

**AFRIQUE ET
DEVELOPPEMENT
AFRICA
DEVELOPMENT**

Vol. XXII, No. 2, 1997



AFRICA DEVELOPMENT AFRIQUE & DÉVELOPPEMENT

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Le CODESRIA exprime sa gratitude à certains gouvernements africains, à l'Agence suédoise pour la Coopération en matière de recherches avec les pays en voie de développement SIDA/(SAREC), au Centre de recherches pour le développement international (CRDI), à la Fondation Rockefeller, à la Fondation Ford et à l'Agence danoise pour le développement international (DANIDA).

Typeset and Printed by CODESRIA

Cover designed by Aïssa Djonne

AFRICA DEVELOPMENT AFRIQUE & DEVELOPPEMENT

A Quarterly Journal of the Council for the
Development of Social Science Research in Africa

Revue trimestrielle du Conseil pour le développement de la
recherche en sciences sociales en Afrique

Editor/Rédacteur en Chef
Tade Akin Aina

Vol. XXII, No. 2, 1997

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CODESRIA, B.P. 3304, Dakar, Senegal.

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ISSN 0850 3907

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
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
Edited by
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1997 470 p.
ISBN: 2-86978-063-x (paperback)
US\$38.00 / £21.50

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
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Facing Donor Missions with Informed Policy Decisions: Lessons from Capacity Strengthening for Policy Analysis in Malawi

Suresh C. Babu*

Résumé: Le malaise actuel des décideurs et analystes des politiques gouvernementales dans plusieurs pays en voie de développement est dû au fait que les bailleurs imposent leurs points de vue sur les réformes politiques à travers des restrictions et des conditionnalités dans l'utilisation des fonds. Cet article tente de renforcer la capacité d'analyse des politiques au Malawi à travers la collaboration bailleurs-gouvernement dans les processus d'élaboration des politiques et de préparation de projets, lorsque l'expérience pratique montre que cela est nécessaire aux économistes du gouvernement afin qu'ils négocient plus efficacement avec les missions des bailleurs. Certains pensent que le renforcement de la capacité et des institutions pour l'analyse des politiques de développement en général est nécessaire, si elles doivent être durables.

Introduction

Development projects funded by international development agencies have formed a major method of intervention in various sectors of developing countries in the past four decades. Generally, implementation of these projects follows a thorough analysis of the development issues addressing a sector by clearly defining development plans and policies. In addition to the plans proposed by the government departments, development research and policy analysis of the international agencies provide information for setting priorities for implementing intervention projects. In recent years, there has been considerable conflict among the priorities set by governments and those of international lending agencies in implementing development projects both at the sectoral and at the national level (*The Economist* 1993; Von Freyhold 1985:113). This has resulted in unnecessary delays in the initiation of development projects. Further, such disagreements tend

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to reduce the speed with which the intervention projects could be implemented and retard the process of development. Thus, it is important to identify the impediments in reaching consensus on development issues so that improved means of collaboration between the government and donor agencies could be developed.

The lack of human and institutional capacity and poor utilisation of the existing resources, the conditionalities associated with the donated aid and the lack of coherent framework for aid management are among the frequently suggested reasons for poor collaboration between government and donor agencies in implementing development projects. Issues related to the political economy of aid conditionality have also been shown to play a significant role in determining the use of funds and the ultimate success of the development policies and programmes.

The hidden agenda of the donor agencies and how they influence the implementation of the proposed development programmes have been well documented (Moslay *et al.* 1991). The lack of interest in project implementation from the recipient governments due to aid conditionalities and the resultant failure of the development projects have cost significant amount of resources both to the donors and the recipient governments. Yet, conditionalities associated with the aid continue to be imposed, although the degrees of their compliance vary. Given the high dependency of development projects on the external resources, the conditionalities are accepted with an expectation that they could be overcome or managed during the actual use of the funds.

Successful negotiations with donor agencies to reduce the conditionalities require strengthening the indigenous capacity of the government to generate informed policy decisions. Such capacity could be developed through periodically upgrading the skills of the policy analysts and managers in the governments. This paper addresses the issue of capacity strengthening as an approach to enhancing the process of donor-government negotiations and relates it to the associated issues of political economy of aid conditionalities and aid management.

The process of donor funding and its relationship to policy analysis capacity in the recipient government is described in the next section. A conceptual framework for donor-government collaboration in policy analysis and capacity strengthening is given in section three. A brief description of the Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System that has been developed by the Malawi Ministry of Agriculture for designing agricultural policies is presented in section four. The process of collaboration between the World Bank mission and the government economists and its outcome — identification of policy interventions

and improved capacity of policy analysis — are also explored in section five. Lessons from this exercise are documented in section six and the concluding remarks form the last section.

The Process of Donor Funding and Its Implications for Policy Analysis Capacity

The ideal process of funding a development project could be described as follows. Sectoral ministries such as Ministry of Agriculture or Ministry of Health identify areas of interventions that could result in an improvement in the welfare of the population. Given the limited allocation of funds from the government, intervention projects depend largely on external sources of funds, at least until they are absorbed under the government revenue for continued implementation. These funds are obtained from bilateral and multilateral agencies through either loans with low interest or grants in kind or cash. For the projects funded through loans, multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and their regional counterparts such as the Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank and PAN American Bank are by far the leading institutions.

The project proposals from the governments are evaluated for the benefits and costs by the lending agencies when the request for loans are made by government ministries. The projects are also reviewed for the nature of implementation procedures before the loans are approved. To appraise the project and review the proposals from the governments, donor agencies employ project economists with an additional group of subject matter specialists relevant for the design of the project. However, due to the lack of adequate capacity to identify the problems, develop the issues, analyse the policies and prepare a project document in developing countries, these tasks are also done by the donor staff or their consultants. Equipped well with such information and research results that could be applied directly to prepare the projects and advise the governments on the process of implementation, the members of the donor missions have an edge over the government economists. The donor agencies use this advantageous position to modify the policies of the governments. In this process, these organisations also impose certain restrictions and conditions in the use of their funds. This has led to a state of discontent among government officials, with a perception that the donor agencies impose their views on the governments and that the country governments have no way of disputing or arguing successfully with the donor missions. This is partly because the government economists are generally not prepared adequately to face donor missions although they are aware of the issues that face their sector and the potential interventions that are likely to improve the welfare of the population.

Notwithstanding the political pressure under which they operate, government economists tend to cooperate with the donor missions. They help donor missions with information and data required for project preparation, but generally have limited say in the method of policy analysis and the projects suggested for implementation. In some cases, if a donor agency decided that a particular project should be implemented, it can force it on the government irrespective of the need for such a project. This is largely seen by the government economists as an imposition of external views and this reflects in lack of their support and enthusiasm in the implementation of such projects. However, hitherto, there is a growing resistance in several developing countries to accepting the projects suggested by donors although those projects are proposed with good intentions (*The Economist* 1993).

For successful implementation of development projects funded by donor agencies, it is not enough to resist the projects which are not considered essential; the governments should have the necessary capacity to face the donor missions and defend such a position. Until such capacity is developed, the imposition of views and projects by donor agencies is likely to continue. While this is recognised as a pressing development problem, little attention has been paid to it by the academic and research community (Liddle 1992). Information is lacking on the potential areas of conflict between the government and donor agencies in the process of formulating development plans. The policy analysis capacity in the government departments also need to be reinforced to enable government officials to negotiate better with donor agencies. In developing countries, one of the major approaches to do this has been largely through training and upgrading of the skills of government policy analysts.

The objective of this paper is to document an approach taken by the Malawi Ministry of Agriculture to work with the project preparation missions of the lending agencies in designing projects with informed policy decisions through joint research and analysis of the data. A case study of a project on how to design food and agricultural policies, through strengthening the policy analysis capacity of government economists based on the collaborative efforts of a World Bank mission and the Ministry of Agriculture, is presented. The Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System implemented by the Malawian Ministry of Agriculture, as a basis for agricultural project planning and policy making, is used in this research.

Government-Donor Collaboration in Policy Debate and Analysis: A Conceptual Framework


Successful design of development policies and their effective implementation require a thorough understanding of the issues confronting various sectors and a commitment by the government officials in addressing those issues. Given the major role of the international donor agencies in policy reforms and their implementation, collaboration of these agencies with government officials is essential. Lack of such collaboration and the resultant low level commitment from the government have been frequently suggested as a factor determining effectiveness of the intervention projects in improving the welfare of the population. To understand the potential areas of collaboration between a donor agency and the government departments and the activities that will require their joint contribution, a conceptual framework is shown in Figure 1, with the food and agriculture as a leading sector.

Informed policy decisions and development of intervention projects as final outcome of collaboration between government departments and donor agencies is given at the centre of the diagram. The decision makers from the donor agencies and the governments are placed on both side of the final outcome as its contributors. The first stage in the design of policy reforms and preparation of projects is to have a candid debate of relevant issues that affect the food and agricultural sector (Bremer-Fow *et al.* 1988). Such debate should also identify potential alternative strategies that may influence the sector.

In the second stage, these policy alternatives should be analysed for their potential impact on the welfare of the population. Information derived from the policy analysis is documented generally as background papers for discussion between the government departments and the donor agencies. Two groups of analysts are involved in the analysis process; the technical mission of the donor agency and the policy analysts from the government. The government policy analysts also include the technical assistance personnel and policy advisors already present in the government. In the absence of analytical capacity in the government ministries, policy analysis is generally carried out by the donor-employed analysts. An important element that is often missing in the process of policy analysis is the interaction of the donor-employed analysts and the government policy analysts. Enhancing such interaction would result in boosting of usually weak capacity of the government economists in policy analysis. Considering that the preparation of project plans and policy interventions by the donor missions are regular feature in a developing country, there exists an opportunity to develop analytical capacity by introducing an

additional element of training in project preparation activities by the donor agencies. This is shown at the bottom of the conceptual framework.

Figure 1: A Conceptual Framework for Identifying Areas of Government-Donor Collaboration in Policy Analysis and Capacity Strengthening



Although government-donor collaboration, as illustrated above, could enhance the success of policy interventions, formulating development projects and their implementation continue to be undertaken with limited or no government inputs. The policy issues and the areas that require reform are often identified by the donors and suggested to the government. However, they need not be accepted by the government before policy alternatives are analysed. The analysis of donor-determined policy alternatives are generally carried out by the donor-employed consultants who prepare the background material under time pressure and circumstances of poor data availability. The policy alternatives are analysed without involving government policy analysts although they are frequently involved in data preparation and interpretation. The results of the policy analysis are then used to support the policy reforms. Intervention projects are prepared to address the reforms with very little interaction of the government policy analysts. The role of government, or the lack of it, in these efforts, should also be recognised adequately.

The political environment in which the government policy analysts operate preclude them from recognising the potential areas of reform. This is partly due to the apathy of senior decision makers in undertaking new policy initiatives. This results in donor agencies playing the role of advocacy by pointing out the problem areas. Further, the present institutional arrangement and the low availability of human capacity for policy analysis in governments in several developing countries do not provide opportunity for analysis of policy alternatives (Babu *et al.* 1993). Consequently, they continue to be undertaken by the donors themselves. This results in acceptance of donors' recommendations as potential areas of intervention. This situation is likely to persist until a critical mass of policy economists are trained, placed strategically and assigned the responsibility of policy analysis (Paul *et al.* 1989).

While developing adequate capacity to identify the policy issues and to analyse the alternative strategies is generally considered as a long-term process, it is important to identify possible avenues for reinforcing the capacity of existing personnel in contributing to the policy debate and in understanding implications of policy alternatives. The remaining of this paper narrates one such effort made in the Malawi Ministry of Agriculture in the preparation of the Agricultural Services Project of the World Bank.

Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring as a Basis of Agricultural Policy Analysis and Planning in Malawi

Household food security and nutritional status of the population as major indicators of welfare are influenced by government policies and interventions. This is particularly so when food security and nutrition issues are considered as

final objectives of food and agricultural planning. Failure to identify the factors associated with food security and malnutrition explicitly in the process of policy decision-making may result in implementation of erroneous policies (Pinstrop-Andersen 1989). Given the scarcity of information on the indicators of and factors associated with food security, food and agricultural policies are more frequently made under the veil of ignorance. The food security and nutrition monitoring systems which are being developed in several developing countries form a major source of information which could be integrated readily into development planning and policy interventions (Arnauld *et al.* 1990; Babu and Mthindi 1992).

In Malawi, data collected from rural households through Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring (FSNM) surveys provide information to the policy decision makers on the food security and nutrition situation in various parts of the country. The surveys involve use of four different modules: food security module, markets and prices module, household expenditure module and nutrition monitoring module. They are conducted twice a year to capture the effects of seasonality on food availability and nutritional status of the population. In a year, the first round of survey is conducted just before the harvest in June and the next round is implemented in December, during the planting period.

Capacity Strengthening for Development Policy Analysis in Malawi

On a country basis, capacity building is required generally at three different levels for development policy analysis. For the purpose of identifying the target groups for capacity strengthening, they could be classified as national level, sectoral level and local level capacities. The policy analysis skills that are required to address the macroeconomic issues and their role in food and agricultural sector and the issues relating to the food trade, stock management and food aid are generally developed at the national level. The capacity to deal with the sectoral policies relating to agricultural sector such as agricultural production and price policies are seen as basic requirement in the sectoral ministries. Although the need has been felt for quite sometime, there exists a general consensus that the issues relating to capacity strengthening to meet the policy analysis at the local (regional) level has not been adequately addressed (Kinyanjui 1994).

Policy analysis capacity to general public and private actions towards food emergencies has been increasingly recognised as an important factor in mitigating the effects of famines and other food related calamities. The policy analysis capacity is also essential for monitoring and evaluating the food intervention programmes on security and nutrition which could be used for understanding the coping mechanisms that the households adopt to improve their

food security. In addition, capacity to analyse the food and agricultural issues and address them in a policy and programme context is essential for intervention and action at the community and grassroots levels. Such capacity also enhances the effectiveness of governmental and private voluntary organisations in mobilising and targeting their resources to improve the food security and nutritional situation of the population. Above all, the policy analysis capacity to analyse, interpret the information from the field, and design appropriate intervention related policy in the food, agriculture and nutrition sector is fundamental for implementing development programmes to meet the welfare needs of the population.

The food security and nutrition monitoring system in Malawi provides an opportunity to design policy interventions and development programmes that could be addressed to improve the welfare of the population at three different levels. As described earlier, in the first stage, the data collected from the rural households on the indicators of and factors affecting food security and nutritional status are processed and analysed for decision making at the agricultural district level. The evaluation economists in each of the eight agricultural development divisions analyse the data collected from their divisions. Besides this group of policy analysts, the capacity strengthening efforts in Malawi have also concentrated on improving policy analytical skills of two other target groups, namely the economists and nutritionists at the sectoral (ministry) level, particularly in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Office of the President. It should be noted, however, that the capacity building efforts in policy analysis in the past invariably focused only on the later groups.

Training in development policy analysis involved, as a first step, developing an inventory of potential policy alternatives and programmes that could be implemented at the national level of decision making. The economists and nutritionists were involved in this process through a series of training workshops. The major content of this training was to develop a conceptual framework which could be sent to analyse the issues relating to household food security nutrition. The conceptual framework was then used to differentiate the indicators of household food security and nutritional status which reflect the welfare of the population from their casual factors. The workshops also addressed the potential areas of intervention which have immediate, medium term and long term impacts on the welfare of the population.

The variable (indicators and casual factors) for analysis were also classified according to their level of influence, namely at the household level and at the community level. Followed by the conceptualisation exercise, the participants were trained to relate the indicators of food security and nutritional status to

casual factors to infer the degree of their association. Some of the specific analytical skills developed during the training workshops included functional classification of food insecure households; analysis of production-oriented policies; and analysis of household coping mechanisms and their implications for designing development programmes.

In sub-Saharan Africa, most of the countries have established food security and nutrition monitoring systems. However, their objectives, levels of operation and extent of coverage differ widely (Babu and Mthindi 1992). Despite this development, the use of information in designing appropriate policies has been limited. This is partly due to the lack of human capacity and institutional arrangements within the governments to analyse and report the situation.

The Case of World Bank Ministry of Agriculture Collaboration in Policy Analysis

The Agricultural Services Project to be implemented in Malawi for the next ten years with loans from the World Bank is an outcome of the collaborative effort between the members of the World Bank technical mission and the government policy economists. During the early stage of project preparation, the Ministry of Agriculture assigned specific groups of staff to work with the members of the technical mission depending on the policy issues that are to be tackled. This resulted in formulation of informal teams that could work on specific issues and prepare background working papers.

Identification of Policy Issues

Identifying broad policy issues that should be addressed is important before preparing the project components for funding. A three-day workshop was organised by the Malawi Ministry of Agriculture and the World Bank with participants from government, donor agencies and academic institutions to discuss various policy issues that are within the food and agricultural sector. Various potential policy alternatives were identified for further analysis during this workshop. The policy options which addressed the smallholder productivity included adoption of hybrid varieties of maize; increased cash crop production; adoption of agroforestry techniques such as alley cropping; adoption of soybeans in cropping rotations to increase soil fertility and introduction of small scale irrigation. In what follows, only the collaborative and capacity strengthening efforts related to these policy issues will be discussed, although various other issues were identified and addressed subsequently by other policy analysis teams. Other components of the Agricultural Services Project included agricultural extension policies; agricultural research issues; rural credit policies; irrigation development; and input supply for agriculture.

Identification of Data Sources for Policy Analysis

Using the policy issues suggested by the workshop participants as guidelines, the policy analysis teams prepared an inventory of existing data in Malawi to be used in their analysis. Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System data collected by the Agricultural Development Divisions (ADDs) formed a major source along with other existing information such as Annual Surveys of Agriculture (ASA).

In the Annual Surveys of Agriculture, a nationally representative sample of smallholder households are interviewed during each crop year. The information collected through the ASA included household size and composition, size of smallholder garden plots, cropping patterns, yields of crops, input use, timing of crop operations, off-farm employment, livestock owned and marketed, extension contacts and remittances. In addition to these two major data sets which were already available in the Ministry of Agriculture, smallholder crop production estimates from the ADDs, fertiliser use data from agricultural research trials and markets and prices data from the Rural Development Projects were identified as potential data sources (Babu 1991). A data management team was formed to help policy analysts from both the government and the World Bank in preparing these data sets for analysis. It included a statistician, a computer programmer and an economist from the Ministry of Agriculture.

Preparation of Data Sets for Policy Analysis

A typology of smallholder farm households was developed to prepare the data sets in analysing the policy issues. Recognising the heterogeneous nature of smallholder farming households in terms of differences in resources availability, three broad categories of households were identified. They were further classified into eight groups based on the agro-ecological zones defined by the development divisions (Babu 1992).

Table 1 presents the basic typology developed for policy analysis in the smallholder sector. The households in the first category have sufficient resources to capitalise opportunities provided through the policy options. They are also able to respond to relative price changes through additional investments. Households under the second category satisfy their basic needs in good years and take limited risks in bad years. With improvements in their income, they could respond better to the policy changes considered under the project. The third category included both chronically food deficit households and those who are sporadically deficit in food. A major use of this typology was to design strategies that correct differential requirement of these categories of households in promoting poverty alleviation and growth along with equity considerations.

Table 1: A Tentative Typology of Smallholder Households

Household Characteristics	Area Cultivated Per Household by ADD (ha)							
	Karonga		Mzuzu					
1. Surplus producers with market orientation	>1.50	>1.00	>1.00	>1.50	>2.00	>2.00	>1.50	>3.00
2. Smallholders with enough land to meet food needs	0.75 1.50	0.75 1.00	0.50- 1.00	1.00- 1.50	1.00- 2.00	1.25 2.00	0.75- 1.50	1.75- 3.00
3. Food deficit household	0.50 0.75	0.25 0.75	0.50- 1.00	0.50- 1.00	0.50 1.00	0.50 1.25	0.50- 1.50	1.00- 1.75
Chronic	<0.50	<0.25	<0.50	<0.50	<0.50	<0.50	<0.50	<1.00

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Lilongwe.

Based on this typology, the data sets were prepared to address specific policy issues. For example, the Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring data were reorganised to analyse the following: characteristics of food insecure households, nature and seasonality of household employment, coping strategies of food insecure households, labour availability for agricultural operations, technology adoption characteristics, nature and extent of market availability for inputs and outputs, patterns of expenditures and growth linkages, and food security, health and nutrition linkages. The Annual Survey of Agriculture data was prepared in line with policy issues relating to incentive structure, agricultural technology, crop diversification and public expenditure requirements in the agricultural sector. The data preparation team worked hand in hand with the policy analysis team in making the data readily usable for policy analysis.

Linking Capacity Strengthening with Policy Analysis

Using the technical mission of donor agencies — whose primary goal is to prepare project documents — for strengthening capacity in government departments contributes to successful implementation of proposed projects. For example, an understanding of the methods of policy analysis used for preparing the projects enables the government economists react constructively to the project proposals. In addition, a good grasp of the results of alternative policies

enhances their capacity to influence the decision makers at various levels in implementing prudent policies.

In adopting the food security and nutrition monitoring data for policy analysis, two sets of policy analysis training were provided by the World Bank technical mission. In the first, the policy analysts at the ADDs were given a week-long formal training in converting the farm-household data into meaningful policy recommendations. This also formed a part of their regular training in the analysis of FSNM data for policy alternatives at the ADD levels. The details of the contents and approach of training programmes are given elsewhere (Babu and Mthindi 1995). In the second set of training, policy analysts at the sectoral level (MOA headquarters) were trained on a one-to-one basis in analysing sectoral policy alternatives using the data sets described earlier. The first set of training along with training programmes that were on-going under FSNM resulted in a series of food security working papers at the ADD level which identified production-oriented policies to improve productivity and household food security of smallholder farmers (MOA 1991). The second set of training resulted in a series of background papers written specifically for preparing the project documents for the Agricultural Services Project (Simler 1992). These background papers were used further in the preparation of specific intervention projects and their implementation plan.

Converting Results of Policy Analysis into Intervention Projects

Policy research results as an outcome of policy analysis capacity strengthening interaction are given in Table 2. Two major policy issues that were addressed by the Agricultural Services Project to be funded by the loans from the World Bank included, reforming institutions and management of agricultural research, extension, and input supply systems; and increasing the farm income and food security of smallholder farmers through increasing productivity. Under each of these broad policy issues, several policy alternatives were considered for analysis by the government-donor teams. For example, under increasing farm income and food security, adoption of hybrid flint maize varieties, diversification through cash crop production, adoption of agroforestry techniques, and small-scale irrigation were some of the policy alternatives analysed for their potential impact. The basic results of the policy analysis conducted by the donor-government team which resulted in enhancing policy analysis capacity in the Ministry of Agriculture are given in the third column of Table 2. The project components that were guided by the results of policy analysis are given in the last column. These components were presented to the subject matter specialists and senior level decision makers during a workshop organised by the Ministry of

Agriculture and the World Bank. This provided an opportunity for brainstorming the project components and re-emphasising the results of policy analysis.

Table 2: Policy Issues and Conversion of Policy Analysis Results into Intervention Projects

Policy Issue	Policy Alternatives	Policy Research Results	Project Components
1. Reforming institutions and management of agricultural research and extension and input supply systems	establish a cost-effective research system to generate technology responsive to farmers' needs. provide cost-effective extension for productivity. increase availability and use of fertiliser by smallholders	Improved research management could reduce cost and increase research benefits; impact of extension could be increased by integrating with research at local levels; increased infrastructure for input delivery could increase the impact of technology generated from research	Improve research - extension linkages. Delinking credit from extension; expansion of livestock extension integrate women's programme into national extension support formulation and implementation of fertiliser policy reforms; institutional support for private sector fertiliser trade
2. Increase farm income and food security through increasing smallholder productivity	adoption of hybrid maize varieties. crop diversification with cash crops. adoption of agroforestry techniques	adoption of hybrid maize increases smallholder income by 57 per cent; inclusion of burley tobacco as a cash crop in credit increases net returns by 43, 15 and 17 per cent for small, medium and large smallholder; using <i>Acacia albida</i> as a tree crop for fertiliser for hybrid flint maize, the net returns of these farmers increases by 61, 18 and 17 per cent	Increased availability of hybrid maize seed by increasing seeds production and reducing their price; continued expansion and necessary support for liberalising tobacco to smallholder farmers; investment in projects for extension of Agroforestry technologies

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Lilongwe

The government economists who were part of the policy analysis teams were also the members of the discussion groups which finalised the project components for implementation. These economists, trained in conducting the policy analysis and in understanding the implications of the results of policy analysis in preparing the agricultural services project, played the role of resource persons in these group discussions by helping the policy decision makers to better relate the policy results to the final outcome of the project goals. Without such a group of trained economists to facilitate the group discussions, these

project preparation exercises might have resulted in two possible but extreme outcomes; either the government decision makers take the World Bank project preparation mission's word for it or reject a part or total project components recommending further study. Even with the government economists involved in policy analysis and project preparation, projects can still be rejected with a recommendation for further study. But the capacity for such studies has been created by the approach to project preparation followed by the Malawian Ministry of Agriculture.

With the support of trained policy analysts, the policy decision makers of the government faced the World Bank mission with more confidence and speeded up the preparation of implementation documents to be used for negotiations. Some of the government economists who were members of the policy analysis teams were also part of the government negotiation team which was sent to Washington DC. The capacity developed in understanding the issues, policy analysis, and project preparation during the early stage of the project was helpful in feeding relevant information at appropriate time during the negotiations from the government side.¹ This facilitated the negotiations since the major actors from the government side were clear about objectives of the project and the process of implementation. The relevance of the conditionalities as they relate to the implementation of project activities was also better appreciated by the policy decision makers.

In addition to their use in the process of developing the Agricultural Services Project, the policy working papers were also fed into the general policy development framework of the Ministry of Agriculture. For example, the economists who were involved in the donor-government collaboration in policy analysis were also asked to develop a revision of the National Development Plan 1987-1997. The results of the policy analysis were effectively used in this process. This was possible due to the existence of trained human capacity to analyse the need for changing earlier policies and priorities. As mentioned earlier, the Food and Nutrition Information System which comprises the Planning Division, Prices and Marketing Divisions, and National Early Warning System in the Ministry of Agriculture, provided platform to debate the emerging policy results and convert them into policy statements of the Ministry of Agriculture.

1. Personal communication with Mwanthengere.

Lessons from Capacity Strengthening Through Government-Donor Collaboration

The process of converting data into policy guidelines and using them effectively in designing development projects is seen as a surmountable task facing governments given inadequate institutional and human capacity for policy analysis (Paul *et al.* 1989; Webber *et al.* 1988). Due to this deficiency, government agencies depend on the analytical capacity of the donors who fund development projects. This situation has resulted in government officials having very little or no power in setting priorities among development projects during the process of donor-government negotiations. Although recognised as a common problem in several developing countries, this has not been addressed adequately in the development literature. There is no general prescription to address this constraint since the solution could vary from country to country and call for an understanding of the need for capacity and improved policy information at various levels. However, from the case study of Malawi presented earlier, it is possible to derive some lessons for similar situations in other countries.

Human capacity in generation and compilation of data and policy analysis while necessary, is not generally sufficient to have meaningful policy decisions. Appropriate institutions that provide opportunities for policy debate are also required. Such institutional capacity could be developed either within the government or in the academic institutions although its presence outside government usually enables more open discussions. Such institutional development also provides a forum for addressing the pressing development problems in a policy context. Policy analysis units should also be created within government departments to deal with the missions of various donors and to convert the technical consultancy reports into readily understandable policy briefs. The use of food security and nutrition monitoring system for policy making and project preparation established the need for a policy analysis unit in the Malawi Ministry of Agriculture.

In the absence of necessary human capacity for policy and programme analysis within government sectors, such activities will continue to be undertaken by medium and long-term consultants. Generally, these consultants provide policy advice for six to twelve months. It is also a general expectation that these consultants would train and impart analytical skills to the local counterparts. However, given the short period of their presence and the work load, there exists in reality, a conflict between consultancy and capacity building. One approach to avoiding such conflict is to provide opportunities for local staff in the analysis with the help of consultants. Also, frequent policy

analysis workshops should be conducted to transfer the skills and the results of policy analysis.

In places where capacity building is seen as a part of consultancy, a wide gap emerges between the contents of training and their actual use. In these situations, it is helpful to use material developed by consultancy in the training programmes as was done in the Malawian approach. This furnishes real-world examples for training programmes and also enhance the utility of policy results in the design and implementation of development projects.

Existence of data generating capacity is a prerequisite for sound policy analysis and capacity building efforts. In Malawi, fortunately, the infrastructure for data collection and processing already existed. It was then easy to build on the policy analysis capacity which could use effectively the data generated from the field. Policy analysis capacity developed at the sectoral level may prove to be sterile without an information generating mechanism such as the food security and nutrition monitoring system in Malawi.

Generally we can notice a tendency among the consultants and international agencies to criticise the poor quality of data that are available within government ministries. Since the government officials are rarely given an opportunity to analyse the data, they do not realise the importance of quality improvements in data collection. The use of Annual Survey of Agriculture for policy analysis helped government economists to realise the weakness of the data in terms of missing variables and the quality of data itself. This information is currently being used for refining the ASA questionnaire. Unless the capacity is developed for data analysis and the government economists are used to policy analysis as their routine work, the quality of data will not be improved.

Lessons from the Malawi exercise also indicate that while adequate policy analysis capacity is necessary for better collaboration and reducing lopsided negotiations between donors and recipient governments, it is not sufficient. Necessary institutional structure and mechanisms to convert policy analysis results into concrete decisions are also required.

Linking capacity strengthening activities with policy analysis and project preparation missions of the donor agencies has several advantages. First, it enables a clear understanding of, and consensus on, the relevant policy issues confronting the country and being addressed by the donors and the government economists. Second, it leaves a capacity to undertake similar project preparation activities in the future. Third, it facilitates faster implementation of development projects. The time involved in project preparation, discussion and negotiation is long and could be reduced by trained economists working for the government (Giles 1979). Fourth, it increases the confidence of policy analysts and policy

makers to negotiate better with the donor teams and to reach consensus on implementable projects. Finally, monitoring and evaluation of the implementation projects for their intended benefits becomes easy with a group of trained economists who understand the goals of the project and the process of implementation.

Invariably, most of the development projects have a training component. A part of the project funds is set aside for project preparation. The funds needed for capacity building in policy analysis and project preparation could be taken from the training component of the project to be used prior to project implementation. Though this results in a reduction of training funds for project related activities, the project, as an outcome of thorough policy analysis, has a higher probability of meeting its intended objectives.

Concluding Remarks

This paper has analysed the issues of implementing donor-funded development projects with a good understanding and concurrence of government decision makers. Capacity to analyse potential policy alternatives that would result in development projects has been severely limited in several developing countries. This has resulted in donors imposing on governments the projects suggested by their consultants. Conflicts between the donors and the governments in the choice of policies and development projects could be resolved by joint analysis of policies and preparation of projects by the donor-employed consultants and the government economists. One such attempt in the Malawi Ministry of Agriculture has been described in this paper with a conceptual framework for identifying the areas of capacity strengthening which could benefit from such a collaboration. The use of already existing data generation mechanisms such as the Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System in Malawi for policy analysis and project planning has been the basis for building the policy analysis capacity.

The process of donor-government collaboration in policy analysis, project preparation and capacity strengthening was described in the context of the World Bank funded Agricultural Services Project in Malawi. The lessons derived from this exercise indicate that training economists in the government departments in undertaking policy analysis enables them to negotiate better with donors. Capacity strengthening cannot, however, be undertaken in isolation from planning general development activities if a sustainable core of economists is to be trained in policy analysis in a short period of time. Utilising every possible opportunity for strengthening capacity at various levels of policy decision-making is important to achieving this task. With the limited capacity for policy analysis and project preparation in the developing country, and the dwindling

funds for future capacity strengthening through short-term and long-term training programmes, the significance of donor-government collaboration towards this goal can hardly be over-emphasised.

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The Devaluation of the CFA Franc: Some Preliminary Results

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Résumé: La dévaluation du franc CFA officiellement annoncée le 11 janvier 1994 a eu lieu suite à la détérioration constante et générale des économies des pays africains de la zone franc depuis les années 1980. Ce processus fût marqué par des crises financières répétées qui ont mené à l'adoption de toute une série de programmes d'ajustements structurels avec la plupart du temps la bénédiction des institutions de Bretton-Woods. Alors que d'autres pays en développement d'Amérique latine et d'Asie sont parvenus à modifier la structure de la composition sectorielle de leurs économies et à gagner des parts du marché mondial, les exportations de la zone franc n'évoluent pas depuis 1985. L'étude relève les premiers résultats de l'effet de la dévaluation sur les économies de la zone franc après une année d'application et tente de vérifier si les mesures d'accompagnement qui ont été prises dans le cadre de l'ajustement structurel pourront relancer ces économies, basées sur une restriction de la demande et poursuivies pendant trop longtemps dans des circonstances où il fallait plus de réflexion et une plus grande insistance sur les politiques d'offre intérieures et de «développement durable».

General Overview

Among the many facets of the relations between Europe and Africa is the link between France and its former thirteen colonies, grouped into a so-called 'Communauté financière africaine' (CFA). The CFA zone is a monetary arrangement consisting of two currency unions, one in the West and the other in Central Africa, whose rules of operation are connected with France. The common currency of the two unions — the CFA franc — was freely convertible and guaranteed by the Bank at fixed exchange rate since 1947 and any change in parity requires the unanimous consent of the CFA zone member states, including the French government. In turn, the CFA member states were required to deposit 65 per cent of their exchange reserves in French francs with the Bank of France.

In 1990, however, within the context of the Single European Market, the French government has advocated the substitution of this special institutional

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relationship with a new one, involving direct links between the CFA franc and a proposed European Federal Reserve Bank. Hence, starting that year, the CFA franc was effectively pegged to the ECU as realignment between French franc and other EC currencies became more infrequent and inflexible. However, if the Delors Plan for a European monetary union proceeds as planned during the late 1990s, the future of the relationship between the CFA franc zone and the Bank of France may be called into question and the other EC member states were much less sympathetic to the maintenance of direct financial relations with what they perceive as unstable economies of Africa.

Although the precise structure of the European monetary union has yet to be decided, the majority of EC currencies are already very tightly aligned to one another. With this tight monetary policy and an increasingly fixed exchange rate, the African CFA zone countries will find it difficult to maintain their competitiveness because their CFA currency will, in effect, be overvalued, as they will be unable to influence collective EC actions at a time when France is increasingly distracted by European policy imperatives.

Hence, the African franc zone countries feared that any diminution or weakening of franc zone links after the SEM 1992 could well result in a diversion of investment and financial flows from Europe in general, and from France in particular to their economies, since there will be a greater loss of control over their exchange rate determination as the 1992 SEM programme unfolds. There were two alternatives left to them. At first, the CFA zone members took all these contingencies into account in the post-1973 energy crisis period in maintaining the original decision of fixed parity and, hence, forgo the opportunity to devalue their nominal exchange rate because the founders of the zone calculated the inflation-controlling benefits of a fixed exchange rate but they did not anticipate the costs in terms of their countries' inability to adjust to unfavourable external circumstances. Hence, the very faster and more stable growth in the 1970s prevented them from adjusting to external shocks of the 1980s.

The other alternative was that, as the French franc becomes increasingly tied to other European currencies, so does the CFA franc, and therefore, if the Delors Plan for a European monetary union is adopted, the CFA franc will be pegged to the single European currency and the parity of the CFA franc to that currency will have to be re-established, by effecting the devaluation that until recently has been resisted; otherwise, if the other European partners are unwilling to support the CFA franc, the outcome may be a severing of its link with the French franc. This may have been one of the reasons why the Heads of State and Government of the zone countries were compelled to take a decision in January 1994 in

Dakar, to devalue the CFA franc by 50 per cent, with a parity changing from 1 FF = 50 F CFA to 1FF = 100 F CFA. However, a change in the CFA franc parity is equivalent to abandoning its fixed exchange rate and the credibility, which made the original arrangement tenable for so long, is now lost. Once it is known that the CFA franc can be devalued, pressures will amount for it to be devalued again and again. Once this process is set in motion, the convertibility of the currency and the guarantee from the Bank of France or from the future European Federal Reserve Bank could become less tenable and be abandoned.

The question of overvaluation of the CFA was the very controversial one, in its magnitude and its effects not only *vis-à-vis* the European currencies but also its coexistence *vis-à-vis* the neighbouring countries' currencies most of which have known constant devaluations during the 1980s. The fact that the CFA was not adjusted created distortions to the detriments of exports of the member countries of the CFA zone. The fixed parity and overvaluation of the CFA franc have impaired the flexibility and mobility of factors in the franc zone and led to loss of competitiveness as the productivity and the proportion of goods with a high added value in the export sector had not improved since the middle-1980s. However, the fixed parity ensured stability in the exchange rate which reduces the risks and prevents the inflationary anticipations. The question raised is whether or not the devaluation of the CFA franc will be profitable for the CFA zone member countries.

The attendant needs of devaluation is to shift resources from non-tradable to tradable by reducing export prices in the foreign currency and increasing import prices in the local currency. By putting exports cheaper, it increases foreign demand of the country's exports and hence increases foreign exchange receipts; and parallelly, by making imports expensive, it reduces the domestic demand for imports, reduces the external payments and hence, improves the trade and the situation of balance of payments.

The other advantage of devaluation is that it eliminates the overvaluation of the local currency and makes the traded products more competitive in the international market. But, in order to realise this, certain conditions have to be met: that the sum of price elasticity of export demand and the price elasticity of import demand is greater than one (Marshall-Lerner conditions). But looking at the structure of African exports, it is less probable that these price-elasticity conditions be met, given the fact that the price of raw agricultural products and some mining products were low and falling in the international markets. The adjustment of the demand elasticities to changes in relative prices take time in order that their sum exceeds one unity. Local prices can increase in the proportion of devaluation should a deflationary policy (reduction of public

spending and compression of the money supply) be missing and this will be to the detriment of the production and employment.

The experience of the other non-CFA African countries showed that constant changes in the exchange rate in the 1980s had not allowed countries to rectify the external disequilibrium. On the contrary, the deficit of balance of payments continued to increase and that the rate of inflation was much higher in these countries than in the CFA zone countries (UN-ECA 1991:16). In the case of the CFA zone, the current account of the CFA countries started to deteriorate in 1984, due to the drastic fall in the price of cacao (Côte d'Ivoire), coffee (Cameroon), uranium (Niger), and petroleum (Cameroon, Gabon and Congo). However, the current account of the other CFA countries than these improved despite the overvalued CFA currency *vis-à-vis* the US\$ by 30 per cent between 1984 and 1989. Therefore, one would expect that the devaluation of CFA franc may have the following effects: (i) increase in the general price level; (ii) the deterioration of balance of payments due to the non-satisfaction of the Marshall-Lerner conditions, as there is in the CFA countries a very strong domestic demand for imported products and a very weak external demand for export products; (iii) an increase in external debt burden through increased debt servicing ratios.

The preliminary study presented by ECA at the conference of African Ministers of Finance in Libreville, however, shows that these perverse effects of devaluation can be attenuated if there are at the same time accompanying measures such as : (a) the implementation of restrictive fiscal and monetary policy (compression of budgetary spending and price controls); (b) an increase in external aid by 30 per cent increase achieved in past years); (c) the implementation of differential interest rate and selective credit policies; (d) consolidation of debt relief and debt cancellation; (e) transformation and diversification of production and trade through the implementation of dual or multiple exchange rate policy; (f) strengthening of the subregional monetary cooperation between CFA and non-CFA countries through ensuring stable convertibility between African currencies and renegotiation of monetary agreements with France (UN-ECA 1994).

This paper summarises, first, the ECA simple simulation model, stating its perceived assumptions and results. Second, the paper analyses the economic situation in the CFA zone countries after the devaluation, derived from the information we compiled during our missions to various CFA countries at the end of 1994. Finally, the paper concludes by evaluating the reform programmes as applied in Africa in general.

ECA Simple Devaluation-Simulation Model

The Model

During the annual meeting of the African Ministers of Finance that was held in Libreville, Gabon, from 1-2 March 1994, ECA experts presented a paper on 'Dynamic Simulation of the Macroeconomic Effects of the CFA Franc Devaluation', using a simple macroeconomic model. The model concentrates essentially on the effects of the CFA devaluation on the production, exports and imports of the Franc zone countries. It is composed of five equations as follows :

Production

$$(1) \quad \text{LogGDP} = a_{10} + a_{11} \log IF + a_{12} \log CG + a_{13} \log YD + a_{14} \log X + a_{15} \log M = a_{16} \log \text{GDP}_{-1}$$

Investment

$$(2) \quad \text{LogIF} = a_{20} + a_{21} \log \text{GDP}_{-1} + a_{22} \log F$$

Exports

$$(3) \quad \text{LogX} = a_{30} + a_{31} \log Y_{OECD} + a_{32} \log X_{-1} + a_{33} \log \left(\frac{PM}{P} \right)$$

Imports

$$(4) \quad \text{LogM} = a_{40} + a_{41} \log F + a_{42} \log X_{-1} + a_{43} \log \left(\frac{PM}{P} \right)$$

Prices

$$(5) \quad \text{LogP} = a_{50} + a_{51} \log \text{GDP}_{-1} + a_{52} \log CG + a_{53} \log PM + a_{54} \log M2$$

Where:

<i>GDP</i>	=	Gross domestic product; a110; a120; a130; a140; a150; a160
<i>IF</i>	=	Fixed domestic investment; a210; a220
<i>X</i>	=	Exports of goods and services; a310; a320; a330
<i>M</i>	=	Imports of goods and services; a410; a 43
<i>Y_{OECD}</i>	=	Combined GNP of developed market economies of OECD
<i>YD</i>	=	Disposable income
<i>F</i>	=	External capital flows and export earnings
<i>CG</i>	=	Government expenditures or consumption
<i>M2</i>	=	Money plus quasi-money or credits to the economy
<i>PM</i>	=	Import prices
<i>P</i>	=	GDP deflator; a510; a520; a530; a540
<u><i>PM</i></u>	=	Index of national products competitiveness.
<i>P</i>		

The model parameters are estimated simultaneously using two stages least squares method (2SLS). The data sample include the annual observations for the period 1971-1990.¹

The model was supplemented by the so-called 'elasticity theorem' to determine the impact of devaluation on the balance of payments. Starting from the trade balance:

$$(6) \quad TB = X - IM$$

¹ The sample includes ten countries, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, the Central African Republic, Senegal and Togo. The data used are drawn from the World Bank *World Tables, 1992*; IMF *International Financial Statistics, 1992*; and UN-ECA *Statistical Yearbook* various issues.

Where:

TB	=	Trade balance
X	=	Value of exports in local currency
tM	=	Value of imports in local currency
t	=	Exchange rate
X_e	=	Price elasticity of exports
X_i	=	Price elasticity of imports

Taking the derivative gives:

$$dT B = X_e . X d t / t + X_i M . d t - M d t$$

or

$$(7) \quad \frac{dT B}{M} = X_e . X d t / M + X_i d t - d t$$

From the equality (7), we can have:

$$dT B = d X - t . d M - M . d t$$

or

$$(8) \quad d X = X_e x d t / t \text{ and } t . d M = X_i M d t$$

Assuming that there is equilibrium in the trade balance from the beginning (that is $T B = 0$ and thus $X / t M = 1$), the equation (8) can be read:

$$(9) \quad \frac{dT B}{M} = d t . (X_e + X_i - 1)$$

In the case of devaluations (i.e. $d t > 0$) in order that $d T B$ be positive, the sum of the two elasticities must be superior to 1.

The Results

The results of the estimation of the model is as follows :

**Table 1 : Estimation Results of the Model
(Using two least square method)**

	Parameters	Estimations	Standard Error	t. Statistic
Equation (1) R = 0.93	a ₁₀	0.880	0.013	67.7
	a ₁₁	-0.033	0.181	0.2
	a ₁₂	0.203	0.075	2.7
	a ₁₃	0.345	0.082	4.2
	a ₁₄	0.185	0.082	1.5
	a ₁₅	-0.018	0.265	-6.8
	a ₁₆	0.514	0.105	4.9
Equation (2) R = 0.57	a ₂₀	25.500	0.060	425.0
	a ₂₁	-0.184	0.304	-0.6
	a ₂₂	0.276	0.089	3.1
Equation (3) R = 0.95	a ₃₀	11.880	0.060	198.0
	a ₃₁	0.671	0.206	3.3
	a ₃₂	0.478	0.153	3.1
	a ₃₃	0.376	0.146	2.8
Equation (4) R = 0.89	a ₄₀	16.450	0.079	208.2
	a ₄₁	0.184	0.035	5.3
	a ₄₂	0.260	0.127	2.0
	a ₄₃	0.023	0.173	-0.1
Equation (5) R = 0.90	a ₅₀	-27.000	0.013	-20.8
	a ₅₁	0.714	0.058	12.3
	a ₅₂	0.143	0.056	2.6
	a ₅₃	0.172	0.025	6.9
	a ₅₄	0.183	0.021	6.3

Source: World Bank, IMF and UN-ECA, 1994.

a) Conditions of Elasticities

One can observe from Table 1 above that almost all parameter coefficients of the model are significant and have the expected signs. Looking at the external import prices as compared to the local prices (PM/P) causes a rise of 0.376 per cent in exports and a decline of 0.023 per cent in imports (although the latter is not statistically significant). The sum of elasticities of TWO variables (0.353) is far from meeting the Marshal-Learner conditions of over 1 so that the trade balance be improved through devaluation. It seems that imports in the CFA zone are more or less insensitive to changes in relative prices.

