control in the African Region

The economic contributions from the cultivation and sales of tobacco products in tobacco producing economies are well known. Tobacco growing and sales provide jobs and income for farmers and other workers. Many governments also obtain tax revenues and foreign earnings from the export

and foreign investments in some cases. However, the jobs and income come at a cost to the countries and the risk factors are high. For instance, major non-communicable diseases such as heart attacks, strokes, cancers, diabetes, asthma, and other chronic diseases, which together account for 60 per cent of all deaths, are associated with the jobs and income offered by tobacco (WHO 2009). The WHO estimates that 46 per cent of deaths by 2030 – up from 25 per cent in 2004 – from non-communicable diseases will occur in the 46 countries of WHO Africa region.

The members of the tobacco control network from the developed countries believe in the benefit of engaging their African counterparts to collectively assist them with the adoption of best practices as domestic tobacco laws because of the similarities of the activities of the tobacco companies in the region (Personal communication 2010). Therefore, the network has been creating and funding regional organizations, which are used as agents of disseminating tobacco control ideas. A staff of the ACS indicated that it is easier to extend the meagre resources to many countries if they are engaged collectively at the regional level. He maintains that the strategy helps to promote a united front in reducing the activities of the tobacco industry in the region. However, funding has been provided directly to domestic tobacco control activists and NGOs to campaign for the adoption of specific policy in areas where the tobacco control situation is unique (Personal communication 2010).

The Framework Convention Alliance (FCA), an association of tobacco control governmental and NGOs, has championed and facilitated the establishment of the Africa Tobacco Control Alliance (ATCA), which is serving as a Pan-African network for tobacco control to promote a healthy and tobacco-free Africa (ATCA 2009). The FCA gave a grant of US $10,000 to the ATCA to organize its first board meeting in Nairobi, Kenya in April 2009 (ATCA 2009). The meeting enabled the ATCA to identify five priority areas of focus for five years. The ATCA also received a grant of CAN $122,000 from the IDRC to establish a secretariat and expand its activities to attract more audiences and support. The Norwegian Cancer Society (NCS) also granted US $50,000 to the ATCA to develop and distribute materials that indicate a link between tobacco control, poverty alleviation, and development (ATCA 2009). The ATCA uses the resources and materials to lobby government officials for the inclusion of tobacco control in the poverty alleviation strategies and developmental plans. So far, the ATCA has organized several activities to promote its tobacco control agenda. Some of its activities include tobacco control exhibitions and side events during meetings and conferences of regional and sub-regional bodies of the African Union, ECOWAS, SADC, EAC and ECCAS officials (ATCA 2009).

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has also offered grants of $7 million over five years to the ACS to coordinate and lead evidence-based tobacco control approaches to control the consumption of tobacco and its related health problems in the African region (Becker 2010). The grant was to enable the ACS to organize and assert leadership of the Africa Tobacco Control Consortium to prevent a tobacco public health hazard in the region. The Consortium is made up of the Africa Tobacco Control Regional Initiative (ATCRI), ATCA, FCA, the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (CTFK), and the International Union against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease (The Union). The Consortium seeks to promote a common message on tobacco control that will help to curtail the activities of the tobacco industry in the region.

In addition, many tobacco control organizations and activists from the region have benefited from a joint grant of $500 million provided by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Bloomberg Foundation for global tobacco control initiatives (Personal communication 2010/2011). A staff member from the Bloomberg Foundation indicated that the disbursement of funds for tobacco control activities are normally channelled through five major organizations – the WHO, CTFK, CDC, the World Lung Foundation, and John Hopkins University's Bloomberg School of Public Health – to NGOs and tobacco control agencies. However, the grant from the Bloomberg Foundation is jointly managed by The Union, and CTFK (Personal communication 2010/2011). The question that remains to be answered is why the donor agencies channel the fund through Western organizations instead of sending them directly to the African organizations. The question becomes moot, especially after the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation suspended its funds to the IDRC in 2010 after it found out the Director of the IDRC doubled as the Director of Imperial Tobacco Canada, Ltd.

Nonetheless, the Foundation has offered grants directly to certain groups to promote measures considered essential for tobacco control in certain countries. For instance, an NGO in Ghana, Vision for Alternative Development, was offered a grant by the Bloomberg Foundation to promote the adoption of smoke-free laws in Ghana (Personal communication 2011). A staff member with the Bloomberg Foundation indicated that the total commitment of the Foundation for tobacco control was US $375m, to be disbursed over six years starting from 2007. So far, the Foundation has disbursed about US $ 250 million, averaging about US $ 58.5 million a year (Personal communication 2011). She indicated that the Gates Foundation joined the Bloomberg Foundation in 2008, and the Gates Foundation has offered US $15 million in support of the tobacco control activities. She also noted that Mayor Michael Bloomberg believes that helping other countries

to control their tobacco situations indirectly help New York City because the city attracts people from all over the world, especially from developing countries. Therefore, if other countries succeed in addressing tobacco and cigarette smoking problem, the city might likely attract fewer people who smoke and be in a position to focus on the smokers already in the city.

The ACS and the Cancer Research UK (UKCR) also offered funding to the ATCRI to provide the stage for sharing relevant information and also to provide institutional support and capacity building to adopt, implement, and enforce efficient tobacco control laws and programmes in Africa. Additionally, tobacco control groups from different countries in Africa have benefited from a grant of $10 million provided to vulnerable countries by the ACS, the UICC, and the UKCR to create awareness about the dangers of tobacco, and to put pressure on their governments to sign and ratify the FCTC (ACS, UICC and UKCR 2004).

In 2007, the RITC and IDRC of Canada also established the Africa Tobacco Situational Analysis (ATSA), with the support of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to analyse the tobacco control situation of certain African countries. The ATSA helps to build the capacity of researchers to gather, synthesize, and analyse relevant tobacco control information. It also assists tobacco control groups to use information generated through research to support broader strategies for tobacco control in Africa. The objective of the ATSA has expanded to include the use of country specific case studies that analyse and document the broader social, economic and political tobacco control activities as a way of identifying policy priorities and interventions (IDRC, 2009). The ATSA adopted twelve countries – Malawi, Ghana, South Africa, Senegal, Cameroon, Eritrea, Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya, Mauritius, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria – as case studies for analysis with the hope that the study will be extended to other countries in the future.

In addition, the WHO and other IGOs periodically organize training and conferences for tobacco control actors (mostly in the health sector), to offer them technical expertise for tobacco control and some members of the network have also been offered funding to attend such conferences. For instance, several tobacco control activists and NGOs were offered financial assistance to attend the premier of the Livestrong Global Cancer Summit in Dublin, Ireland, in August 2009 (Nelson 2009). The summit discussed essential strategies for controlling cancer to eliminate its burden globally. Nonetheless, some IGOs fund research to assess how tobacco control may impact the economies of developing countries. A case in point is a study commissioned by the Commonwealth of former British colonies to examine the impact of tobacco control on the member countries (Latif

2004). The study provided policy recommendations to member countries that have not adopted comprehensive tobacco laws because it is considered essential to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The UN MDGs were adopted by the Commonwealth Head of Governments Meeting (CHOGM) held in Coolum, Australia on March 2002 because of the perceived link to tobacco consumption, poverty, and poor health (Latif 2004). The MDGs were initially embraced by 189 nations of the United Nations seeking to among other things, eradicate extreme poverty and hunger globally, promote universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, ensure environmental sustainability, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, and develop global partnerships for development.[1]

Other studies funded by the Commonwealth have recommended the sharing of expertise on tobacco research and legal skills among member countries (Krishnan et al. 2003). The study recommended that the Commonwealth should ensure that BAT, which operates in almost all the member countries, should maintain the same operational and ethical standards internationally as it does in the UK (Krishnan et al. 2003; Latif 2004). Subsequently, the Commonwealth tasked its legal division with developing a model tobacco bill based on the best practices in the developed member countries to save the developing countries the resources that would have been used to develop new policies. The IDRC and Canadian Public Health Association (CPHA) have also used the conferences of the Commonwealth Health Ministers as a venue for sharing knowledge on the best practices of tobacco control, where they champion the signing of the FCTC protocol and the adoption of domestic tobacco control laws by the member countries (CGTCF 2006).

The Commonwealth Health Ministers also supported the activities of the Canadian Global Tobacco Control Forum (CGTCF), a multi-agency consortium for which the CPHA is the coordinating and administrative agency (CGTCF 2006). The CGTCF, with the support of the Commonwealth Health Ministers and the FCTC-COP, undertook a regional action towards the implementation of FCTC and organized activities that focused on tobacco control alliance-building in Burkina Faso, Congo-Brazzaville, Mozambique, and Niger. The Forum provided financial and technical support to NGOs and government partners in various countries to expose them to Canadian expertise to promoting the ratification and/or implementation of FCTC measures (CGTCF 2006).

The meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government held at Trinidad and Tobago in 2009 identified tobacco consumption as one of the major factors of non-communicable diseases (NCDs), which is a huge public

health problem for all the member countries (Commonwealth Secretariat 2011). Therefore, they agreed to reduce the incidence of NCDs by adopting different policies and community-based initiatives to discourage tobacco use, unhealthy diets, and to promote physical activity. So far the activities of the Commonwealth have been limited to deliberation and advocating the adoption of tobacco control laws and there is no clear evidence that the decision has actually led to the adoption of legislation that is well implemented but that cannot be ruled out. However, tobacco control groups identify the recognition by the Heads of Government that tobacco causes health hazards, which could be avoided with the adoption of relevant tobacco control laws as a huge step forward, especially for countries in Africa. This is because such a realization could motivate the political will to promote the adoption of relevant tobacco control laws to protect public health (Personal communication 2011).

The Framework Convention Alliance has used the conferences of the Africa Union (AU) to champion the adoption of effective regulatory tobacco control policies. The FCA in its 2007 report indicated that the WHO-AFRO Coordinator, Dr Ahmed Ogwell, has attended several conferences of the AU, one of which was the third ordinary session of African Union Health Ministers' Conference held at Johannesburg, South Africa, from April 9-13, 2007. The meetings discussed measures to improve the health situation within the continent and recognize the adoption of effective tobacco control legislation as a major component to achieving that objective (FCA 2007). The Ministers adopted a health strategy and a declaration to strengthen the health system for equity and development of the African continent at the end of the conference. The meetings and declarations are significant to tobacco control because domestic tobacco control groups can use that as accountability politics to put pressure on their respective governments to abide by their commitments by formulating and adopting tobacco control legislation.

Discussion and conclusion

This paper has broadly examined the activities of transnational tobacco control network to promote the adoption of tobacco control ideas as domestic laws for protecting public health in the African region. The finding is that members of the transnational tobacco control network are promoting the adoption of tobacco control policies in individual countries of the African region. The NGOs, IGOs and donor agencies engage their tobacco control counterparts in the African region collectively to provide them with skills and resources to promote the adoption of domestic tobacco policies. The members of the network from the developed countries sponsor the creation of regional

organizations and offer funding to the organizations to spread the tobacco control ideas and skills to the countries within the region as means of ensuring compliance with the FCTC international treaty to protect public health.

The funds to the regional organizations enable them to promote a collective tobacco control campaign and also offer technical skills to the tobacco groups from the individual countries. For instance, the African tobacco control research initiative was able to organize a training workshop for tobacco groups from the African region to offer them the legal skills for changing policy in their respective countries (Personal communication 2011). The ATCRI is funded by ACS and UKCR and the training was meant to develop their skills for using litigation as a tobacco control instrument in their respective countries. The network belief is that the regional approach will promote a collective action for addressing the tobacco problem by providing tobacco control actors in the region with the requisite skills to promote the adoption of tobacco control policies and also to neutralize the political power of the tobacco industry network, which has been influencing tobacco policies in their own favour over the years.

The study concludes that the regional/continental approach to disseminate tobacco control ideas will lead to a common tobacco control campaign, which could promote compliance with tobacco control prohibition regime in the African region. The dissemination will lead to the adoption of tobacco control policy in individual countries, which can curtail the activities of the tobacco companies and protect public health. The tobacco companies normally take advantage of weak or the absence of tobacco law in a country to promote their profit making activities in Africa. Therefore, the approach will send a common policy message to all tobacco companies operating in the region and leave no room for using any tactic to operate in different countries. Giving that the strategy of the multinational tobacco companies is mostly similar in all the areas they operate, the success of the regionalist/continental approach in Africa could lead to the application of similar strategy in other regions such as Southeast Asia, the Caribbean and South American to proscribe the activities of the tobacco companies. This will also promote compliance with the FCTC treaty so as to protect public health in the developing world.

Note

1. For details, refer to http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview.html

References

African Tobacco Control Alliance, 2009, 'Annual Report 2009', (http://atca-africa.org/userfiles/file/Report2009eng.pdf). Retrieved on 22/11/2010.

Ali, Issah, 2012, 'Public Health Bill (Tobacco Control Measures) Passed by Parliament', *Modern Ghana News online*, 12 July, 2012, http://www.modernghana.com/news/405747/1/public-health-bill-tobacco-control-measures-passed.html (Retrieved on 09/03/2012).

American Cancer Society, Cancer Research, UK and International Union against Cancer, 2004, 'Global Advocacy for the Signing, Ratification, Implementation and Enforcement of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control', Executive Report.

Asare, Bossman, 2007, *Tobacco Control – Comparative Public Policy in the United Kingdom and South Africa*, Germany: VDM Verlag Dr Muller.

Asare, Bossman, 2009, 'Tobacco Regulation in South Africa: Interest Groups and Public.

Policy', *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 3 (3): 99-106.

BAT, 1980, 'Africa Public Affairs Conference: The Changing Policies of WHO and their Implications for BAT Companies in Africa', (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/sgn26a99). 21/1/2011.

Barnum, Howard, 1994, 'The Economic Burden of Global Trade in Tobacco', *Tobacco Control*, 3: 358-361.

Becker, Andrew, 2010, 'American Cancer Society to Manage New Effort against Tobacco in Africa', American Cancer Society (http://pressroom.cancer.org/index.php?s=43&item=219), 12/6/2010.

Brenya, Edward, 2012a, 'Struggling To Weaken the Giant: Litigation as a Measure to Compel the Adoption of Tobacco Control Instrument in Malawi', *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, Vol. 6 (7), pp. 155-166, November, 2012.

Brenya, Edward, 2012b, *The Politics of Tobacco Control in Ghana and Malawi: A Comparative Study*, Saarbucken, Germany: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing GmbH & Co. KG.

Brenya, Edward and Bossman Asare, 2011, 'Traditional Institutions and Agenda Setting: The Case of the Adoption of the Ghana Education Trust Fund (GETFund)', *African Research Review*, 5 (3): 90-103.

Cairney, Paul, Hadii Mamudu, and Donley T. Studlar, 2012, *Global Tobacco Control Policy: Power, Policy, Governance and Transfer*, London: Palgrave.

Canadian Global Tobacco Control Forum, 2006, 'Strengthening Global Tobacco Control: Evaluative Report', Health Bridge Canada,
(http://www.healthbridge.ca/CGTCFevaluativereport_may17_.pdf). 15/7/11.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 1999, *Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs*, Atlanta, GA: CDC.

Commonwealth Secretariat, 2011, 'Progress Report: Commonwealth Secretariat Road Map on Non-Communicable Diseases', Commonwealth Secretariat, (http://www.thecommonwealth.org/files/236498/FileName/HMM(G)(11)4Update_on_Commonwealth_Road_Map.pdf). 15/7/11.

Diani Mario, 2000, 'Social Movement Networks Virtual and Real Information', *Communication & Society*, (3) 3: 386-402.

Farquharson, Karen, 2003, 'Influencing Policy Transnationally: Pro-and Anti-Tobacco Global Advocacy Networks', *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 62 (4):80-92.

Framework Convention Alliance, 2007, 'Annual Report on Tobacco Control for 2007', http://www.fctc.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=126&Itemid=76 (Retrieved on 7/5/10).

Hudson, Alan, 2001, 'NGOs' Transnational Advocacy Networks: From "Legitimacy" To "Political Responsibility"', *Global Networks*, 1(4): 331-52.

International Development Research Center, 2009, 'Research for Action on FCTC: Report on the Second Round of a Small Grants Competition, Ottawa, Canada', (http://www.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/12514719831RITC_FCTC2_ENG-corrected-FINAL.pdf). 7/7/2010.

Jha, Prabhat and Frank J. Chaloupka, (Eds), 1999, *Curbing the Epidemic: Governments and the Economics of Tobacco Control*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Jordan, Lisa and Tuijl, Peter V., 2000, 'Political Responsibility in Transnational NGO Advocacy', *World Development*, (28) 12: 2051-2065.

Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph Nye, 1972, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Krishnan, P., Margaret Mungherera, and Sinéad B. Jones, 2003, 'Tobacco and the Commonwealth: A Call to Action', *The Lancet* 361: May 17, (www.thelancet.com) 19/2/ 2010.

Latif, Ehsan, 2004, 'Stubbing It Out', Briefing for Commonwealth Health Ministers on How to Implement the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Commonwealth Policy Unit.

Laugesen, Murray, Michelle Scollo, David Sweanor, Saul Shiffman, Joe Gitchell, Kathy Barnsley, Mark Jacobs, Gary A. Giovino, Stanton Glantz, Richard A Daynard, Gregory N. Conolly, and Joseph R. Difranza, 2000, 'World Best Practices in Tobacco Control', *Tobacco Control Journal*, 9 (2): 228-236. Retrieved on 9/28/2009 from website http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/cgi/reprint/9/2/228.

Leonard Zahn & Associates, 1981, 'Informational Memorandum International Union Against Cancer (UICC)'. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/gyo88c00). 18/11/2009.

Lopez, Allan D., Neil E. Collishaw, and Tapani Piha, 1994, 'A Descriptive Model of the Cigarette Epidemic in Developed Countries', *Tobacco Control*, 3 (3): 242-247.

Mackay, J., Eriksen, M., & Shafey, O., 2006, *The Tobacco Atlas*, (2nd ed.), Atlanta, GA: American Cancer Society.

Madeley, John, 1993, 'The Evil Weed', *The Observer*, London, P.E16, April 10.

Mamudu, Hadii M. and Stanton A. Glantz, 2009, 'Civil Society and the Negotiation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control', *Global Public Health*, 4:150-168.

Mamudu, Hadii M. and Donley Studlar, 2009, 'Multilevel Governance and Shared Sovereignty: The European Union, Member States, and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control', *Governance*, 22 (1): 73-97.

Mamudu, Hadii M., Hammond, Ross and Glantz, Stanton A., 2008, 'Tobacco Industry Attempts to Counter World Bank Curbing the Epidemic and Obstruct the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control', *Social Science and Medicine*, 67 (11): 1690-9.

Mamudu, Hadii M., 2005, 'The Politics of Tobacco Control: The Formation and Function of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)', Dissertation submitted to the Eberly College of Art and Science. Morgantown: West Virginia University.

Nadelmann, Ethan A., 1990, 'Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society', *International Organization*, 44: 479-526.

Nathanson, Constance A., 1999, 'Social Movements as Catalysts for Policy Change: The Case of Smoking and Guns', *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law*, 24:421-488.

Nelson, Bettey Naa, 2009, 'VALD Selected to Participate in Global Summit', *Ghana Chronicle*, August 24.

Nye, Joseph S. and Keohane, Robert O., 1971, 'Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion', *International Organization*, 25(3):721-748

Observer, 1985, 'UICC DEVELOPMENTS. OBSERVER'S REPORT', (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/hcj44e00), 18/11/2009.

Panos Institute, 1994, 'Tobacco: Health and Beyond – Developing Countries at the Crossroads', (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zye17a99). 6/24/ 2011.

Personal Communication, 2011, Additional Emails Interviews of Tobacco Control Experts Conducted Between May and July, 2011.

Personal Communication, 2010, Initial Emails/Telephone Interviews of Twenty Tobacco Control Experts in the African Region and the USA Conducted Between March and June, 2010.

Philip, Morris, 1993, 'The Activist Movement', (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/glg14e00). 18/11/2009.

Piper, Nicola and Uhlin, Andrea, 2004, 'New Perspectives on Transnational Activism', in Nicola Piper and Andrea Uhlin, eds., *Transnational Activism in Asia: Problems of Power and Democracy*, New York: Routledge, pp. 1-25.

Plan International, 2009, 'Malawi Children Tobacco Pickers "50-A-Day Habit"'.

Shafey, O., Eriksen, M., Ross, H., and Mackay, J., 2009, *The Tobacco Atlas*, (3rd ed.), Atlanta, GA: America Cancer Society & World Lung Foundation.

Slaughter, Anne-Marie, 2004, *A New World Order*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Studlar, Donley T., 2002, *Tobacco Control: Comparative Politics in the United States and Canada*, Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press.

Trubek, David M., Jim Mosher & Jeffrey S. Rothstein, 2000, 'Transnationalism in the Regulation of Labor Relations: International Regimes and Transnational Advocacy Networks', *Law and Social Inquiry*, (25) 4: 1187-1211.

Verkerk, H.G., & INFOTAB, 1985, 'INFOTAB Regional Workshop - Kuala Lumpur May 13-15, 1985 International Overview of Main Issues', http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jjq52f00, Retrieved 19/12/2010.

Warren, C.W., Asma, S., Lee, J., Lea, V., & Mackay, J., 2009, *Global Tobacco Surveillance System: The GTSS Atlas*, Atlanta, GA: The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention & World Lung Foundation.

World Bank, 1999, *Curbing the Epidemic: Government and Economics of Tobacco Control*, Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Health Organization, 2008, *WHO Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic: Mpower Package*, Geneva: WHO2.

World Health Organization, 2009, 'WHO launches new tobacco control effort in Africa', http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/notes/2009/tobacco_20091204/en/index.html.

WHO-Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 2009, 'Overview of Control Measures', Website http://www.who.int/fctc/text_download/en/ (Retrieved 7/12/09).

Afrique et développement, Vol. XXXVIII, Nos 1&2, 2013, pp. 133–150

Corruption, croissance et capital humain : quels rapports ?

Pierre Roche Seka*

Résumé

L'objectif de ce papier est d'expliquer l'une des raisons du fort taux d'abandon devenu monnaie courante dans nos universités Africaines. En d'autres termes, comment dans un environnement corrompu, les étudiants perdent tout engouement de poursuivre les études.

Il a été démontré théoriquement, que l'attrait du gain facile en est la cause la plus pertinente. En effet, des étudiants talentueux qui au départ voudraient faire de longues études les jugent précipitamment trop longues, quand ils comparent le niveau de vie de ceux qui en ont déjà fait et ceux qui n'en ont pas fait mais riches de par la corruption.

La méthodologie pour analyser ce phénomène est de deux ordres : à la fois théorique et empirique. Premièrement, au plan théorique, nous sommes inspirés par l'hypothèse de Grusham qui dit que la mauvaise monnaie chasse la bonne ainsi que par la théorie de la panique bancaire qui est que lorsque des mauvaises banques font faillite, les clients des bonnes banques, une fois informés se précipitent pour exiger leurs avoirs dans l'affolement et sans chercher à comprendre, à tel point que c'est tout le système bancaire qui explose très rapidement. Nous pensons que ce phénomène pourrait être utilisé pour expliquer les abandons massifs des bons étudiants. Nous avons donc utilisé un modèle simplifié de la théorie de la panique bancaire pour montrer que dès que les étudiants talentueux sont informés de ce que les mauvais qui n'ont pas terminé les études s'enrichissent de façon frauduleuse, ils abandonnent les études précipitamment pour les rejoindre dans leurs activités mafieuses.

En second lieu, un modèle économétrique est utilisé pour montrer qu'il existe un lien négatif et significatif entre le taux d'inscription aux études universitaires et l'indice de corruption.

Les résultats confirment qu'il existe effectivement une relation négative et significative (dans un intervalle de confiance de 5%) entre le taux d'inscription aux études supérieures et le taux de corruption. Un tel mouvement dit de transfuge met en péril grave le système éducatif des pays Africains.

Enfin, le papier attire l'attention des pouvoirs publics sur le fait que si rien n'est fait pour rétribuer la connaissance à sa juste valeur, l'école en général, et l'enseignement supérieur en particulier, risque l'extinction, mettant ainsi en péril tout effort de croissance et de développement.

* UFR-SEG Université Felix Houphouët Boigny de Cocody-Abidjan.Abidjan. Email: doyen_seka@hotmail.fr

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to explain some of the reasons of the high rate of dropout observed in the system of higher education in the African universities. It has been shown, theoretically, that corruption is one of the major factors. Indeed, very talented students, who otherwise could have pushed further their studies, suddenly dropout when they compare the level of wellbeing of those who are well educated with that of those who are not but enriched through corruption. Where do they go? They join the later in their corruptive activities. Such practice, that somehow is rational, endangers the whole education system. A simplified theory of bank panic has been used to show that whenever talented students are informed on how the bad student are enriched by corruption, they drop out to join the bad students. An econometric model has been estimated to show the negative impact of corruption on the registration rate for higher education. The paper ends by calling for the attention of the public authority that if nothing is done to retribute better well educated people, the education system is at high risk of extinction, endangering growth and development efforts that have been made so far.

Introduction

La corruption, de façon ordinaire, est l'utilisation de l'administration à des fins privées, où un fonctionnaire (agent) ayant pour mission à lui confiée par l'Etat (principal) de fournir un bien public s'engage dans une activité malveillante pour son propre compte, activité difficile à contrôler par le principal. Cette définition concentre son attention sur la corruption dans le secteur public et la définit comme l'abus d'une fonction publique à des fins d'enrichissement personnel (Pardhan 1997).

D'autres définitions existent également, allant de la petite corruption à la grande corruption ; il peut s'agir d'activités purement privées, totalement en dehors de l'Etat. Pour plus d'informations sur la définition, voir Svensson 2005. D'une façon générale, et de plus en plus, il est établi que la corruption agit négativement sur la croissance économique à travers son impact négatif sur l'investissement.

Le capital humain étant l'ensemble des connaissances et de savoir-faire d'un pays, son lien avec la croissance est presqu'évident. Ici, il s'agit de montrer comment la corruption affecte elle aussi la croissance non pas à travers l'investissement, mais plutôt à travers son effet négatif sur la formation du capital humain. La relation va donc de la corruption au capital humain et à la croissance ; ce type de lien entre corruption et capital humain demeure à ce jour moins couvert par la recherche. Il serait donc extrêmement intéressant d'élucider comment la corruption pourrait nuire à la formation du capital humain en décourageant la jeunesse d'entreprendre des études trop longues, ce qui pourrait avoir un impact négatif sur la croissance à terme.

Pour arriver à un tel objectif, nous faisons deux hypothèses :

Premièrement : la corruption agit sur la croissance à travers son impact sur l'investissement privé. Cette hypothèse est largement élucidée et, par conséquent, ne fera que l'objet d'une revue de la littérature dans la présente étude.

Deuxièmement : la corruption agit sur la croissance à travers son effet négatif sur la formation du capital humain. Cette hypothèse est au cœur même du présent papier, et c'est cela que nous allons démontrer d'abord au plan théorique, puis empirique.

