

AFRIQUE ET DEVELOPPEMENT

AFRICA DEVELOPMENT

Vol. XIV, No.3, 1989 - ISSN 0850 3907

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CODESRIA acknowledges the support of a number of African Governments, the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries (SAREC), the International Research Development Centre (IDRC) and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), in the publication of this journal.

Le CODESRIA exprime sa gratitude aux Gouvernements africains, à l'Agence suédoise pour la Coopération en matière de Recherche avec les Pays en voie de Développement (SAREC), le Centre de Recherche pour le Développement International (CRDI) et la Fondation Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), pour leur contribution à la publication de ce journal.

AFRICA DEVELOPMENT AFRIQUE & DEVELOPPEMENT

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THE COUNCIL
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL RESEARCH IN AFRICA

REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DU CONSEIL POUR
LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA RECHERCHE
ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE EN AFRIQUE

Vol. XIV, No.3, 1989

Editor

Zenebeworke Tadesse

(CODESRIA)

Africa Development is the quarterly bi-lingual Journal of the Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA).

It is a social science journal whose major focus is on issues which are central to the development of society. Its principal objective is to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas among African scholars from a variety of intellectual persuasions and various disciplines. The Journal also encourages other contributors working on Africa or those undertaking comparative analysis of third world issues. One issue of the Journal a year is focused on a particular theme and guest-edited by a specialist in the field.

Africa Development welcomes contributions which cut across disciplinary boundaries. Articles with a narrow focus and uncomprehensible to people outside that discipline are unlikely to be accepted.

The Journal is abstracted in the following: International African Bibliography; Documentatieblad; Abstracts on Rural Development in the Tropics; Documentationselienst Africa; A Current Bibliography on African Affairs.

Africa Development is published four times annually by CODESRIA. All editorial correspondence and manuscripts should be sent to:

The Editor,
Africa Development,
CODESRIA, B.P. 3304, Dakar, Senegal.
Phone Number 23-02-11 - Telex 613339 CODES SG - ISSN 0850 3907

Subscriptions

(a) African Institutes: Regular Yearly institutional rate:	\$32 US
(b) Other Institutes:	\$35 US
(c) Individuals:	\$30 US
- Current Individual Copy:	\$ 7 US
- Back Issues:	\$10 US

Claims for undelivered copies must be made no later than three months following month of publication. CODESRIA will supply missing copies when losses have been sustained in transit and where the reserve stock will permit.

Afrique et Développement est le périodique bilingue trimestriel du Conseil pour le Développement de la Recherche Economique et Sociale en Afrique (CODESRIA).

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Afrique et Développement est publié par le CODESRIA et paraît 4 fois l'année. Tous les manuscrits et autres correspondances à caractère éditorial doivent être adressés au:

Rédacteur en Chef
Afrique et Développement - B.P. 3304 / Dakar, Sénégal
Tél.: 23.02.11 - Téléx 613339 Codes SG. - ISSN 0850 3907

Abonnements

(a) Instituts africains	\$32 US
(b) Autres institutions:	\$35 US
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New Release... New Release...

Capital Goods, Technological Change and Accumulation in Nigeria looks at the problems of technology by focussing on developments in the country's capital goods sector. It argues that if underdeveloped countries are to terminate their prostrate external economic dependence and achieve successful industrialization, it is crucial they develop a local capital goods sub-sector. It also argues that Nigeria is one of the few countries in Africa outside apartheid South Africa with this potential.

Much of the conventional literature in this arena has been incapable of identifying key variables in the economic system apart from the price mechanism, with its tendency to view technology as 'exogenously' determined. Little or no attention has been paid to the local capacity for the production of goods that will satisfy the need for technologies that are 'appropriate' for development. In this book a research team of social and natural scientists sets out to ask why a society so richly endowed in manpower and natural resources has failed to set up the type of industries that have historically proved crucial to the accumulation and acquisition of technology. Why is it that despite widely publicized declarations of intent and the production of elaborate plans, so little has been done?

Edited by Akin Fadahunsi and B. U. N. Igwe the book brings together major contributions to the debate on economic development in third world countries, and is a vital tool for anyone interested or involved in the industrialization and technological development of African economies.

CAPITAL GOODS TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND ACCUMULATION IN NIGERIA


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A. Fadahunsi
B. U. N. Igwe



New Release... New Release...

The State, Development and Politics in Ghana is a collection of essays that provide a focussed and serious analysis of the country's political, economic, agrarian and social development within the African continent.

Ghana's political rule has encompassed virtually the whole gamut of political power, ranging from military dictatorships, parliamentary democracy to populism. Its economic policies in turn have ranged from state nationalism to neo-colonialist *laissez-faire*. It is this wide ranging experience that singles Ghana out as one of the singularly fascinating and complex examples of economic management under structural adjustments programmes.