On the other hand, the increase in exports due to rise of 1 per cent in relative prices (PM/P) is approximately 0.38 per cent (parameter a_{33}), which is insufficient to compensate for the loss in the unit price (Mengisteab 1991). This confirms the fact that the conditions of elasticity sensitivity are not, in general, met for certain agricultural products such as coffee, cacao, groundnut, cotton, etc., which constitute the major export products of the CFA zone member states. Therefore, these results do not justify the expectation of the CFA zone countries of correcting the external deficits of balance of payments through devaluation of the CFA franc. Of course, these overall results need to be tested at the individual country levels where the situation may be different.

b) Effects of 50 per cent Devaluation on Nominal Exchange Rate of FCFA/FF

The results of Table 1 were simulated for a period of six years to project the effects of devaluation on production, investments, exports and prices. A devaluation of 50 per cent of F CFA is equivalent to a rise in external prices (PM expressed in F CFA) by 100 per cent (doubling prices). In theory, local prices (P) can remain unchanged if the governments concerned take a vigorous measure to freeze upward price movements. But this measure is difficult to implement, so that, in practice, devaluations are accompanied by a sudden rise in local prices. For example, in Mali, just after devaluation, local prices rose to 30 per cent and up to 100 per cent for some products.

Therefore, in order to appreciate the effects of FCFA devaluation, one should compare the two situations: effects without devaluation and effects with devaluation, other things being held constant. Table 2 gives the simulation results in the absence of devaluation as the last six-year trend projections for the coming six years.

Table 2: Annual Percentage Changes of Economic Variables in the Absence of Devaluation

Economic Variable	t=0 1993	1 1994	2 1995	3 1996	4 1997	5 1998	6 1999
GDP	0.6	1.40	1.25	1.37	1.44	1.52	1.54
Fixed Investment (IF)	0.11	4.86	4.78	4.74	4.72	4.71	4.64
Exports (X)	0.27	0.84	0.97	1.03	1.60	1.31	1.90
Imports (M)	0.15	0.25	0.31	0.35	0.45	0.52	0.6
Prices (P)	0.46	0.74	1.02	1.17	1.45	1.31	1.60

Source: UN-ECA, 1994.

The simulation of the effect of devaluation and the accompanying measures was made on the basis of the following assumptions (or hypotheses):

- H1 - a devaluation of 50 per cent with freezing of local prices during the first year, other things being equal;
- H2 - a devaluation of 50 per cent, with a rise of 50 per cent in local prices during the first year, a persistent rise in government expenditures of 5 per cent per year and an increase in external capital flows by 30 per cent during the first year and, thereafter, by 18 per cent each year,
- H3 - same assumptions as H2, but here it is assumed, in addition, that (i) an active policy to control inflation has been put in place, which after devaluation can allow to maintain the ratio PM/P constant and (ii) a permanent rise in external capital flow by 30 per cent per year during the six-year projection period.

The results of such simulations are reported in Table 3 as follows.²

² Actually, the ECA paper puts these results in the form of graphs. We are translating the graphs in figures in order to compare them with those of Table 2.

**Table 3: Simulation of FCFA Devaluation
(annual percentage changes)**

Economic variables under alternative hypothesis	0 1993	1 1994	2 1995	3 1996	4 1997	5 1998	6 1999	7 2000
GDP								
H1	0	7.8	8.3	6.5	5.0	3.8	2.9	2.2
H2	0	3.5	3.8	3.1	2.6	2.4	2.2	1.8
H3	0	3.5	3.5	4.2	4.1	3.8	3.7	3.5
Fixed Investment (IF)								
H1	5.0	3.5	3.6	3.8	4.0	4.2	4.5	4.7
H2	8.4	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.8
H3	8.4	7.6	7.5	7.5	7.6	7.7	7.7	7.8
Exports (X)								
H1	0	39.7	20.0	10.0	5.0	2.5	2.4	2.0
H2	0	14.3	7.8	4.1	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.2
H3	0	14.3	8.5	6.4	5.6	5.0	4.6	4.5
Imports (X)								
H1	-0.1	-0.3	10.0	5.0	2.8	1.7	1.0	0.8
H2	-0.3	-0.7	3.8	2.0	1.2	0.6	0.5	0.4
H3	-0.3	-0.7	3.7	2.4	1.7	1.4	1.3	1.2
Prices (P)								
H1	0.8	18.0	4.8	5.0	3.8	2.0	1.0	0.8
H2	2.8	18.2	2.8	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.6
H3	2.8	18.2	3.0	3.0	2.7	2.1	2.0	1.9

Source: UN-ECA, 1994.

c) The Effects on GDP

Comparison of the simulation results of Table 3 with those of Table 2 shows that the devaluation will allow an output expansion in short run (first year-1994) of 7.8 per cent for the hypothesis 1. Thereafter, there will be a deceleration to reach 2.2 per cent in the 7th year (2000); whereas, without devaluation, GDP growth will range between 0.6 per cent in the first year simulation (1994) to 1.5 per cent

in the long run (7th year-2000)). This will be due to the fact that, with 50 per cent devaluation of F CFA combined with increase by 39.7 per cent in short run and this boosts GDP growth to 7.8 per cent. The GDP growth slow down in the long run will be due to high rises in the rates of inflation after their first year freeze, with the consequence of loss in export markets, increased external payments deficit and reduction of available resources for investment and production.

In the long run, the scenario H3 seems to be more favourable growth of output and investment. In this context, through the price control that renders local products more competitive, and the increased mobilisation of external resources, a rise in exports and investment will sustain the growth in output (GDP) to reach 3.5 per cent in the long-run against 2.2 per cent for the scenario H1 and 1.8 per cent for the scenario H2.

However, the results of the scenario H2 which is perhaps the most realistic of the three, are less favourable for the output growth in both short and long run. The sudden rise in local prices (by 50 per cent) will, in short run, reduce the beneficial effect of the devaluation on the competitiveness of export products of the countries concerned, so that, at the end, a rise in local prices ($\frac{\Delta P}{P} = 1$)

equivalent to the rise in foreign prices will nullify the effects of devaluation on GDP. In this case, the simulation results obtained are almost the same as those of the historical trend scenario of Table 2; that is, a GDP growth of approximately 1.5-1.8 per cent in the long run.

d) Effects on Trade Balance

As far as external trade is concerned, one can observe that, in the balance of devaluation, the growth in exports of goods and services in the first year of simulation represented about six times that of imports (0.57 per cent of DX against 0.097 per cent for DM), but throughout the period this changed from 1.9 per cent against 0.6 per cent at the end of the 6th year. In other words, the local products become less and less competitive and the imports cheaper. As a result, the trade balance deteriorates in the F CFA zone.

However, the results obtained after the simulation of devaluation and the accompanying measures did not improve the balance of payment equilibrium. Taking the results of the realistic hypothesis H2, one can see that the impact of 50 per cent devaluation of F CFA on the exports of goods and services was about 14.3 per cent in the first year and, thereafter, the rate of growth slowed down to reach 2.0 per cent at the end of the 6th year against 1.9 per cent in the

absence of devaluation. This is due to the fact devaluation causes a rise in the import prices which is reflected in the domestic prices.

Model Policy Implications

The above results lead the ECA paper to conclude that :

- (i) There is need to put in place a mechanism for monitoring the differential rates of inflation by stabilising production costs and national spending. Since the structural transformation of the economy is the major objective of the majority of the African countries, this can be done through selective credit policy which gives priority to financing the agricultural and industrial sectors. As long as these sectors have low productivity compared to that of speculative and trade sectors, a total financial liberalisation will compound the realisation of that objective since it will raise the nominal rate of interest at the level that discourages the initiatives of the small modern operators (particularly in the rural and informal sector) to save.
- (ii) Relaxing the financial constraints through the consolidation of long-term external debt with very low interest rates or its cancelling should be taken as accompanying measures of the exchange rate policy. The resource here hence released should be directed toward the productive sectors of the economy.
- (iii) Actions should be taken to increase the competitiveness of national products on the international market through an adequate trade strategy which would aim at : (a) imposing its prices and its products; (b) finding partners; and (c) increasing the capacity of adaptation to the changing international conditions. This can be done through diversification of production and the increased productivity of each domestic product.

Preliminary Country Results

Prior to Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), African governments did not consider exchange rate adjustment as a major policy instrument. Many governments believed that a devaluation would increase inflation, aggravate budget deficits and yield minimal benefit in relation to increased exports and lower imports. Thus, between the 1970s and early 1980s, most of African economies suffered from over-valuation of the currency which may have resulted in loss of export competitiveness and encouraged a high level of imports especially in the form of luxury goods and unproductive inputs.

There was disparity in terms of currency and the type of exchange rate regime used in the African context. Some countries (CFA franc zone) have a fixed exchange rate and a convertible currency, whereas most African countries have a floating exchange rate regime and their currencies are not convertible either for

capital or current account transactions. It was therefore necessary for governments to assess the advantages and disadvantages of fixed and flexible exchange rates relative to policy pronouncements and implementation. In the case of a devaluation, under a fixed rate regime, the magnitude of the change is subject to policy decisions (fiscal or monetary) whereas for flexible rate regime, the movement of par value will mostly depend on the removal of restrictions on the foreign exchange market. In terms of structural adjustment, countries with fixed rates regime rely almost entirely on tight money policy which is evidenced through high interest rates and low levels of seigniorage. The flexible rate regime however, provides economies with the choice of depreciation.

The devaluation of the CFA franc by 50 per cent brought into focus the role of these two regimes in determining the policy mix relative to economic stability, inadequate and distorted financial markets, unproductive state intrusion, inward-oriented trade policies and correcting macroeconomic disequilibrium. The 13 West and Central African states along with the Comoros using the CFA franc had benefited from a long period of low inflation and sustained economic growth. It was not until the 1980s that the imbalance began to emerge as a result of the appreciation of the French franc against the currencies of the zone's major trading partners and worsening of terms of trade in the zone by 45 per cent in 1985 owing mainly to the fall in world market prices for its major exports (cacao, coffee, cotton and petroleum in particular), and to increase in import prices. These scenarios weakened the external competitiveness of countries in the zone, at the same time they were hamstrung by other structural and sectoral problems, particularly relative high wages.

Since the mid-1980s, GDP growth in the zone had been generally low or negative and investment ratios had been declining. Except in Gabon there were chronic current problems and per capita income was falling and financing gaps widening. The governments' financial situation was deteriorating due to a shrinking tax base as a result of declining competitiveness of the export and import substitution sectors. The usage of internal adjustment strategy alone was not enough to correct these serious distortions that had developed. This strategy would have resulted in increased taxes and cuts in priority current and capital public expenditures, particularly on education, health and infrastructure, which would eclipse the basis for sustained growth. But the devaluation came as a surprise and most of the CFA countries were not prepared to anticipate the devaluation so as to introduce complementary measures specifically geared towards mitigating its negative impact.

The focus after the devaluation was then on how have the governments of the CFA countries responded with policies for the short run, medium term and long

run. For the short term, the provision of standby arrangements with the IMF and France writing off debts (mostly Official Development Assistance, ODA) of these countries would provide some cushion. Most of these countries have implemented controls and protective schemes that would mitigate the most immediate impact of the devaluation, especially on the most vulnerable groups. The IMF has assisted in formulating comprehensive adjustment programmes. The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) has been provided with US\$ 1.6 billion, of which US\$ 555 million would have been available in 1994 for these zone countries; at the same time the World Bank had earmarked US\$ 1.5 billion in support of adjustment programmes. France has also established a special fund, FF 300 million to finance social projects in those countries mostly affected by the devaluation. The fund was to be used for the purpose of essential drugs, basic equipments and public works.

For the medium-term, almost all of the immediate funding that were made available would have been used up and governments that have not developed some real policies would be groping in economic as well as political darkness. For countries like Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Central African Republic where the absence of food production industries is obvious, the road ahead is tumultuous. In the case of Benin and Togo, they will continue to benefit from the vast market of Nigeria and the impact will be diminished somewhat by the continued convertibility of the CFA franc and the fall of the Naira.

Preliminary results show that the CFA zone area has performed better than expected in the short run both in the export and domestic sectors with an upsurge in the import substitute sector. Even inflation which would have hampered any gains has been controlled, averaging 25-30 per cent.³ Devaluation has allowed franc zone countries to return to competitive and profitable exporting. Countries like Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo have experienced marked increase in output of primary commodities (coffee, cotton, cocoa) as well as an increase in producer prices. Senegal's tourist industry is showing an upturn. Intra-zone trade is also flourishing. In competition with subsidised meat exports from the European Union, meat exports have begun to increase. Before the devaluation, only 20 per cent of Côte d'Ivoire's imported meat came from West Africa but now 80 per cent does. Central African Republic, Chad and Cameroon have boosted livestock sales to Gabon. Senegal has increased its fish exports.

3 Although this is still high compared to the pre-devaluation period where inflation rates ranged between 5-10 per cent.

On the negative side, the transition has been a bit more tumultuous for others. Countries like Cameroon and Chad have not, and there is little optimism, that they can draw any significant advantage from new competitiveness in agriculture and other primary exports. Also, there will be a sizeable shortfall in anticipated revenue for these countries, as well as the slowing down of the administrative and structural reforms that were underway. On the other hand, there has been tremendous growth in world demand and increase in prices for groundnut and cotton. For Senegal, this portends a problem, in that cotton prices have risen about 37 per cent higher than groundnut's such that farmers are now threatening to substitute groundnuts for cotton in their next planting season. This will, in the medium to long term seriously hurt the groundnut sector of the country. Thus, to reap the full benefit of the devaluation, while these countries in the short run will be buttressed by provisions explicitly cited earlier, they would have to conceive and implement, for the middle term and long run fiscal adjustment programmes, relevant monetary policies, wage and price policies and speed up structural reforms.

For the CFA franc zone, the impact of devaluation in the long-term is still shrouded in uncertainties and the policy recommendations, as well as programmes that are developed and executed therefrom will have an effect on these zone countries. For the impact of devaluation to be felt by the poorest farmers, some degree of redistribution policies and public investment should be provided such that the benefits of devaluation do not accrue only to the big trading companies. Along side devaluation is the need for a comprehensive debt strategy so that the political strains of devaluation may not undermine the fragility of emerging democracies in these affected zone countries.

There has been concern as to how the devaluation would impact on government budgets, inflation, productive (manufacturing) sector and imports. Relative to inflation, devaluation, may present a vicious cycle (increase in domestic prices through domestic cost inflation) but this may not be prolonged. Much depends on the package of appropriate fiscal, monetary, wage and price policies along with the exchange rate policy. On government budget, devaluation may immediately raise government receipts through taxes and higher income from exports, increase capital inflows through loans and grants, and subsequently enhance the financial position of parastatals in the export sector, thereby reducing the need for government loans or subsidies. Hence, the notion that devaluation will exacerbate government budgetary problem may not be totally valid. Although devaluation will trigger some offsetting repercussions, the net outcome will depend on the country's specific situation.

In terms of production levels relative to devaluation, there is a pervasive notion of 'elasticity pessimism' production is not price elastic. The counter argument is that although there are structural rigidities, this pessimism should not be so ingrained. The assumption is that most African economies are operating below full capacity because of lack of producer incentive and difficulty in obtaining imported production inputs. Therefore, a devaluation along with an increase in 'quick disbursing' external aid to purchase imported intermediate goods can pay-off in the short-run. Devaluation along with raising incentives and incomes of farmers will help assure market for the additional production of manufactured goods. The conclusion is that production response to real devaluation cannot be generalised because the situation is diverse and the outcome will differ from case to case.

Evaluation of Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Policies in Africa

Since the CFA devaluation is one component of the overall structural adjustment package, it is worth assessing the impact of that package in Africa in order to understand the likely magnitude that devaluation may impede on the CFA zone countries' economies in general as compared to other African economies. There is a link between the devaluation and the design and implementation of structural adjustment programmes in terms of their objectives of short-term stabilisation and the medium-term expansion of supply.

In general, most African countries, and especially sub-Saharan Africa, started the 1980s with an enormous macroeconomic disequilibrium which was the result of imbalance between aggregate demand and aggregate supply. This disequilibrium occurred as a result of stagnation in the global economy, debt crisis of African countries, collapse of commodity prices and failure of the African economies to adjust promptly to economic shocks. This was reflected in balance of payments deficits, rising prices, increasing foreign debt, declining growth rates and loss of international competition.

Because of these volatile economic conditions, African countries have continued to demand the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (IBRD) resources along with other multilateral and bilateral assistance. This demand has prompted these institutions along with the respective governments, to design and implement Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs); now more than a decade old having begun in 1980, to re-establish economic equilibrium and eventually through development policies move toward sustainable development. The inception of SAPs was based erroneously on the fundamental premise that domestic factors were essentially the causes of Africa's economic malaise. However, more recent assessments of SAPs purport that this

was only a contributing factor. It has also been observed that even 'successes' attained as a result of programme implementation have been too modest and minimal (World Bank 1993). SAPs also underemployed human skills, technological capabilities and industrial policies.

These SAPs have focused (with supposedly specifics differing from country to country) on: (i) expenditure reducing policies, (ii) expenditure and product switching policies, and (iii) supply side growth oriented policies. The measures undertaken within these policy stipulations include resource mobilisation, productive allocation and utilisation of resources, liberalisation of trade and investment reforms.

The goal is to see that these policy designs impact positively on macroeconomic structures, *inter alia*, rate of growth of real output, ratio of inflation rate to GDP, ratio of current account balance to GDP and ratio of domestic investment to GDP. The policy instruments and stabilisation measures that have been used include: (a) real devaluation of domestic currency, (b) reduction in government expenditure and increase in taxes, and (c) reduction in growth rate of domestic credit and increase in real interest rate.

In a World Bank study (June 1993), essentially using a 'before/after' approach, out of 29 sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 'adjusting' countries, 14 had an improvement in GDP growth whereas 14 showed a decline between the period 1987-1991 (World Bank 1993). This concurs with other individual studies which have shown that the result of the policy instruments on macroeconomic indicators are inconclusive. The World Bank study further confirms that in almost all cases, rates of growth, investment and savings were not at levels required for sustainability of development. According to the report, among the possible reasons for this dismal showing, the authors concluded that 'policy reforms effort has been uneven and insufficient'. This is evidence that the onus of the success of the SAPs lies with the respective governments. In the interim, the idea of 'home-grown programmes' has been more pronounced. The thrust here is to make those upon whom SAPs impact more vehemently become part of the conceptualisation, design and implementation of adjustment policies.

Almost all of CFA countries undertook some structural adjustments after devaluation. The programme for Equatorial Guinea aims at accelerating the rate of economic growth, reducing the rate of inflation and improving the overall balance of payments with a view to eliminating the need for accelerated financing by 1996. To achieve their objectives, the authorities intend to strengthen macroeconomic and structural adjustment policies, through tightening financial and incomes policies and deepening reforms in agriculture, public administration, public enterprises and the financial sector. In line with these

medium-term objectives, the programme for 1994 seeks to increase the rate of real economic growth, contain inflation at 35 per cent and reduce the external current account deficit.

Niger, which had some problems with the Bretton Woods institutions and blamed SAPs for its 'economic melt-down' in 1983 after the uranium boom, implemented a new package. The focus is on adjusting prices, taxes and salaries. The main goals are to reduce costs in improving the uranium sector, liberalise the labour market and simplify the custom tariffs which would encourage more and better movement of tradable goods. In Gabon, the reforms focused on diversification away from oil, restraining public spending and reforming public enterprises. The goal is to see budget surplus rising from 4.3 per cent of non-oil GDP in 1994 to 14.1 per cent in 1995 and 14.4 per cent in 1996 when a balanced budget is envisaged. In Côte d'Ivoire, the structural reforms include promoting flexibility in labour markets and strengthening domestic competition, reforming the public sector including an accelerated privatisation programme and eliminating obstacles to free trade. But as the programme was implemented, there was a desire to increase social safety net measures, provide a labour-intensive approach to public works projects and provide temporary price subsidies on essentials for the poor.

The Central African Republic's major thrust after the devaluation is to liberalise the agriculture markets by removing all price stabilisation and subsidy systems. This is to encourage farmers to be more flexible to market forces (demand and prices) and to develop a more diverse range of crops. The core element is the rebuilding of the public finances through increasing revenue. This will be done through strengthening the tax administration and introducing new revenue measures. The programme is important because it binds the government to some fiscal responsibilities and could be a catalyst for resource flows from other sources.

Congo, which has had continuous disagreements with donors, instituted a post-devaluation programme. The main elements are to accelerate the privatisation efforts, phase out subsidies and institute concrete policy measures which will focus not on export competitiveness like other CFA countries but deficit reduction of 13 per cent of GDP in 1994 toward a surplus of 3 per cent in 1996. Other components include customs reforms, changes in investment code, banking reforms and administrative decentralisation. The method of implementation would be through a labour-intensive infrastructure investment approach. This agreement with IMF will provide avenues for other aids, especially with the World Bank which had suspended cooperation with Congo

because of arrears on loan repayments. France has since provided a bridging loan to pay off these arrears.

Burkina Faso, Senegal, Cameroon, Niger and Benin also instituted structural programmes after the devaluation. The focus was on securing those competitive gains from the devaluation to propel sustainable growth with low inflation and controllable balance of payments. Some elements include: targeting real GDP growth of at least 5 per cent, reducing current account deficits, reducing consumer price inflation and using additional funding to buttress the social sector and rebuilding the productive sectors.

The reforms initiated may not get the desired results because: (i) reform agreed on may not be fully implemented and (ii) reform started may later be reserved. This was seen in the case of Guinea which had instituted SAPs since 1986. Problems developed with the IMF and other donors because Guinea was not meeting the real reform standards and the release of funding was halted in 1993. A 'thawing' of relationships ensued in 1994 when a new Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) agreement was signed as well as the release of the backlog of development funding. There was another situation in Uganda where loans initially approved had remained undrawn because of World Bank's uneasiness with project irregularities.

It is also evident that satisfaction with core elements of the SAPs by the Bretton Woods institutions produces credibility with other donors. This was evident in Ghana where structural adjustment lending and external financial support provided the basis for a significant direct increase in funding for various levels of the society. This is also seen in 1994 in Zimbabwe where its economic reform programme has got IMF and IBRD's support, thus, becoming a priority country for the US Government. This was also the case with the Central African Republic, Congo and Uganda in 1994.

Even though the results of SAPs have not been encouraging, many African countries still undertook some form of economic reform during 1994. Let us examine how the African countries in general and the CFA zone in particular responded in the specific areas of reforms.

Deregulation of Markets and Liberalisation of Prices

One of the conditions for the success of the devaluation is the monitoring of the price movements so as to prevent them from getting out of control. One major component of African countries' Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) has been the *deregulation of markets and the liberalisation of prices*. Prior to SAPs, most of these countries had stringent price and other controls on consumer goods and services. Presumably, these controls were intended not to be set arbitrarily or

hypothetically, but seemingly at a level where an adequate margin of profits would accrue to the producer and not so high that the bulk of consumers would not be able to afford it. But at times, when prices were set at below market prices, excess demand was created and this reinforced the parallel market.

With the advent of SAPs, sweeping decontrol measures were put into effect. The devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994, however, may have stalled or reversed these measures in order to institute some mitigating steps relative to the devaluation. Ordinarily, the decontrol measures would entail liberalising prices such that the supply and demand mechanism would determine market price. Being that equilibrium price is purely conceptual, policy makers have at times taken a more gradual approach to decontrol.

Deregulation and the liberalisation of markets have exhibited mixed results in African countries undertaking reforms. Despite this situation, countries continue to make them part of their macroeconomic objectives. Immediately after the devaluation, the CFA zone governments have introduced reform measures including, *inter alia*, reintroduction of price controls for a range of products regarded as essentials or as having a decisive effect on the price index; lowering of customs tariffs in certain cases in order to reduce the additional costs of inputs and imported products classified as basic necessities; stabilisation of or limited increases in utility costs; stabilisation or limited increases in wages; and reductions, in certain cases, in direct and indirect domestic tax rates.⁴

The situation is reflective in Cameroon where, since 1989 there has been a gradual phasing out of the system of government regulating price changes on many goods and services. But certain categories of goods, utilities and services had been excluded from these decontrol measures. The first group included consumer necessities (basic food supplies, utilities, housing rent), the second group included prices of energy and fuel, and the third group comprised agricultural input and supplies which were basically subsidies for the sector.

In a World Bank study of 29 'adjusting' countries, prior to SAPs (during the 1970s and early 1980s), 26 countries had extensive price controls on 26 or more goods. Two countries (The Gambia and Malawi) had moderate controls on 10 to 25 goods. Only Chad of the 29 countries had controls on fewer than 10 goods. In 1993, with these identical countries implementing some form of SAP, only Mozambique and Burkina Faso had extensive price controls. Five countries had

4 UNIDO Secretariat, Summary Report of 'Subregional Workshop on the Impact of the Devaluation of the CFA Franc on the Manufacturing Sector of the Countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union', Bamako, Mali, June 1994, p.4.

moderate controls, 13 had few controls, whereas in 9 countries, including Zambia, Uganda, Ghana and the Gambia, there were no controls.

The devaluation, as stated earlier forestalled some of the decontrol measures and some countries had to revert to price control, once again, at least to stem some of the potential negative effects of the devaluation in the short run. In Benin, there was a failed attempt to institute controls because of the lack of experience in imposing or policing price controls. This problem exists because there is no centralised enforcement agency and also the populace is accustomed to buying mostly imported foodstuff, medicaments and other essential consumer goods. Countries instituting new levels of price control included Chad, Gabon, Central African Republic, Togo and Burkina Faso.

In Gabon, price controls were placed on bread, flour and other essentials, as well as public utility tariffs, which include telephone, water, electricity and internal transport. In Central African Republic, there was a freeze on all prices of goods and services which led to hoarding due to inflationary expectations. Although inflation is expected to rise in all zone countries, the rate in the Central African Republic was expected to average 35 per cent above the rate in other countries. This is due to the country's limited manufacturing base and the need to import finished products. The goal is to bring inflation rate to 3 per cent in 1995 and keep it under 2 per cent. This may be possible if the zone's record of tight monetary policy and low inflation remains intact. In Burkina Faso, basic item costs were frozen and price rises between 24 and 39 per cent were allowed for other items. In Togo, all petroleum prices were frozen.

In some countries, to accommodate the devaluation, emphasis was also placed on the supply side to ease the transfer of cost to the consumers. This included reduction or elimination of duties and reprisals for disobeying price controls. This process was carried out in Togo where duties on salt and pharmaceuticals were eliminated and duties on school books, pencils, chalks and others were halved. Burkina Faso reduced custom duties on essentials (rice, sugar, milk, flour). The authorities were also commencing reprisals against those disobeying price controls. These included closure of business and/or fines.

Although the CFA zone devaluation was the most prominent in terms of exchange rate policy, other African economies pursued some of their own. In Algeria, along with its economic stabilisation programme, the dinar was also devalued to make non-oil exports more price-competitive. In the short run, this will raise the dinar value of hydrocarbon taxes and other government income. The goal here is to substantially reduce the government budget deficit. In the case of Algeria, the policy focused in 1994 on deregulation and market liberalisation because of the transformation from a state-managed system into a

market-oriented economy. The objectives include reducing the budget deficit, containing inflation, generating growth in the economy to create jobs, restructuring public enterprises and promoting private sector activity.

The immediate policy instruments used were to devalue the dinar by 40 per cent, increase interest rate and impose some credit controls. The reform also required a reduction in the subsidies on basic goods and price increases in the products of state companies. But the government has decided to move cautiously given the political ramifications of any decline in standard of living. Some basic targets include GNP growth of 3 per cent in 1994 and 6 per cent in 1995. This may be possible if the present problems in Nigeria persist because the exports level of hydrocarbons from Algeria may rise resulting in increased earnings. It is envisaged that prices will rise due to the devaluation of the dinar by 40 per cent, the reduction of subsidies on basic goods and movement of products from state companies to market levels. This means that prices for nine food items, including bread, flour, milk and domestic fuel prices will increase.

In Egypt, as part of their economic package, there was a reduction in subsidies, increase in direct taxation and continued price deregulation. These measures, when implemented will lead to price increases but not at the full impact of the measures. This is because inflation would be moderated by fiscal and monetary discipline, stable exchange rate, limited wage increases and lowering of tariff rates. Policy makers are estimating the inflation rate to stabilise between 3-5 per cent by the end of 1995. Egypt has embarked upon a policy initiative of maintaining exchange rate stability a priority. The goal here by the Central Bank is to keep investor's confidence high and maintain continuous high capital inflows. Although the Egyptian pound has been stable since the free market rate in 1991, there are concerns that it is overvalued and hinder exports. The government is following a gradual implementation of its programme because of the fear of unrest prompted by economic hardship and austerity. This pace created some friction with the World Bank which led to the delaying of a US\$ 4 billion debt write-off.

Morocco's thrust is to develop a market-oriented economy which will attract foreign capital to finance growth and development. The policy elements included tight control on inflation, encouraging investment and generating growth to enhance employment. The government planned to coordinate taxes on various financial mechanisms and to develop the securities and foreign exchange market.

In the absence of controls, consumer prices have continued to increase while stifling economic growth. The major contributing factors include currency devaluation, growth in money supply and removal of subsidies on food staples and other necessities. This was the situation in Nigeria where the removal of fuel

subsidy along with the level of stockpiling or hoarding in anticipation of some social and political unrest prevented any hope of inflation abating.

In Ghana, where the government was anticipating a rate of 15 per cent for 1994, the fear of further increase in ethnic fighting in the North did not materialise. The reason is that much of the food consumed by the populace comes from this region. In Uganda, inflation had ebbed in 1993 showing negative year-on-year rates for 4 out of 12 months. The rise in the rates in March was due to 18.2 per cent increase in food prices. The inflationary history has impelled the government to take firm control by continuing to impose strict monetary growth.

In Madagascar, the main focus was on imports, where 150 non-strategic imports were recommended to be prohibited from being imported. This included private cars, television, washing machines, tobacco and whisky. The concern here is that this will cause reduction in a major source of income and may propagate inefficiency within the domestic enterprises due to the apparent loss of competition from imports. Other measures included the decontrol of the franc, end to restrictions on the use of foreign exchange by exporters, tax reforms to help budget deficit and the restructuring of state-owned banks.

In Mozambique, a loan was approved under the ESAF to support economic reform through 1995. There has been progress despite 16 years of conflicts and the transformation from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy. The government's medium-term strategy is to overcome widespread poverty and provide a basis for economic growth. Targets include an average annual GDP growth of 6 per cent, a steady reduction of inflation, a reduction in external current account deficit relative to GDP and a recovery in exports through improved and expanded incentives. By the end of 1994, some partially administered price controls had been lifted, reform of the public enterprises and financial sector had progressed significantly and privatisation of large parastatals had been accelerated.

Despite previous concerns about the tremendous social costs of SAPs, and on the heels of exchange rate reforms, Angola adopted a programme in February 1994. The embodiment of the programme was to correct the extreme imbalances which had resulted during the shift from a controlled to a market-oriented economy. The main measures were to reduce budget deficit, bring money creation under economic liberalisation, initiate price reforms and enhance the privatisation process. The goal is to reduce budget deficit to 4 per cent of GDP (from 29 per cent in 1993), reduce money supply from 635 per cent in 1993 to 112 per cent in 1994 and reduce price inflation from 1,838 per cent in December 1993 to 260 per cent in 1994. It is noted that the entire reform process and its

fruition is incumbent upon the cessation of hostilities and the revival of the depressed oil sector.

Zambia showed some resilience from the corruption allegations and benefited from the good graces of donors. The SAP programme was continued also because of improvements in the privatisation process, reduction in the average rate of inflation, and increased budgetary allocation to the social sectors, which was up 150 per cent in 1993.

In Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwean dollar was devalued by 17 per cent in January. By the third quarter, there had been an increase in the market rate *vis-à-vis* the official rate. This narrowing of the gap between the two rates eventually led to an early full convertibility of the Zimbabwean dollar. The IMF approved loans under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) totalling US\$ 144 million. This was in association with the reform programme that has made Zimbabwe to reach a total debt burden of Z\$ 34.1 billion (US\$ 4 billion).

It should be stressed that even with the introduction of price liberalisation there was not a spontaneous cut of subsidies. The curbing of subsidies has been slowed because most of the subsidies which are considered part of the 'social safety net' are targeted for the agricultural sector in the form of agricultural inputs and fertilisers.

The Areas of Fiscal Policy and Public Enterprise Reforms

Fiscal stabilisation measures included ensuring higher income from increased taxation, involving adjustments to the tax base, the simplification of tax law and effective tax collection. The difficulty in dealing with these measures was to distinguish between point-of-entry taxation, whose main objective is to protect domestic products, and Value Added Tax (VAT), whose main objective is to raise income. In general, for external trade taxation, governments opted for simplification and relaxation of tariff procedures; but for the inputs and capital goods, the tariff policy was adjusted so as to cushion the effects of the devaluation, with zero revenue duty for capital goods and reduced rate for inputs. For other goods and finished products, tax adjustments were meant to protect local production, to ensure the provision of essential items such as medicines, sugar, milk, rice, school supplies, etc., taxation policy measures adopted were, for example, gradual phasing out of the employer's flat-rate contribution; strict enforcement of the VAT mechanism so as to maintain its universal applicability; reduction of the rate of profit tax; harmonisation of the minimum-levy system.

For almost all African adjusting economies, the most difficult areas of reform have centred around *public enterprise reforms*. Reform of the public enterprises

was necessary because of their drag on financial sources, inefficiency and crowding out of the private sector in the commercial sector. But the reforms have been slow relative to the pace envisioned by the programmes. This slow pace has been attributed to the absence of data to corroborate reform taking place and the extent of privatisation. However, privatisation of public enterprises is still a priority but its implementation remains a problem. One reason could be that many nationals do not have the economic wherewithal to take responsibility of these parastatals since most governments want to take the 'indigenisation' route. Also, the government may be indecisive as to which enterprises it wants to retain, sell or establish some new form of ownership (e.g. partnership, joint venture). Most of the parastatals may be in such economically depressed state that there are no 'takers' and the government may be weighing the political and social ramifications of a complete shutdown.

Within the framework of SAPs, particularly with respect to the CFA zone, the expansion of supply was made through the fiscal policy rather than through the monetary policy; and it mainly concerned the expansion of the export sector production. Devaluation offered the opportunity to impart a stimulus to supply, for the change in parity that involves a 100-per-cent increase in the price of imports and hence protection from imported-products and an opportunity to increase exports which had become cheap for the foreigners. But this requires that the governments master the factor costs and that there is availability of long-term, stable and affordable financing.

The Areas of Monetary Policy and Financial Reforms

Another difficulty of SAPs relates to the *financial reforms*. The financial sector helps to mobilise savings, allocate financial resources and regulates the payment system. Therefore, it needs to be strong and especially in African least developed countries (LDCs), since it is needed to propel the movement toward sustained economic growth. The reforms have been hampered by an unstable macro-economic and political environment, reliance on financial systems that are inadequate, regulations that suppress private sector borrowers and the absence of the required manpower capacity to sustain a developing financial sector.

Specifically, one of the main policy instruments of adjustment has been currency devaluation. Concern of the overload of this instrument is rampant and that its anticipated impact may not be realised in the absence of other factors. Also its value as an instrument for correcting structural disequilibrium of the economy may be overstated. One example is that if devaluation is being used to increase exports, to sustain that level will entail enlarged export capacity. As empirical evidence do suggest, there is a correlation between exchange rate movement and growth in export volume, especially over the medium term.

However, this develops the 'adding-up problem', which produces a decrease in commodity price of a commodity due to simultaneous increase in supply from respective sources.


The financial issue concerns also the interest rate liberalisation and inflexibility in the monetary policy. So far structural adjustment reforms in the CFA countries were made on the fiscal side and the monetary policy was left out of the scene because CFA franc is closely tied with the French franc and the Banque de France which, together with member-states concerned, should authorise or provide the framework for expanding or reducing money supply in the CFA zone. Therefore, there was a little manoeuvre in the part of African governments to use this tool to finance development. Hence, the path towards a *financial deepening* of the economy has been slow in African countries, compared to other developing countries in Latin America and Asia. Most African bankers continue to play a conservative and traditional role of financing international trade rather than development. Only few countries have succeeded to increase the number of bank branches and other financial institutions to rural areas and to initiate the public at large to hold their wealth in the forms of financial assets.

The interest rate liberalisation policy which was advocated by the structural adjustment programmes, supposedly aiming at increasing the financial deepening, ended up having a high nominal interest rate and, in the absence of price controls (if prices are left to the free interplay of the market forces), this has resulted in a negative real interest rate, thereby discouraging private domestic savings. This is because financial liberalisation through increasing interest rate on deposits is stagflationary, unless portfolio switches take place, say from rentiers holding inflation hedge real assets (such as durable goods, hoarded money, housing, gold, diamond, or inventory stocks) towards productive loans to firms or enterprises (financial assets). This, generally, is not the case in most African countries.

Most of the African countries are, in effect, in the realm of the so-called 'technological dualism'; their economies being composed, on the one hand, by a relatively modern, technologically advanced sector which is identified by exchange market or monetised economy and in which coexist industry, mechanised plantation agriculture, mining, transport, finance, insurance, trading and associated services; and, on the other hand, there is the retarded, traditional sector with a subsistence economy and unorganised markets and in which peasant agriculture, handicrafts, very small-scale industry and their services constitute the principal activities of the economy (Thisen 1982).

Therefore, the SAP arguments to let the market forces determine the single real interest rate can only be applied in developed countries and in the newly industrialising economies of Latin America and Asia. In Africa, in general, the financial assets such as treasury bills, government bonds, prime industrial bonds, readily marketable shares which form the transition between money and real assets in countries with full financial systems play a minor role in the asset portfolios of wealth holders (Polak 1967:30). In contrast, the real or physical assets dominate in the assets portfolios of wealth holders in Africa. Consequently, the substitution effect, stemming from financial assets and operating through interest rate mechanism is smaller in African countries than in the developed countries.

Table 4: Asset Structures in African LDCs versus Advanced Countries

African Countries (LDCs)	Developed Countries
Money	Money
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Treasury bill - Government bonds - Prime industrial bonds - Readily marketable shares etc.
Physical Capital	Physical Capital

Source: Compiled by the author

Thus, it would be misleading to assume, as in advanced countries, that in developing African countries with fragmented economies, unintegrated monetary system (formal and informal financial sectors) and imperfect money and capital markets, that there is one single real rate of return on the real and financial assets that represents the uniform opportunity cost of holding money. In those countries the demand for money and the demand for real physical assets tend to be complementary in the private asset portfolios rather than as competitive assets as Keynes and Neo-classical economists argue. As McKinnon (1973) argued, the complementarity factor can be represented by two interest rates: the average rate of the returns on physical capital and the rate of return on holding money adjusted with the expected rate of inflation (McKinnon 1973).

The single market interest rate determination ought to be done gradually until such time that the fragmented sectors of the economy are integrated and the economy is fully monetised. This is a long-term objective. But what is to be done in the transitional stage? Will it be possible, for developmental purposes, to apply two sets of interest: one in the formally well advanced segments of the economy, to be left to the interplay of the market forces, and the other in the backward or less advanced, informal economy to be determined by administrative promotional measures? This would amount to the application of the so-called differential interest rate policy that the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa has proposed (UN-ECA 1991). In some African countries, for example Ethiopia, financial deepening is taking place more firmly through the extension of commercial bank branches in the rural areas than through the complete liberalisation of interest rates.

Another monetary issue is the fact that the capacity of the banking system and financial institutions to issue money to finance economic development without causing inflation is greater when income velocity of money is falling than when it is constant or rising. This is explained by the fact that when velocity of money declines — as it is the case in many African countries — the cost of production of new money becomes cheaper or less than its exchange value. The issuing financial institutions can inject money into the economy in order to acquire resources from the public as long as its cost of production is below its exchange value. These resources can then be lent or allocated for economic development purposes (Thisen 1982:30-35). This can help also increase the financial deepening of the African economies.

The Issue of Social Dimensions of SAPs

The *social dimension* of structural adjustment programmes has attracted quite a lot of discussions among scholars and policy makers. Recently, (although UNICEF confirmed as early as 1987) the World Bank's study, along with other independent and international organisations studies confirm that despite the implementation of SAPs, the number of the poor are increasing such that there is a reversal in the rate of growth of social progress (Thisen 1982; Cornia *et al.* 1988). An example is the reduction in overall rate of school enrolment (Thisen 1994:79-115).

Ghana, which has been a 'model' for SAPs, in continuing the second phase of its adjustment programme, included the Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD). Other such programmes are SDA and PAPSCA. The effort now is to find the best approach to this problem, whether through preventive programming (*ex ante*) or 'restorative remedies' (*ex post*). In any cases, the social dimension should be introduced right from the design of

SAPs and should be sustained during the whole period of the implementation of reforms.

The Issue Related to Income Policies

Another issue relates to *income policies*. In recent years, the dual 'devils' of high unemployment and inflation have simultaneously imputed negatively on world-wide economies but more disastrously on less developing countries, especially African LDCs. The static neo-Keynesian counter-cyclical fiscal approach (fiscal stimulation or fiscal restraint) has become moribund. Therefore, new policy measures have been instituted to complement the traditional ones. These include various forms of income policies such as voluntary or mandatory wage and price restraint.

These policies, when used in developed economies, have been almost exclusively in restraining inflation for brief period of time especially to squash inflationary expectations when the economy is not affected by excess demand. Although these formalised incomes policies are associated with industrialised market economies, this does not preclude the fact that such policies or elements therefrom are relevant for African economies.

Income policies in developing countries have sought to maximise income and income distribution. In contrast to developed economies, income policy and not wage policy is pursued because wages are a much smaller component of total incomes in less developing countries. Thus, incomes policy is more comprehensive in coverage, seeking to influence all forms of income and prices with wage employment often only a small, but nonetheless, an important part.

In developing African countries, incomes policy may include wage policy, fiscal policy, control of wages and salaries above the minimum, more equitable distribution of income and rapid expansion of employment opportunities. The component of better income distribution is spurred on by fiscal policy through taxation of profits and government expenditure in education, health, housing and infrastructure which may be the most important factors in reducing some of the wide disparities in real living standards in sub-Saharan Africa.

In 1994 there were major income policies initiated, invigorated by fiscal reforms stipulated in structural adjustment programmes being undertaken by many countries and the devaluation of the CFA franc. Some countries restructured or enacted legislation which provided for a minimum wage; a setting or a ceiling on wage increases which should not exceed an average of 10 per cent; settlement of all wage arrears so as to reinvigorate consumption and put public finances in order; raising of the agricultural producer prices by an amount slightly higher than the rate of inflation so as to sustain the recovery in

the food and agricultural sector and agro-industries. Among these were Togo, Gabon, Senegal and Burkina Faso. In Togo, the minimum wage had been 72 CFA fr/hr but increased to 75.6 CFA franc in January 1994. The high minimum wage instituted in Gabon has encouraged employees to seek non-Gabonese labour. In 1994, it is stipulated that there will be monthly increases of up to CFA franc 30,000 in wages because of the prolonged civil unrest.

The devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994 provided for some changes in individual policies relative to income. This may have caused some countries to suspend policies that were to be implemented or to initiate or/and expand new policies. Following the devaluation, minimum wage which had remained unchanged since 1982 in Côte d'Ivoire underwent steep rises in 1994. State employees' salaries increased between 5 and 15 per cent. In Senegal, civil servants received salary increases between 7 and 24 per cent in March. The higher extreme going to those with the lower level positions. The total wage bill for Senegal is expected to increase by 9.6 per cent in 1994. This is in contrast to stipulation within the programme of economic reforms signed in January with the IMF. This percentage increase in the wage bill will amount to a total wage bill of CFA Franc 8.5 billion in 1994. Despite this increase, real income will still fall after devaluation because the government as well as the private sector (where wages will increase between 5 and 20 per cent) cannot accommodate the full impact of the devaluation.

In Burkina Faso, civil service salaries increased between 4 and 8 per cent in April 1994 while the minimum wage also increased by 10 per cent. In Congo, the planned cut in civil service salaries' was postponed. Even for some countries that did not experience any drastic devaluation, there was also state employees' salary increases. In Sao Tome and Principe, public civil servants salaries increased by an average of 30 per cent in 1994. The increase was between 8 and 30 per cent. In July, Zimbabwean civil servants, police and the army also received interim pay raises of 10 to 23 per cent.

Due to the fact that cost of living is increasing faster than average monthly wage in most African economies, especially sub-Saharan Africa, the parallel market is increasing in its volume and expanding in the type of trading and illicit activities. This portends to increase cross border activities. The disparities in civil servant earnings within subregional areas have also necessitated labour movement between borders and heightened black market trade. Reports show that civil servants in Guinea earn 40 per cent less than those in Togo and 20 per cent less than civil servants in Côte d'Ivoire.

