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Globalisation and Social Security in Low-Income Countries: The Case of Côte d'Ivoire

Steven D'Haeseleer
& Jos Berghman*

Abstract

Drawing on empirical evidence from Côte d'Ivoire, this article emphasises the need to reform existing social security systems in low-income economies in order to alleviate poverty and guarantee economic security. Following a background perspective, the article presents a brief overview of existing formal and informal social security systems and examines their merits and limitations. Next, the challenges of globalisation for social security systems in a low-income country context are discussed. Here, it is argued that the impact and challenges of globalisation are real and increase the need to redesign social security. The article concludes by suggesting that social security provision in low-income countries should be organised in a complementary way, drawing on the strengths of both formal and informal arrangements. Future reforms should attempt to combine poverty alleviation with measures designed to promote economic development and international economic integration.

Résumé

Cet article, qui s'inspire de données empiriques sur la Côte-d'Ivoire, souligne le besoin de réforme des systèmes de sécurité sociale existants dans les économies à faible revenu, nécessaire à réduction de la pauvreté et à la garantie d'une certaine sécurité économique. Cette ocntribution, qui suit une perspective de base, présente un bref aperçu des systèmes de sécurité sociale officiels et informels existants, et examine leur mérite, ainsi que leurs limites. L'on discute ensuite des défis liés à la mondialisation, qui se posent à ces systèmes de sécurité sociale, dans le contexte d'un pays à faible revenu. Il est affirmé que l'impact et les défis de la mondialisation sont réels et augmentent le besoin de redéfinition du système de sécurité sociale. L'article se termine sur l'idée que le système de sécurité sociale des pays à faible revenu devrait être organisé d'une

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façon complémentaire, qui s'inspirerait des points forts des deux systèmes officiels et informels. Les réformes à venir devraient combiner l'entreprise de réduction de la pauvreté à des mesures de promotion du développement économique et de l'intégration économique internationale.

Introduction

One of the great social achievements of the twentieth century is the adoption of social security as a basic human right to which all individuals are entitled. Fundamental international treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights include the right of everyone to social security. Formal social security programmes have been created by governments of both industrialised and developing countries as an instrument for the realisation of this principle. However, whereas most industrialised countries have achieved almost complete coverage, social security systems in low-income countries[1] cover only a small minority of the population for a more restricted range of contingencies. The majority of the population is excluded from formal social security coverage and has to seek protection through alternative institutions outside the state. To make matters worse, the process of economic globalisation is said to undermine the capacity of both state and non-state based systems to provide adequate protection against social risks. Hence, in order to achieve broad-based coverage, many low-income economies need to reform their social security systems in a direction that better suits their specific socio-economic conditions and one that can cope with the pressure and challenges emanating from the process of globalisation.

These issues are analysed in more detail in this article. The argument will be illustrated with evidence drawn from the experience of Côte d'Ivoire. Both the socio-economic situation of Côte d'Ivoire and the challenges facing its social security system are typical of many low-income countries: it is mainly an agricultural country with a large informal sector and a heavy dependence on trade in a narrow range of agricultural commodities. From a social point of view, the general situation is characterised by low living standards and a high incidence of poverty. Considering this context, Côte d'Ivoire exemplifies the challenge facing the social security schemes of practically all low-income economies: how to implement a broad-based social security system that is both compatible with its socio-economic environment and can contribute to economic development in order to reduce economic insecurity and ameliorate poverty.

Background perspective

Among developing countries, a growing discrepancy has been observed between those that are successfully participating in the process of economic globalisation and those benefiting little from global markets and advanced technology. The latter, a group of about sixty countries which will be referred to as the 'low-income economies' in this article, have been marginalised in the wider world economic system, mainly because of an insufficient level of industrialisation for competitive production (Robyn 2001:8-14).

With respect to the low-income economies' involvement in world trade, three country groups can be observed: (i) oil-exporting low-income economies; (ii) manufacturing-goods and/or services exporters; and (iii) primary-goods and mineral exporters with relatively small and inefficient manufacturing sectors. Since the latter comprises the majority of low-income countries, agriculture and extraction of other natural resources remain the cornerstone of economic life and participation in world trade for most of the low-income economies. The Ivorian economy, too, is to a large extent based on agriculture and the export of agricultural products. At present, agriculture accounts for about one-quarter of GDP and 66 percent of the country's total employment.

After independence in 1960, Côte d'Ivoire opted for an outward oriented development strategy through export promotion of agricultural products based on its comparative advantage in the production of cocoa, coffee and timber. Driven by the export of agricultural products, the country grew at an average annual rate of 7 percent for nearly two decades (Goedhuys 1999:16). Yet, with only two commodities – coffee and cocoa – accounting for the bulk of export revenues, the Ivorian economy was highly vulnerable to price or demand fluctuations on the world market. Consequently, the steep drop in world prices for coffee and cocoa and the resulting deterioration of terms of trade was a significant contributory factor in the economic recession of the 1980s which led to the implementation of comprehensive austerity and macro-economic reform programmes, the devaluation of the CFA franc[2] in 1994 and, ultimately the collapse of social indicators. Although the economy slightly recovered after the devaluation, Côte d'Ivoire is now ranked 161st out of 175 countries listed by the United Nations Development Programme, according to the Human Development Index (UNDP 2003:240). Some basic socio-economic and health indicators in Table 1 illustrate the lack of basic need-satisfaction experienced by a large part of the population in Côte d'Ivoire.

Table1: Selected indicators for Côte d'Ivoire, low-income (LIE) and middle-income economies (MIE)

	Côte d'Ivoire	LIE	MIE
GNI per capita ($ US), 2001	630	430	1,860
Average annual population growth rate (%), 1980-2001	3.3	2.1	1.4
Male adult illiteracy rate (% age 15 +), 2001	40	28	9
Female adult illiteracy rate (% age 15 +), 2001	62	46	18
Total health expenditure (% of GDP), 1997–2000	2.7	4.3	5.9
Life expectancy at birth (years), 2001	46	59	70
Physicians (per 1,000 people), 1995-2000	0.1	n.a.	1.9
Prevalence of HIV (% of adults), 2001	9.70	2.29	0.67

Source: World Bank (2003), various tables.

One indicator, i.e. poverty, is especially important from the perspective of the main purpose of this article, since any social security system in a low-income economy must first and foremost deal with an environment of widespread and persistent poverty. In 1995, twelve percent of the Ivorian population had consumption levels below the subsistence poverty line of $1 a day used by the World Bank while almost half of the population lived on less than $2 a day (ILO 2002).[3] Based on the national higher relative poverty line, the poverty rate increased from 10 percent in 1985 to 36.8 percent in 1995 whereafter it fell to 33.6 percent in 1998. Extreme poverty, measured by the lower line, still affects 10 percent of the population (INS & UNDP 2000:20).[4]

Table 2: Poverty incidence in Côte d'Ivoire 1985–1998 (%)

Area	1985	1993	1995	1998
Abidjan	0.7	5.1	20.2	11.1
Other Towns	8	31.2	28.6	33.8
East Forest	15.2	38.9	41	46.6
West Forest	1.6	38.2	50.1	24.5
Savannah	25.9	49.4	49.4	54.6
Côte d' Ivoire	10	32.3	36.8	33.6

Source: INS & UNDP (2000:25).

Income poverty is unevenly distributed both geographically and socio-economically. As Table 2 shows, poverty was traditionally a predominantly rural phenomenon while urban areas have only recently registered a rapid increase in poverty.

In urban areas, the socio-economic group most affected by poverty is informal sector households (INS & UNDP 2000:39). Almost one-third of households headed by an informal sector worker[5] were poor in 1998. By contrast, the poverty incidence among households headed by modern sector workers was only 12.4 per cent. In rural areas 50 per cent of food crop farmers and 45 per cent of households that farm export products were affected by poverty (INS & UNDP 2000:31). Together the latter two categories account for almost 60 percent of poor households in Côte d'Ivoire.

Formal and informal social security in low-income countries: An overview

Most low-income countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, are characterised by a dichotomy in the access to social security: only a minority of formal workers is covered while the great majority of informal workers and rural self-employed is excluded. Informal arrangements have emerged as the response to this lack of protection. In this section, we discuss the structure and shortcomings of formal social security systems and identify existing informal arrangements in low-income countries with reference to the situation in Côte d'Ivoire.

Formal social security systems

Conventional definitions of formal social security often refer to specific state-based social insurance or social assistance programmes that are set up with the aim of providing income protection against the financial consequences resulting from the occurrence a number of prescribed social contingencies. Usually, the list of social risks that are covered is based upon the ILO's Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention from 1952 that included the following provisions: medical care and benefits in case of sickness, unemployment, old-age, employment injury, family size, maternity, invalidity and widowhood.

By the end of the 1990s, formal social security systems existed in the great majority of low-income economies. Like many other countries, Côte d'Ivoire has adopted an employment-related social insurance scheme that is financed by contributions paid by employers and employees. The average total contribution rate accounts for more than 15 percent of the total payroll of which the bulk is paid by employers, i.e. 85 percent (Barbone &

Sanchez B 1999:9). The National Social Insurance Fund is responsible for the administration of the programme while the overall supervision is confined to the Ministry of Social Security and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (N'Doumi 2001:3). The oldest social security programme is the family allowances scheme, which was created in 1955 and comprises the provision of child benefits. The Ivorian pension scheme covers old age, disability and death. Benefits are determined by the worker's length of covered employment and average earnings. In addition, a solidarity pension and a one-time allocation can be provided (Kipré 1995:24-26). A mandatory private pension system plays a supporting role. Other contingencies covered are maternity and work-injury and occupational disease while sickness benefits are omitted from the scheme (US SSA 2003). An embryonic employment protection programme provides benefits in case of redundancies for economic reasons only (CLEISS 2003).

Formal social security in Côte d'Ivoire, as in most low-income countries, suffers from a number of deficiencies that impede the provision of adequate and broad-based protection. A first major shortcoming is its limited extent of personal coverage. This is mainly due to the employment-related nature of social insurance schemes. The adoption of the latter technique was based on the assumptions of the modernisation approach, in which the development of the formal sector of the economy constitutes an important determinant of social security coverage. It was believed that the process of economic growth would be accompanied by a progressive increase in modern, formal sector employment so that statutory social security would eventually cover most of the population. However, these expectations have not been met: employment in the agricultural sector remains dominant (66 percent) in Côte d'Ivoire while the informal sector accounts for 26.9 percent of total employment. Only 7.3 percent is employed in the modern sector of the economy. As a result, the Ivorian state-based social security system has not succeeded in broad-based coverage of the population. Only a small minority of urban industrial workers and public employees – the latter benefiting from a special scheme – is covered, while rural peasants, rural non-farm workers, informal sector workers in urban areas and those outside the workforce are excluded from coverage.[6] Only 395,000 people out of an economically active population of 4,500,000 were covered by the national social insurance scheme in 1989, resulting in a coverage rate of less than 9 percent (Gruat 1990:409).[7] Coverage rates in most-low income countries range between 10 and 25 percent of the working population and their dependants (Van Ginneken 1999: 179). In Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, more than 90 percent of the population is generally not covered (Van Ginneken 1999:1).

Secondly, state-based social security systems in many low-income countries experience severe financial difficulties. With few exceptions, these countries have only a limited proportion of formal sector workers with stable and regular incomes upon which income-related taxes can be imposed or that are in a position to contribute to the insurance scheme. Most workers have very low and insecure incomes. Both their irregularity of income and the fact that self-employed workers have to pay the full contribution rate by themselves explain why so many informal sector workers cannot afford to contribute to state-based social insurance (Van Ginneken 1999:11).

A third problem faced by many low-income countries is administrative incompetence. Management of social security systems has failed to operate efficiently for reasons such as a lack of qualified personnel, high illiteracy rates, poor working conditions, and bad investment of reserves. The Ivorian National Social Insurance Fund (NSIF) suffered from a lack of transparency, poor quality of services provided, and inadequate communication that failed to keep employers and members informed about their participation in the scheme and the allocation of resources. The lack of accessibility and transparency generated a serious crisis of confidence between the social security system and its members. In order to remedy this situation, the NSIF has recently been transformed from a national public institution into a private institution of a special type providing a public service. This reform is expected to improve flexibility and efficiency so that time lags can be reduced, formalities simplified, and relations with the insured population improved (N'Doumi 2001, 2002).

Finally, formal social security systems cover only a limited range of contingencies in many low-income countries. Benefits for employment-injury, old-age, disability and to survivors are provided in many low-income countries. Sickness and maternity schemes are less prevalent. Family allowance and unemployment are seldom covered (US SSA 2003). This pattern can to large extent also be found in Côte d'Ivoire. Recent research, however, suggests that these risks are not considered as fundamental by the majority of workers in developing countries (Canagarajah & Sethuraman 2001; Van Ginneken 1999). Consequently, there is little enthusiasm among them to finance such benefits. In general, the social security priorities for rural and informal sector workers are medical coverage, survivor and disability benefits and smoothing out expenditure on basic education and specific high-cost social ceremonies such as funerals (IFAD; Van Ginneken 1999:10). In Côte d'Ivoire, the demand for adequate health care coverage, in particular, is very strong (Atim et al. 1998:6; IFAD).

Informal social security arrangements

In order to mitigate the specific risks they face, informal arrangements for rural self-employed and informal sector workers have been set up. These are predominantly household- or organisation-based safety nets that provide support to individuals or households in the social and/or economic field.

In the economic field, traditional organisation-based systems in Côte d'Ivoire are known as tontines. These are small-scale rotating savings and credit associations that are set up with the aim of providing credit to individuals otherwise excluded from formal financial services. Scheme members are usually people from the same village or occcupation among whom there exists a strong solidarity and trust. Each member of the group saves a certain amount of money determined at the outset. The collected savings are regularly deposited with a common fund which returns the money – totally or partially and without interest rate – towards each group member in turn for investment purposes. In case of occurrence of a specific social risk such as the death of a family member, this sequence can be revised and the collected savings can be used by the affected member to cover emergency expenses. Besides being a financial institution that provides acces to credit and encourages savings, tontines can therefore also be considered as a form of social insurance (Van Ginneken 1999:21). However, due to a number of serious problems such as theft of the collected funds, these traditional systems have suffered from a lack of confidence recently.

Supported by various actors – national/international and governmental and non-governmental organisations – other informal financial institutions have therefore emerged during the 1990s that are operating alongside the tontines. At present, at least thirty micro-finance institutions with over 20,000 clients are operating in Côte d'Ivoire, both in urban and rural areas. The importance to and adherence of clients is reflected in an average reimbursement rate of 90 percent and the fact that loans are repaid on average in less than one year (Sambe and Djoussou-Lorng 1997:6). In theory, micro-finance institutions can contribute positively to economic development by enabling households to accumulate a diversified range of assets or to create or expand micro-enterprises. In practice, however, the low level of credit is often insufficient for investments in material or equipment and rather functions as an income stabiliser. Micro-credit associations are especially important for women and women-headed households who often have serious difficulties getting formal credit. It is not surprising, therefore, that women constitute a target group in most institutions of which some, such as the Associations Féminines d'Epargne

et de Crédit (AFEC), have been very successful. Recently, these associations have decided to combine and create a joint central fund, the FAFEC, which has acquired a semi-formal status (Laurent 2002:1–4).

In the social field, the Ivorian government has acknowledged the potential of existing mutual-aid organisations to cover the population's health needs by encouraging them to set up self-financed health insurance schemes in which individuals voluntarily share risks by pooling resouces. Typically, the frequency and rate of contributions that members are supposed to make is decided by the organisation itself (ILO 2000:200).

For Côte d'Ivoire, the scarce scientific evidence indicates that the contribution of mutual-aid associations to health care financing has been weak, especially in rural areas. Although the rural population is to a large extent organised into a network of co-operatives that could facilitate the creation of such initiatives, very few rural health insurance schemes have been set up. Competing priorities and an organisational structure directed towards the collection and marketing of agricultural products have meant that these organisations make only marginal allocations for health expenses, notwithstanding the fact that the population in rural areas experiences some (75 percent) or serious (47.5 percent) difficulty paying the cost of care (Atim et al 1998:5–8).[8]

Micro-health insurance schemes are more prevalent in urban areas. In Abidjan, they provide targeted coverage against minor illnesses and/or high-cost, low-frequency events such as hospital care to informal sector workers and their dependants. Revenues are generated through monthly and ad hoc contributions. Similar to the situation in rural areas, however, expenditures for health suffer from competition with other priorities and inadequate funding in urban mutual organisations. The average overall expenditures for health coverage are limited, i.e. only 2 percent of the total contributions received. The average volume of financial allocations to 'death' is three times larger (6.4 percent) while expenditures for the category of 'others' (mostly major social occasions, e.g. marriages) account for almost 10 percent. This ranking of priorities is characteristic for all schemes notwithstanding the fact that some have structurally given priority to health by establishing a quota system stipulating that over half of available resources be allocated for health (Atim et al 1998:6–7).[9]

In sum, the actual contribution of informal arrangements to adequate social security provision in Côte d'Ivoire has had mixed results so far. Institutions of micro-finance have considerably improved access to credit for people in the informal and rural sector with their success being reflected in a high number clients and short reimbursement periods. How-

ever, because of relatively limited funds, credits are generally considered by clients as insufficient for investment purposes other than maintaining a cash-flow. Micro-insurance schemes have improved access to health care for people otherwise excluded from coverage. Yet, the extent of personal coverage and, hence, resources remain limited.

Moreover, some of the design features of informal arrangements constitute a major challenge for effective social security provision. First, since informal arrangements function on the basis of mutual trust and personalised information, they are effective only in relatively small groups or geographic areas. Second, since participation is based on the payment of contributions, these schemes do not always reach the poor. Out of necessity, the latter tend to prefer current consumption over future consumption and are therefore not in a position to contribute on a regular basis. Third, as will be argued below, informal arrangements are often powerless when confronted with a collective or covariate risk that affects all participants simultaneously.

The impact and challenges of economic globalisation

While informal arrangements have improved the economic and social security for a part of the population, the combined effect of the former and formal social security systems is far from providing adequate social security protection for the whole population. In addition, social security systems in low-income countries will have to cope with the pressures and challenges emanating from the process of economic globalisation. The latter can be defined as the increasing global interconnectedness of national economies through transcontinental or interregional flows of trade, direct investment and short-term capital. Closely related is the issue of global economic governance: International financial institutions exert considerable influence on the socio-economic policies of many low-income countries through the implementation of economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes. This section discusses three ways through which globalisation can contribute to further losses of economic and social security in low-income countries if no urgent initiatives are taken to redesign social security systems.

Integration and social security financing

For relatively small-sized and impoverished countries such as Côte d' Ivoire, integration with the world economy is fundamental to growth and modernity and essential for an amelioration of its social, economic and health indicators. Both within-country and cross-country analysis suggests that an increase in international trade leads to faster economic growth rates accompanied

by a proportionate increase in incomes of the poor (Dollar and Kraay 2001). The effects of globalisation on economic growth, however, depend not only on the extent of integration but also on the type of integration. Integrating successfully in an increasingly globalised economic environment requires an industrial base which allows a country to engage competitively in the production and trade of manufactured goods.

Yet, this necessary base from which a process of growth and development could take off, is limited in Côte d'Ivoire and most low-income countries. Although manufacturing is considered to be a more dynamic sector than agriculture, the latter accounts for 24 percent of GDP compared to only 19 percent for manufacturing in Côte d'Ivoire. For low-income countries as a whole, the share of manufacturing in GDP amounts to 18 percent as compared to 23 percent for the group of middle-income countries. The failure to obtain a substantial share in global markets because of insufficient industrialisation has impeded economic development and aggravated poverty. Rapid and sustained industrialisation and economic diversification through substantial policy and institutional changes are therefore important objectives for future economic development and poverty reduction.

In the social security context, it is reasonable to assume that, at least in the long term, integration in the international economy and economic growth will lead to an increase in social security spending and population coverage. Various studies have empirically demonstrated a positive relationship between the degree of trade openness and social security expenditure on the one hand and between the latter and the level of coverage on the other. In the short term, however, economic integration entails adverse implications for the financing of formal social security systems. In general, governments in low-income countries depend heavily on trade taxes as a source of revenue. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, import and export duties accounted for 43 percent of total tax revenues in 2001 (World Bank 2003). The abolition or reduction of tariff barriers would therefore increase the risk of a severe retrenchment in social expenditures and seriously jeopardise the fiscal viability of tax-based social assistance programmes in those countries that have adopted such a scheme. Moreover, labour market effects resulting from the implementation of structural economic reforms constitute a threat to the financial base of social insurance schemes (see infra).

Increased vulnerability to international economic shocks

Following the devaluation of the CFAF in 1994, Côte d'Ivoire has embarked on a process of trade reforms with the result that the Ivorian economy is now more open than in the past. Yet, greater openness entails increased competition from both highly subsidised agricultural sectors of developed countries and more productive and resource-rich agriculture in Asia and Latin America. In addition, trade liberalisation also implies greater exposure to price and demand fluctuations on global markets.

Côte d'Ivoire relies heavily on the export of a narrow range of agricultural products. Although diversification has begun with the production of other agricultural products and manufactures for export, coffee and cocoa still account for more than 40 percent of Ivorian exports (Republic of Côte d'Ivoire 2002:44). This makes the economy extremely vulnerable to international commodity-price fluctuations, an especially serious problem after the recent phase of trade liberalisation. Moreover, a sharp drop in world prices for coffee or cocoa would adversely affect the income and consumption patterns of export crop farmers in rural communities where revenues generated from the sales of coffee and cocoa represent the major source of income of a typical farm household.

As noted above, informal arrangements have been set up with the aim of providing a safety net for participants that are faced with an adverse risk. However, these informal mechanisms may be ineffective or break down during a community-wide or collective shock such as a sudden collapse in commodity prices. That is because of the localised nature of most informal arrangements, which implies that the participants are usually living in an ecologically uniform area or carrying out activities which are similar from a risk point of view. Obviously, a fall in commodity prices would affect all the farmers/participants at the same time, thereby generating a simultaneous demand for income support. As a result, informal networks would have to keep high reserve ratios, a serious difficulty given that most schemes are small-scale and operate in a poor context. Moreover, should a high ratio exist, the occurrence of such a collective or covariate risk would rapidly exhaust financial reserves. Hence, these informal arrangements may be inappropriate for effective social security provision in an environment where income and risks are not independent across the population.

This problem could be dealt with through the expansion of risk-pooling towards villages of other agricultural regions or to urban areas with uncorrelated incomes or contingencies. Yet, as Platteau (1991:140) argues, 'The difficulty with this solution is that it increases the incentive or

information problems at the same time as it reduces the covariance problem'. In other words, an enlargement towards other areas would widen the insurance pool but reduce the informational advantage characteristic for small-scale informal arrangements consisting of intra- and inter-household transfers between related or proximate individuals. Because of close and continuous relations between participants, these systems have adequate and almost complete information on both contingent claims and actions of the insured which reduces the probability of adverse selection and moral hazard.[10] In larger groups, the information is usually less personal and imperfect which may increase these two incentive problems. This situation has been called the insurance dilemma for rural insurance arrangements (Platteau 1991:140).

Structural adjustment and economic stabilisation programmes

Since the late 1970s, structural adjustment programmes have been designed and monitored for over 100 countries as a condition for loans and other forms of economic assistance. This has also been the case in Côte d'Ivoire. Following the severe economic crisis of the 1980s, the government embarked on a process of economic reforms through the implementation of stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes negotiated with the IMF and World Bank. The main objective of the stabilisation and adjustment programmes was to restore macro-economic equilibrium and to encourage market discipline through liberalisation of markets, privatisation of state enterprises, reduction of government intervention in the economy and reduction of government expenditures (Goedhuys 1999:18–19). According to the adjustment model, economic growth would follow soon after economic stabilisation. Social improvements were of second-order importance, being perceived as a by-product of economic growth. Yet, since economic growth did not resume, the expected social benefits resulting from economic reform have not been realised. Instead, economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes led to a further deteriorating standard of living of poor households due to cuts in food subsidies and a fall in medical consultation, access to electricity and private expenditures for education and health care (World Bank 1993:2). In addition, these programmes had a severe negative impact on the financial base of the formal social insurance scheme through their labour market effects.

First, modern sector wage employment has been substantially reduced following the implementation of such programmes. Its share in total employment fell from 13.5 percent in 1980 to 7.3 percent in 1995. Public sector employment, in particular, has been severely affected. Due to closure or privatisation, employment fell by 29 percent in completely state-

owned enterprises and by 17 percent in enterprises in which the state of Côte d'Ivoire was the principal share-holder during the 1980s. Modern private sector employment registered 33,000 job losses up to the beginning of the 1990s. In total, 94,000 jobs were lost between 1980 and 1992 in public and private enterprises. Most affected were unskilled workers, both in the public and private sector (Hugon and Pagès 1998:23-24; Sambe & Djoussou-Lorng 1997:3). Furthermore, public sector downsizing caused a fall in the number of government and public body employees. Consequently, the open unemployment rate increased from 7.7 percent in 1973 to 22.8 percent in 1986, whereafter it fell to 15 percent in 1995,[11] most notably due to an informalisation of employment (Hugon & Pagès 1998:24; Sambe & Djoussou-Lorng 1997:3). In Côte d'Ivoire, as in most low-income economies, informal sector employment performs a compensatory role since most people cannot remain unemployed for long in the absence of adequate unemployment protection. The combination of a fall in formal wage employment and an urban labour supply which exceeds formal sector demand due to various reasons such as strong population growth and rapid urbanisation led to the expansion of informal wage employment. By the mid-1990s, informal employment accounted for 26.9 percent of total employment in the country and 53 percent in Abidjan (Sambe and Djoussou-Lorng 1997:3; ILO 2002).

Second, structural adjustment had a negative impact on income from employment, in particular in the public sector. By freezing the nominal wages, the adjustment programme has caused a fall in real wages of public servants. Average wages in the formal private sector remained relatively unaffected since the downward adjustment of demand was achieved through reduced employment with large-scale redundancies (Morrisson 1992:18).

Third, the implementation of the PASCO-programme[12] together with the revision of the Labour Code has created a more flexible and deregulated labour market in which both formal and informal employment have become more heterogeneous and precarious, in particular for low-skilled workers. Competition-induced phenomena such as sub-contracting by formal enterprises have proliferated drawing on the large urban informal labour supply while, as a result of the institutionalisation of fixed-term contracts, temporary employment has increased by 40 percent (Hugon and Pagès 1998:30). Besides acceptance of contracts with fewer guarantees, greater flexibility is reflected also in measures to facilitate retrenchment and reduce its cost.

Obviously, formal social insurance suffered from the developments described above. The reduction in modern sector employment has directly led to a reduction in the number of social security participants and hence to a corresponding fall in the level of social security contributions collected. Falling real incomes further contributed to the erosion of the financial base of statutory social security. Between 1990 and 1993, income from contributions registered a fifteen percent decline. As a result, the NSIF had to introduce a series of measures, e.g. a suppression or review of certain posts and a reduction in staff, which added up the difficulties of providing comprehensive and efficient social security protection (N'Doumi 2002:1–2). In addition, the formal social security system is not adapted to the competition-induced evolution towards more frequent job changes in a more flexible and deregulated environment.

Towards better protection: Options for a developmental social security policy

Clearly, the most important policy objective for low-income countries is the reversal of social and economic marginalisation through broad-based equitable economic growth that promotes welfare for all sections of the population. Spurred by the growth experience of successfully globalising developing countries, many low-income economies will opt to move forward by integrating into the international economy. Since openness and integration of national economies increase exposure to international economic forces, effective state institutions to cope with external economic risks are needed if a country is to benefit from integration.

One such institutional response is the implementation of an adequate social security system. If well-designed, social security not only provides direct income support but also positively influences both the extent to which a country participates in global economic processes and the extent to which different segments of society participate in national progress. By providing a cushion against the internal risks of adjustment and economic restructuring, social security facilitates the acceptance of necessary reforms for international economic integration. As Rodrik (1998) has shown, social security also helps to mediate – through compensation by social insurance schemes – domestic social conflicts and political instability triggered by external economic shocks. Its collective structures are conducive to sustainable economic development through the promotion of social solidarity and social cohesion, which are necessary factors for the creation of an attractive investment climate.

However, existing formal social security systems are rudimentary in the great majority of low-income economies. New strategies have to be adopted for effective and broad-based protection which may not be confined to a mere reflection of social security systems of industrialised countries but adapted to the circumstances of low-income countries and, as Guhan (1994:38) notes, be part of and fully integrated with broader anti-poverty policies. Given the various strengths and weaknesses of social security mechanisms at the national and community level, the provision of social security should be organised in a complementary way drawing on the comparative advantage of both state and community-based mechanisms (Jütting 2000:19–21). This interlinking of state-based social security institutions and informal arrangements will not only extend social security coverage but enhance solidarity as well.

Existing informal insurance and credit practices are a good starting point for the extension of coverage towards hitherto excluded workers and should therefore be considered a priority for government support. In a country-context characterised by weak institutional and administrative development, these community or employment-based schemes have an informational advantage relative to the state-based systems and are thus better placed to deal with the risk of moral hazard and adverse selection. Yet, since informal arrangements are usually of small size and restricted to a small area, they are especially vulnerable to community-wide risks such as a terms of trade shock or financial crisis. Therefore, some form of integration between formal and informal mechanisms of social security provision must be established. In other words, the state should step in to protect against covariate risks. Government support could include a transfer of financial means towards or the re-insurance of informal schemes. Other necessary measures are the creation of a legal framework and capacity building through the provision of technical assistance.

In addition to this insurance-based approach, cost-effective social assistance measures targeted at vulnerable (e.g. widows and elderly) and poor (e.g. unemployed or underemployed) groups of people should be implemented.[13] Yet, since the development of an adequate system of income transfers is constrained by a low level of administrative development, limited financial means and a demographic context characterised by growing population pressure resulting in an expanding labour force, rural public employment programmes (PEPs) should be viewed as an appropriate instrument of poverty alleviation for the large group of rural poor.

Well-designed public employment programmes provide not only immediate relief from poverty through cost-effective assistance but contribute

also to economic growth by improving infrastructure (roads, schools, irrigation systems) and productivity in rural areas. These investments in infrastructure and transportation should stimulate integration of rural markets into the wider national economy. Furthermore, if the programme is organised in such a way that infrastructural works are undertaken and hence employment is provided during periods of recession or when confronted with an adverse community-wide shock, the resulting income security can induce poor farmers to take productivity-increasing production risks.

From an administrative point of view, the main advantage of PEPs is that they self-select their participants by offering a wage at such a rate that only low-skilled or poor people will apply, thereby reducing and simplifying administrative exigencies. This low wage rate is essential for cost-effectiveness since it will increase the likelihood that only the neediest will be captured and employment will be maximised (Guhan 1994:44).

PEPs have been implemented in low-income economies such as India, Bangladesh, Kenya and Tanzania. Recently, the Ivorian government acknowledged the importance of PEPs by creating several labour-intensive employment programmes for rural youth within the framework of its Poverty Reduction Strategy in order to alleviate the social costs of monetary adjustment.[14] Although empirical evidence indicates that various obstacles can arise to successful implementation, rural PEPs should be considered a promising approach for poverty alleviation because of their targeting efficiency and the creation of assets conducive to economic development.

In sum, for broad-based and effective coverage to realise, outdated social security structures should be abandoned and a 'public-private partnership' (Jütting 2000:20) implemented in which well-designed public action should strengthen the capacity of informal associations while benefiting from the latter's informational advantage. Above all, this seems to be the most appropriate institutional arrangement for meeting social protection needs in a low-income environment.

Conclusion

It is now generally accepted that formal social security in low-income economies has not been able to address adequately the social needs of the population nor has it attained the objective of broad-based coverage of the population. Formal social security programmes cater primarily for persons in wage employment in the modern sector of the economy and for public employees while excluding the population in rural areas and informal sector workers. As a result, these groups have to resort to informal social security

systems to cover future contingencies. As we have seen, the process of economic globalisation can impact adversely on the economic security of the population and constitutes a threat to both formal and informal protective arrangements. At the same time, the most likely path to economic modernisation and growth for most low-income countries is precisely through integration into the international economy. Obviously, existing social security systems need to be reformed in order to deal effectively with the negative effects of globalisation and to facilitate the integration of low-income economies into the global economy. If no adequate social security policy is deployed that can manage external risks on the one hand and maintain or improve social stability and cohesion that can nurture economic development on the other, the benefits of economic globalisation for growth and welfare will be slim. Based on theoretical considerations and the empirical evidence provided by the country experience of Côte d'Ivoire, this article emphasised that future reforms of social security should be compatible with the socio-economic context of low-income countries and consist of a complementary form of income security provision, drawing on the comparative advantage of both formal and informal mechanisms.

Notes

1. According to the World Bank, low-income economies are defined as those countries with a GNI per capita of $735 or less in 2002.
2. CFA is the acronym of Communauté Financière d'Afrique. 1 US dollar = 534.123 CFA Francs (rate in March 2004).
3. These are reference lines in 1993 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, where PPPs measure the relative purchasing power of currencies across countries.
4. The higher relative poverty line equalled an income level of CFAF 75,000 per capita in 1985 and CFAF 162,800 in 1998 while the lower line equalled CFAF 95,700 in 1998.
5. Our definition of informal sector employment covers employment in unincorporated and unregistered micro-enterprises. The production or distribution of goods and services is occasional or illegal and the income level is low. There is an absence of social security and standard labour legislation.
6. Recent reforms, however, have extended the coverage for old-age to certain categories of agricultural workers while certain self-employed may affiliate voluntarily to work-injury schemes (US SSA 2003).
7. These data exclude civil servants.
8. To investigate the extent to which informal schemes contribute to health care coverage in rural areas, Atim et al. (1998) surveyed households in four communities located to the far north of Côte d'Ivoire.
9. It is essential to note however that these findings are based on a limited sample of informal associations in Abidjan.

10. Adverse selection arises from a situation in which one party in a potential transaction is better informed about an important variable in the transaction (here, the individual member's risk) than the other party (here, the insurance system). Moral hazard refers to actions which parties in a transaction (here, insurance) may take after they have agreed to execute the transaction, for example being less risk-adverse when one is insured. Both problems are caused by information asymmetries (Douma and Schreuder 1998: 52–59).
11. This rate obscures very high underemployment, particularly in the traditional agricultural sector and among informal sector workers.
12. Programme d'Ajustement Structurel pour l'amélioration de la Compétitivité.
13. In its 'Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Report', the Ivorian government committed itself to a consistent policy of improving the living conditions of poor and vulnerable people.
14. Nearly 29,000 jobs have been created but the programmes suffered from poor project targeting because of a weak participative approach.

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Institutionalised Marginality, Social Conflicts and the Quest for National Unity in an African Nation-State: A Theoretical Exploration

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Abstract

This essay focuses on the issue of marginality, marginalisation and the quest for national unity. Although, the issue of marginalisation in a nation-state such as Nigeria has been widely discussed by writers, few have attempted to offer a systematic analysis of the issue through a theoretical or conceptual basis. This paper examines the extent to which the competition for resources and the exercise of political control have compelled the marginalisation of various segments of Nigerian society. It highlights the evolving nature and different expressions of marginalisation. By looking at the issue of marginality and the social order in Nigeria against the backdrop of the brutal facts of injustice, inequality and exploitation, we seek to discern the epochal configurations and socio-cultural locations of the problem. Our aim is to discover how this problem has militated against the quest for national integration and reconciliation in the polity. And by highlighting the attendant crisis of social order occasioned by marginalisation, this essay reinforces the need for the urgent establishment of enduring humane rules of distributive justice in the society.

Résumé

Cet article s'intéresse à la question de la marginalité, de la marginalisation et de l'unité nationale. Bien que la question de la marginalisation dans un état-nation tel que le Nigeria ait été largement traitée par divers auteurs, très peu d'entre eux (voire aucun) ont essayé de présenter une analyse systématique de cette idée, en s'appuyant sur une base théorique ou conceptuelle. Cette contribution cherche à découvrir dans quelle mesure la concurrence relative au contrôle des ressources et du pouvoir politique au sein de la société a provoqué la marginalisation de divers groupes de la société nigériane. Elle montre le caractère évolutif, ainsi que les différentes formes de marginalisation présentes au sein de cette société. En examinant la question de la marginalité et de l'ordre social au

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Nigeria, dans le contexte de l'injustice sur fond de violence, de l'inégalité et de l'exploitation, nous cherchons à distinguer les configurations périodiques, ainsi que les localisations socioculturelles du problème. Notre objectif est de découvrir dans quelle mesure ce problème a constitué un frein à l'intégration nationale et à la réconciliation politique. A travers l'évocation de la crise connexe de l'ordre social provoquée par la marginalisation, cette contribution tente de souligner le besoin urgent de mise en place de règles humaines viables pour une justice distributive au sein de la société.

Introduction

This essay examines the problem of marginalistion in the Nigerian nation from a theoretical and analytical perspective. Its primary concern is to identify and examine the conditions of social transformation needed if there is to be enduring national unity in Nigeria. It attempts to confront the fundamental ethical challenge of creating a free society, a social arena of equal rights, and a social system based on justice and mutual cooperation. The marginalistion of some sectors of Nigerian society have led to a series of ethnic, class, political and religious conflicts which have beset the country, vitiating its potential for development and on various occasions threatening to cause the total collapse of the state and the dissolution of society. The propensity for human differences to degenerate into deep and enduring conflicts and violence are clear indications that a multiplicity of factors are at play in the analysis of marginalisation as a basis of the crisis of social order in the country. Apart from the crisis of social order, and the problem of resource management confronting Nigerian society, the reality of marginalisation indicates that Nigeria as it exists in this evolutionary stage has not fully articulated the crucial concepts necessary for establishing a truly humane, civil and harmonious society. Central to the problem of marginalisation of individuals and groups within Nigerian society is the lack of an enduring system of social justice, which can effectively promote genuine social reconciliation and national reconstruction. Indeed, domination in whatever form cannot last forever, hence the need for a restructuring and renegotiation of the diverse contending interests in the society.

Marginality and marginalisation in postcolonial discourse: A conceptual analysis

Over the years different governments, individuals and institutions have systematically entrenched a culture of marginalisation within the social order. The modern social system has produced widespread violence, arbitrary hierarchies and avoidable deprivation. This situation has often led to

'the perpetuation of poverty, widened material inequalities, increased ecological degradation, sustained militarism, fragmented communities, subordinated groups, fed intolerance and deepened crisis of democracy' (Scholte 1996:52–53, Quayson 2000:7). The prevailing injustice and exploitation have created a regime of marginal peoples. According to Axtmann (1998:3) the central feature of marginalisation is the capacity to render regions and countries 'structurally irrelevant'. Evidence shows that structural irrelevance is fueled by the realities and consequences of the notions of difference and dichotomies (Kellner 1998:36), dependence, disorder and discriminatory power (Bhabha 1996:37), contestation (Chakrabarty 1996: 237), tension, genocidal oppression, (Shohat 1996:323–324), invisibility (Quayson 2000:7) and above all, a focus on the idea of separateness as emanating from distinct cultural and historical identities (Gilroy 1996:249–250).

Marginalisation arises out 'of particular relations of power which entrench a system of privileging and structuring that leads to the concrete objectification of individuals, and its corollary-the exploitation of these persons within the social system' (Peterson 1996:3&18). Central to the issue of marginalisation is a relationship of difference, in which people are subjected to political and economic structural domination (Shohat 1996:326). These ideas and their application are central to marginalisation, which simply highlights 'antagonism, aggression and disjunctive binaries in the determination of human interpersonal relations' (Slemon 1996:32–74). The consequence of this phenomenon is a perversion of human relations in a way that creates an underclass through the foisting of a cultural identity, simply because the centre wants an identifiable margin (Spivak 1996:198–200). For Chakrabarty (1996:223) marginalisation compels the idea of a subaltern, existing within 'the distinction between opposites paired in a structure of domination and subordination'. According to Willie (1975:10) marginalised peoples suffer a loss of identity, seen in their retention of a sense of anonymity. The effect of this loss seems to be a search for security, acceptance, and the struggle to be recognised by others. The question then is the extent to which any individual or group can go in order to find meaning, security and significance within the social order.

Laitin (1996:38–39) observes that 'marginality is so thoroughly demeaning, for economic well-being, for human dignity, as well as for physical security. Marginal peoples can always be identified by members of the dominant society and will face irrevocable discrimination'. Nolutshungu (1996:17–18) notes that 'marginal populations are distinguishable minorities within states whose integration to the society and the state is markedly incomplete so that their participation in either is partial, intermittent,

or subject to special qualifications and restrictions'. Furthermore, Nolutshungu (1996:30) insists that marginality 'is primarily about participation (or relative exclusion from participation) in gainfully cooperation with others which includes institutional representation, fair inclusion in the schemes of social protection and support and in the system of rights applicable to each context. The problematic of marginality and insecurity, therefore, invokes the politics of belonging where this entails the rights of participation'.

Although, Nolutshungu (1996:17–18) points out that marginal populations are 'minorities' in a political sense, they need not always be so numerically. Marginality can be linked to ethnic, racial, gender and sexual attitudes of discrimination. Nolutshungu (1996:30) says that the insecurity of marginal people is, in most cases, a problem of oppression and exploitation that highlights the problem of vulnerability. Hayes (1996:13-14) points out that this can lead to resentment which itself is a symptom of deep pathology in a culture, as occasioned by the refraction of oppression and the perpetuation of domination. The reality of political domination and cultural dispossession will lead to 'a consciousness of wretchedness, outrage and a sense of justice denied'. Gaines (1996:25) argues that in order to resist this confrontation posed by cultural hegemony, individuals and groups assert themselves against the odds of institutional and interpersonal barriers to economic and sociopolitical advancement. White (1996:101–103) holds that since the collective experiences and traditions of a nation provide it with the foundation for social living and sociality, domination elicits its rejection such that in any state of oppression a group of individuals will organise to resist.

Institutionalised marginality and the collapse of sociopolitical order in Nigeria

Marginalisation within the nation is the outcome of political and human development deficits arising from the mismanagement of the economy and the pursuit of a development paradigm that has polarised the different groups in the society (Adedeji 1999:32). In Nigeria, evidence shows that the state is central to this process of marginalisation, in so far as it presides over diverse and unequal societies. The state has not always been representative of, or responsive to, all sections of the population. Worse still, its interests and concerns have not always been always coterminous with popular interests (Nolutshungu 1996:2). Fanon (1963:133–138) points out that marginalisation arises because the national bourgeoisie, which seeks alliances with the foreign capitalists, ensures a restriction in the disburse-

ment of dividends or profits from resources and erects a leader capable of stabilising the regime and perpetuating bourgeoisie domination. For him, central to the issue of marginalization is the 'inequality in the acquisition and monopolization of wealth, the rise of specialized opportunism, and the expansion of the domain of privileges and corruption'. This leads to the voracious depletion of national wealth and the state is incapable of inspiring confidence in the citizen. This situation points to the reality of exclusion as a directive principle.

According to Dommen (1997:485–491) exclusion is a reality in every society, and some paradigms of governance are central to the institutionalisation of marginalisation. For instance, prebendalism and kleptocracy are factors that keep the number of beneficiaries at a minimal level. Within the state the ruling class is almost always central to the existence of marginalisation. Fatton (1992:19) holds that the existence of a ruling class implies necessarily the existence of a state whose role is to preserve and promote the economic, social and the political structures of ruling class dominance. There have been varied claims by certain individuals and groups in Nigeria that they are being marginalised. This idea of marginalisation as a depiction of the reality that some persons have been alienated or sidelined to the fringes of social and political life in the country, has become a some what politicised concept in Nigeria. The idea has become a weapon in the service of groups (whether small or large) that have either been removed from, or eased out of, positions of power. This idea has also been peddled or adopted by those seeking more benefits or advantages from the existing arrangements within the state or society, or even those who wish to draw increased attention to their real or perceived plight.

More importantly, the perception, threat and reality of marginalisation, such has arisen in the past decades or even in the recent times, have engendered a conflict situation in Nigeria which has facilitated feelings and expressions of mistrust, division and resentment among the different interests, groups and sectors of Nigerian society. Some scholars have linked such divisions and resentments to the diverse cultural and religious beliefs and values of the different groups constituting Nigerian society. Diamond (1995:420) holds that the differences in culture, education and religion have ensured that there are enormous disparities in the economic and technological development of the northern and southern parts of Nigeria. Such realities have engendered feelings of marginalisation in the nation. This has led to the existence of social conflicts because groups possess, or have confirmed the suspicion or feeling, that the state as appropriated by

certain sectors of the Nigerian society has shortchanged or deprived them of desired or accruing social benefits, rights and entitlements. The realities of exploitation and hatred have consistently aroused the struggle for personal dignity, self-determination and human rights. There has been a tendency to reject or react to alienation and dispossession.

Marginalisation can provide a framework for the analysis of policies and social values. And this can be discerned in the extent to which factors such as poverty, civil strife and sociopolitical instability exist in the society. The marginalisation of groups can been linked to the high rate of failed nation-state projects in Africa, due to the insecurity and violence it breeds. Some persons hold a somewhat sceptical view about the currently widespread claims by some groups in Nigeria that they are being marginalised. Individuals and groups in Nigeria claim that they are being marginalised when certain factors do not seem to be working in their favour (Makama in Aidokanya 1999:33). There is no doubt that such a situation described by Makama can exist, through posturing and deception. However, with reference to Nigeria the truth is that there is at least one individual or group that is being marginalised in the society. For instance, there are those whose rights and privileges have been denied them either as individuals or as groups. The peoples of the Niger Delta are a case in point. In what seems to be either a more optimistic view, or a naïve assertion concerning the problem of marginalisation in Nigeria, one exponent of a democratic minimalist view holds that 'nobody is being marginalized. In a democratic system, the whole country is represented. Every state has a minister. Every part of the country is adequately represented on the boards of government agencies which have been reconstituted' (Babangida 2000:3). Unfortunately, this view is either a blind denial of a reality that is indisputable, or it is a masterpiece of unwarranted presumption. Either way, it does not offer a portrayal of the truth, such as is required for genuine social transformation. Does the fact that institutions exist, detract from the reality that they can be subverted or abused?

The debate on whether democracy can be rightly construed as merely arrangements or a set of institutions for arriving at a desired goal remains pertinent in the light of the issue of marginalisation that is being discussed here. Schumpeter (1982:153–73) says that the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realises the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will. According to this paradigm, we arrive at legislative and administrative decisions by vesting in certain individuals the power to decide on all mat-

ters as a consequence of their successful pursuit of the people's vote (Held 1987:165). Scholars have provided a list of institutional requirements for democracy or technical democratic tools such as political parties, elections (Barletta in Touraine 1991:268), judicial autonomy, power alternation (Nzouankeu 1991:381), agreement over the management of political competition (Clapham 1994:423), power separation, rule of law, and the constitution as a means of assuring rights (Held 1993:23–24).

However, Ghali (1995:6) has objected to the idea of democracy as a set of institutions. He says that although many states are committed to democracy and free elections, simply holding an election does not make a democracy. We also hasten to add that it is very possible for us to have a set of institutions that represent democratic principles, and yet in actual fact, these institutions are not effective or are even non-functional. We also point out the real threat of hijacking, perversion, relegation and abuse to which these supposed democratic institutions are highly susceptible. Surely, it clear that the institution themselves are mere means to democracy and, therefore, are not the end themselves. Moreover, the external character of institutions makes them prone to violations. Worse still, institutions have been known to quickly lose their humane faces, and enthrone rigidity or inflexibility, which makes people slaves to their laws.