L'objectif de ce papier est donc de montrer que par effet de pur mimétisme la corruption agit négativement sur l'accumulation du capital humain. Pour atteindre ce but, nous allons établir un lien entre la corruption et le niveau d'éducation supérieure (pris comme variable représentant l'accumulation du capital humain).

La suite du document s'articule autour des axes suivants : la première section est une revue de la littérature, en rapport avec la relation de la corruption et l'investissement, avec un accent particulier mis sur les travaux de Mauro qui constituent une rupture par rapport à l'ancienne vision que l'investissement était positivement relié à la corruption. La deuxième section s'attelle à montrer que la corruption a un impact négatif sur la formation du capital humain en utilisant au plan théorique les éléments de la théorie de la panique bancaire pour montrer que les élèves les plus méritants qui, au départ, ambitionnent de faire de longues études se convertissent en transfuges en imitant les moins méritants qui s'enrichissent sans effort ; la troisième section fait une application empirique pour substantiver les acquis de l'analyse théorique illustrant l'impact négatif de la corruption sur l'accumulation du capital humain ; enfin, le papier termine avec une conclusion qui attire l'attention des pouvoirs publics sur l'importance du phénomène.

Corruption et croissance à travers l'investissement : un aperçu de la littérature

Il y a quelques décennies à peine, des universitaires faisaient valoir très sérieusement que la corruption favorisait la croissance économique parce qu'elle faisait accélérer les activités d'investissement. Corruption et investissement étaient donc positivement liés. A cette époque, l'idée générale avancée était que les pots de vin aidaient les hommes d'affaires à éviter les lenteurs administratives.

Pour ce courant, la corruption est source d'efficience économique et accroît la croissance économique à travers son impact positif sur

l'investissement. Selon ces auteurs, l'efficience doit être mesurée en termes de temps perdu en attente ; « la corruption, c'est de l'argent rapide » (Leff 1964 ; Huntington 1968 ; Lui 1985). Dans un contexte de jeu asymétrique impliquant n-personnes, Paul J. Beck et Michael W. Maher ont montré que dans un tel contexte, l'individu qui pratique les coûts les plus bas sort vainqueur du jeu ; ils concluent donc que la corruption reproduit l'efficience conséquente du marché compétitif dans un environnement à information incomplète (Beck et Maher 1986).

Mais de nos jours, très peu d'économistes pourraient encore soutenir cette idée qui remet fondamentalement en cause les principes de bonne gouvernance. Ici, l'idée est que la corruption, quand elle se mêle à la gestion des affaires publiques, est source de mauvaise allocation et d'affectation des ressources. La corruption, sous toutes ses formes, décourage les investisseurs potentiels tant nationaux qu'étrangers.

La majorité des travaux, dans ce sens, a mis l'accent sur le lien entre corruption et croissance économique à travers son impact négatif sur l'investissement.

Par exemple, Shleifer et Vishny comparent le régime de la Russie post-communiste et la Russie communiste pour étaler les nombreuses sources d'inefficience qu'engendre la Russie post-communiste par rapport à la Russie communiste (Shleifer et Vishny 1993). Mauro, qui s'intéresse à la question depuis un certain nombre d'années, affirme que de récentes études empiriques donnent à penser que la corruption au contraire peut nuire grandement aux résultats économiques en limitant les investissements et en faisant dévier les projets sociaux de leurs objectifs recherchés (Mauro 1995). Les travaux menés dans ce domaine s'accordent pour montrer que la corruption nuit grandement aux résultats économiques en décourageant les investisseurs, notamment les investisseurs privés. Autrement dit, les efforts d'investissements sont inhibés par le phénomène de la corruption et, par voie de conséquence, la croissance s'en trouve ralentie. Il apparaît donc, selon ces études, que la variable à travers laquelle la corruption agit sur la croissance est l'investissement. Ces résultats ont guidé Paulo Mauro dans ses travaux empiriques. Dans sa thèse de doctorat, Mauro utilise comme mesure de la mal gouvernance la valeur moyenne de la période 1980-1983 de l'indice de qualité de l'environnement institutionnel construit par business international à partir de questions remplies par ses correspondants locaux et dont la valeur est comprise entre 0 (haut niveau de corruption) et 10 (haut niveau de probité). Ces indices concernent entre autres l'efficacité du système judiciaire (indice 1), la bureaucratie (indice 2) et la corruption (indice 3). Mauro utilise particulièrement ce dernier et un indice composite à partir des trois qu'il

appelle « l'efficacité bureaucratique » (Mauro, *op.cit*). Ici nous allons nous intéresser aux résultats obtenus par régression de l'indice de la corruption sur le taux d'investissement d'un ensemble de pays.

L'équation qu'il estime est la suivante : $I_i = \phi + \beta CORi$

Où ϕ est une constante, COR, l'indice de corruption, I est le ratio investissement sur PIB et i pour pays.

Dans l'échantillon, il y avait 58 pays dont certains pays africains. L'estimation de l'équation ci-dessus établit un lien fortement négatif entre l'investissement et l'indice de corruption.

Bien enttendu, l'estimation d'un tel modèle peut souffrir de variables omises, il n'empêche que la part du taux d'investissement expliquée par la corruption est assez élevée (près de la moitié). Mauro estime également les équations d'investissement incluant d'autres variables explicatives (PIB, taux d'instruction, la bureaucratie, etc.). Evidemment, l'introduction de ces variables est supposée réduire le degré d'explication de la corruption ; cependant, la corruption conserve son pouvoir explicatif au seuil de 5 pour cent dans la plupart des spécifications. Ainsi, selon Mauro « si le Bangladesh améliorait l'honnêteté et l'efficacité de sa bureaucratie de façon à se mettre au même niveau que l'Uruguay (ce qui correspondrait à une amélioration d'un écart type de l'indice d'efficacité bureaucratique), son taux d'investissement s'accroîtrait de cinq points de pourcentage et la croissance annuelle de son PIB d'un point de pourcentage ».

La thèse de Mauro est largement partagée par beaucoup d'autres auteurs. Par exemple, selon Farida et al (2008) ; Tanzi et Davoodi (1997), la corruption en général, mais surtout dans la sphère politique ou « grande » corruption, crée des distorsions dans l'allocation des ressources liée aux projets de développement. Ces distorsions sont d'autant plus grandes que le niveau des institutions de contrôle est faible. Ils ont montré que la corruption rime avec un gonflement du montant d'investissement public, un faible revenu pour l'Etat, un faible niveau de maintenance et une mauvaise qualité des infrastructures publiques. Ils argumentent aussi que la corruption accroît le volume des investissements publics tout en réduisant leur productivité et rentabilité. Campos *et al.* (1999) admettent que la corruption affecte négativement l'investissement et donc la croissance. Ces auteurs vont plus loin pour mettre l'accent sur la nature de la corruption selon qu'elle est prévisible ou imprévisible. La corruption, lorsqu'elle est prévisible, a plus d'impact sur l'investissement que lorsqu'elle est imprévisible.

Il y a aussi la question de la durée de l'impact. Ouattara (2007) montre qu'il existe une relation de long terme entre dépenses publiques, corruption et croissance dans les pays de l'UEMOA, mais que le niveau de corruption

n'est pas induite par la croissance économique. Nobuo *et al.* (2005) montrent que l'effet négatif de la corruption sur l'investissement s'observe de façon significative à moyen et à long termes et est non significative à court terme.

Certains auteurs ont mis l'accent sur l'imperfectibilité et l'incomplétude de l'information. La progression de la corruption est due à l'asymétrie de l'information qui existe entre agents. Selon Krueger, lorsqu'il existe beaucoup de restrictions de la part du pouvoir, il se crée des besoins de recherche de rentes qui peuvent prendre des formes telles que la corruption ou les marchés parallèles (Krueger 1974). Ceci est important dans la mesure où la recherche de rentes, surtout dans le secteur public, par la bureaucratie empêche beaucoup plus les activités génératrices d'innovations que dans le secteur de production de biens ordinaires (Murphy *et al.* 1993). Quant à Wade (1985), cette recherche de rentes est due aux comportements opportunistes des agents de l'Etat soumis à des pressions d'affectation d'un poste avantageux à un autre moins avantageux. Selon lui, si l'Etat indien n'est pas meilleur en matière de développement, cela proviendrait de ce phénomène « corruption -affectation » qui génère des malversations au coeur de l'Etat. Pellegrini et Gerlagh (2004) distinguent cinq canaux de transmissions à travers lesquels la corruption influence la croissance, dont les plus importants sont respectivement l'investissement et le commerce extérieur.

Dans la littérature, il est aussi question de la lutte contre la corruption. La corruption apparaissant comme un frein à la croissance des économies, ces dernières années, elle est devenue un thème vivement discuté au sein des instances politiques nationales et internationales. La lutte contre la corruption est devenue un des objectifs de politiques économiques les plus en vue aujourd'hui, car, comme le disent Podobnick *et al.* (2008), en réduisant la corruption, on peut accroître la richesse du pays.

En général, la solution proposée tourne autour du salaire d'efficience : il faut donner des incitations salariales ou accroître les émoluments pour dissuader corrupteurs et corrompus potentiels. Ventelon (2001) a élaboré un modèle qui permet de tester positivement l'hypothèse selon laquelle de meilleures rémunérations des hommes politiques permettraient de limiter la corruption. Cependant, Tanzi (1998) fait remarquer que la solution se trouve dans une réforme en profondeur de l'Etat et que sans cette réforme la corruption va demeurer pour longtemps un problème de société et ce, malgré les mesures mises en œuvre pour la contraindre.

Pour d'autres, au contraire, la solution se trouve ailleurs. Pour Timothy Besley et John McLaren, mieux vaut la corruption que de payer des salaires d'efficience aux collecteurs d'impôts (Besley and McLaren 1993). D'autres sont plus sceptiques. Pour Bardhan Pranab, la possibilité pour l'Etat de

contrôler la corruption dépend de sa crédibilité vis-à-vis de son peuple et de la mise en place d'institutions crédibles et fortes. En cela, il compare l'Afrique aux Etats de l'Asie de l'Est ; l'Afrique ayant des institutions peu crédibles et faibles a eu des résultats plus décevants en la matière que l'Asie qui a des systèmes centralisés et forts, même si la corruption demeure encore importante dans ces pays. Pour cet auteur, la bonne gouvernance des institutions de la République, à tous les niveaux, doit faire partie intégrante de la politique globale de la lutte contre la corruption (Pranab 1996). Cette conclusion est entièrement partagée par des auteurs tels que Al-Marhubi (2004) et Roberg (2004) qui mettent l'accent sur le degré de crédibilité de l'Etat comme solution de la lutte contre la corruption. Pour que cela soit, il faut une bonne législation. Rose-Ackerman fait remarquer qu'une bonne législation en la matière peut autant réduire les montants des transactions qu'une mauvaise législation (Rose-Akerman 1978).

Quelle est la meilleure façon de contrôler la corruption ? Cette question demeure à ce jour sans réponse convaincante. Ali and Hodan (2003), affirment qu'une bonne connaissance des déterminants de la corruption peut aider les autorités à mettre en place des mesures pour amoindrir ses effets néfastes sur l'investissement et la croissance.

Au total, la littérature existante révèle donc que la corruption affecte la croissance à travers son effet négatif sur l'investissement, public ou privé. L'investissement dans le secteur public étant source de beaucoup de corruption, certains économistes proposent leur réduction (Tanzi et Davood *op.cit.*).

Mais la corruption peut aussi bien affecter négativement la croissance à travers son effet négatif sur la formation du capital humain de qualité ; tel est l'objet de la section qui suit.

Corruption et croissance à travers le capital humain

La corruption peut tout autant affecter la croissance à travers son effet négatif sur l'accumulation du capital humain. En effet, l'expansion de la corruption dans nos pays peut être due en partie au nombre d'étudiants qui désertent prématurément les universités sans avoir acquis une formation complète et adéquate pouvant leur permettre d'accéder à un emploi décent. Réduire la corruption revient à inverser le phénomène de mimétisme qui est que des étudiants initialement talentueux imitent les moins talentueux en mettant fin précipitamment à leurs études. Pour cela il convient de mettre l'accent sur le culte de l'excellence à l'école et aussi la rétribution au mieux de l'effort intellectuel. Le reste du document va s'atteler à démontrer cela.

Dans ce qui suit, il est donc question de montrer que la corruption affecte négativement la formation du capital humain, ce qui affecte négativement la croissance à terme. Il est donc utile avant toute chose de jeter juste un regard sur l'importance du capital humain dans la théorie de la croissance.

Capital humain et théorie de la croissance

A ce propos, les théories récentes de la croissance endogène font de l'éducation l'un des facteurs principaux de la croissance économique. Cette idée, qui n'a rien de très original, inspire cependant depuis longtemps les travaux des économistes de l'éducation et du développement. En effet, depuis les travaux de Lucas (1988), plusieurs chercheurs contemporains tels que Azariadis–Drazen (1990), Mankiw *et al.* (1992), Romer (1990), Stockey (1991), Barro et Sala-i-Martin (1995), ont construit des modèles visant à mettre en évidence les effets de l'accumulation du capital humain sur la croissance économique.

La littérature économique fournit ainsi une multitude d'écrits démontrant que l'éducation influe positivement sur la croissance ; nous n'allons donc pas insister outre mesure sur cette idée, si ce n'est que pour insister sur le fait que l'éducation est incontournable dans le processus de développement et qu'il faut la protéger. Il nous reste à examiner les effets de la corruption sur cette variable auxiliaire qu'est l'éducation pour montrer que la corruption a un impact négatif sur l'accumulation du capital humain.

Corruption et capital humain

En réalité, il existe plusieurs canaux par lesquels la corruption affecte le capital humain, qu'il s'agisse de la grande corruption ou de la petite corruption ; la figure ci-après présente certains de ces canaux.

Figure 1 : Canaux de transmission des effets de la corruption au capital humain Corruption



Pour mieux expliciter ces relations, nous avons choisi de construire un modèle dit de transfuge.

Le modèle théorique dit de transfuge

En effet, dans un environnement où règne la corruption, l'attrait du gain facile par des pratiques peu recommandables des étudiants moins méritants peut amener les plus méritants à arrêter précipitamment les études pour rejoindre la bande des riches mafieux, et ce, par pur mimétisme, au regard des avantages immédiats escomptés.

Aussi dans la fonction publique, certains agents dans certaines fonctions ne veulent-ils pas de promotion ; ils s'arrangent à ne point se présenter à des examens qui pourraient leur permettre de monter de grade, car cela les empêcherait d'avoir accès à des situations de rente, pour cela ils refusent de faire de la formation continue pour accroître leur capital humain ; en un mot, ils refusent la connaissance, la perfection pour demeurer dans la médiocrité.

L'existence de comportements corruptifs peut faire tâche d'huile et entraîner une contagion pour affecter durablement une jeunesse qui manque de repère. En ce qui concerne le système éducatif, l'enrichissement facile de ceux-là mêmes qui arrêtent tôt les études peut induire beaucoup de jeunes talentueux à en faire autant. L'arrêt des études par contagion atteint les jeunes qui, au départ, envisagent de faire de longues études, mais qui changent d'idées, chemin faisant, parce qu'ils sont capables de faire des comparaisons entre les niveaux de bien être des intellectuels, à commencer par leurs encadreurs et ceux qui souvent ont à peine des brevets élémentaires et sont insolemment riches du fait de la corruption. On peut donc dire que dans une société où la connaissance est mal rétribuée et la corruption impunie, voire insinuée ou encouragée, l'ensemble du système éducatif est en danger d'implosion. En effet, si l'objectif du gain facile est de mise, les étudiants méritants qui envisagent faire de longues études seront tentés de les arrêter pour s'adonner à des activités très peu recommandables ; de cette façon, la corruption participe à l'effondrement des valeurs en influençant négativement l'accumulation du capital humain. Il apparaît donc que la corruption génère des externalités négatives relativement graves qui nuissent à la croissance et au développement de l'ensemble de l'économie. On est donc tenté de savoir pourquoi les étudiants se comporteraient ainsi et une fois les raisons connues, on devrait pouvoir envisager des moyens d'endiguer le mal.

Essayons d'appréhender ce phénomène à travers un modèle théorique que nous esquissons en commençant par les hypothèses suivantes :

Les hypothèses

Le temps prend trois valeurs : 0, 1, 2, déterminant deux périodes : 0 –1 et 1 –2. Un bien non périssable, le capital humain cumulable et une technique de production de ce bien. Il est possible d'investir une unité de ce bien à t=0 (-1).

Si l'accumulation cesse à t=1, l'investissement se transforme en 1 unité de ce bien et 0 unité à t = 2, ce qui permet à l'individu de percevoir un revenu égal à 1 et une consommation égale à 1, donc l'individu n'a aucune capacité d'accumulation de richesse (d'épargne) si ce n'est par d'autres moyens dont la corruption.

Si l'investissement se prolonge à t = 2, l'investissement rapporte 0 unité à t = 1 et R unités à t = 2 ; R le revenu est connu avec certitude et supérieur à la consommation, permettant à l'individu d'épargner et d'accumuler des ressources, source de croissance et de progrès.

Les agents sont identiques et à t = 0, ils reçoivent tous la même dotation initiale h = 1.

A partir de t =1, chaque élève se révèle appartenir à une catégorie spécifique :

- les élèves de type 1 n'envisagent pas d'entreprendre de longues études et s'adonnent à une consommation immédiate C1en t =1.
- les élèves de type 2 qui envisagent d'entreprendre de longues études préfèrent consommer C2 à t = 2.

La probabilité pour un élève d'appartenir aux étudiants de type 1 ou 2 est connue à t = 0 ; mais la réalisation s'observe à t =1.

Un élève de type 1 au départ a très peu de chance de se comporter comme un élève de type 2, alors que l'inverse est très probable.

Le désir de consommation présente est supérieur au désir de consommation future, ce qui accroît la probabilité d'être transfuge.

L'effondrement du système éducatif arrive lorsqu'aux élèves de type 1 viennent s'ajouter ceux du type 2.

Le processus

Le processus peut être représenté par le tableau ci-après :



Si l'étudiant méritant est amené à interrompre son projet de faire de longues études, cela implique un coût d'opportunité ou un rendement non perçu égal à

R = 1 (1+ w) où w est le taux de rendement du capital humain, assimilable au taux de salaire.

Si au contraire son projet de rester à l'école se prolonge à t =2, il aura une consommation C2 égale à :

$$C2 = \frac{1}{1+W} = \frac{1}{R} = R^{-1}$$

Une consommation actualisée au taux de rendement w qui est inférieure au revenu. Ce raisonnement montre que dans des conditions normales, l'étudiant qui entend faire de longues études dispose de capacités d'accumulation de richesse plus grandes que celles de celui qui arrêtent tôt les études. Si dans la pratique c'est le contraire qu'on observe, alors cela peut être attribué à la pratique corruptive des moins talentueux.

Résultats théoriques attendus

Conformément aux hypothèses ci-dessus, les étudiants du type 2, informés de l'état de bien-être des étudiants de type 1 et de celui de ceux à qui ils voulaient s'identifier au départ, les intellectuels, dont leurs maîtres, vont prendre des décisions tout de même rationnelles sur la base des informations qu'ils auront collectées. S'il s'avère que la situation des étudiants du type 1 est au moins égale à celle des intellectuels de haut niveau, on observera un phénomène de transfuge des étudiants de type 2 vers ceux de type 1 parce que le coût d'opportunité d'arrêter ses études en t = 1 est très faible, voire inexistant ; en d'autres termes, on ne perd rien en ne faisant pas de longues études. Paradoxalement, les étudiants de type 1, les moins méritants, deviennent par la force des choses la référence, ce qui ravive la propension à la corruption, mettant ainsi en péril les incitations à l'accumulation du capital humain.

Comment substantiver ce résultat théorique au plan empirique, tel est l'objet de la section qui suit.

Le modèle empirique

Spécification du modèle

Nous partons de l'idée que le capital humain est l'un des déterminants de la croissance et ce, en accord avec la littérature (Becker 1993 ; Lucas 1988). Nous cherchons donc à quantifier l'impact de la corruption sur cette variable. Par conséquent, le capital humain, représenté par le taux d'inscription au supérieur, est la variable endogène et la corruption, une des variables explicatives.

En plus de l'indice de la corruption comme variable indépendante, il est pris en compte d'autres variables que nous considérons comme déterminantes dans l'explication du taux d'enregistrement dans l'enseignement supérieur, notamment le rendement social de l'investissement dans l'éducation et le rendement privé de l'investissement dans l'éducation. En effet, plus ces rendements sont élevés, plus les étudiants sont incités à faire de longues études. Une variable binaire a été introduite ensuite pour tenir compte du niveau de développement des pays : pays à revenu faible (valeur 1) par rapport à pays à revenu élevé (valeur 0).

Première équation

$$ERTT_i = F(RP_i, RS_i, IPC_i, PNBC_i, \varepsilon_i)$$

$$errt_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 rp_i + \beta_2 rs_i + \beta_3 ipc_i + \beta_4 pnbc_i + \varepsilon_i \qquad (1)$$

Deuxième équation

$$ERTT_i = F(RP_i, RS_i, IPC_i, PNBC_i, dLOW_i, \varepsilon_i)$$

$$errt_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 rp_i + \beta_2 rs_i + \beta_3 ipc_i + \beta_4 pnbc_i + \beta_5 dlow_i + \varepsilon_i \qquad (2)$$

Dans cette spécification, les paramètres b_0 et b_i constituent les paramètres à estimer et qui traduisent les effets des variables indépendantes sur le capital humain. A priori ces variables sont supposées exogènes, mais en fait, des tests statistiques permettent de confirmer ou d'infirmer cette assertion. Nous allons donc exécuter des tests d'exogénéité sur ces variables et le choix des variables comme variables exogènes dont le modèle dépendra des résultats de ces tests ; μ_i est le terme aléatoire du modèle. On suppose qu'il y a une indépendance stochastique entre ce terme aléatoire et la série des variables exogènes ; en outre, ce terme aléatoire est supposé identiquement distribué, suivant une loi normale de moyenne nulle et de variance constante et finie.

Présentation des données de l'étude

Les données concernant l'IPC utilisées dans cette étude sont celles qui sont publiées par Transparency International pour les années 1995 à 2002. En revanche, les données relatives au taux d'inscription aux études tertiaires, les rendements social et privé de l'investissement dans l'éducation ne sont observés que pour un nombre réduit d'années. En effet, ces données que nous avons recueillies dans les annuaires des Nations Unies (annuaire de 1994 à 1998) ne sont disponibles que pour quelques années. Nous avons donc sélectionné un certain nombre de pays pour lesquels les variables sont observées simultanément pour les années retenues. Notre repère temporel est donc l'année 1998. L'indice de perception de la corruption varie de [0-10] : plus il est proche de 10, moins le pays est corrompu ; plus il est proche de 0, plus le pays est corrompu.

Nous aurions bien voulu sélectionner uniquement les pays africains, mais la taille de l'échantillon d'une telle sélection, eu égard à la disponibilité des données, ne peut être suffisante pour avoir de bons résultats d'estimation. Aussi avons-nous alors étendu la sélection à d'autres pays, aussi bien du monde développé que sous-développé d'Amérique latine et d'Asie, soit au total 38 pays retenus. Il s'agit donc de données en coupe instantanée.

Tableau 1 : Présentation et sources des données

Errt	Ratio d'enrôlement aux études supérieures (UNESCO institute of statistics online and WDI online)
Ipc	Indice de perception de la corruption (Transparency International website)
Pnbc	Revenu par tête – US$ (WDI on line)
Rp	Rendement privé de l'investissement dans l'éducation (Psachropoulos G. 1994), UESCO
Rs	*Rendement social de l'investissement dans l'éducation (Psachropoulos G. 1994), UNESCO*

Les résultats de l'estimation

Les résultats de l'estimation sont donnés dans le tableau ci-après :

Tableau 2 : Estimation de l'équation 1

ERTT	**Coef**	**Ecart type**	**T**	**P> /t/**
Rs	.085	.024	3.45	.002
Rp	- .067	.016	-4.24	.000
Ipc	2.18	.737	2.96	.003
Pnbc	1.570	.646	2.43	.021
Cons	13.795	6.989	1.97	.057
Nombre d'observations :		38		
F (4,33)			15.60	
Prob > F			0.000	
R. carré			0.69	

Tableau 3 : Estimation de l'équation 2

ERTT	Coef	Ecart type	T	P> /t/
Rs	.083	0.023	3.49	.001
Rp	-.068	.015	-4.37	.000
Ipc	2.763	.823	3.36	.001
Pnbc	.082	.0307	2.67	.012
Ddow	.465	.407	1.14	.263
Cons	1.857	.541	3.43	.002
Nombre d'observations :		38		
F (4,33)		15.60		
Prob > F		0.0000		
R. carré		0.6977		

Source : Les calculs de l'auteur

Comme nous pouvons le voir sur les tableaux, les résultats d'estimation font ressortir une liaison négative et fortement significative entre l'indice de corruption et le taux d'inscription aux études supérieures. L'inscription aux études supérieures est très élastique par rapport à la corruption. En effet, pour une variation relative de la corruption de 1 pour cent, l'inscription dans le supérieur varie de plus de 2 pour cent (lorsque IPC augmente, correspondant à une diminution de la corruption, l'inscription aux études supérieures augmente). Les autres variables considérées sont toutes significatives bien que le rendement privé de l'investissement de l'éducation n'aie pas le signe positif attendu. La variable muette, bien qu'elle ne soit pas très significative, a le signe positif attendu, traduisant le fait que le phénomène soit plus prononcé dans les pays à revenu faible que dans les pays à revenu élevé. De façon générale, le pouvoir explicatif du modèle est de l'ordre de 70 pour cent, ce qui est largement acceptable pour la méthode utilisée. Le modèle est donc globalement significatif (la probabilité de la statistique de Fisher globale vaut 0). Il est extrêmement important de remarquer que l'élasticité en valeur absolue du rendement social de l'investissement est supérieure à son rendement privé, ce qui traduit le fait que l'éducation est un secteur qui génère des externalités positives et ce, en conformité avec la théorie de la croissance endogène.

Toutefois, le modèle peut souffrir de quelques insuffisances, en particulier l'existence quasi certaine de variables omises (nous n'avons considéré en fait que quelques variables explicatives). Il n'en demeure pas moins que les résultats obtenus sont robustes à tout point de vue.

Conclusion

De nos jours, les études qui ont analysé l'impact de la corruption sur la croissance économique l'ont fait à travers l'influence négative de la corruption sur l'investissement. L'idée qui sous-tend cette démarche est que les activités corruptives inhibent l'investissement productif en décourageant les entrepreneurs et investisseurs.

