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Democratization of Science and Biotechnological Development: Public Debate on GM Maize in South Africa

Pascal Newbourne Mwale*

Abstract

The Mandela government that came into power in 1994 made the democratization of science and technology a priority in post-apartheid South Africa. Attendant ideas of Science Communication and Public Understanding of Biotechnology have hitherto become currency in South Africa's public sector drive towards the democratization of science. Democratization of science and technology implies that the people, as non-experts, are an integral part of all deliberations on policy, regulation and control of science and technology, for example, in debates or controversies on issues arising from biotechnology. Democratization of science and technology is about the sociopolitical control of science and technology by the wider society. Science and technology must be controlled by the society at large because evil-minded groups of people can ill-use it to inflict harm on other groups of people. Moreover, certain unscrupulous and corrupt business entities can collude with the state and/or powerful and influential sociopolitical figures in societies to exploit and abuse indigenous scientific resources as well as endogenous modes of specialized scientific knowledge. On the latter, for example, they can evoke intellectual property rights (IPR) to patent resources that are not theirs historically. Thus, the ideal-type of democracy makes it imperative for the people of South Africa and of other societies in Africa to understand and actively participate in the development of science and technology. This necessitates increasing scholarly attention to be given to ques-

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tions of science communication and public understanding of science, arising at the intersection between science, society and politics in South and southern Africa. This paper discusses the role and importance of social movements in science communication and public understanding of biotechnology in South and southern Africa.

Résumé

Le régime de Mandela qui est arrivé au pouvoir en 1994 avait fait de la démocratisation de la science et de la technologie une priorité en Afrique du Sud post-apartheid. Les idées qui vont avec les Sciences de la Communication et la Compréhension de la Biotechnologie par les Populations sont ainsi devenues monnaie courante dans les efforts faits au niveau du secteur public sud-africain en vue de la démocratisation de la science. La démocratisation de la science et de la technologie implique que la population, les profanes inclus, fassent partie intégrante de toutes les délibérations sur les politiques, la réglementation et le contrôle de la science et de la technologie, notamment les débats ou discussions sur des questions relatives à la biotechnologie. La démocratisation de la science et de la technologie renvoie au contrôle sociopolitique de la science et de la technologie par la grande frange de la population, étant donné que des groupes sociaux malintentionnés pourraient en faire un mauvais usage pour causer du tort à d'autres groupes d'individus. Par ailleurs, certaines entreprises sans scrupule et corrompues, de surcroît, pourraient s'associer à l'Etat et/ou à des personnalités sociopolitiques puissantes et influentes de la communauté pour exploiter et abuser des ressources scientifiques locales ainsi que des modes endogènes de la connaissance scientifique spécialisée. Pour ce qui concerne la connaissance scientifique spécialisée, par exemple, ces entreprises pourraient évoquer les droits de propriété intellectuelle (DPI) pour breveter des ressources qui ne leur appartiennent qui, historiquement, n'étaient pas les leurs. Par conséquent, le modèle idéal de la démocratie impose que les populations de l'Afrique du Sud et celles des autres sociétés africaines comprennent et participent activement à l'évolution de la science et de la technologie. Pour ce faire, il serait nécessaire qu'une plus grande attention cognitive soit accordée aux questions de la communication et de la compréhension de la science par les populations, notamment en ce qui concerne l'interconnexion entre la science, la société et la politique en Afrique australe, plus particulièrement en Afrique du Sud. Ce document aborde le rôle et l'importance des mouvements sociaux dans le domaine de la communication scientifique et dans la compréhension, par les populations, de la biotechnologie en Afrique du Sud et en Afrique australe

Introduction

This paper selects as a case the South African debate on GM maize. First, it looks at the background to the processes of the democratization of science in South Africa. Second, it puts the idea of 'civil society' in the crucible, that

is, South Africa, examining specifically the nature, role, scope and limits of 'social movements' in science communication in South Africa. Biowatch SA's intervention into GM regulation in South Africa is selected as a specific instance of the case study. The overall aim of the paper is to help improve our understanding about the dynamics of public debate on biotechnology in South Africa by looking at the case of public debate on GM maize. Rather than attempt to arrive at neat and tight conclusions about the democratization of science as well as the attendant ideas of science communication and public understanding of science, the paper will further complicate these ideas with the hope of suggesting critical insights into the interaction between science, society and politics. The paper argues that inasmuch as the intervention of social movements might be the drivers of the democratization of science – as they help fill a gap filled neither by scientists nor news media practitioners – the conceptual morass in which the idea of civil society is swamped renders it extremely difficult for thinkers to readily appreciate its political potency and agency in Africa vis-à-vis biotechnological development. Civil society, as an idea, is ill-defined.¹ The regrettable result is science miscommunication and public misunderstanding of biotechnology in South and southern Africa. To remedy science miscommunication and public misunderstanding of biotechnology, the paper recommends more issue-specific and multi-stakeholder studies around biotechnology at both country and regional level.

The democratization of science, science communication and public understanding of biotechnology in South and southern Africa

Southern African societies – just like their counterparts in the developed world in the post-Human Genome Project era – are yet to discover science fully. This is in spite of all the life-changing decisions and activities at the level of macro policy and decision-making within science communities and the state. After the dismantling of both dictatorial and racist regimes in southern Africa – totalitarian regimes that excluded the vast majority of the people from both politics and science – a crucial and urgent need arose in the emerging democratic regimes of the region for the democratization of science. The ideal-type of democracy makes it imperative for people of South Africa and whole societies in the region to understand and actively participate in developments in science and technology.² The process of the consolidation of democracy has ignored, and failed dismally to recognize, the central place and crucial role of 'the people', that is, non-experts, in science and technology communication in the region. There is need for 'the democratization of science' in the region, and in Africa at large.

There is a general consensus among theorists of democracy that the further development of the postcolonial African state will not be achieved without our being cognizant of and respecting the centrality of involving 'the people' in both policy- and decision-making as well as in actual developmental tasks. Catch-all phrases like 'participatory parity' (Fraser 1993), 'the bottom-up approach' (Obadare 2004) and 'public understanding of science/biotechnology', among others, attest to this realization on the part of theorists of democracy of the centrality of 'the people' in development. These phrases point to the need for broad-based, or community-wide, participation in developmental planning and implementation.

Perhaps because of the over-determination of the ideal-type of democracy, on the one hand, and the rapid pace of advances in science and technology, for example, biotechnology, on the other, the democratic imperative of participatory parity, or the all-inclusiveness of voices, in biotechnological policy-and decision-making has been low and poor,³ if not non-existent.⁴

At the continental level, biotechnology raises both hopes and fears in individuals and diverse groups of people in Africa because it has enormous implications for Africa's development. As Fukuyama (2002) argues, in biotechnology both the good and the bad are 'closely interconnected', and hence the need for tight political controls over biotechnological development, use or research (Fukuyama 2002: 181–2). Africa's involvement in the global biotechnology movement could lead to a shift in Africa's location, from the periphery to the centre of the global technology movement. Unlike other kinds of science and technology, biotechnology allows Africa to leapfrog; the operating knowledge is not contained only within the Euro-American cluster. African scientists, for example, are investigating various aspects of 80,000 cells that will collectively define genetic 'characteristics and proclivities' of every person on the globe. This repositioning of Africa in the global biotechnology movement and on the world market has enormous implications for the development of the continent, potentially leading to significant changes in global power politics and important shifts in international economic and trade relations. Biotechnology could positively change the position of Africa on the world market.⁵

South Africa's public sector drive towards the democratization of science

South Africa provides a relevant and an interesting context for beginning to study the problematic idea of the democratization of science as well as the attendant ideas of science communication and public understanding of science. In southern Africa, South Africa plays a leading role in biotechnology. South

Africa, as the regional leader of biotechnological innovations, also becomes the crucible for testing new models of international agricultural economics as well as the initial market for multinational companies' ventures into biotechnology in southern Africa.

South Africa was the first southern African country to conduct experiments on GM cropping in 1997. GM crops, such as GM cotton, have been grown commercially in South Africa since 1997. The South African government gave its approval for commercial activities on GM maize cropping in 1998. A year later, in 1999, parliament passed the GMO Act.⁶ The South African National Biosafety Strategy was published in 2001. Futhi, a much-improved South African dairy cow, was the first higher mammal to be cloned on the African continent in 2003.⁷ South Africa is currently engaged in innovative research on human migration patterns based on tracking of mitochondrial deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).⁸

Impressive as these policy and practical strides the country has taken into the new biotechnology might look, the issues raised by biotechnology are knotty and sticky, and have led to profound and persistent disagreements in South Africa's public domains since the commercialization of GM crops in 1998. Since then, South Africa has found herself at the centre of intense and deep controversies surrounding GM cropping, stem cell research, cloning, antiretrovirals (arvs), among others, providing a regional platform for public debates on conflictual scientific issues that originated outside Africa. South Africa is, inescapably, the epicentre of public debate on GM technology. For Van der Walt, because of its leading position in science and technology in southern Africa, South Africa 'has become the primary biotechnological battleground in Africa' (Van der Walt 2000: 35).

As far as science and technology are concerned, post-apartheid South Africa has a big public sector drive. Science and technology are integral to human development in the new South Africa – no matter how development is characterized. According to the South African government's *White Paper on Science and Technology* (4 September 1996), South Africa will use science and technology to provide basic services, infrastructure and effective health for all South Africans and to become economically competitive on a global scale.

Since 1994, the state has made a number of landmark decisions and crucial initiatives to put the people at the centre of deliberations on policy, regulation and control of science and technology. For example, four years into the new dispensation, South Africa declared 1998 the Year of Science and Technology in South Africa (YEAST 1998). The aim of YEAST 1998 was to make South Africans more aware of how science and technology

affected them in their everyday life. At present, South Africa is the only government in southern Africa that has a Science Communication unit and a Public Understanding of Biotechnology programme. The South African Agency for Science and Technology Advancement (SASTA) houses both the unit and the programme. SASTA is a business unit of the National Research Foundation (NRF). The Science Communication unit of SASTA aims to develop and implement new science communication initiatives in response to national challenges and needs 'in line with international trends in the field of science communication'.⁹ As a concept, science communication is multi-stakeholder, bringing within its purview such players as scientists, news media practitioners, statespersons and politicians, and social movements— in short, it involves both expert and non-expert publics. The Public Understanding of Biotechnology programme of SASTA aims to 'promote a clear understanding of the potential of biotechnology and to ensure broad public awareness, dialogue and debate on its current and potential future applications, including Genetic Modification (GM)'.¹⁰ The Public Understanding of Biotechnology programme is committed to incorporating the views of non-expert publics into discussions and debates on developments in biotechnology, especially in genetic modifications technology and its most notable products like GM maize. Additionally, South Africa initiated the Southern African Science Communication Network (SASCON), which is also housed by SASTA. As a regional networking unit, SASCON 'believes that the way southern Africans understand, communicate and use science and technology significantly affects their economic, social and environmental wellbeing'.¹¹ Thus, it aims to provide a forum for scientific knowledge and information exchange, to improve non-expert publics' understandings of science, and to improve news media's engagement with science.

Thus, Mandela's vision to democratize science and technology explains South Africa's commitment to promoting science communication and public understanding of biotechnology. Overall, South Africa's drive towards the democratization of science and technology has (universalizable) justification. Non-experts are key social actors in science communication for at least three reasons. First, non-experts are the major consumers of products of science and technology. They ought to have a say in major decisions and activities of scientists and relevant government agencies. Secondly, scientists need the *goodwill* of non-experts in order to get public *support* and secure funding from the public sector for their research. Thirdly, recent surveys have shown that *social perceptions* of non-experts and those of the media are in approximate alignment with science news stories. In other words, non-experts play an important role in determining what science news stories

make it to print or air (see, for example, Trumbo et al. 1998: 240; McInerney et al. 2004: 347; Tanner 2004: 353, 360).

One significant dimension of the problematic of the democratization of science is how non-experts can be said to understand, discuss and debate the latest developments in science and technology such as biotechnology and its most notable products. The question of the democratization of science is challenging because it is fundamentally about the participation of non-experts in science and technology.¹²

Therefore, whereas the overall goal of the paper is to help improve our understanding about the dynamics of public debate on biotechnology in South Africa by looking at the case of public debate on GM maize, the paper actually isolates for illustrative and elucidatory purposes the particular case of Biowatch SA, a local social movement registered as an environmental non-governmental organization and it was formed in 1997.

Social movements and the democratization of science

Quite evidently then, the question that is still lingering is how to get non-expert publics or ‘the people’ to discuss and debate biotechnology in particular or science and technology in general. In spite of a big public sector drive, there is a gap filled by neither the scientists nor the media in science communication and public understanding of biotechnology in South Africa. This is in spite of the fact that both scientists and news media practitioners claim to have social legitimacy because they uphold ‘the public value’ and work for ‘the public interest’. Social movements try to fill the gap left by scientists and the news media. They evoke public value and public interest to try to legitimate their intervention in society. Social movements are important in public scientific controversy and public debate on biotechnology because – in spite of their well-known or traditional role as activists and lobbyists in the sociopolitical as well as ethical and cultural realms of society – they play a significant educational role as scientific information providers. Using appropriate mediating and dissemination instruments, especially the print news media, social movements articulate the basic science underlying the key scientific issues arising in the debate, thereby providing crucial detail about the basic science. They also fuel, or accentuate, public critique – which puts the evidence, legitimacy and credibility of the experiments and findings to question – by proffering the counter-science or the alternative scientific or quasi-scientific evidence. Thus, social movements can help us begin to appreciate not only the fate of science in public domains but also the extent to which science is vulnerable when it is exposed to public critical examination,

outside its professional field of production, for example, the laboratory or the scientific community.

Non-experts stand to benefit significantly from social movements' role as educators, information providers and articulators of science in public debate on science. In South and southern Africa, and in the case of the experimental science of genetic modifications technology and its most notable products, social movements – if seen as activists and lobbyists – contribute greatly to the intensification of the controversy over experimental science in that they bolster and augment their arguments or reasoned opinions with non-scientific discourses such as human *rights*, democratic *governance*, *colonialism* and imperialism, postcolonial or post-independence *development*, and *globalization* discourses, among other non-scientific discourses. It can be suggested that by exploring social movements' public engagement in debate on controversial biotechnological products such as GM maize, it is possible to begin to notice clearly the problematic intersection between science, politics and society. An exploration of how one social movement intervened in GM regulation in South Africa is one of the most feasible ways of beginning to look closely at the problematic idea of the democratization of science.

Biowatch SA takes the state and the biotech corporate industry to court

South Africa did not itself experience food shortages in the 2001/2 season. The regional debate that was triggered by widespread acute hunger in the southern region forms the background to the court case in which Biowatch SA took the state and multinational GM seed company Monsanto and its allies and licensees to court on the behalf of 'the people' in what it called a 'public interest' case. Briefly, UN WFP offered GM maize, procured from the US, to hunger-stricken countries. The US-produced GM maize met with resistance in the region, which led to Zambia's total rejection of the GM maize grain and conditional acceptance by the majority of countries in the region. Biowatch SA sued both the state and the biotech industry in the Pretoria High Court in what turned out to be a rather protracted, emotive court trial, from 2004 to 2005. Biowatch SA accused them of withholding information from 'the people' on the risks and dangers of GM technology. It wanted the 'veil of secrecy' on information on GMOs to be removed. In its submissions to the high court, Biowatch SA argued that since July 2000, the Department of Agriculture had consistently denied it access to information on GM field trial licences or permits. In spite of that, Biowatch SA argued, South African law on GMOs – the GMO Act (1999) –specified that no modified crops could be released unless there had been a 'suitable and

sufficient assessment of the risks' to human health and the environment. 'The people', who Biowatch SA claimed it represented, were entitled – or had a right of – access to information that affected their environment, and so the high court should have assessed for itself whether or not the information was 'genuinely confidential'.

The state (Department of Agriculture, the Executive Council for GMOs, and the Registrar for Genetic Resources) and the biotech industry (Monsanto and Stoneville Pedigree Seed Co.) counter-argued that some of the information Biowatch SA was seeking was 'confidential' and could not be disclosed to it.¹³ On 3 March 2005, the high court ruled in favour of Biowatch SA. In the ruling, the high court judge ordered the state to give Biowatch SA the information it had been requesting – but to which it had been denied access – for four years.¹⁴ On the next day, 4 March 2005, the Department of Agriculture reportedly began to prepare the information for Biowatch SA, in compliance with the high court order.¹⁵

Notably, soon after the high court drama the state instituted a study on the implications of GM maize imports on South Africa's export trade. The state put on hold GM maize imports into South Africa, implying that in the course of the studies no GM maize imports were allowed into South Africa. The study began in March 2005 and was scheduled to be completed early 2006. The Department of Trade and Industry launched a study to assess the implications of GM maize imports on South Africa's export trade. This state-run study was in response to society-wide concerns – as expressed by certain 'social movements' in various public forums – that GM maize imports would depress local maize prices and hinder robust exports to markets abroad where consumers rejected GM products. The department also launched two supplementary studies; the first, to assess the implications of GM products within the SADC region, where most countries had rejected GM products, and the second, to assess the trade implications for South Africa as an exporter of GM products.¹⁶

Social movements and civil society in general

Biowatch SA is a non-governmental organization (NGO) involved largely in environmental activism in South Africa. It is a 'social movement' (Greenstein, 2005). The high court case described above raises important questions, chief of which is about the sources of authority and power of 'social movements' and 'civil society' as a whole. 'Social movements' are generally conceived of as instantiations or elements of 'civil society'.¹⁷ Arguably, the idea of civil society has Western roots. The question of the origin, or provenance, of 'civil society' has been a subject of extensive debate, especially about the

meaning, applicability and use of the idea of civil society in non-Western contexts like Africa (see, for example, Bratton 1989; Callaghy 1994; Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; Chandhoke 2001; Deakin 2001; Ferguson 1980; Gellner 1990; Howell and Pearce 2001; Hutchful 1998; Kavrajji and Khilnani 2001). Not wishing to be drawn into the rather frustrating and sterile 'ancestry of civil society' debate, some African thinkers have even gone to the extent of proposing an 'alternative genealogy of civil society' for Africa (Obadare 2004).

The idea of civil society in Africa

Social movements, such as NGOs, are not a new phenomenon in Africa. Nyang'oro (cited in Bashaw, 2001) observes that NGOs 'have been actors on the development stage for several decades', prior to global financiers like the World Bank or global governmental organizations such the United Nations or any other official relief agency. Academic experts and higher education institutions 'discovered' NGOs and gave them international attention only in the mid-1980s (Nyang'oro, in Bashaw 2001: 251). For several years, NGOs have occupied a central place in people's economic and social life in Africa. NGOs' interventionist work in emergency food, refugee shelter and rehabilitation and in community development is acknowledged universally. Their intervention in Ethiopia's 1985/6 food crisis is inerasably memorable. Other than charity and relief, on the political plane, NGOs have successfully mobilized the people towards resistance against totalitarian rule, resulting in positive political change, for example, the United Democratic Front (UDF) in South Africa, Public Affairs Committee (PAC) in Malawi, and numerous others outside Africa such as in South America.

However, social movements in Africa are constrained and limited in important ways. The constraints are both structural/political (external to NGOs) and strategic (internal to NGOs). African states, argues Bashaw, 'are not much inclined to give enough room to enable NGOs to operate and function smoothly. This is certainly the case in Africa' (Bashaw 2001: 252). This is true for oppositional civic organizations. For most African states, NGOs are a thorn in the flesh. A case in point is Malawi where constitutional constraints are without doubt intended to contain and frustrate the political programmes and activities of NGOs. Malawi's NGO Act (2001) prevents NGOs from having, or appearing to have, 'objectives that are political in nature' or to indulge in 'partisan politics'. Khembo (2004) argues that this wording is vague, and it has led to arbitrariness in the interpretation of the act itself. Khembo feels pity for NGOs operating in Malawi because in practice, 'lack of clarity [in the NGO Act] has meant that ... the church, civil society organizations ... have invariably been accused of peddling "partisan politics"'

(p 84), leaving NGOs in a very precarious position in which the NGO Board may at any moment cancel registration of a suspect NGO at will. For Khembo, it is accepted fact that ‘civil society, especially the NGO community, is not entirely immune from calculated legal suffocation’ (Khembo 2004: 86). The Malawian legislators seem to feel at ease with charitable NGOs – a purely economic civil society – but uneasy with NGOs that position themselves as oppositional civic organizations – a political civil society. No doubt, when Biowatch SA contested the South African state power by using the judicial machinery it positioned itself in an oppositional manner, and hence its self-evidential political nature.

Bashaw, however, cautions against our falling for a myth: the mere fact that NGOs do interventionist work does not imply that ‘the people’ can then trust them, ‘simply because they are different from the state ... We cannot love NGOs just because they are nongovernmental’ (Bashaw 2001: 253). Strategically, it is argued that most NGOs are ill-planned: their plans are short term and often geared to alleviating immediate consequences of poverty. NGOs do not plan in the long term, and so they ‘give little attention to matters concerning development theory’ (Cherret et al. in Bashaw 2001: 253). If they are assessed on the long-term basis, most NGOs do not seem to impact positively on poverty in Africa. Most people previously helped by NGOs remain trapped in the vicious cycle of abject poverty (UNDP 1993, in UNO 1995, in Bashaw 2001: 253). Yet, unlike states, NGOs are not directly accountable to ‘the people’ for issues of poverty, let alone development in any state. No citizenry or population group can blame an NGO for not delivering public utilities like water and electricity or for not providing in time basic property such as houses or land for houseless or landless majorities.

Thus, in spite of the efforts of Keane (1998, 2003) to revive our interest in ‘the old idea’, ‘civil society’ remains saddled with serious conceptual and empirical difficulties. As a subset of ‘civil society’, the idea of ‘social movements’ suffers from similar problems as ‘civil society’ does. Conceptual obscurantism, or definitional imprecision or fuzziness, leads to confusion as to what ‘social movements’ are – or ought be, as an ideal-type – and what their potency and agency could be in sociopolitical reality, for example, in Africa’s postcolonial states.

Political control of biotechnology in Africa: The people, civil society and the state

The idea of ‘social movements’ raises an important question around the issue of the political control of biotechnology. The question is two-fold, involving both representation and accountability. Representation: because

'social movements' claim to represent 'the people' – whether 'the people' are perceived as consumers, or as end-users of biotech products in their programmes and activities, while they simultaneously contest similar claims by the state and political party groupings to represent 'the people'. They claim to uphold 'public value' and to work to promote the 'public interest' or 'the general interest'. Accountability: because 'social movements' tend to position and express themselves as though sociopolitical accountability is categorical and not hypothetical – that is, an unconditional, and not a conditional (or *prima facie*) obligation. They believe that the state's accountability to 'the people' is categorical. Thus, the question is: from what source of authority (or mandate or legitimacy) can a 'social movement' claim to represent 'the people'?

The question is important because the issue of the political *control* of biotechnology does not directly suggest that social movements will get to decide whether or not we will control this new technology. Fukuyama, for example, is unequivocal about the collective identity of those who will get to decide about the political control of biotechnology, just as he is clear about the source of their authority (or mandate or legitimacy) in society. For him, decision- and policy-makers will be a

democratically constituted political community, acting chiefly through their elected representatives, that is sovereign in these matters and has the authority to control the pace and scope of technological development ... [i.e.] institutions that can capture the will of the people (Fukuyama 2002: 186).

Thus, when it comes to legislators – in parliamentary sovereignties – there is little or no doubt about the source of their political authority to represent 'the people' in decision- and policy-making on matters biotechnological. It is standard liberal democratic political thinking that legislators govern or lead by the general consent of 'the people' as voter-citizens. However, when it comes to 'social movements', as instantiations of 'civil society', it is not immediately clear what the source of their authority is.

Erstwhile theorization about the idea of 'civil society', from which the idea of 'social movements' is derived, is not helpful either. For example, theorists of 'civil society' here in the South are far from clear about the political potency and agency of the idea of civil society, thereby frustrating others to the extent of debunking the idea altogether. Mbembe (2001), for instance, thinks 'civil society' is yet to emerge in postcolonial Africa. For Mbembe, 'civil society' will emerge only when

places and spaces where ideas of autonomy, representation, and pluralism can publicly crystallize, and where juridical subjects enjoying rights and

capable of freeing themselves from the arbitrariness of both state and primary group (kin, tribe, etc) can come into being (Mbembe 2001: 39).

Therefore, Mbembe envisions postcolonial 'civil society' in the form of autonomous – self-legislating and self-governing – associations and institutions of society that 'will articulate, autonomously and publicly, an idea of the general interest' (Mbembe 2001: 39). At present, all we seem to have on the ground is a multiplicity of disparate 'normative, economic, military and governmental spheres' that reflect a 'heteronomous and fragmented conception of the political community', instead of 'a consolidation of a constitutional state and right-bearing citizens in civil society' (Mbembe 2001: 39).

Other postcolonialist theorists, namely, Khilnani (2001) and Chatterjee (2001), cast more doubts over the political potency and agency of the idea of civil society. Khilnani thinks that in the South 'civil society is best thought of as a complicating term, one that embodies a range of historical idioms intended to establish a legitimate political order' (Khilnani 2001: 13). Contemporary scholarship is not in agreement about – and is yet to locate – the proper location of the sources of 'civil society'. Is it in the economic, or the expressive, or the cultural? In other words, does 'civil society' reside in the economy, or 'in society independent of the economic domain' (i.e. interest-based associations 'where ideas are publicly exchanged'), or in 'a set of cultural acquisitions'? (Khilnani 2001: 13–14).

Hitherto, for Khilnani, the idea of civil society has not been deployed to ideal-typically refer to a substantive, determinate category in postcolonial states, whether it has been conceptualized as an idea distinct from, or opposed to, the state, or as a set of politicized, or depoliticized, or apolitical, associations that complement the state in governance functions, or normatively as 'moral and political' collective 'human capacities', or as an amalgam of 'commercial societies' (Khilnani 2001: 24–5). In spite of its 'promise' for sociopolitical change in the South, theorists of 'civil society' are conscious of the experimental if not elusive nature of the idea itself. Ultimately, Khilnani doubts the adequacy and even significance of the idea of civil society because 'in the task of developing viable and durable democratic politics in the South, the idea of civil society is hardly a self-sufficing one, let alone a fundamental "key"' (Khilnani 2001: 32). Chatterjee debunks the idea of civil society altogether and opts for another idea which he christens as 'political society'. For Chatterjee, 'civil society', for example in postcolonial India, fails dismally to reach out to and represent wider society and the diversity of interests:

An important consideration in thinking about the relation between civil society and the state in the modern history of countries such as India is the fact

that whereas the legal–bureaucratic apparatus of the state has been able ... to reach as the target of many of its activities virtually all of the population that inhabits its territory, the domain of civil social institutions ... is still restricted to a fairly small section of ‘citizens’. The hiatus is extremely significant because it is the mark of non-western modernity as an always incomplete project of ‘modernization’ and of the role of enlightened elite engaged in a pedagogical mission in relation to the rest of society (Chatterjee 2001: 172).

Chatterjee seems to be relegating civil society organizations to elitist, Western-style special-interest associations that could hardly justify their claim to serving ‘the general interest’. He claims that his idea of ‘political society’ will be more inclusive and more empowering in postcolonial states:

But then how are we to conceptualize the rest of society that lies outside the domain of modern society? The most common approach has been to use a traditional/modern dichotomy. One difficulty with this is the trap, not all easy to avoid, of de-historicizing and essentializing ‘tradition’. I think a notion of political society lying between civil society and the state could help us see some of these historical possibilities. By political society, I mean a domain of institutions and activities where several mediations are carried out. (Chatterjee 2001: 172–3).¹⁸

Political societies may resort to strategic manoeuvres, resistance and appropriation akin to those of political parties, but they are distinctively ‘population groups’ – and not bodies of citizens – whose demands on the state are based on ‘the violation of the law’. They demand state welfare as a matter of right. The welfare functions, which political societies demand of the state, are seen as collective rights rather than as individual citizenship rights. The degree to which political societies are recognized by the state and NGOs depends on the pressure they are able to exert on state and non-state agencies (Chatterjee 2001: 177). In essence, political society stands for a community that comes into being spontaneously, for example, ‘through the illegal occupation of a particular land or the collective illegal consumption of a public utility’ such as ‘associations of squatters, encroachers on public property, ticketless travelers on public transport, habitual defaulters of civic taxes, unauthorized users of electricity, water, or other public utility, and other such violators of civic regulations’ (Chatterjee 2001: 177).

