Post-Independence Development Planning in Ghana and Tanzania: Agriculture, Women and Nation-building¹

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Abstract

This article analyses development planning in post-independence Ghana and Tanzania, particularly related to agriculture, in contrast with the contemporary neoliberal subsumption of African economies to market forces. The article derives lessons from both their successes and shortcomings. Ghana and Tanzania’s experiences suggest the importance of agricultural transformation for national self-sufficiency; development planning as a mechanism to link all sectors of the economy; and the key strategic potential of the state in production, distribution and employment creation. Key shortcomings included the inability to fully de-link national economies from the global capitalist political economy, break dependence on earnings from cash crop exports, and the political and economic marginalisation of women in post-independence development planning. The article suggests that progressive development planning that centres the pursuit of gender justice is a critical starting point for imagining and pursuing alternatives to neoliberalism.

Résumé

Cet article analyse la planification du développement au Ghana et en Tanzanie au lendemain des indépendances, surtout dans le domaine de l’agriculture, en contraste avec la subordination actuelle des économies africaines aux forces néolibérales du marché. L’article tire des leçons de leurs succès et de leurs échecs. Les expériences du Ghana et de la Tanzanie montrent l’importance de la transformation de l’agriculture pour l’autosuffisance nationale ; la planification du développement comme mécanisme de connexion de tous les secteurs de l’économie ; ainsi que, l’énorme potentiel stratégique de

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l’État dans la production, la distribution et la création d’emploi. Parmi les principales lacunes, citons l’incapacité à déconnecter totalement les économies nationales de l’économie politique capitaliste mondiale, la dépendance à l’égard des recettes d’exportation des cultures commerciales et la marginalisation politique et économique des femmes dans la planification du développement après l’indépendance. L’article suggère que la planification progressive du développement, centrée sur la recherche d’une égalité entre les hommes et les femmes, est un point de départ essentiel pour imaginer et promouvoir des alternatives au néolibéralisme.

**Introduction**

For African nations at independence, social and economic overhaul was necessary to derive meaningful outcomes from their struggles against colonial rule (Dwyer and Zeilig 2012; Pieterse 2001). The first presidents of Ghana and Tanzania, Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, aware of the political and economic ramifications of their countries’ incorporation into the global capitalist system, sought to pursue models other than the dominant capitalist, Western-induced modernisation. Their goals were clear: to build robust economies that respond to the social needs of their citizens. Development planning became the task of government and the strategies adopted determined which sectors were considered critical for focused, coordinated targeting. In both countries, important economic sectors were placed under state control, making Ghana and Tanzania two of the few African countries with high levels of state-dominated economies pre-structural adjustment.

What passes now as development planning within neoliberal IMF and World Bank prescriptions is fiscal and financial tinkering accompanied by the retreat of the nation-state from direct economic participation to satisfy human needs. The underlying idea of neoliberalism is that once market forces reach the required equilibrium, all sectors will respond with appropriate outcomes to the benefit of citizens, irrespective of their social and economic standing. Apprehensions have been expressed about the IMF and World Bank policy inadequacies and their detrimental effect on African nations such as Ghana and Tanzania. Such concerns dominated early discussions of the feminist group, the Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD) and later the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN). Even as they deepen global poverty, adjustment and austerity policies continue to dominate, framed as the only choice for nation-building.

I use the term development planning in this article to refer to conscious attempts at nation-building that entail interventions directed at transforming
the entirety of social and economic systems (Reddock 2000). I note that mainstream definitions of development have, since the 1950s and 1960s, undergone several modifications, from the point it was conceived as a catch-up process for nations emerging out of colonial rule and those devastated by the Second World War (ibid.). The appropriateness of a Western industrial system fuelled by its private capital as the standard for development was called into question when the promised benefits failed to trickle down; however, emerging alternatives since the fall of the Berlin Wall (heralding the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe) have remained marginal, applied only in local contexts. Such attempts attract intense hostility from Western industrialised countries (Pieterse 2001; Reddock 2000). Questions about the efficacy of this vision of national wellbeing, and its accompanying structures, direct economic policymaking globally and in African countries in particular. Six decades after independence, the ability of chosen economic strategies to meet citizens’ needs remains in question, heightening the need for credible alternatives.

The postcolonial models ended either violently disrupted, such as in the case of Ghana, or consumed under adjustment policies, like in Tanzania. Numerous studies have sought to explain the conditions that rendered the Ghanaian and Tanzanian experiments untenable; recurring conclusions insist they stand as viable models with important lessons for overcoming the current economic challenges facing African countries (Hansen 1989; Ninsin 1989a; Boesen, Madsen and Moody 1977). The main question of this article is: to what extent do the Ghanaian and Tanzanian economic models stand as viable alternatives to the dominant, neoliberal Western system? The goal is to distil lessons for autonomous national development planning that addresses the needs of Africans. In doing this, the article focuses attention on two key parts of development planning: agriculture and the place of women in nation-building.

The Study Goal, Data Sources and Analytical Frame

My aim is to explore how Ghana’s Seven-Year Development Plan and provisions in Tanzania’s Arusha Declaration set out to transform social and economic relations within inherited colonial structures. What striking features of these plans can be recovered to inform current efforts at development planning? To address the questions raised, I examine Ghana and Tanzania’s planning policies around agriculture and provisions to address women’s status in the immediate post-independence period. I draw on documented sources like the Ghanaian and Tanzanian development plans of the first ruling governments, and a selection of studies on their efforts. Further information was derived from expert interviews with a few key surviving members of Ghanaian interest groups like trade unionists,
academics, farmers and youth groups. I submit a deeper coverage of the Ghanaian case because of my familiarity with the context. I use the Tanzanian experience only as a supporting case.

My analytical frame is derived from the political economy approach, guided by a Marxist analysis of production relations, which maintains that central to meeting human needs is how the material base of a society is organised. The two main components, forces of production and relations of production, are accompanied by a superstructure which is a worldview that gives legitimacy to the main production relations and dominant mode of production. I therefore maintain that development planning is the decisions taken about production and distribution to meet citizens’ needs within a nation, which emerge out of a theoretical understanding of what development entails (Tsikata 2001; Hill 2005). The theory that frames the development planning choices nations make is a political question derived from certain assumptions about social reality which shape strategic choices. The theoretical basis of development planning serves as the meeting of politics, ideology and explanation of social reality (Pieterse 2001).

A key assumption of the Marxist analysis I adopt is that development benefits accrue to social groups that control the means of production. The state serves to moderate the interests of the class that benefits from production relations. As such, it is critical to consider the actors, context, content and outcomes of development plans. In terms of context, the analysis sets out to describe the conception of the state’s developmental role, whether as provider or facilitator, and the ensuing rights that citizens could demand. Examining key development actors entails outlining the prime movers (either internal or external to the nation), their spheres of influence and terrain of operation accorded within the development plans. What levels of control over production resources did the state devolve to such constituencies in the national development plans under study?

Within the Marxist approach, it is also important to consider the social power relations the plans set out to change: was there a perceived need to transform or reform the existing social relations identified as inimical to social progress within the agriculture sector? How did the plans analyse gender relations? To what extent did the Ghanaian and Tanzanian plans seek to use agriculture to restructure their national economies within the broader international capitalist system into which they had been drafted as subsidiary members during colonial rule? What did their development planners conceive as limiting to the agricultural sector and its potential role in national development? How did they set out to address the perceived limitations and what were their preferred alternatives? This article also considers the costing and financing strategies of both plans.
In exploring existing literature and other sources, I outline striking features of the two development plans, detailing their common grounds and divergences. The extent to which development planning options were directed at meeting national needs and what lessons they hold for the present is the subject of the sections that follow. This concentration directs focus on women and rural farmers as actors and interest groups shaping policy orientation and choices. The discussions examine women as a social category, noting how they were generally covered in the development plans and the role they were assigned in agriculture. Finally, I draw important lessons for national development planning around agricultural productivity and provisions for women’s social status in the two countries.

