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# AFRICA DEVELOPMENT AFRIQUE & DEVELOPPEMENT

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# Contents / Sommaire

## **Jean K Thisen**

- The European Single Market in 1992 and its possible Effects on African Economies... ..5

## **Mamadou Moustapha Kane**

- Le discours des officiers soudanais sur les peuples du soudan occidental de 1850 aux années 1900: L'africanisme Français à l'époque de l'expansion militaire.....27

## **A B Zack Williams**

- Crisis, Structural Adjustment and Creative Survival in Sierra Leone.....53

## **René Kouassi**

- La répartition des moyens d'incitation à la production entre cultures d'exportation et cultures vivrières en Côte d'Ivoire.....67

## **Kunle Amuwo**

- Transition Planning in Nigeria: A Critique of the Military Civil Transiting Variant .....87

## **Book Reviews**

### **Tiyambe Zeleza**

- Gendering African History .....99

### **Tiyambe Zeleza**

- Steven Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1990, pp.340.....118

### **Kwamina Panford**

- Patrick Obeng-Fosu, *Industrial Relations in Ghana: The Law and Practice*, The Ghana Universities Press, Accra, Ghana, 1991, pp.152.....121

- Index of Africa Development Vol. XVII, 1992.....125



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
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# The European Single Market in 1992 and its Possible Effects on African Economies

Jean K Thisen\*

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*Résumé: La réalisation du Marché unique européen constitue un défi majeur tant pour les Etats membres que pour le monde extérieur. Les pays africains semblent mal préparés à cette formidable mouvance en cours en Europe, leur principale partenaire économique. La part de l'Afrique dans les exportations à destination de la CEE, baisse constamment, du fait notamment du manque de compétitivité des produits africains (au double plan des prix et de la qualité) et des mutations technologiques qui influent sur le processus de production en Europe. Un des éléments les plus importants par rapport à la production, c'est la baisse enregistrée au niveau des quantités de matières premières requises ou la substitution des ingrédients naturels par des produits bio-technologiques. Les pays africains ont peut-être intérêt à diversifier leur coopération commerciale dans le monde, en y incluant également le commerce "triangulaire" entre eux, la CEE et les pays de l'Europe de l'Est. A long terme, il est possible que le marché unique européen donne à l'Afrique la chance d'explorer et de tirer profit de son marché intérieur. Il est également probable que ce marché intérieur européen près d'être achevé, donne l'impulsion à l'intégration économique en Afrique.*

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## Introduction

In 1985 the European Economic Community (EEC) initiated a number of actions towards the full integration of the European market into a single market by the end of 1992 or soon thereafter. An integrated internal market of 330 million people will emerge free of restrictions on the movement of people, goods, services and capital. Such an integrated Single European Market (SEM) will inevitably have a great impact on the world economy. On the one hand, it will bring substantial business opportunities for the rest of the world resulting from the removal of internal barriers and from higher economic growth. On the other hand, it might lead to trade losses for extra-community producers as the competitiveness of the European Community (EC) firms will be enhanced and, possibly, protectionist barriers raised to facilitate the burden of adjustment of internal producers.

Outside the EEC, the predominant reaction was not only concern but fears about the future relationships between the EEC and the rest of the world. African countries, in particular, are becoming increasingly concerned about the impact on their economy of the completion of the SEM, as their economies are particularly vulnerable to EEC trade fluctuations. The African

fear of increased EC protectionism arises essentially from the possibility that the currently remaining most restrictive national trade barriers would be extended on a community wide basis and that the "reciprocity principle" would be used by the EC as a bargaining tool to allow access to the EC market. The resulting improvement in the competitiveness of European industry would result in substantial trade diversion for African countries. Whereas other developing countries of Asia and Latin America could gain access to a "fortress Europe" through direct investment, most African countries would not have the financial and technical capacity to do so.

Furthermore, the uncertainties related to the integration of the EC market are compounded by apprehension associated with the outcome of several important international trade negotiations which are currently underway or projected to start and will have a strong bearing on EC market access for African countries. The negotiations include: (i) the GATT Uruguay Round which was scheduled for completion at the end of 1990; (ii) the reform of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); and (iii) the renegotiation of the Multi-Fibres Agreement (MFA) after MFA IV expires in 1991. Concern arises also from the possibility that financial flows to Eastern Europe from the EC and other major industrialized countries (USA, Canada, Japan, etc.) will "crowdout" capital flows to developing African countries. This would slow down technological transfer to African countries and ultimately their pace of development.

This paper attempts to provide a broad and tentative assessment of the effects of the EC integration on African economies. It starts in Section 2 with an analysis of trade and financial flows between the African countries and the EC and then evaluates in Section 3 the net impact on the African economies of both EC trade creation and trade diversion. Section 4 looks at the sectorial issues such as the elimination of existing African State quota or privileged access for goods from particular membercountries, the harmonization of indirect taxes in the EC and the uniformization of EC technical norms and standards. The impact of Europe 1992 on trade in services and on direct foreign investment is analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 is a brief conclusion of the study.

## **Trade and Investment Links Between the European Community and Africa**

### ***Trade Flows***

The EC made up between 40-60 per cent of Africa's export-import markets during 1975-1990 and exports remain the major source of resources for development finance. Table 1 gives a snapshot of the evolution of Africa's trade with the EC between 1975 and 1990. The EC represented the first largest single export-import market for African countries, while other developed market economies absorbed between 20-40 per cent; the Centrally planned economies between 3-9 per cent; and the other developing

Table 1 - Direction of Trade (Exports X and Imports M) (Per cent)

Year	World X/M	European Community		Other Market Economies		Centrally Planned countries		Other Developing countries		Developing Africa	
		X	M	X	M	X	M	X	M	X	M
1975	100	50.1	65.1	24.2	9.3	3.7	5.1	18.1	16.5	2.9	4.0
1976	100	48.1	63.2	26.4	12.4	3.8	4.8	18.0	15.7	3.7	3.9
1977	100	45.9	59.3	29.2	17.0	3.5	4.9	17.8	15.2	3.6	3.6
1978	100	44.9	58.1	34.5	18.4	4.1	5.0	12.8	15.2	3.7	3.3
1979	100	44.7	52.1	33.6	22.4	3.1	4.7	15.3	17.8	2.8	3.2
1980	100	42.8	51.1	35.5	22.4	3.1	4.2	15.5	18.6	3.1	3.7
1981	100	45.2	50.4	30.9	25.0	3.2	4.7	16.6	16.2	4.1	3.7
1982	100	40.3	49.5	37.6	24.1	3.6	4.4	14.1	17.6	4.4	4.4
1983	100	39.6	41.8	37.7	33.6	3.3	6.7	15.2	13.4	4.2	4.5
1984	100	44.4	40.9	35.2	32.0	3.5	6.5	12.6	16.0	4.3	4.6
1985	100	46.2	42.3	30.9	33.3	4.3	6.9	14.8	13.1	4.6	4.4
1986	100	50.8	47.1	25.3	31.3	5.2	7.2	13.5	10.0	4.2	4.4
1987	100	57.5	50.5	28.9	29.8	4.5	6.4	14.6	8.7	4.5	4.6
1988	100	55.1	50.1	24.6	28.7	4.9	7.2	11.3	9.3	4.1	4.7
1989	100	53.7	52.1	22.8	22.7	5.5	8.7	13.2	11.6	4.8	4.9
1990	100	57.8	50.1	19.9	25.8	5.2	8.1	12.1	10.9	5.0	5.1
Average	100	47.9	51.5	29.8	24.3	4.0	6.0	14.7	14.1	4.0	4.2

Source: IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics, 1991*; UN, *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (various issues)*; and UNECA, *Foreign Trade Statistics for Africa (E/CM.N/Stat/Ser. C/B)*, 1990.

economies 10-20 per cent. The share of the intraAfrican trade is only about 5 per cent of the total African trade with the world. The EC market share in Africa's exports has been shrinking during the first half of the 1980s, partly because of appreciation of the European currencies against the US dollar during the same period. However, after 1985, the EC's share has risen rapidly while that of Japan, the USA and Canada has been falling.

Compared to the overall world trade with the EC, Africa's share of the EC's market which was between 5.7-6.5 per cent during the 1980-1985, declined subsequently to 3.9 per cent in 1986 and 3 per cent in 1988 as demonstrated in Table 2. Thus Africa has been losing EEC markets for the second half of the 1980s decades, despite the preferences accorded to African countries under the Lome II Convention. It is believed that the reasons for the shrinking share of African exports to the EC is Africa's low competitiveness and supplyside bottlenecks. But a combination of domestic production difficulties and stiffer competition in the unified and more open market will probably lead to a further decline in the African produce on the European market.

**Table 2: Exports to the EEC by Group of Countries and their Respective Shares (In billion of US dollars)**

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
<b>World Total</b>	699.0	620.0	643.6	620.4	634.5	660.1	761.7	930.8	1058.2
<b>Industrialized</b>									
Countries	491.4	437.7	460.6	451.7	461.3	484.7	608.9	749.4	859.2
(Per cent)	70.3	70.6	71.6	72.8	72.7	73.4	79.9	80.5	81.2
<b>Other</b>									
<b>Developing</b>									
Countries	167.5	146.6	146.2	132.8	135.1	134.1	123.7	149.4	167.4
(Per cent)	24.0	23.6	22.7	21.3	21.3	20.3	16.2	16.1	15.8
<b>Developing African</b>									
Countries	40.1	36.4	36.8	35.9	38.1	41.3	29.1	32.0	31.6
(Per cent)	5.7	5.9	5.7	5.9	6.0	6.2	3.9	3.4	3.0

Source: IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1989 and 1985*.

Table 3 gives the evolution of Africa's commodity trade composition with the European Community between 1970 and 1987. In value terms, the commodity exports which rose by 15.0 per cent per annum in 1970-1980 fell by 1.6 per cent per annum in 1980-1987 period; whereas the imports which increased by 19 per cent per year in 1970-1980 drastically declined by 1.4 per cent between 1980 and 1987. Clearly massive swings in the price of oil

have had a major impact on the value figures. Looking at the trade composition, fuels continue to represent more than half of the African exports to the EC and its share increased from 43.1 per cent in 1970 to 69.5 per cent in 1980, but declined to 58.5 per cent in 1987. While the share of foods, agricultural and raw materials, and ore and minerals drastically decreased in Africa's exports, imports increased during the period 1970-1987; manufacturing exports to the EC increased substantially from 4.1 per cent in 1970 to 12.1 per cent in 1987 (coming mostly from the Mediterranean North African countries), whereas its overall share in imports declined. The decade of the 1970s was good for Africa-manufactured exports to the EC but, except for oil, disastrous for all other categories. The rise in the share of manufactures primarily reflects the poor performance of exports of primary goods as the demand for and the prices of these commodities shrunk.

**Table 3: Africa's Major Commodity Exports/Imports to/from the EC**

Commodity	Exports			Imports		
	1970	1980	1987	1970	1980	1987
Total ECU Million	7201	29180	25983	5428	30938	28165
<b>A) As % of Total</b>						
Foods (SITCO+1)	25.7	13.6	17.8	11.4	13.4	14.4
Agric. and Raw Mater. (SITC2+4)	7.1	3.7	4.7	1.0	0.7	1.3
Ore and Metals (SITC5)	20.0	7.8	6.8	1.5	1.2	1.5
Fuels (SITC3)	43.1	69.5	68.5	2.5	5.5	3.0
Manufactures (SITC6-9)	4.1	5.4	12.2	83.6	79.2	79.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>B) As % of Africa Total World Trade</b>						
Foods	54.1	54.5	59.1	36.8	42.7	44.6
Agric. and Raw Materials	39.3	51.1	52.9	19.5	17.9	24.3
- Ore and Metals	63.8	55.8	54.3	46.9	40.8	41.6
fuels	78.3	38.9	59.0	24.9	29.1	18.7
- Manufactures	35.9	56.7	52.7	51.8	57.4	58.6
Total	61.2	42.8	57.5	46.9	51.1	50.5

Source: IMF, Directional of Statistics Yearbook 1989 and 1985.

Moreover, the share of Africa in EC imports of manufactures has now fallen once again. Indeed relative to EC imports as a whole Africa's share has fallen by 50 per cent since 1970. The most striking features of Africa's imports from the EC is the increased dependence on imports of foods. Imports of food and raw materials have squeezed out imports of

manufactures which are needed to build up the infrastructure and productive base for development.

**Financial Flows**

Table 4 shows that direct investment flows towards Africa have steadily declined over the second half of the 1980s. While Africa's share of foreign direct investment rose from 0.6 per cent in 1980 to 5.3 per cent in 1985, it decelerated to 2 per cent in 1988. This is a clear evidence of a diversion of investment from Africa in favour of the EC. The foreign direct investment figures fluctuate considerably from year to year. This fluctuation is partly due to changes in the political and economic environment and to the variability of profits and retained earnings and the valuation effects of exchange rate changes.

**Table 4: Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment  
(millions of US Dollars)**

	1980	1982	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
World	52212.2	44236.7	50658.9	48959.9	77459.9	118059.7	143869.9
Developing Countries	10887.0	14253.3	12046.5	13291.9	13875.0	23550.9	25096.5
Developing Africa	311.9	1410.8	1378.9	2570.6	1751.3	2227.2	2853.4
Africa's Share in World (%)	0.6	3.2	2.7	5.3	2.3	1.9	2.0
Africa's Share in Developing Countries (%)	2.9	9.9	11.4	19.3	12.6	9.5	11.4

Source: United Nations, Centre on Transnational Corporations Based on International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Tape, Nov. 1989 and information from OECD, *Development Co-operation* (Paris, OECD, 1991).

Another area of concern to some African countries is their monetary relations with European countries. The fixed exchange rate within the franc zone has played a great role in directing investments towards its African members by providing guarantee to outside investors. Despite several assurances, none is currently able to predict what the future of the CFA zone will be: the European monetary union is unlikely to leave room for special relationship between French franc and the CFA franc. A monetary instability would adversely affect the economies of African members of the franc zone.

**Single Market Trade Creation versus Trade Diversion**

The essence of the European Single Market is production cost reductions for EC producers arising from scale effects and the elimination of sources of inefficiencies in the current imperfect customs union. Hence, EC productivity and competitiveness will increase and this will be reflected in downward pressure on EC producer prices. The price effect of 1992 will

imply "trade diversions" as EC producers become more competitive and intra-EC trade increases to the detriment of extra-EC trade. At the same time, price declines and accelerating economic activity will raise real incomes and this will lead to "trade creation" which will benefit African exporters.<sup>1</sup>

### **Trade Creation**

According to the simulation results obtained by Cecchini, the trade creation of the Single European Market (SEM) may once-and-for-all increase the EC's GDP by an estimated 4.5 to 7 per cent yearly; while consumer prices could go down by 6 per cent.<sup>2</sup> It seems that much of the impact of investment in 1992 on EC may have already taken place, since firms have been preparing for the SEM by rationalizing and restructuring their productive apparatus. In addition, the SEM is founded on the belief that the EC must make a quantum leap in productivity if it is to compete effectively with the USA, Japan and the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) but this also means an improvement in competitiveness vis-a-vis the other developing countries' exporters. As a result, the economic growth will rise and so will the standard of living of European people. With the increase in income, the demand for imports will increase. Hence exports from non-member countries including those of raw materials can be expected to rise by an annual rate of 7 per cent in volume terms.

However, the trade creation for Africa will be most important in exports of fuels. As Table 3 indicates, nearly 60-70 percent of Africa's exports come from fuels; that is, oil exports from Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Gabon, and Angola, and natural gas exports from Algeria. Table 5 shows that trade creation for African products will be ECU 1,347 million or 5.2 per cent of exports. Without the contribution of fuels, trade creation would only sum to ECU 423 million or 3.9 per cent of African non oil exports. The low income elasticity of primary products means that although African exports of these primary products to the EC are more than double that of manufactured products, the trade creation effect is approximately equal for the two categories. In other words, the demand for raw materials will not be boosted to the same extent as the aggregate increase in income and demand due to

- 
- 1 In the classical theory of economic integration, trade diversion or trade creation occurs when a common external tariff replaces national tariffs of countries participating in the customs union. The internal market programme does however not deal with tariff barriers but with the breakdown of nontariff barriers inside the EC. In this way "trade creation" is used for the increase in extra-EC imports stimulated by the rise in EC output or incomes.
  - 2 See Cecchini Paolo, *The European Challenge 1992: The Benefit of a single Market* (Aldershot: Wildwood Press, 1988).



low material intensity of production process in Europe.<sup>3</sup> Even this limited increase in demand will mainly benefit those developing countries that can offer their products competitively and are capable of adapting to change in demand (i.e. Asian countries), since most African producers are seemingly unable to quickly respond to emerging opportunities and generate sufficient supply to take advantage of the expanding market shares. Similarly, additional demand for consumer goods will be of great advantage to those countries where the process of industrialization is well advanced NICs.

**Table 5: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion of African Exports to the EC**

A) Trade Creation	Income Elasticity of demand	Trade Creation	
		ECU Million	% of Exports
Food Items	0.46	101	2.3
Agric. & Raw Materials	0.80	49	4.0
Ore and Metals	0.70	62	3.5
Fuel	1.22	924	6.1
Manufacturing	1.32	207	6.6
Total		1347	5.2
B) Trade Diversion	Diversion Elasticity	Trade Diversion	
Manufactures	1.52	-239	-0.9
C) Total: Trade Volume Change		1108	4.3

Source: Michael Davenport and Ch. Stevens, "The Outlook of Tropical Products", *op.cit.*

### **Trade Diversion**

The redirection of trade away from traditional suppliers and towards partners of EC members, analogous to the redirection that occurred after the initial elimination of internal tariffs, is called the "Trade diversion" effect of 1992.<sup>4</sup> In the African context, the trade diversion is likely to have a major impact in the manufacturing sector. It is not likely to operate in primary products exported by Africa to EC since the EC is not itself producer of these products.

3 The income elasticity such as calculated by Davenport and Stevens is very low for tropical products; See Davenport Michael and Christopher Stevens, "The Outlook for Tropical Products", in C. Stevens and D. Faber (eds), *The Uruguay Round and Europe 1992: Implications for Future ACP/EC Cooperation*, European Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht, pp. 5180.

4 The term "Trade diversion" is used to refer to the total displacement of imports from suppliers outside the EC to those within regardless of whether that displacement is directly occasioned by the elimination of intra-EC barriers (trade diversion in the strict trade theory sense) or other 1992 related cost reductions in the EC.

As can be seen from Table 5, trade diversion in manufactures is estimated at somewhat more than ECU 200 million for the sub-Saharan Africa's manufactures and diversion is likely to be concentrated in chemicals whose high "diversion elasticity" stems from the potential for economies of scale and other available gains from restructuring of the industry in the EC. North Africa will suffer from trade diversion on manufactures, refined oil, chemicals and machinery and transport equipment that it used to export to European countries.

According to Cecchini's study, production and distribution costs are expected to be reduced in the SEM, due to increased competition among EC producers, the rationalization of plants, economies of scale and other advances in efficiency. These cost reductions are estimated at 3 per cent in agriculture and 4-6 per cent in manufactures and will therefore have positive impacts on African import prices. In addition, reductions in EC export prices on world market might in some cases bring down the prices charged by non-EC suppliers, by forcing them to engage in restructuring to capture economies of scale, or to reduce X-inefficiencies in production or producer rents. However, the link between lower EC costs and African import prices depends on a large number of factors, some of which are themselves enmeshed in the 1992 process. For example, the degree of industrial concentration is important in determining the extent to which cost reductions are passed on to final consumers. Also important is the degree to which EC producers can discriminate price between the internal and the world markets. To the extent that 1992 leads to the restructuring, it may increase the concentration of EC industry and thus oligopolistic power. Moreover, it might be argued that since 1992 is all about maintaining the EC's competitive position in the world economy, it will not offer a significant cheaper source of imports for the African countries. At best it will meet the competition from Japan, the NICs and the newly emerging nations of South-east Asia and so on.

### *Terms of Trade*

The terms of trade gains are unlikely to occur in those primary goods where the EC is a relatively small exporter and has little impact on world prices. In the case of capital goods, the only primary goods in which the EC is a major exporter, the EC tends to "dump" large quantities on the world market and thus depress the world prices. But changes in productivity in the production of CAP goods (goods arising from common agricultural policy) are determined in the main by a combination of technological changes and structural subsidies on the supply side and the administered price systems with its panoply of incentives to produce and penalties for overproduction on the other. The impact of the SEM on productivity in the CAP sector will be insignificant unless there is a major shift to a market which seems improbable.

As a result of these considerations, reduced prices have only been included in the case of manufactured exports to the less developed countries, and then only the reductions associated with the direct effects of the SEM on costs. That is, the efficiency gain from abolishing internal borders, member state public procurement restrictions and national standards have been included while those from the restructuring of production in particular economies of scale, reductions in X-inefficiencies and monopoly rents have not.<sup>5</sup> The former set of export price reductions on manufactures as calculated by Cecchini were then weighted by Less Developed Countries (LDC) imports from the EC to arrive at an average reduction in LDC imports price of 1.6 per cent. There will also be a terms of trade effect from higher prices as higher EC demand pushes up world prices for goods for which there is an efficient international market. This gain will depend on the share of the EC in LDC exports, the income elasticity of the demand and the price elasticities of import demand and export supply.

Table 6: Terms of Trade Effects for Africa

A) Rise in Export Values from increase in primary product prices:	EC Share in LDC exports (%)	Increase in World demand (%)	Increase in World price (%)	Terms of Trade Gains to Africa	
				ECU Million	% Export
Food Items	29.9	0.7	0.4	30	0.4
Agric.Raw Materials	26.0	1.0	1.0	24	1.0
Ores and Metals	30.2	1.1	1.0	31	1.0
Total				85	0.3
B) Reduction in Import Values from lower EC export prices:	African Imports from EC ECU Mil.		Reduction in import prices (%)		
Manufactures	22194		2.03	451	1.7
C) Total: Terms of Trade Effects				536	2.1

Source: Michael Davenport and C Stevens, "The Outlook of Tropical Products", *op.cit.*

Table 6 gives the terms of trade effects for developing Africa. Fuels are not included in these effects since supply from each oil-producing country is primarily determined by the OPEC quota systems, which means that output is no longer price-sensitive even though there may be considerable "cheating" on the quota themselves. Putting together the different trade effects, the net gain to Africa is in the order of plus ECU 1.6 billion, based

5 See Cecchini, *op.cit.*; and Cawley R. and Michael Davenport, "Partial Equilibrium Calculations of the Impact of Internal Market Barriers in the European Community", in *Studies in the Economics of Integration* Vol 2 (brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1988), pp. 487-548.

on 1987 trade data. This is about 6 per cent of African exports in that year. Of the gains more than half derives from increased volumes of fuel exports to the European Community and so will be concentrated in a few oil and gas producers in North Africa, Nigeria, Gabon, and Angola. Balance of trade creation in manufactures is estimated to be more than offset by trade diversion. Thus, the 1992 programme is not likely to give a net boost to Africa's industrialization. On the other hand, most of the terms of trade effect is the reduction in the price of EC manufacturing exports, though this is also the most uncertain of the estimates.

Thus, individual African countries will be affected in different ways by trade creation, trade diversion and the terms of trade effects associated with Europe 1992. Table 7 gives their impacts for five selected countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Zimbabwe.

**Table 7: Estimates of Trade Creation, Trade Diversion and Terms of Trade Effects for Selected African Countries in 1987**

	Morocco	Tunisia	Cote d'Ivoire	Kenya	Zimbabwe
<b>A) Trade Creation</b>					
Primary Goods	23.7	26.4	41.1	9.2	9.5
% Exports to EC	3.1	5.0	2.7	2.3	3.1
Manufac. goods	99.0	96.4	11.8	5.1	14.3
% Exports to EC	9.6	9.6	9.3	9.6	9.3
Total	122.7	122.8	52.9	14.3	23.8
% Exports to EC	6.8	8.0	3.2	3.2	5.1
<b>B) Trade Diversion</b>					
Total	105.9	107.9	15.8	7.4	19.6
% exports to EC of Manufac.	10.2	10.8	12.5	13.8	12.7
<b>C) Terms of Trade Effects</b>					
Total	32.8	22.0	18.0	8.2	7.6
<b>D) Overall Total</b>					
% exports to EC	2.7	2.4	3.3	3.4	2.5

Source: Michael Davenport and C Stevens, "The Outlook of Tropical Products", *op.cit.*

### **Sectorial Issues**

Certain specific aspects related to the technicalities of the completion of the Single European Market could also be of importance to African countries. These basically cover the envisaged removal of quantitative restrictions in intraCommunity trade, the harmonization of indirect taxes, and the uniformization of technical standards.

#### **Removal of Quantitative Restrictions**

The specter of "Fortress Europe" relates to the post1992 treatment of the many remnants of national trade policies of member States. A hard-core of national quantitative restrictions remain in place mainly for so-called sensitive produce categories such as textiles and clothings, electronics,

automobiles and other light manufactured products. These restrictions are applied under article 115 of the EC Treaty which allows member States to introduce import quotas and control the flow of indirect imports (through other EC members). African exports of manufactures have been particularly badly hit by the application of Article 115. The reinforcement of such restrictions in the free circulation of goods is only possible by physical border control.

After 1992, these restrictions will be removed and Article 115 will be abolished. However, it appears most certain that, for sensitive products, some form of quotas system will be maintained. The new mechanisms which will be implemented are still being debated and this has raised considerable concern, particularly in African countries.

### *Agricultural Products*

As shown earlier, for most sub-Saharan countries, primary commodity exports to the EC are sizeable. In itself, the completion of the internal EC market would have no negative impact on primary commodity exports of the African countries, since the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) will not be directly affected and most primary commodity exports to Africa are noncompetitive with EC suppliers. Incidences of the remaining import restrictions in the EC have practically disappeared and do not concern Africa. In fact at the Gatt Uruguay Round, the EC proposed to remove all national quantitative restrictions for tropical products, with the exception of bananas. In the case of Africa, trade diversion for primary commodity exports is thus most unlikely to occur. Trade creation, however, could be substantial particularly for those tropical products with higher income elasticities.

The envisaged dismantling of quantitative restrictions has a bearing on only 11 major agricultural products exported by African countries.<sup>6</sup> The fact that, in most cases, such restrictions are currently not enacted, save for bananas and rum, indicate that their removal is not going to significantly affect trade prospects for African countries. As for bananas, exports will continue, most probably to be regulated by the existing banana protocol or similar arrangements characterized by restricted circulation of that product among community members. Due to the difficulties of reconciling too many contradictory interests, this segment of trade is unlikely to be liberalized soon.

The restrictions of agricultural products under Article 115 have been limited to products such as bananas, potatoes, tomatoes and honey. In the

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6 These are: Cocoa, coffee, cotton, groundnut, tobacco, tea, sugar, sisal, bananas, rubber, palm oil.

case of African countries, restrictions have been applied for some items as shown in Table 8. Morocco, Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal benefitted more from their privileged access to the French market than from their access to other EC markets. Egypt is likely to gain market share in potatoes and beans. Kenya will lose its privileged access to France for its bean exports while gaining access to the French pineapple market at Cote d'Ivoire's expense. Britain provides a guaranteed market for unlimited quantities of bananas from the English-speaking Caribbean; France and Italy provide similar guarantees for the French overseas departments, Cameroon and the Cote d'Ivoire; and Italy for Somalia. Thus, the privileged position of the ACP and EC suppliers is not compatible with the SEM: the current 20 per cent preference margin would not be adequate to sustain ACP or EC exports in a free market. Most of the protected producers are smallscale and relatively inefficient and, even with major restructuring of the industry, their costs would remain considerably higher than those of the large plantations of Central America, Colombia and Ecuador.

#### *Manufactured Products*

The manufactured products have been concerned mostly with the export of clothing and textiles to the EC countries. The African countries (particularly sub-Sahara) are not subject to the MFA restrictions since they belong to the group of ACP States which enjoy preferential treatment. But manufactured products do not constitute the major exports of African countries as was shown in Table 3. Besides, they concentrated only in few sub-Saharan countries like Mauritius, Zimbabwe, etc. whereas the North African countries (i.e., Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco) which have expanded their manufacturing trade with the EC are subject to restrictions. With the removal of quantitative restrictions, these countries will have to compete more aggressively on those EC markets where lowercost producers have hitherto been restricted.

The trade regime which will emerge after 1992 will depend on the MFA V negotiations following the expiration of the MFA IV in mid-1991 as well as on the Uruguay Round where proposals are being discussed to bring textile products back under GATT. It is possible that under a new MFA V, EC quotas are maintained while member state shares or sub-quotas could be abolished as they depend on intra-EC border controls and are implemented under Article 115. With the elimination of such articles, African MFA exporters, particularly those from North Africa, will gain from the elimination of member state sub-quotas where utilization of EC's quotas is low while that of national sub-quotas is high. Thus, depending on their current quota utilization, the developing countries could be expected to increase their volume of MFA produce exports to the EC, although such an increase may be offset by a downward pressure on prices resulting from high competition

between MFA suppliers including EC based suppliers. Thus, the total net impact on export earnings might or might not be positive.

**Table 8: Import Restrictions on Horticultural and Fishery Products**

Products	Restricting EC Member States	Exporting Countries	
		Restricted	Unrestricted
Tomatoes	Benelux Greece	Morocco Morocco	
Beans	France	Egypt	Morocco Burkina Faso Senegal Kenya
	Greece	Egypt Morocco Burkina Faso Senegal Kenya	
New Potatoes	All except UK	Morocco Egypt Kenya	
Pineapples	France	Kenya	Cote d'Ivoire
Tuna	France	Mauritius Senegal	Cote d'Ivoire
Black Skipjack			
Preserved	France		Cote d'Ivoire
Orange Juice	France Italy	Morocco	Morocco

Source: Michael Davenport and C Stevens, "The Outlook of Tropical Products", *op.cit.*

### ***Harmonization of Indirect Taxes***

The harmonization of internal taxes with the EC as one of the elements of establishing the unified market is expected to contribute to a greater mobility of goods. In principle, it can be assumed to be across the board. However, at this stage, it is very difficult to assess the impact of this measure on African exports as well as other non-member states. But one of the measures proposed in this respect by the EEC in the Uruguay Round may have a considerable influence on such trade. It relates to the idea of phasing out or substantially reducing the excise duties on coffee, cocoa and tea. The implementation of this proposal may lead to an important fall in consumer prices and, hence, greater demand for tropical beverages in the common market countries. This may represent one of the few segments of the 1992 market integration where African countries can expect real possibilities for growth in exports for their products, provided that they can improve their competitiveness. Furthermore, the demand for the products concerned is not subject to a great deal of elasticity. Table 9 illustrates the different effects indirect tax harmonization can have on price and volume of exports of

coffee, since coffee constitute the largest single commodity export of Africa, after fuels, to the EC.

Table 9 - Effects of Tax Harmonization on Coffee

	Values/Per cent
<b>Effects of Tax Harmonization</b>	
Current EC weighted average excise tax on coffee	18.2
Current EC weighted average VAT rate	6.7
Current EC weighted consumer tax rate	26.2
Harmonized EC VAT rate	5.0
Reduction in EC average tax rate	16.8
Change in EC imports (vol.)	2.1
Change in non-EC world imports (vol.)	-1.7
Increase in EC imports (Million ECU)	395.2
Increase in the rest of world imports (Million ECU)	256.5
Increase in total exports (Million ECU)	651.6
Increase in total exports (Per cent)	6.3
<b>Effects of Increase in EC GDP (Demand)</b>	
Change in EC imports (Vol.)	2.4
Increase in World coffee prices 1.3	
Change in nonEC world imports (vol.)	-0.3
Increase in EC imports (Million ECU)	167.3
Increase in rest of world imports (million ECU)	51.4
Increase in total exports (Million ECU)	218.7
Increase in total exports (per cent) 2.1	
<b>Total</b>	
Increase in EC imports (Million ECU)	562.5
Increase in rest of world imports (Million ECU)	307.9
Increase in total exports (million ECU)	870.4
Of which:	
Cameroon	9.5
Cote d'Ivoire	26.8
Ethiopia	15.0
Kenya	17.7
Uganda	22.3
Zaire	12.0
Africa Total	142.4
Increase in world price	7.7
Increase in total exports (volume per cent)	0.9
Increase in total exports (value per cent)	8.6

Source: Michael Davenport and C Stevens, "The Outlook of Tropical Products", *op.cit.*

While the EC in the context of 1992 will move towards harmonization of tax rates, the precise outcome of, which are yet unknown, the intention is to approximate VAT and excise tax rates. A likely outcome is that the excise taxes which vary significantly across EC countries will be abolished altogether. This would particularly benefit tropical beverage exports, namely coffee and cocoa.