Previous studies have tended to treat the state in Ghana as an essentially irrelevant encumbrance on Ghanaians themselves, portraying in idyllic terms the social struggles that are taking place, concentrating on the exotic and the ephemeral.

In an attempt to share the lessons of Ghana's experience, this collection edited by the late Emmanuel Hansen and Kwame A. Ninsin is a serious attempt by Ghanaian scholars to come to grips with the reality of their country, adding a particularly and, more rare, inherently indigenous voice to the debate on the country's development. They clearly point out that as long as social struggles are a main feature of the society the question of the role of the state will remain central to it.

ISBN 1 870784 04 9 (Paperback)

1 870784 05 7 (Hardback)


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The Concept of Human Rights in Africa

attempts to reconceptualise human rights ideology from the standpoint of the working people of the continent. It argues that the dominant human rights discourse in/and on Africa, however well-intentioned, is objectively a part of the ideologies of domination. Both the critique of the dominant discourse as well as the reconceptualisation are located firmly within the current social science and jurisprudential debates on democratic struggles in Africa.

Hitherto, the human rights debate in Africa has been an exclusive preserve of lawyers and philosophers. Professor Shivji breaks new ground in this book in that he firmly anchors the debate on the social and political places without losing sight of its legal and philosophical dimensions.

While greatly stimulating for the general reader, this work can be fruitfully used in colleges and universities in such academic disciplines as sociology, political science, development studies as well as law and jurisprudence.



ISBN 1 870784 02 2 (Paperback)

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Urbanization and Social Problems in Africa

Moriba Touré*

RÉSUMÉ. La plupart des études sur l'urbanisation en Afrique restent confinées dans une des nombreuses variantes des concepts néo-évolutionnistes qui tous concluent que le développement est un phénomène linéaire. Cependant la réalité a attesté que ces hypothèses sont erronées. En Afrique au Sud du Sahara, l'urbanisation prouve que la corrélation établie entre le progrès technique et économique d'une part, et les aspects démographiques d'autre part est négative. Ce qui caractérise la population africaine c'est une croissance rapide et des mouvements migratoires de toutes sortes dus à de forts taux de natalité et une baisse régulière du taux de mortalité. La tendance est donc à une croissance du phénomène d'urbanisation et à une baisse voire une stagnation du taux de croissance de la population rurale. Dans certains pays africains, cette tendance connaît actuellement des bouleversements extraordinaires dus aux assauts combinés de la sécheresse, de la famine et des guerres. Les causes des formes spécifiques d'urbanisation en Afrique comprennent la manière par laquelle l'Afrique a été intégrée dans l'économie mondiale, le type de modèles de développement suivis et la crise généralisée du système économique des formations sociales pré-capitalistes qui s'en est suivie. Ces variations conduisent à de divers problèmes sociaux dans les milieux ruraux et urbains. Cependant, dans les deux cas, il y a une détérioration alarmante des conditions de vie. L'exode rural a conduit à une baisse de la productivité dans l'agriculture et à des changements dans la structure de la population rurale: vieillissement de la population, stagnation du taux de mortalité et dans certains cas, chute du taux de natalité. Dans les zones urbaines se développent de sérieux déséquilibres entre l'offre et la demande d'emploi, ce qui a conduit à un taux élevé de chômage, un manque d'emplois qualifiés et des infrastructures économiques et sociales inadéquates.

An examination of the abundant literature on the phenomenon of urbanization in Africa south of the Sahara¹ shows a negative correlation between two of its aspects: technical and economic progress on the one hand and demographic characteristics on the other. Within the dominant conventional analysis, urbanization is sometimes viewed as a consequence of economic growth; at other times, however, "hyper-urbanisation" is regarded as one of the major obstacles to the economic and social development process inasmuch as it results in a marked polarity between town and country and inevitably leads to the "marginalisation" of a growing sector of urban society. As a phenomenon which is both quantitative (expansion of urban areas and growth of the urban population) and qualitative (health and educational status, housing and working conditions of city-dwellers), urbanization in Africa is among those conditioning the economic and social development process. We shall thus examine its causes by looking at the dynamics of the

* Institute of Ethno-Sociology - University of Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.

1 Here we had access only to documentation relating to urbanization in general and urbanization in Africa south of the Sahara.

African population, the social problems to which it gives rise and the outlook for the future.

The Dynamics of the African Population

The African population is characterized by rapid growth and by migratory movements of many kinds. An analysis of how the African population has evolved and of its movements among various habitats is therefore essential if we are to understand this process.

Evolution of the African population²

The population of Africa south of the Sahara has grown rapidly since 1930, and even higher rates of growth are forecast between the years 2010 and 2030.

