AFRICA
DEVELOPMENT
AFRIQUE ET
DEVELOPPEMENT

AFRICA DEVELOPMENT
AFRIQUE ET DÉVELOPPEMENT
Vol. XXX, Nos. 1 & 2, 2005

A Quarterly Journal of the Council for the
Development of Social Science Research in Africa

Revue trimestrielle du Conseil pour le développement
de la recherche en sciences sociales en Afrique

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Vol. XXX, Nos. 1 & 2, 2005

Maladjusted African Economies and Globalisation*

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Abstract

The policies of adjustment pursued in the 1980s and 1990s promised African countries not only 'accelerated development' but also a means to end Africa's marginalisation from the process of globalisation by encouraging foreign investment and the expansion and diversification of exports. While for much of the 1980s and early 1990s, the poor performance of African economies was blamed on the failure of African governments to adopt 'the right policies', by the mid-1990s, international financial institutions were saying that the significant adjustments made by African economies had led to economic recovery. However, the performance of African economies with respect to both investment and trade diversification remained poor. Since this could no longer be explained away by saying that African economies had not adjusted, other explanations were needed: these included institutions, geography, culture and ethnic diversity. In this paper I argue that it is the deflationary policies under the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) that have placed African economies on a 'low growth path' which has discouraged investments, trade expansion and diversification, by undermining the investment-growth-trade nexus. Indeed, as a result of this, African economies have been so maladjusted that they responded poorly to a wide range of economic stimuli.

Résumé

Á travers les politiques d'ajustement qui ont été menées dans les années 80 et 90, l'on promettait aux pays africains un «développement accéléré»; mais ces politiques signifiaient également que l'Afrique ne serait plus en marge du processus de mondialisation, grâce au système d'encouragement des investissements étrangers et l'expansion et la diversification des exportations. Au cours des années 80 et au début des années 90, l'on avait expliqué la pauvre performance des économies africaines par l'incapacité des gouvernements africains à adopter de «bonnes politiques», mais, au milieu des années 90, les institutions financières internationales affirmaient que les ajustements significatifs réalisés par les économies africaines

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avaient permis une certaine relance économique. Cependant, la performance des économies africaines concernant les investissements et la diversification commerciale est restée faible. Comme il n'était plus possible d'expliquer cela par le problème d'ajustement économique, il a fallu trouver d'autres explications, parmi lesquelles: les institutions, la géographie, la culture ou encore la diversité ethnique. Je déclare, dans ce document, que ce sont les politiques déflationnistes des politiques d'ajustement structurel (PAS) qui ont dirigé les économies africaines vers un «chemin de lente croissance», décourageant les investissements, l'expansion et la diversification commerciale, en minant le lien investissement-croissance-commerce. De ce fait, les économies africaines ont été si mal ajustées qu'elles n'ont répondu que faiblement à un éventail de stimuli économiques, pourtant assez large.

Introduction

Globalisation is a multifaceted process that defies unique definition. Different authors emphasise different things about the causes and effects of globalisation, partly because of differences in the definition of the process; partly because of differences in focus; and partly because of different ideological predispositions about the process itself. In this paper I will treat globalisation as a process whereby national and international policy-makers proactively or reactively promote domestic and external liberalisation. Africa illustrates, perhaps better than elsewhere, that globalisation is very much a policy driven process. While in other parts of the world, it may be credible to view globalisation as driven by technology and the 'invisible hand' of the market, in Africa, most of the features of globalisation and the forces associated with it have been shaped by the BWIs (Bretton Woods Institutions) and Africa's adhesion to a number of conventions such as the World Trade Organisation, which have insisted on opening up markets. African governments have voluntarily, or under duress, reshaped domestic policies to make their economies more open. The issue therefore is not whether or not Africa is being globalised, but under what conditions the process is taking place, and why, despite such relatively high levels of integration into the world economy, growth has faltered.

The word that often comes to mind, whenever globalisation and Africa are mentioned together, is 'marginalisation'. The threat of marginalisation has hung over Africa's head like Damocles' sword, and has been used, in minatory fashion, to prod Africans to adopt appropriate policies.[1] In most writing, globalisation is portrayed as a train on which African nations must choose to get on board or be left behind. As Stanley Fischer, then Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and associates put it, 'globalisation is proceeding apace and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) must decide whether to open up and compete, or lag behind' (Fischer et al. 1998:5). *The Economist*, commenting on the fact that per capita incomes between the

United States and Africa have widened states 'it would be odd to blame globalisation for holding Africa back. Africa has been left out of the global economy, partly because its governments used to prefer it that way' (*The Economist* 2001:12).

Globalisation, from the developmental perspective, will be judged by its effects on economic development and the eradication of poverty. Indeed, in developing countries, the litmus test for any international order remains whether it facilitates economic development, which entails both economic growth and structural transformation. I shall argue that in the case of Africa, this promise has yet to be realised. The policies designed to 'integrate' Africa into the global economy have thus far failed because they have completely sidestepped the developmental needs of the continent and the strategic questions on the form of integration appropriate to addressing these needs. They consequently have, thus far, not led to higher rates of growth and, their labelling notwithstanding, have not induced structural transformation. Indeed, the combined effect of internal political disarray, the weakening of domestic capacities, deflationary policies and slow world economic growth have placed African economies on a 'low equilibrium growth path' from which the anaemic GDP growth rates of 3–4 percent appear as 'successful' performance. I will illustrate this point by looking at two channels through which the benefits of globalisation are supposed to be transmitted to developing countries – trade and investment.

The paper is divided into three sections. The first section deals with what globalisation and the accompanying adjustment policies promised, what has been delivered and what has happened to African economies during the 'era of globalisation'. The second deals critically with some explanations of Africa's failure. And the last part advances an alternative explanation of the failure with respect to trade and access to foreign finance.

The promises and achievements of globalisation

The promise of trade
Expanded opportunities for trade and the gains from trade are probably the most enticing arguments for embracing globalisation. The promise of Structural Adjustment Programmes' (SAP) was that through liberalisation, African economies would become more competitive. As World Bank economist Alexander Yeats (1997:24) asserts, 'If Africa is to reverse its unfavourable export trends, it must quickly adopt trade and structural adjustment policies that enhance its international competitiveness and allow African exporters to capitalize on opportunities in foreign markets'. Trade liberalisation would not only increase the 'traditional exports' of individual countries, but would

also enable them to diversify their exports to include manufactured goods assigned to them by the law of comparative advantage as enforced by 'market forces'. Not only would trade offer outlets for goods from economies with limited markets, but also, perhaps more critically, it would also permit the importation of goods that make up an important part of investment goods (especially plant and equipment) in which technology is usually embodied.

By the end of the 1990s, and after far reaching reforms in trade policy, little had changed. The few gains registered tended to be of a one-off character, often reflecting switches from domestic to foreign markets without much increase in overall output (Helleiner 2002a, 2002b; Mwega 2002; Ndulu et al. 2002). Indeed, some increases in exports of manufactured goods even occurred as the manufacturing sector contracted. According to Francis Ng and Alexander Yeats of the World Bank.

> No major expansion occurred in the diversity of products exported by most of the Sub-Saharan African countries, although there are one or two exceptions like Madagascar and Kenya. Indeed, the product composition of some of the African countries' exports may have become more concentrated. Africa's recent trade performance was strongly influenced by exports of traditional products which appear to have experienced remarkably buoyant global demand in the mid-1990s' (Ng and Yeats 2000:21).

Furthermore, recent changes in Africa's exports indicate that no general increase had occurred in the number of industries in which most African countries have a 'revealed' comparative advantage. Indeed, after decades of reforms, the most striking trend, one that has given credence to the notion of 'marginalisation of Africa', is the decline in the African share of global non-oil exports which are now less than one-half what they were in the early 1980s (Ng and Yeats), representing 'a staggering annual income loss of US$68 billion – or 21 percent of regional GDP' (World Bank 2000).

The promise of additional resources

A persuasive promise made by BWIs was that adhesion to its policies would not only raise domestic investment through increased domestic savings, but would relax the savings and foreign exchange constraints by allowing countries to attain higher levels of investment than would be supported by domestic savings and their own foreign exchange earnings. One central feature of adjustment policies has been financial liberalisation. The focus is on the effects of interest rates on 'loanable funds', and as the price variable that adjusts to equilibrate the supply of savings to investment. The major thesis has been that 'financial repression' (which includes control of interest rates and credit rationing by the state) has discouraged savings and led to inefficient allocation of the 'loanable funds' (Fry 1988; Shaw 1973). The suggested solution then is

that liberalisation of markets would lead to positive real interest rates which would encourage savings. The 'loanable funds' thus generated would then be efficiently distributed among projects with the highest returns through the mediation of competitive financial institutions. Significantly, in this view, saving precedes investment and growth. After years of adjustment, there is little discernible change in the levels of savings and investment (See Table 1).

Table 1: Savings and Investment in Africa 1975–2001: periodical average (as % of GDP)

Indicator	1975–84	1985–89	1990–97	1998	1999	2000	2001
Gross Domestic Savings							
SSA	19.9	15.7	16.0	14.5	15.6	18.7	17.4
SSA excl. SA & N	14.8	13.4	12.6	11.6	13.5	15.6	15
Gross National Savings							
SSA	18.5	11.6	12.4	12.4	12.7	15.3	14.2
SSA excl. SA & N	15.3	9.2	8.6	10.7	11.3	12.7	12.6
Resource Transfers abroad							
SSA	1.5	4.2	3.6	2.1	2.9	3.4	3.2
SSA excl. SA & N	-0.5	4.2	4.0	0.9	2.2	2.8	2.3
Gross Domestic Investment							
SSA	20.5	12.6	16.4	18.6	18.4	17.5	18.4
SSA excl. SA & N	18.3	12.9	17.6	20.1	20.5	18.3	18.3
Resource Balance							
SSA	-1.8	0.4	-0.5	-4.1	-2.8	1.2	-1.3
SSA excl. SA & N	-5.2	-3.1	-5.2	-8.4	-7.0	-2.6	-3.8

Source: World Bank Africa Database 2003
Note: Gross Domestic Savings (GDS); Resource Transfers (GDS-GNS);
        Gross Domestic Investment (GDI); Gross National Savings (GNS).

Perhaps even more attractive was the promise that financial liberalisation would lead to increased capital inflows and stem capital flight. Indeed, most African governments' acceptance of IMF policies has been based on the claimed 'catalytic effect' of agreements with IMF on the inflow of foreign capital. Governments were willing to enter the Faustian bargain of reduced national sovereignty in return for increased financial flows. Even when governments were sceptical of the developmental validity of the BWIs' policies, the belief — that the stamp of approval of these institutions would attract foreign capital — tended to dilute the scepticism.

To the surprise of the advocates of these policies and to the chagrin of African policy-makers, the response of private capital to Africa's diligent adoption of SAPs has, in the words of the World Bank, 'been disappointing'. The market 'sentiments' do not appear to have been sufficiently persuaded that the policies imposed by the BWIs have improved their attractiveness to investors. The much touted 'catalytic effect' of IMF conditionality has yet to assert itself. The scepticism of private investors about the BWIs' stamp of approval is understandable in light of the history of 'non-graduation' by any African country. Indeed, there is the distinct danger that, since economies under BWIs' intensive care never seem to recover, the IMF presence may merely signal trouble. The BWIs seem to be unaware of the extent to which their comings and goings are a source of uncertainty among business entrepreneurs and evidence of a malaise. This said, there is, nevertheless, a trickle of foreign investment into Africa, but this has not been enough to increase Africa's share of global Foreign Direct Investment flows (FDI) (see Table 2). The rise in foreign direct investment in the latter part of the 1990s is cited as evidence that globalisation and SAPs are working (Pigato 2000).[2] This celebration is premature. There are a number of significant features of the financial flows to Africa that should be cause for concern over their developmental impact and sustainability.

Firstly, there is the high country concentration of investment, with much of the investment going to South Africa. Secondly, there is the sectoral concentration on mining. Little FDI has gone into the manufacturing industry. As for investment in mining, it is not drawn to African countries by macro-economic policy changes, as is often suggested, but by the prospects of better world prices, changes in attitudes towards national ownership and sector specific incentives. Thirdly, there is the problem of the type of investment. The unintended consequence of the policies has been the attraction of the least desirable form of foreign capital. Most of the new investment (a) has taken the form of the highly speculative portfolio investment attracted by 'pull factors' that have been of a transitory nature – extremely high real domestic interest rates on treasury bills caused by the need to finance the budget deficit and temporary booms in export prices which attract large export pre-financing loans (Kasekende et al. 1997) or (b) has been driven by acquisitions facilitated by the increased pace of privatisation to buy up existing plants that are being sold, usually under 'fire sale' conditions. Such investments now account for approximately 14 percent of FDI flows into Africa.[3] Little has been driven by plans to set up new productive enterprises. Some of the new investment is for expansion of existing capacities, especially in industries enjoying natural monopolies (e.g. beverages, cement, furniture).

**Table 2: Foreign Direct Investment inflows 1982–2002
(millions of US $ (rows 1-3) and percentages (rows 5-7))**

	1982-87	1988-94	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
1.Developing Countries & SA	19,694	54,540	116,132	150,577	197,041	191,845	230,798	246,944	216,220	162,899
2. Sub Saharan Africa (SSA)	1,059	2,150	3,964	3,815	7,951	6,046	8,663	5,364	13,295	7,452
3. SSA w/o SA	1,034	2,075	2,723	2,997	4,134	5,485	7,161	4,476	6,506	6,698
4. SSA w/o SA & Nigeria	655	966	1,644	1,403	2,594	4,433	6,156	3,546	5,402	5,416
5. Row 2 as a share of row 1	5.4	3.9	3.4	2.5	4.0	3.2	3.8	2.2	6.1	4.6
6. Row 3 as a share of row 1	5.3	3.8	2.3	2.0	2.1	2.9	3.1	1.8	3.0	4.1
7. Row 4 as a share of row 1	3.3	1.8	1.4	0.9	1.3	2.3	2.7	1.4	2.5	3.3

Notes: SA indicates 'South Africa' and SSA indicates ' Sub-Saharan Africa'.
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2003.

Such expansion may have been stimulated by the spurt of growth that caused much euphoria and that is now fading away. It is widely recognised that direct investment is preferable to portfolio investment, and foreign investment in 'green field' investments is preferable to acquisitions. The predominance of these types of capital inflows should be cause for concern. However, in their desperate efforts to attract foreign investment, African governments have simply ceased dealing with these risks or suggesting that they may have a preference for one type of foreign investment over all others.

Finally, such investment is likely to taper off within a short span of time, as already seems to be the case in a number of African countries. Thus, for Ghana, hailed as a 'success story' by the BWIs, FDI, which peaked in the mid-1980s at over US$ 200 million annually – mainly due to privatisation, was rapidly reversed to produce a negative outflow.[4] It should be noted, in passing, that rates of return of direct investments have generally been much higher in Africa than in other developing regions (Bhattachrya et al. 1997; UNCTAD 1995). This, however, has not made Africa a favourite among investors, largely because of considerations of the intangible 'risk factor' nurtured by the tendency to treat the contingent as homogenous and a large dose of ignorance about individual African countries. There is considerable evidence that shows that Africa is systematically rated as more risky than is warranted by the underlying economic characteristics.[5]

Capital flight
Not only is Africa still severely rationed in financial markets, but during much of the globalisation, there is evidence that Africa is probably a net exporter of capital. Paul Collier and associates (Collier and Gunning 1997; Collier et al. 1999) have suggested that in 1990, 40 percent of privately held

wealth was invested outside Africa and that in relation to workforce, capital flight from Africa has been much higher than in other developing country groups. In a recent more systematic attempt to measure the extent of capital flight, James Boyce and Léonce Ndikumana show that for the period 1970–96 capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa was 193 billion (in US Dollars) and with imputed interests the amount goes up to US$285 billion. These figures should be compared to the combined debt of these countries which stood at US$178 billion in 1996.

The evidence presented in this essay leads to a startling conclusion: far from being heavily indebted, many African countries are net creditors vis-à-vis the rest of the world. This is because their private external assets, as measured by cumulative capital flight, are greater than their public external debts. For the 25-country sample as a whole, external assets exceed external debts by $14.5 billion or $106.5 billion, depending on whether we count imputed interest earnings on the asset side. The region's assets are 1.1 to 1.6 times the stock of debts. For some individual countries, the results are even more dramatic. Nigeria's external assets are 2.8 times its external debt by the conservative measure, and 4.1 times higher when we include imputed interest earnings on capital flight (Boyce and Ndikumana 2000:32).

So far, financial liberalisation has not done much to turn the tide. In a World Bank study on the effects of financial liberalisation in nine African countries, Devajaran et al. (1999) conclude that the effects of liberalisation on capital flight are 'very small'. In response to this failure to reverse capital flight, the World Bank economists now argue that the capital flight may indeed be good for Africa: 'The much-denigrated capital flight out of Africa may well have been a rational response to low returns at home...Indeed Africans are probably better off having made external investments than they would have been if they invested solely at home!' (Devajaran et al. 1999:15-16). The conclusion ignores the obvious fact that the social benefits of citizens investing in their own country may exceed the private benefits accruing to individuals.

All this indicates that financial liberalisation per se may not be the panacea for reducing capital flight. Effective policy measures to reduce capital flight in the African context may need much deeper and more fundamental changes in the economic and political systems. One policy implication of both the reluctance of foreign capital to come to Africa and the huge amounts of wealth held outside Africa has been the calls for policies intended not so much to attract foreign capital but Africa's own private capital. While this is a valid option, the political economy of such attraction and the specific direct policy measures called for are rarely spelled out.[6]

The failed promise of growth

A comparison between Africa's economic performance during the period over which globalisation is often said to have taken hold--the last two decades of the last century--and earlier periods, shows clearly that, thus far, globalisation has not produced rates of growth higher than those of the 1960s and 1970s (See Figure 1). Per income growth was negative over the two decades, a serious indictment to those that have steered policies over the decades. This slower rate of growth is not peculiar to Africa, as is suggested by some of the 'Afro-pessimist' literature.

Figure 1: Sub-Saharan Africa – Annual Growth Rates in GDP per Capita 1965-2003

Source: World Bank *World Development Indicators 2003*, IMF World Outlook 2004.

During the period of globalisation, economic growth rates have fallen across the board for all groups of countries. The poorest group went from a per capita GDP growth rate of 1.9 percent annually in 1960–80 to a decline of 0.5 percent per year (1980–2000). For the middle group (which includes mostly poor countries), there was a sharp decline from an annual per capita growth rate of 3.6 percent to less than 1 percent. Over a 20-year period, this represents the difference between doubling income per person, versus increasing it by just 21 percent. The other groups also showed substantial declines in growth rates.' (Weisbrot et al. 2000a, 2000b; Weisbrot et al. 2001).

The global decline in growth is largely due to deflationary bias in orthodox stabilisation programmes imposed by International Financial Institutions (IFI).[7]

Explaining the poor performance: Has Africa adjusted?

The poor performance of Africa with respect to the channels through which the positive effects of globalisation would be gained – increased access to markets and finance – is now widely accepted. There are, however, disagreements over the cause of the failure. The BWIs have adhered to two explanations. The first one is simply that African countries have rather incomprehensibly persisted with their doomed 'dirigiste' ways and refused to swallow the bitter, but necessary pills of adjustment. Inadequate implementation of reforms and recidivism are some of the most common themes running through the literature on African economic policy. The World Bank's (1994) view was that adjustment was 'incomplete' not because of any faults in the design of the programmes but due to poor implementation.

The second explanation was that not enough time had elapsed to reap the gains of adjustment and, therefore, of globalisation. Coming from the BWIs, this is a strange position. It was these very institutions which, in dismissing the structuralist argument on the inelasticity of response of developing countries to economic stimuli, claimed that liberalisation would elicit immediate and substantial responses and bring about 'accelerated development' (the promise of the Berg Report – World Bank 1981). Indeed, in the early years, the World Bank was so certain about the response to its policies that it measured economic success by simply looking at the policy stance and assuming that this axiomatically led to growth (Mosley et al. 1995).

By the second half of the 1990s, neither of the arguments could be made with a straight face. African countries had made much more far going adjustments than in any other region. Indeed, the BWIs themselves began to proudly point to the success of their programmes, suggesting that enough time had transpired and a large number of African countries had persevered in their adjustment as to begin to reap the fruits of the adjustment process. IMF officials talked about a 'turning point' (Fischer et al. 1998) and claimed that the positive per capita growth rates of 1995–97 (4.1 percent) 'reflected better policies in many African countries rather than favourable exogenous developments' (Hernández-Catá 2000). According to Stanley Fischer and associates:

> Important structural reforms have been implemented in many African economies in this decade: domestic price controls have been abolished or at least liberalised in several countries; some inefficient public monopolies have been dismantled; and a large number of state enterprises have been privatised. In the external sector, nontariff barriers have been eliminated in most SSA countries and import duties have been lowered in some,

> exchange rates have been freed and unified in most countries (with Nigeria a major exception); and restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions have been eliminated in 31 out of 54 of SSA countries. Most countries also have eliminated direct controls on bank credit and have established market-determined interest rates' (Fischer et al. 1998)

Meanwhile, the President of the World Bank James Wolfensohn, reported in his 1997 address to the Board of Governors, that there was progress in Sub-Saharan Africa, 'with new leadership and better economic policies' (Wolfensohn 1997). Michel Camdessus, then Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, at the 1996 annual meeting of the World Bank and the IMF, said: 'Africa, for which so many seem to have lost hope, appears to be stirring and on the move'. The two Vice Presidents for Africa at the World Bank, Callisto Madavo and Jean-Louis Sarbib, wrote an article, appropriately titled 'Africa on the Move: Attracting Private Capital to a Changing Continent' (Madavo and Sarbib 1997), which gave reasons for this new 'cautious optimism'. The then Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Alassane Quattara (1997), would say the following about the good performance: 'A key underlying contribution has come from progress made in macroeconomic stabilization and the introduction of sweeping structural reforms'. The major World Bank report on Africa of 2000 stated 'many countries have made major gains in macroeconomic stabilisation, particularly since 1994', and there had been a turn around because of 'ongoing structural adjustment throughout the region which has opened markets and has a major impact on productivity, exports, and investment'. (World Bank 2000:21). Even the Economic Commission for Africa, a strident critic of SAPs in the past, joined the chorus.[8]

And so by the end of the millennium, African countries had been largely adjusted. There can be no doubt that there has been a sea change in the African policy landscape. Africa is very heavily involved in 'globalisation' and is very much part of the global order, and much policy making during the last two decades has been designed to deliberately increase Africa's participation in the global economy. In any case, more devaluations, lowering of tariffs and privatisation of marketing were imposed in Africa than anywhere else. By the mid-1980s, with the exception of the Franc zone countries, most SSA countries had adopted flexible exchange rates policies and there had been major real exchange rate devaluations. Major reforms in marketing, including the abolition of marketing boards, had been introduced. Arguments that African countries had refused or been slow to adjust or that not enough time had transpired became less credible, especially in light of the celebratory and self-congratulatory remarks by the BWIs themselves.

However by 1997, the growth rates had begun to falter. By 1999, in its report on global prospects and the developing countries, the World Bank made a downward revision of the 1999 growth rate 'despite continued improvements in political and economic fundamentals'. The report blamed the poor performance on terms of trade and the Asian crisis. In a sense, we had been there before. 'Success stories' have been told many times before and countries have fretted and strutted on this 'success' stage only to be heard of no more. Twenty-six African countries have been, at one time or other, on the lists compiled by the International Financial Institutions (See Table 3).

Table 3: 'Good Adjusters' 1981–1998

Country	Number of times listed
Malawi	7
Uganda	5
Kenya	5
Madagascar	4
Ghana	4
Zambia	3
Tanzania	3
Mauritania	3
Mali	3
Cote d'Ivoire	3
Zimbabwe	2
Togo	2
Senegal	2
Nigeria	2
Niger	2
Mozambique	2
Cameroon	2
Burundi	2
Burkina Faso	2
Zaire	1
Namibia	1
Mauritius	1
Lesotho	1
Gambia	1
Chad	1
Benin	1

Source: Several World Bank Reports.

The terms used have included 'Strong Adjusters', 'Early Intensive Adjusters', 'Globalisers', etc. Of the 15 countries listed as 'core adjusters' by the World Bank in 1993, only three (Lesotho, Nigeria and Uganda) appear in the list of strong performers in 1998 (UNCTAD 1998). As in the past, the new 'success' or 'recovery' or 'turn around' was of a one-off nature, and attributable to a whole range of things that have little to do with policies – improvements in terms of trade, new sourcing strategies of mining conglomerates, the end of conflicts and favourable climate.

Rather than abandon the deflationary policies, supporters of adjustment have simply reframed the question to read: 'Why is it that when the recommended policies are put into place (often under the guidance of – and pressure from – the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) the hoped for results do not materialise quickly' (Clague 1997:1). The answer was: lack of 'good governance' and of 'good institutions'. These assertions conceal a clear loss of certainty and a growing sense of intellectual disarray. This is most apparent in the World Bank study, 'Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?' (World Bank 2000). Unlike earlier approaches, the report speaks in a much more subdued and less optimistic tone, based more on faith than on analysis. There is an admission, albeit grudging, that policies of the past have not worked. The new agenda is much more eclectic and more a reflection of confusion and loss of faith than the discovery of a coherent 'comprehensive policy framework'. The additional set of reforms is nebulous, eclectic and largely of a more political and institutional character – good governance, participation of and consultation with civil society, democracy, etc. Increasingly, the World Bank's new solutions suggest that there is little to be done by way of reform on the economic front. The World Bank's projection of African economic performance in the coming decade is depressing reading:

> Despite the growth slowdown of the late 1990s, recent performance continues to support the view that fundamental structural change and institutions strengthening will have significant impact on sub-Saharan prospects. The forecast is for a halt to the region's lengthy decline and marginalisation and even for moderate reversal: The longer term (2003–2010) outlook is for sustained GDP growth – 3.7 percent – with per capita income rising 1.3 percent per year. The primary driving force behind the outlook remains better governance and ongoing reforms to the policy environment (World Bank 2001:152).

Africa maladjusted: The low growth path
As we noted earlier, adjustment has not led to the promised 'resource mobilisation'. The response of the BWIs to the poor performance in resource

mobilisation has been ambiguous, to say the least. At times, they have expressed concern (and bewilderment) over the decline of investment, but blamed it on inflation, the low after-tax, risk-adjusted rate of return on capital which, in turn, has been attributed to macroeconomic instability, loss of assets due to poor enforceability of contracts, debt overhang, and physical destruction caused by armed conflicts (Hernández-Catá 2000); at other times, this fall in investment has been seen as a temporary phase during which efficient use of existing capacity matters more than accumulation of new capital. Once the economy is placed on an efficient path, it will begin to accumulate, so the argument goes.

However, a new twist to the argument is that Africa is 'over-invested'. The BWIs now reach the conclusion that African economic growth does not respond to investment, and conclude that it may be that there is 'over-investment' in Africa. In a World Bank paper entitled 'Is investment in Africa Too Low or Too High? Macro and Micro Evidence' Devajaran et al. (1999) argue that they find no evidence that private and public capital are productive investments in Africa, either in cross-country data or in country case studies. They conclude:

> First, we should be more careful about calling for an investment boom to resume growth in Africa. Unless some or all of the underlying factors that made investment unproductive in the past are addressed, the results may be disappointing. We should also be more circumspect about Africa's low savings rate. Perhaps the low savings rate was due to the fact that the returns to investment were so low. Also the relatively high levels of capital flight from Africa may have been a rational response to the lack of investment opportunities at home (Devajaran et al. 1999:23).

This patently absurd result comes from the failure to consider the possibility that given the errors of the past and the maladjustment of the African economies, a much larger 'Big Push' may be required to get African economies on a path in which economies respond to investment. It also fails to take into account that patterns of investment induced by the SAPs may not be the kinds associated with high economic growth. Although some of the recent literature modifies the 'capital fundamentalist' argument on the primacy of investment, it continues to place capital accumulation at the centre of the growth process. In any case, investment, growth and productivity tend to move in tandem. Secondly, in the pre-adjustment era, investment was associated with relatively high growth and significant total factor productivity gains in a significant number of countries.[9] One would therefore have to explain what it is in the adjustment process that produced what is patently an atypical response to investment.

To understand Africa's poor performance in terms of the two channels of globalisation — trade and finance — we have to understand the interactions between these and economic growth. The usual procedure is to regress growth on initial conditions, GDP, state variables and policy instruments. In these models, export performance and investment rates would be determinants of growth in a unidirectional way. There is a rich theoretical and empirical literature that points to the potential explanatory power of the reverse direction by suggesting a more simultaneous process in which the usual 'determinants' of growth are themselves determined by growth.

Slow growth and resource mobilisation

Let us start with the investment–savings nexus. The earlier literature by Keynesians such as Michael Kalecki and Nicholas Kaldor suggested that the causal chain may be from growth to both investment and savings, and not the other way around. The Kaleckian 'flexible accelerator' view — that capital needs are essentially determined by expected output (i.e. investment demand is driven by expected growth) — is a case in point. 'Endogenous growth theories' have revised interest in this matter by suggesting that some 'determinants of growth' may themselves be dependent on growth.

Norman Loayzaet al. (2000) conclude that private saving rates rise with the level and growth rate of real per capita income. Furthermore, the influence of income is larger in developing than in developed countries where a doubling of income per capita is estimated, other things equal, to raise the long-run private savings rate by some 10 percentage points of disposable income. Likewise, a 1 percentage-point rise in the growth rate raises the private savings rate by a similar amount. In a study of savings transitions, Dani Rodrik argues that there is strong evidence that 'the story emerges in one that emphasis that economic growth tends to have a clear positive effect on the savings rate' (Rodrik 1998). On Africa, ElBadawi and Mwega (2000), and Mlambo and Oshikoya (2001) reach generally similar conclusions, namely that 'causality runs from growth to investment and saving'. The important policy conclusion is that policies that spur development are an indirect but effective way to raise private saving rates and the 'negative focus on saving performance does not seem a profitable strategy for understanding successful economic performance' (Rodrik 2000b: 505).[10]

In this neo-Keynesian view, the poor response of private investors—both domestic and foreign—should not have come as a surprise, what with contractions of domestic markets through deflationary policies and increased competition from imported goods, the collapse of public services and infrastructure and the political uncertainty engendered by policies that have undermined the 'social pacts' that hitherto provided some modicum of social

cohesion. And so, despite the fact that a number of countries had been 'adjusted', new credits were not forthcoming. That was mainly because investors did not have the confidence that the countries' growth performances would improve and that the potential returns on their investments would fully materialize, because improvements in the trade surplus were primarily caused by demand-repression and deflationary policies. For the BWIs, the major explanation for the poor response of foreign investment is 'risk' – a not particularly useful piece of information. But the greatest 'risk' for investors is investing their money in economies under the grip of policies that seek to achieve stabilisation by acting in a pro-cyclical manner by lowering savings and investments during recessions (Bird 2001).[11] It is perhaps this sluggish growth that accounts for the fact that the Institutional Investor rating for Africa deteriorated from 31.8 percent in 1979 to 21.7 in 1995 (the range is 1–100) (Collier and Gunning 1997). It is significant that the two countries that performed well with respect to this index were high growth economies which were not under the grip of the deflationary policies – Botswana and Mauritius. It is on the basis of these theoretical arguments and empirical observations that there have been calls for an 'investment-led' adjustment process (Griffin 2001; Mkandawire and Soludo 1999).

Trade, low growth and absence of structural change
The slow growth discussed above has also had an impact on the growth of exports and diversification by weakening the investment-export nexus crucial to the process. Here again, the orthodox view has been that increased trade or openness measured in various ways is a determinant of growth. Consequently, the major policies with respect to trade have involved trade liberalization and adjustments in exchange rates largely through devaluation.

Industrial stagnation
Failure on the trade front is linked to the failure in the structural transformation of African economies so that they could produce new sets of commodities in a competitive and flexible way. Globalisation in Africa has been associated with industrial stagnation and even de-industrialization (Mkandawire 1988; Singh 1987; Stein 1992; Stewart 1994). African economies were the quintessential 'late, latecomers' in the process of industrialization. I have argued elsewhere (Mkandawire 1988) that although the writing on African economies is based on the assumption that Africa had pursued import substitution for too long, the phase of import substitution was in fact extremely short – in most countries it was less than a decade.[12] SAPs have called for policies that have prematurely exposed African industries to global competition and thus induced widespread processes of de-industrialization.

African economies have somehow been 'out of sync' with developments in other parts of the world. When most economies embarked on import substitution industrialization, financed by either borrowing or debt default, much of Africa was under colonial rule, which permitted neither protection of domestic markets nor running deficits. And even later, when much industrialization was financed through Eurodollar loans, Africans were generally reluctant to borrow so that eventually, much of their borrowing in the 1980s was not for industrialization, but to finance balance-of-payments problems. Every case of successful penetration of international markets has been preceded by a phase when import substitution industrialisation was pursued. Such a phase is necessary, not simply for the 'infant industry' arguments that have been stated ad infinitum, but also because they provide an institutional capacity for handling entirely new sets of economic activities. The phase is also necessary for sorting out some of the coordination failures that need to be addressed before venturing into global markets. A 'revisionist' view argues that (a) substantial growth was achieved during the phase of import substitution industrialisation, (b) even successful 'export oriented economies' had to pass through this phase and maintain many features of the Import Substitution (IS) phase, and (c) important social gains were made.

The phase of import substitution did lead the initial phases of industrialisation. Significantly, UNIDO notes that African countries were increasingly gaining comparative advantage in labour intensive branches, as indicated by revealed comparative advantage (RCA), but then notes:

> It is particularly alarming to note that the rank correlation of industrial branches by productivity growth over 1980–95 and RCA value in 1995 is very low. Productivity has fallen in furniture, leather, footwear, clothing, textiles, and food manufacturing. An export oriented development strategy cannot directly stimulate TFP. Policy must focus on increasing technological progress within the export industries – many of which have seen very rapid progress in the application of the most modern technologies (informatics, biotechnological, etc) to their production and distribution system (UNIDO 1999:245).

Given the conviction that import substitution in Africa was bad and had gone on for too long, there was no attempt to see how existing industries could be the basis for new initiatives for export. The policy was simply to discard existing capacity on the wrong assumption that it was the specific microeconomic policies used to encourage the establishment of these industries that accounted for failure at the macro-level. The task should have been to extend and not reverse such gains by dismantling existing industrial capacity. The rates of growth of MVA (manufacturing value added) have

fallen continuously from the levels in the 1970s. UNIDO (1999) estimated
that MVA in sub-Saharan Africa was actually contracting at an annual average
rate of 1.0 percent during 1990–97. UNIDO shows that for Africa as a whole,
in ten industrial branches in 38 countries, labour productivity declined to an
index value of 93 in 1995 (1990 = 100). Increases in productivity were
registered only in tobacco, beverages and structural clay products. In many
cases, an increase in productivity has been due to a fall in employment growth
(UNIDO 1999). The decline in total factor productivity of the economy as a
whole is due to de-industrialization which it defines as 'synonymous with
productivity growth deceleration'. Output per head in sub-Saharan Africa
manufacturing fell from US$7,924 in 1990 to US$6,762 in 1996. The
structural consequence is that the share of manufacturing in GDP has fallen
in two thirds of the countries. The number of countries falling below the
median increased from 19 during 1985–90 to 31 during the 1991–98 period
(figure 2). While admitting such poor performance in manufacturing during
the era of structural adjustment, supporters of SAPs argue that (a) such decline
in industrialisation is a temporary and welcome process for weeding out
inefficient industrialisation (Jalilian and Weiss 2000) and (b) not enough time
for adjustment has passed to see the benefits from globalisation through the
establishment of new industries. Considering that this argument has been
repeatedly deployed since 1985, Africa may have to wait for a long time
before the gains from globalisation materialise.

Students of historical structural changes of economies inform us that struc-
tural change is both cause and effect of economic growth. As Moshe Syrquin
(1994; 1995) observes, a significant share of the measured rate of aggregate
total factor productivity is due to resource shifts from sectors with low pro-
ductivity to sectors with high productivity. We have learnt from the 'new
trade theories' and studies on technological development how countries run
the risk of being 'locked' in a permanently slow growth trajectory if they
follow the dictates of static comparative advantage. To move away from such
a path, governments have introduced policies that generate externalities for a
wide range of other industries and thus place the economy on more growth
inducing engagement with the rest of the world.

For years, UNCTAD economists have pointed to the importance of growth
for trade expansion. They have argued that it is the absence of growth, or
more specifically an investment-export nexus that accounts for the failure of
many countries to expand and diversify their export base. Rapid resource
reallocation may not be feasible without high rates of growth and investment.[13]

Figure 2: Sub-Saharan Africa Comparative Rates of Growth of Manufactured Value Added

Source: World Bank, 2000, *World Developpment Indicators* (CD-Rom).
Note: The axes are drawn to pass through the median of the 1985–90 period.

The principal means for effecting export diversification is investment. Many empirical tests of 'causation' have been conducted, suggesting that there are good theoretical and empirical grounds for taking this reverse causation seriously as the dynamics of high growth lead to even greater human and physical investment and greater knowledge formation, which, by Verdoon's Law, leads to more productivity and therefore greater competitiveness. Studies of successful export drives clearly show a strong relationship between rates of structural change and rates of growth in value added in manufacturing and rates of growth of exports.

Lessons from countries which have embraced trade liberalization and achieved some degree of success suggest clearly that such liberalisation should be in conjunction with policies that ensure that relative prices will be favourable to export industries (and not just to nontradables) and that interest rates will support investment and economic restructuring. Successful export promotion strategies have required deliberate design of an investment-export nexus. Diversification of exports that is developmental needs to go beyond the multiplication of primary commodities and to include industrial products.

This requires not merely the redirection of existing industrial output to the external, but also the expansion of such output and investment in new activities.

There is a need to design a system of incentives that favours investments that open up new possibilities or introduce new technologies to the country. In this respect, infrastructure and human resource development are important preconditions for the success of pro-export policies. The instruments used to promote investment have included not only public investment, but also provision of subsidised inputs by public enterprises, direct subsidies through tax incentives including exemptions from duties, and industrial policy which, in turn, has meant selective allocation of credit and encouragement of investment by cheapening imported investment goods (often by manipulation of exchange rates in favour of the import of plant and equipment and export sector) (Akyüz 1996; Bradford Jr. 1990). While 'diversification' has always featured in virtually all adjustment programmes, there has been no clear spelling out of how this was to be achieved. In most cases, the need for diversification was overshadowed by short-term pressures to exploit static 'revealed' comparative advantage and reduce public spending. The failure to stimulate new economic activities (especially industry) has meant not only sluggish growth in exports but also failure to diversify.

Under SAPs, all these instruments have been off limits. Evidence that more successful cases have had some kind of 'industrial policy' has been dismissed on the grounds that African countries have neither the type of government nor the political acumen to prevent 'capture' of these policies by rent seekers and patron-client networks. Governments have been left with no instruments for stimulating investment and industrial development directly or for creating an environment for robust demand and profitability in which investment could thrive with complementary public inputs such as infrastructure, R & D, education, and training. It is this passivity that has led to the failure of structural transformation and the establishment of an investment-export nexus that would have led to the increase and diversification of exports.

Thus, the name given to the policy packages of the BWIs notwithstanding, the structural adjustment process has not led to structural changes in Africa. At first glance, one can see signs of structural change, especially in the decreased shares of industrial and agricultural sectors in overall GDP and the significant increase in services. Such change would seem to be following the norms established by Simon Kuznets and other observers of structural change in the process of economic development. However, in the case of Africa, such an interpretation is misleading because the transformation taking place is perverse, reflecting, as it does, stagnation of the economy, de-industrialisation and poor agriculture performance, rather than structural change induced by differential productivity gains and changing demand

structures induced by increasing incomes (by way of Engel's Law). The expansion of the service sector is evidence of growing informalisation, pauperisation of the middle classes and 'compradorisation' of African economies. Structural adjustment in Africa has thus far meant reversing some of the structural changes that African governments sought to induce as countries are driven back to the production patterns of the colonial era through 'back to the future' adjustment of African economies and 'de-industrialization' (Mkandawire 1988; Singh 1987; Stein 1992). Ghana is back as the 'Gold Coast', Zambia is desperately trying to cling to its copper belt, etc.

One should add here that the negative effects of this deflationary process also work through the trade mechanism. For African economies, terms of trade have enormous effects on the performance of economies, a fact that the World Bank now increasingly recognizes as unfavourable trade conditions scuttle its programmes. World Bank economist, William Easterly (2000), in an article tellingly entitled 'The Lost Decades: Developing Countries Stagnation in Spite of Policy Reform, 1980–1998' reaches conclusions that would warm the heart of any member of the 'Dependence School'. He considers the following factors as possible explanations of the poor performance of developing countries: (1) good policies that did not achieve desired results, (2) bad economic policies, or (3) some third factor like shocks? Based on his evidence – cross-country regressions and comparison of turning points that relate events in the rich countries to those in the developing countries – his conclusion is that the most likely explanation was point (3) i.e. 'some third factor like shocks'. The principal shock he finds is the 'growth slowdown in the industrial world'.

In conclusion, in a situation of generalised low growth rates, Africa is unlikely to experience much diversification. General policies such as 'marked liberalisation' or exchange rate devaluations, while perhaps supportive of diversification, are unlikely to induce the shifts in resources essential to tangible diversification.[14] This is because there are structural factors that attenuate responsiveness to new opportunities. The decline of Africa's share in world trade is thus closely related to low levels of growth which in turn is related to de-industrialisation. Or as Gerald Helleiner (2002a:4) succinctly states, 'Africa's failures have been developmental, not export failure per se'. Hence, failure in trade cannot be explained by simply looking at trade policies. One has to look at the overall growth of the economies and the ensuing structural change. As Dani Rodrik (1997) notes, Africa's 'marginalisation' is not due to trade ratios (relative to GDP) that are low by cross-national standards: Africa trades as much as is to be expected given its geography and its level of per-capita income.

Indeed, there is evidence that suggests that 'Africa overtrades compared with other developing regions in the sense that its trade is higher than would be expected, from the various determinants of bilateral trade' (Coe and Hoffmaister 1999; Foroutan and Pritchet 1993).[15] The marginalisation of Africa in world trade is the consequence of two factors: first, Africa's GDP per-capita has grown slower than other regions'; and second, the output elasticity of trade exceeds unity, so that as other countries have grown, their trade volumes have expanded more than proportionately. The dismissal of deliberate, strategic industrial and trade policies to shape Africa's position in the global trading system has left Africa on the low-productivity, low-growth path. The policy implications of this perspective are to stimulate growth, as well as invest in infrastructure and human capital.

WTO context

Africa is the only continent for which it was explicitly predicted that the advent of the WTO trade regime would entail losses. Most of these losses related to trade issues-most specifically the loss of preferential treatment from its erstwhile colonial masters and the European Union under the Lomé Convention. There is one feature of globalisation that Africa's industrialisation aspirations will have to confront – the restrictive policy context of the global financial and trade regimes. Much of the industrialisation that has taken place elsewhere has been supported by explicit or implicit industrial policy. Both the import substitution and export promotion of the post-World War II period have been products of industrial policy.

New trade arrangements, of which the WTO is emblematic, have changed the environment for industrial policy. There is considerable debate as to what globalisation entails in terms of individual states' capacity to pursue their own development strategies. From one end, it is argued that during much of the post World War II era, the global order allowed states considerable room for manoeuvre to pursue such national goals as full employment or growth and development. The current wave of globalisation has significantly reduced the leverage of governments over the economy.

The institutional arrangement said to signal this changed environment for industrial policy is the WTO, which restricts policy options in promoting industry and trade in a manner comparable to pulling up the ladder. A whole range of policies that have been central to virtually every strategy of industrialisation is now off-limits (Adelman and Yeldan 2000; Panchamukhi 1996; Rodrik 2000a). In other words, while the new world order clearly demands highly intensive involvement by the state in industrialisation, the regulatory regimes deny the state the means for such intervention. For the 'late, late industrialisers' such as African countries, it is clear that the international trade

regime to which they are now tethered makes it extremely difficult for these economies to capture the potential gains from global markets.

This view has been challenged by some authors who argue that the WTO regime still leaves room for catching up and that developing countries can still embark on deliberate industrialisation by exploiting some of the special provisions reserved for them in the WTO arrangements. Alice Amsden (1999), who has written extensively on the role of industrial policy in the East Asian context, argues that the WTO regime still leaves room for industrial policy initiatives. For Peter Evans, the WTO is something still in the making and there is, therefore, the possibility that it can be shaped to serve the interests of developing countries. Irma Adelman and Erinc Yeldan (2000), who list the major constraints imposed by the WTO on development policy, argue that, paradoxically, the new regime allow direct government investment in new activities, and non-market pressures on individual private firms to develop new types of comparative advantage. This may lead to greater intervention and more targeted discretionary activities by governments wishing to develop their economies (Adelman and Yeldan 2000).

This debate may ultimately be a fruitless one, given the multiplicity of fora in which 'negotiations' on global issues takes place. Often, concessions made in one forum are eroded or nullified by the conditionalities imposed in another forum. Thus, even the interventionist measures which Adelman points to as policy options not disallowed by the WTO, may simply be off limits under IMF and World Bank adjustment programmes and conditionalities. A country cannot refuse to open all its markets, as demanded by the BWIs, by appealing to WTO exemptions. Pressures for trade liberalisation and the anti-industrial stance of the BWIs have whittled away the positive effects of the provisions that would allow the poor countries to protect their infant industries. This has been particularly so for sub-Saharan Africa, which was undoubtedly subjected to more conditionalities per capita than any other region[16] and where structural adjustment has tended to make it impossible to exploit the special concessions made to African countries in international agreements such as the WTO or Lomé Conventions.

Concluding remarks

The African policy landscape has changed radically during the last two decades. Liberalisation of trade, privatisation as well as reliance on markets have replaced the widespread state controls associated with import substitution. One would expect to see some signs of the 'accelerated development' promised by the Berg report in 1981 by now. That adjustment has failed as a prerequisite for development, let alone as a 'strategy for accelerated development', is now widely accepted.[17] These failures can, in

turn, be traced to the displacement of developmental strategic thinking by 'an obsession' with stabilization – a point underscored by low levels of investment and institutional sclerosis. The key 'fundamentals' that policy has sought to establish relate to these financial concerns, rather than to development. The singular concentration on 'opening' up the economy has undermined post-independence efforts to create, albeit lamely, internally coherent and articulated economies and an industrial structure that would be the basis for eventual diversification of Africa's export base. The excessive emphasis on servicing the external sector has diverted scarce resources and political capacities away from managing the more fundamental basis for economic development. Even the issue of 'poverty' has received little attention except perhaps when it has seemed politically expedient to be seen to be doing something to mitigate the negative effects of adjustment. SAPs, due to their deflationary bias, have placed African economies on such a low growth trajectory, which has then conditioned the levels and types of Africa's participation in the global economy.

Over the last two decades, Africans have been faced not merely with a set of pragmatic measures made on programmatic grounds but with a full-blown ideological position about the role of the state, nationalism and equity, against which many neo-liberals, including Elliot Berg, had ranted for years.[18] It is this ideological character of the proposals that has made them impervious to empirical evidence including that generated by the World Bank itself, and it is that which has made policy dialogue virtually impossible. The 'true believers' insistence on the basic and commonsensical message they carry has made dialogue impossible. The assumption that those on the other side are merely driven by self-interest and ignorance that might be remediable by 'capacity building' has merely complicated matters further. Things have not been made easier by the supplicant position of African governments and their obvious failures to manage their national affairs well. These policies were presented as finite processes which would permit countries to restore growth. With this time perspective in mind, countries were persuaded to put aside long-term strategic considerations while they sorted out some short-term problems. The finite process has lasted two decades.

There are obvious gains from participation in increased exchange with the rest of the world. The bone of contention is: what specific measures should individual countries adopt in order to reap the benefits of increased exchange with other nations. With perhaps the exception of a few cases, developing countries have always sought to gain from international trade. Attempts to diversify the export base have been a key aspect of policy since independence. Import substitution was not a strategy for autarky, as is often alleged, but a

phase in eventual export diversification. However, for years, the integration of developing countries into a highly unequal economic order was considered problematic, characterised, as it is, by unfavourable secular terms of trade for primary commodities, control of major markets by gigantic conglomerates, protectionism in the markets of developed countries together with 'dumping' of highly subsidised agricultural products, volatile commodity and financial markets, asymmetries in access to technology, etc. From this perspective, gains from trade could only be captured by strategising and dynamising a country's linking up with the rest of the world.

It is ironic that while analysis in the 'pre-globalisation' period took the impact of external factors on economic growth seriously, the era of globalisation has tended to concentrate almost exclusively on internal determinants of economic performance. Today, Africa's dependence on external factors and interference in the internal affairs of African countries by external actors are most transparent and humiliating, and yet such dependence remains untheorised. Theories that sought to relate Africa's economies to external factors have been discredited, abandoned or, at best, placed on the defensive. The focus now is almost entirely on internal determinants of economic performance — economic policies, governance, rent-seeking, ethnic diversity, etc. While the attention on internal affairs may have served as a useful corrective to excessive focus on the external, on its own, it also provided a partial view of African economies and can be partly blamed for the pursuit of policies that were blind to Africa's extreme dependence and vulnerability to external conjuncture—a fact that the BWIs have learnt as the exogenous factor that scuttled their adjustment programmes. Indeed, unwilling to discard its essentially deflationary policies, and faced with poor performance among many countries which have been 'strong adjusters', the World Bank's explanations have become increasingly more structural — deterministic and eclectic. Even the IMF's *World Economic Outlook* explains Africa's poor performance in surprisingly structuralist language. As it notes, the 'resilience' of growth in recent years 'partly reflected more favourable developments in nonfuel commodity prices, which did not contract as much as in earlier global slowdowns, as well as debt relief under the HIPC initiative'. The IMF also notes that despite 'the trend toward improved macroeconomic policies in many African countries, 'external current account deficits in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa remain relatively high, reflecting in part continued high debt levels but also low savings rates related to low per capita incomes and structural impediments to economic diversification'.

Today, there is recognition that the axiomatic mapping of policies into performance was naïve and misleading. There are admissions, albeit grudging,

to having underestimated the external constraints on policy and the vulnerability of African economies to them, to having overestimated the responsiveness of the economies and the private sector, to having wrong sequencing of policies, to inadvertently having eroded state capacities and responsibilities ('policy ownership'), etc. However, it is still insisted that the passage of time will do its job and the posture recommended to African countries has been to sit tight and wait for the outpouring of gains. There is no recognition that the accumulated effects of past policy errors may have made the implementation of 'market friendly' policies in their pristine form more difficult.

Economists increasingly use the concept of hysteresis, a phenomenon observed in some physical systems, by which changes in a property lag behind changes in an agent on which it depends, so that the value of the former, at any moment, depends on the nature of the previous variation of the latter. They use the concept to account for any 'path dependence' of the state of economic variables on the past history of the economic system or policies. In explaining the failure of their policies, the BWIs argue that past (before-adjustment) policy errors have a lasting effect through hysteresis. Strangely, no such hysteresis is entertained for policies pursued by the BWIs in the recent past. Policy failures, especially those as comprehensive as those of SAPs can continue to have effects on the performance of the economy long after the policies are abandoned. It may well be that the accretions of errors that are often perfunctorily admitted have created maladjusted economies not capable of gaining much from globalisation. Both the measures of 'success' used for African economies and the projections for the future suggest that, essentially, the BWIs have put Africa's development on hold. This clearly suggests the extreme urgency for Africans themselves to assume the task of 'bringing development back in' in their respective countries and collectively. To benefit from interacting with the rest of the world, African policy-makers will have to recognise the enormous task of correcting the maladjustment of their economies. They will have to introduce more explicit, more subtle and more daring policies to stimulate growth, trade and export diversification than hitherto.

Notes

1. There is something illogical about juxtaposing globalisation and marginalisation. Either the process is 'global' and encompasses all spaces on the globe or is only partial, marginalising certain sections of the planet. Globalisation does not necessarily mean that everyone gains; it entails gains and losers, core and periphery, top and bottom etc. African economies are encompassed by and subordinate to the global economy. Indeed it leaves open

the possibility of adverse globalisation and as Stanley Fischer, discussing capital flight, states: '...in spite of capital controls, African capital has de facto been globalised – albeit in the wrong direction' (the poor performance at the level of macroeconomic outcomes), and high levels of connectivity at the levels of policy and institutional reform. In other words, if one focuses on policy and institutional reforms, Africa is highly integrated into, and not marginal within, the world system (Bangura 2001).

2. This paper seeks to refute the 'old tales' claiming that except for the natural resources sector, African countries fail to attract significant FDI. The author claims that reforming countries do not seem to suffer from the unfavourable image and pessimistic perceptions about the continent. And yet, the paper clearly shows the resource bias of the investments, the preponderance of South Africa and it being privatization driven. Even for South Africa, only 16 percent of investment was in 'green-field' activities. The paper is apparently part of the 'awareness initiative' sponsored by the World Bank and the United Nations to 'help boost SSA's image as an investment location' (Pigato 2000:2). This may explain the positive image that is painstakingly extracted from a set of data that points in the opposite direction.

3. UNCTAD reports that in 1998 alone, foreign direct investment through privatisation triggered a total of US$684 million in foreign exchange reserves in sub-Saharan Africa. This is a one-off affair and may explain the jump in FDI in more recent years. Already by 1999, we witnessed a slowdown in privatisation-related FDI.

4. The 'rise and fall' of Ghana as a pupil of the BWIs is recounted in a number of publications. (See, especially, Aryeetey et al. 2000; Hutchful 2002).

5. A study by the World Bank's International Financial Corporation in which managers were asked questions about specific obstacles to doing business and their interactions with government conclude:

> The first striking finding is that ten out of the fifteen questions elicit the same responses in Africa as is the case worldwide, suggesting that the business environment is no different in these respects: respondents see few problems with regulations for starting new business, price controls, labour regulations, safety or environmental regulations and perceive little threat of terrorist acts. They do find financing problematic, think, unsurprisingly, that taxes are high and/or tax regulations cumbersome; they also find that policy instability and general uncertainty about the cost of regulations pose serious problems to doing business. In all these respects, conditions in Africa are about the same as the world average. This is a very encouraging finding.

6. In most cases, such a reversal of flows may call for 'amnesty', given the illicit nature of the accumulation of much of the expatriated capital. This raises a host of questions including those of the morality of seeming to reward kleptocracy and the credibility of the 'amnesty'. The credibility of the amnesty will ultimately depend on the legitimacy of the government pronouncing the

amnesty and on the adhesion by the domestic class to what is a clearly national and popular development project. 'Amnesty' imposed by outsiders and by officials who belong to the kleptocracy are unlikely to be convincing to either private capital or the general public.

7. In a view of the long inconclusive literature on the IMF Adam Prezeworski and James Vreeland (200) find that IMF programmes lower annual economic growth by 1.5 percent for each year that a country participates in its programmes.

8. According to ECA,

> After two decades of stagnation, from the mid-1990s, African economies started showing evidence of a turnaround. There is now convincing evidence of improved economic performance in a wide range of African countries, with recorded gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates in excess of 6 percent in several of them. The progress has been largely due to improved policy performance, particularly the adoption of less-distorted macro-economic frameworks, and the improvement in governance in many countries (UNECA 1999).

9. Countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Tanzania, and even Zaire experienced higher total factor productivity growth than most East Asian countries (Rodrik 2001).

10. One consequence of the orthodoxy is fixation with austerity not as a programmatic concern over careful use of limited resources, but as an ideologically driven clamp on state driven activities, since in most cases, these measures are often accompanied by removal of constraints on private borrowing, leading to profligacy and reduced private savings. In more concrete terms, this has resulted in strengthening the finance ministry and other 'austerity' and debt management institutions at the expense of the 'spending' ministries so crucial to a growth focused process.

11. And as McPherson and Rakovski (2001: 11) observe,

> Without growth to provide some dynamism, particularly the expectation among investors that growth will continue (and probably accelerate), there has been no incentive for anyone to invest. Thus the slow growth has fed on itself to produce the 'tragedy'. African regional organizations and research institutions have argued for decades that SAPs were anti-developmental because of their deflationary thrust. The 'fundamentals' that SAPs pushed may have been adequate to address stabilization, but they were definitely not the 'fundamentals' for development involving growth and structural change (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999).

12. I have argued this in Mkandawire (1988).

13. One reason why the contribution of investment to growth in Africa is underestimated may be precisely because its contribution to increasing the flexibility of the economy is ignored.

14. This is a recurring message in the collection of papers edited by Helleiner (2002b), especially Mwega (2002) and Ndulu et al. (2002).

15. For a contrary view, see the IMF paper by Subramanian and Tamarisa (2001). There is an intriguing suggestion in the paper that, at least among Anglophone countries, intra-African trade has been much more dynamic than trade with the rest of the world. Subramanian suggests that this is no good for Africa as it means weakening the links with the technologically more dynamic North. He provides no evidence that Africa's import of plant and equipment from the North, the goods most important for technological acquisition, has suffered as the result of increased intra-Africa trade.

16. As Tony Killick noted, the spread of SAPs has 'given the BWIs an historically unprecedented leverage over the economic policies of sovereign developing country governments, to an extent that would be unimaginable among OECD states' (Killick 1996: 221).

17. None less than the Chief Economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz (1998), has called for the transcendence of the Washington consensus in order to place development back on to the agenda. The World Bank has proposed that each country prepare a 'comprehensive development framework' which considers 'structural, social and human aspects' of development (Wolfensohn 1999).

18. On the state see Bauer (1981; 1984). On nationalism see Johnson (1967). Green characterises Elliot Berg's thinking on the economic world view as 'of a more robust and free competitive market-oriented, comparative advantage-led, neoliberal political economic world than that portrayed in the AD (Agenda for Development)' (Green and Allison 1986: 63).

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Shared Governance and Leadership in African Universities: Experiences from Mzuzu University, Malawi, and Amoud University, Somaliland

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Abstract

This paper examines the application of shared governance structure and leadership styles in African Universities, specifically at Mzuzu university in Malawi and Amud University in Somaliland. First, a brief background about Mzuzu and Amoud Universities, and their governance structure will be presented. This is followed with the description and analysis of data on teamwork, job satisfaction, shared decision-making at Mzuzu and Amoud universities. Finally, this paper will provide recommendations for African universities who are faced with similar problems of shared governance with valuable data regarding governance and leadership, and provide information about the ways in which universities governance can be modified to increase the success of higher education institutions.

Résumé

Cet article porte sur l'application de la structure et du mode de gestion caractéristiques de la gouvernance partagée, dans les universités africaines, particulièrement à l'université Mzuzu du Malawi et à l'université Amud, dans le Somali land. Nous commençons par une brève description des universités Mzuzu et Amoud et de leur structure de gouvernance. Nous enchaînons en suite avec la description et l'analyse de diverses données relatives au travail d'équipe et à la prise de décision partagée au sein de ces deux universités. Pour finir, cette contribution fournit des recommandations aux universités africaines confrontées aux mêmes problèmes liés à la gouvernance partagée, sur la base d'informations pertinentes concernant la gouvernance et la direction. Cet article fournit également des informations sur les éventuels changements à apporter à la gouvernance universitaire, de sorte à augmenter les chances de réussite des institutions d'enseignement supérieur.

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Introduction

For America, governance in higher education has involved those in authority, power and influence (Hines 2000). Five themes have been extensively explored in studies on governance: multiple claimants to authority; a continuum from participatory governance to a corporate style of governance; the significance of policy actors external to the campus; locus of authority; and higher education as a major instrument of state policy (Hines 2000:105-106). Governance is a term which was coined by Corson in the 1960s to show separation of decisions about academic or faculty matters from issues of institutional concern. By the 1970s, faculty authority in American universities was established over curricula, faculty status, instruction, research and student performance (Duryea 1973; Baldridge et al 1977). This was differentiated from institutional or communal authority for finance, public relations, physical plant, alumni and student affairs. Stewart (1976) labeled these as 'associational or collegial' as differentiated from 'executive or hierarchical'. Corson had recommended that colleges and universities need restructuring to establish the sense of community that was lost in the 1950s and 1960s. It was argued that faculty's primary authority needed reaffirming. The 1960s student uprisings resulted in student participation in campus governance. Power and influence of faculty also increased (Hodgkinson 1971). This was a significant change for the universities. Reasons that have been put forward for this change include the fact that trustees and governing board members relinquished some of their decision making prerogatives to faculty and campus administrators (McConnell 1970). There was also greater involvement in governance of agencies external to colleges and universities. In short, higher education governance in America has increased levels of involvement by the stakeholders, has promoted a spirit of cooperation between governing boards and major participants and has given recognition to the fact that problems of higher education can be solved by collaborative initiatives and not by competition among stakeholders or centralised mechanisms.

