

# **AFRIQUE ET DEVELOPPEMENT AFRICA DEVELOPMENT**

Vol. XVIII, No. 4, 1993

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# **AFRICA DEVELOPMENT AFRIQUE & DEVELOPPEMENT**

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
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# The Development and Utilization of Science and Technology in Productive Sectors: Case of Developing Africa

J K Thisen\*<sup>1</sup>

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**Résumé:** *Le développement socio-économique est étroitement lié à l'exploitation et la transformation par la société du système naturel par la société. La science et la technologie sont des instruments puissants dans l'utilisation de la nature et la promotion du développement. A ce titre, elles constituent une dimension incontournable du processus de développement. Cependant en Afrique même si l'importance de la science et de la technologie est unanimement reconnue, elle n'est pas traduite dans les actes. La science et la technologie demeurent un domaine réservé aux intellectuels et font rarement l'objet d'une prise en compte véritable ou d'une allocation de ressources suffisantes. Les obstacles à la promotion de la science et de la technologie doivent être recherchés dans les rapports fonctionnels entre les institutions (gouvernements ou secteurs privés) l'infrastructure scientifique et technologique et les secteurs productifs. Les pays en développement devraient accorder une plus grande attention à la manière dont les résultats de la recherche scientifique sont utilisés dans les secteurs productifs pour satisfaire les besoins fondamentaux de la population au lieu de faire de la recherche pour des raisons purement théoriques et académiques.*

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## Introduction

Socioeconomic development depends on the transformation and exploitation of the natural surroundings by society. One of the most powerful instruments for the utilization of nature and for fostering development is science and technology (S&T). Nowadays, the major global issues which are at the interface of social and natural systems are characterized by a strong scientific and technological dimension. Science and technology are not only fascinating to engineers and academicians, but government policy-makers and private entrepreneurs have also fallen under the spell of the new scientific and technological developments. However, while there was a professed realization of the importance to develop both science and technology and

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<sup>1</sup> This is a revised version of the paper presented for the Thirty Third International Atlantic Economic Conference in French Riviera, April 4-10, 1992. The views expressed herein are those of the author.

environmental protection in various developing countries, that realization was seldom translated into action. Both issues were abundantly intellectualized but scarcely, if ever, internalized or matched by adequate allocation of resources to this area in the past decade. The few developing countries that have invested in endogenous capacity building in science and technology have succeeded in improving the living conditions of their peoples, particularly in East Asia, but such success stories are few in other developing countries, particularly in Africa.

The application of science and technology to development in developing countries in general and in Africa in particular, is often seen as one of several alternatives, weighted in terms of labour and capital intensity, available to produce a given product in a more efficient and economic way. It was never recognized as an all-embracing process that affects people's cultural traits and attitudes as well as public institutions and the natural environment. These links that make humans and nature more responsive to sustainable development were marginalized for the following reasons:

- a) Science and technology have been construed as high level scientific research and manpower training, while the application of available, off-the-shelf, science and technology has been ignored. This has greatly affected the funding of science and technology;
- b) There has been little effort to apply research results and findings to local development, and no mechanism has been created for the commercialization of research results;
- c) The private sector, the stake-holders like the bankers, entrepreneurs, consumers, etc. have not been involved in the drawing up of a science and technology programme in their activities; like do many private enterprises in developed countries which devoted much funds in research and development (R&D);
- d) Scientific and technological research and development priorities are not always in line with the country's priority needs. Much attention was devoted to other inputs (labour and capital);
- e) Scientific and technical education at primary, secondary and tertiary levels were not in tune with the requirements of modern S&T development, and a scientific culture was not present;
- f) Incentives to scientific and technological personnel, and to developers, users, and entrepreneurs, who can commercialize technology products, were generally missing.

As a result, one of the most striking features of underdevelopment in those countries has been and remains their technological backwardness. A large population in developing countries continues to depend on technologies that are incapable of generating levels of income to meet even the most

elemental basic needs. These technologies often are also inadequate to transform, without destroying, the natural environment. Since technical changes have been credited in economic theory with being one of the major factors in economic growth, the economic development of developing countries depends, to a large extent, on both the individual and collective ability of these countries to introduce technical changes as an on-going process, as there is a consensus to the direct relationship between science and technology and the socioeconomic development, which in turn is the result of a confluence of many factors: scientific and technical knowledge, management, institutions and proper economic, social and cultural environment, etc.

This paper analyses the functional interrelationship among three social sub-systems that can promote the development and utilization of science and technology with particular reference to developing Africa: (a) the institutional sectors (government and private sectors) which synthesize the goals of society and have the responsibility to establish priorities and to allocate resources to achieve those goals; (b) the scientific and technological infrastructure made up of research institutions, the scientific community, the educational system and institutions created for extension purposes and for the diffusion of science and technology among the populace; financial mechanisms and allocation of resources for research and development and the diffusion of science and technology are part of this process; and, (c) the *productive sector* which is in fact the most important user of the products of science and technology. Section V will appraise the policy implications and brief concluding remarks are given in Section VI.

### **The Institutional Framework of Science and Technology**

In the past three decades, a number of countries have created public and private machineries for the promotion and utilization of science and technology in development. This involved above all the establishment of national institutions for science and technology policy whose names varied from country to country but which nevertheless had the same core functions; namely: (i) to determine priorities for scientific and technological activities and to formulate national policies for attaining suitable objectives within those priorities; (ii) to promote and co-ordinate scientific and technological research in and among relevant private institutions by providing funding and other supportive services; (iii) to identify the technological needs of local (rural) economic activities and assist in the development or procurement of technologies suited to those needs; and, iv) monitor national policies and evaluate their effects on the growth of science and technology.

However, in the African context, it is the government rather than the private sector that had the responsibility to catalyze the development of science and technology (S&T) and promote and facilitate their application in accordance with the objectives of development. Most of the countries in the

African region have created policy-making bodies for science and technology designed to perform the above functions. The functions of the private sector have not always been supported by adequate funding in view of the cross-sectorial nature of science and technology, the involvement of many ministries dealing with sectorial research and training rather than on application of S&T for development. Recent studies conducted by Atul Wad and Radnor and by UNESCO indicate that by the end of 1986 nearly twenty-eight countries in Africa had some form of multi-sector body for coordinating scientific research and for policy formulation (Atul Wad and Rander, 1983; UNESCO 1986a; UNESCO 1984). An Analysis of the institutional framework for science and technology policy-making shows wide divergences among African countries. In some countries, governmental structures for science and technology policy are still at the early stages of formation while others have come a long way in this respect by establishing governmental science and technology policy-making organs. Countries like Algeria, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia, etc. had science and technology policy making bodies; while Benin, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Niger, Togo, needed to strengthen the inter-ministerial mandate of science and technology before they can become truly operational. Countries that lack S&T policy-making bodies but are able to conduct their researches in specialized institutions include Angola, Botswana, Cape Verde, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, etc.

Table I shows the trends in the latest available formation of science and technology policy-making bodies in Africa during the period 1973-1986. Considering different sectors like agriculture, medicine, industry, environment, etc. the overall number of policy-making organs increased from 69 in 1973 to 197 in 1986, meaning that, in 13 years, 128 new policy organs were established. Accordingly, the number of ministries responsible for natural science and technology policies increased from 5 in 1973 to 27 in 1986. However, only few were actually ministries of science and technology. The portfolio for S&T has changed hands rapidly in a few countries like Kenya, Tanzania, Senegal, etc. This is principally due to the multi-sectorial nature of science and technology where many ministries have activities in S&T and do not have to be controlled by one particular ministry. Tanzania, for example, has moved from a National Scientific Research Council under the Ministry of Economic Affairs to a National Commission for Science and Technology chaired by the President.

**Table 1: The Formation of Science and Technology Policy-Making Bodies  
(1973-1986)**

	1973	1979	1986	New bodies created in the 1973-1986 period
<b>- Ministry of Science or Ministerial</b>				
Science Policy Council	5	9	27	+ 22*
- Science Planning Body in general	12	18	20	+ 8
- Multisector Body for Coordinating Scientific Research	18	24	28	+ 10
- Natural Science Research	2	16	23	+ 22*
- Agricultural Research	15	30	32	+ 17*
- Medical Research	6	20	21	+ 15*
- Nuclear Research	3	3	4	+ 1*
- Industrial Research	7	22	25	+ 18*
- Environmental Research	1	14	15	+ 14*
Total	69	157	197	+ 128

Source: Compiled from Wad and Adnor 1983, UNESCO 1984, UNESCO 1986

\* Indicates bodies with rapid increase.

Though Table 1 shows a positive trend in the growth of science and technology policy-making bodies, it does not in anyway bring out the effectiveness of these bodies which have been biased towards research, and have given little attention to the application of S&T.

Thus, in the African context, it is the public sector that plays the lead role in endogenous capacity building for materials technology, for the private sector is usually weak, and has only recently started playing any significant role. Institution building requires heavy investments which the private sector cannot afford in the beginning. It is up to the public sector to finance such institutions like University departments or centres for training and research in materials science and technology; specialized laboratories for testing of materials like building materials, cement, rice-husk, jute, polymers, glasses, ceramics and metals; national standards bureaux for establishing standards, quality-control, certification for manufactured products using locally available or imported materials, centres for technology transfer dealing also with technology assessment, patents and industrial property. The public sector also encourages the private sector to join hands in many of these institutions by giving them adequate incentives through various legislation. Most of the incentives are centred around 'risk and cost reduction' for

private sectors undertaking research and development and setting up pilot units for testing products and processes, and finally commercializing them.

The risk and cost reduction incentives are of three types; financial, fiscal and institutional incentives (Kim, 1984). In order to encourage a private industry to undertake research and development in new materials technology, besides helping the firm through *financial incentives* in the form of low-interest lending programmes by national banks, and through commissioning of R&D activities to them, or through *fiscal incentives* in the form of tax deductions, accelerated depreciations and reductions in duties for imported items meant for R&D, the government may attempt to establish a National Research and Development Corporation (NRDC) that enables the public sector and the private sector to take research results from the laboratories to the consumer in the form of marketable products. The National Research and Development Corporation often groups together the researchers, the policy-makers, the private entrepreneurs, the bankers, the market specialists and the consumer representatives around one table and enables them to decide on priorities for development research, and on ways and means to commercialize research results. The main functions of such an institution (Jugessur, 1990) are: (i) decide on projects that need to be financed; (ii) collect and sift research results from different centres, institutes, faculties, research laboratories that have potential for commercialization; (iii) mount pilot projects to verify the results; (iv) make prototypes and test their efficiency; (v) demonstrate these technologies to users and gauge their acceptability; (vi) contact local entrepreneurs and offer them the necessary incentives to mass produce the products; and (vii) promote their commercialization locally and abroad. Such an institution has been instrumental in the overall technological development instrumental in endogenous capacity building for materials technology in Africa.

Another institution that had contributed to the promotion of science and technology in Africa is a Centre for Technological Transfer that is found either in a university or as an institution directly under the Ministry in charge of Science and Technology. This centre has been responsible for all aspects of technology transfer, including technology assessment, technology forecasting, dissemination of relevant information on available technologies, a data base for patents and industrial property, and for facilitating the registration of new patents. In liaison with research and development centres, it has been also a major arm of the National Research and Development Corporation mentioned earlier. The Centre for Technology Transfer deals with many new materials that are coming in the market as a result of development of the frontiers of science and technology. Some of these materials may have a negative impact on the markets of locally produced materials. The Centre keeps tracks or monitors these new developments on the international scene, assesses the nature of these technologies, and

forecasts their impact on local developments. Sometimes, it is possible to use these new technologies to enhance one's own production processes, or final products and the acquisition of these technologies becomes essential for staying in a competitive market. Patents and industrial property offer a mine of valuable information concerning technologies, either in the public domain, or that are time-bound. The acquisition of the relevant information becomes easy when there is a local institution that can gather the necessary data, store them and disseminate them locally. In many African countries, whenever an innovator has come up with new designs, products or processes, he has had difficulty in knowing who to approach for patenting his innovation. The existence of a patent office within the Technology Transfer Centre can be very effective in promoting local talents in the area of technology development, including new materials technologies.

### **The Scientific Infrastructure**

As for the science and technology infrastructure, trends have been identified as affecting several elements, namely (a) the educational system responsible for the production of the human resources needed in terms of quantity and quality; (b) the quality of research and researchers, and the adequacy of research centres located in the universities, government departments and the productive sectors; (c) the co-ordination and planning of science and technology and the administrative and financial tools needed for the implementation and management of science and technology activities; and (d) the extension system that would carry the results of science and technology to those who need it most — the rural people and the marginalized sectors of society like women.

#### ***The Educational System in Africa***

One of the key bottlenecks of S&T development in Africa is the dearth of qualified S&T personnel, the provision of which depends greatly on the performance of the educational system. The situation in Africa in relation to all these elements during the past say five years provides food for thought. To begin with, the educational system in most African countries is hardly oriented to the production of a science and technology linked to the environment or developmental purposes. Apart from a few countries like Botswana, Cameroon, the Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Ghana, Zambia and Swaziland, there is a dearth of adequately qualified manpower in the whole African region for science and technology development and application. Even in these countries, the highly trained manpower in S&T have not had the opportunity to occupy themselves gainfully in the absence of infrastructure for commercialization of Research and Development (R&D), and a strong private sector involved in R&D. This has led to brain-drain and a loss to the countries.

Skilled technicians are lacking, and most African countries suffer from lack of input from qualified people, because their educational system has concentrated either on basic education (French speaking countries) or high level specialized training (English speaking countries), forgetting the middle-level technicians and virtually neglecting the science and technological training so essential for any industrial development. It is recognized that for every engineer trained, there should be at least ten technicians trained. Only then can the engineer do his job properly; otherwise, he will end up as an administrator or manager, and actual engineering and technological development suffers. The informal sector is the major contributor in production of goods and services in most African countries but this sector unfortunately employs mostly unskilled or semi-skilled manpower, craftsmen and technicians. Engineers keep away from them because they feel it is not up to their standard of education. The French speaking African states have stressed more on scientific research and training than on technological research and development. Hence, they have produced scientists of high calibre, who have unfortunately not found the proper outlet for their knowledge, and have often left their countries for better climes. In English speaking African states, however, there are small and medium scale industries which have enabled the trained scientists and technologists to find their feet, though even here there is room for improvement (Eisemon et al, 1982).

#### *At the Secondary School Level*

A question is raised here: should high schools concentrate their training primarily on basic general science education (Franco-european type of educational system) or should they start already specialized training or technology education (Anglo-American type of educational system)? In our view, high school pupils should grasp fundamental principles of science properly (the first category) while at the same time they should be given an opportunity to handle equipment and experience things through practical experimentation (the second category). In other words, there should be a close link between science and technology in the training of high school students. Technology is not necessarily applied science. Science is codified and systematized knowledge which has the power of explaining certain phenomena, and as such it is different from technology and technology is not always a product of science. Advances in science are mainly dependent on the state of the art of technology itself and especially old technology.<sup>2</sup> Thus, although science and technology are structurally independent, there should be a much

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2 For example, the African traditional knowledge and know-how have not been elevated to the rank of science. It has been transmitted through the ages, it is practiced but it is not well and thoroughly organized in a scientific manner.

stronger relationship and interaction between the two in the courses at the high school level. Indeed, material science and technology deal with the science of internal atomic and crystalline structures of materials, and the technology to manipulate these structures in order to produce new materials of different required characteristics. In most cases, the materials developed have improved mechanical, or optical, or chemical or electronic characteristics and performance. Where mechanical properties are the main target, the materials developed are smaller, lighter, stronger, longer-lasting and often recyclable. The manufacturing processes often aim at using less energy and at being environmentally more attractive, and ending up with products that have more knowledge and information content and a greater added value.

In order to bring these concepts to aspiring materials scientists and technologists, it is essential for the high school students to have a proper curriculum in physics, mathematics, chemistry and biology bearing in mind time and space (i.e. universal history and geography). At the same time the science laboratories should be equipped for practical class demonstration. It is here that the basis for higher science and technology studies is established. In developed countries, the school syllabus and laboratories are under constant review, and the teachers are regularly retrained. This is not often the case in Africa. Most of the African school laboratories are stocked with equipment acquired fifteen or twenty years ago and some date from the colonial period. Most of the school laboratory equipment is imported. Due to rising cost, the laboratories are unable to replace old, out dated equipments which are still utilized for class demonstration. The need to manufacture science equipment for schools to meet the demands of the region has been stressed in several fora, but up to now there is not a single manufacturing institution able to satisfy even the national needs. There has been no recurrent budget for replenishing or improving the laboratories, with the result that the students leave the high school with limited scientific knowledge that do not really enable them to understand even basic concepts of science and technology. No amount of money poured in the university laboratories will enable high level manpower to be trained, if their basic science and technology training in high-school is weak. It is towards the improvement of this basic training that national and international efforts must be concentrated so that endogenous capacity building in science and technology in general and in materials technology in particular, becomes effective. As Dr Frank Kwan Codjoe (1990) indicated:

*Science subjects should become compulsory, especially mathematics, physics and chemistry, in all secondary schools up to six form levels. More science teachers should be trained. The standing, esteem and respect of teachers at all levels should be raised and maintained; They*

*should be given better pay and benefits to allow them to do a better job.<sup>3</sup>*

In the light of the above, there needs to be an overhauling of the entire system of science education in the developing regions. Mass manufacture of school science equipment, improvement of laboratories, greater incentives to science teachers, upgrading and updating of the science curricula, closer link of this curriculum with the local environment, etc. are all urgent imperatives in the process of endogenous capacity building. All students of high schools should be given the opportunity to grasp both the basic universal science education and the practical class laboratory demonstration in order to enable them to understand the basic concepts of science and technology, before they further specialize at the university level.

#### *At the University Level*

With new developments in materials technology, university courses in materials science and technology are integrating areas of applied chemistry, geology, mining, metallurgy, civil and electrical engineering. Specialized courses in surface physics, fracture mechanics, polymers, superconductors, etc. are being organized in developed countries. There is need for an interdisciplinary approach to the teaching of these courses. On the engineering side, various raw materials are studied in order to transform them to fulfill specific engineering needs. There are five classes of materials presently under study and development: (i) Civil engineering materials concerned with building and construction, like cement, concrete, bricks, clay, plaster, etc; (ii) Structural materials including metals, polymers, composites and ceramics; (iii) Renewable materials like wood, agricultural by-products, horns, hides, etc.; (iv) Functional materials including semiconductors, optical fibres, solar cells, magnetic and superconducting materials; and, (v) Biomedical materials used in prostheses and repair of human body parts, orthopedics, etc. The courses related to materials science and engineering are linked as shown in Figure 1.


In the African region, most of the research and development work is concentrated around the first three classes, but in the Western or developed countries, new materials are being developed in the last two classes. In fact the greatest work has been in the area of functional materials which are now on the market, except for superconductors. With these considerations in the background, university curricula have to be reoriented so that the people

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3 For instance, the Buisseret's high school programme introduced in the former Congo (now Zaire) in the late 1950s has successfully initiated such an all-embracing teaching method to provide the students with basic universal knowledge, but unfortunately the programme was short-lived.

trained at the tertiary level should be able to contribute to a much greater extent to finding solutions to the issues of raw materials in their region. The present solution, as highlighted above is such that a few research institutions are working on civil engineering, structural and renewable materials. But at the university level the curricula do not reflect these needs, and classical courses are still being taught. Most of the university graduates are in social and human sciences (80 per cent) at the expense of natural sciences, engineering and technology (20 per cent). There is the need to organize degrees, undergraduate and graduate, in materials science and engineering. The problem that arises in Africa is how and where to obtain the lecturers and the laboratory facilities for such courses. While local lecturers can be sent on training to developed university centres abroad, they can be replaced by qualified expatriate lecturers, either on a loan basis or on co-operative exchange agreements. The qualified expatriates can bring with them a wealth of experiences and help in establishing the curricula and laboratories necessary for such courses. The successful experience of Asian countries is worth emulating.

**Figure 1**



One way is to take the project approach in enhancing the endogenous capacity in materials technology, whereby the African university can settle on a well-chosen collaborative project with another university in the developed countries where the laboratory facilities and technical personnel are available. Both universities agree on the objectives of the project that should be beneficial to either party, and on the sharing of research and development results. The raw materials under study are provided by the African counterpart. A complementarity of technical capabilities and facilities is necessary, and in the process of exchange of staff and collaborative research, the developing country can assimilate the science and technology package, acquire the necessary skills, organize its own laboratories that can eventually test the materials produced, and commercialize the products. An interdisciplinary approach is necessary in this venture for, besides dealing with specialized scientific or engineering issues, the process of production and commercialization of the manufactured goods. This approach will require a close collaboration of management and marketing experts, bankers and entrepreneurs, and people from varied disciplines. In fact, the multi-disciplinary approach should be inherent right from the choice of the collaborative project.


#### ***The Quality of Research and Researchers***

The industrial relevance of university courses and research programmes is a primary factor that determines the socioeconomic development of a country. The stress on academic distinction and on high level intellectual pursuits for the sake of universal culture and knowledge has tended to keep the universities in developing countries as ivory towers, often far from the realities of the environment in which they exist.<sup>4</sup> Most of the university funding comes from the governments in power who often view the universities more as institutions where they can place their proteges than as institutions that can contribute to the solutions of socioeconomic problems. The contribution of the private sector to the running of universities has been marginal, for close university-industry collaboration has been minimal. This may explain why many graduates from universities cannot find employment in the industries, for they have had nothing to do with the industries. They depend solely on the governments for employment. In most countries, the saturation of public sector's jobs has brought unemployment among university graduates, even at

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4 The situation exists even in some developed countries in which university teachers and students concentrate on intellectual and academic exercises without being in tune with the realities of their natural environment and research results remain highly theoretical and published in academic journals or reviews which, in general, do not suggest practical solutions to the socioeconomic problems confronting the policy-makers (government and private enterprises) in their daily running of the country.

**Figure II: Materials Science and Engineering Linkages**



the PhD. level, despite the expansion of the public sector witnessed in recent decades in many industrialized countries. Private productive sectors prefer to employ people whom they know, and this is possible through collaborative programmes, and research projects with universities. The practical and industrial training of undergraduates in science and engineering courses can be organized through close universities contact with industry. The universities gain in the process, and endogenous capacity building is facilitated. Such collaboration can even create new industries or branches of industries and therewith new job opportunities as a result of new inventions by the industry-university joint ventures.

Thus, to enhance the quality of technological research and researchers, there must be a close collaboration between the industries and the universities. Industries that require advanced technologies innovation so as to stay in a competitive market, have advantage in contracting research to universities where the facilities exist. It will take a long time for African industries to acquire their own research and development centres. Hence industry-university collaboration is the means for achieving enhanced capacity in the field of industrial and technological development. This collaboration can increase the income of the universities which will then be less dependent on government funding. Indeed, in many Western developed countries, industries have even established a cell or a centre in the university campuses, in what is known as a science and technology park. Industries rent factory units at favourable rates and have ready access to the laboratory facilities and expertise within the campus. This has enabled an enhancement of the ties between the university, industry and local entrepreneurs, more relevant research and development programmes, consultancies for university staff, testing and quality control services to the universities, technical training for students and their eventual placement in the mother industries. There is also an interchange of staff between the industry and the university on short-term assignment, and an increased income for the universities.

Because of the fact that industries are the main consumers of raw and finished materials, such a collaboration between industry and university can go a long way in promoting relevant training of scientists and technologists and in endogenous capacity building in materials technology. The transfer of technologies from abroad, and within the countries, is facilitated by such collaboration, and new enterprise development within the country becomes possible. Materials available locally can be enhanced by adding value to them, and enabling the manufacturing or building sector to use them to advantage. Their export market will also be improved and thereby the country will benefit from increased income. Government policies encouraging the participation of the private sector and the industries in endogenous capacity building will necessitate suitable legislations providing incentives in various

forms. High level manpower training in materials technology through university-industry collaboration can indeed benefit from such legislations.

**Table 2: Economically Active Scientists, Engineers and Technicians as per Million Inhabitants in Different Regions of the World**

Region	R&D Scientists & Engineers			Technicians	
	1980	1985	1990	1980	1985
- Africa*	84	72	74	831	1376
- Latin America	242	312	364	9754	11759
- Asia*	304	336	396	8985	11730
- Arab States	330	336	363	7046	9143
- Oceania	1774	1414	1610	36941	48213
- Europe	1859	1927	2206	35714	48600
- North America	2734	3024	3359	96023	126200
World Total	894	920	1000	18200	23442

**Source:** UNESCO (1991).

\* Excluding the Arab States.

So far, however, the number of scientists and engineers trained in African universities and polytechnics is far less than what is needed for basic development. In terms of number per million inhabitants, as indicated in Table 2, the African region had about one fifth of the corresponding figures in Asia for 1990 and only 3 per cent of the level in Europe. The number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D activities is very small in all the African countries indeed, compared to size of the population and the needs of the region. Much of the problem is due to the lack of adequate educational infrastructures and research facilities for highest education. According to UNESCO's data, the average figure for scientists and engineers engaged in R&D per million of population in the African region was 84 in 1980 as against 304 in Asia, 242 in Latin America, 330 in the Arab States, 1774 in Oceania, 1859 in Europe (excluding former USSR) and 2734 in North America. However, there was an increase from 20 in 1971 to 84 scientists and engineers per million inhabitants in 1980, which declined to 74 in 1990; whereas the other developing regions had a steady increase in the number of R&D scientists and engineers. The number of scientists and technical manpower in the African region like for all the other regions rose from 831 in 1980 to 1376 in 1985. Table 3 gives a global distribution of R&D scientists and engineers in the world.

**Table 3: Global Distribution of R&D Scientists and Engineers  
(Estimated Percentages by Major Areas)**

Region	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
- Africa	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.7
- Latin America	1.5	1.8	2.4	2.8	3.1
- Arab States	0.6	0.7	0.9	1.4	1.5
- Asia	17.4	18.6	18.5	20.9	22.8
- Europe	22.0	22.6	22.3	21.3	20.9
- USSR	36.6	37.8	36.6	33.8	32.4
- North America	21.8	17.3	18.0	18.2	17.8
- Oceania	0.0	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.8
World	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: UNESCO (1991); UNESCO (1986b:V. II.)

#### ***Policy Coordination and Financial Requirement***

Countries which depend heavily on either export of raw materials or import of processed materials, along with their science and technology policy and plan, also have formulated national materials policy based on assessment of world market situation and forecasting of local needs in the short, medium- and long-terms. Such materials policy took account of the subregional and regional needs in order to avoid the competition within the same region which would affect the market value of the materials produced.

As to the funding of science and technology (S&T), the R&D expenditure as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) and the classification of countries according to the number of S&T personnel per million of population, are shown in Table 2A in annex, in comparison with the developed countries. It can be seen from the table that most African countries (21 of them) have spent less than 0.2 per cent of their GNP in R&D activities: 15 countries spend between 0.2 and 0.4 per cent of the GNP, while 7 countries spend between 0.5-0.99 per cent as of 1980. Recently a few countries, including Egypt, have met the target of 1 per cent of their GNP market for S&T activities, as recommended in the continental development programme: the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA). These can be compared with what the developed countries spend on R&D, where, in many cases, they go far above 2 per cent of GNP. This comparison is reflected also in Table 4. It can be seen that Africa has been losing its share in the world distribution from 0.3 per cent in 1975-1980 to 0.2 per cent in 1985-1990, whereas the Asian countries have gained. Thus, the African region as a whole has not been able to meet the target of 1 per cent of GNP in the eighties because of the adverse and critical economic conditions it was facing. Inadequate funding of S&T activities leads to a weak S&T to exploit

the natural resources, or to develop the continent through agricultural and industrial developments.

**Table 4: Global Distribution of R&D Expenditure  
(Estimated Percentage by Major Areas)**

Region	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
- Africa (1)	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2
- Asia	7.3	10.8	14.8	16.2	19.5
- North America	44.5	33.7	32.1	42.6	42.8
- Arab States	0.2	0.3	0.5	1.3	0.7
- Latin America	0.8	1.5	1.8	1.1	0.6
- Europe	25.3	32.0	34.0	24.1	23.2
- USSR	20.9	20.4	15.6	13.7	12.3
- Oceania	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.7
World	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: UNESCO (1991); UNESCO (1986b).

(1) excluding Arab States

Adequate working and living environment for scientists and technologists demands higher government input in terms of funding. Apart from a few French speaking states of West Africa which receive external funding for R&D, in most African countries nearly 100 per cent of the funding come from national government, the major employer of S&T personnel. Whereas the contribution of the private industrial sector to R&D in developed countries is over 50 per cent, in developing Africa this is marginal.

#### ***Extension System of Testing and Quality Control***

The testing and quality control of materials produced locally or imported are essential for product reliability and quality that dictate the market. Laboratories for these often require very costly equipment which single manufacturers in Africa cannot afford. Government laboratories have often undertaken such testing for building materials. With the setting up of industries, National Standards Bureaux with their own testing facilities have evolved. Universities also have laboratories with equipment for such testing, and have, on ad-hoc basis, helped private industries. Existing infrastructure in teaching and research institutions can be used optimally by allowing them to undertake contract testing from the private sector involved in materials use and professionals involved in testing, provided the university and government authorities encourage such activity and willingly reward the workers including the rural farmers and women through appropriate incentives.

### **Utilization of Science and Technology in the Productive Sectors**

Science and technology have been evaluated as a global phenomenon, whose integration in the production process differs between developed and developing countries. In the former, such an integration takes place through linkages with the production sectors, which orient and provide resources for research and development and, finally 'consume' the resulting innovation. The research and development integration with the productive activity frequently reduce the time lag between the research phase and the commercial production of innovations, hence accelerating the diffusion phase and the economic growth. Nowadays several developing countries are also moving away from purely theorizing and intellectual exercises, towards developing science and technology that effectively contribute to enhance the productive sectors of their economy, including agriculture, manufacturing industry, mining, energy and water, and construction. In other words, they seek to find a close link between science and technology and the production of basic needs (goods and services) of their population. However, in developing countries the utilization of science and technology in the productive sectors requires seven different stages (UNECA, 1991):

- i) **Appreciation of a technological age** which requires the popularization of science and technology concepts, their advantages and disadvantages in a growing economy, their place in the fight against poverty, illiteracy, disease, and in the improvement of the quality of life of people living in harmony with nature. This is achieved through popular radio and TV programmes, village and community participation in scientifically biased art and drama, science and technology clubs for youth, moving exhibitions of new products and processes, incentives and prizes to local innovators, etc.
- ii) **Improvement of formal curricula in schools and colleges** which stresses science subjects, and on multidisciplinary materials courses at university undergraduate and post-graduate levels, that is, the formal training given by the government (and rarely by the private sector).
- iii) **Application of basic knowledge in science and technology:** With the formal training received at schools and colleges, informal sector workers as well as those in organized small and medium scale industries can apply their knowledge to improve existing technologies and thereby improve productivity and quality. The blending of new and traditional technologies can be achieved through this process.
- iv) **Implementation of imported technology:** This is a still higher stage involving research and development. Here research has to deal with technology assessment and technology negotiation in order to ensure a proper technology transfer at reasonable costs. At this stage technologies

are imported in an unpackaged form and not as black boxes, and the process of reverse engineering whereby an equipment is pulled apart into its different components, and reassembled, often with newly improvised parts, is mastered.

- v) **Assimilation for product diversification:** This stage involves research for adaptation of imported technologies, using locally available materials and resources. This eliminates the dependence on imported materials, lessens the costs of production, and often makes the technology available to a greater number of manufacturers.
- vi) **Improvement for enhancing competitiveness:** Here fundamental research and development follow. New products and processes are evolved through high level R&D, and they become more competitive in the world market. It is here that the number of patents registered increases very fast.
- vii) **Large-scale manufacture and marketing:** The products developed through high level R&D are then manufactured on a large-scale by well-established firms, often having multi-national antennas and aggressive marketing.

The seven evolutionary stages mentioned above are being implemented in varying degrees in African countries. The situation concerning materials technology is far from satisfactory. Most African countries have not even tackled the broad issues of science and technology globally. Only a few selected universities have specialized laboratories doing basic research on the use of local materials, especially in the area of research and development. Most of the research output have however stayed in research publications, and little commercial exploitation has been realized. In addition, scientific production is still concentrated in a selected number of fields, of which life science account for a heavy concentration and only ten countries (Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire and Zimbabwe) supply almost 90 per cent of the region's total scientific publications. Technology development is slow if not nonexistent in some countries, despite the realization that the driving force behind the advent of new and frontier technologies in the developed industrialized countries is the development of substitute materials for raw materials that were once imported from the developing countries and thereby shifting the base of their economy. Such development has tremendously reduced the importance of African commodities and thereby negatively affected their market. Unless Africa masters these technologies and uses them to advantage by enhancing their market value through processing, income from export of pure raw materials will gradually decline.

The most striking trend characteristic in Africa has been the emphasis on the process of linear transfer of technology. In developing Africa, unlike

other developing regions, the links between the scientific and technological sectors are, at the present, very weak, while those between research and development activities and the productive system are almost non-existent. Most African countries imitate the organization, structure, purposes and methods of the research and development activities of the developed world, while their scientists and technicians consider themselves as members of the world community of scientists, with loyalties and responsibilities to that community rather than to the home base. Inevitably, the developing African countries are hindered from establishing a scientific and technological base linked to their productive activity and conscious of the constraints and potentialities of its natural environment.

So far, developing African countries have thus become consumers of an imported technology which they have done nothing to generate. The assumption has been that the absorption of foreign technology could raise the socioeconomic system towards higher levels of development (Spencer, 1967). This indiscriminate and uncritical acquisition of alien technology has led to increasing dependency, for the mere assimilation of technology implies the acceptance of a linear concept of development and suggests that the stages that have characterized the development of industrialized countries would have to be replicated in African countries. But modern industrialized societies have developed technologies in accordance with their own peculiar characteristic, and the interrelationship between their resources, capital and environment. These technologies are not well adapted to the circumstances of African countries, but rather to conditions of labour scarcities, capital abundance, and large markets which permit the exploitation of economies of scale leading to a reduction of cost per unit of production.