Year	1930	1950	1980	2010	2030
Total population	130	178	389	954	1430
Rural population	122	159	271	419	470
Urban population	8	19	118	535	960

In only a century, between 1930 and 2030, the African population will have increased rather more than tenfold, from 130 million to 1,430 million, with annual growth rates of over 3 per cent (3.1 per cent to barely 4.0 per cent). Thus, the following rates will be observed between 1980 and 2010: 3.94 per cent in Côte d'Ivoire; 3.77 per cent in Congo; 3.55 per cent in Nigeria; 3.35 per cent in Zaire, but just under 3 per cent in Ethiopia.

This high natural rate of growth of the population of Africa south of the Sahara can be explained by high and rising birth rates everywhere - between 43 and 55 per thousand - and by the steady drop in general mortality rates (between 9.5 and 27 per thousands) and infant mortality rates (between 136 and 185 per thousand) in a number of countries. These divergent trends in birth rates, general mortality and infant mortality rates, which have been brought about by progress in medicine and hygiene, are undergoing drastic changes caused by the combined effects of drought, famine and war in a number of African countries.

The fertility rate, which varies substantially from one country and one habitat to another, lies between 160 and 204 per thousand. Although it is declining in urban environments in certain countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, it tends to rise in other towns such as Senegal.

On the other hand, the rate of growth of the rural population is slower. In one country, from 1930 to 2030, it will have increased just over threefold,

2 The population figures quoted have been taken from World Bank and United Nations studies, cited in *Express Afrique*, November, 1983, pp. V-XXX.

from 122 million to 470 million, and, unlike the urban population, it will grow very slowly between 2010 and 2030.

Whereas the urban population accounted for only 6 per cent of total population in 1930, 11 per cent in 1950 and 43 per cent in 1980, it will account for 56 per cent of total population in 2020 and 65.75 per cent in 2030. Between 1950 and 1980, the urban population of Africa south of the Sahara increased by 550 per cent. Whereas in 1950 there were only one city with 1 million inhabitants and 31 towns with over 100,000 inhabitants, in 1980 Africa South of the Sahara already possessed 12 cities with over 1 million inhabitants, 161 towns and cities with 100,000 to 1 million inhabitants and nearly 2,700 localities with 5,000-100,000 inhabitants.

In the year 2010, three African cities - Kinshasa, Lagos and Abidjan - will have over 10 million inhabitants each and 77 others will have more than 1 million inhabitants. The average rate of urbanization will be 56 per cent compared with 30 per cent in 1980 and 65.75 per cent in 2030. In some countries, however, urbanization rates higher than 70 per cent will be observed from 2010 onwards: Djibouti 87 per cent, Gabon 85 per cent, Botswana, Congo and Mauritius 85 per cent, Benin 77 per cent, Namibia and Senegal 75 per cent, Côte d'Ivoire 74 per cent, Nigeria and Cameroon 71 per cent). On the other hand, urbanization rates will be low (less than 15 per cent) in other countries: Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, Niger, Ethiopia and Kenya.

As can be seen, the statistical data highlight the rapidity of the rate of overall demographic growth, the extent of the phenomenon of urbanization and the slow or even stagnating rate of growth of the rural population. These different trends raise questions as to the causes of the population explosion and the imbalance between the rates of growth of the rural and urban population, and as to the true nature of the urbanization which is under way in Africa south of the Sahara.

If we are to answer these questions now and in the years to come, we should look beyond classical theories of cause and effect explaining them exclusively from the ideological viewpoint of high rates of natural growth and population migrations. Likewise, the many forms taken by these migrations should be reanalyzed from a more human perspective, taking account of the actual living conditions of the migrants before and during the migrations.

Migrations

Since the beginning of time, African population have migrated:

- voluntarily, in search for material or spiritual well-being, either to seek work (agriculture, pastoral nomadism, long distance or short distance trade, fishing, craft and industry) or for religious reasons (revealed and syncretist religions, etc.);
- or because of natural disasters (famine, floods, drought, etc.) or

those caused by human agencies (the slave trade, wars, expulsions, failures of rural development policies, etc.).

To these migrations should be added those which take place between areas of origin and places of work: seasonal migrations of all kinds and various other short-term migrations.

Recent studies have shown that traditional migratory movements have been complemented or supplanted by others of new kinds, both within and between African countries. These include the movements that have developed between certain African countries and those of their former colonizers, and those which draw nationals of North African and Middle Eastern origins to African countries of immigration such as Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Gabon and Cameroon.

Like traditional migrations, the new migrations also intersect with movements from north to south and vice versa predominating. This is due not only to physical factors, but also to colonial development models, which usually assigned the coastal countries to the production of a single crop for export and transformed the land-locked countries of the interior into reservoirs of menial labour.

