

**AFRIQUE ET
DEVELOPPEMENT
AFRICA
DEVELOPMENT**

Vol. XV No.2, 1990



AFRICA DEVELOPMENT AFRIQUE & DEVELOPPEMENT

Acting Editor/Rédacteur en Chef par intérim
Mamadou Diouf

Editorial Assistant/Assistant d' édition
Abdoul Aziz Ly

Editorial Board/Comité de Rédaction

Kwesi Prah - Abdoulaye Bara Diop - Issa Shivji - Habib El Malki
Mahmoud Mamdani - Bernard Founou-Tchuigoua - Thandika Mkandawire

CODESRIA acknowledges the support of a number of African Governments, the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries (SAREC), the International Research Development Centre (IDRC), Ford Foundation and DANIDA.

Le CODESRIA exprime sa gratitude aux Gouvernements africains, à l'Agence suédoise pour la Coopération en matière de Recherche avec les Pays en voie de Développement (SAREC), le Centre de Recherche pour le Développement International (CRDI), Fondation Ford et DANIDA.

Typeset and Printed by CODESRIA
Cover designed by Aissa Djonne

**AFRICA DEVELOPMENT
AFRIQUE & DEVELOPPEMENT**

A Quarterly Journal of the Council for the
Development of Economic and Social Research
in Africa

Revue Trimestrielle du Conseil pour le
Développement de la Recherche Economique et
Sociale en Afrique

Acting Editor
Mamadou Diouf
(CODESRIA)

Vol. XV, No.2, 1990

Africa Development is the quarterly bi-lingual journal of CODESRIA. It is a social science journal whose major focus is on issues which are central to the development of society. Its principal objective is to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas among African scholars from a variety of intellectual persuasions and various disciplines. The journal also encourages other contributors working on Africa or those undertaking comparative analysis of Third World issues.

Africa Development welcomes contributions which cut across disciplinary boundaries. Articles with a narrow focus and uncomprehensible to people outside that discipline are unlikely to be accepted.

The journal is abstracted in the following indexes: *International African Bibliography*; *Documentatieblad*; *Abstracts on Rural Development in the Tropics*; *Documentationseliens Africa*; *A Current Bibliography on African Affairs*.

All editorial correspondence and manuscripts should be sent to:

Tous les manuscrits et autres correspondances à caractère éditorial doivent être adressés au:

The Editor/Rédacteur en Chef
Africa Development/Afrique et Développement,
CODESRIA, B.P. 3304, Dakar, Senegal.
Tel.: 23-02-11 - Telex 613339 CODES SG

Afrique et Développement est un périodique trimestriel bilingue du CODESRIA. C'est une revue de sciences sociales consacrée pour l'essentiel aux problèmes de développement de la société. Son objectif fondamental est de créer un forum pour des échanges d'idées entre intellectuels africains de convictions et disciplines diverses. Il est également ouvert aux autres chercheurs travaillant sur l'Afrique et à ceux se consacrant à des études comparatives sur le Tiers-monde.

Afrique et Développement souhaite recevoir des articles mobilisant les acquis de différentes disciplines. Des articles 'trop spécialisés ou incompréhensibles aux personnes qui sont en dehors de la discipline ne seront probablement pas acceptés.

Les articles publiés dans le périodique sont indexés dans les journaux spécialisés suivants: *International African Bibliography*; *Documentatieblad*; *Abstracts on Rural Development in the Tropics*; *Documentationseliens Africa*; *A Current Bibliography on African Affairs*.

Subscriptions/Abonnements

(a) African Institutes/Institutions africaines:	\$32 US
(b) Non African Institutes/Institutions non africaines	\$35 US
(c) Individuals/Particuliers	\$30 US
- Current individual copy/Prix du numéro	\$ 7 US
- Back issues/Volumes antérieurs	\$10 US

Claims for undelivered copies must be made no later than three months following month of publication. CODESRIA will supply missing copies when losses have been sustained in transit and where the reserve will permit.

Les réclamations: La non réception d'un numéro doit être signalé dans un délai de trois mois après la parution. Nous vous ferons alors parvenir un numéro de remplacement dans la mesure du possible.

ISSN 0850 3907

Contents - Sommaire

Momar Coumba Diop	
L'administration sénégalaise et la gestion des "fléaux sociaux"	5
Amadou Diop	
Population et Villes Sénégal: La croissance démogéographique.....	33
Stella C. Ogbuago	
Family Planning: A Human Right for Women.....	45
Daniel Smart Asante-Odame	
The Crisis of Development Finance and Its Impact on Developing Economies: Trends, Issues and Policy Options	57
Austin Isamah	
Organized Labour Under the Military Regimes in Nigeria	81
Babatunde Zack-Williams	
Diamond Mining and Underdevelopment in Sierra Leone 1930/1980.....	95
<i>Book Reviews</i>	
Kwesi Prah	
The Subvention of the Invention of Africa.....	119
Ernest Harsch	
Reinventing Africa?	131

L'administration sénégalaise et la gestion des "fléaux sociaux"*

Momar Coumba Diop**

Abstract: The data published in this paper are mostly the results of a documentary search. The study begins with a presentation of the concept of "social plague" which shows that it varies considerably with the concerns of public powers. Then a short presentation of the evolution of the concept since independence is given.

Then, on the basis of colonial heritage an attempt has been made to explain how the Senegalese administration has managed some "plagues" like alcoholism, the use of drugs, prostitution and begging. Available information show that it is the setting up of a body of laws of growing harshness which has been the response. Certain social groups related to crime, idleness and disorder have been victim of an often brutal policy of control of *plagues* as is shown by the study on begging. The cases studied have shown how the state has been induced to creating an ideology of rejection of "parasitism" in the urban area.

Introduction

L'objectif de mon analyse est d'exposer le mode de traitement des comportements jugés marginaux par l'administration sénégalaise. Je me propose de montrer, à travers l'analyse des réglementations et du processus de production de certaines normes, comment, à partir de l'héritage administratif colonial, l'Etat sénégalais a géré certains "fléaux sociaux" et comment certains groupes qui allaient à contre-courant des modèles comportementaux qu'il tentait de promouvoir ont été traités. A travers l'étude de certains "fléaux" comme l'alcoolisme, l'usage des stupéfiants, le vagabondage, la mendicité, la prostitution, il est surtout question de mettre à nu un système de protection sociale, les moyens institués par la société pour que certaines normes soient observées.

La notion de "fléau social" est très élastique. Elle ne désigne pas une réalité homogène. Largement utilisée par l'administration coloniale, elle est apparue dans la terminologie des pouvoirs publics sénégalais dès les premières années de l'indépendance. Son surgissement s'explique, en partie, dans le cadre de l'idéologie productiviste véhiculée par le premier Plan de développement économique et social. Parmi les objectifs exprimés par les autorités politico-administratives, à partir de 1960, figuraient:

- *compter sur son propre travail pour se développer;*
- *promouvoir le sens des responsabilités;*
- *renforcer la cohésion nationale.*

* Cet article est une version modifiée de ma contribution à *L'histoire de la Folie au Sénégal* qui doit paraître prochainement

** Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar, Sénégal.

Dans ce cadre, tout ce qui allait à contre-courant du modèle comportemental que les autorités tentaient de promouvoir a été appelé "fléau". Dans ce contexte, une frange marginale de la population est apparue qu'il convenait de canaliser et de contrôler pour éviter qu'elle ne devienne une masse critique pouvant perturber la logique officielle. En effet, après l'indépendance a été noté l'accentuation d'un vaste mouvement conduisant vers les villes une population paysanne qu'une économie en voie de reconstruction et aux ressources limitées n'arrivait pas à employer. Sa concentration dans les villes et la détérioration de ses conditions de vie faisaient d'elle une marginalité "débordante" risquant d'affaiblir l'entreprise de "construction nationale"¹. Aussi bien dans le passage d'une administration coloniale à une administration moderne, indépendante, que dans l'entreprise de construction nationale, l'Etat avait besoin d'un prolétariat et d'un sous-prolétariat disciplinés.

Or, l'existence dans les centres urbains d'un excédent improductif de main-d'oeuvre posait problème. Cette population se manifestait par un errement ponctué de brigandages, de mendicité et d'une agglomération par couches successives dans certaines zones urbaines. Dans une telle situation; l'Etat a créé une idéologie de rejet du parasitisme en milieu urbain. Elle émerge en réponse au développement massif du sous-prolétariat urbain qui risquait de perturber les règles sociales du nouvel ordre économique et politique. Dans les villes, une politique sévère de contrôle de la circulation humaine est mise en place et se renforce d'année en année. Elle s'exprime par une idéologie d'exclusion de certains groupes sociaux, mais le fait marquant est qu'elle prolonge la politique coloniale. En effet, une telle idéologie et les actions qu'elle induit ne diffèrent pas des pratiques d'exclusion coloniale.

L'analyse de la presse² quotidienne et des discours des hommes politiques de l'époque révèle que c'est par référence aux principes ci-dessus dégagés que certains faits comme l'oisiveté, le banditisme, la mendicité sont

1 Cruise O'Brien a procédé à une critique de cette notion de construction nationale (1981:1-3).

2 C'est René Collignon(1976:245-273) qui, le premier a eu l'idée d'une telle recherche. Dans ses propositions pour une histoire de la psychiatrie au Sénégal on retrouve l'idée suivante: "Une analyse des articles du quotidien national, *Le Soleil*, consacrés aux malades mentaux, aux lépreux, mendiants et colporteurs devrait permettre de dater l'émergence du thème encombrement humain, thème quasi officialisé par les mass média. Nous émettons l'hypothèse de travail que cette catégorie qui regroupe les mendiants et les lépreux, les fous errants, les bana bana (colporteurs) recoupe, avec un contenu idéologique qui se modifie en rapport avec la mise en place de l'appareil d'Etat et les impératifs de certains choix de développement (urbanisation, promotion du tourisme), en les péjorant certaines représentations traditionnelles qui assimilaient dans une promesse de destin semblable le fou, l'impuissant, l'agressif le lépreux" (Collignon 1976:251). M. Amadou Ndiaye (1978) a par la suite analysé la presse quotidienne sénégalaise de 1960 à 1975. Voir aussi: René Collignon (1984).

expliqués. Les informations disponibles montrent l'élasticité de la notion de "fléau social". En effet, son contenu varie en fonction des préoccupations des autorités. En 1962 étaient désignés comme "fléaux sociaux" le banditisme et la prostitution, la consommation de chanvre indien et l'alcoolisme. En 1963, à l'issue de la lutte qui opposait les deux groupes qui se disputaient le contrôle des appareils de l'Etat, l'idéologie officielle est dominée par les problèmes de sécurité intérieure et d'assainissement économique. Les "fléaux" changent alors de contenu. Au cours de cette année-là, le détournement de deniers publics est présenté comme le fléau qui menace les fondements de la société.

En 1964, les "fléaux" disparaissent des préoccupations des autorités même si l'arrestation de grands bandits est parfois annoncée. Au cours de l'année 1965, l'alcoolisme revient sur la sellette. A partir de cette date, tout se passe comme si les autorités avaient compris qu'elles n'avaient pas les moyens de supprimer "les fléaux". C'est pourquoi elles ont commencé à les réglementer.

Après la crise sociale qui secoua le Sénégal et ébranla profondément les institutions en 1968, une grande lutte est déclenchée, à nouveau, contre les "fléaux sociaux". L'allure de cette lutte rappelle celle de 1962. Au cours de cette année, la prostitution et la contrebande sont présentées comme les principaux fléaux. A partir de 1969, la lutte contre les "fléaux sociaux" s'est aggravée car en Juillet 1972, une nouvelle catégorie entre en ligne de compte dans l'idéologie officielle, celle "d'encombrements humains". Le discours d'Alioune Badara Mbengue en Conseil National du Parti Socialiste (PS) d'Avril 1977 définit ainsi ce que regroupe cette notion: "bana-bana, mendiants, aveugles, lépreux, talibés, malades mentaux". En réalité, cette notion désigne tous ceux qui gênent le tourisme, les individus indésirables dans la ville. C'est dans ce contexte que le Président Senghor signe la circulaire (No. 11/UPS/SP) relative aux "danses d'exhibition" auxquelles se livrent des sénégalaises" à l'occasion de cérémonies officielles ou des visites de chefs d'Etat. L'objectif est d'interdire ces danses au cours desquelles les femmes exposent "la partie honteuse de leur corps".

En 1981, dans le contexte de la démission de L. S. Senghor et de la construction de l'hégémonie du nouveau Président, le thème du détournement des deniers publics, de la corruption revient sur la sellette avec, cette fois-ci, un changement dans l'organisation de la lutte contre ce fléau social". Les pouvoirs publics ont, en effet, promulgué une loi sans précédent dans l'histoire du Sénégal, celle relative à la répression de l'enrichissement illicite et procédé à grands renforts de publicité, à l'arrestation de quelques hauts fonctionnaires. Depuis, cette loi semble oubliée parce que cette sorte d'amnésie soudaine est plus propice à la reproduction de l'ordre social que l'application des principes contenus dans ces textes législatifs et réglementaires.

La loi 81-53 du 10 juillet 1981 relative à la répression de l'enrichissement illicite et la loi 81-54 créant une cour de répression de l'enrichissement illicite se justifiaient ainsi au yeux des autorités:

Le Sénégal bien que moins atteint que d'autres Etats n'a pas échappé au fléau que constitue la prolifération d'actes préjudiciables à l'économie du pays commis par certains agents publics peu scrupuleux sur les moyens de s'enrichir rapidement. Cette loi crée le délit d'enrichissement illicite: Une personne donnée ayant pu abuser de sa qualité et de ses fonctions se trouve dans l'impossibilité, après la sommation qui lui en a été faite, d'apporter la preuve de l'origine licite de son patrimoine ou de son train de vie. Il s'agit d'un délit instantané qui ne se caractérise qu'au moment de la réponse faite à la mise en demeure.

Une telle disposition a été critiquée par des juristes qui ont considéré qu'elle fait planer l'arbitraire, ce qui lui donne un cachet de "loi de règlement de compte"³. Dans la même période, des lois ont été votées pour réprimer la hausse illicite du loyer des locaux à usage d'habitation(loi 81-21 du 25 juin 1981) et les opérations usuraires(loi 81-25 du 25 juin 1981). En 1986 et 1987, il est encore question de la lutte contre la prostitution. Elle revêt essentiellement la forme de "l'assainissement" de certains quartiers comme *Khoury Mbouki* situé dans la banlieue de Dakar. Cet exemple constitue un des rares cas où la population a demandé aux autorités d'intervenir dans la vie d'un quartier en vue d'éloigner certains marginaux. Le même scénario a d'ailleurs été noté dans un autre lieu de perdition, *Dakhar Clairon*, un quartier de la ville de Thiès où des jeunes, organisés en brigades d'autodéfense, en 1987, ont vidé ce quartier de ses prostituées, proxénètes, vendeurs de drogues et malfaiteurs de tous acabits. Après les émeutes de 1988, l'Etat est préoccupé par la sécurité publique et le civisme des citoyens. De nouveau, des rafles sont organisées. Le Conseil des ministres du 21 mars 1989 demande une mobilisation accrue des services de Sécurité pour lutter contre le vandalisme et la criminalité et, comme pour montrer la détermination gouvernementale, le quotidien *Le Soleil* du 22 mars 1989 titre: Les Forces de l'Ordre veillent au Grain". Dans ce contexte très tendu une campagne est déclenchée pour le réarmement moral de la population. Elle vise "*les casseurs*" qui détruisent les feux de circulation et les bus et les jeunes "incapables de réciter l'hymne national". Les autorités se penchent alors sur ce qui est désigné comme la "crise de la famille" au

3 *Le Soleil* 19 novembre 1981. Cependant, plus qu'un règlement de compte, la loi sur l'enrichissement illicite est aussi une épée de Damoclès pour aligner les barons et les puissants patrons de l'ère senghorienne.

cours d'un symposium consacré à la question. *Le Soleil* du 7 juin 1988 n'hésite pas à parler de "la crise de la famille ... une situation qui menace la société sénégalaise". Une semaine plus tard, les critiques de la presse pro-gouvernementale se font plus précises: "les parents au banc des accusés".

Ce survol de l'histoire de la notion de "fléau social" montre que celle-ci constitue, entre autres, un mode de lecture de la marginalité urbaine. Elle ne peut-être comprise que si on la replace dans le cadre d'une idéologie qui considère la marginalité comme un facteur d'instabilité, de désordre. Cette notion désigne une réalité hétérogène. Elle intègre tous les éléments marginaux, les laissés-pour-compte de la croissance industrielle, les pratiques prohibées.

Les informations disponibles sur les fléaux alimentent l'idéologie alarmiste du caractère dangereux de certains groupes sociaux et donnent lieu à des politiques de répression brutales. Les responsables de la Direction de l'administration Pénitentiaire (DAP) se sont exprimés de la manière suivante sur la question:

la criminalité prend des proportions importantes qui si l'on n'y prend garde peuvent aboutir à des situations regrettables d'ordre économique et social... La sécurité des personnes et des biens semble mise en cause par des crimes et délits de plus en plus fréquents par le fait d'une éducation de base manquée et de l'usage effréné de la drogue (DAP, 1985:8)

L'interdiction de séjour comme mode de traitement de la criminalité constitue, de ce point de vue, un exemple intéressant. Pour la période 1881-1983, sur un total de 951 individus touchés par cette mesure, 52,57% des cas le sont pour 10 ans. Parmi ces cas, on note deux mesures d'interdiction pour 20 ans, avec 18 mois et 2 ans de prison ferme, à la suite d'un vol simple, 88 pour 10 ans et 144 pour 5 ans. C'est pourquoi les analystes de la Direction de l'administration pénitentiaire ont raison de souligner

une disproportion entre le verdict prononcé et la mesure d'interdiction, ce qui a pour conséquence de diminuer les possibilités de resocialisation: on se pose encore des questions sur l'efficacité de certaines mesures d'interdiction de séjour qui ne font qu'occasionner d'autres délits tels que rupture de ban, vagabondage, vol, mendicité, et autres délits... L'interdiction de séjour constitue une exclusion qui risquerait de mettre ceux qui en sont frappés dans un cercle vicieux d'où ils ne sortiront jamais pour peu qu'ils soient livrés à eux mêmes. L'interdiction de séjour est contraire à la politique de réinsertion sociale et est perçue par les détenus comme étant une mesure bourgeoise d'exclusion des basses couches sociales (DAP 1986:8).

L'Alcoolisme

L'administration coloniale avait élaboré sa typologie des pays africains pour ce qui est de l'alcoolisme. La Mauritanie et le Niger étaient les pays dans lesquels l'alcoolisme était sans gravité. La Haute-Volta et le Soudan se plaçaient à un degré plus "inquiétant". Le Sénégal, la Côte-d'Ivoire et le Dahomey étaient les pays les plus profondément atteints par l'alcoolisme

Une lettre du Gouverneur Général de l'AOF, datant du 29 janvier 1953, signale une progression croissante de la consommation d'alcool de menthe précisant qu'il est possible de se procurer ce produit en toute liberté dans presque toutes les boutiques. On sait qu'en milieu wolof musulman, l'alcool de menthe est parfois consommé mélangé avec du lait. Cette pratique semble indiquer que contrairement à ce qui est affirmé, l'interdit religieux provenant de l'islam n'a pas complètement réussi à freiner la consommation d'alcool. C'est pourquoi je me demande sur quoi se basent les affirmations de certains psychiatres sénégalais tendant à démontrer que:

dans les campagnes, et les milieux populaires, le commerce de l'alcool est aussi méprisé que sa consommation qui est source de désapprobation publique (Guèye 1983:148).

La consommation d'alcool ne semble pas avoir été une pratique méprisable. Cruise O'Brien (1971:63), citant un article du *Périscope africain* a montré que la consommation d'alcool de menthe est en réalité une spécialité des marabouts. L'anthropologue britannique explique qu'au début du siècle, un chef religieux avait été surnommé "*The mint alcohol marabout*", voulant montrer ainsi: "*he was not a religious or a moral puritan*"

L'administration coloniale, au vu des informations en sa possession, a voulu "protéger" les populations contre le danger de l'alcoolisme comme le montre la lettre circulaire 808 du 14 novembre 1947 du Secrétariat d'Etat de la Présidence du Conseil chargé du Ministère de la France d'Outre Mer, destinée aux gouverneurs:

De tous côtés, je reçois des renseignements et des plaintes relatifs à la recrudescence de l'alcoolisme dans les territoires d'Outre-Mer. L'administration a le devoir de lutter contre ce fléau qui compromet la santé des populations et contribue à la stagnation économique et sociale. Pour me permettre de mesurer l'ampleur du mal et l'intérêt bien compris de tous les ressortissants, je vous prie de bien vouloir m'adresser un rapport détaillé sur la consommation d'alcool au cours des cinq dernières années dans les territoires que vous administrez. Si vos conclusions montrent que la réglementation actuelle de l'alcool n'est pas suffisante pour assurer une protection efficace de la population, vous voudrez bien joindre à votre rapport des projets de loi

*et de décret qui vous paraîtront de nature, compte tenu des contingences locales, à donner à l'administration les moyens légaux de lutter contre l'alcoolisme*⁴.

Cette lettre dévoile la réaction de l'administration coloniale face à l'alcoolisme: gérer les textes. Ceci a provoqué la mise en place d'un appareil réglementaire impressionnant et sévère, allant de la loi du 1er octobre 1917 relative à la répression de l'ivresse publique, au décret du 14 septembre 1954 relatif au contingentement de certaines catégories de boissons. Ce dispositif réglementaire a fait dire à un médecin, lors d'une conférence sur l'alcoolisme tenue à Kaolack en 1955: "on ne luttera pas efficacement contre l'alcoolisme en ne lui opposant que des lois ou règlements administratifs"⁵.

Une tentative organisée de prévention et de répression de l'alcoolisme a été notée au sein du Comité Consultatif de la Prévention et de la Répression de l'Alcoolisme. Ce comité a été créé par arrêté n 5360 AP 1 du 22 juillet 1954. Il était composé en majorité de français et de cinq syndicalistes sénégalais au départ. Au cours de la première réunion du Comité (31 août 1954), le Gouverneur Torre a présenté l'analyse suivante:

*Les renseignements qui parviennent de certaines régions prouvent en effet que non seulement dans les grandes villes mais également dans les campagnes, l'accroissement du pouvoir d'achat des masses laborieuses coïncide avec une augmentation alarmante de la consommation d'alcool et plus particulièrement du vin. Il faut ajouter à cela que le transport et la commercialisation de ce dernier se font souvent dans des conditions d'hygiène déplorable qui viennent encore déplorer le caractère nocif de sa consommation*⁶.

Il est intéressant de noter cette corrélation entre consommation d'alcool et pouvoir d'achat. Evidemment, il n'est pas fait mention des intérêts des maisons de commerce qui, non seulement voulaient substituer les boissons alcoolisées aux boissons traditionnelles, mais tiraient de gros bénéfices de cette situation.

Une lettre du Gouverneur Général de l'A.O.F. au Gouverneur du Dahomey relative au développement "inquiétant" de la fabrication clandestine de l'alcool au Dahomey mentionne que:

4 Lettre circulaire du Secrétariat d'Etat de la Présidence du Conseil chargé du Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer aux Gouverneurs No. 10808. Le lecteur trouvera des références importantes et intéressantes dans la bibliographie annotée de Becker et Collignon (1988).

5 Conférence sur l'alcoolisme tenue à Kaolack en 1955.

6 Compte rendu de la première réunion du Comité Consultatif Permanent de la Prévention et de la répression de l'alcoolisme, 1er septembre 1954.

l'arrêté du 30 novembre 1938 vient d'accroître les facilités de répression en prévoyant l'octroi de primes élevées aux personnes étrangères à l'administration dont les indications auront permis de constater des faits de fabrication clandestine d'alcool et d'en déterminer les auteurs. Il convient de faire connaître à la population indigène par la voie des commandants de cercles, chefs de subdivision, chefs de cantons et chefs de villages que la fabrication, la détention, la circulation et la consommation de l'alcool local dit Sodabi sont interdites et que les infractions constatées seront réprimées sévèrement⁷.

Plus loin, la lettre explique un fait fondamental:

les mesures de répression n'atteindront leur pleine portée que si l'indigène a la possibilité de se procurer à bon compte dans le commerce des boissons susceptibles de remplacer l'alcool de fabrication locale qu'il avait l'habitude de consommer⁸.

Ces indications permettent de dire que ce dont il était question à propos du Sodabi comme de toutes les boissons alcoolisées de fabrication locale peut se résumer ainsi: le "bon" alcool (importé) doit chasser le "mauvais" (de fabrication locale).

Théodore Monod, à l'époque directeur de l'Institut Français d'Afrique Noire (IFAN) a bien compris l'ambiguïté de la lutte de l'administration coloniale contre l'alcoolisme en demandant aux associations luttant contre l'alcoolisme

d'attirer l'attention sur le grave et scandaleux problème de l'alcool en Afrique noire et de montrer par des chiffres (officiels) la véritable marée de poison que la France laisse déferler sur un pays dont elle prétend si souvent par ailleurs procurer le bien être matériel et moral⁹.

Sans aller jusqu'à dire comme Cissoko F., lors d'une conférence tenue à Kaolack sur l'alcoolisme (29 mars 1955) que "l'Africain se laisse aller à l'alcoolisme pour oublier son triste sort, conséquence de la présence française"¹⁰, il semble pertinent de chercher au niveau des structures sociales en mutation, des intérêts économiques en jeu, de l'inadéquation des mesures proposées, un ensemble d'indices permettant de comprendre ces

7 Gouverneur Général de l'AOF au Gouverneur du Dahomey. Lettre 1581/SE/7 du 23 décembre 1938.

8 Gouverneur Général de l'AOF au Gouverneur du Dahomey, Idem.

9 Th. Monod, Lettre No. 360/IFAN. Dir. 21 août 1955.

10 Cissoko, Intervention au cours d'une conférence sur l'alcoolisme tenue à Kaolack le 29 mars 1965.

comportements. S'agissant des mesures réglementaires, il est significatif de noter que c'est M. Gipoulon, Directeur des affaires politiques et président du Comité qui en a fait le diagnostic le plus précis en indiquant que la réglementation ne permettait pas de lutter efficacement contre l'alcoolisme¹¹.

Le système du contingentement a eu pour conséquence d'augmenter la fabrication et la consommation du vin de palme. D'autre part, la hausse des droits d'entrée sur l'alcool a entraîné, de l'avis même du Général Torre, une baisse de certaines catégories (apéritifs et digestifs) et une augmentation importante de la consommation de vin. C'est ainsi que la sévérité des textes relatifs aux autorisations d'ouverture des débits de boisson est à l'origine du développement des débits clandestins signalés surtout dans le quartier populaire de la Médina en 1954. Il est possible, à partir de ces indicateurs, de s'interroger sur l'efficacité des méthodes répressives véhiculées par les dispositifs réglementaires pour deux séries de raison. Il est évident que la sévérité d'une réglementation peut créer le désir de la transgresser. En outre, il y a toujours des limites à la prévisibilité. Le désir de tout réglementer provoque des zones d'incertitude. Dans le cas de l'alcoolisme comme dans d'autres domaines, il est toujours possible, pour les acteurs, de contourner la réglementation. Achille Mbembe (1988) a expliqué, dans un autre contexte, que cet acharnement à réguler la société transforme l'Etat en "une fabrique de décrets et arrêtés et règlements" (Mbembe 1988:148). Selon cet auteur,

plus le volume des directives et instructions s'est accru, plus l'indigène s'est évertué à bricoler des moyens lui permettant de s'échapper des mailles du filet.." (Mbembe 1988: 147)

En ce qui concerne les déterminants de l'alcoolisme¹², peut-on dire que l'élévation du niveau de vie constitue l'aspect le plus important? Pourquoi doit-elle entraîner une telle option et non une autre? Ces interrogations montrent la vanité et la limite des explications des déterminants de l'alcoolisme à partir des analyses des administrateurs coloniaux, analyses souvent limitées car guidées par le souci de gérer l'ordre public. Ces limites expliquent largement le verdict extrêmement sévère fait par Gipoulon en ce qui concerne la lutte contre l'alcoolisme déclenchée au Sénégal dans le cadre du Comité de Prévention et de Répression de l'Alcoolisme:

11 M. Gipoulon, "Procès-verbal de la réunion du 4-6-1965 du Comité de lutte contre l'alcoolisme".

12 La même analyse a d'ailleurs été faite pour expliquer l'intensification de l'alcoolisme en Côte d'Ivoire en 1938 dans la région de Dimbokro. L'administration coloniale liait ce phénomène à la culture du cacao qui, au cours de la même année aurait procuré aux populations des revenus estimés à l'époque à 16.000.000 FCFA.

*Si on faisait un tableau d'honneur de la lutte contre l'alcoolisme, le Sénégal figurerait difficilement dans ce tableau. Rien d'efficace n'a été fait jusqu'à présent*¹³.

En tout état de cause, pour ce qui est de la réglementation relative à l'alcoolisme, l'administration sénégalaise a suivi les traces de l'administration coloniale car le mode de traitement de ce comportement insiste sur une gestion des textes qui ne permet pas d'obtenir des résultats concrets dans ce domaine.

A vrai dire, il n'a jamais été question d'interdire la consommation d'alcool au Sénégal même si, par ailleurs, on constate que l'administration coloniale a signalé, à plusieurs reprises, l'impact négatif de l'alcool sur la santé des populations. L'objectif des textes coloniaux était d'organiser l'importation et le commerce de ce produit. L'interdiction n'aurait d'ailleurs pas été facile à appliquer car, dans certaines régions, les populations fabriquaient déjà leurs alcools de façon artisanale. En outre, les intérêts des firmes contrôlant le marché de l'alcool s'opposaient à de telles mesures. C'est probablement en fonction de ces intérêts que l'administration coloniale a tenté de décourager la production d'alcool artisanal au Sénégal et au Dahomey où des tentatives ont été faites pour remplacer l'alcool de fabrication locale dit *Sodabi* par l'alcool importé. Si la consommation d'alcool n'était pas interdite, par contre les cas d'ivresse étaient punis comme le montre l'analyse des décisions du tribunal de 1ère instance de Saint-Louis concernant la répression des "ivresses scandaleuses". Dans une colonie comme la Mauritanie où la vente de l'alcool était sévèrement contrôlée, l'administration coloniale a décidé, en 1937, d'interdire la vente d'alcool aux militaires indigènes, suite à des troubles survenus dans la ville d'Atar¹⁴.

L'usage du tabac et des stupéfiants

Les textes législatifs et réglementaires relatifs à l'usage des stupéfiants datent, à ma connaissance, de 1962. Depuis, plusieurs lois et décrets sont venus préciser le dispositif. Alors que l'administration coloniale dans sa réglementation avait l'alcool comme cible, celle du Sénégal indépendant a surtout mis l'accent sur la répression de l'usage des stupéfiants, devenu un véritable problème de santé publique. En 1987, le gouvernement a renforcé le dispositif réglementaire relatif à la répression de l'usage des stupéfiants en aggravant les pénalités pour les trafiquants. Mais il est permis de s'interroger sur l'efficacité de ces textes. Parfois, c'est au niveau même de leur

13 M. Gipoulon, *idem*.

14 Archives nationales du Sénégal (ANS) 17G 160.

élaboration que les problèmes se posent et qu'un grand manque de réalisme est constaté. A ce sujet, la loi 81-58 du 9 novembre 1981 portant interdiction de la publicité en faveur du tabac et de son usage dans certains lieux publics constitue un exemple d'une réglementation dont la portée sociale est limitée. Comment ne pas parler des péripéties de ce texte qui constitue un exemple pertinent d'une gestion laxiste d'un important problème de santé publique ?

Le projet de loi relative à la lutte contre l'usage du tabac a été élaboré par le gouvernement en 1980 et soumis à l'appréciation des institutions spécialisées de l'Etat. Ce texte a fait l'objet de critiques fondamentales du Conseil Economique et Social. Ce projet de loi est la copie fidèle de la loi française du 9 juillet 1976 relative à la lutte contre le tabagisme, ce qui explique que les rédacteurs n'ont pas tenu compte de l'aspect sénégalais du problème. C'est ainsi que l'article 11 du projet de loi portait la rédaction suivante: "la vente du tabac au détail autre que par unité de conditionnement (le paquet) est interdite"¹⁵. Etait-il réaliste dans un pays dont la population a des revenus bas de faire des propositions pareilles? Cette question est d'autant plus pertinente que selon la MTOA (Manufacture de Tabacs de l'Ouest Africain), la proportion de la production consommée à l'unité était estimée entre 30 et 40% des ventes locales. Certains aspects de ce projet semblaient d'une application difficile. C'était le cas, par exemple, de l'article 2 interdisant la publicité, la propagande en faveur du tabac et des produits du tabac, des articles 13 et 14 qui avaient pour objectif la répression des infractions à l'interdiction de publicité en faveur du tabac:

Article-13 - "Si une infraction à une disposition du présent titre est commise par un des moyens mentionnés à l'article 2 (1) les poursuites seront exercées contre les personnes responsables de l'émission ou de l'article, ainsi que contre les chefs d'établissements, directeurs ou gérants des entreprises qui ont procédé à la diffusion de l'émission ou de l'article, même dans le cas où les émissions de radiodiffusion ou de télévision ont été réalisées hors des frontières, dès lors qu'elles ont été reçues au Sénégal".

Article-14 - "Les personnes pour le compte desquelles ont été effectuées la propagande ou publicité irrégulière pour les actes interdits sont également poursuivies comme auteurs principaux"¹⁶.

Ces dispositions allaient beaucoup plus loin que ce qui a été fait dans les pays industrialisés, notamment en France. Dans ce pays la publicité par la presse écrite est autorisée comme on peut en juger par les publications

15 Ministère de la Santé. Direction de la Pharmacie. Projet de loi relative à la lutte contre l'usage du tabac. Dakar, s-d.

16 Idem, p. 3.

vendues au Sénégal. L'interdiction de publicité dans la presse écrite ne gênait que peu les multinationales qui continuaient à déverser leur publicité par le canal de la presse internationale vendue au Sénégal alors que l'entreprise nationale ne disposait pas d'un moyen de faire connaître ses produits concurrents. Un autre aspect rendait très difficile l'application de cette réglementation, surtout en ce qui concerne les articles 13 et 14. Au moment où le gouvernement mettait en place cette réglementation, la nouvelle station de Radio *Africa No. 1* installée au Gabon, avait entamé une campagne d'information auprès des annonceurs potentiels. D'autre part, la diffusion de messages publicitaires à partir de la Gambie rendait la situation plus complexe car il semblait difficile de réaliser avec les pays voisins des accords permettant d'interdire à la radio la publicité des produits du tabac.

Pour ce qui est de l'obligation de faire figurer sur chaque paquet de cigarette la mention intégrale, il ne semblait pas évident que le Gouvernement disposait des moyens de contrôler leur exactitude. En outre, il a été souligné les conséquences que pouvait avoir pour la MTOA l'application des mesures envisagées d'autant que l'entreprise employait 500 personnes et versait à l'Etat des impôts et taxes estimés pour 1980 à 3.412 millions FCFA. Le rétrécissement du marché risquait de provoquer des conséquences importantes sur le niveau de l'emploi et sur les recettes du Trésor Public dans une situation économique particulièrement difficile. Le gouvernement devait finalement adopter ce texte très controversé en 1981¹⁷. On peut supposer que l'objectif politique de cette loi était déterminant. Ce texte a été voté dans un contexte marqué par une campagne contre l'alcool et le tabac menée par des autorités religieuses faisant partie des clients les plus importants de l'Etat en milieu rural. Il a été finalement modifié en 1985.

