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Africa Development is the quarterly bi-lingual Journal of the Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA).

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Notes on Transnationalisation

Samir Amin*

Résumé. Cette étude examine la question de la transnationalisation dans les systèmes économiques qui sont à l'origine de l'économie mondiale. L'évaluation du degré de transnationalisation de l'économie de différents pays peut se mesurer en rapport avec la part du commerce extérieur dans la constitution du PIB. Depuis la seconde guerre mondiale, les cycles d'évolution de la transnationalisation et son impact sur les performances économiques permettent d'apprecier le glissement de "l'autonomie nationale", vieille maxime des années 30 vers la nouvelle obligation "la compétitivité internationale". L'intensification de la transnationalisation est plus un signe de l'interdépendance entre les économies capitalistes des pays développés et marginalement un indice des transferts Nord-Sud. L'importance des transferts dans l'économie mondiale capitaliste a entraîné l'émergence de trois pôles: les Etats-Unis, le Japon et la Communauté Economique Européenne, alors que les performances des pays du Tiers Monde sont médiocres, ou négligeables en quantités absolues, même si ces derniers sont de plus en plus des marchés en expansion, en tenues de transfert pour les pôles développés. Ceci est encore plus vrai pour les pays à revenu moyen dont les transferts vers les pays développés sont plus significatifs qu'entre eux. L'examen des trois pôles et de leurs périphéries respectives permet de repérer les polarisations régionales, d'apprecier leur adaptation au cadre d'une transnationalisation en voie d'intensification et de mesurer les potentialités respectives de chaque périphérie qui sont différentes.

1. On an initial virtually intuitive examination, the share of foreign trade in the GDP of various countries may provide a "measure" of the level of transnationalisation in the economic system forming the world economy. On this criterion, transnationalisation gained a stronger hold over the long cycle following the end of the Second World War. In addition the slow-down in growth from the early 1970s did not mean a loss of steam in world trade, unlike the 1930s when falling production was matched by declining external transfers. Rather the reverse, the rate of expansion in external transfers through the 1970s and 1980s ran above growth: transnationalisation intensified.

The share of exports in the GDP of the developed capitalist countries (OECD) rose from 12 per cent in 1965 to 20 per cent in 1988. If we take into account the increasing weight of non-exportable services in the GDP, (more than 60 per cent) we have some measure of the decisive impact of external trade on the performance of numerous sectors of agricultural and manufacturing output. This is an altogether new phenomenon - although international competition as such is nothing new - and explains why the authorities lay stress on the obligation of "international competitiveness" and have entirely abandoned the old maxim of "national autonomy" prevalent in the 1930s.

It should however be noted that this intensified transnationalisation is primarily a sign of the interpenetration of the developed capitalist economies, and only secondarily of "North-South" transfers. World trade is expanding

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principally because of intensification of intra-European transfers encouraged by the EEC. It is now possible to talk of an "European Economic Region" - although I would hesitate to describe it as an integrated region - on much the same lines as the great pre-Second World War European national economies (Germany, Britain and France). Secondly it is a sign of intensification of transfers between the three poles of the capitalist world economy: United States, Japan and the EEC.

This shift is the main reason for the expansion of external trade's share in the United States GDP (from 6 to 11 per cent between 1965 and 1988) and the rather more modest expansion in Japan (from 11 to 13 per cent over the same period). If the EEC is treated as a single "country" - disregarding intra-European transfers - it can be seen that the "external" transfers of each of the three giant poles represent about 12 per cent of their GDP and that intra-polar flows account for more than 60 per cent of the transfers (the share of intra-OECD transfers went from 66 per cent of their manufacturing exports in 1965 to 70 per cent in 1985, but remains as low as 60 per cent if intra-EEC transfers are excluded). This 12 per cent of GDP might not seem so much after all; it really is substantial as it represents 31 per cent of agricultural and industrial output (with services making up 61 per cent of GDP).

The share of transfers between the developed poles and the peripheries is by no means insubstantial, despite the fashion of writing it off rather too hastily. The Third World is a significant and expanding market for the developed poles. It must be admitted that the expansion of this market is unequal in the extreme. In 1988 world trade (exclusive of USSR, North Korea, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Cuba) amounted to 22,627 billion dollars. OECD exports (2,024 billion) accounted for 7 per cent. The Third World countries (603 billion) accounted for 23 per cent: China 40 billion, India 15 billion, other low-income countries 45 billion, other middle income countries 341 billion, and the wealthy under-populated oil producer countries 154 billion.

Or another breakdown gives: 154 billion for the oil producers, 174 billion in East Asia, 101 billion in Latin America, 85 billion for the Arab countries, Middle East, South and South-East Asia, 29 billion in sub-Saharan Africa. The share of exports of each of the poles - US, Japan and EEC - to the Third World countries was of the order of 20 to 30 per cent, more like 30 per cent for US and Japan and 20 per cent for the EEC, disregarding intra-EEC transfers.

It is worth noting that the volume of external trade of the Third World countries increased more rapidly than the GDP of the constituent countries. China's exports went from 3 to 14 per cent of GDP between 1965 and 1988, India's from 4 to 7 per cent over the same period, those of the middle income countries from 18 to 26 per cent. For the low income countries the share fell from 25 to 19 per cent over the period. We are back to the relative

stagnation of the external trade (and output) of most Third World countries, the components of the "fourth world" (including most of the Sub-Saharan countries). These statistics do not carry quite the same weight as in other countries, since GDP estimates are often highly unreliable (and not particularly significant). The apparent shifts in the ratio of exports to GDP - and the subsequent fall from 25 to 19 per cent - must be treated with caution. What is clear is that the performances are mediocre and the absolute quantities virtually negligible.

If the so-called fourth world is only an inconsequential market for the centres, this is not the case for the middle income countries which represent a significant market expanding at a faster rate than transfers between the developed poles. Transnationalisation has also intensified for the countries of the periphery though this obviously applies only to a narrow segment.

The peripheries do not play a merely passive role in transnationalisation - by opening their markets to expansion from the North. Industrialization of the South gives it an active role, by making it a by no means negligible segment of the world market in manufactured goods.

The North certainly retains control of the world market in agricultural and manufacturing output, because it has cereals surpluses (in the face of food shortages in the South) and the initiative in product innovation. Admittedly the Third World exports of manufactured goods to the three poles - of the order of 200 to 210 billion dollars in 1985 - represents less than 20 per cent of world transfers of manufactures, whose total volume was more than 1,100 billion at the time. The proportion remains modest - but far from negligible - when intra-EEC transfers (of the order then of 22 per cent) are excluded. United States exports to the Third World accounted for 35 per cent of their total exports of manufactured goods (160 billion dollars in 1985); Japan's similar exports were 36 per cent (of overall exports of 170 billion dollars in the same year); as for EEC exports to the Third World - of the order of 100 billion dollars in 1985 - they accounted for less than 20 per cent of the overall exports from the member countries, with the share rising to 25 per cent if intra-EEC transfers are excluded.

At the same time the world market saw the appearance of manufacturing exports from some of the middle income Third World countries.

Active transnationalisation also intensified in the countries of the periphery, albeit obviously still more concentrated in a few countries. In the first instance came the four dragons of East Asia (with more than 70 billion dollars of manufacturing exports in 1985, 28 billion of which came from South Korea). The Latin American giants followed (primarily Brazil and Mexico: about 16 billion). Then came South-East Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines) 12 billion. Eastern Europe (mainly Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary) showed potential for expansion (22 billion in 1985 for the three countries named). China should also be included in the list (13.4 bil-

lion of manufacturing exports in 1985) and India (with 5.9 billions in exports of the kind) where export capacity was expanding. In comparison, the Arab world (3.6 billion of manufacturing exports) and the fourth world (under 2 billion) were not only negligible but also stagnant.

2. If we look in conjunction at intra-EEC transfers, transfers between the poles (the United States, Japan and EEC), and transfers between the poles and the semi-industrialised regions of the Third World, we can see how regional crystallization fits into the framework of increasing transnationalisation. The crystallization occurs around each of the three poles indicated, but their respective peripheries enjoy a very different potential.

The great American region, dominated by the United States and its external province of Canada, is the natural partner of Latin America and the Caribbean. Mexico is already on the road to complete integration in the "great North-American market". Central and South America are being encouraged to follow this example, with the proposal of a free trade area stretching from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.

The great eastern and south-eastern Asian region, dominated by Japan, is incorporating semi-industrialised South-East Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines). The boundaries of this region are still indeterminate. It is by no means clear that Korea can be regarded as "integrated" in the region any more than it makes sense to include China. Even India, despite all its weaknesses, retains its autonomy with regard to the Japanese pole. But the "Japanese" region could stretch westwards (Burma, Sri Lanka and even as far as Pakistan and the Gulf).

The region crystallized around the EEC has its own shape: it is formalized in the EEC-ACP association, reinforced in part by the narrow restraints of the Franc zone. But the African peripheries affected are essentially the poorest countries whose potential within the existing system is unpromising. This is no doubt why transfers between the EEC and the South are relatively less substantial than transfers between the United States and the South, and between Japan and the South. Europe has concentrated on its own internal integration due to receive a new fillip in 1992 with the launch of the single market. Europe's opening on its eastern front may also provide new prospects for integrated European expansion and further slow down any growth in transfers between Europe and the South.

It is therefore premature to talk of "regionalisation" within transnationalisation. The peripheries are still largely exposed to the competition of the poles vying for their market (for trade and for finance). Competitiveness of the poles is unequal for the various kinds of output. Japan and the United States have the edge in new technologies, especially in information technology. The United States, Canada and France have the advantage in cereal production. Germany is predominant in traditional mechanical engineering (cars, machine tools) and chemistry. France is in the forefront of some aspects of

armaments, railways, aeronautics. Transfers between the poles differ from their transfers with the peripheries. Comparative advantage in the new technologies is crucial intra-polar transfer, much less so in competition for Third World markets.

But the chief obstacle to discussion of regionalisation as an accomplished fact is the enormous uncertainty hanging over the policies of the Soviet Union, China, India and the Third World, to say nothing of uncertainty about the future of Europe itself and the crucial decisions to be made by the new Germany.

In these matters we can only conjecture. It seems to me that unified Germany's scope for expansion in Eastern Europe will have a profound effect on Germany's own integration within the EEC. It seems to me that the Soviet Union, China and even India will cling to the possibility of remaining independent of a specific pole, and by that token will retain significant room for manoeuvre. In comparison it does not seem to me probable within the foreseeable future that the great regions of the Third World will organize themselves and around themselves, whether we are looking at Latin America, the Arab world, Africa or South-East Asia. However this is the kind of regionalisation, as the basis for a polycentric world, that is needed for an alternative prospect for development than that of unilateral adjustment - in extended order - to the demands of world-wide capitalist expansion¹.

3. External trade is one of several equally important indices of the intensity of transnationalisation: technology transfers (and dependencies), financial flows (and foreign debt), not to mention supposedly exogenous factors in the economy (culture and communications, geo-strategy and armaments, ecology). All these factors bear witness to the spread of world-wide influence, through interpenetration of economies and the central societies and through integration of the peripheries in the global system.

It is fashionable nowadays to draw two dogmatic conclusions from the facts. The first argues that transnationalisation is ineluctable and must be accepted as such. The only possibility is adjustment. The second argues that active adjustment to the demand is possible on the part of the so-called developing countries, and the "success" of Korea and a few others is the evidence. Everything would depend on factors internal to the various countries of the Third World.

The World Bank reports are models of the kind. Reading them - a task as tedious as reading "Pravda" at the end of the 1960s - had the advantage that it was possible to predict what the World Bank would have to say on any topic, old or new. The World Bank would never go beyond the two conclu-

1 See S. Amin, "In favour of a polycentric world", *IFDA Dossier* 69, 1989.

sions described above - the *a priori* dogmas. Ideology was triumphant. The real issues were always fudged in advance. They were replaced by a mountain of "data" (statistical appendixes, the only useful part of the reports, even if the statistics were silent on many key points and in some cases unreliable to say the least). The data was not particularly meaningful but was supposed to "tell a story".

Econometric models, never more than pretentious substitutes for the rule of three, were manipulated to say what the authors wanted in order to give a "scientific" cover to purely ideological positions. It was pure and simple tautology.

These notes on transnationalisation address precisely those issues fudged in the fashionable treatments. They can be considered under two headings: modalities and experiences.

The first heading looks at the *modalities* of transnationalisation. In simple terms these are the alternatives: can the demands of transnationalisation be reconciled with the maintenance or building of national autonomy - and if so which demands? Or there is such a total contradiction in terms that we must watch national reality being sucked under by world-wide influence? This means the dissolution of structured national integration (where it exists as a historically constituted legacy) or abandonment of such integration if it is not part of the inheritance. This would result in what would henceforth be a world-wide economy (or world-wide system of production, in Michel Beaud's terms) and no longer an international system (since the latter would require the articulation of national systems of production). The question then is whether it is desirable or possible to reconcile the demands of transnationalisation and the aim of "national" construction? I would suggest there are two answers with differing or even conflicting social implications.

The second heading offers a critical appraisal of *experiences* of "adjustment" to transnationalisation, whether the so-called "socialist" experiences of seeming rejection of transnationalisation or the experiences of the contemporary Third World. Here the fashionable treatment makes a bald distinction between "successes" (measured by growth in GDP and a favourable balance of trade) and "failures" (on the same criteria). South Korea stands at one extreme, the African fourth world at the other. This treatment is no more than banal repetition of what the statistics in the appendixes of the World Bank show at first glance. It never promotes an examination of the adjustment strategy being implemented (or suffered) in comparison with what other untried strategies might have achieved. It is essentially an uncritical treatment.

4. The fundamental issue - namely the contradiction between transnationalisation and national autonomy - gives rise to positions that diverge at the outset. The genuine potential in the historical projection is vastly different from that imagined by proponents of the conventional treatment (whose not-

able feature is this very lack of imagination). Apparently all authorities in the OECD countries and behind them the public "opinion" largely shaped by those authorities go along with the principle of evolution from an international economy to a world economy. There is a total consensus between the right and left in the electoral meaning of these terms in the context of the modern West.

Behind this unanimous facade stand "shades of meaning" quintessential to the political changes in the foreseeable future. The United States and Japan are not merely "geographical areas" of the world economy under construction. They are and will remain "national" economies, with the state ensuring continuance of national structures while enjoying the lion's share of the construction of the world economy. The fanatics of "liberalism" will tell us it is a rearguard action. It may well boil down to a rearguard action in the perspective of the next couple of centuries, but it is a vanguard action in the shaping of the next couple of decades. These national options remain decisive at such levels as: spending on civil and military R&D and appropriate training systems; *de facto* protectionism - of agriculture (though subsidies under a challenge with an indeterminate outcome...); mineral and oil resources (the policy of so-called strategic stockpiling) and even of straightforward manufacturing industry; financial management etc. On top of this the United States holds a trump card that in the absence of an alternative has immunity for the short or medium term, namely the dollar fulfilling the role of a world currency.

Europe's situation is by no means comparable and it cannot be argued that the building of the EEC will make it such. Europe is the creature of its past, of the conjunction of historically constituted national economies. The EEC is not a supra-national state and the common policies, even under the single market of 1992, do not meet the demands of such a construct. There is no common policy - except for subsidies to agriculture, under threat as in the United States, with the outcome still indeterminate. The elements of a monetary policy ("snake") are weakened by a diversity of anti-inflationary and short-term policies... not to mention the absence of even a plan for a common social policy. For the time being and the foreseeable future, the common market is what its name suggests and nothing more: a market. Integration in market terms only provokes more contradictions than it resolves. It runs the risk of weakening Europe as a whole, by strengthening some countries and debilitating others in a hybrid construct whereby the national structures of the "strong" (principally Germany) are maintained and those of the "weak" are eroded, without the alternative of an integrated European whole.

This less than optimistic prospect is made more feasible by the persistence of varying and contradictory national strategies within the EEC. Britain accepts world-wide expansion - and erosion of national power - but not to the

benefit of a European construct. On the one hand it is open to a world without borders as is shown by its acceptance of Japanese information technology, as an alternative to a virtually non-existent European information technology policy. Britain is profiting from its legacy as a powerful financial centre. On the other hand it has always bowed to the eventuality of being absorbed by the United States, with whom its shared language and culture are of renewed significance. On this count it must be admitted that the European construct will remain handicapped by linguistic diversity in comparison with the United States and Japan. It is hard to imagine a common R&D and common training systems: in what language?

At the other extreme, Germany is in an entirely new situation. West Germany was already the economic "giant" of the EEC (with manufacturing exports on the scale of the United States and Japan and more than double those of Britain, France and Italy). But it was regarded as something of a "political pygmy". The EEC's balance depended on these compensating factors: Britain and France in the political driving seat, and the German economy as the engine. In the new circumstances, a unified Germany could almost go it alone. This means that Germany without raising a formal objection to the EEC might desire to push "European integration" no further than what a "common market" structure entailed. Germany as the strong partner has the possibility of accepting the market rules while retaining its strong national structure, at the same time as the national structures of its partners are eroded. Germany may even reinforce its national structure by expanding into an eastern Europe reduced to a subordinate role.

Between the British and German options that seem possible (and in my view probable), there is no scope for alternative policies. France, Italy and the other members may dream of activating a European political construct to offset their economic weaknesses through political commitment. Britain is against it and Germany does not need it. Can the slogans be anything more than pious hopes?

The future of the European plan depends finally on what Germany decides. A Germany going it alone could aspire to become the third pole of a system (United States, Japan and Germany) at the economic *and* political level. Of course it would have to overcome some obstacles. German technology does not match up to that of the United States and Japan, and its export performance is based on the traditional industries of post-Second World War reconstruction rather than the new technology. But Germany has not yet resumed its proper political role. Britain and France are among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council with the right of veto - although this privilege is probably on its way out at some point (Gorbachev has already made a proposal of this kind in suggesting a similar status for Germany at the UN).

So why should Germany not exercise the "European option", as its Chancellor proclaims. But what are statements of this sort worth? Why should it? It would maintain the political privileges of its partners, with nothing in return that was not there for the taking?

Pending these decisions, it has to be admitted that Europe remains a "collective political pygmy", to describe it all in the way that hitherto Germany has been categorized. Europe under the American nuclear umbrella (worthless since the coming of what Alain Joxe has seen as "the end of the cycle of deterrence"), fragmented between the subtleties of the divergent foreign policies of the member states, has been able to make only a rhetorical stand against the United States. Europe's very weakness bars it from "settlement" of major North-South issues (over Palestine for example) and Europe has *de facto* to fall into line with the decisions taken in Washington (as the Gulf crisis shows).

For Europe to become a third pole, with the consequent opportunity of being the principal pole on a world scale, it must pursue De Gaulle's old dream of a Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals"; or Vladivostok: by incorporating the Soviet Union (or Russia). Gorbachev is nowadays the only person to pursue this vision under the label of the "Common European Home"². It is a flexible plan of the "confederal" kind allowing the partners: the British, French, German, Russians and others, room to respond to their varying objective circumstances. This recipe for reconciling transnationalisation *and* national autonomy is very close to the thesis I am propounding here. It is also I believe close to the genuine desires of observers of a cosmopolitan turn of mind who are not ready to go as far as extirpating their national roots in history.

If the transnational option is clear for the central powers and only the modalities we have indicated are the subject of debate, it is a very different matter for the Third World and the countries of the East. For the latter the choices they face may have disastrous consequence, but this is not so for the West. Whatever path is chosen in the West will not bring a dramatic social impact. A particular choice - such as a European common market without social and political harmonization - could "marginalise" the poor periphery of Europe: widespread unemployment in the Spanish Asturias, decline in Greece for example. But Europe as a political entity can withstand these set-backs - turn the Mediterranean shores into playgrounds for the North Europeans, and absorb the new immigrant workers leaving the area.

It is not the same for the South and for the East. Here transnationalisation as conceived by its current backers (with no concessions to national auton-

2 See S. Amin, "La maison commune Europe", *IFDA Dossier 73*, 1989.

omy) inevitably entails lasting poverty for the majority, aggravated by immense frustration. Unification of the world through the market carries an inevitable price-tag of violent explosions where the storm zone is the Third World (with all due deference to those who do not recognise its unity) and in particular the semi-peripheral areas (the NICs etc.). The objective conditions of the countries of the East are very similar to those of the Third World.

There is a world of difference between "unmitigated transnationalisation" and national autonomy (what I have called delinking in the modern context). There is no chance of a consensus on the matter as there is in the West. The social interests are at loggerheads, whereas in the West the conflict is muted. There are two warring camps. The ruling classes accept transnationalisation, in what I call compradorisation as it entails passive adjustment - and it does not matter whether it succeeds or fails according to World Bank criteria. They accept it simply because their earnings and authority benefit from the world-wide expansion. But the ordinary people are the victims of this world-wide expansion and will resist until they can secure the objectively essential alternative of national and popular rule.

Hence the Third World is the storm zone once more. This is not the effect of an "essential historical cycle" with the Third World obliged to replicate the steps trodden by the West and repeat the experience of ethnic, national and authority clashes, etc... The fashionable neo-Weberian theses on these lines ignore the essential: the storms are the inevitable outcome of the polarising impact of world-wide capitalist expansion. Just as a storm will always have unpredictable effects, it is also difficult to make a prognosis beyond the immediate future. The distinctions I draw in what follows are based on the recent past and will be subject to the buffeting of the storms of the future.

China seems so far to be the only clear exception to the comprador option. It might therefore be able in the future to play the subtle role of a more pronounced integration in the world economy without having to forego its own national self-reliant construct. Everything will depend on internal political changes. In this instance, since there has been delinking in my sense of the word, the internal factor has once more become crucial.

Some other examples of alternatives to compradorisation must be distinguished in subtly different ways. Cuba and Vietnam are "resistant" but in isolation, partly of their choosing and partly imposed by an imperialism that has not given up hope of breaking the national will of "small countries". India holds a very special place in the "capitalist" world, owing perhaps to India's size (a significant factor in China's case too). India's future is uncertain as the Nehru-Indira Gandhi style of national ideology is ground away by the rising comprador aspirations of the Indian bourgeoisie and the Indian edifice is challenged by local nationalisms. South Korea and Taiwan are even more remarkable exceptions, as they are on principle "anti-socialist".

Their success is not the achievement of rapid growth without serious damage to their balance of payments - something others have managed - but the building of a national structure around a strong state where income distribution remains equitable and controlled within reasonable bounds - something the others have not managed. Their success stems from doing the very opposite of what the prevailing liberal dogma urges! How? The explanation lies in specific historical (arguably cultural) and political factors (such as competition from North Korea and China).

There is really no other exception in the capitalist Third World; in the "wealthy" countries (the oil producers for example); in the poor; in those congratulated by the World Bank on their "success" (in terms of growth and trade balances, the only criteria liberalism takes into account); in the unfortunate victims that have succumbed to treatment (the fourth world). There is no encouragement here for talk of success in terms of a strengthened national construct. Some first steps were taken in this direction in countries of very different background, some of average "development", others with none. All are sliding back. Even in the "semi-industrialised" countries pinpointed by the World Bank (Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, Thailand, etc.) or in such countries as Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya, no advance has been made in national construction. On the contrary the widening disparity in income distribution is a sign of failure. It reduces the chances of the social integration without which national construction is meaningless.

Each case must be treated individually of course. Here or there some ingredients of national policy can be discerned; in some NICs there is technological or financial control; in some countries with a nationalist background the state is playing a part in industrialisation or land reform. But these ingredients have not achieved the critical mass essential to counteract the comprador ambitions of the privileged classes. Accordingly the progress is fragile and threatened with the dismantling "advised" by the World Bank.

Are Eastern Europe and the USSR incurably doomed to a "Third World" transformation and hence to be compradorised? Will they surrender to the demands of unmitigated transnationalisation, which would consign them to a Third World fate? Or, as liberal ideology argues, will capitalism rescue them from the impasse of "socialism" and grant them rapid development on the lines of Western European countries?

The purpose of this note is not to examine the systems that have suddenly fallen in these countries: their achievements and shortcomings; their difficulties and contradictions; the reason for their failure to reform; or even the nature of the open or concealed social and political conflicts under way. The

following comments do however stem from an analysis I have made of the issues³. Things being what they are, the countries of Eastern Europe will have difficulty avoiding the calamity for their working classes of integration in the capitalist system as it is. The integrated national structures established over the past forty years are already being dismantled to the benefit of the expansion of foreign capital (German first of all, but also European, Japanese, American). The new local bourgeoisie will find a role, but it will pay for its economic benefits by comprador surrender. It may in some instances find social support in some class or new intermediate stratum - rich peasants or petty entrepreneurs - as is the case in the Third World. The ordinary people will pay for these "adjustments" by a drastic fall in their standard of living, widespread unemployment, cuts in social services etc..., and this not for a "brief transitional period", as their new leaders would have them believe, but once and for all. How will these classes react to the inevitable changes? It is too early to tell. But potentially troublesome reactions must be expected, fuelling secondary nationalisms (not challenging western domination), the basis for "populist" dictatorships such as these countries experienced in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s:

The USSR is a more complex example. The character of the social conflicts under way and perception of what is at stake, the country's role as a military super-power, the acuteness of the national questions, operate in such a way as to outstrip the best informed studies. We are left with the almost intuitive thought that the USSR, if it finds a renewal - or the Russian heartland, if the Union breaks up - may achieve a subtle combination of democratic political reform, better economic management; greater integration in the world economy, and at the same time continuity - and subsequent reinforcement - of its national structure. The social character of this positive compromise between the demands of transnationalisation and of the creation of internal autonomy will be close to what I have described as "a national and popular social front" - produced by the 1917 revolution but lost in the later confusion in the ideology of so-called "socialist construction". This optimistic scenario does not stop there; such a system would inevitably evolve towards a greater developed capitalist crystallisation (a new pole) or towards the pursuit of an evolution of progressive social content.

5. Performances in the world economy cannot be judged exclusively by the touchstone of the criteria of growth and trade balance. Income distribution acceptable to the nation as a whole is an absolute essential, without which there is no nation and no social integration. The nation cannot exist without autonomy in regard to external forces (of technology, finance, food supply, industry, military hardware, culture). Without such autonomy the nation is

3 S. Amin, "The future of socialism", *Monthly Review*, July/August 1990, N.Y.

no longer an active agent in the shaping of world society. The frustrations of passive surrender to the hazards of an evolution beyond one's control have negative rather than positive effects. Performances in the world economy must be assessed in this light: has the growth in question exacerbated contradictions, sharpened disparities, and deepened dependence, or has it rather reduced them?

The data supplied by conventional economics provide no answer to these questions, as they are fudged at the outset. Tables abstracted from the statistical appendixes of the latest World Bank reports provide data of very limited usefulness. The tables can be quickly scanned. As for the gloss the World Bank chooses to put on them, it is vacuous, irrelevant (*just a priori* legitimating of its own dogmas), and an inappropriate use of the "data". The World Bank undoubtedly with a concern for "moral" purpose, inveighs from time to time on other issues such as "poverty". The very term is significant as it belongs not so much to social science as to the decorous language of some plutocrat or statesman at a charity gala. The "poverty" in question is never linked to the mechanisms of the prescribed economic development!

I shall offer the following comments on performances of world-wide expansion.