### ***The Agriculture Sector***

For instance, agricultural technologies and practices developed in temperate areas of the developed world were directly duplicated or indiscriminately copied in several African countries. Such uncritical transfer of technology in agriculture has failed or, at least, has not reproduced the good results in productivity. In fact, as recommended in the continental development programme alluded to earlier (the LPA), several countries devoted between 60-80 per cent of their resources allocated to national scientific and technological research to agricultural research. But this agricultural research generally focussed more on perennial or cash crops than on food crops. As a source of new technology, research has aimed at increasing crop productivity and disease resistance of major export crops. Research has also focussed on improving agronomic practices, including the use of modern inputs such as fertilizers and development of improved tools and use of animal traction. Although the genetic base of most perennial crops such as coffee, oil-palm, cocoa, coconut palm, etc, has deteriorated in recent years, historical evidence shows that research efforts especially during the colonial

period concentrated on these crops leading to the breakthroughs in the development of hybrid oil-palm in Zaire, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire; tea in Kenya, cocoa in Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire and Arabusta coffee (hybrid of Robusta and arabica) in Zaire. These crops traditionally regarded mainly as men's crops were developed in order to satisfy the demands of the world market rather than local needs.

In the food crops production, the results were even more limited, judging from the problems of food shortages the African countries are facing. For example, as early as the 1940s the British peanut scheme in Tanzania was one of the most spectacular failures: 1.2 million hectares of land were allocated to a giant peanut scheme at the cost of £35 million (British pounds), but the area did not get the needed amount of water. After ten years, the area was eroded, turning, in the dry season, into a cement-hard desert. Apart from the Green Revolution type breakthrough in hybrid maize in Zimbabwe and Kenya during the colonial period, there have been no comparable breakthroughs in research for the food crop subsector dominated by women. Even at present most research activities are related more to cash/export crop rather than to staple food crops. It has been reported that only 24 per cent of agricultural researchers working in Sub-Saharan Africa were specialized in sorghum and millet whereas these two crops account for more than 45 per cent of the region's cereal production and occupy about 60 per cent of the area devoted to cereals.

After a 12 year research programme, a promising variety of sorghum was released in the Sudan only in 1984. Maize has been relatively neglected in West Africa and it is only recently the research on maize streak virus by the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) was undertaken, whereas in Southern Africa (notably Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi), the genetic research base for maize has been undertaken. Research on grain legumes — phaseolus beans, cowpeas and soy beans — has been modest until recently and several regional research projects on these crops are getting underway in East and Southern Africa. Finally, such other crops as roots and tubers (sweet potatoes, yams, cocoyams) which are important staple food crops in coastal West Africa and Central Africa are only now receiving modest research focus particularly from the IITA. Not much information is available on research, if any, on plantain, also an important crop in West, Central and parts of East Africa (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania).

It has been observed that on average, between 60 and 80 per cent of the total resources allocated to national scientific and technological research in African countries is devoted to agricultural research. Although encouraging results have been obtained in research on cash crops as well as on staples. Increase in yields is at times very significant to the extent that yields obtained in research stations are, at times 3 to 5-fold of those obtained on traditional farms. However successful result have yet to be obtained in

developing new varieties of rice and wheat and in the production of compost manure. Nevertheless, due to the low level of technological know-how of the African farmers and the absence of appropriate extension services, the real impact of all these research results on agricultural production in African countries is still limited.

#### ***The Manufacturing Industry***

On the other hand, the industrialization process based on import-substitution is no better. In a great measure it has been associated with strong economic protectionism from foreign competition which contributes to the creation of local entrepreneurship that is not concerned with improving productive capacity and efficiency through local research and development. The situation is aggravated where governmental policies grant almost unconditional terms for imported technology in the form of patents, equipments, semi-finished products, technical personnel and consultants. All these factors undermine confidence in the internal capacity to supply technology, hence weakening even more the already extremely fragile links between the science and technology systems and the productive system. This process is not helped by the attitude of foreign industries, particularly transnational corporations, who have their own sources of know-how and technology to draw upon. Developing indigenous capacities is simply not one of their priorities.

Thus, the impact of national science and technology on the industrial production in the African countries has been and is still very limited. There is a complete contradiction between the desire for economic independence and the industrial policy pursued, the latter being essentially based on imported advanced technology which neither takes account of the local situation nor of the skills of the domestic labour force. Factories in the region are very often no more than branches of a big industry based in the European parent countries, and most of them are essentially concerned with packing and marketing products from parent companies abroad. Consequently, the African states become technologically highly dependent on their industrial development process.

#### ***The Mining and Energy Sectors***

The economy of each African country is unfortunately precariously tied to the export, in most cases, of a single mining or energy commodity. Thus Zambia and Zaire depend heavily on copper; Algeria, Gabon and Nigeria on crude oil; Guinea on Bauxite and Liberia on iron ore. New materials developed in the industrialized countries replace these minerals and thereby reduce their market value. Moreover the technologies for their exploitation and processing are archaic, and the advent of new technologies for these has yet to be taken advantage of. There has been a symbiotic relationship between the government, the public and private productive sectors, and those

involved in research and development will stress on the exploitation of research results aiming at producing energy-saving and cost-saving high performance materials which will substitute conventional materials and building materials. Ceramics, optical fibres, synthetic and composite materials and high performance metallic alloys are coming on the market, and African R&D have to reorient themselves towards the blending of these with conventional materials and exploiting them commercially.

Rare earth minerals have enormous potentials now and for the future for use as raw materials for photovoltaic, photonic, sensors, new fine ceramics, special plastics, and superconductive, magnetic and functional electronic materials. Fortunately Africa has an abundance of these rare earth minerals in the form of beryllium, lanthanum, chromite, strontium, yttrium, zeolite and others. What is required is a systematic inventory of these and their extraction and exploitation, as they are likely to pay high dividends in the future. The same is the case for non-metallic minerals which are in high demand as they are being used in mineral-filled plastics and low-cost polymers. The new and emerging technologies in the area of new materials and products relevant to African minerals and building materials are: ceramics technology, optical fibre technology, new polymeric materials technology, typical composite and materials technology, new metal processing and production technologies, functional electronic materials technologies, and small diameter wood technology. A few developing countries outside Africa are already mastering many of these technologies for their own survival.

In order to avoid negative impacts of these new and emerging materials technologies on the market of African minerals and raw materials, African States should prepare themselves by training requisite manpower, setting up new institutional infrastructure for materials science and technology and improving their production processes using these technologies. There has been a decline in the consumption of iron ore in steel making as a result of improved technologies in iron and steel making. The average steel content in motor vehicles is gradually decreasing and new composite materials are replacing the steel. Similarly there is growing decline in the demand for copper, tin, lead and zinc, while demand for nickel, cobalt and titanium is likely to increase. The replacement of metallic mineral ores with advanced new materials will definitely affect the mineral market adversely in Africa.

### ***The Construction Sector***

In the area of building and construction materials, Africa is rich in building and construction stone, limestone, gypsum, granite, sand, asbestos, fibres and wood. Modern conventional building materials include cement, bricks, concrete, plaster, steel, glass and wood-based composites. Most of these are imported, with little produced locally in some countries. There are also the so-called traditional materials like earth, stone, thatch and bamboo, which

are utilized by most of the population. Finally a third category of building materials has evolved through research and development, like pozzolona, earth-stabilized blocks, ferro-cement, bamboo reinforced concrete, etc, which can offer cheap alternatives to imported materials, and can be quite efficient. In a few cases pilot plants have been set up with government help, as in the case of Ethiopia where possolana blocks have been made, but commercial large scale exploitation is still far away because the private sector has not taken any active part in the whole process. In Ghana, the Building and Road Research Institute for the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, which is one of the oldest applied research institute in the continent, has succeeded in testing sand-lime bricks, laterite soil-cement blocks, and is promoting labour intensive hand-moulded brick production technology (Gadigasu, 1988).

In Nigeria, the level of research and development is higher, and work at the Federal Institute of Industrial Research Organization (FIIRO), the Project Development Agency (PRODA), the Nigerian Building and Road Research Institute (NBRRI) and the National Research Institute for Chemical Technology (NRICT), are tackling not only building materials, but also industrial engineering materials, semiconductors, polymers and plastics (Koleoso, 1988). However, commercial exploitation of results is still far away. But in the area of food processing, textiles, ceramics and vegetable oils and fats, FIIRO has been successful in developing improved technologies, a few of which are now in the market.

The Tanzania Industrial Research and Development Organization (TIRDO), the Kenya Industrial Research and Development Institute (KIRDI), the Housing Research and Development Unit of the University of Nairobi, the Materials Research and Testing Department of the Faculty of Technology at Addis-Ababa University in Ethiopia, the Central Materials Research Laboratory of the Ministry of Works and Housing in Kampala (Uganda), are a few of the institutions in East Africa that are carrying on research and development in materials related to building and construction, but their main contribution has been in the testing of materials required for such activities in the public and private sectors. It is heartening to note that only those countries that have established policy institutions for science and technology also have research and development institutions to work on materials technology.

From the above trend of analyses, it can be said that while the *government* has the responsibility to catalyse the development of science and technology and promote and facilitate their application in accordance with the objective of development, the scientific and technological *infrastructure* should provide society with the capacity to create, adopt and transmit knowledge. The *productive* sector, both public and private, has also an important role to play in the scientific and technological development directly

through their participation in, or support of, research and development activities undertaken by the governmental or private institutions, universities and research centres. Interaction among those three sub-systems is a pre-requisite if science and technology are to become a dynamic factor in-development. But what is of crucial importance is the way the scientific and technological results are put in use in the productive sectors to produce new industrial and/or agricultural materials for the satisfaction of the basic needs of the population. The time when universities theorized for the sake of theory and mere intellectual pleasure is long past gone. If the developed countries can afford to do it, developing countries should devote their scarce resources to keeping close link between university and productive sectors of the economy and to producing university graduates who can at the same time grasp the practical problems of their natural surroundings.

### **Policy Concerns**

Developing indigenous technology cannot be done in isolation from technological development elsewhere. The problem here is not merely catching up with the advanced countries; rather it is managing ethno-science with modern science. Thus, science and technology policies in Africa should strive to strike a balance between indigenous technological development and imported technology. The aim should be the achievement of a technological pluralism in which foreign technology (including frontier technologies) can be utilized side by side with traditional technologies. From a scientific and technological perspective, Africa must rely for solving its present problems more on the available array of technologies and existing institutions and mechanisms than on the development of innovations. Modifications of the present institutional setting, innovations in, and diffusion of, new technologies are costly and time consuming, and often with uncertain results. Institutional changes also take time to materialize, especially when change is hindered by those who are concerned more with protecting their turf than with societal progress.

The question, therefore, is how to choose from the available set of technologies, the ones that can contribute most to the solution of today's African problems without creating rigidities that could impede the adoption of emerging technologies? In this connection, African scientists are faced with the responsibility of assessing the potentialities of those emerging technologies not only to ascertain their applicability to the African condition but also to ensure participation in the process of their development. In recent years, the idea that mankind is at the turning point of a new 'technological revolution' similar to the industrial revolution of the 18-19th Century has gained more and more followers. This revolution is information and scientific intensive. The information revolution is no longer science fiction, it is a present day reality with a direct impact on the lives of the African citizens in its two forms: computer and telecommunications technologies. However, its

development and application are largely concentrated in the industrialized world and grow at the rate of 20 per cent annually. The information revolution requires a quantum change in each country's education and training systems. Many of the newly emerging technologies — particularly informatics, microelectronics and biotechnologies — are 'natural-resources-augmenting', meaning that they help expand supply of natural resources that can be exploited for economic purposes, particularly those needed for the satisfaction of urgent basic needs. And many of these new core technologies<sup>5</sup> do not require large capital investments and they can develop in decentralized systems, thus facilitating the process of rural development. In addition, they are not necessarily energy-intensive, and in particular not oil-intensive. They are rather material-saving and because their reduced wastes permit a more integral use of raw materials, they have their positive environmental impact.

Equally important is the fact that the new emerging technologies can be applied for the revitalization and upgrading of vernacular or traditional technology and therefore, can be assimilated by the population without major cultural conflicts. This suggests that a policy oriented to the merging of new and traditional technology could help avoid the negative aspect of the technological dualism that has so far characterized transfer of technology from the industrialized to developing countries. Thus, the idea of technological blending, or merging of new and traditional technologies, implies a completely different approach to technology policy and planning. The objective should no longer be 'bridging the gap' between technological advanced areas and those presumed to be backward. It also would require a long process of socioeconomic adjustment and change. The policy of merging implies the possibility of a technological 'jump' in which it would be possible to benefit from the advantages of new technologies without having first to undergo fundamental investments in technological infrastructure, as it was necessary with the exclusively imported technologies. The prevailing policy of importing technology condemns the developing African countries to perpetual backwardness.

African countries should therefore, strive to take part in the development and application of new frontier technologies. Increasing efforts in these technologies are being undertaken by some developed countries in order to

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
5 The new core technologies can be subdivided into three categories: (1) Microelectronics which include computer integrated manufacturing industry, consumer electronics services industry, office automation; (2) Biotechnology which includes food processing industry, pharmaceutical industry, agrochemical industry, fine chemicals, petrochemical industry, waste processing industry, biomedical materials, aeromedical materials, aerospace industry and textile industry; and (3) New materials from aerospace, telecommunication and transport industry; metal/steel industry and semiconductor industry.

redefine international competition and achieve comparative advantages (e.g. Japan vs USA). But these efforts are no longer limited to developed countries; several developing countries have undertaken aggressive policies to participate in the development of those technologies (e.g. Brazil), particularly with a view to increasing productivity and reducing costs in export-oriented activities in order to retain old, or capture new markets. This is true even in traditional sectors like textiles and leather (e.g. Taiwan) which are, currently being reactivated in industrialized countries. African countries cannot remain indifferent to all this revolution and remain passive importers of technologies. They have to be active participants in its development in order to benefit from 'learning by doing' and reducing, in the process, their technological dependency. The merging of new technologies with conventional and traditional technologies is an approach that could permit a quantitative and qualitative jump by-passing, in some cases, intermediate steps.

### **Conclusions**

A science and technology culture is still relatively underdeveloped in Africa. Whatever science and technology there are and that have been brought from outside, have stayed within a small elite who have found it difficult to share their knowledge with the masses. This low level of science and technology culture does not popularize basic concepts and make the general masses appreciate the marvels of modern development. The development of manpower in the area of materials is a long-term process and one has to start from the bottom. It requires a strong political will backed by policies and plans, the involvement of the private sector and stakeholders in the economy, adequate financial support, appropriate incentives through legislation to all concerned, institutional structures, and co-operation at the sub-regional and regional levels to optimise the scarce resources available. The popularization of science and technology using all available modes of propagation — folk dramas, folk songs, music, science clubs, audio-visual channels, newspapers, exhibitions, popular talks, seminars and conferences, etc., has to be the basis for such an S&T culture. Thus, cultural dimensions have to be integrated in all S&T programmes and projects in order that they can be effective.

**Annex Figure IA**



*The Development and Utilization of Science and Technology in Productive Sectors*

Annex Table 1A: Science and Technology Policy-making Organs in African Countries - October 1986

Ministry of Science or Ministerial Science	Multidector body for Scientific Coordinating Scientific Planning	Natural Sciences Research	Agricultural Research	Coordinating Bodies for Scientific Research		Env. Research
				Modular Research	Sectoral Research	
Angola	A	A	-	A	-	X
Benin	X	X	X	A	*	X
Burkina Faso	A	*	*	A	*	X
Burundi	A	*	*	A	*	X
Cameroun	A	*	*	A	*	X
Cape Verde	A	*	*	A	*	X
Central Africa Rep.	A	*	*	A	*	X
Chad	A	*	*	A	*	X
Comores	A	*	*	A	*	X
Congo	*	*	*	X	*	X
Côte d'Ivoire	*	*	*	X	*	X
Djibouti	*	*	*	X	*	X
Egypt	*	*	*	X	*	*
Equatorial Guinea	*	*	*	X	*	*
Ethiopia	X	X	X	X	*	X
Gabon	*	*	*	X	*	X
Gambia	*	*	*	X	*	X
Ghana	*	*	*	X	*	X
Guinea	*	*	*	X	*	X
Guinea-Bissau	*	*	*	X	*	X
Liberia	*	*	*	X	*	X
Libya Arab Jam.	X	A	*	X	*	X
Madagascar	A	*	*	X	*	X
Malawi	A	*	*	X	*	X
Mauritania	*	*	*	X	*	X
Morocco	A	*	*	A	*	X
Mozambique	*	*	*	X	*	X
Niger	A	*	*	X	*	X
Nigeria	A	*	*	X	*	X
Rwanda	A	*	*	X	*	X
Sao Tome & Principe	*	*	*	X	*	X
Senegal	A	*	*	X	*	X
Seychelles	*	*	*	X	*	X
Sierra Leone	*	*	*	A	*	X
Somalia	A	*	*	A	*	X
Sudan	*	*	*	A	*	X
Swaziland	*	*	*	X	*	X
Tanzania	A	*	*	X	*	X
Togo	*	*	*	X	*	X
Tunisia	*	*	*	X	*	X
Uganda	*	*	*	X	*	X
Zaire	*	*	*	X	*	X
Zambia	A	*	*	A	*	X
Zimbabwe	*	*	*	X	*	X
<b>Total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>21</b>

Source: Compiled from Ayal Wadi and Radnor (1983) *Science and Technology in Africa: Priorities and Implications for International Cooperation*, North Western University, Evanston, Illinois, U.S.A.

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National papers submitted to CASTAFRICA II.

Note: 1. X indicates institution which existed before 1979

2. \* indicates institution which existed in 1973

3. A indicates institution existing after 1979.

**Annex 2A: Classification of countries according to the number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D activities per million population and R&D expenditure as percentage of GNP\* (for 1980)**

R&D Expenditure as % of GNP	> 2%				
0,2 - 0,49%			Bulgaria* (1)		
0,5 - 0,99%			Lod. Rep. Germany		
1 - 1,9%			Hungary* (1)		
			Israel		
			(Japan (1)		
			Switzerland		
			USA (1)		
			USSR* (1)		
less than 0,2%			Australia		
			Belgium		
			Finland		
			Netherlands (1)		
			Norway		
			Poland* (1)		
			Rumania		
			Sweden		
	Côte d'Ivoire	Cameroun			
	Madagascar	Egypte			
	Senegal	Togo			
	Zambia				
	Burkina Faso		Algeria		
	Chad	Kenya	Congo		
	Nigeria	Liberia	Ghana		
	Sierra Leone	Morocco	Mauritius		
	United Rep. Tanzania	Swaziland	Sudan		
			Tunisia		
	Angola				
	Benin	Botswana	Gabon		
	Burundi				
	Central Africa Republic				
	Ethiopia				
	Gambia				
	Lesotho				
	Libyan Arab Jam.				
	Malawi				
	Mali				
	Mauritania				
	Mozambique				
	Niger				
	Rwanda				
	Seychelles				
	Somalia				
	Uganda				
	Zaire				
	< 50	50 - 99	100 - 499	500 - 1999	> 2000

Number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D activities per million population.

Source: Extracted from 'Estimate World Resources for Research and Experimental Development, 1970-1980, UNESCO, 1984 (CSR-S-17)

\* In percentage of net material product (NMP)

(1) not estimated.

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\* Economist, Socioeconomic Research and Planning Division, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

# Pour une reprise de la planification économique en Afrique<sup>1</sup>

Bruno Bekolo-Ebe\*

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*Abstract: With the generalization of adjustment programmes in all African economies, planning as a tool of development has been dropped. The planning exercise is therefore considered as useless and noxious, and is seen as the symbol of state intervention with the numerous constraints imposed to the economy. The withdrawal of the state has brought an end to planning and left adjustment to market forces. After more than fifteen years of implementation of structural adjustment programmes, the result is a complete failure which is characterized by the implementation of various decisions that had a long and negative impact on the future. Long-term vision has been mortgaged. The deepening of the economic crisis and the protracted nature of the disequilibria are now serious enough to recommend going back to planning as an optimal framework for investment choices.*

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La situation actuelle du continent africain après 15 ans d'ajustement structurel impose une réflexion approfondie et critique sur les choix qui ont été effectués pour la restructuration des économies africaines, et la relance d'une activité économique stagnante.

Depuis près de 15 ans en effet, l'Afrique est entrée dans une longue crise dont les principales manifestations sont apparues, à la faveur du premier choc pétrolier. Le quadruplement du prix du pétrole a créé d'importants déficits de la balance des paiements, dont l'ampleur n'avait rien de comparable avec ceux qu'on avait pu observer jusque-là. Par exemple, des pays comme le Zaïre et la Zambie ont été des illustrations de cette crise. En effet, ils ont connu entre 1974 et 1975 des déficits de paiements courants de l'ordre de 720 et 620 millions de dollars respectivement malgré un taux de croissance de 45% donc nettement supérieur à la moyenne de l'ensemble des pays de l'Afrique subsaharienne. Le déficit de cette région augmente en

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effet de 39% en 1975, par rapport à l'année précédente, pour atteindre 4.800 millions de dollars.

Ce déficit s'accompagne d'une augmentation tout aussi forte des emprunts pour en assurer le financement. Ainsi le Zaïre qui, jusqu'au choc pétrolier, avait emprunté l'équivalent de 10% de son PIB, emprunte pour la seule année 1975, l'équivalent de 20%. En Côte d'Ivoire, 60% des emprunts nets de l'année 1975 sont destinés au financement du déficit des paiements courants.

Pour l'ensemble de la sous-région subsaharienne, les engagements au titre du financement du déficit des paiements courants s'élèvent ainsi en 1975 à 3447 millions de dollars soit 20% de plus que l'année précédente. Le déficit extérieur devient alors un des facteurs explicatifs d'accroissement accéléré d'un endettement extérieur qui deviendra, tout au long de la période considérée, une des plus importantes manifestations, de la crise, et un des problèmes majeurs à résoudre dans le cadre de la recherche de solutions de sortie de crise.

Au déséquilibre extérieur s'ajoutent des déséquilibres intérieurs en particulier au niveau des finances publiques, de l'offre et de la demande de biens et services, du mécanisme des prix et de leur évolution, de la création et de la destruction d'emplois, compte tenu de la contrainte démographique.

S'agissant du déséquilibre de l'offre et de la demande des biens et services, sa matérialisation la plus significative et la plus dramatique est la crise alimentaire, aggravée par des phénomènes climatiques. Cette crise se traduit, à partir de 1974 par la mort de milliers de personnes. Elle reviendra de façon récurrente à la fin des années 70 et au milieu des années 80. Son évocation semble d'ailleurs être désormais représentative du drame économique du continent.

L'ampleur de la crise a conduit à la mise en œuvre de politiques destinées à résorber les déséquilibres et à restructurer les économies, pour leur donner une capacité, non seulement de résistance aux retournements de conjoncture, mais aussi de création de surplus à des niveaux pouvant assurer la continuité de l'accumulation et la pérennité de la croissance.

Ces politiques se sont inscrites dans le cadre de l'ajustement structurel mis en œuvre sous l'impulsion de la Banque mondiale et du Fonds monétaire international qui en sont les principaux concepteurs. Cependant, l'élaboration des programmes se fait en concertation avec les pays concernés, d'autres organismes multilatéraux dont ceux du système des Nations-Unies, et des acteurs bilatéraux publics ou privés.

Au bout de quinze années d'application de ces politiques, force est de reconnaître aujourd'hui que les résultats, quelque louables qu'aient été les efforts conceptuels et matériels déployés, ne sont à la mesure ni des attentes, ni de la vigueur d'exécution des programmes. Bien au contraire, l'évolution semble orienter les économies vers un enlisement qui fonde aujourd'hui le

courant d'afropessimisme. Les économies africaines se marginalisent, d'année en année avec des taux de croissance négatifs qui semblent être désormais la règle, et la persistance de ces déséquilibres dont la résorption constituait l'objectif premier des politiques appliquées. Mais ce qui est encore plus grave est que l'absence de perspectives de sortie de crise à brève ou moyenne échéance s'accompagne d'un ensemble de décisions constitutives du dispositif d'ajustement, dont l'incidence pèse lourdement sur le long terme, et dont les effets pervers éventuels risquent d'avoir des conséquences irréversibles sur l'avenir de nos pays. Une série de questions se posent ainsi auxquelles il faut donner une réponse dans le cadre d'une telle réflexion.

D'abord, comment expliquer les résultats actuels alors que les politiques avaient pour objectifs d'obtenir une croissance soutenue et une autonomisation des économies? Les mesures prises permettent-elles effectivement une structuration de l'économie qui lui confère une marge d'autonomie plus grande? Y a-t-il eu un saut qualitatif entre les structures anciennes et les structures nouvelles mises en place? Si oui, est-il visible dans l'appareil productif? Dans les mécanismes de financement? Dans la gestion de l'espace? Dans la formation et le développement du capital humain et du capital technique? Les choix des spécialisations permettent-ils de desserrer la contrainte extérieure? La recherche de la stabilité assure-t-elle la relance de l'économie? Si oui, donne-t-elle à l'économie les capacités d'une croissance durable? Lui permet-elle de créer un volume de surplus permettant d'en prélever à chaque période ce qui est nécessaire et suffisant pour renouveler le capital existant et accroître les capacités productives? Ces mesures permettent-elles à l'économie de couvrir effectivement tous les coûts de l'homme? La création d'emplois en résultant permet-elle une occupation du volume global de la population et la rentabilisation, au sens large, de l'investissement en capital humain? Cet investissement est-il de nature à permettre aux agents économiques de maîtriser le milieu, d'en exploiter de façon optimale les ressources, et de maîtriser les évolutions et ruptures à venir? L'économie acquiert-elle au cours de ce processus les capacités nécessaires pour être présente, en tant qu'acteur dynamique sur la scène économique mondiale? Ces nombreuses questions attestent de l'importance du problème et de l'urgence de la réflexion, au regard de l'expérience de nos économies et des perspectives sombres qui se dessinent.

Dans les pages qui suivent, nous chercherons à expliquer l'impasse constatée ainsi que les inflexions indispensables pour définir des stratégies alternatives. Sur le premier point notre analyse se concentrera, sur ce qui nous semble être une des carences fondamentales du dispositif d'ajustement actuel, à savoir, la prépondérance du court terme sur le long terme. Cette carence se traduit pour ce qui concerne les objectifs par la dominance de la préoccupation stabilisatrice sur l'objectif de croissance durable et de mise en place de structures qui confèrent à l'économie en général et au système

productif en particulier, un plus grand degré de liberté dans son fonctionnement et sa dynamique d'évolution.

Sur le deuxième point, nous dégagerons les éléments déterminants de choix des projets dans le cadre d'un ajustement structurel qui donne à l'économie une plasticité de fonctionnement et de changement dont les agents économiques intérieurs s'assurent à long terme la maîtrise, quelles que soient les contraintes présentes ou potentielles qui peuvent peser sur le système économique.

### **Le court terme et la préoccupation stabilisatrice sur le processus d'ajustement structurel**

#### ***Les composantes de l'ajustement***

L'application des programmes d'ajustement structurel dans les pays en développement en général, ceux d'Afrique en particulier a connu deux phases: une première dominée par des mesures de stabilisation et un autre qui a un caractère plus structurel.

#### ***La phase de stabilisation***

La phase de stabilisation a eu pour principal objectif de rétablir, selon l'expression consacrée, les grands équilibres rompus à l'intérieur comme à l'extérieur de l'économie considérée. Il s'agit en l'occurrence du déficit de la balance des paiements courants, du déséquilibre des finances publiques, du déséquilibre offre-demande, dès lors que celui-ci est le résultat d'un excès d'absorption intérieure, des tensions inflationnistes.

L'hypothèse de base de l'élaboration du programme est qu'il s'agit ici d'un désajustement profond résultant d'un excès d'absorption. Celui-ci trouve son origine dans l'emballement de la demande résultant de l'accélération de la consommation soit des agents privés, du fait d'une hausse rapide des revenus, soit des pouvoirs publics qui accroissent rapidement la consommation publique ou l'investissement en capital.

Cet excès d'absorption peut aussi être favorisé par une création excessive de liquidités à travers une distribution expansive de crédit et le financement monétaire de la dépense publique. L'excès de liquidités lui-même est par ailleurs générateur de tensions inflationnistes qui elles-mêmes entretiennent une spirale de hausses, notamment des salaires et partant des coûts de production. L'objectif du programme est donc maîtriser cet emballement en stabilisant l'évolution de l'activité. Sans cette stabilisation, les déséquilibres se creuseraient encore plus et prendraient un caractère cumulatif. Ainsi le programme de stabilisation est un dispositif composé de mesures permettant d'assainir les déséquilibres par une maîtrise de la demande globale.

Pour ce qui concerne la demande publique, les mesures tendent à réduire le train de vie de l'Etat. Elles concernent les dépenses de consommations courantes, les subventions de soutien au prix ou aux entreprises notamment du secteur public, les dépenses de transferts, le niveau des rémunérations et

leur rythme de croissance. Sont aussi affectées les dépenses d'investissements publics.

Si l'objectif est de comprimer ces rubriques, il faut à l'inverse accroître les recettes par un renforcement des prélèvements fiscaux dont l'effet restrictif sur les dépenses de consommation n'est pas le moindre. L'accroissement des prélèvements se fait, soit par un élargissement de l'assiette, soit par une augmentation des taux.

La consommation des agents privés est affectée par le gel des rémunérations, l'accroissement des prélèvements et les nouvelles modalités de gestion des effectifs dans les entreprises tous secteurs confondus.

Sur le plan monétaire, les mesures tendent à réduire la liquidité de l'économie par un contrôle de la distribution des crédits pour en limiter l'accroissement et même le volume, et par une réduction des avances du Trésor. L'arme des taux est aussi utilisée pour accroître le coût des financements. Au terme du financement, les déséquilibres doivent être réduits ou résorbés.

La réduction de l'absorption intérieure devrait d'une part, dégager un surplus exportable plus élevé, et d'autre part, réduire la demande d'importation, permettant de rétablir l'équilibre extérieur, de reconstituer un volume de réserves suffisant pour assurer les transferts et le règlement des dettes échues dont les arriérés se sont accumulés.

Les mesures doivent aussi permettre de résorber le déficit public grâce aux effets conjugués de la réduction de la dépense et de l'accroissement des recettes. L'ensemble de ces mesures s'élaborent et s'appliquent en contrepartie des facilités de tirages accordés par le Fonds, au titre des multiples mécanismes mis en place à cet effet.

#### *La phase de restructuration*

Cette phase concerne essentiellement l'offre et complète le dispositif de stabilisation. Elle est relativement récente. Elle a été ajoutée au début des années 1980, pour répondre aux critiques sur le délai très court du volet stabilisation, et l'accent presque exclusif mis sur la gestion de la demande. L'objectif est d'assurer un accroissement de l'offre de biens et services pour remplacer l'économie sur le sentier de la croissance. Les mesures sont ainsi de nature plus structurelles, visant à réduire toutes les distorsions qui empêchent une allocation optimale des ressources. Ces mesures sont d'ordre macroéconomique et microéconomique.

Sur le plan macroéconomique, les mesures concernent la réforme du secteur public dont il faut réduire l'étendue à travers la liquidation ou la privatisation de certaines entreprises, et la restructuration de celles qui restent dans le portefeuille public. Elles concernent aussi la gestion des effectifs dont il faut réduire le volume et le coût, les procédures administratives, les niveaux d'intervention du secteur public dans le sens d'un désengagement progressif et le recentrage des investissements publics sur quelques

opérations à partir d'une redéfinition des priorités. Ces mesures concernent enfin la réforme du marché du travail dans le sens d'une plus grande libéralisation des dispositions légales et réglementaires, pour assurer plus de flexibilité et de mobilité à la gestion de la main-d'œuvre.

La réforme des structures productives a pour objet de libéraliser le marché davantage de sorte que les règles du marché prennent le pas sur l'intervention. Ceci explique la levée des restrictions tarifaires pour ouvrir les entreprises à une plus grande compétitivité qui devrait en accroître l'efficience. Cette libéralisation concerne aussi le régime des prix, le niveau des prélèvements sur les entreprises, le droit des affaires et la législation sur les investissements dans le sens d'une plus grande liberté dans le transfert des bénéfices.

Sur le plan microéconomique, le dispositif s'articule autour de diverses mesures incitatives pour encourager l'investissement et la création d'entreprise dans un certain nombre de secteurs dont l'agriculture.

D'une manière générale, et au-delà du détail des dispositifs, l'ajustement structurel doit se traduire par un fonctionnement de l'économie fondée sur la rationalité privée et le jeu des mécanismes du marché. Un tel fonctionnement est la condition d'une plus grande efficacité du secteur productif, d'une meilleure allocation des ressources, d'une plus grande compétitivité, et d'une meilleure insertion dans la division internationale où le développement des échanges extérieurs constituera le moteur d'une croissance retrouvée.

#### *L'effet pervers de l'hypothèque du court terme*

Au-delà des critiques qui peuvent être faites sur l'efficacité du dispositif dans son double aspect stabilisateur et structurel, il nous paraît important de relever la perspective globale dans laquelle se situe l'ajustement. Il s'agit d'une perspective de court terme, où domine l'objectif de stabilisation, et ce, malgré le volet structurel qui semble indiquer une prise de conscience d'une vision couvrant un horizon plus long. Cette prépondérance du court terme fait peser une véritable et lourde hypothèque non seulement sur l'efficacité même du processus, mais aussi sur l'évolution à long terme de l'économie, et sa capacité à retrouver la croissance.

La prépondérance du court terme exerce d'abord un effet pervers sur l'analyse même de l'économie en crise et sur la nature des déséquilibres à résorber. On considère en effet à travers l'hypothèse d'un excès d'absorption interne, que les déséquilibres sont la manifestation et la conséquence d'une rupture momentanée de l'équilibre général de l'économie et de son fonctionnement normal. Cette rupture tient à un excès de demande affectant l'offre d'exportables, du fait de la forte augmentation de la consommation privée et publique. Une maîtrise de la demande et sa stabilisation devraient donc permettre de dégager en faveur de l'exportation, un volume de biens permettant le retour à l'équilibre extérieur. Ceci devrait se réaliser d'autant plus

rapidement que du côté des importations, les flux seront contractés par la réduction de la demande.

Les déséquilibres apparaissent comme des phénomènes essentiellement conjoncturels, liés à une rupture et à des distorsions dans les mécanismes internes de l'économie et se traduisant par une mauvaise allocation des investissements. Moyennant cet ajustement le Fonds accepte en contrepartie de mettre temporairement à la disposition du pays, un certain volume de crédit lui permettant de réaliser rapidement les ajustements nécessaires, et le retour à l'équilibre réalisé, d'assurer les remboursements des crédits ainsi obtenus. Cette conception de la nature des équilibres explique ainsi la durée des programmes dont la période d'exécution maximale est de trois ans.

