AFRIQUE ET DEVELOPPEMENT
AFRICA DEVELOPMENT

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AFRIQUE & DEVELOPPEMENT

Contents / Sommaire

Mahamadou MAIGA

Le Fleuve SENEGAL
et l'Intégration
de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
en 2011

Les Etats africains sont confrontés à une crise économique et sociale profonde que les politiques d'ajustement structurel n'ont pas pu résorber. Dans un tel contexte, il est indispensable de rechercher des alternatives susceptibles de sortir le continent de l'impasse dans laquelle il se trouve.

L'ambition de cet ouvrage est de participer à un tel débat, en s'inscrivant dans une perspective de promotion et/ou de renforcement de l'intégration économique. C'est ainsi qu'il traite d'abord de l'historique, de la problématique de l'aménagement et du développement du bassin du fleuve Sénégal dans son environnement physique, économique et humain. Il examine ensuite les stratégies d'aménagement et de développement de l'OMVS pour en dégager les forces, les faiblesses et les limites éventuelles, et faire des propositions susceptibles de les améliorer. Enfin, l'ouvrage définit les mesures à prendre pour améliorer les conditions d'existence des populations riveraines du fleuve Sénégal à l'horizon de l'an 2011, sur la base d'une approche intégrée et participative de développement humain décentralisé. L'auteur plaide en faveur d'une réunification fédérative des Etats riverains et de leur intégration au sein d'un ensemble ouest-africain plus vaste et plus viable.

Cet ouvrage sera d'un apport inestimable à tous ceux qui s'intéressent au développement de l'Afrique.

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Democratisation Processes in Africa

Problems and Prospects

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
This book is a selection of papers presented at the Seventh General Assembly of CODESRIA (Dakar, 10-14 February 1992). It is a presentation by African scholars of reflections and cross-sectional analyses of the social, political and economic transformations that have shaken Africa since the end of the 1980s.

Some of the authors of this book have been closely associated with CODESRIA's activities and have largely contributed to developing and consolidating its scientific credibility. Unchallenged and outstanding masters of different theoretical domains, they have played a primary role in the promotion of a space for a creative and original reflection. Their common aspiration is to develop strength, imagination and inspiration which enables them to speak differently of Africa, while using different perspectives and languages. This approach has led them to soberly address the most complex issues relative to the current democratisation process in Africa, using very sound theoretical references. They monitor, identify and name the logic and dynamics of the current changes.

They also dissect the foundations of democratic discourses to determine their structuring. Finally, they call on us to take due cognisance of the severe social and historical constraints, as well as to the African potentialities.

This book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of developments occurring in the African continent as we approach the end of the twentieth century.

Orders

Aux origines de la catastrophe économique de l'Afrique

Samir Amin*

Abstract: *Development policies in the Third-World — from the 'colonial development' to the Bandoung 'Nationalist Project of Modernisation' have shown their limits. This is currently illustrated by the restraint of the Lome Agreements and the impossibility of a globalisation through the market. Today, Africa is living a new era of polarisation as a result of the position it occupies in the new technological, nuclear and financial arena, and in terms of access to natural resources and information. The author calls for a pluricentric, humanist and socialist globalisation project, one which challenges the existing monopolies.*

Au terme des quatre décennies du développement de l'après-guerre le bilan des résultats est fortement contrasté qu'on est tenté de renoncer à l'expression commune de tiers monde pour désigner l'ensemble des pays qui ont été l'objet des politiques de développement de ces décennies. On oppose aujourd'hui, non sans raison, un tiers monde nouvellement industrialisé, compétitif, au quart monde marginalisé, auquel appartient l'Afrique dans son ensemble. On fait remarquer, non sans arguments, que le premier groupe de ces pays n'est pas frappé par la crise générale du capitalisme contemporain, qu'on y enregistre des taux de croissance élevés, particulièrement en Asie orientale, tandis que le second groupe, frappé par la crise paraît incapable de répondre aux défis auxquels il est confronté.

L'objectif des politiques de développement déployées en Asie, en Afrique et en Amérique latine au cours de toute l'après-guerre, à partir de 1948-1950, ou de 1960 pour l'Afrique subsaharienne — date de l'accès à l'indépendance de la plupart des Etats qui la constituent — a été rigoureusement identique pour l'essentiel, en dépit des différences du discours idéologique qui les a accompagné. Il s'est agi partout d'un projet nationaliste qui s'est assigné l'objectif d'accélérer la modernisation et l'enrichissement de la société par son industrialisation. On comprend sans difficulté ce dénominateur commun si l'on rappelle simplement qu'en 1945 pratiquement tous les pays d'Asie (Japon excepté), d'Afrique (y compris l'Afrique du Sud) et — bien qu'avec quelques nuances — d'Amérique latine étaient encore dépourvus de toute industrie digne de ce nom — sauf d'extraction minière ici ou là — largement ruraux par la composition de leur population, régis par des régimes archaïques (les oligarchies latifundiaires d'Amérique, les monarchies sous protectorat de l'Orient islamique, la chine,

etc.) ou coloniaux (l'Afrique, l'Inde, l'Asie du sud-est). Par-delà leur grande diversité tous les mouvements de libération nationale s'assignaient les mêmes objectifs de l'indépendance politique, de la modernisation de l'Etat, de l'industrialisation de l'économie.

Il ne serait pas correct de dire qu'ils ne l'ont pas tous tenté, dès qu'ils ont été en mesure de le faire. Certes les variantes ont été pratiquement aussi nombreuses que les pays, et il demeure légitime, de ce fait, de tenter de les classer en modèles qui les regroupent. Mais on risque alors d'être victime de critères choisis en fonction, sinon nécessairement de préférences idéologiques, du moins de l'idée qu'on se fait, ou plutôt qu'on se faisait à l'époque, du déroulement des expériences en question, des possibilités et des contraintes externes et internes.

Au contraire, en mettant l'accent sur le dénominateur commun qui les réunit, j'invite à prendre quelque distance à l'égard de ces classifications et à voir l'histoire à partir d'aujourd'hui, à relire donc ce qu'elle fut à la lumière de ce à quoi elle a conduit. Industrialiser impliquait avant tout de construire un marché intérieur et le protéger des ravages de la concurrence qui en empêcherait la formation. On partait, pour ce faire, d'observations de bon sens: on disposait ici de matières premières, d'origine agricole (le coton, de produits alimentaires, le bois, etc.) ou minière, de ressources naturelles déjà connues et exploitées, ou mal connues, qui permettraient la production d'énergie, de matériaux de construction, d'acier, de produits chimiques essentiels, comme on avait déjà un marché — interne — alimenté par des importations de produits manufacturés de consommation courante (textiles, ameublement, ustensiles et appareils, etc.). Il n'y avait aucune raison de ne pas mettre à profit ces potentialités pour refaire ce que les Occidentaux avaient fait de leurs temps: une révolution industrielle. Les formules pouvaient varier selon les circonstances — la taille du marché intérieur, les disponibilités en ressources — ou même selon des thèses plus ou moins théoriques, ou idéologiques, donnant la priorité à la production rapide d'industries légères de consommation ou à celle de biens permettant plus tard d'accélérer la première (comme le proposait la thèse des «industries industrialisantes» qui rationalisait les thèses soviétiques). L'objectif final était identique.

Ce même bon sens, exprimé dans le langage commun de tous les technocrates de l'époque, inspirait des choix pragmatiques analogues dans une large mesure. La technologie nécessaire à l'industrialisation ne pouvait être qu'importée, mais il n'était pas nécessaire pour le faire d'accepter la propriété des installations à construire par le capital étranger. Cela dépendait du pouvoir de négociation dont on disposait, ou croyait pouvoir disposer. Du capital financier devait donc à son tour être soit invité à s'investir dans le pays, soit être emprunté. Ici encore la formule — propriété étrangère privée, financement public assuré grâce à l'épargne nationale, à l'aide extérieure en

dons et crédits — pouvait être ajustée à l'estimation qu'on se faisait des moyens et des coûts.

Les besoins d'importation que ces plans d'accélération de la croissance par l'industrialisation impliquaient fatalement ne pouvaient être couverts— dans un premier temps — que par les exportations traditionnelles connues, qu'il s'agisse de produits agricoles ou miniers. Aucune stratégie de développement connue n'a été d'emblée orientée vers l'exportation, c'est-à-dire déterminée principalement par des objectifs de percée sur le marché mondial par l'affirmation de prétendus avantages comparatifs. La lecture que la Banque mondiale propose aujourd'hui, associant le succès des uns a un choix «ouvert à l'exportation» et l'échec des autres à leur repliement sur le marché interne, est une lecture a posteriori qui n'a pas été faite à l'époque, ni par les autorités locales responsables des choix en question, ni par la Banque mondiale elle-même (ou d'autres lecteurs, plus futés, de ces politiques). L'attention première était, dans les cas, le marché interne; les exportations un moyen nécessaire pour financer les importations. L'expérience démontrait d'ailleurs que le raisonnement était efficace. Dans une phase de croissance générale comme l'était l'après-guerre, la demande de presque tous les produits possibles était elle-même en augmentation continue, qu'il s'agisse d'énergie, de matières premières minérales ou de produits agricoles spécifiques. Les termes de l'échange fluctuaient, mais n'annulaient pas systématiquement par leur détérioration, les effets de la croissance des volumes exportés. L'avantage comparé «naturel», assis sur les ressources minérales ou la spécificité agricole, avait un sens. Plus que cela d'ailleurs l'expansion des marchés mondiaux ouvrait des créneaux permettant d'exploiter «l'avantage» de la main-d'oeuvre à bon marché dans certaines gammes de production manufacturières pour ceux qui ne disposaient pas d'avantages fondés sur leurs ressources naturelles. Les multiplications des zones franches à la fin de la période de l'essor de l'après-guerre témoigne de la réalité de ces calculs, à l'époque réalistes.

La construction du marché interne, axe de toutes les politiques de développement de l'époque, n'est pas synonyme de stratégie d'industrialisation par substitution d'importations, comme on l'a trop souvent dit, trop vite, pour l'opposer à une stratégie orientée vers l'exportation qui n'existait pas. L'industrie envisagée s'ouvrait a elle même son propre marché autant qu'elle remplaçait des importations antérieures. A la demande de consommation finale, elle-même en expansion, s'ajoutait toujours celle de biens intermédiaires, parfois de biens d'équipement simples dont on pouvait envisager la production locale, et enfin celle occasionnée par la dépense publique courante et les travaux d'infrastructure.

La modernisation, bien qu'axée sur l'industrialisation, ne se réduisait pas à celle-ci. L'urbanisation, les travaux d'infrastructure de transports et de communications, l'éducation et les services sociaux avaient certes pour

7

objectif, en partie de servir l'industrialisation en moyens et en main-d'oeuvre qualifiée convenablement. Mais ces objectifs étaient également poursuivis pour leurs fins propres, pour construire un Etat national et moderniser les comportements comme on le lit dans le discours du nationalisme transethnique par nature presque à l'époque.

Bien entendu également, à l'époque, l'opposition qu'on fait aujourd'hui si souvent entre «l'intervention de l'Etat» toujours négative parce que par essence en conflit avec ce qu'on prétend être la spontanéité du marché — et «l'intérêt privé» — associé aux tendances spontanées du marché — n'avait pas cours. Cette opposition n'était ni faite, ni même remarquée. Au contraire le bon sens partagé par tous les pouvoirs en place voyait dans l'intervention de l'Etat un élément essentiel de la construction du marché et de la modernisation. La gauche radicale — d'aspiration socialiste dans sa propre lecture idéologique — associait certes l'expansion de cet étatisme à l'expulsion graduelle de la propriété privée. Mais la droite nationaliste, qui ne s'assignait pas cet objectif, n'en était pas moins interventionniste et étatiste: la construction des intérêts privés qu'elle proposait exigeait selon elle, et à juste titre, un étatisme vigoureux. Les billevesées dont se nourrissent les discours dominants aujourd'hui n'auraient eu aucun écho à l'époque.

La tentation est donc grande, aujourd'hui, de lire cette histoire comme celle d'une étape de l'expansion du capitalisme mondial, qui aurait accompli, plus ou moins bien, certaines fonctions attachées à l'accumulation primitive nationale, créant par la même les conditions de l'étape suivante, dans laquelle on rentrerait maintenant, marquée par l'ouverture au marché mondial et à la compétition sur ce terrain. Je ne proposerai pas de céder à cette tentation. Les forces dominantes dans le capitalisme mondial n'ont pas «spontanément» créé le — ou les — modèles du développement. Ce «développement» s'est imposé à elles. Il a été le produit du mouvement de libération nationale du tiers monde de l'époque. La lecture que je propose met donc l'accent sur la contradiction entre les tendances spontanées et immédiates du système capitaliste, qui sont toujours guidées par le seul calcul financier à court terme qui caractérise ce mode de gestion sociale, et les visions à plus long terme qui animent les forces politiques montantes, en conflit par la même avec les premières. Certes ce conflit n'est pas toujours radical; le capitalisme s'y ajuste, avec profit même. Mais il s'y ajuste seulement, il n'est pas à l'origine de son mouvement. J'ai donc, pour cette raison, proposé de qualifier la période de l'après-guerre — notamment pour les deux décennies 1955-1975 — de période de «l'idéologie du développement», ou encore de celle du projet national bourgeois de Bandoung (par référence à la Conférence de Bandoung qui inaugure la période). Dans ce cadre le conflit entre les forces dominantes du capitalisme mondial et celles qui ont animé le projet «développementaliste» de

8

Bandoung a été plus ou moins radical selon que l'étatisme mis en oeuvre était envisagé comme devant supplanter le capitalisme ou le soutenir. L'aile radicale du mouvement se ralliait à la première thèse, et, de ce fait, entrait en conflit avec les intérêts immédiats du capitalisme dominant, notamment par les nationalisations et l'exclusion de la propriété étrangère. L'aile modérée par contre acceptait de concilier les intérêts en conflit, offrant par la même des possibilités plus grandes à l'ajustement. Au plan international cette distinction épousait facilement les termes du conflit Est-Ouest entre le soviétisme et le capitalisme occidental.

Nous retrouvons sur ce terrain à la fois les éléments du dénominateur commun du projet national bourgeois de développement et les caractéristiques de l'opposition entre ses tendances radicales et modernes.

Tous les mouvements de libération nationale en Afrique ont partagé cette vision moderniste, par là même capitaliste et bourgeoise. Cela n'implique en aucune manière qu'ils aient été inspirés, encore moins dirigés, par une bourgeoisie, au sens plein du terme. Celle-ci n'existait pas, ou à peine, à l'heure des indépendances et, trente ans plus tard, n'existe encore qu'à l'état embryonnaire, dans l'hypothèse la plus favorable. Mais l'idéologie de la modernisation par contre existait bel et bien et constituait la force dominante donnant un sens à la révolte des peuples contre la colonisation. Cette idéologie était porteuse d'un projet, que je propose de qualifier du nom — curieux à première vue — de «capitalisme sans capitalistes». Capitalisme par la conception qu'elle se faisait de la modernisation, appelée à reproduire les rapports de production et les rapports sociaux essentiels et propres au capitalisme: le rapport salarial, la gestion de l'entreprise, l'urbanisation, l'éducation hiérarchisée, le concept de citoyenneté nationale. Sans doute d'autres valeurs, caractéristiques du capitalisme évolué, comme celle de démocratie politique, faisaient cruellement défaut, ce qu'on justifiait par les exigences du développement initial préalable. Tous les pays de la région — radicaux et modérés — optaient pour la même formule du parti unique, des élections-farces, du leader-fondateur de la Patrie, etc. Sans capitalistes dans la mesure où, en l'absence d'une bourgeoisie d'entrepreneurs, l'Etat — et ses technocrates — était appelé à s'y substituer. Mais aussi parfois dans la mesure où l'émergence de la bourgeoisie était tenue suspecte, du fait de la primauté que celle-ci donnerait à ses intérêts immédiats sur ceux du plus long terme en construction. La suspicion devenait, dans l'aide radicale du mouvement de libération nationale, synonyme d'exclusion. Cette aile radicale concevait alors naturellement que son projet était celui de la «construction du socialisme». Elle retrouvait alors le discours du soviétisme. Celui-ci était lui aussi parvenu, par ses dynamismes propres, au projet d'un «capitalisme sans capitalistes», ayant fait l'objectif de «rattraper» le monde occidental développé l'essentiel de ses préoccupations.

9

En Afrique les mouvements de libération nationale se partageaient, comme ailleurs, entre des tendances à la radicalisation dite «socialiste» et des tendances à la modération. Cette coupure, franche et tranchée dans certains cas, traversait un mouvement unifié d'apparence dans d'autres. L'opposition se fondait sur un ensemble complexe de causes, tenant pour les unes aux classes sociales sur lesquelles s'appuyait le mouvement — paysans, monde urbain populaire, classes moyennes, classes favorisées — pour les autres aux traditions de leur formation politique et organisationnelle (partis communistes métropolitains, syndicats, églises). La précipitation avec laquelle les deux puissances coloniales principales en Afrique — l'Angleterre et la France — ont conçu le projet de «décolonisation» de 1960, a accentué cette opposition dans l'immédiat. l'Afrique comme on le sait se partageait en 1960 en deux blocs, le groupe de Casablanca, rallié derrière des drapeaux du nasserisme, du FLN algérien et du Nkrumahisme, le groupe de Monrovia; constitué en premier lieu par les plus fidèles élèves de la France gaulliste et de l'Angleterre libérale (la Côte d'Ivoire, le Kenya, etc.). Lumumba, au Congo de l'époque, se rattachait au premier groupe, mais des forces importantes du mouvement dans son pays sympathisant davantage avec le second groupe. Les atermoiements du pouvoir belge, qui avait refusé jusqu'à la dernière minute de tirer la leçon dont la France et la Grande Bretagne avaient fait l'analyse, ont été largement responsables du report de ce conflit sur le terrain congolais lui-même. En réponse à l'établissement fragile d'un pouvoir lumumbiste à Léopoldville — puis à Stanleyville — les forces «modérées» optaient, soutenues par Bruxelles et d'autres — notamment l'Afrique du Sud — pour la sécession du Katanga et du Kasaï. Mis en place à Léopoldville, d'abord dans l'ombre de Kasavubu, Mobutu, réconcilié avec Tschombé et «l'empereur» Muluba du Kasaï, jouait la carte de la réconciliation à laquelle ses maîtres avaient finalement décidé de se rallier. L'exemple congolais allait donc inspirer une politique nouvelle, appelle à polir les angles, dans un premier temps, rapprocher les camps radicaux et modérés, pour user progressivement les premiers. Le génie l'Empereur Hailé Sélassié a été de comprendre que le moment était venu de sceller la réconciliation entre les groupes de Monrovia et de Casablanca par la création à Addis Abeba, précisément dès 1963, de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine (OUA).

Le rapprochement créait des conditions nouvelles pour le déploiement du projet de bandoung en Afrique. Formellement tous les Etats s'y ralliaient, devenant par là même membres du mouvement des «Non alignés», même lorsqu'ils restaient dans le giron des puissances occidentales et même sous leur protection militaire directe dans certains cas. Mais du coup ils acquirent une certaine capacité de manoeuvre, non envisagée au départ dans le schéma néocolonial. Ce fait explique qu'après les initiateurs du «socialisme africain» — Ghana, Guinée, Mali — des générations successives de radicalisation de la même inspiration aient pu se succéder en Afrique (Congo-Brazzaville,

10

Bénin, Tanzanie, etc.). Fait curieux compte tenu de la fragilité des Etats de ce continent face aux pressions impérialistes. Cela explique aussi qu'un Mobutu ait pu disposer d'une marge permettant des extravagances nationalistes qu'on a de la difficulté à comprendre autrement.

Quels que furent les objectifs — communs — de l'ère de Bandoung, de son idéologie du développement, de son projet national et bourgeois de «capitalisme sans capitalistes», des modalités de sa mise en oeuvre, des vicissitudes de ses rapports au conflit des superpuissances, les résultats n'en sont pas moins différents parfois à l'extrême d'un groupe de pays à l'autre.

L'appréciation des résultats est évidemment fonction des critères choisis pour définir le «développement», un concept idéologique dont le contenu reste toujours vague.

Si l'on retient le critère du mouvement de libération nationale, c'est-à-dire la «construction nationale», les résultats restent dans l'ensemble discutables. La raison en est que tandis que le développement du capitalisme dans les temps antérieurs soutenait l'intégration nationale, la mondialisation opérant dans les périphéries du système, à l'opposé, désintègre les sociétés. Or l'idéologie du mouvement national ignorait cette contradiction, étant restée enfermée dans le concept bourgeois du «rattrapage d'un retard historique» et concevant ce rattrapage par la participation à la division internationale du travail (et non sa négation par la déconnexion). Sans doute, selon les caractères spécifiques des sociétés précoloniales précapitalistes, cet effet de désintégration a été plus ou moins dramatique. En Afrique, dont le découpage colonial artificiel n'a pas respecté l'histoire antérieure de ses peuples, la désintégration produite par la périphérisation capitaliste a permis à l'ethnisme de survivre, en dépit des efforts de la classe dirigeante issue de la libération nationale d'en dépasser les manifestations. Lorsque la crise est survenue, annihilant brutalement la croissance du surplus qui avait permis le financement des politiques trans-ethniques de l'Etat nouveau, la classe dirigeante elle-même a éclaté en fractions qui, ayant perdu toute légitimité fondée sur les réalisations du «développement», tentent de se créer des bases nouvelles associées souvent à un repli ethniciste (Amin 1993).

Si l'on retient par contre les critères du «socialisme» les résultats sont davantage contrastés. Bien entendu il faut entendre ici par «socialisme» celui que l'idéologie populiste radicale s'en faisait. Il s'agissait d'une vision progressiste, mettant l'accent sur la mobilité sociale maximale, la réduction des inégalités de revenus, une sorte de plein emploi en zone urbaine, en quelque sorte un Welfare State version pauvre. De ce point de vue les réalisations d'un pays comme la Tanzanie par exemple offrent un contraste saisissant avec celles du Zaïre de la Côte d'Ivoire ou du Kenya, où les inégalités les plus extrêmes se sont accusées continuellement depuis trente ans, tant dans les moments de forte croissance économique que par la suite, dans la stagnation. Mais le critère conforme à la logique de l'expansion

capitaliste — un concept différent de celui, idéologique, de développement — est celui de la capacité d'être compétitif sur les marchés mondiaux. De ce point de vue les résultats sont contrastés à l'extrême et opposent brutalement le groupe des principaux pays d'Asie et d'Amérique latine, devenus exportateurs industriels compétitifs, à celui de l'ensemble des pays africains, qui restent cantonnés dans l'exportation de produits primaires. Les premiers constituent le nouveau tiers monde (la périphérie de demain dans mon analyse), les seconds ce qu'on appelle désormais le «quart monde», qu'on dit appelé à être marginalisé dans la nouvelle étape de la mondialisation capitaliste (Founou-Tchuigoua 1993).

L'explication de l'échec de l'Afrique dans son ensemble, doit mettre en oeuvre toute la complexité des interactions entre les conditions internes spécifiques et la logique de l'expansion capitaliste mondiale. Parce que ces interactions sont trop souvent ignorées, les explications courantes — tant celles avancées par les économistes de «l'économie internationale» conventionnelle que par les nationalistes du tiers monde — restent superficielles.

Les premières mettent l'accent sur des phénomènes qu'elles isolent de la logique d'ensemble du système, comme la corruption de la classe politique, la fragilité de ses fondements économiques, la productivité très faible de l'agriculture, demeurée en deçà de l'âge de la traction animale, l'émiettement ethnique, etc. Présentés de la sorte ces analyses appellent inexorablement à préconiser leur solution par une plus grande insertion dans le capitalisme mondial. L'Afrique aurait besoin de «vrais» entrepreneurs capitalistes, il faudrait briser le carcan de l'autosuffisance du monde rural par la promotion systématique d'une agriculture commerciale, etc. Il s'agit de raisonnements courts parce qu'ils font abstraction du système d'ensemble dans le cadre duquel les réformes proposées opéraient. Ils ignorent par exemple que la voie capitaliste dans l'agriculture produirait des masses gigantesques de populations excédentaires, qui, dans l'état actuel des technologies, ne pourraient pas être employées dans l'industrie, comme elles le furent au XIXe siècle en Europe. L'histoire ne se répète pas.

Les secondes mettent l'accent sur d'autres phénomènes, non moins réels, comme le fait que les prix des matières premières dont dépendent les capacités de financement au décollage se détériorent systématiquement. Les nationalistes du tiers monde invoquent aussi, à juste titre, les innombrables interventions politiques, et même parfois militaires, des puissances occidentales, toujours hostiles aux forces du changement social progressiste, toujours venues au secours des forces réactionnaires et archaïques. Mais ces arguments ne sont pas structurellement reliés à la logique des conflits internes et de la sorte, opposent «l'extérieur» à la «nation» dont on escamote les contradictions.

L'analyse de l'échec que je propose rappelle les responsabilités de la colonisation et de la poursuite de son projet par les classes dirigeantes associées au néocolonialisme, et intègre les considérations de géostratégie globale de l'impérialisme.

La division internationale du travail qui crée le contraste inégal entre les centres industrialisés et les périphéries non industrialisées remonte à la révolution industrielle des débuts du XIXe siècle en Europe. Elle implique que les dernières participent au commerce mondial par l'exportation de produits pour lesquels elles disposent d'un avantage fondé sur la nature et non sur la productivité de leur travail. La règle vaut alors pour l'Afrique, à partir de sa colonisation à la fin du siècle dernier, comme pour les autres périphéries de l'Asie et de l'Amérique latine, qui, de ce point de vue, ne s'en distinguent pas jusqu'à la seconde guerre mondiale. On comprend alors pourquoi les puissances européennes partent à l'assaut du continent africain qu'elles se partagent à la Conférence de Berlin (1885). Il ne s'agit pas, comme on l'a dit trop souvent, d'un calcul «erroné», dont l'histoire aurait démontré ultérieurement l'absurdité, l'Afrique n'ayant pas — selon cette analyse — contribué à la richesse de l'Europe mais au contraire constitué un poids mort pour les puissances colonisatrices. Il s'agissait simplement, pour les puissances qui le pouvaient, d'acquérir un droit de préemption sur les richesses naturelles du continent.

Une fois conquise, il fallait bien «mettre en valeur» l'Afrique en question. A ce point interviennent à la fois les logiques du capitalisme mondial. De quelles ressources naturelles disposent les différentes régions du continent? — et celles de l'histoire antérieure des sociétés africaines. Il m'est apparu que, dans ce cadre d'analyse, on pouvait comprendre ce que furent chacun des trois modèles de la colonisation: l'économie de traite incorporant une petite paysannerie dans le marché mondial des produits tropicaux en la soumettant aux diktats d'un marché de monopole contrôlés permettant de réduire les rémunérations du travail paysan au minimum et de gaspiller les terres; l'économie des réserves de l'Afrique australe organisée autour de l'extraction minière, alimentée en main d'oeuvre à bon marché par la migration forcée en provenance précisément de «réserves» insuffisantes pour permettre la perpétuation de l'autosubsistance rurale traditionnelle; l'économie de pillage à laquelle les compagnies concessionnaires se sont livrées par l'imposition sans contrepartie d'une dîme de produits de cueillette ailleurs, là où ni les conditions sociales locales ne permettaient la mise en place de la «traite», ni les richesses minières ne justifiaient l'organisation de réserves destinées à fournir une main d'oeuvre abondante. Le bassin conventionnel du Congo appartenait à cette troisième catégories pour l'essentiel (Amin 1973:278-296; Vidrovich 1969). Cependant le statut même de la colonie belge, à l'origine propriété privée de son roi, comme l'ouverture de ce petit pays européen, plus marquée que celle des grandes

13

puissances, associée à la richesse minière du Katanga, ont permis un développement colonial qualifié de «brillant» par ses promoteurs — et bénéficiaires — le capital belge et les capitaux étrangers associés.

Pourtant, au-delà des apparences, les résultats de ce mode d'insertion dans le capitalisme mondial allaient s'avérer catastrophiques pour les peuples africains. La mise en valeur coloniale est en effet responsable des deux faiblesses majeures qui pèsent jusqu'à ce jour sur les destinées du continent.

D'abord elle a retardé — d'un siècle — toute amorce de révolution agricole. Un surplus pouvait ici être extrait du travail des paysans et de la richesse offerte par la nature sans investissements de modernisation (ni machines, ni engrais), sans payer véritablement le travail (se reproduisant dans le cadre de l'autosuffisance traditionnelle), sans même garantir le maintien des conditions naturelles de reproduction de la richesse (pillage des sols agraires et de la forêt). Dans les régions ou a opéré l'économie de pillage les régressions occasionnées par ce mode de «mise en valeur» ont été maximales. Cet effet destructif a néanmoins été compensé partiellement au Congo belge par la création d'un embryon industriel plus précoce qu'ailleurs. je fais ici référence aux industries de substitution d'importations établies à Kinshasa (à l'époque Léopoldville) après la seconde guerre mondiale, qu'on doit expliquer par l'ouverture de la Belgique à la concurrence étrangère, à un moment où la France et l'Angleterre s'en protégeaient. L'histoire ultérieure devait néanmoins démontrer qu'il ne s'agissait là que d'un embryon fragile, pas même de l'amorce d'une révolution industrielle.

Simultanément ce mode de mise en valeur des richesses naturelles, exploitées dans le cadre de la division mondiale du travail inégale de l'époque, a exclu la formation d'une bourgeoisie locale quelconque. Au contraire chaque fois que celle-ci amorçait le processus de sa formation, les autorités coloniales s'empressaient d'y mettre un terme (Amin 1971).

Les faiblesses du mouvement de libération nationale et des Etats héritiers de la colonisation remontent à ce façonnement colonial. Elles ne sont donc pas les produits de l'Afrique précoloniale antérieure, disparue dans la tourmente, comme l'idéologie du capitalisme mondialiste tente d'y trouver sa légitimité — en déployant alors son discours raciste habituel. Les «critiques» de l'Afrique indépendante, de ses bourgeoisies politiques corrompues, de l'absence de sens de l'économique, de la ténacité des structures rurales communautaires oublient que ces caractères de l'Afrique contemporaine ont été forgés entre 1880 et 1960.

Nul étonnement alors que le néocolonialisme ait perpétué ces caractères. Les équipes politiques qui se sont trouvées responsables de l'Afrique indépendante n'étaient pas nécessairement artificiellement constituées d'agents d'exécution même parmi celles qui acceptaient l'option

néocoloniale. Leurs faiblesses étaient celle du capitalisme périphérique tel qu'il avait été forgé ici. Il n'empêche que la responsabilité des métropoles demeure majeure. Car lorsque, en dépit des faiblesses de la société coloniale, le mouvement de libération avait produit des élites potentiellement capables d'aller plus loin, tous les efforts ont été conjugés pour faire échouer ces chances pour l'Afrique de sortir de l'ornière.

La forme que cette faillite a prise est toute entière définie par les limites de ces fameux accords de Lomé qui ont lié — et continuent à lier — l'Afrique subsaharienne à l'Europe de la CEE. Ces accords ont en effet perpétué l'ancienne division du travail, reléguant l'Afrique indépendante dans les fonctions de production de matières premières, au moment même où — à l'époque de Bandoung (de 1955 à 1975) — le tiers monde s'engageait ailleurs dans la révolution industrielle. Ils ont fait perdre à l'Afrique une trentaine d'années à un moment décisif du changement historique. Certes les classes dirigeantes africaines ont ici leur part de responsabilité dans ce qui allait amorcer l'involution du continent, particulièrement lorsqu'elles se sont rangées dans le camp néocolonial contre ces aspirations de leur propre peuple, dont elles ont exploité les faiblesses.

La collusion entre les classes dirigeantes africaines et les stratégies globales de l'impérialisme est donc, en définitive, la cause ultime de l'échec. On retrouve alors, dans le fonctionnement de ces collusions, toutes les dimensions des préoccupations de la stratégie des impérialismes dans l'après-guerre — (1945-90), en particulier sa dimension géostratégique. Appartenant par le Katanga à l'ensemble de l'Afrique australe, le Zaïre a, de ce fait, payé le prix de la géostratégie des impérialismes de l'après-guerre. La région tout entière, du Katanga (aujourd'hui Shaba), des Rhodésie du nord (Zambie) et du Sud (Zimbabwe) à l'Afrique du Sud— constituait pour le camp américain de la guerre froide une zone stratégique unique, importante par ses ressources minérales (dont les minerais rares et l'or d'Afrique du Sud) et par sa localisation, contrôlant les communications entre l'Atlantique sud et l'océan Indien. L'URSS de l'époque a cherché à briser ces positions de l'adversaire en faisant alliance avec les mouvements de libération nationale africains, notamment les plus radicaux d'entre eux, en Angola, au Mozambique, au Zimbabwe et en Afrique du Sud (Amin 1993:V). Les puissances occidentales ont répondu par leur soutien, pratiquement sans condition, aux régimes de Mobutu au Zaïre, de Banda au Malawi, de Kenyatta puis de Moi au Kenya, en dépit de leur corruption notoire et de leurs pratiques antidémocratiques à l'extrême, comme elles soutiennent Savimbi en Angola (jusqu'aujourd'hui), le Renamo au Mozambique et poussent au compromis fédéral en Afrique du Sud, fût-ce au détriment d'une solution démocratique véritable (Amin 1993:IV). En même temps évidemment ces considérations géostratégiques de Washington, sur

15

lesquelles les Européens se sont toujours alignés, donnaient à Mobutu une liberté de manoeuvre — plus apparente que réelle — que celui-ci a exploité — à travers son discours «nationaliste» de «l'authenticité», parfois même par l'adoption de mesures de nationalisations («zairisation») qui, en fait, ne gênaient pas l'essentiel des intérêts impérialistes (Yachir 1987).

Ce sont des considérations géostratégiques analogues qui expliquent l'hostilité des puissances occidentales aux bourgeoisies du nord du continent et du Moyen Orient, c'est-à-dire du monde arabe. Ici l'importance de la région tenait à sa richesse pétrolière et à sa position géographique située sur le flanc sud de l'URSS de l'époque. Ces stratégies ont eu également leur part de responsabilité dans l'échec arabe. En sens inverse les considérations géostratégiques ont contraint les impérialistes occidentaux à soutenir, ou tout au moins à tolérer, les initiatives des bourgeoisies de l'Asie orientale, ce qui explique en partie tout au moins les «succès» de cette région dans la période de l'expansion capitaliste de l'après-guerre.

Mais aujourd'hui la page est tournée. Les préoccupations de géostratégie antisoviétique n'ont plus de raison d'être. L'heure de la recompradorisation de l'ensemble des périphéries, mettant un terme aux illusions de l'ère de Bandoung, a sonné. Cette recompradorisation opère néanmoins sur des terrains devenus différents du fait même des résultats inégaux au terme du déploiement du projet de Bandoung.

Une nouvelle étape de la polarisation capitaliste mondiale est désormais amorcée, dans laquelle la logique de l'expansion du capital voudrait que le quart monde africain, soit provisoirement «marginalisé». Aussi le débat concernant ces formes nouvelles de la polarisation doit-il, selon moi, s'ouvrir par la discussion de ce qu'il y a de nouveau dans le système mondial, produit par l'érosion du système antérieur, celui de l'après-guerre (1945-90) décrit plus haut. Ces éléments nouveaux sont ici, selon moi:

i) l'érosion de l'Etat national autocentré et la disparition qu'elle entraîne de la concomitance entre l'espace de la reproduction de l'accumulation et celui de sa gestion politique et sociale, qui a été jusqu'ici défini précisément par les frontières de cet Etat national autocentré;

ii) l'érosion du contraste centres = régions industrialisées/périphéries = régions non industrialisées et l'émergence de dimensions nouvelles de la polarisation.

La position d'un pays dans la pyramide mondiale est définie par le niveau de la capacité compétitive de ses productions sur le marché mondial. Cette compétitivité est le produit complexe d'un ensemble de conditions opérant dans le champ d'ensemble de la réalité — économique, politique et sociale — et, dans ce combat inégal, les centres mettent en oeuvre ce que j'appelle leur «cinq monopoles» articulant l'efficacité de leurs actions. Ces cinq monopoles interpellent donc la théorie sociale dans sa totalité, et sont, à mon avis:

16

i) Les monopoles dont bénéficient les centres contemporains dans le domaine de la technologie; des monopoles qui exigent des dépenses gigantesques, que seul l'Etat — le grand et riche Etat — peut envisager de soutenir. Sans ce soutien — que le discours libéral passe toujours sous silence — et singulièrement le soutien aux dépenses militaires, la plupart de ces monopoles ne pourraient être maintenus;

ii) Les monopoles opérant dans le domaine du contrôle des flux financiers d'envergure mondiale. La libéralisation des institutions financières majeures opérant sur le marché financier mondial a donné à ces monopoles une efficacité sans précédent. Il n'y a pas encore longtemps la majeure fraction de l'épargne dans une nation ne pouvait circuler que dans l'espace — généralement national — commandé par ses institutions financières. Aujourd'hui il n'en est plus de même: cette épargne est centralisée par l'intervention d'institutions financières dont le champ d'opération est désormais le monde entier. Elles constituent le capital financier le segment le plus mondialisé du capital. Il reste que ce privilège est assis sur une logique politique qui fait accepter la mondialisation financière. Cette logique pourrait être remise en cause par une simple décision politique de déconnexion, fût-elle limitée au domaine des transferts financiers. Par ailleurs les mouvements libres du capital financier mondialisé opèrent, il faut le savoir, dans des cadres définis par un système monétaire mondial que j'estime désormais caduc. Ce système est fondé sur le dogme de la libre appréciation de la valeur des devises par le marché conformément à une théorie — selon laquelle la monnaie serait une marchandise comme les autres) et sur la référence au dollar comme monnaie universelle de facto. La première de ces conditions est sans fondement scientifique et la seconde ne fonctionne que faute d'alternative. Une monnaie nationale ne peut remplir les fonctions d'une monnaie internationale d'une manière satisfaisante que si les conditions de la compétitivité internationale produisent un excédent structurel d'exportation du pays dont la devise remplit cette fonction, assurant le financement par ce pays de l'ajustement structurel des autres. C'était le cas au XIXe siècle de la Grande Bretagne. Ce n'est pas le cas des Etats Unis aujourd'hui qui, au contraire, financent leur déficit par leurs emprunts qu'ils imposent aux autres. Ce n'est pas non plus le cas des concurrents des Etats Unis, les excédents du Japon (ceux de l'Allemagne ayant disparu après l'unification) étant sans commune mesure avec les besoins financiers que l'ajustement structurel des autres exige. Dans ces conditions la mondialisation financière, loin de s'imposer «naturellement», est au contraire d'une fragilité extrême. A court terme elle n'engendre qu'une instabilité permanente et non pas la stabilité nécessaire pour que les processus d'ajustement puissent opérer efficacement.

iii) Les monopoles opérant dans l'accès aux ressources naturelles de la planète. Les dangers que l'exploitation insensée de ces ressources font désormais courir à la planète, et que le capitalisme — qui est fondé sur une rationalité sociale à court terme sans plus — ne peut surmonter, renforcent la portée du monopole des pays déjà développés, qui s'emploient à simplement éviter que leur gaspillage ne s'étende aux autres;

iv) Les monopoles opérant dans les champs de la communication et des médias qui non seulement uniformisent par le bas la culture mondiale qu'ils véhiculent, mais encore ouvrent des moyens nouveaux à la manipulation politique. L'expansion du marché des médias modernes est déjà l'une des composantes majeures de l'érosion du concept et de la pratique de la démocratie en Occident même;

v) Enfin les monopoles opérant dans le domaine des armements de destruction massive. Limité par la bipolarité de l'après-guerre, ce monopole est à nouveau l'arme absolue dont la diplomatie américaine se réserve seule l'usage, comme en 1945. Si la «prolifération» comporte des dangers évidents de dérapage, à défaut d'un contrôle mondial démocratique d'un désarmement vraiment global il n'y a pas d'autre moyen par lequel ce monopole inacceptable peut être combattu.

Pris ensemble ces cinq monopoles définissent le cadre dans lequel la loi de la valeur mondialisée s'exprime. Loin d'être l'expression d'une rationalité économique «pure», qu'on pourrait détacher de son cadre social et politique, la loi de la valeur est l'expression condensée de l'ensemble de ces conditionnements qui annulent la portée de l'industrialisation des périphéries, dévaluent le travail productif incorporé dans ces productions tandis qu'elles surévaluent la prétendue valeur ajoutée attachée aux activités par lesquelles opèrent les nouveaux monopoles au bénéfice des centres. Ils produisent donc une nouvelle hiérarchie dans la répartition du revenu à l'échelle mondiale, plus inégale que jamais, subalternisent les industries de la périphérie et les réduisent au statut d'activités de sous-traitance. Les pays nouvellement industrialisés ne sont nullement en voie de «rattraper» les centres dominants, tandis que ceux des quart mondes seraient simplement en «retard» sur ce rattrapage. Les premiers constituent le coeur de la périphérie de demain, tandis que les seconds sont simplement «provisoirement tenus en marge» du système.

En contrepoint du discours idéologique dominant, je soutiens que la «mondialisation par le marché» est une utopie réactionnaire contre laquelle on doit développer théoriquement et pratiquement l'alternative du projet humaniste d'une mondialisation s'inscrivant dans une perspective socialiste.

La réalisation d'un tel projet implique la construction d'un système politique mondial, non pas «au service» du marché mondial mais définissant le cadre d'opération de celui-ci, comme l'Etat national a représenté

historiquement non pas le champ de déploiement du marché national mais le cadre social de ce déploiement. Un système politique mondial aurait donc des responsabilités majeures dans chacun des quatre domaines suivants:

i) L'organisation d'un désarmement global aux niveaux appropriées, libérant l'humanité de la menace d'holocaustes nucléaires et autres;

ii) L'organisation d'un accès équitable, de moins en moins inégal, à l'usage des ressources de la planète et la mise en place de systèmes mondiaux de décision dans ce domaine, y inclus une tarification des ressources qui impose la réduction du gaspillage et la répartition de la valeur et de la rente allouées à ces ressources, amorçant par là même les éléments d'un système fiscal mondialisé;

iii) La négociation de rapports économiques souples ouverts mais contrôlés, entre les grandes régions du monde, inégalement développées, réduisant progressivement les monopoles technologiques et financiers des centres. Cela implique bien entendu la liquidation des institutions chargées actuellement de la gestion du marché mondial (Banque «dite mondiale», FMI, GATT, etc.) et la création d'autres systèmes de gestion de l'économie mondiale;

iv) L'organisation de négociations permettant *une gestion correcte du conflit dialectique mondial/national dans les domaines de la communication, de la culture et de la politique.* Cette gestion implique la création d'institutions politiques permettant la représentation des intérêts sociaux opérant à l'échelle mondiale, en quelque sorte l'amorce d'un «Parlement mondial», dépassant le concept des institutions inter-Etats en vigueur jusqu'ici.