First: The capitalist world economy is well and truly in crisis, and has been so since the end of the 1960s. The long cycle of growth sustained after the Second World War is over and done with. Since 1970 the average rates of growth in GDP have fallen to two thirds of their level in the preceding phase, of agricultural and industrial output to a half. Traditional economics persists in analysing the year-on-year changes in conjunctural terms ("recession", "revival", etc...), whereas it is a case of a long cycle of structural transformation against a "crisis" background (Kondratieff's B cycle), where increasing transnationalisation is one of the main features. Furthermore the emphasis placed on the collapse of the so-called socialist systems and the financial aspect of the "world crisis" (indebtedness, fluctuating exchange rates, inflation etc...) has obscured the real basis of the structural crisis against which conjunctural events are unfolding.

Second: The collapse of the economic (and political) systems of Eastern Europe, the uncertain future of the USSR and China are the second main feature of the structural transformation under way. I refer here to what I have said elsewhere on the subject⁴.

Third: In view of the exceptionally large populations concerned, evolution and progress in China and India are an essential ingredient to the future of

4 S. Amin, "The future of socialism" *Monthly Review* July/August, 1990, N.Y..

the world system. In this context a comparison from any angle is overwhelmingly in China's favour.

The traditional criteria of economics are a first element in the comparison. Compared to India, China shows for the long period 1950-1990 a rate of growth in GDP double and triple per capita. Exports (especially of industrial goods) are double those of India in relative terms. China's investment rates one and a half times India's. China's debt service burden is three times less severe than India's.

In addition to such criteria, China has performed incomparably better in the domains described above. There is no need to cite "statistics" to show that income distribution is vastly different from one country to the other. Nowhere in China reveals the appalling wretchedness to be found throughout India. Even if administrative costs are comparable (and even lower in China since the mid-1980s) their efficiency and the access to social services for the various strata of the people are better (or less poor) in China.

It is more difficult to make a judgement as to dependence on external forces. The leap in China's exports during the 1980s can be noted, as the result of a freely chosen policy. Certainly the almost total closure of the country to foreign transfers was imposed by imperialism in the 1950s and 1960s and to some extent used positively by China to encourage self-reliance and to embark on gigantic progressive social changes remote from the hazards of external pressure. However Soviet aid in the 1950s was by no means a negligible factor in the first instalment of industrial, technology and military capability. Later the leap in imports (that had to be matched by exports) was a necessary part of the "four modernisations" (Zhou Enlai year). Was the opening controlled? Hard to say, as its damaging effects were often felt through the subtle channels of the consumption patterns of the privileged. Nevertheless the character of power in China, which is not exercised directly and exclusively through the bourgeois classes as in India, has so far limited the destructive impact of the international environment.

That said, the analysis must be taken further with emphasis on the character of the changes after the death of Mao Zedong and the problems they raise for the future. I should say in this regard, and as further contradiction to the statements of the fashionable critics of Maoism, that economic growth in the successive Maoist periods was strong and better balanced in the long term thanks to a constant effort at collective investment in irrigation and reafforestation, etc. and better balanced over the various regions of China. It is understood that acceleration in agricultural growth allowed under Deng's new policy produced apparently brilliant results during the first half of the 1980s, but with no future, since it was to the detriment of long term growth. Similarly acceleration of industrialisation was focused on coastal regions. Conversely the Maoist strategy could not be sustained indefinitely and had

reached a plateau by the end of the 1970s⁵. But Deng's latter choices provoked contradictions of all kinds whose resolution is subject to the open and concealed conflicts under way. One of these contradictions is the premature acceleration of urbanisation (although the figures of the World Bank are vitiated here by a change in definition).

Fourth: The performances of the capitalist Third World vary from one set of countries to another on the conventional criteria of growth and trade balance.

From this stand-point, the performances as a whole are mediocre or calamitous. The rates of growth are low everywhere except India and East Asia. Their collapse is disastrous for the countries of the fourth world: sub-Saharan Africa records enormous negative rates as an average over several years as regards per capita income (a negative rate of 2 per cent!). The same is true for the Third World countries as a whole, even for the so-called middle income countries (the 1980s were marked by a fall in per capita income in Latin America). The fall is equally catastrophic for the heavily indebted countries, as the adjustment imposed on them was achieved through the reduction (and often destruction) of productive capacity. Even the group of countries with industrial exports saw a slow-down in growth (although per capita income remained positive). There are only two exceptions: India and East Asia (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore).

The other conventional criteria tell us little more, but complement the picture. The investment effort suffered from the fall in income. The statistics here are unreliable. However they indicate probable stagnation at a generally low level, more severe in the poor countries and those most harshly affected by the adjustments policy (the indebted). Conversely an increased investment rate should be noted in India and in the countries with industrial exports, particularly marked in East Asia. It must be understood that the investments required by modern industry (especially export industries) are very costly. In these circumstances, stagnation in the rates often means *de facto* disinvestment, with negative net investment and amortisation accounting for more than gross investment. A marginally improved rate suggests only mediocre results: growth in industrial production and exports to be sure but modest in production terms and costly in export effort. The World Bank has nothing to say on these points since they run counter to its dogma.

The results in terms of export growth must be judged against their investment cost (in relation usually to stagnant overall income). Exports are up almost everywhere in terms of proportion of the GDP, even if they are stagnant for the poorest countries. They are up even more in India, in the middle

5 See S. Amin, *The Future of Maoism* *Monthly Review Press*, (New York: [1983]).

income countries in general and particularly for the industrial exporters (primarily East Asia). But at what cost for the society? The cost of foreign indebtedness, of which it is one of the causes (but there are others independent of Third World policies, such as the interest rate hike decided by the United States administration). Literature on debt is so plentiful that it is not worth adding anything here (see tables 1 and 2).

There are additional damaging effects of the general crisis and the Third World's burden in this crisis. Statistics on the share of administrative costs in the GDP reveal only a fragment of the state's role and the social services it finances. It has to be observed that if there is a casual tendency to say that the state is "top-heavy" in the Third World, the relative burden of that state on the national economy is much lower throughout the Third World than in the OECD countries! Undoubtedly the full burden is more difficult to carry in the poor countries owing to the greater proportion of non-commodity production. But the real issue goes wider than this quantity and costs framework and should focus on the quality of services, their efficiency and their social effect. Such intervention considered inefficient (or prejudicial) by the "foreign experts" is perfectly understandable and effective on the criteria of the social and political functions it fulfils.

On the conventional criteria of liberal economics, the performances throughout the Third World are mediocre or disastrous. Increased transnationalisation is not a healthy response to the challenge of the crisis, but an ingredient of that crisis. On the conventional view, there are really only two exceptions to the general failure of development: India and East Asia.

India's performances, even if they fall far below China's, are better than those of the capitalist Third World as a whole. India has not "suffered" from the crisis, and has maintained its rate of growth. This is certainly an effect of its size and hence relatively more pronounced *de facto* autonomy from external forces and greater self-reliance, in other words an effect of precisely the opposite of what liberal dogma suggests! However India remains fragile in the long term for reasons that will be considered later.

The performances of East Asia are of another character. At the outset I leave out Hong Kong and Singapore for obvious reasons. I merely repeat what I said earlier: Korea and Taiwan have built their development on a strong state, with pronounced national and social integration. They are the only real successes of capitalism in the Third World!

We must look further than the conventional criteria and analyse prospects on a longer time scale than possible growth initiates or forecloses in the peripheries of the capitalist world system within the context of what I call "really existing capitalism" (in contrast with the ideological model of liberal economics). For this purpose, attention must be paid to what the conventional analysis dodges: income distribution, employment, training, social ser-

vices, the position of the state, development contradictions (especially between town and countryside) etc.

On this basis the performances of the Third World score an overall minus. First, disparity in income distribution is acute everywhere, even in India, for the poor and for the "rich", with a propensity to worsen still more in the countries of most pronounced growth. The only exception is that duo of Korea and Taiwan. Admittedly the degree of disparity is variable, with Latin America enjoying the dubious distinction of providing the most deplorable social model of all.. The "liberals" soothe their conscience with the recollection that it was the same in Europe at the birth of capitalism. They omit to say that the later improvement in distribution in the model was won thanks to workers' struggle (struggles they condemn in the Third World!) and that the struggles occurred in a context of imperialist expansion that facilitated their successful outcome. The inexorable law of accumulation, as formulated by Marx, operates more on the world scale of "really existing capitalism" than of its centres taken in isolation⁶. They seem to forget that the increasing disparity observed here at the periphery of the system is not a vestige of a pre-capitalist past (the fashionable neo-Weberian thesis), but the inevitable product of the current expansion of capital. They seem to forget that accumulation on a world scale produces social structures at the periphery non-conducive to the development of social struggles on the lines of those that occurred in the West.

Other indicators reinforce the negative impact of the law of increasing disparity associated with capitalist expansion in the periphery: in the first instance unemployment, whose real extent is in no way reflected in official statistics. Unemployment is on an enormous scale in the capital cities on the Third World (30 to 50 per cent of the potentially active population would be a reasonable bracket). Feverish urbanisation runs well ahead of the level of development. The urban population accounts for at least half the overall population in Latin America, and in the Arab world, and approaches half in more and more of the other countries. The drift to the towns is an indication of social contradictions beyond the control of capitalist expansion, and aggravated, particularly in Africa, by the destruction of the rural societies brought about by urbanisation.

In such circumstances progress for the Third World entails going against the natural law of accumulation, not adjusting to it. The conclusion is valid when development comes within the framework of overtly capitalist social relations or when it is part of relations evolving under the authority of popu-

6 See S. Amin, "Income Distribution in the Capitalist System", *Review*, 8, 1 Summer 1984.

lar social fronts. This explains the success of Korea and Taiwan who went precisely against the prevailing trends and the liberal recommendations.

Accordingly "dependence", supposedly out of fashion, is a glaring fact, and its accentuation confirmed by all the studies of the "technology gap", the world-wide influence of models diffused by the mass media, foreign debt etc. This dependence is neither cause nor effect of disparity in income distribution. Along with the disparity to which it is closely linked, dependence is inherent in the polarising world-wide expansion of capitalism. It is one side of a coin whose other is compradorisation of the privileged classes who benefit from the expansion, and are the conveyor belt of dependence rather than its "victims".

Solving these problems requires control over foreign relations and the state's active intervention in production guide-lines, social distribution, R & D, employment and training etc. When the World Bank and Western agencies argue that the "poverty trap" can be resolved without a challenge to liberal dogma, but by juggling the various recipes that have been in and out of fashion ("basic needs" etc...), they are bound to fail. The World Bank itself observes this each time after the event, albeit without making any self-criticism of the failure it has encouraged, but clinging perpetually to its charitable language. At other more directly political levels - as with the issue of democracy - the contradiction is equally glaring between the objective demands of polarising world-wide accumulation and those of democratic progress⁷.

On all these essential points, the Third World (peripheral in the capitalist system) is at one despite its varied circumstances. We repeat that it does not add much to stress the variety. The Third World (as an integrated periphery) and the fourth world (as a destroyed periphery) have always coexisted in the world-wide expansion of capitalism.

7 See S. Amin, "La question démocratique dans le tiers monde contemporain", *Africa Development*, Vol.IX, No.2, 1989.

Table 1 Rates of growth, various regions, 1965-1988

	P.capita/GNP	GIP growth	Adm. cons/GIP	Gross inv/GIP	Export/GIP	Urban Pop.
Year	1985 \$	65/80	80/85	80/88	85	88
China	6.4	9.8	10.3	15	14	7
India	2.70	3.8	5.2	10	12	12
Poor countries	200	3.2	2.8	11	12	12
Intermediary	1,290	6.5	1.7	2.6	12	12
Income countries of which:						
Ind. Exporters	520	6.7	5.5	-	13	12
Heavy indebted	1,410	6.4	0.1	1.5	10	10
Brasil	1,640	8.8	1.3	2.9	11	9
East Asia	540	7.2	-	8.5	-	10
Sub-Saharan	400	5.3	-0.7	0.8	11	12
Rich Oil country	9,800	7.5	-2.2	-1.3	15	31
O.E.C.D.	11,810	3.7	2.3	2.9	15	17

Poor countries: the majority in Africa, Caribbean, some Asian countries. - Intermediary income countries: the majority of Arab, Latin America, East and South East Asia, some African countries.

Industrialised exporters: mixed group East and South East Asia, Latin America. - Heavily indebted: mixed group, dominated by Latin America and oil countries.

East Asia: Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. - Sub-Saharan Africa: South Africa excluded. Oil rich countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Libya.

(Tables from the World Bank Reports, 1987 and 1989)

Table 2 International Trade, 1988 billions dollars

EXPORTS	BILLIONS DOLLARS
O.E.C.D.	2,024
China	48
India	15
Other poor countries	45
Intermediate income countries	341
Rich oil countries	154
Total	2,627
Or:	
Sub-Saharan Africa	29
East Asia	174
South Asia	22
Latin America	101
Europe, Middle East, North Africa	103
Japan	264
U.S.A	315
(Heavily indebted)	(128)

(World Bank Report 1990, Table 14)

The Changing Land Use & Allocation Patterns of a West African Community

George J.S. Dei*

Résumé. Cette étude de cas examine les changements et continuités concernant l'utilisation et l'affectation des terres dans la communauté rurale de Ayirebi non loin de Akyem Oda, au Sud du Ghana. Le document étudie précisément les disparités d'ordre sexuel et socio-économique au niveau des foyers en matière d'affection et d'utilisation des terres comme principale ressource productive de la société. Il montre la manière dont, progressivement, les tendances générales et/ou changements en cours dans le domaine de l'utilisation et de l'affectation des terres sont entraînés à tourner au désavantage des couches les plus pauvres de la communauté. En conclusion, l'auteur soutient que ces micro-études sont utiles pour la planification de l'économie nationale et les recommandations de politiques relatives aux réformes agraires.

Introduction

Between July and December, 1989, the author conducted field work in the town of Ayirebi in southeastern Ghana. It was a follow-up study to a 1982-83 research which examined the adaptive responses of the rural people to seasonal food supply cycles, as well as other economic and socio-environmental stresses of the 1980s (e.g. drought, economic recession) [Dei, 1986, 1990b]. The manner of the collective responses of the town residents to the crisis raised questions about the possibility of future intra-village stratification. The primary research focus in 1989 was to examine the extent to which coping strategies have been continued long after the 1982-83 drought, and to note gender as well as socio-economic differentiation among households with respect to the allocation, exploitation and use of the productive resources of society. Particular attention was paid to changes and continuities in land use and allocation among farming households. The learning objective was to ascertain the extent to which landholding patterns observed in 1982-83 have continued or undergone changes in the aftermath of the drought and economic recession of the early 1980s (Dei, 1987). The research information presented here deals specifically with the aspect relating to changes and continuities in the relations of production and property relations.

The Study Community and Research Methodology

Ayirebi is a peasant community of 5,805 people¹. The inhabitants are Twi-speaking belonging to the matrilineal Akan subgroup, Akyem. The town is

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1 This figure is made up of 2,783 males and 3,022 females and based on the 1984 national population census data obtained from the Government Statistician.

situated in the moist semi-deciduous forest zone of southeastern Ghana, about 45 km from the nearest urban centre, Akyem Oda, and nearly 180 km north of the Ghanaian capital, Accra. The town covers an area of over 2 sq. km. The overwhelming majority of the local residents (90%) are food farmers, producing such staples as plantain, maize, cassava, cocoyam, rice, yam, green leafy vegetables, as well as citrus fruits. Among the non-food cash crops cultivated on a limited scale are cocoa, kola nuts and oil palm. The local articulation with the national economy involves the sale of farm produce, arts and crafts, and wage labour on the urban markets of Akyem Oda, Akyem Swedru, Koforidua, and Accra.

The study focussed on 450 households, representing over one quarter of the total households in the town². This figure includes 407 of the 412 households randomly selected for the 1982-83 study³. The breakdown of 1982-83 sampled household heads by sex was 316 (76.7%) males and 96 (23.3%) females. Corresponding data for the 407 households in the 1989 sample are 315 (77.4%) males and 92 (22.6%) females. The data for the total 450 households of 1989 are 348 (77.3%) males and 102 (22.7%) females. The addition of 43 randomly selected new households to the original sample of 1982-83 was to reflect the growth in the number of Ayirebi households, as well as the return of agricultural migrants from northern Ghana. Most of the predominantly farm labourers (representing 7% of the town's population) had left Ayirebi during the stress period of 1982-83 when their presence and services had become redundant. The previous study (Dei, 1987), found the rate of household formation in Ayirebi for the decade (1970-1980) to be 16.3%. The 43 households were chosen largely from the expanding sector of

2 The household refers to a group of people usually (but not necessarily) living in a house or compound who have a common food supply, pool the incomes for common support, and regularly use and share the contents of a cooking pot. In terms of kin composition, a household may consist of a simple elementary family (man, wife and children, and occasionally kin of one or both spouses). The household can also be grouped around a segment of the matrilineage (an elder woman and her sister or her daughter; or a man and his sister or his sister's son). The household may also consist of a combination of the above two types (a man, his wife and children and his sister's children). (see Fortes, 1974; Dei, 1986).

3 Among the latter 412 households, between 1983 and 1989, one male headed household had left the town while another 4 female headed households had been amalgamated into other households through marriage or re-marriages. Two of these 4 households are actually in the 1989 sample size since the female heads married into households represented in the 1982-83 sample. The loss of a household status in such cases was due to their new post-marital residence and a resulting change of household head. In other instances, although household heads could have changed (e.g., deceased) the household existed for re-study. There was no change in the sex composition of household heads for 1982-83 and the corresponding data for 1989. Four household heads among the 1982-83 sample had died by 1989. These were 2 males and 2 females who were either divorced or widowed. The female heads were succeeded by a sister and an elder daughter, and the male heads by two elder brothers.

the community, the site for locating new houses since 1984, including those of the agricultural migrants. In presenting the research findings of this case study, where feasible statistical data for the 450 households have been broken down to isolate the 407 households represented from the 1982-83 sample size, it is hoped that one would get a clearer picture of continuities and changes in land use and allocation through such breakdown and analysis of the data. The adequate representation of the migrant agricultural population should also give a balanced picture of the domestic economy.

The total 1989 research sample had a population of 1,722 people. Their age and sex distribution show 822 (47.7%) males, 900 (52.3%) females. The youth population defined as 0-20 years is 739 (42.9%) and the adult and elderly, 983 (57.1%). The active adult population (i.e., 21 to 64 years) is made up of 403 (45.7%) males and 479 (54.3%) females. The elderly population (64 years and above) has 40 (39.6%) males and 61 (60.4%) females. With regard to primary occupational characteristics of the 450 household heads, 427 (95%) were farmers, hunter/trapper (1); herbalist (1), fetish priest (1); tailors and seamstress (2); trader (7); police officer (2), school teacher (2); shoe repairman (1); transport driver (3), concert promoter/barber (1); and hairdresser (2). It should be pointed out that even the 23 heads who do not list farming as a primary occupation consider it as secondary activity. Two Ayirebi scholars (undergraduate students of the University of Ghana) helped as local research assistants conducting household interviews and administering questionnaires on demographic, ecological, and economic parameters.

Land and Crop Production

Dei (1987) discussed the various modes of land ownership, acquisition, and cropping patterns as crucial to understanding the nature of the Ayirebi domestic economy. Traditionally, all land was communally owned, held by either the community (stool) and/or group (matrilineage). All citizens had usufructuary rights to the use of such community or group land. Changing economic conditions associated with the market economy and/or wage labour introduced other forms of landholding rights such as tenancy, leasehold, outright sale and purchase, and mortgaged or pledged lands to the traditional communal forms of lineage, spouse and stool lands (Okere, 1983; Dei, 1987). The farming household's dependence on these varied sources of land and the cropping systems employed provide a picture of a multiple land use system in the community (Okigbo, 1988; Moock, 1986).

The average farming household has between 2-3 separate farms which could be a garden, field of permanent tillage, an intensive fallows system and/or bush and extensive cultivation field. Most of the staple crops like cocoyam, plantain, yam, maize and cassava are produced on intensive fallow systems. Vegetables, particularly tomatoes, onions, peppers and okras are usually cultivated on the gardens and fields of permanent tillage closer to

the homesteads. Cash tree crops (e.g. cocoa, oil palm, kola) are planted largely on the bush and extensive fields farther away from the homesteads. Farming methods adopted to ensure effective cultivation of agricultural lands include allowing dead leaves, grass, plant roots, branches and other organic material to decompose and fertilize bush and extensive farm fields during a fallow period. All farming households concede fallow periods have shortened over the years with a current average length of 3 years for most fields. For fields of permanent tillage and the gardens, local farmers practice crop rotation and mixed farming, i.e., planting a variety of crops at the same time on the same plot. The farmers also replace soil nutrients removed by cultivated plants through the incorporation of crop residues (vegetable manures), wood ashes, compost of animal (livestock) and occasionally human excreta or refuse, and artificial fertilizer into the soil. A few households construct terraces and contour banks against soil erosion. In a study of the farming systems and processes adopted by the sample of 450 households in 1989, 410 (91.1%) practice mixed farming; 362 (80.4%) crop rotation, 410 (91.1%) bush burning as clearance of vegetation; 79 (17.6%) construction of terraces and contour banks; 194 (43.1%) bush and extensive shifting cultivation; 438 (97.3%) permanent tillage Dei, 1990a; Ruthenberg, 1980).

A study of the responses of the 1989 sample household regarding the chief source of land acquisition of the main food farm cultivated within the last five years show an increasing use of individually purchased and stool lands⁴. Table 1 compares the 1989 data with the household responses obtained in 1982 and 1983. The data for 1989 shows that the rapid acceleration of trends and the differential in rates of change in land acquisition and use first recognized in 1982 have continued.

Between 1983 and 1989, for example, at least 26 households (i.e., taking the sample size of 407 households in 1989) did not rely on lineage lands for their main food farm plot. This represents 6.3% of the 1982-83 household sample size and a changing rate of about 4.3 households per year. The shift is largely reflected in the increase in land obtained through individual outright purchase, i.e., 21 households. When the total 450 sampled households are considered, a notable change is the rise in stool and rent lands. This can be explained by the decision of the local polity to release stool land to the migrant agricultural workers for farming following their return to Ayirebi in the migrant drought period. A related explanation may be the desire of the workers themselves to re-enter into tenancy arrangements with wealthy and sometimes absentee landlords.

4 Stool land is community land under the immediate and sole political authority and jurisdiction of the Ayirebi town chief. Rent land include those obtained through tenancy and leasehold (Dei, 1987; Okere, 1983).

Table 1 - Responses of Household Heads Regarding Chief Source of Land Acquisition for Main Food Farm Plot Cultivated in Farming Seasons (1)

Research Period	lineage2		Outright purchase		Rent		Stool		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1982 (n = 412)	308	74.8	75	18.2	21	5.1	8	1.9	412	100.0
1983 (n = 412)	305	74.0	71	17.2	27	6.6	9	2.2	412	100.0
1989a (n = 407)	279	68.6	92	22.6	20	4.9	16	3.9	407	100.0
1989b (n = 450)	288	64.0	98	21.8	37	8.2	27	6.0	450	100.0

(1) See also Dei (1987; 1990c)

(2) Lineage land could include land acquired from a spouse's lineage which is held as long as the marriage lasts.

Table 2 is a breakdown by income status of the sampled households of 1982-83 and 1989. In defining and determining the status categories for 1989, the same procedure and basis used in the 1982-83 study have been followed (Dei, 1987, 1990b)⁵. The income brackets expressed have been chosen arbitrary and the incomes do not reflect actual purchasing power. The higher income brackets are assigned for 1989 to reflect rising national inflation levels following the devaluations of the local currency, as well as, the increases in the minimum daily wage and local food prices over the years (Dei, 1990c). An in-depth study of the changes in income status of

Tableau 2 - Income Status of Research Sampled Household Heads for 1982-83 and 1989

Status	1982-83 ¹ n=412		1989 a ² n=407		1989b n=450	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Wealthy	66	16.0	67	16.5	69	15.3
Middle rich	185	44.9	161	39.5	167	37.1
Poor	161	39.1	179	44.0	214	47.6
Total	412	100.0	407	100.0	450	100.0

1. See Dei (1987) for definition of status categories of 1982-83

2. Where for 1989:

Wealthy = Annual cash income (market proceeds of all economic production) of ₦20,000

Middle Rich = Annual cash income of ₦10,000-₦20,000

Poor = Annual cash income of ₦10,000

Where: one cedi (₵) = US \$0.0035 or US \$ 1 = ₦ 282

5 Since income alone may not always give a complete and accurate picture of the economic status of the individuals involved, the income data was supported by additional considerations of other important assets in the form of immovable property (house and land). In reaching conclusions on economic status, the income data and research observations of household property (e.g. land, house) have been compared with the views of other community members regarding economics status of some of the sampled households. On the whole analysis of the research findings confirmed that cash income is a good index or a close approximation of economic status.

households represented both in 1982-83 and 1989 shows that one middle rich household of 1982-83 has moved up to the wealthy group of 1989, while 33 have dropped to the poor category of 1989. However, 10 poor households of 1982-83 have also moved up to the middle rich category. The wealthy group has remained stable over the years, and the 5 households of 1982-83 not represented in the 1989 sample belonged to the poor category.

The overall increase in the size of the poor population may reflect the harsh national economic conditions that have impoverished the majority of Ghanaians since the late 1970s. While income may not be a total and accurate assessment of one's economic status, given present economic circumstances it is the only purchasing power for such modern acquisitions as land and house outside the traditional inheritance system. Such property serve as the symbol with which community members identify the wealthy and poor in their midst. The large portion of the new households in the 1989 sample are from the poor category.

With regard to gender differences among household heads by income status, Table 3 shows that generally female households are slightly better off than their male counterparts. The coping successes of female heads during the crisis period of 1982-83 may account for the stability of their income status categories. Their involvement in group farming, as well as trade and marketing of collected forest products, locally made soap and cooking fat, all helped to generate additional household income in the aftermath of the drought. Other contributing factors may be the possession of land by most female heads and the extended matrikin composition of most female headed households. Such group membership encourages the pooling of economic resources. The poor female headed households are usually headed by unmarried or separated women, divorced women previously involved in polygynous relationships who prefer to maintain separate households even after rejoining their matrikin in the large compound⁶. These latter households (including single unmarried female heads) are a more recent phenomenon.

They are in the extreme minority and closely approximate the single parent households (matrifocal families) in western industrial societies. Men are usually under pressure to maintain separate and independent households (even within a larger matrilineal compound) if they can. On the whole, females who cannot support themselves are not encouraged to set up separate and independent households. The rise in the number of males in the poor category between 1982-83 and 1989 can in part be attributed to the presence of the migrant agricultural workers who have overwhelmingly male headed

6 It is important to stress that female heads of households are generally better-off than the majority of ordinary females (e.g., those married and living with spouses in male headed households, single unmarried adult females) in the community. A good portion

households. Of the 33 household heads of 1982-83 that dropped from middle rich to the poor category in 1989, 23 (69.7%) are males and 10 (30.3%) females. The 10 household heads moving up from the poor category in 1982-83 to the middle rich in 1989 are 5 (50%) females. The 5 poor households of 1982-83 not represented in 1989 sample were made up of a male head and four female heads.