Une telle conception s'interdit d'analyser en profondeur l'origine des déséquilibres, l'état de l'économie étant considéré comme donné et implicitement optimal avant la rupture d'équilibre intervenue. Cette vision de l'économie en crise est plutôt statique et ne permet pas d'analyser l'impact et la portée réelle des mesures prises sur l'évolution même de l'économie.

Le volet ajustement a été introduit pour corriger les effets pervers de cette vision stabilisatrice et de court terme. Cet objectif est la transformation en profondeur des structures de l'économie, une correction des rigidités et distorsions qui introduisent des biais dans l'allocation des ressources. Mais là aussi, le changement de perspective n'est pas décisif et fondamental.

L'analyse qui préside au dispositif reste en effet étroitement tributaire de la préoccupation stabilisatrice à l'origine des programmes. Cette prépondérance de l'objectif de stabilisation ne permet pas une mise en perspective de l'économie, sur une longue période, non seulement pour déterminer en profondeur les causes des déséquilibres, mais encore pour définir les orientations à long terme de l'économie, et la capacité des mesures prises à en assurer la réalisation.

La perception restera aussi statique que dans la phase stabilisatrice, d'autant que les changements sont attendus du jeu des mécanismes du marché, lesquels, devraient spontanément conduire à l'équilibre souhaité.

Or, comme l'a souligné Perroux (1968), les modifications structurelles impliquent une politique voulue, s'inscrivant dans la durée, appelant des actions que ne peut seule induire la spontanéité des lois du marché, et se complétant de mesures correctives des effets pervers des décisions antérieures, car les objectifs peuvent se révéler contradictoires.

De ce fait, un ajustement structurel qui s'interdit de réfléchir et de remettre en cause la structuration du système productif, de sérier le poids et la nature des préférences de structure qui le déterminent, à travers les choix de spécialisations privilégiées ne peut permettre de résoudre le problème de la crise à partir de la source.

A l'analyse, la prépondérance du court terme est liée au fait que l'objectif essentiel de la stabilisation est de dégager un niveau de surplus tel que le pays puisse honorer les engagements extérieurs et en assurer les créances. Cet objectif prioritaire commande tout le dispositif de stabilisation et pèse lourdement sur la nature des réformes structurelles engagées. Il pèse aussi sur la durée des interventions, dont le maximum est de cinq ans.

La prépondérance du court terme et de la vision stabilisatrice se manifeste d'ailleurs par la disparition automatique de tout processus de planification. On a certes critiqué les plans élaborés dans les pays en développement, en soulignant notamment le faible niveau de réalisation. Mais ces critiques n'enlèvent pas au plan cette qualité d'être une balise pour l'avenir, et d'obliger à une réflexion sur la cohérence des mesures à prendre, les objectifs à réaliser et les perspectives d'avenir ainsi ouvertes à l'économie. Robert Massé a ainsi raison d'utiliser à cet effet l'heureuse formule du "plan anti-hasard" (Perroux 1968).

Or, au contraire de cette mise en perspective, on observe la mise en œuvre d'une série de mesures, dominées par la préoccupation de réduire les dépenses et de dégager un surplus permettant de servir la dette, sans pouvoir comprendre que souvent, les mêmes mesures compromettent à brève ou moyenne échéance, la capacité même de l'économie à atteindre ces objectifs de court terme.

Ainsi le souci de réduire les dépenses conduit-il à des coupes claires dans les dépenses d'investissements. Le taux d'investissement dans l'économie en est ainsi réduit, ce qui anéanti en même temps la perspective d'un accroissement des capacités de l'économie à créer un niveau de surplus plus élevé dont dépend l'apurement du service de la dette et le retour à l'équilibre extérieur.

Dans le cadre de la même préoccupation, réduira-t-on la formation d'infirmières, d'instituteurs, de médecins, de professeurs, pour réaliser des économies budgétaires, alors que la couverture sanitaire est loin d'être assurée, que la scolarisation est faible et souvent de mauvaise qualité, et que l'absence d'un capital humain constitue un des plus grands obstacles à la transformation de l'économie, à l'accroissement de la productivité et de l'efficience, et à sa diversification. Pour ce qui concerne l'éducation, Vinokur a montré comment la réduction des dépenses à court terme introduit un biais pervers dans les modèles d'analyse de la rentabilité de l'enseignement en pays sous-développés, et dont le résultat est la recommandation faite à ces pays dans le cadre de l'ajustement structurel, de privilégier l'enseignement de base au détriment de l'enseignement supérieur (1987).

Un tel choix impose une hypothèque sur la formation des ressources humaines, au moment où la vitalité des économies en dépend et que l'importance du capital humain détermine la hiérarchie des économies dans

la compétition internationale. On peut en dire autant de l'hypothèque que la préoccupation stabilisatrice à court terme fait peser sur l'économie.

Il s'agit en l'occurrence de l'orientation déflationniste qui détermine les choix de politique économique, et qui conduit à une vision dichotomique de l'activité où la monnaie et sa gestion constituent désormais une entité en soi, distincte, voire sans relation avec l'ensemble de l'économie dont l'évolution lui est désormais subordonnée.

La gestion de la monnaie devient alors telle que les intermédiaires financiers se trouvent dans l'impossibilité de mettre à la disposition des agents économiques les moyens de participer à la création du surplus et à sa répartition. On se trouve alors devant le paradoxe d'une économie souffrant d'une pénurie de liquidité, à laquelle on impose justement, et à ce moment précis, une politique de ponction de la liquidité. C'est le paradoxe de l'anémie contraint au don du sang.

Le conflit d'objectifs stabilité-croissance, et de perspective court terme-long terme n'est certes pas propre à nos économies. On l'a en effet vu resurgir, dans les années récentes, à la faveur de la crise qui a suivi les deux chocs pétroliers, et où les tensions inflationnistes et la résorption des déséquilibres extérieurs et publics a conduit à l'application des politiques de rigueur.

La montée du chômage, la désindexation des rémunérations et la hausse des coûts de financements qui en ont résulté ont été considérés comme le prix à payer pour réussir le processus de désinflation et créer les conditions d'une reprise saine de la croissance. L'objectif de stabilisation a ainsi pris le pas sur celui de la croissance.

Il faut cependant relever, sur un plan général, que cette politique s'est accompagnée d'une action vigoureuse de restructuration de l'économie, de redéploiement sectoriel au bénéfice des secteurs d'avenir pour assurer une mutation des spécialisations et une adaptation du système productif au nouveau contexte de compétition et de prix élevé de l'énergie.

La reprise de la croissance n'a pas été posée comme acquise au départ, et elle a été d'autant plus forte que le redéploiement sectoriel était réussi, sous l'impulsion concertée des pouvoirs publics et des entreprises, afin d'assurer la continuité de la dynamique d'accumulation.

Alors que la crise avait résulté – en partie tout au moins – de la prépondérance de l'investissement de rationalisation, l'effort a tendu à développer l'investissement de capacité pour accroître, créer les revenus nouveaux, élargir la capacité d'absorption interne et conquérir des parts de marchés extérieurs par accroissement de la productivité et de la valeur ajoutée des biens offerts sur le marché.

C'est ce que n'opère pas ici l'ajustement qui assimile – à tort – stabilisation et croissance, et considère comme données la spécialisation de

l'économie, la structure et la logique de fonctionnement du système productif, alors que c'est là où se trouve l'origine de la crise.

On ne peut s'étonner que l'action stabilisatrice, supposée préparer la croissance se traduise paradoxalement par une chute drastique du taux d'investissement qui, dans l'ensemble de ces pays atteint péniblement 15%.

Faute de s'être interrogé sur le rôle dynamique à faire jouer à l'Etat, pour se préoccuper de réduire ses dépenses et sa présence, on doit alors faire face à un effet récessif cumulatif où la stagnation, favorisée par la déflation, devient un état permanent de l'économie, sans pour autant que les déséquilibres qu'on voulait résorber l'aient été.

Il devient donc urgent de définir de nouvelles alternatives, dans une perspective globale et à long terme. Ces alternatives devront mieux tenir compte de l'impact des décisions prises et prévoyant les conflits possibles d'objectifs et les corrections indispensables. Il importe alors de définir les conditions d'élaboration de ces alternatives.

### ***Eléments pour une définition de perspectives nouvelles à long terme***

La situation actuelle impose une remise en cause de la démarche suivie dans le cadre du processus d'ajustement actuel. Cette remise en cause suppose la définition de nouvelles alternatives dans le cadre desquelles devraient être élaborés les différents projets matérialisant les choix fondamentaux en terme d'objectifs de croissance durable, et de maîtriser des évolutions d'une période à l'autre.

Mais comment définir ces alternatives? Sur quels principes les fonder ? Comment prioriser les projets? Quelles relations établir entre la démarche macroéconomique et les préoccupations microéconomiques des agents économiques? Telles sont quelques unes des questions fondamentales dont la réponse permet de dégager les bases des nouvelles perspectives à définir pour l'économie. Quelques principes généraux nous semblent ici d'une importance capitale.

#### ***De quelques principes de base***

La définition d'alternatives nouvelles nous paraît devoir reposer sur quelques principes de base dont le respect doit être une préoccupation constante et en fonction desquelles les composantes des politiques globales ou sectorielles doivent être définies et mises en oeuvre.

Le premier fondement nous semble être la réaffirmation de la nécessité de l'ajustement structurel, mais dans une conception et une logique fondamentalement différente de l'acceptation actuelle de ce processus.

Nos économies ont besoin d'être restructurées de fond en comble. La crise a révélé l'épuisement des possibilités des structures actuelles et de leur inadaptation absolue aux exigences présentées par rapport aux besoins des agents économiques et à la compétitivité internationale. C'est l'épuisement d'un modèle de fonctionnement de l'économie, celui de la mise en valeur

qui a présidé à la structuration de l'appareil productif, en fonction de préférences de structures qui ont déterminé les choix de spécialisation à partir desquelles ces économies s'insèrent dans la division internationale du travail.

L'ajustement doit donc aider à la création de nouvelles structures, au niveau de l'appareil productif, des mécanismes de financement, de la dynamique d'investissement, etc. L'objectif premier est de donner à l'économie une capacité de fonctionnement autonome, et de réduire sa dépendance à l'égard des variables extérieures. C'est un principe contraint qui va avoir des implications pratiques quand il faudra définir les projets à retenir et les articulations de la politique globale.

Le second principe est l'acceptation que le développement ne peut s'analyser comme un processus imitatif qui reproduit les expériences des pays industrialisés, sans tenir compte des spécificités et des contraintes du milieu. Cela signifie que la dynamique d'ensemble de l'économie doit être déterminée par les préférences de structures internes, à l'échelle de l'économie considérée d'abord, à celui de la région ensuite, dans une perspective d'intégration régionale. Il en découle un ensemble d'implications au niveau du financement, des choix sectoriels, de la gestion de l'espace de la production et des choix technologiques, de la formation des ressources humaines.

La prise en compte des structures internes doit être l'élément déterminant de l'insertion dans l'économie mondiale, et de la nature de la relation qui doit exister entre l'économie en structuration et les autres économies, et cela en dépit de la contrainte extérieure. Son existence n'implique cependant pas qu'elle soit irréversible, ainsi que l'exemple de nouveaux pays industriels notamment d'Asie du Sud-Est nous le montre. Les dotations factorielles ne peuvent en effet être considérées comme données une fois pour toutes, irréversibles et condamnant à des choix de spécialisation définis une fois pour toutes, alors que la situation actuelle démontre leur caractère réversible, à travers une marginalisation des productions en résultant, tant à l'intérieur de l'économie productrice – ce qui l'était déjà dès l'origine – qu'à l'extérieur, où la demande en justifiait pourtant la production.

Le troisième principe est la nécessité d'une interaction et d'une implication totale des agents privés nationaux et de l'Etat. La spécificité de nos économies, et l'ampleur du processus de restructuration imposent en effet l'Etat en tant qu'acteur essentiel pour donner des orientations globales et imprimer une cohérence d'ensemble dans laquelle s'inscrivent les plans des agents privés. Il doit jouer un rôle d'impulsion, de régulation et de correction dans l'évolution de l'activité. Pour ce faire, il dispose de moyens suffisants pour remplir cette mission.

Ce rôle dynamique n'est certes pas sans danger, le risque étant qu'un interventionnisme tous azimuts ne finisse par générer une mécanique ayant

sa propre autonomie et étouffant toute possibilité d'action. Une intense controverse s'est développée à cet effet dans les années récentes, pour contester, à la suite de la remise en cause des analyses keynésiennes, la pertinence et l'efficacité de la politique économique, la contestation la plus radicale étant celle des théoriciens de la nouvelle économie classique, dite des anticipations rationnelles. Mais la controverse a eu pour effet en définitive d'apporter de nouvelles justifications théoriques à l'intervention publique, tout en redéfinissant les conditions d'efficacité de celle-ci, dans la perspective d'une interaction micro/macro.

Mais au-delà de cette justification théorique, l'expérience actuelle des économies africaines en général, de l'économie camerounaise en particulier permet de voir quel rôle stratégique et indispensable doit être celui de l'Etat. Cette importance se mesure par ailleurs au rôle qui est le sien dans les grandes économies de marché comme les Etats-Unis et le Japon pour soutenir notamment la recherche technologique, base de structuration de leur système productif.

L'impulsion donnée par l'Etat doit trouver réponse et réaction auprès des agents économiques privés qui ne peuvent ainsi être considérés comme des sujets passifs. Au contraire la cohérence d'ensemble doit être la résultante de la prise en compte des besoins qu'ils expriment, des anticipations qu'ils font de ceux-ci et des perspectives souhaitées ou effectives de l'économie.

Ce trouve ainsi posé le problème de la circulation de l'information et de la détermination des vecteurs d'information et d'incitations, pour saisir les préoccupations, comprendre les besoins, anticiper les évolutions pour pouvoir les maîtriser et éviter les ruptures brutales, atténuer l'impact des chocs, en particulier extérieurs.

L'action des acteurs extérieurs ne peut alors avoir de sens que si elle s'insère dans cette dynamique déterminée par les préférences de structures internes, à la différence de la situation actuelle où leur intervention est la base de l'orientation globale de l'économie.

De ce qui précède découle un troisième principe de base, celui du nécessaire renversement de perspectives, pour donner la priorité au long terme. Il s'agit d'inscrire les réformes de structures dans la durée et partant d'en déterminer le rythme et l'amplitude dans le temps, le court terme se réalisant sous contrainte de favoriser les mutations en profondeur et de donner à l'économie la capacité d'une plasticité durable des structures.

La planification stratégique devient dès lors un instrument capital pour définir les modalités de réalisation, les moyens à mettre en oeuvre, et la cohérence d'ensemble entre objectifs et instruments.

Le plan a certes été l'objet d'une remise en cause favorisée d'une part par l'effondrement des économies socialistes et d'autre part, par ce qu'on a considéré comme l'inconsistance des plans dans les pays en développement en général, des pays africains en particulier. Cette inconsistance a été

favorisée par la forte dépendance de la réalisation des projets retenus sur les ressources étrangères. Ces critiques ne suffisent cependant pas pour rejeter cet instrument dont l'absence a une incidence négative sur l'évolution actuelle de nos économies.

Sur ce point, il est en effet significatif que c'est paradoxalement au moment où l'instrument semblait déperir, quant à son utilisation sur le plan économique global, que la planification a pris une importance particulière au niveau des entreprises en général, des grandes entreprises et organisations en particulier. Celles-ci se préoccupent en effet de l'évolution à moyen et long termes des marchés, des produits, et des concurrents, et sont contraintes de définir des stratégies susceptibles de déterminer l'évolution future et leur positionnement par rapport à la situation présente, leurs ressources, leurs produits, les transformations futures du marché et de l'environnement, les structures de compétition en constante mutation (Bekolo-Ebe 1992).

L'élaboration des stratégies implique alors, pour ces organisations, la mise en place d'un véritable processus de planification et celui-ci se développe d'autant plus que les instruments de prévisions gagnent en performance.

Ce qui est valable pour les firmes et organisations l'est encore plus pour l'économie globale surtout dans des pays qui paient justement le lourd tribut d'une absence ou d'une insuffisante anticipation de l'avenir, et qui sont contraints de s'ajuster passivement à des mutations structurelles, déterminées par d'autres et qu'ils subissent faute d'alternatives.

Le plan ici doit être le lieu d'un débat sur les orientations futures sur le rôle des différents acteurs, sur la nature, le niveau et la qualité des moyens à mobiliser, sur les repères à construire pour les bilans d'étapes, sur les transformations structurelles et institutionnelles à entreprendre pour réaliser les objectifs fixés. Il constitue le cadre idoine pour opérer les ajustements nécessaires entre les objectifs et les moyens, en évitant que la contrainte des moyens ne conduise à des choix hasardeux qui peuvent irrémédiablement hypothéquer l'avenir. C'est la balise au gré duquel doivent s'apprécier les décisions prises et leur adéquation par rapport aux objectifs, la pertinence des choix structurels globaux et sectoriels, par rapport à l'objectif d'autonomisation de l'économie et de consolidation des préférences de structures des agents économiques.

Il conditionne la définition des structures organisationnelles, en tant qu'elles établissent les relations prévisibles entre les missions à réaliser, les tâches à accomplir d'une part, les acteurs qui ont la charge d'assurer cette réalisation d'autre part.

C'est donc un instrument privilégié de formulation et de mise en oeuvre de décisions stratégiques. C'est un processus de long terme permettant de définir une représentation de l'état futur de l'économie et de spécifier les

modalités de mise en œuvre de cette volonté, au double niveau stratégique et opérationnel.

La récurrence du processus permet de définir la durée du cycle et le *timing* des révisions compte tenu justement de son double aspect stratégique et opérationnel. Elle implique la mise en place du mécanisme de circulation de l'information et d'intégration des différents acteurs, en tenant compte des contraintes qui affectent la cohérence et la capacité de réalisation du plan.

C'est un instrument fondamental pour *l'aggiornamento* des économies africaines, à partir d'une analyse critique en profondeur de l'existant.

Les trois principes fondamentaux ci-dessus définis influent sur les modalités de définition des stratégies, l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre des projets dont la réalisation permet de matérialiser les options stratégiques retenues.

### **Des principes généraux aux implications stratégiques et opérationnelles**

Les principes qui précèdent permettent de dégager quelques orientations pour la détermination des choix stratégiques et la nature des projets à retenir pour traduire ceux-ci dans les faits et concrétiser les mutations structurelles à imprimer à l'économie.

Le premier élément concerne le système productif. Donner à l'économie une dynamique autonome implique que la stratégie adoptée opère une mutation en profondeur et un redéploiement sectoriel.

Il s'agit d'une part de redéfinir les spécialisations autour desquelles se structure l'appareil de production, pour en assurer l'intégration interne et réduire sa dépendance extérieure et d'autre part de lui assurer une diversification sectorielle telle que la carence ou la défaillance d'un secteur, d'une branche d'activité n'indue un effet récessif qui bloque et arrête toute l'activité économique. Il faut enfin que le système productif créé un niveau de surplus dont la répartition permet à l'économie de trouver en elle son propre débouché, et que celui-ci serve de coussin de sécurité en cas de retournement de la conjoncture sur le marché extérieur. C'est en fonction de ces éléments que doivent être déterminées les priorités rentables et que doit se construire la conquête des parts de marchés extérieurs.

Les projets productifs doivent donc être retenus en fonction de leurs capacités à réaliser ces exigences d'autonomisation, de diversification, d'intégration et de consolidation du système productif. Leur "priorisation" reposera alors sur leur capacité à assurer les coûts de l'homme, et à exploiter au mieux le potentiel de ressources existant dans l'économie.

Dans ce contexte, les choix sectoriels doivent être retenus en fonction d'un inventaire exhaustif et régulier des besoins existants, une anticipation des besoins futurs et les possibilités de les satisfaire à partir de la valorisation des ressources intérieures disponibles. Dans ce sens, et pour prendre l'exemple de l'économie camerounaise, l'élaboration du Plan directeur

d'industrialisation, semble avoir obéi à ces orientations, de valorisation des ressources disponibles, de développement de filières intégrées de production et de cohérence entre les filières et les besoins du marché intérieur, régional et mondial.

Les projets retenus permettent en effet d'opérer un redéploiement des structures du système productif, d'en réduire la dépendance par rapport à la spécialisation étroite actuelle, d'en assurer une intégration sectorielle où les effets d'entraînement s'exercent entre les secteurs et donnent à la dynamique d'ensemble une plus grande cohérence et une plus grande capacité de démultiplication des effets bénéfiques.

Considérons par exemple les projets agricoles. L'agriculture doit en effet être une priorité, compte tenu du potentiel existant, des besoins à satisfaire, de son impact pour l'industrie, et du rôle stratégique qu'elle joue dans l'économie mondiale, ainsi que le montrent les débats entre la CEE et les Etats-Unis, dans le cadre des négociations du GATT.

Pour ce qui concerne nos pays, les projets retenus doivent l'être non seulement pour assurer l'équilibre alimentaire, comme c'est l'objectif déclaré, mais encore et surtout pour que l'accroissement de la production et sa valorisation permettent aussi le développement du tissu industriel, la valorisation de la recherche scientifique et technologique, la conquête des parts de marché sur les marchés extérieurs.

La stratégie ici conduit à mettre fin à cette distinction qui n'est propre qu'à nos pays, entre agriculture vivrière et agriculture d'exportation, distinction qui n'a pas de sens, mais qui est significative des impasses créées par le processus de mise en valeur.

La stratégie doit aussi permettre une augmentation de la productivité, une rentabilisation des exploitations et une création du surplus qui modifie profondément et qualitativement les conditions de vie des producteurs agricoles, à l'instar de l'évolution observée dans les pays industriels. Ce n'est donc pas une agriculture destinée à fournir des devises, comme on l'a souvent dit pour justifier la spécialisation actuelle, mais une agriculture dont l'expansion s'inscrit dans la dynamique d'ensemble d'autonomisation de l'économie. Il en découle des conséquences sur le plan du financement, de la production technologique et de l'organisation.

Diversifier le système productif et assurer son intégration suppose en effet que les stratégies prennent appui sur le développement de la recherche scientifique et technique qui doit ainsi être une priorité. Elle doit permettre l'amélioration et le développement des techniques de production et partant l'accroissement de la productivité et de la qualité des produits, la création des produits nouveaux en fonction des besoins existants ou anticipés, le développement des normes de qualités, l'innovation permanente dans la production et l'organisation. Ainsi s'installera obligatoirement une interaction permanente et dynamique entre les centres de recherches et les

entreprises pour valoriser les résultats obtenus en les insérant dans les circuits productifs.

Il est urgent de comprendre que le développement de la recherche est la condition *sine qua non* de la revitalisation de nos économies. La recherche est certes souvent considérée comme une activité superfétatoire, sous prétexte que le transfert de technologie peut résoudre les problèmes. Les expériences de nos jours dans ce domaine sont suffisamment éloquentes pour qu'on n'entre pas dans les détails. La technologie est toujours en effet la condition de la maîtrise du capital. Elle est toujours une réponse aux problèmes et contraintes que posent l'environnement à un moment donné, et permet à l'homme de le maîtriser, de desserrer les contraintes et de déplacer la frontière des possibilités qu'offrent le milieu et la nature, tant au niveau des ressources que du degré d'exploitation de celles-ci.

Le corollaire de cette nécessaire production technologique et scientifique est l'insertion dans toute stratégie à long terme, du développement des ressources humaines en qualité et en quantité suffisante, non seulement pour produire les connaissances, mais encore pour les exploiter dans les circuits de production de biens et services. L'effort, dans ce domaine est une nécessité contraignante qui ne peut s'accommoder l'objectif de réduction de dépenses à court terme.

Il est certes vrai qu'en la matière, une révision fondamentale des pratiques actuelles s'impose tant elles ont conduit à faire de l'accessoire et du contingent l'essentiel, et que le hiatus est souvent flagrant entre la formation et les enjeux de l'économie, et de manière générale de la société. Il y a donc là, matière à débat pour redéfinir les grandes options stratégiques et les projets opérationnels. Mais le principe de l'intensification de la formation et de l'amélioration de la qualité ne peut être discuté dans la détermination des alternatives stratégiques nouvelles. La capacité de nos économies à sortir de la logique de marginalité en dépend, de même que leur capacité à tenir la compétition mondiale.

Les choix de stratégies alternatives et de projets doivent, par rapport aux principes généraux sus-évoqués, s'effectuer en intégrant dans les éléments d'appréciation, la mobilisation des moyens de financement internes, comme base de toute la dynamique d'accumulation.

La grave crise d'endettement, les transferts nets négatifs et le poids des préférences de structures qui s'exercent par le biais des flux financiers extérieurs montrent suffisamment l'inanité de toute prétention à construire une économie solide sur la base exclusive ou prépondérante des flux financiers extérieurs.

Il ne s'agit certes pas de se fermer à ceux-ci, surtout dans un monde qui s'analyse de plus en plus comme un village planétaire. Mais ces flux ne peuvent être qu'un adjuvant venant s'inscrire dans une dynamique d'accumulation financée par les flux financiers internes à l'économie. Le

problème qui est ainsi posé est celui du rôle de la monnaie et de l'intermédiation financière dans sa fonction de création et de distribution de la liquidité aux différents secteurs de l'économie.

Aucune stratégie d'autonomisation de l'économie et de sortie de crise ne peut faire l'économie d'une réponse précise à ce problème. C'est une nouvelle dynamique de financement qui doit être mise en place pour déterminer les conditions de mobilisation de l'épargne intérieure, de création, de distribution, de circulation et d'orientation sectorielle de la liquidité, de développement d'une intermédiation financière apte à répondre aux besoins de financement exigés par l'importance de la reprise de la croissance et la restructuration de l'économie.

Les flux financiers extérieurs et l'appui qu'ils peuvent apporter les divers bailleurs de fonds n'auront d'utilité que s'ils complètent les flux intérieurs et s'insèrent dans la logique d'allocation sectorielle induite par les flux internes, s'obligent ainsi à appuyer la matérialisation des préférences de structures des agents économiques internes.

Il s'agit ce faisant d'une rupture fondamentale par rapport à la logique actuelle où un projet est retenu parce qu'il y a des financements extérieurs qui le suscitent d'ailleurs très souvent, l'apport financier interne lorsqu'il existe n'étant souvent que la réponse à une exigence du bailleur de fonds extérieur soit pour garantir la minimisation des risques, soit pour bousculer la passivité des responsables du pays.

Il importe donc, dans cette perspective de restructurer le système financier, de redéfinir le rôle de la monnaie, et de déterminer les règles nouvelles d'allocations de ressources financières entre les secteurs ainsi que les modalités de mobilisation de l'épargne et de son insertion dans le circuit de production et de distribution des biens et services. L'impact positif de toute stratégie alternative devrait ainsi se mesurer à l'aune de sa capacité à mettre en place une véritable économie monétaire de production.

La définition de stratégies nouvelles et/ou sectorielles ainsi que les projets à retenir doit par ailleurs reposer sur une gestion optimale de l'espace. De celle-ci dépendent en effet l'ampleur des économies d'échelles et de dimensions ainsi que la résorption des déséquilibres spatiaux qu'on observe dans chacun de nos pays. Le problème de l'aménagement de l'espace se pose ainsi et permet de situer l'importance en terme de priorité d'une politique de développement des moyens de transports et des moyens de communication. La désintégration spatiale actuelle est aussi une des raisons explicatives de la désintégration sectorielle, et de la faible capacité d'expansion de divers secteurs d'activités, ce qui favorise la forte polarisation de l'économie par l'extérieur, à partir des zones portuaires.

Le développement des moyens de transports et de communication et la densification des réseaux constituent donc une priorité pour toute stratégie alternative et dans le choix des projets à développer.

Cette gestion de l'espace ne doit pas se faire seulement à l'intérieur d'un seul pays, elle doit également intégrer une dimension régionale, tant en ce qui concerne le développement des transports et des communications, que le choix des projets productifs et l'organisation de l'espace financier.

A l'heure de la constitution de grands pôles économiques où la dimension de l'espace est un élément clé de regroupement, l'Afrique ne peut continuer à se définir par rapport à l'atomisation actuelle de son espace. Celle-ci explique, à notre avis, le processus de marginalisation observé, alors qu'ailleurs les regroupements donnent naissance à des pôles qui permettent aux économies concernées de se positionner dans les rapports de force qui se définissent sur la scène économique mondiale. Toute stratégie qui ne s'inscrirait pas dans un cadre intégrateur est vouée à l'échec, ainsi qu'on a pu le vérifier, à l'expérience, avec le processus de mise en valeur.

L'autonomisation des systèmes productifs, le développement d'un espace financier capable de prendre en charge les énormes besoins de financement de la nouvelle dynamique d'accumulation, la production de connaissances scientifiques et technologiques et leur insertion dans le circuit productif et organisationnel, la formation et le développement des ressources humaines dans le sens où nous l'avons décrit, n'auront de chances d'être réalisés durablement que dans une perspective intégrée, grâce à laquelle peuvent être résorbés les déséquilibres internes à chaque pays, et les déséquilibres entre les pays, dont les uns et les autres subissent les effets pervers.

### **Conclusion**

L'indispensable ajustement des économies africaines n'a de chance de réussir que s'il s'opère dans le sens d'une rupture totale avec le processus de mise en valeur. Celui-ci est en effet la source de déséquilibres dont l'ampleur et la gravité tiennent à leur ancrage au cœur de l'économie. Le processus de stabilisation ne peut dès lors les résorber, car ils ne sont pas passagers mais permanents parce que liés à la structuration de l'économie. L'ajustement structurel doit donc s'inscrire dans une perspective de long terme, et conduire à la mise en place de nouvelles structures de production qui donnent à l'économie un plus grand degré de liberté. La mise en place de cette dynamique autonome passe par de nouveaux choix de spécialisation, une diversification sectorielle permettant d'intégrer le système en fonction des besoins des agents, et sur la base d'un financement interne de la formation de capital et d'une dynamique d'investissement privilégiant l'investissement de capacité. Une telle stratégie intègre nécessairement le développement des connaissances scientifiques et technologiques comme base de construction du système productif. Elle accorde aussi la priorité à la gestion de l'espace à l'intérieur comme au plan régional, d'où l'importance d'une politique des transports et de communication d'une part, et du processus d'intégration régionale d'autre part.

L'élaboration de ces alternatives remet au centre de l'activité économique l'Etat en tant que lieu de coordination, de régulation et de définition des nouvelles cohérences indispensables à la mise en place d'une véritable économie de production. Mais ce rôle central n'a de sens et de portée positive que s'il permet d'intégrer tous les agents économiques au processus en prenant en compte leurs besoins existants, en anticipant sur les mutations à venir et en faisant en sorte que l'ensemble s'assure la maîtrise des mutations présentes et à venir. C'est-à-dire tout l'intérêt et toute l'urgence de la reprise du processus de planification, instrument par excellence d'anticipation de l'avenir.

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\* Vice-recteur, chef du département Management à l'Ecole supérieure des sciences économiques et commerciales (ESSEC) de l'Université de Douala, Cameroun.

# Bureaucrats, Peasants and Rural Development Policy in Botswana

Gili P Mayende<sup>1</sup>

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*Résumé: Les petits fermiers constituent environ 60% de la population rurale du Botswana. La stratégie de développement extravertie bénéficie plutôt une minorité de la population. L'objet de la présente étude est d'analyser les tentatives de l'Etat de redresser ces déséquilibres structurels au niveau des revenus à travers les projets suivants: le programme pour le développement de terres arables ainsi que le programme pour le développement accéléré de terre arable sous pluie. Cependant les objectifs de ces deux programmes n'ont pas pu être atteints à cause des obstacles créés par l'intervention des bureaucrates dans les projets de développement de l'agriculture paysanne.*

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## Introduction

In the late 1970s, various assessments of the process of development in Botswana concluded that the majority of the population had benefited very little from the country's impressive record of economic growth. In particular, this was demonstrated in respect of small peasants, who constitute about 60% of the country's rural population. Evidently, the country's outward-oriented development strategy based on mineral and beef exports, had been of disproportionate benefit to a small minority of the population comprising mostly the cattle barons and sections of the elite deriving their incomes from urban-based occupations.

Arable agriculture remained under-capitalized, risk-ridden and under-productive. Only 10 to 15% of those engaged in arable production regularly produced a surplus and 30% managed to meet their subsistence needs. Around 50% of rural households were dependent for their livelihood on remittances from household members in wage employment.

The combination of unemployment – which characterized the period preceding 1985 when employment began to rise in absolute terms – rural poverty and inequality, and increasingly pronounced cleavages in the social

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structure, signalled a potentially explosive political situation. Most profoundly, these processes led to the emergence of new social forces pressing for change, the most articulate and effective of which were located within the state bureaucracy itself. A section of the bureaucracy effectively challenged the policy focus on capital accumulation and were instrumental in influencing subsequent policy changes towards 're-distribution'.

The Botswana state attempted to redress these structural and income imbalances partly through the initiation in 1978 of the Arable Lands Development Programme (ALDEP). This programme was presented as a comprehensive, integrated rural development strategy whose main objective was to increase rural employment and improve peasant incomes and welfare through the transfer of basic agricultural inputs. The inputs were to be provided on a credit/subsidy basis later changed to a more favourable grant/downpayment scheme.

This paper examines bureaucratic intervention in peasant agriculture in the context of the relatively unfettered state-society relations characteristic of Botswana's multiparty system. The paper presents a general profile and analysis of the composition and character of the Botswana state bureaucracy and examines its role in the formulation of ALDEP. It then assesses in some detail aspects of the evolution of socio-political and economic processes leading to the change in the mode of state intervention in agriculture. The paper also examines the efficacy of bureaucrat-peasant relations in the context of the implementation of ALDEP.

Overall, in the analysis presented in the paper two main issues are tackled: a) inadequacies and inconsistencies in the definition of the objectives and implementation of ALDEP, and b) the emergence of processes operating at the 'wider' national level and impinging on ALDEP – particularly pressure from rich semi-mechanized farmers – whose effect was the 'elbowing aside', albeit temporarily, of the programme by the introduction in 1985 of a new scheme called the Accelerated Rainfed Arable Programme (ARAP). ARAP was presented as a drought recovery agricultural subsidy scheme targeted at all farmers but in effect was designed to be, and was of greater benefit to, the better-off farmers. The paper examines the effects of ARAP on ALDEP and on the autonomy and unity of the bureaucracy.<sup>2</sup>

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2 The paper elucidates these issues through the analysis of empirical material collected in 1988/89 in Kweneng District and Gaborone. The empirical material consists of survey data on a stratified sample of 120 heads of household and data based on in-depth interviews with 46 farmers, 62 government bureaucrats (34 central and 28 district level), and 23 extension workers.