Il est plus qu'évident que les tendances du monde actuel ne vont pas dans le sens indiqué ci-dessus et que les objectifs du projet humaniste évoqué ne constituent pas les enjeux des conflits en cours. Je n'en suis pas étonné, et serais même surpris qu'il en fût autrement. L'érosion du système ancien de la mondialisation ne préparait pas par elle-même son propre dépassement mais ne pouvait déboucher dans l'immédiat que sur le chaos. Les forces dominantes inscrivent leur action dans ce chaos, cherchant seulement à tirer la couverture pour leur bénéfice à court terme, aggravant par la même le chaos. Leur tentative de légitimer leurs choix par l'idéologie plate du marché «autorégulateur», par l'affirmation» qu'il n'y a pas d'alternative», ou par le cynisme pur et simple, n'est pas la solution du problème; mais fait partie du problème à résoudre. Les réponses immédiates des peuples à la dégradation de leurs conditions ne sont pas davantage nécessairement positives; dans le désarroi des réponses illusoires, comme les repliements fondamentalistes ou chauvins, peuvent mobiliser des forces importantes. Il appartient à la gauche — c'est sa vocation historique — de construire en théorie et en pratique les conditions de la réponse humaniste au défi. A

défaut et jusqu'à ce qu'il en soit ainsi, des involutions régressives — et criminelles — restent à l'ordre du jour plus probable.

La logique des intérêts dominants n'a pas de réponse à la dégradation continue des conditions matérielles et morales dans lesquelles elle enferme les majorités populaires des périphéries du système. L'ajustement structurel qu'elle inspire est tout simplement l'ajustement unilatéral des périphéries aux exigences de l'expansion mondialisée au bénéfice du capital central, alors que nous aurions besoin d'ajustements mutuels articulant les grandes régions du monde, inégalement développées, fondés sur des négociations collectives modulant les interdépendances globales en les soumettant aux exigences de stratégies nationales et régionales tenant compte des inégalités héritées de la polarisation.

Si certains pays du tiers monde peuvent encore se nourrir de l'illusion que l'ajustement structurel tel qu'il est mis en oeuvre dans cette logique capitaliste dominante leur permettrait de poursuivre leur ascension dans le système mondial, parce que ces pays ont une certaine capacité de négociation, pour ceux du quart monde cet ajustement ne peut qu'accélérer l'involution en direction d'une paupérisation et d'une marginalisation aggravées. L'ajustement en question ne peut en effet se solder par une quelconque reprise de la croissance, mais au contraire conduit au désinvestissement, au démantèlement de leurs rares industries, sans pour autant créer des conditions favorables au démarrage d'une révolution agricole. La stagnation — voire la régression — de la productivité de l'agriculture (en dépit du potentiel gigantesque que l'agriculture tropicale humide offre en théorie) entraîne à son tour une accélération de la migration vers les villes, sans que celles-ci soient en mesure de financer un développement industriel quelconque. L'érosion des acquis de l'indépendance — dans les domaines de l'éducation, de la santé et de l'administration — sont alors inévitables. La poursuite d'un équilibre des finances publiques et de la balance extérieure — seuls objectifs de l'ajustement — devient illusoire; cet objectif n'est jamais atteint dans la spirale involutive qu'il entraîne.

Les processus d'ajustement conformes à cette logique dominante créent néanmoins les conditions politiques qui contribuent à les perpétuer. Dans les pays du tiers monde les plus fortunés ils renforcent les positions d'une bourgeoisie compradore qui bénéficie effectivement de son insertion dans le capitalisme mondialisé. Mais si dans ceux du quart monde ils y parviennent à peine, ils créent néanmoins des conditions défavorables à la cristallisation de réponses populaires appropriées. Ces involutions alimentent alors des explosions qui s'inscrivent presque naturellement dans l'émiettement du pays, son éclatement en régions ethniques ou pseudo-ethniques, produites par l'éclatement du bloc social dominant jusqu'ici et la perte de légitimité de l'Etat. L'Afrique donne déjà quelques exemples de cette tragédie, au Tchad,

en Somalie, au Liberia; au Rwanda et au Burundi. D'autres pays ne sont peut être pas loin d'entrer a leur tour dans ce type d'involution. La marginalisation accentuée par laquelle celle-ci se solde malheureusement dramatique que pour les peuples concernés; elle ne «menace» pas «l'ordre mondial».

L'alternative existe néanmoins, même si la réalisation de ses conditions reste difficile celle-ci implique d'abord à la base dans les pays concernés, la constitution d'un front national, populaire et démocratique digne de ce nom. Mais elle implique aussi qu'au niveau du système mondial les évolutions que j'ai décrites plus haut soient amorcées, en direction de la construction d'un monde pluricentrique, de manière à alléger, les contraintes qui, dans l'état actuel du monde, pèsent de tout leur poids contre la cristallisation de l'alternative populaire démocratique.

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21

The Impact of Foreign Aid on Zimbabwe's Agricultural Policy

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Résumé: Selon l'auteur, bien que l'aide étrangère appuyait le programme le plus populaire de renforcement de la participation des «petits fermiers» aux marchés agricoles jadis discriminatoires du Zimbabwe, l'approche utilisée, plus ou moins évolutive, contrastait avec l'objective radical du gouvernement Zimbabwéen en matière agricole. Il démontre ainsi que l'impact des donateurs sur la politique agricole et le rendement a été un ralentissement des transformations résultant de la faiblesse en quantité et qualité de la terre redistribuée depuis 1980 au Zimbabwe.

Introduction

Foreign aid to Zimbabwe, during its 15 years of isolation through international sanctions until Independence in 1980, was limited to military and sanctions busting support from South Africa and Mozambique. During that period, agricultural policy was cast in the framework of an import-substitution strategy which protected a largely agro-industrial complex servicing white minority consumption, foreign dominated mining and a racially discriminatory agrarian structure dominated by large-scale commercial farms (LSCF). The peasantry was broadly excluded from agricultural markets for inputs and commodities, having been starved of state infrastructural, financial, and technology support services, and retaining a labour reproduction function in 'Communal Areas'. At Independence, agricultural policy was intended to transform and redress these agrarian imbalances, mainly through land redistribution and the reallocation of financial and other resources within a stated socialist framework, underscored however by a policy of national reconciliation.

Agrarian policy in Zimbabwe today thus serves the dual class interests of nearly 5,000 white capitalist farmers and a peasantry of approximately one million households. The ruling 'mass' party, ZANU (PF), has been caught in a 'balancing act' between formulating policy to fulfil its obligation to deliver material rewards to the rural populace for their support in the armed struggle, and maintaining overall agricultural output. The nationalist resistance of the revolutionary liberation forces to the now typical aid conditionalities was, however, gradually eroded as economic performance slackened and the state became captive to the need for multilateral finance.

The extent to which the agricultural objectives of developing 'socialist forms of organisation of production and marketing' and redistributing land were achieved, given the 'pragmatism' of the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) and its reliance on foreign aid for agrarian reform, is a central issue of interest in Zimbabwe's agrarian literature. It is contended in this article, that the pragmatic policy orientation of the GOZ, derived from an increasing dependency on aid, promoted the strengthening of capitalist forms of agriculture and uneven development in the Communal Areas, to the detriment of the peasantry. Much of the post-1980 GOZ support received by the peasantry, was donor financed but targeted on an emerging 'kulak' element, with the overall effect of minimising structural change in agriculture. In particular, land reform proceeded at a pace below the expectations of the rural poor.

The negotiated Lancaster House independence settlement placed initial constraints on resource redistribution by protecting private property rights, especially over land, while donor support did not favour land distribution, particularly when linked to socialist forms of production. The interest of donors was to 'make the Zimbabwe model work', such that capitalist development in agriculture thrived with minimal expropriation of agricultural resources held by whites. Bilateral donors, through various aid programmes, gradually eased the country's agricultural policy towards commercialising the peasant sector and towards export orientation among the LSCF. After 1989 the World Bank gained the foreground in influencing agricultural policy, through its financing of the structural adjustment programme. This ended the dreams of agrarian reform.

This article examines patterns of foreign aid to Zimbabwe's agriculture sector, focusing first on the 1980 and 1986 period when initial attempts at transformation were effected. It shows how such aid contradicted GOZ policy, only to be totally reversed in the period 1987-93, when a structural adjustment programme (SAP) was put in place. The specific role of aid in influencing this outcome in agricultural and development policy is then outlined. The next section examines the nature of the inherited agrarian problem in more detail, while the role of foreign aid to agriculture, including bilateral and multilateral aid, and its impact on selected policies are reviewed later.

Zimbabwe's Agrarian Legacy and Policy Shifts

In 1980, the main agrarian structural inequity inherited by the GOZ was the ownership by some 5,000 large white farmers of 40 percent of the land, while 800,000 black peasant households owned 54 percent of the land, 8,000 black small-scale commercial farmers (SSCF) owned less than 1 percent of the land, while the rest of the land was owned by the state as natural parks, forests and state farms. Sixty percent of the land owned by the LSCF was

24

prime land in agro-ecological terms, and was moreover served by the bulk of rural infrastructure, including dams, electricity, telecommunications and transport networks.

Additionally, the LSCF had monopolised access to state finance. LSCF farmers received 95 percent of the short, medium and long-term credit offered by the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), resulting in an increase in value of LSCF lands following development of farm infrastructure and irrigation systems. Most of this credit was perpetually rescheduled while up to 20 percent of the LSCF never paid taxes because of 'viability' problems (Riddel 1978). Virtually all the other state support infrastructure and services, including the marketing board facilities, research and advisory services were located in the LSCF areas. Historically, the five state marketing boards — the Cold Storage Commission (CSC), Dairy Marketing Board (DMB), Cotton Marketing Board (CMB), Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the Tobacco Board — had been developed to subsidise the LSCF, and offered peripheral services to Communal Areas. The latter areas only had access to minimal extension services, with one extension officer serving over 1,500 peasant households, while their commodities attracted lower official prices than those paid to the LSCF.

The resulting 'dual' agricultural sector was however intricately inter-linked through state-facilitated, cheap migrant labour supplies from the Communal Lands to the LSCF. Legislation controlled agricultural labour movements, encouraged low wages to the benefit of the LSCF, and restricted market participation by the peasantry. Agricultural policy under sanctions, from 1964 to 1979, was intended to increase and diversify LSCF aggregate production, to reduce food imports and to promote clandestine tobacco exports, in order to increase foreign currency earnings. This reduced excessive dependence on tobacco exports and wheat imports, and increased domestic production, particularly of sugar, wheat, fruits and cotton. Wheat production expanded phenomenally through irrigation development in the LSCF, based on cheap power and credit. Large irrigated estates developed by South African and British corporations and the state farm estate sector (TILCOR), enhanced the strategy of encouraging 'self-reliance' among capitalist farmers. This strategy was also aimed at expanding rural incomes and consumption at rural growth points, drawing upon labour from Communal Areas. An economic boom from 1966 peaked around 1973 and began to decline after the oil-crisis, when world recession, local droughts and industrial capacity under-utilisation combined to restrain the economy (Mkandawire 1984). By 1978 the effects of the liberation war on security, state budgets and communal lands infrastructure, such as conservation and livestock control schemes, as well as increased urban migration, had led to growing LSCF farm abandonment and a breakdown of rural administration.

The GOZ thus inherited an unstable agrarian economy, together with numerous 'squatters', refugees and unemployed ex-combatants.

The agrarian policy priority of the GOZ after 1980 focused on rural socio-economic and political rehabilitation through numerous programmes initiated and supported by donors. But, legal restraints on land acquisition contained in Zimbabwe's settlement agreement stifled the rural rehabilitation programme and agricultural policy. At Lancaster House, it had been agreed not to nationalise land, and furthermore that land for redistribution could only be acquired on a 'willing-seller/willing-buyer' basis, with land prices determined by the 'market', while compulsorily acquired land had to be paid for promptly in foreign currency. The civil service, whose leadership was dominated by whites, could only be overhauled through costly early retirement pensions paid in foreign currency, such that initially white civil servants prevailed over agriculture policy. The GOZ's policy of 'reconciliation' led to further concessions to the white community, who were awarded ministries in critical sectors such as agriculture and the public service, while ironically, a black minister was charged with land resettlement, cooperative and rural development in Communal Areas (CA).

The official GOZ agrarian policy was, on paper at least, committed to change. The long-term objectives were to achieve socialist agrarian transformation, integrate the CA and LSCF into a single agricultural system, while allowing for different production systems such as LSCF, SSCF, CA, state farms and collective cooperatives. In the medium-term, the objective was to achieve an acceptable and fair distribution of land ownership and use, through a state programme of land redistribution to individual households, collective producer cooperatives, state farm out-growers and group ranching. The short-term immediate objective was to introduce non-discriminatory agricultural markets, and to offer attractive prices for state controlled commodities. This would be back-stopped in the medium-term with improved marketing, credit, research and extension services development aimed to uplift production and incomes in the Communal Areas, and the restructuring of agricultural institutions and organisations.

Communal Areas would thus be developed through balanced regional growth and development, placing more resources into these previously neglected lands:

> Social considerations require that the regional development strategy must, *inter alia*, establish and strengthen the existence of regional and sub-regional poles of development and growth centres for production of goods and services and, develop hitherto neglected areas outside of the central plateau (Natural Regions I and II) where national resources indicate potential for agricultural and industrial development. The natural regional development strategy will aim at distributing resources through a system of investment incentives, direct participation by the state, and local involvement (Transnational National Development Plan, Vol. I, 1982:55).

Increased water resources and infrastructural development in Communal Lands were considered essential to achieve food security and self-sufficiency, increase the productivity of labour and land, reduce absolute poverty levels, and improve the general standards of living in the Communal Areas. Additionally, the GOZ designed labour policies to enhance the incomes and conditions of agricultural labour, through minimum wage setting and the regulation of working conditions.

The broad effects of this policy shift on the economic performance after 1980 were mixed. An initial 'boom' during 1980 and 1982 was achieved when Zimbabwe experienced a high economic growth rate of 8 percent per year, due to increased capacity-utilisation, expanded demand and growth in peasant production. But from late 1982 to early 1985, the economic growth rate declined to below 2 percent per year, related in part to the world economic recession and the effects of a persistent three-year drought period, which largely affected peasant food security in marginal agro-ecological regions. This led to massive expenditure on state food relief, matched by food aid programmes. This period, which 'coincided' with an IMF agreement, saw massive cuts in public spending in 1983, particularly for resettlement and food subsidies (Table 2). Peasant production increased on aggregate in spite of the droughts, albeit limited to less than 25 percent of those households in the wetter agro-ecological regions. On average peasants had begun to supply 60 percent of marketed maize, cotton and small grain output, rains permitting, even through real prices were declining.

During the period 1985 to 1990, a small measure of economic recovery was achieved but well below projected targets of 5 percent average annual growth. A larger growth rate of 7 percent-8 percent had been projected for the peasant sub-sector, although actual growth rates were well below 3 percent from 1986 onwards ('First Five-Year National Development Plan: 1986-1990':25). Between 1988 and 1992 agricultural growth suffered following a series of droughts which in 1992 resulted in total crop failure in the Communal Lands. In most of these years surplus output among peasants declined to below 50 percent of marketed maize and cotton. During 1989 and 1991, the GOZ's SAP had begun to increase its balance of payments deficits, given the slow delivery of aid pledges and a new practice of hoarding imports which was developed by the private sector following trade liberalisation. Consequently, the GOZ, also bent on reducing food subsidies and costs of grain storage, had adjusted its policy on food security reserve stocks in favour of increasing maize exports. This SAP measure was to ruin the GOZ's foreign currency and food reserves, for it was forced to import two million tonnes of maize during the 1992 drought.

Data on GOZ expenditure on agriculture and the above performance suggest that the objectives of the policy of transformation were not given the priority and emphasis expected. While the agricultural sector's share of the

total budget had increased from 5 percent in 1980 to 10 percent by 1986, the need for wider reconstruction to maintain and expand infrastructure, particularly roads and potable water, absorbed much of this increase. Moreover increases in Government expenditure in agriculture were mostly directed at expanding the marketing boards, which in turn incorporated a heavy element of urban consumer subsidies through food price controls. But by 1987, the GOZ had accepted World Bank advice to reduce such subsidies (Davies 1987), especially for wheat, beef, dairy products and to a certain extent maize meal. For instance, the operating costs of marketing boards had escalated as a result of new food subsidies and increased services to Communal Areas. The cost of subsidies rose to Z$140 million in 1985, against Z$74.5 million in 1982. Interestingly, bilateral foreign aid intended to improve access to marketing boards figured highly in this increase of agricultural expenditure, rather than in the financing of other structural reforms, suggesting that donors were financing that key change in the agricultural sector by 1987. But deficits run up by marketing boards came under attack in the 1990s, prompting their rationalisation. This resulted in rising food prices, the introduction of private maize trading, and some competition in the milling industry.

Government expenditure on extension training improved, although the extension agent to peasant ratio of 1:850 achieved remained sub-optimal. The GOZ Agricultural Technical and Extension Services Unit (Agritex) collaborated with marketing boards, credit institutions such as the AFC and agro-chemical transnational corporations, such as Ciba Geigy, in providing packages of seed, chemicals, credit and training in selected areas to create a demonstration effect for peasants. Substantial donor support allowed the distribution of similar inputs in other areas, resulting in the increased production of surplus maize and commercial cotton by a small proportion of the peasantry.

Government funding for agricultural research in independent Zimbabwe was according to some experts impressive by African standards (Eicher 1986). However, the evidence reveals that a large proportion of such research funding was directed at tobacco, given its importance for foreign currency earnings. In the wake of Zimbabwe's enrolment into the Lome Agreement, EEC funding enabled the GOZ to increase its commitment to research in the livestock sector, especially in the areas of disease control and tsetse-fly eradication. Overall, government research funding continued to be channelled through the Agricultural Research Council, a semi-private organisation broadly controlled by agro-business interests which also contribute funding. In this respect, much of the agrarian change backed by GOZ and donor funds, promoted the growth of capitalist agriculture in the LSCF, among a few peasants, and among agricultural industries and institutions which based their success on agricultural market development.

Yet, the GOZ had spent only $31.6 million on land acquisition by the end of 1985, with a further $45.2 million spent on infrastructural development in the resettlement schemes. Less than half these amounts were spent during the 1986-1990 period, and even less during 1991 and 1993. Over 70 percent of the resettlement programme, however, had been financed by foreign aid, with the major donor, the United Kingdom, committing $62 million in the five years to 1985, followed by the African Development Bank (ADB) with $27 million, the Kuwait Fund with $7.8 million and the EEC with $6.3 million during that period. Subsequently donor funding declined, with fewer donors besides the United Kingdom involved, resulting in annual GOZ funding of less than Z$10 million for land acquisition. Thus, external donor perceptions of the success of land distribution became the key determinants of the pace of resettlement. By 1987, therefore, less than 50,000 households had been resettled on less than 2.5 million hectares (below 10 percent of land) in poor areas, and by May 1993 only 56,000 households were resettled on 3 million hectares, most of which was agro-ecologically marginal.

It was only in 1992 that the GOZ introduced its Land Acquisition Act, following the expiry in 1990 of the market influenced clauses contained in the Lancaster House constitution, enabling the GOZ to administratively acquire land and fix prices. Few donors appear to be willing to support this form of land acquisition.

Alongside expenditure on resettlement the GOZ allocated financial resources to its state farming sector, which was perceived by the rural poor to reduce land and related resources available for redistribution to the peasant sector. The state was committed to participating in the direct production of commodities it considered essential and strategic, and at times GOZ officials suggested that state farming was intended to lay the basis for transformation to socialist agriculture.

Credit, a fundamental resource required for restructuring the bi-polar agrarian economy, was increasingly directed by the GOZ to agricultural parastatals for the purchase of peasant crops, and to finance peasants' increased access to short-term, variable farm inputs. At its peak year of financing in 1985, the AFC granted loans to approximately 10 percent of the peasantry (Table 1), establishing a state focus on the 'Kulak' section among peasants. Having peaked at financing more than 90,000 small farmers in 1986, credit access slumped to 35,000 smallholders by 1989, allegedly due to repayment delinquency among the peasantry. State repossession of peasant assets, such as goats and hardware, was increasingly effected by the AFC to ensure repayments.

Table 1: Agricultural Finance Corporation Lending (1980-89) by Sector

Year	LSCF	SSCF	Communal	Resettlement
1980	2233	4348	2500	-
1981	2526	3333	18400	-
1982	2103	3650	30150	910
1983	1745	2929	39192	4154
1984	1332	2949	50036	12897
1985	1484	2744	85719	15178

Source: Compiled by author from MFEPD 1986b.

However, the GOZ did provide some credit to collective cooperatives, although these received less than 10 percent of the credit allocated to small farmers in the resettlement programme. While the number of loans to Communal and Resettlement areas grew rapidly, the decline in the number and value of loans to large and small-scale commercial areas was not proportionally significant to restructure the skewed credit structure. At independence, the entire small-scale farm sector had received only 2 percent of the total value of loans, while in 1985, the proportion had risen to 36 percent), only to decline to below 30 percent by 1992. While the GOZ slightly restructured its own credit distribution, the LSCF increased its reliance on private lending during the first decade, except during the Structural Adjustment Programme from 1989 to 1993, when AFC interest rates became cheaper than private banks.

However, in order to finance its increased expenditure, the GOZ resorted to international borrowing, and by 1986 it had pronounced its deliberate shift towards an increased dependence on foreign aid to finance its plans:

> ... Government will provide finance for 54 percent of the planned Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP), which totals Z$4,513 million. Two-thirds of this amount will be funded through foreign loans and aid (FFYNDP 1986:46).

Since the agricultural sector was then projected to receive 19.5 percent of the PSIP allocation (FFYNDP 1986:24), this increased the sector's reliance on foreign aid for its development. By 1989, Zimbabwe's purportedly 'home grown' ESAP, had firmly established its dependence on foreign aid, quietly shelving hopes for the agrarian reforms enunciated in the early 1980s. The SAP programme adopted was standard, affirming a greater market

orientation in agriculture, and reinforcing its export focus, which various donor agencies had funded.

The weakening of the state's autonomy in agrarian policy was clear by 1993, when external debt escalated to more than 60 percent of GDP, or Z$3.6 billion, with an expected debt service ratio of around 28 percent of export earnings, and a current account deficit of around 20 percent of the balance of payments (World Bank 1992). And the GOZ was now requesting over US$400 million in soft loans and grants to finance drought relief in 1992 alone, above its regular foreign currency requirements. Yet the GOZ still retained a political interest in land distribution, as demonstrated by its use of the 1992 Land Acquisition Act to designate 70 farms for compulsory purchase at administratively set prices.

As can be seen, the GOZ together with its aid 'partners' achieved limited agrarian reform between 1980 and 1993. The tendency was to focus state and donor funding on developing selected aspects of capitalist agriculture, and subsequently to formally reverse agrarian policy reforms through ESAP. The specific role played by foreign aid in the redirection of Zimbabwe's agricultural policy is further elaborated below.

Patterns of Foreign Aid to Agriculture

Annual overall aid commitments and disbursements to Zimbabwe since 1980 peaked in 1983 and declined steadily until 1985 when aid volumes levelled off in real terms (Table 2). While the earlier years evidenced a high aid absorption capacity of around 65 percent, the impression gained is that following the initial rehabilitation of displaced Zimbabweans, donor fatigue had set in by 1984.

During the first two years of Independence, donors and the GOZ were preoccupied with war reconstruction and rehabilitation at a time when economic performance was at its peak. From 1982 to early 1984 when aid peaked, Zimbabwe experienced economic decline and an enduring three year drought. But, already by 1985, signs of declining aid commitments, had led the GOZ to conclude that there was:

> ... a real need in the immediate future to increase the pipeline of external assistance in order that the present level of aid inflows be maintained during and after the Five Year Plan period (FFYNDP 1986:3).

The increased level of state interest and reliance on foreign aid inflows for its long-term development, and its interest to improve the management of aid, were reflected in the fact that most new agricultural interventions in Zimbabwe were donor funded. Bilateral donors proved to be more faithful in their support with high aid disbursement rates, 72 percent for 1986-87, while multilateral aid disbursement rates averaged only 52 percent of commitments and pledges (FFYNDP 1986:3).

Table 2: Foreign Aid Commitments and Disbursement (1980-85)
(in US$ million)

Year	(Firm pledge or signed agreement) Commitment	Percentage of 5 years Total	Actual expenditure* or disbursement	Percentage of 5 years Total	Annual absorption rates %
1980	292	11.2	121	7.2	4.4
1981	585	22.4	266	15.8	45.5
1982	498	19.1	297	17.7	59.6
1983	611	23.4	277	16.5	45.3
1984	285	10.9	372	22.1	130.5
1985	339	13.0	347	20.6	102.4
Total	2.610		1.680		

* 'An expenditure does not necessarily imply a cash flow into the country, when aid is tied to commodities, equipment and export services' (MFEPD 1986(b):2).

Source: Re-tabulated and calculated from MFEPD, 1986b, pp. 2-3

The terms of aid gradually shifted away from outright grants towards loan agreements. In the six years following Independence in 1980, grants constituted an average 43 percent of total aid to Zimbabwe, but by 1993 around 80 percent of foreign inflows were in the form of loans. Bilateral aid during the six years to 1986 had a 55 percent grant component (FFYNDP 1986:3). By 1993 concessional and commercial loans had tilted the annual ratio of aid against grants, which now stood at slightly less than 40 percent of total aid, reflecting increasing reliance on World Bank, IMF and ADB lending to support ESAP. During the five years to 1985, balance of payments support and related commodity import programmes dominated the composition of aid to Zimbabwe (Table 3). The GOZ justified this pattern thus:

> The Commodity Import Programmes (CIPs) being offered in grant form by a number of donors have generated Zimbabwe dollar counterpart funds, which are used by the Government to supplement the budgetary resources available for the financing of development projects (FFYNDP 1986:3).

Agriculture competed closely with transport, communications, infrastructural developments and education to maintain the second highest sectoral aid allocation, around 11 percent, reflecting the initial preoccupation with rehabilitating refugees and communal lands. Such aid included farm

packages made up of seeds and fertiliser, to start up returning and ruined peasant households on small plots of below one hectare per household. Thereafter, direct aid to agriculture declined, stabilising around 11 percent from 1982 to 1985. Interestingly however, much of the CIP counterpart funds generated were in fact allocated to the agricultural sector. Most donors insisted that CIP counterpart funds be allocated to agriculture. Altogether, however, in spite of the GOZ policy emphasis on agrarian transformation, over 80 percent of total foreign aid was allocated to the non-agricultural sectors (excluding aid to rural development), suggesting that in reality both the GOZ and donors accorded agriculture a low priority.

Table 3: Summary of Sectoral Assistance to Zimbabwe
(in % - 1980-85)

Sectors	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	Average % 1980-85
1. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries	28	18	9	9	11	13	14.3
2. Emergency aid (food)	43	-	-	-	-	-	?
3. Industry	-	21	8	14	12	8	12.6
4. Mining	-	15	-	-	-	-	3
5. Education	24	12	13	10	11	10	13.3
6. Transport and communications	-	11	24	21	12	12	13.3
7. CIP's and balance of pay- ments support	-	11	23	26	25	26	22.4
8. Others*	5	12	23	20	29	31	20

* 'Other' includes listed sectors without any values assigned, as well as other sectors not listed in this table, namely: health, energy, housing, etc.

Source: Compiled and calculated by the author from MFEPD, 1986(b), p. 5.

Moreover, until the increase in ESAP funding, only 46 percent of all the aid received was untied while CIPs accounted for 40 percent of the aid and 14 percent was attributed to technical assistance. Agricultural aid was thus mostly tied to specific programmes and projects preferred by donors.

Table 4: External Aid Classified by Form of Assistance (1980-85)

	PS	CE	TC	Grand Total
Bi-lateral	430 591	595 667	192 675	1 218 953
%	35	49	16	100
Multi-lateral	340 484	34 939	5 384	380 807
%	89	9	2	100
UN-agency related	0 000	43 598	35 682	79 280
%	0.0	55	45	100
Grand total	771 075	674 204	233 741	1 679 020
%	46	40	15	100

Key: PS = Untied Programme/project support
  CE = Aid tied to commodities and equipment
  TC = Technical co-operation projects, training and scholarship programmes

Note: - Multilateral in this table now includes the broad source of World Bank (and not IBRD per se.

  - The totals (grand totals) do not balance because of rounding-up of figures.

Source: Compiled by author from tables in MFEPD, 1986(b).

Foreign aid contributions to agriculture grew unevenly from 1980. Beginning with only US$34 million in 1980, assistance grew immediately in 1982, falling sharply to a mere US$25 million in 1983. Agricultural aid declined for years, until the emergency drought assistance of 1992, when total crop failure led to aid volumes above the 1981 peak. Generally, during the years 1982 and 1983 when Zimbabwe's economic growth performance declined, aid to the agricultural sector also declined, and when signs of economic recovery emerged, for instance in 1984 and 1985, aid to agriculture also increased. Taking into consideration accounting lags, cyclical droughts experienced every third year explain fluctuations in economic growth and in foreign aid contributions. Donors tended to perceive that when Zimbabwe achieved bumper harvests in its staple food (maize) and other crops, it did not deserve much aid. Since most of the droughts were localised and had differentiated regional effects, aggregate output stabilised over the years, aid to agriculture was restrained in spite of the continued need for drought relief in selected communal lands every year.

Because Zimbabwe generally exported agricultural commodities, including maize which donors purchased for triangular aid deals to neighbouring countries, the agricultural sector received less and less priority after the initial rehabilitation initiatives of 1982.

Table 5: Aid Contributions Towards Agriculture in Zimbabwe
(1980-85: in US$ million)

Aid category	1980		1981		1982		1983		1984		1985		Totals 1980-95	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
A. Bilateral	32.93	96.7	43.45	89.9	21.90	83.4	16.42	65.1	25.41	50.0	27.29	60.8	167.40	75.7
B. Multi-lateral	1.11	3.3	0.12	0.2	3.17	12.1	7.70	30.5	14.25	33.7	11.05	24.6	37.40	16.9
C. UN-agency related	0.00	0.0	4.78	9.9	1.18	4.5	1.09	4.3	2.68	6.3	6.56	14.6	16.29	7.4
D. Grand total	34.0	100.0	48.35	100.0	26.25	100.0	25.21	99.9	42.34	100.0	44.90	100.0	221.09	100.0

Source: Compiled and calculated by the author from Tables IV 2 in MFEPD, 1986(b).

Until the advent of the SAP, bilateral donors were by far the main contributors to Zimbabwe's agriculture with 76 percent of total funding, followed by multilateral and UN related aid. British and American funds until 1986 constituted the leading bilateral sources of aid to agriculture. The leadership of the United Kingdom in agricultural aid was related to its colonial obligations, and pledges at its Lancaster House negotiations over land, and conceivably its obligations to finance the acquisition of land from its kith-and-kin, as well as to maintain the substantial British investments in Zimbabwe.

There is a perception that the USA backed down on its implicit pledge to support land reform during the Lancaster House Agreement. Moreover the US Government's reduced aid portfolio to Zimbabwe by 1988 followed diplomatic conflicts over foreign policy in the mid-1980s. Later, when Zimbabwe adopted the ESAP, and following improved relations during the Gulf war, USAID took a growing interest in economic support to Zimbabwe, particularly in liberalising agricultural markets.

EEC contributions to Zimbabwean agriculture were determined by trade interests related to the Lome Agreement on the export of prime beef. Since Zimbabwe's beef industry is dominated by large capitalist farmers, this trade-oriented assistance did not directly benefit small farmers.

Emergency aid constituted a key element of agricultural aid in 1980, 1984 and 1992. For instance, US$52 million was granted as emergency aid in 1980, only to resurface as drought relief for peasant farmers in Midlands, Masvingo, Matabeleland and parts of Mashonaland provinces in localised areas during the 1983 to 1985 period, while in 1992 the worst drought led to substantial emergency aid contributions. From 1984, emergency aid was gradually converted into a 'food-for-work' programme, supplementing other rural employment or labour mobilisation schemes. These food-for-work programmes remain unpopular because as expressed by one peasant:

> We pay on the first count by ploughing our fields and reaping nothing. We lost our land and now the big farmers have all the good land and we don't have enough. Then on the second count we have to work again on this food-for-work, for low wages which are barely enough to survive on (Personal Interviews 1986).

UN donors did not dominate emergency aid assistance until 1992. Previously bilateral donors were the major individual contributors, while the EEC was the largest multilateral source of emergency aid during droughts in the mid-1980s. Thus over the years agriculture has received aid in a variety of forms from different sources, but there was a decline in the quantity after the immediate reconstruction period, while CIP's began to play a significant role from 1984, only to be replaced in the 1990s by balance of payments support conditioned upon the adoption of ESAP. Declining assistance to agriculture was related to perceptions, based on aggregate agricultural output, that Zimbabwean agriculture was successful.

36

The Specific Focus of Agricultural Assistance

The general thesis of this article is that the direction of foreign aid contributions was out of step with the GOZ's stated agrarian transformation programme, although donors were willing to assist in improving the welfare of the poorest agricultural households. This conclusion is reached after examination of the specific agrarian programme funded by donors.

Aid support to agriculture in Zimbabwe was focused on eleven categories of activity namely: emergency assistance, commodity aid, farm equipment, resettlement schemes, micro-projects, aid to marketing boards, extension infrastructure, supplementary feeding, aid to the University of Zimbabwe, technical assistance and aid for irrigation schemes (Table 6). By far the most numerous aid activities were those relating to support for the marketing boards, extension infrastructure and technical assistance, with plant and equipment having also been donated mostly to the marketing boards. Extension infrastructure support included aid to the reconstruction and resettlement programmes, the rural water supply and sanitation programme and centres for agricultural training. A self-help fund for the construction of schools, rural water systems, nutrition and education centres were also instituted, while funds were provided for a general communal area infrastructure development programme via the District Development Fund (DDF).

Technical assistance constituted a major component of bilateral aid activities, covering: training personnel and scholarships for agricultural research, extension and cooperatives; foreign experts and feasibility studies. Zimbabwe thus received various forms of agricultural aid, largely targeted on the Communal Areas, although donors did not apportion this assistance territorially among Communal lands, as is typical of aid elsewhere. There was a tendency for aid to focus on developing peasant markets, rather than promote structural changes such as land reform and the development of large scale infrastructure for Communal Areas.

The specific activities supported and the sources of funding for the period 1980 to 1985, as well as a ranking of donor preferences and priorities for agricultural aid are presented in Tables 6 and 7 below. First, marketing boards had the greatest priority among Nordic donors such as Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, whose support for the Dairy Marketing Board, for instance, was associated with the move towards a capital intensive technology called 'bulk milk handling'. The Danes were responsible for drawing up a master plan for the dairy industry on behalf of the DMB, in addition to giving support to the GMB. French support for the marketing boards was primarily confined to the Cotton Marketing Board and the Grain Marketing Board, probably reflecting their West African experience.

37

Table 6: Types of Activity Funded in Agriculture

Country	Activity	Amount in $	Items
Japan	Emergency Assistance	124 900 000	Food aid and refugee resettlement
Sweden	"	33 700 000	Food aid and drought relief
USA	"	29 565 000	Food aid and drought relief
Netherlands	"	10 000 000	Refugee resettlement
France	"	9 000 000	Agricultural equipment
Germany FR	"	7 600 000	Refugee resettlement and drought relief
Canada	"	6 290 000	Wheat and cooking oil-counterpart funds
Japan	Resettlement schemes	50 000 000	Resettlement of displaced persons
Denmark	"	3 500 000	Credit scheme
Kuwait Fund	"	3 300 000	
Netherlands	"	1 200 000	Dombodema scheme
USA	Commodity aid	97 000 000	CIP
Norway	"	62 531 000	CIP
France	"	25 040 000	CIP
Canada	"	8 000 000	Funds for importing equipment
Belgium	Equipment	129 340 000	Tractors badges, boats and floating dry dock
Denmark	"	51 581 000	Hydrometers, loan for equipment and wood treatment
France	"	12 882 000	Tractors for ARDA and DDF
Germany	"	10 000 000	Tractors
Norway	"	5 400 000	Knapsack sprayers and ploughs
Yugoslavia	"	350 000	Tractors, dental units, industrial engines and PTC equipment
Denmark	Marketing Boards	60 000 000	Grain silos, consultancy for Bulawayo depot, plant for compressing groundnut shells and silo equipment for GMB, machinery and master plan of industry for DMB
Japan	"	55 000 000	Agricultural transport trucks for CSC

(Table 6 contd')

Country	Activity	Amount in $	Items
Norway	Marketing Boards	39 969 000	Electric starters, bulk milk and bulk milk collection scheme for DMB
USA	"	34 375 000	Agriculture sector for AFC
Germany	"	20 500 000	Crop Chemicals, AFC small credit and seed purchase fund
France	"	20 200 000	Seed factor, equipment for CMB, equipment for GMB
Netherlands	"	20 000 000	Tankers for bulk milk, chipping long life milk plant for DMB
Japan	Extension infrastructure	104 000 000	Food production increase projects and rural water supply
Denmark	"	58 854 000	Agricultural institutes
USA	"	45 292 000	Resettlement and reconstruction
Germany FR	"	34 950 000	Rural development programme
OPEC Fund	"	10 000 000	Manufacturing and rehabilitation programme
France	Micro projects	3 277 000	Agrarian systems projects
Netherlands	"	700 000	Micro-projects programme
USA	Technical assistance	24 317 000	African manpower training technical and feasibility studies, regional sorghum and pearl millet research and science and technology exchanges
Denmark	"	11 000 000	Study on irrigation potential and technical assistance programme
France	"	10 280 000	Dam studies technical assistance
Sweden	"	7 270 000	Research co-operation
Canada	"	3 500 000	Training coup personnel
Germany FR	"	2 470 000	Promotion of women groups areas, energy study
Netherlands	Technical Assistance	175 000	Women ex-combatants study
Yugoslavia	"	85 000	Training

Source: Compiled by author from MFPED 1986b.

Based on Table 5 which details the source and amounts of the bi-lateral aid to different categories of activity, it was possible to rank donor preferences and priorities in agricultural aid (Table 6), and draw interesting conclusions.

Table 7: Bilateral Activity Preferences in Agriculture
(1980-86)

Country	Emergency assistance	Equipment	Marketing boards	Extension infrastructure	Micro projects	Supplementary feeding	Technical assistance
Japan	F	-	LF	HF	-	-	-
Denmark	-	LF	HF	F	-	-	ELF
USA	LF		F	HF	-	-	ELF
Belgium	-	HF	-	-	-	-	-
Germany Federal	-	LF	F	HF	-	-	-
Sweden	HF	-	-	-	-	F	LF
Norway	-	F	HF	-	-	-	-
France	-	F	HF	-	-	-	LF
Netherlands	F	-	HF	-	LF	ELF	-
Yugoslavia	HF	F	-	-	-	-	LF
Canada	HF	-	-	-	LF	-	F

Note: HF = highly favoured
    F = favoured
    LF = less favoured
    ELF = even less favoured

Source: Compiled by author from MFPED 1986b.

Donor support for extension infrastructure was highest among such countries as Japan, the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany, countries which have an history of large investment in state agricultural extension services. The Japanese were interested in projects that increased food production, whereas the USA was concerned more with rural reconstruction and marketing. The German contribution, on the other hand, was on a broader 'integrated rural development programme', encompassing farm production and such activities as sanitation, animal health and management, together with training. This was one of the few attempts at territorially focused intensive agricultural assistance, undertaken in Masvingo Province. Emergency assistance held the highest priority for Sweden, Yugoslavia and Canada, with Sweden and Yugoslavia producing relief funds for returning refugees of the liberation wars. The Canadians, on the other hand, donated wheat and cooking oil counterpart funds as part of their emergency assistance. Most of these contributions, by strengthening

peasant production techniques and output infrastructures, were directed at increasing the role of markets in Communal Areas.

Donating equipment has been the highest priority for the Belgians, who provided tractors, hand-driven milling equipment, boats and barges. The latter items were donated to the District Development Fund for fishing projects on Lake Kariba. The Norwegians, French and Yugoslavs also gave high priority to donating equipment. The French, for example, were involved in a cooperative tractorisation project in Chiweshe Communal Area. Technical assistance held highest priority for the Canadians, while others providing technical assistance were Yugoslavia, France, Sweden, the US and Denmark. Of these countries, Sweden accorded high priority to supplementary feeding, while the Canadians and Dutch provided greatest support to micro-projects.

Land redistribution was financed mainly by the British, with small contributions from the African Development Bank and the Kuwait Fund. Field observation indicates that, apart from NGO support for collective resettlement cooperatives, very few donors were interested in supporting these. Moreover, the GOZ has frequently complained that the British Government was not sufficiently supportive of its resettlement programme. In general the thrust of foreign aid was decidedly not directed at the transformationary objectives of the GOZ, especially in Land Reform. While donor support to marketing boards to some extent benefited peasants, by improving their access to markets, the LSCF also benefited from marketing subsidies set by the GOZ with donor support. LSCF farmers monopolise over 70 percent of the services of the marketing boards. The GOZ, however, did not prioritise agricultural reform, while its allocations to education, health and defence expenditure were high, land reform per se received little of the GOZ's financial resources. This declining interest in agrarian reform was reinforced by foreign aid, as shown by its impact on selected aspects of Zimbabwe's agriculture.

The Impact of Aid on Key Agricultural Policies

Most intellectuals who write on Zimbabwe's agriculture policy agree that the development of the sector hinges upon changes in access to land, credit, technology and the output shifts associated with land use and farm viability change. But what was the impact of foreign aid in promoting developments in these four agricultural policy areas? It was suggested earlier that in broad terms much of the aid provided to Zimbabwe was directed at strengthening market processes in agriculture and in providing relief and support services for both peasants and large farmers. So how was aid used to deepen market relations in these specific aspects?