**Setting the Frame for Development Planning**

To appreciate the task that confronted the Ghanaian and Tanzanian governments at independence, it is important to consider the state of economies passed on from colonial rule. The inherited colonial economies in both instances were entirely dominated by British private capital (Ngowi 2009; Ninsin 1989a; Becker and Craigie 2008). They were primary producers of raw materials (agricultural and mineral) for colonial metropolitan industries and purchasers of manufactured products from the metropolis. Unlike in countries of southern Africa, there were no colonial settler communities in Ghana and Tanzania. The main productive forces in both countries, beyond a sprinkling of waged workers in the mines, industries and administration, were peasant farmers. The entire colonial enterprise hardly thought of economic growth outside the interests of the British empire and very few believed that colonial subjects were entitled to benefits other than what the local economy could support (Frimpong-Ansah 1992). The colonial agenda had been subject to debate, nonetheless, and some had advocated for meeting the very simple needs of colonised peoples. Others, such as the economist Arthur Lewis, demanded industrialisation to link modernised agriculture to improve rural productivity, produce food for the domestic market, and release labour tied to the land for urban industry (*ibid.*; Becker and Craigie 2008). According to Frimpong-Ansah (1992), the scale of Lewisian agricultural and industrial transformation was predicated on central planning and the infusion of private capital, an obligation the colonial overlords did not want to assume.

When confronted with the real task of nation-building after independence, the need for alternatives to direct planning became an imperative. Ghana and Tanzania, amongst other African nations, were certain that, after an initial trial, the Western economic model under which they had been colonised was not an option. Nkrumah and Nyerere were clear about the
need to deviate from the Western capitalist models they inherited and seek alternatives that would shorten the national transition to development. The credible alternative were the socialist experiments that had propelled some unindustrialised Eastern European countries to catch up with industrialised Western nations. The added attraction of the Eastern European model was the fact that it was based on the two-stage transition from feudalism to socialism, bypassing capitalism (Dwyer and Zeilig 2012). According to observers like Boesen, Madsen and Moody (1977), Ninsin (1989b) and Jonah (1989), this realisation triggered a redirection of state intervention in nation-building.

Nkrumah and Nyerere set out to develop what they considered viable development alternatives on a brand of socialism that they identified as African. The central tenets of African socialism as basically egalitarian derived its ethos from African communalist values. The African communalistic ethos would allow a transition into socialism, avoiding the disruptive violent conflict associated with the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism in Europe. The ultimate society envisioned was one devoid of what was perceived by the two governments as ‘exploitation’ from internal groups like urban dwellers and speculative businesses. In Ghana, the carrying agent of socialism was the waged worker who was going to produce national wealth in the state-owned industries powered by the Akosombo hydro-electric dam with raw materials derived from modernised agriculture. In Tanzania, it was the peasant in Ujamaa villages practising egalitarian living in an African family style. Both evolved one-party states as the only political system that could deliver and sustain socialism; political pluralism was considered divisive and unable to ensure state control over national resources for the benefit of its citizens (Ayarbior 2016). Tanzania turned to rural development guided by traditional egalitarian principles to deliver citizens from poverty and ignorance, while Ghana proceeded with strategies to reduce dependence on Western imports through rapid industrialisation by modernising agriculture, a strategy termed import substitution industrialisation (ISI). Both placed the foundation of the national development plans in agriculture.

Nyerere was president from 1962 until 1985 and Nkrumah from 1957 to 1966. Whatever potential Nkrumah’s autonomous thinking model held for Ghana was curtailed by a violent coup d’état less than three years into its implementation. The only plan that received mention after Nkrumah’s was the Five-Year Development Plan of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), the second military junta. The SMC’s development plan was projected to cover 1975/76 to 1979/80, but its implementation triggered the economic crisis of the mid-1970s that led the country to neoliberal adjustment in the
1980s. Under Nyerere, Tanzania had the chance to implement the post-independence development planning strategy over two and a half decades. The survival of Nyerere’s Ujamaa, with the buy-in of international aid agencies which invested in sustaining it, might suggest it was not perceived as a threat to the global capitalist order. Tanzania faced both internal and external resistance to the implementation of Ujamaa, nonetheless (Boesen, Madsen and Moody 1977).

**The Tanzanian Agricultural Context at Independence**

Tanzanian socialism was conceived as a fifteen-year, long-term plan covering the period between 1964–80 and implemented in a series of five-year development plans. The goal was to improve the standard of living by altering production structures through the expansion of industrial production, accompanied by a corresponding reduction of the agricultural share in the national economy. The first Five-Year Development Plan had Tanzanisation as its principal goal. It was under the second Five-Year Development Plan that the Arusha Declaration emerged. Hartmann, quoting Coulson, notes that Ujamaa was incorporated into the second plan because Nyerere insisted on it, presenting it as a policy for rural development based on village settlements provided with modern social welfare services (1983: 395). Enterprises based on foreign-supported, capital-intensive production were considered an extension of colonial exploitation, especially of rural dwellers. The two-pronged industrial strategy opted to develop Tanzania and stem rural/urban migration was the Basic Industrial Strategy and the Small Industries Development Organisation (SIDO) (Kent and Mushi 1995).

Malima considers the third Five-Year Plan as truly Tanzanian, since it was ‘the first of its kind to be drawn up almost completely by Tanzanians and be subjected to thorough and arduous scrutiny by both the Tanzania Planning Commission as well as the Central Committee and the National Executive Committee of the Party’ (1979: 48). The first and second were developed by foreign experts ‘with very little political input either from the people, its leaders, or technocrats’ (ibid.). Tanzania was considered then as lacking the needed technical expertise to draft its development plan.

At independence, under the Nyerere-led Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), Tanzania’s developmental problems were initially diagnosed as attitudinal (Schneider 2015). This position changed in 1967 with the Arusha Declaration, which explicitly stated ideological tradition shifted Ujamaa socialism from a state of mind to political action (Boesen, Madsen and Moody 1977). The developmental challenges identified were poverty, ignorance and disease, in a society where few individuals controlled the
major means of production and wealth. Unacceptable wealth accumulation through extortion, discrimination, bribery and corruption was considered exploitative. The declaration emphasised that Tanzania’s wealth, used by the state to provide urban comforts like utilities and modern infrastructure, was derived from rural production, a situation that makes rural/urban disparities exploitative. The task of nation-building was moving Tanzania and Africa out of poverty, ignorance and disease to prosperity, a mission depicted as warfare.

Generally, the eradication of exploitation in Tanzania was seen as contingent on the absence of class society like capitalism and feudalism, as well as of gross income inequality. Political action expected to abolish exploitation was dependent on what was touted as socialist principles of self-reliance, a strong sense of solidarity, and mutual self-help based on the bond between family members. Additional, mainly economic conditions necessary for removing exploitation were full employment, a just return for labour performed, and the guaranteed right of future generations to natural resources. The prerequisites of development mapped out in the declaration were: the people, land, good policies defined as socialism, self-reliance and leadership, intelligence, and hard work.