Given the reality of marginalisation in Nigeria, and the attendant crisis of social order and national security arising out of it, we must agree with Schochet (1979:21) 'that there is a sense in that our institutions have betrayed us and can no longer be trusted'. In a more precise geopolitical analysis, Anyaoku (2000:32) notes that in the southeast zone, north-north zone and north east zone, there are reports of marginalisation by the Federal government itself. It is instructive to note that the Federal government, which ought to be an effective machinery for the creation and sustenance of national cohesion and reconciliation, has clearly failed in this critical task. Clapham (1991:92) holds that the most positive view of the state sees it as supplying the opportunity for individuals to pursue their own happiness and the essential foundation for the pursuit of public benefits peace, welfare, all of which can be described as public goods. For Shepsle (1980:35), examples of these public goods include national defense, inter-state highways, other features, which are vital requirements for human well-being, peace and progress. The state can also enhance the private goods of the citizens by creating effective sociopolitical space for the actualisation of human personal and social aspirations.

The reason why the state ought be effective is that large numbers of people depend on government for protection from a wide spectrum of

dangers such as foreign threats, criminal threats, fuel and food shortages and so on (Edelman 1975:14). All the above features are illustrative of what the government seeks to achieve, when it aspires towards the common good. 'The idea of the "common good" is attached to objects and policies that are beneficial to the whole taken collectively' (Schochet 1979:24). If government is to be seen as a rational device for satisfying people's needs, then it must be capable of proper functioning, using the rules of governance that can promote national unity. Over the years military rule and massive corruption have led to the mismanagement of the country's human and material resources. Obasanjo (1999:8) rightly notes that the fears about ethnic and religious discrimination effectively militate against the establishment of a united country. Madunagu (2000:41) argues that marginalisation in Nigeria is aggravated by the acts of a selfish political class and the restlessness of the greater bulk of the disaffected and exploited citizenry. In this sense, Nigeria retains the character of a place where people have sectional interests, antithetical to the establishment of national unity. In the recent past, one of the leaders of a major armed insurrection against the erstwhile military government of Babangida, stated that the basis for his revolution 'is to free the marginalised, oppressed and enslaved peoples of the Middle Belt and the South. There is a need to stop intrigues, domination and internal colonisation of the Nigerian state by the few' (Orkar 2000:30).

However, 'the complaints by some politicians in the northern Nigeria that they are marginalised could be deceptive and hypocritical because it is this same people who have occupied the most important positions in the nation' (Makama in Aidokanya 1999:33) especially before May 1999 when the military rulers handed over power to the civilians. It is crucial to mention that central to the issue of marginalisation is the question of the balance of political power in Nigeria. The truth remains that the old ethnic divisions remain unmitigated, thus engendering insecurity and instability. The issue at stake in the marginalisation controversy is therefore the fact that no one group can possibly occupy positions of power in society for too long, without others complaining of marginalisation. The question that arises here is, thus, what has been the frame of mind of those political and ethnic groups that have been on the fringes of political power for several decades? More importantly, Anyadubalu (1999:11) notes that there have been claims that the North has been marginalised since May 1999, 'but the question that arises concerns whether or not the north has been marginalised in the Army? In reality the Igbo have been persistently and officially marginalized'. Under erstwhile military dictators, important government

appointments went to individuals from one sector of the country – the northerners. The problem of marginalisation also existed in the realm of the provision, construction and maintenance of infrastructures (Ebelo 2000:5) There were ethnic biases in the allocation or construction of roads, electricity, etc.

The claim by various nationalities that they are being marginalised has led to a loss of faith and optimism in the Nigerian nation (Ogunmodede 2000:7). It must be noted that the issue of marginalisation is not only restricted to the agitation of those excluded or sidelined in the struggle for, or control of, political power. It is also an important factor in the quest by some groups and nationalities for greater regional or ethnic autonomy, greater control of the means to their communal security and the quest for greater economic control and empowerment within the nation. One of the most recent consequences of the long history of marginalisation, and the fundamental ethno-cultural differences existing among the various groups in Nigeria, has been the increasing demand for the initiation of a social and political process which will ensure the re-negotiation of the basis of, and the principles underlying, human social existence in Nigeria. In short, there has been a growing demand for the re-negotiation of the political entity called Nigeria. It seems that the call for the re-negotiation of the basis of Nigerian unity seems to possess some merit, because, it has been consistently argued that the only partnership that is or can be enduring, stable and viable, is one in which all participants are happy, satisfied and have a sense of belonging (*Africa Research Bulletin* 2000:13946–47).

The consistent demand by some groups for the re-negotiation of the sociopolitical entity called Nigeria is anchored in their firm belief that hitherto the prevailing structures and institutions in Nigeria have not adequately met the desires, needs and aspirations of most of the social and interest groups within the society, especially in view of the individuals desire for happiness, peace, justice and security. The state and society can deliberately or inadvertently create a crisis when it intervenes in social conflicts, in order to create security for some , and insecurity for others. In response to the demand for the restructuring of the Nigerian nation, the Obasanjo regime created a constitutional committee to examine the conditions for the amendment of the constitution so as to make it conform to the aspirations and yearnings of the diverse interests in the country. This strategy which seems commendable, cannot as yet provide the quality of sustained and fundamental social transformation needed to rectify the Nigerian situation.

Envisioning national unity and positive social transformation in Nigeria

Willie (1975:11–13) holds that there is a need to devise a way of building an effective power base to foster social change. Effective social systems endure the tension between the need for unity and marginality. The above view implies that marginality can sometimes yield good results. For instance, it can lead people to seek new and creative forms of emancipation. It can also make people to work harder at self-actualisation and accomplishment in life. But despite these laudable goals, can we rightly say that marginalisation has received its justification or certification? Does the fact that marginality can make people work harder, justify its application by a society or government? In fact we can ask whether it is moral to marginalise people. But then this very question is in need of clarification. If we ask whether marginalisation is morally good, we seek to know whether the motives underlying it, or consequences it yields, are good or acceptable. If they are, how many are satisfied by this agenda? More importantly, can we say that marginality is good to the extent that it prevents harm to those in society? Or it is good to the extent that it fosters social cohesion and mutual respect? Does it promote the dignity and integrity of man, as a being deserving of respect and capable of making a contribution to society? These are questions that need to be answered, if the task of national unity is to be realised in a systematic and focused way.

However, there are other types of questions that can arise from a moral evaluation of marginality. If it is the case that marginal people need to transcend the limits of marginality, then the question is: how will this transition be made? Is it through violence, which begets hate, death and destruction? Or will social transformation be achieved by peaceful means, befitting humans imbued with responsibility and dignity? To put it more theoretically, how can we balance the desire to reach our goals, in relation to the means that will be adopted? How can we avoid the contradictions that can arise when the cause is as invidious as the effect, or when the cure is as terrible as the disease? Jinadu (1980:66–67) says that liberation from restraint or bondage, aims at removing certain physical or non-physical impediments that obstruct the realisation of one's potentialities as a morally autonomous agent. One cannot be completely free if one does not consciously or deliberately act to make good the opportunities and possibilities open to one. And in overcoming the overbearing phenomenon of marginalisation, 'people must commit themselves to the quest for freedom and dignity' (Puckrein 1993:2).

According to Thoraton-Hencke (1989:14) there is a need to establish a country predicated on liberty, equality, opportunity and justice for everyone. For Nolutshungu (1996:290) there is a stress on a common belonging, asserting both a potential universality of membership and an individuation of persons. The importance of shared outlooks and values cannot be over emphasised. With reference to the democratic order, tolerance and the appreciation of difference is necessary. The solution to the national crisis confronting the Nigerian nation-state consists in the promotion of a sense of belonging among the various groups. There is a need for the exercise of mutual interdependence between the northern and southern regions. In resolving the national question we must confront the challenge of faithfully applying the principles of genuine federalism, which itself cannot be possible unless there is an understanding of the principles of morality and social order and how these prevent marginalisation. The attempts to redefine the Nigerian state must take into consideration the re-creation of the people's confidence and faith in the ability of the national government to protect and secure citizens. There must be adequate and effective machineries for sustaining social dialogue, tolerance, good governance, respect for human life, and human rights. The moral basis of such social transformation depends on the discussion between various components of the Nigerian state on how to relate with each other in peace and cooperation as the essential ingredients of national unity. Enduring national reconciliation can be achieved only through social justice, seen when certain groups can live in the society without fear of discrimination, occasioned by their ethnic origin or religious creed. There is a need to devise public policies that enhance social solidarity and economic management consistent with the redistribution of wealth such that the adequate welfare of the majority of citizens can be more effectively guaranteed.

Finally, the great challenge before Nigerian society will continue to be how to make this society more organised, humane and progressive. In this context social policies must conform with the nation's obligations to its citizens, and vice versa. As Obasanjo (1999:8) put it, the 'responsibilities of citizenship in Nigeria, compel us to create and sustain a community in which the well-being of all depends upon the collective thrust towards a common goal, and the obedience to the laws intended to guarantee security, peace, justice equity and accountability'. But then there is a need to move beyond the paying of mere lip-service to the need for change and to emphasise those ideals and structures that can adequately mitigate the problem of marginalisation in the social order. This essay has tried to do the latter from an analytical viewpoint.

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Globalisation and Industrial Performance in Nigeria

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Abstract

This paper examines the impact of the neo-liberal globalisation of African economies on industrial performance in Nigeria. Evidence from the study indicates that, contrary to claims by the World Bank, the economic performance of firms in the manufacturing sector during the globalisation period in the study was adversely affected by the process. The study confirms the position that the globalisation project that aims at the structural economic transformation of modern capitalist relations in Africa is associated with a process of de-industrialisation. On the basis of conclusions from the study, the author highlights critical lessons for African countries – the need to be critical in the implementation of the IMF/World Bank open-economy, and the 'hands off' market-driven, non-interventionist development model premised on Adams Smith's 'invisible hand'.

Résumé

Cet article étudie l'impact de la mondialisation néo-libérale des économies africaines sur la production industrielle au Nigeria. Les preuves récoltées de cette étude indiquent que contrairement aux affirmations de la Banque Mondiale, les résultats économiques des entreprises du secteur manufacturier ont été sévèrement affectés par le processus de mondialisation. Cette étude confirme la thèse selon laquelle, le projet de mondialisation qui tente de procéder à une transformation économique structurelle des relations capitalistes modernes en Afrique, est associé à un processus de désindustrialisation. Sur la base des conclusions tirées de cette étude, l'auteur souligne les enseignements majeurs que doivent en tirer les pays africains : le besoin d'avoir une approche plus critique envers l'application de l'économie ouverte préconisée par la Banque Mondiale/ le FMI, envers le modèle de développement non interventionniste, orienté vers le marché, et basé sur le concept de « la main invisible » développé par Adam Smith.

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Introduction and background to study

Globalisation remains one of the most controversial subjects of our time. Several authors have critically examined its varied usages and ideological applications (Spybee 1996; Hoogvelt 1997; Kiely and Marflet 1998; Culpeper 1997; Went 2000; Woods 2000; Mshomba 2000; Scholte 2000). According to Giddens (1990:64), globalisation can be defined as 'the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa'. Irrespective of the on-going controversy and a measure of ambiguity in its use, it often depicts 'the transformation of the relations between states, institutions, group and individuals; the universalization of certain practices, identities and structures, and perhaps, more significantly, the expression of a global restructuring that has occurred in recent decades in the structure of modern capitalist relations' (Aina 1997:8). It is best understood as concerned with 'the intersection of presence and absence, the interlacing of social events and social relations "at a distance" with local contextualities' (Giddens 1991). In line with this, the paper examines the impact of economic (neo-liberal) globalisation on industrial performance within the African context using Nigeria as an example.

Although the influence of the international community permeates contemporary social relations this trend is not entirely new. Globalisation began through an endless series of economic transactions, which linked Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. The trade in slaves from West Africa and the profits made from it boosted the industrialisation of Britain and the European industrial revolution in general. Between 1870 and 1914 the world economy knitted together in a way that had previously been inconceivable. (Theobald 1994; Worsley 1994). This marked the beginning of unequal relations between Africa and Europe based on a Euro-centric economic division of labour that served to benefit the industrialised world. It was made possible only by the European powers arrogating to themselves, through conquests and colonisation, vast areas of the world's surface. Current globalisation therefore, does not reflect a clear break from the past. Perhaps it is the intensity of interpenetration - in qualitative rather than quantitative terms - that may justify current notions of globalisation. At the economic level the ascendancy of neo-liberalism with its emphasis on the market economy as a global economic doctrine was ideologically promoted in the 1980s through the World Bank/IMF inspired programmes.

Went (2000) reflects these in the observation that the term 'globalization' is abused in at least three ways. First in its use by international organisations such as IMF, World Bank and G7 to control and restrict the

policy making abilities of governments especially in developing countries and imposing their own agenda symbolised by the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Second, the use of the concept for the justification of unpopular policies in developing countries. Third, in the employment of globalisation for justifying the increasing acquisition of power by international political and economic organisations such as the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). As part of economic globalisation, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) with its market orientation is presented as inevitable and having no alternative (Olukoshi 1998). 'As a rule, globalization is portrayed as unavoidable and irreversible process which is rolling over us as some major natural phenomenon and drastically reshaping our lives' (Went 2000:5).

The current wave of globalisation can be viewed as a desperate bid by international capitalism to recover lost grounds due to ideological shifts towards alternative paradigms which African countries adopted since independence – especially with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unchallenged hegemony of capitalism and neo-liberal ideology (Sawyerr 1998). This bid was facilitated by the debt crisis experienced by African countries since the 1980s that was hijacked by the Euro-American mentored institutions – especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to facilitate their globalisation of neo-liberalism. The result has been the structural transformation of African economies through the imposition of Structural Adjustment Programmes – which entail the introduction of rapid structural changes in the economy in favour of market relations (Loxley1995).

From the viewpoint of the IMF, the economic crisis in Nigeria is a product of structural distortions in the economy due to overvalued exchange rates, import regulation, huge public sector expenditure, poor investment management and low returns on capital, high wage structure and low productivity of workers, import substitution industrialisation and its policy environment, over-extended inefficient and unproductive public enterprises, and their undue protection by government, and discriminatory credit policies against the private sector. (Onimode 1989; Olukoshi 1995; Beckman 1990; Adesina 1991, 1994; Aina 1997; Zeleza 1997). The underlying argument by the IMF/World Bank is that economic growth became blocked by the presence of unsustainable imbalances in the national economy between aggregate demand and aggregate supply with the result that imbalances caused growing deficits in the balance of payments, high rates of domestic inflation and huge and growing public sector deficits.

Solutions to the problems were, therefore, conceived through short term economic stabilisation programmes involving a sharp restriction of domestic demand through monetary and fiscal measures, and longer term adjustment instruments entailing the application of supply side policies to promote the production of exports and import substitutes – some of which employ exchange rate instruments and the reduction of tariffs and subsidies (Loxley 1995). Generally, these instruments involve policy elements that emphasise neo-liberal (monetarist) economic policies – the role of market forces, the rolling back of the state (non-state intervention), private enterprise economy, trade liberalisation, devaluation of local currency and at the political sphere, liberal-plural democracy. At the root of these is the objective of increasing the production and prices of tradable goods and services relative to the non-tradable ones – to enhance incentives for the production of the former relative to the latter (Bruno 1976; Corden 1977).

The economic restructuring project was, therefore, a major component of the globalisation process introduced to Africa in the form of structural economic reforms known variously as economic stabilisation programmes, economic adjustment policies, economic reform programmes or structural adjustment programmes. Structural adjustment and global integration are interdependent and mutually reinforcing (Aina 1997). While globalisation gave birth to structural adjustment as the countries involved responded to the global economic crisis, the adoption of IMF/World Bank reform measures has in turn widened and deepened the thrust towards global integration. As a result, the main policy changes demanded by the IMF in its financial negotiation with Nigeria relate to three broad areas – cuts in public expenditure, transformation of the structure and operational efficiency of the economy and the liberalisation of fiscal and trade policies (Onimode 1989; Olukoshi 1990, 1998).

While economic stabilisation policies were put in place from the late 1970s, the formal adoption of the economic globalisation in Nigeria began with the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in July, 1986 by the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida. The Programme has tended to favour the advanced capitalist countries rather than the debtor African Countries. George (1992) has observed that from the onset of the debt crisis in 1982 through 1990 each and every month, for 108 months, debtor countries of the South remitted to their creditors in the North an average of six billion, five hundred million dollars in interest payment alone. If payment of principal is included in the tally then each of the 108 months witnessed payments from debtors to creditors averaging twelve billion, four hundred and fifty million dollars. According to Harris (1989:19),

'The overriding agenda of the Fund and Bank is the construction, regulation and support of a world system where multinational corporations trade and move capital without restrictions from nation states'. This globalising objective of multilaterism and 'free trade' which the United States has been promoting since World War II, is deeply and fundamentally rooted in the structure and operation of the Bretton Woods Institutions. After several years of implementing the programme Babangida declared that the Nigerian economy had become a capitalist one – representing an ideological shift from the hitherto 'mixed economy' reflected in the First National Development Plan (1962–1968).

The immediate effects of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1982 enacted by the Shagari administration were the shortage of foreign exchange and the scarcity of imported raw materials and spare parts for industrial production. These were followed by a fall in the utilisation of installed capacity of most industrial enterprises. Olukoshi (1989) records that with capacity utilisation ranging between 20 percent to 40 percent in the industrial sector, about 101 companies surveyed by the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria had shut down for periods of between 7 and 12 weeks by July 31, 1983, with about 200,000 workers laid off.

This paper examines the impact of the globalising economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s on Nigeria's industrial performance – with particular reference to the Food, Beverage and Tobacco sub-sector located in the manufacturing sector of the Nigerian economy. The Food, Beverage and Tobacco sub-sector was selected for this study first because it is one that experienced the collapse of import substitution industrialisation in Nigeria. Remarkably, the organisations in the sector represent different pulses of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) implemented in Nigeria, reflected in its uneven impact. The paper also discusses the coping strategies employed by the participants in the industry in dealing with the challenges of globalisation while arguing that economic globalisation has not favoured the Nigerian economy. Instead it has thrown up complex and intractable industrial problems associated with 'de-industrialisation'.

Given the profit orientation of the organisations, profitability is the major criterion that will be used in assessing their economic performance. The analysis will be carried out first on the basis of nominal naira values, and then in terms of profit margins, returns on turnover and real values of the naira as the case may be.

Moreover, although the entire period examined involved the adoption of various shades of economic globalisation (economic stabilisation policies initiated by the creditor institutions and later adjustment policies), com-

parative analysis of the pre-SAP and SAP periods will be undertaken wherever data are available, to capture the specific effects of the formal introduction of globalisation in 1986. The pre-SAP period is taken to be 1981–85, while the SAP period is taken from 1986 when SAP was formally adopted in Nigeria.

Furthermore, the Radical Organisation Theory outlined by Burrel and Morgan (1979) will be used as the framework of analysis, given its unifying themes of totality, structure, contradiction and crisis. This framework was selected because of its usefulness for explaining the relationships between the economic crisis and macro socio-economic elements of globalisation, on the one hand, and the structures of the industry and firms in the study, on the other. It is also useful in the analysis of the contradictions responsible for the economic crisis, those thrown up by the globalisation programme - reflected in the organisations, as well as the coping strategies employed by organisational participants.

The Pre-SAP period: Crisis, contradiction and structure

In the pre-SAP (stabilisation) period, the crisis experienced in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry was largely part of the wider crisis of capitalist development in Nigeria – which sharpened with the global economic crisis. Its specific manifestation in the industry was reflected in the overall decline in the industry's total turnover from N2,530 million in 1982, to N2,189 million in 1985 – irrespective of an approximately 38 percent increase in the number of companies in the industry, in the period indicated in Table 1. The decline in turnover is a reflection of the production problems that confronted the industry during the economic crisis. As a result of acute raw material problems that confronted the industry at this period, the utilisation of installed capacity in the industry was as low as 10.12 percent by June 1985.

As pointed out earlier, the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry experienced expansion in the pre-SAP era with the growth in the membership of AFBTE – from 56 in 1982 to 77 in 1985, as shown in Table 1. This was however, accompanied by a decline in the workforce within the period from 53,160 and 56,470 in 1982 and 1983 respectively to 42,154 in 1985. These figures reflect the job losses that accompanied globalisation pressures arising from the earlier mentioned crisis. Coping strategies took the form of rationalisation - retrenchment of workers, novel shift work, cuts in wages, compulsory leave, and compulsory overtime work without extra pay. While the former reduced the number of workers, the later ensured that the lean workforce put in longer hours to cover the entire jobs - as

part of their contribution to the survival of the enterprise. This state of affairs also adversely affected the trade union in the industry - the Nigerian Union of Food, Beverage and Tobacco, Employees (NUFBTE), which suffered contraction in union density and funds due to its loss of more than 50,000 members in the pre-SAP period (NUFBTE Records 1990).

Many of the contradictions encountered in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco (FBT) industry were related to the import substitution industrialisation that characterised the industry. These include capital intensive production in the light of abundant labour, and high dependence on imported raw materials and spare parts to the neglect of the local ones which were left unexploited.

Moreover, national level stabilisation policies of the pre-SAP era in the form of austerity measures aimed at reducing the cost of production, improving turnover and profits and ensuring the survival of the organisations, generated contradictions. The wage freeze, retrenchment of workers, redundancies and pay cuts reduced the disposable income of consumers and led to consumer resistance, stockpiles of unsold goods, and further declines in turnover and profits. The nature of goods produced in the industry (especially beer, soft drinks and cigarettes), which were 'non-essential' to consumers also made them susceptible to consumer resistance. The effect of this trend is more prominent in the factor price analysis below, which accounts for the effects of the depreciation of the naira.

The foregoing indicates that the economic crisis at the national level and the consequent macro-economic policies of the pre-SAP era, especially the stabilisation measures of 1982, had an overall negative effect on the Food, Beverage and Tobacco sub-sector.

The SAP-Globalisation period: Crisis, contradiction and Structure

With the formal introduction of globalisation as embodied in the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in July 1986, and the scrapping of the import license system, there was a slight improvement in economic activities. Capacity utilisation in the manufacturing sector in the period 1987–89 rose slightly to an average of 32 percent from the pre-SAP level of 30 percent. (MAN Report 1987–89). Partly responsible for this development was the replacement of the import license system of the pre-SAP period with the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM). The latter operated generally on the principle of 'ability to pay'.

In the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry, capacity utilisation fluctuated within the range of 30 percent to 45 percent in the period 1986-

Table 1: Performance of the food, beverage and tobacco industry 1982–1992

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
1. Number of Companies	56	67	70	77	80	75	77	73	73	71	69
2. Number of Employees	53,160	56,470	53,526	42,154	41,150	37,052	42,830	42,703	39,924	40,216	42,669
3. Turnover (Nmillion)	2,530	2,515	2,578	2,189	2,233	2,688	4,625	6,507	8,592	9,651	16,748
4. Profit before tax (Nmillion)	N/A	N/A	N/A	362	362	322	539	995	1,143	1,469	2,300
5. Return on turnover (%)(43)	N/A	N/A	N/A	16.5	14.6	12.0	11.6	15.30	13.30	15.2	13.73

* *N/A:* Not Available.

Source: Compiled from AFBTE Annual Reports.

1989. By the first half of 1991, however, the utilisation of installed capacity in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry was lower than that of the manufacturing sector as a whole. This stood at about 28.5 percent – lower than the immediate pre-SAP level of 30 percent in the manufacturing sector (AFBTE 1992/93:6). The general picture that emerges from the manufacturing sector and the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry is that since the economic crisis and adjustment, utilisation of installed capacity either before or during globalisation rarely attained 50 percent in the period 1982–1991.

Low capacity utilisation notwithstanding, turnover and profits in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry showed an upward trend in the SAP period – indicated in Tables 2 a and b.

Further analysis of the performance of NBL – the most impressive firm in the industry – will be more illuminating. The financial summary of the firm as shown in Table 3 is very impressive, especially in the second half of the SAP era. When viewed beyond mere percentage increases from preceding years, it becomes even more impressive. In 1986 for instance, NBL's profit before tax was about N45 million. In 1989, it rose to about N227 million. This represents about a 400 percent increase, within the first four years of globalisation. By 1991 it had risen to N422 million – about a 875 percent increase within the period 1986-91. The immediate four-year period prior to globalisation on the other hand recorded about a 29 percent decline in profit before tax.

In comparison with other firms in the industry and other sectors of the economy, NBL emerged top of the beer sub-sector and the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry in 1989. Beyond the industry and sectoral levels, it was ranked first of the top 100 companies in Nigeria, listed according to profits before taxation in 1989. This achievement was irrespective of the slump experienced in the beer/stout sub-sector of the industry in that year (NBL 1989; *This Week* 1989; AFBTE 1990). This performance portrays NBL as one of the most viable firms in Nigeria during globalisation.

The implication of the above picture is that the globalisation policies of the SAP period have been successful in dealing with the economic crisis that faced the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry in the pre-SAP period. This impression may be misleading considering another set of crises that accompanied the implementation of the programme. These included the devaluation of the naira and a high rate of inflation, high cost of production and high ex-factory prices of commodities, consumer resistance and unanticipated high stockpiles of unsold commodities in the firms. The effects of these factors on organisational performance will be evaluated

Table 2a: Sales turnover and profit performance by firms in the food, beverage, and tobacco industry, 1985–1987 (N'000)

Firms	1985		1986		1987	
	Turnover	Profit before tax	Turnover	Profit before tax	Turnover	Profit before tax
1. Nigerian Breweries	179.109	41.566	205.476	45.387	341.047	75.774
2. Guinness Nig.	258.214	68.439	268.052	60.095	307.839	40.120
3. Foremost Breweries	10.202	1.857	9.116	1.033	9.861	0.366
4. Premier Breweries	59.032	8.559	48.877	4.098	48.587	3.191
5. Food Specialties Nig.	102.265	21.832	96.159	23.410	166.497	51.218
6. Northern Flour Mills	103.999	13.842	92.830	11.504	59.366	15.106
7. Coca-Cola	204.922	41.953	309.330	86.474	354.098	59.477
8. Cadbury Nigeria	112.746	17.139	122.249	12.773	125.631	11.135
9. Nigerian Tobacco	89.365	24.118	107.458	31.348	133.627	42.900

Source: MAN Reports 1987–89 and NBL Annual Reports.

Table 2b: Sales trunorver and profit performance by firms in the food, beverage, and tobacco industry, 1988–1989(N'000)

Firms	1988		1989	
	Turnover	Profit before tax	Turnover	Profit before tax
1. Nigerian Breweries	514.992	138.431	811.050	227.040
2. Guinness Nig.	478.600	76.506	1.001.894	162.185
3. Foremost Breweries	10.245	1.933	NA	NA
4. Premier Breweries	56.260	1.465	80.50	10.118
5. Food Specialties Nig.	239.076	42.331	NA	NA
6. Northern Flour Mills	48.485	11.485	18.408	2.189
7. Coca-Cola	526.772	63.121	753.013	77.711
8. Cadbury Nigeria	213.268	16.205	337.012	19.179
9. Nigerian Tobacco	190.475	59.931	295.766	121.322

Source: MAN Reports 1987–89 and NBL Annual Reports.

Table 3: NBL financial summary 1982–1991 in nominal naira values (N'000)

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
1. Net Proceeds of Sales	175,301	230,641	234,536	125,326	148,552	272,075	412,399	609,419	887,909	1,275,422
2. Profits before Taxation	53,887	95,652	104,158	41,566	45,387	75,774	138,431	227,040	274,562	422,501
3. Profits after taxation	30,387	49,402	55,368	26,544	27,567	48,651	78,037	124,982	145,369	247,560
4. Shareholders' Fund	18,038	29,574	159,106	161,869	172,848	192,333	207,940	547,774	951,947	1,248,530

Source: Compiled from NBL Annual Report 1982 to 1991.

with further analyses on production levels, profit margins, commodity price adjustment, returns on turnover and the base year factor cost analysis below.

Table 4 gives an indication of the effects of inflation on cost of production and the consequent adjustments in ex-factory prices of products in the manufacturing sector.

Table 4: Percentage increases in average unit cost of production and Ex-Factory Prices in the manufacturing sector 1987–89

	Average unit cost of Production			Average Ex-factory Price		
	1987	1988	1989	1987	1988	1989
Food Beverage and Tobacco Industry	32.95	24.42	70.93	28.64	22.95	59.65
Manufacturing Sector Average	50.14	54.23	76.88	46.67	49.32	62.70

Source: MAN Reports 1987–1989.

Percentage increases in average unit cost of production for the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry for instance, rose from 33 percent in 1987 (in comparison with the preceding year) to 71 percent in 1989. The increase in average ex-factory prices similarly rose from 29 percent to 60 percent within the same period. The figures for the manufacturing sector are similarly high. Average unit cost of production rose from 50 percent in 1987 to 77 percent in 1989. Average ex-factory prices also rose from 47 percent in 1987 to 63 percent in 1989. These, rather than globalisation policies, largely accounted for the increases in turnover and profits in Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry irrespective of low capacity utilisation.

The high inflation estimated by AFBTE to have risen by about 46 percent in 1992 generally followed from the depreciation of the naira, high interest rates (estimated at 34 percent in 1991 and 65 percent in 1992) and the consequent low exchange rate of the local currency to major international currencies in the globalisation period. In 1982 for instance, the naira exchanged for less than US$0.7, and throughout the pre-SAP period exchanged for less than $1.00. With the formal introduction of globalisation

in 1986, the official exchange rate of the naira to the US$1.00 rose to N1.7. It exceeded N8.00 in 1990 and more than N20.00 by the end of 1992. In the second half of 1993, the official exchange rate of the naira to the US$1.00 was approximately N30.00 (but was fixed at N22.00 by the General Sanni Abacha administration in January 1994). Table 5 shows the rate of appreciation of the dollar and the pound sterling against the naira between 1970 and 1992. In the absence of current data on increase in the unit cost of production and ex-factory prices for the industry, the above picture suggests that between 1989 and 1992, such increase would have been more than 100 percent – using the exchange rate as the basis for estimation.

One of the factors responsible for the high rate of inflation that accompanied the depreciation of the naira since the globalisation exercise is the import dependent nature of the industries in Nigeria. This is the product of the import substitution industrialisation of the 1970s. The limited amount of foreign currencies under SFEM, and the operation of the market, based on ability to pay, exacerbated the crisis of inflation in the SAP period. The problem was worsened by poor monitoring of the activities of the banks and financial institutions by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), and the corruption associated with the operation, which was to create the opportunity for the abrogation of the SFEM by the Federal government in March 1992. The cumulative effects on the cost of living led to consumer resistance and high stock of unplanned inventories in the manufacturing sector.

Tables 4 and 6, for instance, show that average unit cost of production for the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry rose by about 128 percent within the three-year period of globalisation (1987–89), while average ex-factory price rose by 111 percent within the same period. Sales turnover also increased by 100 percent from 1987 to 1989, while unplanned inventories of unsold products rose astronomically by 361 percent within the same period. In 1987 for instance, 31 companies had about N70 million worth or unsold stock in their warehouses (*Business Concord* 7 July 1987). Of 101 respondent firms surveyed on output by the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) in 1992, 49 reported the occurrence of unplanned inventory build up amounting to N780.93 million in the first six months of 1992. The inventory accumulation represents 9.6 percent of the total nominal output of the 101 respondent firms amounting to N8, 064.36 million or 19.16 percent of N4, 074.91 million produced by the 49 companies (MAN Report 1992). Even though the performance of the firms indicated remarkable increases in nominal production from N12.928 billion in January–June 1994 to N16,319 billion in July–December showing an

Table 5: Naira Exchange Rates 1970–1992

Year	Dollar	Pound Sterling
1970	0.7142	1.7114
1971	0.6944	1.7156
1972	0.6579	1.6289
1973	0.6579	1.6289
1974	0.6293	1.4795
1975	0.6158	1.3618
1976	0.6266	1.1317
1977	0.6466	1.1671
1978	0.6351	1.2238
1979	0.6027	1.2628
1980	0.5469	1.2647
1981	0.6052	1.2495
1982	0.6731	1.1734
1983	0.7506	1.1216
1984	0.7672	1.0765
1985	0.8924	1.1999
1986	1.7323	2.5554
1987	3.9691.	6.5929
1988	4.5367	8.0895
1989	7.5064	11.8982
1990	8.3469	16.2419
1991	9.8702	17.4384
1992 (1st qtr)	12.4665	22.0023
1992 (2nd qtr)	18.4744	32.9411

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (1992).

increase of 26 percent, the 1994 MAN Report stated:

> Expectedly, the ravaging inflation and the consequent erosion of purchasing power exerted a depressing effect on market potential. The weak aggregate domestic demand that has been a feature of the Nigerian economy in the last nine years took a more serious dimension during the period

> under review. Of the 182 respondent companies, 62 or 34 percent across the industrial sub-sectors complained of difficulties in sales. At N1,489 billion, unplanned business inventories more than doubled the levels of N548.47 million recorded in the first half of the year (1994). Compared with N747.96 million registered in the last six months of 1993, this meant an increase of 99.2 percent. Clearly, this is a very unhealthy situation and the portents are grim for the future.

By 1995 there was no sign of improvement as unplanned business inventory of about N5.895 billion was recorded in the manufacturing sector representing an increase of 295.7 percent on the June-December 1994 figure, and about 34.3 percent of the total output in the sector.

Hence, while stockpiles of unsold products of the pre-globalisation period were caused mainly by the low disposable income of consumers, those of the globalisation period were, in addition, caused by the high inflationary rate, upward price adjustments of products by manufacturers, and the general high cost of living precipitated by the depreciation of the naira.

A remarkable feature of the employment structure in the manufacturing sector in 1994 is that virtually all its sub-sectors recorded significant declines in their workforce reflecting the slowdown in manufacturing activity. Low levels of factory operation, sales declines and the absence of investment were compelling factors for rationalisation and labour retrenchment by companies faced with rising overhead costs. In observing the continued distress of the manufacturing sector after nearly a decade of the implementation of the globalisation programme, the 1994 Report stated that the industrial production continued to stagnate as evidenced by the relative decline in capacity utilization from 37.38 percent in July-December 1991 to 36.36 percent in the period under review. Industrial recovery remained scuttled by an unhealthy business environment characterised among others by persistent depreciation and instability of exchange rate, high rates of interest and crippling inflation; inadequate protection for local industries as a result of uncritical application of trade liberalisation policy, and continued flagging consumer spending which had added to the drag on production and investment (MAN 1992).

Although manufacturing sector industrial capacity utilisation in the second half of 1995 recorded marginal improvements at 28.75 percent, from 27.74 percent recorded in the corresponding period of 1994 and 26.97 per cent in the first six months of 1995, the performance was still patently below expectations from globalisation. But that was the inevitable consequence of the unprecedented official depreciation of the naira exchange rate from N22.00 to N85.00 for US S1.00 in 1995. Hence, the upward

pressure on production inputs cost which characterised the previous years worsened, while low purchasing power continued to exert a depressing effect on sales, further accentuating the low level of capacity utilisation and labour shedding (MAN Report 1995). The foregoing supports the view that:

> the success or otherwise of the economic liberalization as a major cornerstone of the structural adjustment programmes implemented by developing countries is related to the behaviour of the real exchange rate. From his study of the Nigerian situation he observed that: all the measures of real effective exchange rates (REER) based on the geometrical average formula showed on the average real depreciation. The magnitude of the real depreciation was largest and most significant during the SAP period. Although the rate of inflation shot up and government fiscal operations expanded tremendously, the nominal exchange rate depreciation was large enough to counteract the inflationary and expansionary effects as to make the REER depreciate substantially. This has however, had negative effects on industrial production which has been heavily dependent on imported input. The huge nominal and real exchange rate depreciation has increased the domestic cost of imported input used for producing both tradable and non-tradable. And so the net effect of the real exchange rates depreciation has been to worsen the domestic inflationary spiral and weaken the international competitiveness of the non–oil exportables. It is hardly surprising therefore that the non-oil trade balance has not improved (Obadan 1994:72).

Obadan therefore concluded that the efficiency of real exchange rate adjustment in an input-import dependent economy like Nigeria was in serious doubt and pointed out the need for caution in relying on real exchange rate changes to achieve external balance without re-directing the production structure away from imported input in a significant manner (Obadan 1994). Similar observations were made by Edwards (1989), Ogwuma (1996) and Ajakaiye (1997).

Closely related to the above crisis is the cost of raw materials - imported and local. While the depreciation of the naira affected the cost of imported raw materials directly, it had a similar effect on local raw materials, albeit indirectly. This is because producers of local raw materials also depend on imported machinery and spare parts for their production. Moreover, they depend on products from imported raw materials for their existence. They, therefore, rationally increase the prices of their own goods (locally produced) to enable them purchase the imported ones. These are some of the internal dynamics of the Nigerian economy that are not reflected in the IMF/Bank diagnosis of the Nigerian crisis.

Table 6: Percentage increases in ex-factory price, sales turnover, and unplanned inventories in the manufacturing sector 1987–89

	Percentage increase in average ex-factory price			Sales turnover N'000			Percentage increase		Unplanned inventories of unsold products N'000			Percentage increase	
				(1)	(2)	(3)	B/W	B/W	(4)	(5)	(6)	B/W	B/W
	1987	1988	1989	1987	1988	1989	1 and 2	2 and 3	1987	1988	1989	4 and 5	5 and 6
FBT Industry	28.64	22.95	59.65	1,012.5	1,478.2	2,287.6	46.00	54.80	2.9	4.8	19.4	63.5	298.4
Manufacturing Sector Average	46.6	49.3	62.7	6,875.6	9,577.9	14,547.5	39.30	51.89	45.0	81.3	235.4	80.5	189.4

Source: Compiled From MAN Reports 1987–1989.

Table 7 shows that the cost of imported raw materials for the manufacturing sector rose by 222 percent between 1986 and 1989, with a similar 230 percent rise for the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry within the same period. Comparable figures for the average cost of local raw materials come to about 208 percent for the manufacturing sector, and a staggering 633 percent for the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry. While the average cost of local raw materials for the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry increased by about 76 percent in 1987, it escalated to about 291 percent in 1988, and remained as high as 266 percent in 1989. With the value of the naira depreciating by about 200 percent between 1989 and 1993, the average cost of raw materials can be estimated to have increased by a similar margin.

From Table 4, for instance, it is clear that while the percentage increase in the average unit cost of production in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry rose by about 128 percent from 1987 to 1989, the percentage increase in average ex-factory prices rose by only 111 percent. The difference is even expected to be higher from 1992 when the naira was devalued more than 20 times compared with the pre-SAP values. Increases in production and ex-factory prices were however accompanied by aggressive product sales promotions aimed at minimising consumer resistance (AFBTE 1992/93:7).

Table 7: Percentage increase in average cost of imported and local raw materials in the food, beverage and tobacco industry 1987–1989, with manufacturing sector averages

	1987	1988	1989
1. Percentage increase in average cost of imported raw materials in the FBT industry	109.1	70.48	50.69
2. Manufacturing Sector average	70.63	75.62	75.41
3. Percentage increase in average cost of locally sourced raw materials in the FBT industry	75.75	291.33	266.10
4. Manufacturing Sector average	52.68	75.22	79.93

Source: MAN Report 1987–89.

Hence the huge profits declared by firms in the SAP period of globalisation reflect more of the price adjustments due to inflation and high cost of production than real profits. The report of the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (1987–89) implies this phenomenon as it observes that the sharp rise in the cost of locally sourced raw materials was essentially a reflection of the inflationary spiral that had characterised the economy during the review period.

The above observations were made during a rosy period in the SAP era – not comparable to 1992–1993. The annual report of AFBTE for 1992/93 for instance, estimated the inflationary rate for the period to be about 46 percent, the interest rate about 65 percent from 34 percent in 1991, and interbank rates at between 100 and 200 percent (See AFBTE 1992/93:1–2). In addition, however, the high cost of local raw materials in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry in particular may be related to the high demand and competition for local sourcing of raw materials in the brewing sub-sector among others from 1988, following the Federal government's ban on imported grains. The Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry in fact, recorded the highest utilisation of local raw materials in the manufacturing sector during the globalisation period in our study. This increased from 51.07 percent in 1987 to 63.11 percent in 1989 (MAN Report 1989).

Another factor related to the local raw material sourcing and high cost of production is the problem of low technological capacity. Adaptations and modifications of plants and equipment for processing local raw materials in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry still had to depend on imports. The implication of the above analysis for the performance of the industry was highlighted by the Executive Secretary of AFBTE in the 1992/93 Annual Report of the Association when he remarked that 'in spite of the over 70 percent increase in turnover (from N9.651 million in 1991 to N16.748 billion in 1992) return on turnover fell from 15.2 percent to 13.73 percent'. As Table 8 indicates, return on turnover has been fluctuating in the globalisation period, despite the steady rise in turnover and profit before tax within the period.

The effect of the cost of production and price adjustment in the SAP period is also evident in the profit margin (ratio of pre-tax profit to sales turnover) of selected firms in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry. In contrast with the huge profit picture earlier observed in Table 2 for the firms, the economic performance of most of the firms in the industry expressed in profit margins in Table 8 indicates a downward trend. The high profits of the firms in the SAP era in Table 2, for instance, do not

reflect in the globalisation period in Table 8, when performance is expressed in profit margins.

Table 8: Profit margin in selected firms in the food, beverage, and tobacco industry 1985–1989 (%)

Firms	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Nigerian Breweries	33	31	28	34	37
Guinness Nig.	26	22	13	15	16
Foremost Dairies Nig.	18	(NPM)		3	(NPM)

A more realistic picture of the economic performance of firms in the SAP era further emerges with the 1982 base year factor cost analysis for organisations presented in Table 9. This involves expressing the 10 years financial summaries of the firms in the SAP period in their respective pre-SAP values. It therefore accounts for the depreciation in the value of the naira, and reflects the economic performance of the organisations in real terms. We will do this once again by using the most impressive firm in the industry on the basis of which we may generalise.

From Table 9, it is observed that for NBL, profit before tax rose steadily in the pre-globalisation years until 1985 – at the peak of the raw material crisis in NBL and the FBT industry, when it recorded a fall of about 68 percent. The fall in profit before tax continued through the SAP period until 1988 when local raw material sourcing was largely achieved. Hence, profit before tax rose by more than 65 percent in 1988, from about N12 million in 1987 to about N20 million in 1988. The increase continued marginally up to 1991.

More significantly, Table 9 indicates that the average profit before tax for the four year pre-globalisation period in NBL was about N65 million, in comparison with approximately N18 million for the immediate four year period of the globalisation programme. Furthermore, the most difficult period for NBL (1985) – which recorded the poorest performance in the pre-globalisation period – was better than all the years in the globalisation period except 1991.

Table 9: Financial summary 1982–1991 at 1982 factor cost (N'000)

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Net Proceeds of Sales	175,301	206,827	205,769	94,528	57,721	46,131	61,186	55,696	74,355	95,387
Profits before taxation	53,887	86,673	91,382	31,343	17,635	12,845	20,538	20,749	22,992	31,598
Profits after taxation	30,387	44,301	48,576	20,021	10,711	13,233	11,578	11,422	12,173	18,514
Shareholders' Fund	180,038	26,520	139,591	122,091	67,161	32,616	30,851	19,526	79,717	93,376

Source: Computed from Tables 2a and b.

The analysis so far tends to confirm the argument that globalisation as expressed in the Structural Adjustment Programme could not address the industrial crisis of the previous era, but worsened it – particularly due to the massive depreciation of the naira under SAP.

The structure of the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry was affected in the globalisation era – especially in terms of industry-wide contraction or expansion. Firms in the industry at this period were pre-occupied with research into local raw materials sourcing and the problem of high costs of production. These led to structural changes in the industry that were evident in production technology, price structure and market structure – as earlier highlighted. In terms of size, the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry experienced contraction in its structure in the SAP era, from 80 companies in 1986 to 69 in 1992 as shown in Table 1 – with intermittent rises and falls. Commenting on the viability of the industry in 1992, the Executive Secretary lamented that of the 69 member companies of AFBTE, only 26 were identified as thriving on account of their after-tax profit and return on capital employed (AFBTE 1992/93). Hence SAP tends to 'de-industrialise' the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry. In the industry, the beverage sub-sector was worse hit with the survival of 25 companies in 1992 compared with 40 in 1986.

Ironically, the total number of employees in the industry according to the 1992/93 annual report increased from 41,150 in 1986 when AFBTE had 80 member companies to 42,669 in 1992 when the number of companies in the association fell to 69. This further confirms our earlier observation – that some of the surviving firms were expanding irrespective of the contraction at the FBT industry level – taking advantage of the reserve army of labour and the disparate impact of SAP even on the same sub-sectors of the economy.

The contradictions in the SAP period are related to our discussions on structure above, and emanate from the socio-economic policies of globalisation that are not compatible with the realities of the economic crisis. The devaluation of the naira against the background of the import-dependent economic structure of Nigeria is a major aspect of the contradictions. The stated motivation for devaluation was to increase the volume of exports, improve the balance of payment position and possibly attract foreign investment. In the case of Nigeria however, the economy is mainly dependent on oil exports while the production of most commodities is rarely adequate for the internal market. Oil production and exports, moreover, are subject to OPEC's regulations – which have little relevance to devaluation. In their analysis of the contradictions apparent in the implementa-

tion of neo-liberalism in peripheral states, Gwynne and Kay (2000), observed that by the uncritical integration of these economies into the global economy, the neo-liberal model had consequently made them more dependent on, and hence, vulnerable to, global economic shifts – with adverse consequences in unemployment rates, real minimum wage, real wages, welfare of the poor, and the urban informal sector.

The steep devaluation of the naira during globalisation introduced high rates of inflation, which adversely affected industrial operation – especially in the manufacturing sector (including the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry). Hence in the 1992/93 report, the AFBTE president lamented:

> Quite expectedly inter-bank rates jumped from about 50 percent in 1991/92 to between 100 and 200 percent in 1992/93. The operating environment was also characterized by a continued decline in the value of the Naira with adverse consequences on the purchasing power of the consumer. At the same time, the income of the consumer was ravaged by inflationary spiral... Manufacturers had to contend with weak demand and unimpressive turnover as a result of the erosion of the purchasing power of the consumer... Inflation is not galloping; it is zooming (AFBTE 1992/93:2,4).

According to Crotty (2000), neo-liberal globalisation evident in the spread of IMF 'austerity' programmes and the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programmes across the globe creates both chronic sluggish aggregate demand growth and chronic excess aggregate supply and these tendencies reinforce one another in a vicious circle. Chronic excess capacity in many global industries is a fact of life in the neo-liberal era. According to Business Week, 'supply outpaces demand everywhere sending prices lower, eroding corporate profit and increasing lay off' (January 25, 1999: 118). The combination of reduced aggregate demand due to lower wages rates, and increased supply due to 'coercive competition' in a global free market has led to overcapacity in world markets and low profits (Wolfson 2000). Some of these account for the reason why the benefits of globalisation are by-passing most developing countries. While the average annual growth rate of world output stood at 1.9 percent in the period 1990-1995, the corresponding figure for Africa was 1.1 percent. By 1997 when the world rate rose to 3.3 percent that of Africa stood at 2.7 percent (UNCTAD 1999). Since the 1990s, and earlier for many countries, these marginalised economies have been implementing economic policy reforms with particular reference to trade liberalisation, predicted to increase their ability to share in globalisation. But while policy barriers to trade have been reduced, other barriers evolve that constrain the capacity of the

marginalised countries to benefit from globalisation. These include the fact that liberalisation has a tendency to expose domestic firms to competition from imports long before they develop the capacity to increase efficiency and competitiveness (Morrissey and Filatotchev 2000).