On the other hand, governance structures across Sub-Saharan Africa are derived from the institutional models established by former colonial administrators although they have been modified to suit the various cultural and political philosophies. In Anglophone African countries like Malawi and Somaliland, universities are statutory organisations created by an Act of Parliament. Responsibility for institutional policy decisions rests with a university council whose members are appointed by the Head of State. The university senate is responsible for academic affairs and teaching is organised through faculties, departments and specialised schools or institutes. The Head of State is also the chancellor (President) of the university. This was originally

meant to emphasise the importance of the role of the university in national development. But, in reality, it has served to exacerbate tensions between universities and the state. State control has been rigid hence hindering developmental initiatives of the universities (Saint 1992:72). Centralised governance has also stifled and impinged on academic aspects like research and teaching. It has been argued in the literature (Banya and Elu 1997; Neizer 1998; World Bank 1988; Court 1991; Goma 1989) that greater decentralisation in higher education systems in Africa would bring more efficiency. However, effective decentralisation requires an explicit definition of the roles of the constituencies at various levels and the effective exchange of information between them. Effective governance can provide the stability necessary for the institutional development of African universities (Saint 1992:72). This would also need a sound and effective leadership. It would require a vice chancellor/president who is willing to work with teams and collaborate with others; a vice chancellor/president who is prepared to listen and establish a pattern of cooperation between all stakeholders. It would need a transformational leader. African leadership in universities since their establishment in the 1960s has mostly been transactional. This has been because of the pressure on the universities to produce immediate results. Politicians had urged universities to teach, advance knowledge through research, have academic standards, help unify Africa, produce doctors, lawyers, teachers and so on. The university leaders and their followers were supposed to do all these within a short time as the expatriates were leaving Africa. It therefore became a matter of 'rewards for work done or punishment if not done'. Such transactional leadership styles have lived their lifespan in Africa and universities need to follow what some of the best institutions in the world have done in transforming their institutions, but they should also be conscious of their own environmental changes and needs. They should take into consideration the fact that certain aspects of shared governance may not work in Africa. The aim should be to develop universities that have their own African identity. For America, shared governance has been the trump card for its success story in the higher education in addition to other aspects like open success, autonomous control, wide collaboration and so on. The transparency, representative participation, information flow and shared responsibility would help Mzuzu and Amud universities as well.

This paper discusses the need for changes in governance and leadership styles to suit the current needs which have gone beyond transactional and centralised/hierarchical modes of managing university education. Mzuzu University of Malawi and Amoud University of Somaliland will serve as case studies to shed light on the governance structures in African Universities. First, a brief background about Mzuzu and Amoud Universities, and their

governance is presented. This is followed by a description and analysis of data on teamwork, job satisfaction, shared decision-making at Mzuzu and Amoud universities. Finally, the study provides recommendations for African universities which are faced with similar problems of shared governance with valuable data regarding governance and leadership, and perhaps contribute to the discussions on the measures of accountability, organisational culture, faculty autonomy, sound leadership, and provide information about the ways in which universities governance can be modified to increase the success of higher education institutions.

Background information on Mzuzu University

Mzuzu University was established by an Act of Parliament as a second university in Malawi. Besides establishing the University, the Act provided for the institution's conduct and management, the incorporation of the university council as a body corporate and as a governing body of the university, and the establishment of a senate (Mzuzu University Act 1997). The University's Mission is to promote high quality education, training, research and complementary services to meet the technological, social and economic needs of individuals and communities in Malawi. The objectives include:

- To advance knowledge and promote wisdom and understanding by engaging in teaching, research and training by making provision for the dissemination of learning.
- To engage in such university education, research and training as is responsive to the needs of Malawi, Africa and the world.
- To offer an education of high university standards and
- To provide complementary services to meet the technological, social and economic needs of individuals and communities (Act 1997).

These objectives reflect the country's national developmental goals as stated in the Malawi Development Policies (MDEVPOL).

Governance and structure at Mzuzu University

The university is a quasi-statutory organisation created by an Act of Parliament as noted earlier. Responsiblity for institutional policy decisions rests with the Mzuzu University Council whose membership is determined by the government and the University community. At the planning stage of the university's establishment, the intention was to have an autonomous institution with its own administrative structure different from the one that existed in its sister university which had been established earlier. The planners had argued that such a structure would enable the university to make a fresh start and

thereby avoid some of the problems existing in the university of Malawi. The planners also wanted to have the new university in a position to be able to compete in the current changing environment and encourage excellence. This competitiveness would also, in the course of time, contribute to the advancement of the institution. For the first time, students going to the university would pay for tuition although it was a public university. Previously, university education in Malawi was free of charge. The government shouldered all the financial responsibilities—tuition, accommodation, books, food, transport to and from the university and so on. The students even received allowances for incidentals. It is a well known story how this has created problems for universities in Africa. Mzuzu University was going to be different. It was going to ask students to contribute to their higher education.

Planners also envisioned a collaborative/participatory structure of governance. This was shown even in the initial stages when consultations were underway. The community was consulted on various issues. The institution's status, location, name, funding modes and programmes to be offered were all decided upon after wide consultations. This collaborative and participatory style was evident even after the institution was established.

Key academic decision points: Governance patterns at National University of Somalia (NUS)

The National University of Somaliland was administered by the Ministry of Higher Education. Since the Somali government was the major benefactor of the 'product' of higher education, as well as the major source of its capital, it had considerable clout with regard to university management, including its administration, scholarship programme, and faculty research. In fact, the head of the state (former dictator Siad Barre) was also chancellor of the university, even though his duties were mainly ceremonial in nature (Bullaleh 1993; Nur-Awaleh 2003; Mebrahtu 1992:632).

The rector was the chief executive officer of NUS, assisted by two vice-rectors who were responsible for academic affairs and administrative affairs, respectively. Both the rector and the vice-rectors were appointed by the National Ruling Party (Mebrahtu 1992:632).

NUS had two other main administrative bodies in the university: the university council and senate. The chair of the council is the Minister of Higher Education. The ruling political party, unlike the student body, had its own representative on the council. The senate committee was chaired by the rector and included two academic staff members (selected by their deans). The academic staff in each faculty was responsible for designing and implementing the student curriculum (IEES 1989). Each faculty was headed

by a dean who acted as its chief academic and administrative officer. The dean, who reported to the vice-rector and rector, led the faculty in designing regulation for research, admissions, registration, and examination of students (Mebrahtu 1992:633).

During Siad Barre's regime (1969–1990), institutions of higher learning in Somalia had less autonomy, making them dependent on the government. The government's involvement in higher education came in the form of subsidies, especially free tuition for students. The government's arguments for free education centred around the assumption that society would derive social and cultural advantages because education would provide opportunities for economic and social integration of marginalised groups and individuals (World Bank 1988; IEES 1984). Proponents of these views argued that the analysis of the rate of return on education was inadequate. They also put forth another provocative argument: If the government could subsidise the tobacco industry, why not subsidise higher education? (Samoff 1993:182).

Current status of higher education in Somalia/Somaliland

A major devastating impact of the civil war in Somalia was the destruction of the National University of Somaliland (SNU) and other institutions that offered post-secondary education. Before the collapse of the Somali state, NUS enrolled 4,650 students, and consisted of thirteen faculties: law, economics, agriculture, education, medicine, industrial chemistry, languages, engineering, journalism, geology, veterinary, and political science (International Handbook of Universities 1993). Journalist William Finnegan's description of NUS, especially the former College of Education, in 1995 is telling:

> The low-rise, modern looking building of the former College of Education is now a displaced persons' camp. The classrooms and dormitories were full of families; the walls were blacked by cooking fires... the library was a world of dust. Books were piled everywhere, on sagging shelves, on toppling heaps. Some were stained and disintegrating, but most were intact... A cow mooed somewhere. The dust was so deep that it was though the desert itself was creeping through the walls, burying the books in fine sand (Finnegan 1995:76).

Despite this bleak picture, the impact of genuine efforts to rehabilitate many learning centres by Somalis and local and international nongovernmental organisations is amazing. For example, in Somaliland (former British Somaliland), the stable political environment that has prevailed for the past decade has facilitated genuine efforts to rebuild and rehabilitate the majority of the schools (Nur-Awaleh 2003).

Higher Education in Somaliland consists chiefly of Amoud University (AU) and Hargeisa University (HU). AU is located at the former secondary

school campus at Amoud in the Awdal region of Borama (the largest city in Awdal), while HU is located in the capital of the Somaliland Republic, Hargeisa (Nur-Awaleh 2003).

Like other regions in Somaliland, students in the region of Awdal and other regions in Somaliland never had access to an institution of higher learning in their own backyard. Students who graduated from the former Amoud Secondary School and other schools in the region had to travel to Mogadishu for higher education. The chair of Borama's Board of Directors articulated the dilemma of higher education in Somaliland well:

> All the colleges and faculties of the Somali National University were located in Mogadishu and its vicinities and this obviously provided... the students in the capital an opportunity for higher education that was denied to their counterparts in other regions... No attempt was made by the former government to remedy this obvious disparity in higher education between the North and South... It was sad to recall that during this period it was taken for granted that higher education was strictly the privilege of the South and any suggestion of its expansion to the North (Somaliland) was interpreted as a political sin (Elmi 2000:2).

Amoud University (Somaliland)

The rebirth of the Republic of Somaliland, and the prolonged peace and prosperity experienced by this young nation, necessitated the establishment of Amoud University (AU) in Somaliland. The civil war not only destroyed the economic and social fabric of the society; it also created a bleak future for thousands of Somaliland's youth, who faced a devastated educational system, a lack of opportunity for higher education, and high unemployment. Hence, some have argued that 'Amoud University is perhaps the most powerful tool that could offer a sense of direction to the hopeless and unemployed youth' (Elmi 2000:2).

At present, there are data correlating educational facilities to pertinent social development needs. There is an urgent need for higher learning to meet these needs and to put education at the service of the people. The Somali Diaspora constitutes a severe brain drain from Somaliland, which is already suffering from shortages in technical and professional expertise (Nur-Awaleh 2003). The main justifications given by many Somalians for leaving the country is to pursue education, particularly higher education, for their children. A national university at home would therefore help to attract many overseas Somalians back home and at the same time retain more who are already here (Elmi 2000:2).

AU has two departments, Business and Education. According to Samatar (2001:650), University administrators 'selected education as foundational

discipline due to the country's dire need for qualified schools teachers'. The community and the administration intend to revise an old Somali education tradition in which all university graduates expected to obtain positions in government. By contrast it is hoped that those majoring in business administration will secure employment in established enterprises or create their own business (Nur-Awaleh 2003).

Governance Structure of Amoud University (AU)

Unlike the former National University of Somaliland (NUS), AU is very autonomous and has a very limited relationship with the Ministry of Higher Education in Somaliland. This administrative structure consists of the Supreme Council, the Scientific Council, the president, three vice-presidents, four deans, three directors, a head librarian, and a head of technological support (Nur-Awaleh 2003).

The Supreme Council overseas financial and administrative management, while the president is the chief academic and administrative head of the university and is responsible for its day-to-day operation. Three vice-presidents, one for academic and student affairs, another for planning and registration, and another for external affairs, support the president. At each college level, the dean is the chief academic and administrative head and is responsible to the vice-president for maintaining and promoting efficient management of the college. Within colleges, faculties or centers act instruction. Faculties are made up of various departments divided among various academic disciplines. Departments are in charge of teaching, curriculum development, and student evaluation and assessment (Nur-Awaleh 2003).

The data on the number of instructional faculty at AU show that there were only twelve faculty members for the academic year 1999–2000. The entire university has only one female faculty member. No data are available on the full-time or part-time status, rank, age, and level of education of AU faculty (Nur-Awaleh 2003).

A total of 103 students enrolled in AU in the 1999–2000 academic year, of whom fifteen were female. Based upon a comparison with student-to-teacher ratios in higher education in Africa, AU is not fully utilising its faculty and staff. But the present student-to-staff ratios could be defended as a transitional phenomenon. Of AU students, 71 percent are from the Awdal region. AU has had little success in offsetting the disparities in access to the university for potential students who are not from Awdal region (Nur-Awaleh 2003).

A major problem at Somaliland universities is the issue of the brain drain which has been devastating to higher education and research in Somalia/Somaliland. As a result of the civil war, poor training and facilities, high centralisation of power, limited job and promotional opportunities, decades

of poorly designed structural programmes, poor working conditions, and decades of abuse by the former dictator of Somalia (Siad Barre), the finest and brightest minds in the fields of sciences, higher education, law, engineering, architecture, medicine, educational management and planning, business and public administration, political science, and history have moved abroad, leaving behind an already debilitated system of higher education (Nur-Awaleh 2003).

The University of Amoud has serious difficulties in recruiting and retaining Somali faculty members. The continuous economic hardship faced by Somalia/Somaliland is manifested in an unattractive reward system in the universities. The salaries of professors are so low that it is very difficult to recruit new personnel. The few dedicated and committed faculty who have decided to confront these challenges are faced with a dilemma of whether to pay total attention to instruction and research or divide their attention between teaching and some other private money-generating activities that will help them sustain themselves and their families. Hence, higher education in Somalia/Somaliland is bound to continuously face a downward spiral until the nation's political economy is overhauled (Carrington and Detragiache 1999; Saint 1992; Abdulla 1996).

Conceptual framework

The following research questions guided this study as it relates Mzuzu and Amoud Universities:

1. To what extent does a good working environment contribute to job satisfaction of faculty and staff at Mzuzu and Amoud Universities?
2. What is the relationship between teamwork, job satisfaction and administrative styles that exist at the Mzuzu and Amoud Universities?
3. For effective participation, leadership needs to ensure that constituencies work in teams (Bensimon and Neuman 1993). Do such teams exist at the university?
4. How innovative is the organisational culture of the university?

The above questions have been formulated taking into consideration the theory that the effectiveness of a university depends on the specified outcomes in goal achievement. This in turn depends on the governance structure and leadership of the organisation. Blake and Mouton's Management Grid Theory is considered for adaptation to Sub-Saharan African universities where outcomes are closely tied to national educational goals. Their achievement depends on the relationship of various variables affecting performance of individuals involved. These include: team work, innovative culture, healthy work environment, job satisfaction, and shared governance structure.

Methods and sample

To begin to fill the gap of our knowledge of shared governance, a simple random sample of 50 faculty and staff from Mzuzu university and 12 faculty and staff from Amoud University was selected. A Likert scale survey was given to them. Seven percent of faculty and staff at Mzuzu previously worked in the university of Malawi. The survey was constructed around four independent variables (work environment, job satisfaction, team work, and organisational culture). The survey asked the faculty and staff views on their institution's structure and leadership, job satisfaction, collaboration and shared decision-making, organisational climate and communication. All items were self-reports of attitudes and behaviors that were measured using a 5- point Likert scale ranging from 1 = neutral, 2 = agree, 3 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree. In order to show the effect of the variables on faculty and staff perceptions about shared governance at Mzuzu university, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Pearson r correlations were made for each of the variables.

Table 1: Variables and Number of Responses per category of Mzuzu University

1.Work environment independent variables	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
Helping the university	8	15	15	1
Access to management	3	16	18	3
Flexible policies and structure	8	7	17	4
Commitment to individual development	6	14	15	1
Improvement of the system	6	23.	7	2
Innovativeness	0	6	23	6
Satisfactory management	4	22	7	0
Motivation for good performance	5	26	9	2
Participation in decision making	3	18	14	2
Ethical standards	3	25	6	0
2. Job Satisfaction				
Rewarding skills	6	20	11	2
Fair wages	10	21	8	0
Autonomy at work	3	7	16	13
Satisfactory work outcomes	2	7	20	10
High motivation	2	6	22	8

3. Team work

Communication	2	24	8	4
Rewards for team work	2	15	14	8
Harmony	11	19	13	3
Self directed teams	11	13	13	8
Influence on performance ratings	0	25	8	5
Free and Open discussions	11	11	10	14
Full participation in decision making	0	6	13	18
Adequate communication from leaders	0	2	33	15
Discussions are encouraged	22	12	5	2
Shared decision making	12	10	9	5

4. Organizational Culture

Innovativeness	3	4	22	8
Knowing the vision of the university	16	15	7	0
Involvement in creation of a new culture	5	17	9	2
Collaboration	6	11	13	2
Involvement in decision making	15	19	5	0
University competitiveness	4	8	15	4
Risk tolerant	14	18	4	12
Outcomes are achieved sometimes	2	5	15	6
Outcomes are always achieved	9	8	12	3
Outcomes are never achieved	7	20	4	0

Table one Variables and Number of Responses per Category of Amoud University

1.Work environment independent variables	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
Access to management	0	1	1	4
Flexible policies and structure	0	1	2	3
Commitment to individual development	0	0	6	0
Improvement of the system	0	0	5	1
Innovativeness	0	0	1	5
Satisfactory management	0	0	2	4
Motivation for good performance	0	0	5	1

1.Work environment independent variables	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
Participation in decision making	0	1	5	0
Ethical standards	0	0	6	0

2. Job Satisfaction

Rewarding skills	0	1	4	1
Fair wages		1	5	0
Autonomy at work	0	1	4	1
Satisfactory work outcomes	0	1	2	3
High motivation	0	0	6	0

3.Team work

Communication	0	1	4	1
Rewards for team work	0	1	5	0
Harmony	0	0	5	
Self directed teams	0	0	4	2
Influence on performance ratings	0	0	6	0
Free and open discussions	0	1	2	3
Full participation in decision making	0	1	5.	0
Adequate communication from leaders	0	1	4	1
Discussions are encouraged	0	1	5	0
Shared decision making	0	1	3	2

4. Organizational Culture

Innovativeness	03	0	3	3
Knowing the vision of the university	0	0	2	4
Involvement in creation of a new culture	0	1	4	1
Collaboration	0	0	4	2
Involvement in decision making	0	1	3	2
University competitiveness	0	0		6
Risk tolerant	0	1	4	1
Outcomes are achieved sometimes	0	0	5	1
Outcomes are always achieved	0	0	1	5
Outcomes are never achieved	6	0	0	0

Limitations

There are several limitations to this study one of which is the lack of litera-
ture on the subject from the African perspective. Most of the literature on
higher education in Sub-Saharan Africa has concentrated on issues of qua-
lity, finance and relevance (Banya and Elu 1997; Court 1991; World Bank

1988, 2000). The study is also subject to the limitations associated with the problems of cross-national survey methodology that was be employed in collecting and analysing the data at Mzuzu University. The data for study were also limited to:

1 Two universities (Mzuzu in Malawi), and Amoud University (Somaliland), selected for this study.

2 The study is also subject to the limitations associated with the problems of cross-national survey methodology that was be employed in collecting and analyzing the data for both universities.

3 This study is limited in the sense that it concentrated only on faculty and staff. Hence, it did not include other constituents like council members, students, senior administrators, the community and the politicians. In addition, the variables used did not include other aspects of institutional governance and leadership which would have revealed the underlying beliefs and values of the university.

Findings

Out of all the subjects (62) that were given the survey, 90 percent responded and returned the survey. Nearly three-quarters of our respondents (75 percent) were male. Forty-two percent of all respondents from Mazuzi university said that there is a healthy work environment (The degree to which faculty and staff considered the university to be conducive to their work in terms of access to management; flexibility of policies; motivation; innovative culture & participation in decision making), while 58 percent noted that they are not satisfied with their work environment. On the other hand, 98 percent of all respondents from Amoud university responded favorably toward issues related to shared governance.

When respondents were asked to comment on the autonomy at work, 74 percent of Mazuzi respondents, and 99 percent of Amoud respondents reported that they are satisfied with autonomy that their work gives them.

With regard to team work (the degree to which faculty and staff saw the leadership operating in teams through communication; self direction; performance; participation; open discussions, etc.), 48 percent of Mazuzi respondents agreed that administration is responsive to their needs as they relate to team work items, while 53 percent were not satisfied with administration and participation in decision-making in a meaningful way. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority (98 percent) at Amoud university were highly

satisfied with team work, participation in decision making, and open communication between faculty and administrators at their institution.

Discussion

While the results showed some satisfaction with the work environment, several aspects conducive for shared governance were missing. For example, communication up and down the hierarchy is a problem at Mazuzi University. This came out distinctly in the survey. There is also a culture of silence and confidentiality of information which means that most of the important information about the institution is kept away from faculty and staff. Both faculty and staff felt that they do not work as teams and that the culture of the university is rigid and centralized with limited chances of innovation. These aspects of the institution indicate that shared governance is not practiced at Mzuzu University. The study also found that there is no transformational leadership at Mzuzu university. Furthermore the environment at Mzuzu is not conducive for employee satisfaction, and collaboration is minimal and the communication channel is one way (from administrators to faculty).

On the hand, shared governance is an important characteristics of Amoud university. There is a clear channel of communication. Faculty and staff are highly involved in the decision-making process.

The results from this study show that although the founders had a vision of a less centralised institution and a more participative governance structure, Mzuzu university is still very much like its older sister with a very centralised bureaucracy. Power still rests with the Chancellor (state president), and Vice Chancellor. The university is only five years old and there is room for improvement, but this will need changes in the organisational structure itself. Perhaps it is time the Chancellor's chair became occupied by a professional from the University instead of the head of state. Leadership has to be more transformational instead of transactional so that the university becomes more inclusive and engages all faculty and staff to the maximum.

Recommendations for strengthening governance patterns of African universities

The following recommendations are drawn from this study as well from other studies on the importance of shared governance in the African higher education systems. There is a need for democratisation of decision making within the university so that there is more participatory process in policy decision making. This would make the implementation of policies more efficient and effective. Democratisation could be achieved through wider representation of faculty staff and students in the key university governing bodies such as the senate, the council, and the various committees (Kiugu 1999). This will

ensure that faculty members and students have input in policies that affect them, and so be less likely to oppose implementation. In addition, there is need for more regular formal and informal contacts and consultations between the top university administration and student and staff. This would in the long run nurture the trust among the various stakeholders and avoid any unanticipated explosive situations. The current government of Malawi and former regime of Siad Barre of Somalia were constantly accused of frequent interference with the daily functioning of their respective universities. Tensions between the groups (administrators, staff, students, and auxiliary staff) in the university has been attributed to the government. To this end, it is recommended that the government of Malawi should refrain from interfering with the university autonomy, which is guaranteed by the legislative act. Instead, the government should strive to encourage rather than striffe academic freedom. The government should endeavour to safeguard the independence of the university with regard to the recruitment of administrators and faculty members, curriculum design, admissions, finances, research, etc.

African university leaders need to create environments that encourage constructive criticism and adaptation to rapidly changing scientific and societal circumstances. This will need transformation of prevailing patterns of paternalistic governance into structures of participation and accountability to involve faculty, staff and students as responsible partners. The road to this goal is transparency, information flow, representative participation, incentives and rewards for positive initiative and sufficient delegation. Mzuzu university in Malawi for example could begin with the following: Leadership to help faculty and staff to develop 'niches' by giving them a perception that they have a place in their academic community which is theirs and nobody else's. Everyone should feel part of the larger organisation. Organisational change is more likely to occur when academic units are encouraged to experiment and take risks. Instead of being held accountable for particular results, units are held accountable for conducting and assessment, interpreting the results and making informed judgments about what to do differently. Universities inevitably reflect the societies in which they operate (World Bank 2000). When a country like Somalia suffers from deep tribal rifts or conflicts, these will be present on the university campus. Undemocratic countries are unlikely to encourage shared governance in higher education. A society which is corrupt cannot have its higher education institutions unaffected. In short, external factors have a tremendous effect on universities. The transformational leader in Africa therefore needs various tools to help him or her.

First, he/she will need faculty councils and senates that are representative. Delegating powers to a faculty council and senate promotes shared go-

vernance by limiting top-down directives. Second, there should be a broader representation on the council. This is a buffer between the institution and the external bodies to which the university is accountable. Such a body should not just include political appointees but also members from the private sector. Third, there should be a transparent, logical and well understood set of rules for budgeting and accounting because these have an enormous influence on the operation and performance of the university. Rules should encourage flexibility, stability and transparency. Bureaucracy results in inefficiency and waste (World Bank 2000:64). Fourth, there should be data for decision-making. Without data and information, the leader, even if he/she is transformational, cannot make effective decisions. This include data on teaching, student achievement, research performance, institutional finance status and so on. Such data should be shared with faculty instead of being kept as 'confidential' by the administrators and the leader. Fifth, the chief executive (the Vice Chancellor) has to be elected instead of being appointed because he/she may lack wide support, hence diluting the sense of shared governance. Sixth, faculty quality is the most important determinant of the overall quality of a higher education institution. Nepotism, tribalism and inbreeding are enemies of faculty quality. Faculty and administrative staff should be rewarded for their performance rather than length of service. Finally, leaders need to realise that there is more to gain with transformational style of leadership and shared governance (World Bank 2000).

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Appendix

Taking the presence of shared governance to be the dependent /effect variable, the following independent/cause variables were considered:

- Work environment (WE 1–10) The degree to which faculty and staff considered the university to be conducive to their work in terms of access to management; flexibility of policies; motivation; innovative culture & participation in decision making. (Rated on a 1–4 scale with 1 as strongly agree and 4 as strongly disagree).

- Job Satisfaction (JS 1–5) The degree to which faculty and staff perceived the rewarding system to be adequate; faculty autonomy; satisfactory outcomes & fair wages (Rated 1–4).

- Team Work (TW 1–10) The degree to which faculty and staff saw the leadership operating in teams through communication; self direction; performance; participation; open discussions etc (Rated 1–4).

- Organisational culture (IN 1–12) The degree to which faculty and staff knew the vision of the university; involved in the creation of a new culture; involved in decision making; see outcomes achieved & see the university as being tolerant to mistakes made. (Rated 1–4).

Abbreviations used:

WE = Work Environment (Statements 1–10)

JS = Job Satisfaction (Statements 1–5)

TW = Team Work (Statements 1–10)

IN = Innovativeness in the Organisation (Statements 1–12).

The Growth of Islamic Learning in Northern Ghana and Its Interaction with Western Secular Education

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Abstract

This paper examines the growth of Islamic learning in northern Ghana and its interaction with western secular education. It argues that colonial policies and practice had far-reaching implications for Islamic learning, stifling attempts at growth, and suggests that the contemporary situation with regard to Islamic learning in Ghana cannot be properly understood without an appreciation of the historical forces that have helped fashion this system of learning. It concludes that there is need for a meaningful and sustainable interaction between Islamic and Western secular education, especially in the era of decentralisation and increased demand for new competence at local levels.

Résumé

Cette communication porte sur le développement de l'apprentissage islamique, au Nord du Ghana, ainsi que les interactions de cette forme d'apprentissage avec l'éducation occidentale laïque. Cet essai affirme que les pratiques et politiques coloniales ont eu de profondes conséquences sur l'apprentissage islamique, étouffant ainsi ce dernier. L'on ne peut donc comprendre la situation contemporaine au Ghana, relative à cette forme d'apprentissage, sans tenir compte des forces historiques qui ont façonné ce système d'éducation. Cette communication conclut en affirmant qu'une forte interaction doit s'instaurer entre l'éducation islamique et l'éducation laïque occidentale, particulièrement en matière de décentralisation; en outre, il existe une demande croissante en matière de compétences nouvelles, au niveau local.

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Introduction

It is interesting to note that Islam and the cultures that come with it were often overlooked even in the most authoritative works on culture contact in Ghana. Ward's *A History of Ghana* (1967) has no single statement on Islam or its modes of education. During the colonial period a work published by A.W. Cardinal, *In Asante and Beyond* (1927:107–8), could not discern any progress ever made by Islam. Cardinal asserted that the cluster of Dagomba-speaking people in the north had constituted a strong bulwark against the influence of Islam. In the 1960s, Trimingham (1962:7) was to consider the Guinea states, constituting present day northern Ghana, as having had no contact whatsoever with the Sudan states and thus were uninfluenced by Islam. Recent authors whose work concern specifically education in Ghana like R.B. Bening (1990), MacWilliam and Kwamena-Poh (1978) and B.G. Der (1983) have found nothing of interest in Islamic education to write about.

Despite this utter neglect, some European travellers and anthropologists scouting the then Neutral Zone[1] often made references in their reports on the state of Islam and Islamic education in the Gold Coast. Dupuis, writing about Salaga and Asante in the 1820s, fondly referred to the Neutral Zone as a Mohammedan power and describes Salaga as '...the chief city of these districts... and the population, of whom nearly one-sixth part are Moslems, to be about four hundred thousand souls...' (1984: xxxix). David Asante, an early African clergyman of the Basil Mission, was also to report in 1877 of the existence of many private and public schools, where children numbering between 15 and 20 recited Arabic and learn to read and write and pay school fees (Johnson nd). Theophilus Opoku on his preaching journey also saw private schools '...where only a few children are entrusted to the care of a teacher... Several Arabic prayers and the Mohammedan creed are chiefly taught' (Johnson nd). These eye-witness accounts confirm that Islam, which penetrated the Volta Basin through migration and trade as early as the last decades of the fourteenth century, but most significantly after the nineteenth century, was accompanied by a literary tradition that was to be found not only useful in first the communities but also in the chiefdoms in both present-day southern and northern Ghana (Iddrisu 2002a).

Historical Background

Ivor Wilks (1964) has identified a Wangara substratum and a Hausa overlay as the two basic sources of Islamic learning in Ghana. The Wangara, a Muslim merchant group from Mali, migrated in significant numbers after the fifteenth century and built a network of trade that included Begho, on the fringes of the Akan forest, in order also to participate in the exploitation of the gold resources in the Volta Basin. The Hausa for their part were closely

associated with the Kola trade from the North East.[2] From the sixteenth century onwards these traders spread into other centres and animist communities, and then later into the chiefly houses spreading Islam and its modes of education along the way. Following the collapse of Mali the Wangara moved into the Savannah hinterland, along the trade routes where they helped in the founding of states like Yagbum and Nasa in Gonja and Wa respectively. Within these states they constituted a merchant class and small scholarly elite (Hunwick 2004).[3]

The rise of a trading network between the people of the Middle Volta and the Hausa and Wangara was nourished by caravan leaders, the Madugu,[4] and also saw the emergence of the Maigida,[5] the Muslim traders, as well as literate assistants who performed various tasks at the established trade centres and trade settlements. The Holy Men and other itinerant mallams also closely followed them. It was within these scattered trade settlements that the very seeds of Islamic education were sown, with the establishment of Qur'an schools to train the young and to direct the religious lives of the faithful to prevent a situation of relapsing into 'mixing', especially after the nineteenth century Jihad movements.

Translations of letters of some powerful Madugu like Issa Na Garahu, who lived in Kano and became famous in the last decades of the nineteenth century for his successful expeditions from Kano to the Middle Volta, are available to us. His correspondence constitutes one of the few written sources concerning the trade (Johnson nd). The existence of these letters indicates the extent of literacy during this period. This is not to suggest that all Madugu were literate, but most of them could write. Newcomers to any caravan group, usually called an asali, could learn much about the tenets of the faith by basic instruction from the literate members of the caravan. These persons, together with the Maigida,[6] were to constitute the first teachers or Mallams of the settler communities in the Middle Volta. Salaga for instance emerged as a very important centre of learning, where several short pieces in khabar form of writing progressed into what John Hunwick refers to as the Gonja tradition of historical writing. Mahmud Ibn Abdullah's Qissat Salaga Tar'ikh Ghunja[7] is an example of this form. These writers no doubt were familiar with the Timbuktu Chronicles and used them as models. From the 1890s people like Mallam Al-Hassan, from Bornu and later of Salaga translated the Qissat Salaga Tar'ikh Ghunja into Hausa and also compiled histories of the Mossi, Dagomba, Mamprusi and the Grunshie people.[8] In the Yendi area there was Yaqub Ibn Khalid who recorded parts of the Dagomba drum histories in Arabic as Tar'ikh Dagbanbawi.[9] There was also the illustrious al-Haj Umar of Salaga who later moved to Kete Krachi after the 1894 Salaga civil war. He was probably the most read among his contemporaries.[10]

This tradition of learning was firmly rooted by the mid-eighteenth century. The widespread nature of this form of learning is evidenced by the fact that after the 1774/45 Asante invasion of Dagomba many plundered Arabic books were taken to Accra (Hunwick 2004).[11] These were also in the form of the Gonja Khabar tradition of short stories, or historical in nature like that of Tar'ikh al-Shaykh Sulayman. Ivor Wilks has ably collected and donated some of the copious writings of this period to the Melville Herskovits Africana section of Northwestern University Library. This collection is still to be fully accessed and analysed. John Hunwick's writings on the Sudanic Region are one attempt at documenting this sort of work. K.O Odoom and J.J Holden's *The Arabic Collection* (year 1962) also contains a checklist of the Arabic literature of this region. David Owusu-Ansah (1984) has also analysed an aspect of these writing, relating to the Talismanic tradition within the colonial period. There is also The Yendi Project, which was undertaken in the 1960s by the Institute of Africa Studies of the University of Ghana in collaboration with Northwestern University.[12] However much work still awaits the scholars in this regard.

This tradition of learning survivedup to the present, and every child in the Muslim community is required to attend the *ZongKarim*[13] or other forms of Islamic learning institutions like the Qur'anic School or *Makaranta*. A child, usually between the ages of four and six, started school under a Mallam in what was usually the Zong and progressed through the elementary stage to the Ilm and then the most talented to the advanced levels, where the study of the Islamic sciences was taught. These students upon completing their studies embarked upon Master-seeking, travelling to study under learned Mallams in particular aspects of the Islamic Sciences, while others returned to their localities to found new Qur'an Schools or ZongKarima. Most of these new Mallams named their Schools after their alma mater. This explains the preponderance of such names as Anbariyya, Nurriya and Nah'da or Nurul-Islam Arabic Schools in the Region. The description of Salaga in the last decades of the eighteenth century therefore, as a town where every one could read and write in Arabic, is a striking example of the state of learning that the British colonisers met with in the area that was to become the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast.

The colonial encounter

The state of Islamic learning was to be altered greatly with the advent of colonisation. The encounter no doubt rendered Islamic learning a weak partner in the later attempt at integration. There was however a conscious effort by the colonial administration at restricting Christian Missionary effort in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, beginning first with the Catholic

White fathers and later the Wesleyans, which were the precursors in the establishment of Western secular education in much of British controlled territories (Holmes 1968). The reasons often given are fascinating. While some have argued that the British bar on Christian proselytising was to prevent a clash between the two religions, others held that it was an attempt to hold back the clock of progress in accordance with the designs of the colonisers.[14] What is clear is that the exclusion was not used to further the development of Islamic or Muslim education as happened elsewhere. In Nigeria, for example, the Christian Missionary Society (CMS) was allowed into some Muslim areas, which led to the establishment of what became the mallamai schools.[15]

Instead, the formation of Boys' Brigades was encouraged. Ironically a Muslim, Amadu Samba, started the first of such[16] with the intention of drafting the most intelligent into the first primary school. But this first appearance of secular education did not hold anything of special appeal to Muslims and the intention of transforming the Boys' Brigade into schools fizzled out because no provision was made for teachers.[17] The boys did an hour's drill and an hour's lesson but spent the greater part of the day idling or doing odd jobs for the Limam.[18] One result was that some parents refused to allow their children to return to school after the Christmas vacation of 1914, arguing that secular education rendered the children lazy and reasoned that it were better to have them help in keeping horses and on the farm.[19] The Brigades were thus disbanded, having proved especially unpopular in the Muslim settlements of Bawku and Gambaga.[20] This series of events discouraged people from accepting secular education, and the very foundation of Muslim resistance to secular education in Ghana was established.

What came close to official policy was the determination to allow the Muslims to find out by comparison of the two systems of education, Islamic and western secular, which had the most to offer.[21] The suggestion was that the Muslims, being from a more advanced civilisation, would all the more realise the benefits arising from secular education.[22] Thus there arose three basic challenges for Islamic learning and Muslim education in Ghana. First, the effective exclusion of Christian Mission effort in the north, an area with the highest Muslim population, was to constitute the very first challenge. The mission effort elsewhere was bound to challenge Islamic learning to reform to meet colonial standards of functional education. The second was the half-hearted introduction of secular education with the expressed instruction that progress would only be up to standard three, educating only sons of chiefs in the direct line of inheritance, to allow for the effective running of the Indirect Rule system. Since the majority of Muslims were commoners, it stands to reason that access to such education was very limited (Iddrisu 1998).

The most important challenge that colonial rule presented for Islamic educa-
tion, however, was the attempt to maintain the status-quo in the Muslim-
dominated area, in order to create the enabling environment for effective
exploitation. The collapse of hopes of finding exploitable minerals, the later
failure of mechanised farming, and the decline of the caravan trade (Yakubu
1972), rendered the North an area lacking the resources for development
present in the south (Kimble 1963). The North was rather to serve as a pro-
vider of cheap labour for the plantations and mines in the south (Iddrisu
1998:13). There was an overriding need therefore to prevent the acquisition
of new ideas, and Islam and its modes of education were viewed as '...emi-
nently suited to the native' (Kimble 1963:79), making them easier to deal
with than their compatriots at the Coast (Kimble 1963:535).[23]

The stage was then set for the recruitment of labour from the Muslim-
dominated areas to work in the south on plantations. Later some Northerners
were to participate in the Imperial forces in the First World War. Starting
from 1907, a labour camp was set in Tamale for the recruitment of energetic
and intelligent youth who also formed the cream of the ZongKarim and the
Qur'anic Schools. As a result of this recruitment the Salaga area for instance
was said to be devoid of skilled and healthy men.[24] Such a situation did not
encourage Islamic education, which was based upon continuous learning. It
also prevented the boys from progressing to advanced studies. Again, since it
was these graduates who would have been the founders of new schools, a
further brake on Islamic learning occurred. Muslim education and Islamic
learning therefore could not make any appreciable progress in the face of
these challenges. What actually happened was a sharpening of the suspi-
cions of Muslims, who were thus later less willing to see any advantage in
the integration of the Islamic and western heritages.

Integration: Islamic and Western secular education

In the first half of the 20th century, thus, Muslims continued to practice their
tradition of education without any help from the colonial administration. At
best Guggisberg declared his distaste for the spread of Islam and indicated
in 1925 the desire of the Colonial administration to help the Christian Missions
against the advance of Islam.[25] The provision of secular education was held
back for almost three decades. So that when the Ahmadiyya Mission first
appeared on the scene in 1928 with the intension of arousing 'more interest
in government schools on the part of the Muslims',[26] many Muslims believed
that schooling equated to becoming Christian (Iddrisu 2002a). The Mission's
attempt to start a school was frustrated until in 1932. Even then, the school
was closed down almost immediately because of financial constraints. The
Ahmadiyya Mission's first real success came 1940 with the establishment of

the Ahmadiyya Primary School at Zogbeli in Tamale. Later the school shed its religious character, adopted a secular curriculum, and the basic attraction became not the religious subjects but the religious ethos under which the school operated (Iddrisu 2002c). The Ahmadiyya initiative was rather conservative, for there was still the fear of instituting a radical change in the type of traditional Islamic education known to the people. Western secular education was still considered a preserve of the 'infidel Christian' and the Ahmadiyya attempt was further weakened by doctrinal differences.[27]

Any further attempt at integration had to wait till the 1960s when some leading Mallams were employed to instruct Muslim students for about thirty minutes at the mainstream secular schools. Issues of faith and how to recite a selected number of Surahs from the Qur'an needed in the daily prayer activity were taught, but the lack of authority of these Mallams over the pupils and the inability of some of the Mallams to communicate in Arabic, using the requisite pedagogical approaches, led to the failure of this attempt to generate the needed interest in secular schools.

A more modern attempt at integration was adopted in 1974 with the establishment of what became known as the Islamic Schools. These were Makaranta that had been persuaded to accept secular subjects and secular teachers in their schools. The first four that accepted this programme were the Anbariyya Islamic Institute, the Nurul Islam Islamic School, the Nah'da Islamic School, and the Nurriya Islamic Institute. In order to convince the Mallams that Islamic education was not going to be pushed to the background and that the Government had no intention of taking over these institutions, the Ministry of Education vested ownership of these schools in the proprietors and started the practice of paying the Arabic/Islamic instructors the equivalent of a Pupil Teacher's Salary, after they had sat an exam and been issued with certificates. By the end of 1976 many Makaranta had agreed to join the Islamic Schools system. The first group of secular teachers were basically untrained. An educational Unit was also established in 1980 and properly constituted in 1986 with the National Headquarters in Tamale.

Despite this modern development, the Islamic School system is still beset with problems that render the interaction impracticable. There is no single Senior Islamic Secondary school to absorb students from the forty-two Junior Islamic Secondary schools with an enrolment figure of 6,943 in the Northern Region. Furthermore space for only around 15 percent of all primary school leavers is available at the Islamic Junior Secondary schools. The students are therefore made to compete, rather unfavourably, with their colleagues from the mainstream primary schools, who have had more instructional time, more trained teachers and less intervening activity in their studies for admission.

Table 1: Number of Islamic schools and enrolment figures for Northern Region, 2001–2002

	Number of Schools	Boys	Girls	Trained Teachers	Untrained Teachers
KG/Nursery	159	10,249	8,070	128	268
Primary	265	28,694	5,861	1,507	324
Junior Secondary School	42	4,712	2,231	246	87
Total	465	43655	16162	1881	679

Source: Islamic Education Unit, Tamale.

This no doubt leads to wastage in the system, as could also be inferred from Table 1 above. From the figures collated only 20 percent of pupils from primary school can be admitted into the Islamic Junior Secondary schools. Thus most pupils end their studies here, in both secular and Islamic learning as well. Parents find it difficult to understand why their wards at the Islamic Schools can not compete favourably with their counterparts at the main-stream schools. This situation has led some to withdraw their children, and either to send them to the secular schools directly or to work on their farms or in other jobs.

The Islamic Schools are allowed only two Arabic/Islamic Instructors be-tween them, with the exception of the Islamic Schools in the Tamale Munici-pality which have about five Arabic Instructors. The figures in Table 1 show the number of secular teachers allowed at the Islamic Schools. Each school has six teachers and a Head teacher. But then there is a perpetual fear since 1990 of government attempts at reducing even the small number of Arabic Instructors on the official payroll. There are a few Islamic Instructors in the system who still have the Arabic Instructor's certificate but cannot obtain employment at the only place where their certificates are recognized, the Islamic Schools. Any other Mallam who comes around to teach will have to be sustained by the small contributions of those who receive a salary. Those without salary therefore choose to come to school at their leisure and are frequently absent.

None of the Islamic Schools has a syllabus to guide its teaching and lear-ning activity and no particular text book is in use. Only personally owned books from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Iran and Nigeria are in use.[28] From Table 2, it can be seen that there are twelve Islamic Junior secondary schools that are supposed to be fed by 162 Islamic schools with a total population of 27,843 pupils in the Tamale Municipal area, the capital of the Northern Re-gion. Therefore only 13 percent of space is available to accommodate all

pupils from the Islamic Primary schools and only 8.7 percent of students from the primary schools can be admitted into the Islamic Junior Secondary schools. There is no doubt that most of the students would not find placement at the mainstream Junior Secondary School, since the schools do not even have enough vacancy for their own students, never mind Islamic school leavers.

Table 2: Number of Islamic schools and enrolment figures for Tamale Municipal, 2001–2002

	Number of Schools	Boys	Girls	Total Boys & Girls	Trained Teachers	Untrained Teachers
KG/Nursery	76	5832	5681	11513	61	134
Primary	86	9188	7142	16330	489	78
JSS	12	1003	432	1435	64	19
Total	174					

Source: Islamic Education Unit, Tamale.

The schools are also still looked upon as the property of the Proprietor and the problem as to who really is in charge, the Proprietor or the Secular Head Teacher, is still an everyday confusion with regard to admissions into the Islamic Schools, and the class into which the pupil be placed. Proprietors also check on secular teachers and report directly to the Islamic Unit teachers with whom they feel they can no longer work. This exerts a serious limiting effect on the performance of secular teachers in some Islamic Schools. As a result, the communal spirit that used to characterise the earlier centres of Islamic learning is lacking. A further consequence is that interest in Islamic learning is beginning to wane and Islamic learning is progressively been turned into a weaker partner in the integration of the two systems. Those who attend the Islamic Schools are finding difficulty in competing favourable with their counterparts in the mainstream schools.

There is also the problem of the relegation of Islamic subjects to a mere shadow of its former strength in the teaching timetable. Some Islamic Schools are known to be teaching as much as thirteen subjects at their schools. These subjects are taught in the afternoon at the close of school when certainly both students and instructors are very tired and can no longer settle down to any effective teaching and learning activity. The efficiency of the Arabic instructors is greatly compromised as a result of these extended hours. Some parents who not aware of these problems become worried that their wards at the Islamic Schools are not able to read even at primary level six while their counterparts in the mainstream schools, the Catholic Education Unit and the

Local Authority Schools, are able to do so. This situation has contributed greatly to wastage in the system, with students dropping out quite early from school, while those who do complete are not able to progress into either the Senior Secondary schools or other Vocational Institutions.

Conclusion

There is an overwhelming need for a meaningful and sustainable interaction between Islamic and Western secular education, especially in this era of de-centralisation and increased demand for new competence at local levels. Local businesses, communities, associations and individuals are required to assume new responsibilities for which their Qur'anic education has not equipped them. Western secular education has no doubt become the de facto medium of commerce and of business. Yet the numerous Makaranta still enjoy a higher enrolment in some communities. For beneficiaries of Qur'anic education and the recently established Islamic Schools to meet these new responsibilities it is imperative that the Islamic tradition of education and Muslim education generally be reformed meaningfully and made much more sustainable.

The very first issue should be the training of Arabic/Islamic Instructors up to a standard that would make them capable of teaching both secular and Islamic Subjects. Those who already have had some Makaranta and secular education could be constituted as this new crop of teachers. This could be done with the establishment of a training college with such a mandate. The Rashidiya Islamic University College, located in Tamale, was established to fill this vacuum. But without support from government and the community, Rashidiya is bound to face problems as witnessed today. The school has no approved site of its own; it is funded from voluntary contributions of the faithful - but for how long will such contributions continue to flow and for how long will the lecturers continue to sacrifice? The Islamic Republic of Iran has also established the Islamic University College of Ghana which according to the Registrar has a 'Strong academic and spiritual background',[29] beginning with two courses, Business Administration and Religious Studies. Admission is opened to all irrespective of religion because the question as to how many qualified Muslim applicants are applying does exist. But a much greater need now is to be able to train a crop of teachers capable of transforming the numerous Islamic Schools in the country into institutions capable of contributing students not only to the traditional Universities in Ghana but also feeding the Islamic University Colleges. This is the surest way to putting Islamic education and the education of the Muslim on a better footing in any attempt at fostering meaningful integration.

One start could be made with the introduction of Arabic/Islamic Studies department in one or two of the already existing teacher training Schools in

Ghana. These could be developed into the proposed Islamic Training School. Here refresher courses or workshops could be organised to help upgrade or sharpen the skills of selected Proprietors and Arabic instructors already in the system.[30] Then teachers solicited from the Islamic or Arab countries to help in turning the Islamic School system into an equal partner in the cease-less search for a meaningful interaction. Such Islamic training schools or the Arabic/Islamic Studies departments would be the appropriate places to help develop or redesign the curriculum of the Islamic Schools to include the teaching of science, mathematics and geography so as to eliminate duplica-tion. Subjects such as Ha-t, writing, and Sira, history, could also be encou-raged and taught here. Other subjects like Arabic grammar could start from the lower primary but graded in such a way as to take into consideration the pedagogical needs of the students while the more complicated ones like Tajweed (Phonetics) reserved for those interested in them in the higher classes. Nigeria was aided in floating a similar idea during the colonial era. At that time the Muslim education systems of the Sudan and of the then Gold Coast were studied and teachers brought in from the former and these helped greatly in reforming and standardising the Muslim education system in Northern Nigeria. With such a redefinition therefore the integration in Ghana could be made more meaningful.

In the light of the colonial encounter it is pertinent to observe that the stagnant character of Islamic and Muslim education in Ghana is largely a reflection of the policies and practices initiated by the colonial administra-tion, which resulted in stifling any significant growth and left Islamic educa-tion an underdog in the later integration with western secular education. An integration therefore that seeks to take into account these long-standing defi-ciencies as suggested here is imperative to any meaningful but sustainable interaction between Islamic and Western secular education in Ghana.

Notes
1. The Neutral Zone was an area defined by the Colonial Powers of Britain, Germany and the French to include areas lying between Salaga and Kete-Krachi, within which each one of them could have access to trade. For a fuller discussion of the Neutral Zone see R. B. Bening, 'Definition of the International Boundaries of Northern Ghana 1888-1904', *Journal of the Historical Society of Ghana*, vol. I., (ii).
2. A detailed discussion can be found in Ivor Wilks's two part- essay 'The Wangara, Akan and Portuguese in the fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries. I. The Matter of Bitu', *Journal of African History*, vol. 23.issue 3, 1982, 332-249 and also 'The Wangara, Akan and the Portuguese in the fifteenth and sixteenth Centuries. II. The Struggle for Trade', *Journal of Africa History*, vol. 23, 4, 1982, 465-472.

3. Hunwick (2004), 'Writers of the Great Voltaic Region', Chapter Twelve. I am grateful to Professor Hunwick for showing me this manuscript while it was still in the final stage of publication.

4. The Madugu was usually the leader of the caravan, responsible for the administration and security of the expedition. He was most often a literate Muslim, who, acting alone or with the assistance of specially employed persons, kept records of accounts of the caravan from the Hausaland to the Middle Volta and back. All goods were treated in common with the Madugu and his assistants keeping records, managing accounts and directing sales. For more discussion see P. E. Lovejoy, 'The Hausa Kola Trade 1700-1900', Unpublished d PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1973.

5. This is a Hausa word, which could used as (i) an affectionate way the wife refers to the husband; (ii) the respectful way of addressing one's Mallam; (iii) the householder or landlord.

6. The maigida, the Hausa for landlord, was most often resident in the trade town and provided accommodation to the stranger Muslims and traders. But most important of all, they served as brokers in the exchange trade and carried out research on market conditions and also offered translating services. It is important to note that the maigida together with the merchants served were both Muslims and some were highly learned in the Islamic Sciences, like the Madugu Issa Na Gahanna. Hausa therefore became the first language of these communities. Most often the maigida had a school at his house which was a sort of a community centre, housing so many people. This school trained not only the children in the tenets of the religion but also in Arabic literacy.

7. The Arabic Text and English Translation of the work appeared in a two-part publication of Mahmoud El Wakkad in the Ghana Notes and Queries, September–December 1961 and January-June 1962.

8. Some of his works were translated by J. Withers-Gill as *A Short History of the Dagomba Tribe*, Accra, nd. See also his *A Short History of Salaga*, Accra 1924.

9. *Tar'ikh Dagbanbawi*, Arabic MS, IAS/AR/24241, University of Ghana. A Hausa version of this work is also credited to Khalid Ibn Yaqub of Yendi.

10. Stanislaw Pitaszewicz, 'The Arrival of the Christians': A Hausa Poem on the Colonial Conquest of West Africa by Al-Haji Umaru', *Africana Bulletin*, Warszawa, Nr.22, 1975.

11. See also Nehemiah Levtzion, 'Early Nineteenth Century Arabic Manuscripts from Kumasi', 1965, p. 99.

12. This project was intended to examine the madrasas in Yendi but it focused rather on the teachers in these schools, the learning they had acquired, their teachers and their libraries. They also collected manuscripts which are now deposited at the Institute of African studies, UG, Legon.

13. Zong is the entrance hut to the compound in Dagbani and Karim also means school. The hut was in most areas used as a classroom.

14. R.B Bening argues in The Development of Education in Northern Ghana, (op. cit.) that it was to prevent a clash between the two religions that led to the progressive restriction of Christian missionary effort in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. But Abdulai Iddrisu holds the view that it was to uphold the status-quo, for Islam as the British reasoned had rendered the people amiable and much more easy to deal with than their counterparts in the south. See my 'British Colonial Response to Islamic Education: A Case Study of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, 1890-1940', Journal of the Institute of Education, UCC, Vol. 4, No. 2, July 1998.

15. This was the place where Muslim young men were given education in both secular and Islamic subjects so that they could become the future teachers in the Muslim dominated areas in Northern Nigeria. See my 'Colonial Control and Muslim education in northern Ghana, 1900-1925', Paper presented at the International ISITA Colloquium, Harris Hall, Northwestern University, Evanston/Chicago, USA, 15-19 May 2002.

16. The association of Amadu Samba (*Samba* is a Dagbani word meaning 'Stranger') with Islam is often not mentioned in the history of education in Northern Ghana. His association with Islam was disclosed in an interview with the grand daughter, Madam Balchisu Wemah at GDCP, Dalon, 19 October 2002. Amadu Samba's father was a soldier in the Gold Coast Constabulary Force. He started by assembling children for classes. These classes later became the boy's brigade that the colonial administration intended to transform into a school. He later became a teacher at the Tamale Premier School and was to convince the authorities to allow him instruct the Muslim students for 30 minutes a day in the tenets of the Islamic Faith.

17. Letter from Commissioner, North-eastern Province to Chief Commissioner, NTs, 16th December 1910, Public Records and Archives Administration Department, (PRAAD)-Accra ADM, 56/1/86.

18. Letter from Provincial Commissioner, Gambaga to Ag. CCNT, Tamale, 16th August, 1909, Public Records and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD)- Accra, ADM 56/1/86.

19. Letter from Provincial Commissioner North-Eastern Province, Gambaga to Ag. CCNT, Tamale,19th November, 1915, PRAAD-Accra ADM 56/1/86.

20. Ibid.

21. Letter from Ag. CCNT, Tamale to Provincial Commissioner North-Eastern Territories, 16th November, 1915, PRAAD-Accra, ADM 56/1/86.

22. Letter from Ag. CCNT, Tamale to Provincial Commissioner North-Eastern, 16th November, 1915, PRAAD-Accra, ADM 56/1/86.

23. The products of Islamic education were viewed better than the very first products of secular education. This was typified in the caracter of the late Tolon Na who was the first to be sent to Achimota in the South to attend school. He returned to taunt the colonial administration, for he had learnt to think for himself and continually condemned colonial policy in the Northern Territories. He came to be looked upon as the first case of the disease, which

appears to have attacked the Northern territories boys at Achimota School. This was to determine the acceptance or not of the Christian missionary effort and later Ahmadiyya Mission in the Muslim dominated areas of Colonial Ghana.

24. Letter from CCNT, Tamale, Watherston, 1st February, 1909, PRAAD-Accra, ADM 56/1/84.

25. Memorandum by the Governor, Guggisberg, 23rd February 1925, on 'Education in the Northern Territories', PRAAD-Accra, ADM 56/1/305.

26. Letter from Local head of Ahmadiyya Mission at Saltpond, Mr. M. Nazir to CCNT, Tamale, FW K. Jackson, 25 June 1931 PRAAD, Tamale NRG 8/19/1.

27. This doctrinal difference had to do with the messianic figure of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadiani.

28. Interview with Afa Sulemana Alhassan, Proprietor of Sobriya Islamic School, Kobilmahgu, Near Tamale, 4th November, 2002.

29. Alhaji Rahim Gbadamosi, Registrar of the Islamic University of Ghana, in a Matriculation Speech, Accra. October, 2002.

30. Recently an Islamic NGO, Muslim Relief and Assistance Group, organised a Workshop in Kumasi to discuss some of the problems of Islamic Education in Ghana and to help the Proprietors better distinguish their role from that of the Secular Head teachers.

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Graduates' Perception of University Programmes and Their Relevance to Employment: University of Nairobi (1991-1998)

Gerald Ngugi Kimani*

Abstract

This paper reports a study to assess graduates' perception of the learning conditions and provisions at the University of Nairobi, Kenya. The study identified the jobs held by the graduates and the extent to which they use knowledge, attitudes and skills acquired during their study at the University of Nairobi in their present jobs. The sample consisted of 1,640 graduates drawn from 3,300 graduates of Bachelor of Education (Arts), Bachelor of Science and Bachelor of Commerce degree programmes who had completed their studies between 1991 and 1998. Questionnaires were sent to 1,400 graduates and some 240 others were administered directly to respondents. A total of 580 questionnaires were returned representing a return rate of 35.4 per cent. The findings show that overall the scope and coverage of the courses, teaching quality of lectures and contact with students were the most highly rated aspects of study conditions and provisions of the University of Nairobi. Counseling services, catering facilities on the campus and recreational facilities were the lowly rated aspects. About 61 per cent of graduates were employed in public sector while 37 per cent were in private sector. About 2 per cent were self-employed. Of the surveyed graduates 72 per cent indicated that they used knowledge and skills acquired at the university to a high or very high extent while 25 per cent indicated moderate use. Only 3 per cent responded to the contrary.

Résumé

Cette contribution porte sur une étude destinée à recueillir l'avis des diplômés sur les conditions d'étude, à l'Université de Nairobi, au Kenya. Dans ce cadre, les emplois occupés par ces diplômés ont été identifiés, de même que leur utilisation au niveau de leur actuel emploi, des connaissances, comportements et du savoir-faire acquis

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au cours de leur séjour dans cette l'université. L'échantillon sélectionné regroupait 1 640 diplômés, choisis parmi les 3 300 détenteurs d'une Licence en éducation (département Lettres et Sciences Humaines), en sciences et en commerce, ayant achevé leur cycle d'études entre 1991 et 1998. Des questionnaires ont été envoyés aux 1 400 diplômés et 240 autres ont été directement soumis aux personnes sondées. Un total de 580 questionnaires a été retourné, ce qui représente un taux de retour de 35,4 pour cent. Globalement, les résultats ont révélé que l'étendue et les champs couverts par les cours, ainsi que la qualité pédagogique des cours magistraux et les contacts établis avec les élèves constituaient les éléments les mieux notés. Les services de conseil, les infrastructures de restauration et de loisirs représentaient les éléments les moins bien notés. Environ 61 pour cent des diplômés avaient rejoint le secteur public, tandis que 37 pour cent évoluaient dans le secteur privé. Environ 2 pour cent travaillaient à leur compte. Parmi les diplômés interrogés, 72 pour cent ont affirmé se servir souvent voire beaucoup des connaissances et du savoir-faire acquis à l'université de Nairobi, tandis que 25 pour cent ont déclaré s'en servir de façon modérée. Seuls 3 pour cent ont indiqué le contraire.

Introduction: Background to the study

Over the last two decades the Kenyan education system has been characterised by a very rapid expansion. At higher education levels the number of public universities has increased from one in 1980 to six in 2002. In terms of enrollment, in the 1963/64 academic year there were 571 students at the University College, Nairobi. The number increased to 3404 students in 1970/71 while in 1983/84 the number rose to 9044 (Rok 1988). With the establishment of three more public universities in the 1980s the enrollment increased sharply to 20817 students by the 1987/88 academic year (Rok 1994). Presently, more than 40,000 students are enrolled in the six public universities in the country.

The rapid expansion of university education has created many problems. Some of these problems include:

- Overcrowding and strain in available facilities as a result of double intakes in 1987/88 and 1990/91 in order to eliminate the backlog and accommodate both 7-4-2-3 and 8-4-4 school system candidates (these figures refer to years in primary, secondary and other education).
- Deterioration of the quality of education as a result of resource scarcity, overworked academic staff, lack of physical facilities, equipment, library facilities etc.
- Frequent closures of public universities which have lengthened the duration of academic programme completion beyond the normal time and
- The inability of economy to absorb high level manpower produced by universities (Ministry of Education 1995).

From the 1990s, Kenya like most other African countries, has been experiencing financial difficulties due to poor economic performance. The economy has been unable to grow at a rate that would create enough jobs for the growing labour force from universities and other education and training institutions (Republic of kenya 1999). The country's political and development programmes have been unable to focus on areas with the greatest employment creation potential. Indeed, since 1994, there has been a large-scale retrenchment of workers from the civil service (which was a major employer of university graduates) due to economic stagnation (Republic of kenya 1995). This has led to high unemployment rates among graduates due to the mismatch between available job opportunities and number of graduates produced by the universities.