The income status and sex of household heads depending on lineage, outright purchase, rent and stool lands respectively for the 1983 and 1989 sample sizes were examined. Of the total 96 females heads in the 1983 study sample, 91 (94.8%) utilized lineage land and the remaining 5 (5.2%), outright purchase land. In 1989, of the 92 females heads represented from the 1982-83 sample, 83 (90.2%) utilized lineage land and 6 (6.5%) outright purchase land, and 3 (3.3%) stool land. In the larger sample of 1989, of the total of 102 female heads, 83 (82.3%) utilized lineage land, 11 (10.8%) outright purchase and 7 (6.9%) stool land. Corresponding data with regard to male headed households show that in 1983, among the total of 316 male heads, 214 (67.7%) utilized lineage land, 66 (20.9%) outright purchase, 27 (8.6%) rent, and 9 (2.8%) stool land. For the 315 male household heads of 1982-83 represented in the 1983 sample, 196 (62.2%) used lineage land; 86 (27.3%) outright purchase, 20 (6.4%) rent, and 13 (4.1%) stool land. For the larger sample, in 1989, of 348 male heads, 204 (58.6%) used lineage land, 87 (25.0%) outright purchase, 37 (10.6%) rent and 20 (5.8%) stool land. The data show that female headed households disproportionately utilize lineage land in comparison with their male counterparts. Specifically, among female headed households, the poor and middle rich disproportionately lineage land; the wealthy use outright purchase land. This socioeconomic difference among the female heads is not however marked. While wealthy and middle rich male headed households also depend on lineage land, they disproportionately cultivate farm lands obtained by outright purchase when compared with their female counterparts. The poor male heads similarly utilize rent and stool lands when compared with their female counterparts.

No female heads rented land. The increased use of outright purchase land between 1983 and 1989 is attributed to the rising income of some female heads from their involvement in trade, especially produce marketing, in the

of female heads are widowed, separated or divorced and unlike the spouses of male household heads, they do not have to give their income and economic services for appropriation by the men. These female heads receive farming assistance (e.g., clearing of bush vegetation) from their brothers and sons, as well as utilise wage labour. A breakdown of the marital status of the 102 female heads in the 1989 study sample shows 43 (42.2%) as married; 30 (29.4%) divorced; 3 (2.9%) separated; 24 (23.5%) widowed and 2 (2.0%) single. The category of married female heads refers largely to individuals involved in polygynous marriages who live in their maternal homes away from their spouses, or in separate households established for them by their spouses. In such cases, the man may either live with one of his wives or with members of his maternal kinsfolk.

Table 3: Breakdown by Sex of the Income Status of Sample Household Heads

Income Status	1982-83 (n=412)						1989a (n=407)						1989b (n=450)							
	M No.	% %	No. %	F %	M No.	% %	No. %	F %	M No.	% %	No. %	F %	M No.	% %	No. %	F %	M No.	% %	No. %	F %
Wealthy	45	14.2	(68.2)	21	21.9	(31.8)	45	14.3	(67.2)	22	23.9	(32.8)	47	13.5	(68.1)	22	21.6	(31.9)		
Middle																				
Rich	139	44.2	(75.1)	46	47.9	(24.9)	121	38.4	(75.2)	40	43.5	(24.8)	126	36.2	(75.4)	41	40.2	(24.6)		
Poor	132	41.8	((82.0))	29	30.2	(18.0)	149	47.3	(83.2)*	30	32.6	(16.8)	175	50.3	(81.8)	39	38.2	(18.2)		
Total	316	100.0		92	100.0		315	100.0		92	100.0		248	100.0		102	100.0			

1. The given percentages (in brackets) are based on a calculation using the known income status of the sampled households, i.e., for

1982-83 (n = 412), wealthy (66); middle rich (185); poor (161);

1989a (n = 407), wealthy (67); middle rich (161); poor (179);

1989b (n = 450), wealthy (69); middle rich (167); poor (214).

aftermath of the drought and economic recession of the early 1980s. The additional incomes received enabled some women to buy lands (Dei 1990c). Until quite recently, stool land was given to men in preference to women. In 1983 all 9 household heads utilizing stool lands were males, 7 of whom were poor. Of the 27 heads in 1989, 20 were males and 7 females. The presence of poor female headed households depending on stool land in 1989 may be attributed to two related factors. First, is the economic successes of Ayirebi women who obtained stool land for group farming in 1983. Second, is the subsequent pressure put on the traditional authorities by the Town Development Committee (TDC) and the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR)⁷ to allocate land to other women farmers upon request. The financial contributions some of the successful women made towards community self-help projects also helped this cause. The rise in male renters of farm land between 1982-83 and 1989 is due in part to the return of the migrant agricultural workers.

Land sale and Purchases

The socioeconomic and gender differentiations among households in relation to landholding and use patterns indicate an on-going gradual restructuring of the relations of production and property relations in the community. Since land rights and use are pivotal to the economic and adaptive successes of farming households, questions of who sells, buys or rents land are significant. Given the problems of land litigation, individuals usually keep good and reliable records on land transactions. An acre of farm land now sells for over ₦6,000, an increase of over 650% from the base price of ₦600-₦800 in 1982-83⁸.

In a random sample of 25 household heads who rented out farmlands in 1989, 17 (68%) were males and 8 (32%) females. The majority of these landlords, 21 (84%) were wealthy, comprising of 14 male heads and 7 female heads. No poor heads rented out land. Corresponding data for 14 household heads renting out land in 1983 show 8 (57%) male and 6 (43%) females. Eleven of the 14 heads were wealthy, comprising of 6 males and 5 females. Given the ratio of male household heads to female heads in the community it can be argued wealthy female heads disproportionately rent out

7 The members of the Town Development Committee (TDC) are selected by the local chief in consultation with his elders. Membership of the Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR) is open to all town residents. This latter body was formerly called the People's Defence Committee (PDC). It is a more recent political action group, the idea of which was introduced nationwide by the ruling Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government since 1982.

8 In 1982-83, the exchange rate of the local currency, cedi, (₵) was ₦2.75 to US \$ 1.00. By 1989, the rate had dramatically gone up (following successive government devaluations of the cedi) such that US\$ 1.00 was worth ₦282.

land more than their male counterparts. The tenants (rentees) mostly work on a sharecropping basis with landlords receiving half of farm produce or the monetary equivalent (i.e., *abunu*) after the sale of produce. While rentees are responsible for farm maintenance, capital replacement is the duty of the landlord. In the case of tree cropping, specifically, cocoa farming, the tenurial arrangement is a sharecropping system in which the proceeds from the sale of produce are divided into three equal parts (i.e., *abusá*), a portion to the landlord, the tenant, and the third utilized to maintain the farm. With regard to land sellers, of 24 household heads in 1989, 22 (91.7%) were males and only 2 (8.3%) females. The income status of the males show 9 wealthy, 10 middle rich and 3 poor. One of the 2 females was wealthy and the other poor. A change from the 1983 data worthy of note regarding the income status of land sellers is the presence of the poor in the 1989 data. There were no land sellers from the poor category in 1983. In fact, of 21 land sellers in that year, 19 (90.5%) were men and only 2 (9.5%) women. The 2 female heads and 13 of their male counterparts were wealthy. The remaining 6 males were middle rich. In contrast, 14 (58.3%) of the 24 land sellers of 1989 were from the middle rich and poor categories.

In Table 1, some household heads indicated outright purchase as the chief source of land acquisition for the major food farm cultivated in a farming season. The traditional land sellers are the community leaders (custodians) such as the local chief, sub-chiefs and elders, lineage and family heads, as well as other individuals in the community. For example, of the 98 heads cultivating outright purchase lands in 1989, 17 (17.3%) obtained such lands from the town chief, 14 (14.3%) sub-chiefs, 49 (50%) lineage and family heads, and 18 (18.4%) from "other" individuals⁹. The latter include individuals selling land for economic and humanitarian reasons, and those with tracts of farmland previously acquired through such traditional avenues as pledging and mortgaging or as a gift from the chief in recognition of past services to the community. For the 18 individuals involved here as land sellers, one sold land previously acquired through pledging/mortgaging; 4 land acquired as a gift from the local chief in appreciation of their previous services to community; 8, land obtained through a previous outright purchase; 2, land that previously belonged to the matrilineage but legally ob-

9 The distinction between lineage/family and "other" individuals is on the basis of whether the land in question was individually owned or lineage property.

tained from their parent (fathers) through the system of sasamanisie¹⁰; and 3 sold family land without the required prior group consent. The latter sales are still the subject of litigation in the community. Of these land sellers 8 (44.4%) are wealthy, 4 (22.2%) middle rich and 6 (33.4%) poor.

The chief reasons given for the sale of lineage or communal land by custodian are to obtain funds for a group or family project (e.g., house, farm), to help defray outstanding funeral expenses and, as in the case of the local chief, to assist in the establishment of a community self-help project (e.g. K.V.I.P. toilet, road construction, celebration of royal funerals or an annual town festival). Humanitarian reasons, such as the rehabilitation of a town member returning from a sojourn in the city, occasionally encourage family land sales provided group consent is given for the transaction. The major factor accounting for land litigation within families, lineages, and in fact, at the wider community level between the people and a chief or sub-chief, is when the rank and file perceive (and sometimes with justification) that group or communal land has been sold by the custodian for personal reasons or self-aggrandisement. Even when prior group consent has been secured for such land sales, improper accounting procedures can result in family and community disputes over the sale. Data collected from the local chief and the CDR show that between 1983 and 1989, 17 land litigation cases have come before the chief's court for arbitration and settlement. So far, 11 cases have been settled peacefully while 6 are pending. In the 11 resolved cases, 4 of the transactions were revoked; in the other 7, land sellers were asked to put the money obtained to group (i.e., family) use. One seller was destooled losing his social position as a minimal lineage head. In the history of the town, community leaders (including a chief) are known to have been destooled after admitting to fraudulent land transactions for self-aggrandisement. Among the 6 land litigation cases pending in the chief's court in 1989, there was talk among the family members of 2 of the cases about taking the matter before the legal courts in the city.

Farm Size

The majority of Ayirebi farmers do not intensify their crop production by adopting improved methods such as improved seeds, and artificial fertilisers. They increase total farm output through an extensified crop production, i.e., increase land acreages (Brown, 1990). Table 4 shows the total size of all farm plots in possession of the sampled households of 1982-83 and 1989.

10 Sasamansie refers to lineage land lawfully transferred from a father to his children and/or wife who would otherwise not be entitled under the matrilineal system of inheritance. The matrilineage recognises the capital investment made by the man on the land and to compensate him would reach a mutual (verbal) agreement allowing him to dispose of a portion of the land to the non-lineage members just prior to his death or thereafter.

The majority of households (about 65%) have total farm sizes between 0-6 hectares. There are no marked differences among households by sex of household head, except for the fact that male heads have a slight edge over their female counterparts in the category of 12 hectares and over. Looking at the general picture, any marked difference between the 1982-83 and 1989 data is in the categories of 0-3 hectares and the 12 hectares and over. The increase in households with total farm plots between 0-3 hectares may be explained by a number of factors. There is the return of the agricultural migrant workers who initially set up small size farms, and the fact that in the aftermath of 1982-83 crisis when conditions appeared to stabilise a few farmers might have cut down on their individual farm acreages. It is also possible age shifts could have affected farm sizes if one considers the original sample of 1982-83. The availability of farm hands could also be a factor since the drift of some town youth to the cities and urban centres in the post drought period could have affected some households (e.g., the poor who could not afford to compete with the wealthy for wage labour). The drop in the 9-12 hectares category appears to be compensated for by the slight increase in the over 12 hectares category. This increase may also be related to the responses of Ayirebi wealthy households to the 1982-83 crisis when they took advantage of poorer households buying additional lands to increase their farm acreages. The data presented in Table 5 regarding the income status of farming households and the amount of land in their possession show the wealthy and middle rich have more extensive farm sizes than the poor. There is an overall expansion in total land under cultivation in the Ayirebi community from the TDC estimate of 450 hectares in the 1982-83 farming season to over 550 hectares cropped in the 1989 season. Among the reasons for this are the increased group and communal farming activities, the re-emergence or slight resurgence in tree cropping (cocoa, oil palm), tomato and beans production for commercial purposes, as well as the rise in the number of Ayirebi households resulting from increased population growth and the return of the agricultural migrant workers.

The Competition for Land: Food and Tree Crop Production

As already pointed out, the overwhelming majority of Ayirebi farmers are food producers. Tree cropping such as cocoa, oil palm, and citrus fruits have not been a major part of the domestic economy. In fact, earlier attempts in the 1920s and 1930s at systematic tree cropping, particularly cocoa, failed (Dei, 1990b). Since 1984, a series of government price incentives and the presence of some agricultural extension workers in the community have encouraged some local farmers to take tree cropping seriously. These farmers are still in the minority and of the 450 sampled households, only 69 (15.3%) had established cocoa farms and 22 (4.9%) oil palm fields with land obtained largely through outright purchase. The average farm size is 2 hectares for cocoa and nearly one hectare for oil palm fields. The Ayirebi rural bank

Table 4 - Total size of all farm plots in possession of sampled farming households by sex of household head¹

Farm Size (hectares)	FARMING PERIODS						1989b (n = 450)					
	1983 (n = 412) ²			1989a (n = 407)			1989b (n = 450)			1989b (n = 450)		
M	F	Total No.	%	M	F	Total No.	%	M	F	Total No.	%	
0-3	96	28	127	30.0	104	22	126	30.9	126	26	152	33.8
3-6	113	27	140	34.0	100	29	129	31.7	110	34	144	32.0
6-9	59	27	86	20.9	61	27	88	21.6	62	28	90	20.0
9-12	32	9	41	10.0	26	8	34	8.4	26	8	34	7.5
12 + over ³	16	5	21	5.1	24	6	30	7.4	24	6	30	6.7
Total	316	96	412	100.0	315	92	407	100.0	348	102	450	100.0

1. Figures for the farm sizes refer to all farm plots in household's possession which may not all be necessarily cropped in a farming season.

2. See also Dei (1987).

3. Largest = 16.5 hectares.

Table 5 - Total size of all farm plots in possession of the 450 Sampled farming Households of 1989 by income status

INCOME STATUS <i>(house-holds)</i>	<i>Farm sizes (hectares)</i>									
	0-3		3-6		6-9		9-12		12 +	
No.	% ¹	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.
Wealthy	-	-	-	-	-	23	25.6	(33.3)	24	70.6
Middle rich	11	7.2	(6.6)	71	49.3	(42.5)	67	74.4	(40.1)	10
Poor	141	92.8	(65.9)	73	50.7	(34.1)	-	-	-	-
Total	152	100.0		144	100.0		90	100.0		34
							34	100.0		30
										100.0

1.The given percentage (in brackets) are based on a calculation using the known income status of the sampled households,
i.e. wealthy (69); middle rich (167); poor (214).

provides credit to households going into tree cropping as well as tomato and beans production (Dei, 1990c).

A study of the income status and sex of heads of households engaged in cash tree cropping shows that wealthy male headed households are those largely engaged in tree cropping (e.g., cocoa). These male heads can readily secure credit from the banks because they can provide immovable assets as security for such loans. Until the early 1980s, females were traditionally discriminated against by the banks in the granting of farm credit. On the 69 household heads that had cocoa farms in 1989, 39 (56.5%) made up of 33 males and 6 females are wealthy. Of the remaining, 25 (36.2%) made up of 22 males and 3 females are from the middle rich category. The other 5 (7.3%) heads are all poor males. The wealthy household heads can buy land, invest in cash crops and are able to hire farm labour which in time allows bigger area to be cropped.

The emergence of cocoa production into the predominantly food farming economy of Ayirebi in the late 1980s may pose new land tenure and food supply problems, as well as a gradual competition for land between cash and food crops. In the short interim, these effects have not been felt in the community. Among the reasons for this is the fact that the establishment of cocoa farms invariably calls for the planting of food crops, notably plantain and cocoyam, to provide temporary shade to the young trees. Furthermore, cocoa production continues to be on very limited scale, and the problems of land allocation and use noted in other Ghanaian rural communities where the best lands are reserved for cash cropping are yet to be experienced in Ayirebi (Nyanteng, 1980). However, the higher price demanded by land sellers for tree cropping than for food production, and the general resentment of the matrilineage when group land is utilized for tree cropping are indications of future problems. The family or lineage resentment is explained by the argument that tree crops tie up land for a lengthy period and consequently limit the opportunities for other family members to have access to the land for food production. This would explain why would be tree croppers (e.g., cocoa and citrus fruits) and other cash crop producers (tomato, beans) are utilising more and more of outright purchase lands.

Farm Labour

The extended family remains the chief source of farm hands outside the household production unit. However, there is a growing trend towards the use and dependence on hired and seasonal wage labour. In the 1983 sample of 412 households, 249 (60.5%) depended on extended family labour, 131 (31.8%) hired-wage labour, and 32 (7.8%) friends in labour partnerships

(*nnoboa*)¹¹, as the major source of farm labour assistance outside the household production unit. Corresponding figures for the 450 households of 1989 are 232 (51.6%) on extended family labour, 157 (34.9%) hired/wage labour, 29 (6.4%) labour partnerships. 32 (7.1%) households utilised no external labour assistance. Examining responses of household heads by sex and income status wealthy male heads are found to utilize wage labour more than their female counterparts who largely depend on the extended family. A major reason for this relates to the nature and composition of male and female headed households pointed out earlier. Most wealthy and middle rich female headed households are grouped around matrilineal kinsfolk (as the basic production unit) who readily serve as farm labour supply. Male headed households usually (but not always) consist of the couple, children, and one or two kinsfolk of a spouse as the basic production unit (Dei, 1986).

Generally, poor households also utilize more of the extended family labour and labour partnerships or, do not depend on any external source at all. The gradual shift to the use of wage labour is more on the side of the wealthy and middle rich than on the poor. This may be due to the rising cost of farm (wage) labour over the years (Dei, 1990c). The situation could intensify as a gradual labour shortage leads to a competition between the wealthy and the poor segments of the community. It is important to note that the number of households reporting no use of external farm labour assistance are predominantly in the poor male category. Significantly, no female heads are recorded due in large part to the 'extended' nature of female headed households.

Wealthy households hardly engage in labour partnerships. Among the poor and middle rich, however, such form of labour is an effective adaptive response to the problem of labour shortage and other stressors on the use of farm hands by farming households. The 1982-83 research period had witnessed a resurgence in the use and dependence on labour partnerships among the local farmers. There is no significant change in use of this form of labour in the 1989 data, except perhaps a slight decline among some households, particularly, middle rich, male headed households. As already pointed out, some of the latter are involved in cash cropping utilizing more of wage labour than such labour partnerships. As cash cropping increase labour partnerships decline. Looking at the overall ratio between male and female headed households as represented in the research sample, if may be argued that female heads use of labour partnerships is substantially higher than that of male heads. Of the 32 households depending on labour partnerships as the chief source of external farm labour assistance in the 1983 farm-

11 Labour partnerships (*nnoboa*) are collective self-help group of age mates and friends who assist each other in farming activities (Arhin, 1983; Dei, 1988).

ing season, there were 23 male and 9 female heads. The additional households in the total 1989 sample were virtually male headed households, and among the 29 households that depended on labour partnerships, there were 21 male and 8 female heads. Such partnerships usually take the form of helping mates or friends in the clearing of vegetation, harvesting, and transportation of food crops from the farms to the markets.

Discussion

The supply of land in Ayirebi is adequate. Much of the land under cultivation is held and worked by the small-scale peasant farmers. The traditional system of collective ownership of land is generally upheld. However, there is a gradual shift from the household's traditional overemphasis on access to lineage and communal land for productive purposes to include other sources of individual land acquisition. Such lands are for the most part utilized by wealthy male headed households to cultivate cash crops. Contemporary trends in land allocation and use patterns are generally serving to the advantage of the wealthy in society.

In a 1982-83 study, the author examined the varied access that community members and individual households have to the productive resources and valued goods of society (Dei, 1986; 1987). In this instance, access to land was isolated as vital to an individual's or the household's ability to cope with some of the fundamental economic changes and socio-environmental stressors that the society faced in its contemporary adaptation. Individual and group land allocation and use rights played significant roles in the successful adaptation of households to stress on the local food economy resulting from the drought and national economic recession of the early 1980s. The agricultural successes of some town residents (e.g., wealthy farming households) during the crisis period raised questions about the possibility of future dimensions of intra-village stratification (Dei, 1988). A learning objective in the 1989 study of the continuities and changes in land allocation and use rights was to explore this pattern.

The research findings presented here highlight the fact that the community is neither a homogeneous entity nor an undifferentiated mass. The process of peasant differentiation can be related among other things to the degree of household involvement in the cash or market economy, the use of wage labour, as well as the patterns of land allocation and use rights among groups and individuals in the research community (Watts, 1984). A local peoples confront the exigencies of their social and natural environments,

there is a strategic application of indigenous knowledge on the exploitation and use of local productive resources to solve basic human problems (Eckholm, 1982; Riesman 1984). In the absence of an acute problem of land pressure, increasing crop output through land extensification may be a viable alternative to land intensification. However, as the local population increases, the competition and search for land intensifies¹². The present and future task of Ayirebi local authorities and other community leaders is to safeguard the existing traditional institutional mechanisms that provide all town members with equal access to land.

In many rural communities of tropical Africa, individuals and groups have differential and unequal access to and control over land. In some communities, powerful minority is attacking the ideal of group landownership and individual usufructuary rights which have long protected the right of all members to a portion of farmland irrespective of socioeconomic status or privilege. This assault on group lands has severely limited the access of the group's rank and file to available farmlands. The Ayirebi case study shows that given the income differentiation among farming households, the wealthy and most powerful minority could take advantage of a land policy that would seek broad privatisation and sale of communal and group lands. The minority could always buy the land away from the poor when the customary restrictions on the sale of group lands are no longer in place. As the poor continue to lose their landholding rights to the wealthy and most powerful, their poverty intensifies. The poor would be unable to capitalise on their traditions of sustainable forestry and cannot be expected to make the kinds of investments in land, labour, and capital that would help redress the deteriorating environmental conditions and improve their economic lot (Dei, 1989, Brown and Wolf, 1986, Horowitz, 1988; Rose, 1985).

Hinderink and Sterkenburg (1987) have pointed out that one of the major development questions of sub-saharan Africa is how to encourage rural peasants primarily engaged in food production to become market oriented, i.e., to produce food surplus over and above their own demands and/or to devote land and labour to new crops for sale. For much of the African sub-continent, the attempts being pursued to promote agricultural commercialization so far have actually served to increase local dependency on external demand and widened existing socioeconomic inequalities principally through the appropriation of land and labour from the poorer segments of society. Land reform policies or measures designed to increase production by small-

12 As Hinderink and Sterkenburg (1987) and Timberlake (1985) have pointed out, in parts of tropical Africa, the growing pressure on land has forced farmers to abandon fallow systems altogether and to cultivate more and more of marginal lands with resulting environmental degradation.

holders and to encourage rural socioeconomic development would only succeed if rooted in the indigenous knowledge base, culture and politics of the purported beneficiaries of the reform process (Warren, 1989; Breemer, 1989).

It is essential that the on-going processes of change at the micro-levels of rural communities be understood (Cohen, 1980; Horowitz and Painter, 1986). Micro-level studies of gender and income status differentiation among households in the use of societal resources are relevant for economic planning and policy recommendations. Usually, generalizations are made about rural communities and households without noting socioeconomic status as well as gender differences in these societies. Yet, such information could be helpful in the design and implementation of policy goals to benefit the right people, to illicit or achieve the right response or objectives (Ameyaw, 1990). It is important that the search for general solutions to human problems be complemented with a search for specificity.

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South Africa Versus Southern African Development Coordination Conference

Mohabe Nyirabu*

Résumé. La Conférence de Coordination de Développement de l'Afrique Australe (SADCC) est une organisation régionale inter-gouvernementale mise sur pied en Avril 1980 par la volonté de neuf états africains indépendants dont le but est d'unir leurs efforts pour le développement économique et la libération. L'Afrique du Sud est un pays indépendant et souverain dirigé et contrôlé par une minorité blanche au pouvoir qui, pendant des années depuis la découverte des minéraux au XIXe siècle consolide sa puissance, soutenue en cela par le capital, les armes et la technologie de l'Europe. En 1948, la domination et la ségrégation raciale furent légalisées, donnant ainsi naissance au système de l'apartheid. Ce système aux antipodes de tout concept des droits de l'homme, devint la politique officielle du gouvernement Sud-Africain. En raison de leur opposition à la politique de l'apartheid et aux politiques régionales connexes de l'Afrique du Sud, les Etats membres de la SADCC ont été la cible d'activités de stabilisation et d'agression militaire qui se sont traduites par d'énormes pertes en matériels et en vies humaines. Certes, on peut parler d'identité régionale, mais la situation en Afrique australie, causée par l'Afrique du Sud, aidé en partie par l'Occident, a été un grand obstacle à la réalisation du plein potentiel économique de la région. Le soutien du monde occidental a rehaussé la puissance militaire de l'Afrique du Sud au point qu'aucun pays de la région n'est à l'abri de la machine de guerre sud-africaine. Il s'en est suivi la destruction des infrastructures économiques, routières vitales et la montée de la terreur dans la région. L'objet de cet article est d'examiner les résultats de l'initiative d'intégration régionale en mettant en exergue les politiques de l'Afrique du Sud en Afrique australie et de montrer que la situation en Afrique du Sud est telle que la paix et le progrès passent nécessairement par le démantèlement de la politique de l'apartheid.

Introduction

It is imperative to re-emphasize two forces in Europe -feudalism and capitalism to fully and correctly understand contemporary South Africa. To begin with, South Africa is a settler capitalist formation which was created by the imperialist extension of European capitalism. Partly because of the domination status, South Africa was developed to provide raw materials and market for British capitalism. Since then, capitalist development has captured Southern Africa and consolidated the region's link to imperialism (Magubane, 1986). The Industrial Revolution in England and the collapse of feudalism in continental Europe capture the essence of why these displaced peasants and farmers constitute the settlers who were to run away from these hardships and look for "new lands". Because of unemployment, social discontent, chaos, instability and the threat of civil war, Europe had no choice but to look for colonies.

In the second part of the 19th century, diamonds and gold were discovered. The discovery led to new inroads in South Africa by the Europeans. But this discovery itself cannot explain why South Africa developed the social system it now has. The understanding of this requires an awareness of the Afri-

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can labour in a settler economy leading to the type of exploitation that has never been witnessed elsewhere in Africa. South Africa's structure supports a state in which the minority whites are the accumulators of capital, wealth and political power; while the majority blacks are unemployed, exploited and oppressed. Furthermore, the settler economy instituted a land tenure system which enabled the whites to own practically all good land while the majority blacks are condemned with no land ownership rights (Legassick, 1974).

The Union Act of 1910 offered nothing new. Rather, it was a consolidation of colonial policies that had prospered under British rule. The post-1910 period witnessed the mushrooming of apartheid laws and policies which continued to subjugate the black population to-date. For example Blacks constitute 87 per cent of the total population, but can legally reside on only 13 per cent of crude, arid poor land as stipulated in the 1913 Land Act. This strategy has led to the creation of the so-called "independent homelands" or "Bantustans". Outside these homelands, blacks have to carry passes at all times, failing which they face arrests and imprisonment. An essential element of this separation is that blacks have to commute to the white lands (which contain the mines and agricultural plantations) to provide cheap labour at wages barely enough for survival. Even this single fact alone shows that there are two societies in South Africa, a black one, which is an exploited colony and a white one, which is the colonial power. The relationship between the two can never be one of equality. In 1948 South Africa officially instituted the domestic racial policy of apartheid. Apartheid is a government policy which denies human rights justice, equality and civil norms on the basis of race.