Impact of Aid on Agricultural Credit

The impact of foreign aid on credit policy is assessed here in terms of the objectives evolved by the state's agricultural credit agency, the AFC, the groups and regions targeted to receive credit, the types of credit received, the forms of agricultural production organisations supported, and the broad social impact of credit. To what extent was credit used to promote agrarian transformation through the resettlement and cooperativisation programmes? Reflecting on the purpose of foreign aid to agricultural credit, the evidence suggests that the intention of key donors particularly the World Bank, a major financier of Zimbabwe credit, was to build the Agricultural Finance Corporation, through policy and institutional support, so that it could supply commercial loans to peasants in communal areas. This was achieved through concessional loans to the AFC to develop a separate viable Small Farm Credit Scheme (SFCS). For the AFC to repay its loan to the World Bank, it had to supply secure credit to individual peasants. Indeed the AFC increased its reliance for the SFCS on foreign grants and loans (Ndoro, 1984), and was backed up by a GOZ guarantee for loans which peasants could not repay. Over the years, the AFC had actually sought authority to operate as a regular commercial bank. This contrasted with its legacy of cheap credit for the LSCF, frequent debt rescheduling and the hopes that the state would now fully subsidise peasant loans.

Moreover, although the number of loans and amount of money provided to peasants grew steadily since 1982, the proportional increase in the total value of loans compared to those granted to the LSCF was rather low, suggesting that the AFC adopted conservative lending criteria in the face of growing peasant demand for short-term loans. Furthermore, the fact that over 90 percent of peasant loans were for seasonal inputs, rather than for medium and long-term investments, emphasised the AFC's caution. But this minimised capital formation among the peasantry. Instead the AFC, now obsessed with the timely recovery of loans, ordered repayments to be made through subtraction of its monies from peasants' annual sales of output to GOZ marketing boards. The SFCS programme was thus perceived by the peasants as locking them into the commercial circuit, rather than promoting their development.

Looking at the SFCS target groups, resettlement and cooperative farmers were less favoured by the AFC, compared to the communal area peasantry. The World Bank position on resettlement and supporting the poorest section of the peasantry in Zimbabwe was:

> ... the reality is that settlement, even on a massive scale and even with high levels of industrial growth, would barely keep up with the population growth, let alone make in-roads into the problem of the over-cultivated communal areas. Much of this problem must therefore be tackled in situ. Intensification is possible in the better rainfall areas, and credit will be part

42

of that strategy, but this will need to be supported by strong adaptive research especially in the drier areas, together with improved marketing services and transport (World Bank 1982:3).

The above position which took hold among Zimbabwean policy-makers by the mid-1980s, suggested that agricultural development in Zimbabwe did not require structural transformation as stated in GOZ policies, but the intensification of production, through short-term credit in better endowed communal areas.

The credit strategy thus assumed, contrary to the evidence, that there was efficient land and resource use in the LSCF sector, and that access to land and longer-term investments such as irrigation were not critical constraints in the Communal Lands. Where some AFC loans were granted in resettlement areas, this was mainly to individual peasant households, with little provided to new agricultural producer cooperatives. Resettlement areas, particularly collective cooperatives, were grossly disadvantaged by the AFC's SFCS lending system, with its focus on farm intensification packages addressing land units below three hectares.

The Small Farm Credit Scheme preferred immediate financial returns over social and regional equity. As the World Bank (1982) stated:

> The Communal Areas (CAs) are the main target of the Small Farm Credit Scheme (SFCS). The majority of the CAs from which approximately 50 percent of the total population derive their livelihood, are located in Natural Regions III, IV and V where the agricultural potential is limited. Initially, the Project would concentrate the majority of its support on the more competent farmers in the better areas, mainly in Natural Regions II and III which have greater production potential.

Clearly this policy orientation of the SFCS and World Bank on credit contradicted GOZ policy.

The evidence on regional agrarian development, shows that in terms of marketed agricultural outputs, peasant responses to policy incentives such as credit and infrastructural provisions, were restricted by environmental conditions. Those peasant households in Natural Regions III to V gained the least in terms of crop production increases (Moyo 1986).

The concentration of credit and infrastructure in the better endowed natural regions increased social differentiation in peasant commercial agriculture, whereby only 43 percent of the population of Communal Lands could access GOZ financial incentives. Credit policy thus exacerbated existing regional imbalances, while retaining a greater allocation of credit for the LSCF and disfavoured the resettlement and agricultural cooperativisation.

Finally, the SFCS lending approach to promote a particular cropping pattern through its concentration of loans on 'cash' crops: cotton for medium potential regions, tobacco for the less climatically favoured regions and

maize for the better regions. Indeed Zimbabwe's peasants had no access to credit for other crops including horticulture, dairy and oil seeds, which the SFCS did not finance. Therefore, foreign assistance to the AFC succeeded in contradicting the GOZ's agrarian reform policy and influenced peasant agricultural performance through the concentration of loans on given regions, types of crops produced and the choice of technology.

Impact of Foreign Aid on Land Use

The concentration of foreign aid resources in the better agro-ecological regions of Zimbabwe reinforced shifts in the land use policy of the GOZ as well. The EEC grants and loans provided for the development of infrastructure and other incentives for beef exports, for instance, tended to encourage the development of livestock enterprises in LSCF farms located within the prime lands (Natural Regions I and II). The extensive utilisation of prime land in a country facing land hunger not only threatened reduced crop outputs, but increased the prospects for farm labour displacement. As a result of mechanisation between 1978 and 1983, more than · 100,000 permanent workers had already been retrenched.

Land use in both LSCF and Communal Areas was adjusted after 1980 in line with new resource allocations, partly financed by foreign aid. Peasants in better natural regions increased their maize land allocations, to the detriment of wider food production, while those in Natural Region III increased the allocation of land to cotton. Meanwhile the LSCF increased livestock and wildlife uses of land allocation. Donor support for drought-tolerant peasant crop research and services, as well as price incentives also led to increased small grains production on land in the marginal natural regions.

Furthermore, new conflicts over land use emerged as expanded beef export production required the maintenance of protected buffer zones for livestock enterprises around wildlife and communal areas. Land fencing and buffalo culling were effected to prevent 'foot and mouth' disease spreading into the LSCF, as EEC regulations prescribe that exporting countries be free of the disease for at least 12 months before shipments. Thus, although the 8,100 tonnes of beef exported represented approximately US$60 million in earnings in 1986, the wildlife industry which also earns foreign exchange through tourism was now threatened by the increasing costs of extensive fencing and wildlife reallocations.

Resettlement and Foreign Aid

Agricultural policies aimed at basic structural change, particularly land acquisition and resettlement, were least supported by foreign aid, and credit support for resettlement schemes and cooperatives was minimal. Because by independence the GOZ resettlement policy was already circumscribed by its

44

constitutional commitment to a 'willing-seller-willing-buyer' framework, the amount of money required to purchase adequate resettlement land was high in relation to available public revenue. The Government was thus dependent on the British Government's commitment to co-finance land acquisition. This dependency was most acute during years of poor economic growth when drought reduced revenue, such as in 1982 and 1984, and particularly during 1990-93, when the GOZ external debt profile worsened.

While the amount of finance available for land purchases declined rapidly during the 1980s, land prices rose dramatically. It was therefore argued by some politicians that budgetary constraints determined a cautious but rational resettlement policy, having nothing to do with the position of donors or the militancy of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) on this issue (Bratton 1985). Nevertheless, foreign aid played a crucial role in channelling agrarian resources into alternative programmes such as Communal Area extension , research and marketing, and drew the energies of the GOZ away from land reform. Donors sympathetic to agrarian transformation could certainly have bailed out the GOZ's land reform programme, especially when Zimbabwe's revenues declined further in the face of South African destabilisation. Moreover, donor funded provisions of credit, marketing infrastructure, research and other services did not exhibit any preference for resettlement areas. So, the costs of setting up the new settlers became in itself a constraint.

Regarding the financing of land acquisition, by 1982 the British Government had not only withdrawn from financing farm land for cooperatives, but in 1983 it also began to slow down its disbursements to the resettlement programme because of a purported lack of local matching funds for land purchases and inadequate planning by the GOZ for the schemes. The GOZ, confronted by increased squatting on LSCF lands, particularly in Manicaland, perceived this to be a delaying tactic by the UK's disbursement agency, the Overseas Development Agency (ODA). Gradually a resettlement policy shift emerged, under which settler selection criteria changed from settling the landless to settling 'master farmers' and other 'better-off' peasants in Communal Areas, slowing down the pace of resettlement. Indeed both donors and the GOZ began to be more cautious in their selection of settlers, on the grounds of seeking the economic efficiency of schemes. Unachieved production targets on resettlement schemes and the need to support peasants remaining in Communal Areas became the new concerns. Such concerns were based on short-terms analysis of losses and gains rather than on the need to change the overall demand structure of the agrarian sector and to introduce social equity.

But by 1983, the emphasis of GOZ economic policy had shifted towards a more export-oriented economic strategy (Mkandawire 1984) as part of the beginnings of the 'home-made' SAP. It was perceived that this could be

attained by harnessing the LSCF sub-sector exports and peasant cotton production.

Donors supported this shift through CIPs which relieved foreign exchange bottlenecks in assisting farm mechanisation and export promotion facilities. There was little room in this approach for new settlers from the land distribution programme. Thus, between 1990 and April 1993, the GOZ succeeded in designating less than 200,000 hectares on 70 farms for redistribution, suggesting that it would require more than 20 years to achieve its target of acquiring 5 million hectares of LSCF land.

Agricultural producer collective cooperatives, saw a substantial decline in allocations of their establishment grants from Government by 1984 (Mumbengegwi 1984), although a few donor agencies came to their rescue. Non-governmental agencies (NGOs) such as the Lutheran World Federation, Nordic NGOs and a few European NGOs provided small grants to less than 40 cooperatives (Moyo *et al.* 1989). Most donors, including large ones such as the Americans, did not support the resettlement programme, suggesting that they did not favour the GOZ's attempt to reorganise agrarian relations of production, even on a small experimental basis. Instead, they tended to support peasant marketing cooperatives, on the grounds that their efficacy had been proven over time and that cooperative procurement of inputs, of marketing, of information exchange, labour and implements exchange, were preferred by peasants over collective ownership (Bratton 1984).

Agricultural Policy Influences: Which Interests Prevail?

Through the selective application of aid to various types of agricultural activities, donors have had a crucial impact on Zimbabwe's agricultural policies. In the study of African agricultural policy, Zimbabwe tends to be credited with having had an appropriate policy framework which provided incentives to both large and small farmers, leading to increased production after 1980. Although the GOZ has always denied it, donors did influence agricultural policy through the direction of aid. This began with the devaluation exercise in 1982, and the gradual orientation of foreign aid towards agricultural markets development, especially exports, followed by the reduction of food subsidies. Agricultural policy had been influenced by donors through a gradualist approach to the adoption of a few aspects of a structural adjustment programme until 1990 when ESAP was adopted full-scale. Notwithstanding the revolutionary nationalist and socialist credentials of the GOZ, agrarian transformation was supplanted by liberal market reforms which reinforced the dominance of the LSCF sector.

Most Western researchers on Zimbabwe agriculture consider the above policy outcome to be the correct and economically rational end so far, if only food reserves could be maintained at reasonable levels. The fact that rural poverty, unemployment and low productivity persist among the

peasantry in the face of continued land underutilisation within the LSCF, and due to the lack of production support for peasants, does not seem to justify further agrarian reforms, particularly land redistribution. It would appear that the rational-choice theoretical perspective when applied to African policy-making, eschews only the rationality of market processes rather than other policy interventions which aim to improve the efficient allocation of resources, particularly with regard to inducing productivity gains among peasants.

The larger problem is that interest group theorists have embraced Zimbabwe as a model, because its 'bi-modal' agrarian structure and the development of farm and other lobbies are considered to positively influence policy making, unlike in other parts of Africa. Thus the liberal agrarian policy outcome has tended to be explained as the result of the strong LSCF lobby, which expresses its concerns better than the peasantry (Bratton 1980; Skalnes 1989). Fewer scholars have attributed the above policy outcome to the GOZ's own independently developed rationality. In spite of this, most scholars tend to neglect the role of donors in influencing agricultural policy, even though it is now commonplace to critique post-facto structural adjustment programmes in Africa, instead of developing an appreciation of the manner in which such policies have been foisted on the continent.

Both the SAP critique and the interest group perspective not only reflect the rationality of the African state, but also oversimplify policy processes, by minimising the class and power interests of African ruling classes and their collaboration with and dependence upon donors.

To suggest that where, as in Zimbabwe, farm lobbies are effective, policy will be rational is methodologically flawed, because the sources of policy influence are more complex, stretching beyond the mere existence of strong farm lobbies, to interlocking relationships between state, farm and peasant lobbies, donors, and technical experts. Thus, whereas the LSCF lobby in Zimbabwe was interested in defending LSCF land rights and markets, they were also interested in receiving non-market incentives including state protection through the import-substitution industrial bias and marketing boards, which benefited them most. The role of donors was to support the expansion of peasant production, LSCF exports and technology imports to agriculture, reinforcing through gradual agricultural markets liberalisation the dominance of the LSCF. In their refusal to support land reform, donors displayed similar interests to those of the LSCF, against the stated GOZ policy of agrarian reform. But the GOZ's policy making autonomy was weakened by the poor performance of the broader economy, a contradictory practice of implementing agrarian reforms through parastatals, and its dependence on donor aid. This dependence reduced the GOZ's resolve to execute agrarian reforms.

While policy-making within a bi-modal agrarian structure, is complicated by the heterogeneous production relations, technologies, land tenure and commodity biases, policy preferences of donors can be decisive in determining which farming groups benefit most. Thus the role of donors needs to be given greater consideration in the analysis of specific agricultural policies than is currently the case. For, as shown above, donors influenced Zimbabwe's agricultural policy through their choice of programmes to support, and effectively took advantage of the GOZ's weak financial situation to redirect agrarian policy.

The World Bank and various bilateral donors supported those agrarian aspects that would maintain and expand the inherited bi-modal agrarian structure, and provided an impetus for the increased participation of 'progressive' peasants in agricultural markets. Smaller donors promoted local institutional capacities in research on adaptive technology and improved services to peasants in order to reduce their costs. Through CIPs, bilateral aid particularly from the USA, the United Kingdom, some Nordic countries, and the Eastern Bloc barter arrangements promoted the importation of agricultural machinery technology, equipment and spares, which led to the increased mechanisation of the LSCF and labour substitution tendencies in the LSCF (Moyo 1989). These measures strengthened the LSCF, in spite of the GOZ's interest in building agriculture in Communal Areas.

Donor support to agricultural marketing was the most critical source of policy influence. While the GOZ initially continued and even expanded its market controls, the net effect was that increased coverage of peasants by the boards could not cater for more than 50 percent of the peasantry. Moreover, given the continued dominance by the LSCF of the production of most commodities, with the exception of maize and cotton, they benefited most from marketing resources, especially from subsidies available to producers through commodity pricing and storage facilities. Foreign aid led to the removal of food subsidies and budget balancing measures in the agricultural parastatals, which resulted in conservative strategies of small farmer promotion. The increasing liberalisation of marketing boards under ESAP, has had a more severe direct impact on the peasantry, whose access to such services have tended to be reduced, and among whom free maize marketing rules have been introduced.

Although farm credit towards peasants increased, their share remained small as it favoured those in better agro-ecological regions. Repayment conditions for peasants were not positively discriminatory in their favour, given their own constraints and lack of access to commercial loans. Donor influence in this aspect was critical, since apart from the 1992 drought recovery programmes, there have been no direct state subsidies for peasant production. Provision of inputs continues to be dominated by transnational

firms, private companies and the large farmer 'cooperatives', while the costs of inputs have been rising, eroding peasant gains from output growth. Instead, most donors preferred 'softer' areas of agricultural development assistance to peasants, such as agricultural support services, support to 'reliable' and better off farmers located in well-endowed regions and easily executable programmes, such as CIPs in support of large farmers, while EEC support was directly linked to developing exports markets. Their Nordic counterparts supported basic needs oriented services such as rural water and health.

While foreign aid supported the more 'populist' programme of improving small-scale farmer participation in previously discriminatory agricultural markets, the more or less evolutionary approach contradicted the radical agrarian perspective carried in GOZ policy documents. As a result, the impact of donors on Zimbabwe's agricultural policy and performance has been to slow agrarian transformation. Thus a very limited quantity of mainly poor quality land was redistributed in Zimbabwe over thirteen years, partly a reflection of limited British aid and declining GOZ financial commitments over the years. Both foreign aid and Government budgetary allocations weighed heavily against collective cooperatives, reflecting an overall tendency not to favour 'socialist forms of organisation of production'.

Conclusion

Further research is required to identify how donors, government and farm interest groups interrelate in shaping contemporary agrarian policy in Africa. There is need to examine the efficiency of the current wholesale shift towards market driven agricultural policies, since the development of agrarian capitalism, while marginalising the peasantry, has not been able to improve the capacity of African countries to satisfy their internal demands for food and agro-industrial inputs. Because the rest of the whole continues to subsidise agriculture, the role of the African state in agriculture needs to be redefined so as to generate interventions that broaden the productive capacity of the peasantry. Research needs also to reveal how foreign aid can be utilised for agrarian change, which African markets are unable to induce.

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The Moral Economy of Working Class Struggle: Strikers, The community and the State in the 1947 Mombassa General Strike

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Résumé: Cet article examine certains déterminants cruciaux de la résistance sociale des travailleurs, en particulier la grève comme arme, en prenant pour exemple la grève générale de Mombasa de 1947. Tout en battant en brèche l'usage bien établi de concepts tels que l'économie morale et la communauté, l'article tente d'analyser leur importance ainsi que le rôle de l'Etat dans le processus et l'issue de l'action revendicative des travailleurs. Il montre que dans la grève générale de Mombasa de 1947, les grévistes autant que le patronat, avaient bénéficié de ressources extérieures. Pour les premiers, c'était le poids moral de la communauté. Pour les seconds, la puissance coercitive de l'Etat.

Introduction

For twelve days in January, 1947, the port city of Mombassa in Kenya was virtually paralysed by a general strike. The strike involved more than 15,000 workers out of an estimated workforce of 20,000. It was, and remains to date, the largest strike in Mombassa's history. This strike was not an isolated event. It was part of a wave of strikes that engulfed colonial Africa after the Second World War (Zeleza 1986a:164-190). The Mombassa general strike features prominently in a number of studies. But these studies tend to focus narrowly on analysing the workers' grievances, the articulated goals of the strike, and then proceed to assess whether or not the strikers achieved their stated objectives. Singh (1969:141-160) uncritically celebrates the strike as a great success, Clayton and Savage (1974:276-283) concentrate on the weaknesses of the African Workers Federation, which they believe, wrongly, engineered the strike, while Stichter encapsulates it in the growing tide of nationalist militancy (Sticher 1978-1982:173-174). Perhaps the most perceptive analysis of the strike has been made by Cooper (1987:78-113) who tries to show the way in which it transformed the organisation of work in Mombassa. However, Cooper tends to underestimate the ruthlessness with which the state sought to suppress the strike, and his analysis of community involvement offers important leads that are not fully developed.

It was Cooper (1983:35), in fact, who in a 1983 paper, noted that 'the relationship of spatial organisation and collective action in Africa needs specific attention'. This paper attempts to capture the linkage between communities and strikes by using the 1947 Mombassa strike as a case study. What is remarkable about this strike, and other earlier strikes in Mombassa, is that it was not organised, at least initially, by a trade union. The strike cannot, therefore, be fully understood without analysing the social networks in the community where the workers lived. The paper seeks to show that strikes are not merely episodic struggles between labour and capital at the work place. In reality, they involve much wider struggles in society. In a strike labour and capital are not simply pitted against each other as abstract factors of production, but as workers and employers who are members of different communities. More often than not, workers' struggles are aimed at not only improving working conditions, but also conditions in the community, for it is in the community that workers consume their earnings and reproduce themselves. Moreover, strikes are not sustained simply by solidarity expressed on the picket lines, but through the support of families, friends and the community at large as well.[1]

Focusing on heroic events such as the 1947 Mombassa general strike runs the risk of oversimplifying history. Changes in colonial societies did not come about only because of such gestures of collective defiance. The prosaic but constant daily struggles between workers and the functionaries of capital and the state at workplaces and in the communities, which required little or no coordination or planning, except perhaps the implicit understandings of informal networks, probably proved more enduring in transforming colonial society, in containing the authoritarian practices and hegemonic pretensions of colonial rule.[2] But the general strike provides an irresistible arena for the social historian: the contradictions, brutalities, capacities, and relations between and among the contending forces are thrown into sharp relief.

The paper seeks to examine the way the 1947 Mombassa general strike developed, the role played by the community, the attempts by the state to control and contain it, and the effects of the strike's resolution on subsequent relations between the colonial state, capital and labour, and on social relations in the working class community itself. It is divided into five

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1   This point was brought home to me during a strike at my university in March 1991. The strike lasted three weeks. As the strike dragged on, my morale was affected by the morale of the others on the picket lines, the changing attitudes of the students, my family, neighbours, and the general public as reflected in the media. For accounts of this strike see, *Peterborough Examiner*, 4-30 March, 1991.

2   One of the most compelling accounts of everyday struggles can be found in James C. Scott, 1985.

parts. First, it offers a brief historiographical and theoretical discussion of African labour struggles and the concepts of 'moral economy' and community as used in this paper. Second, the tradition of strikes and the patterns of community organisation in Mombassa are examined. Third, the paper traces the development of the strike during its early days, the use of public meetings as forums for articulating the objectives of the strike, and the initial responses by the employers and the state. Fourth, it delineates the role of the community in the strike and strategies used by the state to crush it. Finally, the paper assesses the impact of the strike.

Struggles and Communities

Ever since the managerial approach[3] in African labour history was superseded at the turn of the 1970s by the so-called 'radical' perspectives inspired by dependence and Marxist paradigms much has been written about the class consciousness of African workers (Sandbrook and Cohen 1975; Gutkind, Cohen and Copans 1979). Endless debates have raged on the extent to which these workers constitute a class, objectively and subjectively, in-themselves and for-themselves. The 'engaged' scholars of the 1970s and 1980s, were convinced that African workers did indeed possess this indeterminate class consciousness, and that they would eventually commit themselves to socialism and the reorganisation of the state and economy. Others were not so sure. They argued that working class consciousness in Africa was compromised by the centrifugal pulls of ethnic identity, peasant culture, or petty-bourgeois populism.

In the debate, the work place was the locus of working class consciousness, the arena where the workers discovered and fought for themselves as a class against capital. Strikes were their rites of passage on the straight line of proletarianization. In this literature neither class consciousness, strike action, nor proletarianization were adequately problematised. In the aftermath of the debacle of 'actually existing socialism' in Eastern Europe and Africa at the turn of the 1990s, much of this 'radical' scholarship appears naively reductionistic and deterministic. It not only ignored the complexity of work cultures, but also of working class *communities*, and the complex articulations between the two.[4]

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3   These studies largely focused on the problems of labour recruitment, efficiency, training, control and organisation. For comprehensive reviews of African labour history see, (Zeleza 1983; Freund 1984:1-58; Freund 1988).

4   The work of Charles van Onselen (1982) was a significant exception. He drew sensitive and fascinating portraits of the world the workers lived in, and made, in early Johannesburg. But so absorbed was he in celebrating everyday life that he failed to illuminate the wider structures and processes that dominated the workers' lives and capture their struggles to transform them.

The search for the 'class' or 'revolutionary' credentials of African workers must be abandoned. Many scholars talk of class consciousness without indicating clearly what they mean by it.[5] We still know little about the real world African workers inhabited. Workers need to be resituated in communities in which they lived and from which they drew support when they faced crises, including labour struggles. It is too simplistic to assume that the consciousness of workers could be derived primarily from the work place. What the workers experienced at work, how they interpreted that experience, and accommodated and resisted it was mediated by their lives in, and discourses of, the community. The dialectical relationship between class, community, culture, and struggle requires careful analysis.

Attempts to decipher the moral economy of workers' strikes offer avenues in this direction. But the concept of 'moral economy' needs to be scrupulously defined. It has mostly been applied to peasants.[6] In Hyden's rather simplistic analysis, the 'moral economy' is a relic of the past, an indication of the peasants' backwardness and incapacity to embrace capitalist values.[7] Few scholars have applied the concept to workers. Unfortunately, some of those that have, they have not redefined the concept to fit the different conditions of workers. For example, in his article on the moral economy of the 1946 South African miners strike, Moodie argues that, like in E.P. Thompson's eighteenth century England, the mines had a moral economy whose bounds and obligations were implicitly agreed upon by the workers and employers (Moodie 1986:1-35). This is comparing apples and oranges: eighteenth century rural England and mid-twentieth century industrial South Africa. Moreover, it mixes social orders with very different normative and moral dimensions: one was 'legitimate', the other colonial and 'illegitimate'.

This is to suggest that the moral economy of working class life and struggle under colonial conditions must be conceptualised differently. It must take into account the context of colonialism as an 'illegitimate' and exploitative system. If subsistence constitutes the moral claim of peasants, for workers it is the right to a living wage. Under colonialism, there was

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5   Gutkind (1988:10) claims, extravagantly, that social anthropologists may have the answer: 'We know what consciousness is. We often call it ethnicity or identity, a consciousness of traditions, habits and ideas. It is unfortunate that we know less about class consciousness having left this subject to sociologists, political scientists and historians'. One hopes he doesn't mean it: who have produced some of the most facile conceptions of Africa if not social anthropologists?

6   Perhaps the most insightful analysis is that of James Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1976), and *Weapons of the Weak*...

7   For a critique of Hyden's (1983) analysis see, Mahmood Mamdani (1985:178-194) and Zeleza (1986b:151-186).

another factor that determined African notions of economic justice and their working definition of exploitation: their view that they were *despised* as a colonised people, as Africans. The racial dimension of colonial rule in Africa, the relationship between race and class, has not been adequately problematised in the literature; at best it is subsumed under 'nationalism' (Brown 1988:42). The concept 'moral economy' should not be used to camouflage colonial racism, exploitation and oppression, like so many other terms used in African studies.[8]

In this paper, the term moral economy is strictly used to refer to the socio-economic, political, cultural and moral imperatives that sustained relations in African working class communities. Relations between African workers and their employers were certainly economic, but colonialism made a mockery of any moral bounds and obligations. When workers went on strike in the cities of colonial Africa they fought for something more than wages and conditions of work: they were struggling for the city as well, trying to alter and redefine the colonial controls over workplace, residence, and movement (Cooper 1983). They were asserting themselves as a collectivity, a community of workers, of colonised people, of Africans. In short, the economic, political and cultural hegemony of the colonial system was being contested.

Strikes are easy to define: they are work stoppages initiated by workers. More difficult to specify is the concept of community, for the term is used in so many different contexts. In general, in the sociological literature the word community is used to refer to either a territorial unit, a unit of social organisation, or a psychocultural unit (Poplin 1972). In studying communities, sociologists have used a number of paradigms, including the human ecology model, according to which the distribution of population in cities is a product of the 'natural' processes of competition, segregation, invasion and succession; the social class model with its emphasis on the role of class factors in the spatial and social organisation of cities and communities; the community power model, which primarily focuses on the nature of community power structures; and 'the paradigm that goes under the rubric Gemeinschaft-Gessellschaft [that] has dealt with the meaning of the spatial aspects of settlement for human relationships. The major component of this paradigm was a generalisation about the differential impact of rural and urban lifestyles' (Bernard 1973:8).

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8   For example, to quote, Catherine Newbury (1980:98), 'State formation under colonial rule is often viewed in positive terms. Progress, development, modernisation, centralisation have all taken the place of the earlier notions of civilisation, pacification, Christianity, commerce... The process underlying these terms is seldom spelled out'.

These paradigms, and others, have been widely used, critiqued, revised and some even abandoned. It is not the intention of this paper to analyse them in detail, except to point out that, as in many sociological and anthropological models, they tend to be ahistorical. In this paper the term community is used in its territorial and relational contexts, that is, as both location and a set of human relationships. It is understood that communities are neither natural nor static. They are social constructions, whose character at any given moment is conditioned by created pasts and the prevailing socio-economic, and political circumstances within the community itself and in the wider society. Community bonds are constructed in situated acts, through shared experiences and struggles. They are engendered by a sense of participating in the same history, and sustained by symbols and traditions which are often invented and evoked in moments of conflict with others.

Communities, therefore, are neither fixed social groups nor structures, but processes, whose features can neither be predetermined nor are universal, inherently congenial or destructive. They are not merely entities to which persons 'belong', but 'points of reference brought into play in particular situations and arenas. The individual brings to these situations a plurality of groups, associations and social networks on which he can draw in defining his an other's behaviour' (Gusfield 1975:41). The community social networks, which are made up of complex threads of kinship, friendship and acquaintance, and sustain daily relationships and conflicts, are usually mobilised in struggles involving large segments of the community and outsiders. In such struggles, the community folds into the protective 'we' of the against 'them'.

Mombassa's Strikes and Social Spaces

Mombassa was the centre of strike action in colonial Kenya. A series of strikes took place in the city from 1900. In that year there was a railway strike which apparently spread to other centres along the line. It was triggered by the withdrawal of certain privileges previously enjoyed by the staff. The strike was initiated by European subordinate staff who were later joined by some Indian and African workers. Two years later African policemen in Mombassa went on strike. In 1908 there were strikes of African railway workers and Indian dockworkers and government farm workers at nearby Mazeras. In 1912 African boat workers went on their own strike. On the eve of the outbreak of the First World War most of the Indian Railway and Public Works Department workers and some African workers struck 'in order to oppose the introduction of poll tax and for the removal of other grievances regarding housing, rations, medical facilities and low wages' (Singh 1969:7; Zeleza 1989b).

Strikes erupted with periodic regularity in the 1920s. But it was not until the 1930s that the era of mass strikes finally arrived. The depression had

wreaked havoc on workers lives, as reflected in falling wages, increased deprivation and insecurity. The strike wave affected the whole country, from the towns to the rural hinterlands. But once again, Mombassa led the way. In July 1934 dockworkers went on strike over wage cuts imposed by the stevedoring companies. This was a prelude to the Mombassa general strike of 1939, which at its height involved about 6,000 workers, according to official estimates, and paralysed the port industry and the city. The strikers demanded such things as higher wages and improved working conditions, housing, recognition of trade unions, workmen's compensation and pension schemes (Singh 1969:Chapter 10; Clayton and Savage 1974:Chapter 5 and 6; Zeleza 1982:Chapter 2; Cooper 1987:Chapter 3).

The wave of strikes gathered momentum during the war. The rapid expansion of the working class and its growing industrial concentration in the urban centres, coupled with the hardships of wartime conditions produced an explosive mixture. Wages failed to keep pace with inflation, the housing problem worsened, and there were severe shortages of goods, so that rationing schemes were introduced in the towns accompanied by a draconian policy of urban 'influx' control in which the state sought to repatriate the unemployed and the wives and children of workers. The strike wave peaked in 1942 and dragged on until 1945. The war ended with another chain of strikes, and with the threat of a general strike looming, and Mombassa was poised to lead it.[9] The general strike was narrowly averted with the appointment of yet another committee of enquiry, the Phillips Committee.

But the respite proved temporary. At the beginning of 1947, Mombassa was rocked by its second general strike in less than a decade, and the country's biggest strike ever. This paper seeks to explain why Mombassa had such an unusual propensity for labour struggles, by looking closely at the 1947 general strike. The tradition of working class protest in Mombassa can only be understood in the context of the city's economic, social, and spatial structures, which, in turn, conditioned the ways work was organised and contested, working class communities constructed and reproduced, and official, and community discourses articulated.

Mombassa's economic life revolved around the port. It was the port, and the railway that snaked from there into the hinterlands of East Africa as far as Uganda, that had helped Mombassa eclipse the other old coastal towns in East Africa, including Zanzibar, and extend the city's commercial orbit throughout the region (Janmohammed 1986). Mombassa was therefore the

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9   Cooper (1987:67-71), notes that the general strike threat was quickly brought to heel in Nairobi, unlike Mombassa where workers were not so easily cowed. He attributes this, quite correctly, to the different urban morphologies of the two cities.

lifeline of the colonial economy, not only Kenya's, but Uganda's as well. Thus the city's workforce had a strategic importance out of proportion to its size. This gave it immense powers of disruption. And strikes thrive on that power. The port industry was relatively easy to disrupt because it was concentrated in a rather small area of a comparably small island. Mombassa was then largely confined to the island, so that it had little room to scatter its workers as was the case in the more expansive Nairobi. The size of Mombassa made the networks of communication and interaction dense. The port industry was also vulnerable to strike action because of its heavy reliance on casual labour. To casual workers a strike fit easily into their calendar of irregular work. For them, the losses were, comparatively speaking, minimal. Moreover, as casuals who drifted from one job to another, the threat of the sack hardly applied. In short, casual labour may have lowered wage costs for the port industry, but it also denied the industry important levers of labour control.

The workers of Mombassa were able to mount these struggles and challenges against the coercive colonial labour control system because they constituted a much stronger community than workers elsewhere in Kenya at the time. The explanation for this lies in Mombassa's urban history and social geography, which differed markedly from that of Nairobi, for example. To begin with, unlike the latter which was established at the beginning of the colonial era, Mombassa was a very old city (de Blij 1968). As a colonial creation and the capital, Nairobi was controlled and organised more stringently than Mombassa ever was. Africans in Nairobi, unlike the residents of Mombassa, were regarded as shifting and temporary population. Consequently, pass laws were strictly enforced and Africans in the city had far less control over their communities and locations than their counterparts in Mombassa (Ross 1968; Macvican 1968; Van Zwanenberg 1972). Not surprisingly, in the early 1920s a number of African settlements in Nairobi were destroyed and a public housing scheme built in Pumwani, in a further attempt to control the residential patterns and movement of Africans in the city. The Pumwani houses, and most of the housing provided by employers, were designed for single men and not for family life. Thus African urbanisation was not only regulated through influx control measures, but also by the provision of public housing for single men.

While efforts were made to impose the colonial urban pattern on Mombassa, the city retained its essential character as a 'native town' (Janmohammed 1977). Pass laws were not as strictly enforced and no effort was made to provide public housing until after the 1947 general strike. Instead workers in Mombassa lived in privately-owned Swahili housing areas collectively known as Majengo. Thus Africans in Mombassa had a much higher proportion of the house owning population than in Nairobi (Stren 1978:36). The design of the Majengo houses also enhanced family

and community life. Typically the Swahili houses had enclosed courtyards, while at the same time ensuring 'the spatial independence of most of the individual rooms — both from the courtyard and its communal or family activities and from each other, which facilitates renting rooms to lodgers without undue inconvenience to the owner's household' (Stren 1978). Majengo houses had their fair share of problems: they were poorly serviced with sanitation and sewerage facilities, and they became increasingly overcrowded, especially from 1935 when the city's Municipal Board banned the village layout schemes which allowed Africans to build their own houses, ostensibly on the grounds that the areas were becoming slums (Stren 1978:133).

It is evident workers in Mombassa lived in a very different world from their counterparts in Nairobi. Majengo was an entrenched, vibrant community, which not only allowed family life, but also absorbed its new comers, the migrant workers, with relative ease, for after all, it was already a melting pot of the different races, ethnic groups, and social classes that made up this ancient city (de Blij 1968:70-71). Majengo, moreover, like Mombassa as a whole, was partly shielded from the corrosive dominance of the colonial order by Islam. Out of historic fear or grudging respect, the colonial authorities made comparatively little effort to confront or destroy Islamic traditions as they sought to do with the cultural and religious heritage of the peoples of the interior in whose midst Nairobi was established. Thus Majengo enjoyed social and cultural space unheard of in colonial Nairobi. It was this space and the concentration of the workers in Majengo which allowed the workers of Mombassa to construct a community with considerable autonomy and the capacity to mobilise and challenge the hegemonic practices and pretensions of capital and the colonial state. Thus the 1947 general strike was a product of the relatively long tradition of labour struggle in Mombassa, fomented by long-standing grievances against the coercive and low wage system and colonial racism. It would be facilitated and sustained by the dynamic social networks within the working class community of Majengo.

Meetings and Grievances

The strike began on the morning of January 13. It came as no surprise. Rumours about an impeding strike had been flying since December 1946. The workers were restive over 'low wages coupled with the high cost of living and lack of consumer goods'.[10] Some employers, including the Port Manager and the Director of the Kenya Landing and Shipping Company,

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10 Member of Law and Order in the Legislative Council, 28.1.1947, in CO 533/544 38091/b part 1.

took the rumours seriously and suggested a wage raise to avert the strike. For its part the government promulgated on January 9 a minimum wage ordinance for Mombassa, which set the minimum at Shs 40 per month. The ordinance was expected to take effect on February 1. The offer was too little too late. For one thing, it excluded 'casuals or the large number of workers already bunched near that wage figure' (Cooper 1987:79).

The decision to go on strike was made on Sunday, January 12, at a heavily attended meeting held at a soccer field, located in Majengo on the grounds of the Sakina mosque. The field was renamed, during the course of the general strike, Kiwanja cha Maskini, Field of the Poor, and 'became the organisational hub of the strike and its most powerful symbol' (Cooper 1987:81). This was not the first meeting to call for a general strike. A week before another meeting had also been held at Kiwanja. A strike was narrowly averted 'as a result of a speech made by one of the Africans present who advised the meeting that the Labour Commissioner was very shortly coming to Mombassa when discussions could be entered into with him'.[11] The Labour Commissioner arrived on January 9. One of his objectives was to look into the registration of the recently formed Kenya Landing and Shipping Staff Association (KL&SSA) as a trade union and the reorganisation of the Railway African Staff Union (RASU) under the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance of 1943. For this purpose he brought with him the Staff and Welfare Assistant of the Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours, Mr Osgathorp, who had 'many years experience of trade union organisation in the UK' (Legislative Council 1947).

The Labour Commissioner and Mr Osgathorp held three main meetings with the leaders of the KL&SSA and RASU in which they promised to assist the two organisations in their efforts to reorganise themselves as trade unions. They also addressed a handful of additional meetings with other representatives of the workers. The commissioner was at great pains to 'explain in detail numerous steps that had already been taken to ameliorate working and living conditions on the island and the further steps which the authorities had agreed to take'. These steps included the enactment of a minimum wage legislation, the replacement of the European Coast Employers Advisory Committee by a Coast Labour Committee to which Africans would have direct representation, the granting of a special allocation to a large firm to import goods and establish an African retail store, the setting up of two fuel depots where Africans could buy firewood at controlled prices, expansion of water kiosks and extension of their hours of operation, the reduction of meat prices, and the transfer of 600 labourers

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11 Member of Law and Order in the Legislative Council, 28-1-1947. Also see Mombassa Times, 18 and 22 January, 1947, and *Kenya Daily Mail*, 24.1.1947.

from the casual labour pool into permanent employment (Legislative Council 1947).

The commissioner was able to persuade some of the people he met, especially the leaders of the KL&SSA and RASU, who promised that it would be 'their intention to advise against a strike' (Legislative Council 1947). But these 'representatives' were out of touch with the anger and impatience felt by the bulk of African workers in Mombassa. This became abundantly clear at the Sunday meeting at Kiwanja. Promises that things would improve rang hollow: the same had been said after the 1939 Mombassa general strike, during the course of the Second World War, and after the strikes of 1945. Between 1939 and 1945 a dozen commissions of inquiry had been appointed to look into labour conditions and disputes and suggest solutions.[12] The 1945 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Labour Unrest in Mombassa, also known as the Philips Report, made a stinging attack of the colonial labour system, and called for profound changes.[13] But by 1947, most of its recommendations had not been implemented. Indeed, the report itself had been suppressed.[14]

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12 The commissions produced a number of reports including:*Report of the Commission of Enquiry Appointed to Examine the Labour Conditions in Mombassa, 1939 Report of the Committee on Arab and African Terms of Service, 1941; Report on the Conscription of African Labour, 1942, Report of the Committee on Post-War Employment, 1943,* all published by the colonial government in Nairobi, and the Orde Browne report published by the imperial government in London,*Labour Conditions in East Africa.* In addition there were other reports that were not officially published, such as the Trades Dispute Tribunal, 1942; the Fact-Finding Committee, 1942; the Cost of Living Relief Committee, 1942; the Stronach Committee, 1942; the Warren Wright Board of Inquiry, 1943; the War Bonus Commission, 1944; and the Report of Committee of Inquiry into Labour Unrest at Mombassa, 1945.

13 The Phillips Report represented a radical departure for it rejected the recommendations and findings of previous inquiries. Specifically, the committee condemned the system of low wages, which contributed to poor living conditions and even malnutrition among workers, as well as the shortage of housing and the accompanying problems of high rents and overcrowding in the African locations. Consequently, the committee recommended the establishment of a minimum wage and an immediate salary increase of Shs 5, the provision of more and better housing, establishment of a permanent machinery to assess and review the cost of living for African workers, price control of basic commodities, among other measures.

14 None of the recommendations had been implemented by the end of 1945. See Labour Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 10.1-1945, KNA Labour 9/60. By 1947 the Shs 5 wage rise had been implemented, but the machinery for assessment and constant review of the cost of living of African workers and a central minimum wage advisory board had not been established; recommendations for family allowance had not been implemented, and not much had been done on the housing question. Other recommendations, for example, for the introduction of rationing were outrightly rejected. See Governor Mitchell to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31.3.1947, CO 533/544 38091/b part 1.

Thus as the workers gathered on that fateful and charged Sunday afternoon neither promises nor threats could dim the collective memory of promises not kept, or dampen the cumulative resolve to flail the system. The Labour Commissioner and the representatives he had met had articulated the grievances of the workers in the discourse of wages and trade union recognition. This discourse did not connect in the sweltering heat and agitation of the meeting at Kiwanja that day. It sounded contrived and stilted. It was also limited. Kiwanja had its own discourse that was loud and impassioned. It was broad as well, encompassing demands for improved wages and denunciation of racial discrimination, provision of consumer goods and the restoration of African pride and dignity, recognition of trade unions and the promotion of community well-being. The official discourse assumed the legitimacy of the colonial situation and the rationality of incremental reform. The Kiwanja discourse was in the language of oppression, exploitation and revolt. One centred on the restricted world of work, the other articulated the diffuse demands of community life, for the Kiwanja meeting was attended by workers and their dependents, the employed and the unemployed, youths and elders. It was the community speaking to itself and to 'them': the employers and state officials.

The meeting decided to begin the strike the next day. The strike began with those seasoned harbingers of labour protest in colonial Kenya, the dockers and railwaymen. The state and employers feigned surprise. The colonial governor declared that the strike was not only 'illegal but entirely irresponsible. No properly formulated demands have been put forward' (Governor Mitchell 1947). The chief security spokesman in the Legislative Council (1947) declared that there could be no doubt that the strike was an attempt on the part of a number of persons to hold a pistol to the head of the community at large. That is borne out by the fact that the strike took place without any notice, and a large number of workers who had no dispute, of any kind, with their employers were persuaded or intimidated into leaving their employment.