La prostitution

Le contrôle de la prostitution par l'administration coloniale a vraisemblablement commencé vers la fin du XIXe siècle. Le développement des maladies vénériennes dans la colonie a poussé l'autorité coloniale à créer en 1849, un dispensaire de salubrité publique. L'article 4 de l'arrêté du 29 mars 1849 portant établissement de ce dispensaire définit ainsi les "filles publiques":

Toute fille ou femme se livrant habituellement à la débauche et en retirant un salaire sera réputée fille publique.

17 Loi No. 81-59 du 9 novembre 1981 dans *Journal Officiel de la République du Sénégal*, No. 4865 du 14 Novembre 1981, p. 1013.

L'article 3 de l'arrêté du 21 mars 1849 précise que toutes les filles publiques devront se faire inscrire. Elles étaient placées sous la surveillance immédiate de la police et inscrites sur un registre spécial. Un livret spécial leur était délivré. L'article 9 de l'arrêté du 21 mars 1864 les soumet à des visites médicales obligatoires:

les filles publiques qui ne se rendront pas régulièrement à la visite du dispensaire seront arrêtées et emprisonnées dans une salle de correction disposée à cet effet à l'hospice civil. La durée de cet emprisonnement sera fixé par le Maire mais il ne peut excéder 15 jours.

Comment se faisait l'inscription de ces femmes ? "Les femmes prises en flagrant délit de vagabondage et se livrant à la prostitution seront inscrites comme filles publiques". Il appartenait au Commissaire de police de Saint-Louis de rechercher ces femmes et de les inscrire légalement¹⁸. Ce contrôle de la prostitution s'explique surtout par des préoccupations médicales et de salubrité publique et c'est probablement pour le faciliter que l'arrêté du 29 mars 1849 autorise l'ouverture de maisons dites de tolérance pour réunir les "filles publiques".

On note, s'agissant de la prostitution, une gestion autoritaire de l'administration coloniale. Le Commissaire de police de Saint-Louis, dans une lettre en date du 27 septembre 1882 informait le chef du service de l'Intérieur qu'il venait de:

donner des ordres pour que les femmes d'une conduite remarquable par son insanité soient menées à l'hospice civil pour qu'elles puissent être visitées par M. le Docteur de cet hospice¹⁹.

Ces mesures étaient appliquées systématiquement par l'autorité coloniale comme l'attestent d'ailleurs ces propos du Directeur du Service de l'Intérieur au Dr Dubouch, médecin de l'hospice de Saint-Louis, en date du 28 septembre 1882:

j'ai l'honneur d'informer Monsieur le Médecin civil qu'en présence de la quantité considérable de maladies vénériennes qui infectent Saint-Louis, j'ai fait prendre des mesures pour la mise en carte et l'envoi régulier à la visite de l'hospice des filles de mauvaise vie. Monsieur Dubouch devra examiner ces filles avec le plus grand soin et garder à l'hospice jusqu'à complète guérison celles qui présenteront des taches suspectes²⁰.

18 Arrêté du 21 mars 1864 portant réglementation sur la police du dispensaire de Saint-Louis. Article 3.

19 ANS H 42 (1874-1882).

20 ANS H 42 (1874-1882).

Le Docteur Dubouch a présenté assez clairement le contrôle administratif de la prostitution à Saint-Louis vers la fin du XIXe siècle:

*la prostitution autorisée ne comprend pas de maisons de tolérance. Il n'y a que des filles soumises à la visite hebdomadaire. L'inscription se fait à la police pour les prostituées de notoriété publique... La liste de la police est déposée à l'hospice et en cas d'absence à la visite, le nom est transmis à la police*²¹.

Les documents d'archives montrent des cas de détention consécutifs à des absences à la visite sanitaire, sans excuse légitime. Cette gestion ne concernait, à vrai dire, que la prostitution officielle car, à côté d'elle, existait une prostitution clandestine qui serait, d'après les autorités médicales, la source des nombreux cas de syphilis signalés à Saint-Louis vers la fin du XIXe siècle.

En tout état de cause, le contrôle de la prostitution au Sénégal pendant la période coloniale n'a été vraiment efficace que sur les prostituées européennes que l'on trouvait généralement dans les maisons de tolérance qui étaient la propriété de Lagrezas Bieber et Mme Cadillac. Les femmes recrutées en France étaient acheminées sur la Colonie²², certaines effectuaient un stage à Angoulême ou à Bordeaux. Au cours des années 1940, l'histoire de la prostitution réglementée s'est enrichie de plusieurs drames: assassinat d'un inspecteur de police, suicide d'un officier, tentative de meurtre sur le propriétaire d'une maison de tolérance par deux officiers de la Marine nationale. On note aussi de nombreux conflits liés au refus des tenanciers d'admettre la population africaine. C'est d'ailleurs ce qui a obligé le Gouverneur du Sénégal à rédiger la circulaire 199/APA du 11 mars 1948 qui prévoit le retrait des licences des hôteliers, restaurateurs, tenanciers de café et propriétaires de salles de spectacles qui auraient refusé d'admettre dans leurs établissements des africains au même titre que des européens²³.

La prostitution indigène était cependant plus difficile à contrôler car elle n'était pas localisée, située comme l'était la prostitution européenne. La loi du 13 avril 1946 rendue applicable par l'arrêté 234/AP du 5 décembre 1946, qui interdit et réprime le proxénétisme, en fermant à Dakar les lieux organisés de prostitution licite et les maisons de tolérance, a dû multiplier la création des foyers clandestins. C'est probablement la raison pour laquelle, par lettre en date du 3 avril 1948, le Délégué du Gouverneur du Sénégal a

21 ANS H 42 (1874-1882).

22 S'agissant des procédures de recrutement des prostituées européennes, voir le récit du débarquement à Dakar de la mineure Comte qui raconte comment elle a été recrutée par un nommé Castoldi. ANS 1F2. Pour plus de précision sur cette question, voir aussi Faye (1988).

23 ANS 17G 177.

proposé aux pouvoirs publics, dans une longue lettre, argumentée, la réouverture des "maisons de tolérance".

La loi du 13 avril 1946 a eu des conséquences sur le contrôle policier et sanitaire de la prostitution. Amadou Cissé Dia, le Ministre de l'Intérieur, dans une note en date du 5 juin 1965, montre que l'une des conséquences de cette loi est que les prostituées africaines ont cherché par tous les moyens à se soustraire aux contrôles policiers et sanitaires. Selon le Ministre,

si les prostituées européennes ont pleine conscience du capital que représente pour elles une bonne santé et se soumettent de leur propre chef à des visites médicales fréquentes, il n'en est pas de même des prostituées africaines et cap-verdiennes pour qui la notion de rapport passe avant la notion de bonne santé²⁴.

En 1966, la prostitution a retenu une nouvelle fois l'attention des autorités, elle est présentée comme un fléau:

la prostitution par le caractère de plus en plus large qu'elle prend en milieu urbain attaque gravement l'ensemble de la société sénégalaise. Elle atteint en premier lieu la jeunesse mais touche également le cadre familial. De plus, elle compromettra la santé publique si l'on n'y prend garde²⁵.

L'appareil législatif et réglementaire de contrôle de la prostitution se met en place à compter de 1965, avec les textes suivants:

- loi 66-21 du 1.2.1966 relative à la lutte contre les maladies vénériennes et la prostitution;
- décret 69-616 du 10 mai 1969 portant application de la loi 66-21 relative à la lutte contre les maladies vénériennes et la prostitution;
- loi 69-27 du 23 avril 1969 complétant le code pénal par un article 327 bis réprimant la prostitution des mineurs de moins de 21 ans; on peut également se reporter à certains articles du Code Pénal (318, 323, 324, 325, etc.

Ces textes permettent, entre autres, la création d'un fichier sanitaire, le contrôle obligatoire des personnes qui se livrent à la prostitution, un examen médical tous les quinze jours des prostituées mises en carte. Notons que sous l'administration coloniale le contrôle était hebdomadaire. Certains indices permettent de douter de l'efficacité de la visite médicale. Des

24 Ministère de l'Intérieur - Communication en Conseil de cabinet au sujet de la prostitution africaine. Dakar, 5 juin 1965, p. 2.

25 Ministère de l'Intérieur - Ministère de la Santé Publique et des Affaires Sociales (MSPAS) "Rapport de présentation du projet de décret portant application de la loi 66-21 du 1er février 1966 relative à la lutte contre les maladies vénériennes et la prostitution, p. 1.

informations publiées en 1983 dans la presse sénégalaise montrent qu'il y aurait 2.500 prostituées inscrites officiellement, or, la clinique des maladies uro-génitales ne pouvait pas les suivre convenablement faute de moyens.

La mendicité

L'arrêté du 5 mai 1840 portant création d'un Commissariat de Police à Saint-Louis montre que l'administration coloniale avait inscrit la mendicité et le vagabondage parmi les problèmes à gérer pour le maintien de l'ordre public. L'article 6 de cet arrêté demandait au Commissaire de Police de

*surveiller les individus qui n'ont aucun moyen d'existence connu, vagabonds, gens sans aveu, mendiants, malfaiteurs et perturbateurs de l'ordre public, des noirs qui se mêlent de prétendus maléfices et sortilèges ou qui sont suspectés d'empoisonnements*²⁶.

C'est le 27 avril 1848 que fut adopté un décret relatif à la répression de la mendicité et du vagabondage aux colonies. L'importance de ce texte en matière de répression de la mendicité et du vagabondage justifie une présentation de son article 1er qui explique comment la mendicité et le vagabondage étaient punis:

Le GOUVERNEMENT PROVISOIRE DE LA REPUBLIQUE,

Considérant,

que le travail est la première garantie de la morale, de l'ordre dans la liberté;

que la sécurité générale est intéressée à la répression de la mendicité et du vagabondage,

Décète:

Article Premier - Dans les Colonies où l'esclavage est aboli par le décret de ce jour, la mendicité et le vagabondage sont punis correctionnellement, ainsi qu'il suit:

Tous mendiants, gens sans aveu ou vagabonds, seront mis à la disposition du gouvernement pour un temps déterminé, dans les limites de trois à six mois, selon la gravité des cas. Ils seront, durant ce temps, employés au profit de l'Etat, à des travaux publics, dans des ateliers de discipline, dont l'organisation et le régime seront réglés par un arrêté du Ministre de la Marine et des Colonies. Les condamnés pourront être

26 Arrêté du 5 mai 1840.

*renfermés dans ces ateliers ou conduits au dehors pour l'exécution des travaux sous la garde des agents de la force publique*²⁷.

Pendant le XIXe siècle, la mendicité et le vagabondage perturbaient l'ordre social que le système colonial tentait de construire. Or, l'abolition de l'esclavage favorisait le vagabondage. Les autorités coloniales avaient clairement perçu les déterminants du vagabondage de la mendicité et de la prostitution. Le Gouverneur Général de l'AOF explique bien²⁸ l'impact de l'abolition de l'esclavage sur le développement de la mendicité, du vagabondage et de la prostitution dans la Colonie:

*L'abolition de l'esclavage puis la recherche et l'émancipation des captifs particuliers jeta sur le pavé des villes entre 1816 et 1850 un grand nombre de femmes et d'enfants sans ressources ni métier. Les mineurs furent également confiés avec des succès divers à des artisans ou des traitants en vue d'un apprentissage. Quant aux majeurs qui sont portés sur la liste de libération de l'époque avec la mention livrés à eux-mêmes ils n'avaient tout au moins à Gorée et Saint-Louis d'autres destins que la prostitution et le vagabondage*²⁹.

Les mesures de contrôle de la mendicité et du vagabondage à Saint-Louis sont signalées par plusieurs sources au XIXe siècle. Une décision du 28 novembre 1856 interdit la mendicité à Saint-Louis:

*Considérant qu'un grand nombre d'étrangers vivent aux dépens de la charité des gens de Saint-Louis et vu la cherté excessive des vivres, le gouverneur avertit le public que la mendicité sera désormais réprimée conformément à loi. Les mendiants étrangers devront quitter immédiatement Saint Louis, les talibés devront cesser de parcourir la ville en mendiant de porte en porte; la loi atteindrait également les maîtres qui les font mendier. Cet abus est aussi contraire à la religion musulmane qu'au bon ordre et à la morale*³⁰.

Les décisions d'expulsion de Saint-Louis des mendiants et vagabonds sont anciennes comme en atteste cette lettre du Commissaire de Police de Saint-Louis au Directeur du Service de l'Intérieur, datant du 9 août 1870:

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que malgré tous nos efforts d'expulser de la ville des mendiants et autres vagabonds, leur

27 Décret relatif à la répression de la mendicité et du vagabondage aux colonies. 27 avril 1848.

28 Lettre No. 14842 du Gouverneur Général de l'AOF au Ministre des colonies. Septembre 1938, 17 G 54.

29 Idem. Lettre 14842.

30 Décision du 28 novembre 1856 interdisant la mendicité à Saint-Louis, 28 novembre 1856.

nombre tend à augmenter journallement. A l'effet d'empêcher le retour des individus expulsés de l'Ile et en vue de la prochaine famine du Cayor probablement inévitable, je proposerai à M. le Directeur de l'Intérieur la création d'un poste de police composé de quatre agents et d'un brigadier établi dans une baraque³¹. Le Commissaire proposait des mesures pour éviter que les personnes entrant ou sortant de Saint-Louis pendant la nuit ne passent inaperçues.

Ces décisions ont été prises à un moment où l'administration coloniale mettait en place un dispositif très sévère de gestion de l'ordre public. Plusieurs décisions administratives montrent un contrôle autoritaire de l'ordre social, surtout à Saint Louis, se manifestant par un dispositif réglementaire qui criminalisait des comportements que les populations trouvaient normaux. Un arrêté du 27 mars 1849 défendait de *faire galoper les chevaux dans les rues de Saint-Louis*, un autre, datant du 21 décembre 1853 portait *interdiction de piler du mil pendant la nuit*. Un arrêté du 15 septembre 1856 défendra *de piler du riz, du mil ou toute autre substance dans les maisons, cours, dépendances de Gorée depuis 10 heures du soir jusqu'à quatre heures du matin*. L'arrêté du 4 juillet 1829 relatif à la police intérieure de Saint-Louis était un exemple assez pertinent de cette gestion de l'ordre social que l'article 4 de l'arrêté expliquait assez bien:

Une fois le coup de canon de retraite tiré il est défendu aux griots et autres de battre le tam-tam. Toute espèce de rassemblement bruyant, de battement de mains et de chants doivent alors cesser à moins de permission spéciale. Toute contravention sera punie d'une amende de trois francs ou de la confiscation de l'instrument ou enfin d'un emprisonnement qui ne pourra excéder 24 heures³².

Dans un tel contexte, les groupes perçus comme perturbateurs de l'ordre social ont très vite attiré l'attention de l'autorité administrative. Un décret du 29 mars 1923 réprime le vagabondage en AOF. A Dakar, en 1934, des mesures sévères ont été prises pour décongestionner, assainir la ville et lutter contre le vagabondage comme le montre cette note de la Direction de la Sûreté:

le développement des grandes villes est étroitement lié à l'évolution politique, économique et sociale des populations autochtones. Si la grande ville est une nécessité sur les points de débouchés commerciaux

31 Lettre du Commissaire de Police de Saint-Louis au Directeur du service Intérieur, 9 août 1870.

32 Arrêté du 4 juillet 1829 relatif à la police intérieure de Saint-Louis. Pour plus de précision voir: Kane (1988:55-111).

(postes, villes fluviales, grands marchés agricoles) elle n'en constitue pas moins un centre d'attraction vers lequel sont entraînés inéluctablement les déracinés et les oisifs. Ceux-ci venant rechercher un travail problématique ne tardent pas à être englobés dans une population flottante où se recrutent les malfaiteurs de toute nature. Cette population flottante, véritable danger par ailleurs au point de vue de l'hygiène publique, milieu sous-alimenté dans lequel les épidémies trouvent un terrain d'insertion et d'expression particulièrement riche doit être l'objet d'une surveillance de tous les instants... L'application rigoureuse des règlements de police et d'hygiène doit permettre de pallier dans la mesure du possible la présence d'indésirables plus spécialement par leur refoulement sur leur Colonie d'origine (mendians, vagabonds, repris de justice)³³.

A Dakar, le problème de la mendicité avait été signalé par l'administration en 1934. Dans une lettre au Gouverneur Général de l'AOF, l'administrateur de la circonscription de Dakar la décrivait et signalait ses conséquences en des termes qui ne sont pas tellement éloignés de ceux utilisés par les pouvoirs publics sénégalais lorsqu'en 1972, ils ont commencé à parler des "encombrements humains":

J'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte de l'augmentation sans cesse croissante de la mendicité à Dakar, mendicité pratiquée surtout par de tout jeunes enfants au bénéfice de marabouts; c'est ainsi que le 8 février, 62 mendians âgés de 6 à 8 ans ont été appréhendés et conduits au Service d'Hygiène pour y être vaccinés. La plupart d'entre eux sont originaires du Cercle du Fouta Toro et ont été conduits à Dakar par des marabouts à qui ils ont été confiés...La migration de ces individus à Dakar présente de nombreux inconvénients du point de vue de la Santé Publique et leur présence peu désirable produit un effet déplorable sur les nombreux voyageurs de passage dans cette ville. Cette situation avait d'ailleurs attiré mon attention et le 6 mai 1933, 42 originaires du Sénégal sans travail avaient été refoulés sur Rufisque (leure 770 AG du 3 juin 1933). Il ne semble pas que cette mesure ait été efficace puisque le nombre de ces vagabonds paraît au moins aussi élevé cette année³⁴.

La description des mendians est faite, dans la lettre citée ci-dessus, en des termes qui justifient l'utilisation énergique de mesures de salubrité publique:

33 Note de la Direction de la Sûreté No. 807 DS du 30 mai 1934.

34 Lettre de l'Administrateur de la Circonscription de Dakar au Gouverneur Général de l'AOF, No. 296 AG du 28 février 1934.

Après avoir cultivé les terres de leurs maîtres, ils viennent à Dakar au début de la saison sèche et sollicitent l'aumône, déambulent, couverts de loques innombrables par les rues de la ville, tenant à la main des boîtes de conserves vides transformées en récipients, fouillant les poubelles et les tas de débris aux marchés pour y trouver quelques déchets qui leur permettront de subsister, les aumônes en argent étant destinées aux maîtres³⁵.

L'Administrateur de la Circonscription de Dakar a proposé l'adoption de mesures réglementaires qu'il savait de portée limitée, pour lutter contre ce "fléau":

La loi du 7 décembre 1874 relative à la protection des enfants employés dans les professions ambulantes n'a pas, à ma connaissance, été promulguée en AOF. Il en résulte que la Police est totalement impuissante à réprimer et à poursuivre ces agissements, aussi vous demanderai-je s'il ne serait pas possible de faire appliquer le texte en AOF pour mettre fin à cet état de chose. Mais il est certain qu'une telle mesure est contraire aux coutumes religieuses des indigènes musulmans chez qui la mendicité par ou pour les marabouts est considérée comme un acte pieux³⁶.

L'autorité administrative savait que la mendicité était difficile à éradiquer uniquement par des pratiques répressives exercées dans certaines localités comme Dakar. C'est pourquoi la réaction du Gouverneur Général fut assez mesurée, d'ailleurs la lettre citée ci-dessus incitait à une telle prudence, compte tenu de la complexité du problème:

le moyen efficace consiste à prévenir le Gouvernement du Sénégal et à lui demander de faire intervenir les administrateurs de Matam et Bakel voire de Podor auprès des marabouts, chefs et familles³⁷.

Il s'agissait de demander à la population de participer à la gestion d'un problème faisant partie des préoccupations de l'administration coloniale, celui de la circulation humaine dans les villes, essayant ainsi d'obtenir la fixation géographique et la domestication de ces "parias" de l'espace urbain. L'administration du Sénégal indépendant prendra en charge avec plus de vigueur mais moins de succès cette lutte pour l'éradication du parasitisme en milieu urbain. On ne le soulignera jamais assez, cette lutte vise une population hétéroclite dont le principe unificateur est le suivant: tous les

35 Idem.

36 Idem.

37 Idem.

marginiaux sont dans l'illégalité. En raison d'un chômage massif et structurel, il y a une forte concentration de désœuvrés en milieu urbain. Or, pour les idéologues des fléaux sociaux, la survie sans travail en ville devient suspecte d'illégalité, elle est en contradiction avec les règles d'une idéologie productiviste.

A partir de 1960, cette idéologie s'est renforcée en fonction des impératifs du développement, de la promotion du tourisme, d'une politique de prestige que les données suivantes vont aider à comprendre. Le Ministère de la Santé Publique et des Affaires Sociales, dans une communication au Conseil interministériel en date du 27 avril 1970, explique aussi les problèmes posés par la présence des "indésirables" dans la ville:

Les rues et les quartiers de Dakar sont envahis par toute une population flottante et cosmopolite qui se livre à des activités plus ou moins régulières. Mendiants, colporteurs et lépreux se ruent en effet à longueur de semaine sur les touristes tandis que les fous errants leur offrent un spectacle désagréable à voir. Les petits talibés, de jour en jour plus nombreux, se postent dans les coins de rue et profitent des arrêts aux feux rouges pour essayer d'arracher une obole aux automobilistes. Cette situation est d'autant plus choquante qu'elle dure depuis des années et semble aller en empirant malgré tous les efforts entrepris à la fois par les pouvoirs publics et par les institutions privées de bienfaisance³⁸.

Les mesures d'éloignement des lépreux, mendiants, vagabonds sont une constante de l'histoire récente du Sénégal. C'est ainsi que de 1958 à 1965 pour résoudre le problème de la libre circulation dans les artères de la capitale d'un nombre croissant de lépreux, les pouvoirs publics ont intensifié les soins et le dépistage de la lèpre. Ils ont également cherché un lieu d'hébergement des lépreux situés dans un endroit révélateur de la politique d'éloignement (baraquement à côté du cimetière musulman et tentatives d'implantation d'un village à Thiaroye et Sangalkam). En 1963, à l'occasion des Jeux de l'Amitié, la divagation des fous posa problème. Il fut décidé de débarrasser les rues de la capitale, des mendiants, colporteurs, lépreux, vagabonds et aliénés. En 1965-66, la préparation et la tenue du Premier Festival Mondial des Arts Nègres (Avril 1966) ont une nouvelle fois conduit les autorités à débarrasser les rues de la capitale "du spectacle affligeant des lépreux, nombreux, peu discrets et souvent trop entreprenants"³⁹.

38 Communication du Ministère de la Santé Publique et de l'Action Sociale (MSPAS) au Conseil Interministériel du 27 avril 1970 par le Dr. Daouda Sow, p. 1.

39 Idem. p. 3.

A partir de 1967, des rafles systématiques de lépreux sont organisées. Ceux qui sont pris en flagrant délit de vol ou de mendicité sont jugés et internés à Koutal près de Kaolack. On note vers la même période la mise en place d'un appareil réglementaire, véritable fondement juridique de l'"assainissement" de Dakar:

- *décret 66-540 du 9 juillet 1966 réglementant la vente sur la voie et dans les lieux publics;*
- *loi 67-50 du 28 novembre 1967 relative à la réglementation des activités qui s'exercent sur la voie publique et dans les lieux publics;*
- *décret 68-664 du 10 juin 1968 réglementant les activités qui s'exercent sur la voie publique et dans les lieux publics;*
- *arrêté ministériel 10878 MSPAS, du 26 août 1971 portant création d'un Comité National de lutte contre l'envahissement de Dakar par les mendiants, colporteurs, lépreux et aliénés;*
- *décret 75-105 du 20 décembre 1975 modifiant et complétant la loi 67-50 du 28 novembre 1967 relative à la réglementation des activités qui s'exercent sur la voie publique et dans les lieux publics;*
- *circulaire n 32 MFAE DCIP du 13 avril 1976 réglementant la vente sur la voie et les lieux publics;*
- *décret 78-540 du 16 juin 1978 relatif à la surveillance et à la protection sociale exercée sur certaines catégories de délinquants.*

L'idéologie qui est à la base de cet arsenal juridique est celle des encombrements humains. Plusieurs sources officielles montrent que sa mise en place a été renforcée à partir du Conseil de Cabinet du 4 novembre 1969 au cours duquel il a été fait le constat suivant:

Dakar est à nouveau envahi par les colporteurs, les mendiants, les lépreux et les aliénés qui importunent les habitants et nuisent au tourisme. Des échos des doléances des touristes de retour en Europe apparaissent dans des articles de presse notamment en Allemagne Fédérale. Il importe de faire disparaître de façon durable mendiants, colporteurs, lépreux et aliénés des rues de Dakar⁴⁰.

De 1969 à 1977 plusieurs réunions ont été consacrées au problème de l'assainissement de Dakar et ont mis à la disposition de l'Etat le matériel de base de l'idéologie de la lutte contre les encombrements humains. Cette notion est pratiquement "légalisée" un groupe de travail est créé dont

40 Conseil de cabinet du 4 novembre 1969.

l'objectif est de déterminer les priorités et de prévoir les moyens matériels humains et financiers à mettre en oeuvre dans le cadre de la lutte.

Nous ne disposons pas d'informations détaillées relatives aux rafles opérées dans le cadre de la lutte contre les encombrements humains. Par contre savons qu'elles se faisaient dans les principales artères du centre ville: Avenue Albert Sarraut, Place de l'Indépendance, Avenue Pompidou, Marché Sandaga, Avenue Lamine Guèye. Du 1er janvier au 30 avril 1977, les résultats de ces rafles s'expriment dans les données suivantes relatives aux opérations menées dans plusieurs villes:

Dakar: - 541 marchands ambulants;

- 35 mendiants;

- 40 mineurs conduits au Centre de Triage de Thiaroye;

- 225 marchands seront condamnés à des peines variant de 4 jours à un mois de prison.

Kaolack:

- 370 marchands ambulants;

- 12 mendiants malades;

- 65 mendiants valides;

- 44 seront condamnés à des peines de 3 à 6 mois de prison.

Tambacounda:

- 76 arrestations parmi lesquelles 15 condamnés de 3 à 6 mois de prison,

- 50 marchands ambulants;

- 10 mendiants;

6 condamnés à des peines de 2 à 3 mois de prison.

Saint Louis:

- 70 marchands ambulants;

- 20 aliénés conduits à Thiaroye.

Louga:

- 2 malades mentaux.

Pendant la même période, la Gendarmerie nationale a arrêté 199 personnes dont 38 mineurs conduites à Thiaroye, dans la banlieue de Dakar. Cette politique n'a cependant pas produit les résultats escomptés. Plusieurs sources officielles montrent que l'un des principaux problèmes était l'insuffisance des structures d'accueil. C'est ainsi que pour ce qui est des lépreux, une instruction présidentielle datant du 28 décembre 1967 avait débouché sur l'aménagement de l'ancien camp pénal de *Koutal* pour ceux pris dans les villes en flagrant délit de mendicité ou de vol. Mais l'opération se solda par un échec car l'entretien et la nourriture de ces détenus devaient être assurés par l'Hôpital de Kaolack mais les crédits correspondants n'avaient pas été dégagés. Là aussi, l'absence de locaux appropriés fut un handicap important. Les personnes raflees étaient parquées dans la Cour du Commissariat Central, l'Ecole de la rue de Thiong, ainsi que la prison

dénommée le Fort B. S'agissant des malades mentaux, on les envoyait au Lazaret de Saint-Louis après un séjour dans des magasins du Service d'Hygiène⁴¹.

Les défaillances constatées dans la construction des centres d'hébergement constituent la plus grande incohérence de cette lutte contre les encombrements humains. L'analyse des sources officielles, laisse à penser que l'Etat n'a pas fait l'effort budgétaire que nécessitait la mise en place de telles structures. Le Conseil interministériel du 14 juillet 1977 relatif aux encombrements humains est très explicite sur la question: l'absence de ces infrastructures empêche de mener l'action humanitaire et de reclassement social dont le cadre législatif a déjà été tracé⁴². Au plan institutionnel, la lutte contre les encombrements humains a amené les autorités à prendre en 1977 les décisions suivantes:

- *transfert du Centre de triage de Thiaroye au Ministère de la Justice;*
- *transformation du Service de l'Education Surveillée en Direction;*
- *création d'un Centre de Sauvegarde destiné aux enfants raflés non réclamés;*
- *création des secteurs d'action éducative en milieu ouvert de Kaolack et Saint-Louis;*
- *achèvement de l'annexe du CAOMI-I (7 bâtiments comprenant 80 places, une salle de classe et un bâtiment administratif) inauguré le 21 juillet 1977⁴³.*

Au plan réglementaire le décret 76-213 du 24 février 1976 institue un Centre de soins et de protection sociale dans chaque région. La loi 76-03 du 25 mars 1976 prévoit l'installation dans chaque région des villages de reclassement social destinés à recevoir les lépreux guéris et mutilés. La loi 75-80 du 9 juillet 1975 prévoyait dans chaque chef-lieu de région un ou plusieurs villages psychiatriques. Les pouvoirs publics reconnaissent, s'agissant des aliénés, que:

pendant longtemps les malades mentaux n'ont posé que des problèmes mineurs au Sénégal. Chaque village, chaque quartier avait son fou ou même ses fous lesquels menaient leur petite vie tranquille évoluant dans un secteur limité nourris et entretenus par leurs familles ou par des

41 Communication du Ministre de la Santé Publique et de l'Action Sociale au Conseil Interministériel du 27 avril 1970 par le Dr. Daouda Sow, pp. 4 et 10.

42 Conseil Interministériel du 14 juillet 1977, Ministère de la Justice. "Rapport sur les encombrements humains", p. 6.

43 Idem., p. 3.

*amis charitables... A l'occasion des Jeux de l'Amitié, en avril 1963, la divagation des fous posa un réel problème aux organisateurs*⁴⁴.

Ces informations venant de la bouche même du Ministre de la Santé Publique pendant la "guerre" contre les "encombres humains" laissent à penser que la politique de prestige et de séduction des étrangers, les nécessités d'une politique de vente d'une bonne image du Sénégal ont conduit les autorités à cette gestion violente. S'agissant des colporteurs, la remarque suivante faite lors du Conseil interministériel du 27 avril 1977, montre les limites des rafles systématiques organisées contre eux:

*pour ce qui est des petits guinéens qui constituent l'essentiel des effectifs des colporteurs, laveurs de voitures, porteurs, etc... on a pensé les ramener à la frontière de leur pays, mais outre le coût du transport (2000 francs par personne environ) on se heurte au refus des autorités guinéennes de reprendre leurs citoyens*⁴⁵.

Pour terminer cette présentation, il convient de préciser que même si la notion d'encombres humains a tendance à disparaître de la terminologie des pouvoirs publics, dans les faits, certaines catégories que désignait cette notion sont toujours victimes des mêmes mesures de répression. C'est ainsi que des lépreux et aliénés sont toujours détenus dans les prisons comme le montrent les informations provenant de la Direction de l'administration pénitentiaire⁴⁶.

La présence de lépreux dans les prisons sénégalaises ne date pas d'aujourd'hui. Elle était signalée en 1950 à la prison civile de Dakar comme le montre une lettre du Directeur de la Santé Publique (no. 4304 du 14 novembre 1950) relative aux conditions d'hospitalisation des malades

44 Communication du MSPAS, op. cit., p. 3.

45 Idem.

46 Le statut du personnel de l'administration pénitentiaire a été institué par la loi 72-23 du 19 avril 1972. Avant cette date, l'administration pénitentiaire regroupait en son sein des agents de différentes administrations qui lui étaient détachés. L'arrêté 013253/MINT/DAP du 30 octobre 1979 portant organisation de la Direction de l'administration pénitentiaire a créé des Services Centraux et Régionaux parmi lesquels on note l'existence d'une Division de la Statistique qui a entrepris un travail de collecte et d'analyse des informations statistiques relatives aux prisons sénégalaises. C'est la raison pour laquelle il est assez difficile d'obtenir des données fiables sur les prisons sénégalaises dans les premières années de l'indépendance. Je l'ai constaté lorsque j'ai voulu reconstituer les informations statistiques relatives aux lépreux emprisonnés. Il ne m'a pas été possible d'obtenir des informations sur une longue période.

mentaux⁴⁷. Parmi les groupes désignés jusqu'à une date récente comme encombrements humains, les aliénés semblent être victimes d'une exclusion particulière. Signalons que parmi les 9 personnes condamnées aux travaux forcés à perpétuité se trouve un aliéné⁴⁸. La loi 75-80 du 9 juillet 1975 relative au traitement des maladies mentales et au régime d'internement de certaines catégories d'aliénés prévoit des dispositions précises lorsque le malade mental a commis un infraction ou lorsque son comportement constitue un danger. Un établissement destiné à l'internement des malades mentaux ayant fait l'objet d'une décision judiciaire a été créé par le décret 75-1092 du 23 octobre 1975. Le décret de 1975 précisait que l'établissement situé à Thiaroye devait être rattaché au Service psychiatrie du CHU de Fann. Pourquoi les mesures concernant l'internement des malades mentaux ayant fait l'objet d'une décision judiciaire ne sont-elles pas appliquées ? Les analystes de la Direction de l'administration pénitentiaire insistent sur la question en faisant remarquer:

On peut se demander si les aliénés ont encore leur place dans les prisons surtout quand ils doivent ressortir tels qu'ils étaient entrés. Des mesures d'internement administratif pourraient constituer un substitut efficace à l'emprisonnement des aliénés⁴⁹.

D'une manière générale, les aliénés ayant fait l'objet d'une décision judiciaire sont internés avec les lépreux et les tuberculeux au Cap Manuel. La population concernée est composée en majorité d'hommes. Il s'agit en général de détenus provenant de l'ensemble des établissements pénitentiaires du Sénégal. Cette situation prouve que malgré l'humanisme des discours officiels, le fou est souvent entretenu aux limites d'une marginalité multiforme où il côtoie tuberculeux, lépreux et criminels. On observe une division de l'espace carcéral afin de permettre une séparation et une classification des détenus. Cette division rapproche le fou du tuberculeux et du lépreux et reproduit dans la prison l'observance d'une règle suivie dans la société: la tendance prononcée à l'exclusion de l'aliéné. Le fou, au même titre que le lépreux, se trouve dans une réclusion solitaire. Ce phénomène n'est pas spécifique à la société sénégalaise. Il a été remarqué dans certains pays développés où les moyens par lesquels on a cru apprivoiser ou réduire la folie ont souvent entretenu un rapport étroit avec la violence. On s'est trouvé confronté à la même pratique: soustraire la folie du regard, effacer les traces de sa présence et assurer ainsi son anonymat le plus absolu.