In addition, national wars of liberations in the former Portuguese colonies and in southern Africa have, since 1970, helped to increase the volume and step up the pace of migration between African countries. Finally, migrations caused by economic and political factors since the accession of most African countries to independence should be added.

The first of these, which can be observed in nearly all African countries, is the maintenance of colonial development structures, and sometimes compounded the incapacity of African leaders to remodel these structures taking into account the socioeconomic and political options they recommend. In this connection, suffice it to note the extent of such phenomena associated with population trends, both in countries which have opted for liberalism (Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Cameroon, etc.) and in those that favour a planned development model (Ethiopia, Tanzania, etc.).

Secondly, massive population movements have occurred under the combined thrust of urbanization and industrialization in some countries, and the implementation of major regional development projects (building of new ports and towns, hydroelectric dams or roads and railways).

Finally, for nearly ten years now, many populations have been forced to leave their places of origin and live elsewhere by wars of liberation (Namibia), civil war (Angola, Mozambique, Chad, etc.), drought and famine (Ethiopia, Chad, etc.), not to mention all the forced displacements caused by massive expulsions (from Nigeria to Ghana, Niger, Benin, Togo and Cameroon, from Chad to the Central African Republic, Cameroon, etc.).

From all of the foregoing it can be seen that African countries are familiar with both internal migrations (within different countries in Africa south of

the Sahara) and international migrations (between different African countries and between African countries and those of other continents).

Internal migrations may take the form of rural-urban migration, migrations between rural areas (intra-rural), migrations between urban centers (inter-urban) and migrations of city population to rural areas (urban-rural), although the last three types are uncommon in Africa, African countries are more familiar with the first type (rural-urban migration) which has more marked consequences for towns and rural areas. Thus, according to World Bank statistics, 3.4 million persons migrated from the country to the towns in Africa south of the Sahara in 1980. This exodus, which is steadily increasing, will in the long term contribute to a stagnation, or even a decline, in the growth of the rural population in a number of countries, including Cameroon, Benin, Mauritania, Botswana, Mauritius and Gabon.

International migrations depend on a number of factors: the respective geographical locations of countries, their ecology and climate and their levels of development. Certain countries, for instance Angola, Zaire, Cameroon, the Côte d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe and Congo, attract large numbers of immigrants, while others - Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya, Chad, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, etc. are countries of emigration.

According to United Nations projections, 42 million Africans, or 4.4 per cent of the population in 2010, will have left their own country for another one on the continent between 1980 and 2010. Even today, however, we may still wonder whether - in the light of the events which led to the expulsion of 2 million immigrants from Nigeria in January 1983 and the aggravation of the situation of refugees in Africa - international migrations will not be a factor in the deterioration of relations between a number of countries of the continent in the years to come. A study of the dynamics of the African population should therefore include the living conditions of migrants, whether "illegal immigrants" or refugees from war or famine.

The Social Problems of Urbanization

These problems affect both rural areas and urban centers. The integration of African countries into world systems of production and exchange has contributed to the dislocation of African societies. Rural areas are those most affected, since "push factors" are created forcing rural population to leave for other countries or for towns and cities. In the Sahelian countries, however, emigration and the rural urban exodus have developed more in response to the crisis in the ecosystem and to the complex of "pull factors" generated by the urban areas which attract rural dwellers away from the countryside.

Social problems in the rural areas

The crisis in the rural areas which leads to emigration and the rural exodus will become increasingly serious as the structure of the rural population changes and its productivity falls. The change in the structure of the rural

population takes the form of a tendency towards ageing due to the departure of the younger inhabitants, to the stagnation in the level of mortality and to the drop in the birth rate in certain rural areas of Africa.

The decline in agricultural productivity will above all affect food production, which does not benefit from the same technical, technological and scientific inputs as export crops. This decline will also increase food dependency in the countries of Africa South of the Sahara, where imports of food-stuffs are steadily increasing everywhere. As can be seen, because the rural areas are being emptied of their populations and those that remain are becoming impoverished and often find it hard to obtain the right food, their living conditions (health, work, habitat) are deteriorating like those of city-dwellers.

Social problems in towns and cities

The population of towns and cities is on the increase owing on the one hand to rising birth and fertility rates and falling general and infant mortality rates, and on the other to the growth in the rate of foreign immigration (in a number of African cities) and the rural exodus. Here, too, population growth is accompanied by a change in demographic structure. The urban population is not only getting younger but is also beginning to contain more women than men.