Measures that would help Tanzania transition to socialism included the nationalisation of public assets, leadership code of behaviour, and wage reforms (ibid.). The Tanzanian state was assigned control over the principal means of production and exchange like land-based natural resources, forests, water and minerals as well as manufacturing, commercial and financial outlets. In this, agriculture was expected to play a key role. In fact, increased agricultural outputs for home consumption and export were outlined as the only means Tanzania could develop. Tanzania’s interest was production for domestic consumption based on the conviction that the direct beneficiaries should be the rural agriculture labour force. A developmental goal was to alter rural production relations by dealing with access to productive resources. Cooperatives were set up as the principal means for organising production. Institutional support for Ujamaa included the ministries of Regional Administration and Rural Development, Development Planning and Agriculture. The Presidential Planning Team of five experts and a TANU regional official also directly reported to the president in the areas of agriculture, cooperatives, land planning, hydraulic development and economics.

Ujamaa was adopted to support Tanzania’s drive to socialism. Communal life was one of the pillars of socialism, egalitarianism and the eradication of poverty as its central ethos. According to Hartmann (1983), Nyerere’s view of development was influenced by the need to have peasants in nucleated settlements to facilitate provisioning of social services. Though the
productivity goal was compromised through cracks in implementation, the social investments in health, education and national unity were high. An outcome of Ujamaa and later villagisation was the resettlement of 11 million Tanzanians by 1977. Another was the homogenisation of languages that is said to be at the basis of Tanzania’s political stability (Hartmann 1983).

The Ghanaian Context at Independence

At independence, Nkrumah’s government inherited the 1951 colonial government’s development plan, which was reduced from its original ten-year phase to five. After independence, this colonial development plan’s implementation was extended to 1959 (Bennett-Koufie 2018). For Ninsin, the colonial development plan follows the industrialisation-by-invitation (IBI) model. He insists that Ghana had adequate capital to initiate independent industrialisation without international finance capital (Ninsin 1989b). For others, however, it was simply a pragmatic approach to avoid providing the colonial government reason to postpone Ghana’s independence (Bennett-Koufie 2018). Whatever the reason for not abandoning the colonial ten-year development plan, the inadequacy of the Lewisian-inspired IBI to transform the Ghanaian economy became apparent by the end of the 1950s (Ninsin 1989b). Private capital inflows were disappointing, trade and budget deficits were high, and so was the country’s indebtedness (Jonah 1989; Ninsin 1989b; Sowa 1989).

Nkrumah subsequently launched his first seven-year national development plan; his opening speech questioned the validity of the ten-year colonial strategy, pronouncing it ‘a collection of various individual petty projects … in preparation for future planning’ (Republic of Ghana 1964: ix), further explaining that:

> [a]t the conclusion of this programme, it became necessary to pause for two years in order to consolidate our position. By the time we reached the stage of implementing the next phase of our programme, it had already become quite clear to us that the only real solution to the reconstruction of Ghana lay, in the long run, in the adoption of a socialist and co-operative programme for industry and the mechanisation and diversification of our agriculture (ibid.: x).

The fourteen-chapter development plan covered topics such as agriculture, industry and mining, infrastructure, education, human resource and employment, health and housing, the hydro-electric Volta River Project, public administration, and foreign trade. The remaining chapters detailed financing, implementation, and management strategies. The strategy was two-pronged: deal with the crisis of the neo-colony through state appropriation of capital for investment and begin the path towards socialism.
Strategies for the development of agriculture after independence are captured in the fourth chapter of Ghana’s Seven-Year-Development Plan. For the framers of the plan, agriculture and industry were the most strategic sectors: first as entry points for state control over ‘supplies and vital springs of economic activity’ (Republic of Ghana 1964: 3) and as the basis for generating the needed resources to grow the national economy. According to the plan, at independence, agriculture supplied 77 per cent of domestic exports, employing about 67 per cent of the labour force. The productive capacity was, however, low, and unable to meet national food needs, causing rising food costs and leading to growing imports to supplement productivity deficits. Rising food prices were noted as a threat to the standard of living, political stability and constituted an economic drain. High food prices made Ghanaian products uncompetitive in the global export market. Lower food prices, therefore, became critical for fiscal, monetary and political stability.

The plan was founded on the Convention People’s Party (CPP)’s Programme of ‘Work and Happiness’, and it hinged on four ‘cardinal points’ named as citizens’ welfare, the establishment of a socialist society, African unity, and independence and global peace. It was to serve as the path for building ‘a self-sustaining economy based on socialist production and distribution in Ghana’ (ibid.: vii). In short, the plan aimed to facilitate the transition to socialism, described as citizens’ control over their national economy to promote their well-being in the absence of worker exploitation irrespective of their location, be it rural or urban. A socialist society was considered the fastest way to meet the needs of Ghanaians. In the interim, Ghana was going to run a ‘mixed economy … in which public and private enterprise will each have a legitimate, recognisable and very important contribution to make towards economic growth’ (ibid.: 2). Strategic areas outlined for state control included those providing the basic living needs of Ghanaians such as utilities, raw materials, light and heavy industries, as well as the production of consumer goods with high rates of returns.

To provide a robust foundation for success, substructures like education and research were set in place. Education was designed to supply the Ghanaian workforce with the necessary skills to advance industry and agriculture. Specialised institutions proposed to oversee its implementation included, at the apex, the National Planning Commission, and supporting committees like State Planning and Management, Budget, and Foreign Exchange. The Academy of Sciences and other research institutions were assigned the responsibility to provide cutting-edge research and advanced technology for pursuing the development agenda. The governmental machinery was slated for reform in tune with policy prescriptions. Nkrumah’s lament was the inability of the plan to cover the entire African continent.
Farmers, Agriculture and Agricultural Modernisation

Part of African nations’ persistent food sufficiency deficits have been blamed on the rural policies of colonial governments and the apparent absence of any effort after independence to break up this colonial strategy (Konings 1981; Dwyer and Zeilig 2012). However, evidence from the Ghanaian and Tanzanian post-independence plans suggest otherwise; breaking the dependence on food imports and delivering adequate nutrition and income for peasant farmers were critical to their developmental agendas. Agriculture was, therefore, one sector where the socialist principles of both governments were played out clearly. Agricultural modernisation was given a prominent place in their development plans. Various modes were advanced in the two countries under study, such as feeding the planned industries and diversifying the mono-export crop production. It was, however, the collectivised production mode that was going to drive the sector. In the next two sections, I examine the agricultural plans of Ghana and Tanzania for their viability in addressing the stated concerns.

Farmers and Agriculture in Ghana

Ghana’s agricultural policy, outlined in the Seven-Year Development Programme according to Gyimah-Boadi (1989) and Hansen (1989), was informed by economic and political considerations. The most pressing economic conditions at independence were the need to provide raw materials for the ISI programmes and capital accumulation to support both hard and soft infrastructure. The Ghanaian population was expected to increase by almost 20 per cent in the planned implementation period and therefore increased productivity was necessary to reduce the domestic food production deficit. Hansen (1989) contends the nation’s food deficit was blamed on production and distribution or marketing. Low technology and techniques, as well as low-quality seed, livestock and poultry breed, constrained productivity. This situation was further worsened by undue post-harvest losses and lack of reliable marketing facilities, producing price disincentives (Gyimah-Boadi 1989; Hansen 1989). Additional problems included heavy reliance on cocoa mainly for international trade and revenue for the import of capital and consumer goods. The solutions to the identified challenges were captured in the development plan under three tasks, namely: nutritional improvement and the elimination of the food sufficiency deficit, raising incomes in Ghana’s rural communities with a special focus on the Northern and Upper Regions, and increasing raw material production for local industry and the export market to ameliorate the nation’s balance of
payments. These goals, in combination with geographical conditions, were expected to influence the regional production of agricultural commodities.

