

AFRIQUE ET DEVELOPPEMENT

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Editor

Zenebeworke Tadesse

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Africa Development is the quarterly bi-lingual Journal of the Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA).

It is a social science journal whose major focus is on issues which are central to the development of society. Its principal objective is to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas among African scholars from a variety of intellectual persuasions and various disciplines. The Journal also encourages other contributors working on Africa or those undertaking comparative analysis of third world issues. One issue of the Journal a year is focused on a particular theme and guest-edited by a specialist in the field.

Africa Development welcomes contributions which cut across disciplinary boundaries. Articles with a narrow focus and uncomprehensible to people outside that discipline are unlikely to be accepted.

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
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New Release... New Release...

The State, Development and Politics in Ghana is a collection of essays that provides a focussed and serious analysis of the country's political, economic, agrarian and social development within the African continent.

Ghana's political rule has encompassed virtually the whole gamut of political power, ranging from military dictatorships, parliamentary democracy to populism. Its economic policies in turn have ranged from state nationalism to neo-colonialist *laissez-faire*. It is this wide ranging experience that singles Ghana out as one of the singularly fascinating and complex examples of economic management under structural adjustments programmes.



Previous studies have tended to treat the state in Ghana as an essentially irrelevant encumbrance on Ghanaians themselves, portraying in idyllic terms the social struggles that are taking place, concentrating on the exotic and the ephemeral.

In an attempt to share the lessons of Ghana's experience, this collection edited by the late Emmanuel Hansen and Kwame A. Ninsin is a serious attempt by Ghanaian scholars to come to grips with the reality of their country, adding a particularly and, more rare, inherently indigenous voice to the debate on the country's development. They clearly point out that as long as social struggles are a main feature of the society the question of the role of the state will remain central to it.

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Capital Goods, Technological Change and Accumulation in Nigeria looks at the problems of technology by focussing on developments in the country's capital goods sector. It argues that if underdeveloped countries are to terminate their prostrate external economic dependence and achieve successful industrialization, it is crucial they develop a local capital goods sub-sector. It also argues that Nigeria is one of the few countries in Africa outside apartheid South Africa with this potential.

Much of the conventional literature in this arena has been incapable of identifying key variables in the economic system apart from the price mechanism, with its tendency to view technology as 'exogenously' determined. Little or no attention has been paid to the local capacity for the production of goods that will satisfy the need for technologies that are 'appropriate' for development. In this book a research team of social and natural scientists sets out to ask why a society so richly endowed in manpower and natural resources has failed to set up the type of industries that have historically proved crucial to the accumulation and acquisition of technology. Why is it that despite widely publicized declarations of intent and the production of elaborate plans, so little has been done?

Edited by Akin Fadahunsi and B. U. N. Igwe the book brings together major contributions to the debate on economic development in third world countries, and is a vital tool for anyone interested or involved in the industrialization and technological development of African economies.

CAPITAL GOODS TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND ACCUMULATION IN NIGERIA

edited by
A. Fadahunsi
B. U. N. Igwe




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The Concept of Human Rights in Africa

attempts to reconceptualise human rights ideology from the standpoint of the working people of the continent. It argues that the dominant human rights discourse in/and on Africa, however well-intentioned, is objectively a part of the ideologies of domination. Both the critique of the dominant discourse as well as the reconceptualisation are located firmly within the current social science and jurisprudential debates on democratic struggles in Africa.

Hitherto, the human rights debate in Africa has been an exclusive preserve of lawyers and philosophers. Professor Shivji breaks new ground in this book in that he firmly anchors the debate on the social and political places without losing sight of its legal and philosophical dimensions.

While greatly stimulating for the general reader, this work can be fruitfully used in colleges and universities in such academic disciplines as sociology, political science, development studies as well as law and jurisprudence.



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Popular Resistance in Tanzania: Lessons from the Sungu Sungu

Horace Campbell*

RÉSUMÉ. En réponse à la grande crise des années 1980, une armée traditionnelle appelée les *Sungu Sungu* naquit dans les régions rurales de la Tanzanie. Revenant aux habitudes vestimentaires, aux armes et aux pratiques médicinales villageoises de la période pré-coloniale, les *Sungu Sungu* mirent au point leurs propres systèmes d'organisation et de mobilisation qui leur permettaient de contourner les tribunaux, la police et les structures du parti chargées de l'administration des villages. Après avoir échoué dans sa tentative de contrôler ce mouvement, le parti nomma les *Sungu Sungu* organe de sécurité des villages, représentant la milice populaire. Cette expérience des *Sungu Sungu* soulève nombre de questions importantes sur la forme, le contenu et l'orientation politique de la résistance populaire. En modelant des mouvements sociaux anti-coloniaux de façon à ce qu'ils cadrent avec une certaine conception du système de parti unique, l'historiographie nationaliste a dérobé aux masses leur histoire. Grâce à un examen critique des mouvements anti-coloniaux, il serait possible de réévaluer les forces et les faiblesses de ces mouvements de résistance et de voir comment de nouvelles formes de résistance pourraient rétablir le droit des peuples à une participation démocratique totale au processus de transformation. Il existe à l'heure actuelle en Tanzanie, tout comme ailleurs en Afrique, de nombreuses formes de résistance passive et moins passive dont, entre autres, les manifestations des travailleurs, l'abattage des caféiers, l'arrêt de production de cultures commerciales et leur utilisation à d'autres fins, le refus de payer l'impôt de Développement, la mise en échec du programme de travaux forcés. L'essor des *Sungu Sungu* correspondit à la fin évidente et tragique d'un mouvement de résistance en cours dans une société de crise et d'ajustement structurel. L'élément qui permet de faire une distinction entre cette phase de résistance et celle de la période anti-coloniale est la capacité des masses à identifier les agents locaux comme étant à l'origine de leur exploitation et de leur domination. Ces soulèvements spontanés ont leur propres contradictions internes à partir desquelles l'on peut mettre au point de nouvelles méthodes d'oppression.

Introduction

During the 1980s in rural Tanzania, there arose a "traditional" army called the *Sungu Sungu*. This army ascribed to itself the authority to maintain peace in the regions of Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora. In this period of intense capitalist crisis where new forms of accumulation were developing in the rural areas, the activities of the plundering of the natural resources had reached such a stage that the established organs of law and order were integrated in a contradictory manner into the structures of the export of capital. Ivory, gold, diamonds, cattle and hides and skins were being taken from these regions when the return for labour was such that the poor were eking out a bare subsistence. In the face of the armed seizure of cattle, brigandry and death from the primitive form of gold mining in Kahama and Geita, the poor developed their own measures to fight the accumulators and cattle rustlers. The *Sungu Sungu* (or as they are called in some parts *ruga ruga*) in reverting to the mode of dress, weapons and medicinal practices of the pre-

* University of Dar-es-Salaam, Department of Political Science

colonial village had developed a method of self-organisation and self-mobilisation which by-passed the courts, the police and the party structures of governance in the rural villages of the above three regions.

Through popular democratic village assemblies, the *Sungu Sungu* dispensed justice and mobilized the energies of the youth to conceptualize their ability to enter the decision making process where they lived and grazed their cattle. In essence, though based on democratic village assemblies, the core of the movement was male dominated. Thus after the original burst of energy to curb cattle thefts and racketeering had subsided, the *Sungu Sungu* turned their attention to other sources of insecurity and was linked to the problems of the resurgence of witchcraft and its opposite, witchcraft eradication. Older nationalist members of the party understood the political implications of this sort of movement. They remember how, during the anti-colonial struggle, "witchcraft could be used for political ends"¹.

After four years of efforts by the state security organs to infiltrate, find the leader and subvert the movement, the party decided in 1983 that the best way to control this peasant uprising was by embracing it. By 1983 the party designated the *Sungu Sungu* as the village security organ, the embodiment of the peoples militia. In the administrative style, the idea of resistance which issued from the *Sungu Sungu* was to be controlled by repressive tolerance. That is the party would laud the efforts of the peoples without dealing with the causes of the insecurity while developing the measures to bring the movements under party and state authority, including the extension of the administrative structure of Shinyanga. The measure of success could be seen by 1987 when the party could call out the traditional peasants army to form a guard of honour for the President on Peasants day in Shinyanga region of Tanzania.

The contours of peasant resistance in Tanzania in the 1980s in an independent African society twenty years after independence raise many important questions about the form, content and political direction of popular resistance. In the specific context of Tanzania, the idea of popular resistance is firmly linked to the anti-colonial struggle. From the armed uprisings of the *MAJI MAJI* in 1905-1906 to the strikes, marches, cash crop hold ups, boycotts and tax evasion of the 1940s and 1950s, the episodes of anti-colonial resistance are documented in the text books as part of the history of the nationalist phases in the history of Tanzania. Because nationalist historio-

1 This was the precise title of a study undertaken by the colonialists in the 1950s. See study made by Hans Cory, *How Witchcraft could be used for political ends*. Hans Cory papers No. 235 University of Dar es Salaam Library. This study was presented to the Witchcraft Committee of the Colonial Legislative Council in May 1958.

grapher seeks to rob the masses of their history, the social movements of the anti-colonial phase are moulded to fit a specific conception of one-partyism.

The books and papers on resistance do not in the main alert us as to how the spirit of rebellion could strengthen the people as they face new forms of exploitation by international capital and their local allies². Such a critical analysis of the form, content and nature of the resistance would allow for new appraisals of the strength and weaknesses of these resistances and how new forms of resistance could re-establish the right of the people to full democratic participation in the process of transformation.

That the nature of resistance in post-colonial Tanzania took many forms is still an area which requires research and documentation. Without doubt, similar to the period of the depression and World War II, at present, there are numerous forms of passive and not so passive resistance in the political life of Tanzania. The rise of the *Sungu Sungu* was the overt and dramatic end of resistance which is taking place in a society of crisis and structural adjustment. Whether in the form of worker protests, (eg the Kilombero Sugar factory protest and subsequent shootings), the cutting down of coffee trees, cash crop hold up and diversion, the refusal to pay the head tax called the Development Levy, or the failure of the forced labour programme (*nguvu kazi* - the Human Resources Deployment Ordinance of 1983), the resistance of the people asserts itself as a factor of Tanzanian politics of the 1980s.

These episodes of resistance can be distinguished from the anti-colonial, or anti-settler acts of rebellion in the continent of Africa. In this period the masses can identify local agents as the sources of their exploitation and domination. This new form of resistance is not unique to Tanzania in this period when there is an intensification of the exploitation of the continent of Africa. All over this continent of debt, hunger, armed struggles and militarization, there are social movements struggling to transform their material and social conditions.

Hence to be able to document and bring to light the popular aspirations of African masses is for the African intelligentsia a concrete expression of solidarity with the poor. However, this solidarity requires that the study is not simply a description of the social movements but the kind of analysis which

2 In particular the work of John Iliffe on Resistance in Tanganyika is linked to the ideas of modernization. See John Iliffe, *A History of Tanganyika*, Cambridge University Press, London 1979. Essentially the party history which is taught as *siasa* (the equivalent of civics) in the educational institutions reflect the same emphasis on the party or important personages in the anti-colonial period. For an alternative interpretation, see: Walter Rodney, *World War II and the Tanzania Economy*, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 1976. See especially the chapter on African Resistance.

can strengthen the organizational capacity of the producing masses as they meet their day to day hardships.

To be able to conceptualize the components of popular resistance and the potentialities has also been sharpened by the fact that a social movement calling itself a National Resistance Army has come to the summit of state power in at least one African territory. The success of the guerilla army in Uganda and the exercise of state power by the National Resistance Movement led by Yoweri Museveni also alerts the committed African scholar as to the fundamental differences between resistance and social transformation. For, in Uganda, a resistance movement seized political power but is confronted with the concrete problems of how to generate concrete economic initiatives to break the old cash crop economy and to inspire real political participation by the masses. Unfortunately the resolution of this question of the direction of the transformation of the Ugandan economy is now compounded by war and new forms of resistance which are linked to the history of regional differentiation and the politicization of ethnicity and regionalism in that battered and war weary society.

This resistance army in Uganda also brings to mind numerous rebellions which are going on all over the continent of Africa in independent states. Some of these rebellions are prolonged guerilla wars as in the Eritrean struggle. However, the nature of African universities and the present intellectual climate on the continent ensure that those in European and American centres of learning know more about the Eritrean struggle or that of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army than the intelligentsia in Africa. Thus in East Africa security pacts by leaders prevent genuine intellectual discourse on resistance movements such as Mwakenya when other Human Rights organizations such as Amnesty International or think tanks in the West fully study the political implications of these movements.

That the centres for international capital study the potential of popular resistance is without doubt. For now in the period of anti-war sentiments in the capitalist metropolises when their own citizens cannot be motivated to fight oppressed peoples, the study and understanding of popular resistance movements in Africa take a new meaning. This is best illustrated in Mozambique where counter-revolution and South African destabilisation carry the label of resistance and exploit the ideology of pre-colonial practices in the rural areas. Cases such as the atrocities of the Mozambique Resistance movement (sometimes called RENAMO) dictate to the progressive scholar in the analysis of social movements and ideas there must be a conscious effort to ensure that the foundation of intellectual inquiry is linked to strengthening the masses against new and more covert forms of manipulation. Where imperialism seeks to use social science to undermine the sovereignty of the African peoples, the progressive scholar needs to build up an intellec-

tual culture which will be part of the culture of harmonizing the knowledge of the people with modern scientific techniques.

In the regions which gave rise to the *Sungu Sungu* in Tanzania are to be found a people which call themselves the *Sukuma*. Whether the *Sukuma* constitute a tribe, a nation or a dispersed ethnic group was for some time a matter of intellectual controversy. But the fact is that without a materialist history of pre-colonial Tanganyika, it is still difficult to say how and why the largest population group of the Tanzanian society speaks one language. The people who are called the *Sukuma* comprise more than 15 per cent of the population of Tanzania. Together with the people who are called the Nyamwezi and who share certain cultural traditions with the *Sukuma* they constitute 18-20 per cent of the population in three of the richest regions of the territory. One is however constrained by the unscientific nature of the studies on the peoples and regions from which the *Sungu Sungu* emerged. For the history of the region showed that the conception of the *Sukuma* tribe came after efforts by the colonial authorities to create 'tribes' for more effective indirect rule.

This fact comes through most clearly in the work of the sociologist - anthropologist Hans Cory³. The voluminous papers of Hans Cory form a veritable wall against a proper study of the regions of Mwanza and Shinyanga. Most studies on the *Sukuma* begin with Cory and even those who seek to differ challenge Cory on the same grounds; the preoccupation with chiefly structures and customary laws⁴. It is important to underscore that this methodological approach not only represents a particular world view but this kind of intellectual work is concerned with social control.

Inevitably this control is disguised under the banner of development and the rehabilitation of the land. One study of the *Sukuma* brought to light the real mandate of Hans Cory. It clarified that:

*The government hired Hans Cory, an Austrian immigrant turned anthropologist-sociologist, to investigate secret societies among the Nyamwezi and the Sukuma. In particular, he was directed to discover whether such societies might be potentially subversive organisations*⁵.

3 The Hans Cory papers in the University of Dar es Salaam library consists of more than 250 papers on the peoples of Tanganyika, especially the *Sukuma*. The most frequently quoted works are: (a) *The Ntami Traditional Rites of a Sukuma Chief in Tanganyika*, London: Macmillan 1951; (b) *The Indigenous Political System of the Sukuma and Proposals for Reform*, Kampala, Uganda. Eagle Press 1954; (c) *Sukuma Law and Custom*. London: Oxford University Press 1953.

4 B. Itandala, *History of the Babinza of Usukama, Tanzania*. Ph.D Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada 1983.

5 G. Andrew Maguire, *Towards Uhuru in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation*. Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp.10.

All over Tanzania at present there are studies which have the same purpose to see the ways in which the cultural aspirations of the people could be channelled to serve the purpose of the deepening of capitalism in the rural areas. Present scholarship on the cultural dimension of development from the *Bulletin of Third World Forum* alerted us to the importance of cultural resistance among the masses.

In the West as well as in Japan, material development was supported by internal changes in social and human relationships. The process, incidentally, was stretched out over a very long span of time. As a consequence, there was no radical break; instead, what took place was an extremely complex process in which selected elements of the old culture were re-absorbed within the context of technical and economic development. Modern capitalism is deeply rooted in native Western (or Japanese) traditions, helping reciprocally to strengthen it through a positive process of evolution that removed obstacles to technical creativity and economic initiative.

From this analysis of the relationship between the rise of capitalism and its integration with Western cultural values, we are reminded that:

Africa's situation is different. The historical conditions under which capitalism penetrated the continent, plus the circumstances of its later expansion, have meant right from the beginning, economic development has clashed with the local cultures. Concurrently, the impulse for changes in social and human relationships has come mainly from abroad, quite often with the help of brutal force⁶.

Because the role of force is so central to the reproduction of capitalism in Africa, the study of resistance in Tanzania as in other parts of Africa must involve the sharpening of the tools of analysis which will help to instill confidence in the people. For, in Tanzania as in other parts of Africa, there is the push to deepen the production of export crops despite the declining terms of trade for primary products from the Third World. This renewed effort by international capital must inevitably clash with local cultures and it is the argument of this paper that the expression of the *Sungu Sungu* was a reflex action by the poor to the looting of the countryside.

Hence the purpose of this paper is to give meaning to the clash which gave rise to the *Sungu Sungu* taking care to make a clear link between the cultural resistance of this movement and the changing political economy of the society as a whole. The concepts of regional differentiation and capital accu-

6 *Bulletin of the Third World Forum*. "A Working Group on the cultural dimension of Development in Africa". Dakar, Senegal, January 1987.

mulation are tools to enrich our understanding of young men bare-chested and crowned with feathers using spears to chase looters and cattle rustlers. The *Sungu Sungu* filled a spiritual void for the youth and used the recourse to pre-colonial ideas to combat the modernization schemes of the Rural Integrated Development Programmes (RIDEP). By resorting to 'traditional' cultural forms, the *Sungu Sungu* gave concrete expression to the clash where the commoditisation process and the processes of exploitation were masked by the language of rehabilitation, conservation and proper land use. But the kind of resistance of the *Sungu Sungu* could not turn into a sustained political struggle because of the contradictory nature of the pre-capitalist ideologies. The involvement of the *Sungu Sungu* in activities which persecuted older women as witches brought to the fore Amilcar Cabral's notion of the dialectical nature of cultural resistance.

Amilcar Cabral, the African freedom fighter provides a theoretical foundation for the study of cultural resistance of the type such as *Sungu Sungu*. Cabral had affirmed:

*The value of culture as an element of resistance to foreign domination lies in the fact that culture is the vigorous manifestation on the ideological or idealist plane of the physical and historical reality of the society that is dominated or to be dominated. Culture is simultaneously the fruit of a people's history and a determinant of history, by the positive or negative influence which it exerts on the evolution of relationships between man and his environment, among men or groups of men within a society, as well as among different societies*⁷.

The positive and negative lessons of the *Sungu Sungu* can be penetrated with the help of Cabral's theoretical tools. For all over the continent the relationship between men and women in the natural environment engender social struggles which can either take the people forward or help to confirm new efforts to harmonize the economic and political domination of the people with their cultural personality. Imperialism is acquiring some expertise in the latter enterprise and the academic foundations have a renewed purpose in financing scholarly research in the African countryside. Hence the progressive scholar needs to clarify the positive and negative aspects of cultural resistance so that a scientific outlook is developed to understand the nature of the contradictions among the people. The questions of real transformation, of the social agents of this transformation, of the principal allies of any resistance movement, of the ideological basis of the resistance and

7 Amilcar Cabral, "National Liberation and Culture" in *Return to the Source*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1973, pp.41.

the objectives of the resistance are all sharpened by the present period in African history.

In 1967 Tanzania embarked on a policy of Ujamaa and Self-reliance. After twenty years of this process, the detractors of Tanzania have declared that even the limited initiative towards social welfare must be reversed. Social welfare and the egalitarian ideas of the society were to be replaced by a more explicit form of class selection and social stratification. Hence the ideas of liberalization, the giving of free rein to market forces and prosperity based on the private individual. Before the present thrust to make trade liberalization respectable the *Sungu Sungu* had been publicly involved in the war against economic sabotage. Now that the former economic saboteurs (called Walanguzi) have been given the stamp of approval by the turn to the IMF, the role and purpose of the *Sungu Sungu* has declined. The embrace of the party stole the thunder from this movement of resistance but the conditions of capital accumulation in the rural areas will continue to generate new forms of resistance among the rural peasantry. Our task is to attempt to grasp the context of the social struggles which brought forth the *Sungu Sungu*.

The Context or the antecedents of resistance in Sukumaland

The rise of the *Sungu Sungu* was a process of resistance in the period of the capitalist depression in Tanzania roughly from 1978 to the present. There is no precise date as to the foundation of the *Sungu Sungu*. There was no founding conference, there was no clear leader and the formation of this traditional army mushroomed all over the regions of Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora. This much is evident from the present studies on the rise of the *Sungu Sungu*⁸. These studies have rightly recognized the significance of the spread of the *Sungu Sungu* and the fact that (a) there is no person or group of persons who could be called the leaders; (b) they are not confined to one village or any one administrative district; (c) that they are not confined to one ethnic group; and (d) that they took the law in their hands even to the point of arresting police persons and overthrowing village governments. Singing songs of resistance, dancing, rediscovering old forms of divination, running over long distances and effecting new forms of communication in

8 Among the Studies on the *Sungu Sungu* are: (a) Patrick Masanja, "Some notes on the *Sungu Sungu* movement" Department of Sociology Seminar, March 8, 1984; (b) Donna Kemer, "Witches, Cows, Thieves and Party Politics: An Examination of the *Sungu Sungu* movement". Department of Education Seminar 1983; (c) J.F. Mbwiliza and Donna Kemer, "The *Sungu Sungu* Movement" Department of History Seminar, February 16, 1984; (d) Mashiku J. Sabasaba and Ndibalama G. Rweyernamu, *Exercise of Punitive Powers Outside the Judicial Process in Tanzania: A Case Study of Neo-traditional Defence Groups (Sungu Sungu)* unpublished dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Law LL.B degree at the University of Dar es Salaam 1986; (e) Ray Abrahams, "Sungu Sungu: Village Vigilante Groups in Tanzania, *African Affairs*, April 1987.

the rural areas, the *Sungu Sungu* stamped a new sense of collective justice while establishing itself as the cultural reference point in the village community between 1981 and 1986. After one hundred years of intensive Christian proselytization, the pre-capitalist cultural patterns were unearthed to confront the oppressive accumulation through forced commoditisation of cattle.

The *Sungu Sungu* is usually referred to as coming from the *Sukuma* people. According to the ethnographic statistical framework of the population count of Tanzania, the *Sukuma* comprise the largest ethnic group in the society of close to 25 million in 1987. Out of this the *Sukuma* comprise about 15 per cent of the population. But because of the weakness of the ethnographic intellectual the *Sukuma* are sometimes grouped with the Nyamwezi without clear reasoning. In the specific case of the rise of the *Sungu Sungu* the analysis of the regions from which they arose include the region of Tabora which is supposed to be populated by the Nyamwezi⁹. This imprecision over who the *Sukuma* are arises directly from the ideation of tribalism which guided colonial scholarship.

Colonialism wanted to remove the African people from history. Colonized peoples were supposed to be passive objects providing an exotic base for colonial anthropologists who came to study primitive societies. Colonialism in the main, determined that Africans were not makers of history and were primarily objects to be looked at for unusual features such as structures of chieftainship, secret societies, witchcraft and other peculiar traits. The negative impact of colonialism was quite dramatic. African political entities lost their power, independence and meaning.

In the two regions of Mwanza and Shinyanga, the peoples were multi-ethnic and the social expansion of the peoples made anything like tribal loyalty a thing of the past. New ties based on specialization, new divisions of labour, increased production and social differentiation had substituted clan and tribal loyalties. However, as in all parts of the world, the substitution of class ties for purely ethnic ones is a lengthy historical process. In Tanzania, this process was arrested by colonial over rule. Colonialism blocked the evolution of national solidarity among a people who lived in a territory bigger than many European states. The degree of the homogeneity of the *Sukuma* language and culture requires an understanding beyond the intellectual heritage of the scholarship of tribalism and cultural change. The colonial state reified the myth of the *Sukuma* tribe.

It is not insignificant that since the work of Cory the principal studies of

9 For an analysis of the Nyamwezi in the mould of the work of Hans Cory see: R.G. Abrahams, *The Peoples of Greater Unyamwezi*. International African Institute, London 1967.

the *Sukuma* culture and traditions have been carried out by the church as an aspect of the civilizing role that it has assigned itself in *Sukumaland*. It is outside the scope of this short paper on the resistance of the *Sungu Sungu* to study the history of this region but part of the emancipatory political process of the Tanzanian people must be the development of a new epistemology with respect to the African past and present. Just as how colonialism went about the creation of tribes to implement colonial rule, the scholarship of the modernizing theorists went about weaving the ideas of social control hidden in the name of improved animal husbandry, proper land use, the individualization of land tenure and the solution to environmental problems. But the important fact for the purposes of our paper was the way in which a *Sukuma Identity* was linked to opposition to external colonial rule.

Future research from the point of view of social reconstruction in Africa will shed light on the ecology, production, class formation, ideology and labour processes among the peoples who are called the *Sukuma*. What were the relations with their neighbours, how did they avoid the rapacious slave trade and how did they emerge from colonialism without a destruction of their cultural personality? These questions are linked to the continuity and change which is evident and more significantly to the cultural clash between European capitalist culture and the indigenous cultural life of the people. This is clear from the numerous schemes to speed commodity production in *Sukumaland* from the period of the *Sukumaland Development Scheme* of the late 1940s to the present *Mwanza/Shinyanga Rural Development project*. In the introduction of the socio-cultural profile, the ideologues of this *RIDEP* insisted that studying *Sukuma* organization and culture for this may be a 'source of resistance to proposed innovations'.

Resistance to Innovation

The so called resistance to innovation which is perceived by the donors is a long process of resistance to the deepening of capitalism in this region of Tanzania. Before the major capitalist depression of the 1930s, the regions of *Mwanza*, *Shinyanga* and *Tabora* were part of the labour reservoir of the colonial trade economy. The 'war-like' history of the *Sukuma* plus the ecology of the region had prevented large scale white settlement. During the depression, when Britain wanted to intensify exploitation of the colonies, these regions became the principal cotton growing areas of the *Tanganyika* territory. Like any other colonial crop the growth of cotton in this region reflected the needs of capital accumulation of colonial capital and not the social needs of the people for a better life. The growth of cash crops speeded the process of social and regional differentiation in the territory. In comparison to the areas of *Kilimanjaro*, *Mbeya*, *Tanga* and *Bukoba*, the intensity of colonial capital did not bring about the same level of social stratification. *Kilimanjaro*, *Tanga* and *Mbeya* were the areas of plantations, of more roads, more schools, more houses with corrugated iron sheets and

more of the infrastructure of colonialism. So though Mwanza and Shinyanga were not as undeveloped as Kigoma, Lindi, Mtwara or Songea, the formation of classes in this region was well underway before independence.

By 1940, however, gold and diamonds were discovered in Sukumaland so that added to the wealth in livestock and agricultural produce. Sukumaland was the largest and richest area in the country, both in actual and potential terms. The whole agenda of the British after 1940 with the *Sukuma* Development Scheme (SDS) was how to weaken the people of the region so that they could be more vulnerable to capitalist exploitation. This could be seen from the thrust of the SDS, the directions suggested by the East African Royal Commission Report of the 1950s up to the present Mwanza Shinyanga Rural Development Project. Weakening the peoples was at the heart of the destocking campaigns of the region.

Destocking was only one of the maze of ordinances and regulations which controlled the peoples. There were rules and regulations affecting all aspects of life. G. Maguire who studied the regions after the euphoria of the unrest in Sukumaland said that the *Sukuma* peasant was

*being pushed around.... He had to ridge and manure acreages of cassava and cotton, plant at certain times and pull out cotton stalks by certain dates for burning after harvest, refrain from cultivating near gullies, cutting trees or transporting cattle without a permit, have his cattle dipped or inoculated against disease, slaughter or sell a certain percentage of his cattle and produce on request certificates indicating sale or attesting that the hides from slaughtered beasts had been seen by the appropriate government officer*¹⁰.