Dans ce travail, il s'est agi plutôt d'établir que la corruption influence négativement la croissance à travers son effet négatif sur l'accumulation du capital humain par un effet de transfuge des étudiants les plus talentueux vers les moins doués, mais riches. L'estimation du modèle proposé montre que la corruption est corrélée négativement aux taux d'inscription aux études supérieures. Il faut noter que ce résultat empirique peut bien trouver son explication dans l'analyse théorique présentée plus haut que des étudiants initialement plus doués disposés à faire de longues études finissent par l'abréger du fait de l'enrichissement illicite de par la corruption de ceux qui sont initialement moins doués et qui ne se sentent pas concernés par des études trop longues. Un tel résultat peut bien illustrer la très forte propension des jeunes à arrêter trop tôt les études pour des activités de rue et du marché informel. Un tel comportement, certes rationnel, met malheureusement en péril grave tout le système éducatif.

Si rien n'est fait pour rétribuer la connaissance à sa juste valeur, la médiocrité deviendra la norme, auquel cas le système éducatif court tout droit vers l'extinction. A ce propos, l'importance du capital humain dans le processus de la croissance et du développement doit interpeller les gouvernants, notamment ceux des pays en développement à revenu faible.

Références

Acemoglu, D.and J. Angrist, 2000, "How large are the social returns to education? Evidence from compulsory schooling laws", in Bermanke, B. S. and Rogoff, K.(Eds), *NBER Macroeconomic Annual,* MIT Press.

Al-Marhubi, F., 2004, "The Determinants of Governance: A Cross-country Analysis", *Contemporary Economic Policy*, Vol.22 (3), pp.394-406.

Ali, A. M. and Hodan, S. I., 2003, "Determinant of Economic Corruption: A cross country comparison", *Cato Journal*, Washington Vol. 22(3), pp. 449-469.

Azariadis, A. J., and A. Drazen, 1990, "Treshold Externalities in Economic Development" , *Quaterly Journal of Economics,* Vol. 104 (2), pp.: 501-526.

Bardhan, Pranab, K., 1996, "The nature of Institutional Impediments to Economic Development", *Working Paper*, no. c96-066, Dept. of Economics, University. of California at Berkeley, March.

Bardhan, Pranab,K., 1997, "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues", *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol.35 (3), pp.1320-1346.

Barro, R.J. (1991), "Economic Growth in a Cross - section of Countries", *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* Vol. 106 (2), pp.407-443.

Barro, R.J., 1997, *Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-country Empirical Study*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Barro, R.J., and Sala-i-Martin, X. 1995, *Economic Growth,* McGraw Hill, New York, NY

Beck, P. J. and Maher, M. W., 1986, "A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in thin

Becker, G., 1993, *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special References,* Chicago University Press.

Markets," *Economic Letters*, Vol.20 (1), pp 1-5.

Besley, T. and Mc Laren, J., 1993,"Axes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives" , *Economic Journal,* Vol.103(416), pp. 119-141.

Campos, J.E., Lien, D. and Pradhan, S., 1999, "The impact of corruption on investment: Predictability matters" *World Development*, Vol. 27 (6), pp.1059-1067.

Farida, M. and Ahmadi-Esfahani, F., 2008, "Corruption and Economic Growth in Lebanon", Paper presented at *the Australian Agricultural and Resources Economics Society Conference series, no 6043*, Canberra, Australia, Feb. 5-8.

Huntington, S.P., 1968, *Political Ordering Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kraster, L and Ganer, G., 2004, "The Missing Incentive Corruption: Anti-corruption and Re-election" in Kornai, J and Rose-Akerman, R. (Eds), Building a Trust Worthy State in Post-socialist Transition, New York, Palgrave.

Krueger, Anne, O., 1974, "The political Economy of the rent-seeking Society", American Economic Review, Vol. 64 (3).

Leff, Nathaniel H., 1964, "Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption", *The American Behavioral Scientist,* Vol. 8 (3), pp. 8-14.

Lui, Francis T., 1985, "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery", *Journal of Political Economy.* Vol. 93 (4), pp. 760-781.

Lucas, R.E., 1988, "On the Mechanics of Economic Development", *Journal of Monetary Economics,* Vol. 22 (1), pp. 3-42.

Mauro, P, 1995, "Corruption and Economic Growth", *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* Vol. 110 (3), pp 681-712.

Mauro, P., 1996 "The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure: A Cross-country Analysis", in Kimberly A.E.(Ed), *Corruption and the Global Economy,* the Institute for international economics, Washington.

Mankiw, G., Romer, D. and Weil, D., 1992, "A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 1107 (2), pp. 407-437.

Murphy, K.M., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 1993, "Why is Rent-seeking so Costly to Growth?", *American Economic Review,* Vol. 83 (2), pp.409-414.

Nobuo, A., Yusaku, H. and Masayo, S., 2005, " Short-run and Long-run Effects of Corruption on Economic Growth: Evidence from State-level Cross-section Data for the United States", *CIRJE Disscussion Papers*, June 9.

Ouattara, W., 2007, "Dépenses publiques, corruption et croissance dans les pays de l'Union Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (UEMOA): une analyse de la causalité au sens de Granger », *Revue Africaine de l'Intégration,* Vol. 1 (1), pp.139-160.

Pellegrini, L. and Gerlagh, R., 2004, "Corruption's effect on Growth and its transmission channels",.KYKLOS, Vol.57 (3), pp.429-456.

Podobnik, B., Shao, J, Njavro, D., Ivanov, P. Ch. And Stanley, H. E., " Influence of corruption on Economic Growth Rate and Foreign Investment", *The European Physical Journal B*., Vol. 63 , pp. 547-550.

Psacharopoulos G., 1994, "Returns to Investment in Education: A Global Update". World Development, Vol.22 (9), pp. 1325-1345.

Roberg, R., 2004, *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Romer, P.M., 1990, "Endogenous Technical Change", *Journal of political Economy,* Vol. 98 (5), pp. 71-102.

Rose-Ackerman, S., 1996, "When is Corruption Harmful?", Background paper for the 1997 World Development Report, the World Bank, Washington.

Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W., 1993, "Corruption", *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* Vol.108 (3) pp 599-617.

Stockey, N.L., 1991, "Human Capital, Product Quality and Growth", *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* Vol. 106 (2), pp. 587-616.

Svenson, J., 2005, "Eigth Questions about Corruption", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol.19 (3), pp. 19-42.

Tanzi V., 1998, "Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures". *IMF Staff Papers,* Vol..45 (3).

Tanzi V. and Davoodi, H. R., 1997, "Corruption, Public Investment and Growth" *IMF Working Papers,* no. 97/139.

Van Rijckeghen, .C. and Weber, B., 2201, "Bureaucratic Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Wages in the Civil Service Affect Corruption and by How Much?", *Journal of Development Economics,* Vol.65, pp. 307-331.

Ventelon, B., 2001, "Equilibres et stabilité de la corruption dans un modèle de croissance: l'effet de la rémunération des politiciens", *L'actualité économique,* Vol.77 (3), pp.339-356.

Wade, Robert, 1985, "The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State is no Better at Development", *World Development,* Vol.13 (4), pp. 467-497.

World Bank (2000), *Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate*, Washington, D.C.Refus de promotion.

Africa Development, Vol. XXXVIII, Nos 1&2, 2013, pp. 151–170

(ISSN 0850-3907)

Changing the Culture of Migration? Attitudes towards Education among Former Basotho Labour Migrants to South African Mines

F. Maphosa* and R. N. Morojele**

Abstract

Until late in the 1990s, employment for unskilled and uneducated able-bodied Basotho men on South African mines was usually available. As a result, the education of male children in most Basotho households was not prioritised. In the 1990s, massive retrenchments took place at the mines, resulting in many Basotho men being retrenched and repatriated. Most of those retrenched did not have any formal education and were generally unskilled. Many of the ex-miners believed that they were retrenched to make way for an educated workforce. Back home, they experienced problems getting employment because of their lack of formal education. These experiences, combined with efforts by the government of Lesotho and its development partners to promote education, have led to a change in the attitudes of the former miners towards education. Most of them now have positive attitudes towards education as they perceive it as a more secure and more sustainable means of getting employment and a vehicle for economic and social mobility. Based on qualitative data obtained from former mine workers this paper provides evidence that as a result of new realities, former migrants are developing positive attitudes towards education. The change in attitude towards education can however, only evolve into a change in the culture of migration if, over time, the benefits of education outweigh those of migration.

Résumé

Jusqu'à la fin des années 1990, il y avait généralement de l'emploi pour les migrants basotho valides non qualifiés et non instruits. En conséquence, l'éducation des enfants de sexe masculin dans la plupart des ménages basotho n'était pas une priorité. Cependant, dans les années 1990, il y a eu des licenciements massifs dans les mines. Ces licenciements massifs ont touché beaucoup de travailleurs basotho et entrainé leur rapatriement. La plupart des licenciés étaient non instruits et généralement non qualifiés. Beaucoup de ces

* Department of Sociology, University of Botswana. Email: france.maphosa@yahoo.com

** Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Social Work, National University of Lesotho. Email: maleboo@webmail.co.za

ex-mineurs croyaient avoir été licenciés pour faire place à une main-d'œuvre instruite. Mais de retour chez eux, ils ont eu du mal à trouver un emploi du fait qu'ils n'étaient pas instruits. Ces expériences, associées aux efforts déployés par le gouvernement du Lesotho et son partenaire au développement pour promouvoir l'éducation, ont conduit à un changement dans les attitudes des anciens mineurs en matière d'éducation. La plupart d'entre eux ont maintenant une attitude positive en matière d'éducation scolaire dans la mesure où ils perçoivent celle-ci comme un moyen plus sûr et plus durable d'obtenir un emploi et un véhicule pour la mobilité économique et sociale. Sur la base des données qualitatives recueillies auprès d'anciens mineurs, cette étude souligne qu'en raison des nouvelles réalités, les anciens migrants développent des attitudes positives en matière d'éducation scolaire. Toutefois, ce changement d'attitude en matière d'éducation scolaire doit s'accompagner d'un changement en matière de culture de migration si, au fil du temps, les avantages de l'éducation scolaire l'emportent sur ceux de la migration.

Introduction

When migration becomes an expectation and a normal part of life of a community, a culture of migration may evolve (Brettell and Holified 2000), so that migration becomes ingrained into the repertoire of behaviours and values of members of that community (Brettell 2003). Kandel and Massey (2002) assert that a culture of migration exists when migration becomes so deeply rooted that the prospect of transnational movement becomes normative. At that point members of a community see migration as a normal part of the life course, representing a marker of the transition to manhood in addition to being a widely accepted vehicle for economic mobility.

A culture of migration therefore usually develops as a response to a community's experience of the benefits of migration. Labour migration, especially, is not just an escape from poverty and unemployment, it is a route to upward social mobility for both the migrants and their families and a source of prestige (Maphosa 2011; Mangezvo, undated). As pointed out by Ali (2007) a culture of migration includes the ideas, practices and cultural artefacts that reinforce the celebration of migration and migrants.

As a result of the long history of migration from other countries in the region to South Africa, several writers have observed the existence of a culture of migration in migrant-sending countries. For example Schapera (1947) observed that in Botswana, a stint underground in South African mines had come to substitute for more traditional forms of initiation. Murray (1981) observed that in Lesotho almost all men and a few women spent most of their middle ages absent from their homes working in South Africa, especially in the mines. Maphosa (2004) found that in some parts of the Matabeleland region in Zimbabwe, migrating to South Africa marked the

coming of age of young men. In fact those who had not been to South Africa were considered as unsophisticated.

Most of the studies on the culture of migration in Southern Africa have concentrated on its impact on the communities of origin. Very few have focused on the realities that have led to or can lead to a change in the culture of migration. This paper seeks to make a contribution towards the filing of this gap.

Statement of the Problem

Due to a combination of historical, geographical and socio-cultural factors, the relationship between Lesotho and South Africa is unique. Lesotho is totally surrounded by South Africa. As an enclave economy and with limited resources, Lesotho is more dependent on South Africa than other countries in the region. As a result Basotho started migrating to South Africa as early as the nineteenth century to seek employment on farms and in towns in the Orange Free State and the Cape Colony. Others were engaged as individual wage labourers in diamond mines, railway works and towns (Kimble 1999).When gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand in 1886, there was an unprecedented rise in the demand for miners and many Basotho men responded to the growing demand that was created by the gold discoveries.

The demand for labour in South Africa came at a time when agricultural production, which was Lesotho's primary source of livelihood, was depreciating dramatically. During this period, Basotho cultivated land for subsistence and used surplus produce to trade with fellow Africans through the barter system. They had become leading suppliers of crops to their neighbouring countries such that they became known as 'the granary of Southern Africa' (Keegan 1986; Kimble 1992). However, adverse weather conditions such as severe droughts undermined agricultural production. The dry weather persisted, and simultaneously the soil quality depreciated and yields lowered significantly since the time Basotho had originally started cultivating (Edredge 1993). The severe drought was followed by the even the more devastating rinderpest, which also decreased agricultural output.

When agricultural produce and trading opportunities diminished because of unfavourable weather conditions, Basotho were forced to consider alternative strategies to meet their basic needs. Migration to South Africa to seek employment became one such option. Gradually, labour migration to South Africa became a necessary element in the economy of most Basotho households (Keegan 1986; Edredge 1993; Crush et al. 1991). Furthermore, engagement in the mines proved to be a favourable option because returns from the mines were far better than returns from agriculture.

The high demand for labour in the South African mines led to the introduction of strategies intended to compel Basotho men to migrate to the mines for employment. The strategies included the introduction of a hut tax, the use of mine recruiting agencies and the involvement of government bodies to manage this system. The government of Lesotho was eager to encourage its men to participate in labour migration. This was because it generated substantial amounts of revenue through charging the mining companies for every employee sent and the deferred payment system in which a large proportion of workers' wages were paid into a special account in the state-owned National Development Bank (Morojele 2004).

As a result of the long history of migration from Lesotho to South Africa, a culture of migration evolved among Basotho. However, in the 1990s among other factors falling profits led to a massive retrenchment of workers from South African mines. Many Basotho men were retrenched and repatriated. Most of them were uneducated and unskilled. On returning home, they found that the skills and knowledge they had acquired at the mines were not relevant. This study sought to investigate the impact of the retrenchments on the attitudes of former mine workers towards education.

Objectives of the Study

Main Objective

The main objective of the study was to find out if the retrenchments of Basotho from the South African mines had led to a change in their attitudes towards education.

Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study were:

- To investigate the attitudes of the former mine workers towards education before they were retrenched.
- To find out what the former mine workers attributed their retrenchment to and how consistent these attributions were with management's reasons for retrenchment.
- To investigate the attitudes of the mine workers towards education after their retrenchment.

Methodology

This paper is based on interviews with former mine workers in Lesotho. The study adopted a qualitative design focusing on the life histories of the former mine workers. Unstructured interviews were conducted with the

former mine workers to obtain information about why they had chosen to work in the mines, why they thought they had been retrenched and how this has affected their outlook in general. Data were collected from former mine workers who were met at the premises of three organisations, namely, the Department of Labour, the Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA), and ER Ramsden Bleskop. The first one is a government department responsible for employment while the other two organisations are mine recruiting agencies located in Maseru. TEBA recruits men who work at gold and platinum mines, while ER Ramsden Bleskop recruits workers for mainly platinum and coal mines and shaft sinkers for all mines. These organisations were located in Maseru, the capital city of Lesotho. Many of the former miners had relocated to Maseru after retrenchment with the hope of either getting employment in Lesotho or being re-hired as mine workers in South Africa. Due to the centralisation of recruitment services for these organisations, even those who had homes in the rural areas had to move to Maseru in the hope of obtaining employment. TEBA for example had reduced its functions in the other districts of Lesotho with recruiting activities being undertaken only at the Maseru office.

Availability sampling which is a non-probability sampling technique was used. This means that there was no systematic or structured method of selecting research respondents. This is because of the lack of a sampling frame from which respondents could be selected. The exact number and personal details of retrenched mineworkers were not known. Available statistics of labour migration from Lesotho to South Africa mainly referred to those who were still engaged in the mines. As a result these statistics were not useful for the purposes of this study whose focus was on those who had lost their jobs. It was not possible to develop any systematic list from which the respondents could be selected as there was no guarantee that those selected could be found when required. The respondents were therefore selected from those who were present at the time of collecting data and were willing to be interviewed. A total of twenty-six in-depth interviews were conducted with former miners of various ages who had worked for different mining companies, in different positions and for varying lengths of time.

Literature Review

A culture of migration exists when within a community migration has become so prevalent that it affects the values and perceptions of its members in a way that increases the probability for future migration (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Ali, Pellerino and Taylor 1993). Despite the existence of a substantial

amount of literature on the culture of migration, Ali (2007) observed that a clear definition or an outline of the contents of a culture of migration has not been advanced in the literature. Researchers, however, agree that a culture of migration has developed in a community when migration becomes deeply ingrained into the repertoire of the people's behaviours and values (Brettell 1993), when migration becomes so deeply rooted that the prospect of international movement becomes normative (Kandel and Massey 2002), when migration becomes an expectation and a normal part of the life course (Brettell and Holifield 2000), when migration becomes so ingrained in the culture that young men are not allowed to marry until they have gone abroad (IRIN 2011), or when migration becomes a habit (Timmerman 2008).

Several writers have observed the existence of a culture of migration among some Mexican communities which have high rates of migration to the USA (Kandel and Massey 2000; Gibson 2005). In such communities, young people expect to live and work in the United States at some point in their lives. The aspiration to migrate is actually transmitted across generations and through social networks. As observed by Ali (2007), the culture of migration has been a prominent theme in studies of Mexican migration to the US. It has not, however, been a common theme in studies of migration beyond this stream.

Some writers have observed cultures of migration in countries whose economies are dependent on South Africa (Schapera 1947; Boeder 1974; de Vletter 1981; Murray 1981; Hishongwa 1991; Weyl 1991; Hobane 1996; Maphosa 2004; Morojele 2004). For example Weyl (1991) observes that migration has become an integral part of such societies. As early as 1947, Schapera observed that in Botswana, after a stint underground had come to substitute more traditional forms of initiation. Murray (1981) observed that in Lesotho almost all men, and a few women, spend most of their middle ages absent from their homes. Maphosa (2004) found that in some parts of Matabeleland, migrating to South Africa marked the coming of age of young men. In fact those who had not been to South Africa were considered as unsophisticated. Despite the existence of a substantial volume of literature on the evolution of a culture of migration in Southern Africa, literature on the factors that may lead to a change in the cultures of migration is still scarce. This paper makes a contribution towards the filling of this gap in literature.

Definition of Concepts

The following are definitions adopted for the major concepts used in this paper:

- *Attitude*: An attitude is a predisposition or tendency to respond either positively or negatively towards a certain idea, object, person or situation, (http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/attitude.html). In this paper, the attitudes of the miners refer to their predispositions towards education which are likely to influence their choices regarding their own or their children's education.
- *Culture*: Culture generally refers to a complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by human beings as members of society (Taylor 1871). Specifically, a culture of migration is made up of those ideas, practices and artefacts that reinforce the celebration of migration and migrants (Ali 2007).
- *Education*: Education refers to the process by which individuals formally or informally acquire knowledge and skills. In this paper, however, education is used in a limited sense to refer to the formalised processes of acquiring knowledge and skills. This refers to attending school or other formally arranged training activities.

Theoretical Framework

The analysis of the findings of this study was informed by Daniel Katz's (1960) functional theory of attitude formation and change as well as Anthony Giddens's (1984) structuration theory. According to Katz, an individual forms, holds onto or changes an attitude because of the function that attitude performs for the individual. In Katz's scheme of things the trigger to change an attitude is either from within an individual or may be in the environment within which the individual exists. Structuration theory bridges the gap between explanations of human behaviour as a response to external factors (structure) and those that focus on individual choice (agency). It helps us avoid the implication of cultural determinism when referring to the 'culture of migration'. Cultural determinism is the view that culture determines human nature. It is a view of human beings as passive creatures who do whatever their culture tells them to do.

Human beings, however, do not passively respond to a 'reified entity called culture' (Ratner 2000). Culture is both a medium and an outcome of human conduct. Human beings are, at the same time, creators and products of culture. This means that culture, in this case the culture of migration, is subject to change as people try to adapt to changes in their environment.

Findings

Educational background of Migrants

The educational levels of Basotho mine migrant workers were generally very low with two respondents reporting that they had never attended any formal school. The rest had attended formal school but had not completed their primary education. This factor is attributable to the widespread practice amongst Basotho of discouraging male children from pursuing formal education or training (Morojele 2004). The general perception has been that even without formal education they would still be employable in the mines in South Africa (UNICEF 2001). Young Basotho men underent a traditional education (initiation) and upon completion were expected to migrate to South Africa for employment in the mines. Basotho culture expects men to provide for their families and success for them is measured by their capability to provide for their families (Thompson and Pleck 1987; Burn 1996; Mills and Ssewakiryanga 2005). Employment in South African mines gradually became one of the most important means to that end.

The 1997 Labour Force Survey provides evidence of the low educational levels of Basotho men. It indicates that there was an increase in the number of job-seekers who registered with the Lesotho Employment Office subsequent to large-scale mining retrenchments during 1993. It found that the majority of them had primary education while a significant number had no formal schooling at all. The respondents gave various reasons for their low levels of formal education, although all of them pointed to the low priority given to education, especially of men, among Basotho. One of the two respondents who had never attended formal school stated:

> At the time I was growing up, only a few parents understood the importance of education and encouraged their children to go to school. Most families, including mine, were eager to see their sons employed in the mines in South Africa. I was raised up knowing that I would be employed in the mines. I never attended any formal school.

The other stated:

> I have never been to school all my life. I grew up herding family livestock and therefore did not have a chance to go to school. When I became of age I migrated to South Africa to work in the mines. I worked have been working in the mines until I was retrenched.

Among the 24 who had attended school, only three had completed high school. The rest had dropped out before completing either primary or secondary schools. The reasons for dropping out of school at any stage were similar to those for not attending school at all.

As in the case of those who had never attended school at all, respondents who had dropped out of school gave various reasons for doing so although the reasons also pointed out to the low priority given to education compared to other personal or family considerations. Some indicated that they were forced out of school because of various family problems, which included failure to pay school fees. For example one of them stated:

> My family experienced severe economic problems and could not afford to pay for my schooling and I was forced to drop out of school. Considering the fact that I was the eldest son in my family, I felt obliged to assist my parents with looking after my sisters and brothers. I had to drop out school to look for employment in the mines.

Another respondent reported that he had to drop out of school when his father who had been the family's sole bread winner and the one responsible for his school fees died. He stated:

> I dropped out of school in standard three when my father died because I had to take care of my mother and younger brother.

Yet another stated that he dropped out because his brother who was his benefactor withdrew his support. He stated:

> My brother informed me that he could not afford to pay my fees anymore and advised me to look for employment.

Some of the respondents indicated that they had to drop out of school to look after their family livestock. This is evidence of the importance of livestock in Basotho household economies. This means that for such families livestock were a better form of investment even with regards to the inter-generational transfer of wealth. One of the respondents in this category stated:

> My father owned a lot of cattle and always made it clear that his sons would not attend formal school. He believed that it was a waste of time, especially for boys. To him, the way to secure our future was for us to help look after the family livestock.

There were respondents who dropped out of school because they had reached the stage where they were expected to start working and prepare to start their own families. One such respondent stated:

> In 1989 I obtained my Standard Seven certificate and enrolled for Form One, but soon dropped out and joined the traditional initiation programme. When I completed the programme I had come of age so I could not go back to school, so I decided to go to South Africa to look for employment in the mines.

Another one asserted:

> I dropped out of school at Standard Four. I had to drop out of school because I had come of age and had to start working.

According to Lesotho Laws, the age of majority is 18 years. The Lesotho Labour Court Order of 1992 prohibits the employment of people under this age. Turning 18 is therefore a very significant milestone in the lives of Basotho youths because it makes them legally employable even outside the country. Some of them so desperately desire to be employed that they alter their stated age. To illustrate this point one respondent stated:

> Although I am actually 26 years old now my passport reflects that I am older than that. I was so desperate to go to the mines that I altered my age to appear older than I was.

The availability of large numbers of able bodied men without any formal education or training worked in favour of the mine owners because they were assured of cheap labour. Their operations depended on an unlimited supply of uneducated and unskilled able bodied men who could be easily exploited (Crush et al. 1991).

Reasons for Working in the Mines

The main reason given by the respondents for their decisions to migrate to South Africa to look for employment in the mines was a rational one: there were limited employment opportunities in Lesotho. One of them stated:

> Working in the mines is nothing special. We go to work there because there are no jobs in our country. If we could be employed in this country there would be no need for us to go there.

While limited employment opportunities may be one of the push factors it is certainly not the only or even the major push factor in labour migration from Lesotho to South Africa. For example, some of the former miners had never attempted to look for employment in Lesotho before leaving for South Africa.

Besides limited employment opportunities in Lesotho some respondents stated that they opted to work in South Africa because South African employers offered better wages than those in Lesotho. This comparison was based mainly on information from those who had been to the mines. Where a culture of migration has taken root, the decision to migrate is often not a rational one. It is often influenced by often exaggerated accounts of work abroad and the often extravagant lifestyles of migrants when they visit their home communities as in the lifestyle of *injiva*, described by Maphosa (2011).

One respondent for example explained that before leaving for South Africa, he had moved from one employer to another in Lesotho with the hope of earning a better salary, but without success. He decided to leave for South Africa because he perceived salaries in Lesotho to be very low compared to

those in the latter country, a perception based on accounts of those who had been to South Africa before. The mere perception that salaries were higher in South Africa than in Lesotho, without any specific knowledge of salary levels, is sufficient motivation for migration. Peer pressure therefore had a significant contribution to the decision to leave for many of the former migrants. One of the respondents pointed out:

> ... seeing my peers coming back from the mines looking smart, confident and rich impressed me. I told myself that one day I would look like them.

As pointed out by Ali (2007), a culture of migration involves the ideas, practices and artefacts that reinforce the celebration of migration and migrants. Brettell (2003) uses the term *vaidade* which means vanity, to describe the tendency by migrants to show off new found wealth from jewellery to cars and houses. *Vaidade* also involves the presentation of the self in public, including the migrants' manner of dressing, the cars they drive and the house they build. Maphosa (2011) found the tendency to show off prevalent among *injiva* (migrants) in the Matabeleland region of Zimbabwe. As a result, migrants become role models with all the symbols of success including money, cars, nice clothes and beautiful modern houses. This perception of a good life abroad has been found to constitute a pull factor in many areas that have a long history of out-migration.

Mine Retrenchments

Many factors contributed to the large-scale retrenchment of migrant labourers from the South African mines. Mine management, for instance, attributed the retrenchments to the influence of the former government's internalisation policy, and the uncertain and relatively low prices of minerals on the world markets. Thoahlane and Coplan (1995) argue that the increasing mechanisation, which attracted many companies because it saved them expenditure on increasing wages and benefits for the workers, also contributed significantly to the situation. However, the 1987 mineworkers' strike and unfavourable price of gold on the world markets were the most crucial factors that led to the retrenchments.