Modernising agriculture production was seen largely as a fitting response to increasing agricultural production. A three-pronged strategy outlined to achieve this was: support for peasant farmers, setting up cooperative and state farms to undertake large-scale farming to feed agricultural industries and produce cereals and meat for the urban market, and turning marketing bodies under state-control. The plan targeted increasing output per farmer and acreage under cultivation. Water conservation and irrigation were key priorities and the goal was to put 80,000 acres of land under cultivation. Greater expansion in the grants for agriculture research was to help solve the problems of seed and stock and outdated farming practices. State-controlled marketing bodies were also established and funds provided to build storage facilities to minimise post-harvest losses and remove from farmers the burden of storing and marketing agriculture produce. The fisheries sub-sector attracted attention as the main avenue for meeting the protein needs in the country. It was to be supported by the State Fishing Corporation with an independent fleet of trawlers that were expected to be increased. Its targeted production was 30,000 tons per annum to be supported by nation-wide cold storage and distribution facilities. Private fishermen were going to receive larger motorised boats and training to operate them, as well as encouragement to organise cooperatives to purchase boats as a means to overcome high prices.

Agricultural modernisation was directed at raising the standard of living of citizens through increased incomes, better nutrition and the stimulation of alternative employment. Modernised agriculture was also considered fundamental to industrialisation since in addition to serving as the main source of industrial raw materials, the sector held the bulk of the nation's labour force. Restructuring agriculture was therefore considered necessary to change employment composition and release labour for rapid industrialisation. Drafters of the plan were aware of the inherent danger in releasing agricultural labour without a corresponding increase in productivity to make up for the reduction in the number of persons working on the land.

The political reasons that shaped the strategic direction of Ghana's agriculture development plan were, according to Gyimah-Boadi (1989) and Hansen (1989), the need to mitigate the growing hostility led by the opposition in its Ashanti Region stronghold. Both cite, in support, the organisations created to facilitate rural, large-scale agriculture: the United Ghana Farmers’ Cooperatives Council (UGFCC), the Young Farmers’ League (YFL) and the Workers’ Brigade. The YFL operated settlement farms for young persons (Gyimah-Boadi 1989). Others were the Ministry of Cooperatives, which
developed out of a department under Local Government and Cooperatives to oversee that the cooperative movement was set up to mitigate absentee farmers’ stiff resistance to the agricultural project (Kwabena Senkyire 2018). According to Baffour Kwabena Senkyire:

Cooperatives were central to the 7-year development programme. Government had no control over cooperatives but needed to use them for promoting and developing self-government. Cooperatives were essential; you cannot talk about socialism without cooperatives. They are necessary to develop agriculture because farmers are individualistic in nature. Cooperatives will help bring them together. But Farmers’ cooperatives were more functional in the cocoa sector and operated more as marketing entities (ibid.).

The UGFCC was incorporated into the central committee of the CPP and their members were given state appointments (Ninsin 1989b). The incorporation was considered mutually beneficial. For the government, beyond the ability to control its members, it allowed better appropriation of capital for nation-building. The state, as an employer and appropriator of surplus, qualified Ghana as state capitalist and less as socialist. The UGFCC became a conduit for appropriating the surplus production of self-employed farmers. Through the Cocoa Marketing Board as the main buyer of cocoa, about 23 per cent tax was imposed on earnings from the sale of cocoa during the 1960 to 1965 era.

The agriculture sector, like the rest of the national economy, was slated to operate under mixed public/private production relations. Identified farming production systems were: smallholder peasant farms, large-scale farms, state farms, and Workers’ Brigades and Farmer cooperatives like the UGFCC and YFL. As an apex coordinating body, the State Farms Corporation was expected to ‘play a leading part in the production of sugar-cane, cotton, rubber, non-apparel fibres and meat where large-scale organisation has decided advantages in production’ (Republic of Ghana 1964: 79). Workers’ Brigade farms were expected to adopt the operational models of state farms, with the state financing initial investments. The state farms and those operated by the Workers’ Brigade were slated to adopt new technologies on a large scale, not only to boost productivity but to serve as experimental farms for small farmers to facilitate the diffusion of new agriculture techniques and practices. Private farmers were going to be encouraged to form cooperatives to access modern technologies like farm machinery and inputs as well as credit.

Unquestionably, land played a great role in the success or otherwise of agriculture generally and rural agriculture in particular. What made land access and control even more imperative was the fact that rural agriculture in both Ghana and Tanzania was dominated by peasant production. Boesen,
Madsen and Moody’s definition of peasantry as those ‘whose ultimate security lies in their having certain rights in the land and in the labour of family members on the land’ (1977: 159) explains the situation. The dominant land tenure system granted members of land-holding groups communal use rights. Management of such use rights was vested in traditional authorities like chiefs, spiritual leaders, and heads of clans and extended families who held the allodial title in the interest of the landholding group. But communal tenure practices were, in some instances, at variance with the development plans, especially where large-scale land acquisition was necessary and farmers had to be settled on land outside their traditional land holding group.

Development planning had to address the problems of large-scale land acquisition and tenure security for tenant and migrant farmers. According to Ninsin (1989c), three laws7 were set out to reform local government practice in Ghana and manage the influence of authority over land. Other laws more directly related to land, according to Ninsin, ‘gave state power over stool and other lands; power to authorise the acquisition and use of such lands for either private or public purposes; and to regulate the collection and use of stool revenue’ (ibid.: 168).8 Legislation gave the state control over land in Ghana, allowing it to circumscribe communal tenure practices, support freehold land acquisition and acquire land for collective farming schemes, leading to state interference with traditional practices (ibid.). Meeting the interests of farmer groups led to a rift with chiefs, largely over the land question (ibid.). Ninsin points out the limited social impact of these laws, primarily from the fact that they failed to address the root of the exploitative relations between landowners and tenant peasant farmers, ‘access to land and security of right in, and of title to, land’ (ibid.: 169). The main issues at the base of production as related to peasant farmers’ control over land, tenure security, and fees were not directly addressed. The limited beneficial impact of these legal instruments was further reduced by ignorance compounded by literacy challenges.

Some achievements were recorded: by 1964 the number of state farms had grown from forty-two to 112; the YFL had thirty-nine camps; the Workers’ Brigade had forty-three farms; and the number of societies operating under the UGFCC had increased from 992 to 1732 (Dadson 1991). However, the implementation of the collectivised farming model under the Seven-Year Development Plan ran into some difficulties, like shortfalls in terms of set targets (ibid.). The state farms deemed the most productive were operating well below target, with under a fifth of the one million acres of land acquired under cultivation. Meanwhile, the YFL could only attain 1 per cent of the projected 10 per cent of the national cultivated area it had been assigned.
The main challenge undermining the effectiveness of the agriculture strategies was timing and sequencing, largely from rolling out a plan whose support systems were yet to be developed. Thus, Dadson (1991) contends that the speed of implementation meant that before supporting organs could yield their targets, actual implementation had begun creating shortfalls in personnel, planting materials, and marketing channels. Agriculture modernisation was riding on mechanisation, fertilizer, and improved planting materials. The nation was, however, dependent on imports for major equipment and their parts. Again, poor scheduling of imports as well as trained technicians rendered almost 80 per cent of the imported farm machinery unusable (ibid.). In terms of management, the multiplicity of organs and ministries made autonomous decision-making at the farm level, especially within the state farms, complicated. In fact, Dadson (1991) remains sceptical about the benefits of collectivised farming, blaming managerial and implementation tardiness. It was not clear how the collectivised farming production modes that had been introduced – state-controlled farms, cooperative farming and YFL and Workers’ Brigade – were enough to transition capitalist production relations within agriculture into socialism. These shortcomings notwithstanding, Ghana set up a wide range of agriculture-based industries, with elaborate storage and marketing systems, that delivered food products to the urban waged workers right within their workplaces. The infrastructure set, once managerial challenges had been straightened out, should have helped ensure that some of the current problems carried over from colonial rule, like the food production deficit, could have been overcome.