A major area of concern regarding university education for the parents, educational administrators and public has been the relevance and quality of training provided to graduates. There has been a lack of a clear relationship between university education and the potential employment opportunities. In a Graduate Labour Market study done in 1994, a former university graduate summarised the feelings of other graduates by stating:

> I feel most of the courses on campus are irrelevant. Admissions have been politicized and interfered with and general standards are on the decline ... The sheer numbers at the university and lack of enough and appropriate facilities made the training inadequate'.

A report commissioned by the World Bank on Cost and Financing of Tertiary Education (1995) acknowledged that reform was required. The report stated:

> Academic programmes in the universities need review. There are non-existent mechanisms for quality assessment and assurance of existing programmes. Most programmes have not evolved with changes in technology and workplace (Ministry of Education 1995).

In the University of Nairobi, no reliable data exist on the employment of its graduates nor have the view of students and employers been ascertained as to the relevance and usefulness of programmes offered. This study attempted to fill this gap.

Purpose of the study
A major objective of the University of Nairobi has been to train and prepare high level manpower needed for the development of the country. In line with this objective, this study was conducted to:
* assess graduate's perception of the study conditions and provisions while at the university.

- examine the transition from higher education/university to employment from the graduate's perspective.
- identify the present job status of the graduates and the extent to which their jobs are appropriate to their level of education.
- determine the extent to which graduates use knowledge, attitudes and skills acquired during their study at the university in their present jobs.

Research methodology

(a) Population and sampling

The target population for this study comprised 3 300 graduates of Bachelor of Education (Arts), Bachelor of Science and Bachelor of Commerce degree programmes who had completed their studies between 1991 and 1998 at the University of Nairobi. Due to inconsistencies in placement/employment records no sampling was done. However the study targeted at least 50 percent of the graduates from each cohort from the faculties of external studies (education), science, and commerce.

(b) Strategies for tracing graduates

The task of tracing graduates was labour-intensive. It involved studying the records of graduates at their former university, at the Higher Education Loans Board (HELB) and at employers. Records from the employers were particularly useful for those who completed their studies from 1995 to 1998. They were however less useful for those who completed their studies between 1991 to 1994 due to factors such as transfers and change of names. The snowball technique was by far the most useful method of tracing the graduates. After graduates were traced by the above mentioned method, they were mailed a letter requesting their assistance in locating other graduates from their year or other cohorts. Each letter included a form containing space for thirty of the graduates' names, institution they were working for, telephone of work place and residence. From the 80 responses received about 950 graduates were located through this method. In total 1640 graduates were traced.

(c) Data collection instruments

Data were collected through the use of a questionnaire. The data collected was on graduates social-biographical data, course of study at the university, transition from university to employment, and current employment status. It also contained items on assessment of work and employment and further training/education undertaken since graduation among other items. The questionnaire was adapted from the one developed by Harald Schomburg at the Centre for Higher Education and Work, University of Kassel, Germany.

(d) Data collection and analysis procedures

Questionnaires were sent to 1400 graduates. Some 240 other questionnaires were administered directly to the respondents. In total 580 questionnaires were returned. Of the returned questionnaires 69 were not properly filled in. These were discarded and not included in the data analysis. The return rate of the questionnaires was 35.4 percent.

After collection of the data, a codebook was developed. Data were coded and entered into SPSS data files. The results for each question were cross-tabulated against year of graduation, course undertaken at the university and gender.

Study findings

Characteristics of the graduates

Of the 511 graduates studied, their age ranged from 24 to 55 years. About 63 percent of the graduates were between 25 and 35 years. The bulk of these graduates studied science and commerce courses and were admitted to university direct from school unlike education graduates. Students admitted in the faculty of external studies to study for the Bachelor of Education degree were required to have worked for three years as teachers before joining the programme. In terms of gender, 74 percent of the respondents were men and 26 percent women. Based on the actual number of students admitted over the period 1991-1998 there was a proper gender balance in the study. Among the 499 respondents who replied to the item on marital status, 43 percent were single and 57 percent were married. Nearly all education graduates (91 percent) were married. This large number was attributed to the fact that all of them joined the Bachelor of Education programme at a mature age. Out of 263 graduates who indicated the number of children they had, 84 percent had between one and four children. About 16 percent had more than five children; and 86 percent had more than two children.

Data on religious affiliation indicated that the majority of the graduates were Protestants (53 percent) followed by Catholics (42 percent), 4 percent Moslems while the rest (Hindu, Animist etc.) constituted 1 percent. About 15 percent of the graduates in the study held administrative positions within their religious organisations.

Graduates' assessment of study conditions and provisions at the University of Nairobi

The graduates' responses toward various aspects of the study provisions and conditions by field of study are presented in Table 1. Analysis of the results indicates an average rating of various aspects of study provisions and

conditions. Overall, irrespective of the area of study, the scope and coverage of courses (68 percent), teaching quality of lectures (65 percent) and contacts with fellow students were the most highly rated aspects. Other well-rated aspects were testing/grading system in examinations (61 percent), the structure of degree programmes (61 percent), and adequacy of teaching staff and assistance/advice offered during final examinations (56 percent). These findings indicate that generally graduates were satisfied with the academic aspects of their degree programme.

The results on the supportive and physical facilities provided at the university indicate that they were lowly rated by the graduates. Counseling services (20 percent), catering facilities on the campus (21 percent), availability of technical equipment such as personal computers, and measuring instruments and so on (23 percent) and recreational facilities (26 percent) were some of the lowly rated aspects of study provisions and conditions at the university. Graduates of education rated these aspects lower compared to those of science and commerce.

The main reason for the low rating of supportive and physical facilities was due to the rapid expansion of enrollment of students at national universities without a corresponding increase in personnel and physical facilities. The Government gave in to public pressure to enroll more students in public universities after they met the minimum admission requirements. However physical facilities and support services were not increased at the corresponding rate of student enrollment.

When graduates were categorised by year of graduation (Table 2) no major difference between the results described above and the results observed were noted. However graduates who completed from 1991-1993 rated more aspects of study conditions and provisions higher than those who completed after 1993. This perhaps was due to the fact that enrollment of students at the University of Nairobi was lower in the early 1990s compared to 1995 and thereafter.

No major difference was observed between male and female assessment of the various aspects of study conditions and provisions. While graduates' assessment of academic aspects of their degree programme was very similar, supportive services and facilities, were rated higher by males, compared to females.

Table 1: Graduates' assessment of study provisions and study conditions at the University of Nairobi by field of study (percent; responses 1 and 2)

	Field of Study			
	Education	Science	Commerce	Total
Assistance/advice for your final examination	66	65	34	56
Opportunity of out of class contacts with teaching staff	39	27	15	27
Academic advice offered	60	29	36	42
Chances to participate in research	30	21	30	27
Teaching quality of lectures	69	77	47	65
Adequacy of teaching staff	55	77	45	59
Quality of teaching staff	46	58	25	43
Scope and coverage of courses	71	72	60	68
Testing/grading system	65	71	48	61
Structure of degree programme	67	61	54	61
Provision of supervised practical work experience	54	35	22	37
Contacts with fellow students	59	72	64	65
Chance for students to have an influence on university policies	24	17	17	20
Availability of technical equipment (e.g. PC, measuring instruments etc.)	18	42	10	23
Quality of equipment of laboratories/workshops (if applicable)	20	52	17	30
Supply of learning materials	57	47	29	45
Supply of teaching materials	49	49	28	42
Equipment and stocking of libraries	34	54	36	41
Accommodation facilities on campus	26	39	46	36
Catering facilities on campus	17	21	24	21
Quality of the buildings	23	51	39	37
Quality opportunities for co-curricular activities	11	45	38	30
Counselling services	7	37	17	20
Games facilities	11	51	38	32
Recreational facilities	13	45	22	26
Count (n)	(184)	(163)	(164)	(511)

Question 3: How do you rate the study provision and study conditions you experienced? Scale 1 = very good; 5= very bad.

Table 2: Graduates' assessment of study provisions and study conditions at the University of Nairobi by year of graduation (percent; responses 1 and 2)

	Year of Bachelor's degree completion			
	1991–1993	1994–1996	1997–1999	
Assistance/advice for your final examination	50	63	51	56
Opportunity of out of class contacts with teaching staff	26	32	23	27
Academic advice offered	52	39	40	42
Chances to participate in research projects	22	26	33	27
Teaching quality of lectures	60	66	67	65
Adequacy of teaching staff	52	59	64	59
Quality of teaching staff	44	42	45	43
Scope and coverage of courses	73	65	66	68
Testing/grading system in examinations	61	64	59	61
Structure of degree programme	61	61	61	61
Provision of supervised practical work experience	39	43	29	37
Contacts with fellow students	63	58	74	65
Chance for students to have an influence on university policies	22	20	18	20
Availability of technical equipment (e.g. P.C, measuring instruments etc)	21	16	33	23
Quality of equipment of laboratories/workshops (if applicable)	25	22	41	30
Supply of learning materials	59	40	40	45
Supply of teaching materials	48	41	40	42
Equipment and stocking of libraries	43	38	43	41
Accommodation facilities on the campus	48	27	39	36
Catering facilities on the campus	34	14	18	21
Quality of the buildings	45	27	41	37
Quality opportunities for co-curricular activities	23	22	45	30
Counseling services	11	16	30	20
Games facilities	25	26	45	32
Recreational facilities	25	17	37	26
Count (n)	(128)	(207)	(176)	(511)

Question 3: How do you rate the study provision and study conditions you experienced? Scale from 1 = very good to 5 = very bad.

Employment of graduates

Results on employment position of graduates immediately after completion of their degree programme is presented in Table 3. Overall 47 percent of the 453 graduates who responded to this item were employed immediately after completion of the degree programme. About 49 percent were not employed and were seeking employment. Some 2 percent of the respondents were not employed and did not intend to be employed. The year of completion was an important factor in the employment of graduates. The majority of the graduates (72 percent) who completed in the 1991–1993 period were employed or had been employed earlier than completion date. Among those who completed between 1997–1999 only 15 percent were employed immediately. The number of those who were unemployed immediately after graduation depended on the year of completion of degree programme. It increased from the early 1990s onwards.

Table 3: Career after graduation (percent)

	Year of Bachelor's degree completion			
	1991–1993	1994–1996	1997–1999	
Employed	72	59	15	47
Professional training	0	1	2	1
Advanced academic study	0	1	0	0
Not employed, seeking employment	25	38	80	49
Not employed and not intending to be /employed	1	2	3	2
Other	2	0	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100
Count (n)	(114)	(184)	(155)	(453)

Question 4: What was your career status at the time of graduation?

Factors important in the employment of graduates

Factors that were important in the employment of graduates are indicated in Table 4. The three most important factors were field of study (76 percent), subject area/specialisation, and personality (50 percent). The first two factors are interrelated. Personality is perhaps important in the private sector but not a major consideration in the public sector. In the employment of graduate teachers for example, personality is hardly considered. However, field of study and subject/areas of specialisation are a major consideration in their employment. The personality of the individual graduate was important among science and commerce graduates as indicated in Table 4. Other factors

moderately identified as important were grades attained at the university (47 percent), reputation of the university (44 percent), and reputation of the department (33 percent) at the university where one graduated from. Other factors were identified by less than 30 percent of the respondents. Government policy on employment which used to be a major factor is no longer considered very important by the graduates.

Table 4: Recruitment criteria of the employer
(percent; responses 1 and 2)

	Field of Study			
	Education	Science	Commerce	Total
Field of study	73	73	81	76
Main focus of subject area/specialization	50	66	82	67
Theme of thesis/projects, if applicable	14	9	10	11
Grades at the university	28	45	62	47
Reputation of the university	26	39	60	44
Reputation of the department	16	35	43	33
Previous work experience	26	29	31	29
Personality	25	70	56	50
Experiences abroad	14	13	5	10
My own world view, religion, etc.	18	14	8	12
Government employment policy	53	12	3	22
Contact/personal connections	14	28	17	19
Religion of ones origin/place of birth	12	4	2	6
Secondary school attended/old boys/girls association	10	5	4	6
Count (n)	(140)	(96)	(153)	(389)

Question 9: In your opinion, how important were the following factors in your being employed? Scale from 1= very important to 5= not at all important.

Employment status

The graduates employment status is presented in Table 5, shows that majority (84 percent) of the graduates'. About 9 percent of the graduates were involved in further professional training or advanced academic study. It is possible that some of those graduates who were in full-time employment were simultaneously studying. Among those not employed 6 percent were seeking employment and 4 percent did not intend to look for employment. The employment status was highly influenced by the year one graduated.

The majority (99 percent) of those who completed during 1991-1993 were in employment. The number in employment decreased as we approached the

end of the 1990s. This can be attributed to the scarcity of job opportunities, particularly in the public sector, and the poor performance of the economy during the second half of the 1990s.

Table 5: Major employment status (percent; multiple responses)

	Field of Study			
	Education	Science	Commerce	Total
Employed (including self-employed, traineeship, etc.)	96	56	96	84
Professional training	9	3	4	6
Advanced academic study	1	6	1	3
Not employed, but seeking employment	1	21	0	6
Without employment, and not intending to be employed (e.g. raising children, illnesses)	1	13	0	4
Other	3	2	4	3
Total (Recent)	111	101	105	106
Count (n)	(160)	(117)	(134)	(411)

Question 12a: What is your current employment status? Major activity?

Kind of employer

Most of the graduates included in our study (61 percent) were employed in the public sector. However, private employers took slightly more than a third (37 percent) of the graduates. About 2 percent indicated that they were self employed or were involved in other activities. The public sector remained the main employer of graduates from the University despite the declining economy. When data were categorised by field of study, it was found that 98 percent of education graduates were employed by the public sector compared to 40 percent of science and 30 percent of commerce graduates. About 69 percent of the commerce and 59 percent of science graduates were employed in the private sector. Only 2 percent of the education graduates were employed in that sector.

Income

The main source of livelihood for the majority of the graduates studied was full time employment. Monthly gross income for the graduates ranged from Kshs. 6500 to Kshs. 300,000 (US$84–3850). The majority (55 percent) of the graduates' gross monthly salary ranged between Kshs. 15000–Kshs.30000

(US$ 192–385). Generally the gross monthly income for the graduates was quite low and a reflection of wage-levels in the public sector.

Table 6: Kind of employer (percent)

| | Field of Study | | | |
	Education	Science	Commerce	Total
Public employer	98	40	30	61
Private employer	2	53	69	37
Self employed	0	5	1	1
Other	0	2	0	1
Total	100	100	100	100
Count (n)	(170)	(78)	(149)	(397)

Question 17: Please state the kind of your employer? Please tick one item only.

Appropriateness of position and work to level of education

A major objective of this study was to investigate whether the position (appointment) held was appropriate to the respondent's level of education. The findings of this study revealed that most graduates (72 percent for responses 1 and 2) were of the view that the position held was appropriate to their level of education (Table 7). Only 4 percent held a contrary view. The findings indicate that courses taken by the graduates studied were relevant to the world of work.

Table 7: Appropriateness of position and work to level of education (percent; arithmetic mean)

| | Field of Study | | | |
	Education	Science	Commerce	Total
Appropriateness of position and work				
1 To a great extent	31	42	27	31
2	50	32	35	41
3	14	15	24	18
4	2	6	10	6
5 Not at all	3	5	4	4
Arithmetic mean	2,0	2,0	2,3	2,1
Count (n)	(179)	(84)	(158)	(421)

Question 32: To what extent is your position and work appropriate to your level of education? Scale from 1 = completely appropriate to 5 = not at all appropriate.

Job requirements and use of qualifications

The provision of relevant skills to graduates is an important consideration in the design and development of a degree programme. It is also taken seriously by employers when considering graduates for employment in their organisations. A list of skills expected to be acquired for various jobs were presented to graduates for them to indicate the extent to which they had acquired them at the time of graduation. The respondents were further asked to indicate the extent to which the skills were required for their present jobs. Each skill was to be rated along a scale of 1 to 5 as indicated in Table 8.

The findings show that graduates had at the time of graduation acquired to a high extent broad general knowledge (83 percent), cross-disciplinary thinking/ knowledge (78 percent), field-specific theoretical knowledge (66 percent), and field specific knowledge of methods (59 percent). However graduates did not find themselves qualified in foreign language competency (16 percent), computer skills (24 percent), and in understanding complex social, organisational and technical systems (38 percent). The deficiency in foreign language competency was to be expected, as most organisations do not require it other than competency skills in national languages used for communication. Understanding social, organisational and technical systems usually takes place when one is employed in an organisation and not at the time of graduation. The deficiency in computer skills for the graduates at the time of graduation is of great concern as knowledge in this area is indispensable in the current world.

Table 8: Professional knowledge and skills possessed by graduates at time of graduation (percent; responses 1 and 2)

	Field of Study			
	Education	Science	Commerce	Total
Broad general knowledge	80	87	82	83
Cross-displinary thinking/knowledge	80	81	73	78
Field-specific theoretical knowledge	69	72	60	67
Field-specific knowledge of methods	66	59	50	59
Foreign language proficiency	17	18	13	16
Computer skills	26	22	23	24
Understanding complex social, organisational and technical systems	42	26	46	38
Planning, co-ordinating and organizing	56	48	53	53
Applying rules and regulations	59	50	47	52
Economic reasoning	55	52	63	57
Documenting ideas and information's	59	57	62	59
Count (n)	(178)	(141)	(162)	(481)

Question 27a: Please indicate to what extent you had the skills listed below when you graduated. Scale from 1 = to a very high extent to 5 = not at all.

On the issue of skills required in graduates' work, it is worth noting that nearly all the listed skills in Table 9 were required to a high extent. However, foreign language proficiency was not highly required. A comparison of Tables 8 and 9 indicated that there was a gap between the skills graduates had at the time of graduation and those required by their current jobs. The University will need to address this issue when revising its curriculum or in the development of new programmes.

Table 9: Employed graduates' required professional knowledge and skills by field of study (percent; responses 1 and 2)

	Field of Study			
	Education	Science	Commerce	Total
Broad general knowledge	95	70	76	83
Cross-disciplinary thinking/knowledge	95	88	78	87
Field-specific theoretical knowledge	83	70	83	81
Field-specific knowledge methods	77	60	67	70
Foreign language proficiency	27	20	21	23
Computer skills	43	47	67	53
Understanding complex social, organizational and technical systems	70	62	61	65
Planning, Co-ordinating and organising	78	77	75	77
Applying rules and regulations	85	81	82	83
Economic reasoning	79	70	81	78
Documenting ideas and information	82	87	78	81
Count (n)	(173)	(79)	(154)	(406)

Question 27b: Please indicate to what extent the skills are required in your current work. Scale from 1 = to a very high extent to 5 = not at all.

Use of knowledge and skills in current job

Graduates were asked to indicate the extent to which certain elements of their study programme were useful to their current work. The course content of the major subject of study/teaching subject (85 percent) was found to be the most useful element of their current work (Table 10). Other very useful elements of their study programme were opportunity for specialization (75

percent) and variety of courses (73 percent) offered. Research emphasis (47 percent) was found to be least useful to their current work according to the graduates' perceptions. This perhaps is due to the fact that at public universities research is more emphasised at post-graduate levels than at the undergraduate level.

When asked to indicate how useful their degree course was in preparing them for their present work 83 percent of B.Ed, 75 percent of B.Com. and 71 percent of B.Sc. graduates indicated that it was tõ a very great extent. They all appeared to concur in their responses that their degree course was very useful in preparing them for other spheres of life (78 percent for responses 1 and 2). There was minimal variation in response to this question.

Overall assessment of the extent of the use of knowledge and skills acquired during graduates' studies is indicated in Table 11. Of the surveyed graduates, 72 percent said that they used knowledge and skills acquired to a high or very high extent, only 3 percent of the graduates responded to the contrary. These findings are an indication that the courses offered by the University of Nairobi are quite relevant to the work assignments of graduates.

Table 10: Graduates assessment of usefulness of degree course by faculty (percent; responses 1 and 2)

	Field of Study			
	Education	Science	Commerce	Total
Course content of major subject	84	74	91	85
Course content of minor subject	85	57	62	70
Variety of courses offered	85	50	73	73
Opportunity for Specialization	82	57	77	75
Research emphasis	66	41	31	47
Practical emphasis of teaching and learning	91	44	42	65
Work experience (internships etc.)	76	40	39	57
Count (n)	(180)	(85)	(160)	(425)

Question 29a: How useful did the following elements of the study programme prove to your current work? Scale from 1 = very useful to 5 = not at all useful.

Table 11: Overall assessment of extent of use of knowledge and skills acquired during studies (percent; arithmetic mean)

	Field of Study			
	Education	Science	Commerce	Total
Use of knowledge and skills acquired during your course of studies				
1 To a great extent	32	24	31	30
2	45	23	48	42
3	13	32	17	18
4	8	13	3	7
5 Not at all	2	9	1	3
Arithmetic mean	2,0	2,6	1,9	2,1
Count (n)	(178)	(88)	(160)	(426)

Question 31: When you look at your current work tasks altogether: to what extent do you use the knowledge and skills acquired during your course of studies? Scale from 1 = to a very high extent to 5 = not at all.

Conclusions and recommendations

An analysis of the results regarding study provisions and conditions at the University indicates an average rating of most of the aspects studied. Indeed seven of the twenty-five aspects were rated as good or very good by 50 percent or more of the graduates. Due to the rapid expansion of the enrollment of students at the University of Nairobi and other public universities without a corresponding increase in facilities in the 1990s, most of the facilities have been strained and run down. Buildings and facilities that the Government had started to put up in the early 1990s in public universities to cater for the expansion of student enrollment were abandoned half-way due to lack of resources. There is an urgent need for the University of Nairobi to rehabilitate its rundown facilities and complete the buildings that were left unfinished in the 1990s. This will reduce the over-crowding and the strain put on the available facilities. Rehabilitation and completion of the incomplete facilities should be given priority to enhance the university's core mission of teaching, research and community service.

Education graduates from the faculty of external studies were employed by the time they first enrolled in their degree programme. However commerce and science graduates took some time to get employed. The period taken by most of these graduates ranged from 5 months to 3 years.

The length of the period between graduation and employment depended on the year of graduation. Those who graduated in later years appeared to have more difficulties in getting employed. This state of affairs was attributed to the

stagnation of the economy and the increase in poverty levels in the country. The public sector, which used to employ the majority of public university graduates now rarely employs them. Indeed, since 1994 there has been a major retrenchment programme for civil servants and university workers. University graduates will in future have to seek other employment avenues particularly in the private sector, the informal sector and in self-employment. Universities will need to re-orient their academic programmes to this reality.

The results with regard to the skills acquired by the graduates and their use in graduates' current work showed that graduates rated them quite highly. Of the 11 skills listed for assessment, only 3 were lowly rated by the graduates. Generally at the time of graduation most of the graduates had acquired critical skills required in their current work. However, one very significant skill where graduates felt inadequate was computer applications. This skill is now very crucial for the performance of most jobs and in everyday life. Training in computer studies at the University of Nairobi has not been introduced on a wide-scale. This has been due to the limitations of computer facilities available. To introduce computer studies for all students will require considerable resources. However, this can be done gradually with proper planning. A major project for the computerisation of teaching and research facilities has been mounted.

Graduates' assessments of the usefulness of knowledge and skills acquired at the University were quite high. The major subject of study, area of specialisation and variety of course offered were found to be very useful in graduates' current work. Research emphasis was rated as the least useful element of graduates' current work. Overall about 71 percent of the graduates indicated that knowledge and skills acquired at the university were very useful in their current work. This was an indication that the courses offered at the University were quite relevant to the work assignment of the graduates.

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Supporting University ICT Developments: The Makerere University Experience

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Abstract

The integration of information and communication technology (ICT) services and systems into the functions of an enterprise will be easier when there is a clearly identified strategic need, with ICT responding to the vision and strategic priorities. The experience of Makerere University is used to highlight best practice approaches to addressing the key challenges of: lack of awareness; mindset and fear; the process; and sustainability. It is argued that a good ICT policy and master plan developed with the full participation of the stakeholders is a key ingredient for success.

Résumé

L'intégration des services et systèmes TIC au sein d'une entreprise peut être grandement facilitée, une fois que l'on a clairement identifié un besoin stratégique spécifique, et que l'on fait appel aux TIC pour réaliser une vision et des priorités stratégiques précises. L'expérience de l'Université Makerere est mise en avant pour présenter les pratiques exemplaires, permettant de relever les défis liés au faible niveau de conscientisation, aux conceptions établies, au processus en question et à la viabilité d'une telle opération. Ce texte soutient qu'une bonne politique, ainsi qu'une stratégie globale en matière de TIC, définies en collaboration avec l'ensemble des parties concernées demeurent la clé du succès pour une telle opération.

Introduction

Makerere University is an institution in a continuous state of transformation. One of the adopted strategies in this transformation is the integration of information and communication technology (ICT) in all the university academic and administrative functions. The planning phase of this project started during the early part 2000. The integration of ICT in any enterprise, especially a university the size of Makerere, presents multiple challenges.

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 See also http://www.makerere.ac.ug/dicts/team/tusubira.htm

This paper uses this ongoing exercise as a vehicle to highlight lessons and demonstrate what should be a winning strategy.

The paper starts by addressing the genesis of change that led Makerere to the strategic decision to use ICT as a vehicle for transformation. The challenges and the process, especially the formulation of the ICT Policy and Master Plan, and implementation with the support of development partners, are also discussed.

The genesis of change

It is the view of the author that the poor governance that Uganda experienced from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, with all the repression, atrocities, deprivation, and suffering, was a blessing for the Ugandans who survived. Survival became a daily challenge that exercised one's wits and abilities to the extreme. Darwinian theory was experienced in a span of just two decades: It was not the strongest, nor the most intelligent that survived, but those most responsive to change.

Uganda therefore started the late-1980s with a crop of people used to getting along in the most adverse circumstances. Improvement in governance and sensible macro-economic policies are all that was required to ignite the creativity of people used to surviving under worse circumstances. Yes, there has been a lot of foreign investment, but that alone would not have resulted in Uganda's continuing recovery.

This is the entry point for Makerere University: an institution that, like all Uganda institutions, had been driven to near collapse during the two decades; an institution that, with the other multiplicity of demands on the national budget, could not expect sufficient government funding. Like other Ugandans, the Vice Chancellors who managed it, the faculty who gave instruction, and the administrators, had to break the mould in order for the university to survive.

The traditional approach of donor conferences was tried. It brought some responses, but nowhere near enough to address the huge challenges of rehabilitation and rejuvenation. Makerere demolished the ivory tower mentality and changed the admission paradigm, to the continuing consternation of many of those admitted under the old paradigm, and many in the population who have a convoluted pride in the old exclusive image of the ivory tower.

A new admission paradigm

Makerere used to admit the cream that would be trained to man the civil service and the private sector, with guaranteed employment. The objective was to identify and refine the best, under conditions far beyond the incomes of the majority of society. Makerere dropped this approach, deciding to be-

come instead a place that educates as many of the Ugandans that want a university education as possible. It has become inclusive rather than exclusive.

Makerere used to admit only those students that could be paid for by the government, with thousands of Ugandans seeking worse quality university education outside the country at very high cost. Makerere decided that it could maximize the use of resources (space, time and faculty) and admit private students in order to finance recovery and development needs.

Makerere used to offer courses that it deemed useful: take it or leave it. Makerere now offers courses that the market considers useful and is willing to pay for, with institutionalised processes in many cases for determining what the consumers of the graduates consider relevant.

Accommodation of students and staff used to be the priority. Provision of pedagogic facilities is now the priority, and new academic buildings are re-placing former staff residences.

Makerere changed and bootstrapped itself, albeit with some negative con-sequences discussed below. It became a shining example of institutional trans-formation. The Ugandans who run it were from the same stock of Ugandans that had learnt to survive by their wits. They applied their wits to the survival of their institution.

The chaos of change

Makerere University succeeded beyond its dreams, and student numbers rose from less than 5,000 to more than 20,000 in less than 10 years. The conse-quences: systems, ranging from the processing of admissions, delivery of instruction and examining, management of academic records, management of human resource and financial records, availing books, and routine admin-istration, started grinding to a halt. Public confidence started eroding, and there have been many indignant, and sometimes justified, complaints. It was a nightmare to register at university, get an academic transcript, convince the university that one has paid fees, find literature and to obtain any informa-tion of any description became a Herculean task.

Total chaos started reigning, and had to be addressed before institutional collapse occured. Yes, the academic history and sheer stubborness main-tained the momentum, but solutions had to be found, and fast.

ICT is taken on board

Makerere University was, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, one of the first (if not the first) entities in Uganda to be an e-mail service provider under the address mukla through ESANET. Makerere, because of lack of awareness, did not appreciate the tremendous opportunity here and neglected it. The result was that mukla was left to the wits of a few individuals, who eventu-

ally gave up. Again in the early eighties, some pioneers, notably Professor Mugambi, pushed for placing computerisation high on the agenda of Makerere University, with some success in getting commitment from the government of Uganda to provide funds under an African Development Bank loan for some computer equipment and a basic limited network. Real progress was however very limited until the year 2000.

This history is given to show that a few people in Makerere have always been aware of the benefits, and indeed pushed for, computerisation. These were however isolated efforts that never gained prominence. The pioneers, led by Professor Mugambi, must however be saluted: they started off, in very adverse circumstances, what has eventually become a major university undertaking.

In reality, it was not until the chaos of change was experienced that the introduction of ICT became a do or die issue. The old manual systems were failing. The reputation of this premier institution was suffering. Makerere had to be responsive to change to survive. The academic and administrative management of a student population of more than 20,000 as well as academic and administrative staff of more than 3,000 was otherwise in a shambles. The environment was not conducive to instruction within the new learning paradigms. The integration of ICT in all the functions of the institution was consequently identified as a priority strategic objective if Makerere was to achieve its mission and fulfill its vision.

Herein lies a critical lesson: The integration of ICT into the functions of an enterprise will be easier when there is a clearly identified strategic need. ICT must respond to the vision and strategic priorities of the enterprise.

It became the dream of the current Vice Chancellor, Professor Ssebuwufu, to bequeath the University a legacy: a modern ICT-enabled university where all major systems are fully automated and efficient; and where the new instruction paradigm, facilitated through e-learning, is the norm.

The challenges
The normal focus of challenges in implementing ICT services and systems is often perceived as financial resources to buy computers and software, and to set up and operate international and internal connectivity on a sustainable basis. The challenges, in our experience at Makerere University, go far beyond this. We found the following critical issues that, if not properly handled, become barriers to success.

One, is the lack of real awareness about the benefits of ICT, and the implications if the university does not integrate ICT in its functions.

Two, is mindset, fear, and consequent unwillingness to face the changes from the highest decision makers to the lowest operational levels. In such a

situation, enterprise resources therefore cannot be committed to joining the information and knowledge society.

Three, is the process: how does one go about it? Integrating ICT in private and public enterprises is a new area in Uganda. We must develop local expertise to plan and manage the change.

Four, is the lack of a clear perception of how ICT resources can be sustainably managed, the operational risks, and likely escalating costs of poor information resource management. Information resource management (IRM) is another area where local expertise needs to be developed if we are to contain costs while ensuring reliability and efficiency.

Addressing the challenges

Creation of awareness and ownership
ICT must always be introduced in the context of an enterprise's strategic objectives. It is just one of the many various strategic approaches that contribute to the achievement of the enterprise goals. The starting point is therefore a clear understanding of the enterprise vision, mission, and strategic objectives.

Step two is the identification, by the users – not ICT professionals – of the constraints and problems that an enterprise has in achieving its strategic objectives, and this should encompass all constraints and problems. The users really understand their processes and problems better than ICT professionals, and only need to be guided in verbalising them.

Having identified constraints and problems, ICT is then introduced as an approach that solves some of them, making the enterprise more efficient and productive. This third step has two stages:

- Putting ICT in context. It is important that users appreciate what ICT is, including its strengths, limitations, and risks.

- Looking at organisations that have integrated ICT in functions similar to those of the enterprises: learning from best practices.

The fourth step is a basic definition of functionality by the users. This must be a high level definition that should avoid direct reference to technology.

Finally, the users must develop timelines, and put in place users' project teams that will move the process forward. ICT professionals must be available at all stages to give information and, where really necessary, guidance. ICT professionals MUST NOT take over the process.

The approach in Makerere has been to run users' workshop where users are also resource people. The sessions have been structured such that all participants give their input. It is our experience that having gone through this process, the majority of users obtain a better appreciation of ICT and its

benefits, costs, limitations and risks. More importantly, the users feel that they own and control the process, as indeed they must if success is to be achieved within the shortest possible time.

Addressing the mindset

Addressing the mindset is probably the greatest challenge. Implementation of ICT is not simply the introduction of new technology, but a complete re-thinking of how the enterprise's functions are achieved. Success only comes when people are able and willing to change their working habits and thinking processes. Planning for the introduction of ICT in Makerere has provided an opportunity for a complete re-evaluation of all the processes. The rallying cry: 'Achieving more with less'.

Users must be willing to change, to re-train, to acquire new skills compatible with the new environment. The biggest worry of users invariably comes up as security of employment. The message must be driven home that the issue is not loss of jobs, but liberating human potential for higher-level functions. Yes, job losses are sometimes inevitable, and, if so, this must be faced squarely. The opportunities of higher production rather than reduced human resources should be thrown onto the scales.

At Makerere, considerable emphasis has been put on the issue of addressing mindset, again in workshop style sessions where people can raise their worries and formulate answers to them. There is complete acceptance that methods of work must change. All plans are now given a student-centric focus, in recognition of the principal clients of the university.

The process

Like any other journey, the process of integrating ICT in any enterprise must be well planned if the journey is to be achieved in the shortest possible time and at the lowest cost. In addition, a well-planned process is the springboard for developing funding proposals (internal, government, or development partners).

Formulating the ICT Policy and Master Plan

An ICT Policy and Master Plan, comprising content and functionality aspects, process aspects, and the resource aspects of ICT, is formulated to aid an enterprise in achieving its strategic objectives using ICT as a vehicle. It is formulated based on the existing environment and projections. Since these projections change with time, there must be an inbuilt dynamism in the ICT Policy and Master Plan. Continuous gap analysis will help in identifying the necessary adjustments, and sometimes, radical changes to the ICT Policy and Master Plan. The only constant should be the Vision of the Enterprise. ICT Policy is the foundation for tactical (or project level) ICT management,

while ICT policy determines ICT developments and management over the strategic time horizon (say five years). In formulating an ICT Policy and Master Plan, we need to:

- Quantify the starting point
  The starting point is where we are, and this must be fully quantified. We must fully define the enterprise in terms of its vision, mission, objectives, functions, resources (physical, financial, human resource, ICT resources and expertise, etc).

- Know the destination
  The destination is not an ICT issue because it is fully defined by the enterprise vision, mission and strategic objectives. If these are not well articulated, this is the logical starting point. ICT must be introduced as an aide to getting to the destination, otherwise it will have no defining boundaries, and technology would have been introduced for the sake of technology.

- Identify the vehicle
  The supposition here is that ICT has been identified as the most cost-effective vehicle, at this time, to get the enterprise to its destination. This would have been decided within the higher context of the enterprise strategic plan.

- Define the route
  The route and management of the journey are the issues that are captured in detail by the ICT Policy and Master Plan. These need to be defined by users, guided, where necessary, by ICT professionals. Development of the ICT Policy and Master Plan must be through:
    - Enterprise wide consultations
    - Involvement of policy makers and management
    - Learning from best practices (and failures).

At Makerere University, the Policy and Master Plan formulation process has involved members of the highest policy body, the University Council, academic and administrative management, and students. Because of this participation, the priority of ICT is accepted at all levels, and Makerere is currently committing close to shs 1 billion ($600,000) per year, in addition to development partner funds, to ICT implementation and management. The amount has been growing from year to year.

Implementation

(i) Mobilising funding

The first challenge in implementation is mobilisation of funding. It has been the experience of Makerere University that top-level commitment, institutional ownership, well-formulated project proposals, and enthusiasm of the main actors, are key factors in internal and external funds mobilisation. This is reinforced by open methods of work, including regular reporting that captures both output and financial accountability. In Makerere, for example, all information pertaining to the ICT project is in the public domain, including the web. All ICT procurements are competitively advertised on the web (See http://makerere.ac.ug/tender). It is a fact that to-date, Makerere has not really experienced any major financial-based constraint in the implementation of ICT services and systems.

(ii) The well-articulated policy and master plan

Proper policies and a plan have had a major impact on the process of working with development partners: funding responds to the priorities as identified by Makerere university, rather than being driven by the development partners. In addition, development partners have been very willing to have the resources they provide fit into the master plan matrix. The plan therefore moves as an integrated whole, rather than as isolated sub-projects.

(ii) Implementing services and systems

Any enterprise-wide integration of the ICT project is a major project, and it is prudent to break it down into distinctive sub-projects, each managed by a project team under the overall control of an implementation committee. At the sub-project level, we deal with tactical ICT management, concerning the planning and control of resources within the framework of the ICT Policy objectives. In the Makerere experience, the easier sub-projects are those that relate to the establishment of the necessary infrastructure and the soft resources to manage it. These are followed by projects for the delivery of web-based services (e-mail, internet and intranet access). Infrastructure as well as web-based services projects are best handled by ICT professionals within the agreed policy framework.

The harder projects are the information systems projects. There is normally a great temptation, once the ICT Policy and the Master Plan has been completed, for ICT professionals to take these over for quick implementation. This is a mistake. Long-term sustainability, and dynamic adjustment as circumstances change, require that implementation should be managed by the users, with guidance from ICT professionals where necessary. The

implementation phase is in itself a learning process. It gives the users a chance to examine in depth what they do and to define new systems. It strengthens continuing ownership of the process.

In Makerere, project committees were set up for the major information systems. These are:

- The Library Information System
- The Academic Records Information System
- The Financial Information System
- The Human Resource Information System

It has been impressive to observe how fast the project committees consisting of users rather than ICT professionals get to grips with their statements of requirements for the systems analysts. They have acquired in-depth under-standing of their processes, and defined their desired system functionality.

Table 1 summarises the estimated cost of implementing ICT services and systems, including current status, while Table 2 gives the funding mobilised to date. The timeline envisages conclusion of the project phase by the end of 2003.

Table 1: Makerere ICT Master Plan Costs

	Sub-Project	Status	Cost (US $)
1	Skills Training for End Users	Started 2001 and ongoing	600,000
2	Library Information System	Tender award Dec 2002	300,000
3	Academic Records Info. Sys	Request for Proposals published	500,000
4	Finance Information System	Request for Proposals published	300,000
5	Human Resource Info. Sys.	Request for Proposals published	200,000
6	Implementation of E-learning	110 trainers trained; Policy prepared	500,000
7	Data Network	Main campus done; others started	1,500,000
8	Email and Internet Access	Implemented	350,000
9	Office Automation (Computers and Building Local area networks)	Ongoing under internal and development partner supported projects in various units	6,600,000
10	Development of ICT Support Unit	Implemented; Training continues	650,000
	Total		11,500,000

Table 2: Funds mobilised

	Source	Amount ($)
1	USAID/Leland Initiative (Including Equipment in Kind)	800,000
2	NORAD (NOK 9.5million)	1,100,000
3	Sida/SAREC (SEK 35.3 million)	3,300,000
	(Including access to online information resources)	
4	Government of Uganda (ADB loan)	1,000,000
5	Makerere University (Internal funds to-date)	500,000
6	NUFFIC (E-learning pilot training) (dfl 497,525)	120,000
7	Various partners working through different	500,000
	faculties (computers and LANs)	
	Total to date	7,320,000

Organisational impact

Even prior to the implementation of the main information systems, the organisational impact has been noted in the following areas:

(i) Research/ Instruction and learning

Makerere now has access to online journals and other information resources. It is a noted major user of the INASP facilitated publications. There is also an increased level of e-mail-based interaction between staff and students, and the generation of online courses (currently using Blackboard) has started. Another important aspect that is handled by the Library is the creation of local content by placing Makerere's rich social and scientific (medical, agriculture, engineering, etc) research content on line.

(ii) Administration and internal communication

The culture of email based communication and transactions is spreading very fast. Internal administrative communication is now very efficient compared to what it used to be.

(iii) Attitude

One of the most remarkable changes is in the attitude of people. Two years ago, Makerere had a 128kbps incoming internet link and hardly any networked computers. Currently, all units, without exception, are now setting aside internal funds to put in place ICT resources. Two years ago, the question was, 'Is it really necessary to allocate funds to ICT resources?' The current complaint is 'ICT procurements are too slow, and yet we are using our own funds. Internet access is too slow'.

Continuing challenges

The major hurdle of initiating implementation has been overcome. Development partners are responding to the needs of Makerere, but many challenges remain:

(i) The cost of internet access via satellite

This remains a major challenge. The cost of satellite-provided Internet access is very high. African universities, working with various development partners, are looking at ways of co-operating in consortia to reduce the cost of access. This initiative was discussed at a workshop of universities and libraries from Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda in Addis Ababa. This forum, supported by The Partnership (Ford, Carnegie, Rockefeller and McArthur) of Foundations, was convened to address 'Effective Use of ICTs to Create a new Environment for Learning, Teaching and Research'. A specific task force has been set up to address the issue of the cost of Internet access.

(ii) ICT human resource retention

ICT expertise is scarce and expensive, and African universities must compete with the commercial ICT industry. This creates a permanent challenge. The Makerere approach is to accept this situation and target bright students in their senior undergraduate years to work in ICT support after graduation for a few years (when they are at their most creative) before they move on. The level of responsibility given to them is also a challenge that motivates them.

(iii) The cost of software

The cost of the common standard packages is prohibitively high for Makerere. The policy is to go as far as possible in using open source software, and join cooperative groups on the continent that are taking this direction. The University of the Western Cape in South Africa, for example, is developing an open-source e-learning platform. Another international consortium of universities is working on an Academic Records Information System.

(iv) Sustainability

The Makerere ICT policy has built sustainability into the policy statements. Heads of academic and administrative units meet to agree on levels of expenditure and the contribution of the different units. When sufficient access for students is in place, consideration will be given to a flat charge not exceeding $30 per year at current costs. An important approach in implementation is never to implement more than can be maintained or sustained using internal resources.

(v) Providing adequate access for users

This is the largest outstanding component of the Master Plan. It requires gradual tackling to ensure sufficient resources to maintain the computers. The target is one computer per five students.

Conclusion

These are still early days in the integration of ICT in all the university functions in Makerere University. There is however a clear direction, and all indications are that the objectives will be achieved. This prediction is not based simply on optimism, but rather on the dynamism and realism that has been built in the process to ensure proactive strategic redirection where necessary. Makerere was forced by necessity to take ICT on board: it is therefore a do or die situation. Makerere shall succeed. We invite colleagues to share our experiences, and our motto: 'We Build for the Future'.

Globalisation, ICTs, and the New Imperialism: Perspectives on Africa in the Global Electronic Village

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Abstract

Globalization as promoted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) is resulting in a new imperialism that is characterized by knowledge dependence and the shrinking of the national space for decision making. It is facilitated by information and communication technologies (ICTs). The centrality of ICTs to globalization has resulted in an international concern for bridging the unequal access to ICTs that has come to be termed as digital divide. However, the discourse about bridging the digital divide tends to mask the reality of the digital deficit which is the consequence of a wider development divide. Yet the reality is that the marginality of Africa cannot be addressed by isolationism as a counterforce to globalization. What is needed is to rethink the terms and nature of Africa's integration in the global economy. This means interrogating among others, the current discourse about bridging the digital divide. This contribution addresses the substantive nature of the new imperialism and offers explanation as to why the digital divide tends to increase rather than decrease in spite of the various efforts aimed at closing it. It concludes by offering some directions in which the digital deficit as part of the wider development divide can be addressed.

Résumé

La mondialisation, telle que promue par l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce (OMC) est en train de conduire à une nouvelle forme d'impérialisme caractérisée par une certaine dépendance intellectuelle, mais également par la réduction de l'espace national permettant la prise de décision. La mondialisation est facilitée par les technologies de l'information et de la technologie (TIC). Le rôle central des TIC au sein du processus de mondialisation a conduit la communauté internationale à s'atteler à la réduction de l'inégalité d'accès aux TIC, plus connue sous le terme de "

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fracture numérique ". Mais le discours relatif à la réduction de la fracture numérique a tendance à masquer la réalité du déficit numérique existant, qui est lui-même la conséquence d'une plus large fracture développementale. La réalité est que l'on ne peut lutter contre la situation marginale de l'Afrique par l'isolationnisme, comme contre-poids à la mondialisation. Il convient mieux de redéfinir les termes et la nature de l'intégration africaine au sein de l'économie mondiale. Cela implique, entre autres, une analyse de l'actuel discours sur la réduction de la fracture numérique. Cette contribution porte sur les multiples facettes du nouvel impérialisme et explique pourquoi la fracture numérique a plutôt tendance à s'agrandir, au lieu de se réduire, malgré les nombreux efforts destinés à la supprimer. L'auteur conclut en proposant des orientations permettant de réduire le déficit numérique, partie intégrante d'une plus profonde fracture développementale.

Introduction

The convergence of microelectronics, communication and computing technologies has given rise to new information systems, which have the ability to manipulate information rapidly in a number of ways and deliver such information with incredible speed at very low cost. This manipulative attribute of the new systems has itself given rise to new categories of services while enhancing old ones. The Internet in particular, which is at the centre of the information technology mediated world, is critical to the globalisation process that is integrating the world into what is termed as the Global Electronic Village (GEV).

Ever since Marshal McLuhan used the phrase global village in the 1960s to refer to a contracting world, the concept of a global electronic village (GEV) has gained increasing currency and an apparent objective reality. The world has become fully connected and brought together at the click of the mouse. Beyond this virtual reality, however, lies a social reconstruction of the world through a globalisation process, which is seen as the integration of the world into a single market. At the heart of this process is Information Technology, or more broadly, information and communication technologies (ICTs), that ever-pervasive technology that is changing the ways in which we do things. Information Technology has unleashed a torrent of technological changes that have profound implications for the way in which society is organised.

How is Africa located in this new global system? What are the implications and the challenges that such a positioning presents to the continent? What are the efforts on the ground to confront the challenges? How viable are they? What alternative options for confronting these challenges exist? These are the substantive questions of this contribution.

The paper starts first by exploring the links between globalisation, ICTs and the emerging world that such linkage is evolving. It argues that globalisation is not only enabled by ICTs but that the level of connectivity of a country determines to a large degree the possibility of its benefiting from the globalisation process. For this reason, the paper undertakes an assessment of Africa's position within the content of cyberspace. What emerges from such an assessment is a gloomy picture: Africa is poorly positioned in cyberspace to be able to benefit from globalisation. Instead, the continent faces the challenges of imperialism anew, this time represented by knowledge dependence. The paper then offers an articulation of the substance and nature of this new imperialism that is resulting from both globalisation and an unequal access to ICTs in a world that is increasingly becoming knowledge mediated. This new imperialism that is signposted by global governance based on the World Trade Organization (WTO) presents Africa with new development challenges which it has to confront.

The paper argues that for Africa to break the hold of this imperialism, it has to find ways of deploying ICTs, among other things, for development purposes. This leads us to assessing the current efforts and strategies aimed at addressing the digital divide in Africa. One basic fact about this divide is that in spite of the multiplicity of bridging strategies and efforts; the digital divide is expanding rather than closing. Within this context therefore, the paper seeks to offer an explanation as to why these efforts are not successful. The last section provides a framework for addressing Africa's digital marginalisation.

The framework takes as its point of departure the fact that the integration of Africa to the global economy is a reality. However, the nature and mode of this integration need to be contested. It also proceeds from the observation that the digital divide, defined as unequal access to ICTs within and between nations, is part of the wider development divide that has been characteristic of imperialist domination of the third world.

The pathways of globalisation

Whether seen as a historical process or an ideological construct, globalisation brings about greater interaction between countries, and between peoples. John Tomlinson (1996) defines it as 'a rapidly developing process of complex interconnections between societies, cultures, institutions and individuals world-wide. It is a social process which involves a compression of time and space, shrinking distances through a dramatic reduction in the time taken — either physically or representationally — to cross them, so making the world seem smaller and in a certain sense bringing human beings closer to one another'. Thomas Friedman (1996) sees it as 'the loose combination of free-

trade agreements, the Internet and the integration of financial markets that is erasing borders and uniting the world into a single lucrative, but brutally competitive marketplace'.

Globalisation reduces the world into an integrated system of markets. In the process, international trade is considered to be the major engine of economic growth, and should therefore be facilitated. This facilitation is to be achieved through trade liberalisation, necessitating the removal of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. In addition, states are to withdraw from social provisioning by privatising state social service organisations. The role of states is being reduced to that of creating a conducive environment for private sector-led development.

In concrete terms, globalisation presents itself as the breaking down of national barriers in terms of trade, flows of information and capital, and in terms of the ownership of key industries. Multinational corporations are increasingly displacing local ownership in key, dynamic sectors of national economies. It is also changing the nature of national policy making in that globalisation demands conformity with policy prescriptions, which national policy-making instruments and processes have no role in articulating. This last has serious implications for the essence of national democracy. Democracy is about the capacity of citizens to participate in the process of decision-making and to influence their governments in the process. In the context of globalisation, the space for this participation has been constrained as policy flows top-down from the international trade regulating organisation to national governments. This means that globalisation disempowers citizens, and therefore substantively undermines democracy globally.

The debate about the nature and impact of globalisation is ongoing. However, a certain consensus is building. For instance, it is now understood to encompass not 'deepening of financial markets, but includes a whole range of social, political, economic and cultural phenomena' that are simultaneously driven and facilitated by developments in ICTs (Cogburn and Adeya 1999:2). O'Neill (1999: 1) talks of them as being 'seminal to the globalisation process'. It is also agreed that in this process, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), an organisation ostensibly established to regulate world trade, has come to assume the role of global governance, whose modus operandi is, as Dot Keet (1999: 9) remarks 'the product of self-serving and highly tendentious political processes; and based upon and reflecting a particular economic model or paradigm favouring the strong'.

What is the role of ICTs in this process? At one level, ICTs provide the pathways by which the world is brought together, conquering both time and space. The critical role of ICTs here is that they allow the flow of information

and market intelligence at incredible speed and at very low cost. This means that multi-national corporations have better access to the most comprehensive market intelligence, and they can better coordinate their activities and management. ICTs also link up the new manufacturing outposts of the transnational corporations in the South to their markets in the North.

The technology of e-commerce has also meant an easy and speedy movement of capital. Multinationals can therefore move their capital to where conditions are most profitable. Moreover, goods and services, including stocks, are traded electronically, thus firms do not have to be involved in the actual movement of funds. Electronic transactions are invisible and therefore difficult to tax, thus allowing for bigger profit margins for the transnational corporations.

One of the pillars of globalisation is international trade in services such as education, financial, health and telecommunication provision. In the past, a country or firm offering these services in another country had to either be physically located in the country, or set up a local representative, usually, a subsidiary, whose operations were subject to national policies. Now with ICTs, these services are being offered in a wider scope online. Electronic banking, online educational services, tele-medicine, data processing, and so on are the deliverables through which the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is being operationalised. Increasingly, these do not only constitute a significant volume of international trade, but also major sources of exports by leading industrial countries such as USA, Japan and Germany. For example, today the marketing of bandwidth and satellite channels by US companies constitutes a major trade export to the African continent. The ability of any country to participate in GATS is largely dependent on its level of ICT connectivity. A country that has poor ICT infrastructure cannot offer services such as online education, tele-medicine and international bandwidth services, even within its national borders.

Another noted feature of globalisation is the internationalisation of production. This along with the outsourcing of goods and services means that transnational corporations can site different units of their overall production systems in a number of different countries, taking unique advantages offered by each site, such as cheap labour, cheap raw materials, poor labour standards, and less stringent environmental protection. This is possible only with a fast and reliable means of communication that is complemented by an equally fast and reliable means of transportation. It is this that has given rise to the border porosity characteristic of globalisation. It is not only that the liberalisation of trade has necessitated the removal of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers but that much trading today is done via the

Internet, which has no national boundaries. In such a borderless space, the capacity of states to legislate in the national space has been critically undermined.

Globalisation proceeds with its own mythical justifications. It thus seeks to not only contest other rival development paradigms but also subvert them. It tries to rationalise a particular way of configuring the world, including privileging a particular type of globalisation over others, as there are indeed many types of globalizations. ICTs provide the platform and channels through which this ideological rationalisation of market orthodoxy takes place.

One other consensus about globalisation is that its benefits are not evenly distributed across nations and people. Even within a country, there are losers and gainers. The ability of a country to benefit in the globalisation process is dependent among other things, on its access to technology, international bargaining power, and the relative strength of its economy. Access to ICTs in particular has been generally recognised as a major enabler for a country and people to benefit from globalisation. Countries that are better connected have a better chance of benefiting positively than those that are poorly connected. In this sense, it is important to assess Africa's position in cyberspace.

Africa in cyberspace

Africa is presently at the bottom of the ICT ladder. This has serious implications for both the continent as well as globally. To illustrate the standing of the continent in the digital divide, we need to look at some of the statistics. With a population share of about 13 percent of the world population, Africa has a total share of only 20,042,100 out of about 10 billion global telephone lines, representing a paltry share of 0.22 percent. It has just a little over 1 percent of total global Personal Computer population. Table 1 summarises the position of Africa regarding the different aspects of ICTs.

Table 1: Distribution of basic ICT access indicators in Africa as percentage of the world

	Landlines	PC population	Cellular lines	Internet hosts	Internet users
Africa	20,043,100	7,556,000	11,295,000	274,742	6,735,700
World	9,281,040,000	495,366,000	727,186,200	141,382,198	498,666,700
%	0.22	1.53	0.16	0.19	1.35

Source: ITU, 2001, 2002.

The precarious position of Africa is even more revealing if we disaggregate the data in terms of density or penetration ratio. This is shown in Table 2. It is seen that while the world average for landlines is about 15.36 lines per 100

people, Africa's is around 2.55. Similarly, where the world average for Internet hosting is 232.66 per 10,000 people, Africa's is only 84.71 per 10,000 people. But the world average is pushed down by the poor showings of Africa and other developing countries. Compared to Europe and the USA, Africa's figures are dismal. For instance, while USA has an average of 67.30 telephone lines per 100 people, 4,000 mobile lines per 100 people, the equivalent figures for Africa are 2.55 and 1.47 respectively. Sweden's figures are 68.20 and 71.37 respectively. When it is taken that more than half of the ICTs in Africa are in South Africa, the rest of Africa appears to have really very little to show. As a matter of fact, by 2000, only about 26 countries in Africa had a penetration ratio of one percent and above (ITU 2001), the minimum recommended by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) for developing countries.

Table 2: Some indicators for Africa as compared to other countries

Africa	2.55	1.06	1.47	3.44	84.71
World	15.36	8.42	12.06	232.66	820.82
Europe	39.16	17.94	36.14	192.45	1804.6
USA	67.30	62.25	40.00	3,714.01	4995.10
Sweden	68.20	56.12	71.37	825.14	5162.74

Source: ITU, 2001. 2002.

Another set of indicators is built around access to traditional or older forms of ICTs. These include radio, television, newspapers and others. This is important because ICTs have integrated these older technologies in a way that modifies their uses. As with other indicators, the African share in terms of these older forms of ICTs is very low, although radio has achieved a better penetration than any of the others (see Table 3).

Table 3: Proportion of people having access to various technologies

Region	Online	Radio	Television
Africa	0.3	17	5
North America	27	118	61
Western Europe	12	29	53
Middle East	3	39	25
Scandinavia	35	112	58
Asia Pacific	5	35	19

Source: compiled from Norris (2001).

The effective use of and the production of ICTs is a function of both the available relevant skills and literacy. The use of computers requires a certain level of functional literacy. Thus, basic literacy is an important indicator of the potential of the citizens of a given country to use ICTs. On the other hand, the ability of countries to deploy and adopt ICTs is dependent on a core of technical skills. This is why these two are relevant parameters in measuring the digital divide. The average literacy rate in Africa is about 55 percent while the percentage of technical graduates is about 2.1 percent com- pared to 56 percent for the developed countries. While the OECD countries spend on average about 2 percent of their GDP on R&D, Africa's spending is just about 0.2 percent. It is not surprising therefore that Africa's share of ICTs production is virtually zero. Thus, the continent is a mere consumer of ICTs.

Cost is also a factor in the low use of ICTs in Africa. The cost of PCs is still beyond the reach of many Africans. This is not to talk of the additional cost of access to the Internet and payment for staying online. Incidentally, the cost per minute use of the Internet is more costly in Africa than elsewhere. The authors of NEPAD put it this way: 'the connection cost in Africa annually is 20 percent of GDP per capita compared with the world average of 9 percent and 1 percent for the high-income countries' (NEPAD, 12). The survey for the Global Network Readiness (Kirkman and others 2002) shows that whereas in Sweden the annual cost of the Internet per 20 hours is 0.12 percent of GDP per capita, in South Africa, which has the best in Africa, it was 5.26 percent. Zimbabwe and Nigeria have 51.53 percent and 55.13 percent respectively. This simply means that access alone is not affordable for most Africans.

But it is not only the citizens that are unable to use ICTs in Africa. Even the governments are not using ICTs as they should, compare to governments in other regions of the world. Table 4 for instance shows the number of government websites in different regions of the world. As can be seen, with per country average of 12 per country, Africa comes last.

Table 4: Government related websites

Region	Total number of websites	Website per country
All	14484	82
North America	1,283	428
Western Europe	5,060	404
Scandinavia	1,156	231
Asia Pacific	2,555	75
Middle East	446	32
Sub Saharan Africa	599	12

Source: Norris (2001).

Africa accounts for almost zero percent of global ICT production and its consumption is equally low. In terms of per capita speeding in ICTs, the region also ranked last. This is illustrated in Table 5. Indeed other than a few assembly plants and some efforts at local software production in some of the countries, Africa imports all its ICT needs.

Table 5: ICT spending per capita

OECD Countries	129.11
Middle East and North Africa	18.12
Sub-Saharan Africa	9.25
Latin America and Caribbean	29.77
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	19.90
Asia Pacific	14.99

Source: Pyramid Research, quoted in eXchange, 1999.

On the non-statistical aspects of the digital divide, there are the issues of ownership and control of the major players in the ICT sector. These include multinational corporations involved in the production and marketing of ICTs, and the bandwidth and channel providers and other related agencies. These are dominated by USA, Europe and Japan. Apart from the UN bodies, such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) that are concerned with the sector, there are many bodies regulating one aspect or the other of the Internet. Domain name administration and protocol issuance are handled by Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). This body, which started as a purely American body has in spite of its global field of operation remained dominated by America. ICANN actually took over these functions from Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), a body that was set up by the US Federal Network Council (Hamelink 1998:18).

Debates within the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CSPR) have tended to see the organisation as unaccountable and non-representative. For instance, in a recent article by Hans Klein (2002), the organisation was exposed as creating the illusion of representation when in fact, it has been systematically doing away with all elements of representation and participation such as elections and open decision-making. It is also seen as responsible for the maintenance of the dominance of the English Language in the Internet (Bridges.org 2001). Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World Wide Web, refers to another problem: 'the best domain names will wind up with the people or corporations that have the most money' (1999: 139). The Intelsat is another intergovernmental body that provides satellite channels. Representation on the governing body of the organisation is based on na-

tional contribution to the body. As a result, African countries have only a marginal presence.

Another aspect of the digital divide is the African presence on the Internet. As of now, African content is minimal. In addition, very few African languages have made it onto the Internet, with so far very few websites. A related issue is the use of the Internet by Africans. At the level of governance, few African governments and their agencies have set up websites to facilitate the exchange and sharing of public information. By 1999, while in Europe all the governments were online, in Africa only 13 out of 55 were. Similarly, out of the 45 parliaments in Africa in that year, only 12 had websites whereas all of European parliaments were online.

Part of the problem is that Africa has low bandwidth capacity. Linkages between African countries hardly exist. Traffic therefore has to be routed through a third party country, usually either in Europe or US. The capacities of these routes are themselves very low compared to other routes as Table 6 shows.

Table 6: Bandwidth in some selected inter-continental routes

Route	Capacity in Gbps
US A - Europe	56
USA - Africa	0.5
Europe - Africa	0.2
Latin America - USA	3.0
Asia Pacific - USA	18
Africa - Latin America	0
Africa - Asia Pacific	0

Source: constructed from DOT Force (2001).