47 Lettre du Directeur de la Santé Publique, 4304 du 14 novembre 1950.

48 Direction de l'administration pénitentiaire "Enquête sur la Population Pénale du 1er trimestre 1986, p. 14.

49 Idem, p. 10.

Conclusion

L'administration sénégalaise a hérité de la colonisation une politique de répression de certains groupes sociaux associés à l'immoralité, au désordre, à la criminalité. Un dispositif réglementaire assez important a été mis en place depuis le XIXe siècle pour gérer ce que les pouvoirs publics désignent par le vocable de "fléaux sociaux", appellation qui varie, selon les préoccupations du moment. Dans l'ensemble, cette réglementation se caractérise par un souci constant de la précision et de la sévérité. Il est permis de penser qu'après l'indépendance, l'Etat avait à sa disposition le matériel idéologique nécessaire au contrôle des groupes qui échappaient ou perturbaient l'ordre social et économique qu'il tentait de promouvoir. Cet ordre social en construction contestait et, conteste toujours, à certains individus le droit à l'errance. L'espace vital de certains groupes s'est trouvé considérablement réduit grâce à une confusion entretenue par les discours officiels sur l'oisiveté dont l'analyse montre qu'ils laissent émerger des mythes rendant solidaires, criminalité, oisiveté et paresse. L'oisiveté serait la mère de tous les vices car conduisant à l'indigence, à la débauche et au crime. On voit ainsi se mettre en place la justification de la répression qui s'est abattue sur les groupes sociaux désignés par le vocable d'encombrements humains⁵⁰, ce qui, sous l'optique des pouvoirs publics, ne saurait être interprété comme un abus de pouvoir ou un acte arbitraire car ces groupes seraient associés à la pauvreté, à l'ivrognerie, au désordre public, rendant ainsi, aux yeux du gouvernement, leur cause plus indéfendable. Il a été constaté dans les pays européens, les mêmes pratiques de gestion de groupes marginaux. Les travaux de Beaune(1983) et Geremek(1976) offrent une discussion de ces questions dans le cas français avec une mise en perspective théorique très intéressante.

Cette politique n'a pas atteint ses objectifs dans le cas sénégalais. Les mendiants, lépreux, aliénés, colporteurs, sont les victimes d'une organisation économique et sociale qui ne peut se reproduire qu'en les niant et ne leur offre que l'exclusion comme alternative. Cette situation devient plus dramatique dans le contexte de crise régressive qui secoue la société sénégalaise. Les sources disponibles montrent l'inefficacité relative des diverses réglementations de l'ordre public qui n'ont pas commencé en 1960. Même si l'administration coloniale n'a pas utilisé le vocable d'encombrements humains, certains groupes que cette notion désignait étaient victimes dès, le XIXe siècle, des mêmes mesures dictées par la même préoccupation: l'éloignement des gens indésirables dans les villes. Ces

50 Mamadou Diop (1988), le maire de Dakar, a proposé d'abandonner une telle appellation au profit d'une autre jugée plus "heureuse": "aspects humains de l'encombrement".

mesures se sont renforcées à Dakar par exemple de 1930 à 1940 comme le montrent les sources conservées aux archives nationales du Sénégal.

La dénonciation des fléaux sociaux ne prend pas en charge une analyse des mécanismes socio-économiques qui les génèrent. C'est pourquoi leur gestion par les pouvoirs publics est essentiellement répressive. L'idéologie qui les présente, les considère comme une gangrène à extirper violemment. Elle n'aperçoit pas la trame des causes et des effets.

L'explication de ces phénomènes implique la critique de la stratégie de développement économique et social qui les génère. Les fléaux sociaux doivent être interprétés comme le produit des options politiques et économiques de l'Etat. En tout état de cause, les "fléaux sociaux" ne tombent pas du ciel. Si tel était le cas, il faudrait alors admettre que les processus qui irriguent les mécanismes inégalitaires de la société en sont les principaux responsables...

Bibliographie

- Beaune Jean Claude (1983), *Le vagabond et la machine: essai sur l'automatisme ambulatoire. Médecine, technique et Société*, 1880-1910, Paris, Champ Vallon, 397p.
- Collignon René et Becker Charles (1989), *Santé et Population en Ségambie: des origines à 1960*. Bibliographie annotée. Paris, INED, 554, p.
- Collignon R. (1976), "Quelques propositions pour une histoire de la psychiatrie au Sénégal." *Psychopathologie Africaine*, XII, 2, 173-188.
- Collignon R. (1984), "La lutte des pouvoirs publics contre les encombrements humains à Dakar". *Canadian Journal of African Studies*. 1984, 18, 3, 573-582.
- Cruise O'Brien D.B (1981), "Langue et nationalité au Sénégal: l'enjeu politique de la wolofisation" *Année Africaine*, 320-335.
- Cruise O'Brien (1971), *The Mourides of Senegal. The political and economic organization of an islamic brotherhood*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 321 p.
- Faye Ousseynou (1988), "L'urbanisation et les processus sociaux au Sénégal: typologie descriptive et analytique des déviations à Dakar d'après les sources d'archives de 1885 à 1940 Dakar, UCAD, FLSII, thèse de doctorat de 3^e cycle, 648 p.
- Geremek Bronislaw (1976), *Les marginaux parisiens aux XIV et XV^e siècle*, Paris, Flammarion, 354, p.
- Kane Ngouda (1988), "L'évolution sociale à Saint-Louis à travers les archives de police" UCAD, FLSII, mémoire de maîtrise, 120 p.
- Ndiaye Amadou Moustapha (1979), Des "fléaux sociaux" aux "encombrements humains:" essai d'approche de l'évolution de la sensibilité aux questions sociales à travers la presse quotidienne de 1960 à 1975. Université de Dakar. Mémoire de maîtrise (département de philosophie). Novembre 178 p.
- Sénégal (République du) Direction de l'administration pénitentiaire
1984 "Enquête sur la population pénale"
1986 (1^{er} semestre) "Enquête sur la population pénale"

Population et Villes Sénégal : La croissance démographique

Amadou Diop*

Abstract: The comparison of the 1976 Senegalese population census and that of 1988 has revealed a population increase of 1,883.834 inhabitants corresponding to a 37.6% global growth. However, the dynamic growth has mostly affected urban centers only. Therefore towns have become an unavoidable reality in the structure of the space of Senegal. Hence, various phenomena of increase and decrease resulted in a reclassification of a few towns. However, the reclassification operated in such a way that the town structuring became more disproportionate resulting in making Dakar, the Capital city, weigh heavily on the system and the lower-level towns shrink. In the process, rural areas suffered a lot because of the huge exodus to towns, mostly to those of the Western part of the country. Therefore, it is urgent to strengthen the regional structuring of the country, mostly that of the Eastern part, by enhancing its socio-economic development.

Evolution globale de la population

Du recensement de 1976 à celui de 1988, la population sénégalaise est passée de 4.998.000 à 6.881.834 habitants. Ce qui correspond à une augmentation totale de 1.883.834 habitants et à un taux de croissance globale de 37,6%. Le déterminant essentiel de cette évolution démographique est la progression continue du taux de croissance moyen annuel qui est passé de 2,3% de 1960 à 1970 à 2,7% de 1976 à 1988.

En réalité la dynamique démographique (Carte No. 1) a surtout profité aux villes, localisées pour la plupart dans le centre occidental du pays. La croissance urbaine est presque 2 fois plus rapide que celle des campagnes. Vingt neuf communes sur trente sept ont un taux de croissance supérieur ou égal à la croissance moyenne nationale qui s'établit à 2,7%. Si le croît naturel a vigoureusement participé à l'urbanisation, la plus grande part revient à la mobilité démographique amplifiée par les problèmes socio-économiques et l'impact de la sécheresse dans les campagnes.


En corollaire, la population rurale (3.208.158 en 1976 et 4.081.069 en 1988) connaît une faible croissance: elle s'est accrue de 27% entre 1976 et 1988, ce qui est inférieur de 10% à la moyenne nationale (37%) et de 29% à l'accroissement moyen urbain (56,4%).

L'une des caractéristiques majeures dans la répartition du croît démographique est l'évolution de la population rurale de l'ouest vers l'est. La partie occidentale du pays notamment le centre ouest qui correspond au

* Département de Géographie, Université Cheikh Anta Diop

Carte No. 1

EVOLUTION DE LA POPULATION TOTALE
AU SENEGAL DE 1976 A 1988



bassin arachidier subit de profondes mutations socio-spatiales, avec une urbanisation de plus en plus marquée.

La faible structuration urbaine de la partie orientale a comme contrepartie des taux de croissance rurale élevés. A l'intérieur de cet ensemble oriental on distingue un noyau dynamique autour de la ville de Tambacounda; Koumpentoun au nord-ouest de cette ville a un taux de croissance de 5,7%; Missira au sud-est a un taux de croissance annuel de 4,3%. La colonisation des "terres neuves" du Sénégal Oriental, l'extension de la culture du coton, les conditions pluviométriques favorables expliquent cette croissance soutenue. A l'extrême sud-est de cette région, l'espace qui s'organise autour de la ville de Kédougou, soumis aux contraintes du milieu et surtout à une sous intégration économique est très peu dynamique comme en témoigne la faiblesse démographique des campagnes: les arrondissements de Bandafassi, de Saraya et de Fongolembi ont un taux de croissance démographique inférieur à 2%; salemata a une variation négative -0,2%. Partout ailleurs dans cette région orientale les taux de croissance tournent autour de la tendance centrale, entre 2 à 4% sauf les villes de Matam et Bakel qui ont une croissance annuelle inférieure à 2%.

Au Sud, la Casamance connaît dans sa partie orientale qui coïncide avec la région de Kolda un dynamisme démographique des campagnes de plus de 4,5% de croissance surtout dans les arrondissements de Médina Yorofoula au nord et de Diattacounda au sud de la ville de Sedhiou. Diendé à l'ouest de la ville de Kolda, 5,3% et Velingara au nord-est, 4,6% témoignent de cette même croissance. L'érection de cette partie orientale en région administrative suite au dernier découpage administratif du territoire en 1984, des conditions économiques avantageuses résultant d'une bonne pluviométrie, une solide tradition agricole avec l'extension de la culture du coton, la promotion de Kolda en capitale régionale dont les fonctions tertiaires se sont étoffées, ont maintenue sur place une partie de l'excédent démographique. La région de Ziguinchor à l'ouest que ce même découpage territorial a amputé de cette partie orientale de l'ancienne région de Casamance a un taux de croissance rurale très faible de 1,5%. Le dynamisme urbain est cependant marquant avec un accroissement de 4,7%.

Une véritable dépression démographique, révélatrice des contraintes spatiales et socio-économiques, marque une grande partie Nord et Centre-Nord du Sénégal. Cet espace d'orientation Nord-Est/Sud-Est comprend la zone médiane de la région du fleuve entre les arrondissements de M'Bane et Ourosogui, la totalité de la région de Louga jusqu'aux zones frontalières des régions de Thiès et de Diourbel. Cette région intègre la zone sylvo-pastorale, espace de parcours dont la vie pastorale est une des composantes majeures, caractérisée par la maigreur des ressources: écologie ingrate, sols peu fertiles (4% des potentialités en terres cultivables pour 21%

de la superficie totale du Sénégal), limites imposées à la culture par une pluviométrie moyenne voisine de 400 mm.

Cet espace sensible, économiquement pauvre, présentant des éléments "déstructurants", alimente des courants migratoires temporaires ou définitifs vers l'Ouest et le Sud du pays. Les dix-huit arrondissements que couvre cette zone ont une croissance démographique inférieure à la croissance moyenne nationale; sur les sept arrondissements qui enregistrent des pertes de population, cinq s'y localisent: Kas-kas au Nord Est de la région du fleuve enregistre une perte de - 0,5%; dans un triangle au Sud de la ville de Louga, les arrondissements de M'bodiène, Koki, Sagatta prolongés par Niakhène dans la région de Thiès, enregistrent une croissance négative.

Enfin dans le centre occidental sénégalais, les campagnes du bassin arachidier s'éclaircissent. La majeure partie des arrondissements ont un taux de croissance inférieur à la croissance moyenne nationale. Signalons le cas exceptionnel de l'arrondissement de N'Dame avec une croissance de 7%. Il abrite la localité de Touba capitale de la confrérie musulmane mouride. Ce centre religieux très dynamique, de plus de 100.000 habitants, est incontestablement une ville. Cependant les chefs religieux s'opposent à l'organisation communale de cette localité.

La région de Fatick (Sud-Ouest du Sénégal Occidental) peu urbanisée présente, par ailleurs, une croissance rurale soutenue dans les départements de Fimela, Djilor et Toubacouta.

L'espace du Centre Ouest, zone de cristallisation de la colonisation arachidière ayant bénéficié d'importants investissements, concentre l'essentiel des villes. Celles-ci étaient d'anciennes escales, relais intégrés dans un réseau de collecte des produits arachidiers acheminés vers l'extérieur par le port de Dakar.

La crise du milieu rural liée à celle de l'arachide et à la dégradation des ressources naturelles explique l'affaiblissement des campagnes qui nourrissent d'importants flux migratoires vers les villes. Ainsi le processus d'urbanisation s'effectue sur fond de crise. Le dynamisme économique des villes, leur capacité d'offrir des emplois est fonction de la solidité du cadre spatial dans lequel elles évoluent. Celles-ci sont ainsi dans l'incapacité de digérer cette croissance à laquelle elles se trouvent confrontées. Les courants migratoires s'orientent surtout vers la capitale, Dakar qui concentre tous les pouvoirs de commandement et l'essentiel du tissu industriel et des activités "informelles".

Hiéarchie et typologie de la croissance urbaine au Sénégal

La ville est devenue une réalité incontournable dans l'organisation de l'espace sénégalais. La dynamique démographique et sa mobilité ont impulsé une croissance urbaine déclenchée pendant la période coloniale. Depuis 1960, année de l'accession à l'indépendance, la population urbaine

Elle est accrue rapidement. Elle a un peu plus doublé en 16 ans passant de 1.044.436 habitants en 1960 à 1.789.900 habitants en 1976 et a triplé en 1988 avec 2.700.000 habitants. Le Sénégal s'est enrichi en 1990 de 11 nouvelles communes: Kounghel, Dioffior, Thionkessyl, Marsassoum, Goudomp, Pout, Oourossogui, N'Dioum, Dahra, Guediawaye, Bargny. Le taux d'urbanisation passe ainsi de 23,3% de la population totale à 32% puis 40%. Pour un pays réputé agricole 1 habitant sur 2,5 vit en ville. Ce qui exige de changer les modèles de références et les images de rhétorique politique.

La Hiérarchie du système urbain au Sénégal

Le dispositif hiérarchique de l'organisation des villes sénégalaises n'a presque pas connu de modification, sinon quelques reclassements d'unités urbaines suite à un renforcement (Richard Toll, M'bour) ou à un fléchissement (Saint Louis) de leur base démographique et socio-économique. Ville primatale et véritable pivot de l'espace sénégalais, Dakar continue à dominer le système urbain sénégalais (Tableau 1). De 1961 à 1988, la capitale n'a cessé de renforcer sa position, dans la hiérarchie urbaine: sa population qui était en 1961 5,8 fois supérieure à la population de la deuxième ville présente un écart de 1 à 7 en 1976 et 1 à 7,4 en 1988 (voir Carte No. 2).

Tableau 1 : Structure par taille des villes sénégalaises


Groupes de taille	Structure par taille en 1961*		Structure par taille en 1976		Structure par taille en 1988	
	Nombre villes	Pop en %	Nombre villes	Pop en %	Nombre villes	Pop en %
Villes de moins de 5000 habitants	15	5,1	2	0,2	2	0,2%
5000 à 20000	14	13	23	13,2	19	8,7
20000 à 50000	4	17,3	4	6,6	7	9,3
50000 à 100000	2	15,9	4	18,2	2	5,9
100000 à 200000	-	-	2	13	5	26,5
Plus de 400000	1	48,7	2	48,8	2	49,4

Source: Recensement de la population du Sénégal 1976 et 1988

* Les données de 1961 sont empruntées au rapport *les villes secondaires en Afrique, leur rôle et leurs fonctions dans le développement national et régional* préparé par: Jacques Champaud, Jérôme Lombard et Michel Sivignon - de l'ORSTOM sous la responsabilité de l'Agence Coopération et Aménagement en 1984.

L'examen du tableau 1 montre que Dakar et son doublet Pikine polarisent l'essentiel de la population urbaine. La concentration des fonctions de commandement politique et économique dans la capitale

Carte No. 2



explique cette croissance: 48,7% de la population en 1961, 48,8% en 1976 et 49,4% en 1988.

Le deuxième niveau de la hiérarchie est constitué par la classe des villes de 100.000 à 200.000 habitants. La structure par taille s'est modifiée au profit de cette strate. En 1961 hormis Dakar dont la population atteignait plus de 400.000 habitants, aucune autre ville sénégalaise ne dépassait les 100.000 habitants. Les villes de Thiès et Kaolack ont atteint ce chiffre en 1976. Aujourd'hui cinq villes dont Saint-Louis, Kaolack, Ziguinchor, Thiès, Rufisque appartiennent à cette strate urbaine. Leur part dans la population urbaine s'élève à 26,4% en 1988 alors qu'elle n'était que de 13% en 1976.

Au Sénégal, l'armature urbaine est constituée pour plus des deux tiers par les niveaux I et II de la hiérarchie, 61,8% en 1976 et 76% en 1988.

La population citadine dans la catégorie des villes de 50.000 à 100.000 habitants s'élève à 5,9% en 1988 contre 18,2% en 1976 et 15,9% en 1961. Cette catégorie a pâti du glissement de certains centres dans la strate supérieure.

La catégorie des centres urbains de 20.000 à 50.000 habitants a connu un affaïssement important entre 1961 et 1976; sa part est passée de 17,3% de la population urbaine à 6,6%. L'apport de quelques centres de la strate inférieure a entraîné un léger mieux, 9,3% en 1988.

Les petites villes de moins de 5.000 habitants et celles dont la population est comprise entre 5.000 et 20.000 habitants sont mieux représentées en nombre: 21 petites villes en 1988, 25 en 1976 et 29 en 1961. Leur part dans la population urbaine diminue rapidement pour alimenter la strate supérieure: 18% en 1961, 13,4% en 1976 et 8,9% en 1988.


L'armature urbaine est disproportionnée avec comme principale caractéristique le poids écrasant de Dakar et le laminage des villes de niveaux inférieurs. La strate des villes à vocation régionale est très mal représentée: seules quatre capitales régionales, Thiès, Kaolack, Ziguinchor, et Saint-Louis sont incluses dans la classe de 100.000 à 200.000 habitants; une capitale régionale, Diourbel, comprise entre 50.000 à 100.000 habitants; trois capitales, Tambacounda, Louga, Kolda, comprises entre 20.000 à 50.000 habitants et enfin une capitale régionale Fatick située dans la strate de 10.000 à 20.000 habitants.

Le poids de ces capitales régionales et l'effet structurant de celles-ci sur leur champ régional sont limités par leur atonie économique, une caractéristique majeure de l'urbanisation sénégalaise, source permanente de déséquilibres régionaux.

Typologie de la croissance urbaine

L'analyse du taux de croissance entre 1976 et 1988 montre d'une façon générale la forte évolution de la population urbaine sénégalaise. Le taux moyen annuel de croissance des villes s'élève à 3,8% et se situe au-dessus

Figure No. 1



du taux de croissance de la population totale qui est de 2,7% et de la population rurale égale à 2,02%. Les rythmes de croissance urbaine sont cependant très différenciés et les variations relatives extrêmes opposent Richard Toll avec 127,1% d'accroissement global et Matam avec seulement 8,8%. L'écart relatif entre le taux de croissance des villes et le taux national de croissance urbaine moyen (Fig. No. 1) permet de dégager une typologie des villes sur la base de leur dynamisme démographique et géo-économique.

Les villes à forte croissance

Les pôles de développement urbain attestant une croissance forte et largement supérieure à la moyenne nationale concernent des espaces ayant bénéficiés d'investissement économique. Le dynamisme des villes de M'Bour et Richard Toll, nourri par une migration intérieure, s'explique sans nul doute par l'étoffement de leur tissu économique, investissement touristique pour le premier centre et industriel pour le second.

Richard Toll qui n'était pas érigée en ville en 1976 a bénéficié d'un important investissement de l'industrie sucrière avec la culture de la canne à sucre et la raffinerie du sucre et constitue un pôle d'attraction important. Son dynamisme, 7% de croissance annuelle (la plus forte du pays) soit 84,2% au dessus de la moyenne, est impulsé par la création massive d'emplois: plus de 1500 emplois permanents et 4500 emplois saisonniers y ont été créés. La ville de Dagana qui s'accroche fonctionnellement à la ville de Richard Toll en lui servant d'espace dortoir profite de ce dynamisme démo-économique.

Outre la pêche artisanale qui fait de M'Bour le premier centre de pêche du pays, l'investissement touristique, matérialisé par la création de la station de Saly Portudal, explique l'élargissement du fait urbain. M'Bour a enregistré pendant ces douze dernières années une forte poussée urbaine, avec une multiplication de sa population par deux entre 1976 et 1988; 65,7% de croissance au-dessus de la moyenne urbaine nationale en 1988. Le centre urbain de Joal intégrée dans la mouvance de M'Bour affiche un dynamisme grâce à ses fonctions touristiques et de pêche.

L'explosion urbaine de Pikine est tributaire de Dakar. Puissant pôle d'attraction à rayonnement national, Dakar continue de concentrer toutes les fonctions, administrative, politique et de gestion économique du pays. La capitale est alimentée de toute part par de très forts courants migratoires. Saturé et en proie à une crise de logement profonde, Dakar rejette tous les nouveaux venus à Pikine son doublet qui enregistre l'un des taux d'accroissement annuels les plus forts du pays, 6,3% soit 65,7% au-dessus de la moyenne nationale. La ville de Dakar quant à elle a un croît de 2,4% soit 36,8% au dessus la moyenne urbaine nationale.

Les villes dynamiques

Certains centres promus administrativement attestent une croissance dynamique: c'est le cas de Fatick qui, hissé au rang de capitale régionale,

connaît une évolution de l'ordre de 5,2% soit 36,8% au-dessus de la moyenne.

La ville de Kolda, composante du triptyque urbain méridional avec Ziguinchor et Vélingara, répond en partie à cette même logique. Cependant cet axe de développement urbain prolongé à l'est par la ville de Tambacounda doit son dynamisme à la solidité de son espace d'évolution: écologie avantageuse, industrialisation liée aux énormes potentialités agricoles. Les progrès de la culture spéculative de coton contribue à l'urbanisation de Vélingara et de Tambacounda qui atteignent des taux de croissance respectivement supérieurs de 18,4% et 7% à la moyenne nationale. L'expansion urbaine de Ziguinchor, la plus vigoureuse de cet axe méridional (4,9% de croissance annuelle soit 29% au-dessus de la moyenne urbaine nationale), répond aussi à des motivations touristiques.

Les villes de croissance modérée et de faible dynamisme

Les espaces géographiques d'expansion urbaine ne coïncident pas toujours aux régions ayant une longue tradition urbaine. Les anciens pôles de développement urbain de la région du bassin arachidier paraissent essoufflés. La ville de Thiès présente une croissance modérée (3,5% par an) soit 7,8% sous la moyenne urbaine nationale. Les grands centres de Kaolack, Diourbel dépouillés de leur fonction commerciale, en proie à de nombreuses difficultés économiques liées à la crise de l'arachide ont légèrement perdu de leur dynamisme: leur croissance modérée est inférieure à la moyenne nationale respectivement de 15 et 18%.

Les petits centres urbains, anciennes "escales de l'arachide" liés fonctionnellement au centre portuaire de Kaolack révèlent un faible dynamisme après l'abandon du port de cette ville au profit de Dakar; Gossas, Guinguinéo, Foundiougne affichent une évolution médiocre voire stagnante, inférieure de 50% à la moyenne urbaine nationale. La ville de Louga évoluant dans un milieu économique et spatial de crise (Crise des ressources naturelles) est touchée par une inflexion urbaine plus importante, 4,9% de croissance entre 1961-1976 et seulement 1,6% entre 1976-1988 (soit 56% en dessous de la moyenne urbaine nationale en 1988).

Les villes atones du Sénégal oriental

Les villes atones de la partie orientale du Sénégal évoluant dans un cadre spatial marginalisé (marginalisation socio-économique, éloignement par rapport à la vie de relations économiques offerte par le port de Dakar et son aéroport) sont les moins dynamiques. Les villes de Bakel, Podor, Matam, anciennes escales du fleuve Sénégal dont la fonction commerciale était liée à la commercialisation de la gomme arabique, sont en proie à de nombreuses difficultés: absence de forme de développement moderne pouvant fixer la population, atonie socio-économique. Les taux de croissance enregistrés par ces villes sont les plus bas et sont pour Bakel 1,6%, Podor 0,8% et Matam

0,7% par an soit respectivement 57,8%, 78,9% et 81,5% en dessous de la moyenne urbaine nationale.

Ces centres urbains de la région du fleuve naguère commandée économiquement et politiquement par la ville de Saint-Louis, ancienne capitale du Sénégal qui éprouve aujourd'hui les mêmes difficultés de croissance (39,4% sous la moyenne), alimentent de puissants flux migratoires vers Dakar et l'étranger.

La ville de Kédougou au Sud-Est de cette région souffre de sa localisation périphérique, 18% en dessous de la moyenne nationale.

Conclusion

Les résultats du recensement de 1988 comparés à ceux de 1976 ont permis de dégager quelques grandes lignes de la croissance démographique sénégalaise pendant ces 12 dernières années. L'accélération de l'urbanisation en est une caractéristique majeure. Elle est, par ailleurs, révélatrice des contraintes socio-économiques des campagnes qui se manifestent par le départ de plus en plus massif de ruraux vers les villes. D'autre part l'organisation spatiale de la population urbaine confirme la grande sélectivité dans la localisation, une partie occidentale occupée opposée au vide de la partie orientale.

La fixation de la population pour la faire participer au développement régional plutôt de la perdre par l'émigration implique que soit renforcée l'armature régionale dans l'est du pays en dynamisant l'évolution socio-économique. Tel est le défi auquel doit faire face l'aménagement du territoire.

Bibliographie

- Becker Charles, Diouf Mamadou et M'Bobj Mohamed (1987), Les sources démographiques de l'histoire de la Ségambie in *Annales de démographie historique* Paris, Mouton
- Claval Paul (1981), *La logique des villes* Litec, Paris.
- M'Bow Latsoucabe (1985), "Une lecture des villes sénégalaises" in *Annales de la faculté des lettres et sciences humaines de Dakar* No. 15 pp. 265-288.
- Miosec Jean Marie (1984), "Activités tertiaires supérieures et organisation spatiale du centre de Tunis: le sens d'un élargissement" in *Bulletin de la Société Languedocienne de Géographie* No. 2.3.
- Revue Historiens/Géographes du Sénégal* No. 4.5 Septembre 1989.
- Van-chi Bonnardel Régine Nguyen (1978), *Vie de relations au Sénégal: le circulation de biens*, thèse de doctorat d'état, mémoires IFAN No. 90.

Family Planning: A Human Right for Women

Stella C. Ogbuagu

Résumé: D'après les résultats de la recherche menée dans ce domaine, le taux d'acceptation du planning familial est relativement bas en Afrique au Sud du Sahara en général et au Nigéria en particulier parce que les femmes n'ont pas conscience qu'il contribue un droit pour elles. Dans cet article, l'auteur cherche à déterminer les facteurs socio-économiques qui expliquent une telle situation (l'éducation, les revenus, la place des femmes dans les emplois rémunérés, la connaissance et l'abilisation de la contraception, la prise de décision, etc).

Le corpus qui a servi à l'analyse est le résultat d'une interview menée auprès de 164 femmes choisis au hasard à Cross-River State au Nigéria, site de la recherche. Les résultats indiquent que c'est parce que les femmes n'exercent pas librement leur droit à d'autres choses telles que l'éducation, l'emploi, la participation totale aux affaires de la communauté, etc.) qu'elles ont également des difficultés) exercer leur droit au planning familial car les droits de l'homme ne sont mieux exercés que s'ils sont considérés globalement et non pris isolément. En conclusion, l'auteur suggère, entre autres stratégies, que la position de la femme soit renforcée dans la société par le biais de l'emploi, de l'éducation et de la reconnaissance sociale afin, qu'elle puisse venir à bout de leur marginalité et ainsi jouir de tous les droits en tant que citoyennes de leur pays.

Family Planning as a powerful preventive health measure and as a human right must mean several things. It must mean more than using contraception to avoid unwanted births. It must mean positive planning for wanted births. It must mean timing and spacing births so that the health of the mother is not put at unnecessary risk. It must mean using contraception rather than being exposed to the trauma of induced abortion. And it must mean taking interests of all the family - and possibly the wider interests of the community and the country into account when deciding to have a child...

Bradman Weerakoon, Secretary General, International Planned Parenthood Federation, 1987.

It is apt to assert that the gap created by falling mortality and continuing high fertility rates (which means growing numbers of children in the family) places a lot of burden on Third World women (Stycos, 1982). To further compound the problem for Nigerian women, the culture stipulates that the onus of bearing, nurturing and socializing the child rests heavily on them. Thus, the Nigerian women bear great strains from the combined effects of these two factors.

It is in consideration of the above facts that this paper is entitled, "Family Planning: A Human Right for Women". It must be immediately added that the writer of the paper is aware that the man is a partner in reproduction. Indeed, in many cultures he is expected to and often does

decide on many important reproductive issues such as timing and number of children to be born (that is barring physiological problems). Given men's powerful position in this matter, we should actually talk about family planning as a human right for men. How be it, many family planning definitions place emphasis on the couple but do point out that since the woman bears the brunt of childbearing she should have the last say when there is a disagreement (Sipila, 1975; United Nations, 1981).

The primary objectives of this paper is to demonstrate that women's position in the Nigerian society greatly inhibits their capacity for exercising the right to family planning. Thus, our working thesis is that as long as Nigerian women suffer major disabilities in other areas of human rights to wit: education, employment, genuine participation in community and public activities etc., for that long will they fail to fully apply the right to family planning. This thesis is predicated on the fact that greatest achievements are made when human rights are applied in their totality rather than in isolation.

Mention of human rights highlights the fact that several national and international instruments exist for the protection of the individual as he/she operates in society. For example, the partly suspended 1979 Nigerian constitution, *inter alia*, specifies that "every individual is entitled to respect of the dignity of his person". It further enjoins that "no citizen of Nigeria shall be subjected to any disability or deprivation merely by reasons of the circumstances of birth". The recently drafted constitution stresses much of the same issues. In other words, both men and women are accorded equal or the same status. However, in practice as well as in human relations in the Nigerian community, it is observed that both respect and non-deprivation are gender biased in favour of the men. Regrettably, women suffer severe disability for being women. For example, women in Igboland generally are forbidden to break the culturally-highly valued and ever-present kolanuts; some of their counterparts in the north of Nigeria are required to stay in purdah; while in different parts of the country women are denied inheritance of family property including land as well as participation in many secret societies and organizations. These are only few evidences of discrimination against women on account of gender.

Traditionally and socially in Nigeria, women are generally accorded the inferior position. This is to the extent that even the poorest, most unformed and rural man tends to believe that he is superior to most women regardless of their social, economic and educational achievements. Such beliefs and attitudes, according to a United Nations' report, "do not present man and woman as equals in dignity, respect and decision-making capacity", (United Nations, 1981;153). Infact, the report goes further to say that "these beliefs are in flagrant contradiction of the body of human rights formally recognized by all countries".

At the international level, the United Nations has made various provisions for the integration of women in all aspects of their nations' activities. It has thus proclaimed the rights to education, employment, and family planning. (United Nations, 1975;7). With special reference to family planning; world leaders meetings in 1966, under the auspices of the United Nations, declared thus:

we believe the objective of family planning is the enrichment of human life, not its restriction, that family planning by assuring greater opportunity to each person frees man to attain his individual dignity and reach his full potential, (ibid.).

This declaration highlights the importance of family planning for the individual in particular but with wider implications for the couple and the society as a whole. Thus far, we have made reference to the concept of family planning but have not yet given it an operational definition. As already noted, Weerakoon (1981) rightly averted that family planning means a lot of different things to different people. In this work, we shall adopt Sipila's interpretation of the principles set out in the Declaration on Population, issued on Human Rights Day, 10 December, 1966, "... that the opportunity to decide the number and spacing of children is a basic human right", (ibid.). Based on this, Sipila interprets family planning to mean "the exercise of the right all persons to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children, including the right not to have children", (Sipila, 1975;8).

Given the above interpretation, it is proper to observe that the individual is assumed to have the wherewithal to reach free and responsible decisions with regard to family.

Sipila's interpretation of family planning is very acceptable if men and women operate as equal partners in decision-making and in the exercise of the "package of human rights". However, as already stated, men generally tend to enjoy superiority of status in society, more so in traditional societies where they exact their influence even in matters of reproduction. It is therefore pertinent to raise the question whether all individuals have the wherewithal to reach free and responsible decisions with regard to family size. It is noted that there are many inhibiting factors (for example, low social status, cultural expectations, illiteracy, high fertility, demon-domesticity, etc.) which make the exercise of this right difficult to attain in many situations. In Nigeria, women seem to suffer these disabilities more than the men. This is why the topic of this paper is narrowed to them.

In dealing with women and the application of the right to family planning, several pertinent questions come to mind. For instance, what is the position of women in society which may encourage or discourage the exercise of this right? Is the individual woman well educated on body

functions, the reproductive activity and its implications for the health of her child and herself and the well being of their community and country? Does she even know that family planning is her right? Even if she knows, does she have access to the appliances and knowledge of its use?

There are no easy answers to the above wide-ranging questions. This is primarily so because the exercise of the right to family planning can only become truly meaningful and "gain height" when it is applied alongside other related human rights. To gain some useful insights into the Nigerian women's capability for asserting the right to family planning, it is necessary at this stage to examine some key variables (for example, social status, education, occupation, fertility rates etc.) that are traditionally expected to affect the exercise of this right.

Let us begin by examining the status of women in the Nigerian society. By social status, we mean the social standing or recognition given to women in the community as measured by their level of education, participation in paid employment outside the home and income, among other factors. In earlier works, (see for example, Ogbuagu, 1986), the author has shown that women in Nigeria generally have very low societal recognition. This observation is neither limited to one ethnic group nor does it have geographical limitations. It seems to pervade virtually the entire Nigerian society.

Thus, traditionally in Nigeria, women are largely supposed to be seen and not heard. In other words, they are supposed to be unquestionably submissive, obedient and indeed subservient to the males. This situation starts with girls playing these culture-bound and culture-supported roles in the family of orientation and later transferring them to the family of procreation.

To perpetuate such a situation, women marry out of their parental families, a bridewealth is paid on them and in many cases they are expected to change their names at marriage. These cultural practices and expectations go very far in perpetuating the low status of women in the society. Given such a weak and low status, women are ill positioned to claim a right such as the right to family planning. For instance, only recently, a group of women after listening to a lecture on AIDS, refused to take condoms home for fear of being suspected of promiscuity by their husbands but instead requested the lecturer to arrange to speak to their husbands on the same topic. This they argued, will help to soften their husbands' opposition to the use of condoms. This further buttresses the point made above.

In order to effectively handle the issues raised above, we carried out a small scale study to examine women's views on and rate of the use of family planning. The research was conducted in the Odukpani local government area of Cross River State of Nigeria. Specifically, we selected the Qua settlement which is east of the Qua river and comprises mainly two

large villages, Idundu and Anyanganse. Though close to Calabar municipality, the settlement is essentially rural. By 1983, it had an estimated total population of 6,683 people.

This area was selected because of its rural nature and its proximity to the researcher's area of residence (Calabar, the Cross River State capital). The latter factor was quite helpful as the researcher had easy access to the research area and therefore could easily reach the respondents than could have normally been the case.

Method of Study

It was necessary to get a listing of the households since no research frame for the area was available. With the aid of four trained assistants, it was possible to carry out a numbering of the households defined in terms of persons who pool resources together for the purposes of eating and meeting the day-to-day financial obligations of the units or as Sule (1988: 40) puts it, a household comprises "persons living together under the same dwelling unit and sharing common eating arrangement." Having done this, we went ahead to select 100 households from the listed 411 households by simple random sampling. It was the intention of the team to select two respondents from each household for analysis. But for various reasons including absence at the time of interview, unwillingness of some of the interviewees to cooperate, etc., all the selected respondents could not be interviewed. All together we were successful in 164 cases (at least 1 respondent was selected from each of the 100 households). This gives a response rate of 82 percent.