Chatterjee’s substitute idea is forceful but not convincing. Chatterjee assumes there is a dichotomy between ‘population’ and ‘citizenship’. Nevertheless, his assumption is questionable. His idea of ‘political society’ draws its conceptual force from the pragmatic idea of ‘population’, which is divested of its moral/legal demands, which are usually normatively imposed

on political individuality – or ‘citizenship’ – in postcolonial states. The fact that violators of the law enjoy and benefit from collective rights does not necessarily imply that the state and non-state agencies will easily recognize their associations.

The pressure they are able to exert on the state and non-state agencies is more about provision of property or access to public utilities than about the official recognition of their associations, which, in any case, violate or sidestep the law. Thus, although political societies often get what they demand as a collectivity, their ‘illegal’ deeds are bound to render them marginalized if not excluded from mainstream political programmes and activities. The possibility of marginalization or exclusion renders them weak and vulnerable ‘subaltern publics’. Therefore, the notion of citizenship, which is infused with moral/legal imperatives, is still crucial to our conception of individual or collective rights in a polity. On this, says Hawthorn (2001):

For states in the South ... whose capacities are now constrained ... associations concerned with civil rights can press issues of constitutional kind, those concerned with political rights for improvements in political procedures. And both are likely to be able more effectively to do so if there are opportunities for discussion and debate, opportunities that these associations, with others, might be able to do something to improve. But *it is unrealistic to suppose that the associations can act greatly to extend the scope of powers of public policies to improve the well-being of the majority of the population. To be clear about the concept of ‘civil society’ is first to be clear about what citizenship can be, about what the state can do, about a point of politics itself* (Hawthorn 2001: 286; my emphasis).

Hawthorn is hereby highlighting the interrelatedness of concepts of population, citizenship, politics and the state. Thus, even if the state deployed the concept of population for macro policy purposes or centralized planning – in the form of demographic statistics – it would not lose sight of the political nature – or citizenship status – of the population.

Conclusion

The problematic idea of the democratization of science is multi-issue in scope and is a multi-stakeholder effort. The idea is important because it provides the basis for thinking more deeply about biotechnological development in South and southern Africa. Science communication and public understanding of biotechnology do not make sense outside the framework of the democratization of science. Hitherto, scholarly attention has focused only on the role of scientists and news media in making science more and more accessible to wider society, especially to non-expert publics. Scientists are

accused generally of being poor communicators of their own trade, preferring to work in isolation behind closed doors, in laboratories. News media practitioners are accused generally of misrepresenting science in public domains. Social movements, as elements of civil society, raise a hope of filling the gap left by both scientists and news media practitioners. Looking at Biowatch SA's intervention in GM regulation in South Africa some years ago, one could see that there is room for such hope. At least to start with, one could see that the processes of the democratization of science are not the prerogative of one group of stakeholders such as the state, scientists or news media practitioners. Yet the idea of civil society is swamped in confusion at present. Thus, there are reasonable doubts about its political potency and agency to help democratize the new science and technology (biotechnology) – that is to bring biotechnology to 'the people'. Moreover, the idea's pretensions to introducing and sustaining any desired sociopolitical change in southern Africa need to be interrogated further.

There is little or no doubt though that social movements have, at least at the empirical level, made their presence felt in South and southern Africa, in Africa at large, as well as at the global level. A social movement such as Biowatch SA would definitely be one to reckon with in South Africa. Once more, Biowatch SA managed to draw the attention of the high court, sued the state and the biotech corporate industry, and eventually won its 'public interest' case. However, in spite of such anecdotal evidence of their integration into wider society, social movements still occupy a theoretically obscure and politically contested space in Africa. The meaning of the idea of civil society, together with its attendant ideas such as social movements and NGOs, is not only conceptually fuzzy but also relentlessly contested by traditional sources of power and authority such as state agencies, political parties and trade unions, which have enjoyed and still enjoy moderately tidy and neat conceptualizations. Since the meaning of the idea of civil society is unclear, rendering theorization obscure, clear and tidy conclusions about the democratization – that is, the sociopolitical control – of science and technology in the region, or the continent at large, are not easy to reach.

In spite of the fuzziness of the idea of civil society, some would be hesitant to leave all policy, regulation and control on biotechnology in the hands of 'parliamentary sovereignties' (Fukuyama 2002) or 'strong publics' (Fraser 1993). These traditional sources of power and authority can help democratize science and technology. African states might be resource-poor, inefficient in terms of service delivery, generally corrupt and the least accountable to 'the people', but they are largely strong states.¹⁹ South Africa's big drive towards the democratization of science is testimonial to, or at least indicative of, a

strong state. Although the emergence of ‘strong’²⁰ states does not preclude the growth of a strong civil society, oppositional civil organizations in Africa are politically constrained and limited in important ways. Biowatch’s legal victory against the state and the biotech corporate industry raises Mbembeian and Keanian quasi-utopian visions of a future African deliberative democratic public sphere, an abstract ‘becoming’, with a bit of luck to be realized when ‘the people’ are mobilized by civil society organizations – rather than solely by political parties and trade union – to participate in societal deliberations on matters biotechnological, in particular, and, scientific and technological, in general.

Finally, the paper recommends more issue-specific and multi-stakeholder studies in things biotechnological at both country and regional level. Regardless of whether the idea of civil society is original or derivative, in-depth research on the idea is required in order to further clarify its conceptual–epistemological status or meaning and its conditions of applicability and use in South and southern Africa. Generally, future research in science communication and public understanding of biotechnology in South and southern Africa might further illumine the complexities of ‘the democratization of science’ in South and southern Africa and Africa as a whole.

Notes

1. Moreover, although it is the least significant concern for this paper, civil society organizations are uncoordinated in their goals and interventions in Africa, leading to duplication and wastage of their otherwise worthwhile interventionist efforts.
2. The background idea to deliberative democracy is that of the public sphere for deliberations as envisioned by Habermas (1962, translated into English in 1989).
3. See, for example, *HSRC Review 2005*: 2, July, for South Africa’s low level and poor quality of ‘public understanding’ of biotechnology.
4. See, for example, Mwale (2005a, 2006) for Zambia’s near-zero level and very poor quality of public understanding of biotechnology. See also Chinsembu and Kambikambi (2001).
5. *Genomics and Society*, 2004.
6. The South African parliament amended the GMO Act (1999) in January 2006. See SA GMO Amendment Bill (2006).
7. Poster on Public Understanding of Biotechnology, 2005, South African Agency for Science and Technology Advancement (SAASTA).
8. *Genomics and Society*, 2004.
9. See <http://www.saasta.ac.za/scicom/index.shtml> (retrieved in June 2007).
10. See <http://www.pub.ac.za/about/index.html> (retrieved in June 2007).
11. See <http://www.saasta.ac.za/sascon/index.shtml> (retrieved in June 2007).

12. A number of factors, three of which are the most worrisome, beset non-experts' participation in science communication: ignorance, the language barrier and resource-poverty. On non-experts' *ignorant* of science, in 2004, an HSRC client survey of a representative sample of 7000 adults showed that about 80% of South African non-experts did not know, or had no knowledge of, biotechnology. An average of 73% did not know if genetic modifications were either positive or negative (*HSRC Review*, 2005: 2). In South Africa, the above-cited 2004 HSRC client survey showed that the media comes second to the university as 'the most trusted institution to provide reliable information on biotechnology' (*HSRC Review* 2005: 2).
13. *The Mercury*, 5 May 2004.
14. *The Mail&Guardian*, 9 March 2005.
15. *Cape Argus*, 5 March 2005.
16. *The City Press*, 28 October 2005.
17. The view that 'social movements' are a subset of 'civil society' commands wide consensus in contemporary social critical theory. For example, Greenstein (2005) perceives post-Apartheid South Africa's 'new social movements' as 'elements of civil society'. He likens them to Fraser's 'subaltern publics', i.e. 'arenas for debate and contestation'. He is interested in how 'the new social movements ... create in the discussion of alternative policies, modes of organization, and social and political visions' (Greenstein 2005: 5). Hawthorn (2001) describes 'civil society as the great variety of social movements ... whose purposes and direction are not controlled by the institutions of the state' (Hawthorn 2001: 276). Khilnani (2001) is worried that an exclusive focus on 'social movements' that exist outside 'high politics' and the party system, as the crucial agent for the creation of a civil society and 'democratization', yields an overly partial perspective. Khilnani complains that the exclusive focus on 'social movements ... avoids questions about the abilities of social movements to secure both stable and durable institutional form and to embody self-limiting properties: if they are to govern, what governs?' But he does not commit himself to proposing an alternative to 'social movements', i.e. as the crucial agents in the emergence of civil society in the South (Khilnani 2001: 31). Tester (1992) looks at 'civil society as a label applicable to all those social relationships which involve the voluntary association and participation of individuals acting in their private capacities' (Tester 1992: 8).
18. Political society is only feasible where the definitive concept is that of *population*, because though 'differentiated', it is 'classifiable, describable, and enumerable' – unlike *citizenship*. Chatterjee says he is indebted to Michel Foucault (*History of Sexuality*. Harmondsworth: Viking, 1985) for rudiments of the idea of 'political society'. For Chatterjee, Foucault 'has been more perceptive than other social philosophers of recent times in noticing the crucial importance of the new concept of population for the emergence of modern governmental technologies... Perhaps we should also note the contribution

here of colonial anthropology and colonial administrative theories' (Chatterjee 2001: 173).

19. For Migdal (1988), apart from having 'strongmen' [powerful leaders], strong states are also characterized by 'strong state agencies', which exercise 'social control' on the population because they have 'channels to the population to induce mobilization through a viable mix of rewards, sanctions and symbols' (Migdal 1988: 210). In an ANC-majority-led government, it would be unusual for the South African state not to be considered 'strong'.
20. The binary 'strong/weak' in the categorization of states is without doubt only a speculative – and not a practical – idea. In practical reality, most states would lie somewhere midway along the continuum strong-to-weak. Recently, an empirical study used what was called the Minorities at Risk Database to impose this characterization on sub-Saharan African states. This study gives us one of the latest attempts at empirical definitions of a 'strong' or 'weak' state. Analysts Atiku-Abubakar and Shaw-Taylor used 'inter-communal conflict' to measure and describe the attributes of a sub-Saharan African 'weak state' as one 'having a prevalence of structural inequality, the components of which are economic differentiation, cultural (or social) inequality and political inequality' (Atiku-Abubakar and Shaw-Taylor 2003: 168). This empirical definition is far from clear, let alone precise as to what constitutes 'weaknesses' in a state.

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Community Development: A Cross-Examination of Theory and Practice Using Experiences in Rural Malawi

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Abstract

The philosophy of ‘community development’ relates to the concept of ‘locality’ and people. In essence it underscores the indispensability of local needs, aspirations and local resource mobilization within geographically and socially defined spheres. Through an appraisal of community involvement in various projects, this paper interrogates the virtues of community development practices in Malawi in the last 40 years. While acknowledging that community development or local participation, as it is popularly known, is ideal in many development activities, this paper argues that participation is not a magic pill for rural development. Participation in gravity water and social action fund projects, among others, provide instances for appreciating the opportunities and the challenges of community development. One such challenge is the absence of projects that are in every sense community-driven. With few exceptions, there is no participation that is truly voluntary. Vulnerability to poverty and lack of resources at community levels defeat efforts towards genuine community development. This is a similar outcome to projects implemented under coercive rule.

Résumé

La philosophie du ‘développement local’ renvoie au concept de ‘localité’ et à celui de population. En substance, elle souligne le caractère indispensable des besoins locaux, des aspirations et de la mobilisation des ressources locales dans des domaines géographiquement et socialement bien définis. A l’aide d’une

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analyse critique de l'implication de la communauté dans les projets de développement, ce document remet en question les vertus des pratiques liées au développement local, mises en oeuvre au Malawi au cours des 40 dernières années. Tout en reconnaissant que le développement local ou la participation locale, tel que communément connu, serait idéal pour bon nombre d'activités de développement, ce document soutient que la participation des populations à des projets pareils ne constitue pas une formule magique pour le développement rural. Par exemple, la participation à des projets d'eau de pesanteur et de fonds d'action sociale permet de se rendre compte des possibilités d'atteindre les objectifs ou de relever les défis de développement local, au rang desquels figure l'inexistence de projets de développement totalement basés sur la communauté. A quelques exceptions près, aucune participation des populations à la mise en oeuvre de projets n'est faite de façon bénévole. La vulnérabilité des populations par rapport à la pauvreté ainsi que l'absence de ressources au niveau communautaire font avorter tout effort véritable de développement de la communauté. C'est le même sort qui est réservé aux projets mis en oeuvre de façon coercitive

Introduction

Rural development is commonly understood as enabling the benefits of development to reach the rural poor, a group that includes small-scale farmers, tenants and the landless (Chambers 1983), as well as the marginally employed and unemployable (Bibangambah 1985). Although the factors affecting rural development vary over space and time, rural development outcomes reflect conscious and effective redirection of investments, including capital, technology, human resources and institutions (Singh 1999), among others, in a manner that benefits those who seek a living in rural areas. Specific rural development outcomes have over time remained enhanced agricultural production of food and cash crops, improved and easy access to essential social services such as health, education, transport and safe water, and also the modernization of traditional rural structures (Arnon 1981; Chambers 1983; Singh 1999). Wherever rural development is perceived as the development of things and modernization of rural structures the balance swings in favour of the central government and external modernizing agents that include both local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The outsiders draw up plans, provide funds and lead implementation of projects for the rural people portrayed explicitly or implicitly in project proposals and progress reports as beneficiaries, even when the standard term is 'clients'.

What makes community development or 'participation' a fashionable issue? First and foremost, contemporary thinking is influenced by the participatory paradigm, which rests on devolution of decision-making power. Failure of externally driven projects, lack of project sustainability and resource constraints have also popularized this shift in development thinking towards

community or participatory approaches (Streeten 1995). Rural development initiatives (in agriculture, water supply and sanitation, education, health, etc.) are considered devoid of meaning if the ultimate stakeholders are on the receiving end. On the surface the maxim is that rural communities should be active agents in meeting developmental needs rather than waiting for the central government and other outside agents to provide what might be lacking (Mohammed 1989). In many instances NGOs are deemed as better placed to facilitate the mobilization of communities than the government (Singh 1999). Yet, some NGOs are authoritarian and inefficient as the state they are supposed to complement and sometimes displace when facilitating community development.

The goal of this paper is to show that community development is not a theory on how to develop rural areas but a means and outcome of making development possible at the level of a community. A subsidiary goal is to examine factors that lead to a situation whereby community development is rarely based on voluntary participation. Three case studies drawn from Malawi, namely, the Youth Week initiative, the Piped Gravity Water Supply Programme and the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF), have been selected for this purpose. Among the factors emerging from these case studies that compromise voluntarism are authoritarianism of the state, inefficiency of NGOs at mobilizing local participation, inequalities in power relations, financial and material resources constraints and vulnerability to poverty, just to mention a few. Lessons arising from the implementation of the three projects are later contextualized by drawing inferences to experiences in other parts of the developing world to demonstrate two scenarios: first, why community development rarely starts from the grassroots, and secondly, to challenge the view that community participation can be a means to all needs at the level of a community.

The notion of community development

Warburton (1998) suggested that the notion of 'community' relates to two dimensions of 'people' and 'place'. It emphasizes the relationships among people and between people and the place or locality in which people live (Worpole and Greenhalgh 1996). A 'community', upon which this contemporary development philosophy is founded, could be construed as comprising the web of personal relationships, group networks, as well as traditions and patterns of behaviour that develop against the backdrop of the physical locality and its social, economic and political situations (Flecknoe and McLellan 1994). In this context, participation is good for the residents of the locality, allowing them as principal stakeholders to influence the development path of their locality. The 'good' of the community is intrinsically

linked with community-wide social, economic, political and environmental good, as studies on agency have demonstrated the interconnectedness of individuals and the societies or communities to which they belong. Community development is supposed to reflect people's actions and attributes of self-consciousness. Hence, commitment to community development should recognize interconnectedness between individuals and the societies to which they belong. As Giddens and Pierson (1998: 77) argued:

Society is a structural phenomenon and that the structural properties of a group or a society have effects upon the way people act, feel and think. But when we look at what those structures are, they are obviously not like the physical qualities of the external world. They depend upon regularities of social reproduction, that society only has effects on people in so far as structure is produced and reproduced in what people do.

It follows that community development has its logical and epistemological basis in the social obligations that individuals have towards societies that nurture their talents. Participation or self-help spirit is inspired by awareness among individuals and the communities they belong to and the recognition that individuals become who they are – agents – through relationship with others (Nyamnjoh 2002: 111). As much as community life is constituted by interacting, non-independent and by mutually susceptible human beings (Barnes 2001: 348), the notion of community participation draws on independent power of individual human beings to intervene in the ongoing flow of events in their community to make a difference, to create and change social order so that collective accomplishments transcend individual hopes. The challenge is: why is voluntary participation rarely intrinsically derived?

Page (2002: 16) notes that in Anglophone Africa 'community development' is partly based on colonial tradition of 'self help', which became the main British strategy for implementation of welfare-oriented colonial development policy in the 1950s. Malawi shares in this Anglophone colonial tradition. Community development was during colonial time based on coercion and control. The native was perceived as lazy and irresponsible and had to be whipped into action. In the late 1940s and 1950s native farmers were forced to adopt draconian soil and water conservation measures. Farmers who were reluctant to follow recommended measures had their crops destroyed and sometimes were imprisoned (Nambote 1998). An alternative approach named the Master Farmer system was adopted after native resistance that were inspired by nationalist sentiments that resented anything colonial. Master farmers were usually prominent native farmers who were quite influential in particular area. The colonial government provided such farmers with seeds, fertilizer, implements such as ploughs, and advisory services. The assumption

was that once the master farmers had adopted and implemented the innovations then neighbouring native farmers would follow suit. The intended demonstrative effect did not bear expected fruits; hence on attaining independence the concept of master farmer was abolished but the notion of community development remained intact and ingrained in the independence and later multiparty democracy rhetoric of home-grown development as illustrated by the selected case studies.

The Youth Week initiative

This was a self-help initiative coordinated by the Malawian central government through the Youth and Culture department. Rural communities were engaged in the construction of social infrastructure such as classroom blocks, health units (clinics), postal agencies, community halls, police posts, periodic markets, roads and bridges, shallow boreholes and small-scale irrigation schemes (Lwanda 1993). Between 1976 and 1985 about 6723 projects were completed countrywide. The machinery of the then ruling party, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), played a catalytic role. The Youth League of the party was used to mobilize people at different levels to contribute labour. Primary and secondary schools were required to suspend classes for a week or more to participate in public works projects. There are few written accounts on these countrywide initiatives apart from the fact that local participation was achieved through coercion. The autocratic and one-party rule of the late Dr Banda was well known for its use of force against opponents and ‘good’ citizens alike (Lwanda 1993). Cross and Kutengule (2001) have summarized the effect of the political situation on community development in the following words:

From 1967, the country witnessed the beginning of a process that led to the displacement of councils with the establishment of District Development Committees (DDCs), coordinated through the Office of the President. The DDCs were linked in a hierarchical relationship with Area and Village Development Committees (ADCs, VDCs) all staffed by party cadres, with no community involvement in decision making. By the early 1970s the golden age of local government was at an end.

No wonder that the Youth Week initiative was hurriedly abandoned during the transition to multiparty democracy, since it was widely resented and some of the multiparty advocates branded the practice *thangata* (a colonial practice of forced labour). The initiative could not be sustained without the backing of a coercive political structure. However, a sitting of parliament in mid-2006 passed a private member’s bill calling on the government to prioritize youth participation in development activities by reinstating Youth Week,

among other measures. The action by a democratically elected parliament to resurrect a hated scheme associated all along with autocracy underscores the folly of rejecting everything associated with past autocratic regimes just for the sake of change. It is also food for thought on the virtues of popular participation in local and national development. At the moment the challenge is how to resuscitate and manage the initiative in a democratic dispensation characterized by plurality rather than unanimity and a homogeneity of values and views.

Piped gravity water Supply Programme

This is a nationwide programme supplying portable water to rural communities from high altitude or mountain sources to the surrounding low-lying areas by the force of gravity. The first project was established during the regime of Dr Banda. A community in Chingale located to the west of Zomba, the old capital of Malawi, requested the government to provide financial support to exploit water from a nearby mountain source for domestic use. Work started in 1968 in two villages. The government provided pipes while the community supplied voluntary labour for the construction and maintenance of the project (Streeten 1995). Within a few months the project was completed, supplying water to a population of 3000 (Lindskog and Lundquist 1989). An evaluation of the project indicated that success depended on the fact that it was initiated, planned and implemented by the community. Another notable observation was that since the project was small in size work was completed within a short period of time, and the members of the community were able to reap the fruits immediately. There were also few conflicts since only two villages were involved. It is further argued that the total project cost was very low because of the use of voluntary labour (Lindskog and Lundquist 1989).

The success of the project in Chingale prompted the government to replicate the project in other areas with similar water resource endowments. Between 1969 and 1970 a bigger project was planned for Chambe (Mulanje district) to serve 30,000 inhabitants in 60 villages. Village leaders from Chambe area were taken to Chingale to appreciate and learn how the villagers in Chingale managed the project in their locality. After a visit to Chingale, the community leaders and their subjects in Chambe decided to cooperate with the government to implement a similar water supply project. However, the implementation process in Chambe was not as smooth as in Chingale. Lindskog and Lundquist (1989) stated that the project was too large for a pilot project in the area; there was also a credibility gap between what the leaders had seen at Chingale and what they were able to convey to the people in Chambe area; there were problems of retaining government field staff

because of the remoteness of the area; there was also an issue of skills – while self-help was sustainable for tasks requiring unskilled labour, it was not so suited to skilled work that was needed for a bigger project. Since the project was bigger, it took longer to finish and people's enthusiasm started to wane. In addition, clandestine political groups, which opposed the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP), were discouraging people, arguing that self-help was *thangata* (a colonial practice of forced labour). Despite the odds the project was completed, and began servicing over 30,000 people. On a number of occasions, however, there were quarrels over the use of water. The most common reason for the quarrels was that some beneficiaries did not work on the project despite repeated reminders. The disputes weakened community initiatives such that a chairman of one of the village development committees observed that 'internal disputes in the village are the worst enemy to development' (Lindskog and Lundquist 1989).

Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF)

The Malawi Social Action Fund is an initiative by the government of Malawi. The scope of this project is broad since it aims at providing social infrastructure of various kinds, other than water, in rural areas through community participation. The project was launched in July 1994 with financial support from the World Bank (EIU 1999). Like the Youth Week initiative (from the 1960s to the early 1990s), the MASAF project focuses on construction of classrooms, health units, roads and bridges, police units, and teachers' houses. Rural communities are required to provide unskilled labour and building materials such as bricks, river sand and rocks worth at least 10 percent of the total cost of a project. The government provides all manufactured parts such as roof sheeting, door and window frames and electric wiring. In 1996 alone, there were 450 small-scale projects under construction (EIU 1999).

The MASAF project is now in its third phase. An evaluation of the first phase concluded that it was a success, considering that a large number of projects were completed and the quality of work was relatively good. Compared to similar projects run without community involvement, MASAF projects were more efficient in terms of resource utilization and the speed at which projects were completed. In the second phase, a further component, the Sponsored Sub-Project, was added to address the needs of vulnerable people like orphans, street children, HIV/AIDS affected, the aged and the disabled (Cross and Kutengule 2001). However, this phase was marred by political interference and rampant cases of corruption at the highest levels of government. Some funds collected from fuel levy as a MASAF safety net were not accounted for, presumably diverted for the use of the then ruling

political party. The misappropriation of funds is reminiscent of ghost projects in the Ministry of Education, which led to the loss of over K187 million in ghost and abandoned projects (National Assembly 2000). The third phase is being implemented through district assemblies in the spirit of decentralization. District development committees (DDC) are instrumental in the screening and selection of community-initiated projects. Accountability of funds is hard to guarantee since district assemblies are currently operating without the ward councilors. The electoral commission has been unable to organize local government elections owing to lack of funding, enabling legal instruments and political bickering among parties represented in parliament. The 2005/6 budget had a provision for local government elections but the allocation was later cancelled and money diverted to provide subsidized fertilizer to enable smallholder farm households to recover from severe drought and food shortage in previous years.

The most notable and innovative feature of MASAF in its third phase is the attempt to mitigate famine by facilitating the acquisition of subsidized farmer inputs by the poorest of the rural poor. Between August and November in 2005 and 2006 MASAF implemented a money-for-assets programme to empower poor households for the growing season. Several road construction projects were completed with remarkable success and direct livelihood benefit to the poor. As opposed to normal MASAF projects where community participants were paid K43.00 per working day task (equivalent to four hours of work), MASAF doubled the working day task to eight hours of work for a fee of K200.00 per day. At individual or household level, it was anticipated that after a two-week period households would be able to earn K2000.00, which was enough to buy two bags of fertilizer weighing 50kg each at a subsidized price of K950.00.

Why does community development rarely start from the grassroots?

Projects implemented under the three initiatives are all small in size, involving small sums of money and probably less significant in terms of capital, skill and managerial requirements. Less significant, though, they indicate that some rural development projects cannot get off the ground if rural people do not come forward. The project in Chingale could not begin without cooperation among the local people and with the government (Lindskog and Lundquist 1989). Likewise, MASAF-sponsored projects cannot take off if local people choose not to participate by contributing labour or basic material requirements. In a similar way, Mathur (1986) observed that plans to increase agricultural production cannot be effective if farmers are unwilling to use

new agricultural technologies and other inputs that government extension agents propagate. These points underscore the importance of local participation and community development as a process and a measure of how much can be achieved by the people for themselves (Cohen 1996). Yet, in many cases participation is not voluntary or a reflection of self-consciousness, but the outcome of conditioning by the social structures and regularities of social reproduction (Giddens and Pierson 1998) or sometimes extremes of vulnerability to poverty.

Hence, in many cases community development relies on imposition and reinforcement of traditional and oppressive social order upon people. Participation is sometimes based on imbalances that are manifested at three levels – a triune of the community, the family and the individual (Campbell 1994). For instance, the low social status of women, role stereotypes and the belief that awareness of the needs of the community is greater among women (Momsen 1991) tend to put the burden of community development activities on women. This is true in all water supply projects since fetching water is regarded as women's responsibility. For the good of the community, that of their families and their own good, women are compelled by circumstances and unwritten rules governing the gender allocation of tasks to take a leading role in water-related projects. Public works programmes such as food-for-work projects attract more women participants than men. Programmes that provide the option of payment in cash appear equally attractive to both men and women. From insights on gender and development in Africa, it is known that some men do not use cash income from public works to improve household welfare (Momsen 1991: 73).

Stresses of modern life also discourage community development (Taylor 1992). Zoomers (1999) has argued that communal efforts are waning as more and more traditional tasks are being eroded, resulting in increasing decommunalization or decollectivization even in the use of resources. Decommunalization in the use of resources has been observed to reduce shared values and communal cohesiveness that is central to the spirit of community participation. In the gravity water supply project in Chambe, Linskog and Lundquist (1989) observed a situation whereby at the beginning of the project people in some villages worked hard because they thought they would get a tap outside their houses, but when they realized that the nearest tap would be 500 metres away they lost confidence in the project and their commitment to work declined during the latter part of the project. Under the one-party state, the government resorted to coercion. Coercive tactics, whether direct or indirect, prevent genuine locally initiated community projects from taking root. Instead, projects planned by the political machinery

or the government become more common and rural people are called upon to provide labour not as partners but as agents of the political system (Lwanda, 1993). The effects of lack of voluntary participation under the Banda regime are evident now when people cannot voluntarily come forward, and instead have to be paid for working on projects that serve local needs and interests. This is not surprising since it reflects two debilitating situations that arise through lack of voluntarism (Shortall and Shucksmith 2001). The first situation relates to the absence of adequate mechanisms for horizontal coordination. The second situation is the failure to synergize local initiative with national development programmes. Hence, lack of voluntary participation in the initial stages becomes a threat to genuine community development initiatives in the later stages.