After the emergence of the National Union Mineworkers in 1983, mine management was pressured to improve working conditions of the miners, especially to increase wages. The NUM demanded a 55 percent wage increase, while mine management offered increases ranging from 17 to 23 on gold mines, and 15 to 23 percent on coal mines (Crush et al. 1991). Failure by the two parties to reach an agreement on this matter resulted in the 1987 strike. The mineworkers' strike continued for several weeks and caused substantial losses in mine production. Mine management tried various

strategies to break the strike but failed. Eventually they started dismissing workers and an estimated 60, 000 workers lost their jobs by the end of the strike (Markharm and Mothibeli 1987).

The price of gold on the international market in the years that followed the 1987 mineworkers' strike caused marked economic contractions in the South African economy (Bezuidenhout 1999). The gold price decreased from US $850 an ounce in 1980 to US $500 an ounce in 1987 and it lowered further by 1996 (Monyau 2000). To deal with the lowering gold prices, mine management decided to retrench workers and counteract operational losses (Siedman 1993). In some companies expired mineworkers contracts were not renewed while in others the response to the gold crisis was closing down of their operations. Gold mining industries lost nearly 180,000 jobs to downscaling and retrenchments as a result of mine closures (Seidman 1993). The drop in the gold price therefore had an immediate impact on the Lesotho economy because many Basotho men were retrenched because of the restructuring and downscaling of the South African mining industry (CBL 2001).

All informants indicated that management explained the reasons for retrenchment. The explanation, which seems to have been generally consistent across different mines, was that the price of gold had depreciated on the international market and operations had become unviable. Some companies informed their employees that they were retrenching because they had decided to use subcontracting companies.

Despite the explanations given by management for the retrenchments, some of the former workers had different explanations for why the retrenchments took place. The explanations given by the retrenchees included those that agreed with management that the retrenchments were caused by viability problems in the industry. Other reasons given by the former workers included the internalisation policy, xenophobia and lack of education. One respondent who believed that the companies were implementing a policy of replacing foreigners with locals stated:

> They just wanted to get rid of us foreigners and replace us with locals. We know there is a policy that says so. It is unfortunate that at the time when South Africans were not interested to work in the mines they employed people from outside South Africa to work in the mines. They employed us when it suited them. Now that the South African are getting interested in working at the mines, they have to send us away.

One of the respondents who cited xenophobia as the reason for retrenchments stated that members of the local community from the area in which the mine was located were very hostile to foreigners. He alleged that this situation was exacerbated by the *modus operandi* of their trade union, which preferred

to hold its meetings in the villages. This gave the impression that they served the interests of the locals rather than all the workers at the mine. He stated:

> They always told us that the mine was established on their land. They did not want any outsiders to work in the mine. The mine owners had to send us away to avoid xenophobic killings at the mine.

Some of the respondents believed that the retrenchments were specifically meant to remove Basotho and not just foreigners in general, from the mines. One respondent who held this view stated:

> We were told that the mines were retrenching because the price of gold had gone down internationally and companies were not making enough money to pay us and keep operating. Yes, this is the information that we were given about retrenchment. However, when we looked at the situation closely it appeared to us that the industry was targeting Basotho workers only.

Notwithstanding viability problems the desire to replace foreigners with locals, therefore, made a significant contribution to the retrenchments. With the movement of the rural black population to the urban areas, high unemployment levels in South Africa became more pressing (Morojele 2004). Crush (1995:19) argues that:

> ... the historical argument that South Africans would not work in the mines for the wages that the industry could afford to pay ceased to have much credibility.

This was particularly because wages increased sharply with the rise in the gold price. To address the growing level of unemployment in South Africa, an internalisation policy was introduced, and mining industries began to replace foreign labour with South Africans. Mining companies started to employ directly at their own gates (Crush et al. 1991), which was far more cost effective for them because they did not have to pay recruiting agencies for their services. The implementation of this policy reduced the number of novice recruitments from foreign countries such as Lesotho, and it lowered the general intake of foreign labour significantly (McNamara 1995). Preference was given to South Africans, especially for long-term employment categories, such as jobs in administration and skilled production. However, foreign workers still filled the highest skilled positions as a result of their long service in the industry. Since novices from outside South Africa were deliberately not employed, there was a noticeable age difference between the foreign employees, who were older than the new South African recruits (Crush 1995).

Lack of education was mentioned by 19 out of the 26 former mine workers interviewed, indicating a general belief among them that their

retrenchment was motivated by the desire by their former employers to replace them with those who were better educated. This perception had a significant contribution to the development of positive attitudes towards education by the former mine workers.

Attitudes Towards Education Before Retrenchment

Before retrenchment, respondents generally had a nonchalant attitude towards education. That is partly of the reason why many of them either did not attend school at all or dropped out before completing primary or secondary levels. Some respondents stated that they opted out of school despite advice from parents and other relatives not to do so. One such respondent stated:

> My parents tried to convince me to continue with my education but I refused. I did not think education was important and I would mind the family cattle. After initiation, I continued to take care of my parents' livestock until I left for the mines.

For others, they could tolerate school for as long as they were still under the age at which they could be legally employed in the mines. As a result, attending school was a way of passing the time while waiting to become of age. The following statement by one of the respondents illustrates this point:

> In 1989 I obtained my Standard Seven certificate, and enrolled for Form One. I dropped out of school before I completed Form One and went for initiation. After the initiation, I had become of age so I went decided to go to the mines.

Another one stated:

> I did not attend school for a long time. I only went as far as Standard Four but had to drop out because I had become of age and had to start working.

These findings are consistent with those of Maphosa (2011) in his study of a migrant sending community near the Zimbabwe-South African border where many young people remained at school only until they felt ready to go to South Africa. Some of them did not even wait for their results after writing their school examinations in December.

Education in Lesotho

Lesotho has been offering free primary education since 2000. The revised Education Act of 2010 makes primary education free and compulsory. The Act makes it an offence for parents to negligently fail to ensure that their children are enrolled and regularly attend school. While opportunities for education are being made available, formal employment opportunities continue to decrease. Self-employment appears to be the alternative for the many

school leavers, university graduates, and retrenched mineworkers. As a result, various organisations have initiated skills training programmes for former migrants. The Migrant Labourers Development Agency (MDA) coordinates a two-week micro-enterprise development programme sponsored by NUM, targeting rural areas where most of the retrenched migrant workers live (Philip 1995). The government of Lesotho also established the Ntlafatso Skills Training Centre (NSTC), with the aim of equipping retrenched mineworkers with skills that would enable them to fill productive employment opportunities or to start their own businesses. The three-month programmes offered include plumbing and carpentry. Both initiatives offer programmes free of charge.

Attitudes Towards Education After Retrenchments

Evidence from this study indicates a general change towards a positive attitude to education by many former mine workers. This is attributable to their retrenchment experiences, some of whom attribute it to low levels of education, failure to secure employment back home because of lack of formal education, and usable skills and the efforts by the government of Lesotho and its development partners in the provision of education.

Out of the twenty-six men interviewed, twenty-four of them reported that they now considered education to be important. For some respondents, retrenchment marked a turning point in their lives as an experience that has led them to appreciate the importance of education. Many regretted their decision to leave school when they had the opportunity to continue, especially those whose parents were able and willing to pay for their schooling. Others blamed their parents for failure to appreciate the importance of education and their consequent failure to facilitate and encourage them to pursue it. There are respondents who expressed regret at not attending *skuru mine* (mine schools) while they were still employed. One of them commented:

> I don't think there is anything more important than education with respect to securing livelihoods. Education is extremely important. Everybody should be encouraged to pursue some education.

Another one stated:

> It is only now that I understand the importance education. I wasted my time by dropping out of school to go to the mines. If I had not defied my parents and continued with my education I might have not worked in the mines. I behaved immaturely by deciding to leave school and was attracted by the immediate benefits of working in the mines and failed to think about my future.

The former migrants generally attributed their retrenchment and failure to secure jobs back home to lack of education. One of pointed out:

> Due to my lack of education or skills, I cannot possibly obtain a job in this country. What can I present to the employers? They ask for certificates before they can consider you for employment. Lack of education is a serious limitation for me, it is big problem.

Although the former migrants generally perceived education as an important tool in securing sustainable livelihoods, some of them believed that they were past school going age. They however, expressed the desire to facilitate their children in getting an education. One of them pointed out:

> Well, I cannot do it now because of my age. I feel I am now too old for that. I just want to ensure that my children go to school.

There were some, however, who still had aspirations to get education or skills training. These believed that the acquisition of knowledge and skills would enhance their chances of getting jobs back home. One of them who indicated that he aspired to be a teacher stated:

> ... a teacher has a long working life and there is never a time when he/she does not have a job.

One of the major concerns expressed by the ex-miners is that the mines were no longer interested in an uneducated and unskilled workforce.

Thabane and Guy (1984) found that retrenchment and subsequent inability to secure alternative employment back home led to a sense of failure and disappointment. Daniels (2002) observes that the economic and social challenges faced by the former mine workers have made them realise that skills development is not an option.

Discussion

Asis (2006) observes that the evolution of the culture of migration in the Philippines was aided by the institutionalisation of migration. He points out that the government of the Philippines facilitates migration, regulates the operations of the recruitment agencies and looks out for the rights of its migrant workers. This is because the remittances sent back home by migrants make an important contribution to the country's economy. As a result of the country's extreme economic dependency on South Africa, the government of Lesotho has historically encouraged its young men to migrate to South Africa to seek employment. Labour migration has always been institutionalised through the contract labour system. The government of Lesotho did not

pay much attention to the provision of education because employment in the mines did not require any formal education or skills. This was also to the benefit of the mine owners (Morojele 2004).

Since 2000 government began to offer free primary education in order to improve the literacy levels in the country, with the ultimate objective of alleviating the unemployment crisis (Morojele 2004). The government considered education and training to be effective poverty eradication strategies and a prerequisite for people to participate in the labour market. Organisations both inside and outside Lesotho have initiated training for migrant labourers to curb the unemployment problem. Combined with the general perception among retrenched migrants that they were retrenched because they had limited or nor educational qualifications, this has led to more positive attitudes towards education by the former miners. The positive attitudes towards education were in anticipation of the benefits of education, particularly that it would enhance the employability of the former miners back home. This change in attitudes towards education is indicative of a change in the culture of migration that has been prevalent among many Basotho communities. The changes in attitudes towards education can only evolve into a change in the culture of migration if there are tangible benefits accruing from pursuing an education rather than migrating at an early age. This means that besides providing education, the country has to develop its capacity to create jobs to absorb its graduates. The problem is that Lesotho has a very low employment creation capacity (CBL 2001). According to Gay (2000: 66) since the onset of the retrenchments,

> 'The problem is becoming increasingly acute as the population continues to grow, and employment opportunities consistently fail to meet an ever-increasing demand for jobs'.

As the population increases, jobs increasingly become scarce and migration continues to be a more attractive route to employment and social and economic mobility. The country might, in the absence of large-scale institutionalised migration in the form of the contract labour system, experience an increase in irregular migration.

Conclusion

The notion of the culture of migration is used in migration literature to refer to a way of life where migration is a norm. It is a very useful concept in explaining why migration takes place in some communities. Like many cultural explanations of human behaviour, the concept of the culture of migration is at risk of being employed in a deterministic way in which culture

is presented as a constant which constrains human beings to behave in particular ways. The culture of migration is a phenomenon that develops and changes as people relate to changing realities in their environment. A culture of migration develops where the community benefits more from migration than non-migration. This means that a culture of migration will change if the benefits of migration are outweighed by those of non-migration.

References

Ali, S., 2007, '"Go west young man": the culture of migration among Muslims in Hyderabad, India', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33 (1): 37-58.

Asis, M. B., 2006, 'The Philippines' culture of migration', Migration Policy Information, Washington, DC.

Bezuidenhout, A., 1999, 'Between a rock and a hard place: productivity agreements in gold mining', *South African Labour Bulletin*, 23 (4): 69-74.

Boeder, R. B., 1974, 'Malawians abroad: The history of labour emigration from Malawi to its neighbours, 1890 to the present', Unpublished PhD thesis, submitted to Michigan State University, Department of History.

Brettell, C. B., 2003, *Anthropology and Migration: Essays on Transnationalism, Ethnicity and Identity*, Walnut Creek/Oxford: Altamira Press.

Brettell, C. B., and Holifield, J. F., 2000, 'Introduction: migration theory: talking across disciplines', in Brettell, C. B. and Holifield, J. F., eds., *Migration theory: Talking Across Disciplines*, New York: Routledge.

Burn, S.M., 1996, *The Social Psychology of Gender*, California: McGraw Hill.

Central Bank of Lesotho (CBL), 2001. *Quarterly Review*, September 2001, XX (3), Maseru, Kingdom of Lesotho.

Crush, J., Jeeves, A. and Yudelman, D., 1991, *South Africa's Labour Empire: A history of Black Migrancy to the Gold Mines*, Cape Town: David Philip.

Crush, J. and James, W., 1995, *Labour migrancy in Southern Africa: prospects for post-apartheid transformation*, University of Cape Town: Labour Law Unit.

Daniels, G., 2002, 'The great skills grab', *The Mail and Guardian*, 20-26 September, 18 (37).

De Vletter, F., 1987, 'Foreign labour on the South African gold mines: new problem or an old problem', *International Labour Review*, 126 (2): 199-218.

Eldredge, A.E., 1993, *The South Africa Kingdom: The Pursue of Security in Nineteenth-Century Lesotho*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gay, J., 2000, 'Migration attitudes of skilled professionals in Lesotho', *Africa Insight*, 30 (2): 65-74.

Gibson, H., 2005. 'The culture of migration in Southern Mexico', *Contemporary Sociology*, 34 (6): 647-648.

Giddens, A., 1984, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hishongwa, N., 1991, *The Contract Labour System and its Effects on Family and Social Life in Namibia: A Historical Perspective*, Windhoek: MacMillan Publishers.

Hobane, A.P., 1996, The Commercialisation of Gonimbrasia Belina in Bulilima-Mangwe District: Problems and Prospects, Unpublished MPhil thesis, Harare: Centre for Applied Social Sciences.

IRIN, 2011, 'Mali: Culture of migration faces tough new realities', (http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=61471 - accessed on 15/11/11).

Kandel, W. and Massey, D., 2000, 'The culture Mexican migration: A theoretical and empirical analysis', *Social Forces*, 80 (3): 981-1004.

Katz, D., 1960, 'The functional approach to the study of attitudes', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (2): 163-204.

Keegan, T., 1986, 'Trade, accumulation and impoverishment: Mercantile capital and the economic transformation of Lesotho and the conquered territory, 1870-1920', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 12 (2): 196-216.

Kimble, J., 1999, *Migrant Labour and Colonial Rule Basutoland, 1890 -1930*, Grahamstown, South Africa: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University.

Mangezvo, P.L., n.d., 'Debating notions of "triumphant return" of male migrants from Zimbabwe', in R. Mate, ed., *Migration from Zimbabwe: Understanding migration in a context of an African political crisis*, Consolidated report of the Zimbabwe national working group, submitted to the Council for the Development of Social Science in Africa (CODESRIA), Dakar.

Maphosa, F., 2004, 'The impact of remittances from Zimbabweans working in South Africa on rural livelihoods in the Southern districts of Zimbabwe', Research report submitted to the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), (http://www.Livelihoods.org/hot_topics/migration/remittancesindex.html

Maphosa, F., 2011, 'Multiple Involvements or Multiple Exclusions: Transnational Experiences of Communities on the Zimbabwe-South Africa Borderlands', Addis Ababa, OSSREA.

Markham, C., and Mothibeli, M., 'The 1987 Mineworkers' Strike', *South African Labour Bulletin*, 13: 58-75.

Massey, D.S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Ali, K., Pellerino, A. and Taylor, J. E., 1993, 'Theories of international migration: A review and appraisal', *Population and Development Review*, 3:431-466.

McNamara, K., 1995, 'Gate politics: Competing interests in mine hostels', in Crush, J. & James, W., eds., *Crossing Boundaries: Mine Migrancy in a Democratic South Africa*, Cape Town: Creda Press.

Mills, D. & Sswakiryanga, R., 2005, 'No Romance without Finance: Commodities, Massculinities & Relationships amongst Kampala Students', in Cornwall A., ed., *Readings in Gender in Africa*, Indiana, Indiana University Press.

Monyau, M.K., 2000, 'Macroeconomic impact and prospects of downscaling in the RSA mining industry', Central Bank of Lesotho, Maseru.

Morojele, R. N., 2004, Determining the attitudes/perceptions of retrenched Lesotho migrant labourers from the RSA mining industries regarding education using their career life histories, Unpublished MPhil Thesis, submitted to The University of Stellenbosch, South Africa.

Murray, C., 1981, *Families Divided: The Impact of Migrant labour in Lesotho*, Johannesburg: Ravan.

Phillip, K., 1995, 'The NUM job creation and development programme', in Crush, J. & James, W., eds., *Crossing Boundaries: Mine migrancy in a democratic South Africa*, Cape Town, Creda Press.

Schapera, I., 1947, *Migrant Labour and Tribal Life*, London: Oxford University.

Seidman, G.W., 1993, 'Shafted: The social impact of downscaling on the Free State Goldfields', *South African Sociological Review*, 5, 2: 14-34.

Thabane, M. and Guy, J., 1984, 'Unemployment and casual labour in Maseru: The impact of changing employment strategies on migrant labourers in Lesotho', Cape Town, Carnegie Conference paper, no. 124.

Thoahlane, T. & Coplan, D., 1995, 'Motherless households, landless farms: employment patterns among Lesotho migrants', in Crush, J. & James, W., eds., *Crossing Boundaries: Mine Migrancy in a democratic South Africa*, Cape Town: Creda Press.

Thompson, E.H. Jr and Pleck, J. H., 1987, 'The structure of male role norms', in Kimmel, S.M., ed., *Changing Men: New Direction in Research on Men and Masculinity*, London: Sage Publications.

Timmerman, C., 2008, 'Marriage in a culture of migration: Emirdag marrying into Flanders', *European Review*, 16 (4): 585-594.

UNICEF, June 2001, 'Child Workers in the Shadow of Aids: Listening to the Children', Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office, Nairobi.

Weyl, U., 1991, *Labour Migration and Underdevelopment in Malawi: Late 19th Century to Mid 1970s*, Masvingo: Belmont Printers.

Africa Development, Vol. XXXVIII, Nos 1&2, 2013, pp. 171–190

(ISSN 0850-3907)

US Foreign Policy under President Barack Obama and the Promotion of Multilateralism and the Rule of Law

André Mbata B. Mangu*

Abstract

Five years ago, in November 2008, Barack Hussein Obama was elected the 44th US president. Senator Obama's campaign message had been 'change', 'change we need', and 'change we should believe in'. In this post-Cold War era, the US is the only remaining superpower and the American president the world's most influential leader. Accordingly, despite the fact that non-Americans do not participate in an American presidential election, they are nevertheless interested in its outcome given the leading role that the US plays in shaping international relations, for better or worse. This article does not explore US politics. Nor does it revisit the political economy of imperialism let alone the dependency discourse. It rather reflects on American foreign policy against the background of the promises that Senator Obama made in his book, *The Audacity of Hope* and later during the campaign. It is based on the hopes that his election raised in the 'world beyond the American borders' and aims to pave the way for a critical but fair assessment of US foreign policy under President Obama.

Résumé

Il y a plus de quatre ans, en novembre 2008, Barack Hussein Obama a été élu comme 44e président des États-Unis d'Amérique. Le slogan de la campagne du sénateur Obama était le «changement », « nous avons besoin de changement », « nous devons croire au changement ». En cette ère post-guerre froide, les États-Unis d'Amérique restent la seule superpuissance et le président américain le dirigeant le plus influent au monde. Ainsi, bien qu'ils ne participent pas à l'élection présidentielle américaine les non-Américains sont néanmoins intéressés par le résultat de cette élection compte tenu du rôle de premier plan que les États-Unis d'Amérique jouent dans les relations internationales, pour le meilleur ou pour le pire. Cet article n'examine pas la politique américaine. Il ne revisite pas non plus l'économie politique de l'impérialisme, encore moins le discours de dépendance. C'est plutôt une réflexion sur la politique étrangère américaine par rapport aux promesses que le sénateur Obama a faites dans son ouvrage *The Audacity of Hope* et plus tard au cours de sa campagne. Il se fonde sur les

* Research Professor, Department of Public, Constitutional and International Law, College of Law, University of South Africa / Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Kinshasa. E-mail: manguamb@unisa.ac.za

espoirs suscités par son élection dans le « monde au-delà des frontières américaines » et vise à ouvrir la voie à une évaluation critique mais juste de la politique étrangère américaine sous le président Obama.

Introduction

'Change' was Barack Obama's campaign slogan during the US 2008 presidential election. The American people finally endorsed his message of change when they elected him their 44th President.

Senator Barack Obama took the 'Gospel of change' to the rest of the world, especially to Asia and Europe which he visited briefly before the 2008 election but the message was heard in the remaining parts of the world, including Africa where Barack Obama's father was born.

The people and leaders of the rest of the world expected that unlike under his predecessors, the US under President Obama's administration would avoid unilateralism and abide by international law in conducting its international relations. This would require working through international organisations instead of undermining them when they did not seem to serve US interests. The Obama Administration was also expected to privilege dialogue and peace over war and militarism, invest more in the development of the poorest nations, and contribute to giving a human face to the monster of globalisation that mainly worked for the developed countries and their companies while increasing the number of its victims among the underdeveloped nations and their peoples. Expectations in Africa were even higher than in any other part of the world given its close ties to the US African American president whom some Africans considered a 'son of Africa'. African people expected 'change' in the US African policy and hoped even against all hope that Africa would be given a pride of place in US foreign policy under President Obama.

In this post-Cold War era, the US is the only remaining superpower and the American president the world's most influential leader. Accordingly, despite the fact that non-Americans do not participate in an American presidential election, they are nevertheless interested in its outcome given the leading role that the US plays in shaping international relations, for better or worse.

This article does not deal with the US domestic policy under President Barack Obama. It rather reflects on the American foreign policy against the background of the promises that Senator Obama made in his famous book, *The Audacity of Hope* (Obama 2008) and later during the campaign. It is based on the hopes that his election raised in the 'world beyond the American borders' (Obama 2008: 320-382) which is revisited. It stresses some principles that were expected to drive 'change' and be promoted in US foreign

policy under Obama's presidency, namely multipartyism, international rule of law, dialogue, peace and development. Senator Obama had also been critical of globalisation and advocated 'change' in US-African policy. The article aims to pave the way for a fair assessment of US foreign policy under President Obama.

Barack Obama's 'World beyond the American Borders'

Politically, economically and ideologically, the tendency of different American administrations over the past decades, especially after the Second World War, has been to push the American borders as far as possible with a view to extending the American Empire.

To assess US foreign policy under President Obama, it is critically important to understand the 'world beyond the American borders', where it begins and ends and how to mark out this world which consists of states, non-state entities, organisations and even individuals (Mangu 2011: 153-157).

Although it was not named, Israel, America's closest ally, which is to be protected by all means and at any times, and whose policy should never be condemned officially, is seen as 'part of America' in the minds of millions of American citizens. Accordingly, Israel can be excluded from the 'world beyond the American borders'.

Indonesia was the first countrythat Barack Obama named as part of the 'world beyond the American borders' (Obama 2008: 320-330, 375-376, 380-382). Barack Obama used this country as a 'metaphor' for the world beyond the American borders, 'a world in which globalisation and sectarianism, poverty and plenty, modernity and antiquity constantly collide' (Obama 2008: 330). The Indonesian people therefore expected the US to get involved in more development activities than in the military ones in their country, in both public and private relief aid, as the Americans did after the Tsunami that affected the region (Obama 2008: 376). Indonesia is one of the biggest Muslim countries.

In his inaugural address, President Barack Obama referred to America as 'a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews, and Hindus – and non-believers' (Obama 2009). Born of a Muslim father and having spent part of his life outside the US in Indonesia, Obama is certainly the US president who was supposed to be the closest to the Muslim world. He could better understand the Muslims and show greater respect for them. Change in this area also required a divorce from George W. Bush's policies after 9/11 that contributed to alienating millions in the Arab and Muslim world rather than approaching them by labelling them 'terrorists'.

President Barack Obama promised the Muslim world that America would 'seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect' (Obama 2009).

After Indonesia, Iraq is the country that attracted more attention from Senator Obama. Until recently, there were more US troops in Iraq than in any other country in post-Cold War history. Iraq had been invaded under Bush's administration. Most Americans were opposed to the continuation of war in Iraq. Senator Obama opposed war in Iraq as 'a dumb war, a rash war, a war based not on reason but on passion, not on principle but on politics' (Obama 2008: 348). His earlier opposition to this unpopular war was one of the first arguments that Senator Obama provided as evidence of his leadership in foreign policy against McCain who had reportedly voted for Bush more than 80 percent of the time and supported his foreign policy in the Senate. Senator Obama first visited Iraq in January 2006, almost five years after 9/11. What the Iraqi people expected from the Obama's administration was the fulfilment of his electoral promise to withdraw American troops within 10 to 16 months and to contribute to reconstruction and national reconciliation in this country. Having been part of the problem for their unilateral invasion of Iraq in violation of international law for bypassing the UN, the US had to be part of the solution to Iraqi problems.

After the elimination of Saddam Hussein, Americans were expected to keep on providing development assistance to Iraq and reconcile with the majority of the Iraqi people who opposed war against Iraq despite being also opposed to Saddam Hussein, himself a former US ally in his war against Iran. Iraq and Afghanistan were also the only foreign countries that President Obama called by names in his inaugural address delivered on 20 January 2009 and in his first State of the Union Address a month later. They were also singled out among the beneficiaries of Obama's Stimulus Plan.

The 'world beyond the American borders' included Indonesia, Iraq, and Afghanistan (and its Taliban) (Obama 2008: 347, 362, 364, 368, 378). It included the Balkans (Obama 2008: 366, 378), North Korea (Obama 2008: 357, 373), Brazil (Obama 2008: 375-376), Burma, Bosnia, and Sudan (Darfur) (Obama 2008: 357, 378, 380), China (Obama 2008: 360, 362, 363, 377, 380), Russia, India (Obama 2008: 362, 368, 371, 377), Ukraine (Obama 2008: 368-371), Venezuela (Obama 2008: 372), Kenya (Obama 2008: 373, 378), South Korea, Cuba (Obama 2008: 373-374), Poland (Obama 2008: 374), Kenya (Nairobi) (Obama 2008: 65-66, 242, 373, 375, 378, 380), Iran (Teheran) (Obama 2008: 375, 380), Nigeria (Obama 2008: 377), Somalia, Sierra Leone and the Congo (Obama 2008: 377), Uganda (Obama

2008: 377), Rwanda (Obama 2008: 377), Mozambique (Obama 2008: 377), US Allies (Obama 2008: 378-379), South Africa (Obama 2008: 341, 374), and Zimbabwe (Obama 2008: 378).