South Africa in Southern Africa

The wind of change that swept across Africa during early 1960s resulted in important post-colonial developments. In some respect, these were negation of South Africa's attempts to have relations of peaceful coexistence. The new independent African states were hostile to any accommodation with South Africa. As early as June 1961 Nyerere (1966: 12) had warned that his participation in the Commonwealth was only possible if South Africa was out: "to vote South Africa in is to vote us out". By the mid-1960s, South Africa began to embark on an outward policy of trying to extend her links with independent African states (Geldenhuys, 1984). There were some initial "success" including establishing diplomatic relations with Malawi in 1967. A cornerstone strategy was continuous alliance with white ruled Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonial rulers of Mozambique and Angola. But the defeat of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique in 1974 led to a reassessment of South Africa's regional strategy. Even more disconcerting to South Africa, were the results of the elections leading to Zimbabwe's inde-

pendence in 1980, in which Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF won an outright majority.

The increasing isolation of South Africa in Southern Africa led Pretoria to attempt some new initiatives with her neighbours. First, came the dialogues of the 1970 with some independent African countries. In this venture, Pretoria's aim was to win acceptability as a country concerned with regional problems. The tactic used here was one of economic means some of which can be traced back to the earlier days of mineral exploration and expansion.

To a certain extent the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 accepted peaceful change in the name of dialogue to redress the obnoxious South Africa Apartheid system¹. Quite interestingly, this belief of peaceful change was once again echoed in 1985 by the Commonwealth. The "club" assigned a task force (Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group) to explore the path to peaceful change in South Africa. Their conclusion was not different from what has already been said: "that South Africa is not ready to accept the reality. But change is inevitable and Apartheid must by any means come to an end" (Fraser and Obasanjo, 1986).

The failure of the dialogue attempts of the early 1970s led South Africa to change tactics towards realizing her objectives. These have included economic, political and security hegemony. In the economic field, South Africa has been trying to expand the volume of her export to African countries, partly as an attempt to compensate for the domestic market which has been curtailed by Apartheid's negative impact on the incomes of black Africans, thus reducing their purchasing power. It has also been the deliberate policy of the South African regime to increase the role of the state as a regional power in Southern Africa by consolidating, protecting and expanding Pretoria's economic activities in SADCC member-countries. In November 1986, for example, South Africa signed an agreement with Lesotho for the construction of a water canal-the Highland Water scheme - to supply water to South Africa. Actually this implicates Lesotho to be even more dependent on Pretoria.

The ever-increasing internal resistance against white South Africa has made the regime proclaim that the threat to white South Africa is not confined to the borders but is as also beyond the borders. According to Pretoria, this represents a "total onslaught" against South Africa and can only be effectively met with a "total strategy". As a result of this militaristic policy, state power has shifted to the security-military establishment. This is particularly true for the defence forces, which are determined to destabilize the

1 Paragraph 20 of the Lusaka Manifesto may have been a source of confusion in the nature of the struggle (Shamuyarira, 1971).

internal order of SADCC countries (Cawthra, 1986). The domination of the military in decision making has increased to the extent that South Africa Defence Minister General Magnus Malan is increasingly becoming Pretoria's main spokesman on regional matters². The 1985 State Emergency declaration has to be understood in the context of the crisis that Pretoria is confronting partly because of the increasing black African popular revolt, partly because of international public opinion advocating economic sanctions and disinvestment from South Africa, and finally because the system was becoming too expensive to maintain with state repressive policies.

South Africa authorities clearly know their isolated position in the region. To counter this position, various policies have been pursued. To begin with, South Africa has never been serious in granting genuine independence to Namibia. The lack of progress in Namibia's struggle for independence must be understood as part of South Africa's economic-strategic formula for colonising the territory. During the sixty-eight years of struggle for Namibia's independence, South Africa has made the territory its own colony and rejected any attempts for the UN to assume responsibility over Namibia. Even earlier attempts by the Western Contact Group or "Gang of Five" faced delaying tactics intended to create an alternative to South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO).

There is something significant about this tactic, because South Africa knows the mass support SWAPO enjoys - it is known worldwide as the only legitimate advocate of Namibia interest. This explains the repressive and destructive campaign being levelled against SWAPO and its supporters. Furthermore, Pretoria's illegal occupation of Namibia has provided South Africa with a springboard for launching terrorist attacks on neighboring states. The Pretoria regime is quite aware that the independence of Namibia, even within the context of the much-debated UN Plan would have a colossal impact on the politics of Southern Africa. The liberation of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe led to the withdrawal of the white colonialist. In the case of Namibia, because of the apparatus of the South African state, and the psychological impact of losing an "Afrikaner colony" it would be more catastrophic.

African States In Southern Africa

Throughout the colonial period, South Africa made vigorous attempts to incorporate Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS). Competition with Britain for control led Britain to reject such attempts including the Verwoerd

2 The South Africa Defence Minister General Malan, for example, said in November 1986 that unless Mozambique agreed to cooperate with South Africa as Swaziland and Lesotho did, terror and instability would continue. See *Africa-Asia* No.35, November 1986.

Proposal of establishing a common market or "Commonwealth" in Southern Africa. The failure of these ideas led BLS to a position where incorporation into a South-Africa dominated customs union and rand monetary zone was a survival choice.

Over the years, as they have attempted to look North, BLS have been subjected to various negative tactics by South Africa. The Pretoria regime has always alleged that BLS are giving sanctuary - or even training - to the African National Congress (ANC) combatants. But the sole aim has been to justify military intervention.

However, internal contradictions in South Africa are clearly visible to Lesotho - the "captive state". Following the Soweto uprising, Lesotho became more vocal denouncing Apartheid. The determination to arraign South Africa policies has led to series of military raids in Maseru. On 20th January 1986, the pro-Pretoria Lesotho paramilitary headed by major General Justin Lekhanya staged a coup which was preceded by a South Africa backed economic blockade. The outcome was the overthrow of the civilian administration of the late chief Jonathan. An increasingly outspoken critic of Apartheid, Jonathan had refused to sign a Nkomati-type pact of peaceful co-existence with Pretoria despite the massive pressure he faced.

Botswana, another border state, has been an example despite its economic and geographical position vis-a-vis South Africa. In addition to being a member of the Frontline State Group also embracing Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Botswana is a founding member of Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and hosts the SADCC secretariat. Confrontations with South Africa have basically been always due to Botswana's staunch opposition to Apartheid. In the course of this, Botswana has sheltered numerous refugees fleeing the racist terror inside South Africa and Namibia. Well before the signing of the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique in 1984, Pretoria had vainly put pressure on Botswana to enter into a similar agreement. But Botswana had learnt enough from experience to reject the overture. This rejection led to a series of military threats which climaxed on May 14, 1986 when Gaborone, Harare and Lusaka were attacked by South Africa defence forces, resulting in the deaths of innocent citizens and heavy destruction of property.

The Botswana delegate to the UN Security Council speaking on proposals to condemn South Africa's raids to neighboring states, echoed the views shared by many in the region:

Botswana harbours refugees, not terrorists. It would never turn its back on victims of racial tyranny in South Africa, regardless of consequences. Botswana refused to be enslaved by a non-aggression pact with a country which notoriously violated agreements concluded in good faiths. That pact, in addition to turning Botswana into "Servile buffer Zone" in the struggle for freedom in South Africa, would commit it to

performing slave tasks for which it had neither the capacity nor the moral inclination (UN Chronicle, 1986).

Swaziland is no exception to the factors that have contributed to the role South Africa has played in the region: geographical proximity and economic dependence. However, what distinguishes Swaziland whithin the BLS grouping is the acceptance of a 1982 secret security agreement drafted by South Africa with police powers over Swaziland bestowed on South Africa. This agreement goes further than the Nkomati Accord. It is puzzling as to why Swaziland being in better position than Lesotho readily swallowed this bait. For one thing Swaziland was unlike Mozambique-there was no MNR-type banditry. Once again, Pretoria imagined ANC "terrorism" to raid Mbabane occasioning many deaths. The increasing alliance between the ruling elite in Swaziland and South Africa capital may probably be a crucial factor to explain the Mbabane-Pretoria axis which often has led to agreements.

Perhaps the 1982-84 period is one during which attacks on neighboring states in the region peaked³. In this destabilisation drive, giant South African war machinery was partly supported by an International Monetary Fund credit of US\$ 1.1 billion on very low conditionality terms with the tacit backing of the Reagan administration (Campbell, 1984). This credit offered under the Compensatory Finance Facility would under normal cases, have required an cut in public expenditure. But in this case the IMF credit was intended to upgrade South African ability to stabilize neighboring states. Thus on October 6, 1982 *BEELD*, an Afrikaans-language newspaper editorialized that:

it is not a matter of weakness. Actually we would get along without the loan, but... the interest rate is so attractive... it is a feather in our cap since granting such a loan means our house is in order⁴.

It was in this very spirit that South Africa increased military logistical support to her proxy - Savimbi's Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Once again, the USA was openly supportive of this militaristic policy with increased aid to UNITA to the tune of US \$15 million⁵. The absolute certainty of American-South African policy regarding Angola is that destabilisation is central. Examples of this abound. The occupation of Southern Angola led to the Lusaka Agreement of February 1984, under which South Africa was to withdraw from Angola's territory on two condi-

3 From 1981 to 1985 South Africa conducted 168 bombing raids, 234 airborne troop landing, 90 strafing incidents, 74 ground attacks and 4 naval landing. *New York Times Magazine* February 1, 1987, p. 28.

4 Quoted in "IMF Strikes a blow for Apartheid", *New York Times*, January 27, 1983.

5 *Daily News* (Dar-es-Salaam) February 2, 1987.

tions. First, the Cuban troops would not use Southern Angola to fight in Namibia. The full implementation of this agreement would have ideally led to the implementation of UN Security Resolution 435. It is not insignificant that no sooner had the Angola government accepted this agreement than the South African regime, with the full support of the Reagan administration, unearthed the linkage of Namibia's independence to the withdrawal of the Cubans. This intransigence of the Americans meant a delay in Namibia's independence, more destabilisation of Angola and Namibia falling victim to Pretoria's war machinery.

The case of Mozambique was even more serious. It culminated in the signing of an agreement on non-aggression and good neighborliness, popularly known as the Nkomati Accord in March 1984. We do not intend to discuss the merits or demerits of the Accord in this paper. However, it is worthy asking whether the agreement has been honored by South Africa and whether, therefore, peace and stability have been achieved in Mozambique since the Accord. Although interpretations vary, the Accord has brought Mozambique no sign of relief. The South African supported Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) has continued to spread terror and play havoc in rural Mozambique. This situation had led to widespread insecurity, adversely affecting economic activities. One result has been the worst famine ever to hit Mozambique this century, which left some 100,000 people dead and some 4 million others suffering from dietary deficiencies. The recent international call to come to Mozambique's help is a testimony of the gravity of Pretoria's destabilisation policies which are estimated to have cost Mozambique US\$ 5.5 billion since 1980.

It was against the background of this state of affairs that the search for peace and stability in Southern Africa led to the death of President Samora on 19th October 1986, paradoxically near the banks of the Nkomati river on the South Africa side, where the Nkomati Accord was signed. This tragic event be-speaks obsolescence and non-starter nature of the Nkomati Accord.

Why South Africa Survives

Basic to Western interest in Southern Africa is the presence of strategic minerals, traditional ties and high level of investment. Following this, one could categorize the interests. First, there is the security interest arising from the Cape Route. This is considered crucial to the supply of oil and minerals to the West and should, therefore, be free of hostile powers. The USA, as a leader of the Western world, has accepted this view and incorporated it in its official policy on South Africa. The Reagan administration's assistant secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester A. Croker (1980) had succinctly stated this view:

At a time of general war or even limited conflict that would break out elsewhere, these supplies (oil, minerals, etc.) via the Cape Route remain vital. It is clearly more than a mere convenience that South Africa's

excellent port and air facilities not be in the hands of a potential adversary or be available to such an adversary.

Ronald Reagan's 1980 election victory aroused hope among white South Africans. It looked as if the erstwhile claim by Pretoria that it was a protector of Western interests, bastion of freedom and a bulwark against communism was embraced wholesale in the West. The Reagan administration may have been responsible for the elevation of that belief and the increased violence and instability in the region.

For a time, it appeared that with the backing of the West, South Africa could play the role of a regional power, promoting peace and stability. The West's expectation was that after Namibia's independence, under UN supervision, other tension would be reduced and a situation of peaceful coexistence would be realized by both South Africa and her neighbors. But how could this be achieved while Apartheid remained intact?

All these signals led to the West's policy known as "constructive engagement" spearheaded by the USA. Even if this policy has failed, it was never constructive as Ungar & Vale, (1985), Johnson & Martin, (1984) have aptly pointed. It was a destructive engagement. Namibia is no closer to independence partly because of Washington's linkage of the Cuban withdrawal from Angola so that the West could continue to deplete Namibian resources and partly because of South Africa's Apartheid policy.

Because of its white population, vast resources and giant geographical size, South Africa is regarded by the West as the single most important country in the region, followed by Zimbabwe. Angola, because of its good relations with Cuba and the USSR, is accorded special status, when the argument is in terms of strategic importance. This, to a degree implies that the competition between the USA and the Soviet Union has to be extended to all parts of the world and thereby render the very nature of governments, everywhere a matter of international security.

Secondly, the political interest of the West have included a preference for governments that support the West's global strategic view point. It has been the interest of the West to deal with governments that agree with their view about the "threat" from the Soviet Union. This has meant an application of country-by-country assessment of governments. For example, Zimbabwe's aid was in 1986 cut on the basis of political difference with the USA. A related factor to the political interest is the perceived impact of Western credibility in global politics whereby honoring commitments to friends is of importance to foreign policy maker. In short, in the global strategic perspective, Southern Africa is linked to the struggle between the USA and the

USSR, thus seeing the issues in the context of containing communism⁶. The third and most important interest lies in the economic arena. This includes access to raw materials, protection of investments and promotion of unequal trade. Since the West has invested heavily in South Africa, there is an active Western policy which promotes exploitation and depletion of natural resources (First et al, 1973).

Economic and political interest make strange bed-fellow. It is noteworthy that the very countries that have been Pretoria's backbone and which have reaped enormous profits from the Apartheid system are the ones expected to support or even add vigor to the process of disengagement from South Africa. The West is certainly committed to Southern Africa, for well-known reasons. Perhaps, it should be of concern to SADCC to ascertain the flow of foreign assistance which could be used to continue dependence on South Africa and thus further South Africa's domination and the Apartheid system.

Although South Africa remains SADCC's foremost public enemy, it must be remembered that the West and Japan are the main sponsors of the evil system of Apartheid. This reality can be traced back to the early South African history when British capitalism was responsible for developing South Africa into part of British imperialism. And, in our century, the role USA imperialism plays in supporting South Africa, and therefore destabilising and supplanting African states such as Angola, is too obvious to be elaborated here (Hanlon, 1986). All that merits repetition is that Angola, for example, has become one of the battle-grounds where forces for a *Pax Praetoriana* are waging a proxy war supported and financed by the West (Cawthra, 1986).

The Apartheid Bomb

Records show that while the West remains silent on South Africa's nuclear development, the military links developed in response to the 1963 United Nation Arms embargo point to the contrary. The records also show that in more recent times when repressive measures in South Africa have increased, collaboration with the West has been encouraged in the fields of licences, patents and technological transfers through Western multinationals with subsidiaries in South Africa. While South Africa possesses uranium, it has been the West which has provided the knowledge for nuclear development. The USA, for example supplied Pretoria with its first nuclear reactor and, by 1981, South Africa was the third largest recipient of USA nuclear exports in the world (Adeniran, 1981).

6 Reagan's First Secretary of State, Alexander M. Haig Jr. emphasized this view when he said that the tendency of the Carter administration and the USA public not to think in global terms had "cost (the American people) dearly" (Haig, 1984, 1984: 118).

The arms embargo never had an effective deterrent role in South Africa's armament development. But it is Pretoria's possession of nuclear weapons which has the greatest implication for SADCC and Africa as a whole. The Soweto uprising in 1976 coincided with a contract awarded by a French consortium for building a nuclear power plant in South Africa. Three years later, a detonation and nuclear device was spotted in the Atlantic Ocean. The Western media pointed to South Africa as the source of this "mystery" (Washington Office on Africa, 1985). This development raises a number of important questions. First, South Africa is unlikely to use nuclear force in her own territory. Second, and more alarming, there is a possibility of using it against some SADCC countries. To be sure, SADCC is in a dilemma because of lack of countervailing power. And, with the recent increasingly desperate acts by South Africa, the deployment of nuclear force cannot be ruled out in the face of the Black people's struggle and white South Africa's intention to survive. The racist's Deputy Minister of Defence, H.J. Coestsee has clearly stated Pretoria's view:

As a country with a nuclear capacity, it would be very stupid not to use it if nuclear weapons were needed as a last resort to defend oneself
(Quoted in Casthra, 1986: 109).

SADCC for a Change

The political and economic experience of the 1960s and 1970s indicated that autonomous national development undertakings were failing in the world's low-income countries partly because of dependence on primary products and partly because of the linkage with colonial powers. The countries constituting SADCC in 1980 were no exception. SADCC is a multi-government organisation with political programme for economic liberation, reducing dependence and disengaging from South Africa, for which the nine member-states have committed themselves for the realisation of their goals. In a sense, SADCC was born in the context of the Monrovia Strategy and the subsequent Lagos Plan of Action of 1980. It was in line with the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER) adopted at the United Nations Special Session on Africa held in May 1986.

The absence of a formal treaty establishing SADCC and instead only relying on a declaration setting out the objective is a reflection of the situation in Southern Africa as characterised by conflicts and war. These conditions have resulted in government initiative, involvement and control at the highest political levels. This initiative explains why sectorial activities are decentralized, i.e. individual member-states are assigned programme for formulation and co-ordination, ministerial committees are created for major areas of activities, proposals are put forward by the government and SADCC institutional arrangements have been kept to a minimum.

On 22 August 1986, SADCC held its sixth summit in Luanda. As predicted, the heads of states and government agreed that SADCC projects it-

self into the future, the post-Apartheid period in the region, as an example of South-South cooperation. While Apartheid represents its biggest obstacle to the realisation of full economic potential in the region, SADCC is not limited to eliminating economic dependence on South Africa. Rather, other overriding interests are to achieve development of resources in the interest of their citizens and attain a degree of economic self-reliance necessary to achieve even further development.

Because of the war situation in Southern Africa one, of the major aims of SADCC is transport liberation. The dependence of southern African States on South African transport network has been well documented. Lesotho, for one, has no overland options; 50,100 and over 90 per cent of Zairian, Zambian and Zimbabwean trade, respectively passes through South Africa. And the dependence of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland on South Africa's transport is in the range of 80 to 100 per cent either to and from South Africa or through South Africa's rail and port system to and from world markets. The two points at Mafeking and Belt-Bridge, where the rail-lines from Botswana and Zimbabwe cross, point to the consequences to be expected should Pretoria want to destabilize. Between Botswana's border and the South African town of Mafeking, train must cross 16 kilometres of territory in the so-called homeland of Bophuthatswana which all countries in the world, except South Africa, have denied diplomatic recognition. In January 1987, this homeland decided to force international recognition by demanding visas from citizens of Botswana and Zimbabwe working as railway crews in trains plying across South African territory. The trains carry over 50 and 90 per cent of Zimbabwean and Botswana's trade, respectively. But this move, which could not be instituted without South Africa's knowledge, had the intention of an economic blockage of these countries. Although the situation has been temporarily resolved with heavy costs, it points to the terrible consequences of dependence on South Africa. This pervasive policy of destabilisation include the staking off of "Bantustans" at the borders as a tactic of winning recognition for these homelands and trying to force some kind of relationship with other Africa states. It is in essence, the externalisation of Apartheid and domesticating dependence.

The basic document for SADCC's cooperation is the Lusaka Declaration of 1980. It has an increase in intra-trade as one of its highest priorities. The trade is doubtless a means for SADCC to achieve other ends, the central objectives being the ability to increase production, employment and incomes. Intra-regional trade is also likely to increase other trade benefits, including reducing external dependence and producing inter-trade linkages for alternative development.

The low level of intra-trade in SADCC is a reflection of three factors. First is lack of complementary economic structure. Second, because of its dominating position in the region, Pretoria has been the major trading partner,

importing about 17 percent of SADCC member-countries exports and exporting 22 per cent to SADCC compared to a meagre 5 per cent intra-SADCC trade (Lewis, 1986). This could explain why South Africa is concerned with efforts to increase her trade with SADCC and is therefore, still committed to agreements such as the South Africa Custom Union which comprises Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and South Africa. And, finally another factor has to be found in the colonial ties inherited and periodically updated in such other forms as the ACP-EEC agreements. To a considerable extent, the development of intra-SADCC trade will depend on industrialisation in the region. And, since industrialisation requires costly imported machinery and other inputs, these undertakings are the target of South Africa and her proxies. The increasing violence and other acts of sabotage have been costly to SADCC countries⁷. As in many other policies pursued by Pretoria, it is once again being demonstrated that violence is part of her external economic policy. Violence has been used to make it difficult for SADCC to attempt any serious economic liberation measures. The destruction of transport networks, bridges, oil installations and industrial projects and the creation of "technical tactics" of providing and then withdrawing of railway stock or cut-price mechanism to compete with Mozambique's network when the line has not be sabotaged are all violent tactics directed towards SADCC member-states.

Given the performance of regional integration initiative in Africa during the past two decades, can one be optimistic about SADCC? It may be argued that SADCC has a future, for the following reasons. First, SADCC member-countries are facing such economic crises that these countries are being forced to consider practical integration programmes as one of the strategies to deal with the crises. secondly, as the 1987 Gaborone and 1988 Arusha SADCC conferences showed, there is new awakening on the part of donor and aid agencies on the value of regional integration and of the need to provide wide-ranging support for regional projects. One may not want to dispute whether or not aid increases dependence on South African partners. But what is being suggested is that SADCC fully knows the dangers. It is, therefore, perhaps that a combination of local and foreign forces will be marshalled to re-orient SADCC's priorities into constructive cooperation. The partnership with foreign investors could act as a deterring effort in the increasing sabotage activities by South Africa.

7 Since SADCC's creation, total economic damage caused by South Africa's activities has been estimated to be USA\$30 billion, with Angola alone accounting for US\$20 billion (See Courier September/October 1986). Coffee production in Angola, for example, has fallen from a total of 215,000 tonnes in 1974 to a mere 11,000 tonnes in 1987 (*Daily News - Dar-es-Salaam*, January 25, 1988).

The third argument lies precisely in the reason that led to the establishment of SADCC, namely the political will to fight for economic independence. That is the alternative to lessening dependence on South Africa or at least keeping economic contacts to a minimum level? SADCC is a threat because it negates what South African Foreign Minister Eric Low pointed out in the late 1950's that the territories to the north of Limpopo are going to be natural markets for South African goods. The same argument was echoed by Werwored:

that Southern African states should be free to pursue their own domestic policies but continue to cooperate economically with South Africa (Geldenuys, 1984).

If SADCC succeeds in loosening its links with South Africa to a meaningful degree and develops an acceptable economic capability, the fear for Pretoria is that these states will be more assertive, more demanding and more independent in their relations with South Africa. The expected policies could include open support for ANC because they would be less vulnerable to South Africa's machinations. One of the crucial factors in regional co-operation efforts is the level of political commitment, this including the degree of ideological tolerance. It might be politically strange for some to see that Malawi and Tanzania are co-existing in SADCC but not in the Frontline States Group. The fact that SADCC has accepted political tolerance in fighting South Africa is an exercise in political sophistication.

Concluding

It need not surprise anyone that in the 1980s the revitalization of the ANC of South Africa has been the most dramatic occurrence in the politics of Southern Africa. After being driven underground in the 1960s, the aftermath of Soweto uprising saw ANC growing with such force that almost every action in the fight against Apartheid in South Africa is being identified with the ANC. From the 1985 message of ungovernability to "from ungovernability to people's power", the ANC has become the central force (Tambo, 1985).

This point can be emphasized by looking at recent measures adopted by different groups inside and outside South Africa in the wake of the ANC's increased role in post-Apartheid South Africa. Over the past few years, there has been an increase in the flow of South African businessmen who have travelled to Lusaka to seek audience with the ANC on the future of South Africa. And in July 1987, fifty prominent white South Africans including politicians, academicians and businessmen led by former liberal opposition leader, Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert defied their government and travelled to Dakar for talks with ANC. They accepted armed struggle as a historical reality and saw the meeting as an attempt to start a dialogue between white Afrikaners and the ANC on structure of government and economy in a fu-

ture South Africa⁸. With the proclamation of the 1986 state of emergency, it is beyond doubt that force and repression are part and parcel of the policy to confront rising demands for political power.

Equally important has been the crisis that the system is facing in the wake of ANC efforts to mobilize international opinion towards enforcing economic sanctions on Pretoria. Whether sanctions alone can work is not the issue. Sanctions are in reality, only a means to an end and not an end in themselves. The main thrust of sanctions lies in the political will that South Africa has transgressed against international conventions on the Rights of man - on Human Rights and Civil norms.

The more the South African regime has faced both domestic and international opposition, the more it has depended on the military establishment for military solutions to political problems. Thus, the more the regime relies on the military, the more repression and terror that will be waged in the region. Indeed, it was racist Defence Minister Melan who sold the idea of 'Total National Strategy', an ideology which in essence assigns the predominant role for the military in the policy-making process (Jaster, 1985). By increasing destabilisation in the region, South Africa has certainly reaffirmed the policies that were begun in 1978 by P.W. Botha, under which the regime was put on warfooting in preparation for a wider war in Southern Africa.

Perhaps, South Africa may be harboring the belief that the monopoly of the instruments of violence may help it survive. Tolstoy, in *War and Peace*, was critical of those experts who predicted the outcome of battles by only looking at number of opposing armies: men, tanks, guns and other weaponry. Such a view was misleading. In his view, the fighting spirit and morale are often the decisive factors. The fighting spirit in South Africa and Namibia is evident among young children, women and even the aged workers who are determined to destroy the Apartheid system. Although for the past 27 years the ANC has been banned in South Africa with its members and sympathizers subjected to various repressions and deaths, the organisation has grown in fighting spirit both internally and worldwide. And this is a powerful weapon for the oppressed.

The growing instability in Southern Africa means that the African States must continue to fully support the liberation struggle. The masses in these countries have demonstrated a general and politically important taste for active support for the liberation process, despite domestic constraints. Neither Pretoria nor its allies at the IMF or in London, Washington, Bonn or Tel Aviv should be given the chance to thwart the liberation process. It is very clear that the effort of the FLS, especially founding members Tanzania and

8 *The Guardian*, July 13, 1987.

Zambia, created bases from which other struggling peoples in the region re-organised themselves and fought for their independence. Thus, the war in Southern Africa will require collective efforts to mobilize enough resources and progressive forces around the world to defeat Apartheid.

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Le Management africain: Mythe ou Réalité?

Amadou Lamine DIA*

Summary. African management today, essentially characterized by a traditional style of management - whereby managers act on behalf of and for the group from which they originated - as well as a personal style of management - whereby authority and decision-making are concentrated in the hands of the omnipresent company head - is the main reason for the failure in Africa of companies which too often are unviable, non competitive and short-lived. This type of management should therefore become a myth and be rapidly replaced by a new and real African management, which would not deny African cultural specificities but would associate them with principles of strictness, rationality and method. These principles characterize western management, but their value and efficiency must be regarded as universal.

Introduction générale

Le management, science de la gestion des entreprises a vu le jour dans le contexte américain au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale. Les techniques modernes expérimentées ont très rapidement fait l'objet d'une systématisation et d'une modélisation destinées à permettre leur application à des milieux socio-culturels différents. Elles ont ainsi été diffusées vers le Japon et vers les pays européens puis progressivement vers les pays en développement.