Africa and neo-liberal globalisation: Some conclusions

Contrary to the claims in World Bank quarters (World Bank 1989, 1994; Zanini 1994), this study confirms the position that the globalisation programmes that aim at the structural economic transformation of modern capitalist relations in Africa, foisted on the continent by the Bretton Woods Institutions, have been associated with a process of de-industrialisation (Adesina 1991, 1994; Bangura 1991; Obi 1991; Chikhi 1991; Thomas 1995; Onyeonoru 1994). The reform programmes have not been successful. Instead they have adversely affected the industrial and economic performance of the countries (Onimode 1989; Streeten 1997; Sawyerr 1998). Rather than acknowledge this failure as a mark of the inadequacy of its globalisation project, the World Bank takes the escapist route by attributing it to such factors as poor governance, stop-go implementation syndrome (or irregularity in the taking of the adjustment 'medicine'), as well as political and bureaucratic corruption (Hussain 1995; Pleskovic and Stiglitz 1997).

A major problem with the globalisation programmes is that they were introduced into Africa as debt-settling projects rather than development programmes, and worse still, with little regard to market imperfections in the African domestic economies. The result is that the expectations from globalisation are not being realised. Economic globalisation is not so beneficial to Africa – it is on balance counter-productive (Gibbon 1990, 1995; Olukoshi 1998).

The conclusions from this study, for instance, show that the adverse economic performance of the manufacturing sector in general and the food, beverage and tobacco sub-sector in particular that became evident in Nigeria in the early 1980s was not substantially modified by the globalisation structures introduced by the Structural Adjustment Programme in 1986 – contrary to the predictions of the advocates. Instead there were tendencies towards de-industrialisation that have continued unabated. This applies to our analyses both at the firm, industry and sectoral levels and confirms conclusions from similar studies elsewhere. According to Thomas (1995:13), 'labour market research in Africa shows dramatic falls in real wages for a workforce which is shrinking rapidly due to the privatization of public enterprises as well as actual de-industrialization'.

In particular, the real naira value analysis of the net proceeds of sales and profit before taxation of the most viable firm in the FBT industry during the globalisation period, suggests that the industry performed better in the pre-globalisation period. Given the fact that the firm in question (Nigeria Breweries Plc) was one of the most highly rated firms in terms of economic performance under the globalisation process in Nigeria, firms not so highly rated would not have performed as well. This picture may, therefore, reflect the broader economic scenario - the overall poor performance of firms, and the extent of de-industrialisation, as a result of the pressures of globalisation.

Part of our observation is that the huge profits declared by firms in the globalisation period in our study were cosmetic and do not represent a brilliant industrial performance. The real picture emerges with the analysis of performance based on base year factor costs that approximated the real naira values. The globalisation process anchored on the structural adjustment programme, therefore, has not favoured the economic performance of the food, beverage and tobacco industry in Nigeria - and by inference, the industrial sector in general.

The foregoing conclusions have noteworthy policy implications, especially when viewed from the perspective of the high economic performance of the East Asian countries. There is now abundant evidence that the economic reforms that led to the celebrated economic 'miracles' of this zone were in many ways remarkably different from the typical IMF/ World Bank open-economy, market-driven, non-interventionist model premised on Adams Smith's 'invisible hand' which emphasises the rolling back of the state and reduced social spending. Instead, the East Asian countries employed a purposively strong interventionist approach to the labour market rather than the wholesale market determined model. Governments of these high growth adjusters provided implicit and explicit subsidies to strategic industries, undertook the promotion of high-wage skill-intensive development strategies, especially in the medium phase of adjustment with performance based reward structures which provided strong growth-oriented incentives and served as a basis for awarding government subsidies (Loxley 1995; Stiglitz 1996; Ito 1997).

Moreover, East Asian Countries diversified their economies in favour of the production of manufactured export goods with economic management sharply different from that characteristic of African countries' structural adjustment. The former embodied export-led growth secured by a system of domestic incentives in combination with degrees of trade liberalisation and social spending (Demery and Squire 1996). The achieve-

ment of the high-growth East Asian state-guided model is remarkable irrespective of the financial crisis that followed. Lessons abound not only from an exceptionally successful alternative development model of the past two decades (Crotty 2000), but also from its flaws. The financial crisis for instance is traceable among other things to an under-regulated financial environment – the adoption of premature financial liberalisation without adequate safeguards (Onis and Aysan (2000). Most importantly, contrary to the conventional wisdom, far from revealing a 'hands off' market determined approach, government in the high growth adjusting countries deliberately promoted both low wage labour-intensive and high wage skill-intensive development strategies at different times (Loxley 1995:18).

A major problem with the globalisation process in Africa is that many of the programmes being implemented derive from the agenda of the international financial institutions rather than from the voluntary policies of the adjusting countries - whose interests the programmes do not reflect. This underscores the observation that the expression of globalisation in terms of deregulation and liberalisation of African economies has been achieved not through the self-propelling activities of market forces and the persuasive power of the rationality of the market but rather through the powers of compulsion and pressure available to international creditors and financial institutions (Aina 1997:68).

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Gender, Globalisation and Marginalisation in Africa

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Abstract

Globalisation is discussed as an all-encompassing historical process of change that has been with humanity for generations. Yet, it is a system of domination and disempowerment which impacts social groups differently and some detrimentally. Globalisation is altering gender relations in societies as well as distancing people from the very cultural resources within their societies. In the latter sense, globalisation deepens dependency in all its facets. The paper's main objective is to demonstrate how globalisation is producing marginalisation between gender groups. In its recent ramification, globalisation is portrayed as liberalisation of the economy (structural adjustment programmes) and of politics (democratisation). But men and women differ in their responses to globalisation and in the strategies that are being employed to smuggle gender-specific agendas into the state arena. As its methodology, the paper employs content analysis, observation, and personal interview to enrich the analysis. The paper, in its conclusion, cautions against an undiscriminatory consumption of the products (whether material or immaterial) of globalisation. It also describes the forms of resistance women have deployed in the face of globalisation.

Résumé

La mondialisation est ici considérée comme un processus historique et global de changement, présent au sein de l'humanité depuis des générations. Il s'agit d'un système e domination et de dés-autonomisation qui agit différemment sur les groupes sociaux. En effet, la mondialisation transforme les relations de genre au sein de la société, et éloigne les individus des ressources culturelles de leur société. Dans ce sens, ce phénomène accentue la dépendance sous toutes ses formes. L'objectif principal de cette présentation est de montrer comment la mondialisation produit u ne certaine forme de marginalisation entre les genres. Une des récentes ramifications de ce phénomène est la libéralisation de l'économie (programmes d'ajustement structurel) et de la politique (démocratisation). Les hommes et les femmes ont des réactions différentes envers la mondialisation ; ces derniers déploient également des stratégies différentes de dissimulation de programmes de genre spécifiques, au niveau de l'état. En

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guise de méthodologie, cet article utilise l'analyse de contenu, la méthode de l'observation, ainsi que les interviews personnels, afin d'enrichir l'analyse effectuée. Dans sa conclusion, cette contribution met en garde le lecteur contre une consommation discriminatoire des produits (matériels ou immatériels) de la mondialisation. Elle décrit également les différentes formes de résistance à ce phénomène, déployées par les femmes.

Introduction: Globalisation through the ages

The plethora of literature that is being churned out from the Internet, books, research articles in journals and discussions in the media on the concept of globalisation has the tendency not only to mystify it but to obfuscate the fact that this process has been happening for ages. Social change is ever taking place even though those who witness the process may not notice it. Those who observe the change process from outside may also exaggerate it.

The means by which human society is influenced by the process of social change is referred to as cultural diffusion. The imported element of any culture is not small. This is so whether we examine the material and the immaterial aspects of culture. There is no culture that is closed to influence through diffusion from other cultural systems.

With regard to America, Ogburn and Nimkoff (1958:640) observed as follows:

> Most of the social heritage of colonial America was brought here from England, Spain and other European countries. Some items of the social heritage such as the potatoes, maize, type of cooking and methods of warfare were contributed by the American Indian, though this fact is not generally known. There have been many additions to the culture since then, some of which were invented here, but most of which were imported from other countries.

Borrowing of ideas and material culture through diffusion is thus inevitable and this is largely facilitated through migration over long distances a process that has now been abridged in time because of transportation and the revolution in communication technology. Authors differ regarding their conceptualisation, analysis, cause and course of social change. Yet, whatever our orientation, the economic factor in the process of change is important. Globalisation itself is a process of economic change. But Africa's position in the world's social structure has put it at a disadvantage in loudly proclaiming its own positive impact on globalisation. The implied assumption from a survey of writings is that if it is global then the source can only be in Western Europe and North America. In rejecting the notion

that globalisation has a dual character - globalisation from above and globalisation from below – Ojo denied that Africa has contributed meaningfully to globalisation (see alfa.fdu.edu/ojo/glob.htm at page 6).

On the surface, this may seem so. However, it is more heuristic to conceive of globalisation as a dialectical process of thesis and antithesis which then produces a synthesis which later triggers the entire process again. The ways in which the consequences of globalisation are negotiated also induce modification in the process at a later stage of this phenomenon. Ironically, a one-sided view of globalisation has led many authors to overstretch the concept as an all-embracing independent variable on which every other significant change depends.

There is no consensus yet among several authors as to the starting point of globalisation nor as to its desirability or inevitability. As diverse as the authors are with regard to the recency or otherwise of this phenomenon, they all seem to agree in some respects. It is important to outline these commonalities as a means of providing a conceptual framework for the discourse of globalisation. First is that globalisation must be viewed historically. A number of authors referred to the classic work of Walter Rodney on *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Rodney himself was influenced by Marx's historical materialism. The economic infrastructure is regarded as the most important factor in change.

Marx in his three volumes of *Das Kapital* and in his other writings had analysed the global nature of capitalism and its capacity to bring the entire world under its feet and in its own image but for no other good other than the profit motive which he saw as the main driving force and capitalism's main undoing. In the holistic writings of Karl Marx, no region of the world was too far to be integrated into this system of production – even the most backward regions regardless of artificial separation. Thus the end of the bi-polar world (itself a product of globalisation) which many saw as a negation of Marx's predictions may in fact be a prelude to the final collapse of capitalism as it is creating neo-bipolarism (between the haves and the haves not) and thus between the north and the south in an unprecedented way.[1]

Secondly, a number of these authors regarded globalisation as re-positioning Africa between marginalisation and globalisation. This implies somehow that globalisation is a kind of continuum, a sort of bi-polarism with globalisation being the ultimate and desirable end. See for example Ali Mazrui's *From Slave-Ship to Space Ship: Africa Between Marginalization and Globalization* – web.africa.ufl.edu/asgd. A variant of this position was that advanced by Henriot who advocated globalisation

from below through NGOs (see sedos.org/english/global.htm). Lipumba (1999:157–218) was of the opinion that if Africa makes good use of the opportunities and challenges of globalisation then improvement will certainly not be a mirage.

A third point emanating from the appraisal of the various authors is that globalisation in its recent ramification has impoverished Africa. This position was premised on the absence of the African viewpoint in the initiation and implementation of the global change processes of structural adjustment programmes and democratisation and in the different world trade agreements that were foisted on Africa (see Nyangoro 1998:27–33). For the authors in this group, globalisation as a process of change has merely deepened Africa's dependency, and it is increasingly becoming helpless. It is in active support of this position that a group, (outside Africa) the anti-globalisation movement has been organising protest against the damaging consequences of globalisation on Africa.[2] The resistance to globalisation and the protest against it through the resilience of certain African social institutions is often ignored. Globalisation may not be inevitable after all. In fact, when the number of those who are really active in it is considered, the process may be regarded as a minority movement. Of course, African leadership can do more to make globalisation more beneficial to the majority at the grassroots.

A fourth characterisation of the writings on globalisation is its being viewed as all-encompassing in that it is interpreted as influencing every facet of life and therefore every significant change unfolding in society must be analysed from this premise. Its impact is regarded as immediate in that it has brought time and space within its reach (see Aina 1996). This seems a sophisticated form of reductionism. This position tends to ignore not only the resistance to the phenomenon of globalisation but also the sphere of socio-economic and political life that remains to be affected by it.

A fifth appraisal was the absence of an explicit gender implication of this process of modernisation. There are two aspects. First, as a matter of fact, all of the contributors that I have come across were men. Secondly, the female voice was absent. There has not been enough gender-specific analysis of the consequences of globalisation. This lacuna is difficult to justify considering the fact that the process of globalisation affect men and women differently.

This paper will attempt to fill this gap. Globalisation is in addition being understood to mean a change process of cultural diffusion encompassing material and non-material (non-tangible) culture. The younger

generation in Africa is under the tremendous influence of the western culture in music, dress, food and behaviour generally. Globalisation not only negates economic development but it brings about cultural disorientation as well. When we consider the centrality of culture to development, then it can be appreciated that globalisation in its present form is compromising Africa's future development. It means the ease with which decisions in far away places affect people at the local level – the breakdown of geographical barriers and space. The research question which the paper addresses is whether or not globalisation has implications for gender relations in the third world. Does it affect one gender in such a way as to produce marginalisation? If so, which gender is marginalised and what are the manifestations and consequences of this marginalisation? Is globalisation breaking down cultural barriers between men and women by allowing women also to access significant economic resources in society? Is there also a gender specific resistance to globalisation?

In order to address these issues, the paper has been structured into four sections including the introduction. In section two, we demonstrate that globalisation is a form of domination and dis-empowerment in that it enforces an agenda of development that is rigid and allows no room for variation across the African continent in spite of evident diversities. It erodes the autonomy of the state and gives a free reign to multinational corporations. The implications of globalisation for gender relations are addressed in section three. In section four, we provide a gender analysis of the resistance to globalisation. This resistance reflects the perception of globalisation by the female gender as an extension of male chauvinism which further confines women to the domestic arena and the informal sector by excluding them from the public sphere.[3]

Globalisation as domination and dis-empowerment

In establishing whether or not globalisation promotes domination and disempowerment of Africa, and African women in particular, we need to find out the goal of globalisation. The driving force behind globalisation is not philanthropy or a pre-occupation with human welfare or social reproduction. The invisible hand behind globalisation is the profit motive; the rate of return to capital being the main goal (as clearly admitted by Lord Lugard in *The Dual Mandate*) that informed the British colonial adventure in Africa as elsewhere. And the goals of profit and of humanity are not often compatible except accidentally. The former is driven by relentless greed and the other by moral considerations.[4]

For Africa, it can be summarised that the central elements of globalisation include the structural adjustment programmes which were meant to make the African economy more business-like by removing wastages and cutting down on social spending. It endorses the withdrawal of states from economic activities – the requirement that the economy must be regulated. Africa must also comply with the requirements of the World Trade Organisation – trade liberalisation.

The meaning of structural adjustment has been highlighted as follows:

> All over Africa, the hallmark of structural adjustment entailed massive currency devaluation, price interest rate payments and trade liberalization; the imposition of credit ceilings and control over money supply, a freeze on wages and salaries, public enterprise privatization/commercialization/liquidation, public expenditure reduction, the withdrawal of subsidies (real and imagined) and the introduction of cost recovery measures on a range of (mainly social) services, the reduction of the size of civil service through staff retrenchment and the stepping up of efforts at revenue mobilization through inter alia, the introduction/enforcement of a range of direct and indirect taxes (Gibbon and Olukoshi 1996: 57–58).

The *Oxfam Poverty Report* (1995:73–75) had also outlined the essential focus of structural adjustment as summarised above. Thus what really dominated economic thought for much of the 1980s and 1990s was the belief that good economic performance depended upon the liberalisation of markets as the private markets could be trusted to undertake an efficient allocation of resources. This philosophy was promoted as the universal solution without regard for the unique sociology of economic life in Africa.[5] There had been several other critiques of this approach to development as it was not even internally consistent as well as being ahistorical. It has been pointed out for example that post-war reconstruction in Europe and Japan was based upon expansionary economic policies to restore infrastructure and wider economic activity. The state of infrastructure in Africa prior to the structural adjustment was perhaps the equivalent of what then obtained in Europe during the post world war era. Moreover, the implementation of structural adjustment in such countries as Ghana which the international community has often paraded as a model has not produced any spectacular result.[6]

Although there had been some successes recorded here and there, overall, structural adjustment had failed to deliver the promised dividend. The optimistic position of Faruqee (1994:280) that structural adjustment in Nigeria had been able to reverse the decline in the economy could not be borne out by the people's life experiences as we shall see shortly, particu-

larly the consequences of structural adjustment for women. The question here is whether or not structural adjustment enhanced women's role in the dominant peasant agricultural sector?

The other major element of globalisation is in the area of political reform. The states in Africa, especially those under one party systems, were required to open up the political space to admit competition and political liberalism with a view to making the state more stable and to minimise political contestations from ethnic and religious groups. The question is how has political liberalisation altered gender relations – has it opened up for women more opportunities for political leverage and participation in state activities from which they had been previously excluded or only marginally involved? There are other components of globalisation. Information Technology is presently the most visible and perhaps a most powerful and indomitable component of globalisation. There is the Cable News Network, the Voice of America and the BBC which have since drowned the voice of the national radios in Africa. There is also the Internet. Information technology has made it easier for the entire world to be within the reach of global investors than ever before. How has this global technology advantaged women vis-à-vis men in Africa? In Africa who are the marketers of this technology and who are the consumers? The sphere of culture and popular education are also now under the pressure of globalisation. This has implications for local consumption and production relations. There is presently a vast centralisation of strategic knowledge being shared only by Internet users. This promotes social exclusion, particularly of women in Africa, who, because of low education, fuelled by poverty and social discrimination, cannot participate in large numbers in this process of information technology. Simultaneously, useful local knowledge is also being pushed further to the background as this is not included or made part of the global culture and education. And where they are, there is distortion. The combined effect of all these processes of globalisation is to accentuate the dependency and thus the dis-empowerment of Africa generally and of African women in particular. Unfolding social processes do not have the same effect on groups that constitute society. It seems obvious why the social processes which globalisation triggered off may not have benefited men and women equally. Though men and women differ with regard to their biological make-up, it was social prejudice and stereotypes which had, over the ages and across societies, been employed to exclude the female gender from society's most valuable resources. This largely functions through the social meanings that are imposed on purely biological differences. It seems

that with the conclusion of each phase of globalisation, men and women became more unequal. The colonial officers, with their Victorian concept of women as home makers/workers bluntly turned against African women's visibility in the public domain. The people's world view revealed that there were few areas of unequal relationship between men and women in the pre-colonial era, especially in the economic and political sense. The ways in which globalisation in its concrete manifestation has worked to alter gender relations are discussed next.

Implications of globalisation for gender relations

Peasant agriculture employs well over 70 percent of the population and remains the dominant form of economic activity in Africa (on peasants and their organistions see Romdhane and Moyo 2002:341–361). Women are dominant in this sector. In Tanzania for example, about 54 percent of agricultural workers were women compared to 46 percent men in 1990/91 (See Bureau of Statistics Publication on Women and Men in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam 1997). In Uganda 81 percent of employed women were in agriculture compared to only 68 percent of men (See facts and figures on women and men in Uganda 1998:4). The corresponding figures for Tanzania were 90 percent and 76 percent (See p. 36 of Bureau of Statistics Publication, and also Mbilinyi 1991 and Ngware 1996:21–24). In Kenya as well, women make a vital contribution in subsistence agricultural production. They are actively involved in 'planting, weeding and harvesting of beans, maize, millet and vegetables which are produced for household subsistence consumption. They normally would sell a small surplus in a good season. The men are primarily responsible for the production of sugarcane, pyrethrum, coffee and wheat for sale. Male labour participation in food production is much less regular than that of women and other members of the households' (Suda 1996:124–125). The result is a double workload for women not only in Kenya but across the entire continent of Africa. Women in other cultures also have a greater workload than men but the availability of modern technologies reduces the tediousness of domestic labour for women in the developed world.

Because of women's participation in the sector, whatever affects agriculture therefore will certainly alter whatever gender relations existed in that sector before. Structural adjustment in advocating specific reforms in the agricultural sector must therefore have impacted on gender relations. Lets us summarise the reforms that structural adjustment outlined for the agricultural sector and thereafter assess the implications for gender relations. One way in which structural adjustment immediately im-

pacted on agriculture was through the abolition of the marketing boards which had been in place since the colonial period to stabilise the commodity price of export cash crops. Many regarded the activities of the marketing boards as largely exploitative as they often withheld large surpluses from peasant farmers without shielding the farmers from the consequences of depression when prices fell. In the past, politicians had squandered these accumulated surpluses, which can be substantial. The abolition of the marketing board was intended to allow farmers to reap the full reward for their labour. There are variations across the different regions of Africa on women's role in agriculture with regard to the kind of crops that they are allowed to cultivate. It had been pointed out that in Uganda the production and marketing of coffee are controlled by men while women concentrated in staple food production, but in west Africa women also engage in the cultivation and marketing of commercial crops (Watkins 1995:89–90). As a matter of fact, Yoruba women in South-West Nigeria could inherit cash crop farms, cultivate and market the same. But there are constraints. The abolition of the marketing boards within the context of local currency devaluation implies more returns from the export of cash crops. Over the years, as women were being pushed into the cultivation of food crops for reasons connected with the food security crisis, they were not able to take full advantage of the liberalisation of the cash crop agricultural sub-sector. Men more than women would have also benefited from the credit facilities that came with liberalisation as men have the requisite network to secure loans. Even though some women do cultivate cash crops and even though the people's world view in some cases allowed them to undertake the marketing in practice, pre-occupation with domestic activities prevented women from this profitable venture which is increasingly becoming more male dominated. The improved returns from export crops mainly cultivated by men may make them to subtly coerce their wives' labour into the sector. Food security in the domestic domain may become threatened as women's labour time may be withdrawn from subsistence farming. The liberalisation of agriculture also has implications for land transactions. All over Africa, land is communally owned even though individuals have usufruct rights. With the increasing tempo of commercialisation of the agricultural sector, alienation of land is in full force. How this process is to men's advantage should not be difficult to discern.[7]

The increase in returns to male cash croppers and the resultant privatisation of land resources have the potential of promoting individualism and greed which pose a danger for community life in which women are

very active. This will further exclude African women from meaningful participation in the activities of their society. Once family land has for example been sold, there may be no basis to hold family or community meetings. Women often employ the forum provided by such meetings to sponsor gender specific agendas. It is also important to note that farming is a last resort for men who have lost out in the reform of the civil service thus further pushing women to the fringe of the agricultural food sub-sector when male migrants returned home to settle down to farming.

Structural adjustment in practical consequence has aggravated poverty in Africa as it has ensured that more countries in Africa paid more to the IMF than they received from it. Also Africa's share of the world trade has drastically reduced compared to the 1960s. This is spectacularly true of agricultural cash crops (see Nyang'oro 1998:30–31; Lipumba 1999:173 particularly Table 2 on the Sub-Saharan share of agricultural exports). The *New York Times* of June, 20 1994 as cited in Nyang'oro 1998:30) provided a graphic illustration of this development. It said inter alia

> Africa's share of the world trade... is now closer to 2 percent. That is so marginal it is almost as if the continent has curled up and disappeared from the map of international shipping lanes and airlines routes that rope together Europe, North America and the Far East. Direct foreign investment in Africa is so paltry it is not even measured in the latest World Bank study.

Thus as far as the economy is concerned, especially with regard to agriculture, structural adjustment is a failure in Africa. Women have consequently become more disadvantaged as there are more women in the sector than in any other. We recognised the boom in commercial crop marketing which structural adjustment initially created but the gains were wiped away by the unprecedented level of inflation, particularly in the price of farm implements that accompanied it. That structural adjustment has more women as casualties than men can hardly be disputed. Some accounts by women speak volumes for the real meaning of globalisation processes as manifested in structural adjustment. A few examples will suffice:

> ESAP (Zimbabwe's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programme) has meant that we can only eat two meals a day. We can no longer afford meat because prices are too high. Everything costs more. I can not afford to pay the school fees for my son and daughter since they started charging. Government said it was because of ESAP. We can not even go to the clinic when the children are sick because we can't afford the medicines – Zimbabwean woman, Harare.

> I have read that our country is stabilising. That may be true, but we have no jobs. We can't send our children to school. May be stabilising is a good thing for the countries we pay debt to, but here life is getting harder. – Zambian women (See the Oxfam Poverty Report 1995:71).

In an interview I conducted in Southwest Nigeria in the year 2000 a woman respondent said as follows:

> You know my husband left for Abidjan about 13 years now with the hope to return after a year or two. That was when the price of flour for bread jumped up. You know he was a baker. Initially, he was getting in touch with us and sending money. But for the past eight years now he has not entered into any form of communication with us. I thought of visiting him but then the cost of transport is scaring. Now that education is no longer free I have to pay school fees for all these four children. When I could not cope again I had to withdraw one of them, one also started working part-time after the school hours. I have also changed my job from tailoring due to massive importation of second hand cloth. The children are not even doing well in school. The teachers are always on strike. They complain of low and untimely salaries. And I cannot afford to pay for school lessons organised by the teachers because I haven't got the money. In fact, I am finished and confused but how can I abandon these children and run away from home as their father did 13 years age. This is my dilemma if you can help... (narration by a respondent given to the author during an interview).

The informal sector where women are dominant has been particularly hit by structural adjustment. A study on the effect of structural adjustment on the working poor in Zimbabwe concluded that:

> the economic crisis of the great majority of women informal operators was clearly shown to have deepened. The crisis was popularly perceived by women themselves as one of market saturation on the supply side, coupled with a decline in demand. Both, and especially the latter, were further perceived as an effect of ESAP. In several cases, women traders were forced out of certain markets by these trends, severely threatening their social reproduction (Brand et al 1995:209).

All the above summarise the consequences of structural adjustment for women in Africa. More and more households are becoming female-headed as men are deserting homes to escape financial responsibilities and women have to double the number of hours they work in order to cope. Across Africa, school drop-outs are on the increase mainly because of poverty and related causes. In Uganda as in most African countries, women have higher illiteracy rates than their male counterparts. At the university level,

not only do men predominate, also courses which have better prospect for profitable employment are dominated by men.

It is often ignored that structural adjustment programmes in as far as they affect the economy and thus the status of poverty, also penetrate the realm of reproductive behaviour. And the connection is not remote. If education becomes expensive or rationalised (resulting from cuts in social expenditure), an average family would likely decide that the girl child's education has to be forgone in preference to male education. When girls drop out of school because of pregnancy or fees unaffordability, they may end up in an unsteady relationship or even become prostitutes. The chances of HIV infection are thus higher for women than men.[8]

Let us now discuss how the politics of adjustment (democratisation) has affected gender relations. Women were relatively active in the pre-colonial politics. Women's struggle in resisting colonialism is now well documented.[9] African women also fought in some of the African liberation struggles. Among the Igbo and Yoruba of Nigeria for example, no decision affecting women could be taken without their representation.

Prior to the democratisation processes that accompanied structural adjustment, dictatorial military regimes and one party states were common in Africa. The latter were based on the leaders' assumption that there were no classes in Africa but communal groups. To admit the existence of classes would amount to accepting that there were cleavages and hence conflictual relationships were a possibility.

Recently, Kenya's former president, Daniel Arap Moi, reiterated an earlier position of his that multipartism in his country is aiding ethnicity, political faction and that it is endangering the country's unity (*Daily Nation*, August 1 2001). This was a typical response of most African leaders. The opening up of the political space in Africa however owes a lot to the pressure from the World Bank, the IMF and other multilateral donor agencies who made it a condition for finance. The donor's pressure on political reform in Africa, especially from about the mid 1980s, should not be underestimated. According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:135–36)

> By 1990s ... African political leaders discovered that they could no longer court external support simply by professing Marxism-Leninism or anti communism. In order to obtain development assistance they henceforth had to show willingness to observe human rights, practice efficient and honest governance and hold genuinely competitive elections.

But it must not be forgotten that there was also the agitation and pressure on the state mounted by several professional organisations, civil societies, women's groups, ethnic groups and religious bodies to democratise (Olurode 1998). Perhaps equally important was the wider environment in which treaties and conventions on women multiplied with the emphasis on affirmative action.

The research question which emanates from the above is whether or not this development altered the practice of politics to the advantage of women. Did women become more of a force to be reckoned with politically than in the pre-structural adjustment era? Generally, in both the developed and the underdeveloped worlds, men and women participate differently in politics. Women are generally under-represented at the formal level of politics. But this by no means implies that women cannot get their views across or even influence state policies positively. This can take the form of shifting the boundary between the public and the private spheres and thus politicising the private as had happened in many countries where the issues of rape, abortion and domestic violence had been pushed into the arena of public discourse (Alvarez 1990). The important thing is therefore to analyse under what conditions and with what strategies[10] women's movements can influence the state and policy agendas (Waylen 1996:11).

In the post-structural adjustment period, though women might not yet be key actors in large numbers, there are certain political practices which had a positive potential for women's visibility in politics. Across Africa, women's non-governmental organisations have multiplied and some of these organisations are so active that the state had responded by either co-opting their significant members into the state apparatus or by causing divisions within them. Some of these organisations also aid oppressed women to seek legal redress in cases of violation of womanhood or of women's property rights. In a well celebrated case, Nigeria's Court of Appeal ruled that a customary practice which disentitled a wife from the estate of her deceased husband was null and void to the extent that it was repugnant to natural justice, equity and fairness (*The Guardian*, Nigeria October 25 1997: 'A woman's triumph over custom'.) The burgeoning of women's organisations and their activities, the critical role of the media regarding women's marginalisation and governments' commitment to affirmative action are factors which must be considered in the emerging alterations in gender relations in politics.

These women's organisations are of different varieties which reflect their concerns – some being purely professional or philantunapic whilst others are action and research oriented. Their emergence not only further widened the political space but it also has the potential of serving as a recruiting ground for women's future participation in active politics. The emergence of these organisations was therefore a positive development. Ordinarily the more they are, the wider should be the political space for women indirectly influencing state's politics. They could however be used to frustrate women's political goals under a conservative and authoritarian regime.

We should in fact not ignore the fact that women are increasingly mounting pressure to ensure a fair representation at the formal level of politics. They insist on compliance with affirmative action. And this is producing some encouraging outcomes. For example, in the 1995 general elections in Tanzania, 67 (or 5 percent) women contested political positions against 1, 268 (95 percent) men. Definitely, multipartism has somehow opened up more space for women's participation in the politics of Tanzania. Special seats are increasingly being allocated to women which continues to improve their representation in parliament. The number was 15 seats in 1990, 36 in 1995, and 48 seats in the 2000 elections. Their representation in the immediate independence period was low. This declined from 7.5 percent in 1961–65 to 3.9 percent in 1970–75. An argument had been put forward for the inclusion of more women in the administrative cadres of the party structures as well as in electoral bodies (see paper by Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee, 2000).

In Uganda, women are also becoming involved in formal politics as cabinet members, members of parliament and as decision makers at the local level. A recent BBC report also informed us that a woman had emerged as the president of the powerful Mozambique's Miners Union (BBC News, June 26, 2001). In Nigeria's democratisation processes, some women had stood in the presidential elections. A few of them (3 out of 109) won seats as Senators and a dozen or so were elected as members of the House of Representatives in the general election of 1999. A woman[11] also emerged as the deputy governor of Lagos State – the most populous, heterogeneous and politically volatile state in Nigeria. Women are now more visible at all levels of decision-making in Nigeria. For example women in Lagos State dominate the judiciary at the upper level. Though outwardly ceremonial or un-harmful, the symbolic role of the wives of the president and governors and even local governments in Nigeria may sometimes be oppositional and challenging of the status quo. Their roles

are not to be pre-construed as essentially subservient to the state. We should try to understand the circumstances under which those roles get activated and for what purpose – emancipatory for gender relations or exploitative of them:

> These activities often entail entering the public sphere and either making demands or acting collectively, whether on a national, local or community based level. This kind of activity therefore entails the politicization of the private sphere and entry into the public sphere on that basis. The participant's gender therefore becomes a fundamental part of this type of political activity, as the fact of their being women is a central part of the action (Waylen 1996:19).

It is public knowledge that Nigeria's President Obasanjo preferred a non-visible woman as the first lady but his wife objected. In their campaign against behaviour that impaired reproductive health (prostitution, early marriage etc), wives of the president and governors indirectly attacked men's reproductive behaviour. The wife of Nigeria's Edo State governor recently openly opposed the idea of using female young undergraduates as entertainers for visiting male governors.

The simultaneous pressures at the formal and informal levels are desirable in that they not only complement each other but may also generate emancipatory outcome for women. Men and women however require continuous sensitisation and re-socialisation to maintain the tempo of change under political liberalisation.

Women's low participation in the sphere of education also accounts for their marginal role in the new information technology where they are neither the merchants nor the main consumers. Women are thus readily excluded from the vast centralisation of knowledge and empowerment that Internet usage implies. In today's post-capitalist society, information and knowledge are powerful instruments of control and subordination. Peter Drucker (1993) made the point that in today's world, knowledge, (not land, labour or capital) is the most crucial mode of production. The culture of the Internet is strongly gendered to women's disadvantage. Women are not yet key actors in the new information technology.

The emerging global consumption pattern of fast food which is fast becoming noticeable in third world cities also poses a threat to the culture industry, the kitchen and this may further dis-empower women in an area where they exercise tremendous leverage. America's pop music is booming everywhere. Mr. Biggs, McDonalds and other fast food giants would certainly take some consumers away from the kitchen, the home and from the food crops which women grow and derive income from. This erosion

may also take food vending away from women and thereby also the accompanying economic advantages which it confers. The potential of this development for women's further marginalisation and disempowerment is real. These developments are not being unchallenged by women. In the conclusion that follows, we promote a discussion of gender and resistance to globalisation in some detail.

Conclusion: Gender and resistance to globalisation

Most African women may not be able to discuss the concept of globalisation in ways that may sound academic or meaningful to someone from the West but as we have seen in the previous sections, they are able to give vivid accounts of this process in terms of what it means for their livelihoods and political participation. Structural adjustment may be a technical term but its consequences are social in that women experience high food prices, payment for social services that used to be free or which attracted only marginal charges, their husbands' loss of jobs through what is technically referred to as rationalisation of the civil service and privatisation of public enterprises, and the increasing domestic workload being borne. They also know that they suffer more from HIV infection and that more and more of their children are being involved in civil war and communal conflict occasioned by disagreement among principal actors (men) over the sharing of state's resources, itself a product of the imposition of stringent economic measures, poor governance, corruption and greed.

Theoretically, we must not ascribe too much analytical power to the concept of globalisation. But it is not easy to empirically ascertain how much of what goes on cannot be explained by it. How much must be ascribed to factors endogenous to Africa itself – greed, corruption and poor governance? The recognition of this possibility is in itself a step forward. Poor governance and corruption are the very factors which made the imposition of stringent economic measures inevitable in the first instance. The persistence of certain social relationships in the midst of profound social change triggered off by globalisation is somehow problematic. For example, extended family obligations persist. The traditional political institutions retain their vitality. All these remnants may constitute sources of additional economic burden on people already in dire financial straits.

Women do not accept that these processes are inevitable or that there are no alternatives to structural adjustment – as some male state actors had insisted by parroting their external sponsors. In various cities in Af-

rica, structural adjustment, which inevitably pushed up food prices and reduced living standards, was greeted with spontaneous riots largely by women. In Benin republic, the removal of the subsidy on rice resulted in street riots by urban residents. Structural adjustment-induced riots were a common phenomenon in Africa in the immediate post-SAP era.

In response to the difficulties of accessing state resources, women in both rural and urban areas began to exit from the state by constructing structures of finance and politics that rivalled the state. Women are nowadays more active in cooperative societies, market associations and are increasingly assuming household headship with pride. More than before, the incidence of female-headed households is increasing even in areas where during interviews it would be denied (Olurode 1995, Oyekanmi 1993). The context in which this is happening is even more important. The underlying reason is men's failure to recognise that combining domestic chores and reproductive roles with productive roles seriously increases women's workload and impairs their health. Female-headed households may thereby be a mode of regaining control over women's reproductive behaviour.

We also discovered that in a few cases, women are constructing parallel political terrains where male endorsement may not be required. African women are insisting that their own worldview is not always coterminous with that of men though they collaborate with men as the need arises. It was Okonjo (1976:45) who employed the concept of the 'dual sex' system to characterise the African social system of gender relations which implies that 'each sex manages its own affairs and women's interest are represented at all levels'. However, under the European single-sex system, 'political status-bearing roles are predominantly the preserve of men ... women can achieve distinction and recognition only by taking on the roles of men in public life and performing them well'. Thus a European woman merely apes the European man.

In South-West Nigeria, Yoruba women have elevated the title of *Iyaloja* (head of market women) to such a status that not only diminished the status of *Iyalode* (Women's representative in the king's court), but a few Iyaloja also were dissatisfied with even the king's (male) recognition of their title. The former title is achieved whereas the other is hereditary. The case of the Iyaloja of Iwo in South-West Nigeria had been discussed at length in Faluyi (2000). Africa's traditional women have always been relevant politically but its today's women that are removing themselves from the realm of relevance by refusing to link up with grassroots-based illiterate women's organisations. There had been women monarchs in dif-

ferent parts of Africa and even today in some parts of South-West Nigeria (Ondo and Ekiti States) the tradition of appointing women as regents on the death of kings still persists. While they are extending their participation at the formal political level, women are simultaneously protesting the state's incursion into the family and community sphere. There is a need for a re-appraisal of the African world view with the objective of studying which aspects of it can be utilised for the purpose of advancing women's interest at the formal and informal levels of political participation.

Africa cannot afford an wholesale consumption of the product of globalisation. Globalisation works to erase jobs and this cannot be in the interest of Africa which has no social security system. Moreover, from the sociology of economic life in Africa, we know that economic rationality is not the totality of economic activities. In its impact on culture, globalisation fosters alienation from our cultural roots as foreign pop music and the fast foods become the ideal. The real African identity is discarded as we become foreigners in our own land. Also the market for our own cultural objects dries up and the knowledge about the production of such artefacts gradually becomes forgotten. It is part of African women's resistance to globalisation to refuse to be lured by the glamour of this change process. In spite of its drudgery, a large percentage of women in Africa still work as farmers and they also remain dominant in the informal sector. The challenge before African leadership in this age of globalisation is how to promote people-centred development and transparent governance within which women as citizens can pursue legitimate economic activities which will in turn positively impact on their political practices. Africa is sufficiently endowed with natural resources, especially mineral resources, which should enable its leaders to banish poverty from the continent. Unfortunately, in the fierce conflict over its resources, African women are the losers. Rather than abating this conflict, globalisation seems to be intensifying it and this is compounding Africa's poverty profile as well as having the potential to compromise women's welfare as a gender category. The consequences of conflict are more devastating and socially disruptive for women than for men.

Notes

1. This inequality between the north and the south is a major factor in the migration of people from the poorer south at great risk to their lives to the north in spite of stringent immigration regimes which now classify such immigrants' as economic refugees rather than asylum seekers.

2. Recently, the group launched an advertisement campaign depicting a healthy western baby trying to breast feed from a malnourished African woman (*Daily News*, Tanzania, June 20, 2001). A number of protests had been organised by this group in major world cities such as Seattle, Melbourne, Prague, Quebec and most recently in Genoa. This last one provoked anger against police brutality when one protestor was killed. It is however a misnomer to label the group as anti-globalisation. They only stand up against its damaging consequences – see 'Globalization a misunderstood concept', *Daily Nation*, Kenya, July 27, 2001.
3. Women and their organisations were however active in the pre-colonial and even in the colonial period. Women's activism in the years of decolonisation had somehow become dampened in the post-colonial era when it was most desirable.
4. If the process of globalisation sometimes results in humanistic considerations, these are secondary and accidental. It can be recalled that the American firm that produces anti-retroviral aids drug was reluctant to give in to the mass production of the drug in developing countries as this would erode the company's profit level. The company guards its monopoly jealously.
5. In Africa, the profit motive in economic activities may not be the sole motivating factor. There may also be non-economic bases of seemingly economic behaviour such as in strengthening ties of friendship and family bonds, and which may sometimes be valued more than purely economic gain.
6. Thus in spite of the acclaimed success of the structural adjustment programme in Ghana, the point has been made that the private sector's response has been lukewarm as evidenced in the poor performance of Ghana's industry. A major reason was said to be the poor institutional environment. Thus institutional and economic reforms need to go hand in hand to induce the participation of private sector economic actors – see Amponsah 2000:10 for details.
7. Men have an initial edge in strategic economic activities which put them at an advantage in owning prime agricultural land. As more land come under cocoa cultivation and as more peasant labourers accumulate enough savings to become first share croppers and later farm owners, women may have to farm less fertile land and at long distances from home thus increasing for women the cost of production – see E.A. Walker (2000) "Happy Days are Here Again": cocoa Farmers, Middlemen, Traders and the Structural Adjustment Program in South-West Nigeria, 1986–1990', *Africa Today*, Vol. 47 No 2, Spring pp. 151–170 for a general discussion of the impact of structural adjustment on cocoa cultivation in south-west Nigeria. The analysis was however not gendered.
8. The report on Tanzania which is true for most African countries shows that women are at a higher risk of being infected than men and they (women) are even infected at much younger ages (20–24) than men with zero-positive peak between 25–35 years (see p. 28 of Bureau of Statistics Publication referred to earlier). Preference for young girls as sex partners is also a contributory fac-

tor. The belief is that young girls cannot be carriers of HIV because of their tender age. In Uganda, the reason which was given for the higher rate of infection among women was follows: 'This could be attributed to women's sexuality being controlled by men' (see pp. 28–29 Facts and figures on Uganda, 1998 referred to above). Uganda's 1995 Demographic and Health Survey (UDHS) also showed that more women (36 percent) than men (11 percent) had not changed their reproductive behaviour in order to prevent AIDS. This was because women lack total control over activities relating to their reproductive roles. The crippling economics of structural adjustment is an additional factor in this disempowerment over reproductive life. Without a skill and without a job, young girls easily become prostitutes. Yet, in the traditional social milieu before globalisation, women were not so helpless in the area of mate selection, family formation and reproductive behaviour. A study of the people's worldview through proverbs had confirmed this to be true of Yoruba women in south-west Nigeria (see Olurode 1999: 170–172).

8. For example see Nina Mba (1982), *Nigerian Women Mobilised: Women's Political Activity in Southern Nigeria*, pp. 140–141 on women's activism in southern Nigeria.
9. An illiterate leader of women traders in the South-West town of Iwo (with a population of over 500,000) in Nigeria in 1992 refused to be coerced by the local authorities into giving her consent to the demolition and reconstruction of the town's popular market. She insisted on a written agreement that she as the leader would be allowed to exercise control over the right to allocate the market stalls after completion contrary to the position of the local authorities. She thumb-printed only when this term was included in the agreement and was translated to her by a trusted fellow market woman. So, women's capacity to influence decisions should not be narrowly construed. But for the market leader's insistence, the local authorities could have allocated the market stalls to political lackies, cronies, friends and family members. Sometimes those who feel disadvantaged politically, especially women, could resort to public ridicule, sarcastic song, dancing and drumming to express their voices of dissent and their rejection of political exclusion (*The Punch*, Nigeria, Feb. 2, 2001).
10. This is unprecedented in Nigeria's political history. This woman deputy gov ernor has been creating some unease in the circle of only male governors. She was accused of making underground moves to outsmart the governor of Lagos State. She claims that she was being denied her constitutional role. Other male governors see her moves as dangerous and threatening (*The Guardian*, Nigeria, June 28, 2001). It should be mentioned that women in the southwest had a long history of political activism.

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The Nature and Scope of Production Sub-contracting in Nigeria

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Abstract

This study analyses the nature and scope of production sub-contracting linkages in Nigeria. The basic concepts are integration and industrial linkage, and production subcontracting. Data for this study were collected from the 68 contracting firms among the 15 industrial estates/areas in the Lagos region. The study's finding shows that the dominant form of sub-contracting is speciality sub-contracting. The various products of sub-contracting among the industrial estates/areas in the Lagos region, and between the Lagos region and the rest of Nigeria are discussed. Independent sub-contracting is the most common type of sub-contracting relationship. While over 50 percent of the contractors engage the services of a maximum of two subcontractors, it is only in motor vehicles and the miscellaneous assembly industry group that production sub-contracting accounted for more than 30 percent of the total costs of production. It accounted for about 20 percent in each of all the other industry groups in any of the years under consideration. Furthermore, this study shows that production sub-contracting carried out over relatively short distances became very important after the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in Nigeria, and it is perceived as most useful in reducing the costs of production.

Résumé

Cette étude analyse la nature et l'étendue des relations de sous-traitance de la production au Nigeria. Les principaux concepts sont l'intégration et les relations industrielles, ainsi que la sous-traitance en matière de production. Les informations relatives à cette étude ont été obtenues des soixante-huit entreprises contractantes situées dans les 15 régions industrielles de la région de Lagos. Cette étude révèle que la forme dominante de sous-traitance est la sous-traitance spécialisée. Les produits soumis à la sous-traitance entre les différentes zones de la région de Lagos et le reste du Nigeria sont évoqués dans ce texte. La sous-traitance indépendante est la relation de sous-traitance la plus répandue. Tandis que plus de cinquante pour cent des entrepreneurs s'offrent les services de

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deux sous-traitants, au maximum, seuls l'industrie des véhicules et les groupes industriels d'assemblages divers ont un niveau de sous-traitance de la production représentant plus de trente pour cent du prix de revient total. Ce prix de revient représentait environ ving pour cent du prix de revient, dans chacun des groupes industriels, au cours de l'année considérée. En outre, cette étude montre que la sous-traitance de la production pratiquée sur des distances relativements courtes s'est accentuée avec l'introduction de Programmes d'Ajustement Structurel (PAS) au Nigeria, et s'est avérée très utile à la réduction des prix de revient.

Introduction

Production sub-contracting is a production technique whereby part of a firm's production is handled by another independent firm. It therefore entails the de-concentration of production processes into smaller units over space. This process of breaking down production procedure into smaller units has attracted the interest of geographers in the literature. It is a major strategy of corporate organisation (Clutterbuck 1985; Lash and Urry 1987). In developed market economies, such as the United States of America, the rise of production sub-contracting is attributable to the performance problems caused by capital redundancy and labour militancy (Cooke 1988). Some writers (e.g. Storper and Walker 1989; Best 1990), also attribute the rise of production sub-contracting to the strategic responses of firms towards rapid market changes, increased international competition, and the corresponding development of new modes of corporate competition, which are based on interfirm consultative coordination and continuous improvement in the production process.

Production sub-contracting provides firms with the benefits of reduced investments risks, strengthens control over the labour process, and fosters response to technological and market changes (Holmes 1986; Donaghu and Barff 1990). In addition, it provides production systems with increased viability for long-term growth and development (Saxenian, 1990), and promotes exchanges between firms in many forms (Contractor and Lonrange, 1988). Furthermore, it plays an important role in the restructuring of some industrial sectors both at the intranational and international levels. Perhaps this explains why international sub-contracting linked to the development of free trade areas and Export Processing Zones (EPZ) has become of particular interest to international agencies, such as United Nations Industrial Development Organization and the World Bank (UNIDO 1974; UNTCD 1979; Berthomeiu and Hanaut 1980). The development of production sub-contracting is not confined to the developed market economies. A number of major developing market economies, such as Hong

Kong, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China have also experienced similar changes. These changes are attributable to the strategic needs of firms to expand production and/or to reduce cost pressures associated with labour shortages or labour costs (Chen 1983; Federation of Hong Kong Industries 1990).

The literature on production sub-contracting has focused on four major themes: the nature of production sub-contracting, the basis for its existence, the temporal dynamics, and the locational structure (see Watanable 1971, 1972, 1980; Challou 1977; Friedman 1977; Holmes 1986; Beneria and Roldan 1987; Donaghu and Barff 1990; Leung 1993; Echeverri Carroll 1996; and UNIDO 1974; for details). These themes have been approached from a transaction costs perspective as developed by Coase (1973), and later espoused by Willamson (1975, 1979, 1984, 1985), Scott (1983, 1986, 1988), and Storper and Scott (1990).