Groups and people like the Taliban, Osama Bin Laden, his Al Qaeda and allies were also considered part of the 'world beyond the American borders' (Obama 2008: 363-381). Apart from these entities and groups that were expected to be taken care of, the US under President Obama had also to improve its relations with other African, Asian, East European, and American countries, including Cuba, North Korea, and Iran that the Bush administration considered part of the 'Axis of Evil'. And yet, the US proved to be 'part of the Evil' through its constant violations of international law and use of force. On the other hand, US foreign policy could not neglect traditional allies in Europe, America, Asia, Africa and those in the islands of the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans who also expected to benefit from change in US foreign policy under Barack Obama who promised that his administration would be more respectful of international law and favour a multilateral approach in dealing with the major problems affecting our contemporary world.

Multilateralism and Respect for International Law in US Foreign Policy

The maintenance of international peace and security as the major objective of the United Nations (Article 1 (1) of the UN Charter) requires the people of the world to work together. No single country, no matter how powerful it may be, can achieve this purpose alone. As President Obama stressed in his first state of the union address, 'America cannot meet the threats of this century alone, but the world cannot meet them without America' (Obama 2009). On the other hand, good leadership in international affairs is a leadership that is collective and respectful of international law rules and principles.

In recent years, the US was tempted to act unilaterally and used its position as the world's sole superpower to bypass international organisations when they did not endorse its foreign policy, obey its instructions or ratify Washington's decisions. In the process, the US probably succeeded in inflicting more damage to international law than any other world nation.

The Americans have been several times out of their borders in arms to destroy their real or supposed enemies or to silence them. One may remember the hard choice that the rest of the world was required to make with regard to the American-led 'war on terror'. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York, former President George W. Bush called for a 'coalition of the willing' and asked nations to choose whether they were with or against the US. Yet, the US cannot take advantage of its relative prosperity and might to enslave the rest of the world or subject it to new forms of

imperialism. On the other hand, the US cannot stand alone and isolate itself from the rest of the world. The opposite of isolationism is not unilateralism, but multilateralism. The outcome of unilateral diplomacy has been failure or mixed success. The fact of being the only remaining world superpower is no excuse to bypass the rest of the world and shun international organisations to act unilaterally. Nor is it a guarantee that actions so unilaterally conducted will be successful.

The 'Change' that Barack Obama promised in US foreign policy required the US to abandon its unilateralist tendency and engage in multilateral diplomacy to address the world's problems in a more successful and comprehensive manner (Mangu 2011: 157-166). Barack Obama committed himself to promoting multilateralism by working together with the leaders of other nations to change the world for the better and the rest of the world expected that he would live up to this commitment. Change was therefore expected in US foreign policy under Barack Obama. As he rightly confessed:

> Without a well-articulated strategy that the public support and the world understand, America will lack the legitimacy – and ultimately the power – it needs to make the world safer than it is today. We need a revised foreign policy framework that matches boldness and Truman's post-World War II policies – one that addresses both the challenges and the opportunities of a new millennium, one that guides our use of force and expresses our deepest ideals and commitments (Obama 2008: 357-358).

Despite its might and resources, the US alone cannot pretend to solve or succeed in solving the world problems such as terrorism, insecurity, global warming, poverty and pandemics such as AIDs and malaria without becoming itself the world's major problem (Obama 2008: 365). Obama argued that it was in the US strategic interest to act multilaterally rather than unilaterally, especially when the Americans use force around the world (Obama 2008: 365). In Obama's words, 'Acting multilaterally means obtaining most of the world's support for our actions, and making sure our actions serve to further recognize international norms' (Obama 2008: 365). This implies that the US should act within international organisations and abide by international norms.

According to Obama, the US should comply with international law because 'nobody benefits more than we do from the observance of international "rules of the road"' (Obama 2008: 365-366). He added:

> We can't win converts to those rules if we act as if they apply to everyone but us. When the world's sole superpower willingly restrains its power and abides by internationally agreed-upon standards of conduct, it sends a message that these are rules worth following, and robs terrorists and dictators of the argument that these rules are simply tools of American imperialism (Obama 2008: 365-366).

Compliance with international law also granted some legitimacy to any action undertaken by the US. According to Obama, in military parlance, legitimacy is a 'force multiplier' (Obama 2008: 366).

In spite of the fact that the US contributed immensely to the creation of the UN and other international agencies, which set up international law rules to be observed or complied with by all the members of the international community, the irony is that the US has also become one of the leading nations as far as the violation of international law norms is concerned. Directly, it has repeatedly violated international law by action or by omission.

The establishment of the Guantanamo prison and CIA jails where prisoners were denied human rights, the use of force against Iraq and other military actions unilaterally conducted in other parts of the world are some instances of direct violation of international law by the US. Senator and Democratic candidate Barack Obama bemoaned the effects of Reagan's policies toward the Third World, especially his administration's support to the apartheid regime of South Africa alongside the funding of El Salvador's death squads and the invasion of Grenada (Obama 2008: 341). The US was associated directly or indirectly with Haiti's 33 coups d'état (Gutto 2009: 13), the more recent being the 2004 coup that overthrew President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

The US also indirectly violated international law norms through its agents or allies by encouraging or abstaining from condemning some of their actions. However, the US cannot blame 'rogue states' for behaving badly and for their non-compliance with international law norms when it behaves itself as a rogue nation within the UN Security Council, sitting there to silence other nations and veto their actions when they are opposed to American interests, or when the US is unwilling to accept that its own actions be vetoed by the same Security Council.

Senator Obama argued that 'our challenge is to make US policies move the international system in the direction of greater equity, justice and prosperity' (Obama 2008: 374). One of the key actors of the international system is the Security Council, which appears to be undemocratic as five nations; namely the 'Big Five' (the US, United Kingdom, China, France, and Russia) hold the veto right they use as they please to mainly champion their own interests and make law for almost two hundred states that participate in the UN. South America, African continent, and the whole of Asia, except for China, have no veto right in the Security Council that claims to decide for and on behalf of the entire world.

To meet the challenge of moving the international system towards greater equity and justice, the people of 'the world beyond the American borders' expected the US under the Obama administration to agree to the enlargement of the permanent membership of Security Council to states representing

other parts of the world. 'Change' under Obama also required the US to engage in the reform of the Security Council to make it more representative of the people of the world, including those of Africa.

This entailed a reform of the Security Council that Obama also criticised for being 'frozen in a Cold-war era time wrap' in its structure and rules (Obama 2008: 365). Senator Obama recognized that it was in the American interest for the US to act multilaterally through international organisations and in compliance with international law. He advised that 'we should be spending more time and money trying to strengthen the capacity of international institutions' [such as the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Atomic Energy Agency (AEA), and the World Health Organisation (WHO)], 'so that they can do some of this work for us' (Obama 2008: 378, 379). Obama went on:

> The more effective UN peacekeeping forces are in handling civil wars and sectarian conflicts, the less global policing we have to do in areas that we'd like to see stabilized. The more credible the information that the International Atomic Energy Agency provides, the more likely we are to mobilize allies against the efforts of rogue states to obtain nuclear weapons. The greater the capacity of the World Health Organisation, the less likely we are to have to deal with a flu pandemic in our own country. No country has a bigger stake than we do in strengthening international institutions – which is why we pushed for their creation in the first place, and why we need to take the lead in improving them (Obama 2008: 379).

This was a recognition that the US tended to use these international organisations as instruments of its foreign policy. Yet, international organisations were not created to do the work for the US or serve American imperialism. One expected, however, that the US under the Obama administration would spend more time and money to strengthen international organisations instead of undermining them.

According to Senator Obama, besides the UN agencies that functioned well like UNICEF, there were other agencies that seemed to do nothing more than hold conferences, produce reports, and provide sinecures for third-rate international civil servants.

But he added that those failures were not an argument for reducing 'our involvement in international organisations, nor are they an excuse for US unilateralism' (Obama 2008: 378-379). The reality is that UN agencies such as UNESCO and even organs such as the Security Council and the General Assembly are often accused of inefficiency and therefore deprived of funding when they tend to rebel against the US and act against the American interests. Unfortunately, international relations provide the ground for competition of states' interests where the most powerful ones would generally prevail over

other states. Former French President General de Gaulle is reported to have rightly pointed out that 'states have no friends but interests'. One should also understand that the primary objective and business of US foreign policy is to serve American interests even if this would require the US to act unilaterally and violate international law.

Senator Barack Obama suggested at least two areas of American unilateralism. The first area was where the US could act to perfect its own democracy and lead by example in improving its human rights record tarnished by violations of human rights such as detention without trial and torture in the Guantanamo prison, and degrading and inhuman treatment in the prisons of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Marines and the CIA, in or outside the US.

Senator Obama referred to the existence of the Guantanamo prison where the US administration had instituted a law which was totally different from the one it applied to its own citizens as the worst conscience case. He even quoted from a Pentagon report indicating that 'some U.S. personnel at Guantanamo had in fact engaged in multiple instances of inappropriate activity – including instances in which U.S. female personnel pretended to smear menstrual blood on detainees during questioning, and at least once instance of a guard splashing a Koran and a prisoner with urine' (Obama 2008: 152).

Obama rightly found this totally unacceptable on legal and moral grounds and deplored that 'the very ideals that we have promised to export overseas were being betrayed at home' (Obama 2008: 339).

Abroad, foreigners detained in the CIA prisons suffered the same fate even when these prisons were established in European countries which had abolished torture and were bound to respect the rights of all the people living on their territories.

In his State of the Union Address, President Obama reassured the world when he held: 'I can stand here tonight and say without exception or equivocation that the United States of America does not torture. We can make that commitment here tonight' (Obama 2009). The 'world beyond the American borders' expected that his administration would honour such an unprecedented commitment by not torturing or condoning torture by its friends and allies abroad. The US was expected to improve its human rights record by signing and ratifying international instruments such as the Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) aimed at prosecuting and punishing all those responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, including American citizens. It was also expected that the US under the Obama administration would sign and ratify treaties such as the Tokyo Conventions on the protection of the environment instead of polluting it. Moreover, international peace and security required the US to

stop spending billions in the development of weapons systems of dubious value while labelling nations such Iran, Iraq, and North Korea 'rogue states' and preventing them from developing their own weapons of mass destruction.

According to Senator Obama, the unwillingness to make hard choices and live up to its ideals undermined US credibility in the eyes of the world and weakened its ability to press for democracy, human rights, protection of the right to environment, reduction of weapons and the rule of law in despotic regimes (Obama 2008: 380).

The second area of unilateralism suggested by Obama was the area of self-defence (Obama 2008: 365). The US, as any other state under international law, has the right to take unilateral military action to eliminate any imminent threat to its security. Unfortunately, Senator Obama understood 'threat' to mean 'a nation, group, or individual that is actively preparing to strike US targets (or allies with which the US has mutual defence agreements), and has or will have the means to do so in the immediate future' (Obama 2008: 364-365). This broad definition of 'imminent threat' led to a far stretched American definition of self-defence, which conflicts with international law that also does not support the doctrine of preventive self-defence (Dugard 2000: 418-421). 'Change' that Barack Obama advocated also required the American administration under his leadership to promote dialogue, peace and development in its foreign policy.

Promotion of Dialogue, Peace and Development as a Consequence of Change in US Foreign Policy Under the Obama Administration

From its inception, the US has been a warring nation. It waged war to gain its independence. During the first 50 years of its independence, it was confronted with the American Civil War and the Secession War. It participated in the First and Second World Wars, and was instrumental in bringing both to an end. The US has also demonstrated that it was the only country capable of waging war on several continents at once.

The US led the Cold War against the former Soviet Union. Since the 1950s, it has been almost on all international battle fields and even on domestic ones, directly or through proxies.

Over the past decades, the US took the lead in the war against Iraq when this country invaded Kuwait. The US backed Iraq in its war against Iran. Before turning its back on Iraq in the aftermath of its war on terror, the US also supported the Taliban in their war against the Soviet Union. It led the war against Iraq when the Saddam Hussein's regime was deliberately accused of backing Al Qaeda and producing weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, the US has been threatening war against North Korea and Iran. Washington's heavy hand is always felt in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The use or threat of force has been a key component of the American foreign policy. Whether the US has won all its wars is a matter of dispute. Vietnam and Somalia bear testimony to the contrary.

On the other hand, the US is generally blamed for focussing on business and American interests while paying little attention to the improvement of the life conditions of other peoples and to the development of their countries. Obama's discourse of change therefore called for change of focus from war to peace, dialogue and development-oriented American foreign policy (Mangu 2011: 166-172). The rest of the world expected the American diplomacy under the Obama administration to focus on dialogue, cooperation and development rather than the use or threat of force that should be an ultimate resort.

Instead of resorting to use force or threat to force, the Obama administration was also expected to engage in a meaningful and sincere dialogue with countries such as North Korea and Iran to combat the proliferation of weapons and fight terrorism, which threaten international peace and security.

The US was expected to rather promote dialogue and peace with other and even within nations such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland and former Yugoslavia. In the Middle East, the US was expected to promote dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians on the one hand and between Israel and the Muslim world on the other hand. From the US-led Security Council and from the US itself, the Palestinians expected not quiet diplomacy, abstention or silence when Israeli forces were killing, but rather some tough decisions to compel the Israeli government to dialogue and make peace with the Palestinians. Obama recognised that the US had an obligation to engage in efforts to bring about peace in the Middle East, not only for the benefit of the people of the region, but for the safety and security of American children as well (Obama 2008: 381). There was mistrust between the US and the Muslim world. This mistrust reached its peak in the US during the 2008 presidential election when opponents accused Obama of being a Muslim, as if an American Muslim or an American of Arab descent did not qualify to be elected US president.

Beyond the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the rest of the world also expected that Obama would help bring peace between the US and the Muslim world on the one hand and between Christians and Muslims on the other hand.

Moreover, under the Obama administration, the US was expected to wage war against underdevelopment and poverty instead of sticking to a militarist concept of peace understood as the silence of weapons. Billions of dollars spent for military activities in Iraq, Afghanistan or elsewhere could be used to fight poverty and underdevelopment in these countries.

In his inaugural address, President Obama made the following commitment:

> To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds. And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer afford indifference to suffering outside our borders; nor can we consume the world's resources without regard to effect. For the world has changed, and we must change with it (Obama 2009).

It was therefore expected that the US under the Obama administration would invest more in the development of the poorest nations. This also required the US to contribute to 'humanising' or giving a human face to globalisation that mainly benefited the developed nations and their companies.

US Foreign Policy Under President Obama and the 'Humanisation' of Globalisation

Globalisation relates to the opening-up of the market. So far, it has been benefiting the rich countries, including the US, at the expense of the poor nations that have been even growing poorer. The 'Washington Consensus' also led to an unjust international economic order and contributed to safeguarding or promoting the economic and financial interests of the rich countries instead of promoting prosperity for all.

According to Obama, 'If overall the international system has produced great prosperity in the world's most developed countries, it has also left many people behind – a fact that Western policy makers have often ignored and occasionally made worse' (Obama 2008: 373).

Obama blamed globalisation and its main agents, which are financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), multinational companies and developed countries, for their role in increasing poverty in the underdeveloped world (Obama 2008: 375-376). Among these agents of globalisation, he first blamed the US and other developed countries.

Obama deplored that:

> the United States and other developed countries constantly demand that developing countries eliminate trade barriers that protect them from competition, even as we steadfastly protect our own constituencies from exports that could help lift poor (Obama 2008: 375).

Change in the US-African policy under President Obama

Obama never denied his African origin or identity. He visited Africa several times prior to his election and, whether she liked it or not, he took his

fiancée Michele to Kenya before they were married. Accordingly, unlike most of his predecessors, some of whom knew Africa through story books and Hollywood movies only, Obama was not foreign to the African continent nor was Africa foreign to him. Kenya is naturally the first African country named in *The Audacity of Hope*. He visited this country three times since he became US Senator in 2004 and evoked this country as the country of his father and where he had family, cousins and a grandmother. The main problems of Kenya related to massive violations of human rights and constitutionalism, the corruption of public officials, ethnicity, and denial of freedom of expression and opposition to government. Obama argued that Americans had to win the hearts and minds of people in Nairobi and in Nyangoma Kogelo, a small village in Western Kenya where his father was born and where there was a real sense of kinship with him (Obama 2008: 65-66, 242, 373-375).

Less than a year after hundreds were killed in ethnic violence following the great fiasco that was the 2007 Kenyan election, millions of Kenyans hoped that Obama could help reconcile them and inspire many people in the political leadership and the citizenry who longed for the kind of change he represented and had called for. As Juliana Mwihaki rightly stressed, there were, indeed, many lessons for Kenya to draw from Obama's election as US president (Mwihaki 2009: 58). The American people, who were mostly white, elected a black person born of a father from the Luo ethnic group in Kenya while political intolerance in this country was such as a Luo could not be elected president. Had he returned to Kenya and taken up a Kenyan citizenship to run for president of this East African country, Obama could have been disqualified as a foreigner or failed to be elected a Kenyan president.

Apart from Kenya, Senator Obama knew the history and problems faced by many other African countries. He referred to Somalia, Sierra Leone and the Congo as 'lawless countries' (Obama 2008: 377). This is an assessment based on the classification of African countries in the American conventional social science discourse between 'failed', 'collapsed', 'weak', 'underdeveloped', or 'quasi' states struggling between 'disintegration' and 'reconfiguration' (Wunsch& Olowu 1990; Zartman 1995, 1999; Migdal 1988; Médard 1977: 35-84; Jackson 1990; Villalon & Huxtable 1997).

In Somalia, the US-led UN mission once failed to restore peace and law. Somalia 'collapsed' and 'disintegrated' partly due to the withdrawal of the international community. As a result, terrorist activities have intensified in Somalia over the past three decades. Somali pirates have also been particularly active along the Somali coasts and in the Indian Ocean.

State reconstruction as a prerequisite for peace, security and development in Somalia and the rest of Eastern Africa is not only in the interest of the Somali people but also in the interest of the world since a 'collapsed' Somalia has also been threatening international peace and security. African people expected that decades after its withdrawal, the US under the Obama administration could make a comeback to Somalia and join hands with the African Union and the States of the Eastern Africa sub-region that have been struggling to help reconstruct Somalia and bring law and order to this country.

Sierra Leone now seems on a good track, but armed conflicts are still rife in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), especially in the Eastern part of the country where some militia and foreign armed groups have been operating for many years. The DRC was destroyed during three decades of the authoritarian rule of President Mobutu Sese Seko who was backed by American administrations. President Laurent-Désiré Kabila who overthrew Mobutu was also backed by the US directly or indirectly through its new allies in the region; namely Rwanda and Uganda. These countries invaded the DRC. When Barack Obama was advocating change in America and came to power, Rwanda and Uganda were still operating in the DRC. Rwandan and Ugandan officials, the Congolese rebels or militias that they supported and a number of Western multinationals were involved in the illegal exploitation of the DRC's natural resources while the Congolese people, including children and women, were victims of gross human violations. Expectations were therefore high that the Obama administration could help reconstruct the DRC; consolidate peace, security, and democracy; promote respect for human rights and the rule of law; end foreign aggression and the illegal exploitation of the Congolese natural resources; and encourage cooperation, development and democracy in the Great Lakes Region.

President Barack Obama also told authoritarian leaders around the globe and those clinging to power through corruption, violence, human rights violations, vote-rigging and manipulation that they were on the wrong side of history, but the US would extend a hand if they were willing to unclench their fist (Obama 2008: 377).

Zimbabwe and Libya were singled out as African countries where massive human rights violations were committed (Obama 2008: 378) but they were not the only countries where people suffered from the authoritarianism of their leaders. President Mugabe sometimes organised elections even though he could not think of anybody else to lead Zimbabwe. In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi acceded to power by a coup d'état in 1968. When President Omar Bongo of Gabon died in June 2009 after 42 years in power, Colonel Gaddafi became the 'Dean' of African presidents. Election was

unknown in the Libyan political dictionary. Gaddafi's decisions, which were wrongly attributed to the people, were not open to any form of criticism. Many people who knew he had delusions of grandeur were not surprised when he proclaimed himself the 'King of African traditional Kings' (Mangu 2011: 180-181).Under the above circumstances, Obama's message of change and his subsequent election could not go unnoticed among the Zimbabwean and Libyan citizens. They could also dream of change and expected that the Obama administration could contribute to change in the governance of their countries.

In North Africa, although Morocco and Western Sahara were not mentioned in *The Audacity of Hope* expressly, one expected that the Obama administration could promote dialogue and peace between these countries, their leaders and peoples in the same way as they encouraged dialogue between the Khartoum government and that of South Sudan.

The Saharawi people hoped that the US could convince the King of Morocco to accept a referendum that could help them enjoy their right to self-determination like the South Sudanese.

In Morocco where the powers were concentrated in the hands of the King, there was hope among the militants of democracy that they could receive some support from Washington after Obama's election. The US administration was also expected to keep an eye open on Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria, which operated under de facto military regimes and where progress towards democracy had been slow despite their good ranking in terms of economic, social and corporate governance.

West Africa is a region where some progress had been made on the road to constitutionalism and democracy in countries such as Benin, Ghana, Mali, and Senegal. However, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Togo still had a long way to go. The US administration was expected to contribute to consolidating constitutionalism and democracy in the countries where they were already established or to promoting them in those countries where they were on the wane.

On the other hand, Obama had associated Nigeria with India and China as countries that developed two legal systems – one for foreigners and elites, and another for ordinary people (Obama 2008: 377). American and British companies and people were among those foreigners who pushed for and ultimately obtained a special legal system. Accordingly, like the Indian and Chinese, the Nigerian people could dream of change and expect that the Obama's administration would help bring this dual and discriminatory system to an end in their country.

South Africa performed the miracle of bringing the apartheid system to an end and reconciling its people into a 'Rainbow Nation' of which Nelson Mandela was the founding father. Unfortunately, the end of apartheid did not mean the end of poverty that still affects the overwhelming majority of the South African population who are black. Economic apartheid persisted in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. The Black majority expected the US under the Obama's Democratic administration to help them in the same way as the Republicans supported the apartheid government. However, like in some Western African countries, progress had been made in terms of democracy, respect for the rule of law, human rights, good governance, and development in Southern African countries such as Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Mauritius, and Zambia. Accordingly, there was no darkness everywhere in Africa, as Conrad once suggested (Conrad 1999).

Barack Obama rightly deplored that some positive trends in Africa were often hidden in the news of despair. Yet, despite the staunch resistance of some authoritarian leaders and the rise of some coup-minded military officers, democracy is spreading in Africa. The economies of authoritarianism and dictatorship, which paradoxically used to be funded by some Western democracies under Washington's leadership, have entered into recession. The days of authoritarian leaders and other military junta are numbered. According to Barack Obama, 'We need to build on these glimmers of hope and help those committed leaders and citizens throughout Africa build the better future they, like we, so desperately desire' (Obama 2008: 377). It would be immoral and inhuman for Americans to watch others die with equanimity (Obama 2008: 378). Imperialism unfortunately does not know any morals. It does not care about the people. Its morals leads it to selfishness and non-stop economic exploitation to benefit the rich people. The 'monster' has no concerns for the plight of its victims and this is part of its nature.

If moral claims were insufficient for Americans to act as the African continent implodes, Senator Obama argued that 'there are certainly instrumental reasons why the United States and its allies should care about failed states that don't control their territories, can't combat epidemics, and are numbed by civil war and atrocity' (Obama 2008: 378).

Africans expected that the Obama administration could engage in aid relief to combat AIDS and other pandemics, help those who were affected by droughts and famines, and end wars and armed conflicts by using their political and armed muscles since most conflicts developed thanks to Washington's silence or support. The US administration could also help those who fought against authoritarianism and corruption since most corrupt leaders during the Cold War were hailed as Washington's friends or

allies. Over decades, Obama admitted, 'we (the American administration and business) would tolerate and even aid thieves like Mobutu, thugs like Noriega, so long as they opposed communism' (Obama 2008: 338). In fact, contrary to Obama's assertion, they were not thieves or thugs. They were darlings of the US and the romance only came to an end when the US was no longer interested in them and when they ceased to serve its interests. This resulted in the US becoming vulnerable and losing any authority to give other nations a lecture about democracy, respect for the rule of law and human rights. The US also supported the apartheid regime in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) was considered a terrorist organisation and Nelson Mandela branded a terrorist leader. In former Zaire, 'Mobutu or Chaos' was the formula that long shaped US foreign policy (Schatzberg 1991; Weisman 1974). Western countries, especially the 'Western Troika' made up of the US, France and Belgium, continued to support President Mobutu as the best representative of Western interests to the detriment of the masses and democratic forces.

From 1990 to 1993, the US facilitated Mobutu's attempts to hijack political change by maintaining that Mobutu as the president of the Republic was a legitimate part of the transition process leading to free and fair elections, rather than an impediment to it.

The US also backed the rebels fighting to oust President Mobutu and Presidents Laurent-Desire and Joseph Kabila without providing any substantial support to non-violent and democratic opposition.
According to Nzongola-Ntalaja:

> The message that the world community of nations sent to the people of the Congo and Africa as a whole in these two instances is loud and clear. Changes through democratic means and the rule of law are not as deserving of unequivocal support as changes through the barrel of a gun. The first changes are slow, somewhat confusing, and rely on universal principles of governance that some believe are not applicable to Africa. The second, on the other hand, are decisive and led by self-reliant African leaders who are likely to establish stable political orders and market economies compatible with the interests of the developed North (Nzongola-Ntalaja1998: 5).

Africans expected change not only in the message from Washington under the Obama administration, but also in its deeds. Economic and strategic interests could no longer prevail over ideals to command support for African authoritarian and corrupt leaders. Africans did not ask President Obama to impose democracy and good governance with the barrel of a gun or to liberate them from tyranny, which he could not, but to just do what he said the Americans could:

> We can inspire and invite other people to assert their freedoms; we can use international forums and agreements to set standards for others to follow; we can provide funding to fledging democracies to help institutionalize fair election systems, train independent journalists, and seed the habits of civic participation; we can speak out on behalf of local leaders whose rights are violated; and we can apply economic and diplomatic pressure to those who repeatedly violate the rights of their own people Obama 2008: 374).

Barack Obama was also right not to trust those who 'believe they can single-handedly liberate other people from tyranny' (Obama 2008: 374).Unfortunately, they were and still are many to hold such belief in the Western hemisphere, especially in the US.

As he pointed out:

> there are few examples in history in which the freedom men and women crave is delivered through outside intervention. In almost every successful social movement of the last century, from Gandhi's campaign against British rule to the Solidarity movement in Poland to the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, democracy was the result of a local awakening (Obama 2008: 374).

Africans hoped that an American administration led by a man who directly traced his roots to an African country (Kenya) would do more to help the continent. However, Obama was not a senator for Okelo, a Kenyan or an African lawmaker. He was rather an American citizen and a senator for Illinois. He could not love Africa and Africans more than America and the Americans who elected him (Mwihaki 2009: 60; Mangu 2011: 187-188). He could be black, but his mind and soul were American. The last sentence of his *The Audacity of Hope* even sums it up when he confessed that 'My heart is filled with love for this country' (Obama 2008: 427). This means that there was no or little space left in his heart for other countries, including the African.