### **The Botswana State Bureaucracy and the Ideology of 'Modernization'**

The dominant view in the literature on the Botswana state bureaucracy and its relationship to development policy is that it is an 'administrative elite', which is one of the country's dominant 'socio-economic elites' (Picard 1987). Since it is part of the ruling class, this administrative elite enjoys 'considerable autonomy' in decision-making on policy issues, which is left largely to it (Gunderson 1971). Isaksen (1981) takes the view that the exercise of this policy-making autonomy by the bureaucracy functions within the limits of 'two main borderlines [which] are to avoid critically endangering the relationship with South Africa and to refrain from promoting interests which are seen as directly in competition with those of the cattle industry'.

If it implies that the entire state bureaucracy in Botswana is committed to pursuing a programme for capital accumulation by the economically dominant class, this analysis is an over-simplification of its nature and character. The analysis also reflects a failure to appreciate the evolution of this bureaucracy over the years since independence in 1966. The suggestion that the Botswana state bureaucracy is a homogeneous entity pursuing the programme of the ruling and dominant class is not borne out by empirical scrutiny.

The views of Isaksen (1981) and Picard (1987) emerged out of a focus on senior civil servants, identified by the former as 'macro-managers'. These bureaucrats are recruited from within the ranks of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and they do indeed exhibit socio-economic characteristics similar to those of the national politicians. Some of them, together with some of the present-day members of the Cabinet, were part of the colonial bureaucratic establishment. This group includes Permanent Secretaries (PSs), directors of parastatal enterprises, the army and police top brass, and those holding other top administrative positions. Some of the senior bureaucrats are eventually inducted into ministerial posts.

There is, however, a second category of government bureaucrat in Botswana, which is largely the product of the evolution of the country's economy and society since independence in 1966. This category of bureaucrats has also benefited immensely from the country's multiparty system and comprises younger entrants into the civil service, most of whom are graduates of the local university or of centres of learning situated abroad.

Their recruitment into the civil service is not subject to membership of the BDP. These civil servants are therefore not necessarily bound by loyalties to the ruling party. They are salaried officials recruited mainly on the basis of their qualifications or experience. This contrasts sharply with the view of the state bureaucracy in most of Africa as made up of political appointees recruited through a system of patronage and clientelism (Bates 1983; Hyden 1983; Bayart 1986). These civil servants constitute an

independent-minded group within the bureaucracy whose activity is not obviously subject to the sets of limits outlined by Isaksen.

Many of these bureaucrats occupy middle-level administrative or technical positions at ministerial headquarters or at district level. In recent years a significant number have risen to the top of the administrative hierarchy at the district level. These bureaucrats tend to perceive their role as that of 'modernization', as against ensuring the continuation in power of the ruling party and politicians. It may therefore be said that they exhibit an *esprit de corps* deriving from their common understanding of their role in society.

While there is an element in this 'split', in the bureaucracy which is generational (many of the 'lower level' bureaucrats entered the civil service after independence in 1966 and as mentioned earlier were socialized within the multiparty system), another, more important factor is that of social origin. Most of them originate from the relatively better-off strata of the peasantry, mostly middle peasant households. These strata of the rural population have access to adequate income in the form of cattle and cash which can be invested in the higher education of their children (Kerven 1982). As will be shown, while they have benefited immensely from government rural development policies in the 1980s, from time to time all strata of the peasantry exist under precarious economic conditions.

Since most of them originate from rural backgrounds, these bureaucrats claim a strong affinity with the rural population. They often express a deep resentment of some of the policies of the present government, pointing to the increasing control of the business sector by foreign, particularly South African capital. They routinely deride the government for what one respondent referred to as the government's 'tendency to ignore the widening gulf between rich and poor'.<sup>3</sup> Most of all, they are highly critical of what they perceive to be a deliberate policy of slowing down the localization of the civil service. The 'expatriate question' has always been a sensitive political issue in Botswana.

The ideology of 'modernization' prevails across the entire bureaucratic structure. This concept is, however, subject to different interpretations. The group at the top of the hierarchy advocates the promotion of unhindered capital accumulation from which the poor would benefit from the 'trickle down' effect. The other section believes that capital accumulation and redistribution should go hand in hand, and if necessary, the former must be curtailed in the interests of the latter.

It is within this ideological framework that many of these bureaucrats also define their role as representing the interests of the poor. This role has

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3 Interview, Gaborone, September, 1988.

been of much significance in influencing the shift in the late 1970s towards some kind of re-distribution of resources to the peasantry. These bureaucrats have apparently taken up this role in view of the relative absence of effective grassroots organization designed to bring pressure to bear on the government for better policies. Their background is also an important factor which influences their support for a pro-poor policy orientation for rural development which is informed generally by a desire to eliminate structural constraints and any policy inconsistencies which may accentuate them.

As will be seen, however, this situation has had the negative effect of reinforcing an essentially top-down approach to policy administration and a paternalistic attitude towards the rural population. Furthermore, the notion of 'progressive farming' developed by some of these bureaucrats and which form the basis of their approach to agricultural development have, because they are more applicable to the better-off strata of the peasantry, had the effect of marginalizing the poor. It will also be shown that conflicts often arise within this bureaucracy, whose effects are to undermine this very concern with improving the situation of the rural poor.

### **The Origins and Nature of ALDEP**

After the onset of the diamond boom in the early 1970s the Botswana economy went through a process of growth that may be described as phenomenal. Gross National Product (GNP) per capita grew by some 8.5% annually between 1965 and 1985, which according to Harvey and Lewis (1990), was 'the most rapid rate of any country in the world'. Rates of economic growth in the 1970s were in excess of 15% per year (Colclough and McCarthy 1980). From US\$80 in 1966, GNP per capita had reached US\$910 in 1984. By 1988, GDP stood at P2,749 – a remarkable leap from the P36.9 recorded in 1966. In 1985, minerals, which dominate exports, accounted for 77.8% of the country's total exports of US\$353.1 million. By the last quarter of 1989, the country's foreign exchange reserves stood at US\$2.8 billion (Financial Times 1989).

As the result of an increase in construction activities and the growth of the public sector, formal sector employment grew considerably, by about 36%, during 1972-76 (Dahl 1981). In later years, particularly from the late 1970s, the rapid growth of the private sector contributed to a growth rate of formal sector employment of 11%, leading to a significant reduction of the level of employment in about 1985 (Harvey and Lewis 1990).

Trends in the early to mid-1970s indicated that the number of formal sector jobs within Botswana was set to grow by only 11,500 per year in the 1980s, which was certainly not enough to provide employment for the 21,000 school leavers entering the labour market every year (Whiteside 1986). Adding to this figure was the estimated 2,000 migrants returning from South Africa in the wake of the decrease in demand for these workers

in that country since the mid-1970s. In 1977 alone, the decline in recruitment of mine labour was of the order of 50%. On the other hand, throughout the postcolonial period the rate of rural-urban migration has been high. The rate of urbanization, at 11.3% per year in 1973-84, was the third highest in the world after Oman (17.6%) and Lesotho (20.1%) (World Bank 1986, 240-41).

Underlying these trends was the implementation of government policies which were directed mainly at promoting the cattle industry, which is firmly in the hands of the indigenous elite. The distribution of cattle is highly skewed, with 45% estimated as owning no cattle, 40% owning up to 50 heads each, and the 15% who are large cattle owners (or 'cattle barons') owning three-quarters of the national herd (Government of Botswana 1976, 109) of some 3.4 million. The cattle barons are also significantly represented within the state apparatus by senior national politicians and senior civil servants (Colclough and McCarthy; Parson 1980). The cattle barons and other rich agrarian strata have among them access to 42% of total rural incomes (Watanabe and Mueller 1984, 115).

In promoting the cattle industry, the Botswana state took advantage of new market opportunities in EEC countries which came in the wake of the Lome Conventions. This was followed by massive investment in the cattle industry and the promotion of the interests of large cattle owners in many ways. Major efforts focused on veterinary support, the development of water supplies and the maintenance of a low taxation regime on the industry (Hudson 1981; Hubbard 1986). This led to a reversal of the fiscal incidence in the cattle industry, turning the industry into a 'net recipient of public funds, whereas in the colonial period it had been a net contributor' (Hubbard 1986, 194).

The most penetrating criticisms of the favourable policy regime for the cattle industry and the bias in favour of the large cattle owners have come in the form of the now numerous analyses of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP). The TGLP was introduced in 1975 in the form of a government White Paper purporting to be designed as a rural development strategy whose main thrust was land reform and range management. The policy proposed the formation of private ranches under a leasehold system. It soon became clear that the main purpose of the policy was to expedite modalities of commercializing the cattle industry whose main beneficiaries were a small number of people, mainly the cattle barons (Cliffe and Moorsom 1979; Parson 1980, 1984; Hitchcock 1982; Molutsi 1986).

On the other hand, arable agriculture, from which the majority of the population derive their livelihood, was supported half-heartedly. The small-scale peasant sector was largely ignored and the majority of peasant households exhibited high levels of poverty. Only half of rural households had access to remittances and reliable sources of cash income in 1974-75

(Lucas 1985). Because this cash income is usually small, remittances are usually sufficient to ensure bare survival.

Agricultural production in Botswana is so-called 'deficit agriculture', marked largely by sub-subsistence cultivation (Hesselberg 1985) about half of the cultivating households produce too little basic food to sustain themselves throughout the year, while only a little more than one-third produce more than the family can consume (Hesselberg 1985). A good indicator of this is that presently, Botswana imports over half of its staple food requirements and the bulk of processed food. Arable agriculture presently accounts for a mere 3% of GDP.

It is important to note that arable agriculture is not Botswana's comparative advantage, nor the comparative advantage of the individual peasant household. The major contributors to Botswana's national wealth are the mining and beef sectors. On the other hand, because of the country's erratic rainfall, many small arable producers seek to minimize inputs in arable farming and maximize them (subject to the limits of household income, etc.) in cattle production, since the latter has a greater potential in terms of financial return.

Notwithstanding these observations, however, there has been a discernible bias against smallholder production throughout the post-independence period up to the initiation of ALDEP in the late 1970s. This bias does not, however, manifest itself in the form of a rising real exchange rate as has been the case elsewhere in Africa, but in the sense of a real and perceived failure to provide ways of increasing the productivity of the smallholder sector. Moreover, the country's marketing parastatal, the Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board (BAMB), tends to pay producers above border prices for gain (Jones 1981).

A crucial explanation of the bias against the small-scale peasant sector in rural development policy before 1980 lies in the manner of the peasantry's mobilization into national politics. The Botswana peasantry was inducted into participation in the country's multiparty electoral system not as an occupational group, i.e. as agricultural producers or peasants, but in the form of the more amorphous category of 'the people' – 'Botswana'. They were mobilized to vote in the first election under the BDP slogan: 'a vote for the BDP is a vote for your chiefs' (Moamongwe 1982), thus giving credence to a loyalty justified by tradition. The majority of the rural population were also not included in the party structure in the rural areas. They were instead expected to be politically acquiescent.

The effect of this approach to mass political mobilization was the exclusion of the agrarian question from the political agenda from the very outset. Moore (1983) discusses a similar trend in a slightly different context in Sri Lanka. He highlights the failure of peasants in that country, who have a record of voting different governments into power, to get the system to

provide better prices for agricultural products. However, Moore also points out that the government in Sri Lanka tends to re-invest the money taxed out through low prices in rural social infrastructure. In Botswana the problem is the more fundamental one of getting the agricultural sector off the ground.

Politically, the situation does not lend itself to a straightforward explanation. The BDP continued to enjoy large electoral majorities ranging from 68% (1969) to as high as 77.8% (1974). However, voter turnout has been varied but generally low, as demonstrated by the fact that 56% of the eligible population voted in 1965, 30% in 1969, 21% in 1974, 37% in 1979 and 56% in 1984. A possible source of concern for the BDP is that its share of the vote has tended to fluctuate, reflecting losses to the opposition. It was 68% in 1969, and reached its all-time high of 77.8% in 1974, seemed steady at 75.2% in 1979, and then declined to 68% again in 1984. These may be 'wild' swings which do not illustrate an underlying pattern, and they may also reflect a degree of voter apathy. It has been argued, however, that 'many instances of non-registration and non-voting are expression of discontent rather than satisfaction, with the *status quo*' (Polhemus 1983).

From the mid-1970s the government came under pressure from an increasingly articulate and confident opposition and, more often than not, from BDP back-benchers, to be seen to be doing more for the rural population. Criticisms of the TGLP increased the possibility of anti-BDP voter vengeance at the polls. The largely negative reactions to the TGLP among small peasants revealed the fragility of the state's control over the peasantry.

Also important was the issue of the government's maintenance of 'excess liquidity' in foreign reserves. This is a favourite talking point among opposition politicians in the country who routinely criticize the government of pursuing a conservative fiscal policy and of 'keeping money lying idle while no development takes place'. The rapid increase in national income, mainly from mining, was therefore another factor influencing the subsequent shift to re-distribution.

External factors also played a significant part in influencing changes in government thinking on rural development policy in the late 1970s. In the 1980s particularly, the most serious threat, although no record exists of it ever being made explicitly, was the possibility of punitive economic sanctions by South Africa, such as the withdrawal of South African exports to Botswana, of which over 50% would constitute food products. This would not only be economically damaging but would undermine the BDP politically.

Also important were the changes during the 1970s in the thinking of the World Bank and other donor agencies about rural development. The World Bank had until then been more prepared to provide funding for the cattle sector and large-scale arable farming. In the late 1970s these agencies began to advocate the 'smallholder focus' in agricultural programmes as against

large-scale farming. This was soon translated into a condition for certain kinds of aid.

The most decisive factor influencing the shift towards some form of redistribution, however, emanated from within the state machinery itself. A number of government bureaucrats, located mainly in the Ministry of Local Government and Lands (MLGL) as well as in the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), began to highlight the problems facing the majority of the rural population. The findings of the Rural Income Distribution Survey (RIDIS) published in 1976, which revealed serious income inequalities, were cited regularly. Since many of these bureaucrats were involved in rural development activities, they spoke authoritatively of a 'crisis' in these areas. The failure of the TGLP to be of any significant benefit to the poor was singled out for special criticism.

In response to all the factors mentioned above, the first step taken by the Botswana state was to assess the employment problem by commissioning an EEC-supported study by Professor Lipton in 1977/78. His report was instrumental in laying the general framework for ALDEP, particularly through his detailed articulation of a 'smallholder-focused', agriculture-based employment creation policy (Lipton 1978).

When ALDEP was eventually initiated in 1979, it was presented as the single most comprehensive and important policy in the Botswana government's strategy for promoting rural development and employment creation. It was stressed that the programme lay at the core of an 'integrated' rural development strategy, backed up by other new efforts in settlement planning, communal (village area) development, and the encouragement of small rural industries. ALDEP thus emerged as an effort apparently aimed at redressing the country's major structural and economic problems, particularly the continued bias against arable farming.

As outlined in government documents, the major aim of ALDEP was to raise the productivity and standard of living of small-scale peasant farmers. In the words of the Fifth National Development Plan (NDP V, 1979-85), ALDEP aimed:

*to increase production to achieve self-sufficiency in basic grains and legumes at rural household and national levels plus export surplus for these and cash crops in all but the poorest rainfall years; in so doing, to raise arable incomes (both self-employed and waged) through improved agricultural productivity, and to optimize income distribution effects by concentrating on smallholder development; and to create employment in the lands areas to absorb underemployment and reduce rural-urban drift (Government of Botswana 1979).*

Three broad groups of targets for the programme were outlined in 1978. The first of these, designated 'production targets', revolved around the objective

of increasing arable production by 4 to 6% per annum (ALDEP 1981). Under this plan average yields would rise from the present 200 kg/ha (and the mean of 10 bags?) to over 400 kg/ha. The second set of aims, designated 'income targets', involved raising average rural income from its estimated level of P460 per annum to P1,060 by the year 2000 (ALDEP 1981; Government of Botswana, 1978). Under the third category of targets, covering 'employment creation', it was hoped that agriculture would provide around 2,500 jobs per year, in the form of self-employment generated by the envisaged commercialization of smallholder production (Government of Botswana 1978, 166).

Perhaps rather too optimistically, it was also claimed that these efforts would help earn and save foreign exchange 'through import-substitution and rising exports' (Government of Botswana 1979, 148). The programme targeted the group defined as 'resource poor farmers', i.e. those cultivating less than 10 hectares of land and owning less than 40 cattle. These producers constitute an estimated 60,000 to 70,000 'traditional' farmers practising rainfed crop production. 11,000 producers were selected to participate in Phase I of the programme, which would cover the five-year period from 1981/82 to 1986/87.

The farmers belonging to the target group were divided into three categories, which were designated Models 1, 2 and 3. Those designated as Model 1 are the non-cattle owning group who constitute 45% of the total; 54% of these are believed to be female-headed households. Model 2 farmers are those with 'inadequate' draught power, as their cattle holdings fall within the 'unreliable' range of 1-25. The Model 3 group consists of producers considered to have 'adequate' draught power since they own between 21 and 40 cattle.

At its inception Phase I of the programme which would cover the five year period from 1981 to 1986 was to be financed with P23 million (equivalent to US\$29 million when the programme was initiated), most of which was obtained through loans from the African Development Bank (ADB) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The Botswana government itself covered 20% of the initial financial outlay for the programme. ALDEP was launched on a nationwide scale in 1981/82 after going through a pilot phase between 1979 and early 1981.

Under ALDEP the target group farmers were to be given access to agricultural implements and other inputs (officially called 'investment packages') under a credit scheme which was changed three years later to a more favourable grant/downpayment scheme. Under this scheme the farmer meets 15% of the cost of a particular package while the remaining 85% is covered by the government. The packages provided are the following: animal draught power (donkeys, oxen, or mules), animal drawn implements (ploughs, row planters, cultivators, and harrows), fencing materials, and

water tanks. In addition to these, the producers would benefit from extension and input delivery efforts which would be directly linked to the programme.

Recent studies of state intervention in the economy have suggested that the re-distribution of resources to under-privileged classes signifies autonomous state action. This is the case particularly if this action is undertaken against the interests of the dominant economic class (Skocpol 1979; Evans et al 1985). When considering the case of ALDEP in Botswana, this issue must be treated with extreme caution. This is primarily because the main economic interests in Botswana are based and well entrenched in cattle production and not in arable farming. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the cattle barons at any stage felt significantly threatened by the prospect of ALDEP.

However, ALDEP was cause for concern among the group whose economic interests are based on arable farming, namely the rich peasants and medium scale farmers who constitute roughly 10% of the rural population and cultivate an average of 50 hectares of land. They also own cattle ranging from 50 to 100 heads — a level which is significantly below that of the large cattle owners whose cattle holdings average 250. The medium scale farmers, and to some extent the rich peasants, are semi-mechanised surplus grain and cash crop producers (officially called 'progressive farmers') who also employ labour under a clientelist system characterized by the payment of the labourers in kind, mostly in bags of grain (Parson 1979, 201). They also play an important 'intermediate' political role acting as the 'eyes and ears' of the national politicians, particularly those of the ruling party, within the rural areas, a role which they perform in their capacity as District Councillors, village headmen, and district and village-level party representatives.

Since the programme sought to spread the services provided by government agencies among a larger group of farmers, to this group ALDEP seemed to pose the threat of diminished income. Until then government-provided credit and other facilities were focused on this group. As will be seen the decision in 1983 by the government to change ALDEP from a credit/subsidy to a grant/downpayment scheme led to concerted demands by the rich peasants and medium scale farmers to have such benefits extended to them as well.

In initiating ALDEP the Botswana state embarked on a path which significantly altered its approach to rural development. This tends to confirm the suggestion above that the state itself went through significant changes between 1966 and the late 1970s, and casts doubt on the impression of the Botswana state as an ossified structure, given by the many analyses which were based on the study of the cattle industry before 1980. However, the extent to which these changes were irrevocable is a different matter.

### **Implementation and Bias: ALDEP in Kweneng District**

A total of 1,213 farmers nationwide obtained ALDEP packages under the grant/downpayment scheme in 1982/83 (Opschoor 1983, 171-2).<sup>4</sup> By 1987/88 this figure had reached 21,034, 35% of the target group. On the surface, this appears impressive. However, this figure is merely an unanalyzed aggregate. The offtake of the packages has been concentrated on the group designated as 'Model 2', i.e. those owning between 1 and 25 cattle, who represent 67.3% of the beneficiaries. Another 20.2% of beneficiaries belonged to the 'Model 3' group, i.e. those owning 25 to 40 cattle, while the non-cattle owning 'Model 1' category account for a mere 12.3% of the beneficiaries.

About half of the 'Model 2' group (45%) are relatively better-off. They own between 12 and 20 cattle and plough an average of 10.1 hectares. Their cattle holdings are therefore safely above the 'critical threshold' for a reliable span of eight oxen which has been placed at 12 cattle (Vierich and Sheppard 1980, 20). The remaining 55% on the other hand own 1 to 9 cattle and plough 3.5 hectares of land.

The most important factor responsible for this bias in favour of better-off farmers are notions of 'progressive farming' developed by the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) agronomists and technical scientists. The dominant view is that 'progressive farming' is to be found at two levels. The first level is that of large-scale mechanized farming. The second is 'small-scale' farming utilizing 'improved' technologies, production and farm management techniques (Government of Botswana 1973, 1985).

The most effective way of analyzing the implementation of the recommended package of cultivating techniques is to begin by carrying out a brief comparison of the bureaucratic (so-called 'modern, scientific'), and the peasant (so-called 'traditional') approaches to arable production. MoA recommends ploughing in spring, around October. The majority of the small-scale producers, around 79% (Government of Botswana 1987, 120), normally begin ploughing in mid-summer, i.e. around December/January.

Row planting is considered to be the most important of the package of techniques recommended to small-scale farmers in the country. It is generally regarded as the greatest contributor to increased yield (ALDEP 1979). The majority of the peasants, however, practice the broadcast planting

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4 This discussion focuses on the ALDEP grant/downpayment scheme which was introduced in 1984 after the abandonment of the credit/subsidy scheme. The latter was abandoned mainly because of a low rate of package offtake due to the fact that the majority of the target group farmers did not have the financial means to take part. The scheme had also had a regressive effect, marked by a situation where the majority of the beneficiaries (some 60%) were richer farmers and a minority (13.4%) were not part of the target group.

method. According to a MoA report (1987), 87.1% of the 'traditional' farmers who ploughed in 1985 used this method (Government of Botswana 1987:130).

The majority of small-scale producers also fail to comply with the recommendation that they must weed their fields at least on two occasions during the crop year. MoA estimates that 87.7% (41,850) of the 47,650 crop farms which were weeded in 1985 did only one weeding (Government of Botswana 1987, 134). Inter-cropping (the planting of different crops in rows) is also rejected in favour of mixed cropping, which is done through the broadcasting method. The producers do however tend to comply with the recommendation to use of certified seed and fencing, the latter being an effective means of protecting crops from damage by animals.

Available data suggest that the 'traditional' approach to arable practices represents a mixture of good sense and risk avoidance, derived from experience. For example, most farmers broadcast seed when planting because they lack sufficient labour, draught power and implements necessary in carrying out the row planting operation. Planting in rows requires the use of an animal drawn planter over a field which has already been ploughed.

On the other hand, the practices recommended by the bureaucrats are not obviously efficient or feasible. It has also been shown that the agronomic and technical research schemes on which these recommendations are based are not particularly reliable. For example, Lightfoot (1981) asserts that these 'improved technologies have not resulted in significant increases in yields'. In particular, he shows in the case of broadcast planting that 'there is no large difference between the yields of row and broadcast crops'.

On the other hand, extension outreach among the peasants is generally low. For example, out of my survey sample of 120 producers in Kweneng District, only 45 (i.e. 35%) reported that they had been visited by their extension officers, called Agricultural Demonstrators (ADs), for the purpose of advice on methods of cultivation. Moreover, 47.6% of these farmers are rich peasants or middle peasants. However, almost the whole sample (92%) were aware of the extension package. Notwithstanding this fact, extension visits remain important as they enhance the flow of information between extension officers and farmers, as well as facilitate the provision of inputs to the latter.

To what extent does ALDEP provide a useful framework for reconciling the opposing approaches to agricultural production between peasants and bureaucrats in Botswana? The purpose of the programme is to assist farmers to increase their production by giving them access not just to inputs but to the means of introducing high-yielding cultivation methods. However, even official data show that the uptake of these methods has been low even among those who have taken some of the ALDEP packages (ALDEP 1987b).

This is partly explained by the fact that most of these producers have concentrated on obtaining ploughs and fencing. According to the ALDEP (1987) report for, ploughs account for 86% of the total number of implements of different kinds taken so far under the programme. The ploughs do not seem to entail a commitment to the recommended methods of cultivation. On the other hand, the low uptake of the planters and cultivators, which together account for a mere 14% of all the packages taken, serves as a limiting factor on the adoption of the recommended techniques. Row planting, for example, depends on the acquisition of a row planter. Therefore over the years since the programme began a small minority of the ALDEP target group have been able to acquire a full package of ALDEP inputs necessary to enable them to follow the extension programme.

The set of 'eligibility criteria' prescribed for participation in the programme have also played a major role in limiting the level of small peasant participation in the programme. These include the condition that the farmers must have 'shown that their crop husbandry management is adequate as shown for example by their past willingness to carry out timely ploughing and weeding operations' (ALDEP 1984). These conditions are rather stringent and they have had the effect of marginalizing poor peasants, most of whom are not in a position to meet any of them.

Another seriously limiting factor is lack of sufficient arable land among small peasant households. Most assessments have stressed that the main problem is not the lack of land as such, but that the available land is 'insufficient'. A study by the Botswana Government and the FAO (1974) found that 40% of the sample households had 'insufficient land' to meet their food requirements (Cooper 1982, 270). Insufficient land was estimated by Odell (1980) to be in the region of 1 to 4 hectares. Many of these households are therefore not in a position to increase their production to the required levels which under ALDEP are seen to be possible on a field of 5-6 ha. Studies carried out in Kgatleng District by Opschoor (1981) and Arntzen (1985) confirm this pattern (Opschoor 1981; Arntzen 1985).

Above all, as was subsequently shown in official reports, the majority of small and poor peasant households did not have the financial capacity to enrol in the scheme (ALDEP 1987a, 19). Although about a third (68% according to my survey) of peasant households have access to cash from various sources, for the majority in the form of remittances from members in formal employment, a small minority (some 12%) are in a position to spend this money on items associated with arable production. The majority use it to cover basic household needs. They cannot afford the 15% required as downpayment for most inputs under ALDEP. It may be said, therefore, that in this and other respects the position of the majority of small peasants is untenable.

### The Limits to Bureaucratic Autonomy: The Case of ARAP

The introduction of the ALDEP grant/downpayment scheme in 1984 set the stage for a major confrontation between the government and the medium and large scale farmers. Murmuring of discontent and talk of an equally 'free' programme, especially for the rich medium-scale arable farmers and rich peasants could be heard as early as 1984. This was fuelled by the fact that the economic fortunes of the rich peasants had been seriously undermined by increasing indebtedness and bad harvests in the drought years of the early to mid-1980s. In particular, complaints began to mount over loans owed the government major credit institution, the National Development Bank (NDB), which many rich peasants, medium and large scale farmers had obtained for the purposes of stock breeding, purchases of tractors and other machinery, diesel fuel and seasonal inputs. By 1986 many of these farmers owed the NDB large sums, perhaps P5,700 on average, and continued to accumulate more debts at a rate averaging about P3,000 annually.<sup>5</sup>

Realizing that the stirrings of discontent among the rich peasants could lead to political uncertainty, in 1985/86 the government decided on two strategies to defuse the issue. First, it announced an across-the-board writing off of NDB loans for seasonal agricultural items. The main reason given was that these farmers had suffered badly during the drought. About 1,400 farmers and up to P8 million were involved.<sup>6</sup>

A bolder move to placate these farmers came with the announcement in 1985 of the initiation of the Accelerated Rainfed Arable Programme (ARAP). ARAP was presented on 16 September 1985 in a speech to Parliament by the Minister of Agriculture as essentially a drought recovery measure and as a government initiative designed to benefit 'that large group of farmers engaged in arable production [but] not covered by either ALDEP or FAP'.<sup>7</sup> As stated in a MoA Savingram sent to all local agricultural offices on 9 October 1985, ARAP had been necessitated by the fact that the other programmes, such as ALDEP and the subsidy scheme for [business activities] called the Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) which was initiated in 1982 'did not fully cater for middle-level farmers'. Subsequent government notices on the programme, which was introduced during the 1985/86 agricultural season, pointed out that this was to be a 'project which would not be discriminatory to any group of farmers' (Government of Botswana 1988). This implied that ARAP was some kind of 'bonanza' scheme aiming at subsidizing and providing cash income for virtually every arable farmer.

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5 Interviews, Gaborone, November 1988.

6 Interviews, Gaborone, October 1988.

7 Hansard, *Botswana Parliament*, 1985.

An analysis of the implementation of ARAP reveals that the programme was formulated hastily. This suggests that the pressure to introduce it was immense. Unlike ALDEP for example, whose formulation took four years to complete, ARAP was announced suddenly. From the Cabinet decision to operationalize it, ARAP was taken through the pre-launch formalities in less than six months. Again unlike ALDEP, ARAP was financed entirely from government coffers.

Another peculiar feature of ARAP was that it provided cash payments to farmers for carrying out certain operations on their own land or on that of others lacking the technical means to do so for themselves. These operations included ploughing, for which the farmers were paid P50 per hectare ploughed up to a maximum of 10 hectares; row planting, P20 per hectare up to a maximum of 10 hectares; and destumping, P30 for 1 to 30 stumps removed, P40 for 21 to 30 stumps, and P50 for 30 stumps or more. P10 per hectare was offered for weeding, which was dropped from the scheme when it entered its second year in 1987/88. Each farmer could claim free seed amounting to 8 kg per farming household, estimated to cover a 10 hectare plot.

Even a cursory examination of the progress of ARAP between 1985 and 1988 reveals that it has been of disproportionate benefit to the tractor-owning medium and large scale farmers. Within three years government expenditure on ARAP, whose budget was initially placed at P29,890,000 but by March 1988 had grown to P55,858,008, was twice that provided under ALDEP. Except for P1,600,134 spent on fencing (2.9% of the total), which since 1986 has been provided free of charge to a selected group, and P3,817,245 spent on destumping (6.9%) the remaining P50,440,629 (90.4% of the total) was spent on non-permanent agricultural activities such as ploughing, row planting and weeding. Ploughing was the most popular of all these activities, accounting for 81.8% of the total and covering a larger number of beneficiaries. In 1987/88 ploughing alone covered 452,015 hectares, while row planting was done on 103,425 hectares, weeding on 121,760, and destumping on 42,305 hectares.

Clearly, ARAP has been able to reach a considerable number of farmers. The beneficiaries numbered 92,226 and 160,560 in 1986/87 and 1987/88 respectively. However, official ARAP data do not specify the categories of farmers assisted under the scheme. One has to rely on some simple but useful estimates based on known national data concerning the distribution of draught power among cultivating households. Considering that under ARAP those who own draught power were paid for ploughing for those without it, we may conclude that on a nationwide basis no more than 20% of the farming population received cash payments for ploughing. This figure is based on the estimate that 50% of agricultural producers in the country are definitely known to be lacking draught power and 35% have inadequate

draught power. The 20% who have access to adequate draught power consist overwhelmingly of either large-scale capitalist farmers or medium scale farmers and rich peasants who own tractors. It is also worth mentioning that ARAP statistics showing the total number of beneficiaries include all farmers ploughed for by others under the scheme as well as those who obtained cash for doing so. Thus, while a large number of farmers benefited from the scheme, those who derived an income from it were mainly the rich.

The effect of the implementation of ARAP on ALDEP was to restrict its modest but selective progress. As shown earlier, the latter had its many faults; but this programme, which was evidently designed to achieve a lasting solution to the problem of the low productivity of the smallholder sector, came under pressure as the direct result of the introduction of a scheme designed as a one-off exercise which in the end benefited only a few.

ARAP was literally superimposed over all the other MoA institutions and activities involving arable agriculture. The key institution drafted to implement the scheme was MoA's Department of Agricultural Field Services (DAFS) and its extension network. Although the post of ARAP coordinator was created, the structures and personnel functioning below him consisted of the whole gamut of institutions placed at the disposal of ALDEP.

The first salvo of criticism of ARAP's effect on ALDEP came from the ALDEP Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (ALDEP 1987a). This document highlighted the issue of pressure exerted by ARAP on the time of MoA's extension workers, the ADs, who under this programme were expected to measure farmers' fields to establish the extent to which particular ARAP operations had been carried out. Having done this, the ADs would then calculate the amount of money due to the farmers and complete forms in triplicate each for destumping, ploughing, row planting, and weeding, which the farmers would then take with them to the District Agricultural Office to claim payment. Considering the large amount of 'office type' work already faced by the ADs who also had to complete ALDEP forms, this more than doubled the amount of paperwork done by these extension workers.

One ALDEP document noted that the ADs 'who are primarily responsible for screening and recommending applications for ALDEP packages, remained wholly occupied with the measuring of fields for issuing certificates to ARAP farmers to receive payments' (ALDEP 1987b, 4). Emphasis in the original. This conflict over the use of the extension services was presented in another report which stated that ARAP was having a 'negative effect on ALDEP', with the 'result [that there] has been a loss of momentum for ... ALDEP which [relies] heavily on extension' (ALDEP 1987a:32). Some of the senior bureaucrats responded to these criticisms by pointing out that ARAP was a short-term and 'emergency' programme.

Another serious point of conflict was the fact that ARAP was providing free of charge some of the inputs for which ALDEP was insisting on a 15%

downpayment. Even though ALDEP had introduced a free fencing package for the poorest farmers around the same time as ARAP did in 1987, a major complaint was that in some districts the 'eligibility criteria prescribed under ALDEP regarding the provision of poles have tended to be bypassed by ARAP' (ALDEP 1987a, 32).

The most important cause of consternation among MoA bureaucrats over ARAP was their resentment of being made to participate in a programme perceived as a populist BDP political mobilization strategy. This view was expressed with more frequency after the government decided to extend ARAP into the 1988/89 season on the grounds that many farmers had 'still not recovered sufficiently from the effects of the ... drought to enable them to continue production on their own' (Botswana Daily News 1988). Ironically, the government media were at the same time referring to a 'bumper harvest' in the wake of good rains which broke the drought during the previous season.