### ***Uniformization of Technical Standards***

The problem of technical barriers could be tackled through harmonization and mutual recognition of existing standards and rules. However, the African countries fear that their exports to the EC will be adversely affected by the slew of harmonized technical standards, particularly those relating to exports of plants, fish and meat, and their various products. It is likely that health and sanitary standards for food imports in the EC will rise, and this is expected to affect much of African food and processed-food exporters since most African countries lack appropriate investment programmes to modernize the hygienic processing of these products. The elimination of technical barriers to trade inside the EC and the harmonization of technical standards should make the EC market more transparent for African exporters of primary products. This should allow possible cost-reducing scale effects as larger shipment entering any one of the EC members could be distributed freely across the EC.

It is expected that, after 1992, EC technical standards for manufactured products will be higher than they currently are in some member countries. This could hurt the African countries which in the past have shown great flexibility at adapting their products to market requirements. However, the simplification of procedures on content measures and labelling and the reduction of bureaucratic protectionism associated with standard certification should benefit African exporters of manufactures as they will be less dependent on any national bureaucracy to import in the EC market.

### ***Triangular Trade Relations***

The EC's future trade policy will depend more on the result of current Uruguay Round negotiations. Little is known so far as to the outcome of the GATT negotiation, since tariff preferences will become increasingly less relevant following MFN tariff cuts. However, GATT's Article VI remains imprecise on the issue of anti-dumping which can be used by the EC to transfer some of the adjustment burden of the single market to African producers. Nor is it clear as to how the EC will deal with the on going globalization of production and with foreign producers manufacturing or assembling in the EC as this may affect foreign direct investment both in the EC and in developing countries.

Europe 1992 gives Africa a challenge to look for more trade opportunities other than the traditional ones. Complementarities of demand between the African countries and East European countries can be fundamental for the expansion of the triangular trade between South-West-East. These complementarities are a function of the existing structural complementarity of their economies, which is as yet of inter-branch nature than in East-West relations, where patterns in inter-branch specialization prevail. In effect, the economies of most African countries were and still are heavily dependent on

exports of few primary products (See Table 3), which are also in great demand in the East European countries, and for a long time, where channel to them through the intermediary of the developed market-economy countries, namely the EC countries.

On the other hand, African countries building up their infrastructures and implementing various development projects require machinery and equipment which are available on favourable terms in the East European countries. In a number of cases the expansion of this trade has been stimulated by the removal of discriminatory import licensing requirements for commodities originating in those East European countries. In addition, although, as a rule, prices for mutually delivered commodities are set on the basis of the world market prices for similar goods, the developing countries have in many cases been offered a higher unit value for their primary product exports. In the initial stage of their trade relations, the partners from both groups of countries could find it mutually advantageous to opt for clearing payment arrangements, which can help them to expand and diversify their trade exchanges without resorting to hard currencies and with the mutual granting of most favoured nation treatment in all matters concerning trade relations.

Thus, a special form of economic cooperation that can be devised and which has a well established position in international economic relations is the so-called East-West co-operation in third countries, or "Triangular Trade Co-operations", whereby the African countries increase the production and processing of their raw materials and sell them directly both in EC and East European markets; the East European countries including the Soviet Union sell their abundant semi-finished products such as durable construction materials, steel and manufactured inputs, including agricultural and industrial equipments, tractors, transport equipments, trucks, aircraft, trailers and ships to African countries<sup>7</sup> and the foreign exchanges they get from this mutual trade allow both African and East European countries to import fine finished goods and advanced technology from the EC and other industrialized countries (USA, Japan, Canada). However, the failure of African businessmen to take advantage of these trade opportunities may prompt businessmen from the EC (as it is the case now) to buy these semi-products in East Europe at a cheaper price and re-sell them to African countries at the world (higher) price. The buying power of the East European countries will depend on their export capability and the level of their foreign currency earnings for purchasing European and American products.

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7 Since they may find it difficult to sell them to Europe and USA because of the relatively low quality of such products which cannot compete in Western markets and the EC is unlikely to disband its steel plants to buy cheap steel from East European countries.

Therefore, trade relations should be established between African countries and East European countries, whereby Africa supplies their markets with tropical products, mainly processed agricultural products including processed meat and fish which are of great demand in East-Europe, and the East in return supplies Africa with cheap semi-finished and investment products to enhance its productive capacity and foreign currency to acquire finished goods from the West (EC). These East-South trade relations are crucial since it will not only accelerate the reconstruction of the East European economies, but will also stimulate the economic growth of African countries so that markets in both Eastern Europe and Africa can import advanced Western European products and technology. This type of cooperation can accelerate the development and industrialization process of the African countries, as they will be able to receive the relatively highest possible technology at the lowest cost when building up their infrastructure or production capacity. In addition, the African client does not become dependent on only one source of technology and supplies.

### **The Effects on Trade in Services and Capital Flows**

#### ***Services***

The European community has yet to spell its own policy for the internal market and define its approach towards the developing countries regarding the situation in the sector of services which remains very unclear. The liberalization of markets for services and financial transactions will primarily benefit those countries that are in a position to meet the growing demand in that area because this may imply a diversion of capital from investment in developing countries. Western Europe accounts for about two thirds of imports of shipment, travel, and other services. The services exports of African countries are dominated by travel, tourism and passenger transports.

With respect to tourism, price and income effect will combine and appears to generally favour an increase in tourism exports from African countries. Increased competition will put downward pressure on the prices of tourist services in the EC, but this will probably be more than offset by a proposed value added tax on intra-European travel and by expected labour cost increases in the tourist areas of the EC which are competitive with African tourism (mainly for the North African countries). Hence, the ratio of internal to extra-EC prices of tourist services is likely to increase. In addition, the acceleration of income growth in the EC as a whole should favour African exporters of tourist services.

In the area of transportation, competition in aviation which has become an important market for several African countries, can be expected to intensify significantly as EC airlines merge and the relative bargaining power of African carriers for landing rights and airport slots is reduced. At the same time, EC carriers could become more competitive worldwide. Indeed,

European airlines have concluded among them, agreements aimed at lowering their operating costs and thus improving their effectiveness. At the governments' level, agreements have been elaborated by the European Commission for Civil aviation on fares and sharing of capacities with a view to generating greater competition; as a result, deregulation is spreading in Europe. Privatization of airlines is a dominant trend and negotiations on mergers are under way. Although the Single Act does not apply only to the air transport, it is likely to induce air transport liberalization for the following reasons: (1) the emergence of an international area with no internal frontiers, pursuant to Article 13 of the Single Act; (2) Community institutions will liberalize air transport, in application of Article 16 of the Single Act.

Owing to the liberation of Europe a few major companies will emerge which will be more competitive than smaller ones of other regions. It is likely that African airlines will no longer enjoy the fifth freedom traffic right, while their European counterparts will probably continue to enjoy such rights which they have been generously granted throughout Africa. There are signs that the whole of Europe may be considered a single territory as regards the application of air transport agreements. This may lead to confining African airlines to very few points in Europe, while European airlines will probably continue to operate throughout Africa.

With regard to maritime transportation, the EC commission has the mandate to act against unfair pricing by Third World country suppliers. Thus, little changes can be expected in the maritime transportation sector after 1992 as it is already well integrated at the community level.

#### ***Direct Investment Flows***

The completion of the single market is likely to direct more capital towards financial speculation and more profitable "openings", to the detriment of useful investments in developing countries. In fact disinvestment in Africa is a trend which is gaining momentum as Table 4 shows. The unification of Europe by 1992 will give rise to severe competition between firms selling to Europe. This will result in more selective investments both inside and outside the EEC. In this respect, Africa has little chance to attract industrial investments, as other regions have decisive comparative advantages. This is, in particular, the case for Eastern European countries.

Indeed, the Eastern European countries are in a position to attract many industrial plants which, for various reasons (pollution, high salary cost, etc.), the EEC would like to install outside its territory. First the basic infrastructure (roads, railways, channels, electricity, telecommunications, etc.) exists in Eastern Europe. Second Eastern European countries have experienced of industrialization which Africa, to a great extent, still lacks. All Eastern European countries need is to adopt flexible management methods and new technologies capable of adjusting to market economy requirements. Moreover, the recent establishment of the European Bank for Reconstruction

and Development will facilitate the evolution of Eastern European economies towards greater competitiveness and adaptability.

In view of the above, it is likely that the stagnation, if not decline of direct investment in Africa noticed between 1975-1980 and 1985-1987, will persist. Africa is becoming increasingly less attractive investment-wise because of its low competitiveness and the socioeconomic crisis which seems to be degenerating into political instability.

Within the EEC itself, the removal of non tariff barriers will result in the increase of investment, employment and growth. The costs of production will be decreased because of economies of scale associated with larger markets; the prices of goods will be lower because of greater competition among producers of similar goods. The profit of firms will be higher and this will stimulate increased investment in Europe and have serious implications for the flow of investment to African countries. Also the new regulations related to health and technical specifications governing imports of African products will discourage investment in manufacturing for export from Africa to the EEC.

### **Conclusion**

The composition of the European single market is a major challenge both to the EEC member states and to the outside world. African countries must feel especially concerned, as they seem ill-prepared, for the tremendous move which is underway in Europe - their principal economic partner. Some measures need to be taken and in some cases steps have already been taken towards better preparation of Africa.

In the field of trade, Africa has no choice but to improve the competitiveness of its products; it is most unlikely that the New Europe will continue to adopt or maintain any special regime of preferences for African countries. As shown above, despite the preferences granted under the successive Lome Conventions, Africa's share in exports to the EEC has steadily declined mainly because of the lack of competitiveness of African products (both in terms of prices and quality) and the technological change affecting the production process in Europe. As regards competitiveness, Africa's productivity is very low, which results in high production costs; moreover, the quality of many African products (mainly the manufactures) is far from meeting European standards. Concerning the technological evolution, one of its most important effects is the reduction in quantity of raw materials required or the substitution of natural ingredients by bio-technological products which are less expensive owing to economies of scale and faster production process. For all these reasons the demand for African commodities tends to diminish and Africa may not benefit from the expected growth in Europe in 1992 and beyond. The African countries may find it profitable to diversify their trade cooperation in the world to include also the

"triangular trade", between them, the EC and the East European countries, as the ideological constraining factor is no longer valid nowadays.

However, the deadline set for the completion of the European single market may be too close for Africa to find adequate response to its effects by 1993. This underlines once more the risks related to the excessive dependence on external markets. But in the long run, the European single market may give Africa a chance to explore and take advantage of its domestic market as called for in its continental programme: The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos which calls for the self-sustained development and economic integration at the subregional and regional levels.<sup>8</sup> The near successful completion of European internal market may give economic integration in Africa an impetus if basic conditions, especially the political will, are met so as to acquire a strong bargaining power in the world economy.

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<sup>8</sup> See OAU, *The Lagos Plan of Action for Development of Africa 1980-2000* (Geneva ILO, 1982).

# Le discours des officiers soudanais sur les peuples du soudan occidental de 1850 aux années 1900: l'africanisme français à l'époque de l'expansion militaire

Mamadou Moustapha Kane\*

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**Abstract:** *The triumphal emergence of neoclassical theory with its emphasis on internal constraints to development over-generalization and notions of economic irrationality, passivity and atavism of people in developing countries revives the shadow of colonialist discourse. In Africa, it nurtures a deepening of Afro-pessimism. The numerous documents produced by colonial officers in the second half of the 19th century are often considered as "primary data" by Africanists. It is often neglected that the military officers embarked upon the exploration and systematization of information on African people in the context of imperial expansion. "As good" Europeans of their time, these officers considered Africans as disorganized, lazy, easy-going, naive and atavistic people with under-developed arts, industries, literature and religions. When confronted with fierce resistance, they perceived nationalist leaders as tyrants, terrorists and fanatics. Ethnic groups were classified as "good" or "bad" depending on the degree of hostility or resignation vis-à-vis the imperial project. Based on racism and a product of low intellectual standard, the literature was characterized by limited perception of cultural relativity and a tendency towards over-generalization.*

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## Introduction

Les écrits laissés par les officiers de l'armée coloniale française d'Afrique ont subi des traitements divers: lettres, rapports et récits ont été souvent exploités comme sources d'histoire et même parfois, analysés en rapport avec le contexte historique ou littéraire.<sup>1</sup> Cependant, même si Fanoud-Siefer a fait une petite place aux colonels Mangin et Baratier dans son anthologie sur *Le Mythe du Nègre et de l'Afrique Noire*, et quand bien même des

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1 C'est dans ce cadre qu'il faut situer les articles de Abdoulaye Bathily, "Aux origines de l'Africanisme: Les conséquences de l'oeuvre ethno-historique de Faidherbe sur la colonisation du Sénégal". In *Cahiers de Jussieu, Le Mal de Voir* 10/8,2, 1976. Léon Fanoud-Siefer, *Le Mythe du Nègre et de l'Afrique Noire dans la Littérature Française de 1800 à la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale*. Ouvrage publié avec le concours du C.N.R.S., Librairie C, Klincksieck, Paris, 1968.

auteurs y font souvent allusion dans des préfaces ou introductions à des ouvrages, les écrits des officiers restent pour l'essentiel soustraits comme catalogue.<sup>2</sup>

C'est ce qui explique cette tentative d'approcher les officiers soudanais comme un groupe et d'analyser leurs oeuvres comme un corpus de textes comparables dans leur forme, leur motivation, et leur portée générale. Il s'agit de définir l'échantillon soudanais, de fonder sa représentativité et sa pertinence pour le sujet qui nous occupe, de dégager le contexte historique dans lequel cette littérature s'inscrivait, et de passer en revue les jugements des auteurs sur les peuples d'Afrique occidentale, avant de conclure par les conséquences immédiates et à long terme de ces mêmes jugements.

### **Les officiers soudanais et le contexte du milieu du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle**

#### ***Les officiers soudanais et la métropole***

Le nom "officiers soudanais" est un terme générique usité à l'époque de l'expansion militaire française pour désigner ceux des officiers qui avaient servi au Soudan occidental, la région sub-saharienne de l'ouest africain. Par extension ce vocable devait s'appliquer même à ceux ayant officié dans des pays plus méridionaux que ceux de la bande sahélienne.

Sur le théâtre d'opérations comme sur la scène nationale une fois revenus en métropole, ces officiers semblaient constituer un groupe cimenté par une même idéologie qu'une expérience commune et un esprit de corps informaient tout naturellement.

L'échantillon qui a servi de base à cette réflexion concerne aussi bien des lieutenants comme Mage, des colonels comme Monteil et Klobb, que des généraux comme Faidherbe et Gallon. Chacun d'eux eut à servir dans des régions différentes de l'empire colonial français, côtoyer divers peuples, et aider à penser et appliquer diverses politiques: Faidherbe, ancien Gouverneur du Sénégal, servit d'abord en Algérie, en Guadeloupe et encore en Algérie entre 1844 et 1851; Galliéni au Sénégal et Soudan français (1870-1880), en Indochine (1892-1896), et à Madagascar comme Gouverneur (1896-1905), avant de devenir Ministre de la Guerre de 1915 à 1916; Louis Monteil, officier d'ordonnance au Sénégal de 1877 à 1880 devait servir dans les îles du Pacifique de 1881 à 1883 avant de rejoindre l'Annam (Indochine) de 1883 à 1888.<sup>3</sup>

Plus que des vétérans du Soudan, ces officiers étaient représentatifs de l'armée coloniale française. Dans la vie civile, en métropole comme dans les

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2 Voir Aussi l'introduction (Africanists and African History) du livre de Bill Freund: *The Making of Contemporary Africa*. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1984.

3 Pour ces renseignements voir par exemple, Michel Guy, *Bâtisseurs d'Empire*. 16<sup>e</sup> mille "Tout pour Tous, De Girord, J, Editeur, 15 rue Cassette Paris (VI<sup>e</sup>).



colonies, ils exerçaient un rôle et une influence des plus significatifs face à une opinion et une opposition indifférentes à une aventure coloniale perçue comme une perte de temps, de ressources, et de vies humaines, tout juste bonne à assurer carrière et gloire à une poignée d'ambitieux.<sup>4</sup>

Il devaient faire front commun afin de rallier à leur cause les intérêts religieux et commerciaux, les maisons coloniales de Bordeaux et de Marseille solidement implantées au Sénégal et favorables à une politique du pas en avant.<sup>5</sup>

Dans pareil contexte, ces officiers, passés "experts" en matière coloniale, et tous ceux qui partageaient leur foi en l'empire se devaient de collaborer, s'informer mutuellement, et s'épauler dans la prise de décisions. C'est cette nécessité de fournir des éléments d'information, combinée à la soif de récits exotiques manifestée par les éditeurs (Hachette, Flammarion, Société de Géographie et autres), la célébrité et les avantages matériels, qui expliquent la tendance des soudanais à puiser dans leurs souvenirs et leurs archives personnelles pour faire publier des oeuvres largement colorées par le contexte ouest-africain du milieu du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle.

#### *Le contexte ouest-africain autour de 1850*

Faire un tableau de l'Afrique de l'ouest sahélienne au milieu du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle revient ici à prendre la mesure du déploiement de la machine de conquête et de la réalité de la présence française dans cette partie du continent, et de préciser la position des différents groupes par rapport au projet français et à sa mise en forme.

#### *Les Wolof*

La population du Sénégal de l'époque était pour l'essentiel composée de Wolof vivant dans les Etats du Kajor, Waalo, Bawol, et Jolof; le premier contrôlant les salines du Ganjool à l'embouchure du fleuve et encourageant la production céréalière, le deuxième étant soumis à la double influence des Français de Saint Louis et des Maures du Trarza dont ils constituaient un *domino*, et en fin les deux derniers vivant relativement en bonne intelligence avec la colonie.<sup>6</sup>

Dans la ville de St-Louis, du fait de contacts plusieurs fois séculaires, les Wolof, habitués de la présence française, fournissaient à ces derniers,

4 Voir par exemple, Raoul Girardet: *Idéologie coloniale en France 1871-1962*. Mouvement d'Idées, La Table Ronde, 40 rue du Bac, Paris 1972.

5 Voir à ce sujet Barrows Laland Conley: "Faidherbe, Maurel & Prom and Sénégal". Ph.d. dissertation.

6 Pour des renseignements sur ces relations voir entre autres sources: Eunice Charles, "A History of the Kingdom of Jolof 1800-1890." Ph.d. thesis, Boston University, 1973. Lucie Gallistel Colvin, "Kajor and its diplomatic relations with St-Louis 1763-1861." Ph.d. thesis, Columbia University, 1972.

navigateurs, interprètes et spécialistes de toutes sortes, en même temps que concubines, épouses, et soldats du bataillon de Tirailleurs sénégalais réorganisé par Faidherbe en 1857.<sup>7</sup> Dans les limites de la juridiction de St-Louis, les Wolof pouvaient être considérés à cette époque comme de 'loyaux' sujets.

#### *Les Bambara et Soninke*

Ces groupes étaient déjà en rapports similaires avec la colonie, en particulier la ville de St-Louis où ils étaient présents depuis l'époque de l'occupation anglaise. Par suite de la réoccupation de la ville, de nombreux esclaves furent libérés dont une bonne proportion de Bambara, et affectés à diverses tâches domestiques militaires et civiles.<sup>8</sup>

Les Soninke eux, en bons experts dans le négoce, entretenaient avec les Français des relations commerciales suivies autour de l'or, la gomme, et des esclaves. A l'occasion, ils s'enrôlaient aussi comme navigateurs et manoeuvres.<sup>9</sup>

#### *Les Maures*

Les Maures, en particulier les tribus Hasan ou guerriers, comptaient parmi les puissances les moins négligeables de l'époque. Depuis des siècles, ils exerçaient une influence notable sur le commerce de la gomme et des esclaves le long du fleuve. Les Etats les plus en vue étaient les confédérations Trarza à l'ouest, Brakna dans la moyenne vallée, et Ida'u Aysh dans le Haut fleuve au nord, qui entretenaient avec leurs homologues Tukuloor, Wolof et la colonie du Sénégal des relations non uniformément bonnes.<sup>10</sup>

#### *Les Haal-pulaar'en*

Organisés dans une confédération théocratique composée de sept provinces autour de la moyenne vallée du Sénégal, les Tukuloor comme on les appelait, restaient les maîtres incontestés du chenal du fleuve entre Dagana

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7 Voir entre autres, John Hargreaves: "Assimilation in 18th century Senegal" in, *Journal of African History*, Vol. 1, 2, 1965. Oludare Idewu, "Assimilation in 19th century Senegal.", Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1968.

8 Selon Hargreaves les affranchis bambara avaient une réputation de gens laborieux et dociles, peu enclins à s'enfuir leur pays étant si loin dans le haut fleuve. ("Assimilation, p. 179).

9 C'est seulement vers 1880 qu'on allait assister à une péjoration de ces relations, du fait de la révolte de Mamadou Lamine.

10 Celles-ci dépendaient à la fois de la conjoncture et des caprices des princes maures. Les Trarza rançonnaient des caravanes même dans le voisinage immédiat de St-Louis, et leur Amir Muhammad Al Habib se vantait d'être en mesure de faire son SALAM à St-Louis, à la première manifestation d'hostilité de la part des Blancs.

et Bakel. A ce titre, ils subordonnaient la régularité du flux des marchandises et les mouvements de troupes vers le Soudan nigérien à leur bon vouloir, ainsi qu'à leurs intérêts politiques et économiques que la colonie s'efforçait de ménager à travers le paiement périodique de coutumes.

En outre, l'émergence de réformateurs musulmans adeptes d'un Islam militant et guerrier comme Alhajji Umar Taal, et de chefs traditionnels jaloux de leur indépendance comme Abdul Bookar Kan, restait une source constante d'inquiétude et de méfiance, qu'une politique amorcée de démembrement du Fuuta était propre à renforcer.

#### *Les Malinke*

Sous-groupe de la grande famille Mandé, ils comprenaient essentiellement des cultivateurs et des Julaa, en relations commerciales suivies avec les Anglais de Sierra Léone.

Les Français commençaient de s'intéresser aux Malinke surtout à mesure que leurs regards se portaient vers le Haut-Niger et qu'ils décelaient en eux un obstacle éventuel à la conquête de cette région.

Dès lors les missions d'exploration devaient se succéder en leur direction, prélude aux campagnes militaires de la deuxième moitié du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle.

#### *Les Twareg*

Les Twareg habitaient loin à l'intérieur des terres et, tout comme leurs ancêtres de l'époque médiévale, restaient plus rivés sur la Méditerranée et le commerce trans-saharien que sur l'Atlantique. Comme les Maures dont ils sont ethniquement proches, ils étaient loin de céder devant la force des Européens.

En somme les différents groupes sont entrés en rapports avec les Français à différentes époques et parfois, de manières différentes. Les Wolof, Bambara et Soninke semblaient plus intimement liés à la colonie du Sénégal que les Tukuloor, Maures, et Fulbe, classés le plus souvent comme "ennemis et obstacles majeurs à l'expansion de la France en Afrique occidentale."

Il importe de considérer le contexte politique et les impératifs militaires conjoncturels si on veut interpréter la vision que les officiers soudanais avaient des peuples du soudan occidental.

#### **Les Africains de l'ouest vu par les officiers soudanais**

Depuis le début du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, la société et la culture françaises avaient renforcé à travers les cercles scientifiques, les encyclopédies du jour, la presse écrite et la fiction, une idée du noir et de l'Afrique héritée des siècles

antérieurs, propre à appuyer tout discours justificatif de rêve de grandeur impériale.<sup>11</sup>

Le discours des officiers soudanais de l'époque d'expansion semble prolonger cette idée tout en y puisant. Sa lecture permet d'en repérer les thèmes récurrents et les maître-mots, et prend en considération trois éléments: la caractérisation des chefs traditionnels et des résistants, l'exposé des manières de vivre et des attitudes générales face aux problèmes de l'existence, et la description des qualités morales et physiques de groupes pris individuellement.

### **La caractérisation des chefs et des résistants**

Les écrits des officiers soudanais regorgent de caractérisations des chefs traditionnels rarement élogieuses, les mots les plus usités étant tyran, imposteur, fanatique, sanguinaire, pour n'en citer que quelques uns; Les exemples de Alhajji Umar Taal réformateur et conquérant musulman, de son fils et successeur Ahmad Al Kabir ou Amadu Séku, d'Abdul Bookar Kan chef du Boosoya et symbole de la résistance Foutanke et enfin Samori Tuure empereur du Wasulu, illustrent bien ce propos.

- Alhajji Umar Taal: Dans son livre *Le Sénégal et la France*<sup>12</sup> Faidherbe présente l'attitude des soldats Umariens démoralisés par le retournement de situation à la bataille de Médine de 1857, comme le résultat d'un mécontentement contre "ses impostures continuelles et ses promesses de miracles sans effet" (p.184). Plus loin, le passage du marabout dans la région de Bakel est donné comme synonyme de disette, famine, et mort. (p.225-6)
- Ahmad Al-Kabir: Les témoignages sur le fils de Alhajji Umar se recourent chez plusieurs auteurs qu'il s'agisse de Mage, Galliéni ou Archinard. Le Lieutenant Eugène Mage en visite dans ses Etats en 1864-6 laisse de lui le souvenir d'un despote:

*Pendant deux ans et demi, Ahmadu ne consulte personne et personne ne lui donne son avis: Le jour où tout est arrêté. convenu, il provoque une discussion pour la forme et donne l'air de céder à l'avis des chefs enchantés d'être consultés (Voyage au Soudan Occidental, p.279).*

Simon Galliéni aussi dans son livre *Voyage au Soudan Français* accuse Ahmadu et ses Tukuloor d'employer envers les peuples Bambara occupés le système de la terreur (p.7).

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11 William B. Cohen: *The French Encounter with Africans* (White response to Black 1530-1880). Indiana University Press, Bloomington & London, 1980.

12 Pour le détail des références voir la bibliographie en fin de texte.

- Abdul Bookar Kan: ce chef du Boosoya fût au Fuuta Tooro un des plus constamment hostiles aux intérêts français de 1863 à sa mort en 1891. Dans le contexte de la révolte du Tooro dont il était un des instigateurs, Faidherbe le décrit comme un jeune fanatique (*ibid.* p. 245).

Lorsque Galliéni traversait le Fuuta en 1879 Abdul restait encore un incorrigible perturbateur qui, selon lui, méritait un châtement exemplaire si on voulait le repos de la colonie et la sécurité des commerçants (*ibid.* p. 22).

- Samori Tuure: Sous la plume de Faidherbe, l'empereur du Wasulu n'était pas mieux qu'un simple marchand d'esclaves avec une armée de nègres fanatiques et cruels (*ibid.*, p. 317-8) Pour illustrer son propos Faidherbe se lance dans une longue description de ce qu'il appelle le spectacle favori de Samori; creuser un grand trou, le combler de centaines de prisonniers et brûler ces derniers vifs.

Sur un ton légèrement nuancé, Etienne Péroz décrit L'almaami comme un brillant chef de guerre et son oeuvre comme une source de paix profonde et une assurance complète du lendemain par opposition aux quinze années de guerres qui avaient menacé le Wasulu de dépeuplement. Mais, cela n'empêche pas Péroz de trouver à l'autorité de Samori une bonne dose de tyrannie. (*Au Soudan français: Souvenirs de guerre et de mission*, pp.460-1).

Le même qualificatif de tyran sanguinaire se retrouve chez le colonel Monteil (*Souvenirs Vécus*, p. 432) qui par ailleurs, présente les chefs noirs en général comme avides de pillages et constamment désireux de faire la guerre pour entretenir l'ardeur belliqueuse de leurs sujets (*ibid.*, p. 64).

Pour l'essentiel on peut remarquer que ces jugements étaient ceux de 'chefs de guerre' contre leurs homologues du camp ennemi. Cela valait pour Faidherbe opposé à Umar dans la vallée depuis 1857, Eugène Mage qui pendant deux ans et demi attendait d'Ahmadu l'accord pour un traité avec la France, mais aussi pour Galliéni qui dût faire preuve de la même patience lors de sa mission à Segou; patience due en grande partie à la lettre reçue d'Abdul Bookar avertissant Ahmadu que l'officier français était chargé de prendre les dessins de toutes les places fortes de l'empire de dresser des plans de routes afin de faciliter plus tard la voie à une colonne expéditionnaire.<sup>13</sup> De même Abdul Bookar empêchait les Français de parachever la construction du télégraphe entre Salde et Bakel.<sup>14</sup>

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13 A cause de la lettre les interprètes de la mission à Segou avaient trouvé l'opinion fortement indisposée à leur égard, et eux mêmes avaient été pendant leur séjour en butte à une surveillance étroite et hostile. (*Ibid.*, p. 364).

14 Voir à ce propos, David, W, Robinson: *Chiefs and Clerics: Abdul Bookar and the History of Fuuta Toro 1853-1891*, Clarendon Press, 1972.

Sur l'échantillon d'officiers consultés, seul le commandant Toutée laisse un témoignage à l'actif du roi Ajani de l'ancien Dahomey; en effet il loue la magnanimité de ce dernier vis-à-vis du récadère (envoyé) coupable non seulement d'avoir usé de sa femme mais, plus grave encore, d'avoir positivement tenté de l'empoisonner.<sup>15</sup> (*Dahomey, Niger, Touareg*; p 94).

### **L'image des Africains de l'ouest en général**

#### ***La notion du "nègre désordonné"***

Celle-ci est faite de clichés nombreux relatifs à la psychologie et aux attitudes des peuples aussi bien qu'à leurs coutumes, leurs langues, et de façon générale leur culture. Dans un souci de concision il importe de s'appesantir sur quelques aspects seulement, comme les prétendus sens du désordre, paresse, négligence, naïveté, arriération technologique et linguistique, et sexisme. La plupart des officiers font référence au sens du désordre inhérent au noir qui conférerait à sa vie et à ses activités une empreinte de confusion remarquable. Deux points de vue illustrent bien ce propos: ceux d'Eugène Mage et de Simon Galliéni.

Pendant son voyage au Soudan, alors que des Bambara étaient occupés à lui construire une hutte de passage, Mage frappé par la frénésie et l'animation qui accompagnaient le travail observa:

*Ces Bambara travaillaient avec un désordre qui me frappa: Ils criaient, se disputaient. Personne ne conduisait l'ouvrage; ils faisaient, défaisaient et, malgré leur ardeur ma case fut très longue à construire. C'était bien là l'image de leur vie et celle des nègres en général: le désordre sous toutes ses formes (ibid, p. 51).*

Galliéni accuse les noirs de ce même prétendu amour pour le désordre lorsqu'il remarque que "les noirs sont tellement faits au désordre qu'il est indispensable de prendre mille précautions pour remédier aux inconvénients souvent graves qui résultent de leur insouciance et de leur négligence habituelle". (*ibid*, p. 28)

Ces remarques renvoient bien sûr à la notion de relativité culturelle et appellent donc une discussion qu'il sied de réserver à la fin de cette section.

Concomitante dans la littérature est l'idée d'une paresse et d'une insouciance dites congénitales du Noir.

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15 Suit un témoignage sur la douceur des moeurs du pays en particulier de la justice dahoméenne où, selon Toutée, l'application du pardon était plus une règle qu'une exception.