All these measures were predicated on teaching the *Sukuma* how to properly use the soil and not to overgraze the land. It was never reasoned that the regressive nature of cotton production was the real cause of soil erosion.

To the extent that there was a crisis in land use methods in Tanganyika by the 1950s, the colonialists were responding not merely to the backwardness of existing African technology but also to the consequences of intense cultivating of cotton without offering any possibility of improved technology to replace an African technology which was adequate when there was shifting cultivation and a smaller population¹¹. The force of colonialism all over Tanganyika territory was linked to the establishment and spread of the narrow range of export crops: sisal, coffee, cotton, cashewnuts, tea and tobacco.

10 G. Andrew Maguire, *op.cit*, pp.30.

11 The ideas that the *Sukuma* were responsible for soil erosion because of poor farming methods formed the basis of the study by D.W. Malcolm, *Sukumaland, An African People and Their Country*, Oxford University Press 1953.

But in the specific case of the *Sukuma*, force served a direct economic function by incorporating into the capitalist system value which initially laid outside the said capitalist system. This was most explicit in the destocking legislation which forced the people to sell their cattle at giveaway prices.

Destocking and Resistance in Sukumaland

The force of colonialism during the post war period of Tanganyika could be seen in every aspect of social reproduction. The coercive legislation and the web of regulations which were implemented as war time requirements became permanent features of the colonial economy. This continuity was most explicit in the destocking campaign which in the parlance of the neo-colonial period is called the need for proper livestock farming. The destocking campaign actually began in the 1930s when the colonialists began insisting that the pasture was over stocked and that Africans would do themselves a good turn by selling cattle and destocking¹².

This is in spite of the fact that the establishment of the colonial enterprise had unleashed a major rinderpest epidemic between 1880 and 1920 and more than 90 per cent of the cattle herd of East Africa was decimated. Lord Lugard had boasted of the impact of the rinderpest epidemic on the pastoralists of the region where vast herds of cattle were wiped out¹³. Studies on the ecology and cattle complex of the region since then have shown that the decline in cattle herds led to a falling human population and the subsequent spread of the tsetse wild game eco-system¹⁴. Up to the present, the peoples of East Africa have not regained their independent initiative in relationship to the natural environment.

Despite the clear evidence of the decline in cattle herds, the colonial state embarked on a massive destocking campaign in the regions of Mwanza and Shinyanga. World War II had brought a dramatic increase in the demand for beef to feed British troops. Thus the British meat processing firm of Leibigs had established a buying station and factory at Athi River in Kenya. The colonial propaganda machinery induced the pastoralists of Tanganyika to part with some livestock as their contribution to the war fund¹⁵. But as the war intensified, the colonial state turned from exhortation to forced destocking. Walter Rodney in his study of this period showed how the Defence Regulations were invoked to ensure the compulsory sale of cattle in 1942. Under the provisions of the Defence (Compulsory sale of cattle) Regulations it was decided that Kwimba, Maswa and Shinyanga districts should supply

12 Walter Rodney, *World War II and the Tanzanian Economy*, pp.22-24.

13 Lord Lugard, *The Rise of our East African Empire*, Vol.11. Edinburgh, 1893, pp.525-526.

14 Helge Kjekshus, *Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History*, Heinemann, 1977.

15 Rodney, *op.cit.*, pp.22.

60,000 of the 70,000 heads of cattle required from the Lake Province. Quotas for each district were allocated to the chiefs and to the villages. Rodney showed how "the resistance to the compulsory sale of cattle formed a special part of African resistance in the rural sector during the war". After the war the colonial state helped British capital by establishing Tanganyika Packers Ltd. (TPL).

Even during the war, it was clear that there was no problem of over-stocking so that after the war, it was necessary to devise new measures to take value out of Sukumaland. Serious problems had arisen for though the beef for Britain campaign was linked to an enterprise located at Athi River in Kenya, the factory drew 90 per cent of its supplies from Sukumaland by way of long and poorly watered stock routes. So to be able to continue the destocking campaign and the concomitant compulsory sale of cattle at low prices, the colonial state sheltered British capital by the establishment of a company formed jointly with the colonial government and Leibigs under the name of Tanganyika Packers Ltd. This company was incorporated in November 1947. In the twenty year period between 1947 and 1967, this company survived and prospered through state subsidies. Not only was this company subsidised by compulsory destocking thus assured of supplies but the company was given tax concessions, profitable prices and the necessary infrastructure of feeder roads, reduced freight rates and priority access to transport from the Railway Authorities.

This explicit support for colonial capital with the political impact of compulsory sale of cattle disguised as destocking meant that Sukumaland became the pivot of the anti-colonial resistance during the 1950s. The resistance to cattle sales took many forms and even the colonial sociologist in giving evidence before the East African Royal Commission testified to the unpopularity of the destocking measures to support TPL. Cory, presenting his case in the liberal tradition that men should have the right to dispose freely of his property, warned that, "without the Tanganyika Packers Ltd., a compulsory destocking campaign could not be executed, because the surplus cattle could not be sold"¹⁶.

It was therefore not insignificant that in the anti-colonial struggles of the period of mass resistance in the 1950s, forced destocking was at the top of the list of the measures that the African nationalists wanted to be removed. So when in 1954 the political expression of anti-colonialism emerged in this region, the *Sukuma* Union drew up an agenda for discussion with the colonial state the first three items of which were:

- (1) Necessity for destocking

16 Hans Cory Papers No.77. "Destocking in Sukumaland".

- (2) Destocking (procedures) and
- (3) Prices paid by Tanganyika Packers Ltd¹⁷.

The area called Sukumaland was one of the most militant centres of opposition to colonial rule and the ferocity of the resistance in this period was such that the colonial authorities banned the operations of the nationalist party - The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) - in Sukumaland for three years. Hans Cory who had been studying the subversive 'potential of *Sukuma* secret societies' wrote a warning for the colonial state on the conditions which gave rise to the *Maji Maji* and the *Mau Mau*. He was using his knowledge to prevent an uprising in the regions of the *Sukuma*. In August 1954, the colonialists did not yet know the full measure of the nationalists so, by banning TANU, they drove resistance underground though some of the energies were channelled into the building of the cooperative society to market the growing cotton crop¹⁸. When legitimate forms of political expressions were driven underground in the regions of Mwanza and Shinyanga, the fledgling nationalist politicians lost control over the peasant resistance and this was manifest in the Geita uprising of 1958.

Geita, in Mwanza region, is a rich area where today there is a gold rush in that part of Tanzania. The colonial authorities at that time undoubtedly knew of the existence of the vast deposits of gold and had wanted to establish a multi-racial council as a new form of governance. The mass opposition to colonialism in this region climaxed in a protest march which opposed the specific establishment of the multi-racial council but the Geita uprising was part of the general unrest throughout Sukumaland as "dissidents flouted agricultural rules, sought to release prisoners and threatened courts"¹⁹.

This uprising speeded the decolonization process as the colonial state gave more authority to the nationalists so that they could help to stabilise the situation. With the liberation war of the Land and Freedom army engaging British troops in neighbouring Kenya, the British did not want the Geita uprising to escalate and spread throughout the Tanganyika territory. The equivocal attitudes of the nationalists to the self organisation and self activity of the people is now stifled in the nationalist presentation of the heroes of the colonial struggle. This is especially important for in the era of the *Sungu Sungu*, the resistance was aimed against the same state machinery, only this time commanded by the former nationalists. What is also of special

17 G. Maguire, *op.cit*, pp.147.

18 Maguire *ibid*. pp.181-195. Maguire suggested that this was the result of an explicit agreement between Bomani and Nyerere.

19 John Iliffe, *op.cit*, pp.558-560. Iliffe actually saw this uprising as the breakthrough which strengthened TANU vis a vis the colonial state. For a fuller discussion of the issues of the "geita crisis" see Maguire, *op.cit*, pp;199-215.

significance was the way in which the anti-colonial uprising was linked to the notion of *Sukuma* identity. For a while the colonial state toyed with the idea of mobilising the ethnic identity by setting up the *Sukuma* Federal Council but Julius Nyerere, the then leader of TANU, opposed the colonial support for this council for he had perceived the divisive potential of this form of organisation in the context of the nationalist struggle all over the continent of Africa. He opposed the Sukumaland Federal Council on the grounds that "we can't have another Katanga here"²⁰.

The period after political independence in 1961 brought a respite in the spate and intensity of the peasant resistance. The forms of *Sukuma* identity which had been part of the Geita uprisings and other forms of passive protest had been submerged under the euphoria of 'Uhuru'. Nationalist forms of governance replaced the indirect rule of the colonialists. Chieftainships were abolished and the party institutionalised in the rural areas as the political leaders sought to effect greater cohesion of the society through the party and the laying of the foundations for a territorial language - Kiswahili. It was the strength of the party which enabled the nationalists to abolish the chiefly structures throughout the territory. Together with the promise of Ujamaa in 1967 and the efforts towards self-reliance, the Tanzanian society became distinguished from its neighbours by its relative stability. It is our view that the declaration of Ujamaa acted as a safety valve for the nationalists but without the conceptualisation of how to harness the knowledge of the village community for transforming the poverty of the rural poor, the forms of the colonial trade economy were bound to lead to new patterns of resistance.

The regions of Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora were rich areas but there were no plans to use the gold, diamonds or cattle for the strengthening of the local capacity for sustained economic development. Instead the effort was to intensify the old insistence on a narrow range of cash crops. In the specific case of TPL, without the overt support of the state, this company could not prosper by competing in the 'marketplace'. After the Arusha declaration, the company was nationalised under terms which would be questionable in a society where a larger per cent of the population understood basic accounting or where the state was in any way responsive to democratic appeals. And to be able to get closer to the cattle of the *Sukuma*, the TPL laid the foundations for a meat processing plant in Shinyanga. But like so many other projects in the neo-colonial period, after fourteen years the fa-

20 Maguire, *ibid.* pp.282.

ctory was not opened²¹. The history of TPL is still riddled with anti-people activities to the point where even the party had called for a ten per cent destocking in certain regions; viz Arusha, Mwanza and Shinyanga. But the party's own efforts to probe the maladministration of the TPL has led to class solidarity in that the findings have never reached the public.

Forced destocking of the colonial type could never be implemented in the neo-colonial era (except by a military regime) even though 'aid agencies' had to find new ways to reduce the cattle herd so that the people could become more dependent on the sale of cash crops for their livelihood. So, by the end of the 1970s the region of Sukumaland became once more the area of intense cattle rustling. Where the TPL could not take the surplus cattle because of the incompletion of the Shinyanga meat processing factory, the old Athi River factory in Kenya was the next closest factory and was one of the destination of the cattle of the people. Similar to the era of colonialism the value from the peoples labour was entering the circuit of capital accumulation through the Kenya Meat Marketing Board. It was not insignificant that Shinyanga region with over 32 per cent of the total cattle population of the country was the area of the most intense violence and cattle theft.

The spate of cattle thefts and violence in Shinyanga was one clear manifestation of the alienation of the poor peasantry from the state. During the 1970s, all the regions of Mwanza and Shinyanga seethed with discontent and the surface appearance of the problem was the increased witchcraft homicides in this area. The insecurity and uncertainty generated by the forced villagisation of the 1970s was being compounded by the lack of clarity on how the concept of collective villages should affect the pastoral peoples. The idea of settled villages did not seriously consider the long term effects of villagisation on the pastoral peoples as the state accepted the colonial view that the livestock producing peasants were not yet settled. Kemal Mustafa in his study of the 'Pastoral Question in Tanzania' said that

Administrators continue to assert, usually without any empirical evidence, that without further destocking, there could be no development for the livestock producing masses. He went on to say:

Given the reluctance by the livestock producing peasants to reduce their cattle numbers under increasingly difficult economic conditions, there

21 The links between the needs of the state and the economics department of the University were most explicit in the M.A. thesis written to develop policy guidelines for a guaranteed supply of meat to the proposed meat canning factory. See, E.S. Bukuku, *Marketed Cattle Supply in Shinyanga Region: A Study of Producer's Response to Price and Rainfall*. M.A. Economics, University of Dar es Salaam 1977.

has been a growing tendency to use both legal and illegal force to bring this destocking in the interests of accumulation.

Linking this process of forced commoditisation to the increased plunder of the rural areas, especially after the 1979 Kagera War, this writer like many others noted the use of heavy sub-machine guns to rob the pastoralists of their cattle.

The oppressive nature of this accumulation on the basis of the livestock producing masses has been leading to an increasingly antagonistic relationship between the livestock producing peasants and the petty bourgeois class in control of state power in Tanzania. The rise of the militant Sungu Sungu movement in Mwanza, Tabora and Shinyanga regions, the heart of the so-called livestock zone of Tanzania in the 1980s is a direct response by the livestock producing peasants against this oppressive accumulation through 'forced commoditisation'²².

In our view the rise of the *Sungu Sungu* was related to the increased insecurity in the regions; insecurity generated the results of forced villagisation, the lack of clarity on the future of pastoralism and far more important, the increased use of machine guns to steal cattle from the peasants after the 1979 war in Uganda. The *Sungu Sungu* was a response to the deepening class struggle in the rural area. This class struggle was no longer silent as the masses could not count on the Stock Theft Prevention Unit to protect them. According to the figures of the government there were over 11,453 cattle thefts and 15 murders in Shinyanga, Maswa, Kahama and Bariadi districts in 1981. In 1982 there were 21,922 cattle thefts and 8 murders related to cattle thefts in the same districts. A total of 52,876 cattle were reported stolen from the country in 1982²³. This meant that at 1982 prices the state was losing over US \$66 million from cattle thefts. In essence this was a rough estimate for the state did not know the full extent of the livestock population of the country for up to the present, many of the rural livestock producers associate the livestock census²⁴ with taxation or other measures linked to coercion such as forced destocking.

By the 1980s, insecurity was compounded by increased activity linked to gold mining, smuggling and those forms of economic activities associated with primitive accumulation. Mwanza on Lake Victoria was like a frontier

22 Kemal Mustafa, "The Pastoral Question in Tanzania" paper presented at the seminar on Economic Recovery in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Feb. 1986.

23 *Daily News*, 10 August 1983.

24 According to the Minister of Agriculture there were 12.5 million heads of cattle, 7 million goats, and 3.4 million sheep in Tanzania - by the figures of the 1984 census. *Sunday News*, August 16, 1987, pp.7.

region where the possibility existed to receive all kinds of contraband goods and where leaders made a mockery of the party's code of conduct. From time to time, the press reported alarming figures of deaths of up to 11 persons per week in Geita until the state was so embarrassed that the news of the insecurity only reached the capital city Dar es Salaam in a trickle.

The vein of gold in Geita which runs all the way through to Kahama is only partially mined by the State Mining Corporation at the Buck Reef Gold Mines. The bulk of the mining is carried out by small scale operators who have very little legal protection from competing claimants. The diggers had even less security even more so because the mining methods were primitive without the minimum of safety conditions for those who were digging for the gold. But, however, much of the mining methods were primitive without proper drilling equipment or other mining equipment, the amount of gold taken out was in such large quantities that one estimate in the newspaper suggested that over half a billion shillings worth of gold was being taken illegally every week²⁵. Mining villages such as Bulyankulu in Kahama district became the magnet for all kinds of dealers and by 1987 over 30,000 persons were to be found in this small village, which had to be divided in stages Bulyankulu 1, 2, 3, etc. stretching the limits of all forms of administration and normal social interaction.

Kahama district is a rich fertile district in Shinyanga region and it is not accidental that the *Sungu Sungu* first appeared in Kahama district. This district epitomized the cultural clash between the impossible modernisation, Europeanisation of the village community and the cosmology of the peasantry. This clash is compounded by the fact that the region of Shinyanga is one of the richest in Tanzania both in human resources and in terms of the resources in gold, diamonds and other wealth being taken out of the country. State mining ventures such as the Madui Diamond Mines took a fraction of the actual amount of diamonds mined. This was common knowledge in Tanzania and from time to time the popular outcry by parliamentarians and other sections of the party national executive led the state to set up Commissions of inquiry into the rate of smuggling of gold and diamonds²⁶. But where class solidarity ensured that the findings of these commissions are never revealed to the public, the violence and insecurity required urgent at-

25 The figures of the newspapers would suggest that more gold was being smuggled out of Tanzania than the total of the revenue of the state budget for the past four years. Calculated at 70 shillings to the dollar this figure would amount to over US \$342 million per year being smuggled out in gold. See *Sunday News*, September 13, 1987 and *Daily News*, December 12, 1987.

26 The most recent Commission was the formation of a Parliamentary Select Committee to study the Mining Operations in Mara, Mwanza, Shinyanga and Singida regions. *Daily News*, August 28, 1987.

attention and in order to halt the spread of violence, insecurity and cattle rustling, the people resorted to a traditional form of military organisation to form the *Sungu Sungu*.

The *Sungu Sungu*²⁷

That the *Sungu Sungu* arose as the social force to resist the violence, insecurity and forced commoditisation of cotton was a profound statement on the form of class struggles in rural Tanzania. The very name of the *Sungu Sungu* itself in its meaning reflects the search for solidarity and collective action by the people. Research into the nomenclature of the *Sungu Sungu* showed that it is very difficult to transpose a concept which is linked to tradition to the English language. For in this process the concept of *Sungu Sungu* is going through three layers of language. The closest that this research could come to this in its attempt to carry forward this concept to English was the fact that the concept related to "cooperation in doing jobs" which is similar to the cooperation of insects which in *Kisukuma* are known as *Sungwa or Sungu*²⁸.

The *Sungu Sungu* are also called *Wasalama* which means those soldiers who have brought peace and security in the society. This name is a Kiswahili name and is linked up to the general acceptance of the work of the *Sungu Sungu* in the three regions of Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora where the people do not all claim to be *Sukuma*. One important point however, was the way in which the *Sungu Sungu* brought to life a form of *Sukuma* identity in the above-mentioned regions. So much so that in a region such as Tabora where the people are predominantly Wanyamwezi, in the military operations associated with peace keeping in the villages, the *Sungu Sungu* in this region were also called *Basukuma*. It suggested that the *Sukuma* identity was taken on for cohesion and discipline, especially so in the area of Kahama which had attracted thousands of immigrants in the past ten years.

P. Masanja in his study of the *Sungu Sungu* said that through legend the founder of the movement was one Kishosha, the grandson of Ng'wanamalundi. The legends surrounding this Ng'wanamalundi are all linked to his knowledge of traditional plants and his opposition to colonial rule to the point where he was exiled from Shinyanga by the British. Through oral literature tales are told of how he defied the British authorities to escape detention and it is clear from these stories that they are meant to motivate the youth. Deeper investigation showed that the *Sungu Sungu* in its structure

27 Research on the *Sungu Sungu* was carried out over a period of four years by this author with assistance from Monica Morris who did field work and completed the questionnaire in Mwanza and in Sengerema. M. Kamata carried out research in Bariadi district of Shinyanga region and Vincent Joshua did the bulk of the research in Kahama district.

28 Notes of researchers in Shinyanga in 1987.

and organisation does not depend on an individual but on the collective self organisation of the village community. The spread of the movement in the short period between 1980-1983 showed that there was a certain autonomy to each village assembly so that for years the state security organs were studying the leadership structure of the *Sungu Sungu* in order to curb the growth but could not do it. Here was an army of the people which later called itself "Jeshi la Ukombozi" which traversed an area over 50,000 square kilometres establishing law and order according to the conception of popular village assemblies.

One researcher in describing the *Sungu Sungu* said:

*the Sungu Sungu specialize in the apprehension and punishment of live-stock thieves..... When a thief is caught he is taken to the location where the theft occurred and punishment takes place..... Sungu Sungu members appear quite exotic as they are barefoot and bare-chested, wear feathered head-dresses, shorts, quivers of bows, bells around their ankles and carry arrows and spears in their hands. They dance and sing in a circle around the thief who sits impassively in the centre, appearing dazed and disinterested*²⁹.

Beyond the exotic appearance of this army this researcher captured the place of dance and songs in this collective village security process. For the songs and dances were a reflection of a deeper manifestation of a people trying to preserve their cultural heritage. These dances demonstrated the popular culture of the village and were not the subversive societies that Hans Cory had been mandated to study. Dance and song occupy a very important place in the village community. They are not only outlets for artistic and aesthetic expressions among the people but they also fill material, spiritual and emotional needs.

Even though one of the more important of the *Sukuma* dances, the snake dance (buyeye) is now used to entertain tourists, the dance societies were related to entertainment, physical exercise and the skills of medicine, hunting and the herding of cattle. Undoubtedly the content of the dances and songs have been affected by the transformations unleashed by colonialism and neo-colonialism. Thus while the *Sungu Sungu* seem traditional in the form of the songs sung or the dances performed, the traditional structures which were linked to homesteads (*kaya*) or established fields (*matongo*) were affected by the new production and social relations that had arisen in the society. What was traditional was that the *Sungu Sungu* dug deep into the knowledge of organisation and collective security to develop an army

29 Donna Kemer, *Witches, Cows, Thieves and Party Politics: An Examination of the Sungu Sungu Movement*, Department of Education Seminar, 1983.

which could confront and neutralise the superior weaponry of the cattle rustlers. Far more important than the exotic characteristics of the *Sungu Sungu* was the class content.

Fifty years earlier, Hans Cory warned the colonial bureaucracy that it was powerless to interfere with the dance societies so that the state should be careful lest the societies provide the focus for popular self-organisation, (in the words of colonialism - discontent). After describing seventeen societies including 3-5 dance societies he had warned that:

Although the societies described above do not meddle in the administrative or political affairs there is the possibility that if changing economic conditions give rise to class divisions based on wealth, one or more of these societies may provide the focus for discontent, because there is the tendency for the sophisticated and better off native not to join this kind of society.

After one generation of independence, the better off "native" of the *Sukuma* had indeed become part of the state class in the party, the regional administration or in the ideological apparatus of the state machinery. For this reason, though cattle rustling affected pastoralists more than it affected cultivators, it was in the interest of the whole community to break the cycle of insecurity and violence generated by the forced commoditisation of cattle. The content of the *Sungu Sungu* was to defend the weak and the poor; pastoralists and non-pastoralists. P. Masanja in his notes, while explaining the traditional *Sukuma* forms drawing extensively from his facility in the language was penetrating enough to perceive the class content. He said:

The Sungu Sungu initially emerged as a response by the middle and poor peasants who had been harassed by increasing armed cattle rustling, highway brigandry (known as Kodi ya Milembe or Masanja) and house breaking. In Kahama they considered themselves as Jeshi La Ukombozi against the much richer peasants who had created their own organisation known as Chama cha kumi in which cattle keepers paid a membership fee of 200/- which allegedly was used to grease the palm of those in authority to arrest thieves as an insurance against theft³⁰.

The social processes which gave rise to this movement were very specific to the nature of the regions with large numbers of cattle. Far more research is needed on the links between cultivators and pastoralists if collective forms of association are to be engendered in the future. This research work could also help to show how the social wealth of these communities is linked to

30 P. Masanja, *op.cit.*, pp.3.

the ownership of cattle and not to the newer symbols of capitalism. Yet, from the present evidence, it is clear that the poor whether cultivators or pastoralists came together to defend their communities. This is seen from the social basis of the social organisation of this army of resistance.

The Sungu Sungu basis of social organisation is the village community (kijiji or Nzengo). All inhabitants of the kijiji are Basungusungu. While initially the Sungu Sungu were a few able-bodied men who secretly met to plan out strategies for defence, now every inhabitant is deemed to be Sungu Sungu. There are no membership fees as such, though on the day that the kijiji constitutes itself into the Sungu Sungu, word is passed around that from the neighbouring village, Sungu Sungu will come to install the leadership and contributions of 20/- are collected from each (kaya) household. The enthusiasm with which people readily pay is an indication of the positive response from the peasantry and the way they wish to be identified with this movement..... The village community was its assembly to which all belong and participate in deliberations.... The assembly elects in a public gathering their (ntemi) leader, (katibu) secretary, five elders and a makanda to head each group of 10 able bodied young men³¹.

This description and other works on this army emphasised the democratic and popular nature of the movement where free elections, open accountability and collective resistance superseded the social domination of the party and the state with the layers of functionaries who were to be seen cooperating with thieves, smugglers and other corrupt elements of the bureaucracy and donor agencies. In more than one instance, the *Sungu Sungu* even apprehended police persons and replaced village governments. The *Sungu Sungu* gave themselves the mandate to return the security to the villages by removing and guarding against cattle rustling, thieves, racketeers (walanguzi) and alleged witches.

Before the era of trade liberalisation in 1984, the prosecution of hoarders and racketeers in the villages was carried out with such vigour that the village community had reasoned that magendo brought insecurity. This was a tremendous development in the popular consciousness but the *Sungu Sungu* lacked the ideological tools required to deepen this profound transformation in the consciousness of the poor peasants. The *Sungu Sungu* had no links with the working class in the towns nor with the progressive intelligentsia so that when they are acclaimed by the state and the party as having restored

31 Ibid. pp.14.

peace and security, it could be legitimately asked who benefitted from that security.

Despite the ideological limits of the *Sungu Sungu*, the nature of this organisation was such that the military structure of the movement did not take the form of a standing army. The *Sungu Sungu* were integrated into the village community and were answerable to and carried out their conception of justice with the power of the community behind them. This power of the community to sanction justice outside the legal framework of the colonial judiciary had been noted by colonial officials who studied the *Sukuma*³². This form of law enforcement by community action meant that the army was totally integrated into the community. In this sense the *Sungu Sungu* was a real peoples army totally reliant on the community. This is clear from the weapons, system-bows and arrows, the knowledge of the environment, the motivation techniques, the knowledge of medicine (the proper chingira), the command, control and communications system of the army called the *Sungu Sungu*. The command structure is linked to the *Ntemi* and the commander who must be a person with medicinal practices and the sort of training necessary for fighting and endurance. While tracking cattle rustlers, the *Sungu Sungu* moved in small groups of 8-10 or the size of the section of the platoon of the Western army. The *Sungu Sungu* used guerilla tactics for survival and drew heavily from the *ruga ruga* tradition: that is the military skills which were used by Chief Mirambo in the battles of the 19th century.

The *Sungu Sungu* had their own unique methods of communication over a region of 50,000 sq. kilometres with over 5 million persons. The process of establishing this sort of communication was linked to the cultural bonds between the people and the fact that the power of the poor peasants held sway over the rustlers and racketeers. *Sungu Sungu* went from village to village and carried out a ceremony called *kutemya* (some researchers including my own research assistants call this an enthronement ceremony but this ideation seem to contradict the popular basis of the movement. It seems that there is no adequate English translation for this process). In this ceremony the *Sungu Sungu* dance and sing the following song:

Gininiga ng'watwizilike ng'wali ng'wakumuka wibi
na basambo abo ng'watogwa kubulaga
banhu sagala
Mmane giki Sungu Sungu itabembelejaga
Lelo ng'wacha.

(roughly translated)

32 R.E.S. Tanner, "Law Enforcement in Sukumaland". *Journal African Administration*, Vol.VII, No.4 October 1955.

*Gininiga you have come to call us
thieves were dominantly threatening everywhere,
Witchcraft rejoiced to kill people,
Let you all know the facts
Sungusungu has no mercy on you,
death is upon you,
be prepared.*

The military organisation of the *Sungu Sungu* described above proved adequate as long as resistance remained within the politics of the districts from which the army arose. It could not confront a real army bent on mowing down peasants armed with bows and arrows. So while there was a high rate of success in trapping cattle rustlers this limited military capacity, especially with respect to weapons could not succeed in battles elsewhere. This was clear in a major battle in May 1984 where scores of *Sungu Sungu* were ambushed in a battle with the Wataturu. The party Secretary General was rushed to Shinyanga region and the party prevailed upon the *Sungu Sungu* not to take revenge. Instead the party promised that it would "equip the traditional defence groups with modern defence techniques to enable them to be more effective"³³. This was only more pushed by the political leadership to pacify and demobilise the *Sungu Sungu*. Since that time the official line has been that the *Sungu Sungu* represented the true embodiment of the people's militia and as such should be recognised under the law governing the peoples militia. (At the same time another party commission urged caution in the issuing of firearms to the peoples militia in the areas where the *Sungu Sungu* were strong). The older party leaders who has matured out of the popular struggles of the nationalist era knew of the potential of this kind of village grassroots organisation and thus to control the uprising in order to curb it the party gave the *Sungu Sungu* its public blessing while seeking ways to restrain its autonomy and independence from the party structures in the villages.