This was the language of aggrieved state power, at once arrogant and uncompromising, but also fatuous, for it sought to confine and define the strike on its own terms, terms which were in fact being contested by the strike.[15]

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15 Government officials knew fully well the causes of the strike. As one of them put it, 'the foundation of the unrest was the complaints about the rate of wages and the cost of living. There was also considerable feeling of impatience. During the last few years... there had been 5 or 6 Committees of Enquiry, tribunals, etc. There was an impression among the Africans and among other races also, that nothing much ever happened'. He dismissed the allegation that the strike was caused by 'agitators coming from outside. Most of the so-called leaders were people who had lived in Mombassa

The attempt to delegitimise the strike was gradually intensified. Apart from blaming 'agitators', officials believed that the strike was inspired by the successful African dockworkers strike in Durban, South Africa.[16] Clayton and Savage 1974, echo the official line and argue that the news of the Durban strike was one of the 'three events' that converted the unrest in Mombassa 'into the general strike of 1947'. The other two, they assert, were 'rumours that the railway administration had forced stevedoring companies to abandon a plan for a pool of labourers who would be paid a retaining fee', and finally, the strike was triggered by the appearance of 'a leader to focus and to organise the discontent and unrest. This was Chege Kibachia' (Clayton and Savage 1974:276). These sets of events did not trigger the strike. The strike boiled from the grievances, anger and protests that had been brewing in Mombassa for sometime.

The strike was well-timed. The next day the 27,268 ton white Star Liner Georgic was expected to dock with over 1,000 passengers. The government immediately declared the strike illegal and the police moved quickly to disperse the strikers, but to no avail. That morning 'a few Africans continued at their jobs for a time, but left after pickets spoke at them' (Reuter 1946). The situation did not always go so smoothly. Historians have tended to underestimate the amount of coercion used by the strikers in 'persuading' non-striking workers to join. Clayton and Savage claim that 'there was little need for intimidation' (Clayton and Savage 1974:277). In Cooper's account the strike is portrayed as an outpouring of effortless solidarity, and he commends the one act of intimidation he mentions, that of shaving the heads of scabs, as having been 'carefully orchestrated', and concludes that 'no one died during the strike', as if coercion is only real when it results in death (Cooper 1987:82-83).

Whether intended to correct contemporary official charges of widespread intimidation and violence, or to counter earlier anthropological and historiographical orthodoxies that portrayed a low level of class consciousness among African workers, these interpretations obscure the complex realities involved in sustaining such a massive strike, comprising as it did diverse groups of workers in different establishments and occupations. Solidarity was not given, it had to be constructed and reproduced on a continuous basis for as long as the strike lasted. And that process involved both negotiation and coercion, wherever and whenever the strike was being organised, discussed, and evaluated. It should not be forgotten that, 'in

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for very long'. Testimony of Acting Provincial Commissioner, Coast to the Thacker Tribunal, 20.2.1947, KNA Labour 3/13.

16 See for example, Port Manager to General Manager, Railways, 7.1.1947, Establishment Files, Railway Archives 13/1/1/3.

practice, a picket line is a weapon, security blanket, and propaganda organ in one' (Stewart n.d.:71). It is, therefore, both a compact of solidarity for the striking workers and a shield of intimidation against scabs and strike-breakers. There can be little doubt that during the Mombassa general strike pickets were sometimes used to intimidate non-striking workers. There are reports that 'crowds assembled at all main-road entrances to the town and threatened Africans and Asians who had tried to go to work' and 'taxi cabs driven by Africans were stoned, and windows of the European Carlton Hotel were smashed after an Arab servant had been seen' (Reuter 1946).

By the end of the first day the strike had spread and 'paralysed work at the docks and on the Railway and practically all hotels, offices, banks and private houses [were] without African servants' (*East African Standard* 14.1.47). Later in the afternoon a mass meeting was held at Kiwanja. It was at that meeting that the African Workers Union was formed (Singh 1969:141). Thus, contrary to official propaganda at the time, echoed in the work of some scholars (Clayton and Savage 1974:276, Berman 1990:236), the union was the product, rather than the instigator, of the general strike (Cooper 1957:84-85).

That evening 'armed and steel-helmeted police specially drafted into this great East African (Cooper 1957:84-85) port were on patrol' (Reuter 1917). They apparently 'charged rioting mobs of natives... Native stonethrowers broke shop and hotel windows and the police had to break up gangs attacking volunteer workers' (Reuter 1946). They made many arrests (Reuter 1958; *Daily Herald* 1947). The rest of the night reportedly passed quietly (Reuter 1958).

What the archival data does not tell us is the situation in Majengo and other African locations. The night was charged with excitement and apprehension. In small public congregations inside and outside their homes, and along the winding roads and paths, or in the privacy of family gatherings the workers who were on strike and those who were not and other members of the community talked about the strike, assessed the events of the day, savoured their solidarity or deplored disunity, debated strategy, and worried about the future.[17]

In the meantime, additional police and troops were on their way from Nairobi to Mombassa (Reuter 1958). The next day a statement was issued warning the strikers that the present strike is against the law. Unless you return to work the government cannot beneficially continue investigations into ways and means whereby the difficulties described to the Labour Commissioner by your representatives can overcome (Reuter 1611).

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17 Oral interview, Peter Ndegwa, June 1989; Oral interview, Reuben King'ori, July 1989.

The statement continued that they were 'rendering themselves liable to loss of pay and dismissal' (Reuter 160). This language was distressingly familiar to the workers, and they ignored it. The strike gathered momentum. When the Georgic docked, passengers and troops, helped by crew and European volunteers, carried their own baggage, protected by military police guard, although the strikers made no effort to interfere (Reuter 1519). The ship was 'tied up' by 'senior naval officers, government officials, numerous Europeans and one young woman' (Reuter 1453).

The state augmented the feeble voices of propaganda with the armed fists of physical force. Police patrols were increased and more arrests were made. Altogether, by the end of the day 'about 200 Africans had been arrested at Mombassa on charges of intimidation and molestation' (Reuter 1443). Despite this, 'the stoppage of work was almost complete' (Reuter 1443). By the third day, 'troops had arrived in Mombassa and, according to press reports, 421 workers had been arrested by police' (Singh 1969:141). Instead of terrorising the workers, this merely reinforced their resolve.

As had become customary, that afternoon the workers gathered at Kiwanja and the AWU got a shot in the arm with the appointment of Chege Kibachia as its Executive Officer. Up to that point the fledgling union had had little impact on the organisation of the strike. The strike was coordinated and mobilised through word of mouth (Clayton and Savage 1974:277). The existing service associations, especially the railway clerical and civil service associations, gave little support to the strike. This discredited them in the eyes of many workers. In short, in the first few days of the strike there were strike patrol groups which largely functioned independently and sometimes in isolation, and temporary strike committees were formed among several groups of workers employed in the same industry or occupation (Zeleza 1982:233-234).

Kibachia was a twenty-eight year old salesman for the East Africa Clothing Company. He had moved to Mombassa from Nairobi in late 1946 (Clayton and Savage 1974:276). That same day he left for Nairobi to try to contact Eliud Mathu, the lone African representative in the colonial Legislative Council. Cooper believes that Kibachia was appointed as Executive Officer 'because he knew Mathu' (Cooper 1957:85). But he offers little evidence for this. In fact, the union sent Kibachia and another representative not only to meet Mathu but also Kenyatta and other leaders of the Kenya African Union and government officials (Singh 1969:142). Kibachia's appointment had a lot to do with the fact that he had already established a reputation as an effective labour organiser.

In Kibachia the union found an educated, articulate, and militant leader and a fiery speaker, someone who spoke their language and the language of state power. Three days after his appointment, and a day after returning from Nairobi without having contacted Mathu, Kibachia wrote to the press,

refuting official propaganda and asserting the union's position. The letter (*East African Standard* 21.1.1947) stated:[18]

> We wish to clear the allegation advanced in your paper today that the strikers are under the influence of 16 Ex-Service Askaris who have been to England without ground. The strikers are under the influence of those whom they have chosen to lead them. The motives behind the strike are: (1) Indifference towards paying them equally with the other workers of other races who performed identical or same duties; (2) Partiality and disrespect shown to African workers wherever they are employed; (3) Deliberative devices to keep the Africans poor that he may keep at his work all the time...; (4) Not giving wives and children allowances; (5) Taking no notice of the present high cost of living.

It can be seen that as far as the union was concerned the strike was over the issues of wages and racial discrimination.

Pickets and Patrols

Employers and the state found the strike increasingly intolerable. 'Senior staffs', one report lamented, 'in Mombassa's hotels, offices and homes swept the floors and did the dusting because of the six-day.old strike of all African labour in the port. Some of the women had never previously done such work' (Reuter 0025). Ship crews and passengers loaded and unloaded their own baggage, or were assisted by volunteers.

As the strike entered its second week the state intensified its efforts to break it. Four major tactics were used: propaganda, recruitment of strike breakers and scabs, development of police and troops, and conciliation. The propaganda offensive was stepped up. For example, on the eight day R.A.F. aircraft 'showered 10,000 leaflets in English and Kiswahili over a big crowd of strikers' (Reuter 1958). This was the first time the colonial government 'had used aircraft for a purpose such as this' (Reuter 1958). The leaflets combined appeals, warnings and threats as can be gauged from the following:

> Have you stopped to think a little how the strike is injuring yourselves? Have a look round. The life of town goes on. Big steamers are going and coming, they are being loaded and unloaded. Shops, hotels and clubs are carrying on as usual. The only difference is that no Africans are getting wages. Now what about your condition? Are you getting enough to eat? Have you rent to pay at the end of the month? Who brought [the food] to you? Does food grow in the Mombassa Shambas? If the government and railway didn't bring this food, do you really think your leaders could do

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18 The letter was written on January 18, and published three days later.

so? You should realise that at the very time when you began to strike the Labour Commissioner was busy investigating the grievances which your representatives explained to him. But as you chose to follow the foolish advice of those people from afar off who claim to be your leaders, the Labour Commissioner is unable to continue to consider your grievances until you've returned to work (Reuter 2106).

In addition to the leaflet campaign loudspeakers blared in the streets. During one afternoon, for example, loudspeakers implored 'street sweepers to return to work to prevent the possibility of an epidemic' (Reuter 2056).

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the propaganda offensive. Many workers eagerly read the leaflets. To some what was striking about these leaflets was not the message they contained, but the manner in which they were delivered. It was quite a spectacle watching them fluttering from the skies.[19] A few feared that this was a prelude to a bombing campaign. Wild rumours and fear were most pronounced the first day that the leaflets were dropped. In the subsequent days they were received with weary amusement.[20]

The fact that the strike dragged on meant that propaganda and threats did not have the desired effect immediately. The state and employers, therefore, recruited gangs of strike breakers, consisting of hundreds of African, Asian and Arab volunteers, over 800 European men and women volunteers and about 700 Italian civil internees, including 12 prisoners-of-war who were awaiting a ship to Italy. A Central Manpower Committee was formed for the duration of the strike to co-ordinate the distribution of this labour corps. The strike breakers were able to maintain a few essential services.[21]

Employers and the state tried to enlarge the ranks of the strike breakers by encouraging scabs. While the strikers generally did not molest the strike breakers, they reacted more violently towards scabs. They were jeered at and sometimes beaten.[22] On a number of occasions scabs were violently removed from their work places. For example, 'a gang of between 20 and 30 visited the house of Mr Hoey and removed all the workers but one by force'.[23] Groups of strikers went to various premises where scabs were

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19 Oral Interview, Peter Ndegwa June 1989).
20 Oral Interview, Abdul Hassan, June 1989.
21 Governor Mitchell to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18.1.1947; Governor Mitchell to Secretary of State for the Colonies 21.1.1947; Governor Mitchell to Secretary of State for the Colonies 22.1.1947; Reuter 0708, all in CO 533/544 38091/b part 1.
22 General of Command in Chief East Africa to War Office, 20.1.1947, CO 533/544 38091/b part 1.
23 Governor Mitchell to Secretary of State for Colonies, 3.3.1947, CO 533/544 38091/b part 1.

suspected, warning them of severe consequences if they did not stop scabbing. The strikers worked these patrols in shifts. Sometimes they carried letters from the AWU to the employers. One of the letters read:

> Sir, having knowledge that some postal staff are privately being taken to duty which is against our wishes and an act which may constitute disturbances, we beg upon you kindly ask the withdrawal from duty of such people to avoid trouble, as we are peaceful strikers.[24]

This represented an attempt by the union to monitor, coordinate and control the growth of the strike. But its capacity was limited.

The workers themselves and their communities proved to be the most effective in mobilising and maintaining the strike. Many taxi drivers offered their services for free and took carloads of union organisers all over the city to oversee the way the strike was progressing. [25] Ethnic associations also played an active role. There were numerous ethnic associations in Mombassa. They served many functions: assisted and welcomed new comers, supported members in times of crisis, and organised festivities. Above all, they offered the workers, many of whom were rural migrants who came far from Mombassa, a sense of belonging, the comfort of custom and tradition. Through these associations the often lonely, alienated workers sought to reinvent the social and moral spaces they had left behind. The ethnic associations, which were mostly led by workers in permanent positions, used their moral weight to call on their members to join and remain in the strike. For example, the Meru 'association joined the strike voluntarily on account of hunger'.[26] The Kikuyu General Union,[27] the Mombassa Tabora Association,[28] the Taita Union,[29] and the Wakamba Union[30] did the same.

Religion also appears to have played some part in the organisation of the strike. It is significant to note that the football field where the strike

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24 Governor Mitchell to Secretary of State for Colonies, 3.3.1947, CO 533/544 38091/b part 1.

25 African Workers Federation letter quoted in Governor Mitchell to Secretary of State for Colonies, 3.3.47 in CO 533/544 38091/b part 1.

26 P. Mtondoka, (in mosquito control, the municipality), Secretary, Meru Association, Mombassa, Kibachia Hearing, CO 537/2109.

27 J.O. Kinanga (lab assistant in a government department), Secretary to Kikuyu General Union, Kibachia Hearing, CO 537/2109.

28 S. Manyonga (a mason in the Railways), President, Mombassa Tabora Association, Kibachia Hearing, CO 537/2109.

29 A. Kubo (clerk at Smith Mackenzie, a large company), Secretary, Taita Union, Kibachia Hearing, CO 537/2109.

30 W. Kihege (time keeper, New European Bakery), Secretary, Wakamba Union, Mombassa, Kibachia Hearing, CO 537/2109.

meetings were held was on the grounds of Sakina mosque. The mosque authorities must have approved or at least been sympathetic to the strike. That may also help explain why the police hesitated to break up these meetings: they would not only be incurring the secular rage of striking workers but the spiritual wrath of believers. If this supposition is correct, it could be argued, then that Kiwanja cha Maskini, was not only propped up by the size of the crowds that came, but also the sanctity of faith.[31]

These pressures did not only come from the organised institutions in the community. They also emanated from the diffuse discourses of the community, discourse understood both as verbal process and action (Cooper 1990:167). Moral pressure and physical coercion were applied to rally the reluctant and reclaim the scabs. Some unlucky scabs were rounded up and had their heads shaven and 'stretched in the sun' (Reuter 2108). If all this did not work, the threat that 'their relatives living in the native portion of town would be beaten up' often did the trick.[32] Oral data indicates that relatives of scabs were, indeed, sometimes harassed by being jeered at, shunned, and even molested. Pressure against scabs did not only come from the other strikers. It came from the scab's neighbourhood and community at large. Women played a critical role in 'shaming' the scabs, either directly or indirectly through their spouses, who, in turn, put pressure on their scabbing husbands or partners. These pressures, or fears of such humiliation, prevented many workers from scabbing and helped maintain the morale of the strike. But there were some unrepentant scabs, mostly single up-country migrant labourers, who often had weak local networks of support.[33]

It can be seen that the community provided the moral force and sanctions to sustain the strike. It was at Kiwanja that the community was at its most palpable and animated. Meetings were held there every day to express the collective goals of the strike, cement the solidarity of such a diverse group of workers, and rally faltering spirits. The meetings had a free, carnival atmosphere. As one participant later recalled: he 'never saw anyone telling people what to do. It was open to anyone to speak'.[34] Kiwanja was the organisational hub of the strike, the social matrix where people met, established, renewed, and sealed friendships. At Kiwanja the strike was

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31   This subject awaits more research. Some testimonies to the Kibachia hearing intimate the active participation of Muslim imams and Christian clerics in the strike. See, for example, S.A. bin Said Aderhaman, Arabic teacher and Imam, and C. Mwangi, elder Church of England Mission, CO 537/2109.

32   Governor Mitchell to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 3.3.1947, CO 533/544 38091/b part 1.

33   Oral Interview, Reuben King'ori, July 1989; Oral Interview, Zaihnabu Faisal, July 1989.

34   W. Kihege, Secretary, Wakamba Union, Mombassa, Kibachia Hearing, CO 537/2109.

constructed and reconstructed daily, and through the workers who periodically returned to their rural homes and families, the strike radiated to the countryside from which came the solidarity and sustenance of food, which was sometimes brought to Kiwanja to be cooked and shared (Cooper 1987:81-82).

It is important to note that the migrant labour system, which prevented many workers' families from reproducing themselves on the workers' wages, now helped sustain the strike. Labour casualisation and low wages, against which the workers were fighting, also fortified many of them against hardship, for they had never been able to depend entirely on wages for their survival. It was a supreme irony of the strike that poverty was both the curse and armour of the workers. The strike was waged against low wages and labour casualisation, but during its duration it was sustained longer than it would otherwise have been by these very conditions. The low wages and prevalence of casual labour also militated against the atomisation of workers and their households, and strengthened the networks of community interdependence.

The role of these networks cannot be overemphasised, for the union had no resources to help the striking workers, so the latter either relied on themselves or their families, relatives, neighbours and friends. The role of women, whether in the rural areas, from where migrant workers brought supplies, or in Majengo itself, in organising the distribution of food and other forms of relief was critical. As one former striker recalled:

> Three of us used to live together. Kamau and Ogenga were from upcountry. I was lucky because I was from the coast, no too far from Mombassa. I used to go home every weekend. During the strike things were hard. We had no money. Usually we had no money, anyway. But this time it was worse because we were not paid. I did not even have enough money to travel home. Fortunately, my wife came with one of the children and brought me food. That's what we lived on during the strike. It was not just me. I knew many other workers who depended on their wives for food. When it comes to food, women can be resourceful, you know.[35]

Zaihnabu Faisal, a woman who combined her job as a domestic worker with petty trade, remembered that during the strike, in which she participated,

> I was the leader of a Muslim women's group. We thought we should help the strikers in our neighbourhood, especially those that came from afar and did not have families to depend on. So we collected foodstuffs, and we would ask young men to deliver it to those who needed it. I can tell you they were so grateful. Those were tough times, but also wonderful.[36]

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35 Oral Interview, Juma Said, 1989.
36 Oral Interview, Zaihnabu Faisal, July 1989.

There can be little doubt that women, often invisible in the historiography of strikes, were often the bedrock of community support that sustained those strikes. Strikes are not simply made and broken on the picket lines, but in the homes of the striking workers as well.[37]

Thus community support was not confined to expressions of moral solidarity. The community also rendered essential material assistance. Striking workers facing difficulties were provided with food, free accommodation, and sometimes money by their neighbours or relatives.

In the words of one striker:

> Because of the strike I did not have money to pay rent. My landlord was quite harsh and unreasonable. He evicted me and my family, all six of us, my wife and four children. It was rough. We moved into my brother's house. There were so many of us there. We lived like rats. But we managed until the strike was over.[38]

This shows that the tensions generated by the strike were reproduced in the community, while, simultaneously, community relations mediated the organisation of the strike.

The community did not of course always have its own way; just as its actions were responses to provocations by the state and employers, the latter also responded to community actions. Police protection was mobilised for the scabs and strike breakers. 'A large draft of King's African Rifles with three Bren Gun Carriers', a Reuter despatch reported as the strike entered into its second week,

> has arrived in Mombassa... bringing the town's military strength to five companies of the 4th Battalion of the KAR... additional police reinforcements have been drafted into the town and a majority of the European population and many Asians have been enrolled as special police. Patrols of troops and police with fixed bayonets are guarding key points in the town (Reuter 0703).

The government was getting edgy not only because the strike was holding longer than it had been anticipated, but also because there was 'talk of a mass meeting to be held in Nairobi at the end of the week to consider calling a general strike throughout Kenya and Uganda to commence on Monday next'.[39] More arrests were made. And for the first time, some were charged 'under the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes ordinance of 1943 —

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37 As one author puts it: 'more strikes collapse under the withering stare of a workers' family than are ever beaten on a picket line' Stewart *(n.d.:*21).

38 Oral Interview, Kilongo Maitha, July 1989.

39 Governor Mitchel to Secretary of State for Colonies, 21.1.1947.

that of being concerned in "picketing in such numbers as to be calculated to intimidate"' (Reuter 2053).

While the state was flexing its coercive muscles, it also extended the hand of conciliation. It sought to use the good offices of negotiators who had some credibility with African opinion. The first to be tried was the Rev. L.J. Beecher, one of the two representatives of African interests in the Legislative Council. He was hurriedly sent to Mombassa on the seventh day of the strike where he addressed leaders of the strike. His mission failed when he told them that:

> he 'could not support an illegal strike', but as soon as the strikers returned to work he would do his utmost to further any legitimate demands. The strikers replied that they 'would not budge' from their present position (Reuter 2329).

In fact, Beecher was apparently 'threatened by the strikers demanding that he should support their claims' (Reuter 2149). Times had indeed changed: the paternalistic admonitions of a missionary now carried little weight.

The strikers then called for Mathu, the first African member of the Legislative Council.[40] Before his arrival in Mombassa on January 23, he had secured a guarantee from the government that a tribunal with mandatory powers would be appointed and a survey of living conditions in Mombassa would be conducted. He came with the attorney general and the member for Mombassa in the Legislative Council (Reuter 2332). But he went to meet the workers alone. First he talked to the strike leaders at his hotel. He persuaded them to end the strike with assurances that their grievances would be addressed by the government. That evening he held meetings with government officials. Next morning he held more meetings with the strike leaders. They agreed to end the strike. In the afternoon he appeared at a mass meeting attended by 10,000 strikers (Reuter 2332). He asked them to return to work with a promise that the matter would be settled within three months. The workers agreed to call off their strike.

That same evening the government announced that an investigator would be appointed to ascertain the facts which must be known in order to ensure that wages are such as to provide a reasonable standard of living... an investigation into the cost of housing in Mombassa has also been ordered (*East African Standard*, 25.1.1947).

The workers began returning to work on Saturday morning, January 25, convinced that they had won a great victory. However, it was not a joyous day for everyone. Many workers 'are reported to have been told on reporting back for work that their services were no longer needed, the strike having

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40 For a biography of Mathu see Roelker 1976.

shown that they could be dispensed with'. The government was also keen to dampen any sense of victory on the strikers' part. It distributed leaflets denying that their grievances would be settled within three months. 'It can't be too strongly emphasised', the statement said, 'that there is absolutely no truth to the rumour' (Reuter 2237).

Benefits and Costs

When it appeared that the government might be backtracking the workers became restive once again. A week after the strike had ended rumours began flying that the strike would resume. Police patrols were reactivated and voluntary workers were put on standby to maintain essential services (Reuter 2112). The threat of a new strike probably forced the government to act quickly. At the beginning of February the Thacker Tribunal, named after its leader, Justice Thacker, and a social survey team were appointed.

The tribunal issued an interim report on March 20 and a final report three months later. The interim report made an award that increased wages by 10% for those earning less than 54 shillings 50 cents. But the wage increase was restricted to monthly workers employed in government departments, Municipal Boards, the Railways and Harbours, the three stevedoring companies and the East African Power and Lighting. All casual workers, and workers in small firms, domestic servants, and agricultural labourers were excluded. The African Workers Union, now renamed African Workers Federation on Mathu's suggestion in order to distinguish it from the Kenya African Union, held a mass meeting on March 23 where the award was denounced for being selective, and 'inconsistent with the democratic approach to the question of labour' (*East African Standard* 1.4.1947). Kibachia reportedly 'advised the Africans not to accept the interim award and stated that he and his organisation would make representation in London for a special commission to be sent out to do the work of the tribunal'.[41] The award was rejected, although it had initially been accepted by the workers concerned.

The meeting went further to articulate issues of persistent popular discontent. The speakers railed against the government's 'removal of unemployed Africans from Mombassa, as this action was inconsistent with the principles of the Atlantic Charter and freedom of movement in their own country';[42] condemned the monopolisation of shops by non-Africans, and called for the boycott of municipal 'tembo [palm wine] canteens which are demoralising, injurious to culture and contrary to moral purposes, and [were]

41 E.J.A. Leslie, new District Commissioner for Mombassa, Kibachia Hearing, in CO 537/2109.
42 Director of Intelligence to Chief Secretary, 24.3.1947, KNA Labour 3/17.

used as a trap for the arrest of Africans' (*East African Standard* 1.4.1947), 'and were a means whereby African money was transferred to municipal pockets other than African pockets'.[43] The constitution of the Tribunal was also criticised for having inadequate African representation.[44]

It was a mark of the federation's power and the lingering solidarity of the workers that 80 percent of the monthly workers rejected the salary increases in their April paycheques. But it proved difficult to sustain this level of solidarity. Given the low wages, the money was simply too tempting. But the end of May the number of workers rejecting the interim award had dropped to 40 percent. Some casual workers also accepted a Sh/50 raise offered by a number of companies. The final tribunal award made in June 'added slightly to the cost of living adjustment given monthly workers and significantly to the wages of casual workers... Monthly workers were guaranteed leave, holidays, and paid overtime according to a specified formula' (Cooper 1987:100).

The impact of the Mombassa general strike was felt beyond Mombassa. The minimum wage raise was not confined to the city. The government decided to give similar increases to workers in Nairobi, Kisumu, and elsewhere 'without waiting for the recommendations of the Minimum Wages Advisory Board' (*East African Standard* 24.4.1947). Also, Mombassa provided some impetus to a series of strikes in other parts of the country, reaching as far as Kisumu where a general strike erupted from 14 to 16 April (Labour Department 1947, Singh 1969:146-147). The *East African Standard* (16.4.1947) lamented:

> Kisumu, like other urban centres in Kenya, has recently been experiencing a not unexpected, not blameworthy, unrest among African workers. The effects of the Mombassa strike have not yet worn off. They will continue until Africans are satisfied that steps are being taken to deal with legitimate grievances, and to study their problems. They will continues, also, until Government takes firm action against those who are fomenting the agitation... What everybody would like to know is who is responsible for setting such a futile movement as the Kisumu strike on foot and what is going to be done about so-called 'leaders' who delude ignorant Africans, jeopardise their livelihood and propose to defy Authority.

Thus Mombassa was identified as the centre from which the virus of labour unrest had radiated. It followed that efforts to introduce industrial peace had to be concentrated there, too.

It could be argued, therefore, that while the general strike brought considerable and immediate benefits to workers in Mombassa and elsewhere

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43 Cf. E.J.A. Leslie *op.cit.*
44 Director of Intelligence to Chief Secretary, 24.3.1947, KNA Labour 3/17.

in the country, it also strengthened the coercive colonial labour control system. To be sure, the industrial relations regime that subsequently evolved differed in important ways from that of the pre-war era. Its authoritarian core was encased in a paternalistic exterior. This coercive-paternalistic industrial relations system was consolidated in the 1950s. This latter period lies beyond the scope of this paper.[45] Suffice it here to point out that the origins of the 1950s industrial relations system lay in the 1947 Mombassa general strike.

Following the strike, important elements in the state apparatus, functionaries of local capital, and influential sections of the press, who wanted to avoid the 'confusion' of 'unwieldy' mass strikes in the future sought to promote 'apolitical' trade unionism. As the tribunal was being appointed the colonial government was planning to bring 'a trade union expert' 'to organise African labour' (Reuter 2114). He arrived in April 1947. His name was James Patrick, a right-wing Scottish trade unionist, who believed that 'the institution of trade unions in this country constitute[d] the most fearful threat of all' (*East African Standard* 14.1.1949), and that he could not imagine 'anything more disastrous to the progress of the colony than the development of trade unionism by uneducated people'.[46] He vowed to work hard to have unions that were 'unsatisfactory de-registered'.[47]

True to his word, Patrick was instrumental in the dissolution of the AWF in 1948. In a memorandum written the following year he proudly stated:

> When I arrived in Kenya two years ago (in 1947) an organisation calling itself the African Workers Federation was very much to the fore. The Leader became such a danger to the maintenance of law and order he had to be deported. I personally had to discourage the growth of the Federation because I believed it would be completely impractical to administer. There was no restriction, limitation, or qualification on membership. You could be a baker, a tailor or a candle-stick maker, it didn't matter what your occupation was, if you wanted to join, the African Workers' Federation would only be too pleased to accept you.[48]

Patrick played a major role in the subsequent formation of more 'responsible' trade unions, and in framing Kenya's repressive and restrictive trade union legislation enacted in the late 1940s and early 1950s. He also

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45 For comprehensive analyses of the consolidation of this system see: Amsden (1971), Berman (1981), Zeleza (1982:chapter 6).

46 James Patrick, Memorandum on Trade Union Development and Policy, 1949, KNA Lab.10.

47 James Patrick, Memorandum on Trade Union Development and Policy, 1949, KNA Lab.10.

48 James Patrick, Memorandum on Trade Union Development and Policy, 1949, KNA Lab.10.

engineered the removal of union leaders whom he found too militant and disagreeable and rewarded and promoted those he found moderate with scholarships and other favours.[49]

This is to suggest that the demise of the federation had more to do with the determined opposition of the state and capital, rather than the internal weaknesses of the federation itself, as some historians have argued. For Clayton and Savage the federation weakened itself because of its overextension outside Mombassa and, more importantly, because of its poor accounting procedures (Clayton and Savage 1974:280). Thus, shoddy administration was the main cause of the federation's eventual collapse. To Cooper inadequate analytical skills on the part of the federation was the central problem. The federation failed, in Cooper's words, 'to develop a critique of the award or an appreciation of how much both its benefits and the sense of victory it entailed meant to the workers' (Cooper 1987:104). No amount of good administration or penetrating analysis would have saved the federation from a state that was determined to destroy it. This is not to say that the federation did not have internal weaknesses. It did. But those weaknesses in themselves would not have resulted in the federation's collapse at the time it did. That dubious distinction lies squarely with the state.

To the state and employers the federation embodied the dangerous urban mass, rather than trade unionism. As Patrick made clear, it had to be crushed at all costs. Opposition to the federation was not confined to the functionaries of the state and capital. The federation's activities were of grave 'concern to all responsible opinion in Kenya, including', the acting governor wrote, 'such important unofficial opinion as Archdeacon Beecher and Sir Alfred Vincent', who believed that a serious political situation would' arise unless the government [took] action 'against the growing campaign of the AWF' 'to discredit not only the government but also all European institutions'.[50]

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49 For a detailed analysis of Patrick's career in Kenya, see Zeleza, T., (1987:6-8). Patrick's activities were even attacked at the Annual Conference of the British TUC in 1952 by some British trade unionists, although the TUC General-Secretary defended him, TUC Annual Report 1952 (London: TUC), pp.351-2.

50 Acting Governor 8.6.1947, in CO 537/2109.

The offensive against the AWF began in earnest following the federation's successful campaign against the Thacker tribunal's interim award. The federation was also critical of the final award in that it applied to less than half the city's workers, although it accepted it.[51] The provincial administration believed that the federation was muted in its response to the final award because the majority of workers are not yet anxious to undergo the discomfort of a general strike so soon after the last one, and the leaders realise this and wish for time in which to prepare the ground for the next move. No doubt they will return to the charge when the time seems ripe.[52]

The workers who had been excluded decided to take action. The domestic workers were so 'angry' by the exclusion that they decided to form the Domestic Servants Union.[53] Drivers and mechanics formed the Drivers and Mechanics Association.[54]

Given the fact that so many workers were excluded from the award it is not difficult to see why the AWF could argue in its memorandum to the Colonial Office that the Thacker Tribunal had 'left things as they were before'.[55] This was not a 'misanalysis', 'a political error, a misreading of the importance of success in the course of a struggle' as Cooper (1987:106), contends, but a reflection of the fact that many workers were left out of the settlement and others were dissatisfied with what they received. Those at the top of the pay scale were not too impressed with the awards. Neither were some government officials and observers.[56] It is quite ahistorical, therefore,

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51 The AWF apparently advised the workers covered by the award to demand that the final award increase be included in the end of June paychecks. Refusal by some employers led to a few incidents. Senior Labour Officer, Coast to Acting Provincial Commissioner, 9-7-1947, KNA Labour 3/14.

52 Acting Provincial Commissioner, Coast, to Member for Law and Order, 12.7.1947, KNA Labour 3/14.

53 S. Bin Abdulla, Chairman Domestic Servants Union, submission in the matter of Kibachia's deportation, in CO 537/2109.

54 P.H. Brown, Municipal African Affairs Officer, Kibachia Hearing, CO 537/2109.

55 The memorandum was enclosed in a letter from Chege Kibachia to Creech Jones, 12.8.1947, CO 537/2109.

56 For instance, the Acting Coastal Provincial Commissioner argued that the award was not generous enough, although he thought it should have been confined to government and railway firms 'who could be trusted to honour it' rather than extended to the small employers who couldn't. One of the most extensive and scathing attacks on colonial labour and wage policy following the Thacker Tribunal interim award was made by T.P. O'Brien. In his view the low wage system was a 'major error', rationalised by ignorant 'western anthropologists and economists', intended to satisfy the needs of 'the metropolitan country'. T.P. O'Brien, Colonial Labour and Wage problems: Memorandum Submitted to Mombassa Trades Disputes Tribunal, 26.5.1947, CO 533/544.

to expect the federation to have gone out of its way to celebrate 'the workers' success'.

Cooper's argument that the award package as a whole marked a success for the workers is tantalising. The awards, he believes, marked an important step towards paying African workers a living wage. The workers had also struck a blow against casual labour. Moreover, the strike forced the government to take African workers seriously, while its resolution through Mathu's intervention showed the importance of African politicians as mediators (Cooper 1987:88-93). In short, the strike forced changes in the organisation of work and the structure of wages. The achievements were real, but they should not be overemphasised. From the vantage point of the Mombassa workers in June 1947 or in the next few years there was little to celebrate. The weight of economic deprivation, social dislocation and political marginalization remained as heavy as ever. The problem with Cooper's analysis is that it is not about the discourse among Africans, but among colonial officials, especially those in the Labour Department who relished the language of liberal reform at the same time that they were busy fortifying the authoritarian industrial relations system.

The AWF memorandum presented not only a perspective analysis of the cheap labour system and its disastrous effects on rural life, culture and values, and the insidious cancer of racial discrimination, but also a poignant account of African despair and anger. Its demands were comprehensive: dispatch of a British Parliamentary Delegation to look at the grievances of Kenyan workers afresh; promotion of equal pay for equal work; payment of Shs 100 minimum wage, sick pay, workers' compensation and family allowances; provision of better housing, sanitation, travelling expenses, and educational facilities; abolition of pass regulations and beer canteens; recognition of trade unions, including the federation; and instituting the practice of advance notice before discharge.[57]

This memorandum was sent in August.[58] It clearly reflected the continuing dissatisfaction with the labour situation in Mombassa. Tensions

57 Chege Kibachia to Cree Jones, 12.1.1947, CO 537/2109.
58 There was no response until April the following year. In March, 1948, the Acting Governor drafted a response to the Secretary of State for the Colonies which dismissed the AWF memorandum point by point. A sample - on sending a British Parliamentary delegation: 'no useful purpose would be served' given the fact that 'Orde Browne's Report on "Labour Conditions in East Africa" was only published last year'; on equal pay for equal work: it was inappropriate not only because the three races in Kenya 'have vastly different standards of living, but generally speaking, the African at present displays a marked lack of responsibility'; On minimum wages: Not only are they 'hard to enforce', but 'any further considerable increase would be beyond the economic means of the colony and would result only in gradually increasing unemployment'; on travelling expenses: 'not enforceable'; on warning

were rising. On 18 June 1,500 people gathered when they heard that the fire Brigade had 'imprisoned' a woman, and a riot ensued.[59] By the end of July there were still many employers who had yet to enforce the final award.[60] For its part, the government was procrastinating on granting recognition to the AWF, which the latter had applied for about four months earlier. The meetings at Kiwanja became increasingly defiant and strident. As the Acting Governor observed:

> It is generally true to say that until recently those meetings were conducted in an orderly manner, and while many of Chege's utterances were entirely political his behaviour gave little cause for anxiety, as he proposed constitutional action. On 20th July, however, and in marked contrast to the general tone of previous meetings, the Secretary (James Muchenda), at a meeting under the Chairmanship of Chege, informed those present that arrangements were in hand for a countrywide general strike... He informed the meeting that a much sterner attitude would be adopted by the Federation leaders against persons who continued in their employment once a strike had been called, mentioning, in particular, that, whereas heads were shaved on the occasion of the last strike, persons refusing to obey their leaders on the next occasion would be permanently maimed by having an ear removed... at a meeting the following week, on July 27 Chege himself reiterated that plans were afoot for the calling of a general strike in the comparatively near future.[61]

The government began making plans to silence Kibachia and the federation's secretary. The only problem was to find a convenient method and an appropriate charge. The Attorney General advised that 'the facts would not support a criminal charge of incitement to violence', but any evidence of threats was sufficient to deport Kibachia and Muchenda 'to a suitable place in Kenya'.[62] The persecution of the AWF and its officials escalated. For example, the federation was refused permission to hold a procession on 3 August, because of Kibachia's 'remarks at the meeting of

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before dismissal: 'advance notice of discharge cannot of course be given in respect of labour employed by the day'; on beer canteens: they are 'run by municipalities and any profits are devoted to the welfare of the African'. Acting Governor to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6.3.48, CO 537/3587. For the response, see, Secretary of State for Colonies to Governor Mitchell, 6.4.1948, CO 537/3587.

59 M. Kinyanjui, Labour Assistant, Native Civil Hospital, Mombassa, Kibachia Hearing, CO 537/2109. According to this report, the 'mob threw stones' against the 48 police officers who were there, and 'the AWF Secretary tried to assist in restoring order... the AWF was not responsible for riot'.

60 The Labour Department was even forced to launch a campaign after these employers, some of whom were convicted or fined. See *East African Standard,* 23.5.1947, *Mombasa Times,* 16.7.1947, and Clayton and Savage (1974:281).

61 Acting Governor, 8.8.1947, CO 537/2109.

62 Acting Governor, 8.8.1947, CO 537/2109.

July 27',[63] and one of the federation's officers, James Mwangi, 'was arrested for entering Coast Province without a permit' (Cooper 1987:155).

Kibachia was not deterred. On August 16 he went to Nairobi to open a branch of AWF. That afternoon he addressed a large meeting at Kaloleni Social hall, Nairobi's indoor Kiwanja, attended by some of the country's leading nationalists, including Kenyatta, at which he announced that the federation's headquarters would be shifted to Nairobi. The site of the office was identified the next day in Shauri Moyo, a densely populated African location. He declared that the office would be known as Ofisi ya Maskini, Office of the Poor. For the next three days he kept a frantic schedule attending meetings and conferring with trade union and nationalist leaders (Singh). The prospect of the AWF and the Kenya African Union (KAU) working together in Nairobi alarmed the government.[64] It decided to drop the gauntlet.

Kibachia was arrested on August 22 upon his return to Mombassa under the charge of 'conducting himself so as to be dangerous to peace and good order'.[65] His trial lasted about two weeks. It was a farce. The public and press were barred from attending. Great play was made of the threat to cut the ears of future scabs. The testimony of the Africans and the Europeans on this issue varied considerably, underscoring the different racial perceptions and discourses that divided settler colonial society. To the Africans, a laughing Kibachia had made the remark 'in a joking way[66] 'the crowd laughed and clapped'[67] and 'no one showed alarm'.[68] To the Europeans, 'tension did undoubtedly increase considerably... as a result of the threat[69] and it was apparent many workers feared that if there was 'another strike they would be subject to violence, so much so that they intended to run away'.[70] There were of course dissenters. A European police officer stated

63 K.J.M. Holmes, Superintendent of Police Coast Province, Headquarters, Mombassa, Kibachia Hearing, CO 537/2109.

64 Annual Report of the Native affairs Department, 1946-47 (Nairobi: Government Printer), p.80.

65 Acting Attorney General, 18.8.1947, CO 537/1209

66 Dickson Alaba, Assistant Inspector of Police, Kilindini, Kibachia Hearing, CO 537/2109.

67 S. Manyonga, President, Mombassa Tabora Association, Kibachia Hearing, CO 537/2109.

68 L.V. Macharia, Chairman, Municipal Staff Association, Kibachia Hearing, CO 537/2109.

69 P.H. Brown, Municipal African Affairs Officer, Kibachia Hearing, CO 537/2109.

70 P.J. Bostock, Priest, Church of England and Rural Dean of Coast, Kibachia Hearing, CO 537/2109.

that Kibachia made no 'unlawful remarks' or were there any' unlawful acts at those meetings'.[71] Most of the testimony was in Chege's favour. But this was not enough to save him.[72] He was found 'dangerous to peace and good order', and duly deported to Kabarnet in Baringo District, then a remote part of the Rift Valley Province where he languished for a decade.[73]

The state was not simply after Kibachia, but to crush militant trade unionism. Eighteen other leaders of the federation were also arrested.[74] Five days after Kibachia's arrest, Singh, probably Kenya's most indefatigable trade unionist before the rise of Mboya in the 1950s, was ordered to leave the country' within thirty days. He had arrived back in Nairobi from India only five days earlier' (Singh 1969:157). Singh was the General Secretary of the Labour Trade Union of East Africa, successor to the Labour Trade Union of Kenya, and the oldest omnibus union in the country. The era of general worker's unions was drawing to a close. The ground was being laid for the deradicalization of the Kenyan labour movement, which would be accelerated during the state of emergency in the 1950s (Zeleza 1982:Chapter 6).