In addition, while several studies on production sub-contracting have been conducted in the western world, especially the United States of America and Great Britain, studies on industrialisation in sub-Saharan Africa, and specifically in Nigeria, have largely focused on the examination and analysis of single components of industrial activity or the spatial distribution and development of manufacturing industries. Examples of earlier works include Schatzl (1973), Onyemelukwe (1974), Vegale et al. (1974), Ayeni (1976, 1981), Arikawe-Akintola (1986), and Ighalo (1989). Other studies (Lewis 1974; Oyebanji 1978, 1980) have focused on small-scale industries at the regional level. More recent studies, among which are Lee and Anas (1989), Lee (1991), and Babarinde (1995), have focused on some behavioural aspects of manufacturing in Nigeria. In some cases, explanations have been offered in terms of factor endowments.

In other words, there is no known study conducted on production sub-contracting in sub-Saharan Africa and especially in Nigeria. This paper therefore examines the nature, scope and the perceived significance of production sub-contracting in Nigeria.

The study was carried out in the Lagos region, Nigeria. However, given the fact that the main focus of the study is sub-contracting relationships between the Lagos region and the rest of the Nigeria, there is a sense in which the whole country could be regarded as a subsidiary study area. Therefore, this section discusses various aspects of the industrial geography not only of the Lagos region but also Nigeria as a whole. The Lagos region covers metropolitan Lagos and the outlying districts of Agbara, Sango/Ota and Ojodu/Isheri industrial estates/areas, in Ogun State. This region, located along the south west of Nigeria, is situated approximately

between Latitudes 6° 27' and 6° 37' North of the equator and longitudes 4° 15' and 3° 47' East of the Greenwich Meridian. The Lagos Region, with an area of about 1,088km^2, covers about 32 per cent of the land area of Lagos State. About 20 percent of this area is made up of lagoons and mangrove swamps.

The Lagos region, apart from being the industrial nerve centre of Nigeria, is also the leading centre of commerce. Some 60 to 70 percent of all commercial transactions in Nigeria are carried out or finalised in the Lagos region. About 70 percent of the total value of industrial investments in Nigeria is in the Lagos region. Over 65 percent of the country's industrial employment is concentrated in this region, leaving the remaining 35 percent to other parts of the country. It is, in part, the recognition of the marked concentration of industries in the Lagos region that motivated its choice as the study area for this work.

Apart from the foregoing, the Lagos region has two seaports: Tin Can Island and Apapa. The two ports handle about 60 percent of Nigeria's total exports excluding crude oil and about 70 percent of imports. Major terminals for both road and rail routes are located in the Lagos region. The strategic location of the Lagos region is further strengthened by the presence of the most important airport. Perhaps, it is this strategic position of the Lagos region within the country that explains why most major industrial concerns and trading companies, such as the United African Company (UAC), Union Trading Company (UTC), Patterson and Zochonis (PZ), have their head offices located in this region. In addition, major financial centres, such as the Nigerian Stock Exchange, and the head office of major banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions are located here. The implication is that the Lagos region, more than any other part of Nigeria, is likely to have strong links with the other parts of the country. The subsidiary study area (Nigeria) lies between latitudes 4° 00' and 14° 00' north of the equator, and longitudes 4° 00' and 14° 00' East of the Greenwich Meridian. Nigeria, with a total land area of 923, 772 km^2 has the most extensive habitable land area in Africa south of the Sahara. The population of Nigeria was 88.5 million people in 1991 (NPC figures). Nigeria is a leading industrial nation in the West Africa sub-region.

Conceptual framework

The relevant concepts/theories reviewed here are integration and industrial linkage, and production sub-contracting. Integration involves all forms of collaborative and co-operative ventures among industrial organisations over space. There are two forms of integration, namely vertical integra-

tion and horizontal integration. Vertical integration is 'a process which refers to the extent to which successive stages in production and distribution are placed under a single firm shaped by internal economies of scope'. (Lee 1994:292). This involves the amalgamation of productive units at different stages of production. By contrast, horizontal integration is a production system whereby 'firms producing related products (competitive, complementary or by-products) operate under central control' (Lee 1994: 292). This involves the firm moving into activities that are very closely related to its current activities.

Vertical or horizontal integration may offer greater stability or growth of corporate profits and the spreading of risks (Dicken and Lloyd 1990). This is possible because not all activities in the firm will follow an identical cycle of demand. Integration thus, involves the linkage of firms in a chain of production. In general terms, this is what is referred to as industrial linkage. Industrial linkage is a process whereby one manufacturing firm purchases inputs of good or services from, or sells output to, another manufacturing firm (Keeble 1976). 'Industrial linkage includes all forms of contacts and flows of information and/or materials between two or more individual firms' (Johnson 1994: 334). This term is most widely used in industrial geography to indicate the interdependence among firms and its effects on locational choice. There are three forms of linkage. These are backward, forward and sideways linkages. Backward linkage is a situation where a firm makes use of the products of some other firms as input in its own production process. Forward linkage occurs when a given firm produces its products for use in the production process of other firms. Sideways linkage involves the information flows between firms at the same level of the production process.

Linkage is possible over a wide range of distances. However, strong or complex linkage ties usually operate only over short distances. On a national scale, 'the systematic ties of a plant to others have locations significance. Plants located primarily in relation to raw materials or markets form a small proportion of total industrial activity. On the local scale, connections to adjacent or nearby plants do exist, but such connections do not account for the concentration of heavy industrial areas' (Wood 1969: 34). The foregoing suggests that linkage reflects a distance decay function.

Production sub-contracting is the arrangement of production process wherein firms externalise their manufacturing activities to other independent firms. The contractor provides the orders and the sub-contractor furnishes the work or services for the processing of materials or the production of parts, components, subassembly or assembly of products according

to the production specifications and the marketing arrangements of the contractor (UNIDO 1974, Leung 1993). Production sub-contracting is thus a form of industrial linkage. Production sub-contracting is classified based on the technical character of the subcontracted work, the durability and stability of the relationship between the contractor and the sub-contractor, and the nature and form of business relationship between the contractors and the sub-contractor (Sharpston 1975). It is further classified based on the source of raw materials required for the subcontracted work (Taylor and Thrift 1975), and who takes the decision on the conception, design, and the production process (Chaillou 1977). Although Chaillou (1977) identified and describes seven distinct subcategories of sub-contracting, for simplicity, the study collapses them into three major categories. These are capacity sub-contracting, specialisation sub-contracting, and supplier sub-contracting. Based on Chaillou's classification, sub-contracting is further classified into industrial and commercial sub-contracting.

Industrial sub-contracting involves a manufacturing process or the production of intermediate products. Commercial sub-contracting pertains to finished commodities. Industrial sub-contracting, the focus of this study, is further classified into a number of types based on the needs of the contracting firm. These are specialised, complementary, and cost saving sub-contracting (Watanable 1971, 1972, 1980; Leung 1993). Specialised sub-contracting is due to inadequate technological know-how or equipment on the part of the contractor for some aspects of production. Complementary sub-contracting occurs as a result of inadequate capacity on the part of the contractor to meet delivery schedules. The situation may well be that some aspects of the production process of the contractor can be produced at a much lower cost by the sub-contractor. If the sub-contractor then produces such aspects for the contractor, such an arrangement is generally classified as cost-saving sub-contracting.

Another classification is that based on the types of sub-contracting relationships. Four types are usually identified. These are branch sub-contractors, subsidiary sub-contractors, independent sub-contractors, and former employee sub-contractors (Lawson 1992; Leung 1993). Branch sub-contractors are establishments fully owned and controlled by the contractor. Subsidiary sub-contractors are wholly owned by multi-national corporations, while independent sub-contractors, apart from the sub-contracting arrangement, have no other form of relationship with the contractor, hence the contractor and the sub-contractor operate as equals. Former employee sub-contractors are those firms owned by entrepreneurs who have previously worked as employees of the contractors. They have ac-

quired adequate knowledge of the operations of the contracting firms. They may or may not enjoy financial support of the contractor in order to establish or carry out their production activities.

Data collection procedure

Both primary and secondary data were required for this study. While primary data were collected from contracting firms, secondary data were collected from published sources. Since no publication on the location and operation of production sub-contracting activities in the country is available, information on these had to be collected from relevant firms. The collection of data from the primacy source was done in two different stages. These are the reconnaissance survey and questionnaire administration. The reconnaissance survey was carried out during the months of November and December 1995. It covered all the fifteen industrial estates/areas and outlying firms in the Lagos region. In each of the industrial estates/areas, all the industrial establishments were visited to determine whether or not they were involved in production sub-contracting. The purpose of visiting all firms in each estate and other industrial centres was to ensure that none of the industrial establishments was not covered during the survey. The visit entailed personal interviews with the industrialists or designated officers.

The result of the reconnaissance survey, shown in Table 1, indicates that 68 (10.7 percent) of all the operating firms in the Lagos region are involved in production sub-contracting. The number of contracting firms varies from one industrial estate/area to the other. While two of the estates (Gbagada and Yaba) have no contracting firms, Ilupeju estate/area alone has 12 (representing 17.6 percent) of the total. Ikeja/Ogba/Iseri industrial estate/area accounts for nine (13.2 percent), while Oregun, Iganmu and Agbara estates/areas have seven (10.3 percent) firms each. Other industrial estates account for numbers ranging from one (1.5 percent) to five (7.4 percent). All the sixty-eight contracting firms identified during the reconnaissance survey were covered in the questionnaire administration carried out from January to August 1996. The questionnaire sought information on such issues as the industry group (line of activity), the location (address/industrial estate/or area), the firm and activities relating to production sub-contracting. The distances separating sub-contracting partners were determined with the aid of the road network maps (see Ajayi 1998, for details). The questionnaire was administered so that contracting firms in each of the industrial estates/areas and the outlying firms were visited one after the other. In each case, the questionnaire was left with the industrial/designated officer for completion.

Table 1: Distribution of contracting firms in Lagos region

S/No	Industrial Estate/Area	Number of Contractors	Percentage
1.	Ikeja/Ogba/Isheri	9	13.2
2.	Oregun	7	10.3
3.	Gbagada	0	0.0
4.	Ikorodu Road/Ojota	3	4.4
5.	Oshodi/Agege	5	7.4
6.	Matori	1	1.5
7.	Isolo	5	7.4
8.	Ilupeju	12	17.6
9.	Mushin/Surulere	4	5.9
10.	Yaba	0	0.0
11.	Ijora	1	1.5
12.	Iganmu	7	10.5
13.	Sango/Ota	5	7.4
14.	Agbara	7	10.4
15.	Apapa/Tin Can Island	2	2.9
	Total	68	100.0

In some cases, several visits were made to the establishment before the completed questionnaire could be retrieved. All the contracting firms satisfactorily completed the questionnaire by the end of the fieldwork. The *Industrial Directory of Nigeria* (1993 Edition), published by the Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria (MAN), served as the basic source of secondary data. The Directory contains a list of manufacturing establishments employing at least 10 workers. Other publications include the Nigerian *Vanguard Yellow Pages* (1991 edition), a publication of the Vanguard Newspaper, which is the directory of business enterprises in Nigeria; the *Nigeria Yearbook* (1992 edition); the *Directory of Incorporated Companies* (1993 edition). Other publications are the *Annual Abstract of Statistics* (1994 edition), and the *Nigerian Statistical Bulletin* (1994 edition). These sources of secondary data were the most recent and comprehensive editions at the time of the fieldwork.

Results and discussion

Nature of production sub-contracting

The nature of production sub-contracting pertains to the types of sub-contracting, items produced, and the type of relationships between contractors and sub-contractors.

Type of Sub-contracting

The literature on production sub-contracting suggests that whereas complementary sub-contracting is common in West European countries such as Italy and France, speciality sub-contracting is the predominant form in North America. Table 2 shows that the dominant form of sub-contracting in Nigeria is speciality sub-contracting. Whereas 66 (97.66 percent) of all the contracting firms are involved in speciality sub-contracting, only five (7.35 percent) of the firms are involved in complementary sub-contracting.

While all the industry groups are involved in speciality sub-contracting; only three are involved in complementary sub-contracting. These are the chemicals and pharmaceuticals, pulp, paper and paper products, printing and publishing, and textiles, wearing apparel and leather industry groups. Whereas only one (4.55 percent) of the contractors in the chemicals and pharmaceuticals industry group was involved in complementary sub-contracting, two (20.0 percent) in the pulp, paper products, printing and publishing; two (9.1 percent) are involved in the textile, wearing apparel and leather industry groups.

Products of sub-contracting

While all the products in the food, beverages and tobacco industry groups are received from sub-contractors in the Lagos region, only plastic crates are received from sub-contractors in Ibadan, Ilorin, Kaduna, Kano, and Sagamu. In the chemicals and pharmaceuticals industry group, in addition to products received from sub-contractors in the Lagos region, soaps are received from sub-contractors in Ilorin, PVA/Aerosol from Owerri, and industrial carton and starch from Ibadan.

In the textiles, wearing apparel, and leather industry group, while spinnards and yarn are received from sub-contractors in Ikorodu, Kano, Lagos, and Zaria, tarpaulin materials are received from sub-contractors in Zaria only. Sub-contractors in Jos, Kano, Lagos and Sokoto carry out leather tanning, while chemicals and nylon wrappers are received from sub-contractors in Ibadan and Lagos. All other items, such as dyeing, shoe finishing, buckles; clothes and soothing are received from sub-contractors within the Lagos region.

Table 2: Types of production subcontracting engaged in by firms in each industry group

Industry group	Type			
	Speciality subcontracting		Complementary subcontracting	
	No.	%)	No.	%)
Food, Beverages and Tobacco	7	00.0	0	.0
Chemical and Pharmaceuticals	21	5.45	1	.55
Domestic and Industrial Plastics and Rubber	1	00.0)	0	.0
Basic metal, Iron and Steel and Fabricated Metal products	5	00.0	0	.0
Pulp, Paper and Paper Products,Printing and Publishing	8	0.0	2	0.0
Textiles, Wearing Apparel and Leather	20	0.9	2	.1
Wood and Wood Products (including furniture)	1	00.0	0	.0
Non-metallic Mineral products	2	00.0	0	.0
Motor Vehicle and Miscellaneous Assembly	1	00.0	0	.0
Total	**66**	**7.06**	**5**	**.35**

Foam and plastic shells required in the wood and wood products (furniture) industry group are received from sub-contractors in Ibadan and Lagos. Plastic containers and cylinder turners required in non-metallic mineral products industry group are received from sub-contractors in Ibadan and Lagos. Also, cover boards, printed circuits, and tin sheeting required in the motor vehicles and miscellaneous assembly industry group are received from sub-contractors within the Lagos region.

Contractors within the Lagos region source their products/items from a variety of indiustrial areas where sub-contractors are established. For instance, in the food, beverages, and tobacco industry group, bottles required by contractors in Ikeja/Ogba/Isheri, Iganmu, Sango/Ota, and Agbara industrial estates are received from sub-contractors in Ikeja/Ogba/Isheri, Sango/Ota, and Agbara industrial areas. Crown caps required by contractors in Iganumu, Sango/Ota, and Agbara industrial estates/areas are received from sub-contractors in Sango/Ota industrial estate. Plastic crates required by contractors in Agbara industrial estate/area are received from sub-contractors in Iganmu industrial estate/area. Metal cans required by contractors in Ikeja/Ogba/Isheri and Ikorodu road/Ojota industrial estates/areas are received from sub-contractors in Ikeja/Ogba/Isheri and Sango/Ota industrial estates/areas, and malt syrup required by contractors in Ikeja/Ogba/Isheri industrial estate/area is obtained from sub-contractors within the estate. Labels required by contractors in Agbara industrial estate/area come from sub-contractors located in the Isolo industrial estate/area.

Foam and plastic shells, required by contractors in the wood and wood products industry group in Ilupeju industrial estate/area, come from sub-contractors within the estate. Plastic containers, and cylinder turner, required by contractors in non-metallic mineral products industry group in Oshodi/Agege, and Matori industrial estates/areas are received from sub-contractors located in Ikeja/Ogba/Isheri, Matori, Ilupeju, and Agbara industrial estates/areas. Cover boards, printed circuits, and tin sheets required by contractors in the motor vehicle and miscellaneous assembly industry group in Sango/Ota industrial estate/area are derived from sub-contractors located in Ikorodu road/Ojota, Yaba and Sango/Ota industrial estates/areas.

Types of relationships between contractors and sub-contractors

The type of the relationships between contractors and sub-contractors defined in terms of branch sub-contractors, subsidiary sub-contractors, independent sub-contractors, and former employee sub-contractors (see

literature) is shown in Table 3. The dominant form of relationship is independent sub-contracting. A total of 155 (90.12 percent) of all the sub-contractors are independent sub-contractors, 11 (6.39 percent) are branch sub-contractors while five (2.91 percent), and one (0.58 percent) are subsidiary sub-contractors and former employee sub-contractors respectively.

All the sub-contractors in the food, beverages and tobacco; domestic and industrial plastics and rubber; wood and wood products (including furniture); non-metallic mineral products; and motor vehicles and miscellaneous assembly industry groups are independent sub-contractors. There is only one branch sub-contractor in the chemicals and pharmaceuticals industry group. The number of branch sub-contractors is two (18.18 percent) in basic metal, in iron and steel and fabricated metal products; two (7.69 percent) in pulp, paper and paper products, printing and publishing; and six (14.29 percent) in the textiles, wearing apparel and leather industry groups. There are two (3.03 percent) subsidiary sub-contractors in chemicals and pharmaceuticals industry group, but only one (3.85 percent) subsidiary sub-contractor in pulp, paper and paper products, printing and publishing; and two (4.76 percent) in textiles, wearing apparel, and leather industry groups. There is only one (3.85 percent) former employee sub-contractor in the pulp, paper and paper products, printing and publishing industry group.

Table 4 shows the categorisation of sub-contractors in the Lagos region. While 137 (92.52 percent) of the sub-contractors are independent sub-contractors, nine (6.08 percent) are branch sub-contractors, one (0.68 percent) each is a subsidiary sub-contractor, and former employee sub-contractor. There are three and six branch sub-contractors in pulp, paper and paper products, printing and publishing; and textiles, wearing apparel and leather industry groups respectively. There is only one (1.82 percent) subsidiary sub-contractor in chemicals and pharmaceuticals; and one (4.17 percent) former employee sub-contractor in the pulp, paper and paper products, printing and publishing industry groups.

Scope of production sub-contracting

The scope of production sub-contracting pertains to the number of sub-contractors engaged, the percentage of total industrial production accounted for by production sub-contracting, and the distances over which sub-contracting linkages are carried out.

Table 3: Types of subcontracting relationships

Industry group	Type of Relationship (% in bracket)			
	Branch	**Subsidiary**	**Independent**	**Former-employee**
Food, Beverages and Tobacco	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	16 (100.0)	0 (0.0)
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals	1 (1.52)	2 (3.03)	63 (95.45)	0 (0.0)
Domestic and Industrial Plastics and Rubber	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	2 (100.0)	0 (0.0)
Basic Metal, Iron and Steel and Fabricated Metal	2 (18.18)	0 (0.0)	9 (81.82)	0 (0.0)
Pulp, Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing	2 (7.69)	1 (3.85)	22 (84.62)	1 (3.85)
Textiles, Wearing Apparel and Leather	6 (14.29)	2 (4.76)	34 (80.99)	0 (0.0)
Wood and Wood Products (including furniture)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	2 (100.0)	0 (0.0)
Non metallic mineral Products	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	4 (100.0)	0 (0.0)
Motor Vehicle and Miscellaneous Assembly	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	3 (100.0)	0 (0.0)
Total	**(6.39)**	**5 (2.91)**	**155 (90.12)**	**1 (0.58)**

Table 4: Types of subcontracting relationships between contractors and subcontractors in the Lagos region

	Types of Relationship (% in brackets)			
Industry group	**Branch**	**Subsidiary**	**Indepen-dent**	**Former Employee**
Food, Beverages and Tobacco	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	15 (100.0)	0 (0.0)
Chemicals and Pharmaccuticals	0 (0.0)	1 (1.82)	54 (98.18)	0 (0.0)
Domestic and Industrial Plastics and Rubber	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	3 (100.0)	0 (0.0)
Basic Metal, Iron and Steel and Fabricated Metal	1 (10.0)	0 (0.0)	9 (90.0)	0 (0.0)
Pulp, Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing	2 (8.33)	0 (0.0)	21 (87.5)	1 (4.17)
Textiles, Wearing Apparel and Leather	6 (18.18)	0 (0.0)	27 (81.82)	0 (0.0)
Wood and Wood Products (including furniture)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (100.0)	0 (0.0)
Non metallic mineral Products	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	4 (100.0)	0 (0.0)
Motor Vehicle and Miscellaneous Assembly	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	3 (100.0)	0 (0.0)
Total	**9 (6.08)**	**1 (0.68)**	**137 (92.57)**	**1 (0.68)**

Table 5: Number of subcontractors engaged by contracting firms

Industry group	Number of Subcontractors (% in brackets)			
	1	2	3	4
Food, Beverages and Tobacco	2 (28.57)	2 (28.57)	2 (28.57)	4 (14.29)
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals	2 (9.09)	5 (22.73)	6 (27.27)	9 (40.91)
Domestic and Industrial Plastics and Rubber	0 (0.0)	1 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Basic Metal, Iron and Steel and Fabricated Metal Products	0 (0.0)	4 (80.0)	1 (20.0)	0 (0.0)
Pulp, Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing	2 (25.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	6 (75.0)
Textiles, Wearing Apparel and Leather Products	8 (38.1)	8 (38.1)	2 (9.52)	3 (14.29)
Wood and Wood Products (including furniture)	0 (0.0)	1 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Non-metallic Mineral Products	0 (0.0)	2 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Motor Vehicle and Miscellaneous	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (100.0)	0 (0.0)
Total	**14 (20.59)**	**23 (33.84)**	**12 (17.65)**	**9 (27.94)**

Number of sub-contractors engaged

Table 5 shows that the number of sub-contractors engaged by any given contractor ranges from one to four. Over fifty percent of the contractors engaged the services of a maximum of two sub-contractors. Only 12 (17.65 percent) and 19 (27.94 percent) of the contractors engage the services of three and four sub-contractors respectively. In the food, beverages, and

tobacco industry group, two (28.57 percent) contractors engaged the services of four sub-contractors.

In the chemicals and pharmaceuticals industry group, two (9.09 percent) contractors engaged the services of only one sub-contractor each, five (22.73 percent) contractors used the services of two sub-contractors each, six (27.27 percent) and nine (40.91 percent) contractors were serviced by three and four sub-contractors respectively. In the textiles, wearing apparel, and leather industry group, eight (38.1 percent) contractors engaged the services of one sub-contractor each. Another eight (38.1 percent) contractors used the services of two sub-contractors each while two (9.52 percent) had four sub-contractors each. On the average, each of the contractors in this industry group engaged the services of three sub-contractors.

Percentage of total production accounted for by production sub-contracting

It is only in the motor vehicles and miscellaneous assembly industry group that production sub-contracting accounted for more than thirty percent of the total costs of production by the contracting firms in any of the years. Production sub-contracting accounted for about 20 percent of the total costs of production in the other industry groups in any one year.

In spite of the generally low level of the total costs of production accounted for by production sub-contracting, a few of the industry groups show evidence of increased sub-contracting activities over the years. For instance, in the chemicals and pharmaceutical industry group, the number of firms where the percentage of total costs of production accounted for by production sub-contracting is more than 20 percent increased from four (22.77 percent) in 1990 to seven (36.37 percent) by 1994. Similarly, in the textile, wearing apparel and leather industry group, the number of contracting firms where the percentage of total costs of production accounted for by production sub-contracting is more than 20 percent increased from seven (33.33 percent) in 1990 to 10 (47.62 percent) by 1994.

Distances over which sub-contracting and carried out

Regarding the distances over which sub-contracting are carried out, Table 6 indicates that 144 (83.72 percent) of the sub-contractors are located between one and 40 kilometres from the contractors. While all the industry groups subcontract within this range, six of the industry groups subcontract to locations beyond 40 kilometres. These industry groups are

food, beverages and tobacco; chemicals and pharmaceuticals; basic metal, iron and steel and fabricated metal products industry groups. Others are pulp, paper, and paper products, printing and publishing; wood and wood products (including furniture) and textiles, wearing apparel and leather industry groups. In fact, sub-contracting linkages, in some instances, are carried out at distances beyond two hundred kilometers. However, only 28 (16.28 percent) of the sub-contractors are located at distances of more than 200 kilometres from the contractors. Some 49 (33.11 percent) of the sub-contractors in the Lagos region are located at distances not more than five kilometres from the contractors, and 30 (20.27 percent) at distances between six and 10 kilometres. This implies therefore that over 50 percent of the sub-contractors are located at distances not more than 10 kilometres away from the contractors.

While 21 (14.19 percent) of the sub-contractors are located at distances between 26 and 30 kilometres, 10 (13.19 percent) are located at distances above 30 kilometres, It is only in food, beverages and tobacco, chemicals and pharmaceuticals; and motor vehicles and miscellaneous assembly industry groups that sub-contractors are located at distances above 30 kilometres. It is obvious from the foregoing that sub-contracting is mainly carried out over short distances.

Perceived significance of production Sub-contracting

Perceptions among contractors regarding the importance of sub-contracting are analysed in this section. The analysis is based on the responses of the 68 contracting firms in the study area, Lagos region. Production sub-contracting became very important after the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in Nigeria in 1986. Only five (55.5 percent) of the industry groups perceived production sub-contracting as very important before SAP. The level of importance in these industries range from 32 percent in the textile, wearing apparel and leather industry group to as much as 80 percent in the food, beverages and tobacco industry group.

The situation after the introduction of SAP was such that seven (77.78 percent) of the industry groups indicated that production sub-contracting was very important. The level of importance in these industry groups ranged from 50 percent in the basic metals, iron and steel and fabricated metals industry group to as much as 100 percent in the motor vehicles, and miscellaneous assembly industry group. The level of importance is 50 percent in chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and 63.57 percent in pulp, paper and paper products, printing and publishing industry groups. Responses indi-

Table 6: Distances over which subcontracting is carried out (in %)

Industry Group	1–40	41–80	81–120	121–160	161–200	200+
Food, Beverages and Tobacco	15 (93.75)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (6.25
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals	53 (80.30)	5 (7.58)	0 (0.0)	3 (4.55)	0 (0.0)	5 (7.58)
Domestic and Industrial Plastics and Rubber	2 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0.(0.0)	0(0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Basic metal, Iron and Steel and Steel andFabricated Metal Products	10 (90.91)	0.(0.0)	0 (0.0)	0(0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (9.09)
Pulp, paper and paper Products Printing and Publishing	24 (92.31)	0(0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (3.85)
Textiles, Wearing Apparel and Leather Products	32 (76.19)	1 (2.38)	0 (0.0)	0(0.0)	0(0.0)	9 (21.43)
Wood and Wood Products (including furniture)	1 (50.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (50.0)	0 (0.0)	0(0.0)
Non-metallicMineral Products	4 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0(0.0)
Motor Vehicle and Miscellaneous	3 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0(0.0)
Total	**144 (83.72)**	**6 (3.49)**	**0 (0.0)**	**5 (2.91)**	**0 (0.0)**	**17 (9.88)**

cated that production sub-contracting was perceived as most useful in reducing the costs of production, while it was considered as less useful at improving labour crisis management and the enhancement of research and development (R&D). The foregoing analysis tends to support the assertion in the literature that production sub-contracting increases during a downturn in an economy.

Summary and policy implications of study

This paper shows that whether in terms of number of contractors involved or volume of production sub-contracting, the textiles, wearing apparels and leather industry group dominates the production sub-contracting scene. While the number of sub-contractors engaged by any contracting firm ranged from one to a maximum of four, over fifty percent of the contractors engaged the services of a maximum of two sub-contractors. The number of sub-contractors engaged varied markedly especially in the food, beverages and tobacco; chemicals and pharmaceuticals and textiles, wearing apparel and leather industry groups. The dominant form of sub-contracting was speciality sub-contracting, mainly carried out by independent sub-contractors over short distances. Production sub-contracting became very important after the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), and it was perceived by industrialists as very important in reducing the costs of production.

The research findings have implications for the development of indigenous independent entrepreneruship in particular and the industrial development of Nigeria in general. The increasing rate of production sub-contracting could be harnessed to develop indigenous entrepreneurship (see Mabogunje 1990). This is especially so as the dominant form of production sub-contracting is specialised sub-contracting carried out by independent sub-contractors. The Japanese experience shows that the promotion of industrial sub-contracting in economic development is largely motivated by the participation of small entrepreneurs. Such motivation could be in either of two forms. On the one hand is the encouragement of retirees to set up small business units with the motive of producing parts or sub-assembly of products. Such retirees will be more able to bring their experiences, acquired over the years, to bear on part production or sub-assembly of products, based on mutual trust. This kind of encouragement could be in the form of assisting such retirees to set up small business units or by providing the required capital or both. On the other hand, the government is involved in the setting up and in facilitating collaborative ventures between large and small scale enterprises, especially in the hinterlands.

The policy implications of this study are that production sub-contracting strategy could be used in effecting a more even distribution of industrial activities in all parts of Nigeria. No doubt, the development of transport and communication facilities will enhance the development of hinterlands sub-contractors. In addition, the government's initiative in encouraging the local manufacture of industrial products hitherto imported could be enhanced through the promotion of production sub-contractors. The sub-contracting of specialised aspects of industrial production could be better explored for the development of indigenous entrepreneurship. As a part of the privitisation and liberalisation programmes, sub-contracting of components or sub-assembly of products could further be harnessed to launch Nigeria into the desired goal of industrialisation. The development of the Export Processing Zone (EPZ) will facilitate the development of production sub-contracting. Production sub-contracting, is in fact a strategy for mobilising both human and material resources for industrial development.

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Globalisation, Institutional Arrangements and Poverty in Rural Cameroon

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Abstract

This paper posits that the institutional environment, which is constantly modified by the forces of globalisation, significantly influences access to and returns on primary assets that determine poverty outcomes in rural societies. Within the framework of institutional economics related to globalisation, rural institutions and poverty, the paper (1) identifies monetary and exchange rate arrangements, public debt burden, democratic culture and rent-seeking, openness and obstacles to international trade, economic and structural reforms, and NGO activities as the main channels by which the forces of globalisation permeate down to the rural poor and (2) considers changes in land tenure arrangements, rural financial markets and marketing of agricultural products as important within the institutional environment that determines the capacity of rural dwellers to build on and derive returns from their primary asset endowments. Good governance is viewed as crucial in curbing socio-economic difficulties and poverty in rural Cameroon.

Résumé

Le présent article cherche à montrer que l'environnement institutionnel, qui est constamment modifié par les effets de la mondialisation, exerce une grande influence sur l'acquisition et les bénéfices des ressources 'primaires' qui déterminent les effets de la pauvreté en milieu rural. Dans le cadre de l'économie institutionnelle mettant en rapport la mondialisation, institutions du milieu rural et la pauvreté, l'article identifie en premier lieu, les politiques monétaires et de taux de change, le poids de la dette publique, la culture démocratique et la recherche effrénée des gains, l'ouverture et les obstacles au commerce extérieure, les réformes économiques et structurelles, et les activités des ONG comme principaux moyens par lesquels les effets de la mondialisation atteignent les populations pauvres des zones rurales. En deuxième lieu, il examine les changements relatifs aux règlements fonciers, aux marchés financiers ruraux et à l'écoulement des produits agricoles en tant qu'éléments essentiels dans l'environnement institutionnel qui détermine la capacité des populations des zones rurales à accroître leur

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dotation en ressources 'premières' et d'en tirer des bénéfices. Enfin, l'étude présente la bonne gouvernance comme constituant un facteur essentiel pour la réduction des problèmes socio-économiques et de la pauvreté en milieu rural Camerounais.

Introduction

After the remarkable success of the post-war Marshall Plan assistance to Europe, foreign aid in the form of investment capital was brought to the fore as a credible policy prescription, which could be transplanted to stimulate growth in less-developed countries (LDCs). With the disappointing experience of foreign aid in the LDCs in the 1960s, the concept of capital was widened to include human capital whose scarcity was considered another critical obstacle to development in poor countries. While both physical and human capital accumulation are indispensable for economic growth and development, the problem of economic progress in developing countries appears to be more complex. This view is buttressed by the observations that (1) high rates of physical capital accumulation in most developing countries have been accompanied only by modest economic growth, and (2) some countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South America achieved rapid expansion in education, but growth failed to follow (Clague 1997).

In this regard, the importance previously ascribed to foreign aid or indigenous physical and human capital accumulation has recently been waning because of the growing forces of globalisation. It is becoming increasingly apparent that creating an enabling environment in a given country would attract both private physical and human capital that would foster growth and development. Hence, to encourage the entry and accommodation of existing investment resources, as well as augment their productivity, the focus needs to be extended to include the incentive structures that lead to the accumulation or attraction of physical and human capital. These incentive structures represent aspects of the institutional environment, as it is progressively being recognised that attempts in understanding and explaining the determinants and consequences of institutional arrangements can help in the analysis of the problems of poor countries (North 1990).

These institutional arrangements include community culture, which is the set of norms, attitudes and values of an entire community that induce individuals to behave in particular ways. This links with Commons's (1961) characterisation of institutions as 'collective action in control of individual actions'. Community culture tends to reinforce and be reinforced by specific patterns of behavioural innovations in the community such as corrup-

tion and democratic culture. It is, therefore, obvious that the formally sanctioned behaviour patterns and associated cultural norms can be serious obstacles or incentives to economic progress whose trickle-down effects influence the welfare outcomes of rural communities.

The majority of people suffering from abject poverty in Cameroon live in rural areas and are engaged mainly in agriculture-related activities (Fambon et al 2000; Njinkeu et al 1997; World Bank 1995). A credible way of responding to the plight of the rural poor is to facilitate their access to economic assets that are essential for their survival and well-being. Economic assets in this context include primary assets (natural, physical, human and financial) and secondary assets (formal and informal institutional environment) (Nissanke 2000). Poverty results from a deficiency in the level of and returns on primary assets, a situation that is the outcome of economic, social and political processes, and their interactions, which are mediated through a wide range of institutions – both formal and informal. Institutional structures that motivate and regulate actions and interactions of economic agents have two effects – a set of incentives and a set of constraints. It is the influence of these two effects on poverty outcomes in the context of globalisation that this study attempts to illustrate.

The main focus of this paper is to explore the impact of globalisation and rural institutional arrangements on poverty outcomes in Cameroon. The specific objectives are to (1) identify channels by which globalisation impacts on the asset characteristics of the poor, and (2) examine the institutional environment that determines the capacity of households to build and enhance returns on primary assets in the process of globalisation. These objectives are guided by the view that the institutional environment, which is constantly modified by the forces of globalisation, significantly influences the welfare of the rural people. The rest of the paper is in four parts. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework that links poverty to globalisation and rural institutions. Section 2 discusses the vectors of globalisation that impact on poverty outcomes. Section 4 relates rural institutional arrangements to assets holdings that affect poverty outcomes, and Section 5 pools the various strands of the paper into concluding remarks.

Conceptual framework

This section presents the concepts of globalisation, institutions and poverty, and shows how they may interact to determine the welfare outcomes of the rural people.

Concept of globalisation

Globalisation is often taken to mean the increasing depth of economic interaction among countries reflected in (1) an increasing share of imports and exports in GDP, (2) increasing share of foreign capital in domestic investment, (3) increased financial integration among countries and (4) greater harmonisation of domestic laws and standards with well established norms. Globalisation can provide immense opportunities for a small open economy like Cameroon to accelerate its development process. These opportunities centre on access to world financial, commodity, labour and technological markets that enhance the potential for exploiting comparative advantages and the opportunity for greater capacity utilisation. Successful participation in the global economy, however, requires the achievement of stability in key macro-economic issues such as maintaining low inflation, sustainable budget deficits, stable and appropriate real interest rates, and appropriate and stable real exchange rates (Rodrik 1996).

Globalisation is viewed as an inevitable process that is driven by new technological innovations, market forces, as well as inescapable socio-political forces. Successfully participating in the process of globalisation is, however, not neutral to policy, but a policy-induced condition. In this regard, trade and financial liberalisation is seen, along with other market-based structural and institutional reforms such as privatisation, legal and other regulatory systems, as a *sine qua non* of a successful integration into a globalising world economy (Nissanke 2000). Mere integration into the international economy, *per se*, does not necessarily ensure benefits. Since the current phase of globalisation is taking place in an environment of global instability, characterised by the rapid expansion of global financial markets, the risks and costs involved in integration can be large for fragile economies.[1] Before reaching the rural people, the effects of globalisation are transmitted through a wide range of institutions, which may mitigate or aggravate these effects. The next sub-section is, therefore, devoted to the concept of institutions.

The concept of institutions

We consider institutions here as governance structures (the gamut of rules and regulations) imposed by both formal and informal arrangements that regulate the way economic agents – organisations, businesses and individuals – (1) articulate their interests, (2) exercise their rights and obligations, and (3) mediate their differences in the process of asset acquisition (Baye et al 2002). This perception of institutions is well articulated by North (1990) where he asserts that institutions are the humanly devised

constraints that shape human interaction. By defining and limiting the set of choices of individuals, institutions structure incentives in human exchange in the political, social and economic domains. Institutions can be (1) formal rules, regulations and enforcement, which include political, judicial and economic rules and contracts, or (2) informal constraints, which refer to conventions, codes of conduct and norms of behaviour that are culture-specific. Hence, as North (1990) intimated, the same formal rules and constitutions could produce different outcomes if they were applied to different societies. A good example here is the variation in the outcomes of the democratic culture imposed by the 'winds of change' that swept through sub-Saharan Africa from the 1990s.

Whether rules are formally written down and enforced by officials or are unwritten and informally sanctioned, the respect or non-respect of these rules depend on the credibility of the prescribed or implied punishment strategies. The rules need not be uniformly obeyed to be considered institutions, but the concept does imply some degree of rule obedience (Clague 1997). If the rules were generally ignored, we would not refer to them as institutions. Institutions can be classified into three categories – constitutional order, governance structure of organisations, and cultural endowments.[2]

As North (1992) observes, the subjective perceptions that may prompt economic or political 'entrepreneurs' to contemplate institutional changes are partly culturally derived, partly acquired through experience and partly through training. Sources of institutional changes are both externally and internally driven. External changes in the institutional environment may be sanctioned through changes in relative prices, which are often the most important source of institutional change, or through the process of indigenisation of the western-style democratic culture. Internal sources are manifested through education and training, which may suggest to the entrepreneurs new opportunity sets that lead to institutional changes. Institutional changes, however, are generally motivated by some blend of external changes and internal learning, which determines choices available to the leadership of organisations. Interest in setting-up new institutions or modifying existing ones is based on the recognition that they significantly affect access to and returns on primary assets, which determine poverty outcomes, especially in rural areas. It is therefore important to discuss the concept of poverty.

The concept of poverty

The concept of poverty covers both monetary and non-monetary aspects. Monetary poverty can be considered as an absolute concept (see Ravallion 1994), or a relative concept (see Ali 1997). As an absolute concept, poverty may be defined as the inability of an individual (or household) to command sufficient resources (or assets) to satisfy basic needs. These basic needs may include food, clothing, shelter, health care and other non-food necessities of life (Fields 1997), which may vary from one society to another. These requirements are evaluated and expressed in local monetary units as the poverty line. The relevant unit – individual or household – is then classified as poor if its income (or consumption) is below the poverty line and non-poor if it is above. As a relative concept, the poverty line can be measured, for instance, as the average real income of the poorest 40 percent of the population. In this context, the poverty line is augmented in proportion to increases in the mean income (or expenditure), that is, the richer the population in which poverty is being measured, the higher the poverty line.

The World Bank (2000) draft report on poverty and development as reviewed by Nissanke (2000), takes a specific position with respect to the concept of poverty and the effects of globalisation. In particular, (1) poverty is viewed as a multidimensional phenomenon arising out of complex interactions between primary and secondary assets and (2) global trends present extraordinary opportunities for poverty reduction, but also extraordinary risks: growing inequality, marginalisation and social explosion. A critical concern, therefore, is how to manage these risks in order to make the most of the opportunities. Multidimensionality is the perception of poverty held in this paper.

Globalisation – institutions – rural poverty linkages

Poverty results from a deficiency in the level of and returns on primary assets, a situation, which is the outcome of economic, social and political processes, as well as their interactions. These interactions are mediated through a wide range of institutions. Nissanke (2000), inspired by the World Bank (2000) draft report on Poverty and Development, classifies the multitude of assets highlighted in the draft report into two main categories – primary assets and secondary assets. Primary assets can be sub-divided into four groups, comprising (1) natural assets (land, pastures, forests, fisheries, water etc); 2) human assets (household composition and size, health and nutritional status, education and skills), (3) physical assets (productive and household assets, livestock and food stocks), and (4) financial assets (cash, savings, access to credit and insurance markets). Poverty at

the individual level is seen as caused by a blend of low levels of primary assets, low returns on these assets, and high volatility in returns on these assets.

Secondary assets encompass the entire institutional environment that affects and determines the level of and returns on primary assets, which individuals possess. The institutional environment is, therefore, composed of all market and non-market formal and informal arrangements that may influence poverty outcomes. The institutional environment also affects and determines the distributional mechanisms of the returns on primary assets. By the same token, changes in the institutional environment could act as a constraint on primary asset accumulation and their returns or provide the poor with new opportunities to access different primary assets or extract higher returns from existing ones. Thus, the institutional environment can have a profound effect on inequality and poverty profiles of a given society. Secondary assets within this framework of analysis may include those governing (1) gender relations, (2) land tenure arrangements (3) technology and productivity, (4) rural financial markets, and (5) marketing of agricultural products.

The level of and returns on primary assets, as well as the volatility of returns on those assets are usually affected by both micro and macroeconomic policies, and overall economic conditions. Since these economic conditions in general, and government policies in particular, have been changing as the economy opens up to international trade, capital, technology flows, and democratic culture, the poverty outcomes, including asset characteristics of the poor, would be subject to globalisation effects. Moreover, liberalisation and other requisites of structural adjustment policies in Africa have not only brought about substantial changes in relative prices in both goods market and factor markets, but also considerable amendments in rural institutions and their interactions with each other (Nissanke 2000). Yet, economic policies are executed directly or indirectly within the ambit of the institutional environment that is constantly changing, and whose effects on the level and returns of primary assets naturally trickle-down to the rural poor.

This framework of analysis goes beyond the conventional economic analysis of the determinants of poverty.[3] This is done by explicitly recognising that individuals interact with each other not just through markets, but through a myriad of institutional arrangements that include markets, whose main facets are changing because of the effects of globalisation. Consequently, this framework considers poverty not just as a function of the level of income/expenditure, but also a function of the institutional

Figure 1: Globalisation – Institutions – Rural Poverty Linkage Framework



environment and the effects of globalisation. Such an analysis is therefore more robust than the conventional analysis, and is capable of filling the knowledge gaps that exist when an attempt is made to explain the causes of poverty in any given society.

Figure 1 proposes a simple framework that attempts to capture the linkages between globalisation, institutions and rural poverty. Vectors of globalisation influence the institutional environment, which in turn generates a series of incentives as well as constraints that have an impact on primary asset holdings that determine rural poverty outcomes. The forces of globalisation may still influence these incentives and constraints directly, intensifying them or mitigating their influences on primary asset holdings, which again determine rural poverty profiles. Incentives reduce rural poverty while constraints worsen the poverty situation through their influence on access to and returns on primary assets. The effects of globalisation can also be transmitted directly to influence the primary asset holdings and thus, the poverty outcomes of the rural people. The outcome of activities in the rural economy may also transmit signals that influence changes in both the formal and informal institutional environment. As concerns the global environment, rural communities and the institutional environment are considered too small to exert any real influence on it.

Channels of globalisation and rural poverty

Cameroon is a country endowed with abundant natural and diversified cultural resources. It fared well until the second half of the 1980s, when world prices of its commodities plummeted. The over-valuation of the CFA franc against the US dollar – a currency in which most of Cameroon's exports are quoted – and the structural deficiencies of the country also accounted for the economic crisis. The severity of the crisis plus external pressures led managers of the country to abandon the long-term development planning system pursued since independence[4] and adopt the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes (SAP) from 1988. The intensity of the crisis introduced an array of structural and behavioural changes, some of which, inevitably, led to significant institutional changes that affected rural poverty outcomes.

Although poverty existed in Cameroon before, it became more pronounced in the 1990s. This worsening poverty situation was blamed, at least in part, on poor macro-economic performance and the short-term effects of the ensuing policies designed to redress the situation. In the discussion that follows, we examine vectors through which the effects of globalisation impact on the welfare outcomes of people in rural Cameroon.

Six channels are identified and discussed for this purpose, viz. (1) monetary and exchange rate arrangements, (2) public debt burden, (3) democratic culture and rent-seeking, (4) openness of the economy and obstacles to international trade, (5) economic and structural reforms, and (6) NGO activities in rural Cameroon.

Monetary and exchange rate arrangements

Cameroon is a member of the Central African Franc Zone, with a Central Bank – BEAC.[5] Members maintained a fixed parity of CFAF50 to 1FF (French Franc) until 12 January 1994 when the CFA was devalued to CFAF100 to 1FF after a decision by member states. The BEAC zone is governed by a number of principles, namely (1) use of the same currency among members and hence, a common foreign exchange policy with the rest of the world, (2) pooling of the zone's reserves, (3) full convertibility of the CFAF to the FF through an operations account (Compte d'Operations) kept at the French Treasury, and (4) a loan facility for each member of not more than 20 percent of her previous year's tax revenue from the Central Bank.

The fact that member countries are obliged to hold at least two-thirds of their reserves in the operations account is quite constraining, but this is the price to be paid for the full convertibility of the CFAF into the FF, and through the FF into the EURO, which absorbed the FF from 1 January 2002. As a group, BEAC countries appear to have benefited from the discipline imposed by the need to co-ordinate monetary policies within member states. The need for co-ordinating monetary policies, however, imposes constraints on individual member countries. Some policies such as monetary growth and nominal exchange rate changes must be co-ordinated. Although this facilitates the control of inflation in the region, it might be at the cost of output and employment objectives pursued by the individual governments. This puts a greater burden on other policy instruments for maintaining balance of payments (BOP) equilibrium, particularly on fiscal and wage policies.

When the real exchange rate of the CFA against currencies of Cameroon's major trading partners was overvalued prior to 1994, food commodities and other consumer goods were imported more cheaply into the country. Prices paid to local producers for similar commodities were depressed. This reduced returns on primary assets and the welfare of their holders. Overvaluation, therefore, acted as a subsidy on imports and a tax on local producers. It diminished the competitive strength of domestic producers and reduced their production incentives accordingly.

Overvaluation, however, reduced the cost of external debt servicing in local currency terms. With the 1994 realignment, the external debt burden more than doubled. Local producers were supposed to benefit on the commodity export-side and lose on the fertiliser and other inputs import-side. Farmers suffered a cost-price squeeze that drastically reduced their incomes. The high cost of inputs resulting from foreign exchange rate changes, and over-production of their main export crops by other regions of the world, depressed output prices on the world market. Farmers consequently abandoned their coffee and cocoa farms. The net outcome was low incomes for farmers in an environment where incomes from these cash crops had sustained families over the years.

Public debt situation

Globalisation can also be viewed as an economic phenomenon characterised by the adoption of international agreements aimed at enhancing mobility of capital resources between countries. Foreign capital inflows do fill in the gaps or shortfalls in investment expenditures in many countries, notably the developing nations. Repayment of debts contracted this way or otherwise has been problematic for many developing countries, especially those that depend on natural resources. These countries can be victims of wild swings in prices on the world market and this affect their ability to service their debts. Indebtedness and debt servicing and repayment in poor countries raise issues of great concern to the welfare of their people, notably the rural poor.