As I pointed out elsewhere (Mangu 2011: 188), the primary responsibility for rebuilding or developing Africa and improving the life conditions of its peoples lies with Africans themselves. In this world where people are interdependent and should cooperate, Africans also need the assistance of other nations, especially the US and other world developed nations. The continent that suffered from the slave trade to benefit the Americas and that used to be marginalised had to be given a pride of place in the hearts of the Americans and in US foreign policy (Mangu 2011: 191).

Conclusion

Obama's election was a historic moment in the American and world history. It symbolised the victory of hope over despair, optimism over pessimism, tolerance over intolerance, equality over discrimination, human rights over human wrongs, reconciliation over hatred and racial segregation, justice over injustice, morality over immorality, the new over the past, the truth over the lies, audacity over adversity and civilisation over modern forms of barbarity. It was the triumph of constitutionalism, democracy and human rights. Obama's election was based on 'change' he advocated. Accordingly, 'change' was expected in US domestic and foreign policy, including the African policy. Unlike the previous American administration, the Obama administration was expected to promote multilateralism and the rule of law in international affairs. As for the majority of African people, they expected that Africa would be given a pride of place in the American foreign policy and that the Obama administration would promote peace, security, development, good governance, and democracy on the continent despite the main responsibility for an African renaissance resting with Africans themselves.

This article was not about why Obama was elected and whether he delivered on his promise of 'change'. Even when he focussed on the US foreign and African policy, the author did not intend to examine the driving force, which is imperialism, and its political economy let alone the dependency discourse. Nor did he purport to investigate the magnitude and feasibility of 'change' under President Obama.

The article rather reflected on the American foreign policy against the background of the promises that Senator Obama made in *The Audacity of Hope* and later during the campaign. It took stock of Obama's promise of 'change' and the 'audacious' hopes that his election raised across the world in general and in Africa in particular. Its main aim was to provide a solid background for a credible assessment of the US foreign and African policy under a president who advocated 'change' not only in Washington and the US, but also in the 'world beyond the American borders'.

A fair and complete assessment of 'change' that Obama promised in US foreign and African policy will only be made later when his second and final term ends in 2016. It will then be possible to judge whether Obama delivered on his promise of 'change', whether he could bring about significant 'change' in US foreign and African policy, and whether it was 'business as usual' and that the immense and audacious hopes that he raised across the world and in Africa were unfounded.

References

Conrad, J., 1999, *Au Coeur des Tenèbres*, Paris: Edition Mille et Une Nuit.

Dugard, J., 2000, *International Law: A South African Perspective*, 2nd Ed, Johannesburg: Juta & Co.

Gutto, S.B.O., 2009, 'Projecting Change and Continuity under the Obama Administration', Keynote Address at the US-Africa Policy Forum organised by Africa Action in collaboration with Howard University African Studies Department, Howard University, Washington D.C., 19 February.

Jackson, R.H., 1990, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International System, and the Third World*, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Mangu, A.M.B., 2011, *Obama's election: Lessons from the world, Africa, and US foreign Policy*, Saarbrucken: Lambert Academic Publishing.

Mangu, A.M.B., 2012, *Barack Obama et les défis du changement global*, Paris: L'Harmattan.

Médard, J-F., 1977, 'L'Etat sous-développé au Cameroun', *Année Africaine*, 1977, 35-84.

Migdal, J., 1988, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Mwihaki, J., 2009, 'Obama, Local Hero: Obama Special', *Msafiri*, Edition No. 66, Kenya Airways, February-April, 54-60.

Nzongola-Ntalaja, G., 1998, *From Zaïre to the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Nordiska Africainstitutet.

Obama, B., 2008, *The Audacity of Hope. Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream*, New York: Vintage Books, 1st Edition.

Obama, B., 2009, 'State of the Union Address', at http:joanjoyce.com/blog/?p=884 (accessed on 27 February).

Schatzberg, M.G., 1991, *Mobutu or Chaos? The United States and Zaïre, 1960-1990*, Lanham & Philadelphia: University Press of America.

Villalon, L. & Huxtable, P., Eds., 1997, *Critical Juncture: The African State between Disintegration and Reconfiguration*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Weisman, S.R., 1974, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960-1964*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Wunsch, J.S. & Olowu, D., 1990, *The Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and Self-Governance in Africa*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Zartman, I.W., 1995, ed., *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Zartman, I.W., 1999, *Collapsed States*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Africa Development, Vol. XXXVIII, Nos 1&2, 2013, pp. 191–226

(ISSN 0850-3907)

The Making of the 'Informal State' in Uganda

Moses Khisa*

Abstract

This article analyses the evolution, reproduction, and sustenance of what I refer to as the 'informal state' in Uganda – a distinct mode of organising and broadcasting power that simultaneously centralises and fragments the state system. The 'informal state' is manifest in the construction of structures parallel to the legal and constitutional ones. This article departs from other studies of stateness in Africa that accent colonial legacies, illicit economic activities, and social conflict in accounting for the so called 'African state' that supposedly fails to approximate to the model (modern) state. Instead I argue that Uganda's 'informal state' is a consequence of three key factors: the country's post-independence experience with wide-spread insecurity and political instability in the 1970s and 1980s, the belief in militarism as an ideology by the new (post-1986) group of rulers along with the imperatives of retention of political power, and foreign-aid flows as reward for embracing neoliberal economic reforms. The article also shows that the 'informal state' system reproduces its survival and legitimates its rule through maintaining aspects of legal-rational state structures, ceding power to varied constituencies as well as expanding the patronage network through the creation of numerous agencies.

Résumé

Cet article analyse l'évolution, la reproduction et la subsistance de ce que j'appelle « l'État informel » en Ouganda – un mode distinct d'organisation et de diffusion de la puissance qui centralise et fragmente le système étatique simultanément. « L'État informel » est manifeste dans la construction de structures parallèles aux principes juridiques et constitutionnels. Cet article a comme point de départ d'autres études relatives à l'État en Afrique qui mettent l'accent sur les héritages coloniaux, les activités économiques illicites et les conflits sociaux dans la description du soi-disant « État africain » qui, prétendument, ne parvient pas se rapprocher de l'État modèle (moderne). Au contraire, je dirais que l'« État informel » de l'Ouganda est une conséquence de trois facteurs principaux: l'expérience post-indépendance du pays avec l'insécurité largement répandue et l'instabilité politique dans les années 1970 et 1980, la croyance au militarisme comme une idéologie du nouveau groupe de dirigeants (post- 1986) ainsi que les impératifs de la conservation du pouvoir politique et les flux d'aide

* Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, USA.
Email: moses.khisa@gmail.com

étrangère comme récompense pour l'adoption de réformes économiques néolibérales. L'article montre aussi que le système de l'« État informel » reproduit sa survie et légitime son pouvoir à travers le maintien des aspects de structures étatiques légales-rationnelles, cédant le pouvoir à des groupes variés et propageant le réseau de patronage à travers la création de nombreux organismes.

Introduction

Who today can escape the question of the State and Power? (Poulantzas 1980: 11).

Owing to myriad state crises in the global periphery Fukuyama (2005: 84-88) underscores the pertinence of 'stateness', arguing that 'before having a democracy, you must have a state...' To surmise thus, by a famous neoliberal triumphalist, captures the extent to which rethinking statehood has animated scholarly debate. In Africa, crises of the state are seen as the crisis of 'stateness'. Thinking about statehood in Africa, thus, has attracted analytical, descriptive, and normative categorizations. Some are loaded buzzwords while others capture what is at stake, to wit: the shadow state (Reno 1995 and Clapham 1996), personalized state (Joseph 1987; Jackson and Roseberg 1982), the criminalized state (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1998; Chabal and Daloz 1999), the quasi-state (Jackson 1987), the veranda state (Terray 1986), among others. Then, there is the category adjudged to be on the precipice and sliding into statelessness (Reno 1998; Bates 2008), Somalia and DR Congo being the often cited examples. These concepts and phrases have assumed somewhat aphoristic status, the implicit presupposition being a certain malaise that deviates from the norm – the modern state. Thus abounds a strong current of opinion that there is a problem with the 'African state'.

It is in that respect that Doornbos (1990: 179-98) inquired into the generality of the 'African state', its nature, role, and position.[1] He delineates six features of the so called 'African state': its post-colonial status, and implications for civil society; an *a priori* problematic relationship as regards territorial jurisdiction; heavy involvement in a restricted resource base; relatively undifferentiated yet ethnically heterogeneous social infrastructure; salient processes of centralization and consolidation of power; and pervasive external dependency. But this putative homogenous entity – the 'African state' – available as an un-modulated, fixed object of inquiry is central to what Mamdani (1996: 9) calls 'history by analogy'. This analogy-seeking has led to totalizing analyses that search for approximations and deviations from the 'model (modern/European) state'.

Notwithstanding glaring socio-economic and demographic differentiations, disparate ideological and political trajectories, it still sounds plausible or acceptable to talk about the 'African State'. Not much attention is paid to

important cross-national variations in stateness. Thus, writes Kaarsholm (2006: 3), 'a dimension of Afro-pessimism and moralistic prejudice seems to have been as pervasive in scholarly writings on the dynamics involved in politics of African societies as in mass media and popular culture'. This Afro-pessimism and moralistic prejudice is best represented by the highly lurid work of Chabal and Daloz (1999), despite the authors' advance protestations to the contrary. One way to break with the totalizing trend is to seek out the historical specificity of a case and interrogate the interface of a dynamic internal historical process with the external forces of globality. It is after grasping historical specificities and contextual forces in individual cases that we can arrive at meaningful, sound cross-national comparative generalizations.

The basic starting point of this article then is that a particularly distinct system of broadcasting power has been systematically constructed and is discernible in today's Uganda. I have called this system an 'informal state'. By informal I neither mean the direct opposite of formal nor do I mean strictly informal institutions as 'unwritten rules that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels' (Helmke and Levitsky 2006: 5; Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Rather what I mean by 'informal state' is a technology of control that simultaneously centralizes and fragments power through building structures parallel to legal and constitutional public institutions.

This article proceeds as follows. First, I briefly review the key literature on the 'African state', followed by an analytical framework that simultaneously upholds but attempts to transcend the dominant neo-patrimonial model. Second, I advance and pursue three propositions that attempt to explain the 'informal state': the first proposition is about the *nexus* of interplay of internal forces that largely occasioned and enabled the making of the 'informal state'; second, the *form* in which it operates; and third, the international dimension that not only provided the financial resources crucial to oiling the process of entrenching the system but also contributed, immensely, to shaping what has become arguably Uganda's most ubiquitous problem – corruption. When I pursue, to some length, arguments that cohere with these three, I hope to convince the reader about something particularly novel in the exercise of state power in Uganda.

The third (and last) part shows how the 'informal state' augments its legitimacy and reproduces survival. I end with some concluding thoughts. In tracing the forging of the 'informal state' I pursue a *path dependency argument* by situating the quest for security and political stability in the

wake of near state collapse in the 1970s and 1980s. In sum, this article seeks to answer the following key questions:

- What is the historical context that helps account for the evolution, construction, reproduction and sustenance of the 'informal state' in Uganda?
- How does the 'informal state' function and broadcast power given shifts in the contours of local politics and societal forces?
- How does the 'informal state' strike a balance between maintaining an edifice of formal juridical statehood along with parallel structures? How has informalisation been enabled by maintaining the formal institutions of political modernity?
- What is the nature of state-society relations? How does society react to, negotiate with, and contest against a bifurcated 'informal state'?

The Literature on the 'African State'

The idea of the 'African state' has spawned a plethora of literature. Jeffrey Herbst (2000: 4) argues against the 'almost universal assumption that colonialism changed everything…', noting that it was impossible to change 'everything' in the few decades that Europe colonized Africa. For Herbst, the fundamental problem facing state-builders in Africa was (and remains) one of projecting power over inhospitable and sparsely populated territories. Herbst's state-building analytical framework is three-pronged: the cost of expanding domestic power infrastructure; the nature of national boundaries; and the design of state systems. Thus, the state of the 'African state' has to be understood in the light of challenges posed by those three factors. Herbst's is a political-geography argument, accenting the challenge of projecting power over expansive lands. But this approach glosses over many cases of geographically small countries, with high population densities, but facing similar stateness challenges as the big sparsely populated ones. Herbst's geographical determinism falls short in accounting for observable shifts in state capacity and modes of rule in independent Africa.

By contrast, Achille Mbembe (2002, 2001) pursues a culturalist perspective accenting three historical forces that provide the point of departure for scholarship on Africa: the slave trade, colonialism and apartheid; and two resultant currents of thought: *Nativism* and *Afro-radicalism*. While acknowledging that the two adhere to no single theory of identity, politics or culture, he nevertheless roundly condemns both for obstructing the development of conceptions on African past, present and future: Afro-radicalism being instrumentalist while Nativism is faulted for espousing a

'metaphysics of difference', that is, claiming a unique African identity founded on membership to the black race.

Mbembe seeks to shed light on the current African imagination of the self by rejecting the standard tendency of equating identity with race. Does he succeed in charting a way out of the dead end of nativism and Afro-radicalism? Not quite. Mbembe (2001) attempts to blur the superfluous line between those who look out for an essentialist African-ness, on the one hand, and the external production of Africa (in this case the 'African state') under conditions of Western modernity. At a philosophical level, while the former searches for an internal unique feature in the African Self to account for social-political phenomena, the latter is bent on confronting Othering 'the African' through slavery, colonialism, apartheid and the contemporary imperial order. Beyond his spirited (and sometimes overly polemical) critique, Mbembe does not offer a persuasive theoretical alternative.

Somewhat straddling Herbst and Mbembe, Mamdani (1996) rejects 'analogy seeking', an approach that unites two otherwise divergent strands of thought: modernization and neo-Marxist dependency theories. He calls for the establishment of the legitimacy of Africa as an object of study, taking the historical specificity of the African experience as the point of departure. Mamdani's argument is that colonialism produced and reproduced a bifurcated state and power system, placing under its hegemonic authority, citizens and subjects; the former governed by civic authority and the latter ruled by customary power. The creation of a bifurcated state of citizens and subjects was occasioned by the native question that colonial rulers had to grapple with.

The native question was a euphemism for the dilemma of stabilizing and consolidating alien rule: 'how can a tiny and foreign minority rule over an indigenous majority?'. Mamdani lays bare 'the regime of differentiation (institutional segregation) as fashioned in colonial Africa – and reformed after independence – and the nature of resistance it bred' (1996: 7-10). This regime was variously called direct rule, indirect rule, association, apartheid (and assumed other labels in post-independence Africa), but all approximate to decentralized despotism.

Crawford Young arguably the most thoroughgoing scholar in underscoring the 'African state' as a colonial state or the postcolonial state as a colonial legacy, attributes Africa's present pathologies to the 'particularities of colonialism in Africa' (1994: 10). For Young, much like Mamdani, but unlike Herbst and Mbembe, colonial exploits in Africa created a system of boundaries and frontiers, new to Africa; introduced novel economic systems (based on the money economy); and entrenched religious and cultural practices that

fundamentally altered the socio-cultural milieu. Unlike the British West Indies and India where working democracies evolved, colonial regimes in Africa neither permitted the requisite politico-economic freedom nor laid the appropriate cultural foundation for a civil society with a competitive self-interest to foster accountability. When on their deathbed they attempted to repent, they could not reform productively because of the brutally exclusio-nary manner in which they had secured their state interests in the first place.

Young evokes the image of *Bula Matari* (crusher of rocks) – a nickname for Henry Morton Stanley who traversed the Congo on behalf of King Leopold of Belgium – to describe the colonial state in Africa that managed in a short time to assert a powerful hold on subject society and smash its resistance (Young 1994: 139-40).[2] Colonial African states, in Young's analysis, coerced more labour, raised proportionately more tax, co-opted fewer indigenous people into positions of power, and allowed less room for the emergence of civil societies (see also Lonsdale 1999: 540; Reno 1995).

Other major studies include Jean-François Bayart's (2009) focus on the historicity and *longue durée* of the 'State in Africa'; Zaki Ergas's edited volume, a seminal inquiry into the 'problematic of the African state', highlighting the embedded difficulties and casting doubt on the viability of the states themselves (Ergas 1987); Reno's (1995) study of the 'shadow state' and corruption in Sierra Leone; and Clapham's (1996) emphasis on the external underpinnings of the 'African state'. Chabal and Deloz (1999: 2) for their part see the state in sub-Saharan Africa as not institutionalized 'for historical reasons – the bureaucratization of the colonized state had been institutionally feeble – and partly for cultural reasons – the personalised nature of prestige and status in African societies'.[3] What do we make of this whole corpus of scholarship?

Although Mamdani draws on case studies of urban South Africa and rural Uganda to provide a comparativist analysis of the bifurcated state, much like Young, the thrust is to show that Africa's common historical (colonial) experience necessarily presents a problem of the 'state'. But a cursory snapshot of variations in this purported common history, and the presumed problematic present, is telling: Ethiopia staved off colonial conquest at the historic battle of Adwa in 1896 but is treated as just another postcolonial 'African state'; Sierra Leone and Liberia as homes of former slaves have a somewhat different history; South Africa remained under a nefarious apartheid rule till 1994 and differs greatly from other states; Mozambique surmounted a brutal guerrilla conflict to become a modestly democratic state; from the ashes of genocide, blamed on nativism/racialism, Rwanda is reckoned as a

model of a development-oriented state, perhaps only second to pace-setters like Botswana; the list goes on.

These variations – by no means exhaustive – challenge the uniformity of a discourse on the legacy buried in the three currents of slave trade, colonialism and apartheid. In foregrounding Africa's colonial past, some scholars elide confronting the intractable present seen from the prism of recent post-independence forces and dynamics of globality. In fact little has been done by way of systematic study of contemporary state formation processes on the continent (exceptions include Young 2012). By contrast, when the present is interrogated, it is seldom historicised; when it is historicised, the link between the distant past and the present is often blithely poor. What is more, some scholars are often caught between disavowing generalization about the 'African situation', while in fact continuing to speak of the 'African crisis' in generic terms moreover in a truncated way. Thus for Chabal and Deloz (1999: xix), 'all African states share a generalized system of patrimonialism and an acute degree of apparent disorder', yet for these two authors, curiously, North Africa, the Horn, and South Africa fall outside of their stylized sensational depictions of instrumentalised disorder!

Neo-patrimonial Postcoloniality: Towards an Analytical/Theoretical Framework

The above review points to the so called 'African state' being neo-patrimonial in nature. Thus, politics and the state are understood to operate through rent seeking and personal rule (Kaarsholm 2006: 3-5; Reno 1995; see also Bates 2008, Young and Turner 1985; Callaghy 1984). From where is this state traced? Colonial states provided social welfare through distant paternalism and taught independent Africa's publics to see the state simply as the purveyor of a national cake (Young 1994). This system is taken to be so ubiquitous in Africa, a system of 'clientelism' with dyadic ties involving a larger instrumental friendship. Compliance is critical in this relationship: the patron expects compliance from the client in matters crucial to patronal interests and a patron reciprocates. Thus Reno (1995) employs the notion of the 'shadow state' to explain personalized rule in Sierra Leone where the 'real' state is constructed behind the facade of formal statehood. To run this state, ruling elites must undermine the evolution of formal statehood.

While this neo-patrimonial framework has been so pervasive in scholarship on African politics (Olukoshi 2007), its structuralist thrust means being inevitably ensnared in absolute binaries that assign analytical value to the lead term (patron), while relegating the other term (client) to residual status.[4] This binary can describe the power configurations but is incapable of

unravelling historical complexities, reconfigurations and various registers of contestations. Extricating from that structuralist binarism requires transcending the neo-patrimonial model. Thus I adopt from Mbembe (2001) two tropes, *commandment* and *entanglement*, that may help shed more light. Commandment refers to the reigning force of power and authority while entanglement denotes processes that are neither smooth nor unilinear but point in different directions with fluctuations and destabilizations. This gives way to a colonial rationality and its reproduction in postcolonial Africa, a kind of rationality used to rule through the provision of goods and services, and governing through extreme material scarcity and insecurity.

The interface of commandment and entanglement produces 'an unprecedented privatization of public prerogatives, and the correlative socialization of arbitrariness. These became the cement of postcolonial African authoritarianism' (Mbembe 2001: 46). The imperative of providing utilities explains the proliferation of public and semi-public bodies and policies concerned with recruitment and the allocation of benefits, salaries, and perks, thus 'Private Indirect Government' where three forces re-order society, culture, and identity: privatization of public violence, appropriation of means of livelihood, and imaginings of the self. The practices of those who command and the commanded are so entangled as to render both powerless. This powerlessness is violence par excellence. Such powerlessness impinges on the rationality for the mode and exercise of power. In sum, a strict neo-patrimonial approach, caught in structural binarism, fails to grasp the ambiguities and tensions between dominants and dominees, rulers and the ruled, control and resistance, and most important, state and society (Bayart 2009; Reno 1995).

Locating the Roots of Uganda's 'Informal State'

Overview of the Problem

The Republic of Uganda is, in many ways, a quintessence of wide-ranging aspects, emblematic of African coloniality: a territory that formed part of the [in]famous East and Central African long-distance Slave Trade; a British colony whose geo-political strategic location attracted other colonial powers like France; a postcolonial state apparatus inherited en-masse from colonial rule; decades of political instability; years of civil strife and, until recently, home to the world's most neglected humanitarian crisis (resulting from two decades of war in the northern part of the country); a 'shining star' of the 1990s neoliberal reforms; a recent resurgence in despondence, apprehension and uncertainty in politics; and a state apparatus that is at once coercively/

destructively strong but constructively weak – despotically strong but infrastructurally weak.

Conventional wisdom invariably looks at Uganda as just another African case where practice has deviated from Western modernity, or where reality has interfered with theory. It is as if some sort of 'African determinism' pops up to produce unexpected reality. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, debate on the state of Uganda spawned vigorous commentaries pointing on the one hand to despondence, decline, and decay; while on the other underscoring the irreversibility of a progressive politics and attainment of hitherto elusive stability. But the current public discourse no less than questions the competence of the state to legitimate its authority through constructive and productive arbitration, more so questions the probity of a highly personalized political system and the credibility of putative formal state structures.

Thus when the Ugandan president announced a cabinet reshuffle in early March 2009, naming his wife (also a Member of Parliament) to the cabinet, a newspaper commentator noted that:

> ... increasing family influence in government has gone hand in hand with the informalisation of power. Although formal authority is vested in official institutions, effective power is wielded by this informal clique of family and kin. The official structure presents a semblance of national ethno-regional and religious diversity to win the regime legitimacy. The informal but highly powerful structure of the closest of the president's family and kin is the 'real' government (*The Independent* March 11, 2009).

It is widely believed even among hitherto unwavering regime-financiers (the Western donor community and international financial institutions) that Uganda is sliding into deeper authoritarianism, and that the gains mustered over the years are being devoured by misuse and abuse of state power. 'We regret that we cannot be more positive about the present political situation in Uganda', concluded a World Bank commissioned report, 'especially given the country's admirable record through the late 1990s'. The report pressed on: 'the President and his remaining associates have failed to meet ... the establishment of an enduring set of political institutions that embraces all Ugandans' (Barkan, et al., 2004). In seemingly growing refrains of disapproval, a retired Supreme Court Judge and key architect of Uganda's current constitution observed: 'Today Parliament waits for the word of the Executive and when the President has spoken ... For goodness sake what has happened to this country?' (*Daily Monitor*, May 29, 2009).

A certain insidious malady seems to be eating up the Republic as unprecedented political criminality abounds such that sentiments of disillusionment can be heard even from unlikely quarters such as unabashed loyalists and regime insiders. Writing in the state-owned *Saturday Vision* newspaper, senior presidential advisor on media relations, John Nagenda, bemoaned the extant state of affairs:

> Everything that has happened on this stretch of land has happened before our very eyes. What in the name of God is happening, or how can it be happening? Let the criminals responsible be brought to book ... The worst that can happen is what nearly always happens: a wall of silence! Parliament, do your duty this time (*Saturday Vision*, March 21, 2009).

Two pertinent issues are apparent from the above comment: first, unacceptable criminality has flourished with an inexcusable degree of impunity. Second, while things go wrong, institutions of state and government are either lethargic, thus unable to act, or their actions are inconsequential and therefore negligible. But this view assumes serendipitous shifts in the workings of the state. How did Uganda get to the present state of affairs? Why the wall of silence and why can't Parliament act? Little has been done to historicise this state of the current Ugandan state. Instead, driven by an exaggerated presentism many commentators tend to ignore, or downplay, antecedent events that supplied the building blocks and the confluence of forces that led to the present situation. This presentism is equally culpable for conflating, if confusing, normative aspirations with observable social-political realities.

By contrast, attempts to historicise tend to reduce the past to a one-dimensional reality; a historicist approach that assumes a unified past from which an equally unified present harmoniously emerges – 'reconstruction of the past as if the only thing that happened was laying the foundations of a present crisis' (Mamdani 1996: 287). Both presentism and historicism obfuscated an adequate grasp of the pathologies afflicting Uganda's body politic. To get around this problem this article attempts to link historical forces with the present political designs of power holders.

Turbulent Post-Independence and Military Ideology

The first proposition of this article then is that the 'informal state', in large measure but by no means exclusively, emerged from a series of negotiating forces and interests converging at the interstice of Uganda's turbulent post-independence politics coupled with the militaristic-ideological provenance of the ruling party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM). At this point

of converging interests is as much the quest to hold state power by the rulers as it is to partake of that power by varied constituencies of citizens. It is this convergence of interests, I argue, that helps explain the way state power has been organised and is exercised in today's Uganda. Perhaps I am moving ahead of myself. First, what is it about turbulent post-independent politics that supplied the antecedent to today's 'informal state'?

The quest to have a politically stable country with minimum guarantee of security (on the part of the ruled) and the belief in militaristic methods of managing society (by the rulers) opened up a domain of politics that shaped the nature of the state today. The clamour for security of person, coming against the backdrop of breakdown of law and order in the 1970s (the Idi Amin reign of terror) and early 1980s (the second Milton Obote rule)[5] produced a post-1986 widely romanticized mantra in Uganda: 'at least we can now sleep'.[6] This hackneyed refrain entered the popular domain and became a campaign slogan during successive national elections. The concrete quest for a secure Uganda dovetailed with a calculated strategy of justifying even outright diabolical actions by those holding state power through invoking the past juxtaposed with the present. In a sense, this meant that cases of use of brute force, criminality and repression could be explained away on account of the need to avoid lapsing into a past that was replayed in public memory as having been punctuated by sheer bloodletting.