From that period when the party leaders took to tours to address the *Sungu Sungu* this movement was gradually turned from its original objectives to become cheap unpaid labour to keep peace in the villages especially in the frontier gold mining villages of Kahama and Geita. During 1983, when the state was in a battle against racketeers, the *Sungu Sungu* were deployed in

33 The newspapers reported that 48 were killed in this battle but local party officials said that the figure was much higher. For the figures of the government see *Daily News*, June 19, 1984. Some villagers believed that the police assisted in setting up the ambush.

the towns of Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora and became part of the peace-keeping apparatus of the state³⁴.

This was a major achievement for the party commissioners who studied the *Sungu Sungu* were old enough to know the consequences of driving resistance underground as the colonialists did in the same regions in the 1950s. But in their embrace of the *Sungu Sungu* the party did not bring any clear leadership to deal with cattle rustling and insecurity and thus embraced all the aspects of the *Sungu Sungu* including the contradictory aspects of the male dominated community organisation. This contradiction was most explicit in the speeches of the party leaders on witchcraft and witchcraft eradication. Hence the party exhorted the *Sungu Sungu* to refrain from the persecution of witches without developing the kind of programme which would seek to help the peasantry to cope with their pre-occupation with witchcraft. The tactic of the party recognition of the *Sungu Sungu* was a short term measure of repressive tolerance but was inadequate for the long term resolution of the social conditions which gave rise to the *Sungu Sungu*.

For this reason, confusion exists over the lines of authority between the state organs such as the police, the courts, the Stock Theft Prevention Unit and the *Sungu Sungu*.

The Sungu Sungu and the State

The spread in the size and operations of the *Sungu Sungu* in rural Tanzania was a profound response of the peasantry to the way in which state control over the lives of the people had been strengthened by villagisation and the administrative changes developed in its wake. *Sungu Sungu* was to be a source of confidence for rural villagers that they could develop autonomous forms of popular assembly which was in resistance to the 'plethora of appointed officials at the local level'. The take over of village governments and the take over of police stations by the *Sungu Sungu* was a dramatic response to the forms of governance in the rural villages. This form was authoritarian, and its content anti-democratic and was the political expression of the socio-economic policies pursued in the society and disguised as *Ujamaa*. The fundamental problem however, was in the objective basis for accumulation in Tanzania.

Though the ideology of the state since 1967 had been predicated to self reliance and socialism, there was a marked continuity in the direction of the colonial economic policies. Where the nature of village organisation changed to resemble the collective aspirations of the people called *Ujamaa*, the essence of the structures of production and marketing was to perpetuate the old dependence on a narrow range of export crops. The gold from Kaha-

34 *Daily News*, August 10, 1983.

ma and Geita, the cotton, the cattle and the diamonds did not go to build the foundations of a socialist economy, or even the foundations for a local capitalist class. These commodities entered the circuit of international capital in ways which led to the leakage of capital and reinforcing the history of super-exploitation and marginalisation. More than one study in the recent past has documented the ways in which villagisation was the culmination of efforts that started way back in the colonial days to restructure rural economic life so as to facilitate further exploitation of the rural masses by international capitalism³⁵.

To be able to test this assertion, one needs not remain at the level of the operations of the Tanzanian state in the sense of the examination of the relevant organs. For in the day to day operations of the state, it can be seen how all the organs of the state whether ideological or coercive are integrated with foreign capital. Its links with the socialist community strengthen the claim to legitimacy of being socialist but this in no way diminishes the way in which the whole economy is integrated with western capitalism. This was even more explicit in the 1980s when in the face of the balance of payments crisis the "donor" agencies took a more direct role in administering regional integrated projects. The church and the donor agencies intensified their campaign to modernise the rural peasantry.

While in other parts of the underdeveloped world such as in Latin America the church has been transformed in the process of popular resistance to link the ideas of theology to liberation, the church in rural Tanzania is still rolling ahead with its civilising mission ensuring that it is part of the cultural confrontation in the society. This is because in its civilising mission the church does not seek to build up on the spiritual and religious experiences of the poor. So that in the campaign rhetoric to rid the society of ignorance, poverty and disease, there is no sense in seeking to tap the vast knowledge dammed up by colonialism. The health projects reinforce the domination of multinational drug firms through the aid called the Essential Drug Programme. Education for self reliance also turns its back on the informal process of knowledge production in the village community so that even the advances made in Universal Primary Education is threatened in turning into its opposite as shortages of desks, chairs and books affect the youth³⁶.

35 This is not to say that Ujamaa started out with the explicit objective of strengthening capitalism in the rural areas but once international capital saw that this strategy was based on a narrow range of cash crops they supported the idea to defeat the genuine aspirations of the people. See (a) Cheryl Payer, "The World Bank and Tanzania". *Third World Quarterly* October 1983 and (b) H. Mapolu, "The State and the Peasantry", in *The State and the Working People in Tanzania* ed. Issa Shivji. Codesria Books 1985.

36 The President acknowledged in a speech at the university of Dar es Salaam in June 1987 that there were over 48,000 pupils in the primary schools in Dar es Salaam alone without desks and chairs.

Hence the fact that the bulk of the army of the *Sungu Sungu* were standard seven leavers was one indication of the reality that the villagers were saying that the school system did not prepare their children for the realities of peasant life. This was a major statement on the whole rationale for state legitimisation in Tanzania since the policy of education for self reliance was one of the cornerstone of the Ujamaa strategy.

Defiance and resistance, however, while mobilising the energies of vast communities proved unable to generate the kind of outlook which could carry the people forward out of the insecurity generated by their relationship to the natural environment and to the state. And the party leadership could only think of development in terms of intensifying what had gone on before. Most of the development projects were rewrites of the post war programme, rewritten as the World Bank Programme 1961, with the latest version being the Structural Adjustment Programme of 1982. All these plans called for the extension of the acreages under tobacco and cotton. These two crops were the cash crops of the region of the *Sungu Sungu*. Tobacco production with its dependence on firewood led to deforestation and the regressive nature of cotton production. Its linkages in the economy meant that the people who produced the cotton could not afford the clothes from the same cotton. The kind of scientific outlook necessary to lay the basis for transformation was not forthcoming as the leading economic thinkers in the University became consultants for donor agencies on how to deepen the production of the same regressive crops in the face of resistance from the peasantry.

Because the present foundations of the Tanzanian state did not simply lay in the heritage of the colonial state the party which itself arose out of the resistance of the people took a different line on the *Sungu Sungu* from the other organs of the state, especially the coercive organs. Whereas the police, the courts and the Stock Theft Prevention Unit called for greater powers over the *Sungu Sungu* the party as the ideological arm of the state and the source of the legitimisation of the system first studied the *Sungu Sungu* and held regular consultative meetings with district and regional officials from the *Sungu Sungu* areas. At the same time party functionaries in the University studied the *Sungu Sungu* and warned that "it should not be driven underground".... "It is important to avoid coercive measures and instead adopt political measures that can transform and modernise the movement into an effective and highly disciplined grassroots organisation rooted in the history and culture of the peoples it intended to serve"³⁷. The Party commission took this modernising theme to heart and this was reflected in the speeches of party and government leaders promising the *Sungu Sungu* modern wea-

37 J.F. Mbwiliza and Donna Kemer, "The *Sungu Sungu*" History Department Seminar, Feb. 1984.

pons and uniforms. This was an empty promise for there was a shortage of equipment for the more established layers of the coercive forces, like the peoples militia. This ensured that up to the time of writing the *Sungu Sungu* still wore their exotic uniforms even when called out to be guards of honour at state functions such as peasants day in 1987.

Because the party was a thermometer to test the attitudes of the people, the party recommended that in order to bring the movement under stricter state control, the *Sungu Sungu* would become the village security committee. At the same time to be able to better administer the movement another district was created in Shinyanga region. Thus Maswa district was divided into two to create the districts of Maswa and Meatu. (This was the border area over which a lot of the rustled cattle passed on its way to Kenya). From time to time there were reports in the press that the party was preparing training programmes for villages and to decide which offences were to be handled by the peoples army and those which were to be handled by the police. These distinctions were never codified into law.

But there was a certain logic in the approach of the party for at times the state found it convenient to mobilise the *Sungu Sungu* when there were internal squabbles between different sections. This was glaring after the planned military intervention by certain elements in January 1983. The shaken political leadership identified a new class of accumulators as its principal opponents and called them economic saboteurs. The party then mobilised the *Sungu Sungu* in the rural areas to flush out corrupt elements, racketeers and saboteurs (called *Walanguzi*). In the heat of this campaign, the then Prime Minister commended the *Sungu Sungu* for "carrying out a cultural revolution in the country" in their efforts to fight crime and to build socialism³⁸. The then Prime Minister who later met his death in an automobile accident, was at that time the Secretary of the National Defence and Security Commission of the party. He asserted that the society had forgotten the role of their tradition and culture in defence and security. Statements such as this endeared the Prime Minister to the *Sungu Sungu* to the point where one of their most favourite songs was on the untimely death of the Prime Minister in April 1984.

*Sokoine uli Nsalama ugongwa gali
guseka amasambo
Mungu bebe leka na bile baba u-Sokoine
Nuchoba abasambo*

38 Speech by the Prime Minister Edward Sokoine in Mwanza in October 1983. Reported in *Daily News* October 21, 1983.

(roughly translated)

*Sokoine was the upright man
The enemies of the people planned an accident
He died and they rejoiced
Sorrow spread everywhere
Ok God, I cry for Sokoine
I will hunt for the conspirators.*

During this period, the policy of confinement of goods was a measure against the wholesale importation of luxury goods. In the villages, those who hoarded goods were identified as enemies of the people. It was for this reason that the *Sungu Sungu* took up the campaign against saboteurs in earnest for as poor peasants they suffered from the shortages of essential commodities and the high prices when these goods appeared. As long as there was a collusion of interest between the national leadership and the role of the *Sungu Sungu*, the President, the Prime Minister and the Secretary General of the party called for the recognition of the *Sungu Sungu* under the law. So successful were the *Sungu Sungu* in curbing cattle rustling that by 1985 the cattle rustlers had to take their activities to Mara region. Then the national party leaders called on the people to form traditional defence groups of the *Sungu Sungu* genre to combat the insecurity and murders in Mara region. This was problematic not in the least for the fact that the *Sungu Sungu* developed not simply as a self defence group but in a specific cultural and historical context. Up to 1987 the party Chairman and former President was calling on the government to recognise the traditional defence groups the "baraza" in Mara and the *Sungu Sungu* in Sukumaland³⁹.

This position of the top party leadership was always at odds with the local party officials in the regional administration and with the legal authorities in the society. Firstly, during the Anti-Economic Sabotage Campaign, there were many instances in the regions of Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora when regional leaders were harassed and called Walanguzi by the *Sungu Sungu*. Secondly, after the 1984 budget, when the trade liberalisation policy allowed the so called former racketeers to freely import and sell goods, those who raised their voices against the *Sungu Sungu* called for more efforts to curb the traditional defence structure⁴⁰.

In the initial period of the new trade liberalisation policy, the party, to cushion the apparent shift in policy direction called on the *Sungu Sungu* to plant trees and to increase agricultural production.

39 *Daily News*, August 5, 1987.

40 This was reflected in the parliamentary debates. Every year, since 1984, there have been heated exchanges in Tanzanian Parliament on the existence of the *Sungu Sungu*.

This was the beginning of the new explicit campaign to demobilise the *Sungu Sungu* and this was to be carried forward by the 'donors' who introduced a special scheme of "incentive goods for rural Tanzania" especially among the *Sukuma*. Incentive goods were to be thousands of bicycles which would be used as a carrot to induce the peasant to produce cotton despite the fact that the world price of cotton was below the cost of production. In other words the incentive goods were to dissuade the *Sungu Sungu* from turning their energies to demand a fair price for their produce. By 1987, the legal experts of the state felt confident enough to proclaim that the party (CCM) recognition of the *Sungu Sungu* did not have the force of law⁴¹. This problem of the relationship between the *Sungu Sungu* and the law highlighted the contradictions of the state and its inheritance both in relation to the people and to the colonial legal statutes. The decision of the party to allow the *Sungu Sungu* to organise was a major political retreat. But this retreat meant that there were clear contradictions with other branches of the state. This was explicit in relationship to the laws of Tanzania for the *Sungu Sungu* gave themselves the authority to try and pass judgement on cattle rustlers.

A clear contradiction existed between the agencies of the law, the law itself and the *Sungu Sungu*.

Though the party exhorted the *Sungu Sungu* to follow the laws of Tanzania, the party leadership from time to time called for the court to respect the rulings of the assemblies and called on the *Sungu Sungu* to hand over their charges to the courts. But the law was never changed to give a legal base for the activities of the *Sungu Sungu*. So when local state functionaries recovered their nerve after the political turn around in 1984, they started to arrest some members of the movement. This even led to more confusion as this strengthened the resolve of the *Sungu Sungu* in some areas and to the weakening in others.

Whereas under English common law a person is innocent until proved guilty, the *Sungu Sungu* had their code of investigation and those arrested are presumed guilty. At independence, Tanzania inherited the British legal system with the change of name of some courts but essentially with the same functions. What the party had wanted was for the activities of the village assemblies to have the force of the primary courts. These courts have a limited mandate and can only pass certain sentences. The *Sungu Sungu* gave themselves a higher authority and would not shirk from carrying out the death sentence if necessary.

It was this conflict which led to the repeated calls by state officials for the movement to hand over suspects to the police. This was the line of the

41 Speech of the Attorney General to Parliament. *Daily News* July 18, 1987.

Ministry of Home Affairs and this call became more urgent when the *Sungu Sungu* seized at least one police station in Mwanza region and when the weapons they seized from racketeers were found on the streets again. Behind the Ministry of Home Affairs, lawyers in the University have argued that the *Sungu Sungu* was illegal and should be disbanded⁴². As this settlement found wider acceptance, there were those who wrote letters to the press claiming that the *Sungu Sungu* was a terrorist organisation, terrorising innocent persons in the rural areas⁴³. This potential for the movement to turn into its opposite emerged from the efforts of the party to enforce unpopular laws such as the Human Resources Deployment Act - (called *Nguvu kazi* by the masses). By 1985 the *Sungu Sungu* were being called upon by the government to ensure that villagers paid the new head tax which was called 'the development levy'.

The dialectics of the positive and the negative in this movement was always present and was to emerge most clearly in the problems of witchcraft. For the party in embracing the movement had embraced it with all its contradictions and one of the manifest contradictions of rural Sukumaland was the persecution of old women as witches. During the 1970s, the problem of witchcraft homicides in Shinyanga had rocked the society and the scandalous actions of the state security organs in dealing with the problem had led to the resignation of the then Minister of Home Affairs, who is now the President of Tanzania⁴⁴.

The *Sungu Sungu*, Witchcraft and Socialism

The ideation of witchcraft remains one of the most baffling questions for socialists in their conceptualisation of the requirements of the transition to a higher form of social organisation beyond the poverty, destruction and *cul-de-sac* of neo-colonial capitalism. For inevitably as in the case of the *Sungu Sungu*, all conflicts in the rural areas hinge on the belief in the supernatural. Witchcraft has been defined by anthropologists in many books but as of the present, these understandings begin from the colonial standpoint that the native was superstitious and backward. The authors in a much quoted book on *Witchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa* defined witchcraft as 'a mystical and innate power, which can be used by its possessor to harm other people'⁴⁵.

Such a definition is static and begins from the starting point which ignores the cosmology of peasants in African societies. In the present struggle in

42 See *The Exercise of Punitive Powers outside the Judicial Process in Tanzania: A Case Study of Neo-Traditional Defence Groups (Sungu Sungu)*.

43 This was reflected in a very strong letter to the *Daily News*, March 6, 1984.

44 P. Masanja and S. Mesaki, "Witchcraft Homicides in Sukumaland". Department of Sociology, University of Dar es Salaam, November 1983.

45 John Middleton and E.H. Winter, *Witchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1983.

South Africa where real questions of social transformation are posed, there is no attempt to define witchcraft but to understand its place in social reproduction. When popular defence committees fighting the South African state were confronted with the problem of youths trying to unleash violence on so called witches, some elements called for a sober analysis and asked the relevant question, whether witches are just a superstitious remnant of the dark pre-colonial past or is there a more rational explanation for their existence? Other questions were: Is the belief in witches necessarily reactionary or can such beliefs be transformed into a progressive ideology? Is the political and cultural isolation of the countryside just a passing problem that will disappear with the march towards liberation? Or does it reflect profound difficulties in the ability of urban people to understand and interact with rural culture?⁴⁶

From these profound questions the same commentary maintained; "To Christians, Christ exists. To Muslims, Allah exists. To Marxists, class exists. To many living in the countryside, witches exist".

Such a starting point allows for a more thought provoking approach beyond the colonial witchcraft ordinances which sought to outlaw a popular custom and influenced the work of scholars in East Africa. It requires a scientific and philosophical outlook to grapple with the transformation in the society which generates the kind of insecurity which leads to the practices associated with witches and witchcraft. There are many problems raised by this question in Africa not the least is the way in which the idea of witchcraft is firmly embedded in the consciousness of the people. A graphic example of this fact is that there is hardly a soccer team in Africa which does not travel with its own witch doctor.

The colonial state even while passing legislation against witchcraft did not ignore the depth of this belief among the people. The colonial state paid close attention to those who were supposed to have the supernatural powers and the potentialities of witchcraft eradication movements. Their experience all over the colonial world taught them that witchcraft eradication movements could also develop into mass anti-colonial movements. In the specific case of colonial Tanganyika the British took care to ensure that there was no overt alliance between the nationalists and the witchcraft eradication movements⁴⁷.

46 "Burning the Herbs.... Youth, Politics and Witches in Lebowa" *Work in Progress*, No.40 South Africa, 1987.

47 There is evidence that at least one such person Nguvumali was mobilised to work on the side of the colonial state. *Tanganyika Standard*, August 29, 1957. See also L.E. Larson "Problems in the study of Witchcraft Eradication Movements in Southern Tanzania". *UFAHAMU* Vol.VI, No.3, 1976.

The aspect of the nationalist struggle is not yet properly documented but there is work which links the *Maji Maji* revolt of 1905-1906 to witchcraft eradication movements. Hans Cory in his extensive study of witchcraft had warned the colonial authorities that witchcraft and traditional beliefs could be used to mobilise anti-colonial feelings⁴⁸.

Where the intellectual starting point of anthropology was concerned with control and repression, an emancipatory intellectual framework must be developed to be able to transcend the sociology of control. The potentialities of this direction was demonstrated during the struggle, for political independence in Zimbabwe. In the process of waging armed struggle the guerillas did not turn their backs on the ideological outlook of the peasants. The guerillas made a conscious effort to mobilise the diviners and spirit mediums on the side of the liberation war⁴⁹.

To be able to tackle the insecurity in Sukumaland Tanzania which stems from the large numbers of witchcraft homicides requires a transcendence beyond the kind of exhortation to be found in the speeches of the political leaders in Tanzania. As the economic crisis deepened in rural Sukumaland so did the increase in the incidence of murders of old single women. In this the region of the *Sungu Sungu* witchcraft homicides provided for the general climate of insecurity in the community. *Sungu Sungu* arose as an antidote to this insecurity and it was therefore not surprising that members of this peasant movement have been arrested on charges of murdering witches. The party and government has called on the *Sungu Sungu* to refrain from persecuting witches but without laying the basis for changing the conditions which strengthens the outlook and beliefs in witchcraft.

This problem pointed to the urgency of the need for a scientific view of the links between witchcraft and the labour process. Progressive intellectuals need to try to understand how the consciousness of witches is determined by the relationships between men and women in the natural environment. To be able to separate real techniques of labour and the imaginary techniques of magic requires a philosophical outlook which grasps the social relations of production and the links to nature⁵⁰. A non-materialist starting point begins

48 Hans Cory, "A Few Comments on Witchcraft" No.84. In Kenya, during the struggle of the Land and Freedom army, the British called a conference of witch doctors to attempt to mobilise them against the freedom fighters. See, John Nottingham, "Sorcery among the Akamba in Kenya" *Journal of African Administration*, Vol.XI, No.2, 1955.

49 David Lan, *Guns and Rain: Guerillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe*, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1986. In Mozambique the MNR seeks to mobilise the spirit mediums on the other side of the border in the cause of South African destabilisation.

50 This attempt is made in a preliminary fashion in the study of "Traditional forms of Insurance and Social Security", in J.L. Kanywanyi, *The Effect of Ujamaa Socialism and Nationalisation on Insurance Law and Practice in Tanzania*. PhD Faculty of Law University of Dar es Salaam, 1987.

from the view that the existence of the idea of witches relates to paganism. This is because the philosophical view of Western capitalism separates matters of the spirit and the soul from sciences and technology. The philosophy of the West which was consistent with the rise of capitalism postulated that science and technology determined every sphere of life, transforming social relations in the process. The *Sungu Sungu* and the ideological infrastructure from which it sprung was one of the manifestations of resistance to the ideological formulation of capitalist development which claimed universal validity. This resistance in trying to preserve precapitalist forms could not thrive at a time when the society was confronted with the real issues of the political and economic legacies of Africa's domination and exploitation. In so far as the pre-capitalist ideas failed to challenge this domination, then even the component of resistance would hold the people back instead of carrying them forward as in the case of the rise of the *Sungu Sungu*.

Having said this, however, it should be noted that there has always been a big difference between those who profess to be witches and those who have specialised knowledge of the herbs and plants of the African countryside. As early as the 1930s the British were studying the "Native Poisons and Native Medicines of Tanganyika"⁵¹. Today, when modern medicine is caught with the contradictions of the high level of chemicals in the products of the transnational drug firms, there is a major search for natural remedies in plants and herbs. Transnational drug companies are carrying out research in the rural areas while the state imports the complex of health care of Western medicine and high cost drugs. If the state in Tanzania spent one tenth of the resources of the Essential Drug Programme on the Traditional Medicine Research Unit, then the society would be making a major step in harnessing the knowledge of traditional doctors to improve the health of the people.

Present research work in other African states such as Nigeria and Zimbabwe seeks to link the resources of the research institutes of the academic community to the medical laboratories and to the patients using the knowledge of the local healers. In Tanzania, the effort of the state to marshal this knowledge is limited and just as how at present the peasant plants cotton and cannot afford to buy the clothes, one day the herbs and plants will be packaged by transnational drug companies and the rural peasants will not be able to afford it.

The Chinese Communists in the process of transforming the inheritance of

51 W.D. Raymond, "Native Poisons and Native Medicines of Tanganyika" *Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene* October 2, 1939.

backwardness did not turn their backs on the knowledge of the traditional herbalists. In China one could find herbalists practicing alongside modern doctors and the treatment by acupuncture is now world famous⁵². The Chinese started from the point of view that socialism and socialist transformation involved the knowledge, skills and scientific techniques of the people accumulated over centuries. In Africa the modernising elites who took over as leaders after the end of formal colonialism even when proclaiming socialism turn their backs on the examples of self reliance among the people and seek to harmonise the economic exploitation of the people with the impossible task of Europeanisation. But the rise of the *Sungu Sungu* should encourage research on the relationship between social transformation and 'tambiko'⁵³.

Resistance and Transformation

The experience of the *Sungu Sungu* in Tanzania in the 1980s was a major testament to the failure of the modernisation strategy, whether this strategy was carried forward in the name of socialism or in the name of capitalism. It was an experience of the poor resisting in the main against the forced commoditisation of their labour power.

From the period of World War II to the present, all the major initiatives for economic development have been predicated on the weakening of the people to make them more vulnerable to external domination. Scholars who have been impatient with the failure to break the resistance from the villages speak of 'the uncaptured peasantry' while social democrats who dominate the donor agencies in Dar es Salaam call for capitalist development but with the learning of the experiences from the poor⁵⁴.

The *Sungu Sungu* challenged the progressive scholar to discern the real spirit of this recent manifestation of resistance in the Tanzanian countryside. They sharpened the notion of the clash between Europe and Africa, between the deepening of capitalist relations and the possibilities for new forms of democratic association and organisation. In this respect the *Sungu Sungu* cemented the place of the self organisation and the self emancipation of the masses. And at the same time the lessons of the ability of the party to take the movement under its wings reinforce the need for ideology and the clarity as to who are the allies of the rebelling masses.

52 Ralph C. Crozier, *China's Cultural Legacy and Communism*, Pall Mall Press London 1970. See especially the chapter on the attitudes toward traditional medicine. This was written before the turn to 'modernisation' in China in 1978.

53 Tambiko; loosely translated refers to the traditional values and belief systems among the popular masses.

54 Per Brandstrom, "Do we really learn from experience? Reflections on Development efforts in Sukumaland", in Anders Hjort, *Land Management and Survival*, Scandinavia Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden, 1985.

Popular discontent and resistance of the *Sungu Sungu* went beyond simple protests and took the form of armed organisation, albeit arms and weapons of a pre-colonial nature. As part of the historical process of the Tanzanian people, this movement joined the long chain of passive and active rebellions which are associated with capitalist penetration of the village community. Just as in the past capitalism retreated from other rebellions to find new forms of domination, the rise and growth of the *Sungu Sungu* did not in any way check the expansion of the ferocity of exploitation in a period of world capitalist crisis. However, if the movement did not succeed in breaking the new thrust to increase cash crops, it exposed the hollow basis of the party line on Ujamaa and self-reliance.

Significantly the *Sungu Sungu* clarified to other peasants that it was one thing to take over village governments but quite another to run them. In Mwanza, the movement removed corrupt leaders only to find out that if they were to manage the development projects of the village, then there would have to be a break in the way in which the whole operations of the village had been integrated into the parallel market. In Uganda, the Resistance movement in seizing state power is finding out that there is a big difference between resistance and laying the foundations for the real empowerment of the producing masses. In Tanzania, this question is not yet seriously tabled as the state seeks to concretise its links with the IMF without explaining the political and economic costs of this overt capitulation to pressures from the West.

Despite the claims that the 1986 agreement and the so called Economic Recovery Programme has brought essential commodities to the rural areas, the essential requirements for agricultural production could only be procured by participating in the illegal but thriving parallel market. Hence successful village projects require that even the village administration sell hides and skins and other valuable commodities to neighbouring countries. And because the *Sungu Sungu* does not understand the workings of international capital, they do not see anything wrong with keeping the peace at Geita and Kahama when 95 per cent of the gold mined is taken from their communities, while the level of the material culture of their community remain impoverished. A social movement with a wider vision would place a tax on the gold mines to ensure that there are more schools, roads, clinics, the supply of clean water and other essential services in their communities. The *Sungu Sungu* by concentrating on theft and cattle rustling at the village level did not make links with workers in towns such as Mwanza and Shinyanga. Nor did they try to deal with the real thieves who organise the nature of the society thus creating the problems to which thieving is only a response. Moreover by 1985, when the *Sungu Sungu* were being called upon to keep peace in the towns, some elements were playing with the idea of using the *Sungu Sungu* as an anti-worker force.

This was a major weakness, one which was compounded by the campaign of some members of the *Sungu Sungu* against witchcraft. Thus though the movement eliminated one form of insecurity by combatting cattle rustlers armed with sub-machine guns, it created insecurity for older women who saw the movement as a traditional aggressive male form of authority which is repressive. Witchcraft eradication has been a feature of the peoples called the *Sukuma* and was one of the control mechanisms exercised by society. In this period of crisis women tend to lose out because they do not have the power to determine where resources go and ultimately older single women are vulnerable to perceptions of ill omen in a community⁵⁵. Rural peasants are experiencing real hardships in Tanzania and it was not always easy to identify the state and foreign capital as the source of the crisis in the economy. For this, the party has been eminently successful in deflecting the energies of the poor to guarantee the legitimisation of the system⁵⁶.

The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other agencies of international capitalism have not been unaware of the demobilising role of the party. Together with the incentive goods and the promise of health, sanitation and welfare, the exploiters of African labour survey the lessons of the *Sungu Sungu* movement. The thinkers of these 'donor agencies' reflect on how to use grassroots organisations as a management unit, thus permitting the diffusion of a management and control system down to the last family and *kaya* in the village... The potential usefulness of these grassroots leaders mobilisation capability in the *Sukuma* context should not be underestimated by any development endeavour⁵⁷. The promise here is to be able to mobilise the party and the remnants of the *Sungu Sungu* to entrench the production of cash crops when the resistance to the regressive form of agricultural production was growing. But as the problems of the bumper crop of cotton of 1986-87 showed, the people of Tanzania have no control over the world market price for primary commodities. And inside Tanzania, the state may exhort the peasants to produce; the peasants will respond but the state does not have the infrastructure for storage, transport, ginning, marketing or to pay the peasants for their crops.