In order to elicit information from the selected candidates, an interview schedule was used. Two forms were adopted - the original English version and a translation of it into Efik the commonness local language spoken in the area. This made it possible for people of different educational levels to be interviewed. In all, the English schedule was used for about 65 percent of the respondents and 35 percent was interviewed with the local dialect schedule.

Considering difficulties often encountered in interviewing rural or village people who are often not very familiar with the interview situation or process and so can easily suspect the intentions of the interviewers, this response or success rate is quite encouraging.

The Research Population and Sample

Our target population was women of childbearing age (15-49 years) in the selected households. Although it was not possible to have an accurate count of the number of women per household, an estimate we made gave us a range of one to four women per household. Our sample of 164 was then selected by random sampling of the women of the specified age range living in the households. At least one woman was interviewed in each household.

Respondents' Attitude to and Use of Family Planning

Our data in Table 1 reveal that an overwhelming majority (83.3%) of the respondents approve of couples using family planning to limit the number of children they have. Only 7.9% disapprove while another 8.6% are uncertain about their attitudes. This is a good sign that the respondents are aware of the existence and perhaps the usefulness of family planning. If this interpretation is correct, the probability that these women are using contraceptives will be fairly high.

Table I - Distribution of Respondents according to their Attitude to and Usage of Family Planning

Attitude	Ever used	Usage Never used	NA	NO	Total %
Approve	17	92	28	137	83.5
Disapprove	0	3	8	13	7.9
Uncertain	3	8	3	14	8.6
Total	20	105	39	164	100.0

N.A. = No answer.

However, an analysis of the respondents' use of contraceptives casts some doubt on their earlier widespread approval that couples should use contraceptives for regulating their family size. From these responses, of all those who approve of the use of family planning by couples, only 13% admitted to have ever used or are currently using any form of contraceptives for controlling their fertility. This percentage of usage is very small. The discrepancy between approval and use calls for further examination. It is possible that although the women approve usage, they are unable to use any form of contraception because of lack of knowledge of the different methods.

Respondents' Knowledge of different Contraceptive Methods

To pursue this line of reasoning, it was necessary to examine respondents' knowledge of different methods of contraception. On this question, responses as displayed in Table II, show that only 13% of them did not know of any method of family planning. The rest (87%) had knowledge of at least one method. It appears that the major problem is not lack of knowledge. The question still remains as to why most of the women do not use contraceptives. Even those few who are currently using or have ever used contraceptives (71%) use very unreliable methods - the rhythm and withdrawal methods whereas only a small percentage (29%) used pills and diaphragms.

Table II - Distribution of Respondents according to selected socio-economic Variables

Socio-economic Variables	No. of Respondents	%
Educational level:		
No Education	31	18.8
Some Primary School	105	64.0
Some Secondary School	28	17.2
Total	164	100.0
Occupation for Women:		
Stereotyped	148	90.4
Non-stereotyped	8	4.8
Farming	8	4.8
Total	164	100.0
Current Occupation:		
Petty trading	96	58.8
Farming	44	26.6
Unemployed	24	14.6
Total	164	100.0
Family Income:		
Below N2,000	64	39.1
N2,000 - N3,999	82	50.0
N4,000 - N5,999	5	3.1
N.A.	13	7.8
Total	164	100.0
Knowledge of Family Planning:		
Yes	143	87.0
No	21	13.0
Total	164	100.0
Reasons for supporting Family Planning		
Economic	115	70.3
Health	21	12.5
Others	28	17.2
Total	164	100.0
Decision-making in family:		
Both	114	69.6
Husband alone	50	30.4
Wife alone	0	00.0
Total	164	100.0

Decision-making in the Family

From these observations, it appears likely that the women are handicapped in matching what they most probably need with actual use. To further explore this matter, an examination of decision-making on important or major issues in the family was undertaken. In all, 71.9% of the respondents gave an answer to this question. A breakdown of the responses shows that in 30.4% of the cases, the husbands took decisions alone. In the remaining cases, the respondents indicated that both of them reached decisions together. In no case did the woman take major decisions alone. This suggests a strong male influence which could affect other areas of family living including the primary focus - reproduction. This conforms with the stipulations of the National Population Policy (1988) which strongly suggest, among other things, that men should be enlightened on their "role and responsibilities in family life". From the above discussions, it can be inferred that the non-usage of family planning methods by the majority of the women may be linked to their weak position in decision-making in the home.

Reasons for approving Use of Contraceptives

To underscore this point, we analyzed the reasons the respondents gave for approving the use of contraceptives for family planning. From Table II, we observe that most of the women (70.3%) gave economic difficulties as their major consideration for supporting family planning. Another 12.5% cited health problems as a reason for their approval of family planning, while the remaining 17.2% gave other reasons or did not in some cases respond to that question. The implications of these given reasons for the development of a strong motivation for the adoption of family planning are far reaching. Notwithstanding such evidences of willingness to use contraceptives, the majority of the women do not in actual fact use them. Once again, we are reluctantly led to conclude that the women may not really be in a position to adopt the methods they know and have good reasons for supporting.

Educational Background and Knowledge of Contraceptive Methods

In support of this observation, we examined the women's educational background. The women are mainly semi-illiterates. Thus, 64.1% have few years of or completed primary school while 18.8% are illiterates with no formal schooling, (see Table II). Only 17.2% have some years of secondary school education and so can be regarded as literate. It is obvious from these data that the women generally have poor educational background. To further examine this issue, in table III, the level of education is cross-tabulated with knowledge of types of contraceptives. Generally, knowledge is high but there is still a noticeable differential to the level of education as knowledge rises with higher levels of education. In addition, knowledge of the more

reliable methods - diaphragm, the pills and injection - increases as educational attainment rises. This goes to buttress the point that is being stressed which is that exposure to education helps the individual woman in taking decisions on reproductive matters. Since education is a key factor in developing an individual's awareness and appreciation of social issues, it can be argued that the respondents under discussion are, in the main, primarily unexposed to the real benefits of education. With this observed low level of education, it is hard to see how they can successfully break the bonds of traditionalism and thus be able to assert their right to family planning (an exercise which needs full awareness of one's rights and the capacity for achieving those rights).

Table III - Level of Education by Knowledge of Types of Contraceptives
No of responses to types of contraceptives

Level of education	No of Respondents	VD	DR	JE	RY	PILLS	Injection
No school	23	6	10	2	21	10	11
% of expected cell frequency (23)		26.1	43.5	8.7	91.3	43.5	47.8
Primary school	94	21	64	15	82	83	78
% of expected cell frequency (94)		22.3	68.1	16.0	87.2	88.3	83.0
Secondary school	26	7	22	13	24	25	23
% of expected cell frequency (26)		26.9	84.6	50.0	92.2	96.2	88.5

Na = 21

Note

- (1) D = Vaginal douche
DR = Diaphragm
JE = Jelly
RY = Rhythm/Withdrawal
- (2) The percentages do not add up to 100 as respondents were requested to tick as many of the methods as they know. In effect each cell is supposed to have as many responses as there are respondents.

Some Effects of High Fertility

Fertility is another factor which plays a major role in influencing women's ability to assert themselves. In Nigeria, fertility rates are high. The Nigeria fertility survey estimates the total fertility rate of Nigerian women to be about 6.34 children, (National Population Bureau, 1984). For Women from Southern Nigeria, the total fertility rate can go as high as 7.48 children, (Etukude, 1987 and Ukaegbu, 1977). For the women of the Qua settlement in Odukpani local government area Cross River State used for this study, the number of children ever born by women who have completed their fertility is 6. Though this figure is slightly lower than the above quoted national rate, it is still quite high. In any case, since we are dealing with recalled numbers, these older women may have forgotten to include children who may have died or those who had long left home. These possibilities notwithstanding, the fertility rate of 6 children is high. Such high fertility rates have serious implications for the women.

Apart from the risk to mothers (which according to the International Planned Parenthood Federation 1987, is still very high in Nigeria), the women spend virtually all their lives nursing and caring for children without having much time for themselves. Such a heavy burden placed on women tends to limit their participation in community and other non-familial activities. Without such participation, their visibility in the society is blurred and so is their social recognition in the polity.

Job Aspirations of Respondents and their Current Occupations

It is no wonder that in response to a question on what occupations they consider appropriate for women, they mentioned mostly those occupations traditionally regarded as good for women and compatible with housework and child-bearing (see table II). Thus, 90.4% of the interviewees consider stereotyped occupations, (trading, typing, secretarial duties, teaching, nursing and petty private business) as appropriate for women. Only 4.8% would want to see women as medical doctors (an example of a non-stereotyped career).

To further explore the respondents' job aspirations for women, we found it necessary to examine their current occupations. From table II, it is observed that most of them (58.8%) are petty traders while 26.6% and 14.6% are farmers and job seekers respectively. For these categories of women, being a teacher, a nurse or a secretary may be considered an improvement on their current status. It is highly probable that this fact may have largely influenced their choice of appropriate jobs for women.

Income Levels of Respondents' Families

Finally, we considered the income levels of the women as Table II shows. Generally, the family incomes (a combination of wife's and husband's annual income) are low. Specifically, 39.1% of the respondents have family incomes of below ₦2,000 when the national minimum wage for the lowest worker is about ₦1,800 per annum. About 50% of the respondents come from families that earn above ₦2,000 but below ₦4,000. Only 3.1% of the families earn above ₦4,000 but below 6,000 per year. Such low incomes are earned mostly through self effort or self employment.

Given these low incomes and large families to cater for, there is enough reason to conclude that the respondents are typical of Nigeria's poor rural farmers and traders, a segment that dominates the country's population. Thus, encumbered with many cares and striving hard to meet mere survival needs, it would have been a great wonder if they were well committed to the use of family planning. The fact that only a small proportion of the research sample has ever used any method of family planning is consistent with their low social status, high fertility, meagre educational achievements, poor incomes and low status occupations.

Placed in such circumstances, can these women and women in similar situations in Nigeria adequately and effectively exercise their right to family planning? The answer is most probably not. This being the case, there is need for the guiding hands of state policy to come to their aid in order to change things for the better for the rural poor and the country as a whole.

Suggestions on Policy Inputs

This paper therefore calls on the Federal State and Local Governments to adopt and meaningfully implement policies that will, among other positive effects,

- *Hasten the pace of female education in the country; broaden school curricula to include population education at primary, post-primary and post-secondary levels of the educational system;*
- *make available family planning information, services and facilities to all persons who wish to use them without discrimination on account of "circumstances of birth";*
- *integrate family planning into the country's overall national development programmes;*
- *de-emphasize the cultural division of labour according to gender and put women in positions of decision-making especially in those areas that are particularly critical to the female segment of the population.*

Conclusion

We wish to emphasize the fact that women's lives are intricately intertwined with men's lives. Any efforts at enhancing the life of women will equally have positive effects on both the men and the society as a whole. The sooner women are encouraged, helped or liberated to enjoy their inalienable rights as full citizens of the country, that sooner will the much sought-after socio-economic development of the country come true. In all, a full attainment of women's rights especially in the area of family planning will by extension be beneficial to the entire society.

Bibliography

- Daily Times 1979, *The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria* (Apapa).
- Etukudo, W.L. 1986, *Current Fertility Levels in Rural Nigeria: A Case Study of Anua in Uyo L.G.A. of Cross River State*, (now Akwa Ibom State), A master's Thesis presented to the Graduate School, University of Calabar.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1988, *National Policy on Population for Development, Unity, Progress and Self-Reliance* (Federal Ministry of Health, Lagos).
- International Planned Parenthood Federation, 1987, *People 14: 3*.
- National Population Bureau, 1984, *The Nigeria Fertility Survey 1981/82* (Lagos: The federal Republic of Nigeria).
- Ogbuagu, S.C. 1984, *Statistic of Nigerian Women in Education*. Paper presented at the Third Annual Conference of Women in Nigeria held at Port Harcourt.
- Ogbuagu, S.C. 1985, "Depo-Provera, a Choice or an Imposition on the African Women: A Case Study of Depo-Provera usage in Maiduguri", in *Women and the Family: Proceedings of the Second Annual Women in Nigeria Conference* (Addis Ababa: CODESRIA).
- Ogbuagu, S.C. 1985, "The Integration of Women in the National Economy for Development: A Case Study", *The Nigerian Journal of Social Studies* 2, 1: 18-27.
- Ogbuagu, S.C. 1986, "The Status of Women and Fertility in Nigeria: The need for State Intervention", Paper presented at the Fifth Population of Nigeria Conference held at Kano, September 3-5.
- Rowley, J. 1987, "A death every minute" *People 14,3*.
- Sipila, H. 1975, *Status of Women and Family Planning* (New York United Nations).
- Stycos, J. 1982, "Status of Women", *International Encyclopedia of Population*, (New York: The Free Press).
- Sule, R. 1988, *Housing and Environment Planning*, (Calabar: Wusen Press Limited).
- Ukaegbu, A. 1977, "Family Planning Attitude and Practices in Rural Eastern Nigeria". *Studies in Family Planning* 8, 7: 173-187.
- United Nations 1975, *Population and Human Rights* (New York)
- United Nations 1981, *Population and Human Rights* (New York).
- Weerakoon, B. 1987, "Positive Planning", *People 14*, 3:20.

The Crisis of Development Finance and its Impact on Developing Economies: Trends, Issues and Policy Options

Daniel Smart Asante-Odame

Résumé. Dans l'article qui suit, l'auteur passe en revue les récentes tendances dans les flux financiers, discute de leur impact dans la situation financière interne et externe des pays en développement et indique les divers obstacles politiques à lever pour garantir un financement adéquat dans l'avenir.

Après avoir montré que le financement du développement traversait une crise qui se manifestait sous diverses formes (réduction des principaux composants de ces flux, chute des prêts bancaires, des investissements directs et des crédits à l'exportation), l'auteur en attribue la cause à un mauvais fonctionnement des mécanismes de transfert des ressources qui, pour résoudre cette crise, ont eu recours à des financements "d'entretien", et des prêts conditionnés par la performance macro-économique. C'est pourquoi, l'auteur estime que la stratégie globale de sortie de cette crise doit passer par une meilleure disposition des banques commerciales à consentir des prêts importants à titre volontaire et en cas de difficultés de paiements, elles doivent même pouvoir accepter des accords de rééchelonnement multi-annuel.

Introduction

The deep recession which hit the world economy after the turn of the decade markedly affected both the institutional arrangements for channelling the financial resources and the volume of such resources. Starting in 1982, commercial banks began to react to heavy debt accumulation in major debtor countries by reassessing their exposure. Budgetary pressures in many developed countries and a sharp decline in the OPEC countries' current account surplus were both reflected in the respective aid flows. Other official flows, notably export credits, also experienced a reduction as did direct foreign investment, while flows from multilateral institutions grew at a reduced rate.

The outcome of these developments was a progressive decline which affected most categories of concessional and non-concessional finance. This resulted in lower levels of gross and net flows as well as of net transfers. Indeed, in several countries net transfers have turned negative since 1983 under the combined impact of a reduction in, and increased interest payments on commercial banks' lending. The slow pace of bank lending stems mostly from most banks' reluctance to lend to the many developing countries that were already heavily indebted and/or are experiencing serious difficulties.

Spontaneously lending to developing countries was almost confined to Asia, and it has shown little tendency to revive in countries that have

recently restructured their debt. About 60% of bank lending to developing countries in 1984 and the first half of 1985 was accounted for by concerted lending - i.e. new credits extended by banks under the co-ordination of a bank advisory committee and in conjunction with the restructuring agreements and IMF-supported programmes.

A major factor in the contraction in net transfers can be traced to accelerating outflows, particularly of interest payments which offset the more hesitant growth in gross receipts of financial resources by developing countries. The outflow of debt service payments was accentuated by a rising trend in profit remittances. Profit remittances alone do not, however, fully capture the recent evolution of outflows related to direct investment since they do not take into account another type of associated outflow; transfer pricing by the transnational corporations. It must be pointed out, at this juncture, that this phenomenon is not readily susceptible to measurement and also that estimates often differ widely. However, an attempt will be made first to show the extent of resource outflows from all groups of developing countries in a bid to portray the negative effects of such outflows of their internal and external financial situation.

The over-all impact of this phenomenon on the economies of the developing countries especially as regards their internal and external financial situation - is then reviewed. In adjusting to the sharp fall in the availability of external credit, many countries were forced first to reduce their foreign exchange reserve holdings from already low levels and then to accumulate payment arrears, sometimes in anticipation of debt re-organization which had become unavoidable. The international financial system is now required to cope with the phenomenon of large and frequent payments arrears, repeated reschedulings which have caused banks and other financial institutions to lose control over the maturity of their claims, involuntary lending, costly reserve building in some countries and sharply reduced levels of reserves in others, particularly in Africa. The external financial position of many developing countries has significantly deteriorated over recent years in the face of continued deflation in the world economy, the sharp fall in non-oil commodity prices and the collapse of oil prices. The resulting increase in the need for external finance has not been met. Rather, net capital flows and net transfers have shrunk further. While there can be little doubt that increased efforts are needed in many countries to boost savings and growth performance, the fact that the effectiveness of these efforts often depends on the external environment is not always fully grasped.

Against the background of the crisis, this article also attempts to identify the policy measures which could be considered on the international policy co-operation front to resolve the current crisis of development finance. Enhanced multilateral cooperation is essential for this purpose, involving

developing countries, developed countries, multilateral institutions and commercial banks. Developing countries would need to pursue growth-oriented domestic policy reforms, with major emphasis on export promotion, enhanced domestic savings and major improvements in the efficiency of investment. Developed countries need to improve their own economic performance, thus contributing to the world economic environment, with lower real interest rates, higher commodity prices and increased market access for developing country exports. They also need to encourage higher capital contributions to multilateral lending institutions, without which multilateral institutions are unlikely to meet the challenge of playing the leading role in development finance. Commercial banks should be ready to provide substantial flows, partly in the form of voluntary lending. Where countries with severe debt problems cannot attract it, Multi-Year Rescheduling Agreements (MYRAs) remain crucial in sustaining their financial needs. For many poorer developing countries, the further writing-off of official debt is necessary. Finally, increased non-debt-creating resources should be mobilized.

The Decline in Financial Flows to Developing Countries

Trends in official flows

It is common knowledge that international financial co-operation has traditionally focussed on official flows because of their overall magnitude and their particular capacity to carry terms tailored to specific country situations. But as we shall see below, both the institutional arrangements for channelling official flows, notably export credits, to developing countries and the volume of such resources were markedly affected by the deep recession which hit the world economy after the turn of the decade. The outcome of these developments was a progressive decline which affected most categories of concessional and non-concessional finance and which resulted in lower levels of gross and net flows as well as of net transfers to developing countries.

Aid flows

Net long-term capital flows to developing countries have continued to decline since 1981 (see table 1). By 1985, net long-term inflows were approximately US\$ 35.5 billion, down 52% from the high point of US\$ 74.6 billion reached in 1981. For the group of heavily indebted countries, the decline has been approximately 76%, from US\$42.9 billion in 1981 to an estimated US\$10.1 billion in 1985.

Table 1 - Public and private long-term capital flows to developing countries, 1975 and 1980-1985 (billions of dollars)

Country group and item	1975	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
All developing countries							
Disbursements	46.4	102.6	121.9	115.5	95.3	86.8	92.9
From private creditors	31.4	75.3	91.4	84.2	64.8	54.3	55.5
Principal repayments	15.8	43.8	47.3	49.3	42.8	46.8	57.4
Net flows	30.6	58.9	74.6	66.2	52.5	40.0	35.5
Low-income Africa							
Disbursements	2.0	4.2	4.0	3.3	3.0	2.5	3.4
From private creditors	0.8	1.6	1.3	0.9	0.6	0.3	1.7
Principal repayments	0.4	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8	1.0	2.0
Net flows	1.6	3.4	3.1	2.3	2.2	1.4	1.4
Heavily indebted countries(a)							
Disbursements	21.9	53.1	69.0	57.6	38.3	32.5	31.9
From private creditors	17.3	45.9	60.5	48.3	28.8	22.6	18.5
Principal repayments	8.9	24.7	26.1	25.7	18.1	18.2	21.8
Net flows	12.4	28.4	42.9	31.8	20.2	14.3	10.1

Source: The World Bank, *World Development Report 1986*

(a) Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. These countries accounted for nearly half of all debt at the end of 1985.

As can be observed from Table 1, net flows to low-income Africa have been cut to less than half their 1981 level, dropping from US\$3.1 billion to US\$1.4 billion. In the case of low-income Africa, however, official grants remain important. They increased slightly from US\$3.2 billion in 1981 to US\$3.3 billion in 1984.

In real terms, the drop in net capital flows was even larger. In addition, total interest payments by developing countries on external public and private long-term debt amounted to US\$57.6 billion in 1985 (up from US\$41.8 billion in 1981)¹, which represented 11% of their export earnings. Thus, developing countries paid out approximately US\$22 billion more in

1 The World Bank, *World Development Report 1986* p. 37.

long-term debt since 1985 than they received in disbursements of long-term lending !2 . The heavily indebted countries accounted for most of this net transfer. These reduced levels of aid and massive resource outflows have coincided with a time when low-income countries were confronted with unprecedented financing needs caused by a combination of factors, not least among them an extremely unfavourable external environment.

Official creditors continue to be the most important source of net lending to developing countries. In contrast to commercial banks, official creditors' share in net disbursements to highly indebted countries were several times their share in total claims on this group of countries !3 Official creditors net lending of US\$3.5 billion in 1988 amounted to 38% of the interest payments they received from these countries on earlier loans (see Table 2) and was responsible for positive total net flows of US\$2.9 billion to the highly indebted countries. !4 .

Table 2 - Official Lending to Highly-Indebted Countries, 1986-88 (a) (billions of US dollars)

	1986	1987	1988
Disbursements	15.0	14.6	15.8
Principal repayments	8.9	10.7	12.3
Net lending	6.1	3.9	3.5
Interest payments	7.0	7.5	9.2
Net lending as % of interest payments	87.0	52.0	38.0

Source: IMF-World Bank, *Finance and Development*, September 1989, p.14

(a) Includes use of IMF credit.

The heavy involvement of official creditors in several countries led to a rise in the share of official creditors in total debt outstanding. For example, during 1986-88, six countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico and Nigeria) received more in net disbursements than they needed to refinance their interest payments to official creditors !5 .

Furthermore, among the bilateral official creditors, the Japanese government proposed the recycling of up to US\$30 billion of Japan's external surplus over 3 years (1987-89) to developing countries !6 .

Given the important role of Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member

2 *Ibid*, p. 37.

3 See, Ishrat Husain's - "Recent Experience with the Debt Strategy" in *Finance and Development*, September 1989, p. 14.

4 *Ibid*, p. 14.

5 *Ibid*, p. 14.

6 *Ibid*.

developing countries, it is useful to review how the donors have responded to the development challenge. The DAC donors in 1962 provided about US\$27 billion (measured at 1987 prices and exchange rates). In 1986, they provided US\$44.3 billion, an increase in real terms of more than 60%. But GNP in DAC countries increased nearly threefold over this period, so the 1988 ODA level represents a diminished effort in terms of a ratio of ODA to GNP, a drop from a 1962 ratio of 0.53% to a 1988 ratio of 0.35%. On current evidence, donors' performance remains mixed. Aside from the consistent record of the 4 DAC aid givers with the highest ODA/GNP ratios Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (see Table 3), 6 other countries which have recently accepted intermediate aid targets have significantly improved their ODA/GNP ratios in the 1980s.⁸ However, there is evidence to support the view that countries which have not accepted specific time-frames for meeting aid targets have performed less well.

Table 3 - Net ODA from DAC Countries in 1988

United States	9.78		0.20	
Japan	9.13		0.32	
France	6.96 ¹	4.78 ²	0.73 ¹	0.50 ²
Fed. Rep. of Germany		4.70		0.39
Italy	3.01		0.37	
United Kingdom	2.62		0.32	
Canada	2.34		0.50	
Netherlands	2.23		0.98	
Sweden	1.53		0.87	
Australia	1.09		0.46	
Norway	0.99		1.12	
Denmark	0.92		0.89	
Switzerland	0.62		0.32	
Finland	0.61		0.59	
Belgium	0.59		0.39	
Austria	0.30		0.24	
New Zealand	0.10		0.27	
Ireland	0.06		0.20	
Total DAC	47.58		0.35	

Source: DAC, OECD, 1989.

1. Including overseas department and territories
2. Excluding overseas department and territories

7 Joseph C. Wheeler - "The Critical Role for Official Development Assistance in the 1990's". In *Finance and Development*, September 1989, p. 40.

8 Canada, Finland, France, Italy, Japan and Switzerland.

These mixed trends have meant that the estimated collective DAC/ODA/GNP ratio in 1988 of 0.35% is only half of the internationally targeted level of 0.7% of GNP.

It must be pointed out that, unfortunately, the Arab-OPEC aid which reached the extraordinary level of nearly US\$14 billion (at 1987 prices and exchange rates) in 1975 and which ran over US\$10 billion until 1981, has since come down to slightly above US\$2 billion in 1988 (though still at a high ratio of ODA to GNP exceeding 2%)⁹.

Export Credits

Export credits can play a key role in financing the adjustment process of developing countries, by maintaining critical imports. As with commercial bank lending, export credits in the post-1981 period virtually collapsed in response to developing countries' loss of credit-worthiness combined with the compression of their imports. After rising to peak levels of around US\$13 billion in 1980-1981, new export lending contracted sharply thereafter to reach an estimated US\$3 billion in 1985¹⁰. The curtailment in export lending reflects the perception of increased risks. In many cases, export credit guarantees and insurance coverage have been limited to short-term operations or suspended entirely following rescheduling operations. It should be noted that demand factors linked to contractionary adjustment policies have also contributed to the decline in export lending.

Multilateral flows

Deteriorating growth prospects in many developing countries and a growing perception that adequate financing will not be forthcoming from private lenders have focused attention on the role the multilateral finance institutions could play in financing adjustment and mobilizing flows from their sources. Following a period of rapid expansion in the late 1970s, the pace of multilateral disbursements slowed down in the first half of this decade. Financial support for the lending programmes of the major multilateral institutions has fallen short of the growing needs for finance since member countries like the US have, for some time now, demonstrated their lack of confidence in multilateralism. The US pull-out from multilateral organizations such as the UNESCO, among others, is a case in point. Consequently, multilateral concessional lending has lost much of its earlier dynamism as programmes such as those of International Development Association (IDA) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) have become increasingly prone to resource stringencies. These

⁹ See Joseph C. Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

¹⁰ For discussion of export credit agency policies and responses to debt-servicing problems, see *IMF Export Credits: Developments and Prospects*, Washington D.C. 1986.

institutions have nevertheless greatly extended their policy influence over the past several years. Acceptance of their policy conditionality by developing countries has, in fact, increasingly been a pre-requisite for the allocation of ODA and commercial bank loans.

At the same time, there has been a growing acceptance within the international community of the need to give more emphasis in adjustment programmes to raising the rate of growth. It is also recognized that the multilateral institutions must play a pivotal role in this process. In practical terms, this has been reflected in such developments as the Baker and Brady Initiatives, the United Nations Programme of Action to African Recovery and Development (1986-1990) and at the level of the multilateral institutions themselves in the appearance of various innovative forms of co-financing, fast-disbursing programme assistance and structural adjustment lending and other special facilities for the needier countries. Even though co-operation among the institutions is being intensified, it must be emphasized that the overall effectiveness of these institutions depends heavily on the adequacy of their capital resources.

Private Flows

International Capital Markets

From the 1970s up to the early 1980s private flows especially bank lending played a dynamic role in underwriting investments and balance-of-payments financing in developing countries. But as confidence rapidly evaporated with the onset of debt-servicing difficulties, both spontaneous bank lending and foreign direct investment sharply receded in 1982 and have remained depressed since.

Following the emergence of major debt-servicing difficulties in 1982, international bank lending to developing countries has continued to decline. Voluntary bank lending is now virtually non-existent and has been replaced by concerted financing with official intervention. In fact, voluntary lending to severely indebted countries has fallen to such low levels that debt service now siphons off a significant part of domestic savings to the detriment of domestic capital formation.

The slow pace of bank lending stems from caution on the part of developing countries and more importantly from most banks' reluctance to lend to many developing countries that were already indebted and/or are experiencing serious difficulties.

The debt strategy emerging from the Baker Plan stressed the importance of increased net lending by commercial banks to the highly indebted countries. But the large flows of voluntary finance from commercial banks have not resumed. If net disbursements or net flows (more meaningful indicators) are taken into consideration, it is observed that the commercial

banks have not achieved much by way of contributing to financing current account deficits of highly indebted countries (see Table 4).

**Table 4 - Commercial bank lending to highly indebted countries
(billions of US dollars)**

	1986	1987	1988	1986-1988
Concerted new money ¹				
Commitments	8.3	2.4	5.6	16.3
Disbursements	3.2	5.7	6.0	14.9
Change in exchange rate adjusted claims ²	3.5	0.6	2.0	6.1
Net disbursements ³	-0.4	2.3	2.1	4.0

Sources: 1. IMF-World Bank, *Finance and Development*, Sept. 1989 p. 13

2. These claims include identified debt conversions, arrears and other balance sheet adjustments

3. Debt and International Finance Division, World Bank.

It is observed from table 4 that during 1986-88, commercial bank creditors provided only US\$4 billion in net new financing on long-term public and publicly guaranteed debt to the highly indebted countries. The general trends outlined in table 4 conceal great differences across countries, but in no case did commercial banks provide more net financing than they received in interest payments¹¹. The contribution of commercial banks in meeting the external financing requirements of highly indebted countries during 1986-88 did not, therefore, live up to the expectations of the proponents of the Baker Plan.

One reason for commercial banks' unwillingness to lend has been poor country performance reflected in the deep discounts on highly indebted countries loans in the secondary market. But there are other factors, such as banks' concern with building their capital bases; the competitive pressures they face in increasingly deregulated and liberal domestic financial markets; and the effect on their ability to raise new shareholder equity in the markets of their exposure (outstanding loans) in developing countries¹².

Spontaneous lending to developing countries was almost confined to Asia (to the middle-income newly industrializing countries), and it has shown little tendency to revive in countries that have recently restructured their debt.

11 For a more detailed discussion of the recent performance of commercial banks, see UNCTAD, *Trade and Development Report*, 1989.

12 Ibid. and see also Ishrat Husain in *op. cit.*, p. 14.

As for bond finance, the recent growth of the international bond markets has largely by passed the developing countries. Furthermore, most developing countries have very limited access to security-related lending, while note issuance facilities and other back-up credit facilities are largely reserved for prime borrowers from developed countries.

Foreign Direct Investment

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has traditionally been an important vehicle for the transfer of financial capital, technological and marketing skills to developing countries. FDI flows grew erratically through much of the 1970s, with a general deterioration in the investment climate. Lately, the problems associated with developing countries indebtedness and with high levels of real interest rates have revived interest in the potential for a greater role of equity in development financing. For highly indebted countries, the importance of non-debt-creating flows (including direct investment) rose significantly.

Between 1986 and 1988, while net lending to these countries fell from a peak of 24.3 billion dollars to a meagre 11.6 billion dollars (more than 52% fall), the total value of direct investment flows almost doubled from 6.6 billion dollars in 1986 to 11.0 billion dollars in 1988 - an increase of 66.7%, (see Table 5), accomplished in part through debt-equity swaps¹³.

Table 5 - Net Resource Flows to Developing Countries, 1986-1988
(billions of US dollars) - All Countries

	1986	1987	1988
Aggregate net resource flows ² of which	51.5	41.4	44.2
Direct investment	6.6	10.3	11.0
Net lending ³	24.3	10.4	11.6
Total external resource balance	55.8	51.6	51.0

Source: IMF debt and International Division, World Bank

See *Financing and Development*, September 1989, p. 13.

Whether FDI can assume a larger financing role will depend on a number of factors. At present, a number of negative influences would seem to be working FDI growth in the developing countries. First, sectors traditionally favoured by FDI such as mineral and petroleum are now depressed and marked by overcapacity¹⁴. Moreover, economic uncertainties in major debtor countries act as deterrents to new investment flows.

13 For further discussion see, "New Financing Approaches in the Debt Strategy", by Klaus Regling in *Finance and Development*, March 1988, p. 15-18.

14 See, Report of the 13th Session of the Commission on Transnational Corporations, E/C.

Reactivation of FDI in major borrowing developing countries is conditional on a satisfactory resolution of these countries' debt problems, since foreign exchange stringencies associated with debt-servicing difficulties also tend to limit profit remittances. More recently, the slackening of world economic growth bringing with it renewed upsurge of protectionism has discouraged FDI flows that are export-oriented¹⁵.

The general conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing analysis is that, by and large, development finance to developing countries has exhibited a downward trend due to several factors some of which have already been discussed. However, a major factor that needs to be emphasized in the contraction in net transfers can be traced to accelerating outflows, particularly of interest payments, which offset the more hesitant growth in gross receipts of financial resources by developing countries.

The outflow of debt service payments was accentuated by a rising trend in profit remittances. However, profit remittances alone do not fully capture the recent evolution of outflows related to direct investment, since they do not take into account another type of associated outflow. For instance, transnational Corporations are often in a position to shift working balances in times of acute financial or political difficulty. Furthermore, net financial flows and net transfers hardly reflect the effect of capital flight which constitutes an additional source of reverse flow from developing countries. It is worthy of note that this phenomenon is not readily susceptible to measurement and estimates often differ widely. The next section shall consider the trend of resource outflow from the developing countries in a bid to throw some light on recent developments on the issue.

Financial Outflows from Developing Countries

The Net Financial Transfer of the Developing Countries

As a whole, the developing countries are still transferring resources abroad, as they have been doing since 1984. Apart from 1982, 1983 and 1986 with net accumulation of reserves (due to several reasons chief among which was a drastic reduction of imports), all developing countries transferred financial resources abroad reaching a peak of US\$36 billion in 1987 (see Table 6). But there seems to be three separate stories behind the overall flow.

One involves the energy-exporting developing countries which are generally referred to as "capital-surplus countries". As shown in Table 6 they have actually been net recipients of financial transfers from abroad since 1982 as weakening oil prices (until the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990) and a major military conflict in the Gulf area (the 8

10/1987/2.

15 Ibid.

year-old Iran-Iraq war) cut deeply into their ability to transfer resources abroad.

The large net transfer made by four generally small Asian economies constitutes a second net-transfer story. They comprise a group of very successful exporters of manufactures, namely, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China. Their aggregate net transfer of financial resources abroad was about US\$16 billion in 1989, down from US\$23 billion the year before (Table 6), owing mainly to the sharp cut-back in the trade surplus of the Republic of Korea. Such transfers were also made possible particularly through their ability to invest abroad at a rapid pace in both financial and direct investments, especially in the major developed market economies and in the developing economies of Asia and the Pacific !16 .

Table 6 - Net Transfer of Financial Resources of Groups of Developing Countries, 1982-1988^a (billions of dollars)

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Surplus energy exporters	2.0	26.4	17.8	11.5	28.7	11.8	15.8
Capital-importing economies	31.0	-5.9	-33.0	-24.4	-16.5	-47.8	-40.8
of which							
Africa ^b	13.9	7.7	1.9	-1.5	5.4	-0.2	3.9
Latin America and the Caribbean	3.4	-25.6	-35.2	-31.4	-15.0	-19.3	-22.4
Four recent surplus economies in Asia ^c	-0.3	-4.1	-8.3	-10.9	-22.7	-28.5	-23.4
Other Asia and Europe	14.0	16.1	8.5	19.3	15.8	0.2	1.0
All developing countries	33.0	20.5	-15.5	-12.9	12.1	-36.0	-24.9

Source: Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the UN Secretariat based on IMF data and official national sources.