More difficult to decipher is the aftermath of the strike on community life. Testimonies to the Thacker Tribunal and Kibachia Hearing indicate little sense of elation with the results of the strike. Many Africans giving evidence pledged that if there was another strike they would not join it, although it is more than likely that these statements were made for the benefit of the hearings. The fact that there was little organised protest

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71 R.J. Joseph, Assistant Inspector, Kenya Police, CO 531/2109.
72 The remark on cutting ears amused the House of Commons. Mr Rees-Williams, responding to a question about Kibachia, 'that this man was rather a dangerous individual. In July 1947, he threatened that unless people came out on a strike he proposed to call, they would have their ears cut off (laughter). The government did not think this contributed to good trade union practice (loud laughter).Until the man learned to behave himself he would be detained. (Renewed laughter). *Times* (of London), 26.2.1948. So much for the view that the governing post-war British Labour Party was 'enlightened' when it came to colonial labour movements, see T. Zeleza, *Trade Union Imperialism..*
73 The government insisted that he was 'not under detention'. S.F. Sutton, Attorney General Chambers to A.B. Cohen, Colonial Office, 28.1.1948. CO 537/3587. The AWF was given official recognition by June 1948. But by then it had lost most of its leaders. Its fate was sealed when it lost use of the mosque grounds for its Sunday meetings. By 1950 its impact had paled into insignificance. In the meantime, the government actively tried to promote ethnic and other voluntary associations, see Stren *op.cit.*, p.70-71.
74 *East African Standard,* 26.1.1947, 1.9.1947, 10.9.1947, 24.9.1947, 2.10.1947; Mombassa Times, 28.8.1947.

following the arrest of Kibachia and the other leaders had little to do with Kenyatta's denunciation of 'illegal strikes'[75] (Cooper 1987:107). The fact that the workers did not protest was not remarkable; it would have been remarkable if they had, having just waged the colony's longest general strike earlier that year. After the tumultuous events of the past few months, the strike, tribunal hearings, awards, threats of further strikes, arrests of labour leaders, including Kibachia, it would not be farfetched to argue that fatigue or despair or both had set in.

Some of the testimonies also indicate that tensions persisted, at least for a while, between those who had participated in the strike and the scabs. The strike and its resolution also exacerbated the underlying strains among the workers themselves, especially between the lowly and relatively higher paid, as this exchange intimates:

> We really went on strike because of low wages, not because of no mosquito nets or anything like that, and if these highly paid friends of our say that they had nothing to do with it, and if they only came to the meeting place pretending to sympathise, then if they come next time there is a strike, they are the people who should be killed'.
> The President [of the Tribunal] warned him that this was violent language. 'You're on very dangerous ground, young man'.
> **Mr Orongu**: 'I'm not on dangerous ground, I'm only stating facts...'
> **The President**: 'Are you advocating that anyone should be killed?'
> **Answer**: 'All the lower paid people are very much against the statements of these men who are highly paid. My food expenses are the same as those of a clerk'.[76]

The Mombassa working class had never been homogeneous. The Thacker awards reinforced its internal cleavages and differentiation.

Already before the general strike sections of the Mombassa working class, especially the local Swahili, were stabilised. After the strike the process of stabilisation quickened. For some workers it came because their wages had risen to the point where they could sustain family life, while for others diminishing access to productive resources in the rural areas was the impetus for stabilisation. Sustaining and reflecting the growing stabilisation of Mombassa labour was the provision of more housing by the state and employers. The need to construct more working class housing received urgent attention following the general strike.[77] It was recognised that the

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75 It had already becoming clear by this time that Kenyatta was no firebrand. His message usually cautioned moderation. See Zeleza T., 1989:166-168. Spencer 1985.

76 Tribunal Hearings, 26.2.1947, CO Labour 3/13.

77 The growing preoccupation with the housing question is readily apparent in official reports and correspondence. For instance see KNA Labour 3/3 on 'Housing of Labour 1940-48', and the report therein by P.E.D. Wilson, Labour Officer, On Labour

problem was immense because it had 'been neglected over a number of years'.[78] In 1949 construction began of Port Tudor Housing Estate, the first public housing estate in Mombassa (Stren 1978:136-137). Old housing estates provided by large corporations and government agencies were criticised for 'overcrowding due to the fact that no provision was made for wives and families in labour lines in the past'.[79]

The construction of new working class housing, although far from adequate, away from Majengo gradually dispersed the working class community, so that the dense social and spatial community networks which had facilitated the general strikes of the past began to fray. The better off workers moved to Tudor and other estates built later. A study done in the 1960s found that the Tudor residents, unlike those of Majengo, were mostly recent migrants who were less predisposed to regard Mombassa as home, and had weaker family structures. Moreover, they were predominantly Christian and less ethnically diverse than Majengo, although they had more ethnic associations (Stren 1978:Chapter 9). The fracturing of working class Mombassa into several urban communities undermined the capacity of the city's workers to act collectively in the future. It is significant that there was never another general strike in Mombassa after 1947 until 1992-93, although there were numerous strikes confined to particular industries and communities.

Conclusion

The paper has tried to show the development and social dynamics, containment and aftermath of the Mombassa general strike, a major landmark in the history of the Kenyan labour movement. In this struggle both the strikers and the employers mobilised external resources: for the former it was the moral weight of the community, and for the latter coercive might of the state. This was, therefore, much wider struggle, one that transcended the grievances over wages and conditions of work. The strike was a challenge against, and an attempt to redefine, the hegemonic practices of colonial society. It was a moment in which the amorphous urban mass transformed itself into a working class community with its own discourse, symbols, and conventions.

Conditions Generally in the Coast Province of the PWD with Special Reference to Housing; also see Progress Report on Phillips Report, especially Part IV, KNA Labour 3/15; and (Booker and Devrill n.d.) *Report on the Economic and Social Background of Mombassa Labour Disputes*, (Nairobi: Government Printer). Also see Stren (1978: chapters 7 and 8).

78 Director of Public Works to Labour Commissioner, 26.11.1947, KNA Labour 3/3
79 Director of Public Works to Acting Chief Secretary, 12.7.1947, KNA Labour 3/3.

Thus what happened in Mombassa in 1947 during and after the strike cannot simply be measured in the nebulous terms of success or failure, victory or defeat, or assessed exclusively in terms of changes in the organisation of work and nationalist politics. Far more happened to the people of the city. Their relationships and views of themselves were transformed in ways that are difficult to measure. It would be fascinating to know how many friendships were lost or gained, marriages broken or strengthened, careers built and destroyed, neighbourhoods enriched and impoverished, of opportunities seized and lost, dreams realised and shattered, and the subtle ways in which gender roles, age hierarchies and power structures were dissolved and reconstructed. Such a rich and textured story can perhaps best be captured in a novel rather than an academic paper.[80]

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80 See, for example, the brilliant portrayal of the 1947-48 rail strike in colonial French West Africa in Sembene (1981). I have dealt with the subject, in fictional form, of how a strike in a post-independent Africa country profoundly alters the relationships, identities, and politics of a community. The story focuses on the lives of two families from different social classes, one working class and the other middle class, drawn together by the strike (Zeleza 1992).

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Etude socioculturelle de l'entreprise sénégalaise

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Abstract: *The authors selected nineteen (19) large-scale enterprises, including fourteen (14) public and five (5) private enterprises. Within these, some 754 workers were asked questions relating to their age, gender, family status, level of education, ethnic and religious affiliations, formal or informal associational activities in their workplaces. The review of the results reveals that, apart from gender, religion, family status, and ethnicity, all the other factors are elements of differentiation between public and private enterprises in Senegal. These findings represent a contribution to the debate on the relationship between African cultures and management, particularly with respect to the phenomena of continuity and break between African socio-cultural spaces and the so-called modern enterprises.*

Introduction

Depuis la fin des années 1970, la variable culturelle est devenue un élément important dans l'explication des performances de la firme. Le débat entre cultures (de l'entreprise ou de l'espace social) et performances de la firme n'a pas intéressé que les chercheurs en gestion, même s'ils ont le plus écrit sur la question. Il a vu notamment la participation des anthropologues, des spécialistes en sciences politiques et des sociologues.[1]

Ainsi, le fait que la firme soit l'un des instruments essentiels du développement économique explique 1) pourquoi un rapprochement automatique est souvent fait entre culture et développement, et 2) pourquoi les pays africains sont au centre du débat sur les cultures et les performances de la firme. La crise économique et sociale qui persiste sur le continent africain depuis la deuxième moitié des années 1970 a été en fait l'un des points de départ du débat sur les capacités des pays africains à s'adapter aux techniques et méthodes modernes d'organisation de la production.

1   Pour une analyse des différentes approches, voir B. Tidjani, «Management et Cultures Africaines: Une Problématique, Plusieurs Approches Vers la Construction d'une Typologie». Paraîtra dans la revue «Gestion des Ressources Humaines», no.17.

Ce débat ne présente cependant un intérêt réel que s'il rend possible l'identification de facteurs favorables ou défavorables à la réalisation des objectifs de la firme. Cela suppose deux choses de la part du chercheur: premièrement une définition de ce qu'est une gestion efficace; et, deuxièmement, une étude empirique approfondie de tous les éléments du contexte de la firme.

Or, généralement, l'introduction de la variable culturelle dans l'analyse des organisations et de leurs performances souffre de plusieurs insuffisances. Soit, elle part du postulat de l'existence d'un *one best way* (souvent le modèle occidental, et de plus en plus le modèle asiatique); ceci bien entendu exclut toute réflexion sur les résonances politiques, sociales et même sémantiques des outils ou méthodes de gestion importés. Soit, elle fonde ses conclusions sur une connaissance largement superficielle du contexte culturel de l'entreprise. Soit elle limite arbitrairement les contraintes environnementales de la firme aux contraintes culturelles. En fait, très souvent, les études sur les rapports entre la gestion de l'entreprise et les cultures des espaces sociaux africains combinent toutes ces insuffisances. Ainsi, les conclusions auxquelles elles aboutissent généralement sont que les pays africains constituent des contextes non appropriés pour l'utilisation des techniques de gestion modernes d'origine occidentale. Que doivent donc faire les pays africains? Démissionner ou réinventer la roue mais à partir de leurs propres réalités?

L'objectif de la présente étude n'est pas d'apporter des réponses à toutes ces questions. Il constitue la première étape d'un travail à long terme sur la gestion de la firme au Sénégal. Il s'agit d'une recherche empirique dont le but est de proposer une configuration socioculturelle de l'entreprise au Sénégal. A notre connaissance, une telle étude, dont la nécessité pour une bonne compréhension de l'organisation et du fonctionnement de la firme constitue une évidence, n'a jamais été réalisée au Sénégal.

Intérêt de l'étude

Au Sénégal, comme probablement ailleurs, le bassin des entreprises possède une structure composite. On y distingue, entre autres:

- des entreprise privées appartenant à des nationaux qui dans la plupart des cas en sont à la fois les mandants (propriétaires) et mandataires (dirigeants);

- des entreprise privées appartenant à des étrangers dont la gestion interne est fortement influencée (certains diront importée) par celle de leurs société-mères;

- des entreprises publiques appartenant entièrement ou partiellement à l'Etat dont l'organisation et le fonctionnement internes sont fortement influencés par l'environnement politique;

- des entreprises privées créées par de jeunes diplômés de l'enseignement supérieur. Elles constituent un cas digne d'intérêt car on aura tendance à penser que la formation de ces derniers les prépare à l'utilisation des techniques modernes de gestion;

- des entreprises du secteur informel dont le succès et le rôle central dans l'équilibre social et économique national (par opposition au déclin des entreprises du secteur dit moderne) peuvent conduire à la conclusion simpliste que leur forme d'organisation est la plus adaptée à l'espace socioculturel sénégalais..

Si on ajoute à toutes ces variations, celles liées à la taille, à la position géographique, et à l'activité par exemple, on voit immédiatement l'intérêt d'une étude articulée autour de la question de savoir si les entreprises au Sénégal présentent ou non la même configuration socioculturelle. Les résultats permettront donc:

- de repérer les différences et similarités interentreprises. Ces différences et similarités mettront en évidence les possibilités et les limites de toute tentative de généralisation d'un mode quelconque de gestion de la firme; et,

- de procéder à une segmentation des entreprises étudiées sur la base de critères socioculturels.

Méthodologie

Les variables socioculturelles suivantes ont été retenues:

- la situation familiale du salarié;

- les caractéristiques du personnel que sont le sexe, le niveau de scolarisation, et la catégorie socioprofessionnelle;

- la religion du salarié;

- les organisations formelles et informelles existant dans l'entreprise; et

- le processus décisionnel dans l'entreprise.

Les données ont été collectées en 1991. Depuis lors, le contexte économique et social du Sénégal a connu des changements importants notamment:

- le désengagement croissant de l'Etat sous la pression des bailleurs de fonds internationaux (Banque mondiale, Fonds monétaire international). Ce désengagement s'est traduit par le changement du statut juridique de plusieurs entreprises de l'échantillon: certaines des entreprises ont été partiellement (SICAP, SONACOS) ou entièrement privatisées (Salins du Saloum) ou sont appelées à l'être (SENELEC, SONEES, SOTRAC).

- l'aggravation de la crise économique et financière du Sénégal avec la dévaluation du Franc CFA en janvier 1994, dont les conséquences

négatives sur le pouvoir d'achat des travailleurs, leur comportement sur les lieux de travail, et les relations professionnelles sont évidentes.

La présente étude n'intègre pas tous ces changements récents· de l'environnement économique et social de l'entreprise au Sénégal.

Questionnaires

Deux questionnaires ont été administrés. Le premier était destiné aux responsables du personnel. Il devait permettre de comprendre les éléments de la politique sociale de l'entreprise. Le second visait les salariés. Il devait conduire à une identification de certains aspects de leur comportement au travail, de leurs caractéristiques individuelles, et de certaines de leurs attentes.

La présente contribution s'appuie surtout sur le second questionnaire. Il est apparu en effet que les responsables du personnel tendaient plutôt à décrire leurs situations de façon normative, alors que l'entreprise vivait une réalité tout autre. Cela a réduit la qualité de leurs réponses.

Les encadrés 1 et 2 présentent la nature des informations recueillies auprès des responsables du personnel et des travailleurs.

Encadré 1: Pour les directeurs du personnel

Rubriques	Variables
Identification	statut, capital social, principaux actionnaires
Activités	principales activités, chiffre d'affaires par activité, part à l'exportation, résultats des trois dernières années,
Personnel	effectifs, composition par sexe, âge, niveau d'instruction, composition socioprofessionnelle
Organisations de défense	le poids des différentes structures de participation des salariés: comité d'entreprise, coopérative d'achat, d'habitat, associations culturelles,etc.
Organisations informelles	associations religieuses, ethniques, régionales, associations de jeunes, de tontine, de femmes, etc., mode de coopération avec la direction, perception du mode de fonctionnement de ces associations par la direction, le rôle de celles-ci dans les conflits, etc.
Politique sociale	politique de recrutement, plan de carrière, politique de promotion, de motivation, de contrôle et d'évaluation du personnel, gestion des conflits, gestion des lieux de culte, politique de communication, de formation.
Entreprise et environnement	actions sociales ou politiques destinées à l'environnement de l'entreprise.

Encadré 2: Pour les salariés

Rubriques	Variables
Identification	âge, sexe, durée de présence dans l'entreprise, ethnie, situation familiale, nombre d'enfants, qualification professionnelle, niveau de scolarisation, religion, confrérie,
Appartenance à un groupe	*dahira*, associations diverses, tontine, relations avec les collègues de travail, appartenance à un syndicat, etc.
Relations professionnelles	mode de recrutement, de promotion, relations avec la hiérarchie supérieure, conception du chef.

Après l'exploitation des questionnaires, des interviews ont été réalisés auprès d'autres salariés et d'autres responsables du personnel non inclus dans l'échantillon de départ. L'objectif était de mieux analyser les résultats de l'enquête.

Echantillon

Les entreprises

Les entreprises ont été sélectionnées sur la base des critères suivants:

- la propriété du capital: on s'attendait à ce que les traits socioculturels caractéristiques de l'espace social soient plus marqués dans le secteur public que dans le secteur privé;

- la taille: les entreprises de grande taille et de taille moyenne ont été privilégiées à cause de leur position stratégique dans l'environnement économique sénégalais;

- l'ancienneté: concernait les entreprises privées étrangères dont le management est souvent importé. On s'attendait à ce que, avec le temps, ces entreprises partagent la même configuration socioculturelle que celle des entreprises appartenant ou gérées par des sénégalais;

- les capacités techniques des dirigeants de la firme, mesurées par l'existence: d'une organisation par fonctions; d'un service de comptabilité; et d'un service du personnel.

Seules les entreprises présentant ces traits organisationnels ont été sélectionnées:

- la localisation géographique: l'objectif était d'intégrer dans l'échantillon les régions de Kaolack et de Thiès qui sont également des régions industrielles, en plus de la région de Dakar.

93

L'échantillon final était donc composé de vingt (20) entreprises dont: 74% ont été choisies dans le secteur public, et 26% étaient des entreprises privées.

Plus des trois quarts (79%) des entreprises étaient situées dans la région de Dakar. Sur les vingt (20) entreprises qui formaient l'échantillon, dix-neuf (19) ont répondu aux questionnaires. Le tableau 1 donne la composition de l'échantillon.

Tableau 1: Echantillon des entreprises

Entreprises	Nombre	Région de Dakar	Autres régions
Publiques	14	11	3
Privées	5	4	1
Total	19	15	4

Source: Composé par l'auteur

Les salariés

Le second questionnaire a été administré aux salariés des dix neuf (19) entreprises choisis au hasard. Il était prévu d'interroger quarante (40) travailleurs par entreprise. Finalement, 754 travailleurs ont été interrogés.

L'exploitation des résultats

Les questionnaires ont été exploités grâce à un logiciel d'exploitation SPAC pour obtenir les résultats bruts. Ensuite un programme de DBASE IV nous a permis de reconstituer la même base de données pour affiner nos analyses.

Présentation des Résultats

Les résultats sont présentés en cinq (5) rubriques: 1) les caractéristiques du personnel: âge, situation familiale et taille de la famille, le niveau de scolarisation, l'ethnie; 2) l'entreprise, l'Islam, et le*Dahira*; 3) l'entreprise, le syndicat et les organisations informelles (la tontine, les associations de femmes, de jeunes, de ressortissants de village, etc.); 4) Les relations professionnelles; 5) la comparaison entre le secteur public et le secteur privé.

Caractéristiques générales du personnel

Age et sexe

Les effectifs des entreprises étaient composés à majorité d'hommes (85%) contre 15% de femmes. Parmi les hommes interrogés, 71,86% avaient plus

de 35 ans, contre 38,79% pour les femmes. Il était intéressant de constater que très peu de jeunes de moins de 25 ans travaillaient en entreprise (3,4% des hommes et 5,17% des femmes).

Situation familiale, niveau de scolarisation, ethnie
Parmi les salariés hommes 72,55% étaient mariés; 24,40% étaient célibataires et 3,05% veufs ou divorcés; 20,5% des femmes étaient célibataires ou divorcées contre 69,5% de mariées. La polygamie semblait être une pratique courante dans les entreprises de l'échantillon: 30,94% des hommes interrogés étaient polygames (cela représentait 42,92% des hommes mariés). Moins ils étaient instruits, plus ils étaient polygames. Ainsi, près de 50% des salariés sans instruction étaient polygames alors que 19,23% seulement de ceux ayant un niveau supérieur l'étaient.

La taille de la famille semblait liée à la situation familiale, mais aussi à l'âge de son chef. Les résultats montrent que près du tiers des salariés hommes ayant entre 45 et 55 ans et étant monogames avaient plus de sept (7) enfants; chez les polygames appartenant à la même tranche d'âge, le taux était de plus de 85%. Par contre, tous les polygames âgés de plus de 55 ans avaient plus de sept (7) enfants.

La composition ethnique des entreprises enquêtées reflétait celle de la société sénégalaise, à savoir: 40% Wolof et 20% de Pular. Il s'agit des deux groupes ethniques les plus importants sur les vingt (20) que compte le Sénégal.

Religion et entreprise
Les musulmans représentaient 90,69% des salariés interrogés. L'islam sénégalais est confrérique. Ainsi, 47,21% des musulmans interrogés se déclarent de la confrérie tidjane, et 24,63% de la confrérie mouride; le reste des musulmans sont niassènes, layennes, khadres (10,23%). Seuls environ 18% des musulmans n'appartenaient à aucune confrérie.

Une des particularités des confréries est de s'organiser en *dahiras* qui est un regroupement de fidèles d'une même confrérie. Les *dahiras* existent au sein de nombreuses entreprises. Leur objectif est double: l'éducation religieuse (objectif spirituel); le renforcement de la solidarité entre ses membres (objectif social).

Chaque *dahira* est sous la tutelle morale et spirituelle d'une autorité confrérique désignée par le guide de la confrérie. L'adhésion effective au *dahira* des musulmans interrogés était la suivante. La participation des mourides dans le *dahira* (48,52%) paraissait largement supérieure à celle des tidjanes (38,58%). Chez les confréries minoritaires (khadre, layenne et surtout niassène) l'adhésion était encore plus forte (plus de 50%). La raison de cette forte adhésion étaient leur nombre réduit qui facilitait leur organisation.

Le niveau de qualification paraissait avoir une influence sur l'adhésion. Les résultats de l'enquête montrent que l'adhésion des cadres au *dahira* (25% chez les tidjanes et 30% chez les mourides) est inférieure à celle des agents qualifiés (44% chez les tidjanes et 47% chez les mourides). En général, l'adhésion des femmes est plus faible (31,57%) que celle des hommes (37,32%). Cela doit être lié au fait que la population féminine a des préoccupations familiales absorbantes.

L'adhésion au *dahira* apparaît comme étant fortement liée à l'âge: la tranche de 35-45 ans a le taux le plus fort d'adhésion avec 42,75%. Il faut néanmoins remarquer que 50% des hommes âgés de plus de 55 ans et 60% des femmes ayant moins de 25 ans sont membres d'un *dahira*. Cependant, leur nombre réduit par rapport aux effectifs totaux ne permet pas de conclusion intéressante. Les adhérents aux *dahiras* peuvent se prévaloir d'une certaine expérience de l'entreprise car plus de 64,37% des adhérents sont dans l'entreprise depuis plus de cinq (5) ans.

L'entreprise, le syndicat, les organisations informelles autres que les dahiras

Les Syndicats

Les firmes de l'échantillon connaissent des taux de syndicalisation élevés. Comme dans le cas des *dahiras*, les femmes sont moins syndiquées (35,34%) que les hommes (63%). Il semble que le taux de syndicalisation varie également avec l'âge. Les jeunes (âgés de 25 ans au maximum) adhérent moins(33,33%) que les salariés qui sont dans la tranche d'âge de 35 à 45 ans (66%) et ceux qui ont plus de 55 ans (75%).

Les résultats montrent que les salariés qui ont le taux d'adhésion le plus élevé sont ceux qui possèdent des niveaux de qualification intermédiaires. Ainsi, les cadres hommes (50%) et les femmes non scolarisées (0%) ont un niveau d'adhésion faible.

La Confédération nationale des travailleurs du Sénégal (CNTS), syndicat traditionnel et affilié au parti socialiste, au gouvernement, reste de loin le syndicat le plus puissant avec 36,33% des travailleurs, les autres syndicats se partageant le reste des travailleurs. L'adhésion aux syndicats autonomes est d'avantage l'affaire des cadres que des autres catégories professionnelles.

Les organisations informelles

Si le syndicat est légal et a des droits et des obligations, il n'en est pas de même pour toutes les organisations qui sont plutôt tolérées parce qu'étant souvent des regroupements de solidarité.

Associations des ressortissants d'un même village ou d'une même région

Elles ont l'ambition d'aider leurs villages ou leurs régions sur les plans économique et social par la construction d'infrastructures communautaires ou par l'organisation de journées culturelles et sportives. Généralement,

l'association d'entreprise est affiliée à un vaste réseau national d'associations du même village.

Les adhérents représentent près de 10% des salariés, avec un taux supérieur pour les hommes (10,20%) par rapport aux femmes (7,76%).

Le «tour» de famille ou d'amis

C'est une organisation à partir de laquelle chaque membre reçoit chez lui, à tour de rôle, les autres membres du groupe. Selon les règles de chaque organisation un dimanche (ou jour férié) peut être réservé au «tour». Une cotisation régulière est versée pour faire face aux dépenses mais celui qui reçoit supporte la plus grande part des frais. Le but recherché semble être une solidarité entre membres et entre les familles des membres. L'importance de ces organisations reste très faible: moins de 5% des salariés disent adhérer à de telles organisations. La participation à ce type d'organisation est conditionnée par une cooptation, car les liens affectifs y jouent un rôle important.

La tontine

La tontine est une forme de club d'épargne qui se constitue sur la base d'une confiance mutuelle. Le nombre d'adhérents est souvent de douze (12) et la cotisation est mensuelle. A tour de rôle, un membre prend la somme des cotisations à la fin du mois. Ainsi à la fin de l'année chaque membre est assuré d'avoir reçu la totalité de ses cotisation en une seule fois, ce qui constitue une bonne épargne susceptible d'être investie de manière productive. Les études faites à ce sujet montre cependant que ces sommes sont plutôt consommées lors de certaines cérémonies familiales.

La tontine est de loin l'organisation informelle la plus importante après le *dahira*. Plus de 25% des salariés qui ont répondu au questionnaire sont membres d'une tontine. Les femmes (37,07%) y participent plus que les hommes (22,48%). La gestion de ces associations ne nécessitent pas beaucoup de temps, surtout quand tous les membres travaillent dans le même établissement (Dupuy et Servet 1987:40-54).

Les relations professionnelles

Ici il s'agissait surtout de voir d'une part si dans les relations de travail, la hiérarchie prenait en compte les avis des subordonnés au cours du processus décisionnel, et d'autre part comment était perçu le chef.

A la question de savoir s'ils étaient sollicités par leurs supérieurs pour des suggestions, et si ces suggestions étaient retenues, un peu plus du tiers seulement des cadres ont dit être toujours sollicités (34%). Parmi ceux-ci, seuls un tiers estimait que leurs idées étaient acceptées. Les agents non qualifiés étaient très rarement sollicités (2%).

En ce qui concerne leurs rapports avec leurs supérieurs hiérarchiques, 57,46% des salariés interrogés attendent principalement du chef des qualités humaines, 26,24% des qualités professionnelles et seulement 12,91% des

qualités managériales. L'appréciation subjective du chef semblait l'emporter sur le recours à des critères objectifs. Le respect des procédures de décision étaient secondaires pour le personnel.

L'importance des relations humaines dans les entreprises sénégalaises était également révélée par la nature des relations amicales qui étaient très développées. En effet, 16,4% seulement du personnel n'avait pas noué de relations amicales avec d'autres membres de son entreprise. L'importance des relations humaines était vraie pour toutes les catégories professionnelles.

Il n'était donc pas surprenant de constater que le mode de recrutement était dans 43% des cas examinés basé sur des recommandations au lieu d'être formalisé par des tests ou examens. Les agents de maîtrise et les cadres avaient le taux de recrutement par tests le plus élevé (soit respectivement 70% et 67%).

A la base de ce mode de recrutement informel, il y avait les pressions politiques, syndicales, familiales, religieuses, et la préférence par beaucoup de responsables pour une opacité dans les procédures de recrutement permettant de mieux servir les siens. Ces pratiques sont à rapprocher du nombre de salariés ayant un parent (22,50%) et plus d'un parent (19,81%) dans l'entreprise.

Comparaison entre les secteur public et privé
Les résultats font ressortir des similitudes et différences entre le secteur public et le secteur privé sénégalais en ce qui concerne les différentes variables. Ces variables pourraient éventuellement expliquer les différences de performances entre l'entreprise publique et l'entreprise privée. L'enquête a en effet révélé que les entreprises privées avaient des chiffres d'affaires et des ratios bénéfice net chiffres d'affaires systématiquement supérieurs à ceux des entreprises publiques.

Les similitudes
Le sexe, la religion, la situation familiale, l'ethnie du salarié ne constituent pas des facteurs de différenciation.

Les différences
L'âge, la durée du salarié dans l'entreprise, la composition professionnelle du personnel, le niveau de scolarisation, l'adhésion au *dahira* et au syndicat, le mode de recrutement, les liens de parenté, les formes de dialogue social, la perception du chef sont autant de différences entre les deux secteurs. Voyons quelques uns de ces éléments.

L'âge et l'ancienneté
Le personnel du secteur privé semble plus jeune avec 50% des personnes interrogées âgées de moins de 35 ans contre 40% pour le secteur public. Le personnel ayant moins de cinq (5) ans d'entreprise dans le secteur privé représente 57,24% contre 34,61% dans le public; 37,13% des salariés du

public sont restés plus de dix (10) ans dans l'entreprise contre seulement 15,61% pour le privé.

Catégorie socioprofessionnelle, niveau d'instruction, mode de recrutement

Le secteur privé est caractérisé par une proportion importante de salariés ayant reçu au maximum une instruction primaire, soit 44,56%; dans les entreprises du secteur public, ce pourcentage est de 28,12%. On retrouve également moins de cadres moyens (agents de maîtrise) dans le secteur privé (17,47%) que dans le secteur public (28,06%). Quant aux cadres supérieurs ils représentent 4,09% des effectifs des entreprises du privé contre 13,51% dans le public.

L'une des différences les plus importantes entre les secteurs privé et public se situe au niveau du mode de recrutement. Alors que dans le secteur public 68% du personnel interrogé déclarent avoir été recrutés sur la base de tests ou concours, le pourcentage n'est que de 38,05% dans le privé. Ceci est à priori surprenant dans la mesure où 51,15% des personnes interrogées dans le secteur public disent avoir au moins un parent dans l'entreprise, contre seulement 26,58% pour le privé. Ce phénomène relationnel est encore plus prononcé chez les cadres. En effet, 65,70% des cadres interrogés dans le secteur public disent avoir au moins un parent dans l'entreprise contre seulement 9,10% dans le secteur privé.

Le processus décisionnel

Il existe également des différences en ce qui concerne le comportement des salariés vis-à-vis de leurs supérieurs. Si 62,10% du personnel du secteur public trouvent que le chef doit avoir principalement des qualités humaines, 49,25% seulement des salariés interrogés du secteur privé pensent ainsi. Dans le secteur public 17,15% des salariés affirment que leur supérieur hiérarchique leur demande toujours un avis contre seulement 7,83% dans le secteur privé.

Les syndicats

Le taux de syndicalisation dans le privé est moins élevé que dans le public. La CNTS est plus contestée dans le secteur public qu'elle ne l'est dans le secteur privé. L'intervention de l'Etat dans le secteur public peut en être l'explication car l'Etat a cherché le plus souvent à contrôler ou à utiliser certaines entreprises qu'il qualifie de stratégiques (dans les secteurs de l'énergie, des transports urbains, des mines, etc.). Par le biais des syndicats, il a exercé dans ces entreprises un certain contrôle social et politique depuis 1969, au lendemain de la crise sociale de 1968. C'est ce qui a fait de l'entreprise publique un champ politique et de confrontation sociale.

Analyse et interprétation des résultats

En quoi les composantes de la configuration socioculturelle identifiées peuvent-elles constituer des avantages ou des inconvénients dans la gestion de l'entreprise au Sénégal? En d'autres termes, ces composantes peuvent-elles faire l'objet d'une utilisation efficace par les dirigeants de l'entreprise?

L'enquête a révélé deux types de résultats. Premièrement, elle montre en quoi certaines caractéristiques de l'espace social telles que la religion sont inévitablement présentes dans l'entreprise indépendamment de sa nature juridique. Deuxièmement, en mettant en relief les différences entre entreprises privées et entreprises publiques, la présente contribution montre les limites de toute définition de l'entreprise comme reflet de son environnement socioculturel.

Sur la religion

Dans la mesure où le Sénégal est islamisé à 90%, il est normal de considérer que les caractéristiques et le comportement du salarié sénégalais sont ceux du salarié de religion musulmane. Compte tenu de l'organisation des salariés en association religieuses au sein de l'entreprise, il est normal de se poser des questions sur l'utilisation de ces associations comme relais des mouvements islamiques (en tant que contre-pouvoirs) qui connaissent un développement rapide sur le plan national.

Les dirigeants de l'entreprise doivent-ils se méfier de ces mouvements et associations comme le suggère Magassouba (1985)? Doit-on voir en eux comme Mamadou Dia (1975):

> des mouvements issus de civilisations qui se sont prononcées en faveur de l'être contre l'avoir, qui accordent une large place au don, à la gratuité. Peut-on leur reprocher d'être trop sensibles aux relations humaines, de prêter attention plus à l'échange de valeurs qu'à l'échange de biens mesurables et de s'ouvrir ainsi tout naturellement à l'entraide et à la solidarité?

Faut-il comprendre que la pratique de l'islam peut humaniser les rapports de travail dans l'entreprise?

La religion est donc très présente dans l'entreprise au Sénégal par le biais des *dahiras* dont l'introduction n'est d'ailleurs pas récente. Sa première apparition date de 1945 au Port autonome de Dakar (Ndiaye 1990). L'expérience de plusieurs entreprises montre que les associations religieuses ne constituent pas un danger pour leurs performances. Ceci est dû au fait qu'en s'impliquant dans la défense des intérêts immédiats de leurs adhérants, les associations religieuses assument des fonctions qui recoupent (et réduisent en même temps) celles des syndicats. Ainsi, *les dahiras*

d'entreprise sont différentes de celles qui existent dans la société civile et qui, essentiellement, assurent la formation religieuse de leurs membres.

Ceci étant, la construction d'édifices de cultes et l'organisation de cérémonies religieuses peuvent représenter des demandes coûteuses pour les entreprises. En effet, ces dernières sont amenées à octroyer des subventions ou à tolérer les absences de leurs personnel lors de ces cérémonies. Cela peut bien entendu avoir des conséquences néfastes sur les finances de l'entreprise ou sur sa productivité.

La polygamie, en tant que conséquence de la composition largement musulmane du personnel des entreprises au Sénégal, pourrait constituer un obstacle à des performances élevées par le stress que les familles larges font supporter aux parents-travailleurs. En outre, la recherche d'une seconde source de revenus s'impose à ces derniers s'ils veulent maintenir un niveau de vie acceptable et une certaine motivation au travail. Cela se fait bien entendu généralement au détriment des performances de l'entreprise vis-à-vis de laquelle les travailleurs se sont engagés par la signature d'un contrat.

Cependant, l'enquête a révélé l'existence d'une corrélation positive entre la pratique de la polygamie et l'âge du salarié. Les jeunes travailleurs pratiquent moins la polygamie que les travailleurs âgés. Ceci est la preuve d'une structure en évolution qui permet de voir les dangers de toute description figée des cultures africaines. Ainsi, une technique de gestion moderne non utilisable à un moment donné à cause d'un comportement culturel qui prévaut dans l'entreprise, le sera à un autre moment grâce à l'adaptation (souvent possible) des façon de faire et de penser. Il est par exemple fort probable que dans une vingtaine d'années le discours sur la polygamie dans l'entreprise au Sénégal devienne différent de ce qu'il est aujourd'hui. Souvent, le débat sur les cultures africaines n'a pas tenu compte de cet aspect dynamique.

Sur les relations professionnelles

Selon René Bureau, parlant du pouvoir en Afrique, «la grande différence avec l'Europe est que les rapports de pouvoir, de possession, ne sont pas maîtrisés en Afrique». Selon Christian Coulon (1983):

> Le chef que nous présente la tradition politique de cet espace africain n'a [...] en général pas grand-chose à voir avec le potentat que toute une littérature et toute une imagerie nous proposent encore aujourd'hui. Le meilleur chef, c'est celui qui gouverne le moins, qui n'abuse pas de son pouvoir et qui n'accumule des biens que pour les redistribuer.

Cela explique sans doute le fait que dans l'entreprise sénégalaise, le pouvoir de décision soit plus personnel qu'il ne relève d'une procédure décisionnelle rationnelle et impliquant plusieurs acteurs. On comprend également pourquoi une faible formalisation des procédures de gestion, notamment en

ce qui concerne les ressources humaines, a pu constituer un terrain favorable à l'expression de ce qui est généralement appelé la solidarité africaine.

Cette solidarité, ramenée au niveau familial, est un élément d'explication de l'utilisation répandue du recrutement informel ou basé sur les relations dans les entreprises au Sénégal. Selon Binet (1970), «chacun sait et proclame que la famille est, en Afrique, l'élément essentiel de la vie sociale et probablement de la vie tout court».

Différences entre secteurs public et privé

Les entreprises des secteurs privé et public sont différentes en ce qui concerne l'âge, l'ancienneté des travailleurs, la composition professionnelle du personnel, le niveau de scolarisation, la présence des *dahiras* (les entreprises privées interrogées n'avaient pas de *dahiras*), l'adhésion aux syndicats, le mode de recrutement, les liens de parenté et, la perception des supérieurs.

Ces différences ne permettent pas de faire référence à un type unique d'entreprise au Sénégal, dans le débat sur les cultures et la gestion. Il faut au moins envisager une segmentation entreprises privées/entreprises publiques.

Ensuite, le fait que de nombreuses différences entre le public et le privé relèvent de décisions prises par les dirigeants (en ce qui concerne notamment le recrutement, la formation, le contrôle de l'espace de l'entreprise par la formulation d'une culture d'entreprise) montre que les choix stratégiques des dirigeants (probablement plus que les cultures de l'espace social) déterminent dans une large mesure la configuration socioculturelle de l'entreprise, et surtout les comportements de ses salariés.

Implications pour la recherche

L'aspect le plus intéressant de travail d'enquête pour le chercheur en gestion réside sans nul doute dans l'existence d'une configuration socioculturelle plus ou moins différente selon que l'on analyse l'entreprise privée ou l'entreprise publique. Compte tenu de cette différence, il devient risqué et hasardeux de parler de l'entreprise sénégalaise, et à fortiori d'entreprise africaine comme le fait la grande majorité des travaux sur les spécificités de la gestion dans les pays africains.

Ainsi, tout travail de recherche sur les rapports entre cultures et gestion de l'entreprise doit s'appuyer sur la méthode de cas dont l'avantage est de permettre d'étudier toutes les variables (matérielles et immatérielles) qui peuvent être à l'origine de l'échec d'une entreprise concernant l'utilisation des techniques modernes de gestion. Ainsi, cette enquête a permis de constater une certaine réalité socioculturelle dans l'entreprise au Sénégal. Cependant, elle ne permet pas de comprendre la dynamique de cette réalité; en d'autres termes, la présence dans plusieurs entreprises de travailleurs

présentant des caractéristiques similaires n'entraîne pas le recours aux mêmes techniques de gestion.

Conclusion

La présente étude avait pour objectif de proposer une configuration socioculturelle de l'entreprise au Sénégal. Nous avons particulièrement insisté sur des variables telles que la religion, la famille et les relations professionnelles pour mettre en relief leur importance, et anticiper l'impact qu'elles pourraient avoir sur la gestion de l'entreprise.

L'enquête qui a été menée auprès d'une vingtaine d'entreprises et plus de 700 salariés a permis d'obtenir les résultats dont les plus significatifs sont les suivants: les lieux de travail au Sénégal sont dominés par un personnel dont la moyenne d'âge est au dessus de 25 ans. Compte tenu de l'orientation religieuse de la société sénégalaise, le personnel des entreprises au Sénégal est en majorité constitué de musulmans. Ceci explique la présence sur les lieux de travail d'un nombre important de travailleurs polygames responsables de famille très larges.

L'orientation religieuse de la majorité des travailleurs sénégalais explique également l'existence dans l'entreprise d'associations religieuses qui cohabitent avec des syndicats assez forts, et qui assument comme ces derniers des tâches de défense des intérêts des travailleurs. En plus des associations religieuses, on trouve dans les entreprises des regroupements par village, des formes de socialisation familiales, et des clubs d'épargne.

On retrouve également au sein des entreprises une conception du chef ou supérieur qui repose sur sa personne plutôt que sur ses compétences. Cette conception qui donne aux relations industrielles un caractère informel permet l'expression d'une certaine solidarité familiale dont la manifestation la plus concrète se retrouve dans les modes de recrutement fondé sur les recommandations plutôt que sur des tests. Cette pratique existe aussi bien dans les entreprises du secteur privé que du secteur public.

Enfin, l'enquête révèle l'absence de continuum entre l'espace social et culturel sénégalais et l'entreprise. En effet, des différences significatives sont apparues entre les secteurs public et privé en ce qui concerne l'âge du personnel, l'ancienneté des salariés, le niveau de scolarisation, l'adhésion au *dahira*, le mode de recrutement, les liens de parenté, les relations professionnelles, et la perception du chef. Ces différences montrent l'importance des choix stratégiques variés réalisés par les dirigeants dans la gestion de leurs entreprises.

Elles constituent une base de départ intéressante pour tout travail de recherche sur les rapports entre cultures de l'espace social et gestion de l'entreprise au Sénégal.

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The Politics of Informal Justice:
A Critical Analysis of Informal Process of Justice in Rural Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun of Nigeria

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Résumé: *Cet article donne un aperçu de la pratique de la justice informelle dans les communautés rurales de Kilba, Mumuye et Jukun du Nigeria. L'auteur soutient que la plupart des prétendues vertus de la justice informelle: l'avantage de la proximité du tribunal dont bénéficient les parties plaidantes, frais de justice peu élevés, participation, ainsi que la prédominance du consensus, n'ont pas été démontrées par l'étude. Cela s'explique par le contexte socio-économique dans lequel se déroule cette justice.*

Introduction

A lot of studies on the actual operation of criminal justice has been done in Europe and America. Many of these studies have shown that the due process — a notion on which criminal justice is said to operate and ensure justice for all that experience it — is not at all justice ensuring as far as the poor, minorities and women are concerned (Bottomley 1973; Robertson 1974; Sikes 1975). One of my criminological studies in former Gongola State, which draws on a survey of 300 prisoners from three Prisons (Hong, Jalingo and Wukari), and on the examination of 300 cases files from magistrates' courts in Yola, has also revealed gross injustices in formal process of justice in Nigeria (Sa'ad 1988).[1] In that study, it has been found that from arrest to investigation, the majority of the 300 prisoners interviewed suffered in the hands of the police from all sorts of brutality in breach of their constitutional and legal rights, and human dignity. This appears to be partly because of the wide discretionary powers the Northern Nigerian Criminal Procedure Codes

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[1] Two similar studies with results similar to this study were conducted four years earlier in Borno State of Nigeria (Sa'ad 1991). In fact, a handful of scholars, lawyers, police, Judges and other eminent personalities in Nigeria have also decried the inadequacy of, and the injustices in the Nigerian Criminal and penal processes (Adeyemi 1975; Elias 1968 and 1972; Odekunle 1977, 1979 and 1982; Sa'ad 1981).

gives the police, and partly due to the socio-economic status of the respondents which rendered them unable to bribe or influence the police.