A similar outcome can occur when rural development agents are not effective and transparent when mobilizing local participation for community work. This is true for projects implemented by NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), as well as some government departments. In Malawi, in the case of NGOs and FBOs in particular, local communities are sometimes considered to facilitate the transfer of money from donors who insist on community participation, particularly that of women. Afterwards there is no genuine effort to engage with the communities beyond rhetoric. Cases of ghost NGOs, CBOs and abuse of donor funding by some well-known NGOs and CBOs prove this point. Early in 2006, a consortium of over 50 NGOs lost funding from the Danish Church Aid (DCA) owing to financial mismanagement. The same grouping of NGOs was a few months later reported to have mismanaged project funds amounting to K694 million that were provided by the Norwegian and Swedish governments.¹ These occurrences suggest that NGOs are hardly readable and transparent, and in this respect they cannot be trusted to build a genuine culture of community participation, whereby communities have to be involved at all stages from planning to implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

Left to themselves, most rural communities in Malawi cannot manage a participatory process. Low literacy levels and lack of financial resources, mobilization and facilitation skills are serious constraints. Time is also a major constraint for many community members juggling with other commitments – for example, to produce their own food and attend social gatherings such as initiation ceremonies and funerals that are common owing to high numbers of HIV/AIDS-related deaths. The result is that most ongoing projects operating on the principle of community participation are initiated elsewhere and by outsiders and co-optation rather than participation is the most appropriate term. Participation in such projects attracts the vulnerable who lack viable

employment opportunities, and in the previous two to five years by challenges related to the precarious food situation. In situations where access to relief food items is dependent on willingness to provide labour in public works projects, those who come forward are the poor and hungry. However, in the case of MASAF projects, the initiative has variously been attacked for being insufficiently politically accountable, too focused on infrastructural projects and tending towards top-down management practices. A study by Cross and Kutengule (2001) observed a general feeling among the study respondents that MASAF projects suffer from political pressure. The majority of community members observed that they would rather work with chiefs than politicians in implementing the grassroots development interventions. Their rationale was that politicians either from the government or opposition side are often partisan in administering development interventions. Hence, community development becomes a battlefield where the juxtaposition of traditional leadership based on chieftancy (from village level to the level of paramount chief) and modern leadership based on political parties (from the level of branch to the national level) confront each other. Community development fails in situations where a compromise cannot be reached.

Conclusion

Although several development activities were carried out in the past and numerous others are in the offing on the principle of community participation, the results both actual and potential do not signify a breakthrough in the problem of rural development – improved and easy access to essential social services such as health, education, transport and safe water, and also the modernization of traditional rural structures, just to mention a few. The case studies cited in this paper show that community development is not specifically an economic, technical or infrastructural problem. It is a problem of matching the external support offered by rural development agents with the internal characteristics of rural systems. Hence, rural development agents should learn to ‘put the last first’ (Chambers 1983). In theory, the role of the central government and other outside agents should be to inspire local initiatives that improve community welfare (Passmore 1972). In practice, top-down planning and implementation of development projects have to give way to bottom-up or active community participation to achieve what Neocosmos (1998) termed ‘development through negotiation’. That is, community development should be perceived not as a theory of development but a practice of development that emphasizes emancipation from inappropriate institutions and any debilitating situations that lead to cosmetic participation. Also,

community development should be a mechanism to draw on the collective power of the members of particular communities – comprising of men and women, the rich and the poor, the able and disabled, etc. – to transform order in their locality.

Note

1. Joseph Langa, 'Another audit implicates HRCC', *Weekend Nation*. 13–14 May 2006.

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Globalization and State–Society Relations in Africa

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Abstract

The post-colonial African state has long been viewed as a major culprit in Africa's socioeconomic crisis. Its failure to coordinate policy with broad social interests and to reconcile its governance system with the institutions and cultural values of its citizens is a major factor. This paper examines if new globalization and its liberalization policies have begun to narrow the discrepancy between policy and social interests and to facilitate the reconstitution of the state by shifting the balance of power between state and society in favor of society. The findings suggest that, despite the apparent spread of democratization during the era of post – Cold-War globalization, the policy mechanisms of globalization have notably worsened the disjuncture between policy and social interests and exacerbated the antagonisms between the state and society in the African continent.

Résumé

L'Etat africain post-colonial a longtemps été perçu comme étant principalement coupable de la crise socioéconomique qui frappe l'Afrique. Son incapacité de coordonner la politique et les intérêts sociaux de la population et d'adapter son système de gouvernance aux institutions et valeurs culturelles de ses citoyens en est un facteur majeur. Ce document examine la question de savoir si la nouvelle mondialisation, ainsi que ses politiques basées sur le libéralisme économique, ont commencé à réduire l'écart qui existe entre les politiques et les intérêts sociaux et à faciliter la reconstitution de l'Etat en contrebalançant le rapport de force qui existe entre l'Etat et la société en faveur de la société. Les résultats révèlent que même s'il est apparent que le processus de démocratisation n'a

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cessé de gagner du terrain depuis le commencement de l'ère de la globalisation post guerre froide, les mécanismes politiques globalisants ont considérablement aggravé la disjonction entre la politique et les intérêts sociaux et ont exacerbé les antagonismes entre l'Etat et la société en Afrique

Conceptualizing globalization

While globalization is a highly contested concept, it is widely viewed to involve a process of rapid intensification of economic, political, and cultural interconnectedness among the different actors and geographic areas in the global system. The forces that unleash globalization are also in dispute. There is little doubt that market forces play a significant role since expansion of markets worldwide is inherent to the capitalist socioeconomic system, in which production is primarily geared for exchange. Technological advancement, especially in the areas of communication and transportation, also facilitates the process. These two 'generic' (Sklair 2006: 30) factors are not new, however, and they do not explain the outburst of globalization, especially since the end of the Cold War. Two hegemonic forces or conditions provide a fuller explanation. One is a high level of concentration of global political (military) and economic power culminating in the rise of a dominant (hegemonic) state. Another condition is a balance of power among social classes, which is decisively tilted in favor of capital, especially transnational capital, at the global level. The confluence of these two conditions sets in motion episodes of the capitalist system that are characterized by a hyperdrive for accumulation of capital and accumulation of power. To facilitate the attainment of these two goals, the hegemonic power, along with powerful capital, promotes the vision of integration of national economies into a single economic space through various mechanisms, in a pattern of direct colonialism in the nineteenth century and institutional arrangements and liberalization policies in the twenty-first century.

The kinds of configuration of power among states and the balance of power among social classes that make the rapid integration of the global system under a liberal ideology possible are not always present. Capitalism is, thus, not always characterized by the broad globalization that has unfolded in either the post-Cold War era or the one that prevailed in the nineteenth century roughly between 1840 and 1914. Globalization of the nineteenth century (henceforth old globalization) was established largely under the political and economic hegemony of Great Britain and it incorporated areas outside of Western Europe and North America largely through imperialism and often through direct colonialism. The rise of powers that challenged British hegemony by the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century culminated in the world wars, which, in conjunction

with broad social struggle against the dominance of capital, brought changes in the global configuration of power and in the balance of power among social classes and thereby the end of old globalization.

Another cycle of globalization (new globalization) has unfolded since the closing decades of the twentieth century after an interlude of roughly 75 years, which were largely dominated by episodes of the welfare state system and socialism. These two social systems reflected the relative ascendancy of working-class influence in global politics and the emergence of contending superpowers and competing ideologies.

Like old globalization, new globalization is projected by a new political and economic hegemony accompanied by the ascendancy in the power of the capitalist class relative to other social classes. Opinions on the nature of the new hegemony vary widely in the literature. One view suggests that the US, which is in a position to influence other powers to act in conformity with its leadership, represents the new hegemonic power and that globalization is a reflection of US dominance of the global system (Waltz 1999). Another perspective contends that the new hegemony is not state-based but rather composed of a decentralized transnational elite (Hardt and Negri 2000; Robinson 2004). It is unclear how the transnational elite are able to exercise and sustain global hegemony without the direct control of military power. Nevertheless, despite the differences in the interpretation of the nature of the hegemony, it is widely recognized that the new global order is projected by a new political, economic, and ideological hegemony.

The resurgence in the power of capital is also evident from a number of developments, including deregulation of capital mobility, which have facilitated the rise of a transnational capitalist class and enhanced capital's bargaining power vis-à-vis states (especially the less powerful ones) and labor. The growing influence of capital over policy, including expenditures on social services, regulatory measures, and tax policies is another indicator of the upsurge in the power of capital. Some studies have shown that capital's interests coincide with smaller government and lower taxes while labor prefers higher taxes and state provision of greater public services (Findlay and Wellisz 2003). The disproportionate remuneration of capital relative to its contribution to productivity, while wage rates have fallen below rates of economic growth at least in the OECD countries (which have reliable data), is another reflection of the surge in the power of capital (OECD 1997–2000; Rupert 2000: 41). The weakening of labor movements, partly through deregulation of labor markets and partly through reorganization of work, which is propelled by rapid technological advance, is another indicator of the shift in the balance of power among social classes in favor of capital.

The relative weakness of US economic and technological dominance has led to suggestions that the US hegemony is on the decline (Wallerstein 2004). Others suggest that the decline in economic profitability and crisis of legitimacy of its leadership account for the weakening of US hegemony (Brenner 1998; Silver and Arrighi 2005). The inability of the US to suppress wars of insurgency, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, is likely to bolster the view of the decline. In any case, the suggestion of the decline of US hegemony does not refute its presence. Rather it raises questions about the sustainability of the hegemony and that of globalization, which is projected by the hegemony.

Unlike old globalization, new globalization has unfolded without direct state-based colonialism. Instead, the new hegemonic power or 'Empire', as referred to by Hardt and Negri (2000), mostly utilizes institutional arrangements and policy instruments as mechanisms of globalization or conditions for integration with the global economy, although economic sanctions and even force are also applied when deemed necessary. The policy-based mechanisms of globalization largely rest on creating an open global economy through liberalization of trade and mobility of capital, restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, including those that cover taxes, public spending, interest rates, and foreign exchange rates, and retrenchment of state involvement in economic activity, including its redistributive and regulatory measures. In addition to promoting capital accumulation, these globalization mechanisms facilitate the distribution of economic benefits among geographic areas and social classes on the basis of access to and control of capital. A brief discussion of Africa's incorporation into the global system follows so that our analysis of the impacts of new globalization on state-society relations in Africa is placed within a historical context.

Africa's incorporation into the global system

Whether the hegemonic power is a provider of global leadership, by establishing a path of development and the rules governing the state system for the advancement of interests beyond its own, or merely represents an imperialist domination has been a subject of debate (Bienefeld 1994; Chase-Dunn 1994; Amin 2001; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001; Silver and Arrighi 2005). Even if it is a provider of leadership, however, the development path and rules of the state system it sets up are likely to have different impacts on different countries. It is thus possible for the hegemonic power to project characteristics of both leadership and imperialist domination at the same time. It is often to the interest of the hegemonic power to extend the benefits of its position to potential contenders (secondary powers) in an effort to thwart any collusion among them for purposes of challenging its power. It does

not, however, need to extend any benefits to weak states that pose little threat to its hegemony, although it may also pursue policies of differential treatment towards weak states. Moreover, it is likely that the narrower the power-gap between the hegemonic power and the secondary powers is, the more imperialistic the hegemonic power becomes towards the weak states. The need for increasing profit rates to fortify its economic power and to display its military power to potential contenders may lead the hegemonic power to take a more aggressive imperialist posture towards weak states. In this way hegemony can represent leadership to some and sheer domination to others.

In any case, the experience of Africa's incorporation into the global capitalist system gives little reason not to view hegemony as imperialist domination. While specifying the precise dates for each phase is difficult, at least four different phases of incorporation of the continent into the global economic system can be identified. The first phase occurred roughly between the middle of the fifteenth century and the middle of the nineteenth century. This phase itself had at least two stages, including the early commercial incorporation and the pillage of the continent during the era of the slave trade, between 1500 and 1890, when roughly 22 million slaves were exported out of the continent (Ogot 1999: 43). The second phase of incorporation started during the waning decades of old globalization with the Berlin Conference of 1884. This phase of incorporation was attained through direct colonialism and lasted until the era of decolonization in the 1960s, outlasting old globalization by about half of a century. The pillage of the continent during the era of the slave trade was devastating to African societies in terms of both human and economic considerations. However, the most fundamental and lasting changes on Africa's political and economic systems, cultures, institutions, and class structures took place during the period of nineteenth-century (old) globalization. Africa's present political map and economic structures were formulated during the era of colonialism, which represented growing imperialist competition among European powers with the decline of British hegemony. Africa's place in the global division of labor was also sealed during this phase. Moreover, in most cases, the departing colonial state created the post-colonial African state in its own image. The African state inherited the colonial state's extractive institutions and repressive security apparatus (Young 1994; Musah 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). Like the colonial state, it also operated essentially as an extroverted enclave isolated from the traditional institutions and cultural values and even interests of its constituency.

The third phase of Africa's incorporation into the global system took place during the interlude between old and new globalization – the three decades between the beginning of the continent's decolonization in the early 1960s and the end of the Cold War in 1991. Decolonization marked the loosening of the monopolistic grip on African economies by their European colonial powers, resulting in some diversification of the trading partners of African countries. Despite the limited opportunities the third phase created, various factors undermined attempts by African countries to develop their own development strategies and to reconstitute the terms of their integration into the global system. The rivalry between the two ideological camps often denied African countries the independence necessary to chart their own development strategies, and the rival powers often used them as battlegrounds for proxy wars. Civil wars in the Congo, Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia are the most obvious examples. Given the political and economic structures of African countries, the post-World War II global economic system also continued to perpetuate the fragmentation of their economies by maintaining old links between former colonial powers and the resource-rich enclaves, at times through military intervention, as in the Congo in the early 1960s.

The internal contradictions of the post-colonial African state was another critical factor that hindered the ability of African countries to chart their own development strategies and redefine the terms of their integration into the global system. As a product of the anti-colonial social struggle, the post-colonial African state, no doubt, embodies goals of liberating its population from external domination. However, its failure to change fundamentally the structures of the state, which were designed by colonialism to oppress and exploit, has not allowed the post-colonial state to become an agent of empowerment of its constituency. With few exceptions, such as in Botswana and Mauritius, and South Africa to some extent, the state has remained largely outside the control of citizens and has, as a result, failed to reconcile its governance system with the traditional institutions of governance, cultural values, and interests of its citizens and thereby to transform the fragmented institutions of governance established under colonialism. Most African countries are, thus, characterized by duality and incoherence of institutions of governance. In the absence of a fundamental transformation and synergy between state and society and traditional and modern institutions, the post-colonial state is often seized by dictators who advance their own interests at the expense of broad social interests.

Independence from the influence of the citizenry allowed many African leaders to engage in gross corruption and to behave as if they owned the state. Mobutu of Zaire, Idi Amin of Uganda, Bokassa of the Central African

Republic, Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, Mengistu Hailemariam of Ethiopia, Abacha of Nigeria, and Taylor of Liberia are conspicuous examples. These dictators essentially privatized the state and used its coffers as their private bank accounts and its security forces as their private armies (*Economist*, 11 May 2000). Such conditions led to the characterization of the African state as ‘state without citizens’ or the ‘vampire’ state by some observers (Ayittey 1998; Ayoade 1998). Others characterized the African political landscape as a politics of clientelism or patrimony (Clapham 1982; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Callaghy 1984).

Segments of the counter elite (elite not in power), also often saw the state as a prize to be won in order to get access to the privileges of power. Rebellions, such as those led by Jonas Savimbi in Angola and Foday Sankoh in Sierra Leone, were clearly inspired by a blatant drive to capture state power for self-serving purposes. Many of the military coups that took place in Africa between the late 1960s and the early 1980s were also motivated by similar, if less conspicuous, private ambitions. Often, leaders of opposition parties and armed rebel groups in post-Cold War Africa have also been driven by the same goals. The peace plans proposed by various mediators in efforts to settle current intra-state conflicts in the continent, including those in the Côte d'Ivoire, the Sudan, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, also center on power-sharing arrangements designed to incorporate rebel leaders into the power structure. Such plans, as important as they are in stopping devastating wars, pay little attention to broad social interests (Mengisteab 2004). The intensity of election disputes such as those that occurred in Togo, Ethiopia, and recently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo also reveals that retention of and access to the privileges of power rather than commitment to public service frequently motivates the contestants, who rarely shy away from politicizing ethnicity and risk undermining the fragile process of state- building in their countries.

Even nationalist leaders who were not viewed to be blatantly self-serving, such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, and Houphouet Boigny of the Côte d'Ivoire, did not bring the state under the control of citizens. To the extent that these leaders differed from the self-serving dictators, the manner in which they governed was largely an expression of their own vision and sense of benevolence rather than the expressed wishes of their populations. The unpopularity of Ujaama in Tanzania or many of Nkrumah's policies in Ghana, including the outlawing of opposition parties, are examples.

The identified contradictions in the nature of the African state and the discrepancy between popular expectations and the interests of the ruling elite did not allow Africa to take full advantage of the openings the global system presented during the interlude between old and new globalization. Nevertheless, the Cold War-era rivalry between the superpowers and the global Keynesian welfare state ideology of compromise between social classes, which prevailed during that era, facilitated the success of nationalist movements in decolonizing African countries. The Cold War-era global system, along with GATT's preferential treatment rules, which allowed promotion of infant industries, also enabled some African countries, especially those with relatively more benevolent leadership, including Kenya, the Côte d'Ivoire, and Senegal, to initiate some level of industrialization behind protectionist policies and to expand public services, such as education and healthcare, to their populations in the 1960s and early 1970s. Such changes, in turn, facilitated a modest level of diversification of African social classes. Easterly (2001) suggests that the 1960–79 period, which saw the median growth rate of per capita income in LDCs rise to 2.5%, was an unusual era for LDCs while the 1980–98 stagnation, when the median growth rate fell to 0.0%, represents a return to the historical pattern of divergence between rich and poor countries. His observation depicts Africa's experience rather well.

New globalization and state–society relations in Africa

The fourth phase of Africa's incorporation corresponds with the advent of new globalization at the end of the Cold War. The crisis of socialism and the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the emergence of a uni-polar global configuration of power with a homogenizing global ideology of liberalism. These changes marked a significant modification of the Cold War era-terms of incorporation of African economies into the global system. With new globalization, retrenchment of state involvement in economic activity, along with policies of liberalization that foster openness of the economy, including removal of protectionist measures, and deregulation of exchange rates, interest rates, and capital mobility, have become conditions for the integration of African and other developing economies into the global economy. These measures were imposed on developing economies as conditions for obtaining loans and aid, while the advanced economies, which have the power to make the world market work to their advantage, maintain their benefit from non-market advantages, such as subsidies and other forms of protectionism.

Crippled by the debt crisis, which was caused by a variety of factors, including the oil crisis of the 1970s, falling prices of primary commodities, worsening terms of trade, and mismanagement, African countries often

reluctantly succumbed to pressures by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and donor countries to adopt liberalization policies.

The impacts of new globalization on African economies have been highly controversial. Four different views can be identified. Proponents of globalization contend that liberalization by freeing the economy from state inefficiencies promotes faster growth and diversification of the economy and, thereby improves human conditions and fosters political stability (World Bank 1994). A polar opposite view contends that new globalization is a form of imperialism with polarizing expansion and subordination of the interests of developing countries to those of the advanced countries (Bienefeld 1994; Amin 2001; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001). A third view attributes the problems of de-industrialization, rising poverty, and inequality in Africa to globalization's liberalization programs without linking globalization to an imperialist design (UNECA 1989; Bentsi-Enchill 1992; Adepoju 1993; Kawewe and Dibia 2000; Mkandawire and Soludo 2003). A fourth view is highly skeptical of the claim of positive relationship between the adjustment programs and economic growth without necessarily attributing broader economic problems to the adjustment mechanisms (Przeworsky and Vreeland 2000; Easterly 2001, 2005; Barro and Lee 2002).

Disentangling the effects of globalization mechanisms from the influences of other factors has proven difficult (Soludo 2003). Factors that may be fully or partly exogenous to the globalization mechanisms, such as civil strife, can obviously undermine the effectiveness of globalization mechanisms in attaining their stated goals. Some of the influences of such variables, however, can be detected from the differential performance between countries that incurred civil strife and countries that did not. The data provided in Tables 1–5, for example, show that the performance of countries with chronic conflicts, such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, was generally worse than those of most other countries. Factors, such as unfavorable or deteriorating terms of trade, and various forms of unfair trading practices by the advanced countries, that are largely beyond the control of individual African countries, can also undermine the effectiveness of globalization. Such adverse impacts, however, reveal deficiencies in the globalization mechanisms, which are expected to perform better than pre-globalization strategies in dealing with such adverse external conditions. The differential performance of African economies, through factors unrelated to globalization, also adds to the methodological complexity. Notwithstanding the sharp divergence of views and the methodological constraints, it is clear that after roughly two decades, globalization has not reversed Africa's dismal economic performance, which is described as 'the

worst economic tragedy' of the twentieth century (Artadi and Sala-i-Martin 2003, 2004).

With the foregoing background, we now turn to the focus of the paper and examine how globalization has impacted on state–society relations and the nature of the African state, which is widely viewed to be responsible for the disjuncture between policy and broad social interests. More specifically, the rest of the paper explores two contrasting interpretations. The first is whether globalization strengthens society at large, thereby shifting the balance of power sufficiently in favor of society to enable it to reconstitute the state by transforming it from an imposed predatory entity, which sets policies with little regard for broad social interests, into an agent of social advancement that bases policy on social interests. The second is whether globalization helps to preserve the existing state–society disjuncture and the state's excessive extroversion, and thereby perpetuates the weak influence on policy by the general population outside the governing circle (henceforth civil society). As the previous section of the paper tried to argue, the predatory nature of the African state and the lack of coordination between policy and broad social interests have their roots in old globalization. The intention here is to examine if new globalization changes these conditions or perpetuates them.

The impact of globalization on state–society relations can be captured by examining changes in the level of influence of civil society on policy following the implementation of globalization mechanisms. Such changes, in turn, can be detected from the patterns of expenditures on public programs, especially those that constitute the most basic societal interests. The rationale is that if society's influence on policy-making and public spending priorities increases, such influence would lead to better coordination of policy with broad social interests, which, in turn, would be reflected in higher investments on the development of human capital and improvements in human conditions, compared to those of the self-serving predatory state.

It is difficult to determine what constitutes societal interests, as they vary from place to place and over time. In Africa's present socioeconomic context, however, they are very likely to include expansion of societal access to public services that enhance human capital, especially healthcare and education. Some studies have suggested that the prevailing low levels of primary school enrollment and low life expectancy, due to the pervasiveness of diseases, such as malaria, are important factors in the poor performance of African economies (Artadi and Sala-i-Martin 2003). It is estimated that malaria costs Sub-Saharan African countries between 5.8% and 17.4% of their annual gross national product. Health and educational services have become even

more critical components of social interests following the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The HIV/AIDS epidemic is estimated to cost Africa between 11.7% and 35.1% of GNP annually (Taylor and De Young 2003–4). Other aspects of broad social interests include; alleviation of poverty, increasing food availability, diversification of the economy to facilitate growth and job creation, and, of course, creation of a democratic system of governance with real representation for the general population. Changes in the identified indicators would give a reasonably good signal of changes in policy coordination with broad social interests.

The poor quality of data on African socioeconomic indicators is a concern since it can distort the detection of changes. However, if the quality of data can be expected to remain unchanged over the period of analysis, trends if not the precise level of changes can be detected with a reasonable level of confidence. Changes in policy coordination with social interests can be detected both from the side of allocation of resources and from the side of outcomes. However, absence of consistent and reliable data forces us to use either outcomes or allocation of resources for some of the indicators.

Policy changes in creating access to education can be estimated by comparing the ratio of expenditures on education to gross domestic product over time. It can also be measured by comparing the changes in the ratio of the population that has access to primary education, although access created by non-governmental agencies does not necessarily indicate a shift in policy. Access to healthcare can also be measured by the ratio of health expenditures to GDP and by health expenditures per capita and by the changes in life expectancy and child mortality rates. Food production and availability can be measured by the annual changes in total food production and by per capita calories intake, although food imports and food aid can affect this measure. Diversification of production can be captured in several ways. One way is to compare changes in the growth rates of the manufacturing sector and the changes in the share of the manufacturing sector to GDP. It can also be captured by comparing the changes in value added as percentage of GDP in the manufacturing sector. Changes in the levels of poverty are detected by the changes in the ratio of the population living on less than US\$1 a day, a widely used measure of poverty. Presence of a democratic system of governance would give a good indication of improvements in state–society relations. However, the presence of the formal institutions of democratic governance, such as multi-party systems and elections, does not necessarily capture the level of influence of society on policy, since elections can be conducted to recycle the elite in power without providing significant policy choices to the voters. African democratic institutions at the state level also

remain shallow since they only nominally represent the peasantry, which constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population in most countries. The peasantry, of course, participates in voting but its interests are greatly underrepresented owing to the urban bias of the development approaches African countries pursue, and in many cases the peasantry continues to adhere to traditional institutions of governance.

Access to education and healthcare services

One aspect of the package of structural adjustment programs, which are used as globalizing mechanisms, is retrenchment of public expenditures. This policy is intended to reduce budgetary deficits, restrain the growth of money supply, and thereby establish the bases for stable prices and a climate conducive for investment. Obviously, a persistent large budgetary deficit would be unsustainable as it would lead to economic instability and undermine the development process. However, in the African case, where the level of human resources and infrastructure development are extremely low, there is widespread concern that austerity measures are likely to limit investments in these areas, thereby, impeding the long-term prospects for overall development.

Many Sub-Saharan African countries have retrenched their expenditures on public services since adopting adjustment mechanisms. Public expenditure on education has declined steeply in many countries, although modest increases are reported in a few cases. As depicted in Table 1, public expenditures on education as a ratio of gross national income (GNI) in the year 2000 declined in 13 out of 32 countries when compared with 1970. The 2000 rates declined in 18 of 35 countries when compared with 1980 rates. They also declined in 26 of 42 countries when compared with the rates of 1990. For Sub-Saharan Africa in general, public expenditures on education as a ratio of GDP declined from 4.5% in 1992 to 3.3% in 1999 (World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization 2004).

Access to education as measured by the ratio of relevant age groups enrolled in elementary schools gives a mixed picture. Out of the 30 countries examined, the ratio of enrollment in elementary school in 1997 declined in 11 countries compared to the ratio of enrollments in 1980 (UNCTAD 2002). In five countries the changes were positive but the improvements were less than 5%, and in 14 countries there was positive change but the change was too modest for a 17-year interval. Assessment of progress towards achieving the UN Millennium Development Goal of attaining universal primary education by 2015 also reveals that only 8 of 25 countries with data are regarded to be

on track while 17 countries are either far behind or slipping back (African Development Bank 2002; Versi 2004: 17).

At a time when malaria and the HIV/AIDS epidemic are eroding the economic and social fabric of many African societies, total health expenditures as percentage of GDP show little effort by African countries to deal with the continent's growing health crisis. Compared to expenditures in 1990, total health expenditures (as ratio of GDP) in 2001 have declined or remained unchanged in 23 of 40 countries (Table 2). In six other countries, the change was 0.6% or less. Per capita expenditures in 2001 also declined in 23 of 39 countries and remained unchanged in one country (Table 2).

Budgetary stringency has also severely limited the capacity of many African governments to train health workers and to attract, retain, and maintain the moral of professional health workers (USAID 2003). A high rate of flight of health professionals, including doctors and nurses, to the advanced countries is a clear indication. The international Organization for Migration estimates that 23,000 African health professionals leave their countries every year, 'leaving their own stretched health service in dire straights' [sic] (*All Africa.com* 31 January 2005). Surveys estimate that 68% of health workers in Zimbabwe, 60% in Ghana, 58% in South Africa, 49% in Cameroon, 38% in Senegal, and 26% in Uganda want to leave their countries and migrate elsewhere (Liese and Dussault, 2004). When compared to figures from either the 1970s or 1980s, several Sub-Saharan African countries also experienced a decline in physicians per 100,000 of population in the 1990s (Liese and Dussault 2004). Child mortality rate as an indicator of availability of healthcare service also reveals that few African countries are making progress in extending healthcare to their populations. Only 8 of 48 sub-Saharan African countries are regarded to be on track to reduce mortality rates of children under the age of five years to a third of their 1990 level by 2015. Three countries are said to be slightly off track while 37 countries are far behind or slipping back (Africa Development Bank 2002; Versi 2004: 17). Life expectancy is another good indicator of availability of healthcare service. This indicator also reveals stagnation of the continent's healthcare system. The percentage of the population aged 60 years and above in 2002 declined or remained unchanged in 23 of 43 sub-Saharan African countries compared to those of 1992 (WHO 2002).