District-level bureaucrats also voiced their displeasure with the scheme. A typical statement to this effect is contained in the 1986/87 Annual Report on ARAP of the Central Region which reads: 'We feel that ARAP should not be re-introduced afresh. It must be reviewed to become a subsidy (sic) for seasonal and on-farm inputs like herbicides, pesticides, fertilizer, etc. (Government of Botswana 1987, 3). Around this time it had become evident that ARAP was lowering morale among extension workers. Another complaint that has been made is that ARAP is creating 'a dependent society' by providing cash payments instead of market incentives and subsidies.

The large number of ARAP beneficiaries suggests a less virulent bias despite the fact that the scheme deprived ALDEP of some of its resources but also delivered something to ALDEP farmers. This, however, was undermined by the fact that ARAP created income for the better-off largely because it was corrupt. Among the unintended consequences of ARAP the most serious was an unprecedented increase in corruption and fraud involving both farmers and local-level agricultural officials. This took the form of claims for payments for fictitious ARAP operations, particularly ploughing, by some farmers in collaboration with some local officials and ADs.

This issue was taken up by the local private press with some enthusiasm. The 'Botswana Guardian' reported on 7 October that the government had been 'swindled' of a total of P178,000. Four cases of alleged fraud were cited in the report, which was alleged to have taken place in locations as geographically diverse as Lobatse in the South, Mahalapye and Machaneng in the Central District, and Molepolole in Kweneng in the South-East. The fact that the majority of the offenders were tractor-owning large-scale farmers rather than small peasants served to underscore the point that the availability of so much funds was corrupting particularly those with the capacity to make the best out of the scheme.

Most profoundly, the initiation of ARAP demonstrated the strength of socio-political forces operating at the 'wider' national level and its adverse effects on the coherence of action and unity of the bureaucracy. It demonstrated the limits of the autonomy of the progressive sections of the Botswana state bureaucracy vis-à-vis the national politicians. ARAP had the effect of undermining the unity and coherence of action of the bureaucracy and of strengthening the position of elite farmers more closely linked to the political interests of the ruling party. The effect of these developments was to severely restrict existing efforts designed to re-distribute resources to the rest of the peasantry.

### **Conclusion**

The foregoing analysis has demonstrated the limitations of the particular mode of re-distribution to the peasant sector currently being implemented in Botswana. In particular, the analysis has illustrated the argument that bureaucratic intervention in peasant agriculture is based on largely stereotypical notions of 'progressive farming' developed by MoA bureaucrats. This translates into a peasant-bureaucrat relationship which provides little scope for the reconciliation of the opposing bureaucratic ('modern, scientific') and peasant ('traditional') approaches to production.

This situation is accentuated by socio-economic factors which have had the effect of marginalizing the majority of small and poor peasants to the extent that they are incapable of deriving any significant benefit from a policy such as ALDEP. This has to do primarily with dwindling sources of income among the majority of small peasant households, undermining their capacity to take part in the acquisition of inputs despite the programme's favourable grant/downpayment scheme.

Various forms of bias against small peasants, which mirror a tendency to support better-off (middle) peasants and, as shown by the case of ARAP, medium and large scale farmers as well as rich peasants, limit the effectiveness of the process of re-distribution. These biases serve to undermine the progressive thrust of the actions of the bureaucracy and often result in serious inter-bureaucratic conflict.

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\* Department of Sociology, University of Transkei, UNITRA Umtata, Southern Africa.

# Concepts et approches pour une définition de l'espace sahélien

Boureima Alpha Gado\*

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*Abstract: How does one define precisely what the Sahel is? Where does it start and where does it end? That is the difficulty facing any researcher trying to grasp the physical and human contours of the Sahelian space. After reviewing all existing definitions and shortcomings of the Sahelian space, the author suggests another definition. What makes the Sahelian space original is that the Sahel is at the junction between two worlds. It is a moving space with fragile equilibrium. What makes the equilibrium fragile is the complexity and interaction of the limiting factors. The respective impacts of nature and history and may have rendered the Sahelian space an underdeveloped region where there is the abominable cycle of drought and famine.*

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## Introduction

Le Sahel, pour des milliers de téléspectateurs des pays occidentaux que les institutions internationales et organisations humanitaires prennent à témoins pour solliciter des aides d'urgence, se résume à un symbole, à des images: symbole du sous-développement, de la pauvreté, symbole de la main tendue. Pour des millions de personnes que l'on cherche à sensibiliser aux problèmes de la sécheresse et de la famine, le Sahel, c'est surtout des images pathétiques d'enfants squelettiques, carcasses d'animaux agonisant par manque de nourriture ou des nuages de criquets dévastant les récoltes. L'image caricaturale du Sahel que véhiculent les média à l'affût du sensationnel occulte malheureusement la nature véritable de cette zone, la complexité des phénomènes interactifs à l'origine de la dégradation du milieu et les véritables préoccupations essentielles des agriculteurs et éleveurs qui y vivent.

Géographiquement où commence et où finit le Sahel? Quelles sont les différentes interprétations données au mot Sahel à travers les réalités physiques, socio-économiques et politiques qu'il renferme? quelle est la nature véritable des fléaux qui s'abattent épisodiquement sur le Sahel?

## Origine et définition du mot Sahel: (le Sahel ou «les Sahel»?)

Pour la définition la plus courante, le Sahel est le domaine de transition entre le Sahara et le Soudan ou le point de contact entre les peuples de l'Afrique du Nord et ceux de l'Afrique Noire. Etymologiquement, le mot signifie "rivage". C'est la déformation du mot arabe *Sahil* ou *es-Sahil* (le

rivage). A l'origine, le terme désignait les collines littorales d'Afrique du Nord, et tout particulièrement celles du *es-Sahil* algérien (Copans 1975, 5). Par extension et métaphore, cette expression aux bordures du Sahara. De nos jours géographiquement, le mot «Sahel» est utilisé pour désigner la zone de transition entre les régions désertiques et celles où règne le climat soudanais.

La réalité sur le terrain est beaucoup plus complexe. L'espace dont il est question est plutôt une «zone mouvante» qui peut remonter au nord ou descendre au sud sur plus de cent kilomètres selon les variations de la montée du front intertropical (FIT) (Notes et et. doc. 1975, 10). C'est ainsi qu'une localité comme Bourem au Mali, en raison des régimes pluviométriques de ces dernières années, connaît un mode de vie saharien. Même à Gao (Mali) ou à Ouallam (Niger), les hivernages typiquement sahéliens se font de plus en plus rares, tandis que Dosso (Niger) et Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) considérées comme des villes sahéliennes, ne connaissent pratiquement pas d'aridité en raison des conditions climatiques très proches du type soudanais.

Des pays comme le Nigéria, le Cameroun, la Côte d'Ivoire, le Ghana, sont des régions qui, naguère soudanaises, sont en voie de sahélisation. En outre, les Etats d'Afrique de l'Est, qui ont les mêmes caractéristiques climatiques (Soudan, Ethiopie, Kenya, etc.) et qui constituent le prolongement géographique du Sahel ouest-africain, ne sont pas souvent cités parmi les Etats sahéliens d'Afrique. De plus en plus, les réalités sociales, économiques et géopolitiques semblent prendre le pas sur les seuls critères géographiques ou climatiques utilisés pour définir l'espace sahélien. On peut même dire que les différentes approches sectorielles ou socio-professionnelles des spécialistes intervenant en milieu sahélien ont donné naissance à plusieurs «Sahel». Au «Sahel pluviométrique» des climatologues s'ajoute un «Sahel pastoral» ou «Sahel des nomades» (Giri 1983, 12) par opposition au «Sahel agricole» ou «Sahel sédentaire» appelé souvent «Sahel utile» (Copans 1975). Enfin, la grande sécheresse des années 1968-1973, et la création par un certain nombre d'Etats du Sahel ouest africain d'une institution de lutte contre les effets de la sécheresse (CILSS) a servi de prétexte à l'utilisation du terme «Sahel politique» ou «Sahel géopolitique» (Giri 1983). Ainsi, des préoccupations diverses font apparaître un certain nombre d'approches qui aboutissent quelquefois à des conceptions différentes de l'espace sahélien. L'approche géographique privilégie les critères climatiques, géographiques, et phytogéographiques. Les concepts de «Sahel des nomades» et «Sahel des sédentaires» mettent l'accent sur des facteurs humains et des considérations socio-professionnelles et économiques.

Quant à l'approche géopolitique, elle voit le Sahel sous l'angle des rapports Nord-Sud, de l'aide au tiers monde, ou de la géopolitique de la faim. C'est ce Sahel qui suscite un grand élan de «solidarité internationale», dont les motivations déclarées sont humanitaires ou scientifiques.

## **Etude de l'espace sahélien: concepts et approches**

### ***Approche géographique***

L'espace sahélien est très souvent défini comme l'ensemble des régions subsahariennes vulnérables aux aléas climatiques "formant une bande de 300 à 400 kilomètres de large de Dakar à N'Djamena" (Giri 1983). En d'autres termes:

(...) la zone d'Afrique francophone au sud du Sahara la plus directement atteinte par la raréfaction des pluies et qui correspond d'ouest en est aux pays suivants: le Sénégal, la Mauritanie, la majeure partie du Mali et du Burkina Faso, le Niger et le Tchad. L'ensemble couvrirait une superficie de l'ordre de 5 millions de kilomètres carrés pour environ 25 millions d'habitants (Circoulon 1976).

Les limites géographiques ainsi définies ne font pas l'unanimité. Pour d'autres, le Sahel c'est tout l'espace s'étendant des rivages de l'Atlantique à ceux de l'Océan Indien (Pehaut 1986). Aux pays relevant de l'ancien régime colonial français, s'ajoutent ainsi le Soudan, l'Ethiopie, la Somalie, le nord du Kenya mais aussi quelques franges septentrionales du Nigéria et du Cameroun (Suret Canale 1968). Une des caractéristiques du domaine sahélien étant sa position rigoureusement zonale, au plan géographique, l'idée d'un Sahel ouest-africain exclusivement francophone nous paraît peu fondée, dans la mesure où des pays d'Afrique centrale et de l'Est et une bonne partie des pays comme le Ghana, le Nigéria et le Cameroun sont également confrontés de plus en plus à un déficit pluviométrique et alimentaire chronique. Dans cette délimitation de l'espace sahélien, on a souvent tendance à oublier l'archipel du Cap Vert, ce "Sahel maritime", compris tout entier dans la zone de faibles précipitations, et qui est chroniquement affecté par des sécheresses et famines.

Au plan historique, le Sahel précolonial, la partie ouest-africaine de cet ensemble, du fait de son contact privilégié avec le monde arabe et la Méditerranée, fut une des parties les plus actives du Continent africain. Berceau des grands empires médiévaux du Soudan (Ghana, Mali, Songhay), la région a connu une intense activité commerciale et de grandes métropoles au rayonnement spirituel, économique, religieux et culturel jamais égalé auparavant dans cette zone. Le seul moyen, nous semble-t-il, de contourner cette impossibilité d'attribuer un contour géographique précis à l'espace sahélien est de le définir à partir de ses traits caractéristiques fondamentaux: critères climatiques, hydrographiques et phytogéographiques..

### ***Le Sahel climatique ou "Sahel pluviométrique"***

Comme les contours géographiques, les limites pluviométriques ne font pas l'unanimité. Les bornes proposées vont des isohyètes 100, 150 ou 200 (pour les limites septentrionales) aux isohyètes 600, 800 et même 1000 (pour les

limites méridionales). Il y a pratiquement autant de définitions que d'auteurs ayant abordé la question. Jugez-en plutôt.

- Le Sahel proprement dit correspond approximativement à la zone comprise entre les isohyètes 800 et 400 (Copans 1975).
- La vraie zone du Sahel s'étend de 100 à 300 (Suret Canale 1968).
- Le Sahel comprend toutes les régions où les précipitations annuelles sont inférieures à 1000 mm (Notes et et. doc. 1975).
- On peut valablement retenir le tracé des isohyètes 150-200 au nord du désert, et 600 mm au sud comme délimitation du Sahel (Pehaut 1986). Ces dernières limites sont très proches de celles proposées par Bernus.
- Le domaine sahélien qui s'inscrit entre le saharien au nord et le soudanien au sud peut grossièrement être situé entre les normales pluviométriques annuelles 100-150 et 500-650 mm (Bernus s. d.).

Les relevés pluviométriques moyens à partir desquels on peut penser que les risques d'une délimitation du Sahel sont moins hasardeux, ne fournissent pas non plus une définition satisfaisante. Les tracés des isohyètes annuelles moyennes pris comme limites nord ou sud du Sahel sont donc très controversés. Les moyennes pluviométriques annuelles du Sahel "matérialisées" par les isohyètes masquent de très grandes irrégularités et de très grandes variations locales.

Une des particularités du climat sahélien réside dans la distribution journalière des pluies. On trouve des écarts considérables selon les années au niveau d'une même station et entre deux stations très voisines. Il apparaît ainsi pour chaque station de grandes différences dans la nature et le déroulement des hivernages successifs. Ainsi, à Niamey, 46 jours de pluie ont donné 112 mm de pluie en 1972. En 1964, le même nombre de jours a donné 705 mm de pluie. Le nombre de jours de pluie n'est pas significatif, mais il importe plus que la hauteur des pluies annuelles (Pehaut 1986).

Mais le nombre de jours de pluie a une influence considérable sur le cycle végétatif. L'importance de la durée du cycle végétatif par rapport à l'importance des précipitations a donné lieu à l'utilisation de l'expression "pluies utiles".

Après la pluviométrie, le deuxième trait dominant du climat sahélien est la température. La moyenne annuelle est généralement comprise entre 27° et 30° avec une évolution des courbes présentant des maxima en avril/mai et des minima en décembre/janvier. Il est reproché à l'approche climatique d'avoir longtemps privilégié l'aspect quantitatif des données météorologiques, en l'occurrence le volume pluviométrique annuel. Or, on sait que certaines années où le total des précipitations peut apparaître normal sont en réalité des années défavorables pour l'environnement.

### *Le Sahel hydrographique et phytogéographique ou botanique*

Au plan hydrographique, le domaine sahélien se caractérise par un réseau peu dense à écoulement intermittent, même en période d'hivernage. Les grands fleuves (Niger, Sénégal) prennent leur sources dans des régions plus humides du sud et viennent traverser le Sahel comme des "intrus" ou en "étrangers" selon les expressions métaphoriques de Pehaut (1986). C'est le cas du fleuve Niger qui fait naître sur ses deux rives des paysages naturels et anthropiques qui tranchent avec les environs. En année de grande sécheresse, comme les années 1972-1973 et 1984-1985, il arrive que ces fleuves tropicaux parvenant au Sahel se tarissent complètement en certains endroits. En ce qui concerne le Niger, la superficie immense de son lit majeur, surtout dans son delta inférieur, permet une riziculture pour les populations riveraines et des bourgoutières<sup>1</sup> (Copans 1975) pour le bétail. Ailleurs, l'essentiel du réseau hydrographique se résume au système d'oued.

(...) dont l'écoulement temporaire se fait par des crues violentes d'hivernage qui se perdent rapidement vers l'aval de vallées très larges héritées des périodes humides du quaternaire (Pehaut 1986).

C'est le cas des anciens affluents du Niger de la rive gauche (*les dallols*).

Quant à la végétation, elle se présente sous forme de steppe à deux ou trois strates: une strate herbacée plus ou moins continue, et une strate arbustive, buissonnante ou sous forme de brousse arborée. Pour beaucoup d'auteurs, c'est le *cram-cram* (*Cenchrus biflorus*) qui constitue la limite nord du Sahel. Au Sud la disparition de certains grands arbres comme le *karité* (*Vitellaria parkii*) que les autochtones appellent *bulanga*<sup>2</sup> ou le *kapokier* (*Bombax buono pazense*) ou encore le *néré* (*Parkia biglobosa*) est considérée comme un des meilleurs indices de la naissance du Sahel. Certaines espèces sont également très représentatives du milieu sahélien: le *baobab* (appelé *konya*, *adansonia digitata*) qui se rencontre essentiellement dans les régions sud-sahéliennes, le *palmier à doum* dans les vallées fossiles et le long des cours d'eau (*Hyphaens thebaica*) ou *kangaw* de son nom local, et enfin et surtout les *acacia*, comme le *gomnier* ou *delinya* (*Acacia senegalensis*), *garbeynya* (*Balanite egyptiaca*). Mais l'espèce sahélienne la plus utile et la plus célèbre en raison de son "caractère étrange" reste de loin le *gao* ou *gaonya* (*Acacia Faidherbia albida*), dont la limite septentrionale est généralement fixée au nord du 14° 30' (Sidikou s. d.). C'est l'espèce

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1 Pâturage du fleuve poussant à la faveur de la crue composé de plusieurs variétés de plantes dont la plus importante est appelée *burgu* (espèce hydrophile affine *Enchinochloa stagnina*).

2 Les termes locaux utilisés sont en Zerma-Songhay la langue parlée par la majorité des populations dans la boucle du Niger (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger).

représentative type du milieu sahélien. Son cycle végétatif est inversé. En hivernage, il est complètement dénudé. Cela permet aux éleveurs d'utiliser ses feuilles et ses fruits comme principale alimentation en saison sèche.

#### ***Approche socio-professionnelle***

Le milieu sahélien est généralement défini à partir de valeurs climatiques, la nature de son réseau hydrographique ou du couvert végétal. Le Sahel, c'est aussi des hommes qui subissent les vicissitudes de cette nature. Les facteurs humains, en raison de l'accroissement démographique exceptionnel que connaît cette région, sont l'un des éléments clé de la crise alimentaire chronique. En période de paix, et dans des conditions météorologiques normales, les populations du Sahel arrivent tant bien que mal à produire les ressources alimentaires nécessaires à la reproduction du mode de vie paysan. Mais en période de troubles (socio-économiques, politiques) ou sous la servitude imposée par les aléas climatiques, les moyens de subsistance susceptibles de garantir la survie du groupe deviennent aléatoires. En dépit des incertitudes sur les limites géographiques du domaine sahélien, il existe des données chiffrées sur le nombre d'habitants qui peuplent le sahel. Dans une publication de la Documentation Française, il est fait état d'une population totale de 25 millions d'habitants répartie en huit Etats dont le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Notes et doc. 1975).

Du point de vue de l'espace, on distingue à l'intérieur du "Sahel géographique" deux "sous-Sahel": le Nord semi-désertique entre les isohyètes 150 et 350, où, à l'exception de quelques oueds ou vallées fossiles l'agriculture d'hivernage est inexistante ou aléatoire; le sud entre les isohyètes 300-400 à 800-1000, où les conditions météorologiques autorisent les cultures qui sont la base de l'alimentation des populations: mil, sorgho, maïs et riziculture (sous pluie ou irriguée) dans la vallée du fleuve Niger.

#### ***Sahel des sédentaires et Sahel des nomades***

La partie Nord du "Sahel géographique" est appelée "Sahel pastoral" ou "Sahel des nomades" (Giri 1983), la partie Sud "Sahel agricole" ou "Sahel des sédentaires". Le paysage démographique épouse cette distinction entre "Sahel des nomades" et "Sahel des sédentaires". Dans le "Sahel des sédentaires", les aires les plus habitées sont les rubans de peuplement le long des axes hydrographiques (le fleuve Niger et ses affluents où les densités humaines approchent 100 habitants au km<sup>2</sup>). Sur les plateaux dunaires, l'habitat se résume en une multitude de hameaux dispersés dans les champs de culture. Les sociétés pastorales s'organisent en îlots de peuplement autour des points d'eau en saison sèche. Pendant l'hivernage, l'habitat est très mouvant car les éleveurs se déplacent d'un pâturage à l'autre.

L'image caricaturale souvent véhiculée est celle d'un "Sahel géographique" qui fut longtemps sous le contrôle politico-militaire et économique des sociétés pastorales, Maures, Touareg, Peul.

*Organisées en confédérations guerrières très mobiles grâce aux chameaux, elles exerçaient une pression constante sur les sédentaires auxquels elles confiaient le soin d'entretenir leurs troupeaux ou d'exploiter à leur compte des terrains de culture (...) quand elles ne détournaient pas à leur profit (par pillage ou par le biais de redevances de tribut) une partie des récoltes des agriculteurs (CILSS 1984).*

C'est l'occupation coloniale qui aurait perturbé ce rapport de force inégal imposé par les nomades et subi par les sédentaires. Les sociétés nomades ont perdu ainsi depuis la colonisation leur suprématie et leur pouvoir sur les agriculteurs. C'est l'exemple type d'analyse que développent certains auteurs qui ne retiennent des rapports entre agriculteurs et Éleveurs du Sahel que l'esprit d'opposition et d'antagonisme. En réalité, il s'agit de deux mondes complémentaires. Une complémentarité non "imposée par les uns et subie par les autres" (CILSS 1984), mais dictée par la nature. Les siècles qui ont précédé l'occupation coloniale ont été caractérisés par des conflits armés dont les origines et les mécanismes sont à chercher beaucoup plus dans les alliances et les intérêts de classe qu'au niveau de simples oppositions ethnolinguistiques ou socio-professionnelles. La maximisation de cette bipolarisation des groupes humains qui vivent au Sahel en deux mondes distincts présentés comme des groupes hostiles, a engendré une sorte de clivage d'opinions jusqu'au sein des organisations humanitaires. De là, à faire "un choix des victimes" entre ces deux communautés au niveau de l'orientation de l'aide alimentaire, il n'y a qu'un pas que certaines organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) ont franchi sans le moindre scrupule.<sup>3</sup>

Pour justifier leur intervention au niveau des seules sociétés pastorales, certaines organisations humanitaires protestent que les projets de développement mis en œuvre par les gouvernements des pays sahéliens ne sont généralement destinés qu'aux groupes sédentaires.

#### *L'approche géopolitique ou "Sahel politique"*

Cette conception de l'espace sahélien est celle qui est la plus fréquemment utilisée dans le langage courant malgré la confusion qu'elle crée au plan scientifique. Elle inclut l'intégralité d'un certain nombre de pays qui ne s'étendent qu'en partie en milieu sahélien si l'on ne doit tenir compte que des données climatiques.

Pour l'opinion publique internationale, les associations ou organisations internationales très souvent sollicitées pour apporter une aide d'urgence au Sahel frappé par une sécheresse ou des invasions acridiennes il n'y a aucune

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3 Nous avons pu constater sur le terrain au Mali que la presque totalité des ONG intervenant dans une région comme celle de Lere (Tombouctou) ou les populations nomades et sédentaires connaissent les mêmes difficultés orientent leur aide vers les groupes nomades.

ambiguïté: ce concept désigne les pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest qui, au lendemain de la grande sécheresse des années 1968-1973 ont créé une institution dénommée Comité Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel (CILSS) dont le siège se trouve à Ouagadougou. Ce sont le Sénégal, la Mauritanie, le Mali, le Burkina Faso, le Niger, le Tchad auxquels se sont joints la Gambie, les Iles du Cap Vert, et surtout récemment la Guinée-Bissau. Cet ensemble couvre une superficie d'environ 5,5 millions de km<sup>2</sup> pour près de 33 millions d'habitants (CILSS 1986).

Le CILSS se veut le seul interlocuteur sous-régional auprès des pays développés en l'occurrence l'Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques (OCDE), pour les persuader d'aider les pays du Sahel. Le Club du Sahel constitue une sorte d'arbre à palabres, sous lequel pays donateurs et pays bénéficiaires du CILSS se réunissent pour débattre des moyens de lutte contre la sécheresse et la famine au Sahel. Les neuf Etats réunis au sein du CILSS se sont fixés comme objectifs pour l'horizon de l'an 2000 l'autosuffisance alimentaire et un nouvel équilibre écologique qui conservera le capital foncier et forestier du Sahel (CILSS 1986).


### **Le Sahel des sécheresses, famines et épidémies**

L'image d'une Afrique sahélienne précoloniale à l'abri de crises alimentaires où l'homme vivait en parfaite harmonie avec son milieu ne résiste à aucune analyse objective. Aussi loin que l'on puisse remonter dans le temps, des causes naturelles ou humaines ont été susceptibles de rompre l'équilibre combien fragile entre l'homme sahélien et les ressources alimentaires dont il a pu disposer.


La figure 5 montre une tentative d'interprétation des relations d'interdépendance entre facteurs naturels et facteurs humains. Les causes du déséquilibre écologique sont très nombreuses et variées au Sahel. Le schéma démontre que les causes des famines ne sont pas exclusivement climatiques. Les facteurs humains jouent un rôle considérable dans la dégradation de l'environnement au Sahel.


Au cours du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle, le Sahel a connu un grand nombre de fléaux. Il est utile de connaître et d'analyser les mécanismes et les conséquences démographiques des plus catastrophiques d'entre eux. Parmi ces calamités, les plus couramment cités dans les sources écrites et orales sont dans l'ordre: les famines, les sécheresses, les disettes, les épidémies, les invasions acridiennes, les épizooties, etc.

Inventaire comparé des différents fléaux enregistrés depuis la fin du siècle dernier (voir tableau A).




Hydrographie






Végétation



LE SAHEL POLITIQUE

**Figure 5: Les relations d'interdépendance entre facteurs naturels et facteurs humains du déséquilibre écologique au Sahel**



A - Chronologie des grandes famines, épidémies et invasions accidéntales depuis 1870

Date	Sécheresses et famines dans la boucle du Niger	Épidémies	Invasions accidéntales	Famines et épidémies dans d'autres régions
1870	Grande famine "Gassu-Borgu" dans tout le Sahel (famine des cacaissées)	Épidémie au Sahel		1869-70: Famine à Tchit Épidémie de variole à Tchit et à Walata; Famine en pays Soninké (Sénégal)
1880	1885: Famine "Wogba" au Yatenga (Nom du roi)	1888-94: Grande épidémie de boeuf dans tout le Sahel "Samu"	1888-90: Grande invasion espèce non identifiée	1888-92: Grande épidémie en Ethiopie, famine en Ethiopie
1890		1893-94: Épidémie au Tékror et au Soudan		1893-96: Famines et épidémies à Walata et à Tchit
1896	Famine signalée au Soudan	1896: Epidémie de variole (I) à Tombouctou et boucle du Niger	1896-1902: Invasion du criquet migrateur	1896: Famine signalée au Tchad
1900	1900-03: Famines dans plusieurs régions du Sahel "Ize-Nère" (vene des enfants)	1906: Grande épidémie du Yatenga "Nagratang" et tout le territoire militaire du Niger	1906-09: Invasion du criquet migrateur	1900-03: Famines en Ethiopie et en pays Soninké (Sénégal)
1910	1913-14: Grande famine dans tout le Sahel appelé de "Gande-Béni" (grande poitrine)	1913: Variole au Soudan et au Niger.	1913-19: Invasion du criquet pétérin	1913-14: Grande famine en Ethiopie, famine en pays Soninké (Sénégal), famine signalée au Tchad
1918		1914-16: Épidémie de boeuf au Sahel		
1920		1918: Grande épidémie de grippe espagnole dans toutes les colonies		
1921			1928-33: Grande invasion du criquet migrateur dans tout le Sahel	
1927	1927: Famines localisées dans plusieurs régions du Sahel	1924-27: Succession d'années de peste bovine (A.O.)		1927-28: Famine en pays Soninké (Sénégal)
1930	1931-32: Grande famine dans plusieurs régions du Sahel "Doss-Jiiré" ou année des criques	1932-33: Grandes épidémies variolique/rougeoleuse dans plusieurs régions		
1940	1941-44: Famine dans plusieurs régions "Yeda-Kora" (famine de Yeda)	1937-38: Épidémie de méningite		1941: Fièvre jaune à Niamey, Doré et Fada.
1950	1953: Famines locales "Baro" (famine de manioc)	1945-46: Épidémie de méningite	1950-62: Invasions du criquet pétérin	1944-45: Famine en pays Soninké (Sénégal)
1960	1965: Famine "Bandalbare" (tourner le dos)	1951: Épidémie de méningite		1953: Sécheresse et famine en Ethiopie
1970	1972-73: Grande famine au Sahel			
1980	1984-85: Grande famine au Sahel			1974-75: Invasion du criquet sénégalais
1986				1985-86: Invasion du criquet sénégalais

### **Les problèmes du Sahel contemporain ou "Sahel postcolonial"**

Les conditions naturelles auxquelles s'ajoutent un contexte socio-économique, économique et culturel des plus défavorables contribuent à faire de l'espace sahélien un espace sous-développé qui compte en son sein un grand nombre de pays parmi les plus pauvres au monde. De nos jours, les dix plus grands maux dont souffrent les pays du Sahel sont:

1. crises des paysanneries,
2. faible taux de scolarisation et d'alphabétisation
3. chômage et sous-emploi,
4. mauvaise conditions sanitaires et nutritionnelles,
5. économies extraverties et dépendance extérieure,
6. agression culturelle et acculturation,
7. enclavement,
8. explosion démographique
9. dégradation continue de l'environnement,
10. rupture entre un Sahel urbain et un Sahel rural (crise de confiance)

### **Quelques données de base sur les neuf pays membres du CILSS**

Pays	Population en (millions)	P.N.B (\$US)	Espérance de vie (années)	Mortalité infantile (pour 1000)	Taux de Scolarisation (pour 100)
Burkina Faso	8,832	210	76	157	20
Cap Vert	0,369	370	60	78	
Gambie	0,812	360	42	194	52
Guinée	0,953	180	44	158	88
Mali	8,012	170	47	132	33
Niger	7,475	300	44	132	23
Mauritanie	2	480	45	138	33
Sénégal	7,171	490	45	155	48
Tchad	5,537	80	39	161	35

Source: The World Bank Atlas, 1986.

### **Conclusion**

Ce bref exposé sur les données physiques et humaines du milieu sahélien a montré les limites des différentes approches utilisées dans la recherche d'une définition pour le Sahel.

Les valeurs extrêmes (normales pluviométriques annuelles), que les spécialistes s'accordent à utiliser comme critère climatique, dissimulent en

réalité l'élément le plus déterminant dans les précipitations du Sahel: les grandes irrégularités dans le temps et dans l'espace.

Au plan socio-économique, les incertitudes pluviométriques, qui caractérisent en premier lieu cette zone, ne sont pas ressenties au même moment et de la même manière chez les agriculteurs et chez les éleveurs: "saison des vaches maigres" et saison des disettes ne coïncident pas. Les populations pastorales qui vivent avec leurs troupeaux ne sont pas soumises aux mêmes conditions épidémiologiques que les populations sédentaires.

Au plan démographique, certaines disparités régionales existent. En ce qui concerne par exemple le taux d'accroissement naturel des populations, un pays comme le Burkina Faso ne suit pas le mouvement général observé dans les autres pays du Sahel. La croissance de sa population est d'environ 1,6% à 1,8% au lieu de 2,7% dans les autres pays, même si cette tendance est imputable pour l'essentiel à une forte émigration vers la Côte d'Ivoire (Giri 1983).

Les considérations géopolitiques, quant à elles, n'aboutissent en définitive qu'à un concept ou une image du Sahel — destinée aux organisations internationales et associations humanitaires — que le goût du sensationnel des mass-média fait ressurgir le temps d'une crise alimentaire afin de donner mauvaise conscience à l'opinion internationale des pays donateurs. En outre, dans le cas du CILSS, cela laisse penser que d'autres pays africains ayant les mêmes caractéristiques, ne sont pas concernés par les problèmes de sécheresse et de famine.

#### *Quelle définition pour le Sahel?*

Beaucoup de critères utilisés pour définir le Sahel ne révèlent qu'un seul ou seulement quelques aspects des réalités géographiques, économiques, sociales et politiques.

Faut-il se contenter de ces concepts imprécis que sont les définitions qui nous sont proposées, ou proposer à notre tour une définition même provisoire du Sahel?

La difficulté majeure que nous avons rencontrée dans la recherche d'une identification du milieu sahélien est l'absence d'un concept local.<sup>4</sup> Il n'existe pas de terme qui peut être considéré comme équivalent au mot Sahel dans toutes les communautés ethnographiques du Sahel (Hausa, Peul, Touareg, Zarma-Songhay, Mossi). Par contre, il est très facile de se rendre compte que la question essentielle dans le milieu sahélien pour toutes les populations se résume en un seul mot: *la subsistance*. Le problème de survie

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4 La seule référence au mot "Sahel" est une terminologie Touareg utilisée dans la région de Tombouctou pour désigner le désert "Sahal" ou "Azouad" s'étendant au nord de Tombouctou.

qui est au centre de la vie des agriculteurs et éleveurs du Sahel doit apparaître pensons-nous dans la définition du mot Sahel. On peut retenir du Sahel l'idée suivante:

*Le domaine sahélien correspond en Afrique occidentale à la zone de transition entre les régions complètement désertiques où aucune activité agricole n'est possible sous condition pluviale et la zone dite soudanaise où les précipitations sont suffisantes pour rendre les cultures moins vulnérables aux aléas climatiques. Les sociétés agricoles et pastorales qui y vivent sont confrontées à un complexe de facteurs interactifs (climat, démographie, épidémies, épizooties, invasions acridiennes, systèmes socio-politiques, économiques et culturels inadaptés, etc.) limitant considérablement leurs stratégies adaptatives au milieu. Le facteur déterminant est constitué par l'eau.*

Cet essai de définition apporte-t-il plus de clarté et de précision que les précédents? Je ne puis répondre par l'affirmative. On s'efforce, en vain, de trouver des limites naturelles à un ensemble dont l'originalité réside justement dans le fait qu'il s'agit d'abord et avant tout d'une zone charnière, un maillon intermédiaire aux contours immatériels et impalpables. Dans ces conditions, toute définition reste forcément arbitraire.

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\* Enseignant Chercheur à la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de l'Université Abdou Moumouni de Niamey.

# **Democracy, Multipartyism and Emancipative Politics in Africa: The Case of Zaire**

**Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba\***

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**Résumé:** Cet article traite de l'histoire du multipartisme et des rapports entre le parti et la politique émancipatrice au Zaïre. La démocratie en Afrique d'aujourd'hui suppose-t-elle une politique émancipatrice? La démocratie est certes à l'ordre du jour en Afrique mais il faudrait éviter de la confondre avec l'Etat parlementaire qui nous vient de l'extérieur et qui ne favorise que l'élite intéressée par le partage du pouvoir comme c'est le cas au Zaïre. Un développement auto-centré des peuples passe nécessairement par de nouvelles formes d'organisation susceptibles de promouvoir les aptitudes politiques des masses pour la libération des peuples.