In some countries, pay has been linked to some indicators. In Ghana, except in 1992 when pay raises were given prior to the general elections, pay has been

linked to productivity, inflation and ability of companies to pay. This is important because, to effectuate incomes policies in Africa, there has to be some compromise between the social partners-employees, employers and government representative to jointly develop strategies to pursue the goals of growth, equity and price stability.

Since incomes policies cannot serve as a substitute for fiscal and monetary policies, it must be used as a supplement to monetary and fiscal policies in achieving price stability, improving the trade-off between inflation and unemployment and to interrupt inflation expectation in the short run. But even in the absence of a comprehensive and coordinated incomes policy in sub-Saharan Africa, there are invariably connections between various areas of policy. Price changes affect the standard of living and income distribution which directly impacts on minimum wage. Because of these changes, there will be adjustment in the nominal wages which accordingly affects fiscal policy through taxation whereby employees will be entering taxable income brackets for the first time while others will be moving to a higher tax level.

Conclusion

Thus, the road ahead for structural reforms is still laborious and unpredictable. One positive sign is that a consensus seems to be building that Africa's problems are such that a 'quick fix' approach through stabilisation policies and Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) will not bring about the sustainable development on an assured basis. In the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, ambiguity and theoretical confusion still abound as to what 'structural adjustment' is all about. It began to be used as a synonym for good economic management as planning was used in the 1960s. It has become increasingly more difficult to distinguish the debates about adjustment from those held about 'development'. Consequently, views are being expressed that it is now apropos to return to development — whether 'human development' or 'sustainable development' — as the central theme of economic policy debate in developing Africa (UNDP 1990-1993).

The IMF and World Bank sponsored programmes have provided an 'anchoring effect' and in the process have exposed some caveats of reform programmes relative to developing Africa. Therefore, in formulating alternative programmes that are credible, sustainable and growth oriented, one has to look at exogenous factors that prey on the success of reforms, the speed of adjustment and who bears the burden of adjustment among other factors. One such alternative is the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa's 'Alternative Adjustment Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation', (AAF-SAP). The AAF-SAP is more

elaborate and specific because: (i) it is human centred, (ii) it has a holistic approach to socio-economic change, (iii) it looks at the structural rudiments of the African political economy, and (iv) it acknowledges the uniqueness of every country (UN-ECA 1989).

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Actualité de la pensée économique de Karl Marx et analyse de la crise économique africaine

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Abstract: The value of Karl Marx's work dwells, for modern economists, inter alia, in the didactic and methodical values that allowed him construct the dialectical movement law which commands the evolution of the economies of societies. Ideas tracing back from Marx are echoed in the social and economic debate of the centre capitalist countries and their periphery. Politicians and commentators are not quoting Marx, but they often confront issues that generally were not recognised as such before him, namely unequal development, due to the pursuit of maximum profit, is one of the system factors that generated long theoretical debates. It now practically corresponds to global scale political oppositions in terms of «North-South» relationships.

La question concrète de savoir si «La théorie de Karl Marx est-elle encore d'actualité?» a suscité de nombreuses réponses. Mais dans la plupart des cas les réponses données procèdent de partis-pris idéologiques qui s'expliquent assez souvent parce que l'on a vite fait d'assimiler abusivement le marxisme aux déformations bureaucratiques et étatistes de la postérité de l'auteur et ses continuateurs. Cet article voudrait dégager quelques évidences que rendent confuses à la fois des aveuglements de classe, les déceptions des idéalismes et des bonnes volontés révolutionnaires. Nous le ferons en nous plaçant du point de vue de la théorie économique de Marx après avoir rappelé l'origine du brouillard idéologique répandu sur cette question, alors que la recherche scientifique doit tenter de la résoudre en partant des données de base historiquement vérifiables ou présentement observables, afin de les exprimer dans une systématisation théorique correcte.

Les réflexions qui suivent prétendent seulement débayer ou contribuer à débayer un terrain encore encombré par les résidus des spéculations idéologiques d'hier et d'avant-hier. A l'aide de cette orientation, dans ce cadre,

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nous examinerons successivement : marxisme et «sciences sociales» ; capital, classes chez Marx et l'Afrique ; la crise économique africaine dans la perspective marxienne ; et maintenant ?

Le marxisme et les «sciences sociales»

Les «sciences sociales» sont nées et se sont développées dans le cadre des Universités et des institutions universitaire. Tel n'est pas le cas du marxisme.

En effet, de Marx et Engels jusqu'à nous, en passant par Lénine et Trotsky, le marxisme s'est élaboré et déployé dans le cadre du mouvement ouvrier et l'on peut même ajouter qu'aucun spécialiste universitaire ne lui a apporté de contribution importante. Aussi, l'exposé du marxisme, dans le cadre de cet article, pose-t-il une sorte de problème préalable qu'il nous faut tenter de résoudre.

Né selon Lénine, de trois sources qui sont la philosophie classique allemande, l'économie politique anglaise et le socialisme français, le marxisme n'est réductible à aucune discipline universitaire existante (Lénine 1947). En outre, il met radicalement en question la division intellectuelle du travail qui a séparé et continue à séparer dans les universités les recherches des économistes de celles des sociologues et des historiens ainsi que la prétention des diverses spécialités d'atteindre à une objectivité scientifique globale indépendamment de la lutte des classes inhérentes aux sociétés et constitutive de leur divers aspects.

De fait, jusqu'au lendemain de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, le marxisme a été à peu près exclu de l'enseignement des universités bourgeoises ; aux yeux des économistes, des sociologues et des historiens, il passait pour une doctrine philosophico-politique tandis qu'aux yeux des philosophes il était généralement tenu pour un système économique. Pour les uns et les autres, son caractère «partisan» justifiait l'exclusion en question. Mais depuis 1950, sous la pression du nouveau rapport entre les forces dans le monde, le marxisme a «fait son entrée» dans ces mêmes Universités. Il y est traité comme une «théorie» parmi d'autres et l'on s'efforce de l'intégrer à un héritage intellectuel global, au mépris de ses origines et de sa nature radicalement antibourgeoises.

Par ailleurs, à partir des années 1930, en URSS et, à partir du milieu du siècle, en Europe orientale, en Chine, en Corée du Nord, puis en Indochine, le marxisme a été et continue à être enseigné officiellement comme une doctrine d'Etat selon des «interprétations» qui, aujourd'hui, ne sont plus les mêmes à Moscou, à Pékin.

Dénaturé à l'intérieur des universités bourgeoises par l'éclectisme régnant et dénaturé dans les Etats bureaucratiques par le stalinisme et ses séelles le marxisme demande à être retrouvé, à partir de sa réalité propre que Trotsky

définissait comme «l'expression consciente du processus historique inconscient». Nous allons tenté, pour notre part, de le retrouver, en relation avec les idées défendues par l'auteur dans le débat social et économique.

Capital et classes chez Marx

L'idée centrale de Marx était la suivante : dans une société divisée en classes les travailleurs manuels produisent un surplus c'est-à-dire plus de bien qu'ils n'en ont besoin pour vivre ; et ce surplus est approprié par les couches dominantes, qui ont accès à la propriété des moyens de production, à l'argent, au pouvoir. La notion de classe désigne un rapport économique et social conflictuel : certains s'enrichissent aux dépens des autres en les faisant travailler pour eux. Les «riches» ont besoin du surtravail des «pauvres». Ceux-ci, contraints de travailler par la force ou par le besoin sont exploités, c'est-à-dire dépossédés des produits de leur surtravail par les conditions de leur emploi. La notion d'exploitation est ainsi au centre de la division d'un système économique en classes complémentaires et antagoniques.

La notion de classe exploitée n'est pas morale, ni psychologie. Appliqué au capitalisme, elle est une catégorie de l'analyse d'une système économique dominé par le capital. L'ouvrage central de Marx s'appelle *le Capital*, et les disciples parleront de «l'accumulation du capital» (Rosa Luxembourg), du «Capital financier» (Rudolf Hilferding), de «l'impérialisme» (Lénine et bien d'autres).

Cela signifie que la condition ouvrière dépend de l'histoire et des stratégies du capital, quel que soit l'effet des luttes de classes.

Toute étude sociologique devrait en tenir compte. A l'inverse et pendant longtemps, la notion de classe comme catégorie économique a été considérée comme ne pouvant pas permettre une analyse des sociétés africaines. Notamment l'ethnologie néocoloniale a proposé l'idée selon laquelle l'Afrique ancienne aurait ignoré ou presque ignoré la division de la société en classes et qu'elle aurait essentiellement comporté des communautés ethniques collaborant ou s'affrontant entre elles selon les circonstances.

Emboitant le pas aux ethnologues, les responsables politiques africains depuis les années 1960 n'ont cessé de répéter, que la division en classes avait été dans le passé le fait des sociétés occidentales et non celui des sociétés africaines, que la véritable division du monde actuel n'était pas une division en classes, mais plutôt une opposition entre «Etats prolétaires» et «Etat nantis», enfin qu'il fallait bannir en Afrique, tout esprit de luttes de classes afin de réaliser dans «l'union

nationale» les grandes tâches du développement et de l'indépendance «véritable».¹

Il est établi aujourd'hui, à partir de l'article pertinent de Richard L. Sklar² que les apports d'un auteur comme Samir Amin n'ont pas permis de concilier la notion de classe sociale avec les implications du modèle «centre-périphérie». Sa conception de la «bourgeoisie périphérique» implique que diverses catégories fonctionnelles ont des activités diverses, tandis que sa conception du «prolétariat périphérique» est construite de façon discutable moins autour d'une analyse des rapports de production qu'à partir des relations d'échanges. Ainsi assure-t-il que les «masses paysannes» de la périphérie font partie d'un prolétariat périphérique du fait de leur intégration à l'ensemble du marché mondial. De ce point de vue, le prolétariat périphérique comprend la grande majorité des populations de la périphérie qui, déclare-t-il, «dans une très large proportion ont été prolétarisées». Et l'auteur de conclure, qu'Amin se sert du concept de «classe» surtout pour la commodité du langage et sans lui attribuer une véritable valeur analytique ?

Bien de raisons aujourd'hui expliquent que la notion de classe ouvrière comme instrument d'analyse puisse être utilisable dans tout le champ de la production capitaliste :

- aujourd'hui, ce sont les problèmes de l'internationalisation du capital, ou de la globalisation financière, qui semblent être dominants ;
- les grandes sociétés transnationales répartissent leurs unités de production là où celles-ci sont les plus profitables : soit à moindre coût salarial, ou dans un contexte de marché favorable.

Stéphan Marglin, de Harvard, mentionne entre autres apports de Marx à l'analyse économique par ailleurs l'accent mis sur le phénomène d'accumulation, c'est-à-dire le processus d'investissement et de constitution du capital; sur l'instabilité et le caractère évolutif de la société qu'engendre le capitalisme ; ses travaux sur les relations entre le capitalisme et la politique, le système légal, les courants culturels, etc. En outre, la théorie selon laquelle les classes sont fondées

1 Membre du groupe «modéré» de Monrovia, comme Senghor, Houphouët Boigny, Diori, Yaméogo, etc., ou membre du groupe «progressiste» de Casablanca comme Mohammed V, Nasser, Sékou Touré, Modibo Keita, N'Krumah, etc., les chefs d'Etat du début des années 1960 exorcissent toute la lutte des classes en la présentant non-africaine. Après sa chute en 1966, N'Krumah (1972), réfugié à Conakry, révisera ce point de vue dans son dernier ouvrage.

2 Les économies à bas revenu sont définies comme étant celles où, en 1986, le revenu moyen par habitant était inférieur à 460 dollars des Etats-Unis.

sur les intérêts économiques est essentielle pour comprendre comment l'économie fonctionne et évolue.

En attirant l'attention sur ces tendances profondes du capitalisme, Marx a soulevé des questions importantes ignorées par les économistes qui l'avaient précédé, mais que l'on ne pouvait plus désormais éviter de poser.

Un exemple : en rejetant la loi de Say, selon laquelle la production crée sa propre demande, et, par conséquent, la thèse des économistes classiques selon laquelle existerait une tendance naturelle au plein emploi, Marx a mis le problème des crises au centre des débats. Il n'a pas été jusqu'à élaborer une théorie intégrée des cycles économiques, mais il a certainement présenté une grande diversité d'explications qui a stimulé et continue de stimuler l'analyse économique, et plus particulièrement dans les périodes difficiles. Marx a mis en évidence la force explosive des crises économiques pour le système capitaliste ainsi que pour celui qui s'est peu à peu implanté, de nature périphérique dépendant étroitement du «centre» — les pays riches développés — avec une forte tendance à l'imitation des schémas de consommation des sociétés industrielles et avec un niveau élevé de dépenses somptuaires dans les secteurs dominants. Ceci a contribué à freiner, voire souvent à annuler l'accumulation du capital.

Quelques précisions sur le concept centre/périphérie

Les concepts de centre et de périphérie, suggérés au départ par S. Amin, ont alimenté par mal de débats et subi divers correctifs importants. Au début simple théorie décrivant l'exploitation des pays pauvres du tiers monde par les pays riches, l'idée de centre-périphérie s'est nuancée chez de nombreux auteurs. Il convient d'ajouter à l'opposition originelle quatre précisions fondamentales.

1. Certains pays dits socialistes fonctionnent également de manière impérialiste et peuvent de ce fait être inclus dans le concept de centre.
2. La périphérie existe en tant que telle entre autres grâce à la complicité active des élites locales des pays qui la composent, la corruption économique et culturelle qui les caractérise agissant comme relais indispensable dans le processus d'exploitation.
3. Au centre, malgré la situation de «privilegiés» que, leur confère leur insertion dans le système économique planétaire, la classe ouvrière et le sous-prolétariat connaissent eux aussi une condition d'exploités.
4. De façon générale le système capitaliste, qu'il soit privé ou étatique n'a pas vraiment de «pays d'élection». Le pouvoir a certes tendance à se trouver polarisé dans l'hémisphère Nord. Mais il n'est pas exagéré de dire que le capitalisme n'a pas tellement un centre que du centre, qu'il génère et qu'il cristallise et qui s'organise sous la forme d'une pyramide de points d'encrage et de relais hiérarchisés et entremêlés. En principe, chaque patron d'industrie, chaque bourgeois agit

spontanément en conformité avec la logique de l'accroissement du capital qu'il contrôle, fonctionnement de fait de façon «centrale».

L'impression qu'il existe un centre vient de ce que certaines concentrations économiques, par leur emplacement stratégiques, leur effet de seuil et leur prédominance à siéger dans le monde occidental, peuvent être considérés comme des lieux où le pouvoir de décision revêt une intensité particulière. La capacité de s'auto-perpétuer et de s'auto-accroître que possède cette asymétrie politique et économique engendre forcément à la périphérie un légitime sentiment d'injustice. Mais les remarques qui précèdent montrent qu'à un monde qui ne serait fait que de «bons» opposés à des «méchants» (vision en noir et blanc), il faut substituer l'idée d'une répartition complexe du pouvoir, même sur le plan strictement spatial.

La crise économique africaine dans la perspective marxienne

Marx avait gardé sa foi en la croissance, ce qui n'est pas très en vogue de nos jours (pour se disculper, on joint l'épithète «qualitative» au mot croissance, même si la classe ouvrière en général, celle du tiers-monde et donc de l'Afrique en particulier, aspire fortement plus avant de vouloir consommer mieux), où le terme reste suspect... Mais pour Marx, le cycle conjoncturel constituait un facteur de perturbations dont l'ampleur allait s'accroissant.

Lowenthal estime que les récessions contemporaines constituent des phénomènes particuliers parce qu'elles se développent au rythme «des carences en matières premières et des distorsions structurelles». En fait et Karl Kühne le montre (voir, *Problèmes économiques* No. 1848 du 17 novembre 1983), les carences en matières premières sont parfaitement fictives; les distorsions structurelles ont caractérisé les récessions du XIX^e siècle, qui sont au demeurant rigoureusement identiques dans leur ampleur et dans leur déroulement à celles que nous connaissons aujourd'hui. On constate de même une évolution ralentie des taux de croissance moyens (par rapport aux années cinquante et soixante) très proche, à 2 ou 3 pour cent, de celle du XIX^e siècle. C'est pourquoi l'analyse marxienne du cycle conjoncturel, ainsi que la tradition d'analyse conjoncturelle d'un Tugan-Baranowsky et d'un Spiethoff qui lui est liée, et dont un conservateur invétéré comme Hayek avoue avoir subi les influences, gardent leur caractère éminemment actuel. Les raisons sus-évoquées expliquent par ailleurs pourquoi les économies africaines sont devenues de plus en plus vulnérables dans leurs rapports avec le reste du monde, exposées qu'elles sont à des changements structurels se produisant notamment dans les pays du centre capitaliste. La crise économique qui traverse l'Afrique est liée au fait même que les économies africaines ont quelque chose de particulier comparées aux autres économies des autres continents en développement, à savoir leur remarquable ouverture sur le monde extérieur. La crise économique a été rendue possible par l'hétérogénéité sociale : dans la situation actuelle, il est encore facile aux

couches supérieures dans les pays d'Afrique noire de s'approprier la plus grande part des fruits du développement. Le modèle en Afrique qui était un modèle de puissant interventionnisme de l'Etat, mis en place trente ans plus tôt et qui aurait pu donner selon les cas de notables résultats, n'a plus eu dès lors le dynamisme ni la force qui lui aurait permis de conduire de façon autonome la transformation économique. Celle-ci était de plus en plus orientée à partir du centre, loin des pays d'Afrique. Le centre nous obligeait et nous oblige à des ajustements pour faire face aux conséquences de changements survenus dans les économies développées. Ce qui entraînait périodiquement des crises dans les pays périphériques d'Afrique.

En effet, la crise économique mondiale à partir des années quatre-vingt a engendré des bouleversements dans la politique internationale des pays du Nord à l'égard de ceux du Sud. Une manifestation essentielle de ce renversement d'idées en matière de coopération s'est traduite de la part des organismes internationaux et en particulier de la Banque mondiale et du Fonds monétaire international, par le lancement de programmes d'ajustement structurel (PAS) qui visaient d'avantage à rembourser des dettes qu'à mettre en oeuvre un processus réel de croissance et de développement. Si cet ensemble de mesures prises par les autorités internationales a été plus bénéfique à un continent comme l'Amérique latine déjà fort avancé sur la voie de l'industrialisation, tout autre a été la situation de l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara en particulier. Là, le greffon de l'industrialisation n'a pas pris. Avec les programmes d'ajustement structurel les objectifs d'équilibre financier des experts financiers du FMI l'ont emporté sur les priorités de croissance. Et la réduction drastique du secteur public s'y est accompagné d'une diminution sensible de la masse salariale et d'une augmentation du chômage, sans qu'une relève effective y soit assurée par le secteur privé. Cette aggravation de la pauvreté n'a pas été sans influence sur les manifestations politiques voire les émeutes récentes enregistrées ici ou là. L'ajustement financier y a été mal accepté et considérée comme une calamité supplémentaire imposée aux économies sous-développées.

La crise a éclaté le jour où la manifestation de la pauvreté s'est fait durement ressentir. Entre 1960 et 1980, le taux de pauvreté — la proportion de personnes dans l'état de pauvreté — avait commencé par se creuser : de 33 pour 100 à 40 pour 100 de la population. Depuis 1980, cette proportion a repris de façon vertigineuse : 42 pour 100 en 1985, 55 pour 100 en 1993. Le système ne parvenait plus à éponger les effets de l'imitation des modèles de consommation du centre capitaliste, induite par le développement du capitalisme périphérique : il ne réalisait pas l'intégration sociale indispensable, la justice distributive nécessaire. Il subissait la conséquence des ajustements requis par la nouvelle économie sous influence des centres capitalistes.

C'est en agriculture que la crise économique africaine s'est fait sentir le plus du fait de l'application des programmes d'ajustement structurel de la Banque mondiale et du FMI. On peut même affirmer que ces programmes sont ultimement responsables de famines connues ces dernières années dans la mesure où ils sous-estiment systématiquement toute activité économique, rurale ou urbaine, qui ne contribue pas directement aux intérêts du marché global. Avec la levée des barrières tarifaires et la chute du pouvoir d'achat les industries qui offrent des produits de substitution aux importations sur les marchés nationaux sont démantelées ; les petits artisans s'appauvrissent et les cultures vivrières sont abandonnées au profit des cultures d'exportation. L'imposition de l'austérité financière détruit à son tour les appareils d'Etat, alors que la société civile s'effondre et que les nations se fragmentent politiquement. Le tableau qui suit fait ressortir les mauvais résultats des pays situés au sud du Sahara (ASS) après le premier choc pétrolier de 1973-1974.

Tableau 1: Taux de croissance annuel du PIB par habitant pour l'Afrique subsaharienne et les autres pays en développement, 1965-1987 (en pourcentage)

Pays	1965-73	1973-80	1980-84	1985	1986	1987
Afrique subsaharienne*	3,7	0,7	-4,9	2,9	-0,2	-4,6
Tous pays en développement	3,9	3,1	0,7	3,3	3,1	1,8
Pays en développement à faible revenu	2,9	2,6	5,1	7,2	4,2	3,1
A l'exclusion de l'Afrique	2,9	2,9	3,2	6,8	5,1	3,0
A l'exclusion de la Chine	0,8	1,0	3,0	3,8	-	-

Sources: Banque mondiale, 1988, p. 219, pour toutes les rangées à l'exception des deux dernières qui sont des estimations tirées de la Banque mondiale, 1986, p. 172, pour toutes les années jusqu'à 1985. Les chiffres pour 1986 et 1987 <<à l'exclusion de l'Afrique>> sont des estimations de l'auteur fondées sur des données désagrégées.

* Les pays de l'Afrique subsaharienne sont ceux à revenu faible et moyen, à l'exclusion de l'Afrique du Sud.

Le tableau 1 donne également les chiffres correspondant pour tous les pays en développement ainsi que pour les pays à faible revenu (selon les définitions types de la Banque mondiale). La conclusion inéluctable est que les pays de l'ASS souffrent d'une crise profonde depuis au moins une vingtaine d'années. Leurs résultats ont été bien pires que ceux de tous les pays en développement à faible revenu, même si l'on fait abstraction de l'influence déformante de la Chine qui appartient à cette catégorie de pays. Les résultats ont commencé à accuser une divergence importante après le premier choc pétrolier, car la région subsaharienne a d'abord connu une période de stagnation puis, dans les années 1980, une chute rapide. Alors qu'entre 1965 et 1980 le PNB par habitant des pays de l'ASS avait augmenté de 40 pour 100, performance supérieure à celle de tous les pays à faible revenu (Chine non comprise), au cours des quatre années suivantes le revenu moyen a régressé de 18 pour 100 alors qu'il augmentait d'environ 12 pour 100 dans l'ensemble des pays à faible revenu (Chine non comprise). En 1985, la baisse a été enrayée, mais les revenus ont de nouveau baissé pendant les deux années suivantes. Sur l'ensemble de la période 1965-1987, une progression de 13 pour 100 a été enregistré en ce qui concerne le revenu moyen par habitant alors que le revenu moyen des autres pays en développement à faible revenu (c'est-à-dire de tous les pays en développement à faible revenu à l'exclusion de l'Afrique) a au moins doublé. Cette situation économique préoccupante de l'Afrique appelle nécessairement une tentative de réponse claire.

Et maintenant ?

Que proposer dans ces conditions ? Et d'abord quand au rôle de l'Etat «accusé» généralement d'être à l'origine de la médiocre performance des économies africaines. Compte tenu de l'importance historique qu'à toujours eu l'Etat pour assurer l'accumulation de capital nécessaire au développement, il n'y pas, en fait, de vrai espoir de progrès social et économique de nos pays avec la destruction de l'Etat qui semblerait pourtant le but de certains aujourd'hui ! Ce qui s'impose, c'est sa «modernisation», pour qu'il redevienne une base capable de conduire les processus de changement car en fait, personne ne nie aujourd'hui que l'intervention de l'Etat soit encore plus justifiée lorsqu'on sait que les prix ne peuvent jouer le rôle d'ajustement des variables macro-économiques.

Mais il n'est pas d'Etat moderne sans une société moderne. Où, si l'on veut, la modernité politique passe par le fonctionnement d'institutions permettant aux citoyens de contrôler l'activité de l'Etat et de contraindre les fonctionnaires à la responsabilité. Elle implique une représentation adéquate à tous les secteurs sociaux, le renforcement et la rénovation des partis, l'accès de nouvelles organisations sociales et communautaires à une vraie représentation. Elle

implique, afin que chaque segment social ou territorial (région, municipalité) soit doté de moyens nécessaires à la prise des décisions qui doivent lui revenir. De telles institutions permettraient à la société civile de se projeter au plan politique, afin que la diversité des acteurs et des intérêts soit mieux représentée. Moyennant quoi, la société se retrouverait en mesure d'agir efficacement pour le développement. Il faut, en premier lieu, que la société civile prenne corps : que les amorces d'innovation sociale déjà repérables se développent, qu'elles s'amplifient — soient reconnues — et que d'autres initiatives soient prises pour compenser progressivement la rigidité des hiérarchies sociales traditionnelles./.

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Economic Recovery and Self-sustaining Development in sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of Capacity Building Implications

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Résumé: Le déficit de développement de l'Afrique au sud du Sahara ne fait qu'augmenter. Or, les réformes institutionnelles, fiscales et politiques proposées par les programmes d'ajustement structurel comme remèdes, s'avèrent insuffisantes. L'article tente de lier le renforcement institutionnel en Afrique au développement de celle-ci. Par ailleurs, l'auteur met en exergue les différents domaines dans lesquels l'Afrique a enregistré des performances particulièrement médiocres. C'est le cas de l'industrie, de l'agriculture et des finances, etc.

Introduction

Since the early 1960s when many African countries attained independence, the declared goal of public policy has been development. Yet, development, howsoever defined, least reflects the current sub-Saharan African condition. Instead of political development, the region has had to contend with political decay, and in place of economic growth, it has witnessed economic stagnation and depression. While its peoples had, on the eve of independence, eagerly looked forward to an era of abundance — an era when the 'fruits of independence' would be shared by all and sundry — the realities of today differ significantly from the dream of yesterday. Indeed, no term more accurately describes sub-Saharan Africa's dilemma over the past three and half decades than that of 'development deficit' — a term coined by Stuart Holland (1993) but here used in a broader sense than implied by a mere comparison of revenue with expenditure outlays.

The underlying thesis of this paper is that sub-Saharan Africa's development deficit is not only widening but that reducing it will take more than the fiscal,

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policy and institutional reforms incorporated in structural adjustment programmes. As argued in the paper, development deficit is essentially a deficit in capacity — particularly, human, and to some extent, institutional, capacity. A legitimate question is why such a self-evident truth has not really influenced the content and direction of public policy, and if it has, why sub-Saharan Africa's development has stalled for so long.

The answer to the first part of the preceding question is that capacity building has always formed an integral part of development policy management in Africa. In other words, it is not a new crusade, but an old idea repackaged. After all, long before the advocates of structural adjustment and of structural transformation (or 'collective self-reliance') recognised the value of capacity building, contributors to development thought had indicated how nations waxed or waned depending on the extent to which human potential was harnessed and utilised. It is thus not surprising that the technical assistance strategies embarked upon in the First Development Decade placed high premium on training, human resource development and the development of 'executive capacity'. Institution building was a priority in the early post-independence period.

If, in spite of the attention paid to capacity building over the years, sub-Saharan Africa remains underdeveloped, what factors must have been at work? Why for instance, has 'capacity building' not done for the region what it has done for the newly industrialising countries of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Malaysia? Above all, how can the on-going initiatives in the area of capacity building be implemented to ensure macro-economic stability in the short-term, and structural transformation and self-sustaining development in the long-run?

In attempting to answer the preceding questions about the links between capacity building and development, this paper begins with a broad conceptual framework. It then proceeds to examine the challenges of economic recovery and development — i.e. the objective conditions which programmes in capacity building are expected to address. In the third part, the paper discusses, against the background of the challenges described in the second section, the strengths and limitations of the early and the contemporary capacity building programmes. The fourth part of the paper outlines a new capacity building strategy which simultaneously addresses the immediate concerns for economic turn-around, and the long-term need for self-sustaining development.

The Development or Decay of Nations and Human Capacity: An Analytical Framework

It is generally agreed that human capacity is the major driving force in development. Whether a society will progress from one stage of existence to a preferred alternative, or stand still, or, worst of all, revert to barbaric, stone-age

conditions, depends to a significant extent on the will and capacity of its people to manage and generally add value to available resources. The question is what we mean by 'development' and precisely what kind of 'capacity' is needed to bring it about. Until we answer this dual question in a fairly satisfactory manner, we cannot expect to respond in any meaningful way to the analytical and practical problems encountered in the process of formulating, managing, and reforming development policy.

What Development is Not

One concept which has up to now proved difficult to define is 'development'. While some analysts equate it with 'modernisation' others have taken it to mean 'Westernisation'. Yet others define it loosely as technological progress or improvement in the material conditions of the people.

None of the preceding attempts at concept clarification has succeeded in overcoming language and cultural barriers, and in promoting a communality of vision on the essence and 'techniques' of development. In any case, and if the experience of sub-Saharan Africa offers any lesson, development is best understood within the context of what it is not. And for one, it is not a mathematically precise, value-neutral and scientific concept — one which can be approached with a universal formula and an automatic technique. As Toye (1987:10) eloquently puts it: 'Definitions of the goals of development and of the process by which these goals should be striven for, unavoidably depend on the values of the person doing the defining, as well as on facts that are in principle falsifiable.'

This cautionary approach to development — i.e. one that makes allowance for multi-cultural variations — runs counter to the unilinear view adopted for decades by the adherents of modernisation theory. It will also certainly come as a rude shock to policy-makers in sub-Saharan Africa who had invested time, money and their personal reputation (including political fortunes) on projects sanctioned by development 'experts', and on the importation of 'modern' institutions. Contrary to a fundamental principle of capacity building which places high premium on indigenous intellectual leadership and sees possibilities for the incorporation of local cultural values in the process of development, the majority of the then newly independent countries of Africa continued for decades to rely on external models and 'know-how'.

One example of Africa's over-dependence on external institutions is in the choice of economic policy and management tools. The Keynesian revolution had, after the Second World War, not only started to influence public policy in the industrialised societies of the West, its advocacy of a substantial developmental role for the state also found ready acceptability in the then

emerging states of Africa and Asia. Apart from the Harrod-Domar formulation which targeted fixed capital investment as the critical variable in economic growth, a new set of development models and planning techniques, based on Keynes' General Theory, were constructed by scholars, and widely promoted in the developing countries by technical assistance agencies. Among the leading structuralists who exported the Keynesian revolution to what subsequently came to be known as the Third World are Sir W. Arthur Lewis, Albert I. Hirschman, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan and John K. Gailbraith.

It took approximately four decades and a combination of Thatcherism and Reaganomics for the opponents of structuralism to stage a neo-liberal, monetarist counter-revolution. According to a central figure in the propagation of the new economic orthodoxy, Harry O. Johnson, monetarism (like Keynesianism before it) owed its success not to its intrinsic scientific worth, but its uncanny ability to gauge and respond to contemporary social mood: 'New ideas win a public and professional hearing, not on their scientific merits, but on whether or not they promise a solution to important problems that the established orthodoxy has proved itself incapable of solving' (Toye 1987:23).

Yet without taking pains to identify their own 'important problems', the political and administrative elites in post-independence Africa went ahead with a solution which to them appeared most attractive — i.e. modernisation. To these elites and their local and foreign advisers, that option offers otherwise traditional, agrarian, and subsistence economies an opportunity of a life-time to break away from 'backwardness', and join the advanced societies of the West in the race towards increasing literacy, industrialisation, urbanisation, material prosperity, and political participation. To be 'developed' then came to mean discarding the ways of, and loyalties to ancestors, while embracing the culture of individualism and mass consumption. Above all, development was interpreted as necessitating the replacement of an old mind-set with a new, predominantly, alien one. Talcott Parsons' pattern variables readily sum up the choice which the 'developing' society had to make to cross the boundary of poverty and move to the land of affluence: specifically, it had to give recognition to 'achievement', 'universalism', 'collectivity orientation', 'functional specificity' and 'affective neutrality', and step down, if not obliterate, the erstwhile traditional and primordial values (Parsons 1951:58-67).

Suffice it to say that sub-Saharan Africa's single-minded pursuit of 'modernisation' objectives has not availed the region against poverty, hunger and disease — precisely the misfortunes it had hoped to escape and the 'important problems' it had intended to tackle by embarking on the new course. If anything, modernisation, or at least, Africa's approach to it, has brought untold suffering to

the vast majority of the people, and has contributed in no small way to the continent's marginalisation in the world order. Modernisation has diverted the Africans' attention away from indigenous knowledge and traditional practices which in ancient time produced notable results in fields such as sculpture, iron smelting and metal fabrication, herbal medicine, weaving, agriculture, and territorial administration.

Modernisation has particularly had a devastating impact on Africa's cultural identity. The triple heritage (of indigenous African values, Christianity and Islam) described by Mazrui (1986:1-2) is one of increasing de-Africanisation of the African soul. Some will even argue that instead of de-Africanisation, a process of outright emptying of the soul is taking place, with the consequent loss of awareness of who or what the African is. Whatever the case — whether it is one of de-Africanisation or de-humanisation — the 'modernised' Africa is not doing well. To quote Mazrui: 'Things are not working in Africa. From Dakar to Dar-es-Salaam, from Marrakech to Maputo, institutions are decaying, structures are rusting away'.

The rapid decomposition of socio-economic and political structures might, according to Mazrui, not be unconnected with the wrath of the ancestors. They cannot rest in peace because their descendants, i.e. the modern-day Africans, seem too eager to become what they were not meant to be. In the name of modernisation, and for want of a credible indigenous developmental ideology, they 'seem to be undergoing faster cultural changes in a single generation than the Jews underwent in the first 1000 years of dispersal' (Mazrui 1986:12).

The argument in this paper is not that change is inconsistent with the goals and strategies of development. The critical question is the nature and direction of the changes taking place at any point in time. The African dilemma is how to identify (from the triple heritage) those values which are abiding and should be strengthened, as against those values which should be constantly adapted to the imperatives of development. This by itself is a major capacity building priority.

If, in a broad sense, development is not synonymous with modernisation, it is also not, in specific terms, Westernisation. Neither can it be equated with the defunct ideology of communism. While the need to overcome ethnocentric barriers in development thought was recognised early enough, getting all the actors to heed Wilson's (1993) advice and perceive human development as a multi-linear and multi-cultural enterprise has up to now proved difficult. Ironically, those who first dealt objectivity in social science a fatal blow were the social scientists themselves. While the pioneering work of anthropologists, such as Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940), has given birth to the structural-functional mode of analysis, and had opened up new vistas in

cross-cultural comparisons of social systems, even the most scholarly assessment of Third World conditions today could not help applying First World cultural standards.

How else could Daniel Lerner (1958), Morroe Berger (1957), and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1970) have concluded that the 'modernisation' of the Islamic societies of the Middle East depended on these societies 'reforming' aspects of Islam which inhibited the assimilation of 'western technology'? It did not occur to these critics that Islam is by itself a potent force of social change. If it appears to 'resist' the this-worldly culture of the west, it is because it sees itself as a self-contained, credible and internally consistent alternative way of life.

Development scholars are not alone in wishing to reconstruct developing societies in the image of the 'developed'. Donor and technical assistance agencies are also liable to export their ideas of development to the so-called Third World. In other words, the basic goal of the agencies is to equip the average developing country with the 'capacity' to produce and consume as developed countries. Kindleberger, for instance, noted as far back as 1954 that World Bank missions:

bring to the under-developed country a notion of what a developed country is like. They observe the under-developed country. They subtract the latter from the former. The difference is a program.... Ethnocentricity leads inevitably to the conclusion that the way to achieve the comparable levels of capital formation, productivity and consumption is to duplicate these institutions (McClelland 1961).

The developing countries' insatiable appetite for the benefits of economic growth has been taken as a vindication of the hedonistic culture of western capitalism, and of the liberal political philosophy underpinning it. Hedonism is seen as a normal human desire, and western technology and managerial 'know-how', the most efficient — nay, the logically inevitable — way of fulfilling it.

Lewis (1955) for instance argues that the 'desire for goods' is an obvious psychological factor determining how hard people will strive to improve their material welfare. In his view, and contrary to Weber's conclusions on the positive impact of religious asceticism on capital accumulation, a frame of mind which stresses abstinence and 'places a positive value on prayer and other non-economic activities' was highly unlikely to foster growth in the short-, or development in the long-run. If Lewis is right, secularism and development are synonymous.

Yet efforts in many parts of Africa at separating the church (or mosque) from the state have not yielded the expected 'developmental' results. For the secularist model of development to operate as intended, a proper balance has to be maintained between consumption and investment. This, sub-Saharan Africa has

by and large been unable to do. Though there is no limit to desire, the capacity to fulfil it is sadly lacking.

In contrast to the open-ended 'consumption possibilities', sub-Saharan Africa is faced with a huge deficit in productive capacity or what might be termed 'development deficit'. Indeed the root of Africa's development crisis lies in the recurring tendency to import the taste for foreign goods, as well as the capacity for satisfying it. Whether it is for the capital needed to meet growth targets in the public and private sectors, or the skills required to manage and add value to the capital, the region is heavily dependent on the industrialised economies. The doctrine underpinning this dependency relationship is that of 'comparative advantage' — one which requires that nations concentrate their attention on what they are best endowed by nature to produce. Needless to add that the doctrine ignores the fact that the late entry of some countries (particularly those in Africa) into the global economic competition, by its nature, inhibits their 'comparative advantage', and that the solution lies in the structural transformation of the economies of these new-comers — i.e. in the development of indigenous capacity to fulfil basic and higher-order needs.

The experience of sub-Saharan Africa further shows that the harder the dependent nations try to enhance their 'comparative advantage' the more disadvantaged and dependent they become. The primary commodities which they export at low prices can barely pay for the capital goods which they import at exorbitant costs. Maintaining the capital goods and obtaining replacement parts constitute additional burdens on their dwindling resources.

In a nutshell, development is not a commodity to be imported from outside or a formula to be copied without regard to the conditions prevailing inside a country. It is not a computerised air terminal in a country where the level of numeracy and literacy is low. It is not a turn-key project financed entirely from external sources, and managed, maintained and rehabilitated with external technical assistance.

It is true that no society exists in isolation. Modern transport and communication means have brought the nations of the world close to one another. Developments in international economic relations — particularly, the globalisation of markets, payments and production systems — have further contributed to the integration of the world's economies. However, insofar as Africa remains at the periphery of the momentous changes taking place in today's world, it is necessary to examine the root causes of the crisis facing it as a region. The position taken in this paper is that the crisis is essentially that of the capacity to conceptualise, formulate, and manage development policies and programmes.

Development: A Working Definition

Thus far, we have defined development essentially as what it is not. Exactly what is it? Could it possibly mean a state of nature — a state in which things are left as they have always been? If this is development, man (or woman) would have been no different from lower animals, or indeed, plants and other passive objects of nature. Development does not have to mean resisting change or negating what foreign cultures stand for. Indeed, Islam, which has been erroneously described as a religion with a static and fatalistic view of the universe, is, in reality, development-oriented. The Holy Qur'an (13:11) teaches that '... God will never change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves...'

And while acknowledging that God never tasks any soul beyond its capacity, the Qur'an notes that the human race in general has to bear certain earthly and spiritual responsibilities in return for the special endowments from the Creator: 'It is He (God) Who has created for thee (the faculties of) hearing, sight, feeling and intellect; little gratitude have ye (human beings) shown' (23:78).

To the extent, therefore, that human beings are endowed with physical and mental attributes, to that will it be illogical to visualise a society that perpetually stands still. In its basic form, development means moving an organism, a household, a firm, a tribe, or a nation from one stage of existence to another — usually, to a preferred alternative — while at the same time maintaining the cherished values, norms and traditions. Development is very much like Vieg (1946) defines administration and management, i.e. making those things happen which a polity through its acknowledged representatives would like to see happen, and forestalling any occurrence which runs counter to this vision. Development is a process in which society identifies its 'important problems' and provides an atmosphere that is congenial to the articulation of ideas for resolving these problems — or the bulk of the problems — locally. Development is in effect the sum total of indigenous resources (or capacities) that are deployed to achieve specific ends, while battling with environmental constraints and foreign competition. The first equation below denotes a situation whereby indigenous capacity is overwhelmed by environmental constraints and foreign competition, resulting in development deficits. The second and third show how additional efforts on the capacity building front could rework the balance in favour of development.

$$P = \frac{P_{x_1} P_{x_2} \dots P_{x_n}}{E_{x_1} E_{x_2} \dots E_{x_n}} < P_{y_1} P_{y_2} \dots P_{y_n} \quad (1)$$

where:

- P = the initial, dependent stage of development (a stage characterised by development deficits of various kinds);
- $P_{x_1} \dots P_{x_n}$ = net value of indigenous capacities and of capacity building programmes/measures;
- $E_{x_1} \dots E_{x_n}$ = internal and external environmental constraints on indigenous capacities (civil strife, political instability, ethical violations, bias towards foreign assistance, etc.);
- $P_{y_1} \dots P_{y_n}$ = net value of imported capacities and external capacity building assistance.

$$P_1 = \frac{P_{x_1} P_{x_2} \dots P_{x_n}}{E_{x_1} E_{x_2} \dots E_{x_n}} > \frac{P_{y_1} P_{y_2} \dots P_{y_n}}{\sum^n S_{P_1} S_{P_2} \dots S_{P_n}} \quad (2)$$

where:

- P_1 = self-sustaining development stage;
- $P_{x_1} \dots P_{x_n}$ = net value of indigenous capacities and of capacity building programmes/measures;
- $E_{x_1} \dots E_{x_n}$ = internal and external environmental constraints on indigenous capacities;
- $P_{y_1} \dots P_{y_n}$ = net value of external/imported capacity and external capacity building assistance.

- $\sum^n S_{P_1} \dots S_{P_n}$ = net value of supplementary policies/measures instituted locally in support of capacity (i.e. all-inclusive, competitive and equitably administered affirmative action, procurement set-asides, and skills development programmes, support to local R&D initiatives; etc.). Note that whereas other variables have geometric values, the supplementary measures, in view of overwhelming internal and external constraints, impact on one another in an incremental, arithmetic manner.

A third option may yet be considered. In other words, instead of perceiving capacity building as an eternal struggle between domestic and foreign initiatives, and instituting measures aimed at strengthening the former at the expense of the latter, our supplementary policies ($S_{p1}...S_{pn}$) may be directed towards reducing the negative impact of the environment ($E_{x1}...E_{xn}$). Equation 3 attempts to capture this environment-centred approach to indigenous capacity building. It shows how specific environmental constraints could be dealt with through the adoption of appropriate measures.

$$P_2 = \frac{P_{x1} P_{x2} \dots P_{xn}}{(E_{x1} - S_{p1}) \cdot (E_{x2} - S_{p2}) \dots (E_{xn} - S_{pn})} > P_{y1} P_{y2} \dots P_{yn} \quad (3)$$

Human and Institutional Capacity

In much the same way as we looked at development, human and institutional capacity may be defined as a process which is totally different from previous conceptions. It is certainly not the acquisition of skills which are either not relevant or, if relevant, are not properly harnessed and optimally deployed. A policy or programme which relies permanently on external advisers and managers is not consistent with the objectives of capacity building or of development. Thus, the token 'capacity building' efforts indicated by equation 1 ($P_{x1}...P_{xn}$) will not result in any substantial development until the additional ($S_{p1}...S_{pn}$) measures referred to in equations 2 and 3 are implemented.

In essence, capacity has to do with human, material, financial and organisational resources that are essential to the successful accomplishment of development policy — be the policy in the area of nation-building, economic stabilisation or growth, social welfare, community development, civil service or public enterprise management, technological innovation or law enforcement. Of all the resources which are subsumed under the heading of capacity, the most crucial — in fact, the moulder of other resources — is the human resource. Consequently, the selection, development, deployment, motivation and management of this resource constitute vital components in the design and implementation of capacity building programmes.

However, it is necessary to underscore the fact that capacity building goes beyond human resource management. When the World Bank (1992) refers to capacity building, it simply means strengthening indigenous capacities in policy analysis and development management. The assumption is that targeting the policy and senior management level was necessary to 'clear the way' for growth. In recent years, the World Bank has stressed the need for a 'governance

approach' to capacity building (Dia 1993). This entails a radical overhaul of the machinery of government — with special emphasis on measures directed towards promoting the rule of law, transparency, and accountability, and towards the rehabilitation of executive, legislative and judicial institutions. Equally comprehensive is ECA's definition of capacity building. In the framework document submitted to its 1994 Conference of Ministers, ECA identified three broad areas in which sub-Saharan Africa is deficient in capacity — the human, institutional and infrastructural areas (ECA 1994). Like the World Bank's, the ECA approach does not make any fine distinctions between specific policy objectives and the capacities needed to attain them, or between factors which promote and those which impede capacities in any given area.