**Farmers and Agriculture in Tanzania**

In Tanzania, agriculture was seen as ‘the basis for development’ (Ibhawoh and Dibua 2003: 64), one that was, as in Ghana, conceived of as a socialist project. The policy environment guiding agriculture included the five-yearly development plans of the Arusha Declaration, and several policies passed between 1969 and 1973 on rural development and collectivised agriculture. In 1967, the year of the Arusha Declaration, the supporting Five-Year Development Plan targeted increased food production, and improved educational and health access. The goal of the second Five-Year Development Plan was to ensure the agriculture sector would produce enough food for the growing Tanzanian population, provide raw materials for industry, and produce cash crop to earn foreign exchange to finance imports. The strategy was to transform the production techniques of peasant farmers and improve that of those identified as progressive farmers who had already adopted
modern techniques and were into capitalist production. Commercial farming was also targeted in earlier development plans. Generally, commercial farmers were in the minority, made up of foreigners, but responsible for over two-fifths of the value of national exports. The specific targets set for agriculture production were to overcome some of the basic hindrances, emanating from the utilisation of outdated agricultural practices and techniques, like being overly rain-dependent and utilising rudimentary tools like the hand-hoe (Malima 1979: 48). The strategies included the introduction of animal-driven ploughs and soil fertility enhancement through fertilizer and manure use as well as irrigation. The idea was to incorporate peasant agriculture into the market economy and render them less able to depend on subsistence farming by restricting them to few crops.

Ujamaa villages were conceived as cooperative production systems based on the ‘traditional African practices of communal living and social equity’ (Ibhawoh and Dibua 2003: 67). Beginning with Ujamaa in 1968 and later villagisation in 1974, rural relocation and resettlement transformed from voluntary choice to force (Hartmann 1983). In a bid to increase productivity, the government supplied support to Ujamaa village dwellers in the form of agriculture inputs like seeds, insecticides, farming technology-tractors, and ploughs. Other inputs included infrastructure such as utilities, transportation, storage, social services, and marketing facilities and extension services (Boesen, Madsen and Moody 1977). Ujamaa had varying levels of success, faring better in areas of dispersed settlements, higher poverty and lower levels of cash crop production. For some, the introduction of villagisation policy, presented as a bifurcation of two elements of Ujamaa, ‘living together’ and ‘working together’, represented a vague admission that the earlier Ujamaa policy had failed (Hartmann 1983: 273).

The role of land in agriculture policy as outlined in the Ghanaian case applied in Tanzania as well. Direct management of land by the state was more successful in Tanzania than in Ghana. Thus, state acquisition of land, introduced by constitutional fiat, made the president the highest authority over land in Tanzania. State intervention was used to regulate access for poor rural farmers and to meet large-scale agrarian policy goals in Tanzania. Some of this authority was extended to the minister in charge of energy and mining, to facilitate land acquisition for mining (Schneider 2015). Such widespread authority was imperative for Tanzania’s Ujamaa.

Several implementation strategies limited the beneficial outcomes of Ujamaa or rural transformation just as in Ghana. Named shortcomings were evidenced in the inability to meet set goals and failure to achieve agrarian change to catalyse socialist transformation. The causes named are
numerous, including the lack of clarity around management responsibilities to ensure delivery of policy goals, and clear-cut implementation strategies. Some accounts have noted the limited capacity of peasant production to expand to meet the needs of the capitalist society, an observation that is not borne out by Ghana’s experience of cocoa production. Hartmann rejects these explanations and looks for answers rather in policy formulation and implementation processes. For her, the multiplicity of policymaking sites (government, party and presidency), as well as the disjuncture within these sites arising out of their opposing goals and motives, set the stage for policy collapse (Hartmann 1983). However, Hartmann suggests that the disconnect between president, politicians and technocrats in rural policymaking and implementation was deliberate, as it served the interest of Nyerere by offering him some ‘manoeuvrability’ to push his ideas (1983: 88). It also allowed party members to have their way.

The original intent was to use Ujamaa for the grassroots mobilisation of rural Tanzanians; however, strategies did not exist to connect the political party (TANU) structures with those of the Ujamaa villages. Existing structures were hardly functional and those connecting village-level decisions to district, regional and national decision-making were weak. Lost in this were the participating members of the Ujamaa villages, who were effectively removed from practical decision-making and reduced to passive recipients of support:

their labour inputs, which were small and irregular, and … participation in meetings where the role of the villagers was mainly passive in approving the proposal presented to them by government officials directly or through the village leadership (Boesen, Madsen and Moody 1977: 154–5).

By 1973, the state shifted from incentives to coercion (forced relocation and imprisonment) to ensure mass relocation (ibid.). Rural Tanzanian attitudes, according to Ibhawoh and Dibua, ‘ranged from scepticism and mistrust to outright resentment and opposition’ (2003: 68). While coercion entrenched resentment, making the scheme further unpopular, incentives dampened the motivation for increased productivity.

Other gaps included the fact that Ujamaa, though framed as benefiting from traditional modes of living in Africa, actually provided limited opportunities to incorporate traditional agricultural practices as they were deemed backward relative to Western-style agriculture. The project was also supported by an overblown public service, a situation which Kent and Mushi (1995), quoting Biersteker (1990) and Schott (1992), describe as ‘wider Keynesianism’ fraught with the tendency to overload the state (1995). Thus, while the public service grew at 15 per cent per annum, ‘agriculture and industry together increased at an average of about 3.4%’ (Malima 1979: 48).
TANU had three direct implementation responsibilities: providing political outlook, coordination and mobilisation (Hartmann 1983). These differing aims and institutional responsibilities, for Hartmann (1983), led to divergent interventions leading to reduction in agriculture productivity. For example, while some crops increased productivity, such as tobacco, tea and cashew nuts, other major export and food crops did not fare well. Agricultural production decreased in the period between the first and second development plans, though there was an increase in industrial production (Malima 1979). Tanzania became more dependent on foreign aid in 1975, six years after the Arusha Declaration, than it was before. According to Hartmann, ‘the aid component was 24.4 per cent of total development expenditure in 1967, but 32.5 per cent in 1970/71, and 62 per cent in 1975/6’ (1983: 8). This intensified decline in agriculture in the early 1970s, compelling the three organs to coordinate their activities through a joint platform. It also marked the shift from Ujamaa to villagisation. But for some observers villagisation was the final nail in the coffin of agricultural decline, coinciding with a drought and famine that forced Tanzania to import food at a time when its foreign earnings were under stress from higher crude oil bills and also strained reserves (ibid.). Other accounts of the failure of the villagisation project were the high levels of capitalisation that it attracted. Insufficient funds rendered most of the targets set as unattainable.