***La notion du noir "paresseux" et "insouciant"***

La remarque de Mage est ici encore une de celles qui caractérisent le mieux de tels clichés, lui qui expliquait la désertion de St-Louis par les 'Nègres français' et le gonflement des effectifs de Alhajji Umar comme le résultat du fanatisme, "mais aussi de ce défaut qui est le plus grand obstacle à la civilisation de l'Afrique: l'horreur du travail et le désir de s'y soustraire".<sup>16</sup> (*ibid*, p 94)

En parfaite consonance avec cette impression, Galliéni voit dans le fait de produire pour satisfaire ses besoins - l'agriculture de subsistance - une consécration de cette prétendue paresse, ainsi que de l'irrationalité. Il ajoute que les populations du Haut-Sénégal-Niger sont "paresseuses" et que, elles ne seraient pas nègres sans cela. (*ibid*, p. 439)

Partageant ces vues, Etienne Péroz explique le phénomène par le manque d'ambition caractéristique du Noir. Il estime en effet que le noir n'a plus rien à désirer lorsqu'il possède une case, une ou deux femmes, un fusil, quelques captifs, une vache, de rares moutons et assez de mil dans les greniers pour préparer le couscous quotidien (*ibid*, p. 3435).

Enfin, le commandant Edmond Ferry fait preuve de moins d'originalité encore quand il insiste sur l'insouciance des noirs qui, selon lui, "usent sans retenue de ce que leur donne le sol mais ne pensent pas à se conserver la moindre réserve pour les mauvaises années", ou aiment, quand leurs préoccupations ne les appellent au dehors, s'accroupir sur le pas des portes à tourner ou se polir les dents avec un morceau de bois tendre, ou encore palabrer avec le voisin; le repos est, selon Ferry, "leur suprême bonheur et ils en usent en bons philosophes" (p. 278).

***Sur les notions de "bravoure" et de "fidélité"***

En ce qui concerne la prévalence de ces qualités chez les noirs du Soudan, les avis des officiers sont assez partagés. Partant de la désertion d'une poignée de soldats du prince de Kankan Moriba, Péroz devait conclure "qu'en pays mandingue la fidélité au chef et le patriotisme d'où naissent les dévouements héroïques sont choses inconnues" (p. 385).

De même, Faïdherbe fait des Ceddo du Waalo, Kajor, Saalum et autres Etats Wolof, des gens peu redoutables: "capables par moment d'un courage brutal ils se démoralisent assez facilement" (*ibid*, p. 2501). En revanche il salue l'audace incroyable des Tukuloor qui, à la bataille de Médine ne faisaient pas un pas plus vite que l'autre et préféraient se laisser tuer plutôt

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16 Et Bélin, J, son éditeur d'ajouter en note inframarginale ce qui suit: "Ce défaut est celui des sauvages de toutes les parties du monde, c'est-à-dire de tous les ennemis de la civilisation".

que de fuir tant était grande leur exaspération de voir échapper une proie (les soldats français) qu'ils tenaient déjà si bien<sup>17</sup> (*ibid*, p. 184).

Cependant, Galliéni, Toutée, Monteil et Mage ne semblent point partager ces impressions. Le premier s'était même fait le devoir de corriger ceux de ses compatriotes qui au départ de St-Louis doutaient de la fidélité et du courage des noirs de son escorte, en louant les qualités de son guide Tukuloor qui ne le quittait jamais au moment des combats, et était toujours prêt à recevoir la balle qui lui était destinée (*ibid*, p. 34). Plus loin, il mentionne le courage des soldats noirs de son escorte, courage qui en Europe les aurait couvert de gloire, et reconnaît: "c'est le dévouement naïf et héroïque en même temps de ces soldats qui nous a permis d'échapper à l'horrible sort qui nous attendait".<sup>18</sup>

Toutée quant à lui tire le chapeau aux soldats de Béhanzin pour avoir tenu tête pendant cinquante jours de combat ininterrompu à des troupes européennes à peine inférieures en nombre, les obligeant à autant de jours d'efforts pour atteindre une capitale située à quatre pauvres jours de marche de la côte (*ibid*, p. 72). Comme pour apporter un démenti aux affirmations de Péroz, il conclut en des termes sans appel: "des gens qui défendent leur pays d'une pareille façon quelque soit le principe au nom duquel ils le défendent, quelque soit le succès final, ont droit à la considération de tous ceux qui un jour peuvent être appelés à en faire autant"<sup>19</sup> (p. 73).

Enfin, Mangin dont le point de vue sur la valeur des combattants noirs n'est d'ailleurs que trop bien connu, renforce ces conclusions lorsqu'il affirme que les sentiments de famine, de clan, de race, le dévouement au chef naturel ou choisi "ont toujours inspiré au noir un dévouement qui va de la fidélité constante du désintéressement parfait et quotidien jusqu'au sacrifice de la vie"<sup>20</sup> (*Souvenirs Vécus, Ibid*, p. 178).

### ***Sur la place de la femme africaine dans la société***

La vision que les officiers ont laissée de la femme africaine est généralement celle d'un "être inférieur", d'un citoyen de deuxième ordre, qui plus est, est soumis à une exploitation des plus injustes.

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17 Nous reviendrons sur les nuances dans les jugements en fonction des ethnies.

18 Remarquer le qualificatif "naïf" comme pour atténuer la portée du témoignage.

19 Dans la même veine, Monteil constate que les dévouements aussi complets et aussi désintéressés que ceux dont les noirs avaient fait preuve à son égard méritaient d'être mis en relief car ils sont révélateurs de qualités morales que bien des civilisés pourraient envier. (*Souvenirs Vécus, ibid* p. 28).

20 Toutée devait apprendre par la suite que la femme et un conseiller du roi s'étaient mis d'accord pour envoyer un courrier au roi de Save afin de savoir comment lui et Tofa étaient traités par les français, et que la femme avait demandé au courrier de s'arranger pour ne revenir qu'après son départ.



La femme Bambara ou Malinke est selon Galliéni une captive, une véritable bête de somme, la chose du mari (p. 390). Moins élogieux encore est le jugement de Etienne Péroz sur la place de la femme en milieux Bambara et Soninke, tout à fait ignorant selon lui, de la galanterie: "aux hommes les doux loisirs, aux femmes les pesants fardeaux, les durs labeurs..." (*ibid*, p. 126). Plus loin il ajoute que la femme Malinke occupe une petite place au foyer où le maître de Maison la considère simplement comme une domestique de confiance (*ibid*, p. 190).

Cependant, dans le même temps, Péroz semble contredire Galliéni et se contredire lui-même quand il fait de la femme Malinke une femme rarement maltraitée et par sa qualité de mère, respectée à l'instar d'une madone; de même quand il insiste sur la gentillesse et l'appui de Sarangekeni, femme favorite de Samori, par qui il serait arrivé à décider L'almaami à satisfaire aux demandes des Français, "plus sûrement que par un séjour de plusieurs mois durant lequel je ne l'avais vu qu'entouré de ses conseillers".<sup>21</sup>

C'est dans cette perspective que se place la remarque du commandant Toutée sur la femme de Ajani, roi des Bariba, dont l'opposition à la signature du traité fit un effet des plus notables. Selon l'auteur, la femme manifesta dès le premier jour une opposition d'autant plus dangereuse qu'elle était enveloppée des formes de la politesse la plus raffinée, décidant son mari à faire preuve de plus de circonspection:

*Ainsi enthousiasmé par mes cadeaux, séduit par le récit qu'on lui avait fait de notre conduite, il voulait signer le soir même. Mais avertie par son instinct de femme que ce blanc allait apporter une perturbation quelconque dans les mœurs du pays, la reine dit en bariba à son mari: 'fais attention, rien ne presse, tu signeras ce soir'. Je remarquais aussitôt le ton d'autorité avec lequel elle avait parlé. Toujours est-il que c'est à ce moment seulement qu' Ajani me parla de son intention de consulter son peuple*<sup>22</sup> (*Ibid*, p. 147).

Mis à part ces deux exemples contradictoires, le discours des officiers sur la femme africaine et sa place dans la société reste uniformément négatif, et dénonciateur de "sexisme".

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21 *Ibid.*, p.363 - C'est pourquoi Péroz conclut à la nécessité de compter désormais avec les femmes pour ce qui concerne les missions diplomatiques au Wasulu.

22 Toutée devait apprendre par la suite que la femme et un conseiller du roi s'étaient mis d'accord pour envoyer un courrier au roi de Save afin de savoir comment lui et Tofa étaient traités par les Français, et que la femme avait demandé au courrier de s'arranger pour ne revenir qu'après son départ.

**Sur les langues, la mémoire collective, et la tradition**

De l'échantillon considéré, seuls Faidherbe, Galliéni, Ferry et Maqé s'étendent sur ce sujet. Les deux premiers semblent se faire l'écho de leur simplicité et de leur arriération. Les Africains selon Ferry ne parleraient pas des langues mais, des idiomes qui ont toujours suffi à leurs ancêtres et qui certes leur suffiront.

Ces langues sont selon lui, d'une simplicité étonnante:

*Pas de constructions de phrases compliquées: pas de temps, de modes, de personnes dans les verbes; pas de genres dans les noms ou les adjectifs; juste ce qu'il faut pour s'exprimer: des infinitifs, des substantifs, des adverbes, des adjectifs que l'on accole les uns aux autres en simples et courtes propositions directes; donc ici comme en toutes autres choses l'effort minimum (sic) qui caractérise si bien le tempérament noir (ibid, pp.227-8).*

Et l'auteur d'expliquer que c'est là l'origine du "parler petit-nègre" par lequel les noirs du Soudan reporteraient dans la langue française les constructions et les habitudes de leurs soi-disant idiomes.

Faidherbe qui se voulait - comme Gaden pour le Pulaar - un expert de la langue Wolof, a traité de celle-ci dans son livre déjà mentionné. Dans un des passages il affirme que les Wolof quand ils veulent certifier quelque chose "jurent par leur nez": *suma bakan*: ou s'ils veulent prêter un serment plus solennel, par le nez de leur mère: *souma bakan ou ndeye*. Dans l'un des cas, selon lui, le locuteur veut dire par mon nez, et dans l'autre "par le nez de ma mère" (*ibid*, p. 364).

De même dit Faidherbe, ce qui appartient à l'un d'eux dans une famille appartient à l'autre d'où les locutions *suma fas ou bay* c'est à dire *mon cheval de père*, ou *suma fetel ou mag* c'est à dire *mon fusil de frère* pour "le fusil de mon frère". Ces affirmations en disent long sur le caractère limité de son expertise.<sup>23</sup>

Comme Toutée vis-à-vis de Péroz et Galliéni, Mangin se veut apparemment plus nuancé quand il ne s'inscrit pas en faux contre les assertions de Ferry et de Faidherbe. Pour lui certaines langues africaines comme le Peuhl (PULAAR) font l'admiration des philologues par leur richesse, leur précision, leur harmonie et leur souplesse. (*Regards sur la France d'Afrique*, p. 175) Et, il trouve aux lettres que les noirs écrivent en arabe des images heureuses qui n'ont parfois rien à voir avec l'éducation littérale.<sup>24</sup>

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23 Faidherbe a écrit aussi un traité de Grammaire de la langue peulh.

24 Il faut quand même remarquer la référence à la langue arabe, alors qu'en réalité c'est une langue africaine utilisant seulement l'alphabet arabe.

Par ailleurs la tradition orale et son siège, la mémoire collective ont aussi fait l'objet de commentaires. Les noirs apparaissent chez Edmond Ferry comme des gens qui ne notent aucun fait mais plutôt gardent des traditions que l'on se redit de génération en génération et qui ne tardent pas à devenir des légendes. A en croire Ferry, les noirs auraient du mal à se situer dans la durée:

*Ils vivent de lunes en lunes, de ramadans en ramadans, n'ont qu'une connaissance très approximative de leur âge, ne se souviennent guère et encore sans pouvoir leur assigner une place précise dans le temps que des plus grands événements qui les ont personnellement, et violemment frappés: cataclysmes de la nature, invasions, famines (ibid, p. 228).*

Enfin, sans dire s'il y voyait une qualité ou un défaut, il estime que, comme il arrive pour tous les contemplatifs, les noirs ont une mémoire surprenante et très fidèle des lieux et des choses; qu'ils retrouvent et reconnaissent après de longues années les endroits où ils sont passés ne fut-ce qu'une fois, les objets qu'ils ont vus; que, servis par un merveilleux instinct que le développement de l'intelligence n'a pas encore éteint, ils savent s'orienter sûrement et rapidement.

Quant à Mage, il est d'accord que le noir a une excellente mémoire mais seulement en raison du peu de faits qu'il y loge.

Prenant tous les deux auteurs à contre-pied, Monteil estime à partir de l'exemple de ses compagnons que le Wolof n'a pour ainsi dire aucun sens de l'orientation, s'inquiétant peu des obstacles qu'il peut rencontrer, ou des points de repères éventuels

*...aussi demandez lui des renseignements sur la route qu'il a parcourue la veille, il vous induira en erreur la plupart du temps. Son esprit est si peu capable d'effort qu'interrogé à peu d'intervalle sur une même chose, il se contredira sans que cela le frappe ou même le mène. (Monteil: Explorateur et Soldat p. 57).*

#### ***Des religions en Afrique de l'ouest***

Les religions traditionnelles ainsi que l'islam sont l'objet de commentaires. Dans l'ensemble les auteurs voient dans le système traditionnel du simple fétichisme et de la superstition, et dans le culte, des pratiques grossières dont il est mal aisé selon Galliéni de saisir la raison. Tous insistent sur ce qu'ils appellent la crédulité du noir, qui rend celui-ci esclave des fétiches.

Cependant, de tous les systèmes de croyance prévalant chez les Africains, l'Islam est celui qui a attiré le plus d'attention chez les 'officiers soudanais'. Tous semblent partager le sentiment que l'Islam est une religion "mal comprise" et "mal pratiquée" en Afrique de l'ouest, qu'il n'a pas contribué au progrès moral des populations et qu'il constituait un obstacle à la "mission civilisatrice" de la France.

L'un des plus sarcastiques dans son traitement de l'Islam en Afrique occidentale est peut-être le Lieutenant-colonel Klobb. Il voit dans les gestes du patron de son chaland en prières, des baisers intempestifs du pont de son bateau et affirme que celui-ci ne comprend rien à ce qu'il marmotte (i.e: aux versets du coran). Pour lui les nègres ne sont pas très ferrés dans la religion musulmane, sont d'ailleurs parfaitement incapables de l'entendre. A Basaka, village Soninke où il observait prier des gens à jeûn, il conclut que cette prescription n'est pour les populations qu'un emploi du temps et une simple distraction (p. 34).

Dans la même veine, Klobb accuse les habitants de Tombouctou de mauvaise observance du jeûne en notant sur son carnet de route que beaucoup ne s'étaient nullement gênés de tourner et de boire du thé acheté en cachette chez le traitant.

Toutée renforce cette vision du noir comme mauvais musulman et sempiternellement attaché à ses fétiches ou gris-gris. (p.66)

Le thème de l'Islam comme facteur de "corruption du noir est également récurrent dans la littérature impériale française en Afrique. Ainsi, Faidherbe fait des habitants du Fuuta des gens viciés par l'islamisme qui les a rendus aussi menteurs et aussi voleur que les Maures.<sup>25</sup>

Mage, à la vue de qui les femmes se sauvaient assez souvent en se voilant le visage, interprète ce geste comme "une sauvagerie musulmane ... une des innovations apportées par Elhadj (Omar) dans les moeurs des toucouleurs et en général des sénégalais" (p. 52).

Enfin, tous les officiers s'accordent que cette religion est un obstacle à l'exécution des projets français et ceci de Mage, qui pense dès 1866 que la plupart des maux en Afrique viennent de l'islamisme, à Galliéni qui constate en 1879 que les ennemis les plus acharnés des Français en Sénégalie ont toujours marché contre eux en invoquant le nom du Prophète (p.614), et Mangin pour qui l'Islam source d'ennemis et de rivaux ne doit être encouragé sous aucun prétexte, fut-ce celui de la laïcité de nombreux administrateurs (p. 213-4).

A coté des jugements sur la religion et les attitudes on trouve d'autres relatifs à la vie matérielle, aux arts et industries.

#### ***Des arts et des industries en Afrique occidentale***

Dans ce domaine les caractérisations étonnent à la fois par leur nombre et par leur similarité. Parlant des Bambara, Eugène Mage décrit leurs habitations comme misérables, leurs ustensiles comme grossiers, et leurs arts les plus avancés - la métallurgie et le tissage - comme étant encore dans

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25 Faidherbe et beaucoup d'autres associent la prétendue perfidie des maures et des toucouleurs à la religion que ces derniers professent, l'Islam.

l'enfance (*ibid.*, p.69). De même il qualifie la musique donnée en son honneur par ses hôtes Bambara de bruit assourdissant... bizarre et élémentaire.

Dans le même sens Ferry pense que l'art des noirs est comme leur littérature, il est aussi simple qu'elle, qu'en dehors des armes, ses manifestations les plus recherchées ne sont que des reproductions naïves et timides de l'homme qui s'éveille, que le noir n'a pas le sens du beau et qu'il appartient à la France de l'aider dans sa "longue et difficile ascension vers le beau et le bien comme on aide un frère plus jeune et plus faible".<sup>26</sup>

Par contre, Mangin voit en le noir un être doué en matière artistique, doté d'un sens élevé de l'ornementation et d'une grande capacité d'invention. Son art, selon lui, est l'art de l'avenir.

### **Remarques sur des groupes particuliers**

Les jugements qui précèdent peuvent être considérés comme généraux dans la mesure où ils se veulent tous globalisants et descriptifs du noir, terme générique maintes fois préféré à d'autres plus spécifiquement représentatifs de pays ou de populations. Parallèlement les officiers soudanais, comme soucieux de faire montre de discernement et oeuvre de typologie, se sont livrés à des caractérisations de différents groupes, qui tranchent souvent avec celles précitées pour ce qui est de la nuance.

#### ***Les Wolof***

Edmond Ferry fait une différence entre la femme Wolof, plus amoureuse et plus portée selon lui vers les parures, et la femme encore primitive du soudan français. Le même jugement favorable au Wolof revient lorsqu'il décrit les larges avenues de Dakar parcourues de nombreux noirs: "les oulofs se distinguaient par leur stature élevée, leur allure solennelle et la pureté de leur type". En dehors des Fulbe et des Haalpulaar'en, les Français considéraient généralement le Wolof comme le plus beau type noir et le plus civilisé. Mais, en même temps, du fait de la relative facilité avec laquelle ils furent subjugués, les Wolof étaient souvent classés les plus poltrons. (cf, Faidherbe plus haut).

#### ***Les Bambara, Soninke et Malinke***

Depuis le milieu du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, les Bambara avaient plus ou moins bonne presse parmi les Français. Ceux d'entre eux qui habitent le Bélédugu sont pour Faidherbe "fiers industriels. économes ... braves qui cultivent la terre,

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26 Cette conclusion est liée au fait qu'interrogé par Ferry sur sa conception de la beauté féminine, le Capitaine Mamadu Raasin avait avoué porter plus d'attention aux traits du visage qu'à la ligne du corps. (p.231).

élèvent les troupeaux amassent des provisions". Curieusement, Faidherbe semble faire de ces activités l'apanage des Bambara.

Mage fait des Masasi "le seul type pur de la race bambarienne qui doit ses qualités physiques aux nombreux croisements avec les peuhls" et, des gens qui parlent à voix basse contrairement aux autres Bambara qui, à l'en croire, crient à se faire entendre de tous les sourds de la terre.

Sous la plume de Galliéni, les Soninke deviennent la race la plus intéressante du bassin du Sénégal, celle qui comprend le mieux les avantages du commerce, et qui exècre, le farniente perpétuel, prétendument caractéristique des Africains.

***Les Haalpulaar'en; 'toucouleur' et 'peuhls':***

Ces deux groupes sont peut-être de ceux qui ont inspiré le plus de jugements péjoratifs de la part des officiers. Tous s'accordent pour en faire des êtres enclins au mensonge et à la perfidie (voir le jugement de Faidherbe plus haut). Galliéni appuie ces vues quand il dénie au Tukuloor toute idée de sincérité. Selon lui, ils n'abordent jamais franchement les questions au cours de "ces interminables palabres où l'on ment avec un aplomb sans égal" (p.45-89). Plus haut, il parle d'Alpha Séga, "menteur comme un toucouleur et un kassonké réunis" (p. 362).

A l'inverse, il note à leur égard, "une réputation de bravoure bien établie dans tout le Soudan" et signale que sans la supériorité tactique et logistique avérée des Français, ils auraient été un obstacle sérieux aux projets de ces derniers.

***Maures et Touaregs***

Bien que physiquement proches les uns des autres, ces groupes ne jouissaient pas toujours de la même presse sous la plume et le regard des "officiers soudanais", le premier étant relativement mal vu par rapport au second.

Ainsi la perception que Faidherbe avait des Maures était celle de gens d'une saleté légendaire et de surcroît, belliqueux, sanguinaires et qui, pour le pouvoir, s'assassinent à l'envie. (p.39)

Ferry établit une différence entre les deux au net avantage du second. Physiquement, dit-il, le maure n'a pas l'allure de race du touareg, moralement il n'en a ni l'esprit élevé, ni la bravoure, ni la fidélité à la parole donnée. Tous les deux groupes cependant ne sont à ses yeux que de tristes débris de vieilles races dont ils auraient gardé un esprit de fourberie assez commun (sic) chez les peuples de l'orient.<sup>27</sup>

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27 Il pense aux Tartares, Mongols et Chinois.

Et Ferry de s'apitoyer sur la prévalence des maladies en leur sein, et sur le fait que "la civilisation en se retirant d'eux leur a laissé le lourd héritage du mal sans qu'ils aient le moyen de le guérir" (p.218).

Le Lieutenant-colonel Klobb aussi est tendre à l'égard des Touareg. Il estime qu'ils sont nobles et braves avec des moeurs vertueuses, que leur parenté avec les Français leur donne le droit d'être traités autrement que les noirs. (p. 265) En conséquence il voit en eux le peuple des plus faciles à assimiler parmi tous ceux conquis.

Enfin, dans un passage où il décrit la foule à Kayes et qui apparait comme très représentatif des clichés sur les ethnies il poursuit:

*On trouve là des spécimen d'à peu près tous les types: Maures de la rive droite d'un blanc sale, Ouolofs d'un noir d'ébène, toucouleurs de toutes teintes, peuhls au profil égyptien, saracollets au museau de singe, bambara et malinke à la face bestiale et aux cheveux crépus (p. 266).*

### **Remarques sur le discours des 'officiers soudanais'**

Le discours des officiers soudanais sur les peuples de l'Afrique occidentale frappe sous maints rapports: la récurrence des thèmes déjà mentionnée à travers les nombreux exemples; la similitude dans le raisonnement et la démarche; Les contradictions inhérentes aux jugements des différents auteurs, mais aussi à ceux d'un même auteur parfois.

L'opinion généralement répandue est que les accents aussi bien que le sens de ce discours tiennent d'un héritage raciste dont plus d'un se trouverait imprégné. Mais, une lecture attentive de ce discours suggère que la situation est plus complexe. Qu'il faut rechercher les explications non seulement dans cette attitude subjective mais aussi dans le manque d'esprit critique devant des faits de civilisation étrangers; le niveau intellectuel relativement faible de certains cadres de l'armée coloniale; la tendance marquée à généraliser à partir de cas isolés, et les impératifs militaires conjoncturels.

### **L'ignorance des officiers**

Le niveau intellectuel des cadres de l'armée coloniale n'était pas élevé au cours de la période concernée. Dans l'ensemble la "vieille armée" en France se caractérise jusqu' autour de 1870 par une inertie intellectuelle, l'ignorance ou le mépris des connaissances techniques et du travail de l'esprit.<sup>28</sup>

Même en Angleterre et en Belgique, pays dont les cadres coloniaux bénéficiaient d'une meilleure formation, il faut attendre le début du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle pour voir ceux-ci se doter d'un niveau universitaire. Le manque de

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28 Raoul Girardet - *La Société militaire de la France contemporaine, civilisation d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*, Paris librairie Plon, pp.109-110.

familiarisation avec les réalités culturelles africaines au moyen d' une formation circonstanciée ajoutée à cette ignorance.

Ainsi, l'étonnement de E. Mage devant l'animation accompagnant la confection de sa hutte ne s'explique que par son ignorance de cette donnée fondamentale: la compatibilité entre le travail d'un côté, et la musique et la conversation de l'autre. De même la prétendue apathie du noir constatée ici et là relève d'une méprise. Le travail agricole dans nombre des pays visités est rythmé par les saisons et la fréquence comme l'intensité des occupations varie suivant les tranches de l'année.

Les conclusions de Faidherbe, L et Ferry, E, sur les langues africaines procèdent sûrement d'une volonté marquée d'interpréter celles-ci à travers le prisme du français sans l'effort parfois difficile d'en saisir la spécificité et l'originalité profondes.

Dans les exemples cités plus haut, Faidherbe écrit *souma bakan ou ndey* au lieu de *suma bakkan' u ndey*, et la donne comme un serment sur "le nez de ma mère" au lieu de "la vie de ma mère", sens d'autant plus adéquat que le "nez" est le siège du souffle vital, élément si fondamental dans la "philosophie" négro-africaine.

Une autre preuve que les officiers de la Coloniale n'étaient pas toujours fondés à connaître et interpréter correctement les faits culturels est la brièveté du séjour de nombre d'entre eux. Faidherbe lui même se plaint que les gouverneurs quittent souvent la colonie "sans avoir eu le temps d'apprendre le nom des pays qu'ils ont à administrer".<sup>29</sup>

E. Ferry partage ce souci qui réclame une permanence du personnel administratif dans les postes ou dans les mêmes régions, "pour que les fonctionnaires civils et militaires connaissent à fond les moeurs et les caractères des indigènes" (Ferry: 247-8).

### Généralisations abusives

De cette ignorance et de cette brièveté de séjour propre à aggraver celle-ci, découle une prédisposition manifeste à faire de l'induction amplificatrice, tirer des conclusions hâtives et globalisantes sur base d'exemples et d'expériences isolés. Ainsi, si nous avons établi une distinction apparemment artificielle - entre les jugements relatifs au noir et ceux relatifs aux groupes c'est que, contrairement au deuxième, dans le premier cas ils sont formés à propos d'individus et se transforment très vite en sentences sur le noir en général. Les populations qui habitent le Haut Sénégal-Niger sont

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29 En effet de 1880 à 1888 il y eut en comptant les intérimaires dix gouverneurs du Sénégal: Brière de l'Isle, Delanneau, Canard, Vallon, Servatius, Bourdiaux, Seignac, Quintrie, Grenouille, et Clément Thomas. Faidherbe insistait particulièrement sur ce fait pour dénoncer la suppression de l'école des otages qu'il avait fondée en 1855.



certainement paresseuses, elles ne seraient pas nègres sans cela. Cette assertion de Simon Galliéni typifie sans doute la tendance susmentionnée. De même la conclusion de Eugène Mage observant les Bambara à travailler: "c'était bien là l'image de leur vie et celle des nègres en général, le désordre sous toutes ses formes".

L'on peut noter par ailleurs quelque volonté chez maints auteurs à confirmer des voyageurs ou missionnaires précédents. Curieusement, les auteurs dans leur généralité, ne se laissent tenter par l'induction amplifiante que lorsque l'impression et le jugement sont négatifs. Cela, même le commandant Toutée le juge dérangeant, estimant que sur cent voyageurs, les quatre vingt-dix neuf n'avaient pas pénétré à plus de vingt cinq kilomètres à l'intérieur des terres, et surtout, regrettant que, "la déplorable impression qu'ils ont rapportée s'est appliquée dans l'esprit public européen à l'ensemble des populations noires" (pp.48-9).

Il n'est dès lors pas étonnant que le discours de l'un comme de l'autre soit émaillé de contradictions.

#### **Contradictions du discours des officiers**

Sur une même page, on tient parfois des propos différents sur les éléments d'un même groupe. Ainsi, pour E. Péroz, la femme Malinke est à la fois une 'domestique de confiance', une "mère respectée à l'instar d'une madone", et un agent d'une influence occulte des plus sérieuses" sur le mari. Ces jugements semblent jurer avec ceux de Galliéni sur la femme Bambara ou Soninke présentée comme une "chose" du mari, une "bête de somme", pour ne citer que ces qualificatifs.

La perception du noir "civilisé" par les Français par opposition au noir resté lui même, est souvent aussi objet de variance voire, de désaccord. Klobb fait des femmes des Tirailleurs et Spahis (auxiliaires Africains de l'armée coloniale) les plus propres et les mieux habillées (p. 83). De même Ferry fait le départ entre les peuples primitifs de l'intérieur et ceux neufs de la côte qui auraient adopté une partie des précieuses qualités de l'Européen.<sup>30</sup>

A l'opposé, le commandant Toutée pense devoir à la vérité de noter au passage, que les noirs vus chez eux sont des gens fort sensés, "mais que vus chez nous sur l'étroite bande de terres où nous broyons leurs pauvres idées ils ont perdu le sens" (pp.48-9).

Mangin prend à témoin les douze ans passés en Afrique noire sur le Sénégal, le Niger, le Congo et le Nil pour affirmer que le noir dit primitif

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30 Selon lui, le goût du travail, l'esprit de prévoyance et de sage épargnent. Curieusement, il fait allusion mais sans les citer aux pires défauts de son frère supérieur que le noir se serait également appropriés (Ibid, pp.215-6).

n'a rien des défauts que les Européens ont transmis au noir dit civilisé. Une certaine dose de paternalisme imprègne sans doute ces jugements mais ils restent pour l'essentiel en désaccord avec ceux suscités.

S'agissant des contradictions relatives aux jugements appliqués aux groupes, le lecteur ne peut s'empêcher de les lier aux impératifs conjoncturels et en particulier, à la position des groupes par rapport au projet impérial français, la religion professée (Islam ou religions traditionnelles), et autres considérations.

Enfin, l'effort d'analyse perceptible chez des auteurs comme Toutée et Mangin, sans doute suggestif d'un niveau intellectuel relativement supérieur, semble constituer une base supplémentaire de certaines des contradictions. Par exemple, là où Galliéni lie les cadeaux faits à la naïveté et aux convoitises enfantines des noirs, Toutée perçoit en les cadeaux offerts au roi Ajani, les présents de son gouvernement à l'occasion du traité conclu, le prix de l'hospitalité que ses cinq cents hommes allaient recevoir pendant quelques jours, et la fourniture de quatre mille journées de porteurs (p.144). Le soin que Mangin met à analyser les lettres écrites en arabe par les Africains participe du même effort de ne pas toujours rester à la surface des choses.

Quelque soit son ton, son sérieux, ses contradictions et faiblesses, le discours des "officiers soudanais" a à ce point déteint sur la politique coloniale française et la facture du discours africaniste français et occidental en général, qu'une analyse de sa portée historique s'impose.

### **Conséquences du discours des "officiers soudanais"**

Il serait fastidieux de citer toutes les conséquences des écrits des officiers soudanais. En métropole comme en Afrique elles furent à la fois pratiques et théoriques, politiques, sociales et culturelles.

#### ***En France***

En France même, le discours avait une portée considérable. En tant que Voix des Bâisseurs d'Empire, cette littérature servait d'étai à la voix du Parti Colonial et de tous ceux favorables à une aventure coloniale tous azimuts. Comme tel, le discours était partie intégrante du Credo Colonial exprimé dans les discours des banquets et des congrès, aussi bien que dans la littérature de voyage ou de vulgarisation géographique.<sup>31</sup> Elle devait aussi prêter ses stéréotypes à la presse, à la fiction, au théâtre et à la poésie.