But most important in the making of the 'informal state', especially in the early years, is that because of the pre-1986 instability and lawlessness, the NRM government enjoyed enormous goodwill, which goodwill engendered a modus operandi of state and government that played into the hands of a militaristic ideology (Rubongoya 2007; Kobusingye 2010). Thus, notes one observer, 'by the time we woke up to violently rigged elections, safe houses, corruption with impunity; things that make the NRM look exactly like the "bad governments" they replaced, Museveni and his followers had firmly set themselves in power with their influence spread all over all critical sectors of the state' (*Daily Monitor*, January 27, 2009).

While many studies of the 'African state' point to lawlessness and the lack of effective formal state control as the conditions under which informal networks weave a perverted regime of power, Uganda's 'informal state' took a different path. It was forged against the backdrop of a period of near state collapse, war-lordism and rule by gangs, reaching the precipice in the mid-1980s. Whereas near-state collapse in other cases (among others, Liberia,

Sierra Leone, Somalia, Nigeria; see Reno 1995, 1998 and 2006; Clapham 1996; Mbembe 2001; Bates 2008) formed the basis for fragmentation and informalised systems of control, in Uganda it was the antecedent.

The antecedent of turbulent post-independence politics produced a post-1986 political establishment whose ideological provenance is traceable to the proverbial Marxist-Leninist inspired belief in guerrilla armed struggle and militarism. The armed wing of the NRM, the National Resistance Army (NRA) gravitated from a paramilitary force – the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), which fought alongside anti-colonial/apartheid movements in Southern Africa (especially in Mozambique) – to become Uganda's national army. Long before its formation, the eventual founder/leader of FRONASA, and current Ugandan President, presciently expressed his views on state formation in a article at the University of Dar es Salaam: 'Bismarck certainly despised Parliamentary and peaceful struggles ... we must not be oblivious of their limitations either ... I wish that some militaristic African could knock together Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Rwanda, Burundi, etc., to form one state' (Museveni 1966: 11). More than four decades later, he reiterated his political inclinations: 'I am an extremist', the president told his audience. 'There is no doubt about that. I don't have two sides. You are not on our side politically – out' (*Sunday Vision*, January 4, 2009).

Thus recourse to military methods as the best option to resolving social-political questions has been fronted, albeit with limited success, in the realm of the Judiciary. Although the most thoroughgoing construction of the 'informal state' has taken place in the Executive and Legislative branches (see below), the Judiciary too has not been spared. The push for entrenching a parallel military quasi-judicial system is instructive. The military's court martial system is seen as better than the civil Courts of Judicature in delivering justice: 'Justice is done and seen to be done. And the court martial brings out this very well', President Museveni told a meeting of judges in 2008. He continued: 'We killed an officer in the bush who had killed people and everything changed. It [court martial] has worked in Karamoja ... and I want judges to learn from the way the court martial does its things' (*The Observer*, January 21, 2009). In that regard since the early 2000s, attempts have been made to build a parallel military court system, not for the exclusive trial of suspects involved in war-related acts or armed violence but as an alternative to the civil courts.

Realizing the tidal move to entrenching the military court-martial system, and the attendant implications for the rule of law in the country, a public interest litigation petition – Constitutional Petition No. 1 (2006) – was filed in the constitutional court on the role and place of the military court

system. The court's verdict was expected: that the military court system cannot be placed on the same footing with civil courts, and that the General Court Martial (GCM) was subordinate to the High Court, in the same way that the army was subordinate to civilian authority. But from the above quote by the President, the military system is not just an alternative to the civil courts; rather it is seen as the best way of delivering justice. Undeterred by the constitutional court ruling, the Executive continued to push through the military court system, creating a stand-off with the leadership of the Judiciary. Two unprecedented events worth noting occurred.

First, on November 16, 2005 a group of hooded gunmen, dressed in a mix of military fatigues and civilian wear invaded the High Court in Kampala. The group was later identified by the ominous name, Black Mamba, one of the many paramilitary forces. The gunmen, on a mission to re-arrest treason suspects as they left the court, after being granted bail, laid siege on the court, sending shock waves and inflicting a chilling impact on the state of the rule of law in Uganda. This court siege prompted the then Principal Judge (PJ) to refer to the incident as 'the most naked and grotesque violation of the twin doctrines of the rule of law and the independence of the Judiciary', and as amounting to 'defilement and desecration of our temple of justice' (*Sunday Monitor*, November 20, 2005). The incident was likened to the 1977 kidnapping of the then Chief Justice, from the same court premises. The PJ noted that 'not since the abduction of Chief Justice Ben Kiwanuka from the premises of Court during the diabolical days of Idi Amin has the High Court been subjected to such horrendous onslaught as witnessed last Wednesday'. But the Executive did not relent.

Another court siege was mounted more than a year later leading to the second event: Industrial Action by the Judiciary starting March 5, 2007. The stand-off that led to the first High Court military siege remained unresolved as treason suspects (granted bail) could not walk free. Being directly under the Executive (through the Ministry of Internal Affairs), the Uganda Police Force and Uganda Prisons had disregarded the court's verdict and instead heeded the directive from the GCM to continue detaining the suspects as they faced parallel trial in the military court. Thus on March 1, 2007, a second military siege was launched on the same High Court premises again to re-arrest the suspects. The leadership of the Judiciary came to the conclusion that they could not carry on with business as usual. Declaring a week-long strike, acting Chief Justice, Leticia Kikonyogo, cited the 'repeated violation of the sanctity of the court premises, disobedience of court orders with impunity and the constant threats and attacks on the safety and independence of the judiciary and judicial officers' as the reasons for the strike.

For now, the judiciary appears to be holding sway although tensions abound owing to the lurking parallel military court system: 'As the judiciary exists parallel with the military courts, disputes have risen over how justice is administered and dispensed by the two parallel systems', noted the country review report of the African Peer Review Mechanism (*Daily Monitor*, March 24 2009). Unlike in the Executive and Legislature where things have worked out (to which I turn shortly), the architects of Uganda's 'informal state' are still grumbling about the obstinacy of the Judiciary.

Three factors may account for the failure to upstage the judiciary. First, partly due to the conservative nature of judicial systems, anchored in the venerable and ancient ideals of the rule of law and separation of powers, the Ugandan Judiciary has proved a difficult customer in the 'informal state' project. Second, judicial independence is important for legitimacy purposes. But the Executive, whenever necessary and from time to time, swiftly reminds the Judiciary as to who holds real power as highlighted above in the case of treason suspects. Another case worth mentioning was the 2005 Constitutional Court ruling that the Movement (No-Party) System of government was null and void because Parliament had passed the 2000 Referendum Bill irregularly. The Bill formed the basis for the June 2000 national referendum that endorsed continuation of the No-Party (some say One-Party) system (Oloka-Onyango and Mugaju 2000). Consequent to the ruling, the President appeared on state television, clad in full military fatigues. He made it clear that he would not sit idly by as courts passed rulings that 'subvert the will of the people'. The next day government/state[7] operatives organized street protests, targeting court premises and judicial officers.

The third factor for the failure to whip the judiciary into line is that, beyond questions of legitimacy, to completely water down the independence and formal working of the Judiciary would be to undermine the strength and workings of the 'informal state'. How? If the Judiciary were completely informalised by, say, having the parallel military court system eclipse the civil courts, then the entire formal state system would become wholly 'nformal'. In other words, if the mask of the formal separation of powers were to be completely removed by having judicial matters (handled by military court system) under the full control of the Executive, then the 'informal state' would lose the formal edifice that contributes to its reproduction, leading to the possible collapse of the entire system. The safety valve would have been removed.

The Form of the 'Informal State': Workings of the Executive and Legislature

The second proposition is that Uganda's 'informal state' takes the form of simultaneous centralisation and fragmentation of the centre of power, proliferation of quasi-state agencies and pseudo-governmental organisations. Simultaneous centralisation and fragmentation largely applies to the Presidency as the embodiment of Executive power and authority. This spawns myriad political mobilization groups, intelligence and paramilitary bodies, and the coercive institutions of statecraft, more generally. To legitimate activities of the 'informal state' and reproduce its survival, formal statehood expected of political modernity (in the form of functional bureaucratic institutions, constitutionally sanctioned state agencies and bodies) exists, but only to the extent that the 'informal parallel state' can hold sway. Whenever necessary the formal state structures must be undermined or rendered inconsequential. To strike such delicate balancing entails a ruse that enables a schema of a centralized state system and personalized ways of broadcasting power that operate through a fragmentary centre but with an internal monitoring and disciplining mechanism.

Fragmentation at the pinnacle of state power is parallel to, and constantly negotiates for space with, the traditional decentralized state system. Thus, it often transpires that State-House (the Presidency) based political groupings and quasi-intelligence agencies clash with local political leaders and security operatives in matters of ruling-party political mobilization, service delivery, and intelligence gathering.[8] If the localized state (at the district level and sub-county levels) is a formal and constitutional process of power devolution, the fragmentation taken from the centre downwards is subtle, complex and ultimately largely illegal. Yet, as an instrumental mode of broadcasting power, the latter is distinctively functional, thorough and effective.

Mamdani (1996: 291) underscores the seesaw of African politics with continual shifts from centralization to decentralization and vice-versa. While decentralized despotism is seen as exacerbating ethnic divisions, thus necessitating centralization, centralized despotism exacerbates the urban-rural division requiring the solution of decentralization. In that regard the innovative political dexterity of managing a highly centralized but fragmentary power-centre along with a parallel-decentralized system that we observe in the case of Uganda is particularly telling and novel. If the colonial and immediate postcolonial systems took the form of divide and rule by fragmenting the ruled along racial and tribal lines or creating a bifurcated state for citizens and subjects, the 'informal state', by contrast, broadcasts fragmentary power on a highly divided population. The added logic therefore has been to perfect a system that simultaneously pursues decentralization but also fragments the centre of power.

What leads rulers to undermine their state agencies intentionally, asks Reno (2006). There is an instructive instrumental rationale which I will quickly sketch here. One of the most recurrent developments that came to define post-independent Africa was the change of government through bloody or bloodless military coups. In conventional terms and acceptable norms of modern juridical statehood, legitimacy informs the way the state broadcasts power. Therefore, to augment legitimacy both locally and internationally, state power must necessarily be exercised through formal institutions that are not only legal but are also adjudged to be politically acceptable – legitimate. States like the Ugandan one face severe (internal) legitimacy crises.

Up until the 1990s African rulers faced a seventy-two percent risk of violent removal from office (Reno 2006: 28). In Uganda between 1962 (the year of independence) and 1986 (the year of take-over by the current regime), a period of twenty-four years, there were six different governments with five presidents (one having been president twice). Four of the six governments were either outright military coups (largely bloodless) or military backed civilian take-overs. This was pretty common across the African continent. This high risk of losing power at continental level declined to forty-five percent from the 1990s partly because of the abandonment of single-party regimes and the embrace of multiparty politics. But whether under military authoritarianism, or single-party authoritarian rule, or multiparty pretensions, the hard lesson from the days of military coups sunk in deeply: do not keep highly centralized formal political and military structures, instead, build a fragmentary security system, by creating 'multiple anti-crime units, tax enforcement units, informal paramilitaries and palace guards' (Ibid: 29). This fragmentary security system has the net impact of achieving two mutually reinforcing strategic goals.

First, the institutionalized and formally structured system that is prone to a high risk of overthrow is undermined or at best rendered dysfunctional. So the risk of losing power is reduced. Second, the multiple centres of power created by various security and defence forces become a handy network through which state patronage is dispensed. Construction and maintenance of an 'informal state' structure using patronage resources is made possible by these numerous security and defence agencies for one importantly procedural factor: unlike other governmental bodies and state agencies, those concerned with security and defence, whether ostensibly or actually, are not subject to the same (if any) public scrutiny and accountability. Most of their activities and operations, and ipso facto their expenditure details, are subsumed under the rubric of classified information, thus constituting a key source of patronage resources (Reno 2002; Tangri and Mwenda 2003; Mwenda and Tangri 2005).

Table 1: Network of security and defence bodies

Security/Intelligence Agencies	Parallel Agencies	Auxiliary Forces
Uganda Peoples Defence Forces	Joint Anti-Terrorism Taskforce	Amuka Boys
Uganda Police Force	Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence	Arrow Boys
Internal Security Organization	Black Mamba Squad	Special Police Constables
External Security Organization	Rapid Response Unit	Kalangala Action Plan
Criminal Investigations Directorate	Anti-Stock Theft Unit	Kaladushica Action Plan
	Special Revenue Police Services	Local Defence Unit
	Popular Intelligence Unit	Kiboko Squad
	Special Investigations Bureau	Home Guards
	Civic Defence Unit	Land Protection Unit
	Special Forces Group	Paramilitary Police
	Crime Intelligence Unit	Oil Wells Protection Unit
	Counter Terrorism Unit	Child Counter-Trafficking Unit
	State House Counter	First Family Protection Unit
	Intelligence Unit	

Consequently the patronage network is greatly widened. In addition to jobs in the parallel agencies, there are presidential representatives (Resident District Commissioners and their deputies) to more than one hundred districts;[9] more than eighty presidential advisors and special assistants, and more than forty presidential private secretaries and their deputies. All these constitute the fragmentary nature of managing the centre of power. As by law, the head of state is Commander-In-Chief of the armed forces. Also by law, security and intelligence agencies (including the auxiliaries in support of the armed forces) fall under the Ministry for Security in the Office of the President. But the parallel agencies (which according to Figure 1

above more than triple the constitutional ones) operate not from the Office of the President but from State House, the official presidential residence. This shift in the locale of the 'seat of power' from the official (Office of President) to the residential (State House) is further illuminated by the budgetary allocations as shown below:

Figure 1: Budgeted and Actual Expenditure of President's Office



This shift in budgetary allocation is seen by some observers as representing the shift from the official to the informal – from the state to the family: 'It is a manifestation of personal rule where usually there are competing centres of power outside the official ones', a political scientist at Makerere University told *The Independent* news magazine (April 1, 2009). State House, although a public institution, is the residence of the President and his family. It is supposed to plays host to social and ceremonial activities of state and government but not serve as the chief administrative seat of the state. In practice, however, while the Office of the President employs a large staff, the 'real business' has shifted to State House. As one observer noted: 'state power has now been consolidated in State House and State House has become the executive, legislative, and judicial nerve centre of government; State House is the Central Bank, the national military headquarters, the Electoral Commission headquarters and in practically all ways, State House is the Uganda government' (*The Independent* January 7, 2009).

The Role of the Ruling Party Parliamentary Caucus

If the most elaborate fragmentation of power at the centre has unfolded in the Executive branch of government in the form of multiple security and intelligence agencies, political mobilization groups, preponderance of State House, the most effective parallel power structure emerged in the legislative realm – the Parliament. The caucus of the ruling NRM party has assumed the status of the *de facto* 'Parliament' and eclipsed the official parliament. Caucusing is not a practice unique to Uganda. Although the idea of caucusing

is constitutional and legal, the practices and methods of the NRM caucus are anything but, making it a somewhat *sui generis* political praxis. It plays a kind of surrogate role for the Executive's control over Parliament.

Thus a retired Supreme Court Justice aptly captured what is at stake: 'If you look at the British Parliament, they go in the lobby when there is a controversial measure and people who spoke for it or against that measure are known that very evening. In Uganda we don't know how many members of the Movement [NRM] opposed or supported a particular proposal because they are told to keep silent' (*Daily Monitor*, May 29, 2009). This was confirmed by one ruling party MP: 'Some of us who come from a stringent party ... are not allowed to speak after the decision of the caucus ... and when you speak they label you a rebel and when you don't speak the scorecard will give you zero. We are trapped between a rock and a hard place' (*Daily Monitor*, June 2, 2009).

Although the NRM caucus has engineered several legislative decisions, including the 2005 constitutional amendment that deleted presidential term limits, the most widely appreciated case that underscored its power over the legislature came in November 2008. A parliamentary select committee investigated and found two Cabinet Ministers (one also NRM Secretary General) culpable for influence peddling and conflict of interest in a land transaction with the National Social Security Fund (NSSF). Before the tabling of the select committee's report in the house, a local media house contacted most MPs, asking how they would vote on the report, whose findings had been leaked to the public. To the majority MPs, as was with the wider public opinion, it was a foregone conclusion that Parliament would adopt the report, and the two ministers had to resign or face parliamentary censure. The president, who had earlier declined to get embroiled in the saga and vouched for the due process of parliament, stepped in at this point.

All party MPs were summoned to State House, Entebbe, purportedly to debate the report and adopt a position ahead of the scheduled session of Parliament. After daylong deliberations, a binding position was taken. Below is a summary of local newspaper reports on the matter:

> On Monday, November 3, MPs of the ruling NRM were ferried to State House ... for the party' caucus meeting. President Museveni summoned the legislators to discuss two reports recently written by members of a committee of Parliament that investigated the controversial land deal between Security Minister Amama Mbabazi and the NSSF ... Museveni said there are different types of courts in the land. 'The legal court where High Court and others like that fall; the "quasi judicial court" where institutions such as the IGG belong, and the administrative court where "I am the chief justice". I am the one in charge and I will not allow anybody to destroy

> the Movement...' Museveni then ordered that every MP will strictly follow a written guideline to be circulated on Tuesday 10.[9] (*The Observer* November 5, 2008 and *Daily Monitor* November 8, 2008).

Prior to the above saga the President explained to a public gathering the roles of Parliament, on the one hand, and the NRM caucus on the other: 'You are really missing out because whatever goes to Parliament goes through NRM caucus where your MP does not sit. So he is there to sit and wait for a finished product because in Parliament we just bring what is finished to put a stamp', Mr Museveni told a rally in Mbale Municipality, represented by an opposition MP (*Daily Monitor*, August 11, 2008).

The External Economic and Financial Dimension

To construct parallel state structures invariably requires access to economic and financial resources to oil the system. The NRM took power in Uganda in 1986 at the height of the Reaganite and Thatcherite era, also at the time of the retreat of the Left. It was the time when neoliberal forces were mounting a concerted effort to strike a final blow at Communism. The NRM had a strong Leftist ideological leaning and came to power through a Marxist-Leninist inspired guerrilla armed struggle. Yet the new government faced a daunting task of resuscitating a collapsed economy, reconstructing a thin infrastructure eroded by years of war, and rebuilding a state apparatus necessary for establishing effective administration. These stupendous projects required huge financial and technological resources, which the new regime could not muster internally.

Although at the time of capturing power the new president was unwavering in his 'non-aligned' rhetoric, maintaining that he was neither pro-East nor pro-West but rather pro-Africa, by the end of the 1980s (and perhaps in a manner that stunned some Western capitals) the non-aligned rhetoric had assumed a backseat. A fundamental shift occurred: from 'vociferous anti-imperialism', writes Mazrui (2000: 131), 'to abandonment of Westphalia – obsession with sovereignty – for Westphilia – embrace of the West'. Consequently, Uganda embraced neoliberal reforms through the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), and Museveni became a 'poster child of structural adjustment' (Young 2001: 207-10). This economic-ideological shift resulted in wholesome market liberalization, privatization of public prerogatives and utilities, deregulation of the economy, retrenchment to downsize the civil service, and rolling back the state generally.

The swift embrace of neoliberal reforms had two resultant developments worth noting, which in due course became critical to entrenching and sustaining the 'informal state'. First, the regime secured much needed external recognition, gained legitimacy from Western capitals, and ipso facto,

unlocked aid and loan taps to Uganda. However, given that by the second half of the 'decade of hope' (the 1990s), it had emerged that most IMF/World Bank bankrolled reforms across Africa and the agenda of aid-to-Africa was coming to no avail, there was an urgent need to push harder for some success stories. Therefore (and this brings me to the third proposition), the desperate search for success stories of neoliberal reforms by international financial institutions, and the wider Western donor community, supplied the much needed financial inflows that economically oiled the process of entrenching Uganda's 'informal state' while contemporaneously insulating the government against civic scrutiny and accountability. The insulation against deeper scrutiny and thorough public accountability was enabled largely by the upsurge of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or what I may ungenerously call an NGO economy, which assumed the status of civil society but lacking in organisational autonomy and institutional strength to counter excesses of the state.

The NGO phenomenon percolated into all key domains of the polity, including government ministries/departments as well as traditionally autonomous institutions like Churches and the 'non-state sphere', generally.[11] It became commonplace for government departments to set up NGO-like project implementation units, much like Churches register subsidiary organizations that are fronted to secure donor funds to implement projects. Some NGOs get sub-contracted to implement government policies while some are patronized by elements with strong connections to the inner circle of the ruling elite. This fusing has prompted a cynical coinage of Governmental Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGO). To show the thoroughgoing extent of this phenomenon, even the department of political science at Uganda's premier university, Makerere, included in its Bachelor's degree curriculum a course on 'Administration of NGOs'.

Therefore, while studies of other neo-patrimonial states (that parallel Uganda's 'informal state') highlight the role of local informal markets, exploitation of precious minerals, illicit activities like drug trafficking, money laundering, etc., the Ugandan case derived much of its economic muscle and financial wherewithal from Western donor-aid inflows, debt relief, and long-term loans. This contrasts sharply with related findings in the literature. Reciprocal relations between a parallel economy and a parallel state played a critical role in forging Reno's (1995) shadow state in Sierra Leone. There, a shadow state leaned on a shadow economy based on illicit trade in diamonds in the 1990s. Similar cases include Liberia, Cameroon, and Nigeria (Reno 1998 and 2006; Mbembe 2001; Bayart 2009). For example, Reno (2006: 30) notes that stripped of state institutions and bureaucratic hierarchies used

to control associates and subordinates, African rulers manipulate markets to manage clients and punish and deny resources to others who otherwise might oppose them. 'This led to evolution of informal political and clandestine economy networks amidst collapsing state institutions, and creation of numerous informal linkages' (Ibid: 35).

Uganda presents an interesting departure from that trend. Although it had a shadow economy at the height of near state collapse in the late 1970s to early 1980s (Green 1981 and Kasfir 1984), to say the same about the 1990s and 2000s would be erroneous. Rather than a shadow economy, there emerged an NGO economy; instead of illicit trade, a different dynamic in Uganda's economy has been at play – donorisation. Perhaps with oil production imminent a new resource base will come into play. Suffice to note that by the end of the 1990s Uganda had emerged as a leading destination of Western aid and loans. By the mid-2000s the country was a leading beneficiary from the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, HIPC (Tangri and Mwenda 2006; Mwenda and Tangri 2005, 2003; Reno 2002).

What exact role does aid money play? 'Aid in Uganda performs a dual function', argues veteran journalist Charles Onyango-Obbo. 'It is a form of patronage that regime functionaries and the middle class are allowed to steal, in order to keep them vested in Museveni and NRM remaining in power; and the crumbs that are put to good use go toward mollifying Museveni's peasant base with things like UPE' (*The Independent*, January 28, 2008).[12] Although the country's aid dependence was greatly reduced, throughout the 1990s Uganda's recurrent expenditure was more than seventy percent donor-funded while development expenditure was paid for in full by the same source.

To argue as some scholars have done (see Muhumuza 2009; Makara 2009; Rubongoya 2007) that President Museveni hoodwinked donors to believe that his government was indeed seriously implementing democratic reforms is to gloss over the pragmatism of the Bretton Woods institutions. As long as the country implemented market reforms (assured a deregulated market system, ensured macro-economic stability, overhauled the public service, expedited privatization, however haphazard, and posted impressive economic growth rates, kept inflation under check), the IMF, the World Bank, and other external financiers were less bothered by internal political developments. Part of their apolitical position rested on a disingenuous claim that their home charters and international law norms prohibited them from involvement in political matters of a foreign country like Uganda (Bayart 2009: xliii-iv; Olukoshi 2007). Yet the very process through which, say, SAPs were negotiated was no less political.

The second major outcome of embracing neoliberal reforms (or at least the manner in which SAPs were implemented) had to do with the shaping of what is now considered Uganda's single most overarching malady – corruption and abuse of office. Pressured by the 'there is no alternative' (TINA) mantra (Olukoshi 2007), sweeping privatization of public parastatals and state run public utilities, wholesome market liberalization and deregulation of the economy and the haphazard downsizing of the state (which, in the first place required substantial reconstruction at least in welfare terms) opened up a channel through which corruption acted as a tool for mobilizing resources for the burgeoning 'informal state'. Not that corruption was being invented; rather the project of rolling back the state enabled the forging of a new form of politics that became the hotbed of unprecedented corruption and abuse of office. The mess in privatization reached inexcusable levels in 1997/8 culminating (for the first time and till now) in Parliamentary censure of two Cabinet Ministers, while a couple other ministers were forced into resignation.[13] But this had the unintended consequence of supplying a lesson that corruption and abuse of office had to be executed in the most sophisticated and subtle way possible.

As of this writing an inquest into two government ministries preliminarily reveals millions of dollars (of donor funds) swindled with speculation ripe that the situation could be worse in other ministries. In 2008, haemorrhage of public resources through corruption was estimated by the World Bank to be no less than a quarter billion dollars annually. What is more, a 2006 report commissioned by the Ministry of Public Service found that one in ten civil servants is a non-existent 'ghost worker', costing taxpayers as much as Shs1.6 billion ($ One million as of 2006) per month. Out of 229,901 records verified, 26,473 were found to be invalid (ghost employees). Of these, some 20,590 were from education institutions and schools where the dead, sacked, transferred and those who left service were still being paid (*Daily Monitor*, February 9, 2009).

What is more, a 2009 survey by the Global Corruption Barometer of Transparency International ranked Uganda as the third most corrupt country in the world. Commenting on the role of the ruling party in abetting corruption and abuse of office, a 'historical member' noted: 'We find the NRM texture being strangely transformed. It is increasingly becoming an association mainly for princely fights over available spoils in the state. Our party is becoming a political asylum for those who are seeking offices to conduct themselves with impunity against our people' (*The Observer*, February 11, 2009).

What Went Wrong?

The easy conclusion has been to blame it all on one man, the President (see Kazoora 2012; Kobusingye 2010; Makara 2009; Muhumuza 2009; Rubongoya 2007). What happened, asks Rubongoya (2007: 192), 'to the "peasant/warrior", war hero, champion of popular democracy, anti-sectarian crusader, and democratic populist – Museveni?'. Rubongoya concludes that 'he stayed too long!' Some say 'he is an African dictator of old'. 'He is hostage to the Stone Age', others retrospectively claimed. Thus, at the height of incandescent political activity (climaxing in deletion of presidential term limits from the constitution in 2005), the London *Telegraph* predictably noted: 'Once held up as part of a new breed of leaders who would lead Africa's renaissance, Mr. Museveni… is succumbing to the old temptation of the continent's presidents to cling on to power' (*The Telegraph* 2004).

That may be the case but such hurried conclusions failure to grasp the obtaining mode and technology of power in Uganda. Baffled by the 'passiveness' of Ugandans in the face of the abuse of state power, some commentators decry the weak civil society while others wonder as to why the citizenry can look on (perhaps helplessly) as things go wrong: where is civil society? How did a revolution seeking modernity turn into a corrupt neo-patrimonial order? A former regime insider notes that 'the country has ended up with a regime whose outstanding characteristics are arbitrariness, disrespect for the law and privatization of the state, a personalized state' (*Daily Monitor*, May 29, 2009). Perhaps comments by a prominent journalist sums up quite well the prevailing mood and general thinking: 'Uganda today is sliding backwards toward a system of one-man rule engineered by the recently re-elected President Museveni ... Perhaps more disturbingly still, the stakeholders whom one would naturally expect to rise to denounce Museveni's sapping ... Uganda's oppositionists, civil society groups, middle-class citizens, and foreign donors… have been virtual no-shows' (Mwenda 2007: 23-37).