Most of Cameroon's debt burden was fuelled by bilateral loans with 'strings', which obliged the country to import technical expertise and/or goods and services from the creditor country. This lack of freedom to take advantage of competition on the international market of goods and services led to extra costs, which compounded the debt burden through over-billing, high prices and monopoly-like practices. A significant proportion of some of the loans contracted to carry out rural development projects were diverted into private pockets, a situation that further perpetuated inequality in the distribution of income. The debt indicators presented in Table 1 show, starting from the early 1980s, the deterioration in Cameroon's debt situation over time. This dismal debt situation can be attributed to (1) the ease with which the country contracted loans in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the economy was booming, (2) the duration of the economic crisis that started in the mid 1980s, and (3) the collapse in export commodity prices, which reduced the capacity to reimburse previous debt obligations.

Table 1: Some indicators of Cameroon's Public Debt (in billion CFA francs or otherwise as indicated)

	1982	1985	1989	1990	1992	1994	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
External Debt	426	858	1318	1503	1987	4243	4456	4271	4079	4656	4874
Debt servicing owed (a) (in million dollars)						670	1131	1045	915	992	
Debt servicing paid (b)(in million dollars)						307	510	396	768	590	
Gap (a-b) (in million dollars)						363	624	649	147	590	
Debt Servicing./ Social Expenditure. (%)					1.13	1.64	3.77	6.03	5.47	1.84	
Effective Total Debt Service / Gov't Revenue (%)		20.7	6.04	14.47	14.53	12.08	18.17	15.82	18.06	20.05	26.7
External Debt Stock. / GDP. (%)		14.9	23.49	27.82	40.06	57.2	97.28	91.09	82.98	78.98	83.3
External Debt Stock. / Export (%)		71.9	389	192.2	275.8	473.5	535.6	575.8	459.4	393.8	312

Source: Cameroon's Debt Management Fund (CAA, French acronym) [6] and IMF.

External debt can affect investment in three ways: (1) debt servicing and repayment involves a withdrawal of funds from the debtor economy, which means a reduction of resources available for public investment in key development sectors such as road infrastructure, health, education and rural development projects, (2) the anticipated 'tax' that future servicing of debts implies reduces the expected returns from investment and hence, employment, and (3) external debt can affect investment as a result of 'debt overhang'[7]. In this regard, as the economic performance of the debtor country improves, part of the proceeds from all investments would, at least in part, go to its creditors rather than be used by the country itself to ameliorate the welfare of its citizens.

An important feature of the Cameroon debt situation is that most of the debts were contracted by the public sector. This was based on the structure of the economy where the rural sector produced the cash crops, but a public sector mechanism - the marketing board – was responsible for the sales. Output from the rural areas was thus a sort of guarantee for the repayment of debts that were contracted. Unfortunately, Cameroon became a victim of fluctuations in world market prices that led to shortfalls in government revenues. Rural areas were doubly victimised because (1) payments for their produce dropped, and (2) public sector investments in infrastructure, health, education and extension services were no longer possible in many rural areas because of the shortfall in the government investment budget.

There is, however, an emerging consensus among creditors, debtors and the civil society that the HIPC initiative is likely to be a more credible means of helping Africa out of her debt problems, and hence poverty.[8] This is because, unlike previous initiatives, it touches both on bilateral and multilateral debt cancellation and resources are effectively generated and 'saved' for development purposes in the debtor countries. Cameroon reached the 'decision point' of the HIPC initiative in October 2000 and has started benefiting from interim debt cancellation. Although the outcome of the HIPC initiative on poverty alleviation is still a matter of 'wait and see', if the funds 'saved' from it are well used in the social sector, the welfare situation of the poor will improve. However, if they are mismanaged, then the poverty burden may even become heavier. Cameroon submitted its final Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) to the Executive Boards of the World Bank and IMF in April 2003. Success in

implementing the PRSP is subject to constructive achievements in the domain of good governance.

Democratic culture and rent-seeking

Democracy is a complex set of checks and balances to ensure good governance. For democratic culture to prevail in a country like Cameroon, a number of conditions are needed. The first of these is the presence of a democratic state, the second a free and vibrant civil society, the third the existence of effective institutions that ensure the rights and liberties of the citizens, and the fourth a free and objective press.

The difficulties Cameroon is facing today stem, at least in part, from changes in the international environment and the delays in coping with them. In 1966, a few years after independence, Cameroon moved from a multiparty state to a one-party state. The reasons for this move, according to the political 'entrepreneurs' of the time, were that the multiparty system was too expensive and slowed down economic progress. During the years of the one-party state (1966–1990), the country was effectively under the excessive weight of the Executive.

With the near collapse of the economy in the mid 1980s, it turned out that the one-party one-man rule could no longer deliver the goods. State authority dwindled and the probability of arresting and punishing lawbreakers declined as the number of violators increased. Through international pressure and internal agitation in the early 1990s, Cameroon introduced some elements of a democratic state,[9] but within a background where the morale of the population had been destroyed by the one-party system. A rent-seeking elite developed, using the political dispensation to perpetuate its hegemony. Corruption increased and the extent of inequality exacerbated because access to public services was and is still mainly obtained through the very vibrant and expensive *black market*, which sometimes involves patronage. Politically inspired tribal hatred that sometimes led to death and loss of property was encouraged by unscrupulous elite with a view to reaping fall-outs when called upon by political 'entrepreneurs' to act as brokers.

The spread of political pluralism can only help strengthen democratic culture in Cameroon, if and only if, the participation of the people is solicited. Participation of the rural poor can best be achieved through decentralisation since the majority of people live in the countryside. Decentralisation will guarantee local self-governance and draw on the historical and contemporary experiences of the country to build a democratic nation. For practical purposes, there is a need for civic education to enlighten the

rural people concerning their rights in making institutions accountable. Rural people generally view the government as a monster that is sometimes benevolent by providing them some amenities, and sometimes is wicked by extracting taxes from them without providing them any benefits.

The outcome of introducing elements of a democratic culture has unfortunately reinforced tribalism instead of political pluralism, as reflected in the unevenness in the spatial distribution of administrative portfolios. The rural poor are preyed upon by the political actors and are reduced to hand clappers and passive animators (especially women), at the mercy of some elite figures, who dishonestly obtain their votes during 'multiparty' elections. At the end of the day, the citizens are even deprived of justice in a rent-seeking judicial system as they lack *bribe money* required to navigate through judicial procedures.

Openness and constraints to international trade

Computing the degree of openness and the net foreign direct investment-GDP ratio can capture some facets of the extent of Cameroon's insertion into the global economy. The general indication as shown in Table 2 is that Cameroon was more open to the global economy in the early 1980s than at any other period since then. This observation is supported by the ratio of net foreign direct investment, which suggests an important inflow of foreign capital, even if it was mainly absorbed by the oil sector. From the latter half of the 1980s, Cameroon's participation in the global economy weakened as she plunged deep into economic crisis. Disinvestments followed (negative sign of the ratio of net foreign direct investment) as confidence crisis in the management of the economy deepened. The 1994 CFA devaluation somewhat enhanced Cameroon's international participation, and the ratio of net direct investment subsequently turned positive.

The liberalisation of the audio-visual and information landscape has witnessed the opening up of private radio and television stations and private operators are now doing business in the telecommunications and Internet distribution sectors. Although the Internet is considered as one of the main vectors of globalisation, duties on imported communication equipment are considered high. The 2001/2002 Finance Law, however, cut down duties on the imported computers (excluding computer accessories) up to fiscal year 2003[10] with a view to increasing the quest and taste for these new information and communication technologies. These technologies are still impractical in most rural areas, which have no telephone services.

The slowdown in economic activities in the industrialised countries subsequent to the 'September 11' events (terrorist attacks) in the United States

and the wars that ensued are being translated into deteriorating terms of trade for Cameroon. These have implications for the rural poor, since the momentum of implementing poverty reduction strategies will likely be slowed down because of shortfalls in previously budgeted financial resources.[11]

Table 2: Indicators of the degree of Cameroon's insertion into the global economy (in %)

	Average Propensity to Export	Average Propensity to Import	Degree of Openness	Ratio of net Foreign direct Investment
1981/82	23.34	18.49	41.84	1.34
1982/83	25	16.41	41.4	1.11
1983/84	25.34	14.49	39.83	1.85
1984/85	14.83	12.38	27.21	2.46
1985/86	19.01	16.16	35.17	0.6
1986/87	12.96	14.24	27.19	1.98
1987/88	12.2	11.87	24.07	0.52
1988/89	15.28	11.45	26.73	-0.28
1989/90	16.61	12.42	29.03	0.82
1990/91	16.42	11.48	27.91	-0.94
1991/92	16.32	9.8	26.12	-0.56
1992/93	13.4	9.32	22.72	-0.19
1993/94	17.67	9.4	27.07	-0.51
1994/95	19.6	11.23	30.83	-0.73
1995/96	18.03	12.57	30.6	-0.54
1996/97	19.52	14.07	33.59	0.88
1997/98	20.53	16.56	37.09	0.88
1998/99	17.14	15.26	32.4	N/A
1999/00	18.95	15.81	34.76	N/A

Sources: Computed by author with data from BEAC and Ministry of Finance and the Budget.
Note: The GDP is the denominator in all the indicators computed.

Transaction costs in Cameroon are still relatively high as reflected in (1) the slow and cumbersome administrative procedures as well as delays in the settlement of commercial and civil litigations,(2) the many police check-points on the highways and the general poor state of the road infrastructure as well as insufficiency in storage facilities, which all have serious consequences for the development of exports, (3) the fact that the Douala

port, which is the main transit port in Cameroon, is the most expensive port on the West African Coast, notwithstanding the recently set up of one-stop export taxes and duties window at the Douala port, which is a timely move to reduce bottlenecks, (4) the poor and comparatively costly telecommunication facilities, (5) the very limited access of exporters to bank loans due to the prohibitive nature of required collateral and the absence of specialised financial institutions, and (6) the observation that some powerbrokers gain from and seek to maintain the *status quo.*

It is now recognised that the poor quality of products and production processes in Cameroon are the root causes of poor competitive positions, lower employment levels, underdeveloped research and development capabilities, few opportunities in supply networks and joint ventures, and a smaller tax base. Improving quality is the basis of enhanced competitiveness, and with the present globalisation trends, continuous quality improvement is a major factor in attracting investment. Similarly, standardisation and technological regulations are increasingly becoming essential to trade and transfer of technology, given that they are sometimes used as important non-tariff barriers to trade. In some industries, for instance, wholesalers, industrial partners and potential investors may demand evidence of compliance with international standards.

Economic and structural reforms

In an effort to redress the dismal economic situation, Cameroon adopted the IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Programme in 1988. The government engaged in a series of expenditure-reducing and expenditure-switching measures. The expenditure-reducing measures included (1) liquidating non-profit making public enterprises and privatising some marginal profit making ones, (2) reducing public expenditure on education, road infrastructure, extension services, rural water and electrification as well as health care services, (3) freezing advancements of public sector workers, (4) drastically reducing the salaries of public sector workers by about 60 percent on the average in January and November 1993, and (5) retrenching public and semi-public sector workers from the early 1990s.

After implementing all these measures, it became apparent that expenditure-reducing measures alone could not overturn the dismal economic outlook. That is why an expenditure-switching component was added. With a view to enhancing the global competitiveness of the economy, a 50 percent devaluation of the CFA franc against the French franc was effected on 12 January 1994. As a centrepiece of adjustment, devaluation was intended to slowdown domestic absorption of imported goods as the

level of foreign prices increased in domestic currency terms, and to reallocate resources away from non-tradable to tradable commodities, especially agricultural exports. This was a measure to boost the rural economy. Unfortunately, the cost–price squeeze the rural sector suffered worsened the poverty situation.

The expenditure-reducing measures aggravated the burden on the poor, extending the dimension of their deprivation to include social, political, moral and spiritual poverty. This manifested itself in many ways, including high rates of infant mortality, low levels of literacy, reduction in life expectancy attributed to the spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, limited access to medical facilities, environmental degradation and corrupt practices.

In Cameroon before now, the poor were located mainly in the rural areas and engaged primarily in small-scale agriculture and its related activities. The advent of the economic crisis and its associated policy responses introduced a new poverty class in Cameroon (Baye 1998). This new category of the poor is comprised of civil servants, state employees, retrenched workers, retired public sector workers, and unemployed certificated school-leavers.

The price hikes resulting from the 50 percent devaluation of the CFA franc and the meagre salaries following the double salary cuts (about 60 percent) pushed many Cameroonian public sector workers towards the consumption of second-hand goods from Europe including items of clothing, household equipment, cars etc.[12] The nutritional status of most public sector workers deteriorated sharply as priority was given more to quantity than quality. Foodstuffs like cocoyams and cassava products, formerly regarded as inferior, were then prominent in the diet of most households. Financial assistance to relatives in the village was curtailed and this led to more hardship in the rural areas. An increasing number of public sector workers and/or their relatives in rural areas did not have access to or could not afford health services. This led to the emergence of roadside vendors of both modern and traditional medicine – a potential hazard to public health.

Activities of NGOs in rural Cameroon

From the mid 1980s, public finances dropped considerably, making it difficult for the government to smoothly pursue its rural development strategy. Even some infrastructural achievements in rural areas deteriorated due to lack of maintenance. Many of the rural development institutions put in place by the state collapsed, thereby aggravating the poverty of people in the rural areas.

The donor community started doubting the efficiency of public management of rural projects. Coupled with problems of governance and their attendant effects, foreign governments and donor agencies preferred assisting local communities through NGOs rather than through their traditional governmental counterparts.[13] The proliferation, in Cameroon, of both international and local NGOs with the mission of ameliorating the living conditions of the rural poor appears to be in line with this perception. With the present wave of globalisation, liberalisation of economic activities and the progressive state withdrawal from active involvement in aspects of rural development, NGOs are perceived as a means of filling the gaps left by governments (Tafah and Asondoh 2000). An example of such an NGO is the American cattle development project in developing countries - the Heifer Project International (HPI) - that operates in many rural areas. NGOs obtain development assistance from foreign countries, international donor agencies and other NGOs based abroad to foster development in local communities in Cameroon.

Development initiatives propelled solely by NGOs, however, are likely to be risky and possibly unsustainable because NGOs operate projects with fixed and short duration, and at times funding may be withdrawn when projects are still being executed. When this happens, the participating groups are deeply frustrated and their willingness to effectively collaborate with other NGOs is weakened. Moreover, rent-seeking NGOs can be described as brokers who confiscate the value-added to projects. To ensure continuity and sustainability, formulating new institutions and promoting networking and partnerships among them is likely to be more appropriate than NGOs operating in isolation.

Institutional arrangements and rural poverty

In this section, we explore some aspects of institutional arrangements and attempt to show how their evolution has affected the welfare status of the rural people. For this purpose, we discuss three institutional arrangements: (1) land-tenure arrangements; (2) rural financial markets, and (3) marketing of agricultural products.

Land-tenure arrangements

Land-tenure institutions are the laws or customs relating to the control and use of land. These institutions influence and are influenced by the pattern of land-use and the rural population density. At the same time, they reflect national socio-political characteristics. The land-tenure system that operates in any country will determine the degree to which investments are

made in land to make it more productive. The dynamic land-tenure and resource-access system operating in Cameroon is the outcome of the chequered history of the country. The geographical entity now identified as Cameroon went through different periods and experiences beginning from the time of migratory tribal groups in search of appropriate places to settle, through a colonial period that saw Germany, Britain and France as colonising powers that imposed their systems of tenure and resource access on the territory. The present tenure and resource-use arrangements in Cameroon draw heavily on this colonial heritage.

Since the National Land Laws first came into effect in 1974, only about 3 percent of rural lands have been registered under private title, and mostly by civil servants (Sikod et al 2000). In order to obtain a land title, the law stipulates that the occupants must demonstrate that they have the means to develop the piece of land, implying that there can be no title to a virgin land. The dominant governance structure over land continues to be the traditional system whereby land belongs to the tribe. The tribes claim long-standing or historical rights to land, the forests and resources. The land laws define four categories of land tenure: state, national, private and local council. State land includes all communal lands on which usufruct rights are granted to villages by the State. Yet, this is still considered by the local people as traditional land over which they have control. The land law provides that individuals, families or lineages can obtain titles to the land they are using from the State. The traditional councils, with the chief at the head, serve as mediators between the grassroots and the administration.

Land disputes are a frequent phenomenon among the rural farmers, especially in the Northwest, West and Far North Provinces where there is a shortage of fertile land. These disputes are of two forms, namely farmer-grazer disputes and farmer-farmer disputes. Land is the most important input in rural production. It is also a store of wealth for the rural population. Disputes arise because of insecurity of tenure and population growth. Disputes tend to aggravate the feeling of insecurity among farmers and promote open access. The settlement of these disputes is the joint responsibility of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Livestock, fisheries and Animal Industries. Unfortunately, these ministries issue orders related to the settlement of land disputes which are hardly enforced and which at times are conflicting.

One of the characteristic features of Cameroon over the last decade or so has been pronounced regional movement of people; the most re-

markable of which has been the mass movement of rural people to the cities. There has also been mass regional movement. This phenomenon has had an impact on land-tenure, access to resources and the use of these resources. This is because the logic and motives of migrants are different from the socio-cultural logic of the local population. Mixing migrants' and local beliefs and cultures tend to modify the traditional institutions – beliefs and governance structures. This modification in social factors influences the perceptions of the local and migrant populations, leads to changes in land-tenure, as well as resource use and management. Because these factors tend not to be coherent, resources are overexploited, leading to environmental degradation and rural poverty.

Rural financial markets

Financial services targeting the rural population are necessary for poverty alleviation. The rural finance system in Cameroon is very complex, involving a multiplicity of formal institutions, informal groups and private individuals. Some of these institutions are only incidentally involved in rural finance, but nevertheless play an important role. One way to categorise the different entities involved would be to distinguish between a formal sector including commercial banking arrangements and the informal sector including the credit union system, the rotating savings and credit associations as well as private individuals.

Before the economic crisis, formal financial institutions that directly or indirectly provided financial services in rural areas included the Bank of Central African States (BEAC), commercial banks and specialised institutions, such as the defunct National Fund for Rural Development, (FONADER – French acronym), the Marketing Board (NPMB), etc. The Central Bank gave preferential rates to the commercial banks to finance the purchasing and storage of traditional export crops, cocoa, coffee, cotton, palm oil, rubber, for cash food crops, groundnuts, maize, rice. When the economy started collapsing, almost all the commercial banks went bankrupt. Those that survived were restructured and could no longer offer adequate services to the rural sector.

Even before the crisis in the banking system, commercial banks financed mainly large public enterprises, co-operatives, and authorised exporters. Small rural farmers benefited only from trickle-down effects. Commercial banks were located mostly in urban centres and were quite few in rural areas. These unfavourable conditions obliged rural operators to take refuge in decentralised financial institutions and in the informal financial market. Decentralised financial institutions here comprise credit

unions, saving co-operatives, specialised networks and projects. The Post Office Savings Fund can also be included in this set because it collects rural and urban deposits. With the exception of those belonging to the Cameroon Credit Union League (CAMCUL) network, the oldest of which dates back to 1963, co-operatives were created following enactment of the 1992 law. Savings co-operatives autonomously managed by their members and which are located in both rural and urban areas, collect savings and extend credits.

In Cameroon, it is estimated that informal finance institutions or loan and thrift societies (*Njangis*) account for 75 percent of the total assets and liabilities in rural finance and grow rapidly (Heidhues and Weinschenk, 1986). Nzemen (1989) puts the gross amount of money held by *Njangis* in 1984 at 18000 million CFA francs or about 4.5 percent of GDP. Schrieber (1989) indicates that in 1988, the value of the credits extended by informal groups represented 36 percent of the total amount of loans made available to the private sector by the banks. According to the same source, informal savings/deposits could have amounted to 54 percent of the country's total financial deposits. These observations are as valid today as they were fifteen years ago. The informal financial market is filling the gap created by the collapse of the commercial banking system. Informal production units, urban micro enterprises and agricultural activities can count only on the expansion of informal sector financing for their development because available formal credit is inadequate, difficult to access, urban-biased and involves a high transaction cost.

Marketing of agricultural products

The marketing of agricultural products can be considered under two broad categories: the marketing of food crops and the marketing of traditional exports. Food crop marketing has always been open and is operated by private individuals, especially women. Specialisation by type of product among the various classes of intermediaries is not common and the volume of trade for each of them is relatively modest. Transportation of commodities and the role of intermediaries (including the rent-seeking behaviour of the forces of law and order) are shown to be the major handicaps on food marketing. At the national level, the institutional environment supposed to cater for food crop marketing includes the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Livestock, fisheries and Animal Industries, the Ministry of Trade and Industrial Development, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation, the Ministry of Transport, and the Ministry of Public Health. These ministries should normally have some

influence on the marketing and transportation system of food products, pricing, handling, weights and measures, grades and standards, and food flows. Unfortunately, there is no co-ordination among these ministries, and this makes it difficult for the marketing system to be efficient.

Before 1991, the domestic marketing of the main traditional agricultural exports (cocoa, coffee, cotton etc.)[14] was carried out through the National Produce Marketing Board (NPMB)[15]. The main objectives of the NPMB were to stabilise and guarantee remunerative prices to the producers and to undertake quality control. In this regard, the Board was to (1) insulate producer prices from the day-to-day fluctuations of the international commodity market, and (2) achieve a measure of stability in the incomes of producers. Fixing pan-territorial guaranteed prices in advance of each crop season, and hence breaking the link between farm-gate prices and the unstable world prices, led to the achievement of these objectives.

Domestic price stabilisation was effected through a price schedule with all cost elements such as transportation, storage, bank charges, cost of jute bags and conditioning, and a margin of profit for the middlemen added to the guaranteed farm-gate price to arrive at a 'guaranteed export' price level. If international prices obtained for a given consignment of produce were higher than the level guaranteed in the schedule, the difference was received by the NPMB as withdrawals (or an implicit export tax). If vice versa, the difference was paid by the NPMB to the exporter as an export subsidy.

Through this system of price fixing and stabilisation, the NPMB inadvertently became an extremely effective instrument for the mobilisation of revenue for government-sponsored economic development. Since the resources of the NPMB were held in the Public Treasury, the traditional export commodity sub-sectors contributed to the development of the entire country. For instance, the large size of the NPMB's contribution to the national budget (almost one fourth in fiscal year 1980/1981) constituted one source of the charge that the export crop farmers were financing the general development of the country rather than development of the rural areas (USAID 1983).

Faced with the prolonged declining world market prices in the latter half of the 1980s, and handicapped by extremely high production costs, low yields, shortage of liquidity at the Public Treasury and the banking sector, the NPMB could no longer continue to perform its functions as it could not lay hands on funds that had been accumulated over the years. Deficits increased and the stabilisation mechanism was disrupted. As part

of the SAP measures, Government withdrew from the production and marketing sectors by the progressive liberalisation of (1) the fertiliser sub-sector starting from 1988, and (2) the internal and external marketing of the coffee and cocoa sub-sectors. From 1990, the State disengaged itself from domestic and export trade on cocoa and coffee and these sub-sectors were partially liberalised. In 1991, the NPMB was dissolved and replaced by the National Cocoa and Coffee Board (NCCB), which had as mission to manage the stabilisation system and undertake quality control. From 1994, the government abandoned the policy of guaranteed farm-gate prices and the stabilisation system. The NCCB ceded the role of quality control to three licensed private companies in 1997,[16] thus marking the total liberalisation of the cocoa and coffee sub-sectors.

The liberalisation of the cocoa and coffee sub-sectors exposed farmers to the world commodity markets. The process coincided with two lucky episodes - the 50 percent devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994, and the July 1994 world commodity market price hikes following the Brazilian frost.

The coffee business became very lucrative and there was panic buying at all levels in the marketing chain. A multitude of agents entered the business, buying coffee in all its forms. Subsequent seasons witnessed the same scale of activity and a speculative expectation developed that prices would improve towards the end of the season. The buying of coffee at the farm-gate was done with no premium for quality. This pushed some farmers and dealers to seek artificial ways of increasing the quantity marketed by harvesting unripe fruits or introducing foreign matter into their produce. These malpractices were further exacerbated by the laxity in quality considerations at the port of shipment. Of course, Cameroon exports were soon rejected for non-conformity with quality norms. The attempt by exporters at the port of shipment to sort and dry (reduce moisture content) to conform to quality norms led to the non-respect of contract deadlines and attracted enormous penalties, resulting in the near collapse of marketing produce abroad. The world prices of these commodities have since dropped, especially with countries like Vietnam entering the coffee market. The response by farmers as they experience sharp drops in their incomes has been to reduce maintenance and re-orientate production strategies towards other activities.

Conclusion

Within the context of globalisation, the paper developed a framework of institutional economics, with a view to explaining rural poverty outcomes.

In particular, it (1) identified channels by which effects of globalisation impact on the asset characteristics of the poor, and (2) examined the rural institutional environment in the process of globalisation that explains rural poverty in Cameroon. These objectives were guided by the view that the institutional environment, which is constantly being modified by the forces of globalisation, significantly influences access to and returns on primary assets that determine poverty outcomes in rural Cameroon.

Prior to 1994, the CFA was overvalued and food commodities and other consumer goods were imported more cheaply into the country. Prices paid to local producers for similar commodities were depressed. This slowed down acquisition and reduced returns on primary assets as well as the welfare of their holders. It diminished the competitive strength of domestic producers and reduced their production incentives accordingly. With the 1994 realignment, local producers benefited on the commodity export-side but lost on the fertiliser import-side, while the external debt burden more than doubled. Debt servicing and repayment meant reducing resources available for public investment in key sectors such as road infrastructure, health, education and rural development. Fortunately, there is an emerging consensus among creditors, debtors and the civil society that the HIPC initiative is likely to be a more credible means of helping Africa out of the debt burden and rural poverty. This is because, unlike previous initiatives, it has to do with debt forgiveness that touches both on bilateral and multilateral debt cancellation and resources are effectively 'saved' for developmental purposes in the debtor country.

Through international and domestic pressures in the early 1990s, Cameroon introduced elements of a democratic state, but within a background where the psyche of the population had been destroyed by the one-party system. A rent-seeking elite developed, using the political dispensation to perpetuate its hegemony. Corruption increased and the extent of inequality exacerbated because access to public services was and is still mainly obtained through the very vibrant and expensive *black market*, which sometimes involves patronage. Politically inspired tribal hatred was encouraged by unscrupulous elite with a view to reaping fall-outs when called upon by the political 'entrepreneurs' to mediate.

With the near collapse of the economy in the mid 1980s, Cameroon's participation in the global economy weakened and disinvestments followed as a confidence crisis in the management of the economy deepened. The 1994 devaluation somehow enhanced Cameroon's involvement in international issues. Although transaction costs remains relatively high, it is now recognised that, in addition, the poor quality of products and production

processes are the root causes of poor competitive positions, lower employment levels, and a smaller tax base. Improving quality is the basis of enhanced competitiveness, and with the present globalisation trends, continuous quality improvement is a necessary factor in attracting investment. The expenditure-reducing measures of SAP aggravated the burden on the poor, extending the dimension of their deprivation to include social, political, moral and spiritual poverty. A new poverty class was born and remittances to rural relatives were curtailed.

With progressive state withdrawal from active involvement in aspects of rural development, NGOs were quickly perceived as credible alternatives. Yet, development initiatives propelled solely by NGOs are likely to be unsustainable because they operate projects with fixed duration, and at times funding could be withdrawn when projects are still being executed. In this context, institutional structures that amalgamate and regulate partners in rural development appear to be the way ahead.

The land-tenure (and resource access) system operating in Cameroon is dynamic and is the outcome of the chequered history of the country beginning from the pre-colonial era through the colonial period right up to the present. The traditional tenure system is, however, still the most common and at times conflicts with the national land laws - an outcome that discourages productivity-enhancing investments in land. The rural finance system in Cameroon is very complex, involving a multiplicity of formal institutions, informal groups and private individuals. The informal financial system is the main source of financial support for the rural sector because available formal credit is inadequate, difficult to access, urban-biased and involves high transaction costs.

The liberalisation of the cocoa and coffee sub-sectors coincided with two lucky episodes that made business very lucrative, leading to panic buying at all levels in the marketing chain. Many agents entered the business, buying produce in all its forms at the farm-gate with no premium for quality. This led to malpractices and rejection of Cameroon origins for non-conformity with quality norms. The attempt by exporters at the port of shipment to sort and reduce the moisture content to prescribed levels led to the non-respect of contract deadlines, which attracted enormous penalties. The trickle-down effect of this adversely affected rural poverty.

The paper recommends good governance – behavioural cleansing at the level of the individual agency, institutional alignment and credible punishment strategies – as the required menu in the present context to re-

dress the dismal socio-economic performances and rural poverty in Cameroon.

Notes

1. Many authors have recently been interested in aspects of globalisation in Cameroon; see for instance, Touna Mama (1999), Biao and Noumba (2000), Ngongang (2000) and Tamba (2000).
2. For a succinct discussion of these categories of institutions, see Ostron, et al. (1993).
3. See Fambon et al. (2002) for the determinants of poverty in Cameroon using household data.
4. For a succinct presentation of the planned development policies executed through Five-Year Development Plans in Cameroon, see Baye and Fambon (2001).
5. The BEAC Zone is a component of the wider Franc Zone (FZ). The African Franc Zone has three Central Banks: BEAC (Bank of Central African States), having as members, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon; BCEAO (Central Bank of West African States), with Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo as members; and the Central Bank of Comoros.
6. The Autonomous Sinking Fund is in charge of the management of Cameroon's public debt.
7. A country's debt overhang refers to its inability to fully service its debt, and this results in a situation where effective repayments are determined through negotiation between the debtor country and its creditors. In this case, the amounts to be repaid are generally determined by the economic performance of the debtor country and not the terms agreed on at the time the loan was being contracted.
8. Launched in September 1996 by the Bretton Woods institutions, the HIPC initiative aims to provide relief for eligible countries with foreign debt burden deemed 'unsustainable' even after getting debt–stock reduction from bilateral creditors, mainly the Paris Club.
9. A democratic state should have political pluralism representing different ideologies, freedom of the press and of information, independence of the judiciary, free, fair and open elections at reasonable intervals, a peaceful and orderly alternation in power, a clear separation of powers, and separation of the state from political parties.
10. The budgetary year was changed to correspond to the civil year from 2003 in Cameroon.
11. This outcome may only be abated if the donor community accepts to fill the ensuing financing gaps within the ongoing IMF- and World Bank-supported programmes.

12. Following the devaluation of the CFA Franc in 1994, domestic inflation initially accelerated to 35 percent before tapering off. Contrary to the situation in other countries of the CFA Franc zone where nominal salary increments of 10-15 percent were granted, in Cameroon nominal salaries remained at their 1993 reduced levels. Thus, while the social costs of SAP were high in rural areas (particularly in remote areas where 65 percent of the population are women), urban poverty also worsened.
13. This view is well articulated by Bebbington and Thiele (1993) as they note that 'donors, faced with the confidence crises and inefficiencies of their traditional governmental counterparts now prefer to work with NGOs in programmes of poverty alleviation... and sustainable development'.
14. For a detailed discussion of marketing arrangements in these sub-sectors before liberalisation, see Baye (1991).
15. The NPMB was established in 1978, and took over, as a unifying and harmonising force, the activities of the former Stabilisation Fund' (CAISSTABI) in Francophone Cameroon and the Produce Marketing Organization (PMO) in Anglophone Cameroon.
16. These companies and their volume of activity for the 1997/98 season are: Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS) –78.4 percent; Observatoire Camerounais de la Qualité (OCQ) –15.1 percent; and Cornelder Cameroun S.A. –6.5 percent.

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Les immigrés nigérians à Douala: problèmes et stratégies d'insertion sociale des étrangers en milieu urbain

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Résumé

Honnis et rejetés par les populations locales de la ville de Douala du fait de leur orgueil et de leur ostentation, les migrants nigérians ont, malgré cette répulsion, déployés avec une efficacité remarquable un ensemble de micro stratégies individuelles et collectives dans le cadre de leur insertion sociale. C'est cette configuration sociologique paradoxale qui se trouve au cœur de la présente étude. Celle-ci montre en effet un type particulier d'interactions entre nationaux et non nationaux en milieu urbain et, réintroduit judicieusement la construction de l'altérité dans la problématique des migrations internationales africaines.

Abstract

Despised and rejected by the local populations in the city of Douala, allegedly because of their arrogance and ostentation, Nigerian migrants have resorted to a set of individual and collective micro strategies, for their own social integration, despite the rejection from which they are suffering. This paradoxical sociological configuration is at the heart of this study. It describes a specific kind of interaction between nationals and non-nationals in an urban environment and also engages the construction of the otherness in the problematic of African international migration.

Introduction

L'intensification des flux migratoires observée dans le monde depuis deux siècles[1] n'a pas épargné l'Afrique. Et, comme un peu partout, les principaux pôles d'attirance des étrangers dans ce continent sont les villes, c'est-à-dire les lieux où les investissements et le développement sont les plus manifestes[2]. Cette brutale intrusion des flux démographiques transnationaux en milieux urbains engendre des nouvelles formes de sociabilité dans les villes d'accueil (Bretton 1981) créant ainsi un champ d'investigation original, susceptible d'offrir des pistes de recherches

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novatrices dans les études migratoires. La présente étude a pour ambition de traiter de la question des immigrés[3] nigérians dans la ville de Douala[4].

Située dans le littoral camerounais, Douala est une importante métropole d'Afrique centrale. Elle couvre aujourd'hui une superficie urbaine de près de 6000 hectares et fait l'objet d'une croissance démographique galopante qui dépasserait, d'après les estimations, 2 000 000 d'habitants[5]. Encerclée par le fleuve Wouri, Douala s'étend sur des reliefs bas, aplatis, coupés de falaises sablonneuses de faible commandement et aisément franchissables. Cette configuration particulière caractérisée par une extrême perméabilité des frontières a favorisé l'immigration d'une forte colonie étrangère et a fait de Douala une aire de longue tradition migratoire. Par exemple, sur près de 3 000 000 de Nigérians vivants au Cameroun, on en estime jusqu'à 300 000 uniquement à Douala[6]. Incontestablement la population étrangère la plus importante en nombre à Douala, ils y arrivent par voie terrestre et par voie maritime[7]. Il en a résulté dans la mosaïque de populations d'origine et de nationalité diverses de cette ville cosmopolite, une forte odeur de « nigérianité ».

Par ailleurs, un coup d'œil synoptique sur la géographie urbaine de Douala montre clairement que sa morphologie résidentielle est en étroite congruence avec les appartenances ethniques et autres formes de replis identitaires. Les quartiers apparaissent alors comme des lieux de regroupements sociaux et d'identification des ethnies[8], qui se rejettent quand elles ne s'affrontent pas. Ensuite, les problèmes liés au chômage et à une insécurité grandissants font de Douala une ville dangereuse et d'une sociabilité plutôt difficile[9]. Dans le même ordre d'idées, la construction par les populations locales de l'ethnonyme « biafrais », lourdement chargé d'une symbolique péjorative et suffisamment expressif d'un sentiment de méfiance et d'hostilité à l'égard des Nigérians ; sentiment illogique vus le déploiement, l'accroissement en nombre et la prospérité de cette population étrangère. L'implantation des immigrés nigérians à Douala est donc en tout point énigmatique.

En effet, comment expliquer l'insertion massive des Nigérians dans un tissu urbain réputé aussi répulsif que celui de Douala dont on connaît la tendance xénophobe grandissante? Comment comprendre la propension à l'accroissement de ces émigrés nigérians malgré un sentiment de suspicion affiché en général par les populations locales vis-à-vis des étrangers ? De plus, comment expliquer que la communauté nigériane puisse vivre en toute tranquillité à Douala alors qu'à seulement 300 km de là les armées nigérianes et camerounaises s'affrontent sans merci (Weiss 1996: 39–51) ?

C'est que, dans ce contexte urbain « turbulent » et répulsif, les immigrés nigérians (majoritairement représentés par les ethnies Igbo, Yoruba et Haoussa-Fulani), ont réussi à déployer de façon somme toute remarquable, des stratégies d'insertion qui se singularisent des modalités classiques d'intégration sociale (socialisation, acculturation, etc.). Dans le cas d'espèce, c'est l'hypothèse de l'insertion contournée qui est envisagée. Celle-ci met en œuvre des ingénieries qui, procédant par des logiques d'évitement et de méthodes raffinées, permettent aux immigrants nigérians de s'infiltrer avec subtilité dans le tissu social malgré les obstacles. Ici, le succès de l'implantation ne ressortit pas d'une volonté délibérée des populations des sociétés d'accueil. Il résulte d'abord d'un ensemble d'ingénieries tantôt individuelles, tantôt collectives, avant de prendre ensuite les contours d'un « fait accompli » ou d'un pis-aller pour les populations hôtes. L'objectif de ce papier est, dans un premier temps, de rendre compte des barrières auxquelles les populations nigérianes se heurtent quant à leur insertion et, dans un second temps, de montrer les tactiques et stratégies déployées par ces acteurs allochtones, dont le degré d'implantation contraste étonnement avec la situation précaire des autres étrangers. L'hypothèse d'enquête quant à elle était basée sur le principe selon lequel le processus d'insertion de tout groupe humain dans un environnement social différent pose de multiples problèmes qui s'inscrivent très souvent dans le cadre de la conflictualité, elle-même induite de l'altérité. Pour le vérifier, certaines investigations (des enquêtes notamment)[10] ont paru nécessaires et l'usage de la méthode d'observation-participante (Pinto 1990:7-52) comme moyen approprié.

Les barrières à l'insertion sociale

Par rapport à la situation des autres étrangers vivants à Douala (Béninois, Togolais, Sénégalais) qui partagent le français avec les populations locales, les immigrés nigérians (essentiellement anglophones) font face à des obstacles liés à la difficulté de la communication et à la perception que les populations locales ont d'eux.

L'obstacle linguistique

Les premiers contacts sociaux entre personnes étrangères s'effectuent en général par le biais de la langue. Celle-ci est le tout premier objet de l'interaction entre les acteurs, et constitue un enjeu déterminant pour la nature et la forme des rapports dans la société. Il s'ensuit que de la fluidité ou de l'échec de la communication, se construisent des schèmes de pensée spécifiques, qui peuvent se traduire chez les interlocuteurs soit par une

insertion facilitée (Lebon et Falchi 1980), soit par des formes de replis (Bouillon 1999:137), soit par des sentiments répulsifs (Morris 1999:75-123, Wieviorka 1997:291-317).

L'observation de la situation des immigrés nigérians à Douala montre que le handicap de la langue est un frein important à leur insertion dans le milieu urbain. Ainsi, contrairement à ce que l'on pense très souvent, le « pidgin-english », sorte d'anglais créolisé que l'on utilise à Douala et dans certaines localités du Nigeria n'est pas forcément un vecteur de leur insertion. De plus, l'usage massif du français par les populations locales et dont les Nigérians ne comprennent très souvent pas un traître mot à leur arrivée, en constitue également un obstacle sérieux.

Les contraintes d'expression sociolinguistiques

Le cosmopolitisme de la ville de Douala a imposé le « pidgin-english » comme langue de transaction (Sindjoun 1994:175). Mais, on devrait signaler ici qu'il est, malgré quelques similarités, différent en beaucoup de point de celui utilisé par les immigrés nigérians. En effet, la créolisation de l'anglais dans des aires culturelles différentes a entraîné des spécificités qui l'ont nuancé de manière significative. Ainsi a-t-il été de l'anglais parlé au Nigeria et celui parlé au Cameroun. Si à l'observation quelques mots anglais peuvent se recouper ici et là, on doit dire que pour l'essentiel, le « pidgin-english » utilisé par les populations locales est par l'accent et le vocabulaire largement différent de celui utilisé par les Nigérians à Douala. Il devient même à cet effet un facteur discriminant. Par exemple pour dire « mon frère » en signe d'interpellation, les populations locales utilisent les termes « Ma mbrala ». Pour les Nigérians, ce sera plutôt « Hoga ». Pour dire « comment ça va », les populations locales diront « how noo »; alors que les Nigérians diront « how naa ». Des idiomes différenciés de cette nature sont très nombreux dans les « pidgin-english » qu'utilisent les deux parties. Le mélange de chacune des langues locales à l'anglais a donc eu pour conséquence leur spécification, tant et si bien qu'un apprentissage est encore nécessaire pour ne pas se faire démasquer dans un échange interlocutoire. Il en est résulté par conséquent un étiquetage, l'identification immédiate de l'immigrant nigérian dans une conversation. Le « pidgin-english » qualifié de « langue commune » entre les deux peuples a ainsi des effets ambivalents. S'il permet, à un certain stade, la communication entre les immigrés et les locaux, il y a qu'inversement, il contribue, du fait

des différenciations idiomatiques observées, à démasquer le « biafrais » dont le premier réflexe est souvent de fondre dans le corps social. Cette situation constitue le tout premier obstacle des immigrés nigérians dans le processus d'insertion dans le corps urbain, pour autant qu'ils sont *a priori* suspects, de par leurs origines ou nationalité, aux yeux des populations locales.

Les contraintes de la prévalence de la langue française à Douala

Avec l'anglais, le français est l'une des langues officielles au Cameroun. Mais du point de vue de la pratique le français est, à tous égards, l'instrument de communication le plus usité dans la ville de Douala. Or à leur arrivée, les immigrés nigérians ne l'ont presque jamais utilisé[11], raison pour laquelle le processus d'adaptation et d'insertion dans le tissu urbain pour les immigrés passe par son apprentissage qui n'est guère un exercice facile. Nous avons observé que cela pouvait prendre deux à trois années pour les immigrés les plus enthousiastes et les plus motivés. On peut également voir qu'en général les Igbo s'en tirent très souvent mieux que les autres. Mais il faut dire que pendant cet apprentissage, la majorité des immigrés nigérians sont, pour une bonne période, mis en marge des relations sociales; puisqu'ils répugnent d'ailleurs eux-mêmes à se faire identifier comme tel dans une conversation, à cause de la «mauvaise qualité » (Bouillon 1999:132) de leur français qu'ils auraient honte d'extérioriser. La visite du quartier Camp-Yabassi où les Igbo sont devenus les maîtres des lieux donne des allures d'une véritable foire aux empoignes d'où sourdent à longueur de journées et dans un vacarme étourdissant, des onomatopées étrangères incompréhensibles pour les populations locales. Ici on parle d'abord le Igbo entre immigrés avant le « pidgin-english » ou un français approximatif pour ceux des clients qui ne comprennent ni l'une ni l'autre des deux langues citées plus haut. Jusqu'en septembre 1999, moment où nous avons arrêté nos enquêtes, pratiquement toutes les personnes sondées (Igbo, Yoruba et Haoussa-Fulani) considéraient que leur français approximatif était un facteur limitant leur insertion dans la ville de Douala. L'énorme suspicion qui pèse sur eux commence en effet dès ce premier contact et conduit très souvent à un blocage interlocutoire. Cette situation n'est pas la même dans le sud-ouest du Cameroun où l'anglais et le « pidgin-english » ont cours. Dans cette partie du Cameroun, leur insertion sociale semble plus facilitée par le partage de ces langues. Mais l'obstacle le plus important à l'insertion des immigrés nigérians dans la ville Douala est lié à la perception que les populations locales ont d'eux.

Les problèmes de perception

Contrairement à ce que pense Thomas Weiss (1998:163-244), la perception que les Camerounais du sud ont des Nigérians est en général négative, même si on pouvait déceler ici et là quelques îlots de « sympathie ». En fait, ce que l'auteur désigne par « témoignages de sympathie » des Bamiléké à l'égard des Nigérians est déduit d'une vue superficielle de la réalité. En effet, l'objectivation des interactions entre ces acteurs montre que les autorités publiques et les commerçants Bamiléké ont sans doute la même perception des immigrés nigérians que les « civils ». Cette « sympathie » qu'évoque Weiss est feinte et masque des relents de répulsion empreints d'une forte dose d'hypocrisie. Les tracasseries administratives et policières quotidiennes envers les Nigérians et les backhishs qui s'ensuivent le prouvent; les mises à sac des biens nigérians par certains commerçants Bamilékés à la moindre occasion l'attestent; et le relais de cette image constamment négative fournie par la presse locale encore plus acerbe le montre encore mieux. La différence réside uniquement à notre avis de ce que cette répulsion est ouverte et *manifeste* avec les populations locales, alors qu'elle est larvée, *latente* et plutôt insidieuse avec les autorités locales.

La méfiance des populations locales

« Je les ai vus le 1er (janvier) se comporter comme s'ils étaient chez eux, faisant exploser bruyamment et joyeusement de grosses baudruches. Je n'ai pas manqué de leur demander si un Camerounais pouvait se comporter ainsi au Nigeria. Ils n'ont pas hésité à me rétorquer avec insolence ». Cet extrait d'un journal de la presse locale[12] illustre remarquablement l'image et la perception que les populations locales ont des immigrés nigérians. Caricaturés comme personnages irrévérencieux et iconoclastes, les immigrés nigérians notamment Igbo qui constituent sans doute, à cause de leur proximité, la majorité du contingent nigérian à Douala, seraient à la base de cette image. Perçus comme individualistes et issus des « démocraties villageoises » (Ejiofor 1981, Boutet 1992:26, Weiss 1998:136) c'est-à-dire des sociétés sans hiérarchie, ils ont tendance à transposer ce modèle de rapports sociétaux lâches dans la ville d'accueil. Cela a entraîné un choc culturel, matérialisé par une sorte de méfiance et d'aversion des populations locales envers les immigrés nigérians. La méfiance et l'aversion se traduisent concrètement dans ce contexte non par un évitement (d'ailleurs impossible) des Nigérians plutôt expansifs, mais plutôt par une propension quasi obsessionnelle des populations locales à les attraire en justice ou à quelque lynchage lorsque cela est possible. La fréquence des

plaintes déposées dans les commissariats à leur encontre est significative à cet égard. Ce sont principalement les commissariats du 6e, du 4e et du 2e arrondissements qui sont le plus concernés par les plaintes contre les Nigérians. L'entretien avec le chef de bureau de la section judiciaire du 2e arrondissement de Douala[13] permet de savoir qu'il y a au moins une fois tous les trois jours, une plainte contre les Nigérians dans ses services, et cela depuis 5 années qu'il est en fonction. Soit environ 121 plaintes par an ! Nous avons retrouvé les mêmes tendances aux commissariats du 4e et du 6e arrondissements[14]. L'analyse attentive de plaintes montre certaines régularités : le nombre élevé de motifs liés à l'injure et à l'abus de confiance (50 %) d'une part et d'autre part le nombre important des Igbo concernés dans ces affaires (80 %). Cela amène à dire que la mauvaise image projetée sur l'immigré nigérian semble, toute proportion gardée, d'abord le fait des Igbo que celui des Yoruba ou Haoussa-Fulani qui ont été très peu impliqués dans ce type de litiges.