**Women as a Development Constituency**

This section presents an account of women’s activism in colonial Ghana and Tanzania and the extent to which their mobilising and organising potential was effectively channelled into post-independence development planning generally and agriculture in particular. Women were an important constituency in nationalist struggles across Africa. Various accounts show that in Ghana and Tanzania, women’s participation in pre-independence struggles provided the mobilising pivot for the CPP and TANU. This was however, not reflected in the elite and male-dominated nationalist leadership (Dwyer and Zeilig 2012).  

**Ghanaian Women and the Seven-Year Development Plan**

During the independence struggle, women were at the forefront of protests and mass mobilisation. Women traders were instrumental to the success of hold-ups in the trade of imported goods and cocoa, and women also deployed large financial outlays for the CPP to function as a political entity. Tsikata attributes the growth of the CPP to women ‘who toured the regions of the country alongside the men’ (1989: 77). Manuh (1991) adds that the
appointment of four women as propaganda secretaries – Leticia Quaye, Hannah Cudjoe, Ama Nkrumah and Sophia Doku – was responsible for mobilising party members. They carried out educational programmes for women in the party and were critical thinkers. Mabel Dove Danquah and Akua Asabea Ayisi worked to produce the CPP’s newspaper, *The Evening News*, also contributing articles (*ibid.*). Other contributions mentioned included operating singing and cultural groups to liven up party meetings and serving water (*ibid.*). In fact, some women, such as Leticia Quaye, Akua Asabea Ayisi and sixty-year-old Arduah Ankrah suffered time in the colonial prisons on account of their activism in the CPP (*ibid.*).

Ghana’s Seven-Year Development Plan recognised the impact of women’s social status on nation-building and included attempts to address them. In Ghana, there was a conscious effort to address women’s absence in political decision-making in the party and national politics. Nkrumah’s affirmative action provisions after independence ensured that women were part of the legislature. The Representation of the People’s Act (Women Members), passed in 1959, later amended in 1960, saw ten women elected to the National Assembly.¹⁰ Other provisions included appointments to ministerial and district level headship as well as on boards of corporations and schools (Manuh 1991). Such efforts failed to take into consideration the role of women during the independence struggle and sought to discourage independent women’s mobilisation, instead channelling their efforts into apolitical ventures. Beyond Nkrumah, who recognised women’s potential benefit to the party and country, the general attitude of the CPP hierarchy was one of hostility and suspicion, with some fearing women could overturn male dominance in the party (Tsikata 1989). Tsikata explained that the General Secretary of the CPP, who had been assigned the task of organising women, ‘saw an organisation of women as a potential threat to the position of men, and dismissed the task of organising them … [as] a great inconvenience’ (1989: 80). In Ghana, two important women’s organisations, the Ghana Women’s League¹¹ and Ghana Federation of Women,¹² were encouraged to merge by the ruling party into the National Council of Ghana Women (NCGW) (Manuh 1991). The NCGW, like the farmers’ organs, was incorporated into the ruling CPP. The task of the NCGW was organising rallies, building day-care centres for working women, and networking with other women’s organisations beyond Ghana (Tsikata 1989). The CPP constitution was at pains to ensure that women did not develop autonomy within the party, stating that:

> Each party branch shall have a women’s section to cater for the special interests of women, but the women’s section shall be part and parcel of the branch. There shall be only one executive committee for each branch, including the women’s section. The same applies to the ward and constituency.¹³
Unlike in the Tanzanian Arusha Declaration, beyond the specific mention of women in relation to high childbearing rates, Ghanaian women’s contribution to the composition of the development plan and potential for the achievement of development goals were acknowledged, stating that ‘like other progressive countries, Ghana should make full use of the potential of female labour force especially now that, with universal education, these girls will be educated by the time they are ready to enter the labour market’ (Republic of Ghana 1964: 152). Domesticity was highlighted as essential for women in the Ghanaian plan, indicated in the statement: ‘[f]or girls it is intended that, in addition to learning some of the commercial and manipulative skills taught to the boys, there will also be training in such specialised fields as domestic science and handicrafts’ *(ibid.)*: 152).

After independence, women benefited more from economic and work-related legislative changes and improved access to social services like education, health and wider employment opportunities in the formal sector. Educational expansion resulting from the Accelerated Plan for Education in 1952 and the Education Act of 1961 gave women in Ghana a new impetus, increasing their enrolment from primary to tertiary institutions like universities. Adult education programmes gave older women opportunities to acquire literacy skills. While educational enrolment and participation rates still failed to match those of men, increased opportunities enhanced women’s access to formal sector career opportunities. There were, additionally, attempts to create in-roads for women in hitherto male-dominated occupations like tractor driving and the military, both infantry and the Air Force as pilots (Manuh 1991). Thus, according to Manuh, ‘[b]y the end of the CPP rule (1966), there were a number of women doctors, dentists, lawyers, graduate teachers, administrative officers, parliamentarians and a judge of the Supreme Court’ *(ibid.)*: 117). Other benefits were in the area of legislation like the Industrial Relations Act of 1958 (IRA 56) that favoured working women in the formal waged sector. Discriminatory pay policy between women and men was made illegal, and women could get pregnant while working and not suffer loss of employment. They were, in addition, entitled to maternity leave with pay *(ibid.)*. Employment opportunities were created in the non-waged cooperatives.

The strategies largely failed to match their pre-independence potential (Manuh 1991; Tsikata 1989). The direct benefits of the development strategies to rural women farmers and urban traders were few. It is their petty-bourgeois counterparts who gained prominence (Manuh 1991). Perhaps the intention to modernise the Ghanaian economy through industrialisation led to the neglect of specific efforts to improve the lot of women farmers and
traders. The main beneficiaries of the CPP rule have been acknowledged as petty-bourgeois women whom Manuh blames for unsuccessful attempts to enact legislation to protect women's interest in marriage, divorce and inheritance (1991). Such legislation might have provided women farmers some measure of tenure security in the event of marriage failure through divorce or widowhood. Women’s land rights remain a problem and there were attempts to address this in a new land Act passed by Ghana’s parliament in July 2020. The Act merged the numerous and often conflicting legal instruments on land in Ghana. Thus, women might have gained entry into large-scale plantation agriculture as waged workers under favourable conditions and the largely peasant rural women farmers might have gained access to improved farming techniques and inputs as well as storage and marketing facilities. The key question of access to the main means of agricultural production – land – was inadequately addressed.

**Tanzania Women and Ujamaa**

Tanzanian women, like their Ghanaian counterparts, were also critical in mobilising for the nationalist struggle that brought independence, financing political events, and connecting party leadership with their members. Their presence in the ruling party was just a chance occasion, as Geiger’s (1987) account shows. It was fuelled by Bibi Titi Mohamed’s connection to the party through family ties. The turning point was the visit of John Hatch, who insisted on meeting women members of the party, an event that galvanised Bibi Titi Mohamed to expand women’s membership in the party.\(^{14}\) Like their Ghanaian counterparts, the most active Tanzanian women in TANU were urban located traders ‘in a range of occupations vital to urban existence’ (Geiger 1987: 10).