Table 1: Public expenditure on education (% of GNI)

Country	1970	1980	Change	1990	2000	Change
Angola	—	—	—	4.4	4.4	0.0
Benin	3.2	4.2	1.0	3.5	2.7	-0.7
Botswana	4.0	4.5	0.5	4.9	7.8	2.9
Burkina Faso	1.8	2.1	0.3	2.2	1.4	-0.9
Burundi	—	2.6	—	3.3	3.1	-0.3
Cameroon	3.2	2.9	-0.3	3.2	2.3	-0.8
Cape Verde	—	—	—	3.8	3.9	0.1
Central African Rep.	3.6	3.7	0.1	2.2	1.6	-0.6
Chad	2.1	1.8	-0.3	1.6	2.0	0.4
Comoros	1.4	1.4	0.0	3.9	3.9	0.0
Congo Dem.Republic	2.3	2.6	0.3	0.9	0.9	0.0
Congo Rep.	5.7	6.6	0.9	5.8	6.5	0.7
Côte d'Ivoire	4.7	6.1	1.4	6.8	4.5	-2.3
Equatorial Guinea	—	—	—	1.6	1.7	0.1
Ethiopia	—	—	—	2.8	2.7	-0.1
Gabon	3.1	2.0	-1.1	3.8	2.1	-1.7
Gambia	2.2	2.9	0.7	3.2	3.6	0.4
Ghana	3.8	1.7	-2.1	2.8	4.4	1.6
Guinea	—	—	—	1.5	1.5	0.
Guinea-Bissau	0.6	4.0	3.4	2.7	2.7	0.0
Kenya	4.7	6.2	1.5	6.4	6.1	-0.3
Lesotho	2.8	4.1	1.3	3.0	6.4	3.4
Liberia	4.9	4.9	0.0	—	—	—
Madagascar	2.9	3.7	0.8	2.0	1.8	-0.2
Malawi	3.4	2.6	-0.8	2.5	3.8	1.4
Mali	3.5	3.6	0.1	2.9	2.2	-0.7
Mauritania	3.2	5.0	1.9	4.5	3.7	-0.8
Mauritius	2.9	4.8	1.9	3.3	3.3	0.0
Mozambique	—	3.8	—	3.8	3.7	-0.1
Namibia	—	1.5	—	6.7	8.4	1.7
Niger	1.1	1.5	0.4	2.6	3.0	0.4
Nigeria	1.5	2.2	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.0
Rwanda	2.2	2.3	0.0	3.3	3.3	0.0
Senegal	3.8	4.4	0.6	4.0	3.4	-0.6
Seychelles	3.8	5.5	1.8	8.1	6.1	-2.0
Sierra Leone	2.8	3.3	0.5	1.1	1.1	0.0
Somalia	1.0	0.9	-0.2	0.3	—	—
South Africa	5.1	5.1	0.0	5.8	6.9	1.2
Sudan	3.6	4.4	0.8	2.2	0.9	-1.3
Swaziland	4.2	4.6	0.3	4.8	6.5	1.7
Tanzania	—	—	—	3.0	3.4	0.4
Togo	2.0	5.4	3.5	5.2	4.3	-0.9
Uganda	—	1.1	—	1.4	2.2	0.8
Zambia	3.6	4.2	0.7	2.0	2.0	0.0

Source: World Bank, 2002, *World Development Indicators*, Washington, DC: World Bank.

Table 2: Total expenditures on health, 1990/2001

Country	% of GDP			Per capita in US\$		
	1990	2001	Change %	1990	2001	Change %
Benin	4.4	4.4	0.0	17	16	-1.0
Botswana	6.2	6.6	0.4	155	190	35.0
Burkina Faso	8.6	3	-5.6	—	—	—
Burundi	2.3	3.6	1.3	5	4	-1.0
Cameroon	2.8	3.3	0.5	26	20	-6.0
Cape Verde	6.6	3.7	-2.9	48	57	9.0
Central African. Rep.	4.2	4.5	0.3	18	12	-6.0
Chad	6.2	2.6	-3.6	13	5	-8.0
Comoros	5.4	3.1	-2.3	26	9	-17.0
Congo Rep.	3.9	2.1	-1.8	6	5	-1.0
Côte d'Ivoire	3.4	6.2	2.8	28	41	13.0
Congo Dem. Rep.	2.9	3.5	0.6	49	18	-31.0
Equat. Guinea	7.5	2	-5.5	27	76	49.0
Ethiopia	3.9	3.6	-0.3	5	3	-2.0
Gabon	3.9	3.6	-0.3	172	127	-45.0
Gambia	7.4	6.4	-1.0	29	19	-10.0
Ghana	3.5	4.7	1.2	14	12	-2.0
Guinea	3.8	3.5	-0.3	18	13	-5.0
Guinea-Bissau	8	5.9	-2.1	16	8	-8.0
Kenya	4.3	7.8	3.5	16	29	13.0
Lesotho	8.3	5.5	-2.8	27	23	-4.0
Liberia	9	4.3	-4.7	4	1	-3.0
Madagascar	2.6	2	-0.6	7	6	-1.0
Malawi	5	7.8	2.8	11	13	2.0
Mali	5.2	4.3	-0.9	15	11	-4.0
Mauritania	3.8	3.6	-0.2	20	12	-8.0
Mozambique	6	5.9	-0.1	6	11	5.0
Niger	4.9	3.7	-1.2	16	6	-10.0
Nigeria	2.9	3.4	0.5	10	15	5.0
Rwanda	3.7	5.5	1.8	11	11	0.0
Senegal	3.8	4.8	1.0	30	22	-8.0
Sierra Leone	2.4	4.3	1.9	5	7	2.0
South Africa	5.6	8.6	3.0	158	222	64.0
Sudan	3.3	3.5	0.2	12	14	2.0
Swaziland	7.1	3.3	-3.8	70	41	-29.0
Tanzania	5	4.4	-0.6	5	12	7.0
Togo	4.2	2.8	-1.4	19	8	-11.0
Uganda	3.4	5.9	2.5	6	14	8.0
Zambia	3.2	5.7	2.5	14	19	5.0
Zimbabwe	6.2	6.2	0.0	42	45	3.0

Source: World Health Organization, 2003, *The World Health Report 2003* and World Bank, 1999, *Health Expenditures Services and Outcomes in Africa: Basic Data and Cross-National Comparisons, 1990-1996*, July.

Levels of poverty

The widespread outcry by critics about the disproportionate burden of the costs of adjustment on the poor prompted the sponsors of the globalization mechanisms to incorporate some poverty-alleviation measures to the adjustment programs (Cornia et al. 1987; ECA 1989). Despite the add-on measures, poverty as measured by the head count ratio has continued to increase in Africa. A comparison of the ratio of the population living on US\$1 or less per day for the years 1987–89 and 1997–99 in 24 Sub-Saharan states shows that the ratio of the destitute increased in 13 countries (Table 3). In two countries, the ratio declined by less than 2% and in 9 countries the ratio declined by more than 3%. Adjusted poverty rates for Sub-Saharan Africa in general increased from 48% in 1970 to 60% in 1995 (Artadi and Sala-i-Martin 2003). The total number of the population living on less than US\$1 in Sub-Saharan Africa also increased, from 140 million in 1975 to 360 million in 2000 (Artadi and Sala-i-Martin 2003). According to the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (2004), the total number of the destitute increased from 241 million in 1990 to 323 million in 2000. An assessment of progress of African countries towards achieving the UN's Millennium Development Goal of reducing extreme poverty to half the 1990 level by 2015 also reveals that only 4 of 44 countries have achieved the goal and 9 countries are said to be on track while 31 countries are regarded to be slightly off, far behind, or slipping behind (Versi 2004: 17). Furthermore, the absolute poverty figure in the continent is expected to rise to 686.5 million people by 2015 (Yuri 2005).

In addition to sluggish economic growth, rising unemployment and cuts in state subsidies of food, education, and health are among the factors contributing to increasing the number of the poor. The rise in the number of the destitute has also been accompanied by rapid intensification of inequality in income distribution. The gini coefficient for Sub-Saharan African countries increased from 0.58 in 1970 to 0.65 in 2000 (Artadi and Sala-i-Martin 2003). On the basis of the identified evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that either poverty reduction has not been a high policy priority in much of Africa or that African countries are facing conditions that do not enable them to reduce poverty.

Food production

Food production is another area where the dissociation of policy from social interests is conspicuous. A comparison of growth rates of total food production and per capita calories intake in 33 Sub-Saharan states for the periods of 1980–90 and 1990–2000 shows that growth rates of total food production

declined in 17 countries. In four countries the changes were positive but the difference was 0.5% or less. In 11 countries the difference was positive and greater than 1% (Table 4). A comparison of growth rates of per capita calories intake for the same two periods shows that the rates declined in 14 of the 31 countries. Poor performance in the two indicators shows that either little shift in policy in favor of food security has taken place or that policy shifts, if any, have not succeeded. Given that the poverty rates are greater in rural areas, where incomes of most people range from US\$0.33 to US\$0.80 a day (World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization 2004), the weak performance in the food sector also suggests that African governments have not taken serious policy initiatives to transform the subsistence sector of their economies. With growing global demand for African resources, many African states are also engaged in compulsory acquisition of communal land in order to grant concessions to corporations in the extractive industries. Often compensation to customary holders of such lands is either nonexistent or grossly inadequate. A growing number of people are evicted from their lands and condemned to poverty. Protectionist agricultural policies in rich countries have also contributed in undermining Africa's agriculture by making it difficult for African farmers to compete in the markets of those countries. Even more damaging to African agriculture is that subsidized agricultural exports from rich countries have driven African small farmers out of the domestic market and into subsistence farming.

Diversification of production

For proponents of globalization, openness through liberalization of trade allows the local opportunity costs of resources to be reflected more accurately. Decontrolling interest rates also raises the rates and encourages savings and the adoption of appropriate technology. Liberalization of capital mobility is also expected to stimulate foreign investment while privatization of banks is anticipated to allow banks to allocate funds to finance private investments in industry. However, each of these policies can also produce adverse results depending on the prevailing conditions. Lifting protectionist policies can, for example, lead to loss of revenue and the destruction of potentially competitive local infant industry by cheap imports. Higher interest rates and tight credit may also hurt industry, which tends to have higher working capital needs, while privatization of banks may discourage investments on industry, which tends to have longer duration and higher risks. High interest rates are also likely to discourage the formation and growth of small industries. Deregulation of capital mobility may also destabilize monetary systems, as they have done in several developing economies.

Table 3: Share of population living on less than US\$1.00 a day

Country	% Total population		% Point
	1987-9	1997-9	difference
LDCs with increasing export/GDP ratio and increasing GDP/capita:			
Uganda	57.6	41.5	-16.1
Cape Verde	18.2	11.6	-6.3
Mozambique	40.5	36.8	-3.6
Benin	22.4	16.4	-6.1
Malawi	76.2	55.8	-20.4
Ethiopia	86.8	85.5	-1.2
Lesotho	19.5	41.8	22.3
Burkina Faso	66.6	60.1	-6.5
Mali	63	71.7	8.7
LDCs with increasing export/GDP ratio and decreasing or stagnant GDP/capita:			
Senegal	13.3	14.1	0.8
Central African Republic	45.6	68.9	23.3
Chad	79.1	81.6	2.5
Guinea-Bissau	56	80.9	25
Madagascar	42.2	46.7	4.5
Comoros	64.6	76.4	11.8
Angola	70.4	71.9	1.5
LDCs with decreasing export/GDP ratio and increasing GDP/capita:			
Mauritania	36.2	30	-6.2
Guinea	71.5	64.1	-7.4
LDCs with decreasing export/GDP ratio and decreasing or stagnant GDP/capita:			
Gambia	52	35.8	-16.3
Togo	64.8	63	-1.7
Niger	69.3	74.4	5.1
Rwanda	45.5	58.5	13.1
Burundi	60.2	71.2	11
Sierra Leone	30.2	67.4	37.2

Source: UNCTAD, 2002, *Escaping the Poverty Trap: The Least Developed Countries Report 2002*, New York and Geneva: United Nations.

Table 4: Food production and availability

Country	Average growth rates %			Per capita calories intake		
	1980–90	1990–99	Change	1980	1999	% change
Angola	1.1	4.4	3.3	2134	1875	-12
Benin	5.4	5.3	-0.1	2023	2489	23
Burkina Faso	5.7	3.3	-2.4	1671	2376	42
Burundi	2.7	-1.6	-4.3	2022	1628	-19
Cape Verde	11.4	4.2	-7.2	2556	3166	24
Central Af. Rep.	2.4	3.6	1.2	2301	1978	-14
Chad	2.1	4.9	2.8	1646	2230	35
Comoros	2.4	2.7	0.3	1784	1800	1
Congo Dem. Rep.	3.3	-1.3	-4.6	2086	1637	-22
Djibouti	8.8	-0.2	-9.0	1733	2129	23
Equatorial Guinea	1.5	-0.7	-2.2	—	—	—
Gambia	0.7	2.3	1.6	1644	2598	58
Guinea	-0.8	4.1	4.9	2269	2133	-6
Guinea-Bissau	3.9	2.7	-1.2	1898	2245	18
Lesotho	1.9	0.8	-1.1	2179	2300	6
Liberia	0.9	2	1.1	2504	2089	-17
Madagascar	1.7	1.5	-0.2	2374	1994	-16
Malawi	0.6	5.5	4.9	2246	2164	-4
Mali	2.1	2.6	0.5	1746	2314	33
Mauritania	1.3	0.9	-0.4	2118	2702	28
Mozambique	0.1	5.4	5.3	1940	1939	0
Niger	-0.3	3.2	3.5	2139	2064	-4
Rwanda	0.8	-2.2	-3.0	2292	2011	-12
São Tomé & Príncipe	-1.2	5.3	6.5	—	—	—
Senegal	3.9	1.8	-2.1	2207	2307	5
Sierra Leone	1.7	-0.7	-2.4	2087	2016	-3
Somalia	1.8	1.9	0.1	1735	1555	-10
Sudan	-0.7	5.8	6.5	2201	2360	7
Togo	3.2	3.7	0.5	2281	2527	11
Uganda	3.1	1.1	-2.0	2056	2238	9
U R Tanzania	3	0.8	-2.2	2252	1940	-14
Zambia	4.1	0.9	-3.2	2273	1934	-15
All LDCs	1.7	2.8	1.1	1888	2018	7

Source: UNCTAD, 2002, *Escaping the Poverty Trap: The Least Developed Countries Report 2002*, New York and Geneva: United Nations.

With trade liberalization, the level of tariff protection of import-substituting industries in Africa fell roughly between 30% and 50% over the period from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s (Oyejide 2003). The downward trend of tariff protection has continued since then. The optimistic expectations of proponents have not materialized, however. Instead, liberalization has exposed the industries of a number of African countries to significant losses through competition from cheap imports. The overall picture of Africa's industry since the implementation of liberalization policies has been rather grim. A comparison of manufacturing value added (as percentage of GDP) for the years 1990 and 1999 shows a decline in 23 of 30 countries while there was no change in 4 countries (Table 5). A comparison of value added as percentage of GDP for overall industry for 1990 and 1999 also shows a decline in 17 of 31 countries. A comparison of average annual growth rates of output in industry and in the manufacturing sector for the periods of 1980–90 and 1990–2000 also reveals a similar trend. In the manufacturing sector growth rates declined in 12 of 23 countries while growth rates in industry declined or remained unchanged in 15 of 29 countries (UNCTAD 2002). For Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole annual growth rates of value added in industry have declined from 2.2% for the 1975–84 period to 1.7% for the 1985–89 period and to 1.3% for the 1990–2000 period (Table 6).

According to an UNCTAD study (2001), the elasticity of industrial value added with respect to GDP, which was 1.10 and 1.03 during the 1960s and 1970s respectively, declined to 0.75 for the 1980s and 0.65 for the 1990s. Average annual growth rates of exports of manufactured goods also declined, from 44.3% for 1975–84 to 30.9% for 1985–89 and to 3.7% for the 1990–2000 decade (Table 6). Moreover, annual average gross national savings as percentage of GDP as well as annual average gross domestic investments as percentage of GDP have declined from 20.6% in 1975–84 to 15.7% in 1985–89 and to 12.8% in 1990–2000 (Table 6). Average annual gross domestic investments as percentage of GDP for the 1985–2000 period are also lower than the pre-1984 years (Table 6). The ratio of private investments to public investments, however, has increased since the early 1990s (Artadi and Sala-i-Martin 2003), suggesting a modest shift in the balance of power between the state and a small capitalist class.

A number of factors have contributed to the stagnation of Africa's industry. Loss of market share to more established external competitors is one factor. The failure of globalization mechanisms to address some of the serious external constraints that African economies face is another factor. Among such constraints are Africa's limited access to the markets of developed countries, paltry foreign investment flows to Africa, and the continent's persistent unfavorable terms of trade, which have declined from 0.6 for the

1974–84 period to –3.8 for the 1985–89 years and to –0.5 for 1990–2000 (World Bank 2002).

Table 5: Value added in industry and manufacturing (% of GDP)

Country	Industry			Manufacturing		
	1990	1999	Change	1990	1999	Change
Angola	41	77	36.0	5	4	-1.0
Benin	13	14	1.0	8	8	0.0
Botswana	56	45	-11.0	5	5	0.0
Burkina Faso	22	28	6.0	16	12	-4.0
Burundi	19	17	-2.0	13	9	-4.0
Cameroon	29	19	-10.0	15	10	-5.0
Central African Rep.	20	20	0.0	11	9	-2.0
Chad	18	15	-3.0	14	12	-2.0
Congo Dem. Rep.	28	17	-11.0	11	—	—
Congo	41	49	8.0	8	7	-1.0
Côte d'Ivoire	23	26	3.0	21	21	0.0
Ethiopia	13	11	-2.0	8	7	-1.0
Gabon	43	41	-2.0	6	5	-1.0
Ghana	17	25	8.0	10	9	-1.0
Kenya	19	16	-3.0	12	11	-1.0
Madagascar	14	14	0.0	12	11	-1.0
Malawi	29	18	-11.0	19	14	-5.0
Mali	16	17	1.0	9	4	-5.0
Mozambique	18	25	7.0	10	13	3.0
Niger	16	17	1.0	7	6	-1.0
Nigeria	41	33	-8.0	6	5	-1.0
Rwanda	25	20	-5.0	19	12	-7.0
Senegal	19	26	7.0	13	17	4.0
Sierra Leone	20	27	7.0	4	4	0.0
South Africa	40	32	-8.0	24	19	-5.0
Tanzania	18	15	-3.0	9	7	-2.0
Togo	23	21	-2.0	10	9	-1.0
Uganda	11	18	7.0	6	9	3.0
Zambia	49	24	-25.0	14	12	-2.0
Zimbabwe	33	25	-8.0	23	17	-6.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	34	29	-5.0	17	16	-1.0

Source: World Bank, 2001, *World Development Indicators 2001*, Washington, DC: World Bank.

The ever increasing debt burden is another factor, although recent donor agreements on debt relief for the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) may help some beneficiaries of the program. Sub-Saharan Africa's total external debt service payments (long-term loans and IMF credit) averaged \$11,643 million annually for the years 1990–2000. As Tshibaka (2003) notes, external factors play a significant, if not a leading, role in constraining the growth of African economies. The globalizing mechanisms, however, provide no protection from the external factors. By imposing unqualified openness on them, they are, in fact, likely to exacerbate the vulnerability of the continent's economies. In any case, neither Africa's agriculture nor its industry has responded positively to liberalization of trade, largely relegating the continent's production system to its traditional export of primary commodities. Improving commodity prices in recent years may improve growth rates of resource rich African countries. There is, however, little indication that such growth will be utilized to address poverty or to diversify the economy.

Table 6: Selected indicators of African economies

Indicators	1975–84	1985–89	1990–2000
Average annual % growth of value added in industry	2.2	1.7	1.3
Average annual % growth of value added in services	3.1	2.5	2.4
Average annual % growth of exports of manufactured goods	44.3	30.9	3.7
Average annual % of growth of export unit values	6.0	3.6	-0.5
Average annual % growth of export of goods and non-factor services (real)	0.9	2.7	4.4
Average annual gross domestic investment as % of GDP	20.8	15.3	16.7
Annual average gross national savings as % of GDP	20.6	15.7	12.8
Terms of trade	0.6	-3.8	-0.5
Total external debt service payments in \$ millions current prices	4,649	9,116	11,643

Source: The World Bank, 2002, *World Development Indicators 2001*, Washington, DC, World Bank.

Institutions of democratic governance

A more direct indicator of changes in state–society relations and in the level of influence of society on policy would be the development of a democratic system of governance that allows genuine representation of the general population in decision-making and allows the coordination of policy with broad social interests. Democratic regimes generally choose policies that are more favorable to the poor than undemocratic regimes (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2003: 2). The influence of the general population in the ballot box through their numbers is likely to influence policy-makers in a democratic system to pay more attention to the needs and interests of the poor and the general population.

Proponents have credited globalization for the rapid spread of democracy worldwide. Most African countries, like many others in the poor regions of the world, have allowed modest freedoms of the press and allowed the establishment of multiparty political systems, partly through home-grown pressure, perhaps bolstered by the demonstration effect of democratization elsewhere in the world. Political conditionalities imposed by donors, who consider political liberalization essential for sustaining a functioning market system, are also factors contributing to political liberalization in the continent. Although often marred by irregularities, elections are now regularly conducted in most African countries. However, the data on the other indicators, such as poverty, do not show that democratization has shifted policy in favor of the population in Africa. In other words, the political liberalization measures, such as the institution of multiparty systems, elections, and relative freedom of the press have not yet translated into notable changes in public policy. Economic policies of regimes that came to power through election, such as those in Zambia, Kenya, and Malawi have also changed little from those of the regimes they replaced. In many countries the political reforms have also not been accompanied by independence of the judiciary, without which the rule of law cannot be firmly established.

As a result, some have viewed the democratization process in Africa as ‘sham’ largely undertaken by African leaders in order to meet the requirements of donors (Economist 2000). This view, however, tends to neglect the role of internal struggle for democratization that has taken place throughout the continent. The political reforms have also not been totally inconsequential. In several countries, including Senegal, Zambia, Ghana, Malawi, and Kenya, elections have resulted in regime changes. The political freedoms associated with such changes are also invaluable in themselves. Moreover, the political systems in several African countries, including South Africa, Botswana,

Mauritius, Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana, Mali, Benin, and Senegal can no longer be characterized as patrimonial or clientelist.

It is also possible that the political liberalization that has taken place can lead to conditions suitable for peaceful social struggle for policy coordination with broad social interest over time. Such an optimistic scenario is not very likely, however, given the contradictory impacts of globalization on democratization. Coordination of policy with broad social interests under a democratic system requires policy independence. By contrast globalization, as a development path imposed by the global hegemony, is inherently against policy independence. A report by the Copenhagen-based Centre for Development Research (1995: 66–7; Olukoshi 2003), for instance, notes that Structural Adjustment Programs have decreased the capacity of the African state, intensified Africa's aid dependency, and conditioned African societies to operate under an external 'policy command'. Furthermore, by strengthening the power of donor agencies, the transnational capitalist class, and the small local capitalist class over the rest of society, globalization weakens the forces of democracy that would coordinate policy with broad social interest. Globalization, thus, promotes democratization without self-determination in policy-making. A major risk of such deformed democratization is that African societies may lose confidence in the democratic system of governance and become more volatile and violent. A number of studies have emerged claiming that globalization reduces civil strife (Indra de Soysa 2001; Busmann and Schneider 2003). African realities hardly support such claims as the occurrence of conflicts in the continent has risen since the early 1990s (Adedeji 1999; Newbury 2002; Human Security Center 2005).

Conclusion

The principal goal of the paper was to examine if globalization shifts the balance of power between the state and society in favor of society sufficiently to bring about the coordination of policy with broad social interests. Our analysis suggests that the impacts of globalization on state–society relations in Africa have been at best paradoxical. Two noteworthy changes have taken place with globalization. One is a relative strengthening of the private sector compared to the public sector. As noted earlier, the increase in the ratio of private investments to total investments at the expense of public investments suggests such a shift. If this shift continues, it may provide a segment of civil society, the capitalist class, an economic basis that would allow it to bolster its influence relative to the state as well as the rest of society. Such a development, in turn, may lead to some level of political pluralism. The second related development is the spread of some of the formal institutions of de-

mocracy. However, as Sklar (1996: 39) notes, democracy implies the public management and nurture of markets so that they flourish with affordable fairness in the distribution of opportunities, services, and wealth. Democracy is expected to bring about such management of markets because it entails the empowerment of society at large to influence policy on access to social services and productive assets. Contrary to such expectations, the spread of the formal institutions of democracy has not narrowed the discrepancy between policy and social interests in the African case.

Political pluralism and freedoms of organization and press as ends in themselves are, of course, invaluable, even when not accompanied by the coordination of policy with social interests. A state that provides such liberties, as limited as they are, would be preferable over one that is repressive and authoritarian and does not coordinate resources with social interests. It is also possible that along with the expansion of the private sector of the economy the adoption of the institutions of democratic governance would gradually lead to the empowerment of civil society. The competition among political parties in conjunction with a freer press can, for example, lead to the expansion of political and economic space for civil society beyond the small capitalist class. This, in turn, may allow different civil society organizations to struggle through legal means for the narrowing of the gap between policy and social interests.

However, globalization has promoted two counter developments that may negate such possibilities. One development that undermines popular influence on policy is the external control of policy-making manifested by the conditionalities imposed on African states by the international financial institutions and donor countries. The conditionalities limit the sovereignty of African societies over development policy in general and public policy in particular. Another development is the shift in the balance of power within civil society in favor of a small capitalist class that can easily ally itself with the ruling elite and the external agents of globalization. Such a shift in the balance of power is not very likely to allow the development of popular democracy in which society at large would have a significant influence on policy. Globalization, under these conditions, is unlikely to facilitate the reconstitution of the African state or improve the coordination of policy with broad social interests. It is also likely that failure to bring about coordination of policy with broad social interests may exacerbate social unrest and political instability, which are capable of undermining both democratization and development.

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Traditional Authority at the Crossroads of Governance in Republican Cameroon

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Abstract

The study shows that traditional authority is indeed at the crossroads of governance in republican Cameroon. The citizen is bound by both modern law and traditional values; even if political theorists and leaders of republican institutions take objection to certain traditional values and seem to find difficulty over whether/how to formally integrate traditional authorities into the realm of the republic. Traditional authority incarnates a reassuring institutional stability and certainty to the masses, which elected officers (who come and go) do not provide in republican institutions. The vast majority of the population feels distant from the concept of 'republic' at grassroots level, where traditional authority remains the *de facto* institution of local governance. Based on empirical findings that highlight the important role that traditional authorities play in local development, the paper submits that traditional authorities should be formally integrated into the republican institutional setting by effectively constituting the first level of decentralized institutions of governance.

Résumé

L'étude montre que l'autorité traditionnelle est véritablement à la croisée des chemins de la gouvernance au Cameroun républicain. Le citoyen est interpellé aussi bien par la loi moderne que par les valeurs traditionnelles ; même si les théoriciens politiques et les responsables des institutions républicaines émettent des objections à l'encontre de certaines valeurs traditionnelles et semblent avoir des difficultés à admettre la question de savoir s'il faut et comment intégrer de manière formelle les autorités traditionnelles dans le sphère de la république.

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L'autorité traditionnelle incarne une stabilité institutionnelle rassurante et une certaine constance aux yeux des populations, ce que les officiels élus (qui vont et viennent), ne parviennent pas à assurer dans les institutions républicaines. La grande majorité de la population se sent très éloignée du concept de la 'république' au niveau des masses où l'autorité traditionnelle demeure, *de facto*, l'institution chargée de la gouvernance locale. Se fondant sur des résultats empiriques qui mettent en exergue le rôle important que les autorités traditionnelles jouent dans le cadre du développement local, le document soutient que ces dernières devraient être formellement intégrées dans l'arène institutionnelle républicaine, constituant ainsi de façon effective le premier échelon d'institutions décentralisées de la gouvernance.