C'est en bons étudiants de cette littérature que Jules Ferry et Eugène Etienne, célèbres hommes politiques français, faisaient allusion aux vertus

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31 Voir par exemple, Raoul Girardet: *L'idée coloniale en France 1871-1962*, La Table Ronde, Paris 7è, 1972.

libératrices et civilisatrices de la mission française en Afrique soudanaise. Au delà du monde politique, c'est surtout sur la jeunesse destinée aux tâches administratives dans les colonies que ce discours devait agir. A l'Ecole coloniale créée par décret du 23 novembre 1889 et ouverte en 1896, le discours des officiers soudanais occupait une bonne place dans ce qu'on appelait alors les sciences coloniales. Une place d'autant plus importante que les auteurs passaient pour être des experts qui apportaient de précieux documents... "à l'histoire de la pénétration française en Afrique, à la connaissance des hommes et des faits".<sup>32</sup> Socle des sciences coloniales, le discours des officiers soudanais était donc une "bible" pour les futurs cadres coloniaux et, du coup, une source importante de la politique sur le terrain, politique à forte coloration assimilationniste, anti-islamique, élitiste et répressive en matière culturelle.

### *Assimilation*

La politique d'assimilation remontait au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle en ce qui concerne la colonie du Sénégal. Elle consistait essentiellement en une profession de la foi catholique, une introduction dans la communauté sénégalaise d'institutions de type européen et d'adoption consciente de valeurs et normes inspirées par l'occupant français.<sup>33</sup>

Mais cette politique ne fut appliquée avec fruit qu'au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle grâce aux convictions et à l'énergie de gens comme Louis Faidherbe, qui innova beaucoup l'ancien système en encourageant les mariages à la mode du pays avec des autochtones ou Signares, et en fondant dès 1855 l'Ecole des Otages (plus tard Ecole des Fils de Chefs).

Dans le même ordre de faits, le mépris des langues africaines dérivé de cette littérature fut à la base du concept colonial de langues vernaculaires pour distinguer celles-ci du Français langue écrite et jugée supérieure. C'est cela qui explique l'imposition du Français pour devenir membre du Conseil Général même si, du coup, on empêchait les Africains illettrés la majorité de l'électorat d'envahir la structure aux dépens des lettrés Français et Métis.<sup>34</sup>

Par ailleurs, l'ignorance des langues devait avoir des répercussions sur la compréhension que les officiers et la plupart des cadres coloniaux en avaient. C'est le lieu de noter l'influence volontaire ou fortuite des officiers soudanais sur des générations d'intellectuels africains. Le "duel" Senghor-Cheikh Anta Diop des années 1970 en est une illustration: En rejetant la

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32 Voir la préface de Mangin au livre du colonel Parfait Louis Monteil, *Souvenirs Vécus: Quelques feuilles d'histoire coloniale*. Paris, Société d'édition géographique, maritime et coloniale, rue Jacob, 1924.

33 Voir Hargreaves, *ibid.*, pp.180-2.

34 Voir à ce propos, Oludare Idowu: "Assimilation in 19th Century Senegal", in *Nigerian Institute of International Affairs*, 1968.

gémation (Siggi au lieu de Sigi; Ceddo au lieu de Cedo), ou en imposant le OU de coordination senghor rappelle étrangement l'orthographe de Faidherbe dans le Suma Bakan Ou Ndey précité plus concevable sous la forme *suma bakkan' u ndey*.

De même les stations de radiodiffusion de plusieurs pays indépendants devaient continuer pour un temps de parler d'émissions en langues vernaculaires au lieu de langues nationales.

Quant au corollaire de l'absence d'écriture, la tradition orale, et le manque de rigueur qui lui est généralement attribué, elle est restée longtemps objet de mépris par rapport aux archives comme source indispensable de l'histoire de l'Afrique. Sa réhabilitation comme instrument privilégié dans la renégociation de l'identité ne date pas de longtemps, et a exigé une lutte des plus âpres de la part des historiens.<sup>35</sup>

#### *"Politique musulmane" de la France*

S'il faut s'accorder avec Sidney Kanya-Forstner que l'attitude des Français vis-à-vis de l'Islam résultait de la longue expérience de conflits franco-musulmans en Algérie que Faidherbe avait transmise, il faut néanmoins convenir que les guerres contre les marabouts au Soudan occidental et la systématisation que nombre d'officiers en avaient faite, y étaient pour beaucoup. Parce que ces luttes gagnèrent en importance dans la seconde moitié du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, l'attitude anti-islamique des cadres coloniaux gagna aussi en intensité.

Le Gouverneur Vallon traita l'Islam de grande menace contre l'influence française; plus tard Mangin fit de la Christianisation un devoir, même pour des cadres qui se distinguaient par un esprit laïc, soucieux qu'il était de voir le catholicisme faire de fidèles sujets français comme le protestantisme fait des sujets anglais.<sup>36</sup>

Le combat spirituel contre l'Islam pour le "domestiquer" et mieux assimiler l'Africain, est alors engagé qui comporte un volet surveillance surtout des marabouts et un volet étude, tous deux confiés aux administrateurs sur le terrain et à des orientalistes importés de la métropole. Commence alors une longue succession d'islamologues et d'études qui, de Robert Arnaud à Vincent Monteil en passant par Paul Marty, Eugène Mangin, Alphonse Gouilly, Marcel Cardaire pour ne citer qu'eux sont tous plus ou moins animés par un esprit de croisade, doublé d'une volonté de trouver à

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35 Le rôle de l'Anthropologie et des chercheurs anglo-saxons avec leur culte de FIELD WORK (Enquêtes sur le terrain), n'est pas non plus à négliger.

36 Voir par exemple, Martin A Klein - *Islam and Imperialism in Senegal 1847-1914*. Hoover Institution of War and Peace, Standford University Press, 1968.

l'Islam en Afrique au sud du Sahara une identité propre par rapport à l'Islam matinal et soi-disant moyen oriental.<sup>37</sup>

Deux conséquences majeures en découlent:

- une politique musulmane instable voire insaisissable qu'Alphonse Gouilly décrit assez fidèlement quand il affirme qu'elle était "hostile souvent" quelque fois favorable. faite de contradictions, de repentirs, de brusques retours, description que même des islamologues contemporains semblent accepter.<sup>38</sup>
- une attitude de défiance si excessive que Cruise O'Brien n'hésite pas à parler d'une sorte de "French Administrative Paranoia", qui devait même friser l'arabophobie dans la lutte contre le Wahhabisme des années 40-50.<sup>39</sup>

Cet anti-islamisme et d'autres considérations inhérentes au discours des officiers soudanais comme les préjugés à l'encontre des ethnies devaient aussi renforcer pour ne pas dire générer une politique du "diviser pour régner".

#### *Le "diviser pour régner"*

Une des conséquences majeures des idées léguées par les militaires et reçues par les administrateurs sur les différents groupes ethniques et religieux, fut d'opérer un Distinguo entre les Africains suivant le degré d'hostilité, de soumission, vis-à-vis des français, et d'orthodoxie en matière de religion. Deux mythes devaient colorer la stratégie et la tactique françaises: celui de l'"alliance" des peuples Mande, et celui de l'"hostilité" des Toucouleur-foulbe.

Les Bambara, Soninke et Xaasonke, considérés comme hostiles à l'Islam et agressés par les éléments Fuutanke d'Alhaji Umar étaient perçus comme alliés naturels contre les Haalpulaar'en et les Fulbe des Fuuta Tooro, Jaloo, et Bundu. Dans ce sens, Archinard au cours de sa campagne contre l'empire d'Ahmadu sut utiliser pleinement la carte ethno-politico-religieuse. La politique consistant à affecter des gardes et soldats d'une région et d'un groupe ethnique donnés dans une autre région et parmi d'autres groupes, est une survivance et une application de cette politique.

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37 Les titres des études en disent long: *Etude sur l'Islam Noir; L'Islam en A.O.F. L'Islam Noir.*

38 Par exemple, David Robinson: *French Islamic Policy and Practice in late 19th century*, Donald Cruise O'Brien: *Toward an Islamic policy in French West Africa, 1854-1914.*

39 Voir à ce propos, *Evolution of Islam in West Africa: The Wahhabia Movement and its Contribution to Political Development, 1945-1958.* North Western University Ph.D., 1972.

Dans la même veine, les idées des officiers soudanais sur les peuples primitifs et les peuples neufs, devaient aussi aider à fonder ou renforcer la distinction entre indigènes et évolués, sujets et citoyens.

### **Conclusion**

Etudier les écrits des officiers soudanais dans la deuxième moitié du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle peut à première vue relever du superflu étant donné les nombreuses allusions et les quelques études sur le développement de l'Africanisme qui s'y rapportent. En vérité, passer en revue les divers éléments qui informent leur perception des habitants du Soudan occidental, replacer cette perception dans le contexte d'expansion impériale et de mise en place de l'administration, et surtout, faire la relation de la perception à la formulation et l'exécution des différentes politiques se justifie à plus d'un titre: beaucoup sont habitués à voir en ces politiques des "données premières" résultant de la réflexion des milieux politiques civils plus que des idées des officiers eux mêmes. C'est dans le contexte d'une expansion coloniale timide parce que mal appuyée par l'opinion que les militaires se lancèrent dans un mouvement d'exploration et de systématisation des informations sur les peuples Africains.

Parmi les groupes, certains avaient déjà une longue expérience de contact avec les Français dans la colonie du Sénégal et se montraient assez coopératifs. D'autres, malgré une longue période de relations commerciales autour du fleuve restaient encore dans la seconde moitié du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle tantôt hostiles tantôt aimables, et dans tous les cas, méfiants. D'autres encore ne devaient se laisser intégrer sous le giron français que plus tard.

En "bons" Européens de l'époque les officiers soudanais considéraient les Africains et les noirs comme désordonnés, paresseux, insouciant, naïfs et ataviques avec des arts, industries, littérature, et religions, sous-développés.

En "bons" soldats, en butte à une résistance des plus acharnées, ils percevaient les Leaders de ces mouvements comme des tyrans, des terroristes et des fanatiques, opposant très souvent les bons et les mauvais groupes ethniques, suivant le niveau d'hostilité ou de résignation vis-à-vis du projet impérial. Ainsi, les Toucouleur devaient apparaître comme courageux, mais incroyablement fanatiques, perfides, malhonnêtes et grossiers; les Maures, sales, prétentieux, superficiels, belliqueux et rapaces; les Wolof, Bambara et Soninke, bons travailleurs, fidèles, et assez circonspects pour percevoir les avantages du commerce et de la civilisation.

Le discours des officiers soudanais, quelques soient les éléments qui ont pu l'influencer, reste caractérisé par un sens très limité de la relativité des faits de culture, lui même révélateur d'un niveau intellectuel parfois bas, une tendance excessive à généraliser, un parti pris évident, et de profondes contradictions dans les termes. Au global, l'analyse révèle que la perception des

officiers soudanais loin d'être seulement tributaire des idées racistes héritées de longue date, était en réalité une alchimie de racisme (impressions générales), de chauvinisme national (clichés sur les chefs et partis pris politico-stratégiques), de faible niveau intellectuel (manque d'esprit critique), et de ressentiments de tous ordres.

Tous ces clichés allaient déteindre fortement sur la politique coloniale en matière de traitement de l'Islam, d'assimilation des peuples occupés, et de stratégie administrative au sens large.

Enfin, par delà notre période et à plusieurs décennies de distance, la littérature du sous-développement des années 70 rappelle étonnamment ce discours. Comme celui-ci, la théorie dite néoclassique ou *Modernization Theory* accorde une grande place - dans son insistance sur les obstacles internes au développement - aux prétendus irrationalité économique, passivité, et atavisme des peuples de pays en voie de développement.<sup>40</sup> De même un autre auteur fait penser aux généralisations sur le noir lorsqu'il porte l'accent sur les insuffisances des théories du sous-développement en insistant: "The central defect of a great deal of writing on the third world is that of over-generalization".<sup>41</sup>

Aujourd'hui, avec la persistance du sous-développement et de la pauvreté de nombreux pays, les difficultés et embûches qui semblent jaloner encore le processus de démocratisation et, surtout, l'afropessimisme montant, l'ombre du discours des officiers soudanais continue de planer et peut tenter maints observateurs.

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40 Selon certains auteurs, l'idée du PASSIVE POOR est un des principaux éléments à occulter la faim dans le monde. Voir, Frances Moore-Lappe and Joseph Collins, *World Hunger: Ten Myths*, Institute for Food and Development Policy, San Francisco, Calif. 1979.

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# Crisis, Structural Adjustment and Creative Survival in Sierra Leone

A B Zack-Williams\*

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**Résumé:** *En Sierra Leone, la crise ainsi que les mesures prises pour la résoudre ont obligé la population à utiliser diverses stratégies de survie face au désespoir. De larges couches de la population sont privées de nourriture parfois pendant plusieurs jours. Un autre signe de la paupérisation de larges couches de la population est l'augmentation considérable des mendiants dont certains sont des employés de bureau tombés dans la pauvreté la plus abjecte. Le moyen de survie le plus important est "l'institutionnalisation de l'illégalité" consistant à fonctionner comme s'il n'y avait pas de gouvernement. Les formes que prennent ces stratégies de survie dépendent de la classe et du genre de l'individu. Par exemple elles comprennent l'utilisation des ressources de l'Etat et des compagnies à des fins privées et personnelles. Les femmes s'adonnent à d'autres activités pour compléter le revenu familial. La crise frappe les femmes si durement qu'elles s'adonnent également à un ensemble d'activités allant de la mendicité aux rapports sexuels pour avoir de l'argent, des biens ou des services.*

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## Introduction

With an estimated population of four million and an area covering approximately 72,000 squares kilometres, Sierra Leone is one of the smallest countries in Africa, one that is endowed with rich mineral deposits, as well as an abundant amount of off shore fishing and very fertile soil. At the time of the attainment of Independence in 1961, there was much expectation that this country, which had inherited an efficient civil service, would act as a model of democracy and economic progress in Africa.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, Sierra Leone became the first country in Africa to vote out an unpopular Government in 1967, when the regime of Albert Margai was narrowly defeated by Siaka Steven's All Peoples' Congress (APC), though the actual handing over of power was interrupted by a military intervention.<sup>2</sup> However, since the mid-1970s, the economy has been experiencing a number of difficulties culminating, in the 1980s, in economic and political crises.

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*Africa Development Vol. XVIII, No. 1, 1993, pp.53-65*

- 1 Collier, G B, *Sierra Leone: An Experiment in Democracy in an African Nation*, New York University Press, 1970.
- 2 Cartwright, J F, *Politics in Sierra Leone: 1947-67*, Toronto University Press, 1970.

In this paper we shall look at the nature of the crisis facing the economy and society of Sierra Leone; the causal factors of this crisis; policies which have been taken to correct the crisis, leading to the long and painful route to the International Monetary Fund's structural adjustment conditionalities; and finally, we shall try to show how some groups and individuals have tried to weather the crisis.

### **Situating the Crisis: Nature and Casual Factors**

In the late colonial and early Independent era (1950-1972), Sierra Leone experienced an average annual growth rate of 7%, which was one of the highest among the economies of the west African sub-region. This growth was accompanied by rising incomes in the agricultural, mining and manufacturing sectors.<sup>3</sup> During this period, mining and agriculture remained the twin pillars of economic growth, particularly in the export sector. For example, between 1960-70, agriculture accounted for 33% of GDP, whilst mining accounted for 18%. In 1969, diamond export alone accounted for 69% of the total value of all exports. Other features of the period include: relatively low level of inflation (averaging below 5% annually in the period 1960-70); the relatively low balance of payment deficits; and low budget deficit of 3 million Leone for the decade or 1.3% of GDP. The period was also marked by large scale public infrastructural investments in road and factory building, designed to foster the government's policy of 'open door', in order to attract foreign capital.

However, by the mid-1970s, the growth achieved in the 1960s and early 1970s had started slowing down, due to external and internal factors. The country's economic performance after mid-1970 has been poor on most macro-economic indices. By the early 1970s, growth rate had slumped to around 3% a year; and by the second half of the decade, GDP had sunk to under 2% a year.<sup>4</sup> After 1980 the economy experienced a steep decline as shown in Table 1.

The external factors, which cannot be analyzed in isolation from the domestic ones, include the shock to the economy from the OPEC oil price increase after 1973 and the subsequent inflationary pressure this generated internally, as well as the negative effects it unleashed on the balance of payments. For example, Table 2 shows the deficit in current account which appeared to be manageable up until the early 1970s, after which it rose dramatically.

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3 See Zack-Williams, 'Sierra Leone: Crisis and Despair', in *The Review of African Political Economy*, No.49, December 1990; and 'Crisis, Structural Adjustment in Sierra Leone: Implications for Women', Institute for African Alternatives, March 1991.

4 Kamara, S et al., *The Effects of Structural Adjustment on Human Welfare in Africa South of the Sahara*, Sierra Leone UNICEF, Freetown, April 1990, pp.4 and 12.

**Table 1: Average Rate of Growth per Capita 1970-85**

1970-1975	1975-1980	1980-1985
-0.9	-0.7	-5.6

Source: *National Accounts Statistics: Analysis of Main Aggregate*, 1985, UN.

**Table 2: Current Account Situation for Selected Years 1963-86**

Year	Value in \$M
1963	-17.1
1968	-2.0
1970	-15.9
1974	-60.9
1978	-112.0
1979	-179.1
1980	-165.1*
1982	-160.2*
1984	-22.8
1986	126.0**
1987	-24.3

\* The surplus in these years was the product of inflow of loan capital designed to build the infrastructure for the hosting of the Organization of African Unity conference in 1980.

\*\* The surplus in this year was due to SDR provided by the IMF structural adjustment fund.

Source: Kamara, S et al., *The Effects of Structural Adjustment on Human Welfare in Africa South of the Sahara, Sierra Leone UNICEF, Freetown, April 1990.*

The strain on the balance of payment was worsened by the deteriorating terms of trade of the country's major exports. For example, in 1977 the price of a ton of cocoa on the international market was \$3,000, by 1986 it had slumped to \$600. However, not only was there a deterioration in the unit value of exports such as cocoa, there was also a decline throughout the 1980s in the total volume of some leading exports. Total volume of cocoa exported fell from 12,500 metric tons in 1983 to 8,600 metric tons in 1986. A similar fall was recorded for palm kernel, as well as diamonds, the leading export earner accounting for 35% of total export earnings in 1986. Recorded diamond exports dropped from 2 million carats in 1970 to 595,000 carats in 1986, and a derisory 48,000 carats in 1988. The fall in diamond export is indicative of depletion of the alluvial deposits, as well as the Government's inability to control smuggling of gem stones out of the country.

The deteriorating terms of trade, plus the depletion of rich iron ore deposits, led to the Sierra Leone Development Company (Delco), ceasing production of iron in Marampa in 1975. This was a major blow to the local economy where by this time Delco had become a *betriebsgemeinschaft*, as well as to the export earnings of the Sierra Leone exchequer.

The internal factors include the policy of under-valuing the prices peasant producers received for export crops they sold to the state-regulated monopoly, the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPMB). This policy meant that farmers who could 'smuggle' their goods across the Liberian or Guinean border, would not only receive better remuneration, but will be paid in 'hard' currency, the US dollar, which is legal tender in Liberia, or the Guinea Franc in Guinea. Other internal factors include: economic mismanagement and corruption, which tended to intensify leakages and smuggling. Indeed, these problems of economic mismanagement and corruption are epiphenomena to a more fundamental question; that of the political structure that would unleash the energy of the Sierra Leonean masses.<sup>5</sup>

One feature of the crisis, particularly after 1980, is the decline of economic performance: growth fell sharply as economic activities in mining, agriculture and manufacturing stagnated. Taking 1980 as the base year, real GDP fell to approximately 83% in 1984 and 1989 respectively.<sup>6</sup> The fall in economic activities was not reflected in a fall in consumption, as such there was a rapid decline in savings and investments. For example, total real expenditure on health fell from 12.9 million Leone in 1980 to 4.3 million Leone in 1986, and to just 2.7 million in 1989. Similarly, real expenditure in education fell from 34 million Leone in 1974 to 10.2 million Leone in 1986 and slumped to just 6.0 million Leone in 1989.<sup>7</sup> The increased consumption was financed by increased domestic borrowing, as well as from bilateral and multilateral sources, and by running down the foreign exchange reserves. Thus by the end of 1989, Sierra Leone's external debt was in excess of 1 billion USD or 128% of GDP,<sup>8</sup> with little debt servicing during the 1980s.

One consequence of the down turn in economic activities was the fall in Government revenue, leading to the crisis in recurrent budget. For example in 1972, the Government received 20% of GNP in recurrent revenue. By 1978 this figure had fallen to 17.8%.<sup>9</sup> According to Kamara et.al., 'only one

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5 Zack Williams, (1990), also see the same author: 'The Politics of Crisis and Ethnicity in Sierra Leone', paper presented to the Center of African Studies, University of Liverpool, 22 February, 1991.

6 Kamara op. cit. p. 15.

7 Ibid. p. 64.

8 Ibid., p. 20.

9 Ibid., p. 25.

country for which the World Development Report (1989) carried data had a worse performance - Chad'. However, this fall in Government revenue was not reflected in government expenditure which continued to rise right through the late 1970s and 1980s as shown in Table 3. Table 3 shows that the problem of recurrent budget deficit became worse after 1975, and by the 1980s, it had assumed a crisis proportion. The budget deficit was used both to maintain the consumption pattern of the petty bourgeois class, as well as to augment the bureaucracy in order to facilitate the patron-client relationship, the hallmark of politics in Sierra Leone. For example, on the insistence of the IMF, the wage bill was reduced in the financial year 1988/89 by 634 million Leone, or 40% of the total wage bill of the civil service, with the disappearance 'ghost workers'. The net result of this budget crisis was to increase the money supply, thus unleashing hyper-inflation. By the late 1980s, inflation was running at 171%,<sup>10</sup> the figure now stands at 124%.<sup>11</sup>

**Table 3: Government Expenditure for Selected Years**  
(in million USD)

Year	Revenue	Expenditure
1970	16.0	15.2
1975	14.8	16.9
1976	13.2	16.5
1978	21.4	32.1
1979	18.7	16.8
Average	16.5	19.9
1980	18.1	31.4
1985	7.8	19.5
1986	8.3	23.4
1988	9.8	17.3
1989	8.9	15.9
Average	11.8	24.0

Source: Kamara, S et al., *The Effects of Structural Adjustment on Human Welfare in Africa South of the Sahara, Sierra Leone UNICEF, Freetown, April 1990.*

Inflation has wrought havoc on vulnerable groups, such as the rural/urban poor, women, the old, children and those on fixed incomes.<sup>12</sup> Those on fixed incomes such as pensioners have seen their incomes reduce drastically

10 Ibid., p. 26.

11 Conteh, S. 'Joseph Momoh's Reign: Elusive Ideas', *West Africa*, 29th April-5th May 1991, p. 645. As we shall see presently, the inflationary pressure thus generated is partly the result of measures implemented to correct the imbalance in the economy.

12 See for example: 'The Children and Women of Sierra Leone: an Analysis of their situation 1989', Vol. 1, Ministry of National Development and Economic Planning and UNICEF, Freetown.

to the point where they cannot sustain the basic necessities of life. Savings have been wiped out, and successive devaluation has meant that average income has not kept pace with rising prices. As we have seen, development expenditure has suffered, with the result that the social and economic infrastructures are at breaking point. Public welfare services have taken the full brunt of the cut in expenditure; with private clinics charging prices well beyond the means of the average wage earner, have flourished. Drugs and other equipment, destined for the state sector, are often diverted to the private sector by corrupt officials. State hospitals are permanently short of essential drugs which are readily available in private clinics, and drug stores, a large number of which are owned by politicians or senior health workers. Health workers, teachers and other public sector workers, have worked for months without pay, thus producing widespread demoralization and subsequent fall in the quality of services offered. We shall return presently to look at some of the strategies which workers have adopted to cope with the crisis. However, we must now turn to look at how successive Governments in Sierra Leone have tried to cope with the crisis.

#### **The Long and Painful Route to the IMF**

The Government's initial policy response, as we have seen, was to continue building up huge debts through suppliers credit, and borrowings from the domestic banking system, with the hope that the crisis would either go away with an upturn in the world economy, which might increase demand for the country's exports, or that a new export commodity, such as the much talked about kimberlite dykes in the Kono District, might act as a *deus ex machina*.<sup>13</sup>

In 1979, the cost of staging the OAU conference to be held in 1980, forced the Government to its first major encounter with the IMF. Under this agreement, the former received a one-year balance of payment support to the tune of \$26 million, to tide it through what was seen as a short term balance of payment problem. This was the first major loan obtained from the Paris Club. In 1980, a three year extended agreement for purchases to the tune of \$200.4 million was concluded with the IMF. However, this agreement was suspended in the following year due to a default in payment to the Fund by the Government. In 1983, there was yet another agreement under the Fund's compensatory funding facility, by which the Sierra Leone Government obtained loan facilities for purchases to the tune of \$23.3 million. The follow-

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13 Zack-Williams, 1990.

ing year saw the signing of a year's stand-by support programme of \$51.9 million. This too was suspended after only \$19 million had been utilized.<sup>14</sup>

It is clear from the above that there has never been any sustained policy of structural adjustment between the Fund and the Sierra Leonean Government. Virtually all agreements have had to be abrogated by the Fund due either to the inability of the Government to honour its debt to the Fund, or because of the Government's fear of the social and political consequences of implementing all the conditionalities prescribed by the Fund.

It is true that all these agreements were signed during the regime of Siaka Stevens. His decision to quit politics in 1985 and hand over power to his chosen successor, the Force Commander, Major General Momoh, was interpreted by many observers as an opportunity for a younger person with the vigour and discipline needed to correct the economic ailment of the country, and to implement the Fund's conditionalities to take over the affairs of government. Momoh, who in fact described his regime as 'the new order' Government, strived rather astutely to distance himself from the by-now discredited administration of Stevens. It was with this new found vitality that the new regime entered into negotiations with the IMF in 1986. In November of that year, the first long term structural adjustment facility with the Fund was concluded. This was preceded at the behest of the IMF by 'the most ambitious set of reforms... intended to reverse the economy's rapid deterioration since 1980'.<sup>15</sup>

This pact consisted of a year's stand by agreement and a three-year concessional funding to the tune of SDR 40.53 million under the structural adjustment facility, in return for certain conditionalities, which included the following:

- 1) The introduction of flexible, market-determined exchange rate. This 'floating exchange rate' resulted in massive devaluation of the currency within a very short period of time;
- 2) Liberalization of trade;
- 3) Reduction in the size of the bureaucracy, and Government expenditure;
- 4) The removal of subsidies on essential commodities such as petroleum and rice;
- 5) Decontrolling of retail trade, and the ending of State monopoly in the importation of rice;
- 6) Increase in the producer price for major cash crops;

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14 Riley, 'Sierra Leone: Debt & Fiscal Crisis', in Parfitt, T. & Riley, S.: *The African Debt Crisis*, Routledge, 1989, for a history of these encounters.

15 Kamara, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

(7) The Government was also expected to honour its debt obligation to the Fund.

The aim of the agreement was to achieve equilibrium in the balance of payment, exchange rate stability, increase in export earnings as well as the expansion of the import-substitution sector. As far as the Fund was concerned, this was a 'complete package' and failure to implement any part of the deal would lead to suspension of the agreement. However, in April 1987, after only SDR11.58 million had been used from the drawings, the agreement was suspended by the Fund, because of what it perceived as poor performance criteria, particularly the failure to accelerate the depreciation of the currency, which was thought to be grossly over-valued and because of the Government's inability to honour its debt, leading to an accumulation of arrears.

The impact of these measures had more far-reaching effects than earlier attempts to rectify the economy. In particular, the floating of the currency and its subsequent depreciation, as well as the removal of subsidies fuelled inflation which, as we have seen, was running at over 170% in 1987. This further reduced the standard of living of most Sierra Leoneans, weakened the social and economic infrastructure, and intensified the scarcity of essential commodities. At the political level, there was widespread concern about policies 'designed to make things better, but in fact ended up impoverishing' the vast majority of the people. Workers, demanded increases in wages in order to make up for loss purchasing power, while several politicians made anti-IMF speeches. The 'new order' regime's credibility with the people was at stake, with many people quickly contrasting the ancient regime more favourably to that of Momoh. It was the fear of the social and political consequences of a rapidly run down economy without any safety net that forced the Government to slow down the pace of implementation of the conditionalities.

The potential for unrest was a stark reality for Momoh who emerged as leader of the party without having a strong base within it; and who had to depend on the 'young turks' of the *Akuway* group (an ethnic cabal) to bolster his support.<sup>16</sup> Also shortly after he assumed power, Momoh had to deal with a case of attempted *coup d'état* resulting in the sentencing and execution of one of his deputies. Thus there were countervailing forces working against the full implementation of all the conditionalities of the Fund. By April 1988, the programme had been abandoned, and the country was declared ineligible to utilize the Fund's resources, due to the building up of huge arrears.

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16 Zack-Williams, 'The Politics of Crisis and Ethnicity in Sierra Leone'.



Meanwhile, in order to tackle the ever worsening economic situation, the Government decided to gradually adopt a number of traditional adjustment measures demanded by the Fund, but, this time, at its own pace. The relation was to prepare the ground for another visit to the IMF in December 1989, an IMF staff team visited Freetown with the aim of helping the Sierra Leone authorities to implement a package of fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate measure and to assess their effectiveness. About a week after the IMF visit, the President broadcast to the nation stating the Government's intention to implement certain immediate measures. These included:

- 1) Curb on Government expenditure;
- 2) The introduction of a mini-austerity budget in January of the following year i.e. 1990;
- 3) The sale of special treasury bills to the non-banking sector at a significantly high interest rate i.e. over 45% in order to mop up excess liquidity;
- 4) Increase the special deposit the commercial banks hold with the Central Bank, the former should be free to determine their lending rate;
- 5) To implement exchange reforms involving the introduction of the complete liberalization of the exchange system and a market determined exchange rate;
- 6) To decontrol and raise the prices of petroleum products with immediate effect in order to reflect the increase in the excise duties and the prevailing exchange rate, as well as to privatize their procurement;
- 7) The repeal of the Economic sabotage Act which was designed to stop hoarding of the local currency and to undermine the 'parallel' market in foreign currency. This was seen as a hindrance to normal commercial activities;
- 8) There was also a commitment from the Sierra Leone Government to make significant repayments to the Fund for outstanding arrears;
- 9) The elimination of most price controls.

The objectives behind these policies were to reduce inflation, mobilize domestic savings in order to support growth and improve the efficacy of policy instruments. The strategy was to limit the growth of the money supply and restrict the expansion of credit, particularly through public borrowing from the Central Bank of Sierra Leone. By March 1990, most of these policies had been implemented in anticipation of the structural adjustment facility from the IMF. Thus, interest rates and prices had been decontrolled, and treasury bill had been sold at very high rates of interests. In April 1990, the currency was once more left to be determined by market forces 'floated', resulting in an effective 60% devaluation within a month;

and the minimum producer prices offered for the two major export crops - coffee and cocoa, were increased by 60% in June 1990.

### **Survival Strategies**

The crisis and its antidote have forced Sierra Leoneans to adopt various survival strategies. They have also produced many ingenious and comical terms used to describe various states of despair. Thus those who have gone for a long time without food are referred to as suffering from *suckia*, i.e. someone living off air, the only commodity that is within grasp. One often hears individuals say in conversation, 'we de suckia bo'. There is a more advanced stage of deprivation than *suckia*, known (as airlock at this stage, the individual is forced on the street as a beggar). Again in conversation one hears individuals talk of trying to avoid airlock. As would be expected under such austere conditions, the number of beggars has increased tremendously in the 1980s. One informant told me that on Fridays (the Muslim Sabah when alms are doled out to the 'deserving poor') the rank of the baggers is swollen by a number of workers; including white-collar workers who have fallen into abject poverty. In this way one can see that both the crisis and its antidote have tended to pauperize the mass of Sierra Leoneans.