Le transfert des techniques de gestion s'est effectué à la fois par l'intermédiaire des consultants et des managers européens appelés dans le cadre de contrats techniques et grâce à des écoles de formation spécialisées.

Cependant, bien que le problème de l'existence d'un management africain a été à plusieurs reprises posé par les praticiens¹, les travaux de recherche théorique sur la gestion de l'entreprise en Afrique demeurent encore trop peu nombreux.

La présente étude qui compte contribuer à ce débat a pour but, d'une part, de définir les composants essentiels d'un management spécifique fondé sur les particularités de la culture africaine d'autre part, d'en déterminer l'évolu-

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1 On peut lire la synthèse des actes de colloques sur le management africain dans les revues ci-après: *Le management a-t-il un avenir en Afrique? Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens* No. 2041, année 1984, p. 3199-3200. La recherche des bons principes du management en Afrique, *Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens* No. 2063, année 1985, p. 1273-1274. Marketing pour le développement, *Revue Française du Marketing* No. 112, année 1987/2 p. 73.

tion future en les analysant dans une perspective diachronique. Elle s'articulera autour des deux points suivants:

1. De la Culture africaine à un Management spécifique;
2. Vers un nouveau Management africain.

De la Culture africaine à un Management spécifique

Culture africaine et Types d'Entreprises

L'étude d'un management particulier aux pays africains suppose une définition de la culture africaine et une typologie des entreprises.

Le Concept de Culture

Dans la langue française du Moyen Age le terme de "culture" était synonyme de culte religieux. Le mot s'est ensuite appliqué au travail de la terre et, par métaphore au domaine de l'esprit, pour désigner à partir du XVIIIème siècle le progrès intellectuel d'un individu.

L'acception moderne du mot a sans doute une origine allemande. Johann-Christophe Adelung, par exemple, publie en 1782 un ouvrage sur l'histoire de la culture de l'espèce humaine dans lequel le terme "culture" prend le sens élargi de "progrès intellectuel et social de l'humanité". Les phénomènes de groupes et de sociétés sont alors intégrés dans la création et l'évolution de la culture.

Repris par des auteurs anglais, le concept subit, une autre transformation au cours du XIXème siècle. L'anthropologue E.B. Tylor fait paraître en 1871 un ouvrage, intitulé "Primitive Culture", qui contient une première définition ethnographique du mot, qui demeure encore d'actualité:

La Culture ou la Civilisation, entendue dans son sens ethnographique étendu, est cet ensemble complexe qui comprend les connaissances, les croyances, l'art, le droit, la morale, les coutumes et toutes les autres aptitudes et habitudes qu'acquiert l'homme en tant que membre d'une société.

C'était grâce aux sociologues américains Park, Burges et Burn que la culture presque complètement ignorée par Marx, Weber et même Durkheim pénètre le domaine de la sociologie.

La transformation de la description antérieure de la culture en concept opératoire conduit à la définition suivante:

la culture d'une nation est un ensemble cohérent de manières de penser, de sentir et d'agir, plus ou moins formalisées qui, étant apprises et partagées par une pluralité de personnes, servent, d'une manière à la fois objective et symbolique, à constituer ces personnes en une collectivité particulière et distincte.

Elle est en général immuable, non seulement parce qu'elle se loge dans l'esprit des individus, mais aussi parce qu'elle est partagée par un grand nombre de personnes et s'est cristallisée dans les institutions qu'ont bâties

ces communautés: les structures familiales et d'éducation, l'organisation des religions, les formes de gouvernement, l'organisation du travail, les lois, la littérature, etc.

Toutefois il faut noter que cette culture peut évoluer au contact avec d'autres cultures et que la mondialisation des moyens de communication et le développement de la logistique affaiblissent les barrières culturelles.

La Culture africaine

Compte tenu de la définition précédente, on devrait parler de cultures nationales, à l'instar de Henry Bourgoin dans son étude sur la culture nationale de la Côte d'Ivoire² car l'Afrique est composée de pays différents ayant chacun une culture propre.

L'existence d'une culture africaine définie comme un ensemble de croyance et de valeurs communes aux populations africaines qui habitent l'Afrique, sans toutefois caractériser chaque individu, est cependant indéniable³. Les Africains ont le plus souvent un désir de "considération" et une volonté de s'extérioriser plus vifs que les Européens.

Par exemple, c'est le désir de paraître et de vouloir se rehausser aux yeux de son groupe d'appartenance que bon nombre de dirigeants flétrissent sur les nombreuses sollicitations.

Les Africains sont également conditionnés par des influences culturelles de diverses natures imposées par la famille, le clan, l'ethnie et la caste.

La famille ou le groupe

Par "famille", il faut entendre la famille élargie regroupant les descendants d'un ancêtre commun soudés entre eux par les liens du sang et du sol. Le groupe familial peut du fait de la polygamie, devenir quantitativement très important; il devient alors un clan à patronyme commun. Il s'organise autour d'un chef à la fois autoritaire et protecteur: l'homme le plus âgé de la famille, qui sert d'intermédiaire entre le monde des vivants et celui des morts et symbolise ainsi l'une des principales caractéristiques de la société africaine. Cette caractéristique confère au chef une autorité très grande, mais jamais despote sur les autres membres du groupe.

2 Bourgoin (Henry): L'Afrique malade du Management Paris - Editions Jean Picollec, 1984. Perspective 2001, p. 60-62. Voir également Desaunay (Guy): *Les Sciences Humaines*, c'est quoi même? Réflexion sur une expérience d'Enseignement des Sciences Humaines dans les écoles de gestion d'Abidjan et (RCD); *Les Cahiers de Recherches du CESA* (HEC) No. 124, 1979.

3 On peut citer parmi les travaux les plus récents sur les caractéristiques de la culture qui déterminent un modèle d'organisation original propre au pays étudié ceux de Geert Hofstede, Relativité culturelle des pratiques et théories de l'organisation. *Revue Française de Gestion* no. 64, septembre-octobre 1987, p. 10-21.

Cette forme d'organisation sociale n'admet pas d'individu isolé: ce dernier est avant tout le parent, et le concitoyen d'un grand nombre de personnes. La conscience qu'il peut avoir de sa personne, de sa personnalité propre lui apparaît comme un phénomène tout à fait secondaire. L'existence de l'individu est liée à la vie de la famille et du groupe. La solidarité familiale est une contrainte qui s'impose à tous les membres du groupe.

Le système d'autorité

Comme le souligne fort remarquablement Guy Desaunay⁴, l'autorité n'est, en Afrique, liée ni à la personne, ni à la compétence mais au statut social et au statut magique. En effet, est chef celui qui "sait", qui a des "pouvoirs" et la "bonne parole". C'est dire que son autorité est sans appel

Le champ d'application de la culture se prolonge jusqu'à l'entreprise industrielle d'où la nécessité d'étudier le mode de fonctionnement des entreprises africaines.

Adéquation entre culture et types d'entreprises

En Afrique, le tissu économique, qui se compose d'un ensemble d'unités productives, est d'une extrême diversité. Les entreprises africaines sont très différentes les unes des autres. Il est cependant possible de les répartir en divers groupes définis par des caractéristiques homogènes. Plusieurs typologies satisfaisantes ont été proposées dans le cadre d'études sur les entreprises nationales⁵. Dans le secteur primaire, le commerce, l'industrie ou les services, différentes catégories d'entreprises peuvent être distinguées, selon un degré croissant de complexité: entreprise indépendante, artisanale, petite, moyenne, grande, société étrangère ou multinationale, société para étatique ou société d'économie mixte.

Il est possible de construire les profils d'entreprises suivants (tableau 1), fondés sur les caractéristiques majeures de leur organisation (statut, salariés permanents, secteurs d'activité).

Dans l'ensemble les caractéristiques d'organisation se rapprochent de celles de l'entreprise européenne. La remarque s'applique surtout aux entreprises africaines affiliées à des structures multinationales.

En revanche sont nettement moins structurés, les petites entreprises dans lesquelles l'entrepreneur joue un rôle primordial.

⁴ Desaunay (Guy), Op. cit, p. 15-17.

⁵ Voir à ce sujet: Dia (Amadou Lamine) - Choix stratégique de l'Entreprise privée sénégalaise - *Afrique et développement* - Octobre-décembre 1984, p. 33-48. Banderembako (D) - Mode de Gestion des PME au Cameroun, *Centre Universitaire de Recherche pour le Développement économique et social (CURDES)*, Bujumbura, 1985. Koffi Kouadio (D) - La Crédit d'Entreprise par les Nationaux en Côte d'Ivoire depuis 1960 - Ed. CEDA, 1983.

Tableau 1: Typologie des Entreprises et Caractéristiques Majeures de leur Organisation

<i>Caractéristiques typologiques</i>	<i>Status</i>	<i>Secteurs d'activités</i>	<i>Nbre de salariés permanents</i>
Indépendant	Société familiale ou indépendante	Services, commerce de détail, parfois commerce de gros, artisanat	Une dizaine au maximum
Entreprise artisanale	Société familiale ou associée	Commerce de détail et de gros, import-export, services, petites unités industrielles	Moins d'une vingtaine le plus souvent
Petite entreprise	Société de personnes	Principalement industrie, travaux de construction, travaux publics	Moins d'une trentaine
Moy. entreprise	Société de personnes	Commerce et surtout industrie d'import-export	Peut aller jusqu'à 100 salariés
Grd. entreprise	Société anonyme	Grande distribution, industries et services	Nombre important dépassant parfois le millier
Société étrangère ou multinationale	Société anonyme	Principalement commerce, industrie de sous-traitance	Nombre très variable selon les activités
Société para-étatique ou société d'économie mixte	Sociétés d'Etat avec forte participation de l'Etat, aussi bien du commerce, des services, de l'Industrie ou du secteur rural	Secteurs considérés comme stratégiques par l'Etat, aussi bien du commerce, des services, de l'Industrie ou du secteur rural	En général en grand nombre dépassant le millier

Source: Tableau synthétique établi à partir des enquêtes sur les entreprises africaines: Sénégal 1984; Côte d'Ivoire 1985; Cameroun 1985; Centre-Afrique 1984

Culture Africaine et Styles de Direction

Le style de direction est défini, en général, comme la manière dont les hommes de l'entreprise se conduisent pour réaliser leur objectifs. Il est ici conçu comme l'ensemble des méthodes et des processus de décision, des attitudes et de motivations de l'équipe dirigeante ou du dirigeant qui détermine le fonctionnement et les directions de l'entreprise. Cette dernière définition permet de faire une synthèse du profil des entreprises africaines (voir tableau 2).

Les caractéristiques principales des styles de direction des entreprises africaines sont analogues à celles qui existent en Europe. Cependant plus la dimension de la firme est réduite plus elles s'en éloignent.

Le P.M.E. est le champ favorable d'expérimentation du management africain: les influences culturelles y sont plus nettes surtout au niveau de la prise de décision et dans l'administration.

Administration

Les hommes et leurs motivations

Les anciens colonisateurs ayant surtout formé des commerçants en pays anglophones et des administrateurs en pays francophones, les dirigeants d'entreprises africaines ont été et sont encore, trop peu nombreux. Cette situation est aggravée par l'impossibilité d'affecter les cadres originaires d'un pays à un autre pays du continent.

Les patrons africains aujourd'hui âgés de cinquante ans et plus ont presque tous été des fonctionnaires et beaucoup par prudence, le demeurent encore.

Force est enfin de constater que les cadres africains ont dans leurs pays une disponibilité restreinte du fait des contraintes familiales, ethniques et politiques qui pèsent sur eux.

L'étude des motivations est un domaine en plein essor qui occupe une place importante dans les décisions des entreprises, des organismes publics, de sociétés à but non lucratif et des représentants élus des populations.

Les pays industrialisés ont manifesté le plus d'intérêt et de détermination à étudier les motivations des hommes. En Afrique le comportement et la motivation constituent un domaine de recherche assez nouveau⁶. Le travail en Afrique n'est pas seulement un moyen de gagner sa vie mais répond surtout à un besoin de valorisation sociale de l'individu. Le salaire et le statut lui permettent de "rembourser" sa dette sociale et de conserver ainsi le soutien du groupe.

6 Parmi les études réalisées voir: Dessuny (Guy), *Les Relations Humaines dans les Entreprises Ivoiriennes*, *Revue Française de Gestion* No. 64, année 1987, p.95-101. *Gestion du Personnel: Outil social ou Clef de la réussite* thème des Journées de réflexion de l'ENSUT - Université Cheikh Anta Diop (Dakar), Mars 1985.

Tableau 2: Typologie des entreprises et caractéristiques majeures de leurs styles de direction

Caractéristiques	Formation du directeur	Méthode de gestion	Cadres de gestion	Prise de décision
Indépendant	Directeur souvent illité formé "sur le tas"	Autocratique et "traditionnel"	Inexistants. Dans le système traditionnel un membre de la famille conseille et influence le directeur	Prise sur la base de la situation de la caisse, des perspectives de récupérer son argent ou de gagner "gross" rapidement
Entreprise artisanale	Technique professionnelle ou apprentissage du métier sur le tas	Autocratique et "traditionnel"	Techniciens diplômés s'occupent essentiellement de la production	Prise par le dirigeant sur la base des besoins de sa production et de son "flair" du marché
Petite Entreprise	Formation professionnelle et/ou "sur le tas"	"Traditionnel"	Surtout des techniciens. L'un d'eux par exemple, le comptable peut jouer un rôle privilégié pour conseiller le directeur	Les principales sont prises par l'entrepreneur, les décisions techniques courantes par le chef d'atelier mais sanctionnées par le directeur
Moyenne Entreprise	En général de formation supérieure DUT, ingénieurs	De moins en moins traditionnel. La structure et les problèmes plus complexes imposent un degré de participation plus ou moins importante	De plus en plus nombreux et indispensables, complexité en raison d'une croissance, comptables, agents commerciaux. En général un début d'organisation clarifie les rôles, les responsabilités, et les pouvoirs	La décision finale est prise par l'entrepreneur, mais il demande souvent l'avis de ses cadres ou des techniciens.
Grande Entreprise	De plus en plus un gestionnaire de formation supérieure au minimum un technicien de haut niveau avec une expérience professionnelle importante	Exploitation des méthodes modernes avec parfois un système de certification ou de participation formel ou informel	En général un personnel de cadres assez important. Existence d'un organigramme et d'une structure hiérarchique	Souvent prise au sein d'organes de gestion de type comité de direction

Source: Tableau établi à partir des enquêtes sur les entreprises africaines

Dans la plupart des cas, le personnel n'a véritablement connaissance ni de l'entreprise ni des contraintes qu'elle comporte. Celles-ci demeurent donc extérieures et mal perçues. L'individu n'a aucun sentiment de culpabilité ou d'échec face à un travail mal fait. La contrainte que l'individu s'impose à lui-même et qui l'oblige, pour des raisons morales à déployer tous ses efforts pour atteindre un résultat n'existe pas et ne peut donc jouer le rôle moteur qu'elle joue dans les entreprises occidentales.

Dans les pays occidentaux, le système de compétition incite les cadres et les dirigeants à prendre des risques, à améliorer leur carrière, en recherchant les responsabilités. En Afrique, le besoin d'appartenance et/ou de pouvoir prime sur celui de réalisation. Le cadre accède par sa fonction à un certain rang social et cherche avant tout à conserver cette fonction en nouant de bonnes relations avec son patron et avec les autres agents. Sa contribution à la réussite de l'entreprise et son auto-réalisation n'ont qu'une faible importance au regard de ce souci constant.

Esprit d'entreprise et goût d'entreprendre ne sont certes pas inconnus en Afrique, mais ils semblent orientés vers la spéculation ou la recherche d'un statut social.

Le patron exerce une attraction réelle sur l'ensemble du corps social de son entreprise mais le potentiel de loyauté et de motivation ainsi disponible est lié à l'homme. Certains dirigeants le cultivent en amplifiant le côté relationnel, devenant ainsi de véritables chefs de quartier ou de village, rendant la justice, dispensant des conseils matrimoniaux... D'autres tentent d'obtenir un transfert de ce potentiel vers l'entreprise. Mais, faute d'identification, de symbole et de valeurs collectives, ce transfert se fait en pure perte, entraînant frustration et démotivation.

Le patron possède, surtout dans les petites et moyennes entreprises un pouvoir sans limite. Etat au cœur de l'entreprise, il coordonne toutes les actions et dirige suivant sa vision et son flair.

L'Organisation

A l'exception des grandes firmes, où les relations sont souvent formelles, la plupart des entreprises n'ont pas d'organigramme, et le rôle fonctionnel de chacun des agents n'est pas précisément défini. Ce sont généralement les circonstances qui dictent à l'individu sa conduite. Cette situation est du reste souvent entretenue afin que toute tâche puisse, quelle qu'elle soit, être imposée à tous.

De plus, le recrutement du personnel est une affaire quasi privée du chef d'entreprise, qui a, par là-même, tendance à recruter les membres de sa famille, de son ethnie, de son village... Recruter un membre du groupe est une obligation stricte à laquelle on ne peut échapper sans courir le risque de sanctions sociales graves (passage devant le tribunal de famille...), donc au moins d'une perte de prestige considérable. Le système de commandement se trouve ainsi faussé. Et les dirigeants africains paraissent, aux yeux de

leurs homologues étrangers, à la fois cassants vis-à-vis de leurs subordonnés et trop proche d'eux⁷. Il est effectivement difficile d'imposer le respect à des individus dont le choix est dicté par le groupe d'appartenance.

La prise de Décision

Dans le contexte africain, le décideur essaie rarement de maîtriser les éléments extérieurs, qu'il considère comme supérieurs et échappant à son emprise. La planification des activités est souvent inconnue et les grandes décisions sont prises rapidement, sous la pression des circonstances. Un importateur, par exemple, ne mesure pas les évolutions possibles de la consommation, mais achète généralement dès que la rupture des stocks est proche ou s'il a des informations sur une probable pénurie à venir⁸.

Ainsi, la gestion par les objectifs devient impossible, en raison d'une certaine réticence à l'égard de l'idée même de planification et d'un fatalisme évident, pour peu que la réalisation des objectifs soit entravée par des éléments extérieurs.

Le pouvoir se trouve concentré entre les mains de dirigeants dont l'omniprésence influence toutes les décisions. Il s'acquiert d'ailleurs par la force, ne se négocie ni ne se partage. Pour la conserver, les responsables établissent généralement une distance hiérarchique entre eux-mêmes et leurs collaborateurs immédiats et filtrent systématiquement la diffusion des informations. Ce n'est que par ce mécanisme de concentration des informations au sommet de la hiérarchie que la direction parvient à imposer son autorité.

Les relations entre la Direction Générale et les cadres supérieurs s'exercent exclusivement par le biais des ordres d'exécution. Des flux vers le sommet sont possibles, mais le système ne les encourage pas et a tôt fait de démontrer qu'ils nuisent au bon fonctionnement des rouages de l'entreprise. La décision finale émane en définitive du groupe ou de leaders reconnus dans le groupe dont sont issus les dirigeants.

Tel semble être le style de direction africain et la caractéristique d'un management propre à l'Afrique. Le transfert de technologie a seulement favorisé l'apparition, à côté de ce management traditionnel, personnel, relationnel et social, d'un management de type occidental, moderne, rigoureux, rationnel et méthodique. D'où la situation actuelle, caractérisée par la juxtaposition de deux mondes opposés. Est-il possible de dépasser cette antinomie?

7 Voir Olomo (Paul, R.) - Comment concilier Tradition et Modernité dans l'Entreprise africaine, *Revue Française de Gestion*, No. 64, année 1987, p. 91 - 94. Voir aussi Desaunay (Guy), Op. cit, p. 8-10.

8 On peut consulter la synthèse des journées de réflexion sur le thème: Le marketing sénégalais, tenues à l'ENSUT, Université Cheikh Anta Diop Dakar, Février 1984.

Vers un Nouveau Management Africain

Les Résultats Pratiques du Système actuel de Gestion

La création d'entreprises et la compétitivité

La création d'entreprises, particulièrement d'unités industrielles, peut avoir un effet bénéfique, tant sur la structure de la production intérieure brute que sur la croissance et le développement économique et social. Les pays d'Afrique ont donc fait le choix de politiques industrielles privilégiant les petites et moyennes entreprises. Il faudrait cependant, pour lutter avec efficacité contre le sous-développement, que ces entreprises fussent bien gérées et compétitives.

Or l'expérience des vingt cinq dernières années montre qu'en dépit de quelques véritables succès, la situation générale des entreprises est loin d'être brillante: taux de mortalité important (6 entreprise sur 10), croissance quasi insignifiante⁹. Beaucoup, particulièrement les entreprises de petites et moyennes dimensions et les entreprises publiques, au niveau de leur fonctionnement et de leur performance, sont dépourvues de toute efficacité. La rentabilité, pour certaines, est négative, pour d'autres, très médiocre¹⁰.

Les causes de l'insuccès

Plusieurs explications peuvent être avancées. Les unes sont liées à l'histoire, d'autres à la conjoncture actuelle (chute de l'activité économique due à la sécheresse, aux mauvaises récoltes, baisse des cours des principaux produits d'exportation, blocage des prix et des tarifs, endettement, concurrence d'autres pays, rareté des aides, répercussion de la crise internationale), d'autres, enfin, aux déficiences du management dans la conduite des affaires, (les dirigeants d'entreprises ont pris en considération, les seules techniques de gestion, au mépris du facteur culturel, ou ont, au contraire, accordé à ce dernier une attention exclusive).

Quelques exemples sont particulièrement significatifs¹¹.

9 On peut consulter l'étude réalisée par le Laboratoire de Recherches en Gestion de l'ENSUT Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar en collaboration avec l'Association sénégalaise des anciens élèves de HEC Paris et portant sur "Vie et Mortalité des Entreprises: Cas du Sénégal" 1987.

10 Voir sur ce point l'étude de Causse (G). "Les Obstacles à la Gestion de Type privé dans les Entreprises publiques africaines", Colloque International et Interdisciplinaire sur le thème: Entreprise Publique et Développement, Cotonou, 24-28 février 1986, *Laboratoire de Gestion et Cultures africaines*, Nice 1986, p. 15.

11 Pour de plus amples détails nous renvoyons le lecteur aux études suivantes: Gouadian (D) et Lecointre (G) - Difficulté de Gestion des Entreprises des Pays en Voie de Développement. *Laboratoire de Gestion de Nice* 1985, p.7. Causse (G) Op. cit. p. 16-18. Delalande Philippe - Gestion de l'Entreprise Industrielle en Afrique, *Economica* Paris 1987, p. 51-117.

Dans le domaine de la Gestion commerciale

De nombreux chefs d'entreprises estiment que la société africaine est encore une société de pénurie, dans laquelle la gestion commerciale ou le marketing sont des raffinements superflus. Ils subissent de lourdes pertes en vendant indistinctement aux Africains sans tenir compte des différenciations sociologiques. La population africaine se répartit en effet en cinq catégories principales: le secteur rural traditionnel, à économie de subsistance ou à forte autoconsommation; le secteur rural diversifié, fruit de la croissance de l'économie monétaire et du développement agricole et commercial; le secteur urbain marginal; le secteur urbain a revenu moyen; celui des classes privilégiées, caractérisée par une consommation de masse de type occidental.

Une transposition sans discernement des méthodes d'étude de marché pour la commercialisation de nouveaux produits. Le résultat a été négatif, en tout cas n'a pas répondu aux prévisions. D'une part, en effet, les statistiques socio-démographiques, de production, de consommation, d'importation... manquent, le plus souvent, de fiabilité; d'autre part, l'échantillonnage probabiliste, fondement des études qualitatives, est rendu hasardeux ou trop coûteux par l'inexactitude, ou même l'inexistence, des cartes et des plans de villes. Enfin, la collecte des données par téléphone ou par correspondance est quasi impossible et celle des enquêteurs entravée par leur petit nombre, la multiplicité des langues et les fréquents refus de réponse.

Dans la conception des produits, les mobiles techniques sont privilégiés par rapport aux mobiles commerciaux, alors qu'une démarche marketing logique devrait conduire l'entreprise à se définir constamment par rapport à son environnement et au marché des besoins individuels qu'elle a décidé de satisfaire. Des produits conçus sans tenir compte du goût des consommateurs africains ont en général une durée de vie courte¹². Tel fut, par exemple, le cas du pamiblé (pain composé de 15% de mil et de 85% de blé) mis sur le marché au Sénégal et dont la fabrication a dû cesser au bout de trois mois parce que son goût ne plaisait pas aux consommateurs urbains.

La politique de communication des entreprises africaines a souvent conduit à l'échec en raison soit de l'absence de distinction entre le segment riche de la population et les masses, soit de l'opinion de certains dirigeants accordant une efficacité absolue à la seule palabre, aux discours comiques ou au "mataquage" publicitaire.

12 Au sujet du marketing en Afrique on consultera avec un grand intérêt: Boyer (A) - *Africain Premarketing*, XIIIth Annual Conference, European Marketing Academy, Grenoble, Avril 1983. Bollinger (D) - *Le marketing en Afrique*. Tome 1 la Côte d'Ivoire, Editions CEDA Abidjan 1977. Maricourt (R. De) - Les principes et techniques de marketing sont-ils applicables aux pays en développement? *Revue Française de Marketing* No. 112, année 1987.

La distribution des produits pose des problèmes extrêmement complexes aux entreprises parce que les spécificités africaines ne sont pas cernées et prises en compte. Par exemple, la fonction de demi-grossiste a disparu dans les pays industrialisés alors qu'en Afrique on trouve non seulement l'importateur et le grossiste mais ensuite quatre ou cinq types de demi-grossistes, suivis d'une série de détaillants, de sous-détaillants, etc... ce qui constitue un handicap sérieux pour la compétitivité des petites et moyennes entreprises sans moyens financiers.

L'application d'une stratégie de prix en fonction de la position de la firme sur le marché s'avère difficile dans la mesure où la plupart des Etats imposent des prix pour la commercialisation des biens de consommation de première nécessité.

Dans le domaine de la Gestion du Personnel et des Oeuvres sociales

La formation insuffisante du personnel, ses motivations et comportements constituent autant d'obstacles au développement, et même à la simple survie de l'entreprise. La vue extrêmement parcellaire qu'ont de l'entreprise et des processus qui s'y déroulent, les ouvriers, la plupart des employés et une partie des contremaîtres ne permet pas d'appréhender l'influence du travail personnel sur les résultats d'ensemble¹³.

Le recrutement du personnel de l'entreprise essentiellement fondé sur le critère de l'appartenance à une famille, une ethnie ou un clan ne favorise ni la motivation, ni l'émulation ni la responsabilité. Et la productivité s'en trouve réduite.

L'entreprise africaine ne peut être compétitive car on attend seulement d'elle qu'elle soit au service de la solidarité des groupes représentés en son sein et de leurs clients.

Une autorité reposant exclusivement sur la compétence ne suffit pas à la bonne marche de l'entreprise, si elle n'intègre pas les références culturelles de ceux sur lesquels elle s'exerce.

Dans le domaine de la Gestion comptable de financière

Dans ce domaine, il s'agit moins d'une inadéquation de l'outil de gestion comptable et financière que de sa mauvaise appréciation par les entreprises. En effet, les nombreux insuccès proviennent de la confusion du patrimoine de l'entreprise et de celui de l'entrepreneur: dans les P.M.E., le patron et sa

13 A propos de la gestion du personnel en Afrique et des conflits possibles entre l'impératif industriel et l'impératif familial, on peut consulter: Desaunay (G.) - Les Relations humaines dans les Entreprises ivoiriennes. Op. cit. p. 98-100. Borgoin (H.) - L'Afrique malade du Management. Op. cit. p. 131-163.

famille font souvent des prélevements en cas de besoin, dilapidant ainsi les ressources de l'entreprise.