However, even this limited bandwidth is rented from international bandwidth providers. Thus, all the submarine cables and the satellite transponders belong to American and European companies. Africa pays heavily for the use of this bandwidth. For instance in 2002, it was estimated that African ISPs are paying about $1 billion per annum for connectivity to American and European bandwidth providers (Bell 2002).

The resurgence of the new imperialism

Global governance is implicated in an attempt by the industrial countries to privilege a specific articulation of globalisation for the benefit of their multinational corporations. This global governance is premised on two principles: the withdrawal of the state from the provision of social goods and services,

and the weakening of national sovereignty. Filling in the space vacated by the states, is the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which has been created to enhance international trade of the multinational corporations. WTO has claimed the powers relinquished by the states without any of the responsibility to the citizens that these powers entail. This organisation is restructuring the world in such a way as to ensure the domination of the weak by the powerful. Given the critical role of ICTs in the new world economy, WTO has also set about to configure this sector.

WTO's intervention in the ICT sector is centred around the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and the Agreement on Telecommunication. Within the general framework of liberalisation and privatisation, countries are to dismantle their governments' control of the sector, sell off government service companies, remove tariff and non-tariff barriers, and open up the sector for foreign participation. While the argument canvassed for these steps is that they would accelerate the growth of the sector, the reality is that this approach could simultaneously transfer control of the sector to multinational corporations and at the same time open up the lucrative markets of developing countries for these firms, whose home markets are already becoming saturated. To allow GATS to control our service sectors in this era of the ICTs mediated world, will, as a UNRISD statement observes, 'negate the possibilities that cyberspace offers for a new global forum, and to reduce this space to a marketplace where a controlled volume of ideas will be traded' (quoted in Varoglu and Wachholz 2001).

The effect of this is to remove access to ICTs from the domain of social provisioning and transfer it to the market arena. By making the market the dominant driver of the sector, the choice is very clear: investors will only invest to the extent that they would be assured of profits. This means that national disparities and unequal access to ICTs would not be eliminated. Rather, they could be accentuated by the inability of the poor to afford the cost of access in the absence of government subsidies. The WTO approach would therefore contract rather than expand access to information systems in its member countries. Global trends in ICTs have shown that the information gap is expanding, with those countries that have more developed ICT sectors better leveraged to develop faster.

But GATS and TRIPS are concessions made by developing countries in favour of the developed countries (Third World Network 2001). This is because, with respect to GATS, developing countries that are unable to meet their national obligations cannot be expected to trade these services in the developed countries. They have no capacity to compete. In reality therefore,

it comes down to developed countries marketing their services in the developing countries and not the other way round. Given the fact that GATS cover education as well, the implications are enormous. It would not only open up this sector for the transnational corporations but also commoditise education. The consequence of this is that access to education, which has been largely a public good, would be conditioned by the market. This undermines the capacity of African and other developing countries to benefit from globalisation since education is a critical requirement in the new information mediated society. Globalisation privileges the highly skilled and educated set of people and communities. More relevant to this discussion, the access to vast ICT networks by the transnational corporations would make it impossible for local educational suppliers to compete with the transnational corporations. The space is thus opened not only for the control of access to education by the citizens of the developing countries but also for laying the foundations of cultural imperialism.

The TRIPS expanded both the scope of traditional copyright protection to include such issues as patents, industrial design, trademarks, geographic indicators and appellations of origins, layout of integrated circuits, and software, among others, and extended the period of patents, in some cases to over 90 years. This means the first to win a patent would enjoy an assured monopoly. Virtually all intellectual property is today in the hands of the developed countries and therefore protecting it as the TRIPS does means that developing countries would find it very difficult to have access to new scientific knowledge and technology. TRIPS in particular is meant to ensure the preservation of the international division of labour in which research and technology reproduction is done in the home countries of the transnational corporations, while the developing countries should remain consumers of it. In this way, the technological gap between the developed world and the developing one would continue to increase.

TRIPS has also other implications. For instance, it would set the cost of access to technology at arbitrary monopoly prices. It is also implicated in the trend to cultural imperialism. Ann Capling (1999) for instance has drawn attention to how TRIPS is facilitating the globalisation of a (specific) mass culture of commercialised mediocrity while undermining local popular culture. The coding and patenting of local indigenous knowledge and cultural motifs would not only commercialise such knowledge and cultural products but also limit their accessibility to communities.

The Telecommunications Agreement (the fourth Protocol of GATS) is a comprehensive document that provides the framework for the current telecommunication sector reform in most African countries. Among other

things, it requires states to end state monopolies, open up the sector for foreign participation, and adhere to the WTO rule of non-discrimination against any participant. This last means that governments should not assist or subsidise local companies operating in the sector. This according to the WTO logic is to ensure a level playing field. Unfortunately, the field had never been level. Local companies cannot compete with multinationals that have access to vast resources, an extremely large capital base, access to the most current technology, and the advantages of economy of scale.

In practice, what is happening is the edging out of local companies in the sector as in other sectors. The nation as a whole loses any control over the operators of the sector, since most of the framework of their participation has been decided and crafted by the WTO. This is why Hamelink (1998) notes with respect to the Telecommunications Agreement that it is undermining the capacity of states regarding national policy making. The takeover of the sector by multinational corporations can be illustrated by two examples. When Nigeria called for bidding for GSM licenses in 2001, only one local company was able to participate. This company did win a license but had to forfeit it because it was unable to raise the required funds. But even when eventually it obtained another license two years later, it became obvious that it was merely a front of German Deutsche Telecoms. In the same vein, no local company could bid for the 40 percent share in NITEL, the sole national operator, because of the huge monetary requirements. The second example draws attention to the observation Mike Jensen (1999:12) makes that in all the countries in Africa that ended state monopolies, companies of the former colonial countries took over. This is not just symbolic but a fact of the resurgence of imperialism.

While African countries that have undertaken the liberalisation of the telecommunication sector have ended state monopolies they have suddenly found themselves saddled with a new monopoly: that of the foreign investors. The AITEC report on the state of ICT infrastructure in Africa for the year 2000 (Hamilton 2002) clearly shows this trend.

WTO itself is increasingly becoming a counter-force to the UN system. This has three implications in the shaping of the world that promoters of WTO wish to see. The first is that while the UN system tends to focus on human development and peace building, the WTO's focus is international trade as an end in itself. To that extent issues of human rights and democracy would only receive lip service in the struggle to create the environment for profitability. Indeed, the WTO makes nonsense of all the fine UN declarations on human rights. This is because in the first instance, states have been restricted from providing resources for the realisation of these rights. The

contradiction between the WTO's regime of minimum state responsibility on the one hand and the popular consensus of the other UN bodies, demanding that more resources should go into social welfare provisioning, is increasingly being resolved in favour of the WTO, subverting both the traditional role of the state in meeting the basic needs of its citizens and the UN's role in regulating international relations. An example of this is the demand by WTO, through its Bretton Woods sister organisations, that developing countries should cut public spending, including on education, while UNESCO on the other hand has been calling on states to devote as much as 26 percent of their national budgets to education.

Secondly, the fact that these services have been moved from the domain of social responsibility to that of market relationships means that they will be provided with the sole aim of making profits. And where subsidies do not exist, people have no option. Thus while the services could become indeed more available, they would equally become more unaffordable to the majority of citizens in the third world countries. Such is the paradox of the WTO that availability and affordability have become mutually exclusive. There have, for instance, never been so many opportunities for distance education as today, yet because of the commercialised overreach of these programmes, those who should benefit from them cannot.

In spite of its many flaws, the UN system is still relatively open, accountable and representative. The WTO on the other hand is opaque, non-representative and accountable only to multinational corporations and the governments of the big countries. It is clear as the recent invasion of Iraq shows, that the big powers do not want the inconveniences of the UN system and would rather prefer a short cut where they can act independently without the pretence of democracy. The imperialist imperatives are too obvious.

Third, WTO is undermining the capacity of states to pursue an independent development agenda in their respective countries. This undermining of the capacity of the state to pursue its own development agenda in the national space also weakens state capacity in delivering social progress. However, as Bangura notes (2001:8), it is 'now an accepted axiom that no country has ever developed under conditions of weak state capacity'. It means therefore that globalisation that seeks to undermine state capacity holds no promise for the development of those societies.

One of the promises of the information age is that access to information and channels of communication would produce a truly plural world. However, the reverse is happening: instead of a plurality of voices, what we see is a homogenising tendency (Schechter 2001), towards the reproduction, amplification and circulation of the voices of the big and the powerful. This

homogenising tendency is the result of three aspects of the distribution of ICTs across nations and people. One is that those who have better access to them are better placed to project their voices and vision. Secondly, ICTs are further deepening the earlier trend of vertical concentration in the media. Increasingly a few mega-sites such as Yahoo!, Hotmail and CNN are meeting the information needs of the majority. In this process, the smaller platforms have no chance of being heard. Thirdly, and worse of all, however, these few sites are also owned by corporations that dominate other key sectors of the economy, accelerating horizontal concentration.

To make it worse for the developing countries, ICTs have created new financial drains that are contributing to capital flight. These include the inability of third world countries to tax transactions completed over the Internet as in e-commerce, the fact that capital is now extremely mobile, and the equally important fact that ICTs contribute to high levels of profit repatriation from developing countries. Apart from direct transfer in the purchase of ICT equipment, African countries have also been paying huge amounts to international backbone providers through both unfair settlement rates and payment for bandwidth. The high mobility of capital in a world that is called upon to rely on foreign direct investment (FDI) is forcing developing countries to lower tax regimes in order to attract FDI. This has resulted in eroding their revenue from taxation (Torres 2001). Additionally, in terms of trade and commerce, local firms are not able to compete with transnational ones, thus exacerbating the capital flight.

Typical of the era of imperialism, there is now a scramble for markets and territories by the major powers. However, unlike in the past where it was conducted through open wars, this time it is fought using a variety of means including control of technology standard setting. In the telecommunications sector, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) traditionally has this responsibility but it has now been joined by a plethora of new standard organisations, reflecting the breadth of the ICT spectrum. One of the fiercest battles was over GSM standards. The USA has developed the Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) standard while its European rivals have gone for the Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (W-CDMA) standard. In arguing their case for the different standard, the companies spearheading the European standard argued that the USA standard was developed for military purposes and that building a network that would be controlled by the USA Defence Department was politically not wise (Lembke 2002:163–220). The European partners won and have been giving the USA serious competition not only in Europe but also elsewhere, as in Africa.

The nature of this imperialism is characterised by knowledge dependence by the new re-colonised countries on the new imperial powers. It is a soft

type that does not involve the physical occupation of the countries but whose pathways are mediated by the vast network of ICTs. It is signposted by a control mechanism exerted through the WTO, which acts on behalf of the western powers and their transnational corporations. It is supported by an array of methods of ideological internalization that controls the flow of news, entertainment and literature, as well the whole cultural space. Today, the media scene is dominated by a few organisations such as CNN, BBC, and Yahoo!. They decide what is news, what should be circulated and listened to or read, and ceaselessly block those that conflict with the values they want to spread. All of this of course is only possible through their control of the ICTs.

ICTs are also reinforcing the old international division of labour while at the same time creating a new one. Because of the ease with which capital can now be moved around the world, multinational corporations select the most profitable locations for their operations. Although a few developing countries such Taiwan, Korea, and China have been able to build national ICT production capacity, the truth is that many cannot and will therefore remain consumers of ICT products and services. As producers they will only export primary commodities.

There has been much talk about teleworking being able to transfer many online jobs to the Third World. Yet the nature of these jobs reflects the sort of international division of labour that ICTs are recreating. While industrialised countries have been luring the best and most experienced brains from Africa and other third world countries, especially in the ICT sector, they are locating non-skilled ICT jobs and environmentally degrading production outfits to these countries. De Alcantera notes (2001:12):

> With the exception of some groups (like software programmers), it seems that most teleworkers – who are predominantly women – are receiving extremely low wages; and some of them work in the kind of modern-day sweatshop conditions that characterized export-oriented manufacturing throughout the developing world.

Africa is already suffering the results of the brain drain. A report for the UNECA shows that by 1999, more than 30,000 Africans with Ph.Ds were living and working outside the continent (Cogburn and Adeya 1999:12), a situation that moved the African Development Forum to set up a Commission on how to tap this African Diaspora in the efforts to build the African Information Society Initiative (AISI). The immediate implication of brain drain is that research in technology and in particular, ICTs would be conducted only in the industrialised countries, thus ensuring the ever widening nature of the digital divide. But there is a parallel to the colonial period here:

while Africans were taken to Europe and America as slaves to supply physical labour, now they are taken to supply mental labour, which is needed there. On the other hand, there are all the restrictions on the migration of manual labour. The strategy of export processing zones has done away with the need for manual labour to migrate. Instead the new slaves work in their countries for the consumption and needs of the metropolitan centres. This has the added advantage that environmental pollution can be relocated to those backward countries, and that labour standards do not apply, thus making it very cheap and convenient.

The challenge before Africa

Globalisation is thus a euphemism for the new imperialism. Its instrumentality is a world of decision-making processes in which policy choices are determined by the governments of the developed countries and by international institutions that are mainly under their control or influence (Khor 2002). To confront this new imperialism, Africa has to strategise its integration into the global economy. This strategising must proceed from the recognition that integration into the global world system is a reality. What need to be contested are the nature and manner of this integration. Isolationism cannot provide a counter development option nor a strategy for countering the re-colonising impulses of globalisation.

The strategising is also multi-faceted. One aspect is how to address the issue of the digital divide, not the least because ICTs are engines of economic development. In pointing out the key elements of this strategising with respect to the digital divide, it would not be out of place to first review the current efforts at addressing this problem.

The pioneering work of the United Nations Commission on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD) starting from 1995 placed the issue of ICTs as development tools on the global development agenda. In two major studies (Howkins and Robert 1997; Mansell and Wehn 1998), the UNCSTD sought to understand the relationship between ICTs and development, and how ICTs could be diffused across the world. One of the issues that these efforts highlighted was the digital divide. Since then bridging the divide has become an omnibus upon which every organisation hopes to latch.

There is a consensus on the need to bridge the digital divide. However, the motivations for the bridging and the strategies being employed are as diverse as the players. While organisations like the WTO see the need to bridge the gap as part of the efforts to promote global trade, others see the need to close the gap in order either to enhance the economic development of those on the negative side of the divide, or in order to escape from the recolonising impulses of the new global order.

Over time, there have been several initiatives at bridging the digital divide. These efforts can be divided into four categories:

• Those by development organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNESCO and the UN itself. The UNDP has been the most intensively involved in building the capacity of developing countries to utilise ICTs for development purposes. Its involvement also started earlier in 1993 when it established the Sustainable Development Networking Programme (SDNP) with the goal of addressing the connectivity and networking issue. By 1996, the network had expanded to 42 islands that were connected through the Internet for information sharing (UNDP 2001). The following year, the UNDP started two regional programmes, the Internet Initiative for Africa (IIA) and the Asia-Pacific Internet Programme, both of which provide assistance and advice to a select set of countries in the two regions in developing Internet connectivity. Since 2000, it has been involved in the Global Network Readiness and Resources Initiative, which is a partnership with several other organisations.

The World Bank has also, apart from its banking assistance programmes in the ICT sector, been active through its infoDev unit, doing work in the area of evaluating strategies, advising governments on policy frameworks, and generally promoting market reforms in the sector. The infoDev is a global partnership involving private sector organisations and governments that pool the intellectual, technical and financial resources of the public and private sector, facilitating market development and promoting the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) in areas such as education, health, government, commerce and environment (infoDev 1999). Both the World Bank and the UNDP are serving as the joint coordinating secretariat of the DOT Force programme of G-8. The UN itself in 2000 set up a Task Force on ICTs. Its mandate is to advise the UN Secretary General on policy and initiatives to promote greater access to ICTs in the developing countries. UNESCO has also been involved with the use of ICTs for education, especially in the area of distance learning. ITU's contribution has centred on policy development and in the building of regional capacity for ICT administration. Both the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) are active in building the capacity of developing countries to partake in e-commerce.

• Those efforts by the governments of the industrialised countries, especially the Digital Opportunity Task Force (DOT Force) of the G-8. Driven by the need to capture the virgin markets of the developing countries, G-8 member states have also taken the issue of bridging the digital divide. When

in 1995 they organised a Summit on Information Technology, they invited Thabo Mbeki of South Africa to deliver the keynote address. Expectedly Mbeki used the occasion to call for partnership in the information society (Mbeki 1998:185). Subsequently, the G-8 set up the DOT Force charged with the responsibility of coordinating the activities of the group in the area of bridging the digital divide. Individual governments of members of the G-8, especially USA, UK and Japan have all been giving unilateral assistance to developing countries. The G-8 initiative and those of the individual governments, in spite of their 'rhetoric', aim more at capturing the African market which is not saturated as in the developed countries. Thus while it could lead to a general improvement in connectivity, it cannot deal with the digital divide.

• Those by non-governmental organisations. Many local and international NGOs have been working to improve access to ICTs for marginalised groups in the developing countries. The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) has been the most active in Africa. Other NGOs that have been active in bridging the digital divide in Africa include Computer Aid International, World Computer Exchange, and a number of foundations, such as the Soros Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Kellogg Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation and others (Hafkin and Wild 2002). Much of the activities of these NGOs have centred on bringing in computers, setting up access centres such as telecentres (Ya'u 2000), imparting ICT skills and providing networking platforms such as Association for Progressive Communication (APC), OneWorld and Kabissa. Although they have also been engaged in advocacy for improving access to ICTs and bridging both internal and international aspects of the digital divide, the effort of NGOs does not address the fundamental problems that ensure the prevalence of the gap. Another problem of the NGO intervention is the issue of sustainability. This is particularly true of project-based interventions such as telecentres and micro-credit projects. After the initial funds are exhausted, the project quickly winds up.

• Those by governments of the developing countries which are on the negative side of the digital divide. Individually and collectively, developing countries have been carrying on their own initiatives at bridging the digital divide, often taking into consideration efforts by other actors. In Africa, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) has spearheaded the continental efforts, which commenced in 1996. Under the guidance of UNECA, African countries agreed on the African Information Society Initiative (AISI) document (UNECA 1996), which was to be implemented in the countries

using what was called the National Information and Communication Infrastructure (NICI) framework. In 1999, the ECA convened the first African Development Forum, with the theme Globalisation and the Challenges of Information Age to Africa, to assess progress made in the implementation of AISI and to draw up new initiatives. As part of the preparation for the Forum, it commissioned a continent-wide assessment report on the ICT situation in each of the African countries. This report (UNECA 1999) showed that while there was some progress, much still remained to be done to leverage Africa into the information society (Ben Soltane 1999). The policy thrust of this document has now been largely incorporated into the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) under its Bridging the Information Divide section. So far, apart from the deployment of technology, which has seen the evolution of mobile networks in many African countries, the major area of activity at the national level has involved policy development and the building of capacity for regulation. The policy framework involves the liberalisation and privatisation of state monopolies. Many countries have liberalised the sector, some have ended state monopoly through the licensing of second national carriers, while others have ended state control through privatisation.

In spite of the many efforts and initiatives, the digital divide seems to be increasing rather than decreasing. Several reports (USIC 2000; Bridges.org 2001; OECD 2001, etc.) have shown that while there is a general improvement of connectivity globally, the rates are unequal across countries. The industrialised countries' networks are growing faster than those of the developing countries. This has seen the widening of the digital divide. For instance, a 2001 report of the OECD noted that the gap between America and Africa rose from a multiple of 267 in 1997 to a multiple of 540 by 2000.

A number of observers such as Howkins and Robert (1997), Mansell and Wehn (1998), Cogburn and Adeya (1999) tend to think that the digital divide will hardly ever be bridged. While Mansell and Wehn's modeling led them to conclude that it would take Africa about 100 years to reach the 1995 level of Ireland (1998:25), Howkins and Robert in their scenario building concluded that even the most optimistic of the four possible scenarios arrived at by the UNCSTD Scenario Building Workshop, the Networld, ends up with a world that is afflicted by poverty and deprivation. But they also draw the conclusion that the Networld is unlikely to happen because 'its causes and the circumstances that might lead to its coming into existence are fuzzy' (1997:46). Instead, they see more of the symptoms of the March of Follies, the worse of

the scenarios in the current reality. The March of Follies is based on a global community that is exclusive and fragmented.

A number of factors are implicated in the failure of these efforts to bridge the digital divide. First, there is the fact that fundamentally, the sector reforms that are taking place do not aim at bridging the gap but providing access to markets for the transnational corporations, which have seen their home markets becoming saturated relative to the virgin market of Africa and other developing areas. FDI goes to lucrative markets rather than where there is a need to promote universal access to ICTs. Secondly, and flowing from the first, there are the efforts to treat those countries that are on the negative side of the digital divide as essentially consumers of ICT goods and services. This will reproduce and perpetuate the digital divide rather than closing it. Without building a capacity for the production of ICT goods and services, they cannot hope to catch up with those countries that already have better access to ICTs, which they deploy to their economic advantage.

Thirdly, the digital divide is restrictively defined without taking into consideration the ownership and control of the networks. What does it mean that people have access to information or channels that they do not own – Citizens are provided access to channels over which they have no control. Increasingly also, they are offered content in which they have little or no real choice.

Fourthly, the bridging strategies tend to see the digital divide in isolation from the large development divide that characterised the world past and present. They ignore the fact that the digital divide is not just the lack of diffusion of ICTs, but both a structural problem and a product of historical phenomena, whose legacies are several other divides in relation to the developed and developing countries (Ya'u 2002). We have to realise that the digital divide is part of a larger social divide, which is at the core of imperialist relationships. To that extent, the digital divide can never be eliminated in isolation of this wider divide. This means that the question of access to ICTs should not be seen in isolation of the other development problems of Africa.

Fifthly, it is important to interrogate the grammar of bridging the digital divide. Bridging the digital divide rather than universalising access to ICTs implies that there is only one possible development trajectory, which is to retrace the steps taken by the industrialised countries. This is not only fallacious but also ignores the fact that the development of the telecommunication sector of the West and the corresponding underdevelopment of that of Africa and other Third World countries is a consequence of colonial conquest (Sy 1996). To the extent that Africa cannot colonise any other continent, it has to seek other paths to industrialisation.

Towards democratising access to ICTS: Concluding remarks

In Africa ICTs must be deployed to facilitate addressing the chronic develop-
ment problems that the continent is facing, such as access to education, good
healthcare services, good governance, and so on. But ICTs in themselves do
not provide these services. ICTs have to be deployed within a framework
that seeks improvement of the existential conditions of people, rather than
accepting the volume of international trade as the measure of development.
This is why the priority in Africa should be democratising access to ICTs
rather than some mirage of bridging the digital divide. Unfortunately, the
market alone cannot provide incentives for democratising access to ICTs.
The historical experience of the most connected countries of the world such
as Scandinavia and the USA shows that their high level of connectivity was
achieved largely by public investment rather than through the market. The
market took over only when the network had matured.

This is why the first requirement for making ICTs accessible to African
citizens and organisations is to challenge not only the content of WTO agree-
ments but also their legitimacy. African countries should resist making edu-
cation, health and knowledge tradable commodities. Africa needs the deve-
lopment state, and such a state cannot come into being under the market
orthodoxy of the WTO. It also needs a breathing space by curtailing the sweep-
ing powers of the WTO, which undermine the capacity of states for an inde-
pendent development policy-making agenda.

Secondly, African countries, along with other countries, need to demand
the reform of WTO towards a more democratic and open organisation. Its
structures should be representative of countries, while its decision making
processes should be transparent. Simultaneously, they have to put back the
mandates of UN development bodies, which the WTO is increasingly taking
over. For instance, the issues of intellectual property rights should return to
the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) where they are more
appropriate. They are not simply matters of trade, but part of humankind's
cumulative heritage.

Thirdly, there has to be a shift in what Dani Rodrik (2001:5) calls the
development mind-set in the WTO. One of these shifts is to allow for greater
autonomy by states in policy making. The other is to shift the focus of the
WTO from harmonising and reducing national institutional differences to
that of managing them.

The elements of such a strategy should include:

1. ICTs for Development: Much of the discussion about bridging the
digital divide treats access to ICTs as end on its own. For the developed
countries that are looking for markets to sell ICT goods and services, this is

understandable. For Africa however, access should only be a means to address Africa's development problems. This means that ICTs should be used for development purposes such as providing access to education, and healthcare services. In this context, it is important to realise that it does not make sense to have hospitals connected to the Internet when there are no drugs in the hospitals or schools that have no chairs to be connected to the Internet. We need to deploy ICTs creatively and appropriately to address our development needs. The Rowing Upstream Advisory Committee puts it nicely: 'In planning for and using ICTs, remember to emphasize what you want to accomplish with the technology, rather than the technology itself' (Levey and Young 2002:81).

2. Universal Access versus a Market-led ICT Sector: The reforms that WTO agreements have forced on developing countries is not only to liberalise the sector but also to seek the withdrawal of access to ICTs from the domain of public social provisioning to that of the market arena. This is in line with creating a conducive environment for investors to make profits. However, the market cannot promote universal access. Universal access for Africa is not only desirable but also a necessary condition for the deepening of democracy in the continent. This is because it is only when people are informed and have access to the means to communicate that they can participate in the decision making process in their society. Africa must remain committed to universal access through appropriate state subsidies to poorer citizens.

3. Who Owns the Local Networks? One of the myths of the Internet is that it is not owned by anybody. The truth is that there are those who own the means with which to access the Internet as well those who own the content. The question of content is already a hot issue under the rubrics of Intellectual Rights Protection. Current reforms being advocated by the industry giants would make it impossible even to read things on the Internet without paying for the content. The strategies of bridging the divide focus on allowing people to have access to the channels without a stake in the ownership of them. Liberalisation and privatisation are only handing over the sector to companies of the former colonial countries. The channels are not only means of communication but also a mechanism for control. Africa must therefore own its local networks.

4. Financing ICT Infrastructures: Having a stake in the ownership of the channels of communication means that Africa must find the funds to finance the deployment and building of adequate ICT infrastructures. Current practice relies on loans and FDI. Neither has produced good results. Instead, they tie the continent in a subordinate relationship to Western countries. Africa can finance ICT infrastructure by mobilising local resources, for instance, by

establishing an ICT development fund or bank. Africa is already saddled with the debt burden. Such a burden cannot allow for the speedy building of an adequate ICT infrastructure on the continent. This is why the debt question should be resolved quickly through either cancellation or repudiation.

5. Production of ICT goods and services: Africa must transcend its status as a consumer of ICT goods and services by engaging in their production. With respect to goods, it is generally accepted that the economies of scale, market proximity and capital demand will make individual national capability for production very difficult if not entirely impossible (Dedrick and Kraemer 2000). In such a case, Africa must engage in both regional and continental efforts, to pool resources, expertise and national endowments to achieve a continental production capacity. As for service production, this can be done simultaneously at the level of individual states and continentally. Content production is particularly critical but it is also easy to do. We need to provide content that is useful to our people and relevant to our development needs, represent Africa's cultures in an authentic manner, and be in a position to counter the homogenising tendency that globalisation promotes.

6. Education: Content production requires both skills and technical literacy in the use of ICTs. There is an increasing acceptance that the landscape of literacy has dramatically changed to include basic computer skills as part of the minimum education one requires to lead a meaningful and productive life. Thus in addition to democratising access to ICTs, citizens must be empowered to acquire the technical competence and skills for effective use of ICTs. Africa must therefore integrate ICT education at all levels of its educational system. It must also reinvent its educational system, and remain committed to state responsibility in the provision of education as a public good.

7. Promoting African Languages: Democratising access to ICTs requires more than technical literacy. It demands the ability of citizens not only to use content but also to generate it on their own. At the moment, much of the content on the Internet is in European languages, which are not understood by the majority of African citizens. This means that the content of the Internet is largely incomprehensible to them. At the same time, because there is little presence of African languages on the Internet, they cannot effectively participate in the generation of African content. There is therefore the need to promote the presence of African languages on the Internet so as to make it truly a meaningful development and information tool for all.

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L'Union africaine comme réponse africaine au défi de la mondialisation

Reine Djuidje Kouam*

Résumé

Cette étude nous mène dans le chantier très complexe de la construction régionale
en Afrique pour s'adapter à la mondialisation. Elle analyse l'Union africaine dans la
perspective des plus récentes initiatives et des stratégies africaines en réponse aux
enjeux nouvellement acquis par la mondialisation ainsi que les approches de
renforcement des mécanismes et de création d'institutions adaptées à celle-ci. Elle a
la préoccupation suivante: l'Union africaine (UA) est-elle une réponse adéquate au
processus de globalisation dont les paradigmes-clés sont intégration et
interdépendance? Autrement dit, est-ce que le simple fait de créer une nouvelle
institution est susceptible de doter le continent africain des moyens de juguler les
problèmes que pose la mondialisation dans le système international aujourd'hui ?
L'objectif de ce travail consiste à rendre compte de la dimension pragmatique de
l'UA. Il importe de repréciser la perception africaine des problèmes que pose la
mondialisation jumelée aux nouveaux éléments constitutifs des relations
internationales. Cette démarche implique de revenir sur l'environnement à la fois
global et continental de sa création; les objectifs que se sont fixés ses fondateurs et
les processus de sa mise en œuvre.

Abstract

This study deals with the construction of regional integretion as a tool for Africa to
better adapt to globalisation. It analyses the African Union, from the perspective of
the most recent African initiatives and strategies, created as a response to the new
stakes brought about by globalisation. It questions whether the African Union (AU)
is an appropriate response to the globalisation process, the key paradigms of which
are integration and interdependence? In other words, is the fact of creating an
institution enough to provide the African continent with the necessary means to
challenge the problems brought about by globalisation, within today's world
dispensation? The study attempts to present the pragmatic nature of the AU, bearing
in mind that globalisation-related issues as well as the new elements in international

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relations as seen through an African perspective. It argues that this understanding implies an analysis of both the global and continental context of the AU creation, as well as its implementation processes, and objectives of its founders.

Introduction générale

Cette étude nous situe dans les problématiques globales et contemporaines des phénomènes toujours plus complexes et complexifiés qui accompagnent la dynamique de la mondialisation depuis la fin de la bipolarité. L'économie politique de la mondialisation a fait ressortir parmi ses enjeux les déterminants politiques d'une rationalité économique conjuguée à une cohabitation dangereuse entre la logique politique et la suprématie du marché (Laroche 1997:265) dont l'influence sur l'organisation des sociétés a largement été prouvée. Elle tendrait alors à rendre caduque toute référence à l'État dont le rôle est de plus en plus sous-estimé. Progressivement, l'acteur étatique du système international tend à s'effacer et à se fondre dans les entités supérieures de type fédéral ou supranational, présumés plus efficaces pour surmonter un certain nombre de défis. C'est cette transformation des stratégies de regroupement que Laroche (1997:267) englobe dans le paradigme «convergence post-guerre froide» pour illustrer la complexification et la diversification du concept de partenariat et des rapports entre les acteurs plus significatifs de la coopération commerciale et économique sur la scène globale. Ils se sont mobilisés dans les jeux concurrentiels qui représentent une véritable gageure pour les États qui doivent réunir des conditions optimales pour prendre place au sein de ce dispositif par lequel ils seront cooptés ou rejetés selon le degré de convergence dont ils feront preuve.

L'accélération des processus de globalisation s'est accompagnée d'une intégration économique et d'une coopération institutionnelle; véritables défis pour l'État (Higgot 1999:21). Quelles que soient les relations entretenues par ces deux mouvements de mondialisation et de régionalisation, quels que soient les fondements (économique, sociologique, politique ou institutionnel) de cette tendance accrue et généralisée à la construction régionale, nul ne conteste l'idée que le pouvoir du marché s'est développé au détriment de l'autorité de l'État. De plus, en l'absence de structures satisfaisantes, le choix du niveau adéquat de gouvernement est une question qui n'admet plus une réponse unique (Coicaud 2001:256-308) comme au temps des alternatives médiévales contre le système westphalien moderne. Les États se sont ainsi de plus en plus tournés vers le développement de structures régionales. Même si ce processus a aussi généré son contraire, notamment la désintégration régionale (Ciroën 1999:25) comme c'est le cas par exemple en ex-URSS ou encore en ex-Tchécoslovaquie. Ces mouvements contradictoires posent cependant avec

une acuité renouvelée les problématiques récentes liées aux paradigmes composant le discours de la mondialisation et confrontant par le même temps l'État au concept d'interdépendance.

Le concept d'interdépendance est le «strict antonyme» (Badie 2001:26-31) du concept de souveraineté. Prolongeant une étude sur la place de l'État dans une structure mondiale bouleversée (Badie et Smouts 1992), il précise que l'interdépendance est devenue une exigence croissante aujourd'hui devant la dure réalité des pratiques politiques. Il ajoute que les manifestations de l'interdépendance s'apprécient à travers les nouvelles formes de réinvention des communautés politiques. Cette reconstruction du politique étant très souvent l'effet nécessaire du redéploiement face à la mondialisation des solidarités sociales et de la volonté de vivre ensemble. De ce point de vue, l'invention régionale participe de la même logique tout en s'affirmant plus novatrice. L'intégration dans les vastes régions du monde est aujourd'hui une façon de répondre au défi que représente la mondialisation et d'adapter les processus décisionnels et les choix collectifs à la dimension nouvellement acquise par les enjeux. Comme l'illustrent l'Alena, le Mercosur, l'Union européenne, l'APEC et d'autres structures régionales, elles redessinent par leur déploiement les espaces qui sont à la mesure des formes toujours novatrices d'interdépendance.

Cette réflexion se donne pour tâche de nous mener dans les sentiers très complexes de la construction régionale sur le continent africain en se proposant d'analyser les dynamiques de création d'une nouvelle institution continentale dans les perspectives des nouvelles formes d'interdépendance et de reconstruction régionale. L'Union africaine s'inscrit dès lors dans la lignée des récentes initiatives et des stratégies des dirigeants politiques pour répondre à la mondialisation et ses corollaires incontournables: recomposition des blocs régionaux; construction de grands ensembles économiques; réinvention des dynamiques d'intégration face aux stratégies toujours pragmatiques des regroupements régionaux. Un autre élément constructif est la progressive institution de la région comme niveau pertinent d'action pour tirer profit du Nouvel ordre économique international (NOEI) autorisé par la fin de la bipolarité à travers des approches pour le renforcement des mécanismes ou la création de nouveaux adaptés à celui-ci.

Quels que soient les avis qu'elle suscite et les controverses autour de sa portée, force est d'admettre qu'une réforme institutionnelle s'est bien déroulée au sein de l'OUA dont la mutation définitive résultera d'un double processus de refondation puis de substitution. Ce sont là des perspectives bien réelles inscrites dans les dynamiques des relations internationales africaines.

Ces dernières font du continent un ensemble géopolitique en mutation (Lacoste 2001:8 et suivantes) et aussi un sous-système régional (Braillard

1997:20) en redéfinition. Comme tous les autres États, les pays africains s'affirment comme pouvant se prévaloir de ce type de transformation. De fait, ils sont confrontés à la nécessité de renforcer leur sous-système continental. Ainsi, lorsque l'on considère le système international dans sa globalité, ne peut-on manquer d'être frappé par un certain nombre de changements qui ont caractérisé son évolution au cours des dix dernières années (Ramonet 1997:5). Bien plus, de nombreux pays membres de l'OUA se sont prononcés en faveur de la mutation de l'organisation panafricaine et certaines élites politiques se sont même assignées la difficile mission d'en créer une nouvelle (Yahmed 2001:6-7). Plusieurs projets convergent vers l'idée selon laquelle les stratégies d'insertion dans la mondialisation par la mise sur pied de mécanismes et de structures appropriés sont devenues un «impératif continental» (Rugumamu 2001:5). Ces préoccupations semblent devoir constituer le noyau dur des rationalités et des logiques chères aux réformateurs de l'OUA et fondateurs de l'Union africaine, au moment où est en train de s'opérer la reconstruction du continent de concert avec le monde. Il faut souligner que cette dynamique demeure profondément dépendante des processus de mise sur pied de cette nouvelle institution. Il s'agit des questions autour de la transition de l'OUA à l'UA. Cette dernière étant présentée comme idoine pour gérer ces nouvelles dynamiques tant au niveau continental qu'international.

Dès lors, notre préoccupation fondamentale est la suivante: l'Union africaine est-elle une réponse adéquate aux processus de globalisation dont les paradigmes clés sont interdépendance et intégration régionale? Autrement dit, est-ce que le simple fait de créer une nouvelle institution est susceptible de doter le continent des moyens de juguler les problèmes que pose la mondialisation dans le système international aujourd'hui?

Nous aborderons la recherche des réponses à ces interrogations selon les perspectives néo-institutionnalistes (Higgot 1999) telles qu'utilisées pour une analyse du régionalisme en Asie. Il aborde l'intégration régionale sous un angle à la fois idéologique et institutionnel. Cette approche a le mérite de faire ressortir le rôle des idées et des institutions dans tout processus régional. Il procède en s'interrogeant sur les relations entretenues par ces deux dynamiques idéologiques et institutionnelles. Ainsi donc, les processus de construction régionale sont constitués de cette double dynamique que nous nous proposons d'élucider au cours de notre analyse de l'Union africaine. Cela implique de revenir sur les motivations des acteurs et la trajectoire de développement des structures en gestation.

L'objectif de notre étude revient, dès lors, à procéder à une sorte d'évaluation préliminaire; les observations de même que les conclusions auxquelles nous aurons à faire référence ayant forcément un caractère temporaire. De fait, les processus décrits et les dynamiques évaluées passent

encore par une phase continue de changement, au moment où nous les examinons. Il serait prématuré d'émettre un quelconque jugement définitif. L'objectif est bien plutôt celui d'une réflexion critique sur les récents développements traduisant le désir et la volonté politique des dirigeants du continent de doter celui-ci d'un nouveau mécanisme de coopération afin de lui permettre d'assurer pleinement le rôle qu'ils estiment être le sien sur la scène mondiale en ce XXIe siècle (ordre du jour du sommet extraordinaire de l'OUA à Syrte en septembre 1999). L'analyse qui va suivre s'appuie sur l'observation des efforts récemment accomplis pour renforcer les structures de l'OUA et surtout la remplacer par une nouvelle plate-forme (UA) de collaboration plus étroite entre les États du continent et plus bénéfique avec le reste du monde.

On le comprend, le temps de la transition est un moment hybride qui fait du continent un système régional inédit. Il nous revient la délicate tâche de rendre compte de cet entre-deux institutionnel, sujet à toutes les interprétations de la part d'acteurs, d'analystes et même d'observateurs de tout bord. Le temps de la mutation se caractérise aussi par des contradictions, des avancées et des reculades qu'il importe d'appréhender dans ses diverses dimensions historiques, idéologiques, politiques et institutionnelles. Il a aussi un caractère atemporel qui rend hasardeux tout découpage chronologique. C'est très souvent le cas au cours des périodes de changement, car il s'agit bien de changement institutionnel.

Il faut bien le reconnaître, l'étude de la création de l'UA pose un certain nombre de problèmes dans la discipline des relations internationales, en termes de mutation d'une institution et de succession d'organisations internationales. Il s'agit de situer les problématiques dans une perspective institutionnaliste au-delà des réticences sur le caractère performatif de l'idée d'unité africaine; la force unificatrice des idéaux et discours panafricanistes ou encore la dimension pragmatique de l'engagement des dirigeants. Il s'agit de revenir sur les controverses doctrinales autour des phénomènes de changement institutionnel (Ruggie 1998), du développement de celles-ci et du poids des acteurs sur elles (Hall et Taylor 1997) afin de marquer une distance scientifique par rapport aux aberrations telles que l'UA ne serait qu'une OUA-bis. Il semble de plus en plus incongru d'accréditer de telles thèses, basées sur des postulats selon lesquels une institution ne peut pas changer. Elles se poursuivent en soutenant que la mutation de l'OUA ne serait limitée qu'à un changement de dénomination; un jeu sémantique (OUA / UA); une jonglerie de sigle où le «O» disparaît pour mettre en exergue le «UA». C'est là une conception simpliste, culturaliste et marginalisante selon laquelle l'étude qui nous occupe n'aurait jamais eu lieu. L'important demeure finalement cet entre-deux

institutionnel, période transitoire entre les deux organisations, porteuse des rationalités de mutation de l'une d'elles parmi lesquelles la mondialisation.

Nous adhérons à la thèse du changement de l'OUA. À bien des égards, l'environnement d'une institution peut cumuler les logiques conditionnant sa transformation. Il s'agit des facteurs dominants tels que ses acteurs, les enjeux et les objectifs à la base des nouveaux mécanismes et instruments élaborés en son sein. Plusieurs organisations internationales nous ont montré l'exemple dans leur quête de légitimité face aux dynamiques complexifiées de la globalisation (Heiskanen 2001:1-44). Pourquoi en irait-il autrement pour l'OUA? Cette thèse peut aisément lui être applicable dans la mesure où les évènements tendent à prouver que malgré les scepticismes, les polémiques doctrinales, les résistances politiques, l'inertie apparente, l'immobilisme bureaucratique, l'OUA s'est effectivement transformée et a été remplacée par l'UA au terme d'un processus de transition. Ces faits forcent notre admiration, aiguisent notre esprit scientifique et apportent quelques éléments de support à la thèse que nous défendons.

L'intérêt de cette étude réside dans le fait que l'institution qui fait l'objet de notre problématique demeure embryonnaire et en cours de construction. L'Union africaine est une entité dont il faut comprendre, du moins tenter de saisir les moments de naissance, la nécessité à laquelle elle entend répondre et le processus par lequel elle est entrain d'être instaurée. Il s'agit de saisir au vol comment et sous l'effet de quelles forces elle fait son chemin. L'enjeu ici est de mettre en exergue les ambiguïtés, les tensions et les compromis de cette période intermédiaire. D'où la pertinence du continuum «rigidité / fluidité» (Sindjoun 2002:7) dans cette dynamique des relations internationales africaines dont il n'est question ni de début, ni de fin. C'est un entre-deux institutionnel marqué d'incertitudes de toutes sortes, mais aussi des stratégies de démarcation et de différenciation de la nouvelle organisation continentale voulant échapper à ce qu'il est désormais convenu d'appeler «La malédiction de l'OUA» tout en conservant les leçons de ses quarante ans d'expérience dans la diplomatie africaine.

Il importe d'étudier la création de l'Union africaine en gardant à l'esprit ces considérations théoriques, mais aussi en adoptant une approche opératoire qui sied à l'étude du régionalisme. Pour rendre compte de la dimension pragmatique de celui-ci en Afrique, cette étude repose sur deux pistes de recherche:

1. La détermination du système d'idées ayant mené à la création d'une nouvelle organisation continentale en termes du rôle des idées et des concepts qui sous-tendent le changement politique dans le système régional qui

nous occupe. Ceux-ci étant le produit de son environnement immédiat et lointain.

2. La mise en exergue du développement des structures qui posent des préalables importants pour la còmpréhension des perspectives et des limites du processus de création d'un nouveau mécanisme de gestion de la coopération et de coordination de la région en Afrique.

L'environnement de la création de l'Union africaine: de l'évolution de l'intégration régionale aux aspirations vers une nouvelle organisation continentale

L'analyse de l'économie politique de la mondialisation établit un rapport étroit entre les mouvements de globalisation et de régionalisation, le second mouvement étant peu à peu considéré comme accompagnant le premier. Cette tendance a consacré l'environnement international et continental de la création de l'Union africaine.

L'environnement international: la consécration de la région dans le discours de la mondialisation

Nous choisissons, ici, d'évacuer les débats dialectiques entre la régionalisation et la mondialisation dans le but de retenir les relations qu'elles entretiennent et qui ont abouti à l'émergence du niveau régional et l'institution de la région comme niveau pertinent d'action.

La mondialisation et l'émergence du niveau régional

Les analyses des phénomènes de la mondialisation et de la régionalisation montrent que le discours du premier en remettant en cause la légitimité de l'État met ainsi en exergue le rôle des régions. Le développement des structures régionales a acquis une grande importance à travers les nouvelles dynamiques de construction des blocs régionaux dont certains tendent à s'imposer comme modèles dominants (Castells 1993:15-44).

1- La construction de la région

Il n'existe aucune définition facile de la région et les critères varient selon les questions concernées et selon les acteurs dominants d'un groupe donné de pays considérés, à un moment donné, comme étant leurs priorités politiques. La région se définit traditionnellement par la proximité et par une série de caractéristiques historiques, linguistiques et culturelles communes. On s'y réfère en tant qu'ensemble géopolitique, sous-système régional, système international régional ou encore système tout court. Cependant, il peut aussi y avoir des déterminants structurels de la coopération régionale. Finalement,

les régions sont des entités socialement construites (Higgot 1999:23), c'est-
à-dire que leur affirmation repose sur des mesures politiques et sociales.

Chaque pays espère trouver au niveau d une union au sein d'une structure
régionale un pouvoir d'influence qui n'est plus accessible à l'échelle nationale,
du fait de «la motivation du rôle de l'État en tant qu'acteur dominant du système
international, car il est confronté à l'émergence d'autorités concurrentes».
Parmi eux notons des acteurs mondiaux tels que le Fonds Monétaire Interna-
tional, la Banque mondiale et l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce.
L'accélération des processus de mondialisation dans les années 80 s'est
accompagnée d'un retour en grâce des associations régionales et au ralliement
inédit des États-Unis aux zones de libre échange (ALENA). En 1995, tous
les membres fondateurs de l'OMC (sauf le Japon) déclaraient adhérer à au
moins un accord régional (OMC 1995). Le regroupement des économies
régionales est considéré comme une tendance lourde qui accompagnait la
mondialisation en le complétant et en l'aménageant surtout par rapport à
l'absence de consensus au sein de l'OMC pour mettre à jour ses règles de
loyauté.

La volonté de les consolider va au-delà ou autrement que dans l'OMC est
souvent un préalable à l'ouverture, celle-ci étant aisément plus satisfaite au
niveau régional qu'au niveau multilatéral (Ciroën 1999:27).

2 - L'imposition de modèles dominants

Ainsi, la régionalisation s'est illustrée par l'évolution de l'Union européenne,
de l'Accord de Libre Echange Nord-Américain (ALENA), de l'APEC, du
MERCOSUR, du CARICOM ou divers autres exercices de coopération
économique régionale accrue parmi lesquels les économistes ont opéré des
distinctions et ont consacré des modèles dominants de régionalisme fermé
(UE) et de régionalisme ouvert (APEC).

Le premier modèle vise la libération partielle pour un grand marché
protégé, mais qui est renforcée par une hiérarchie de pouvoir centralisé et un
régime interne commun fondé sur des règles et dirigé par des structures
institutionnelles solides dont les objectifs sont tant socio politiques
qu'économiques. En face de l'architecture européenne (Irondelle 2001:29-
30) des modèles concurrents (Laroche 1997:225) dont l'APEC et le
régionalisme ouvert. Ce dernier cherche à éviter tout formalisme institutionnel
et la libéralisation des échanges entre ses membres résulte d'un processus de
multilatéralisme concerté.

Ces pratiques ont contribué à ramener dans le cadre de la région la
résolution des problèmes à dimension globale.

La région comme niveau pertinent d'action

La mondialisation a conduit les États à introduire des politiques de régionalisation et à construire des structures de coordination des politiques régionales afin de recomposer de grands ensembles économiques et de gérer les rapports entre les divers blocs régionaux.

1- La recomposition des grands ensembles économiques

La tendance à la régionalisation est considérée comme un intermédiaire dans les relations entre l'État et l'économie mondiale (Higgot 1999:22).

Dans ce cadre, la coopération entre les États peut prendre plusieurs formes telles que des engagements commerciaux assez informels ou des accords institutionnels plus ou moins contraignants. Ayant eu pour effet de modifier les règles du jeu de la concurrence entre entreprises, au sein d'un même pays ou sur les marchés internationaux, la mondialisation a constitué une incitation à la régionalisation, par les acteurs publics ou privés. Elle a conduit les États à introduire des politiques d'intégration pour accroître la crédibilité des membres d'une région vis-à-vis d'acteurs externes, en particulier des investisseurs potentiels. La conclusion d'accords avec des pays voisins entraîne une discipline en matière de politique économique, se heurtant souvent à l'opposition nationale.

Cependant, ces processus ne se déroulent pas de manière uniforme. Il faut distinguer l'Europe avec l'accélération de l'intégration dans son espace unifié, l'Amérique du Nord avec les déséquilibres maîtrisés de l'Alena et la région Asie-pacifique avec son intégration pragmatique et informelle (Laroche 1997:222-239).

2 - Les enjeux des partenariats inter régionaux

Ces régions ont compris la nécessité de stimuler l'intégration régionale pour persuader les entreprises mondiales de leurs mérites spécifiques par rapport aux autres. Ceci à travers la pratique du partenariat concurrentiel (Koechlin 1992:992-100) pour se positionner au-delà des autres en tant que site d'investissement.

Les régions les plus avancées détournent ainsi une grande partie des flux d'IDE (Investissements Directs Etrangers) à leur seul profit (Frank 1991). La mondialisation diminue l'efficacité des mesures nationales non efficaces face à la concurrence internationale. La régionalisation est devenue un élément essentiel de cet environnement en permettant d'attirer les entreprises. L'échelon régional paraît plus pertinent. Ainsi, les espoirs sont placés, en théorie, dans une communauté de vue dans les domaines politique, économique et socioculturel. Il y a des raisons d'ordre pratique de croire qu'il faut traiter les problèmes mondiaux d'abord à l'échelle régionale comme dans les régions

de l'UE, des États-Unis et d'Asie où ces communautés sont plus ou moins récentes (Higgot 1999:23).

L'expérience récente de la construction régionale dans ces zones corrobore l'affirmation selon laquelle les idées sont à la base des facteurs et des programmes susceptibles d'étayer notre compréhension de la construction régionale plus que par le passé et dans d'autres régions du monde telles que l'Afrique.

L'environnement continental: la nouvelle perception des enjeux de l'intégration régionale

Une analyse de la construction régionale en Afrique montre des tentatives d'arrimage à la convergence globale vers le système d'idées dominant qui sous-tend le changement dans d'autres régions du monde. Ces idées tirent leur force épistémologique d'une forme convergente d'idéologie néo-libérale et semblent constituer la base politico-idéologique des décisions politiques sur les questions de coopération régionale. Ainsi, dans le continent africain, elles se sont traduites par des programmes et des initiatives pour revisiter le discours économique de l'OUA et améliorer la place de l'Afrique dans le partenariat global (Miyando 2001:245-253).

L'évolution du discours économique de l'OUA

Sur le continent africain, le discours de l'OUA sur les questions économiques reflète dès 1990 la prise en compte des enjeux du nouvel ordre économique international (NOEI). On constate en même temps l'affirmation d'un engagement politique en faveur de la promotion d'une culture de la régionalisation en Afrique et le renforcement des structures sous-régionales existantes.

1-La promotion d'une nouvelle culture de la régionalisation en Afrique

Ces positions ont résulté non seulement de l'identification des intérêts de l'Afrique et de ses peuples, mais aussi du constat d'échec des initiatives d'intégration sur le continent.

Les précédents programmes pour le renforcement de la culture de l'intégration adoptés par l'OUA ont constitué les stratégies de développement du continent dès la décennie 70. Ils avaient toujours été engagés dans le sens de la construction des idées, des visions unanimes et la définition d'une identité régionale pertinente. Parmi ces projets, on peut évoquer la Déclaration de Monrovia (1979); le Plan d'Action de Lagos (1980), la Déclaration d'Addis-Abeba (1990) et le Traité d'Abuja (1991) qui visaient tous la mise sur pied d'une Communauté économique africaine afin de sortir le continent du sous-développement. Toutefois, force est de reconnaître que malgré l'ambition affichée par tous ces plans, qui ont réussi à identifier les vertus de l'intégration

et à illustrer une réelle volonté politique, leurs réalisations sont demeurées limitées (Anyang'Nyong'o 1990:3-13; Carthy 1999:1249). L'historiographie des projets d'intégration depuis le début des années 90 fait ressortir plus d'obstacles que d'avancées.

Des analyses abondantes et enrichissantes ont déjà été consacrées aux problèmes de l'intégration dans le développement économique de l'Afrique. Elles sont unanimes pour reconnaître que malgré les échecs des initiatives passées, ces obstacles peuvent être surmontés (Rugumamu 2001:21-25). Ces obstacles sont notamment: les divergences idéologiques, les égoïsmes nationaux, l'opportunisme des acteurs, le laxisme des institutions et des ad-ministrations, la pauvreté en infrastructures de base, l'absence d'opérateurs économiques efficaces et dynamiques et enfin, des secteurs économiques dualistes et désarticulés. Il ne nous appartient plus de revenir sur ces écueils, mais de nous attacher à une analyse temporelle qui met en avant les nouvelles dynamiques de l'intégration en Afrique. Elle est devenue un passage obligé pour le continent s'il veut son insertion dans le partenariat économique planétaire à travers le renforcement des structures sous-régionales existantes.

2- La promotion d'un nouveau type de régionalisation
Pour les membres de l'OUA, les nouveaux types de régionalisme illustrés par les relations entre les entités de la Triade (UE/USA/Japon) considérée comme les trois principaux pôles du commerce et des échanges internationaux sont une bonne chose sur le plan normatif. En conséquence, les nouvelles tendances du régionalisme constituent le discours dominant sur la construction de la région économique en Afrique. Le traité instituant la Communauté économique africaine est entré en vigueur en 1994 et le paragraphe 8 de la Déclaration de Syrte demande aux États africains d'accélérer sa mise en œuvre. Ces nouvelles dynamiques naissent de la volonté des leaders politiques de renforcer les mécanismes de coopération. Face à la non-réalisation des objectifs et des programmes de coopération entre l'OUA et les Communautés économiques régionales (CER), il est apparu évident que leur mise en œuvre nécessitait une nouvelle approche (Aly 1994:69-70). En effet, certaines communautés sous-régionales se révèlent plus avancées que d'autres. C'est le cas de la CEDEAO en Afrique occidentale et de la SADC en Afrique australe (Lipalile 2001:303). Promouvoir un nouveau type de régionalisme signifiait dès lors renforcer ces mécanismes, encourager l'ouverture des pays sur la région pour élargir l'espace économique afin de faire face à la faible coopération entre les communautés et résoudre le problème de la coordina-tion de la pléthore d'institutions sous-régionales (Rugumamu 2001:22) qui sont plus un obstacle qu'un tremplin de son insertion dans la mondialisation (Collier 1998:147-181) ayant pourtant des effets inévitables sur son économie.

L'aménagement de la place de l'Afrique dans le partenariat global

De nouvelles dynamiques se sont inscrites dans le sens de la prise de conscience du poids insignifiant de l'Afrique dans les processus de globalisation et d'engagement en faveur de l'établissement d'un mécanisme pour gérer ces processus au niveau du continent.

1- La place de l'Afrique dans le partenariat global

Cette prise de conscience cherche à reconsidérer le rôle de l'Afrique au prochain millénaire et initie des rencontres de l'OUA depuis la moitié des années 90 jusqu'en septembre 1999, date de la réunion déterminante de Syrte en Libye.

Il s'agit pour le continent d'établir un nouveau partenariat stratégique dans le but de réduire la dépendance du continent par rapport au «binôme aide-crédit» (Cardoso 1993:149-159) et de redéfinir les politiques de coopération. La guerre froide a laissé en héritage une aide inefficace en partie sous forme de prêts qui se sont accumulés pour constituer une dette importante. Nous ne reviendrons pas sur le contexte et le profil de l'aide, son influence et ses conséquences, les effets de sa sélectivité, l'inefficacité des mécanismes de prestation de l'aide, ainsi que les tentatives infructueuses pour qu'elle favorise le développement (nouvelle approche, redéfinition de son concept et restructuration de ses mécanismes). Toujours est-il que la formule traditionnelle de la coopération a montré ses limites depuis des décennies. Il en est de même du poids de l'Afrique dans les échanges (Yeats *et al.* 1996:38-41), la globalisation des investissements (Koechlin 1995:92-100) avec les partenaires étrangers membres de la triade ou non (Griffin 1991:645-685). Nul ne conteste la marginalisation du continent dans les flux économiques et financiers internationaux.

Ces dernières années, on a assisté à une «déconnexion progressive de l'Afrique de l'économie mondiale» (OCDE 2002:1). Bien plus, la chute de la part de l'Afrique s'est maintenue sur une courbe déclinante. Entre 1980 et 2000, sa part du PIB mondial a diminué d'un tiers, marginalisant le continent dans le processus de globalisation. Sa part dans le commerce mondial et dans les Investissements Directs Etrangers est en régression depuis ces 20 dernières années. Le taux de croissance du continent ne suffira pas à faire reculer la pauvreté au prochain millénaire ni à améliorer sa place dans le commerce international. La baisse des IDE en direction du continent a impliqué une division de sa part par 2 entre les années 70 et 80, et encore une division par 2 dans les années 90 (OCDE 2002:2). L'Afrique est considérée comme n'ayant pas participé au mouvement de la mondialisation qui s'est caractérisé par une délocalisation accélérée des investissements industriels dans les pays émergents. Elle a donc aujourd'hui accumulé un retard très

important par rapport à la mondialisation des investissements, qui contribue aussi à expliquer son déclin dans le commerce international.

Cependant, la domination que les États-Unis exercent en Afrique, la zone Euro et le Japon complexifie la conjoncture à laquelle l'Afrique doit faire face et pose le problème de structures adéquates.

2- L'établissement d'un mécanisme continental pour gérer ce contexte
Il s'est exprimé dans les aspirations vers une nouvelle approche institutionnelle à la hauteur de ces nouveaux enjeux. Il s'est agi dans un premier temps de moderniser l'OUA afin de l'adapter au niveau international (Wembou 1995:227-335) avant des propositions pour une mutation profonde.

L'extension des partenariats de la Triade vers l'Europe de l'Est, la Méditerranée, les pays d'Asie du Sud-Est et l'Amérique latine a posé pour le continent africain la nécessité de disposer d'un mécanisme pouvant favoriser sa participation dans les forums internationaux tels que l'OMC et de faire front aux ingérences des institutions économiques et financières internationales (FMI, BM). Ceci dans le but de mettre sur pied une stratégie collective, dynamique et concertée. L'enjeu est ici le désir de dépasser l'histoire conflictuelle et controversée de l'implication des dirigeants dans la politique du continent. Ces initiatives résultent largement de la remontée d'un sens de l'identité régionale. On peut aussi considérer que les projets de renforcement de l'OUA illustrent l'émergence, à l'échelle de la région Afrique, du dialogue politique aspirant à faire de l'organisation continentale le cadre redynamisé de définition et d'orientation de la politique économique régionale pour les siècles à venir. Ces stratégies semblent présenter des réponses reposant largement sur une conception panafricaniste de l'intérêt du continent. Ainsi, l'un des effets de la mondialisation a justement été de faire évoluer un dialogue africain solide sur la place de l'Afrique dans la coopération internationale.

Ce dialogue a pu être illustré par les différentes réformes qui ont eu lieu au sein de l'OUA. Il s'agissait pour les divers acteurs de traduire au niveau institutionnel l'idée de construire une nouvelle communauté dirigeante forte, de plus en plus convaincue du bien-fondé des principes de la construction régionale et son intérêt à la fois national et continental. Ils se sont aussi montrés convaincus que:

- il serait essentiel de se recomposer au sein d'une institution pour soutenir la crédibilité des réformes et le respect des normes mondiales;
- l'Afrique dispose de structures pour la diffusion de ces normes qui sont en voie de devenir des préalables pour l'accès aux marchés des pays développés;

- l'Afrique a besoin d'un moyen pour concourir à la formulation de ces normes.

C'est ainsi que l'OUA est passée par une série de réformes institutionnelles avec à la base, la nécessité de mieux coordonner les efforts des États membres afin de mieux faire entendre leur voix sur le plan international en mettant l'accent sur la construction régionale. L'émergence des perspectives communes sur la notion du rôle de la région peut être considérée comme le coup d'accélérateur des réformes commencées en 1990. Ces réformes sont cependant demeurées limitées et insuffisantes car tributaires des structures internes de l'organisation (Kamto *et al.* 1994:252) et de ses pays membres. Ce fut le cas pour la décision d'assainir les finances en 1990, la mise en place d'un mécanisme de gestion des conflits en 1993, la décision de condamner les coups d'État en 1999, jusqu'à la décision de transformer l'OUA en 1999. C'est ainsi qu'est né le projet de l'Union africaine en septembre de la même année, issu des propositions des acteurs majeurs d'un nouveau courant réformateur en faveur de la création d'une nouvelle organisation continentale.