In the interest of analytical clarity, it has been deemed necessary in this paper to make a distinction between dependent and independent variables. The capacities (which are subject to manipulation) are the indigenous human, material, financial and organisational resources referred to earlier ($P_{x1}...P_n$). The environmental constraints ($E_{x1}...E_{xn}$) include bureaucratic and other obstacles to individual creativity, civil strife, political instability, internal and external resistance to affirmative action. The measures taken to enhance the problem-solving capacity of indigenous resources, and to turn the restrictive environment of capacity building into an enabling one ($S_{p1}...S_{pn}$) represent the third and last set of variables included in our model.

Capacity Building for Economic Turnaround and Development: A Paradigm

Although capacity building is no doubt essential to, and could justifiably be deemed synonymous with, development, we should resist the temptation to regard it as a magic wand to be waved at the slightest sign of economic distress, or a miracle cure for sub-Saharan Africa's socio-political ills. How effective it will be in meeting particular challenges depends largely on certain minimum conditions being fulfilled. When viewed against the background of the imperative of economic recovery and long-term development in sub-Saharan Africa, the success of capacity building programmes will very much hinge on:

- (i) the strength of political institutions and their ability to formulate, or at least, sustain capacity building programmes;
- (ii) the commitment of policy-makers to indigenous capacity enhancement measures, as reflected in their readiness to support capacity building and utilising institutions, and to overcome internal and external resistance to change;

- (iii) the credibility of formal capacity building institutions, and their effectiveness in undertaking policy analytic, institution building and rehabilitation, and human resource development activities;
- (iv) the preparedness of agencies in the civil service, public enterprises, local government, and the private sector (formal and informal) to implement innovative management measures, including new initiatives in human resource management; and
- (v) the extent to which a culture of accountability, efficiency, and responsiveness can be developed in place of the patrimonial and rent-seeking tendencies frequently encountered at different levels of officialdom.

Before discussing these issues in subsequent sections, it is necessary to examine the challenges which capacity-building programmes in sub-Saharan Africa ought to address.

The Challenges of Economic Recovery and Self-sustaining Development

The challenges which capacity building programmes in sub-Saharan Africa are expected to meet are daunting. These challenges include stemming the precipitate decline in economic performance and eliminating obstacles to growth; mobilising the resources required not only for the maintenance of infrastructural facilities and the management of capital development programmes, but also to plug the deficits in social and environmental management expenditure; extinguishing fires ignited by ethnic conflicts, civil strife, and political instability; and above all, reconstructing and rehabilitating political and administrative institutions which are currently at different stages of decay. Building the capacity to produce public and private goods at minimum socio-political and economic cost about sums up the challenges facing sub-Saharan Africa today.

The Economic Challenge

That the economies of sub-Saharan Africa have performed very badly in recent years is by now very clear. Table 1 shows that the general trend between 1978 and 1988 was negative.

Table 1: Performance of the African Economy: 1978-1988

	1978	1988
1. GDP per capita (US)	854.00	565.00
2. Growth of GDP per capita (%)	3.03	-0.88
3. Share of investment in GDP (%)	25.20	15.80
4. Annual rate of inflation (%)	15.10 (1980)	21.30
5. Annual growth rate of agriculture (%)	1.50	2.30
6. Annual growth rate of industry (%)	7.50	4.90
7. Annual growth rate of mining (%)	7.20	4.70
8. Annual growth of export (%)	11.20	3.80
9. Annual growth of import (%)	9.90	0.30
10. Current account/Foreign trade deficit (\$ billion)	3.90	20.30
11. Total external debt (\$ billion)	48.30	230.00 276.7 (1991)

Sources: Adedeji (1990); Onimode (1993).

Admittedly, some countries have done better than others. The oil exporters, for instance, have recorded higher GDP growth than the oil importers. However, a consistent growth pattern is yet to be established in any of the countries. Even Botswana which was once presented as an economic show piece is beginning to show symptoms of recession.

The decline in the level of investment is a clear evidence of sub-Saharan African economies' lack-lustre performance in the last two decades. From a peak of 23 per cent of GDP (at current prices) recorded in 1975/76, gross domestic investment fell to below 16 per cent of GDP in 1991.

Economic Recovery and Self-sustaining Development

Table 2: Industrial Performance Indicators for Selected Countries in Tropical Africa, 1980 and 1990 (in constant 1985 dollars)

Country	MVA (million 1985 dollars)		Manufacturing employment (thousands)		Labour productivity		Wage per worker	
	1988	1990	1980	1990	1980	1990	1980	1990
Nigeria	2 742	2 042	432	393	6 344	5 189	1 388	1 058
Zimbabwe	1 186	1 692	161	193	7 376	8 770	3 083	3 228
Kenya	639	897	143	188	4 466	4 776	1 920	2 092
Ethiopia	662	811	77	107	8 635	7 530	1 270	1 560
Côte d'Ivoire	786	786	67	51	11 708	15 539	3 549	6 679
Zambia	510	760	59	65	8 631	12 143	2 122	3 25
Cameroon	549	715	51	50	10 845	14 207	3 757	4 636
Ghana	252	574	80	71	3 141	8 069	627	1 019
Sudan	303	405	65	52	4 644	7 835	1 615	1 645
Mauritius	104	341	43	121	2 429	2 823	1 270	1 248
United Republic of Tanzania	468	323	101	117	4 637	2 763	1 521	1 036
Senegal	200	221	32	44	6 307	4 999	2 710	2 573
Gabon	167	198	18	21	9 329	9 487	4 701	5 268
Burkina Faso	99	159	8	10	12 022	16 519	2 768	3 541
Madagascar	176	139	41	47	4 336	2 955	1 657	998
Rwanda	140	139	65	80	21 571	17 342	2 239	2 340
Burundi	58	109	3	5	16 726	21 364	2 408	2 154
Malawi	102	91	39	45	2 622	2 014	864	846
Botswana	28	80	5	19	5 141	4 149	2 530	1 284
Swaziland	75	74	11	15	6 936	5 060	2 798	2 518
Mali	51	54	14	21	3 724	2 585	1 029	834
Congo	48	47	5	10	8 972	4 384	3 169	2 365
Somalia	61	46	10	14	5 584	3 336	1 871	774
Fogo	33	43	5	5	6 348	7 882	1 911	2 286
Benin	45	31	6	7	7 501	4 577	1 858	1 262
Niger	21	23	2	2	10 302	9 847	4 493	3 483
Gambia	10	17	2	3	5 124	5 470	1 296	1 195
Central African Republic	27	16	6	5	4 628	3 257	2 109	2 561
Lesotho	9	6	3	4	2 733	1 281	717	1 998

Source: UNIDO database

Nearly all the sectors of the African economy have been plagued by various types of crises. The manufacturing sector, in particular, faces what UNIDO (1992:77) terms 'the challenge of ... declining employment, labour productivity and wage earnings'. Among the factors militating against increased manufacturing value added (MVA) are the global recession of 1981-1982; foreign exchange scarcity; shortage of intermediate inputs, parts and machinery; high and fluctuating interest rates; and, above all, managerial weaknesses. Table 2 shows that while MVA rose in many countries (between 1980 and 1990), the result of overall industrial performance (as measured by MVA manufacturing employment, labour productivity, and wage per worker) was mixed. Within this period, many countries recorded productivity losses and decline in manufacturing employment. The few countries where productivity (and to some extent, employment) gains were achieved are Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The food and agriculture sector has not done better than the industrial sector. Table 3 reveals that in contrast to the other regions of the world, per caput food production between 1980 and 1991 has remained consistently low. By contrast, the developing world, to which Africa was once supposed to belong, recorded high production rates.

**Table 3: Per Caput Food Production by Region
(1979-81 = 100)**

Region	1980	1985	1990	1991
World (total)	99.09	104.72	105.53	103.06
Africa	99.35	96.23	94.90	94.99
Asia	99.13	111.29	119.78	119.73
Europe	100.97	105.57	105.00	103.79
Developing Countries	99.32	108.13	113.00	113.26

Source: FAO (1992) *1991 Yearbook*, Vol.45, Rome (Table 9).

Trade and Finance

The lack of progress on the economic production front has been reflected in sub-Saharan Africa's trade and finance balance sheet. The region's insignificant contribution to the production of the world's tradable commodities is clearly mirrored

by the available trade statistics. Out of a total value of merchandise trade exports of US\$3,415,299 million for the entire world in 1990, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for a mere US\$40,330 million, i.e., 1.18 per cent of the global figure. The value of Africa's imports in the same year was US\$37,834 million which was 1.06 per cent of the world's total (US\$3,549,300 million) (See Tables 4 and 5).

**Table 4: All Merchandise Trade Exports by Region
(1970-1990)**

Region/Country	Value of all Exports (US\$ million)			
	1970	1981	1985	1990
World Total	315,100	1,973,800	1,937,199	3,415,299
Developed Market Economies	223,500	1,228,100	1,281,499	2,439,299
South Africa	2,151	11,076	9,326	18,969
Developing Countries and Territories (a)	57,900	566,000	457,000	738,000
Africa (total)	12,770	76,630	61,990	74,100
North Africa	5,105	36,405	28,460	33,767
Other Africa (a)	7,663	40,228	33,531	40,330
Other Africa as Per cent of World Total	2.43	2.03	1.73	1.18

Source: Percentages calculated from figures supplied by UNCTAD (1992), *UNCTAD Commodity Yearbook 1992*, United Nations, New York.

(a) Excluding major petroleum and/or manufacturing exporters.

**Table 5: Imports: All Merchandise Trade
(Million of US Dollars)**

Region/Country	Value of all Imports (US\$ million)			
	1970	1981	1985	1990
World Total	328,300	2,043,400	2,017,999	3,549,300
Developed Market Economies	234,900	1,335,699	1,388,600	2,566,800
South Africa	3,937	21,077	10,319	17,075
Developing Countries and Territories	58,700	521,800	413,200	723,500
Africa (total)	11,080	85,470	53,600	75,230
North Africa	3,872	38,241	26,624	38,319
Other Africa	7,210	48,476	27,553	37,834
Other Africa as Per cent of World Total	2.19	2.37	1.36	1.06

Source: UNCTAD *Commodity Yearbook* 1992.

It is true that external factors are partly responsible for Africa's poor performance in world trade. In particular, and as a result of the recession in the industrialised countries in the early 1980s, as well as the fall in the demand for, and the stockpiling of, Africa's export commodities, the region had to contend with worsening terms of trade. Tables 6 and 7 reveal steep falls in Africa's commodity prices between 1978 and 1989 and between 1989 and 1991 respectively.

The negative effect of an increasingly hostile international economic environment notwithstanding, sub-Saharan Africa has to face up to the responsibility for its own economic sustenance. It has to develop the capacity to restructure the entire production system so that the region becomes a force to reckon with on the global scene rather than the bit player it currently is. It should be noted that when UNCTAD (1992) prepared a line-up of 30 principal exporters of 18 IPC (Integrated Programme for Commodities) and other selected commodities, Africa could boast no more than a few countries — South Africa for agricultural products; South Africa and Zambia for minerals and metals;

Zambia and Zaire for copper; Egypt for cotton; South Africa, Liberia and Mauritania for iron ore; Côte-d'Ivoire and Kenya for coffee; Zimbabwe and Malawi for tobacco. Suffice it to say that even fewer African 'principal producers' of the commodities (possibly South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Kenya) added any substantial (manufacturing) value to the export commodities. Besides, Africa did not feature significantly (if at all) in technology exports, and in exports of commodities such as live animals and meat, fisheries, vegetable oilseeds and oils, natural textile fibres, non-coniferous timber, sugar, bovine meat, hides and skins, bananas, tin, jute products.

**Table 6: Percentage Change in Africa's Commodity Prices
1968-78 and 1978-89**

Commodity	Percentage Change in Prices	
	1962-78	1978-89
Agricultural		
Cocoa	+7.4	-6.7
Coffee	+3.4	-3.3
Cotton	+1.5	-1.5
Sugar	+7.4	-12.4
Tea	-3.2	-3.1
Groundnut oil	+3.1	-7.5
Tropical timber	+1.0	-0.1
Hides and skins	+1.4	-5.9
Minerals		
Copper	-5.3	-3.7
Aluminium	-1.0	-3.7
Phosphate rock	+5.6	-3.9
Iron ore	-1.3	-1.8

Sources: United Nations, *Africa's Commodity Problems — Towards a Solution*, New York, 1989; and Onimode, Bade, 'Lessons from Africa's Development Experience for South Africa', paper presented at Conference on Development Strategy for South Africa, 2-4 August 1993.

Table 7: Commodity Price Indices in Tropical Africa, 1989-1991
(Base year 1978-1981 = 100)

Commodities	1989	1990	1991
Agricultural non-food	84.2	84.0	81.1
Agricultural food	81.5	75.2	73.0
Metals and Minerals	121.1	112.7	102.2
33 selected commodities (excluding petroleum and steel)	95.1	89.0	84.9

Source: ADB (1992) *African Development Report 1992*, Abidjan, 1992, p.39.

In the meantime, Africa has to wrestle with balance of payments difficulties (Table 8).

Table 8: Sub-Saharan Africa's Balance of Payments Statistics
(1972-1978)

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1978
Current account balance (US\$ billion)	-	-2.1	-3.5	-6.9	-0.9
Overall balance of payments (US\$ billion)	-	0.5	0.2	-0.7	-0.4
Terms of trade (% change)	-1.8	8.5	4.7	-12.78	-7.2

Source: World Bank (1989) *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth — A Long Term Perspective Study*, LTPS, Washington DC 1989

As a consequence of the worsening balance of payments position, sub-Saharan Africa has accumulated a huge external debt — \$140.1 billion in 1989, \$167.4 billion in 1992, and approximately \$300 billion in 1994.

Social and Environmental Imbalances

An offshoot of the economic crisis is an equally devastating crisis in the social and human development sector. In response to the deteriorating economic situation, many countries introduced draconian structural adjustment policy

measures, the elements of which include the reduction in the size of the public sector, budget rationalisation, privatisation of state enterprises, currency devaluation, elimination of subsidies and price controls, and liberalisation of the economy. An assessment of the justification for, and the impact of SAPs is beyond the scope of this paper. It is, however, necessary to add that the belt-tightening measures adopted under the programmes had adverse capacity-building implications in the public sector beside the restrictive impact on the private sector. As Adedeji observed, structural adjustment reforms 'failed to provide short-term relief, and their impact in the long run might be to cripple public management capacity without replacing it with viable alternatives' (Adedeji 1992).

SAPs have also been implemented at tremendous social and political cost. With the retrenchments in the public service, the factory closures and reduced capacity utilisation in the private sector, the rising unemployment, and the general shortage of essential commodities (like food, medical prescriptions, school textbooks and stationery and laboratory equipment), life in structurally adjusting Africa is not far from a simulation of the Armageddon. It is probably the deterioration in the quality of life which ignited the demand for political change in many countries, and threatened peace and security in a few others.

Before discussing the crisis of governance, it is necessary to add that economic decline has worsened the already precarious environmental situation. Toxic waste dumping, deforestation, sea pollution and other ecological threats are symptoms of a deeper malaise — i.e. absolute lack of ideas on how else to tackle the problem of economic survival.

Ethics, Accountability and Good Government

Establishing political and administrative institutions which enjoy the support and confidence of the people is the last main challenge facing Africa today. Unfortunately, after decades of one-party rule and/or military dictatorship, the systems of governance inherited on independence have by and large atrophied. With the exception of countries such as Botswana, Mauritius, Kenya and Zambia, attempts to restore the democratic political process have not been an unqualified success. It is easy to be taken in by the elaborate arrangements made to organise free elections and to encourage the hitherto disenfranchised groups to participate in these elections. Yet voter turnout is not likely to be high where the tradition of voting is alien and/or the results of elections are still subject to the ratification of a military junta. As the UNDP (1993:65) aptly noted: 'Democracy is not a matter of one decision or of hastily organised elections'. To move towards genuine democracy, more than token efforts would have to be made to restore the citizens' confidence in the basic institutions of governance. In

addition, it is essential that a credible programme of citizen empowerment be designed and implemented with total honesty. The main elements of this programme are as follows:

- (i) the development of an open society in which people can freely 'associate' with, or dissociate from, one another as members of political parties, interest groups, trade unions, etc.;
- (ii) the establishment of a tradition of popular sovereignty, with a democratically elected parliament performing essential legislative and general oversight functions;
- (iii) the entrenchment of the independence of the judiciary to enable it to carry out its adjudicative role without fear of incurring the displeasure of an omnipotent ruler or of power-driven bureaucrats;
- (iv) substantive decentralisation of powers and functions to local, grass-root institutions;
- (v) enhancement of the financial, managerial, and decision-making capacity of the (local-level) institutions;
- (vi) the development of a feeling of 'political efficacy' among the electorate by acknowledging that popular sovereignty is the basis of the legitimacy of government at any point in time; and
- (vii) replacement of corrupt elites with development-oriented ones.

What is the relevance of all these to capacity-building? Where does good government fit into in the equation of development through systematic enhancement of human and institutional capacity? Whether the will of the people is frustrated by the cynicism of the political class or crushed by army tanks, Africa cannot but pay the developmental price. To begin with, where a government is not answerable to a larger public, it does not have to conduct its business in an open, transparent and accountable way. And once a government is not accountable, all ethical codes can be breached with impunity — including codes relating to conflict of interest, offer and acceptance of bribes and gratifications, diversion of public funds into private accounts, misuse of government property, diversion of food aid to groups other than those intended, destruction of case files and subversion of the judicial process.

Yet another danger of corrupt oligarchies trying to perpetuate themselves lies in potential oligarchies making a successful bid for power — either through subversion or by perpetrating large-scale violence. In other words, unless

appropriate pre-emptive measures are taken, bad governments tend to replicate themselves.

The political instability (which is an integral part of a system based on force) is a threat to the durability of public policies and institutions. It is no accident that when General Ibrahim Babangida left office in August 1993, what could have served as his legacy in the political and economic fields, left with him. This is the story of the democratic institutions which he spent time, money and air waves building — the two-party system, the ‘bottom up’ strategy of demilitarisation, democratically elected assemblies and public functionaries, etc. It is the story of the SAP which he introduced at grave personal and political risk but which was temporarily reversed by his successors. His 1988 civil service reform is, according to inside sources, the next target of his opponents. Instability is therefore a destroyer, not a builder, of human and institutional capacity.

Capacity Building in sub-Saharan Africa: Practices and Problems

In examining the experience of sub-Saharan Africa in human and capacity building, it is necessary not only to assess the achievements recorded to-date but also to highlight what remains to be accomplished.

Preliminary Assessment of Capacity-Building Efforts

It is difficult to be precise about the status of capacity building process in the present-day sub-Saharan Africa. However, while making allowance for deviations from the norm, the first equation worked out in the first part of this paper about sums up the capacity building situation to-date, viz:

$$P = \frac{P_{x1} P_{x2} \dots P_{xn}}{E_{x1} E_{x2} \dots E_{xn}} < P_{y1} P_{y2} \dots P_{yn}$$

Although various attempts ($P_{x1} \dots P_{xn}$) have been made to add value to indigenous capacity, factors which are traceable largely to the internal and external environment ($E_{x1} E_{x2} \dots E_{xn}$) have persistently eroded the value of indigenous capacity and enhanced (some will say ‘inflated’) that of foreign capacity ($P_{y1} P_{y2} \dots P_{yn}$). In a nutshell, sub-Saharan Africa is yet to build the critical capacity — i.e. the capacity to produce at minimum socio-political and economic cost.

Deviations from Pattern

Before discussing in detail the general pattern just described, it is necessary to look at some important deviations. First, capacities, as well as the measures adopted to build or enhance them, are unevenly distributed among countries, within countries, among different levels of government within the same country (say between central and local government), and between one office and another located next door. Even within the same office, technical, managerial and entrepreneurial skills are not equally distributed. Besides, capacity improvement efforts may co-exist with capacity neglect or outright capacity destruction.

The difference which is easily quantifiable is in the development of human capital. At any point in time, one can point to a mixed bag of efforts in human capacity building among SSA countries. Policies differ in the impact they have on:

- (a) school enrolment (especially, the period of attendance);
- (b) the ratio of technological/scientific manpower to total population; and
- (c) level of literacy.

The second major difference among countries relates to the influence exerted by the domestic environment on capacity building. Certainly, capacity building takes a form in Mauritius, Botswana and Ghana that is different from what it is in countries where the capture and/or retention of power is the sole preoccupation of the elites. According to Grey-Johnson (1994:3), if any country in Africa has succeeded in transforming its economy within a relatively short period, that country is Mauritius. A coherent policy on capacity building and utilisation is one possible explanation for this feat. By contrast, Madagascar's problems in optimising the benefits of its natural resource endowments might not be unconnected with the lack of an enabling environment for the creation and nurturing of human and institutional capacities.

The third important difference examined in this paper is the use to which foreign aid for capacity-building is put. Whereas some countries have established strong aid coordination and monitoring units, the rest prefer to let the structure, content and ultimate impact of capacity building programmes be determined by the donors, individual ministries and departments, and the public officials participating in overseas training programmes.

The General Trend

The differences discussed earlier notwithstanding, it is necessary to point out that as a region, sub-Saharan Africa faces a challenge of how to turn its huge development and capacity building deficit into a surplus. Due largely to internal

and external environmental factors, the level of productivity in the region remains very low. This does not become obvious until the region is compared with other regions. According to UNIDO (1992:78), the SSA manufacturing sector not only failed between 1980 and 1990 to create employment, improve labour productivity and increase wage earnings, it also was unable to close the widening productivity gap between the Africa region and North America. Relative to the North American level, labour productivity fell from 12.6 per cent in 1980 to 10.0 per cent in 1990 (It was 15.7 per cent in 1970). In addition, wage earnings per worker fell to 8.7 per cent of the North American level in 1990, from 9.2 per cent in 1980 and 10.5 per cent in 1970.

Public Sector Capacity Building Measures : A Critical Review

In the preceding paragraphs, we undertook a general survey of the capacity building situation in sub-Saharan Africa. It is now necessary to focus on the public sector where formal, sometimes elaborate, efforts have been made to mobilise capacity for development. As Jaycox (1993) clearly stated: 'Human and institutional capacities are lacking in virtually all sectors and all countries in sub-Saharan Africa'.

The public sector in Jaycox's view, is no exception. Indeed,

At independence most countries had only a handful of professional people, and institutions were weak. Post independence policies of state centralisation, coupled with personalised systems of governance fed these weaknesses. Poor governance, political instability and the continued deterioration of African economies also forced many talented Africans to leave their countries (Jaycox 1993).

One major explanation for the retarded growth of indigenous capacity is the tendency in many African countries to transfer the initiative for human and institutional capacity building to external bodies. It is true that indigenous leadership was behind a number of policies formulated in the 1960s and 1970s — e.g. policies on the introduction of one-party rule, the integration of party with state, token devolution of powers from central to lower level authorities, and the establishment and management of state-owned enterprises.

Yet, even where indigenous leadership yielded specific policies, the details of how to operationalise and generally follow-up the policies were left to be worked out by external advisers, donors, and technical cooperation agencies. This was certainly the case with the design of organisation structures, the recruitment and training of staff, and the installation of 'modern' management systems such as Management-by-objectives, programme and performance budgeting, matrix or project management, organisation and methods, and work planning and scheduling.

What is worse, even when foreign consultants designed and installed new management systems and procedures, their local 'counterparts' seldom learnt how to operate them (the systems and procedures) on their own. Either the consultants were not keen on accelerating their departure (through rapid 'technology transfer') or the policy makers and senior managers failed to provide an environment within which skills-acquisition by local counterparts could take place (Mutahaba, 1992). The refusal to deploy employees to jobs for which they have been trained represents yet another instance of wilful loss of capacity building opportunity.

So far, we have concentrated on the capacity building deficits in countries where attempts were made by policy makers to put their stamp on policy — if not on its implementation. In many others, policies, implementation, and institutional structures were controlled almost entirely by external advisers and/or agencies. The 'turn-key' approach enjoyed special favour in those countries which placed high premium on the acquisition of 'western know-how'. Such countries might have invested huge sums on the establishment of universities and technical colleges, but would rarely utilise the products of these 'local' institutions. The same group of countries would tend to construct 'modern' airport facilities (with sophisticated radar and air-control systems) but are likely to over-look elementary things such as air-conditioning and passenger welfare services. Countries which get carried away by 'modernisation' trends in the technologically advanced societies are wont to purchase, at high cost, state-of-the-art, computerised devices which remain idle most of the time due largely to the shortage of the personnel trained to operate, maintain, and/or repair the said equipment. An illustration is Murtala Mohammed International Airport in Nigeria where up to January 1995 the installed (electrical, electronic, mechanical) systems operated at least, 60 per cent below capacity. Outside Nigeria, but still in sub-Saharan Africa, it is not impossible to find that x-ray machines have, for want of a more appropriate use, been turned into brooms and brushes storage racks!

Sub-Saharan Africa's experience in the acquisition and application of 'modern technology' has been replicated in the area of institution building. In most cases, the practice was to 'start big and end up small'. Again, on the advice of foreign consultants, many African countries in the 1960s and 1970s embarked on ambitious development programmes. This resulted in the rapid increase in the size and cost of their public services. With the rapid decline in economic performance in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the bulk of the programmes administered by the public services were deemed unsustainable. So were public

service explosion halted, institutions reduced in number, and a policy of privatisation inaugurated.

The lessons of Africa's experience in capacity building are clear. Instead of wishing to be a carbon copy of the former metropolitan power, the typical African state ought to have devoted time and resources to identifying and tackling its 'important problems'. This would almost invariably have led to a realistic assessment of options and resources, besides focusing on areas in which certain critical capacities ought to be developed. At the very least, an inward-oriented approach to development would have enabled the average African country to start the project of nation-building on a small, manageable scale, and, over time, grow big. This is how Mauritius and, to some extent, Botswana, seemed to have got their capacity building equation right.

Capacity Building for Economic Recovery and Self-sustaining Development: A Paradigm and a Summation

If at all SSA's experience in capacity building offers any important lesson for the future, it is that the initiative must come from within. Donor-driven programmes have a way of reflecting external preferences and biases, and of ignoring internal African realities and needs. Besides, in view of the fact that foreign aid tends to come with too many strings — particularly, strings tying SSA to specific procurement contracts and compelling indigenous personnel to learn to operate a bewildering variety of equipment or procedures — it might be advisable, at least, in the interest of long-term sustainability, to pursue a policy of collective self-reliance. As Jaycox (1993:2) observes: 'External development agencies failed ... to insist on full local participation in identification and design of projects ... In sum, the donors have done a disservice to Africa, and many African governments have participated blindly'.

The way forward, therefore, lies in the creation of a critical mass of development-oriented leaders — leaders who, besides being socialised to (i.e. trained in) peaceful and constitutional methods of seeking power, appreciate the need for the application of analytical techniques in development policy formulation and management. The reason for advocating a broad approach is clear: non-economic variables such as civil strife, ethnic conflicts, political instability, and ethical violations, have direct and immediate impact on SSA's economic growth and long-term development. These non-economic variables (E_{x1} E_{x2} ... E_{xn}) have also been known to erode the benefits of investment in capacity building (P_{x1} P_{x2} ... P_{xn}).

While the details of capacity building programmes for leadership and governance will have to be worked out in each country, it is possible at this stage to suggest the broad outline of such programmes. To begin with, the

techniques or 'art of associating together' which are now patently lacking within the main social structures (the family, political parties, interest groups and professional associations) will need to be highlighted. It is tempting to blame the collapse of democratic experiments in SSA solely on the manipulations of 'sit-tight' leaders. What is seldom realised is that even within the opposition camp, the will to temper personal ambitions for the common good is sadly missing. So are the skills of persuading people from diverse backgrounds to cross ethnic, racial, gender, religious, and generational boundaries, and coalesce under one solid organisation. That is why political parties or interest groups inaugurated with fanfare soon break into splinter groups which in turn produce increasingly smaller factions.

In addition to the 'art of associating together', central elites and local community leaders need to be exposed to the technique of policy analysis and management. It is not enough to set up policy analysis units in selected ministries and departments. Political parties, employers' federation, trade union organisations, and consumer protection groups need to develop a strategic orientation and avail themselves of the services of regular think-tanks.

Building the remaining institutions from the ground up is the next logical component of the new capacity building programme. This entails identifying the distressed institutions and proffering solutions to their problems. Within the public sector, the obvious candidates for institutional rehabilitation are the following:

- (i) the regular civil service;
- (ii) the law enforcement and regulatory bodies (e.g. the police, customs and immigration services, licensing authorities, environmental control agencies and many other similar organisations);
- (iii) local government and decentralised institutions; and
- (iv) commercially-oriented public enterprises.

The capacity building problems facing the private sector can only be determined and tackled by each firm. On condition that the government does not place unnecessary bureaucratic obstacles in the way of private enterprise, and so long as the essential infrastructural supports are in place, it can be safely assumed that the 'invisible hand' which guides investment will also design and implement the private sector's capacity building programmes.

Supplementary Measures

We have thus far focused on the minimum preconditions for the creation and utilisation of development capacities. If the currently wide deficits in development are to be substantially reduced, it is essential that additional measures ($S_{p1} \dots S_{pn}$) be instituted. In particular, it is necessary for governments to earmark an increasing amount of resources for the rehabilitation of capacity building institutions and facilities. This will entail, among other things, reconstructing the decaying physical infrastructures, procuring new teaching devices (especially laboratory equipment), motivating the teachers through increases in remuneration and regular payment of their salaries, improving the general learning environment, and refraining from any action which might be interpreted as a devaluation of knowledge and skills.

In view of the incremental value of the constant application of knowledge and skills, it is also advisable that governments in SSA make increasing use of their human resources. Affirmative action and set-aside policies should now be extended to the implementation of development projects — including projects financed from external sources. An aid package which requires that resources be allocated to priorities solely dictated by donor agencies should be rejected outright, if for no other reason than that it stunts the growth of domestic capacity.

Above all, capacity building entails taking measures which promote organisational alertness and enhance productivity. First, the manning tables should be constantly reviewed to ensure that staff complements are in alignment with work-load, and that incumbents are properly trained to handle on-going and new responsibilities. Secondly, the present overwhelming bias towards hierarchy and red-tape should give way to innovative managerial approaches. Merit and excellence should be the guiding principle of staff selection and promotion. Thirdly, the issue of employee motivation, which has been brought to the fore by structural adjustment reforms, but over-looked in subsequent policy changes, should now be boldly tackled. To this extent, it might be advisable to begin to experiment with the installation of pay and productivity schemes in a small number of public service organisations which handle economic or quasi-economic activities. Depending on the results of pilot efforts, the schemes could be extended to other areas of public service management.

Role of Donor and Technical Cooperation Agencies

With the overwhelming bias towards an inward-propelled capacity building strategy, it is legitimate to ask where the donors and the concept of technical assistance or cooperation fit into all this. Does it mean that donor assistance is

no longer required or that the idea of technical cooperation is dead? The answer to both questions is an emphatic 'no'.

First, donor assistance is, and for sometime to come will, continue to be, required in tackling the broad developmental and the specific capacity building challenges. At the same time, it will be naive to expect the donors to make resources available without considering the economic and political pay-off, and the impact their assistance makes on the life and well-being of the recipients.

However, while acknowledging the vital role of donors and their rights to determine for what purposes their resources should be allocated, it is necessary to come to a new understanding on how to maximise the benefits of foreign aid. To begin with, the present practice of ignoring the immediate and long-term capacity building implications of technical assistance programmes should be discontinued. In specific terms, donor countries should care as much about exporting their manufactures and cultural nuances to recipient-nations as assisting these (recipient) nations to overcome obstacles to growth and to develop along their own path.

Secondly, the tendency to offer aid in a truncated, and therefore, non-usable form, needs to be seriously reconsidered. It is not unknown for large sums of money to be made available for the procurement of computers, but not for the recruitment of the personnel required to train local officials in how to operate a computerised system. Providing assistance towards the development of indigenous technology is of course out of the question (Odhiambo 1992:127-128).

If foreign aid is to serve a useful purpose, it should at the same time be needs-based, problem-solving, and beneficiary-responsive. To this end, it is necessary for the UNDP, as the main global development agency, to provide a forum at which the basic issues could be resolved by the donors, the recipients, and technical cooperation organisations. In the light of their achievements to-date in the area of capacity-building, both the ECA and the World Bank should be closely associated with the new initiative.

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Preventive Health Strategies and Infant Survival in Zimbabwe*

Assata Zerai**

Résumé: Il s'agit de l'observation dans une approche multidimensionnelle des variables socio-économiques et démographiques afin d'identifier les facteurs qui influent sur la survie des enfants au Zimbabwe (1983-88) par l'utilisation de données de l'Étude sur la Population et la Santé. Le niveau de participation de la communauté en matière de santé infantile influe de manière conséquente sur la survie des enfants. La principale découverte a été que le niveau moyen d'instruction des femmes en âge de procréation a, dans leur communauté, un impact plus important sur la survie des enfants que celui du niveau d'instruction des mères individuelles. Ce résultat soutient l'argument que la survie des enfants est sérieusement affectée par l'éducation des masses (Caldwell 1989). Cette étude éclaire davantage aussi les théories qui affirment qu'un développement social vulgarisé est nécessaire pour contrer la récente dégradation des mœurs dans les pays en voie de développement (Palloni 1989).

Infant mortality levels are still high in less developed countries today. The major causes of infant mortality are preventable and are tied to decreasing levels of household contamination, increasing nutritional intake and improving preventive and curative health practice (Preston 1980). My objective is to show that these

* This research was supported by a NICHD predoctoral fellowship and a Mellon Foundation postdoctoral fellowship. Institutional support was provided by the Population Research Centre of NORC and the University of Chicago, the Carolina Population Centre, and the Centre for Policy Research at Syracuse University. I am very grateful to first and foremost, my dissertation chairperson, Marta Tienda, for providing the working environment, guidance, and intellectual stimulation that allowed me to crystallise these ideas which came out of my dissertation research. I would also like to acknowledge the helpful comments from Bill Parish, William Awinn, Amy Tsui, Cecelia McFadden, colleagues at Obafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria, Antonio McDaniel, and anonymous reviewers who made suggestions based upon earlier forms of the paper or dissertation.

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inputs affecting infant health can take place on a community level, and additionally, that community-level infant health inputs can sometimes exert an even greater influence on infant survival outcomes than individual-level characteristics.

I examine demographic and socio-economic variables measured at the individual level, as well as community conditions influencing infant survival in Zimbabwe. The theoretical model used shows that the socio-economic status of the household and community conditions are mediated by proximate determinants, including maternal fertility, personal disease control, nutrient availability, and household contamination (Mosley and Chen 1984).

There is not an extensive literature on community level effects on child survival from which to chart theoretical direction for this research (notable exceptions include: Bailey 1988; Mosley and Chen 1984). But there is a developing literature on multi-level analysis (Entwisle 1989; Billy and Moore 1992; Tsui 1985), and an extensive literature supporting the positive effect of the individual mother's education on child survival (Caldwell 1986; Caldwell 1989; Das Gupta 1990; Cleland and van Ginneken 1988; Cleland 1990). In a survey of 99 countries (Caldwell 1986:179) it was found that average levels of female education is the main predictor of child survival at the societal level. There is as close a correlation between child survival and general levels of education in a community as there is between child survival and maternal education (Caldwell 1989:103). A multi-level analysis which incorporates both the individual mother's level of education with the average levels of education of women in the community is necessary to get a better understanding of the relative importance of education at the individual and community level for promoting child health.

Theoretically, this research is motivated by the basic premise stated by Palloni (1985) that economic development and unidimensional health interventions such as immunisation programmes are not enough to ensure constant mortality decline in low-income countries. He suggests that widespread social development is necessary to sustain a consistent mortality decline. There have been not only slowdowns in the pace of mortality decline in African and Latin American countries, but there have even been reversals in infant and child mortality trends in such countries as Zambia (Gaisie, Cross, and Nsemukila 1993:81) and Nigeria (Federal Office of Statistics 1992:78) which are seeing recent increases in child mortality. While medical technology and economic development are important, programmes that ensure the distribution of social development resources throughout the country to improve the living standards of families are necessary to sustain declines in infant mortality. Infant health is chosen as the dependent

variable because infants are the most vulnerable population to the changes in economic and social development (Hill and Palloni 1992).

Further theoretical development is needed on many fronts in order to advance our understanding of determinants of child health. The main analytical difficulty has been in specifying the mechanisms of multi-level models that delineate the pathways by which community characteristics influence individual behaviour (Tienda 1991) and specifying the mechanisms through which maternal education affects child survival (Cleland and van Ginneken 1988). Even less attention has been paid to delineating the mechanisms through which the education of women in the community impacts child health.

Unfortunately, this project does not solve any of those dilemmas. But it contributes to the state of knowledge on the use of multi-level analysis and on the effect of maternal education on child survival by incorporating both level of education of the infant's mother and the level of education in the infant's community into the same model to see which exerts a greater effect on infant survival. While the mechanisms tying community and individual behaviour to child survival are still largely unknown, the average levels of education of child bearing aged women in the community turns out to be a type of proxy for development at the community level. Further research which incorporates participant observation or ethnographic methodology to delineate social networks and spheres of influence within and between networks in a community is necessary to determine the actual mechanisms.

Zimbabwe Social Setting

Zimbabwe is an appropriate social setting in which to look at effects of maternal education on child health because it is a newly independent country in which citizens are exercising a greater sense of political and personal efficacy. The transition in control of educational and health institutions from the hands of colonial settlers who were unconcerned about the health of the majority of the African population to a nascent government elected by the previously dispossessed majority has allowed policy-makers to institute progressive health strategies motivated to benefit the majority populace.

The Zimbabwe government believes that development is not just economic in nature. It is also social, political, and cultural. When assessing their country's development, the people of Zimbabwe chose leadership committed to addressing the relevant questions regarding poverty, unemployment, and inequality. Their concern for social development grew out of their struggle for liberation from colonialism as an expression of their self-determination. The ideological perspective of Zimbabwe's leadership is that market-oriented development does not give preference to the needs of the masses. So the Zimbabwe government

chose not to follow a strategy that measured progress solely by export-oriented economic growth. Instead, they chose to couple economic schemes with social development strategies, and to give priority to the social betterment of the majority of its citizens. This strategy reflects the underlying belief that equitable distribution of resources is an important part of development.

Zimbabwe is an interesting context in which to study child health because of the substantial improvements in indicators of living conditions since political independence (attained April 18, 1980). The country's 1960 infant mortality rate was 113 deaths per 1000 live births; according to the Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey (ZDHS), it dropped to 27/1000 (United Nations 1989; ZDHS 1989; Population Reference Bureau 1994). Zimbabwe's Equity in Health programme reflects the government's commitment to social development in many ways. Zimbabwe has encompassed some of the most progressive strategies for improving child health. Some of these include integrating traditional health practitioners into the health care infrastructure, balancing curative and preventive health measures, and a focus on redistributing health services so that the poorest citizens in greatest need have improved access to health services.

The result of the abandonment of the racially discriminatory and inequitable colonial practice in controlling health care access has been overwhelming. There is majority access for Zimbabwe's population to health centres and hospitals in even the remotest areas. During the first 10 years of independence, rural areas were targeted for the more than 500 health centres that were built or upgraded, and more than a dozen district hospitals were completed or are under constructions (World Bank 1992:1). Additionally, between 1980 and 1985, more than 4000 Village Health Workers who disseminate health information and provide preventive and simple curative services in the rural areas were trained. More than 200 State Certified Nurses were trained to manage staff clinics (World Bank 1992:1). The result has been that 'millions of people have for the first time gained access to basic care' (World Bank 1992 : ix).

In 1980 (at the time that Zimbabwe attained its independence), 44 per cent of the publicly funded services went to the urban-based sophisticated central hospitals serving about 15 per cent of the population, while only 24 per cent went to primary secondary level rural health services for the majority of the population (Sanders and Davies 1988:724).

But as of 1988, 'in Zimbabwe, nearly half of all rural women (were) within 5 kilometres of some type' of health provider, and only 12 per cent are more than 15 Km distant from one' (Wilkinson, Njogu, and Abderrahim 1993:24). The median distance to a health centre for married women ages 15 to 49 interviewed in the nationally representative Demographic and Health Survey sample is 3.1 kilometres: 5.1 Km in rural areas and 1 Km in urban areas (Wilkinson, Njogu,

and Abderrahim 1993:26). Immunisation data show no inequality in distribution between rural and urban areas of Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office 1989),¹ although there is some inequality by province (Zerai 1992). Additionally, health education has promoted low-risk maternal fertility practices such as delayed child bearing, parities of four or fewer children, and adequate spacing of births (Zimbabwe Federal Office of Statistics 1989).

Multi-Level Approach

By using the multi-level approach, the researcher attempts to guard against the myopia of micro-level analyses which 'implicitly assume that variations in (behaviour associated with the dependent variable) are due only to individual characteristics and that the social context in which people live have invariant effects...' on the outcome variable (Billy and Moore 1992:978). The advantage of the multi-level approach is that the research simultaneously attempts to model the individual-level effects on the outcome variable that macro-level analyses omit. 'A multi-level approach bridges the gap between the strictly macro- and micro-orientations' (Billy and Moore 1992:978).

While the multi-level frameworks have been widely praised for incorporating both micro- and macro-level models (Billy and Moore 1992; Tsui 1985; Brewster, Billy, and Grady 1990; Entwisle, Casterline, and Sayed 1989, etc.), the approach has been criticised for mechanically connecting the individual and contextual models without specifying the mechanisms through which macro forces exert an effect on micro-level behaviour and outcomes (Tienda 1991).

When putting together multi-level models of infant health, the average level of female education is an excellent independent variable to focus on because considerable effort has been expended in an attempt to identify mechanisms linking maternal education to child survival (Caldwell 1986; Caldwell 1989; Cleland and van Ginneken 1988; Mosley and Chen 1984). The problem of specifying the mechanisms organically linking macro and micro influences is exemplified by the problem of specifying the mechanisms through which education affects child health. Whether it is measured at the level of the

1 According to the ZDHS, among all children 12-23 months, 79.8 per cent living in rural areas had health cards with immunisation data recorded on it and 71.3 per cent of children living in urban areas had health cards. Among children with health cards, 98 per cent received the BCG vaccine in rural areas and 96 per cent received the vaccine in urban areas; 96 per cent of children living in rural areas received their measles vaccine and in urban areas this number was 92 per cent of children ages 12-23 months (Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office 1989:97).

individual woman or measured in aggregate, education is a macro-phenomenon. Formal education prepares the young to fulfil the expectations of their society. Its function is largely socialisation. Unfortunately, although several mechanisms, through which maternal education affects child health, have been proposed in the literature, we still lack a definitive knowledge of these mechanisms (Caldwell 1989:106).

Importance of Maternal Education

A review of the literature shows that while the higher socio-economic status of better educated women explains about half of the magnitude of the relationship between maternal education and child survival (Cleland and van Ginneken 1988), the domestic health practice of individual women is probably the next most salient mechanisms in the maternal education/child mortality relationship.² The fact that mother's education is a more important determinant of child survival than father's education shows that there is greater maternal involvement in child-health related care (Caldwell 1989). The mother's education influences her choices and skills in health care practices (Bailey 1988; Das Gupta 1990; Caldwell 1989). For instance, both educated and illiterate mothers recognise when their child is sick but the educated mother more frequently will take action 'without waiting for (her) husband or mother-in-law to notice the child's condition too' (Caldwell 1989:106). 'This is partly because illiterate women do feel a lack of capability when dealing with the modern world' (Caldwell 1989:106). Caldwell found that the educated mother is 'more likely to report back to the health centre if the treatment does not seem to be effecting a cure. Educated women see the (health process) as experimental... (And do not feel it is an attack on the health care practitioner to give this important feedback)' (Caldwell 1989:106). Joshi (1994:24) has postulated that it is through the acquisition of skills and identify that education impacts the health behaviour of women, but says, 'while these findings are interesting, they are still incomplete. More studies, especially longitudinal ones, are needed before these findings can be woven into a meaningful theory'.

Education as a Community Phenomenon

We know even less about the reason average levels of female education in the community exert a positive effect on infant survival. But this is an important

2 There is supporting evidence for this in a recent article by Arun R. Hoshi 'Maternal schooling and child health: preliminary analysis of the intervening mechanisms in rural Nepal' (1994).

relationship to consider. Caldwell (1989:103) points out that 'an uneducated woman may feel more deprived in a country where most other women are educated than one in which they are not: nevertheless, her children stand a much greater chance of survival'. The mechanisms operating in the mass education/child mortality relationship are likely to be multi-dimensional. One possibility is health service advocacy. The equitable distribution of community health services influences child health in Kerala State India (Preston 1980). Advocacy to ensure better distribution is imperative. Bailey (1988) found that the shortage of health facilities and personnel affect child health in Sierra Leone. 'As argued powerfully by Caldwell (1986) the key to low mortality at the societal level may be a synergy between mass education and egalitarian politics which leads to demands for a health service that caters to the needs of all' (Cleland and van Ginneken 1988).