At one level, the major means of survival is to 'operationalize illegality' (i.e. to operate as if there is no Government). This assumes several forms depending on the class and gender status of the individual. The appropriation of state and corporate resources for private and individuals use is quite common and widespread. Within the petty bourgeois class this process is fuelled by the absence of democratic accountability, which prevents offenders from being prosecuted. At another level, many people have simply removed themselves from the formal sector, only to strive for survival within the informal sector. Thus, while the formal sector has shrunk significantly, the informal sector, which is not easily quantifiable, has continued to expand. Within this sector there are serious attempts at establishing a 'business culture', more specifically, a trading culture. In Sierra Leone every one trades - from little children, who sell kerosene and fruits for their parents or guardians, to women who sell cooked food to the urban poor: or politicians who use their influence to obtain import licences and set themselves or relations up in trading activities.

For many workers in the formal sector, especially the state sector, their job is only partially accountable for their social reproduction. Since wages and salaries have not kept pace with inflation, and in a large number of cases they have not been paid for months, many people resort to *mammy cokerism*, the local equivalent of moonlighting. This assumes several forms reflecting the class position of the individual. For example, skilled civil servants would spend much time either organizing their private enterprises or working in the private sector. Employment within the state sector soon as-

sumes the status of part-time work; teachers have set up 'private lessons' for students entering for either the 'selective entrance examination', the Sierra Leonean equivalent of the eleven-plus or those involved in public examination such as the 'O' and 'A' level exams. Given the low morale within state schools, it is clear that children who do well in these public examinations tend to be those who have had private tuition. Other forms of *mammy coker* include drivers using their employers' vehicles as taxis and lecturers undertaking consultancy for international agencies, in order to have access to foreign exchange.

Diane Elson has noted that underlying all structural adjustment policies is the assumption that women could continue to provide their services of social reproduction free of charge. As she puts it:

*Women's unpaid labour is not infinitely elastic - a breaking point may be reached, and women's capacity to produce and maintain human resources may collapse.*<sup>17</sup>

In a number of cases, women are now emerging as 'breadwinners', but without social recognition. Women as 'domestic managers' have to continue organizing the household under increasingly stringent and chaotic conditions. For most women the 'housekeeping money' has not kept pace with inflation. In order to supplement the household budget, many women now embark on various forms of income-generating activities. Even women who work full time are now engaged in artisanal, commercial or simple moonlighting activities 'to make ends meet'.<sup>18</sup> Rural women try to stave off hunger through inter-cropping of both subsistence and cash crops.<sup>19</sup> Many young women try to weather the crisis through *dregging*. This could take one or several forms, from doing *mammy coker* and other menial jobs, to begging or casual sex in return for money, goods or services. The proliferation of *dregging* is an indication of the severity of the crisis on women.

One important feature of the era of crisis and structural adjustment is the rise in ethnic consciousness and the spread of kinship networks. The latter has become an important mechanism for surviving the crisis. Various individuals adopt this strategy to weather the crisis. For example, in the late 1980s some traders in the Freetown metropolitan area used kinship network to thwart the decision of the leaders of the city council to ban street trading.

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17 Diane Elson, 'The Impact of Structural Adjustment on Women: Concepts and Issues', in Onimode, B, *The IMF, The World Bank and the African Debt*, Vol. 2, IFAA & ZED Books, 1989.

18 Zack-Williams, 'Crisis and Structural Adjustment: Implications for Women'.

19 Richards, P, *Coping With Hunger: Hazard and Experiment in an African Rice Farming System*, Allen & Unwin, 1986.

These market women lobbied one of the vice-presidents who was a kinsman and through his influence the decision was reversed. Individuals used their contacts 'as brothers' within the bureaucracy to obtain favours. A brother is one who offers help in times of need. The period of economic decay has witnessed the spread of fraternities and sororities, such as Masonic lodges, Rotary clubs, tribal associations such as Akutay, for the Limbas, or Feron-sola for the Korankos. Others include the Association of University Graduates and fundamentalist religious sects. Indeed, an important line of research would be the relationship between the spread of fundamental religious ideas and the intensification of the crisis.

Another method of social network which is utilized is through the tradition of wardship. This involves poor parents fostering their children to rich relations because they cannot afford the financial cost of bringing them up.<sup>20</sup> These children tend to work for their guardians, looking after their children, preparing meals as well as household chores, in return for food and in some cases, education. The system itself is quite exploitative. Since the working hours are not regulated, many of these wards work for very long hours, while others are prevented from attending school because they have to look after the children of their guardians. However, as Blesdoe has argued, many parents in Sierra Leone do believe that hardship is good for training young minds. Nonetheless, that is an example of how kinship network is manipulated to facilitate survival.

### Conclusion

In this paper we have looked at the nature of the crisis facing the people of Sierra Leone, noting that the causal factors are both internal as well as external. In the case of the latter we see that the Sierra Leone economy remained dependent on the exigencies of the world capitalist system. With regards to the internal factors, we have pointed to the twin problems of economic mismanagement and corruption, noting that the latter is the direct result of the absence of any political structure that is responsive to the needs of the Sierra Leonean people. The absence of democratic accountability, within the dysfunctioning one-party system, meant that actions and decisions were not tempered by social concerns, but by narrow class and individual interests. This meant that the energy of the people was not tapped. The people then turned to the information sector for their livelihood.

In terms of policy prescription, we have seen that successive Governments have found it difficult to embark upon a sustained policy of structural

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20 For a detailed analysis of kinship as survival strategy, see Baptista Lundin, 'An analysis of the relationship between social organization and the strategies for survival in a crisis: a case study from Maputo City, Mozambique, mimeo, November 1989.

adjustment. In many cases the package is withdrawn by the IMF because of the inability of the Government to honour all the conditions, due to both the scarcity of foreign exchange and the latent fear of social unrest among the disenfranchised masses. Indeed, this remoteness from the people means that any policy imposed from the top was doom to failure.

In terms of the strategies to cope with the crisis, we have seen that individuals and groups have built up specific mechanisms as survival strategy. The dominant strategy of 'operationalizing illegality', is one which, together with the profligacy of the ruling elites, brings into question the legitimacy of the state. The contraction of the informal sector, the despair and sense of hopelessness which perforates life in the country, are all symptomatic of the growing problem of political legitimacy. It is not surprising that in Sierra Leone the anti-IMF agitation which is articulated by some social movements, is also strongly linked to the demand for a multi-party political set up. Clearly, the crisis and its antidote-structural adjustment, have had differential impacts on different sectors of the society. The devastating blow which has been struck on the social services, means the children, the urban/rural poor and women are taking the full impact of the crisis. We have seen how gender responsibility has been transformed without the accompanying social status, as well as the spread of *dreg*, resulting in the degradation of women.

The spread in ethnic groups such as *Akutay* and *Ferensola*, plus the rise of other corporatist institutions, poses a potential flash point which, if not handled well, could pose a threat to national integrity. At the time of writing (May 1991), the armed forces of Sierra Leone are locked in battle with groups of rebels who have infiltrated into the South-eastern part of the country through Liberia. The Government of Sierra Leone blames the Liberian rebel leader Charles Taylor, who in turn claims the fighters are dissident Sierra Leoneans. What is clear is that the rebels are utilizing ethnic contradictions to demand an end to the one-party system.

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# La répartition des moyens d'incitation à la production entre cultures d'exportation et cultures vivrières en Côte d'Ivoire

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*Abstract: The difficulties Africa has in feeding its people, particularly its urban populations, are generally attributed to the impoverished food sector in agriculture. In the majority of African countries, this impoverishment is the result of the post-colonial agricultural policy that favours cash crop production to the detriment of food crop production. A case study of Côte d'Ivoire agriculture, considered to be the most efficient in sub-Saharan Africa via constant reference to the 'Ivorian Miracle' underscores this point. Policies of agricultural pricing, crop diversification, agricultural credit and the marketing and transformation of agricultural products are primarily oriented towards cash-cropping. So too are existing structures of transportation and industrial outlets. Although there has been an increase in the volume of food crops, the increase is not proportional to population growth. Consequently there is a sizeable need to import foodstuffs to feed the growing urban population. The long-term result of these policies has been depopulation of the impoverished rural areas. All these factors point to the need for rethinking national agricultural policy. The revised policy must give equal emphasis to both sectors of agriculture so as to minimize the need for importing food and assure a more harmonious development of the rural sector.*

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## Une allocation sectorielle inégale des moyens d'incitation à la production

Au lendemain de son accession à la souveraineté nationale, la Côte d'Ivoire a choisi l'agriculture comme moteur de son développement économique et social. A cette fin, plusieurs politiques relatives à la promotion de cette agriculture sont adoptées et exécutées avec une attention soutenue. C'est ainsi que des mesures d'incitation ont été développées et entretenues pour susciter la motivation des paysans à l'égard de l'adoption: des spéculations plus sélectionnées, de nouvelles techniques culturales et de nouveaux facteurs de production. Dès lors, des sociétés d'Etat sont créées pour encadrer les paysans en vue de l'amélioration et de l'accroissement de la production agricole; des crédits sont distribués (par l'entremise de la BNDA) afin de favoriser l'acquisition des facteurs de production (machines, engrais...); des prix garantis à la production sont instaurés pour encourager la production paysanne; des structures de commercialisation et de transformation sont développées pour favoriser l'écoulement des produits

des zones productrices vers des unités de transformation d'une part, et d'autre part, pour obtenir une plus grande valeur ajoutée des activités agricoles. Des deux principales composantes de l'agriculture ivoirienne, laquelle va bénéficier davantage de l'attention des décideurs ivoiriens ? En d'autres termes, quel est le secteur agricole qui va être le plus gros bénéficiaire de l'ensemble des moyens dégagés pour développer l'agriculture ivoirienne?

### ***La Prééminence de l'agriculture d'exportation***

En Afrique, la colonisation s'est manifestée sur le plan agricole par l'introduction (de gré ou de force, selon les spécificités de chaque territoire conquis) de nouvelles spéculations (café, cacao, hévéas, thé, coton, canne à sucre...). Ceci a eu pour corollaire la perturbation de l'ordre agricole existant (basé essentiellement sur les cultures d'auto-consommation ou de subsistance) pour donner naissance à un dualisme agricole. Dès lors, cohabitent dans les colonies, deux types d'agriculture: l'agriculture de subsistance et l'agriculture d'exportation. Ce dualisme, généré par la colonisation, a survécu une fois les libertés retrouvées. En Côte d'Ivoire, comme dans la plupart des pays en développement, le besoin de devises pour asseoir les bases d'un développement économique a amené les gouvernants à concentrer l'essentiel des moyens de développement sur les cultures d'exportation. Ces moyens tiennent principalement au prix garanti à la production; au financement des activités agricoles; à la commercialisation et à la transformation des produits d'origine agricole. Mais il est important de noter que la première manifestation des motivations offertes aux paysans est l'affectation par ces derniers de l'essentiel des terres les plus riches aux cultures d'exportation. Nous analyserons sommairement la nouvelle structure de la surface arable entre les deux agricultures avant de mettre en lumière la répartition entre elles, des moyens dégagés pour développer l'agriculture ivoirienne.

### ***Les cultures d'exportation: Reines de l'Espace agricole ivoirien***

La monétarisation de l'économie ivoirienne par le biais du café et du cacao, a enlevé à l'agriculture de subsistance le monopole de l'occupation de l'espace agricole. En effet, avant l'avènement de ces deux spéculations, l'agriculture d'auto-consommation régnait sans partage sur les superficies cultivées. Mais depuis son introduction par la métropole colonisatrice, cette agriculture s'est vue exproprier l'essentiel de la surface cultivable (particulièrement en zone de forêt) par l'agriculture de rapport. La désorganisation de l'ordre social existant et les moyens plus ou moins contraignants (impôt en espèces, plutôt qu'en nature, besoin de numéraires pour acquérir les biens et services importés et pour couvrir les dépenses relatives à la santé et à l'éducation...) employés par les puissances coloniales, ont historiquement contribué au recul du monopole de

l'agriculture d'auto-consommation. La période de l'indépendance n'a vu naître aucune politique visant à corriger l'inégalité spatiale entre les deux agricultures. Loin s'en faut, cette inégalité s'est accentuée singulièrement en zone forestière devenue le terrain de prédilection des cultures d'exportation. L'importance du besoin de financement a, semble-t-il, conduit les autorités ivoiriennes à poursuivre, tout en l'améliorant, la politique agricole héritée de la colonisation. C'est ainsi que l'agriculture d'exportation a rallié le suffrage de tous les décideurs ivoiriens de l'époque en raison de sa relative capacité à remédier dans l'immédiat, au déficit en ressources que ressentait la Côte d'Ivoire. Dès lors, les cultures d'exportation vont bénéficier d'une position dominante dans l'occupation de l'espace agricole ivoirien. Le tableau 1 ci-après en est une illustration édifiante.

**Tableau 1: Répartition de la superficie cultivée entre cultures vivrières et cultures de d'exportation (en 1000 ha)**

Années	1975		1985	
Indicateurs		%		%
Superficie cultivée totale	3250	100	4787	100
Dont vivriers	1086	33	1604	34
Dont cultures d'exportation	2164	67	3183	66

Source: Calcul fait à partir des données tirées du: Ministère des Relations Extérieures Coopération et Développement (République Française), *Bilan national de l'emploi en Côte d'Ivoire*. Paris, Mai 1982.

A la lumière du tableau 1, il apparaît nettement que les cultures d'exportation occupent l'essentiel de l'espace agricole ivoirien. En 1975, elles représentaient 67% des superficies cultivées contre 33% pour les cultures vivrières. En 1985 (10 ans plus tard) on observe une stagnation structurelle de l'occupation spatiale puisque les pourcentages sont respectivement de 66% contre 34%. Au plan régional, l'on observe une hégémonie des cultures d'exportation en zone de forêt. Elles représentent respectivement en 1975 et 1985, 76 et 74% des surfaces cultivées contre 24 et 26% pour les cultures vivrières. Alors qu'en zone de savane, les cultures vivrières couvrent encore l'essentiel des superficies cultivées en dépit de l'avancée sensible des cultures d'exportation avec à leur tête le coton sous la houlette de la CIDT. En 1975 et 1985, ces cultures représenteraient respectivement 70 et 66% des surfaces cultivées contre 30 et 34% pour les cultures de rapport (cf. tableau 2).

En définitive, il est à noter que la structure d'incitation qui entoure les cultures de rapport a généralement concouru à la prééminence de ces dernières sur l'espace agricole ivoirien.



**Tableau 2: Occupation régionale de l'espace agricole  
(Savane/Forêt) en 1000 ha**

Indicateurs	Savane		Forêt		Savane		Forêt	
	1975	%	1985	%	1975	%	1985	%
Superficie cultivée	668	100	891	100	2582	100	3896	100
Dont vivriers	468	70	590	66	618	24	1014	26
Dont cultures d'exportation	200	30	300	34	1964	76	2882	74

Source: Calcul fait à partir des données tirées de: Ministère des Relations Extérieures  
Coopération et Développement (République Française), *Bilan national de l'emploi en Côte  
d'Ivoire*. Paris, Mai 1982.

*Institution de stimulants favorables aux cultures d'exportation*

Au premier rang de ces stimulants se trouve la politique des prix agricoles. En Côte d'Ivoire, comme dans la plupart des pays de l'Afrique subsaharienne, il existe une politique des prix agricoles discriminatoire. Nous ne nous interrogerons pas sur les mécanismes de fixation de ces prix, ni sur leur représentativité pour ce qui est du pouvoir d'achat des paysans. Mais nous voulons insister sur le fait qu'en dépit de toutes les imperfections qui pourraient caractériser ces mécanismes, l'existence de la garantie des prix à la production constitue un important facteur pour les paysans dans leur décision d'adapter et de développer telle ou telle culture Ceci est fortement corroboré par des études ponctuelles qui font apparaître une grande élasticité de la production agricole par rapport au prix. Ces études (R. Krishna (1967); P. Ossein Askari et J. Cumming (1976) ...) montrent qu'à court terme, les exploitants réagissent à tout changement de la structure des incitations en adoptant la spéculation la plus rentable. En effet, sous l'autorité de la Caisse de Stabilisation, les cultures d'exportation bénéficient, en Côte d'Ivoire, des prix garantis à la production, ce qui dans une mesure, va motiver les paysans à les développer aux dépens de cultures vivrières. Ainsi, hormis le riz et le maïs, toutes les autres spéculations sont à la merci des variations quotidiennes des prix sur les marchés urbains. Les tableaux 2, 3 et 4 en Annexe témoignent de la disparité qui caractérise la politique des prix agricoles en Côte d'Ivoire.

Il en ressort également que si les prix des cultures d'exportation sont officiels et garantis à la production, ceux des cultures vivrières sont dans leur quasi-totalité (exception faite du riz et du maïs qui bénéficient de prix officiels garantis) des prix officiels non garantis. Dès lors, le prix payé effectivement aux producteurs de certaines denrées comme le mil, la banane plantain, la patate, est relativement peu rémunérateur et représente parfois le

1/3 ou le 1/4 de celui officiellement proposé par les responsables de l'agriculture. Aussi est-il important de souligner que pour ce qui est des cultures vivrières, les tableaux 3 et 4 en Annexe mettent en relief l'existence d'un écart appréciable entre le prix payé aux producteurs et le prix de détail pratiqué sur les marchés de consommation. L'importance de ce différentiel de prix constitue, semble-t-il, une source de découragement pour la promotion par les paysans, des denrées alimentaires. Ces derniers (les producteurs) justifieraient leur comportement par l'énorme profit (représenté par l'écart de prix précédemment évoqué) que réaliseraient les commerçants grossistes et détaillants sur leur dos. Par conséquent, l'autoconsommation semblerait être, pour la plupart d'entre eux, le facteur le plus déterminant de leur propension à promouvoir les cultures vivrières.

A cette politique des prix agricoles, s'ajoute une politique de commercialisation et de transformation également discriminatoire. En Côte d'Ivoire, l'essentiel de la commercialisation des produits de l'agriculture d'exportation est conjointement assurée par les Groupements à Vocation Coopérative (GVC) et la Caisse de Stabilisation. Si les GVC s'occupent du transport du bord champ aux silos de stockage ou au port d'embarquement, la Caisse de Stabilisation quant à elle, se charge des transactions internationales ou sert d'intermédiaire entre la Côte d'Ivoire et le marché international. L'organisation des paysans en GVC revêt un intérêt certain dans la mesure où ces groupements essentiellement de commercialisation (par opposition aux GVC de production qui font leur timide apparition dans le secteur vivrier) à travers les ristournes qui leur sont distribuées, constituent un important facteur d'augmentation de la production. Or en Côte d'Ivoire, ils sont pour l'essentiel, destinés à l'agriculture d'exportation. Ceci représente une autre source de motivation pour les paysans ivoiriens à accorder beaucoup plus d'intérêt aux spéculations d'exportation. Sur 3866 GVC encadrés par la Direction de la Mutualité Coopérative (DMC) pendant la campagne 1982-1983, 2743 s'occupaient des produits d'exportation, contre 964 pour les vivriers et 159 pour les autres activités (cf. tableau 3).

Pour ce qui est de la transplantation des produits agricoles en produits finis ou semi-finis, force est de constater que la substitution aux importations se réalise en faveur des cultures de rapport comme dans la plupart des pays africains (A. Basler, 1986). Exception faite du riz (traitement du paddy en riz blanchi par les rizeries) du manioc (traité par l'Institut de Technologie Tropicale (ITT), de la tomate (SODEFEL) et du maïs (Brasseries) les autres vivriers ne font l'objet d'aucun traitement industriel. Les structures de transformation existantes sont essentiellement axées sur les cultures d'exportation (cf. tableau 4). Ce tableau met en relief le caractère sectoriel de l'agro-industrie en Côte d'Ivoire. L'essentiel des activités agro-industrielles porte sur les produits d'exportation même si, une part relativement importante d'entre eux est encore exportée à l'état brut. A contrario, les cultures vivrières ap-

paraissent comme le parent pauvre des activités agro-industrielles en Côte d'Ivoire. En effet sur 54 unités agro-industrielles opérant en Côte d'Ivoire, 8 seulement traitent des produits issus de l'agriculture vivrière. Les structures agro-industrielles se situant en amont et surtout en aval de l'agriculture ivoirienne sont donc à l'avantage des cultures d'exportation, ce qui constitue un débouché certain pour ces cultures et par conséquent une source de motivation supplémentaire pour leur adoption et leur promotion par les paysans. Les débouchés industriels sont réduits, voire inexistantes pour les cultures vivrières. Dès lors, ceci constitue partiellement de réelles difficultés pour leur éventuelle développement.

**Tableau 3: Répartition des GVC entre cultures d'exportation et cultures vivrières et autres activités: campagne 1982-1983.**

Cultures d'Exportation	Nombre de GVC	Vivriers et Autres Activités	Nombre de GVC
Café - cacao	2,484	Vivriers	964*
Coton	253	Pêche	44
Coprah	1	Élevage	14
Ananas	6	Artisanat	12
		CREP	68
		Maraîchage	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,743</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>11,123</b>

\* 865 d'entre eux sont des groupements informels en voie de reconnaissance et officiellement reconnues.

Source: *Annuaire des Statistiques Agricoles et Forestières 1983.*

Outre les unités agro-industrielles mises en place pour le développement de l'agriculture, les autorités ivoiriennes, ont initié par le biais de la Banque Nationale pour le Développement Agricole (BNDA) une politique de financement des activités agricoles. Cette politique permet aux paysans et aux entreprises agricoles de se doter des moyens de production nécessaires pour améliorer et accroître leur production. Ici encore, les cultures d'exportation sont les principaux bénéficiaires des crédits agricoles destinés à l'agriculture ivoirienne (cf. tableau 5). Ce tableau fait apparaître une concentration relative des fonds alloués au développement de l'agriculture, sur les cultures d'exportation. Ainsi au cours de la campagne 1982-1983, l'on remarque que 96% des prêts accordés par la BNDA ont été destinés aux cultures d'exportation contre 4% aux cultures vivrières. Le différentiel de financement qui existe entre les 2 types de cultures confirme la préférence des autorités agricoles pour les cultures d'exportation.

**Tableau 4: Répartition des activités industrielles entre cultures d'exportation et cultures vivrières**

Nature des Cultures	Unités de Transformations	Matières Premières Transformées	
Cultures d'Exportation	Sté Nouvelle SIFCA	café - cacao	
	UNICAFE	Café	
	UNICO	Café - cacao	
	SAT	Café	
	SIT	café-cacao	
	CIC	café-cacao	
	Decorticalf	café	
	Stocaci	cacao	
Industries Agro-alimentaires	UIPA	café	
	Nouvelles Siaca		
Cultures d'Exportation	Safco	ananas	
	Nouvelle Siga	ananas	
	SCB	banane	
	Sodesucre	canne à sucre	
	Sicor	coco	
	Saco	cacao	
	Satmaci	café - cacao	
	API	cacao	
	Chocodi	cacao	
	Procaci	cacao	
	Capral	café - cacao	
	Industries des Corps Gras - Dérivés et Alimentaires	HSL Blohorn	graines de palmiers
		Palmindustrie	" "
Sodepalm		" "	
Trituraf		" "	
Siprot		Oléagineux	
Industrie des Textiles et de l'Habillement	Ets Gonfreville	Coton	
	Socitas	"	
	CIDT	"	
	FILTOSAC	"	
	UTEXI	"	
	COTIVO	"	
	FIBAKO	"	
	SETCI	"	
	SOFITIS	"	
	CFCI	"	
	SAB	"	
	COTOA	"	
	UNIWAX	"	
	SOTRIPA	"	
	COFIPECHE	"	
Industrie de Caoutchouc	SAPH	caoutchouc	
	CCP	"	
	MACACI	"	
	SOGB	"	
	Flexibles Ivoires	"	
Cultures vivrières	SAP	"	
	SOPAGRI	riz	
	EGDK	riz, autres céréales	
	SORIZCI	riz	
	UNIRIZ	"	
	SODEFEL	fruits et légumes	
	ITT	manioc	
	AMERICO	riz, manioc, sucre	

\* Cette unité traite simultanément des vivriers et des cultures d'exportation.

Source: Ministère de l'Industrie: *Répertoire des Industries et activités en Côte d'Ivoire, 11e édition, 1985-1986.*

Aux moyens précédents favorables au développement des cultures d'exportation, s'ajoutent d'autres éléments qui exercent une influence certaine sur le choix des paysans pour tel ou tel type de culture. Ces éléments sont relatifs aux prix subventionnés de certains facteurs de production (engrais, produits phytosanitaires...), aux primes de 30,000 FCFA pour un ha de nouvelles plantations de café et de cacao créées de 60,000 FCFA par ha pour le recépage de vieilles plantes de café et aux stimulants immatériels, telle que la coupe nationale du progrès.

**Tableau 5: Crédit agricole: répartition des prêts entre cultures vivrières et cultures d'exportation (en pourcentage)**

Années	1978-9	1979-80	1980-1	1981-2	1982-3	1983-4
<b>Indicateurs</b>						
Cultures d'Exportation	98,3	98,3	97,3	95,9	96,4	95,5(1)
- dont café - cacao	53,3	47,5	56,0	55,3	56,5	5,9
Autres	45	50,8	41,2	40,6	39,9	88,6(2)
Cultures vivrières	1,7	1,7	2,8	4,1	3,6	4,5(3)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Calculs effectués à partir des données tirées de: *Annuaire des statistiques agricoles et forestières*. Ministère de l'Agriculture et des Eaux et Forêt, 1985.

(1) dont 0,3% pour les agrumes

(2) dont 80,5% pour le coton

(3) dont 37% pour le riz

### *Une diversification et une modernisation sectorielles*

Dans le but de se mettre à l'abri des fluctuations des cours mondiaux des matières premières végétales et de la détérioration des termes de l'échange, la Côte d'Ivoire a entrepris depuis 1965, une politique de diversification et de modernisation de son agriculture. C'est ainsi que de nouvelles spéculations firent leur apparition, mettant du coup fin au règne du "duo" café-cacao sur l'espace agricole ivoirien. Cette politique de diversification est caractérisée par l'exécution de plusieurs plans agricoles au nombre desquels figurent les plans hévéas, cocotier, palmier et coton... Mais à la lumière du contenu de la politique de diversification et de modernisation, tout porte à croire qu'elles sont faites exclusivement au profit des cultures d'exportation.

### *Les cultures d'exportation, bénéficiaires de la politique de diversification*

L'idée justificative de la politique de diversification des cultures a vraisemblablement laissé sa marque sur les nouvelles spéculations introduites dans l'agriculture ivoirienne. Elles sont pour l'essentiel, destinées à l'exportation (cf. tableau 6). Ce tableau constitue une illustration édifiante du caractère sectoriel de la politique de diversification initiée par les

autorités ivoiriennes depuis la première moitié des années 60. Si l'agriculture d'exportation s'est enrichie de nouvelles spéculations, l'agriculture vivrière quant à elle n'a pu avoir croître ses cultures.

**Tableau 6: Tableau récapitulatif de la diversification agricole en Côte d'Ivoire**

Cultures d'Exportation	Cultures vivrières
1. Avant diversification Café, Igname Cacao, Banane plantain	1. Avant diversification (*)  Taro Maïs Manioc
2. Après diversification (à partir de 1965) Café Cacao Hévéas Banane Palmier Coton Ananas Soja Agrumes Cannes à sucre Cocotier (Coprah)	riz(**) fruits et légumes maïs(***)

\* Cultures traditionnelles servant à la consommation de base des populations ivoiriennes. A noter que certaines d'entre elles ont été l'objet de recherche en vue de l'amélioration des semences (riz, fruits et légumes) et des variétés (igname).

\*\* En 1963, le riz a fait l'objet d'une tentative de vulgarisation qui s'est poursuivie en 1965.

\*\*\* A partir de 1980, le maïs a bénéficié d'une attention particulière des autorités agricoles pour sa promotion et sa commercialisation.

Source: Construction personnelle

#### *Une modernisation favorable aux cultures d'exportation*

La modernisation de l'agriculture ivoirienne est à l'image de sa diversification. En effet, ce sont les exploitations consacrées aux cultures d'exportation qui vont être le terrain de prédilection de nouvelles méthodes culturales, des facteurs de production les plus performants et des semences les plus sélectionnées. Dès lors, parmi les exploitations agricoles ivoiriennes, les cultures d'exportation apparaissent comme le biais par lequel les éléments de modernisation peuvent s'introduire. Elles permettent de se procurer des intrants qui leur sont d'abord destinés, mais qui peuvent être utilisés pour améliorer la production vivrière (cf. A. Basler, 1986 et Dupriez, 1980). Mais cette modernisation est essentiellement le fait des sociétés d'Etat à vocation agricole (Satmaci, Sodepalm, Cidat, Saph...), des grandes exploitations appartenant à la bourgeoisie nationale (les lauréats de la coupe

nationale du progrès et certains particuliers ne participant pas à l'épreuve) et de la bourgeoisie internationale (exemple de Michelin dans l'hévéaculture). Deux raisons principales expliquent ce fait:

- l'ignorance de la plupart des paysans qui font preuve d'un esprit rigide au regard de l'adoption de nouvelles méthodes culturales et des moyens de production modernes.
- la faiblesse du pouvoir d'achat de ces derniers qui bien que convaincus de la modernisation, sont incapables de la pratiquer faute de moyens financiers suffisants.

Ainsi la quasi-totalité des entreprises agricoles choisissent les cultures d'exportation pour rentabiliser leurs capitaux. Les cultures vivrières sont donc marginalisées dans le processus de la modernisation de l'agriculture ivoirienne. Etant en plus le fait des petites exploitations paysannes, elles (cultures vivrières) continuent, pour leur promotion, de ne bénéficier que des moyens de production relativement rudimentaires.

#### **Les contreparties des privilèges accordées aux cultures d'exportation**

L'allocation des moyens d'incitation à la production, entre cultures d'exportation et cultures vivrières a produit un biais au détriment de ces dernières. Si les premières ont connu un développement indéniable, les secondes quant à elles, semblent être confinées dans le rôle de productrices de denrées alimentaires pour l'autoconsommation des populations rurales et urbaines. Ceci a abouti à un développement sectoriel de l'agriculture ivoirienne. On serait même tenté d'affirmer que l'agriculture en Côte d'Ivoire, se développe selon une allure à deux vitesses ou encore que c'est une agriculture qui ne "marche que sur un pied".

#### ***Une agriculture d'exportation florissante***

L'agriculture ivoirienne, par l'entremise de sa branche destinée à l'exportation, est perçue comme l'une des plus performantes de l'Afrique subsaharienne. Le "miracle ivoirien" tant évoqué dans les années 70, a été réalisé grâce à la croissance et au développement des cultures d'exportation.

#### ***La popularité des cultures d'exportation en milieu rural***

Historiquement, l'introduction en Côte d'Ivoire des cultures comme le café et le cacao, s'est heurtée à l'hostilité des paysans ivoiriens (Abdoulaye, S, 1977). C'est en usant de beaucoup de subterfuges (impôts en espèces...) que l'ex-métropole colonisatrice est parvenue à faire adopter ces spéculations. A cette époque, elles étaient considérées par les autochtones comme des cultures d'oppression. Mais en raison de la monétarisation de l'économie ivoirienne avec son cortège de modifications dans les structures sociales et mentales, ces cultures sont passées du stade de cultures d'oppression à celui de cultures populaires. Cette popularité va être accentuée par la politique de

développement agricole adoptée par les autorités ivoiriennes à l'aube de l'indépendance. C'est ainsi que l'essentiel des mesures d'incitation à la production initiées en direction des paysans a largement contribué à l'adoption inconditionnelle par ces derniers, des cultures d'exportation.