Les processus de création de l'Union africaine: implication des acteurs gouvernementaux/étatiques

Le processus de création d'une nouvelle organisation à l'échelle du continent a vu l'implication d'acteurs étatiques en la personne de certains leaders politiques dont les initiatives visaient la refondation complète de l'OUA et sa transformation lors d'une session extraordinaire de l'ancienne organisation à Syrte (Libye) en septembre 1999 où la décision fut prise de créer une Union africaine. Celle-ci s'est opérée après une phase politique et une phase créatrice.

Le processus de conception de l'Union africaine: enjeux de puissance

La phase politique de la création de l'Union africaine a donné lieu aux approches de réinvention du concept d'unité africaine. Il est devenu générateur d'une «nouvelle modernité originale» (Mattelart 1995) diffusée dans les discours de la reconstruction africaine; expression de la volonté des dirigeants et des élites de se reconstruire autour d'un véritable projet de société mais aussi de création d'une institution de coordination des politiques régionales en Afrique. Ce processus de conception a vu les manifestations des manœuvres des acteurs, qui en ont fait un enjeu de puissance symbolique et hégémonique à l'image du clivage maximaliste/minimaliste (Maloka 2001:3).

Le processus d'élaboration: réinterprétation et réappropriation des discours du panafricanisme

Le courant réformateur, dont l'OUA a été traversée avec pour instigateur le leader libyen, a été animé par d'autres dirigeants politiques en faveur de la mutation de l'organisation continentale. Ainsi, aux origines de l'OUA se trouvent les diverses réinterprétations de l'idée d'unité africaine. Diverses logiques ont caractérisé ces redéfinitions du panafricanisme. Néanmoins, notre schéma d'analyse basera sa lecture sur deux approches, qui s'avèrent significatives à notre sens. Il s'agit des conceptions libyenne et sud-africaine.

1- Les États-Unis d'Afrique ou le projet fédérateur du colonel Kadhafi

Lors du sommet extraordinaire qu'il avait convoqué à Syrte, le colonel Mouammar Kadhafi avait dévoilé son grand projet des États-Unis d'Afrique en s'inspirant du rêve panafricain de Kwame Nkrumah pour prôner une approche fédérative à la construction de l'unité du continent avec, en filigrane, le positionnement de la Libye comme locomotive.

Perçu comme une «dangereuse illusion» (Laraoui 2000:22-25) ou encore taxé de «quaddafiades», le projet de Kadhafi voulait se montrer pragmatique par ses préoccupations exprimées et discutées à Syrte autour du thème «comment renforcer la capacité de l'Afrique à faire face aux défis du nouveau millénaire». Selon lui, il fallait prendre les idéaux fondamentaux du panafricanisme et leur assigner de nouvelles connotations et de nouveaux objectifs. «J'ai étudié le mouvement panafricaniste, j'ai examiné les textes de l'OUA et de la Communauté économique africaine: je n'ai rien à y ajouter et ne demande que l'accélération de leur mise en œuvre» (Ouazani 1999:11-14). Il l'avait déjà dévoilé quelques mois plus tôt à Alger. Ses postulats fondamentaux sont puisés des idées de Nkrumah. Ses percées interprétatives du panafricanisme maximaliste demeurent fidèles à ses antécédents idéologiques au sein du groupe de Casablanca depuis 1961. Il a fait du mot d'ordre de Nkrumah «l'Afrique doit s'unir» et son projet des États-Unis d'Afrique, les paradigmes mobilisateurs de son discours. Il s'en est approprié peu à peu pour soutenir ses thèses de complot et de domination de la race noire dont il parle dans son fameux Livre Vert qui a prévalu lors de la création de l'OUA.

Le projet fédérateur de Kadhafi était donc semblable à celui de Nkrumah. Pour ce dernier, le continent africain devait se doter d'une nationalité, d'un drapeau, d'un emblème et d'un hymne communs. La future union devait disposer d'une politique étrangère et de défense communes. Le parlement panafricain devait être doté de pouvoirs législatifs. Il déclarait que l'unité était le seul moyen de tenir tête au colonisateur. Kadhafi ajoute que «ce n'est pas une question d'optimisme ou de pessimisme. Nous voulons que l'Afrique

soit un acteur majeur du troisième millénaire, au même titre que les États-Unis ou au moins l'Union européenne». Cependant, cette idée d'une organisation supranationale a vu la contribution et les propositions d'autres chefs d'État dont celles de Thabo Mbeki. L'approche libyenne a été suivie d'une intense activité diplomatique du colonel Kadhafi pour replacer la Libye sur la scène internationale et continentale (De Salies 2001:9).

2 - *La renaissance africaine et le projet intégrateur du président Mbeki*
Le président sud-africain a proposé sa propre vision de l'Union africaine en tant que projet intégrateur fondé sur les idéaux de la «renaissance africaine» pour la reconstruction de l'unité du continent avec l'Afrique du Sud comme symbole.

Le discours de la renaissance africaine, élaboré par Thabo Mbeki dans l'espace national et politique de l'Afrique du Sud a, par ses initiatives, peu à peu dépassé le cadre sud-africain. Il cherche ainsi à contribuer à la production d'un espace de sens qui soit propre au continent africain et à réinventer l'héritage du nationalisme noir en l'investissant de la mission de construction de l'union de l'Afrique. «L'homme de la renaissance africaine» cherche à produire un «imaginaire régional africain» (Crouzel 2000:172) dont la future organisation sera la représentation institutionnelle. S'inspirant d'éléments puisés dans les discours philosophiques du passé sur le panafricanisme, la négritude, l'Ubuntu et la conscience noire (Khumalo 1998:15), Thabo Mbeki a formé ce paradigme de ralliement. Dans une définition très large, elle renvoie à un renouveau de l'Afrique en termes de démocratisation et de développement économique et culturel. Elle vise à construire un nouveau monde africain fait de démocratie, de paix, de stabilité, de développement durable et de vie meilleure pour le peuple, d'absence de racisme et de sexisme, d'égalité entre nations et d'un système de gouvernance international qui soit juste et équitable (Mbeki 1998). À ce titre, il proclamait lors de son investiture que «le XXIe siècle sera africain» (Mbeki 1999). La traduction de la renaissance africaine en concepts et en programmes politiques va commencer par les orientations de la politique étrangère de Mbeki (Dolbeau 2000:3) pour faire peu à peu entrer le terme dans le discours politique continental puis international. Pari qu'il décidera de remporter avec le NEPAD et le MAP (Weisbrot 2000:30-31). Cette rhétorique est donc fortement marquée par des concepts économiques car l'approche mbekienne réinterprète l'imaginaire panafricain traditionnel pour l'articuler à l'environnement actuel de la mondialisation. Il s'inspire pour cela de la renaissance asiatique et du miracle économique de l'Asie du Sud-Est avec qui il trouve un destin commun avec l'Afrique.

La référence à l'unité africaine comme l'un des buts de la renaissance montre que pour Mbeki, «Le temps de l'Afrique est arrivé» et «on ne peut parler de la renaissance africaine sans se projeter à la fois dans le passé et

dans l'avenir». Et ceci pour des questions aussi bien économiques que politiques. Selon lui, les États doivent créer des conditions favorables à la coopération et à l'intégration de leurs économies (Vilakazi 1997:11). L'enjeu ici est la restauration de l'image du continent qui nécessite un engagement individuel et collectif. C'est l'opportunité qu'offre l'Union africaine par les principes politiques qu'elle voudrait promouvoir. Elle remet en cause le principe de la souveraineté nationale au profit d'une souveraineté continentale. Le discours de la renaissance africaine est une composante de la politique de l'image de Pretoria qui lui a permis d'opérer un recentrage progressif sur le continent et le renforcement de son statut sur la scène internationale (Pascal 2000:15). Elle participe de la construction de l'Afrique du Sud comme puissance pédagogique (Sindjoun 2002:205). Pretoria se fait le chantre d'une reconstitution, le symbole et l'exemple des propositions économiques et politiques diffusées par Mbeki.

Parler au nom de l'Afrique ou alors parler pour l'Afrique est un enjeu de puissance symbolique (Afrique du Sud) et de puissance hégémonique (Libye) comme le montreront les assises de Lomé.

Le processus d'adoption de l'acte constitutif de l'Union africaine: controverse et compromis entre les architectes de la nouvelle organisation

L'acte constitutif de l'Union africaine a été adopté à Lomé lors du 36e sommet de l'OUA en juillet 2000. Cette phase institutionnelle s'est caractérisée par une dynamique fluctuante et oscillante entre implication profonde et passionnée, participation partielle, présence indifférente, oppositions farouches et constats d'absences. Les assises de Lomé ont aussi été marquées par les divergences sur l'architecture de l'Union africaine.

1 - Les divergences de Lomé: luttes de leadership et manœuvres d'appropriation

Au-delà de la rémanence des dissonances interprétatives de l'Union, de ses principes, de sa forme et de ses structures, Lomé a laissé entrevoir des empoignades et des divisions qui ont mené à un compromis.

On le sait, dans les années 1950-1960, le Ghana assurait le leadership idéologique en Afrique grâce à l'emprise de son président sur les énoncés majeurs du panafricanisme. Cependant, plus de quarante ans plus tard, le vide ghanéen n'a pas été véritablement comblé surtout lorsqu'on parle de revisiter les idéaux qui lui étaient chers. Le bras de fer pour le leadership moral s'est déroulé entre Thabo Mbeki avec son concept de «renaissance africaine» et le colonel Mouammar Kadhafi avec son projet des «États-Unis d'Afrique» (Mbeki 1998). À Lomé, chacun voulait s'attacher l'auréole qui est

toujours liée au concept d'union continentale dans l'esprit africain (Amaïzo 2001:98) et qui confère le statut «d'oracle du panafricanisme» (Sindjoun 2002:205) et de père fondateur de la nouvelle institution panafricaine.

Le leader libyen proposait une union de type fédéral à l'américaine. Il caressait aussi l'espoir d'assurer la présidence de cette union fédérale qu'il estimait lui revenir de droit (Garbi 2002:12-21). En face de lui, d'autres proposaient une forme confédérale très souple d'union. Du fait de cette vision floue et imprécise, l'OUA s'est répartie en deux grands groupes, mis à part les pays absents au cours des débats.

Un premier groupe de pays avait refusé de signer l'Acte constitutif le 12 juillet 2002. Il s'agissait des pays qui n'avaient pas d'obligation, ni de liens particuliers et certainement pas de dépendance financière vis-à-vis de la Libye qui avait relancé l'idée de l'Union africaine totale et immédiate. Certains ont aussi voulu témoigner leur désapprobation pour ce projet qu'ils estimaient précipité (Afrique du Sud, Égypte, Érythrée, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Ouganda, Mauritanie, Rwanda, Tunisie, Zambie, Zimbabwe, Gabon).

Le deuxième groupe se composait de pays ayant adhéré au principe de l'union mais avaient estimé nécessaire de recentrer l'approche libyenne en y incluant des propositions d'autres pays au Sud du Sahara afin de déterminer en commun les contours du processus unitaire.

2 - Le compromis de Lomé: l'esprit de l'Acte constitutif de l'Union africaine
Les chefs d'État réunis à Lomé sont parvenus à revoir le projet plus ambitieux du leader libyen même si certains d'entre eux avaient adhéré dans le principe à ses propositions panafricanistes. Ils ont aussi dégagé un «consensus minimaliste» (Bourgi 2000:20) suivant le thème de «ce n'est qu'un début» sur un processus unitaire différent de celui selon les vues exclusives de Kadhafi. Il s'agissait de recentrer le processus politique en évitant toute personnalisation et précipitation des étapes de réalisation du projet de l'Union, mais aussi déterminer un processus institutionnel dont la trajectoire originale est rendue par le document final de ces assises. Ce dernier entend insuffler à la toute nouvelle institution une architecture normative et structurelle marquée du sceau de l'innovation et du pragmatisme.

L'esprit de l'Acte constitutif illustre la pertinence de l'axe historique Addis-Abeba / Lomé par le recours à l'œuvre normative de l'OUA pour bâtir l'orientation normative de l'Union. Ainsi, depuis les assises de Lomé, les relations internationales sont-elles marquées par «le paradigme Addis-Abeba / Lomé» (Sindjoun 2002:84). Addis-Abeba renvoie au lieu d'adoption de la Charte de 1963 et Lomé à celui de l'Acte constitutif de 2000. C'est l'indication de la cristallisation des principes de l'OUA à Lomé. La Charte demeure la référence de base des principes (Acte constitutif, paragraphe 1b) énoncés et

maintenus à Lomé (Article III de la Charte). Cependant, ils se complètent de principes novateurs et d'objectifs plus pragmatiques. Cette innovation principielle à travers des stratégies de différenciation espère éloigner les stigmates de l'OUA. Parmi les principes cristallisés de l'OUA figurent l'égalité et la souveraineté, l'indépendance, le respect des frontières, l'interdiction de recourir à la force, le règlement pacifique des différends et la non-ingérence. Parmi les principes novateurs, notons le respect des principes démocratiques, des droits de l'homme et de la bonne gouvernance, de rejet des changements anticonstitutionnels, la participation des peuples africains aux activités de l'Union et la promotion de l'égalité entre l'homme et la femme (Article IV de l'Acte). La rhétorique de Lomé s'est construite autour de deux thèmes nouveaux: l'intégration régionale et l'insertion dans les dynamiques globales (préambule de l'Acte, paragraphe e). Ses objectifs sont porteurs d'un programme politique, sécuritaire, économique et social pour l'Afrique (Article III de l'Acte) nécessitant des structures appropriées.

Plusieurs structures de l'OUA ont été transformées pour s'adapter aux nouveaux principes et objectifs. L'article 1 de l'Acte consacre le changement de dénomination des organes transformés sans qu'il ne soit précisé l'apport substantiel de cette mutation. Il s'agit de (art. 5):

- La Conférence des chefs d'États et de gouvernement qui devient «la Conférence de l'Union» (art.6);
- le Conseil des ministres de l'OUA qui devient «le Conseil exécutif des ministres de l'Union» (art. 10);
- le Secrétariat général de l'OUA devient la «Commission de l'Union'» (art. 20).

Le véritable changement réside dans la création des comités techniques spécialisés dont la composition et le rôle sont précisés dans les articles 14,15 et 16. Le texte complète l'architecture de l'Union africaine dans ses dimensions populaires, juridiques et financières: un parlement panafricain (art. 17); une cour de justice (art. 18); des institutions financières (art. 19), notamment la Banque Centrale Africaine; le Fonds Monétaire Africain et la Banque Africaine d'Investissement.

Le texte de Lomé contenait aussi des dispositions pour sa ratification et son entrée en vigueur en ses articles 27 et 28; puis, des précisions sur les sanctions (art. 23); le siège de l'Union (art. 24); les langues de travail (art. 25); son interprétation (art. 26); le statut de membre (art. 29, 30, 31); et les arrangements transitoires (art. 33) pour la mise en œuvre de la nouvelle organisation.

Les processus de mise en œuvre de l'Union africaine: suivre sa propre trajectoire

Même s'il apparaît que les concepteurs de l'Union africaine se sont inspirés des exemples d'intégration régionale dans le monde, ils se réclament plus particulièrement du modèle européen. Néanmoins, au vu de la phase créatrice, elle est loin d'être une version édulcorée de l'UE. De fait, la nouvelle institution a fait le choix d'une trajectoire institutionnelle qui lui est propre et qui est propre aux spécificités africaines. Ce sont ces considérations qui marquent l'originalité de l'Acte de Lomé. Car, malgré les équations à plusieurs inconnues que posait l'adoption d'un texte nouveau, tous se sont accordés sur une indispensable révision et un compromis pour que l'UA soit effective. Ceci après une période de transition menant à la phase de lancement (Bourgi 2000:20).

Le processus transitoire: mettre sur pied le cadre institutionnel de l'Union africaine

La conférence des chefs d'État et de gouvernement de l'OUA lors de sa 37e session à Lusaka (Zambie) en juillet 2001, a adopté la décision AHG/Dec. 160 (XXXVII) sur la mise en œuvre de la Déclaration de Syrte sur l'Union africaine. Elle faisait suite à l'entrée en vigueur de l'Acte constitutif le 26 mai 2001 après le quota des deux tiers de ratification constaté lors du sommet extraordinaire de Syrte II en Libye en mars 2001. La décision de Lusaka apportait des précisions sur les arrangements transitoires prévus dans l'Acte constitutif (art. 33) portant sur les structures et leurs missions.

1- La gestion de la période transitoire par les structures de l'OUA

La décision de Lusaka chargeait le tout nouveau Secrétaire général d'entreprendre un certain nombre de tâches pour mettre en œuvre les dispositions de l'Acte constitutif et pour la mise en place des organes qu'il prévoyait au cours d'une période transitoire d'une douzaine de mois. Les assises de Lusaka avaient vu non seulement la «mort symbolique» de l'OUA qui ne devait être remplacée qu'un an plus tard, sa charte restant en vigueur pendant cette période transitoire, mais aussi l'élection d'un nouveau secrétaire général à la tête de l'organisation continentale.

Le choix s'est porté sur l'ancien Ministre ivoirien des Affaires étrangères Amara Essy en remplacement du tanzanien Salim Ahmed Salim dont le second mandat touchait à sa fin. Ce fut une élection très disputée avec le contrepoids de certains pays qui appuyaient d'autres candidats (le Namibien Theo Ben-Guirob et le Guinéen Lansana Kouyaté). Cependant, la mission de Lusaka fut confiée à Amara Essy: assurer la transition entre l'Organisation de l'unité africaine (OUA) et l'Union africaine (UA) avec l'appui de partenaires spécifiques. Le secrétaire général nouvellement élu avait plus précisément

pour mission d'élaborer tous les textes qui vont régir le fonctionnement des institutions de la nouvelle organisation (règlement intérieur, nombre de membres de la Commission, les pouvoirs du président de la commission, les modes d'élection...); créer les structures de l'UA (conférence des chefs d'État, Conseil exécutif, Commission, Comité des représentants permanents). La décision de Lusaka avait de ce fait identifié 13 tâches qui devaient être exécutées par Amara Essy, dans le cadre des efforts de création du cadre institutionnel de l'Union africaine (Secrétaire général de l'OUA 2002:2).

Le secrétaire général rappelle toutes ces tâches dans le paragraphe 6 de son rapport sur la mise en œuvre de la décision de Lusaka. Il fournit aussi des informations sur les actions menées en collaboration avec les États membres, les communautés économiques régionales (CER) et d'autres partenaires pour exécuter le mandat qui lui avait été confié. Compte tenu de l'ampleur de ces tâches, la Conférence a demandé au Secrétaire général d'accorder la priorité au lancement des organes clés, et de soumettre des propositions et des recommandations sur certains organes restants, y compris les institutions importantes de l'OUA dont la place au sein de l'union n'avait pas encore été définie. Il avait pour recommandation d'assurer sa mission en étroite consultation avec les États membres.

Le Secrétariat général a alors déployé tous les efforts pour mettre en œuvre la décision de Lusaka dans cet esprit, tout en continuant d'assurer ses responsabilités régulières dans les domaines politiques et économiques (exécution de son agenda pour la paix et la sécurité sur le continent, réaction d'urgence aux situations de crise et participation aux négociations mondiales comme celles de l'OMC) pendant la période transitoire.

2- Le bilan de la période transitoire: renforcer la plate-forme du lancement de l'Union

Le processus de mise en œuvre a été lancé immédiatement après la mise en place de la nouvelle direction du secrétariat général. De larges consultations ont été engagées en son sein avec les représentants des États membres de l'OUA à Addis-Abeba, les ministres et les chefs d'État, les partenaires internationaux et les organisations de la société civile afin de réaliser des avancées sur les tâches prioritaires et préparer les autres tâches.

Il s'agissait de réfléchir afin de dégager une compréhension commune de la décision de Lusaka et d'arrêter les modalités de mise en œuvre de l'ensemble du processus de transition. Il était coordonné par l'Équipe d'Appui à la Planification de la Transition (EAPT) constituée avec le soutien technique du PNUD. Il se composait de fonctionnaires et a bénéficié du soutien d'experts externes pour superviser et conduire les activités opérationnelles de la transition. Un Groupe Consultatif d'Eminentes Personnalités (GCEP) a été mis

sur pied. Il est composé de 15 personnalités africaines ayant une vaste expérience et provenant de toutes les régions de l'Afrique, pour conseiller le secrétaire général et contribuer à l'orientation stratégique de l'Union, élargir et enrichir l'examen des questions avant leur soumission aux organes de décision de l'OUA. Pour le lancement des organes clés, la première session de réflexion au sein du secrétariat a consisté en la mise en place de deux sous-comités composés de fonctionnaires du secrétariat et présidés par des secrétaires généraux adjoints. Le premier sous-comité était chargé d'élaborer les règlements intérieurs de la Conférence, du Conseil exécutif et du Comité des représentants permanents ainsi que les relations entre ces organes et la Commission. Le deuxième sous-comité avait pour tâche d'élaborer le cadre pour la structure de la Commission, sa composition, les modalités de prise de décision, ses pouvoirs et attributions, les modalités pour la nomination des commissaires et la structure organique de la commission. Les structures transitoires ont ensuite tenu des réunions de consultation avec les partenaires du secrétariat général pour finaliser les textes des organes clés (Gharbi 2002:72-73).

Ces textes devaient être prêts pour le démarrage effectif de l'Union africaine à Durban avec la fin de la période transitoire fixée à un an à Lusaka. Ainsi, le 38e sommet de l'OUA devait marquer sa fin en juillet 2002 à Durban. Cependant, certains instruments juridiques qu'elle avait créés restaient valables (la Charte africaine des droits de l'Homme, le Traité d'Abuja, la Déclaration du Caire) et devaient être ultérieurement intégrés aux cours des réunions organisées par le Secrétaire général avec des experts et des consultants sous la supervision des mécanismes de transition ayant abouti à la préparation des projets de statut de quatre organes. Il s'agit des quatre organes clés sur les dix prévus par les textes de l'organisation panafricaine. Il y avait aussi un projet de protocole sur le futur «Conseil de Sécurité Africain» qui devait être soumis ainsi que les documents des quatre autres organes à l'approbation des ambassadeurs, des ministres des Affaires étrangères et des chefs d'État alors attendus à Durban pour le lancement de l'Union africaine.

Le processus de lancement: rendre l'OUA opérationnelle par étapes

Le dernier sommet de l'OUA en même temps assemblée inaugurale de l'Union africaine a consacré son lancement préparé en douze mois de transition par l'adoption des organes clés et la prise de ses premières décisions pour «renforcer les causes de la paix, de la sécurité et de la démocratie en Afrique» (Cilliers 2002:1).

1 - Étape préliminaire: le lancement des organes clés de l'Union africaine
Elle s'est déroulée à travers l'adoption des textes suivants portant sur les organes clés: le règlement intérieur de l'Assemblée de l'Union; le règlement intérieur du Conseil exécutif de l'Union; le règlement intérieur du Comité des représentants permanents; le statut de la Commission de l'Union.

Pour la Conférence de l'Union, le président en exercice sera désigné pour un an et aura un rôle protocolaire en tant que «président de l'Afrique». La conférence aura lieu une fois sur trois au siège (Addis-Abeba 2004); les sessions extraordinaires se tiendront toutes en dehors du siège, à l'invitation d'un État membre. Pour assurer le suivi et l'exécution des résolutions de la Conférence, les experts préconisent que des pouvoirs accrus soient délégués au Conseil exécutif.

Le deuxième organe clé regroupe les ministres des Affaires étrangères. Il devrait changer de président tous les six mois et se réunir plus de deux fois par an. Il devrait être doté de véritables pouvoirs, notamment celui de nommer huit des dix membres de la Commission de l'Union.

La Commission de l'Union est le troisième organe clé de l'organisation panafricaine dont le président (d'abord secrétaire général de l'OUA) ainsi que son vice-président seront élus par les chefs d'État. Les dix commissaires représenteront les cinq régions du continent (deux par région).

Le quatrième organe qui est le Comité des représentants permanents (COREP) permettra à tous ses membres d'être associés de près aux activités de la commission. Les autres organes prévus seront définis et lancés par étapes. Il s'agit du parlement panafricain (protocole adopté en mars 2001 à Syrte II) qui devrait voir le jour en 2003 ou 2004 selon les signatures et les notifications, la Cour de Justice; le Conseil économique et social; la Banque centrale africaine et la Banque africaine d'investissement. Durban n'est donc que la première étape. Elle a permis de prendre des décisions pour la période post-Durban jusqu'au lancement de tous les organes de l'Union.

2- L'étape intermédiaire: les décisions de l'Assemblée inaugurale de l'Union africaine
Elles ont porté pour la plupart sur des questions politiques et sécuritaires qui devront être gérées pendant l'étape intermédiaire.

Il s'agissait de la décision de renforcer le rôle de l'Union africaine pour la supervision et les observations des élections; l'adoption d'un protocole relatif à la mise en place d'un conseil de paix et de sécurité ainsi que l'approbation de recommandations portant sur la supervision des questions de sécurité et de stabilité, de développement et de coopération dans le cadre de la Conférence sur la Stabilité, la Sécurité, le Développement et la Coopération Africains de Revue des Pairs (CSSDCA). Elles ont été suivies par l'adoption

du Mécanisme africain de revue des pairs (MARP) du NEPAD et les documents y afférents. Par rapport au Nepad (intégré au processus unitaire depuis Lusaka), il a aussi été décidé d'élargir son comité de mise en œuvre de quinze à vingt membres.

Cependant, malgré ces nouveaux engagements et ces arrangements structurels concrétisés par le sommet de Durban, le besoin en ressources financières et humaines pour leur mise en œuvre effective se fait sentir. De là dépendent les perspectives et la portée de l'Union africaine.

Conclusion générale

La portée et les perspectives de la nouvelle organisation panafricaine dépendront du pragmatisme réel de cette expression unique de volonté politique de Syrte à Durban. L'enjeu est énorme, il faut créer une organisation qui ne soit pas l'OUA-bis. Le Secrétaire général de l'ONU avait prévenu à Lusaka: «cet effort historique demandera des qualités de dirigeants, du courage et de la volonté de se détacher du passé».

Les plans ambitieux de l'UA sont placés dans une perspective dynamique qui cherche non seulement à concrétiser les idéaux panafricanistes et les rêves d'unité continentale défendus depuis 1960, mais aussi à lancer de nouvelles institutions prévues par l'Acte constitutif pour renforcer l'autorité continentale aux dépens des principes et pratiques en marge du projet unitaire de juillet 2000. Même si le passage à l'UA représente une équation à plusieurs inconnues tant au niveau conceptuel que structurel: la relative imprécision du type de l'union, l'absence de la société civile et des représentants des populations montre les graves insuffisances de ce processus. En effet «il n'y aura pas de véritable Union africaine sans la reconnaissance d'une Afrique plurielle et indépendante, sans la participation active de la société civile aux décisions la concernant, ni abandons de souveraineté nationale vers le supra national» (Pelletier 2002:1528). Cependant, il serait prématuré de dire aujourd'hui si la controverse à propos de certains concepts (souveraineté nationale, non-ingérence) sera atténuée.

Comme cela a déjà été précisé dans l'introduction, il serait injuste et prématuré de tirer des conclusions définitives à ce stade encore précoce de transformation des paradigmes et des paramètres de la politique africaine. Les perspectives de l'UA (comme du NEPAD) sont profondément liées à une dynamique institutionnelle encore trop récente pour être évaluée. Ainsi, le Secrétaire général avertissait de ne pas vouloir «tout, tout de suite» (Marchés tropicaux 2002) surtout lorsqu'on sait que la période transitoire a cédé la place à une période intermédiaire, que Durban n'était que la première grande étape de lancement laissant à l'étape post-Durban le lancement progressif

des autres organes pour que l'Union africaine ne ressemble pas à «du vieux vin dans des bouteilles neuves» (Melber 2002:14-17).

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NEPAD and the Digital Divide:
The Case of Botswana and
the Silent Marginalised Minorities

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Abstract

This paper addresses the question of whether the New Partnership for Africa deve-
lopment (NEPAD) through its e-Africa Commission and its Science and Techno-
logy agenda for ICT provides for new possibilities for Africa's marginalised indi-
genous minorities to engage meaningfully with development processes. It questions
whether NEPAD recognises the power of ICT beyond providing access to informa-
tion, particularly its potential as a resource for the oppressed to wage their battles
for self-determination, and willing to go beyond questions of access, and address
the politics of power and the Internet and other ICT. Is there likelihood in Africa,
for ICTs to become new sites of resistance and oppression? The paper suggests that
there is already evidence that for marginalised ethnic minorities such as the Basarwa,
the San peoples of Botswana, this new forum and the Internet in particular will be
yet another tool to mute their voices.

Résumé

Cette contribution pose la question de savoir si le Nouveau partenariat pour le
développement de l'Afrique (NEPAD), à travers sa Commission e-Afrique et son
programme de sciences et technologies pour les TIC, pourrait offrir de nouvelles
possibilités aux minorités indigènes africaines marginalisées, qui leur permettraient
de s'impliquer activement dans le processus de développement. L'auteur y pose la
question de savoir si le NEPAD reconnaît le pouvoir des TIC au-delà du simple
accès à l'information, particulièrement leur potentiel à servir de ressources aux
opprimés, en leur permettant de mener un combat pour l'autodétermination; la ques-
tion consiste également à savoir si le NEPAD est prêt à aller au-delà de la question
de l'accès, et à aborder la question du pouvoir et de l'Internet, ainsi que l'accès à
d'autres TIC. Est-il possible qu'en Afrique les TIC deviennent de nouveaux centres
de résistance et d'oppression? Cette présentation laisse penser qu'il est bien évident
que pour les minorités ethniques marginalisées, telles que les Basarwa et les San du
Botswana, ce nouveau forum et l'Internet en particulier, ne seront qu'un nouvel
outil de plus destiné à taire les voix des masses.

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Introduction

Using the example of an on-going land use dispute between the Botswana government and the indigenous minorities group, Survival International (SI), largely fought through the Internet, I explore challenges facing the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) on its agenda to improve access to Information and Communication Technology (ICT). Using Internet, the London-based Survival International for Indigenous Minorities was able to stage a powerful campaign and solicit international support to force the Botswana government to slow down and justify the relocation of the Basarwa, the San peoples in the country from a nature reserve to 'development facilities', outside the reserve. SI turned the hitherto unknown and weak resistance of some Basarwa to prevent the government of Botswana taking over the Central Kgalagadi Game Reserve (CKGR) into by far Botswana's most sensitive issue. With the help of communities beyond Botswana's borders, Basarwa, have been able to take the government to court with very good legal representation in a case in which the Botswana government is dispossessing them of special land use rights in the CKGR they have enjoyed since 1961. The digital divide makes it easier for Western activists to use the Internet to pressurise African governments to rethink development policies while the oppressed themselves are unable to participate in their own struggles. Is the situation in Botswana, in which ICT allowed Survival International and the Botswana government to speak over the heads of Basarwa, a signal that African ethnic minorities will become further marginalised in the flow of information, the policies of their own states being challenged more by citizens beyond their borders than themselves?

Furthermore, Information and Communication Technology presents new opportunities to link Africa's oppressed to more powerful Western citizens that can better challenge oppressive policies made by African governments in the name of development. At the same time this creates new strains on autonomous African development that NEPAD seeks to promote, especially given the already weak nature of African states against Western capital's other forms of control.

NEPAD, empowerment and ICT

> 'How we ensure that ICT is engaged to reduce poverty and prevent techni-
> cal know-how from becoming a tool of oppression and further coloniza-
> tion of the improved people of Africa is of paramount importance to the
> development community'.

> Dr. Nii Narku Quaynor,
> e-Africa Programme Commissioner, Internet and Software Development, 2003

'perhaps the most important aspect of the Internet [is] eliminating space and time giv[ing] us an unprecedented means of overcoming two of the root causes of extreme poverty-ignorance and isolation'.

Mark Malloch Brown,
Administrator, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2000

Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is one of the latest buzzwords in the development jargon. It has fast become a key area for development actors such as the UNDP. It is quickly catching up with, and cross-pollinating with other topical development concerns such as 'Democratic Governance', 'Poverty Reduction', 'Crisis Prevention and Recovery', 'Energy and Environment', 'HIV/AIDS', 'Capacity Development', and 'Gender in Development'. ICT is expected to contribute towards faster delivery in a variety of sectors and strengthen participatory approaches to development. It is expected to allow for the involvement of more people, accomplish a deeper geographic penetration for hitherto unreached or underserviced especially to rural areas, than is the case with traditional means and modalities. ICT's power is perceived as lying in its ability to transcend borders, languages and cultures, foster empowerment of communities, women, youth and socially disadvantaged groups. In this regard, ICT is indispensable to realise the global information society and the global knowledge society (UNDP Information Technologies (IT) for Development Programme, 2000).

The New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) too has jumped into the bandwagon about ICT. It has set up an e-Africa Commission task team responsible for 'developing policies and strategies and projects at the continental level as well as managing the structured development of the ICT sector in the context of NEPAD'. It is chaired by Alpha Oumar Konare, former president of Mali. Through the e-Africa Commission, NEPAD endeavours to 'Promote the e-Africa initiative to citizens, civil society, corporations and government of Africa and create avenues for their participation' (Chetty 2003).

The May 2002 NEPAD draft Executive Summary Short Term Plan counts infrastructural development of ICT, along with energy, water and transport as priority in the short term. ICT is expected to strengthen and be the foundation of all other integration programmes for the African Union. With regard to ICT, NEPAD intends to speed up the process of sub-regional and regional connectivity and interconnectivity (2002:8). This will be spearheaded by the e-Africa Commission, whose core objectives are 'accelerating the development of African inter-country, intra-country and global connectivity, and; promoting conditions for Africa to be an equal and active participant in the

Global Information Society'. NEPAD envisages a new area where Africans can aggressively make their mark and become leaders in the ICT industry.

Among its proponents, NEPAD is by far one of the most important mission statements Africa has ever committed itself to. It envisions an Africa free of wars, malnutrition, political instability, negative imaging and respect for human rights. To this end, NEPAD will strengthen, not only the continent as a whole to face global capital as a united front, but each of the member states of the African Union which have been characterised as weak. For marginalised indigenous minorities within many nation-states, the 'weak' state that NEPAD and even its critics lament and seek to strengthen, weak as it may be against global capital is, however, too powerful for them to carve out their own perceptions about development and rights. Is enough care being taken to ensure that empowering the admittedly weak African state for competition in the global economic arena does not happen to enable oppressive and autocratic governments to use ICT to further oppress their weak?

To its critics, including some African academics, it is worse than the Lagos Plan of Action. A gender analysis of NEPAD reflects that its macro-economic framework serves the interests of the market at the expense of the dispossessed, especially women and children (Randrianomaro 2002). There has also been scepticism regarding the endogenous-ness of NEPAD, with critics arguing that it is a baby of the West. Its Neo-Liberal stance at best champions the needs of a bourgeoning African capitalist at the expense of many poor Africans in the same way as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) champions the needs of global capital at the expense of the Third World. At the 2002 Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) Third World Network conference on the NEPAD entitled 'Africa and the Development Challenges of the Millennium', held in Accra, Ghana, it came out clearly that NEPAD is not for the poorest of the African continent.

NEPAD, ICT and representation of indigenous minorities
Francis Nyamnjoh (2004) notes the tendency that is growing not only in Botswana but a major characteristic of Africa's second liberation struggles since the 1980s, of a growing obsession with belonging and the questioning of traditional assumptions about nationality and citizenship almost everywhere. Identity politics and more exclusionary ideas of nationality and citizenship are becoming more important, as minority claims for greater cultural recognition and plurality are countered by majoritarian efforts to maintain the status quo of an inherited colonial hierarchy of ethnic groupings. As minorities intensify their struggle for recognition and representation, this is countered by greater and sometimes aggressive reaffirmation of age-old exclusions informed by colonial registers of inequalities amongst the subjected.

This was the case in the matter where the government of Botswana has discontinued provision of services inside a reserve that was gazetted for the use of Basarwa in 1961, with recognition of their unique relationship to land and other natural resources. Basarwa have been provided with what the government is convinced are better development facilities outside the nature reserve. However, as they follow 'development' outside the reserve, Basarwa in exchange are being asked to give up for good, their group rights to the reserve, which they have enjoyed until 1991, although the constitution does not recognise such land ownership.

Although Botswana ratified the International Labour Organization (ILO) convention no. 169, at the March 2004 CIVICUS Summit, President Mogae totally rejected the concept of indigenous minorities, saying, 'Like our brothers and sisters elsewhere in this region, we shall also continue to reject the old colonial apartheid myth that insists that some black communities are more indigenous than others'. The ILO Convention recognises the Basarwa as members of the category of communities variously known as 'tribal peoples', 'first peoples', 'indigenous peoples', or 'marginalised minorities'. It recognises their aspiration towards self-control, control over the maintenance and development of their identities, language and religion, and the responsibility of governments to work together with the peoples to protect and guarantee their rights, especially with regard to land (Saugestad 2001:44). Advocacy groups such as Survival International have battled with little success with the government to acknowledge groups rights as one of the distinguishing features of land use practices among indigenous minorities.

In one of his boldest statements speaking at the opening of a biennial world assembly of CIVICUS, an umbrella body of civic organisations, in the capital Gaborone in March 2004, Botswana President, Festus Mogae, stated that 'rural poverty, no matter how romanticised, is a condition, not a culture' (IRINnews.org, 2004). By so saying, Mogae reduced the cultural expression of the Basarwa as merely an expression of poverty. Unfortunately, the government's campaign to blur the distinction between Basarwa's undeniable poverty and their ways of expressing their unique identity has almost been successful. Their land claim in the CKGR receives very little support within the country, with not a single civil society organisation fully supporting their cause.

With specific reference to the interface between citizens and ICT, the Commission aims to 'promote the e-Africa initiative to citizens, civil society, corporations and governments of Africa and create avenues for their participation (2003)'. Dr. Nii Narku Quaynor, the e-Africa Programme Commissioner for Internet and Software Development's powerful remarks

that ICT should be prevented from becoming another tool of colonisation of the oppressed people, are an important starting point. These remarks are premised on the fact that most poor Africans enjoy access to ICT that is far below what ordinary citizens in the West enjoy. NEPAD addresses the economic gap between Africa and the West. While this is an important undertaking, there is also need to acknowledge that the digital divide is more than a West vs. South condition. ICT must also protect the oppressed people from their own governments, not only from external oppression such as global capital. Information technologies must enable the oppressed to reverse not only gender discrimination, but also differential access to resources based on ethnic hierarchies crafted during colonialism and legitimised by post-independence constitutions.

Basarwa are the most prominently featured tribal group in Botswana on the Internet. They are probably the most researched, especially in terms of their cultural diversity and human right abuses, and are probably, together with HIV/AIDS, the most currently heard about entities in Botswana across the world. Can Basarwa, under the NEPAD, tap into the power of technology to fight their struggles? Are they condemned to at the very best, read what is on the net, without ever confronting development and its actors using this resource? Lack of access to ICT among Basarwa prevented many of them from being a part of the cyberspace battle over their rights.

A major challenge to the Basarwa becoming soul brothers with other tribal groups and advocates from outside the indigenous minority is the unequal access to ICT. While their advocates, Survival International have better access to information regarding the Basarwa and political struggles of other tribal peoples around the world, the Basarwa themselves are limited by their illiteracy and thus cannot fully exploit this resource. Between oppressive governments, domineering insider and outsider activists, and tugs of war between those with power, the voices of Basarwa in the new spaces created by ICT remain muted. Merely increasing access to ICT and extending it to all is not likely to be the only challenge. ICT is a power tool and therefore cannot escape the politics of power and access that characterise the nations that seek to acquire it. ICT is likely to be co-opted into the realities of differential access to resources in Africa, outside the obvious North - South imbalances.

The new solidarities that ICT brings Basarwa into, with others outside the national borders has in itself brought challenges about the legitimacy of such alliances. Within the borders of Botswana, the government has succeeded in using the outside intervention to bring to disrepute, the local Basarwa involved such as Roy Sesana. Roy Sesana, a veteran activist on the matter has come to be perceived in many quarters in the country as a sell out who

while enjoying the fruits of modernity, is being bribed by outsiders to pre-
vent development reaching his people so they remain tourist attractions. Both
the state and its 'citizens' label this 'beyond borders' support as 'undue ex-
ternal influence' by outsider activists. The 'patriotic' citizens of Botswana
are therefore called at this particular moment, by the government to disasso-
ciate themselves with the Basarwa that are taking the government to task and
the 'nosey' and 'misguided' foreigners from the West that want to deny the
poorest of our peoples 'development'.

As the power of ICT, such as Internet, as a cheap but effective weapon
becomes increasingly recognised by those with power such as governments,
and non-governmental organisations, there are real chances that the weak
may become subjected to not only lack of access, but even restricted educa-
tion on where its power lies. Basarwa need more than access to information
technology; ICT must represent, especially for the hitherto subjugated groups,
new and more effective platforms for fighting their battles and to access
spatially distance resources beyond their immediate borders.

NEPAD, in the same way that the Botswana government does, empha-
sises the poverty of indigenous minorities over the politics of power and
patronage that defines the link between access to resources and ethnic mem-
bership in Africa. The Botswana government, like NEPAD, does not address
the question of why some ethnic groups are more vulnerable to poverty than
others. Their poverty becomes their identity, its alleviation their trap. The
reality that Basarwa are a subjugated ethnic minority, discriminated against
and politically, economically and culturally dominated by the majority
(Saugestad 2001) is trivialised by government as simply a question of pov-
erty. Under the pretext of 'alleviating them from poverty', the government
uses 'development policies' to disarm marginalised minorities from making
their claims for equality. That their poverty is as a result of being robbed of
cultural expression is conveniently forgotten.

NEPAD is silent on the new politics of power that ICT will present. With
far reaching implications, NEPAD seems oblivious to the citizen - subject
relations within nation states. It does not problematize the dynamics of in-
equality that characterise the categories of civil society and citizens as is the
legacy of late colonialism in Africa. In what may be characterised as both a
post-colonial and post-independence condition, ethnicity has become a ma-
jor aspect in the negotiation of 'development', subjecthood and citizenship
in contemporary Africa.

NEPAD, ICT and 'autonomous African alternatives'

The e-Africa Commission endeavours to turn around the condition where
Africans are relegated to always being followers of the West, so they exploit

their strong heritage of cultural diversity to unleash local information tech-
nology inventions and solutions. 'Cultural diversity' is presented in the lan-
guage similar to that used for strategic plans that are currently in fashion, as
an opportunity rather than a challenge as strategic plans often do. The fact
that such cultural diversity in Africa is often a site of ethnic tensions is glossed
over. Some cultural forms in this diversity are often denied expression by
others, indigenous minorities in particular.

ICT brings new dimensions on the notion of accountability. When the
Basarwa against the relocation exercise could not on their own bring the
government to take them seriously, Internet enabled 'others' in solidarity
with their cause to launch a more powerful campaign against the govern-
ment, without the constraints of borders. ICT has 'reduced the cost of and
increased the speed of communications across the globe, abolishing pre-ex-
isting barriers of time and space, and affecting all areas of social and eco-
nomic life'. For minority groups all over the world, this has created unprec-
edented possibilities of forging brotherhoods with others at distances hitherto
unimaginable. Internet brings together previously disparate communities to-
gether, which they can mobilise for resistance 'against a broader society which
attempted to homogenize their unique difference'. The government of Bot-
swana's position is that the Basarwa should not be treated any differently
from other citizens who have been resettled before.

There is no strong challenge locally against Botswana government policy
to relocate Basarwa from the Central Kgalagadi Game Reserve (CKGR), as
the reserve became restricted to game by the Wildlife Conservation and Na-
tional Parks Act No. 28 of 1992. Communities of activists, mainly from the
West, are the main combatants in the Basarwa land struggle on Internet. They
send out sometimes factually incorrect communiqués around the world to
challenge the Botswana government's position that development has every-
thing to do with the relocation exercise. Survival International, in particular
published quite extensively mainly on the Internet, to very wide audiences
about the relocation exercise. Some of the very powerful headlines include
'The Bushmen peoples: The hidden face of racism today', 'Last Kalahari
Bushmen tortured and facing starvation', 'Botswana Ignores Kalahari
"Bushman" land ownership', 'Botswana squeezes Kalahari peoples out', and
'Botswana: Bushmen persecuted to drive them off their land' (http://
www.survival-international.org/about.htm). ICT has opened up otherwise
'private' matters to 'outside' audiences, thus increasing the checks and bal-
ances on domestic policies. Being a marginalised ethnic group, the govern-
ment of Botswana almost succeeded in resettling the Basarwa without much
resistance even as some them were protesting. ICT enabled this information

to reach hitherto cut-off audiences, who in turn put up the fight, taking on the role of advocacy for Basarwa.

The Botswana government has quickly come to appreciate this power of Internet as not just a gimmick for the 'techno enthusiasts'. Even as it has proceeded to effect the relocation with increased vigour, the government has not been able to ignore Survival International's Internet campaign. It has in fact now taken to using the Internet to lodge its counter attack, setting up a hyperlink from its official website entitled 'The Relocation of Basarwa', in which it provides the 'facts' about the relocation to defend itself from attacks from the likes of Survival International.

Interestingly, while at once challenging Survival International's involvement into an 'internal' or domestic issue, the Botswana government felt the pressure to justify its actions to the same 'outsiders'. It utilised the most compelling feature of Internet, its disrespect for borders, to its own advantage, seeking to persuade other global citizens that Survival International's allegations were wrong. The Government was not so naïve as to ignore the power of the 'outsider' citizen who at times actually enjoys greater civic rights than the 'local' citizen. Locally it used the media it owns to reaffirm its 'autonomy', and its 'sovereignty', to its peoples, and to prove that it does not succumb to 'undue external interference', and proceeded with the relocation with even greater determination.

The continuing power of Survival International, a Western agency, to bring the Botswana government to justify at ever increasing forums, its decision to relocate Basarwa shows the strain on the concept of autonomy in the age of ICT. NEPAD has to address how African states can balance the imperatives of autonomous African alternatives as well as accommodate the fluid nature of identities and solidarities within globalising contexts.

Conclusion

It is not yet clear what the potential for ICT is at the moment, considering the high levels of illiteracy in information technology. Yet we are given the impression that it is one of the important highways to the future. There is concern even as we celebrate and embrace its promises. As Steve Cisler (1997) has warned:

> When technologies are introduced into a culture, the changes can be abrupt,
> profound, jarring, subtle. The effects can be felt even if the culture is not
> making use of the technology itself, as with the railroad and the airplane
> which lessened the isolation of some cultures without their having any

control over the consequences. Rarely can we predict how a technology
will be used, how it will spread, and what the long term effects will be.

The interactive capacity of ICT and its distributed character change the con-
tours of social and political discourse. The ability of grassroots voices to
impact in a collected and cumulative fashion on the key policy agencies is
not dependent on the consent of the policy agencies: sites which shadow the
performance of the policy agencies are easily constructed and local mes-
sages are readily transformed into global impulses. The development agen-
cies can of course enhance grassroots' abilities to communicate by resourcing
such communication but the ability to close down local and authentic mes-
sages of criticism by a rich and powerful agency has been severely curtailed
(Grieco and Holmes 1999).

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Connecting African Activism with Global Networks: ICTs and South African Social Movements

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Abstract

In this article the potential of ICTs to amplify the work done by social movements and activists in South Africa will be explored. Against the background of new discourses of Pan-African Unity such as those around the African Renaissance and the New Plan for African Development (Nepad), the use of ICTs by a South African activist group, the Treatment Action Campaign, will be investigated to establish how these communication technologies can embed local social movements within larger political and communicative networks both on the African continent and globally.

Résumé

Cet article étudie la capacité des TIC à élargir le travail accompli par les mouvements et activistes sociaux d'Afrique du Sud. L'utilisation des TIC par un groupe d'activistes sud-africain sera analysée, dans le contexte des nouveaux discours sur l'unité panafricaine, tels que ceux portant sur la Renaissance Africaine et le Nouveau Plan pour le Développement de l'Afrique (NEPAD), afin de voir comment ces technologies de la communication peuvent être intégrées aux mouvements sociaux locaux, dans le cadre de larges réseaux politiques et communicatifs, aussi bien sur le continent africain qu'ailleurs.

Introduction: New media technologies, activism and the 'fifth estate'

In her 2003 Harold Wolpe lecture, Jane Duncan stated that 'another journalism is possible', even in the face of an increasingly convergent and commercialised global media. Quoting delegates at the conference on media

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and globalisation at the World Social Forum, Duncan refers to the emer-
gence of a 'fifth estate', alternative media networks created by social move-
ments in order to remind the traditional, commercial media of their societal
responsibilities. New social movements worldwide, according to Duncan,
are also busy reclaiming the traditional media.

Increasingly, non-commercial media are on the agenda of social move-
ments internationally. Free speech radio and television stations are being
established as spaces for non-commercial journalism, and a new layer of
emerging grassroots media is springing up (Duncan 2003).

Also in South Africa, Duncan goes further to show that social movements
are increasingly producing their own media to further their causes. She men-
tions newspapers and newsletters springing up, and suggests that micro-ra-
dio be further explored as a vehicle by these movements.

Duncan does not mention the possibilities that the Internet might pose for
South African social movements, although she does refer to Indymedia, an
alternative media network that uses the Internet to great effect. Indymedia
(www.indymedia.org), an international network of non-commercial journalists
that also has a South African branch, similar networks like Civicus – an
organisation distributing information about civil society activities to more
than 4,500 subscribers all over the world (Civicus 2003) – and the Association
for Progressive Communications (APC), a network linking other NGO
networks, have used computer systems to amplify local struggles at relative
low cost and with high speed across a global support system (Kidd 2003:58).

That the Internet can assist in network formation, makes sense when
bearing in mind that it has been 'about networking' from its inception: 'not
just networks of wires and hubs but networks of people' (Gurak & Logie
2003:25). The Internet's capability of linking people and forming issue-
centered communities can be seen in numerous petitions being circulated
and protest networks being formed[1] (ibid.:43–44).

Cultural minorities have also successfully used the Internet for
empowerment. Many examples exist, such as Hawaiians (Wood 1997), Indian
diaspora in the USA (Mallapragada 2000) and the Cherokee Indians (Arnold
& Plymire 2000). Virtual communities in cyberspace make it possible for
such groupings to gain social power and consolidate their cultural identities
in spite of societal constraints or geographical borders by producing and
circulating their own knowledge (Arnold and Plymire 2000:188).

Some of the advantages that the Internet holds for grassroots networks
are that the medium is suited towards a non-hierarchical structure and that it
reduces the need for centralized communication. The Internet can also assist
activists to mobilize participation by augmenting existing communication

methods. The notion that the Internet signifies a radical break with the old ways in which society will be ordered, however, has been amended by those proposing the theory of 'amplification' (e.g. Agre 2002; Brants 2002), contending that the Internet will serve to enlarge and accelerate processes already in place in societies and organisations, rather than create entirely new forces. Rather than a revolutionising force, the Internet is embedded in larger networks of societal processes and amplifies existing social forces when appropriated for use by participants in the communication process (Agre 2002:315–6).

The speed of communication on the Internet also enables activists to act more quickly and co-ordinate their activities on a regional, national and international level (Pickerill 2001:366–7, 370; also see Bray 1998) and to circumvent regulations monitoring political organization (Baber 2002:294). In combination with more traditional media like press, television and radio, the Internet can create a 'global media space' for deliberation, dissemination and mobilisation where individual contributions can result in decisions being made from the bottom up (Moore 2003).

Apart from facilitating mobilization, the Internet can also help to build support networks and promote solidarity, between local and international groups that share similar interests, and also aid communication across physical or ideological distances and the sharing of ideas and skills with other movements or groups (Pickerill 2002:367). Bennett (quoted in Tilly 2003), highlights several ways in which digital media are changing the way activists operate internationally, such as greater introduction of local issues into larger movement discourses, increasing the strategic advantages of resource-poor organisations within social movements and combining older face-to-face performances with virtual performances. Throughout these media, local struggles can be magnified to reach national or even global agendas giving them access to remote information germane to their struggle (Mele 1999:291–2, 304). For this reason the Internet (as well as other ICTs such as mobile phones) has been a valuable tool in the activities of the new 'superpower' (Moore 2003) or the 'third wave of democratisation' (Karl et al. cited in Struwig & Conradie 2003:250), namely the global social movement of citizen activists that represents a broad agenda including social development. Most recently, observers such as Tilly (2003) have noted the use of cellphone text messaging to create 'flash mobs' engaging in protest action. Tilly mentions in passing protests in Nigeria and Ethiopia, but does not elaborate further on examples of the use of ICTs by social movements in Africa.

Can social movements in Africa, where access to technologies are hindered by a number of economic, cultural, social and political factors (Wasserman & De Beer 2003), follow the example of their international counterparts?

Can the Internet and related communication technologies, such as e-mail
and cellphone messaging, be used as a form of alternative media by
organisations working at grassroots level, such as Duncan shows with regard
to traditional media? If so, how would this contribute to the building of Pan-
African and global networks of resistance?

This article does not attempt to provide definitive answers to these ques-
tions, but explores some of them by focusing on a specific South African
social movement as an illustration of how ICTs can be used for activism.

The post-apartheid 'ultra-left' and ICTs

In post-apartheid South Africa, a number of new social movements have
come into being. These groups protest the ruling ANC governments' lack of
service delivery on a range of issues, including health care, electricity provi-
sion, housing and land restitution. These movements have met with opposi-
tion from the ANC and those aligned with the ruling party, with Thabo Mbeki
branding them the 'ultra-left' (Forrest 2003).

These groups are opposed to corporate globalisation and form part of
overlapping networks, both inside the country – with their leaders playing
central roles in different organisations – and globally, having links with other
activists in Third World countries (Jacobs 2004:210). Although having their
origins among poor communities, these movements often use the Internet[2] to
publicise their message, since they do not view the mainstream media in a
positive light due to its perceived bias towards the elite or eschewing of
political issues (Jacobs 2004:212–3). The Internet also provides a relatively
cheap and easy way to self-publish information (cf. Bennett 2003). This does
not provide an immediate solution to the needs of social movements wanting
to communicate their message, since only a small percentage of South Afri-
cans, mainly the elites, have access to the Internet (see Wasserman 2003b for
a discussion of connectivity in South Africa). Although the Internet may as-
sist in mobilisation for protest action, it is probable that the bulk of this com-
munication will have to be done through more traditional means. Some other
ICTs, like cellphones, might prove more useful in reaching the core constitu-
encies of social movements in South Africa. However, the internet may
broaden the support base of activist groups to also include elites in South
Africa and abroad (Jacobs 2004:213) or help them to form links with like-
minded groups on the rest of the continent and globally.

These networks not only amplify (Agre 2002) the reach of local organisa-
tions, but have also become a public sphere in themselves, decentralised and
broadly distributed across many nodes without being dependent on the con-
tinued existence of every single one of them (Bennett 2003). In the case of
African CSOs using the Internet, this aspect of networking might be advan-

tageous in the light of the huge connectivity problems on the continent. By creating networks in which the different nodes support each other, the demise of certain nodes would not necessarily have to mean the collapse of the whole network.

As an example of how activist groups in post-apartheid South Africa use ICTs, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) will be discussed. While successes (or failures) of specific civil society groups in their use of new media in specific contexts should not too easily be extrapolated to draw conclusions about Africa as a whole, an investigation into a specific case can be of value. By looking at how certain civil society movements use the Internet and related technologies, one might get an understanding of how they 'form part of the forces that constitute global ICTs, but do so quite specifically as groups with particular physical space and goal commonality' (Mudhai 2003). Although taking place under very specific circumstances, the communication facilitated by new media might be subject to similar power relations, political processes and discourses elsewhere. Moreover, by investigating the wider networks of which specific social movements form part and which are made possible through these new media, one can also start exploring the potential of ICTs for solidarity building, the creation of a pan-African or global public sphere and mobilisation across borders and boundaries.

By considering the ways that TAC make use of ICTs to spread information, mobilise supporters and establish global links, some insight might be obtained into the potential and limitations these technologies hold for similar organisations in Africa.

The Treatment Action Campaign, ICTs and network-building[3]
It has been said (Bennett 2003) that global activism, marked by inter alia mass demonstrations and publicity campaigns is currently at 'impressive levels', and that the Internet and related technologies have in many cases helped organisations to overcome limits of time, space and even identity and ideology. These technologies have, in other words, facilitated the establishment of global networks and the co-ordination of protest action that would not have been possible before (Bennett 2003).

One of the issues around which such a 'global community' consisting of a variety of roleplayers has emerged, is the provision of Aids drugs to developing countries (Redding 2003). The interaction between these participants in the debates has taken place on a different level than traditional interaction between nation-states, but has taken the form of networks of activists reacting to (in different ways and with different foci) the processes of neo-liberal globalisation (Redding 2003). The South African activist group the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) can be seen as one of the members of

this global community. It is one of the most effective and active of the post-apartheid activist groups (Forrest 2003) and its 'media-friendly' image has ensured extensive and favourable media coverage (Jacobs 2004:231, TAC 2003j). TAC's main objective is 'to campaign for greater access to Aids treatment for all South Africans, by raising public awareness and understanding about issues surrounding the availability, affordability and use of HIV treatments' and protest against the 'excessive pricing of antiretroviral medicines' (TAC 2003a, 2003j) by big pharmaceutical companies. Currently the provision of anti-retroviral medicines (ARVs) in the South African public health service is very limited, a fact often attributed to President Thabo Mbeki's scepticism about ARVs and the link between HIV and Aids (see *The Economist* 2003). Recently, the government has called for an investigation into the 'roll-out' of ARVs in the public health sector, but a strategy has not been finalised yet.

TAC has been very visible through its civil disobedience campaigns, the largest mobilisation (up until then also the largest Aids march yet held in South Africa) being a march to parliament on February 14, 2003. It has also already won a case (regarding the provision of drugs preventing mother-to-child transmission of HIV) against the government in the Constitutional Court (TAC 2003j). TAC makes use of the traditional media to promote its cause, but also relies on a website and email to communicate with supporters and establish links with solidarity networks. This makes it an interesting example of how new media technologies can be used by social movements in South Africa.

One of the reasons that the Internet might prove a viable option for a civil society organisation such as TAC is that it also appeals to members of society who can afford Internet connections. According to TAC's national secretary, Mark Heywood, TAC is 'primarily rooted in poor communities' (Heywood 2003) similar to several other social movements currently active in South Africa (see Forrest 2003; Haffajee & Robinson 2003; Kindra 2003). However, TAC straddles different classes and also appeals to the middle class (Geffen 2003), where it has 'managed to reawaken a spirit of volunteerism and commitment amongst many middle class professionals (...)' (Heywood 2003). This support base among a more affluent group with access to ICTs might be instrumental in establishing and maintaining a global solidarity network via the Internet and email. This use of the Internet to reach elites supports the observation by Bennett (2003) about the Internet's 'audience-building capacity' beyond activist circles. Already TAC uses an email list to distribute statements and important news (TAC 2003j) to approximately 1,400 subscribers (May 2003), including 'highly influential people' locally and

abroad (Geffen 2003). Jacobs, (2004:203) also attributes TAC's media success to the middle-class image of its leaders.

How does TAC use the Internet to create local, continental and global networks? The following observations are based on a series of interviews done with TAC officials at TAC's national headquarters in Muizenberg, Cape Town, in September 2003. Although this research brought other interesting aspects of TAC's use of ICTs (e.g. mobilisation) to the fore, this paper will focus only on the establishment of regional, continental and global networks. For TAC's use of the Internet for other uses such as mobilisation and spreading of information, see Wasserman (2003b) and Wasserman & De Beer (2003). In a certain sense, of course, the distinction between regional, continental and global networks is made redundant exactly by the overlapping networks and global reach of the Internet, creating a 'space of flows' in Castells' words, rather than geographical entities. Internet users for instance, may visit TAC's website via the website of an organisation situated in the USA. Nevertheless, the distinction gives an indication of different focal points, or nodes in TAC's support network.

Regional and national

Regional and national links are established and/or strengthened through TAC's use of the Internet and email.