Out of this chaos, there will be new frustrations and other forms of resistance will rise up in the countryside. Progressive scholars must be able to

55 Monica Morris, *"The Effect of Socio-Economic Changes on the Position of Women in Sukumaland"*. A report submitted in the fulfillment of the requirement for the Diploma in Food Resources Related to Community Development. University of London 1986/1987.

56 Horace Campbell, "The IMF debate and the Politics of Demobilisation in Tanzania" In *Eastern Africa Social Science Review*, Vol.II, No.2, 1986, Addis Ababa.

57 World Bank Preparation Report for the Mwanza/Shinyanga RIDEF. "The *Sukuma*: A Socio-Cultural Profile" Policy Evaluation Unit, The Prime Minister's Office, pp.22.

develop a scientific orientation so that there is theoretical guidance for the spontaneous outbursts of the masses so that these rebellions do not provide new techniques of oppression. This was the concrete lesson from the results of the *Mau Mau* struggle⁵⁸.

As the process of class selection expands under the IMF, sections of the petty bourgeoisie will attempt to use the legacies of the *Sungu Sungu* for the purposes of the politicisation of ethnicity. The absence of the overt forms of this aspect of politics was not because of the absence of ethnic differences, but due to the weak development of the petty bourgeoisie. Now these strata are using the welfare guise (of burials and weddings) to rear its head.

By Way of Moving Forward

The *Sungu Sungu* has re-established the right of the pastoralists to be part of the future of Africa. For too long the idea of development was based on the destruction of the way of life of the pastoralists. The Ujamaa strategy for livestock development did not differ in content from the East African Royal Commission Report of 1953 nor the subsequent investigations of the specialised agencies of finance capital. Speech after speech by national leaders call for the pastoral people to be linked to the cattle complex which deepen their dependence on Western grain, the banking system and Western drugs.

The experience of the Soviet Union where the dependence on imported grain is tied up to the acceptance of the Western model of animal husbandry should be studied by those who seek to develop genuine socialism and self reliance. Moreover the present system of livestock production has definite limits in improving the yield of the livestock population.

A socialist strategy for Tanzania must draw from the storehouse of the experience of humanity, including the positive and negative lessons of capitalism and socialism. A prerequisite for social change must be the ability to build on the historical experiences of the people including the mobilisation of the positive skills and knowledge transmitted over centuries.

Already the thrust of specialised investigations on the peoples such as the Masai and the *Sukuma* tend to study these people under the rubric of environmental protection and wildlife. The ecological flag is raised to justify the physical elimination of these peoples from the continent in the long run.

The *Sungu Sungu*, in defending the right of their communities, have entered the legend of herdsmen who defended their cattle. This fact is now part of the history of Tanzania.

Tanzania is a vast underpopulated land and the health and nutrition and change in the standards of living is linked to a healthy population of goats,

58 Al-Amin Mazrui, "Ideology, Theory and Revolution. Lessons from the Mau Mau" *Race and Class*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, 1987.

sheep and cattle. And if the pre-colonial forms of livestock control are to be transformed, then progressive social scientists are confronted with fundamental problems, e.g. What should be the attitude of the progressive scholar to the hunters and gatherers? What is the adequate form for the improvement of the livestock yield of the pastoralists? How can new scientific skills be introduced in the village communities of Africa without destroying the skills and knowledge of the rural producers.

The rise of the *Sungu Sungu* sharpened these questions as the society grapples with its past and confronts the future. The *Sungu Sungu* was a reassertion of the cultural strength of the African people. The party in its embrace of the movement embraced all its contradictions in order to demobilise and diminish the growth of the uprising. There was no real effort to study the lessons for history. It would require another form of democratic politics to link up the positive aspects of this movement with modern scientific techniques.

This is what the Chinese meant by 'Science walking on two legs'. This paper hopes to be part of the starting point for a more precise understanding of the content of popular resistances from the village communities as Africa struggles to be independent.

Crise financière et Ajustement par le Marché dans le Monde arabe: Quelles Perspectives?

Habib El Malki*

ABSTRACT. The debt issue dominated the discourse of the 1980's signalling international credit as the main form of accumulation in the world economy. It was founded on a new form of inter-dependence between debtors and creditors with the latter making sure that the former do not go bankrupt. As a result, the debt issue overdetermines everything subordinating concerns with growth and development. The spiral of debt results from the transformation of the role of money and finance following the emergence of the electronic currency and a vast and unique global market of capital managed by the computer and satellite links. Accelerated by the mobile mass of petro-dollars, this "Casino-economy" signals the growth of speculation at the expense of productive activity. Given the growing interventionist policy of financial institutions specially the IMF and the World Bank, for debtor countries, debt repayment has meant the intensification of inequalities, dependence, pauperization, loss of sovereignty and reversal of development priorities. Originating both from the global financial and monetary anarchy and internal financial policies, the debt of Arab countries is neither conjunctural nor transient. Its specificities lie in the inter-regional flow of finance between Arab-countries. Although heterogeneous in nature, agriculture and food dependency is a common profile of the debt structure in Arab countries. As elsewhere, Arab countries have turned to structural adjustment Programme as a solution. Conceived independently of the socioeconomic specificity of countries and ignoring complexities in favour of simplification, SAP advocates universal recipes and market forces as a solution to all ills. Its depressive budgetary policy liberalization and restrictive social policy have meant giving priority to the export sector and downgrading the internal market. This aggravates social differentiation, marginalizing large sectors of the population, impoverishing the middle class and threatening local based entrepreneurs. The past and recent history shows that an imposed market system is more a source of renewed domination than a source of liberation for countries of the south.

La Crise actuelle, Source de Mutations profondes, est à Dimension multiple: économique, financière, technologique et socio-culturelle

Incertitudes mais accompagnées de nouvelles perspectives de développement: tels sont les deux traits majeurs qui illustrent les paradoxes de cette crise, notamment à travers sa dimension financière qui ne cesse de dominer les années 80. Discours et politiques économiques sont façonnés par les problèmes de la dette. Comme l'enjeu des rapports Nord-Sud est présenté comme un enjeu financier.

La dette surdétermine tout. Elle s'impose comme une grille de lecture et d'analyse des problèmes contemporains: une sorte de passage obligé pour s'interroger sur les perspectives d'évolution de l'économie mondiale. D'où l'éclipse des problèmes de croissance et de développement qui deviennent subordonnés à la question de la dette.

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Enjeu financier, la dette est aussi un jeu sans fin, mettant en présence différents acteurs (créanciers publics et privés d'un côté et Etats débiteurs de l'autre), jeu médiatisé par la Banque mondiale et le Fonds Monétaire International (FMI). Un jeu qui aggrave les inégalités en amplifiant la paupérisation des pays pauvres à travers l'enrichissement des pays riches.

Un tel phénomène n'est pas nouveau. Il date du 19^{ème} siècle car l'endettement extérieur du Tiers Monde a constitué l'un des instruments privilégiés qui a favorisé le déploiement de la stratégie d'expansion de l'Europe. Plusieurs expériences montrent que le processus de pénétration coloniale directe a eu comme corollaire l'asphyxie financière de plusieurs pays indépendants. Autrement dit, l'incapacité des Etats emprunteurs à gérer une dette devenue considérable, donc touchant à des intérêts importants des pays exportateurs de capitaux, a facilité la multiplication des interventions militaires étrangères. C'est le cas des pays arabes de la rive sud de la méditerranée¹.

L'Egypte - qui était placée juridiquement sous la souveraineté ottomane entra en cessation de paiement en 1876, situation qui déboucha sur l'aliénation de sa souveraineté par l'occupation anglaise en 1882. En effet, le *Khédive* Ismaïl, successeur de Mohamed Ali, considérant que son pays faisait partie de l'Europe, s'engagea en avant à travers le lancement d'une série d'emprunts, dépassant largement la capacité de remboursement de l'économie égyptienne de l'époque.

L'endettement tunisien commença en 1830. Depuis, le recours excessif au marché des capitaux provoqua une aggravation des charges de la dette et conduisit la Tunisie à suspendre ses paiements extérieurs. Une commission comprenant les représentants des principaux bailleurs de fonds français, italiens et anglais, se constitua pour mettre de l'ordre dans les finances de l'Etat tunisien. La perte de l'autonomie économique et financière aboutit à l'occupation militaire française en 1881.

Dans le cas du Maroc, le recours systématique à la politique des emprunts à la fin du 19^{ème} siècle, auprès de l'Angleterre, de l'Espagne et de la France, est significatif de l'aggravation de la crise financière². Une double tendance est à l'origine de cette situation:

- une tendance à l'accroissement des dépenses, notamment à la suite de la politique des réformes (réforme administrative, introduction de la culture du coton, installation d'industries d'armements légers, modernisation de l'armée, construction de ports, de Tours pour se défendre contre les invasions

1 Voir George Corm: "L'endettement des Pays en voie de Développement. Origine et Mécanismes". Collectif: *Dette et Développement*. Ed. Publisud, Paris, 1982.

2 Voir H. El Malki: l'Endettement international du Maroc: Un fait de longue durée - Collectif: *L'Etat marocain dans la Durée (1850-1985)* Edino (Rabat) et Codesria (Dakar), 1987.

étrangères...) et du paiement des "indemnités" aux Européens;

- une tendance à une diminution considérable des ressources de l'Etat provoquée par la réduction des recettes douanières et la diminution de l'assise fiscale interne (troubles intérieurs, extension de la pratique de la protection des puissances étrangères qui soustrayait la couche la plus solvable de la population à l'impôt...).

Le Maroc s'installa progressivement dans le cercle vicieux de l'endettement externe. Ainsi, l'emprunt de 1904, en consacrant la prépondérance de la France avec la Banque de Paribas, précipita l'installation du Protectorat en 1912.

La comparaison entre les deux crises financières (fin du 19^{ème} siècle et fin du 20^{ème} siècle) est pleine d'enseignements. Les similitudes ³ montrent avec force combien l'histoire, si elle ne se répète pas, peut être bonne conseillère. A la fin du 19^{ème} siècle, plusieurs pays ont connu des périodes de fort endettement: les Etats-Unis, le Canada, le Japon, l'Australie. D'autres ont procédé à la répudiation de leurs dettes: l'Union Soviétique après la Révolution d'Octobre de 1917, l'Argentine et surtout l'Allemagne entre les deux guerres... Ces quelques exemples historiques montrent que la relation-emprunt-développement-remboursement revêt des significations différentes. Aujourd'hui, les termes du problème ont changé et les conditions historiques ne sont pas les mêmes. Le renouveau et la mondialisation de la dette qui gangrènent l'ensemble des composantes de l'économie mondiale ont créé une situation nouvelle. Economies capitalistes développées, économies socialistes et économies du Tiers Monde se sont installées avec plus ou moins de confort, dans une économie de crédit international, basée sur un système d'inter-dépendance particulier entre débiteurs et créanciers, ces derniers veillant à ce que les premiers ne tombent pas en faillite.

L'arithmétique de la dette dans le monde est très approximative, mais suffisamment évocatrice pour montrer que le développement à crédit est plus une réalité contraignante qu'un mythe libérateur, particulièrement pour le Tiers Monde: 100 milliards de dollars pour l'Europe de l'Est, 500 milliards de dollars pour l'Europe de l'Ouest (endettement brut, fin 1984) et 1300 milliards pour les pays en développement. La dette extérieure américaine constitue une véritable bombe à retardement. Crédeur net de 171 milliards de dollars en 1982, les Etats Unis ont fini l'année 1987 sur un endettement net de 368 milliards. A ce rythme, le cap des 1000 milliards de dollars pourrait être atteint au début des années 1990⁴.

3 Ouverture violente par la force sur l'extérieur, atteintes répétées à la souveraineté des Etats.

4 Les Etats Unis représentent un cas unique au monde: ils empruntent dans leur propre monnaie qui se trouve être la principale monnaie de réserve internationale. Dépensant

Cette spirale de la dette résulte des transformations du rôle de la monnaie et de la finance au niveau international.

En effet, la nouvelle technologie de l'information a fait émerger une nouvelle forme de monnaie: la *monnaie électronique*, par définition immatérielle et de plus en plus omniprésente. Traditionnellement, la monnaie remplissait les fonctions d'étalon de la valeur, d'unité de compte et de placement de réserve. Aujourd'hui, elle remplit une nouvelle fonction: l'information qui apparaît comme principale - "c'est la qualité, la richesse d'information qu'elle véhicule qui déterminent d'une manière décisive la parité d'une monnaie, son ultime contrepartie"⁵. La monnaie électronique est une monnaie planétaire. Des milliards de dollars se déplacent d'une place financière à une autre à la vitesse de la lumière. L'argent est ainsi plus qu'un simple moyen d'échange commercial. Il devient un produit de plus en plus élaboré exerçant un véritable pouvoir de fascination, circulant 24 heures sur 24 au sein d'un réseau planétaire. Le développement de la monnaie électronique ainsi que la réduction des barrières entre les différentes places financières ont favorisé l'émergence d'un vaste et unique marché international de capitaux: un seul marché géré par l'ordinateur et les liaisons par satellite. La déréglementation en vogue a favorisé cette tendance.

Cette mondialisation de l'espace financier s'est traduite par une perte de contrôle des autorités monétaires nationales et internationales. Qui contrôle quoi? et pour faire quoi? La réponse à ces interrogations est complexe tant l'imbrication des faits est forte et les perspectives incertaines. Et c'est dans le domaine de la finance que complexité, interdépendance et aléa prennent leur véritable sens.

Comment gérer l'imprévisible? Le pouvoir des mots est plus fort que celui des conventions, quand elles existent et sont respectées. Une simple déclaration de tel ou tel responsable des principales puissances financières suffit à créer confiance et stabilité ou désarroi et panique. Un événement social (grèves), politique (élections), la publication du bulletin de santé du Chef de l'Etat...: tous ces facteurs agissent sur la valeur de la monnaie et provoquent des déplacements de capitaux. Ils soulignent encore une fois combien la monnaie est un véritable vecteur d'information.

... sans compter, ils sont devenus un pays à déficit commercial et budgétaire structurel. A défaut d'ajustement interne, ces énormes trous financiers sont comblés par le reste du monde.

5 Charles Goldfinger: *La Géfinance*. Ed. du Seuil, Paris, 1986, p.19.

L'Autonomisation de la Finance internationale par rapport aux Mouvements réels entre les Pays

En effet, à l'échelle internationale, les mouvements de capitaux, ont acquis une importance nettement supérieure aux échanges commerciaux internationaux⁶. Ils représentent 40 fois le niveau des seconds; d'où un renversement du schéma d'analyse traditionnel: les flux du commerce international expliquent de moins en moins les flux financiers. Et la relation de détermination qui prévalait jusqu'aux années 60 n'est plus vérifiée. Ainsi, de "variable résiduelle", les flux financiers sont devenus "variable indépendante", déterminant à leur tour taux de change et taux d'intérêt. Cette nouvelle situation explique pourquoi, en dépit de la faiblesse de l'échange de marchandises, l'échange de monnaie n'a jamais été aussi florissant.

La dichotomie grandissante entre la sphère réelle et la sphère financière est source de dérèglements, de déséquilibres sinon de ruptures nécessitant tôt ou tard des réformes en profondeur. Elle montre combien l'architecture érigée au lendemain de la deuxième guerre mondiale dans le domaine monétaire, financier et commercial est tombée en ruine. Le paysage géo-économique ainsi que le paysage financier ont fortement changé, rendant caduque les règles laborieusement établies en 1944. Le système monétaire et financier international, hérité des Accords de Bretton Woods, est devenu une simple référence. Schématiquement, il est passé par deux grandes phases.

La première phase, marquée par une certaine efficience, s'achève à la fin des années 60. En favorisant l'échange international des biens et des services, en facilitant la mobilité du capital, ce système a contribué à une croissance régulière et rapide de l'économie mondiale.

Par contre à partir d'Août 1971, date à laquelle les Etats Unis décident d'abandonner la convertibilité or-dollar à un prix fixe, dérèglements et désordres monétaires et financiers vont conduire à la répudiation définitive du système créé à Bretton-Woods. A la stabilité relative qui était la principale vertu de l'ancien système, se substituent fluctuations désordonnées des taux de change, des taux d'intérêts et fébrilité des banques et des marchés.

Deux traits caractérisent le système actuel: d'une part le dollar en est l'unité de compte et l'étalon de fait, et d'autre part les taux de change flottent librement.

L'évolution d'un tel système sera fortement déterminée, encore plus que par le passé, par celle de l'économie et des finances américaines, que symbolise l'état de santé du dollar. Sa force et ses faiblesses vont provoquer et amplifier ici et là les secousses financières et les turbulences monétaires qui

6 Voir Cahiers Français: *Finance internationale* No.230, Mars-Avril 1987, Documentation française, Paris.

marqueront les années 80. La dette du Tiers Monde, libellée en très grande partie en dollars, et particulièrement la dette du monde arabe, en subira toutes les conséquences.

Faut-il rappeler qu'en l'absence d'un ajustement réel de l'économie et des finances américaines - pour remédier aux déséquilibres profonds qui les minent - l'économie mondiale est en passe de devenir une véritable "économie-casino". Inconscience des joueurs et effets anesthésiants de l'endettement ne cesseront d'amplifier cette tendance.

La Crise de la Dette

Déclenchée par la crise mexicaine de l'été 1982 et la crise boursière de l'automne 1987 sont très significatives de la croissance rapide de l'économie de spéculation, au détriment de l'économie productive.

En effet, l'autonomisation excessive de la sphère financière a créé des mirages et développé la fuite en avant. La spéculation se nourrit de la spéculation en l'amplifiant, d'où la fragilisation des appareils de production et l'accroissement du degré de vulnérabilité des économies.

Les principales bourses de la planète n'ont-elles pas enregistré une croissance de quelque 300% depuis 1982, alors que la croissance économique cumulée des cinq dernières années dans les pays de l'OCDE dépasse à peine 15% durant la même période? Comment expliquer que les bourses de valeurs mobilières, refuge de valeurs réelles en temps d'inflation, aient offert de telles plus-values de temps de désinflation⁷.

Sur les marchés des changes, la valeur des opérations quotidiennes a été estimée à 150-300 milliards de dollars, dont 3 à 5% seulement correspondent à des transactions commerciales.

La brutalité du retournement de tendance à partir d'octobre 1987 a eu l'effet d'un séisme: panique généralisée, chute brutale des cours, fermeture-réouverture des bourses... Impossible d'arrêter les démons de la spéculation tant la croyance en les forces du marché était forte! La circulation de l'information boursière, à la vitesse de la lumière, amplifia dans une conjoncture de crise, la tendance baissière des cours. Et l'argent, qui exerce un pouvoir de fascination/répulsion, se métamorphose dans ses fonctions pour devenir une source de faillite, après avoir été une source de réussite. Ainsi, le krach boursier provoqua en quelques semaines des pertes qui s'élevèrent à 2.000 milliards de dollars - dont la moitié pour Wall Street, soit à peu près 2 fois l'ensemble de la dette du Tiers Monde et 12 fois la dette du monde arabe.

7 En quatre ans, entre fin 1982 et fin 1986, la capitalisation boursière (nombre des titres en circulation multiplié par le cours) a été multipliée par 5 à Paris, plus de 4 à Tokyo, moins de 3 à Londres et moins de 2 à New York - (voir *Le Monde*. Dossiers et Documents: "L'explosion des marchés financiers". No.149, Novembre 1987).

Ceci montre combien l'argent, en définitive, c'est de la fumée verte⁸. La bourse symbolise le développement - contradictoire - du capitalisme. Son essor est fortement lié à la création des compagnies de chemin de fer, à l'expansion de l'industrie et du commerce qui marquèrent particulièrement le 19ème siècle. Cependant, le développement de cette nouvelle forme de richesse (les valeurs mobilières) engendra un parasitisme effréné, une soif de gain sans effort productif⁹.

On ne crée pas, on gagne de l'argent: telle est la philosophie qui détermine les règles du jeu des spéculateurs en bourse.

La Crise de la Dette du Tiers Monde est un autre aspect majeur caractéristique des Mutations économiques et financières, au niveau international

C'est la manifestation dominante, dans la phase actuelle, de la crise des rapports Nord-Sud. Elle résulte de l'intégration financière du Sud dans les circuits financiers internationaux, essentiellement à caractère privé, contrôlés par le Nord.

La dynamique de l'intégration du Tiers Monde dans le marché international a connu une longue évolution en passant par trois grandes périodes¹⁰:

- la première période est celle de l'intégration par les échanges: c'est l'intégration à dominante commerciale caractéristique d'une spécialisation primaire au sein de la division internationale du travail. C'est en grande partie le cas du continent africain;

- la deuxième période, marquée par la transnationalisation de la production, est à dominante industrielle. Elle correspond à ce mouvement de restructuration des appareils productifs qui a débouché sur l'émergence de cette nouvelle catégorie de pays appelée NPI (Nouveaux Pays Industriels), posant par là de nouveaux problèmes d'ordre conceptuel et théorique dans l'analyse du développement;

- la période actuelle est celle de l'internationalisation des circuits financiers, processus lié au nouveau rôle de la monnaie et au décloisonnement des marchés de capitaux. Les masses errantes des pétro-dollars ont accéléré ce processus dans les années 70.

L'évolution de ces trois périodes n'est pas forcément linéaire car les différentes modalités d'intégration peuvent se chevaucher dans un même pays ou dans une même région. Cependant, le problème lancinant de la dette du Tiers Monde souligne que, dans cette période, l'intégration est à dominante

8 Voir le roman politico-financier de Gérard Leroux (banquier Suisse) et Robert Buchard (journaliste) intitulé: *Fumée Verte*. Ed. Albin Michel, Paris, 1987.

9 *Wall Street*, le dernier film américain de Olivier Stone, démonte parfaitement les mécanismes occultes et les racines souterraines de la spéculation à la bourse de New York.

10 Voir Ch. A. Michalet: *Le Développement indépendant*. Ed. Rochevignes, Paris.

financière avec toutes ses implications socio-économiques. Dans cette optique, il apparaît que la dette est plus un phénomène de structure qu'un phénomène de conjoncture, rendant imprécise - sinon dépassée - la délimitation traditionnelle entre l'état de solvabilité et l'état de liquidité au niveau des Etats.

Trois traits majeurs caractérisent la Dette du Tiers Monde

L'accélération du rythme de progression de la dette du Tiers Monde qui a plus que décuplé entre 1973 et 1987.

En effet, pendant cette période, elle est passée de 110 milliards de dollars à 1.200 milliards de dollars. La rapidité de ce rythme est incomparablement supérieure à l'évolution de la croissance économique. Et une corrélation négative s'est établie entre l'augmentation de la dette par tête et celle de la production annuelle par tête. Cela signifie que la dette est devenue un obstacle, sinon un facteur de décroissance économique; en définitive, une source d'appauvrissement!

La très forte concentration de la dette: 17 pays concentrent plus de 40% de l'ensemble de la dette du Tiers Monde dont 11 pays Latino-américains¹¹. Le Maroc est le seul pays arabe classé dans la catégorie des 17 pays lourdement endettés - selon la terminologie de la banque mondiale. Durant la période 1980-87, plusieurs indicateurs soulignent la précarité sinon la dégradation de l'état de santé de ce groupe de pays: une très faible croissance économique (1%) et des taux moyens annuels négatifs pour l'investissement (-4,8%) et pour la consommation par tête (-1,6%).

Cette situation est appelée à durer d'autant plus que le taux d'endettement moyen est supérieur à 60%¹² et que le service de la dette pour 1987-89 est estimé à 230 milliards de dollars dont 87 milliards pour les intérêts - la tendance est à la bancarisation de la dette extérieure du Tiers Monde. Ainsi, plus de 60% des emprunts sont d'origine privée. Ce taux est particulièrement élevé, notamment dans les pays lourdement endettés en Amérique Latine (74% en moyenne). Il souligne un changement de structure de la dette, résultant d'un recours massif aux banques commerciales privées, notamment à partir du milieu des années 70¹³. La conséquence directe est l'accroissement du degré de vulnérabilité de la dette extérieure du Tiers Monde, processus amplifié par la conjonction de plusieurs facteurs, dont en particulier:

11 The World Bank: *World Debt tables* - 1987-88 Edition Washington D.C. La dette de ces 17 pays est en moyenne de 500 milliards de dollars, avec en particulier le Brésil (114,5 milliards); le Mexique (105 milliards) et l'Argentine (50 milliards).

12 Ce taux est obtenu en rapportant le volume de la dette au PNB. Il est de 127% pour le Maroc, de 197% pour la Jamaïque, de 123% pour la Côte d'Ivoire, de 119% pour Costa Rica et la Bolivie et de 138% pour le Chili.

13 Seule l'Afrique échappe à cette tendance. Sa dette reste principalement d'origine publique et contractée sous forme concessionnelle.

- L'augmentation des taux d'intérêts réels, sans rapport avec ceux qui prévalaient lorsque les contrats ont été signés. En même temps, la part de la dette à taux variable par rapport à l'encours total de la dette publique s'est fortement accrue: 43% en 1983 contre 16% en 1974, à titre d'exemple.

- La surévaluation artificielle du dollar américain jusqu'en 1986, phénomène d'autant plus préjudiciable que la dette du Tiers Monde est libellée à plus de 70% en dollars.

- Le renouvellement des crédits sur la base d'échéances de plus en plus courtes. La contraction de la durée moyenne des prêts concerne aussi bien les prêts publics que les prêts privés, avec successivement 14 années et 8 années.

L'ensemble de ces facteurs sont significatifs de la détérioration des conditions d'endettement du Tiers Monde. Ils se traduisent par une augmentation des charges financières, remettant fortement en cause la capacité de remboursement des pays endettés. C'est ainsi que le rapport service de la dette/revenu des exportations a été multiplié par 2,5 entre 1975 et 1986 en passant de 8,5% à 21,3%. Comme le rapport en cours de la dette/recettes d'exportations a augmenté durant la même période, presque dans les mêmes proportions, 173,3% en 1986 contre 73,5% en 1975.

Ces ratios montrent combien la spirale de l'endettement conduit à une situation insupportable pour les pays emprunteurs qui se trouvent dans l'obligation de consacrer une part toujours croissante de leurs ressources au remboursement de la dette.

La Logique perverse de l'Endettement extérieur

Les effets pervers de l'endettement extérieur du Tiers Monde touchent non seulement les équilibres macro-économiques mais aussi et surtout les aspects qualitatifs de la croissance.

En effet, la politique de gestion de la dette est fortement déterminée par l'augmentation de la capacité de remboursement de la dette, considérée comme une priorité. D'où la nécessité de développer le secteur d'exportation, souvent au détriment des secteurs sociaux, pour pouvoir rembourser. *Or le remboursement est fondamentalement déflationniste.* Au niveau des pays débiteurs, il se traduit par un transfert de ressources à des fins autres que l'investissement productif ou l'investissement à caractère social ou culturel. Et au niveau des pays industrialisés, la partie des recettes d'exportation consacrée au remboursement de la dette n'est pas utilisée à l'achat des biens d'équipement. Ces facteurs conjugués ne peuvent contribuer à une relance durable et saine de l'économie mondiale.

De surcroît, la politique de gestion de la dette a aggravé l'hémorragie financière qui rend de plus en plus anémiques les économies des pays endettés. L'amplification des flux financiers allant du Sud vers le Nord revêt des

formes très variées (service de la dette¹⁴, évasion des capitaux, investissement du Sud au Nord¹⁵).