Another important possibility is the improvements in status that are accrued to all women as a result of mass education. This impacts how women are viewed in society and also how women view themselves. 'The quality of schooling seems relatively unimportant..., it is not so much what you learn or understand, but how you see yourself and how others see you' (Caldwell 1989:106). 'Women who had been to school thought of the school as part of the whole modern system which included independence, five-year plans, government programmes, health centres, modern medicine and themselves' (Caldwell 1989:106). So mass education has an important influence on both the individual and the society.

Another result of mass education that may have important implications for child survival is its compounding multigenerational effects (Caldwell 1989). Wealth flows reverse as there are larger investments by families in the development of their individual children (Caldwell 1982).

Frameworks


The general theoretical question addressed examines the relationship between development and population. The specific question asks to what extent social development determines infant mortality. There is debate on the causes of mortality decline and the position argued here in that mortality decline is sustained in less developed countries as a result of economic development, humanistic social development, and equitable distribution of development resources (Palloni 1985; Caldwell 1986).

Distribution of development resources to all in society ensures that the standard of living is adequate, women and men have the freedom to choose their contribution to society, and that children's health receives a high priority. Having clean water supplies, proper sanitation, educational facilities, and hospitals, promotes the well-being of citizens which finally has positive effects

on child health. When universal education is encouraged and high percentages of women complete schooling, women have a more egalitarian role in society (Caldwell 1986) that allows them to delay childbearing and encourages the lower parities conducive to improved child health (Chen 1983). When men and women exercise their right to choose their education and employment, living standards rise as a result of increased household economic resources. This produces living environments with reduced contamination that promote child health. Development resources such as piped water and adequate sanitation promote health because they also reduce contamination. Finally, when child health is a high priority in the public sector, as reflected in the building of hospitals and health centres that include prenatal care, immunisation, and growth-monitoring programmes, children's survival chances improve.

The theoretical framework of child health in Zimbabwe here begins with some of the individual-level variables in the classical proximate determinants framework (Mosley and Chen 1984). Other crucial variables that operate through the proximate determinants, such as maternal education, parent's occupation, and community-level variables (see Figure 1) are added. The community conditions are mediated by proximate determinants of child health. Proximate determinants operate through specific mechanisms to determine child health outcomes.

Figure 1: Casual Ordering of Factors Affecting Child Health in Zimbabwe



The casual ordering is that macro-economic, political, and social factors set the stage for community conditions and socio-economic realities in which families find themselves. Community conditions and socio-economic variables operate through the proximate determinants of child health. Community conditions also exert an impact on socio-economic conditions to influence proximate determinants of child health indirectly.

Presently, *maternal fertility* variables are typified by later marriage and childbearing, lower parities, and longer birth intervals than in preceding periods in Zimbabwe. Operating through the biological mechanism of improved production of breastmilk and through the social mechanism of less competition with siblings for mother's attention and household resources, children get better nutrition and better care, thus improving their survival chances (Chen 1983).

In Zimbabwe, *household contamination* is still a big problem. Piped water is provided to a minority of households. Sanitation measures are still not adequate. But improvements in these areas since independence work through the mechanism of less exposure of children to contamination to make them less susceptible to disease and eventually lower mortality.

Nutrient availability has improved due to drought feeding programmes (Agere 1986), land reform and increased economic opportunities (Sanders and Davies 1988). Operating through the mechanism of decreased susceptibility to illness, improved nutrient availability leads to improvements in child health (Preston 1980).

Personal disease control is typified by better immunisation coverage and increased access to treatment. The goals set by the Ministry of Health of universal immunisation of children and targeting rural areas for building primary health care centres (Manga 1988) have improved the timeliness of disease prevention and treatment. Timely personal disease control is critical for improving child survival chances.

Mother's higher levels of education and increased professional and blue collar *employment* of the household head lead to low child-health-risk fertility, timely immunisation of children, adequate nutritional intake by children, and household environments with lessened contaminants. These socio-economic variables operate through the proximate determinants to influence child health.

Community conditions have become more conducive to child health in Zimbabwe today than in the past. Some characteristics include free and compulsory education (Zvobgo 1986), widespread family planning education, land reform measures, free health services to citizens who do not make minimum wage (Sanders and Davies 1988), prenatal care programmes (Agere

1986), and postnatal care including growth monitoring. These conditions make it easier for individual households and mothers to maximise the health of their children.

Community conditions operate through socio-economic variables and proximate determinants to influence child health. For instance, higher percentages of women receiving primary level and more education lead to improved socio-economic outlooks of families, which in turn influence fertility variables, personal disease control, nutrient availability, and household contamination.

Models


The Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey (ZDHS) and ZDHS Service Availability data are used to analyse the effect of individual and community-level determinants on child mortality between 1983 and 1988 in Zimbabwe. To incorporate individual level and contextual determinants in this study of infant health in Zimbabwe, a three-tiered analysis is conducted by establishing a baseline model that includes individual-level determinants and background characteristics and then analysing both a community model that includes distal determinants and finally an expanded model that incorporates all the variables in the first two models. (See Figure 2).

First, the individual level risk factors to neo-natal and post-neonatal survival are evaluated for children born during 1983-1988 in Zimbabwe. Background variables are added as controls. The maternal histories collected in the Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Surveys provide adequate data to examine effects of environmental contamination and maternal variables on individual-level child survival.³ However, to understand child health status better, it is important to understand the context in which child health outcomes unfold. This analysis reveals that individual level risk factors are expectedly not the whole picture, but mediate contextual determinants.

In the second part of the analysis, the effect of resource distributive programmes (as reflected in contextual variables) are examined. These programmes were established after Zimbabwe attained independence. The expanded model examines the joint effects of the individual-level determinants and community conditions on neonatal and post-neonatal mortality.

3 Values of socio-economic variables collected at the time of the survey are used as a proxy for socio-economic measures at the time the child was exposed to risk.

Figure 2: Proximate and Distal Determinants of Survival for Infants Born Between 1983 and 1988 in Zimbabwe



Note: Model 1 includes proximate determinants and background characteristics.
Model 2 contains distant determinants.
Model 3 includes proximate, background, and distal determinants.

Data

The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) are a rich source of data on developing countries in general, and Africa in particular. The national probability surveys interview all or ever-married women ages 15-49 and provide a wealth of information on child health, the proximate determinants of fertility, fertility preferences, and other social and economic characteristics unmatched by comparative data from developing countries to date.⁴ Retrospective data are collected to provide complete birth histories, as well as more detailed information on the five years preceding the survey (1983-88).

The sample size in the Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey is 4,201 women. It was fielded between June and September 1988. To prepare the data for analysis, files with mothers, children, and finally child-months as three different units of observation from the ZDHS data set were constructed. While the ZDHS data give very specific information on 1983-88 they only give limited birth history and child mortality information for previous years. Therefore, the empirical analyses here are restricted to the 3,393 children born during this short period.

Variables analysed for all models are listed in Table 1. Descriptive statistics for all variables are listed in Table 2. The analysis of child survival is limited to infants under 1 year where a majority of child mortality usually occurs. That infant mortality rates are sensitive to social development inputs permits an assessment of the impact of proximate and distal determinants on child health in Zimbabwe. Different sets of variables influence neonatal and post-neonatal mortality, requiring separate investigations for the latter. Analysis of neonatal and post-neonatal survival allows examinations of two important aspects of early

4 Some of the limitations of the Demographic and Health Survey data set pointed out by Brockerhoff and De Rose (1944) that need to be acknowledged include the fact that there is no information on childrearing history. This analysis assumes that all children live with their birth mothers. Another limitation is that there is insufficient observation of morbidity and health interventions — educated mothers are more likely to report health interventions. The result in this analysis is that the effect of prenatal care is possibly underestimated. Finally, there are at least two instances in which the effect of educational levels on infant survival might be underestimated. Because the birth history data are collected retrospectively and mothers with greater levels of education are probably less likely to omit births that end in death than are mothers with less education, the effect of education on infant survival may be underestimated. And because maternal education is related to maternal mortality, and birth history information is not collected on mothers who died in the locale, the effect of education on infant survival might again be underestimated.

child health in Zimbabwe; neonatal mortality reflects 'the pre-existing health conditions of the mother and the health care she and her infant received during pregnancy and shortly after delivery' and post-neonatal mortality reflects 'post-birth socio-economic, environmental, and medical care' indicators (Campbell 1989).

Proximate Determinants

The study uses individual-level variables whose relationship to infant survival has been well established (Chen 1983; Mosley and Chen 1984; Pebley and Millman 1986; Curtis, Diamons, and McDonald 1993; Phuapradit *et al* 1990). Mother's age at childbearing, parity, and the preceding birth interval are examined in the form of a high risk fertility index. If any of these high risk conditions existed at the time of the birth, a pregnancy was deemed to be at high risk of complications, negative birth outcomes such as neo-natal mortality, or problems with post neo-natal survival. If none of the conditions existed, the index child was designated a low risk birth category.⁵ Half (51 per cent) of children in the subsample were born in conditions of high risk to pregnancy, birth or postbirth complications. The high-risk maternal and child health index was constructed to address the problem of collinearity among maternal fertility variables and also in preparation for further bivariate analysis which will treat risk as endogenous to the relationship between background and community variables affecting infant survival.

Other variables from the classical proximate determinants model such as nutrient availability, personal disease control, and incidence of injury were not examined because of insufficient information on the variable itself (in the case of incidence of injury for all infants and immunisation or other indicators of personal disease control for infants that died), and inadequate information that would allow causal inference (such as nutrient availability and succeeding birth intervals).

5 The combined index more closely aligns this analysis with policy prescriptives that identify high risk pregnancies than with theoretical concerns with the distinctive impact of fertility limitation, birth spacing, and maternal age on infant survival.

Table 1: Variable Names and Values for all Models

Variable Type and Name	Description	Value
Dependent Variables		
Neo-natal mortality	Mortality before completing first month of life	1 = Died, 0 = Survived
Postneo-natal mortality	Time varying: Mortality after surviving the first month and before completing the 1st year of life	1 = Child died in observation month, 0 = Child survived the observation month
Independent Variables		
1. High-risk maternal fertility index	Index accounting for the presence of at least one high risk variable: Parity greater than 4, insufficient preceding birth interval, interval of <24 months for second or higher parity child, or Maternal age under 18 or over 36.	1 = At least one high risk factor 0 = None
Socioeconomic Status		
Educational level of mother		
2. Incomplete primary	Recorded to 3 dummy variables (omitted category)	1 = yes, 0 = no
3. Complete primary		1 = yes, 0 = no
4. Secondary		1 = yes, 0 = no
Parent's usual occupation		1 = yes, 0 = no
5. Missing	Father's occupation measured; mother's occupation substituted if father is unemployed or absent.	1 = yes, 0 = no
6. None	Father's and mother's occupational data missing	1 = yes, 0 = no
7. Agriculture	Parent has no usual occupation	1 = yes, 0 = no
8. Manual labour	Includes farmworkers and farmers	1 = yes, 0 = no
9. Non-manual labour	Non-agricultural	1 = yes, 0 = no
Household Contamination		
10. Household contamination factor	Factor score coefficient comprised presence of refrigerator in household; toilet on premises, porous floor material, and distance to household water supply (ordinal codes: 1 = on premises, 2 = less than 5 metres from premises, 3 = 6 to 100 metres away, 5 = 101 to 500 metres away, 6 = 501 metres to 1 km away, 7 = 1-3 kilometres away, 8 = 3-5 kilometres away, to 9 = greater than 5 kilometres away)	mean = 0, s.d. = 1
Community Conditions		
11. Number of household members	Number at time to survey	Continuous
12. Prenatal care	Care from a medical professional	1 = yes, 0 = no
13. Residence	Place of residence	1 = urban, 0 = rural
Average level of females' education in the community	Ordinal variable recorded to three dichotomous variables (omitted category)	1 = incomplete primary 1 = complete primary 1 = secondary
14. Incomplete primary		
15. Complete primary		
16. Secondary education		
17. ZNFPC: community based distribution programme		1 = yes, 0 = no
18. Hospital or health centre in the community		1 = yes, 0 = no

Source: ZDHS data (1989).

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on all Variables in Models

Variables	N	Mean	Standard Deviation
Neo-natal mortality	3393	0.03	0.14
Postneo-natal mortality	3223	0.02	0.14
Proximate Variables			
1. High risk fertility	3390	0.51	0.50
2. Mother under age 18	3393	0.04	0.19
3. (Mother 18-36)	3393	0.82	0.38
4. Mother over age 36	3393	0.14	0.35
5. Preceding birth interval < 24 months	3388	0.19	0.39
6. Birth order > 4	3393	0.36	0.48
7. Number of household members	3393	7.41	3.37
8. Professional prenatal care	3393	0.84	0.37
Background Characteristics			
9. (Mother did not complete primary level education)	3393	0.19	0.39
10. Mother completed a primary level education	3393	0.63	0.48
11. Mother completed secondary level or more education	3393	0.18	0.38
12. Parents unemployed	3393	0.02	0.14
13. Agricultural occupation	3393	0.26	0.44
14. Manual occupation	3393	0.50	0.50
15. (Non-manual occupation)	3393	0.17	0.38
16. Missing information on occupation	3393	0.05	0.22
Type of Place of Residence			
17. Rural/urban residence	3393	0.27	0.44
Community Conditions			
Average level of females' education in the community:			
18. (Incomplete primary)	3393	0.04	0.19
19. Complete primary	3393	0.82	0.38
20. Secondary education	3393	0.14	0.35
21. ZNFPC distribution programme in locale	3387	0.66	0.47
22. Hospital or health centre in the community	3387	0.81	0.39

Source: ZDHS data (1989)

Note: Residual categories in parentheses.

Background Characteristics

Socio-economic variables determine the availability of nutritional resources, which is especially important because once infants reach the age of 6 months, they can no longer depend on nourishment from breastmilk alone. Mother's education is important because it facilitates her integration into a society impacted by traditional customs, colonialism, and neo-colonialism. Education heightens her ability to make use of government and private health care resources and it may also increase the autonomy necessary to advocate for her child in the household and the outer world. If a mother has not completed primary level education, her child is more likely to die.

The other socio-economic variable measured is parent's occupation. If parents do not have regular employment, they will be less able to supply nutritional needs of children and consequently their children will be more susceptible to disease and other causes of death.

Household contamination is an important indicator of child susceptibility to contagion leading to disease. The higher the value of the household contamination index, the greater the contamination in the household through lack of easy access to water, modern toilet facilities, and refrigeration and having nonporous floor material. A factor score was constructed for these variables to address statistical problems presented by the level of high collinearity among them. The number of people in the household is added as a measure of crowding in the household. Finally rural/urban residence of the infant is included model as a control variable.

Distal Determinants

The ZDHS-Service Availability (ZDHS-SA) data set was collected on 166 of 167 sample clusters⁶ in Zimbabwe. ZDHS-SA variables were matched to the individual-level and child-month working files by cluster. Two of the variables for examining the effect of community-level variables on infant survival between 1983 and 1988 are extracted from the ZDHS-SA. General categories of variables measuring community-level inputs into child health include existence of family planning education and contraceptive distribution programmes, female education, and health care availability.⁷

6 Often these clusters were located in independent communities.

7 Since information collected on community health facilities within the Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey consisted of data from only the *nearest* health facility, these data are not nationally representative.

Clusters are the primary sampling unit used in the ZDHS. Families living in the same cluster live in close proximity to each other in the same community. In the sample of 3,393 children, an average of 20 survey households is represented by each cluster (with a standard deviation of 11). This ranges from 1 to 84 of the households in which women were interviewed. The total number of households in a cluster is less than 500 for a majority (72 per cent) of the communities and no more than 2000 for all communities (Wilkinson, Njogu, and Abderrahim 1993).

The first community-level variable of interest is the average level of women's education. A variable indicating the mean level of education for childbearing aged women was created by calculating average educational levels of all women by cluster from the original ZDHS file. Caldwell (1986:191) points out that the percentage of women in the community with primary schooling is an important determinant of child health because it indicates female autonomy and the extent of egalitarianism in the society. The more empowered childbearing-aged women are as a group, the more likely individual women in that community will be able to promote actively the health of their children. Children living in communities where women on the average complete primary and secondary level education are expected to have higher probabilities of survival than those living in communities in which women on the average do not complete primary-level education.

The second community-level variable is whether or not the locale has family planning education and contraceptive distribution programmes which are important because it is hypothesised to increase the likelihood that parents use contraceptive at least to space their births, to the benefit of mother and child's health. Children who live in a community in which family planning education and contraceptive distribution programmes are available, are more likely to be healthy.

The availability of community health care facilities indicates the extent of health services, including prenatal and postnatal care, immunisation, and growth monitoring. Hospital and clinic availability is mainly important for personal disease control. If resources for disease prevention, such as prenatal care, immunisation, and growth monitoring are available in the community, the child is more likely to be healthy. If resources for disease diagnosis and treatment, such as hospitals, health clinics, and health workers are available, the child is more likely to survive.

In Zimbabwe, most hospitals and health clinics have prenatal care, immunisation, and growth monitoring. Availability of hospitals and health centres in the community is also an indicator of social development. The greater the development infrastructure, the greater the access to hospitals and other health resources.

Methods

The logistic regression and Cox proportional hazards models are used to estimate the effect of proximate and distal covariates on child mortality. Neo-natal mortality models are estimated with logistic regression. Post-neonatal mortality models are estimated with the proportional hazards model. The Cox proportional hazards model allows researchers to study events, or the change from one state to the other at a specific point in time (Allison 1984). For the first part of this analysis the transition from the state of being alive to the state of death is examined.

Results

The model selection results appear in Table 3. The overall fit for all neo-natal and post-neonatal mortality models is good. The chi-square statistic is significant at the 001 level for proximate, community and saturated models. Chi-square tests result in significant improvements of the expanded models over the proximate and community models. This shows that individual and community-level variables contribute significantly to our understanding of infant mortality in Zimbabwe.

Table 3: Mortality Model Selection

Model	Overall Model Significance	- 2* Log Likelihood	Degree of Freedom	Chi-square (Comparing Constrained and Saturated Models)
Neo-natal mortality:				
Base (proximate model)	82.86***	1450.38	4	9.90*
Community model	23.86***	1517.92	10	77.44***
Expanded (saturated model)	95.41***	1440.48	-	--
Postneo-natal mortality:				
Base (proximate model)	544.41***	12618.82	4	128.34***
Community model	278.19***	12883.52	10	393.04***
Expanded (saturated model)	669.70***	12490.48	-	---

Source: ZDHS data (1989)

Note: Negative log likelihoods are reported in Tables 4 and 5.

Tables 4 and 5 list the results of the logistic regression and Cox regression analyses of neonatal and post-neonatal mortality, respectively. Odds ratios are presented for all logic models, and hazard ratios are presented for Cox regression models. Estimated hazard and odds ratios are relative risks — for a one-unit change in the independent variable the instantaneous risk of death increases by a multiplicative factor of the reported value of the hazard ratio (Computing Resource Centre 1992:212). The first column in Tables 4 and 5 list the independent variables for all three models. The second and third columns list the results of the individual-level model, the fourth and fifth columns show the results of the community model, and the sixth and seventh columns report the results of the saturated model.

Determinants of Neonatal Mortality

All children at risk of dying before the first completed month of life are included. Of the 3,393 children in the sample, 108 infants did not survive to age 1 month (a neo-natal mortality rate of 32.1 deaths per 1000 live births). Proximate and background variables that determine whether a child survives to age 1 month are listed in Table 4.

The high-risk maternal fertility index is the first significant determinant of neo-natal mortality ($\alpha = 0.05$). If the child's birth order is greater than 4, if the child's preceding birth interval is 24 months or greater, or if the mother was not the optimal age at birth, as indicated by a value of 1 on the high-risk index, the child is 1.42 times as likely to die as infants who were born under low risk conditions. A low risk birth is one in which the child has higher chances of survival because there has been a sufficiently lengthy time interval after the previous birth (or because the index birth is a first order birth), the mother is at her biologically and socially optimal age for childbearing, and because of lessened competition for maternal resources due to lower parities.

The only significant household contamination variable is the number of persons residing in the household. For each additional member in the household, children are only 89 per cent as likely to die in the first month of life as children in smaller households ($\alpha = 0.001$). Whereas, originally, theory predicted that the number of people in the household could be used as a proxy for crowding and increased susceptibility to disease through contagion (Aaby 1988); it appears the number of household members may be a better proxy for the number of caretakers available to children under 5 years of age. As shown in Table 6.

Table 4: Determinants of Neo-natal Mortality

Variables	Individual model		Community model		Saturated model	
	Odds / Ratio	Z / Value	Odds / Ratio	Z / Value	Odds / Ratio	Z / Value
Proximate Variables						
1. High risk maternal fertility	1.42*	2.246			1.42*	2.170
2. Number of household members	0.89***	-4.430			0.89***	-4.227
3. Household contain ination factor	0.89	-0.953			0.88	-0.978
4. Professional prenatal care	0.35***	-6.591			0.35***	-6.596
Background Variables						
5. Mother completed secondary or more education	0.73	-1.082			0.86	-0.496
6. Mother completed primary level education	0.89	-0.659			1.02	0.086
7. (Mother did not complete primary level education)						
8. Parents unemployed	2.79*	2.388			2.85*	2.426
9. Agricultural	1.11	0.391			1.09	0.317
10. Manual	1.00	0.035			1.00	0.018
11. Missing	1.73	1.499			1.69	1.330
12. (Non-manual)						
13. Rural/urban residence	0.53*	-2.497	0.62*	-2.063	0.54*	-2.165
Community Variables						
14. Secondary level education			0.33*	-2.715	0.41*	-2.022
15. Completed primary level education			0.49**	-2.568	0.58	-1.737
16. (Incomplete primary level education)						
17. ZNFPC distribution programme in locale			0.76	-1.697	0.73	-1.846
18. Community hospital or health centre			0.97	-0.169	1.04	0.243

Source: ZDHS data (1989)

Notes: Logistic regression analysis of neonatal mortality, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, and *** p < 0.001.

Omitted category in parentheses.

Table 5: Determinants of Post-neonatal Mortality

Variables	Individual model		Community model		Stratified model	
	Hazard / Ratio	Z / Value	Hazard / Ratio	Z / Value	Hazard / Ratio	Z / Value
Proximate Variables						
1. High risk maternal fertility	1.10	1.268			1.08	0.991
2. Number of household members	0.86***	-10.973			0.87***	10.380
3. Household contamination factor	1.02	-0.330			0.99	-0.208
4. Professional prenatal care	0.30***	-16.483			0.31***	-16.222
Background Variables						
5. Mother completed secondary or more education	0.49***				0.71	-2.096
6. Mother completed primary level education		-4.517				
7. (Mother did not complete primary level education)	0.84	-2.031				
8. Parents unemployed						
9. Agricultural						
10. Manual	1.74**	2.639			1.80*	2.791
11. Missing	0.92	-0.720			0.85	-1.365
12. (Non-manual)	0.90	-0.959			0.85	-1.433
13. Rural/urban residence	1.50*	2.206			1.33	1.528
Community Variables						
14. Secondary level education	0.41***			-4.044		
15. Completed primary level education		-6.553				
16. (Incomplete primary level education)						
17. ZNFPC distribution programme in locale						
18. Community hospital or health centre						
					0.08***	-9.284
					0.38***	-8.274
					0.62***	-4.254
					0.11***	-7.962
					0.45***	-6.122
					0.72***	-4.102
					0.74***	-3.729

Source: ZDHS data (1989)

Notes: Logistic regression analysis of neonatal mortality, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, and *** p < 0.001.

Omitted category in parentheses.

Table 6: Household Composition by Household Size

	ALL Households (n = 2228)	Number of People in Household	
		Six or Fewer (n = 1035)	More than Six (n = 1193)
Average number of children under age 5 in household	1.81	1.36	2.20
Average number of children born to index mother 1983-88	1.52	1.47	1.57
Percentage of households with children born between 1983 and 1988 not residing in household	17.00	24.20	10.70
Percentage of households with children under age 5 in addition to those born between 1983 and 1988	32.40	16.60	46.20
Average number of members over age 5	5.49	3.23	7.45
Average number of eligible women in household	2.00	1.00	2.00
Average household size	7.30	4.59	9.66

Source: ZDHS data (1989).

The main compositional difference between large and small households is that larger households contain greater numbers of adults. This finding supports the idea that these additional members contribute to the pool of caretakers or free the primary caretaker to spend more time with the new-born.

Personal disease control is measured by whether or not the pregnant mother was cared for by a nurse or doctor prior to the birth of her child. New-borns whose mothers received prenatal care from a health professional are 35 per cent less likely to die as those whose parents had not obtained prenatal care from a nurse or doctor ($\alpha = 0.0011$).

Neonates whose parents are unemployed are 2.79 times as likely to die during the first month of life as children whose parents are working in professional occupations. This variable indicates socio-economic resources of the household. Households that can afford to provide proper nutrition, personal disease control,

and highly sanitary living environments are more likely to have healthy children residing in them.

The last variable in the individual-level model is rural/urban residence. New-borns in urban areas are approximately half as likely to die as new-borns living in rural areas during the first month of life ($\alpha = 0.05$). Conditions are still more favourable to child health in urban areas of Zimbabwe.

Logistic regression analysis of the effects of community-level variables on neo-natal mortality are reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 4.⁸ The average educational level of women in the community significantly influences survival of new-borns. Infants living in communities where women have a secondary level education are 0.33 times as likely to die and those living in communities where women have on the average completed a primary level education are 0.49 times as likely to die the first month of life, as infants living in communities where the average woman is uneducated. Both results are highly statistically significant ($\alpha = 0.01$).

The only shared variable in the proximate model and community model is rural/urban residence. Similar to the residence variable in the individual model, urban neonates are 0.62 as likely to die as rural neo-nates.

Model 3 encompasses the individual level variables in model 1 and community-level variables of model 2 (see columns 6 and 7 of Table 4). The magnitude and direction of effects are the same as in the results for the constrained individual and community models. The significance is virtually the same as well.

Determinants of Post-neonatal Survival

Determinants of infant survival to age 1 year are examined (see Table 5) using Cox regression. Of the original 3,393 children observed, 108 were deleted because they died in the first month of life, and 62 observations were deleted because they were censored.⁹ Of the 3,223 children at risk, 68 did not survive to 12 months of age (a post-neonatal mortality rate of 23.2 deaths per 1000 live

8 My assumptions for analysis of multi-level models include the following: that contextual variables are not picking up effects of correlated, excluded individual-level variables; that mothers have not selected their contexts by perceived levels of education, existence of contraceptive distribution programmes, or access to health facilities; and that mothers' community of residence at the time of the survey are where the children were exposed to the risk of mortality in earlier years.

9 These children were less than 1 month old because they were born during the month the survey was taken.

births). The independent variables are the same as in the analysis of neo-natal mortality.

The significant household influence on infant mortality was the number of members in the household. For each additional member in the household, children were only 86 per cent as likely to die before reaching age one as children living in households with fewer members ($\alpha = 0.001$). The more household members there were, the more likely the infant to survive. The magnitude of the effect is similar to that in the neonatal mortality model.

Infants whose mothers obtained professional prenatal care were 0.30 times as likely to die in Zimbabwe as infants whose mothers had not obtained such care. This statistic is significant at the $\alpha = 0.001$ level.

Family-level socio-economic variables are important for infant survival. Mother's education (at least primary level) and parents' employment status significantly influence survival of infants. Infants whose mother had a secondary level education were 0.49 times as likely to die ($\alpha = 0.001$) and infants whose mother completed primary level education were only 0.84 times as likely to die, as infants whose mothers did not complete a primary level education ($\alpha = 0.05$). While mother's individual-level education was not significant in neonatal mortality models, it was significant in infant mortality models. In the individual-level post-neonatal model, neither parent has a regular occupation, the infants were 1.74 times as likely to die as children whose parents work in non-manual (including professional) occupations ($\alpha = 0.01$).

According to individual level mode results, infants living in urban areas are 0.41 times as likely to die as infants living in rural areas ($\alpha = 0.001$). And according to results from the community model, infants living in urban areas are 0.62 times as likely to die as those living in rural areas ($\alpha = 0.001$).

Results from the community model reveal that in Zimbabwe infants living in communities where adult female educational attainment is on the average primary or secondary level are 0.38 and 0.08 times as likely to die as infants living in communities where women are largely uneducated ($\alpha = 0.001$). Infants living in communities with Zimbabwe National Family Planning Council (ZNFPC) contraceptive distribution programmes were 0.76 times as likely to die as those without this resource in their communities ($\alpha = 0.001$); and those living in communities with access to hospitals or health centres are 0.66 times as likely to die within the first year of life as those that do not have access to modern health care ($\alpha = 0.001$).

There are some differences between the results of neo-natal and post neo-natal mortality community models. ZNFPC and hospitals or health care centres in the community do not significantly influence neonatal mortality. This social

determinant is less important for neo-natal survival than biological determinants influencing fetal health. But the average level of adult female education in the community is important in both neo-natal and post neo-natal mortality models.

Results from the expanded model reveal that the number of people in the household, professionally administered prenatal care, mother's secondary level education, parent's regular employment, urban versus rural residence, the average level of women's education in the community, ZNFPC contraceptive distribution programmes and hospitals and health centres in the community all significantly influence infant survival (Table 5). The magnitudes of effects are similar to the proximate model of individual-level family and household variables. The main difference is that education of individual mothers is a weaker determinant of post-neonatal mortality in the saturated model. Whereas maternal secondary level education was a strong determinant of child survival in the model that excluded community variables, once community variables are added in a saturated model, the average level of female education in the community overshadows the effect of maternal education on infant survival. Among neonates, the effect of individual mother's education in the saturated model is not significant in either the individual-level or saturated model, although the level of education of women in the community is a significant determinant of neonatal survival (refer to Table 4).

Discussion

The individual-level model effectively sets the stage for results to follow in the community and expanded models. Its performance is supported by the chi-square statistics in Table 3 which report that the community model is improved by the addition of proximate and background variables. The proximate determinants framework yields some useful predictors, but not all variables significantly influenced neo-natal and post neo-natal mortality in Zimbabwe.

Individual-level variables that are consistently significant predictors of child survival include the number of members in the household, whether the mother obtained prenatal care from a doctor or nurse and parents' employment. The household contamination variables did not yield significant results as was expected. Household contamination, as measured by a factor of porous floor material, refrigerators, distance to household water, and modern toilet facilities, is not an important indicator of new-borns' and infants' health status once other socio-economic variables are taken into account. And although the number of household members was an important indicator in all four models in which its effect was estimated, it operated less as a crowding and increased contagion variable and more as a possible childcare variable.

As was expected, community-level variables gave added explanatory power to the individual-level models. High proportions of women receiving a secondary level education in the community was the most important community-level variable influencing infant mortality, with access to hospitals and the existence of ZNFPC programmes being important as significant determinants of post-neo-natal survival.

Educational levels of women in the infant's community proved to be more significant than the education of an infant's own mother in neonatal and post-neonatal models that include both variables. This indicates that equitable distribution of this resource is beneficial to infant and new-born survival (Caldwell 1986). The proportion of young girls enrolled in primary school has declined in most African countries since the 1980s (according to the World Bank and UNICEF), and will probably decline further in coming years. The positive relationship between mass schooling and infant survival will translate into lower infant mortality in Zimbabwe only insofar as the country's population and economic growth levels allow for increased enrolment.

Conclusion

While a clear delineation of the mechanisms linking education and infant survival still remains an unresolved issue, results of this analysis show that secondary-level education of individual mothers and of women in the community promotes child survival. Results reveal that when maternal education and average levels of female education in the community are both observed, the state of female educational advancement (or lack of education) in the community overshadows the effect of the individual mother's educational attainment on infant survival. It is not clear what the average level of female education in the community is actually measuring. At least, it measures the existence of a phenomenon at the contextual level which exerts an effect on infant mortality. We need to do further research to help us more specifically define this context in social terms (and not just as an area demarcated by a specific geopolitical boundary) and then examine specifically what characteristics of this context correlate to proximate causes of health behaviour and outcomes. Is it that uneducated women are mimicking the health promoting behaviour of educated women who live close to them? Or are women who live in close proximity sharing child care information? Another possibility is that there is a greater demand for social amenities that benefit child health and that all benefit regardless of educational level. Ethnographic child care practice studies are needed to get a better grasp of these mechanisms (Feyisetan 1988).

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Cameroun : Pourquoi les noms des grandes figures historiques des années 1950 sont-ils tabous dans la bouche du Président Paul Biya ?

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Abstract: Humans are at the beginning and at the end of any past event. Quoting a historical fact while leaving aside its authors or heroes is of no interest. The different speeches President Biya pronounced in the chief towns of the provinces of Cameroon from August to October 1991 are the best illustrations of that. He never mentioned the names of the figures who were involved in the last fifty years of Cameroon's history. Be that in ignorance of history or a voluntary omission; such attitudes apart from the Head of Cameroonian State are both instructive enough to deserve a sustained historical study. The author takes his stand on three points: referring to Cameroonian historical figures, the context of the provincial tour and its concrete objective, and the historical nature of the present power. His main finding was the following: to remain as long as possible in power, heirs of the outlaw regime would evade any past event susceptible of concurring them.

Introduction

Dans la conclusion de son livre-programme, *Pour le libéralisme communautaire*, paru en 1986, quatre ans après son accession au pouvoir, M. Biya écrit :

Je tiens à le rappeler ici : l'histoire du Cameroun ne commence pas en 1960, avec l'indépendance. Et comment fut-elle donc acquise, cette indépendance ? Elle ne fut point ni «donnée» ni «octroyée» aux Camerounais. L'indépendance de notre pays fut conquise de haute lutte par de nombreux et dignes enfants issus de ce terroir et dont les noms sont, hélas, restés tabous pendant le quart de siècle qui vient de s'écouler (Biya 1986:251-252).

Le deuxième Président de la République du Cameroun salue les efforts déployés par les combattants nationalistes camerounais au cours des années 1950. Ils ont arraché l'accession à la souveraineté de leur territoire, le plus souvent au prix de

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leur vie (Chaffard 1967; Joseph 1986). Ils exigeaient l'indépendance et la réunification immédiates, toutes revendications nuisibles aux intérêts à court et à long termes du colonisateur français. Les personnages de Ruben Um Nyobé, de Félix-Roland Moumié, d'Ernest Ouandié et d'Abel Kingué, principaux dirigeants de l'Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC) — parti politique créé le 10 avril 1948 — sont associés à cette phase cruciale de l'histoire du Cameroun (Chaffard 1967). Le pouvoir français leur a préféré des hommes-lignes pour conduire le destin du Cameroun indépendant. Tel a été le cas d'Ahmadou Ahidjo; il a dirigé le Cameroun du 18 février 1958 au 6 novembre 1982 (Owona 1982:3; Gaillard 1994). Il a conservé ses fonctions pendant ce «quart de siècle» en éliminant systématiquement ses adversaires par la violence et par l'imposition du parti unique, l'Union nationale camerounaise (Bayat 1979). Sous son autorité et même sous celle de son successeur, jusqu'à la réinstauration effective du multipartisme le 12 février 1991,¹ l'on était sérieusement inquiet dès qu'on posait les actes suivants : exposer les images des nationalistes cités ci-dessus, prononcer leurs noms en public ou diffuser leur idées. Certains Camerounais, dont notre collègue Achille Mbembe, l'ont appris à leurs dépens.² Les efforts de créativité intellectuelle, inhibés par la peur, en ont été affectés. Nous nous permettons d'observer que M. Biya était déjà Secrétaire général de la présidence de la République à compter du 16 janvier 1968 (*Journal officiel* de la République fédérale du Cameroun 1968:277); il est devenu par la suite Premier

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- 1 Les tout premiers partis politiques, la «Démocratie Intégrale au Cameroun» (DIC) et l'UPC ont été légalisés à la suite d'une décision signée le 12 février 1991 par le ministre de l'Administration territoriale, Gilbert Andzé Tsoungui, *Cameroun Tribune*, no. 4826 du 15 février 1991 page 5. Notons au passage que l'UNC, créée le 1^{er} septembre 1966, est devenue le Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais (RDPC) le 24 mars 1985. C'était la seule formation politique autorisée à l'époque.
 - 2 En juin 1976, deux cents étudiants, enseignants et employés des services publics et privés sont arrêtés et détenus sans inculpation ni jugement pour avoir diffusé des tracts pro-upécistes, hostiles au régime du Président Ahmadou Ahidjo. Ils ne seront libérés qu'après quatre ans et même après novembre 1982 à la suite de l'entrée en fonction de M. Biya, Mbembe (1984:18). Le 13 septembre 1976, Sébé Njoh, journaliste, «fête» le dix-huitième anniversaire de la mort de Ruben Um Nyobé (ancien Secrétaire général de l'UPC) sur toutes les chaînes de la radiodiffusion nationale. Il est vivement inquiet et suspendu d'antenne pendant plus de six mois. Nous citons de mémoire. En juin 1981, son compatriote Achille Mbembe, étudiant à la faculté des lettres et sciences humaines de l'Université de Yaoundé, rédige son mémoire de maîtrise d'histoire intitulé : «La violence dans la société bassa du Sud-Cameroun. Essai d'analyse historique». Il pose un «acte de rébellion» en dédiant son texte à Ruben Um Nyobé. Les enseignants, devant siéger au jury, prennent peur et se rétractent. Le candidat ne soutient pas son mémoire; néanmoins les autorités universitaires lui délivrent le diplôme, Mbembe (1993:81-82).

ministre du Président Ahidjo du 30 juin 1975 (*Journal Officiel de la République Unie du Cameroun* 1975:801. *Cameroon Tribune* 1975:1 et 6) au 6 novembre 1982 (*Cameroon Tribune* 1982c:1, 2 et 3).

Sa réflexion apparaît alors comme une rupture nette avec le passé, avec la démarche d'un homme dont il a été longtemps l'un des plus proches collaborateurs. L'on note que le nouveau président a «l'intention» (Mbock 1985) de construire une société nouvelle, plus ouverte et plus juste en associant les idées de tous ses compatriotes, morts ou vivants. Car, soutient-il à Douala le 24 février 1983, «.. de la grande oeuvre de construction nationale, une oeuvre difficile et de longue haleine, une oeuvre de tous, une oeuvre pour tous, personne ne doit être écarté, personne ne doit s'écarter» (*Cameroon Tribune* 1983g:12).

Cette formule semble prescrire que le Cameroun devrait faire la politique de son Histoire. Toutefois, nous percevons comme une lacune dans la réalité. Certes, M. Biya rend hommage aux «nombreux et dignes enfants issus de ce terroir». Mais il ne prononce pas leurs noms. Plusieurs mois se sont écoulés depuis la parution de *Pour le libéralisme communautaire*. Son auteur a eu d'autres occasions de s'exprimer par la suite sur l'évolution de son pays. Il élude toujours les noms des personnages historiques des années 1950. Le Chef de l'Etat camerounais montre donc qu'il a de la suite dans les idées. Sa démarche, relativement cohérente, semble avoir une signification profonde que l'historien se doit d'expliquer. Nous nous fondons sur les dix discours qu'il a prononcés au cours de sa deuxième tournée provinciale (28 août, 4 octobre 1991); la première s'est déroulée du 9 février au 11 juin 1983 (*Cameroon Tribune* 1983h). Les références aux grandes figures historiques du Cameroun, le contexte de cette visite et sa finalité réelle, et la nature historique du système politique actuellement en vigueur au Cameroun seront nos principaux repères.

Les références aux grandes figures de l'histoire du Cameroun

Ahmadou Ahidjo est le premier personnage historique auquel se réfère le Président Biya. C'est que de nombreux liens unissent les deux hommes. Le 4 novembre 1982, à la surprise générale, M. Ahmadou Ahidjo, à la tête de l'Etat depuis de plus de vingt-quatre ans, décide de quitter ses fonctions de Président de la République Unie du Cameroun (*Cameroon Tribune* 1982a:1). Deux jours après, il transmet les pouvoirs à son successeur constitutionnel, le Premier ministre Paul Biya (*Cameroon Tribune* 1982c:1, 2 et 3). Au départ, les deux hommes sont des employés de la fonction publique. L'un est commis des Postes et télécommunications (*Journal officiel du Cameroun Français* 1942:98). C'est lui qui, devenu Chef de l'Etat, recrute l'autre dans la fonction publique camerounaise en juillet 1962, sur une recommandation écrite du Dr. Louis-Paul

Aujoulat, leur parrain commun (Kuoh 1991:116-117). Très vite, Ahmadou Ahidjo fait du «jeune Paul Biya» son principal collaborateur. Les deux hommes entretiennent des relations solides et confiantes pendant vingt ans. Mais, subitement, moins d'un an après sa démission et pour des raisons diverses, le Président Ahidjo tente de retirer de la main gauche ce qu'il a donné à M. Biya de la main droite (*La Gazette* 1984, *Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens* 1989, 3506, *Jeune Afrique* 1989:5-15, Gaillard 1994). Il est même accusé, en août 1983, d'avoir fomenté un complot contre son successeur. Il est jugé et condamné à mort par défaut en février 1994; la peine est commuée à une détention à temps (*Cameroon Tribune* 1984a:1). La tentative de coup d'état du 6 avril 1984 — exécutée par des Camerounais originaires pour la plupart des trois provinces septentrionales du pays comme l'ancien président - ravive encore la tension entre les deux hommes. D'autres malentendus, multipliés et grossis par leurs entourages, scellent la rupture, lourde de conséquences pour l'ensemble du pays.

Pour le Président Biya, la prononciation du nom d'Ahidjo évolue au rythme de ses rapports avec son ancien patron. L'on constate que, dès sa prise de fonctions, il s'engage à respecter la constitution; et, surtout, il place son action sous le signe de la fidélité à Ahmadou Ahidjo. Il voue alors une admiration sans bornes à son «illustre prédécesseur».

...Digne et prestigieux fils de ce pays, père de la nation camerounaise, artisan de son unité et de son développement, le Président Ahmadou Ahidjo se sera révélé à nos yeux comme un géant de l'histoire camerounaise, de l'histoire africaine, de l'histoire tout court (*Cameroon Tribune* 1982c: 3, Fouman Akamé 1983:234).

L'adulation envers ce «leader exceptionnel et vénéré» ne dure que le temps d'une rose, de novembre à décembre 1982. Dès le début des tensions, au second semestre de l'année 1983, M. Biya ne se réfère plus à M. Ahidjo que comme «mon prédécesseur», «l'ancien président», «les nostalgiques».³ Est-ce que c'est un nom tabou ?, lui demande alors un journaliste français le 15 novembre 1984. «NOT, rétorque-t-il, le nom d'Ahidjo n'est pas tabou, vous voyez, je le prononce. Monsieur, je le prononce». (*Cameroon Tribune* 1984c:3). Rien n'y fait. C'est la dernière fois, dans une prise de parole publique, que l'actuel occupant du palais de l'unité prononce le nom du «fondateur de la République». Un mois avant sa disparition survenue le 30 novembre 1989 à Dakar, le Président Ahidjo n'est plus qu'un «fantôme» que le gouvernement Biya n'a plus

3 Le 17 mai 1984, M. Biya dit aussi d'Ahidjo qu'il est un «vivant témoignage du passé», sans le nommer, *Cameroon Tribune*, no. 2977 du 18 mai 1984, p.3; voir aussi *Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens*, no. 2011 du 25 mai 1984, p. 1321 et *La Gazette*, no. 503 Spécial du 29 mai 1984, p. 13.

guère le temps de «ressusciter» (*Cameroon Tribune* 1989:1). Nous avons dressé ci-après un récapitulatif (tableau 1) indiquant la date et le lieu des prises de parole publique du Président Biya pour la période allant de novembre 1982 à novembre 1984. Ces données sont suivies de chiffres représentant le nombre de fois où le deuxième Chef de l'Etat du Cameroun prononce le nom de son prédécesseur.⁴ □

Ainsi, en dehors d'Ahidjo, M. Biya ne nomme pas d'autres grandes figures des années 1950. Il a plutôt recours aux personnes historiques de la fin du XIX^e et du début du XX^e siècles. Les noms de Rudolf Douala Manga Bell et de Martin-Paul Samba deux héros de la résistance contre le protectorat allemand, pendus le 8 août 1914 sont choisis pour baptiser deux promotions successives de jeunes officiers issues de l'Ecole militaire inter armes du Cameroun (EMIA) en 1986 et 1987 (*Cameroon Tribune* 1986: 3, 1987:3). L'on se serait attendu à ce que les promotions suivantes portent les noms des autres «dignes enfants issus du terroir camerounais». M. Biya suspend son répertoire historique. Et subitement, le 27 juin 1991, au plus fort de la contestation de son régime, il l'ouvre à nouveau et annonce que, «demain peut-être», il demandera à l'Assemblée nationale «la réhabilitation politique de tous les fils de ce pays qui ont oeuvré pour sa liberté et son rayonnement et qui ont mérité de la patrie ... quelles que soient les erreurs commises...». (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991h:12). Aussi, la loi portant réhabilitation d'Ahmadou Ahidjo, de Ruben Um Nyobé, de Félix-Roland Moumié et d'Ernest Ouandié entre-t-elle en vigueur le 18 décembre 1991 (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991i:1 et 2). La forme et le fond de ce texte donnent à réfléchir. Ruben Um Nyobé, Secrétaire général de l'UPC, retranché dans le maquis après juillet 1955 a été tué par une patrouille coloniale française le 13 septembre 1958 (Um Nyobé 1984). M. Ahidjo était alors Premier ministre; M. Xavier Torrè haut commissaire (*L'Unité* 1979). Moumié est mort le 3 novembre 1960 des suites d'un empoisonnement, M. Ahidjo était déjà Président de la République du Cameroun (Chaffard 1967:401).