As far as TAC's website is concerned, hyperlinks are provided (TAC 2003g) to South African Aids organisations and activist groups, such as the Aids consortium (a network of more than 300 organisations and 200 individuals) and the Aids Law Project, as well as local information resources such as the Actuarial Society of South Africa's Aids model, the health-care news agency Health-E and the Legal Resources Centre. TAC's regional and national hyperlinks as well as those referring to international websites (to which will be referred below) show similarities with activist or NGO websites in other countries, where the Internet's capability of linking to other websites is also used to expand and consolidate solidarity networks (Bray 1998). TAC's national manager, Nathan Geffen sees the Internet and email as useful tools for reaching 'organisations and middle-class people' and indicates that many supporters have found TAC through their website. Geffen's comments that traffic on the website also increases around the time of protest events, can be seen in page visit statistics provided via an icon on the web page (Nedstatbasic 2003a). During March 2003 the highest number of daily page views (178) was registered on 20 March, the day the TAC embarked on a civil disobedience campaign (TAC 2003f). Visits picked up significantly from the 19th and remained at relatively high levels from the 20th to the 24th. Geffen acknowledges that the members of their email lists 'are not the same people

who come and march', but that they have influential positions and are instrumental in terms of being able to influence policy. Mobilisation for protest action, Geffen outlines, is done through more traditional means like use of pamphlets, word of mouth, phone calls and house to house visits. This is an illustration of the amplification theory (Agre 2002; Brants 2002) that holds that the Internet does not so much introduce a force with entirely new political and social effects, but rather amplifies existing structures and forces. In TAC's case, their support network is amplified by the Internet to now also include members of the 'connected classes' that would otherwise not be reached through their more traditional mobilisation campaigns.

The National Executive Secretary of TAC, Ruka Cornelius, affirms that email is 'integral' to establishing links with NGOs on a provincial level. Traditional media like pamphlets are also used to provide TAC's email address to potential supporters, but a lot of the emails received by TAC are generated through the websites of other organisations that have links to TAC's website. Email is also an 'invaluable tool' for planning between TAC branches and an 'essential tool' in networking, although not all the provincial offices of TAC are linked to the TAC network yet. The chairperson of TAC, Zackie Achmat, has previous experience of using email networks in activist work in the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Aids Law Project. In his opinion e-mail serves 'multiple functions', makes communication within the organisation 'much easier, because it is regular, easy and cheaper', affords him more time to respond and enables him to express his needs more clearly, and also because it provides a record of communications.

However, TAC does not use ICTs in isolation from more traditional methods of spreading information through regional support networks: 'Emails get sent to provincial offices, who contact branches, who contact districts, who distribute posters and pamphlets at train stations and taxi ranks. We go to churches on foot – the message is more simplified usually – also go to NGOs, or fax all of them', says Cornelius. In a township like Khayelitsha, outside Cape Town, mobilisation is reliant on these methods, TAC volunteer Mandla Oliphant affirms. This method of spreading information to community leaders or via community organisations seems to recall the 'two-step flow[4]' process of communication, but also confirms Bennett's remarks (2003) that the constituents of the Internet communication process 'travel in chaotic yet patterned ways'. This might suggest, as do other examples in Africa[5], revising some of the theories regarding Internet communication as they are formulated in other contexts, to make provision for a less individualised form of communication. Instead of either many-to-one, many-to-many or one-to-many (cf. Burnett & Marshall 2003:47), the mediatory aspect in some African

communication contexts rather suggests something to the effect of one-to-one-to-one, or one-to-one-to-many.

The Internet and email therefore extends the range of communication tools available for internal communication within TAC itself, thereby amplifying (Agre 2002) communication networks rather than radically altering them. Achmat confirms that the Internet should be seen as part of a combination of communication methods. 'We have to combine the styles - formal and informal, for example video'. He also refers to a local television series, *Beat It*, which gave TAC exposure and created goodwill for the organisation. Although ICT brought about significant changes it has its limits: 'Contemporary, twenty-four hour media access, such as radio, Internet and so on, have revolutionised communication and organising. The disadvantage of course is that enemies do it too, people who are reactionary. Email is a very effective tool, but doesn't replace personal communication'. Achmat adds that TAC's email lists 'used to be completely open until the drug companies started using them to send stuff to our lists'.

While agreeing that TAC's website and email newsletter (see below) have made a 'significant difference' to middle-class support, Geffen reminds one that people from the working class and poor people are excluded from their Internet and email activities, due to limited access to the Internet and email. Geffen says that although all paid TAC staff have access, access among their general membership is 'very low' and something they need to address, through for example providing PCs to their smaller branches. According to Achmat TAC does provide its members with some training on the use of new media by sending them on IT courses. TAC's problems regarding the availabilty of computer hardware and lack of training is a common problem among politically orientated institutions and organisations in South Africa (Struwig & Conradie 2003:257).

Continental

One of TAC's mailing lists, africa@tac.org.za, is devoted to the Pan African HIV/Aids Treatment Access Movement (PHATAM) and according to Geffen has approximately 1,000 members. This movement was developed after 70 delegates from 21 African countries met in Cape Town in August 2002. A declaration, in which demands for measures aimed at preventing and treating people living with HIV/Aids in Africa were set out, was directed to national governments in Africa, donor countries, multilateral institutions, pharmaceutical companies and the private sector (PHATAM 2002). This declaration was also sent out on several lists in South Africa, the rest of Africa and abroad, including TAC's newsletter. This movement can therefore

be seen as having specific local and continental interests at heart, but with a global reach.

However, TAC's links page does not include this movement nor any other specifically African organisations (except those within South Africa).

According to Njogu Morgan, TAC International Co-ordinator (Morgan 2003), e-mail correspondence is used for lobbying and advocacy in other African countries. To express solidarity with similar groups and to share literacy materials with them. The email list is also used to provide 'the latest news on access to anti-retrovirals in countries, regionally and internationally, reports from members on their upcoming activities, strategising by members and [to offer] moral support when members pass on' (Morgan 2003).

Page view statistics on the TAC website (Nedstatbasic 2003b) show that the majority of visitors to the website came from Africa, with North America and Europe respectively in the second and third place. However, a break-down according to country suggests that most of these visits originated in South Africa, with other African countries like Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Congo and Kenya much lower on the list.

Global

TAC's website serves as a means for the local organisation to link with established global networks of solidarity and political pressure. TAC's links page (TAC 2003g) represents a wide range of activist groups or information resources from all over the world, including international organisations such as the Nobel Prize recipients, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) and the United Nations Programme on HIV/Aids (UNAIDS). It also serves as a site for cross-reference to other protest events taking place internationally (TAC 2003j). TAC's international links signifies the extent to which TAC forms part of a new global movement of social activists (Moore 2003).

TAC's website also serves to embed local representations in global networks of meaning, which, according to Bennett (2003), is another important factor in the networking potential of the Internet. Through what he calls the 'global imaging' of protests, not only the organisation of protests but also their representation across geographical borders are made possible through the Internet. According to this logic, TAC's inclusion on its website (TAC 2003k) of photographs of its protest action as well as of events with high symbolic value like the visit Achmat received of Nelson Mandela, a funeral and an interfaith church service, activates liberatory and religious discourses respectively. By including these photos, TAC can also on a symbolic representational level 'simultaneously occupy local, national, and transnational global space' (Mittleman, cited in Bennett 2003). That TAC capitalises on

the liberatory discourses in the wake of South African democratisation, can furthermore be seen in the choice of date to orchestrate an international Day of Solidarity in the week of April 27, 2003 – to coincide with the ninth anniversary of South African democracy. This day is also further indication of TAC's worldwide solidarity network, since protests were held in New York, Los Angeles, London, Paris, Manila, Delhi, Nairobi and Brussels (Jacobs 2004:231).

Furthermore, the networks brought about by these linkages not only amplify the mobilisation of activists, but may also stimulate 'collective cogition' (Agre 1999) – through these networks individuals, such as those living with HIV/Aids may find the support (e.g. information, solidarity, shared experiences) they need while not actually necessarily participating in collective action.

Even though much of TAC's raison d'être is directly related to the vast socio-economic divides in South Africa, which makes ARVs inaccessible to the majority who do not have private medical care and necessitate special literacy programmes on a number of HIV/Aids-related issues (see TAC 2003j for examples of these) it also draws support from an elite, both nationally and internationally, including both black and white intelligentsia (Haffajee & Robinson 2003). This international support network makes it important for TAC to have a web presence.

Page view statistics on the TAC website (Nedstatbasic 2003b) also show much activity originating from North America and Europe, with many other countries also represented.

According to Geffen, TAC's email list for newsletters (news@tac.org.za) contains 'some very influential subscribers like the World Health Organisation and the United Nations as well as governments from countries abroad. TAC's newsletter is sent out once a week to approximately 1,600 subscribers. Another list, internat@tac.org.za, is dedicated to activists in and outside South Africa, and has a membership of about 150. Although protest actions are mostly held locally, TAC does sometimes co-ordinate protests in other parts of the world to coincide with local ones. This, according to TAC volunteer Mandla Oliphant, are mostly done through e-mail. Iming Lin, a volunteer fund-raising assistant at TAC, says the Internet is very important for making contact with social movements in especially the US, where people are used to donating money online. The Internet provides access to a larger number of people and email makes it possible to attach pamphlets, more easily than faxing them. Sammy Moshenberg, International Volunteer Co-ordinator, estimates that 80 per cent of the emails from prospective volunteers are from abroad. She is herself an employee of a women's organisa-

tion in the US, and the Internet makes it possible for her to spend part of her day doing her work for her US employer and the rest as volunteer for TAC.

It would therefore seem that ICTs are used pervasively in the activities of TAC, performing a variety of functions ranging from mobilisation to the spreading of information. As members of TAC's leadership have pointed out, however, these ICTs are effective predominantly inasmuch as they succeed in harnassing support from a connected middle class. For those activities aimed at the grassroots, traditional media are used. If TAC, with its large component of elite support (Jacobs 2004:233), is so limited in its use of especially the Internet, it will probably be more so in the case of organisations with a smaller measure of support among the elite. This might also be true in other African countries.

The viability of ICTs for social activism in Africa

A lot has been written and said about Africa's communication backlog. Just as one should avoid a crude technological determinism in exploring the positive potential of new media such as the Internet, one should also not overstate the negative aspects relating to connectivity and lose sight of the innovative use of these technologies by activist groupings on the continent. Although Africa has seen a boom in the take-up of certain new technologies like cell phones (Ashurst 2001) the statistics regarding Internet usage is considerably less upbeat. The term 'Digital Divide' has gained common currency. It not only refers to inequalities in Internet access internal to even developed countries, where connectivity is unevenly spread according to social, racial, gender, age and spatial factors (Castells 2000:377), but, in the context of this paper specifically, to the vast difference between different regions of the world. Africa is among the poorest connected of these, although recent surveys suggest some growth (for a discussion of some these statistics, see Conradie et al. 2003; Wasserman 2003c; Wasserman & De Beer 2003). African connectivity figures are also subject to the same interpretations ranging from the utopian to the dystopian as are some of the Internet's applications (e.g. for e-democracy, see Struwig & Conradie 2003:252). Whether one takes an optimistic or pessimistic view of these fi-gures, the question of 'real access', including connectivity as well as the necessary skills and technological literacy, should be considered seriously. Furthermore, these inequalities are indicative of larger, structural inequalities between Africa and the developed world. Some fear that the digital divide might even perpetuate or exacerbate existing global inequalities of wealth and power distribution, and that access to information alone will not necessarily result in development (APC & CRIS 2003:13).

When assessing the potential ICTs hold for African social movements, connectivity problems should prevent overly optimistic analyses. The particularities of the specific social movements and the specific African country will have to be accounted for in these analyses, as they will differ depending on the situation. For instance, vast inequalities in Internet access exist in South Africa. Internet connectivity correlates with the racial, gender and class divides of apartheid (see for instance Webchek 2001, 2002), although there are some indications (Balancing Act 2003) of some improvement. Responses from government also included, with mixed success, so-called telecentres to combat the urban-rural divide (Conradie et al. 2003). This means that the way ICTs are used by civil society or activist organisations such as the Treatment Action Campaign will have to be shaped around these realities. As shown above, this might mean that the Internet is used mainly for expanding the activities of the social movements on a global level or among elites, or that new media technologies are complemented with more traditional ways of communication and mobilisation. In a survey done among South African institutions and organisations in the political sphere, including NGOs, a range of problems regarding affordability and skills were raised (Struwig & Conradie 2003:257). ICTs in Africa are often subject to strict regulations and taxes (Mutume 2003) and faced by a range of socio-cultural, economic and infrastructural hindrances (Wasserman & De Beer 2003).

Add to this the warning (Redding 2003) against the overstatement of the pervasiveness of the global movement around issues such as access to Aids drugs as this activism has mainly involved an intellectual and socio-economic elite, and a rather pessimistic view of the potential of ICTs and especially the Internet for African social movements and continental networks might result.

Nevertheless, the fact that ICTs should not be viewed as utopian terms, does not mean that one should opt for a completely dystopian view. ICTs like the Internet might not change the world completely, but they might change some things (cf. Nakamura 2002:xiii). While it remains necessary to remain realistic when exploring the possibilities of ICT networks for social activism in Africa, some successes have been achieved. While the use of ICTs by a group like TAC remain modest in contrast to the problems and challenges that still remain, the potential of this medium should not be discounted.

Conclusion

In the era of globalisation one cannot think of Pan-Africanism without seeing African countries and African civil society as part of global networks of

power, the global economy and the global public sphere (see Alexander 2003). But this does not mean that African interests should be subjected to the global hegemony. The same new media that accelerates globalisation can also be used by African activists, to create a counter-flow of information and communication by publicising their aims to a broader audience. These media can also be used to draw on sympathies abroad and in so doing to embed local issues within global discourses and solidarity networks.

If there is a challenge where renewed collaboration between African countries is needed, where the demands to protect local interests from the negative effects of corporate globalisation[7] are urgent and where global solidarity should be sought and tapped, it is the fight against HIV/Aids. As Alexander (2003) points out, this pandemic will have an effect on Africa for decades to come and can make a mockery of the African Renaissance put forward by the same leader who has repeatedly received criticism for his questionable views of the disease. It is therefore fitting that an Aids activist group such as TAC should also harness the globalising medium of the Internet and other ICTs to fight this battle. In forming not only intra-continental but also global networks through the use of ICTs, TAC is indeed redefining the ideal of Pan-Africanism within the sphere of globalisation. This means that co-operation on a continental level in the pursuit of common goals cannot be seen separately from the continent's position within a global context. ICTs, as one of the facilitators of accelerated globalisation, create a tension between the local and the global. Through ICTs African issues can be incorporated within global spheres of influence. In this regard the example of the Pan-African HIV/Aids Treatment Access Movement indicates how a network can be established which simultaneously consolidates African organisations around an issue while opening this Pan-African network, via postings to other email lists, to global users forming communities of interest. The networks of which an organisation like TAC forms part and which is facilitated through new media technologies, should not be seen in technological determinist ways - they are not only a causal result of new communication technologies, but also of broader processes of globalisation on political, economic and cultural levels (Bennett 2003). However, a realistic view of the infrastructural limitations incumbent upon the use of ICTs in Africa should be taken. In this regard the priority given to the development of ICTs in the framework of Nepad should be welcomed.

Notes
1. The ease with which the Internet facilitates protests also have a negative side– Gurak & Logie (2003:43) point out, for instance, that the anonimity of Web protests raise 'credibility concerns'.

2. Of the twelve prominent social movements listed in Forrest (2003), seven had their own official websites while information on some of the others were included in the web pages of other civil society groups. Some of the most important groups having their own websites, were the Treatment Action Campaign (www.tac.org.za), the Anti-Privatisation Forum (www.apf.org.za), the National Land Committee (www.nlc.co.za), the Education Rights Project (www.erp.org.za), the Anti-Eviction Campaign (www.antieviction.org.za), the Palestine Solidarity Committee (http://psc.za.org) and the South Durban Community Environmental Alliance (http://scnc.udw.ac.za/~ub/cbos/sdcea/whatissdcea.html) .

3. The author wishes to thank Sieraaj Ahmed and Clayton Swart for their assistance in gathering information during fieldwork at TAC. Except when otherwise noted, all the interviews referred to in this section is transcribed in Ahmed & Swart (2003).

4. Oliphant adds that short message services (SMS) on mobile telephones are not used on a co-ordinated basis to extend the reach of other forms of communication. This might strike as surprising in the light of South Africa's robust cellular phone industry, built on the dearth of communication infrastructure in black townships created by apartheid. Cell phones has also been seen 'fulfilling ordinary Africans' aspirations for a voice', resulting in South Africa having more cell phones than fixed lines (Ashurst 2001:14-15). Consequently, cellphones are increasingly seen as a way of extending the limited penetration of the ICTs in Africa, through for instance SMS messaging (e.g. in health care, see Mayhew, 2003) or to provide wireless Internet connections (see Stones, 2003). SMS TAC provincial co-ordinator Thembeka Majali did indicate that SMS's are used by TAC co-ordinators to get hold of branch leaders, who would pass on the information to members – another example of a communication flow showing similarities with the two-step flow mentioned above.

5. Richard Koman (2003), notes the Ugandan example of community radio stations offering an email service to rural listeners. People can email one another care of the radio station, and at a designated time the radio will, at a small cost, alert everyone who has received an email.

6. In interviews with TAC members (Ahmed & Swart, 2003) many of them mentioned e-mail as the standard way of being informed of the deaths of co-members of the organisation.

7. Such as the pricing of anti-retrovirals through multinational companies, see Bond, 2003.

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NGOs and Conflict Prevention in Burundi: A Case Study

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Abstract

Since the abortive coup in October 1993, Burundi has been in a severe crisis, however, lately reaching a more hopeful situation. The international community has made substantial efforts at preventing the escalation of the conflict and at contributing to a process for sustainable peace in the country. This includes the UN system, bilateral countries and in particular the neighbouring states. A number of NGOs have been among the actors. Here the efforts of some major NGOs lending their support to Burundi's peace process are discussed both as regards their support for peace building and for support to peace mediation. The aim has been to assess their performance based on their aims and objectives in relation to respective NGO's overall reasons for coming to Burundi in the first place, as well as their wider aims. Efforts are made to find common denominators and possible conclusions and recommendations useful for others involved in similar activities in Burundi and elsewhere.

Résumé

Depuis le coup d'état avorté d'octobre 1993, le Burundi est empêtré dans une sévère crise, mais tente toutefois d'améliorer sa situation difficile. La communauté internationale a fourni d'importants efforts pour empêcher l'escalade de ce conflit, et contribuer à la mise en place d'un processus de paix durable dans ce pays. Parmi les membres de cette communauté internationale figurent les NU, les pays bilatéraux, particulièrement les pays voisins, ainsi qu'un certain nombre d'ongs. Ce texte décrit les efforts de certaines grandes ongs, soutenant le processus de paix au Burundi et participant aux opérations de médiation vers la paix. L'objectif est d'évaluer leurs

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réalisations, sur la base des objectifs que celles-ci s'étaient fixées en s'implantant au Burundi, mais également sur la base de visées plus larges. L'on tente de trouver des dénominateurs communs, ainsi que d'éventuelles conclusions et recommandations, qui serviraient à d'autres éléments impliqués dans les mêmes activités au Burundi et ailleurs.

Introduction

Since the abortive coup in October 1993, in which the first democratically elected president was assassinated, Burundi has been in a severe crisis – the latest in a cycle of conflicts over the past forty years. The international community has aimed at preventing the escalation of the conflict and at contributing to a process for sustainable peace in the country. A number of NGOs have been among the actors.

Undoubtedly and unfortunately, the war will continue in Burundi, though, ultimately, a more inclusive peace process should lead to a more durable negotiated compromise and a more solid peace. The partial political agreement signed in Arusha on 28 August 2000 did not automatically bring peace but cleared the way for a sharper focus on essential negotiations between the real armed belligerents.

In this case study,[1] I will discuss the activities and efforts of some major NGOs lending their support to Burundi's peace process under two headings: a) support for peace building and b) support to peace mediation. The first refers to efforts in building an infrastructure of attitudes and institutions as a basis for a sustainable peace; the second refers to support to the peace mediation and negotiation process. Although closely interrelated, a major difference can be found in their time perspectives. While there are very few restrictions in presenting work under the first heading, it is only possible to give an overall presentation of the work under the second heading due to its confidential nature in the midst of a formal peace negotiation process.

My aim is to assess the performance of some NGOs in Burundi based on their aims and objectives. It is not sufficient to simply study whether the objective of each separate activity has been fulfilled or not according to short-term goals. It is also necessary to study the respective NGO´s overall reasons for coming to Burundi in the first place, as well as their wider aims. By doing

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1. This case study, which was finalised in November 2000, was prepared as part of the Reflection On Peace Practice Project (RPP), a collaborative learning project of over 50 agencies worldwide that work to address violent conflict. RPP was jointly directed by the Collaborative for Development Action in Cambridge, Massachusetts and the Life and Peace Institute in Uppsala, Sweden.

this, my hope is to find common denominators and possible conclusions and recommendations useful for others involved in similar activities in Burundi and elsewhere.

Background: 1993–2000

The countries in the Great Lakes Region have in recent years met with an increasing amount of conflict and violence – the genocide in Rwanda, the two wars in DRC and the continuous conflict in Burundi. All conflicts in the region are interrelated and none of them can be solved without major improvements in the rest of the region. Although this text mainly concentrates on Burundi, the regional perspective must always be kept in mind.

There is no doubt that Burundi has been in a state of severe political crisis for a considerable period. There is an abundance of written material on the distant and more contemporary history (Abdallah, Evans, Reyntjens, UNHCR, van Eck). An analysis of this documentation does not provide any easy explanations for the present situation. On the contrary, one of the few safe conclusions is that the present crisis results from an accumulation of past events, with one factor forming a building block for the next.

Burundi, together with Rwanda, is perhaps the most illustrative case of manipulation of a pre-colonial society, built up over centuries. Both countries were historically well developed political entities with a special background of co-habitation between different groups. The small size of the countries, the fertile soils and plentiful rainfall created a basis for population increase and nation building. However, from the latter part of the 19th century, i.e. the end of the pre-colonial era, over the two periods of colonial occupation by Germany (1899–1916) and Belgium (1916–1962), and particularly, in the post colonial period, the elite manipulated the relationships between the different groups, creating the deadly 'ethnic' divide which still prevails.

The causes of politicised ethnicity, between Hutu and Tutsi, are thus not easily defined. A crisis has been built up over time, leading to a severely divided nation on the brink of self-destruction.

Although Burundi went through a number of problems in the 1980s, it was seen as one of the best examples of democratic development in Africa. Elections took place in June 1993 and were declared fair and successful by the international community. However, to the surprise of many – including President Buyoya – the electorate voted in accordance with its ethnic allegiance. For the first time in modern history, the Hutus received recognition and gained responsibility for the country. The Hutus' self respect grew enormously – a very important fact to grasp in order to understand what is happening today.

Democracy was never allowed to get a foothold. Some Tutsi leaders, particularly within the army and the legal profession, did not accept the situation. As the number of Hutus introduced to government jobs grew, Tutsis felt ever more threatened, which ultimately, in October 1993, led to the assassination of President Ndadaye and a number of prominent Frodebu leaders. The following three years, the country experienced 'a creeping coup', as Professor Filip Reyntjens puts it, eroding the power of the elected government and increasing the power of mainly Tutsi extremists. The coup itself and the counter reactions are estimated to have led to the death of approximately 50,000 and, in the years after, about 150,000.

In July 1996, after the death of another Frodebu president and the killing of tens of thousands on both sides, Buyoya returned to power through a military coup. The international community had problems on how to handle the nullifying of a democratic government elected only a few years earlier. At the same time, most international actors saw the political chaos just before the military coup and thought that an alternative to Buyoya might result in increased oppression of the majority.

While most big powers gave Buyoya 'the benefit of the doubt' neighbouring states took clear positions against the military coup. With OAU's support, they imposed sanctions against Burundi and demanded the reestablishment of the pre-coup parliament, free political activities and negotiations between the different parties. Former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere was appointed mediator between the combating groups within and outside Burundi. After almost two years of very slow progress, the Arusha peace talks started in the summer of 1998.

Internal negotiations between the Frodebu-dominated parliament and Buyoya's government resulted in the internal partnership government in 1998. The Agreement was not a return to the democratic framework established in 1993, but was probably the only possible compromise at that time.

The negotiations in Arusha brought together 19 internal and external political and military groups; first under the leadership of Julius Nyerere and, after his death in October 1999, under Nelson Mandela. The greatest hurdle was how to get the different military groups to agree on and keep to an armistice. The main rebel groups, operating from Tanzania and DRC, were the most difficult to get on board, and since mid-1999 their fighting even increased. The violence travelled from one region to another. During 1999, the government felt so threatened that they moved large groups of people to guarded camps, which in turn increased the protests and counterattacks. This was the reason why most work, both openly and behind closed doors, had been concentrated on negotiations between the armed groups and the army.

Under the leadership of Mandela, the peace discussions at Arusha finally, on 28 August 2000, led to a partial agreement. After this study was concluded in September 2000 the peace process continued. On first November 2001 an important part of the Arusha Agreement was implemented as the new Transitional Government was installed. Parallel with this, the fighting between the National Army and the more and more split-up armed opposition continued. It was only late 2003 that all but one armed opposition group had laid down arms and joined the process. Peace agreements have been signed, members of the former armed opposition groups have joined the Transitional Government and integration of former rebel fighters into the National Army is under way. It is thus likely that the efforts discussed in this study have actually led to positive results even if the situation remains tense with great risks of setbacks and new conflicts.

International interest in the peace efforts
After the coup in October 1993, the international community followed the development in Burundi with great concern. The self-criticism among international organisations and major powers after the genocide in Rwanda 1994, led to an increased number of initiatives which all aimed at preventing the escalation of the conflict in Burundi. The United Nations and the OAU appointed special representatives to Burundi and a number of international organisations, bilateral donors and NGOs sent missions and observers to assess the situation and give suggestions to actions in order to alleviate the crisis. International awareness was clearly established and there is no doubt a willingness to contribute to de-escalate the crisis existed.

During an initial period of political confusion, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Burundi (SRSG), Mr. Ould Abdallah, made a unique and important contribution. As far as his mandate allowed, he assisted in the co-ordination of outside interventions and in the assignment of specific roles to the different actors on the scene.

With reference to the neighbouring countries' interventions through the Arusha negotiations and the sanctions after the 1996 coup, it must be concluded that there are few other national conflicts in Africa where that many states have been so insistently involved in promoting peace and democracy in a neighbouring state.

Many of the major powers, such as the United States, France and Belgium (the latter, because of history) have intervened and been active on the international scene, but done surprisingly little in Burundi itself. In fact, most of them withdrew their aid and military assistance as a consequence of the abortive coup in October 1993. Belgium, France and Germany (closed in December 1999) retained embassies in Bujumbura. The United States and

Europe (EU) appointed Special envoys for Burundi, Howard Wolpe and Aldo Ajello respectively. Interestingly, while most European countries slowed down or completely halted their direct assistance to Burundi, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway became more active.

NGO support to peace efforts

A number of NGOs wanted to contribute to the peace process. I will mainly cover two of them, International Alert and Search for Common Ground, both invited by the SRSG to engage in Burundi. In addition to these two, I will shortly discuss the Sant'Egidio Community and the South African Centre for Conflict Resolution.

Search for Common Ground in Washington, DC, and its sister organization, the European Center for Common Ground in Brussels, are independent, non-profit organizations dedicated to transforming conflict into cooperative action. Established respectively in 1982 and 1995, they apply innovative techniques of conflict prevention and resolution, negotiation, facilitation, and collaborative problem-solving to a broad range of conflicts. At core, all their programs engage conflicting parties to identify where they share common problems and concerns since shared interests is the best way to develop mutual trust.

International Alert (Alert) was founded in 1985 by a group of human rights advocates in response to growing concerns over ethnic conflict and genocide. They recognised that the denial of human rights often led to internal armed conflicts, inevitably undermining efforts to protect individual and collective human rights and to promote sustainable social and economic development.

Alert's experience of conflict situations is that there can be no quick fixes. Its philosophy is therefore process-oriented, demanding time, patience and extended engagement in constructive efforts leading to medium and long-term change. Alert recognises the capacity of people to resolve their own conflicts and believes that they must be the primary actors in building sustainable peace, which is time demanding.

The Community of Sant'Egidio (or Saint Giles) was established in Rome in 1968. Members try to live by the light of the Gospel, and in direct relationship with the poor. Since 1986, the Community has been recognised as a 'public association of lay people within the Church', approved by the Holy See. At the same time, Sant'Egidio is broadly ecumenical, welcoming all Christians (and anyone who would like to participate) to its prayers and work.

Recently, the Community has become more involved in peace reconciliation. After their involvement in the peace agreement in Mozambique,

contacts with and requests from countries that have experienced similar armed catastrophes, have led to continued involvement.

The South African Centre for Conflict Resolution seeks to contribute towards a just peace in South Africa and elsewhere in Africa by promoting constructive, creative and co-operative approaches to the resolution of conflict and the reduction of violence. It's associated with the University of Cape Town. Mediation facilitation, training, education and research comprise the Centre's main activities with an emphasis on capacity building. The goals of the Centre are to:

- provide third party assistance;
- equip and empower individuals and groups;
- participate in national and regional peace initiatives;
- promote public awareness around conflict resolution;
- contribute towards an understanding of conflict and violence; and
- contribute to the transformation of the South African society and its institutions by promoting democratic values.

A number of other organizations have acted as catalysts for the peace process in Burundi. The Carter Center arranged two meetings at a crucial point in the process of conflict prevention in Burundi, opening the way for coordinated action by the neighbouring states. The two conferences, Cairo (November 1995) and Tunis (February 1996), were important for the Nyerere initiative to develop.

The Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation was established in June 1996, as a permanent tribute to Julius Nyerere's contribution to improving the sustainability and quality of human relations. The Foundation's work is based on Nyerere's philosophy and belief that all people are equal, deserve respect by virtue of their humanity and are the purpose and justification of all human activity in any society. Their work should reflect the values, principles and character of the Founder and first chairman Nyerere. The practical tasks for institutional capacity building and programme development are organically linked, requiring different but complementary methods for goal achievement.

The Burundi Peace Negotiations is a project of the Foundation. It is recognised that the Arusha negotiations are only one aspect of the Peace process. Monitoring the implementation of agreements and participating in creating the environment for its sustainability through acceptance and ownership by the people of Burundi are other critical aspects to be developed and is supported by the Foundation. Subsequent to the death of Nyerere, former President Nelson Mandela assumed the role of Facilitator of the Burundi Peace Process under the Foundation.

Action Aid, Christian Aid and Oxfam have also recently been active in Burundi, working with long-term support at the grassroot level. Although not discussed here, their work on the grassroot level is an important basis for peace building and long-term development. One celebrated example is the Action Aid program in the Ruyigi region.

Peace building

The general objective of peace building activities is to create an attitude conducive to sustainable peace. It is a long-term project and invariably requires major attitudinal and societal changes towards democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and protection of minority rights. It is difficult and probably not that valuable to assess every small intervention in the light of this overall objective. My purpose is to assess the different activities and interventions by Search for Common Ground and International Alert to draw some joint conclusions in order to find the common denominators which might be useful for others working in Burundi or elsewhere.

Search for Common Ground (SEARCH)

In Burundi, Search's programs have taken the form of a Women's Peace Center, a radio production house, and a youth project. In addition, Search, in 1996, partnered with former ANC parliamentarian Jan van Eck to launch a Political Dialogue project centring around Van Eck's experience and expertise in negotiation and reconciliation.

Search for Common Ground's engagement in a conflict situation is guided by the following principles:

1) After making a commitment to long-term engagement in the country or region, they strive to maintain maximum flexibility to create and adjust specific programs aimed at reconciliation and peace-building. Analysis and evaluations are done at the outset of projects, but are also continuously used to identify areas of maximum impact.

2) 'Understand the differences, act on the commonalities'. In each Search project, the organization seeks to engage locally-based partners who represent the different stakeholders to the conflict, work with them to identify possible areas of mutual concern, and facilitate a process to pursuit those shared interests. As a result, each project is completely different. The long-term goal is to develop relationships of mutual trust as the basis for addressing the conflict at hand more directly.

3) Seek high-impact 'leverage points'. Search works with local partners to seek those that may have the maximum impact on the conflict.

4) Focus on long-term reconciliation and peace-building. While Search sometimes engages in crisis-prevention as situations present

themselves, the main approaches involve long-term relationship-building efforts across traditional barriers. By working with local actors to identify and apply multiple strategies, the organization hopes to maximize breakthroughs at different levels of the conflict.

Studio Ijambo

When Search for Common Ground decided to incorporate a media component, radio was the natural choice. Radio is productive and cost effective means for delivering information. In fact, radio is such a powerful tool in the Great Lakes region as a whole, that it has often been exploited to manipulate listeners and to promote fear, mistrust and violence. With the goal of using radio as a tool to achieve the opposite results, Search established Studio Ijambo, Burundi's first independent radio studio.

■ Objectives

The Studio's objectives were to:

1. provide balanced coverage within and outside Burundi, allow access to accurate information, foster debate and discussion, and keep Burundi linked to the outside world;

2. build a regional network to increase Burundi's profile, allow for a regionally integrated approach and increase and integrate understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the media;

3. aid the peace process by broadcasting speeches from Arusha in a language that everyone can understand, and support discussions within the country as well as at the negotiating table;

4. emphasise Burundi's common cultural base by making and broadcasting cultural-based programmes, and help strengthen groups (such as women) who have played little part in the violence; and

5. bear witness and keep alive a sense of hope by demonstrating that not everyone behaves violently in a crisis situation, that other countries have gone through and come out of similar nightmares, and that there are always people of good faith.

■ Project content

How many listeners Studio Ijambo's programmes reach varies greatly due to the changing availability of radio stations in the region. Nonetheless, Studio Ijambo has consistently aimed at producing relevant, accurate and entertaining radio programmes aired throughout Burundi and the larger Great Lakes region.

To start with, the Studio's main objective was to provide the country and region with balanced, reliable news on the quickly changing events. They hired journalists of varied ethnic backgrounds and assigned them to report on stories together, each journalist gathering information from communities

to which he or she had better access. The Studio then combined these reports into news programmes, aired over multiple radio stations.

Studio Ijambo's early news programming became one of the only reliable sources of accurate and unbiased information in Burundi. To date, most indigenous sources of news for international wire services including the Associated Press (AP), Reuters, Agence France Press and Voice of America (VOA) originate from former or current Studio Ijambo journalists.

Next, they introduced Social and Cultural Magazine Programmes, emphasising social and cultural programming encouraging reconciliation and highlighting areas of mutual concern. These include programmes on:

- a variety of social issues that touch Hutus and Tutsis alike, ranging from issues of healthcare to agriculture to the economy
- international examples of conflict situations and analyses of how they have progressed toward a peaceful resolution
- human rights, environment, peace and tolerance
- cross-ethnic solidarity and bravery, both during the crisis of 1993-1996, and more recently.

Most of the programmes are in Kirundi – spoken by all Burundians – and some in French.

One of the most important innovations in the Studio's programming was the addition of a soap opera to address sensitive topics and common daily problems – both entertaining and supportive of reconciliation. As news programmes, particularly those aired over the national radio station, are susceptible to censorship, the soap opera provides an alternative means through which some of the most sensitive matters may be addressed to the broadest possible Burundian audience. When the 275th such programme was broadcasted, a majority of the population listened to it, according to available statistics.

The Studio also produced four different educational programmes designed to inform and stimulate discussion. As well as having programmes that touch directly on reconciliation and information, the Studio works to provide a much needed entertaining, inter-community contact. While these comprise only a small portion of the Studio's output, they serve the essential function of reviving Burundi's cultural heritage and pride by celebrating local artists and culture.

One of the Studio's main functions is to develop the local capacity for responsible media. Several of the Studio journalists have been trained both inside and outside of Burundi on topics ranging from technical skills to responsible journalism.

The Studio also aims to build a regional network to facilitate reporting by expanding the number of outlets for its programming, participating in several training initiatives and developing partnerships. One of the main constraints on the Studio's effectiveness is the difficulty to secure a variety of broadcasting outlets, an issue being investigated and worked on.

Women's Peace Center

■ Background

Burundian women must be included as key players in the process of ethnic reconciliation and have access to the tools necessary to fulfil that role. Sustained conflict has resulted in a disproportionate number of women being forced to play non-traditional roles as head of households and other positions of responsibility for which many are ill-prepared and unsupported. The Women's Center was founded to offer a safe space for women of all ethnicities to come and talk about their problems and provide technical skills. The Women's center is staffed by an ethnically diverse team.

■ Objectives

The Center's main objectives are to:
- empower female peacemakers by facilitating their capacity to network and cooperate, boosting their access to funding and resources, attracting publicity to their activities as appropriate and providing training;
- incorporate local administrations and partners to create environments where women can work in stability and peace with the understanding and support of local administrations;
- promote women's economic development;
- develop structures/platforms for women to voice their needs, issues and opinions, and support effective representation through appropriate government institutions, with training provided accordingly; and
- undertake regional initiatives and partnerships to promote understanding of the conflict and its causes and to share tools to manage and prevent further violence.

■ Project content

Search for Common Ground established the first Women's Center in Burundi in January 1996. The Center provides a neutral ground for nascent women's associations to meet, plan activities and receive training. In addition to providing space for such gatherings, the Center also schedules weekly roundtable sessions on topics that concern women from all ethnic groups. These discussions initially attracted about 30 women, and have since increased to as many

as 150 women. Roundtables have proven to be an effective tool, as they allow tracking of changing needs.

Throughout its existence, the Center has been used equally by women from the highest levels of civil society to the grassroot level. By the end of 1999, between 100 and 200 women visited the Center weekly.

As the women's associative movement in Burundi evolved, the Center's role developed from being a simple forum for exchange and training to a link between increasingly independent and self-sufficient local associations and funders. Initially brought together by immediate needs, women can now find longer-term benefits from their associations, including friendship, solidarity and understanding. The Center promotes coalitions for effective action and activities in the larger community, instead of their immediate constituencies.

The Center works with the main local network of women's associations, CAFOB, and groups associated with Oxfam, World Food Programme and other international NGOs in a wide variety of fields including agriculture, law, human rights and the media. By collaborating, they avoid costly and inefficient overlapping.

The Center also continues to provide support for newer associations, but this is now more need-driven and targeted towards information on how to access local funding, build small income generation programmes, access legal assistance and work with local authorities and communities.

In addition, the Center seeks to organise events and projects around developments likely to affect all Burundian women. These become natural points of common ground and they have resulted in numerous benefits, including a network of conflict resolution practitioners, a platform for Burundian women to voice their needs, as well as forging much-needed co-operative relationships between civil society actors and relevant government institutions. The Center's Legal Rights programme is a successful example.

In addition to the Legal Rights activities, which have targeted every commune in Bujumbura, Gitega and Ngozi provinces, the Women's Center regularly holds workshops, training sessions and roundtables in the interior of the country. It has struggled with how to reincorporate the internally displaced populations to their original communities, an essential task for a lasting peace.

In 1997–98, it joined with Ligue Iteka and the Center for Conflict Resolution in South Africa to organise a Burundi Conflict Resolution Train the Trainers Programme that would complement the network of trainers developed through the International Alert/Unifem/Search. The programme's goal is to foster the growth of skilled conflict resolution trainers and facilitators.

Youth project

Search is also working with the local Burundian youth association, JAMAA, to bring together young men throughout the city of Bujumbura and its surrounding areas for a series of recreational and communal activities designed to build relationships of trust and help them work together for positive social change. Search and JAMAA have targeted disadvantaged youth from each of the most divided districts in and around Bujumbura; those who are without an education or jobs as well as those who have suffered particularly from or actively participated in the ethnically charged violence. Most of the youth are leaders in their communities and all are aged between 18 and 29. Search and JAMAA have organized soccer tournaments, published a Kirundi cartoon book entitled 'A Better Choice' and organized a series of exchanges and weekend camps during which the youth have come to know each other as friends. In 2000, the project was hoping to raise the funding necessary to develop work camps, where ethnically mixed groups would work together to clean and rebuild their schools, churches, and hospitals. Search and JAMAA hope that by engaging youth, they can address one of the main sources of past instability and future hope.

International Alert (Alert)

Objectives

After deciding to work in Burundi, Alert, together with the UN SRSG arranged a major conference in London in early 1995 where they defined relevant activities to be distributed between interested parties. A small team spending a great deal of time in Burundi started activities centred around three study tours to South Africa, leading to a number of follow-up activities. Based on guidance from the UN SRSG, and other analyses, the aim of Alert was defined as 'helping to prevent escalation of the conflict and contributing effectively to a process of achieving a just and peaceful resolution to the crisis in Burundi'.

   Within that aim, Alert each year reviews and redefines its objectives, as in its 1999 annual report:
   - *Learning and Analysis* – to continue to learn, analyse and share information about the causes of the conflict, and about forces and events affecting Burundi's progress to peace;
   - *Dialogue* – to support and facilitate dialogue and confidence-building between political and ethnic antagonists;
   - *Capacity-building* – to strengthen the knowledge and skills of individuals, and the capacities of groups and organisations to work for a just and sustainable peace;

- *Catalyst action* – to act as a catalyst in support of changes favourable to peace;
- *Advocacy* – to contribute to policy-making by international actors and advocate appropriate measures on the basis of analysed information.

Learning, analysis, advocacy

Alert's Burundi staff has constantly widened their network inside the country, and expanded their dialogue with dissident armed groups and with Burundian political exiles. As a matter of routine, Alert consults with the South African Centre for Conflict Resolution, the Sant'Egidio Community, International Crisis Group, and Search for Common Ground, as well as with leading academic figures who monitor and analyse events in the Great Lakes region. They also have regular meetings and exchanges with interested UN, North American and European foreign affairs officials and diplomats.

Information, perceptions and views come primarily from these direct contacts and are supplemented by continuous monitoring of events. Alert continues to produce and circulate short political analyses and updates. During 1999, Alert made a specific study of the Justice system and later a major study of education in Burundi and its significance for peace in the future.

Dialogue and confidence-building

Over the years, Alert has facilitated dialogue between different groups within the country as well as between groups in the country and those in exile. The partnership with the Compagnie des Apôtres de la Paix (CAP) is one such group.

CAP emerged from one of the study tours of 25 influential Burundians to South Africa in 1995. Today CAP is made up of Burundians from the two main ethnic groups holding positions of influence in political parties, the army, parliament and administration. Both moderate and more extreme tendencies of the conflicting political positions are represented and their objective is to develop dialogue and peace building among themselves and their peers. A number of CAP members also hold important positions in the negotiating groups at Arusha and in the government and National Assembly.

After their common experience in South Africa on what can be done for peace, they decided to stay together and form an NGO. Alert assisted CAP by providing institutional support and training and acting as a discussion partner. Their list of activities from 1995 to 2000 is impressive, though some planned activities never materialized, partly due to excessive ambitions and deteriorating security situations.

Given the events between June and November 1996, especially following the July army coup, into consideration, the fact that CAP survived is in itself

an achievement. For several years, this group was the only forum where grievances with someone from the other side could be discussed. Their mere existence was an extremely important example for other Burundians.

Political events in 1999 put again great strain on the trust between group members, but CAP came out strengthened by the crisis and has since been very active, for example arranging 'mini conferences', to broaden the debate, and meetings between parliamentarians and army officers and also arranging meetings abroad between internal groups and groups of Burundians in exile.

The Observatoire is a newly created NGO and a close cousin of the well-respected Burundian Human Rights organisation, Ligue ITEKA, envisaged as a partnership between three sectors – NGOs, journalists and parliamentarians to monitor government performance and publish occasional reports. This function will be critical for independent Burundian analysis of the provisions of a Peace Agreement, and of subsequent progress (or not) in the peace process. Though embryonic, Observatoire received a grant earlier in 2004 from Alert to carry out studies on government performance on justice and education; this work is due to be completed shortly.

Alert's goals in supporting the development of the Observatoire are two-fold. First, to ensure that politically independent analysis are produced by a Burundian organisation on a sustained basis. Second, to strengthen Burundian civil society by establishing a centre of expertise and excellence which can pass on analytical skills to other groups.

Justice

Alert early signalled that the justice sector was a key factor in the peace equation and should receive more attention and support from the international community. In 1999 Alert carried out an initial study of the justice system with full collaboration of the authorities, NGOs and other interested parties. Alert has since been lobbying for well-targeted aid to correct weaknesses and distortions in the administration of justice.

Alert supported the new Prosecutor General's first meeting with all the provincial prosecutors to brief them on the new Penal Code enacted by the National Assembly in July 1999. A session was added to the meeting to enable an unprecedented face-to-face exchange between the Assembly's Select Committee on Justice and the assembled prosecutors.

In the latter months of 1999, the Minister and the General Prosecutor put forward a proposal aimed at reducing the numbers of prisoners held in preventive detention without proper charges by deploying supplementary magistrates from Bujumbura to several provincial centres to accelerate the examination of cases. Alert supported the scheme to be piloted in Ngozi and Bururi.

Education and youth
In the past, Alert has funded peace education in collaboration with the Ministry of Education, but when a new Minister took over in 1998, with intentions to review the secondary schools curriculum, Alert decided to delay its support to peace education, but sought and gained his approval to carry out a study of the current state of education in Burundi. The report confirmed Alert's contention that the exclusion, which is a primary cause of conflict in Burundi, is rooted in the unequal access to education at all levels. The report will be used to mobilise large-scale international aid for education in Burundi as a *sine qua non* for the consolidation of peace.

Human rights
Alert engaged in discussions with the Minister for Human Rights about his strategy, including the involvement of a wide range of groups like youth, women and church organisations. At the request of the Minister, Alert in 1999 arranged for an external consultant to carry out a review of existing Human Rights promotion institutions and to make recommendations. The consultants review was incomplete why Alert placed a Project Officer to work with the Ministry, the Centre for Human Rights Promotion, and Human Rights NGOs in Bujumbura for a period of several months. The outcome was a three part package (essential office and communications equipment; Human Rights promotion training; and production of home-grown Burundian Human Rights promotion materials), which Alert agreed to fund. Concurrently, Alert's project officer has been researching groups and organisations that potentially could carry out Human Rights promotion with these materials.

Women's Peace Programme
The Women's Peace Programme (WPP) started in 1996, as a direct response to needs identified by women and women's organisations working for peace in Burundi, Rwanda and the wider Great Lakes region. Since 1996, WPP has facilitated dialogues between women from different ethnic groups in both Burundi and Rwanda as well as in the Diaspora. Alert also provides support for individuals, structures and organisations that support women's roles in the politics of sustainable peace. Alert's capacity-building work targets women working in local NGOs and associations, women community workers, and women operating at senior decision-making levels.

The specific objectives of the WPP in Burundi were:

- to strengthen the engagement of women in the politics of peace-making at all levels of society;
- to encourage and enable contacts and dialogue between ethnic and political adversaries;

- to strengthen capacities for peace-making and peaceful reform;
- to continue to learn and analyse issues, interests and forces that impact on conflict and/or peace processes in Burundi; and
- to contribute to international information, understanding and policy-making, and advocate appropriate policies and action.

The WPP provided CAFOB (a collective of at present 40 women's organisations working for peace and development) with institutional support to reinforce the operational capacities of its member associations. CAFOB has organised a wide range of activities including anti-poverty advocacy, promotion of women's rights and gender equality, advice on legal matters affecting women, and training in project management and reproductive health. In the area of peace-building, it has organised seminars, days of reflection, visits to displaced persons camps and has participated in regional and international conferences. The collective is also publishing a quarterly newsletter. CAFOB was requested to organise the 'Marche Mondiale des Femmes' for the eradication of poverty amongst women in collaboration with the Canadian NGO, CECI (Le centre canadien d'étude et de coopération internationale).

CAFOB has been instrumental in gaining acceptance of women at the Arusha negotiations. As a result, there is now a delegation of six women with 'permanent observer' status representing women civil society, in addition to four women who are members of the political parties delegations and the National Assembly.

An interesting example of a collaborative rather than a competitive way of working has been the informal partnership between International Alert, Search for Common Ground and the UN Women's Organisation, UNIFEM. Alert's contribution to the programme was the training and support provided to women peacemakers. The aim was to build awareness and increase women's participation, to promote dialogue at the community level. A group of 45 women (social and community workers, teachers and religious leaders among the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa) was trained in a series of six workshops, held since June 1996.

One major outcome was the creation of a network of community trainers called 'Dushirehamwe', which means, 'let's reconcile' in Kirundi. The network is very active in eight provinces, working with women from all ethnic groups and different sectors and has implemented local conflict resolution workshops and has trained local leaders. The network is also working with teenage girls, especially those living in displaced peoples camps or who have dropped out of school, with questions such as prostitution, HIV/AIDS and early marriage. The Dushirehamwe network receives direct support and technical assistance from two permanent local consultants contracted by Alert.

With Alert's support, a dialogue between six Burundian women in the country and six in exile took place in Kenya in July 1999. This meeting provided opportunities for women from both sides to engage in substantial discussions on the judiciary system, the role of the army and guerrilla factions as well as women's participation in the internal peace process and the Arusha negotiations.

The Committee of Women for Peace is a coalition of seven ethnically mixed women's organisations, including Dushirehamwe and the 'Association Femmes pour la Paix'. The coalition seeks to unite women around a common agenda for reconciliation and reconstruction in Burundi. The Committee, along with the Dishirehamwe network, CAFOB, SOFEPA and other women's organizations, will have an important role to play post-Arusha, not only in explaining the peace process to women, but also in lobbying international development agencies to take into account the role and needs of women in the reconstruction phase.

Support to major institutions
The Burundian Catholic Church has significant influence in Burundi. It has been part of the problem in the past and has to be part of the solution for the future. Alert's Senior Policy Advisor, Prof. Edmundo Garcia, is a specialist on church involvement in peace-making. As a consultant, he has made a number of visits to Burundi to familiarise himself with the context of the Catholic Church in Burundi, establish good working relationships with leading figures, and identify ways of encouraging greater involvement in peace work by the church. Based on that work, Alert has reached an agreement with the Church to assist in strengthening the embryonic Justice and Peace Commissions in collaboration with Catholic Relief Services and Jesuit Refugee Service. Two groundbreaking workshops have been arranged by Alert to bring experience from other church contexts.

Alert has long-standing connections with Burundi's Parliament, which has functioned more effectively since the installation of the 'partnership' government in June 1998. In February 2000, Alert arranged for two Burundian MPs to take part in a one-week conference in the UK on 'Models of Democracy'. With a similar capacity-building purpose, Alert arranged for the National Assembly Press and Information Officer to attend an appropriate training course in the UK for four weeks.

Alert also supports the Great Lakes Regional Parliamentarians Forum, AMANI. A Burundian branch of the Regional Forum was formally established in September 1999 with the public backing of the First Vice-President and of the President of the National Assembly.

Conclusions

- Alert tries to put into practice its belief in the importance of local 'ownership' of peace-related processes.
- Alert emphasises qualities and significance of specific individuals. It explicitly recognises the importance of seeking out individuals on all sides of the conflict, and taking the time to build relationships on a basis of mutual confidence. It is prepared to maintain its moral and practical support over long periods.
- Alert emphasises updated analysis and action plans in the light of twists and turns in the overall peace process and of changes in attitudes and mindsets, and of course the impact of major events.

Assessment of the peace building programmes

As stated above, peace building refers to the efforts in building an infrastructure of attitudes and institutions as a basis for a sustainable peace. The ongoing programmes of Alert and Search have undergone major evaluations in the past few years (Sörbö, et al. 1997; Abdallah et al. 1999). These evaluations note that for each activity, Alert and Search define their goal, strategy and detailed objectives/action plans. They further note that objectives are being fulfilled with the flexibility of making necessary changes. Thus Studio Ijambo produces the planned number of radio programs of the right quality, and the women's programs are training the planned number of women, establishing the use of the training in follow-up activities. Cost effectiveness is difficult to assess but it seems that cost consciousness has been adhered to.

The impact of the supported programs is more difficult to measure, though the organisations try to carry out listener's surveys and follow-up activities. The evaluations referred to above are quite positive about the impacts of the programs and interviews carried out as a follow-up are also on the positive side. Most people interviewed perceived that women have become considerably more active and influential in the peace dialogue. People also thought that the radio is now more involved in peace building activities and that seminars of the type that CAP is implementing are important.

The extent to which particular activities contribute to Alert's and/or Search's wider aim of peace in Burundi can only be assessed in relation to changes in other variables and the progress (or not) of the peace process over a longer time period.

Let's take a closer look at their relations to overall development, as far as that is possible.

1. Motives for engaging in Burundi. Both organisations have extensive experience from support to peace building in different parts of the

world. The violent collapse of the democratisation process in Burundi 1993 and the genocide in Rwanda, as well as the UN SRSG's plea for them to engage in Burundi made them want to explore what they could do.

2. The importance of a comprehensive view of the situation in the country and to possible solutions to the problems. This requires analyses and a basic theory of how to support peace-building. As shown in the presentations above, both organisations have well-established procedures for this. Search talks of 'finding real leverage points' for interaction, while Alert talks about 'creating spaces for dialogue'. In each case, there is a close relationship between the analyses and the strategy. Analyses can also be used for assessing ongoing programs and strategies. A preparedness to make necessary changes can for example be seen in the CAP program after the army coup in July 1996. However, closeness to the day-to-day developments may sometimes create an almost excessive readiness for readjustments. A proper balance has to be struck between the daily information received and conclusions drawn. Therefore the importance of information gathering and exchange being built into the program as a well thought through and continues process.

3. Full-time presence in Burundi. Search has a local office in Burundi and operates its projects to begin with through international staff, while aiming to recruit local staff in important positions. Alert operates with staff based in London, making frequent visits to Burundi and works almost exclusively with and in support of local partner organisations. Both Alert and Search engage international and local consultants if necessary. The main advantage of permanent presence in Burundi is the possibility to closely monitor the situation and activities and quickly react to changes. The advantage of non-permanent presence in Burundi is to give room for local staff to take the major responsibility and thereby ensuring sustainability. Both organisations seem fully aware of these pros and cons and seem to tackle the problems involved with their choice. Interestingly enough, in spite of its long-distance approach, Alert's analysis on political developments in the country have been well accepted and at times the most reliable.

4. Choice of targets for intervention. Search assesses the situation and selects a number of 'real leverage points' on which they develop special long-term projects for peace building, such as the Studio Ijambo. After having made their choice, development of new large-scale programs is difficult, but they are very open to adjust and adapt to new

possibilities within each programme. They will look for local specialists to run the program, but when they don't find the right people, they will recruit internationally. Over time, they develop a local capacity to reach sustainability. Search opts for 'local staff with a balanced temperament and desire to make a difference' that are trained on the job in technical or professional skills necessary. This is, which Search willingly gave witness to, a long and cumbersome process. Problems with keeping expatriate staff over long time periods hurts the continuity of the programme and makes the transition to local management longer and harder. Alert, on the other hand, investigates to find areas of interaction where there are already local initiatives and, even more importantly, local individuals, which can develop with external support. If activities are in line with their over-all analyses, they will be supported. Sustainability is therefore often directly assured. Both organisations make exceptions to their general rule such as Search's support to the Youth project.

5. Training components. To prevent escalation of a conflict and to start the long-term process of peaceful resolution of the crises in Burundi, a new attitude leading to new skills and different ways of behaviour must be built up. Many seminars, workshops, briefings and also longer courses have been implemented according to schedule. Most of them are well documented and contain self-evaluations and often follow-up activities. Hardly any training activities supported by Alert or Search have been undertaken as an isolated event, but rather, as part of a clearly defined process with short and long term objectives and with local back-up and support over a long period. Results are, however, extremely difficult to assess. In the interviews I conducted, it appears that the training has made people aware of the possible means of airing grievances and solving conflicts other than through violence, without making the trainees complacent or resigned to the status quo. This balance is very delicate and the issue should be kept under close surveillance at all times. The ethnic divide and educational imbalance favouring Tutsi can easily affect this balance.

6. Peace building in both local and international partnership. Search as well as Alert has worked closely with other available actors. In a number of cases, Alert has, after having acted as a catalyst at an early stage of a project, been prepared to let other actors/funders take over. For a small NGO like Alert, acting as a catalyst, facilitator and/or fund-raiser during an implementation of a well-defined programme might be more efficient than to actually run the whole process.

7. No quick fixes in peace building. Peace building programs of this kind must be process-oriented, run for at least 5–10 years and require a great deal of humility and flexibility. Also, wisdom and experience from development work in general offers relevant principles for conflict-related work (long-term strategy, importance of institution building, ownership etc.). All of this has to a large extent been true for Alert's and Search's strategy in Burundi.

8. Peace building is best done quietly. Neither of these two organisations are putting any emphasise on parading their activities or boosting their image in Burundi. Both Alert and Search learned this important lesson during past interventions in other regions.

Peace mediation and its support

Background

Talking about 'peace mediation' reference is made to the support to the peace mediation and negotiation process. A number of NGOs including the Carter Center, the Community of Sant'Egidio, International Alert, the South African Center for Conflict Resolution of Cape Town University and Search for Common Ground through its Political Dialogue Project have taken part in the Burundi process. The Nyerere Foundation, is perhaps the most important one, but it is not discussed here, as it is part of the formal mediation process.

As the negotiation process was still under way at the time of the study, I have not been able to describe each activity of the various NGOs in detail, but rather to give an overall account to indicate which types of activities are involved.

The activities of all these organisations have in one way or the other been related to the mediation efforts among the many Burundian parties, and the formal peace negotiations. What really makes the situation in Burundi different from most other places is the degree of communication and the common analyses between the organisations. Keeping each other informed and using each person's or organisation's special knowledge and comparative advantage has proved to be extremely valuable.

The objectives for the support provided by NGOs under this heading are quite simply 'to make it possible for the Burundians to reach an agreement that will lead to a durable peace'. The means used are manifold – but aiming in different ways both to support the formal mediation efforts, and to help all Burundian actors to engage in and own the process.

Peace mediation activities

a) Direct or indirect support to the Arusha process

The Political Dialogue Project (financed by Search 1996–1999) consists of efforts, made by Jan van Eck (a former South African parliamentarian), to facilitate dialogue and to build trust between all major political and military stakeholders.

Based in South Africa, van Eck spent 1996–2000 roughly 40 percent of his time in Burundi during which he met with the President and most major political leaders and role players. His meetings were normally private talks, but sometimes carried out in larger groups, and were meant to encourage co-operative solutions and steps that could aid the negotiations.

Van Eck had also given direct support to the mediation process. Together with Bill Yates of Alert and Matteo Zuppi of Sant'Egidio, he helped to establish lines of communication between parties to the Arusha talks and parties that remain outside the talks, including key rebel groups. They tried to convince these rebel groups to make contact and interact with the mediator, a very important task in helping achieving Mandela's objective of getting all parties to the negotiation table.

Van Eck has actively assisted in the various rounds of the Arusha talks, often shuttling between opposing parties, helping them to find ways to smoothen potentially serious conflicts and sticking points. He has successfully helped opponents find areas of common ground while maintaining 'face', held multi-party roundtables enabling different sides to better understand their opponents' positions and assisted participants in both the official and unofficial processes see the importance of making negotiations as inclusive as possible.

Sant'Egidio has also offered its good offices for secret peace talks between the government of Burundi, representatives from the army and the major opposition groups in exile. Starting in 1996, these meetings, in Rome and in the region, have been important as safety valves, particularly when the Arusha process run into problems. Sant'Egidio has also been directly involved in the Arusha negotiations by supplying the chairman to one of the committees preparing the agreement.

Alert worked in a more indirect way by supporting local peace initiatives and organisations that were involved in the internal dialogue, such as CAP and Women's organisations. Many CAP members had participated in the Arusha talks on different sides but still kept informal contact with each other, which had been useful for the process. The mini-conferences held under the auspices of CAP was helpful for the internal dialogue during crucial periods of the Arusha talks. Another example was the visit they arranged for a former

senior British army officer to discuss security sector reforms with the Minister of Defence and senior army officers.

b) Auxiliary activities to the mediation process

Van Eck with his South African institute and Alert has also engaged in a number of auxiliary activities designed to support Burundi's mediation process. In June 1998, van Eck arranged conflict resolution training in South Africa for Burundian parliamentarians, followed in August by training for senior Burundian government officials. He also helped organise a conflict resolution workshop in Cape Town for a delegation of Burundian government and opposition leaders. This was followed up by a number of workshops for negotiators in the region.