En introduisant sans discernement les principes de rigueur et d'efficacité, on a ainsi défait la trame sociale et culturelle préexistante des pays africains. L'intrusion des méthodes occidentales de gestion a été la cause, dans les entreprises africaines, d'"acculturations" qui sont en réalité des "déculturations", des dislocations et des déséquilibres¹⁴.

La Réconciliation de la Tradition et de la Modernité

L'Echec du Modèle occidental

La transposition pure et simple du modèle occidental en Afrique ne peut qu'échouer, l'environnement, les cultures, les valeurs étant différents.

Les travaux de Peters et Waterman¹⁵, Mintzberg¹⁶, Koestler¹⁷, Tversky et Kahneman¹⁸ ont clairement montré que l'esprit et la mentalité sont conditionnés par le milieu social et culturel, et que l'homme est très souvent guidé par son intuition ou son subconscient dans ses décisions et ses activités journalières. Le milieu intime a une incidence sur la vie professionnelle.

Lawrence et Lorsch¹⁹, dans leur théorie relativiste dite "théorie de la contingence" (la plus récente des théories de l'organisation) ont souligné qu'il n'existe pas de théorie unique universellement valable, dans le temps comme dans l'espace, pour résoudre les problèmes des organisations. Les structures de l'entreprise doivent donc s'adapter à l'environnement ou à son évolution. C'est dans le cadre de cette théorie que nous allons tenter de définir le management africain de demain²⁰.

Celui-ci doit réconcilier tradition et modernité et tirer partie de l'une et de l'autre pour faire de l'entreprise africaine une unité de production rentable et compétitive. L'outil de gestion dans les pays en développement en est au

14 J. Kizerbo - *Culture et Développement*, Institut International d'Etudes sociales, No. 8, Genève, 1976.

15 Peters (T.) et Waterman (R.) - *Le Prix de l'Excellence*. Paris, Edition du Club-France Loisirs, 1983, P. 75-104.

16 Mintzberg (G.) - *Planning on the left side and Maning on the Right* - *Havard Business Review* Jul.-Aug., 1976, p. 53.

17 Koestler (A.) - *Le Cheval dans la Locomotive: le Paradoxe humain*, Paris, Calman-Levy, 1968

18 Tversky (A.) et Kahneman (D.) - *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and biases*, Science, 27 Sept., 1974, p. 1124.

19 Lawrence (P.R.) et Lorsch (J.W.), *Adapter les Structures de l'Entreprise, Intégration ou Différenciation*, Paris, Ed. d'Organisation, 1973.

20 On peut consulter les importants ouvrages sur le type de management: Philippe d'Iribane - *La Gestion à la Française*, *Revue Française de Gestion*, janvier-février 1985, p. 5-13. Jyoti Gupta, *Le Style de Management Indien*, *Revue Française de Gestion*, janvier-février 1984, p. 80-85. Cyert (R.) et March (J.G) - *Processus de Décision dans l'Entreprise*, Dunod, Paris, 1970. Drucker (P.F.) - *The Pratice of Management*, London Mercury, Books, 1961. Ouchi (W.) - *Théorie Z: Faire face au Défi japonais*, Traduction de l'Américain par Jacques Guiod, Paris, Interédition, 1982.

stade de l'adolescence. Les hommes y apprennent progressivement, au fil des expériences à organiser, à administrer, à décider. L'Afrique, par la même, constitue une école de gestion maîtrisant les réalités de l'environnement et qui va favoriser l'apprentissage des techniques et l'éclosion des talents.

Le mode de gestion des entreprises africaines tel qu'il existe ne doit être qu'une étape vers l'utilisation d'un nouveau management: le véritable management africain, qui comprendra d'une part des principes immuables, qui s'imposent aux dirigeants, et d'autre part, des principes spécifiques sur lesquels les chefs d'entreprises pourront agir pour rendre leurs structures performantes.

Les Principes du Immuables du Management

- Les principes immuables du management sont la rigueur, l'efficacité et la rentabilité. Il existe, en effet, un minimum de structures de comportements fondamentaux et universels, que les Africains ne sauraient remettre en cause.

Que l'entreprise soit nord-américaine, asiatique, européenne, ou africaine, qu'elle soit exposée à la concurrence ou protégée, elle doit tenir compte de trois données fondamentales:

- un marché, une clientèle et un produit ou un service qui présentent assez d'avantage pour permettre la satisfaction d'un besoin;
- un personnel remplissant les diverses fonctions d'encadrement et d'exécution;
- un capital destiné à l'acquisition des moyens nécessaires à l'exploitation et au développement, et dont les possesseurs attendent en contrepartie, la rémunération et la valorisation.

Les entreprises africaines, au même titre que celles situées dans d'autres continents, doivent être rentables et solvables pour leur survie et leur développement à long terme.

La solvabilité consiste pour l'entreprise à assurer à tout instant le paiement de ses dettes exigibles tandis que la rentabilité se définit comme l'aptitude à sécréter un bénéfice.

Le bénéfice est fondamental: il permet l'accumulation de liquidités suffisantes pour assurer le maintien du capital de production de la firme, assurer le remboursement des emprunts, contribuer à la naissance du capital nouveau et dégager une rémunération du capital investi par les associés. Cependant, l'objectif de rentabilité ne représente pas la même chose pour toute entreprise. D'une part, parce que les rémunérations personnelles et familiales jouent un rôle plus important dans les petites et moyennes entreprises que dans les grandes entreprises. D'autre part parce que si l'on raisonne dans la grande entreprise en termes de rentabilité à moyen et long terme, c'est la recherche de la rentabilité à court terme qui prévaut pour les P.M.E. africaines.

Ainsi les chefs d'entreprises africains, comme leurs homologues d'autres secteurs géographiques, ont pour tâche de satisfaire les aspirations de tous leurs partenaires, d'être en permanence responsable de cet équilibre et de veiller à la rétablir toutes les fois qu'il se trouve rompu, au risque de disparaître tout en ruinant la collectivité. Ils ont le devoir de compter et doivent en être conscients. Bien gérer, en effet, c'est d'abord bien compter et le développement des pays africains suppose une bonne gestion des entreprises, rationnelle et efficace.

Les variables culturelles du Management africain

Tout en constituant des obstacles au développement des entreprises africaines, elles peuvent, quand elles sont examinées avec discernement, offrir nombre d'opportunité, comme le montrent les exemples suivants:

Dans le domaine de la gestion commerciale

- Les études de marché sont possible en Afrique. Elles peuvent éviter bien des erreurs à condition que leurs auteurs se contentent de méthodes assez rudimentaires, et fassent largement appel au jugement et au bon sens. Il faut souvent utiliser des échantillonnages empiriques, recruter des enquêteurs en fonction des populations étudiées et les former soigneusement, s'appuyer sur les notables et les chefs de famille et préparer les interviews par des explications simples et convaincantes.

- La politique de produit suppose, dans le contexte africain, une schématisation. Il faut proposer des produits simples et robustes, à longue durée de vie, pour tenir compte d'une part des faibles possibilités de maintenance, d'autre part du bas niveau des revenus. Les emballages doivent être renforcés en raison des difficultés de stockage et de transport et facilement réutilisables, éventuellement pour d'autres usages.

- La segmentation de la population en plusieurs catégories de consommateurs nécessite une diversité de conditionnements, destinée à faciliter les achats par très petites quantités par les populations à faible pouvoir d'achat.

- En matière de prix, il convient de rechercher le prix le plus logique, le plus bas possible à la lumière du pouvoir d'achat des consommateurs. Les prix fixés par l'Etat s'imposent à la firme. Celle-ci doit donc accorder une attention particulière aux procédures publiques de détermination des prix. Par ailleurs, la firme doit disposer d'une comptabilité analytique permanente et rigoureuse pour être en mesure de présenter un dossier de structure de coûts et prix de revient corrects. Cette précaution permet d'éviter que le prix de vente fixé par les pouvoirs publics sur la base de ce dossier ne couvre pas les coûts de l'entreprise.

Dans le domaine de la Gestion du Personnel et des Affaires sociales

- Les conflits entre l'impératif industriel et l'impératif traditionnel peuvent être écartés par une bonne gestion des affaires sociales. Il en est ainsi des relations financières entre le dirigeant d'entreprise et son personnel. Au nom

de la solidarité, le patron offre souvent, à ses employés des sommes allant de 1000 à 25000 francs CFA, puisées dans la caisse de l'entreprise et sans remboursement.

Une solution peut être trouvée sur le modèle d'une pratique déjà courante dans de nombreuses entreprises, où les salariés se sont organisés eux-mêmes spontanément en une sorte de "tontine"; chacun des membres adhérents verse chaque mois la même somme d'argent et l'un d'entre eux bénéficie de la totalité de la somme collectée, ce qui lui permet d'utiliser une somme importante pour faire face à une dépense imprévue qu'il n'aurait pu assumer seul.

De la même manière, un fonds de solidarité communautaire peut être constitué officiellement dans le but de couvrir des dépenses familiales exceptionnelles de membres du personnel.

Dans le domaine de la Gestion comptable et financière

Le redressement de l'entreprise africaine passe par l'amélioration de son fonds de roulement et par voie de conséquence du renforcement des fonds propres. C'est au démarrage même de l'entreprise qu'il faut réunir des fonds propres suffisants. La constitution d'une entreprise sociétaire ou collective savère donc nécessaire car le promoteur africain est généralement peu fortuné. Toutefois il est souvent difficile de convaincre un créateur d'entreprise africain qu'il doit accepter d'être minoritaire s'il veut réussir.

L'utilisation d'instruments fiables, légers et adaptés constituent d'autres éléments d'une bonne gestion financière. On lit parfois que la comptabilité dans les entreprises africaines est approximative ou inexistante. C'est souvent vrai dans le petit commerce ou l'artisanat mais inexact dans l'entreprise industrielle. Par contre, ce qui est fréquent c'est le délai excessif de traitement des informations comptables. Les états financiers sont produits de manière irrégulière et trop tardivement pour servir d'instruments efficaces de gestion. Un peu de rigueur dans le service comptable pourrait souvent remédier à ce défaut plus sûrement que l'introduction de l'informatique.

L'Afrique a été pendant longtemps connue à travers ses militaires, ses hommes politiques et quelques hauts fonctionnaires. Les managers africains commencent à entrer sur scène et il est à souhaiter qu'il puissent prendre, dans les années à venir, la place qui leur revient dans le développement économique et social de leur continent. L'Afrique peut se développer sans perdre son âme, à condition que ses dirigeants y introduisent une forme particulière de management jusqu'à présent trop souvent ignorée. Tourné vers l'extérieur, ce management devrait, pour réussir, avoir une certaine spécificité culturelle, sans toutefois conférer aux particularités locales africaines une valeur intangible et sacrée ni remettre en question les principes de base universels. Avec ses imperfections et ses tares, l'actuel mode de gestion des entreprises devrait ne devenir qu'un mythe. Le nouveau management afri-

cain tel que nous l'avons défini n'est encore qu'un mythe, mais il serait souhaitable qu'il pût, dans les plus brefs délais, devenir une réalité.

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Quelle Stratégie de Développement pour l'Afrique Sub-Saharienne

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Summary. Beyond the reaction to the Sub-Saharan African economic decline, including optimism for some and pessimism for others, the present debate on the development problematic and alternatives is based on the opposition between two paradigms: one supporting self-centered development and the second one, development through liberalization and opening up. In view of the economic decline of the region and the uncertainties brought about by the implementation of strategies developed from the above two models, this paper will investigate the following question: given the internal and external constraints and contradictions in the different economies in the region, how can one conceive the long-term development of Sub-Saharan Africa beyond strategies aimed at merely overcoming the crisis? Two rules should be observed regarding priorities to be selected and, hence, the orientation of development in the region. One, radical and exclusionary solutions such as total opening and specialization or introversion at any cost, ought to be avoided. One should instead implement "relative, selective protectionist" policies encouraging maximum use of opportunities created by the promotion of exports and survival of a number of vital areas that are protected from international competition. Two, one should always bear in mind that only activities that are first and foremost geared toward meeting the basic needs of the people and generating jobs should be selected. Secondly, in terms of regulating growth and the direction of the development process, one should beware of peremptory moves consisting in systematically giving precedence to, either, private initiatives over public ones, or market over the State, or external competitiveness over regional integration. It may be wiser to take into consideration the roles and functions of the different actors and make use of the advantages of the different regulation methods. Finally, in spite of the dominant practice of considering mobilization of resources as nothing else but fund raising and in the past few years, as the debt issue especially, one should keep in mind that people should be both the first resource to mobilize and the first beneficiaries of development. Such a mobilization of people is only possible if it is integrated in a self-development strategy, that is, if the given people enjoy relative autonomy in defining objectives and in decision making.

Introduction

La question qui sert de titre au présent article s'impose à la réflexion du fait de la gravité de la crise¹ qui sévit en Afrique subsaharienne depuis le début des années quatre-vingt et, notamment, des réactions qu'elle a engendrées. En effet, face au déclin économique de la région et à la montée de l'incertitude, deux types de réactions ont été enregistrés: l'optimisme pour certains, le pessimisme pour d'autres.

Pour les optimistes, au nombre desquels figurent notamment les organisations internationales, les exemples de l'Inde et de la Corée du Sud qui, il y a encore près de trente ans, se trouvaient dans une situation semblable à celle

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1 : Cf. H. Diatta (1988) - *La Crise des Années 80: Crise des Diagnostics et des Remèdes*, Doc. ronéo, Brazzaville.

de l'Afrique subsaharienne aujourd'hui, fournissent toutes les raisons d'espérer. Le développement de l'Afrique subsaharienne est possible si les gouvernements africains procèdent à la libéralisation des échanges, si l'aide étrangère augmente et fait l'objet d'une meilleure utilisation, si des politiques adéquates sont adoptées et si la gestion interne des économies concernées est améliorée.

Pour les pessimistes, parmi lesquels on retrouve de nombreux universitaires, l'accroissement des recettes extérieures ne garantit pas le déclenchement du processus de développement; l'industrialisation de l'Afrique subsaharienne n'est pas possible du fait de l'étroitesse des marchés; l'intégration économique régionale qui pourrait permettre cette industrialisation est minée par la multiplication des conflits et des rivalités entre Etats voisins, la croissance agricole et le développement rural sont hypothéqués par la ponction du surplus paysan réalisée par les couches dirigeantes des villes, bref, les solutions d'auto-développement sont inapplicables du fait des antagonismes de classes.

Globalement, au moment où s'achève la troisième décennie du développement décrétée par les Nations Unies, le pessimisme prédomine, tant parmi les chercheurs que les militants, pour ce qui concerne l'avenir de l'Afrique subsaharienne. Face à ce pessimiste oscillant, entre le simplisme des solutions du type "y a qu'à" et l'impuissance engendrée par le déclin économique et les sombres perspectives qui s'offrent à cette partie du monde, une autre attitude est possible; c'est celle qui combine le refus de la démission avec le souci d'approfondir l'analyse.

La réflexion qui va suivre porte sur l'interrogation suivante: au-delà des stratégies de simple sortie de crise, comment penser le développement à long terme de l'Afrique subsaharienne eu égard aux contraintes et aux contradictions internes et externes qui caractérisent les différentes économies de la région? A cet sujet, plutôt qu'une simple énumération de nouvelles recettes dont la pertinence ne peut être consacrée que par la pratique des acteurs concrets, c'est beaucoup plus la restructuration de la problématique du développement de la région qui sera recherchée. La première partie du texte sera consacrée à l'orientation globale du développement et la seconde aux instruments de régulation de ce processus.

Ordonnancement des objectifs et orientation du développement

Bien que la pratique du développement ait été dominée pendant la décennie par une série de tâtonnements, il apparaît néanmoins que les analyses de la crise et les solutions proposées relèvent principalement de deux paradigmes qui se sont affrontés au cours de cette période. Le premier de ces paradigmes, qui est au centre du Plan d'Action de Lagos (PAL) soutient le modèle de développement autocentré et se structure autour de trois principes à savoir l'autosuffisance nationale, le volontarisme étatique et l'autosuffisance collective. Selon ce paradigme, le processus de développement doit

reposer sur l'utilisation des ressources locales, viser la satisfaction de la demande interne et des besoins essentiels de la population, être impulsé par l'Etat et se réaliser dans le cadre de l'intégration régionale. Le second paradigme, au contraire, privilégie l'initiative privée comme motrice du développement, le marché et les prix comme mécanismes régulateurs et l'ouverture comme condition indispensable d'une croissance auto-entretenue. Dans ces conditions, toute réflexion sur la (ou les) stratégie(s) de développement de l'Afrique subsaharienne pour les prochaines décennies passe par une prise de position en faveur soit du premier paradigme, soit du second, soit de leur dépassement. Cependant, il y a lieu, avant de se prononcer, d'examiner les perspectives que les tendances actuelles ouvrent à l'Afrique subsaharienne.

Les perspectives globales

L'évolution de l'Afrique subsaharienne est certes conditionnée par un certain nombre de contraintes, mais elle est déterminée en dernière instance par les stratégies des acteurs, comme on l'a dit plus haut. Aussi, l'objet des lignes qui suivent est-il non seulement de mettre en évidence les lourdes tendances économiques internes de la région, mais aussi d'explorer les effets possibles de ce qui y constitue la pratique dominante depuis le milieu de la décennie à savoir l'application généralisée des Programme d'Ajustement Structurel (PAS).

La première des tendances lourdes généralement évoquée dans les études prospectives consacrées à l'Afrique concerne les pressions démographiques² repérable à trois niveaux. Il s'agit d'abord de la population globale qui, selon la Banque mondiale³, passerait de 424 millions en l'an 2000. Le taux de croissance démographique passerait quant à lui de 2,7% entre 1965 et 1980 à 3,1% entre 1960 et 1986 et à 3,2% entre 1986 et 2000, l'Afrique subsaharienne détenant toujours le taux le plus élevé de la planète. Ensuite, s'agissant des villes, le taux d'urbanisation passerait de 25% en 1985 à 35,5% en l'an 2000. Enfin, la tendance à l'accroissement de la population rurale va se poursuivre, bien qu'à un rythme moins élevé que dans les villes, avec pour effets la poursuite des courants migratoires, la surexploitation accrue des ressources renouvelables et la dégradation des écosystèmes.

La deuxième tendance a trait à l'évolution des structures productives. En ce qui concerne l'agriculture et l'alimentation, la réduction des déficits actuels supposerait un taux de croissance supérieur à celui de la population (soit 4% au moins), mais une telle croissance n'est possible qu'avec une révolution technique (culture associée, intensification, semences résistantes, révolution verte...) dont la réalisation paraît difficilement envisageable d'ici

2 Cf., par exemple, le numéro spécial de la revue *Afrique Contemporaine* du 2ème trimestre 1988 consacré aux "Afrique en l'an 2000: perspectives économiques".

3 Banque mondiale (1988) - *Rapport sur le Développement dans le Monde*, Washington.

l'an 2000. Sur le plan industriel, il fait signaler l'irréalisme de l'objectif fixé par le PAL qui suppose, pour être atteint, que l'on retrouve les taux de croissance enregistrés dans les années soixante et soixante-dix. Or, ces taux (8 à 9% en moyenne) n'ont été obtenus que grâce à certains facteurs favorables (fort protectionnisme, fortes subventions et financement extérieur élevé) qui sont de plus en plus réduits à l'heure actuelle. Par conséquent, la tendance à la désindustrialisation risque, soit de se poursuivre, soit au mieux de faire place à une faible croissance. En ce qui concerne la structure économique globale, la coexistence de plusieurs modes de régulation (étatique, capitaliste, domestique, marchande simple) pourrait perpétuer la tendance à la fragmentation de l'espace économique et à la désarticulation.

La troisième tendance a trait à l'accroissement des différenciations économiques entre pays africains, des dynamiques différentes se dessinant de plus en plus. On peut en effet entrevoir, avec Philippe Hugon⁴, trois types de dynamiques et classer les pays de la région en trois catégories. D'une part, les pays spécialisés dans les cultures de rente, caractérisés par une forte vulnérabilité vis-à-vis de l'extérieur, une faible importance des firmes transnationales et un blocage structurel de l'accumulation. D'autre part, les pays rentiers disposant de ressources minières ou pétrolières dont les dynamiques sont axées sur les créations et les circulations des rentes. Enfin, les pays marqués par une dynamique d'industrialisation, bénéficiant d'accès privilégiés aux crédits extérieurs, représentant des marchés potentiels ou des lieux d'investissement extérieurs et constituant des pôles régionaux d'accumulation.

La quatrième tendance, relative aux contraintes externes, concerne l'instabilité des recettes d'exportation des pays de la région et la perte progressive des parts de marché pour leurs produits primaires. Il s'en suit une réduction de la capacité interne de financement et un recours accru à l'endettement qui se soldent par le resserrement de la contrainte financière liée au remboursement de la dette.

La cinquième tendance, enfin, se réfère au degré d'insertion de l'Afrique subsaharienne à l'économie mondiale. Sur ce plan, on constate une marginalisation accrue de la région, une déconnexion subie, manifestée par le recul de ses échanges commerciaux avec le reste du monde (Cf. Tableau 1).

En plus de l'influence qu'exerceront les tendances lourdes qui viennent d'être présentées, l'avenir économique de l'Afrique subsaharienne sera sans nul doute très fortement influencé par les mesures d'ajustement mises en œuvre actuellement.

4 Ph. Hugon (1988) - "Quels avenirs économiques pour l'Afrique?", *Afrique contemporaine* No 146 (spécial).

**Tableau 1 - Evolution du Volume des Echanges de l'Afrique subsaharienne, 1973-1987
(Pourcentage moyen de variation annuelle)**

	1973-80	1980-87
Exportation de marchandises	0,1	- 1,6
Exportations de produits manufacturés	5,6	4,7
Exportations de produits de base	- 0,1	- 2,0
Importations de marchandises	7,5	- 6,9

Source: Banque mondiale (1988), Rapport sur le Développement dans le Monde.

En effet, la réorientation des investissements commandée par l'application de la théorie des avantages comparatifs aura pour effet de renforcer la spécialisation primaire de la région. En outre, il est difficile d'imaginer dès à présent les modes de régulation qui découlent de l'accent mis dans les PAS sur la mise en cause des modes étatiques de régulation de l'activité économique en vigueur jusque là et la primauté accordée à l'initiative privée et au mécanisme des prix car, ainsi que le souligne Jean Coussy,

C'est d'une dynamique de conflits ouverts, de résistances cachées, de détournement concret et de bricolages syncrétiques que l'on va, une fois de plus, assister en Afrique subsaharienne⁵.

De même, on peut difficilement prévoir les effets de l'ouverture et de la recherche de "la compétitivité à tout prix" sur des économies qui certes se sont retrouvées en crise en partie au moins à cause de la protection, mais qui ont réalisé, grâce à elle, des taux de croissance significatifs pendant plus d'une décennie.

Au total donc, des perspectives pour le moins incertaines, voire sombres. Cependant, loin de limiter la réflexion à l'analyse des tendances lourdes, ni même à l'exercice prospectif visant la construction d'un scénario volontariste, il y a lieu de la poursuivre par la reformulation de la problématique et l'exploration des alternatives du développement en Afrique subsaharienne. En ce qui concerne la problématique, les questions de fonds sont en réalité aussi vieilles que l'économie du développement. Ce qui est nouveau et qui rend nécessaire leur réformulation, c'est le contexte dans lequel ces questions réapparaissent qui est celui de l'imposition généralisée, sur fond de crise particulièrement profonde, du modèle libéral de développement à l'ensemble des pays de la région. Cette problématique, comme les alternatives du développement, peut se saisir à trois niveaux: celui des priorités, celui des instruments et enfin celui des ressources.

⁵ J. Coussy (1988) - "L'avenir de l'Afrique subsaharienne dans l'économie internationale", *Afrique contemporaine* No 146, op. cit.

Choix des Priorités et Orientation de Développement

Les diagnostics et remèdes proposés, avons-nous dit, sont sous-tendus par deux paradigmes qui s'affrontent. Il convient de préciser ce point pour saisir les termes du débat actuel sur l'orientation et la problématique du développement en Afrique subsaharienne.

En fait d'affrontement, il y a lieu de noter d'abord l'existence, pour les tenants des deux paradigmes, d'un certain nombre de points d'accord quant à la manière d'envisager le développement de l'Afrique subsaharienne. En particulier, en ce qui concerne les objectifs généraux du développement, les théoriciens de l'ouverture conviennent avec ceux du développement auto-centré que ce qui est recherché, c'est avant tout la satisfaction des besoins essentiels du plus grand nombre, la réalisation d'une croissance durable et auto-entretenue indispensable à cette satisfaction, l'accroissement de l'autonomie interne pour les économies et les populations concernées. De plus, s'agissant des activités devant permettre d'atteindre ces objectifs, les uns et les autres s'accordent sur la priorité à accorder à l'agriculture qui occupe trois personnes sur quatre, fournit environ le tiers du Produit Intérieur Brut (PIB) et dont les résultats médiocres sont considérés comme le principal facteur à l'origine de la mauvaise performance économique de la région. Cependant, les divergences apparaissent dès lors qu'il faut aller plus loin dans la définition des modalités de réalisation des objectifs ci-dessus.

Culture vivrière ou cultures d'exportations? C'est le premier point de divergence entre les tenants du développement auto-centré et ceux de l'ouverture. Pour les premiers, la réalisation de l'objectif de l'autosuffisance alimentaire suppose l'orientation prioritaire de l'investissement agricole vers les productions vivrières (céréales, élevage, pêche). Pour les seconds, au contraire, l'accent doit être mis, en priorité, sur les cultures d'exportation car, selon eux, la promotion des exportations agricoles n'entre pas nécessairement en conflit avec l'objectif d'autosuffisance alimentaire et que, même si l'on pouvait prouver que les cultures d'exportation se développent au détriment de la production vivrière, cela ne serait pas forcément un mal. Cette deuxième position mérite d'autant plus qu'on s'y arrête que c'est elle qui est actuellement imposée aux pays de la région par la Banque Mondiale à travers les PAS.

Le programme indication d'action (Banque mondiale, 1981, page 75) souligne en premier lieu que les faits ne confirment pas l'hypothèse selon laquelle l'expansion des cultures d'exportation se traduit par un recul de la production vivrière. Il semble, selon les rédacteurs du programme, que dans la majorité des cas, l'inverse se soit produit, c'est-à-dire que les pays où les cultures de rapport prospéraient, étaient également ceux qui réussissaient le mieux à développer les cultures vivrières. Les auteurs du programme citent, à l'appui de cette thèse, les cas du Mali et du Burkina Faso où la production cotonnière a substantiellement augmenté dans les années soixante-dix et où

les régions spécialisées dans la culture cotonnière sont également grandes productrices de céréales pour le marché. De plus, l'analyse des données globales fournies par la FAO sur quarante pays d'Afrique ainsi que l'étude réalisée par John Cleave⁶ font ressortir une corrélation positive entre ces deux types de production.