Concerning bail, the evidence was that most of the 300 respondents in prison and 300 defendants sampled from Yola Magistrates' Courts' case files, failed to get bail mainly on financial grounds. Consequently, they suffered for long periods of time the pains and restraints that even a 'proper prisoner' was not subjected to. Thus, contrary to the ideals of a formal justice system, they were assumed guilty even before their trials and started receiving punishment even before they were convicted and sentenced. Remand conditions together with the police maltreatment of the respondents who were not on bail while on trial, led to many of them pleading guilty when they were most probably not.

As for the right to legal representation, it was simply a constitutional cosmetic as far as most litigants were concerned. That legal representation was of benefit to the few richer litigants who happened to have them was pretty obvious in that study — most were either discharged, bounded over to be of good behaviour or merely fined. The few who were imprisoned despite having defence counsels were certainly satisfied with the terms of imprisonment they received. Hence, they did not care to appeal even though they had the money to do so.

Regarding the pattern of sentencing, the courts passed their sentences in an 'off-the-cuff' manner. Consequently, not only that many of the respondents in prisons could be said to be wrongly there, but the average terms of imprisonment for those of them convicted on only one count each, were close to the statutory maximum specified in the Penal Code sections under which they were variously convicted. Interestingly however, all those who were relatively wealthier were able to pay their fines to avoid imprisonment.

Finally, although litigants have the legal and constitutional rights to appeal, within a given period of time, against certain specified injustices they felt they suffered, only one-third of the respondents in prison, who would have wanted to appeal, had the resource and opportunity to appeal. What was more, none of the very few who appealed heard anything about their appeals for which they had applied a year earlier, nor were they released on bail pending the results of their appeals.

In short, it was very clear in that study that formal justice in practice in Nigeria was rough, costly to many, time consuming, and sentences were generally severe. To be sure, it was not the actions of the law enforcement agents (police and courts) alone that mar the realisation of the ultimate objective, i.e., justice, of the Nigerian formal justice system. The nature of the law administered by, or binding, the law enforcement agents, and the socio-economic status of litigants appeared clearly to be responsible as well. With regard to the law, it was clear that in some situations the law

enforcement agents have many options as to which section of the law to apply. And in situations where law enforcers are bound by only one section of the law, having no alternative section to resort to, the wording of such a rule is usually broad and open to abuse. In other situations, the law gives rights to only certain types of accused such as the legal aid provision which limits legal aid to only capital offenders and appellants. What is more, in other situations, such as the rule against the appearance of counsel in Area courts, the law openly denies the accused their constitutional rights. In short, much needs to be done in terms of legislation to protect and uphold the human rights of litigants in Nigeria.

It was also established in that study that Nigerian formal justice was unable to provide justice to most, if not all, of the prisoners interviewed in the study because of their socio-economic circumstances. Majority of them were not on bail, did not get legal representation, and could not appeal against their judgement or sentences which they were dissatisfied with mainly because they did not have the money. There were also a few who were in prison because they could not pay fines. It seems apparent therefore that a right of action will always stay illusory if the means of invoking it are beyond the reach of a person having such a right. It is mainly for this reason that the protagonists of informal justice would prefer informal over formal justice. The central concern of this paper therefore, is to critically examine if 'informal' justice in Nigeria is, in terms of the virtues its protagonists attribute to it, any better.[2] These virtues relate to the nature of the process of informal justice, its social-structural organisation, and the nature of its outcome. It is however pertinent to first of all describe, albeit briefly, some social characteristics of Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun societies.

Social Characteristics of Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun Communities

Politically the Kilba have from ancient times recognised a central authority in the person of the chief of Hong known as *Til* Hong. The *Til* Hong was not a divinely appointed ruler. He was, however, a priestly as well as a political leader. He and two of his leading officials, the *Hedima* and *Kadagimi*, were the leaders of the highest cults in Kilba: *Kateshawa-Kurndasu* and the *Shantaru* cults respectively (Sa'ad 1979:16). *Til* Hong was usually chosen from one of two royal families namely *Kasheri* and *Dawi*, which have become identified with Mithili and Gaya areas respectively. The authority to choose *Til* Hong lay in the hands of *Hedima*, the Prime Minister, and four others namely, *Birawal*, *Biratada*, *Kadagimi*, and

2   The material discussed in this paper has been collected from nine rural areas (three each from Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun) of former Gongola State during my seven months (July, 1986 to February, 1987) fieldwork for a doctoral thesis.

107

Kadafur. Other title holders surrounding the *Til* Hong at Hong included *Batari, Zarma, Midala, Kadala, Sunoma, Burguma* and *Kadakaliya, Duba-Dubu, Talii, Dubu-kuma,* and *Danyatil* (Sa'ad 1979:15).

All members of the royal families however, lived in the outlying villages. For example, a senior member of the Mithili branch of the royal family bearing a title known as *Til Uding,* lived in Uding village and from there controlled the Mithili area; while that of Gaya branch controlled Gaya area from Mijili, and was known by the title *Til Mijili*[3] Under them were the village-heads bearing the title *Shal.* They were usually members of one of the two royal families appointed by *Til* Uding/Mijili and his priestly officials. These local royalties ran their local units quite independent of both the *Til* Uding/Mijili and *Til* Hong. Thus, the system of leadership established by Kilba, though fairly elaborate, did not entail the centralisation which we shall see in Jukun society.

The structure of Kilba justice system paralleled its political organisation. All disputes were referred to *Shal.* Only matters which proved beyond their competence were referred to *Til* Uding/Mijili or ultimately to the central chief, the *Til* Hong. Offences which were beyond the competence of *Shal* included: 1) disputes involving a prisoner guilty of murder by projecting needles into the body of his enemy; 2) disputes over adultery with wives of *Til* Hong, and; 3) suspected cases of serious theft which called for a divine decision. Two type of disputes seemed outside the jurisdiction of all the three types of Kilba chiefs — *Til* Hong, *Til* Uding/Mijili, and *Shal.* These were disputes involving the deliberate killing of a person, or witchcraft that led, or was suspected to have led, to a sudden death of the victim.

Politically, the Mumuye had no central government. They recognised the priest of Yoro known as *Vabon* (the chief rain-maker) and Yoro itself as their original home. But outside his magico-religious duties, the priest of Yoro's authority was entirely confined to his own local group; a village area of Yoro which consisted of a number of hamlets. For the Mumuye authority structure to become clearer one should give some account of their form of social organisation as the two were intertwined.

The Mumuye lived in hamlets. A number of self-contained hamlets formed a local unit or group which could be referred to as a village-area. For example, one of the village areas surveyed was Mika, and it consisted of about twelve hamlets, viz.: Dansa, Danyusa, Dimhe, Kakulu, Kupuli, Lanapu Boro, Lanapu Koron, Lanupu Tokolon, Lanapu Wariham, Pawuno, Shomman and Zahan (Meek 1931a:450). Each hamlet was

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3   The title 'yerima' which Meek said they both bore (Meek 1931a:183) was incorrect. The title are borne by royal family members who live outside Hong as mere princes (Sa'ad 1979:15).

composed of a number of extended families each of which was known as *dollassa* (meaning beer drinking group) which were usually related to each other by blood on paternal line. Each village-area and hamlet had its own *Vabon* who was both the religious, social and political head of his people. Also, each *dollassa* (extended family) within a hamlet had its own *Vadosun* as its religious, social and political head. Administratively, the *Vabon* of a village-area was also the *Vabon* of the hamlet within which he resided as well as the *Vadosun* of his extended family (*dollassa*). He thus controlled the affairs of his hamlet and extended family as well as other hamlets and their extended families through their various *Vabon* and *Vadosun* respectively. On the other hand, the *Vabon* of the hamlets were also the *Vadosun* of their extended families, and thus controlled their extended families and those of others through their various *Vadosun*.

The structure of the Mumuye traditional legal system was parallel to its social and political organisation described above. All less serious disputes within extended families could be settled by *Vadosun*, those between two families could be settled within hamlet by the *Vabon* of the hamlet, and those between hamlets could only be settled by the *Vabon* of the village-area. Thus in Mumuye legal system, like in Kilba's, a jurisdictional hierarchy existed though, in the former, it completely stopped at the village-area level without extending to the chiefdom.

Socially, the Jukun lived in local groups consisting of extended families some of which were not related by blood at all, but which members believed themselves to be related.[4] These local groups also bore common titles. But, as Meek (1931b) rightly observed, sometimes even the common title merely indicated the place of origin of the extended family rather than indicating a blood relationship. For example, *Ba-pi*, *Ba-Nando* and *Ba-Kundi* means immigrants from Api, Nando and Kundi respectively. What was more, these extended families were also not totally exogamous. For all the foregone factors, Meek concluded that the Jukun could only be said to have lived in Kindreds rather than in clans. Outside Wukari, the capital city of the Jukun, a single kindred lived close together forming a village which bore a name different from that of the kindred. But in Wukari several kindreds were found and each was frequently scattered through out the eight wards of the city which were known as *Abadikyugashi*, *Abagbonkpa*, *Abakpoto*, *Abavi*, *Abanuti*, *Abakata*, *Abandogwa* and *Abanduku*. Each ward was headed by its member who held a senior title received from the *Aku-Uka*, the divine king of the whole Jukun.

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4 For a more detailed description of the social organisation of the Jukun, see Meek (1931b: Chapter II). According to elders interviewed the situation as described by Meek during the colonial era was basically true of the pre-colonial era.

In the village, which usually consisted of a single kindred, the priest of a very important cult of the kindred was regarded as the religious as well as the social and political leader of the village. However, an ordinary man could, by his influence or affluence, succeed in obtaining a senior title from *Aku-Uka* at Wukari and be regarded the social and political leader of the kindred. Thus, as the executive head, he was subordinate to the chief priest only in religious matters. At the extended family level an eldest member who might also be the custodian of an important cult of the family was the executive and religious leader of the family. However, it should be noted that every Jukun household was a religious organisation par excellence, and that all leaders beginning from the extended family level through kindred— or village-head, and ward-head to *Aku-Uka* and his counsellors were regarded as being, in varying degrees, incarnations of a deity. The supreme incarnation being the *Aku-Uka* at Wukari.

The government of Jukun, unlike those of Kilba and Mumuye, was said to be centralised at the capital, Wukari.[5] Each of the senior officials at Wukari was being responsible for the administration of one or more outlying villages. Thus, for example: the *Abon-Anchuwo* was responsible at Wukari for the villages of Wunufo, Tsufa, Akyekara, and Shinkai; the *Abon-Ziken* for Abinsi; the *Kinda-Anchuwo* for Ritti, Fyayi, Gangkwe, Tikason, and Kinyishi; the *Kinda-Bi* for Dampar, and; the *Katon-Banga* for Akwana. Each official at Wukari was able to keep firm control of his area(s) through constant touch by means of messengers. Thus, although in almost all secular matters the family looked first to the head of the extended family, most of these matters were referred to its official representative at the capital through its kindred or ward-head, and, when necessary, to the *aku-Uka* himself through *Abon-Anchuwo* who was the representative of the people in their relations with the king.

As regards the structure of the Jukun traditional justice system, a parallel could be drawn from its political and social organisation briefly described above. As the supreme head of the religious, social and political life of the people, the *Aku-Uka* was also the supreme person to refer to in some more serious disputes. Normally then most disputes were dealt with by authorities below him — the heads of the extended families, kindreds or wards, and some senior officials in the capital.

The Nature of the Process of Informal Justice

The issues usually addressed here relate to speed and cost involved in justice processes, and the roles of the disputants, of their relatives, of the dispute

5   For a detailed ethnographic description of the Jukun's governmental organisation see also Meek (1931b: Chapter VIII).

settlers and, finally, of the public. The protagonists of informal justice claim that informal justice process is just because, unlike formal adjudication, it is cheap, speedy, dispute settlers only mediate between disputants, and that almost everybody in the community participate fully (physically and emotionally) in the dispute settlement process. In the following three major subsections, all the above so-called virtues of informal justice will be assessed critically against empirical materials from Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun rural communities of former Gongola State of Nigeria.

Cheap Versus Costly

The process of informal justice are usually regarded as cheap to an individual disputant for two main reasons: 1) the proximity of the informal 'courts', and; 2) the non-requirement of a legal representation (Danzig and Lowy 1975; Galanter 1974; Merry 1979).

It is true that, unlike the formal courts, there was at least one informal 'court' in every Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun locality since a leader (religious or otherwise) of every locality was also the local community's dispute settler.[6] This, according to elders in these respective communities, has been the case since as far back as their grandparents could remember. So, if one was to go by this fact alone, one could conclude that the systems of justice in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun rural areas are cheaper for individual disputants than the formal justice system since in the former, a disputant does. not have to travel far away in order to lodge a complain, or have his/her dispute settled. However, if one assessed more critically the jurisdictions and powers or authorities of the various hierarchies of the so-called informal courts as they existed in the past in these societies, one .would not succumb to such a sweeping generalisation. Amongst the Kilba for example, not all disputes could be tried by local *Shals*. Few others, such as murder by projecting needles into victims body, adultery with wives of one of the ruling authorities, and any serious dispute that called for a divine decision, had to be taken to Hong with generous gifts to the *Til* Hong.

Among the Mumuye too, though any dispute, except homicide, could be settled by any of its three types of leaders (*Vabon* of the hamlets, and of the village-areas, and *Vadosun* of the extended families), the major determining factor as to which leader could settle a given dispute was the place of residence of the disputants involved. So, if a member of one village-area stole from a member of another village-area, the problem would ordinarily

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6 Magistrates' courts were available only in the Local Government Headquarters of these communities, which are Gombi for Kilba community, Jalingo for Mumuye and Wukari for the Jukun. There were also the grades III area courts in Hong for Kilba, and in Pantisawa and Pupule villages for the Mumuye.

be taken to a Yoro priest. But, as it was repeatedly stated by the elders, disputes were usually not taken to Yoro. The reason for that appeared to be because of the distance of Yoro. The consequences were fights and deaths which were, of course, more costly.

Among the Jukun as well, almost every dispute had to be transferred to Wukari for the final settlement. The disputants had also to be accompanied by one of their relatives, taking with them some generous gifts to their next dispute settler, their village-representative, at Wukari. Some of the elders interviewed reckoned that some of the main deterrents of crime in the olden days, was the fear of the waste of time and materials involved in their (Jukun) dispute settlement process.

Thus, although physically the informal 'courts' were at the 'door-steps' of every individual Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun, functionally they were not that close. In other words, the functions of these, especially the Jukun, informal 'courts' were not as fully decentralised as the protagonists of informal justice would have us believe. Consequently, the process of informal justice might as well had been as costly as that of the formal one. However, in the paragraphs that follow, it will be demonstrated further that even if functionally the informal courts in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun were totally decentralised such that disputants did not have to travel out of their villages or immediate localities, the process of justice in each of these communities could be anything but cheap. Substantial material costs to disputants were still involved because of the so-called gifts the disputants were usually required to make either before, during and after a settlement, or at any one or two of these stages. The costs that were involved in each of the three communities' systems of justice are discussed fully in a recent study (Sa'ad 1988:Chapter 5 and pp.158-164). But because of the limited space here, we can afford only one example from the Kilba community.

In Kilba for example, when a thief was caught in the act by several people, in which there was no need for a search, he would be taken direct to a local *Shal* without any gift been necessary. But if a search was to be made, the complainant would make a gift of at least two chickens to *Shal*. During the course of the search, every household searched would be required to make a generous gift to the search team. In one of the disputes witnessed in Kilba, a search team of four was employed for two days. The complainant gave a chicken before the search and a goat after. As many chickens as 11 were obtained as presents from the householders searched. It was also reported that they were entertained with some beer.[7] The 11 chickens were

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7 The need to lavishly entertain dispute settlers when they visit the compounds of disputants in an on-going trial is not an uncommon element of informal justice (Merry 1982). In her study Merry found that in order to avoid violence escalating, mediators

however regarded as relatively small by the dispute settler and two other elders because, according to one of them:

> People nowadays are not generous. They think they are wise, but it is better for every man in this, our village to be generous in such a thing because he may one day need it (meaning the service of the search team).

In this case, the search team was successful. If it had failed, which, according to the dispute settler, was not unusual, the complainant would have had to appeal either: 1) to *Katu* or *Malamusu* cults by taking at least two baskets or bundles of grains and 1 *Gammo* (or a minimum of ten Naira in local currency), or; 2) to *Kurta* cult by taking at least a goat and a big flowing garment to a well known medicine man, which was what a complainant in one (a theft of grains from a dwelling place) of the four disputes observed in Kilba did. That consulting either of these cults is expensive is attested to by the complainant who consulted *Kurta* cult. Although the relatives of the culprit were made to compensate him by replacing all the five sacks of his farm produce stolen, he was not happy that the compensation did not take into account the expenses he incurred by consulting the *Kurta* cult, which he regarded as heavy.

Speed Versus Delay

One of the major elements of injustice in formal systems of justice is said to be their inability to deal with cases efficiently. Delays usually bring a lot of suffering for litigants, especially those who are not on bail. That this is true of formal justice in Nigeria has been clearly evident in previous research in this area (Sa'ad 1984:13 and 14, 16-18; Sa'ad 1988:121-139).

Contrary to this, informal courts are said to be able to deal with disputes as they come without any delay, and therefore are more just. In stating the theme of his paper on informalisation of formal justice system in America, Danzig (1978:1-2) wrote:

> What is salient to the informal citizen and academic alike are the facts that... major metropolitan courts abrogate their principal function [i.e., justice] by not adjudicating the guilt or innocents of the majority who come through their doors. This article focuses on one of the ideas that have been put forward as cures or at least crutches for the American municipal justice system; the idea that increased effectiveness [and therefore justice] can be achieved by decentralisation [informalisation] of some or all of the operation of existing system (Words in brackets not in original. See also Sander 1976).

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often visited disputants constantly and each visit demanded lavish hospitality with the most desirable food.

113

Writing on the speedy nature of informal justice in five small-scale societies she studied, Merry (1982:29) pointed out that dispute settlement was initiated immediately before the disputants could 'think about their ancestors, their pride and social positions'. This fact was evidently true in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun rural communities. It was unlike in the formal system where a time-lag usually exists between an arrest and when the defendant is finally put on trial before the court. In many cases the delays are of a serious nature. But with regard to all the 12 dispute settlements witnessed in rural communities of Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun, the process started right at the moments they were brought for settlement before the authorities concerned. And as the authorities acknowledged, this was usually the case. However, the rest of the justice process in most of the disputes was not so speedy as the protagonist of informal justice would have us believe.

To be sure a dispute in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun, was more likely to be dealt with within a maximum of three days. But more importantly however, in 11 of the 12 dispute settlements encountered in our research, the full enforcement of the decision reached did not occur immediately after. An ultimatum within which a full compliance was expected was given, and there were indications that a full enforcement in each of these settlements was likely to take dispute settlers a long period of time. One indication is that throughout the seven months of fieldwork, a full compliance was, to the best of our knowledge, met in only two of the 12 disputes settlements observed. Other indications abound in our more recent work, where the substance of the decision taken, and the ultimatum for compliance to the decision reached in all the 12 dispute settlements (four each from Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun) observed, is fully described (Sa'ad 1988:165-171). In fact, the dispute settlers themselves confessed that their ultimata are frequently breached these days. The reason some of them gave was that they now have ceased to have the authority their predecessors used to have.

The argument that ultimata were infrequently breached in the past is difficult to counter argue. But, even in the olden days of Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun, a full enforcement of a decision in most types of dispute settlement did not seem to take place immediately.[8] Usually, a guilty opponent was simply required to comply as soon as possible without any fixed ultimatum. If after some times (days, weeks, or even months, depending on the desperation of either the dispute settler or the complainant), the defendant did not comply, he would again be brought before a dispute settler for another trial. The dispute could take a new dimension requiring for example, some use of ordeals, or appeals to some cults. Thus, it was very likely that

8   For details on the protracted nature of informal justice in the pre-colonial era in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun, see Chapter 5 in Sa'ad 1988.

even in the olden days, authorities did take long period of time to fully resolve a dispute. It is even debatable that disputes are ever fully resolved in small-scale societies simply because of the informality of their systems of justice. For if a dispute is 'any kind of behaviour that points to contention based on opposing claims and involves the taking of sides between persons or groups' (Epstein 1974:9), a dispute, it seems, cannot be fully resolved as long as its source (i.e., the bone of contention) remains unresolved; the nature of justice system (formal or informal) notwithstanding.

Full Participation Versus Non-Participation

Another major element of injustice in the trial process of formal justice is said to be the lack of freedom for litigants, their relatives and the public to fully (physically and emotionally) participate in an on-going trial in a court. Defendants and, more especially, complainants are usually represented by legal experts or, to use the language of one of the protagonists of informal justice, 'professional thieves' (Christie 1977:3). While the experts talk the most, the litigants and their witnesses talk the least; their talk being always guided by the experts. In contrast, an informal court is said to allow free exchange of words and arguments between litigants and their supporting camps such that almost all the people in the local area of an informal court do both attend and participate fully in the trial process (See e.g., Pospisil 1971:35-6; Felstiner 1974; Sander 1976).

In the sections that follow, the degree/level of participation exercised by disputants, dispute settlers and other people in dispute processes among the Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun in the rural areas visited is examined critically. This is done in two stages. First, by finding out and analysing the percentages of those who attended at most one dispute session from the total populations of each of the rural areas of Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun from which each of the 12 dispute settlements was observed. Secondly, by analysing the distribution, and the proportion of the talks/comments made by the different categories of persons that attended at most one dispute session.

Participation Measured by Number of Attendants

The total number of people present at any dispute settlement session for each of the 12 dispute settlements witnessed have been obtained by counting both the people who came and remained throughout the session, and those who came and left while the session was still going on. Care was taken not to recount those who left and then came back while the session was still on. More than one dispute sessions were held in most of the 12 dispute settlements observed. In those settlements, only those people who were not present in the previous session(s) were counted. The new total was then added to the old one. Thus, the figures in column three of Table 1 below are, as much as possible, free of duplication or omission.

115

And in obtaining the population figures in column 2 of the table, the tax-payers lists were used, because the populations of these areas were not available in the Statistics Division of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning which was the major body responsible for providing such information for the areas. Thus, the tax collectors and I went through the tax-payers' lists, counting number of single and married males, and the number of wives of the married males.[9] The population figures are therefore not comprehensive. They exclude non-tax paying adult males with their wives (if married), female without husbands, and children. Despite this obvious underestimation of the total population, involvement of people in the processes of informal justice in rural Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun, measured by number of attendants, was very low.

Table 1 below shows that in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun respectively, only 13.0%, 7.4% and 10.7% of the population attended at most one dispute session. From further discussions with dispute settlers, it seems this recorded attendance at scenes of dispute settlement processes was higher than usual for many years, suggesting that somehow our presence attracted people to the scenes. A statement from one of them summarises it all:

> It is quite a long time since I saw as many people coming to witness our dispute settlement (Sasantawa) as today. Not many people do come when there is Sasantawa as they used to do in the past because nowadays everybody is busy going about his business. And many people do not have regards for our tradition nowadays.

So, to the consternations of the protagonists of informal justice, it is most proper to say here that almost all rural population in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun do not participate in their informal justice processes. Moreover, Merry, herself one of the protagonists of informal justice, in her paper on five small-scale societies noted that dispute settlers were sometimes only go-between; meeting with disputants privately (Merry 1982:24 and 26). This means informal justice does sometimes deprive its public even the simple appearance at the scene of a dispute settlement. It may however be argued that in the past far more people than now in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun societies had participated fully in dispute settlement processes. This is clearly implied in the statement of an elder quoted above, and in the discussions of the pre-colonial situation with elders.

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9   Thus: 1) In Kilba, out of 255 tax payers, 86 were married to 172 females. Total population: 255 + 172 = 427. 2) In Mumuye, out of 217 tax payers, 130 were married to 223 females. Total Population: 217 + 223 = 440. 3) In Jukun, out of 263 tax payers, 116 were married to 169 females. Total Population: 263 + 169 = 432.

Table 1: The Total Populations of the Local Areas Studied in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun Rural Communities, and the Proportions of the Populations that Attended at most One Dispute Session Observed in those Areas

Types of Communities	Total Population	Total Number of Persons that attended a maximum of One Dispute Session	Percentages of the total populations that attended a maximum of One Trial Process
Kilba	427	55	13.0
Mumuye	440	31	7.4
Jukun	432	45	10.7
Totals	1,299	131	10.3

Source: Compiled by author

Participation Measured by Talking/Commenting in a Dispute Session
Another way one could attempt measuring degree of participation by individuals in a justice process is by narrowing analysis to those who are actually present at the scene of a dispute settlement, and calculating the frequency of talks/comment made by those individuals during the dispute session. To accomplish this second task, each time an individual talked or passed a comment in an on-going dispute session, one entry was made into one of the seven categories of persons (as specified in Table 2 below) which best described him/her. The category 'Other people' in Table 2 below, refers to all the people who were supposedly neutral audience, and therefore representing the wider population of their local areas. But ironically, out of the whole 217 entries made, only 16 fell under this category, which means only 7.4% participation for the wider population. Again, it is most proper to say here that almost all the surveyed rural population of Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun did not participate in dispute settlement processes of their respective local communities. Even if one narrows the analysis to just the population at the disputes settlement scenes, and also include the relatives of the disputants among the 'Other people' category, the situation improves to only 43 entries, which is 19.8% participation. Thus, the situation still remains true that it cannot be said that there was full participation by the people. More

so, if we realised that the other people in this new sense is still the majority in terms of population of those that attended at most one dispute session.[10]

Table 2: Frequencies and Percentages of Talks/Comments made by Categories of Persons at Disputes Settlement Scenes in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun Rural Communities

Categories of Persons present at a Dispute Scene	Frequencies and Percentages of Talks during a Dispute Session in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun			Row Total and Column %
	Kilba	Mumuye	Jukun	
Dispute Settlers	30	32	31	93
	32.3	34.4	33.3	42.9
	49.2	49.2	34.1	
Co-dispute Settlers	4		9	13
	30.8	-	69.2	6.0
	6.6		9.9	
Complainant	10	16	7	33
	30.3	48.5	21.2	15.2
	16.4	24.6	7.7	
Defendants	9	11	15	35
	25.7	31.4	42.9	16.3
	14.6	16.9	16.5	
Relatives of the Complainant			12	12
	-	-	100.0	5.5
			13.2	
Relatives of the Defendant	8		7	15
	53.3	-	46.7	6.9
	13.1		7.7	
Other People		6	10	16
	-	37.5	62.5	7.4
		9.2	11.0	
Column	61	65	91	217
Totals	28.1	30.0	41.9	100.0

Note: The top figure in a cell is the cell count, the middle the row percent, the bottom the column percent.

Source: Compiled by author

10 Out of 55, 31 and 45 people that attended at most one dispute session in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun respectively, 48, 25 and 36 of them were 'Other People' in this new sense.

Although participation was more widespread in Jukun than in Kilba, and in Kilba than in Mumuye, the persons who clearly dominated dispute settlement processes in all the three rural communities were the dispute settlers and their assistants (co-dispute settlers). A total of 106 entries were made for them, which is nearly half (48.9%) of the whole 217 entries made. This too is contrary to what the protagonists of informal justice believe to be the characteristic of informal process of justice.

Also from the Table 2 above we cannot say that disputants participated fully enough in settling their disputes unless we consider their relatives as disputants as well. In fact, from our observation of the manner of participation in dispute settlements by the disputants' relatives (where they participated at all), we would rather regard them as representing and guiding the disputants. In other words, it appears that in six of the eight dispute settlements (four each from Kilba and Jukun) observed, the senior relatives of disputants played the role of the lawyers to their junior relatives. It should, however, be quickly pointed out here that in Mumuye, no disputant was represented by a relative in any of the four dispute settlements observed. There appeared to be three good explanations for this. First, two of the settlements observed were virtually uncontested. Secondly, one of the settlements did not involve a third party; disputants tried to settle it by themselves. Finally, in the dispute involving wife-abduction plus adultery, not even a single relative of the disputants was there. One possible reason being that the relatives of both were living far away from the village in which the dispute was being settled. However, it seems that the most likely reason was the relative economic independence of the disputants in this dispute. The complainant was both the eldest and the head of his household, which, as we shall see later in this paper, is to some extent still the unit of production in Mumuye. The accused on the other hand, though young and single, was making a living on carpentry independent of his father's household and hamlet. In fact, the few disputants in Kilba and Jukun, who were not represented by senior relatives were either themselves the elders/heads of their households, or persons who managed to severe their relationships with their extended families through a new economic independence.

In conclusion then, it is safe to say that, contrary to what the protagonists of informal justice thinks, disputants in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun rural communities can neither be said to be totally unrepresented nor can their talks be said to be totally unguided. Those who participated fully in their disputes were either household heads, elders or persons who were economically independent of their extended families.

119

The Social Organisation of Informal Justice

The salient issue usually raised here concerns the class/status of adjudicators/dispute settlers *vis-à-vis* litigants/disputants in a court of justice. An adjudicator in a formal court is often criticised as belonging to an upper class of his community, and having less or no knowledge of the values and life experiences of the lower class litigants that daily appear before him (Cook *et al.* 1980). Thus out of touch with the ordinary realities of life in his community, a formal adjudicator is seen to treat majority of his litigants unfairly. On the contrary, an 'informal adjudicator', (i.e., a dispute settler) is said to be usually equal in status with the majority of his disputants, and therefore shares in common the values and norms of his community members (Gulliver 1977:36). It is thus assumed that the norms and values a dispute settler administers are also in the interest of everybody in the community including the disputants, and therefore cannot be unfair.

The argument that there is a status equality between a dispute settler and the majority of his disputants does not appear to be correct as far as our research amongst the Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun rural communities is concerned. First of all, in 11 of the 12 dispute settlements witnessed in these communities, dispute settlers were employed, and all of them were clearly people of higher status *vis-à-vis* the disputants that came before them. Each of them was either a chief, a titled elder or a priest/diviner (Merry 1982:30). The difference in status between these people and disputants could clearly be noticed even from the sitting arrangements during the settlement processes in 11 or 12 dispute settlements observed. In each, the disputants, their relatives and other people sat on the ground in a semi-circle facing the dispute settler who sat on a chair or a log of tree. Where titled elders were present, they too sat on the ground, but side-by-side with the dispute settler; the one next to the dispute settler in rank sitting most of the time by his right-hand side.

Secondly, according to my informants, among whom were the dispute settlers themselves, one of the most important roles of chiefs, titled elders and people of special religious status since time immemorial has been settling disputes and enforcing law and order in their communities.[11] The status of these people as the traditional elites in Africa since pre-colonial time has been recognised by Lloyd:

> The elites... in the pre-colonial period were the traditional rulers of the many kingdoms and chiefdoms..., and in many societies, ritual specialists who enjoyed high prestige and perhaps considerable power... The influence

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11 The jurisdictions and powers/authorities of this class of people as dispute settlers is fully explained in Chapter 5 of my recent work (Sa'ad 1988).

of these men has remained largely confined to their areas of traditional jurisdiction (1973:131).

Thus, the fact that dispute settlers in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun have, since pre-colonial era, been people of higher statuses in their communities, could mean that they, or at least the informal law they have been enforcing, has also been to some degree biased in their favour. This is notwithstanding the view expressed by a privy council that: 'it is the assent of the native community that gives a custom its validity'.[12] Or as Roberts has found amongst the Kgatla people that: 'Everyone, even the chief is expected to comply with these rules (informal laws) in their everyday behaviour...' (Roberts 1979:147, supra note). To be sure, none of the dispute settlers or elders interviewed openly held the view that he was above the law of his community. The assumption about the possible bias/partiality by high status dispute settlers, or at least in the laws they enforce, is based on a number of considerations, especially in the ways the relationship between the law and the state is sometimes conceived.[13] In fact, evidences of bias/partiality in informal laws and administration regarding dispute settlements in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun, which can be interpreted as serving some special interests of the local elites, especially the dispute settlers, abound in our recent study (Sa'ad 1988:180-186). Again because of the limitation of space, only one example can be given here; this time from the Mumuye.

The decision taken in the first dispute settlement (wife-abduction and adultery) observed among the Mumuye illustrates quite clearly the fact that the informal justice serves to some extent the interests of traditional elites as dispute settlers. In this dispute settlement, it was decided that a girl and seven goats were to be given to the complainant as compensation by the defendant's paternal family. This was enforced by *Tokwoumbo* group. Although this was decided in accordance with the Mumuye legal tradition in such disputes, the defendant's father was not happy because, according to him, his son has become a Christian, and has since declared himself independent of him and his family. In view of this, he was demanding back at least his seven goats from the dispute settler. The latter did not only refuse, but reiterated that the defendant's father would continue to be responsible for his son's bad behaviour in the locality. To know that the

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12 See also Pospisil's concept of 'social internalisation' (Pospisil 1981:270-272). Moreover, as my recent research has shown, the informal justice in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun rural communities no longer command the 'assent' of their 'native' (local) communities (Sa'ad 1988:Chap 8).

13 This is raised in the earlier chapters of my recent study and dealt with in details in Chapter 9 of the study (Sa'ad 1988).For a general discussions on the relationship between law and the state, see, for examples, Pashukanis 1978; Chambliss *et al.* 1978.

response to the demand of the defendant's father in this dispute settlement was in the interest of the dispute settlers and the other traditional elites, we need only to realise two things. First of all, five of the seven goats were going to be shared between the authorities settling disputes in the area, namely, *Vabon* of the village area, who would take three goats, and two other priests (the Vadosuns), who would get a goat each. Secondly, the defendant's father was to remain accountable for every misbehaviour of his son because the latter was more likely to refer any dissatisfaction to the formal court than comply fully with the decisions of the informal justice. As the defendant himself revealed: 'I threaten to call the police for them whenever they threaten that Va^{14} would eat me with witchcraft [meaning bewitch me]'.

To the consternation of the protagonists of informal justice, it should be noted here that this kind of bias in dispute settlements is not peculiar to the present-day Mumuye or Kilba and Jukun, but a phenomenon that had existed even in the pre-colonial days of Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun societies, as well as in several other pre-colonial societies in Nigeria (See for example Amadi 1982).

The Nature of the Outcome of Informal Justice Process

The salient issue here is coercion or sanction. The use of force to back up a decision reached in a justice process. Physical coercion used to be conceived as the exclusive form of legal sanction. Hoebel for example, maintained that the only condition of the existence of law is 'the legitimate use of physical coercion' and he defined a social norm as legal only:

> If its neglect or infraction is regularly met in threat or in fact, by the application of physical force by an individual or group possessing the socially recognised privilege of so acting (1954:261-228).

The acceptance of physical force such as execution, mutilation, flogging, imprisonment, etc., as the exclusive form of legal sanction has led to a denial of the existence of law in small-scale societies by some legal scholars.[15] Almost all dispute settlement in a small-scale society is seen as based on consensus; a voluntary agreement of the two parties in the dispute.

The idea of physical sanction as the *sine qua non* condition for the existence of law, has been rejected by other criminologists as absurd. Barkun (1968:64) for example writes:

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14 'Va' is a Mumuye general name for the various idols which they worship.
15 Excluding of course the author of the passage quoted above. As is rightly noted by Pospisil, Hoebel '...did not carry his stress on the physical nature of sanction to [such] an objectionable extent...' (Pospisil 1971:28).

> Coercive [meaning physical] sanctions need NOT to be the mainstay of law
> in as much as the vast number of social interactions seems never to invoke
> them or to be due to their presence. To limit law solely to instances in
> which sanctions are applied (a not uncommon approach) is to reduce it to
> social pathology.

This rejection has led Barkun along with some contemporary criminologists
and the protagonist of informal justice to argue correctly that law exists in
every small-scale society. But their failure to recognise that to qualify as a
sanction, an action does not have to be physical but may be either economic,
social, psychological, or a combination of two or all of these, has led some
of them to argue wrongly that an informal justice system is sanctionless. The
whole book by Barkun entitled *Law Without Sanctions* can be understood
only in light of this misconception of sanctions as a legal attribute.

The main thrust of his argument in the book seems to be thus: because a
small-scale society is egalitarian, and 'manifestly lacks the infrastructure
[meaning legal institutions such as the courts, and professionals or powerful
authorities] that sanctioned law requires', its law also is 'horizontal'
[meaning not hierarchically structured] and possesses no 'conventional
[meaning physical] sanctions' (Barkun 1968:65, 155). This argument does
not seem to be correct as far as Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun systems of justice
are concerned. We have seen in the two previous sections of this paper that
authority and legal structures have been existing in these three communities.
In fact, even though one may talk of a society without a central political
hierarchy, one cannot think of any society without an authority structure.
Levine (1960:58) puts it more cogently when he writes:

> All societies have authority structures and values concerning the
> allocation of authority. In stateless [meaning decentralised] societies,
> the proper unit for the analysis of such phenomena is not the total
> society, where we are likely to mistake lack of a central political
> hierarchy for egalitarianism, but the maximal decision-making unit (or
> some cohesive subgrouping within it).

Finally, during our empirical observation of the use of sanctions in Kilba,
Mumuye and Jukun rural communities, sanctions were recorded in all the
disputes dealt with by the dispute settlers. In fact, several sanctions were
used in the same dispute settlement. Thus, as Table 3 below shows, 25
sanctions were used in only 10 dispute settlements. This means that at least
two sanctions were used in each dispute. Hence, we can even maintain that
there are more sanctions in informal justice than in formal one.[16] This is not

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16 Only 22.0% of the 300 adjudicated cases in formal justice received up to two
sanctions; that of imprisonment and fine (See Sa'ad 1988:146-152).

to argue that it is unjust for a justice system to have many sanctions at its disposal, but to emphasise that the informal justice systems examined here are not sanctionless. Thus, because of the obvious presence of the element of sanction in almost every settlement reached in a dispute settlement process, an informal system of justice can hardly be said to be an outcome of a voluntary agreement or a consensus between disputants involved.

Table 3: An Inventory of Sanctions Used in 10 Dispute Cases in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun rural Communities

Types of Sanctions Used	The Type of Rural Community			Row Total and Column %
	Kilba	Mumuye	Jukun	
Physical	2 (5.4)	0	0	2 (8.0)
Caning/flogging	1	0	0	1
Confinement	1	0	0	1
Economic	10 (76.9)	4 (100.0)	4 (50.0)	18 (72.0)
Compensation/Damages	3	2	0	5
Gifts for Ritual to be held	0	2	2	4
Labour on a Fare	0	0	1	1
Confiscation of Property	3	0	1	4
Fine	4	0	0	4
Social	0	0	4 (50.0)	4 (16.0)
Forcible Marriage	0	0	1	1
Ceremonial Reprisand	0	0	1	1
Cessation of Offending Behaviour	0	0	2	2
Psychological	1 (7.7)	0	0	1 (4.0)
Sorcery through a Medicineman	1	0	0	1
Column	13	4	8	25
Total	52.0	16.0	32.0	100.0

Note: - The top figure outside the bracket is the total for each type of sanctions used, the one in bracket is the column percent.
- 12 dispute cases were witnessed in these three communities (four from each), but only 10 are used in this table. The two missing cases are both from Mumuye. They were disposed off without convictions.
Source: Compiled by author

Other strong facts exist as evidences of the predominance of lack of consensus in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun dispute settlements observed. The fact that in each of the dispute settlements, it was the dispute settlers alone who decided the appropriate sanction(s) is one good evidence. The need to

enforce the sanction(s) decided upon is a further evidence for the predominance of lack of consensus. This need is in turn evident in the giving of ultimatum for compliance, the threat or the fact of further sanction if ultimatum was broken, the use of search teams such as the *Tokwoumbo* among the Mumuye, the threat or the use of sorcery, etc. In fact, in Merry's paper on four small-scale societies, there were evidences that dispute settlers in their efforts to arrive at a settlement, pressurised disputants that seemed more subservient irrespective of what should be a fair (consensus) settlement (1982:17-42). What is more, the opinions of most disputants, particularly the defendants, interviewed about the outcome of their dispute settlements appear, as a recent survey has shown in detail, to rule out consensus as the dominant element in the outcome of dispute settlements in small-scale communities such as the rural Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun of Nigeria.[17] To be sure, many of the complainants were relatively satisfied with the outcome of their dispute settlements, even though they did not appear to get the outcome they would have wanted, which indicates some elements of compromise and consensus on their parts. But the defendant on the other hand, received, it appeared, almost the highest sanctions or penalties traditionally or otherwise prescribed for the offences they were convicted of, and they were apparently very dissatisfied.

Conclusion

In conclusion therefore, we can say that the concrete operation of informal justice in small-scale societies examined in the foregoing sections of this paper did not, critically speaking, have most of the so-called virtues of informal justice. The analyses revealed a wide gap between the reality of informal justice in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun rural communities and the ideals of informal justice as conceived by its advocates. First, the absence of professional lawyers and the relative proximity of the 'courts' notwithstanding, dispute settlement in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun was not so cheap; the main reason being the gift-giving involved in each dispute process. Although the process usually started immediately a dispute was brought before dispute settlers, an 'on-the-spot' justice/settlement was not possible. To enforce a settlement was always a problem. Ultimatum after ultimatum had to be given. As a result, none of the decisions, where it was reached at all, was fully enforced immediately as the protagonists of

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17 Almost all the disputants interviewed in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun disagreed almost totally with the outcomes of their dispute settlement. The defendants in particular and/or their relatives, did not only disagreed with the settlements reached in their dispute settlements but they were totally dissatisfied with those decisions (See Sa'ad 1988:190-194).

informal justice would have expected. Many were still to be enforced, pending ultimatum, when the author left after seven months of field work.

Secondly, although people were not barred from attending the scenes of disputes settling process, only very few did attend, and they hardly talked there. Participation at the dispute settlement scenes had clearly been the preoccupation of only the disputes settlers, their assistants and the parents or senior relatives of the disputants (especially those of the defendants') in which the dispute settlers played a dominant role.

Thirdly, the dispute settlers were special status people, and the manner gifts were given and/or fines and compensations were exacted and appropriated, suggested clearly that people who benefited most (materially at least) were the disputes settling authorities.

Finally, the obvious existence of the element of imposed sanctions, and other reasons, including the opinion of most of the disputants (particularly the defendants) interviewed, appear to rule out consensus as the dominant element in the outcome of dispute settlements examined in this study.

Clearly therefore, informal justice in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun of Nigeria is lacking in most of the virtues propagated as inherently informal. This could be explained as due to the socio-economic context within which the informal justice in these societies operate as at now, which is an amalgam of pre-capitalist and capitalist modes and relations of production. However, it is not the intention of this paper to dwell on this.[18]

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18 For a detailed discussion of the relationship between informal law and justice and mode and relations of production in Kilba, Mumuye and Jukun societies see Sa'ad (1988 and 1990).