L'évasion des capitaux est l'une des formes les plus connues et joue un rôle important dans ce sens. Elle est estimée modestement par le FMI à 300 milliards de dollars entre 1974 et 1985, dont plus de 50% en provenance de l'Amérique latine. Sur cette base, on constate que plus le niveau d'endettement est élevé, plus la fuite des capitaux est forte. La sortie des capitaux obéit à plusieurs considérations d'ordre monétaire (vif intérêt pour les devises étrangères, crainte d'une dévaluation brutale), de rentabilité des capitaux (faiblesse des perspectives de croissance locale, facteurs incitatifs à des placements dans des paradis fiscaux) et de sécurité (instabilité politique, absence de confiance dans l'avenir). Elle permet à des particuliers d'acquérir des actifs, notamment financiers, à l'étranger. Elle accroît donc le montant de devises étrangères, ce qui exige presque inévitablement de nouveaux emprunts à l'extérieur pour éviter une crise des paiements. Par ailleurs, ces devises empruntées peuvent se retrouver elles-mêmes aussitôt replacées à l'étranger avant d'avoir pu trouver une utilisation productive dans l'économie nationale du pays emprunteur.

Le paradoxe est que cette fuite de capitaux, par son importance, assure une partie du financement du déficit record des Etats Unis. En effet, les rapports annuels de la Banque des Règlements Internationaux constatent une forte progression des dépôts en dollars des ressortissants des pays endettés dans les banques situées en dehors de ces pays, dans les paradis fiscaux notamment. Ces dépôts en transitant par l'euromarché permettent ainsi de combler partiellement le déficit américain.

En définitive, qui finance qui?

Les mécanismes de transfert financiers du Sud vers le Nord soulignent clairement combien la logique de l'endettement extérieur est perverse: renforcement des rapports d'inégalité et de dépendance à l'égard des pays créanciers, paupérisation des pays débiteurs, renversement des priorités de développement. Croître pour rembourser et rembourser pour respecter "la légalité financière internationale". Or la subordination des choix économiques aux seules préoccupations financières ne peut aider à briser le cercle vicieux de l'endettement.

Dans le monde Arabe, et de manière générale au Tiers Monde, la relation emprunt-développement-remboursement tend à devenir univoque, de plus en plus complexe, mettant en rapport pays débiteurs, créanciers publics et pri-

14 Le service de la dette net des bénéfices rapatriés est estimé à 40 milliards de dollars pour 1985.

15 Les investissements du Sud vers le Nord sont un phénomène nouveau. Ils représentent approximativement 511 milliards de dollars entre 1973-74 et 1984.

vés, FMI et Banque Mondiale - dont l'interventionnisme ne cesse de se renforcer. Une relation qui pose en termes nouveaux la conception et la mise en oeuvre de la politique économique: quel est le mode le plus efficient pour gérer la contrainte financière? Comment concilier le court terme avec le moyen terme, c'est-à-dire déficit et croissance économique et sociale? Enfin, une relation qui soulève des problèmes de souveraineté pour les Etats endettés, face au nouvel interventionnisme du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale.

La dette des pays Arabes n'est ni un phénomène de conjoncture, ni un phénomène passager

Elle trouve ses origines aussi bien dans l'anarchie financière et monétaire internationale que dans les politiques de financement interne. Son montant total est estimé à 161,3 milliards de dollars (1986), soit 14% de l'ensemble de la dette du Tiers Monde¹⁶. Il est à noter que la structure de la dette des pays arabes est spécifique car elle ne revêt pas un aspect strictement ou exclusivement international¹⁷. Les engagements financiers ne sont pas contractés uniquement auprès du système financier international: ils recouvrent aussi des flux intra-régionaux découlant des mécanismes de financement arabo-arabes. D'autant plus que l'espace arabe est une région productrice de pétrole et génératrice de surplus financiers.

L'examen de la répartition de la dette permet de constater que cinq pays parmi l'ensemble des pays arabes (Algérie, Maroc, Egypte, Arabie Saoudite et Irak) concentrent plus des 2/3 du volume de la dette. Ils appartiennent à des groupes de pays ayant des structures économiques et des orientations de développement divergentes, et, plus largement des niveaux de développement différenciés: l'Algérie et l'Irak pays exportateurs de pétrole et à économie dirigiste, le Maroc et l'Egypte - pays à revenu intermédiaire - avec successivement 560 dollars et 610 dollars, et enfin l'Arabie Saoudite, premier pays exportateur de pétrole et dont le revenu moyen par tête est parmi les plus élevés - le troisième après les Emirats Arabes Unis et le Koweït.

Le degré de concentration élevé de la dette ne doit pas cacher l'hétérogénéité des situations d'endettement. C'est ce que montre le tableau 2 à travers le rapport PNB/Dette. Trois catégories de pays sont à distinguer¹⁸:

- la catégorie des pays à taux d'endettement faible couvrant des pays exportateurs de pétrole et faiblement peuplés: Lybie, Arabie Saoudite...;

16 La dette des pays arabes représente moins du 1/3 de celle des pays d'Amérique Latine et à peu près la moitié de celle des pays d'Asie.

17 Voir Arabi Jaidi dans le collectif: *La Crise et l'Endettement du Tiers Monde*. Ed. Maghrébines, 1988, Casablanca, p. 187 et suites.

18 Cette classification est à nuancer en fonction des fluctuations du prix du baril et de l'importance de la population des pays concernés.

Tableau 1: Dette des pays arabes - 1986 (en milliards de dollars US)

Pays	Dollars
A.	46.9
Algérie	21.9
Maroc	18.3
Tunisie	06.7
B.	67.1
Egypte	38.4
Bahrein	01.3
Soudan	08.6
Syrie	04.5
Jordanie	05.2
Yémen Nord	02.6
Yémen Sud	02.0
Liban	00.9
Oman	03.0
Quatar	00.6
C.	47.6
Arabie Saoudite	14.3
Irak	12.9
Koweït	08.9
Lybie	02.3
Emirats Arabes Unis	09.2
Total	161.3

Source: OCDE: Financement et Dette extérieure des Pays en Développement 1987. *World Development Report 1987*

Tableau 2: (en dollars US)

Pays	PNB/Tête ^a	Dette/Tête ^b	PNB/Dette ^{a/b}
Lybie	7,170	575	12.5
Arabie Saoudite	8,850	1,192	07.42
Syrie	1,570	409	03.84
Koweït	14,480	4,450	03.25
Oman	6,730	3,000	02.24
Emirats Ar. Unis	19,270	9,200	02.1
Yémen Nord	550	325	01.69
Tunisie	1,190	957	01.24
Jordanie	1,560	1,300	01.2
Algérie	2,550	2,255	01.13
Soudan	300	377	00.80
Egypte	610	784	00.78
Maroc	560	832	00.67
Yémen Sud	530	1,000	00.53

Source: *World Development Report 1987*.

Y. Gazzo: "Crise de l'Etat ou Crise de Confiance dans les Economies du Monde Arabe". *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord CRESM/CNRS*, Paris, 1987.

- la catégorie des pays à taux d'endettement moyen concernant des pays différents: Algérie/Yémen du Nord, Tunisie/Jordanie;

- la catégorie des pays à taux d'endettement très élevés ; elle englobe aussi bien des pays comme le Maroc et l'Égypte que des pays moins avancés (Mauritanie, Somalie et Soudan).

La prise en considération d'un indicateur composite de risque¹⁹ (stabilité, sécurité, ressources naturelles, solvabilité...) conduit à la même classification: pays à risque faible avec essentiellement les États du Golfe, pays à risque moyen: Tunisie, Jordanie, Syrie, Yémen du Nord et enfin les pays à haut risque présentant des taux de solvabilité très faibles et couvrant des pays très disparates: Maroc et Soudan, Égypte et Somalie, Irak et Liban affaiblis par les guerres.

Par ailleurs, la dette des pays arabes est fortement marquée par la prépondérance des emprunts d'origine publique avec une seule exception, celle de l'Algérie. Dans ce processus, les flux en provenance de l'intérieur de la région sont relativement importants. Deux mécanismes ont facilité ces transferts intra-régionaux: le système des aides bilatérales entre les États du Golfe et les pays arabes déficitaires, et les transferts réalisés par le biais des institutions de développement nationales ou régionales. Les transferts bilatéraux sont plus importants que les seconds²⁰.

Enfin, l'une des caractéristiques de la dette arabe est sa tendance à la bancarisation et à la privatisation: plus du 1/3 dans les années 80 contre le 1/4 au début des années 70 du total de la dette. Il est à souligner que cette tendance résulte en partie de flux financiers médiatisés par les circuits financiers internationaux, soulignant par là la faible intermédiation financière inter-arabe.

Les facteurs à l'origine de l'endettement international du monde arabe sont multiples, aussi bien d'origine interne qu'externe. Cinq facteurs sont particulièrement importants:

- le poids grandissant de la contrainte extérieure, notamment dans la conjoncture qui a marqué les années 80. Sa nature et son impact sont à identifier en fonction de plusieurs paramètres: ressources énergétiques, choix sectoriels et technologie importée, déficit alimentaire et pression démographique...

19 Cf. Arabi Jaidi, op. cit.

20 Durant la période 1974-81, le total de l'aide bilatérale arabe a atteint 25 milliards de dollars sur une valeur globale de 45 milliards affectée à l'ensemble des pays en développement. Les agences de développement arabes ont réalisé un montant de crédit de 8,4 milliards de dollars dans le monde arabe, soit plus de 50% de leurs engagements totaux dans le Tiers Monde.

De manière générale, tout dépend du type et des modalités d'insertion des économies arabes dans le marché mondial qui restent généralement retardataires par rapport à la nouvelle dynamique de la division internationale du travail. C'est pourquoi à défaut d'une stratégie de développement global et intégré, la manne pétrolière n'a pas été suffisante pour asseoir doublement et accélérer le progrès économique et social dans la région.

- l'augmentation rapide des dépenses de défense, d'autant plus que ce secteur fait fortement appel à l'importation, donc son incidence sur l'endettement est non seulement directe mais réelle. Le conflit israélo-arabe, la guerre Irak-Iran et les conflits inter-arabes interminables entretiennent et amplifient ce phénomène qui se traduit par une forte ponction des ressources qui pourraient être affectées à des dépenses productives. Selon les indications statistiques très approximatives, la part du budget de défense dans le PNB se présenterait comme suit: Algérie 2.0% (1985); Tunisie 5.2% (1984); Maroc²¹ 5.5% (1985); Egypte²² 8.1% (1985);

- la fragilité des appareils productifs des pays arabes qui sont peu compétitifs et peu adaptés aux exigences et aux changements rapides de l'environnement régional et international. Les politiques sectorielles, à l'origine de la mise en place de ces appareils, ne sont pas étrangères au recours à l'endettement extérieur. C'est le cas des politiques industrielles tournées vers l'exportation (Maroc, Tunisie, Egypte) et qui se caractérisent par une forte concentration des investissements dans les branches de consommation finale, ou dans celles des biens intermédiaires d'origine minérale (Maroc, Jordanie, Tunisie). Aussi bien les grands projets publics de transformation des phosphates que des projets plus axés sur la sous-traitance, ou sur la promotion des petites et moyennes entreprises sont financés par des ressources publiques ou par des emprunts étrangers garantis par l'Etat.

D'autre part, le modèle d'industrialisation par l'amont, qui a privilégié les branches des industries intermédiaires et des biens d'équipement, avec un secteur dominant, a conduit à une industrialisation coûteuse, avec de grandes réalisations de prestige, utilisant une technologie sophistiquée, sans conditions d'accueil favorables.

La crise économique et l'épuisement des moyens financiers ont souligné les limites de ce modèle qui n'a pu générer un surplus permettant de développer la capacité de reproduction élargie. Les autres pays arabes moins avancés (Soudan, Somalie, Mauritanie) restent encore plus sensibles et plus

21 Comparativement aux autres pays du Maghreb, l'importance de la part relative du budget de défense dans le PNB s'explique par la défense de l'intégrité territoriale, faisant suite à la guerre du Sahara.

22 L'Egypte, depuis les accords de Camp David (1979), se consacre à un vaste programme de modernisation et de renouvellement de son arsenal militaire.

vulnérables à la dégradation des termes de l'échange et aux fluctuations du commerce extérieur.

Sur le plan agricole, les pays arabes présentent à des degrés différents un dénominateur commun: la dépendance agro-alimentaire significative des limites des politiques agricoles.

Tableau 3: Taux de couverture des échanges alimentaires (%)

Pays	1974	1980-85
Algérie	03.5	00.6
Egypte	17.2	06.7
Maroc	62.3	49.5
Tunisie	59.3	30.7

Source: FAO, annuaires du Commerce agricole.

Ce tableau souligne une dégradation rapide et continue du taux de couverture des échanges alimentaires. Il permet de mesurer la sévérité du déficit particulièrement pour l'Algérie et l'Egypte dont le montant est estimé successivement à 2 et 3 milliards de dollars. Les importations de produits alimentaires représentent environ 20% des importations totales de l'Algérie et plus de 30% en Egypte.

Le Maroc et la Tunisie présentent des situations relativement comparables. Dans l'un et l'autre cas, les importations alimentaires constituent moins de 20% des importations totales.

Cette nouvelle forme de dépendance a contribué à alimenter l'endettement externe, même si la facture alimentaire est assurée pour certains pays par l'aide étrangère. Les causes profondes de cette situation tiennent à la conception et au choix des politiques de développement qui se caractérisent par la dévalorisation et la marginalisation du rural²³; en somme l'absence d'une approche intégrée du développement. D'où le déclin des cultures vivrières et des production destinées à la satisfaction des besoins alimentaires internes. La question de la propriété foncière, les techniques de production et le système des prix continuent de jouer au détriment de la production et de la productivité.

- La politique de financement, tournée vers les solutions de facilité

L'installation d'une économie de l'endettement international favorisa de

23 H. El Malki: *Au delà des chiffres. Quel développement?* Ed. Maghrébines - Casablanca, 1983.

telle pratique. En effet, à la suite des mutations financières et monétaires en cours, le crédit international s'est substitué progressivement à l'investissement direct, comme modalité de financement. Cette tendance est marquée par l'émergence d'un nouveau pouvoir bancaire international à travers l'élargissement du rôle des banques commerciales privées, renforçant par là la fonction d'intégration financière internationale.

Durant les années 70, les banques ont prêté "généreusement" pour satisfaire la boulimie de plusieurs pays arabes. Ceci d'autant plus que les prêts bancaires, à la différence des crédits publics ou des crédits à l'exportation ne sont pas liés à des projets: "cette autonomie d'affectation les rendent attractifs pour certains pays arabes (Maroc, Algérie). L'alourdissement de la dette est en partie imputable à la partie bancaire de ces prêts"²⁴. Cette situation s'est aggravée par l'application d'un modèle de financement libérale, fondé sur l'appel massif aux investissements étrangers grâce à des codes d'investissement d'une grande libéralité (Maroc, Tunisie). Un tel modèle n'a pas contribué à une gestion saine de la crise, l'objectif étant d'entretenir la capacité de remboursement des pays arabes, avec une observance stricte des ratios, du mode d'affectation des ressources empruntées et du degré d'adaptation aux déséquilibres externes.

L'endettement a représenté la solution de fuite en avant au détriment d'une mobilisation méthodique et rationnelle de l'épargne intérieure. D'autant plus que les conditions d'emprunt étaient favorables avec des taux d'intérêt réels faibles sinon négatifs durant les années 70.

Si l'analyse de la relation emprunt-investissement-croissance est complexe, deux périodes sont à distinguer: la première période (1973-78) est marquée par une relation positive entre ces différentes variables. Par contre, à partir de 1979, une inversion de tendance s'imposa avec l'éclatement de la crise financière et ses multiples implications, provoquant une régression économique et sociale.

- L'évasion des capitaux: phénomène qui aggrave les problèmes de la balance des paiements car les avoirs privés à l'étranger représentent parfois une proportion non négligeable de la dette officielle. En général, l'essentiel des exportations illégales de capitaux n'apparaît pas dans les statistiques. La pratique qui consiste à acquérir et à placer à l'extérieur des devises étrangères en falsifiant les informations contenues dans les documents commerciaux est courante, mais elle est difficile à estimer. Des évaluations fondées sur la comptabilisation des exportations privées de capitaux ne servant pas à

24 Cf. Arabi Jaidi: *op.cit.*, p.201.

rembourser la dette en se fondant sur la balance des paiements, ont montré que la proportion de sortie de capitaux par rapport aux emprunts pour la période 1976-82 a atteint 34,2% dans le cas de l'Égypte, 33,3% pour la Jordanie, 96% pour la Syrie et 20% pour le Maroc²⁵.

A la lumière de ces différents facteurs, il apparaît que les modèles de développement en vigueur ont généré l'endettement international, processus amplifié par le désordre financier et monétaire international; d'où les impasses actuelles. Comment gérer la crise de la dette? Promouvoir des réformes de structure dans le cadre d'une nouvelle conception du développement, intégrant la dimension qualitative, c'est-à-dire la santé, l'éducation, la culture, la communication... Ou bien introduire des aménagements contraignant l'économie et les finances à un retour à l'équilibre dont la finalité reste à définir.

Dans les années 80, c'est la vision du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale qui a prévalu à travers la mise en place des PAS (Programme d'Ajustement Structurel).

Ajustement economico-financier et éclosion d'une nouvelle culture

La situation de crise financière a permis de renforcer et d'élargir le rôle du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale. Et pour faire face à l'acuité des besoins de financement des pays membres débiteurs, ces organisations ont vu leur fonction d'intermédiaire financier s'accroître, l'objectif principal étant d'enrayer le risque d'une rupture des paiements internationaux. A cet effet, les deux institutions ont élargi les mécanismes de financement existant, comme ils ont créé de nouveaux mécanismes, particulièrement depuis le déclenchement de la crise financière. Rappelons à titre principal au niveau du FMI: élargissement de la facilité de financement compensatoire, facilité pétrolière, facilité élargie, établissement du Fonds Fiduciaire, prêt d'ajustement spécial (à destination des pays moins avancés endettés). Au niveau de la Banque Mondiale: la création du Prêt d'Ajustement Structurel appelé à jouer un rôle important dans la restructuration des économies du Tiers Monde en crise.

Cependant, l'évolution la plus significative a trait au rapprochement du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale à travers la complémentarité qui sous-tend la conception, la mise en oeuvre et le financement du PAS.

C'est sur cette base et dans cette optique que rééchelonnement de la dette et prêts sont consentis; les pays débiteurs s'engagent fermement à appliquer le PAS.

Dans la littérature récente du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale l'ajustement est devenu un mot-clé, un mot stratégique auquel on attribue toutes les vertus. Or cette pratique n'est pas nouvelle: les Etats, sous différentes formes et

25 A. Jaidi: *op.cit.*, p.197; Ismaïl Sabri Abdellah: "Reverse financial flows", voir Publications de l'Académie du Royaume du Maroc, collection sessions: *Pénurie au Sud, Incertitude au Nord - Constat et Remèdes*, Rabat, 1988.

selon des techniques variées ont toujours procédé à des ajustements. Cependant dans la période de crise actuelle, ce concept a pris un relief particulier. Chargé de valeur parce que les maîtres d'oeuvre sont les organisations financières internationales, se définissant comme porteur d'une politique anti-crise, l'ajustement est appelé à déterminer une bonne partie des années 90.

De l'exercice 79 à l'exercice 87 inclus, 121 prêts représentant au total 15,3 milliards, ont été approuvés. Trente et un prêts d'un montant total de 4,1 milliards de dollars ont été approuvés pendant le seul exercice 87 contre 15 en 1983 et 4 en 1980 (tableau 4). Ce qui souligne une très forte progression durant les années 80.

Jusqu'en 1987, 50 pays, surtout des pays africains à faible revenu et des pays à revenu intermédiaire très endettés, ont reçu des prêts d'ajustement. Et pendant l'exercice 87, ces deux groupes ont représenté les trois quarts du nombre des prêts d'ajustement.

On compte, parmi les pays arabes bénéficiaires, le Maroc (industrie et commerce: 350,4 millions de dollars, agriculture: 100 million de dollars, l'éducation: 150 millions de dollars et entreprises publiques: 240 millions de dollars) et la Tunisie (agriculture: 150 millions de dollars et industries et commerce: 150 millions de dollars).

Le PAS est basé sur un diagnostic à l'identique dans tous les pays concernés. Elle recommande de façon uniforme les mêmes recettes qui sont devenues une panacée universelle: abolition ou libéralisation des contrôles de change et d'importation; dévaluation du taux de change; mise en oeuvre de programme anti-inflationniste à travers le contrôle du crédit bancaire, le contrôle du déficit budgétaire, le contrôle des prix; et enfin la création d'un meilleur climat pour les investissements étrangers.

Cette politique, au delà des différences de formulation (politique de stabilisation, politique d'austérité, politique de redressement...) est souvent conçue indépendamment du contexte socio-économique, de la nature des structures et du niveau de développement atteint. Théoriquement, elle est guidée par trois objectifs fondamentaux interdépendants:

- (a) - promouvoir la croissance,
- (b) - réduire l'inflation,
- (c) améliorer à moyen terme la position des paiements courants de la balance des paiements.

Mais à travers les premiers bilans, suite aux craquements économiques et sociaux que secouent plusieurs pays "sous programme", il apparaît que la démarche des organisations financières internationales présente des limites sérieuses. Deux séries de raisons sont à prendre en considération:

(a) *L'incohérence de la démarche du FMI*

En effet, la politique du FMI est conçue selon de vieux schémas keynésiens qui considèrent l'inflation et le déficit extérieur comme la conséquence d'un excès de la demande aussi bien publique que privée. Aussi cherche-t-il

à agir sur la demande selon la thérapeutique keynésienne traditionnelle dans le sens de la compression mais en recourant à des techniques monétaristes (réduction de la masse monétaire à travers une politique de crédit restrictive une politique salariale sévère, une politique budgétaire déflationniste...). Dans cette optique, la vision équilibriste devient dominante: la priorité consiste à favoriser le retour aux équilibres macro-économiques quel que soit le coût social.

Or de quel équilibre s'agit-il? Est-il suffisant pour qu'une économie soit en bonne santé, qu'il y ait égalité entre emplois et ressources? N'est-il pas plus important de formuler la question comme suit: Quelles ressources pour quels emplois?

L'expérience des dernières années souligne que la *politique d'ajustement est plus une politique de retour à l'équilibre qu'une politique de développement*. Tout devient subordonné à cette notion abstraite qu'est l'équilibre. Et les véritables problèmes se trouvent ainsi occultés. Ceci est d'autant plus vrai que l'histoire économique et sociale des pays industrialisés enseigne que si "la mise en ordre d'un certain nombre de choses" est nécessaire, le développement ne peut s'effectuer par et dans l'équilibre.

D'autre part, cette politique découle d'une analyse qui reste prisonnière de la partie visible de l'iceberg. La crise est appréhendée en termes de dérèglements, de déséquilibres, débouchant par là sur des schémas simplificateurs. Et la crise s'identifierait donc à une situation de déséquilibre et la "non crise" à une situation d'équilibre.

(b) *L'attachement sacro-saint de la Banque Mondiale et du FMI au dogme de l'économie de marché*

Sur cette base, libéralisation de l'économie et privatisation constitueraient la véritable issue à la crise.

Or de quelle crise s'agit-il? La crise qui secoue plusieurs régions du Tiers Monde n'est pas, réductible à une analyse en termes de budget, de balance des paiements courants, de monnaie et de prix. Comme le marché n'est pas dans le contexte socio-culturel des économies arabes cette institution privilégiée dont le libre fonctionnement permettrait de restaurer de façon miraculeuse l'équilibre.

Réduire l'équation du développement à "plus ou moins d'Etat", aux lignes de démarcation secteur public/secteur privé relève de la transposition mécanique de schémas d'analyse étrangers aux réalités du Tiers Monde. Certes, plusieurs Etats arabes se comportent en rentiers pratiquant la "consumation" dans sa forme moderne. Comme la bureaucratisation de l'économie est à l'origine de nombreux obstacles devenant de véritables freins au développement, les organisations financières internationales, par la politique d'ajustement qu'elles défendent, ont ravivé de vieux débats et remis à l'ordre du jour des oppositions devenues anachroniques: libéralisme / dirigisme, plan / marché, secteur public / secteur privé...

Tableau 4: Prêts d'ajustement, exercices 1979-87

	Ex.79	Ex.80	Ex.81	Ex.82	Ex.83	Ex.84	Ex.85	Ex.86	Ex.87	Ex.79-87
Ajustement structurel										
Nombre	-	3	6	6	7	6	3	7	13	51
Millions de \$	-	305	717	1072	1285	1282	163	610	665	5897
% total des prêts	-	2,7	5,8	8,2	8,9	8,9	1,1	3,7	3,8	4,7
Ajustement sectoriel										
Nombre	1	1	3	-	8	8	13	18	18	70
Millions de \$	31	65	137	-	641	1318	1475	2283	3452	9403
% total des prêts	0,3	0,6	1,1	-	4,4	8,5	10,3	14,0	19,5	7,5
Tous prêts d'ajustement										
Nombre	1	4	9	6	15	14	16	25	31	121
Millions de \$	31	370	854	1071	1926	2400	1638	2893	4148	15300
% total des prêts	0,3	3,2	6,9	8,2	13,3	15,5	11,4	17,7	23,3	12,2

Source: Rapport spécial sur les Prêts d'ajustement - Banque mondiale - Avril 1988.

Cependant, l'approche du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale présente un certain intérêt plus par les questions soulevées que par les réponses imposées. A titre d'exemple:

- les pays du Tiers Monde, dont plusieurs pays arabes, vivent au dessus de leurs moyens. Mais il reste à déterminer les couches ou classes sociales qui, étant donné la nature et le mode de répartition des revenus, s'accaparent l'essentiel du revenu national;

- la crise d'endettement touche surtout les entreprises publiques et semi-publiques, en somme l'Etat. C'est une crise financière de l'Etat! Comment les emprunts ont été utilisés? Comment la dette a été gérée? Quels sont les principaux bénéficiaires?

- les économies arabes, au delà de leur diversité, sont des économies de rentiers et d'assistés. Dans quelles conditions s'est effectuée l'extension du système de rente et d'assistance qui est devenu une source de blocage à toute dynamique économique?

La réponse à ces questions ne peut être que tronquée, dans le cadre d'une politique d'ajustement que subissent plusieurs pays arabes, avec une double conséquence:

- le développement de l'extraversion de l'économie à travers le développement prioritaire du secteur d'exportation, considéré comme la pierre angulaire des programmes d'ajustement. L'objectif est d'accroître la capacité de remboursement des pays débiteurs.

Le type d'ajustement est d'autant plus subi qu'il s'effectue conformément aux exigences d'une dynamique externe, non maîtrisée, qui est celle de la division internationale du travail (Maroc, Tunisie, Egypte). La variable motrice reste le marché extérieur, tandis que le marché interne continue de remplir une fonction d'appoint;

- l'aggravation de la déstructuration sociale sous l'effet d'une politique budgétaire dépressive et d'une politique sociale restrictive: baisse des investissements publics productifs et à caractère social (éducation, santé, déréglementation du système des produits consommés à grande échelle...).

Non seulement une partie de plus en plus importante de la population ne cesse de se marginaliser, faisant suite à l'affaiblissement des couches moyennes, mais un secteur non négligeable des entrepreneurs tournés vers le marché interne se trouve menacé par la libéralisation des importations.

C'est ainsi que les organisations financières internationales, à travers leurs analyses de la crise et les solutions appliquées, ont joué un rôle non négligeable dans l'éclosion et la propagation d'une nouvelle culture; celle-ci façonnant des comportements et des mentalités, déterminant la façon d'être et d'avoir, uniformisant les discours et les politiques économiques. Cette nouvelle culture ne s'embarrasse pas de la complexité des situations: privilégiant les schématismes, elle se limite aux apparences des choses complexes. Elle prend appui sur des mots-clés comme équilibre, rentabilité, compétitivi-

té... notions chargées de valeur qui véhiculent ici et là une vision particulière.

Donc, la solution aux désordres actuels réside par et dans l'ordre marchand: tel est le credo de cette nouvelle culture qui se propage rapidement dans les quatre coins du monde.

L'ordre marchand est-il celui de la vérité? Si oui, la vérité peut-elle être parcellisée? D'autant plus qu'elle n'a de sens que si elle englobe non seulement le domaine économique mais aussi le domaine socio-culturel et politique. C'est à cette conditions que l'ordre par l'économie du marché pourra fonctionner de façon efficiente. Combien de réformes entreprises dans plusieurs pays arabes ont échoué parce que le marché ne fonctionne pas comme organisateur du désordre. Les conditions historiques, socio-culturelles et politiques faisant défaut, il rend le désordre anarchie, conduisant à des fractures, si non à des ruptures.