- a). Expenditure basis (negative of balance on payments of goods, services and private transfers, excluding investment income).
- b). Excluding Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and South Africa
- c). Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China.

16 United Nations Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, *World Economic Survey 1990*. E/1990/55/ST/ESA/218.

With respect to the generally termed "capital-importing developing countries", their net resource transfers abroad started in 1983 (see Table 6) albeit in a totally different context. These are countries with recent debt-servicing difficulties and which have been the most likely to make net outward transfers under the dual impact of reduced bank lending and higher interest rates, since a large part of their outstanding debt had been contracted at market related, variable terms. For this group of countries, debt-service payments, particularly the interest component, have accelerated faster than gross inflows, especially after the collapse of voluntary lending from mid-1982. From 1983 onwards, net transfers turned sharply negative reaching a peak of more than 47 billion dollars in 1987 (see Table 6) and would have attained far greater magnitudes were it not for the cushioning impact of concerted lending and debt rescheduling¹⁷. In spite of this factor, it can be observed from table 6 that the total transfer of resources abroad from Latin America and the Caribbean amounted to over 148 billion dollars over the period 1983-1988.

Relatively speaking, low-income countries in Africa have been more insulated in this respect since much of their borrowing has been on concessional and relatively stable terms. Thus, as can be observed from table 6, real resource inflows significantly took a down-ward trend. They reached negative levels in 1985 and 1987 with some recovery in 1986 and 1988 due mostly to drastic cuts in imports, debt reschedulings, and a considerable redirection of ODA to these countries, coupled with substantial emergency financing.

The emergence of several developing countries as net providers of financial resources is a serious cause for concern, primarily because it is taking place during a period of acute pressure on growth and in the external accounts of these countries. In the first place, the sudden decline in net transfers to developing countries suggest that the shift took place as a result of a rapid rise in interest rate on the one hand and a breakdown in the mechanism for rolling over maturities, on the other. Secondly, many of the countries affected are far from the stage at which they could reasonably generate domestic savings at a rate which could offset shortfalls in external flows of the size encountered in recent years. It is thus not hard to understand why governments of the highly constrained developing countries have had grave and protracted difficulties, as discussed later on, in bringing about economic stabilization and structural adjustment.

While the general trends outlined above conceal great differences across countries, the indications are that, although the various flow categories

¹⁷ See Michael P. Booley and C. Maxwell Watson, "Reinvigorating the Debt Strategy" in *Finance and Development*, September 1989, pp. 8-12.

underwent some modifications (eg. modest rebuilding of official reserves), the overall effect, however, was a reduced volume of net inflows compared to increasing net outflows. Below the impact of the foregoing scenario shall be examined in terms of several factors of particular importance to the developing countries.

An Assessment of Trends and Related Issues

Qualitative Assessment of Recent Trends in Financial Flows

The declining volume of external financial resources available to developing countries which has characterized the 1980s reflects both the tendency for the major components of such flows to behave in a pro-cyclical fashion and the close linkages among them. Thus, the availability of bank credit, upon which many developing countries had come to rely heavily and which depends largely on perceptions of the borrowers' credit worthiness, decreased dramatically as developing countries' growth slowed down and balance-of-payment situations began to worsen.

Structural changes in capital markets and in official flows during the 1980s have further complicated the situation for developing countries. Whereas in the 1970s, balance-of-payments finance was readily available from capital markets, given the necessity to recycle the OPEC surplus, and official flows from both bilateral and multilateral source rose significantly, the situation has changed considerably in recent years, with implication for both the volume and the quality of financial transfer to developing countries.

The present situation with regard to the provision of development finance is characterized by 2 main features: the predominance of "maintenance" financing by creditors and the pervasive practice of policy-based lending. The former is designed primarily to prevent the collapse of debtor countries' economies rather than to restore the flow of financial resources needed to revive growth. Banks that lend just enough to a debtor country to ensure that it can meet current interest payments, export credit agencies that lend enough to ensure minimal maintenance of export markets and tolerable levels of unemployment in key export industries and aid agencies that divert funds to provide the imports necessary to sustain current output, are all engaged in "maintenance" or "defensive" financing.¹⁸ While such policies might be appropriate responses from the viewpoint of creditors, given the availability of resources, they can play only a limited role in bringing about the changes in economic structure necessary not just to overcome current difficulties of debtor countries but also to promote long-term growth.

18 For a comprehensive discussion of "Maintenance" and policy-based financing as well as related issues, see, *Official Development Assistance: selected issues* (TD/BC.3/213).

The second change has been the expansion of policy-based lending which is designed to assist debtor developing countries in remedying perceived policy shortcomings. Such lending implies that sustained financing can only be forthcoming if accompanied by appropriate policy changes - the so-called structural adjustment programmes - in borrowing countries. Policy-based lending has typically been granted in support of efforts to liberalize policy in areas deemed to interfere in the efficient operation of markets. The objective of such lending has therefore been to lay the groundwork for a more efficient allocation of resources and to provide greater flexibility to the economy in responding to changing market forces¹⁹.

The growing trend towards policy-oriented lending has subjected many debtor countries to prolonged periods of negotiation with different institutions thus leading to the delay both in financing and policy adjustment²⁰. Strong imperatives are therefore placed on the need for expeditious as well as planned and coordinated negotiations and financing within an overall adjustment package. Active participation by the borrowing country is also important if it is to identify fully with the adjustment package.

The Emergence of Financial Disorder

The international financial system has been plagued in the last few years by financial disorder. In adjusting to the sharp fall in the availability of external credit, many countries were forced to draw down their foreign exchange reserves, sometimes to minimum levels and to accumulate payments arrears, sometimes in anticipation of a debt reorganization which had become unavoidable. The international financial system is now required to cope with the phenomenon of large and frequent payments arrears, repeated reschedulings which have caused banks and other financial institutions to lose control over the maturity of their claims, involuntary lending, costly reserve building in some countries and sharply reduced levels of reserves in others, particularly in Africa. Some of these phenomena are discussed below.

Payments arrears

As a result of growing payments difficulties, cumulative arrears of developing countries have been rising since the end of 1982 as well as the number of countries that have been experiencing arrears²¹.

Although, the IMF pays particular attention to the question of arrears in its programmes with member countries, the persistence of arrears suggests

19 *Ibid.*

20 *Ibid.*

21 The World Bank, World Development Report, 1989.

that the problem is of a scale not amenable to solutions on the basis of current policies.

Arrears tend to be extremely costly. In the first place they block access to trade credits and result in significant mark-ups on normal commercial transactions !22 . In order to recoup losses as a result of defaults, suppliers frequently levy premium charges even on goods financed by confirmed letters of credit !23 .. Secondly, various precautionary measures adopted by export credit agencies also result in higher costs to the importers. One type of response has been to reduce the proportion of the value of sales which can be insured. In extreme cases, this may be zero !24 In response the exporter may raise prices even in situations where the importer is not in arrears.

A further difficulty may arise when the size of the accumulated arrears is such that they cannot be repaid out of current foreign exchange earnings in the short-term. In this case, the arrears have to be rescheduled as part of a debt reorganization and on terms which tend to be harder than on current maturities !25 . Thus, the growth in outstanding debt proceeds in an environment in which the prospects for eliminating arrears tend to decline.

Repeated Reschedulings

Traditionally, debt reorganization has been considered as a last measure, resorted to only in case of acute balance-of-payments difficulties because of the potential for loss of credit worthiness and disruption of financial relations. The key objective of rescheduling !26 has been to secure a manageable profile of debt repayments as part of a package of national and international measures which would ensure the level of imports required to safeguard the development process. Rescheduling of the magnitude witnessed in the 1980s undoubtedly provided a source of financing and relief which enabled most countries involved to maintain a level of imports higher than would otherwise have been possible and helped prevent a collapse in international financial relations. By and large, however, debt reschedulings were not accompanied by a resumption of new lending from commercial banks except in the form of involuntary lending.

22 See, Peter Kranevald - "Keeping export credits competitively neutral" in *The OECD Observer*, No. 147, August/September 1987, p. 16.

23 *Ibid*

24 *Ibid*.

25 *Ibid*.

26 For a more extensive discussion of the adequacy of present arrangements for multilateral debt rescheduling, see, UNCTAD Review of the implementation of section B of Trade and Development Board Resolution 222 (XXI) (TD/B/980, and UNCTAD, Conclusions drawn by the UNCTAD Secretariat following consultations in pursuance of conference resolution 161 (VI) (TD/B/950).

Several features of rescheduling arrangements have been a source of growing concern: firstly, in relation to the scale of the difficulties experienced during the last several years, the amounts rescheduled represented only a fraction of outstanding debt²⁷. Secondly, many of the countries which have rescheduled continue to face payments difficulties and to accumulate arrears. Very few countries which succeeded in eliminating their difficulties through debt reorganization have yet re-established normal access to either private or official and other trade-related financing. Particularly serious has been the difficulty experienced by countries in the sub-saharan region and major debtor countries in Latin America. Countries which have had their debt rescheduled in the Paris Club have continued to face serious difficulties ensuing from restrictive policies applied by the export credit agencies affecting access to insurance cover²⁸. In many instances cover has not been restored, even after the completion of rescheduling agreements. The practice of repeated reschedulings, each associated with a short consolidation period, not only imposes high costs on debtor countries in terms of continuous damage to their credit worthiness but also exerts strains on the scarce time of senior officials.

The short-term character of debt rescheduling has often led to the repetition of reschedulings of debts owed by the same countries. However, the emergence of multi-year rescheduling arrangements (MYRAs) starting in 1984 between Mexico and its private creditors, has been a positive sign heralding changes in creditor policies²⁹. Following this development the first MYRA was extended by official creditors in 1985. This agreement with Ecuador was followed by others with Côte d'Ivoire and Yugoslavia in 1986. These agreements were, however, limited to the rescheduling of repayments of principal only MYRAs have, so far, relieved only marginally the financing constraints faced by heavily indebted developing countries and thus have not led, as expected, to a rapid restoration of credit worthiness.

Reserves

As regards reserve building, recent upheavals in financial markets have had a major impact on trends and incentives underlying the accumulation of reserves. When their access to the international capital markets became severely restricted in 1983, developing countries were abruptly confronted with the need to acquire and maintain more prudential levels of reserves. For example, countries like Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Philippines, Republic of

27 *Ibid.*

28 Peter, Kraneveld *op. cit.*

29 Despite the innovative character of the Mexican rescheduling, however, it has not enabled that country to establish conditions for resumption of voluntary borrowing, nor has Mexico been able to secure improvements in its payment situation of a size to enable it to resume growth.

Korea and Venezuela have shown sustained efforts in building reserves. For instance, Venezuela's external reserves which stood at only 1,047 million dollars in 1970 jumped to a high of 11,510 million dollars in 1987 equivalent to 10 months of imports of foods and services capable of cushioning off future financial disturbance (see Table 7).

Table 7 - Reserves Position and Months of Import Coverage of Selected Developing Countries 1970 and 1987.

	Gross international reserves Millions of dollars		In months of import coverage
	1970	1987	1987
Middle-income countries			
Mexico	756	13,692	6.2
Brazil	1,190	7,477	3.0
Argentina	682	3,734	3.5
Korea, Republic	610	3,739	0.9
Venezuela	1,047	11,510	10.1
Low-income countries			
Ethiopia	72	245	2.3
Zaire	189	417	1.8
Tanzania	65	32	0.3
Zambia	515	111	1.4
Sierra Leone	39	6	1.0

Source: The World Bank, *World Development Report 1989* pp. 198-199

In contrast, countries in Africa, in spite of some reduction in current-account deficits, experienced a considerable attrition of their reserve levels in 1987. For this group of countries, reserves fell to levels equal to little more than one month of imports of goods and services, leaving no margin for manoeuvre in the event of financial disruptions: Sierra Leone, Zambia, Tanzania, etc. fall into this group (see Table 7).

Recent reserve building has been associated with growing uncertainties in the international environment. The slow recovery, coupled with uncertain prospects for capital flows, for the future evolution of the United States trade deficit and for the dollar exchange and interest rates, have increased downside risks for developing countries, particularly the highly indebted ones. The effect of these uncertainties has been to add to precautionary demands for reserves. More cautious policies in reserve building have additionally been induced on the supply side by acute shortages in the availability of international liquidity caused by the gradual reduction in

access to less conditional fund facilities and near impossibility for many developing countries to borrow reserves on the international capital markets³⁰.

Impact on domestic savings³¹

The disorder in the international financial system has reduced not only the availability of external finance but also the capacity to finance development through domestic savings. Surely, the reduction in net financial flows to developing countries and the emergence of negative net transfers make it all the more important to improve the effective mobilization of domestic savings. While there can be little doubt that increased efforts are needed in many countries to boost savings and growth performance, the fact that the effectiveness of these efforts often depends on the external environment is not always fully grasped.

The worsening terms of trade of developing countries during the 1980s has meant that supply available for domestic use has fallen in relation to domestic output. Consequently, the maintenance of investment out of a given volume of domestic output would require the full brunt of the reduction in the real output available for domestic use to fall entirely on current consumption.

The consequences of the deterioration in the external financial environment have also been serious. Since interest payments to non-residents are a first claim on domestic savings, an increase in interest rates on outstanding debt necessarily reduced national savings (defined here as domestic savings less net factor income payments to non-residents) and hence also the volume of investment that could be financed from domestic savings.

A large number of developing countries have experienced a marked deterioration in both the external financial and trading environments during the 1980s³². While the order of magnitude involved varies from one country to another, the additional savings efforts required to offset the adverse consequences of the decline in the terms of trade, the rise in interest rates and the cut-back in lending has been substantial. The difficulties experienced in their external accounts have led governments of debtor developing countries to adopt policies designed to redress external imbalances. However these policy responses, often including currency devaluation, frequently have had the unwanted side-effect of impairing the capacity of private business to

30 Thom B. Thurston and K. Aufhauser and company - "The Changing Institutional character of International Financial Markets in the 1980s" in *Supplement to World Economic Survey 1985-1986* (ST/ESA/186).

31 For a fuller discussion of this issue see, *Trade and Development Report*, 1986, chapter VI.

32 The World Bank *op. cit.*, 1989 pp. 44-49.

save and invest. The financial position of domestic firms that had borrowed substantial amounts in foreign currency was impaired, often very considerably, by the increase in the domestic currency equivalent of their foreign obligations. Firms' balance sheets and profits were also generally weakened where domestic demand contracted and interest rates were sharply increased. For these reasons, in many countries, business lost, in whole or in part, the capacity to generate savings. This in turn had an impact on the viability of domestic financial institutions, through the effect on the quality of their loan portfolios. The domestic financial system has thus been impeded from playing its role of mobilizing domestic savings and allocating them among alternative domestic users.

With respect to the capacity of governments to generate public sector savings, sharp currency depreciation has been a serious obstacle since it has raised the domestic currency cost of servicing the external public debt and hence has aggravated the budget problem created by high interest rates and debt-service obligations. Furthermore, in many developing countries, receipts from tariffs have been an important source of governmental revenue. Where external payments difficulties required sharp cut-backs in imports, government revenues fell correspondingly, reducing public sector savings. The effect was exacerbated where tariffs were replaced by currency devaluations as part of an adjustment programme.

Thus, the deterioration in the external financial and trading environment has widened the gap between aggregate (i.e. domestic and external) savings and the investment necessary for steady growth. In some Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) the fall in national savings relative to gross domestic product has been of the order of 10 percentage points. In China the fall has been such that national savings alone are now insufficient even to maintain the capital stock³³. In most countries where efforts to increase domestic savings have been successful, national savings and investments as a percentage of GDP have nevertheless declined, or failed to rise, because of worsened external financial conditions. Thus, in countries where domestic savings efforts were successful, they were not sufficient to compensate for the deterioration in the external environment, even during the recent period of recovery. This experience suggests, therefore, that most developing countries are unlikely to be able to make up, to any significant extent, for the non-availability of external finance and the deterioration in trading conditions through an improved savings performance, at least in the relatively near future. Rather, the success of such efforts will depend essentially on the resumption of growth and hence on the improvement of the external environment and the availability of development finance.

33 *Trade and Development Report op. cit.*

Various policy options that could be considered by policy makers in order to remedy the situation are reviewed below.

Conclusion

The Policy Options

The foregoing analysis has shown the extent to which disruption of financial flows can lead to external financial disorder and economic stagnation mostly in developing countries. It has also shown how quickly external financial difficulties spill over into the domestic financial sector of developing economies making it difficult to generate and mobilize domestic savings and diverting savings from domestic investment precisely at the time when increases in such investment are mostly needed.

The policy response to these problems has registered certain successes but on the whole has not been adequate, given the full dimensions of the crisis. There is now virtually universal agreement that downward pressures on growth must be reversed and that the objective of restoring adequate rates of growth must stand at the centre of any viable international strategy on debt³⁴.

Thus, on the home front, developing debtor countries will have to make firm commitments to further strengthen their economies by adopting additional market-oriented economic policies, relying more heavily on supply-side actions such as tax and labour reforms, transference of inefficient state enterprises to the private sector, liberalization of trade practices, and adoption of policies to attract more foreign investment. In some countries, serious efforts to convert large parts of the public sector to private ownership have been undertaken. Some countries - Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Ghana - have done much more than others and it is hoped that the rest will follow suit.

The question nevertheless remains as to how the financial requirements of future growth and development are to be met. Domestic savings will remain the principal means of financing investment for development. However, in the poorer developing countries, domestic savings will not be sufficient, even under the most optimistic assumptions, to allow rapid inroads into the present levels of absolute poverty. Whatever the success in this area, external financial flows will continue to have a critical role to play in the financing of development. The declaration in 1985 in Seoul by James Baker, the former United States Treasury Secretary on this issue should thus be seen as a bold step in the right direction. His current position as Secretary of State should help translate the declaration into concrete measures.

34 This idea constitutes the cornerstone of such initiatives is the Baker Plan, the Brady Initiative, the Miyazawa Plan, the Mitterand Proposal and the Brundland Report etc.

The challenge before policy-makers is to come to a fresh understanding of how under present and prospective conditions in the world economy, external financial flows could make the necessary contributions to reviving and sustaining development.

The Baker declaration and the recent Brady initiative of the US Treasury Secretary called for more money from commercial banks and enhanced role for the World Bank and more growth in the developing world. But it is needless to say that the multilateral financial institutions cannot function properly in the face of the skeptical attitude and suspicion of its main shareholder - the US government. Unless the United States openly backs both an increase in the World Bank's capital and changes in its lending practices - which, so far, it has refused to do - the Baker plan and other initiatives will fall through.

The commercial banks have been asked by the Baker plan to continue to lend to the heavily indebted developing countries and to increase their exposure by at least 2.5% per year ¹³⁵. But heretofore most European commercial banks would not lend more money nor make funds available on long-term maturities because they do not consider most developing country borrowers to be sufficiently credit worthy. In such circumstances, there is a strong rationale for involving official entities in the process of financial intermediation so as to ensure that loans are guaranteed. It is precisely this reasoning which led to the establishment of the World Bank and the regional development banks. In this wise, the World Bank has to guarantee portions of a loan, particularly in the tail end of the maturities due. This guarantee applies to principal only. In order to obtain such a guarantee, bankers pay a fee which effectively reduces their rate of return. Such guarantees in fact reduce the risk that a debtor country will default, because the commercial banks are more willing to lend the amounts required. Provided such financing and guarantees are coupled with strict monitoring of the economic performance the country, the chances of success increase significantly ¹³⁶.

For those countries whose debt servicing problems can be speedily overcome by lower interest rates and rapidly rising export earnings, a return to normal (i.e. voluntary) financing from private capital markets can be envisaged if the external environment improves accordingly. Access to such flows are unlikely to expand again at the pre-crisis pace, but such flows can nonetheless make a significant contribution to external financing.

Again, for many poorer developing countries whose debts are growing faster than their net export proceeds, the banks and industrial governments

35 See, Christine A. Bogdanowics-Binder - "World Debt: The US Reconsiders" in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1985/86 vol. 64 No. 2.

36 *Ibid.*

should consider writing off part of their debts³⁷. In fact, a number of banks have already written down, though they have not written off, a sizeable portion of their exposure to small debtors. There would not be any major consequences for banks to write off debts, provided countries benefitting from such an exercise do not present a risk to the financial system. A write-off by the banks for some countries would obviously have to be reviewed carefully, to examine the possibility that the debtor could further reduce imports, adjust its economy or generate additional exports.

In this context, a safety clause to guard against free rides by debtor countries can be made so that in the event of a country enjoying a sudden, unexpected increase in foreign exchange receipts, because of a jump in cocoa or copper prices, debt cancellations would be reviewed. However, in situation where countries are considered to be technically in default because of endemic economic devastation resulting from civil wars, poor resources, *inter alia*, like in Chad, a debt write-off could be justified, not only to respond to the debtor's bankruptcy, but also to protect international financial structure and practices.

As regards official debts owed to governments, these can be converted into grants as an alternative to debt write-off. An African nation's obligations to Britain, for instance, would be redefined as grants; but the debtor would not necessarily be excused from some kind of *quid pro quo*, because payments could be accepted in the currency of the country. If such an arrangement were made with Ghana, for instance, Britain could spend its acquired cedis on consular and other British personnel purchases locally. Ghana's foreign obligation would, thus, be cleared. This would also allow a reduction in pound sterling inflows to Ghana for embassy operations.

With respect to FDIs, relevant investment policies should be improved upon by the host developing countries so as to attract them and the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) should provide guarantees for direct investments in developing countries. Again, export credit agencies need to increase their lending and guarantee programmes. Bilateral assistance should be increased significantly. Japan, which has the world's biggest current account surplus, has proposed the recycling of up to US\$30 billion of its external surplus over three years 1987-1989 to developing countries³⁸. This is an encouraging development. But other official bilateral creditors (e.g. export credit agencies) also need to do more

37 The initiative proposed by President Mitterand in May 1989 to forgive French official debt to 35 last developed and most indebted countries should help considerably to reduce the financial imbalance confronting them.

38 See Saleh H. Nouli - "Structural Adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa" in *Finance and Development*, *op. cit.* p. 33.

if financing requirements for the resumption of even minimal per capita growth in the highly indebted countries are to be met.

The direct provision by donor governments of concessional flows would also require detailed review with an eye to reaching a broad consensus on the rationale, scope and indicated distribution of such assistance in the future. Particular emphasis would need to be given to ensuring an expanded flow, in a more coordinated manner, of highly concessional aid to the poorest developing countries.

There is thus, reason to believe that a stronger official presence will be required in financial intermediation for development in the future than in the past. However, given the great variety of circumstances of developing countries, direct flows from private lenders and investors will also have an increased role to play for many. In this area, what needs to be encouraged is the evolution of financial instruments so as to ensure that these flows occur in ways that are best adapted to the needs of developing countries, in particular, as regards the maturity and certainty of flows and the mixture between debt-creating and non-debt-creating finance.

We should not forget that the collapse of developing countries' economies will definitely have calamitous results for the entire international financial system - to say nothing of the political and human consequences across the continents.

Organized Labour Under the Military Regimes in Nigeria

Austin Isamah*

Résumé: Dans la majorité des pays africains, les régimes militaires, , sont devenus un fait de la vie. Cependant, dans le processus d'administration de leur pays, les militaires ont eu à avoir des interactions et des relations réciproques avec beaucoup de groupes dont la plupart énoncent et mettent en avant différents intérêts. Parmi ces groupes d'intérêts, les organisations ouvrières dont les relations réciproques avec l'Armée varient d'un pays à un autre jouent un rôle important.

Le présent article examine les relations entre le gouvernement militaire du Nigéria et les organisations ouvrières dans le cadre du processus de développement économique global.

L'argument principal ici est que, compte tenu de l'orientation des deux groupes fondée sur leurs normes et valeurs organisationnelles et expériences respectives, ils diffèrent pour ce qui est du pouvoir politique et de son utilisation dans le processus de développement. Les différents régimes militaires ont donc mis au point différentes stratégies pour assujettir et contrôler le mouvement ouvrier.

Most interested scholars and commentators both within and outside of Africa are agreed that where the military is in power, there is need for it to establish a cooperative relationship with organized labour in the interest of societal development and progress. Ali Mazrui (1973), for instance developed a thesis which sought to explain political instability in the new states of Africa on the cultural deficiency of the Western educated ruling elites. He suggested that the military (the 'lumpen-militariat') and the workers (the 'lumpenproletariat') share the same cultural idiom and the marriage between these two groups, i.e. the forces of destruction and those of production, is a recipe for a cultural rediscovery and resurgence. In other words, Mazrui (1973) advocated the cooperation of the military and labour first for political stability and ultimately for social and economic development. Such a collaboration does not of course preclude occasional conflict. Infact such occasional conflict may be desirable to prevent the ossification of creativity and initiative.

However events all over Africa would seem to indicate that rather than cooperation and collaboration, the relationship has been one of conflict and antagonism. Thus for instance, Adekanye (1984) divided the major interest groups in the typical African country into two broad categories based on the nature of their relationship with the military. The two categories are the 'pro-military' groups and the 'anti-military' groups. Included in the pro-military groups are the military establishment itself, the bureaucratic

* Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria

elite, certain business interests, the urban unemployed and the rural mass. The anti-military groups on the other hand include the restoration government, the old aristocracy, the intelligentsia, radical political organizations and organized labour¹. There is no doubt that the nature of the relationship between the military regime and each of these groups will depend on the particular interest each group seeks to represent and how it goes about achieving that objective. The manner which each group operates thus influences how the military regime comes to perceive such a group and determines its (the military) reaction to that group. Where for instance the military regime considers the operation of a particular interest groups as disruptive, that regime's reaction would be in the direction of control or coercion or in the extreme, extermination.

The present paper focuses on an examination of the nature of the relationship between the military-in- government and organized labour in Nigeria. Nigeria with her immense human and natural resources stands on the threshold of modernization and development. But for this process to be realized, there is no doubt that all the strategically located groups must collaborate. The military, on the one hand, which, as already pointed out, has a monopoly over the forces of destruction and has used them to obtain for itself political power and hence the ability to exercise control over the direction and pace of national development, and organized labour which on the other hand, is directly involved in the production of national wealth and is thus in a position to accelerate or retard the development process, are both strategically located in the national political economy. This makes it imperative that they collaborate if the country's resources are to be adequately and efficiently harnessed. Where both parties find it difficult to work together, as is indeed the case in much of Africa, the resultant antagonism and suspicion cannot but contribute to political instability and underdevelopment.

In looking at the prevailing situation in Nigeria, the argument here is that several factors have functioned to make the highly desirable cooperation and collaboration problematic. It must however be pointed out that some of these factors result from the very nature of the two groups themselves, i.e. in the nature of the military organization and the type of orientation it develops and transmits into its members and secondly the experience of the trade union movement since colonial times.

1 Though Adekanye was primarily concerned with what we called 'Post-Military' States, his analysis is still very relevant to the Military States.

The Military

There is no doubt that the phenomenon of military intervention in government has become a fact of life in Africa. This is illustrated by the fact that, of the 51 independent states, no less than 30 are presently under military rule, while a significant proportion of the remaining have either been under the military in the past or have experienced unsuccessful coup attempts; The point then is that in contemporary Africa, there is a preponderance of what Adekanye (1984) referred to as 'military States', i.e. 'states whose governments have fallen overly to the rule and direction of their soldiery, welding supreme executive power'. In such states, the military in addition to its traditional defence functions take on political and administrative functions.

Nigeria is one of these military states, which but for the short period between October 1979 and December 1983, has been under military rule since January 1966. She gained independence from Britain in October 1960 and the first civilian government of Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, weighed down by corruption, nepotism inefficiency etc. collapsed in January 1966 ushering in Nigeria's first military regime. To date, the country has had 5 military regimes², which implies that in Nigeria's 29 years as an independent state, the military has been in power for about 20 years. More than the civilians therefore, the military has had the greatest opportunity to determine the social, economic and political direction of the country. Since politics concerns the behaviour of groups and individuals in matters likely to affect the course of government, the military has had to interact with various groups in the course of pursuing its political and administrative functions. As argued earlier, the reaction of the military to each of these groups usually depends on how the military, on the basis of its ingrained orientation, perceives such a group and its activities; The Nigerian military shares important features of characteristics with other military forces elsewhere. It is the case then that any military organization that is worth being so called must possess the essential characteristics of;

- 1) unity of command
- 2) concentration of authority
- 3) division of functions
- 4) hierarchy of relations
- 5) penchant for discipline

2 These are; the Ironsi regime, Jan. 1966 - July 1966; the Gowon regime, 1966-1975, the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime, 1975-1979; The Buhary regime, 1983-1985 and the Babangida regime, 1985 to the present. No attempt is made to discuss each regime's relationship with organized labour separately.

- 6) network of communications and
- 7) esprit de corps³.

It is the combination of these characteristics that make the military organization what it is and distinguishes it from other organizations. However when the military takes over government, in its relations with the competing interest groups, some of these characteristics tend to become more prominent and thus influence significantly the nature of such relations. The most salient of these characteristics which have influenced the relationship between the military regimes and organized labour in Nigeria have been those of concentration of authority, hierarchy of relations and the penchant for discipline. These characteristics make the military into a highly stratified system, with a system of graded positions and the tradition of unquestioned obedience of orders by subordinates. Such organization places the greatest emphasis on discipline; The content of discipline, according to Max Weber (1964) is nothing but the consistently rationalized, methodically trained and exact execution of the received order in which all personal criticism is unconditionally suspended and the actor is unwaveringly and exclusively set for carrying out the command. The orientation which results from the inculcation of such values as those stated above is a hierarchical conception of authority and political rule. When extended to the day to day governance, such an orientation by necessity rules out the possible existence of any organized group within the country which could function as a centre of 'opposition'. Hence the usual ban imposed immediately on assumption of power by the military on all political parties and other para-political organizations. On the surface, the usual reason for this action is to rid the country of the social ills associated with politicians and political parties; the policization of ethnic cleavages, and intra-elite strife in government structures which result in political and administrative paralysis, corruption, nepotism, government inefficiency and so on⁴.

However a second and perhaps more fundamental reason is that political parties could constitute a source of opposition, a base for social mobilization against the military and their aims and programmes. One consequence of the banning of political organizations is that a vacuum opens up between the military rulers and the mass of citizens, a gap which political and para-political organizations filled hitherto. Dudley (1982) suggests that this gap is occupied under the military by the bureaucracy, a situation in which top civil servants are required not only to advise and execute but also to take on decisional roles. Dudley describes this linkage between the military regime and the bureaucracy as a 'symbiotic relationship' which involves

3 J. Bayo Adekanye (1981).

4 Rafiq Ogunbambi (1985).

above all a greater centralization of political power than ever before. What emerges from all this is that the interests of the lower classes remain unarticulated and unprotected from the negative fall outs of the military regime's programmes, precisely because to a large extent the interests of the bureaucratic elites coincide with those of the military officers in government. Thus given the fundamentally undemocratic nature of military regimes, no matter their pretensions to the contrary, and the absence of intermediary political organizations, experience in Nigeria shows that the Labour Movement gets thrust into the position where it not only protects the interests of its members but also takes on the role of the defender of lower class interests. In these closely related roles, the movement assumes the position of an opposition group, a role it is constrained to undertake because as Adrian Peace (1974) puts it, the great majority of the urban masses have little possibility of such structured opposition - they look at the wage earners to provide the leadership in protests which the wage earners themselves are acutely aware' of. Then evidently in this larger role, it cannot but come against the military's authoritarian conception of power. Hence the desire of the successive military regimes to put down the trade union movement, a desire which has taken several concrete dimensions.

The Trade Union Movement

The development of trade unionism in Nigeria has been attributed to the colonial administration, although conclusive facts on the exact date of unionization in Nigeria have not been established. Current thinking is that the organization of the Nigerian civil service union in 1912 marked the beginning of trade unions in Nigeria. During much of the colonial era, the trade union movement performed two closely related roles. First it was concerned with the protection and advancement of the economic interests of the 'native' workers. In this role, it was relatively successful as on several occasions it was able to win significant concessions from the employers for the workers. Secondly, it was inevitably drawn into the political struggle for independence during which it was closely allied with the nationalist politicians. In this latter role, it came to oppose the colonial administration on two grounds - as the biggest employer of labour and as the political ruler of the colony of Nigeria.

This is not to imply that the trade union movement was one harmonious body, united in the pursuit of common goals. Rather, the entire history of trade unionism in Nigeria has been characterized by competition and internal wrangling. However, it is remarkable that inspite of the internal squabbles which have dogged the movement, unity was usually achieved at crucial points in time and in the face of common obstacles. Thus it is perhaps correct to suggest that the greatest success of the movement during the colonial period was the 1945 general strike which in the words of one

commentator, thoroughly shook the foundations of the Nigerian nation; and involved between 30,000 and 43,000 workers. It must however be pointed out that throughout the colonial era, the colonial administration was primarily interested in nurturing up a strong non-political labour movement along the line of the British Trade Union Congress (TUC). The administration, furthermore favoured voluntary negotiation and collective bargaining in the determination of wages, a policy which was largely unsuccessful because in the social context of the colony, it proved difficult to prevent the politicization of wage determination. Thus on the eve of political independence, a relatively powerful labour movement was in existence, a movement which had weathered numerous storms, internal and external, to emerge as one of the most organized and articulate of the various interest groups in the new nation-state.

However at independence in 1960, the movement was forced to part ways with the politicians as the latter competed fiercely among themselves for political and economic power. The dreams of life abundance conjured up by politicians before independence proved illusory and increasingly the lower classes were marginalised as mismanagement and corruption worsened the country's economy. One major consequence was that real wages failed to keep pace with inflation and resulted in a general fall in the standard of living of wage earners. The trade unions put forward wage claims, and the government prevaricated. But under the threat of a strike by the hastily formed Joint Action Committee (JAC), the government set up what is now known as the Morgan Commission "to investigate the existing wage structure, remuneration and conditions of service in wage-earning employments in the country and to make recommendations concerning a suitable new structure...". Even with the Report submitted to government, nothing happened, hence the 1964 general strike during which Nigeria lost more than 100 million dollars. More than any other thing, the strike 'articulated the class resistance of workers and the popular resentment of politicians'. In other words, the strike went beyond ordinary wage demands to include social and political grievances of the lower classes against the politicians. Also significant is the fact that other members of the lower classes, notably market women and the unemployed joined in the protests that accompanied the strike. One of the major consequence of the 1964 strike was a general disenchantment with politicians' rule and the more or less general euphoria which greeted the January 1966 military coup.

The structure of the Trade Union Movement: Pre-1966

The initial structure of the Nigerian trade union movement was determined by the Trade Union Ordinance of 1930, promulgated by the British Colonial administration. This was the first law in Nigeria to regulate the development of trade unions with its stipulation that 5 or more persons may form a trade

Union. The direct consequence of this stipulation was the proliferation of very small, financially and organizationally weak 'house' unions. Furthermore, as Fashoyin (1981) pointed out, because the ordinance disregarded jurisdictional demarcations, between trade and occupational groups and between different levels of workers, it introduced leadership rivalries which in many cases led to the formation of yet more small unions. Thus, for instance there were 14 unions in 1940 with a total membership of 4629. This however rose to 360 unions in 1960 with a total membership of 274,126. Evidently, the increasing number of wage earners had also functioned to increase the number of unions.