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Question nationale et ethnies en Afrique noire: le cas du Sénégal

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Abstract: *How has the national question been theorised in Africa and in Europe by the various thinkers and what relationship have they established with the ethnic factor? How to tackle the national question in Senegal? These are some of the questions the author attempts to answer, after having carried out a critical review of the contending theses in the liberative since the famous conference by E. Renan in 1882 ('What is a Nation') the author necessarily reviews. Then, the position, role and impact of the various factors, i.e. territory, exchanges, languages, culture and history, in the formation of the nation in Senegal.*

La formation de la nation en Afrique noire est devenue une question incontournable à la suite des rébellions armées, des conflits ethniques ou tribaux. C'est un sujet qui mérite une réflexion lucide et approfondie après trente ans d'indépendance qui ont permis de faire apparaître des phénomènes nouveaux dans le domaine politique, économique, social, culturel, linguistique et religieux. Les problèmes relatifs à la question nationale ne peuvent plus être posés aujourd'hui de la même manière qu'ils étaient abordés durant la colonisation.

Dans beaucoup de pays africains, la question nationale en rapport avec l'existence des ethnies est posée ouvertement et frontalement. Elle a donné lieu à des recherches et à la publication de nombreux ouvrages (Ahidjo 1964, Hazoume 1972, Sylla 1987, Mampouya 1983, Mbongo 1985, Mbokolo 1985, Pokam 1986, Mbuyinga 1989) C'est surtout deux pays d'Afrique centrale: Rwanda et Burundi qui ont fait l'objet de nombreuses publications.

Au Sénégal, la question nationale en rapport avec les ethnies à très peu retenu l'attention des chercheurs et des hommes politiques. Ce problème a été systématiquement abordé ces derniers temps par l'économiste sénégalais: Makhtar Diouf (1994) dans son ouvrage: *Sénégal les ethnies et la nation*, L'Harmattan Paris. Youssouf Mbargane Guissé (1986), chercheur à l'IFAN, Cheikh Anta Diop, n'a abordé que les dimensions spatiales de la question nationale dans son projet de thèse esquissé dans: *Fondements historiques et sociaux de la religion et de la culture des wolof du Sénégal (De l'ethnie à la Nation)*.

Notre objectif est d'apporter notre contribution à l'étude de la formation de la nation en rapport avec les ethnies au Sénégal.

C'est pourquoi nous examinerons successivement les questions suivantes:

- Les questions théoriques et méthodologiques;
- L'étude de la question nationale au Sénégal;
- La question nationale et le problème casamançais.

Questions théoriques et méthodologiques

Si la question nationale a été discutée par certains intellectuels ou hommes politiques sénégalais, elle n'a jamais été mise en relation avec les ethnies durant la période coloniale et les trois premières décennies de la période postérieure à l'indépendance. Cheikh Anta Diop, Léopold Sédar Senghor et Mamadou Dia ont eu à préciser leurs positions sur les problèmes relatifs à la nation.

Dès 1954, le mot nation nègres figurent dans le titre de l'ouvrage de Cheikh Anta Diop Nations nègres et culture publié aux Editions Présence africaine. Quelle est la conception qu'il se fait de la nation et notamment des nations Nègres? Quel type de relation entretiennent les nations avec la culture? Telles sont les questions qu'on peut se poser et auxquelles nous essayerons de fournir des débuts de réponses. C'est dans sa préface à *Nations nègres et cultures* que Cheikh Anta Diop aborde la question nationale. On sent qu'il polémique avec les étudiants africains organisés en groupe de langue au sein du Parti communiste français (PCF). Il se réfère explicitement à l'ouvrage de Staline: *Le marxisme et la question nationale et coloniale* (1913) très lu dans les milieux estudiantins africains. Il invite les Africains à étudier leur propre histoire et leur civilisation pour mieux se connaître. Face à ce problème, les Africains ont adopté trois positions. Il y a d'abord les cosmopolite-scientiste-modernisants qui estiment que fouiller dans les décombres du passé pour y trouver une civilisation africaine est une perte de temps. Ensuite on rencontre l'intellectuel qui a oublié de soigner sa formation marxiste ou celui qui a étudié rapidement le marxisme dans l'absolu sans en avoir jamais envisagé l'application au cas particulier qu'est la réalité de son pays. Enfin il y a les antinationalistes formalistes qui se lancent dans une sophistique économiste pour démontrer — on ferait mieux de dire constater — qu'en cette ère d'interdépendance économique, il est vain de parler d'indépendance nationale. Cheikh Anta Diop n'aborde pas frontalement et systématiquement la formation des nations en Afrique noire. Il s'intéresse plutôt aux rapports de colonisation entre les pays européens et les pays africains pour revendiquer l'indépendance nationale. Il constate que les antinationalistes formalistes pourront être offusqués par le titre de son ouvrage: *Nations nègres et culture* qu'il considère lui-même comme peu satisfaisant. Il se défend en invoquant le titre de l'ouvrage de Staline sur le marxisme et la question coloniale et nationale: «on peut leur (antinationalistes formalistes) faire remarquer que ce n'est pas parce que

Staline (1971) a écrit «le marxisme et la question nationale et coloniale», un livre dont le titre contient le terme de «national» qu'il fût nationaliste».

Cheikh Anta Diop retient du «nationalisme» les deux thèmes qu'en retiennent les marxistes: la culture nationale et l'indépendance nationale. Cette conception de la nation que Cheikh Anta Diop (1954:12) attribue aux marxistes n'est pas conforme à la définition stalinienne de la nation: «la nation est une communauté stable, historiquement constituée, de langue, de territoire, de vie économique et de formation psychique, qui se traduit dans la communauté de culture». D'une part, écarte des facteurs fondamentaux constitutifs de la nation et retenus par Staline comme la communauté de langue, de territoire et de vie économique. Ce sont là des facteurs objectifs qui entrent dans la définition stalinienne de la nation. D'autre part, ce sont peut être les seuls marxistes africains qui parlent de l'indépendance nationale parce qu'ils appartiennent à des pays colonisés et dépendants. Mais Staline n'en parle pas, car la définition est générale; car elle englobe les pays européens qui ont colonisé l'Afrique.

Se demandant ce qu'on pourrait assimiler à des Nations en Afrique, Cheikh Anta Diop pense qu'on peut facilement appliquer la définition de Staline à certaines ethnies ou pays d'Afrique noire:

> Il serait aisé d'appliquer la définition de Staline aux Ethiopiens, Bambara, Wolofs, Zoulous, Yoruba, etc. Au Soudan, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Sénégal, Guinée, Niger, Kenya, Afrique du Sud, Soudan dit «Anglo-Egyptien», existent des noyaux de nations qui se consolideront dans la lutte pour l'indépendance. Certes Cheikh Anta Diop ne nous dit pas en quoi ces ethnies résidant dans des territoires coloniaux où vivent d'autres ethnies et comment ces territoires coloniaux artificiellement constitués par les colonisateurs sont des «noyaux de nations»

A partir de là, ils font des prévisions sur les langues qui s'imposeront dans chacune de ces régions. La communauté de culture, d'histoire, de psychisme ne fait aucun doute, selon Cheikh Anta Diop qui estime vain de chercher à déterminer aujourd'hui quelles seront les frontières exactes de ces Nations. Ici Cheikh Anta Diop ne règle pas la question de *la communauté de territoire* retenue par Staline en écartant le problème du tracé des frontières qui est fondamental dans la délimitation des Nations. Par ailleurs il passe sous silence la communauté de la vie économique. Cheikh Anta Diop pense que le problème des frontières se réglera comme cela est en train de se faire pour l'Inde: c'est-à-dire que les frontières actuelles tracées pour la commodité de l'exploitation colonialiste — sinon au hasard — ne sont pas forcément inviolables. Il ajoute: «nous devons éduquer notre conscience en vue de la rendre apte à accepter une future modification». Mais l'expérience historique montre que le tracé des frontières est une question de rapport de forces pour l'essentiel et non une question de conscience ou d'éducation.

Cheikh Anta Diop s'est inscrit dans la problématique des abolitionnistes de l'époque comme Victor Schoelcher (1948) qui parle de Nations nègres (cf. *Esclavage et colonisation*, PUF). Pierre Armand Dufau, rapporteur de l'ouvrage de Schoelcher *Abolition de l'esclavage. Examen critique du préjugé contre la couleur des africains et des sang-mêlés* pour l'obtention du prix Grégoire, parle de «Nations blanches». L'existence des nations blanches ou noires est discutée surtout par les partisans et les adversaires de l'abolition de la traite des esclaves noirs. En conclusion, Cheikh Anta Diop n'a pas systématiquement abordé la question nationale. Il a surtout examiné le problème colonial en rapport avec la domination que les pays européens ont exercée sur les pays africains. C'est pourquoi il a privilégié le problème de l'indépendance et de la culture nationales. Il a réduit la position des marxistes à la seule position de Staline, alors que d'autres marxistes remarquables ont traité de la question nationale. Enfin il a racialisé la question nationale.

En dehors de l'auteur de *Nations Nègres et culture*, deux hommes politiques sénégalais Mamadou Dia et Léopold Sédar Senghor ont eu à traiter de la question nationale dans l'optique adoptée par Ernest Renan et en des termes qui méritent d'être examinés de manière critique.

Dans son livre *Nations africaines et solidarité mondiale* (PUF. Paris), Mamadou Dia (1963) est à la recherche d'une nouvelle définition de la nation. Il s'efforce de serrer de plus près le concept de nation dont les historiens de l'Occident ont tendance à faire une «catégorie» réservée, une notion particulière à leurs sociétés ou à des sociétés de type occidental. Il se tourne vers Ernest Renan qui, exceptionnellement, affirmait dans sa conférence célèbre («Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?» conférence faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars 1882), que la nation n'est pas seulement un fait historique, pas seulement un groupe d'hommes, un territoire, une tradition, une «âme», mais la spiritualisation de ces différents éléments matériels, le tout orienté vers le bien commun du groupe, de l'humanité. Mamadou Dia précise ce qu'il retient de la définition de la Nation qui est chez Renan (1882:5) «une affirmation», «une construction inachevée» et «une vocation collective».

> ce qu'il faut retenir de cette définition, c'est que la nation au lieu d'être un état statistique, définitif, est plutôt «une affirmation», un mouvement perpétuel, une construction inachevée — se plaçant dans la progression de la pensée de Renan, on pouvait définir la nation comme une «vocation collective», celle-ci s'appuyant sur une table de valeurs communes, un ordre institutionnel et enfin des buts communs. Il étaye son propos avec une citation de François Perroux qui écrit: «La nation est une vocation»

Dia pense que la définition de Renan devrait contribuer à écarter les théories racistes qui prétendent fonder la vocation nationale sur la race ou sur le peuple. Car ceux-ci ne sont que des éléments biologiques. Il ajoute que les

exemples sont de plus en plus nombreux des groupements historiquement et ethniquement allogènes qui participent à une vocation collective nationale. La nation est un dépassement selon Dia qui s'appuie sur Charles Péguy: C'est dans ce sens qu'il faut entendre le mot admirable de Péguy «La nation est une mission».

La définition de la nation avancée par Mamadou Dia s'inscrit dans le sillage de la position de Senghor. Elle est aux antipodes de la définition stalinienne de la nation qu'il assimile à la définition de tous les marxistes. En réalité, Mamadou Dia marque avec force ses désaccords avec les marxistes. Néanmoins il reconnaît que le marxisme a joué et continue de jouer un rôle idéologique sur le développement des nationalismes coloniaux. Son problème est de préciser les limites du rôle du marxisme dans l'étude des questionnaires qui est relativement récent. Marx a été beaucoup moins soucieux des «colonies» que de la lutte du prolétariat européen.

Lénine devant le développement de l'impérialisme a eu à serrer de plus près la question nationale. Mais il a été amené à lier et à subordonner la question nationale au sort de la révolution socialiste selon Dia (1963:15) qui écrit:

> Ce qu'il faut surtout noter, à l'intention des apologistes du marxisme - léninisme qui se posent en même temps comme champions du nationalisme africain, c'est que l'appui de l'idéologie qu'ils prônent aux mouvements de libération des peuples est en vérité motivé par des considérations de tactique et de stratégie.

Le processus de la formation des nations en Afrique est original. Comme tout mouvement contre l'ordre établi, le processus de la formation des nations du XXe siècle, et donc des nations africaines, bouleverse des systèmes habituels de raisonnement, les règles généralement admises par les uns et par les autres, y compris celles du marxisme-léninisme.

Le nationalisme chez Dia est tout autre chose qu'une théorie fondée sur une idéologie raciale ou religieuse. Ce nationalisme, à base raciale ou religieuse, est une construction primaire qui compte, beaucoup plus sur une conscience nationale, sur la folie collective des foules, sur la force destructive des instincts mis en état d'exaspération. C'est un nationalisme aveugle et fermé, inaccessible à la notion de *nation-solidarité, sans ouverture* sur un humanisme universel selon Dia (1963:10) qui condamne ce genre de nationalisme: «C'est pourquoi les nations africaines qui sont appelées à jouer demain quelque rôle historique ne seront ni des nations nègres, berbères ou arabes, ni des nations chrétiennes, musulmanes ou animistes».

Mamadou Dia semble ne pas être indirectement d'accord avec Cheikh Anta Diop qui parle de *Nations Nègres.* Le titre même de son livre: *Nations africaines et solidarité mondiale* peut le faire penser. En réalité, Mamadou Dia s'inscrit dans la problématique de Renan qui veut prouver le caractère

français de l'Alsace et de la Lorraine. Il pense comme Renan (1992:48-51) que la race et la religion ne sont pas des facteurs constitutifs de la nation: «Les premières nations de l'Europe sont des nations de sang essentiellement mélangé». La religion ne saurait non plus offrir une base suffisante à l'établissement d'une nationalité moderne (Renant 1992:51. *Qu'est qu'une nation?* Presses Pocket).

Guy Landry Hazoumé (1965:165), un philosophe béninois, dans son ouvrage: *idéologies tribalistes et nations en Afrique* a noté, à juste titre que Mamadou Dia a repris la définition «subjective» ou «idéaliste» de la nation proposée par Ernest Renant. L'homme politique sénégalais influencé par les intellectuels chrétiens épouse les mêmes points de vue que le professeur Jean Buchmann, militant chrétien qui a enseigné durant la colonisation au Congo Belge. Ce professeur de droit prétend réfuter l'analyse des auteurs marxistes fidèles à la définition stalinienne de la nation, en écrivant:

> que l'élément subjectif qui se trouve ainsi réduit au rôle d'épiphénomène (dans la théorie stalinienne) est en réalité le seul décisif. Ce n'est pas le territoire, la langue, la culture ou l'économie qui fondent la nation, mais l'idée que les hommes se font de l'espace — de son caractère «vital» ou de ses limites «naturelles» — et de la langue, de la culture, des intérêts économiques; il faut y ajouter l'idée qu'ils se font de l'histoire d'où l'importance réelle du passé légendaire et de l'utopie futuriste. Renan avait compris cela pour qui la Nation était essentiellement la volonté de vivre en commun et c'est à une conception analogue que Mamadou Dia, la confondant à celle de Potekhine (qui, à notre avis, reprend la définition de Staline) déclarait «adhérer au nom de l'Afrique noire toute entière.[1]

Ainsi cet élément subjectif ou ce facteur de conscience nationale peut également être examiné en lui même et sans en évaluer le poids et l'importance par rapport aux autres facteurs ou éléments qui permettent de définir une Nation. Telle est la remarque critique formulée pour G.L. Hazoumé. Celle-ci peut être articulée à l'encontre de la conception de la nation avancée par Cheikh Anta Diop.

La position de Mamadou Dia sur la définition de la nation n'est pas tellement éloignée de celle de Senghor (1957), qui insiste essentiellement sur l'élément subjectif. Le poète sénégalais écrit:

> La Nation, si elle rassemble les patries, c'est pour les transcender. Elle n'est pas comme la patrie, déterminations naturelles, donc expression du milieu, mais volonté de construction, mieux: de reconstruction. Elle est objectivement restructuration à l'image d'un modèle exemplaire, d'un archétype. Mais pour qu'elle atteigne son objet, la Nation doit animer de sa

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1 Le Père Calvez cite Jean Buchmann dans un article de la *Revue Française de Sciences Politiques* no.3 Juin 1965:165 (Ms 462-463) cf.: Guy Landry Hazoume (1965:165).

foi, par-delà les parties, tous ses membres, tous les individus. Des individus, elle doit faire des personnes, c'est-à-dire des volontés conscientes des âmes.

Et Senghor (1957), à l'appui de cette affirmation, évoque Hegel: «Ce ne sont pas les déterminations naturelles de la Nation qui lui donnent son caractère, mais son esprit national».

Senghor hostile à la théorie de la lutte de classes, adhère à la conception renanienne de la nation. Il insiste sur la notion de consensus comme le souligne Babacar Sine (1983:127): «Il substitue à la conception de classe de l'Etat la théorie du consensus national». Senghor développe une thèse bizarre sur la naissance de la nation sénégalaise qui date de la Révolution française lors du dépôt du cahier de doléances de quelques habitants de Saint-Louis aux Etats Généraux: «Dans notre cas, il s'agit de réaliser une commune volonté de vie commune, c'est-à-dire de construire une nation qui est en devenir depuis le 15 avril 1789».

Babacar Sine commente de manière critique cette conception senghorienne de la nation. Tout en se défendant d'être totalitaire, Senghor entend mobiliser dans une mystique nationale toutes les forces sociales composantes du pays. L'Etat s'assigne comme mission de réaliser la nation et de s'identifier à elle. La conception senghorienne de la nation se rapproche plus de l'idéologie de l'Etat national que de l'idéologie de l'Etat partisan. Cette pensée est parfaitement cohérente. Car elle exclut toute différenciation interne des classes et par conséquent exclut toute organisation étatique qui serait fondée sur cette base. Ainsi toute l'architecture de la théorie marxiste de la société se trouve ainsi renversée. Mais, selon Babacar Sine, cette construction théorique est loin de correspondre à l'expérience pratique, aussi bien au Sénégal qu'en France. Elle passe superbement par dessus les luttes de classes réelles qui s'y déroulent.

Ce subterfuge théorique auquel Senghor a recours est de transposer sur le plan mondial le phénomène qu'il récuse sur le plan interne, en pensant que la seule contradiction fondamentale est d'ordre externe. Senghor reconnaît l'existence d'inégalités internes. Mais les inégalités essentielles seraient d'un tout autre ordre qui se situeraient au niveau de la confrontation généralisée entre «nations prolétaires» et «nations capitalistes». Depuis l'ouvrage de Pierre Moussa intitulé *Nations prolétaires*, cette idée a fait son chemin dans pas mal d'esprits africains.

Ainsi dans son ouvrage *Pour une relecture africaine de Marx et Engels*, Senghor revient sur cette idée avec force:

> Il y a plus. Le problème majeur du socialisme ne peut plus être seulement la suppression des inégalités à l'intérieur d'une nation, il est dans la suppression des inégalités au niveau international entre nations capitalistes et nations prolétaires, nations riches et nations pauvres.

135

La notion de «nations prolétaires» est elle même suspecte. Elle exerce une certaine séduction auprès de quelques esprits nationalistes. Mais dans son fond, cette notion escamote la réalité bien plus qu'on le pense selon Babacar Sine:

> Elle schématise et pervertit les liens d'exploitation coloniale en scotomisant les luttes de classes au sein des pays dominés (l'idée de «nation prolétaire» transpose la contradiction majeure entre l'impérialisme et les masses populaires au plan d'une opposition entre entités historiques (pays pauvres — pays riches), à la grande satisfaction et de l'impérialisme et de bourgeoisies locales). Mamadou Dia partage avec Senghor deux idées fondamentales dans le domaine de la question nationale la définition renanienne de la nation et l'existence de nations prolétariennes.

Revenons à la thèse de Senghor selon laquelle la nation sénégalaise est née en 1789 lors du dépôt des cahiers de doléances de quelques habitants de Saint-Louis. D'abord il y a des controverses sur le caractère représentatif de ceux qui ont rédigé ces cahiers.

Ensuite dans ce cahier rédigé uniquement par des français et des métis, il est demandé le maintien de la traite des nègres qu'il faut libéraliser par la suppression du monopole de ce commerce par une compagnie à charte: La compagnie du Sénégal. Ce cahier ne prend nullement en charge les intérêts des Noirs de Saint-Louis. Enfin en 1789, le Sénégal tel qu'il est actuellement dans ses limites géographiques n'existait pas.

Dans ce débat relatif à la question nationale, deux théoriciens politiques sénégalais sont absents: Abdoulaye Ly et Mahjemout Diop. Il serait intéressant d'expliquer les raisons de cette absence. Abdoulaye Ly, par ses recherches historiques sur la traite des nègres et la connexion capitaliste des continents, a concentré ces efforts sur l'exploitation du continent africain par l'extérieur et a négligé les processus sociaux internes à l'Afrique. Il se contente de parler de «Nation négro-africaine» sans préciser son contenu dans son livre: *Les regroupements politiques au Sénégal (1956-1970)* (CODESRIA 1992). Mahjemout Diop était soucieux de réfuter la thèse des dirigeants africains et notamment celle de Senghor selon laquelle il n'y a pas de luttes de classes en Afrique noire. Il était plus intéressé à établir les fondements théoriques à l'existence d'un parti prolétarien à vocation nationaliste comme le Parti africain de l'indépendance (PAI). Il présente Cheikh Anta Diop comme l'idéologue de la bourgeoisie nationale sans définir ce qu'il entend par bourgeoisie nationale dans son livre: *Classe et idéologies de classe au Sénégal* (Editions du comité central, 1962).

En conclusion, les hommes politiques et intellectuels sénégalais ne parlent pas d'ethnies lorsqu'ils traitent de la question nationale. Ils se divisent en deux camps: les partisans de la définition renanienne de la nation (Mamadou Dia et Léopold Sédar Senghor) et les utilisateurs critiques de la conception stalinienne de la nation (Cheikh Anta Diop, Babacar Sine). Mais

tous ces hommes politiques et intellectuels réduisent la position des marxistes sur la question nationale à celle de Staline ou de Lenine. Cela veut dire qu'ils n'avaient pas connaissance de la position des autres marxistes comme James Connoly, Rosa Luxemburg, Léon Trotsky, Anton Pannekoek, Joseph Strasser, Karl Renner, Otto Bauer, Karl Kaustky. Par ailleurs, ils n'ont pas tiré parti des critiques de la définition stalinienne de la nation et des réflexions intéressantes faites par Karl Kaustky et par Otto Bauer.

L'apport des autres théoriciens marxistes

Karl Kausky, issu d'une famille tchèque et citoyen autrichien, n'était pas d'accord avec les idées vieilles et inapplicables de Marx et Engels dans le domaine de la question nationale. Il est l'un des premiers marxistes à définir la nation dans un ouvrage au titre significatif, *La nationalité moderne (Die Moderne Nationalisât*, Neue Zeit, V, 1887) — Produit du développement social, la nation est aussi un fait culturel; de tous les éléments qui ont contribué à sa formation, le plus décisif est, pour lui, la langue qui s'impose comme langue commune dans un Etat commun (Haupt *et al.* 1887:121-122). L'avenir de la langue nationale est lié au développement de l'économie. L'extension des marchés, trait caractéristique du capitalisme, va de pair avec l'unification linguistique autour des langues les plus parlées, ou avec le développement d'une langue universelle (Carrère d'Encausse 1987:21).

Karl Renner sous divers pseudonymes (Synopticus, Springer) juriste, attribue un rôle important dans l'équilibre et de la réalisation des aspirations nationales et s'efforce de définir ce qu'est un Etat multinational viable. Il développe le lien entre la culture et la nation mis en avant par Kautsky et en tire les conséquences quant à l'organisation de l'Etat. Sa démarche rappelle celle de Cheikh Anta Diop. «Avec l'entrée du prolétariat dans la politique autrichienne, la question nationale cesse d'être une question de culture». L'appartenance à une nation est une affaire personnelle: «C'est le principe de personnalité, non le principe territorial qui doit servir de fondement à la réglementation» (Haupt *et al.* 1887:222).

Si Renner reste attaché à une recherche de solutions juridiques et institutionnelles, Otto Bauer adopte une démarche sociologique qui fera progresser de manière décisive la réflexion sur la nation et son avenir historique. Il exercera une profonde influence sur les révolutionnaires que rebute souvent l'approche internationaliste ou par trop pragmatique de Marx. Lorsqu'il écrit: *La question des nationalités et la social-démocratie* (Vienne, 1907), Bauer pense à l'empire austro-hongrois et au conflit entre Tchèques et Allemands, qui pèse sur l'avenir de l'empire et, de manière plus grave encore, sur celui du mouvement ouvrier sensible aux conflits nationaux. La définition de la nation d'Otto Bauer est la suivante: «La nation est l'ensemble des hommes liés par un destin commun en une communauté de caractères». Cette définition mérite d'être précisée. Le destin commun, c'est

avant tout l'histoire commune; la communauté de caractère, c'est en premier lieu la communauté de langue.

La nation n'est donc pas pour Otto Bauer un phénomène transitoire lié à une période déterminée de l'histoire des classes en lutte, ou du développement économique, c'est une catégorie permanente dont l'existence a précédé le capitalisme et qui se maintient malgré les transformations économiques, qui enfin, selon toute probabilité, lui survivra. Ce rôle du socialisme n'est pas d'ignorer les nations ni de les abolir, mais au contraire, de donner une nation à chaque travailleur. Lénine a su mobiliser contre Otto Bauer et ses disciples Staline, le «merveilleux géorgien». L'article de Staline, *le marxisme et la question nationale*, est divisé en trois parties nettement distinctes. La première est consacrée à une discussion générale du concept de nation, la seconde critique les positions de l'austromarxisme, la troisième traite du problème de l'autonomie culturelle dans la perspective du mouvement socialiste en Russie.

A la définition austro-marxiste de la nation «agrégat des peuples liés dans une communauté de caractère par une communauté de destins (Bauer), indépendante du sol (Renner [Springer]), Staline répond par une condamnation. Les austro-marxistes, écrit, ont confondu la tribu, «unité ethnique» et la nation, «communauté constituée historiquement, indépendamment des données ethniques». Et il avance sa propre définition de la nation: «La nation est une communauté stable, historiquement constituée, communauté de langue, de territoire, de vie économique et formation psychique qui se traduit dans la communauté de culture» Ces critères sont inséparables. S'il en manque un seul, la nation n'existe pas. C'est le cas de la Suisse, Etat trinational qui n'a pas de nation. C'est aussi le cas des Juifs dont le destin est d'être assimilables par les nations au sein desquelles ils vivent. Staline oppose à la conception «quasi mystique» de la nation des austro-marxistes une conception historique. La nation, écrit-il, est une formation globale de l'époque du capitalisme ascendant qui lui est liée, et donc non permanente.

Staline combat la position des austro-marxistes sur deux points. En défendant le maintien de l'Etat multinational, les austromarxistes, ignorent le droit à l'autodétermination des peuples, et réduisent les droits politiques aux droits culturels. D'autre part, en érigeant la nation en catégorie permanente, l'austro-marxisme perpétue les préjugés nationaux et la division nationale du monde contre la vocation internationaliste et unificatrice du prolétariat. Staline dénonce les effets concrets de l'austro-marxisme dans l'empire russe, où son influence sur le Bund et les sociaux-démocrates caucasiens a conduit à l'affaiblissement du parti, au clivage du prolétariat selon des lignes nationales. Staline commet certaines erreurs qu'il convient de relever. Certaines d'entre elles sont mineures: décrire la Suisse comme un Etat trinational; affirmer qu'au début du XIXe siècle, l'Amérique du Nord était

connue sous le nom de Nouvelle Angleterre. Mais Staline commet des erreurs plus importantes dans l'analyse des austro-marxistes.

En reprochant à Bauer d'avoir confondu nation et tribu, en l'accusant de négliger le cadre historique du développement de la nation, Staline s'est livré à une lecture trop rapide ou il est de mauvaise foi. Bauer a toujours insisté sur la nécessité de considérer la nation dans son développement historique. Il y a d'autres erreurs à relever chez Staline. Dans le travail de Staline, il y a des insuffisances. La définition stalinienne de la nation est étrangère à la pensée de Lénine. Communauté *stable*, pour Staline, alors que Lénine a toujours souligné son aspect transitoire. Staline met en lumière, tout en s'efforçant de les nier, la stabilité et la permanence du fait national. Certains des critères de la nation définis par lui ont un caractère durable, même si l'histoire les a forgés et les transforme; la culture nationale, la psychologie nationale, ou encore la communauté de vie psychique. La communauté de caractère d'Otto Bauer et la communauté de vie psychique de Staline sont de même nature. Elles désignent l'identité des nations développée au fil des siècles et non uniquement à l'étape du capitalisme ascendant. Quant à l'idée de *culture nationale*, Lénine la condamnera toujours, comme «concept bourgeois».

Enfin, sur l'autodétermination, pierre angulaire du système proposé par Lénine, les vues de Staline sont différentes aussi. Il ne débat pas de l'autodétermination dans *le Marxisme et la question nationale*. En revanche, dans un texte daté de la même année, et traitant de l'autodétermination, il écrit qu'elle implique des solutions variées telles l'autonomie et la fédération, solutions que Lénine condamnera peu après. Une bonne lecture de Staline montre que ce qui le différencie de Lénine — formulation précisant la nature du fait national, insistance sur sa capacité de durer — doit beaucoup à Renner et à Bauer. Il en va de même des solutions retenues: l'autonomie et la fédération appartiennent à leur système de pensée. Chargé de combattre les austro-marxistes, Staline a pour partie repris leurs idées. Issu du Caucasse où comme dans l'empire austro-hongrois un enchevêtrement national extrême a renforcé les conflits nationaux, le développement d'un mouvement d'émancipation proprement national a impressionné Staline comme les austro-hongrois. De là vient sans doute qu'il ait attribué au fait national une dimension que Lénine, pourtant si attentif au réel, s'est toujours refusé à lui reconnaître[2]. Lénine était, à beaucoup d'égard, très jacobin.

Ces rappels étaient nécessaires pour montrer la vivacité des débats relatifs à la question nationale chez les marxistes et la diversité des points de

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2   Nous avons beaucoup emprunté à Carrère d'Encausse (*Le Grand Défi*, Flammarion 1987).

vue. C'est un élément qui permet de mieux enrichir la manière dont les Africains peuvent aborder la question nationale en Afrique.

Contribution à l'étude de la question nationale au Sénégal

L'étude remarquable de Makhtar Diouf (1994) *Sénégal Les ethnies et la nation* est notre point de départ. C'est un travail très documenté, systématique et honnête. Makhtar Diouf a eu le mérite de s'être consacré à l'étude de l'intégration nationale après avoir fait de nombreux travaux sur les problèmes de l'intégration régionale. Il a su utiliser l'abondante littérature produite sur les groupes ethniques du Sénégal, et les travaux orientés dans différents domaines des sciences sociales (histoire, géographie, linguistique, sociologie, science politique) comme sources complémentaires. Il n'a guère négligé les nombreux reportages de la presse écrite sénégalaise sur le problème casamançais et un certain nombre d'études empiriques. Il s'est appuyé sur des entretiens — conversations tout a fait libres. Par ailleurs, bien que son étude porte sur le cas sénégalais, il a souvent procédé à des comparaisons avec la situation ethnique dans d'autres pays du tiers monde et de l'Europe.

L'ethnicité est le champ d'étude de Makhtar Diouf. C'est un domaine de réflexion intéressant, parce que le Sénégal n'a pas jusqu'au tout récent problème casamançais connu de problème de revendication séparatiste. La particularité de son étude est de tenter de cerner les raisons profondes de l'harmonie ethnique qui a toujours prévalu au Sénégal, sempiternellement constatée et répétée, mais jamais expliquée. Il faut dépasser les constatations et les apparences pour expliquer et saisir l'essence des choses. C'est la démarche empruntée à juste titre par Makhtar Diouf (1994:15) qui écrit:

> *Une telle explication est nécessaire, ne serait ce que pour les leçons à en tirer pour les autres pays africains confrontés aux conflits ethniques; mais aussi pour le Sénégal, où le problème casamançais montre que, dans ce domaine, rien n'est définitivement acquis.*

Ethnies et nation

Dans son étude, Makhtar Diouf n'a pas évité d'aborder des problèmes conceptuels et théoriques d'un très grand intérêt scientifique. Il a préféré utiliser le terme français, d'origine grecque, ethnie, qui rend compte d'une certaine division sociale, principalement à partir des critères de langue et de culture; le terme d'ethnie est d'application générale, universelle, valable pour toute société humaine, donc scientifique, à la différence du terme *tribu*, vestige de l'anthropologie coloniale britannique et circonscrit à l'Afrique et au tiers monde, par les mêmes qui parleront de *nationalités* pour l'Europe de l'Est, de *mouvements autonomistes* pour la France, la Belgique, l'Espagne, le Royaume uni pour présenter au fond une même réalité. «Le terme de *tribalisme* n'est jamais utilisé pour les séparatisme basques, corses, irlandais, lituaniens, croates...»

Makhtar Diouf a raison de préférer le concept d'ethnie au concept de *tribalisme*. Il partage le même point de vue que le chercheur sud africain Archie Mafeje (1971:136-140) qu'il cite et l'économiste Egyptien Samir Amin. Roger Martelli (1979) n'hésite pas à parler d'ethnies dans son étude consacrée à la formation de la nation en France. En adoptant le terme d'ethnie, Diouf se démarque du chercheur congolais J. Mampouya formé à Moscou qui a intitulé son livre: *Le tribalisme au Congo* (1983). Si le concept de tribu a été abandonné comme le font remarquer M. Eliou (1977), le concept d'ethnie est contesté par le sociologue congolais Henri Ossebi dans sa thèse: «Rejetant le concept archaïsant de «tribu» ou encore celui également confus d'«ethnie», nous nous sommes intéressé à la notion d'«ethnicité» envisagée dans sa dimension historique». Les dirigeants, les hommes politiques et les intellectuels sénégalais répugnent à parler de l'existence d'ethnies dans leurs discours et dans leurs écrits. Pourquoi cela? c'est une question à laquelle il faut répondre.

Les autorités coloniales n'ont pas eu besoin dans leur tactique diviser pour régner, d'opposer les ethnies au Sénégal. Elles ont utilisé le clivage politique qui existait entre les originaires de quatre communes, citoyens français et les habitants des pays du protectorat, sujets français. Les autorités coloniales n'ont jamais utilisé le terme d'ethnies a propos des Lébu. Elles préféraient parler de la «communauté lébou», de «collectivité lébou». Même des intellectuels lébou parlent de peuple léboue: c'est le cas de Assane Sylla (1992) qui intitule son livre: *Le peuple lébou de la Presqu'île du Cap Vert.*

Que faut-il entendre par ethnie? C'est la Première question qui mérite réponse. Et en quoi se distingue t-elle de la nation? C'est une deuxième question qu'on ne peut guère éluder. Makhtar Diouf propose pour le terme ethnie la définition de Bromley:

> *l'ethnie est un ensemble stable d'êtres humains, constitué historiquement sur un territoire déterminé, possédant des particularités linguistiques, culturelles (et psychiques communes et relativement stables) ainsi que la conscience de leur unité et de leur différence des autres formations semblable. (conscience de soi) fixée dans l'auto-appellation (ethnonyme)*
> (Bromley 1983).

La langue et la culture peuvent être les conditions nécessaires de détermination de l'ethnie. S'y ajoutent les conditions suffisantes comme l'endoperception (Comment les membres de l'ethnie se perçoivent), et l'experception (comment les membres de l'ethnie sont perçues par les autres). L'ethnicité sera l'auto-présentation, l'auto-identification du groupe. L'ethnicité est une quête d'identité collective, au plan culturel, et parfois au plan politique, remarque M. Diouf.

La religion peut aussi dans certains cas être perçue comme facteur important de perception ethnique (en Yougoslavie, au Bénin, en Inde, au Cachemir, au Bengladesh, au Pakistan etc.).

Diouf exprime son désaccord avec beaucoup de chercheurs contemporains qui ont tendance à classer les différents groupes raciaux présents dans un même pays, comme des groupes ethniques. Il préfère les identifier par le terme groupe ethnico-racial.

Il précise (Diouf 1994:11):

> Comme en Mauritanie, pour distinguer les Maures Beydanes et les Négro-africains; comme en Guyane, avec d'un coté les Noirs, et de l'autre, les Indiens. Au Sénégal un tel problème ne se pose pas, bien que le pays compte des populations Maures: parce qu'avec la longue tradition de métissage, la plupart des Maures sénégalais actuels sont de peau plutôt noire.

Roland Breton (1981), dans son ouvrage: *Les ethnies* fait l'historique du mot ethnie et avance deux définitions. Au sens strict, ethnie désigne un groupe d'individus partageant la même langue maternelle. Au sens large, l'ethnie est définie comme un groupe d'individus liés par un complexe de caractères communs — anthropologiques, linguistiques, politico-historiques etc. — dont l'association constitue un système propre essentiellement culturel: une culture.

Mais c'est l'examen de chaque groupe ethnique qui permet d'établir quels sont les critères d'identification les plus valables dans chaque cas: origine anthropologique, communauté de territoire, usage linguistique, coutumes et mode d'existence, appartenance religieuse ou politique. Tout objectivement aux yeux de l'observateur que subjectivement dans la conscience des intéressés, note R. Breton (1981:9).

L'économiste Egyptien Samir Amin (1973:21) a essayé de définir les concepts d'ethnie et de nation. Pour lui:

> l'ethnie suppose une communauté linguistique et culturelle et une homogénéité du territoire géographique, et surtout, la conscience de cette homogénéité culturelle, quand bien même celle-ci serait imparfaite, les variantes dialectales différant d'une province à l'autre.

La nation suppose l'ethnie, mais la dépasse. Selon Saad Zahran, elle apparaît en effet si, de surcroît, une classe sociale, qui contrôle l'appareil central d'état, assure une unité économique à la vie de la communauté, c'est-à-dire l'organisation par cette classe dominante de la génération du surplus comme celle de sa circulation et de sa distribution solidarisent le sort des provinces.

Les marxistes africains et la question nationale

Samir Amin illustre sa pensée sur la question nationale en prenant des exemples historiques variés. Ainsi, dans les régions où le contrôle de l'irrigation exige la centralisation administrative et la planification de la production à l'échelle de l'ensemble du pays, la classe-Etat dominante transforme l'empire en nation s'il est déjà une ethnie homogène. Les cas de la Chine (malgré ses variantes régionales marquées) ou, mieux, de l'Egypte,

sont plus probants. Si la condition d'homogénéité ethnique n'est pas remplie, ou celle de l'unité économique, il y a empire, non nation comme en Inde.

Cette classe-Etat n'est pas la seule classe précapitaliste qu'on trouve à l'origine des faits nationaux: Celle des marchands dans les formations tributaires-marchandes ou esclavagistes-marchandes. La Grèce antique et le monde arabe constituent des exemples de nations de ce type.

On découvre en Afrique noire et notamment dans toute la savane en bordure méridionale du Sahara, des formations tributaires-marchandes qui sont à l'origine des grands Etats historiques, le Ghana, le Mali, le Songhay, les cités haoussas. On y trouve ici au moins l'embryon de nations en formation. Mais celles-ci se sont rapidement défaites avec la fin du commerce saharien et la Traite esclavagiste atlantique.

Le surplus, faible, n'exige pas une unification économique; il circule peu, et la société reste un conglomérat de régions insuffisamment intégrées pour être national. C'est cela qui a empêché les Etats africains au sud du Sahara de survivre ne serait-ce comme nations embryonnaires, après la disparition du commerce saharien.

Samir Amin montre son désaccord avec la thèse stalinienne selon laquelle la formation de la nation est due à l'émergence du mode de production capitaliste. Mais il nuance sa pensée en soulignant que si le fait national est antérieur au capitalisme, le mode de production capitaliste n'en joue pas moins un rôle considérable dans son développement; car il porte le degré de centralisation économique à un très haut niveau par la génération de la forme marchandise du produit tout court (et non plus seulement du surplus), pour la forme marchandise que le travail acquiert, assurant par la mobilité de la population — une plus grande intégration humaine, enfin par la forme marchandise que prend lui même le capital assurant l'intégration du marché (notamment la centralisation de la gestion monétaire de la société) et la circulation de la richesse.

Samir Amin aborde la dimension sociale de la formation de la nation qui est souvent négligée dans les analyses mêmes des théoriciens marxistes. Il insiste sur le rôle de certaines classes dominantes dans la formation des nations:

> La nation implique donc que la classe dominante puisse prétendre à l'hégémonie nationale dans la société, qu'elle soit constituée en une classe intégrée au niveau national, organisée et hiérarchisée à ce niveau, par opposition aux classes dominantes constituées d'égaux juxtaposés et autonomes. Cette intégration est le cas pour la classe-Etat des systèmes tributaires riches, exceptionnellement pour la classe des marchands dans la période de grande prospérité des sociétés dominées par elle, et surtout pour la bourgeoisie, tout au moins dans les formations capitalistes centrales.

143

Samir Amin a su enrichir la théorie marxiste de la nation en rompant avec le stalinisme et le dogmatisme. C'est dans cette voie que Babacar Sine a voulu s'engager dans son ouvrage: *Le marxisme devant les sociétés africaines contemporaines* (Présence africaine, 1983).

A la suite de l'éclatement du monolithisme doctrinal, il y a eu des circonstances favorables à l'émergence d'un marxisme africain créateur qui commence à étendre sérieusement son discours à une juste appréciation du rôle et de la place des faits culturels; et cela à la faveur de deux événements théoriques intervenus au sein du marxisme: d'une part la critique des schémas staliniens, d'autre part l'extraordinaire résurrection de la pensée d'Antonio Gramsci attentive à tout ce qui se passe dans l'instance culturelle.

En Afrique, le fait national est d'essence essentiellement culturelle. C'est la thèse de Babacar Sine qui récuse la thèse stalinienne de la nation «Appliquer de façon dogmatique les critères marxistes de la réalité nationale tels qu'on a pu les dégager du célèbre ouvrage de Staline, *Le Marxisme et la question nationale*, ou même les fameuses notes critiques de Lénine sur la question nationale serait aberrant».