After independence, Tanzanian women lost their political clout as a constituency with the power of contestation to threaten national or party stability. All independent women's organisations were replaced with the *Umoja wa Wananawake wa Tanganyika* (Women's Unity of Tanganyika, UWT). The Tanzanian state saw no need to involve women and few were seen in political leadership positions in either parliament, public office, or the party. Dwyer and Zeilig explain: ‘few women MPs were elected, and female ministerial representation was generally limited to tokenistic areas such as Social Welfare’ (2012: 66). Geiger suggests the demand for literacy was an excuse to exclude women from political decision-making in independent Tanzania.\(^{15}\) They suffered rejection, such as Bibi Titi Mohammed whose husband, under pressure from his male colleagues, is reported to have divorced her (Dwyer and Zeilig 2012; Tsikata 1989).
As such, post-independence benefits in Tanzania, just like in Ghana, accrued to women with Western education, usually those outside grassroots mobilising. Overnight, women who were not part of the nationalist struggles for independence gained attention as viable leaders. Activists like Mwanvita Mnyamaini and Binti Kipara got jobs in the formal sector as unskilled waged workers. Western education, not activism, became the resource propelling women into political leadership; formal education qualified women to offer to their ‘less fortunate’ sisters lessons in domestic science. As domesticated citizens, Tanzanian women were provided educational programmes to enhance their ability to support rural family welfare. They were taught home economics practices informed by Western norms.

The agriculture project, the Ujamaa, was highly gendered, predicated on the assumption that women would perform as ideal mothers and wives with extreme devotion to the home. Gender roles were framed in the language of war, with ‘the true female soldier of Ujamaa socialism [projected as] the devoted mother … of her own children and by extension of the nation as a whole’ (Lal 2010: 6). As soldiers, Lal (2010) goes on to explain, women were to be ‘guardians of food security and family well-being.’ Thus:

the plan proposed a range of projects, including seminars and trainings in home economics, the establishment of day-care centres, and the initiation of collectively run women’s petty commercial groups engaged in activities such as sewing, cooking, vegetable cultivation, and livestock management (ibid.: 7).

In the absence of a dedicated focus on women’s needs, be they material or strategic, traditional women’s groups emerged in most villages. According to Boesen, Madsen and Moody, the groups were organised around ‘mutual insurance or public relief’ to ‘satisfy the need for some kind of external security for the survival of the household for which the women are otherwise directly responsible internally in the family’ (1977: 138). Membership precluded women who were deemed to be unstable and therefore had no interest in agriculture like sex workers and those who rented rooms. The groups enabled women to deal with their immediate needs. Few of these groups were successful; a number were described as plagued by irregular meeting attendance, uneconomic enterprises, lack of integration into the mainstream Ujamaa structures, and a total absence of support from the wider society.

The gendered configuration of the family, and women’s place in it, was, according to Lal (2010), not without contradictions. The relegation of women to the developmental roles of mother and wife were derived from what was supposedly indigenous. Evidence for it was sought in pre-European contact practices and norms. Yet the model projected was the monogamous nuclear family, an ideal based in Europeanised Christianity that abhorred
the traditional kinship structure, which formed the basis of Ujamaa living in rural Tanzania (Lal 2010: 3). The notions of femininity on which Ujamaa womanhood was founded were derived from traditional as well as colonial Christian ideas rooted in patriarchy with an ideological underpinning that separated the private/domestic from the public domain of activities. As Lal explains, underlying this was the TANU ‘symbolic configuration of the [Tanzanian] nation as … an extended socialist family’ (Lal 2010: 10). Women who strayed from this ideal were attacked and subjected to various forms of violence, from verbal abuse to physical attacks. In urban spaces, radical unmarried women who took to Western fashion met the wrath of state representatives: young male militants empowered by Operation Vijana.

Dwyer and Zeilig (2012) observe that postcolonial governments, despite their anti-poverty and equality rhetoric, in practice reinforced feminine stereotypes. The emerging developmental focus, derived from the liberal approach, sought to include women into mainstream society, without questioning existing patriarchal structures that constrained their participation in political and economic spaces. Family-friendly provisions were designed to improve efficiency and not to address systems and structures generating gender inequality. The provisions in development plans for Ghana and Tanzania were, for all intents and purposes, informed by patriarchy, derived from prevailing colonial Christian notions of femininity and accompanying masculinities. They were at variance, in several instances, with the actual role women played in the independence struggle. The absence of a strong, politically aware women’s movement was blamed for this state of affairs. Women’s active participation in nationalist struggles did not emerge out of progressive attitudes towards women that were challenging patriarchal structures. This omission within the nationalist struggles to focus on structures generating women’s inequality, created in the confluence of pre-and colonial systems, meant that the chance to deal with patriarchy in post-independence Ghana and Tanzania was lost.

**Strategic Choices and Lessons for the Current Era**

This section highlights lessons from the immediate post-independence period in Ghana and Tanzania for present-day development planning. In distilling strategies that can be recovered to inform current attempts at nation-building, I focus not only on the positives but the negatives as well, since both draw attention to practices that are at once supportive and inimical to nation-building. Using the Marxist analysis announced earlier, I begin by highlighting the ideological underpinnings of the development plans as well as key development actors and their levels of economic and political control.
My earlier accounts have covered to some extent attempts to outline factors that rendered these two experiments ineffective. These shortcomings, which I identify as the negatives, hold lessons for current day practices since they inform the policy-making terrain about what should be avoided. First, was the failure to fully de-link national economies from the global capitalist political economy that had positioned African countries as primary producers, a failing identified as the bane of all postcolonial attempts at building economic and political alternatives. Keeping the linkage amounted to ‘effectively postponing any political formulation that would directly address class contradiction within African societies’ (Dwyer and Zeilig 2012: 31). Second, the economic strategies adopted, according to Dwyer and Zeilig, failed to break the dependence on earnings from cash crop exports to finance development expenditure. Thus, agricultural development positioned export trade as a major development goal even as it sought to increase production for domestic consumption and industrialisation.

The states’ influence over productive resources were constrained by the incorporation of national economies into the capitalist system, a situation that made foreign direct capital a principal productive resource for development. The ISI of Ghana and Ujamaa of Tanzania are described by Dwyer and Zeilig as: ‘national developmentalism … largely dependent on international forces beyond the control of supposedly sovereign African states’ (2012: 35). This allowed the haemorrhaging of local foreign exchange reserves, through the repatriation of underserved profits. Using the example of cocoa earnings, Ninsin shows how a dramatic increase in cocoa production of over 200 per cent only earned Ghanaians an additional income of 7.7 per cent. This shortcoming continues to plague both nations as they still remain primary producers of agricultural products that form the main source of foreign exchange earnings to finance development. In Ghana, the land question remained unresolved, and the limited attempts to use legislation to restrict customary control over land and land rights of peasants and women were inadequately addressed.

Women’s role in national development is an area that the development plans offer both positive and negative lessons for current attempts at nation-building. The discussions show how women’s political roles in nationalist struggles were completely reversed after independence in a move that depoliticised their actions in both countries. Once independence was achieved, women underwent the full brunt of patriarchy in both Ghana and Tanzania. There was no effort by both political parties to harness the enormous political potential women had displayed during the struggle for independence for nation-building. As a result, the post-independence economic and political
benefits were claimed by men and urban educated women who took advantage of Western formal educational opportunities. In most instances, they had played no role in the nationalist struggles.