4 Voir *Cameroon Tribune* nos. 2522 des 7 et 8 novembre 1982, p. 3; 2526 du 12 novembre 1982, p.3; 2533 du 20 novembre 1982, p.3; 2534 des 21 et 22 novembre 1982, p.6; 2557 du 18 décembre 1982, p.3; 2568 des 1^{er}, 2 et 3 janvier 1983, p.3; 2587 du 25 janvier 1983, p.3; 2601 du 10 février 1983, pp. 3 et 12; 2602 des 13 et 14 février 1983, p.3; 2604 du 16 février 1983, p.3; 2612 du 25 février 1983, pp. 3 et 12; pour les discours prononcés à Bafoussam, Buéa, Garoua, Maroua, Ngaoundéré, Bertoua et Batouri, cf. no. 2698 des 12 et 13 juin 1983; pour Yaoundé (18 juin 1983), no. 2703 du 18 juin 1983; et 3130 des 18 et 19 novembre 1984, p.3.

**Tableau 1 : Prise de parole publique de P. Biya et récurrence
du nom d'Ahidjo**

Dates et lieux	Récurrence du nom d'Ahidjo
06.11.1982, Yaoundé	5
11.11. " Yaoundé	2
19.11. " Yaoundé	2
21.11. " Yaoundé	5
17.12. " Yaoundé	2
31.12. " Yaoundé	3
24.01.1983, Yaoundé	1
09.02. " Bamenda	1
10.02. " Yaoundé	1
15.02. " Paris	3
16.02. " Paris	1
24.02. " Douala	1
18.03. " Bafoussam	1
15.04. " Buéa	1
04.05. " Garoua	2
05.05. " Maroua	1
06.05. " Ngaoundéré	1
26.05. " Bertoua	1
27.05. " Batouri	1
18.06. " Yaoundé	4
15.11.1984 Yaoundé	1

Source: Compilé par l'auteur.

Le dernier leader upéciste, Ernest Ouandié, a été fusillé le 15 janvier 1971 à Bafoussam sur ordre du Président Ahidjo. Il est donc établi que celui-ci a été un complice actif de l'élimination physique et même le bourreau de ses trois adversaires politiques. Honorer la mémoire de quatre personnages le même jour et dans un même texte semble prêter à équivoque et procéder de l'amalgame. La presse gouvernementale s'en est fait l'écho, entre les lignes : «Ahidjo, Um Nyobé, Moumié et Ouandié. Quatre figures, deux itinéraires» (*Cameroon*

Tribune 1991i:1 et 2). Les héritiers spirituels des «trois martyrs» l'ont sérieusement regretté (*Challenge Hebdo* 1991b:11). De son côté, Mme Germaine Habiba Ahidjo, veuve de l'ancien président, trouve que cette réhabilitation est une

humiliation supplémentaire pour Ahidjo. Je ne porte de jugement sur personne. Je ne fais que constater. Le Cameroun a bien le droit de réhabiliter tous ses fils, il le fait et c'est bien. Mais, doit-on réhabiliter Ahidjo dans le même lot que les autres ? Un homme qui a été Président de la République pendant vingt-cinq ans, qui a assumé sa tâche avec dignité, et qui par la suite est parti de lui-même, laissant un pays sain et prospère méritait autre chose (*Jeune Afrique Economie* 1993:95).

En réalité, il convient de noter que le Président Biya promulgue cette loi à deux mois des premières élections législatives prévues le 16 février 1992 (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991k:11). Peut-être veut-il s'attirer les bonnes grâces du grand Nord (les trois provinces septentrionales), l'Ouest et le Centre, régions les plus peuplées du Cameroun. Ahidjo, Moumié et Ouandié, et Um en sont originaires. Nombreux sont ceux qui pensent que cette réhabilitation relève de l'opportunisme et a été décidée à «la carte électorale» (*Le Messager* 1992:2). Cette démarche, relativement intéressée, est-elle déjà inscrite à chaque étape du voyage de M. Biya à l'intérieur du pays dès août 1991 ?

Le contexte de la deuxième tournée provinciale et sa finalité concrète

Le premier Camerounais a visité successivement Maroua, Garoua, Ngaoundéré, Bertoua, Ebolowa, Bafoussam, Bamenda, Douala, Buéa et Yaoundé du 27 août au 4 octobre 1991 (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991j:7-18). C'est une période particulièrement agitée dans la vie nationale. L'opposition tente de réduire l'influence du RDPC, l'ancien parti unique au pouvoir. Sa revendication majeure est la convocation d'une Conférence nationale souveraine pour fixer de nouvelles règles du jeu adaptées au contexte pluraliste. Le gouvernement s'oppose à la réunion d'une telle instance, arguant que la Constitution, en vigueur depuis le régime de parti unique, autorise toutes les mutations nécessaires. Les tenants du pouvoir ajoutent que le Cameroun ne connaît pas de crise institutionnelle, situation qui a rendu la Conférence nationale «nécessaire dans certains pays» (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991c:4, 1991d:3, 1991e:11-14). La plupart des leaders de l'opposition ne sont pas convaincus. Ils campent sur leurs positions et organisent une campagne de désobéissance civile, renforcée par une opération «villes mortes». Ainsi, le citoyen refuse de s'acquitter de ses impôts, de payer ses factures d'électricité et d'eau. L'objectif est de priver les entreprises publiques et l'Etat de ressources financières souvent utilisées à des fins personnelles et pour la corruption. Qui plus est, dans certaines villes comme Douala, les automobilistes ont tendance à enfreindre les règles de la circulation

automobile; le non-respect des feux rouges et des sens interdits devient la règle (Monga 1992:4). La contestation la plus remarquable est l'observation du mot d'ordre de «villes mortes» marquée par l'interdiction de circuler dans les villes, la fermeture des magasins, sans limitation de durée et sans aucun service minimum y compris dans les services de santé. Seuls les samedi et dimanche sont réservés à l'approvisionnement. Il s'agit donc d'une grève générale complètement suivie à Douala, Bafoussam, Bamenda, Mbouda, Maroua, Ngaoundéré pour ne citer que ces exemples. Le gouvernement répond à cette vive contestation par la force. Des commandements opérationnels, forces conjointes de police, de gendarmerie et de l'armée sont installés à Douala, Bafoussam et Garoua le 16 mai 1991 (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991f:1, 1991g 10-11) afin de «rétablir l'ordre par tous les moyens» dans les sept provinces contestataires (extrême-Nord, Nord, Adamaoua, Ouest, Littoral, Sud-Ouest et Nord-Ouest). Le même jour, la direction de la police est confiée à M. Jean Fochivé, policier très redouté, réputé comme un homme à poigne. Il conserve ses fonctions à la tête des services spéciaux de renseignements camerounais. Il les assume depuis 1964 après une brève «traversée du désert» de cinq ans (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991g:10-11). Un tel dispositif rend la confrontation inévitable. Des affrontements entre les forces de l'ordre et les manifestations font de nombreux blessés et près de trois cents morts, selon le rapport annuel du sénat américain (Monga 1992:4). Aucune tentative de dialogue entre l'opposition et le pouvoir ne semble amorcée.

Six associations de défense de droits de l'homme sont dissoutes le 13 juillet 1991.⁵ Elles sont accusées de se livrer à des «activités contraires à leur objet, faisant peser des dangers sur la paix et la sécurité publique» (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991i:5). C'est que, en fait, ces organisations soutenaient l'action des partis d'opposition. De même, des journaux, très critiques envers le pouvoir, sont suspendus en août et en septembre 1991. Citons *Challenge-Hebdo*, *Le Messager*, *Galaxie* et la *Nouvelle Expression*, hebdomadaires paraissant à Douala (*Galaxie* 1991:1 et 2). Le contexte apparaît donc très tendu. L'on ne perçoit aucun geste d'apaisement. Les divergences se cristallisent au point où un carton rouge, de même dimension que celui utilisé dans l'aire du jeu de football, demande le

5 Les associations dissoutes sont le Comité d'action populaire pour la liberté et la démocratie (CAP-LIBERTE), l'Organisation camerounaise des droits de l'homme (OCDH), le Collectif des femmes pour le renouveau (CFR), la Human Rights Watch (HRW), l'Association des chauffeurs professionnels et l'association nationale des sportifs camerounais.

départ de Paul Biya. Le document, signé «Le peuple camerounais», est largement distribué dans l'opinion.

C'est dans cette ambiance que M. Bello Bouba Maigari, Premier ministre de M. Biya, du 6 novembre 1982 au 22 août 1983 (*Journal officiel* de la République unie du Cameroun 1982:2940, 1983:2177), héritier spirituel du regretté président Ahidjo, rentre d'exil le 17 août 1991 (*Challenge Hebdo*: 1991a:1 et 5). Près de 20.000 camarades de l'Union nationale pour la démocratie et le Progrès (UNDP), l'accueillent à l'aéroport de Douala. Le lendemain, à Garoua, environ 100.000 personnes venues de presque toutes les localités du grand nord (extrême-Nord, Nord, Adamaoua) lui font un véritable triomphe. C'est comme si le Président Ahidjo, ressuscité, retrouvait sa ville natale après huit ans d'absence ! Le Cameroun septentrional aurait-il donc basculé dans l'opposition ? Encore que, ici, les populations n'ont pas oublié la répression brutale qui a accablé certaines d'entre elles à la suite de la tentative de coup d'Etat d'avril 1984. De violentes manifestations ont d'ailleurs été organisées ici le 17 janvier 1991 pour réclamer la «libération des prisonniers politiques» (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991a:23). La qualité de l'accueil réservé à M. Bello Bouba semble avoir inquiété sérieusement le pouvoir.

Le Président Biya commence son périple par le grand Nord, dix jours seulement après le retour de son ancien collaborateur. Sa stratégie d'occupation du terrain consiste à montrer qu'il a la situation en mains. Il incarne la «légalité républicaine»; alors, les populations et les bailleurs de fonds internationaux peuvent continuer à lui faire confiance. Il n'est donc pas dans l'intention du Président de la République de dire une moindre parole favorable à ses adversaires : des faits ou des noms de personnages historiques récupérés ou adulés par l'opposition. C'est de bonne guerre. Cet argument est d'autant plus recevable que le locataire du palais de l'unité est convaincu qu'une Conférence nationale souveraine, revendication majeure de ses adversaires, a pour finalité de réduire progressivement ses prérogatives. Les exemples du Bénin et du Togo sont fort édifiants. Il préfère alors les élections : un vote, organisé par les soins d'une administration acquise à l'ancien parti unique et à son «grand camarade», assurerait inmanquablement sa victoire et le conforterait dans son poste. Il lance cette idée à Paris le 3 avril 1991 (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991d:3), la confirme et commence à la répandre à l'intérieur du Cameroun huit jours après (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991e:11-14). Et, à toutes les étapes, surtout à Bertoua (4 septembre), à Ebolowa (6 septembre), à Douala (20 septembre) et à Yaoundé (4 octobre), il martèle ces phrases (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991j:18):

... Le peuple est, et doit demeurer, au commencement et à la fin de tout pouvoir exercé en son nom.

Le peuple accorde sa confiance ou la retire selon des modalités établies.

En démocratie, ces modalités, c'est le recours aux élections libres.

Et si nous prétendons nous faire l'écho de la volonté populaire, si nous sommes sûrs de parler au nom du peuple, pourquoi aurions-nous peur de recourir à la sanction du peuple ? Ayons le réflexe patriotique d'aller devant le peuple pour solliciter le droit de la représenter, et d'agir en son nom.

Sa tournée provinciale apparaît donc comme une sorte de campagne électorale qui ne dit pas son nom. D'ailleurs, M. Biya commence son allocution en citant, l'une après l'autre, les «nombreuses réalisations économiques, sociales et culturelles» du «Renouveau» dans la région visitée : infrastructures routières, immeubles publics, aides aux agriculteurs, complexes industriels, établissements d'enseignement scolaire et universitaire. Il fait aussi des promesses «raisonnables». Il dit ne tenir que le «langage de la vérité». Il déconseille vivement le recours à ses adversaires: ce ne sont que des «marchands de rêves et d'illusions», des «vandales», des «irresponsables» (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991j: 7-18). Comment peut-il citer nommément les idoles et les gloires de l'opposition dans ce contexte? Car, il sait que prononcer le nom d'Ahidjo à Garoua le 29 août, ville natale de son ancien patron et fief de l'UNDP, c'est favoriser ce parti. Il lit juste ces deux phrases lapidaires: «.. La providence a voulu, qu'ici, naisse le premier Président de la République du Cameroun. L'histoire et le peuple camerounais le retiennent» (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991j:9). Il n'a pas regretté la mort de son prédécesseur comme il convient. Il n'a pas non plus posé un geste allant dans le sens du rapatriement des restes du défunt. Qui plus est, dire aussi les noms de Félix-Roland Moumié, d'Ernest Ouandié, d'Abel Kingué, de Noé Tankeu et de François Fosso à Bafoussam le 11 septembre, c'est conforter l'UPC et d'autres partis alliés sur leur terrain de prédilection. M. Biya reprend alors à son compte les méthodes fortes utilisées par ses prédécesseurs Mbida et Ahidjo. Il met ses compatriotes de l'Ouest en garde contre la politique du «tout ou rien». Car, si la rébellion resurgit, elle sera encore matée comme du temps du Général Briand (Chaffard 1967:392-401). au début des années 1960 La menace est à peine voilée (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991j:13):

... Mieux que quiconque, vous connaissez le prix de la paix et de la liberté.

Les épreuves que notre pays a connues à l'aube de son indépendance, ont eu des conséquences douloureuses dans cette région. Il faut avoir constamment à l'esprit les fils du Cameroun qui ont payé de leur vie leurs choix intransigeants.

Aujourd'hui, cette triste page de notre histoire est tournée. Nous n'avons pas le droit de recréer les angoisses et les horreurs du passé.

Traduction : Moumié et ses compagnons ont eu tort de combattre le colonisateur français et ses collaborateurs camerounais pour «l'indépendance et la réunification immédiates» ! Cette «intransigeance» semble pourtant saluée dans *Pour le libéralisme communautaire*: une indépendance conquise «de haute lutte» par de «nombreux et dignes fils issus de ce terroir». Peut-on mener une «haute lutte» sans être rigoureux sur les principes et les choix à mettre en oeuvre ? La contradiction apparaît donc ici entre l'écrivain politique de 1986 et un homme d'Etat contesté, engagé à conserver ses fonctions à tout prix avec l'avènement du pluralisme. De même, les noms de Foncha et de Muna ne sont pas cités à Bamenda le 12 septembre (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991j:14). Sans doute faudrait-il comprendre que les deux hommes d'Etat, désabusés, se sont éloignés et ont choisi des voies contraires à celle du Président national du RDPC. Le 20 septembre à Douala, M. Biya ne nomme que Lydwig Mpondo Akwa, Ngoso Din et Rudolf Douala Manga Bell, des figures marquantes de la résistance contre la domination allemande au Cameroun (1884-1916). C'est comme si des nationalistes des années 1940 et 1950 comme Makanda Pouth, Alexandre Ndoumb'a Douala Manga Bell et Marcel Bebey Eyidi n'avaient pas éprouvé l'administration coloniale française à Edéa et à Douala ! (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991j:15). Enfin, le 4 octobre à Yaoundé, les noms des combattants nationalistes Um Nyobé et Osendé Afana sont franchement occultés. M. Biya fait allusion à André-Marie Mbida, mais n'en prononce pas le nom (*Cameroon Tribune* 1991j:17). Il s'agit du tout premier Premier ministre du Cameroun français (13 mai 1957, 18 février 1958) (Abwa 1993). L'intéressé était aussi le fondateur du Parti des démocrates camerounais (PDC). Evoquer le souvenir de cette formation politique déjà légalisée serait un bon point pour son président Louis-Tboe Mbida, fils de l'ancien chef de gouvernement, et ses militants. S'il parvient enfin à prononcer le nom d'André-Marie Mbida le 6 octobre 1992 à Monatéle, chef-lieu du département de la Lékié et fief du PDC (*Cameroon Tribune* 1992:3), c'est qu'il est déjà assuré du soutien de cette formation politique à l'élection présidentielle prévue seulement cinq jours seulement après.

Au total, tous les personnages dont le Président Biya tait les noms sont des nationalistes ou hommes d'Etat de la première heure. Ils l'ont précédé sur le terrain de la lutte pour la décolonisation et la construction de l'Etat camerounais. Est-il alors aisé d'avancer que l'actuel Chef de l'Etat du Cameroun ignore l'histoire du Cameroun et, par ricochet, les noms de ces «nombreux et dignes enfants issus de ce terroir» ? Il y a lieu d'en douter. Car, Paul Biya est né le 13 février 1933 à Mvomeka'a, près de Sangmélima, au Sud du Cameroun. La recherche d'une bonne formation scolaire et universitaire l'a amené à quitter son village natal et à séjourner successivement à Nden, Edéa, Akono et Yaoundé de 1940 à 1956. Il a fait ses études universitaires en France de 1956 à 1962

(Fouman Akamé 1983). Il était déjà majeur, donc un témoin lucide des joutes politiques en cours au Cameroun dès le milieu des années 1950 (Chaffard 1967, Joseph 1986). Ses aptitudes intellectuelles lui ont aussi permis de s'instruire davantage sur l'évolution politique et sociale de son pays, avant l'accession à l'indépendance. Il a dû lire des journaux et rencontrer des personnalités politiques camerounaises et françaises impliquées dans ce processus. Il tenait par ailleurs à compléter sa formation en science politique, quelques mois après son retour au Cameroun. Il semble que ses multiples fonctions administratives et politiques ne lui ont pas laissé le loisir de soutenir une thèse de doctorat de science politique à la faculté de droit de Paris sur «Les institutions et la vie politique du Cameroun depuis l'indépendance» (Gonidec 1969:86). M. Biya a aussi été Directeur du cabinet civil du Président de la République de 1967 à 1968 et Secrétaire Général de la Présidence de la République de 1968 à 1975. A ce titre, il traitait presque toutes les affaires du pays. Il a dû suivre le déroulement de la lutte contre la rébellion upéciste et l'exécution de son chef Ernest Ouandié le 15 janvier 1971 (Kom 1971, Mongo Beti 1972). L'âge du Président Biya, son cursus scolaire et universitaire et ses hautes fonctions administratives et politiques nous permettent de noter qu'il est un témoin privilégié des événements décisifs survenus au Cameroun depuis le début des années 1950. Quoi qu'on dise, il demeure un membre actif du système politique en vigueur depuis l'avènement de la loi-cadre Defferre du 23 juin 1956. Son prédécesseur Ahmadou Ahidjo le soulignait déjà le 19 août 1985 dans une interview à l'Agence France Presse (*Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens* 1985:2152):

Je croyais que si barons il y eut, M. Paul Biya était le premier d'entre eux. Si j'avais un jour à écrire mes mémoires, on y verrait comment la plupart des hommes nouveaux d'aujourd'hui n'étaient que des anciens du sérail dont certains ont même montré jadis beaucoup de zèle

Aussi trouvons-nous utile d'expliquer davantage l'attitude du Président Biya à l'égard des grandes figures historiques du Cameroun en nous interrogeant sur la nature même du système politique actuellement en vigueur au Cameroun.

La nature historique du régime de la loi-cadre Defferre

Essayons d'abord de rappeler quelques faits dont répondent les gestes des hommes actuellement au pouvoir au Cameroun. L'UPC a été interdite le 13 juillet 1955 à la suite d'un décret du gouvernement français (Levine 1984/1964, Chaffard 1967, Joseph 1986). Ce mouvement nationaliste, acculé à la clandestinité, a choisi de revendiquer l'indépendance et la réunification immédiates des deux Camerouns, français et britannique. Il est resté intransigeant sur ces options, ce qui avait sérieusement ébranlé le colonisateur

français, soucieux de contrôler le mieux possible les immenses ressources naturelles et humaines du territoire. L'objectif de la France, déjà présente sur les quatre-cinquièmes de l'ancien Cameroun allemand, était de continuer sa domination après l'indépendance. L'utilisation des collaborateurs indigènes était donc nécessaire pour la réalisation de ce dessein (Kuoh Moukouri 1963, Mveng Evina 1981, Tsalla 1994). C'est dans ce contexte qu'il convient de situer l'avènement de la loi-cadre Defferre du 23 juin 1956 et les élections subséquentes, surtout la législative organisée exactement six mois après, jour pour jour (Levine 1964/1984, Joseph 1986). Elle aboutit à la formation d'une chambre de 70 membres et à la constitution du premier gouvernement autochtone dirigé par André-Marie Mbida. L'avantage de la métropole a été de disposer de l'un des meilleurs connaisseurs des élites camerounaises de l'époque. Il s'agit du Dr Louis-Paul Aujoulat. Médecin, catholique pratiquant, il était arrivé au territoire en 1936 (*Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens* 1949, 1937a, 1937b, *La Croix* 1952, Foray 1981). Le but de son séjour était de constituer et d'animer des infrastructures de santé, utiles aux autochtones et à l'influence française. Citons par exemple Efo, Bafang. Il était soutenu par sa propre fondation dénommée Association des laïcs universitaires catholiques et missionnaires (AD-LUCEM) créée à Lille en 1932. En 1951, il fonde le Bloc démocratique camerounais (BDC), parti politique dont seront successivement issus le Front national (1955), l'Union camerounaise (UC, 1958), le PDC (1958), le Cameroon United Congress (CUC, 1965), l'UNC (1966) et le RDPC (1985). Ce schéma chronologique apparaît comme un « arbre généalogique des partis administratifs au Cameroun ... ceux qui doivent leur existence à l'administration (coloniale), au pouvoir, au gouvernement » (Eyinga 1992). Louis-Paul Aujoulat est donc député du Cameroun, secrétaire d'Etat à la France d'outre-Mer, rue Oudinot, de 1949 à 1953 et ministre de 1954 à 1955. C'est à partir de ces années qu'il accueille, encourage et soutient de nombreux étudiants camerounais nouvellement arrivés en France. Il leur assure une formation d'homme en plus leur cursus académique. D'ailleurs, la plupart des « médecins africains » camerounais ayant terminé leurs études dans les facultés de médecine françaises remerciaient le D. Aujoulat ou lui dédiaient leur ouvrage dès les premières pages de leur thèse. Les exemples édifiants sont fort nombreux (Bebey Eyidi 1950, Tchoungui 1956, Wang Sonnè 1989). Le travail de ce praticien français, extrêmement intelligent et travailleur, consistait donc à favoriser l'accession aux responsabilités des élites camerounaises plus portées à la conciliation qu'à « l'intransigeance » dénoncée avec vigueur le 11 septembre 1991 à Bafoussam. Pour mémoire, les principaux moules de « conciliation » étaient l'Ecole primaire supérieure de Yaoundé (Tsalla 1994); le Centre d'instruction médicale d'Ayos (Wang Sonnè 1989); les facultés de médecine françaises et l'Institut des hautes

études d'outre-Mer devenu depuis Institut international d'administration publique (IIAP), rue de l'Observatoire à Paris. Pour nous, les lauréats de ces institutions scolaires et universitaires sont des fidèles de la loi-cadre, ou, plus précisément, il convient de les appeler «membres du groupe Aujoulat». Car, ils réunissent un certain nombre d'attitudes communes :

- ils n'aiment guère les têtes nouvelles, surtout lorsque celles-ci sont des héritières des associations animées dès les années 1950 par des combattants nationalistes ;
- un rappel de la mémoire de ces derniers est, pour eux, un véritable épouvantail. Par exemple, des personnages qui, à l'époque coloniale, collaborèrent avec les autorités coloniales, voient leurs statues érigées dans les villes, tandis que les noms des héros sont délibérément occultés, même dans le cadre des opérations récentes de baptême des rues, places et monuments publics menées à Yaoundé et à Douala (1994 et 1995) ;
- enfin, ils sont réticents sinon opposés à tout débat contradictoire susceptible de les affaiblir.

Louis-Paul Aujoulat a donc largement contribué à mettre le dispositif en place, au moment de l'application de la loi-cadre. Il choisit des élites camerounaises pour jouer la carte de l'administration coloniale d'abord et du néocolonialisme ensuite. Il est nécessaire de noter que «jusqu'aujourd'hui, la fonction de premier chef du gouvernement autochtone et de Chef de l'Etat n'a été occupée [au Cameroun] que par ses héritiers et obligés» (Eyinga 1992). L'itinéraire politique d'André-Marie Mbida est suffisamment connu (cf. supra Abwa 1993). En plus, c'est Aujoulat lui-même qui, si l'on en croit l'ancien administrateur des colonies Pierre Chauleur (*Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens* 1973a:3572):

avait détecté les élites susceptibles de prendre en mains le destin des nouveaux Etats. C'est ainsi qu'il avait distingué à Garoua celui qui devait devenir le président de la République du Cameroun [Ahidjo] et lui avait porté une amitié attentive qui ne devait jamais se démentir. En France, il accueillait chez lui les étudiants d'Afrique à chaque heure du jour et de la nuit.

Qu'on nous comprenne bien. Faute de sources de première main, nous ne pouvons interpréter immédiatement comme semble l'affirmer le politologue Abel Eyinga ci-dessus que Ahmadou Ahidjo, ses collaborateurs et ses successeurs étaient ou sont des *béni oui oui* des Français et de leurs alliés. Certes, M. Ahidjo a effectué cent voyages en France de février 1958 à janvier 1960 alors qu'il était Premier ministre ! (Abwa 1993). Sans doute allait-il recevoir des instructions; la période était très délicate au Cameroun. M. Biya, paraît-il, vient de s'offrir les services du Français Yvon Omnès, ancien ambassadeur de France au Cameroun (1984-1993). Mais, il s'est trouvé des Camerounais qui, en intégrant le groupe,

voulaient peut-être changer les choses de l'intérieur. Ont-ils réussi ? Les historiens des années 2000 nous édifieront. Toutefois, nous observons que le groupe Aujoulat a utilisé et continue d'utiliser tous les procédés pour se maintenir au pouvoir : imposition des méthodes du parti unique sous un régime pluraliste, succession aux hautes responsabilités de père en fils ou au moyen de relations amicales,⁶ utilisation de l'Ecole nationale d'administration et de magistrature de Yaoundé et de l'IIAP de Paris, véritables «laboratoires» de recrutement des décideurs de la République. Voilà pourquoi il nous semble fort utile de suivre les premiers pas de M. Paul Biya dans la fonction publique camerounaise. Nous devons les lignes suivantes au ministre Christian-Tobie Kuoh (1991:116-117), témoin direct de son recrutement :

Je me souviens alors, comme si c'était d'hier, de cette fin de matinée de cette journée de l'été de l'année 1962. Le président [Ahidjo] me fit venir et me tendit une enveloppe décachetée. Très laconique, il me dit : «Tiens cette lettre et prends ce postulant au cabinet». Je me retire à mon bureau et prends connaissance de la correspondance qui lui a été personnellement adressée. Elle émane de M. Louis-Paul Aujoulat, personnalité très connue au Cameroun, ancien ministre de la IV^e République française, ancien député du Cameroun au parlement français avant l'indépendance dans les années cinquante; ancien représentant à l'Assemblée représentative du Cameroun et à un moment même président de cette assemblée. Catholique fervent, très proche du clergé camerounais, sa démarche de s'intéresser au jeune Paul Biya, ancien séminariste comme lui, s'expliquait aisément. Son poulain venait de sortir de l'Institut des hautes études de la France d'outre-Mer, qui prépare des administrateurs civils appelés à servir dans les Etats des pays francophones. Et l'intéressé s'appêtait à faire carrière dans l'administration camerounaise, son pays d'origine.

Je le convoque et me voilà face à un jeune homme de bonne tenue, inspirant la sympathie, plein de prévenances. Le premier contact est bon; aussi je l'affecte dans un service où je peux personnellement suivre sa formation. Le voir assez souvent, ce qui me permettra de mieux le connaître et de constater ses progrès. Un an passe sans qu'avec le président nous ayons la moindre conversation sur ce jeune fonctionnaire évoluant au cabinet...

6 Nous nous permettons de citer deux exemples puisés dans les quarante dernière années de l'histoire du Cameroun. Arouna Njoya a été ministre dans les gouvernements Mbida (1957-1958) et Ahidjo (1958-1966). Son fils Adamou Ndam Njoya a été à son tour ministre sous l'autorité du Président Ahidjo de 1975 à 1982. Le Dr Simon-Pierre Tchoungui a été ministre dans le gouvernement fédéral puis Premier ministre de l'Etat fédéré du Cameroun oriental de 1965 à 1972. Son fils Roger Tchoungui a été membre du gouvernement Biya de 1989 à 1992.

L'on sait déjà que les années suivantes transformeront le destin du «jeune Paul Biya». Il gravira tous les échelons de la haute administration camerounaise jusqu'au fauteuil qu'il occupe aujourd'hui. Ainsi l'ont été André Fouda, Enock Kwayeb, Jean-Faustin Betayene, Onana Awana, Moussa Yaya, Etèki Mboumoua, Mbombo Njoya, Sabal Lecco, Marcel Marigoh Mboua, Sadou Hayatou et bien d'autres encore qui ont élargi le cercle (Eyinga 1992). Peut-on alors imaginer chacun de ces coéquipiers prononcer facilement les noms des nationalistes «intransigeants» cités et vivement critiqués plus haut ? C'est voir leur influence réduite et le pouvoir leur échapper à court ou à moyen terme. Car une lecture attentive et honnête de l'histoire du Cameroun nous oblige à faire cette remarque : le régime de la loi-cadre qui est le contexte dans lequel le groupe Aujoulat est installé à la tête du Cameroun depuis trente-huit ans (du 13 mai 1957 à la date où nous achevons cet article, décembre 1995), fonctionne sur la base de l'exclusion.

Conclusion

Le Président Biya observe beaucoup de réticence et de distance à l'égard des grandes figures historiques et surtout des combattants nationalistes camerounais des années 1950. Avec Ahmadou Ahidjo, il y a juste eu une méprise ou quelques différences d'appréciation entre deux hommes formés à la même école par le même père spirituel. La crise de bicéphalisme qui les a opposés de juin 1983 à avril 1984 n'a en rien modifié les liens profonds qui unissent les deux membres éminents du groupe Aujoulat. M. Biya reconnaît lui-même au plus fort de ces «remous de surface» que c'est par la volonté du Président Ahidjo qu'il est devenu Chef de l'Etat et «qu'on a un père pour la vie» (Gaillard 1994:229). Ce qui sous-entend qu'il est «le fils» d'Ahidjo.

Il ne peut donc se réclamer ni de Ruben Um Nyobé, ni d'Ernest Ouandié, ni de Félix-Roland Moumié, ni d'Abel Kingué, et ni de tous ceux de leurs compagnons et héritiers qui ont payé de leurs personnes pour une libération politique, économique et culturelle réelle du Cameroun. Tous les gestes que le deuxième Président de la République du Cameroun pose en public le montrent à suffisamment. Cette attitude relève d'une certaine vision de l'histoire du Cameroun, exprimée depuis 1957. Elle ne privilégie que les actes posés par les piliers du groupe Aujoulat et leurs proches collaborateurs (Eyinga 1995). L'on perçoit déjà la place subalterne réservée aux autres Camerounais, «fusent-ils de vivants témoignages du passé».

Aussi une nouvelle conceptualisation de l'histoire du Cameroun s'impose-t-elle aujourd'hui. Car, dans l'itinéraire de chaque grand homme, se révèlent des épisodes entiers du passé d'un pays. Ce sont de nombreuses pages qui s'ajoutent à nos volumes d'histoire. Une bonne catégorie de citoyens peut retrouver là plus

d'enseignements, plus de dignité et un stimulant décisif pour l'exécution des tâches quotidiennes, la maîtrise de l'environnement et la construction de l'avenir. Ce désir ardent de réécrire l'histoire pourrait aussi préparer une nouvelle dynamique du partage du pouvoir à toutes les échelles de la société.

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Heterodoxy in Political Economy: From an Alternative to the Walrassian Model to a Synthesis with Neo-classical Methodology

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Résumé : Inspirée par les courants de pensée de Grenoble et de Paris, l'école régulationniste (1975) analyse le système capitaliste selon une perspective à la fois historique et spatiale, en tant qu'alternative à la théorie walrassienne de l'équilibre général. Les concepts et approches mis en oeuvre sont uniques et permettent une analyse novatrice d'une part des relations économiques internationales, et d'autre part, de la dynamique de croissance et de la crise du système capitaliste. Critiqués par les conventions, proches de la nouvelle économie institutionnelle américaine, les régulationnistes sont aujourd'hui confrontés à des incertitudes et à des phénomènes économiques chaotiques les obligeant à renouveler leurs outils de travail conventionnels.

Introduction

The history of political economy has been marked by the debate on how to measure the value of goods. With the development of trade in capitalist economies, economists have been increasingly confronted with the question of how to compare goods of different nature to establish a common measure as a basis for trade. As Di Ruzza (1994:41) pointed out, 'goods must necessarily have a common denominator, a basic substance they can be brought back to'.

Economists have proposed two different types of solutions to this question. There is on the one hand the theory of work-value, prevalent from the classical period to Marx, which based the value of goods on the work which forms both their substance and their objective measure. On the other hand, the subjective theory of value states that the usefulness of goods is their only source of value, and based on their rarity, serves as a means of measurement. These divergent solutions formed the basis for the division between heterodox and orthodox

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streams of thought in political economy. By the end of the nineteenth century, Walras and the Marginalist school opposed their theory of usefulness-value to the objective vision of the classicists. This new theory progressively dominated the field of political economy, becoming the central matrix of all analysis. Subsequently, throughout its history, the heterodox school of thought based its entire research programme and its attempts to construct an alternative paradigm on criticism of Walrassian theory.

Walras founded the subjective value theory, but the scope of his research programme went beyond the study of natural laws governing exchange values and trade, or what he referred to as 'pure economy'. He also sought to analyse the concrete operating conditions of the economy (applied economy or social economy), covering problems linked to the distribution of wealth. However, this scientific undertaking was never brought to completion, since he was held up by difficulties in reconciling the notions of justice and interest whose competition constitutes, according to Weiller and Carrier (1994:31), 'a monumental challenge to anyone seeking to construct a rational economic science of trade and distribution'.

Although he was forced to subjugate the logic of justice to the rationality of Pure Economics, Walras continued to attempt new forms of synthesis between the two notions.¹ However, these new findings were not formalised and incorporated into his other works (Weiller and Carrier 1994). The second uncompleted aspect of Walras' research efforts resides in the incomplete formal construction of his research project. According to Weiller and Carrier 1994, the incompleteness stems, 'first and foremost from pure economy, in which many demonstrations were not made, but also and especially from a broader scientific project (...) in which hypotheses on rational logics of interest and justice were never completely formalised'.

Walras' scientific undertaking was continued in two different directions. First, the Parétian orientation sought to establish the domination of Pure Economics over Social Economics, thus resolving the conflict between the logic of interest and the logic of justice by formalising the Walrassian project. This school of thought which has dominated the field of Political Economics, forms the 'orthodox' paradigm. The second orientation, that of Antonelli, does not deny the importance of Pure Economics, but conserves a more open, pluralistic attitude in its analysis of economic dynamics. E. Antonelli tried to set the Walrassian analysis into a general framework by proposing an analysis of

1 L. Walras proposed a new method for reconciling justice and interest.

capitalism as an economic system. Furthermore, he states that unlike the Walrassian project which concentrated on static aspects, his study must take into account the system's evolutionary dynamics.

Parallel to this internal debate among followers of Walras, the heterodox protest against Walrassian orthodoxy was already beginning to develop. This new tradition came to light in the writings of Simiand (1987) who attacked several aspects of Walras' work. Firstly, he criticised the concept of a *homo economicus* which in his view reduced complex individual motivations to a simple principle. Simiand (1987) also opposed the Walrassian theory of trade and its suggestion of determinism where prices are concerned. His opposition stems from the fact that the theory also reduces the trade networks and relationships constructed by our societies to a relatively simplistic principle. Finally, he attacks the concept of equilibrium which is the foundation of Walras' work. Simiand (1987) considers equilibrium to be an exceptional situation in the operations of contemporary economies. From that perspective, Simiand believes that economists should concern themselves more with situations of disequilibrium in contemporary economies, rather than try to define the conditions for an improbable equilibrium. As early as the beginning of the century, these criticisms formed the content of the heterodox research programme which was clearly set apart from the Walrassian programme. Indeed, if for the latter the objective was to pursue the works of Walras and Paréto, to refine the formal aspects so as to increase the coherency of the construct, the heterodox research agenda is to set as priority, the analysis of the real and formulate its relevancy. This concern is central to the heterodox movement and explains its constant renewal.

Thus, with the profound transformation of economic structures in capitalist economics in recent years due to the crisis, there has been a major renewal of the heterodox school of thought. One of the first attempts at adjustment was made by the Anglo-Saxon Marxists who sought to construct a new general theory of exploitation based on the analytical tradition (*Actuel Marx* 1990, special issue). From a methodological standpoint, this movement rejects the holism of Marxist tradition in favour of methodological individualism. Furthermore, analytical Marxism favours a 'moralistic' discourse on notions of freedom and equality over philosophising on history. According to Bidet and Texier (2000), this new discourse,

is in keeping with the zeitgeist: it reconstructs exploitation using the very categories of what is called 'bourgeois' Economics (neo-classical Economics), debates on justice using the terms of the radical American philosophy, and approaches individuality not as a product of social relationships, but as a principal for rational activity and choice.

Finally, this stream of thought refutes the work-value theory, basing its analysis of exploitation on ownership relationships (Romer 1982). According to this perspective, capitalist exploitation arises, in the tradition of analytical Marxism, from restricted, unequal access to the means of production.

This rejection of the work-value theory is also at the heart of another attempt at renewing the heterodox approach. The new concepts abandon the theory of work-value and consequently criticise the supporting hypothesis of that theory which states that economic agents are socialised in production, and that trade only sanctions a pre-existing power struggle. According to this stream of thought, socialisation is carried out through trade and the market which can set prices. Not only is the work-value theory abandoned, but the orientation also criticises the subjective value theory on the grounds that it does not describe the operations of a decentralised economy, but rather those of a specific form of centralised economy. Indeed, the existence of an auctioneer and the strategic role he is given in the tentative Walrassian model effectively reduces the decentralised economy to a centralised one. From that perspective, centralisation in the Walrassian model means that there is *a priori* validation of economic activities, whereas a true decentralised economy should give a more important role to the market, and validation is carried out *a posteriori*.

This research movement has proposed several explanations for the socialisation of economic agents. Aglietta and Orléan (1982) use Girard's analyses of desire and imitation to analyse the socialisation process, and see money as the central institution in this process. Others see the wage relationship as the core of socialisation (Benetti 1978; Benetti and Cartelier 1980). This relationship is not market-based, as claimed by neo-classical theory, but is based on a coercive relationship which allows for an unequal distribution of wealth. De Vroey (1987; 1990) combined both approaches in his attempt to construct a new theory which would be an alternative to General Economic Equilibrium, using a model based on money and the wage relationship. From that perspective, money obeys two types of logic:

- a centralised logic linked to political sovereignty, in which context money plays an important role as a standard which can be used to validate the operations of the economy;
- a decentralised or private logic in which money plays the role of medium of exchange.

Similarly, the wage relationship is considered as a specific social relationship which belongs both to market logic and politico-institutional logic.

These approaches, despite their heterodox affiliations, agree with the neo-classical approaches in that they consider that the goal of political economy is to answer the fundamental question of the viability of a decentralised economy. Furthermore, the two approaches also converge in their analysis of socialisation mechanisms, since they introduce other institutions complementary to the market, to ensure the stability of market regulation. However, they differ as to the nature of these institutions. While the Walrassian model introduces the auctioneer, the alternative approaches prefer different institutions such as money or the wage relationship in order to avoid changing the object of study, and continue analysing decentralised economies.

At this point, the work-value theory could take one of two directions: either concentrating on an analysis of production and the struggles over power between businesses and workers, or focusing on the sphere of exchanges and circulation. Benetti and De Vroey chose the latter alternative, rejecting the notion of added value, and making a study of the commercial relationships which they supposed to be the source of the socialisation of economic agents.

Simultaneously with these approaches based on market analysis, towards the middle of the 1970s there began to develop a new approach known as Regulation theory, which studies production by seeking to determine the principles of regulation besides the market. These new theories rapidly came to predominate among heterodox scholars and set themselves up as an alternative to the theory of general equilibrium. However, after a decade of productive research, in which many areas of economic analysis were renewed, Regulationist research seemed to have gone as far as it could and required a major overhaul of its analytical tools. One way to achieve renewal is hinted at by the alliance and the points of convergence between the Regulationist programme and the convention theory. These points of convergence, strongly criticised though they may be, sparked the evolution of certain elements of heterodox thought towards theoretical and methodological positions close to methodological neo-classicism and the neo-Keynesian programme. The section that follows examines that evolution.

Regulation Theories: Some Elements and an Evolution

Regulation theory is a new theoretical approach which began to develop in the middle of the seventies. At that point, Boccara (1995) was the first economist to use the concept of regulation in economic analysis. Then, G. De Bernis introduced the problem of regulation into economic theory. First, De Bernis (1975), who rejected the General Equilibrium Theory, appealed to the need to construct an alternative framework capable of explaining contradictory aspects of reality, such as the rules and mechanisms that served, at certain well-defined

points in history, to maintain the unity of the growth dynamics in capitalist economies within tolerable limits. In this article, De Bernis proposed to replace the normative hypothesis of general equilibrium with a hypothesis whereby the economic system is regulated by the operation of its own forces.

This hypothesis was expanded using the idea of regulation set forward by the philosopher Canguilhem (1980:1) which was defined as, 'adjustment, in accordance with certain rules or norms, of a multiplicity of movements or actions and their effects or products which were apparently separated by their diverse or successive nature'. De Bernis (1977) introduced the notion into economic theory as a means of renewing heterodox thought and as a point of departure for an alternative to the General Equilibrium Theory. In its reworking of the heterodox approach, the Research Group on the Regulation of Capitalist Economies (GRREC), formed by De Bernis and his followers, granted special status to the two laws of profit, downward counter-trends and equalisation, whose operations and coherent interaction can be used to define periods of stable operation in capitalist economies (GRREC 1983; 1990, *Economies et Sociétés*).

Concomitantly with the Regulationist School in Grenoble, the work of Aglietta gave rise to the new 'Parisian' School of Regulationists. In his thesis on the history of capitalism in the United States and in his book, Aglietta (1982:14) set out a research programme for himself whose objective was 'to study the transformation of social relationships creating new forms that are both economic and non economic, and are organised into structures and which reproduce a crucial structure: the reproduction mechanism'. This work formed the starting point for sustained reflection on a series of issues, including fundamental Marxist categories, such as the value of work, money, credit and inflation in capitalist economies.

Aglietta's trailblazing work had considerable impact on the research community and inspired new contributions by the scientific community in general and the CEPREMAP in particular (Boyer 1987). At the methodological level, the same procedure was used to study the historical evolution of capitalism in France and in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, which contributed to the enrichment of the notion of the system of accumulation. Furthermore, Bertrand (1978; 1983) and Billaudot (1976) helped deepen analysis of the differences between intensive and extensive accumulation. And researchers working on inflation at CEPREMAP were able to develop more precise definitions of the notions of structural forms, accumulation systems and modes of regulation (CEPREMAP-CORDES 1977).

These two currents very quickly came to dominate the Regulationist research agenda. They agreed on a series of issues that led to a major renewal of

economic theory. Firstly, both groups recognised the fundamental importance of production to economic analysis, which entails an analysis of distribution and consumption in relation to the mode of production. Moreover, these analyses also admit the importance of money and attempt to integrate it into the analysis of production.

There are also points of convergence between these two Regulation movements where analysis of capitalism is concerned. In their analysis, they attempted to place the evolution of capitalism in historical perspective while integrating spatial aspects. The work made it possible to envision capitalist dynamics as an alternation between periods of stability and periods of instability, so that periods could be defined in the history of capitalism. And both groups have a similar analysis of the periods of instability in capitalism, supporting the hypothesis of an endogenous source of crisis. They believe the crisis originates in the internal contradictions of the dynamics of accumulation.