These workshops gave participants tools to prevent and manage conflict both in their work and their communities. The training also exposed participants to a concept of negotiation and compromise which did not require them to 'give up everything' and which was not based on a 'win-lose' situation. Certainly, it is very difficult to measure the results, but many participants entered with the idea that compromising is akin to giving up, but left with an appreciation for the 'win-win' situation negotiations can achieve.

c) Internal and external preparations for and conscientisation of the different constituencies

Most efforts discussed above would be relevant to mention under this heading. It seems that from 1996 onwards we have been seeing a clear shift in attitudes towards gradual and widening acceptance of negotiations. The internal partnership as a concrete experience, the increasing emphasis on the future rather than the exclusive obsession with the past and the moderation of the political discourse are all tangible indicators of attitudes encouraged and helped by the above measures.

Assessment of the peace mediation activities

When the information for this paper was compiled (second half of 2000) only a partial agreement existed and it was still too early to assess the impact of the activities by all actors against the overall objectives for peace mediation. There is, however, no doubt that many of the activities discussed above have been extremely valuable in making the process of negotiations go forward. Personal interventions by people with long experience of the conflict in Burundi have definitely helped in overcoming obstacles, solving problems and getting new ideas and solutions introduced. Most important is, however, that these small NGOs have been able to act in support of the mediation team in Arusha – especially in keeping the non-participating parties in the picture.

The following factors have made these efforts useful:

1. A common deep analysis of the situation in Burundi and the needs for actions and strategies to reach a durable peace. This requires a deep knowledge of Burundi and good relations with different relevant institutions and individuals in the country.

2. Continuity and commitment. The same persons have been active and responsible for activities in this particular field ever since the NGOs began their support. The task requires full commitment and readiness to act on short notice whenever and wherever it is needed. Personalities matter!

3. Close contact with Nyerere/Mandela. Interventions have been aimed directly or indirectly at supporting the Arusha process. With the tacit understanding of Nyerere/Mandela and a maximum of discretion, they have listened to and informed the armed rebel groups about the Arusha process in which they did not participate. At the same time, efforts have been made to convince Nyerere/Mandela of the importance to include all parties in the negotiations. Considerable caution and common sense have been used in actions towards the peace mediation process. (It is of course of utmost importance that any actor in the mediation process should never counteract the appointed mediator. This can only lead to confusion and lessens everybody's influence and credibility).

4. Collaborations between NGOs. The NGOs involved have often acted in collaboration and always in contact with each other. They have been able to bring their respective know-how and experience to the joint efforts. It is a high-risk venture for any small NGO to participate in peace reconciliation and mediation. Doing it in consultation with others lowers their vulnerability and makes it possible to exchange views before entering into difficult commitments.

5. Long-term commitments. Although we are talking of ongoing negotiations, the actors have to be prepared to make long-term commitments. The present negotiation process in Burundi has almost been going on for eight years.

6. Utmost discretion. All the NGOs involved carry out their work quietly and with no or very careful reporting to the world outside its closest constituency.

7. Availability of supportive measures within the NGOs. The preparedness of the South African Centre for Conflict Resolution to give training as well as CAP's (supported by Alert) and Studio Ijambo's (Search's)

activities to make Burundians, including those in exile, aware of what is going on in Arusha are cases in point.

Conclusions

In presenting and discussing the activities of the NGOs that are most active in the fields of support to peace building and peace mediation in Burundi, a number of conclusions and recommendations have been presented above. They are all of such aggregate nature that they might be useful to consider in future similar ventures, although, as the 'recommended' analyses will show, each case is unique.

On a more global level, this case study points at possible roles and comparative advantages of NGOs supporting the peace building and mediation efforts of a country. Much has been said in literature on possible risks and pitfalls for small NGOs to get involved in this very difficult field of activities. However, when done properly, NGOs can be extremely useful. Some of the reasons are their:

- openness and preparedness for flexible solutions;
- position as neutral and informal actors;
- speedy reactions to changes and opportunities;
- implementation capacity which official structures such as bilaterals or UN organizations, although desired, might not possess; and
- capacity to act as a go-between.

Burundi and its peace process have been strongly affected by major events in the country and in the region over the past decade. The Rwandan genocide; the Burundian coup in 1996; the regional sanctions; the two Congo wars; and the impact of Nelson Mandela taking on the Arusha mediation. All these have put a very high responsibility on the NGOs to be flexible and act with great care. With all necessary caveats in Burundi and pros and cons discussed above, it seems as if the NGOs discussed in this case study have been able to act in good support of the peace building and mediation.

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Le chemin de l'autodestruction: origine et dynamique de la guerre civile en Côte d'Ivoire

Dele Ogunmola*

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Résumé

Cet article argumente que l'histoire coloniale et son héritage conjugués à la mauvaise gestion du legs houphouëtiste contribuent à la crise ivoirienne. Le marasme économique qui a suivi une période de prospérité économique qui a résulté à la contraction du système patrimonial participent à la fracture de la société ivoirienne. La crise qui se joue sur le terreau identitaire de l'ivoirité, allie également l'ethnique au religieux pour déboucher sur l'impasse militaro-politique. Un sursaut patriotique authentique et une volonté politique collective et pragmatique des Ivoiriens doivent étayer la médiation internationale en vue du règlement pacifique du conflit ivoirien.

Abstract

This article contends that colonial history and heritage coupled with an ill-managed Houphouët legacy have led to the crisis in Côte-d'Ivoire. The economic crisis that followed the period of economic prosperity resulted in the harming of the patrimonial system, thus leading to a shattering of the Ivorian society. The crisis that is occurring around the Ivorian identity is based on ethnic, as well as religious grounds, and has led to a military and political stalemate. Ivorians must demonstrate an authentic and patriotic reaction, as well as collective and pragmatic political will, in order to support the international mediation aiming at settling the conflict in a peaceful way.

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«L'État qui depuis le traité de Westphalie (1948) est le plus caractéristique de toutes les institutions modernes se meurt» (MartinVan Creveld 1996).

«Le système politique et la violence sont liés» (Rummel 2003).

Introduction

La guerre civile en Côte d'Ivoire rappelle d'autres conflits intra-étatiques dans la sous-région de l'Afrique de l'Ouest où l'étiquette «État-nation» est apposé arbitrairement pour qualifier des entités disparates, hétérogènes et culturellement asymétriques créées par les puissances impériales. Les pseudo-compositions ethno-religieuses ont donné l'apparence d'unité nationale à ces États. Le partage des richesses du pays par le truchement d'un système néo-patrimonial a apaisé les revendications des citoyens, qui se sentaient lésés ou qui n'avaient pas reçu une part équitable dans la distribution des récompenses dérivées de l'appartenance à la bureaucratie et de l'accès au parti unique. En outre, la fin de la compétition idéologique bipolaire et ses effets boule de neige sur l'échiquier politique international comme le signe du triomphe des idées libérales ont eu un impact socio-économique en Afrique de l'Ouest.

De prime abord, l'article adopte une démarche historique qui met en exergue les mouvements migratoires et la dynamique transfrontalière en Afrique précoloniale et pendant la colonisation, et dans l'État postcolonial. Ce fait explique partiellement l'acuité de l'ethnique et à, un degré moindre, du religieux dans la crise ivoirienne. Après une longue période de croissance économique pendant le long règne d'Houphouët-Boigny, la Côte d'Ivoire, à l'instar des autres pays de l'Afrique subsaharienne, a connu une crise économique et financière. La mauvaise gestion politique de l'héritage houphouëtiste, conjuguée au marasme économique persistant ont eu des contrecoups pervers sur les couches sociales. C'est dans ce contexte qu'émerge l'ivoirité, doctrine qui a miné les fondements politico-sociaux de la Côte d'Ivoire et a abouti à la crise militaro-politique. Tous ces facteurs endogènes et exogènes sont des ruisseaux qui confluent pour révéler l'écart béant qui existe dans les milieux sociopolitiques en Côte d'Ivoire.

Aperçu historique

La crise ethnique et identitaire actuelle découle de l'ère coloniale. Apparemment, plusieurs facteurs ont contribué à cette crise. Premièrement, les causes peuvent être attribuées à la politique coloniale de la France. Optant pour un pragmatisme économique et administratif, le colonisateur a jugé adéquat d'amalgamer les territoires de la Côte d'Ivoire et le sud-ouest de la Haute-Volta (connu aussi comme la Haute Côte d'Ivoire) à la Côte d'Ivoire le 5 septembre 1932 (Ba 1996:432; Crowder 1997:153). Ce découpage admi-

nistratif a été facilité par le chemin de fer et les réseaux routiers entre la partie septentrionale de la Côte d'Ivoire et la Haute-Volta. Le 4 septembre 1947, soit quinze années plus tard, un décret abrogea cette décision. La colonie de la Côte d'Ivoire fut établie, mais le sud-ouest de la Haute-Volta fut partagé parmi les colonies du Niger, du Soudan français (actuel Mali) et de la Côte d'Ivoire (Ba 1996:423). Il faut ajouter à cela le désir de la France de créer une fédération en Afrique de l'Ouest, en l'occurrence l'Afrique occidentale française (AOF). Cette possibilité a été envisagée pour des raisons administratives et facilitée par la contiguïté des territoires qui étaient sous le joug français. Les effets concomitants des transferts de territoires coloniaux ont abouti à des mouvements de divers groupes ethniques d'un territoire colonial à un autre. Il n'y avait pas de frontière bien définie entre ces colonies. Cette ambiguïté était une source de conflits fréquents et inutiles entre les gouverneurs des différents territoires de ces colonies françaises (Crowder 1977:146). Cette confusion au sujet de la démarcation géographique des entités politiques coloniales a entraîné les divers groupes ethniques de la Haute-Volta (Burkina Faso), du Soudan français (Mali), et ceux du nord de la Côte d'Ivoire à être à califourchon entre les États postcoloniaux. Une illustration de ce transfert de population et de la confusion qu'elle engendre dans la période post-indépendance était «le royaume de Kong, fondé par les ancêtres de M. Alassane Ouattara [précisément Sékou Ouattara] qui s'étendait du XVIIe siècle à la conquête coloniale sur un territoire que se partagent la Côte d'Ivoire, le Mali et le Burkina Faso» (Bathily 2003:97). De même, le colonisateur avait mis sur pied l'Office du Niger afin de repeupler la région de Sansanding [Mali], dans le but d'irriguer la rive droite du Niger par des populations de la Haute-Volta pour cultiver le coton et le riz (Crowder 1968:315). Si le projet n'avait pas échoué, «1,5 millions d'agriculteurs voltaïques auraient été transférés dans cette région». Néanmoins, «en 1940, environ 12 000 Africains avaient été transférés [dans cette région]» (Crowder 1968:321-322). Il est inutile de dire que les colonisateurs n'ont pas tenu compte des configurations ethniques et des réalités de l'Afrique précoloniale en délimitant les États coloniaux. Les impérialistes ont transmis ces zones géographiques qui ne tiennent pas compte des réalités ethniques et transfrontalières aux leaders nationalistes. Les problèmes ethniques sont imputables au colonisateur. Tout d'abord, le transfert des populations entre les colonies, ensuite la séparation des groupes ethniques sans tenir compte des réalités sociolinguistiques de la période précoloniale, et les frontières arbitraires expliquent en partie le problème ethnique en Côte d'Ivoire. Par convenance, cette mosaïque géographique a été avalisée par les pères fondateurs de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine (OUA), l'ancêtre de l'Union africaine (UA), alors qu'il sem-

ble que ces frontières sont en réalité artificielles, parce qu'elles n'ont pas tellement altéré les liens commerciaux qui existaient entre ces peuples. L'organisation a expressément reconnu les frontières héritées de la colonisation. Ces frontières sont à l'origine de certaines frictions entre les pays indépendants (Foltz 1998:95-97; Imobighe 1989:16-18). Ces heurts sont exacerbés si la zone qui est la pomme de discorde est riche en ressources naturelles. Une autre dimension qu'engendrent ces configurations de l'État postcolonial sont les flux migratoires des populations et la dynamique de défiance des «allogènes» ou «étrangers» dans l'État moderne. L'intégration de ces populations dans l'un des États contigus peut s'avérer délicate si l'on tient compte du facteur ethnique dans la politique africaine.

La composition ethnique de la Côte d'Ivoire

La Côte d'Ivoire a accédé à l'indépendance le 7 août 1960. Cette année fut pratiquement l'année de l'indépendance politique des colonies en Afrique de l'Ouest à l'exception des colonies lusophones. La Côte d'Ivoire s'étend sur une superficie de 322 463 km2 et a une population de 16,9 millions d'habitants (données de juillet 2003) (www. Cia.gov/cia/publications/factbooks/geos/iv). Ce pays partage ses frontières à l'Est avec le Ghana, alors que le Liberia et la Guinée sont situés à l'Ouest. Ses voisins septentrionaux sont le Mali et le Burkina Faso. L'océan Atlantique constitue sa frontière naturelle au Sud. La Côte d'Ivoire est composée approximativement de 80 groupes ethniques (David 1986:16-22). Les Akan ont immigré du Ghana, alors que le peuple Krou est d'origine libérienne. Au nord-ouest, les flux migratoires ont poussé les Mandinka/Malinké et les Dan à traverser le Mali et la Guinée respectivement pour s'installer en Côte d'Ivoire. Quant aux Sénoufo, Koulango et Lobi leurs racines remontent à l'actuel Burkina Faso. Ces groupes ethniques sont considérés comme appartenant au groupe voltaïque (David 1986:16-22).

La conclusion inéluctable qui découle de ces données montre que la Côte d'Ivoire est peuplée de groupes ethniques qui avaient immigré des pays limitrophes, et à ce titre, la Côte d'Ivoire est un melting pot qui refuse de servir de creuset. Du reste, certains groupes ethniques du Sud du pays (les Bété et les Baoulé par exemple) s'identifient facilement comme des «Ivoiriens authentiques». Pour ceux qui sont originaires des pays frontaliers septentrionaux, ou même qui portent des noms musulmans, être nordiste impliquerait d'avoir des racines burkinabés, maliennes ou guinéennes. La corrélation est que pour les personnes qui portent de tels noms, l'authenticité de leur identité ivoirienne serait douteuse, et elles ne sont pas des citoyens ivoiriens à part entière. Partant de ce fait, ces populations seraient donc des allogènes. Apparemment, cela proviendrait du fait que les ouvriers agricoles qui ont immigré dans ces zones portent aussi dans certains cas les mêmes

noms que les membres des groupes ethniques du Nord. En effet, cette réalité
constitue l'argument majeur des nordistes qui sont convaincus qu'ils sont
considérés ou traités comme des citoyens de deuxième ordre. L'introduction
de la carte de séjour qui ne s'appliquait qu'aux étrangers est devenue
progressivement contentieuse.

On note des similitudes quant aux noms entre les groupes voltaïques et
mandinka/malinké avec les populations de la Guinée, du Mali et Burkina
Faso. Ils croient fermement qu'ils sont considérés comme des citoyens qui
ont des devoirs envers l'État mais qu'en retour, ils sont privés de leurs droits
conformément aux dispositions du code de la nationalité, les conditions
d'éligibilité à la magistrature suprême, particulièrement après le règne
d'Houphouët-Boigny. L'alchimie du premier président de la Côte d'Ivoire avec
la population et son règne sans partage ont éclipsé la tendance chez les
apologistes du dogme de «l'enfant du pays». Enfin, les germes de la
xénophobie étaient déjà latents dans la société ivoirienne avant l'indépendance,
comme nous le verrons plus en détail.

La marche vers l'indépendance

Il y avait deux principaux partis politiques en Afrique occidentale française
(AOF), à savoir le Rassemblement démocratique africain (RDA) et le Bloc
démocratique sénégalais (BDS) qui est devenu plus tard le Bloc populaire
sénégalais (BPS). Le RDA était dirigé par Félix Houphouët-Boigny, alors
que le BPS était sous le leadership de Léopold Sédar Senghor. Dès le début,
le RDA n'alla pas par quatre chemins pour afficher son ambition d'être un
parti supranational par-delà les divisions nationales en Afrique occidentale
française. Le manifeste du BPS exprimait une idéologie nationale. L'objectif
du RDA était de devenir non seulement la plate-forme électorale des aspira-
tions politiques, mais son objectif manifeste était également de devenir la
synthèse des partis politiques de la fédération. L'approche du BPS était
ambivalente: en effet, ce parti vacilla entre une structure fédérative et la
balkanisation de ladite fédération. En fait, Senghor mit même sur le tapis
l'idée de deux fédérations au sein de l'AOF qui auraient chacune son conseil
de gouvernement, un à l'Ouest qui comprendrait le Sénégal, la Mauritanie, le
Soudan et la Guinée, et l'autre à l'Est qui inclurait la Côte d'Ivoire, la Haute-
Volta, le Niger et le Dahomey (Sirex 1957). Cet antagonisme se refléta dans
la période post-indépendance et ceci démontre que l'Afrique francophone
occidentale n'est pas un bloc monolithique comme on est souvent enclin à la
présenter et que certaines jalousies et rivalités existent, même si elles sont
insignifiantes.

Bien que le RDA entreprit des démarches pour une politique panafricaniste,
on pouvait déjà voir les signes précurseurs des évènements qui se sont déroulés

après l'indépendance de la Côte d'Ivoire. Ces appréhensions se confirmèrent lorsque, mue par une vague xénophobique, l'Association pour la défense des intérêts des autochtones de la Côte d'Ivoire (ADIACI) protesta avec véhémence contre la prédomination sénégalaise et dahoméenne dans la fonction publique, et en 1958 des émeutes eurent lieu pour exclure les Dahoméens et les Senegalais de l'appareil de l'Administration coloniale (Dozon 2000). Ainsi, les symptomes de cette marque de nationalisme étaient déjà enracinés dans la société ivoirienne avant l'indépendance.

Le RDA, sous le leadership d'Houphouët-Boigny remporta les élections en Côte d'Ivoire. La priorité du gouvernement postcolonial en Côte d'Ivoire fut de continuer la mise en œuvre, avec ténacité, de la politique agricole héritée de la puissance coloniale. Le nouveau gouvernement avait besoin de la main-d'œuvre des migrants afin de poursuivre sa politique agricole (Bathily 2003). Les pays frontaliers septentrionaux étaient des zones disposées à fournir cette main-d'œuvre à cause des conditions climatiques peu propices à l'agriculture et à la pauvreté de leur sous-sol en richesses naturelles. La culture principale d'exportation de la Côte d'Ivoire est le cacao, dont le pays est le premier producteur mondial. Les autres produits de base destinés à l'exportation qui pèsent lourdement en faveur de la balance excédentaire de la Côte d'Ivoire sont le café, l'huile de palme, le coton, et l'hévéa.

Les perspectives d'un brillant avenir économique alliées à la politique d'ouverture de Félix Houphouët-Boigny et les idéaux panafricanistes du RDA firent de la Côte d'Ivoire un eldorado économique qui attira des milliers de citoyens de la sous-région. Bien que la Côte d'Ivoire fit partie du groupe de Monrovia (conservateur), le président Houphouët-Boigny soumit un projet de loi à l'Assemblée nationale sur la double nationalité pour les individus originaires des pays francophones de la sous-région. Ce projet échoua car les députés ne l'avaient pas voté mais il acceptèrent que les ressortissants de l'ex-AOF puissent voter et soient dans certains cas éligibles. De même quelques-uns se retrouvèrent à la tête de certains ministères. Cette politique exprimait la volonté du gouvernement ivoirien de faire de la Côte d'Ivoire une terre d'accueil. Cette volonté politique fut renforcée par la philosophie du «dialogue et de la paix» qui étaient les mots d'ordre du leader ivoirien. Cette politique fut connue sous le nom d'«houphouëtisme».

Stabilité politique, prospérité économique et déclin
Il est indéniable que la prospérité économique ininterrompue et soutenue de la Côte d'Ivoire pendant deux décennies a frayé la voie à une politique économique et sociale particulière. Cette politique s'est traduite par l'émancipation rapide des Ivoiriens et a amélioré leurs conditions de vie. Ils étaient mieux nantis que les autres citoyens de la sous-région. Par exemple, le Produit intérieur

brut (PIB) est passé de «130 milliards CFA en 1960 à 1900 milliards en 1979» (David 1986:52) et dans la même foulée, «de porter son budget d'investissement annuel à 44 milliards [en 1970], soit l'équivalent de tout le budget du Sénégal de l'époque» (David 1986:52). Cette réussite montre les qualités indubitables d'Houphouët-Boigny qui s'est efforcé d'équilibrer la distribution du «gâteau national» et le partage des postes-clés des ministères et des entreprises publiques. Certes, le système était clientéliste dans la distribution du patrimoine. Il faut cependant reconnaître que «le développement du prébendalisme» et «le système de redistribution des dépouilles» (Bakary 1991:77), ainsi que «le patrimonialisme» (Bakary 1991:77; Chabal et Daloz 1999:158) illustrent la panoplie des moyens à la disposition de la classe politique ivoirienne. Il est évident que le système du parti unique a servi de canal de creuset en ce qui concerne la politique de distribution. Plusieurs facteurs ont contribué à l'institution du parti unique en Afrique de l'Ouest. Premièrement, l'État postcolonial a été créé au moment de la guerre froide. En effet, les rivalités Est-Ouest et la nécessité d'avoir des alliés/États clients ont joué en faveur des dirigeants africains (Chabal et Daloz 1999:116).

Ensuite, le choix d'une des deux idéologies excluait l'autre. La co-existence des conservateurs-radicaux ou capitalistes-communistes/socialistes était une autre source de dissentiment en Afrique (Thompson 1969:162-175). Ces choix d'idéologies ne posaient pas de problèmes dans bien des cas, car certains pays africains ont bénéficié de l'assistance des deux blocs idéologiques (Chabal et Daloz 1999:119). Pendant la guerre froide, la Côte d'Ivoire s'aligna sans équivoque sur l'Occident et adopta le capitalisme comme système économique. Enfin, la composition ethnique de l'État postcolonial, le religieux et les clivages linguistiques font de l'Afrique de l'Ouest une sous-région complexe (Ochoche 2002:22).

Ces facteurs ont aussi contribué à instaurer le parti unique afin de conserver l'unité du pays. Dans ce cas, le multipartisme dans une société composée de plusieurs groupes ethniques pourrait être donc l'affirmation de solidarité et de la différence identitaires, d'où la prolifération des partis ethniques. Le parti unique était alors le leitmotiv de l'unité nationale. Comme l'a fait remarquer Tessy Bakary, «en Côte d'Ivoire plus qu'ailleurs, le parti unique a fait l'objet d'un consensus implicite: il représentait le *modus vivendi* auquel étaient parvenus les «évolués». La nature pluraliste ou autoritaire du régime n'a jamais été un enjeu politique. Les opposants radicaux ou les contestataires du PDCI ne remettaient pas en cause le système du parti unique. La grande préoccupation des «intellectuels», de 1960 au début des années 1980, résidait plutôt dans l'orientation pro-occidentale ou capitaliste du régime» (Bakary 1991:68). Ainsi, il apparaît pour l'élite que l'adhésion au parti unique, le PDCI,

était considérée comme un gage, sinon une garantie de l'ascension sociale, puisque l'espace politique était limité au PDCI (Bakary 1991:68.).

La stabilité politique caractérisée par la longévité au pouvoir d'Houphouët-Boigny, ainsi que le libéralisme économique ont été des éléments catalyseurs des investissements et de l'aide étrangers dans le pays. Les relations franco-ivoiriennes étaient alors caractérisées par de grandes concessions aux investisseurs français. La Côte d'Ivoire était le miroir de la réussite économique due à la longue période de stabilité politique. Cette prospérité économique est essentiellement due à l'exportation des produits agricoles. Lors du VIIe Congrès du PDCI, le président Houphouët fit le bilan économique de la Côte d'Ivoire en ces termes:

> La valeur ajoutée de la production agricole est passée de 69,4 milliards en 1960 à 1028 milliards en 1985. La valeur des exportations agricoles est passée à 294,6 en 1985 contre 39,3 milliards en 1960 (David 1986:54).

On peut cependant affirmer que les signes avant-coureurs du malaise économique s'annoncèrent à l'orée des années 80; la détérioration des termes de l'échange réduisit considérablement les revenus de l'État ivoirien. Les conséquences de cette réduction se sont d'abord manifestées par une stagnation socio-économique (David 1986:61-63). Cette crise socio-économique fut exacerbée par la fin de la guerre froide qui marqua un grand tournant au plan mondial. La marge de manœuvre des États africains s'est considérablement réduite, car «il n'est plus possible pour l'élite dirigeante africaine de tirer de réels avantages ou supposés des rivalités Est-Ouest afin de se procurer de l'aide financière, [ou de l'assistance] diplomatique ou militaire qui étaient souvent utilisées pour neutraliser la pression interne pour le changement» (Bach 1992:29). À cela s'ajoute l'exécution des réformes économiques et sociales rigoureuses sous la surveillance des institutions de Bretton Woods. Il faut insister sur le fait que «la crise financière et les politiques d'ajustements structurels qu'elle cause provoquent des mouvements de résistance qui mettent en questions la révision des bénéfices matériels par les acteurs sociaux» (Niandou-Souley 1992:379). L'une des conditions des réformes fut l'ouverture de l'espace politique afin d'accommoder le pluralisme politique: un néologisme de la vie politique ivoirienne. Un autre élément qui a contribué à la démocratisation en Côte d'Ivoire fut la fin des dissensions Est / Ouest. Les retombées de la fin de la guerre froide ont perturbé les structures socio-économiques de l'ex-Union soviétique et de ses satellites en Europe de l'Est. L'effet boule de neige a également atteint les républiques bananières communistes. Un troisième facteur qui a eu un effet direct sur les ex-dominions français fut l'esprit post-Baule qui envoya des ondes de choc aux dictateurs des pays francophones. La France, alors sous un gouvernement

socialiste, après des tâtonnements au sujet de sa politique africaine, revint à la *Realpolitik*. Ce qui se réalisa par un retour à la conception gaulliste des affaires africaines (Bayart 1984; Nwokedi 1989). Paris annonça que dorénavant l'assistance technique et l'aide financière seraient liées à la libération de l'espace politique. C'était donc dans cet état d'esprit et dans l'atmosphère des Conférences nationales que le «Vieux» accepta d'aller aux urnes. Pour la première fois depuis l'indépendance de la Côte d'Ivoire, un autre candidat se présentait aux élections présidentielles de 1990. En l'occurrence, Laurent Gbagbo du Front populaire ivoirien. L'ère des élections présidentielles à majorité étouffante par le biais du parti unique et l'adoption du président candidat également par une majorité écrasante fut ainsi révolue. Le phénomène du parti unique était aussi enraciné dans la politique coloniale et ce n'était pas uniquement les impératifs des rivalités idéologiques qui avaient érigé le système du parti unique et l'avaient rendu alléchant pour l'élite dirigeante africaine.

Dans le cadre de la politique en Côte d'Ivoire, la stature d'Houphouët-Boigny avait conduit à la *nananisation* (personnalisation) de l'État. En effet, la notion, «d'État-personne recouvre également la centralisation de l'autorité, le renforcement du pouvoir aux mains de la personne placée au sommet des institutions... [les] garde-fous à l'omnipotence d'un chef de l'État qui cumule les attributs des présidents américains et français... sont annulés sur le plan politique par l'existence du parti unique, en théorie pivot des institutions» (Bakary 1991:72). Cette dette morale s'était aussi traduite par une «Nanamania politique», ancêtre mythique et totémique de l'État et de la nation { «Nana», «le Vieux», «le Père de la Nation» }, voire maître des destins sociaux des Ivoiriens (Bakary 1991:70-71). En somme, la personnification de l'État et de sa machine était considérée comme «légitime» puisque le président avait lutté pour l'indépendance du pays. La quasi-totalité de ses concitoyens se sentirent «endettés» vis-à-vis de lui. La reconnaissance de cette «dette morale» était exprimée par un soutien sans faille au chef de l'État et au PDCI-RDA (Bakary 1991). Bien que Gbagbo perdit les élections présidentielles, il y avait un arc-en-ciel politique dans l'hémicycle de l'Assemblée nationale où le parti au pouvoir, le Parti démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) a dû concéder quelques sièges à l'opposition. Le marasme économique qui a perduré dans les années 1980 a marqué un déclin dans l'économie ivoirienne. Davarajan et de Melo (1987:447-448) constatent que «la proportion du service de la dette (les paiements du service de la dette comme un pourcentage des marchandises d'exportation) qui atteignait une moyenne de 8% pendant la période 1965-1975 a quadruplé pendant 1980-1985». Ils affirment qu'«au début des années 1980, la Côte d'Ivoire et le Sénégal ont connu des paiements élevés de leur dette, il y avait simultanément un déclin de leur PIB». En effet,

le taux de croissance du Produit intérieur brut (PIB) était passé de 0,2 en 1981 à -3,9 en 1982, - 4,4 en 1983 et il était de -2,8 en 1984, puis 5,0 en 1985 pour chuter en 1986 à 3,2 (*Africa Research Bulletin* 1987:8507). De plus, «pressées par une vague d'agitations sociales et de contestations politiques internes, contraintes par les nouvelles rigueurs d'un quatrième plan d'ajustement structurel et sensibles aux recommandations des bailleurs de fonds, les autorités gouvernementales ivoiriennes se sont résolues à libéraliser le régime, à légaliser l'expression d'opinions politiques différentes et l'organisation de partis concurrents» (Fauré 1991:31). La stagnation économique a accéléré l'application du programme de redressement du pays sous la directive des institutions financières internationales. Mais «en accordant la priorité à la performance économique, les dépositaires d'enjeux n'avaient pas tenu compte des retombées sociales de ces politiques d'ajustement au début des années 1980» (Bourguignon 1991:315). C'est donc dans un contexte économique difficile qu'un aspect des conditions des Institutions financières internationales (IFI) a été exécuté: la stabilisation de l'économie et l'assainissement des finances publiques de la Côte d'Ivoire. C'était dans cette optique qu'Alassane Dramane Ouattara, ancien gouverneur de la Banque centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO) fut nommé Premier ministre dans le but de sortir la Côte d'Ivoire de l'ornière. Le Premier ministre prit des mesures économiques draconiennes afin de réorganiser le secteur économique (Fauré 1991:35). Son gouvernement introduisit l'établissement de cartes de séjour pour les ressortissants étrangers. Les Africains qui jugèrent son application délétère pensèrent aussi que ces cartes étaient excessivement chères pour leur bourse amaigrie par la crise conjoncturelle et le marasme économique qui sévissaient. Pourtant, cette politique renfloua les caisses de l'État, mais rendit le gouvernement Ouattara impopulaire parmi les ressortissants africains.

Le décès d'Houphouët-Boigny et la crise de sa succession

Alassane Ouattara était le Premier ministre du Président Houphouët-Boigny et *de facto* le numéro deux dans la hiérarchie administrative du pays. Mais l'Article II de la Constitution ivoirienne stipulait qu'en cas de vacance de pouvoir, le Président de l'Assemblée nationale remplirait ce vide politique par intérim en attendant de nouvelles élections présidentielles. Cette disposition permettait au président de l'Assemblée nationale d'être le deuxième personnage du pays. Une autre source de complication est qu'il n'existait pas de vice-présidence sous Houphouët. Le chef de l'État a incarné l'État et le parti pendant trois décennies.

Constitutionnellement, le défunt président avait laissé une bombe à retardement dont le compte à rebours commença lorsqu'il fut alité en Suisse.

Les gladiateurs se donnaient des tacles dans l'arène politique. Quand Boigny s'éteint le 7 décembre 1993, il y a eu un embouteillage politique. La classe politique était devant un dilemme pour le choix du successeur du défunt président. Pendant son long règne, Houphouët-Boigny n'avait pas caché sa croyance superficielle dans le modèle de la démocratie à l'occidentale. Les victoires électorales à majorité écrasante étaient un produit de marque du système politique ivoirien. Les tripoteurs politiques allèrent en besogne pour satisfaire les ambitions politiques des protagonistes. Le Premier ministre, en tant que chef du gouvernement, crut comme fer qu'il était le successeur légitime. Le Président de l'Assemblée nationale, et ancien ministre des finances, Henri Konan Bédié assuma enfin la présidence intérimaire selon les dispositions de l'Article II de la Constitution. La dissonance au sein de la classe politique ivoirienne était patente. Le FPI et le Parti ivoirien du travail (PIT) étaient favorables à la formation d'un gouvernement de transition (*Fraternité Matin*, 12 février 1994). Alassane Ouattara créa son propre parti politique, le Rassemblement démocratique des républicains (RDR) avant de retourner à son poste au FMI comme directeur général adjoint pour l'Afrique. Ainsi, trois partis politiques étaient en lice pour les élections présidentielles de 1995: le parti au pouvoir, le PDCI, le FPI et le RDR. C'était dans ce climat politique que la doctrine nébuleuse de l'ivoirité fit son apparition en Côte d'Ivoire en 1994.

L'ivoirité: doctrine et instrument d'exclusion politique

L'ivoirité comporte plusieurs aspects. Cette doctrine est utilisée différemment par les analystes et les spécialistes de la scène politique ivoirienne selon leur but et leur appartenance politique. L'ivoirité peut signifier inclusion ou exclusion. Pour le gouvernement Bédié, l'auteur de la doctrine, elle connote «l'Ivoirien idéal», le modèle du groupe ethnique Akan, et précisément l'Ivoirien doit exsuder des traits de caractère de l'ethnie Baoulé (Dozon 2000:19). L'ivoirité est aussi une expression ethno-nationaliste qui met l'accent sur «le sang non dilué». Plus précisément, dans ce cas, l'ivoirité veut dire que «l'ivoirien authentique» doit être né de parents ivoiriens qui ont vu le jour sur la terre ivoirienne. Alors que les Ivoiriens qui sont le fruit de mariages mixtes, sont des «Ivoiriens atypiques» et par conséquent inéligibles à la présidence. En un mot, les Ivoiriens qui ne peuvent pas exhiber un acte de naissance digne de foi étaient automatiquement stigmatisés comme des citoyens de seconde zone. L'hybridation devint soudainement un crime de lèse-majesté. Cette doctrine servirait dès lors à séparer le bon grain de l'ivraie. L'exemple le plus frappant selon les dispositions de l'ivoirité est le cas des enfants du premier président de la Côte d'Ivoire. Ils ne pourront pas accéder à la magistrature suprême pour la simple raison que leur mère est sénégalaise !

L'idéologie est même bicéphale avec une face interne qui met en doute la citoyenneté des nordistes et la population de l'Ouest ne peut théoriquement accéder aux hautes fonctions de l'État, notamment à la magistrature suprême parce que leur tradition ne les prédisposerait pas à ces fonctions (Dozon 2000:19; *The Guardian* 12 janvier 2000). Pour les nordistes, c'était un secret de polichinelle que l'ivoirité était conçue pour Alassane Ouattara et la doctrine était sélectivement programmée pour exclure l'ancien Premier ministre de la course à la présidence. Le constat qu'on peut faire de l'application de l'idéologie de l'ivoirité est qu'un important pan de la population est devenu victime de l'ethnicisation. Ce qui en résulta est le fait que ce groupe de citoyens devint conscient de son identité ethnique. Une autre conséquence de cette idéologie abominable fut la perturbation de la formule du partage du pouvoir. L'ivoirité a oblitéré l'administration politique et augmenté les clivages.

Henri Konan Bédié remporta les élections présidentielles de 1995 dans un climat de hiatus politique. L'économie ivoirienne, sous la formule austère des Institutions financières internationales (IFI), conjuguée à la suspension de l'aide financière de l'Union européenne suite à la généralisation de la corruption dans la hiérarchie de la fonction publique était mal en point. Le néo-patrimonialisme et le prébendalisme étaient devenus le *modus operandi* (Sindzingre 2000:29-32). Le gouvernement Bédié fut sévèrement critiqué par les institutions de Bretton Woods et l'Union européenne pour faute de gestion transparente. Le régime fut financièrement handicapé et *ipso facto* ceci accéléra l'affaiblissement social de la population et la pauvreté gagna rapidement du terrain. En outre, les hoquets politiques ont approfondi les schismes ethno-religieux. Les signes avant-coureurs de la guerre civile étaient déjà palpables.

Sybarite, l'élite dirigeante ne prit pas de mesures concrètes qui auraient abouti à la réconciliation politique ou colmaté les brèches socio-économiques qui menaçaient l'édifice social de la Côte d'Ivoire. C'est à l'issue de cette ineptie que le contingent ivoirien qui avait participé aux opérations de maintien de la paix en République centrafricaine utilisa la rue comme forum de prot-estation pour revendiquer le paiement de ses indemnités. Ces derniers ont été rejoints par leurs homologues désenchantés par la politique du gouvernement et la déchéance matérielle qui avait plongé le moral de l'armée au plus bas niveau. Le régime Bédié s'écroula le 24 décembre 1999. Après sa chute, Bédié a affirme que l'ivoirité était un concept culturel qui a été pris dans son contresens. Selon l'ancien président,

> On a détourné de son sens originel, par calcul politique et volonté de désinformer, un concept noble et fédérateur. Il avait pour seul objectif de forger une culture commune pour tous ceux qui vivent sur le sol ivoirien,

étrangers comme nationaux. Justement parce que les équilibres sont fragiles dans un pays accueillant tant d'étrangers, j'ai souhaité créer un vaste mouvement d'intégration et d'assimilation, pour que toute personne vivant sur notre sol, toutes ethnies et régions confondues, Ivoiriens comme Burkinabé, Guinéens comme Libanais, tous se reconnaissent dans une synthèse culturelle et se sentent solidaires du destin de la Côte d'Ivoire (*Le Monde* 15 janvier 2000).

Bien que la religion puisse être une base d'unité (Rubin and Weinstein 1974:14), être nordiste ne veut pas nécessairement dire être musulman, de même, être sudiste ne signifie pas toujours être chrétien. Amplifier la dimension religieuse du conflit équivaut à une interprétation artificielle de la crise identitaire. C'est oublier qu'il y a eu en Côte d'Ivoire deux colonialismes religieux. Le christianisme est venu par le Sud alors que l'islam est arrivé par le Nord en Côte d'Ivoire. Donc, c'est le fait colonial, historique et démographique qui caractérise le religieux en Côte d'Ivoire. L'héritage religieux n'est pas vraiment un fardeau. La preuve: chrétiens et musulmans coexistent depuis des décennies à Abidjan (ville cosmopolite) sans heurts. Ainsi, il apparaît que l'ethnique submerge le religieux. Comme le souligne Dozon (2000:15),

> ... l'ivoirité, telle qu'elle commença à servir de fondement légitime au pouvoir de Konan Bédié durant la campagne pour les élections générales (présidentielles et législatives) de 1995, fut très précisément à l'origine de vives contestations du côté des principaux partis de l'opposition (le RDR du reste se créant à cette occasion avec, pour l'essentiel, des ex-cadres et militants du PDCI, et le FPI qui boycotta les élections), et, surtout, au départ de ces rumeurs de guerre civile qui allèrent croissantes jusqu'à la survenue du coup d'État.

Ce qui précède corrobore le constat selon lequel les leaders politiques peuvent utiliser l'ethnique afin de mobiliser leurs partisans (Turton 1997:1) et démontre également que «le système politique et la violence sont liés» (Rummel 2003). Tout semble effectivement indiquer que l'ivoirité a servi de ferment de discorde et de division dans la crise identitaire ivoirienne, la doctrine est donc une référence importante.

L'intervention de l'armée dans la politique ivoirienne: le régime du général Gueï

Immédiatement après le coup d'État, les insurgés placèrent le général Gueï aux commandes de l'État. Au début, la junte militaire fut composée d'un triumvirat: les généraux Robert Gueï, Lansana Palenfo et Abdoulaye Coulibaly. Faisant l'état des lieux, le général Gueï fut catégorique sur les

dégâts que l'ivoirité a causés au sein de la population septentrionale du pays et dénia les rumeurs selon lesquelles les deux officiers supérieurs étaient des sympathisants de l'ancien Premier ministre. Le chef de la junte donna l'impression que le gouvernement militaire prendrait des mesures rectificatives et qu'il établirait les bases d'une vraie démocratie et qu'il était venu pour mettre de l'ordre dans le paysage politique. Le visage angélique du chef du régime militaire était synonyme d'un homme d'État discret qui n'entraverait pas le futur processus démocratique. Pourtant, fidèle aux traits caractéristiques de la classe militaire dirigeante, le général Gueï purgea l'armée et la restructura selon les affinités ethniques et promut sélectivement les membres des groupes ethniques de sa région. Il écarta les deux autres membres de la junte de l'organe de décisions. De ce fait, le triumvirat devint inéluctablement une peau de chagrin dont le général Robert Gueï incarna la figure emblématique. Il poursuivit une politique d'attaque purement rituelle de la nomenklatura et exhiba des tactiques dictatoriales.

Pour couronner cette excentricité, le général président décida d'entrer de nouveau dans l'arène politique, mais cette fois par la voie des urnes, soutenu par un parti qui s'est constitué derrière lui, l'Union pour la démocratie et la paix en Côte d'Ivoire (UPDCI). Quatre candidats s'étaient manifestés, mais deux seulement ont pu avoir l'aval de la commission électorale. Par conséquent, le général Gueï et le candidat du Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), Laurent Gbagbo étaient en lice. Bédié fit un forcing pour faire valider sa candidature à l'élection présidentielle et fut disqualifié en raison de ses antécédents. Alassane Ouattara fut aussi écarté de la course sur les mêmes bases qu'en 1995 parce qu'il n'aurait pas satisfait aux dispositions du code de nationalité en vigueur. Le général Gueï choisit la politique de l'autruche, alors que les membres de la société civile tiraient la sonnette d'alarme quant aux conséquences néfastes que sa candidature provoquerait pour le pays. Une fois de plus, en érigeant des obstacles infranchissables pour Alassane Ouattara, une frange de la Côte d'Ivoire fut marginalisée. À ce point, il est important de remarquer que les consultations électorales dans une société où règne le pluralisme culturel et ethno-religieux comme en Côte d'Ivoire, l'ethnique plus que le religieux est un facteur qui influence l'électorat ivoirien. C'est la raison pour laquelle généralement en Afrique, les candidats aux élections présidentielles obtiennent la majorité des voix dans leur région qui est aussi considérée aussi comme leur fief. Il est important de comprendre également que le candidat aux élections présidentielles est plus ou moins le candidat ou le représentant de son groupe ethnique. Les consultations électorales sont par conséquent et de façon concluante une question de fierté, de développement des infrastructures et de réalisations coûteuses mais superflues pour la région ou le village du chef de l'État. Yamoussoukro devint

la capitale politique de la Côte d'Ivoire par la perspicacité politique d'Houphouët-Boigny; Daoukro connut une métamorphose «météorique» et fut un centre pour la classe politique lorsque Bédié était au pouvoir.

Il est incontestable que dans les arcanes de la politique africaine, le facteur ethnique est un déterminant important qui raffermit l'appartenance non seulement au groupe ethnique, mais aussi au pays. Le revers de la médaille est qu'une marginalisation prolongée et cristallisée d'une frange ou un segment important du paysage ethnique peut être fatale pour l'unité du pays. Le troisième facteur que nous ne devons pas ignorer afin d'avoir une image complète de l'ethno-nationalisme est la religion. Tous ces éléments qui concourent aux troubles ethniques existaient déjà en Côte d'Ivoire. Donc, c'était dans une situation sociopolitique tendue que les élections ont eu lieu en Côte d'Ivoire et Laurent Gbagbo remporta de justesse ces élections présidentielles avec «l'aide de la rue» dans une atmosphère qui préludait la guerre civile (*Tell* 6 novembre 2000). L'horizon politique était sombre pour le général-président. D'une part, la haine accumulée en défaveur de l'élite militaire qui est intervenue dans l'arène politique et a échoué dans sa politique économique et son dessein de se maintenir vaille que vaille au pouvoir ont contribué inexorablement à son impopularité. D'autre part, il faut reconnaître que le nombre est un facteur important en politique, surtout en ce qui concerne les élections. Le résultat des élections montre que le général Gueï a mis à découvert son «contrat social» avec les Ivoiriens. Le facteur ethnique ne peut donc être écarté d'«un geste de la main» dans le processus électoral. Il faut souligner aussi que pendant la période houphouëtiste, le facteur ethnique entrait également dans le calcul politique car «les maîtres du système de recrutement ont développé un art consommé dans la manipulation de la représentation ethnique des dirigeants» (Bakary 1991:76).

Entre la légitimité et la légalité

Le résultat des élections présidentielles était sujet à controverse. Le RDR refusa obstinément de reconnaître ces dites élections en partant du principe qu'elles ne reflétaient pas les aspirations de l'électorat et milita pour l'organisation de nouvelles élections. Par essence, le RDR mit en doute la légitimité du mandat de Gbagbo et présenta le président élu comme le bénéficiaire d'une fraude électorale. Bien que le PDCI ait émis des réserves, son attitude était d'une manière ou d'une autre tiède en comparaison à la position du RDR. Par conséquent, pour l'opposition, Gbagbo avait la légalité, mais pas la légitimité de gouverner le pays. C'était principalement une lutte entre les Bété — le groupe ethnique de Gbagbo — et les nordistes représentant l'autre segment du conflit qui prit une dimension religieuse entre les chrétiens et les musulmans. Mais il faut affirmer qu'en Côte d'Ivoire le religieux est

plutôt un facteur sous-jacent et secondaire. Dans la crise actuelle, même quand on a parfois tendance à donner des colorations ethniques au religieux, les conflits ou affrontements entre musulmans et chrétiens sont plutôt exceptionnels. L'ethnique, exacerbé par l'ivoirité, a accentué les clivages nord-sud. La fracture nord-sud doit être considérée sous l'angle ethnique car les musulmans et les chrétiens coexistent sans heurts apparents en Côte d'Ivoire. Le religieux est donc un sous-produit de l'ethnique. Ceci accéléra le clivage nord-sud. L'interstice social s'élargissait progressivement, mais de manière irréversible. Ainsi Laurent Gbagbo devint le quatrième président de la Côte d'Ivoire. Le climat de suspicion mutuelle entre sudistes et nordistes persista et compliqua les rapports ambigus que la classe dirigeante entretenait, et par la suite, plongea le pays dans un malaise socio-économique. À la décharge du président Gbagbo, il faut préciser que le premier citoyen ivoirien a pris des initiatives en faveur de la réconciliation afin de calmer les esprits meurtris. Le Forum pour la réconciliation nationale se déroula en 2001 et le noyau des actionnaires politiques de la scène ivoirienne a participé au débat. Le Forum fut présidé par Seydou Élimane Diarra. Malheureusement pour la Côte d'Ivoire, le Forum n'aboutit pas à des décisions concrètes qui auraient pu apaiser les partis qui se sentaient lésés. Ceci aurait permis de tirer un trait sur ce cul-de-sac sociopolitique et cimenter l'unité du pays depuis le décès de Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Le Forum n'était simplement qu'une façade qui avait caché momentanément les dissensions réelles entre les différents camps politiques. La sécheresse et la pauvreté dans la gestion de la situation ont fissuré davantage la Côte d'Ivoire et le pire des scénarios qu'on craignait commença à se dérouler.

La guerre civile

Les signes d'une guerre de destruction réciproque étaient déjà palpables en Côte d'Ivoire. Le coup d'État avorté du 19 septembre, l'insurrection d'une faction de l'armée qui dégénéra en une rébellion déclarée contre les institutions républicaines n'étaient pas fortuits. Les premières victimes furent Émile Boga Doudou, ministre de l'Intérieur et de la décentralisation, le général Gueï, son épouse et quelques membres de sa famille. Le premier aurait été assassiné, c'est ce que prétendent les auteurs du coup d'État manqué, alors que les autres victimes auraient été massacrées par les troupes gouvernementales en représailles de l'assassinat du ministre. Les forces rebelles sont devenues très facilement maîtres de la situation dans le Nord et occupèrent le «Grand nord» et une partie importante du centre du pays notamment Bouaké, la seconde ville du pays sur le plan économique et du développement industriel après Abidjan. Bouaké devint effectivement la capitale de la rébellion. Apparemment, la faiblesse des Forces armées nationales de Côte d'Ivoire

(FANCI) dans leur contre-offensive contre la rébellion dans les premiers jours des hostilités de la guerre fratricide est étroitement liée à la politique de défense de la Côte d'Ivoire.

Après son indépendance, la Côte d'Ivoire confia sa sécurité nationale à la France. La Côte d'Ivoire devint un allié et un partenaire inconditionnel de l'Ouest. Le niveau des investissements français est très important dans ce pays. La Côte d'Ivoire est le «premier partenaire commercial de la France au sein de la zone UMOA» (Decraene 2000:8). Le bloc capitaliste exhiba le premier producteur mondial de cacao comme la vitrine et le modèle du succès économique dans les années 70. Cette entente cordiale avait entraîné la Côte d'Ivoire à signer un accord de défense et d'assistance militaire avec la France en 1960. La France impériale a la latitude d'intervenir en faveur de la Côte d'Ivoire dans un conflit inter-étatique (Vogt 1990:77). Cette politique est contraire à l'idée qui veut qu'un pays mette en œuvre sa politique de défense en comptant sur ses propres moyens (Baylis 1997:195). *A posteriori,* il semble que la politique d'affaiblissement de l'armée est devenue contre-productive. L'armée n'était pas une priorité pour les dirigeants ivoiriens. Ceci s'illustre par la déclaration d'Houphouët-Boigny selon laquelle «un franc consacré à l'armement est un franc volé au développement» (*Afrique Contemporaine,* 2000, n° 193:9). En outre, la Côte d'Ivoire fait partie des pays qui allouent une partie infime de leur budget à leur défense (Holsti 1995:217). L'inventaire de l'arsenal des Forces armées nationales de Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI) avant le début des hostilités est effectivement révélateur: les FANCI «comptent environ 18 000 hommes, dont 8000 gendarmes. L'armée de terre qui comprend 6800 hommes dispose de 5 Chars-légers AMX-13, 7 ERC-90 Sagaie blindés de reconnaissance, 16 AML-60/-90 et «Mamba», 16 M-3 et 13 VAB blindés de transport de troupes, 16 AM 4 mortiers (4m-1950) de 105 mm ainsi que 16 mortiers AM de 81 mm et 120 mm» (IISS 2001/2002). À cela s'ajoutent «les forces navales qui comprennent 900 hommes et possèdent deux patrouilleurs et garde-côtes et un bateau de transport amphibie» (IISS 2001/2002). En ce qui concerne «l'armée de l'air qui compte 700 hommes, elle a été dotée de cinq avions de combat Alpha-jet et sept hélicoptères de transport (hors combat). La garde présidentielle compte 1100 hommes, alors que les forces de réserve comprennent 12 000 hommes» (IISS 2001/2002). De plus, la hiérarchie militaire avait été incorporée dans la catégorie des cadres de l'Administration pendant le règne d'Houpouët. L'armée faisait partie intégrante de la gestion du pays et on peut donc en déduire que le dernier échelon de l'armée ivoirienne formait une «unité de bureaucrates». Pour ce qui est du budget militaire, «plus de 80% allait au règlement des soldes du personnel» (*Afrique Contemporaine* 2000:193:9)

Ce qui découle de cette analyse est que la Côte d'Ivoire ne disposait pas d'une armée conventionnelle. À vrai dire, cet état de chose peut être attribué au rôle anticonstitutionnel que l'armée est très encline à jouer dans la vie politique des pays en voie de développement. Par conséquent, il est très probable que le but de la classe dirigeante était de soumettre les forces armées en vertu de la présence du parapluie militaire français. En appliquant cette politique de défense, il semble que l'État ivoirien a omis le fait que «la puissance militaire est l'un des instruments que les États utilisent le moment venu à la poursuite de leurs intérêts nationaux respectifs» (Garnett 1975:50). Ainsi, la mise sur pied d'une puissance ou force militaire nationale, indépendante et efficiente ne faisait pas partie des priorités des gouvernements successifs.

La crise économique et financière qui a résulté de la détérioration des termes de l'échange au cours de la décennie 1980, la dévaluation du franc CFA de 1994, et la réduction des dépenses publiques sont révélatrices: «la part de la santé publique dans le total des dépenses primaires (hors charge de la dette) passe de 7,2% en 1993 à 5,8% en 1997, celles consacrées à l'éducation de 32,8% à 25,5%» (Cabrillac 2000:43). Cette situation ne pouvait qu'engendrer une diminution du budget de l'armée.

Il faut aussi noter que «l'absence de recrutement et le vieillissement de la troupe, le manque d'entraînement, l'état du matériel» (*Afrique Contemporaine* 2000:11) ont contribué à l'affaiblissement de l'armée. C'est donc dans un contexte structurel difficile pour l'armée que la mutinerie du 19 septembre s'est transformée en guerre civile.

Dans ces conditions, une offensive des FANCI dès le début de la guerre dont l'objectif serait de contrecarrer les rebelles était apparemment difficile, en particulier à Bouaké et au Nord. Il est vrai que les premiers exploits militaires des insurgés ont désagréablement surpris les FANCI et ces succès ont eu des effets retentissants et ont simultanément envoyé des ondes de choc dans les FANCI. Ces facteurs expliqueraient le repli stratégique des FANCI face à la puissance de feu des insurgés au début de la guerre civile. Comme Mao Tse Tung (1972:64) l'a si bien exposé, l'objet du «repli stratégique est de conserver la force militaire afin de préparer la contre-offensive. Le repli est nécessaire car refuser de reculer avant l'attaque d'un ennemi fort équivaut à compromettre la préservation de sa force». La dynamique qu'engendre la fin de la guerre froide a changé les données stratégiques en ce qui concerne l'intervention de la France dans les conflits en Afrique subsaharienne (ASS) depuis l'avènement de l'Union européenne et du système unipolaire. Un autre aspect des dissensions idéologiques occasionnées par la guerre froide était la politique de soutien que Paris menait en faveur de ses protégés (Chipman 1986:23). Il n'y a aucun doute qu'Abidjan a accepté que Paris soit le garant de sa sécurité nationale. Cet optimisme est renforcé par le

fait que la France a une base militaire, le 43e BIMA, qui est établie à proximité de l'aéroport international Port-Bouet. Avec du recul, on est en droit d'affirmer que les mutins avaient un double objectif qui revient au même but: le changement du régime en place par des moyens anti-constitutionnels et notamment par la force. L'échec du coup d'État qui s'est traduit par une rébellion ouverte, a plongé la Côte d'Ivoire dans la guerre civile et à par la suite provoqué la scission du pays en deux.

Le leadership de la branche militaire des rebelles était composé du colonel Gueu, fervent supporter du général Gueï, et qui est secondé par le colonel Soumaïla Bakayoko. D'autres insurgés qui occupent le devant de la scène sont l'adjudant Tuo Fozie et le sergent Chérif Ousmane. La section politique est dirigée par Guillaume Kigbafori Soro. Le spectre d'un long conflit avec une avalanche d'atrocités planait sur la population civile lorsque deux autres groupes rebelles firent leur apparition à l'Ouest du pays: le mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO) et le Mouvement pour la justice et la paix (MJP).

La violence de la guerre et la destruction qu'elle engendre, surtout quand elle a une coloration ethnique, sont justifiées et mises en exergue en ces termes «les attaques de l'ennemi justifient des représailles à un niveau semblable de destruction (...) [puisque] la guerre a développé une psychologie de riposte» (Holtsi 1995:321). Le gouvernement ne fait pas de distinction entre les groupes rebelles puisqu'il est convaincu qu'ils sont blancs bonnets, bonnets blancs. En un mot, les autres mouvements rebelles émaneraient du MPCI que le gouvernement considère comme la marionnette de certains pays limitrophes de la Côte d'Ivoire.

La dimension internationale du conflit

Les autorités ivoiriennes n'ont pas hésité à accuser nommément le Burkina Faso et ensuite le Liberia de Charles Taylor comme étant les mentors des rebelles. Selon le Professeur Mamadou Koulibaly (2003:1), «des hordes d'assaillants venus du Burkina Faso, du Liberia et d'autres pays de la sous-région se sont jetés sur elle [la Côte d'Ivoire]». Les deux pays ont catégoriquement nié toute implication dans la guerre civile ivoirienne et ont présenté le cas comme une affaire interne de la Côte d'Ivoire. On est en droit de supposer que la position du gouvernement ivoirien est justifiable et que ces accusations ne sont pas vaines. Les affinités ethniques des rebelles avec certains groupes ethniques de ces deux pays et le fait que quelques-uns parmi les insurgés aient trouvé un havre de paix à Ouagadougou concourent à étayer ces accusations. Ces facteurs soulignent «l'importance de la dimension africaine du rôle que jouent les opérations transfrontalières» (Clapman 1995:83) aussi bien que l'élément de suprême importance c'est-à-dire «le

besoin des insurgés d'obtenir au moins le soutien tacite des États limitrophes du pays [que les rebelles] attaquent» (Clapman 1995:83). Sans une telle aide, les mouvements rebelles ne peuvent avoir de succès concrets, tangibles et significatifs parce que les insurgés dépendent des pays frontaliers pour leurs logistiques. Primo les relations entre Ouagadougou et Yamoussoukro s'étaient détériorées depuis les exactions sur la communauté burkinabé en Côte d'Ivoire au sujet du foncier rural et ceci a entraîné un exode des planteurs et ouvriers de ce pays (Schwartz 2000:64). Secundo le fait pour les rebelles d'avoir fait leur incursion à partir du Nord de la Côte d'Ivoire ne fait que compliquer la situation. Tertio, certains *dramatis personae* de la rébellion avaient demandé l'asile politique au Burkina Faso. Il y a également la facilité avec laquelle la rébellion a eu accès aux moyens logistiques. Enfin de compte et apparemment, le gouvernement ivoirien a tendance à considérer la combinaison de ces faits comme faisant partie intégrante d'un complot international qui vise à renverser le gouvernement Gbagbo afin de mettre en place un gouvernement «favorable», et depuis le coup d'État avorté de janvier 2001, les relations ivoiro-burkinabé s'étaient dégradées.

Le fait que le MPIGO et le MPJ aient commencé leur rébellion aux frontières ivoiro-libériennes a aussi détérioré les rapports tendus que la Côte d'Ivoire entretenait avec le Liberia de Charles Taylor, vu l'insécurité qui règne dans cette zone frontalière (*Afrique Contemporaine* 2000:10). La situation au niveau des frontières entre les deux pays est beaucoup plus complexe, car les milices libériennes et sierra-léonaises collaboraient avec les deux camps du conflit ivoirien. De plus, le trafic d'armes est aussi un phénomène qui contribue à l'insécurité. Par exemple, «en Afrique de l'Ouest, 70% des armes en circulation sont illicites» (Bellescize 1999:13). La présence d'éléments libériens au sein des insurgés et particulièrement celle du chef de guerre sierra-léonais le tristement célèbre Sam Bockarie alias Général Mosquito du RUF constituent une corrélation sur les liens que les seigneurs de guerre tissent et les activités transfrontalières des rebelles dans les guerres civiles en Afrique de l'Ouest. Les États africains sont perpétuellement menacés par cette catégorie d'acteurs non étatiques particulièrement les États qui regorgent de richesses naturelles. Nous ne pouvons dissocier les opérations des chefs de guerre de la participation des mercenaires dans la crise ivoirienne. Si les rebelles sont accusés de compter des desperados en leur sein, il y a aussi des preuves que les troupes gouvernementales emploient le savoir-faire des «soldats de fortune» en contenant et en repoussant dans certains cas l'avancée des rebelles. Dans les conflits intra-étatiques, les États africains sont enclins à faire appel ou à confier des aspects de leur défense à des compagnies privées de sécurité, puisque l'assistance des anciens alliés ou de l'ex-puissance coloniale en ce qui concerne l'intervention dans la guerre civile s'est tassée

(Cilliers 1994:5). Les activités de ces compagnies de sécurité s'étendent sur plusieurs domaines de la défense en Afrique. Ceci est dû à l'incapacité de l'État à remplir ces fonctions (Cilliers 1994:5). Par exemple, l'Executive Outcomes (EO), qui a fourni ses services à l'armée ivoirienne (*Jeune Afrique* 4 octobre 2003), avait déjà participé à la guerre civile sierra-léonaise. La compagnie a formé des militaires sierra-léonais ainsi que les «Kamajors», milice pro-gouvernementale (Perch 1994:94). Le gouvernement a aussi bénéficié de l'assistance de l'Angola, bien que le degré de leur participation soit ambigu.