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## **Elements for a History of Emancipative Politics**

In Africa today, is democracy the new name for an emancipative (progressive, revolutionary or liberating) politics and is multipartyism its indicator or operator? Using the case of Congo-Zaire, this article briefly examines this difficult political question. To do this and to understand the political currency of the present world situation, a vision of emancipative politics is needed. In this context, the historicity of multipartyism and the relationship between the party and emancipative politics must be considered.

In its modern sense, emancipative politics is politics under condition. This conception was introduced by Lenin (1902) in his *What is to be done?*<sup>1</sup>. Politics under condition implies that politics is of a subjective order i.e., of the order of phenomena of consciousness; what Lenin called 'consciousness'. Politics is identified, in its subjective condition, as a 'revolutionary consciousness': it is a break with 'spontaneity'. In everyday life activities, we can identify three basic attitudes: political, trade-unionist and ordinary (routine or common sense based) consciousness. The political attitude is not accommodating; the state of affairs in the world does not have to remain so because it is so. People may live differently than they live. Politics is not expressed through the spontaneous consciousness. It is an

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<sup>1</sup> I am using Sylvain Lazarus's (1992) interpretation of the essay. Lazarus is probably the most creative thinker of Marxist politics around.

active prescriptive relationship with reality and not a reflection or representation in consciousness of invariant structures (economic structure or level of development' or the state). Politics is a creative invention. Let us do something about the situation! characterizes a political attitude.

Politics is one of the four generative processes (Badiou 1988; 1992) which produce *truths as events*. The other three are: science (scientific practices), art (artistic practices) and love. Truth-events, in science, are called 'discoveries'; those in art are referred to as 'masterpieces' and 'courtly love' was a truth-event of love. The ancient Athenian democracy, for example, emerged as a political event and not as a reflection in politics of processes outside of politics. Political materialism requires that politics be dealt with in political terms.

As Mao Ze-Dong said:

*'not everything which moves is red'; the mere existence of social movements does not carry with it the existence of politics. For there to be politics, according to Lenin, there must be a break in the subjectivity, a break described by him as a 'consciousness of antagonism with the existing overall socio-political order'* (Lazarus 1992, 9).

That is the active realization that the existing state of affairs must disappear — not as a scientific discovery but as a politics. This modern vision of politics under the condition of subjective break is encountered and not observed. It is revealed through militant forms of thought (e.g. Mao Ze-Dong's political enunciations at the outset of the cultural revolution) and not through the movement of history, or the representation (reflection, description) of social structures. Only such a symptomatic break and the militants it gives rise to differentiate politics from the state. The history of states is different from that of politics. Politics has sites and militants (Lazarus 1992). Sites are constituted by localized political processes through which matters of politics are treated. We can cite as examples the factory as site of politics (political processes against factory despotism), democracy as people relating to themselves, and the national question (political processes for national self-determination).

Emancipative politics does not always exist; when it does, it exists under conditions. It is, thus, precarious and sequential: it unfolds until its conditions of subjective break disappear. When people lose the consciousness of subjective break by ceasing to be involved in political processes, emancipative politics disappears. The completion of a sequence of progressive politics does not lead automatically to another. In the absence of emancipative politics, the state problematic or the imperialist influence prevails in the treatment of matters of politics. To reduce every political capacity to a state capacity is to abscond from politics.

Politics is incarnated or organized through what Lazarus (1986, 1989, 1990, 1992) calls historical modes of politics. Through an analysis — still incomplete — of the history of emancipative politics, he has identified five major sequences. The historical sequence of the Jacobin Convention (during the French Revolution) existed between 1792 and 1794 (the 9th Thermidor) with Robespierre and Saint-Just<sup>2</sup> as militant figures and the Jacobin Convention, *sans culottes*, clubs and revolutionary armies as its sites. The revolutionary mode organized this sequence. The sequence opened up by the 1848 workers revolutionary struggles ended with the failure of the Paris Commune in 1871. The militant figures of this politics included Karl Marx and Engels (authors of *The Communist Manifesto*): 'communists in the revolutionary movement' constituted its sites. Lazarus calls its historical mode of politics, the classicist mode (Lazarus 1991). The Bolshevik sequence, opened up by Lenin's *What is to be Done?* (1902), reaching a peak with the 1905 Russian Revolution, ended with the October Revolution of 1917. Lenin was its militant figure and the workers socio-democratic party and the Soviets (people's councils) were its sites. The revolutionary war' sequence, opened up with Mao's writings related to the Chingkangshan base, closed with the seizure of the state power by the Communist Party of China in 1949. Mao Ze-Dong was one of its militant figures and masses (political processes in the masses, 'Mass work'), the Red army, great situations (war, etc) were its sites. Lazarus calls its historical mode of politics, the dialectical mode. This is because, for Mao dialectics is the site of politics and politics the site of dialectics. And finally, the sequence of the Cultural Revolution, which started in 1965, ended in the spring of 1967. Mao was again its militant figure. The historical mode of this politics still needs to be worked out. I call it a non-party mode of politics. The respective historical modes and their characteristics related to these sequences are summarized in Appendix 1.

It is only in the Bolshevik historical mode of politics that the party was an operator reinforcing the revolutionary political process. The practical existence of the consciousness of antagonism with the existing overall socio-political order', a break with the 'spontaneous forms of consciousness', in a revolutionary process, required four articulated necessities: the need for professional revolutionaries ('Marxist politics'), necessity of viewing things from the perspective of the whole (at least from a national framework), the need for alliances between workers and rural masses, and the need to break the counter-revolution by a protracted centralized and militarily offensive process. The party was the operator to master that process. Moreover, the

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2 This important speech would have been a good source of inspiration in the CNS déballage, to explain why President Mobutu should have been condemned.

party was not the sole site of politics; the soviets (councils) were another site. Emancipative politics is a politics of a multiplicity of sites. That is why its identification through constant summing-up at an independent and consistent political thought is necessary.

After the seizure of the state power, in October 1917, the party became a structure for managing the socialist state. It became intolerant (Brinton 1970) of any break in subjectivity and independent politics. It is the existence of an independent (emancipative) politics which makes the destructive transformation of the state possible. The notion of professional revolutionary' and the military breaking of counter-revolution have state-line characteristics. The political treatment of contradictions among the people is not in line with these characteristics. Managing the state is not a destructive transformation of the state *per se*. From which sites is the state destructively transformed to allow the politics of non-domination to emerge? Is the violent change in the state personnel such a transformation? Does the routinization of a 'subjective break' constitute the victory of an emancipative politics? Those are difficult questions whose answers might explain the fate of Bolshevism.

In the situation of 'revolutionary war', in China, the party did not play the role of an operator of an independent politics. The Red Army was in charge of the political tasks of the revolution. The party, the mobilization of the masses, the people, etc. were treated politically through dialectical laws of political capacity — the distinction between antagonist contradictions and contradictions among the people was one of such laws. Political capacity under the condition of proper handing of dialectical laws does not solely depend on the party as an operator to exist. The party is one of the mediations of human capacity and subordinated under the same laws.

At least at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, politics under the condition of the subjective break with forms of the spontaneous consciousness occurred without the party and went against the state party (the Communist Party of China). This was the beginning of post-Leninism. Similarly, the French May 1968 movement and the Polish Solidarity led movements — with a repercussion of the Cultural Revolution politics — took the form of politics (without the party or against the party) through political movements. Since the failure of the Cultural Revolution to find a proper trajectory and operators, no self-proclaimed revolutionary parties have successfully incarnated emancipative politics. The Communist Party of China, *per se*, became an obstacle against such a politics; and the call to build a party of the new type produced no significant result.

This type of analysis of politics as 'revolutionary consciousness' is needed for Africa to be in a position to critically assess the limitations of multipartism. This will allow us to clearly distinguish 'democracy as imperialist policy' from 'democracy as people's political capacity for self

control and control of their leaders'. The so-called failure of African intellectuals to take up liberal democracy<sup>3</sup> may also be seen in a proper perspective; of which specific sequence of emancipative politics have they been (or failed to be) militant figures? We need to identify historical sequences of emancipative politics in Africa: their respective historical modes of politics, militants and sites. In what sense are universities for example, site of politics?

### **Tentative Analysis of Sequences of Emancipative Politics in Congo-Zaire**

From 1921 to 1992 five sequences of emancipative politics could be identified in Congo-Zaire. The Ngunzist (or prophetic) sequences, opened up by Simon Kimbangu's 'preaching', in 1921, ended with the establishment of the Kimbanguist Church.<sup>4</sup> Kimbangu's teaching summarized by 'the civilization of the Congolese, by the Congolese for the Congolese' enunciated a politics under the condition of the subjective break with *évolué* consciousness as well as the 'traditional' consciousness, i.e. a break with a submissive consciousness. I propose to call this historical mode of politics, the independence mode. Nguist groups, the healing-universal meetings and solidarity communities (*kintwadi*) were the sites of that politics. Kimbagu, Filipo Mbumba, etc. were the militants. In some aspects, the *Alliance des Bakongo* (APAKO) drew its inspiration from this Nguist politics.

The self-determination sequence, opened up by Lumumba's speech on June 30th, 1960, ended with Mobutu's first coup d'état and the assassination of Lumumba and his colleagues. This politics under the conditions of unshakable principles of self-determination (marked by a profound trust in the destiny of the country), in the epoch of the Cold War needs more study to characterize clearly its sites. Besides the 'popular meetings', and the 'Nation stripped of puppets', Lumumba tended to view even state apparatuses (government and parliament, especially) as sites. He increasingly found himself a prisoner inside his own government. The mere occupation of colonial

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3 I am referring to Jibrin Ibrahim's (1993) article in which we made too much of heroes for perhaps one's own publicity. In any case, I never call for a return to the past tradition. But, when a specific movement creatively reactivates ideas which once emerged in the past, one must explain why one has to reject them *a priori*. Even traditional intellectuals seem to be ahead of us on this. See for example Muhlberger (1993), and Geschreene (1982).

4 It is from the point of view of the symptomatic break enunciated by this new Nguist sequence, that it is made clear that the establishment of the Kimbanguist church by Dianangienda was based on a deviation from Simon Kimbagu's doctrine. By searching for recognition by all means, the Church fell back to submissive consciousness. A similar current is very much alive in Congo-Brazzaville related to Andre Matsoua and Matsouanism.

state apparatuses proved to be in contradiction with the politics of self-determination.

The second Independence movement sequence existed between 1963 and 1968. Pierre Mulele, Thomas Mukwidi, Théodore Benguila, Leonard Mitudidi and Felix Mukulubundu were its militants. The sequence was organized as a politics under the condition of mass armed insurrection in constant attachment with the rural masses. This politics had to distinguish various contradictions operating among the people to resolve them correctly. That is why I call its historical mode of politics, a variant of the dialectical mode of politics. Its sites were the various *maquis*, 'liberated zones', the *Conseil National de Libération* (CNL) and village assemblies and councils. The glaring omission was the neglect of cities and factories as sites of politics. Sometime in 1966-67, Mulele and colleagues were detached from the village masses. The condition of the subjective break with submissive consciousness disappeared. This sequence ended with Mobutu's 1965 coup d'état and the murder of Mulele, Benguila, Mukwidi, and Mitudidi.

Another Ngunzist sequence, beginning from 1969, seems to be gaining momentum. It incarnates a politics under the condition of *cultural break with Western domination* and reactivation and elaboration of indigenous civilization. This is understood as an actualization of Kimbangu's 'civilization of the Congolese for the Congolese and by the Congolese'. The first volume of the basic book, Makongo (equivalent of the *Bagvad Gita* the *Torah*, the *Koran*, the *Bible*, the *Nihonqi*, etc.) has been issued. I call its mode of politics, the *culturalist* mode. Its sites are called *Maziku* and are scattered all over from Angola to Gabon. Ne Muanda Nsemi (1989, 1992) is its militant.

The last identified sequence is that of the *Conférence Nationale Souveraine* (CNS) (Wamba-dia-Wamba forthcoming). It began with the formation of the civil society coordinating committee and ended with the forced closing of the CNS on December 6th 1992. I call its mode, the 'democracy mode of politics', it is politics under the condition of people's capacity as a political subject (people's sovereignty). The whole nation as a universal palavering community, 'the CNS, marches, secular Christians' Committee, civil society organizations, *Mbongi*, etc. constitute its sites. The coup attempt, triggered off by the January 1993 military looting, marked the end of this sequence. It is difficult right now to say who were its major militants: the late Dr. Numbi was definitely one of them. The above indications (see a summary in appendix II) are preliminary. They are only useful to characterize more clearly the consistency or lack of it of emancipative politics in the mass movement for democracy. The historical thread linking various upsurges of emancipative politics has been the emphasis on principled subjective break with submissive consciousness (rejection of every

form of domination) and people's capacity as a political subject (people's sovereignty).

Lumumba and Mulele advocated the necessity of the party but, it is not clear how the party could have served as the operator reinforcing the political processes in which they were militants (Wamba-dia-Wamba 1981). Of course, Lumumba failed to conceptualize the sites from where the colonial state and its conditions of existence (the submissive consciousness, etc) could have been destructively transformed. It is symptomatic that Mulele (Martens 1985) thought of the vanguard party as the key to extend and reproduce the 'liberated zones' in the epoch in which the party was becoming an obstacle to emancipative politics. Parties (self-proclaimed Lumumbist or Mulelist) created after the death of Lumumba or Mulele, do not seem to incarnate an emancipative politics. Madame Pakasa, the 'iron lady', seems to have led pro-democracy marches independently of the *Party Lumumbiste Unifié* (PALU) party politics. The centrality of the party to bring about a politics of non-domination in Congo-Zaire needs to be proved. What politics (i.e. subjective break) will it be an operator of?

People's resistance against the Congo-Zairean neocolonial state has been protracted since the assassination of Patrice E Lumumba (17/1/1961). A political class collaborated in his murder while serving the West in the localized struggle against the communist world. This class was formed through a Western imposed variant of parliamentarism and encouraged to use physical elimination of political adversaries as a method of political rule. Lumumba incarnated, at least briefly, a form of politics operating under the condition of complete subjective independence. It required a complete break with *évolué* class consciousness of submission to the West. The practical impossibility for its immediate realization led, among other things, to his murder. This practical impossibility is often dealt with in terms of the need of a vanguard party serving as the leading core of the whole people. Without an undying confidence in the Zairean masses, this problem cannot be solved. How can a politics under the condition of a subjective break be provoked in the people?

### **Multipartyism in Congo-Zaire**

The first Constitution of Congo-Zaire, *La Loi Fondamentale*, was patterned on the Belgian model. It:

*had juridical implications exactly like those of the Belgian monarchical constitution: a head of state who 'rules' but does not govern; a government supervised and able to be dismissed by the head of state; an over-large and relatively powerless parliament consisting of a chamber of representative and a Senate. There was furthermore a colonial 'Force Publique' more in the nature of an expeditionary force than the basis for a real national army; and a carefully worked out limitation to*

*the powers of the central government, which would enable the provincial authorities to make decisions against the national interest, but to the advantage of foreign big business (Ranza 1977).*

That was the framework, rooted in imposed structures of conquest, on which multipartyism was grafted in Congo-Zaire.

Modern state structures in Central Africa were fundamentally erected on the basis of military conquest<sup>5</sup> as required by primitive accumulation for Western powers and economies. They had, as a backbone, praetorian militarism. Almost everywhere, coups d'état prevented popular attempts to create state formations principally based on civil institutions.

In this context, multipartyism could only be limited to *évolués* (i.e. Westernized, principally urban people) who had accepted and internalized their individual conquered state. To them, independence was an extra gift of the colonial civilizing mission — sign that one has evolved — and not as a result of struggles against foreign domination. Only after a real cultural revolution and a complete freeing of their colonial subjectivity can the universalist significance of multipartyism become apparent. The reproduced colonial state-neocolonial state — is seen as the key structure to have access to outside benefits.

The limited multiparty system, open principally to *Évolués*, became an occasion for the Africanization (replacing white colonialists from the colonial state apparatuses) of the 'independent' variant of parliamentary post-colonial state. In relation to the perspective of entering the colonial state, parties defined through this multipartyism framework were not fundamentally different from those sponsored by white colonialists. Those which drew some inspiration from repercussions of emancipative politics (the Ngunzist element for ABAKO, etc.) ran into crisis while trying to fit into multipartyism. The latter was at variance with ABAKO's demand for a federal reorganization of the colonial state, for example.

The multiparty system is a form of the state and not independent of or antagonistic to it. In its subjective dimension (see Appendix 3) the system entertains spontaneous consciousness'. Legal and constitutional dimensions, separation of powers, recognition of freedoms of association, expression, religion, etc., are structural traits of the state. They do not identify a mode of politics which has to be grasped through its subjective dimension. Subjectively, the above freedoms are not often consciously exercised. Voting, the institutional articulation between the subjective side of opinion and the governmental objectivity, is the essential political act of parliamentarism. It

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<sup>5</sup> The implications for the resulting form of state are well discussed by Cheikh Anta Diop, (1981).

transforms vague ‘programmes’ or ‘promises’ of parties into the authority of a consensus — useful to capital. The parliamentary state, thus, has no programme (which can only be that of a social group or class) as this state has to be only functional and based on consensus; it is regulated externally by capital. By insisting that his government had to have a programme for the interests of the oppressed, for the complete abolition of conditions of colonial life (June 30th 1960 speech), Lumumba had to go; he did not abide by the authority of the consensus. To protect the authority of the consensus, a multiparty system can become very repressive. Very much so, when it is, like the one introduced in the ‘decolonization process’, grafted onto a colonial, essentially undemocratic (variant of apartheid) state. The state, in our African countries, is fetishized: it is believed that through the state people will have international aid and without it nothing can be done. This is in line with Nkrumah’s ‘seek ye first the political kingdom and everything will be given unto ye’. Relations of power, of production and of consumption are thus fetishized.<sup>6</sup> The real role of the state in imperialist dominated relations of power and production is misunderstood. The state is seen to represent only relations of international legitimization.

Very soon, in Congo-Zaire, the masses realized that independence had been sold to imperialist powers by the murderers of Lumumba. And people had to struggle for a Second Independence (Wamba-dia-Wamba 1987). The constitution of the CNL (first indication of a subjective breach with *évolué* independence) opened up the sequence of the Second Independence which reached its peak with Mulele’s leadership of mass armed insurrections. The pro-West neocolonial state, during this sequence, was on the verge of collapse. Through a coup d'état (1965), with direct and indirect Western interventions (military and financial) the state was re-organized<sup>7</sup> As long as the peoples’ organized resistance continued, governing the country was just a continuous reproduction of the coup d'état. That is a permanent or protracted organization of the usurpation of people’s sovereignty. This is how (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1980) developed, a policy which needs outside support to survive.

After the defeat of the armed mass insurrections, different forms of political organizations incarnated the pursuit of people’s resistance. This was

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6 My thanks to Jacques Depelchin who reminded me of this important issue of state fetishism in Africa.

7 One of the leaders of the mercenaries, Mike Hoare, who helped destroy the 1964 nationalist movement and who, by so doing, laid the conditions for the 1965 coup d'état was reported to have said: ‘our mission in the Congo was to kill as many communists as possible. As far as we were concerned all Congolese were potentially communists. We killed as many as we could’. These mercenaries, like the missionaries before them, described themselves as ‘defenders of Western civilization’.

true under the *Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution* (MPR) fait privé state (1967-1971), the Authentic neocolonial state (1972-1986), the *MPR-Parti Etat* state (1986-1990) as well as now under the 'split personalized collapsing' (Mobutist/Haut Conseil de la République (HCR) state. Those organizations included: religious movements,<sup>8</sup> student movements, 13 parliamentarians' Second Party movement leading to the creation of the *Union pour le Développement et le Progrès Social* (UDPS), armed struggles (*Front National de Libération du Congo* (FNLC) and two Shaba, People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), etc.), peasant mobilization movements and cooperatives (*La Solidarité Paysanne*), and other so-called civil society' organizations (e.g. *L'Ordre des Médecins*), etc. As long as the Cold War existed, supporting the process of neocolonization based on militarism, massacres of population (e.g. Kwilu) or massacre of students (1969-1990) was acceptable to the Western sponsors of the state. By 1990, of course, after the end of the Cold War, the concentration and convergence of the resisting people's forces galvanized into a strong mass movement for democracy against the increasingly personalized '*Mobutiste*' state which has continued to usurp people's sovereignty.

The December 1989 events in countries of Eastern Europe started off a process, leading to the collapse of socialist states and the break with socialism, opening up the epoch of post-socialism. Celebrants of capitalist triumphalism have seen in this development the 'end of history', the 'triumph of capital over communism', and a 'single transition from planned economy to market economy'.<sup>9</sup> Shock therapy advice, based on classical capitalist property rights, has been given to those countries. The centrality of understanding the role of the state in capitalism has thus been left out. After all the epoch is periodized by the collapse of the state. When a state collapses (or is in a dying crisis) does the combination of multipartyism and marketization constitute an emancipative solution? Is this solution that is being applied in post-socialism states and societies doing any miracles? The movement for democracy in Zaire is being offered this solution by the West

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8 At some point, the number of syncretic churches reached up to 4000. The regime took measure making it illegal to create a church outside of the accepted ones. Some of these churches were hidden ways of doing politics under a single party authoritarianism.

9 In fact, in the USSR, for sometime before the collapse of the state, through a series of reforms, new norms of production, circulation and sometime capitalization in certain sectors of the economy were introduced. This was, under the socialist state, an attempt to develop sectors regulated through market economy. This was a transition from planned economy to market economy within the socialist state. China is in this transition. This transition, in the USSR, did not solve the problem those reforms aimed at solving. Instead, it aggravated them leading ultimately to the collapse of the socialist state and a break with the first transition.

and its local allies. Despite some reluctance, Mobutu himself accepted this idea under the condition that it be grafted onto his state!

Since European intervention in Africa or the colonial period, international capital and its world economy subordinated our countries' economies. The open door policies connected with the 1960s experiences of multipartyism and marketization failed to provide for the masses' basic needs. The resumption of the people's struggle for the Second Independence interrupted the experience. Attempts, in Africa, at some 'rationalist protectionist reforms ('non-capitalist path', developmentalist experiences, etc.) were fought against in a very protracted way, by institutions of international capital — the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and their supporting states. Strategies included: invasions, coup d'état, Structural Adjustment Programmes and aid conditionalities. They were presented, as in the case of colonial civilizing mission, as acts of charity to salvage the countries from the very crises they had induced. This reminds me of a saying by one of the Nzinga ancestors: 'Colonialists found us alive, well and kicking; after they had taken over our land they turned around and claimed that if it were not for them, we were going to die off'. The appeal to marketization and multipartyism as a solution to bring up our countries and economies in the image of the West for the latter's interests is not new. It is more audible now within the movement for democracy because we are in the epoch of post-socialism. The celebrants of capital (in its worldwide phase) present the Western variant of democracy as emancipative politics — leaving hidden the fact that pro-democracy movements are also developing in those countries. This new transition to more marketization aiming at breaking down through enclosures remaining social ties (which allow people to reproduce themselves), will not guarantee the emancipation of the masses of people. Further marketization of an economy already subordinated under the international market will not take up the question of people's basic needs.

The crisis of parastatals, in Africa, for example, reveals the crisis of the state whose role has been fetishized. It was the informal unethical privatization in the functioning of the parastatals which led these to crisis. Formalization of that privatization will not change much as far as people's needs are concerned. When a head of state steals from his own state treasury or uses national resources in private dealing with the outside, is there a state? When a head of state privatizes the army or the central bank, is there still a state and is he still a head of state? An appeal to reconstruct the state from the point of view of the people is part of an emancipative politics.

The analysis, briefly alluded to above, is important for appreciating the forms of consciousness structuring the politics of the mass movement for democracy. This powerful movement does not just aim at bringing out liberal democracy or a parliamentary form of the state. Even if it were the case, we need to know on whose initiative this is being realized. The various

forms of consciousness characterizing the movement are complex and need a thorough study. It is reductionist and statist to insist that as we are in a post-socialism period only those forms of the subjective break that are consonant with the parliamentary form of the state are epoch-making and supportable. This attitude forgets that 'people think'. A politics which does not start from the notion that 'people think' is an oppressive elitist politics.

### Zaire under the Sequence of the Conference Nationale Souveraine

On the 24th of April 1990, President Mobutu made an important speech introducing a limited multipartyism. International pressure connected with the end of the Cold War and internal pressure-from-below forced Mobutu to accept limited political pluralism. Forces of resistance which were brewing underground suddenly came to the fore.

Despite some reluctance and retreat (May 1990 speech), by June 1990 President Mobutu was forced to grant complete multipartyism. Parties started to form and register by the dozens, reaching by the opening of the *Conférence Nationale Souveraine* (CNS) in July 1991, at least 300 parties. Independent newspapers, very critical of the regime and of its President, arose almost eclipsing the official ones. Subjects which used to be taboo, such as Mobutu's CIA involvement, started being publicized.<sup>10</sup>

During the epoch of the Cold War, the United States led Western countries had a tight grip on Zaire by relying on the militaristic usurpation of the people's sovereignty. Mobutu and his Binza group were the key elements in such a grip. To remind the reader, the Binza group grew out of the CIA sponsored effort to politically and physically eliminate Patrice E Lumumba who was seen as a potential if not a real ally of the Communist World. Mobutu used 'the threat of Communism' to get the necessary support of the Western powers in smashing the Congolese people's resistance to this dictatorial rule. Direct invasions,<sup>11</sup> mercenaries as well as financial and military aid were used for this purpose.

Without the threats posed by the Cold War, the West had to change the form (if not the content) of its grip on the country. Lessons drawn from the experiences of the Eastern European countries had to be taken into account. The new form of grip had to be a combination of the World Bank/IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes and the articulation of multipartyism

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10 Here are some of the titles appearing in various newspapers: 'Mobutu l'homme de Washington Révélations sur les opérations secrètes de la CIA' *'La Conscience'*, 50 (19-26 Sept. 1991); 5-8. 'Mobutu pourrait se réfugier au Brésil' *Elima*, 6 (14-15 sept. 1991). 'Mobutu Assassin' *La Conscience*, 49 (13-19 sept. 1991).

11 Comité d'organisation et de promotion de la mouvance progressiste du Zaïre (Congo), 'le Peuple Congolais doit être son propre libérateur'. *Solidaire*, 8 (827) (24 Feb. 1993); 14. The most recent account of six foreign (Western) invasions since independence.

(‘democratic governance’) and marketization (through the community of essentially compradore NGOs). Pushed by the radicalization of the lower clergy, the Catholic higher clergy, supportive of Mobutu’s regime all along,<sup>12</sup> started agitating for democracy. Notorious members of the Binza group became also supporters of democracy’. This made it somewhat difficult to differentiate democracy as imperialist policy’ from ‘the real thing’: self-emPOWERment of the people for people’s sovereignty necessary to control themselves and their leaders. The dominant matter of politics of this sequence emerged as the need to rehabilitate people’s sovereignty against all those who have condoned its usurpation: Mobutu and his (national and foreign) allies. How to understand this need, what to do to achieve it or make it impossible to be achieved is the bases of the Zairean people in different camps.

We can, very roughly differentiate three camps in the Zairean politics during this period: the camp of those in power and around Mobutu forming a group giving itself different names at different moments — from *Famille Présidentielle*, *Majorité Présidentielle* to *Mouvance Présidentielle*. This group is fundamentally opposed to any form of people’s sovereignty. It would like to use anything-including multipartyism — to keep itself in power without changing the content of its dictatorial power. The second camp includes elements of the political class in the opposition — essentially an internal class opposition — organized in parties regrouped in four fronts: the *Union Sacrée radicale* led by UDPS, the *Union sacrée libérale*, *Front nationale des partis progressistes* and *Union des Forces Nationalistes Lumumbistes* led by PALU. These regroupings keep shifting with the unfolding of political struggles. This is the camp of the elite politics of democracy. The idea of the people’s sovereignty is slightly modified as national sovereignty more in line with state politics. The occupation of state positions, by good people, through fair elections constitutes the horizon of this camp’s politics. In the absence of documents, it is difficult to analyze and correctly classify the 300 or so parties contending for state power. Of course, the second camp is for liberal democracy and against Mobutiste state militarism. It hardly grasps the essence of Mobutiste regime and uses vague notions such as ‘dictatorship’, ‘personalized state’. It does not seem so clear to many members of this camp that the mere disappearance of Mobutu will not destroy his regime.

Parties which have remote connections with past mass uprisings (UGEC student movements, Mulelist mass armed insurrections, Second party

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12. Even the declarations of Churches (Catholic, Protestant and Kimbanguist) at the CNS contained no credible self-criticism for the fact that they have, in the main been supporting Mobutu’s dictatorship from which their leaderships have benefitted a lot.

movement) such as UDPS, PALU, *Front Patriotique*, etc. seem to have organized links with the large masses of people, much more so than others. These parties seem to accept the notion of people's sovereignty, even if they give priority to the control of the state. They feel, like others, that nothing can be done without state power.

Parties of the *Mouvance Présidentielle* are just mediations inside the people and the state of Mobutiste dictatorship. Former collaborators of Mobutu, who became very rich by dubious means and later became disappointed with Mobutu, lead some opposition parties (e.g. *Union des Démocrates Indépendants* — UDI). In view of the new balance of forces, these former collaborators perfectly understand that their only possibility to remain in power will depend on distancing themselves from Mobutu.

In the main, most of the self-styled parties are not parties at all, but clientelist, family and corruption based state organizations (in the sense that they are geared towards sharing state power). It is difficult to believe that the representatives to the *Conférence Nationale Souveraine* of some of these parties were representing anything more than their personal interests. *Directoires* (Central Committee) of these parties were never elected by any party congresses. Judged by the number of scandals going on in established democracies (Italy, Japan, etc) can we not say that this way of functioning of parties is typical of multipartyism. On the other hand, in Kinshasa at least, one felt that a strong connection existed between the people and the UDPS, PALU and to a lesser extent, MDR (where some cadres were nothing but state security agents).

The people's camp which constitutes a terrain of struggles is organized by multiple types of organizations (civil society organizations, church based organizations, etc.) through which the would-be ruling political class tries to win people over to its politics. It is precisely because of the historicity of the political class and its organizations, that the civil society as a political category viewed as being independent from party politics emerged.<sup>13</sup> It was an attempt to conceptualize a people's politics independent from the elite politics of multipartyism. Division in this camp are numerous: Class, gender, generation, urban/rural, ethnic, etc. The progressive leadership among the civil society organizations has been trying to unite the camp. This topic needs further research to explain the independent political stand vis-à-vis political parties. The coordinating committee of the civil society group, especially under the leadership of the Late Dr Numbi, incarnated this stand.

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13 In Zaire the use of the category *société civile* is very particular. It does not include political parties. It is an indication of the political distance advanced civil society organizations would maintain in relation to political parties geared towards the occupation of state posts.

The main objective of the struggle of the opposition elements of the Zairean 'ruling' political class is to force the *Mobutiste* state to open up to other members of the class in the dynamics of *power sharing*. This is true whether or not these class members are organized or not in their various parties. This political class, to salvage its class global interests, wants to end Mobutu's reign which is based on an increasingly narrow clientelist network and Western sponsorship. However, as a class, they remain open to Western commands (orders) for solving Zairean political problems. The call for democracy, coming from the mass movement, is politically interpreted by them as signifying the return to or the realization of the multiparty system and not as the self-empowerment of the Zairean people to overthrow the compromised political leadership based on the usurpation of people's sovereignty. That is, the 'ruling' class members want a parliamentary form of the state stripped of *Mobutiste* militarism and extravagances of personal exercise of power, but not necessarily of its Western sponsorship. This approach was very actively supported by elements of the Sinza group, the CIA sponsored Zairean power broker. At face value, this idea constitutes a major change in the existing state if compared to the period before the acceptance of multipartyism. However, it is clear, that at this point, this party pluralism does not strip the state of its militarism and extravagance.

The state and the market constitute two appealing arenas 'for the class members' appetite for accumulation. The competitions of Mobutu, in terms of wealth (Kengo wa Dondo, Thalbwa Lyalba, etc. who are regrouped in UDI) are in the *Union Sacrée Radicale* pushing for market economy and the privatization of state parastatals. Democracy precisely means here to make the rules of the accumulation game fairer than Mobutu has made them.

In contrast, the masses of Zairean people and their militants want a new politics and a new society for the country. They want the country to cease from being controlled by outside Western interests (economic or strategical) through a Zairean minority which benefits from this relationship. They want the country to be made self-propelling on the basis principally of the basic needs and wants of the Zairean people as a whole. They want true independence against any attempts at colonization or neocolonization; they want real liberation from imperialist domination; and they want the transformation of social relationships which make social justice possible. To achieve this, the key is a process of political self-empowerment of the people i.e., the revitalization of people's sovereignty which has been usurped since the overthrow of Lumumba's government. The political class, whose rule has been erected on the basis of this very usurpation, must be forced to reform its modes of life or prevented from controlling the state. The links with Western powers, based on the denial of people's sovereignty, must be redefined on a different basis. *The Conférence Nationale Souveraine* was seen as the process through which such a politics could be achieved (CNS,

1992). Various experiences of armed struggle politics have failed. Militants of this new politics were scattered around various sites — including: parties (more in some than others), churches, so-called civil society organizations (cooperatives, trade-unions, study groups, NGOs etc.) and the independent mass media.

Due to the fact that the 'ruling' class was politically formed, on the basis of submission to the Western powers, its members have always preferred treating political matters behind closed doors (*in camera*) away from the participation of the masses (e.g. from the Brussels political Round Table, Coquilhatville, Tananarive, Lovanium Conclave to the Palais de Marbre I & II conferences). They have failed to exercise, with confidence, any significant cultural hegemony at all. Even the so-called 'Authenticity' movement, forced on them from below, ended up becoming nothing but a celebration of 'authentic neocolonialism', i.e., trying to make people believe that neocolonialism is real independence (Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1981).