Introduction

With the end of the Cold War, 'governance' for the first time prominently overshadowed democracy in international development, academic and policy discourse. Development assistance is increasingly made conditional upon fundamental reforms in line with donor perception of 'good governance'. Governance is indispensable in enhancing the effectiveness of government operations and in stimulating private investment and, therefore, growth. In African society governance is mirrored by at least three blocs of institutions: the traditional, religious and republican (Elong Mbassi 1994: 15). Collectively these stakeholders, the republic (or republican institutions), religion and traditional authority, ensure governance. Unlike the democratic agenda, which excludes some actors on the grounds of principle, governance theory is inclusive of all stakeholders (UNDP 1995, 1997). When in the late 1980s and early 1990s, international development discourse predicated development on democracy, the undemocratic tenets of traditional authority were highlighted as the reason for their being sidelined by modern institutions. This came to add to the ravages that had been dealt to this institution by colonization and postcolonial strategies in favour of institutional hegemonization built around republican values. The consequence of this was the clear 'creation of two publics' (Ekeh 1977), 'as one of the lasting legacies of colonialism' (Osaghae 2006: 237), and the laying of the foundation for 'citizen and subject' (Mamdani 1996). Applying republican principles, there would be elections that result in a winner who represents citizens (the civic public) in civil society and dominates subjects through the appointment of traditional authorities (the primordial public). At the dawn of the new millennium and with the accent of policy discourse on governance, one key pro-active issue was the identification of actors in the governance process to include (even if generally characterized with civil society), traditional authority. The relevance of this topic, therefore, arises from the apparent interest manifested by the

government of Cameroon itself, in the adoption of a National Governance Programme in 1998.

Traditional authority predates colonization. At independence it has imaged itself as a 'symbol of tradition' while at the same time striving to serve as an agency for 'modern projects' (Geschiere 1993: 152). The postcolonial difficulties and mutations of traditional authorities or chiefdoms have indeed constituted the subject of vast scholarly interest, and traditional authorities have in the process served diverse purposes. By indirect rule, for example, the British sought to borrow legitimacy from traditional authorities for the implementation colonial policies (Jua 1995: 41, 43). Again, chiefs appointed as Native Authorities in the Bamenda region of Cameroon were empowered to collect tax revenue within their jurisdictions for expenditure by colonial masters, and, on their advice and under section 40 of the Federal Constitution of Cameroon of 1961, they were constituted into the now-disbanded House of Chiefs (Jua 1995: 39). With the advent of democracy, traditional authorities have served as 'vote banks', especially in one-party states (Fisiy 1995; Nyamnjoh 2002) and as members of the 'Land Commission' on the strength of section 12 of Decree No 76-166 (27 April 1976) establishing terms and conditions for the management of national lands.

Modernization theorists in the decades following the Second World War predicted that traditional authority would soon become outmoded and be replaced by 'bureaucratic offices and institutions' (see, for example, Balander 1972: 159ff.; Warnier 1993: 318; Harniet-Sievers 1998: 57; Kamto 1999: 201). Other social scientists have, on the contrary, praised its remarkable powers of survival (Fisiy 1995: 50), and as 'a dynamic institution, constantly re-inventing itself to accommodate and be accommodated by new exigencies' (Nyamnjoh 2002: 8). Scholars are of the view that in the governance era, 'the level of power the chiefs can exercise will be determined by their level of collaboration with those who hold the reigns of power – the state elite' (Fisiy 1995: 59), and by 'anticipation of or failure to attract state-driven development efforts in their chiefdoms' (Nyamnjoh 2002: 6).

Based on the submission that traditional authorities are stakeholders in the governance process, this paper departs from the sterile debate of traditional authority as a dying institution (or not) to propose that it exposes the positive role that traditional authorities today play in development as institutions, which justifies their integration into republican institutions rather than being left on the periphery.

In Cameroon today, traditional authority is exercised at the grassroots level and is governed by decree No. 77/245 of 15 July 1977 organizing the chiefdoms. This has not always been so. Prior to independence, the present Cameroon was made up of centralized societies in especially the grassfields

(such as Bamenda and the present Northern provinces) and acephalous groupings in the southern part of the country. In fact, powerful and centralized chiefdoms (traditional authority) in the Bamenda region of Cameroon date back over 400 years (Nyamnjoh 2002). These were not dismantled by the British colonial policy of indirect rule. By contrast, in the segmentary southern half of the Cameroonian territory, a region without a tradition of central government, the French colonial masters created 'warrant chiefs' (Le Vine 1964; Gardinier 1963) and sought to reform it (Le Vine 1964: 97–8) by Order No. 224 of 4 February 1933 defining the status of indigenous chiefs. Though the earlier cited 1977 postcolonial decree is said to mark 'the gradual bureaucratization of the institution of chieftaincy' (Fisiy 1995: 59), it is significant that today all traditional authority in Cameroon is subject to uniform legislation. Especially, it is submitted that this 'uniformization' renders findings of studies on traditional authorities in centralized chiefdoms useful to the same authorities created by law in the acephalous parts. Cameroon has, however, been undergoing institutional reform since Law No. 96/06 of January 1996 introducing the new Constitution. In its section 55, the latter Constitution ushered in decentralization whereby the decentralized authorities would be regions and councils. The latter structures are mainly charged with the task of local development under section 4(1) of Law No. 2004/17 of 22 July 2004 on the Orientation of Decentralization. The constitutional provision is silent on any consideration of traditional authorities (organized by law) as decentralized bodies. Also, traditional authorities do not formally constitute part of the deconcentrated institutions of the republican administrative machine that is made up of divisions and subdivisions. They simply are 'traditional authorities', albeit stakeholders in governance.

Methodology

The analysis is descriptive. Primary data is drawn from a pilot study conducted in the first quarter of 2007. Secondary data is based on a review of the works of social scientists, and the examination of the laws on traditional authorities in Cameroon. The primary data was collected through a questionnaire survey of 100 persons of both sexes aged 20–79 in the Tubah Municipality in the North West Province of Cameroon.

This region of Tubah, although neither very cosmopolitan nor multi-ethnic, can be considered a microcosm of the nation. It is a microcosm in the sense that key actors in development and leadership here epitomize the changing dynamics of the nation. Traditional authority is present albeit centralized. A local council that constitutes the decentralized modern authority is present. Nevertheless, unlike former times when the latter had no direct responsibility for local development, the law now endows them with the said duty. To

complicate matters, councillors are largely retired civil servants who have spent the most of their working lives out of the area. They need to connect to effective local power to carry out meaningful developmental change. They need the clout of local authorities for them to use their knowledge of republican values to effect change at grassroots level.

Respondent groups involved in the study were split into modern authorities (councillors and members of parliament), traditional authorities and commoners. Of these 51% were male and 49% female; all of them were indigenes. Of the commoners, 44% had no formal education while 56% had at least primary education. Determination of who participated in the survey was through a structured sample to ensure proper representation. The purpose was to elicit and determine through the collected data whether there is a nexus between governance and traditional authority within a republican framework. Information was therefore gathered from the target groups in the sample with emphasis on the role of traditional authority as perceived and lived by modern authorities, commoners and traditional authorities themselves through questions touching on their job description, the place of traditional authorities in their activities, issues over which modern authorities consult traditional authorities, and whether this consultation is mandatory or discretionary. Questions were also asked about the nature of the relationship between modern and traditional authorities and whether this enhanced or hampered their work for development, and if modern and traditional authorities could and should co-exist. Secondary data was collected through documentary research, which sought to highlight whether/how and if at all traditional authority is integrated in the governance machine of the republic, considering the role of the former in the life and essence of the latter.

The concepts of 'republic', 'governance' and 'traditional authority' are central to the analysis. 'Governance' is a commonly used word but it has been described as a 'plastic' concept (Jenkins 2002) because it is complex and difficult to define. 'The republic is a vision, a conception of the world, where the people – and no more the king – are sovereign' (Kamto 1999: 181). 'Traditional authority' is subject to diverse definitions. It might therefore be useful to briefly circumscribe the conceptual framework on which the paper builds before reverting to empirical findings that buttress its argument.

Conceptual framework

Traditional authority

Chambers Twentieth Century English Dictionary defines the noun 'tradition' as handing over, oral transmission from generation to generation, anything bound up with or continuing in the life of a family or community etc. It

defines an 'authority' as 'a person or body holding power or right, permission derived from office or character' More specifically, according to *Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary* (1976: 40), 'authority is a body charged with power and duty of exercising prescribed functions'. Traditional authority as such refers to an institution or power that is received and handed down or over from generation to generation. It is arguable, however that this definition captures the current meaning of those two words because in Cameroon traditional authorities must also have the benediction of public authority to legally wield power, right and prescribed functions.

Max Weber (Extracts: 328) perceives traditional authority from the perspective of legitimacy; whereby acceptance of the right to rule is based on tradition or custom. To some scholars, 'traditional authority' is synonymous with traditional chiefdom/rulership. These experts argue that the adjective 'traditional' should not be understood as hitherto defined because, it was used by colonial masters to contrast with the modern powers that they represented. Its connotation is therefore, denigrating. For example, Joseph Mbouï¹ states that 'the use of the term "chief" (authority) instead of "king" by the colonial masters was meant to denigrate African rulers'. Crowther and Ikime (1970: 9) also assert that the word 'chief was a distinctive diminutive colonial term meant to reduce the status of great African Kings like the Obase of Benin, who in colonial times considered themselves and were considered by their people as "Kings"'.

For the purposes of this study, traditional authority whether created by law, in centralized or in segmentary societies, is a power, or permission, an institution that draws its legitimacy, whether wholly or partially, from tribal/ethnic/cultural values of a group of people (wherever they may be) that share them. Traditional authority therefore contrasts with that based on republican values of accession to power by, say, the application of a constitution, which, for example, embraces democratic principles. The republican mode enables the creation of powers and institutions for which accountability is owed to the electorate, unlike the traditional ruler who is largely accountable to a traditional council of notables and to his subjects. It has to be understood that this dichotomy results from migration and interaction of people of various ethnic backgrounds who have to live together in a common geographical environment.

The republic is a vision of the world

A republic is not a particular form of government. Political theorists, both ancient and modern, are of the opinion that 'republic' refers to what ought to be the character and business of government. According to Thomas Paine (1792: 88), 'It is wholly characteristic of the purport, matter or object for

which government ought to be instituted, and on which it is to be employed, *Res-Publica*, the public affairs, or the public good; or, literally translated, the public thing.' 'Republic' is 'naturally opposed to the word monarchy, which has a base original signification. It means arbitrary power in an individual person; in the exercise of which, himself, and not the res-publica, is the object.'² In American constitutional theory, James Madison (1787) states that the republic is a political regime or form of government, 'in which the scheme of representation takes place'. To the French constitutional theorist Benjamin Constant, 'all governments – constitutional monarchy, republic or empire – are acceptable so long as they respect fundamental rights'.³ Maximillien Robespierre (1791) is of the view that 'the republic is any state governed by law without any form of administration for it to be, because the public interest simply governs'.⁴

Modern academic writing on 'the republic' generally highlights the non-hereditary character of the head of state, representation – of sovereign people – and the fact that the latter is the very essence that enhances and ensures the common good that is the end of power. To the Roman political theorist, Slim Lagmani (1994),⁵ the election of those who govern is the sole mode of designation that gives meaning to sovereignty of the people, enabling the realization of the end of politics: the common good. The republic, in one breath, apparently is the state, system of government and mode of designation of the head of state.

The modern republic is therefore one that has the public interest as a core value, with others being liberty, sovereignty, representation, equality of all before the law, separation of powers – state/religion, citizenship referring to the holder of rights and obligations. In theory, therefore, every government that does not act on the principle of a republic or, in other words, that does not make the *res-publica* its whole and sole object, is not a good government. Republican government is no other than government established and conducted for the interest of the public, as well individually as collectively. In fact, Thomas Paine (1792: 88) asserts that it is not necessarily connected with any particular form, but it most naturally associates with the representative form, as being best calculated to secure the end for which a nation is at the expense of supporting it.

The African republic is a particular case, owing to African nations being at the crossroads of cultures and values that are African and yet must stay abreast with modern as well as universal political cultures. Against a republic nurtured by an ethic as is the case in the West, African republics have to reconcile their multiple cultures and ethnicities (on which patterns of the exercise of power in Africa are built) with the universal political values of developed nations. This disfigures the classical republican concept to the

extent that it is now argued by Kamto (1999: 201) that African cultural values be severed from republican precepts because

the republic is political whereas ethnicity is socio-cultural and historic ... African monarchies/traditional authorities have only survived by becoming a place of cultural reference, identity assembly points or structures of its members ... Traditional authority is condemned to disappear ...

As concerns Cameroon, it is difficult not to take objection to Kamto here. For one thing, the roots of traditional authority are generally ethnic and/or cultural, and do not dilute the fact that 'authority' has to do with power and therefore is unavoidably 'political'. Secondly, the end of traditional authority is the 'public good' as *res publica* means. In the centralized societies of the grassfields of Cameroon, traditional authority has survived colonial and postcolonial attempts to relegate it to the pile of dead institutions because it plays a positive role in governance. In a nation that is essentially a collection of ethnic groups, traditional authority is the foundation of governance to most people.

It must further be clear here that the analysis has evolved to a perception and acceptance that African political and governance institutions are alive and with us. The question hence is and should be whether, and by how much, they serve the public good.

Governance is the manner in which power is exercised for development

The market-oriented view, championed by the World Bank (1992), is to the effect that governance refers to 'the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development'. Policy advisers and specialist institutions often use governance as a qualitative term for describing the administrative effectiveness and efficiency of state institutions (Beall 2005). Similar views of governance have been expressed by UN ESCAP (2004), that governance is 'the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)' (UNDP 1995 1997), that governance is 'the set of values, policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic, political and social affairs through interactions among the government, civil society and private sector'. UNDP also defines governance as the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country's affairs at all levels. For USAID, governance is 'the effective management of public affairs through the generation of a regime (set of rules) accepted as legitimate, for the purpose of promoting and enhancing societal values sought by individuals and groups' (Hyden et al. 2005).

Added to this multitude of governance systems is the notion of ‘good governance’, which now is a general guiding principle for major donor agencies in the distribution of development and relief assistance. UNDP defines good governance as governance that is effective, participatory, transparent, accountable, equitable and promotes the rule of law. Particularly important in the context of countries that are institutionally weak is the fact that UNDP’s definition of good governance encompasses not just the state but the private sector and civil society as well. All three are viewed as critical for sustainable human development. The role of the state is viewed as that of creating a stable political and legal environment conducive to sustained development, while civil society institutions and organizations are viewed as a means of facilitating political and social interaction and mobilizing groups to participate in economic, social and political activities.

The World Bank describes good governance as ‘central to creating and sustaining an environment which fosters strong and equitable development, and is an essential complement to sound economic policies’ (World Bank 1992). Good governance is ‘epitomized by predictable, open, and enlightened policy making (that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law’ (World Bank 1994). This rather normative concept identified a group of policy ideas that were seen as a model for effective economic and political management (Beall 2005). It includes characteristics such as: participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency. Good governance is in general a highly technical and institutionally orientated approach towards governance that owes more to public administration and management than it does to political theory.⁶

Policy literature concerned with local governance is mainly focused on the theme of decentralization. It is seen as an important component of the good governance model, and it serves as the dominant overarching analytical and policy framework towards local governance. The concept of decentralization refers to the general process of ‘transferring political and administrative authority to sub-national government bodies’ (Sisk et al. 2001). Political science theorists have differentiated four major types of decentralization: deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatization, all referring to deferent levels of power and resource transfers (Cheema et al. 1983). It is believed that this type of government can improve governance by fostering accountability, transparency, efficiency, improved service delivery and popular participation (Martinussen 1997).

Governance is also a way in which power relations are structured in society

The society-oriented thinking on governance has largely been concerned with developing a better analysis and understanding of the different state/society relations. Governance is not seen as a set of technical functions but as a way in which power and authority relations are structured in various societal contexts (Doornbos 2001). Society-oriented theorists like Jenkins (2002) are of the view that governance refers to the 'prevailing patterns of the exercise of power in a given society'.

Peter Evans et al. (1985) emphasized the state's autonomous position in society and its central and powerful role in shaping people's behaviour. Joel S. Migdal (1988, 2001), however, challenges the forgoing state-centred view, noting that states have been in general successful in penetrating society but failed in effectively changing population's behaviour and regulating social relations. For example, the present pilot study demonstrates that the citizen in Cameroon out of fear in one case or willingly in the other, subjects himself to two types of orders: modern and traditional. To understand this, it is important to acknowledge that states have an impact on societies, and societies also impact on states.

The governance premise that underlies the present analysis is that of a traditional authority of centralized society origins (or not) with a common culture and ethnicity as its basis. It is a legitimate model of the exercise of power at grassroots level at the service of the people. In modern terms, traditional authority in this paper is a model that combines both the market-oriented definition (with the efficiency and efficacy connotations included and subsumed in good governance) and its society-oriented meaning (i.e. traditional authority is an integral part of institutions that regulate social relations). These connotations are highlighted by the findings of the pilot study, which make the case for formally involving traditional authority in the management of the affairs of the republic. Traditional authority, like republican authority, serves the common good. The law half-heartedly organizes and endows traditional authority with roles (as the role/legal framework shows); yet traditional authority seems to be unavoidable in matters of effective local development.

Role/legal framework of traditional authority

The legal framework is set by the earlier-cited decree of 1977, which recognizes and assigns roles to traditional authority. Yet academics and the Cameroonian legislator are at odds with each other as to the role of traditional authority today. Academics see the role as a negligible one. To Nack Mback

(2000: 84), 'traditional institutions have lost their role as a check on the powers of modern institutions and have been relegated to the rank of mere consultative organs'. Traditional authorities, to Kamto, are 'a place of cultural reference: structures where members gather together to project a common identity. Traditional authority is condemned to disappear by obliteration as was the case with Sekou Touré's Guinea should it engage in political competition or power play with the State' Kamto (1999: 201). To the legislator however, traditional authorities have a role that surpasses that of a mere 'place of cultural reference'. Chiefs are organized into and identified with 'territory', and traditional authorities are 'auxiliaries of the administration'.

Chiefs are organized into and identified with territory

The 1977 decree organizes traditional chiefdoms on a territorial basis following a pyramid of three, the highest of which is the First Class chiefdom. This legal instrument represents a verbatim taking over (Nkwi 1976, 1979; Nyamnjoh 1985; Mouiche 1992, 1997) of legislation on the same subject under French colonial administration (Order No. 224 of 4 February 1933 defining the status of indigenous chiefs).⁷ The First Class chiefdom is one whose area of jurisdiction covers at least two Second Class chiefdoms and its territorial boundaries do not in principle exceed those of a division. A Second Class chiefdom has jurisdiction over at least two Third Class chiefs with boundaries that must not exceed those of a sub-division. A Third Class chiefdom corresponds to a village or a neighbourhood in rural areas and in urban areas. It has been suggested that the legislator's attempted attachment of traditional rulers to 'territory' is intended to confine the ambit of their powers to subjects in identifiable and predefined geographical areas (Nack Mback 2000: 84).

The attachment of traditional authority to 'territory' is intriguing when considered within the context of decentralization and the effective governance role that these authorities play. Most specifically, the decree would seem to be out of sync with the ambit and the realities of the exercise of traditional authority. First, in the grasslands of the English-speaking provinces of Cameroon, for example, traditional authorities were Fondoms (chiefdoms). These Fondoms still exist today. The Fon is the paramount head of a community of values, customs and of a shared history with others (wherever they may be) in spite of the subjects being part of a nation. Territorialization of fondoms seems to smack of a misunderstanding of the ambit of the powers that traditional authorities wield over their subjects. The authority of the Fon is not limited to the 'territory' where his throne is found or where the majority of his subjects live. The Fon's authority pursues his subjects wherever they may be!

Moreover, recent institutional reform (as recorded by the Constitution of 1996⁷) does not repeal the 1977 decree organizing chiefdoms. Under section 1(2) of the Constitution of 1996, Cameroon is a unitary decentralized State made up of administrative units that are deconcentrated into divisions, subdivisions and districts at grassroots level and of local authorities that are decentralized into regions and councils (section 55). So, though the decree of 1977 attaches traditional authority to 'territory' and the latter are considered prior to 1996 as 'auxiliaries of the administration', it would appear that after that date, they are neither obvious decentralized institutions of local governance nor are they formal arms of deconcentrated administrative units. So the apparently flawed 1977 organization of chiefdoms by 'territory' remains.

It is submitted that if 'territorializing' traditional authority to a community was a deliberate attempt by the legislator to confine these authorities to identifiable and predefined geographical areas, the attempt failed because the authority of chiefs is extraterritorial, by mere dint of the fact that the said authority attaches to his subjects wherever they may be. It is now arguable that it might have been an appreciation of the extraterritoriality of the tentacles of power of traditional authority that put off the legislator from regulating it at all in the Constitution of 1996 and formally bringing it within the realm of modern institutions of governance – thus neither killing traditional authorities as institutions nor reforming them. Yet traditional authorities still exercise the governance roles they were cast into by the decree of 1977.

Accession to traditional authority is hereditary

The decree of 1977 is to the effect that: 'Chiefs are in principle chosen from among families called upon to exercise traditional customary authority' (section 8 of 1977 decree). By this provision too, candidates must *inter alia* 'as far as possible, know how to read and write'. As in other African countries such as Mali (Beridogo 1997), the latter requirement has the implicit effect of modernizing and widening the circle of those who are eligible to accede to power under an otherwise hereditary method of succession. The choice of the successor from the candidates presented is made by the modern administrative authority responsible for the 'territory' concerned. The said choice is made after 'mandatorily' consulting with the competent Council of Elders (known as the *Kwihfoyn* in Tubah and Kom, *kwifo* ' in Bafut, *Ngumba* in Bali, or *Ngwerong* in Nso) in a public meeting presided over by the competent administrative official (sections 11, 12). In the case of a First Class Chief, the eventual appointment is made by the Prime Minister and by the Minister in charge of traditional authorities in the case of a Second Class Chief. The competent senior divisional officer appoints Third Class Chiefs (section 15).

Petitions against the choice and appointment of a traditional ruler are addressed to and heard by the authority vested with the power to appoint. The latter has the last say in the matter (section 16 (1)).

Against this provision, respondents to the pilot study charged that one major weakness of Cameroonian republican institutions today is the absence or ineffectiveness of its instruments of accountability: 'why endow this official with final powers of appointment when the efficacy and accountability of his institution is questionable and blamed for graft?' they ask. But Ekeh (1975: 100) rationalizes this trend when he states that the

native sector has become a primordial reservoir of *moral* obligations, a public entity which one works to preserve and benefit. The Westernized sector has become an *amoral* civic public from which one seeks to gain, if possible in order to benefit the moral or primordial public.

Nevertheless, it is significant that today, both the Council of Elders who indeed are the custodians of local laws and customs (subjects who are said to master the instruments of local governance) and republican administrative authorities are involved in the appointment of the traditional authority.

The hereditary nature of accession to traditional authority does not augur well for the republican values of governance whereby, under the preamble of the 1996 Constitution, 'all men are born equal without distinction of race, religion, and sex and are endowed with inalienable rights' and as such, accession to power is via democratic elections. This view is buttressed by political theory. Thomas Paine (1782: 86), states that 'The hereditary system is as repugnant to human wisdom as to human rights, and is as absurd as it is unjust.' Nevertheless, 91% of commoners involved in this study state that succession to the throne is and should remain the prerogative of the ruling family 'because custom says so'.

The Cameroonian legislator and the executive have both attempted to bring traditional authority into the realm of republican institutions. First, Parliament has demonstrated a desire to maintain the status, for the time being, of traditional authorities – in spite of the need to modernize. In matters of legislation concerning traditional authorities, members of Parliament were issued with a directive (Cameroon National Assembly Report 1979), that: 'caution be exercised so that Western ideas are not superimposed hastily in this very sensitive area where ... customs are still very rich and varied'.⁸ This Legislative caution does not, however, mean that the Cameroonian Executive approves of the hereditary nature of traditional power. In a bill tabled by the government before parliament in 1979, the Executive argued that 'traditional chieftaincy is now a public institution ... and as such must not be handed down by a will'.⁹

Administrative authority and the Council of Elders choose traditional rulers

The Council of Elders is usually made up of subjects of integrity and objectivity who have distinguished themselves in one way or another and have been recognized as such by the traditional ruler. Respondents state that access to the Council of Elders is also in 22% of the cases by inheritance, while about 50% are appointed by the traditional ruler after consultation with the subjects and reigning members of the Council of Elders, the *Kwihfoyn*. Tradition has it that the successor to the throne had to be groomed in the tools of governance by members of the Council of Elders for upwards of nine months. Respondents in the study indicated that during this grooming period, the chief is acquainted with the type of issues the ruler will be called upon to handle: 79% of them having to do with land/farmer grazier problems, 9% probate, 7% witchcraft etc. A near-unanimous 97% of respondents state that the chief is effectively answerable and accountable to the Council. If the appointed successor was too young to rule, he was assisted by a trusted member of the Council (backed by his peers) who at all times will edify him on all sides of each issue before suggesting a decision, which the ruler would then take in his name. Moreover, respondents state that the Council, with the traditional ruler, provide representation and are an embodiment of stability, which reassures the people of the future peace of the locality. As a matter of fact, respondents here state that 79% of successors to the throne were chosen by the deceased/last traditional ruler.

On the other side of these elders is the representative of modern authorities. The latter consults the Council and takes the final decision. Even though this personality may be alien to local laws and customs, appointments that the latter makes that are based on the objective advice of the elders have stood the test of time, and the exercise has marked a good symbiosis between the modern and the traditional working together. There has, however, been social upheaval where chiefs have sought to impose the ruling party's ideology (Fisiy 1995: 59; Jua 1995: 45) or where the voice of the people (as expressed through the Council of Elders) has been ignored.¹⁰

Traditional authorities are 'auxiliaries of the administration'

The 1977 decree empowered traditional authorities as 'auxiliaries of the administration'. If, prior to 1996, it was obvious that traditional authorities were 'auxiliaries of "unitary and centralised administration"', it is not so clear today that local authorities (regions and councils) are also institutions of 'administration', albeit local. Traditional authorities under the law were auxiliaries of the administration of the unitary centralized state that were deconcentrated into provinces, divisions and subdivisions. Ambiguity now is

rife because the territorial scope of the powers of chiefs as organized by the 1977 decree. However, the authority of certain chiefs extends beyond councils, subdivisions, divisions and even provinces. And (as will become obvious subsequently), decentralized modern authorities (incarnated in councillors and members of Parliament), for example, concede that they cannot effectively operate without traditional authorities. Consequently, it is either conceded that the 1977 decree is obsolete or traditional authorities are at the crossroads of modern/local authorities, especially because the Cameroon Constitution of 1996 is silent on the status of traditional authorities.

De jure, the administrative functions performed by traditional authorities essentially have to do with guiding the people. Traditional authorities have the dialogue/communication duty of transmitting directives of administrative authorities to their subjects. They also administer justice according to native laws and customs, where litigation involves subjects of the traditional ruler. In other words, the decree of 1977 (sections 20–21) further empowers traditional authorities with judicial responsibility. Traditional authorities assist in the collection of taxes and fees for the state and local authorities as well as ensure that law and order are respected. Again they are expected to carry out such other duties as are assigned to them by the local administrative authority.

The law therefore implicitly assigns traditional authorities with governance roles. The implications of the exercise of these roles are profound. Subjecting citizens to some other rules than modern law in a republic is implicit concession by republican authorities that the citizen obeys and is bound both by modern law and their native laws and customs (cf. Mamdani 1996). It is difficult to capture the ‘republic’ in Cameroon that is devoid of this reality. So relegating traditional power to the past because of its origins so as to see ‘politics’ and power only from the purview of the West, as Kamto (1999) suggests, is to fatally ignore the context in which the Western pattern of the ‘the republic’ is exercised in Cameroon. The foregoing analysis shows, on the contrary, that traditional authorities serve the common good, *res publica*. The law endows them with roles, as has been seen, and traditional authority seems to be unavoidable in matters of effective local development.

Traditional authority is at the centre of local development

Common interest epitomized in local development seems to be a common denominator of the essence of traditional authority, governance and the republic. ‘Common interest regulates their concerns and forms their laws and the laws which common interest ordains, have a greater influence than the laws of government’ (Paine 1792: 78). Governance is today perceived and understood as fundamentally one of power relations and the different

ways in which power is exercised for development. It is submitted that the common good, which constitutes the essence of the republic, has competence and efficacy as key and is at the centre of the delivery of public services.

Traditional authorities are at the centre of local development and, as such, are educators of the local population on matters of local development. They are advisers of local councils on the priority development problems of the area. So, traditional authority links the local with the national/global and through cooperation and partnership with modern authorities and institutions. Respondents to this study are unanimous that traditional authorities are institutions that serve councils to attain their development objectives. They help identify priority development needs of the people. Indeed, Mayor Muffi of Tubah Municipality, a respondent to the questionnaire survey of this study, stated that the council

cannot reach the people without passing through traditional authority. Councils are modern authorities that must deliver development to the people or be sanctioned by the people. Councils cannot work effectively without the collaboration of the traditional authority.