En même temps, l'ordre marchand est celui de la puissance et de la force. Et l'histoire des rapports entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée, à titre d'exemple, l'illustre parfaitement dans des domaines très variés: économique, commercial, technologique et culturel. L'histoire passée et récente montre combien l'ordre marchand, tel qu'il est imposé, est plus une source de domination renouvelée qu'une source de libération pour les pays du Sud.

En définitive, il apparait que la nouvelle culture est fondée sur l'ordre de l'argent. Et l'homme en tant que finalité disparaît. Seules ses fonctions techno-économiques de production, d'échange et de consommation, c'est-à-dire ses fonctions de création et de destruction des richesses sont valorisées.

C'est ainsi que le développement, dans sa dimension qualitative, est abandonné. Il devient subordonné à la logique du marché qui médiatise tout. Et la grande vague du néo-libéralisme qui continue de déferler sur le monde a sacralisé une nouvelle fois les lois du marché.

Ghana Rice Policy: The Cost of Self-Sufficiency¹

Samuel Asuming-Brempong*

RÉSUMÉ. Le Programme de production alimentaire du Ghana est dominé depuis des années par l'auto-suffisance alimentaire, notamment en matière de riz. Conformément à cette politique, les gouvernements successifs ont opté pour la substitution à l'importation, dans le domaine du riz, comme moyen de préserver voire générer des devises. Une étude de la production de riz révèle que, sur le plan de la vente en gros, la production de riz du Ghana ne présente pas d'avantage comparatif. Il est en résultat d'une part des prix élevés pour le riz sur le plan national (parfois dix fois plus cher que le riz vendu à la frontière) et d'autre part des prix de facteurs de production faibles. Or, le riz est la seule culture qui, dans le cadre du programme alimentaire des gouvernements successifs, ait bénéficié d'un appui important sur le plan des politiques d'irrigation et de fixation des prix des intrants. L'une des retombées de cette politique a été, entre autres, que le consommateur au Ghana a été imposé non pas au profit des revenus gouvernementaux mais comme moyen de transfert de revenus du consommateur au producteur et à l'agent de commercialisation pour financer en fin de compte une industrie de riz inefficace. Cette politique a également fait perdre des devises au Ghana. En effet, la production de riz dans ce pays a, à ce jour, fait l'objet d'une très mauvaise répartition des ressources, ce qui a nui à son économie.

Introduction

Rice has been one of the traditional and leading commercial food crops in Ghana since the seventeenth century. In terms of total production, however, rice output is low when compared to other staple food crops produced in Ghana. Maize for example has averaged about 350,000 tons per year, and yam has averaged some 700,000 tons per years; while rice production averaged only about 70,000 tons per year of paddy in the 1970s and 60,000 tons per year in the early 1980s (FAO statistics). Moreover, on the basis of per capita consumption, rice is a minor staple in Ghana (WARDA estimated per capita consumption to be 6.7 kg in 1983 and 4.9 kg in 1985), and accounts for about 10% of all cereals produced in the country (Table 1). Yet rice has

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been the single crop that has enjoyed a great support in the food programmes of successive governments of Ghana, particularly in terms of irrigation and input - output pricing policies.

Table 1 - Area Harvested, Yields, and Rice Production Among Other Cereals, Ghana, 1979-85

Year	Area harvested 1000 ha		Yelds kg/ha		Production 1000mt		% Rice Production
	Total cereals	Rice	Total cereals	Rice	Total cereals	Rice	
1979-81	902	107	805	837	726	89	12
1982	822	61	662	590	544	36	7
1983	835	40	369	1000	308	40	13
1984	943	57	924	1158	871	66	8
1985	964	87	809	919	780	80	10
1986	1020	90	887	889	905	80	9
1987	996	82	917	1073	913	88	10

Source: FAO Production Yearbooks, Various Issues.

Rice imports to Ghana over the years have been second only to wheat, which is not grown domestically. In 1980 for example, Ghana imported 43,000 tons of rice which represented about 60% of the total quantity of rice consumed that year; and in 1985, WARDA (1986 estimation) showed that Ghana was only 55% self-sufficient in rice production. Successive governments in Ghana therefore sought to reverse the trend whereby the country depends on rice imports to satisfy domestic needs.

The Problem

Ghana, like the other West African countries, has pursued a policy of self-sufficiency in food (particularly rice) since the mid 1960s. Even though Ghana has not attained rice self-sufficiency, cost involved in pursuing a policy of self-sufficiency in rice production has been enormous.

Granted that such factors as adverse weather conditions and an unstable political atmosphere, *inter alia*, might have contributed to the bad performance of the rice economy, the question still remains as to whether the government's continuing policy of self-sufficiency in rice production is economically sound. Moreover, the policy of rice self-sufficiency implies that the option of import substitution for rice has been adopted by successive governments of Ghana as a means of conserving or even generating foreign exchange.

How would domestically produced rice benefit the economy? That is, will benefits accruing from import substitution in rice outweigh the cost to the economy? Do rice policies in Ghana lend support to domestic rice production? Who is/are the target clientele of the import substitution approach?

Have consumers in Ghana benefited or been penalized by the import substitution drive for rice? These are some of the basic economic issues that arise from the policy of import substitution for rice in Ghana, and this paper attempts to address some of these issues.

Comparative Advantage of Rice Production in Ghana

Food policies of both past and present governments of Ghana have favoured increased food production, particularly rice. The crucial question then is whether benefits accruing from import substitution for rice outweigh the cost to the economy. This question was addressed using the Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) measure.

Intuitively, the DRC criterion is an expression of the comparative cost principle in international trade. Ghana has a comparative advantage in rice vis-à-vis the rest of the world if domestic cost per unit of rice is less than the shadow exchange rate. This analysis has employed the DRC as an "ex-post" measure of the cost of a restrictive trade system, using input - output analysis. It evaluates the opportunity cost incurred by the economy in sustaining its existing import substitution policy in rice.

When the opportunity cost of all domestic factors of production (expressed in domestic currency units, i.e. cedis) are evaluated as a ratio of the net foreign exchange earned or saved (expressed in foreign currency units, say dollars), and the ratio deflated by the Shadow Exchange Rate (SER) of the cedi, the coefficient thus obtained represents the DRC.

For a more vivid picture of Ghana's rice economy, the Nominal Protection Rate (NPR) which measures the rate at which the domestic price of a final output (rice) deviates from the world market price (or border price); the implicit Tariff (IT) rate which shows the deviation of the domestic prices of inputs from their border prices; and the Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC) which is the ratio of domestic value added (obtainable as a result of the application of protection measures) to value added in world market prices were estimated. Unlike the IT, the EPC considers protective measure relating to both inputs and outputs (see Appendix I for an outline of the methodology).

A summary of the economic efficiency indicators for rice production in Ghana (based on 1986 data) has been given in Table 2. These were obtained by applying the models outlined in the appendix to empirical data (ie data on cost of production and processing).

The computed DRC figures which were 1.2 for the traditional system, and negative for both the improved and irrigated systems (see Appendix 2 for explanation of these systems) indicate that Ghana has no comparative advantage in rice for all the three systems of rice production considered. Even more important is the fact that both the improved and irrigated systems result in negative value added to the economy, in spite of the tremendous protection afforded by government pricing policies. Also, all the three sys-

tems showed negative economic profitability, indicating that rice production in Ghana resulted in a loss to the economy (see Table 2).

Table 2 - Summary of Economic Indicators by Production Systems, Ghana, 1986.

Item	Units	Financial			Economic		
		(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)
1. OER = c90.00 per US\$1.00; SER = C135.00 per US\$1.00							
2. Gross revenue							
Yield (paddy rice)	t/ha	1,0	1,6	3,5	1,0	1,6	3,5
Milled (white rice)	t/ha	0,7	1,0	2,3	0,7	1,0	2,3
Gross revenue	t/ha	41600	66560	145600	18395	29432	64383
NPR rice	%				126	126	126
3. Production costs							
Traded inputs	t/ha	2,634	10,737	12,730	172	27,058	87,109
Domestic factors	t/ha	25,743	59,632	71,298	25,743	59,632	712,298
Total	t/ha	28,377	70,369	84,028	25,915	86,690	158,407
IT Production	%				10	-19	-47
4. Milling/marketing							
Traded inputs	t/ha	1,314	2,103	4,600	2,836	4,538	9,926
Domestic factors	t/ha	2,657	4,252	9,300	2,657	4,252	9,300
Total	t/ha	3,972	6,354	13,900	5,493	8,789	19,226
IT Milling/marketing	%				-28	-28	-28
5. Total costs							
Total cost	t/ha	32,349	76,723	97,928	31,408	95,479	177,633
6. Value added							
Value Added	t/ha	37,652	53,720	128,270	15,387	-2,164	-32,652
7. Profit							
Net Profit	t/ha	9,252	-10,163	47,672	-13,013	-66,047	-113,251
8. Net foreign exchange earning							
Net foreign exchange earning (NFEE)	t/ha				171	-24	-363
9. Domestic resource cost DRC							
	t/ha				1,2	-ve	-ve
10. Effect protection rate EPR							
	%				145	-ve	-ve

Source: Computed from Cost and Return Field Data.

(a) Traditional - (b) Intermediate - (c) Irrigated

In order to investigate the effect of relative changes in assumptions regarding the parameters used in the analysis with respect to the DRCs for the different rice production systems, sensitivity analysis was done within an elasticity framework. The assumption here was that the DRCs are likely to be sensitive to the c.i.f. price of rice, yield, labour costs, irrigation/pumping cost, and capital services. Only the parameters for the production systems were considered since post-production activities may not be confined to only one method, and, therefore, have little influence on elasticity values. In this respect, the elasticities are functions of the size of the domestic resource cost and the respective parameter, or the share of the particular factor in the initial total cost of production.

The sensitivity analysis indicates that all the production systems are sensitive to yield and border prices of rice. This means that policies that ensure higher yields on the farmers' fields when matched by higher world market prices for rice will substantially improve Ghana's comparative advantage position in rice production. The traditional system shows high sensitivity to unskilled labour cost, but not to capital services. This is not surprising, since unskilled labour is the most important factor of production in the system; and implies that innovations that save labour in the traditional system will improve its comparative advantage. On the other hand, the improved and irrigated systems are highly sensitive to capital services, indicating that the cost of inputs like machinery and their respective quantities/numbers employed in the production processes significantly effect the county's comparative advantage in rice by these systems.

The sensitivity analysis brings into sharp focus the issue of whether Ghana should continue to promote large-scale rice farming and so use scarce resources to import the necessary machinery and make further investments in irrigation development, or turn to the traditional small-scale rice farmer and improve the prospects of comparative advantage there by means of yield increasing innovations.

Protection of Ghana's Rice Industry through Input-output Prices

Ghana's rice industry continued to enjoy substantial protection from government policies in the mid-1980s. This is demonstrated by the Nominal Protection Rate (NPR) estimates which show the extent of deviation of the domestic price from the border price (see Table 3). The NPR for the period 1970-1986 shows that government pricing policies generated enormous protection for the rice industry. The NPR ranged between 300% in 1976 and 1700% in 1982. This means that between 1976 and 1982, rice consumers in Ghana paid between 3 times and 17 times higher for each kilogram of rice than they could have obtained it at free trade prices (i.e. if there were no restrictions on imports). The implication here is that consumers in Ghana have been taxed (in terms of rice) over the years, not for government revenue (since quantitative restriction through import licensing were used), but as transfer of income from consumers to producers and marketing agents to finance an inefficient rice industry.

The excessive protection given the rice industry could be attributed to (a) an overvaluation of the Ghanaian cedi, and (b) government market intervention policies. Lutz and Scandizzo² observe that NPR measures are directly related to foreign exchange shadow rates. Thus the NPR (when a currency is overvalued or under-valued) will be a measure of the equivalent tariff (or

2 Lutz, E. and P. L. Scandizzo (1980): Distortions in Developing Countries: A Bias Against Agriculture. *European Review of Agricultural Economics*. Vol. 7, No.1.

subsidy) implicitly levied against the commodity as a consequence of the overvaluation (or under-valuation), and of the direct intervention.

Table 3 - Estimates of Nominal Protection Rate (NPR) for the Rice Industry, Ghana 1970-86

Year	Border price c.i.f. Tema (cedis/mt)	Domestic price wholesale	NPR %
1970	191.50	269.30	41
1971	171.20	277.93	62
1972	252.60	376.43	49
1973	194.36	451.14	132
1974	466.69	496.22	6
1975	452.76	680.32	90
1976	349.58	1,394.70	299
1977	358.82	1,973.41	350
1978	421.96	2,680.54	535
1979	381.92	3,051.68	699
1980	1,128.00	9,330.00	727
1981	1,271.00	12,440.00	879
1982	748.70	13,330.00	1,680
1983	4,754.00	48,700.00	924
1984	9,266.15	50,000.00	440
1985	12,009.91	64,000.00	433
1986	19,998.00	64,000.00	220

Source : Ministry of Trade, Accra, Ghana.

The implicit tariff (IT) rate estimates which quantify the impact of government policies on tradeable inputs such as fertilizers, show further that the rice industry in Ghana has enjoyed a high level of protection. A positive IT means a disincentive to the use of the input because its price is higher than would be the case without government intervention. Alternatively, a negative IT means incentive is provided to encourage the use of the input.

In terms of production costs, the IT rates were 10% for the traditional system, -19% for the improved system, and -47% for the irrigated system. These figures suggest that while government policies created disincentives for the use of traded inputs in the traditional system, strong incentives were offered for the use of these inputs (i.e. fertilizers and machinery) in the improved and irrigated systems.

The Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC), also expressed as the ratio of the excess in domestic value added over freetrade value added, measures the combined impact of price policies on output and tradeable inputs on producers' incentives, and, therefore, reflects the incentives afforded for invest-

ment in an industry³. The EPC for the traditional system was positive, 1.45, which means that on the aggregate, pricing policies offered strong incentives for rice production by this method.

On the other hand, the EPC values were negative for both the improved and irrigated systems. This implies that the returns to domestic primary factors (domestic value added) were much lower economically for the improved and irrigated system than what these factors could earn in a free trade situation.

Thus, returns to factors of production were penalized by the protection system, so that removal of the protection would allow these factors to be employed in more efficient productive activities than the rice industry.

Also, the negative EPC indicates that rice production by the improved and irrigated systems led to an absolute loss of foreign exchange to the economy. This could be attributed to the high cost of traded inputs used in these systems. Since both systems use fertilizer and machinery which are traded, and whose prices have substantially increased as a result of the cedi devaluation (for example, a 65 hp tractor cost ₵35,000.00 and combine harvester cost ₵100,000.00 in 1979/80; and in 1986 (which is the study period) their prices increased to ₵3.5 million and ₵6.9 million, respectively) the overall value added was negative in both cases. Again, this implies that government input price policy resulted in the diversion of factors of production from more efficient activities to a less efficient activity.

As has already been discussed, the comparative advantage analysis of rice production in Ghana indicates that Ghana has no comparative advantage in rice production at the wholesale level. This means that it costs higher to produce rice in Ghana than obtaining it through imports, and therefore an import substitution drive for rice could be detrimental to Ghana's economy. More significant is the fact that both the improved and irrigated systems of rice production show negative DRC estimates, and therefore result in loss in foreign exchange to the economy. In other words, these two system of rice production conclusively lead to social welfare loss.

For example, the figures for Economic Value (EV) added, Net Economic Profit (NEP), and Net Foreign Exchange Earnings (NFEE) were all negative for both the improved and irrigated systems. The irrigated system, however, showed the highest negative figure as shown in Table 2 (EV = ₵32,652/ha; NEP = ₵113.151/ha; and NFEE = US\$ 363/ha), indicating that the irrigated system has the highest economic loss or social welfare cost and therefore higher loss of foreign exchange.

3 Corden, W. M. (1966). The Structure of a Tariff System and the Effective Protection Rate, *Journal of Political Economy* Vol.74.

It could be deduced then that even though government policies have favoured and protected the domestic rice industry, rice production in Ghana has so far been detrimental to the country's economy. It is therefore necessary that government takes a critical look at her policies related to rice vis-à-vis the country's rice production potentials.


Ghana's Domestic Rice Prices and World Market Prices

Government policies which have affected rice marketing in independent Ghana have been:

- (a) Trade restrictions for imported rice through an import licensing system;
- (b) Floor (support) and ceiling prices for domestically produced rice.

Even though government was able to control the prices of imported rice at the official distribution centres, there has been no effective machinery to control the prices of locally produced rice. Subsequently, there has existed three price regimes for rice in Ghana, namely: (1) official prices for imported rice (which have been lowest), (2) official prices for locally produced rice, and (3) open market prices for both local and imported rice which tend to equalize. This is explained in Figure 1. The resultant effect is that the actual market prices faced by consumers in Ghana have always been higher than the government official prices which have been the same throughout the country (regardless of distribution costs).

Fig. 1 : Rice Price Regimes in Ghana, 1980-87



- D = Demand Curve for rice (which is relatively elastic)
 Sd = Supply Curve for rice if there were no imports
 S (D+I) = Supply Curve for rice (local rice plus imports)
 Pn = Price of rice if there were no imports
 Po = Open market price for both local and imported rice
 PL = Official price for locally produced rice
 PM = Official price for imported rice.

For example, in 1981 when the border price was $\text{¢}1.27/\text{kg}$ for imported rice, the official retail price was $\text{¢}4.00/\text{kg}$ which was more than 3 time higher. But the open market price for the same period for both local and imported rice was $\text{¢}29.90/\text{kg}$; about 7 times higher than the official retail price, and 24 times higher than the border price.

The divergence in rice prices in Ghana reached a peak in 1984. The 1984 official retail price for imported rice was $\text{¢}11.40/\text{kg}$, and that for local rice was $\text{¢}50.00/\text{kg}$, which was more than 4 times higher. But the open market price for both local and imported rice was $\text{¢}171.61/\text{kg}$ about 15 times higher than the official price, and 18 times higher than the actual border price (c.i.f. Tema price was $\text{¢}9.27/\text{kg}$). Thus consumers in Ghana have paid very high prices for rice as compared to the prevailing world market prices. Table 4 and Fig 1. show these three price regimes.

Table 4 - Official Retail Price versus Open Market Price* for Rice
 (cedis/kg), Ghana, 1980-87

Year	Official Price		Open Market Price	
	Local	Imported	Local	Imported
1980	9.33	9.33	-	-
1981	12.57	4.00	29.90	29.90
1982	17.76	4.60	42.32	42.30
1983	48.70	11.40	115.98	115.98
1984	50.00	11.40	171.61	171.61
1985	64.00	36.00	96.00	96.00
1986	64.00	36.00	96.00	96.00
1987	96.00	50.00	100.00	1000.00

* Some of these figures have not been officially documented.

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Accra.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to analyze the misallocation of scarce resources in favour of rice production in Ghana in an effort to increase domestic rice output and attain rice self-sufficiency, using the DRC criterion as a measure of comparative advantage. The analysis has shown that even though Ghana has no comparative advantage in rice production at the wholesale level, government policies have highly favoured domestic rice production. This resulted in high domestic rice prices as compared to border prices (sometimes

sulted in high domestic rice prices as compared to border prices (sometimes more than 10 times higher) and subsequently high consumer welfare losses. High subsidies on inputs like fertilizer and machinery resulted in gross mis-allocation of resources as large area expansion and large-scale rice farming, as well as expensive irrigation projects were under-taken; such that the minimal increases in rice production over the years could not compensate for the huge investment costs incurred by government in pursuing a programme for self-sufficiency in rice.

On the basis of the foregoing analyses, it seems appropriate to discourage rice production in Ghana for reasons of economic inefficiency. For example, if one looks at the Net Economic Profit (NEP) which is negative for all these systems (see Table 2), but least for the traditional system (NEP = -¢13,013/ha), and with a conservative estimate that each of the three systems considered resulted in a loss of ¢13,013/ha to the economy, one could conclude that for the 1986 crop season alone, the total loss to the economy through rice production (area harvested conservatively put at 60,000 ha) amounted to at least ¢781 million (or US\$8.7 million). This is a huge loss to a developing economy like that of Ghana saddled with balance of payment problems and foreign exchange constraints.

However, if the government's decision takes into account other issues such as food security and income distribution, then it will be more economical and socially beneficial for the government to direct attention towards the traditional small-scale rice farmers where a relative comparative advantage in rice lies. This will allow only large-scale farms which are relatively efficient to survive while marginal farms phase out gradually. Moreover, these small-scale farmers will gradually acquire the techniques and management skills for modern rice cultivation practices, and thereby improve rice yields on their farms which are rather low at present.

It is envisaged that favourable government policies such as adequate and effective support prices, adequate and timely provision of credit facilities, and an improved input delivery system will not only help small-scale (traditional) rice farmers to increase rice production, but also facilitate the movement of income towards the rural sector. And higher rural incomes mean higher nutritional status and higher level of welfare for the farmers.

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A p p e n d i x 1

The Methodology

Scandizzo and Bruce (1980) have outlined methodologies for analyzing government market intervention effects and the social/economic cost of productive activities. These methodologies have been adopted and modified for the Ghanaian situation in this analysis.

In order to ascertain the comparative advantage of rice production in Ghana, the Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) criterion was used.

Estimates were made also for the Nominal Protection Rate (NPR), Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC), and Implicit Tariff (IT) rate as a means of assessing the impact of government input-output pricing policies.

Since the estimation of the DRC is based on certain assumption, a sensitivity analysis was also done to reflect the effect of changed assumptions on comparative advantage.

Nominal Protection Rate (NPR)

The NPR measures the rate at which the domestic price of a final output (rice) deviates from the world or border price.

In formula:

$$NPR = \left(\frac{P_{jd}}{P_{jb}} - 1 \right) \times 100$$

NPR > 0 means protection to domestic producers

NPR < 0 means penalty on domestic producers

A related measure is the Implicit Tariff (IT) rate which helps to quantify the impact of government policies on tradeable inputs.

$$IT = \left(\frac{P_{jd}}{P_{jb}} - 1 \right) \times 100$$

IT > 0 means disincentive to the use of the input.

IT < 0 means incentive for the use of the input.

where

P_{jd} = domestic price of output

P_{id} = domestic price of input

P_{jb} = border price of output

P_{ib} = border price of input.

Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC)

Balassa (1975) defines the EPC as the ratio of the domestic value added, obtained as a result of the application of protective measures, to value added in world market prices.

This ratio of excess in domestic value added over free trade value added indicates the combined impact of price policies on output and tradeable in-

puts on producers' incentive, and therefore reflects the incentive afforded for investment in the rice industry (Corden, 1966). Thus the EPC could give an indication of the direction of movement of resources in terms of the rice industry.

In expression:

$$EPC_j = \frac{Va_j^d}{Va_j^b} = \frac{\text{Value added (financial)}}{\text{Value added (economic)}}$$

By decomposing it into input and out components,

$$EPC = \frac{P_j^d - \sum_{i=1}^k a_{ij} p_i^d}{P_j^b - \sum_{i=1}^k a_{ij} p_i^b}$$

where

a_{ij} = quantity of the i th input used to produce one unit of the j th output

P_j^d = domestic price of the j th commodity

P_j^b = border price of the j th commodity

P_i^d = domestic price of the i th input

P_i^b = border price of the i th input.

By way of interpretation:

$EPC > 1$ means protective measures provide positive incentive

$EPC < 1$ means protective measures discriminate against rice.

$EPC < 0$ signifies an absolute loss of foreign exchange.

Domestic Resources Cost (DRC)

Simply defined, the DRC is a measure of the social opportunity cost (in terms of domestic factors of production employed directly and indirectly) of earning a marginal unit of foreign exchange. Ghana has comparative advantage in rice vis-à-vis the rest of the world if domestic cost per unit of rice is less than the shadow exchange rate. This can be expressed as:

$$DRC = \frac{\text{Opportunity Cost of Domestic Resources (in domestic currency)}}{\text{Net foreign exchange earned or saved (in foreign currency)}}$$

Algebraically,

$$DRC = \frac{\sum_{s=1}^n Y_{sj} MPP_s^b P_s^d}{P_j^y - \sum_{i=1}^m a_{ij} P_i^y}$$

where,

- Y_{sj} = quantity of primary traded factors used in producing a unit of the i th commodity
- MPP_s^b = Marginal physical product of the s th input in its best alternative use (b)
- P_s^d = domestic price of the s th input
- P_j^y = foreign price of the j th output

then,

- DRC < 1 means Comparative Advantage
- DRC = 1 is Neutral
- DRC > 1 means Comparative Disadvantage

Shadow Exchange Rate (SER)

Due to price distortions, the official exchange rate (DER) does not normally reflect the free trade equilibrium rate or the shadow exchange rate (SER). In this study the SER for Ghana was estimated, following Medalla (1979), and the World Bank's study on "Ghana: Policies and Programme for Adjustment" (1984).

In formula :

$$SER_t = OER_t (1 + b)$$

where b = premium put on foreign exchange

Considering the rather erratic movement of Ghana's exchange rate for the cedi since 1983, and the approach used by the World Bank in the 1984 study, the premium put on foreign exchange for this study was taken to be 50%.

$$SER_{1986} = 90 (1 + 0.5) = 135$$

Exchange rates (cedis/US \$ 1.00)

1978/82	¢02.75
1983	¢30.00
1984	¢35.00
1985	¢59.88
1986	¢90.00
1987 May	¢149.25

Sensitivity Analysis

In an effort to approximate the effect of dynamic changes within the system with regards to the major variables in the estimates, sensitivity analysis was done on these variables within an elasticities framework.

In expression, the elasticity E is :

$$E_i = \frac{\Delta \text{DRC coeff.} / \text{DRC coeff.}}{\Delta \text{item} / \text{item}}$$

It is to be noted that in interpreting these elasticities reference should be made to the importance of that item or factor in the total cost. This is because the relative magnitude of the elasticity of any given shadow price depends on the importance of that factor in the total cost. As a result, unimportant factors have low elasticities. Also, the estimates are point elasticities, and they are probably valid for only small changes in yield and factor costs.

Appendix 2

The analysis centered on three categories of rice production systems which are considered to embrace the major micro rice ecologies found in Ghana. These are:

(a) The traditional system which includes rice production practices in both the forest and savannah zones of Ghana which use neither mechanization nor modern inputs like high yielding varieties and fertilizers, and are totally rainfed (ie upland rice);

(b) The improved, semi-intensive system which refers to rice cultivation practices which are partially mechanized, use modern inputs, and supplement rainfall with pump irrigation from nearby rivers and ponds; and

(c) The irrigated, fully mechanized intensive system under which all farm operations are mechanized (except sowing and fertilizer application), which uses modern inputs, and depends mainly on government (large irrigation projects).

Essential features of these rice production systems are summarized below:

Major rice production systems in Ghana				
	Unit	Rice system		
		Traditional	Improved partially mechanized	Irrigated fully mechanized
.....				
Nature of rice culture		less-intensive	semi-intensive	Intensive
.....				
Yield	t/ha	1,0	1,6	3,5
Labor	man-days/ha	113	209	159
Varieties (seed)		local	modern	modern
Fertilizer				
NPK (15-15-15)	Kg/ha	nil	200	400
Sulphate of ammonia	kg/ha	nil	75	150
Cultivation	-	manual	tractor	tractor
Harvest	-	manual	manual	combine
Extension contact	-	nil	yes	yes
Capital source	-	traditional	banks	banks
Water source	-	rainfed	mainly rainfed	irrigated

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Accra; Irrigation Development Authority (IDA), Accra, and Crop Service Department, Accra.

Prix officiels et Prix d'Equilibre des Denrées alimentaires: le Cas du Maïs et du Mil à Lomé

Mavor Tetey Agbodan*

ABSTRACT. Public authorities have always sought to control prices not so much of services as of other products. There are generally two objectives but of a varying nature: protection of economic agents mostly urban consumers in Africa and control of fiscal fraud. While the intentions are worthy, the measures taken often seem inappropriate and the means used out of proportion in comparison with the outcome. At times the measures trigger a boomerang i.e. price inflation instead of stabilization, negative results and general discontent. A case in point is the ensemble of administrative measures taken by TOGOGRAIN to stabilize prices of staple cereals, maize, millet, sorghum, beans and rice. To meet its objectives of developing food products through sufficiently remunerative prices to producers, stabilization of the price of consumption and forwarning against deficits, TOGOGRAIN uses moral persuasion, price fixing, banning of exports and detention. The prices paid to producers by TOGOGRAIN are smaller than that offered by wholesalers. A policy of price stabilization should aim at production and not prices. In Togo, the surface under cultivation is stagnant, the yields are regressive and there has been a significant increase in population. As there is a deficit in maize and millet, products whose consumption rate is very high, these products are imported. Just like at the stock exchange, the traditional African market is very sensitive to the variations of demand and supply as a result of which prices vary many times in the day. Commercial transactions obey neither dictates nor the barrel of the gun. The arbitrary fixing of prices results in withdrawal of produce from the market and the birth of parallel markets both of which further trigger prices. TOGOGRAIN is not viable not because it is subsidized as is European agriculture but because of the discrepancy between the stated objectives and the outcomes.