Since the industrialization process and the creation of employment in the other sectors of the urban economy are inadequate to cope with urbanization and the growth in the urban population, serious imbalances are arising between labour supply and demand. The level of unemployment, already high, is rising steadily everywhere. Another aspect of these imbalances, which is also observable everywhere, is the chronic shortage of skilled labour and the over-supply of unskilled labour seeking work in towns and cities. This is due to the inadequacy of training and education systems and the high level of wastage which results; with many dropouts³ who can work neither on the land nor in industry which is highly capital-intensive. This situation is partly responsible for the development of the informal sector and the phenomenon of disguised underemployment in African cities. This affects urban settlement patterns.

Urban settlement patterns are characterized by a growing segregation between "integrated" and spontaneous or "marginalised" urban areas. This spatial segregation is the result of unsuitable and contradictory African housing policies, with an increase in luxury housing for speculation purposes, inadequate numbers of low-cost dwelling (although their number is on the in-

3 "Dropouts" are young people who, for various reasons, have not been able to continue their studies in the second cycle of secondary education.

crease), the absence of social housing projects and the mushrooming of spontaneous settlements, despite the evictions and the precarious living conditions from which their inhabitants suffer.

Intense demographic pressure on living space, lack of economic and social infrastructure in low-income neighborhoods, the haphazard maintenance of existing infrastructures, lack of employment and the high cost of living in African cities are largely responsible for the deterioration in urban living standards and the increase in delinquency and in strife between different urban communities. In many countries, in fact, the growing frequency of all forms of crime and the aggravation of poverty (of which the indigenous population sees itself as the victim) give rise to xenophobia and favour its development, often sharpening the conflict between the various "foreign" communities and the "indigenous" or "national" population. This xenophobia is all too often used against the "foreigners" by political leaders (as in Ghana in 1969 and Nigeria in January 1983 and 1985, etc.), either to conceal their failures or economic difficulties or for purposes of winning elections.

Expulsions lead to certain phenomena which are likely to develop with the worsening of the economic crisis in the countries of immigration, creating both in the countries of return (or origin) and in those of immigration (or host countries) new problems of adjustment or readjustment which are worth identifying and analyzing. Special attention should also be devoted to the other problems leading to these expulsions or arising out of them.

Theories and practices of urbanization in Africa

It is mainly at the economic level that the disequilibria provoked by urban growth give the most cause for concern and explain the imbalances mentioned earlier. Basically, they may be studied from four angles, namely:

- (a) the disparity between high levels and paces of urbanization and levels and paces of industrialization far lower than those found in other regions which are equally urbanized;
- (b) the financial imbalance created by the immobilization of the vast resources necessary for the organization of essential services for high concentrations of population which are not always production centers;
- (c) the breakdown in the socioeconomic structures of rural areas;
- (d) the lowering of the living standards of the population, which is aggravated by the appearance of new items on city-dwellers' budgets (transportation, rent, superfluous consumption induced by the prevailing market economy, etc.).

Because the two processes of industrialization and urbanization in Africa are not the outcome of any kind of historical experience, they are at variance with the prevailing conception that development, being linear, should take the same form in all regions of the world.

It remains to be proved whether the large amounts of capital invested in

public services represent unproductive expenditure and whether they might have been used for more directly productive purposes.

As for the disintegration of the rural areas, this may be neither the consequence of urban growth nor the result of the dissemination of urban values. It is determined above all by the contradiction between rapid population growth and the maintenance of unproductive forms of land ownership and settlement⁴. The system of ownership of modern means of production and of land utilization is not very productive as far as the peasants are concerned, but productive enough to be in the interests of the major possessors of modern means of production. This contradiction displays the same features as urban industrialization in that there is a community of interest between the ruling classes in urban and rural areas.

*"The imbalance is thus not merely one of level but lies in the differential impact of industrialization on rural and urban societies, decreasing or increasing their productive capacity and facilitating exchanges between the two levels"*⁵.

Finally, even if urban per capita incomes, though low, are higher than rural incomes, the level of superfluous consumption induced by the prevailing market economy in cities is higher. This consumption is accounted for mainly by imported goods. The galloping inflation which is endemic in African countries thus places a heavy burden on the incomes of both urban and rural workers.

It can already be seen from the foregoing that urban growth and economic and social development are linked. Nevertheless, a theoretical analysis of the interplay of urban growth and economic and social development in Africa has given rise to certain ideological interpretations, the most important of which is the neo-evolutionist.

From the theoretical point of view there are three schools of thought - with many variants - regarding urbanization in "underdeveloped" countries:

- first, urban growth is an automatic consequence of economic growth;
- secondly, the acceleration of urban growth in developing countries impedes or favours economic and social development;
- Thirdly, the "underdeveloped" countries are dualist societies, i.e. rural/urban, agricultural/industrial and traditional/modern.