However, despite these initial points of agreement as to the need to develop an alternative approach to general equilibrium, divergences soon appeared which opposed the two movements. The first divergence concerns the status the Grenoble school attached to the laws of profit. This status is contested by the Parisian theory which focuses its analysis on mechanisms for adjusting consumption with production. Moreover, the two schools divide capitalism into different periods. The Parisians divide it into two periods: competitive capitalism or Taylorism up until the crisis in the 1930s, followed by monopolistic capitalism or Fordism; while the Grenoble group discerns three major historical periods: competitive capitalism up until the great depression at the end of the nineteenth century, monopolistic capitalism up until the crisis in the 1920s, and State monopolistic capitalism until the end of the 1960s. The two movements are further opposed by differences in their use of certain economic categories, such as the wage relationship, or certain types of analysis of the current crisis.

Regulation theory developed considerably in the 1980s, becoming more and more frequently used. In this context, Jessop (1989) identified seven different streams of thought on the international level which implicitly or explicitly referred to the problem, this being proof of the idea's richness and vitality. However, before we examine the development of Regulation theory in recent years in greater detail, we must first understand the conditions under which it came to be.

Conditions of the Genesis of the Regulationist Research Agenda

Regulation theory was born in a specific context characterised by the outbreak of crisis. This context influenced the field of political economy to the extent that it required theories to produce tools capable of explaining the loss of stability in economic growth dynamics. In this context, neo-classical theory (Classen and Salais 1978) develops two lines of analysis for the economic crisis:

- according to some, the crisis is the result of external shocks like the oil crisis of 1973, or the money scare in 1971, which upset the stable operations of the economy;
- according to other economists, the crisis is linked to the rigidity of institutional structures set in place in the 1950s and 1960s which impede the market's own adjustment processes and, as a result, prevent Western economies from attaining equilibrium.

According to the economists of the synthesis, the crisis stems from the intensive internationalisation of economies which renders Keynesian tools for economic policy stimulation and action ineffective.

These analyses have been judged insufficient by economists seeking to construct an endogenous analysis of the advent of crisis (Grefe and Reiffers 1978). Their rejection of conventional analysis of the crisis led them to refute the hypothesis of a perpetual crisis in capitalism, and to seek out the reasons underlying the alternation between periods of structural stability in accumulation and periods of crisis in the history of capitalism (Coriat 1994). This analysis enabled economists to underscore the hypothesis that there are special mechanisms and procedures allowing capitalist economies to regulate themselves and maintain their contradictions within tolerable limits.

Along with analysis of the crisis, the Regulationist programme developed under the influence of Althusser's work. Althusser's first two books (1965a; 1965b) and especially the concepts of structural dynamics and overdetermination held definite attractions for first-generation Regulationists. In the France of the early 1960s, Althusserism breathed fresh life into Marxist philosophy, renewing a tradition that had become ossified with Stalinism. This renewal effectively liberated the theoretical philosophy from the political and created the conditions for the autonomy of theory and the development of a scientific movement which took its inspiration from Marxism.

The main contribution of Althusserism was its view of historic reality as a complex combination of contradictory and autonomous relationships. This constituted a break with classical Marxism which analysed ideological structures and power relationships as a simple reflection of the development of productive

forces. However, this autonomy was only relative since it also recognised the overdetermination of certain relationships in relation to others. Thus, Althusser envisioned historical reality as a succession of ideologico-politico-economic configurations with varying degrees of stability (Lipietz 1988).

In order to study these configurations, Althusser introduced the concept of the social formation, defined as a particular combination of modes of production. Each social formation is overdetermined by a specific mode dominating social relationships among agents. This domination lends unity to the formation, and this is manifested on the political level through political hegemony, i.e. the ability of the dominant classes to set up their own interests as being representative of the 'general' good of the nation. The concept of social formation allows us to analyse historical reality as a multiplicity of contradictions overdetermined by each other. Furthermore, it allows us to explain, economically speaking, how societies manage to control the explosive nature of their contradictions and maintain periods of stable growth (Lipietz 1988).

Furthermore, Althusser contested the deterministic view of history seen as the result of the development of forces of production, which advanced the hypothesis that the development of these forces in capitalism should lead to socialism. Indeed, according to Althusser, the development of production forces would lead only to capitalism to the extent that these forces are not neutral but are analysed as social relationships intertwined with the organisation of production.

However, Althusserism, stressing the concept of reproduction and the capacity of social formations to overcome obstacles, came to abandon the concept of contradiction and reject the subject. These positions derive from the fact that in Althusser's analysis, social relationships are seen as structures that can reproduce themselves and overdetermine the subject. Indeed, as Lipietz (1988:3) points out, 'Althusserism came to reject the contradictory nature of social relationships themselves, as well as the autonomy of the individuals and groups involved in these relationships, and their ability to set themselves up as social subjects capable of changing the structures'. Thus, faced with the structural ossification of Althusserism, the Regulationists developed the problem of Regulation, which, although inspired by Althusser's work, distanced itself from the determinism of the concept of reproduction and its functionalist repercussions on analysis, by rewriting the history of capitalism as an alternation between periods of stability

and instability.² The crisis which struck at the end of the 1960s helped the Regulationists further distance themselves from reproduction-oriented analysis.

Besides its Althusserian heritage, the Regulationist research project also drew on Keynesian Economics, particularly its analysis of money in the production economy, and the Institutionalists for their consideration of conventions and institutions in the operation of capitalist economies.

Definition of Regulation

As we mentioned earlier, De Bernis was one of the first economists to suggest the concept of Regulation as an alternative to the concept of equilibrium in the field of political economy. In an early definition of the notion of Regulation, he stated that:

The introduction of historic time into economic analysis seems incompatible with the central hypothesis of general equilibrium. However, it seems possible to introduce the notion if we replace this hypothesis by the great classical hypothesis held by the likes of Smith, Ricardo, Marshall and Marx, to that of the capitalist economic system is regulated through the action of its own operating laws... From another perspective, using another central hypothesis this analysis of Regulation takes up the principal contribution of Walras' general equilibrium theory, which is the idea that all participants in the economy are in a permanent situation of global interrelationship with each other (De Bernis 1975:924).

A few years later, De Bernis (1983:174-175) explained the content of the idea of Regulation, which he defined as:

The process of linking together the two laws of profit in as much as the broader reproductive process depends on them. Since each of the laws — is incarnated in specific forms during each period... their linkages necessarily take different forms in each period.

According to Aglietta (1976),

To talk about the Regulation of a mode of production is to seek to express the means by which the determinant structure of a society is reproduced in its general laws... A theory of social Regulation is a global alternative to the General Equilibrium Theory... The study of the regulation of capitalism cannot be a search for abstract economic laws: It is the study of the transformation of social relationships which create new forms that are both economic and non economic, and that are organised in structures and reproduce a determinant structure, the mode of reproduction.

2 This is what A. Lipietz is referring to when he describes Regulationists as the rebellious children of Althusser (Lipietz 1995).

For his part, Boyer defined Regulation as 'a dynamic process of adaptation of production and social demand, a conjunction of economic adjustments associated with a configuration of social relationships, institutional forms and structures' (Boyer, Bénassy and Gelpi 1979). This content was again confirmed by Boyer (1979) when he stated the content of the concept in the 'Parisian' research programme, saying:

- We will use the term Regulation to designate the conjunction of mechanisms working towards the overall reproduction of the system, given the state of economic structures and social forms. Regulation is the source of short- and medium-term dynamics... However, very long-term dynamics are not the mere result of the succession of fluctuations and cycles, but also essentially involve the political and social struggles which, although partly determined by the dynamics of accumulation, cannot be reduced to it.

By studying these different definitions of Regulation, we can understand the points of convergence between the two principal Regulationist schools on two levels (Boyer 1987):

- both schools sought to construct an approach that would be an alternative to the General Equilibrium Theory in the field of political economy;
- both attempted to develop a grid for analysis which could include the evolution of the various adjustment mechanisms of capitalism, thus integrating the temporal aspect into economic research.

However, these definitions also reveal divergences between the two approaches. These divergences concern the status of the laws of profit, the importance of value theory and the weight of adjustments between consumption and social need in the regulation of the economy.

Concepts in Regulation Theories

In this section we will deal only with concepts from the Paris and Grenoble schools of Regulationist thought. This will enable us to come to a better understanding of the contents of the problem.

According to the Grenoble theory of Regulation, the process of accumulation-enhancement of capital requires two main types of adjustment which correspond to the needs of expanded reproduction:

- adjustment of the structure of production and social need: needs must be satisfied in order to ensure the economic reproduction of society. This requirement entails clearly-defined quantitative relationships between various types of production. As a result, a coherent allocation of capital among various industries will be ensured by capital competition and the tendency of profit rates to be equalised within capitalist economies;

- adjustment of conditions of distribution so as to ensure the reproduction of capital and manpower. This adjustment is the social manifestation of the class struggle over the distribution of the fruits of labour between capitalists and workers, and on the theoretical level it is expressed by the interaction of counter-trends towards lower profit margins.

Thus, the process of capital accumulation-enhancement depends on the combination of these two laws of profit. Regulation of the capitalist mode of production is defined in this context as the coherent interplay of these two laws. This interaction requires 'social procedures' which differ from one period to another, and which together constitute the 'mode of Regulation' capable of ensuring the stability of the process of accumulation and maintaining any imbalances within tolerable limits. Thus, taken together, these movements ensure that the system operates and govern the spatial distribution of economic activities.

In the light of this, Regulation theory introduced the concept of 'the production system' as a spatial context for the organisation and distribution of the accumulation of capital. The productive system is defined as a system that produces something, that is a system capable of generating a surplus product, or more precisely as 'taken together, the working processes and the enhancement processes governed by the same specific mode of Regulation during a period in the history of capitalism' (Calvet, De Bernis, and Di Ruzza 1983:6).

Thus defined, the production system presents three main characteristics (De Bernis 1983:235-287):

- 'coherence' which refers to the sectoral coherence of the accumulation process and the correspondence between production and social need where distribution is concerned;
- 'autonomy' which refers to the autonomy of the rate of accumulation due to mastery of the distribution system;
- 'time-space dynamics' which ensures a relatively stable evolution.

The concept of the production system is very useful for theory and analysis. Using this concept, the following can be achieved (Gerbier, and Di Ruzza 1986:3-7):

- first, Regulation theory can be spatialised, and the production system can constitute the area of operation of the regulation mode;
- second, the time dimension can be introduced and the crisis analysed as the destruction of systems of production bringing on a slackening in relationships of domination between dominant and dominated nations.

The point of departure of the 'Parisian' theory of Regulation is the concept of 'mode of production' in which accent is placed on the Althusserian tradition regarding production relationships. The mode of production is defined as 'any specific form of production and trade relationships, i.e. social relationships governing the production and the reproduction of the material conditions required for human life in society' (Boyer 1987:43).

The mode of production is not envisaged in its pure state, but analysed as part of a complex whole made up of production and trade relationships. In this perspective, Regulation theory limits itself to the study of the capitalist mode of production characterised by a particular form of trade and production relationships. In this context, trade relationships take on market form, while production relationships mean the separation of direct producers from their means of production, and the obligation of workers to sell their manpower.

But Regulation theory makes its analysis at a lower, or intermediary, level of abstraction, with the introduction of the concept of the 'accumulation system' defined as:

The sum of the regularities that ensure general and relatively coherent progress in the accumulation of capital so that the imbalances and disequilibria constantly arising from the process itself are either absorbed or stretched out over time (Boyer 1987). The analysis of systems of accumulation requires the study of the organisation of production and the temporal horizon of capital enhancement, conditions for value sharing, the interaction of social demand and production capacities and the mechanisms linking them with non capitalist forms of production.

The second intermediary notion held by the Paris school of Regulation theory regards the 'institutional forms' that correspond 'to all codification of one or many fundamental social relationships' (Boyer 1987:48). This notion can be used to understand the source of the regularities that ensure the stability of the economy's growth dynamics. Among these institutional forms, Regulation theory concentrates on: forms of monetary constraint, configurations of the wage relationship, forms of competition, mechanisms of adherence to the international system and forms of state intervention in the economic dynamics.

The third notion introduced by Regulation theory is the 'mode of Regulation' defined as 'a set of individual and collective procedures and behaviours which has the following three properties:

- reproducing fundamental social relationships through a conjunction of historically determined institutional forms;
- supporting and 'guiding' the system of accumulation in effect;

- ensuring the dynamic compatibility of a set of decentralised decisions, without the economic actors having to internalise the entire system's adjustment principles (Boyer 1987:55).

This notion helped Regulation theory distinguish itself from General Equilibrium Theory since the former conceived a set of norms or institutional rules channelling the individual behaviour of economic agents.

Together, these notions and concepts helped Regulation theories apprehend historical realities and produce analyses that would help it rebuild its dynamics.

Results of Regulation Theories

Using the concept of the production system, the Grenoble school of Regulation theory was able to develop a new analysis of international economic relationships. Indeed, one of the most vital contributions of Regulation theory is its consideration of the production system as a multinational system to the extent that the dominating nation attempts to integrate other 'peripheral' nations into its operations. The relationships thus created between dominating and dominated nations, in the context of the production system, are relationships of power struggles and domination exerted through the trade situation, direct investments, and monetary flow (De Bernis and Byé 1987; Borrelly 1991).

From this perspective, throughout the history of capitalism, the structural stability of the capital accumulation process central to each production system has needed regular and continuous recourse to external support. By integrating certain areas, capitalism sought to raise profit margins by bleeding a good part of the national surplus off into peripheral areas and adjusting production and social need to a larger scale.

The integration of these outside areas, which is necessary to stabilise the accumulation process in the central country, and which was carried out using different forms and mechanisms according to period, is an obstacle to the accumulation of capital in peripheral nations. Indeed, the development of the production force in dominated areas was initiated from the outside and answered no imperative of internal coherence and national integration.

The Grenoble Regulationists also concerned themselves with analysis of the crisis in capitalism. Social regulation procedures were unable to ensure the sustained structural stability of the accumulation process, and accumulated contradictions finally threatened the ability of the mode of regulation to resolve problems, leading to open crisis. The ineffectiveness of the mode of regulation and its inability to absorb the imbalances arising from the system have led to the destruction of production systems, the destabilisation of technological order, the destruction of pricing standards, the reduction of profit margins and their

disequilibrium from industry to industry, and the disruption of labour relationships.

The GRREC made two types of contribution to the analysis of the crisis. They started initially with a methodological contribution since their analysis had to meet two requirements. First, that the crisis should be analysed as an endogenous phenomenon, a result of the build-up of internal contradictions in the economy. In order to respect that requirement, De Bernis (1983:237) noted that 'it is not a matter of deciding that the crisis can be explained using an arbitrarily determined field of Economics, but rather one of defining our field of study in such a way that it includes all forces that play a role (be it active or passive) in the crisis'.

The second methodological requirement is related to the first. It requires that the problems at the root of the crisis be sought in periods of expanded reproduction. Expanded reproduction is seen as 'the result of a combination of variables, effective during a given period, although they have different rates or types of evolution over time' (De Bernis 1983:241). The effectiveness of the combination is not sustainable and 'crisis arises' notes De Bernis (1983:241), 'when their evolutions give the different variables values (or behaviours) that are too far different from their original values (or behaviours)'. This second methodological requirement is as important as the first since it helps identify the contradictions that will form obstacles to accumulation as they arise during periods of growth.

Based on these methodological requirements, a research question for crisis theory can be developed. According to De Bernis, such a question should provide answers to questions on the origin of the crisis, its evolution and its outcome. This analytical framework has helped Regulationists develop an analysis of the origin of the crisis and, more particularly, its evolution in terms of an opposition between two phases: an initial phase of inflation and opening up of production systems, and a second phase of deflation with the production systems retreating into protectionism.

Finally, this school of Regulation theory managed to use the concept of production systems and crisis analysis to bring forth a hypothesis explaining the emergence of new production organisations in the Third World, (the newly industrialised nations). The economic crisis has produced a widespread movement of decomposition of the structures of the economy. As for the relationships between central countries and satellite countries, the crisis in the mode of regulation and the resultant destructuring of production systems has meant a slackening in the old domination relationships and a modicum of freedom in under-developed countries. The loosening of internal ties within the production systems between central nations and dominated areas has placed the

latter in conditions allowing them to exceed the accumulation of capital determined by the vertical international division of work set into each production system (Borrelly 1987). In some countries where the capital accumulation process has been mastered, new opportunities for accumulation created by the crisis have allowed them to structure a coherent production system operating with its own autonomous mode of regulation..

However, the effects of the crisis are not limited to a movement of decomposition of the former mode of regulation, but also include a trial-and-error attempt to reconstitute a new capitalist mode of regulation and structure a new area of operation for that mode of regulation. In this context, the central nations are attempting to create the conditions and the mechanisms for renewed integration of the satellite countries they need to stabilise their accumulation processes by intensifying trade and the flow of capital.

The renewed integration of satellite countries is an essential dimension of the new mode of regulation presently in gestation. It combines both the old forms of integration which ensured the structural stability of the old modes of regulation and new forms of integration capable of absorbing the imbalances stemming from the current crisis.

The 'Parisian' school also produced a series of original works of research on the capitalist growth dynamic. Unlike the Grenoble school, the Parisians developed their own historical periods of capitalism:

- a period of competitive capitalism covering the period from the end of the nineteenth century up to the crisis of 1929, characterised by a system of extensive accumulation organised on the principles of Taylorism;
- a period of monopolistic capitalism lasting from the crisis of 1929 up to the present crisis, which began according to this theory in 1973, with a system of intensive accumulation along Fordian lines.

But Fordian analysis was the focal point of the Regulationist researchers. This wage relationship characterises the organisation of work, the way of life and the reproductive mechanism of salaried employees, and was behind the strong growth witnessed in capitalist economies following the Second World War. The spread of the scientific organisation of work made it possible to modernise production tools and make enormous gains in productivity. This new organisation of work was coupled with new distribution procedures that associated increased productivity with wage rises. Employees' increased disposable income created a huge market so that internal trade could be re-energised and mass production and consumption associated.

The implementation of specific distribution mechanisms was not the result of direct negotiations between social partners but rather of global discussions between labour unions and employers with strong government mediation. These global social negotiations inspired Regulationists to introduce the notion of 'institutional compromise' (André and Delorme 1983). According to Coriat (1994:125), these compromises 'are not contracts but laws, or regulations, which are rooted in legislation or executive power. Often these compromises, which are complex arrangements, are implemented through unwieldy institutional procedures, as is the case, for instance, with health insurance or pensions'.

Thus, from the early years of its apparition to the end of the 1980s, the Regulationist research programme progressed rapidly and came up with many innovative findings. But the school did not develop a truly original theory and for this reason did not form a complete body of research. The Regulationists themselves speak of 'approaches in terms of regulation' or 'schools of regulation' without actually using the term 'theory' (Lipietz 1987). Furthermore, the development of these approaches paved the way for the development of its first critiques and protests.

Criticisms of Regulation Theory and Attempts at Renewal

Criticism of Regulation Theory can be grouped into three main categories. The first is a criticism of a rather theoretical nature and concerns the status of the new research programme and especially its claim to providing an alternative to General Equilibrium Theory. Cartelier and De Vroey (1989) pointed out that the construction of an alternative framework required either that a new answer be found to the fundamental question of Political Economics on the viability of a decentralised economy, or that new questions be asked. However, according to Cartelier and De Vroey, Regulation Theory brought with it no new developments in this area. Indeed, regarding the functionality of decentralised economies, the authors stressed the ambiguous position of regulationism which is halfway between Walrassian equilibrium and the classical notion of gravitation. Thus, unable to construct a concept which poses an alternative to equilibrium, it seems regulation theory must abandon the status of fundamental theory and resign itself to the intermediary level of reordering and reconstructing the logic of certain historical facts.

Indeed, theoretical work which is restricted to an analysis of the operations of capitalism 'however pertinent and interesting it may be, only reaches an intermediary theoretical level. While in doing so they pointed out the insufficiencies of the dominant theory, essentially, most of these authors have not proposed a new economic theory' (Cartelier and De Vroey 1989). Thus, the majority of Regulationists turned away from the work-value theory, preferring

concrete analysis of capitalist dynamics. Only Lipietz and the Grenoble Regulationists sought to ground their analysis in theory by attaching themselves to the work-value theory and introducing money into the ex-post validation of private work. However, by the beginning of the 1990s, the project's theoretical eclecticism and lack of clear theoretical references led to splintering and Regulationist research headed in diverging directions.

The second criticism levelled at Regulation Theory is analytical in nature. The Parisian School of Regulation Theory has been reproached with under-representing the importance of the international factor in the regulation of economies in developed countries, and especially the use of the Third World to enhance the capital of first world nations. This limitation was underscored by Amin (1994:274) who believes these conceptions of regulation to be 'insufficient since these theories seem to have examined 'Fordian' capitalism with a magnifying glass while ignoring all areas that fall outside the scope of the magnifying lens'. The growth dynamics of Fordism based, according to the Paris Regulationists, on the correspondence of progress in increased production and rising salaries neglects to study the importance of peripheral areas in reproducing the Fordian economy in the Centre. Furthermore, the notion of Fordism has been criticised by certain historians, since the productive and social organisation of post-war France was set up by Regulationists as a canonical model for analysis (Brenner and Glick 1989). Their research has demonstrated that capitalist dynamics in developed countries have had multiple forms of organisation of production and distribution.

Finally, the notion of 'institutional compromise' developed by the Paris Regulationists in their analysis of Fordism has also been challenged (Negri 1994). The critique was based on the fact that from its status as a research finding, the search for 'institutional compromises' has been promoted by the Regulationist programme to the status of ultimate horizon for a solution to the current crisis of Fordism.

However, despite these criticisms, the Regulationist programme fostered a second generation of research, beginning at the end of the 1980s, more interested in the study of economic norms. The issue of norms, which was long marginalised by heterodox theory since it was seen as the province of normative approaches and more precisely, neo-classical theory, is now at the centre of a renewal of the social sciences. The aim is not to construct norms for social operations and make them into a principle or rule for social behaviour. Instead, interest in this idea derives from research on the mechanisms for the socialisation of individuals within a given society. In this light, historical study has demonstrated that societies attempt to structure (sometimes unintentionally)

the laws and rules by which they operate so as to avoid 'chaos' and ensure relative coherence among individual interests, which is necessary for social reproduction. Thus, from a positive viewpoint, the study of norms is an analysis of the process of structuring-destructuring of the rules and laws of social operations.

Since its inception, Regulation Theory has been interested in the idea of norms. The concept already figured in the first definitions of regulation. For example, Canguilhem (1980) defined regulation as, 'adjustment, in accordance with certain rules or norms, of a multiplicity of movements or actions and their effects or products which were apparently separated by their diverse or successive nature'. Hence, the analysis of the evolution of societies and their regulation means studying and identifying the norms governing them.

This issue was central to the renewal of regulation theory in the 1990s. In his study on norms in various regulation theories, Di Ruzza (1993) distinguished three types of norms, each type corresponding to a different level of abstraction. The first type, known as 'regulation norms' constitute the general constraints that need to be obeyed for global reproduction to occur. The stability and coherence of the accumulation process depend on observance of this unintentional norm. From this viewpoint, crisis can be defined as non-observance of the regulation norms due to reduced effectiveness of the social procedures governing observance of these norms. Regulationists have attributed varying forms to this type of norm. It has been seen as the determining structure of society in its general laws (Aglietta 1982), the rules of social cohesion necessary for reproduction (*Ibid.*), the conditions for adapting production to solvent needs (Benassy, Boyer, Gelpi 1979), or the non-decrease of profit margins, in order to ensure capital enhancement.

The second type of norm at the intermediate level of abstraction, known as 'regulatory norms' are those which form 'the framework for the actions of economic actors, says Di Ruzza (1993:14-15), overdetermining their own rationality and channelling their behaviour for periods of variable length'. These norms are far more important in the running of economies since they structure individual behaviour and certain forms of social organisation and help implement global regulation. Thus, the regulatory norms largely determine the content of the mode of regulation and make it possible, as Boyer (1987:54) says, 'to effect the transition from a set of limited reasoning on multiple, decentralised decisions on production and trade, to the possibility of dynamic coherence for the entire system'. Furthermore, the crisis analysed in regulation theories as a rupture in the mode of regulation, can be studied as the result of the decomposition and loss of coherence of the regulatory norms. The Grenoble

school of Regulation Theory defines three regulatory norms: the technical standard, the price standard and the monetary standard.

These norms are also central to the Parisian view of the regulation of capitalist economies, and according to Boyer (1987:48), are 'the source of regularities which channel economic reproduction during a given historical period'. When codified under precise institutional forms, these norms involve monetary constraint, the configurations of the wage relationship, and the forms of economic competition. Indeed, if we limit analysis to the reproduction of capitalist societies, Boyer (1987:48) enumerates the fundamental norms, which include,

money, surely the most all-encompassing, since it defines the means of connection between economic units. Next, the wage relationship, which is essential because it characterises a certain type of appropriation of surplus. And finally, competition, since it describes the mechanisms for relationships between the different centres of accumulation.

Besides these three norms, the Parisian school distinguishes two institutional norms or forms that enable us to define stable regulatory periods, viz. the forms and mechanisms of state intervention and the configuration of international integration of national economies.

The third type of norm, known as 'rational norms' operates on a more concrete level and involves a set of codified, practical rules that dictate the behaviour of economic agents. These norms are similar to the regulatory norms, but their content is more concrete. These include norms of intensity or productivity, forms and contents of protest movements, the particular forms of expression and resolution of such conflicts, the mechanisms of competition between producers and capital competition, the budgetary criteria for state intervention, the management mechanisms of internal and external equilibria and the maintenance of deficits within tolerable limits...

Whereas the regulation norm or global reproductive constraint is unintentional and results from the social action and discipline imposed by regulatory and rational norms on various agents, the latter is the result of their conscious action. In this perspective, it is necessary to examine the means whereby these norms are mediated. Boyer (1987:55) distinguishes three principles of action that allow these norms or institutional forms to be made operative. The first of these is the law, rule or regulation which, according to Boyer, 'is defined from the outset, on the collective level, and whose mission is to impose a certain type of economic behaviour on the groups or individuals to which it applies, through coercion which is either direct or symbolic and mediated'.

The second principle of codification of norms is a compromise resulting from negotiations between social groups with conflicting interests. These negotiations result in agreements on behaviour between economic agents. One example that can be cited is collective bargaining between social partners to establish wage agreements. The final means of homogenisation of the individual behaviour of economic agents emanates from the shared system of values or beliefs held at a given time by the members of a society, which can influence or even dictate rules of conduct and behaviour. These include, says Boyer (1987:56), 'religious beliefs, rules of good conduct... but also, in the economic order, long-term expectations (Keynes' views of the future) and representations of the operations of the economy and the rules of the society involved'.

From this analysis it appears clearly that the analysis of norms, their origins, their social codifications and their destructurations are at the heart of Regulationist theoretical procedures. This method appears very interesting to the extent that it constitutes a fundamental criticism of the General Equilibrium Theory which sees the market as the sole form of socialisation of rational agents. The originality of the heterodox approaches resides in their taking into account the plurality of forms and mechanisms for the socialisation of individuals within a given society during a definite period. The diversity of forms of socialisation allows contemporary societies to channel individual and private undertakings into a global dynamic which could be referred to as a social synthesis, and which does not exclude conflicts.

However, despite this interesting aspect, in our view, the concept of norms as they are envisaged by regulation theories has a form of economic determinism in its analysis of social reproduction. Indeed, in the study of the socialisation process there is a predominance of economic criteria or norms in the definition of social synthesis. While one cannot deny the importance of economic aspects in the overall regulation of societies, to reduce the socialisation of agents and individuals to the structuration of a set of economic norms seems to us to be deficient. More precisely, the elimination of the political sphere and the content of political legitimisation mechanisms severely limit the analysis.

However, despite these limits, regulation theories' attention to norms seems to us to constitute an important renewal of positive theoretical methods for the study of social reproduction dynamics. From that perspective, the analysis of the process of structuring-destructuring various social norms allows us to study and understand the possibility and viability of social organisations based on multiple individual undertakings, without any previous principle of coherence to bind them. However, this analysis should not be limited, as we have stressed, to economic norms alone when defining periods of stable reproduction, but should

also take into consideration the political, legal and other laws and rules human societies use to reduce instability and uncertainty. Furthermore, since the accumulation of capital is not limited to the national context, the analysis of the dynamics of structuring social norms should include the study of international dimensions.

As the Regulationist research project renewed itself by taking norms into account, a third generation of Regulationist researchers began to develop in the mid-1990s by linking itself to the theory of conventions. This approach was the most highly criticised and rejected by Regulationists themselves. This rejection was inevitable because the approach questions the original project of constructing an alternative to equilibrium theory and ties in with the new neo-Keynesian synthesis.

Regulation Theory Revisited by Convention Theory

Convention Theory

Convention theory is a new school of thought which arose in France in the 1980s. The research was motivated by the difficulty of the neo-classical framework to account for economic situations beyond pure and perfect competition. However, the goal of the economists who adhered to the theory was not to amend and extend the framework of standard theory (Dupuy *et al.* 1989). Rather, they were engaged in what Orléan (1994:13) described as, 'a long-standing collective project dedicated to analysing capitalist economies, while recognising the essential role played by non-market forms of coordination, production and resource allocation'.

The movement developed within the parameters of a set of methodological and theoretical guidelines. The first of these was the will to construct a multidisciplinary approach associating Economics with Sociology in order to analyse the various forms of collective action and coordination. The Conventionalists' second requirement was to go beyond the opposition between orthodox and heterodox movements in political economy, which they viewed as sterile. This meant convention theory would take into account the contributions of standard extended theory in the study of organisational and institutional phenomena and recognise the importance of methodological individualism. It is no longer a time for oppositions, but a time for rapprochement, even synthesis, based on a movement, 'dominated', as Orléan (1994:15) pointed out, 'by a sentiment of belonging to one big scientific community faced with difficult problems'.

Despite their common will to develop a broad eclectic framework allowing for a large gathering of unorthodox approaches, the notion of conventions differs

among economists. Initially, the convention could be defined as, 'a mechanism constituting and producing an agreement of wills; having mandatory normative force...; should be understood both as the result of individual actions and as a framework of constraint for its subjects' (Dupuy *et al.* 1989:143). But this relatively abstract definition has been elaborated on by adherents of convention theory in specific fields of analysis. For example, Salais (1989) used the notion to analyse labour relationships. The starting point for this analysis is the neo-classical model's inability to explain the labour relationship since it is established between the employer and employee before the work is carried out. According to Salais, labour relationship reposes on two principles: the signing of a labour contract upon hiring and the implementation of manpower in production. These two principles correspond to two logical equivalencies: the equivalency between future working hours and wages, and an equivalency between current working hours and production. This ambivalence in labour relationship creates a double uncertainty as to the completion of the product and its quality. However, in Salais' view, this uncertainty is always removed in the actual economy by the establishment of two conventions:

- a 'productivity convention' which allows an alternative norm to be substituted for non-existent work when exchanges are made;
- an 'unemployment convention' which constitutes an ex-post procedure for evaluating the productivity convention and allows the employer to make adjustments between projections and actual production.

Based on this, Salais (1989:237) defines labour relationship as:

a compromise, fraught with tension, between two equivalency principles, the first of which establishes an equivalency between future working hours and salary when the employer and employee conclude their market agreement, and the second of which establishes an equivalence between actual work and production in the subsequent stage of production.

The uncertainty stemming from the growth dynamics of capitalist economies during the current crisis is also behind Orléan's (1991) reflection on conventions. According to the author, this uncertainty is a manifestation of the Walrassian market's inability to ensure the coordination of individual action in a decentralised economy. Although the neo-classical theory now recognises uncertainty, according to Orléan, the theory reduces it to probabilisable risk and is therefore unable to explain the evolution of modern economies. Again according to Orléan, uncertainty creates situations of general defiance regarding the constraint of social reproduction.

General defiance can lead to a global risk for systems of socio-economic organisation which cannot be overcome by agreements or private insurance. At

that point, conventions become necessary and their legitimacy 'results from the specific need for coordination that uncertainty or widespread defection poses to the social system' (Orléan 1989:244). The author gives examples of this type of convention, such as the last-ditch lender and deposit insurance. But more than a study of individual forms of coordination, convention theory should allow us 'to understand how a collective logic develops and what resources need to be mobilised to attain stability' Orléan (1994:16). From this perspective, convention theory economists must have at their disposition 'formal tools allowing them to understand the structures linking various market, organisational, institutional or ethical resources, and how their organisation can be made coherent despite the apparent diversity of the logic on which they are based' (Orléan 1994:16).

This search for global coordination mechanisms is also present in Favereau's (1989) work. His analysis of conventions is grounded in a critique of standard theory which reduces the rationale behind individual behaviour to optimisation and the coordination of individual behaviour to market regulation. Furthermore, the extended standard theory, including approaches such as transaction theory, and incentive, agency and contract models, reduces non market forms of coordination to individual agreements between agents. However, increased pertinence in the basic model can be achieved only at the cost of reduced general coherency. In this light, the contribution of Convention Theory according to Favereau (1989) resides in the fact that, besides individual rules and contracts, it attempts to take into account the 'collective cognitive mechanisms' that ensure the coherence of individual decisions in a decentralised economy. By taking these conventions into account, Favereau is able to arrive at an alternative representation of the decentralised economy seen as a population of organisations (in the sense of internal markets) structured by the interactions of reproduction and coherence.

These aspects of the varying conceptions of conventions can help us bring to light the principal characteristics of this new school of thought. Its claim to heterodoxy springs from its origins in criticism of the Walrassian model which reduces coordination between economic agents to market regulation. Furthermore, this school is not satisfied with the additions brought to extended standard theory, since accounting for non-market forms of coordination is limited to individual agreements and contracts. From this standpoint, convention theory aims to develop an alternative approach through the institution of conventions stemming from the collective behaviour of economic agents as a regulating principle in decentralised economies.

However, despite these declarations of principle, one cannot help but note that the Conventionalists' concrete analysis is a repetition of extended standard

theory. The parallels between the two schools of thought are behind a new broader synthesis that the Conventionalists eagerly advocate in order to go beyond the sterile oppositions between 'orthodoxy' and 'heterodoxy'. The rapprochement is visible in their methodological choices, in their abandonment of the holistic approach, and their opting for individualism despite the conventionalists' contention that a global approach to Economics must be maintained.

The ties between the two schools can be seen in the Conventionalists' use of the theory of non-cooperative interaction to analyse interactions between economic agents. However, although this theory makes it possible to relinquish the hypothesis of the auctioneer in the traditional model, it has some difficulty in explaining the viability of a decentralised economy. Finally, a parallel can also be seen in the two movements' conception of institutions. In this respect, despite their reference to Commons, one of the founding fathers of American Institutionalism in the 1920s and 1930s, the Conventionalists seem to be much closer to the vision of the new American institutional Economics. And, while the new institutional Economics claims to have its roots in early American institutionalism, the former and the latter contradict each other on a number of issues (Dutraive 1993). The difference between the two schools of American institutionalism resides in their conception of institutions. While in Commons' view, the institution carries a set of rules and norms that agents may obey, in the reductionist vision of the new institutional Economics, the institution corresponds to the totality of forms of coordination generated by the imperfections of the market. Furthermore, institutionalism recognises and seeks to integrate the action of structures in the definition of coordination institutions, whereas the new institutional Economics limits its study of institutions to individual agreements. This opposition is grounded in the methodological opposition between holism/individualism in the two schools.

In the final analysis, Convention Theory took its departure in heterodox positions and entered into a broad and eclectic synthesis including methodological neo-classicism and neo-Keynesianism. This evolution was accomplished by abandoning holistic methodological positions and rejecting the project of developing an alternative to General Equilibrium Theory. Convention Theory has moved Regulation Theory in that direction.

Conventions and Regulation

The deepening of the current crisis in the mode of regulation and the extensive economic destructuring which is its result have created growing difficulties for economic theory in its attempt to analyse and explain contemporary transformations and change. Certain Regulationist economists, such as Boyer,

even refer to a crisis in macroeconomics due to its inability to explain all the facts that have appeared in the last two decades. This difficulty is all the more important since certain economists attempt to support their discourse with rigorous use of models. According to Boyer (1991), this has led to 'a race between macroeconomic formalisations and the dynamics of change in organisations, techniques and public intervention mechanisms, which constitutes much of the charm but also much of the difficulty of macroeconomic theory'.

The difficulties faced by the heterodox stream of thought and its Regulationist component in analysing and creating models for the recent changes in economic structures were responsible for the temptation to enter into the current synthesis by way of Institutionalism and Convention Theory. This constitutes an admission of the failure of Regulation Theory to renew its analysis and explain the crisis which was its point of departure, which is why part of the Regulationist movement sought to overcome its current stagnation by rediscovering institutional analysis. Indeed, Boyer (1991:6) pointed out that 'macroeconomic theory will better overcome the present crisis if it recognises the major role that institutions and forms of organisation play in the type of equilibrium, the form of cycles and even the transitions from one mode of regulation to another'.

Boyer and Orléan (1994:222) took up the point of departure of the conventionalist research programme, with its criticism of the traditional Walrassian model, as their own. The critique is based on the fact that 'the problems of coordination cannot be resolved on the sole basis of individual rationality: their resolution requires the existence of exogenous data whose mobilisation helps bring out from among the continuum of possible solutions the qualitative differences that will enable behaviour to be polarised'. The traditional theories' inability to analyse non market forms of coordination led Boyer (1995) to suggest the Regulationists renew their analysis by taking all institutional forms of coordination into account. However, inclusion of contractual aspects distinguishes this movement from the attempts at extending orthodox theory, since it attempts to develop a framework for global coherence in the economy. Thus, Boyer and Orléan (1994:223) borrow the notion of 'evolutionally stable strategies' from Smith to define the notion of convention. They see a convention as 'a strategy such that, if it is followed by all members of a population, then no mutant strategy can invade that population'.

Favereau succumbed to the same temptation to revisit Regulation Theory through Convention Theory, who sought to construct a non standard paradigm by combining those two lines of thought with Rawls' (1987;1993) notions of equity. 'Although they are in very different registers, these three theories are supported at a crucial stage of their development, by three rationalisations which.

although they are not identical in their reasoning, seem to make up three different elements of a larger, single piece of reasoning' (Favereau 1994:122). The search for rules and institutions is at the heart of this new 'unique and non standard paradigm', the rules being seen as the solution to the non cooperative equilibrium of a repeated interaction.

Thus Regulation Theory revisited by Convention Theory loses all its originality and loses itself in an eclectic synthesis whose main concern is to study rules and contracts within a decentralised economy. This evolution in the Regulationist research project has given rise to a series of critiques and controversies (Coriat 1994).

Lipietz, de la régulation aux conventions : le grand bond en arrière?' (Lipietz, from Regulation to Conventions: a Giant Step Backwards?), *Actuel Marx*, no. 17, 1995. Indeed, several Regulationists are opposed to this evolution for several reasons. Firstly, the study of individual contracts teaches us nothing about the mechanisms for transition to a general operating model of the decentralised economy. Convention theory does not cover the origin and history of conventions. This issue is subjected to circular reasoning, in which conventions are supposed to guide the actions of agents, and yet they are themselves deduced from the actions of micro-agents. Furthermore, convention theory reduces the complexities of social relationships to horizontal interactions between individuals with no hierarchy. In the final analysis, Convention Theory is a simplification of the original framework of departure from Regulation Theory, which it reduces to a two-dimensional analysis of a world with no hierarchies and no domination.

Conclusion

This presentation has followed the evolution of Regulation Theory. This new paradigm which was developed in the 1970s dominated heterodox research in the 1980s. The aim of this intellectual movement was to develop an alternative to the General Economic Equilibrium Theory which dominated the field of Political Economics. However, after a generation of original research papers, the Regulationist research movement ran into difficulties in analysing the dynamics of economic structures increasingly prey to uncertainty due to the effects of the crisis. These difficulties led certain Regulationists to abandon the initial objectives of their research programme, seeking the means of overcoming these difficulties in a synthesis with the Conventionalist movement. This group of economists rejected holism and the concept of reproduction, turning to methodological individualism and the study of non market forms of coordination.

This evolution was criticised by the mainstream Regulationists. But their criticisms were negative to the extent that they did not lead to new answers to the question of how to analyse the chaotic movements of economic structures.

With that in mind, the dead end presently faced by the Regulationist research project can only be got through intensive reflection on the formal tools that will enable researchers to improve their analysis of the dynamics of economic structures in periods of instability. Since Regulation Theory has always been very open to the contributions of other scientific fields, it can now benefit from recent progress in non linear dynamics in order to spark a new generation of research work in line with the original objectives of the Regulationist research programme.

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Book Reviews

Struggle for the University A Review Article

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The African Experience with Higher Education, by J. F. Ade Ajayi, Lameck K. H. Goma, and G. Ampah Johnson, Accra, The Association of African Universities, 1996, p.xii+276; *The African University and Its Mission*, by Emanuel Ngara, Lesotho, The Institute of Southern African Studies, 1994, p.xviii+194; *Towards a Commonwealth of Scholars: A New Vision for the Nineties*, by Lalage Bown, ed., London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1994, p.xii+245; and *The State of Academic Freedom in Africa 1995*, by CODESRIA, Dakar, CODESRIA, 1996, p.189.

The educational achievements of independent Africa are as impressive as the challenges are intimidating. More schools and universities were established in the first twenty-five years after colonialism than in a century of imperial rule. In 1960, the putative year of African independence, only 9 per cent of the African population was literate, rising to about 50 per cent three decades later. The rapid expansion of education not only led to a massive improvement in the African human capital stock, it also laid the institutional basis for the social production of African intellectual capacities, communities, and commitments. But the constraints, contradictions, and confusions of African education remained daunting, indeed, they deepened as one country after another reeled from the recessions of development and democracy, conditions that were exacerbated by the imposition of draconian structural adjustment programmes, which threatened to decompose the social fruits of *uhuru*.

As with other social phenomena, the educational enterprise in Africa is, therefore, a tale of triumph, trials, and tribulations, a stirring and searing story of perpetual struggle punctuated by sporadic successes and setbacks. From the 1980s, the setbacks outweighed the successes, as the struggles for the reproduction, regulation, and relevance of university education faced

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unprecedented challenges which were, simultaneously, institutional and intellectual, political and pecuniary, and moral and managerial. These are the issues discussed in the four books by some of Africa's leading university administrators and intellectuals. Perceptive and prescriptive in their analyses, they are written with profound and passionate urgency, about university governance and finance, autonomy and accountability, mission and responsibility. They should be compulsory reading for all those who oversee, fund, run, teach, study in, and are committed to the future of, African universities.

The African Experience with Higher Education is an ambitious and detailed overview of the development of university education in Africa, its past accomplishments, present agonies, and future possibilities. Its analysis is as thorough as its recommendations are thoughtful. It is compelling reading. It takes the story from the beginning, tracing the origins and development of Africa's complex and diverse traditions of education. Among those examined are indigenous education, Alexandrian and early Christian education, and Islamic education. The latter gave Africa and the world, the first universities, those of Karawiyyin, founded in the Old City of Fez in 859, and Al-Azhar founded in Cairo in 969, followed centuries later in West Africa by the establishment of the University of Timbuktu. In the meantime, Christian education continued to grow in Coptic Egypt and Christian Ethiopia. And during the era of the Atlantic slave trade, Western education began to make its impact felt along the West African coast, especially in the settler colonies of Sierra Leone and Liberia, and was promoted by the aspiring modernisers of nineteenth century Egypt and Madagascar. Quite fascinating is the debate in Freetown in the 1870s between radical African intellectuals, such as Edward Blyden and Africanus Horton, and patronising European missionaries about the establishment of Fourah Bay College. Debated were issues of the college's relevance, autonomy, and mission in reforming and reinvigorating African society, questions that were to become central in twentieth century African developmentalist discourses.

Fourah Bay remained the only university institution in West Africa until 1948. In fact, it was barely tolerated. Educated 'natives' were despised as uppity and feared as saboteurs of the colonial project, which was not about the modernisation of African society, as it was about its manualisation, turning African men and women into vast armies of underpaid producers for the colonial export economy. In response to the African hunger for education, for liberation from the manual order, and the needs of the colonial bureaucracy for 'native' ventriloquists, a few schools, mostly at the primary level, were established, usually by missionaries. Secondary schools were introduced grudgingly and sparingly. The European colonial empires sought to shield their subjects from the

plague of university education, except, ironically, in the internal settler colonialism of South Africa, where Fort Hare was founded in 1916. The adventurous 'natives' trekked overseas, usually to the imperial metropolises, and increasingly to North America, and sometimes India.

After the Second World War, the manualisation project of colonialism began to crumble in the face of internal social and spatial differentiations, partly spawned by colonial capitalism itself, and the rising tide of nationalist militancy. The African elites wanted the class certification of degrees for themselves and their children, while the beleaguered colonial officials embraced African modernity as the salvation, not of colonialism, but capitalism, as they increasingly came to understand that modernisation could not be realised within the antiquated cultural confines of the colonial system. And so it was that in the twilight years of colonial rule, in the transition to independence, the first universities in British, French, and Belgian Africa were established, each tailored to the traditions of the metropole. For their part, the autonomous states of Liberia and Ethiopia also set up universities, so did the recalcitrant settlers of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, while their southern neighbours plunged deeper into the illusions and blight of apartheid education.