Pour les théoriciens et les experts de la Banque mondiale, les cultures d'exportation ont plutôt des effets bénéfiques sur les cultures vivrières car elles sont le noyau autour duquel s'installent les services de vulgarisation, de fourniture de facteurs de production et de commercialisation et elles créent pour les producteurs de denrées vivrières un marché souvent plus sûr et plus stable que les marchés urbains éloignés. Cependant, le principal argument en faveur des cultures d'exportation est, pour la Banque, le fait que la plupart des pays africains ont un avantage comparatif très net dans ce domaine. Dans cette optique, une politique d'autosuffisance basée sur le sacrifice des cultures d'exportation serait coûteux au plan du revenu et, en détournant les ressources disponibles des cultures d'exportation en faveur des cultures vivrières et de la sécurité alimentaire, la baisse des recettes d'exportation peut se solder par des problèmes de balance des paiements de nature à compromettre l'objectif d'autosuffisance lui-même.

En attendant de voir les limites des stratégies de développement basées sur la théorie des avantages comparatifs, on peut faire observer qu'historiquement, la thèse des effets bénéfiques des cultures d'exportation sur les cultures vivrières est contestable. En effet, si cette thèse était valable, on s'expliquerait difficilement les nombreuses famines enregistrées à partir des années soixante-dix, dans les pays du Sahel notamment. La plupart des études consacrées à ce phénomène ont toujours parfaitement montré le lien entre la promotion des exportations agricoles, la régression des cultures vivrières, la désertification et le développement des famines. De plus, même dans les régions où s'effectuent ces cultures d'exportation, les effets de diffusion des techniques et la fourniture des facteurs de production sont très limités. De toute manière, le fait que la tendance à privilégier ce type de cultures soit présente depuis la colonisation n'a pas empêché la dégradation continue de la situation alimentaire. On est donc en droit de douter de l'efficacité d'une stratégie axée sur la promotion des exportations agricoles pour réaliser l'autosuffisance alimentaire.

Dans ces conditions, il semble plus judicieux de privilégier les cultures destinées à satisfaire directement les besoins alimentaires des populations, sans exclure pour autant les opportunités de revenu offertes par les exportations. En clair, il s'agit d'accorder la priorité aux cultures vivrières et de

6 John H. Cleave (1974) - *African Farmers: Labor Use in the Development of Smallholder Agriculture*, New York, Praeger.

développer en même temps les cultures d'exportation en tenant compte des possibilités qu'offre, à chaque période, le marché mondial. Evidemment, une telle orientation suppose, pour être concrétisée, qu'un certain nombre de conditions politiques soient réunies.

Spécialisation primaire ou remplacement des importations industrielles? C'est le second point de désaccord entre les tenants des deux paradigmes. Pour les théoriciens de l'ouverture, la disponibilité des terres cultivables lorsqu'on considère l'ensemble de la région, le fait que les trois quarts de la population vivent en milieu rural et le climat constituent les trois facteurs qui sont à la base de l'avantage comparatif que possède l'Afrique subsaharienne dans certaines productions (café, cacao, bananes, etc) et qui impliquent sa spécialisation agricole. En y ajoutant le fait que le continent africain est considéré comme l'une des plus grandes réserves mondiales de richesses minérales, il s'en suit que ses possibilités de croissance et de développement se trouvent dans la spécialisation primaire. Dès lors, la question de l'industrialisation est reléguée à l'arrière plan: la stratégie proposée par la Banque Mondiale, par exemple, se limite à un processus de restructuration industrielle consistant essentiellement à transformer sur place certaines matières premières et à promouvoir les Petites et Moyennes Entreprises. Les adeptes de l'autocentrage quant à eux, tout en accordant la priorité à l'agriculture, insistent sur sa nécessaire intégration à l'industrie, notamment par la création d'unités de production situées en amont et en aval de celle-ci.

Les limites de ces deux stratégies sont bien connues. La stratégie de la spécialisation internationale et la théorie des avantages comparatifs dont elle découle rencontrent d'abord une limite théorique tenant à la contradiction entre l'hypothèse d'une spécialité des dotations nationales en facteurs de production et celle de la concurrence pure et parfaite, cette dernière supposant, en effet, que la mobilité des facteurs de production suivant leur rémunération devrait aboutir à une dotation factorielle identique d'un pays à l'autre. Deuxièmement, l'instabilité des marchés des matières premières rend aléatoires et précaires les revenus attendus de telles exportations. Troisièmement, face aux aléas des marchés mondiaux, s'il est facile à un constructeur d'automobiles de se reconvertis dans la production de micro-ordinateurs, la spécialisation est pratiquement irréversible pour le producteur de café ou de cacao. Quatrièmement, si le pays qui se spécialise dans la production d'automobiles utilise une main-d'œuvre très spécialisée et voit se créer des grappes d'industries en amont comme la sidérurgie et de sous-traitance comme les industries électriques, les industries des plastiques, etc., le pays qui se spécialise dans la production de café a peu de chance de voir se créer des industries en amont et en aval des plantations. Cinquièmement, enfin, la liberté du commerce international n'est qu'illusoire puisque, comme le reconnaît la Banque Mondiale qui plaide pour la libéralisation des échanges, la

menace du protectionnisme est permanente et on assiste depuis quelques années à une montée du protectionnisme sous forme de barrière non tarifaire⁷.

En ce qui concerne la stratégie de substitution aux importations, son application dans de nombreux pays a révélé trois limites essentielles.

En premier lieu, il s'est avéré que cette stratégie avait pour effet immédiat d'accroître le déficit de la balance des paiements et donc la dépendance financière, du fait de l'importation des biens d'équipement.

En second lieu, son application s'est traduite le plus souvent par une forte dépendance technologique, les pays concernés étant obligés d'acheter très cher des technologies sophistiquées qu'ils ne maîtrisent pas.

Troisièmement, les effets d'entraînement restent le plus souvent très limités tant en amont qu'en aval du processus de production, du fait des déficiences de la demande globale (marché national trop faible pour assurer les débouchés à une industrie naissante) et des distorsions opérées par la protection douanière. Une solution aux limites de la substitution aux importations pourrait être l'intégration régionale qui permettrait l'élargissement du marché et les économies d'échelle, mais la concrétisation de cette intégration est longue, difficile et incertaine.

Compte tenu des limites qui viennent d'être présentées, quelle orientation retenir? D'abord, éviter les solutions extrémistes et exclusives: ni l'ouverture et la spécialisation totales, ni l'introversion à tout pris. La promotion des exportations est nécessaire, ne serait-ce que pour financer l'importation de certains biens indispensables et non encore produits dans la région comme les biens d'équipement. Mais celle-ci doit s'appuyer sur une analyse "plus cohérente et plus imaginative"⁸ permettant d'identifier les possibilités les moins défavorables telles que le rétablissement de productions traditionnelles qui se sont effondrées (par exemple, le cacao au Ghana, la noix d'acajou en Tanzanie, le cuivre en Zambie), la préservation des parts de marché existantes ou la reconquête de celles qui ont été perdues, l'exploitation de nouvelles ressources naturelles (comme le gaz naturel et ses sous-produits au Nigéria et au Cameroun, la pâte à papier en Tanzanie, les gisements aurifères réévalués au Zimbabwe, le charbon au Botswana et au Mozambique) et le développement de nouvelles productions agricoles dont les perspectives de débouchés sont raisonnables. Une analyse tout aussi systématique des possibilités de remplacement des importations s'impose, notamment en ce qui concerne les produits de grande consommation obtenus grâce aux industries agricoles et alimentaires, les combustibles et l'énergie de type commercial, les matériaux de construction, etc. Il s'agit donc de mettre en œuvre

7 Banque mondiale (1987) - *Rapport sur le Développement dans le Monde*, Washington.

8 R.H. Green (1985) - "Réflexions sur l'état de nos connaissances et les moyens d'une progression, in Tore Rose, *Afrique subsaharienne: de la Crise au Redressement*, Paris, OCDE.

des politiques de "protection relative et sélective"⁹ permettant à la fois la survie des secteurs économiques vitaux, le développement de certaines activités à l'abri des influences immédiates du marché mondial et l'exploitation des opportunités offertes par ce même marché.

Il convient, ensuite, d'avoir constamment en vue le fait que les activités sélectionnées ou à retenir doivent s'orienter prioritairement, comme le souligne Gérard Grellet¹⁰, vers la satisfaction des besoins essentiels de la population et la création d'emplois, car la croissance, l'accumulation du capital et l'industrialisation n'ont de sens, dans le contexte actuel des pays sous-développés et surtout de l'Afrique subsaharienne, que par rapport à cet objectif premier du développement.

Régulation et Management du Développement

L'opposition entre adeptes de l'autocentrage et partisans du libéralisme est encore plus marquée lorsqu'il s'agit de définir les fonctions et rôles des différents acteurs dans la régulation de la croissance et du développement. Sur ce plan, l'offensive est principalement menée par les défenseurs du courant libéral contre les effets de ce qu'ils appellent le "dogme dirigiste" sur l'efficacité de l'affectation des ressources.

Le Choix des Instruments

La problématique de la croissance se structure essentiellement, en Afrique subsaharienne comme ailleurs, autour de la question du rôle de l'Etat non seulement dans la définition des règles de comportement des différents agents, mais aussi dans sa participation directe à l'activité économique, ces deux aspects donnant lieu à une double interrogation. En outre, la prise en compte de la dimension internationale de cette régulation soulève une troisième question.

Entreprise publique ou initiative privée? Dès leur accession à l'indépendance, la plupart des pays d'Afrique subsaharienne ont donné la priorité à la construction des Etats-Nations dans un double but politique (conquérir l'espace, assurer la défense extérieure, maintenir les frontières héritées de la colonisation, réaliser des équilibrages ethniques et régionaux assurant l'unité nationale) et économique (création et distribution des rentes, accumulation, industrialisation protégée, gestion des prélevements sur l'agriculture). La réalisation de l'objectif économique a conduit les dirigeants africains,

9 Les idées exprimées dans cette partie tirent beaucoup des discussions auxquelles nous avons pris part en 1987 et 1988 au sein du groupe de recherche ROSA (Recherche sur l'Ouverture, la Stratification et l'Accumulation) de l'IEDES (Université de Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne).

10 G. Grellet (1987) - "Stratégies d'Industrialisation pour l'Afrique noire". Communication au Colloque ORSTOM *Economie Industrielle et Stratégies d'Industrialisation dans le Tiers Monde*, Paris.

quelles que soient leurs options politiques, à constituer, par création ou par nationalisation, de nombreuses entreprises publiques ou para-publiques. Le rôle prépondérant de l'Etat dans la réalisation des activités économiques a constamment été souligné, notamment dans le PAL, compte tenu de l'intérêt relativement faible manifesté par les investisseurs étrangers pour la région.

Tout autre est la conception d'organismes comme le FMI et la Banque Mondiale pour qui le secteur para-public doit, sinon être réduit à la réalisation d'un minimum d'activités (celles qui ne peuvent pas être effectuées par le secteur privé), du moins, être réformé dans sa structure et son fonctionnement. Dans cette optique, l'actualité économique, la croissance et le développement doivent être avant tout le fait de l'initiative privée, en Afrique subsaharienne comme partout ailleurs.

Cette position est à mettre en rapport avec le premier postulat de l'économie libérale qui a trait au comportement des agents. Ainsi, s'appuyant sur des études empiriques menées dans différentes parties du globe, Deepak Lal¹¹, par exemple, affirme que les individus isolés sans instruction, qu'il s'agisse de paysans, de migrants des zones rurales vers les zones urbaines, d'ouvriers des villes, d'entrepreneurs privés ou de ménagères, sont tous des producteurs et des consommateurs qui agissent économiquement. Ces individus réagissent aux variations des prix relatifs conformément à ce que prévoit la théorie néo-classique. De ce fait, le principe de la rationalité économique s'applique aussi bien aux pays développés qu'aux pays sous-développés puisque les pauvres sont peut-être plus incités à trouver un moyen d'améliorer leur sort que les riches. De plus, il n'y a aucune raison de considérer que les préférences des travailleurs du tiers monde sont particulières car, plus riches, ces travailleurs chercheront, comme leurs homologues des pays développés, à accroître leur temps de loisir. En outre, les caractéristiques institutionnelles du Tiers Monde (structures sociales et agraires ou systèmes de crédit non officiels apparemment usuraires) ne sont pas nécessairement un obstacle à l'efficacité et à la croissance dans la mesure où elles s'adaptent, bon an mal an, aux risques et aux incertitudes propres à un environnement économique donné. Enfin, la thèse néo-classique relative aux possibilités d'interchanger certains facteurs dans la production est parfaitement valable dans les pays du Tiers Monde, la mesure dans laquelle différents facteurs et produits peuvent se substituer les uns aux autres dans la production ne variant guère des pays développés aux pays sous-développés.

Les implications stratégiques de cette conception pour l'Afrique subsaharienne sont faciles à imaginer. Pour la Banque mondiale, par exemple, si l'on veut assurer la croissance agricole par la promotion des exportations, la

11 Deepak Lal (1985) - "Les Erreurs de l'Economie du Développement", *Finances et Développement*, juin 1985, Volume 22, No2.

primauté doit être accordée aux petits exploitants, puis aux grandes exploitations privées et aux sociétés d'économie mixte, les grandes exploitations gérées par l'Etat devant être, soit privatisées, soit liquidées. De même, au niveau de la commercialisation des produits agricoles et de la fourniture des facteurs de production, la préférence de la Banque va vers les petits commerçants privés et leur regroupement en coopératives. Enfin, sur le plan industriel, la Banque insiste sur le développement de l'esprit d'entreprise et la promotion des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises dont les potentialités en matière de croissance, d'emploi, de productivité et d'efficacité dans l'utilisation des ressources semblent plus élevées par rapport aux grandes entreprises.

La conception libérale et ses implications appellent les remarques suivantes. En premier lieu, nulle part dans le monde les individus ne vivent ni n'agissent isolément. La part du comportement ou les actes individuels échappant à la détermination sociale sont négligeables. La rationalité collective détermine nécessairement les préférences individuelles. Même enfermé dans une logique purement économique, le paysan africain, comme l'entrepreneur américain, ne cherche pas forcément à maximiser le profit. Dans certaines circonstances, la maximisation de la sécurité peut être préférée à la maximisation du profit. Si tel n'était pas le cas, on comprendrait difficilement certains comportements qui, considérés dans une optique strictement économique, sont souvent qualifiés d'irrationnels. En second lieu, la condamnation des entreprises publiques s'appuie sur une conception étiquetée de leur rôle. En effet, bien que le souci d'accumulation du capital ait souvent été mis en avant au moment de la constitution de ces entreprises, leur fonction sociale réelle dépasse largement cet objectif car elles servent davantage des objectifs d'emplois, de clientélisme politique et, accessoirement, d'indépendance économique nationale¹². Ce fait, combiné avec l'absence de repreneurs nationaux et étrangers explique les nombreuses tergiversations des autorités locales lorsqu'il s'agit de privatiser, malgré les injonctions du FMI et de la Banque mondiale.

Cependant, la croissance et l'accumulation étant indispensables à la satisfaction des besoins essentiels et à l'amélioration des conditions de vie des populations, il y a lieu d'agir sur deux fronts. D'une part définir des normes de conciliation de la rentabilité sociale et de la rentabilité économique et financière des entreprises publiques. D'autre part, promouvoir l'initiative privée par la réforme des politiques d'incitation. A travers ces deux options, c'est toute la question du mode de régulation approprié qui est posée.

12 P. Jacquemot (1988) - "La déséatisation en Afrique subsaharienne: enjeux et perspectives", Colloque GREITD. sur *les Politiques d'Ajustement Economique et Recompositions sociales dans le Tiers Monde*, Paris.

Marché ou Etat? C'est le second point d'attaque du dogme dirigiste par les libéraux qui condamnent les interventions de l'Etat dans la régulation de l'activité économique. Ces interventions qui revêtent plusieurs formes (contrôle du commerce extérieur, licences industrielles, contrôle des prix sous diverses formes, financement inflationniste des déficits budgétaires, etc.) sont, du fait de nombreuses distorsions qu'elles engendrent, qualifiées d'irrationnelles et considérées comme les causes premières de la crise actuelle. La condamnation de l'interventionnisme étatique a pour corollaire l'apologie du marché et du mécanisme des prix considéré comme l'un des mécanismes sociaux les plus utiles et les moins coûteux de transmission de l'information et de coordination des actions d'un grand nombre de sujets économiques interdépendants.

Or, comme le souligne Gérard Grellet, dans les économies du Tiers Monde, les mécanismes du marché sont le plus souvent défaillants¹³. En effet, ces économies, plus que celles de pays industrialisés, se caractérisent par l'absence de concurrence. Du fait de l'exiguïté des marchés nationaux, le nombre d'offreurs et de demandeurs est réduit. En particulier, dans les économies à forte protection douanière, les firmes industrielles jouissent de situation monopolistique. De plus, l'absence d'informations et de moyens de communication réduit les possibilités de concurrence.

Cependant, pour les partisans du libéralisme, les défaillances du marché ne peuvent suffire à justifier l'interventionnisme étatique pour deux raisons. Premièrement, l'imperfection des marchés n'est pas une spécificité des pays du Tiers Monde. Deuxièmement, dans une économie de marché nécessairement imparfaite, il n'y a aucune raison de croire que des politiques dirigistes accroîtront le bien-être économique, celles-ci pouvant même être "plus néfastes dans leurs conséquences que le laissez faire"¹⁴. Aussi, proposent-ils un programme de libéralisation s'articulant autour de trois grands chapitres à savoir le désengagement de l'Etat vis-à-vis des activités économiques, la redéfinition de son rôle et l'instauration de marchés concurrentiels.

S'agissant du rôle de l'Etat, la Banque mondiale par exemple réduit celui-ci aux trois priorités suivantes¹⁵: en premier lieu, instituer des règles du jeu claires, équitables et fermes; de deuxièmement, s'assurer que les services d'infrastructure sont efficace et fonctionnent convenablement sans que l'Etat doive nécessairement les fournir lui-même; enfin, influer sur le fonctionnement des marchés - par exemple pour prévenir les abus, améliorer la protection sociale, agir sur l'investissement et la production.

13 G. Grellet (1986) - *Structures et Stratégies du Développement Economique*, Paris, PUF, page 145.

14 D. Lal (1985), op. cit..

15 Banque mondiale (1988), op. cit. page 88.

Quant aux prescriptions relatives à l'instauration des marchés concurrentiels, elles se résument à l'élimination du contrôle exercé par l'Etat sur les prix, les salaires, les taux d'intérêt et les investissements, la suppression des subventions et la création des marchés des valeurs mobilières; les buts recherchés étant de stimuler la concurrence, de favoriser la mobilité des ressources et une meilleure circulation de l'information.

Une critique de fond peut-être faite à l'option en faveur des marchés concurrentiels et de la régulation par les prix. Dans la mesure où une telle option s'inscrit nécessairement dans une stratégie d'ouverture sur l'extérieur, il faut tenir compte des effets exercés par la dynamique de l'économie mondiale sur les marchés internes. Or, la quasi totalité des pays d'Afrique subsaharienne sont des mono-exportateurs primaires contraints d'ajuster leurs agrégats économiques et d'allouer leurs facteurs de production suivant les indications d'un prix imposé par le marché mondial. Le principe de la concurrence est d'autant plus faussé au plan interne que les ajustements imposés par les marchés mondiaux ne correspondent pas au rapport entre l'offre et la demande nationales. De plus, la concurrence est déjà faussée au niveau mondial puisque les prix mondiaux de certains produits alimentaires par exemple (blé, riz, maïs) ne reflètent pas les conditions réelles de production de ces biens mais constituent plutôt des prix de liquidation des excédents fournis par les systèmes agricoles d'Amérique du Nord et d'Europe.

Par conséquent, une régulation automatique de la croissance et du développement ne peut être attendue de l'instauration de marchés concurrentiels et du mécanisme des prix. La stimulation de la concurrence et l'instauration des prix incitatifs sont certes nécessaires pour améliorer les performances des entreprises tant publiques que privées. Mais, à défaut d'une libéralisation totale au niveau planétaire, l'Etat doit jouer un rôle bien plus important que celui auquel voudraient le réduire les partisans du libéralisme.

Compétitivité extérieure ou intégration régionale? Dans la conception libérale, la nécessité de l'ouverture découle du postulat selon lequel le marché est d'autant plus efficace dans l'allocation optimale des ressources qu'il est étendu. La seule possibilité qu'a une économie de reculer les limites du marché national est de s'intégrer au marché mondial. Mais cette intégration n'est bénéfique sur le plan de la croissance que si l'économie en question est compétitive. La compétitivité sur les marchés mondiaux repose sur cinq facteurs: le coût des matières premières, la disponibilité d'infrastructures, les économies d'échelle, la capacité de mettre en oeuvre de nouvelles technologies et les faibles coûts de la main-d'œuvre. Or ces facteurs sont rarement disponibles dans les pays d'Afrique subsaharienne: seuls quelques uns disposent de matières premières en abondance, les infrastructures de recherche sont souvent inexistantes, la faible taille des marchés nationaux interdit l'exploitation d'économies d'échelle préalablement à l'exportation, les coûts de la main-d'œuvre peuvent être élevés du fait de l'absence de techniciens lo-

caux et de la nécessité de recourir à des expatriés. L'un des principaux objectifs des PAS est précisément de rendre ces économies compétitives.

A l'inverse, les dirigeants africains misent sur l'exploitation des complémentarités régionales et l'harmonisation des politiques nationales pour réaliser une croissance durable. La nécessité de renforcer les organisations économiques régionales et d'accélérer le processus d'intégration économique de la région trouve là sa justification. Malheureusement, force est de constater que les expériences d'intégration amorcées dès le début des indépendances, malgré quelques progrès enregistrés vers l'élimination des obstacles non tarifaires aux échanges et notamment des restrictions quantitatives, ont été marquées jusqu'ici par des résultats insignifiants. En effet, que ce soit au niveau de la Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO), de la Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CDEAO), de l'Union Douanière des Etats d'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC), de la Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL) ou de la Communauté Economique des Etats d'Afrique Central (CEEAC), il n'y a ni spécialisation par produits ou gammes de produits, ni échanges au sein d'une branche d'activité donnée.

L'harmonisation industrielle a brillé jusqu'à présent par son absence: les unités de production se font double emploi et la production s'effectue sur une échelle plus petite que ne le permettraient l'importance et la structure du marché régional. Ainsi les avantages résultant de l'intégration sont-ils perdus, avantages qui découleraient de la spécialisation et de l'exportation d'économie d'échelle¹⁶.

Face à cette évolution, et l'intégration étant nécessairement un processus à très long terme, on peut se demander si les divers organismes de coopération mis en place ont contribué de quelque manière que ce soit au développement des pays de la région. D'autre part, les doubles emplois observés soulèvent une autre interrogation; existe-t-il réellement des complémentarités entre les économies de la région ou sont-elles plutôt concurrentes dans la mesure où elles présentent pratiquement la même structuration? Si c'était le cas, c'est toute l'approche en terme d'intégration qui serait en cause. Il y a donc lieu de poursuivre la réflexion sur les conditions d'une intégration efficace.

La Mobilisation des Ressources

Sur ce plan également, il existe des divergences entre l'OUA et ce qu'on pourrait appeler la communauté financière internationale; mais celles-ci ne se réfèrent plus nécessairement aux paradigmes évoqués plus haut. En outre, la plupart des travaux effectués et des débats menés sur ce sujet portent

16 P. Robson (1985) - "L'intégration régionale: résultats et priorités en ce qui concerne plus particulièrement l'Afrique occidentale", in T. ROSE, *Afrique Subsaharienne: de la Crise au Redressement*, op. cit.

souvent sur les problèmes financiers, ce qui pousserait à penser soit que la mobilisation des ressources humaines va de soi et ne pose pas de problème particulier, soit qu'il y a un consensus sur la façon de réaliser cette mobilisation, soit enfin que les problèmes qu'elle pose sont secondaires. Examinons successivement ces deux volets.

Comment desserrer la contrainte financière? Cette question est souvent placée au centre des discussions dans les instances internationales. La raison tient à l'aggravation des problèmes d'endettement depuis le début de la décennie. Bien que la dette de l'Afrique subsaharienne soit négligeable en valeur absolue, en comparaison de celle de certains pays d'Amérique latine, elle n'en est pas moins préoccupante dans la mesure où elle représentait en 1986 entre 24% du PNB au Rwanda et 240,5% en Zambie alors que ce pourcentage variait entre 37,6% au Brésil et 120,1% au Chili.

Pour remédier à la crise de l'endettement, les pays africains, comme l'ensemble des pays du Tiers Monde suggèrent, soit l'annulation pure et simple de la dette, soit l'allégement global de celle-ci. Pour la communauté financière internationale (Club de Paris, Club de Londres, FMI, Banque mondiale) au contraire, les modalités de règlement de la dette doivent être définies cas par cas. Ainsi, en ce qui concerne l'Afrique subsaharienne, la Banque mondiale distingue-t-il deux groupes de pays, d'une part, les pays à faible revenu bénéficiaires des concours de l'Association Internationale de Développement lourdement endettés (c'est-à-dire dont le ratio service de la dette avant rééchelonnement/exportations devrait se situer entre 25% et 109% entre 1988-90, la moyenne étant de 48%) et d'autre part, les pays à revenu intermédiaire fortement endettés. Pour les pays du premier groupe, les solutions préconisées pour réduire l'endettement et accroître les flux de financement générateurs de croissance sont constituées par les mesures libérales d'allégement des dettes, l'accroissement des flux d'aide concessionnelle émanant de la Banque, le développement du co-financement des programmes d'ajustement et l'augmentation du montant des ressources disponibles au titre de la facilité d'ajustement structurel du FMI. Pour les pays à revenu intermédiaire, le desserrement de la contrainte financière passe par l'adoption de mesures de politique économique visant à accroître les exportations.

Donc, pour les uns, des mesures d'allégement de la dette complétées par une aide concessionnelle au développement et pour les autres, le remboursement de la dette par l'accroissement des exportations attendu de la mise en œuvre des programmes d'ajustement structurel. Sans être un remède définitif, l'allégement de la dette, dans la mesure où il s'accompagne d'une augmentation de l'aide concessionnelle, peut effectivement soulager les pays à faible revenu et leur permettre de retrouver une certaine croissance. Par contre, les pays à revenu intermédiaire risquent de voir leur dette se renfor-

cer compte tenu de l'incertitude qui pèse sur la réalisation des objectifs de l'ajustement structurel.

D'une manière générale, le desserrement de la contrainte financière passe par l'augmentation de l'épargne interne qui ne peut être obtenue que si les ressources disponibles sont affectées à la réalisation des projets économiquement rentables ou des projets sociaux susceptibles de contribuer à l'amélioration de la productivité (santé, éducation par exemple). En outre, si les statistiques officielles laissent apparaître, pour l'Afrique subsaharienne, un niveau d'épargne particulièrement faible comparativement aux pays industriels et à l'ensemble des pays sous-développés (Cf. tableau 2), il y a tout lieu de croire, compte tenu des dépenses de prestige, de nombreux gaspillages observés et du dynamisme des formes non institutionnelles d'épargne, qu'il existe d'importants surplus utilisables. Tout le problème est de mettre au point les mécanismes de mobilisation de cette épargne potentielle.

Tableau 2 - Niveau d'Epargne en pourcentage du PIB (1980-1987)

	1980	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Afrique subsaharienne	16,7	8,5	8,5	10,2	7,6	10,9
Tous pays en développement	23,4	20,3	21,4	21,3	21,5	23,6
Pays industriels	22,7	20,3	21,3	20,7	21,2	22,0

Source: Banque Mondiale (1988), Rapport sur le Développement dans le Monde.