Other strengths of traditional authority are those of communication for development, sensitization and mobilization of community effort for development after projects have been approved by Parliament. Traditional authorities constitute the most appropriate channel for transmitting information from modern authorities to the villagers, especially because, in the rural setting, the oral culture of communication remains the most reliable and most used. This specificity raises problems of the medium of communication and of the credibility of the communicating authority. First, development information that is destined for the grassroots that passes through traditional authorities permits ownership by the latter. Secondly, this information leaves the palace of the traditional ruler to the people in the local dialect with which the majority of the masses easily identify. This is unlike modern authority that relies on the written medium for communication, which is carried out either in English or in French. Contrary to the thinking of underdevelopment and dependency theorists (like Harneit-Sievers 1998) who doubt the mobilizational potency of traditional authorities, most of the respondents further stated that there was no better way of mobilizing/sensitizing the local population in favour of development than through traditional authority. The latter have authority to order the people to come out and join in development in language that is not alien to the population. Traditional authorities complement rather than compete with modern authorities.

All the councillors and members of Parliament involved in this study state that traditional authority is consulted for the identification of priority development needs of the area. Asked whether modern authorities feel bound by the law to consult and use traditional authorities in matters of development, 82% of them stated that customary law bound them so to do as subjects of the traditional ruler (whose subjects elected the modern authorities into power); 10% stated that they consult and rely on traditional authority for reasons of efficacy, while 8% stated that they did so out of respect because traditional authorities are auxiliaries of the administration.

The foregoing are noble functions that normally should not leave traditional authorities at the crossroads of constitutional reform. The traditional authorities, however, are creating what has been referred to by Onibon et al. (1999) as 'sterile dualism'. The reason is that local authorities, like councils, are, for example, empowered by law with the task of local development but it is not they who are effectively operative either for the state or for local inhabitants. On the other hand, traditional systems remain the frame of reference for rural inhabitants in their day-to-day involvement in national life.

Conclusion: Traditional authority is at the crossroads

Findings of the pilot study are based on traditional authority in centralized society in (a multi-ethnic country that also has traditional authorities created by law to govern in those parts of the nation that are segmentary). Whether centralized or acephalous, what these societies today have in common is the regulation by (and uniformity under the) law of traditional authority. The law endows local councils to take charge of local development. This study shows that traditional authority here is complementary to the modern authority in matters of local governance in the republic in the kind of support they provide to local councils. Without formally integrating traditional authority into the realm of republican institutions, however, legislation only recognizes this by endowing traditional authorities with roles that exemplify the UNDP vision of governance seen earlier. Outstanding in the legislation and pilot study findings are questions of succession, the effectiveness of the Council of Elders as an instrument of accountability in the traditional setting (that republican institutions seem to lack) and the attempted organization of chiefdoms through linkage to territory. These three factors are benchmarks that leave traditional authority at the crossroads of governance in the republic.

First, it is clear that Legislative organisation of traditional authority by territorialization under the 1977 decree seems ill-adapted to the realities of the extraterritoriality of traditional power. As has been demonstrated, traditional authority follows subjects wherever they are because of their ethnic and cultural foundations. Territorialization should therefore be a tool for identifying

the ethnic origins of a people rather than of circumscribing the geographical scope of a traditional ruler's powers. From this perspective, territorialization becomes an inclusive and not a divisive tool of governance within the republic.

Furthermore, current legislation on the method of access to traditional authority seems to be a middle-of-the-road solution. Neither are questions of succession to traditional authority entirely governed by local laws and customs, nor are they by modern law; the situation is an incomplete mix of both with pros and cons. It is submitted that the dispositions governing succession and access to traditional authority constitute a well-intended approach by republican institutions to modernize access to the same. The 'obligatory' consultation of the Council of Elders prior to the appointment of the chief gives representative 'voice' to the people akin to representation under republican values. The problem, however, is that public officials alien to local culture are endowed by the same disposition with the final decision to choose traditional rulers, and the appeals procedure against their decisions seems flawed. This has often given rise to deliberate or fortuitous disrespect for customary and cultural precepts on the subject and in turn provided a perfect recipe for riots.¹¹

Additionally, in the appeals procedure, the official responsible for appointment is both judge and jury, to the exclusion of the Council of Elders who were consulted prior to the appointment. This is even less transparent, especially considering that respondents to the pilot study charge that one major weakness of Cameroonian republican institutions today is the absence or ineffectiveness of its instruments of accountability. It is feared that if present trends continue, traditional authority will eventually reflect the current weaknesses of republican institutions over questions of accountability and graft. Considering the relative advantage of stability and security that traditional authority is said to provide the people as against the republican, it is suggested to leave questions of the mode of accession to traditional power to recognized traditional Council of Elders entirely. Perhaps if traditional authorities per region with common cultures were structured, they could be better arbiters in matters of overseeing questions and problems of succession of their kith and kin than those who are total strangers to the culture.

This study also shows that the public good is a common denominator that underlies governance in the republic and under traditional authority. Under the decentralization laws, local councils have local development as their primary responsibility. Traditional authorities expressly have no place under the decentralization laws. Though qualitative research needs to buttress these quantitative findings irrefutably, the results show that the input of traditional authorities in local development is immensely valuable. Yet the recent

constitutional reform of 1996 is silent on the future role of traditional authorities within the republic, while leaving the patently deficient 1977 decree in place. Colonialism did not wipe out traditional authorities in Cameroon. It is doubtful that republican precepts and democracy are capable of annihilating traditional authority either.

Traditional authority embodies social norms within ethnic communities. Because people who belong to these ethnic groups have internalized the social norms, there is a minimum level of effort in directing development behaviour in these communities. This facilitates good governance. So it is suggested to accommodate traditional institutions formally and most especially in view of the local development role that this study establishes as played by them and perceived and attested by other actors in local development. Traditional authorities should be formally integrated into the republican institutional setting by effectively constituting the first level of decentralized institutions of local governance rather than being left in limbo as is the case now. The laws of the state have to be aligned with social norms to ensure participation by the larger population, and to promote development. Undervaluing the dynamism of social or customary/traditional values in a country with a rich ethnic background like Cameroon has tended to produce undesired outcomes, such as corruption, bad governance, and so on, to the detriment of the development of the nation. A way forward is to formally integrate traditional authorities into republican institutions.

Notes

1. Quoted by Tohnji Sama Walters, thesis, n. 51, p. 4.
2. See also *Les Droits de l'homme* (1791–2) by B. Vincent (reprinted by Presses Universitaires de Nancy), p. 172
3. Benjamin Constant, *Principes applicables a tous les gouvernements* (reprinted by Droz, Geneva, 1980), p. 80 quoted by Kamto. The translation is the author's.
4. Maximilien Robespierre, Discours du 13 juillet 1791, in *Oeuvre*, Vol. II, *Discours*, 2e Partie (Paris, 1962), p. 552. The translation from French to English is the author's.
5. Quoted by Kamto, p. 186.
6. International Crisis Group, Preliminary Report: Governance in post-conflict settings, literature review (March 2006), p. 3 (unpublished).
7. Arrêté No. 224 du 4 février 1933 fixant le statut des chefs indigènes, *Journal Officiel du Cameroun* 1933, p. 92 (updated as at 31 décembre 1950).
8. Cameroon Law No. 96/06 of 18 January 1996.
9. Cameroon National Assembly Report No. 563 of the Second Legislative Period. Legislative Year 1979/80 First Ordinary Session, Report presented on behalf of the Committee on Constitutional Laws, Justice, Legislation and Standing Orders by the Rt Hon. El Hadj Moussa Madi (Member of Parliament) on Bill No. 160/

PJL/AN relating to disputes arising from the appointment of traditional rulers, p. 4.

10. Ibid: p. 3. Author's note: This reasoning is questionable. It gives the impression that these authorities were hitherto not 'public institutions'. It is submitted, however, that the Honourable Minister was by that statement intimating that the introduction of democratic rule after colonization brought traditional authorities into the fold of 'public' institutions of governance.
11. One such example is the recent case of an allegedly appointed and corrupt traditional ruler who died by roasting at the hands of his subjects in 2006 and who was said to be the favourite of republican authorities at the expense of the known and legitimate Crown Prince: 'Mutations' 1779, 10 November 2006, p. 5 'L'analyse: Chefferies en péril'.

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Moderating Poverty: The Role of Remittances from Migration in Botswana

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Abstract

This study examines internal labour migration of Botswana citizens and their remittance behaviour. Though international remittance is among topical global issues, it does not appear to contribute much currently towards national development in Botswana. About twenty-five years ago remittances from internal migration had no impact on poverty. This study indicates that the situation has not changed. The new economic theory of labour migration is addressed within a theoretical framework. From primary data, the level of poverty is measured and factors influencing remittances are examined. Following this is an examination of the impact of remittances on poverty. The results indicate that migrants maintain links with their home-based households through remittances in cash and goods. This is generally done in order to reduce poverty, especially in rural areas. There is considerable variation in the extent to which remittances are appreciated as a reliable means of subsistence in the household. Regression results reveal that economic and social factors are related with remittances from migrants. However, the remittances do not have a significant moderating effect on poverty in Botswana. While female-headed households dominated among those that were transitorily poor, there is no evidence that this is the case among those that lived in extreme poverty. Policy implications are addressed.

Résumé

Cette étude examine la migration interne de travailleurs Botswanais et leurs comportements en matière d'envoi d'argent. Même si les envois de fonds internationaux constituent une question d'actualité à l'échelle mondiale, il est

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impossible de dire qu'ils contribuent actuellement, de façon considérable, au développement national du Botswana. Il y a près de vingt-cinq ans, les envois d'argent effectués par des émigrés sur le plan national n'avaient aucun impact sur la pauvreté. L'étude révèle que la situation n'a pas évolué du tout. La nouvelle théorie économique relative à la migration de la main-d'œuvre est également abordée à partir d'une base théorique dans ce document. À l'aide de données de base primaires, le niveau de la pauvreté est mesuré et les facteurs qui influent sur les envois d'argent sont également examinés. L'auteur s'est également intéressé à l'impact des opérations d'envois d'argent/d'autres colis sur la pauvreté, ce qui a permis de se rendre compte que les immigrants entretiennent leurs liens avec les membres de leur famille restés au pays (d'origine) à l'aide des envois de fonds ou d'autres biens. Ils le font surtout pour aider à lutter contre la pauvreté, notamment en milieu rural. La façon dont les remises de fonds ou d'autres biens sont perçues comme de moyens sûrs de subsistance pour les ménages varie considérablement. Les résultats de régression montrent que des facteurs économiques et sociaux sont liés aux envois effectués par les immigrants. Cependant, les envois ne contribuent pas, de façon considérable, à la réduction de la pauvreté au Botswana. Si le nombre de ménages dirigés par des femmes était plus élevé parmi ceux considérés comme transitoirement pauvres, rien ne prouve que ceci est valable pour les ménages vivant dans une pauvreté extrême. Les implications des politiques sont également traitées dans le document.

Introduction

Increasing attention is being paid to migration as a survival strategy of the poor. But given the effects of globalization and the huge amount of money remitted each year the focus of research has shifted towards the dynamics of poverty and remittances within the framework of international migration. In Botswana, where emigration of skilled citizens is just beginning, it is expedient to examine the dynamics between remittances and internal migration to determine the potential of Botswana (citizens of Botswana) to remit. Largely as a result of economic factors, internal migration has increased remarkably since the country attained independence in 1966. Much of these movements were designed to reduce poverty in rural households. Voluntary labour migration is popularly perceived as a response to the economic gap between rural and urban centres. Whether migration is motivated by rural/urban income differentials (Todaro 1969; Harris and Todaro 1970); labour demand, income risk reduction (Stark and Levhari 1982) or social security mechanisms (Schrieder and Knerr 2000), the major driving force in migration decisions is the development of migrants and members of their families. To assist the achievement of this goal, money and goods are remitted by migrants to households (or families) at the origin. In Botswana, internal and international

migrations have historically been perceived as a significant method of minimizing income risk and poverty.

The economic and settlement policies of the national government from 1966 contributed considerably in creating employment opportunities that enhanced internal labour migration. Households used these opportunities to send young men and women out to work (Lucas 1982) and these migrants assisted the families at home largely through remittances. The national education policy (Botswana 1994) provided additional opportunity to rural families to maximize remittances from their educated children. This paper addresses voluntary labour migrants and their links with families (i.e. households) at home. It is primarily designed to examine the factors that influence the receipt of remittance by households and to determine the effect of remittance on poverty reduction in households. Recognizing that the utility of remittance is best obtained from the recipient, this paper addresses this subject from the perspective of households at the origin. Before 1970, when poverty was rife and education levels very low in Botswana, emigration to South Africa was an important means of moderating poverty. But the situation has changed remarkably since then. With one of the best economies in Africa and a high level of education, internal migration in Botswana currently takes precedence over international migration.

Theoretical considerations

Remittances reflect human interaction and may be theoretically placed among the effects of social relations and economic behaviour (Mooney 2003). They play an important role in maintaining cultural, familial, kinship and community/home links. Indeed, Gardner and Grillo (2002) have called attention to the contribution of traditional rituals to the continuity of migrants' affinity with home. Such rituals include periodic meetings of the extended family (migrant and non-migrant), and migrants who do not participate in them may not be appreciated as significant contributors to the wellbeing of households at home even if they do remit. In Sub-Saharan Africa, funerals frequently provide a justification for such meetings, especially to discuss inheritance issues. Nigerian funerals frequently involve conspicuous consumption, and this requires much human and financial contribution, much of which is remitted from within the country.

Notwithstanding the socio-cultural nature of remittances, they also serve to stratify receiving households according to their wealth. The new economic theory of labour migration (NELM) explains much of the relevance of remittances with economically disadvantaged households in sending areas. NELM considers the contribution of altruism and what Lucas and Stark (1985)

refer to as self-interest in the desire to remit. Contrary to neoclassical theories, which associate migration with individual decisions, NELM argues that such decisions are actually taken by the household (Stark and Bloom 1985; Massey et al. 1993). The economic contribution of household members to migration costs partly explains the altruistic effect in migrants' decision to remit. NELM identifies remittance as a determinant of labour migration and also indicates that migration is selective by access to wealth (Gubert 2002). Here, the definition of wealth includes future income gained by educating children. Thus, households that have invested materially in educating their children would to a large extent receive more from such migrants where they remit (Mooney 2003). In effect, such households acquire sustained wealth by investing in the education of their children. It is therefore profitable to invest in children's education and, by implication, migration. However, until recently, primary and tertiary education in Sub-Saharan Africa was free or highly subsidized by several governments. Moreover, for many rural families, child fosterage and remittances contribute to the education of children (Schrieder and Knerr 2000; Alber 2003). Thus, the contribution of African rural families to income maximization by educating children is small compared to what it could have been if investment in education was at the level it is in developed countries.

Within the realm of neoclassical theories, Stark (1980) suggested that the lowest-income rural households received the most remittance because they sent most migrants to the city. This reaction was premised on a previously pessimistic observation by Rempel and Lobdell (1978) about the utility of remittances in sending areas. Contrary to Stark, these authors concluded that remittance does not contribute significantly to rural development. Instead return migration is the route through which migrants contribute to rural development. Drawing on evidence from Kenya, Stark (1980) maintained that remittance from urban areas actually contributes to reducing income inequality in rural areas. Joining the debate, Taylor (1999) cited studies that seem to support Rempel and Lobdell's view. He noted that migrants are incapable of converting 'savings into production' (Taylor 1999: 74). It was argued that remittances cannot stimulate economic growth where skilled labour is low, the economic structure lacks diversity, and 'there is (no) financial system capable of mopping up small amounts of savings from a wide variety of sources and channeling them to businesses willing and able to respond to a rising demand for their output' (Taylor 1999: 74, taken from Stahl and Habib 1991: 177).

However, Taylor conceded that the wide range of effects that remittances have on families and communities makes it difficult to test for macro-

level effects from studies that merely describe how remittances are spent. After all, several studies support the NELM hypothesis that remittances are most effective in the poorest households and that they serve to ensure those that remain at the origin and reduce income risk (Taylor 1999; Gubert 2002). As Ahmed (2000) observed, some of the difficulties associated with analyzing the impact of remittances stem from including multiplier effects, which have greater implications on development demands than remittances could provide. Ahmed noted that very many positive effects could be observed by examining the immediate effect of remittances. After all, migrants remit mostly to satisfy short-term requirements in the household of origin. Those that are invested in long-term projects, such as buildings and farms, are made with a view towards individual or household development. They are therefore directly or indirectly associated with the migrant's return to the source. Thus, any reference to the impact of return migration on regional or national development, as Rempel and Lobdell (1978) suggested, may translate into positive impact of remittances on development.

Since the debate on the utility of remittances focuses on development, it is expedient to examine the factors that are considered in the measurement of development. For instance, it is apparent that the economic perspective of increased income inequality is that it is not a positive development (Taylor 1999). But the remittance effect should not be considered as negative simply because of its potential to stimulate income inequality. Realizing that remittances are made by individuals, independent of government's direct contribution, the focus of their impact should be within the household. From an international perspective, there are indications that diasporas contribute directly or otherwise to national development at home (Shain 2000), especially through 'brain circulation' effects. But the bulk of what is remitted is for individual or family benefit, and the total amount is difficult to obtain because of the variety of transfer methods used. If the unequal distribution of remittances in the rural area contributes to increased income inequality, this may reflect differential willingness of families to invest in children's education and migration. Improvement in education, health, housing and economic standards of families that receive remittances reflects positive effects of migration on development of the family. And if the returns to child education contribute to rising income inequality at the origin, this should serve to encourage less motivated families in the community to make similar investments in children.

From another perspective of NELM, the social network theory of remittances (Portes 1995) may be linked to the intergenerational wealth flows theory. This explains the influence of social and economic factors on fertility

decisions, especially in developing countries (Caldwell 1978; Dow et al. 1994). In early transitional societies, it was strongly sanctioned and religiously expected that wealth would flow within the family through income transfers from younger to older generations. This situation was moderated considerably in the latter transition period largely through modernizing effects. Thus the transition to fertility decline was influenced partly by reduced intergenerational wealth flows as education of children increased childrearing costs to the extent that net financial benefit to parents approached zero. Parents' expectation of future economic rewards from children also holds within modernizing communities; and in the process of maximizing such rewards, parents would endeavour to provide children with the highest possible level of education. Likewise, households may contribute directly to poverty reduction by facilitating migration of eligible members. Where net reverse flow of remittance is negative (household to migrant minus migrant to household), the remittances received from such migrants assist in improving household incomes.

With increasing rural and national poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa since the 1980s, the preferences of educated migrants have been altered to the extent that they often decide to work in the city. Those who choose to assist their parents and families at the origin do so largely by remitting. Within contemporary African economic situations, remittance constitutes an important reason for migrating. Even among the educated and their daughters, marriage (bridewealth, etc.) does not quite deter intergenerational wealth flows. Depending on the financial agreement between spouses (Nwoye 2000), wives have freedom to remit. As Eloundou-Enyegue and Calves (2006) observed, educated African women have considerable ability to remit materially to their parents and family at the origin. However, the potential to receive remittances is often limited by existing social and economic conditions in many households.

Methodology

The data was obtained from a nationally representative survey of Botswana based on stratified and cluster sampling. The sample was selected to be proportional to population size for all relevant strata. Households were drawn from all major land use areas of the country including primary and secondary urban centres as well as major communal areas. This ensured that both sending and receiving areas of internal migration were included. Sample selection was done in two stages. The first stage was to randomly select district and urban areas out of the existing 36 census districts. This determined the number of primary sampling units (PSU) selected countrywide. Areas

with very small populations were not selected as this was not cost effective. The second stage was random selection of enumeration areas (EA) from each of the rural and urban areas proportionate to the size of the PSU. A sample of 30 EA was randomly selected from each of the enumeration areas. All migrant households in each sample cluster were enumerated.

The 2001 national census population was used to select an initial sample of 1200 households. The total number of households selected in each of the census districts was proportionate to the size of the national households. For example, approximately 11.8% of the households were drawn from Gaborone as this was the proportion of households in the city in relation to the national population of households. The household data were provided by the household head. In very few cases a responsible adult served as proxy. Individual data were provided by the household member or (in the case of children and absentees) the household head or a knowledgeable person in the household.

SPSS was used to analyze the data. Logistic regression was applied to identify the factors that significantly influenced (1) receipt of remittance by households and (2) household poverty. The first response was obtained from the question, 'does a migrant worker send money home to this household?' The target response is Yes while No is the reference category. Yes and No were recoded to reflect 1 and 0, respectively, in the SPSS system. Poverty was defined to reflect households that lived without cash, food, water, medical treatment/medicine, electricity and/or cooking fuel most of the time or always during the past year (12 months preceding the survey date). Households that never experienced being without these essential items or had experienced it once or occasionally were grouped into the reference category (recoded 0). Each item (cash food, etc.) was recoded 1.

In selecting the predictors that were included in the first analysis, the focus was to produce a model that was significant (see Pregibon 1981; Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). It was decided that the most significant model obtained after the predictors were entered would determine the variables discussed in this paper. With respect to the determinants of remittance received, the independent economic variables are: Number of times household lived without cash (defined as never = 1; once = 2; several times = 3; many times = 4; always = 5); Household borrowed money in past 12 months (yes = 1; no = 2); Household remitted to migrant (yes = 1; no = 2); and Annual income (less than P30,000 = 1; P30,000 and over = 2). Income includes total earnings from wages, formal and informal businesses, farms and pensions. The demographic variables are: Age (defined as <45 years = 1; 45+ years = 2); Sex (male = 1; female = 2); Education (none and primary = 1; secondary and tertiary = 2); Marital status (married = 1; single [includes

separated, divorced and cohabiting] = 2); and, having observed the effect of including international migration in this analysis, we included internal/international migrant (internal = 1; international = 2). This variable is better than another that represented urban/rural region (REGION). The socio-cultural variables are: Frequency of migrant's home visits (monthly = 1; once in three months = 2; once in six months = 3; once a year = 4); Household member visit migrant (yes = 1; no = 2); and language spoken at home (Setswana = 1; Kalanga = 2). In each analysis, the last category is the reference category.

Definition of concepts

A *migrant* is a person who moved from one region (district) in Botswana to another to work or seek work.

Extreme poverty is sustained poverty throughout the study year, and *transitory poverty* is a temporary state of poverty that occurs among people whose annual income is above poverty level.

A *household* consists of people who share food from a common source, sleep in the same house or compound at least 15 days in the past year and share in a common resource pool. Unlike the *de jure* definition of a household, which excludes migrants from the home household (see Sanni 2006), the culture of Botswana permits their inclusion in the household (see Lucas 1982; Izzard 1985).

Results

Household characteristics

The actual sample was 1160 households comprising a total of 6744 persons, and average household size was 5.8 persons. The mean age of the population was 29 years and the sex ratio was low (94 males to 100 females). The majority (88%) of those who were five years of age and over were educated. Most of them had been to primary and secondary school (54% and 28%, respectively) while 18% had achieved tertiary education, with half having studied in a university. Employment rate (excluding students) was 72%, and a considerable proportion (44%) of those employed were professional, administrative and managerial officers or self-employed business persons. Most of the others were employed in sectors that did not require much skill (e.g. manual, domestic, service, mine, agricultural, fishing and security workers as well as hawkers). The average (mean) annual income was P22,706, which is about what the average citizen earned in 2001 (see Botswana 2003). From an economic perspective, this implies considerable poverty within the study population.

Poverty and its measurement

Though there is evidence of poverty in Botswana, its economy and social policies have produced a population with a much better standard of living than obtains in most Sub-Saharan African countries. According to the national government, the current poverty rate is 23%, an increase of 3 percentage points from 1994 (Botswana 2007; Gaolathe 2007). However, since 2000, the government has found it difficult to increase employment nationally (Anonymous 2005). In a paper presented at the Review of the National Population Policy Delivery in June 2007, H.M. Yousif revealed that unemployment had increased since the 1990s especially among the youth. The Household Income and Expenditure Survey in 2002/03 reported a national unemployment rate of 24%, with school leavers between 15 and 24 years old being the worst affected (Botswana 2007). The observations about unemployment in Botswana and the higher poverty figures provided by other sources challenge the government's poverty rate. The Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis estimated that in 1993/94, 47% of Botswana citizens lived below the poverty line (BIDPA 1997) and it was argued that this figure reflected a substantial decline in poverty since 1985/86. But BIDPA's method of measuring poverty is basically economic, which is restrictive, given its poor treatment of social factors that contribute significantly to human development.

Probably mindful of this, Mattes et al. (2003) developed the lived poverty index (LPI), which was applied to data from surveys of the living conditions of people in southern Africa in 2000. It implied cognizance of the hierarchy of needs by Maslow (1943) and Sen's (1999) view that poverty should be measured from the standpoint of access to basic needs. Mattes et al. (2003) found that citizens of Botswana and South Africa enjoyed the best standard of living in southern Africa. Among the merits of the LPI method are that it is simple, it provides a direct measure of people's access to basic needs and it considers the multi-dimensionality of human wellbeing. This method was applied to the data on which the current study is based, using twenty-one questions. The questions asked how frequently households were forced to live without basic necessities (such as food, clean water, etc.) as well as fear of crime, domestic violence, etc. (see Table 1). For example, 'how often have you or your family gone without food, etc.?' and 'how often have you or your family feared crime, etc. in your home?' In the first question, 'food' was subsequently replaced by 'clean water', 'medical treatment', etc. while in the second question 'crime' was subsequently replaced by 'housebreaking', 'physical assault', etc..

Table 1: Lived poverty index (LPI) for basic necessities, fear, etc.

Unit of Index	LPI	N
Food	1.05	1135
Clean water	0.86	1152
Medicine	0.80	1131
Electricity	1.59	984
Fuel	1.04	1138
Cash income	1.46	1136
Crime	1.30	1143
Housebreaking	0.84	1146
Physical assault	0.66	1144
Domestic violence	0.60	1139
Communal violence	0.61	1137
Fear of being raped	0.53	1143
Fear of being murdered	0.53	1127
Witchcraft	0.94	985
Livestock stolen	0.71	1127
Land dispute	0.60	1137
Serious illness	0.91	1147
Young child dies	0.67	1142
Young adult dies	0.68	1144
Drought	0.72	1136
Flood	0.55	1141
Total	0.84	1125

LPI scores range from 0 to 4 (0 = zero poverty and 4 = extreme poverty). The means of the poverty ratios for food, etc. were computed from grouped poverty levels (0–1, 1–2, 2–3, 3–4) as $m = \sum fx/n$. For example, the index for food was computed as $\Sigma (720(0.5), 220(1.5), 182(2.5), 13(3.5))/1135$. Table

1 shows the computed LPI of the basic needs and fear or experience of negative events. With the exception of fear of crime, much of the hindrance to attaining high living standards is apparently influenced by access to basic needs. Medical treatment and clean water are the only two basic items that have LPI less than 1. Much of the credit for good access to medical treatment goes to the national government for its vigorous implementation of the health policy that was designed to improve the state of wellness of the population (Botswana 1991). Electricity and cash income seem to be the most troublesome obstacles to living above poverty level. Crime has increased in Botswana since 1990; and while this is largely an effect of development, it has been frequently associated with illegal immigration, especially of Zimbabweans (*Daily News* 2000; 2001). Where basic needs only are considered, the LPI is 1.13 (i.e. $\Sigma(1.05, 0.86, 0.80, 1.59, 1.04, 1.46)/6$). This is lower than Mattes et al.'s (2003) estimate (1.98) for Botswana in 2000 (at the time the lowest in southern Africa). When fear (related to crime, violence, etc.) was included among the units of analysis, the overall LPI dropped to 0.84, implying a good level of security among the study population.

Table 2 indicates that the majority (63%) of households were never forced to live without sufficient food during the twelve months preceding August 2004. Seven percent always lived without sufficient food throughout this period. A much higher proportion of households (77% and 79%, respectively) had never been without clean water and medicine/medical treatment. Electricity ranked lowest among the basic necessities that the population had access to. However, given the financial cost versus utility function of this power source to rural populations' preferences for cheaper alternative sources of fuel (such as candles, firewood, paraffin and gas), the satisfaction derived from using non-electrical appliances probably puts the wellbeing of households higher than the figures suggest. This position tends to receive support from the observation that only 7% of households always lacked sufficient cooking fuel during the reference period. Cash income ranked lowest among the basic factors that households never lacked.

A better understanding of poverty levels in Botswana was obtained from an examination of the dummy variables that were created from six basic needs of our sample population (i.e. cash, food, water, medicine, electricity and fuel) for use as response variables in regression analysis. Each variable represents poverty where people lived without these basic factors most of the time and always.