Par ailleurs, l'appartenance des Igbo à des gangs de voleurs ou leur implication dans des meurtres macabres tend à crédibiliser cette hypothèse. Certains faits sociaux, pour le moins abjects sont ainsi leurs œuvres, comme en témoigne la scène qui a eu lieu dans la nuit du 11 au 12 novembre 1996 où un enfant de 12 ans, le nommé Nyobe (Bassa de la population autochtone) fut assassiné et la tête ensachée par 2 Nigérians d'origine Igbo (Augustine Ihezie et Jerry Obassi) aux fins de trafic de corps humains. Selon le journal *Le Messager*[15], ces deux meurtriers n'étaient pas à leur premier forfait et ne constituent en réalité que la partie visible des immigrés nigérians se livrant à toute sorte de pratiques illégales. Par contre, les affaires liées à l'arnaque recoupent toutes les composantes de la communauté nigériane à Douala. Le commissariat du 2e arrondissement est, à cause de sa proximité avec le marché central de Douala, le plus concerné par ce type de plainte. Dans ce marché se trouvent Yoruba et Haoussa-Fulani qui évoluent essentiellement dans le commerce du textile et souvent auteurs de ce genre d'incivilités. Dan Ousman, originaire de Kano au Nigeria peut, par ses multiples escroqueries être considéré comme un des précurseurs du « 419 » dans la ville de Douala. L'intéressé, qui avait déjà séjourné pendant 3 ans dans cette ville jouissait, aux dires des populations locales d'une moralité sans faille. Sa gentillesse et ses largesses avaient d'ailleurs fait de lui l'un des représentants de la congrégation des musulmans du marché Lagos. Plusieurs personnes avaient été sidérées qu'il soit à l'origine de cette scabreuse affaire de vente à des commerçants locaux, de la poudre de manioc soigneusement ensachée dans des milliers de sacs de farine estampillés « semoule de blé dur » que les populations

utilisent habituellement dans la fabrication du pain. L'escroquerie avait fonctionné grâce au caractère affable de Ousman qui avait fait propager la rumeur de sa faillite (fictive) et de la solde subséquente des produits restant avant fermeture définitive de son commerce. Les prix bas provoquèrent rapidement une ruée des commerçants locaux qui vidèrent le magasin en 2 jours et, lorsque le pot aux roses fut découvert, l'intéressé avait disparu et n'a plus jamais été revu. Cette histoire de farine de manioc ensachée dans des sacs de semoule de blé n'est en fait qu'une des milles et une arnaques perpétrées dans la ville de Douala, et dont les auteurs sont très souvent ces immigrés nigérians. Tous les commissariats de la ville abondent de ce type de griefs, attestant des ressentiments envers les Nigérians du fait qu'ils sont « peu honnêtes », « roublards » et « fourbes ».Telle est l'image que les populations locales se font de leurs voisins nigérians. À ceci, ces derniers, dans leur majorité, rétorquent qu'il ne faut pas confondre business et familiarité ou fraternité: « Business is Business ». Traduction, les affaires ne s'accommodent pas de scrupules. Pour les populations locales, les Nigérians confondent « affaires et fourberie », « affaires et tricherie ». Cette image empreinte d'aversion et lourdement chargée d'une symbolique péjorative se matérialise également par la logique de bouc-émissaire que l'on peut déceler à différents moments.

La logique de « bouc émissaire »

La répulsion des populations locales à Douala envers les immigrés nigérians s'exprime souvent avec violence et heurts. En effet, le dynamisme, l'ardeur et la persévérance au travail des immigrés nigérians, leur ethos d'accumulation (forte épargne + sous-consommation) se soldent régulièrement par une réussite en termes de pouvoir financier. Cela ne semble guère plaire aux populations autochtones qui les trouvent « orgueilleux » et « vantards ». La réalité serait, comme l'affirme le commissaire spécial du 2e arrondissement, que « ces gens arrivent en haillons sans le moindre argent, supplient pour avoir de quoi survivre et au bout de 5 ans, ils deviennent vos patrons, vous emploient parfois dans le même quartier ou dans la même boîte ». À l'évidence, cela fait des jaloux, notamment dans les populations locales qui supportent assez mal ce retournement. Ainsi, le moindre prétexte est vite trouvé pour « régler les comptes » aux immigrés nigérians, comme l'atteste l'invasion des quartiers Ngodi et Camp-Yabassi par les populations locales le lendemain du meurtre du jeune Nyobe (Le Messager 1996:9) : plusieurs établissements de commerce appartenant à des Nigérians furent en effet éventrés et vidés de

leur contenu, dans la perspective latente de réappropriation de bien spoliés par l'«envahisseur » et « tricheur » nigérian. La scène de pillage contre leurs commerces en avril 1992 par les populations locales, incitées par les commerçants autochtones pendant les journées « villes mortes [16]» retourne également de cette tendance xénophobe. Mais la manifestation la plus flagrante de cette répulsion est l'accusation faite contre les Nigérians à propos des disparitions de sexes. Matériellement non prouvé, ce « vol de sexes » apparaît comme un autre prétexte trouvé pour jeter l'«envahisseur » nigérian aux gémonies. Ainsi de cette affaire qui s'est déroulée au quartier Bessengue-Deido, où deux Nigérians furent molestés par la foule, pour avoir « volé le sexe » d'un jeune adolescent[17] camerounais. Les examens[18] effectués quelques temps après sur la victime par le médecin-chef de l'hôpital de Deido attestaient de l'état de santé normal de l'intéressé et que la prétendue disparition du sexe relevait davantage d'un phénomène hallucinatoire lié à une sorte de psychose que les populations font à l'endroit des Nigérians, dont il faut s'en méfier par principe. Sans qu'il ne soit besoin de multiplier à l'infini des exemples de ce genre, il y a à remarquer que leur fréquence et leur récurrence traduisent très exactement la tension permanente qui alterne de manière cyclique entre une répulsion rampante et ouverte envers ces « biafrais » qui font peur.

L'étape supérieure de la méfiance et de la suspicion: la construction de l'ethnonyme «biafrais»

À l'origine du terme «biafrais», l'ex-État du Biafra proclamé le 30 mai 1967 par le Lieutenant Colonel Ojukuwu et composé en grande partie de l'ethnie Igbo. Cependant cette appréhension objective d'une réalité historique ne correspond pas avec la construction subjective de la réalité sociale faite par les populations locales pour désigner les immigrés nigérians. Dans le contexte de la ville de Douala, l'appellation «biafrais» est une catégorie sociale que l'on peut appréhender sur un double plan physique et psychologique. La variable physique regroupe tous les ressortissants nigérians, c'est-à-dire Igbo, Yoruba et Haoussa-Fulani confondus. Les clivages historiques connus entre ces principales ethnies nigérianes (Suberu 1998) s'estompent devant cet « ethnonyme unifiant » et de sa fonction performative (Sindjoun 1994:381). L'autre variable explicative de l'ethnonyme «biafrais» est psychologique et s'analyse en la charge symbolique péjorative qu'il contient. L'appellation «biafrais» prend ici les allures d'un « stéréotype envahissant » (Morris 1999:85) et renvoie alors à toute personne réputée « fourbe », « malhonnête », « tricheuse »,

« trafiquant », « faussaire » « peu scrupuleuse », etc. C'est une construction sociale basée sur la représentation de l'autre comme sujet pathologique et la symbolique qu'elle véhicule exerce dès lors « un rôle structurant dans l'organisation de la perception sociale » (Bouillon 1999:134). À Douala, il s'agit en fait d'une réaction des populations locales empreinte soit de jalousie face à l'impétuosité des immigrés nigérians, soit d'hostilité contre le caractère « tricheur » et « peu scrupuleux » du Nigérian. La composition de ce portrait procède par structuration d'éléments négatifs ou anormaux, immoraux comme la méchanceté, la tricherie; puis par un processus d'ancrage de schèmes qui se cristallisent dans l'inconscient collectif et déterminent en définitive les attitudes envers les immigrés nigérians. Mais le processus ne s'est pas arrêté à ce stade. Il y a eu ensuite extrapolation de ce signifiant tant et si bien que dans l'imagerie populaire, l'appellation «biafrais» renvoie tour à tour au ressortissant nigérian, à toute personne « fourbe », « tricheuse », « peu scrupuleuse », mais aussi de manière générale à toute chose négative. Une conserve est frelatée à l'achat ? pas de doute : c'est du « biafrais ». Un médicament ne soigne pas ? ce doit être du « biafrais ». Un gosse est mal élevé ? alors il est « biafrais »[19]. Le glissement du qualificatif « biafrais » des personnes aux choses exprime la gradation de la répulsion qu'il a y eu dans l'attitude des populations locales envers les immigrés nigérians. L'expression tirée du « pidgin-english » local « biafra na tchop die » et qui signifie littéralement « celui qui peut mourir pour son mensonge » est suffisamment illustratif du degré de répulsion qu'ont développé les populations locales vis-à-vis des Nigérians. Tout ce soubassement de relations empreintes d'aversion n'a pourtant pas stoppé les ardeurs des immigrés nigérians qui ont, dans la perspective de leur insertion, mis en œuvre des stratégies remarquables, les unes aussi subtiles que les autres.

Les stratégies de contournement des barrières à l'insertion sociale

Largement dérivée d'un effet de composition d'action individuelle, l'immigration nigériane a, devant la répulsion affichée par le tissu urbain de Douala, déployé des stratégies d'insertion très singulières. Ces stratégies sur un plan pratique s'inscrivent dans des logiques de contournement et de subtiles infiltrations dans le corps social. L'observation permet d'en distinguer deux types : les ingénieries mises en œuvre dans un cadre collectif et les ingénieries mises en œuvre individuellement.

Les strategies collectives

Très nombreuses, nous n'en évoquerons ici que celles qui sont les plus usitées. Il s'agit du déploiement de stratégies résidentielles, de la mise sur pied des associations ethniques ou corporatives et la construction de monopoles professionnels.

Les stratégies résidentielles et spatiales d'implantation des Nigérians

Les immigrés nigérians ont développé des stratégies d'insertion qui consistent en l'investissement des zones inhabitées ou alors des zones habitées mais insalubres pour y installer leur commerce. Leur prolifération dans ces zones infectes est souvent très fascinante, au regard du type de logique déployée sur le terrain: on occupe systématiquement les marécages que l'on essaie tant soit peu de viabiliser, puis on y installe son commerce. Cela coûte forcément moins cher par rapport aux zones cadastrées et de plus, nul n'a idée de venir les déloger dans ce type d'endroit infect. Le choix des zones insalubres n'est pas hasardeux: il aide fortement à la mise en œuvre des activités clandestines qui leur procure l'essentiel de leurs revenus. La stratégie vise ainsi à terme, la création d'espaces extra-territoriaux conformes à la réalisation de leurs projets migratoires. Les exemples types d'occupation de zones insalubres sont Monaka, Youpwè ou encore le long de la rivière Mboppi qui traverse le sud de la ville de Douala. Les deux premiers sont des arrondissements de la ville de Douala et, en fait, des îles perdues dans les marais et la mangrove. L'hostilité des lieux y a chassé la majeure partie de la population autochtone, ce qui a permis aux Nigérians de s'y engouffrer durablement dès les années 1920. Ils représentent entre 85 à 90 % de la population totale, leurs principales activités étant la pêche, le petit commerce, le trafic de stupéfiants et des armes de petit calibre. Leur ancienneté et surtout leur sédentarisation dans ces presqu'îles s'apparente à une migration définitive, tant ils y sont sereins et donnent l'impression d'être les maîtres des lieux. Leur supériorité numérique par rapport aux locaux, leur maîtrise de l'essentiel des activités économiques développées et l'usage du naira (monnaie nigériane), à côté du franc CFA comme monnaie et instrument légitime de transaction montre qu'il s'agit bien d'une implantation relativement réussie, basée fondamentalement sur ces stratégies résidentielles.

Par ailleurs rarement propriétaires de maisons[20], les immigrés nigérians sont en général des locataires à Douala. Il ne faut pourtant pas y voir l'absence d'un ethos de la « munificence ». Cet ethos existe bien. Il est simplement déployé dans « l'espace investi » et non dans « l'espace vécu », sans doute pour des raisons de répulsion évoquées plus haut. Les loca-

tions de maison sont donc souvent négociées pour des périodes relativement longues, allant généralement de 5 à 10 ans. La stratégie consiste à refaire des maisons originellement en « carabotte[21] », dans le sens de leur sécurisation et à amputer les dépenses occasionnées par cette réfection sur les loyers à venir. L'astuce permet de se mettre à l'abri des harcèlements des propriétaires des maisons qui pour la plupart n'ont pas d'autres sources de revenus. Mais plus profondément, la tactique permet de programmer et de planifier les activités sur 5 ans voire plus, et, en temps opportun, de «settle»[22] un autre Nigérian lorsqu'on estime avoir tiré partie de cette opération. L'autre chose à faire remarquer dans ces ingénieries, c'est la logique de regroupement de l'habitat. En règle générale, les établissements de commerce des immigrés nigérians sont regroupés en bordures des routes. Il y a concentration dans le même endroit[23], pour des besoins de solidarité et de sécurité, des personnes appartenant à la même ethnie ou exerçant la même activité. Il s'ensuit qu'« aucun prix n'est souvent assez fort pour eux pour occuper ces espaces ». Des «Sabon gari» ont ainsi surgi dans certaines zones de la ville de Douala et l'investissement des lieux est tel que l'on ne peut y faire un pas sans se retrouver en face d'un Nigérian; comme c'est le cas au Camp-Yabassi, à Manoka ou encore à Youpwé, où ils prolifèrent et «donnent l'impression d'être chez eux »[24]. L'investissement de l'espace apparaît donc stratégiquement comme la première phase de l'implantation des Nigérians à Douala. Cette ingénierie axée sur des tactiques d'appropriation spatiale et résidentielle vise à apprêter à ce stade, l'espace vital à partir duquel s'effectuera leur insertion sociale et le déploiement de leurs activités. Le regroupement des immigrés nigérians à travers les associations est un autre moment important dans leurs stratégies d'insertion sociale.

Les stratégies associatives et corporatives d'insertion dans le tissu urbain

La création des associations de solidarité entre immigrés nigérians est, eu égard à leur efficacité, une phase importante de la mise en place d'instruments de leur insertion dans la ville de Douala. À côté des associations que nous qualifierons de « communautaires », il en existe une autre catégorie que nous désignerons de « sociétaires » (Leif 1944).

Les associations « communautaires » regroupent les immigrés nigérians suivant le critère ethnique. Elles sont dans un premier temps un cadre d'enserrement des immigrants dans le groupe, et dans un second temps un vecteur de leur insertion dans le tissu urbain. Selon « l'Honourable » Joseph A. Ogunbadejo représentant de Ogun state, son association a une

fonction éducative et permet à leurs jeunes « convillageois » de s'intégrer plus facilement dans le corps social. L'appartenance définitive à l'association est subordonnée à l'obtention d'une carte de membre et à des cotisations obligatoires. En retour, l'association est garante, jusqu'à concurrence de certains actes, des comportements de ses ressortissants ; par exemple lorsqu'il est question de plaider pour eux en cas de litige dans les commissariats ou devant les tribunaux. Il s'agit en fait d'une « solidarité restreinte » qui se manifeste dans le cadre ethnique, et qui est fondée sur des « motivations altruistes » ou d'« introjection de valeurs » (Portes 1995). L'observation des attitudes des immigrés nigérians montre également qu'aux logiques émotionnelles qui président à ces types de regroupements se combinent parfois des critères comme celui de la spécialisation de l'activité menée (Antoine et Coulibaly 1987:11). À ce titre, la concentration de certaines activités dans certains quartiers correspond de façon générale à l'implantation d'une ethnie particulière. Ainsi a-t-on des associations des vendeurs de planches (Timber Dealer of Camp-Yabassi) majoritairement originaires de Akwa Ibom résidant à Camp-Yabassi, des associations de vendeurs de pagne composés pour l'essentiel de Yoruba résidant au quartier Congo, l'association des pêcheurs composée principalement d'Igbo à Youpwè, etc.

Les associations « sociétaires » sont celles qui regroupent les immigrés suivant les intérêts personnels et des rationalités individuelles. La Nigeria Union en est un exemple. Cette association à l'échelle urbaine regroupe tous les Nigérians sans distinction de leur appartenance régionale ou ethnique. Selon M. Patrick N. Ndjoku Président de la Nigeria Union à Douala, l'association qu'il préside a pour vocation fondamentale de regrouper les ressortissants nigérians vivant à Douala et de « faciliter leur insertion dans la vie active ». Les associations des immigrés formées comme la Nigeria Union sur la base des intérêts et des calculs sont nombreuses. Nous avons observé de l'intérieur la NASPDA (New-Auto Spare Part Dealers) : il s'agit du regroupement des Nigérians de tout horizon exerçant dans la vente des pièces détachées d'automobiles. Elle est composée de près de 100 membres qui se réunissent tous les dimanches chez « Chief » Uzoma Igbokwe qui a séjourné près de 30 ans à Douala et, qui représente son association devant la Nigeria Union et devant les autorités administratives locales. C'est « Chief » Uzoma qui agrège les doléances des membres de son association et les articule auprès des autorités locales. L'appartenance à cette association est une garantie sécuritaire importante pour l'immigré qui, exerçant dans le secteur délicat des pièces automobiles, doit quotidiennement faire face à une population locale fort

susceptible et méfiante. La NASPDA procure ainsi par la « crédibilité » de son chef protection et légitimation de ses membres auprès de l'administration locale. Ce type de regroupement est basé sur le principe de « réciprocité » (Portes 1995) dans la mesure où les individus n'adhèrent ici que par « intérêt ». Ces associations bâties suivant des logiques émotionnelles (regroupement ethnique) et fonctionnelles (regroupement rationnel) apparaissent stratégiquement comme une phase décisive du processus de leur insertion sociale, et, tendent à s'illustrer comme des structures indispensables pour les ressortissants nigérians installés et exerçant une activité légale.

Les stratégies de construction des monopoles professionnels comme démarche d'insertion dans le tissu urbain

Se rendre indispensable et incontournable. Tel semble être la technique mise sur pied par les Nigérians à Douala pour faire face à l'hostilité ambiante. Le procédé consiste en la constitution des monopoles non pas seulement pour maintenir l'exclusivité de la commercialisation d'un produit, mais pour créer, au-delà, la dépendance des populations locales. L'observation des commerçants Igbo et Haoussa-Fulani du marché Mboppi de Douala permet de mieux cerner le processus. C'est que, contrairement à leurs homologues camerounais qui exercent en rang dispersés, les Nigérians se regroupent en des organisations marchandes pour adopter des stratégies communes. Ils peuvent alors réduire de manière significative les frais d'achat, de transport, de douanes et donc les coûts finaux. Cela leur permet de pratiquer des prix bas, d'évacuer parallèlement toute concurrence et de créer un monopole dans la filière. Il en est ainsi de certains produits de première nécessité comme les sandales (*minayou*), les cosmétiques (*karibu*), les écrevisses (*mandjanga*). La seule possibilité de survie pour les concurrents camerounais dans cette hypothèse réside dans une alliance avec eux. Voilà comment se créent des relations de subordination entre « biafrais » et commerçants locaux. Et, de mal aimés, ils deviennent si indispensables qu'on imagine assez difficilement la vie à Douala sans eux. Autre fait justifiant la position incontournable des « biafrais » dans la ville de Douala : la fermeture des commerces de pièces détachées d'automobiles le lendemain du meurtre du jeune Nyobe le 11 novembre 1996 par 2 Nigérians et la terrible pénurie qui en advint. Ainsi dès le 16 novembre 1996, soit 4 jours après la fermeture de leurs commerces, il était devenu impossible pour les automobilistes locaux, du fait d'un pouvoir d'achat extrêmement faible, de se procurer un filtre à huile, un carburateur, une batterie... à cause des prix parfois 5 fois plus élevés chez les

autochtones ou chez les concessionnaires japonais (Cami-Toyota) ou français (Renault). La réouverture de ces comptoirs quelques jours après apparut comme la levée d'un embargo dans lequel les populations locales semblaient véritablement s'asphyxier. Le monopole de certains secteurs d'activités de la vie économique justifie donc amplement leur présence qui est liée à l'utilité qu'ils ont auprès des populations locales. Devenus incontournables par le subtil jeu de monopole de certaines filières, les immigrés nigérians à Douala, dans leurs stratégies d'insertion, développent également des ingénieries que l'on peut caractériser d'individuelles.

Les strategies individuelles

L'insertion des immigrés nigérians dans le tissu urbain prend aussi les voies des ingénieries individuelles. Au rang de celles-ci la contrefaçon, la corruption, la conversion, mais aussi la religion. On part ici du postulat que l'individu développe en fonction des ses intérêts un ensemble de stratégies fondées sur sa propre rationalité[25], et qui font de lui un acteur dont le rôle est à prendre au sérieux dans ce processus d'insertion sociale (Touraine 1984).

La collusion des stratégies occultes d'échange social comme procédures d'insertion: contrefaçon, corruption, conversion

Arrivés pour la plupart clandestinement à Douala, c'est-à-dire sans visa d'entrée ni permis de séjour, les immigrés nigérians doivent faire face aux problèmes de papiers avec la cohorte de conséquences que cela entraîne pour tout migrant (Lebaron 1999:4). Malgré la souplesse de l'administration locale et de la législation camerounaise en vigueur[26], les immigrés nigérians semblent préférer les voies frauduleuses[27]. Ils optent dans ce cas pour des solutions diverses. Soit ils se font délivrer des fausses cartes d'identité camerounaises moyennant argent, soit ils s'arment de l'argent nécessaire pour corrompre de manière ponctuelle les autorités en cas de contrôle. Largement corrompues, ces dernières n'initient que très rarement des procédures d'expulsion et, en général l'immigrant qui n'est pas en règle n'a jamais été reconduit à la frontière. L'inculpé paye séance tenante le prix de son infraction, sous forme de prébende. Cette pratique de « manipulation d'identités » (Engbersen 1999:32) a fini par se normaliser à tel point que où le danger pour l'immigré est moins la non-possession des papiers, que le manque d'argent pour corrompre. Un «Tchoko» à l'autorité, c'est-à-dire son pourboire, résout *ipso facto* le problème de l'« undocumented immigrant » (Chavez 1992:169-171). L'histoire de Hello, grand homme d'affaires nigérian résidant à Douala permet de mieux

comprendre le mécanisme de ces ingénieries individuelles d'insertion dans le corps social. Interpellé le 1er juillet 1999 par une patrouille de police, celui-ci fut arrêté au motif qu'il détenait deux cartes d'identité, une de nationalité nigériane et l'autre camerounaise. « Je me suis débrouillé comme çà à me faire établir une carte nationale d'identité camerounaise pour éviter les tracasseries policières». Le procédé consiste à produire un faux acte de naissance où l'intéressé est né au Cameroun et, sur cette base, se faire délivrer par les autorités compétentes une carte nationale d'identité authentique. Ces documents leur permettent, au gré des circonstances, de s'afficher tantôt comme des Nigérians, tantôt comme des Camerounais. Toujours est-il que s'agissant de M. Hello, il fut libéré seulement quelques temps après son interpellation. Les informations que nous avons recueillies à son sujet convergeaient pour l'essentiel à l'idée selon laquelle l'inculpé était une personne particulièrement « généreuse » (comprendre corruptrice) et jouissait de l'estime de certains patrons de la sécurité. Ce qui est utile de savoir à travers ce cas, c'est qu'il s'agit là en réalité de pratiques quotidiennes et que, des exemples comme celui de M. Hello peuvent être cités à profusion. Les immigrés nigérians se sont rendus compte que les autorités locales ne résistent pas beaucoup à l'argent, alors la corruption est devenue pour eux un véritable outil de sécurisation et d'insertion sociale. Si à l'évidence ce procédé est totalement empreint d'illégalité, il y a qu'il leur assure inversement certaines commodités et attributs liés à la possession de cette «nationalité». La plupart des immigrés nigérians font donc de la corruption le principal instrument de leur processus d'insertion sociale à leur arrivée dans la ville de Douala. Cette allocation de ressources aux autorités administratives locales s'inscrit dans la logique de la conversion (Warnier 1993) et garantit aux immigrés nigérians protection, voire impunité face aux autres acteurs sociaux au pouvoir d'achat particulièrement faible. Dans ce cas de figure, il devient parfois dangereux ou inintelligent pour un national de conduire des Nigérians dans un commissariat de police. Au-delà de la perte de temps que cela induit, il y a un grand risque de se faire garder par les autorités de police qui sont en collusion avec ces immigrés. L'observation montre que ces derniers s'en tirent plutôt bien. Les autorités locales sont leurs «amis». Dans le jargon local, on dit qu'»ils ont des relations». Il y a dans cette situation une conversion du capital financier ou économique en capital relationnel ou social. L'affaire qui s'est déroulée le 25 juin 1999 au commissariat du 2e arrondissement entre M. Takam Jules de nationalité camerounaise et M. Awal Salissou (Nigérian) est assez significative de cet état de chose. M. Takam avait porté plainte contre le sieur Awal Salissou pour abus de confiance. Il estimait que le fait pour ce

dernier d'avoir reçu de lui une somme de 500 000 FCA pour livraison dans un mois de tissus pour meubles et que 6 mois après le contrat (verbal) ne fut respecté, était constitutif d'un abus de confiance. Si au regard de la logique du droit on peut bien estimer que la plainte du requérant était bien fondée, il faut aussi dire que les choses ne se passent guère de cette manière dans la ville de Douala, surtout lorsqu'on a à faire avec un nigérian. Le problème justement c'est que Awal avait de solides «relations » au niveau du commissariat : l'inspecteur (comme d'ailleurs tout le monde dans ce commissariat) chargé des enquêtes était aussi son « ami ». M. Awal fut relâché et, c'est plutôt le requérant qui a dû passer quelques jours dans les geôles de la cellule pour les «besoins de l'enquête». Des affaires comme celle de Takam sont nombreuses et attestent de l'efficience des ingénieries d'insertion individuelles des immigrés nigérians dans la ville de Douala. Cette autre technique consiste à corrompre où à « donner la chèvre du patron » (Warnier 1994:184) ou de l'autorité dès son installation, en prévision de quelques interventions futures de sa part et, s'inscrit dans la logique de la « convertibilité » (Bourdieu 1983) qui permet en fin de compte aux Nigérians d'avoir leur mot à dire dans le fonctionnement de la société d'accueil.

Les stratégies religieuses et matrimoniales d'insertion sociale

Le processus de sécularisation entamé dans les villes avec l'avancée des technologies s'est traduit dans la ville de Douala par un cosmopolitisme religieux et la prolifération de congrégations religieuses qui offrent aux immigrés nigérians un important cadre d'insertion sociale. Les principales structures de recrutement ici sont les églises pentecôtistes et leurs démembrements («God is Live», «Jesus is my Live[28]», «Bethesda», etc.) respectivement pour les immigrés chrétiens et les mosquées pour les immigrés musulmans, où ils se ruent à leur arrivée dans la ville. Orock, immigré Igbo et résidant au « Camp-Yabassi » a procédé de cette manière pour se faire une place de choix dans son quartier: Il se rend tous les dimanches à l'Église Pentecôtiste du «Plein Évangile» de Kassalafam avec le fils de sa bailleresse et plusieurs de ses voisins. Il n'oublie jamais d'informer son bailleur quand il se rend à l'église et reprend les homélies du pasteur à longueur de journée. Il fait beaucoup de dons à l'église et aide les gens du quartier. Ainsi Orock donne-t-il l'image d'un bon croyant, ce qui lui vaut d'être admiré, intégré et consulté sur les questions d'assainissement du quartier. Au centre de cette technique d'insertion, l'instrumentalisation des nombreuses congrégations religieuses qui prolifèrent à Douala. Le procédé consiste d'abord en une adhésion en leur

sein, et ensuite par le déploiement d'un activisme qui les intègre progressivement dans le tissu social. L'observation peut également s'étendre aux commerçants Haoussa-Fulani musulmans habitant le quartier Congo, qui utilisent subtilement l'islam comme un moyen d'insertion sociale: la stratégie consiste à s'affirmer comme un grand donateur de fonds au profit de la congrégation, et ensuite à s'employer à apparaître comme un modèle devant ses pairs. La période du jeûne du Ramadan leur en donne très souvent l'occasion. À une ostentation mal déguisée, se profilent très souvent des séances de démonstrations de l'avoir, fondées sur le fait que toute richesse viendrait de Dieu et que ceux qui ont beaucoup reçu doivent redistribuer pour mériter la miséricorde. Les invitations et indications des domiciles des riches nigérians chez lesquels les fidèles peuvent aller «casser le ramadan» sont alors faites pendant les prières de la journée. Cela justifie les bousculades des populations locales que l'on retrouve chez eux à partir de 18 heures durant la période du jeûne. Ce comportement leur confère probité, magnanimité et surtout l'image de bons musulmans aux yeux des populations musulmanes locales qui n'ont plus aucun mal à les considérer comme des membres de la *umma*, donc des frères musulmans. Les bénéfices tirés de cette insertion dans une communauté religieuse sont importants, notamment lorsque des conflits surviennent entre Nigérians et populations locales. Ainsi leurs premiers défenseurs pendant les rixes sont parfois, avant même la police, les populations locales d'obédience musulmane qui voient d'abord en eux des frères religieux et non pas uniquement des ressortissants nigérians. Par exemple au tout début de la guerre entre le Cameroun et le Nigeria pour le contrôle de la péninsule de Bakassi et de la vague de ressentiments qui s'ensuivit envers les immigrés nigérians dans la ville de Douala, l'Iman Abubakar de la mosquée du quartier Congo exhortait ses congénères à distinguer entre les politiciens et les musulmans qui n'avaient rien à y voir; et que les musulmans locaux avaient le devoir de protéger tout musulman quelque soit son origine ou sa nationalité. Toute proportion gardée, la tension perceptible à ce moment dans la ville était largement amoindrie du côté du quartier Congo où la plupart des Nigérians Haoussa-Fulani sont de religion musulmane, ceci en comparaison avec d'autres zones où des échauffourées se produisirent de manière récurrente.

Dans ce même registre de stratégies individuelles d'insertion sociale, il convient d'inscrire l'instrumentalisation des régimes matrimoniaux dans lesquels la pratique des fiançailles est la plus usitée. La pénétration de quelques ménages des immigrés nigérians (notamment Igbo et Yoruba) permet d'observer une forte tendance de cette pratique par lesquelles les

filles du quartier et en général les filles de leurs bailleurs sont souvent leurs « fiancées ». Logique pratique uniquement ? Nous pensons que non. Notre hypothèse va plutôt dans le sens des stratégies des séjours. En effet, ce qui est important à relever dans ce type d'union, c'est qu'à aucun moment (ou alors très exceptionnellement) ces fiançailles ne se concrétisent par un mariage (Weiss 1998:71), pas même par un « mariage à but résidentiel » comme on le voit dans certains pays (Engbersen 1999), aux fins d'obtenir une naturalisation. Nous n'avons en effet pas rencontré au cours de nos investigations plus de 3 mariages entre Nigérians et populations locales. En réalité, c'est que les Igbo sont chrétiens dans l'ensemble et déjà mariés pour la plupart dans leur pays d'origine. Ils n'entendent donc pas se greffer ou s'encombrer d'une relation similaire qui pourrait éventuellement leur causer plus d'ennuis à l'image des contraintes juridiques, sociales, culturelles ou économiques. L'option pour le concubinage et les fiançailles leur offre donc une relation lâche, moins contraignante (et du reste interminable puisqu'elle peut durer pendant tout le séjour migratoire) et doit s'analyser comme un procédé d'insertion dans les familles et dans les quartiers. Le statut pré-matrimonial induit de la situation de « fiancé » leur confère une certaine audience et surtout atteste de leur bonne foi par rapport à l'image de personnes souvent considérées comme « malhonnêtes ». Au total, ces années de concubinage ou de fiançailles sont souvent suffisantes pour que le Nigérian se constitue en « fils » de la maison ou encore devienne « un enfant » du quartier et faire oublier sont identité d'origine du reste largement pourfendue dans la ville.

Les immigrés nigérians musulmans (Haoussa-Fulani du quartier Congo) contractent par contre régulièrement des mariages avec les populations locales de religion identique. Sans doute parce que l'islam dans ses préceptes favorise-t-il ce type d'unions. L'observation montre que dans la majeure partie des cas, les épouses camerounaises s'occupent de la gestion des établissements de commerce (textile, bijouterie), ce qui permet à leurs époux de voyager (Kumba et Nigeria en général) pour ravitailler les boutiques. Leur intégration dans le tissu urbain semble plus réussie, notamment du fait de l'élargissement de la base familiale, qui intègre en fin de compte les enfants et toute la famille des épouses, comparativement aux Igbo et Yoruba qui doivent mobiliser d'autres formes de capitaux (corruption, conversion, etc.) en vue de leur insertion sociale. En fin de compte, la mobilisation de toutes ces ressources collectives ou individuelles permettent aux immigrés nigérians, malgré un climat empreint d'hostilité, de s'infiltrer dans le tissu urbain de Douala. Au demeurant, cela leur permet de s'afficher

par moments comme des agents sociaux indispensables à la cohésion du tissu social et économique[29].

Conclusion

Il ressort de ce qui précède que l'insertion des immigrés nigérians dans le tissu urbain de Douala n'a pas été chose aisée et que, ce que l'on qualifie de « relative réussite » de l'implantation des Nigérians à Douala serait moins le fait d'une traditionnelle « hospitalité africaine » que de leur capacité de « fabrication » d'instruments efficaces d'insertion sociale et de l'appropriation d'un capital d'utilité économique dans certains secteurs d'activité ou filières. Tolérés du fait de leur importance économique, et honnis pour leur caractère « fourbe » et « roublard », les immigrés nigérians à Douala se trouvent dans l'«entre-deux »; entre le *rejet* et l'*acceptation*. L'observation des interactions entre Nigérians et populations locales révèle en effet l'existence, au niveau des formes de sociabilité, de deux tensions antagoniques. L'une centrifuge et désintégratrice s'inscrit dans la tendance répulsive des populations locales; l'autre, centripète et intégrative s'inscrit dans le cadre de leur capacité d'insertion et, surtout, la sensation de son utilité exprimée par les populations locales. Si leur assimilation parfaite semble donc aujourd'hui difficile à concevoir, il reste que leur départ paraît également improbable. Sans doute s'agit-il d'un autre cas d'»ennemis commodes» (Christie 1986).

Notes

1. Sur l'importance des flux démographiques transnationaux depuis ces deux derniers siècles, Badie et Withol de Wenden (1994), Badie et Smouts (1992), Dumont (1995).
2. Voir le document de l'UNESCO (1983).
3. Il convient de préciser dans le cadre de cet exposé que nous entendrons dans un sens synonymique les termes « immigré » et « étranger »: bien que désignant sur un plan strictement scientifique des réalités différentes ou mieux, des représentations issues de constructions différentes, ils sont, dans le langage courant, interchangeables. Dans la ville de Douala et de manière plus générale au Cameroun, seul le terme « étranger » est régulièrement usité. Ici il renvoie aux « non-nationaux ». Il s'agit aussi de l'examen de la situation des immigrés nigérians dans cette ville pour la période qui va de 1971 à nos jours. Le choix de cette borne temporelle s'explique par le flux massif des Nigérians à Douala après la guerre du Biafra.
4. Sur la ville de Douala, voir Gouellain (1976), Mainet (1979).
5. Voir *Cameroun Tribune* (journal gouvernemental) du 4 décembre 1993. Selon le schéma directeur d'aménagement urbain ce chiffre s'évaluait 674 000 habitants en 1982. Avec une croissance annuelle d'environ 7 %, Douala pourrait

atteindre 5 400 000 habitants en 2010. Voir *Construire la ville africaine*, ouvrage précité, p 16.

6. Voir *Messager* n° 557 du 04 novembre 1996. Mais on doit dire que malgré les nombreux recensements de population effectués au Cameroun, il n'est pas aujourd'hui possible d'évaluer avec précision le nombre d'étrangers, comme c'est le cas du RGPH de 1986 où les Nigérians n'ont pas spécifiquement été pris en compte pour la ville de Douala. En l'absence de données statistiques exactes, nous ne pouvons donc procéder ici que par ordre de grandeur.
7. À ces deux voies d'accès correspondent deux types de migrations. Une migration horizontale constituée d'émigrés qui arrivent à Douala par voie terrestre après un séjour dans les villes environnantes (Mamfé, Bamenda, Kumba, Tiko, etc.) et une migration verticale, de loin la plus importante par le volume, qui s'effectue par voie maritime. Les débarquements ont généralement lieu aux ports de Limbe, Mudeka, Idenao, Tiko, Youpwè ou encore ces derniers jours à Bonagang (Akwa-nord), par un bras du fleuve Wouri (« petit-wouri »). Les émigrants âgés en général de 15 à 30 ans, sont ensuite récupérés par des frères ou des amis déjà installés dans la ville.
8. New-Bell Bassa, New-Bell Bamiléké, New-bell Ewondo sont par exemple des quartiers de Douala dont l'identification est essentiellement attachée à des regroupements ethniques. Ainsi existe-il un quartier New-Bell habité par l'ethnie Bassa , un quartier New-Bell habité par l'ethnie Bamiléké, un quartier New-Bell habité par l'ethnie Ewondo, etc.
9. Le *Messager* n° 495 du 08 avril 1996 stigmatise, par la plume de M. Alex Gustave Zébazé la forte criminalité et l'insécurité totale dans laquelle la ville de Douala baigne au quotidien..
10. Faite durant les mois de juillet et de septembre 1999, l'enquête, à prétention largement exploratoire, visait à saisir les problèmes et les stratégies d'insertion des immigrés nigérians dans la ville de Douala. Elle s'est malheureusement heurtée à certaines difficultés qui ont amené à réduire notre champ de travail, en le circonscrivant à quelques quartiers de la ville. Ainsi, trois quartiers de notre échantillonnage, du fait de leur éloignement n'ont pu être quadrillés avec la rigueur exigible. C'est le cas des îles comme Djebalè, Manoka, Youpwè localités respectives de Douala VIII et Douala I dont les populations sont à majorité composées d'immigrants nigérians. Mais *a contrario*, les quartiers dit « Camp-Yabassi » et « Congo », qui regroupent le gros du contingent de la communauté nigériane à Douala ont été explorés de manière acceptable. Ici, l'extrême mobilité (inter/intra-urbaine, et surtout transfrontalière) (« volatilité ») des Nigérians et leur éternelle dérobade devant l'administration des questionnaires (Fodouop 1989) a fait entrevoir l'inutilité de certaines techniques d'enquêtes usuelles comme la méthode des quotas ou la méthode de l'échantillonnage stratifié au hasard. Face à cette double difficulté liée d'une part à un objet de recherche instable et essentiellement mouvant et d'autre part à la difficulté d'effectuer un sondage valide à cause du refus de collaboration, nous avons opté pour la méthode de l'observation participante. On

parle d'observation participante lorsque le chercheur, infiltré dans le groupe à étudier «n'a d'autres ressources que sa propre expérience ». Il est en effet apparu qu'elle présentait, comparativement aux autres techniques d'enquêtes, une opérationalité et une fécondité heuristique supérieure. Elle semblait offrir de réelles possibilités permettant de fournir un éclairage pour une analyse qualitative de l'objet de notre préoccupation, en nous facilitant «l'accès à l'objet sous la forme d'un constat immédiat », à savoir l'immigré nigérian, ses stratégies d'insertion et ses rapports avec l'autre. Notre situation de natif de la ville de Douala, et la connaissance du pidgin-english (langue usuelle des populations locales et nigérianes) nous a aidé à pénétrer les cercles fermés des ménages, associations et réseaux nigérians afin d'en prélever et appréhender les stratégies d'insertion sociale, et leur perception des populations locales. Ce travail de collecte des données, pour être complet, a été suppléé par une série d'interviews faites sur la base d'un échantillonnage simple auprès des populations locales, afin d'en dégager parallèlement leur perception des immigrés nigérians et le contenu qu'elles donnent par exemple à l'ethnonyme « biafrais ». Les populations, les autorités administratives et policières ont été privilégiées à ce niveau, eu égard à l'étroite connexité des rapports qu'elles entretiennent avec les Nigérians. Toutefois, notre « citadinité » de Douala, l'immédiateté recherchée et notre immersion dans la sphère de l'expérience vécue pouvaient devenir pernicieux du fait de la méthode choisie (observation participante). En effet le risque de sombrer dans le sens commun, la tendance à la réappropriation des préjugés et autres stéréotypes est grande lorsque le chercheur est lui-même immergé dans l'objet de recherche. Cela pouvait conduire à une oblitération de l'observation due à l'illusion de la transparence, au dévoiement de l'explication à cause de l'ancrage de certains stéréotypes sociaux, de prénotions, en un mot, à un « déficit épistémique ». La rupture avec le sens commun et un « recul épistémologique » devenaient donc impérieux pour l'objectivation de l'objet « immigrés nigérians à Douala ». La « posture réflexive » (Bourdieu et Wacquant 1992) est apparue à ce stade comme l'attitude qui nous permettait le mieux d'éviter ces différents écueils. Elle devrait nous aider à effectuer d'abord un « re »-tour sur nous-mêmes avant de saisir, dans la perspective durkheimienne, le fait « immigré nigérian » « comme des choses ». Cette attitude apportait donc la dose de circonspection nécessaire, de « vigilance épistémologique» (Bourdieu, et Chamborderon 1983) lors de l'utilisation de la méthode d'observation participante.

11. À leur arrivée, ils ne parlent pour la plupart que leur langue d'origine ou au mieux l'anglais ou le pidgin-english.
12. *Mutation*, n° 107du 13 avril 1998.
13. Entretien du 2 juillet 1999.
14. Selon le commissaire du 6e arrondissement, la fréquence de ces plaintes est largement due à une agressivité qui semble consubstantielle chez les immigrés nigérians (notamment Igbo) et le sursaut d'orgueil des populations locales

qui n'entendent pas se « faire brimer » chez elles. Un coup d'œil sur les registres de ces trois commissariats de police fait observer la bigarrure des plaintes: Djol Anne Marie (Camerounaise) contre Uwe Obiaruko Innocent (Nigérian) BP 2324 Douala du 23 mars 1999 pour injures et abus de confiance; Abouem Bruno (Camerounais) contre Kabu Stella Long Street (Nigériane) du 27 mars 1998 pour injures et escroquerie ; Diyangui (Camerounais) contre Uzoh Charles (Nigérian) du 03 septembre 1998 pour injures, coups et blessures.

15. Journal de la presse locale n° 500 novembre 1996.
16. Rapport *OCISCA*, précité p 40.
17. *Messager* n° 566 du 1er novembre 1996.
18. Commissariat du 9e arrondissement de Douala, année 1997.
19. Lire *Mutation* n° 107, avril 1998.
20. En dehors de très riches commerçants (notamment Mrs « Ojukwu », « Hello », « Alhadji », Ndjoku...en somme moins d'une cinquantaine sur une population estimée à près de 500 000 personnes) qui sont propriétaires d'immeubles à Douala, les Nigérians préfèrent construire en général chez eux au village (Adepoju 1974).
21. Sorte de planches taillées à partir du bois de qualité moyenne.
22. Comprendre « installer» un autre nigérian.
23. Lire dans le même ordre d'idées Coleman (1990:225-259).
24. Voir *Mutations* n° 107 du 13 avril 1998.
25. Voir Birbaum et Leca (1991), Boudon (1986), Alain (1991).
26. Voir le décret n° 63-DF-55 du 2 mars 1963 portant ratification d'un accord de coopération bilatérale entre la République fédérale du Cameroun et la République fédérale du Nigeria; également la Loi n° 97/012 du 10 janvier 1997 fixant les conditions d'entrée, de séjour et de sortie des étrangers au Cameroun.
27. L'argument parfois tiré par les immigrés nigérians est le nombre jugé « excessif » de titres de séjour qui s'élève depuis mai 1994 à 276 750.
28. La dénomination en anglais a partie liée avec le processus de transnationalisation des familles religieuses pentecôtistes dans la région, et dont le point de départ est la Nigeria Union.
29. Canel, Delis, et Girard (1990:99-100) en font une évocation fort poignante, dans le domaine de la construction de l'habitat: « La menuiserie métallique et la ferronnerie allient la conception, la fabrication artisanale, et la vente de protections métalliques des portes et fenêtres (sécurité). À Douala, c'est une spécialité des « biaffrais », commerçants Igbo du Nigeria, qui réalisent notamment les moules à parpaings: « Au départ, on achète des tôles de 3 ou 4mm à la ferraille, chez « Madame » à Akwa, ...On a acheté le poste de soudure à la quincaillerie; quand il est épuisé, on va chez les « biaffrais » *Construire la ville africaine*, pp 99-100.

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An Empirical Profile of Weak States in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Abstract

In this paper, we present an empirical construct to describe attributes of weak states in sub-Saharan Africa using the Minorities at Risk Database. Weak states are defined as having a prevalence of structural inequality, the components of which are economic differentiation, cultural (or social) inequality and political inequality. We used this construct to predict intercommunal conflict in two periods: between 1940 and 1989, and since 1990. Analysis showed that the structural inequality construct is reliable and that the likelihood of intercommunal conflict between 1940 and 1989 was associated with cultural differentials. Results also suggest that structural inequality, by itself, does not directly lead to intercommunal conflict. We argue that the addition of a variable that captures prevalence of small arms or light weapons will improve the predictive power of the model. Frequency distributions of the construct revealed that there is a high incidence of intercommunal conflict in the region and that three countries in particular were 'best performers'.

Résumé

Cette contribution présente une construction empirique, permettant de décrire les attributs des états faibles, en Afrique, à l'aide de la « Minorities at Risk Database » (Base de Données sur les Minorités Menacées). Les états faibles sont décrits comme des états souffrant d'inégalités structurelles, dont les composants sont la différentiation économique, l'inégalité culturelle (ou sociale), ainsi que l'inégalité politique. Nous nous sommes servis de cette construction, pour diviser les conflits inter communautaires en deux périodes : de 1940 à 1989, et à partir de 1990. Les analyses ont montré que la construction basée sur l'inégalité structurelle est crédible, et que la probabilité d'éclatement de conflits intercommunautaires entre 1940 et 1989 était liée aux différentiels culturels. Les résultats suggèrent également que l'inégalité structurelle, en soi, ne provoque pas directement de conflits intercommunautaires. Nous affirmons que l'addition

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d'une variable démontrant la prévalence du phénomène des armes légères permettra d'améliorer la justesse des prévisions de ce modèle. La distribution de fréquence de ce modèle a révélé qu'il existe une forte incidence de conflits intercommunautaires dans la région et que trois pays, en particulier constituaient « les champions en la matière ».

Weak states

One major factor that has been identified as inhibiting successful governance in sub-Saharan Africa is that the state is considered weak. Chazan et al (1999:66) described the characteristics of 'relative weakness of governments' as follows: 'scarcity of resources, politicized patterns of social differentiation, overexpanded state structures, insufficient state legitimacy, inadequate state power, and the lack of adaptation of alien institutions to local conditions'. The African state, it is argued, is characterised by a general inability to organise material and human resources, mobilise its citizens, and implement policies for general societal growth (see inter alia Englebert 1997; Ayoob 1995; Dia 1996; Migdal 1988; Tilly 1985).

Englebert (1997:767) has elaborated on the divergent political and social factors that shape the evolving state in Africa. He writes that the 'state in Africa is really a dubious contested community of heterogeneous and occasionally clashing linguistic, religious and ethnic identities that fails the test of legitimacy, and territoriality'. In the immediate post-colonial era, the process of political development involved the values of liberal political institutions borrowed from Europe, but sometimes diluted by values of militancy borrowed from Marxist-Leninist ideology (review for instance Kwame Nkrumah's legacy in Ghana, Nyerere in Tanzania, Toure in Guinea). In other countries, political development took the form of totalitarianism (for example, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo). The development of the new nation-states with borders that were foisted on them by the colonial countries was also affected by inter-ethnic competition or tension and divergent ethnic interests (review, for instance the civil war in Nigeria, Angola, Sudan) (Ki-Zerbo et al 1993). The high incidence of military coups has also undermined the political development and organisation of the state (see for instance Elaigwu and Mazrui 1993). According to Chabal and Daloz (1999), the state in Africa is used by African elites as an instrument of 'primitive accumulation'. Steeped in patrimonalism, some rulers, according to Chabal and Daloz, allocate resources to clients based on patronage (see also Ekeh 1998).