Numerous attempts have been made at uniting these small unions into larger, more viable and organizationally stronger unions, but these have largely failed. Similarly, attempts at uniting all unions under one central union also failed, though as pointed out earlier, the workers usually managed to present a united front in times of difficulties as is illustrated by the joint condemnation of the British authorities after the Enugu shooting of coal workers and the Joint Action Committees of 1945 and 1964. Thus up till the military take over in 1966, the structure of the movement was one of a multiplicity of small 'house' unions, very weak in relationships with employers, but with several fitful attempts made at amalgamation and centralization. As pointed out earlier, these attempts met with varying degrees of failure.

The nature of the Relationship

As Adekanye (1981) had argued basically, military organizations and trade unions are inherently contradictory, for reasons not the least of which centres on the consideration that the former are oriented towards the maintenance of a given socio-political "order" while the latter tend to function more or less through 'agitations'! In spite of the contradictory nature of both organizations, the requirements of development and progress demands that they co-exist and work together. In Nigeria, the attempt at cooperation and co-existence has taken the form of subjugation and control by the military of the Labour movement. While the military regimes recognize the place of trade unions in the development effort, there is however a divergence of opinion on the *modus operandi* the labour movement should adopt. A comparison of the two statements below demonstrates this divergence:

We are compelled to seek the answer to the questions: with what should the trade union movement concern itself?... I feel that the trade union movement with-deviating from its traditional responsibility to seek better working and living conditions and a fair share of the benefits of economic development for its members, must nevertheless concern itself increasingly with the broader questions of social and economic policy...

The potential contributions of trade unions to development planning can take many forms. They can organize or support housing projects, cooperatives health and welfare programmes and vocational training. In all these ways, trade unions can help to effect the vital transformation of the process of development from a movement from above into a movement from below carried forward by the momentum of a people's will⁵.

... The fundamental and enduring concern of the honest trade union is the welfare of the worker and his family. The genuine trade union is above political or compromise betrayal of the workers' interest; it is independent of the government and employers and free of extraneous control. The genuine trade union works for social justice and national progress. It works for these great ideals on their most meaningful level - the greatest good of the greatest number⁶.

It is evident that both parties are agreed that for the trade union movement to be especially relevant to the development process, it must expand its role beyond strictly labour - management or bread and butter issues; However, the manner in which it does it is problematic. Going by Brigadier Adefope's comments, it is clear that the military government recognizes the importance of the trade unions as a vehicle of mass mobilization. However, it has to fulfil this function as partner (a very junior partner at that) of the government. Thus it is expected to restrict itself to 'non-harmful' social programmes expected to benefit the lower classes. In other words what is expected is a docile and servile productionist labour movement without any independence of action beyond the boundaries prescribed by the military government. However, as already pointed out earlier, the Nigerian Labour Movement prides itself for its independence and militance in pursuing its interests. It holds very dear its 'populist' image. Hence the desire to seek 'the greatest good for the greatest number'. This has proved intolerable for the successive military governments, who have reacted by increasingly intervening in the industrial relations process primarily as a means of curbing the activities of the trade unions. As Yesufu (1962; p. 10) pointed out, 'there is nothing that has characterized Nigeria's industrial relations system so much in recent years as the greatly enhanced degree of government involvement since 1966... In Nigeria, before military rule, such intervention was confined to enacting basic legislation which safeguarded the lowest categories of workers from physical exploitation...

5 Brigadier H.E.O. Adefope: Opening address of the National Seminar on *Nigerian Labour Legislation, Impact on Industrial Relations & Economic Development*, 24-30 August 1975.

6 Part one of UCLN Policy Paper titled *A Programme for the Future*, May 1962.

however, the shift that had taken place after the inception of military rule in 1966 had been such as to amount, on the face of it, to an almost complete negation of the principle of voluntarism. This is evidenced by the amount and content of labour and industrial relations legislation that was enacted since 1966, together with the various complementary decrees and administrative actions which had the effect of putting the economy under former state control and severely limiting the areas of initiative open to workers and employees. Some of these mechanisms adopted by the military are examined below

Strategies of Control

The first and perhaps the most fundamental of the strategies of control adopted by the military regimes have been an elaborate system of decrees which by their nature supercede any existing constitutional laws. It is no surprise then that most important political or administrative actions taken by the military are backed by decrees which cannot be challenged in any court of law. Some of the more significant decrees which affect the labour movement need to be examined.

During the Nigeria civil war (1967-1970), several stringent controls were instituted which included a compulsory contribution to a national development fund and a freeze on wages. These brought about increased worker militancy to which the government reacted with restrictive legislation beginning with the Trade Disputes (Emergency Provisions) Decree No. 21 of 1968. This law introduced, for the first time, compulsory arbitration and the requirement that collective agreements should be deposited with the Federal Ministry of Labour. No worker could go on strike until the procedure introduced in the law had been systematically followed. A 1969 amendment abrogated the right of workers to go on strike. While it is understandable that the war situation required some strong measures, however, the 1969 amendment did not reduce or stop the incidence of strikes by workers. Infact as Fashoyin (1978) showed, the incidence of trade disputes and strikes rose significantly while the laws were in operation.

The trade Union Decree No 31 of 1973 updated the Trade Union Ordinance of 1938 passed by the colonial administration. The ordinance had prevented officials of the Police Force and the Prisons from belonging to trade unions. However, the 1973 Decree expanded the categories of employees who cannot form or join trade unions to include those in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Customs, Central Bank, Nigerian External Telecommunications Limited, Federal and State government employees bearing arms. This implies essentially that a very large number of government employees are prohibited from participation in trade unionism. This decree has not been very effective as on several occasions, some of the prohibited employees have gone on strike. For instance in June 1986,

workers of the Nigerian Security, Printing and Minting Corporation went on a prolonged strike for improvement in conditions of service.

Secondly, section 15 of the Decree prohibits the use of union dues for political purposes. This section states that 'unless the rules otherwise provide, trade union dues under the rules shall not be applied directly or otherwise to the furtherance of any political objectives. Now this is a strange stipulation for by 1973 when the decree was promulgated, the government of the Federation was firmly in military hands and the Gowon regime had extended the proposed handover to civilian politicians until 1979. Thus this section can only be interpreted as a measure to ensure the disassociation of the trade union movement from politics and political organization then, and in the future. This is of course in keeping with the military's longstanding strategy of isolating and controlling the movement. Finally, of equal importance also is that the 1973 decree raised the minimum number of employees who could form a trade union from the 5 stipulated by the Ordinance of 1938 to 50. Similarly the Decree provided for the voluntary amalgamation where desired by the small house unions.

Second, one of the most fundamental steps taken by any of Nigeria's military regimes, with regard to the Labour Movement was that taken by the Mohamed/Obasanjo regime in 1977 which culminated in the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No 22 of 1978. The Decree gave legal backing to the Restructuring of the trade union movement. The constant squabbling within the movement since colonial times reached a peak in 1975 with the formation by the 4 existing central unions of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC). A torrent of protests and complaints was directed at the government concerning the manner in which the NLC officials were selected. In reaction, the military government not only refused to recognize the NLC but also withdrew the registration papers of the 4 component central unions. An administrator was appointed to, among other things, examine the existing structure of the trade union movement and to restructure it into a fewer number of unions. What is interesting is that the restructuring of trade unions is a strategy which has been adopted in a number of developing countries with the ostensible reason of making them more capable of positive contribution towards national development. While the intention of the government might be noble and genuine, one cannot ignore Allah Gladstone's (1979) suggestion that the motivation for the restructuring of the trade union movement of a country could be due to, among other things, the need to transform trade unions from a possible centre of opposition of policies (e.g. economic mobilization) to a centre of support for, and an ally and implemented in respect of these policies.

Whatever the motivation behind the restructuring exercise, the numerous small house unions ceased to exist in favour of 42 industrial unions, all compulsorily affiliated with the military government founded and funded

Nigerian Labour Congress. Similarly the leadership of the new NLC was government appointed. The International Labour Organization in a 1983 report had cause to question the whole exercise on two grounds. First the report stated that affiliation of national industrial unions to the NLC by statute implies deregulation which is an infringement of Article I of convention No 87 of 1948. Furthermore the report stated that legalizing only one central labour organization is a violation of workers' Freedom of Association. Secondly the Decree backing the exercise made it obligatory that all trade unions upon official recognition to be recognized by employers. The ILO report regards as unfair Labour practice to force employers by law to recognize and deduct check-off to any unions that are registered instead of achieving such through the voluntary process. Taken together, there is no doubt that by restructuring the trade union movement into bigger industrial unions, the military had unwittingly improved the capability of the movement to function as the champion of the interests of the lower classes. Not surprising the successive regimes have found it expedient on occasions to resort to coercive measures.

The two most important of these measures are the detention of labour leaders wherever the military leaders feel their own interests are at stake and the threat or actual ban or proscription of recalcitrant trade unions. Through the years, the military regimes have found the power to detain labour leaders whenever they prove intractable very effective and they have not hesitated to use this power. During the civil war, the military government, worried about the effect of large scale industrial unrest on the war effort had cause to detain some labour leaders for varying lengths of time, though this did not prove very successful in curbing labour militance. After the war in 1970, two important Labour leaders, Wahab Goodluck and S.U. Bassey were detained from February 1971 to June 1972 for what was termed anti-government activities. A more recent instance is the detention of the senior hierarchy of NLC between June 3rd and 6th 1986 over a proposed nation-wide protest to be organized by the Congress. The military government aborted the proposed protests by arresting and detaining the major labour leaders before the protests against declining living standards of the working class could take place. More ominous however is the life-sentence passed on nine National Electricity and Power Authority (NEPA) Union officials in January 1989. They had been detained since the middle of 1988 over a strike by NEPA employees protesting against, once again, low wages and poor conditions of work. After the strike which threw the country into darkness for about a week, the officials of the Electricity and Gas workers Union were arrested and charged with economic sabotage, which culminated in life sentences for each of them.

In addition to detentions and arrests, the military regimes have also found the proscription of trade unions a very useful strategy. This strategy

has however affected mostly the unions of middle class professionals who have increasingly come into the conflict between the military and the labour movement⁷. Thus when the Nigerian Medical Association squared against the Military government in 1984 over a wide range of social, economic and political issues, the government retaliated by proscribing the union and detaining its officials some of whom took refuge abroad. The National Association of Aircraft Pilots and Engineers fared worse also in 1984. After a confrontation with the Federal Military government over salaries and conditions of service, 64 members of the union, mainly officials were dismissed from government service. Perhaps the harshest punitive action taken by any of the military regimes was in 1977, when after a board of enquiry appointed by the government to look into the affairs of the Labour movement recommended the total ban on certain individuals from taking part in trade union activities in the country. These individuals, eleven in number, all veteran trade unionists were "disqualified from holding office in or belonging to any trade union or taking part whatsoever in any trade union including the management of property or any other affairs of any trade union". And what more, this decision could not be challenged in court.

In addition to these more obvious coercive measures, subtle mechanisms have also been adopted by the military regimes. One of the most important of these is the establishment by the government of the National Institute of Labour Studies. This was a step taken to pre-empt the unions from establishing such an institute, after several decades of discussion among the labour leaders on the desirability of such an institution, aimed primarily at improving the calibre of leadership material available to the Labour Movement. The military government took the initiative in "furtherance of the government's objective of devoting attention during the plan period (1975-80) to the education and training of workers in trade union matters so as to make them more responsive to the needs of responsible industrial relations". The institute which commenced full operations in 1986 is run by government officials and it is those officials who will determine for the labour movement what 'responsible' trade unionism is. There is no doubt that a major purpose for the establishment of the institute is to train a new breed of trade union leaders who will view trade unionism from a government perspective and act accordingly. The consequence of a predominance of such individuals in the labour movement is of course a loss of dynamism and independence or action, attributes which have characterized the Nigerian Labour Movement since colonial times.

A factor which has influenced significantly the military-labour relationship in Nigeria in recent times is the downturn of the Nigerian

7 See Austin Isamah (1986).

economy since the early 1980s. Much of what was discussed above took place during what is called the 'oil boom years', a time of economic bouyance. However, since 1981, a combination of mismanagement, world recession and fall in oil prices, has transformed Nigeria into a debtor country. Thus under the prod of the IMF and World Bank, the country has had to introduce a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The SAP, though equally felt by most of country, has however had a thoroughly negative effect on wage earners. As part of the SAP, the military government has attempted to reform several Labour Decrees. In 1986 for instance, the National Minimum Wage Amendment Order sought to exempt employers with less than 500 workers from paying the national minimum wage of ₦ 125 a month. Now this was one of the major concessions the NLC was able to wrest from the civilian government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1981. This order is particularly debilitating to the Labour Movement because most enterprises in the country employ less than 500 workers. Of course employers took advantage of the order in several places to reduce their work force to less than 500 to benefit from the Order.

Taken together, there is little doubt that all the measures adopted by the successive military governments, some of which were discussed above, have had the purpose of cowing the labour movement. To a large extent, they have succeeded. Nigeria's hitherto vibrant and militant labour movement has wilted progressively under pressure from the military. The movement occasionally shows glimpses of its old self, however the sum total of everything is that it has become reticent and feeble in its role as an organized opposition to the military.

Conclusion

Without any doubt, the hall mark of a democratic government is the tolerance and even encouragement of opposition. In this regard, the military regimes in Nigeria have proved to be singularly undemocratic. As has been shown in this paper, the disappearance of other political and para-political organizations after a military takeover leaves the trade union movement as the only viable organized opposition to the military and their policies. However, the military leadership because of its training and orientation views labour as a group of subversives who must be coerced into submission. What is significant is that the labour movement in its new role has the support of the lower classes against what is popularly perceived as the authoritarianism of the military.

The point must be made however that the Nigerian Labour movement is perhaps a better organized entity today due to the activities of the military governments especially in the forcible restructuring of the movement. This exercise has eliminated to a large extent the persistent internecine strife which plagued the movement since colonial times. In its new structure, it

has been able to fight more effectively for political and economic democracy in Nigeria.

References

- Adekanye, Bayo, J., Military Organization and Federal Society, *The Quarterly Journal of Administration*. Vol. XVI, Nos. 1 and 2, Oct. 1981/Jan. 1982, pp. 3-24.
- Adekanye Bayo, J., Politics in a Post-Military State in Africa. *IL. POLITICO*, (Univ. Pavia, Italy) 1984, Anno XLIX No 1 pp. 25 - 60.
- Dudley, B., *An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics*, Macmillan Press, 1982.
- Fashoyin T., The Impact of 1968 & 1969 Decrees on Strike Activity, *Quarterly Journal of Administration*, Vol. XIII, No 1, Oct. 1978, pp. 53-71.
- Fashoyin, T., *Industrial Relations and the Political Process in Nigeria*. International Institute for Labour Studies, 1981 Geneva.
- Gladstone A., *Trade Union Growth and Development*, International Institute for Labour Studies, 1979, Geneva.
- ILO, Report III, Part 4A, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendation, Geneva, 69 Session 1983.
- Isamah, A., Professional Unionism in Nigeria, *Indian Journal of Industrial Relations* Vol. 21 No 4, April 1986, pp. 413-427.
- Mazrui, A., Lumpenmilitariat and the Lumpenproletariat, *Political Studies*. Vol. 21 No 1, March 1973.
- Ogunbambi, R., Military Intervention in Independent African States Revisited: A Review 1960-1983. *Africa Spectrum* 84/3. 1984.
- Peace, A., Military Protest in Nigeria, in E. DeKaat & G. Williams (eds.) *Sociology & Development* (Tavistock Publications, 1974).
- Yesufu, T.M., *An Introduction to Industrial Relations in Nigeria* (London, Oxford University Press) 1962.

Diamond Mining and Under-development in Sierra Leone-1930/1980

Babatunde Zack-Williams

Résumé: Cet article est une analyse historique de la manière dont l'extraction du diamant a conduit au développement du sous-développement. Cette expression telle qu'elle est utilisée dans cet article renvoie à l'exploitation mais aussi à l'implantation de structures du sous-développement. En considérant l'ensemble de l'industrie du diamant, il est possible d'identifier deux modes de production distincts: le mode capitaliste dominant qui était dominé par le capital de la métropole, et le mode non-capitaliste où figure le capital sierra léonais. La majorité des ressources (capital, personnel qualifié, et gisements riches) qui entrent dans l'industrie allant au secteur privé, la tendance était à la consolidation de l'hégémonie de ce secteur. Le besoin de maintenir cette domination avait également conduit à l'atomisation du secteur non-capitaliste. Dans des cas tels que celui de *Leone Trial Mining* où la terre était consolidée et le personnel qualifié utilisé, l'expansion de ce secteur était telle que les salaires étaient devenus un moyen de rémunération par contraste avec le partage proportionnel de bénéfices dans le cadre du mode non-capitaliste. Le *Contract Mining Scheme* est l'analyse d'un exemple où le travail dans le secteur non-capitaliste était utilisé (sans être prolétarisé) en vue d'extraire des pierres qu'il n'est pas possible d'obtenir par la technique à forte intensité de capital du secteur capitaliste. En examinant la relation entre l'agriculture et le secteur minier, on peut observer que le secteur agricole a dû disputer la terre au secteur minier dans une compétition où le premier est l'éternel perdant. La réussite du secteur minier dans cette compétition a eu des conséquences incalculables sur le travail agricole et la production alimentaire dans leur ensemble.

Introduction

For the past fifty years diamonds have been one of the most important exports of Sierra Leone, and in recent years the single most important source of Government revenue¹. In spite of these "benefits", I shall argue that diamond mining has led to the development of underdevelopment. This term as used in this paper has a dual meaning; firstly, it refers to the generation and maintenance of the structural imperatives of underdevelopment. By underdevelopment, I refer to the structures which lead to capital drain from the satellite to the metropolis, the blocking of local initiatives, and the reproduction of structures of mass inequalities. Secondly, the term is used to connote exploitation. By exploitation, I mean "the use of surplus by a group for an aggregate) which has not provided the corresponding labour"².

1 In 1954, diamond export accounted for 37% of the total value of mineral exports. See R.G. Saylor - *The Economic System of Sierra Leone*. Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, 1967, p. 128.

2 G. Dupre and P. P. Rey - "Reflections on the Relevance of a Theory of the History" in D. Seddon (ed) *Relations of Production: Marxist Approach to Economic Anthropology*, Frank Cass, 1978, p. 196.

In what follows, I shall argue that within the diamond industry we can identify two modes of production; capitalist and non-capitalist. I shall try to show how the coexistence of these modes of production leads to the devalorisation of labour power within the industry, as well as the atomization of the non-capitalist mode. The Contract Mining Schemes is analyzed as an example of how non-capitalist producers are utilized for the accumulation needs of capitalism.

A Brief History of Diamond Mining in Sierra Leone

In an earlier work³ I have presented a detailed history of diamond mining in Sierra Leone. Here only a condensed form will suffice. Diamonds were discovered in the country in the 1930's, together with other minerals such as gold, platinum, chromite and iron ore. The diamond discovery was brought to the attention of the Consolidated African Selection Trust (CAST), who by this time was operating diamond mines in the then Gold Coast. In 1934, CAST formed a subsidiary company, the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), a private company wholly controlled by CAST, to exploit the Sierra Leone deposits. In 1935 the company was given sole right to mine diamonds in Sierra Leone for a period of 99 years. Since 1935 when actual mining started, SLST held a monopoly in diamond mining and prospecting until 1956 when this was breached with the establishment of the Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme (ADMS)⁴. Under this scheme private individuals were empowered to carry out alluvial mining activities within certain designated areas. Most of these areas were only marginally diamondiferous, since good quality diamonds could only be found within SLST's lease

Two types of mining activity were provided for under the scheme: "individual licensed miners", and "native firms". Under the latter non-Sierra Leonean capital was welcomed provided it was not more than 49% of share capital⁵. The ADMS also legalized the purchase and sale of diamonds by private individuals; these being referred to as alluvial diamond dealers. In 1970, after prolonged negotiation with SLST, the Sierra Leone Government took over 51% of the shares of SLST, and a new company, the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC) of Sierra Leone was formed. However, SLST retained the remaining 45% of the shares, as well as being responsible for corporate decision and the day-to-day running of the mines.

3 See A.B. Zack-Williams - "Merchant Capital and Underdevelopment in Sierra Leone", *African Review*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1983.

4 See the Alluvial Diamond Mining Ordinances and Rules, 1956.

5 *Ibid.*

Modes of Production Within the Diamond Industry

Within the industry, we can identify more than one mode of production, i.e. a capitalist (SLST) mode, and a non-capitalist (ADMS) mode. In what follows, I shall argue that the capitalist mode does not constitute an enclave⁶, i.e. it is not isolated or independent of the non-capitalist mode. Indeed, I shall try to show that the very structure of the non-capitalist mode is determined by the dominant position of the capitalist mode within the industry.

SLST and the Capitalist Mode of Production

Since 1935, SLST has carried out large scale alluvial diamond mining in two separate areas in Sierra Leone; at Yengema, Kono District; and Tongo Field, Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District. In recent years the company has started mining Kimberlite dykes at Koidu, Kono District; and Sumbuya, in the Kenema District. The company's operations are much more capital intensive as compared to the ADMS, as can be seen from the figures of estimated capital invested in the ADMS from 1956-77 and figures for SLST (Tables 1. & 2).

Table 1 - Total yearly investment for SLST 1970/71-1976/77

Year	Amount (in le'000)
1970-1971	2,100
1971-1972	2,400
1972-1973	2,000
1973-1974	2,330
1974-1975	2,540
1975-1976	8,500
1976-1977	6,700
TOTAL	27,370

Source: Ministry of Development, Freetown.

Table 2 - Total amount invested within the ADMS 1956-77 excluding "Surface Rent"

Total sales by mines division	= Le 723,641.4
Total loan under the AARLF	= Le 274,875.24
Total expenditure on mining equipment (1956-71)	= Le 1,985,541.2
Grand total	= Le 2,984,057.8

Source: Estimated from the Field.

⁶ As theorists of dualism have argued.

SLST prices itself on its systematic mining. The company unlike miners under the ADMS has the capacity to employ specialists such as geologists and mining engineers. Much of the prospecting done within the ADMS is based on hunch. SLST's labour force constitutes a proletariat in the true sense of the word. The relations of production is defined by the "free" labourer's sale of his labour power in return for wages. The worker has no claim to the final product of his labour, since this is the property of the shareholders of SLST. By contrast as we shall see presently, under the ADMS, the mode of remuneration does not constitute "wages", but assumes the form of "percentage sharing", with the labourer having a legal claim to the final product. Thus under the "SLST Mode", there is a class of labourers divorced from the means of production, and from whom surplus value is expropriated by a class of non-producers, the shareholders of SLST. We shall see below, that this kind of distinction (proletariat divorced from the means of production and capitalists owners of the means of production) is very difficult to draw for production under the ADMS.

Furthermore, not only does surplus labour assume the form of surplus value under SLST production but, it is appropriated through commodity exchange. This presupposes the existence of labourers who are willing and "free" to sell their labour power. By contrast, we shall see that this description does not hold for the "tributors" under the ADMS, most of whom could at best be described as "worker-peasant"⁷, since they migrate between the diamond fields and the peasant family farm. In short, they are not "free" in the sense that they could not stay all the year round with their mining employers, since they have commitments to the peasant family farm. Remuneration from mining is not the sole source of the reproduction of labour under the ADMS.

SLST Contract Mining Scheme 1959-70

In 1959, SLST embarked upon a scheme which came to be known as the "Contract Mining Scheme". Under this scheme, the company selected certain areas within the Yengema lease which were unsuitable for its own large-scale mining operations and gave them to miners from Kono District who would mine them under-contract. The reason for this scheme is not quite clear. Van der Laan has described it as "an attempt to improve the methods of the diggers"⁸. Much earlier in the same book he suggested yet another reason:

7 P. Raikes - "Rural Differentiation and Class Formation in Tanzania". *Journal of Peasant Studies*. Vol. 5, No. 3, April 1978.

8 H.L. Van der Laan - *Sierra Leone Diamonds*, Oxford, 1965, p. 73.

*This plan was to increase the area where Konos could work legally and end the belief that the interests of the company and of the Kono diggers were always conflicting*⁹.

Whilst this latter reason oscillates around what I consider the objective reason, the whole argument of Van der Laan is premised on a naive assumption of a benevolent capitalist. The relevant question is why SLST failed to establish this scheme earlier? Two events occurred in Sierra Leone around this time which must have influenced the company's decision to try and enlist the support of the people of Kono.

The first was the conflict between SLST (through its "parent" company CAST) and De Bears' Diamond Corporation over the price the former was receiving for diamonds sold to the latter¹⁰. As a result SLST decided in 1960 to by-pass the Diamond Corporation and instead sold its diamonds to two independent American dealers. The second was the radical political agitation that took place in Kono District between 1957-1960, through the Kono Progressive Movement, which tried to articulate the interests of those in Kono who could only join mining operations as "tributors", and for whom diamond mining operations brought little, if any reward. The movement too was supported by chiefs from the non-diamondiferous chiefdoms in Kono District. With these events in mind we can suggest that the creation of the Scheme was an attempt to win over allies in Kono for the cause of the company.

However, it is important to note that the Scheme satisfied a number of basic economic problems for the company - i.e., the need to employ the most marginally diamondiferous areas within the leased area. Most of the sites had already been mined by SLST, basically the Scheme entailed that certain sections of the lease would be opened for controlled use by local Kono miners. All diamonds won from the sites were to be sold to SLST. The company was not responsible for hiring labour, nor the provision of equipments, although some equipments were rented to contract miners at a specified rate. Contracts were awarded to Paramount Chiefs of Chiefdoms in which the contracts were awarded or their nominees. Clearly, the scheme provided an avenue for traditional rulers to accumulate wealth and consolidate their power. Furthermore, it provided SLST with cheap labour, hence with diamonds from areas which were unprofitable for it to mine.

This latter point can be substantiated by Appendixes 1 & 2. The most important columns are: column 4 of Appendix 1 and column 5 of Appendix 2. These show that for all the years for which figures were available SLST

⁹ *Ibid*, P. 35.

¹⁰ For details of the conflict, see Van Der Laan, *ibid*.

winning were on average higher than those of the contract miners. The tables show that by using contract miners whose "form" of production was essentially the same as the ADMS, and hence non-capitalist, the capitalist institution was able to gain 53,413.5 carats of diamonds without investing any amount of money in the scheme.

ADMS and the Pre-capitalist Mode of Production within the Diamond Industry

In order to understand the history and the present structure of the ADMS, I will pose and try to substantiate a number of hypotheses:

1) that at the time of the establishment of the ADMS, SLST had a fairly good knowledge of the diamond deposits of Sierra Leone;

2) that SLST was in a position in 1956 to opt for the richest deposits;

3) that most of the capital that went into the industry were invested in the SLST sector;

4) that the very structure which the ADMS assumes, in particular its pre-capitalist structure, is the result of the dominant position of SLST within the industry, and the need to perpetuate this dominance;

5) that the ADMS is not only a pre-capitalist mode, but in spite of the development of productive forces, its old relations of production remains relatively unchanged, and that this is the product of SLST's dominance of the industry.

Hypothesis 1

In another work I drew attention to the strenuous efforts made by SLST to find the limits of the Sierra Leone deposit¹¹. By the early 1940's the Sierra Leone field was considered one of the richest in the world. By 1953, the two primary sources of the field had been located, one in Koidu Town, and the other in Lower Bambara Chiefdom; Kenema District. It should also be noted that throughout this period, the Geological Survey Department continued with its prospecting to which SLST had access.

Hypothesis 2

That SLST opted for and obtained the best deposits can be substantiated empirically. However, this does not mean that by analyzing production figures from both sectors one would expect to find SLST's towering above those of the ADMS. In fact this cannot be the case since the rate of exploitation between the sectors differed. With fixed installations and heavy equipments, SLST had to plan its operations to the capacity and life-time of its installations. Furthermore, as Van der Laan has argued, the profit taxes which companies pay act as an incentive for the companies to smooth out

11 See my "Merchant capital and underdevelopment in Sierra Leone", *op. cit.*

their profits over the years¹². By contrast the diggers under the ADMS had only a small outlay on capital. Some of their tools were farm equipments which had been converted to mining tools without much expenditure. Furthermore, taxes do not penalize fluctuating operation or profit as it does to a large organization such as SLST. Finally, the operation of illicit diamond miners (IDM) has always tended to inflate the total sales figure in ADMS production. Much of this illicit mining takes place within SLST's lease.

Apart from controlling the deposits in the source areas, SLST was also given the option to select a further 200 sq. miles. This option was later reduced to 100 sq. miles after much resentment from the people of Kono District, where SLST had by then created a *betribgemeinschaft*, Van der Laan a writer who could not be described as critical of SLST's role in Sierra Leone observed:

Licensed digging in Kono was handicapped in two ways. The 1965 agreement (setting up the ADMS) meant that SLST had first choice in Kono and that only the poor diamond bearing land would be left for licensed diggers...¹³. (Emphasis mine)

This point is again reiterated by Rosen. He argued that after the ADMS had been introduced, SLST still had control over the original lease in Kono some 450 sq. miles of some of the richest diamond areas in Africa. Rosen continued:

... many of the areas surrendered by the SLST were only marginally diamondiferous and given the heavy capital requirements, unprofitable to mine. Local diggers on the other hand, using simple equipment and carrying limited cost in overheads, could achieve a high return rate in these marginal areas since their investment was primarily labour¹⁴.

It can also be argued that since SLST was an important export earner for the country, there was the perceived need to preserve the hegemonic position of the company, in order to avoid de-stabilising the country's export trade.

Hypothesis 3

The fact that most of the capital that entered the industry was invested in the SLST capitalist sector should not be in dispute. We have pointed to the fact that SLST is relatively capital intensive in its operation. Most individual

12 Van der Laan, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

13 *Ibid.* p. 127.

14 D.B. Rosen - *Diamonds, Diggers and Chiefs: The Politics of Fragmentation in a West African Society*, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Urbana-Champaign, 1973.

miners could not afford the means to purchase large diggers and excavators such as caterpillar and draglines. The fact that SLST received most of the capital that entered the industry enabled it not only to purchase expensive labour saving machinery and equipment, which helped to reduce handling and hence pilfering, but also meant that the company could attract some of the best personnel. Investment figures for SLST is not always available, largely because of the secrecy which surrounds the industry. However, figures are available for the period 1970/71-1976/77, which together with those of the ADMS tend to substantiate our hypothesis (see Table 1).

It is almost impossible to know the exact amount of capital that has been invested within the ADMS. However an attempt has been made¹⁵ using; 1) The American Aid Revolving Loan Fund (AARLF)¹⁶; 2) Total number of finances issued; 3) Estimated cost of digging materials. The Fund has provided us with a useful source of information on investment within the ADMS. Since only a proportion of licensed miners patronized this scheme the data will be supplemented by further estimates.

Between 1960-76 a total of Le723,641.4 sales were made under the Revolving Loan Scheme¹⁷. During the same period a total of Le274,875.24 loans were offered under the Scheme. This gives a total figure of Le998,516.64. However, this gives us only a partial idea of the total capital that went into this sector. To have a more comprehensive picture we have to take into consideration the amount of capital sunk into the ADMS in the pre-AARLF era, as well as those unsuccessful miners who did not patronize the fund. In order to achieve this, we need to know the implements that these miners used, and to try to cost them. These included; shovels, pick-axes, jig-sieves and washing pans. Furthermore, we will like to know how many labourers were employed under the scheme since it is labour intensive. Between 1956-71, some 63,128 licences were issued and some 461,145 laborers were employed within the ADMS¹⁸. This gives an average for the 15 years of 4,208 licences issued and 30,743 labourers per year. Now we have to assume that each labourer had a set of mining equipments. This in fact would be an exaggeration of the real situation, since not all tributors used new equipments. However, these figures give us a rough idea of the amount of money invested in the ADAMS. Thus if we take the total cost of equipments and multiply it by the number of tributors, we find that over the

15 See my *Underdevelopment and the Diamond Industry in Sierra Leone*, unpublished Ph. D Thesis, Sheffield University, 1980.

16 This was set up in 1960 with A grant of \$100,000 from the American Government to assist miners to purchase mining equipments.

17 Zack-Williams 1980, *op. cit.* p. 205-207.

18 M.S. Deen - *An Appraisal of the ADMS*, Mines Division, Kenema, 1972.

period 1956-71 some Le1,985,541.2 was spent within the ADMS as Table 2 shows.

Hypotheses 4 & 5

These constitute the essence of the rest of the paper. The history of the ADMS can be divided into two; the period 1956-62; and the period 1963-77. The former can be described, for lack of a better word as the "honeymoon period". This period was full of all kinds of unrealistic assumptions. Many licensed miners over-estimated the extent of diamond deposits in the country. To a certain extent this unrealistic approach was compounded by the fact that there were reports of diamond discovery over a wide geographical area.

The second period marked the emergence of the "supporters" i.e., the emergence of entrepreneurs who were not simply dealers, but were responsible for the maintenance of the tributors. By this time some degree of realism had entered the industry, and many of the miners who remained in the field realized that in order to mine their plots, they needed more than pick and shovel. Since most of the areas declared for ADMS were marginally diamondiferous, and in many cases these were areas which had been mined by SLST. It soon became clear that to mine these deeper deposits a greater capital outlay was needed. From now on most licensed miners came to be dependent upon a "sponsor", a "supporter" as they were called, who provided mining materials of capital for various considerations such as a claim to a proportion of the value of all winnings. It is interesting to note that virtually all the supporters were licensed dealers, the majority of whom were Lebanese.

Early Method of Labour Recruitment

The task of labour recruitment often follows upon the procurement of a mining lease, though the process may be reversed. In the early days, the licence holder or his appointee "the Gang-Master" toured villages in order to recruit tributors. Once in a village, gifts were presented to the village head, and the purpose of the visit then quickly explained. The best time for such a visit was often after the harvest when activities were at their lowest. A "village crier" will be summoned to broadcast the news. The gang master would then offer to pay all the debts owed by the potential tributors, as well as their local taxes. From now on, the security of the labourers was his responsibility. For this reason, the credential of the gang-master or licence-holder is thoroughly scrutinized by the village head. In order to make an impression on the villagers, the gang-master was usually accompanied by a native of the village, usually someone who had "made it good" during the illicit diamond mining period (i.e. pre-1956). While the recruitment lasted, the accomplice was given every encouragement by the

gang-master to dress above the average village inhabitant and to spend freely in their presence, with a view of enticing as many of them as possible¹⁹.

This method of labour recruitment has its origins in the illicit mining days when there were only gang bosses who were employers. In those days, the only items of expenditure were the recruitment and maintenance of the labour force. In most cases the labourers came with their tools, i.e., picks and shovels, though it was not uncommon for these to be provided by the gang-master.

Since this early system of labour recruitment had its origins' in the illicit mining period, it is interesting to answer the question, why did recruitment in the illicit period assume this form? To answer this question it is important to point to the hazards involved in illicit diamond mining (IDM) in areas which were always dominated by SLST's security force, as well as the Sierra Leone Police Force. To entice workers into such confrontational situations with authority called for a good assurance that in the event of being caught there would be a "patron" who would look after their welfare and those of their family. Clearly, one can argue that had the company's monopoly not been in force, it is quite possible that the emergence of this form of "patron-client" relationship would not have been so prevalent in the industry.

Early Method of remuneration of labour

We have shown that it was quite common for the direct producer to enter the industry with his own tools²⁰. This unity of the direct producer to his means of production is an important determinant of pre-capitalist modes of production. If the relations to the means of production render the ADMS as pre-capitalist, the method of remuneration does nothing to challenge this view of the pre-capitalist nature of the ADMS.