Table 2: Percentage of household members' experience of having gone without food, etc.

Unit of basic necessity	Never	Just once or Twice/Several times	Many times/ Always	Total	N
Enough food to eat	63.4	30.0	6.6	100.0	1136
Enough clean water	76.8	17.8	5.4	100.0	1142
Medicine/medical treatment	79.1	17.1	3.8	100.0	1132
Electricity in the home	55.1	13.8	31.1	100.0	984
Enough cooking fuel	65.1	27.6	7.3	100.0	1138
Cash income	45.5	36.8	17.7	100.0	1137

From these variables a composite variable (POVERTY) was computed to represent the population that was not poor (0) and those that were at a level of poverty (1 to 6). The six are cases where households lived without one or more of the six basic factors. Poverty was subsequently divided into 1 = Transitory Poverty and 2–6 = Extreme Poverty. The results indicate that 48% of the population were not poor while 27% were transitorily poor and 25% were extremely poor. There was significant gender difference in the exposure to poverty ($X^2 = 10.84$, $p < .01$). Table 3 shows a dominance of men among those that were not poor. However, substantially more women than men were transitorily poor. Contrary to general opinion that extreme poverty affects significantly more women than men in Botswana, the results suggest otherwise. The difference between extremely poor male-headed households and women-headed households is apparently not significant.

Table 3: Percentage distribution of people that were not poor and poor, by sex

Level of poverty	Sex	
	Male	Female
Not poor	51.4	42.4
Transitory poverty	23.0	31.7
Extreme poverty	25.6	25.9
Total	100.0	100.0
N	591	394

$X^2 = 10.836$, $p < .01$

Migration

The study enumerated a total of 1377 internal labour migrants. The majority (77%) of these had regular jobs, 17% were seasonal workers and the rest were unemployed. Most migrants had moved at least twice (i.e. from birthplace to place of previous residence and from previous residence to current place of residence). During the first move 82% were from rural areas; but during the second move, this proportion fell by ten percentage points. Much of the change in the pattern of internal migration may be attributed to increased urbanization. Before 1991, rural localities in Botswana were considered villages or large villages, depending on population size. By parliamentary Act, the large villages were reclassified as urban if, in addition to a threshold population of 5,000, 75% of the labour force was employed in non-agricultural sectors (Gwebu 2006). Almost half of the migrants went to the capital city (Gaborone). An additional 15% went to Francistown (the second largest city in the country).

For a quarter of the migrants, family issues, such as fosterage and marriage, influenced migration from the birthplace. The economic factor was second among motivators of migration to urban areas, but was third where the destination was rural. Probably related to greater numbers of secondary and tertiary educational institutions in urban areas, relatively more migrants moved to urban than rural centres for educational reasons. Similarly, more migrants went to urban than rural centres for 'bright light' reasons (i.e. attraction of the city). During the second wave of migration, economic factors formed the primary motive for moving to urban and rural centres (33% and 30%, respectively). Family issues dropped to second place while living conditions was third. Differential preference for urban and rural areas was particularly evident where education and attraction of city were concerned. Twenty-nine percent of the population that was 15 years and over intended to migrate elsewhere in future.

Remittances

Many households depend partly on remittances in order to maintain a healthy state of economic wellbeing. Fully 71% of all household income was derived from wage work and income from informal trade and casual work. An additional 18% was obtained from remittances of money and goods from migrants and the rest was from other sources, including agriculture. Some 65% of migrants remitted, and the average (mean) amount of cash remitted during the twelve months before the survey was P1650. The peak frequency (53%) of remittance was once a month, while 7% of migrants remitted at least twice a month, 16% did so once every three months, 12% more than twice in three months and a few (4%) remitted once a year. Half of the

migrants preferred to carry the money home personally. The post office and bank were the second and third most preferred mode of transfer. Almost everyone was consistent in using the most preferred money transfer method. This is largely because it was perceived to be highly reliable.

Migrants from rural areas apparently have a greater propensity to remit than those from urban areas ($X^2 = 51.27$, $p < 0.001$). Though the proportion (58%) of migrants from rural areas exceeded that of urban areas by 16 percentage points, the difference among those who remitted was much greater (67% rural versus 33% urban). In both rural and urban areas there was no significant difference between the proportion of migrants who remitted less than P1000 and those who remitted P1000 or more ($X^2 = 1.21$, $p > 0.05$). Though males seemed to remit a little more than females, the difference was not significant ($X^2 = 1.36$, $p > 0.05$). Similarly, while migrants with secondary and tertiary education appeared to remit more than those with primary or no education, the difference was not significant ($X^2 = 2.01$, $p > 0.05$). The data also did not support the theory that educated migrants remit less frequently than less educated ones ($X^2 = 1.23$, $p > 0.05$). However, there was general agreement that migrants' remittances contribute much to the availability of basic necessities (food, cash, education, etc.) in the home-based household (see Table 4). Further analysis points toward this being stronger in rural than urban areas ($X^2 = 2.89$, $p < 0.01$). Much less (67%) expressed positive feelings about the general effect of migration in the household; 15% felt otherwise while the rest thought that labour migration made no significant difference to standard of living in the household.

Table 4: Importance of remittances to survival of household (percentage) regarding availability of basic items

Item	Important	Neutral	Not important	Total	N
Enough food to eat	87.9	7.7	4.4	100.0	775
Enough clean water	75.3	12.3	12.4	100.0	775
Medicine/medical treatment	72.2	15.0	12.8	100.0	769
Electricity	75.1	10.9	4.0	100.0	675
Enough cooking fuel	82.4	10.6	7.0	100.0	771
Cash income	87.5	7.3	5.2	100.0	772
Sending children to school	78.2	.3	14.5	100.0	757

Though it is usually perceived that remittances move in the direction of migrant to household, it is not always so. A considerable amount of gross remittance is made by the household to migrants, especially those that are in school or looking for work. The average amount of money transferred by households to migrants during the year preceding the survey was P1289. Considering the amount remitted by migrants, it appears that the net remittance favours households. The highest average amount transferred then (P9398) was made by households that remitted money more than twice in three months, and the second highest occurred among those that remitted regularly on a monthly basis. Most of the remittances were sent by household heads or their spouses (56% and 31%, respectively). Two-thirds of the senders were female, thereby reflecting the remarkable economic role (and independence) of women in Botswana households. Many (68%) of the recipients of these remittances were sons and daughters of household heads. Considering that a substantial proportion of household members left to work or look for work, it may be conjectured that these recipients were not only students, but also young labour migrants who were either unemployed or had not yet acquired enough to contribute to their parents' household income. Remittances from households to migrants were more frequently in the form of money (57% of remitting households sent money) and food (36%). Just over half of the households (52%) sent these items once every six months or once a year.

Multivariate analysis

Table 5 shows the factors that influence receipt of remittance from migrants. Given the multicollinearity between income and education, an interaction term (education x income) was included in Model 1. But the model does not seem satisfactory, though the goodness of fit is significant. Hence, mindful that education may serve as a proxy for income (Ben-Porath 1973), it replaces the interaction term in the second model. This improves the model fitness and it is therefore preferred. Some results in the model are significant at .05 level and may be subject to type II error; but they are hereby assumed to be free of such error.

Model 2 indicates that households that lived without cash just once in the past year were four times more likely to receive remittances from migrants than those that always lived without cash. Also, those that lived without cash several times were five times more likely to receive remittances from migrants than those that always suffered the same fate. This implies that economic poverty does attract financial assistance through remittances but raises questions about its significance. The model also shows that households that borrowed money as a survival strategy during the twelve months preceding the survey were about two times more likely to receive remittances than

those that did not borrow money. Considering that the poor tend to lack collateral for effective borrowing, it is possible that some households borrow on the strength of expected remittances.

Table 5: Odds ratios from logistic regression of remittance from migrant on demographic, economic and socio-cultural factors

Variable	Model 1	Model2
Economic		
Frequency living without cash		
Never	0.389	2.305*
Just once	1.095	4.378***
Several times	1.044	4.758***
Many times	0.522	2.539*
Household remits to migrant	.478	1.358
Household borrowed money	1.263	1.920**
Demographic		
Sex	1.444	1.269
Age	0.478	0.915
Marital status		
Interaction term (income x education)	0.895	-
Education	-	1.822*
Internal migrant	3.052*	4.076**
Socio-cultural		
Frequency of migrant visit home		
Monthly	7.386***	5.233***
Once in three months	3.672**	2.878**
Once in six months	1.277	1.431
Household member visit migrant	2.675**	2.787***
Language spoken at home	2.967**	1.224
N	392	658

It is also observed that visitations by migrants and by household members to migrants influence the flow of remittance to the respective households, thereby supporting an observation, *inter alia*, that bringing remittances home is popular among migrants. Migrants who visited home every month were five times more likely to remit than those who visited home once a year. The corresponding odds ratio for those who visited home every three months was 2.88 ($p < .01$). Similarly, migrants who received visitors from the household were three times more likely to remit than those who were not visited by household member(s). The data also suggest that the likelihood of receiving remittances from internal migrants was four times greater than that of international migrants.

The effect of remittance on poverty

Given the theoretical link between remittance and poverty, we now examine the impact of remittances from migrants on poverty. The analyses commence with an investigation of the effect of remittances on access to the six basic items, i.e. cash, food, water, medical treatment/medicine, electricity and cooking fuel. Once more, education is used as a proxy for income because it produced a better model than when the interaction term (education x income) was included. Consideration of income here assumes that household annual expenditure was more or less proportional to household income. The results reveal that remittances from migrants do not have significant impact on poverty (see Table 6). However, with the exception of medical treatment/medicine, education above primary school level is apparently required to live above poverty. There are indications that living in rural areas enhances the chances of being poor. Apparently, borrowing money reduces the chances of being without cash many times or always.

With the composite variable as the response, Table 7 reveals the absence of significant influence of migrant remittances on aggregate poverty in Botswana. However, it does indicate that people with primary or no education are three times more likely than those with secondary and tertiary education to head poor households. Where migrants work on a seasonal basis, there seems to be less chances that the household would be poor. Male-headed households were less likely than female-headed ones to be poor (i.e. aggregated poverty).

Table 6: Odds ratios from logistic regression of living without basic goods and services on demographic, economic and socio-cultural factors (odds ratios)

Variable	Cash	Food	Water	Medical treatment/ Medicine	Electricity	Cooking fuel
Demographic						
Sex	0.900	1.019	1.278	1.388	0.650	0.748
Age	1.797*	2.159*	1.296	1.458	1.722	3.046***
Marital status	0.936	0.751	0.827	0.688	0.865	0.908
Economic						
Education	2.623**	5.047**	3.175**	1.733	5.000***	3.898**
Migrant remits to household	0.541	0.426	1.109	0.654	0.312	1.689
Amount of cash remitted by migrant	0.891	0.800	0.949	0.868	1.219	0.662
Migrant remits: Monthly	0.852	0.368*	0.889	0.658	0.669	0.682
Migrant remits: Every three months	1.194	0.459	0.198	0.479	0.665	0.990
Household remits to migrant	1.558	1.178	1.471	1.541	0.944	0.920
Household borrowed money	0.626*	1.243	0.676	0.772	1.169	0.784
Migrant's work is seasonal	1.147	0.817	1.958	0.657	0.536*	0.761
Socio-cultural						
Frequency of migrant visit home: Monthly	0.161**	1.825	0.991	0.888	1.207	1.652
Once in three months	0.415	2.301	1.727	1.537	1.626	2.089
Once in six months	0.371	2.193	1.874	0.703	2.421	2.862
Household member visit migrant	0.788	0.399**	0.752	0.355**	1.123	0.611
Geographic						
Region of household location	1.729*	2.139*	5.753***	4.237**	1.096	1.654
N	438	438	439	436	356	438

Table 7: Odds ratios from logistic regression of poverty on demographic, economic and socio-cultural factors

Variable	Aggregate poverty (Transitory & Extreme)	Extreme poverty
Demographic		
Sex	0.447**	0.900
Age	1.865*	2.461**
Marital status	1.132	0.832
Economic		
Education	3.410***	4.162***
Migrant remits to household	0.269	0.582
Amount of cash remitted by migrant	0.896	0.291
Migrant remits: Monthly	0.458	0.525
Migrant remits: Every three months	0.619	0.606
Household remits to migrant	1.340	1.746
Household borrowed money	1.051	0.864
Migrant's work is seasonal	0.484*	1.103
Socio-cultural		
Frequency of migrant visit home:		
Monthly	0.714	0.570
Once in three months	0.853	1.559
Once in six months	1.107	2.207
Household member visit migrant	0.820	0.582
Geographic		
Region of household	1.319	2.268*
N	349	349

Where extreme poverty was examined, the results in Table 7 reveal again the significant influence of education. Households with heads that had primary or no education were four times more likely to be extremely poor than those where the head was educated at secondary or more level. The indications again are that remittances do not have a significant impact on extreme poverty. Similarly, households were about two times more likely to experience extreme poverty

where the head was younger (< 45 years) than otherwise. The table also shows that rural households were twice as likely as urban ones to be in extreme poverty. It appears that the significant relationship between gender and household poverty obtains only within transitory poverty. Where extreme poverty is considered, women are apparently not more likely than men to head poor households.

Discussion and policy implications

Undoubtedly this study reveals that a systematic link exists between internal migrants and their families at home. But it raises questions about the importance of this link to especially rural households. The results of univariate and bivariate analysis point toward Ahmed's (2000) observation that remittances have positive effects on the economic wellbeing of households. But the multivariate analysis indicates otherwise. Table 6 and 7 reveal that remittances currently have no significant influence on poverty (transitory and extreme) in Botswana. In other words, the ability of very poor households to lift themselves out of this state is not assisted by the remittances that migrants send. This conclusion is consistent with that of Lucas (1982) and seems to strengthen the observation (noted *inter alia*) by Rempel and Lobdell (1978).

The data that Lucas used was obtained about three decades ago (Botswana 1982) when income and educational levels were quite low and wages from work in South African mines were significantly higher than those in Botswana. Even so, Lucas reports that the amount of money remitted by migrants was still small after including the effect of mine workers' remittances. From a qualitative study Izzard (1985: 274) observed that 'rural women complained that the remittances they received were inadequate and irregular'. Table 5 in this paper indicates that internal migration now contributes more to remittances than international migration. This may be partly explained by the increasing number of highly educated citizens who hold senior administrative and professional positions in Botswanan towns and cities. Meanwhile relatively few Botswana professionals currently work outside the country and the number of people (mostly unskilled) working in South African mines has fallen considerably. From a peak of 18,079 Botswana

mine workers in 1985, there were 6494 in 2000 (SAMP 2005). Much of the remittances that went from urban to rural areas recently were motivated by altruism as well as self-interest. While the magnitude of the two cannot be determined, it is likely that the difference between the two partly explains the insignificant impact of remittances. In view of this and Lucas's (1982) observation that remittances from migrants were quite low, it appears that the net effect of remittances from migrants was not enough to make a significant impact on poverty in rural areas. However, the expressed satisfaction that some households derived from migrants' remittance should not be overlooked. Poor households may likely have been worse off in the absence of remittance. What this study reveals is that remittances from migrants are not significantly high enough to help raise households out of poverty.

The proportion of this study's sample that lived in extreme poverty is more or less consistent with the government's figures for level of poverty in Botswana. However, bearing in mind the controversy related to measurement of poverty (see Aaberge and Mogstad 2007), the 25% level of (extreme) poverty is considered tentative. In view of the feminization of poverty theory, our observation that female-headed households were more likely to be transitorily poorer than their male counterparts is consistent with other findings (see Akinsola and Popovich 2002). However, we find no evidence of gender difference in the experience of extreme poverty, and this requires some comment. Notwithstanding the methodology on which this finding was obtained, there is a good reason to retain it. Increasingly, questions are being raised about the reliability of the feminization of household poverty in developing countries (e.g. Buvini and Gupta 1997; Quisumbing et al. 2001; Medeiros and Costa 2006). From a study of ten developing countries (including Botswana), Quisumbing et al. (2001) found that while poverty exists more in female-headed than male-headed households in many developing countries the difference between these two groups of households is really not significant. In Botswana, three measures indicated that poverty was greater among male-than female-headed households, though the difference was insignificant. Chant (2007) further observed the appearance of a dominance of female-headed households among those that were not poor. Several cultural props that fuelled gender discrimination in Botswana have weakened considerably, partly owing to the government's educational policy and changes in fertility attitudes, which have significantly moderated preferences for sons.

Policy implications

The results point towards a need to review the poverty, education, employment, gender and urbanization policies in Botswana. However, our results on household poverty do not lend themselves easily to policy formulation be-

cause the survey was designed to investigate poverty at a macro (household) level. As Fuwa (2000) noted, a micro-level investigation is required to fully understand the dynamics between individuals in the household in order to arrive at policy statements that would benefit governments in their quest to minimize poverty. In this regard, it would be premature to recommend policies from our observation that female-headed households experience extreme poverty as much as male-headed households. What this study brings out is the immediate need for further in-depth research in this area. While this could be costly, it is expedient to guide government and non-governmental organizations on where to focus future plans and projects that address poverty in Botswana.

It may be conjectured that the remittances do not assist in poverty alleviation partly because remitting is only one of many options available to households wishing to reduce poverty risk. As the results show, borrowing is also an option that households take (and there is no significant difference in the borrowing practices of the poor and those that were not poor). But apart from providing temporary relief from cash problems, it does not significantly influence poverty. The reality is that the government has provided its citizens with many poverty-alleviating options by establishing economic development agencies and programmes such as the Botswana Institute of Development and Policy Analysis, Botswana Productivity Centre and Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency (Matiage 2002). Given that the poor have limited access to personal and other loans, government interventions leave the public with few options lift themselves out of poverty from individual efforts. Owing to economic and other factors, there is a high preference among young professionals to emigrate to work in other countries (Crush 2006). This may, in future, provide substantial remittances to assist in moderating poverty in especially rural areas. Hence, now is the time for the government to consider policies that would attract remittances from its citizens who would have left the country to work elsewhere.

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Poverty Eradication Dilemma: Understanding Poverty Dynamics in Nebbi District, Uganda

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Abstract

This paper addresses a current methodological gap in poverty measurement, which stems from acknowledging the multi-dimensionality of poverty, on the one hand, and using an income/consumption measurement of poverty as the norm, on the other. The current income-based measure of poverty presents only part of measuring poverty status as a whole. The consumption basket is wrongly taken by those of economic inclination to wholly represent the entire, even non-monetary valued, range of poverty. The paper approaches this dilemma using a participatory and community-driven approach where the subjective views of people are used to define and categorize the poor, contrary to the poverty line approach. Such categorization was based on the perceived wellness of life and what made/denied wellness. A survey follows to explore the quantitative scope of poverty. This participatory, qualitative and quantitative mix of method, it is argued, provides for ascertaining organizational accountability in terms of the relevance of programme targeting and outreach as well as performance measurement over time. The method can also be used to deepen current participatory poverty assessments that simply stop at defining and identifying poverty causes, effects and solutions.

Résumé

Ce document porte sur la déficience méthodologique notée actuellement dans la mesure de la pauvreté. Ceci découle, d'une part, du caractère multidimensionnel de la pauvreté, et d'autre part, de l'utilisation comme norme de la mesure de la

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pauvreté basée sur revenu/ consommation. La mesure courante de la pauvreté basée sur le revenu ne présente que partiellement l'état de la pauvreté prise globalement. Le panier de la consommation a été considéré par les thèses économiques comme l'élément qui représente tous les aspects de la pauvreté, même ce ceux avec une valeur non-monnaire. Le document parle de ce dilemme en adoptant une approche participative basée sur la communauté où les opinions subjectives des populations servent à définir et à catégoriser les pauvres, contrairement à l'approche basée sur le seuil de la pauvreté. Une telle catégorisation était basée sur la supposée situation de bien-être et ce qui favorise/empêche le bien-être. A cet effet, une étude a été menée pour mesurer la pauvreté de façon quantitative. D'aucuns pensent que cette combinaison d'approches participative, qualitative et quantitative permet de s'assurer du sens de la responsabilité institutionnelle en terme de pertinence du ciblage du programme ainsi que de la vulgarisation et de la mesure de la performance au fil du temps. Cette approche pourrait également aider à approfondir les méthodes participatives de mesure de la pauvreté utilisées en ce moment et qui ne se limitent qu'à définir et à identifier les causes et effets de la pauvreté, et à proposer des solutions.

Introduction

Poverty debates have been raging for some time. More fundamental has been the conflict on measurement method, which has widened from a narrow view of material deficiency – income and consumption – through to basic needs considered as acceptable human decency to human development (see UNDP 1997: 15). Yet, with the politicization and prescription of poverty from an insiders' viewpoint, new dimensions such as vulnerability and voicelessness are equally given prominence (Kanbur and Squire 1999: 19–23).

However, while poverty is now considered as multi-dimensional in both its causes and effects (World Bank 2000), its measurement has remained static, with the preferred measure being household income/consumption in relation to a set of basic needs weighed along purchasing power parity. Apart from the data sources being questionable, this approach ignores the now-accepted multi-dimensionality of poverty. This study, therefore, attempts to solve this problem with reference to the dilemma faced by an NGO in terms of its organizational relevance – vision translation into programme targeting and outreach.

The second part of the paper presents the Ugandan poverty measurement dilemma using the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), an all-inclusive anti-poverty formula with diverse definitions and policy strategies. The third part presents a meso-level dilemma of how the operationalization of PEAP is not carried out by a focus on poverty at a decentralized local government level. In the fourth part the paper shows how these dilemmas culminate in functional accountability questions for development partners using the example of a non-governmental organization. Finally, in the fifth part, a methodological

exploration is presented. Herein poverty definition and measurement are anchored on a participatory and community-driven approach.

Poverty? Uganda's dilemma

Despite relentless efforts to bring about development to 'developing' countries from the 1940s, the development industry recently took a new approach, codenamed the anti-poverty agenda. Thus, poverty reduction has continued to receive increasing political, business and academic attention. In Uganda, the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), as part of the globally driven poverty reduction strategy, was formulated in 1997 (and is revised every two years) as an umbrella under which coordinated actions are to be taken to ensure that Uganda, in line with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), reduces poverty levels to less than 28% by 2014. In this vein, five pillars are identified as the cardinal grounds for guiding government resource mobilization, allocation and utilization (see Appendix 1). The pillars are: (i) economic management; (ii) production, competitiveness and income; (iii) security, conflict resolution and disaster management; (iv) good governance; and (v) human development (MoFPEP 2004: xvi–xxvi). Through the Medium Term Expenditure Framework, Poverty Action Funds are invested by central and local governments, donor communities, the private sector and civil society organizations.

Supported by policies like decentralization, liberalization and privatization of the economy, and many others, over the years, it is noted that Uganda's poverty trends have tremendously reduced, from 56% in 1992 to 37% in 2005, although marked geographical variations exist, as is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Percent distribution of poor households by residence¹

	1992/93	1993/94	1994/95	1995/96	1996/97	1999/2000	2002/03
<i>Residential distribution</i>							
Total	55.5	52.2	50.1	48.5	44.0	35.0	37.7
Rural	59.4	56.7	54.0	53.0	48.2	39.0	41.1
Urban	28.2	20.6	22.3	19.5	16.3	10.0	12.4
<i>Regional distribution</i>							
Northern	71.3	69.2	63.5	68.0	58.8	65.0	63.6
Eastern	59.2	58.0	64.9	57.5	54.3	37.0	46.0
Western	52.8	56.0	50.4	46.7	42.0	28.0	31.4
Central	45.5	35.6	30.5	30.1	27.7	20.0	22.3

Source: MoFEPD (2001, 2004).

Table 1 shows a remarkable performance in the fight against poverty. In a decade Uganda achieved an 18% decline in its 'considered' poverty levels. Not surprisingly, Uganda is regarded by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the donor community as an economically successful country. However, many Ugandans, witnessing the controversies in the daily newspapers and advocacy by civil society, would contest such romantic figures. The simple fact is that a 38% poverty level would mean that only 3 in every 10 people are poor. Yet, poverty analysis points out that the poor are largely rural, female-headed households, are illiterate and are employed in the subsistence agricultural sector, that is, in categories that constitute the majority of the population. Their livelihoods (both as means of living and enjoying their lives) have not changed. On the contrary, these categories are drifting from bad to worse, as the Chronic Poverty Report, 2005 attests.

Beyond the time-honoured conceptual disparities in the definition and measurement of poverty (see Lakwo 2006: 117–20), this controversy points to two distinct issues taken up in the present paper. First, the controversy unearths the unclear definition of poverty, with thus far no agreed-upon definition of poverty (or its antidote development) in Uganda. While government institutions rely on income/consumption status measured by the World Bank's favoured poverty line of US\$1 or 2 per day, a number of civil society organizations prefer the subjective approach that anchors poverty in the perception of the individuals or communities experiencing it. In an attempt to support this view, the first Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment defined poverty as lack of basic needs and services such as food, clothing, shelter, healthcare, education and powerlessness. The second such assessment added to this list issues of social exclusion, governance, conflict/insecurity, ignorance, unemployment, lack of productive assets and lack of knowledge and awareness (MoFPED 2002: xi).

Surprisingly, although it has been recognized that poverty is multi-dimensional, hence the widening of the frontier from which to fight it, there has been no clear merger of the objective and subjective approaches (even in PEAP design beyond mere acknowledgement). This omission partly explains why poverty remains a blurred issue that falls somewhere between income/consumption, powerlessness, social exclusion and lack of knowledge (MoFPED 2002: 11–13).

Arising from this, poverty performance tracking has also lacked focus, despite a monitoring unit set up for it. It has continued to remain rather difficult to measure 'real' accepted poverty status because poverty lies between economics and socio-politics. To date, different monitoring frameworks and indicators are being used (see Table 2 and the PEAP document, MoFPED 2004: 223–39). The indicators reflect the multitudes of

poverty embedded in income, public services consumption and good governance poverty. But they are disjointed and not aggregated to give one single picture of 'Uganda Poverty Status'. This aggregation failure has led to 'poverty machination' presented by the 'so-called' income/consumption poverty, which fully ignores other facets of poverty. The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development acknowledged this fact when it noted that, 'the lack of performance indicators and targets for some interventions and the inadequacy of the monitoring and evaluation functions at different levels have aggravated the [poverty tracking] problem further' (MoFPED, n.d.: 172).

Table 2: Some poverty indicators used in Uganda

Perception of poverty	Welfare indicators
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of adequate food • Lack of good shelter • Lack of good clothing • Inability to afford medical treatment • Lack of knowledge and information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Take sugar • Use soap for bathing • Each child has a blanket • Has at least a pair of shoes • Each has at least two sets of clothing
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inability to afford secondary education • No access to clean drinking water • Inability to access credit facilities • Lack of cash money for investment 	

In a nutshell, it can be said that in Uganda poverty is everything. Not surprisingly, fighting poverty is a catch-word in the political pursuit of modernization and industrialization even if it has meant forest, schools and other land give-aways to investors. Besides, it is evident that what is considered as Uganda's poverty status is merely half the truth given that it focuses on only one facet of poverty, ignoring what Maxwell (1999: box 1) notes as the multi-dimensionality of poverty:

it [poverty] should best be described as income or consumption poverty, human (under)development, social exclusion, ill-being, (lack of) capability and functioning, vulnerability, livelihood unsustainability, lack of basic needs, and relative deprivation.

From development policy perspectives and especially the demand for accountability it becomes irrelevant to commit a nation and its resources (borrowed funds inclusive) to what cannot be validated. The irrelevance

emanates from the fact that without a clear definition of what poverty is, there will be a lack of policy focus (or national vision). Hence, the inclination to opt for the World Bank 'one-size-fits-all' income poverty measure without questioning its relevance beyond global policy/technical prescription continues to create more dilemmas for poverty reduction (and attaining the MDGs).

Nebbi district's sketchy solution

Nebbi district is one of the 80 districts in Uganda. It is located in the north-west of the country and is the gateway to the other six districts in the West Nile region. As a decentralized local authority, Nebbi district is charged with the responsibility of developing its constituency while taking care of central government priorities. To this end the district has formulated a three-year development plan that envisions 'wealth and prosperity for all', tied to a mission 'to serve the community through a coordinated delivery of services which focus on national and local priorities and contribute to the improvement in the quality of life of the people in the district'. As such, the district operational goal is 'to improve incomes of the poor, improve the quality of life in the district, and promote good governance, harmony and security' (DPU, 2006: vii). Central in all this organizational positioning is the pursuit to fight poverty among its people.