Babu (1996:90) writes that Africans inherited economic weakness from the 'primitive structure of colonial economy'. The theme of colonial (and

post-colonial) economic dependence has also been articulated by Nkrumah (1965,1973). The economic dependence of Africa, essentially the former colonies, on the West, particularly, Europe, was stark in the post-colonial era. Coquery-Vidrovitch (1993:301), writes that after independence, the new African states 'had to contend with disjointed structures of underdeveloped economies inherited on colonial lines, with production geared for export and a very limited domestic market'. Owusu (1993) argues that there was an 'export bias' in African agriculture policy due to the colonial pattern of trade, because the former colonial powers were still important trade partners with the former colonies. A consequence of this bias is that Western Europe accounts for nearly two-thirds of Africa's total trade. Kipre (1993:371) suggests that 'the post-colonial era in Africa started out with a major handicap: people had become accustomed to consuming (imported) manufactured goods, while the African economy was still largely in the pre-industrial age'.

In 1980, the situation had changed little and generally, the few industries in Africa were vulnerable to trans-national corporations with world-wide interests. Africa remains the least industrialised continent and is mainly a supplier of industrial raw materials to the industrialised countries of Europe and America. According to Meier and Rauch (2000:65) Africa's current economic status is characterised by: (1) low levels of education and income, (2) the absence of indigenous entrepreneurial class, (3) a heavy dependence on primary product exports induced by the colonial approach to development, and the 'consequently under-developed condition, distorted nature of infrastructure oriented towards trade with Europe, rather than internal development', (4) the small size of domestic market, and (5) poorly operating market mechanisms.

In sub-Saharan Africa, several states (and regions) are also grappling with armed conflicts in addition to state 'weakness'. In the past 10 years, Africa has experienced more armed conflicts than any other continent (for instance, wars in Rwanda, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Burundi and the two Congos), and the West Africa region has become volatile due to past and current conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea Bissau. These conflicts also directly involved the armies of Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, The Gambia, Mali and Niger in the role of peace-keeping.

Gamba (1998), Lumpe et al (2000), and Boutwell and Klare (2000) among others have argued that these armed conflicts are due to the massive quantity of illegal light weapons and small arms circulating throughout the region and moving unchecked across porous borders (see also

Small Arms Survey 2001). During the Cold War, arms transfers were made from government to government under the patronage of the super powers. After the Cold War and since the 1980s, arms are transferred from government to self-styled insurgents and guerilla movements facilitated by globalisation and stockpiles of arms left over from the Cold War. The ready availability of these weapons is also due to the fact that they are inexpensive, portable, easy to maintain, conceal and use (Klare 1999). Cohen and Deng (1998) estimate that 10 million persons have been internally displaced in Africa due to these armed conflicts. It is argued that the ready availability of these weapons encourages warfare as a means to conflict resolution and extends the duration of wars.

These arguments about 'weak states' or structural incoherence (political, cultural or economic) in Africa are necessarily grounded in a post-colonial framework. Structure or structural properties as used in this paper describe rules and resources that facilitate or transform relations among people or institutions. In this rendition, 'weakness' is not related to external military threats, but rather specific intra-state existential experiences in a post-colonial era.

In this paper, we argue that state weakness can be described or captured by measuring structural inequalities within the state. We argue that structural inequality is based on political, cultural and economic differentiation or inequality within states. In other words, political incoherence, ethnic stratification, and the unequal distribution of wealth are the core dimensions of structural differentiation in sub-Saharan Africa. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons exacerbates the structural inequalities of these societies. The influx of light weapons or small arms may be seen as an opportunistic social disorder facilitated by domestic structural vulnerabilities and contradictions. (In fact, the proliferation of these weapons may be seen as undermining the state's claim to the monopoly of instrument of coercion or violence).

In general, the discourse on states is informed by the Weberian ideal type, which is profiled as possessing a monopoly of violence and deriving its authority from the consent of the governed. However, the temptation to compare the experience of sub-Saharan states (Third World countries, for that matter) to Europe (or the developing world, for that matter), is discouraged by Tilly (1985:169) as he correctly argues that 'in no simple sense can we read the future of Third World countries from the past of European countries... It will therefore help us to eliminate faulty implicit comparisons between today's Third World and yesterday's Europe'.

Based on the foregoing argument, we pose the following question: how is state 'weakness' or structural inequality related to communal conflict within these countries? In other words, does the incidence of armed conflict coincide with the prevalence of weak characteristics in African countries?

Structural inequality

In this paper, we draw on three common core concepts to empirically characterize weak states in Africa. We argue that these concepts describe structural inequality or social conflict within states, and include cultural stratification (e.g. Chazan et al 1999; Englebert 1997), political inequality (e.g. Englebert 1997, 2000; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Ekeh 1998; Ayoob 1995) and economic inequality (Kipre 1993; Owusu 1993; Babu 1990). In a neo-conflict perspective the African state is confronted with social conflict based not only on economic differentiation, but divergent ethnic interests and incoherent systems and structures of governance. From the Weberian perspective, the authority of the post-colonial state in Africa is contested. As such, the social contract between state and the governed is non-existent. Chazan et al (1999:239) describe the travails of these countries aptly: 'African countries, regardless of regime type or ideology, have confronted three general challenges of economic development in the post-colonial era: poverty, structural transformation, and dependence'.

We derive an empirical construct defined as structural inequality or 'weakness', that measures the extent of political, economic and cultural (social) differentiation using the Minorities at Risk data-set. This construct does not measure global exogenous factors such as global markets, or stockpiles of licit or illicit small arms or light weapons. Indeed, data on illicit arms trade would inform our investigation; however, our searches did not uncover reliable data on the illicit trade in Africa. The Small Arms Survey publishes estimates of the global trade, but in general such data are extremely difficult to garner, especially because national monitoring systems are inadequate in tracking illicit gun brokers, transport agents or 'gun-runners' (see Wood and Peleman 1999; Small Arms Survey 2001).

Our research questions are: (1) What is the relationship of the structural inequality construct (or state weakness) to violent communal conflict within the country? (2) How do the core structural inequality variables covary or how are they related with one another (what is the internal consistency of the structural inequality construct)? (3) What is the extent of political, economic and cultural inequalities in sub-Saharan Africa based on this construct?

An example of a similar construct is the United Nation's Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a composite index based on health and socioeconomic indicators: longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth; educational attainment, as measured by a combination of adult literacy and combined gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrollment; and standard of living as measured by GDP per capita. This index captures the distorted economic structures that may covary with poverty and social conflict. (The index classifies most of African countries as having low human development and a few countries having medium human development (see Human Development Report 2000).

The data

Data are drawn from the Minorities At Risk database (MAR), which is maintained by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland and supported by the National Science Foundation, the United States Institute for Peace, the Hewlett Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation and the State Failure Task Force. Beginning in 1986, the MAR has collected and coded information on conflicts relating to minority groups in all countries with a current population of 500,000. A minority group at risk is defined as an ethnopolitical group that collectively suffers or benefits from systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society; and/or collectively mobilises in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests (MAR codebook 2002). According to the MAR (see MAR website, www.mar.org), such groups might be ethnonationalist (people with a history of organised political autonomy), religious (communal groups holding different religious beliefs), cultural (tribes or ethnic groups with distinct cultural beliefs or practices), indigenous (descendents of conquered inhabitants who conform with the dominant culture), and ethnoclass (ethnically or culturally distinct peoples whose social and economic status in the main is different from the dominant group).

Other than gender inequality, these characterisations of groups or community identity capture the core features upon which social stratification or social inequality might be based (see for instance Hurst 1992). As such, this database provides important information about the nature of social inequality or equality of opportunity in 116 countries. The key advantage of this database is that it provides, for the first time, frequency counts based on nominal scaled qualitative data on political, economic and cultural inequality (or structural inequality) vis-à-vis groups within countries. Most important, the MAR provides such data that depict systematic

unequal treatment related to communal identities that may be based on language or culture, ethnicity or race, religion, or territory. The construct of structural inequality as a manifestation of state weakness proposed in this paper is consonant with the nature of the MAR database.

Depending on the number of minority groups our analyses are based on 32 sub-Saharan African countries for which there is information, a country may have more than one record in the data-set. Data are mainly categorical of the ordinal nature and include both 'static' and 'dynamic' variables. Static variables are data that remain relatively the same over long periods (such as name), and dynamic variables are those that are subject to change (such as regime type). Indeed 'static' variables may be aptly classified as constants. The database contains five types of variables: (a) group characteristics and status, (b) group discrimination, (c) group organisation, (d) group collective interests, and (e) group conflict behaviour.

Methods

Ten variables were originally selected to depict the construct. Regime type (RT), economic differentials index (EDI), economic discrimination index (EDCI), political differentials index (PDI), equal protection (EP), right to organise (RO), cultural differentials index (CDI), and different language (DF) were originally selected to be predictor or explanatory variables. Intercommunal conflict 1940-1989 (IC1), and intercommunal conflict since 1990 (IC2) were selected to be the outcome variables. All the predictor or explanatory variables were recoded for our analysis.[1]

In addition to regime type, we used three variables, namely political differentials index,[2] equal protection, and the right to organise, to depict political inequality. Two variables cover the area of economic inequality, namely economic differentials index and economic discrimination index. These variables represent inequality in income, wealth, land property and education.[3] Two variables represent the concept of cultural inequality, namely cultural differentials index and different language. These variables represent inequality based on ethnicity or nationality, language, historical origin, religion, social customs, and territory.[4]

We used two variables to represent intercommunal conflict. These two intercommunal conflict variables come closest to our original idea of significant violent ethnic conflict within the country. Specifically, the codebook describes these conflict variables as follows: 'these variables provide information on open hostilities between the minority group and other communal groups, which includes open conflicts with other mi-

norities and the majority or dominant group, but not conflicts with the state, or with dominant groups exercising state power. The minority being coded often is the target of attacks, but in some instances may initiate them. The actual initiation of violence is difficult to determine'(MAR codebook 2002:83).

We hypothesized that all countries in sub-Saharan Africa have some level of inequality in all three domains (political, economic and cultural) and that these inequalities are related to intercommunal conflict. We also hypothesised that these variables represent a reliable construct of the dimensions of weak states in Africa.

We conducted three kinds of analysis based on the research questions posed: correlation analysis provides the extent to which these variables are related to one another; reliability analysis provides a measure of the internal consistency of the construct; and logistic regression assesses which elements of the construct tend to coincide with the presence of intercommunal conflict. Finally, frequency counts provide the extent to which there are political, economic and cultural inequalities in Africa.[5]

Findings

Table 1 presents the correlation matrix of all the selected original variables. This matrix is a first step in determining the systematic association among the variables of interest. We judged highly correlated variables to have coefficients in the range of 1.0 to 0.7 and moderately correlated variables to have coefficients in the range of 0.6 to 0.4. Coefficients that are less than 0.3 depict variables that have low correlation. It is important to note that the correlation coefficient does not imply causality. In selecting variables for inclusion in subsequent procedures, we were interested in predictor or explanatory variables that are moderately correlated, but are highly correlated with the outcome variables. Highly correlated predictor or explanatory variables create collinearity problems in general linear models because it is difficult to study the separate effects of the predictors on the outcomes.

Notably, the correlation coefficient between political differential index and economic differential index is moderately acceptable at 0.51, and so is the correlation coefficient between cultural differential index and economic differential index, 0.48. Right to organise and equal protection are highly correlated with the political differential index (0.77 and 0.69 respectively). The economic discrimination variable has a moderate correlation with the economic differential index, (0.38), but has low correlations with other variables in the matrix. The different language

Table 1: Correlation matrix of indicators

	Regime Type	Economic Differential	Economic Discrimination	Political Differential	Right to Organise	Equal Protection	Conflict 1940–1989	Conflict Since 1990	Cultural Differential
Economic Differential	-.06								
Economic Discrimination	.14	.38							
Political Differential	.14	.51	.25						
Right to Organise	.07	.32	.10	.77					
Equal Protection	.21	.32	.27	.69	.54				
Conflict 1940–1989	.16	-.09	.03	-.04	-.07	-.06			
Conflict 1990	.10	.03	.28	.01	.03	.04	.19		
Cultural Differential	-.27	.48	.25	.21	-.02	.06	-.04	.02	
Different Language	-.15	.06	-.06	-.00	-.04	-.10	-.07	-.19	.29

variable also has low correlation coefficients with the cultural differential index and other variables in the matrix. The matrix reveals that except for political differential index, economic differential index, cultural differential index, which among them demonstrate moderate correlation, the rest of the predictor variables demonstrate either high or low correlation. The economic discrimination index has a moderate correlation with the economic differential index, but does not show promise when correlated with the political differential index or the cultural differential index. It is also noteworthy that none of the variables is moderately or highly correlated with the outcome variables, intercommunal conflict between 1940–1989 and since 1990. This is an indication that the relationship between the construct and the posited outcomes may be weak.

Table 2 presents the results of the reliability analysis. The analysis yields information about the internal consistency or the average inter-item correlation of the construct based on the three variables selected above from the correlation matrix. A high alpha coefficient means that the variables or items are positively correlated and that they are measuring a common phenomenon.

Table 2: Reliability coefficients

	Alpha If Item Deleted
Economic Differentials	0.3482
Cultural Differentials	0.6717
Political Differentials	0.5774
Cronbach's alpha for 3 items	0.6635
Standardised item alpha	0.6721

The alpha provides a single summary measure of internal consistency, which in this analysis is a respectable 0.66; the standardised alpha is a simplified version of the alpha, which assumes that item variances are equal. Table 2 also presents the relative strength of the indexical variables in the construct. Of the three, economic differential contributes the most to the alpha; when this variable is deleted from the construct, the internal consistency of the measure declines to 0.34. These results leave us confident that the structural inequality construct made up of three index variables is robust and reliable.

Table 3 presents the results of logistic regression procedure. The logistic regression model was developed by recoding the three predictor variables into dichotomous variables.[6]

Table 3: Logistic regression model

	Intercommunal 1940–1989	Conflict Since 1990
R^2	0.008	0.002
Independent Variables	Odds Ratios	
Economic Differentials vs. not	1.01	0.95
Political Differentials vs. not	0.85	1.15
Cultural Differentials vs. not	1.38*	1.11

**Significant at $p < .01$*

Logistic regression produces odds ratio estimates for each predictor. These estimates are probabilities that are easily interpretable. Each estimate indicates how much more likely it is that an outcome would be observed if, all things being equal, the predictor occurs compared to when the predictor does not occur. The model we built in this paper estimates how much more (or less) likely intercommunal conflict will occur given political, economic and cultural inequality. An odds ratio above 1.0 means that intercommunal conflict becomes more likely, and a ratio below 1.0 means that it becomes less likely. Ratios that are statistically significant are identified with an asterisk.

Table 3 shows that countries that had cultural differentials were almost one and half times more likely to experience intercommunal conflict between 1940–1989; none of the predictors in the construct significantly increased or decreased the likelihood of observing intercommunal conflict since 1990. The R^2 yielded by the model is very low and clearly suggests that the model can be improved. The significant odds ratio estimate suggests that prior to 1990, ethnic differences increased the likelihood of intercommunal conflict.

Table 4 presents frequency distributions of modal scores for all countries in the sub-Saharan region. We used modal scores because all countries had multiple records. This table shows the prevalence of structural

inequality in the region. Most of the countries in the region are coded as having some kind of political (81 percent, 26) or economic (66 percent, 21) inequality. All countries are coded as having cultural differentials. Between 1940 and 1989, a little over half (53 percent, 17) of the countries are coded as having intercommunal conflict, whereas 75 percent (24) were coded as having intercommunal conflict since 1990. Three countries emerge as 'best performers' based on these modal scores; Zambia, Tanzania and Ghana. Of the five indicators, Zambia had no intercommunal conflicts and no significant political or economic differentials. Tanzania had no intercommunal conflicts and no significant political differentials. Ghana had no intercommual conflicts and no significant economic differentials.

Discussion and conclusion

The results of the analysis support the argument that the construct of structural inequality comprising political, cultural and economic differentiation variables is reliable and robust. There is positive inter-item correlation among these variables and the reliability coefficient is acceptable. However, all the original explanatory variables selected for this study were not useful because they were not moderately correlated with the other core variables in the construct. Analysis also revealed that of the three variables, economic differentiation was the most powerful. This is an important finding, suggesting that governments in Africa can significantly reduce overall structural contradictions or inequalities in their countries by reducing economic inequality. This is not to say that political inequalities (i.e. the right to organise, guarantees of equal protection, access to power, access to civil service, recruitment, and voting rights) are not important, or that discrimination based on ethnicity or nationality, language, religion, or territory is not important. Rather, the finding suggests that a reduction in economic inequalities mitigates the effects of political and cultural differentiation.

The logistic regression model showed that the odds of having intercommunal conflict from 1940 to 1989 increased when there were cultural differentials. This is an important finding because it supports the historical reality of the time and confirms the significance of cultural difference in the immediate postcolonial milieu. The development of new nation-states with borders that were foisted on them by the colonial countries immediately after independence was affected by inter-ethnic competition or tension. In Nigeria, for instance, cultural differentials led to a brutal civil war. The struggle for political maturity and the general search

Table 4: Modal scores on selected variables

Country	Political Differentials Index	Economic Differentials Index	Cultural Differentials Index	Intercommunal Conflict 1940–1989	Intercommunal Conflict since 1990
Angola	Substantial (2)	Major (3)	Slight (1)	Yes (1)	Yes (1)
Botswana	Slight (1)	Major (3)	Major (3)	No (0)	Yes (1)
Burundi	Slight (1)*	Slight (1)*	Substantial (2)*	Yes (1)	Yes (1)
Cameroon	Slight (1)	Slight (1)*	Substantial (2)*	No (0)	Yes (1)
Chad	Major (3)*	Not sig (0)	Major (3)	Yes (1)*	Yes (1)*
Côte d'Ivoire	Major (3)	Substantial (2)	Extreme (4)	No (1)	Yes (1)**
Dem. Rep. Congo	Substantial (2)*	Not sig (0)	Slight (1)	Yes (1)*	Yes (1)*
Djibouti	Extreme (4)	Extreme (4)	Major (3)	Yes (1)	Yes (1)
Eritrea	Slight (1)	Major (3)	Extreme (4)	No (0)	No (0)
Ethiopia	Substantial (2)*	Extreme (4)	Extreme (4)	No (0)	Yes (1)
Ghana	Slight (1)*	Not sig (0)	Slight (1)	No (0)	No (0)
Guinea	Substantial (2)	Not sig (0)	Slight (1)	Yes (1)	No (0)
Kenya	Slight (1)	Major (3)	Substantial (2)*	Yes (1)	Yes (1)
Liberia	Substantial (2)	Substantial (2)	Major (3)	No (0)	Yes (1)**
Madagascar	Substantial (2)	Not sig (0)	Substantial (2)	Yes (1)	Yes (1)

Mali	Not sig (0)*	Slight (1)*	Major (3)	No (0)	Yes (1)
Mauritania	Major (3)*	Major (3)	Major (3)	Yes (1)	Yes (1)
Namibia	Slight (1)*	Slight (1)*	Major (3)	No (0)	Yes (1)
Niger	Substantial (2)	Slight (1)*	Slight (1)	No (0)	No (0)
Rep. of Congo	Not sig (0)*	Not sig (0)*	Slight (1)	Yes (1)	Yes (1)
Nigeria	Major (3)	Extreme (4)	Substantial (2)	Yes (1)	Yes (1)
Rwanda	Major (3)*	Not sig (0)*	Slight (1)	Yes (1)	Yes (1)
Senegal	Slight (1)	Substantial (2)	Substantial (2)	No (0)	No (0)
Sierra Leone	Slight (1)*	Not sig (0)	Slight (1)	Yes (1)	Yes (1)
Somalia	Substantial (2)	Not sig (0)	Slight (1)	No (0)	Yes (1)
South Africa	Not sig (0)	Extreme (4)	Extreme (4)	Yes (1)	Yes (1)
Sudan	Substantial (2)*	Major (3)	Extreme (4)	Yes (1)	Yes (1)
Tanzania	Not sig (0)	Slight (1)	Substantial (2)	No (0)	No (0)
Togo	Not sig (0)*	Slight (1)	Slight (1)	Yes (1)	Yes (1)
Uganda	Substantial (2)	Substantial (2)	Substantial (2)	No (0)	No (0)
Zambia	Not sig (0)	Not sig (0)	Substantial (2)	No (0)	No (0)
Zimbabwe	Slight (1)*	Not sig (0)	Substantial (2)	Yes (1)	Yes (1)

* Where multiple modal values exist, the mean value is reported.
**Data coding revised by authors based on current information.

for coherence in systems and structures of governance, was a painful one and it still is. Young (1994:75) writes that 'the political structuration of ethnic units for colonial local administration, particularly within the (British) indirect rule doctrine, embedded ethnic identity within an institutional frame, especially in historically centralized African states'. After independence, ethnonationalism collided with economic dependence (on Europe) and incoherent political systems. Indeed, in some of these sub-Saharan African states, national integration is not completed and the state-building project is a work in progress.

However, the overall construct did not perform well in predicting intercommunal conflict. This suggests that there are other variables that can improve the model. This is another important finding, which suggests that structural inequality by itself does not lead to violent intercommunal conflict. The results also clearly indicate the prevalence of intercommunal conflict since 1990. The prevalence of intercommunal conflict (75 percent) in sub-Saharan Africa and the inadequacy of the construct in predicting it clearly indicates that there are other key variables that covary with intercommunal conflict and that structural inequality by itself does not directly lead to violent inter-ethnic conflict. We postulate that the illicit trade in small arms is an important catalyst for the initiation of wars and violent intercommunal conflict and that such a variable may enhance the power of the construct in predicting intercommunal conflict.

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Notes

1. Of the ten original variables, equal protection and right to organise are three level ordinal variables (0-2), with 0 coded as no differential, 1 coded as some differential and 2 coded as significant differential. Regime type is a four level ordinal variable with 1 coded as old democracy, 2 coded as new democracy, 3 coded as transitional polity, 4 coded as autocracy. Political differentials index, economic differentials index and cultural differentials index are seven level ordinal variables (-2 to +4). For our analyses, these variables were recoded as follows: -2, -1, & 0 = no significant differential, 1 = slight differential, 2 = substantial differential, 3 = major differential, 4 = extreme differential. The economic discrimination index is coded differently: 0 = no discrimination, 1 = historical neglect/no remedy, 2 = historical neglect/remedial policies, 3 = social exclusion, 4 = restrictive policies. Intercommunal conflict 1940-1989 and intercommunal conflict since 1990 are dichotomous variables (0 = no; 1

= yes). For all three domains, we selected one indexical or composite variable to represent the core concept. Other variables were selected based on a review of the component variables.

2. The political differentials index variable is a composite index of six political dimensions, which include right to organise, guarantee of equal protection, access to power, access to civil service, recruitment, and voting rights.
3. The economic differential index is a composite index of six dimensions including income, land property, higher education, presence in commerce, presence in professions, and presence in official positions. The economic discrimination index represents public and social policy relating to economic inequalities.
4. The cultural differentials index is a composite index of six dimensions including different ethnicity or nationality, different language, different historical origin, different religion, different social customs, and different residence. Different language is used as an additional indicator of ethnic presence.
5. Correlation analysis describes the extent to which variables covary. This analysis yields the correlation coefficient r, which is a summary measure of the linear relationship between paired values. Reliability analysis yields Cronbach's alpha, which is a measure of internal consistency of the construct. Logistic regression is a useful tool to model data, however no claim is made for direct causal relationships. Logistic regression is often used when the dependent variable is composed of two values (in this analysis, the presence or absence of intercommunal conflict). The analysis yields odds ratios which indicate how much more likely an outcome would be observed if, all things being equal, the predictor occurs compared to when the predictor does not occur. Logistic regression also yields the R^2 coefficient or strength of association between the dependent and independent variables. We used SPSS for Windows version 11.0 for all analysis except the logistic regression procedures, for which we used SAS for Windows version 8.0.
6. The logistic model may be illustrated by the following equation (based on the general linear equation):

$$\text{Logit}\,(C2) = b0 + b1 * V1 + b2 * V2 + b3 * V3$$

Where $C2$ denotes an outcome of intercommunal conflict or whether or not there was intercommunal conflict within a period. When $C2 = 0$ then there was no intercommunal conflict, when $C2 = 1$, then there was intercommunal conflict. The variable $V1$ represents one of the predictor variables, where $V1 = 0$ represents nonexistence of a type of inequality and $V1 = 1$ represents the presence of inequality, and the $V2$ and $V3$ represent the other predictor variables.

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Secondary Education – A 'Tool' for National Development in Ghana. A Critical Appraisal of the Post-Colonial Context

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Abstract

The paper appraises the role of secondary education as a 'tool' for national development in post-colonial Ghana. In so doing, it analyses the problems of secondary education provision focusing on funding and reform. I have argued that – notwithstanding the World Bank's present support for universal primary education throughout Africa, a project commenced in Ghana as early as 1951, which represents a major shift from the Bank's previous endorsement (1960s) of university education as the panacea to Africa's development challenges – secondary education remains vital to Ghana's development aspirations. As the most accessible form of higher education in Ghana today, increased attention to, and expansion of secondary education has a greater potential than primary education of sustaining literacy levels attained, raising political awareness and thus advancing democracy, as well as supplying sufficient middle-level manpower crucial to national development.

Résumé

Cet article évalue le rôle de l'éducation secondaire, en tant qu'»outil de développement national dans le Ghana post colonial. Il analyse les problèmes de l'éducation secondaire, en insistant sur son financement et sur sa réforme. J'écris que, malgré le soutien actuel que la Banque Mondiale accorde à l'éducation primaire universelle en Afrique (un projet initié au Ghana dès 1951), qui constitue une rupture majeure par rapport à l'ancien programme de financement de l'éducation universitaire initié par cette même Banque (années 60), considéré comme la panacée aux défis de développement de l'Afrique, l'éducation secondaire demeure vitale à la concrétisation des projets de développement du Ghana. Elle constitue la forme d'éducation supérieure la plus accessible aujourd'hui, au Ghana, et qui bénéficie actuellement d'un regain d'attention et d'une certaine évolution ; elle est plus à même que l'éducation

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primaire, de préserver les taux d'alphabétisation réalisés, de forger une certaine conscience politique, et, ainsi, de faire avancer la démocratie et de fournir une main-d'œuvre de niveau moyen, indispensable au développement national.

Introduction

Secondary education in post-colonial Ghana, that is, the period since 1951, has been considered a 'tool' for manpower and national development. Yet, research on the history of education in Ghana (Mc William and Kwamena-Poh 1975; Bening 1990; Quist 1990); educational reform and social change (Foster 1965; Ahiable- Addo 1980; Scadding 1990; Antwi 1990) and the church contribution to educational expansion (Bartels 1965; Smith 1966; Odamtten 1978; Quist 1994) has under-recognised the crucial contribution of secondary education to national development. This paper attempts to fill this gap by specifically focusing on, examining, and critically appraising, secondary education's role as a 'tool' for national development in post-colonial Ghana. The paper argues strongly for increased attention to secondary education since it constitutes a vital link between the primary and tertiary levels of education and constitutes a touchstone in any country's efforts at human capacity building with implications for accelerated national development. In view of this, the paper does not cover primary or university education.

Structurally, the paper first provides a profile history of secondary education expansion and proceeds to examine its relation to national development. This serves as a framework for a critical appraisal of the problems of secondary education development in the second part. Here, issues relating to funding and reform are addressed. Third, I analyse the implications of the problems of secondary education for national development, pointing to the challenges for Ghana in her goal of becoming a middle-level income country by 2020.

I contend that despite the World Bank's present support for increased primary education in Africa, a major shift from its previous (1960s) endorsement of higher education as the panacea to Africa's post-colonial development challenges, secondary education remains critical to Ghana's quest to develop at a faster rate. It is the most accessible form of higher education in Ghana today with greater potential than primary education of sustaining higher levels of literacy, increasing political awareness, strengthening democracy and producing a pool of middle-level manpower crucial to national development.

A brief history of secondary education and national development

In 1876 the first Methodist church secondary school, Mfantsipim (initially, the Wesleyan Mission High School), a boys' institution modelled on English Wesleyan schools, was established at Cape Coast in the Central Region of Ghana. By 1930, the Anglican and Catholic churches, in competition with the Methodists, had respectively founded at Cape Coast Adisadel (1910) and St. Augustine's Colleges (1930). These later two were also boys' institutions. The colonial state under Governor Gordon F. Guggisberg (1919–1927), realising the importance of secondary education, joined the enterprise initially in 1924 and more fully in 1927 by establishing Achimota School (initially Prince of Wales College), its co-educational masterpiece. Achimota was modelled on elite English 'Public' schools, namely, Eton and Winchester that trained the scholar, 'gentlemen', politician, and elite professionals of Britain, among others (Abodeka 1977; Annstrong 1981; Quist 1999a, 1999b). It rather unsuccessfully sought to blend this elite British model with an American one – the Hampton – Tuskegee design – intended solely for the industrial and manual training of liberated African-Americans in post-Civil War United States (Bennan 1971, 1972; Steiner-Khamsi and Quist 2000). Such replication and expected adaptation of metropolitan models (from England and the United States) with their inherent tensions and contradictions had cultural, social and educational implications for Ghana's development as a nation (Steiner-Khamsi and Quist 2000).

The Mfantsipim model, most especially, but also Achimota, provided the prototypes for secondary education influencing other private schools, notably Accra Academy founded in 1937 in Accra (Boahen 1996; Quist 1999), the national capital. All these early schools were founded in southern Ghana, that is, the geographical area extending from the coast of Ghana to the Ashanti Region. This development placed the south almost half-a-century ahead of the north, the latter being the territory stretching from Ashanti to the Upper East and West Regions respectively. Two notable female institutions, namely, Wesley Girls High (1935) and Holy Child Schools (1946) were also sited at Cape Coast. These educationally prestigious Cape Coast schools (even to date) as well as Achimota, more than any others, have attracted the cream of Ghanaian primary school graduates.

The south of Ghana, thus, took an early lead in the political development of Ghana by producing the first crop of highly educated elite who

were mostly professionals in law, medicine, journalism, teaching but also ardent nationalists contesting colonial rule on a regular basis. Notable among these were two British trained lawyers, John Mensah-Sarbah and Joseph E. Casely-Hayford. The North of Ghana had its first secondary school in 1951.

Throughout the colonial era no quota system was instituted for the benefit of educationally neglected areas such as the North. Gross gender, class, ethnic and regional imbalances prevailed nation-wide with implications for national development. Williams (1964: 299) asserts that data spanning the 1920s and 1930s, that is, the Guggisberg era (1919–1927) confirm that the ratio of girls to boys in government and government-assisted schools was 1:4.8. Specifically, in 1925, it was 1:4; in 1928, 1:3.5 and in the 1930s, 1:3 and in 1891 it was 1:3.9.

Thus, Williams concludes that 'whatever one's interpretation, the hard facts are that the ratio of girls to boys was approximately the same at the end of the Governor's' [meaning Guggisberg] period of office as it was had been thirty years earlier (that is 1891). And this was in spite of Guggisberg's criticism of the entire educational system as one that was inefficient, ineffective and 'rotten' to the core. Instructively, Guggisberg and the colonial state notwithstanding, the pioneering work of the missions (churches) remained unsurpassed. At the end of the colonial period, 1950–51, there were altogether only two government secondary schools with an enrolment of 857, eleven government-assisted (mostly church-established) institutions with a total attendance of 1,919, and 44 non-assisted ones (private) also with an attendance of 3,386 (Foster 1965; Quist 1999b). Achimota, a government school, and the Cape Coast church-initiated institutions that became government-assisted were well established, providing courses that led to the General Certificate of Ordinary and Advanced Levels. In the Nkrumah era (1951–1966) these examinations modelled on the Cambridge School Certificate of England were taken at the end of five years of secondary education and a two-year sixth-form work respectively.

Under the Nkrumah administration, secondary education received particular attention since the government regarded it as the lynchpin for educational progress, manpower development and overall national development. A 'national' secondary schools project was implemented through the Ghana Educational Trust (GET), 1957–1964. The Trust aimed to increase access to secondary education nation-wide, particularly in rural and deprived areas by creating and increasing access and participation. By 1960, GET had established nineteen secondary schools throughout

the country. Table 1 depicts the status of secondary education in Ghana in the critical years of the Nkrumah era when national development received the greatest attention.

Table 1: Secondary schools in Ghana from 1951–1966: Types, number and enrolment

Year	Public (Government& Approved) Schools		Private Schools		Total	
	No.	Enrolment	No.	Enrolment	No.	Enrolment
1951	13	2,937	49	3,964	62	6,901
1957	38	9,860	22	2,259	60	12,119
1960	39	11,874	31	4,238	70	16,112
1966	105	42,628	45	5,940	150	48,568

Sources: Ghana, 1960, *Educational Statistics*, 1959, Accra, Ministry of Education, pp. 1–2; Ghana, 1964, 1962 *Statistical Year Book*. Second Issue, Accra, Central Bureau of Statistics, pp 194–165; Ghana, 1969, 1965–66 *Statistical Year Book* Accra, Central Bureau of Statistics, p. 200.

Table 1 features 1951, that is, the start of the post-colonial phase and an era in which Ghana was politically in 'transition to independence'. It also presents data on 1957, the year of Ghana political independence from Britain and 1960, the year Ghana attained republican status under Dr. Krame Nkrumah. The year 1966, when Nkrumah was overthrown in a military coup d'état, is also covered. The Table shows the number, type and enrolment figures for public (government and government-assisted) and private (owned by individuals) secondary schools. It discloses an almost three hundred percent increase in the number of public secondary schools between 1951 and 1957, and between 1957 and 1966. Enrolment rose by approximately 300 percent between 1951 and 1957, and 500 percent between 1957 and 1966. Such increases were, however, not replicated at the private school level where a decline of 200 percent in the total number of schools between 1951 and 1957 can be discerned.

From Table 1, public secondary educational access expanded more rapidly at the expense of the private sector and this was as a result of the Nkrumah administration's policy of using the private sector to augment

the public domain. Such a policy was effected through the 'encouragement' status granted the more promising private secondary schools by virtue of the fact that they were performing well academically. Such status brought these schools more fully into the public domain, making them government-assisted. Twenty-three of these institutions were actually built, managed and controlled by GET by 1961 (Quist 1999b). From September 1959 to September 1962, GET managed no fewer than 34 well-equipped and well-housed secondary schools. By September 1963, it alone had put up forty-six buildings, increasing access and opportunity for many Ghanaians students irrespective of ethnicity, class and gender. This was possible following increased funding from the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (now Ghana Cocoa Board) which endowed it with initial seed money of 2.5 million pounds sterling. The Ghana Cocoa Board remains the sole buyer and exporter of all cocoa (the leading export crop and major foreign ex change earner until the 1990s) produced in Ghana.

Under Jerry Rawlings's Provincial National Defence Council (PNDC) government, 1981–1991, a major change in the inherited colonial secondary education structure, most especially, and the content occurred in 1987 with the implementation of the Junior Secondary education reform. This introduced a 3-3 structure, that is, three years of Junior and three years of Senior Secondary education; a structure apparently informed by similar ones (the 3-3 high school system) in the United States, Japan and Nigeria. This structure was a major departure from the British colonial 5-2 model. Importantly, it made three years of secondary education compulsory for all primary school graduates for the first time in Ghana. Two new examinations, namely, the Basic Education Certificate Examination (BECE) taken at the end of three years of Junior Secondary education, and the Senior Secondary School Certificate Examination (SSSCE) administered at the end of the Senior Secondary programme were also introduced (Quist 1999b). One significant change was the elimination of the old middle school. The curriculum content of the Junior Secondary schools now included cultural studies, Ghanaian languages, environmental studies, agricultural science and life skills, mostly based on Ghanaian themes. Content, in most subjects at the senior secondary level, was also revised to reflect new standards and expectations.

Despite these, a radical reform of the system was still absent. The Senior Secondary programme essentially retained some of the features of the old system, such as course designations, preparation and management of the examination and certification processes. Further, Senior Secondary schools still remained highly selective, meritocratic and elitist, espe-

cially the Cape Coast schools and Achimota. By 1990, an expanded secondary school system produced 252 Senior and 4,918 Junior Secondary schools nation-wide; the Junior Secondary institutions had a total enrolment of 507,168, while Senior Secondary schools (the old secondary schools) had 169,204 students. By 1993, enrolment at the Junior Secondary level was approximately 80 percent while that at the Senior Secondary level was about 40 percent of secondary school-going students. With the 1987 reforms, only Senior Secondary education remained the prized aspect since it guaranteed access to the universities and other tertiary institutions.

How was secondary education connected to national development? Since colonial times, secondary education was an instrument for the production of middle-level manpower comprising clerical staff, technicians, schoolteachers, facilitators for adult learners, nurses and other paramedical staff, critical to national development.

I define 'National development' as 'the effective harnessing of all potential human (natural) resources of the state through education, training, industry and technology, among others, for accelerated economic growth and socio-political development'. Secondary education was also a 'tool' for cultivating the 'cream' that secured university education and became lawyers, doctors, academicians, engineers, accountants, among others. Yet, internationally, the exact role of education in national development remained difficult to determine. As Debeauvais (1981:67) noted, 'in less than thirty years we have witnessed the birth, the success, and the decline, of the notion that education is one of the chief factors of development'. This notwithstanding, belief in education's contribution to national development remained strong and accounted for the targets set by countries the world over for increased admission to schools, calls by donor institutions such as the World Bank for enlarged access to all types and levels of education, better educational financing, and continuing research that linked education to national development (Easton and Klees 1990).

How far then might it be argued that the post-colonial state's use of secondary education was for 'national development'? To what extent would a contrary argument hold for the colonial state? The post-colonial state, convinced of the importance of education to modernisation and national development, and confronted by the harsh realities of Ghana's peripheral status in a globalising world, resolved to expand higher education beyond the elementary level rapidly. The result was the immediate attention paid secondary (and university) education by the Nkrumah government (1951–1966) and, in recent years, the Rawlings regime (1981–

1991). Its expansion to cater for the universities (three by 1966, and five by 1999 including one university college) – the most critical higher education – was of primary concern. Also crucial was the elimination of regional, gender, class and ethnic inequalities as a me and of promoting national integration (Bray, 1986). This latter, essential to the associated task of nation-building, includes curriculum reform with a stress on a national language, quota/scholarship systems for less privileged areas and massive infrastructural expansion.

Scholarship schemes such as the Cocoa Marketing Board and the Northern Special Scholarships were instituted by the Nkrumah administration to create opportunities for access. These, solely funded by the Cocoa Marketing Board (now Ghana Cocoa Board) and the Ghana Government, have been continuing, aimed at financially handicapped but needy and promising students. The Northern Special Scholarship Scheme has been, singularly, aimed at bridging the alleged fifty years development gap between the south and north of Ghana by supporting the deprived and under-served Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions. The Junior and Senior Secondary programme pursued by the Rawlings regime (1981–1991) has also been instrumental in carrying further the goals of national development though its benefits will only become evident by the year 2020.

For the colonial state (1874–1950), however, it has been argued that the main purpose of education with its stress on the colonial education policy, 'education for adaptation', was neither to train a bourgeoisie in the likeness of the metropolitan country (Britain), nor train scientists and technicians capable of developing technology, but rather to produce individuals alienated by the very content of what they had been taught (Amin 1975: 51). The colonial state's only secondary school, Achimota, patterned on English 'Public' schools, doubtless contributed to the progress (development) of the colony by producing excellent graduates, future leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah and Jerry Rawlings, scholars and researchers in agriculture for the benefit of Ghana and Africa. Certainly, this was development-oriented even though Kwame Nkrumah (1970:36–37) was to note later on that Achimota's '... curriculum, discipline and sports were as close imitations as possible of those operating in English Public Schools. The object was to train up a western oriented political elite committed to the attitudes and ideologies of capitalism and bourgeois society' . Strikingly, 'development' as a concept with economic and social implications only assumed international currency after the Second World War (Esteva 1992). Achimota's isolated setting also negated its initial mission of de-

veloping a rural-community flavour. The school's atmosphere fostered elitism, intellectual and academic pursuits as the English 'Public' Schools did (Armstrong 1981). Its doors were never really opened to the masses nor was it able to effectively champion the colonial state's education policy of 'education for adaptation' (Lewis 1954; Scanlon 1964).

Indeed, 'education for adaptation', which advocated the 'adaptation of education in Africa to the aptitudes, mentalities, occupations and environment' and which was championed by the colonial state as a development policy was considered as dependency rather than development-oriented (Kay and Nystrom 1971:252; Bude 1983; Barrington, 1983:65). It was intended to promote the underdevelopment of Ghana and British Tropical Africa. Berman (1971:145) observed that 'the successful implementation of the Phelps-Stokes Commission's concept of "education for adaptation", of which Achimota was the exemplar in Ghana would have radically altered the course of modern African history, and not in Africa's favour. It would have placed the African countries several centuries behind the advanced countries and would also have deepened the stereotype generally accepted in the West about Africa even today'. What remains controversial in academic and scholarly circles is whether the colonial state apparatus really aimed to promote development. Secondary education, although seen as a medium for restricted middle level manpower development by this state, was not favourably regarded since it had the potential of producing politically conscious and educated persons capable of stirring national unrest.

Problems of secondary education development

Morsy (1987:4) has argued that for developing countries 'secondary education has not been adapted to deal with the present crisis (of national development in a rapidly globalising world) as well as the exponential growth of science and technology'. I would argue here that this has largely been so in Ghana for two main reasons. First, there is the issue of inadequate funding despite the popularity and consensus among all interest groups, namely, the state, educated elite and the churches, about the significance of secondary education to national development (and nation-building), and this was notwithstanding the fact that it received consistent funding since colonial times (Quist 1999a, 1999b). Second, are questions and problems surrounding reform with particular emphasis on the curriculum.

First, let us examine the question of funding. Insufficient and disproportionate funding for secondary education has been a problem. In the

colonial era, and right into the early post-colonial phase, that is, 1957–58, funding was biased in favour of Achimota Secondary School. Achimota alone was allocated the following from government recurrent expenditure for education between 1957 and 1960: in 1957–1958 she received £G 107,320 from the total of £G 618,289; 1958–1959 she was given £G 96,600 out of £G 657,900 while the rest of the government secondary schools in the country received £G 34,300; and in 1959–1960 Achimota had funds amounting to £G 101,280 out of a grand total of £G 727,640 compared with the £G 38,360 for other government-assisted institutions (Quist 1990:196). The church-established schools such as Mfantsipim School, Adisadel and St. Augustine's Colleges, and several others, depended on government grants-in-aid of which Achimota was still the measuring rod. Such lop-sided funding adversely affected the nation-wide expansion of secondary education. Strikingly, the colonial state throughout its seventy-six years (1874–1950) of effective colonial rule only established one secondary institution.

The question might further be posed: what then was the financial status of secondary education as a whole vis-à-vis other sectors of the national economy throughout the post-colonial era? Despite Quist's (1999a, 1999b) assertion that secondary education in Ghana received consistent and sustained funding, at times more than other critical sectors of the national economy such as health, agriculture, and fuel and power since colonial times, secondary education nevertheless competed with these very sectors, as well as with primary and university education for limited government funds. Consequently, funds for secondary education never amounted to half the total national budget for development projects. In this instance, it was (and has been) secondary technical education, critical as well for advanced technological education that ultimately suffered.

What are the pointers? Here, it would be useful to compare government expenditure from 1958–65 (the Nkrumah era) with that for 1985-90 (the Rawlings period). These two eras constitute the watershed in secondary education development in Ghana. In Table 2 which covers 1958-65, the total education expenditure of £G66,003.0 in 1965 constituted 65 percent of the entire social services budget for the whole country. In this same year secondary education alone was allocated £G 7,902. 9, that is, 12 percent of the education vote, while primary education received a higher amount of £G 23,921.5, equivalent to 36 percent. In comparison, the colleges and universities were also allocated £G 28,261.8, that is, 43 percent. Clearly, secondary education received the least funding among the key aspects in the education sector. Education as a whole, however,

received more funds than health in 1965. From the Table, the overall total for the Defence sector alone between 1958 and 1965 was higher than that for secondary education, which received £G 756.1. The Defence sector was allocated 3,495.5, four times more than what was given to secondary education. In 1960–61 secondary education received £G 4,995.1, whilst the Defence sector was allotted £G9,972.2, almost twice. In 1965 secondary education was allocated £G7,902.9 whereas the Defence sector received £G25,384.5, about three-and-a-half times that of secondary education.

Table 2: Revenue and expenditure of central government on Education: Combined consolidated and development funds, 1958–1965, compared with selected sectors (in £G, percentages in parenthesis)

Sector	1958–59	1960–61	1962–63	1965
Administration	1,244.5(13)	778.40(05)	998.3(04)	3,280.6(05)
Primary	3,031.6(31)	4,534.9(30)	8,709.5(38)	23,921.5(30)
Secondary	756.1(7.8)	4,534.9(33)	1,919.6(08)	7,902.9(12)
Colleges & Universities	3,858.2(40)	3,245.4(22)	8,251.1(36)	28,261.8(43)
Teacher training	93,4(01)	543.1(22)	616.9(03)	1,393.0(02)
Other	165.9(02)	253.3(02)	1,924.5(08)	160.9(02)
Total	9,682.1	14,973.3	22,865.2	66,003.0
Overall Total for social services	19,895.5(49)	27,730.8(54)	40,171.7(57)	101,358.0(65)
Defence	3,495.5	9,972.2	11,076.9	25,384.5
Health Total	3,835.5	5,987.5	9,583.2	19,660.0

Source: Ghana (1964) 1962 *Statistical Year Book* Second Issue (Accra, Central Bureau of Statistics), p. 148; Ghana (1967) 1964 *Statistical Year Book*, Fourth Issue (Accra, Central Bureau of Statistics). Table 153, P. 163; Ghana (1973), *Statistical Year Book* 1969–1970. Seventh Issue (Accra, Central Bureau of Statistics), pp. 144–145.

*Percentages derived by author were rounded off to the nearest whole figure.

Clearly, the Nkrumah government emphasised education more than all other social services including health. As shown, however, secondary education did not attract more funds between 1958 and 1965 than Defence,

Table 3: Total government development expenditure on community and social services (1985–1990), compared with other sectors (amount in million Cedis and percentage distribution in brackets)

Sector	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Education	402.1(32.1)	657,7(31.9)	1,686.0(38.5)	2,358.8(27.2)	3,149.9(27.6)	6,696.3(33.4)
Health	233.4(18.7)	447.0(217)	2,153.3(49.2)	2,119.6(24.5)	3,566.6(31.3)	5,121.6(255)
Social security & welfare	27.7(2.2)	25.9(0.0)	109.0(2.5)	-	125.7(1.1)	347.8(1.7)
Housing & community services	419.6(33.5)	748.4(36.3)	428.2(9.8)	3,931.7(45.4)	3,995.8(35.0)	5,090.7(25.4)
Recreational, cultural & religious services	168.5(13.5)	182.2(8.9)	-	248.2(4.9)	563.7(4.9)	2,818.1(14.0)
Total (1)	1,251.3(100)	2,061.8(100)	4,376.5(100)	8,658.3(100)	11,400.8(100)	20,074,5(100)
Total as % of total recurrent & development expenditure	6.9	7.1	9.5	12.9	12.5	16.4
Defence	322.2	809.8	-	141.5	527.9	671.5
Road & waterways	2,174.8	2,052.7	6,869.1	9,943.1	12,214.5	12,290.2

Sources: Ghana (1990;1994) *Quarterly Digest of Statistics*, VII an XII, 4 and 1. pp. 42 and 54 * Percentages Compiled by Author

or the colleges and universities as a whole nor than primary education, except in 1960–61. Within the secondary sector itself, the Nkrumah government's expenditure levelled gradually for all institutions by 1960, but favoured Ghana National College at Cape Coast more than any other institution in the country; a situation reminiscent of Achimota. Ghana National College was the first of the 'national' secondary schools to be established by Kwame Nkrumah in 1948.