There is something missing in these conclusions. The dearth of deeper theoretical analysis of the problem at hand is conspicuous. How come there is no resistance to the way state power has been shifting from the formal to the 'informal' realm? Could it be that the kind of resistance at play cannot be deciphered in orthodox fashion? Crucially, how does the 'informal state' reproduce its survival even when the wider public (or at least the Ugandan elite) construe it as undesirable? Is the 'informal state' necessarily antithetical to democratic practice? Are there some productive facets emanating from the 'informal state' that can augment democratic practices suitable to the local conditions? In the next part of this article I attempt to shed light on these questions.

Augmenting Legitimacy and Reproducing Survival

Understanding the Rationality

In the foregoing paragraphs, I have attempted to thresh out the intricate yet thoroughgoing mode of exercise of power, which for all intents and purposes was forged in Uganda's recent political and military history, the post-1986 era. I have also accented the antecedent pre-1986 near state collapse that emboldened the primacy of security both on the part of the citizenry and the rulers. In that regard one Herculean task that I sought to unravel is the logic of maintaining the edifice of a formal state structure (or at least some semblance of it) and the contemporaneous construction of parallel structures on which the 'informal state' is anchored. This was captured in a recent study on decentralization in Uganda aptly noting: 'it is interesting that Museveni has not responded to challenges to his power by unilaterally overturning or openly working outside formal democratic institutions' (Cammack, et al. 2007: 47).

This raises an important puzzle: why not just do away with the formal state praxes that do not suit the plans of those exercising state power? Why must parallel state institutions and agencies be constructed behind the façade of formal juridical statehood? Why not unmask and embrace informality officially? To do so, as I noted earlier, would obviously defeat the logic given that what is at stake is holding a grip on state power. I have attempted to answer that question by reiterating the obvious and banal argument of legitimacy. But, more importantly, I have underscored the theoretical rationality that makes the formal structure indispensable to constructing parallel structures that are crucial for the functioning and survival of the 'informal state'.

The rationality underpinning the system in question is to maintain continuity and sustenance by striking a delicate balance between legality and illegality, legitimacy and illegitimacy, formal and informal, official and unofficial, etc. Such balancing in due course of time creates an internal mechanism that holds together the system while also giving justification for its modus operandi. Therefore, beyond the much-vaunted rationale of legitimacy, as the reason why formal state structures must be maintained, the thrust for striking a balance between formal and informal is that the latter would cease being what it is intended to be without the former. Other than this political (instrumental) rationality there is a normative, moral rationality too.

The consistent and continual bemoaning of personalisation and informalisation of state power mirrors a certain normative rationality. Even within the thinking of those who do not countenance a replication of Western

political modernity, the normative quest for a formally institutionalised system provides the lens through which the informalised exercise of power is viewed, judged and construed as being undesirable. On the other hand, the architects of the 'informal state' seem to be pushing toward the same normative goal by experimenting with parallel institutions. In fact, regime ideologues acknowledge the superior moral imperative of formal state structures and are willing to either maintain their functionality, not only as instruments of moral-political legitimation, but also as a measure on which parallel experimentations can be judged, weighed and effected. This, to my understanding, is how state formation has been taking shape in Uganda. Failure to take cognizance of these internal dynamics leads to hasty and superficial condemnations.

Uganda has experimented with several political systems including the so-called No-Party System, which was again another case of shifting from institutionalised (party) politics to individualism.[14] All experimentation has been anchored in the language of broader Western political modernity even when such experimentations seek to find local innovative approaches that suit local circumstances. Indeed, since 1986 the NRM has been consistent in its refrain of modernisation; all policy initiatives and governmental programmes are embellished with the language of modernising Uganda. So, here is an important converging point: those who push or advocate for formal state structures are driven by a normative rationality, which rationality is acknowledged and negotiated by architects of the 'informal state'. This presents infinite pull and push contestations. While on the whole real state power is shifted to the 'informal state', to construct an effective 'informal state' through parallel structures the formal remains indispensable. Such contestations are not about to end and what lies ahead is unpredictable, but suggestions of impending state failure are a little exaggerated.

Reproducing Survival: Creation of Districts and the Role of the Media

How does the 'informal state' actually broadcast and distribute power in such a way as to reproduce its continuity and assure its survival? The standard argument is that the exercise of state power that does not approximate to formal-legal juridical statehood (or the Weberian idea of legal-rational) tends to be highly centralized and personalized under a potentate of one type or the other: a benevolent dictator, a military ruler, a monarchical despot, or an imperial president. Being neo-patrimonial, the argument goes, such states tend to be presidential: power is concentrated in one individual who dominates the state apparatus and stands above its laws.

Cammack et al., (2007: 31) note that 'intolerant of challenge and criticism and reluctant to delegate, Museveni fears alternative centres of power. This has led him to micro-manage policy and surround himself with weak "yes-men", both of which factors reinforce personalised power and decision-making and undermine effective policy-making'. This article takes a different tack: such centralism can only reproduce its survival by, ironically, fragmenting the centre itself, making it impracticable to maintain one unified centre of power. Thus, even though at face value the potentate appears to be the ultimate and indisputable embodiment of state power, in practice the system reproduces its survival by rendering even the most powerful, so to say, powerless.

The survival of this fragmented centre is underpinned by a kind of circular system that makes every actor involved to keep a watch on the other; mutuality of co-existence and the drive to work for continuity of the status quo compels even the seemingly most powerful to cede power to others around. Bayart (2009) calls it the 'politics of the belly'. Therefore, the obsession with the cliché 'Africa's strongmen' misses a fundamental rationality that coheres with the exercise of state power: for the centre to hold it has to necessarily be fragmented and for the potentate or benevolent dictator to survive, those closer and afar should feel sharing in the power carcass. In effect the president of Uganda, construed from various shades as an invincible revolutionary, an altruist and selfless leader, an autocrat, another of those African big men, is at different times dissimilarly the opposite of such power adornment: powerless, vulnerable and insecure.

To negotiate this paradox of powerful but powerless at the same time, power is exercised through commandment – the arbitrary force of power, which entails the conflation of state, government, ruling party and sections of both the private (business) sector and civil society. The state is projected as simultaneously indistinguishable from society, and as the upholder of the law and keeper of truth (Mbembe 2001: 105). This fusing of different registers of political authority and military power provide the cement of today's 'informal state' in Uganda. Thus opposition leader Augustine Ruzindana aptly notes that because the state is equated with society and since the ruling party is fused with the state, all activities of opposition parties aimed at state power are *ipso facto* acts against the state and thus treasonable (*Daily Monitor*, May 15, 2009). As the embodiment of commandment, President Museveni has wasted no time in declaring his God-like status; and since the days of the bush war tales are told of the mysterious ways of the man. Chiding his main political opponent, the president spoke of who he is, as

President: 'Besigye stood for presidency and he should not tell lies because the President is second to God and a President should not tell lies' (*New Vision*, October 13, 2008).[15]

So the President thinks of himself as 'God's Deputy'. He is not just another mortal being. And when he surmises thus, a large section of his listeners either believe him outright or are prompted to search for reinterpretations that conform to, and confirm, his immortality. His handlers craft puzzles that warrant beseeching the president to intervene and apply extra-ordinary wisdom, earning him ululations that set him aside as above ordinary mortals. Yet this same invincible and mysterious politico-military leader is well aware of his limits as a human being, his vulnerability, weaknesses, and his fallibility. He also recognizes that his fetishistic exercise of power is paralleled by a desire to share in the same by those he rules. Further, the ruled too go about despising the ruler for being a cheap and power-thirsty autocrat. This forms a convivial relationship that produces the forces of production that continually reproduce the extant system observed in Uganda. The ruler simultaneously projects an immortal self and a sense of vulnerability; the ruled are aware of such a duality. In effect there emerges a shift from the convivial to the fearful, which nevertheless holds the system. Two examples will help shed light: creation of districts as part of power devolution and the role of a relatively free media. I will take on one in turn.

First, as regards the creation of districts: while the centre of state power has taken on informal fragmentation, there have been contemporaneous formal processes of power devolution through creation of local government (district) units. While fragmentation at the centre is informal, unofficial, and in large measure both illegal and illegitimate, fragmentation by way of creation of local government units goes through formal processes of decision-making. A petition by the local community, or representatives, is sent to Cabinet and thereafter Parliament passes the final decision of granting district status. Much of the discussion here has focused on the 1990s and early 2000s as the period within which several processes coalesced in forging the 'informal state'. In 1990 Uganda had thirty-three districts, forty-four by 1997, seventy-eight in 2006, eighty in 2009, and close to 100 by 2010. It is difficult to pin down the exact number but over 100 have so far been created and the number is expected to reach 120 in the near future.

The creation of (what is viewed especially within elite circles) as unviable districts has put Uganda on a path of profligate public spending as the cost of public administration shot through the roof in the late 1990s reaching 980 billion shillings (500 million US dollars) as of 2008. This transforms into more than four percent of Uganda's GDP, estimated at about dollars US 12 billion (as of 2012). The standard argument is that such an irrational and

disingenuous populist practice, as creation of districts, is part of the workings of the neo-patrimonial state; a resort to a populist policy in order to win votes and fend off electoral challenges. Thus, Cammack et al., (2007) observe that the proliferation of districts has been driven by Museveni's personal political agenda and his need to generate elite and popular support in the face of democratic challenges to his authority. Although popular, such a policy is ill conceived, opportunistic and, in some instances, undertaken without due legal process.

To be sure, these 'local-state' units directly benefit only a few bureaucrats and elected officials in material terms, yet yearning for district status (and especially the locale of the headquarters) remains very popular. Why? By ceding power to the districts, regardless of how much and substantive it is, a certain placatory gesture is actualized. This creates a feeling of empowerment, however imaginary, sufficient in engendering a convivial relationship between the rulers and the ruled. If the ruler imagines himself as invincibly powerful yet in reality he rules with certain powerlessness, the ruled too celebrate enjoyment of the imaginary power that is realized whenever they demand for, and are granted, district status.

Second, as regards the issue of media freedom, Uganda has a relatively vibrant media sector (at least at face value and in quantitative terms), especially electronic media, with close to 200 radio stations spread across the country. All radio stations at dusk buzz with heated debates on politics, economics and society generally. There abounds a satisfying sense of ideas being left to contend and the citizenry being allowed the latitude to speak out, unfettered, on matters concerning their country. Both the urban dwellers and rural folks, through live studio appearances and telephone calls, debate spiritedly; they even stretch their freedom of expression to trading personal insults and uttering unfair comments. Privately owned newspapers, magazines and myriad small newsletters are relatively free to publish even damning reports about activities of government, the army, and key individual military and political players. Cartoonists too do their work, caricaturing the President, members of the First Family, and the political 'big fish'.

Paradoxically, while media vibrancy flourishes, Uganda for long kept on its law books colonial draconian media laws: the law of sedition, publication of false news, criminal defamation, sectarianism, etc., (with the constitutional court only recently declaring unconstitutional the law against publication of false news and of sedition). These laws play a critical self-censoring role; seldom are they invoked to successfully prosecute journalists or members of the public. Instead, from time to time journalists are summoned, interrogated and charged with various cases only for the state to lose interest

in the cases after years of court proceedings. But there is personal and official inconvenience, legal costs, and psychological torture: these serve the needful just well.

What is the relationship between the 'open and free media' and the workings of the 'informal state'? How come that abuse of power through the workings of the 'informal state' is exposed or unearthed largely through the same media over which the state subtly controls but which nevertheless promotes public debate, expert analyses and commentaries? Are free media a threat to the 'informal state'? Autocratic and quasi-democratic regimes may leverage a seemingly free and open media environment to continue holding onto power. But such regimes in the end may come down tumbling at the hands of media-instigated civic insurrection. The recent 'Arab Spring' is instructive.

However, the role of the media in the workings of the 'informal state' in Uganda is more nuanced: 'In exchange for a freehand to loot public resources and destroy public goods and services, the regime has given elites "freedom" to shout wolf in newspapers and radios, evade taxes, violate traffic rules, throw garbage on the streets and build in road reserves' (*The Independent*, May 12, 2009). In effect the media have been a handy avenue to assuage public outrage and neutralise civic discontent. But they also help in gauging public opinion and determining the necessary measures to be taken to avert potential and actual political crises.

Conclusion

I have argued in this article that a distinct regime of power evolved in Museveni's Uganda under the auspices of a historical experience of near-state collapse coupled with the formative ideology of the rulers. This system of power fragments the centre and constructs parallel structures while maintaining important aspects of formal juridical statehood. For heuristic purposes I have called this system an 'informal state', although informal here should not be construed as the direct opposite of formal. Is this 'informal state' necessarily antithetical to desirable political development? If so, can we tease out some unintended consequences from its workings? The Ugandan 'informal' state takes a distinct outlook: it is neither the traditional sovereign power built on pure brute force, oppression and coercion nor is it a modern regime of power that works largely through surveillance, monitoring and disciplinary institutions, as Michel Foucault proposed. So, what is it?

The easy conclusion has been to say it is hybrid. That it combines formal power (legal-rational) with informality (personal and charismatic); coercion with persuasion; repression and brute force with disciplinary institutions, repressive and ideological apparatuses (à la Louis Althusser). This

presupposes a healthy relationship between formal and informal, oblivious of the contestations that inevitably lead to entanglements and displacements. Not persuaded by the idea of hybridity, I have underscored the logic of striking a delicate balance between formal and informal. But I have also emphasised that such a balance is geared toward enabling the functionality of the 'informal state'.

A cloud of uncertainty has engulfed Ugandan politics, and the 'informal state' is seen as inherently inimical to harnessing and propelling democracy. Policies pursued through the 'informal state', and the general fashioning of national politics are adjudged as populist (Laclau 2005). But to construe populist policies as necessarily democratically regressive is to wish away a whole dynamic domain of state-society engagement whose irreversibility is no small feat. Nobody can rule out for sure the eventuality of the same populist policies and criminality that hold together a seemingly undesirable system producing the forces that unleash a rapturous passage to a more desirable political system. The rhetoric of pro-poor policies, the resort to invoking the past in justifying otherwise indefensible actions of the 'informal state', the fragmentation of political power at the centre and ceding of the same to unviable local units, the creation of occasional fear and insecurity; all these and others constitute the crucible that can potentially lead to political transformation. Already, an archetypical case of informality, the oxymoron 'No-Party' system was abandoned after failed experimentation. Rather than cling on to the copy and paste of Western traditions of state, Uganda, no less other African countries, must subject state systems and praxes to internal tests and contestations if genuine and sustainable political development is to be realized.

Acknowledgement

I presented drafts of this article at the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences Calcutta (CSSSC), India and at Centre for Basic Research (CBR), Kampala. I am grateful to audiences at both institutions for helpful comments. I am particularly indebted to Partha Chatterjee of CSSSC and Columbia University, William Reno of Northwestern University, and Simon Rutabajuuka, Mwambutsya Ndebesa, and John Barya, all of Makerere University and CBR. I first drafted this article in May/June 2009 at the conclusion of a year-long pre-doctoral research training fellowship at CSSSC funded by the South-South Exchange Programme for research on the History of Development (Sephis). I am grateful to the Sephis Secretariat in the Netherlands and to Anjan Ghosh (RIP), the then Sephis Coordinator at CSSSC, staff and faculty of CSSSC for according me an intellectually fruitful time in Calcutta. The usual caveats apply.

Notes

1. This concern necessitated international organizations and consultants to help 'solve' the problem.
2. This position is in stark contrast to that of Herbst, discussed above, who arrives at an opposite conclusion about the impact of colonialism.
3. It is curious that these two authors stridently insist that 'what we discuss has already happened elsewhere in the world in earlier periods and could well happen again in those parts of the world which now view Africa with such distaste' (Chabal and Deloz 1999: xx), yet they go ahead to attribute informalisation of politics to 'the personalised nature of prestige and status in African societies' (Ibid: 2).
4. On 'analogy seeking', my debt to Mamdani (1996).
5. For discussions of post-independence but pre-1986 Ugandan politics and society see, for example, Karugire (1988), Mutibwa (1992), and Rubongoya (2007).
6. The point is that during the decades preceding seizure of power in 1986 by the current politico-military establishment, insecurity reached its zenith when 'peaceful sleep' at night was a kind of luxury for many Ugandans.
7. The fusing of government, state, party and presidency is a mark of the way the system of power under discussion works. I will elaborate on this later.
8. This clash was most pronounced during the 2001 and 2006 national elections pitting a paramilitary outfit, Kalangala Action Plan, headed by Major Roland Kakooza Mutale, a Presidential Adviser, and local leaders as well as members of parliament in different parts of the country.
9. The number now stands at over 100 and expected to reach 120 if new proposals are approved by parliament and especially as the country nears the next general elections.
10. The interesting twist to this saga was that the president's wife (a Member of Parliament who subsequently became a Minister) was among those who disagreed with the president. The local press quoted her saying: 'From what I have read, Mbabazi [one of the two culpable ministers] has one option; repossess his land and refund the Shs 11 billion or take responsibility and resign as a minister'. See *The Observer*, November 5, 2008.
11. I have deliberately avoided using the phrase civil society here, wary of the widely used conceptual misnomer of erroneously ascribing the status of civil society to all activities and organizations lying outside of the strict domain of the state. In Uganda, what I have called the NGO economy constitutes much of what is seen as civil society organizations. This NGO economy, I wish to argue, is neither civil society in theory nor in practice. For a similar critique, see Chatterjee (2004).
12. UPE, or Universal Primary Education, a government programme for free-universal primary education.

13. Similar corruption and abuse of office-related resignations happened in early 2012.
14. The 'individual-merit' principle under the so called 'No-party' system provided that competition for political office was by individual politicians, not political parties. This principle, as popularized by the NRM and included in the 1995 constitution, was later discredited as a ploy by the NRM, which continued to operate as a political party under the guise of being a 'political system' while maintaining a tight lid on activities of other political parties (see Mugaju and Oloka-Oyango 2000, Carbone 2008).
15. Kiiza Besigye, former leader of the main opposition party, the Forum for Democratic Change, thrice contested and lost against the incumbent Yoweri Museveni: in 2001, 2006, and 2011.

References

Barkan, J.D. et al., 2004, 'The Political Economy of Uganda: The Art of Managing a Donor-Financed Neo-Patrimonial State', A background paper commissioned by the World Bank in Fulfilment of Purchase Order 7614742, Final Draft, Kampala: the World Bank.

Bates, R.H., 2008, *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bayart, J-F., 2009, *The State in Africa: the Politics of the Belly*, Second Edition, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bayart, J-F., Ellis, S. and Hibou, B., 1998, *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*, Oxford: James Currey.

Callaghy, T., 1984, *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Cammack, D., et al., 2007, 'Neo-patrimonial Politics, Decentralisation and Local Government: Uganda and Malawi in 2006a', Working Paper 2, London: Overseas Development Institute.

Carbone, G., 2008, *No-Party Democracy? Ugandan Politics in Comparative Perspective*, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.

Chabal, P. and Daloz, J-P., 1999, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, Oxford, Bloomington and Indianapolis: James Currey and Indiana University Press.

Chatterjee, P., 2004, *Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World*, New Delhi: Permanent Black.

Clapham, C., 1996, *Africa and the International System: the Politics of State Survival*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Daily Monitor, 2008, 'FDC Constituencies Orphaned - Museveni', August 11, Kampala: Monitor Publications.

Daily Monitor, 2008, 'NSSF: Why Janet Differed from President on Mbabazi', November 8, Kampala: Monitor Publications.

Daily Monitor, 2009, 'How Museveni Has Managed to Rule Uganda this Long', January 27, Kampala: Monitor Publications.
Daily Monitor, 2009, 'Report: 1 in 10 Government Employees A "ghost"', February 9, Kampala: Monitor Publications.
Daily Monitor, 2009, 'Peers Pin Museveni on Bad Governance', March 24, Kampala: Monitor Publications.
Daily Monitor, 2009, 'Uganda's Democracy in Reverse - Kanyeihamba', May 29, Kampala: Monitor Publications.
Daily Monitor, 2009, 'How the NRM has Transformed Since 1986 (Part 2)', May 15, Kampala: Monitor Publications.
Daily Monitor, 2009, 'Character of National Resistance Movement Regime', May 29, Kampala: Monitor Publications.
Daily Monitor, 2009, 'Scorecard: NRM MPs Blame Party for Poor Performance', June 2, Kampala: Monitor Publications.
Doornbos, M., 1990, 'The African State in Academic Debate: Retrospect and Prospect', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ergas, Z., ed., 1987, *The African State in Transition*, New York: St. Martin's Press.
Fukuyama, F., 2005, 'Stateness First', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 16, Number 1, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
Green, R., 1981, 'Magendo in the Political Economy of Uganda: Pathology, Parallel System or Dominant Sub-Mode of Production?', Discussion Paper 64, IDS Sussex: University of Sussex.
Helmke, G and Levitsky, S., eds., 2006, *Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Helmke, G and Levitsky, S., 2004, 'Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda', *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 4, December.
Herbst, J., 2000, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Jackson, R. H., 1987, 'Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World', *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 519-549.
Jackson, R.H. and Roseberg, C., 1982, *Personal Rule in Black Africa*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Joseph, R., 1987, *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic*, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kaarsholm, P., ed., 2006, *Violence, Political Culture and Development in Africa*, Oxford: James Currey.
Karugire S., 1988, *Roots of Instability in Uganda*, Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
Kasfir, N., 1983, 'State, Magendo and Class Formation in Uganda', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. 22, No. 3.

Kobusingye, O., 2010, *The Correct Line? Uganda under Museveni*, London: Authors House.

Laclau, E., 2005, *On Populist Reason*, London, New York: Verso.

Lonsdale, J., 1999, 'The African Colonial Sate in Comparative Perspective' (Book Review), *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Volume 32, Issue 2/3, Cambridge: African Studies Centre.

Magaju, J. and Oloka-Oyango, J., (Eds), 2000, *No-Party Democracy in Uganda: Myths and Realities*, Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Makara, S., 2009, 'The Challenge of Building Strong Political Parties for Democratic Governance in Uganda: Does Multiparty Politics Have a Future?', IFRA ~ Les Cahiers, Number 41, pp. 43-80.

Mamdani, M., 1996, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mazrui, A., 2000, 'The Role of Ideology in Uganda', in J. Mugaju and J. Oloka-Onyango, eds., *No-Party Democracy in Uganda: Myths and Realities*, Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Mbembe, A., 2002, 'African Modes of Self-Writing', *Public Culture*, 14 (1): 239-273, Duke: Duke University Press.

Mbembe, A., 2001, *On the Postcolony*, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of

California Press.

Muhumuza, W., 2009, 'From Fundamental Change to No Change: The NRM and Democratization in Uganda', IFRA ~ Les Cahiers, No. 41, pp. 21-42.

Museveni, Y., 1966, 'On the Silent Class Struggle', Mimeo, Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam.

Mutibwa, P., 1992, *Uganda Since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes*, Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Mwenda, A.M., 2007, 'Personalizing Power in Uganda', *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 18, Number 3, pp.23-37, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Mwenda, A.M., and R. Tangri, 2005, 'Patronage Politics, Donor Reforms, and Regime Consolidation in Uganda', *African Affairs*, 104 (416): 449-467, London: Oxford University Press.

New Vision, 2008, 'Besigye Lying About Rwanda - Museveni', October 13, Kampala: Vision Group.

Olukoshi, A., 2007, 'Assessing Africa's New Governance Models', in J. Oloka-Onyango and Nansozi-Muwanga, *Africa's New Governance Models: Debating Form and Substance*, Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Poulantzas, N., 1980, *State, Power, Socialism*, London and New York: Verso.

Reno, W., 2006, 'Insurgencies in the Shadow of State Collapse', in P. Kaarsholm, ed., *Violence, Political Culture and Development in Africa*, Oxford: James Currey.

Reno, W., 2002, 'Uganda's Politics of War and Debt Relief', *Review of International Political Economy*, Number 9: 3, pp. 415-435, Routeldge: Taylor and Francis.

Reno, W., 1998, *Warlord Politics and African States*, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner.
Reno, W., 1995, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rubongoya, J. B., 2007, *Regime Hegemony in Museveni's Uganda: Pax Musevenica*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Saturday Vision, 2009, 'OMW Take Your Bow!', March 21, Kampala: Vision Group.
Sunday Monitor, 2005, 'Uganda Military Rapes the Temple of Justice', November 20, Kampala: Monitor Publications.
Sunday Vision, 2009, 'I Have no Time for Opposition - Museveni', January 4, Kampala: Vision Group.
Tangri, R., and Mwenda, A. M., 2006, 'Politics, Donors and the Ineffectiveness of Anti-corruption Institutions in Uganda', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 44 (1):101-24, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tangri, R., and Mwenda, A. M., 2003, 'Military Corruption & Ugandan Politics Since the Late 1990s', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 30, No. 98: 539-552, ROAPE Publications.
Terray, E., 1986, 'Le climatiseur et la veranda', in *Afrique plurielle, Afrique actuelle: Hommage a Georges Balandier*, Paris: Karthala.
The Independent, 2008, 'M7's Life Presidency and its "Democracy Dividends"', January 28, Kampala: The Independent Publications.
The Independent, 2009, 'Ugandans to Walk Tough Road in 2009', January 7, Kampala: The Independent Publications.
The Independent, 2009, 'Family Rule in Uganda: How Museveni's "Clan" Runs the Government', March 11, Kampala: The Independent Publications.
The Independent, 2009, 'Farewell Republic of Uganda, Welcome Rwakitura Kingdom', March 11, Kampala: The Independent Publications.
The Independent, 2009, 'Sacrifice or Privilege', April 1, Kampala: The Independent Publications.
The Independent, 2009, 'Why Uganda's Democracy Fails', May 12, Kampala: The Independent Publications.
The Observer, 2009, 'Top Lawyers Scoff at Museveni on Judges', January 21, Kampala: Observer Media Ltd.
The Observer, 2009, 'Beware, Fear Can Breed Hostility', February 11, Kampala: Observer Media Ltd.
The Observer, 2008, 'Janet Museveni Breaks Ranks, Asks Mbabazi to Resign or Refund', November 5, Kampala: Observer Media.
The Telegraph, 2004, 'Protests as Museveni Lays Plans to Stay in Power 25 Years', October 3, London.
Young, C., 1994, *The African Colonial Sate in Comparative Perspective*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Young, C., 2001, 'Review: Uganda under Museveni', *African Studies Review*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 'Ways of Seeing: Beyond the New Nativism', pp. 207-210, African Studies Association.
Young, C. and Turner, T., 1985, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.