#### *Des résultats agricoles spectaculaires*

Le développement des cultures d'exportation en milieu rural, consécutif à la politique agricole essentiellement héritée de la colonisation, a permis à la Côte d'Ivoire de disposer des moyens financiers relativement substantiels pour son développement économique. En effet, l'importance du volume de sa production, doublée de la diversité de ses spéculations, a permis à l'agriculture d'exportation d'être le poumon de l'économie ivoirienne grâce aux ressources financières qu'elle y injecte et qui permettent à leur tour le financement de nombreuses réalisations économiques et sociales, aux emplois qu'elle y crée dans les exploitations familiales; les entreprises agricoles et les sociétés à vocation agricole (Satmaci, Saph, Sodepalm...) les unités de commercialisation (Caisse de Stabilisation) et de transformation (Capral, Elohorn...). L'expansion de l'agriculture d'exportation peut se mesurer à travers sa part dans le PIB agricole. Ainsi durant la seconde moitié des années 60, la production alimentaire représentait encore 60% du PIB agricole. Cette part a été réduite par la croissance rapide des cultures d'exportation qui représentent de nos jours plus de la moitié du PIB agricole (Banque Mondiale, 1987). D'après la même source, au cours des deux dernières décennies, la production vivrière s'est accrue de 3,5%, par an, alors que les cultures d'exportation ont progressé d'environ 7% par an. Ces dernières ont donc favorisé et soutenu le financement de l'effort de développement et social de la Côte d'Ivoire. Ce n'est donc pas par hasard que ce pays occupe de nos jours respectivement le premier et le troisième rang mondial des pays producteurs de cacao et de café, le premier et le second rang des producteurs africains de palmier à huile et de coton.

#### *Une agriculture vivrière pauvre*

Les analyses précédentes ont mis en relief les conditions d'épanouissement dont a bénéficié l'agriculture vivrière aux côtés de l'agriculture d'exportation. Par rapport à l'occupation de l'espace agricole, à la politique des prix, aux structures de commercialisation et de transformation, au système de crédit agricole, à la modernisation des techniques culturales..., le secteur vivrier est considéré en Côte d'Ivoire comme le "parent pauvre" de l'agriculture ivoirienne. Les efforts entrepris depuis le début des années 80, en vue de répondre au souci de l'autosuffisance alimentaire, restent encore insuffisants pour réhabiliter les cultures vivrières et leur permettre de concurrencer la production destinée à l'exportation. Ces dernières vont dès lors connaître une évolution continue en volume, mais inférieure à la croissance démographique. Au cours de la période 1965-1984 par exemple,



la production vivrière s'est accrue au taux annuel de 3,4%, contre 4% pour la croissance démographique. (Banque Mondiale, 1987). La Côte d'Ivoire va ainsi être obligée de recourir aux importations pour nourrir principalement sa population urbaine.

#### *Importations croissantes des denrées alimentaires*

Pour couvrir son déficit alimentaire dû essentiellement à la marginalisation de l'agriculture vivrière, la Côte d'Ivoire va accroître ses achats extérieurs en denrées alimentaires. Sa demande va porter principalement sur le blé, le maïs, la pomme de terre et surtout le riz devenu ces dernières années la denrée la plus consommée par les ivoiriens. A cet égard, les tableaux 7 et 8 sont assez explicites. En 1985, les besoins en riz couverts par les importations étaient de 332,000 T. En 1990, la Côte d'Ivoire aurait besoin de 500,500 T de riz pour couvrir ses besoins intérieurs (cf. tableau 8). Les importations de céréales (blé, maïs, riz) étaient en 1980 de 455,298 T pour un coût de 33,966 millions de FCFA.

En 1984, elles sont passées à 529 944 T pour un coût de 49 484 millions de FCFA (cf. tableau 7). Ces chiffres déjà importants, risquent de doubler ou de tripler dans les décennies à venir, si des mesures visant à développer la production nationale ne sont pas prises. L'insuffisance relative des recettes d'exportation agricole due essentiellement à la baisse actuelle des cours du café et du cacao (qui constituent la principale source de devises malgré la diversification des cultures) met en lumière les difficultés inhérentes au paiement des importations alimentaires présentes et futures et conforte la thèse de la nécessité d'encourager la production vivrière locale.

**Tableau 7: Importations des céréales (en milliers de tonnes et en millions de FCFA)**

Produits	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Blé	183381 (9001)	209114 (10885)	165597 (10547)	205486 (14128)	205496 (14883)
Maïs	18692 (798)	24061 (1555)	5752 (358)	3183 (296)	3542 (345)
Riz	252686 (24126)	335278 (35139)	356740 (34269)	382499 (36613)	320800 (34238)
Total	455298 (33966)	568624 (47602)	530677 (45333)	591421 (51073)	529944 (49484)

\* Les chiffres ( ) représentent les importations en millions de francs CFA.

Source: *Annuaire des statistiques agricoles et forestières*. 1984

**Tableau 8: Riz: Besoins couverts par les Importations en Côte d'Ivoire  
(en milliers de tonnes)**

Riz	1978	1980	1985	1990
Production tendancielle	218800	227600	245700	260700
Consommation milieu rural	192000	199300	214300	226700
Disponible	26800	28600	31400	34000
Besoins urbains	202800	242600	363400	534500
Besoins couverts par les importations	176000	214300	332000	500500

Source: Direction de la planification et de la prévision, Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, 1987.

#### *La dégradation du milieu rural*

Les privilèges accordés aux cultures de rente vont laisser leur marque sur le développement du milieu rural. Une des manifestations de cette situation va être le déplacement des populations<sup>1</sup> des régions de savane vers les zones forestières considérées comme terrain de prédilection des cultures d'exportation. Des lors, les premières vont se vider d'une partie essentielle de leur force de travail au bénéfice des secondes qui sont devenues un véritable pôle d'attraction pour la population active agricole du pays en raison de l'importance du revenu agricole que l'on peut y gagner. En savane par exemple, l'exploitation moyenne rapporte (valeur des cultures vivrières comprises) 260,000 FCFA nets par an, ce qui représente par personne 37,000 FCFA. En zone de forêt, les résultats sont relativement meilleurs, soit en moyenne 860,000 FCFA nets par an, c'est-à-dire 120,000 FCFA par personne (cf. Rapport de la Banque Mondiale, 1987). Ceci a abouti à un développement inégal entre le nord (zone de savane) et le sud (zone forestière) où se rencontrent indubitablement les éléments représentant le fleuron de l'économie ivoirienne.

Les récentes politiques agricoles initiées dans les années 1970 pour corriger les inégalités régionales en vue de parvenir à un développement harmonieux sur tout le territoire ivoirien, n'ont pas totalement réussi à endiguer le flux des populations vers les régions forestières.

1 Ces mouvements intra-régionaux vont être précédés d'une migration étrangère importante. Cette migration étrangère issue des pays limitrophes (principalement le Mali, la Guinée et le Burkina Faso) va élire les régions productrices de café et de cacao comme terre d'accueil.

D'autres manifestations, non moins importantes, tiennent au phénomène de l'exode rural. La non-maîtrise du Marché des matières premières agricoles n'autorise pas les autorités du pays à proposer un prix suffisamment rémunérateur aux paysans, principaux artisans de l'agriculture d'exportation. Ce facteur, doublé de la pauvreté qui caractérise les cultures vivrières, incite partiellement, les jeunes paysans à désertier les campagnes au profit des grands centres urbains où ils espèrent améliorer leurs conditions de vie (R. Deniel, 1968). Aussi est-il important de noter que les candidats au départ ne se recrutent pas seulement au sein de la population autochtone. La population allogène n'est pas à l'écart de l'exode rural dû en partie à la place qu'a occupée l'agriculture vivrière jusqu'à une époque récente dans la stratégie d'ensemble du développement de l'agriculture ivoirienne. L'effet conjugué de ces deux facteurs porte en lui les germes de la dégradation de l'agriculture ivoirienne, et partant, ceux du milieu rural, si des mesures adéquates ne sont pas prises pour maintenir les jeunes ruraux et surtout pour susciter en eux l'intérêt de s'adonner aux cultures vivrières.

Au terme de cette étude, il est apparu que les cultures d'exportation ont été privilégiées par la politique agricole appliquée au cours des deux premières décennies de l'indépendance de la Côte d'Ivoire. Les mesures d'incitation à la production ont été conçues en vue d'orienter la préférence des paysans vers ces cultures. Ceci a permis à ces dernières de se populariser, de régner sur l'espace agricole ivoirien, de se développer davantage et de réaliser des résultats spectaculaires. L'agriculture vivrière quant à elle, est restée le fait des petits paysans qui ne détiennent pour sa promotion que de moyens de production rudimentaires. Même si la Côte d'Ivoire ne souffre pas de graves pénuries alimentaires, les ruptures de stock constatées çà et là sur les marchés urbains, la rareté à certaine époque de denrées alimentaires de base dans les campagnes, sont des indicateurs qui doivent être inscrits à la réflexion des planificateurs ivoiriens.

La Côte d'Ivoire dispose d'atouts considérables pour promouvoir son agriculture vivrière et par conséquent pour se tenir à l'abri des importations céréalières dont la croissance pourrait être préjudiciable à ses efforts de développement. L'essentiel de ces atouts réside dans la générosité de la nature et dans la mobilisation permanente de ses paysans. Sans modifier l'occupation actuelle de l'espace agricole entre cultures vivrières et cultures d'exportation, les premières peuvent connaître un réel développement si elles bénéficient d'un encadrement continu à l'instar des secondes. Certes, il y a un début d'encadrement par l'entremise de la politique de l'auto-suffisance alimentaire initiée à partir des années 80. Mais des résultats réels ne seront enregistrés qu'à partir du moment où l'on est animé d'une volonté politique permettant de traduire dans les faits les projets prometteurs qui n'ont pour l'instant d'éclat que dans les documents ministériels.

## Annexes

**Tableau 1: Structure des superficies cultivées en cultures d'exportation et en cultures vivrières en 1960, 1970, 1980.**

Cultures	1960	1970	1980
Cacao	17,5	15,20	18,63
Café	23,51	14,48	20,38
Coton	3,36	1,44	2,13
Cocotier, hévéas	0,95	2,63	2,88
Palmier à huile	-	-	-
Total	45,32	43,77	44,07
Riz paddy	9,15	8,90	8,02
Maïs-graine	9,73	9,23	10,44
Mil, Sorgho, fonio	6,76	3,12	
Taro	1,93	5,07	5,62
Manioc	7,20	4,62	3,83
Igname	9,42	5,50	4,89
Banane plantain	9,03	18,33	19,68
Arachide	1,46	1,46	1,09
Total Vivrier	54,68	56,23	55,93

Source: CIRES: *Les cultures vivrières: Elément stratégique du Développement agricole ivoirien*. T2, Mai 1982, p.627.

**Tableau 2: Prix garanti au producteur (en francs CFA par kilogramme)**

Campagne	Café	Cacao
1955-1955	104	58
1956-1957	90	89
1957-1958	110	65
1958-1959	110	85
1959-1960	100	90
1960-1961	90	89
1961-1962	75	65
1962-1963	75	65
1963-1964	90	70
1964-1965	90	70
1965-1966	75	55
1966-1967	90	70
1967-1968	90	70
1968-1969	90	70
1969-1970	95	80
1970-1971	105	85
1971-1972	105	85
1972-1973	105	85
1973-1974	120	110
1974-1975	150	175
1975-1976	150	175
1976-1977	180	180
1977-1978	250	250
1978-1979	250	250
1979-1980	300	300
1980-1981	300	300
1981-1982 (en cerise)	150	300
1982-1983 "	150	300
1983-1984 "	175	350
1984-1985 "	190	375
1985-1986 "	200	400
1986-1987 "	200	400
1987-1988 "	200	400
1988-1989 "	200	400
1989-1990 "	100	200

Source: Documents Caisse de Stabilisation

**Tableau 3: Féculent: Prix au producteur**

Années	Ignames	Manioc	Taro	Banane	Patate
1960	13	8	7	8	8
1961	13	8	7	8	8
1962	13	8	7	8	8
1963	13	8	7	8	8
1964	13	8	7	8	8
1965	13	8	7	8	8
1966	13	8	7	8	8
1967	13	8	7	8	8
1968	13	8	7	8	8
1969	13	8	7	8	8
1970	13	8	7	8	8
1971	13	8	7	8	8
1972	12	11	7	6	8
1973	15	14	9	8	10
1974	17	16	9	8	10
1975	20				
1976	25				
1977	42				
1978	49				
1979	65				
1980	59				
1981	60				
1982	72				
1983	72				
1984	72				

Source: Direction de la planification et de la prévision. Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances.

**Tableau 4: Féculent: Prix de détail à Abidjan**

Années	Ignames	Manioc	Taro	B. Plantain	Patate
1960	19	14	17	14	17
1961	25	16	17	19	17
1962	23	20	17	18	17
1963	20	18	17	15	16
1964	22	13	16	17	17
1965	26	21	17	16	17
1966	30	23	20	19	20
1967	26	17	13	14	17
1968	25	18	18	15	18
1969	30	27	18	15	20
1970	36	34	20	22	23
1971	35	33	21	23	21
1972	33	27	20	20	20
1973	49	44	28	34	26
1974	49	46	-	33	-
1975	52	47	-	35	-
1976	51	57	-	40	-
1977	109	110	84	67	79
1978	93	93	84	61	77
1979	137	97	79	94	92
1980	138	151	93	74	93
1981	130	141	94	92	84
1982	131	119	-	96	119
1983	169	139	135	160	146
1984	179	178	169	143	146

Source: Direction de la statistique. Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances

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# Transition Planning in Nigeria: A Critique of the Military-Civil Transiting Variant

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*Résumé: A cause en grande partie de la nature des processus économiques et politiques dans lesquels l'élite nigériane opère, un gouvernement uniquement civil est devenu une aberration. La nature et les caractéristiques du paysage politique du pays ont été rendus plus coercitifs et violents par le militarisme et la militarisation. Pour l'essentiel, ces caractéristiques de l'Etat sont restés les mêmes pendant toute la période post-coloniale. Parce qu'il oublie de tenir compte de ces facteurs, le Nigeria va encore rater l'occasion de planifier correctement sa transition du régime militaire au régime civil. En rejetant à l'arrière-plan ce qui est important et en n'insistant que sur la structure du gouvernement et de la typologie du personnel à savoir la même cohorte de personnel politique, les mêmes parties avec les mêmes nomenclatures, on a l'impression que tout le processus n'est que du vieux vin mis dans des bouteilles renouvelées. Qui plus est, la tâche de mise en place d'un nouvel ordre politique incombe aux militaires, un groupe intéressé plus au maintien de l'ordre socio-économique actuel. Les expériences passées ont montré que les résultats les plus probables qui puissent sortir de cette transition sont que les militaires vont placer leurs candidats aux postes politiques.*

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## Introduction

Due mainly to the nature of the economic and political processes that Nigeria's inheritance elite operate, a typical civil rule has become an aberration on the country's political landscape. The military, which has stepped in on a number of occasions, allegedly to halt a dangerous slide towards national catastrophe, has lost, in the process, its apolitical posture of noninvolvement in politics. The first and subsequent coups d'état were to serve as catalysts for the emergence of the military's internally divisive politics and a multiplicity of conspiratorial groups. By the same token, the military became a big political talking shop where politics, politricks and politicking have free rein.

Soldier-rulers, not unlike a civilian restoration government, have immense difficulty in curtailing excessive politicization of both officer-politicians and military bureaucrats. At any rate, the persistent *remise en cause* of civilian supremacy which military seizure of power occasions has put paid to the empirical validity of military apolitism of Ciceron. For, in Nigeria, as elsewhere in the militarist world, it suffices for military officers,

who have little or no commitment to apolitism, to enthrone illegality on the thin pretext that "dominant civilian values" are at variance with "professionally military values" (J.S. Ambler, 1966: 402).

Once the coup succeeds, the military is torn between two contradictory, apparently irreconcilable, postures: recivilianization of the polity or stabilization of militarism. Empirical evidence tends to show that once the euphoria welcoming the coup subsides, some sections of the country's domestic policy elite - those who do not see themselves as primary or direct beneficiaries of 'temporarily permanent' military rule clamour for a rapid demilitarization. It would appear that unlike in the Arab world, military leadership has hardly been regarded as an historic necessity in the country (Eliezer Be'eri, 1970:4). Having stayed in power for the greater part of Nigeria's post-independence years, military politicians have shown themselves to be at once "subject to the vices of their virtues" (G.M. Haddad, 1965: 230) and something less than a neutral, disinterested armed expression of the general will.

To be sure, Nigeria's officer politicians can hardly lay claim to be the guardian, protector or defender of the wretched of the Earth; certainly not in terms of political stability or a meaningful political culture. The absence of a sustained history of State-society collaboration looms large. Nor can the military be said to be democratic. If anything, the military, both organizationally and functionally, is an antithesis of democratic rule. At any rate, Soldier-rulers do not see themselves as running a democratic and open government. Successive Nigerian military administrations have had occasions to remind the governed that since they are not issued from electoral consultations, they should not be treated as such. General Ironsi's Supreme Military Council's communique of June 8, 1966, after stressing the foregoing, declares that his administration was simply a corrective one meant to stamp out the abuses and excesses of the deposed civilian regime and create a healthy community that would permit return to civil rule (R. Luckham, 1971:281).

Paradoxically, then the military, while recognizing its own undemocratic nature sees itself, in the image of the non-democratic state, as having a more or less historic task of paving the way for democratic civil rule and participatory politics. This perhaps explains why the military seeks to make its rule short and 'effective', regarding itself as being little more than a transitional government. However, while the military intervenes, ostensibly to arrest a rapid shrinking of the political arena, occasioned by civilian misrule, only to deepen the crisis, it considers its own disengagement as a desideratum for the emergence of a mature political culture. In so doing, the military seems to gloss over, either by design or by default, the negative fallouts of its own rule.

For one, several years of military rule in Nigeria have tended to permit the fracturation of government. As J. Bayo Adekanye puts it, after the first demilitarization (1979-1983), there is hardly any consensus on defence of the civil rulership (Adekanye 1985:42). For another, and flowing from the above, the Nigerian military hardly indicates any intention to totally withdraw from both formal and informal politics. It merely declares its preparedness to hand over power. Thus, while officer politicians are wont to talk about their readiness to regain barrack serenity and furnish us with some material evidence to postulate that when it comes to perpetual military rule, the military is, itself, fundamentally antimilitarist, at another, time, military untowardness, vacillations, and feet-dragging are such as to make one subscribe to the argument of Claude Welch Jr. (1970:50) that military finds it easier to seize power than to let go.

The military is therefore trapped in a dilemma of disengagement. In the Nigerian context, the first demilitarization experience instructs us that, when faced with this dilemma, the military tends "to grant power to those who (are) ready to make militarily approved decisions" (E. Furniss 1964:289-290). But then the benediction a government committed to the restoration of civilian rule by a withdrawing military regime is not enough guarantee of survival. In fact, by placing militarily favoured political candidates in political offices, the military becomes, informally, the political power-holder. The restoration government would then be involved in little more than survival politics such that it does not have enough time to adequately and effectively address crucial and critical national issues relating to the substance of government. For such a 'post-military state', how to contain the looming military factor, seems to constitute a major part of the national question. Another military intervention takes place because, as 'Mayo Adekanye observes:

*belief in civilianism per se, in the sense of respect for civilian constitutional rule, under an open, competitive-party system, by all means and at all costs, as against any form of military rule however benevolent, is yet to take root (Adekanye, 1984:36).*

In Nigeria, some privileged *milieux* tend to have more faith in the military for the resolution of the crisis facing the post-Colonial State. In a sense, it can be argued that barring those social classes who do not know where their objective interests lie, the majority of Nigerians who express faith in the military are invariably those who are beneficiaries of military rule. In other words, those who have gained immensely from, *inter alia*, indigenization policy and other state-sponsored policies of "embourgeoisement of segments of the civil and military societies" (Ali A.Mazrui, 1975) ultimately give the military a blank cheque of perpetual rule.

Such views tend to comfort the military in its assumption that its withdrawal, necessitated by an opposing, powerful societal current, cannot but be temporary. It therefore withdraws only to prepare its return; it cannot reappear on the political landscape without initially disengaging. What is however instructive is that whether military disengagement is voluntary or not, the transition process is hardly planned in such a way as to put an end to military rule. While the military - that is, its officer politicians' segment would appear to favour the rise, via skillful constitutional engineering, of "effective civilian institutions that will render future military intervention superfluous", (D. Rustow, 1963:9) it does not seem to address itself properly to issues such as the essence of transition; the character, nature and purpose of the post-colonial State; its effect on the form and substance of government and the linkage between the foregoing and the quality of public welfare goods. Again since the society has, beginning with formal independence, been made to be servile to the State, how could the current transition process permit a reversal of this trend?

These and related issues ought to be at the centre of transition planning in Nigeria. Since it can hardly be said that the country has addressed such issues towardly, a critique of the past experience appears in order. This is the purpose of this paper. The remainder of our discussions addresses the following themes: Essence of the Transition Process; Nature, Character and Purpose of the Nigerian State; and Form and Substance of Government in Nigeria.

#### *Essence of the Transition Process*

Transition Period ought, ideally, to offer the opportunity for new options to be placed on the national agenda and for new and critical elements forming the national question to be thoroughly debated such that this process would permit the augmentation of the quality and substance of government. And about the most important contemporary challenge of the national question in Nigeria is the resolution of mass poverty. Transition planning could then be used by the dominated forces in the society to make legitimate demands on the State if only for incremental changes in the body politic. Maximally, given the context of a dislocated, dependent, and weak post-colonial state, transition planning should consist of substantial structural and functional reforms, if not transformations, in the various sectors of the polity. In short, the internally dominated forces can clamour for the use of the State as a vehicle for societal transformation.

Of course, this perspective, that of the world-view of the dominated classes, cannot be said to be the dominant perspective. Latter belongs to the State, its hegemonic classes which, its internal dislocation and relative dependence on the dominated forces notwithstanding, still excels in political muscle-flexing. This perspective, ascendant in the pre-transition period, continues to enjoy prominence being synonymous, in its letter and spirit, with

the maintenance of a political, economic, social and moral order. The call for reform by leading civil and military politicians tends to be only rhetorical. Officer politicians who overtly intervene in politics, hypothetically to correct variegated ills of the society, who openly show their putative credentials of superior morality informed by barrack and/or mess notions of discipline, altruism, puritanism, sacrifice, rigour, accountability etc, and who, by the same token, promise a new lease on life particularly for the masses, soon find themselves subdued by the ills of the civil society they had intended to purify.

It, in fact, appears, by the advantage of hindsight that history offers, that such aforementioned values are little more than organizational or even putative. At any rate, they are not sociological. This explains why they are easily cast aside when the military seizes power. By easily glossing over the ethos and creed of military training and orientation as soon as they leave the proximity of the barracks, and the vicinity of the officers' mess, soldier-rulers easily become self-centered and corrupt as civil politicians. Paradoxically, or perhaps hypocritically, concern of officer politicians for the furtherance of their own private, class or corporate interests does not preclude their preoccupation, even if partly pretentious, with a recivilianized polity that would permit the articulation, clarification and resolution of leading national issues in such a way as to achieve a "sound, viable and genuinely acceptable political arrangement".

In fact, President Babangida, not unlike Generals Gowon and Mohammed, had wished for the establishment of a political system which, while allowing a shift from 'military' to 'participatory political system', will guarantee justice and equal opportunity. Thus, while inaugurating a 17-man political bureau on January 13, 1986 to structure debates on the country's political future, the Nigerian leader had hoped for a debate that would help evolve "a political system... capable of sustaining our enthusiasm for a healthy future".

In the same vein, General Babangida urged the Politburo and the general debating public to avoid institutional and constitutional import-substitution. The transition process, he contends, should make Nigerians look inward in their search for new structures and forms of government. This is mainly because:

*We share neither the political history nor the political cultures of advanced countries. Our democratic settings and social structures differ vastly from theirs. We presently lack the sophisticated and advanced industrialism that provides the economic foundations for these alien political models (The Guardian (Lagos) January 15, 1986:13).*

More specifically, the President stressed the commitment of the men of August 27, 1985 to "an order that will check the excesses of government and the abuse of power by the political leadership" while also insisting that "we shall equally frown at a system in which a small group of individuals shall be allowed to misuse power to the detriment of our national aspirations" (ibid).

There is, in this presentation, a *prima facie* case for a convergent point of view between those who occupy the commanding heights of the State apparatus and those, in the society, who have generally been treated as a conquered race. I use the term "prima facie" advisedly since, once we go into specifics, the State's set of preferences does not substantially tally with the world outlook of the society. While in theory the State acknowledges and accepts dissenting voices extent in the society, in practice it shows its displeasure, in violent reaction, not only vis-a-vis dominated societal forces, but also in relation to those who "potentially belong to the same class as those who control the reins of violence" (P.P. Ekeh 1985:48).

This development is worrisome on both scores but particularly on the alienation of the spokespersons of the people who are trapped in between the *Free state* of the market economy brand and the *Restricted State* of the planned economy variant. Thus, it can be argued that the Nigerian State, in the image of its nebulous mixed economy ideology, is at once permissive towards those forces who want to maintain the status quo and repressive vis-a-vis critics of a decadent and decaying socioeconomic formation. Given this ambivalence, the State, or rather its material embodiment legislature, executive, judicial, military, security and ideological apparatuses cannot be adjudged to be neutral or value-free. It is mainly in the service of forces that are not conterminous with, but simply a fraction of, the society. Nor do the interests of the former fully coincide with those of the latter.

Increasingly, the State uses its many apparatuses of coercion and violence to forestall the expression of the will of societal forces constantly led to demand a more humane, just and egalitarian socioeconomic order.

#### ***Nature, Character and Purpose of the Nigerian State***

The foregoing elements would suggest that if the State performs, in Nicos Peulantzas' language, cohesive and integrative function, it is also divisive and arbitrary. The State is the former to those whose interests coincide with controllers of State power, while it is the latter to the labouring classes, generally treated as subversive elements. It is the abrasive, arbitrary and secretive character of the post-colonial State that is laid bare before the general populace. The State is closed and unpredictable. Thus, while it can be argued, following Alavi and Saul, that the post-colonial State is overdeveloped, it can also be contended that the State is weak, by its disability to effectively contain 'entrenched forces of society' (P.P. Ekeh 1985:32).

The State therefore permits itself the luxury of employing violence vis-a-vis civil society; the opposition, real or imagined, is worsted with insecurity becoming the norm rather than the aberration. With the simultaneous phenomena of 'shrinking province of power' and 'growing prominence of violence' (P. P. Ekeh, 39), the State approximates to what Alexander J. Groth refers to as a 'non-State', where the community is left to the fancies, whims and caprices of 'lawless predators' (Groth 1971:251). Not only are participatory values absent and the people used as a sociological fraud, the agencies and apparatuses of the State are also periodically, if not regularly, commandeered for both class-relating and private-regarding purposes. But, again, the ubiquitous paradox and ambiguity of the post-colonial State resurface: while the bureaucracy, for instance, is sometimes "more or less sensitive to public opinion", it is also at some other times, "more or less arbitrary of its treatment of people. (Groth 1971:240).

At any rate, the State, whether militarist or civil, becomes essentially militarized in terms of the use of certain military-inspired structural and functional modalities. In such systems, certainly the use of arbitrariness, violence and coercion defy political system typology; yet the use of retroactive decrees, amongst other, suffers the military to be classified as a more or less autocratic system whose degree of autocracy varies, sometimes according to the temperament of those who control the State edifice. In short, there is the stark absence of both the tangibles and intangibles of personal security. Again, we turn to Alex J. Groth:

*the individual ... can never be sure that what was not a crime yesterday may not become a crime today. He does not know what the rulers may construe, to be a 'political security matter' rather than an ordinary legal matter. Even if the use of the procedure is rare, the citizen can never forget the possibility of being arrested and banished to prison, even executed without anyone knowing about it except for the "authorities", of course ... (Groth 1971:214).*

Admittedly, the Nigerian post-colonial State cannot be said to be as autocratic or arbitrary as traditional autocracies. To say this is to read the character of the State in some other climes and climates into the Nigerian State. But, then, the Nigerian State does not possess elements of the liberal-democratic political tradition sufficient enough to have compassion for and solidarity with the poor masses. Contemporary efforts respectively under the Buhari/Idiagbon and Mohammed/Obasanjo regimes to make Nigeria embrace elements of these two grand historical experiences were short lived. Neither can the country be said, by any stretch of the wild imagination, to be a socialist, centrally-planned economy.

However, if the Nigerian State defies any rigorous classification on the ideological spectrum; if it is neither 'hot' nor 'cold', it appears to be 'warm'

and it is perhaps this middle-of-the-road, 'moderate' character of the State that allows for ambiguities and paradoxes, complex rigidities and inexplicable flexibilities in the behavioural patterns of the principal agency of the State - the government. This explains why, sometimes, the State gives the impression that, to paraphrase Frantz Fanon, the people are creating the summit themselves. At such instances the State appears to be pursuing popular, if not populist, policies; at other times, the State uses its major apparatuses in such a barefaced violent manner as to instill fear and distrust of a 'distant' State in the citizens.

Thus, while Nigeria may constitutionally, and procedurally be more 'liberal' than 'autocratic', concrete social welfare policies towards both the *old* and the *new* poor, hardly appreciable in any sense, tend to push the country more to the 'autocratic' than 'liberal welfarist' political system typology. It can therefore be argued, following Alex J. Groth, that, in the image of some traditional quiescent autocracies, Nigeria seems: "dedicated not to the remaking of (its) society in some chosen image, but simply to the perpetuation of an inherited order ... It is neither politically mobilizational, socially innovative, nor materially generous" (p. 1745).

The list of the basic components of public welfare as presented, in 1961, by the United Nations' Department of Economic and Social Affairs is extensive and comprehensive enough. The components include provision of unemployment insurance to workers and employees; granting of subsidies to families and individuals to maintain 'minimally satisfactory' standards of nutrition and health; payment of subsidies to public institutions, governmental or private - such as schools, hospitals and recreational centres - for promotion of the material, physical and spiritual or cultural well-being of persons served by them (United Nations, 1961:79-80).

Certainly, it is not as if the Nigerian State does not attempt through its numerous development plans and budgetary proposals, to boldly come into grips with the phenomenon of the immiseration of the rural, semi-rural, urban and peri-urban masses. However, the conception of the State as a source of private enrichment and the furtherance of the interests of a class; of governors as against the society, has the potential of thwarting the realization of such goals. Public welfare is also conceived by the State merely as a process of periodic concession to the society. But perhaps more important is the fact that political structure and a dominant political, ideology are deemed relatively irrelevant to a 'good' government, a government that is 'substancefull'.

#### ***Form and Substance of Government in Nigeria***

The failure of the government is its inability to provide, minimally, the elements of existence - food, shelter, clothing for the mass of the people. This failure appears to have been a recurrent political decimal. Each government has experienced a dilemma of incongruity between declared



goals and actualized objectives - the astute civil and military politicians' catalogue of promises couched in welfarist, if not populist, language. This phenomenon seems to have accounted for the passivity, frustration and apathy of the mass of the people an apathy creeping into the rank and file of peripheral members of the core elite group in relation to any and all forms of government.

Now, early studies in the policy sciences in advanced capitalist industrialized polities have tended to conclude that political structures and ideas are relatively unimportant in the determination of public policies. Scholars like J. H. Gold Thorpe, S. S. Lipset, H. Marcuse, Wilensky, T.R. Dye etc., postulated the convergence theory of industrial society and its variants: the "end of ideology thesis" and the theory of "deradicalization of the working class movement". Gold Thorpe's summation of the convergence theory bears quotation:

*As societies adopt a progressively more industrial infrastructure, certain determinate processes are set in motion which make them more and more alike. Technology and economic development have their own inherent logic which has a levelling and convergent impact on diverse social structures, cultural traditions and political systems* (Gold Thorpe, in F. Castles and R.D. Mckinlay ed., 1979:170).

In short, this traditional school argues that "social and cultural patterns and processes of economic development" are evidently more important in shaping social reality than "formal distribution of power embodied in constitutional procedures" (F. Castles et al. *ibid*).