In a certain sense, Tshisekedi has more subjectively, publicly and more persistently stood up against Mobutu. Although he had been, for a long time a member of Mobutu's block, he appears to now incarnate politics under the condition of courageous unshakeable principles and in so doing he breaks with Mobutism (the system of *anti-valeurs*). This is what has made him very popular and made him appear to be the 'hammer to crush the rock — Mobutu'. In July 1991, after consultation with Mobutu, he accepted to become Prime Minister; his supporters pressured him to refuse. He had to refuse the offer, even if, later on he accepted it. The opposition elements have seen the post of Prime Minister as the key for the transition to democracy. It is not made clear that the new politics, struggled for by the Zairean people, does not need to have the post of Prime Minister as its strategical operator. With Mobutu still in power, the occupation of the post of Prime Minister by Tshisekedi — viewed as a personal enemy of Mobutu — does not ease the process of transition; instead it blocks it. What is needed is a structure, strong enough, coordinating the various militants of the new politics who are scattered around. The civil society coordinating committee for the work at the CNS was a beginning that should have been developed. It is through this process that a genuine leadership in favour of the Nganda Congress which came out with the magic formula'; '*Mobutu reste, règne et ne gouverne pas*' (Mobutu stays, reigns and does not govern) emerged. The formula echoes the one patterned on the Belgian model and found in the *Loi Fondamentale*. It aimed at making Mobutu another Kasavubu'. It is said that the visits in Zaire of the US Under-secretary of State in charge of African Affairs, Herman Cohen, occasioned the adoption of that formula. As is usually the case with this political class, this Western advice or order was adopted; the desires of the masses were completely ignored. And no real explanation for the change was given — the 'hammer' slogan

not notwithstanding. This decision to conform to ‘power-sharing’, this ‘Mobutu reigns and does not govern’ became the guiding principle of the organization of the process of transition to democracy. It was probably believed that by following the Western advice, the West would eventually remove Mobutu. Ironically, now the UDPS continues to call on the West or even the UN ‘to liberate Zaire from Mobutu’!

The conception of transition to democracy in line with the new politics was different. It called for: (1) the necessity of a genuine national réconciliation; (2) this *Réconciliation Nationale* (RN) should be informed by a critical reading of the country’s political history exposing individual and collective responsibilities; (3) the reports to be discussed through a *déballage* (unpacking, washing dirty linen — public self-criticism, a palaver); (4) forcing the accused to admit their wrong-doings, to amend themselves and seek and obtain pardon after having accepted to repair the damages they wrought. The NR was seen as crucial for the transition to even take off. It would have been nothing less than the creation of a sound political atmosphere for a new beginning. This conception was, at the CNS, defeated by the ‘power-sharing’ politicians — which included representatives of the mainstream party opposition, the high clergy, public institutions (presidency, parliament, magistrates, etc.), etc.

The RN, despite the monument built for the purpose, never took place. Reports containing the crucial critical rereading of the country’s history were not read or discussed. For the obscure political reason of ‘pleasing the wrong-doers to avoid bloodshed’. The reading of the report of the political commission was stopped by the NCS president. And people are still being killed. This CNS president’s decision provided MPR representatives with excuses for leaving the CNS. Important acts of the CNS which are favourable to the profound aspirations of the large masses of people (peasants, workers, students, women, children, simple soldiers etc.) are failing to be implemented. This failure is due to the conception of transition to democracy based on ‘power sharing’ with a dictator.

True national self-determination requires, in Zaire, the reconstruction of the ‘collapsing’ personalized state on the basis of accountability from below and the eradication of *anti-valeurs* (negative values). This is how the state power will be limited and subordinated under the people’s control. The people agitated for an emancipative politics based on people’s sovereignty and political capacity. This was to be achieved on the basis of a subjective break with all forms of ‘structural’ consciousness. They, thus, called for the CNS as a universal palaver in which the complete and free realization of the principle ‘people think’ would take place. In principle, a universal palaver has many sites and not just one physical location. The *Mbongi* (meetings provoked by specific events or situations) which emerged outside of the *Palais du peuple* (where the CNS met) were as many universal palavers as

the CNS. The sad thing was that, especially after the election of the Prime Minister, not many *Mbongui* were organized. The pro-new politics people's pressure on the deliberation of the CNS subsided.

The party representatives thought of the CNS as an *élargissement* (extension) of the state or a prefiguration of the parliamentary form of state (*Etat de droit*). It aimed at constructing the parliamentary state with or without the people's involvement. This construction tended increasingly to be viewed as a technical question. This made jurists become heroes of the CNS debates. Rules for rules' sake, courtesy, etc., were considered more important than political truths in the effort to achieve consensus. Every opinion was seen as equal truth character wise — to every other opinion. Opinions of offenders (murderers, human rights violators or embezzlers and those of the victims (orphans of arbitrarily murdered fathers, etc) were treated equally. The CNS was then hardly a prefiguration of the new society in which rules are rooted in political truth of people's sovereignty and equality. Some participants — a minority, fortunately — saw in the CNS an opportunity to receive a substantive *per diem*.

Although dominated by forms of state consciousness (protection of state secrets', legalism, church pastoralism, state entryism, etc.) and incarnated by parties as well as state representatives (*Institutions Publiques*, the CNS dinosaur guests), the CNS accomplished some important things. These include: a fairly democratic project of the federal constitution, charters for national education and press and information, and important acts to reorganize specific domains of the country's life (health, economy, legal system, conservation of nature, etc.). Unfortunately people's demands for *déballage*, transparency, and national reconciliation were not met. Disoriented by the politics of occupation of the state positions (entryism) and the death of Dr. Numbi (the coordinating committee chairman of the *Société Civile* group), the *Société Civile* group failed to continue to correctly orient the direction of the CNS. Its own candidate for CNS bureau presidency, Archbishop Mosengwe Pasinya, became more drawn into state/church politics rather than people's politics. Disoriented by the victory of Etienne Tshisekedi, in the Prime Minister election, and on whom tremendous hope was placed to alleviate people's miseries, the mass movement failed to outwardly pressurize the CNS. The defence of Etienne Tshisekedi's government took precedence over people's self-empowerment.

### **The Need for a New Sequence of Emancipative Politics**

When the CNS was forced to close on December 5th, 1992, in Camera (without the people viewing the ceremonies through the media, there was no organized people's protest. In his closing speech, the CNS president was forced to concede that national reconciliation had not taken place. Shortly before the closing, the CNS participants' criticism of the CNS leadership

was made without expecting any change. The CNS president was already being elected to the HCR presidency by acclamation. The critical evaluation of the CNS remains to be done. This is necessary to clearly see how a successful CNS (in terms of the new politics) can be organized.

In the face of the threat or violence by the *Mobutiste* regime, the movement for the *déballage* in line with people's fundamental demands subside. The state problematic and imperialist influence took over. This marked the closing of the sequence of the CNS emancipative politics. Even the *Cité morte* movement declaring Mobutu dead on December 18, 1992, was unable to conceptualize how to carry out its execution. This was due in part to the opposition party leadership's acceptance of the formula 'Mobutu reigns and does not govern' for two years of the transition. The declaration of Mobutu's death is an attempt at a subjective break from the *Union Sacrée Radicale* politics. How do we give a political autonomous consistency to this break? The masses' strength which forced the CNS to be held, in spite of the systematic opposition of the *Mobutiste* state, seems to have disappeared. After all, why continue dying in vain? The continued struggle for emancipative politics seems to have no clear path. While the mass support of the Prime Minister and the support from the HCR are not enough to drive out Mobutu from controlling positions, appeals are being made for the intervention of the external partners. Some people, including the *Union Sacrée Radicale* leaders, were advocating, as a liberating solution, the intervention of Belgian troops.

A leadership, independent of both the regime and the opposition party leadership, is needed for the pro-democracy mass movement to start moving again. The *Union Sacrée Radicale* became the opposition faction of the ruling class within the state. It thus, distanced itself from a politics of people's self-empowerment. Its politics could not go beyond the very state it has, at the same time, to protect even if it succeeds to drive out Mobutu from controlling the central bank and the control of taxes, the state will not be transformed and take up people's interests.

Without a new sequence of emancipative politics, the killing will continue without any breakthrough in sight. That is, unless the West intervenes militarily or the Zairean armies are thoroughly divided in such a way that Mobutu's control is broken. Being part of the state (with eyes on the West for legitimacy), the opposition party appears unable to conceive of creating parallel radio or TV channels, let alone organizing a pro-people army. Does the failure of the CNS point to a turn to a politics based on armed insurrection? Hopefully not. Where this politics is systematically organized (Peru, Cambodia, etc.) it is not winning. We now have two Prime Ministers, two governments and two parliaments in Zaire. Is this still 'power sharing' politics? Will another 'political compromise' be reached or should we just wait until our small gods, Western partners, liberate us from Mobutu? Or is

this 'peaceful transition to democracy' taking place? It is the movement of people's self-empowerment, independently of the state, which has to be deepened. Will the so-called '*Mouvance progressiste*' contribute to this?

### **Conclusion**

I tried, very briefly, to show that democracy, understood as people's political capacity for people's sovereignty, is on the agenda in Africa. But, in Zaire, it should not be confused with the project of a parliamentary state, a model which, was proposed from the outside and incarnated by an inside elite who are interested only in the limited project of 'power sharing' with or without Mobutu. To even consider this last project as a stepping stone towards achieving people's self-empowerment, new forms of political organizations are needed. Self-proclaimed parties linked to the parliamentary, state project — whatever their nature — can not achieve this. By the time the CNS was closed, tribalism was on the rise under the guise of 'geopolitics' and federal or local self-determination. Parties did not go against this development. They seemed to be sowing it.

## Appendix I Concrete Experiences of Emancipative Politics According to S Lazarus

Year	Sequence	Historical Mode of Politics	Main Theorician	Conception of Politics	The Status of the Party
Summer 1982 to July 1994	The Jacobin Convention	This revolutionary mode of Politics. Its sites: Jacobin Convention, sans culottes, clubs, revolutionary armies (multiplicity of sites)	Saint-Just, Antoine de (1767-1794) - author of constitution - political theorician of revolutionary war - general principles	Politics, when it exists, is confronted by the State. 'A people has only one dangerous enemy: its government'. Politics is phenomena of subjective order (forms of consciousness)	Saint-Just talks of the need for institutions to keep the revolution going... for 'the revolution masses, not the Party.'
Opened up by 1848 and closed by 1871	1848 (the French workers hot June 1848)	Classist mode of Politics. Its sites: Communists in the 'revolutionary movement' (Multiplicity of sites).	Karl Marx (1818-1883) with F Engels wrote <i>The Communist Manifesto</i> (1848)	Fusion; politics and the State. Independent politics possible only in communism, classless, stateless society of non-domination. Unity history-politics (major category of history).	The Party as prefiguration of Communist society. Proletarian Parties are those who incarnate the communist society to come. They live as if communism is already a reality.
1882 to 1917	Opened up by Lenin's <i>What is to be done?</i> reaching a peak with the 1917 Russian Revolution and closing with the October 1917 Revolution.	The Bolshevik Mode of politics. Its sites: - Workers socio-democratic Party - Soviets (Multiplicity of Sites)	V I O Lenin (1876-1924) He made a sum-up, from the point of view of the subjective break, of the Paris Commune's failure. The 4 necessities requiring the Party as an operator to be actualized.	Politics under the condition of a subjective break. Politics as phenomena of the order of subjectivity.	The Party as the operator of the 'Consciousness of antagonism with the existing overall socio-political order'. The Party does not incarnate the political process, it empowers it.
1927/28 to 1949	The revolutionary war sequence. Opened up by Mao's writings at the Chiangkangshen base and closing with the seizure of the state power in 1949.	The dialectical mode of politics. Its sites: Dialectics is the site of politics and politics the site of dialectics - politics work.	Mao Ze-Dong (1893-1976). Thought of war as a political process. Emphasis on Internal causes and forms of consciousness related to them.	'The Red army is in charge. The masses, the operators of the political tasks of the revolution'. Politics is specific, but has laws. It serves the proletariat and relies on practice. 'In the end everything comes to one question; whom do you serve'	'The Red army is in charge. The masses, the operators of the political tasks of the revolution'. Politics is specific, but has laws. It serves the proletariat and relies on practice. 'In the end everything comes to one question; whom do you serve'
1965 to Spring 1967	The Cultural Revolution	The non-Party mode of politics?	Mao Ze-Dong (1893-1976)	Politics without or against the Party. 'It is right to rebel against reactionaries'	The Party as an obstacle to the pursuit of emancipative politics. Mass mobilisation against the State Party

**Appendix 2**  
**Congolese (Zairean) Experience of Emancipative Politics**  
**(Tentative Indications)**

Year	Sequence	Historique Mode of Politics	Main Theorician	Conception of Politics	Forms of Organisation
1921-1957 (?)	The Nguist sequence	Independence mode of politics since; togherness communities	Simon Kimbangu (1887-1951)	'Civilization of the Congolese; by the Congolese', for the Congolese; civilisation under the condition of complete subjective independence	Universal healing Mbongy/Baraza
1960	Opened up by Lumumba's June 30, 1960 speech and closing with his letter to Pauline?	Self determination mode of Politics? Sites; the People, the Popular meeting	Patrice E. Lumumba (1925-1961)	Politics under the condition of unshakable principles.	People as Party understood as a new type of people mobilized by a profound trust in the destiny of the country'
1963-1968	Second independence Movement	A variant of 'dialectical mode of politics'?	Pierre Mulele (1929-1969)	Politics under the condition of armed mass insurrections. Politics under the conditions of Constant attachment to the masses of people	The Party as people's revolutionary movement
1969 To?	Another Ngunist Sequence?	Culturalist mode of politics?	Né Muanda Nsemi	Politics under the condition of cultural break with the West	'Universal Maziku'?
1991-1992	Conférence nationale souveraine	'Democracy mode of politics?' (People's sovereignty politics)	Some leaders of the Civil society organization (e.g. Dr. Numbi, etc.)	Politics under the condition of people capacity as political subject	'Universal Palavar'

**Appendix 3: Example of External Referenced Modes of Politics  
(Against the notion 'people think')**

Historical Mode of Politics	Characteristics	Elements of Reference	Site of Politics
Parliamentary mode of politics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Against the conception of politics under the condition of subjective break (Politics as phenomena of consciousness).</li> <li>- Politics not seen as <i>thought</i> but essentially an <i>opinion on government</i>. Parliamentary Parties are the organizers, in subjectivity, of those opinions. They organize the subjective dimension of the state. These parties are thus, state organizations Parliamentarianism as politics is a function of the state-parties.</li> <li>- The principle of Parliamentary politics is not 'people think' but 'people have opinions'</li> <li>- Voting as the institutional articulation between the subjective side of opinion and the governmental objectivity; as such it is the <i>essential political act</i> of parliamentarianism.</li> <li>To vote, whatever the expressed intentions of the voter, is an essential subjective alignment to parliamentarianism.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Against the figure of the militant as opposed; the journalist media as a 'static organization'; (A state is what its government does).</li> <li>- They are integral part of the functioning of the constitutional and state system. Multipartyism is a form of the state.</li> <li>- These parties have their <i>raison d'être</i> from the existing bourgeois state.</li> </ul>	Unique site: The state the (Parties and Trade Unions are internal to them unique site).
Stalinian mode of politics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Voting does not serve to 'represent' opinions. The parliamentary state is functional and based on consensus. Its functioning depends on having a majority of professional-political personal provided by parties. Voting produces that majority; it transforms the plural subjectivity of opinions on the government into a functioning unity.</li> <li>As based, on consensus, this State has no programme (which is by essence an expression of a group - say class).</li> <li>- Voting transforms vague 'programmes' or promises of parties into the authority of a consensus. The State is regulated from the outside by capital.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The country is identified with citizenship defined in indigenous terms: non-citizens have no rights.</li> </ul>	Politics as reflection of the state, economy, or the social structures
Marxist-Leninist or socialist mode of politics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>An external referenced mode of politics taking the form of a self-referenced mode of politics - with the Party claimed to be a subjective factor. The Party is seen as the exclusive and obliged incarnation and the principle of its actualization. The Party is the sole subjective space of Consciousness i.e. The Party functions as political thought. Consequence: the organizational scheme becomes a thinking agency at the expense of Mao's people think.</li> <li>Organization becomes the content of thought. Thinking Political becomes a procedure of organization and the Party ceases to be an apparatus of rigorous thinking to become a policy of real thinking excluding attempts of creative self-referenced political thoughts of emancipative politics</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Party is the elements of self-reference of politics.</li> <li>The so-called red trade unions are seen as an extension of the Party, i.e. the Party in the factory</li> </ul>	The Party as the exclusive site of politics.

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\* Department of History, University of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.

# Les résistances à la colonisation française en Afrique noire (1871-1914)

Christophe Wondji\*

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**Abstract:** *The creation between 1871 and 1914 of Francophone Western Africa and Francophone Eastern Africa was achieved through two processes: conquest then complete domination of the peoples. However the peoples strongly resisted both politically and militarily. In the Sudan-Sahel area, Islam played a key role in the resistance to French conquest by devising the military logistics and diplomatic channels. African kings also used the wars and diplomacy for their political gains and strategic alliances. That was what Elhadji Omar, Samori, Gbehanzin and Rabah did to fight Bouet-Willaumez, Faidherbe, Borgnis-Desbordes, Gallieni, Archinard and Gentil. After the defeat of the more powerful kings the struggle for resistance was continued by the less powerful ones. This happened in many segmentary societies and some revolts against social and economic exploitations. However in some coastal and forest areas, the local resistance was weak.*

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De 1871 à 1914, la colonisation française s'est imposée à huit Etats de l'Afrique occidentale et à quatre Etats de l'Afrique centrale; le Togo, le Cameroun, le Rwanda et le Burundi étaient sous domination allemande et le Zaïre sous domination belge.<sup>1</sup> La mise en place des fédérations coloniales d'AOF et de l'AEF s'est effectuée en deux phases; une phase d'exploration et de conquête jusqu'en 1900, une phase de prise en main effective des populations non encore soumises à l'autorité française après la signature des traités de délimitation.

Au cours de ces deux processus, les rois et les chefs, les peuples des communautés villageoises et claniques, les chefs des cultes et confréries religieuses, s'opposèrent aux Français par des actions de résistance dont la multiplicité et la diversité voire la permanence, exprimèrent la volonté des Africains de refuser le système colonial. Mais l'histoire a souvent retenu les

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<sup>1</sup> Le Togo et le Cameroun entrent dans la mouvance française comme territoires sous mandat rattachés à l'Afrique occidentale française (AOF) et l'Afrique équatoriale française (AEF) après la défaite de l'Allemagne pendant la première guerre mondiale. Il en est de même pour le Rwanda et le Burundi qui entrent dans la mouvance belge aux côtés du Congo (Zaïre).

grandes résistances organisées et conduites par les hommes d'Etat et de guerre qui ont dominé la scène politique de l'Afrique à l'époque de l'expansion; El Hadj Omar, Samori, Gbehanzin, Rabah, etc. Elle a négligé comme de menus faits les résistances acharnées menées par les villages, groupe de villages ou ethnies qui ont donné beaucoup de mal aux colonnes militaires.

La plupart des grandes résistances ont un caractère essentiellement politique et militaire: refus de la présence étrangère génératrice d'empiétements territoriaux et dangereuse pour l'intégrité et la souveraineté des Etats. Elles s'inscrivent surtout dans la période du partage colonial qui coïncide pour l'ensemble du continent africain avec la deuxième moitié du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Contre les troupes françaises les souverains africains engagèrent souvent de longues guerres de résistance.

L'un des théâtres privilégiés de ces guerres, en Afrique occidentale et centrale, fut l'espace sahélo-soudanais qui s'étend du Sénégal au Niger et au lac Tchad. Dans cette vaste région de steppe et de savane, ouverte depuis des siècles au commerce transsaharien et qui fut le domaine d'élection des grandes hégémonies politiques, l'Islam contribua au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle à la reconstruction des Etats africains précoloniaux. Grâce à l'influence des confréries maraboutiques, on assiste d'une part, à la revigoration d'anciennes entités politiques (émirats mauritaniens, sultanats du Niger, royaumes sénégalaïs et tchadiens), d'autre part à l'émergence et à l'affirmation de nouvelles hégémonies (empire toucouleur d'El Hadj Omar à Ahmadou, empires de Samori et de Rabah). Cet Islam militant accentua sa vocation à la résistance d'autant plus que la politique française d'expansion, conduite par des officiers décidés à créer un grand empire africain et peu enclins aux compromis diplomatiques, s'accompagnait mal de l'existence des souverains musulmans indépendants; d'où les nombreux affrontements ponctués par des trêves souvent éphémères.

La stratégique de la conquête française se déploya à partir des positions acquises depuis Bouet-Willaumez sur le littoral atlantique allant de St-Louis jusqu'au Gabon, et de la colonie du Sénégal créée par Faidherbe de 1854 à 1864. Après la politique de "recueillement" consécutive à la guerre de 1870, l'expansion reprit ses droits en 1876-80 en suivant deux axes majeurs: l'axe maritime en direction du Golfe de Guinée et du Gabon, l'axe terrestre en direction du Niger et du Tchad; ces deux axes devaient être raccordés par des missions Nord-Sud et Sud-Nord, reliant le Soudan au Golfe de Guinée et le Congo au Tchad. Pour construire ce grand empire africain, les moyens en personnel avaient été dégagés depuis Bouet-Willaumez et Faidherbe: les officiers de marine et du génie avaient des troupes régulières à leur disposition avec la création en 1857 du corps des tirailleurs sénégalais; ils étaient dirigés par des chefs d'envergure dont l'habileté politique et la ténacité allaient contribuer efficacement aux succès de l'entreprise. A ces

moyens militaires qui étaient donnés aux Borgnis-Desbordes, Gallieni, Archinard, Gentil et Dodds, s'ajoutaient les moyens diplomatiques que constituaient les traités de protectorat hérités de la période des comptoirs et ceux signés à l'intérieur au cours des explorations du dernier quart du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle.

L'utilisation de la diplomatie et de la guerre fait aussi partie de la stratégie des chefs d'Etat africains auxquels allaient se heurter les officiers de la conquête française. Cette stratégie s'observe dans les résistances des royaumes sénégalaïs situés sur l'axe qui mène au Niger et au Soudan. Ayant déjà annexé le Walo et imposé son protectorat aux Etats du Haut Fleuve, la France n'avait plus qu'à soumettre le Djolof, le Sine-Saloum, le Fouta-Toro et le Cayor. En proie aux dissensions sociales internes liées aux appétits des clans dynastiques et aux aspirations des groupes traditionnellement associés au pouvoir (esclaves de la couronne), attisées par l'Administration française dont la politique coloniale sapait les bases économiques de l'aristocratie, ces royaumes eurent souvent recours à la diplomatie plutôt qu'à la guerre; alliances entre souverains et traités avec la France furent noués par intermittence.

L'exemple du Cayor est significatif à cet égard. Chassé de son pays en 1864, Lat Dior, damel (roi) du Cayor, engagea la lutte contre la France qui avait la mainmise sur la partie septentrionale de son royaume. Reconnu comme damel en 1871, il entretint de bonnes relations avec les autorités françaises jusqu'à ce que le gouverneur du Sénégal décide en 1881 de construire le chemin de fer Saint-Louis — Dakar afin de stimuler le commerce et favoriser la pénétration coloniale. Ne pouvant accepter l'occupation de son pays Lat Dior entreprit d'empêcher la construction de la voie ferrée et de s'entendre avec les autres souverains de la région pour organiser la lutte contre la France. Dès lors, ce fut la rupture: un corps expéditionnaire est envoyé au Cayor, Lat Dior destitué et remplacé par un nouveau damel, est contraint à l'exil. Malgré son alliance avec Alboury Ndiaye, roi du Djolof, et l'appui des rois du Sine Saloum et du Fouta Toro, il allait courir d'échec en échec jusqu'en 1885, date à laquelle la France fit la paix avec le Djolof. Abandonné par ses pairs et par ses sujets, ne pouvant reconquérir son rôle, Lat Dior fut acculé à une confrontation finale avec les Français en 1886; défait à la bataille de Dekhle, il meurt dans la dignité; mais le Cayor est définitivement conquis. Les autres royaumes suivront. Affaibli par les querelles dynastiques consécutives aux disparitions de Maba Diakhou (1867) et de Kumba Ndoffen Diouf (1871), le Sine Saloum est conquis en 1887. Quant au Fouta Toro dont le souverain Abdul Bokar Kane a rompu son alliance avec les Français en 1879, il perd son indépendance en 1891. A cette même date, Albouri Ndiaye, roi du Djolof qui a signé des traités avec la France en 1885 et en 1889, est acculé à quitter son pays pour

rejoindre les armées d'Ahmadou, roi de Ségou. Le Djolof entre ainsi dans la mouvance française.

Ayant choisi la mort ou l'exil plutôt que la soumission, ces souverains légitimistes du Sénégal sont des souverains déterminés qui ont réalisé l'alliance de l'islam et des traditions héroïques africaines. On retrouvera cette même détermination au Soudan occidental et d'abord chez Mamadou Lamine Dramé qui créa un Etat musulman à cheval sur le Sénégal, la Gambie et l'actuel Mali. Fils de marabout, ayant étudié au Fouta Toro, le Sarakhollé Mamadou Lamine a fait son pèlerinage à la Mecque, a voyagé à Constantinople et séjourné à Ségou. Membre de la *Sénoussiya*, il professe un islam dont l'une des idées principales est que les musulmans ne doivent pas vivre dans une région gouvernée par les non-musulmans. Il entreprend donc la lutte contre les Français qui ont imposé réquisitions et travail forcé aux populations du Haut-Fleuve, situées entre la colonie du Sénégal et le Soudan en voie de conquête. Après le siège de Bakel (mars 1886), le marabout doit s'enfuir vers la Haute Gambie où Galliéni a décidé de le poursuivre. Malgré ses nombreuses troupes, Mamadou Lamine ne peut résister aux attaques des Français et de leurs alliés africains (Ahmadou de Ségou et Moussa Mollo de Haute Casamance); il est défait et tué en décembre 1887.

L'obstacle du marabout sarakhollé étant franchi, l'expansion française au Soudan va se heurter à deux grands Etats musulmans; l'empire toucouleur d'El Hadj Omar dirigé pendant cette période par Ahmadou et l'empire de Samori Touré alors en plein essor. Sur la résistance de ces deux puissants empereurs les écrits sont abondants et les faits bien établis. Retenons qu'ahmadou fut plus diplomate que guerrier et Samori plus guerrier que diplomate; mais tous les deux voulurent préserver la souveraineté de leurs Etats.

De 1870 à 1887, Ahmadou rechercha constamment l'alliance des Français avec lesquels il avait intérêt à s'entendre pour des raisons de politique intérieure. Vaste empire allant du Sénégal au Niger et composé de peuples divers dont certains comme les Bambaras et les Peuls aspiraient à l'indépendance, l'empire toucouleur connaissait des difficultés: famille impériale divisée, armée faible en hommes et en matériel, sources d'approvisionnement aux mains des Français désormais maîtres du Sénégal et des voies de communication reliant le Soudan à la mer. Ahmadou devait donc compter sur les Français. Ceux-ci connaissaient en outre le prestige au Soudan de l'héritier d'El Hadj Omar, qui se considérait comme le chef unique de la communauté musulmane et avait beaucoup d'influence en Sénégambie, surtout au Fouta Toro, berceau des toucouleurs. Le traité signé en 1880 reconnaissait l'indépendance et l'intégrité des territoires d'Ahmadou. Celui de 1887 consécutif à la progression de l'expansion française sur le Niger (Bamako en 1881-83), accordait la protection

nominale de la France à l'empire toucouleur. Mais Ahmadou fut déçu: en 1889, Archinard attaque Koundian l'une des villes-fortes de son allié.

A partir de 1889, Ahmadou passa de la stratégie de l'alliance à la stratégie de la guerre. Il s'appuya sur son titre de Sultan pour en appeler à la défense de la foi; des lettres sont envoyées au Djolof, au Fouta Toro et en Mauritanie. Rien n'y fit; il est obligé de faire la guerre car en avril 1890, Archinard prend Ségou et Koniakari; en dépit de ses attaques contre la voie ferrée Kayes-Bafulabe, Archinard le chasse de Nioro en 1891 et le contraint à l'exil vers Dori et le pays haoussa, suivi de quelques partisans prestigieux comme l'ex-roi du Djolof Albouri Ndiaye. L'empire toucouleur avait vécu mais Ahmadou n'avait pas été soumis aux étrangers et aux infidèles.

Quant à Samori, préférant l'affrontement à l'alliance, il mit constamment la diplomatie au service de la guerre de résistance. Surtout, lorsqu'il s'aperçut de 1882 à 1884 que les Français cherchaient à le chasser du Haut-Niger dont il contrôlait les sites aurifères. Il était, en effet, en pleine ascension lors de son premier contact avec les officiers de la conquête française: en 1881-1882, l'empire s'étendait sur les savanes méridionales soudanaises allant de la Sierra Léone à la Côte d'Ivoire du Nord-Ouest; il disposait alors d'une armée bien équipée, formée d'une cavalerie et d'une infanterie, dotée d'un matériel de plus en plus perfectionné et composée de soldats de métier. D'où les succès qu'il remporta sur les Français en 1885: repoussé du Bouré (Haut-Niger), il réussit à le reconquérir. Il avait un autre avantage sur Ahmadou: les routes de la mer par la Sierra Léone et le Libéria lui étaient ouvertes et sa diplomatie consistait à rechercher l'alliance des Britanniques qui contrôlaient les sources de son approvisionnement en armes et munitions. Enfin, un troisième avantage: un réseau de marchands liés à l'empereur animait le commerce dans les territoires conquis.

L'évolution de la résistance samorienne se déploie en trois mouvements à partir de 1882. Jusqu'en 1888, Samory signe des traités avec les Français (1886 et 1887), afin de gagner du temps et de lutter contre les ennemis intérieurs; la guerre contre Tiéba, roi de Sikasso, lui montre la complicité de ce souverain avec la France dont les officiers suscitent par ailleurs des révoltes dans ses Etats. C'est pour donner une plus grande homogénéité à son empire qu'à partir de 1886 il prend le titre prestigieux d'Almamy et tente de créer un Etat théocratique. Mais à partir de 1888, avec l'échec de la guerre contre Sikasso et la grande révolte qui secoue ses Etats, Samori renonce à son projet d'un empire exclusivement musulman même s'il continue d'être Almamy. Entre temps, grâce à son commerce avec la Sierra Léone son armée est équipée en fusils Gras à répétition (1885) et en fusil à tir rapide (1888); le traité avec les Britanniques en 1890 est destiné à consolider les bonnes relations avec Freetown. De 1891 à 1892, la pression française se fait plus forte et Samori sera chassé du Haut-Niger: victorieux en septembre 1891 mais battu en janvier 1892, il amorce son repli vers l'Est

pour créer un nouvel empire au Nord de la Côte d'Ivoire. Repoussant les colonnes (colonne Montéil en 1895), occupant sans coup férir toutes les contrées qu'il traverse de Kong à Bondoukou jusqu'en Haute-Volta et au nord de la Gold Coast, Samori devient un obstacle à la jonction des possessions du littoral avec le Soudan Français. Et, la progression de l'expansion européenne en ces années 1890, où les accords entre puissances conquérantes délimitent les zones d'influence, obstrue les voies d'accès à la mer; après Freetown et Monrovia (1893-1894), la porte du Bandama se ferme avec la conquête du pays Baoulé (1897-1898). D'où le retour de Samory vers l'Ouest, c'est-à-dire vers le Libéria et le pays Toma; devenue inévitable, sa capture a lieu en septembre 1898 à Guéoulé dans un petit village de l'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire. Déporté au Gabon, il meurt en exil; il n'a pas eu la chance de finir ses jours en toute liberté comme le Sultan Ahmadou qui mourut en 1898, chez ses parents maternels de Sokoto.

Le bassin du lac Tchad où Rabah imposa la guerre aux Français est une autre région de grande résistance dans l'espace sahélo-soudanais. Venu du Bahr el Ghazal, Rabah avait créé de 1875 à 1889 un vaste empire qui s'étendait d'Est en Ouest du Wadaï au Bornou. Par la guerre et les razzias, appuyées sur une armée nombreuse et disciplinée, il avait mis sous sa suzeraineté les vieux Etats musulmans de l'Afrique centrale: Kanem, Bornou, Baguirmi, Wadaï. Son influence fut si grande qu'elle atteignit le Haut-Oubangui, chez les Sara et les Kouti. En 1898, Rabah était puissant et riche grâce à son armée de 35000 hommes, à ses razzias fructueuses et aux tributs annuels que lui versaient les sultanats et les peuples soumis.

Deux objectifs fondamentaux allaient conduire les Français à lutter contre Rabah: les méthodes brutales d'un empereur esclavagiste, la stratégie de l'expansion française qui avait donné au lac Tchad la vocation de plaque tournante entre les possessions d'Afrique du Nord et du Sahara, de l'Afrique occidentale et de l'Afrique équatoriale; d'où les missions d'exploration et de pénétration en direction du Tchad et l'inévitable conflit avec Rabah.

Les difficultés commencent dès 1890-1891 avec l'exploration de la Haute-Sangha, de l'Oubangui et du Chari, menée à partir du Congo. En avril 1891 à El Kouti, les hommes de Rabah assassinent Crampel qui tente de joindre le lac Tchad par la voie de l'Oubangui et du Kouango. La tension monte lorsqu'en 1895 Gentil reconnaît le lac Tchad et signe un traité avec le sultan du Baguirmi en 1897. Mécontent, Rabah détruit Kousséri et Goulsel — villes du Baguirmi — et chasse le sultan de sa capitale Massenya. Celui-ci fait appel aux Français; la mission Bretonnet-Braun est massacrée par Rabah à Kouno en octobre 1899; Rabah est obligé de se retirer à Dikoa dans le Bornou, où il fait arrêter et exécuter De Behagle, chef de mission commerciale et diplomatique. Dès lors, les Français décident d'en finir avec Rabah et envoient contre lui trois colonnes expéditionnaires chargées de le prendre en tenailles.

Une colonne venue de l'ouest par Zinder, touche le Tchad en octobre 1899 et signe un traité avec le Kanem; une autre arrive de l'Algérie par le Sahara et atteint le Tchad en janvier 1900; ces deux colonnes font la jonction avec celle qui est venue du Sud par l'Oubangui-Chari: le 22 avril 1900, à Kousséri, les Français, sous le commandement de Lamy livrent bataille à Rabah. L'empereur est défait et tué; mais le commandant Lamy périra au cours du combat.

De la bande sahélo-soudanaise vers le Golfe de Guinée, on rencontre quelques grands Etats dont les résistances ont été vite réduites. En 1896, avec la prise de Ouagadougou, le plus grand des royaumes mossi était occupé. En 1898, c'en était fini du Kénédougou de Tiéba avec la prise de Sikasso et la mort héroïque de Babemba. Dans la zone intermédiaire conduisant vers la mer et la forêt, le Fouta Djallon et le royaume du Dahomey ont eu des réactions de résistance dignes d'intérêt.