However, all these schools of thought inevitably arrive at the same ideological conclusion: development is a linear phenomenon, or, to put it more

4 M. Castells - *La Question urbaine* (Paris, F. Maspéro, 1973), p. 61.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 87.

precisely, a well-trodden path followed by any society with the smallest trace of enterprise⁶. The first school of thought takes as its starting point an empirical assumption as to the level of technological and economic development and the demographic characteristics of "underdeveloped" countries and takes urban growth to be the outcome of economic growth, the level of technological and economic development being regarded as the initial stage of the economic and social development process.

First, it should be remarked that, since economic growth is a quantitative concept differing from one country to another, it cannot be equated with economic and social development, which is both quantitative and qualitative. Next, the assumption on which the neo-evolutionist analysis is based takes no account, at all, of the fact that "urban growth in developing countries has accelerated at a rate higher than that in industrialized countries, without being accompanied by economic growth"⁷.

The second school of thought, although more differentiated, applies the scheme for the analysis of economic growth in industrialized countries no less mechanically to countries with a different historical context, namely that of dependence. The correlation between urban growth and industrialization cannot be linear, especially since the impact of industrialization may be stronger in certain societies with a low level of urbanization at a given period in their evolution. If such examples can be found in nineteenth-century Europe, contemporary Africa has had no experience of this kind.

The third and last school of thought, known by the name of the "dualist theory", which contrasts the town with the country, agriculture with industry and tradition with modernity, is the most refined and most widespread form of neo-evolutionism and the one that has done the most damage inasmuch as it rests to some extent on social reality as regards forms of social relationships and expressions of culture. But "this reality is the reflection of a single structure in which effects on one pole are produced by the specific way in which it is linked with the other"⁸. In other words, the causes lie in a generalized crisis of the economic system of pre-capitalist social formations in Africa south of the Sahara.

And, as has been shown, "once broken, the traditional agricultural production circuit could not be repaired when falling or fluctuating prices resulted in unemployment"⁹. Moreover, at the present stage of social penetration of the world social system by Africa, it is not possible for "two different com-

6 This is the viewpoint elaborated by W. W. Rostow in *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1960).

7 • Castells, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 68.

9 P.A. Baran: *Economie Politique de la Croissance* (Paris, F. Maspéro, 1954).

mercial systems to function in parallel or for an economy of exchange to develop at the same time as a market economy"¹⁰. In other words, the entire world production system is organized with reference not to the interests of African societies but to those of the dominant societies. In these circumstances it is perfectly logical for the internal economic system of the dominated countries to be fragmented. This lack of cohesion is merely a consequence of an international economic network which is perfectly coherent.

It is therefore impossible to study in depth urban growth and economic and social development in Africa south of the Sahara as isolated internal phenomena. An understanding of these phenomena has to be explained by the notion of dependence.

The Outlook for the Phenomenon of Urbanization in Africa

How will this model of growth and dependent economic and social development evolve in the future? To find the reply to this question we shall briefly examine the attempted solutions that have been designed and implemented with a view to tackling the problems posed by urban growth and so promoting economic and social development. Any answer to our question must also take account of the following alternatives: either the current model will be retained, with all its implications, without the various African countries ever being able to master it, or the African countries must at some time in their development work out another model whose design and application will require them to take a different attitude with regard to the developed countries and whose consequences will be just as important. Some solutions have, however, already been tried out.

Solutions already envisaged

Efforts to find solution range from coercion (expulsions, return of migrants to their country or region of origin) to the improvement of the rural living environment and the creation of new towns.

Coercive measures have had very limited effects over time and have in some cases increased the spatial spread of urban growth and created serious problems for countries. In Dakar and Abidjan, for example, expulsions have led to the spontaneous creation of new neighborhoods which are continuing to develop, and to the construction of new housing which is, if anything, favouring speculation in real estate and social segregation.

By contrast, although the expulsion of "foreigners" from Ghana in 1969 resulted in the disorganization of certain economic sectors of the country (commerce and agriculture), it permitted a modest revival of agriculture in Togo. The expulsion of foreigners from Nigeria in 1983 and 1985 con-

10 Castells, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

tributed to the deterioration of relations between that country and nearly all the other countries of the continent.

As for the measures to create new towns in Ghana, Tanzania, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Cameroon and other countries in order to open up certain regions and to relieve congestion in big cities, although these are justified from an economic and social point of view, their revitalizing effects cannot yet be fully measured either because projects for next capitals are still under study or because the heavy costs of constructing the new towns that are already in existence tend rather to increase the dependence on the industrialized countries of the countries which have to bear the burden. Moreover, the phenomenal growth of a new town, such as San Pedro in Côte d'Ivoire, has not helped to slow down the rate of growth of Abidjan, nor has the growth of other new towns in Africa halted that of the major cities.