The first point to note is that the workers under the ADMS were not wage-labourers, they were tributors²¹. Though the form of remuneration varied, yet the category "wages" did not exist²². If the licence-holder himself had recruited his labour force, then the winnings are distributed as follows; two-thirds for the licence holder and one-third for the tributors. Where a gang-master was involved, the distribution was 60% for the licence-holder, 30% to the tributors and 10% to the gang-master. Superficially, tributing

19 T. L. Balewa - *The System of Reward of Labour under the ADMS*, Government Engineer's file, Mines Division, n.d.

20 But he did not own the land.

21 Since they owed their protection to the gang-master.

22 The social relations between the tributor and the gang-master is one of client-patron relationship.

seemed to be a symbiotic relationship, as it provided incentives to both employer and employed. In practice, tributing was highly exploitative with the burden falling upon the tributors.

For example, the winnings were frequently under-valued, since the tributors had no means of establishing their true value. Occasionally, even the gang-master would be ignorant of the market value of winnings. However, very often both gang-master and licence-holder colluded and deliberately under-valued the winnings. It is interesting to note that no serious consideration was ever given to the idea of providing a regular wage structure in the industry outside the SLST sector. One writer has suggested that it is:

... probably due to the unwillingness of both the labour force to forego the proceeds of their labour if there are particularly large wiping and the employer to take on an added expenditure burden which might not be recoverable if the production was nil...²³

Now this explanation is inadequate since it fails to look at the underlying structure of the industry, instead it is premised on some short term outlook on the part of both employee and employer. The relevant question why their counterparts in SLST were willing to forego the proceeds of their labour if and when there were particularly large winnings was never posed. The reason for these differences in the mode of remuneration is due largely to SLST's abundant resources (physical capital to undertake wide scale prospecting and forward planning. Thus it was possible to take workers on a wage basis without jeopardizing the company's existence. This type of forward planning was beyond the reach of most miners under the ADMS who had neither the rich ground to mine nor the wide geographical area to enable forward planning²⁴. Thus, the reason for the pre-capitalist nature of remuneration must be sought neither in the psychological make-up of licence-holders and tributors, nor simply within the ADMS. Instead we must look at the industry as a whole, in particular the dominant position of SLST within the industry.

The Supporter Period 1973-77

The need to mine the deeper deposits meant that sophisticated machinery had to be brought into the ADMS. With the help of their supporters, many alluvial miners invested in such mining equipments as diesel water pumps and in a few cases even in mechanical diggers. In spite of these

23 Balewa, *op. cit.*

24 The size of holdings vary according to the type of mining to be carried out; river licence restricted to 2000ft x 50ft; and land licence to 200 ft x 200ft.

developments in productive forces and of relations to the means of production, yet the mode of remuneration of the direct producer remains largely pro-capitalist. Remuneration in the supporter period assumes the form of percentage sharing of the final sales values.

Unlike the situation within SLST, under the ADMS as it later developed, the direct producer continued to lay claim to the final product of his labour until it is finally sold to a dealer. The mode of remuneration under the ADMS - percentage sharing is a characteristic of the feudal mode of production - or in the absence of the tie of servitude is more a feature of modes of production where the surplus generated is appropriated collectively, such as under syndicalism.

The system of percentage sharing varied according to the parties involved. For example, in the case of a tripartite agreement, the most common ratio was:

Tributors	25%
Licence holder	25%
Supporter	50%

In the case of quadripartite agreement, the distribution was as follows:

Tributors	20%
Mines manager	10%
Chiefs or Wardens	10%
Licence holder/supporter	60%

The mines manager was in theory an employee of the supporter who was there to ensure that diamonds were not withheld from the supporter. The warden was an employee of the Government's Mines Division, responsible for demarcating mining plots.

As we have noted earlier, the ADMS provided for both individual mining and that of "native firms". Through this ordinance a small number of Sierra Leoneans were able to establish thriving mining ventures. The most successful of these was *Leone Trial Mining* (LTM) wholly owned by Alhaji Abdulai Sesay. The success of this mining venture substantiates our point that the dominance of SLST in the industry, and the need to protect the company's lease area have led to the atomization of the ADMS. Once a relatively large and "rich" lease was provided for alluvial miners, it was then possible for forward planning to take place. But the hiving off of such relatively rich deposits posed a serious threat to SLST's hegemony in the industry, as well as its ability to remain the largest earner of foreign exchange.

Alhaji Sesay first entered mining as an alluvial gold miner in 1934, and remained in the industry right through to 1977 except for the period 1941-45 when he was conscripted into the colonial army. In 1956 with the beginning of alluvial diamond mining, he moved into this sector and carried out both

river and land mining on his own until 1965, when he had cause to resort to the supporter system due to increased costs of mining operations. However, in 1970, he decided to abandon the system when it became clear to him that the supporter system was eating deeply into his profit margin. By 1971, he had come to the conclusion that the only form of mining that will be viable in the areas newly released from SLST was large scale mining. However, in order to achieve this goal, it was necessary for these atomized plots to be consolidated - a new kind of "enclosure" in mining. His major task was to try and convince other licence holders that the best way forward was to try and pool resources, in particular to bring all nearby leases under one roof. The task of convincing miners was not an easy one, many licence holders were worried about being entangled in new forms of supporter relationship. But it soon became clear to most miners that the only way forward was to accept the idea of land consolidation. By 1973, agreements had been signed with all interested parties, and the Mines Division had given its blessing to the project²⁵.

Now with resources (both Land and capital) pooled, it was possible for forward planning to be done. Furthermore, it was also possible for mechanical devices such as draglines and caterpillars.

The method of remuneration of labour varied according to whether LTM was working on contract basis with other licence holders or on its own. In the case of the former, winnings were distributed equality between LTM, tributors, and the landowner who had contracted for his plot to be mined. When no contracting party was involved, one-third of winnings went to the tributors, and two-thirds to LTM. The mines manager shared with the tributors.

However, there was one additional feature; LTM paid its machine operators wages. As far as I could establish, only one other native firm paid its operators wages. Another miner from Yomandu who was building a dam on the Bafi River, rented a dragline excavator from the Ministry of Works and as such was not responsible for the wage of the operators.

The question we must now pose is why was LTM able to enter into a wage relation with its operators unlike most native firms? The answer could be found in the fact that LTM was able to employ large mechanical excavators. But this answer begs the question; why was LTM able to employ mechanical devices? This is due to the fact that LTM had large enough area, and one that was relatively proven. This tended to reduce the risk of losing ones capital since recovery rate was relatively high. Thus the problems of the native firms hinged on a cyclical thesis. They did not have

25 For a detailed discussion of the project see U.B. Usman, *Leone Trial Mining mimeo*, Mines Division Koidu, n.d.

enough resources (capital and land) to engage in long term prospecting which meant that they had to do with small plots, which in turn called for labour intensive techniques which could not efficiently recover stones from the deeper deposits.

The Nature of labour under the ADMS

We have argued that the category wage-labour is not applicable to the mode of remuneration under the ADMS. If we compare the methods of recruitment and remuneration of tributors with the modern wage-labourers (within SLST), we find that one important respect in which they differed was the degree of economic freedom they enjoyed. Wage-workers freely entered into contract of employment with employers and are free to move from one employer to the other. By contrast, the tributor had to be coaxed out of the peasant family farm, thus suspending their usufructuary right to land until their return at the end of the mining season²⁶. This meant that the tributor unlike the wage-labourer was not totally dependent on his employer in the diamond field for his livelihood. This fact affected the final benefit which tributor received from his productive efforts, one which was only designed to provide for part of his reproduction.

Furthermore, percentage sharing of the final sale of the product of labour of the direct producer (with the tributor laying claim to these products), has nothing to do with capitalism. On this point Marx was quite unequivocal:

...the product is the property of the capitalist and not that of the labourer, its immediate producer. Suppose that a capitalist pays for a day's labour power at its value; then the right to use that labour power for a day belongs to him, just as much as the right to use any other commodity, such as a horse that he had hired for a day. To the purchaser of a commodity belongs its use; as the seller of labour power, by giving his labour, does no more, in reality than part with the use-value that he has sold. From the instant he steps into the workshop, the use-value of his labour power and therefore its use, which is labour, belongs to the capitalist. By the purchase of labour power, the capitalist incorporates labour, as a living ferment, with the lifeless constituents of the product. From this point of view, the labour process is nothing more than the consumption of the commodity purchased, i.e. labour power; but this consumption cannot be effected except by supplying the labour power with the means of production. The labour process is between things that the capitalist has purchased and things that have become his

26 The mining season coincided with the dry season when farming activities are least demanding.

*property. The product of this process belongs, therefore, to him, just as much as does the wine which is the product of a process of fermentation completed in the cellar*²⁷.

If we look at the relations of production of all the "native firms" and individual mining ventures within the ADMS, we find one common feature, i.e. the method of remuneration. We have already noted that this has nothing to do with wage-labour, and hence the relations of production is not capitalist. On examination it resembles a version of the *metayage* system, in particular, the share-cropping system of the Southern United States.

The share-cropping system of the USA resulted from the need to link the soil and the cultivator. The former slaves lacked funds to buy land; the slave owners lacked funds to pay wages. Hence the agreement that the landlord would provide the land, the freedman the labour, and each would receive a share of the proceeds from the final harvest. The cultivator, like the tributor under the ADMS, received the necessities of life on credit during the annual periods between harvests. Similarly, we have argued that because alluvial mines were usually restricted to small plots in the marginally diamondiferous areas, it became very risky to try to employ tributors on a wage basis. We have seen that in the most developed sector of the ADMS, namely *Leone Trial Mining*, because relatively small plots, in proven grounds were consolidated into large leases, it was possible to employ skilled workers such as dragline operators in return for wages.

Diamond Mining and Underdevelopment in Sierra Leone

To suggest that diamond mining generated underdevelopment in Sierra Leone is not to deny that certain groups and individuals did not benefit from what was for some a lucrative operation. Many individuals, foreigners and Sierra Leoneans alike, made windfall gains, the industry provided much needed foreign exchange earnings for the Government, it has provided wage and non-wage employment for thousands of Sierra Leoneans. These gains are not being denied, instead three crucial points are being emphasized. Firstly, that Sierra Leone or Sierra Leonians did not do as well as other participants in the industry. Secondly, the damage done to the diamondiferous areas and to agriculture in particular is such that it will take years and a massive injection of capital to rehabilitate these areas. Finally, we try to show that the net effect of diamond mining was to prevent local people from taking the initiative to control their economy. We have also drawn attention to the fact that these negative features were largely the result of SLST's dominance in the industry.

27 K. Marx *Capital*, Vol. 1. Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1974, p. 180.

The need to project SLST's lease was the major reason behind the ordinance of 1936²⁸, which empowered the Government to prohibit and restrict the residence of "strangers" and the issuing of store and other trading licences in the diamond areas. Kaniki who has done some study of this period in the country's history has argued that it was through the application of this legislation that SLST's security force harassed non-Kono traders and others, and systematically reduced their numbers in the district²⁹. The relative isolation of this area has led Minikin to suggest that:

*The slow pace of economic change in the pre-war period is partly attributable to the deliberate policy of isolation practised by the colonial authorities and the SLST after the discovery of diamonds in 1930*³⁰.

The prohibition of "strangers" from setting in the district was a clear interference in the traditional way of life of the people in the area. Furthermore, it blocked opportunities for local entrepreneurs who would have expanded the exchange sector.

The emergence of mining struck a serious blow at the agricultural sector, particularly in Kono where agriculture had to compete with mining for land. In practice the latter usually triumphed, mainly because of the long gestation period between planting crops like cocoa and coffee and profit realization, compared to the relative ease with which compensation could be obtained from would-be miners, and the fact that one good discovery in the diamond field is worth more than a life-time of farming.

The increase in population resulting from migration into the diamond areas put further strain on the distribution of farm land. This led to over-crowding, with the result that many people had to leave the land in search of employment in the towns. Since jobs had always been hard to come by, many one-time farmers joined the ranks of the urban unemployed. It is true that some of these ex-farmers moved into the mining areas as tributors, and others got into the industry as gang-masters. Earlier, we have noted the fate which awaited these tributors which we have argued was the direct result of SLST's dominance in the industry. In this way, we can see how the production and profitability of SLST resulted in the marginalisation of the mass of the people in Kono District. This process of marginalisation has been made more acute by the mining policy of SLST. The company's operations have been carried out with the aid of heavy machines on upland

28 Chapter 196 of the Laws of Sierra Leone 1960, Section 3.1.

29 M.H.Y. Kaniki - *The Economic History of Sierra Leone: 1929-39*, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1972, p. 295.

30 V. Minikin - *Local Politics in Kono District, Sierra Leone, 1945-70*. Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Birmingham, 1971, p. 145.

and swamp areas in both Kono and Kenema Districts. Most of these mined areas were left to perish without any serious attempt at rehabilitating the land. This point has been emphasized by a field worker, who observed that:

*The conditions of the people in the Kono and Tongo leases areas are growing worse everyday without proper and adequate rehabilitation... the mining by the company of the swamps and valleys has left the people in the leased areas to concentrate on upland rice and farming. This had caused a lot of strain in producing their staple food in any appreciable quantity... the people are now left with no alternative but to go to the hills, far from their settlement to farm. This (mining) has caused a lot of problems in these areas... lack of good farming land, lack of good drinking water, infestation of mosquitoes, rapid spread of diseases and low earning capacity of majority of the rural people in these areas"*³¹.

The need to protect SLST's lease from the activities of IDM posed further problems on the farming community in Kono. For example, permission was heeded to cultivate plots close to or within the leased areas, and this was only granted if the areas were not marked for future mining. Fishing, a major source of protein, was prohibited in streams within the leased areas as diamonds could be found in river beds.

With all these constraints on farming matched by the demand for manual labour in the mining industry, it is not surprising that the percentage of farmers in Kono is the lowest of all the districts in the province. For example, in 1970, only 46% of the labour force was employed in agriculture as compared to between 70-75% for other districts³². This drop in the percentage of agricultural producers could indeed be seen as a sign of progress, provided that those who left the land were able to find paid employment in other sectors of the economy; and also provided that those who remained on the land were able to produce enough to feed the increasing number of non-producers. We have already noted that for most of those who left the land, paid employment was not a feasible proposition. With regards to the productivity of those who remained as farmers, Saylor has argued that as far as subsistence crops were concerned, there was probably an increase in productivity, since these did not suffer the same decline as export crops³³.

31 S. Dunbar - *Rehabilitation in the NDMC (S.L.) Ltd, Leased Areas in Kono and Tongo Field*, mimeo, n.d. Mines Division Kono.

32 Figures from the National Accounts, Central Statistics Office Freetown, 1975.

33 Saylor, *op. cit.*

Nonetheless, there were other factors which helped to negate this increase in productivity. These include poor communication, lack of infrastructure, and inflationary pressure- all factors which were more intensified in the mining areas³⁴.

Who Benefited from Diamond Mining in Kono

This question can be answered by looking at the benefits derived from diamond mining by major social groups within Kono. We can distinguish three such groups: 1) The Kono masses (i.e. urban/rural poor) who participated in "the pariah-like activities of illegal miners"³⁵. 2) The rich and powerful (i.e. the chiefs and their political allies). 3) SLST and other capitalist interests.

As far as the urban/rural poor are concerned, diamond mining as we have seen tended to exacerbate their predicament. We have pointed to the paucity of employment possibilities outside of either tributing and illicit mining. We have also seen how the policy of protecting SLST's lease led to the persistent marginalisation of the farming population in Kono. In terms of infrastructure, outside of the SLST enclave, Kono had the least infrastructural development of all the regions in the country.

In 1974-75, the Eastern Province which includes Kono and Tongo had the lowest number of secondary school pupils in the country; 8,333 compared to 18,684 for the western area; and 9,941 for The Southern Province. As far as hospital delivery system is concerned, in 1963 the Eastern Province accounted for only 14% of Government hospital beds, compared to 41% for the western area; 23% for the Southern Province and 22% for the Northern Province, Kono had the highest ratio of persons per medical officer (202,000:1) compared to 2,887:1 for the western area. This is also true of the ratio of persons per hospital bed and also persons per health and medical centre³⁶. In short, Kono has served as an internal colony for the accumulation needs of peripheral capitalism in Sierra Leone.

If any indigenous group benefited from diamond mining, it was the chiefs from the diamond mining areas and their political allies. This was possible mainly because the colonial authorities (and later the post-colonial rulers) and SLST needed their confidence in order to facilitate the exploitation of the country's mineral. The pretext for this approach was that since the chiefs were custodians of tribal land, they had to be recognized as such and that all decisions involving land should be channelled through

34 *Household Survey National Accounts 1970-71-1875-76*, CSO, Freetown.

35 Minikin, *op. cit.*

36 Figures from *Directory of Medical Units*. Ministry of Health/WHO Team, Ministry of Health, Freetown.

these "natural rulers". Thus several agreements were signed between the chiefs in the diamondiferous chiefdoms and SLST, whereby the former agreed to exclude strangers (i.e. non-Konos) from their chiefdoms in return for stipends³⁷.

By far the largest beneficiary of diamond mining was SLST and other capitalist interests in the industry. These benefits took the form of profit repatriation, smuggling and robbery³⁸. The loss to the Sierra Leone economy due to profit repatriation cannot be estimated with any degree of certainty due to the paucity of trade statistics. However, by looking at one capitalist institution within the industry we can have a rough idea as to the gains made by metropolitan capitalist interests. From 1960-76, the Diamond Corporation West Africa limited (DCWA) managed the Government Diamond Office (GDO), and bought all the diamonds from the ADMS. During this period, a total of 13,881,039 carats were bought for Le419,971,622; and the Government of Sierra Leone received Le31,4 million in export duties and licence fees. The DCWA received a total of Le54,6 million from its operations within the ADMS³⁹. This figure does not take into consideration the profit made by the DCWA from its purchase and sale of diamonds in Sierra Leone, or profits made through deliberately buying stones below the scheduled price, i.e. by under valuation⁴⁰.

With regards to smuggling, I shall argue that the dominant position of SLST within the industry, which we have seen led to the supporter/tributor system, helped to encourage smuggling⁴¹. Furthermore, I shall try to show that the activities of the Diamond Corporation encouraged and facilitated smuggling.

Prior to the legalization of alluvial mining, two major smuggling networks had been established linking cutters in Europe and North America; through Beirut (Lebanon) and Monrovia (Liberia)⁴². The Beirut connection emerged as a result of citizens of that country illegally exporting Sierra Leone diamonds. In the case of Liberia, the crucial factor was the dollar premium which could be earned by exchanging diamonds in a country where the US dollar is a legal tender. According to Van der Laan, Liberia

37 Minikin, *op. cit.*

38 M. Harbottle - *The Knives of Diamonds*, London, Seeley, 1976.

39 Figures from Mines Division, Kenema; and Zack-Williams *Underdevelopment and the Diamond Industry*, p. 280-82, Sierra Leone Government share is equivalent to 7% duty imposed on sales at the GDO; DCWA's consists of 12% which SLST paid to the Central Selling Organization and the 1% which it charged as commission for managing the GDO on behalf of the Government.

40 See Zack-Williams *op. cit.*

41 Smuggling in this context refers to the patronizing of overseas markets at the expense of the locally instituted market.

42 Van der Laan, *op. cit.*

had no deposit worth mentioning; the success of the Liberian market was based on supplies mainly from Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ivory Coast. Yet, this did not stop the Diamond Corporation from setting up an associated company in Liberia to run the Diamond Appraisal Office on behalf of the Liberian Government.

We now turn to look at two important questions: 1) Why did smuggling continue even after the establishment of the Diamond Corporation in Sierra Leone? 2) Why did the DCWA want to enter the Liberian market?

Some of the answers to the first question included factors which were internal to the Liberian economy, such as the lower effective duty compared to those charged in Sierra Leone and the dollar premium. But a crucial reason was the trading policy of the DCWA. According to Van der Laan, in the period 1956-59, the trading margins of the company proved too high, with the result that buyers who were in a position to compare prices in the Monrovia market and at the DCWA soon found out that their profit margin would be reduced by making sales at the DCWA. This policy of very high trading margins was reversed in the period 1959-67. This change of policy raises the question why the corporation wanted a stake in the Monrovia market. In 1959, when it took over the GDO in Freetown, it embarked upon a policy of buying as much as possible rather than to earn as much as possible⁴³. This policy fitted in well with its strategy on maintaining as large a share as possible of the world's market of diamonds. However, this policy would succeed only if the Central Selling Organization (CSO) was prepared to forego more profit and accept a lower trading margin⁴⁴. The CSO which at the time had become very worried about the Monrovia market (over which it had no control), decided to make good its losses in the Monrovia market. This step was necessary because most of the good quality gem stones from Sierra Leone were channeled through this market, whilst only the poor quality industrial stones were sold through the GDO. The operation in Liberia simply meant that what was lost in Sierra Leone was gained in Liberia.

It is not easy to arrive at an estimate of the value of stones that left Sierra Leone for foreign markets. However, using Van der Laan's formula in particular his assertion of a 1:1 ratio of gem and industrial diamonds for Sierra Leone's deposit⁴⁵, we can arrive at a rough estimate. This estimation is premised on the assumption that the industrial stones were not smuggled

43 Van der Laan has noted that since the discovery of the Sierra Leone fields, Beers (the parent company of DCWA) had been anxious that this field might upset its control of the world diamond market. These policies must be seen in that light.

44 The CSO has been the major cartel in the industry since the 1930's, and is largely controlled by De Beers.

45 Van der Laan, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

in any appreciable quantity, so that the volume of recorded industrial diamond exports were taken as representing 50% of actual production under the ADMS. We then subtract the volume of recorded gem exports from the volume of recorded industrial diamond exports to obtain an estimate of the volume smuggled gems. Assuming the same unit per carat as for recorded gem diamond exports, the value of smuggled gem diamond exports was then obtained. The estimated value of smuggled gem diamond averaged roughly Le 15,5 million per annum over the 14 year period 1960-74⁴⁶. The estimated value of smuggled diamonds represented 34% of the value of recorded diamond exports and 21% of the value of total domestic exports. In effect the value of exports could have been boosted by at least one-fifth if effective measures were taken to combat smuggling. In addition, the loss of export duty averaged 33% of actual revenue from export duties over the period under review; and 2,5% of total Government revenue from all sources. To the extent that the exchequer and the economy lost these revenues which could have been used in development efforts, smuggling tended to intensify the problem of capital drain and underdevelopment.

Conclusion

In this paper I have tried to show how diamond mining led to the development of underdevelopment in Sierra Leone. In locating the modes of production within the industry I have argued that the structure of the non-capitalist sector was determined by the hegemonic position of the capitalist sector within the industry. Because most of the resources (capital, trained personnel, and rich deposits) that entered the industry found their way into the SLST sector, the company was able to exercise its hegemonic control over the industry. We also noted that this hegemonic position of SLST largely accounts for the atomized nature of the ADMS. The case of *Leone Trial Mining* showed that with relatively large, and rich deposits as well as capital, it was possible for relations of production in the industry to be transformed. Furthermore, we saw how the company tried to articulate its interests with those of pre-capitalist forces, such as chiefs.

With regards to the surplus that was retained within Sierra Leone; we noted that because of poor infrastructure in the mining areas, the absence of any welfare provisions, these areas could be said to have acted as an internal colony. We also argued that for the majority of the people in these areas, diamond mining has caused more harm than good. We drew attention to how agriculture had to compete unsuccessfully with mining for land.

⁴⁶ This estimate was arrived at from figures from the *Bank of Sierra Leone Economic Review*, July-December, 1974.

Appendix I
Table comparing production of SLST and contract mining 1965-1970

Year	SLST	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
1	Overburden moved (Cu yds)	3,346,528	3,399,751	3,822,360	4,093,586	5,791,526	7,923,292
2	Gravel treated (Cu yds)	759,714	728,477	812,273	866,883	1,200,743	1,444,996
3	Carats recovered (in carats)	652,410.1	701,894.5	660,455	655,723	831,488.4	988,196.7
4	Grade of Gravel (Carats per cu yd.)	0.86	0.96	0.81	0.76	0.69	0.69
5	Overburden (Depth ft.)	8.6	9.0	8.8	10.5	10.6	12.40
6	Average Gravel (Depth ft.)	2.2	1.9	2.0	2.3	2.1	2.2

Appendix II

Year	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
1	11	16	11	3	2	2
2						
	No. of sites					
	Overburden stripped (Cuyds)	150,649	291,566	57,715	27,521	7,069
3						
	Gravel treated (Cu yds)	33,466	61,260	15,118	6,788	537
4						
	Production (carats)	19,660.20	23,638	8,630.70	1,484.60	N.A.
5						
	Grade (Cu/Cu yds)	0.77	0.39	0.59	0.22	N.A.
6						
	Value per carat (Le)	13.22	9.32	11.45\$	16.20\$	N.A.
7						
	Cost per carat (Le)	8.08	6.98	4.06\$	2.20	N.A.
8						
	Employment	682	650	730	160	328

* Contract Mining was stopped in March 1970

- Measures not available

\$ Applicable to end of June

Source: Report of the Mines Division, Ministry of Lands and Mines, Freetown

Book Reviews

Two reviews of V. Y. Mudimbe. *The Invention of Africa*, Indiana University Press Bloomington, Indiana. And James Currey, London, 1988

The Subvention of the Invention of Africa

Kwesi Prah

*Colonialism is dead !
Long live the new colonialism
Flagged with the banner of universalism
under western tutelage... (Kwame Walata)*

*I want to be free and equal
But cannot leave old master... (Anon)*

Introduction

It is unfortunately not often that scholarship on Africa, or rather by Africans on Africa, both in Africa and in the diaspora, which scintillates, gemlike, or soars in stature, in compositional intricacy and verbal facility appears for public consumption. We are referring in this respect not only to language and expressiveness. Rather, we are thinking more of the organic character of the knowledge which is presented and its encyclopaedic breadth, the sheer volume of its learning, and its ability virtually to stand, blow by blow, the best that can be called into comparative witness from anybody, anywhere else in the world. The regular feature of African scholarship has been possibly more often rather spare on learning and encyclopaedia and too often over-generous in textual and facile philosophical regurgitation. Mudimbe's text, 'The Invention of Africa' is exceptional in learning, reading and presentation.

Mudimbe sets himself in this text, a task and a half, and rises to the occasion as a master of his concerns and much of what he surveys, in spite of the fact that there are important and significant weaknesses in his overall position and in some matters of detail. As he says in his introduction ;

The book attempts,.....a sort of archaeology of African gnosis as a system of knowledge in which major philosophical questions recently have arisen : first concerning the status of traditional systems of thought and their possible relation to the normative genre of knowledge. From the first chapters, which interrogate Western images of Africa, through the chapters analyzing the power of anthropologists, missionaries, and ideologists, to the last, on philosophy, I am directly concerned with the processes of transformation of types of knowledge (Introduction. Page X)

Mudimbe is as much an artist as he is a thinker, and I mean it here in a complimentary sense, although there are those who may argue to good effect that the two categories are essentially mutually exclusive. Whichever way one looks at it, one clear and undeniable steadfast fact about the inventor of 'The Invention of Africa' is that almost giraffe-like, he stands with his doubtlessly exceptionally erudite text, a head and a long neck above the academic lilliputians and the scholastic pedestrians who happen to be too many for any good in contemporary Africa. Like a giraffe, he sees very far and very well but sometimes misses the reality of his immediate universe. Like an archaeologist he unearths buried and forgotten knowledge and experience embossed and enshrined in priceless cognitive artifacts.

At the discrete analytical level, where isolated notions and elements of discourse are scrutinized, Mudimbe comes out with full marks and flying colours. He disentangles propositions and contextual imperatives with skills and a mind subtly imbued with dialectical finesse and verbal propriety. It is at the level of synthesis that he falls short. The analytically disentangled pieces are not sufficiently glued back, the epistemological jigsaw puzzle never achieves the sort of unity which permits the reader to concretely conceive Mudimbe's philosophical bearing conclusively.

The Chemistry of an Eclectic

Mudimbe's prodigious reading in a sense overwhelms him. One loses his views in the views of others. Sometimes, the readiness to refer to sources is taken to a fault. For example, (Page 92) in the middle of the text, Mudimbe points out that; 'The political image of Africa after 1965 is indeed distressing. Authoritarian regimes have multiplied, rules and norms of democracy have been fluted or rejected'. We are referred to Gutkind, Wallerstein, O'Meara and Carter. What is said is so well known and so well understood by any observer of contemporary African history that one is at a loss to see why credit is given to the above authors with regards to these views. On the same page, we are told that ; 'Toure was isolated in his dictatorship and Nkrumah, challenged and insulted, died in exile'. We are referred to Erica Powell. Erica Powell, in her autobiography reveals a lot about her long service to Nkrumah which is to say the least very revealing, interesting and informative. But, the above points brought forward by

Mudimbe are common knowledge. Do we need Erica Powell to know this? Mudimbe could have as well simply stated this.

He appears overeager and too ready to call others to witness by a selective evidential method, in which key confirmatory or disputative passages are recalled with albeit a precision which the best surgeon operating on the human body would be hard put to rival. His witnesses, whether for the prosecution or the defence say just what and how much he wants them to say, not one word more or less. This is of course superb craftsmanship. But, the whole message or evidence of such witnesses is lost. In effect, too many of them say what they do not really intend on the whole to say. Such procedures are artistically permissible. They form the substance and technique of the collage. But as a scientific mode it is dodgy or, to say the least, contentious. For some, it may appear to be a technique of over-summarization of more detailed and complex issues. For others it may be almost heretical. But hearsay may be historically a viable course of progress.

The implicit philosophical basis of such notional collation which Mudimbe is obviously a master of and has crafted to such eloquent sublimity, is eclecticism. While it permits the richness and ideological tapestry of a philosophical Tower of Babel, it excludes conceptual and methodological consistency. As Marvin Harris noted years ago in his *The Rise of Anthropological Theory*, 'eclecticism is certainly the path of least resistance through the frequently strident polemic of the system-mongers'¹. What however needs to be pointed out is the fact that, not all eclectics consciously adopt such positions in order to avoid the minefield of argumentation with nomothetic thinkers, system-builders and 'grand-theoreticians'. Many are philosophical sceptics who are generally suspicious of whatever may appear to be all-embracing approaches to scientific analysis. Others are plain inductionists who prefer 'multi-dimensional' approaches inspired by the use of 'all available techniques'. In the introduction to his study, Mudimbe invokes the views of Foucault to attest to his approach. He writes that ;

...from a methodological viewpoint I think, as Foucault put it, that 'discourse in general and scientific discourse in particular, is so complex a reality that we not only can but should approach it at different levels and with different methods'. For this essay, I have chosen an archaeological perspective that allows me to address the issue of the progressive constitution of an African order of Knowledge. However, for reasons having to do with the bizarre nature of some of

1 Marvin Harris, *The Rise of Anthropological Theory*. New York. 1968. P. 284.

the sources used, mainly the anthropological ones, I have preferred not to distinguish the epistemological level of knowledge from the archaeological level of knowledge. (Introduction. Page XI-XII).

The spontaneity and volitional approach to methodological issues is grounded ultimately in philosophical quicksand. Eclecticism collates and catalogues, without a firm systemic grid. Thus for Mudimbe, the Belgian scholar B. Verhaegan 'is both a Marxist and a Catholic' (Page 178). There is here apparently no contradiction. Fanon, Mudimbe suggests was 'a solid Marxist' (page. 92). Fanon like many of his generation was affected by the existentialist thinkers, and also Hegelianism and Marxism, but he can hardly be described as 'a solid marxist'. The limits of his theory of nationalism and culture, the Sorelian character of his concept of revolutionary violence reveal wider philosophical affiliation than 'solid marxism'.

Few social scientists have pointed to the pitfalls of eclecticism with the succinct and unmitigated forthrightness of Harris. He writes that ;

Eclecticism,...abounds with hidden dangers. In practice, it is often little more than a euphemism for confusion, the muddled acceptance of contradictory theories, the bankruptcy of creative thought, and the cloak of mediocrity. It bestows upon its practitioners a false sense of security and an unearned reputation for scientific acumen. Science consists of more than responsibility to the data; the data must be responsible to theory. Neither one without the other suffices. It is impossible to be faithful to the facts and at the same time indifferent to theory².

Technically, Mudimbe is an analytical mind of exquisite quality. But because of his philosophical eclecticism and the theoretical limitations or impositions of this, the continuity of analysed units of discourse is undermined and ruptured. The collation as a thought-continuum is segmentary and ultimately truncated. This weakness runs almost consistently throughout the text, except to a much lesser degree, in his discussion on 'The Missionary Discourse and Africa's Conversion' (The Power of Speech), where the philosophical and analytical integument of his exposition is systematically liberated and achieves consistency and homogeneity.

Mudimbe's reading of the debates triggered by Tempels's *Bantu Philosophy*, Griaule's work on the Dogon, and the reactions of Mbiti, de Hemptinne, Kagame, Diop, Tshiamalenga, Dieterlen and de Heusch is succinct. His conclusion here can hardly be faulted;

2 M. Harris. *Ibid.* p. 285.

I am personally convinced that the most imaginative works that reveal to us what are now called African systems of thought, such as those of Dieterlen, de Heusch, and Turner, can be fundamentally understood through their journey into Einfühlung. In the case of African scholars, it often becomes a case, as with Kagame correcting Tempels, or sympathy towards oneself and one's culture (Page 145).

The 'journey into *Einfühlung*', we must remember, started from 'the primitivist tradition'. In itself it represented progress within its own historical context i.e. the late colonial period. It is a journey almost as distant as the journey from evolutionism to functionalism. Kagame, Lufuluabo, Mujynya and Mulago are not mere intellectual gobemouches of Tempels. In sympathy with their cultures which have for so long been denigrated by the westerner, they attempt to polish in the context of their historical conjuncture the then new approach to 'the other'. They claim a gnosis which will authenticate and rehabilitate their culture especially in as far as ontological issues are concerned. They claim a gnosis which will authenticate and rehabilitate their culture especially in as far as ontological issues are concerned. They ultimately, together with most of the ethnophilosophers, the negritude philosophers and negrologues, belong to the populist ideological mould which in the era of late anti-colonial and early post-colonial nationalism articulated the strength of populist consensus and Afrocentric reaction to retreating western colonialism. Idealization of the past is a hallmark of populism. Indeed the 'retrojection' which Towa accuses the ethnophilosophers of is a classic feature of the populist ideological edifice (Page 158). They share together with the functionalists one major weakness among others. This is that, they are methodologically ahistorical, creating reified and timeless images of the African reality reconstructed within the framework of 'the ethnographic present'. The methodological and substantial crudities of Tempels and his disciples' contributions to the analysis of African traditional thought systems, do not detract from, in the first place, the need to undertake this task, and secondly the considerable degree of preoccupation centrality which these issues continue to enjoy in the African mind in the post-colonial era. Obviously, *weltanschauungen* in themselves do not constitute composite philosophical constructs, but they are subject to philosophical analysis. I would go as far as suggesting that they represent primary areas of concern if the enterprise of philosophy in Africa is to engage the essence of African culture, society and history. In other words there is little point in Africa philosophers simply integrating themselves into western concerns and competing for audience on the western preoccupation platform. The analytical tools may well be universal, but the point of focus must have historical and sociological relevance. We are saying that, Socratic philosophy was not concerned in sociological focus about issues in China; the Utilitarians were concerned

with issues of emergent western industrial society; the Existentialists were responding to the *angst* inherent in modern western society; the Enlightenment philosophers were in the main preoccupied with considerations which found expression in the French Revolution and its aftermath. We are here in agreement with Mudimbe when he places the issues raised by Eboussi-Boulaga on the origin, identity and being of the African, on the critical philosophical agenda (Page 153). Hountondji's demolition of the ethnophilosophical position has been sound, and Mudimbe accords him careful attention. But, the weakness in Hountondji's position, his willingness to identify his position both formally and contextually essentially within the western epistemological field has rightly opened him up to criticism for western dependency and neo-colonialism. When Hountondji announces with aplomb that; 'we have produced a radically new definition of African philosophy, the criterion being the geographical origin of the authors rather than an alleged specificity of content' (Page 159), he in one fell swoop attempts to obliterate the contradiction between the universal and the specific; the specific being 'the invented Africa'. The message is that, there is nothing worth the name in the African field, join the so-called universal philosophical crusade under western eyes.