The university entered independent Africa in chains, on the one hand firmly tethered to the academic gold standard of western intellectual currency, conventions, and concerns, and on the other pulled by the unyielding demands of nationalism and developmentalism. The explosion in the number of universities in the 1960s and 1970s was accompanied by increasingly cantankerous calls for autonomy, authenticity, and accountability, pitting against each other the new governments committed to rapid change and the universities wedded to the unhurried pursuit of knowledge; expatriates guarding their privileges and indigenuous staff seeking acceptance; between the advocates of the university as an ivory tower of research and publications and those who saw it as a factory of teaching and manpower training. The competing institutional identities of African universities reflected their promiscuous multilateralisation and partial domestication: colonial models were supplanted by imports from the United States, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere, and superficially grafted on inchoate yearnings for indigenisation. The manifestation of these processes of course varied from one region and one country to another, and the strength of this book lies in its ability to draw out the particularities from the tapestry of general trends.

The 1970s witnessed profound changes in the structure and governance of African universities. First, inter-territorial universities, such as the University of East Africa, and the University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland were

broken up into national universities. Regional university systems in Francophone Africa were similarly dissolved. This led to a proliferation of national universities, and in the case of Nigeria, the creation of an extensive federal and state university system. Within a period of seven years, during the oil boom years of 1975-1982, for example, Nigeria built 22 new universities, raising the total from 6 to 28. Second, expansion was followed by the Africanisation of personnel and curriculum, and the increasing devaluation of the western academic gold standard; indeed, by attempts to forge an African equivalent through the creation of the Association of African Universities and other regional agencies. The work of these organisations, however, was too limited to counter the growing trend towards the nationalisation, often leading to the parochialisation, of African universities. This, in turn, facilitated, and was spawned by, the growing power and proclivity of the state to impose its autocratic will, while at the same time it was reducing its financial responsibilities, which reflected both its growing fiscal crisis and the declining need for bureaucratic manpower. The universities had succeeded only too well in fulfilling the limited mission of decolonisation: they had trained and supplied the required educated labour for the Africanisation of state apparatuses. They were now almost irrelevant to many a ruling elite that worshipped state power and were averse to the rigors of private capitalist accumulation and the insatiable needs of the wider society for sustainable development, and who could reproduce their class position through the blood ties of patronage and the costly privileges of foreign education for their children.

The struggle for the university entered a particularly difficult phase in the 1980s. While newer universities continued to be established in such countries as Nigeria and Kenya, including private ones, and student numbers rose rapidly, the crisis of higher education in Africa became more evident. Diminishing financial resources, combined with mounting state tyranny, led to deterioration of research, teaching, and physical infrastructures, demoralisation of faculty and students, and the social devaluation in the status of academics and the scholarly enterprise. The result was widespread 'brain drain' and 'brain haemorrhage' as academics fled from the universities to other sectors at home or universities abroad, or turned into consultancy hustlers and informal sector hawkers. The crisis of African economies and higher education was exacerbated by ill-conceived structural adjustment programmes imposed by the Bretton Woods twins, the World Bank and IMF. The Bank's misguided neo-classical gospel was imposed on the universities, which were told to adjust through cuts in programmes, hikes in student fees, and financial diversification. Universities were implored to become more entrepreneurial and turn their begging bowls

away from the strained state coffers to the miserly pockets of an often anaemic domestic private sector, itself reeling from liberalisation.

Ajayi and his colleagues examine these issues with admirable clarity. In the last section of the book, Chapters 8-11, they focus their penetrating and pragmatic gaze on special issues that confront African universities and what ought to be done to restructure and revitalise them. They discuss many pertinent issues. First, the importance of upholding academic freedom, not as an exclusionary privilege, as expatriates in the 1960s and the white universities in South Africa construed it to be, but as an essential condition for the advancement, transmission, and application of knowledge. Academic freedom and university autonomy, they insist, must be accompanied by social accountability. Universities must revise their colonial and postcolonial nationalist and developmentalist missions, and unflinchingly commit and confine themselves to providing higher education guided by the pursuit of excellence, creativity, and relevance, not as dictated by the state or reactionary popular elements, but by the enlightened aspirations of society. Mediocrity, whether of students or teaching staff, has no place in a university, which must be centres and beacons of excellence. They cannot achieve these goals without managerial efficiency, democratic governance, and the promotion of gender equity. They close the book with an impassioned plea that the continent and its scholars need vibrant, self-referential intellectual communities that dominate and are on the cutting edge of knowledge production on Africa.

Ngara's prescriptive package differs in matters of detail and depth. *The African University and Its Mission* offers little historical analysis, but plenty of philosophical and pedagogical counsel on reforming and improving African universities. In the first two chapters the author revisits the questions of academic freedom and the mission of the university. He endorses CODESRIA's comprehensive and highly nuanced *Kampala Declaration on Academic Freedom and Social Responsibility*, and seeks to redefine the traditionally accepted three-fold mission of universities — teaching, research and service — although little is said that is original. This is followed by rather prosaic discussions of learning theories, teaching methods, and curriculum content and degree structure in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.

The structural model proposed in Chapter 6 for improving the delivery capacity of the African university focuses mostly on the university's research mission and offers pertinent suggestions on the need for developing effective research management structures to promote a vibrant research culture and improve university research performance. Called for is the establishment of a Research and Development Centre which would be responsible for formulating

the university's research and publication policies, proposing research priorities, developing instruments for measuring the quality and quantity of research, conducting research training programmes for junior staff, students and other interested researchers, and promoting linkages between the university researchers and the community and cooperation with other universities. The Centre would be headed by a Dean and overseen by a committee composed of key university officials and outstanding scholars. In order to raise funds and service the public and private sectors, and to coordinate and oversee the use of university facilities in consultancy work, universities are encouraged to set up a separate Consultancy, Service and Production Centre headed by a Director who is an experienced and astute business manager. In short, universities should 'make a distinction between activities aimed at promoting excellence in fundamental, applied and developmental research on the one hand, and on the other, legitimate activities directed at both producing knowledge for the sake of solving the problems of particular industries and agencies and generating funds for the university' (p.124).

Debates about university management are raised in Chapter 7, and the argument made that old styles of administration must give way to new corporate management styles tailored to the university's mission. Senior university administrative officers should be highly accomplished scholars and men and women of vision and leadership qualities, not supervisory hacks imposed by the state, and should seek to promote collegiality, efficiency and productivity, strategic planning, and periodic evaluations, or institutional self-analysis, as the author calls it.

The last chapter examines the special challenges and prospects of transforming university education in post-apartheid South Africa. The much-publicised 'transition blues' at the University of Witwatersrand in the last few years poignantly capture the immense difficulties faced by the country's political and academic leaders as they seek to overcome the apartheid legacies of uneven distribution and access to university resources and other opportunity structures among the country's races, classes, genders, and regions, and as they strive to pluralise the privileges of academic freedom and define university autonomy in the new dispensation; to reconcile the demands for excellence and equity, institutional democratisation and intellectual rigor; and to channel the politics of struggle into struggles for relevance that can wean South Africa from its debilitating Eurocentric delusions that it is an outpost of western civilisation on the 'Dark Continent'.

South African universities and intellectuals have a lot to learn from, and contribute to, the experiences and future of other African universities. Indeed,

universities everywhere need the incessant intellectual infusion of internationalisation, more so than ever in this era of globalisation. This is the subject examined in *Towards a Commonwealth of Scholars*. The various papers, originally presented at a Commonwealth workshop in Singapore, outline the strategies and mechanisms for developing, maintaining, and expanding intellectual exchanges, especially of students. While much is known of student flows from the South to the North, this collection analyses and advocates the far less developed practice of student migration from the North to the South and within the South. In the introductory chapter the editor summarises the complex array of academic and non-academic factors that influence student mobility and other scholarly exchanges. They include the policy commitments of sending and receiving institutions and countries; the quality and currency of academic programmes and qualifications; cost and cultural factors; and the availability of such support structures as information and publicity, congenial immigration procedures, accommodation facilities, and guidance and counselling services. A series of models developed to facilitate student exchange are assessed: award schemes, establishment of bilateral and multilateral inter-university link schemes, direct student exchange, offering courses targeted to students from elsewhere, and organisation of regional curriculum consortia and centres of excellence.

As the imperial bonds of the Commonwealth have loosened, intra-commonwealth student mobility has declined. Flows to the four industrialised Commonwealth countries — Australia, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand — fell by over 10 per cent between 1977 and 1987, largely due to the introduction of high fee regimes in these countries and the sharp currency depreciations experienced by the Commonwealth countries of the South. In the meantime, new regional affiliations emerged as Britain petulantly turned its fate to Europe, Canada to North America, Australia and New Zealand to the Pacific rim, while the postcolonial states of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean groped for new regional integration schemes, or anxiously sought to herd their students away from the snobbish tutorial rooms of Oxbridge to the industrious professional schools of the United States. These trends are examined in Part Two of the book.

The cases of Britain and Canada are followed up in specific chapters in Part Four. As befitting an imperial metropole, albeit a languishing one, there is little official interest in Britain for encouraging students to study in its old colonies of the South. The key problems as seen by British universities are funding and quality assurance. In contrast, there is greater interest in internationalisation in Canada, so much that this objective was integrated into the mission statements of more than half the country's universities by 1991. Despite rising official and

student interest in studying in the developing countries, Canadian students overwhelmingly trek to Western Europe and the United States.

It stands to reason that there are considerable postcolonial variations in the policies and patterns of educational internationalisation. Several chapters examine India, Malaysia, and Singapore. India boasts the largest number of foreign students among the Commonwealth countries of the South, thanks to its relatively large, low-cost, and sophisticated system of higher education. Also, there is considerable support for internationalisation from the national and state governments, and the universities themselves. However, administrative, academic, and socio-cultural barriers to mobility and entry still remain. Malaysia's case is notable because its higher education is conducted in Bahasa Malaysia rather than English. This limits the flow of foreign students, which is further exacerbated by heavy unmet local demand, so that over 52,000 Malaysian students were enrolled abroad in 1990. The small numbers of foreign students who make it are mostly from the member countries of ASEAN. Singapore has developed one of the most aggressive and coordinated programmes of student exchange as part of its rapid modernisation drive in which human resource development and international competitiveness are seen as key. Consequently, up to 20 per cent of first year places at its two universities are reserved for foreign students, who made up 17 per cent by 1991.

Nigeria also has a set quota for foreign students, earmarked at five per cent of its total annual higher education enrolment, 40 per cent of whom should come from other Commonwealth countries. But the gap between the quota and actual enrolment is much higher than in Singapore. In 1989-90 there were only 678 foreign students out of a quota target of 8,600. Between 60 to 70 per cent of the students came from Cameroon, and others trickled from other African countries, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Very few were from the developed countries. The shortfall between generous policy and meagre results can be attributed to the deterioration of Nigerian universities and the political fallout of military misrule. Kenya has been able to attract more students from the North, especially the United States, because of reciprocal and mutually beneficial exchange linkages its universities, principally the University of Nairobi, have managed to establish with foreign counterparts. Zimbabwe, in contrast, has not been as successful, partly because of its small capacity to absorb foreign students and government ambivalence to the benefits of internationalisation.

The issues discussed in this book are quite important. Certainly African universities need to take the question of internationalisation seriously insofar as their economies, cultures, politics, and prospects are irretrievably tied to a highly competitive and increasingly integrated global order. Internationalisation does

not, of course, simply mean linkages to the North, but must encompass South-South and intra-African exchanges of intellectual concerns and institutional capacities, of ideas and interests, people and programmes, research and resources, technology and trade. But this is not likely to happen if the universities are deprived of funds and freedom. Unfortunately, most of the contributions do not examine the political contexts in which the universities in Africa and elsewhere currently operate, so that they read like prescriptive pies in the air.

CODESRIA's *The State of Academic Freedom in Africa 1995* is a sobering survey of the conditions under which African universities and intellectuals survive and struggle for autonomy, accountability, and authenticity, for relevance and self-reproduction. CODESRIA should be commended for starting annual reports on academic freedom in Africa. If the current issue is anything to go by, these reports will constitute invaluable and indispensable witnesses and weapons in the struggles for a more enlightened and energetic intellectual order in the continent. Divided into three parts, it contains powerful, penetrating, and profoundly moving studies, notes, and briefings on the material and intellectual assaults against universities and academics by the state, elements from the academy itself, and groups within civil society. But it does more than chronicle the tribulations: it celebrates the struggles and the occasional victories. The stories may be grim, the scale of state authoritarianism and fiscal austerity gruesome, but these are narratives and analyses animated by a firm commitment to a more democratic and generous future.

Opening the report is Busia's erudite exegesis of the legal framework of academic freedom as embodied in human rights jurisprudence, specifically the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which represents regional human rights norms. While the Charter does not exactly provide for 'academic freedom', it stipulates certain rights which are protective of academic freedom, such as the rights on freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of movement, right to education, and right to self-determination. Despite its merits, especially in the placing of economic and social rights on the same legal footing as civil and political rights, the Charter is littered with clawback clauses which subjects the exercise of the civil and political rights to restrictive duties and responsibilities. These rights are supposed to be exercised as 'provided by the law', or 'in accordance with the law, or within the law', without clearly stipulating which law, national law or international human rights law. Given the fact that the laws of dictatorial regimes often conflict with international human rights laws, to which they are usually signatory, this is not a moot legal point, but a question of utmost political significance. For example, the restriction that in exercising the right to freedom of expression the individual must show

responsibility to 'public morality' or to respect 'public order'; not to engage in any advocacy of national, ethnic, racial or religious hatred; not to publish anything that may be defamatory; and not to compromise the security of the state is often used by autocratic states as a blank check to censure all forms of criticism and dissent. Notwithstanding these constraints, Busia advises that insofar as the African Commission which is entrusted with the function of implementing the Charter has yet to develop its own jurisprudence, academic institutions and individuals should take advantage of that and place academic freedom high on the African human rights agenda by making regular representations to the Commission when violations occur and by seeking Observer Status with the Commission.

The rest of the contributions in Part One look at the situations in Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Nigeria. It is chilling reading. These cases demonstrate that authoritarianism wears different faces. In Algeria it is religious fundamentalism that constitutes the main threat to academic freedom, in Côte d'Ivoire it is unbridled developmentalism, in Kenya civilian despotism, and Nigeria military dictatorship. In an exceptionally insightful paper, El Kenz unravels the process by which state oppression gave way to religious persecution, and detentions were replaced by assassinations. Once acclaimed as a model of Third World socialist development, Algeria was rocked by riots in 1988 once the flow of petrodollars, which has sustained the bureaucratic system, slumped and the shell of autocracy cracked. The future, it seemed, belonged to the popular movement, to democracy. The intellectuals were a cheerful lot. But their 'epistemological optimism' soon turned sour. Obsessed with state violence and violations of freedom, they failed to see and scrutinise the tyrannical impulses of the Islamicists. In fact, both they and the state authorities were taken by surprise. To the state, it was the left, the activist intellectuals, who posed a threat, and so it concentrated its terror and surveillance on them; indeed, it promoted the expansion of religious activity as a counterbalance and an outlet for mounting social and political discontent. Using their vast network of mosques, educational and charitable associations, the Islamicists seized more public and rhetorical space, turning popular discourse from the economic and social to the religious and moral. For them conquest of state power was only part of the journey towards the systematic transformation of society, of its representations and values. They wanted a cultural revolution. Secular intellectuals, as bearers of a contrary cultural formation, as masters of competing social meanings, endangered the hegemonic ambition of the Islamicists and became their prime targets.

In Côte d'Ivoire the enemy of academic freedom is still largely perceived as the state. In this case, academic freedom is guaranteed by law. Indeed, many of

the rules and principles governing universities relating to academic freedom are entrenched in the constitution. But constitutional proclamations, argues Dégni-Ségui, mean little as they are not respected and enforced. He demonstrates that over time the Ivorian state has breached the territorial and personal freedoms of universities and academics with growing impunity. Interventions on campuses by the security forces, mostly unrequested, increased until 1992-93 when they became a permanent presence. Academics have also been subject to intimidation and arrests, and student and staff organisations have been suspended or dissolved. Justifying its actions in the name of economic development and national unity, the state has also taken advantage of the ignorance of academics of their rights, their fear of reprisals, and opportunistic complicity. Academics who become government ministers are renowned for being particularly contemptuous and abusive of academic freedom.

Mutunga and Kiai outline the state of academic freedom in Kenya between 1992 and 1994. They provide adequate background, noting that the postcolonial state inherited much of its authoritarian apparatus and ardour from the colonial state. The turn of the 1990s marked a watershed, as growing internal and external opposition, in which academics and students played an important role, forced the Moi regime to concede multi-party politics. But the pluralisation of politics has not been followed by the extension of civil liberties and human rights, including academic freedom. They catalogue the abuses of academic freedom, such as continuing closures of universities and expulsions of students, arbitrary arrests and detentions, harassment and dismissal of activists, denial of academic staff to unionise and students to organise, censorship and proscription of publications, and discrimination against women. Uncowered students have responded through boycotts, sit-ins, and riots, and in November 1993 the academic staff of all the public universities went on an unprecedented strike that lasted as long as ten months at the University of Nairobi.

The tradition of student and staff struggles against military tyranny and material deprivation in Nigeria is even more impressive. Mustapha shows these struggles intensified from the 1980s as the bankruptcy of the economy and the military became more evident, and the tentacles of pauperisation and persecution clutched the petty-bourgeois shoulders of students and academics. As conditions deteriorated, student fees were raised, the appointment of university administrators became more erratic, arbitrary arrests, sackings, and compulsory retirements increased, and closures became more frequent. The result is that strikes, boycotts, and court battles became a staple feature of Nigerian university life. Particularly widespread was the opposition to the mean-spirited World Bank university sector loan of US\$120 million. More often than not the courts have aided the cause of academic freedom by upholding the rights of the academic

community. But this is not a united or homogeneous community. Funding for the universities is differentiated according to generation and location, and the whims of divide and rule and political favouritism. And opportunists have only too gladly sold their intellectual souls for dirty pieces of silver.

It can be seen that the specificities of violations of academic freedom and struggles against its perpetrators, vary from one country to another. This becomes more evident in the shorter 'notes' and 'briefings' in Parts Two and Three, which describe the state of academic freedom in ten other countries (Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, Guinea, Sudan, Zaire, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Liberia, and Zambia). But the underlying message is the same: abuses against academic freedom, whatever form they take, are unacceptable, and African scholars are determined to fight until they achieve their full professional and political rights as intellectuals and citizens. There are not simply struggles for the university, but for democratisation, for gone are the days when university students and academics lived in the splendid isolation of colonial ivory towers. Privation and persecution have bonded them to the masses hungry for the promised fruits of the 'first independence': development, democracy, and self-determination. In fighting for the 'second independence', however, intellectuals must always remember their vocation as creative and critical thinkers, and rededicate themselves to intellectual excellence, to the goal of turning their universities and institutions into great centres of research and reflection, teaching and talent, able to compete with the very best anywhere in the world. That is where their lasting contribution to the African struggle lies.

A propos de «mouvements ouvriers et crise économique»
Réponse à O. Faye

Alfred I. Ndiaye et Bassirou Tidjani*

Les lecteurs de *Africa Development* (Vol. XXI, No. 1, 1996, pp.123-133) qui ont eu l'opportunité de lire la critique faite par Ousseynou Faye de la monographie sur *les syndicats sénégalais face à l'ajustement structurel* (Ndiaye et Tidjani, 1995) s'attendaient certainement à une réponse des auteurs pour deux raisons au moins. Premièrement, les auteurs ont l'obligation scientifique d'expliquer si besoin est leur thèse. Deuxièmement, cette réponse peut relancer le débat sur l'évolution récente des syndicats de travailleurs au Sénégal.

La réponse arrive relativement tard. Cependant, ce retard est essentiellement lié à notre hésitation à débattre avec un collègue, en l'occurrence O. Faye, dont la critique dénotait dès sa première phrase une préoccupation plutôt polémique. Comment peut-on en effet débiter une contribution en présentant les auteurs du document critiqué comme «deux universitaires sénégalais, militants du Syndicat autonome des enseignants du supérieur (SAES)», et par la suite, faire croire aux lecteurs que cette contribution part des conventions méthodologiques des sciences sociales ? (p.123).

Cette caractérisation de Ndiaye et Tidjani est purement manipulateur dans la mesure où, dans sa critique O. Faye est incapable de démontrer l'impact de cette appartenance au SAES sur les arguments développés dans la monographie. En réalité, cette dernière apparaît plutôt comme une critique du retard pris par l'Union nationale des syndicats autonomes du Sénégal (UNSA) à laquelle appartient le SAES vis-à-vis de l'évolution de l'environnement économique, politique et social au cours des années 1990. C'est pour cela que la bataille contre le Plan d'urgence a constitué un test important pour le mouvement syndical sénégalais.

De notre côté, nous dirons tout simplement que l'appartenance syndicale ou politique de O. Faye ne nous intéresse pas.

Venons-en au texte en commençant par sa composition. Sur trois pages de texte de O. Faye, une demi-page est consacrée à l'introduction, une page entière est réservée aux critiques de forme (orthographe, ponctuation), un quart de page

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porte sur les critiques méthodologiques, le reste étant consacré à la substance. Cependant, dans ce reste, O. Faye discute «les faiblesses majeures de la monographie» en une demi-page seulement. Manifestement, l'auteur a attaché plus d'importance à la forme qu'au fond. En somme, la note de lecture servie par O. Faye a la particularité d'être apparemment sévère. En fait, elle est peu argumentée, plus axée sur la forme et l'écriture que sur le fond. Tout ceci la rend scientifiquement très légère.

Sur la forme

Certainement habitué à encadrer les travaux d'étudiants et du fait de sa pratique dans l'enseignement, O. Faye conclut avec force que «des efforts devront être consentis en matière d'écriture» après avoir insisté sur la «faible qualité littéraire» de la monographie (pp.123, 124). A notre avis il devrait être plus nuancé. Tout un chacun a le droit d'apprécier une forme d'écriture, de la juger digeste ou indigeste, lisible ou illisible. Et encore!

O. Faye sait sans doute que les auteurs ne sont pas les éditeurs de la monographie. Si ses critiques de forme sont une façon indirecte de s'attaquer au CODESRIA, nous lui en laissons l'entière responsabilité. Nous espérons seulement que cela n'est pas dans ses intentions.

A propos de la méthodologie

O. Faye nous reproche de ne pas respecter ce qu'il appelle les «conventions méthodologiques des sciences sociales». Nous nous attendions à ce qu'il nous offre une liste de ces conventions, au moins les plus importantes. O. Faye est historien de formation. Veut-il imposer aux spécialistes des autres disciplines des sciences sociales les conventions en vigueur en histoire?

Nous ne nions pas l'existence de conventions méthodologiques dans le domaine des sciences sociales. Ceci dit, nous défions quiconque de prouver que ces conventions sont les mêmes que l'on soit en histoire, en relations industrielles, en économie, en sociologie, en anthropologie, ou en Sciences Politiques pour ne citer que quelques exemples.

Lorsqu'il exige des détails sur les techniques de collecte de données utilisées pour notre monographie, O. Faye semble ne pas comprendre que nos arguments auraient été présentés différemment dans le cas d'une publication destinée à une revue scientifique dotée de règles de publication. Une monographie est un type de «working-pape» ou de cahier de recherche qui, généralement, n'ont pas de règles de publication. Jusqu'ici, il y a certainement eu autant de styles de présentation que de monographies publiées par le CODESRIA.

En outre, certains des arguments de O. Faye révèlent une ignorance qui requiert plus d'humilité de sa part. Il note en effet la disproportion qui existe

entre les «quelques renvois (38) aux travaux bibliographiques consultés ... et la longue liste de titres dressée sous forme de bibliographie» dans la monographie (p.124). Son objectif est d'illustrer une autre faiblesse méthodologique des auteurs.

En tant que donneur de leçon en méthodologie, O. Faye aurait dû en savoir un peu plus sur le rôle et la signification d'une bibliographie. Les conventions méthodologiques nous apprennent que la bibliographie d'une étude donnée doit contenir tous les documents publiés cités, les études non citées mais concernant directement une dimension du travail et enfin, des études d'intérêt général qui ont marqué la réflexion dans le champ d'analyse. En somme, le travail de boutiquier auquel s'est livré O. Faye n'a aucun sens ici.

A propos des «faiblesses majeures de la monographie»

Selon O. Faye, «les faiblesses majeures de la monographie découlent du fait que Ndiaye et Tidjani privilégient le recours à un modèle d'analyse mal tropicalisé (...) et la production d'un outillage conceptuel peu opératoire (...)» (p.125). Sur ce point, une analyse plus approfondie était attendue. O. Faye s'est contenté de proposer des axes pour un projet de recherche sur le syndicalisme et une indication méthodologique. En réalité, le terrain de recherche constitué par le mouvement ouvrier et syndical contemporain sénégalais est peu fréquenté et les chercheurs doivent faire preuve de plus de modestie lorsqu'ils en discutent.

A travers cette monographie, notre ambition était de proposer une «interprétation des transformations récentes du mouvement ouvrier et syndical sénégalais dans ses dimensions sociales et politiques» (Ndiaye et Tidjani 1995:3). La centralité de l'ajustement structurel dans les politiques économiques du Gouvernement sénégalais depuis la fin des années 1970 justifiait le choix de la lutte des syndicats sénégalais contre le Plan d'urgence économique du 16 août 1993 comme étude de cas. L'ampleur, les enjeux et implications de cette lutte en ont fait un des éléments centraux de l'analyse des transformations du mouvement ouvrier et syndical au Sénégal.

Vu que pour le gouvernement aussi bien que pour les bailleurs de fonds l'attitude des syndicats vis-à-vis de l'ajustement structurel était déterminante dans l'application de ce dernier, il était important pour nous d'analyser la façon dont ces syndicats avaient assumé leurs responsabilités face à cet ajustement.

A notre connaissance, aucune étude n'avait été réalisée dans un domaine aussi central pour les principaux acteurs sociaux (Etat, patronat, travailleurs). Ainsi, contrairement à ce que pense O. Faye, la monographie découle de nos préoccupations en tant qu'enseignants-chercheurs et non en tant que militants du SAES. Ceci est d'autant plus vrai que notre examen de l'évolution des syndicats

sénégalais ne faisait que démarrer avec la monographie. Nous le poursuivons dans le cadre du réseau sur le rôle des syndicats dans l'élaboration des politiques économiques et sociales en Afrique, dirigé par Jimi Adesina. Nous le poursuivons également dans le cadre d'un ouvrage collectif dirigé par B. Beckman et L. Sachikonye portant sur l'émergence de nouveaux régimes de relations industrielles sous l'impact des politiques de libéralisation en Afrique.

Dans toutes ces contributions nous avons utilisé les systèmes de relations industrielles tels que définis par Dunlop en 1958 comme cadre d'analyse. Dans la monographie, nous ne nous sommes donc livrés à aucune tentative de «tropicalisation» du modèle de Dunlop. Avant nous, d'éminents chercheurs africains en relations industrielles tels que Damachi et Fashoyin l'ont utilisé pour l'Afrique.

Lorsque O. Faye explique que «les faiblesses majeures de la monographie découlent du fait que Ndiaye et Tidjani privilégient le recours à un modèle d'analyse mal tropicalisé» (p.125), l'on s'attend d'abord à ce qu'il propose un modèle plus opérationnel. Ensuite et surtout, ce type d'argument classe O. Faye dans la catégorie d'universitaires dont le discours apparemment nationaliste cache mal une frustration liée à une incapacité à proposer un cadre d'analyse de leurs réalités socio-politiques et un manque d'humilité face à une telle incapacité.

La pauvreté des arguments de O. Faye montre que sa critique de l'inadéquation du modèle de Dunlop à un examen des relations industrielles au Sénégal n'est basée que sur ce que la monographie en dit. Il ignorait tout de ce modèle avant notre monographie. A un niveau plus général, sa critique de notre «discours ritualisé» et surtout sa demande de «définition de nombres d'unités significatives» (p.125) nous font douter de son aptitude à critiquer la monographie.

En effet, comment un universitaire, dans une note de lecture aussi critique d'une monographie, peut-il en même temps demander aux auteurs de cette dernière de lui définir des concepts tels que «relations professionnelles», «syndicalisme de combat», «syndicalisme courroie de transmission des partis politiques», etc.

Les auteurs sont obligés de dire à O. Faye qu'ils n'ont pas écrit cette monographie pour des néophytes; il ne s'agissait pas non plus d'un cours de relations industrielles mais d'un document de travail spécialisé.

Revenons brièvement à l'approche dunlopienne pour permettre aux lecteurs qui n'ont pas eu l'occasion de lire la monographie de juger. Dunlop écrit que les trois composantes principales des systèmes de relations industrielles sont les acteurs, les procédures d'établissement des lois et règles permettant d'organiser les rapports entre les différents acteurs et le contexte.

Les principaux acteurs sont l'Etat, les employeurs, les travailleurs et leurs organisations respectives. Les procédures d'établissement des lois et règles sont centrales parce qu'elles traduisent les rapports de force entre les acteurs. Le contexte est tout aussi central: il est composé des contraintes technologiques et budgétaires, de la distribution du pouvoir au niveau sociétal et du marché. En outre, pour Dunlop, les relations industrielles peuvent refléter soit totalement soit partiellement la distribution du pouvoir au niveau sociétal parce qu'elles constituent un système en elles-mêmes.

Deux faits importants ont justifié notre recours à l'approche de Dunlop. Premièrement, la crise économique qui dure depuis les années 1970 constituait un test important de cette approche. Deuxièmement, pour des chercheurs qui privilégient l'analyse comparée, les fortes ressemblances dans la transformation des relations industrielles au cours de ces dernières années dans les pays industrialisés et dans les pays sous-développés offraient des possibilités d'utilisation généralisée de l'approche de Dunlop. En effet, rares sont les pays dont les lois et règles de relations industrielles ainsi que les processus de leur établissement n'ont pas été sensiblement affectés par les contraintes budgétaires, technologiques et le marché au cours de ces dernières années.

Notre intérêt scientifique pour l'analyse des transformations des relations industrielles dans plusieurs parties du monde ne date pas d'aujourd'hui. Il a commencé avec notre étude approfondie des cas américain et français comparés aux cas japonais, allemand et scandinave (Tidjani 1992). Il s'est poursuivi avec notre étude sur les syndicats africains et l'ajustement structurel (Tidjani, n.d.) et nos travaux sur les réponses à la crise apportées par les travailleurs au Sénégal (Ndiaye 1990, 1992). Depuis la publication de la monographie il y a eu, comme nous l'avons indiqué précédemment, nos travaux sur l'analyse du rôle des syndicats dans les processus de décision et sur l'impact des politiques de libéralisation sur les relations industrielles en Afrique.

Notre objectif est de contribuer à une meilleure compréhension des relations industrielles dans notre pays et en Afrique. Ceci ne nous empêchera pas, non pas de «tropicaliser», mais d'être attentifs aux développements de notre discipline sous d'autres cieux et à l'utilisation de toute approche qui nous semble appropriée pour une meilleure compréhension de ce qui se passe chez nous.

Ainsi, au-delà de toute considération de forme, de méthodologie et d'approche, l'intérêt de la monographie réside sans doute dans son effort et sa tentative de proposer une grille de lecture des mutations syndicales récentes. Il aborde deux questions majeures qui interpellent aujourd'hui tous les acteurs syndicaux: la question de l'unité syndicale et celle de la participation syndicale à l'élaboration des politiques aussi bien dans l'entreprise qu'au niveau

macro-économique. L'étude de cas basée sur la lutte des syndicats contre le Plan d'urgence a établi la liaison étroite entre ces deux préoccupations. L'Intersyndicale d'août 1993, un cas remarquable d'unité syndicale, n'a pas survécu car, entre autres raisons, elle a été incapable de résoudre la question de la participation syndicale.

Les mesures d'ajustement semblent favoriser l'unité syndicale. Mais cette unité restera fragile tant que les syndicats ne s'entendront pas sur les stratégies participatives. La question de la privatisation, aujourd'hui au centre du débat national, en est un exemple patent. Dans toutes les entreprises concernées par ce phénomène, des intersyndicales ont été créées et constituent des outils de défense des intérêts des travailleurs. Cependant, très souvent, ces intersyndicales butent sur les modalités de privatisation acceptables par les travailleurs, les différents syndicats les composant n'ayant pas la même conception de la participation.

La monographie tente de donner une explication de cette relation unité-participation syndicale, de définir ses bases, de montrer ses limites et de dégager ses perspectives. Elle tente aussi d'établir que durant toute la période de crise et d'ajustement structurel, le mouvement ouvrier et syndical sénégalais n'a pas été en mesure d'assumer toutes ses responsabilités. Ses formes d'organisation et de fonctionnement, la nature de ses dirigeants, et parfois même ses stratégies de lutte ont été des facteurs bloquant.

Ce constat ne doit pas occulter le fait que les syndicats sénégalais ont atteint un niveau qualitativement supérieur d'organisation et que l'on a assisté durant la période 1970-1990 à une plus grande maturation politique des travailleurs sénégalais. Les arguments essentiels avancés sont que les organisations de travailleurs, de plus en plus, ont des préoccupations syndicales et non politiques. Ceci, rapporté à l'histoire syndicale de notre pays, est révélateur de certaines mutations profondes. L'observation et l'analyse révèlent la formation lente et progressive d'un mouvement ouvrier et syndical réellement indépendant qui gêne considérablement certains intérêts politiques. La subordination des syndicats aux partis politiques est une vieille tradition politique sénégalaise. La tendance semble être au renforcement de l'autonomie des organisations de travailleurs vis-à-vis des politiques à travers la lutte et à l'émergence en leur sein d'une expertise nécessaire à l'analyse des situations complexes auxquelles ont conduit la crise et l'ajustement structurel.

Conclusion

Si O. Faye veut poursuivre le débat, qu'il nous propose une autre analyse des syndicats face à l'ajustement. C'est de cela que la communauté scientifique a besoin.

Les syndicats sénégalais ont-ils changé? Pourquoi?

Quels ont été les déterminants de ces changements?

Assiste-t-on à l'émergence d'un nouveau régime de relations industrielles au Sénégal?

Y-a-t-il jamais eu un régime de relations industrielles au Sénégal?

Les tendances actuelles sont-elles nationales ou internationales?

La meilleure démarche d'analyse doit-elle partir du national vers le sectoriel ou vice versa et pourquoi?

Ce sont là certaines des questions qui nous préoccupent.

La monographie sur «Mouvements ouvriers et crise économique» est peut être mauvaise et indigeste. Mais son mérite est d'avoir essayé de comprendre les syndicats sénégalais en période d'ajustement structurel en fondant ses arguments sur des données empiriques.

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De l'«essai» à la «réponse» de Alfred I. Ndiaye et de Bassirou Tidjani ou les faiblesses d'une pensée connaissante

Ousseynou Faye*

A la suite de la publication par la revue *Africa Development* (Vol. XXI, No.1, 1996:123-133) de notre critique de la «monographie» de Alfred Inis Ndiaye et de Bassirou Tidjani datée de 1995 et parue dans la «Série de monographies» du CODESRIA, nous avons eu droit à une «réponse» de ces derniers. Mis en relation pour constituer un intertexte, ces deux discours renseignent sur la pensée connaissante des auteurs, notamment sur ses faiblesses. Aussi, envisageons-nous de les mettre à nu pour réaffirmer avec force, par la suite dans la présente note, la nécessité d'un dépassement de la lecture qui nous a été offerte du fait syndical sénégalais.

Le type de faiblesse révélé en premier lieu à notre attention par la «réponse» de A. I. Ndiaye et de B. Tidjani est relatif au manque de sagacité de ce principe gouvernant la pensée et appelé prosaïquement esprit. Nous nous évertuons à (dé)montrer cela en détectant les propos dont l'intérêt réside dans le fait qu'ils fonctionnent ou peuvent fonctionner comme des contre-arguments en défaveur de leurs auteurs.

Le «travail de boutiquier auquel s'est livré O. Faye» est repris par ces deux auteurs dans leur étude de la composition de notre recension. Mais, ils le font mal car leur calcul est inexact. En vérité, avec respectivement 22 et 20 lignes, soit une moyenne d'une demi-page, les passages relatifs aux problèmes de forme et aux problèmes de méthodologie n'affichent pas le déséquilibre annoncé. Concernant les problèmes cognitifs, l'exposé, qui est fait, occulte sciemment les développements consacrés aux faiblesses non «majeures» dans l'effectuation de leur calcul sur l'équilibrage du texte pour les réintroduire, par la suite, au moment de la prise en compte du volume du fond dans la comparaison générale. Nous reviendrons sur ce point en abordant la question de la logique manipulative et le procédé de l'omission volontaire produit par le discours des deux auteurs.

Le propos argumentatif énoncé et jouant en leur défaveur que nous pouvons étudier en second lieu, a trait à l'invocation du profil du lectorat et du statut

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théorique de notre texte, regardé par A. I. Ndiaye et B. Tidjani comme «une note de lecture aussi critique». Une telle procédure leur permet, pensent-ils, de pouvoir balayer d'un revers de la main le problème de la lexie soulevé dans notre recension. Cependant, ils ne se gênent pas à nous demander de revoir notre «note ... critique» en y intégrant «une liste de ces conventions sociales» élaborées par les sciences sociales. Oublient-ils qu'ils ne sont pas des néophytes et qu'on peut leur rétorquer qu'on ne s'adresse pas non plus à des néophytes dans notre compte-rendu de lecture? Bref, ils convoquent pour se justifier, tout en nous l'interdisant, ce que les sémanticiens appellent une pensée qui procède par condensation, c'est-à-dire par décodage compressif du message en déroulement.

Le troisième propos posé par les deux auteurs sous forme de postulat est réductible à la logique manipulatoire qui est censée informer ce compte-rendu de lecture. Le prétexte, qui a été trouvé, se rapporte au passage où nous avons simplement évoqué leur double statut d'«universitaire» et de «militant», c'est-à-dire celui de sujets porteurs d'une pratique épistémologique et d'une pratique sociale. La suspicion aidant, cette évocation est présentée comme une entreprise de péjoration de leur «monographie» avec l'affirmation selon laquelle une préoccupation polémique a informé, dès le départ, notre note de lecture. En somme, elle est assimilée à une démarche manipulatoire. Cette lecture est assise sur une interprétation négative du second statut ; laquelle interprétation est faite, en notre nom et pour notre compte, par les deux auteurs.

Ces derniers ne se rendent-ils pas compte que l'arme de la logique manipulatoire peut leur être retournée ? Pour notre part, nous nous contenterons de leur fournir quelques indications contenues dans leur «réponse» et parfaitement opératoires quand on veut valider ce propos. Retournement que nous nous gardons cependant de faire, car nous ne croyons pas en cette conception dite policière dépréciant vaille que vaille la pratique humaine. Le calcul opéré en vue d'invalider la recension, en prenant appui sur un paramètre établi sous forme de ratio entre les composantes organiques du texte, illustre parfaitement la faisabilité de ce retournement. La relecture des lignes consacrées ci-dessus au jeu d'arithmétique et de comparaison des auteurs autorise à conclure dans ce sens.

L'examen du point portant sur la bibliographie offre l'opportunité de montrer qu'on peut valablement retourner aux deux auteurs leur chef d'accusation relatif au délit de manipulation. L'abus de droit est d'ailleurs le premier élément de contentieux qu'on peut leur fabriquer quand on les suit dans leur réflexion «sur le rôle et la signification d'une bibliographie». Produire une liste de 139 titres, dont seulement 38 semblent avoir été exploités et sont effectivement cités, donne lieu à ce genre de ruse intellectuelle appelé extrapolation et s'apparente bien à un mauvais usage du droit revendiqué avec force. Mauvais usage susceptible de cacher,

pour un esprit soupçonneux, un jeu d'illusionnisme consistant à faire croire au lecteur non vigilant que le travail intellectuel effectué est le fruit d'une riche documentation. En définitive, sur ce point précis, les deux auteurs ont fait une mauvaise option. Oublient-ils qu'il leur est fait obligation pour les titres des travaux non consultés de produire, sous des formes appropriées, les renvois les concernant avant l'établissement de la bibliographie ? Cette mauvaise option ne leur a-t-elle pas d'ailleurs joué des tours au moment de la fabrication de leur discours ?

L'examen suivant, celui du propos auto-biographique, fournit l'occasion de donner une réponse plausible à cette dernière interrogation. Les *curricula* esquissés sont porteurs d'obligations, au nombre desquelles il convient de citer l'ouverture à la critique.

Il nous semble que Alfred I. Ndiaye et B. Tidjani ont plutôt privilégié dans leur «réponse» la mise en oeuvre de la tactique de l'évitement. Le procédé de l'omission volontaire étant le levier utilisé pour réussir cette entreprise. Ainsi, concernant nos remarques sur l'écriture, le silence est apporté en guise de réponse, notamment à celle qui porte sur l'hésitation constatée dans le maniement de la langue française (p. 124).

Un silence plus lourd et très éloquent est observé à propos des passages du compte-rendu de lecture où nous répertorions les erreurs et les omissions portées par leur discours. La méthodologie piégeante retenue en matière de rapport au document à consulter fonctionne certainement à merveille pour comprendre à la fois ce mutisme et la féerie des signes de la faiblesse de la documentation effectuée lors de la fabrication de l'«essai».

Alfred I. Ndiaye et Bassirou Tidjani, présents depuis 1990 sur «le terrain de recherche constitué par le mouvement ouvrier et syndical contemporain sénégalais», en sont réduits, dans certains cas, à dissenter à partir de représentations inexactes des réalités sociales étudiées. Même celles de leur propre milieu professionnel sont concernées, comme nous l'avons montré dans notre recension (p. 125) et comme l'atteste cette autre affirmation selon laquelle «le SUDES (est) proche des marxistes clandestins du PAI (p. 19 de l'«essai»)». Ce qui est invalidé par l'histoire de la gestation de ce syndicat de 1974 à 1976 et les décisions prises au moment de sa création par des cadres syndicalistes se réclamant de divers groupes (LD, PAI-Sénégal au lieu de PAI, GOR, RND, Xarebi).

Quelles autres faiblesses peut-on encore déceler dans le déroulement de la pensée connaissante de Alfred I. Ndiaye et de Bassirou Tidjani ? Une pensée captive qui cultive l'incohérence, telle est la réponse à deux directions à apporter à cette interrogation qui prépare la clôture de notre objection. L'exercice de

recitation de «la parole du maître», entrecoupant l'explication de texte produite vers la fin de la «réponse», est une réactualisation de l'attachement des auteurs au discours ritualisé. Il en est de même quand ils nous demandent de leur présenter un modèle d'analyse substitutif, brandissent des exemples de chercheurs africains connus pour leur recours à la systémique dunlopienne des relations professionnelles et formulent des interrogations dans leur conclusion. Avec cette logique mimétique gouvernant un «travail de recherche» où la collecte des matériaux occupe une maigre place (3 documents syndicaux mentionnés dans la bibliographie de 139 titres contenue dans l'«essai»), on ne peut que conclure au déroulement d'une pensée captive dans l'intertexte de A. I. Ndiaye et de B. Tidjani.

Cette dernière fait montre d'ailleurs d'une incohérence notable dans les lignes de la «réponse» où ils installent une polémique sur le modèle d'analyse dunlopian. Les deux auteurs nous font le reproche de travailler à l'établissement d'un catalogue de propositions de recherche au lieu de procéder à une analyse de la question. Plus loin, concernant cette même question, ils nous créditent d'une argumentation qui respirerait l'indigence ! La présence multipliée de ce type de contre-performance intellectuelle dans l'«essai» et dans la «réponse» nous conduit à poser la plausibilité de l'hypothèse selon laquelle la pensée de ces deux auteurs se fait tâtonnante dès qu'elle n'est pas actionnée par la logique mimétique. Aussi, l'incohérence s'affirme-t-elle comme un de ses lieux de manifestation privilégiés.

Que reste-t-il à dire encore de la «réponse» des auteurs ? Un refus systématique de la critique libellé sous forme de défi dans la première ligne de la conclusion ou opéré au nom d'un laissez-faire induit par le *work paper*, des accents de «répondeurs» en colère perceptibles dans la tonalité de certains passages, une occultation de l'interdisciplinarité qui se dessine avec la référence inutile à l'autonomie méthodologique reconnue à chaque discipline scientifique, une «trouvaille» pour notre fibre «nationaliste» (l'abominable mot !) avec l'érection des *Relations Industrielles* au rang de science sociale par des universitaires sénégalais, une auto-évaluation conclusive très intéressante au plan psycho-critique et nettement infirmée par l'indigence criante du travail de documentation entrepris, telles sont quelques-unes des données susceptibles d'être discutées pour en savoir plus sur la pensée connaissante de A. I. Ndiaye et de B. Tidjani. *Le plus grand mérite attendu de ces deux auteurs est de se rendre compte dans les meilleurs délais que leur texte appelé «essai» n'est, en vérité, qu'un avant-texte dont la relecture et la réécriture s'énoncent en termes de tâches prioritaires et incontournables.* Quant à nous, nous réaffirmons avec force, sans vouloir céder au «répépillement», la nécessité de jeter un autre regard sur les mutations présentes du mouvement syndical sénégalais.

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ISSN 0850 3907