The idea of creating a new capital, inspired by the example of Brazil, has made headway in a number of countries, including Nigeria, Tanzania and the Côte d'Ivoire. This is a fundamental political act which might have considerable political and economic repercussions in certain countries, since it is likely to be considered "authoritarian" and in contradiction with vested interest born of speculation in real estate in congested capitals. It would also make developed States an easy prey for developing countries over long periods, since the construction of a new capital places a heavy burden on their financial resources and requires large-scale mobilization of foreign capital.

Solutions to improve the rural living environment by modernizing housing, opening up rural areas, providing electric lighting in the larger villages, creating recreation centers in these localities, etc., have been attempted in countries such as Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. Although they deserve to be nurtured despite their heavy cost, it has to be admitted that they have not yet succeeded in halting the rural exodus. It is more important to resolve the crisis which is undermining traditional structures and which is aggravated by the state of dependence of African countries, than to improve the rural living environment without any mechanisms for self-regulation and autonomous reproduction.

Given the inconclusiveness and inadequacy of these experiences, one may expect that African towns will still continue to grow and to attract large populations. In fact, the weight of the past is such that most African countries have not envisaged any solution outside the context of dependence. This attitude appears to be strengthened by the difficulties facing those who, albeit timidly, have followed other courses alien to dependence and opposed to it.

Finally, there is every reason to believe that the gap between the rate of industrialization and that of demographic growth will continue to widen in Africa south of the Sahara, inasmuch as the former depends on developed countries and the latter is explained by the steady drop in mortality and the

substantial rise in the birth rate following the marked advances made in health in Africa.

Conditions favorable to the mastery of social problems associated with urbanization in Africa

The other alternative we have mentioned, namely the formulation of a new model of urban growth and economic and social development for Africa south of the Sahara, is a political one. Nevertheless, the contribution of research to a project of this kind may be beneficial, since researchers can examine historical precedents and everyday reality in order to throw light on the limitations of projects, new options and their possible repercussions.

Research should also take account of the conditions under which the current model of urban growth and economic and social development in Africa south of the Sahara will continue to develop. Since the phenomena studied are closely linked with those of industrialization and the agricultural revolution and not merely with the epiphenomenon of the demographic explosion, any attempt to implement a new model must take account of the following:

(a) if the crisis in the rural world is to be resolved, industrialization must above all help to improve rural productivity. However, in the Third World in general and African countries in particular, "industrialization has never been envisaged to serve the advancement of agriculture"¹¹. Here industry is parasitic in the sense that it grows fat by feeding on the rural world, from which it derives both its human resources (it obtains its labour force from rural migrants) and its financial advantages (tax relief, internal terms of trade unfavorable to the peasants, etc.), without making any return to support the take-off of agriculture;

(b) in order to integrate those who are ideologically referred to as the "urban marginal population" the production of luxury goods for the local market must be abandoned, since it largely rests on the contribution of a docile labour force which is easily recruited among this population;

(c) finally, although mutual assistance should be promoted among the dominated countries in general and African countries in particular, the aim should not be limited to technology transfer which serves the agricultural revolution, since such a transfer brings in its wake an imbalance in the relations between those who dominate and those who are dominated. The objective should rather be to promote creativity in the fields of technology and scientific research.

It is with these conditions and on these new foundations that the relations

11 S. Amin - "Development auto-centré, Autonomie collective et Ordre économique international nouveau: Quelques Réflexions", in *Africa Development*, 1978, Vol. III, No. 1, page 18.

between industrialized and developing countries must be envisaged, without the new model of urban growth and development necessarily being regarded as autarkic.

Conclusion

To conclude these reflections on the social problems created by urbanization in Africa, it seems to us that these problems are linked not only with demography and the area covered by towns, but with the overall development of Africa and its relations with "developed" countries.

Thus, despite the fact that African countries are becoming aware of the seriousness of the problems posed by urbanization, and despite the efforts to find lasting solutions, it is to be expected that African cities will still continue to grow and to absorb large populations.

However, among the solutions to the problems so far proposed, that of the neo-althusians is to be rejected for two reasons:

(1) the ratio of population to natural resources is far from homogeneous for African countries as a whole;

(2) So far, all experiences made with birth control in Africa south of the Sahara so far have ended in total failure because they fail to take socio-cultural factors into account.

Each country should therefore implement its demographic policy which it considers most appropriate to its objective situation. In the final analysis, all African countries should autonomously fix a number of clear objectives and the modalities of implementing these objectives before deciding on a line of action which would influence the current world economic order.