En Afrique, il n'y a pas une adéquation historique parfaite entre territoire économique, unité du marché national, unité psychique et culturelle, et communauté linguistique, comme l'Europe peut en offrir des modèles. L'Afrique vit la réalité d'une oppression économique dans le cadre des *territoires coloniaux* qui ne correspondent nullement à des espaces culturels parfaitement homogènes, du fait de la balkanisation de ses structures culturelles, éclatées et dispersées de façon désarticulée.

Babacar Sine appelle à une réévaluation critique de la conception classique de la nation. Comment alors expliquer le développement de mouvement de libération nationale sans nations, sinon par le fait, en plus du colonialisme économique, de l'acuité singulière de la situation psycho-culturelle africaine? S'interroge Babacar Sine qui estime être en face d'Etats-nations à constituer, l'Etat préexistant à la nation et étant l'instrument historique qui s'évertue à la constituer.

Dans l'Afrique précoloniale, s'étaient déjà édifiés de grands ensembles historiques et culturels relativement homogènes (Ghana, Mali, etc.). Nul doute que le cours de l'histoire africaine allait déboucher sur la construction de nations africaines, au sens classique du terme (unité du territoire économique, notamment du marché national, unité linguistique, unité psychique et unité culturelle, etc.). Car la loi de formations de nations modernes est liée intrinsèquement à la naissance du capitalisme.

Cette analyse de Babacar Sine appelle plusieurs remarques. D'abord son affirmation selon laquelle le cours de l'histoire africaine allait déboucher sur la constitution de nations africaines n'est étayée par aucun argument. Ensuite Babacar Sine ne parle que de la loi de formation des nations modernes sans nous dire s'il existe une loi de formation de nations non modernes. Enfin il

se retrouve en accord complet avec Staline qui a défendu la thèse selon laquelle la nation est née avec le capitalisme. Là, sa position diverge d'avec celle défendue par Samir Amin soutenant qu'avec le mode de production tributaire il a existé de nations précapitalistes (ex.: Chine, Egypte).

Faute de ce concept, Babacar Sine n'a pu faire des avancées théoriques dans le traitement de la question nationale.

Après avoir constaté la stérilité des marxistes africains dans le domaine de la culture et notamment de la question nationale, il se rallie purement et simplement au culturalisme de Cheikh Anta Diop sans esprit critique. Pour lui les marxistes africains scientistes sont stériles. Par contre, les nationalistes africains culturalistes sont féconds. Cela nous paraît simpliste bien qu'il y ait une grande part de vérité dans ce qu'il écrit.

Babacar Sine avance des réflexions intéressantes, mais aussi discutables sur la question nationale en Afrique. En Afrique noire, à de rare exceptions près, ce que l'on peut appeler conscience nationale est déterminée par deux facteurs fondamentaux: tout d'abord, la conscience de l'exploitation coloniale, le refus donc d'une domination absolue, ensuite le sentiment intime d'appartenance par delà les différences accidentelles à une communauté historique et culturelle.

Cette démarche ne manque pas de susciter des réserves. D'abord parler de conscience nationale sans déterminer les contours des nations à laquelle on se réfère n'est pas juste. Y-a-t-il des nations en Afrique et quelles sont ces nations? Ce sont des questions incontournables. Ensuite l'histoire et la culture sont elle communes à toute l'Afrique ou à certaines parties de l'Afrique? Affirmer l'existence d'une communauté historique et culturelle relève beaucoup plus d'un postulat que d'une démonstration.

Babacar Sine semble se rallier à la thèse de Cheikh Anta Diop selon laquelle il y a des nations nègres. Il écrit «l'originalité de la démarche de Cheikh Anta Diop est de poser celle-ci (la communauté historique et culturelle) comme le fondement principal des «nations nègres». Pourquoi ces guillemets à nations nègres? C'est une question à laquelle Babacar Sine devait répondre.

Pour définir une voie spécifiquement africaine de formation de la nation, il estime judicieux de s'écarter du «modèle stalinien» pour privilégier, comme y invite plutôt Cheikh Anta Diop, «le critère de la communauté historique a-culturelle?»

A notre avis, si Babacar Sine a avancé des mises en garde épistémologiques aux Africains, il n'a pas réussi à traiter correctement la question nationale en se tenant à l'élément culturel comme fondement de la constitution de la nation. Il a écarté des éléments qui nous paraissent fondamentaux comme le mode de production, le territoire, la langue, etc.

En définitive les marxistes africains ont eu diverses attitudes. Certains n'ont pas traité de la question nationale et s'en sont tenus à l'étude des

classes sociales. C'est le cas de Mahjemout Diop. D'autres se sont livrés à des considérations générales, à partir du texte de Staline, comme Sine Babacar. Par contre Youssou Mbargane Guissé a abordé la question nationale à partir de la religion et de la culture.

Sémou Pathé Guèye, membre du Parti de l'indépendance et du travail, (PIT) étudie la question nationale au Sénégal dans un article intitulé: «Le léninisme, la question nationale et notre lutte» et publiée dans la revue de son parti: *Gestù — Recherches marxistes* no.7, août-septembre 1982. Il s'intéresse exclusivement à l'approche léniniste de la question nationale et passe sous silence l'approche stalinienne et les positions des autres marxistes européens du XXe siècle.

Ce qui est caractéristique, c'est que les marxistes africains, plus ou moins staliniens, ont ignoré les textes écrits sur la question nationale par d'autres penseurs qui se réclament du matérialisme historique comme Karl Kautsky, Anton Pannekock, Renner, Strasser, Otto Bauer, Trostsky, James Connolly, etc.

Les chercheurs et hommes politiques qui ne partagent pas les vues du marxisme ou qui en sont les adversaires ont aussi ignoré ces textes pour ne retenir comme position marxiste sur la question nationale que celle défendue par Staline et Lénine. C'est la cas de Mamadou Dia et de Cheikh Anta Diop.

Makhtar Diouf a raison de reprocher aux marxistes attentifs au clivage des classes de ne pas faire apparaître les groupes ethniques qui se situent à un niveau extra-économique. Il ajoute que certains marxistes orthodoxes sont même allés jusqu'à suspecter l'ethnicité de n'être rien d'autre qu'une invention idéologique de missionnaires, des anthropologues et des administrateurs coloniaux pour masquer la réalité de la lutte des classes (Markakis 1991).

Pour étudier la formation de la nation au Sénégal, nous allons examiner brièvement les différents facteurs qui contribuent à la construction de la nation en général comme le territoire, la langue, l'unité économique, l'unité culturelle et psychique, l'histoire commune.

Le territoire

Le territoire actuel du Sénégal est un héritage de la colonisation française qui se situait dans le cadre de l'ancienne fédération d'Afrique occidentale Française (AOF) composée de sept (7) colonies. Ses frontières qui étaient à la fois administratives (au regard des autres colonies de l'AOF) et politiques (au regard de la Gambie et de la Guinée Bissau) ont été constituées suivant les intérêts français. A certains égards, elles ont fait l'objet de négociations avec d'autres puissances coloniales européennes comme l'Angleterre et le Portugal. Les tracés de ses frontières n'ont pas été établis selon les exigences de groupes sociaux du Sénégal qui est un pays conquis. Ce sont des frontières qui ont été établies exclusivement par les autorités coloniales

françaises pour des raisons à la fois politique, administrative et militaire. Elles sont le fait non de «nationaux», mais d'étrangers. Cela ne manque pas de poser de graves problèmes pour la formation d'une nation sénégalaise. Car comment opérer le passage d'un territoire administratif colonial à un espace proprement national alors que ce territoire intégré dans l'espace fédéral colonial de l'AOF est fortement intégré dans l'espace économique et politique de la France.

C'est un problème qui mérite d'être examiné de manière approfondie quand on pense que l'OUA a décidé de maintenir les frontières héritées de la colonisation en 1963.

Le problème des limites territoriales est posé au Sénégal lors du conflit sénégalo-mauritanien de 1989 et du conflit sénégalo-bissau guinéen à propos des frontières maritimes. Ils étaient déjà posé à propos de quelques villages situés sur la frontière sénégalo-gambienne.

Pour Mamadou Dia certaines disputes autour des frontières sont stupides. Car si la nation n'est pas un absolu, elle est par définition une réalité contingente, aux limites changeantes. Et cela est vrai surtout de la nation en voie de formation. (1963:6) — Cette thèse de Mamadou Dia ne résout guère la question des frontières nationales en Afrique.

La délimitation des frontières du Sénégal pose des problèmes d'ethnies coupées en deux ou trois branches appartenant à d'autres pays (Mali, Gambie, Mauritanie, Guinée Conakry, Guinée Bissau, etc.).

Elle doit aussi amener à réfléchir sur la viabilité de la nation sénégalaise en formation. Le Sénégal peut-il assurer son unité nationale avec l'existence de. la Gambie qui le sépare de sa partie méridionale. Les frontières constituées par les fleuves ou de simples tracés terrestres ne correspondant à . aucun obstacle «naturel» sont elles de véritables frontières? Ce sont là des questions qu'on ne peut guère éluder dans l'étude de la formation des nations en Afrique et au Sénégal en particulier.

Si l'existence d'un territoire commun est un facteur favorable, à l'unité nationale, son mode d'occupation et d'exploitation est très important.

L'espace territorial et la vie économique

Le mode d'occupation et d'organisation économique inhérent à la politique de mise en valeur coloniale n'est pas favorable à la constitution d'une entité nationale sénégalaise.

Youssouf mbargane Guissé considère que «le Sénégal n'est pas une nation parce que les Sénégalais auraient un commun vouloir de vie commune». Pour lui la question nationale n'est pas sénégalaise. Elle est sénégambienne: «La question nationale doit intégrer au niveau scientifique et politique la dimension essentielle de l'espace régional» (Guissé 1986:33). Le système colonial a fractionné et émietté l'espace historique commun de

vie et de civilisation des peuples sénégambiens en «micro-Etats», «micro-sociétés» et micro-nations».

L'organisation de l'espace territorial obéit aux exigences de la mise en valeur coloniale du Sénégal qui est le premier territoire a être fortement intégré dans l'espace impérial français. Jusqu'à la fin de la moitié du XIXe siècle, la traite de la gomme et des esclaves était l'activité principale du pays. Cela donnait de l'importance aux escales du fleuve Sénégal et à la ville de Saint-Louis, capitale de l'AOF, du Sénégal et de la Mauritanie.

A partir de la 2e moitié du XIXe siècle les activités économiques centrales se déplacent dans le bassin arachidier. Le développement de la culture de l'arachide a provoqué des mouvements migratoires importants dans le bassin arachidier: venue de navétanes du Soudan français, de la Haute Volta, du Fouta Djallon, conquête des zones pionnières de culture d'arachide par des cultivateurs wolof au détriment des pasteurs peulh. Ce qui donne une expression ethnique aux conflits entre pasteurs peulh et cultivateurs wolof (Pélissier 1966). L'administration coloniale n'est pas demeurée neutre dans ces conflits. Elle a favorisé le développement de la culture de l'arachide dans la zone sylvopastorale au détriment des activités pastorales.

Dans le cadre du type de mise en valeur coloniale, l'administration coloniale a encouragé la culture de l'arachide dans la région de Kaolack devenue la première zone productrice de la graine oléagineuse après la deuxième guerre mondiale. Elle a été jusqu'à concevoir une culture mécanisée de l'arachide dans la moyenne Casamance avec la création de CGOT. Elle a incité les paysans sérère du Sine en quête de terre à émigrer dans les Terres Neuves au Sénégal Oriental.

Ces mouvements de population ne manquent pas de poser de problèmes de coexistence entre différentes ethnies au Sénégal. C'est une question qui mérite d'être étudiée dans le cadre de la nature des relations entre ethnies et formation de la nation.

Avec le déclin de la culture de l'arachide, l'émigration des cultivateurs de Bassin arachidier vers les régions périphériques comme le Fleuve Sénégal et la Casamance pose des problèmes de coexistence entre différentes ethnies du Sénégal.

La concentration des investissements dans les grandes villes et dans le bassin arachidier a introduit des éléments de déséquilibre régionaux qui ne favorisent pas le processus d'intégration nationale. L'établissement de la capitale dans des villes situées sur la côte, sur des îles (Saint-Louis) et sur des péninsules (Dakar) qui ont eu des vocations de villes-relais entre la France et le Sénégal n'est pas de nature à favoriser la formation d'une nation dans le pays. La capitale du Sénégal doit être déplacée à l'intérieur du pays pour qu'elle ait une position centrale favorable à un processus d'intégration des différentes régions du Sénégal.

Ainsi les voies de communication seront conçues pour favoriser le développement et l'approfondissement d'un marché intérieur sur lequel les autorités du pays auront une grande emprise.

Ce processus pourra favoriser la réalisation d'une nation sénégambienne qui est un élément fondamental pour l'accomplissement de l'intégration régionale ouest africaine des pays qui déplaceront leurs capitales à l'intérieur.

Si le mode d'occupation de l'espace territorial est un élément important, il en est de même de la langue.

La langue

Par nationalisme sans nation, beaucoup d'Africains parlent de langues nationales sans se poser la question de la pertinence scientifique de l'utilisation de terme comme langues nationales. Parler de langue nationale ou de langues nationales c'est supposer l'existence d'une nation ou de nations au Sénégal. Si on suit en toute logique le gouvernement du Sénégal dans sa décision de ne retenir que six langues nationales, cela suppose l'existence de six nations, alors que dans les discours officiels et dans ceux de l'opposition, on parle de la nation sénégalaise. Cela est une contradiction qui doit faire réfléchir.

Au Sénégal, le wolof est la langue qui est utilisée comme instrument de communication. Ce processus de wolofisation s'explique par certains facteurs historiques, géographiques, économiques, sociaux, culturels et religieux. De manière fondamentale, c'est le type de mise en valeur coloniale du Sénégal qui a été à l'origine du processus d'expansion de la langue wolof.

L'expansion de la langue wolof ne peut pas se comprendre si l'on ne remonte pas à la fondation de Saint-Louis en 1659. Au départ trois langues étaient en concurrence dans l'île. Le bambara était parlé par «des captifs soudanais, fort prisés sur les marchés d'Amérique constituant la moitié de la population de la ville à la fin du XVIIIe siècle». Le Pular était pratiqué à Saint-Louis. Mais le Wolof a réussi a triompher de ces deux langues africaines pour plusieurs raisons. D'abord Saint-Louis est à proximité de régions Wolofophones comme le Walo et le Cayor. Ensuite l'adoption de la langue wolof comme la langue de communication dans la ville de Saint-Louis a amené le premier instituteur français, défenseur de la thèse de l'Egypte nègre, à demander l'introduction de cette langue africaine dans l'enseignement. Cet instituteur bourguignon écrira la première grammaire wolof en 1836 intitulée: *Grammaire wolofe* (imprimerie royale, 213p). Il écrira un dictionnaire français-wolof et un dictionnaire français-bambara.

L'expansion de la langue wolof est étroitement associée à l'extension de la culture et de la commercialisation de l'arachide, comme le note Makhtar

149

Diouf (1994:66): «Le Bassin arachidier est constitué par les zones où l'on retrouve les plus fortes concentration de populations wolofs»

L'existence des villes escales de l'intérieur et de la capitale du pays a favorisé l'expansion de la langue wolof. Par ailleurs l'essor du mouvement mouride par la colonisation des terres sérères du Centre et de l'Est du Baol habituellement occupés par des sérères animistes et des peulhs.

L'islamisation et la wolofisation sont allées de pair. C'est pourquoi Mamadou Diouf (1992) parle de l'existence du modèle islamo-wolof au Sénégal. Les marabouts d'origine maure, pular, soninke et bambara ont été obligés d'utiliser la langue wolof pour islamiser les populations sénégalaises.

La langue wolof est largement utilisée dans les campagnes électorales et dans les cérémonies religieuses (mosquées et Eglise).

A partir de l'expansion rapide du wolof, certains patriotes sénégalais demandent l'instauration de langue wolof comme unique langue nationale du Sénégal. Ce courant de pensée est très fort dans le pays. Il s'appuie sur un argument purement arithmétique. La langue wolof, parlée par la majorité des sénégalais, doit être imposée comme langue officielle à la place du français. C'est ignorer les susceptibilités des autres ethnies.

Sémou Pathé Guèye a invité certains secteurs de ces forces patriotiques à ne pas commettre l'erreur d'imposer le wolof aux autres ethnies sous le prétexte que cette langue s'est acquise une place historique de langue commune d'échanges et de communication au niveau des couches populaires et à l'échelon du pays. (*Gestù* no.7, août-septembre 1982 p.6). Cette décision ignorerait l'avis des autres ethnies et serait considérée par celles-ci comme une nouvelle oppression. C'est pourquoi Sémou Pathé Guèye s'en tient au principe léniniste de l'égalité des langues. Faut-il partir de l'"avance historique» du wolof pour le considérer comme «langue unique» officielle ou au contraire promouvoir toutes les langues nationales au statut de langues officielles à tous les niveaux et laisser ainsi jouer les «nécessités économiques» dont parlait Lénine pour la détermination de la langue qui finira par s'imposer comme langue commune? Telle est l'interrogation de Sémou Pathé Guèye. Les questions délicates dont la solution heureuse ou malheureuse ne saurait manquer d'avoir des conséquences extrêmement importantes pour la préservation de l'unité du pays. Ce ne sont pas des problèmes scientifiques ou techniques que «des experts en linguistique» pourraient se permettre de trancher à coups de thèses et d'articles par dessus la tête des ethnies et des hommes concernés.

La langue wolof s'est répandue dans la capitale de la Gambie, Banjul. Ainsi elle exerce une fonction unificatrice dans l'espace sénégambien, comme le note Makhtar Diouf (1994:71):

C'est le Président Gambien Daouda Diawara qui déclare que le Wolof a fait de sa capitale Banjul une zone de dé-ethnicisation (*de-tribalising area*). Et pourtant, à la différence du Sénégal les Wolofs en Gambie ne

constituent que le troisième groupe ethnique soit 15,7% de la population, derrière les Peul (18,22%) et les Manding (42,3%).

Ce phénomène constaté en Gambie mérite d'être expliqué d'une manière approfondie.

En conclusion, on peut dire que, si la langue wolof est devenue une langue de la communication ou une *lingua franca* en Sénégambie, elle n'est pas encore une langue nationale officielle au sens où on l'entend dans les pays de capitalisme central.

L'unité culturelle et psychique

Le thème de l'unité culturelle en Afrique a une connotation idéologique très forte. Il a été développé par des nationalistes africains soucieux de répondre à la thèse des partisans du système national suivant laquelle l'Afrique est culturellement, linguistiquement et ethniquement divisée.

L'Afrique qui compte plusieurs ethnies et langues est-elle culturellement unie? C'est une grande question. Que faut-il entendre par culture? La culture est-elle identique même dans une même ethnie ou dans une même aire géographique?

Le Sénégal est-il uni culturellement? Les autorités coloniales qui ont organisé l'espace géographique sénégalaise l'ont-elles fait sur la base de l'unité culturelle ou non? De quel Sénégal s'agit-il? Du Sénégal précolonial, colonial ou postcolonial? En tout état de cause, le Sénégal précolonial n'existait pas? On peut tout juste parler du Sénégal, ex-territoire colonial ou postcolonial?

Avec l'intervention coloniale, il y a des clivages religieux, linguistiques et même biologiques qui ont engendré des processus de diversification dans les cultures du Sénégal. On peut le noter avec la pénétration de l'Islam, du christianisme, du droit français, etc. La différence des zones écologiques (savane et forêt) a eu des influences dans la culture des populations qui habitent ces zones.

Il y a des sociétés fortement hiérarchisées qui connaissent le phénomène des castes comme les Wolof, Pular, Soninké, Serere, Manding. Par contre les Diola, le Tenda ne connaissent pas le système des castes.

En réalité l'unité est faite de diversités. Les phénomènes culturels changent avec le temps; on ne peut pas en avoir une approche figée. Les emprunts culturels sont des faits qui existent. Si la culture commune est un élément qui peut favoriser l'émergence d'une nation, l'histoire commune est un facteur fondamental.

L'histoire

L'histoire est souvent instrumentalisée pour forger une conscience nationale. C'est pourquoi son utilisation obéit plus à des considérations idéologiques qu'à des exigences scientifiques.

Peut-on parler d'une histoire commune du Sénégal dans un passé précolonial? Il y avait des histoires de royaumes ou d'Etat qui n'excluait pas des guerres. La colonisation est elle un fait historique suffisant pour forger une conscience nationale sénégalaise? Est-une question qui mérite d'être élucidée.

C'est pourquoi le choix de héros nationaux au Sénégal appelle des contestations suivant les ethnies et même à l'intérieur d'une ethnie comme les wolof (Lat Dior, Alboury Ndiaye, etc.).

L'espace historique favorable à la formation d'une nation n'est-il pas sénégambien? Telle est la question qui est posée en filigrane chez des historiens comme Boubacar Barry et Lucie Colvin.

Notre propos n'était pas de résoudre la question nationale en rapport avec les ethnies du Sénégal. Cela exige qu'un livre lui soit entièrement consacré. Nous voulions soulever des questions qui nous paraissent fondamentales pour susciter des discussions. C'est pourquoi la troisième partie de cette communication consacrée aux relations entre la question nationale et le problème Casamançais fera l'objet d'un document spécial. Néanmoins, nous aborderons avant de terminer la thèse de Léopold Sédar Senghor sur les rapports entre nation et Etat.

D'ordinaire, l'évolution sociale et économique de l'Afrique, la salarialisation, la prolétarisation, l'émergence éventuelle de bourgeoisies «nationales», tout cela devrait aller dans le sens de la diminution des phénomènes «tribaux» ou «ethniques». Mais on peut constater que le phénomène ethnique n'a pas manifesté la moindre diminution d'intensité. L'Etat n'est pas créateur de nation comme l'affirme Senghor: «En Afrique, l'Etat a précédé la nation.» C'est une erreur. Car la réalité est inverse: dans les pays sans nation, le nationalisme — c'est-à-dire le projet de construire une nation et non l'expression politique d'une nation préexistante — est nécessairement élitaire; car la seule couche sociale apte à le porter est celle, produite par le colonialisme, qui gravite autour de l'Etat et de l'économie moderne. La proclamation du projet de construire une nation est non seulement un axiome. On n'entrevoit pas la possibilité de créer un Etat sans nation — mais va impliquer des politiques antipopulaires d'injection de la nation» à des communautés ethniques qui ne ressentent guère un tel sentiment; alphabétisation en français, anglais ou portugais, limites territoriales administratives sans rapport avec les segments ethniques, politiques des prix favorables à la population urbaine au détriment de la production vivrière paysanne, négation ethnique officielle plus ou moins

prononcée (qui n'empêche nullement des pratiques ethnoclientélistes), etc. Cette critique pertinente de la thèse de Senghor par Michel Cahen (1994:101) (*Ethnicité politique. Pour une lecture réaliste de l'identité, l'Harmattan*) se termine ainsi:

> en résumé, le nationalisme élitaire passe rapidement de la proclamation du projet de la nation à la proclamation de la nation en elle-même, glissement qui servit maintes et maintes fois à justifier les partis uniques en réalité paravent pour assurer la domination d'un groupe particulier ayant su saisir l'Etat.

Cet Etat nationaliste n'est pas du tout un Etat-nation. Il reste fragile et est nécessairement antidémocratique de par les politiques antipopulaires qu'il se doit impulser. Cela signifie que le nationalisme est dans ces conditions antagonique à la création de l'Etat. Cette réalité est contraire à la nation de Senghor et de Immanuel Wallerstein (Balibar et Wallerstein 1988.)

Michel Cahen, comme Samir Amin, a bien compris l'importance de la dimension sociale de la formation de la nation. C'est une classe, un groupe social ou en ensemble de classes ou groupes sociaux qui peuvent avoir intérêt à la formation d'une nation. C'est un point fondamental.

Conclusion

Les hommes politiques et intellectuels n'abordent pas frontalement et systématiquement, à l'exception de Makhtar Diouf, le problème ethnique, parce que le système colonial n'a eu besoin d'opposer les ethnies que pour se maintenir au Sénégal. Ils sont jacobinistes et centralisateurs, et par là même incapables de générer la diversité qui existe dans la société (ethnies, appartenance religieuse, régions, castes, etc.). Ils examinent la question nationale dans sa dimension externe et non interne à la suite de la nécessité de réaliser l'indépendance nationale au détriment de la domination et de l'exportation impérialistes qui a engendré la naissance d'un nationalisme sans nation.

Partisans de l'existence d'un Etat-nation, ils fétichisent, sacralisent la nation à tel point que les leaders historiques se présentent comme les «Pères de la nation» et veulent construire la nation grâce à l'Etat et à la constitution d'un parti «dominant» ou «unifié» qui est en réalité un véritable parti unique.

Le projet de construire la nation est considéré comme déjà réalisé. Les partis au pouvoir et d'opposition partagent la même problématique et anticipent sur la réalité pour proclamer l'existence d'une nation sénégalaise. En réalité la nation ne peut être qu'en formation.

La nécessité s'impose à l'heure actuelle de discuter systématiquement et de manière approfondie de la question nationale à la lumière des riches expériences acquises ces dernières années dans les différents continents et de

l'énorme littérature qui a été consacrée à la question nationale et ethnique développée par des chercheurs marxistes et non marxistes.

Le débat sur la question nationale au Sénégal mené frontalement et systématiquement et sans passion pourrait permettre d'esquisser des solutions au problème casamançais

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Book Reviews

Chelewa, Chelewa
The Dilemma of Teenage Girls

The book is basically about the problems of young women in Tanzania who, owing to a variety of factors experience different problems attendant with early motherhood. The research under which this work was produced was carried out by women in different sub-disciplines of the social sciences.

The book began with the examination of the realities of the situation of the typical teenage girl in Tanzania. It analysed the *demographic* situation of teenage Tanzania girls between 1978 and 1988. The conclusion is that there has been a change in this direction because of the increase in the ratio of teenage girls compared with the rest of the population. Next it considered the evolution of population policy in Tanzania and pointed out that there has been a change from hypersensitivity and eventual hostility to a more detailed attempt to formulate an explicit population policy after the middle of the 1980s.

Moreover, the first chapter looks at the various stereotypes of the teenage girl which have resulted in what is described as 'the pathologization of the teenage girl'. The authors suggest that this method of stereotyping should be changed. They argued in this direction that various other options such as the evaluation of the population problem and 'men's uncontrolled desire' should now replace the old image of teenage girls as ignorant, deprived, depraved and exploited.

Chapter 2 takes a look at the present and past situations of pubescent girls, and discussed the customary modes of contracting marriage relationships in certain rural areas of Tanzania. This analysis shows that the average pubescent girl is given out to marriage to satisfy the aims of other people — parents, aunties and society in general. The girl who is about to become a woman is not seriously considered in marriage transactions. Her hopes and aspirations are subordinated and she has little or nothing to contribute while contracting this relationship which is bound to change her life completely. Chapter 2 ends with the challenging remark by the authors that they meant to make the teenage girls' voice heard. They also wanted to overturn the usually sympathetic, slanderous or condemnatory perception of the pubescent girl.

Chapter 3 delves into the education of girls in Tanzania and the implications of pregnancy in this direction. The chapter analyses the enrolment of girls in higher and tertiary institutions and concluded that the percentage of girls enrolled in these institutions is small compared with that of boys. It goes on to discuss the choice of subjects among those girls and their performance at school. It is stated that the performance of girls in some selected schools has declined from 14 percent in 1985 to about 10 percent in 1987 and then to about 7 percent in 1989. Specific reasons for this are not given.

It was also asserted that girls tend to prefer language subjects and most of them tend to shun technical subjects because they don't like them. Another point of focus is the impact of pregnancies on secondary school girls, parents, teachers, administrators and the students themselves who have different understandings and interpretations of the situation. However, it is obvious from the study that school-girl pregnancy has negative consequences not only for the girls and their children but also for the community. For example the girls can no longer further their education and with this goes the possibility of securing good-paying jobs. The parents lose all the money they have invested in the girls education and since the girls are usually expelled from school when they become pregnant, the resources the state had devoted to the training of the young girls is wasted.

The chapter concludes on a sobering note, and states that once the girls are pregnant they are somewhat ostracised and receive little or no support from fathers, husbands, religious leaders and the community. The community is indicted because it seems not interested in protecting the youth from the dangers of adolescent life. Instead, the authors argue, the community is prepared to risk the sexual and reproductive health of the youth in order to uphold traditional norms and morality.

Chapter 4 examines the phenomenon of arranged marriages in Tanzania and Zanzibar regions. In some areas, it is noted that parents arrange marriages for their daughters in order to fulfil religious obligations. In other areas the prevalence of arranged marriages is low as compared with what happened in the past. In the Wakurya society, for example, arranged marriages figure mostly on the basis of tribal culture. In the conclusion, the author suggests that socio-economic pressure is bound to have repercussions on both marriage and on the division of family assets in cases of divorce. Additionally it is further suggested that improvements should be made to the Wakurya customary laws by removing those that are oppressive to women.

The fifth chapter is devoted mainly to various initiation rites prevalent in certain societies in Tanzania. The structure and modes of these initiation ceremonies are thoroughly discussed. The symbolic details of their meanings are also explained. This chapter is very interesting in certain respects. First, it shows that some communities in Africa have well-organised and

institutionalised ways of launching a female from girlhood to womanhood. Secondly, these initiation rites constitute a link between puberty and marriage. It also clearly demarcates the roles of women within the family set-up. However, it is clear that modernisation had taken these instructions on sexuality out of their social and cultural contexts. Previously, for instance, these rites were organised at the community level. These days they are becoming increasingly individual and private. In addition to this, the modern approach is biomedical and gives less emphasis to the socio-cultural implications of sexuality and fertility. The authors state that in the past initiation rites were aimed at safeguarding the moral and reproductive order in the context of given societies. Presently, the community pays lip service to the question of bridging the gap between the situation of their young daughters in the past and what obtains in the present.

Chapter 6 focuses mainly on the matrimonial set up in a community in Tanzania called Mwera. This Mwera is found in the Lodi region. In this community matrilineal set-up is very strong. There is also a discussion of the conflict between the traditional initiation rites and the need to improve girls' opportunities for formal education. In this connection, the authors note that there are statutory policies which are intended to improve the educational opportunities for the girls. However, there are factors which hinder the realisation of the objective of these policies. Here it was noted that where both the demands of education and culture exist simultaneously, one of these forces has to give way to the other. There was also a discussion of the traditional stories told to children about the way children are brought into the world. Most of these stories are false with the result that when girls grow up they engage in sexual activity unprepared and ignorant of its consequences.

There were some questions that were raised at the concluding paragraphs of the chapter. Some of these have to do with the question of how marriage is understood by members of the community. There is also the question of the impact of modernity on the matrilineal set-up of the Mwera. Finally there was the issue of how to modify the customs of the Mwera people in order to protect the girls from becoming victims of AIDS.

Chapter 7 is appropriately titled 'Looking for Men'. It discusses the various ways in which girls come into contact with the opposite sex. From the discussion, it is evident that the opportunity for such contacts is greater in the urban centres than in the rural areas. We are also told of the divergent things which motivate the different young men and women into establishing relationship. For example, girls are sometimes attracted to men because of economic reasons and sometimes out of the sheer attempt to do what others do. For the men, generally, they want to have fun. And some of the married men who indulge in having girl friends do so simply to live up to the phallocentric world-view of the community which is richly reflected in the

symbolic language of ordinary discourse in food utensils, tools for farming and architecture. Sometimes these casual relationships may lead to pregnancy and then to marriage. The authors point out that in sub-Saharan Africa, married couples do not form a unit in the same sense in which this obtains in Europe. There is a sort of alienation, according to the authors, between the husband and the wife in sub-Saharan Africa. It is alleged, quoting Jacobsons-Widdins, that the only thing a man and a woman have in common is the night. In the past, according to them, these boundaries made it possible to have what is termed as dangerous mixing of bodily fluids. They conclude by stating that remnants of this alienation can be traced in contemporary conflicts between men and women.

Chapter 8 begins with the assumption that teenage mothers have their babies before they are fully aware of the implications of their reproductive abilities, rights etc. The basic theme of this chapter is that teenage mothers need more information on their sexual capabilities and reproductive health. The chapter also shows that it is usually the mothers of the young girls who give them information regardless of the implications on their sexuality. Although the authors do not condemn the traditional approaches to reproductive health and sexuality among girls totally, they urge that more scientific knowledge in child birth should be made available to traditional midwives so that they can offer safer services. All these are argued within a wider context of a more holistic approach to child birth so that cultural issues of the community have to be considered in so far as they do not interfere with the child bearing process and the health of the mother and the newly born baby.

Chapter 9 opens up with the study focused on how much or how little young mothers know concerning their sexuality and reproductive health. Knowledge of reproductive health among these mothers is generally taken to be low and some of the young girls express anxiety and fear over the possibility of becoming mothers. The research in this chapter, just as in most other chapters of the work, is based on field work which entailed the questioning of the various segments of the population.

The study argues that teenagers, based on the sample interviewed, do not receive enough information concerning their reproductive health, the piece meal information which they gathered came from their fellow girls, mothers and other close relatives. It is also stated that these teenagers are mainly ignorant of their physiology, family planning methods and the dangerous consequences of frivolous sex. It is however shown that some of the expectant teenagers who are children in their own rights, did not even know that they were pregnant until some months after pregnancy had occurred.

Because of the negative reaction of parents, boy friends and relatives of these young mothers end up being anxious over their future. It is as if the society has abandoned the young mothers to their fate. The next chapter has

to do with the legal and sociological components of teenage motherhood. This chapter is very instructive because it analyses the legal aspects of the situation involving young girls. Sometimes, it is shown that the law appears to be unfair to these young mothers. For instance, with regard to contraception, although there is no law prohibiting girls from contraceptives, the existential facts of the community was bound to interfere with this freedom in practice.

With reference to abortion, there is the curious fact that its illegality has led to a situation whereby so much activity goes on unrecorded and consequently in many cases have led to illegal and unsafe abortion through quacks. It cites the UN convention on all forms of discrimination against women. This convention interprets access to health care as including, among other things, family planning services and information on reproductive health. The conclusion is that the Tanzanian government should be prepared to take appropriate measures to live up to the ideal set up in the aforementioned UN convention.

The book is mainly descriptive with scattered suggestions here and there. It is well written, simple, clear and hence easy to understand and it clarifies some of the ambiguities and obscurities which are generally associated with usual discussions of teenage motherhood. The book also uses field research, the questionnaire method and there are a number of helpful tables and diagrams contained in the text.

One of the problems however is that it advocates a kind of marriage between traditional customs and modern methods, especially with reference to the sexuality and reproductive health of young teenagers. There is no specific statement on how this unholy marriage is to be effected. Furthermore, the book seems to absolve these young mothers from any blames — it is either the parents, the boyfriends, the community even the governmental agencies that are held to be blameable (p.31). But what about the young girls themselves? Is it not possible that many of these young girls made responsible choices contrary to advice, exhortation and other attempts to make them live more reasonable lives? This is probably an attempt to look at the other side of the coin without an attempt to analyse the sharing of responsibility. Teenage girls, we are told, in the first chapter, have hardly been considered as a specific group for the purposes of analysis (p.15) as a target and not as an actor in her own right... speaking for her and not giving her chance to raise her own voice. Now that teenage girls speak for themselves, it is natural they will blame others for their predicaments.

It is to the credit of the authors that an attempt was made to combine Western feminists and African scholars writing about African societies. The inherent politics of discussions of culture is therefore greatly watered down. But the notion that men's promiscuity can be explained as the result of African phallocentric world-view (op.161) suggests some remnants of

Eurocentric tendencies. Male promiscuity in the West is neither less serious nor rampant even though men's phallocentricy is sometimes assumed to be absent in their non-symbolic languages. All in all, the attempt shows that anthropological studies of African societies need to stress more the way Africans see themselves and perhaps less of how the West sees them.

Sophie B. Oluwole

Thomas R. Black. *Evaluating Social Science Research: An Introduction,* London, SAGE Publications, 1993, p.183.

Most social science books seem to give a lot of attention to the nature of social science research and how to undertake them. Black in his book *Evaluating Social Science Research: An Introduction* addresses the question of evaluating social science research reports. Reading the book one recognises, and indeed appreciates that it is not enough to know how to design and carry out social science research. One needs to know how to read critically and evaluate research reports, conference papers and journal articles. This theme is the core of the book.

The concept of critical reading of works is not as developed in the social sciences as it is in art (Literature and fine art for instance). Literature has people specially trained (critics) to subject literary works to critical evaluation. Along these lines Black's book can be viewed as a guide for social science 'critics' in that it aims to enhance readers' understanding of research works and their ability to discover strengths and weaknesses embedded in the works. With the academic community engulfed in publish or perish syndrome, critical evaluation is necessary to separate the wheat from the chaff'. Black lays down this mission thus:

> the consumer of reports should learn to be critical without being
> hypercritical and pedantic, able to ascertain the important aspects, ignore
> the trivia and, to certain extent, read between the lines by making
> appropriate inferences. The ability to identify true omissions and covert
> commissions of errors is a valuable skill (1993:4).

Black outlines the major issues in evaluating social science research in the following questions:

1. Are the questions and hypotheses advanced appropriate and testable?
2. Is the research design sufficient for the hypothesis?
3. Are the data gathered valid, reliable and objective?
4. Are the statistical techniques used to analyse the data appropriate and do they support the conclusions reached?

The themes underlying these questions run through the whole book.

The book is organised into eight chapters. It begins with an overview of evaluating social science research. Chapter two discusses how to evaluate research questions and hypotheses highlighting the importance of sound research questions and good hypotheses. In chapter three Black considers the evaluation of representativeness which is an important springboard for generalisation. In this regard, he poses the question for 'what group will the conclusions be justifiably relevant'? Black considers data quality in chapter four. This is examined in two ways; first, how one judges the range and

relevance of variables for which data are collected and second, the quality of the actual measuring instruments used to collect the data. Chapter five deals with descriptive statistics showing how one can critically read frequency data, charts and graphs used in research reports and determine whether they are used correctly or not. Chapter six and seven discuss evaluation of statistical inferences involving correlational and experimental designs. In the last chapter evaluating conclusions is discussed.

In the book well framed research questions (specific and clear) are viewed as guides to the research effort. Black observes that:

> if the original question or hypothesis is weakly stated, then it is much easier to ignore evidence that contradicts the research team's, and there is a danger that they will find what they want to find (1993:26).

With regard to representativeness Black poses a pertinent question: Are samples typical such that they can appropriately represent the population? Since it is not always feasible to obtain data from whole population the researcher 'must depend on the vigour of sampling process to justify representativeness of the sample' (p.44). The way samples are drawn is therefore critical for representativeness.

Black presents criteria for evaluating variable significance, validity, reliability and objectivity of data. He contends that the type of data collected will eventually determine the kind of descriptive and inferential statistics suitable to them.

Graphs and charts can be deceptive. Black illustratively shows that too few or too many class intervals will produce deceptive graphs and charts. He, for instance, observes that presenting a graph where the 'vertical frequency axis does not start at zero is an approach commonly used to exaggerate differences' (1993:98).

The author also points out that statistical tests do not necessarily suggest relationship, statistical tests only tell whether the result could have occurred by chance or not. This is an important caution in the interpretation of statistical tests as is inexperienced researchers often tend to read into statistical tests cause-effect relationship. He illustrates this point thus: *there is a high correlation between age and height for a range of ages of children, but neither one causes the other* (1990:130).

The importance of choosing the appropriate statistical test is emphasised:

> choosing an appropriate test is often a matter of matching the tests to the type of data and, for parametric tests, making sure that all the assumptions have been met. There is the danger of degradation of data by using 'lower' tests by considering intervals as rank ordered data and using non parametrics. This can increase the risk of making a type II error, not finding significance where it is really there (1993:160).

On evaluating conclusions of research reports, two aspects seem to feature prominently in the book. First, conclusions being drawn on relevant data and second, justification for the conclusions. The argument of the author is that 'the main criticism is usually not whether the conclusion is right or wrong, but the strength of the support provided, which includes how well the researcher has justified the conclusions' (1993:11). This conviction probably stems from the acknowledgement in the book of a common weakness in research reports — inappropriate conclusions for data or even no conclusions drawn, only description of data and process.

One may, however, find Black's strategy in the 'overview' of beginning with the last 'action' (stage) i.e. data analysis and conclusions and, proceeding backwards to the statement of the overall question as an impediment to the understanding of evaluation holistically. some readers would probably find it more fruitful if the presentation in the 'overview' as well builds up climaxing in the 'action' of data analysis and drawing conclusions.

Evaluation of tables could be considered a serious omission in the book under review. Most research works utilise various types of tables and thus skills in evaluating them are critical.

It is also important to note that although in the preface Black indicates that his work disregards the normative/non-normative distinction his presentation in the text exhibits strong quantitative orientation. This is reflected in the emphasis on hypotheses, quantification of measurement and statistics. Thus one gets the impression that a title like 'Evaluating Quantitative Social Science Research: An Introduction' would be more specific.

The disregard of the normative/non-normative distinction suggests that Black assumes that in evaluating quantitative and qualitative social science research there is little difference. A closer look at research reports written in either tradition, however, suggests otherwise.

Nonetheless several strengths stand out in the book. First, the subject matter — evaluation of social sciences research, which has had little attention in the social sciences. Second, simple presentation, well illustrated with relevant tables, graphs and examples which make it readable. Third, boxed activities that guide the reader through practical evaluation of phenomena relevant to specific stage or aspect of research process and reports. Fourth, at the end of each chapter Black provides (for photocopy) condensed profile sheet for evaluating specific aspects of research reports. For example, a profile sheet for evaluating research questions and hypotheses.

The book is written for social scientists and educationists. Postgraduate students, university teachers as well as journal and book editors will find it useful. As the book does not assume prior statistical knowledge, it will assist readers with little statistical background or training develop a critical eye in reading statistics-based research reports.

Kibet A. Ng'etich

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> It is interesting to note that... the word for "tribe" does not exist in indigenous languages of South Africa (Mafeje 1971:254).

N.B.: It is essential that the bibliography lists every work cited by you in the text.

An abstract of 150 to 200 words stating the main research problem, major findings and conclusions should be sent with the articles for translation into English or French. Articles that do not follow this format will have their processing delayed.

Authors should indicate their full name, address, their academic status and their current institutional affiliation. This should appear on a separate covering page since manuscripts will be sent out anonymously to outside readers. Manuscripts will not be returned to the authors.

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> Il est intéressant de noter que... le mot pour «tribu» n'existe pas dans les langues indigènes d'Afrique du Sud (Mafeje 1971:254).

N.B.: La bibliographie doit répertorier tous les travaux cités dans le corps du texte par l'auteur.

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Contents / Sommaire

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