Qu'est-ce que l'auto-développement? Les dirigeants africains ont affirmé, en adoptant le Plan d'Action de Lagos, la nécessité de réaliser un développement autocentré, basé sur l'autosuffisance nationale et l'autonomie collective. Cet objectif semble de plus en plus irréalisable avec l'aggravation de la crise. Le FMI et la Banque mondiale affirment quant à eux que la façon la plus sûre de conquérir l'autonomie c'est de s'ouvrir totalement au marché mondial. Cependant, l'issue des programmes mis en oeuvre à cet effet est incertaine. Enfin, les populations, lassées par la succession de promesses non tenues par les dirigeants et par l'application des mesures contraignantes contenues dans les PAS, se sont confinées dans des stratégies de survie.

Dans ces conditions, est-il encore possible d'amener ces populations à croire au développement et à mobiliser leurs énergies à cette fin?

La réponse à cette question sera nécessairement négative si l'on continue à privilégier la croissance et la répartition inégalitaire des revenus, les mécanismes du marché, le souci d'indépendance nationale, ces thèmes ayant perdu leur puissance mobilisatrice du début des indépendances.

Par contre, si la pratique des dirigeants, et non pas simplement leur discours, vise en permanence à faire en sorte qu'une partie sans cesse croissante de la population puisse manger à sa faim, être soignée en cas de maladie, disposer d'un toit en dur, avoir accès à l'eau potable et apprendre à lire

et à écrire, il y a de fortes chances que cette population puisse se sentir concernée par le développement.

Cependant, il faut souligner que dans cette optique, le développement est avant tout, pour les principes concernés, un processus autonome, un auto-développement. En ce sens, il suppose une auto-finalisation, c'est-à-dire une relative autonomie dans la définition des objectifs et la prise de décision. L'exercice de cette autonomie suppose à son tour la participation démocratique des principaux bénéficiaires du développement aux diverses instances de définition des objectifs et de prise de décision.

En conséquence, la mobilisation aux fins de développement des populations qui représentent à la fois la première des ressources et les principaux bénéficiaires de ce processus suppose de la part des dirigeants une prédisposition d'abandonner certaines des prérogatives liées à leur situation, une décentralisation du pouvoir de décision.

Conclusion

S'il fallait résumer la pratique du développement observée en Afrique subsaharienne pendant les années quatre-vingt, on pourrait retenir la formule suivante: "ouverte avec l'affirmation par les dirigeants africains de la nécessité d'une déconnexion voulue, l'actuelle décennie s'achève par la crainte d'une déconnexion subie". Cette crainte résulte non seulement des tendances enregistrées au cours de la période mais aussi des sombres perspectives qui semblent s'offrir à la région pour la prochaine décennie.

L'avenir économique de l'Afrique subsaharienne sera sans nul doute fortement influencé par les réformes en cours initiées par le FMI et la Banque mondiale. L'issue des PAS étant incertaine et, compte tenu des difficultés rencontrées par les dirigeants africains dans la réalisation de l'autocentrage, il nous a semblé nécessaire, dans la recherche d'une stratégie alternative, d'éviter les solutions extrémistes.

Néanmoins, une conviction s'est renforcée quant à l'orientation du développement et au mode de régulation du processus en question; le choix des activités à promouvoir doit se faire prioritairement en vue de satisfaire les besoins essentiels d'une partie sans cesse croissante de la population, ce qui n'est possible qu'avec la participation effective des principaux concernés à la définition des objectifs et à la prise de décision.

Book Reviews

The History and Structure of African Poverty - John Illife, *The African Poor, A History*, Cambridge University, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 387.

Tayambe Zeleza*

The 1980s have not been kind to Africa. The continent has been ravaged by economic, social and political tribulations. The euphoria of the 1960s, that heady independence decade, has all but vanished, and the pessimism of the 1970s, once confined to the radicals, has now become commonplace. Scholars have not been immune from the crisis bug. The 'crisis' has become the central problematic of African studies. Scholars using widely differing paradigms have been trying to explain the causes and nature of the crisis and to devise solutions. Now historians have entered the fray. This should not be surprising. "All history", Croce the Italian philosopher and historian once said, "is contemporary history".

A moment of crisis offers both opportunity and danger, opportunity to chart new directions, and the danger that past achievements may be permanently eroded. The present crisis has presented historians with both the opportunity to ask new questions about the past, and the danger of resurrecting historiographical shibboleths. In this book Illife has seized the opportunity, but in the end he is buried under the ideological weight of imperialist historiography, which was once dominant before Africa's independence.

Independence in Africa was accompanied by the rise and triumph of nationalist historiography, which held sway until the early 1970s. One of the major weaknesses of the new historiography was that it ignored the poor, those 'masses' of the nationalist demagogues. From the early 1970s, the dependency approach gained popularity. It sought to bring the 'people' back to the historical centre stage, but not as actors, rather as eternal victims of exploitation and repression at the hands of the world capitalist system. The nationalist historians ignored poverty in their search for great states in pre-colonial Africa and celebration of the activities of the nationalist heroes during the colonial period. For their part, the dependency historians subsumed poverty under the dialectic of the development of underdevelopment.

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Illife seeks to challenge both approaches. His central thesis is that structural poverty in Africa, as he calls it, has not changed at all from the pre-colonial to the colonial and independence periods. In other words, Africans have always been poor throughout their history. If that is so, then poverty in contemporary Africa cannot and should not be blamed on colonialism and capitalist exploitation as the radicals maintain, nor indeed can it be attributed to the weather or population growth or to the incompetence of African governments. No poverty in Africa is a primordial condition, obvious to the movement of time and the organization of space.

Illife contends that poverty has afflicted most Africans at most times. It is this omnipresence of poverty that makes Africa unique and fascinating. 'Africa's splendour', he enthuses, 'lies in its suffering'. The heroism of African history is to be found not in the deeds of kings but in the struggles of ordinary people against the forces of nature and the cruelty of men. Likewise, the most noble European activities in Africa have been by those - often now forgotten - who have cared for the sick and starving and homeless' (p.1). Illife's history of the African poor is a story of indigent Africans. and charitable Europeans.

Illife's perspective bears uncanny resemblance to imperialist historiography, in which Africa, the 'dark continent', was seen as a continent stuck in a moribund state of nature, populated by a primitive race wallowed in depravity, cruelty and poverty. In contrast, European adventurers in Africa were portrayed as harbingers of progress, and colonialism was celebrated as a 'civilizing mission'.

We are told in this book that there was a scarcity of formal institutions dealing with poverty in pre-colonial Africa. The first European visitors were anxious not to be overwhelmed by the African poor. 'This they attempted', Illife writes, 'by introducing poor relief institutions from their own countries, so that sub-saharan Africa - itself so lacking in formal institutions - now experienced early modern Europe's diverse approaches to poverty' (p. 95). To eulogize Portuguese and Dutch relief to the poor, as Illife does in chapter 7, when the Portuguese were busy plundering Africa and carting away shiploads of slaves and when the Dutch were decimating the Khoisan and other Africans through commando raids and disease epidemics, is the height of historical perfidy. The missionaries come from Illife's deodorized story as paragons of virtue, humanism and boundless charity. Forgotten are their seedy activities as employers of forced labour, grabbers of land, racist ideologues and accomplices of colonial conquerors.

There are other affinities between Illife's book and imperialist historiography. Like imperial historians who were anxious to divorce North Africa, and especially Egypt, from the rest of Africa lest the continent exhibited some light of civilization, Illife's Africa excludes North Africa and is confined to 'sub-saharan' Africa, a designation of little analytical and historical

value given the fact of not only extensive and intensive contacts among African societies across the desert, as has been amply demonstrated in UNESCO's eight-volume *General History of Africa*, but also the 'Africanness' of ancient Egypt itself. As Martin Bernal has shown in his remarkable book, *Black Athena*, it was not until the early 19th century that the ancient model which depicted Egypt as African was overthrown by the Aryan model which not only sought to underplay Egypt's Africanness, but also to deny its achievements and contributions to Greece, the cradle of European civilization.

Also, as in much imperialist historiography, in Illife's book, Europe is used as the yardstick against which to judge Africa. The alleged scarcity of formal charitable or poverty relief institutions in Africa is a case in point. Such institutions are defined from the context of European history. Their scarcity in Africa leads Illife to make the untenable conclusion that care for the poor in pre-colonial Africa was poorly developed as compared to Europe. A more careful historian would have sought to analyze systematically institutions and networks of poverty alleviation in the pre-colonial era, as has indeed been done by some historians with reference to the problem of food shortage and hunger.

Then there is the question of sources. One of the methodological fortés of nationalist historiography lay in its discovery of oral tradition. Illife makes no use of oral tradition, whose impressions of poverty, he avers, can be misleading. His study has also not used 'unpublished sources surviving in Africa. It rests largely on published sources and certain documents available in Europe' (p.3). The problem of sources cannot be underestimated. But that does not call for an excessive reliance on European adventurers for descriptions of poverty in Africa as Illife tends to do. Many of these descriptions, moreover, are taken from the travelogues of 19th century adventurers, most of whom were unrepentant imperialists and racists, to whom 'savage' and 'backward' Africa was only good for European colonization. It should no longer be permissible for major sections of African history to be known largely by what exploiters and oppressors have said or permitted to be said. Their documents hardly tell us how the Africans themselves viewed poverty. In relying on such sources, Illife has failed to decipher the differentiated meaning of poverty to different peoples in different societies and at different moments in time. It is not enough to throw in one or two words used to describe poverty in a particular African society and make generalizations about the nature of poverty across the width and breadth of Africa.

What, indeed, is poverty? Poverty may be interpreted objectively or subjectively, in economic and material terms or in non-economic and non-material terms. The objective interpretation would emphasize the extent to which the physiological needs of such things as food, clothing, shelter, water and sanitation are met to prevent ill-health undernourishment and the like. The ques-

tion would then be what is adequate and who determines that? The subjective interpretation would emphasize the satisfaction of people's wants as perceived by the people themselves in any given society at a particular point in time. A non-economic and non-material interpretation would emphasize the socio-political content of poverty by considering such issues as the mechanisms of individual and group participation in the economic and political process. A comprehensive theory of poverty would have to combine all these elements and also be cognizant of the fact that both absolute and relative poverty change with changing historical conditions.

This is where Illife's book ultimately fails. It does not give us a comprehensive definition of what is meant by poverty. By poverty Illife seems to mean physical want and incapacitation. Illife's poor are generally the sick, epitomized by victims of leprosy. Leprosy is even given its own chapter (Chapter 12), which makes quite interesting reading. But there is a danger of making poverty conterminous with disease. While it is true that disease generally discriminates against the poor, there are also diseases which favour the rich or come with increased affluence. In any case, the eradication of disease need not entail the eradication of poverty. Disease aetiology is much as biological as it is a social phenomenon, and the ability or failure to cure it should be sought within both the therapeutic and social system. In the case of leprosy, as Illife himself notes, modern understanding of this disease only dates from the late 19th century, and the nature of the disease is still not fully understood up till now. The case for making it the barometer of African poverty is therefore rather dubious.

Illife's thesis rests on a distinction which is made between structural and conjunctural poverty. Structural poverty refers to 'the long-term poverty of individuals due to their personal or social circumstances, and conjunctural poverty,... is the temporary poverty into which ordinary self-sufficient people may be thrown by crisis' (p. 4). The dichotomization between 'structure' and 'conjuncture' is too contrived. Conjunctural poverty, to use Illife's terminology, has structural underpinnings, and, in turn, structural poverty is a cumulative process of conjunctural poverty. In short, poverty is an integral part of the social process; Thus to argue that structural poverty in Africa has remained the same throughout the centuries to the present is tantamount to saying that the social process has remained unchanged, which is of course untrue.

Illife also contends that there is a distinction 'between the structural poverty characteristic of societies with relatively ample resources, especially land, and that characteristic of societies where such resources are scarce. In land-rich societies the very poor are characterized by those who lack access to labour needed to exploit land - both their own... and the labour of others' (p. 4). Unfortunately, he does not see it fit to discuss the structure and process of labour organization in pre-colonial Africa. Illife's characterization of

Africa as a land-rich continent rests on Goody's disputed contention that this was one of the major differences between Africa and Europe; the latter was apparently land-poor. Such a generalization does little justice to the varied and complex land tenure systems in pre-colonial Africa, which it should be added, changed over time in response to changing economic, social and political conditions. It is absurd to think of Egypt, for example, as having been land-rich. But then Illife ignores such awkward cases. And we may ask: if structural poverty in Africa in the 1980s is still what it was centuries back, does that mean Africa is still as land-rich now as it was then? The absurdity of such a proposition is only too obvious. Illife's claim that the nature and causes of poverty in pre-colonial Africa, and indeed most of Africa to this day, 'had little to do with technology, landownership, intensive agriculture, or even (in a direct sense) the pattern of social stratification, although these did affect the behaviour of the poor' (p. 4) sounds like a miserable joke. If none of these things had nothing to do with poverty, then what did? Nature or the African's congenital backwardness? This is not serious history.

What is remarkable for a book that makes such grand claims for itself as the first to chart the history of poverty in Africa is that the theoretical discussion of poverty is so anaemic, confined to just about two pages in an introductory chapter of eight pages. The rest of the book is an empiricist catalogue of examples of poverty in 'sub-saharan' or 'Tropical' Africa and the various attempts, especially by Europeans, to deal with it.

Predictably, the story begins in Ethiopia, the scene of so much suffering during the famines of the early 1970s and 1980s. Ethiopia's poverty appears timeless, unaffected by changes in production structures, social relations, and political institutions, which are not discussed in any coherent manner. There is even no discussion of the development and impact of Ethiopian feudalism on poverty formation. Christian Ethiopia, we are told, placed poverty at the centre of its culture. And yet there was such little institutionalized care for the poor. The explanation is sought in the bilateral family structure of the dominant Amhara people. We are reminded that 'bilateral societies are characteristically individualistic and mobile, both socially and geographically. This was so among the Amhara' (p. 15). This is the language of an anthropologist not a seasoned historian. Not surprisingly, the author jumps freely from the 16th to the 20th century, unencumbered by the movement of time or the historical process.

Chapter 3 is on poverty within the Islamic tradition. The story continues in its by now familiar pattern. The question that bothers one is: why did the author choose religion as his analytical framework in chapter 2 and 3. Was religion in these societies the determining factor in the productive and distributive system? In the subsequent chapters dealing with the non-Christian and non-Islamic societies the author had to find another analytical framework since it was difficult to find an adequate religious appellation. So in

Chapter 4 he discusses ‘poverty and power’ in societies beyond the influence of Christianity and Islam, and in Chapter 5 he examines poverty and pastoralism. Then in Chapter 6 he singles out the ‘Yoruba and Igbo’ for discussion, for the simple reason that ‘they are especially well-documented. Anglican missionaries and evangelists lived among the Yoruba from 1845... Anglican missionaries also settled among the Igbo in 1857’ (p. 82)..

The prelude to the colonial era is encapsulated in Chapter 7’s ‘Early European Initiatives’ concerning poverty relief. Having sufficiently comforted us with these initiatives the author then introduces us to ‘poverty in South Africa, 1886-1948’ in Chapter 8. The two magic dates of South African history are invoked. The processes generating poverty during this period are analysed quite adequately. Indeed, the evidence presented here challenges the argument that structural poverty has not changed in Africa over the centuries. Certainly Africans in South Africa lost the privilege of being land-rich and their labour power was swallowed into the suction-engines of capitalist industrial and agricultural development. But Illife’s cynicism is never far from the surface. ‘Ironically, South Africa’s racialism’, he says, ‘probably helped African townsmen to endure their poverty: at least they need not see themselves as failures’ (p. 139). And he concludes the chapter in a similar vein: ‘Ironically, during the next forty years, the National Party was to elaborate the most extensive welfare system in Africa, a system which like the Apartheid programmes, was born of urbanization, inequality, state power, and rampant technocracy’ (p. 142). With only a few minor revisions South Africa’s propaganda chiefs would be quite happy with this statement.

Forgetting for a moment that South Africa is, as far as the African majority is concerned, in a colonial situation, Illife discusses poverty in ‘colonial Africa’ in separate chapters. Chapter 9 examines rural poverty. Two generalizations are made. One is that conjunctural poverty changed quite considerably, while structural poverty did not. By conjunctural poverty changing he means that ‘the great famines which in the past had periodically decimated populations ceased in the mid colonial period and were replaced by more subtle problems of nutrition and demography’ (p. 143). Surprisingly, nowhere in the previous chapters has Illife discussed any of the precolonial ‘great famines’. Substantiation of this point is important because, as Illife must surely be aware, there are historians who have argued that the scale and intensity of famine in colonial Africa increased over what it had been in the precolonial period because colonial capitalism disrupted the commodity composition and the social and ecological organisation of African agriculture, as well as famine relief systems. The widespread hunger and famine of the early colonial period can surely not be explained away by the fact that ‘tropical African rainfall as a whole was low and exceptionally erratic during the first half of the colonial period but began to increase and stabilise between the wars and reached relatively generous levels during the 1950s (p.

156). It would seem that the god of colonialism worked in wondrous ways, spitting drought to the recalcitrant Africans in the first decades of colonial rule, and then rewarding them with ample rainfall once colonialism had been consolidated. This chapter contains many other poorly substantiated assertions. It is certainly not true that 'wages were usually quite high during the early colonial period' (p. 149).

Chapter 10 considers 'urban poverty in tropical Africa'. Again, much evidence is adduced on the process of urbanization and poverty formation that contradicts the author's vacuous central thesis. The tone of the chapter is set in the opening paragraph where we are informed that 'the poor of precolonial Africa were bred in the countryside but seen in the town. That is why they were so often overlooked: precolonial Africa had few towns. During the colonial period towns grew quickly. Observers, white or black, noticed more and more poor people and assumed that their numbers were increasing and that towns created them' (p. 164). Apparently this was not a correct perception. The author asserts that Towns rarely created poverty, although they gave it new forms. In other words, colonial towns, recently introduced from the outside, could not possibly have generated Africa's eternal structural poverty. Are the new forms of urban poverty which he identifies - proletarianization, unemployment, prostitution, delinquency - conjunctural rather than structural? Does it make sense at all to use these concepts in analysing urban poverty during the colonial era?

The question of institutional care for the poor in colonial Africa is examined in Chapter 11. Both religious and secular institutional charity are examined. Pride of place is given to the role of missionaries, and the heroes of colonial folklore like Albert Schweitzer whose 'self-sacrifice caught European imaginations and validated European civilization' (p. 195). Islamic charity and the charity practices of Africa's 'indigenous religions' (Christianity and Islam were presumably not) are dismissed in one paragraph each. Illife recognises, correctly, that institutionalized care for the poor was limited, so that the poor mostly relied on families and neighbours. But 'how far they (the families and neighbours) met these obligations is unknown' (p. 212). That is what should be investigated instead of eulogising the puny poverty-alleviation efforts of missionaries and colonial governments who were directly and indirectly responsible for the emergence and spread of new forms of poverty in 20th century Africa. The institutionalized provision of care for the poor itself needs to be analysed in the wider context of social struggle: missionaries and colonial governments were often prompted to take action by the struggles of the poor themselves. Urban welfare programmes, for examples, were partly born of workers struggles, and were not simply manifestations of enlightened missionary and government attitudes.

The chapter on independent Africa (Chapter 13) argues that the growth of structural poverty in the independence period can be attributed to 'the demo-

graphic expansion which has begun between the wars' (p. 237), and 'policy failures (which) were probably even more important' (p. 233). This reads much like the neo-classical argument, propagated most loudly by the World Bank and the IMF, the gendarmes of multilateral imperialism, that Africa's current economic crisis is a product of rapid population growth and 'policy failures' by African governments themselves. Illife, like the World Bank's Berg Report, also underplays the role of 'external' factors in causing and reproducing the crisis in Africa.

Illife argues that after independence not only did structural poverty grow, but non conjunctural poverty returned in the form of mass famine mortality. This was caused by two main factors. 'One resulted from warfare and political conflict' (p. 250). 'The second reason for the return of mass famine mortality was drought' (p. 252). Was the god of colonialism showing his wrath on poor Africans for having attained their hard-won independence by spitting drought once again?

Illife's analysis of poverty in independent Africa clearly echoes the conservative or neo-classical critique of the poor economic performance of independent African states. Indeed, this book can be considered as the historical version of the Berg Report. But Illife does not of course think that he is a right-wing ideologue. In his concluding paragraph he criticises both the left and the right for misunderstanding the nature of African poverty. 'Men of the left', he states, commonly misconceived (poverty) as a recent phenomenon due to colonial and capitalist exploitation. Men of the right misconceived it as a recent phenomenon due to the weather or population growth or the incompetence of African governments. Few realised that conjunctural poverty had changed during the twentieth century. Fewer still realised how much of structural poverty had not changed at all' (p. 259).

Illife's own analysis of the current crisis, as noted above, puts him squarely among the 'men of the right'. His entire thesis is, in fact, the final vindication of these men's contention that Africa's crisis of underdevelopment and poverty is a product of unfavourable internal factors. Illife has carried the argument to its logical conclusion: the internal factors are deeply rooted in Africa's history. Independence brought to an end the brief interlude of enlightened foreign rule, during which the 'conjunctural poverty' of famine was contained, and Africa returned to her isolated and splendid eternal poverty. This, then, is the ideological message of this book. Historians are not above the fray in the current debate about the causes and nature of the African crisis. This should not surprise us. The practice of history producing and reproducing is an ideological enterprise, and an integral part of the social production of knowledge, which is conditioned by the structures, forces and struggles in society. Currently there are intense struggles over how to explain and resolve Africa's crisis and reshape the continent's future. History is a powerful weapon in this struggle.

Let there indeed be more research on the history of the African poor. Il-life's book presents the version of 'men of the right'.



Julius Ihonvbere (ed.) - *The Political Economy of Crisis and Underdevelopment in Africa: Selected works of Claude Ake*, JAD Publishers Ltd., Lagos, 1989, 120 p.

A.D. Adeoye*

The deteriorating material condition of existence of the mass of the African people engendered by decades of economic stagnation and collapse, has continued to attract the attention of social scientists. This valuable collection of Professor Claude Ake's hitherto "unpublished" essays, himself a leading commentator on what has since been canonised as the "African Crisis", is meant to provide a rigorous theoretical basic for grasping the significance, dynamics and specificity of the African crisis with a view to overcoming it. Relying on the methodological assumptions of the radical political economy approach popularised by Ake, Julius Ihonvbere, who is fast acquiring reputation as a leading radical political economist, sets the tone for discussion in his brilliant introduction. There, he argues that the African ruling classes have failed to tackle the problem at its roots. At best, they have attempted rather cosmetic, diversionary 'solutions' aimed at the symptoms or effects of the crisis which have in turn complicated the crisis and exacerbated Africa's developmental problem. This situation is due, first, to a limited understanding of Africa's, crisis which has led to the application of wrong remedies, and second, to the unwillingness of the ruling classes to effect the desired radical changes in the political economy of the African continent.

The book is divided into four parts spread over eight chapters. Part I is a theoretical elaboration of the tool of political economy and its relevance to Africa. Whereas fundamentalist marxism has been hypercritical of dependency theory, Ake cautions against this un-marxist tendency, positing instead that as a form of consciousness, dependency theory "can only be finally understood in the context of its history, that is, by relating it to the contradictions of material life which it expresses... It represents concrete aspirations and concrete struggles" (p. 40-41). I agree entirely with him. Part II attempts

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to delineate the political roots of the economic crisis. The dominant role played by the political instance in accentuating the crisis is brought into sharp focus. This is very important because of the negative role of the ruling political class in the development process. The author lays bare the various ways in which the ruling political classes in Africa constitute an obstacle to progress. Part III treats the issues of unemployment, human rights and non-alignment. The structural nature of unemployment as occasioned by the uneven penetration of capitalism and capitalist relations, the peripheralization and commoditisation of Africa's economy, the parasitical and negative role of the ruling political class, is emphasised. Africa, it is argued, has an objective interest in vigorously pursuing non-alignment, first, to fight colonialism and second, to struggle for the establishment of a more equitable international economic system. The concept of human rights is demystified when the autor makes a distinction between human rights as conceived by the industrialised societies and what it should mean in Africa. For the former, being essentially people with a 'full stomach', human rights relate to esoteric aspects of self-realisation. But the vast majority of African People are not in this position. Therefore, the emphasis must shift to a different kind of rights which can mean something for people fighting to survive and burdened by ignorance, poverty, disease; to social rather than individual rights. Part IV is a survey of contending political economy approaches which logically and structurally speaking ought to be treated alongside Part I. The Author does not make any prediction about the future of Africa. He shows an element of doubt and self restraint by suggesting that the future will depend on the dialectics of theory, practice and struggle (p. 112).

Despite the broad appeal of the book, several problems remain. What precisely is the meaning of 'orthodox marxism' as used in pp. 36 and 40? As a system of thought marxism is more of an open - ended system than a closed theory. As a Research Programme, it is capable of *progressive problem shifts*, involving changes in a theory when it comes into contact with new empirical situation. Marxism is a dynamic theory of social change and that is its greatest merit. Marxism cannot be fossilised. We can talk of Euro-centric marxism or state marxism but certainly not orthodox marxism: the term is meaningless. Second problem. There is the recurring theme of the state being 'non-autonomised' or being not autonomous and hence to mediate intra class conflicts within fractions of the hegemonic class and inter-class conflict between that class and others. Both Ihonybere and Ake seem to subscribe to the class-mediatory theory of the state in which the state is said to be capable of autonomous, neutral action, representing no particular class interest. True, Marx, Engels and others admit the possibility of the state acting independently in certain historic conjunctures, such as in the Asiatic mode of production and under the despotic rule of an autocrat as with Bonapartism in France. The question is, can the state, itself constituted on class

ERRATA

1. Please find below the continuation and end of the book review by A. D. Adeoye from page 106.

... domination, mediate in a neutral manner, class conflicts or rise above class conflicts? There is apparent confusion here, for even Marx recognised the fact that Bonapartism itself was not something hanging in the air, but was founded on the support of the most numerous class in France then - the small holding peasants. In the contemporary condition of Africa, the lack of autonomy of the state acquires meaning and significance only in relation to foreign capital and ruling classes, not in relation to local classes of which it is a part. The third problem is the organisational format adopted by the Editor which is very unsatisfactory. It is usual for edited works to carry information on the articles assembled in the volume such as the date the article was written, the forum at which it was presented and where the article had been published previously. The Editor does not do this. It is arguable whether this omission is deliberate, for the claim that the works in this collection are hitherto unpublished is only partly true. The essay on "The African context of Human Rights" (ch. 6) was originally read at the international Conference of Human Rights in the African context held at the University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria in June, 1987. A selection of the papers presented at that conference, including Professor Ake's essay, was subsequently published in a special issue of *Africa Today*, vol. 34, Nos. 1 & 2, 1987. Furthermore, the referent material is not included, except in the introduction. How does he want the reader to follow up, for example, the work cited in the body of chapter 8 when relevant detailed references are not provided? Again there is no justification for treating Part IV separately from Part I since both are a continuum dealing with the same subject: the theoretical and methodological concerns of political economy and their application to Africa. Finally there are countless typographical errors. It is important that these problems are taken care of in a subsequent edition. Exceptional care should also be taken to avoid these pitfalls in the proposed second volume of the series.

Undoubtedly it is a useful collection which must interest anyone concerned with the present and future condition of Africa. Unfortunately the exceptionally high price at which this slim volume is offered for sale (N30.00) will surely restrict its appeal. I wish the Editor could do something about this.

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