The development plans under study had different levels of gender sensitivity. Neither the Ghanaian nor the Tanzanian plan recognised prevailing gendered stratification of women as inimical to national development and requiring dedicated targeting. There were no strategies designed to confront the systemic structures of gender inequality. Their gender unawareness led to policies entrenching the status quo. Ghana's, however, can be said to be an example of how general provisions can benefit women, while at the same time pointing to the need for some level of gender sensitivity on the part of policymakers. In Ghana, where some attempt was made to boost women’s political participation, it was mainly an affirmative action provision to integrate women into mainstream society by granting them access to political leadership. Limited as this provision was, it led to an increase of women in the legislature. To date, Ghana struggling to get an affirmative action bill passed to create some opening for women in political decision-making and national public life. What must be avoided is a concentration on women that makes them the problem and therefore puts on them the burden of resolving gender inequality.

There were issues of buy-in by the very people that development plans were meant to benefit; thus, an ideological constituency that owned the development plan, with deep understanding and implementation capacity, was missing. The failure on the part of the nationalist movements to cultivate class consciousness linking living conditions under colonial rule to global capitalism led to their demise after independence. The recourse to highhanded measures to rural Tanzanians’ resistance and opposition to Ujamaa villagisation is a case in point. For some, like Schneider (2015), it was inevitable that authoritarian paternalism should be the option adopted to deal with the extreme resistance of rural dwellers to move into modern Ujamaa villages. The official perception was that, since the end was in the interest of the entire community, any means to achieve it were justified. However, it rendered the peasants powerless, transferring control to technocrats.

These failings notwithstanding, there are positive lessons for present-day development planning. They derive from the comprehensiveness of the plans that linked all sectors of national economies, the clear goal of self-sufficiency, especially in feeding the nation, framed by a vision of a state that responded to the needs of its citizens. The strengths of the development plans were their sturdy ideological focus that led them to prioritise domestic needs. Nkrumah and Nyerere set development planning as political projects and chose African socialism as their ideological orientation to deliver their nations out of
underdevelopment. They were convinced that capitalism could not hold the answer to the problems of the postcolonial state. The economies of both nations under discussion were planned with the simultaneous operation of the capitalist modes of production with other non-capitalist forms. Private capital was allowed space to operate under measured terms. The emergence of a domestic capitalist class was seen as inimical to the socialist orientation of the nations. State-controlled national capital was supposed to play the critical oversight role. Such a clear ideological position is lacking currently in both countries. Even as the rhetoric of ‘Ghana beyond Aid’ gains currency in national discourse, there is very little questioning of the dominant neoliberal framework that locks the country into the exploitative international economic relations that make aid a necessary component of the national budget.

The second lesson is the role of the state as a principal economic actor, holding onto strategic areas of production and distribution and generating employment. The economic framework, though situated in the capitalist mode, placed the state in between foreign direct capital and citizens, meditating to some extent the impact of capitalist exploitation. The state provided the needs of citizens with the surpluses appropriated by its direct participation in production. This is perhaps the strongest lesson that these two development plans hold for the current era where adjustment policies remove the state from direct production and submit meeting citizens’ needs to the for-profit market.

The third lesson concerns how development planning grounded the two national economies on agriculture. Though the strategies differed in both countries, the approach speaks to a fundamental understanding of the basis for economic transformation. Slated as the key economic sector, prioritised goals for agriculture were to meet domestic consumption and industrial production. The differences lay in where the national wealth was going to be created to sustain the socialist ideals. In Ghana, it was the state enterprises; in Tanzania, it was the Ujamaa villages. Both believed and promoted collectivised farming as a solution to agriculture productivity, especially amongst peasant farmers. Attempts were also directed to control distribution and marketing of agricultural products. At present, both nations, like others across the African continent, still grapple with challenges that frustrate efforts at meeting food self-sufficiency. Ghana, for example, maintains a production shortfall in major cereal staples like rice and maize, as well as vegetables and fish, relying on imports to make up these deficits. Ghana and Tanzania stand to benefit from lessons these two plans hold for rural agricultural transformation to propel national development. Investment in agriculture was also an employment potential, especially for young persons.
Conclusion

In highlighting lessons, I note the directions pointed out by the negatives and the positives. In conclusion, I draw for emphasis the positives that should offer leads out of the myriad of African economic and social development, and negatives that should be avoided at all costs. The strongest point is in the conviction of Nkrumah and Nyerere that development planning extended beyond a purely economic affair into the political realm grounded on a philosophical orientation that gave it legitimacy. They both made a strong ideological grounding in the imperative for African socialism. Their variants of socialism were dictated by what they conceived as African humanist values. Development planning sought to regain and maintain state control over productive resources, making the direct producers the main beneficiaries. This was the origin of the uniqueness of these development plans. A fact that calls on governments in countries such as Ghana and Tanzania to begin a debate on an alternative world outlook that is critical of the validity of the claims of liberalism to submit production and distribution for national development to the dictates of the market. Developing an ideological outlook to guide development planning should be accompanied by an ideological constituency that will own and guide its progress.

Dealing with women’s social positioning can derive lessons from what should not be done. Thus, strategies that are evolved should move away from integrating women into existing structures but rather target structures that uphold patriarchy as a political system with interests. Also to be outlined for focus in development plans are other systems of privilege that allow women to navigate gendered limitations better than others. Perhaps these shortcomings can be seen in the conceptions of socialism of the two leaders, Nkrumah and Nyerere, who believed in a non-violent transition from communalism.

The suggestions offered so far are only a preparation for a robust focus on agriculture. Nations have to recover agriculture as the base sector for development. Supporting farmers to acquire inputs, services, farming practices and productive resources then becomes a state responsibility. The problematic area of storage and marketing should also be a state responsibility that builds on collectivised farming. Collectivised farming holds the key to expand control over the national income, create employment and facilitate industrialisation. This, however, calls for a re-conception of the state’s development role. As my analysis shows, this may only be achieved by resuming the efforts to break the hold of capital over African economies to capture policy, a move that calls for an ideological shift.
Notes

1. University of Cape Coast. This article was completed as part of the Post-Colonialisms Today project.
2. See for example The Dakar Declaration on Another Development with Women (AAWORD 1982) and the SAPRIN (2004) publication, The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty and Inequality.
6. These were communities neglected under colonial policy to induce labour migration into mining and manufacturing.
8. The land laws in question were the Akim Abuakwa Stool Lands Control Act, 1958 (Act 8); the Ashanti Stool Act, 1958 (Act 28); the Stool Lands Control Act, 1960 (Act 79); Farm Lands (Protection) Act, 1962 (Act 107) Rents (Stabilisation) Act, 1962 (Act 109); Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123) and the Concession Act, 1962 (Act 124) (Ninsin 1989c).
9. See Geiger (1987) for a detailed account of male vulnerability and the use of women to front TANU activities in Dar es Salaam.
10. The full list as provided by Manuh (1991: 132) are Susanna Al-Hassan, Lucy Anin, Regina Asamany, Comfort Asamoah, Grace Ayensu, Sophia Doku, Mary Koranteng, Victoria Nyarko and Christiana Wilmot.
11. This organisation had a political character and operated under the leadership of Hannah Cudjoe.
12. Founded in 1953, it was originally known as the National Federation of Gold Coast Women. It was headed by Evelyn Amartefio and was known as the less political organisation.
13. See the Women’s section of the CPP constitution (CPP Revised 1959) from pages 25 to 26.
14. See Geiger’s (1987: 10) account of how the astute Titi Mohamed turned the occasion into an opportunity to mobilise women into TANU.
15. Geiger (1987) mentions the few active women in the pre-independence struggle who were able to transition into post-independence political leadership; they were Bibi Titi Mohamed, Tatu Mzee, Asha Ngoma and Hadija Swedi.

References