While it can be argued that since Nigeria is neither an industrial society nor an economically advanced State, the convergence theory is hardly intelligible when confronted with the Nigerian social reality, Wilensky's argument that "economic growth makes countries with contrasting cultural and political traditions more alike in their strategy" (1975:27-28 in Castles et al.) and T. R. Dye's contention that "... health and welfare policies, regardless of political systems are closely associated with levels of economic development" (1976) are true in respect of the developing world, particularly the constellation of poor African States, where, irrespective of political system and party typology, social welfare policies differ from one country to the other only in degree and not in kind.

More recent studies on the correlation between form and substance of government in the industrialized capitalist world show that politics and political forms are not irrelevant in the delivery of social or public goods. In their joint study on some twenty Euro-American capitalist States, Frank Castles and Robert D. Mckinlay conclude that:

*in the context of the public welfare commitment in advanced democratic States ... politics in both relevant and irrelevant. However not only is*

*politics more relevant than irrelevant, but also its irrelevance is only manifested once its relevance has been taken into account (1979:182).*

More specifically, Alex J. Groth has persuasively demonstrated the remarkable influence of structures and processes government and political systems - 'pluralistic democracies', 'traditional authoritarianism' and 'innovative-mobilizational autocracies' - on distribution of political goods and resources in key public policy areas such as taxation, education, health care delivery, housing, food production etc. He has also shown how variables such as structures and processes of politics - the "openness and participatory tendencies in group life" (1971:32), the clashing orientations within the ruling elite or chronic division of policy makers; degree of their control over the system etc, all come to bear on government impact or otherwise on civil society. In the same vein, a State's dominant Political ideology determines to a large extent the thrust of its public welfare programmes. In States where public welfare is a privilege rather than a right, public welfare programmes amount to little more than what Groth calls "statute book tokenism": the welfare of the people improves only on the pages of development and budgetary plans.

Form of government, one often hears in Nigeria, is hardly relevant as long as there is 'good' government. This idea has become rampant in the country's body politic; such that while suggesting varying forms of government during the one-year political debate in 1986, various members of the Nigerian public were quick to point out that whatever form of government is adopted - Federation, Confederation or Unitary; Parliamentary or Presidential or semi-presidentialism; or party typology - zero-party, one-party, two-party or multi party - what is important is the ability of the government to deliver. The kernel of the argument seems to be that good political leadership defies governmental forms; that any leadership of vision, without subscribing to what General Mohammed calls "a rigid political ideology" and irrespective of structural and constitutional *modus vivendi*, would perform.

Of course, it would be misleading to posit that form of government has no relevance. For one, there is a material linkage between form and substance the question of whether forms of government have a way of exercising pressure on the manner public policy is being delivered. Opposition parties in a typical competitive party-system, tend, at once by their presence and programme - enunciation to modify governmental policy. The party in power is forced, periodically, to adopt opposition's more qualitative programmes with a view to neutralizing opposition or making it irrelevant. It is doubtful if zero or one-party states can experience the same phenomenon with the same degree of intensity. For another, there is a psychological linkage between form and substance of government, that is in the manner in which performance is regularly concretized - *the question of how*. Specifically, the quality of public policy, particularly in a 'liberal' polity, emphasizes

the safeguard of the dignity of man while supplying his basic material needs. The Spanish dictator, Franco, was delivering materially, but his intense love for authoritarianism led his peers and compatriots to reject him.

The country's soldier-rulers and civil politicians seemed to have comprehended this social reality. The consistent defence of the federal political corpus on the grounds that it enhances political stability, that it brings government nearer to the people; that it ensures even development; that it permits some measures of decentralization of power etc, does not appear gratuitous: It would, however, appear that the intangible goods of the federal arrangement are more than the tangible ones. It is not, for instance, clear what positive impact a much more federal arrangement under Shehu Shagari's second Republic (1979-1983) had on the mass of the country's population in contradistinction to a more centralized and stronger unitary form of federal government that the military tends to operate. Simply put, it is one thing for a government to be close to the people, it is entirely another thing for it to use the advantage of close 'grass root' knowledge and contact to mobilize for mass participation and, ultimately, popular development.

### **Conclusion**

The present effort towards another transition planning appears, not unlike the first (1975-1979), to have glossed over critical issues relating to the nature and character of the Nigerian State and the effect of this on both the form and substance of government. By relegating the substance to the background and pursuing the shadow of mere structure of government and personnel typology - the same set of political personnel, same parties with different nomenclatures constituting old wine in renovated bottles - Nigeria seems set, once again, to miss adequately planning the transition from military to civilian rule. Moreover, it is on the same military, more interested in maintaining the present socioeconomic order, that the task of preparing a new political order has devolved.

With their eyes irrepressibly fixed on survival and primitive capital accumulation, it is very much likely that the scenario present in 1975-79 would recast itself between now and 1992, particularly because the nature, character and purpose of the country's post-colonial State remain essentially the same. It has been the major thesis of this paper that the problematic of transition planning can be more concretely located in the nature and character of the State, which militarism and militarization have simply rendered more violent and coercive. The crisis of misplanning or nonplanning is therefore less the consequence of the form of government; though there is an umbilical cord between nature and character of the State and substance of government.

Emphasis needs, henceforth, to be placed on the Nigerian State whose character and relationship with civil society does not seem to have been

adequately and satisfactorily apprehended and studied in the search for a new political end - I dare add - social and economic order.

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## Book Reviews

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### Gendering African History

A Review of Jane L. Parpart and Kathleen A. Staudt, eds. *Women and the State in Africa*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1989, 229 pp.; Sharon Stichter and Jane L. Parpart, eds. *Women, Employment and the Family in the International Division of Labour*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990. 253pp.; Luise White. *The Comforts of the Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1990. 285 pp.; and *Family, State, and Economy in Africa*, Special Issue, *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 16, No.4 (Summer, 1991).

Not so long ago women hardly featured in the literature on African History, society and politics. Now gender analysis is taken seriously in all the major social science disciplines. In the process of incorporating the dimensions of gender, many conventional interpretations, theories and paradigms have been refined, reformulated, or rejected altogether. One could argue that it is no longer permissible now to write history as his-story. It is gradually becoming, and must become, our-story. But the day of gender-neutral history and social science is still some way off. In order to get there we need to uncover and reconstruct women's lives, contributions and struggles. The concepts and methodologies we use must constantly be interrogated, so that they can be stripped of their patriarchal and sexist prejudices, which help to envelope women's work and activities, concerns and values, lives and struggles in cloak of invisibility.

This paper is a review of four recent works that seek, in their various ways, to advance the process of integrating gender analysis into African historical and political studies. They re-examine, among other things, the questions of state and family formations, the development of rural peasantries and urban working classes, and the constructions of, and struggles over, gender. For the sake of analytical clarity, the review is divided into four parts. It begins by examining how these studies deal with the issue of women and politics, followed by the subject of women and peasant agriculture, women and urbanization, and ends with a discussion of the politics of producing feminist knowledge in African studies as exemplified in the reviewed works.

### **Women and the State**

Parpart and Staudt argue, quite correctly, that conventional analyses of the state in Africa have tended to ignore women. The book seeks to change that, to demonstrate that the process of state formation is a gendered one. The various contributions in the book demonstrate that women have been excluded and marginalized from the political process. But despite that women have organized and fought back. However, the discussion tends to be heavier on the political subordination of women than on their struggles. Mbilinyi's<sup>1</sup> paper on colonial state intervention over beer brewing in Dar es Salaam in the 1930s is the only one that deals with women's struggles at length. It is also the only one that focuses almost entirely on the colonial period. The rest of the papers mainly examine the post colonial period, and deal with such issues as state policies towards market women,<sup>2</sup> women and land resettlement<sup>3</sup>, the impact of development policies on women,<sup>4</sup> relations between women and the military,<sup>5</sup> and the effects of economic crises on peasant women.<sup>6</sup> While the various authors conceptualize and problematize the process of state formation and women's access to state structures and resources differently, there is general agreement that the 'female experience in African politics during the past century... [has been] one of exclusion, inequality, neglect, and subsequent female consolidation and reaction'.<sup>7</sup>

It can be seen that the range of topics covered is relatively wide. But the same cannot be said about the regions and time periods. Only five countries are examined. Two of the papers are on Zambia. West Africa is short shrifted with one paper and North Africa is not even mentioned. The same skewed coverage can be observed in the *Signs* collection, whose papers deal with six countries. Two of the papers are on Uganda. North Africa is also left out, quite deliberately, the authors tell us, because in their 'view, North Africa represents quite different patterns from Africa south of the Sahara'.<sup>8</sup>

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- 1 Marjorie Mbilinyi, 'This is an Uncomfortable Business': Colonial State Intervention in Urban Tanzania', in Parpart and Staudt, eds.
  - 2 KarenT Hansen, 'The Black Market and Women Traders in Lusaka, Zambia', in Parpart and Staudt, eds.
  - 3 Susan Jacobs, 'Zimbabwe: State, Class, and Gendered Models of Land Resettlement,' in Parpart and Staudt, eds.
  - 4 Monica L. Munachonga, 'Women and the State, Class, and Gendered Models of Land Resettlement,' in Parpart and Staudt, eds.
  - 5 Nina Mba, 'Kaba and Khaki: Women and the Militarized State in Nigeria', in Parpart and Staudt, eds.
  - 6 Catherine Newbury and Brooke G. Schoepf, "State, Peasantry, and Agrarian Crisis in Zaire: Does Gender Make a Difference?", in Parpart and Staudt, eds.
  - 7 Naomi Chazan, 'Gender Perspectives on African States', in Parpart and Staudt, eds. p. 186.
  - 8 'Editorial', *Signs*, p.646.

Why and how? Certainly nothing in Lazreg's paper on Algerian women in the Stichter and Parpart collection,<sup>9</sup> bears out the contention that women's situation in North Africa differs markedly from 'patterns from Africa South of the Sahara'. Incidentally, Lazreg's paper was probably included less because Algeria is seen as a part of Africa, than a part of the so-called Third World, which is the focus of the collection, despite its grand sounding title. It is a shame that the imperialist and racist construction of Africa as 'Black' has invaded studies of African women as well.

As already mentioned, only one of the papers in Parpart and Staudt deals exclusively with the colonial period. For a book claiming to represent 'the first systematic effort to introduce gender into the analysis of the state in Africa',<sup>10</sup> this is a great pity. The modern African state, as Fatton<sup>11</sup> calls it, was created by colonialism. It probably makes more sense, in fact, to call it *post-colonial*, rather than *African*. Thus the book is less informative on the role of gender in the origins or information of the modern state in Africa than it might otherwise appear.

Given its limited geographic and temporal coverage it is not surprising that Parpart and Staudt's collection's theoretic contribution is rather desultory. The introduction is a rudimentary outline of the dependency and modes of production approaches used to analyze African societies, and the perspectives that inform discussions on the state. The two so-called theoretical chapters are particularly unsatisfactory. Most of the generalizations they make about Africa are untenable because they are constructed on thin empirical data.

Fatton's paper gives political science a bad name. It is full of fatuous and unsubstantiated assertions masquerading as theory. African societies and states are portrayed as peculiar deviations from some universal norm. In Africa, he tells us, 'women's subordination is more pervasive, acute, and accepted'.<sup>12</sup> Than where? Women's struggle for emancipation in Africa, he continues, 'is replete with contradictions, ambivalence, and silence'.<sup>13</sup> Silence, no. Contradictions and ambivalence, yes. But where isn't that the case? And he variously describes the African state as weak, fragile, non-integral, non-hegemonic and authoritarian without authority. It is because the African ruling classes are non-hegemonic, he argues, that popular resistance

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9 Marnia Lazreg, 'Women, Work and Social Change in Algeria', in Stichter and Parpart, eds.

10 Chazan, *op.cit.*, p.185.

11 Robert Fatton, 'Gender, Class, and State in Africa', in Parpart and Staudt, eds.

12 *Ibid.*, p.51.

13 *Ibid.*, p.54.

'is seldom frontal and revolutionary. Resistance takes the form of withdrawal from the public realm...'.<sup>14</sup> Are we to conclude that the American ruling class is non-hegemonic because Americans are not 'revolutionary' and the majority of them have withdrawn from the electoral process? Fattoum mistakes conjunctural appearances for structural realities. In the aftermath of the tumultuous struggles for democracy that have rocked Africa in the last few years his analysis appears dated. Lovett<sup>15</sup> displays the same tendency towards over generalization. She constructs her theory from the cases of Nairobi and the Copperbelt. One wished both Fattoum and Lovett had heeded Harniss's admonition that the processes and effects of state formation 'in distinct social segments are highly variable in historical terms and often differ from one country to the next'.<sup>16</sup>

Musisi's<sup>17</sup> paper in the *Signs* collection amply demonstrates the complex historical processes at work in gender and state formation during the precolonial era, which defy the kind of simplistic generalizations made by Fattoum and Lovett. It examines the relationship between state formation, women's status, and marriage forms in Buganda from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries. She examines what she calls 'elite polygyny' and argues that 'polygyny in precolonial Buganda must be distinguished from colonial and post-colonial polygynous practices and viewed, most critically, in the context of elite strategies to create and ultimately to control not only economic but political and social components of state apparatus as well'.<sup>18</sup> It is a fascinating, richly textured analysis, reconstructed through a feminist rereading and reinterpretation of Buganda oral and written sources. It is demonstrated that 'elite polygyny' was an integral part the three processes of state, class, and gender formation. The point is made that women became more differentiated. While the majority were excluded from 'direct involvement in Buganda's political process', the wives of the elite, the *Bakembuga*, 'played an important role at the state level in balancing internal and regional politics. The *Bakembuga* became not only the mothers of kings but king-makers as well'.<sup>19</sup>

Musisi leaves her story in 1900. One wishes she had carried it forward to show how the superimposition of the colonial state on Buganda transformed the patterns of gender, class and state formation. There can be little doubt

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14 *Ibid.*, p.55.

15 Margot Lovett, 'Gender relations, Class Formation, and the Colonial State in Africa', in Parpart and Staudt, eds.

16 Hansen, *op.cit.*, p.143.

17 Nakanyike B. Musisi, 'Women: "Elite Polygyny", and Buganda State Formation' in *Signs*, pp.757-786.

18 *Ibid.*, p.758.

19 *Ibid.*, p.786.



that colonialism transformed these patterns in complex and contradictory ways. It is often assumed that Indirect Rule shielded Buganda from intensive state interventions witnessed in settler colonies like Kenya. The paper by Summers<sup>20</sup> challenges that assumption. It argues that the British colonizers devised and tried to implement a highly intrusive policy on reproduction itself, ostensibly in response to Uganda's population decline in the early twentieth century. At first decline was blamed on the trypanosomiasis epidemic which killed 250,000 to 330,000 between 1900 and 1920. After the epidemic, official attention turned to the continuing low birth rates, which were attributed primarily to sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), especially syphilis.

Out of this, the colonial state and its functionaries, built a crisis, against which they resolved to intervene medically. Before long, medical intervention was accompanied by moral intervention as the crisis of disease was turned into a moral crisis, and the incidence of syphilis, which Summers shows was exaggerated, became a barometer of African immorality. From here to intervention in the reproductive practices and choices of African women was but a short step. African women came to be viewed as 'clumsier, stupider, and dirtier than African men'. The state felt justified 'to intervene in the private sphere of pregnancy, birth and infant care'.<sup>21</sup> This was colonial social engineering at its most intimate, an unashamed attempt to reshape African families and reproductive behaviour. Summers indicates that women avoided the STD programs, but the overall impact of colonial state interventions over reproduction and motherhood is not adequately drawn out.

The colonial state did not always work single-handedly to impose its capitalist patriarchal will on African women. As Schmidt<sup>22</sup> argues in the case of colonial Zimbabwe, African chiefs and elders colluded with colonial officials and functionaries to control the behaviour of African women. The agendas of the two groups were of course varied. The former were trying 'to reassert their waning authority over women, their services, and their offspring', while the latter 'were concerned with obtaining cheap African male labour. If it took the regulation of African women's sexual practices to achieve this objective, the state was prepared to pass laws to that effect'.<sup>23</sup> Schmidt believes that the European colonizers strove to control women not only because they suffered from deep-seated racial and gender prejudices

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20 Carol Summers, 'Intimate Colonialism: The Imperial Production of Reproduction in Uganda, 1907-1925', in *Signs*, pp.787-807.

21 *Ibid.*, p.800.

22 Elizabeth Schmidt, 'Patriarchy, Capitalism, and the Colonial State in Zimbabwe', *Signs*, pp.732-756.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 756.

against African women, but also because controlling the sexuality and mobility of African women offered a means of mitigating the disruptive impact of migrant labour on African family life, and preventing the collapse of indigenous authority structures, especially in the face of growing women's resistance. Apart from the various restrictions imposed on women's opportunities and mobility, the colonial state, relying on age-old European misconceptions about African society and the selective memories of African chiefs and elders, created 'customary' law, which turned flexible custom into inflexible law.

The collusion between the African rulers and the colonial state does not mean that the two groups share equal responsibility for the construction of women's subordination in colonial Africa, as some writers, including Schmidt, seem eager to suggest. It should be remembered that the African chiefs and elders were themselves subordinate to the colonial authorities. The tendency to talk indiscriminately of 'African men' must be resisted, for African men, no less than African women, were not homogeneous. They differentiated according to class, status, and occupation, so that they did not share similar interests with regards to women's position in society. Much of the new revisionist literature which rejects the functionalist argument that the colonial state instituted migrant labour because it was functional to capital, by showing that migrant labour was also a product of domestic struggles between African men and women,<sup>24</sup> often slips into the same functionalism, except now the argument is that migrant labour was functional for men. Just as migrant was not functional for all fractions of capital at all times, women's subordination was not functional for all men at all times.

### **Women as Peasants**

Parpart's and Staudt's collection contains two papers which seek to examine African women as peasants. Both of them are on the contemporary situation. One is on the agrarian crisis in Zaire and the failure of remedial policies devised by the state and international lenders to target women and incorporate their needs and concerns. This will result, the authors argue, in the crisis deepening because women are central to the agrarian economy.<sup>25</sup> The other paper examines land resettlement in independent Zimbabwe and argues that while legislation has tried to remove some of the worst aspects of colonial legislation which discriminated against women, women's needs continue to be neglected 'in many spheres of state policy, including the

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24 See, for example, Belinda Bozzoli, 'Marxism, Feminism and South African Studies', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 9, No.2, 1983: 139-171; and Jane L. Parpart, 'The Household and the Mine Shaft: Gender and Class Struggles on the Zambian Copperbelt, 1926-64', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 13, No.1, 1986: 36-56.

25 Newbury and Schoepf, *op.cit.*

resettlement program'.<sup>26</sup> In the individual family resettlement programs women have been marginalized, while progress in the cooperative resettlement programs has been hampered by poor government funding and men's appropriation of the use of advanced technology such as tractors and harvesters.

These studies may be interesting, but they only scratch the surface of women's experiences as peasants. This reinforces a point made earlier that this collection lack a long-term historical perspective and is excessively narrow in its coverage. The 'theoretical' paper by Lovett also helps to underscore the importance of treating the precolonial period historically, rather than merely as a static backdrop against which changes brought by colonial capitalism are set. Her analysis of gender and class formation in modern Africa is predicated on a cursory and misleading review of the sexual division of labour in what she calls 'precapitalist' societies. It is simplistically assumed, for example, that patriarchy was universal, unambiguous and uncontested. Also, social age is defined only in relation to men, the omnipotent male elders of anthropological folklore. This ignores the varied and complex situation in the matrilineal societies, which existed in the regions she discusses.

There is one paper in the *Signs* collection which attempts to begin filling the gender gap in the historiography of rural production in the precolonial period, and another that covers the last 150 years, spanning the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial periods. Using Lesotho as a case study, Eldridge<sup>27</sup> seeks to demonstrate that women 'were the primary agents of accumulation and growth in the nineteenth century economy of Lesotho'.<sup>28</sup> Thus the economic growth and prosperity that Lesotho enjoyed in the nineteenth century cannot be understood without considering women's contribution. She shows that in the agricultural economy women were responsible for gathering, caring for pigs and poultry, cultivation, bird-scaring, harvesting and threshing. In addition to food production, women also looked after food processing, they fetched water and collected fuel for cooking, and made many of the household goods, such baskets and pottery. Many of the goods traded outside the household were produced by women. Despite this, however, women enjoyed little political power.

What is administrable about this paper is the way it captures the changes that took place in the gender division of labour. It is noted, for example, that as building in cut stone spread, home building ceased to be a female task

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26 Jacobs, *op.cit.*, p.179.

27 Elizabeth A Eldridge, 'Women in Production: The Economic Role of Women in Nineteenth-Century Lesotho', *Signs*, pp.707-731.

28 *Ibid.*, p.708.

and was taken over by men. In particular, it is shown that the widespread adoption of ox-drawn plows changed the labour time of both men and women. Women's workload in farming increased, in exchange for which they 'gave up other activities such as weaving, pottery and home building'. Men's labour was also 'reallocated; that is, they began to help women. It became more common to hold work parties for weeding, harvesting, and threshing, at which married and unmarried men helped with the agricultural task that women usually performed'.<sup>29</sup> As men became more involved in agriculture, and the goods that they previously produced in the household, such as blankets, clothing, and wooden and iron tools, weapons and utensils became readily available in the markets, they gave up on, or spent less time, producing these goods. For their part, the young and the old were allocated new tasks. These changes altered the old forms of women's subordination, empowerment, struggles, and differentiation. From Eldridge's study Basotho women are not pawns of some ubiquitous patriarchy, but historical actors who consciously shaped the changing world in which they lived.

The term 'traditional' has been widely abused in African studies. What often appears 'traditional' were practices and ideologies invented at specific moments in the recent past. Carney's and Watts paper on agrarian change in Senegambia amply bears this out.<sup>30</sup> They argue that the agricultural system that currently operates in the Senegambia is not 'traditional' in the sense that it is ancient. It emerged in the mid-nineteenth century, a product of the growing commoditization of peasant production. In the last 150 years repeated attempts have been made to intensify rice production. Intensification was both a social and gendered process and one that was, moreover, continually negotiated and struggled over. Before the mid-nineteenth century, the gender division of labour was based on tasks. But as the commodity production of groundnuts expanded, there was a change from 'task-to crop-specific gender roles'. Rice, grown mostly for household consumption, became women's work, while groundnuts largely produced for export, became men's work. Also, 'as groundnut cultivation expanded on upland fields away from the floodplain and swamps, 'male and female agricultural labour became increasingly spatially separated between upland and lowland zones, giving rise to a much more rigid sexual division of labour by crop'.<sup>31</sup>

The withdrawal of male labour power from rice production intensified female labour time in food production. But women burdened as they were with other household activities were unable to produce enough rice, and so

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29 *Ibid.*, p.723.

30 Judith Carney and Michael Watts, 'Disciplining Women? Rice, Mechanization, and the Evolution of Mandinka Gender Relations in Senegambia, *Signs*, pp. pp.651-681.

31 *Ibid.*, p.657.

the region became increasingly dependent on food imports. When, the colonial state was established in 1889 it was alarmed by the growing food imports and thus began attempts to reestablish household food self-sufficiency by increasing rice production. The measures included the introduction of improved Asian rice, the clearance of mangrove lands, and the establishment of a series of large- and small-scale irrigation schemes. Rice acreage and production increased. But it could not be sustained unless the gender division of labour was transformed. Further intensification depended on bringing men into rice cultivation. But men 'successfully resisted efforts to intensify their labour on the grounds that rice was "a women's crop"'.<sup>32</sup>

In the meantime, the colonial rice development projects generated conflicts between men and women over the control of land and crops. Mandinka men and women could claim the individual ownership of land if they cleared that land themselves; if it was collectively cleared it fell under common household ownership. In the 1940s and 1950s women's attempts to assert control over the land that they had cleared from the newly opened mangrove swamps and lay claims on the output, were resisted by men, who impressed upon the colonial authorities that women's land ownership contravened 'tradition'. The latter obliged and 'determined that the new rice lands were household, not individual property'.<sup>33</sup> The struggles between men and women, and women's resistance against further intensification of their labour time and appropriation of their surplus, led to the failure of the post-war rice schemes based on ambitious irrigation projects. For example, women were reluctant to work as wage labourers for the mechanized and large-scale irrigated rice project initiated by the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) in 1949. When sharecropping was introduced to save the project 'women systematically underreported their harvest to appropriate larger shares of the crop'.<sup>34</sup> The CDC abandoned the project in 1958, and at independence the new government returned the rice lands to local cultivators.

The post-independence government was no more successful in resolving the productivity and labour crises in rice production. Initially it tried to encourage the development of small-scale, irrigated units controlled by households and based on the double-cropping of high yielding green revolution rice varieties. Although men's participation increased, their attempts to claim women's labour for year-round cultivation was resisted, for historically, 'the farming system was attuned to a five-month cycle'.<sup>35</sup> Following the

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32 *Ibid.*, p.661.

33 *Ibid.*, p.664.

34 *Ibid.* p.667.

35 *Ibid.*, p.670.

failure of small-scale irrigation projects to lessen the country's food dependency, a large-scale irrigation project was introduced in the mid-1980s, based on a coercive labour regime, which reinforced patriarchal family relations. As before, the new project provoked resistance and contestation along social and gender lines. It can be seen that the development of rice production in the Senegambian region involved a complex interplay and reconstructions of gender roles and property rights, state interventions, and household conjugal relations and struggles.

### **Women and the City**

Research on African women has privileged rural over urban women. This partly reflects the fact that, to date, the vast majority of African women have been rural dwellers, primarily engaged in agricultural work. When urban women are discussed, the focus has been mostly on their activities as traders or informal sector operators. The literature on colonial West Africa concentrates on women as traders, and that on East and Southern Africa on women as prostitutes. This divide can be seen in the works under review.

Mann<sup>36</sup> explores women's access to landed property, capital, and labour in the city of Lagos in the second half of the nineteenth century. During this period Lagos expanded rapidly, thanks to the commercial revolution brought about by the end of the slave trade and the growth of the palm trade. The result was that an urban real estate market developed and land prices escalated. The alienation, privatization, and commercialization of urban land affected men and women differently. Although women tried to take advantage of the changes in land tenure, 'many fewer women than men purchased or were granted land',<sup>37</sup> due to the discriminatory policies of both the monarchy and the colonial government. However, there was a minority of women household heads who were able to acquire land. Other Lagos women inherited privately owned land from relatives and husbands. Limited access to landed property undermined women's access to capital, credit and labour, which, in turn, circumscribed their trading opportunities.

Consequently, women became increasingly dependent upon men for land, housing, and capital. At the same time gender conflict in Lagos households over labour and resources intensified. Thus, from the mid-nineteenth century, in the face of expanding trade and changes in the land market, 'women in Lagos faced economic disadvantages that limited their ability to take advantage of new commercial opportunities and weakened their economic position relative to men. The final decades of the nineteenth

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36 Kristin Mann, 'Women, Landed Property, and the Accumulation of Wealth in Early Colonial Lagos', in *Signs*, pp.682-706.

37 *Ibid.*, p.691.

century were no golden age for Lagos women',<sup>38</sup> as studies which celebrate the penetration of European commercial capital tend to imply. At least for Lagos women it was not a time of expanding opportunities and increasing autonomy.

If commercial opportunities for Lagos women were closing at the turn of the twentieth century, wage employment opportunities opened up for some of them, as Parpart<sup>39</sup> shows in her paper on the growth of women's wage employment in southern Nigerian cities from the late nineteenth century to the 1980s. She demonstrates that the size of women wage workers remained minuscule until the Second World War. There was rapid expansion in women's wage employment after independence, thanks to the expansion of the economy, increased educational opportunities for women, changes in family structure, and struggles by women for economic independence. Despite their increased participation, women continued to be clustered in a few occupations, principally nursing, secretarial work and teaching, which were seen as extensions of women's work in the domestic sphere.

The main objective of Parpart's paper is to examine the manifestations and impact of the double day on Nigerian working women. She demonstrates, quite convincingly, that these women were not immune from the burdens of the double day, especially as domestic labour became scarcer and more expensive following the oil boom, and day care centres remained in short supply. The dearth of paid and unpaid household labour was aggravated by the introduction of free universal education for children in 1976; 'parents who had previously been happy to send unschooled children to work in affluent relatives homes, now felt they should send their children to school'.<sup>40</sup> She concludes that although Nigerian working women have developed various coping mechanisms, from the careful regulation of time and fertility, to spurning marriage altogether, the reproductive burdens of the double day have clearly undermined their career mobility. All this is true. Unfortunately, Parpart tends to weaken her case by focusing excessively on 'middle class' women, whose 'domestic labour may be more managerial than manual'.<sup>41</sup> The basis of the distinction between her 'middle class' and 'working class' women is not made clear.

The only other study that examines women's urban wage employment in the works under review is Lazreg's paper on Algeria. It focuses on the period after independence, and shows that until 1978, despite the attempts to

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38 *Ibid.*, p.705.

39 Jane L Parpart, 'Wage Earning Women and the Double Day: The Nigerian Case', in Stichter and Parpart, eds.

40 *Ibid.*, p.170.

41 *Ibid.*, p.177.

construct a socialist economy, women hardly increased their share of wage employment, although official statistics have tended to underestimate women's labour force participation. Algerian wage earning women work predominantly in the urban centres, and they are concentrated in the professions and services, rather than industry. They also tend to be relatively more educated than working men, although 'their education does not beget positions of responsibility'.<sup>42</sup> The major value of the paper is that it explodes the idealist myth that in 'Muslim' societies like Algeria Islam is the explanation of gender inequality. She argues, and proceeds to demonstrate, that the relatively low participation of women in the labour force can be attributed to a number of structural factors, especially the patterns of economic growth, demographic growth and family formation.

Stichter concurs with Lazreg that in order to understand the levels and patterns of women's wage employment, one has to take into account the organization of production and market factors, as well as the family or household structures, which entails examining such issues as household incomes and resources, power and decision-making patterns. Her paper offers an extensive and impressive survey of the literature on both the growth of female employment in the Third World and theoretical approaches to the household. It is pointed out that 'despite the gender gap, female employment in the developing world has shown surprisingly rapid growth in recent years'.<sup>43</sup> Needless to say, there are important sectoral and cross-national differences. Some African nations are among the few in the world where general female rates of labour force participation approach those of men. She argues that the prevailing and competing neo-classical and marxist theories on households are both based on the nuclear or conjugal units of industrialized societies, so that they do not adequately explain the extremely diverse and complex household and family systems found in Third World societies. Consequently, our understanding of the dynamics of female employment in these societies remains patchy.

None of the studies under review analyze female wage employment in Eastern, Central and Southern Africa for any period. The papers discussing urban women in Parpart and Staudt, and White's book, focus primarily on prostitution in the former settler colonies of eastern and Southern Africa. The argument is made that because urban wage labour opportunities for women were negligible in these countries until after the Second World War, prostitution offered women a chance, in the words of Fatton, to carve 'a niche as petty-bourgeois accumulators by providing reproductive labour ser-

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42 Lazreg, *op.cit.*, p.185.

43 Sharon Stichter, 'Women, Employment and the Family: Current Debates', in Stichter and Parpart (eds.).



vices to migrant workers'. It was the primary means by which many African women 'established themselves as integral parts of the emerging urban petty bourgeoisie during the twenty-five to thirty-five years of the twentieth century.<sup>44</sup> The thesis of prostitution as a means of petty-bourgeois accumulation for African women is fully developed by White.

White's book synthesizes and expands on a series she published in the 1980s. It argues that prostitution was reproductive work, a form of family labour, not an activity to be decried in the moralistic language of deviancy, degradation, and depravity. She distinguishes three main forms of prostitution, each of which has 'its own characteristics, behaviour, rate of accumulation, and organization of labour time.<sup>45</sup> First, there was the *watembezi* form, akin to streetwalking. The second was the *malaya* form, in which the prostitute stayed inside her room and waited for men to come to her. Finally, there was the *wazi-wazi* form whereby women sat outside the doors of their rooms or on the porches and called out for men.