Etat théocratique et confédéral, né au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle et situé sur un massif montagneux faisant tampon entre le Haut-Niger et la Côte des Rivières, le Fouta Djallon est resté jusqu'en 1889 hors de portée des visées conquérantes de la France. Il jouit donc d'une relative autonomie entre 1872 et 1890 grâce à cette position géographique et au fonctionnement normal de son système politique fondé sur l'alternance au pouvoir de deux partis claniques; les Al-faya et les Soriya. Pour échapper aux visées expansionnistes européennes, les *Almamy* pratiquent une politique de bascule entre Britanniques de Sierra Léone et Français du Sénégal, signant avec chacune des deux puissances des traités d'amitié et de commerce: 1873 et 1883 avec les Britanniques, 1881 et 1883 avec les Français. Même Samori jouit des faveurs de la coopération avec les *Almamy* (1883). Cette politique allait se dégrader à partir de 1889-1890 sous la pression conjuguée des crises internes et de la volonté française de conquête.

A l'intérieur, la situation se dégrade avec l'avènement de Bokar Biro en 1890 qui met en péril l'équilibre politique et social du système de l'*almamyat*. Ses tendances autoritaires et centralisatrices créent une forte opposition qui coalise clans au pouvoir et chefs de province contre les prétentions hégémoniques du nouvel *almamy*. D'où en 1895 la formation d'une ligne d'opposants animée par Alfa Yaya et qui fait appel aux Français. A l'extérieur, la France qui est en train d'achever la conquête du Soudan et a formé en 1895 la fédération de l'AOF, entend réduire à néant les prétentions à l'indépendance du Fouta Djallon. Le traité de 1883 est interprété en termes d'occupation et une colonne expéditionnaire va créer un poste militaire à Timbo en mars 1896. Esseulé, l'*Almamy* Bokar Biro doit lutter contre les Français coalisés avec les autres chefs peuls: la bataille de Porédaka en novembre 1896 sonne le glas de l'indépendance du Fouta Djallon qui sera annexé à la colonie de Guinée française.

Si la diplomatie a prévalu au Fouta Djallon, au Dahomey, la guerre prévaudra. Vieille monarchie centralisée qui contrôlait depuis le XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle le commerce du littoral en s'appuyant sur les bases portuaires de Ouidah et Cotonou, le royaume du Dahomey va d'abord mener une résistance politique avec le roi Glele. Utilisant la diplomatie dans un contexte où les puissances européennes étaient en compétition sur le littoral, Glele allait défendre fermement la souveraineté de son pays. En 1877, après le blocus anglais de Ouidah (1876), il signe une convention qui confine les Britanniques dans un rôle exclusivement commercial; par l'arrangement de 1887, les Portugais sont amenés à renoncer officiellement à leurs prétentions sur le littoral du Dahomey. Celles des Français sur Cotonou sont dénoncées la même année et l'accord de 1864 est rendu caduc. Les Français recevaient ainsi le même traitement que les autres puissances.

L'échec de Bayol devait déterminer la France, désormais sans concurrent européen, à occuper le Dahomey par la force. A la diplomatie allait succéder la guerre d'autant plus que le roi Gbéhanzin, successeur de Glele, n'entendait pas marchander la souveraineté de son pays qui était d'ailleurs doté d'une forte armée. En temps de paix, le Dahomey avait une armée permanente de 4000 hommes; en temps de guerre, il était capable de mobiliser tous les hommes, et disposait d'un corps d'élite avec les amazones, femmes-soldats redoutables et intrépides. A la force, Gbéhanzin allait répondre par la force tout en sachant cependant négocier lorsque l'adversaire l'acceptait. C'est ce qui arriva en 1890: entre février et mars, les Français arrêtent des fonctionnaires d'Abomey et les livrent à leur allié de Porto-Novo, le roi Toffa; Gbéhanzin riposte immédiatement et met en déroute la coalition des adversaires (avril 1890); le traité signé en octobre reconnaît le protectorat de la France sur Porto-novo et lui accorde contre redevance une concession à Cotonou.

Ayant décidé d'abattre le royaume d'Abomey, la France multiplie les provocations et cherche un *casus belli*; en 1892, elle va au secours de son protégé de Porto-Novo lorsque les troupes d'Abomey envahissent des villages de l'Ouémé; elle se prépare à la guerre lorsque les hommes de Gbéhanzin arraïsonnent une canonnière française sur l'Ouémé.

Avec l'appui du parlement, une armée de 3000 hommes bien équipés est placée sous le commandement du colonel Dodds en mai 1892. De juin à août 1892, le littoral est dégagé à la suite d'opérations menées autour de Cotonou, Porto-Novo et Grand Popo. En septembre, une colonne expéditionnaire marche sur Abomey: Gbéhanzin livre des combats de harcèlement mais la colonne atteint Abomey en novembre 1892. Replié au Nord après la destruction de son armée, le roi organise la résistance populaire des communautés villageoises; il devient imprenable. Mais le régime d'occupation infligé à la population de la capitale désespère l'aristocratie qui accepte la nomination d'un roi fantoche et constraint

Gbehanzin à négocier avec les Français; le 28 janvier 1894 le roi se présente au général Dodds qui l'arrête et l'envoie en exil en Martinique. La même année, la colonie du Dahomey est créée.

Pendant la période des résistances étatiques, on note aussi l'existence d'actions de résistance menées par des groupes de peuples et des grandes chefferies ou "royautés élémentaires" n'ayant pas atteint la puissance militaire des Etats précédents. Telles sont les résistances populaires des sérères du Baol au Sénégal (1889-1891) des Samos, Markas, Bobos et Peuls de Haute Volta (1896-98); telles sont aussi les résistances des chefferies Bariba du Borgou dans le Nord-Dahomey (1897); telles sont encore les résistances des chefferies et royaumes de Côte d'Ivoire de 1893 à 1899 (Indénié, Akaplès, Sud-Baoulé, Assikasso, Bas-Cavally). Ces résistances ne mobilisent pas de grandes armées comme au Soudan Nigérien, au Tchad ou au Dahomey. Elles utilisent la guerre de guérilla faite d'harcèlements incessants des troupes coloniales et d'attaques surprises des postes militaires; d'où leurs liens avec les résistances de la période suivante.

La chute des grands Etats africains et la formation des territoires coloniaux ne marquent pas en effet, la fin de la résistance. Si les souverains sont vaincus, morts ou exilés, les peuples des sociétés non étatiques ne se considèrent pas comme conquis et font fi des accords de possession ou de délimitation auxquels ils n'ont jamais pris part. En 1900, ces peuples s'affirment comme totalement indépendants. Sauf les régions littorales où l'implantation française est ancienne, des portions entières de territoire sont encore à pénétrer et à conquérir en Mauritanie, au soudan, au Niger, en Guinée et en Côte d'Ivoire forestières, en Afrique équatoriale. A la résistance de ces peuples s'ajoute la résistance au système colonial proprement dit, et de 1900 à 1914 on assiste à une combinaison de plusieurs formes: résistances à la conquête et résistances à la colonisation.

Intégrée à l'AOF en 1901, la Mauritanie est à peine conquise et occupée. En 1903, Coppolani met fin à la pénétration pacifique et entreprend l'occupation militaire du territoire. Dès 1904 il doit faire face à un vaste mouvement de résistance organisé autour du Cheikh Ma Al-Aynin, chef marabout maure du Sahara occidental. Coppolani est tué en 1905 mais le colonel Gouraud prend Atar (Adrar) en 1909. Malgré la mort du Cheikh en 1910, la résistance se poursuit et remporte des succès; en 1913 à Al-Boirat; en 1923 à Moutounsi. Elle continuera de façon sporadique et perdra toute vigueur en 1936 avec le ralliement des héritiers de Ma Al-Aynin à l'autorité française.

Au Niger, la pénétration et l'occupation provoquent d'abord quelques réactions isolées dans les régions de l'Ouest et du Sud: en 1898, l'officier français Caze Majou est tué à Zinder; en 1905 et 1906, les troupes françaises doivent réprimer les révoltes suscitées par des marabouts parmi les populations Djerma, Sonray, Peul et Haoussa. Mais la véritable résistance armée

apparaît chez les Touaregs pendant la première guerre mondiale. En avril 1916, l'*Aménokal* (chef) des Oulliminden de l'Ouest attaquent un poste français et tentent de soulever les populations au Nord de Niamey. Dans l'Aïr, le sénoussite Kaossen, et le Sultan d'Agadez mettent en péril la présence française en 1917: la garnison d'Agadez est assiégée pendant trois mois et les Français doivent la dégager avec l'appui de renforts venus du Nigéria. Mais la révolte continuera au Nord-Est de l'Aïr jusqu'en 1918.

Jusqu'à la veille de la première guerre mondiale, les Diola de Casamance, les Dogon du Soudan, les Coniagui, Kissi, Toma, Manon et Guerzé de la Guinée, formaient encore des noyaux de résistance à la pénétration coloniale. Ayant naguère échappé à l'emprise des souverains africains, ces peuples libres et indépendants ne pouvaient accepter de nouveaux envahisseurs. Dès les années 1880, l'arachide et le caoutchouc attirent les commerçants en Casamance et face à la concurrence britannique et portugaise, les Français envisagent la conquête de cette région. Les Diola n'acceptent ni l'installation de postes militaires ni le paiement de l'impôt en riz, encore moins l'introduction en 1891 d'une chefferie artificielle aux mains des Wolof. Habitent un pays boisé où un lacis de marigots isole les villages, aptes à se réfugier dans la forêt avec bétail et vivres, ils se montrent insaisissables et donnent beaucoup de mal aux colonnes de répression qui sont envoyées contre eux de 1887 à 1914. Les coniagui que protègent les sites défensifs de leur zone montagneuse se soumettent aux autorités de la Guinée française en 1904 après une guérilla particulièrement meurtrière. Dans les forêts de Guinée, les conditions naturelles, l'organisation des populations en villages fortifiés et l'incertitude de la frontière libérienne, favorisent jusqu'en 1912 les actions de résistance des Kissi, Toma, Manon, Guerzé. Alliés de Samori, les Toma affrontent les Français de 1894 à 1900 et épuisent leurs troupes. En 1907, ils résistent pendant 6 mois dans l'enceinte fortifiée du village de Boussédu que les troupes coloniales sont obligées d'abandonner. En 1911, une révolte générale embrase les secteurs Guerzé et Manon qui s'insurgent contre le paiement de l'impôt. Il faut attendre 1912 et au-delà pour que l'autorité coloniale s'impose à cette région forestière quadrillée de postes militaires. Ce sont les abus des agents coloniaux dans la perception de l'impôt qui provoquent aussi la rébellion des Dogon en 1908-1909; regroupés en quatre centres de résistance, évitant de descendre dans la plaine mais accrochés à leurs falaises, les villages révoltés refusent de se soumettre jusqu'en janvier 1910.

En Côte d'Ivoire, les résistances populaires furent très nombreuses en raison de l'étendue du massif forestier, de l'extrême morcellement des sociétés à prédominance segmentaire et de la longue durée des actions répressives. La dialectique insurrection/répression/insurrection se développa constamment ici, jusqu'en 1914 et au-delà en 1921. De 1893 à 1900, la colonisation semblait avoir bien commencé: le danger samorien était écarté,

le Baoulé et l'Indénier occupés, une fraction du Soudan incorporée au territoire, une administration régulière établie à la suite des explorations qui avaient fait la jonction du littoral et du Soudan en traversant la forêt. En 1901, l'impôt de capitation était donc introduit comme instrument d'acceptation de l'autorité coloniale.

Mais la résistance, qui était déjà apparue au cours des années 1890, allait continuer à fragiliser cet édifice colonial en gestation. Les populations avaient toléré la présence des Français parce qu'ils promettaient la paix. Jusqu'en 1908, la stratégie de la pénétration pacifique se traduisit par la création des postes et des pistes forestières. Elle s'accompagna cependant d'exigences intolérables comme le portage et les corvées, qui allaient provoquer les révoltes et les insurrections. De nombreuses opérations militaires furent menées de 1902 à 1906 pour imposer le portage aux Baoulés. Révoltés, ils défendirent leur pays village par village; en juin 1902, 1500 à 2000 guerriers empêchent les Français de prendre le centre aurifère de Kokoumbo. En 1905, les Ebriés des lagunes excédés par les corvées s'insurgent contre l'administration coloniale et menacent de prendre Bingerville, la capitale. A Daloa (1906), et à Man (1908) les postes sont assiégés par les populations bété et dan avoisinantes.

Lorsqu'en 1908 Angoulvant prit la direction de la colonie, l'autorité française était à peine assurée: le littoral, le Sud-Est et le Nord exceptés, la Côte d'Ivoire était en proie à la résistance. De 1908 à 1910, le nouveau gouverneur essaye d'abord de faire régner l'ordre en envoyant des expéditions punitives dans les secteurs insoumis. Ainsi, à Osrou chez les Adiokrou, un détachement de 300 tirailleurs est chargé en décembre 1909 de récupérer l'impôt impayé. Cette politique s'affirma de 1910 à 1915: des colonnes militaires aux effectifs importants, bien équipées et dirigées par des officiers chevronnés, sillonnent la région forestière d'Est en Ouest et du Nord au Sud, réduisant systématiquement les foyers de résistance des peuples abè, akyé, baoulé, gouro, dida, bété, dan et guéré. Des affrontements mémorables marquèrent cette chaîne de révoltes et de répressions, cette période de guerre généralisée dont parlent avec émotion les rescapés encore vivants: la révolte des Abè d'Agboville en 1910-1911 fut l'un de ces épisodes mémorables. Exaspérés par les exigences administratives dues à la construction de chemin de fer, les Abè se soulèvent soudainement et pendant plusieurs mois interrompent les travaux. La nouvelle de cette révolte entraîne d'autres révoltes chez les Baoulés (Ngban et Agba) de la voie ferrée et chez les Akyé d'Adzopé. Angoulvant réagit en regroupant près de 1000 soldats dans la région d'Agboville et en organisant le nettoyage systématique des secteurs avoisinant le rail. Ces secteurs sont dégagés en 1911. Jusqu'à son départ en 1915, le "pacificateur" de la Côte d'Ivoire s'attache à éteindre les foyers de révolte par le désarmement et la reddition des fusils ainsi que par l'arrestation et l'internement des meneurs: le 30 sep-

tembre 1914, 111 912 fusils sont récupérés; environ 220 chefs de guerre et féticheurs sont déportés en Mauritanie et au Dahomey. Ces chiffres qui ne tiennent pas compte des internés de Côte d'Ivoire (Bas-Cavally, Nord, etc.), des actions de désarmement et de déportation consécutives aux révoltes des années postérieures (1916-1921), attestent l'ampleur du phénomène des résistances populaires en Côte d'Ivoire.

Dans les régions littorales et forestières de l'Afrique équatoriale, les anciens Etats précoloniaux apparus aux XV<sup>e</sup> et XVI<sup>e</sup> siècles (Loango, Congo, Anzika...) étaient depuis longtemps en décomposition. Réduits en une poussière de chefferies, leur faiblesse explique la forme relativement pacifique de la pénétration de ces contrées. Brazza et les explorateurs du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle n'eurent à affronter aucune résistance digne de ce nom. Ils remontèrent les rivières littorales du Gabon et les affluents du Congo sans engager les grandes batailles auxquelles la conquête de l'Afrique de l'Ouest nous a habitués.

Mais cela ne signifie pas que les Africains de cette partie du continent aient été totalement passifs. Au Gabon les chefs du littoral acceptèrent souvent à contre-coeur les traités inégaux de la première moitié du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle. On sait que les notables Mpongwe, Orungu et Enenga s'opposèrent de 1839 à 1867 aux traités qui établissaient la présence française dans leur pays. Ainsi, Rempole chef des Enenga souhaitait-il en 1867 commercer avec les Européens, laisser passer leurs pirogues mais ne désirait pas les voir s'établir chez lui. C'est que les chefs des populations côtières et avoisinantes exerçaient le monopole sur les échanges avec l'intérieur. Avec les explorations et l'ouverture au commerce des rivières Como et Ogowé, les résistances allaient s'accentuer entre 1873 et 1886. Des soulèvements allaient ainsi se substituer aux attaques de canots et aux pillages de factoreries des décennies précédentes.

Ces soulèvements affectèrent tous les peuples côtiers et prirent l'allure de véritables guerres commerciales: contre la hausse des prix des marchandises importées, les Fang se révoltent en 1876 et 1880, les Nkoni en 1879-1881 et les ngubi en 1884; d'autres soulèvements ont lieu de 1892 à 1902 contre les bas prix imposés aux produits locaux.

Cette lutte contre la détérioration des termes de l'échange qu'on peut observer à cette époque sur toute la côte africaine, s'aggrave ici avec le régime des grandes concessions institué en 1899 et qui superpose les redevances coloniales aux effets de l'échange inégal. La résistance armée conduite par Emanc Tole dans la région de Ndjole sur l'Ogowé de 1886 à 1902 visait à la fois à faire respecter les droits des intermédiaires commerciaux et à réagir contre les abus des grandes compagnies concessionnaires: Emanc Tole réussit ainsi à former une coalition de villages Fang contre la colonne expéditionnaire de Largeau en 1896; à la bataille qui s'engage en 1902 lorsque la Société de Haut-Ogowé recrute des miliciens

pour défendre ses intérêts, Emane Tole est vaincu et déporté à Grand-Bassam en Côte d'Ivoire.

Lorsqu'on entre dans la période proprement coloniale, la résistance s'affirme comme une lutte contre l'exploitation économique, sociale et politique. La rébellion dirigée par Mbombe chez les Mitsogo en 1903 avait des motifs complexes; les excès des agents des grandes sociétés, l'opposition à la création de postes militaires et à la perception de l'impôt. Le combat des partisans de Mbombe dura jusqu'en 1908: après de nombreux affrontements avec les troupes du capitaine Colonna de Leca, les insurgés perdent deux batailles en juin 1908 et leur chef est arrêté; il meurt en prison en 1913 avant même d'être déporté au Tchad. D'autres révoltes ayant les mêmes motifs éclatèrent dans le Sud-Gabon, au Congo et dans la région frontière entre le Gabon et le Cameroun; citons le mouvement de Mavouroulou sur le Haut-Ngunyi (1906-1909), la révolte des populations de la Lobaye au Moyen-Congo (1904-1910) celle de la Ngokosangha dans le Congo occidental (1908), enfin le mouvement des Binzima dans le Woleu-Ntem (1909-1910).

Outre qu'elle signifie la volonté des populations gabonaise et congolaise à rejeter le système colonial, cette multiplication des révoltes témoigne de la faiblesse de l'administration en AEF: les effectifs militaires insuffisants ne permettent pas aux autorités coloniales d'occuper efficacement le terrain; les forêts et les marécages de ces régions méridionales facilitent comme en Côte d'Ivoire la résistance de groupes isolés et insaisissables, les embuscades et la défense des villages fortifiés. D'année en année, les officiers mènent des expéditions punitives mais souvent sans lendemain.

Au Tchad, la résistance n'avait pas cessé après la chute et la mort de Rabah. Ses fils Fad el Alla et Niete reconstituent l'armée de leur père et tentent de reprendre l'initiative au Kanem-Bornou. Ils sont battus; Fad El Alla est tué en août 1901. Une colonne est ensuite envoyée contre les Sénousses du Kanem: ils sont vaincus en 1902 et ceux du Borkou en 1907. Il ne restait plus que le Wadaï à soumettre: le sultan résistant Doudmourah vaincu en 1908-1909 est remplacé par Alcyl, favorable aux Français. Continuant leur oeuvre de "pacification", les troupes coloniales soumettent les partisans de Doudmourah, achèvent l'occupation du Borkou en 1913 après la mort du sultan Senoussi en 1911. Le Tchad est alors totalement occupé.

Si les rebellions de l'Afrique équatoriale procèdent de la résistance à la conquête dans une région où la pénétration est insuffisante, elles évoquent surtout la résistance à l'ordre colonial par la mise en cause du régime économique et social des grandes compagnies concessionnaires. A l'intérieur de la colonisation française telle qu'elle s'organise avant la Première guerre mondiale, des formes de contestation politique, sociale et religieuse apparaissent déjà. Les migrations et les fuites hors des frontières affectent les populations de la Côte d'Ivoire; les Agnis émigrent en Gold Coast en

1915-1917 et les Guéré traversent la frontière libérienne jusqu'en 1921 en quête d'une existence plus libre. Sur un autre plan, les chefs religieux de l'islam sénégalaïs (le mouride Ahmadou Bamba) ou nigero-tchadien (les sénooussites) expriment aussi des refus du système colonial: Ahmadou Bamba dont la confrérie naît au moment de la conquête (1880-1895) a connu arrestations et déportations au Gabon (1895-1902), en Mauritanie (1903-1907) et en divers endroits du Sénégal (1907-1913). Notons aussi la résistance des chefs ralliés aux conquérants mais qui se sont rebellés lorsque leur autorité a été considérablement diminuée par la nouvelle administration: Agoli Agbo le roi fantoche d'Abomey a cru pouvoir régner après la capture de Gbehanzin, il a dû prendre le chemin de l'exil au Gabon pour cause d'indocilité; Alpha Yaya avait aidé les Français à conquérir le Fouta Djallon et le pays Coniagui; il a dû aller en exil au Dahomey et en Mauritanie pour les mêmes raisons. Ces formes sociales, religieuses et politiques de la résistance vont se développer entre les deux guerres et apporter une contribution, grâce à l'appui des élites nouvelles, à la gestation des mouvements modernes d'émancipation anticoloniale.

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\* Université Nationale de Côte d'Ivoire

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## Book Reviews

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*A Modern Economic History of Africa: Vol. 1 - The Nineteenth Century*, by Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, publisher: CODESRIA, Dakar; distributor: ABC, Oxford, 1993, 501 p., 51. bibl., 23 p. index, 5 maps.

Mohamed Mbodj\*

Zeleza's aim was 'to strip the thick layers of myth from the complex maze that is Africa economic history. If by the end the reader feels that nothing is new, but questions some of the things assumed known, then it is well worth the effort' (p. 423). In fact, it is a textbook. It is structured in 5 parts, plus introduction, conclusion, maps, bibliography, and index. The introduction is devoted to rethinking African economic history, followed by parts of varied length on environment and demography (59p), agriculture (88 p.), mining and manufacture (70 p.), domestic and regional trade (107 p.), and finally, international trade and Imperialism (80 p.). And, finally, a short conclusion tries to expand the horizons of Africa's economic history.

In Part 1, the author describes the patterns of climatic change alternating between aridity and humidity, the changing ecology of disease, a slight population increase after decline in the first half of the century, the deleterious impact of the slave trade, the settlement patterns including migrations, and African societies' reactions to the new context. He states that environmental and economic disasters advantaged Europe in the eve of conquest which changed the structure of the society's management of environment.

In part 2 he analyzes the different systems of land use, agrarian relations of production, and the beginning of colonial agriculture. He concludes that diversity and complexity dominated before Europe, but with the success of an agricultural revolution by the end of the century, African agricultural systems were introduced into the world economic system at a very vulnerable level.

Part 3 deals with mining and manufacturing, departing himself from the diffusionist models which made every attempt to trace external origins for certain technologies and their eventual adoption or lack in Africa. He saw no technological conservatism, but only a need to reassess the 19th century general decline. As with mining, handicrafts was more resilient in withstanding foreign competition than thought. In fact, colonial industrialization was based on dispossession and coercion (South Africa), while the French and

the British deliberately deindustrialized most of North Africa (Algeria and Egypt). At the end, African modernization attempts failed for varied reasons, among which social changes in the basis of the regimes and European intervention played a key role.

Part 4 succeeded in staying away from the rather sterile substantivist-formalist debate because both markets and other forms of exchange played a role, the latter much more than previously asserted. The author discusses the formal distinction between local and long-distance (regional) trade, concluding on a blurred picture based on common organization and products. He traces major differences. A monopoly system was dominant in North Africa where trade with Sub-Saharan Africa was more important than the seaborne one before the last quarter of the 19th century (especially in Morocco and Libya), and did not collapse, on the contrary, while there was continuation of an open trade in the West and the East, a large and complex industry which attracted Europeans and Asians. The major event was the demonetization of African currencies which destroyed accumulation and impoverished overnight the merchant classes.

In the last part, Zeleza describes the enormous expansion in volume and persons involved in the international trade, although considerable differences did exist between regions. Therefore, there were varied patterns of integration into the world capitalist economy. Despite the fact that the partition was a heterogeneous experience, economic factors indeed played the decisive role, even with very different triggers; rising indebtedness in North Africa, intense trade rivalries and steep fall in commodity prices in West Africa, speculative capital by the 'feeble' (Belgium and Portugal) in Central Africa, mining capital in Southern Africa, and preemptive colonization in East Africa. Then, it is safe to say that World factors were the causes of imperialism, and not Africa's internal problems, internal fierce resistance opposed to conquest is another proof of that. The slave trade set the basis for colonization; both were launched by Europe with incredible violence.

In his conclusion Zeleza deplores that too often, African societies were described for what they were not, rather than what they were. Here are his main conclusions. On the social ground, varied gender divisions of labour existed, and there is neither patriarchal oppression nor equality across Africa. Labour process covered a wide variety from household, to bonded, and free wage labour. Social differentiation became more pronounced as the century progressed. The 19th century is a period of tumultuous change in virtually all spheres, thus justifying the term 'revolutionary'. On the physical level, environmental conditions fluctuated violently between peaks of aridity and humidity, while the demographic structure was deeply transformed by abolition, fast spreading virulent diseases, mass migrations, immigration from Europe and Asia, urbanization, and depredations by the colonial conquest. In the economy, diversity remained dominant, but as production for

export increased, there was a tendency towards monoculture and decapitalization of the food sector. African industries and mining resisted well in general. All sectors of trade grew, monetization spread, new credit institutions developed, transport systems were extended and reorganized, in short, many of the features associated with colonialism in the 20th century were already developed. These economies were not capitalist social formations, but they were not 'pre-capitalist' either.

Zeleza brings two innovations: the whole continent: the whole continent is covered, whilst most authors distinguish sub-saharan Africa from North Africa; the greater part is devoted to the development of productive forces and production processes and relations, rather than the usual stress on exchange systems.

Although this is a textbook, the methodological discussion is quite refreshing, authoritative, and very well informed, giving an accurate state of the debates and usually putting forth strong points which generally tend to represent the emerging consensus among African historians. Zeleza's points cover a wide spectrum. He is right at pointing that economic history is no longer the poor relation of political history, on the contrary, although rarely acknowledged within the development community. On the more general side, he attacks neo-classical economics which constructed universal economic laws independent of time and space, while being merely rationalizations if not legitimations of the capitalist system. He reacts strongly against grand constructions, over-broad generalizations, imprecise comparisons, unwarranted evolutionism, and unsubstantiated assertions such as the notions of 'shifting cultivators', 'hunters-gatherers', 'pastoralists', 'land-rich but labour-poor Africa', the resistance to call Africans 'peasants', etc. On a more precise level, he denounces the literature's undue emphasis on trade over production, the unproven opposition/abrupt substitution between traditional and modern, the eagerness to construct (and accept) models and theories imposed over the diverse and complex historical reality of Africa, overlooking field work and real facts (as opposed to construct ones).

Despite the fact that this is indeed a great achievement, there are still some points I wish to raise. The first, all too familiar, and yet the most disturbing, is that all of the sources are in English, particularly for someone who got a Canadian PhD. Besides, the most comprehensive Economic History of Africa was published in French: Daniel Cissé's *Histoire économique de l'Afrique*, Abidjan/Paris, PUSAFL'Harmattan, 1988, of which 3 volumes are already published. This might explain why he used a single author on Madagascar (D Campbell), ignored the trading activities along the Sahara Atlantic Coast, considered the Soninke Kingdom of Gajaaga in Upper Senegal as a group among the 'Juula' (p.280). More serious, most of equatorial Africa (Gabon, Centrafrlique, Congo, etc., i.e. the whole Ogo-Zaire-Ubangui-Chari area) is ignored, only Lower Zaire being mentioned. At

a second level, the author did not explain why Egypt and Madagascar were almost the only ones to try to industrialize. On a third level, the maps are too rare and of very little use: the Madagascar one is a political map which has nothing to do with the text; the Transahara trade map is too small to be read; the Central and East Africa one has no title, legend or date; and finally, the Africa 1913 map has pasty bold letters and a very limited variation of grey. For a textbook designed for students this is indeed a serious flaw. Finally, there are some avoidable typing errors such as 'Austin' instead of 'Austen' for the same author on the same page (p.65).

These few shortcomings do not diminish the overall value of the undertaking, and this is definitely a major textbook with a very promising career ahead, especially if the volume on the 20th century maintains the same standard.

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\* Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar/Senegal  
Columbia University, New York.

Momar C Diop et Mamadou Diouf. *Le Sénégal sous Abdou Diouf : Etat et Société*. Paris, Karthala 1990, 438 p.

### Penda Mbow\*

Ce livre que viennent de publier deux jeunes chercheurs sénégalais est un véritable pavé dans la mare. Au-delà du bilan de l'œuvre très controversée de l'ancien dauphin de L S Senghor, il remet sur la sellette le débat central du rôle de l'Etat sénégalais face à une société désarticulée pendant plus d'une dizaine d'années par une politique guidée par les institutions financières internationales (FMI-BM). La capacité de la classe dirigeante à promouvoir une véritable démocratie est sondée.

Après une première lecture, on ne peut s'empêcher de s'interroger sur le destin du Sénégal et sur le rôle joué par Abdou Diouf de 1970 à 1990. Ce livre aux facettes multiples est intéressant à plus d'un titre. Son originalité réside surtout dans la démarche pluridisciplinaire préconisée par les auteurs. On n'insistera jamais assez sur le caractère fondamental de la pluridisciplinarité en sciences humaines. Seules des approches de cette nature autorisent un éclairage pertinent des problèmes qui nous assaillent. Or, dans ce domaine, l'Afrique francophone semble être en retard.

Diop et Diouf fondent leur travail sur une très vaste documentation (rapports administratifs et politiques, ouvrages, coupures de presse, documents audio-visuels, témoignages, etc.) qui fait de cet ouvrage une véritable mine d'information sur la classe dirigeante sénégalaise. Pour donner un exemple, ils ont enregistré et analysé toutes les interventions des hommes politiques diffusées par la télévision sénégalaise pendant la campagne électorale de février 1988. Ils n'ont pas voulu reproduire les préjugés disponibles sur la classe dirigeante, s'éloignant ainsi, avec mépris, des discours des courtisans. Cependant, leur analyse ne reproduit pas non plus les thèmes fabriqués par la propagande de l'opposition.

Des possibilités sont offertes au lecteur de discuter et/ou remettre en question les thèses des auteurs. Ce travail, loin d'être dogmatique, a été une entreprise délicate. L'histoire immédiate est difficile à analyser et implique souvent des choix de lecture/sélection de faits. Les auteurs baignent en effet dans les événements qu'ils étudient, ils en sont les acteurs et le reflet. Mais essayons de voir de plus près ce que nous apportent nos deux émules.

Il est difficile de séparer l'œuvre d'Abdou Diouf de celle de L S Senghor. Malgré la recherche d'une autonomie, toute la politique de Diouf

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\* Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar/Sénégal

ne s'explique que par la crise de l'héritage laissé par Senghor et à laquelle il aura participé par ailleurs. L'Etat sous Senghor est déjà le reflet de la crise du néocolonialisme caractérisée par une intégration politique mal réussie. Les événements de mai 68 constituent le point culminant de cette crise et illustrent les rapports très difficiles entre le pouvoir central et les collectivités locales. L'idéologie de la participation populaire ne favorise pas le contrôle politique des populations; c'est ce qui explique les difficultés consultées dans la gestion des villes, les rapports entre l'Etat et les paysanneries (par ricochet avec certains marabouts).

Diop et Diouf analysent ainsi les difficultés entre pouvoir central et pouvoir local: 'l'absence d'une dimension spatiale et locale de l'administration explique nous semble-t-il le développement du régionalisme dans les espaces périphériques par rapport au bassin arachidier et au milieu islam-wolof' (p. 46). Voilà une manière de saisir la question casamançaise.

Les auteurs montrent qu'Abdou Diouf aura tout essayé pour se maintenir au pouvoir et contrôler les différents secteurs de l'Etat comme l'armée, l'Education nationale, il s'est concilié les marabouts et a surtout favorisé la fragmentation de l'opposition. Il s'est appuyé sur des associations satellites de son parti, les groupes de soutien au moment où le parti socialiste était confronté à des problèmes de survie. Les auteurs analysent la multiplication des groupes de soutien comme indice de la crise de l'Etat et de la faiblesse de la légitimité de la classe dirigeante. Ce fait est essentiel à un moment où l'idéologie du *sursaut national* révélait un manque de consistance et des difficultés pour se présenter comme une alternative à la négritude. Selon les auteurs, la distance qui sépare le *sursaut national* des raffinements théoriques et conceptuels de L S Senghor est comparable à celle qui sépare l'aveugle du clairvoyant.

Les auteurs mettent en évidence le coup décisif porté aux réseaux de clientèle mis en place depuis l'indépendance par la nouvelle politique économique préconisée par les experts des institutions financières internationales. Ils montrent que Diouf a survécu aux différentes crises ayant secoué vigoureusement son piédestal, *sa démocratie*: la révolte policière, les émeutes de février-mars 1988, l'échec de la table ronde nationale, le conflit sénégalo-mauritanien. Quel bilan se dégage de cette réflexion? 'Les crises multiples qui secouent les pouvoirs gravitent autour du régime et le régime lui-même malmènent les institutions et les hommes qui les servent' (p. 417).

Je regrette le fait que le rôle de l'obscure ministre d'Etat Jean Collin ne ressorte pas bien. En effet, les auteurs auraient dû consacrer un chapitre à cette question. Attention aussi à la fascination que peut provoquer la fréquentation du personnage de Diouf sur plus de 400 p. Quelle solution à la crise régressive qui secoue violemment la société sénégalaise? Les auteurs n'ont pas voulu s'avancer dans cette voie de la recherche prospective. Ils laissent à d'autres le soin d'esquisser les lignes d'horizon. La question qu'ils

posent à la fin du livre est importante: *Le PS arrivera-t-il à rétablir la logique de pacification sociale et politique en bâillonnant et/ou en faisant des concessions à une société civile en ébullition?* Ils ont raison de dire que les solutions sont en nombre limité. Le prochain livre de Diop et Diouf devrait porter sur l'opposition sénégalaise qui demeure le grand absent de cet ouvrage.

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