It was later taken over and managed by GET. Table 2 shows that in some years, however, secondary education had more than other levels of education. For instance, in 1960–1961 it received £G 4,995.1, that is, 33 percent of the budget while primary education was allocated £G 4,534.9, that is, 30 percent. Yet, there prevailed an uneven distribution of government recurrent expenditure at the secondary level between 1957 and 1960. Achimota's example as already noted provides ample illustration.

Under Jerry Rawlings (1981–1991) secondary education financing was linked to an economic recovery and structuraladjustment programme. The Ghanaian economy by 1983 was at its lowest ebb following consistent failures in domestic policy implementation and management, political instability arising from frequent military coups between 1966 and 1981, and the droughts of 1982–1983. Anyemedu (1993:13) observed that:

> Real GDP stagnated and per capita incomes declined at the average annual rate of about 3 per cent. Inflation averaged over 50 percent and reached triple digits in some years. By 1981, cocoa's output was less than at independence in 1957 and only 45 per cent of the 1965 peak. The other major export commodities – gold, diamonds, and timber – had all suffered significant reductions [while] agricultural stagnated throughout the 1970s [despite] population growth at an annual rate of about 2.5 percent.

This situation affected secondary education standards, infrastructure, equipment and personnel. The effects were debilitating, especially in view of the fact that cocoa was 'the goose that laid the golden egg' for Ghana's economy and financed secondary education development.

Such economic decline explained the implementation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank advocated Economic Recovery (ERP) and Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) that spanned two phases, that is, 1983–1986 representing the stabilising phase and 1987–1989 constituting the structural adjustment and development phase. These aimed, among others, to arrest and reverse a decade of precipitous decline in production, particularly in agriculture, including cocoa, rehabilitate national infrastructure, sustain economic growth at between 5 and 5.5 percent a year over the medium-term, raise public

investment from about 10 percent of national income to 25 percent by the end of the decade, improve the management of resources in the public sector and effectively mobilise the resources to improve the overall well-being of Ghana (Anyemedu 1993: 19–20).

The government received substantial funding from international donor agencies. By September 1987, it had acquired a total of$34.5 million from the World Bank, Overseas Development Agency (ODA), The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Norwegian Government (Sefa Dei 1993: 53) to initiate the first phase of pre-university education reform. This involved the introduction of a three-year Junior Secondary School (JSS) programme to replace the four-year middle school system. The government also removed subsidies. In the Programme of Actions to mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (1987), it was observed that 'secondary school students have already been hit by the removal of Government feeding and boarding subsidies and the charging of economical fees for the use of textbooks' (Ghana 1987: 37; Quist 1999b:437).

The immediate impact of the structural adjustment and economic recovery programme was felt in the Ghana Education Service, the implementing organ of the Ministry of Education which provided (and still does) teachers for Junior Secondary Schools. It exposed almost 18,000 ghost workers in both the Civil and Ghana Education Services on the government payroll. This led to the introduction of national service for all sixth formers preparing to enter the universities (this programme has now been abandoned) in order to save the Junior Secondary programme. To make up for the removal of subsidy, intensive rehabilitation and repair of many secondary schools that had deteriorated infrastructurally were undertaken. Here, the day secondary institutions attracted the most attention. In 1987, allocations of 8.75 million cedis per day school and 3.5 million cedis per boarding school were made. In all a total of US$ 600,000 was set aside from IDA-EDSAC (International Development Agency-Education and Structural Adjustment Component) sources to start the Junior Secondary programme whilst a further US$ 5 .6 million was being sought.

These foreign loans, however, only increased Ghana's debt problem. Orivel and Sergent (1988) have rightly noted that foreign aid - expected to constitute a panacea for the ailing educational problems - only exacerbated the situation mainly because most donor agencies seek to promote particular interests which in some cases are at odds with what the country actually wants. By 1982, Ghana's long-term disbursed and outstanding

debt was US$ 1.1 billion. IMF debt totalled US$ 21.4 million in 1982 and short-term debt was US$ 195.0 million. By 1987, long-term debt outstanding and disbursed was US$ 2.2 billion; IMF debit amounted to US$ 778 million, and short-term debt was US$ 108 million. These debts placed major constraints on resource provision for the sustenance of the secondary education reform. By receiving all these loans and aids Ghana lost complete control over her own economy (Orivel and Sergent, 1988: 459-469; Bray, 1984:129–136), with significant consequences for secondary education reform and national development.

This raises questions about the purposes and usefulness of foreign aid to national development. The question might be posed whether the country had an alternative. Obviously, the options and alternatives were few or non-existent considering the extent to which the national economy of Ghana had been run down since 1961/2 and the difficulty of raising loans and funds domestically to salvage the situation. Indeed, without the foreign loans, it is doubtful if the New Education Reforms of 1987 could have been undertaken. By 1987, the opportunities for the government to raise funds domestically were virtually non-existent. The country had economic and financial problems revolving around low savings, low capital formation, and increased international debt. Under these circumstances, foreign aid definitely was useful particularly for a developing country such as Ghana where capital formation and capacity building through education remains crucial to accelerated growth and development.

How then did secondary education fare financially vis-à-vis other sectors of the economy in the Rawlings era? Table 3, which covers 1985-1990, provides clear pointers. The Table shows that education as a whole competed actively with health, housing and community services for increased government funds. In 1985, education received 32.1 percent of total development budget, while housing and community services had 33.5 percent of total government allocation for social services, including education. The Table further reveals that in 1986 housing and community services had a budget that surpassed education by 4.4 percent. In 1987 and 1989 education took second position to health receiving 10 and 3.7 percent respectively. As total percentage of gross recurrent and development expenditure, the entire vote for community and social services development of which educational projects were a part between 1985 and 1990 was minuscule. In 1985, it amounted to 6.9 percent; 7.1 percent in 1986; 9.5 percent in 1987; reaching 16.4 percent in 1990. Obviously, the bulk allocation made to community and social services went into recur-

rent expenditure, namely, wages, salaries and overhead administrative costs.

Greater constraint, however, arose from challenges posed by other sectors, notably, agriculture, health, transport and communication and works and housing which since independence had drawn support from governments as a result of their national development plans and programmes.

Considering the inability of the country with a GNP of $390 million in the 1980s (World Education Report, 1993) to support secondary educational reform, Ghana relied more and more on international donor funding to accomplish this. This was unlike the 1950s and 1960s when the country drew on its own substantial cocoa reserves. Financial assistance for the New Education Reforms of 1987, for instance, came from the governments of Germany, France, Japan and Norway most especially. Donor financial support for the 1987 secondary education reforms amounted to $231.7 million. The World Bank's share represented about 79.5 percent of the total investment for the education sector. Yet, Orivel and Sergent (1988:462) point out that, Ghana, together with other African countries, continued to receive the smallest amounts of foreign aid (less than $1 per head).

A second crucial problem worth analysing here is that of reform. The question might be posed: what has 'reform' comprised during the post-colonial era and how has it been effected? What have been the trade-offs and ideological underpinnings? Here, 'reform' must be looked at in terms of infrastructural expansion aimed at increased enrolment, and also curriculum and structural reform and models that best serve the interest of national development. Whereas the objective under Nkrumah (1951–1966) or Rawlings (1981–1991) remained one of dealing with educational inequalities through infrastructural expansion and increased access in participation, attention was also focused on promoting literacy beyond the primary level as a means of fostering manpower and national development. It is worth stating that such use of secondary education politicised it. But secondary education reform whether under Nkrumah or Rawlings was also underpinned by ideological and resource constraints. Crucial questions surrounding curricular relevance, equality and equity, quality and quantity, and changes and innovation in structures, institutions, governance and management processes (Spaulding 1988:5) were paramount while political legitimation was a predominant concern for the government in power. But the state was not the only interest group that kept a keen eye on secondary education. The educated elite, most

Figure 1: Distribution of Ghana Educational Trust (GET) schools



especially, perceived it as a viable vehicle for accelerated social, economic, political and occupational mobility. As a result these groups continued to monitor reform with the aim of ensuring that it did not introduce changes significantly different from the quality and standard of education they had enjoyed.

Quite instructively, state initiated secondary education reform since colonial times did not always imply 'change' over a period of time; 'change' that was structural, content related, infrastructural or organisational and that was consistently pursued. This was amply so in the Nkrumah era where such reform meant massive expansion of the hitherto limited access and increased enrolment. It did not really translate into a radical organisational nor even structural form. Thus, Foster and Clignet (1964) and Quist (1999) affirm that by the end of the Nkrumah era, secondary educational expansion had been mostly quantitative rather than qualitative. The Ghana Educational Trust (1967–1964) that aimed at the massive expansion of hitherto limited access to secondary education was meant as an innovation. It introduced a new kind of secondary school - 'the national school'. Yet, the spread of such schools raises the question as to the distribution of national infrastructure and the initial mandate of building secondary schools in rural and neglected areas. Figure 1 shows that most GET schools were centered in southern Ghana, and this was in spite of the fact that this region, especially the cities of Accra and Cape Coast, already paraded the most prestigious secondary institutions and altogether accounted for the bulk of such institutions by 1966 (Quist 1999). More instructively, the demand for secondary education in the north of Ghana was not intense by the end of the Nkrumah era in 1966.

In some cases especially with the curriculum, 'reform' implying 'change' or 'innovation' was attempted, but this was not comprehensively pursued and in some cases was a mixed bag. Here, subject content that was Ghanaian and African was introduced into the humanities, notably, History, Geography and Religion. But to an extent the teaching syllabus, notably in History, still featured western European themes. Reform with respect to the sciences was a mixed success. In general curricular reform saddled between utilitarian-technical versus pure academic-'grammar' - secondary education. This was further complicated by the persisting contest among the churches, educated elite and the state for control of secondary education content and direction. Such a contest informed the difficulties of Africanisation (indigenisation) of the curriculum.

Doubtlessly, it was the ambivalence and contradictions of the Africanisation project that was also evident by 1966, only to be repli-

cated in 1991 (Kwamens and Benavot 1991; Bishop 1990). Whilst espousing Africanisation of the school curriculum, there was a strong reluctance and apparent difficulty in Africanising the mathematics and the physical sciences or accepting one of the numerous languages as a national language to compete with English. Certainly, the complete Africanisation of the mathematics and physical sciences was a challenging task, considering the fact that most of the theories and theorems could not necessarily be replaced. Efforts could, nevertheless, still have been made to introduce topics/themes that had relevance for the African environment and the development of Ghanaian indigenous science and technology. With regard to language, it is obvious that the multiplicity of languages in most African countries, including Ghana, has always remained a major obstacle to the selection of one language as the national language. Indeed, it is largely in view of this that English has proven more acceptable, and particularly because it is also an international and commercial language. The cultural implications of this difficulty have been adequately addressed by many postcolonial scholars (Whitehead1995; Gosh 1993; Thiong'o 1986). Significantly, the Africanisation policy also attracted distrust from the educated elites who were suspicious of its supposed intentions. More significant in contemporary times are the influences of globalisation and modernisation (taken to mean westernisation). These remain potent obstacles to the reshaping of educational thought and practice in Ghana and Africa as a whole.

Excepting the 1987 reforms when major structural changes were really undertaken bringing into being three years each of Junior and Senior secondary education, previous efforts at reform only replicated the colonial model or readjusted it in diverse ways. The 1987 structural reforms, however, allowed for only one track and pattern nation-wide and remain significant for challenging the colonial model and the prevailing conception of secondary education. The reform also created psychological difficulties for Junior Secondary school students. These students were still considered by many as middle (elementary) school students when in fact they had become secondary school students with the introduction of the new reforms. Worst of all, they were still attired like elementary school students. Also, they continued to occupy the same compound/ school environment with the primary school pupils, and thus, were not readily distinguishable from them, except for the sizes, height and age. Under the circumstances it was difficult for the junior secondary school students to perceive themselves as secondary school students who were expected to display a certain level of maturity clearly distinct from that of the primary

school pupil. Thus, even though most of them wanted to be regarded as secondary school students, parents, education officials and their own teachers still regarded them as children being in a similar position as former Middle School students. New examinations, namely, the Basic Education Certificate Examination (BECE) and the Senior Secondary School Certificate Examination (SSSCE) were instituted to replace the old General Certificate of Education Ordinary and Advanced Levels. However, at the Senior Secondary level the reforms did not eliminate the competitive and highly selective examination process typical of the old system.

At the end of 1991, just as in 1966, and notwithstanding reform that was basically quantitative and infrastructural, many regional, class and gender imbalances regarding secondary education remained. Reference bas already has been made to the distribution of GET schools in the Nkrumah era. These were heavily concentrated in the south even though the Trust aimed to expand secondary education nation-wide and remove gender and regional imbalances. Parliamentarians of the era were embittered by what seemed to have been a discriminatory policy favouring powerful ministers and their political constituencies (*Ghana: Parliamentary Debates* 1964:72–98).

Scadding (1989) also points to the difficulties associated with the implementation of the Junior Secondary programme by the Rawlings regime. She cites inadequate classrooms, leaking roofs and insufficient learning and instructional resources as some of the major reform problems; difficulties and challenges that are not peculiar to Ghana.

Implications for national development

Doubtless, secondary education as provided in Ghana remains crucial to the country's economic growth and national development, sustained literacy as well as the cultivation of a sense of national unity. It is not just a means to economic development, measured by discount rates, rates-of-retum analysis and so on; it has also a broader socio-cultural dimension that needs to be taken into account when measuring its role in national development (Habte and Heyneman 1983:471). Considering that 'it is now widely accepted that education contributes to national and economic development', a basic question arises as to the type(s) and model(s) of secondary education that Ghana should implement and that can best address her twenty-first century national development problems. How should the secondary education curriculum, most especially, be reconfigured to sustain the charge of national development? Countries the world over have implemented models relevant to their national development needs.

This is especially so of such advanced countries as the United States, Great Britain, Japan or Germany. In Africa, models have varied between Francophone (for example Senegal) and Anglophone (such as Ghana) countries, but drawing substantially on metropolitan examples, particularly those of France, Britain and the United States. I am persuaded that as a foreign model transferred to Ghana (and Africa), the secondary educational system/model(s) will continue to be substantially informed by international examples, especially those in the West even as Ghana (and other African countries) attempts to adapt its pattern(s) to the Ghanaian environment. Here, there are bound to be cultural implications associated with such transferred models, and these are worthy of note, and of critical appraisal by the state with the intent of upholding only that which will contribute positively to Ghana's development.

Whereas universal primary education remains crucial to national development, a project started since 1951 in Ghana, I am convinced that as Ghana marches into the twenty-first century there is the equal need for increased attention to secondary education particularly since it is the most accessible form of higher education. Also, there is the need for accelerated secondary education expansion that produces an 80–85 percent enrolment nation-wide, paralleling the present approximately 85 percent primary school enrolment (1993 UNESCO estimations). Indeed, the consensus among all interests groups, namely, the state, churches and education about the benefits of secondary education (Quist 1999a, 1999b), coupled with Ghana's major challenge of becoming a middle income country by 2020 requires that this level of education be given increased attention. Accelerated national development and economic growth, the sustenance of democracy, among others, are inextricably intertwined with higher levels of literacy. I would still contend that secondary education has greater potential of achieving and sustaining these aims. The long-term benefits are doubtlessly tremendous and beyond dispute, especially in the wake of the Jomtien Plan of Action (Thiam 1990) which calls for the involvement of the developing world in the struggle against illiteracy and underdevelopment.

Here, worthwhile curriculum reforms remain decisive. For the sake of scientific and technological development, I would argue for a rethinking of secondary technical education that is responsive to the technological development of Ghana (Heyneman 1987:64). The rapid development of Ghana, and Africa, in the twenty-first century would depend more on an increasing provision and support of secondary technical education of a higher quality that is technological-oriented, world-informed and dynamic.

Here, government needs to court the support of the business community. An immediate step in the direction should be the conversion of all post-primary technical institutions (financially, outdated institutions) into modern secondary technical schools (and then all tertiary polytechnics into polytechnic universities). This should provide all the ten regions of present day Ghana with a least one major secondary technical school that both the state and private business can consistently and persistently support. Funds to these institutions should be aimed solely at resource and equipment acquisition and improvement.

Also critical are concerns relating to gender disparities. Higher education for girls impacts positively on fertility , population growth rate, and the health of children. Women in sub-Saharan Africa, in exercising their responsibility for the upbringing of their children, are key actors in the process of human development (Browne and Barret 1991:275). Education and scholarship schemes aimed at girls deserve increased attention as part of national development. The Girl-Child Unit of the Ghana Education Service obviously needs to intensify its education regarding the benefits of educating the girl-child, at least up to the secondary level.

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The Challenges of Education and Development in Post-Colonial Kenya

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Abstract

Explorations of socio-cultural realities of many African countries in the post-colonial era reveal a very complex yet saddening reality. Poor infrastructure, large numbers of the local populations living below poverty lines, and continued civil and ethnic strife are some of the most prevalent identifiable markers of post-colonial Africa. This paper addresses the legacy of colonialism as manifested in the educational system of Kenya in the post-colonial era. I argue that although Kenya is an independent country, it is overly dependent on the West for its cultural and intellectual nourishment. I critically analyse the role of education in shaping a national sense of identity and as an agent for development. I show that the education system offered in Kenya needs a total overhaul in order to tap the best of its brains by recreating a new cultural orientation. Therefore, this paper examines, with examples from Kenya, the condition of post-coloniality as it relates to education and development, two concepts that are closely related in both national and individual discourses. I argue that through colonialism and post-colonialism, Kenyans have absorbed imperialist values that consequently condition them to think of 'development' as the process of shedding any traces of their unique traditions and cultural practices. This has led to a situation where majority of Kenyans have become schizophrenic members of a nation-state that tries to nurture citizens who strive to be Western and yet remain Kenyan. I also argue that even after three decades of political independence, Kenya's education system has not been able to tailor its content and pedagogy to the socio-economic and cultural realities of its people. Instead it continues to uphold an education system that is centered around schooling rather than learning and which consequently produces a people who are incapable of fitting into their own social environments. I often revert to the first person to articulate my own embeddedness in that which I am critiquing.

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Résumé

L'étude des réalités socioculturelles d'un grand nombre de pays africains révèle une réalité très complexe et plutôt triste. L'Afrique post coloniale est caractérisée par de pauvres infrastructures, par le fait qu'une grande partie de ses populations locales vive en-dessous du seuil de pauvreté, mais également par les interminables conflits ethniques et civils. Cet article se penche sur l'héritage du colonialisme, tel qu'il se manifeste au niveau du système éducatif Kenyan, dans la période post coloniale. J'explique que, même si le Kenya est un pays indépendant, il dépend excessivement de l'Occident, sur le plan culturel et intellectuel. J'analyse de manière critique le rôle de l'éducation en tant que facteur de développement jouant un certain rôle dans la formation d'un sentiment d'appartenance nationale. J'explique que le système éducatif Kenyan doit être réorganisé, afin de produire de bons éléments, en mettant en place une nouvelle orientation culturelle. Cette contribution examine ainsi la situation post coloniale, dans le domaine de l'éducation et du développement, deux concepts intimement liés, au niveau des discours nationaux et individuels. Je soutiens qu'à travers le colonialisme et le post colonialisme, les Kenyans ont intégré des valeurs impérialistes, qui les conditionnent à concevoir le « développement » comme un processus nécessitant la destruction de leurs traditions uniques et de leurs pratiques culturelles. Cela a créé une situation où la majorité des Kenyans sont devenus des membres schizophréniques d'un Etat-nation, favorisant les citoyens qui s'évertuent à devenir des occidentaux, tout en restant Kenyans. Après trois décennies d'indépendance politique, le système éducatif Kenyan n'est toujours pas parvenu à adapter son contenu et sa pédagogie aux réalités socioéconomiques et culturelles de sas population. Au lieu de cela, ce pays continue de faire valoir un système éducatif centré autour de l'instruction au lieu de l'apprentissage, et qui, par conséquent, produit des individus incapables de s'adapter à leur propre environnement social. J'emploie souvent la première personne du singulier, pour décrire mon ancrage dans ce système même que je critique.

Introduction

Much writing on post-coloniality has rightly addressed the need to look beyond the Western concepts and models of domination shrouded in meta-discourses that tend to divide world communities into neat categories such as 'primitive', 'developed', 'underdeveloped', 'oriental', etc. Writers such as James Clifford critique the ethnographic authority of anthropologists in representing other cultures by showing that the 'native informants' can speak for themselves without the mediation of the anthropologists and their 'scientific discipline'(Clifford 1988). Edward Said also draws attention to the construction of the 'orient' through a process of 'orientalism' where the West produces systematic images and discourses of the 'other' for purposes of cultural and economic domina-

tion. Such a process is so powerful that whatever the non-Western peoples say about themselves is negated and discounted all together (Said 1978). From such writings, scholars are drawn to other facets of domination and cultural representation. In doing so, accounts of how dominated and colonised peoples struggle against and resist the powers of colonialism enter the academy. This resistance has in the past manifested itself in movements of decolonisation, self-determination, and national independence. However, it would be unfortunate to romanticise this resistance especially because even after political independence, many former colonies are still under Western domination, both economically and culturally. As a former colony of Britain, Kenya continues to show strong strands of economic and cultural dependency on Europe and America - so much so that most of Kenya's political and economic policies are defined in reference to those in Europe and America. This is attributable in part to colonial structures inherited by the post-colonial state that ensured that economic and political structures established by the colonial system remained primarily to serve the interests of the colonizing Europe. Thus the first school to be established in Kenya in 1846 was run by the Church Missionary Society in Rabai, Mombasa with the purpose of promoting 'evangelism, but as education developed it became an instrument to produce skilled labour for the settlers' farms and clerical staff for the colonial administration'.[1] When Kenyans took over political power following independence, no structural changes were made to the existing colonial education system, except for some attempts to Kenyanise it by having local people trained to take over as teachers and leaders in the schools. Even the reports written to review the system all tended to emphasise structure rather than content.

This paper critically analyses this condition of post-coloniality and how it relates to education and development, in ways that highlight dependency rather than independence. I argue that although colonialism ended in 1963, Kenyans absorbed imperialist values that continue to condition the way they see themselves, especially through the discourse of 'development'. They see development as a process of self-denial that constructs an imagined self devoid of the assumed cultural baggage of its own traditional social and cultural practices. This has led to a situation where the majority of Kenyans have become schizophrenic members of a nation-state that tries to nurture citizens who strive to be Western and yet remain Kenyan at the same time. Kenya's education system has not been able to tailor its content and pedagogy to the socio-economic and cultural realities of its people capable of developing local solutions for local prob-

lems. Instead it continues to uphold an education system that is centered around schooling rather than learning, consequently producing a people who consistently look to Europe for models of development, and are hence incapable of producing knowledge that matches their own social and physical environments. How does one, for instance, explain a curriculum for a school in a pastoral community where one of the courses being taught and examined nationally is agriculture? In such a community where rainfall averages less than 5 inches a year, no crop can thrive yet the curriculum does not teach about animal production but a sedentary agricultural lifestyle incompatible with the pastoral way of life.

Consequently, many social environments have not been developed to meet the demands of the values learnt in school. The result is a people whose degrees and diplomas alienate them from the very societies that education should train them to be part of. Many receive an education devoid of the central ingredients that are crucial in making them active participants in their own socio-cultural existence. Thus while it is desirable to think of this post-colonial period in Kenya as one denoting a process of self-government and cultural determination, one cannot but notice the glaring reality of European and American cultural and economic domination that continues to shape all facets of Kenya's social categories including education.

Post-colonial education and the discourse of development in Kenya

There is a considerable amount of critical literature regarding the current education system in Kenya especially in curriculum design. But most of such literature tends to propose the tweaking of the existing curriculum in order to make it much more relevant to the Kenyan condition.[2] None of these studies seeks to incorporate indigenous knowledge systems in the current curriculum so as to make learning in schools more compatible with existing systems of knowing. This is partly attributable to the fact that both in the colonial and post-colonial periods, Kenya's formal education systems have been linked closely to the concept of development, which has never been conceived of in local terms. Indeed, education and development have often been seen as essential working partners in the modernisation of the so-called developing countries. It is often assumed that when people are 'undeveloped' and 'backward' they are lacking in many 'modern' qualities, one of them being education. Thus, part of the remedy for their predicament is for them to be 'educated'. There are different concepts and ways of explaining what 'education' means but there

seems to be a consensus that to be 'educated' is to be 'modern' and to be 'modern' is to be 'developed'. Many Kenyan school children articulate these issues in their everyday discourses in school, at home, and with their peers. Politicians and the other elites are the pacesetters in this process, always keen on imitating and reproducing graduates and schools modeled after their immediate past colonial masters. Thus the national public schools receive little if any attention while those private schools offering curricula modeled after the British, American, or Canadian educational systems are bursting in their seams with high student enrolments and excellent learning facilities. Everybody is thus trying to get some 'good' education so as to get a job and be part of the process of 'developing' his/her country. But even after receiving this education there are other hurdles to jump. Here is a case to ponder:

> Jack Oloo Kimani (not real name but true case) received his Bachelor of Science degree in chemical engineering from one of Kenya's public universities in 1999 but by late 2001 he was yet to find a job. Upon graduation, Jack started off looking for a job that would match his training in chemical engineering but with no success. He changed to concentrating on finding any job. When he had just finished college his colleagues in the arts had started working as sales representatives for upcoming companies in Nairobi earning what they initially considered high school salaries but they had few, if any, alternatives. Who would have thought that all those years of college would end up like this?
>
> Jack moved back to 'his' rural home where his retired parents live. He resorted to this step after life in the city living with his uncle turned sour. His uncle clearly indicated that Jack had to contribute to the household budget if he hoped to continue living there. Jack had never stayed in their rural home for more than a week because his parents lived in the city all his life. He was thus finding it hard to adjust to the social and geographical environment in his 'new home'. His age-mates who dropped out at primary school have families and are finding means of livelihood tending their small gardens in the village. They even have permanent houses and their kids are going to the local primary school. Jack was unable to walk into the local shopping centre where he was bound to meet some of his peers who have previously offered to buy him a drink. He refused not because he did not drink but because with a university degree he felt he was above them and should have been the one offering them drinks. Finally he went back to a two-year technical college to earn a diploma as a motor vehicle mechanic with an eye to opening his own repair shop in the city.

Jack is a post-colonial product that traverses facets of Kenya's social and cultural systems. He is a product of a system of education that is in itself a form of governmentality (in Michel Foucault's sense) where individuals absorb dominant ideologies that construct imaginary pictures of prosperity that are shaped by foreign lifestyles. Jack is thus aspiring for something better than what his native community may be able to offer him, yet he does not quite manage to find the desired fit. Ironically a 'developing' society or country such as Kenya does need the services of a chemical engineer but the socio-economic structures that would enable the country to absorb this kind of talent are lacking. Kenya's education and economic systems have never been developed to cater for these needs. They are, however, modeled after Western models that have little, if any, relevance for the country's cultural, economic, political, and other realities. School children are continually enculturated to believe that Western education is what they need in order to make it in life; that urban centres are spaces where a good education is rewarded. A degree is thus validated in social discourse as a means of social advancement. It is, therefore, frustrating for graduates such as Jack to find themselves with a degree but no job.

This problem is further attributable to the content of a Western-oriented education that avoids teaching school children about local culture and its importance in their daily lives, and instead teaches them to hate their cultures and consequently to hate themselves. I, for instance, had to wait until I was in graduate school in North America to start thinking seriously about the relevance of my own cultural heritage. I did not know the history behind Kaaga, Meru – the place I was born – until after my undergraduate studies when I read books and papers about the Meru by foreign scholars such as Jeffrey A. Fadiman.[3] Most of my schooling had been geared towards making Western culture the central point of understanding my world. I learned more about the Mississippi and Rhine rivers than I did about Athi and Tana that have immediate relevance to development in Kenya. Granted there were no written works on local communities to be included in the curriculum, no collective efforts were made to address that anomaly or even problemitise it. Collective efforts made towards cultural enrichment were those aimed at collecting artifacts and other material items to be put in national museums as their contexts were quickly being eroded by westernisation. Thus instead of addressing the need to embody local knowledge and sensibilities in the education system they were seen as being trampled on by Western values. When we left home for school we were entering a new socio-cultural space where

anything we had grown up with was constantly challenged and demonised in favour of western values and perspectives. Thus many of our nursery rhymes were set to teach us about 'London's burning', and 'London bridge is falling down'. Even as we tried to learn English it was apparent through the texts that to be 'modern' is to have large cities with skyscrapers and numerous cars like those seen in the West. Our own cultures and traditions were constructed as backward and a hindrance to 'development'.

Since all education is value based, I was constantly taking in Western values that gradually replaced the cultural values I had learned at home from my parents and neighbours before joining formal school. Writing on the process of adopting the British curriculum to the Kenyan education system, George Eshiwani states that 'Place names and currencies were localized and complex language structures simplified... however, the overall structure of the adapted curricula remained intact' (Eshiwani 1993:157). School is a place where children learn to regard their local cultural practices as backward and inferior, always clamoring to be Western. When I was a child of school-going age we were never taught to understand ourselves first and then appreciate other cultures; we were taught that our cultural practices were backward and we had to do everything possible to dissociate ourselves from them. Children in my generation and before were products of a system that was not relevant to our cultural orientation. Whenever school learning tended to match the learning received at home it was almost always geared towards reproducing clear social and cultural boundaries. For instance, home science classes involved teaching girls about child care, cleaning the house, and sewing. Thus these classes were always seen as meant for girls and this was further supported by the fact that they were taught by female teachers. In the mid 1980s during my undergraduate training at Kenyatta University, I remenber there being five men in the home science department, who were subject to endless jokes about their injured masculinity because of taking 'women's classes'. Yet it was never lost to sight that the majority of nationally renowned chefs were men.

Besides school, the media act as another channel through which colonial values are insidiously inculcated. Popular musicians compose songs that urge Kenyans to hurry up and catch up with the developed world, that education is the key to development. I once watched a primary school programme on local Kenyan television where two schools debated on whether it was right for a woman to be a housewife.[4] One student compared being a housewife to staying in caves and wearing skins, a very backward thing to do, according to this student. This student is of course

a perfect product of a school system that is fueled by an exogenously driven and internalised sense of inadequacy in the Kenyan cultures, and is bent on annihilating any local creativity, agency, or value systems. While challenging the idea of women staying at home, the only unthinkable analogy she could articulate to show her opposition to such a lifestyle is a 'primitive' life often used in formal education to elaborate human social change and development. Such views are born of a system that was developed in part by the form of education Christian Missionaries were mandated to establish in Africa. It was a mission to demonise all traditional African practices and sell Western ones through Christianity, education, and colonialism. This legacy has lingered for many years after independence and many Kenyan children are quick to identify with Western values rather than their own.[5] Hence this student was not taught to see that the lifestyle she calls 'backward' is also a lifestyle like any other; a lifestyle where one can fend for oneself and family. She epitomises what many of us have become: a people who are quick to embrace an empty sense of modernity that deprives them of the basic ability to be who we are. We do not question this 'modern' worldview and its values but rather take it up in its entirety. It is only when things seem to go wrong when there is a desire to reflect upon the decadence of modernity.[6]

This is what Masei Ole Moita and Ben Gardner challenge in their preamble to a report on the Osotua Education Program in Endulen Maasai village in northern Tanzania:

> Throughout the world, much of indigenous/traditional/local knowledge is seen as backward or outdated and no longer relevant for today's society. Thus the current [Tanzanian] education system is focused on teaching a new way of learning with its own values, norms, and language with which to interpret the world. Unfortunately, this language or interpretive framework has not been very successful in helping individuals from indigenous groups meet the needs of their communities and often alienates 'educated' people from the rest of the society. We believe that it is important to broaden the concept of education to include all systems of knowledge, with a recognition of the value of indigenous or local knowledge within the education process (Peterson 1999:6).

Indeed, not much has been done to challenge current conceptualisations of 'modernity' and the ways in which such concepts as 'education' and 'development' that are constantly used in our social and national policies are constructed. Some of our leaders have made some strides in defending indigenous knowledge but have themselves fallen into the trap of

ossifying that knowledge as if it were fixed and bounded. Thus I cannot but agree with Ole Moita and Gardner in their observation that:

> Indigenous knowledge is often seen as something that needs to be preserved and documented before it vanishes. This philosophy treats societies as fixed in time and unable to adapt to new conditions. This thinking is often at the heart of development efforts that are meant to 'bring people into the modern world' by delivering them development and in turn changing their way of life. Alternatively, we see indigenous knowledge not as a relic to be documented and saved, but as a process that reaffirms different ways of living and interpreting the world, that ultimately leads to more appropriate models of change (Peterson 1999:6).

While it is appealing to see a modern education system incorporate indigenous knowledge, it is doubtful that such a step would be taken nationally. The national curriculum seeks to build a homogeneous society of Kenyans under a nation-state with a shared sense of identity and common future mediated through the concept of 'development'. Yet the curriculum that seeks to produce such a citizenry is received and taught to people with different potentials, experiences, and resources. Thus while it would be beneficial to have a standard curriculum for all public schools it is impossible to have the same or similar end results. With so many children eligible for school enrolment missing out on both secondary and college education, the efficacy of a national educational system is all the more open to scrutiny and critique. One such critique is to seek to understand whether education in Kenya as it is visualised in the national curriculum is a tool for development.

Education for development or in development?

In a recent survey by a daily newspaper in Kenya, it was estimated that 30 percent of the government's budgetary expenditure goes into education.[7] Indeed, a lot of time and resources have been channeled into education despite the realisation by many that the system needs a serious review.[8] Kenyans are told daily that education is the key to development, although it is not quite clear what kind of education will unlock that mystical door to development nor is there a definition of what that key is and who defines the development we crave. Hence one is left to wonder why with such a high level of education and a great many educated people in the country Kenya is still not developed. The most plausible explanation is that the kind of education Kenyans receive does not equip them with the necessary tools that would enhance development. This means that such an education is not relevant to the country's development needs or that

education is not a necessary ingredient for development. One may also question the local perception of development: what is it and how relevant is it to Kenya's socio-economic and cultural realities? In what way and areas do Kenyans perceive themselves developing?

In its regular usage, the term development describes a process through which the potentialities of an object or organism are released, until it reaches its natural, complete, full-fledged form (Esteva 1992:8). Thus to be developed, a human being has to be able to go through a process that enables one to reach a mature form that enhances the attainment of the full human potential. This involves one's ability to use one's environment successfully to reach that potential, including meeting one's most basic needs of shelter, food, clothing, and reproduction. In the nineteenth century, however, the work by scientists such as Charles Darwin, changed development as a concept from denoting the transformation that moves toward the appropriate form, to denoting movement towards an ever more perfect form. It is during this period when evolution and development began to be used as interchangeable terms by scientists (Esteva 1992:8). This is the time when human communities were seen to be going through an inevitable process of evolution from low to high. When translated to development, this notion of evolution intimated that there were some communities that were 'developed' while others were 'undeveloped'. Indeed, the West became the model for the 'developed' while the rest of the world was either 'developing', 'underdeveloped', or 'undeveloped'. It is this differentiation that brought forth colonialism which then cemented this apparent differentiation in levels of development, propelled it, and also tried to remedy it. Thus in 1932, for instance, the British government developed what it called the Law of Development and Welfare of the Colonies that sought to guarantee the natives minimum levels of nutrition, health, and education (Arndt 1981). This kind of law was based on two assumptions: first, that the natives' nutrition, health, and education were lacking or undeveloped, and second, that the colonial government had the mandate to change that condition. One would wonder what value such a law would have for a hunting and gathering community such as the Okiek in Mt. Elgon area who had never experienced famine or hunger until their land was annexed by settlers and other agriculturalists. If development is self sufficiency then many communities in Kenya had developed since they were able to meet their daily needs without upsetting their balance with their environment. Of course one cannot overlook the advent of colonisation and the world systems that ensued which soon placed East African countries in a global framework of dependence and

exploitation. With such a structure development was bound to be redefined and those redefining it became the trend setters.

It is 1949 and the concepts of 'developed' and 'undeveloped' are crystallised. In his inauguration address US President Harry Truman declares the Southern Hemisphere to be underdeveloped (Sachs 1992:2). This declaration was not made in innocence but in order to provide a comforting vision of the world order where the US would naturally rank first (Sachs 1992). Consequently, when the word 'development' entered the global vocabulary, it was loaded with Eurocentric connotations that put the world in a hierarchy in which the West ranked higher than the rest.

The West was considered to exemplify a 'developed' people to be emulated. Indeed, the West through colonialism, Christianity, and imperialism, became the dominant cultural node whose values were to be imitated and embraced. Colonial governments thus sought to 'assist' other countries to achieve that same state of development. The colonialists conquered and decimated local political systems and injected their own. Missionaries captured the souls and value systems of the colonised and made them Western or approximations thereto; and the social scientists provided in-depth accounts of how they worked or why they did not work so as to make colonisation and evangelising easier. Once colonialism and missionary work had made their breakthroughs, it was possible to let the colonies have political independence since they were already destined for economic and cultural dependence.

Our newly-crowned political leaders sought to move our countries to greater heights in order to be 'developed'. They successfully slipped into the shoes of departed colonial leaders; inherited their economic, judicial, political, and administrative systems, and encouraged their nationals to do everything possible to 'develop' their communities based on the colonial models. The colonial governments together with their counterparts in America and Eurasia, were convinced of the need to assist the new nations to develop. This led to myriad non-governmental organistions, loans and grants, and all kinds of 'assistance' packages that were focused on the undeveloped – and especially Africa. What were the results of such interventions? Let us see what Claude Ake, a renowned African social scientist, said in Abuja, Nigeria in 1995:

> Most of Africa is not developing. Three decades of effort have yielded largely stagnation, regression, or worse. The tragic consequences of this are increasingly clear: a rising tide of poverty, decaying public utilities and collapsing infrastructure, social tensions and political turmoil, and now premonitions of inevitable drift into conflict and violence (1995:2).

It is clear that despite many years of attempts to develop Africa, the livelihood of Africa's population has become worse economically, culturally, and politically. Why? My first intuition is to see it as a result of development prescribed by the West based on a Western diagnosis that does not reflect Africa's realities. Africa does not have the cultural framework necessary for adopting Western development concepts and processes. Until Africa develops a frame of economic, cultural and political institutions or systems that incorporate its own cultural framework, it will consistently remain a sorry shadow of the West. The first step along this road to recovery is a review of the processes of self-reflection and how its youth are trained and equipped for the future. All this falls under the rubric of education. Much of Africa's education can be described as a process of Westernisation, developing a people who are keener on aping the West than learning from their own heritage and histories. Let us now turn to the case of education and its relevance to Africa's development with a focus on Kenya.

Education, schooling, and development

A casual glance at Kenya's education reveals that the school system is one that is more about 'schooling' than 'education', with very little positive influence on 'development'. A clear understanding of the limitations of such a system begins with definitions of these three concepts of schooling, education, and development as used in this paper. Schooling as a concept is used here to refer to the intended process of perpetuating and maintaining a society's existing power relations and the institutional structures that support those arrangements (Shujaa 1994:15). Education is the process through which values, aesthetics, spiritual beliefs, and all the parts of a people's unique cultural orientation are transmitted from generation to the next (See Nyerere 1968; Shujaa 1994). Development as a concept is taken to refer to a process through which a community, by using its knowledge and other resources, is able to confront and maintain its world and environment for its own existence.

How then can we integrate these seemingly related concepts into a cohesive framework that would be useful for us and our communities? One way is to realise that education and school are indeed compatible and that if positively blended they can make a sound contribution to a community's, or country's positive development. Indeed, they can be used positively to serve both the interests of diverse communities as well as those of a nation-state. Thus our school and education systems should be able to do the following:

(i) Foster the development of adequate skills in literacy, numeracy, the humanities, and technologies that are necessary to negotiate economic self-sufficiency in the country;

(ii) Instill citizenship skills based on a realistic and thorough understanding of the political system, and support such citizenship skills by promoting questioning and critical thinking skills and teaching democratic values;

(iii) Provide historical overviews of the nation, the continent, and the world which accurately represent the contributions of all ethnic groups to the storehouse of human knowledge (Shujaa 1994:15).

If all our school and education systems were based upon such principles, our citizens would have full and equal participation in their respective communities, the nation, and the world at large. This kind of system would decentralise the basis of disseminating knowledge and the power of knowing in order to instill in our learners the fact that they and their own cultures did and do contribute to our being and existence. That way no culture would claim supremacy over the other and consequently no culture would negate the importance of its own existence in order to embrace another that is construed as better or 'modern'. This would be proper education and each culture would equally contribute to both local and national development.

Indeed, it is quite refreshing that this kind of thinking has started taking root in Africa through the concept of the African renaissance where some of our leaders and intellectuals are going back to their local cultural practices to seek answers to current problems.[9] It should be noted that some of these cultural practices were once sneered at in the quest to embrace Western ones. Thus traditional methods of healing, ways of resolving conflicts, and farming strategies devoid of harmful inputs are once again being considered in order to make sense of current social, economic, and political problems. This should also be seen as a cue for invigorating our education system that would enable our children to cultivate skills that would give them an all-round sense of self and of their daily contexts of livelihood. Until we do that, our education will remain just a process of schooling that dissociates our students from their own communities and hence making them dysfunctional members.

It is no wonder, therefore, that some university students in Kenya recently conceded that they were not in a hurry to finish school as there were no jobs out there for them after graduating. This is because we have developed a culture that teaches our students that education is a means to

an end, a passport to a job. Thus rote learning and mechanical studying to pass examinations has replaced the all-necessary ethic of studying to develop a deep understanding and mastery of one's life and environment. True education should give its practitioners life sustaining understandings that lead them to self-reliance. What we currently have is too much schooling and very little education (Shujaa 1994).

On education and relevance to community needs

In the five years (1998–2003) that I visited different parts of Kenya on educational trips for American undergraduate students I constantly confronted cases of education for development or relevance and in each area there were local sensibilities about the value of formal education. I once heard a primary school student from Kisima in Samburu District tell her father that she spent the day learning Swahili, English, and Agriculture. English is the official language, Swahili the national language, and Agriculture the backbone of Kenya's economy; thus all are very crucial for a young person being trained to be a useful citizen. However, a perusal of the content of the agriculture course reveals a bias towards a farming culture. How then will this pastoral girl gain from learning agriculture that does not allow her to understand her mode of life? If anything, this education will cause her to look down upon her own community's lifestyle. It is Julius Nyerere who stressed the need for education to be relevant to the community involved when he said:

> The educational system in different kinds of societies in the world have been, and are, very different in organization and in content. They are different because the societies providing the education are different, and because education whether it be formal or informal, has a purpose. That purpose is to transmit from one generation to the next the accumulated wisdom and knowledge of the society, and to prepare the young people for their future membership of the society and their active participation in its maintenance or development (1968:44).

There are two crucial issues raised by Nyerere here. First, that education should transmit a society's accumulated wisdom and knowledge to its children, and second, that education is a preparation for their future membership in their society. This is not possible in our countries today because we are torn between providing education to create national citizens and teaching an inappropriate curriculum designed by a few who have had Western formal training that tends to alienate students from their own communities. Inevitably, this system disregards the views and needs of local communities in its efforts to develop national citizens who are bi-

ased towards a lifestyle that is not necessarily relevant to their local living conditions. Students of such a system must be transformed in order to fully use their acquired education for practical living. There is nothing wrong with having an education that projects a national outlook, one that aspires to harmonise the population into a community of shared values. The problem is rather that the products of this schizophrenic system receive an education that encompasses little, if any, of the valuable tenets of cultural practices from the many communities that form the country's population. Hence it provides a weak foundation for building a national identity. This problem is clearly reflected in the calibre of graduates coming out of our educational institutions. With the increase in the numbers of Kenyans who have school certificates, diplomas and degrees, and the decrease in employment opportunities, the country is faced with the great challenge of dealing with a large population of a people who are ill-equipped to deal with a world that calls for life skills, not just academic credentials. Kenya's attempt to install a curriculum that builds self reliance came through the hastily introduced 8-4-4 system of education. While its relevance to Kenya may be clear, its content through the national syllabi and its relevance to specific communities it questionable. One is quick to want to know which employment sectors will absorb the graduates from this education system with such an alarming percentage of unemployment in the country.

Conclusion

This paper addresses the relevance of Kenya's education to the cultural and socio-economic realities of its citizens today. Although many Kenyans encounter school at different points in their lives, there is a tendency to enroll in formal school at the ages of six and seven. Prior to that many have learnt through watching, listening to, and imitating their care givers, be they parents, house helps, aunts, uncles, grand parents, or any other people with whom they associate in their daily activities as they grow up. During this time they are forming cultural orientations that are very crucial in their overall existence as humans. These orientations will introduce them to cognition, affection, and the road to understanding themselves, their environment, and how they relate to it and to others around them. Their traditional orientations help in placing them within a local and historical context where their peoples' experiences and ways of solving problems are inculcated in them through day to day activities, taboos, songs, riddles, stories, etc. As Shujaa (1994:15) says, '(a)ll societies must provide a means for their members to learn, develop, and maintain through-

out their life cycles adequate motivation for participation in socially valued and controlled patterns of action'. Although Shujaa makes these remarks in reference to the education of African-Americans in a White-dominated society, its ramifications apply to much of the education offered in Africa. Thus, although the nation-state in Kenya, for instance, did not aggressively structure the content and structure of education to reflect and support existing power relations created by colonialism, it did nothing to change them soon after independence. Indeed, the elite replaced the colonial administrators and fitted well in their shoes. Instead of transforming the country's education to reflect the local cultural realities, the government and the ruling elite continue to support an education system that was created to serve the colonial structure – hence imbuing Kenyans with cultural orientations that compel them to constantly strive to catch up with the West. Unfortunately they have never been able to catch up and there is no such chance that they will ever do it. This is because the meanings, policies, and practices surrounding education and development tend to be informed by the colonial thought and legacy that continues to disregard the contributions of local populations. Without a well defined education curriculum that empowers local actors, Kenya's education system will end up as what Mudimbe calls 'the domination of physical space, reformation of the native's minds (particularly in terms of knowledge systems and culture) and the incorporation of local economic histories into a Western perspective'(cited in Banerjee 2003).

Notes

1. www.kenyaweb.com/education/overview.htm February 2, 2004.
2. See numerous research reports by researchers affiliated with the Bureau of Education Research at Kenyatta University, work by Federation of African Women Educators (FAWE), and reports from Kenya Institute of Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR) based in Nairobi.
3. His book *When We Began There Were Witches: An Oral History of Mount Kenya*, (University of California Press, 1994) explores the history of pre-colonial and colonial Meru society.
4. There are weekly programmes on Kenya's premier public television, KBC, that hold debates in either English or Kiswahili between rival schools on various topics.
5. An example of such values is the annual beauty contests held throughout the country and culminating in finals held in Nairobi. The standard of beauty is purely Western, with being thin, tall, and having straight hair being the quintessential markers. However, when it comes to beauty contests for Miss Tourism, the emphasis is on the attire, mostly dominated by Maasai adornment.

6. The prevalence of illegal drugs in all levels of the education system in Kenya in the late 1990s to date has led many parents and educators to review the role of traditional lifestyles in dealing with the problem. See report on drug abuse reported in the *Daily Nation* of October 27, 2003.
7. www.education.go.ke January 30, 2004.
8. A commission headed by Dr. Davy Koech of Kenya Medical Research Institute was constituted to collect and collate views from Kenyans of all walks of life regarding the current system of education and made its recommendations to the government of Kenya. The report stated in part that the current system of education needs to be revamped to allow more flexibility in subjects offered and chosen by students and reduce its emphasis on rote learning. The government through the Minister of Education has directed that the number of examinable subjects in primary school be reduced to five from the usual eight.
9. One notable player in the African continent is South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki and his crusade for African systems of dealing with African problems especially the HIV/Aids problem.

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