The study meticulously delineates the emergence, growth, and transformation of each form, the social and ethnic origins of its practitioners, their relationships with their communities and neighbourhoods, and their earnings and investment strategies. These processes are linked to housing arrangements and policies, changes in the colonial economy, fluctuations in male wages, patterns of labour stabilization, and the eruptions of the two world wars and the Mau Mau war of national liberation. She demonstrates that the colonial state was not opposed to prostitution, although it tried to control it. But state control over the city and prostitution, or over urban space and working class reproduction, was far weaker than is often assumed. White also sketches the solidarities and antagonisms among women engaged in the different forms of prostitution, the development of new family formations around them, and the constructions of ethnicity and sexuality, religion and respectability, class and feminist consciousness.

She writes well and persuasively. But appearances can be deceiving. She extols oral sources, but provides no list of the interviews she conducted. She seeks to offer a radical reinterpretation of Kenyan economic and social history, but often lapses into the colonial language of 'tribes' and 'detrribalization'. The distinctions between the various forms of prostitution, and the changes that they underwent, are sometimes given a sharpness and temporal exactness that appears contrived. For example, the evidence is not compelling that *wazi-wazi* did not exist 'before 1936',<sup>46</sup> or that *malaya* women had 'begun to ask for payment in advance' by 1933, as compared to

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44 Faton, *op.cit.*, p.32.

45 White, *op.cit.*, p.13.

46 *Ibid.*, p.104.

before when they asked for payment after rendering their services.<sup>47</sup> Indeed, the author is forced to abandon discussing each form distinctively for the post-war period, arguing that 'after 1946 it is really not useful to examine the forms of prostitution individually; instead, post-war Nairobi had a fluidity - of streetwalkers, customers, and absentee landlords - that gave the regional variations of prostitution within the African locations a meaning they had not had since the 1920s'.<sup>48</sup>

There are several key planks of the analysis that do not stand up to closer scrutiny. She argues that Kenya's first prostitutes were from the pastoral communities devastated by the ecological disasters of the late nineteenth century. That may be true. But no concrete evidence is presented to support the assertion that women from these societies used their earnings to replenish their father's households' livestock. The contention that women 'from households engaged in subsistence farming... practised the malaya form', while those who chose the wazi-wazi form 'were generally women from families engaged in cash crop production'<sup>49</sup> also lacks substantiation, apart from the problem of defining what is meant by subsistence farming. And how sustainable was the prostitutes' accumulation? According to her own evidence few women who entered prostitution after the Second World War were able 'to build a house with [their] earnings'.<sup>50</sup>

White seems so anxious to celebrate prostitutes that she sees prostitution everywhere in colonial Nairobi. She summons us to 'recognize working prostitutes as Kenya's urban pioneers, the first urban residents'.<sup>51</sup> Whatever happened to the residents of Mombasa, that ancient city on the Kenyan coast? White's prostitutes were strong, enterprising women. They were victims neither of pimps, nor weak, dysfunctional families. Indeed, they were dutiful daughters, driven to prostitution out of loyalty to their families, to support rural production and accumulation. Their activities had little to do with 'sex rafios' in Nairobi,<sup>52</sup> and did not depend 'on men's needs but on the women's labour form'.<sup>53</sup> They were not unduly worried about diseases and violence, for they were in control of their lives. There is no moral ambiguity here, little sense of the way the wider society perceived prostitution. Were the rural families from which the prostitutes came only concerned about their daughters' earnings? If prostitution was new, as we are told, it

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47 *Ibid.*, p.84.

48 *Ibid.*, p.195.

49 *Ibid.*, p.125.

50 *Ibid.*, p.202.

51 *Ibid.*, p.34.

52 *Ibid.*, p.58.

53 *Ibid.*, p.225.

surely must have elicited strong cultural responses. This is a laudable defence of prostitutes that turns into an idealistic defence of prostitution.

There is a split in the feminist literature on the acceptability of prostitution. Some see prostitutes as agents and prostitution simply as work, while others view prostitutes as victims and sex work as the highest form of patriarchal oppression. White would seem to belong to the first group. It is true the usual condemnations of prostitution are often misguided. Certainly, danger, injury, and indignity are not confined to prostitution. Neither is the lack of choice and the presence of coercion, nor the surrender of personal power and control and loss of independence. Similarly, indignity and non-reciprocity are not unique to prostitution. Prostitution is objectionable because, as one author so aptly puts it, it 'is an inherently unequal practice defined by the intersection of capitalism and patriarchy. Prostitution epitomizes men's dominance: it is a practice that is constructed by and reinforces male supremacy, which both creates and legitimizes the "needs" that prostitution appears to satisfy as well as it perpetuates the systems and practices that permit sex work to flourish under capitalism. What is bad about prostitution, then, does not just reside in the sexual exchanges themselves, or in the circumstances in which they take place, but in capitalist patriarchy itself'.<sup>54</sup>

From White's book one would be forgiven to conclude that Kenyan women in colonial Nairobi were all prostitutes. No serious effort is made to trace the development of women's wage labour and other types of informal sector activities, such as beer brewing, food processing, and trade. There are fleeting allusions to women wage employment in 1937 and 1944.<sup>55</sup> Surely by 1963, when Kenya got its independence and White ends her story, wage employment opportunities for women were not as limited as they were in 1937 and 1944. Admittedly, this is a study on prostitution, but prostitution emerged and grew in the context of the changing economic and labour market opportunities for women, just as it was influenced by many other changes in Kenya's political economy that White chooses to discuss. What is the difference between these analyses that privilege prostitution, and colonialist views which portrayed African women as nothing but a bunch of prostitutes? Jacobs even makes the inane assertion that in contemporary Zimbabwe 'for women, urban life is still associated with prostitution'.<sup>56</sup>

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54 Christine Overall, 'What's Wrong with Prostitution? Evaluating Sex Work', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 17, No. 4, Summer 1992: 724. Also see, Carole S Vance, ed., *Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Boston, 1984.

55 White, *op.cit.*, p.98, 152.

56 Jacobs, *op.cit.*, p.164.

The papers by Mbilinyi and Hansen show that women in the colonial cities of Eastern and Southern Africa were indeed involved in activities other than prostitution. Mbilinyi examines beer brewing in Dar es Salaam in the 1930s, and women's struggles to retain their control over this industry. She argues that beer brewing was part and parcel of the dynamic and resilient informal sector, or what she calls 'the off-the-books' sector, which provided income generating opportunities for both men and women who could not find permanent employment. The struggle over beer brewing between women and the state was not simply over revenues and accumulation, but also competing gender constructions, and of women's place in the city, which was deemed by colonial ideologies to be for non-Africans, males, and wage workers. Women in the city were disproved of, except for prostitutes, who were grudgingly tolerated because in the official view, prostitution 'was a necessary amenity in the township which provided a diversion otherwise filled by more political forms of action'.<sup>57</sup> This underscores the fact that the state treated African women differently according to their particular class and specific occupational category. In the end, the women won their struggle against the state over beer brewing by effectively mobilizing their formal networks and tapping community support. Their struggle reinforced the oppositional ideology of popular culture.

Hansen notes that married African women, together with single women, in colonial Lusaka monopolized the sale of home-brewed beer and alcohol, and traded in prepared foods as well. These women were attempting to accumulate capital and at the same time challenging the gender definitions and demands of colonial and indigenous cultures. Although the bulk of the paper deals with Lusaka women traders in the 1970s and 1980s, it shows that these women did not spring out of nowhere. They have a history, one which they made, despite restrictions imposed by a colonial state with settlerist pretensions. From the mid-1970s when the bottom fell out of copper prices, the country's main export, the Zambian economy entered a period of severe crisis and the state was forced by the mighty IMF and World Bank to undertake structural adjustment programs. These developments facilitated the rapid growth of what Hansen calls the 'black market' and reduced state intrusiveness into the activities of women traders, and recast gender struggles within households.

### **Whose Voice?**

Parpart begins her paper on southern Nigerian female workers with a brief comment on the clashes between western feminists and Third World women at a number of forums on the construction of the gender debate. The latter,

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<sup>57</sup> Mbilinyi, *op.cit.*, p.116.

she avers, 'rejected western feminists' preoccupation with patriarchy and insisted that global inequities, not men, were the main enemy facing Third World women... The force of these arguments', she continues, 'alarmed western feminists, many of whom drew back from the apparently dangerous business of cross-cultural feminist analysis'.<sup>58</sup> The issue, however, goes far beyond the question of 'cross-cultural feminist analysis'. It is about power: who sets the agenda? Who speaks for Third World Women?

The studies under review point to a disturbing reality in studies on African women. The voices of African women themselves are largely absent. In the three collections analyzed above there are only three papers by African women that I could identify out of 26 contributions. The Editors of the *Signs* collection justify the absence of papers from African women scholars with a long self-serving litany bemoaning the fact that the 'prevailing socioeconomic conditions in African universities are not conducive to the production of knowledge'; 'scholars situated in impoverished or beleaguers institutions lack the time or resources... to produce scholarly work'; 'African men are more likely to go to the university and become researchers than are African women'; 'the few women scholars situated in African universities often lack a supportive environment to do critical feminist work'.<sup>59</sup> The list goes on. This is the language of exclusion, of privilege and power, of intellectual imperialism.

I simply cannot believe that they could not find a single African woman scholar who could have written a piece of 'critical feminist work' for this issue. I just know too many able African women scholars in various parts of the continent to believe such balderdash. Yes, there are African women scholars who do research and write against great odds. And who said that 'knowledge' can only be produced in comfortable surroundings, from the ivory towers of American universities? This is the voice of an arrogant, institutionalized American feminism. It fits into an old pattern. In an insightful paper on intellectual practices and the production of knowledge in African studies, Imam and Mama note the curious fact that 'it is possible to have, as recently as the last five years, at least three books which are collections of articles on African women, which appear to have no contributions at all from an African researcher... or, a review article on studies of African women published in 1987 in which possibly 15 articles by African women were referenced (out of maybe 100?) and where AAWORD (the Association

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58 Parpart, *op.cit.*, p.161.

59 Editorial, *op.cit.*, p.645.

of African Women for Research and Development) was mentioned favourably, none of its published papers were'.<sup>60</sup>

The rationalizations contained in the *Signs* editorial remind me of the British colonial practice, whereby Africans used to be represented in some Legislative Councils (Legco) by a European, usually a missionary. It was believed the 'natives' could not speak for themselves. They were simple, illiterate people, who did not understand the workings of government. The educated elite among them were too busy scheming or aping the European to understand the 'native' mind. But the missionaries did. After all, they dealt in souls. As true representatives of the 'natives', the Europeans would periodically ask their hapless wards to submit memoranda listing their concerns, which the Europeans would sometimes table in Legco.

Traditions die hard. The colonial tradition of Europeans representing Africans lives on in African studies and the *Signs* collection. After feasting on the 'critical feminist work' of North American feminists, we are given light African dessert consisting of 'Reports From Four Women's Groups in Africa'.<sup>61</sup> We are told this project was four years in the making. And yet, all the Africans could produce were reports informing the North American feminist fraternity that they have been keeping busy. That they are trying. And so the Africanist feminists can feel good about themselves. They have magnanimously given the 'natives' a chance to speak. Like the colonial missionaries, Africanists often act like evangelists out to save some benighted souls. They see themselves as not simply writing *about* Africa and Africans as, say, an American scholar might write about China and the Chinese, but

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60 Ayesha M Imam and Amina Mama, 'The Role of Academics in Limiting and Expanding Academic Freedom', paper presented to the CODESRIA Symposium on Academic Freedom Research and the Social Responsibility of the Intellectual in Africa, Kampala, Uganda, 26-29 November, 1990. The three books they refer to are: Margaret J Hay and Sharon Stichter, eds., *African Women South of the Sahara*, Harlow: Longman, 1984; Claire Robertson and Iris Berger, eds., *Women and Class in Africa*, New York: Africana, 1986; and Sharon Stichter and Jane L Parpart, eds., *Patriarchy and Class: African Women in the Home and the Workforce*, Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988. The review article is by Claire Robertson, 'Developing Economic Awareness: Changing Perspectives in Studies of African Women 1976-1985', *Feminist Studies* 13, No. 1, 1987: 97-135. The same observation could be made of the *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 22, No. 3, 1988, Special Issue on *Current Research on African Women*. None of the 15 articles and 'research notes' were written by Africans. Reading the articles and perishing through their bibliographies one would think there is hardly any gender research being conducted by African scholars, both within and outside the continent.

61 See pp.846-869.

as seers writing *for* Africans. The feminist Africanists in these collections are following a well trodden path.<sup>62</sup>

The tensions and conflicts that Parpart talks are not simply between 'western feminists' and 'Third World women', for neither group is homogeneous. There are many feminisms, diverse women's voices in both the so-called western world and the Third World. The 'western feminism' Parpart is talking about is white-middle class academic feminism. These feminists are as disconnected from the realities of the African women as they are from the realities of racial minorities in North America, including women of African descent. In recent years the 'women of colour', as the racial minority women are sometimes called, (as if the women of European descent have no colour), have been vigorously challenging the right of white-middle class women to speak for them and define their agenda.<sup>63</sup> The hegemony of western white middle class academic feminists over Africa should also be challenged, together with all forms of western intellectual hegemony. The endeavours to gender African history, and African studies generally, must continue. But let African feminist scholars speak for themselves.

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62 I have dealt with the question of the intellectual division of labour between Africanists and Africans in African studies and the former's domination of publication outlets and theoretical work, and the material and ideological conditions that sustain this dependent and asymmetrical relationship in 'African Social Scientists and the Struggle for Academic Freedom', in *Journal of Eastern African Research and Development* 22, 1992. Also see Thandika Mkandawire, 'Problems and Prospects of the Social Sciences in Africa', *Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review* 5, No. 1, 1989.

63 See Maxine Baca Zinn, et al., 'The Costs of Exclusionary Practices in Women's Studies,' in Elizabeth Minnich, et al., eds., *Reconstructing the Academy: Women's Education and Women's Studies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988; Bell Hooks, *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center*; Mary Childers and Bell Hooks, 'A Conversation about Race and Class', in Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn F Keller, eds., *Conflicts in Feminism*. New York and London: Routledge, 1990. Also see the anguished debate between white women and 'women of colour' in *Feminist Review*, Nos. 22 and 23, 1986.

Steven Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1990, pp.340.

African peasants have come a long way. Gone are the days when they were casually dismissed by self-righteous anthropologists as 'primitive', indolent and passive 'tribesmen'. There were of course none of these things. Historians have done much to demonstrate that peasants in the precolonial era did not live in the isolated 'tribal' enclaves of the ethnographic model. They were integrated in complex ways to wider economic and political systems, which rose and fell, expanded and contracted. In short, they lived in porous communities and a world that changed. And their actions contributed to those changes. This book affirms that it was colonialism and anthropology which invented 'tribes' as discrete spatial units and ethnographic objects. Unfortunately, Feierman contends nationalist historians threw out the baby of local culture together with the ethnographic bath water.

He argues that local society need not be abandoned as a unit of analysis, or turned into nothing little more than examples to validate general principles or to demonstrate transformations in the wider world. But the solution does not lie in simply changing the image of peasant society, but in adopting a new analytic approach that breaks the artificial spatial and temporal boundaries in which peasants are enclosed. By looking at local rural society as peasant society, these societies begin to lose their character as insulated ethnographic specimens, for peasant societies were almost by definition, local societies linked to the wider world. Feierman seeks to reconstruct local peasant culture in what was the Shambaa kingdom in Tanzania in the last century and a half. But he is not merely interested in presenting a prosaic historical narrative of how peasants constructed and reconstructed their lives. His primary objective is to examine how peasants conceptualized their world, 'to explore', as he puts it, 'the relationship between the historical context in which peasants, as historical actors, found themselves and the way in which they created and recreated political discourse' (p.13).

This, then, is a story of peasants as actors and thinkers. Feierman argues that Eurocentric and elitist conceptions which define intellectuals by the quality and content of their discourse have long blinded us to the existence of peasant intellectuals in non-literate societies. He adopts Gramsci's definition of intellectuals, while rejecting his analysis of the peasantry, as people who are engaged in socially recognized organizational, directive and educative or expressive activities. The peasant intellectuals earned their living from farming, but at crucial historical moments, they organized political movements and elaborated new forms of discourse. Peasant intellectuals mediated between practical and discursive knowledge, local society and the



wider world, domination and public discourse. The discourse of the peasant intellectuals centred on the well-being of peasant society, articulated in the political language of healing the land (*kuzifya shi*) and harming the land (*kubana shi*), terms which, Feierman believes, expressed and exposed consent for, and dissent against, the policies and practices of the rulers. However, Feierman fails to demonstrate convincingly that these two terms were the core terms of peasant intellectual discourse. The linguistic evidence presented is too thin for such a major conclusion. The effect is that the scope of peasant intellectual discourse appears excessively narrow, and strangely frozen for a study that is determined to be historical and shed anthropological timelessness. It is a discourse confined to the politics of royal power. The only new forms of political discourse appear in the 1950s when peasant intellectuals, he tells us, debated the nature of *demokrasi*.

For a study on peasant intellectuals we learn little about peasant ecological ideas. Peasant ideas on droughts, rains and rainmaking presented in this book are imbued with the ritual mysticism of anthropological analysis. An opportunity was missed to chart out peasant ideas on the environment, nature, the cosmos, and humanity's relationship to them, and whether, when, how, and why these ideas changed. It is ironic for a book that seeks to extricate peasant intellectual discourse from the onerous weight of ethnographic research that we do not hear much from the peasants themselves. Their voices are drowned in the circumlocutions of discourse theory. Most of the oral research for this study was conducted in the 1960s. All the author seems to have done is to reinterpret the data in the light of the new theory. Nothing wrong with that. The only problem is that we learn little about what the peasant intellectuals actually thought.

Another problem with Feierman's analysis is that it is not clear who these peasant intellectuals really are. For the precolonial era he includes the specialized healers, specialized officials at the royal court, and the king's chief minister and representatives, while for the colonial period the peasant intellectuals include the chiefs, because, in his view, they had now become, according to the Gramscian definition of intellectuals, 'the dominant group's deputies', as well as what he calls the peasant-clerk-teachers and functionaries. The issue is not that the composition of peasant intellectuals changed, but that he stretches the definition of "peasant" to the point where it becomes a blanket to cover all rural dwellers and their offspring. The definitional difficulties are shown by his use of the hyphenated categories.

This is to suggest that the book fails where it ought to succeed or where the author hopes it makes a contribution. The sections discussing the peasant intellectuals are tedious and have a convoluted quality to them. Far more successful and interesting are the chapters discussing the process of peasant production and resistance. Chapter 2 examines the patterns of peasant surplus appropriation and dependency in late nineteenth century Shambaai,

singling out the organization of the tribute system, forms of personal dependency, gender division of labour, and strategies for ensuring food security. Part of Chapter 4 discusses shifts in the system of dependency and the roots of political power and the nature of peasant resistance on the eve of colonial conquest. The next few chapters elaborate on the question of peasant resistance during the colonial period, which increasingly focused on the chiefs, thanks to their willingness to implement unpopular colonial agricultural and conservation policies, concretized most sharply in the Usambara Scheme introduced in 1950.

The struggle against the Usambara Scheme, which required peasants to increase agricultural productivity and control erosion by building ridges, was led by women. This is the subject of Chapter 8, perhaps the best chapter in the book. Peasants, especially poor ones, most of whom were women, resisted 'building ridges on subsistence land because this would convert it into men's cash-crop land unavailable for flexible seasonal land loans and unavailable also to people poor in land' (p.182). Thus the scheme threatened the flexible use of land, the guarantee of subsistence to the poor, and intensified the pressure on women's labour time. What Feierman does not say is the extent to which the scheme was seen as a threat to indigenous conservation ideas. For a study claiming to be an examination of peasant intellectuals one would have expected such an analysis. Also, while Feierman pays tribute to peasant women as the leaders of the protest movements in the 1950s, which he sees as the heroic age of the peasant intellectuals during which they tried to create an alternative discourse (a subject examined in Chapter 9), he says little about women as peasant intellectuals.

The last two chapters (9 and 10) on the post-independence period deal with the elimination of chieftaincy and the steady marginalization of the peasant intellectuals and their discourse and the triumph of the salaried elite, whom he sees as descendants of the clerks of indirect rule. The new elite forged its own discourse couched in the language of development, and articulated in the idiom of ujamaa. But beneath this seemingly egalitarian ideology lay the interests of a bureaucratic class trying to establish its hegemony. This analysis may not be entirely new, but it is refreshing. Indeed, the weaknesses noted above notwithstanding, this book is a valuable contribution to the study of African peasants. If nothing else, it shows that peasants were not the 'rural idiots' Marx thought they were. They could think. Of course the peasants themselves knew that. But academic researchers did not. Now they know.

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Patrick Obeng-Fosu, *Industrial Relations in Ghana: The Law and Practice*, The Ghana Universities Press, Accra, Ghana, 1991, pp.152

This book is evaluated in terms of the extent to which it enlightens readers about Ghana's industrial relations laws and practices. Other criteria used in this review are the new insights the author, Patrick Obeng-Fosu, brings to the literature as a result of his 35 years experience as an officer of the Ghana Labour Department. He has been at the department since 1957 and is currently the Chief Labour Officer.

This publication has six sections. The first, third and fourth are the most valuable and deal with the history of Ghanaian trade unionism, labour statutes currently in force in Ghana and industrial relations practices respectively. The first chapter on "Early Trade Unionism" and the "Establishment of Ghana's Labour Department" furnishes important historical and background information on the country's labour movement and Labour Department. Some of the issues addressed are the teething problems Ghanaian workers had to overcome in their efforts to create trade unions. The author also correctly points out that early trade unionism emerged mostly in the government sector which today remains the unions' stronghold. For the reader interested in the origins of Ghana's labour federation, the Ghana Trade Union Congress (TUC), this book provides additional historical information, unavailable in other publications.

On the contemporary Ghanaian labour, the author provides useful information on the organizational structure of the TUC and its national union affiliates. The author, for example, indicates clearly the TUC and national union leadership positions which are elected and those appointed. As it were, this and other similar illustrations in the book permit the author to describe to readers, especially those not familiar with Ghana's labour organizations, how they are structured and how they operate in practice. The author also explains the exact relationship between the Ghana TUC and three other worker associations - the Ghana National Association of Teachers, the Civil Servant's Association and the State Registered Nurses' Association. These labour groups together with the TUC have sought to protect workers through the Consultative Forum of Ghana Labour which was established in 1986.

In addition to the detailed description of Ghana's trade unions, there is a brief section on the Ghana Employers' Association. This section, however, is too brief and marks a typical shortcoming in the literature on African labour - the neglect of the role of private employers' associations and their representatives in industrial relations.

As noted, the important contributions of this book are found in the sections on industrial relations laws and practices in Ghana. In these sections,

the author is successful in explaining how colonial labour laws have been merged with post-independence labour statutes in Ghana. In addition to indicating the relevant existing labour laws, the author explains effectively how these laws shape important trade union activities such as union certification, negotiating collective agreements and the conduct of strikes and lockouts. Unique features of this book are the several practical illustrations furnished by the author. One glaring example is how precisely the author distinguishes between industrial and craft unionism. The illustrations permit the untrained reader to grasp the full meanings of important industrial concepts and processes and how they apply in the Ghanaian context.

Focusing on actual industrial relations practices in Ghana, the author uses his professional experience to describe and explain important characteristics of the Ghanaian industrial relations scene. He draws attention to one important tripartite consultative body - the National Advisory Committee on Labour - which has received inadequate focus in the literature. The importance of this body is reflected in its role in Ghanaian labour affairs. Its responsibilities include advising the Ghana Government on national labour policies, laws and practices and other issues impacting on labour.

The author also refers to another important but often ignored issue - the status of women employees in Africa. Since independence, Ghanaian women (especially in the public and other formal economic sectors) have enjoyed fairly liberal benefits, including fully paid maternity leave and time off to breast-feed new born infants. However, these aspects of women workers' rights have been left untouched by most authors. Obeng-Fosu is therefore one of the first authors to raise such an important aspect of the legal status of women in the work place.

Other recent important labour developments are also treated in this publication. Examples are occupational safety, health and workmen compensation laws passed by the Flt. Lt. Rawlings-led Provisional National Defence Council Government. With respect to the latter laws, the author cited several cases in which workers have successfully been compensated for work-related injuries. Similarly, in the area of industrial conflict, materials included in this book allow the reader to get updated about recent strikes and other conflicts between workers and management. Here too, specific cases depicted permit the reader to grasp fully, developments on the labour front from a practical standpoint.

In addition to the sections I have alluded to, other chapters briefly outline industrial relations practices in some English-speaking African countries including Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia. He also makes quick-references to industrial relations in the US and a few European nations. These sections provide the beginning of an introduction to comparative labour relations. These brief sketches, however, suffer the delimitations connected to broad comparative surveys. An example is that, crucial differences between

European and American trade unionism are glossed over. Another is that how worker participation, through Germany's co-determination system, enhances national economic efficiency is not analyzed, although the author refers to this critical dimension of the German economy.

This book also contains hazards inherent in survey types of studies. An important hazard is the need to be extra vigilant in furnishing not only correct, but also up-to-date data and information on several countries. A case in point is that although the International Labour Office (ILO) indicates that Kenya has ratified both ILO Convention Nos. 87 and 98<sup>1</sup> the author indicates that Kenya has ratified only the former. A similar observation could be made about the number of Conventions Ghana has ratified. The author shows in Appendix 11 that Ghana ratified four ILO Conventions in May 1986.<sup>2</sup> According to the records of the ILO, Ghana ratified five Conventions.<sup>3</sup> Thus the total number of ratification of international labour conventions by both Ghana and Kenya may have been underestimated in this book.

A final note on some of the flaws in this book. The sections on future policies and the ILO need to be expanded to permit the reader to gain a more comprehensive appreciation of the role and influence of the ILO in Ghanaian/African industrial relations. With respect to the potentials of worker participation, the author focused almost exclusively on work place durbars without justifying his choice. But even more important, the emergence of new "revolutionary organs" of worker participation including the Workers' Defence Committees that occurred with the birth of the second Rawlings' government was virtually neglected. The high incidence of conflict between the TUC-led workers and the Rawlings regime is also not treated.

The few flaws I have described, however, cannot outweigh this book's practical utility. In spite of its small size (105 pages of text) it definitely contributes to a better understanding of Ghanaian industrial relations. It is an invaluable addition to the literature on especially union history, structure and organization and industrial relations practices such as union registration, collective bargaining, strikes, dispute resolution and unfair labour practices. The data and information provided in both the text and the several appendices are remarkable and make this book unique. They qualify this book to be designated as a *bona fide* reference manual on Ghana's labour. By collating information and data previously unpublished or scattered in several sources

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1 ILO, Chart of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions, 1 January, 1990. See also Appendices 21 and 22 of Obeng-Fosu.

2 See pp.128-129 of Obeng-Fosu.

3 According to information obtained by this reviewer from the ILO, in May 1986 the Ghana Government ratified five Conventions.

ces, this book will facilitate future research on Ghana's industrial relations. Some of the relevant information supplied include, but are not limited to, the names and duration of tenure of TUC secretaries-general, Heads of Ghana's Labour Department and Employer's Association and strike, wage and other similar data. The depth and breadth of the data contained in this single publication depict the author's immense first hand experience in Ghana's labour matters which, beyond a doubt, make him deserving of the accolade, "a seasoned" labour officer.

In a continent in which high-ranking bureaucrats and most public figures rarely document their professional experiences and personal insights into affairs of state, this book is a welcome addition to the literature on Ghana's labour affairs. This book is therefore highly recommended to both new and experienced students of African and comparative industrial relations.

This reviewer fervently hopes that Obeng-Fosu has, through this book, beaten a path that more African technocrats will soon follow to disseminate their knowledge and experience to complement the work of academicians in the field of labour.

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# Index to Africa Development

Vol. XVII, Nos 1 - 4, 1992

- Achille Mbembe, *Traditions de l'autoritarisme et problèmes de gouvernement en Afrique sub-saharienne*, 1, 37-64.
- Asiwaju A I, *Borders and Borderlands as Linchpins for Regional Integration in Africa: Lessons of the European Experience*, 2, 45-63.
- Crispin Grey-Johnson, *The African Informal Sector at the Crossroads: Emerging Policy Options*, 1, 65-91.
- Dejene Aredo, *Developmental Aid and Agricultural Development Policies in Ethiopia 1957-1987*, 3, 209-237.
- Driss Khrouz, *Effets de l'aide internationale sur l'agriculture africaine: le cas du Maroc*, 3, 99-138.
- Ekong, E E, *The Role of the World Bank in Nigerian Agricultural Policy*, 3, 65-98.
- Jennifer Clare Mohamed, *Collective Rights, Transformation and Democracy: Some Thoughts on a New Constitutional Dispensation in South Africa*, 1, 5-35.
- Julius E Nyang'oro, *National Security and Defense Expenditure in Africa: A Political and Economic Analysis*, 4, 5-28.
- Kouadio Benie Marcel, *Restructuration et Evolution de l'Emploi dans le Secteur Public et Para-Public en Côte-d'Ivoire*, 1, 93-112.
- Kwame Bafo-Arthur, *Europe 1992: A Challenge to Sub-Saharan African Development*, 2, 27-43.
- Lawrence M Sommers and Assefa Mehretu, *Trade Patterns and Trends in the African-European Trading Area: Lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa from the Era of the Lome Accords 1975-1988*, 2, 5-26.
- Machioudi Dissou, *L'aide et les priorités internes des politiques agricoles nationales et sa place dans le secteur agricole: le cas du Bénin*, 3, 139-169.
- Mamadou Dansokho, *Les effets de l'aide bilatérale et multilatérale sur l'agriculture africaine: L'exemple du Sénégal*, 3, 171-208.
- Momar Coumba Diop et Mamadou Diouf, *L'administration sénégalaise, les confréries religieuses et les paysanneries*, 2, 65-87.
- Naceur Bourenane, *Introduction*, 3, 5-33.
- Nyemba Ambela Jean, *Développement rural au Cameroun: et si les paysans le concevaient autrement?*, 4, 29-45.
- Oloka-Onyango, J, *The Legal Control of Tertiary Institutions in East Africa: The Case of Makerere University*, 4, 47-65.
- Oluranti Ogunrinola, I, *Determinants of Entrepreneurship Development in the Urban Informal Sector of Lagos*, 4, 81-97.
- S K Asibuo, S, K, *Inertia in African Public Administration: An Examination of Some Causes and Remedies*, 4, 67-80.
- Sosu, A E, *Multilingualism and Problems of Choice of Indigenous Official Languages in the West African Sub-Region*, 1, 113-128.
- Tenkir Bongor, *The State, the Peasantry and Rural Class Formation in Prerevolutionary Ethiopia*, 2, 89-114.

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## Contents / Sommaire

### **Jean K Thisen**

The European Single Market in 1992 and its possible Effects on African Economies

### **Mamadou Moustapha Kane**

Le discours des officiers soudanais sur les peuples du soudan occidental de 1850 aux années 1900: L'africanisme Français à l'époque de l'expansion militaire

### **A B Zack Williams**

Crisis, Structural Adjustment and Creative Survival in Sierra Leone

### **René Kouassi**

La répartition des moyens d'incitation à la production entre cultures d'exportation et cultures vivrières en Côte d'Ivoire

### **Kunle Amuwo**

Transition Planning in Nigeria: A Critique of the Military Civil Transiting Variant

### **Book Reviews**

#### **Tiyambe Zeleza**

Gendering African History

#### **Tiyambe Zeleza**

Steven Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1990, pp.340

#### **Kwamina Panford**

Patrick Obeng-Fosu, *Industrial Relations in Ghana: The Law and Practice*, The Ghana Universities Press, Accra, Ghana, 1991, pp.152

**Index of Africa Development Vol. XVII, 1992**

ISSN 0850 3907