C'était donc dans cette confusion que la France a décidé d'intervenir dans le conflit ivoirien. Quoique l'intervention française ne participe pas à la mise en vigueur de l'application de l'accord de défense, l'ancienne puissance coloniale avait quand même un devoir moral envers la Côte d'Ivoire en vertu de ce pacte de défense. En outre, il ne faut pas perdre de vue le fait que le niveau des investissements de la France (le plus important en Afrique francophone occidentale) et la présence des citoyens français ont été déterminants quant à la recherche d'une solution politique au conflit.

Le conflit armé ivoirien a des effets pervers sur la vie socio-économique de la sous-région. Premièrement, le poids financier et économique de la Côte d'Ivoire dans l'Union monétaire ouest-africaine (UMOA) n'est pas négligeable en vertu du volume de son exportation et les bénéfices dérivés des produits tropicaux et de leurs conséquences sur la stabilité du franc CFA. Ensuite, les pays enclavés comme le Burkina Faso et le Mali qui trouvent leur débouché maritime par la Côte d'Ivoire doivent revoir leur stratégie de transport ferroviaire et routier, car la plupart de leur approvisionnement transite par la Côte d'Ivoire. Cela constitue aussi un manque à gagner pour l'État ivoirien. Un autre effet négatif de la crise dans la sous-région est le problème engendré par les réfugiés et les déplacés de guerre dans les régions frontalières des pays limitrophes dont les citoyens étaient venus en masse en Côte d'Ivoire, attirés par l'irrésistible potentiel économique que constituait la Côte d'Ivoire dans les années 60 et 70. Sans aucun doute, la Côte d'Ivoire a la plus grande concentration de travailleurs émigrés, planteurs et ouvriers agricoles en Afrique francophone occidentale.

D'Accra à Paris: les Accords d'Accra et de Marcoussis

Lors de sa session extraordinaire à Lomé en 1997, la Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO), «les chefs d'État et de gouvernement de la CEDEAO ont décidé la mise en place d'un mécanisme de règlement des conflits et de maintien de la paix, visant à assurer la sécurité dans la sous-région ouest-africaine» (de Bellescize 1996:16). Ainsi, la CEDAO s'est dotée d'un mécanisme pour assurer la sécurité dans la

sous-région. Dès le début de la guerre civile, les chefs d'État et de gouvernement de la CEDEAO ont mis en place des mécanismes afin de trouver une solution pacifique à la crise ivoirienne. Deux sommets extraordinaires ont eu lieu d'abord le 29 septembre à Accra et ensuite le 15 décembre 2002 à Dakar. Cette médiation a abouti à la création de l'ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) dont le commandant est le général sénégalais Papa Khalilou Fall, alors que la CEDEAO est représentée en Côte d'Ivoire par l'ambassadeur nigérian Raph Uwechue. La CEDEAO a obtenu des accords de cessez-le-feu avec les belligérants, notamment avec le MPCI à Bouaké le 17 octobre et le deuxième a été signé avec le MPIGO à Lomé en janvier 2003. Des zones tampons ont été créées entre les forces gouvernementales et les rebelles. Apparemment, les partis en conflit ont donné leur soutien tacite aux efforts de la CEDEAO afin de trouver une solution sous-régionale à la crise. Le revers que l'initiative de cessez-le-feu a subi est dû d'une part à l'intransigeance de la rébellion qui voulait la démission du président Gbagbo et d'autre part au refus du président ivoirien de ratifier ces accords en partant du principe qu'ils favorisaient la rébellion. En plus, l'attitude du gouvernement est fondée sur le fait que l'essence du cessez-le-feu de la CEDEAO contrevenait l'esprit et la position de l'Union africaine sur les moyens inconstitutionnels de parvenir au pouvoir selon les accords d'Alger de juillet 1999. Tout permet de penser que l'intransigeance des deux camps a entraîné la France à porter une fois de plus son masque hégémonique. La mise en place de l'opération LICORNE a servi à créer une zone tampon entre les rebelles et les forces gouvernementales à Yamoussoukro. La seconde phase de l'intervention française a consisté à l'organisation de la table ronde de Linas-Marcoussis en France en janvier 2003. Le secrétaire général des Nations Unies, Koffi Annan, et le président de l'Union africaine, Alpha Konaré ont participé aux négociations qui ont abouti à la mise en place d'un Gouvernement de réconciliation nationale (GRN) dirigé par un Premier ministre (Seydou Élimane Diarra). Les membres du GRN sont issus de toutes les tendances des partis politiques y compris les Forces nouvelles (l'ex-rébellion). Mais les ministres de la Défense et de la Sécurité intérieure seraient issus des rangs des Forces nouvelles et leur nomination a été renvoyée aux calendes grecques. Le deuxième aspect des accords de Linas-Marcoussis est le code de la nationalité, la véritable pierre d'achoppement des négociations. Le troisième élément est l'abrogation de la carte de séjour dont l'application a été sujette à des controverses. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue le fait que le gouvernement actuel a hérité de la politique de la carte de séjour qui avait été initiée par le gouvernement de l'ancien Premier ministre Alassane Ouattara. Cette politique était impopulaire depuis sa conception.

En ce qui concerne la loi électorale, une proposition d'amendement a été soumise. La présente disposition devrait être supprimée de la Constitution, particulièrement les clauses qui ont été incluses afin d'exclure Alassane Ouattara des élections présidentielles. Cette disposition constitue la pomme de discorde puisqu'une partie importante de la population croyait qu'elle était la cible principale de cette clause odieuse. Alors un nouveau code de la nationalité sera élaboré. Quatrièmement, la Table Ronde a pris des dispositions pour une amnistie générale pour les membres des forces de l'ordre qui auraient prétendument commis des crimes avant ou pendant la guerre civile.

En ce qui concerne le foncier rural, l'Article 26 de la loi n° 98-750 relative au domaine du foncier rural, il y avait une différence fondamentale entre les propriétaires traditionnels de la terre et les détenteurs d'un droit d'usage et leurs ayants droit d'origine étrangère qui peuvent être dépossédés de cette terre trois ans après le décès de ceux qui l'avaient mise en valeur.

Il faut également noter que les dispositions du décret du 15 novembre 1935 de l'administration coloniale avaient prévu les démarches à suivre pour l'obtention de la mise en valeur de la terre. La plupart des allogènes n'avaient pas scrupuleusement adhéré aux conditions de cette loi car «peu d'immigrants allèrent, bien sûr, au-delà de la première étape, encore moins parvinrent à la dernière, tout en étant pas censés ignorer que le droit à l'installation qui leur avait été accordé par les autochtones—même s'il leur avait été vendu—devait être reconnu par l'État pour être pleinement «valable» (Schwartz 2000:63). Et il conclut ainsi: «on comprend dès lors que des conflits aient pu apparaître, en particulier lorsque l'autochtone voulait reprendre pour son compte une parcelle de terre cédée à un allochtone, au seul prétexte qu'il s'en considérait toujours comme le propriétaire» (Schwartz 2000:63). Il faut néanmoins reconnaître que le décret du 15 novembre 1935 stipule «l'autorisation d'occupation à titre précaire et révocable d'une parcelle de terrain du domaine rural». Le Gouvernement de réconciliation nationale (GRN) fera donc des efforts pour modifier certaines dispositions du foncier rural. Les pourparlers de paix ont aussi reconnu la menace que constituent les escadrons de la mort, les activités des éléments incontrôlés dans les zones des rebelles et le haut-le-cœur que donnent les charniers, les exécutions sommaires, et les dangers qu'ils peuvent engendrer sur la coexistence pacifique des divers groupes ethniques. La Table Ronde a alors recommandé que les auteurs de ces actes soient traduits devant les instances juridiques compétentes en la matière. Concernant les médias, il a été conseillé de prendre des mesures qui assureront la liberté d'information.

Il est nécessaire de porter un regard critique sur les Accords de Linas-Marcoussis à cet égard. Les obstacles que le GRN doit franchir sont énormes, vu l'ampleur des réformes proposées par la conférence de Linas-Marcoussis.

La Côte d'Ivoire après Marcoussis: politique, réconciliation et avenir de la démocratie

L'Accord de paix de Linas-Marcoussis est une feuille de route qui doit être élargie et élaborée pour faire avancer le pays dans la voie de l'unité nationale. Par conséquent, son contenu n'est pas exhaustif, mais il constitue quand même la base de futures négociations. L'exécution des résolutions est caractérisée comme il fallait s'y attendre par une méfiance mutuelle, surtout l'annonce de l'attribution des portefeuilles ministériels de la Défense et de la Sécurité intérieure aux Forces nouvelles dans les accords. Cette décision est considérée comme un sacrilège par les supporters du gouvernement. Bien sûr, cette attitude a encore entaillé la crédibilité de Linas-Marcoussis dans le Sud du pays et a résulté sur des manifestations anti-françaises. Un autre handicap des «marcoussistes» était les escarmouches dans le Sud-Ouest, la découverte des charniers à Bouaké et à Vavoua. Les activités néfastes des Jeunes Patriotes ajoutent du venin au psyché national (*Le Jour* 16 décembre 2002). Une autre entrave à l'exécution des Accords est la présence de guérilleros libériens tant du côté des rebelles que du côté gouvernemental à la frontière des deux pays. Par exemple le leader du MPIGO, le sergent Jean-Marie Toualy a été tué dans une embuscade et Sam Bockarie (alias général Mosquito) a aussi été abattu dans un raid transfrontalier. Ce dernier avait même été accusé d'intensifier les batailles sur le front occidental de la rébellion (*Le Temps* 7 avril 2003; *Fraternité Matin* 24 décembre 2003).

Quoique la mise en œuvre du processus des accords de Linas-Marcoussis soit sujette à des soubresauts sociopolitiques, ces accords sont importants. La formation d'un Gouvernement de réconciliation nationale (GRN) est déjà encourageant. Même si l'octroi des ministères de la Défense et de la Sécurité intérieure à des proches du président Gbagbo bloque ce processus, un consensus sur ce problème majeur n'est pas à exclure. Mais cette décision risque d'avoir des conséquences négatives et entraîner une reprise des hostilités. Les autorités ivoiriennes auraient pu partager ces deux postes «sensibles» entre les Forces nouvelles et le FPI afin d'arriver à un consensus, ce qui constituerait une «violation» tolérable des accords de Linas-Marcoussis. Il est indéniablement vrai que la guerre ivoirienne a des effets pervers sur le secteur public et a modifié les dépenses militaires qui ont augmenté d'une manière astronomique (de 98 millions elles sont passées à 125 millions CFA) et cela laisse augurer des conséquences négatives pour le domaine social qui a été écorché par la dévaluation du Franc CFA.

En ce qui concerne les réfugiés et les déplacés de guerre, la suspension des hostilités et les rôles d'opération de maintien de la paix que la LICORNE et l'ECOMICI ont joué représentent un élixir. Les pourparlers de Linas-Marcoussis ont aussi abouti à la création d'un Comité de suivi des accords

dirigé par le Professeur Albert Tedvodjre dont le mandat est de dénouer les questions difficiles et de faciliter la tâche au GRN. Les véritables enjeux qui risquent de compromettre les acquis de ces accords ne sont pas encore en vigueur; notamment le code controversé de la nationalité et le foncier rural. Le second aspect sera extrêmement épineux à entreprendre. Bien que les accords aient mis l'accent sur les *jus soli* et les *jus sanguini,* toujours est-il que si la nouvelle constitution ne favorise plus l'expropriation après trois ans ou même ne supprime cet aspect de la constitution, cela pourrait être un *non decet* pour les premiers propriétaires qui ont soit cédé soit vendu la terre à un prix modique au premier usager.

Tout en reconnaissant que le GRN et le Comité international de suivi (CIS) sont en train de colmater les brèches de l'édifice social, il ne faut surtout pas oublier que cette guerre fratricide a profondément touché le tissu social et que les abus et violations des droits humains font tristement partie du paysage sociopolitique ivoirien. Le rapport de la mission d'enquête dirigée par le haut commissaire adjoint des droits de l'homme des Nations Unies, Bertrand Ramcharan, a mis au banc des accusés les Forces nouvelles et le gouvernement pour avoir commis des violations des droits humains. D'une part le gouvernement a été blâmé pour la prolifération des escadrons de la mort et des milices ethniques qui ont commis des crimes odieux ; d'autre part le registre des Forces nouvelles n'est pas vierge car des cas de viol, de pillages et de meurtre ont été signalés (*Jeune Afrique* 23-29 décembre 2002). Cet état de chose a abouti à la résolution 1464 des Nations Unies qui autorise l'ECOMICI et la LICORNE à faire recours à la force si nécessaire, afin de protéger les civils qui sont directement menacés par la violence physique. Leur mandat est renouvelable pour une période de six mois.

Un transfert d'autorité de l'Opération d'interposition LICORNE aux forces de l'ECOMICI a eu lieu respectivement le 15 et le 29 mars, 2003. (*Weekend Vanguard* 5 juin 2004). À la suite de ce transfert, des troupes de l'ECOMICI ont été déployées à l'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire. L'objectif de ce déploiement est de libérer cette région des menaces transfrontalières que constituent les mercenaires à la frontière du Liberia et de la Côte d'Ivoire. Auparavant, sous le régime Bédié, l'insécurité régnait dans cette zone frontalière et l'armée avait eu des difficultés à sécuriser la zone (*Afrique Contemporaine,* n° 193, 2000:10). L'ECOMICI participe activement aussi au programme de Désarmement, démobilisation et de réintégration (DDR). C'est en vertu du Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies que le Conseil de sécurité a voté le 27 février 2004 la résolution 1528 pour la création de l'Opération des Nations Unies pour la Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI) pour une période initiale de 12 mois. Par la même résolution, la Mission des Nations Unies pour la Côte

d'Ivoire, UNMICI, (dont le but principal était de suivre de près le processus de paix) et l'ECOMICI ont été dissoutes dans l'ONUCI. Le mandat de l'ONUCI est de faciliter l'établissement de l'autorité de l'État sur toute l'étendue du territoire ivoirien, et ceci, avec la coopération de la CEDEAO et d'autres partenaires internationaux afin de préparer les élections présidentielles et législatives selon les dispositions des accords de Linas-Marcoussis (*Weekend Vanguard*, 5 juin 2004). Mais pour que l'ONUCI réussisse dans sa mission, il lui faut la coopération de toutes les parties en conflits, sinon, une solution à la crise serait illusoire. Tout cela dépend de l'application des accords de Linas-Marcoussis signés le 24 janvier 2004.

En guise de conclusion

Le dysfonctionnement de la démocratie, l'ethnicisation de la politique et du religieux sont manifestement des panneaux du type de démocratie qui menace de mettre la Côte d'Ivoire sur ses genoux. Il est certain que le régionalisme a remplacé le nationalisme en Côte d'Ivoire et les politiciens ivoiriens doivent se mettre au-dessus des intérêts de clocher et refléter l'aspiration authentique de tous les acteurs politiques et économiques. Des référendums doivent être entrepris afin de sonder l'opinion publique sur les questions cruciales. La réforme foncière doit être basée sur les réalités sur le terrain. Il y a aussi le besoin de créer une institution inter-religieuse afin de désamorcer la situation et faire renaître la confiance mutuelle entre les groupes ethniques.

En dernière analyse, si l'accord de Linas-Marcoussis est appliquée dans sa lettre et son esprit, la période post-conflit pourrait éroder la prééminence des partis ethniques en Côte d'Ivoire. Les Ivoiriens, quelle que soit leur mouvance politique, doivent faire preuve de patriotisme et mettre l'intérêt du pays au-dessus des querelles et des politiques partisanes. La volonté politique et l'esprit de compromis doivent prévaloir dans la recherche d'une solution politique afin de sortir de l'impasse actuelle. De même, la communauté internationale pourrait aider le GNR à trouver une formule de partage du pouvoir très représentative pouvant endiguer le facteur ethnique. Un autre catalyseur qui pourrait avoir des retombées sociales positives afin d'accélérer le processus de réconciliation nationale est l'amélioration de la situation économique, bien qu'elle dépende du contexte économique international. La communauté internationale peut faire plus dans la voie de l'assistance accordée à la Côte d'Ivoire afin d'aider le pays à sortir de l'ornière de la guerre. En ce qui concerne la CEDEAO, elle doit engager des experts chevronnés dans la gestion des crises afin d'éviter les tribulations qui ont caractérisé la recherche d'une solution pacifique à la crise ivoirienne lors des négociations d'Accra.

La réconciliation devrait être entreprise dans un futur proche en Côte d'Ivoire et chez ses voisins (le Burkina Faso et le Liberia) dans le but de remédier aux relations tendues qui résultent des suspicions prolongées. Ces obstacles sont de véritables défis qui doivent être surmontés par le truchement d'une démocratie authentique et participative dans un très proche avenir pour non seulement le bien des Ivoiriens, mais aussi pour la stabilité de la sous-région.

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Review Article

The Frontier of Interculturality. A Review of Wim van Binsbergen's *Intercultural Encounters: African and Anthropological Lessons towards a Philosophy of Interculturality* (2003), Münster: Lit Verlag, 610 pages 40.90 Euros.

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Wim van Binsbergen's huge book, *Intercultural Encounters: African and Anthropological Lessons towards a Philosophy of Interculturality* (2003) is bold, honest and to some extent quite disturbing.

An immediately striking feature is his relentless critique of his positionality as a North Atlantic subject which is quite admirable. Most academics concerned with Africa tend to exclude this important angle. In this way, postmodernism can be employed in two devastating ways. An uncritical version of postmodernism may not pay sufficient attention to the author's antecedents (and van Binsbergen's self-critique is sometimes embarrassingly frank). Also a playful version of postmodernism may exempt the author from social responsibility.

A forceful text, one that may alienate the positivist mind (or structures of thought that tend towards positivism/scientism) but it (the text) already anticipates this rejection (or in fact denial) with a formidable intellectual arsenal.

Let's concentrate for a moment on the unambiguous condition of van Binsbergen's positionality. Indeed many parts of his massive work address and capture its complexities in a compelling manner; there are continual themes that demonstrate the power of the events, turns and upheavals that have influenced his life and work as an academic such as the absence and even denial of ancestral antecedents; the unilateral identification with the women in his life; and hard struggles against the pain of personal rejection. His merciless self-critique is in fact an extension of an equally unremitting critique of the project of anthropology in general and Africanist anthropology in particular.

So far his wide-ranging anthropological explorations have led him through five different African contexts; rural Tunisia, urban Zambia,

rural Zambia, rural Guinea-Bissau and urban Botswana. During his first
major anthropological project in Tunisia a crucial methodological dilemma
which he didn't problematize at the time came up; 'problems of power,
social change, the interplay between heterogeneous semantic, social and
economic systems within one field of interaction, corporeality, self-
reflection and interculturality' (p. 64). Indeed van Binsbergen's
relationship with anthropology tends to be unusually problematic, a love-
hate relationship that has been mutually beneficial. Consider the view
that 'anthropology is more than just a sublimated form of sleuthing or
espionage' (p. 73). The evocative association of anthropology with
espionage is quite intriguing. He makes many other similarly evocative
and intriguing associations in relation to the project[s] of anthropology.

Anthropology, he consistently points out, is first and foremost
implicated by the project and discourses of imperialism. In order to redress
its often disturbing historical antecedents 'anthropology, almost by
definition, sides with the peripheral, the subaltern, the non-vocal, that
which is excluded from sharing in the political and economic power in
the modern world' (p. 30). In other words, what has been termed an
'anthropology of advocacy' is required to right some of the wrongs of the
discipline's complicities with imperial projects and colonization. But the
complicity of anthropology with colonization does not end with the
moment of decolonization. The discipline is also implicated by the
important category of class. In this regard, van Binsbergen points out that
'anthropology could only rise, as a critical and comparative reflection, in
a complex industrial society whose ideological tissue had been torn by
secularisation, capitalism, and the rise of new classes and political
structures, in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries CE'
(p. 31). In the critique of anthropology's complicity with forms of
sociopolitical oppression (imperialism and colonization), van Binsbergen
maintains a remarkable consistency; 'North Atlantic anthropologists
implicitly share in the privileges and the power of the Northern part of
the world, as against the South' (Ibid). Furthermore, it (anthropology)
represents 'a form of intellectual appropriation and humiliation against
which Africans in the nationalist era rightly protested'. As a way of
redressing colonial imbalance, van Binsbergen advocates a radical
deconstruction of the various biases and epistemologies of Africanist
projects of anthropology. This is not a project to be conducted by North
Atlantic Africanist anthropologists alone. Mafeje, Magubane and Okot
p'Bitek have all done important work in this regard. A crucial strategy to
reconstitute Africanist anthropology, van Binsbergen argues, is to

constantly acknowledge the significance and centrality of the process of interculturality as its *logos*. In other words, interculturality transforms and thus diminishes its inherent violence as representation.

In framing his anthropological project, van Binsbergen gained a great deal from his studies of the production of another anthropologist, Pierre-Philippe Rey. Rey's work 'encompasses, among many other things, inter-continental migrant labour to modern France, the history of capitalism in the North Atlantic region, Nambikwara kinship structures from South America, oriental despotism, and the history of historical materialist thought from pre-Marxism right through to Althusser' (p.76). In specific relation to Africa, 'Rey sees his work as the production of an anti-capitalist, anti-bourgeois ideology, developing a theory of the class struggle of African peasants and proletarians, and thus providing the insights by which their struggle may be strengthened, may learn from earlier struggles, and may ultimately be successful' (p. 76-79). Van Binsbergen finds Rey's work lacking in a number of ways in spite of its strenuous efforts to identify with sections of the agrarian underclass. He argues that the very class location of North Atlantic anthropologists undermines the authenticity, force and validity of their productions unless a relentless operation of auto-critique is instituted. Without this vital operation of auto-critique, what they produce would be products of false consciousness.

The presence and critique of marginality are also a constant in van Binsbergen's life and work. The figure of the leopard – sacred outsider – as a cosmological motif is quite instructive in a number of ways. Even van Binsbergen's choice of an academic discipline speaks volumes about a certain *marginal constant:* 'an important factor in the relative intellectual isolation of the anthropological discipline has been the fact that that discipline has also attracted a remarkable number of outsiders: Jews, women, homosexuals, working-class children [...] migrants, and moreover the spiritual heirs of the explorers, big-game hunters and missionaries of the nineteenth century – so many people who were less welcome in the more established academic disciplines, or who could not take root there' (p. 501). The discipline always provides space for individuals who need to work through various pressures and manifestations of wanderlust.

Van Binsbergen's academic experiments are essentially avenues for understanding human cultures, gender relations and the social and political systems of other peoples and also his own cultural context. The Nkoya of Zambia are very significant in this regard. However, van Binsbergen often reminds us that the formal academic structure of textual production does not always capture all the various emotions, images and psychologi-

cal dimensions that emanate from his ethnographic excavations. In order to address this shortcoming, he often turns to his talents as a poet and novelist.

His analysis of the sexual economy and gender relations among the Nkoya demonstrates the resilience and enduring qualities of some profound aspects of traditional cultures. On the Nkoya husband/wife partnerships, van Binsbergen writes that after sexual intercourse, a Nkoya woman 'kneels down before her partner and claps his hands respectfully, genuinely pleased that, of all women, this man has chosen her to manifest his manhood and donate his seed' (p. 108). She is also expected to 'prepare and serve his food, then kneel before him and by hand-clapping invite him to come and eat it' (Ibid). The patriarchal mode of sociopolitical organization couldn't be more reinforced. Yet, van Binsbergen affirms that women in Nkoya culture enjoy considerable agency and autonomy in their abilities to seek and find redress for forms of male oppression they find unacceptable or unbearable. In the realm of sexuality, Nkoya sexual culture differed markedly from North Atlantic organizations of sexuality. Among the Nkoya, 'the recognition of male needs makes it normal that a woman, in cases of long periods of absence, looks for a temporary substitute for both her domestic domains and her sexual tasks: a 'sister' or a friend, that will not represent a threat to her relationship with her husband' (p. 112). Passages such as these jar the sensibilities considerably but van Binsbergen's self-lacerating quest for ethnographic truth at many turns absolves him from charges of self-indulgence that ought to follow logically in contexts of this kind.

A major event that has profound implications for his personal and professional lives is becoming a *sangoma* (traditional healer). In becoming a *sangoma*, he writes, "from an ancestor-less piece of flotsam of human history, I became a priest in an ancestral cult, in a decisive step not only of professional independence and Africanist exploration, but also of self-construction' (p. 193). He tells us that '*sangomas* are people who consider themselves, and who are considered by their extended environment, effective healers: as mediators between living people, on the one hand, and the ancestors, spirits and God (Mwali) on the other – in a general context where most bodily afflictions and other misfortunes of a psychological, social and economic nature, are interpreted in religious terms' (p. 202).

The transformation of van Binsbergen into a *sangoma* was a long and elaborate process of trials and tribulations. In his demanding attempts to become a *sangoma*, van Binsbergen 'was seeking existential transforma-

tion, fulfilment and redress, much more than anthropological data, across cultural and geographical boundaries' (p. 171). He also ascribes his absorbing quest to a deep and unfolding Lacanian conflict within him in which he strives to fill the void left by the loss and/or severance of the mother. In this way, *sangomahood* becomes the balm of the unification of a splintered self, a therapeutic re-articulation of painful and strife-ridden subjectivity within the confines of a deeply felt spirituality.

The trances and beauty of *sangomahood* are for van Binsbergen therapies of freedom in which catharsis and emotional healing are equally prominent. Not even the discouragement of gore could weaken his resolve; 'I had to join the other *sangomas* in drinking from the cut throat of my dying sacrificial goat; its gall was smeared onto my feet and its inflated gall bladder tied to a string for me to wear as a pendant' (p. 173). Apart from beauty of the trance and also the beauty of the dance, van Binsbergen claims that *sangomahood*, offers 'a researcher a vast range of information, both of esoteric knowledge, and of social arrangements and bodily practices that may not be as accessible to the researcher who remains a relative outsider' (p. 185).

The quest for *sangomahood* had entailed extremes of beauty and sacrifice. In relation to van Binsbergen, it began as a struggle to assuage and overcome what appeared to be an existential lack. Away from his biological home, he sought to escape the traumas of incest, violence and despair. Thus becoming a *sangoma* opened up for him 'the possibility of a non-egoistic, not primarily libido-driven, servitude to the suffering of others' (p. 230-1) which in many ways soothes and redeems the loss and violence of his own past. Indeed he had to find or *create* another home which he sought first of all among the Nkoya of rural Zambia. Eventually, he became an adopted member of the royal family. Also, he succeeded in attaching himself to one of the lodges devoted to therapeutic religion in Francistown, Botswana.

In various ways, van Binsbergen makes the suggestion that *sangomahood* heals both psychic and existential schizophrenia and that it does not compound it as it may seem to many Western eyes. In other words, it is meant to release victims from the traumatisms of schizophrenic situations: 'The aim of *sangoma* divination is primarily therapeutic: to reinsert the client to what may be argued to be her or his place in the universe, so that the life force in principle available for that person but temporarily blocked by their drifting away from the proper place, can flow once more' (p. 256). *Sangoma* divination reconstructed and healed van Binsbergen's emotional and psychological landscape even before he

fully became a *sangoma:* 'I had only joined the *sangomas* in search of therapy after my mental breakdown at the rejection I was experiencing from the local population at large, because the latter perceived me as another specimen of the local hereditary enemy, the Boers' (p. 213). As such, *sangomahood* and its divinatory practices aim for the unity of diverse and often contradictory subjective and psychological resources. Being a Dutch professor, husband and father, an adoptive member of the Nkoya royal family with strong affective relationships with people in North and West Africa extract a number of demands and sacrifices. It pushes van Binsbergen to the frontiers of interculturality, to the extremes of multicultural forms of knowledge resources, different cultures and modes of social organization and the multiple contradictory impulses which they attract.

Thus, becoming a *sangoma* is a crucial way of dealing with a multiplicity of intercultural contexts, forms of communication and orders of knowledge. Perhaps in having so many orders of knowledge at his disposal van Binsbergen is likely to be a better *sangoma* than many of his African co-practitioners. He is knowledgeable about other divinatory systems such as Arabic geomantic divination, the New Age intellectual movement, *I Ching,* runic divination, tarot, the Zulu bones oracle, Native American varieties, *Ifa* divination and astrology. Undoubtedly, easy familiarity with this variety of divinatory systems is likely to enrich his practice of *sangomahood.* Even more important is his employment of the internet and the new information technologies to disseminate knowledge about his practice and the general nature of the divinatory system which by his adoption he promotes. His exact words; 'thus gradually a global practice emerged, where I would no longer meet my patients in person, but they – invariably total strangers to me – would contact me via an electronic intake form on my website, and they would subsequently receive via e-mail the outcome of the session I would conduct in their absence' (p. 236). Thus by his cultivation and assiduous application of postmodern information technologies *sangomahood* has assumed a truly global format.

The mix of the biographical and the strictly academic produces quite an interesting architecture of the text. This, I think, pushes the text to the borders of a manageable trangressivity (definitely not the kind you find with compulsive/aggressive postmodernism) which after all is said and done is almost a requirement in contemporary textuality. The interrogation of the boundaries of autobiographical reflection and academic writing is another very interesting feature of van Binsbergen's text. He claims

to be an Afrocentrist (p. 432) and on the level of the sheer volume of his productions, this claim ought to be taken seriously.

The focus at a point on the issue of integrity raises a lot of personal issues. He defines integrity as 'a person's successful endeavour to create and maintain consistency between his behaviour, on the one hand, and the norms and values to which he is publicly committed, on the other' (p. 200). Again, one is compelled to return to the question of honesty and its role in structuring intellectual/biographical trajectory. Most academics clothe their formulations with a veneer of objectivity which we the readers and they often take for granted. This easily breeds mediocrity and kills originality.

His philosophico-anthropological project/(intercultural encounter[s]) rediscovers the human subject explodes the myth of unhistoricized, unproblematized objectivity but also succeeds in producing a highly satisfying order of knowledge. A liminal transgressive order of knowledge that is full/matronly/non-fascist Wagerianism/high-point modernism on the brink of a self-reflexive poststructuralist deconstruction.

The wide-ranging and ambitious scope of van Binsbergen's work is likely to invite varying degrees of conflict that academics such as Kimmerle and Ineke van Wetering (whose works fall within the European context) had with his earlier work.

A central theoretical quest in the text is the Foucauldian thesis/ *problematique* of epistemic regimes, orders of knowledge and their modes of constitution etc. I sympathise with van Binsbergen's constant reframing of the status of the other and her place in *etic* anthropological frameworks. The typical North Atlantic academic enterprise or industrial orientation tends to appropriate all forms of knowledge for instant and constant commodification. As a North Atlantic subject and author, van Binsbergen can hardly avoid the implications of this reality. But again being an African by choice, a diviner-priest to the bargain, he is more aware.

Thus van Binsbergen has emerged from a complex of elemental conflicts – positionality/subjectivity, academic and textual (the tensions between modernism and postmodernism) – a subject as conflictual as ever but one who has not chosen the path of superficial or uncritical reconciliation. Instead he has established a hard-won region of resolution. Reconciliation, which is an important theme for him, can be interpreted in a number of ways. Reconciliation, within the psychological field, definitely has a lot of upheavals. Reconciliation in a more explicit sense by which I refer to the more mundane manifestations of subjectivity, in van

Binsbergen's terms, that is, as a North Atlantic academic on the one hand and a *sangoma* on the other. He has graphically depicted the fields of conflict to which both vacations give rise and the frustrations through which they mark him. In this way, he enables us to remember not only how we choose our themes but how our themes choose us.

Van Binsbergen argues that reconciliation is a social technology of conflict management and good private and public relations. He explains: 'reconciliation is an essential aspect of all human relationships, both in primary human relations based on face-to-face interaction, and on group relationships of a political, religious, ethnic nature that encompass a large number of people'(p. 350). Because of the severe limitations of paradigm of structural functionalism in dealing with some of the more fundamental problems of conflict resolution, van Binsbergen calls for a new 'anthropology of reconciliation' (p. 351). There is a paralyzing disconnection between social scientific discourses and approaches to reconciliation and established theological paradigms.

A reproblematization of this conceptual space, van Binsbergen argues, is now necessary. Reconciliation, we are informed, 'is a creative social act of rearrangement and reinterpretation' (p. 352) in addition, it is 'the transformation of conflict' (Ibid). This realization is often ignored by paradigm of structural functionalism. One of the excesses of the paradigm is that it does not recognize that 'social systems do not work in the same way as the axiomatic systems of symbolic logic and mathematics: it is common for social systems (as it is for biological systems) to arrive at more or less the same point from different starting points, along different routes, and to invest tnat point with the conflicting tendencies specific to the various points of departure' (p. 357). As events in postapartheid South Africa demonstrate both within and outside the deliberations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the collective task to discover a consensual archive that addresses in a fair way the horrors of apartheid has proved to be exceedingly problematic. As such, reconciliation has become a fervid site for competing ideologies and meaning. Indeed, the current paradigm of reconciliation does take into full cognizance the diverse complexities of social life. An important conceptual linkage is made when van Binsbergen re-reads the South African concept of *ubuntu* as a consciousness of reconciliation.

The critique of globalization has also been one of van Binsbergen's preoccupations. He argues that the concept remains problematic and inadequately theorized and also that 'the silly clichés of globalization, such as jeans, Coca Cola and the McDonald hamburger [...] have gained an

absolutely metalocal distribution' (p. 405). Part of the weakness of its conceptualization may derive from the fact that philosophers until very recently paid scant attention to it. Even Richard Rorty's categorization appears both lame and problematic.

Van Binsbergen poses several important questions about the new information order: 'Does ICT in Africa lead to creative and liberating cultural appropriation by Africans? Does it lead to the annihilation of the African cultural heritage? Or do both propositions apply somehow? Is the computer in Africa to be taken for granted or does it remain an alien element?' (p. 398). Ultimately, van Binsbergen argues that the new information technologies may prove to be beneficial for projects of liberation in Africa. He makes an intriguing claim that the text, that is, the *book* due to its rigid formalism is antithetical to social life in Africa, which on the contrary, is marked by a considerable degree of informalization of various levels of social, political and cultural life and also by a seemingly unstructured inventiveness.

The age of computer technology, on the other hand, is characterized by the emergence of the *network* which in its rapidities and virtualities undermines the slower formalisms of the age of the book; 'for as long as the book remained the norm, and for as long as the forms of communication associated with the book predominated, Africa with its un-booklike response self-evidently lagged behind in ways that it would never be able to make up for. It is not the computer in itself which constitutes an assault on the formal and the linear in information, and puts an end to the book as the gold standard. Rather, such a revolution is being prompted by the ramifying, rhizomatic forms in which information is being presented and may be managed on the Internet and in the hypertextual structures within microcomputers' (p. 424). This is undoubtedly a very useful insight indeed.

On a different level, I would claim that van Binsbergen has lived through his vulnerabilities, insecurities and disappointments with astounding honesty – for me a key quality of the text. His lot as an outsider – construed in a variety of contexts, class, professional, racial – has been transformed into something of immense value, a struggle worthy of emulation.

The discussion of the leopard as a cosmological and existential motif/reality I find very convincing and well-researched. In a way, the leopard has become doubly endearing in representing the Sacred Outsider and all the personas associated with it; diviner-priests, traditional leaders, and all kinds of solitary spiritual travellers. The Nkoya ethnic group of Zam-

bia knows the leopard as Mwendanjangula; 'a hunter on his solitary jour-
ney through the deep and dense savannah forest may meet him, and if he
is the first to greet, may receive great material and healing powers, but if
Mwendanjangula greets the hunter first, then the latter may be stricken
with madness' (p. 197). The figure of the leopard is eternally transgres-
sive and controversial. In van Binsbergen's handling divination, mystery
and the underworld become inexplicably attractive. Even unadventurous
academics cannot fail to be impressed the scholastic atmosphere that sur-
rounds van Binsbergen's discussion of these esoteric themes; references
to Asia, Europe and ancient Egypt all in one prolonged breath. At this
point, the text reassembles itself on another discursive register, one that
broadens its already impressive history and one that marks the rest of the
complexion of the text with other possibilities. Those possibilities need
to be discussed seriously but this is not the place to do so.

Relatedly, in structural terms, there are several levels of tension in the
text. For instance, the entire textual architecture has a certain Kantian
solemnity, a well-deserved authority that would tend to undermine
postmodern notions of play, difference, *jouissance* etc. However, it incor-
porates other fields of tension – the continuous problematization of the
status of the knowing/observing subject, the unabashed unmasking of the
author-function and its hidden motives and the analyses of seemingly
contradictory orders of knowledge or canons of rationality – e.g. esoteric
against conventional academic discourse – within the same conceptual
environs thereby creating a multiplicity of discursive registers. Indeed,
the architecture of the text and the industry of discourse to which it might
give rise is an issue one has to examine at much greater depth and with
more detail.

Let us turn to more concrete if more mundane issues. I think van
Binsbergen's treatment of reconciliation is important for centres of con-
flict resolution in Africa and approaches to conflict management on the
continent. To be precise, his general treatment of reconciliation has a
broad visceral appeal absent in positivist social science approaches. For
instance, I am aware of the work being done by some conflict resolution
centres in Nigeria and it mostly seems to be unrealistically technicist, a
dry impractical assortment of jargon meant only for the developmentalist
industry which van Binsbergen very rightly criticizes in a somewhat dis-
similar if not totally unconnected context. In this instance, I refer to his
discussion of the Kazanga Association (in rural Zambia) which illustrates
how the global developmentalist industry contributes to the milking of

the rural poor through a combination of the activities of bureaucrats of the industry itself and local elites.

On another level, I find van Binsbergen's approach to ethnicity particularly interesting in relation to the contributions many other Africanist scholars and their rather obsolete (by his own unmasking) views on culture. But more importantly, political scientists have a rather mutilated and sterile notion of ethnicity. Van Binsbergen's approach with its avoidance of disconnected jargon – which in many ways parallels and complements his analyses of ideologies of reconciliation – has immense potential for fertilizing the field.

Also, I find his analyses of power structures, the political elites and political institutions in postcolonial Africa quite plausible. They are very responsive to the historical transformations governing the trajectories of power. In addition, van Binsbergen explanation of informalization and its influence on social life in Africa makes so much sense.

On the text is an apt and comprehensive survey of van Binsbergen's intellectual itinerary to date. I had thought the chapter on fieldwork in Tunisia to be rather distant from the rest of the text which focuses largely on sub-Saharan Africa but within the context of wider epistemological aim, the experience can be conceived as part of the central quest in intercultural communication and by extension philosophy. So within the realm of interculturality, it makes considerable sense.

Thus, van Binsbergen's intellectual itinerary on the whole has been one that involved the discovery of the intercultural path without his knowing so until he had become established in his career. An admirable case is made for intercultural philosophy using a mode of discourse that involves anthropology, ethnography, philosophy and history. Unquestionably, this is the beginning of an uneasy but extremely challenging (sub)discipline.

What more can one say? This is an awesome work of research and reflection. The critique of Africa (and African ethnicities), anthropological canons and philosophical methods is conducted in such breadth and with such detail that it is bound to have a multiplicity of reverberations in those areas and many more.

This is not a work informed by flashes of youthful insight. It is the kind of work that can only be produced by many years of immersion in various fields of intellection and this is demonstrated at several levels. Its robust multidisciplinarity is also at all times evident. Through it one locates Michael Jackson's (not the singer!) postmodernist anthropology *ala* the Comaroffs, anthropology generally and its slow interpenetration by

other cutting-edge discourses, the genius of Mudimbe, the lapses of African political theory (specifically, the inadequacies theoretical paradigms of conflict resolution and theories of ethnicity) the isolation and possible demise of each discipline and the rebirth of the disciplines (anthropology, philosophy and sociology) at the combustive crossroads of globalization to which we are ineluctably drawn and by which either we pursue our destruction or our own redemption. Both most times would seem the case.

Just as van Binsbergen's intellectual itinerary is for the most part an excruciation quest for diverse truths, place and belonging, it is also a relentless critique and undermining of the assumed subjectivities of being and the received unities of identity. Most times, the work reads like an alternative project of deconstruction that begins and circulates at the very conceptual compound from which Derridean deconstructionists flee. The traumatisms of inadequacy, incompleteness, alienation and insecurity are overcome by the sheer force of identification, and by the power of sacrifice which gain cultural syncretisms as a means to sociocultural healing.

The act of approaching and conquering the intercultural frontier has entailed a tremendous amount of personal and professional sacrifice and various kinds of effort. Ironically, the establishment of a rigorous practice of intercultural hermeneutics in contemporary times was largely accomplished through the efforts of a German Indian-born philosopher, Mall, who eventually abandoned the rich Indian philosophical heritage in order to learn and reinforce the German tradition. In other words, he spurned the very spirit of interculturality for a reversed ethnocentricism which by a Fanonian mode of psychoanalysis would make quite interesting reading. Van Binsbergen, on the other hand, discovers that a philosophy of interculturality is only possible through both sacrificial acts of continual cultural transgression and also a ceaseless respect for the divisions within and amongst cultures. Interculturality is perhaps better served by an immersion in diverse cultures, various disciplines and modes of activity as van Binsbergen's professional affiliations demonstrate; poet, positivist anthropological researcher, Marxist, *sangoma*, professor of anthropology and finally theorist of interculturality. Let us hope that the intercultural frontier for both van Binsbergen and those who are fortunate to stumble upon it becomes the basis for even greater intercultural conversation.

Book Review/Notes de lecture

Guyer Jane, 2004, *Marginal Gains: Monetary Transactions in Atlantic Africa*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

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Jane Guyer's bold new book is a treasure for scholars working in disparate domains of intellectual life. In *Marginal Gains: Monetary Transactions in Atlantic Africa*, she provides new insights and tools that will aid analysts concerned with developing a textured appreciation for African economic activity. As Guyer points out, many of the models scholars use to analyze monetary transactions on the continent were first rehearsed in Western contexts. For that reason, they often reproduce awkward and inappropriate conclusions and approaches.

But she does not just stop there. After all, challenges to 'economistic' scholarship already have an impressive history in anthropological discourse (Graeber 2003; Sahlins 1976). What makes Guyer's approach so important, though, is that she is committed to developing a new ethnographic method that will ultimately be theoretically innovative as well. Besides yielding new insights, she embarks on a course to develop new strategies for examining micro-economic practices and recognizes that, even though the full realization of this ambitious project lies beyond the scope of her book, she can at least provide a preliminary investigation using techniques of analysis more appropriate for understanding the unique character of 'monetary disciplines in Atlantic Africa' (Guyer 2004:4).

The best part about Guyer's approach is that her effort to better understand how African economic practices 'work' (ibid:8), actually works. In one of her most useful examples, she refines the discourse of African 'wealth-in-people'—to which she has contributed herself (Guyer 1995)—by adding this qualification based on new ethnographic innovations:

> The social and cultural map of how to start from wherever one is and advance —step by step through conversionary transactions, working the repertoires, creating the niches—is accessible to and enacted by everyone [in a given household]. And at each step a person is on both the receiving and the giving end: of expectations to give social support in return for

material transfers (food, school fees, medical costs) looking upward, and
the converse looking downward, all along the finely discriminated ranking
that connects the two ends of the gradient (Guyer 2004:150).

This careful attention to detail thus prepares Guyer to explain how, even
in times of economic uncertainty or instability, '[c]rises may be averted
by a dramatically skilled performance from a familiar repertoire of
transactional institutions' (ibid.:131).

Even this masterful piece of scholarship, though, could be improved.
Fortunately for us, the limitations of this work have less to do with some
inadequacy of content or argument and more to do with the way the au-
thor frames the relevance of this study and the academic debates in which
Guyer expects it to be engaged. In stressing the distinctiveness of her own
approach – and in the explanation of why it so useful for analyzing Afri-
can economies as opposed to the European tools and methods with which
most of us are more familiar – Guyer reinscribes a distinction that actu-
ally undermines the applicability of the new techniques she is pioneering.
And, in fact, I would go so far as to say that she is quite wrong on this point.

Indeed it is true, as she points out, that there is a need for methods that
will trace uniquely African economic transactions that not only developed
in spaces of disconnect and disjuncture, but were deliberately created as
domains of autonomous contrast to European economic regimes. But what
about African economic practices that are tied to European systems? How
do we read African financial arenas that are not delinked from their
European counterparts, such as Citibank in Dakar, Senegal or – if that is
still to be considered a 'Western' financial institution – Ecobank and
Banque Senegalo-Tunisien in the same city? Are these to be considered
European financial institutions because they are ostensibly created on
European formats? Is it somehow less or not important to treat these as
African institutions?

If so, what does 'African' really mean here? For Guyer, it was crucial
to develop a means to study African economic activity in domains labeled
'informal' or 'alternative' but does that mean her tools don't apply to the
domains legitimated as being the 'formal' venues for economic activity?
Or, to approach this problematic from the opposite direction, are we to
believe that the tools developed in formal domains effectively analyze
the economic practices taking place in those locales, or – because of their
rigid and deterministic orientation – might these devices be limited even
in their applicability to such contexts (Ralph, n.d.)?

Guyer has developed effective ways of theorizing economic activity
that somehow escapes formal recognition but that contributes substantially

to formal economic transactions. This is a characteristic feature of African financial transactions, but it has wider applicability. In fact, anywhere analysts see the illusory distinction between 'formal' and 'informal' economies being reinscribed, Guyer's book will be appreciated for its innovative ethnographic methods and the unique theoretical insights they promote.

The path carved out here not only can, but most likely - with this blueprint - will be improved by scholars who share similar theoretical interests and are willing to embark upon the detailed ethnographic work needed to produce a work of this magnitude.

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Florence Etta and Sheila Parvyn-Wamahiu, 2003. *Information and Communication Technologies for Development in Africa: The Experience with Community Telecentres*. Ottawa: CODESRIA and IDRC. Foreword, Preface, Acknowledgements, Executive Summary, Table, Figures, Appendices, Bibliography, xxx + 193.

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Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) are relatively recent phenomena in Africa. The huge differences in access to and utilisation of ICTs in Africa have been a cause of much concern. The difference in access and utilisation of ICTs has been dubbed the digital divide. In a bid to bridge the gap, many initiatives have been started. One such initiative is the development of telecentres. The book under review *Information and Communication Technologies for Development in Africa: The Experience with Community Telecentres* focuses on ICTs in Africa.

This book is in a series of three volumes dealing with ICTs in Africa. The others are Volume 1: *Information and Communication Technologies for Development in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges for Community Development* edited by Ramata Molo Thioune and Volume 2: *Information and Communication Technologies for Development in Africa: Networking Institutions of Learning – SchoolNet* edited by Tina James.

In volume two, Etta and Parvyn-Wamahiu evaluate ICTs with specific attention to experiences with community telecentres in selected countries in Africa as an initiative intended to propel Africa into Information Revolution. It presents findings of country case studies that examined the setting, operations and effects of community telecentres. The volume, therefore, contains results of evaluation research highlighting the relationship between ICTs and development. The research was carried out in five African countries—Mali, Mozambique, Uganda, South Africa and Senegal.

The study utilised methodology that blends qualitative and quantitative approaches. This is enriched with a strong participatory approach (telecentre owners, employees and users), which facilitates ownership and subsequent ploughing back of the results for improvement of management of telecentres.

The book consists of a foreword, preface, executive summary and eight chapters. The foreword by Adebayo Olukoshi (executive secretary of CODESRIA) and Maureen O'Neil (the president of IDRC) which under-

lines that ICTs engender both fear and hope. The world is awakened to 'the real possibility of global information divide whose contours would mirror those of economic prosperity' and 'the potential of information communication technologies (ICTs) to make real changes in ensuring prosperity' (p. xii).

The executive summary presents the contents of the book in a nutshell. This section shows that the information and knowledge age characterised by 'economic globalisation and the new information communication technologies (ICTs) is making inroads in Africa through community telecentres'. The primary goal of a telecentre is the public provision of tools and skills to enhance communication and the sharing of information. (p. xvii). The telecentre is a pioneer movement intended to address disparities in access to ICTs in Africa. The telecentre is 'one answer to the prevailing condition of uneven and unequal access to information and communication technologies in rural and remote areas' (p. xviii). A captivating analogy summarizes the place and essence of the telecentre: 'The telecentre is to information what the school is to education and the hospital or clinic to health and well-being' (p. xxvi).

Chapter one underlines the importance of Africa joining the information society in the new information world order. At the same time the authors caution that 'the new information and knowledge society, rather than close the development and poverty gap, might in fact aggravate it, thereby reducing dividends of global capitalism' (p. 1). In addition, this chapter outlines the key research issues, research questions, methodology and definition of key concepts such as 'information technology', 'information communication technologies' and 'telecentres'.

Chapter two extends the issues addressed in chapter one and places the ICTs in Africa in the context of globalisation showing the disparities in the telecommunication sector. The chapter narrows down to discussion of the concept of telecentre in the African context.

Chapter three to seven presents specific findings from multi-country studies of telecentres. Telecentres in Mali (chapter three), Mozambique (chapter four), Uganda (chapter five), South Africa (chapter six) and Senegal (chapter seven). The key findings show that the telecentres have brought a large number of people in Africa into direct contact with ICTs. However, taking into account the total population, the number of people having access to ICTs is still very small. In all the countries, it is clear that age, sex, education levels and socio-economic status influenced telecentre use. A striking finding which cuts across the five countries is the pronounced gender differences in the utilisation of ICTs. By far women lag

behind in the utilisation of ICTs. The country case studies go beyond evaluation of telecentres to provide useful insights into the status of ICTs.

In all the country case studies, key impediments to the use of telecentres are identified. The major ones include high cost of equipment, maintenance and supplies, which result in high cost of services. Poor management and locational factors also featured prominently as contributing to the poor state of telecentre services.

Perhaps one of the most valuable aspects of the volume which comes in these chapters is not only the identification of the impediments to telecentres but also the recommendations made which could be used to improve the operations of telecentres. The impediments need to be addressed for the telecentre movement to 'grow, spread and have the expected or desired effects'. Although the authors recommend that the spread of ICTs should be grounded on social change theory, it does not specify the appropriate theory of social change, and which one.

The volume concludes with a befitting question: Whither community telecentres? To this end, the African continent must concentrate on five critical Cs: Connectivity, Content, Capacity, Costs and Conceptual framework (p. 167). Of the five Cs, the need for a conceptual framework is of over-arching importance 'because without a framework anchored in the realities and genuine needs of the continent, any strategies developed to drive the spread and adoption of ICTs will fail' (p. 167).

In the information age and in information poor Africa, the volume makes important contribution to the understanding of penetration of ICTs in Africa. The identification of problem areas and numerous recommendations for improvement of telecentres makes this volume of immense value to all people involved in the promotion of ICTs in Africa. If the ever-widening digital gap is to be removed or at least reduced, the volume provides valuable hints on promotion of utilisation of ICTs in Africa.

Review of *Africa Development* XXIX (1) 2004, Special Issue on Philosophy and Development.

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This special issue on 'Philosophy and Development' is interesting for at least three reasons. First, it represents one of the valiant efforts seeking, with only limited success, to fundamentally question the concepts and practices of development, instead of simply elaborating ways of developing societies within the dominant neoliberal framework that has almost assumed the position of a universal and absolute religion. Second, it brings together a group of mostly African scholars to discuss the issue of Africa's development problems, in an era in which debates on the African condition are dominated by people who do not live these conditions. The virtues of this collection go beyond the unsettling of development discourse and practice, which the two characteristics pointed out above represent. It brings together essays that escape economistic myopia to approach the issue of Africa's development from varied directions. Gordon's essay raises the fundamental question of what development is. The contributions of Diagne, Amin, Kebede, Nyamnjoh and Hountondji reflect both on why Africa has continued to face problems of development, and what would make possible an escape from these problems. Keita's contribution in addition to other things also reflects on what a developed Africa will look like.

The contributors to this volume have made no deliberate effort to speak to each other. But one of the subtexts that unites all the contributions is the view that if Africa is to achieve 'development' it will have to do so despite the obstacles presented by the current international system, and not because of the elimination of these structures. All of the contributions in various ways seek possibilities for African transcendence from within Africa. They tackle African attitudes towards various issues, including the pre-colonial past, colonial legacies, current international structures, and the future. The lack of focus on the effects of international political economic structures can be levied as a criticism against all these contributions. One can ask, 'given the character of the international system, does it really matter what Africans think and do?' The refreshing character of this volume comes from the resounding 'Yes' answer that is implicit in all of these contributions. While recognizing that our problems have not necessarily arisen from our own failings, they all escape the trap of waiting for the delivery of salvation from elsewhere. While such an attitude frees

Africans from the onerous tasks of solving these problems, it also legitimizes the hegemony of foreign solutions since African activity is seen as irrelevant within such a framework.

Many of the authors see liberation of both individuals and communities from various forms of received traditions as a necessary condition for the type of African activity that will allow for an escape from present problems. Amir focuses on the individual's ability to depart from received Islamic tenets. Kebede, Nyamnjoh and Keita all focus in various ways on the African's ability to escape the debilitating structures of colonial discourses and educational systems. Interestingly, these authors do not necessarily agree on the conditions for such liberation. Nyamnjoh posits concordance with existing social realities as the yardstick for such liberation. Kebede's analysis flirts with the problematic issue of assigning ahistorical validity to practices when it invokes the resuscitation of valid past practices, decapitated by colonialism as key to liberation from the debilitating effects of colonial discourses. Diagne's reflection on the importance of outlooks in which meaning flows from the future into the present provides an alternative conception of validity that is historical and thoroughly liberating. The future exists in our mind as the realm of the possible – aspirations, dread and anxieties. Meaning is thus not drawn from something fixed and immutable, already in the past, but from existing Africans' 'imagination of possible scenarios' – their future.

Keita's contribution stands out in being the only one that dares to present us with a specification of the content of this imagination; of what a developed Africa will look like. In doing this it also exposes the political character of the issue of Africa's development. There is no one African imagination of the future, there are African imaginations, and the ingredients of these imaginations are and will continue to be the subject of much dispute and struggle within Africa itself.

In conclusion one can say that the project of this volume demonstrates the more positive side of what Gordon refers to in this volume as the condition of 'implosivity'. Gordon associates this situation in which one's choices are confined to contemplating one's reaction to social realities that one cannot seriously influence with the wholly negative attributes of powerlessness, 'madness and despair'. This volume demonstrates that the ability to reconstitute the self, to fashion a response to overwhelming social realities, is for many people of the Third World the fundamental first step towards aspiring to agency. All of the contributors display determination and hope that are genuinely uplifting antidotes to the pervasive Afro-pessimism of our age.

UNRISD (Institut de recherche des Nations Unies pour le développement social) *Recherches pour le changement social*, Suisse, 2004, 141 pages.

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Sous la direction de Thandika Mkandawire, «Les recherches pour le changement social» est un rapport récapitulatif de quarante années de recherches qui retrace l'historique de certains projets de recherche initiés par l'UNRISD dans cet espace temporel. Outre l'avant-propos, la préface, la présentation de l'Institut, la table des matières, les références choisies et les abréviations et sigles, ce rapport est composé de sept chapitres.

Il ressort du chapitre introductif qu'en dépit des interruptions pour des raisons évidentes liées à ses missions, l'UNRISD a œuvré dans six domaines à savoir dans l'ordre: politique sociale et bien-être; cohésion sociale et conflits; développement durable; démocratisation, société civile et gouvernance; genre et développement; marchés, entreprises et réglementations. Les résultats de ses recherches ont nourri les réflexions dans les grands sommets mondiaux. Ses travaux ont bénéficié de l'appui financier de certains pays européens et ONG, et de la collaboration de chercheurs des pays en voie développement.

Au registre des bilans, les projets initiés ces dix dernières années ont donné lieu à la publication de plus de 50 livres et 200 documents traduits et diffusés avec la contribution de plus de 450 chercheurs. En perspective, les préoccupations relatives au genre, au rôle de l'État, à la société civile et au secteur privé constitueront à l'avenir ses axes prioritaires. Toutefois, l'UNSRID ne se départira pas de son esprit critique pour sauvegarder les valeurs de bien-être, d'équité, de droit de l'homme dans le monde en général et dans les pays en voie de développement (PVD) en particulier.

Le chapitre 2 qui débat de la politique sociale et du bien-être montre à suffisance que loin d'être considérées comme un accessoire, un rajouté après coup, ces notions doivent être placées au centre de l'analyse, tant il est vrai qu'il existe un lien étroit entre la croissance économique et le développement social. Aussi cette partie rend-t-elle compte de la méthode quantifiable de l'élaboration de 19 indicateurs sociaux fiables et peu coûteux. Il est apparu dans la pratique qu'une politique sociale qui donne la priorité aux soins maternels et infantiles, à la prévention, à l'amélioration

de l'éducation sanitaire, à l'alphabétisation générale, à l'éducation fondamentale et aux conditions de santé et d'hygiène a des effets marqués sur ces indicateurs.

Les recherches sur la cohésion sociale et les conflits au chapitre 3 ont porté sur la question essentielle, à savoir comment favoriser un type d'intégration propice à la création d'une société juste, équitable et paisible? L'UNRISD, face à des situations-problèmes, a préconisé des solutions qui, si elles ne peuvent pas éradiquer les problèmes sociaux, peuvent au moins les atténuer. Les cas spécifiques des réfugiés, des rapatriés et des immigrés ont été pris en compte dans l'étude. En définitive, l'UNRISD est d'avis que la reconstruction après les guerres passe par un dialogue qui exige une implication de toutes les parties prenantes où chacun se sent citoyen et partage les mêmes valeurs.

Au chapitre 4 consacré au développement durable, l'UNRISD s'est penché sur les causes et les conséquences de la dégradation de l'environnement. Ses conclusions révèlent à ce niveau qu'autant les causes sont liées à un ensemble de facteurs, autant les répercussions sociales de la dégradation de l'environnement revêtent des formes multiples. C'est la raison pour laquelle les projets de programme de protection de l'environnement qui contribuent au développement durable ne doivent pas seulement avoir pour objet de protéger les ressources naturelles, mais également et surtout d'améliorer les conditions d'existence des populations, de respecter leur droit, de renforcer les institutions démocratiques, de favoriser leur autonomisation et de promouvoir un développement soucieux d'équité et de justice sociale.

Dans le chapitre 5 traitant de la démocratisation, la société civile et la gouvernance, l'UNRISD a démontré que la motivation et la participation de la population étaient la clé du succès des projets de développement. Autrement dit, la forme de l'État doit permettre aux personnes jusque-là exclues d'avoir une citoyenneté, une prise sur les ressources, les choix des dirigeants responsables et les organes de contrôle. À cet égard, dans cette structure, les OSC, ONG, et populations locales doivent véritablement jouer leur rôle. Pour ce faire, elles doivent non seulement optimiser les acquisitions des TIC, mais également renforcer leur capacité à s'organiser et à conclure des alliances performantes et durables.

Du chapitre 6 réservé au genre et au développement, on retient que les avancées dans la considération de l'aspect genre ayant conduit à la «démarginalisation» de la question féminine se heurtent à des pesanteurs telles que l'instabilité économique, la déréglementation des conditions de travail et les pertes des droits y afférents, la faible institutionnalisation de

leur droits politiques, la forte résistance des coutumes et préjugés sociaux. Pour en sortir, l'UNRISD estime qu'une approche multidimensionnelle est indispensable pour mettre au point des politiques sociales et économiques adaptées, ainsi qu'un cadre et des processus démocratiques sous-tendus par des revendications féminines efficaces pour plus de justice.

Les travaux de l'UNRISD qui se sont appesantis au chapitre 7 sur les marchés, les entreprises et les réglementations, visaient à appréhender dans son ensemble la complexité du marché d'autant plus que les ajustements structurels et ses corollaires n'avaient pas favorisé le développement économique et social d'une part; et que, les interrogations surgissaient sur l'efficacité du rôle de responsabilité sociale des entreprises. Cette problématique offre un terrain d'affrontement entre les intérêts divergents où le résultat dépendra dans une large majorité de l'équilibre des forces en présence dont le compromis aboutirait à un maintien ou à une modification de la structure existante des droits et obligations.

Si l'UNRISD sauvegarde son autonomie, la pertinence de ses critiques et recherches, affine ses méthodes d'analyse, reste ouvert et attentif à l'évolution du monde, nul doute que ses résultats ultérieurs feront œuvre utile mieux que par le passé. Toutefois, à l'instar de la Banque mondiale dans ses «Rapports sur le développement dans le monde» et du FMI à travers «Finances et développement», il gagnerait à développer des stratégies de marketing pour faire connaître ses réalisations à un public plus large.