One then asks: 'what is the poverty to be fought? How much of it exist and where?' In an attempt to answer these questions, in 2002, Community Empowerment for Rural Development (CEFORD) was contracted, with Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) budget support, to conduct a Participatory Poverty Assessment. This study was conducted in only four of the nineteen lower local governments. Apart from the methodology being suspect, the study had unclear terms of reference (designed and agreed upon by the District Planning Unit and the contractor) and was conducted without any audit, therefore did not provide for the required feedback. The study lacked analytical rigour, as is manifested in the disjointed definition, manifestation and indicators of poverty (see Appendix 2 for an excerpt from the study).

Consequently, the CEFORD study was not harmonized into a District Poverty Assessment report with a Summary Status/Synthesis Report for Nebbi District that would answer questions such as, 'what is poverty, how is it felt (and by whom) and what are its interlocking cause/effect relations, and in sum, how poor/rich are the people of Nebbi district?'

Because the study fell into the same trap as the national participatory poverty assessment, Nebbi district (as in Uganda as a whole) to date can neither present its poverty status beyond the rhetoric of being poor because it is located in northern Uganda, nor can it show and distinguish between its poorest vis-à-vis well-off lower local governments. Likewise, without a clear

poverty status, the basis upon which the poverty reduction policy should focus is missing.

This shortcoming is exemplified by the 'crude' poverty measure used by the District Planning Unit (a centre for the coordination of the district development processes). While poverty is recognized, in line with the 2002 Participatory Poverty Assessment, as 'the inability to meet basic needs such as food, shelter, clothing, basic health care, basic education, lack of information and inadequate household item as paraffin, salt, and soap' (p12), it is technically operationalized in varied measurement indicators. According to the District Planner these indicators include access to roads, number of schools, number of health units, and the proportion paying the lowest quartile of g-tax (personal communication during a brainstorming meeting held with SNV team).² These measures exclude a number of issues raised in the very definition of poverty.

Seen in this way, one continues to wonder about where the eventual outcomes from investing in the pillars of PEAP will place Ugandans in the poverty spectrum. Inherently, this poverty dilemma manifests in affecting the operations of development actors who cannot aggregate their various inputs into a unitary poverty basket that can show the poverty dynamics in Uganda generally and within the various local governments where they are operational specifically. The Agency For Accelerated Regional Development (AFARD) is one such development actor entrapped in this poverty dilemma.

AFARD: caught in the poverty eradication dilemma

AFARD, formed in July 2000, is a local professional, not-for-profit and non-denominational non-governmental organization (NGO) currently operating in Nebbi district.³ AFARD's formation was motivated for various reasons. First, the West Nile region where it is operational is located in the poorest northern region of Uganda, where 6 in 10 people live below the daily US\$ 1 standard. Second, many development interventions have been 'external to local context' and imposed, leaving behind physical structures and dysfunctional committees but a people hardly changed. Third, 'democratic centralism and machination' under decentralization has reduced people to subjects and not citizens of the state. Finally, the high human resource flight from the region has limited new innovations and enthusiasms to work for self-development.

Thus, AFARD's *vision* is, 'a prosperous, healthy and informed people of West Nile' and its *mission* is, 'to contribute to the moulding of a region in which the local people, including those who are marginalized, are able to participate effectively and sustainably and take a lead in the development of the region'.

To achieve the above, AFARD's main activities are embedded in capacity-building of 'poor' marginalized communities to realize sustainable livelihoods. This is done by engaging in a number of thematic issues/activities, namely: well-being security (where HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation, safe water and sanitation promotion, and food security are undertaken); income security (with a focus on community microenterprises development), and good governance (under which gender mainstreaming and advocacy with respect to local government development processes are pursued). For details on these activities, see Appendix 3.

While the thematic focus of AFARD appears straightforward, in terms of the above debate, it is still unclear who the poor are or what is the poverty that AFARD is zealously committed in fighting. This dilemma presented a dilemma within the organization as to how to account (for public image, investment justification and winning staff morale) to its stakeholders (donors, government, peer organizations and the beneficiaries). This study, therefore, aimed at resolving this dilemma as well as creating an opening (through adoption or adaptation) for local government to justifiably commit to poverty reduction.

Exploring the poverty frontiers

The ambiguity surrounding the poverty debate warranted asking (from an accountability perspective) a cardinal question, '*to what extent is AFARD working with "poor" marginalized communities?*' To answer this question, three sub-questions were also further asked, namely:

- First, *what is poverty?* This question solicited the perception of the manifestation of poverty that the people who live in it experience it. It aimed at breaking the World Bank's technocratic US\$1 a day prescription by giving voice to the poor and understanding the inner meaning to poverty so that poverty can be seen holistically.
- Second, *why are the people poor?* This question aimed at exploring the causes of poverty where AFARD is working. This would provide an in-depth understanding of factors that inhibit the people from living the life they aspire to. Answers to this question would therefore provide ways of positioning AFARD's intervention focus in perspective so that what are addressed are root causes and not symptoms/effects of poverty.⁴
- Finally, *are AFARD's interventions relevant?* The core aspects of this question are, first, to validate whether or not AFARD is working with the 'poor' marginalized categories it is committed to work with; and, second, to ascertain whether or not AFARD is working with such people in the right areas of their deprivation.

These questions were asked because, first, existing national quantitative studies are not district-specific but are regional-based. Even if they were, from the discussion above it is apparent they would be describing only half the poverty story. Second, the national participatory poverty assessments have not been conducted in Nebbi in order to draw valid comparisons. Even if this was the case, in the manner they are done the assessments only provide a policy coherence to the PEAP process because the World Bank wants them so, let alone presenting 'window-dressing' views of poverty that are swallowed up in income/consumption measurements. Finally, for AFARD, working in a district with a population having diverse ethnicity and experiences of poverty, answering these questions would provide a basis for attempting to aggregate the existing poverty status among its 'clients'.

Methodological orientation

Aware of the diversity of poverty studies, this study took a middle route between the qualitative and quantitative approaches. It started with a participatory approach in order to be able to define poverty and categorize the poor;⁵ it ended with a quantitative method in order to aggregate poverty and the poor. The draft study report was discussed in a feedback meeting that involved participants from local governments and other civil society organizations.

The findings to the three sub-questions are now presented and their implications for AFARD are analyzed. For each question, a brief statement on the methodology used is also provided. Finally, concluding remarks are provided in view of the way forward for poverty reduction especially at local government levels.

Finding 1a: The meanings of poverty

To explore the meaning of poverty, half-day group meetings were held. Of the thirty community-based organizations engaged with AFARD in the food security project⁶ fifteen were randomly sampled. These partner community-based groups were composed of different members (males only, females only, and mixed). They were located in different agro-ecological settings (farming and trade communities), and the members had different demographic characteristics, economic statuses and political and religious affiliations. Thus, the respondents represented a heterogeneous category that reflected as much of the diversity in local communities as possible.

During the group meetings, facilitated by the AFARD team, group members were introduced to the study objective, that is, understanding what poverty is, who are the poor, and why they are poor. This objective was linked to the food security project that was aimed at ameliorating the condi-

tions of poverty they (as beneficiaries) were living in. This explanation was given by presenting as honestly as possible AFARD's existing dilemma in understanding the above poverty issues. The honesty was meant to stir the group members to help define AFARD's thinking, for, as one participant pointed out, *'we thought you knew it all yet now it is clear that we know it better than you do'*.

It was also emphasized that the team would expect honest responses while every viewpoint would be respected. Thus, the discussion that followed, in which room was given to all group members to air out their views so as to avoid leadership, gender, age, physical ability and educational biases, first focused on the definition of poverty.

What came out from all the discussions was that:

- The term poverty is *not foreign to the local communities*. The local Alur/Jonam dialects refer to poverty as *'can'* while the opposite of poverty, riches/wealth is termed as *'lonyo'*.
- Both poverty and riches *inhere in human beings*, and in terms of the local adage it is said, *'can mako dhano gwok ungo'* (literally, poverty does not live in a dog but in human beings).
- For both poverty and riches to occur, there are *labels* that best describe them. A person living in poverty or riches is known as *'jacan'* or *'jalonyo'* respectively.
- The labels are ascribed to a person depending on his/her lifestyle (or often households). This lifestyle is judged by its *wellness* (what can be known as well-being) and is termed locally as *'kwo pa dhano'*. While *'can'* means leading a miserable or bad life (*'kwo matek, kwo makonye upe'*), riches is *'kwo maber'*, meaning a *'good life'*. Those who live in between these two categories are referred to as leading an intermediate life, or *'kwo ma nya ber ber'*.
- The wellness of one's life is *dynamic*. While at one stage a person may be living a bad life at another point s/he may lead a good or intermediate life. This dynamism reflects how people move in and out of poverty and are therefore not always static in a state of a bad life.⁷ The variation, however, comes about because of the different components of life (what makes living good or bad).
- Given the dynamism and its associated components, the wellness of life makes *categorizing* people in the groups (communities) possible. The people were then categorized as those living a badly-off, intermediate and

well-off lifestyle. This can then be construed to mean the poor, near-poor and rich.⁸

- Finally, and interestingly, one does not need to be rich to lead a well-off life nor poor to lead a bad life. While this contradicts the categorization above, it deepens the fact that it is what *determines the wellness of life* that matters. Cases of rich people living miserably and those who are the poor living with pride were pointed out. For instance, a shopkeeper who had money but did not buy fish for his family on the weekly market day was ridiculed by the so-called poor who had to sell part of their farm produce to at least afford fish.

Along this line of thought, poverty was described as *lack of, inability to achieve and isolation from the desired well-being*. These deprivations were seen to emanate from individual, household and the broader community capacity and politics. An elderly woman argued that, 'I'm leading a miserable life because at my age, I no longer have the ability to engage in hard work both on-farm or in the market in order to have adequate food from the garden or income to buy whatever I need.' A teenage mother reiterated the fact that, 'at least we are better off because we still have few dependants as compared to what our energies on the farm can produce for us'. Yet, a male youth said, if the government had created for him the job he was qualified for, his family would not be suffering.

Apart from the old woman's concern for food, the remarks of the teenage mother and the male youth still leave a lot of questions. Up to this point it is still unclear what the better-off or suffering (read badly-off life) actually are. But what is clear is that all these three people strive for a life other than that of the badly-off. The issues of a good life are, therefore, addressed below so as to clarify how judgements are made of what makes a badly-off, intermediate and well-off life.

Finding 1b: Components of a good life

To explore the different aspects of the wellness of life, the group meetings were asked to list what made their life badly-off, intermediate or well-off. A long list was drawn up as members mentioned what to them best described the wellness of their lives.

This list was later clustered according to various well-being categories (some of which are mentioned in the study of Narayan et al. *already referred to*). Interestingly, in the indicator identification, the people debated and agreed on what the best measure of such wellness would be; for instance (see Table 3), the number of countable assets like livestock, radios and amount of money.

In addition, reasons for identifying a given variable were also offered. For instance, land was seen as a productive asset to produce food or rent

part of it out for immediate cash. Livestock was rated for the social status conferred on owners. An elderly woman pointed out that, without cattle either you die an unmarried person or you engage in a non-traditionally accepted marriage. And both situations are a source of shame to the affected person either directly or indirectly. Should a parent fail to marry for their children, she narrated, their family will be disrespected to the point that the man may be denied a position among his clan's mate. Meanwhile, for the boy, he will fail to fit in with his peers because no one would wish to confide in him given that he is not married (simply because married persons consider that they must discuss important matters only with those who are of their own status).

Finding 2: The causes of poverty

In order to understand why deprivation occurs in the first place and, secondly, how to translate into the different variables and social categorization stated in Table 3, the causes of poverty were discussed and analyzed. Generally, it was pointed that such deprivation was due to:

- Lack of a sizeable and steady income. A majority of the people indicated that their lifestyle was curtailed by a lack of money, which resulted from: (i) over-reliance on subsistence-oriented and indigenous technology-driven agriculture, which in turn has marginally low yields for both food and sales; (ii) their inability to diversify their livelihood activities because they lacked loans with which to start up or build upon their businesses.
- Inadequate knowledge and skills to live a productive and healthy life. A female youth said, 'how would I know what is the value of good food when I'm not schooled?' Another elderly man remarked, 'by what means other than education can I make a successful business?' This means that for any venture to be productive basic education (of whatever nature) was considered important and its shortfall was a setback to leading the desired lifestyle.
- Lack of access to public services. It was noted that although government should have ideally been providing the villages with services that can increase people's productivity, such as extension services, quality healthcare and road networks among others, in most of these (AFARD project) areas, the communities were isolated from getting government services either because of distance to service centres, neglect by government officials or simply being sidelined as unworthy of services. A respondent echoed the fact that, 'political leaders' simply do not hear our needs. Instead, they provide what they deem fit for us without consultation. Sometimes, they even shamelessly want us to contribute funds towards projects we did not need.' Another reiterated the fact that

Table 3: Components and categorization of well-being

Cluster	Indicators	Reasons	Categorization of well-being		
			Badly-off	Intermediate	Well-off
Material well-being	• Living in a good housing unit	Having a decent home without trouble of routine building	Temporary	Semi-permanent	Permanent
	• Ownership of farmland (acres)	Ability to produce own food or rent part of it for money	<1	1-3	>3
	• Owning livestock (no.)	Ability to marry for oneself and children/dependants and to perform social norms	None	1-2	>2
	- Have cattle - Have goats - Have poultry		None	1-5 1-10	>5 >10
Bodily well-being	• Ownership of modern household goods (chairs with cushions on them)	Receiving visitors without shame	No	Partly	Yes
	• Access to information				
	- Have radio - Have mobile phones	Being in contact with the world and knowing what is going on around us	No	1 Borrow	>1 Yes
	• Access to local means of transport (a bicycle)	Being able to reach out to far-off places without difficulty	None	1	>1
Socio-political well-being	• Eating nutritious foods	Living a healthy life without frequent sicknesses	No	Sometimes	Yes
	• Sleeping on good facilities (beds with mattresses and blankets/bedsheets)	Having a sound rest after a long, arduous day's work	No	Partly	Yes
	• Dressing well (Sunday special with shoes)	Fitting well in one's community	No	Partly	Yes
	• Belonging to a bigger community group	Having a collective voice to bring change to community members	No	Partly	Yes
Financial well-being	• Having profitable enterprise	Ability to earn money on a daily basis	No	Partially	Yes
	• Having cash money (savings)	Ability to afford dire needs as and when they come up	No	Up to 100,000	>100,000
Knowledge well-being	• Having sound education	Ability to secure a formal white-collar job	None	Primary	Post-primary

government 'has failed to create jobs for its citizens yet it expects the people to grow rich without telling them how to do so'.

- Cultural discrimination was yet another setback. While the men noted that culture had not put too much burden on them to earn for the ever-increasing family sizes, the youths looked at it as a roadblocks that inhibited them from trying new things given that the conservative elders are the ones considered to have a monopoly on wisdom. To women, such views of the youth were elaborated in view of the ownership of assets (including cash) and eating certain food types.
- Changes in the weather also featured as an impediment to a better life. Many people pointed to the fact that current weather conditions had made life very unpredictable. Apart from reducing productivity from people's own land, climate change had forced many households to deplete their savings (food, livestock and even money) in order to continue surviving. As such, many people are changing many facets of their well-being status because they are unable to cope with life.

Finding 3: Aggregating well-being status

In order to aggregate wellness of life, on the one hand, and social categorization, on the other, it became important to ascertain the extent to which the members of partner groups were living in what well-being status. This entailed undertaking a rapid quantitative household survey. The use of the household as the unit of analysis at this point was based on the fact that despite the heterogeneity of the members, each lived according to a given wellness that is defined by their household status. For instance, all the prioritized indicators, although belonging to individuals, are held for and on behalf of their households.

Therefore, a quantitative household questionnaire that focused at rapidly establishing the status of every household vis-à-vis the indicators of wellness was designed and pre-tested. With the questions' consistency ascertained, the final data collection was conducted among 23 randomly sampled members of the 15 partner groups involved in the group meetings. Two people (the agronomist and animal husbandry experts) collected the data, under my supervision, on dates agreed upon with the group members. However, while the field data collection was ongoing, data entry was being done concurrently and the analysis completed in a timely manner.

Demographic characteristics of respondents


This study was conducted among community-based organization members with whom AFARD was undertaking a two-year food security promotion

project. A total of 338 people (with an average household number of 6 people) were interviewed.⁹ This population was composed of 61% women (because AFARD gives priority to women in its programmes). About 13% were aged 14–24 years (although the mean age was 39 years),¹⁰ and 86% were married (57% women). A total of 16% had no formal education (15% women compared to about 1% men), compared to only 14% with post-primary education (only 3% women).

Who AFARD is working with

Basing on the rating criteria set by the groups, it was found that most of the people engaged in the food security programme were those leading the badly-off lifestyle. Figure 1 shows that those with a badly-off lifestyle accounted for 54% of the entire group members interviewed, and those in the intermediate lifestyle category made 38%. Compared to the well-off (or the rich), at a negligible 8%, this finding means that the majority of the group members AFARD is working with are the poor.

Figure 1: Well-being status of respondents




Source: Household data.

Manifestation of deprivation among target groups

From Figure 2, it is evident that although most of the people are poor (Fig. 1) a majority have a fair status in terms of material well-being (53%). The core areas of well-being deprivation are socio-political well-being, financial and knowledge well-being and bodily well-being. Of importance is the fact that both those leading badly-off and well-off lifestyles lacked socio-political identification with bigger community groups where they can make their voices heard and secure better services. This affects those with badly-off lifestyles more than those with well-off lifestyles because, first, the latter have the

ability to afford the required services and, second, they have the potential of 'governance capture', a scenario where they win favours from those in positions of influence (government and NGO officials alike).

Figure 2: Respondents' well-being categories



Source: Household data.

While this observation presents the general picture of well-being deprivation, more specifically, as can be seen from Table 4, there are variations in the different facets of deprivation among the different social categories. For instance, those with badly-off lifestyles suffer most (in order of score severity) from social-political (1%) and knowledge well-being (8%), while the well-off are deprived of socio-political (2%) and financial well-being (8%). For those at the intermediate category deprivation is in financial (9%) and socio-political well-being (14%).

Table 4: Well-being status by social category (%)

Categories	Badly-off	Intermediate	Well-off	Total
Material well-being	68	34	42	53
Bodily well-being	10	27	27	18
Socio-political well-being	1	14	2	6
Financial well-being	14	9	8	12
Knowledge well-being	8	15	21	12
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Household data.

Intervention relevance

The finding that only 8% of those engaged in the food security project are ‘well-off’ illustrates well that indeed AFARD is working with the ‘poor’ marginalized people in the community. This means that AFARD has the right targeting relevance to ensure that those in dire need are enabled to enjoy their lives.

Further, by looking at the manifestation of deprivation vis-à-vis AFARD’s vision and thematic programmes it can be said that AFARD’s vision-driven interventions rightly address the areas of core needs. By focusing on income security (financial well-being), health security (bodily well-being) and good governance (socio-political well-being), AFARD is empowering its beneficiaries to directly gain increased status on the various facets of well-being and indirectly to translate these gains into material well being.

However, the exclusion of knowledge well-being (considered as a non-niche focus) is known to have impacted negatively on AFARD’s programmes. For instance, in a review of the food security project, it is reported that illiteracy is an impediment to record-keeping, profit calculations and group growth in terms of minute-taking and keeping, among others. It is also known as a constraint on the adoption of rotational leadership as well as taking independent linkage and lobbying roles by group members.

Conclusion

This study addressed a current gap in the global anti-poverty agenda, which focuses on income/consumption poverty, on the one hand, yet, on the other, it tactically proposes the recognition of a multi-dimensional poverty to which it pays no attention. Taking an organizational accountability focus, the study presented, first, the need to accept that poverty is heterogeneous, hence endogenic to the people who face it. In this way, the orthodoxy of global harmonization in income poverty measurement provides no real change from pursuing the failed dictated development for poverty reduction. For the recognition of a multi-faceted poverty to take root a ‘glocal’ orientation is imperative because only this will provide a voice for the ‘so-called’ poor but also allow their aspirations to become part of the anti-poverty policy debate.

Second, the study provides a basis for conducting a relevance test in terms of outreach (category, location and thematic focus). This begs the question of whether or not there is public resource management effectiveness. From a management perspective, it presents a way of asking whether we are reaching out to those in need and addressing their core areas of deprivation. This appears not to be the case in many organizations (government and civil society alike) because resource allocation decisions are based on ‘leaders’ intuition (and also inherent from their interests).

For AFARD, this study provides a critical answer to organizational dilemmas. It demonstrated that AFARD is cardinally targeting poor people with badly-off or intermediate well-being status. It also found out that AFARD's vision is relevant in its area of operation. With these positive results, AFARD can justifiably account for its existence and show cause why its resource mobilization drive is necessary. Finally, these findings mean that over time AFARD, together with its beneficiaries, can monitor how far they have moved in enabling the 'poor' marginalized people to realize the lifestyles they aspire to.

Finally, from a methodological perspective, this study presents a new avenue for studying poverty – its scope (or magnitude). Used with longitudinal data, the methodology can also enable poverty trends (transition of scope) and dynamics (transition of variables) analysis. It shed light on the fact that the starting point for any poverty-related policy and study should not be the World Bank-prescribed US\$1 or 2 a day but rather 'what it means to be poor' among the beneficiary groups. The study shows how varied views can be aggregated so that existing multi-dimensional poverty status is known. In this way, the participatory, qualitative and quantitative poverty-research methods can be used to complement each other.

Notes

1. It should be noted for Table 1 that poverty is measured using an absolute poverty line, which reflects the cost of meeting a minimum of food and non-food requirements.
2. Note that g-tax was abolished during the 2006 Presidential campaign and would have expected, on the contrary, to be omitted from the poverty measurement.
3. AFARD is also a registered member of the National NGO Forum, Uganda National AIDS Services Organizations (UNASO), Participatory Ecological Landuse and Management – Uganda Chapter (PELUM), West Nile Private Sector Development Promotion Center Ltd, Nebbi District NGO Forum (NDNGOF) and Nebbi AIDS Services Organization Network (NASON).
4. This view does not negate the fact that there are cyclic cause/effect relationships in poverty dynamics. Rather, it appreciates the importance of dealing with the root causes of poverty.
5. Narayan et al. (2000) ably distinguished between wealth (which income poverty measures) and well-being that refers to a good life (pp. 21–43), dimensioning well-being as: *material well-being* seen as having enough; *bodily well-being* as being and appearing well; *social well-being* as ability to care for, bring up, marry and settle children, with self-respect and dignity, peace, harmony and good relations in the family and the community; and *security* as civil peace, a physically safe and secure environment, personal physical security, lawfulness


- and access to justice, security in old age, confidence in the future, freedom of choice and action.
6. AFARD perceives food security as based on 'Equitable 4As' – 'Availability, Adequacy, Acceptability and Affordability of quality foods, at all times, by all household members regardless of social categorization'. People should always be able to either produce or buy the right food they need.
 7. This view also cautions on the chronic poverty focus on intergenerational poverty as well as the sinking deeper into the so-called lowest poverty quartiles. It points to the fact that although one may be taken to be chronically poor, s/he is in a continuous dynamic within the various facets of the socially accepted badly-off life.
 8. However, there was a polarized category of the identified three groups. The poor were divided into two – extremely poor and just poor – and the rich into stinking rich and just rich. I opted not use this subdivision because it was used in only six of the 15 groups.
 9. Two things need to be noted here: first, the community-based groups have an average of 25 people and therefore targeting 23 of the 25 members was near-conducting a census; secondly, with 338 responses scored, it represents a 2% non-response rate from the expected 345 people, which occurred because the identified respondents were engaged in other activities, like attending to the sick or even funerals of relatives.
 10. This signifies the low age at marriage that the people engage in, which for those already married was high for women (7%) compared to men (3%).

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Appendix 1: PEAP Pillars



Appendix 2: Perceptions and indicators of poverty

	Area Perceptions of poverty	Indicators
<u>Parombo SC</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of basic necessities like food, clothes and shelter • pending sleepless nights from too many disturbing thoughts • Body weakness from old age and/or poor health • Lack of education, knowledge and skills • Missing what one planned to acquire to acquire 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Body appearance • Dressing • Sanitation • Housing structure • Access to infrastructure, e.g. roads, schools and health units
<u>Pakwach TC</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited land for farming • Inadequate clean water • Restrictions to fishing ground • Low/unreliable income • Poor asset base • Lack of basic household facilities • Poor quality of services like water and health • Displacement as a result of war • Food insecurity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low level of education • Rampant theft and idleness • Risk taking in acquiring resources across the Nile • Having one meal a day • Ill health and constant unhappiness • Poor shelter • Lack of land • Unemployment and odd jobs • Dependence on friends and relative • Poor dressing
<u>Nebbi TC</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inability to have basic needs at home and within the community • Having no support from government and remittance from relative • Inability to do gainful activities like petty trade 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poor health • Poor clothing • Malnutrition • Low level of education • Inaccessibility to services
<u>Zeu SC</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of basic needs • Inability to have good livelihood • Lack of food • Lack of scholastic materials • Lack of good clothing and shoes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poor dressing • Ill health • Illiteracy • Isolation • Poor housing and utensils • Famine • Lack of social infrastructure, e.g. schools, health units and roads • Inadequate community services, e.g. agricultural extension

Source: NDLG (2002).

Appendix 3: AFARD's intervention focus

Theme 1 Community health

HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation

AFARD delved into behaviour change communication in fishing villages (for prevention) and family and community-centred approach for support to Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC) and Person Living with AIDS (for mitigation). Awareness creation, psychosocial support, direct support for OVCs in schools and the enhancement of family and community ability to provide basic services and care are the core activities.

Safe water and sanitation promotion

In promoting Safe Water and Sanitation AFARD provides access to safe water points and toilet facilities at community points and for vulnerable families who are helpless. It also provides safe sanitation and hygiene education through trained voluntary village health committees. These are followed by a community bye-law formulation, approval, launch and enforcement by local courts.

Theme 2 Income security

Sustainable agriculture enhancement

AFARD focuses on increasing household food production and purchasing power so that food is available, adequate, affordable and acceptable throughout the year for all people for a healthy life. High-value (market and food) crops and livestock are multiplied for on-lending using a group-based approach. Field-based extension services are routinely provided in conjunction with agri-business and nutrition education.

Community microenterprise development

To promote activity diversification with prudent business practices and self-funding, AFARD integrates the promotion of group savings and credit schemes with income-generation skills improvement. Management training for savings mobilization and credit management are provided to all group members. Entrepreneurship skills training focusing on the selection, planning and management of small businesses are also provided

Theme 3 Community empowerment

Institutional development

AFARD mainly works with community-based organizations (CBOs). This ensures cost effectiveness and facilitates a 'do-it-yourself' drive for self-reliant development. To enable groups to be competent enough to operate on their own, a facilitation process that starts with the identification of groups is done. This is followed by a participatory capacity self-assessment where each group identifies its organizational strengths and weaknesses. It is the weaknesses that are used in designing a capacity-building plan with the groups. The groups' capacity-building takes the form of training, retraining, networking and linkages, resource mobilization, and advocacy and lobbying. Through periodic review groups ably chart their growth paths and identify their areas of persistent weaknesses.

Good governance

The drive to promote gender equality compelled AFARD to undertake to facilitate a process to engender services delivery in lower levels of local government. This initiative focuses at widening political space for, and entitlements of, women by increasing women's participation and voice in decision-making in local government by promoting the engagement of women and local government leaders (and technical staffs). The intervention includes skills training in gender-responsive planning and budgeting, participatory gender monitoring and evaluation and advocacy and lobbying skills aided by facilitation of and technical backstopping to women to participate in planning processes and monitoring of budgets. Source: AFARD Strategic Direction 2007–11.

Appendix 4: Well-being score by lifestyle category (%)

Well-being indicators	Badly-off	Intermediate	Well-off	Total
Nature of housing	82	15	3	100
Land size	56	18	26	100
Have cattle	85	14	1	100
Have goats	37	56	7	100
Have poultry	25	59	16	100
Housewares	88	9	4	100
Have a radio	89	10	1	100
Have mobile phones	95	4	1	100
Have a bicycle	65	34	1	100
Eat nutritious foods	17	73	9	100
Have good bedding	37	58	5	100
Dress well	35	43	22	100
Belong to a bigger community group	5	92	2	100
Have a business	59	29	11	100
Have cash savings	72	28	0	100
Have sound education	16	70	14	100
Support post-primary education	55	29	16	100
Total	54	38	8	100