Elitism would be a misnomer for Hountondji's disease, unless his accusers see both themselves and the accused as part of the western intellectual world. Mudimbe's discussion of the thinking of African clerics shows close familiarity and sound understanding and his mind appears to be at its best in these sections of the text (*The Patience of Philosophy*).

One area in this text where the absence of clear philosophical bearing and an absence of methodological coordinates is most emphatically felt is in his analysis of some of the principal 'socialist' leaders Africa has seen since the era of independence, and his discussion of 'Marx Africanized'. In Senghor's system, 'anthropologist's speculations are inter-alia, combined with Marxism'; In Nkrumah, the 'African Personality ideology gave rise to the ambiguous social philosophy'; we are told that, 'when prominent leaders such as Senghor or Nyerere propose to synthesize liberalism, idealism and materialism, they know that they are transplanting western intellectual manicheism' (Pages 1984-1850). I am not so sure if they know this. The ambiguity of these philosophical concoctions can be understood essentially within the concept of populism. The mixing of political ideological strands in the name of African Socialism is a feature of the class character of the dominant groups which have over the past three decades supervised the post-colonial state in Africa.

To be or not to be

At heart, Mudimbe's study wrestles with a number of key propositions struggling to achieve the status of plausible assumptions. Very early in his

text, our attention is drawn to the fact that, 'until now, Western interpreters as well as African analysts have been using categories and conceptual systems which depend on a Western epistemological order'. Undeniably, he explains, as any serious examination of the facts will reveal, 'even in the most explicit Afrocentric descriptions, models of analysis explicitly, knowingly or unknowingly, refer to the same order'. This order, in foundation and historical edifice has created 'the other', a beast which is neither fish nor fowl. The invention of this unicorn as Mudimbe amply shows was part of the Western encountering experience, and nearer our times, colonialism in particular. The inventors were not only the adventurers and travellers of earlier times but also the more intellectually astute and trained minds who dabbled in colonial anthropology.

From Herodotus, Diodorus of Sicily, and Pliny of classical Europe through John Lok in the 16th century, the western mind has been satisfied to feed on the idea of Africans as not quite human. Some were 'people without heads, having their eyes and mouths in their breast'. Others were, 'headless, satyrs, strapfoots' still others, were 'cave-dwellers who have no language and live on the flesh of snakes' (Page 71). As Mudimbe points out, the 19th century anthropologists were evidentially firm in their depiction of 'the essential paradigm of the European invention of Africa:Us/Them'. No lesser a figure as Herbert Spencer upheld the view that;

According to Lichtenstein, the Bushmen do not 'appear to have any feeling of even the most striking changes in the temperature of the atmosphere'. Gardiner says the Zulus 'are perfect Salamander', arranging the burning faggots with their feet and dipping their hands into the boiling contents of the cooking-vessels'³.

Attention can also be drawn to another not insignificant figure in anthropology, Lewis Henry Morgan. Carl Resek has 'pointed out that in 1850, concerning the fate of Africans in America, he expressed the view that;

....it is time to fix some limits to the reproduction of this black race among us. It is limited in the north by the traits of the whites. The black population has no independent vitality among us. In the south while the blacks are property, there can be no assignable limit to their reproduction. It is too thin a race intellectually to be fit to propagate

3 Herbert Spender, *Principles of Sociology* (1876). 1906 Edition. New York. Vol 1. p.50. Further on in the same text, while discussing what he considered to be the limited intellectual capacities of primitive peoples he recalls Sir Richard Burton into evidence; '...with Negroes. Burton says of the East Africans, "ten minutes sufficed to weary out the most intellectual" (Ibid. p.83).

*and I am perfectly satisfied from reflection that the feeling towards this race is one of hostility throughout the north. We have no respect for them whatever*⁴.

Levy-Bruhl's prelogical primitives, Malinowski's acculturating and detribalized natives, are all part of the order of 'the other'. During the heyday of the African independence movement in the early part of 1959, the cultured English writer Evelyn Waugh was peddling as recollections of his travels and adventures in Africa and, as part of what he had learnt about the eastern coast of Africa during a visit; that in the 16th and 17th centuries, when Arabs, Turks and Portuguese were contending for over-lordship of the East African coast particularly around Mombasa and Malindi;

*...for several years a ferocious cannibal tribe from south of the Zembesi, called the Zimba, had been making a leisurely progress up the coast, eating their way through the inhabitants. They appeared on the mainland just as the Portuguese fleet anchored off the island. The Turks invited the Zimba to cross over and help against the Portuguese. The Zimba came, ate the Turks and, gorged, shambled away to the north, leaving Mombasa to the Portuguese. They were repulsed at Malindi and disappeared from history*⁵.

When the evolutionists and diffusionists in the nineteenth century, and later the functionalists in the twentieth century brought the African from the back of beyond, it was to 'repress otherness in the name of sameness', strip 'otherness' of its more conceptually outlandish and atavistic baggage and in effect attempt to 'fundamentally escape the task of making sense of other worlds' (Page 72). While arguably, both Anglo-Saxon functionalism and Gallic structuralism are inherently teleological and represent a move from emphasis on 'the other' towards 'the same', the point which Mudimbe does

4 Carl Resek, *Lewis Henry Morgan : American Scholar*. Chicago. 1960. p. 63.

5 Evelyn Waugh, *A Tourist in Africa*. London. 1960. P.49. He writes elsewhere that concerning the Islands of Kilwa Kisiwani, Songo Mnara and Sanji ya Kati, 'The Persians probably came here first and set up a dynasty in the tenth century. It was under the Arabs of Oman that the place became great. The Portuguese came there at the beginning of the 16th century. In 1589 (mine underline) the Zimba ate all the inhabitants and left a waste that irregularly reoccupied (Ibid.p.75). Waugh attributes the authenticity of the story to Mr. Kirkman (the well-known Archaeologist), who 'exuberant enthusiast for the comic as well as for the scientific aspects of his work' (p.48),....'gleefully recounted' (p.49)....'This vivid little history was conveyed to us....with infectious but inimitable zest by the Director of Antiquities' (p.51). James S. Kirkman is hardly unique. Hamo Sasoon in a review of Kirkman's, *Fort Jesus : A Portuguese Fortress on the East African Coast*, Clarendon Press, 1974, informs us that : 'Dr. James Kirkman spent twenty-four years on the coast of Kenya, and of these, fourteen were spent in Mombasa focussing (to quote Sir Mortimer Wheeler) his "skill and almost infinite labour" upon the history of the great Fort'. See *Azania. Journal of the British Institute in Eastern Africa*. Vol XL. 1976. p.196.

not make is the fact that this escape is not accomplished not because of sheer 'limiting ethnocentrism' or 'epistemological determinism'. The creation of 'the other' was a western project, the unification or synthesis of 'the other' and 'the same' historically and dialectically represents the negation of 'the same' as a western product. The new sameness cannot historically be inspired by the old sameness but by its historical anti-thesis. I would emphatically add that this process historically has an intermediate stage or position, where 'the other' has an epistemological order for-it-self. It is only when and after 'the other' defines itself for-it-self that the epistemologically useful negation of occidendo-centric scholarship comes historically on the agenda. I shall revisit this point.

Mudimbe goes to considerable extent in his search for the route forward to an epistemological universalism which will historically outdate upstream the limitations of the past. He cautiously suggests that;

It is surely possible, as functionalism and structuralism proved, to have works that seem to respect indigenous traditions. And one could hope for even more profound changes in anthropology.....'

Mudimbe is obviously not very convinced himself that indeed functionalism and structuralism respect native traditions. They 'seem to respect' are his words, and indeed they only 'seem to respect' the native and his/her lore. The native is no longer six months or a year away from London, in Equatorial forests or harsh deserts, as distant from western civilization as the earth is from the moon. The native is only a few hours flight from London. The conditions of his/her life and mode of livelihood, directly affects the life of the westerner in depths of the concrete jungles of the western world. Stories about man-eating Zimbabwes sweeping along the East African coast eating all humans on sight cannot be pressed into currency however ostensibly authoritative the source may be in the age of the radio and television. Functionalism pleads that the native can and should be understood in his/her own cultural or societal context. The native is different but not a monster, he/she is a neighbour and we know that he/she does not have eyes in the breast. He/she remains 'the other' although less conceptually remote. As Harris observatively notes, between 1930 and 1955, the overwhelming majority of studies and contributions of the structural-functional school was grounded in fieldwork undertaken in European controlled Africa, particularly in the British administered territories. He points out that,

Under such circumstances it is impossible not to draw a connection between the proposal to study social systems as if they were timeless, with

sponsorship, employment, and indirect association of the members of U.S. school by and with a now defunct colonial system⁶.

In both Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's *African Political Systems* (1940), and the Introduction to Forde and Radcliffe-Brown's *African Systems of Kinship and Marriage*, we are advised that these texts are not merely for anthropologists but also those involved in colonial administration. The point must not be lost on us that, 'the other' in the era of functionalism is the colonized or neo-colonized. Structuralism as we know it today, is very considerably a contribution of the French anthropological tradition. Like functionalism, its roots lie with Durkheim, with the continuity rendered in the work of Mauss particularly in *The Gift*, and subsequently by his student Levi-Strauss who refined the methodological underpinnings of the approach to excellence in *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*. Levi-Strauss the giant of French structuralism recognizes the binary character of structure for the anthropologist and his/her study object or phenomenon. The native remains 'the other' an object of western creative genius, scrutiny and rationalization. As Homi Bhabha has eloquently put it, 'an authorized version of otherness'⁷.

Mudimbe is of course right when he points out that;

.... so far it seems impossible to imagine any anthropology without a western epistemological link. For on the one hand, it cannot be completely cut off from the field of its epistemological genesis and from its roots; and, on the other hand, as a science, it depends upon a precise frame without which there is no science at all, nor any anthropology (Page 19).

I would go as far as saying that, the western epistemological genesis and link will remain. It cannot be denied or wished away. Mankind can only be thankful for it, whatever its shortcomings may be. It is part, but only part of the raw material for a future universal epistemological fund and subject to radical reinterpretation. What is more important is what African scholars, or for that matter non-western scholars do with it. In as far as western epistemology autonomously defines 'the other' from its own Eurocentric crucible, 'the other' remains a caricature, a Caliban of the western mind. As Bhabha would have it, 'a reformed recognizable Other, as a *subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite*'⁸. It is only through the scholastic counter-penetration of the existent epistemological field that

6 M.Harris.op cit. p.516.

7 Homi Bhabha. "Of Mimicry and Man : The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse", *Oc ober*. Cambridge, Mass. No.28. Spring 1984. pp.125-133.

8 Homi Bhabha. *Ibid*.

dialectical process towards universalism is completed. No amount of facile, faithful or clever mimicry would resolve this contradiction. But how is this to be achieved?

Mudimbe addresses this problem only in bits and pieces, fighting shy of the fuller and more profound implications of the problem. Summoning the voice of Levi-Strauss and the spirit of Rousseau, he proclaims that: 'Nothing is settled; everything can still be altered. What was done, but turned out wrong, can be done again. The Golden Age which blind superstition had placed behind (or ahead of) us, is in us' (Page 34). He then attempts to resolve the contradiction between 'the same' and 'the other', by invoking Paul Ricoeur's *Cri de coeur*, inviting us under the inspiration of the sign of Plato's 'great class' which itself 'associates the Same and the Other. The Similar is the great category. Or better, the Analogue which is a resemblance between relations rather than between simple terms'⁹ I would argue that Ricoeur's outspoken epistemological conscience given the intellectual currents and trends of our times in the western world represents a voice in the wilderness. Carl Sagan's epistemological ethnocentrism with regards to Sagan's denial of the historico-cultural authenticity of Dogon cosmology in respect to their Sirius mythology is more in character with western images of the African even today. There is still much life in 'the belief that scientifically there is nothing to be learned from them, unless it is already ours or comes from us' (Page 15)¹⁰. For Mudimbe, Foucault's wish to interrogate the western will lead to truth and restore to discourse its impact as an event, and 'abolish the sovereignty of the signifier'; and

9 P.Ricoeur. *The Reality of the Historical Past*. Milwaukee. 1984. p.25. Quoted here from Mudimbe. Op cit. p. 34. Ricoeur's awakening is well recalled by Mudimbe: 'The fact that universal civilization has for a long time originated from the European center has maintained the illusion that European culture was, in fact and by right, a universal culture. Its superiority over other civilizations seemed to provide the experimental justification of this postulate. Moreover, the encounter with other cultural traditions was itself the fruit of that advance and more generally the fruit of Occidental science itself. Did not Europe invent history, geography, ethnography, and sociology in their explicit scientific forms'.... When we discover that there are several cultures instead of just one and consequently at the time when we acknowledge the end of a sort of cultural monopoly, be it illusory or real, we are threatened with destruction by our own discovery. Suddenly it becomes possible that there are just others, that we ourselves are an "other" among others'. P. Ricoeur. *History and Truth*. Evanston. 1965. pp.277-278. Quoted here from Mudimbe. Op. cit. pp.19-21.

10 I recall with cynical hindsight my experience in Cape Coast University, Ghana, 1974-75, where in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, a young American Africanist with a smattering of Twi (Akan) was supposed to be teaching the Social Structure of the Ashanti to undergraduates. This phenomenon is as absurd as visualizing an African sociologist teaching German students in a German university in Bavarian, the social structure of Bavarian society. Scholarship today would regard in all likelihood the former example as 'normal' or acceptable. Indeed, this is precisely the route to an eventual chair in 'African Studies' in the western world. The latter case is likely to provoke laughter at the patently surrealistic.

Levi-Strauss's attempt to conceive empirical categories that can be used as keys or indicators 'to a silent code, leading to universals' break the initial ground for the crusade towards the unity of 'the same' and 'the other'. Mudimbe's discussions here and in this respect, read more like articles of faith than the result of dialectical processes and smack of what I describe as 'epistemological millenarianism'; the conception of a methodologically sensible future in which the epistemological field is an actively common heritage of mankind, but without a plausible or credible route to.

The discussion on Blyden is rich and resourceful. But because Mudimbe does not examine Blyden's ideas from a historically analytical perspective, the evolution of Blyden's thought is lost. On a whole range of issues, including Islam, Christianity, African nationalism, native culture and colonialism, Blyden's views were never static. They changed. A fuller appreciation of Blyden cannot be achieved unless it is structured firmly in a historical matrix. The presentation of Ethiopian Sources of Knowledge, as an appendix, tags on rather ungainly to the tail-end of the study. This is unfortunate, given its analytically exciting possibilities. A mind like Mudimbe's would have possibly satisfyingly dissected it to be gorged by African scholarship.

The text has its occasional factual slips. I shall provide two examples. On page 76, we are told about '....the first monographs of African laws and customs', and then referred to Ajisafe and Danquah. Certainly, Sarbah and Casely Hayford pre-date these efforts¹¹. Another such slip is on page 45, where we are wrongly informed that; 'The mass celebrated on the Guinea Coast in 1481, under a big tree displaying the royal arms of Portugal, symbolized the possession of a new territory'. The Portuguese actually, were in;

*La Mina on the 19th January 1482. On the following morning they suspended the banner of Portugal from the bough of a lofty tree, at the foot of which they erected an altar, and the whole company assisted at the first mass that was celebrated in Guinea..*¹²

Concluding Remarks

Mudimbe has produced a masterpiece in scholarship on Africa. The solidity of his learning, his acutely analytical mind, the richness of his discourse, and his courage to address central and daunting issues facing African scholarship

11 See John Mensah Sarbah, *Fanti Customary Laws*. London. 1st Edition. 1897, Joseph Ephraim Casely Hayford, *Gold Coast Native Institutions*. London. 1903.

12 See N.O.Anim's contribution on Ghana in, D.C. Scanlon. (ed), *Church, State, and Education in Africa*. New York. 1966.p.168. Also, R.M. Wiltgen. *Gold Coast Mission History : 1471-1880*. Techny. Illinois. 1956. p.16.

are laudable. There are of course as indicated, weaknesses in the exposition. To my mind the most sensitive, indeed the Achilles heel of his work lies with the choice of the concepts of 'the same' and 'the other'. In his search to find what many will agree is a desirable objective i.e. the basis of a universal epistemological reference point in the study of society and Africa in particular, Mudimbe's ultimate position is vague. As we have earlier stated, the dialectics of this process requires that initially, 'the other' consciously constitutes itself for-itself as an autonomously self-defining source of episteme. It is this step which will create the basis of the negation of the Occidento-centric focus of what today is the epistemological field. It is only when the negation has been effected that the basis of a common universal epistemological heritage can be put in place. As Mpoyi-Bwatu, N'Zembele and Willame have urged Mudimbe, he needs 'to draw the political implications from his conclusions' (Page XI). The cultural dimensions of the 'national question' is lost on him. As I have frequently insisted, the use of African languages constitutes a missing link in any move forward in African intellectual and scholastic progress. Mudimbe (also Hountondji) wants ultimately to become international without being first national, in a historical situation where 'the self' of the African has never since the penetration of the west been allowed to exist or even coexist except as a mimic man. 'The other' is a mimic man.



Reinventing Africa?

Ernest Harsch*

The images of Africa prevalent today in the industrialized countries of the West may be marginally more sophisticated and nuanced than in the days of direct colonial rule, when they were dominated by explicit and openly racist portrayals of Africans as primitive, childish, and illogical, as "peoples without history". But the likenesses of Africa that find their way into the mass media are still predominantly cast in poses of inferiority: the starving child with begging bowl, the venal and corrupt ruler who can so easily manipulate his subjects, interminable civil wars and tribal slaughter, societies in perpetual decay. Pity the poor African, still struggling to master the art of civilization.

* Sociology Department, New School for Social Research, New York.

are laudable. There are of course as indicated, weaknesses in the exposition. To my mind the most sensitive, indeed the Achilles hell of his work lies with the choice of the concepts of 'the same' and 'the other'. In his search to find what many will agree is a desirable objective i.e. the basis of a universal epistemological reference point in the study of society and Africa in particular, Mudimbe's ultimate position is vague. As we have earlier stated, the dialectics of this process requires that initially, 'the other' consciously constitutes itself for-itself as an autonomously self-defining source of episteme. It is this step which will create the basis of the negation of the Occidento-centric focus of what today is the epistemological field. It is only when the negation has been effected that the basis of a common universal epistemological heritage can be put in place. As Mpoyi-Bwatu, N'Zembele and Willame have urged Mudimbe, he needs 'to draw the political implications from his conclusions' (Page XI). The cultural dimensions of the 'national question' is lost on him. As I have frequently insisted, the use of African languages constitutes a missing link in any move forward in African intellectual and scholastic progress. Mudimbe (also Hountondji) wants ultimately to become international without being first national, in a historical situation where 'the self' of the African has never since the penetration of the west been allowed to exist or even coexist except as a mimic man. 'The other' is a mimic man.



Reinventing Africa?

Ernest Harsch*

The images of Africa prevalent today in the industrialized countries of the West may be marginally more sophisticated and nuanced than in the days of direct colonial rule, when they were dominated by explicit and openly racist portrayals of Africans as primitive, childish, and illogical, as "peoples without history". But the likenesses of Africa that find their way into the mass media are still predominantly cast in poses of inferiority: the starving child with begging bowl, the venal and corrupt ruler who can so easily manipulate his subjects, interminable civil wars and tribal slaughter, societies in perpetual decay. Pity the poor African, still struggling to master the art of civilization.

* Sociology Department, New School for Social Research, New York.

It is such distorted external conceptions of Africa - along with the efforts of Africans to refashion their own thinking - that most concern Valentin Mudimbe, Zairian scholar and philosopher. In a manner similar to that of the early African nationalist leaders and intellectuals, he looks toward a "reinvention" of Africa, in his case focusing most extensively on the realm of ideas.

Mudimbe's "archaeological perspective" seeks to chip away at centuries of European fancy, speculation, and theorizing about Africa to reveal the underlying core of "ethnocentrism" that marked not only the early European colonial writings and commentaries, but also much subsequent Western scholarship and investigation, based as it has been on the premise that "scientifically there is nothing to be learned from 'them' (Africans) unless it is already 'ours' or comes from 'us'" (p. 15). This approach has resulted in a denial of African accomplishments and capacities:

Since Africans could produce nothing of value, the technique of Yoruba statuary must have come from Egyptians; Benin art must be a Portuguese creation; the architectural achievement of Zimbabwe was due to Arab technicians; and Hausa and Buganda statecraft were inventions of white invaders. (p. 13)

We learn that much of the ideological groundwork for the imposition of European rule was laid by the Christian missions, so closely identified with the cultural propaganda, patriotic motivations, and commercial interests of their colonial benefactors. From the Vatican came "sacred instructions" justifying the conquest and domination of pagan peoples, while the missionaries in the field, often in tandem with colonial administrators, sometimes on their own, set about converting African minds, undercutting the cohesion of traditional pre-colonial societies, and replacing them with new relations and modes of thinking better suited to European rule and exploitation.

Very soon came the anthropologists, whom Mudimbe skewers with particular relish. Reflecting the conventions of social Darwinism that were in vogue during the genesis of their discipline, the anthropologists undertook the task of studying and classifying the continent's varied peoples and cultures, assigning them to their places in the grid of social evolution, and measuring their distances from the attributes of civilization, as defined in Europe. Consciously or not, their work provided further intellectual justification for Europe's "civilizing mission" and - not incidentally - gave the new colonial administrators a clearer and more sophisticated understanding of their subjects. Mudimbe notes with sympathy the more recent efforts of some anthropologists to break with this European-centered approach and to analyze African societies with a measure of respect for their

traditional cultures and values. "But so far it seems impossible to imagine any anthropology without a Western epistemological link". (p. 19)

Despite the demise of direct colonial rule and the attainment of formal political independence, African societies continued to be defined within European (and North American) conceptual frames, which, by and large, implied "that Africans must evolve from their frozen state to the dynamism of Western civilization". (p. 76) Though Mudimbe himself cites few contemporary manifestations of this trend, one example that springs to mind is the drive by the major Western powers, through the IMF and World Bank, to impose market-oriented structural adjustment programs on Africa. Without entering here into a discussion of the appropriateness of these particular policy prescriptions, one aspect is worth underlining: the assumption that Africans themselves are incapable of devising strategies for their own economic development and that the solutions must come from external "experts". This can take on particularly arrogant tones, as evidenced by City Bank Vice-President George "Jack" Clark, who has remarked, "in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, we're dealing with institutions that have now been in their businesses for over 40 years ... Their wisdom is so overwhelming that there just isn't anything else in the league"¹³.

The policies of the IMF and the World Bank would not be adopted so readily, nor would other misconceptions about Africa gain such wide currency, if many Africans themselves did not accept this "wisdom" of the West. Citing critiques by E.W. Blyden, Franz Fanon, and more contemporary African thinkers and political leaders, Mudimbe devotes some space to discussing Africans' internalization of the ideas, concepts, and ways of thinking of their former colonial overlords. On top of Africa's many other burdens and afflictions, from the extreme dependence of its economies to the ease with which external powers can intervene politically and militarily, the non-African imprint on much of the continent's intellectual life emerges as a key impediment to African self-awareness and self-actualization.

But by various meandering pathways, with half-steps and false starts, against numerous physical and political obstacles, Africans are striving to cast off their intellectual straitjackets. In history, sociology, theology, philosophy, and even anthropology itself, they are questioning and challenging earlier conceptions about themselves and about their place in the world. It is this process that most concerns Mudimbe, and forms the heart of his book.

¹³ *Africa News*, vol. 31, No. 12, June 12, 1989, p. 2.

Mudimbe cites and comments upon the works of scores of African writers, historians, social scientists, theologians, and political leaders. If nothing else, his bibliography alone would be a valuable reference source for students of African intellectual discourse. One chapter, devoted almost entirely to E.W. Blyden, provides a fascinating intellectual portrait of that prescient - and often contradictory - champion of African advancement, whom some have termed the father of African nationalism and pan-Africanism (despite his ambivalent affinity for Western "civilizing" endeavors).

Reflecting Mudimbe's penchant for the art of abstract thought, one recurrent question seems to emerge from his inquiry: is there an African philosophy? From the evidence he presents, this has been a subject of considerable debate among African intellectuals. The response appears to be colored, in part, by whether the particular individual seeks to borrow and adapt ideas and methodologies originating from outside the continent, rejects them in favor of an "authentic" African world view or seeks a fusion. It also seems influenced by whether one's approach draws on class analysis or is broadly nationalist. (The two sets of dichotomies are not necessarily parallel, with many crosscurrents of thought intersecting them.)

P.J. Hountondji of Benin, one of Africa's better-known Marxist intellectuals, proposes a definition of African philosophy based on the geographical origin of its authors,

rather than an alleged specificity of content. The effect of this is to broaden the narrow horizon which has hitherto been imposed on African philosophy and to treat it, as now conceived, as a methodical inquiry with the same universal aims as those of any other philosophy in the world. (quoted p. 159)

Others (V. Mulago, Alexis Kagame, N. Tshiamalenga) do seek a philosophy that is somehow specifically African in nature. Mudimbe himself seems to lean toward this camp. In a manner reminiscent of the negritude literary and political current of the 1950s or Cheikh Anta Diop's efforts to counter the colonial myths of African primitiveness by demonstrating the existence of vital pre-colonial African civilizations, these authors tend to look back to traditional African thought as an inspiration for contemporary philosophical inquiry. They are not agreed, however, whether traditional thought itself represented a "deep", implicit philosophy (as Kagame has argued), or simply provides the raw material from which a philosophy or philosophies may be built. Nor do they necessarily idealize the past. Mabika Kalanda, for example, has urged that tradition be purged of those characteristics that predispose Africans to submission.

Ironically, considering the role that Christian missionaries played in Africa's colonization, a number of these intellectuals also function within a

Christian theological framework and have been active in movements to Africanize Christian teachings. Some (including Mudimbe himself) are or have been in the priesthood or teach at theological universities. To the inevitable question about why Africans should believe in a Christianity that was used to advance racial and class exploitation, Mudimbe quotes the Jesuit priest E. Mveng responding that "the West is less and less Christian" and preaches ideas that are "far, very far from the gospel" (p.172). Africans, Mveng implies, can play a role in reviving Christianity, by adapting it more to people's genuine aspirations.

But what has this to do with developing an "authentically" African intellectual life? Why should Christianity offer a more favorable avenue for developing African self-expression than do other strains of thought?

The focus on Christianity is all the more puzzling when one considers that in much of Africa, from the north, through the Sahel, and down the eastern coast, Islam - a religion less directly tainted by European colonialism - either is dominant or holds significant minority allegiance. This could hardly be gleaned from reading Mudimbe's book. Outside of his chapter on Blyden, who demonstrated considerable respect for Islamic organization and discipline, Mudimbe only mentions Islam two or three times. He makes no attempt to discuss Islam's influence on African philosophical thought, nor does he acknowledge the existence of an intellectual discourse within Islamic theology. To cite just one example, the violent uprisings in northern Nigeria in 1980 and 1982 by impoverished followers of the Islamic millenarian prophet Maitatsine, in a region dominated by wealthy Islamic emirs, indicates that profound tensions and conflicting viewpoints traverse Islam as well.

Mudimbe's neglect of Islam is reinforced by his geographically narrow treatment of "Africa" as Africa south of the Sahara, a common (and artificial) division which serves to reduce Islam's relative weight. Yet it cannot be explained by this alone. As already implied, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Mudimbe is motivated by a strong affinity toward Christian theology, a bias that influences not only his assessments of particular African thinkers, but also the very selection of authors and topics he chooses to discuss. This would be quite acceptable if the boundaries and leanings of his approach were declared openly, at the outset. They are not.

The particular thrust of Mudimbe's perspective also becomes evident in his treatment of African marxist thought. Unlike Islam, he does not ignore this current and even acknowledges that it has a profound impact on the continent's intellectual life, serving as a source of inspiration, ideas, and methodology for many African thinkers and political leaders from the days of the anti-colonial struggle through the present. As evidenced by his bibliography and citations, Mudimbe has obviously done some reading

among the works of African marxists and non-African marxists writing on Africa, and has pondered how to answer them.

Mudimbe reproaches marxists for positing a universalist theory that seeks to subsume regional and local variables into a general and rigid explanation of social evolution. marxist analysis, he says, reworks history into "a perfectly evolutionist and functional grid as an almost mechanical succession of modes of production determined by productive forces and class struggle". (p. 196) Mudimbe's criticism is not entirely without foundation, considering the tendency among some writers, in line with dogmatic schemas associated with Stalinism, to force Africa into analogies based on the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Western Europe. But that is far from the totality of marxist discourse from and about Africa, and there has been a rich debate within the marxist tradition on the complexities of African social formation, including a questioning of the idea that the continent must inevitably pass through the same stages of economic and social development that more industrialized regions have traversed. Nor can this debate be reduced to an application to Africa of the famous "Asiatic mode of production" construct, as Mudimbe seems to imply in his sole passage devoted to this discussion.

This presentation of marxism as a rigid, *externally derived* approach that is insensitive to African specificity is central to Mudimbe's argument. For he implies that it should be rejected by African intellectuals from a nationalist impulse, as being little different than the ethnocentric European conceptions of primitiveness vs. civilization. Elsewhere, Mudimbe has been more explicit, accusing African intellectuals such as Hountondji, Majhemout Diop, and Amady Ali Dieng of being "seduced by the metaphors of an egalitarian society". Their "conversion", he argues in a preface to another book, has signified "a remarkable reconquest by Western historicity. The colonial period had installed it for Capital. Today it is being installed - in the name of the universality of Marx, and at last openly, after 30 years of rhetorical hypocrisy - as the exigency of marxist and socialist laws. What a symbol!"¹⁴.

Mudimbe's association of marxism with oppressive colonially inspired ideologies is hardly original. The call to "authenticity" has been raised many times before, not only by well-meaning African nationalists striving to find a voice suitable to popular aspirations, but also by reactionary despots (Mobutu, Eyadéma) seeking to stifle critical thought and cloak their oppressive rule in the garb of "tradition".

14 "Preface" to Bogumil Jewsiewicki, *Marx, Afrique et Occident: les pratiques africanistes de l'histoire marxiste*, Montreal: McGill University, Centre for Developing-Area Studies, Monograph Series, No. 19, 1985, pp. iii, xi.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that Mudimbe himself is not consistent about rejecting ideas and philosophies originating from Europe. He presents the works of such (non-marxist) intellectuals as Claude Lévi-Strauss, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Michel Foucault in a very positive light, and explicitly bases part of his methodology on the latter.

In reading Mudimbe's book, one soon becomes aware that he is very much wedded to the concept of the Idea, in its purer forms. This may account for his antipathy to Marxism; which sees its ultimate test in how well it reflects and explains the world of concrete social relations and helps the oppressed to act upon it. For Mudimbe, that is not philosophy's proper vocation. This comes through in his appellation of Hountondji's proposal that philosophy engage in a dialogue with social reality as a "paradoxical task" (p. 168). It is also evident in his attack on black theology in South Africa as being "applied theology", that is, championing the cause of radical political organizations; by way of paraphrasing Eboussi-Boulaga, he charges Desmond Tutu, Allan Boesak, Manas Buthelezi, and other activist theologians of submitting to "the service of new political chauvinisms and idols, repeating the missionary's dream of conciliating God's glory and Caesar's power" (p. 63). That Mudimbe can see little difference between pro-colonial missionaries and black theologians seeking to bring down the colonial-type apartheid regime speaks volumes.

There are other peculiar formulations as well. Mudimbe argues that it was Sartre's *Black Orpheus* that was in large measure responsible for the blossoming of the negritude literary movement in Francophone Africa and that black intellectuals "read Sartre, discussed his anticolonialist positions and, generally speaking, upheld them". (p. 85) Without belittling Sartre's undoubted influence on a layer of African anticolonial intellectuals, a question needs to be posed: Were these intellectuals (and indeed, Sartre himself) not also influenced, at least to some extent, by the very visible anticolonial struggles that were then underway? Did not the strikes by African rail and dockworkers, the women's mobilizations in Nigeria, or rural insurgencies such as Kenya's Mau Mau leave some imprint on African intellectuals' efforts to throw off colonial ideological assumptions and develop new, more independent ways of thinking?

By overlooking this essential interplay, Mudimbe's presentation of the African philosophical debate cuts out the very real social input that gives these discussions their vitality and relevance. If the project of developing a genuine African intellectual tradition is to make further headway, then it needs to continually seek nourishment from outside the relatively narrow and stultified confines of academia.

Notes to Contributors

Manuscripts should be double-spaced with notes, references, tables and charts on separate pages. Camera-ready copies of maps, tables, charts, graphs and other illustrations will be welcome. An abstract of 150 to 200 words stating the main research problem, major findings and conclusions should be sent with the articles for translation into English or French.

Authors should indicate their full name, address, their academic status and their current institutional affiliation. This should appear on a separate covering page since manuscripts will be sent out anonymously to outside readers. Manuscripts will not be returned to the authors.

Articles submitted to Africa Development should be original contributions and should not be under consideration by another publication at the same time: if an article is under consideration by another publication the author should inform the editor at the time of submission.

Authors are entitled, free of charge, to two copies of the issue in which their article appear and 20 off-prints of their article.

Avis aux Auteurs

Les manuscrits doivent être tapés en double interligne avec les notes, références, tableaux et graphiques sur des feuilles séparées. Nous souhaiterions recevoir des prêt-à-photographier des cartes, tableaux, graphiques et autres illustrations. Un résumé de 150 à 200 mots indiquant le problème fondamental de recherche ainsi les principaux résultats et conclusions doit accompagner les articles pour des fins de traduction en anglais ou en français.

Les auteurs doivent indiquer leur nom au complet, leur adresse, leur situation académique ainsi que leur rattachement institutionnel actuel. Ces informations doivent figurer sur une feuille à part puisque les articles seront envoyés anonymes aux arbitres à l'extérieur. Les manuscrits ne seront pas retournés aux auteurs.

Les articles soumis à **Afrique et Développement** doivent être des originaux et ne doivent pas être soumis à d'autres périodiques au même moment. Si un article était déjà soumis à un autre périodique, l'auteur devra en informer le Rédacteur en Chef au moment de sa soumission.

Les auteurs reçoivent gratuitement deux exemplaires du numéro dans lequel leur article est publié ainsi que 20 tirés-à-part de leur article.

Contents - Sommaire

Momar Coumba Diop

L'administration sénégalaise et la gestion des "fléaux sociaux"

Amadou Diop

Population et Villes Sénégal: La croissance démographique

Stella C. Ogbuago

Family Planning: A Human Right for Women

Daniel Smart Asante-Odame

The Crisis of Development Finance and Its Impact on Developing Economies: Trends, Issues and Policy Options

Austin Isamah

Organized Labour Under the Military Regimes in Nigeria

Babatunde Zack-Williams

Diamond Mining and Underdevelopment in Sierra Leone
1930/1980

Book Reviews

Kwesi Prah

The Subvention of the Invention of Africa

Ernest Harsch

Reinventing Africa?

ISSN 0850 3907