Introduction

Les pouvoirs publics ont toujours cherché à contrôler les prix moins des biens de service que des autres produits. Les buts visés sont généralement de deux sortes mais de nature différente: protection des agents économiques surtout des consommateurs urbains en Afrique et lutte contre la fraude fiscale. Si ces intentions ne sont pas toujours contestables, les mesures apparaissent souvent inadaptées et les moyens disproportionnés par rapport aux résultats obtenus. Des fois les mesures conduisent à des effets boomerang, ainsi, au lieu d'une stabilisation, on aboutit par exemple à une flambée des prix. La perte est alors triple: les dépenses budgétaires, le résultat négatif et le mécontentement général. Le cas qui nous préoccupe ici est particulièrement significatif: les mesures administratives de TOGOGRAIN pour stabiliser les prix de certains produits dits "de base" ou "de première nécessité": maïs, mil, sorgho, haricot, riz.

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Créé par décret en septembre 1971, TOGOGRAIN s'est assigné quatre objectifs principaux:

- Promouvoir et développer les produits vivriers, plus spécifiquement les céréales, par la garantie d'un prix suffisamment rémunérateur aux producteurs;
- Stabiliser les prix à la consommation tout au long de l'année;
- Se prémunir contre les déficits en général;
- Parer aux déficits régionaux.

Pour atteindre ces objectifs, l'Office a utilisé jusqu'à présent les moyens suivants: la persuasion morale, la fixation des prix, l'interdiction des exportations, la détention et la vente des stocks de régulation.

Il a été prévu en outre la création d'un "Fonds de Solidarité"; TOGOGRAIN a débuté ses opérations en 1973, mais le Fonds n'a pu être créé qu'en 1981¹.

En 1983, le nouvel Office Togolais des Produits Vivriers a durci sa position sur le plan des mesures d'intervention: pour la première fois les prix, surtout ceux du maïs, mil/sorgho et du haricot ont été décrétés. Au début le sac de 100 kg ne devrait pas coûter plus de 7.000 francs (maïs/mil), 8.500 francs pour le haricot. Ces prix seront relevés plus tard pour la période dite de "soudure", nous le verrons plus loin.

Dans ce document, nous livrons les résultats de notre observation du comportement des marchés du maïs et du mil à la suite de ces mesures. Notre document comprend trois grandes parties: la démarche méthodologique, les résultats de l'enquête et leur analyse.

Démarche méthodologique

Les observations directes

Pour connaître les réactions du marché face à ces prix officiels, nous avons constitué quatre équipes pour observer l'évolution des prix sur quatre marchés "traditionnels" de Lomé: "Polyclinique" (Agbadahonou), Grand Marché, Bè et Hanoukopé².

Pour éviter de se faire prendre pour des "Agents de l'Etat", chaque équipe devait intervenir comme acheteur; nous achetions tous les 15 jours un ou deux "bols" de maïs ou de mil; à cette occasion, l'enquêteur s'informait sur les différents prix.

Nous n'avons retenu que deux produits et deux mesures: le maïs et le mil qui constituent de nos jours encore la base de l'alimentation des populations

1 Le Conseil National sur la Commercialisation des Produits Vivriers a décidé dans une résolution solennelle "la Création d'un Fonds de Solidarité Nationale pour la Révolution Verte" en Août 1981. Voir à ce sujet: *La Nouvelle Marche* Quotidien Togolais d'information, No. 512, Samedi 8 Août 1981, p. 4.

2 Ce sont les principaux marchés centraux de Lomé.

du sud (maïs) et du nord (mil/sorgho); la consommation du blé (pain) et du riz est en progression rapide à Lomé comme partout dans les villes d'Afrique noire, mais son importance est encore réduite par rapport aux deux céréales.

Les mesures dont nous avons observé les prix sont le sac et le "grand bol" qui pèsent respectivement 100 kg et 2,3 kg. Les sacs n'ont pas toujours les mêmes dimensions; la façon de remplir le bol dépend de l'habileté de la "revendeuse"; le bol peut même être "cabossé" pour contenir moins de grains. Ces pratiques bien connues en Afrique font que le poids indiqué n'est qu'une approximation; les différentes pesées que nous avons effectuées ont bien confirmé le phénomène; il y avait des différences jusqu'à 6,5 kg (sac) et 350 grammes (bol).

Les interviews

Au moment des achats, nous devrions "provoquer des dialogues", créer un climat de confiance et poser une ou deux questions au maximum à chaque occasion.

Nous avons à nous plaindre de la cherté générale du niveau de vie, faire remarquer que selon TOGOGRAIN, les prix ne devraient pas être aussi élevés.

Tout comme les prix, les réactions des revendeuses étaient enregistrées non pas devant elles - il va de soi - mais au prochain "coin de rue", pour pallier l'oubli.

Les quatre questions principales à poser étaient les suivantes:

- Quels sont les principaux marchés d'approvisionnement de ces revendeuses?
- Comment TOGOGRAIN intervient-il sur ces marchés?
- Pourquoi les revendeuses n'observent-elles pas les prix fixés par cet Office des Produits vivriers?
- Que devrait faire TOGOGRAIN pour stabiliser les prix?

Le fait d'acheter nous-mêmes quelques quantités des produits observés a permis de nous faire admettre pour de simples consommateurs; bien qu'on changeait de revendeuse de temps à autre, la démarche a fait naître un climat de confiance qui autorisait commerçant et consommateur à parler "ouvertement" de TOGOGRAIN; on regardait à droite et à gauche pour éviter d'éventuels "mouchards", la conversation se tenait à voix basse. Les souvenirs lointains du "chéchia rouge" sont restés dans les moeurs africaines. Peu justifiée ou non, les revendeuses exigeaient cette condition.

Ce passionnant jeu de cache-cache a livré les quelques résultats suivants.

Résultats et Analyse de l'Enquête

L'évolution des prix

Comme nous l'avons signalé, le prix décrété du sac de maïs et de mil était de 7.000 francs. Au début de l'enquête, le 15 décembre 1983, le prix d'équi-

libre s'élevait à 13.500 francs soit un accroissement, de 92,85 au marché polyclinique.

Comme il ressort du tableau No. 1, le prix le plus élevé était 23 000 francs pour le sac de maïs (grand bol 500 F) le 30 Avril 1983 et 19 500 F et 425 F pour les mesures correspondantes du mil à la même date. Cette hausse s'est maintenue jusqu'en juillet où les prix ont retrouvé le niveau de décembre sauf pour le mil/sorgho.

Au moment où le prix du sac était passé à 17 000 F (contre le cours officiel de 7 000 F), les pouvoirs publics ont organisé une rencontre avec les revendeuses de céréales à Lomé à cause de la "montée illicite des prix" et aussi pour leur communiquer les nouveaux tarifs de la période de soudure.

A l'issue de cette réunion, le maïs et le sorgho coûteraient désormais 9 500 F le sac; le relèvement est de 35,71% mais la différence avec le prix d'équilibre restait encore très sensible:78,94.

Outre la persuasion morale, l'appel à l'amour maternel et au civisme, "des sanctions exemplaires" ont été promises aux "revendeuses récalcitrantes"³.

Tableau No. 1 - Prix d'équilibre du maïs et du mil "au marché polyclinique (Agbadahonou) du 15 décembre au 31 juillet 1983

Dates	Maïs		Mil	
	Sac 100kg	Grand bol 2.3 kg	Sac 100 kg	Grand bol 2.3 kg
15 décembre	13.500	300	10.000	250
31 décembre	13.500	300	11.500	250
15 janvier	15.000	350		Rupture de stock
31 janvier	17.000	375	14.500	275
28 février	16.000	350	14.000	275
15 mars	16.500	375	15.000	300
31 mars	18.000	400	16.000	325
15 avril	22.000	500	19.000	400
30 avril	23.000	500	19.500	425
15 mai	21.000	450		Rupture de stock
31 mai	21.000	475	18.000	400
15 juin	21.000	475	18.000	425
30 juin	21.000	450	18.000	425
15 juillet	18.000	400	18.000	425
31 juillet	13.500	350	16.000	350

La réunion ministérielle avec les revendeuses a eu un certain effet puisqu'elle a conduit, croyons-nous, à une légère diminution des prix à la fin du mois de février. La montée a repris dès mi-mars; alors l'Union Nationale des

³ Voir à ce sujet *la Nouvelle Marche*, op. cit.; No. 983 du 23 février 1983, p. 1; les nouveaux prix sont indiqués à la page 4 du journal.


Femmes du Togo (UNFT) organisa à son tour un meeting avec les vendeuses le 26 mars 1983.

Apparemment, cette fois, l'appel ne fut plus entendu. En effet, jusqu'à fin avril 1983, les prix ont atteint les montants les plus élevés. En cette période, le sac de maïs a coûté 25 000 F pendant certains jours, soit 263% environ le prix administratif; en outre, nous avons pu constater que des fois le mil revenait plus cher que le maïs (juillet), phénomène jamais observé auparavant.

En effet, la hausse généralisée du prix du maïs, base de l'alimentation pour plus de 50% de la population, a entraîné des comportements de substitution. La farine de blé a servi de substitut à tel enseigne que Lomé a connu une pénurie prolongée de ce produit; - la baguette de pain blanc a été vendue, "illicitement" à 40 F au lieu de 35 F⁴.

La commercialisation du manioc, de l'igname, de la patate, a enregistré un accroissement sans précédent; non seulement il y a eu un relèvement des prix de 35 à 50 % mais encore une rupture de stock pendant un mois et demi; les "fufu-bars" ont dû interrompre leur prestation de service⁵.

Graphique 1 - L'évolution des prix au Marché polyclinique



- 4 Le gouvernement togolais vient d'autoriser un relèvement du prix du pain; le prix officiel de la baguette est passé de 35 à 40 F.
- 5 Le Fufu-bar ou Foufou-bar est un petit restaurant africain où on sert des tubercules pilées (manioc et igname principalement).

Le graphique 1 visualise l'évolution des prix au marché polyclinique de Lomé. Nous voyons ainsi qu'il n'y a eu aucun point commun entre les prix administratifs et les prix d'équilibre (PE). Celui-ci se situait à 8 500 F lorsque les pouvoirs publics dictaient 7 000 F. Il n'y a donc jamais eu de point d'intersection entre l'allure des deux cours sauf en période d'abondance: août à novembre. Alors que le prix administratif était encore à 9 500 F, le marché ramena les siens à 8 000 F⁶.

Eléments explicatifs de l'évolution des prix du maïs et du mil

- La culture du maïs s'effectue essentiellement dans les régions maritimes et des plateaux, celle du mil/sorgho est pratiquée dans le reste du pays. Les récoltes ont lieu pour le maïs en juillet et en novembre (grande et petite saison); pour le mil, en novembre (une fois l'an); les semences sont effectuées 3 à 4 mois plus tôt.

Ces dates constituent les premiers facteurs explicatifs de l'évolution des prix. Lorsque les pluies commencent tôt et abondamment, une partie du stock constitué est remise en vente: la saison s'annonce bonne; le mouvement des prix à la hausse connaît alors un ralentissement; il y a même baisse sur certains marchés.

Le tableau No. 1 nous montre que le prix du sac de mil est encore très élevé alors que celui du maïs a retrouvé exactement ou presque le niveau de décembre sur les quatre marchés. La récolte du mil, rappelons-le, n'a lieu qu'en novembre, or nous sommes en juillet et c'est grâce aux effets de substitution que le prix du mil a pu baisser (16 000 F).

Lorsqu'on se réfère aux surfaces cultivées, on constate qu'elles sont restées presque stationnaires depuis le début des années soixante-dix.

**Tableau No. 2: Les surfaces cultivées du maïs, du mil et du riz (paddy)
en milliers d'hectares**

	1974	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84
Maïs	129	135	113	129	118	120	123	120	122	120	120
Mil/ sorgho	191	200	154	117	203	206	207	207	208	210	211
Riz (paddy)	10	11	12	16	18	20	23	23	25	26	23

Source: - Direction de la statistique agricole togolaise.

6 Signalons que le prix administratif, 9 500 F, était valable uniquement pour la période de soudure. Mais les commerçantes ne l'entendirent pas de cette façon. Elles disaient: "voyez, TOGOGRAIN demande qu'on vende le sac à 9 500 F et nous, nous vendons à 8 000 F, qui est plus juste"? Qui est plus juste, le marché ou TOGOGRAIN?

Le riz fait exception, sa surface cultivée aura plus que doublé en 1984 grâce à la promotion gouvernementale particulière dont il bénéficie. Mais lorsqu'on prend l'ensemble des cultures vivrières, le taux d'accroissement moyen est d'environ 1,2%; or, la population rurale augmente de 1,9% et celle de Lomé de 6% l'an.

En prenant un taux moyen de production de 900 kg pour le maïs et de 600 kg pour le mil par hectare cultivé et compte tenu des hypothèses de pertes et semences⁷, on obtient l'évolution des quantités disponibles:

Tableau No. 6: Evolution de la quantité disponible du maïs et du mil (en milliers de tonnes).

	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Maïs	99,33	103,95	87	99,33	90,86	92,4	94,94	92,4	93,94	92,4	92,4
Sorgho/ Mil	99,32	104	80,08	60,84	105,5	107	107,64	107,64	108	109	109,72

Cette évolution des quantités disponibles comparée à celle de la population montre que le Togo accuse un déficit en maïs et mil et le pays a toujours été importateur de ces produits au moins depuis le début des années soixante-dix. En fait, il ne peut en être autrement puisque les surfaces cultivées sont presque stationnaires, les rendements régressifs et la population globale en croissance; il s'en trouve donc que le prix de ces deux céréales est très sensible à la quantité produite.

Les mesures d'intervention de TOGOGRAIN: paramètre d'explication de la hausse des prix

La consommation des deux produits que nous étudions est très élevée: 50 à 60% pour le maïs, jusqu'à 90% pour le sorgho⁹. Une politique de stabilisation des prix devrait viser la production et non les structures de commercialisation.

En effet l'un des principaux objectifs de TOGOGRAIN est de promouvoir le développement des cultures vivrières. Dans ce cadre, l'office devrait offrir aux producteurs un prix incitateur parce que plus rémunérateur que les prix d'équilibre des marchés. Or les grossistes qui contrôlent actuellement la presque totalité du marché (99%), offrent un prix supérieur à celui de TOGOGRAIN.

7 15% pour le maïs; 14% pour le mil.

8 Le tableau est obtenu en multipliant les surfaces cultivées du tableau No. 2 par les coefficients 0,770 pour le maïs; 0,520 pour le mil.

9 Pour ces chiffres, voir SEDES, Enquête Budget-Consommation 1964-1965, Togo.

Acculé, l'office a été obligé d'utiliser, outre la persuasion morale, la force pour s'approvisionner. Selon les résultats de l'enquête, plusieurs paysans auraient été contraints de vendre à TOGOGRAIN. Le 7 juillet 1983, deux revendeuses nous ont informé qu'on a interdit à plusieurs femmes de faire le commerce des céréales; des sacs de maïs achetés à 20 000 F ont été saisis. TOGOGRAIN n'aurait payé que 7 000 F par sac.

Ces informations difficiles à contrôler ont conduit à la naissance d'un marché parallèle. Le 31 Mai 1983, nous avons appris pour la première fois l'existence d'une mesure appelée par les revendeuses "TOGOGRAIN". Au moment des contrôles, les femmes présentaient cette mesure comme étant le "nouveau grand bol"; or nos pesées ont montré que le "nouveau" ne pesait pas lourd; 1900 grammes contre 2300 grammes pour l'ancien grand bol.

La multiplicité des produits et/ou de leurs récipients a toujours été un moyen classique de différenciation des prix pour une vente optimale au consommateur. N'est-ce pas le même phénomène ici? Le bol TOGOGRAIN coûtait 250 F (0,131/gr) contre 275 F (0,11F/gr) pour le grand bol.

TOGOGRAIN a commencé ses ventes le 3 juin 1983. L'office voulait "déverser son stock sur le marché" - c'est une menace officielle - pour faire baisser les prix. Rappelons que sur les marchés aucun sac de maïs ou de mil n'était vendu en dessous de 17 000 F. Or l'office offrait son sac plus de 50% moins cher; c'était la ruée, un *rush* généralisé.

Des ménagères se postaient à 4 heures du matin devant l'office pour attendre leur tour. TOGOGRAIN n'ouvre qu'à 7 heures. L'office a dû fermer ses portes le mercredi 8 juin.

A la réouverture, une semaine plus tard, TOGOGRAIN était obligé de rationner sa vente. N'est-ce pas l'aveu d'un échec?

Le soir du 13 juin 1983 je rentrai en taxi à la maison. Profitant de l'occasion, j'ai provoqué une fois encore une discussion sur la montée "incroyable" des prix du maïs et du mil. Une femme, revendeuse, me demanda si je savais combien se vendait le sac de riz et de maïs à Cotonou - Non: 6.500 F; et 8 000 F respectivement; les prix correspondants sont 9 500 F et 21 000 F à Lomé. Savez-vous, continua-t-elle, lorsqu'il y a pénurie en Côte d'Ivoire, nous allions jusqu'au Cameroun chercher de quoi approvisionner le marché ivoirien. Si c'est la Côte d'Ivoire qui vit dans l'abondance, nous en prenions là pour vendre ailleurs; les prix ne montaient jamais en flèche. Or maintenant vos gouvernements - mes gouvernements? - nous arrêtent partout, interdisant la circulation des biens, saisissent les marchandises. C'est normal que les prix augmentent exagérément.

La revendeuse n'a jamais suivi de cours de gestion ni d'économie politique; j'étais sidéré.

En réalité, le marché traditionnel africain est très sensible aux variations de l'offre et de la demande. Pour le comprendre, il faut se référer aux comportements des valeurs mobilières; sur les marchés locaux certains produits

connaissent plusieurs variations journalières de prix sous les effets uniquement de l'offre et de la demande, comme à la bourse! Nous croyons donc fermement qu'il y a ici des phénomènes socio-économiques qui régissent les comportements. Les transactions commerciales n'obéissant ni aux diktats ni aux coups de crosse, ce n'est pas par hasard que tous les blocus économiques ont tous échoué.

Conclusion

On pourrait remonter à l'ancienne Egypte et aux phéniciens pour retrouver les premiers fondements de la loi de l'offre et de la demande. Généralement les économistes s'arrêtent aux classiques: à Stuarts Mill, à Adam Smith, à Jean Baptiste SAY qui disait précisément que "chaque offre crée sa propre demande"; la régulation des prix doit donc agir sur ces deux déterminants principaux.

La fixation arbitraire des prix provoque la raréfaction (diminution de l'offre) et la naissance de marchés parallèles. Les deux phénomènes conduisent à un relèvement du niveau des prix; c'est le cas de TOGOGRAIN. Les paysans ont refusé de vendre à un prix jugé trop bas; l'importation a été découragé par des mesures policières; l'accroissement des prix qu'on voulait éviter devenait ainsi inévitable; c'est l'effet pervers de boomerang.

TOGOGRAIN est donc une entreprise d'Etat subventionnée dont les résultats sont peu viables. Son efficacité en tant qu'organisme de stockage de produits vivriers en vue d'une régulation des prix apparaît douteuse. La raison de ce doute n'est pas à rechercher dans le fait des subventions qu'il reçoit - toute l'agriculture européenne est subventionnée - mais dans l'inadéquation entre coûts et rendement, entre objectifs escomptés et résultats obtenus.

En effet le coût de revient apparaît très élevé premièrement par rapport aux prix de vente et deuxièmement comparé aux performances du secteur privé¹⁰. N'est-il pas préférable de laisser agir ce dernier dans le domaine de la distribution?

Antananarivo a fini par libéraliser la commercialisation du riz après plusieurs années de dépenses inutiles. La sous-région ouest-africaine va-t-elle entamer cette même voie sans issue, à mécontenter les procédures, les consommateurs et les contribuables à la fois?

10 Voir à ce sujet une étude de la Banque Mondiale : *Examen de l'Intervention gouvernementale dans la Commercialisation des Produits vivriers au Togo*, Washington, janv. 1964, p. 67.

ANNEXES

Annexe 1: Prix d'équilibre du maïs au Grand Marché de Lomé

Dates	Prix du Grand Bol	Prix du sac de 100 kg
17 - 12 - 82	350 F	13.500 F
31 - 12 - 82	350	14.000
15 - 1 - 83	340	14.000
31 - 1 - 83	350	Rupture de stock
15 - 2 - 83	375	15.000
27 - 2 - 83	400	15.000
15 - 3 - 83	375	plus de
30 - 3 - 83	400	vente
15 - 4 - 83	525	de sacs
30 - 4 - 83	450	"
15 - 5 - 83	450	"
30 - 5 - 83	450	"
15 - 6 - 83	450	"
30 - 6 - 83	400	"
15 - 7 - 83	375	"
30 - 7 - 83	275	"

Annexe 2: Marché de Bè

Dates	Maïs		Mil	
	Sac de 100 kg	Grand Bol 2.3 kg	Sac de 100 kg	Grand bol 2.3 kg
15 décembre	13.000	275	9.500	235
31 décembre	13.500	300	11.000	245
14 janvier	14.500	325	11.000	245
31 janvier	15.000	330	11.500	250
15 février	16.000	350	13.000	265
28 février	15.500	330	13.200	265
16 mars	16.000	350	13.500	270
31 Mars	17.000	375	14.000	280
15 avril	19.000	470	15.600	300
30 avril	21.000	480	15.800	325
16 mai	19.500	475	17.000	340
31 mai	19.500	465	18.500	400
14 juin	19.000	465	19.000	425
30 juin	20.000	475	19.500	450
15 juillet	17.000	400	19.000	425
31 juillet	14.000	365	18.000	400

Prix officiels et prix d'équilibre des denrées à Lomé

Annexe 3: Marché de Hanoukopé

Dates	Mais		Mil	
	Sac de 100 kg	Grand bol	Sac de 100 kg	Grand bol
15 décembre	12.800	265	9.400	225
31 décembre	13.000	275	10.500	230
15 janvier	13.000	275	10.600	230
31 janvier	13.200	280	11.200	235
15 février	14.000	300	12.500	250
28 février	14.500	325	13.000	250
15 mars	14.500	325	13.000	250
31 mars	16.000	360	13.500	260
15 avril	16.500	365	14.000	325
29 avril	18.000	400	15.000	350
16 mai	19.000	450	16.000	375
30 mai	20.000	470	17.000	400
15 juin	19.000	455	17.500	400
30 juin	18.500	450	18.000	420
15 juillet	17.000	400	19.000	425
31 juillet	16.000	375	19.000	425

Class-formation, State Construction and Customary Law in Colonial Nigeria*

Ejembi Anefu Unobe**

ABSTRACT. Au Nigéria (comme partout ailleurs), on a souvent soutenu que le droit et les tribunaux coutumiers ont été créés par les pouvoirs coloniaux aux fins de protéger et de renforcer un ordre social (et le régime politique s'appuyant sur celui-ci) enraciné dans l'économie politique indigène de ce territoire. Cette supposition n'était qu'un écran idéologique visant à masquer la réalité (ce qu'elle continue de faire d'ailleurs), à savoir que le tribunal coutumier constituait un important instrument entre les mains des autorités et des agents coloniaux pour stabiliser l'ordre social et le régime politique imposé au Nigéria par les Anglais. Le droit et le tribunal coutumiers ont joué un rôle important dans les processus historiques de formation de classes et de construction de l'Etat pendant la période coloniale aussi bien au niveau de la conception qu'à celui de la réalisation. Les chefs de l'époque devinrent un point de référence dans la définition du droit coutumier, et les tribunaux furent délibérément transformés en ce que l'on peut appeler des tribunaux de chefs. Les chefs et leurs tribunaux ont aidé le colonialisme à pénétrer entièrement et efficacement les diverses sociétés du territoire appelé maintenant Nigéria. Ainsi les institutions actuelles appelées droit coutumier et tribunal coutumier remontent au colonialisme et les intentions qui avaient animé ce régime en les créant y sont maintenues ainsi que leurs activités. On ne saurait donc s'attendre à ce que le système en place aide l'Etat nigérian à réaliser les principes de démocratie et de justice sociale prônés dans la Constitution de 1979 si ce système n'est pas remanié de fond en comble.

Introduction

Customary courts administered laws that were supposedly customary (indigenous) in both origin and character. In this argument, the social order and the political regime these courts sought to protect and enhance were rooted in the indigenous political economy of the 'Nigerian' people.

This position is a complete reversal of the reality. To get at that reality, this paper turns that argument on its head and argues, instead, that the courts were in fact a major instrument which colonial officials and agents used to determine the character of the social order and of the political rule that were being imposed on Nigeria. The paper develops this new argument by first rescuing the concept of customary law from under the suffocating weight of colonial falsehood and making it available for theoretical and empirical analysis of the objectives of colonialism and what the courts charged with its implementation did in fact. It then proceeds to an analysis of the processes

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of class and state formation during the colonial period, carefully demonstrating the crucial role customary courts played in these twin processes.

Customary law

Customary law as far as lawyers in Nigeria are concerned does not pose any problem of definition because: "law, customary or otherwise, is an expression of the ideals and aspirations of a given society" (Anyebe, A.P., 1985). Of course, no serious minded professional would challenge the basis of his profession and since law, like any other profession, exists to administer to the interests of society, anything law must necessarily be an "expression of the ideals and aspirations of a given society". Pursuing this rather technicist argument further, Anyebe (1985) wrote:

Native law and custom is I think, a mirror of accepted usage. It is not the business of the mirror to create images or beautify an ugly face, although we do know that special mirror can, and do, distort images. The point is that the mirror is powerless to do more than reflect what it sees.

Lest anyone is inclined to think that customary law during the colonial period in Nigeria presented a case of one of the special mirrors, Justice Anyebe quickly urged that the issue must be "read in conjunction with the Evidence Act imposed on Nigeria by colonial government" for, in this way, it would "be clear that the issue of whether or not there existed customary laws was a non-issue" (Anyebe, A.P. 1985).

But there is surely an issue, that is whether what existed and was called customary law was in fact customary law. If it was, then, it must be qualified as 'colonial customary law'. We rely on sections 73¹ and 14 of the very Evidence Act which Justice Anyebe cited. Section 73(1), for example, requires the courts to take judicial notice of all general customs, rules, principles, which have been held to have force of law in or by any of the superior courts of law equity in England or the Federal Supreme Court or by the High Court of the Region and all customs which have been duly certified and recorded in any such courts. Section 14 went further to state the point as follows:

(1) a custom may be adopted as part of the law governing a particular set of circumstance if it can be noticed judicially or be proved to exist by evidence. Burden of prove shall lie upon the person alleging its existence;

1 The British had the penchant for finding traditional rulers (chiefs) where non existed and justifying this with purely mythical and ideological explanations. But most of the time the people refused to be deceived as accounts of their reactions to the imposition of such chiefs on them clearly show in Afigbo, E.A. (1972) and Dorward, D.C. (1969).

(2) a court of superior or coordinate jurisdiction in assuring that the persons or the class of persons concerned in that area look upon the same as binding in relation to circumstances similar to these under consideration; and

(3) where a custom cannot be established as one judicially noticed, it may be established and adopted as part of the law governing particular circumstances by calling evidence to show that persons or class of persons concerned in the particular area regard the alleged custom as binding upon them: **Provided that in case of any custom relied upon in any judicial proceeding it shall not be enforced as law if it is contrary to public policy and is not in accordance with natural justice, equity and social conscience. (Emphasis added).**

Anyebe's study in terms of analytical perspective, falls into one of three dominant analytical trends or tendencies in the study of customary law in Africa. Essentially these tendencies revolve around the thesis that commonly held official stereotypes provides the basis for customary law. Colson (1971) observed of customary law from this perspective as:

resting on tradition and presumably derived its legitimacy from immemorial custom. The degree to which it was a reflection of the contemporary situation and joint creation of colonial officials and African leaders, more especially of those holding political office, was unlikely to be recognized.

Analyses from this perspective cannot provide a correct understanding of the nature and mission of customary law in Nigeria because such analyses, like that of Anyebe's fails to theoretically and explicitly consider the connection between the subordination of Nigeria's social formation to capitalist relations and the promulgation of this new law. This failure is, of course, consequent upon the manner in which the perspective directs analysis of legal changes to be conducted against a background of assumed indigenous law.

The second tendency, which seems an improvement over the first, sees customary law as "folk law in the process of reception... not so much a kind of law as a kind of legal situation... in dominant legal system recognize and support the local law of politically subordinate communities". (Lloyd Fallers, 1969).

Customary law is presented in this framework as denoting the distinctive, discrete and normative structures of particular ethnic groups which then became the basic unit of analysis. Recognized by colonial authority, these structures and their social referents were encapsulated and incorporated within a large cultural and social whole. The thesis here is that the normative

structures of the various ethnic groups were carefully studied and elements of them acceptable to the colonial authority were recognized and incorporated into the colonial state legico-political structures.

The difficulty with this thesis is that it is premised on a theoretical model which sees society as necessarily a harmonious whole. Yet, that model can only lead to an ahistorical analysis of customary law in Nigeria since it does not allow for an examination of the social forces that selected and shaped it. If the general conception of customary law in Nigeria during colonialism did not always necessarily entail the creation of new norms and concepts, it certainly did always entail justifying of newly elaborated or extant, though changing, legal ideas by reference to an ideally consensual community in a past often presumed to be static. The preoccupation of colonialism in producing this referent was postulating an ahistorical, functionalist conception of social relations in pre-colonial 'Nigeria'. In fact, some writers have gone further and reified this referent in the concept of tradition. This has allowed for an explicit integration of this pre-colonial referent into the ideologies of scholarship and of politics, becoming, as it were, an essential component of the conventional contrast between 'tradition' and 'modern' a dichotomy containing both an evolutionary and political presuppositions. It supplied justification for the otherwise empty ideological position that the future of African communities and countries, including Nigeria, lay inevitably in modernization which in turn depended necessarily and fundamentally upon foreign capital and the intervention of the state. This conceptual dichotomy of which 'customary law' was only a part rationalized this and other positions which then formed the basis of state policies, including the provisional recognition of, and eventual opposition to legal forms other than those sanctioned by the state.

It should be clear, therefore, that the concept of customary law in Nigeria, as elsewhere in Africa, was an ideology of colonial domination produced in the particular circumstances of the colonization process including colonial state formation. The process entailed creation of 'new classes' and the ideology reflected the emergence of these 'new classes' and their relations to the colonial state. It also supplied the framework for their insertion into the peripheral capitalist formations. Even more important, it helped in the relegation of local social forces to a subordinate position vis-à-vis foreign capital and the metropolitan legal ideologies associated with the state. This is precisely the position we shall argue in this paper.

To do this, we require suitable conceptual tools for building a picture of customary law in Nigeria as a phenomenon which is specific to particular historical circumstances, and as an ideology which accompanied and formed an essential part of colonial domination. The third dominant analytical trend, in spite of its shortcomings, provides these tools. The argument of this trend is well summarized by Chanock (1978) as follows:

... in the areas of criminal law and family law, African law represents the reaction of older men to a loss of control. This reaction grew in strength during the first thirty or forty years of the colonial period. Then, in accordance with the policy of indirect rule, a large portion of the administration of justice was turned over to precisely those people who had reason to define and, more importantly to administer the law in a restrictive and authoritarian way. These definitions form the basis of current African law.

Implicit in the above is the thesis that customary law is a kind of neo-traditional ideology and it derives ultimately from the desires and efforts of certain social groups to translate their values (interests) into colonial legal forms in order to compensate for a loss of authority. We suggest that certain interests of these groups coincided with those of the colonialists and that their support was, therefore, needed and actively sought and received by the colonialists to enable them to succeed in the enterprise of building structures of domination, oppression and exploitation. This suggestion finds support in Bere's (1955) belief that:

The position of an African chief is one of great complexity, for he must be representative as well as ruler of his people, not only the authority but, also a link in the chain which joins the mass of the common people to an impersonal government machine. It is of vital importance to any African administration and to the welfare of the people, that this link should not be broken; it is the greatest safeguard against control falling into the hands of irresponsible and evil-disposed people. For the reason the pattern of affairs to which we should be able to look forward to is a blend of the old and the new.

Apart from the lunatic bit about representativity and welfare of the people, this is an accurate representation of the place and role of 'chiefs' in the construction and maintenance of structures of domination and oppression by the colonial power in Nigeria.

Bureaucratization and Centralization of Institutions and Power

Bureaucratization and centralization of institutions and centralization of power were both necessary conditions for and implications of the colonialization process. While centralization allowed for greater and effective control over the running of public affairs by the colonial authority, bureaucratization tended to protect it from reactions which such control could generate by allowing a convenient role for "indigenous institutions" and by introducing impersonal element into the whole process. Burns (n.d.) adequately captured the logic:

The advantages of those Native Courts in Nigeria are very great. At the present time they fill a gap in the judicial system which would not

otherwise be filled save at a prohibitive cost and moreover, they do the work allotted to them more effectively than it could be performed by most British Magistrates. The Courts are presided over by men of the same race as the litigants, speaking the same language and thinking along similar lines. To an African judge the circumlocution and excessive verbiage of an African witness appears natural, to a European it is little less than maddening. But there is more than this. A mistake made by a British official in a case affecting land, marriage or any other of the subjects governed by native law, would be regarded by the unsuccessful litigant and his friends as the result of ignorance, or the malicious interference of the official with the customs and the right of the people; the political effect of a number of such mistakes might be far-reaching and disastrous. On the other hand, a similar mistake by an African judge would be regarded by the losing party and the public as an unfortunate happening due to the machinations of an evil spirit... and the loser would accept the decision with the resolve that on the next occasion he would... offer to the local deity such a sacrifice as would ensure a favourable verdict.

It was this same logic that informed the conception and introduction of indirect rule in Nigeria. The transactional drama of the colonial period can, therefore, be better appreciated within the over all context of that rule. In that context for example, the often convoluted and complex interrelationships between 'traditional' and colonial laws assume an inevitable and wonderful logic (Salamone, A.F. 1983).

Theoretically, indirect rule was to ensure only minimal interference with indigenous conduct of public affairs, but its practice placed enormous constraints on the 'minimal' and ensured great changes in the system. In the legal area, for example, the requirements that justice reach a level appropriate for a British protectorate and that no law be repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience meant in practice the establishment of institutional structures to ensure compliance. Keay and Richardson (1966) neatly summarize the situation Lugard had to contend with:

On the judicial side Lugard's aim was to establish a superimposed court organization consisting of the supreme and provincial courts to enforce the protectorate's penal laws and make available a standard of justice appropriate to a British protectorate, but at the same time to utilize existing indigenous court systems which would, under supervision and control by the government, continue to dispense justice to the masses in a form understood by them.

The colonial authority introduced new institutions, superimposed them on the so called old systems, and in a matter of years did what took their Nor-

man conquerors centuries to do: built a centralized system which, as Elias clearly demonstrated, matched to a considerable extent the court system in England (Elias, T.O. 1962). The superimposition of the new on the old was dictated by expediency, for although the old courts and laws were regarded as inferior to those of the British, and some times by the "natural justice, equity, and good conscience test were regarded as barbaric, the experience of these courts and other judicial institutions and their political significance would help to shape the response of the indigenous population and its political leadership to the new institutions being established by the British.

The stated policy which was followed somewhat religiously throughout the colonial period was that the bulk of civil and criminal cases should be handled by the native courts. Every codification of laws, starting with the Native Courts Proclamation of 1900, embraced this principle. However, a close watch was maintained over these courts. Lugard introduced reforms which established a provincial court in each of the provinces and these courts were superior courts of record. Also, each court of whatever rank had a resident or other political officer of the province in supervision. These officers enjoyed unlimited power in criminal cases. They also enjoyed unlimited jurisdiction in landlords and tenant suits, *habeas corpus* application and personal contract suits among others. All civil cases could, furthermore, be appealed to the supreme court. The most important point to be noted here is that both the administrative control and judicial supervision of the Native Courts was vested in the hands of political officers. This invariably meant control and supervision of the activities of the 'chiefs' who in most cases constituted the members of these courts (Murray, D.J. 1969).

The Native Courts Proclamation of 1906, possibly because of the relative acquiesce to British suzerainty and the pacification of the North, added significant elements to the 1900 codification. With it, for example, the Residents power to establish and control courts became clearly established. Residents could also extend jurisdiction over African non-natives and native government servants. The Proclamation also established Native Courts of Appeals and empowered courts to make rules. One of the logical effects of the proclamation was the formal fusion of the legislative, executive and judicial functions of the colonial authorities.

Between 1910 and 1911, the colonial authority introduced financial reform into the court system and this helped to further strengthen the centralization process.

Although the stated goals of this reform were to end corruption and to raise the prestige of native courts through establishment of fixed salaries, in practice, it made the judges (mostly chiefs) independent of their constituencies and dependent on the colonial authority (they became salaried) but did not end corruption. This was a logical result of the policy which informed that

reform, and that logic was not missed by the colonial officials as testified to by Lugard when he said:

The policy which I am endeavoring to carry out as regards the natives of the Protectorate may, perhaps be usefully summarized here. The Government utilizes and works through the native chiefs, and avails itself of the intelligence and powers of governance of the Fulani caste in particular, but insists upon their observance of the fundamental laws of humanity and justice. Residents are appointed whose primary duty is to promote this policy by the establishment of native courts, in which bribery and extortion and inhuman punishments shall be gradually abolished. Provincial courts are instituted... to enforce these laws of the Protectorate, more especially which deal with... the import of liquor and fire arms and extortions from villagers by terrorism and personification... (Quoted in: Keay, E.A. & Richardson, S.S. 1966).

"Inhuman punishments" were abolished and 'human' ones established as symbolized by prison yards. Of course, we know that prisons did centralize state power in order to control paupers, debtors and dissenters being produced by economic and political crises generated by colonialism. We also know that by centralizing state power, prison was helping to create one of the necessary conditions for the emergence and survival of a new ruling class in Nigeria.

Sir Donald Caceron effected further changes in 1933 in the attempt to bring Northern Nigeria's laws into closer conformity with those of the South. But that, of course, meant greater governmental control of the system. These changes were contained in the Protectorate Courts Ordinance, the West African Court of Appeal Ordinance, the Native Courts Ordinance and Supreme Court (Amendment) Ordinance. A close look at the Native Courts Ordinance would show that the appeal system and powers of the political officers over the system were extended. The significance of the Ordinance, therefore lies in the fact that it carried further the twin principles of centralization and political control.

After the Brooke Commission of 1948, further reforms were made. Among the effects of these were the establishment of Moslem court of Appeal and new Native Courts laws. The Native Courts Laws were aimed at stopping people from jumping from one system to another. For example, anyone who had instituted a case in a native court was made to remain subject to the jurisdiction of that court by the laws. The reforms also specifically provided for land jurisdiction. The net result of the reforms was, of course, greater centralization and uniformity of law, and thus of power.

Customary Law, Class-relations and the State

As various parts of what became Nigeria were pacified by the British colonial might, Native Courts Ordinances were put in place and became law at

the same time. Native Authorities were established. These Native Courts were, therefore, as much part of the machinery of colonial administration as were the Native Authorities. Together they expressed the external form of those normative structures called customary law. The importance of the customary court system for this paper, therefore, lies in the fact that it constituted one of the concrete implementation arenas where the normative structures were demonstrated in practical terms as structures of domination and oppression. The courts were in fact, a major instrument through which colonial officers could (and did) determine the character of rule at the grass-roots; the brunt of the work of settling disputes and of enforcing law and order fell on them. Their activities as law enforcement agents were closely supervised by colonial officers and so they could not but ensure law and order that was decidedly colonial in nature.

Societies in 'Nigeria' were not free from contradictions and conflicts before the arrival of colonialism. But the arrival of British colonialism certainly did introduce new elements into such contradictions and conflicts, particularly at the level of actual struggles engendered by such contradictions. Specifically, the colonial authority introduced new structures and/or strengthened certain existing ones which placed new constraints on how the struggles could be waged, and which determined the fortunes/misfortunes of those who were involved in those struggles. The introduction of new contradictions and new elements into existing ones produced what Malinowski refers to as third cultures, *tertium quids*, (Malinowski, B. 1926). These arose, as do all socio-cultural forms, from real struggles and attempts to control the environment. The colonial milieu provided the conditions in which those new forms could, and did, develop. The basic issue at stake was that of power, of centralization as opposed to decentralization of the nature of the new state and state power being created. Autonomous centers of power had to be broken up to allow for the building of a centralized one. The new concept of customary law as developed by the colonial authority and, the new customary courts based on them were vital for both the breaking up of the autonomous centers of power and for the building of centralized ones. Lugard very much appreciated the role of the customary courts in this regard:

At the time when Native Courts were first established in the old Southern Nigeria Protectorate, the tribal authority had already broken down, and had been succeeded by a complete collapse of native rule under the disintegrating influence of middlemen traders, and of the Aros... The Native Courts no doubt, did much to re-establish tribal authority, and their usefulness is shown by their growing influence and the number of cases with which they dealt. They have prepared the way for a further advance. [emphasis added] (Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., 1968).

As elsewhere (Ranger, 1978), the colonialists found out that the agrarian societies in the Eastern part of the country were already stratified in production and contained distinct class of traders, those were not the primitive utopias they liked to find. The Igbo and other societies in the East and elsewhere in the country certainly lacked centralized authority but were organized.

This discovery of apparently organized societies or communities that ordered their affairs without office-holders empowered to rule immediately presented a threat to British stereotypes of Africa which needed to be taken care of. The battle had to be started at the ideological level, thus the quotation above. In this context, the allusion in the quotation to tribal authority which was assumably centralized but which was broken down by the so-called "Middlemen traders and Aros" begins to make more sense; it provided the needed ideological services to the British in their colonization enterprise in Nigeria. Ideology here did serve the purpose which Mannheim argues it does serve, namely; create a situation in which the collective unconsciousness of certain groups obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to other and thereby stabilizes it (Mannheim, A.n.d.). This helped to secure a pattern of belief (that the colonialists were not after all doing anything entirely new) which proved crucial in maintaining the morale, sense of commitment and effectiveness of the administrators we were charged with the implementation of colonial policies relating to the construction and maintenance of a state.

This ideological frame also provided the much needed justification for the British introduction of a hierarchy of appointed Africans to carry out the day-to-day administration, particularly administration of justice at the local level. The wide powers wielded by these appointed chiefs found justification in custom (Pratt, R.C., 1965; Tosh, J., 1978) as they received representativity premised on continuity with pro-colonial chiefly roles involving mystical ties between chiefs and their subjects (Gartrell, B. 1979). It should be clear that this notion of representativity depended neither on likeness to nor the choice of those supposedly represented. Rather, it was an ideological component of the policy implementation apparatus: colonial officials' of belief in the chiefs as representatives justified dependence on them as the main sources of information on what policy measures would be feasible and the implementation of those policies. The chiefs were no more than salaried bureaucratic appointees of the colonialist who collected colonial taxes and enforced the edicts of an imposed colonial regime. They were a class of people who allied with colonial interests believing that in doing so, their own interests would invariably be protected by the colonial power.

The colonialists were so obsessed with the idea that chiefs were the only right people to be appointed as customary courts presidents such that they had problem in establishing such courts in societies referred to by colonial

anthropologists as acephalous². Lugard (quoted in Report of the Native Courts (Northern provinces) Commission of Inquiry p. 9), in his 1900-1901 report, noted rightly that:

... The systems of native courts has worked fairly well in the districts in which it has been possible to establish such courts, but the greater part of the Protectorate with which we are in touch is occupied by pagan tribes, without cohesion, and in a primitive state of development in which regular native courts are not possible.

What made the setting up of regular native courts impossible in these "pagan" areas? Lugard supplied the answers in the same report; and it is the absence of "chief and councillors of which to constitute them". The absence of chiefs made setting up of courts problematic precisely because "The powers vested in the Native Courts are entrusted to the chiefs who were themselves closely supervised by the District Officers" (Lugard, in: Kirk-Greene 1968). There were two but related reasons why the colonialists thought chiefs should be in the customary courts. First, in several places the chiefs were imposed on the people. They, therefore, would need the service of that coercive apparatus, the court system, to counteract possible reactions from the people, and to make assurance doubly sure, they needed to have the customary courts under their control. The second reason had to do with the ideological fraud already discussed.

The appointment of chiefs even in places where they did not exist before and the subsequent establishment of courts in which they were members or over which they had some control had to do with the rationalization process occasioned by colonial capitalism. Under the spur of that process, all forms of pre-bureaucratic rule had to be replaced by hierarchically organized "public" organizations. These were specially designed to achieve a through and effective penetration of subject populations and to at the same time remain responsive to the dictates of central authority. With bureaucratization, it became possible to transform the cumbersome process of personal rule into what Weber refers to as impersonal and objective system of centralized command (Weber 1968). The economic imperative was the unification of

2 This residual category, which is no doubt a relic of an ahistorical and taxonomic phase of colonial political anthropology, though cannot provide the basis for useful analysis from our point of view, did provide intellectual support to the colonial ideology earlier mentioned. Incidentally, the very reasons which make the category unsatisfactory to us made it the very powerful intellectual tool for colonial ideological warfare. These reasons include; the category inevitably leads to use of negative criteria such as absence of differentiated political office or rulers who possess sovereignty, thereby rendering itself incapable of directing analytic attention to the diverse means by which African societies conducted public affairs. It, also, does not allow for account of changes over time, it is ahistorical..

independent production and distribution units within a single economic complex (tax payable only in colonial money was introduced), the substitution of centralized state bureaucracies for the decentralized pockets of "personal" rule and the unification of previously autonomous arenas of power then stood to serve the logic of that imperative.

It is in this context that the bureaucratization and the hierarchical organization of the administration of colonial justice would begin to make sense. It is also in this context that the importance of the services rendered to the colonial capital and state by the customary courts in helping them to thoroughly and effectively penetrate the subject populations can be better appreciated. The point here is that the imperatives of capitalist growth dictated a need to bring the external world under control. This took the form of internalization; the efforts to identify, take into account, and manipulate what were previously unpredictable, disruptive and partially costly externalize through centralized and highly rationalized system of administration (Spitzer & Scull, 1977). This definitely requires at the barest minimum, social order in form of predictable and stable patterns of social intercourse. It is here, as noted by Polanyi, that the importance of eliminating outbreak of discontent and disorder assumes clarity (Polanyi, 1944). The story of incipient disaffection of so called religious fanatics at Sokoto and Bauchi shows how completely the native Emirs and their "Sarakuna (councillors and courts) identified with this objective when they "voluntarily" tried and executed the rebel leaders in Native Courts (Report of the Native Courts (Northern Provinces) Commission of Inquiry 1949-52). In the same Report, the courts were phrased because:

It was a remarkable fact that crimes of violence and robbery, which in the early years of the Protectorate were regrettably numerous, had almost disappeared since the native courts, with their corollary, native police (Dogarai), had been given a free hand.

Earlier on in the Report it is stated that:

It was possible to look to such courts for effective assistance in such matters as the stopping of bush fires which destroy sylvan produces, and the felling of trees (so as to prevent deforestation, the enforcement of the authorized taxes, and the detection of illegal practices of collectors...

Given this clear importance of the courts, and its so-called corollaries, the prison and police, it should be logical that the colonial authority favoured them as compared to, for example, health and education in allocating resources. (See the various colonial Annual Reports, particularly those for the years 1948, 1950, 1952, 1954, 1956 and 1957.).

The alliance between the chiefs and the colonialists placed them (the chiefs) in a position of exploiters. This was particularly the case with regard

to land relations. Now, under indigenous system land was not alienable, it was communally owned. The colonial authorities changed all that by introducing policies which made land a commodity to be owned by individuals. Land became scarce, a new condition particularly in the North. Prothero noted that a tendency developed whereby non-farmers but rich individuals cornered the best lands (Prothero, R.M. 1957). Farmers, then became rural proletariat. Possibilities for abuse are obvious and indeed became well pronounced in the post-colonial period as evidenced by the reports of Kaduna State's Land Investigation Commission.

The development of that tendency was apparently in violation of the colonial land law of Northern Nigeria as contained in the Land and Native Rights Ordinance (Cap 105, Laws of Nigeria, 1948). According to that law, all lands were native lands and were to be administered in accordance with native law and custom. But the same ordinance introduced certificates of occupancy, a principle which according to Hulley, endangered the law's intent. As he put it: "... It is clear that in the Northern emirates an exclusive right of user, which has now lost most of the aspects of communal right, is being built up beneath the ultimate right of the crown" (Quoted by Meek, O.K. 1968)

Meek's efforts to defend the colonial authority against the accusation that it introduced policies which led to markets in land completely failed. He based his argument purely on what he called the "intent" of colonial land policies (Meek, C.K. 1968).

However, Prothero has demonstrated rather clearly that whatever the colonial authority's intentions might have been, the result of its action in this case was to bring into being a principle in conflict with indigenous systems (Prothero, R.M., 1957). Indeed, Meek's own evidence stood in opposition to his argument. For example, he provided evidence to the effect that chiefs under the guise of distributing scarce land began to accept payment that represented more than what he called modest presents that acknowledged their political authority (Meek, C.K., 1968). Such gifts allowed the giver the right to 'alienate the property'. Of course, it meant best lands for the highest bidder, and probably no land at all for the poor. There is no doubt that the colonial government changed traditional land tenure system by making individual ownership of land profitable and easy. But the consequences were great, and the concept of rural proletariat summarizes it all. The colonial authority attempted to counter this development with the "Native Lands Acquisition Proclamation" of 1900, extended by the "Native Lands Acquisition Ordinance" of 1917 but failed (Chubb, L.T. 1961).

Chieftainship in this case, as in several other cases, came handy as the substance of the ideology needed to justify the colonial land policies in the country. They (colonialists) came out with a conception of African land that was fostered by land laws and expressed in African reference to the chief as

the owner of the land. This was consistent, with the dominant colonial ideology of African land tenure system. African land holding was considered in terms of European notions of sovereignty and ultimate rights to land, the colonialists now made it appear as if the African chiefs were sovereigns with ultimate rights to land. It was then, this ideology that was used to justify claims by colonial state to control African lands through the theory of *domaine eminent* and the doctrine of state succession. But the colonial authority did not overlook the importance of the chiefs in the general efforts to transform land into commodity; and to provide some role to them in the scheme of things, the colonial law permitted administrative recognition of individual customary interests in land, a register was designed to provide a cadaster of these interests. Customary courts were to hear disputes arising from such interests. The needs of commodity production also necessitated an ideological formulation in which the African Chiefs were considered as having proprietary interests in land. This then provided the ideological basis for an alliance, mediated through the state, between the chief, his kin and a new class on the one hand and colonial capital on the other. This class alliance allowed the colonial conception of land relations to be expressed as a central aspect of Nigeria's customary law.

This alliance afforded the chiefs the opportunity to exploit others, particularly the peasants. When the peasants complained about such exploitations the British authority explained them away as either the failings of individual chiefs or as what the peasants were used to anyway. After all, the chiefs were their representatives! Of course, this is in contrast to the view that the chiefs main loyalty was to their own class interests. Their implicit model of society as a harmonious whole made it difficult for the British to see such abuses by chiefs as systematic elements inherent in the process of class differentiation and increasing class conflict consequent upon British conquest and colonial state formation. The people were not deceived as evidenced by various incidences of revolts by the so-called natives. The so called "Aba Riot" stands out clearly as a case of revolt by oppressed classes in Nigeria. Even the report of the commission of inquiry constituted by the colonial government did not miss the point, for as it noted, the women were far more interested in destroying the Native Courts and mobbing the Warrant Chiefs than in looting. The Commission went ahead to identify discontent with the persecution, extortion and corruption practised by Native Court members as one of the main causes of the revolt. Earlier, and in the western part of the country, in 1916 the people had demonstrated against the newly acquired powers by the chiefs resulting in the burning of Native Courts building at Okeho and Iseyin. But Lugard insisted that opposition to the introduction of Northern style Native Courts system to the South came principally from the legal practitioners who stood to lose revenue. According to him, he was reliably informed by the Chief Justice and others that all the protests "have

been promoted solely by local legal practitioners (and their friends), who resent the loss of profits which their exclusion from the Provincial and Native Courts involves" (Lugard, in: Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., 1968). The lawyers, therefore, did not oppose the Native Courts in the South because of their being exploitative structures but rather because they were denied the opportunity to use the courts for their material benefits. They were opposed to a colonial policy which was biased in favour of the so called traditional elite in terms of access to wealth via the Native Courts system. The seeds of intra-class feuds had been sown and this added yet another dimension to the character of the emergent 'Nigerian' political economy.

It is within the context of this general policy of playing one class or a faction/fraction of it against the other that the education policy of the colonial government, particularly in the North, will begin to make sense. Although Lugard would want us to believe that education suffered retardation in the North because of the "natural suspicion and dislike with which the Christian Government was at first regarded by the Moslems..." (Lugard, in: Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., 1968) we know that the reason had to do with the general policy by the colonial authority to favour a class of people who were most receptive to their ideas. The fact that when the so called educational efforts were started in 1909 in Kano most students were drawn from "sons of chiefs and men of influence, who had been brought from various provinces under pressure by government" tell the story rather accurately. A parallel effort was also started to form an industrial class by bringing "artisans from Kano City, who plied their native trades and gave some instruction to pupils" (Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., 1968). This careful selection was necessary because it had been discovered that with some noticeable exceptions, education seems to have produced discontent, impatience of any control, and an assumption of self-importance in the individual. Education therefore, received very little attention compared to courts and penal institutions. For example, by 1913, there were only three Government owned schools in the North (Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., 1968) and in 1954 there were only sixteen such schools (Nigeria Report, 1954) compared to sixty-four prisons maintained by the Native Authorities alone. Indeed, in 1952 an average of 7870 people found their way into the prisons daily (Colonial Report, Nigeria 1952), the figure (daily) rose to 9545.09 in 1954 (Nigeria: Report 1954).

Conclusion

The British colonial power allowed the continued existence of radically modified indigenous laws only as a pacifier to the local chiefs who, largely speaking, then ignored or aided the process of colonization. Whatever norms there were that informed laws in the area now known as Nigeria before the advent of British rule were radically modified even by the very process of formalization and also by being forced to concur with the basic moral and jural postulates of the colonizing power - they were required not to be 'repu-

gnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience'. The clear inference, as correctly noted by Wanks, was that "traditional (indigenous) ideas and methods of justice were inferior to, if not actually repugnant to, eternal principles of justice". (Wanke, M.C. 1973). Of course, the nature of indigenous laws did not allow for the bureaucratization and the hierarchical organization of the administration of justice which was vital for the construction and maintenance of colonial state. Neither could such indigenous laws provide the basis for the imposition of the sort of discipline required for capitalist production.

Customary law both as a concept and as a legal form, therefore, originated in specific historical circumstances relating to the transformation of pre-capitalist social relations which required the construction and consolidation of the colonial state in Nigeria. As an ideology of colonial domination, the conception of customary law supplied the framework for the insertion of rural classes into the peripheral capitalist social formations. Simultaneously, it expressed the subordination of these social forces to the dominant local classes and, through them, to the metropolitan legal ideologies associated directly with the colonial state. These ideologies received practical expression via concrete structures of repression; the customary courts and other institutions like the prisons. Customary law and courts based on them were therefore only an attempt by the colonial power in Nigeria to dress colonial exploitation and oppression in a trade-mark of legitimacy. But legitimacy it never received.

A "State based on the principles of democracy and social justice" (the 1979 Constitution so declared the Nigerian State) cannot continue to allow these blatantly oppressive and exploitative ideology and structure to exist and feed fat on the rights of her people, more so when those who suffer as a result of their continued existence and operation are clearly in the majority. This is why customary law and courts based upon them must receive fundamental changes. Until then, they cannot help, indeed they will hinder the realization of the principles of democracy and social justice.

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