La Crise des Finances publiques et la Dénationalisation de l'Etat: le cas du Mali

Bernard Founou-Tchuigoua*

SUMMARY. Mali is rightly considered as one of the African countries faced with a spectacular developmental and fiscal crisis as evidenced by the withdrawal of the state from public investment, as well as the degradation of major services such as education, health and infrastructure. Conventional theory denotes three functions to public finance namely financing of state activities, redistribution of revenue particularly to disadvantaged sectors of society and regulating the economy through mechanisms such as the banking system. Contrary to its universal and egalitarian assumptions, an examination of international public aid in which technical assistance plays a strategic role underscores the hierarchical nature of relations between various states. To the three functions listed above, a fourth and significant function of public finance will have to be added - the reproduction of unequal relations between the center and the periphery. Similarly the function of redistribution varies in the two poles. In the periphery where the system of social security is not developed, there is perverse redistribution. Public finance serves to redistribute resources taken mostly from the poor and middle class to a minority class, the top administration. It is essentially through private accumulation and job-creation for the educated youth that the class in power reproduces itself. In Africa, and Mali is a good case in point, the capacity for self-adjustment of the imbalances of state budget is missing. Hence, attempts at balancing the budget through the reduction of the remuneration of labour in order to increase the potential benefits of investors result in under employment and impoverishment of the masses. At the root of the current fiscal crisis in Mali and some which have a dialectical relationship with it include, population increase, urbanization, the emergence of the private sector, the alarming educational crisis and the debt crisis. The neo-liberal responses to these multifarious crisis has initiated a process of "denationalization of the State".

Le Mali est considéré à juste titre comme un des pays africains où la crise du développement et des finances publiques se manifeste de manière particulièrement spectaculaire avec la quasi disparition de l'Etat du financement de l'investissement, la dégradation des grands services (éducation, santé etc.) qui manquent de matériel et du patrimoine immobilier et routier. Pourtant la crise malienne est peu étudiée. On explique généralement ce paradoxe par la difficulté d'accéder aux informations fiables si elles existent et par la dégradation des moyens de la recherche universitaire; mais à notre sens la raison majeure est de nature théorique et méthodologique. C'est pourquoi, nous allons consacrer la première partie de ce texte à la notion de crise des finances publiques à la périphérie du système capitaliste, en ayant à l'esprit spécialement l'Afrique subsaharienne dont la plupart des Etats font partie du groupe des Pays les Moins Avancés (PAM) de l'ONU. La deuxième sera consacrée à l'esquisse d'une économie politique de la crise des finances publiques maliennes.

* Forum tiers-monde, Dakar, Sénégal.

De la Crise des Finances publiques à la Périphérie du Système capitaliste

L'économiste malien, Ouatara a raison d'écrire "qu'en tant que moyen de politique générale, les Finances publiques sont le champ où s'affrontent les intérêts soit de profession, soit de classe et où s'opèrent les priorités et les choix politiques"¹. Il nous invite ainsi à éviter l'approche exclusivement techniciste des "macro economics", et au contraire à mettre en évidence les intérêts que la crise sert et par là-même à proposer une alternative favorable aux intérêts de la nation formée pour l'essentiel des couches populaires.

La théorie des finances publiques a été introduite dans l'économie politique conventionnelle après la deuxième guerre mondiale grâce au cadre conceptuel développé par Keynes et du fait que les finances publiques avaient pris une ampleur considérable dans tous les pays du monde à mesure de l'élargissement des fonctions de l'Etat. Musgrave a proposé de distinguer trois fonctions de ces finances. Elles doivent:

- (i) financer les activités qui permettent à l'Etat de fonctionner;
- (ii) redistribuer les revenus notamment au profit de couches sociales défavorisées par les "lois" de l'économie capitaliste perse;
- (iii) servir d'instrument de régulation économique au même titre que le système bancaire.

Les mécanismes de multiplicateur et d'accélérateur sont décrits dans le cadre de cette régulation.

La théorie suppose implicitement que toutes les économies sont capitalistes, développées et donc égales dans leurs relations. Or nul n'ignore plus que les économies capitalistes développées forment le pôle dominant d'un système dont l'autre est la périphérie. De ce fait, la théorie des finances publiques doit prendre pour champ l'ensemble du système et se demander si le nombre et la hiérarchie de leurs fonctions sont identiques aux deux pôles et s'il y a ou non une tendance forte à la connexion des finances publiques de la partie la plus faible de la périphérie avec celles des Etats du centre, comme le fait penser le réseau de l'aide publique internationale dans laquelle l'assistance technique joue d'ailleurs un rôle stratégique. S'il en est ainsi, il faudrait ajouter, pour les Finances Publiques des pays dominants, une quatrième fonction qui est d'assurer à côté d'autres mécanismes la reproduction des relations d'inégalité entre le centre et la périphérie. Le crédit en est l'élément essentiel. Lorsqu'il est trop important par rapport à la capacité de remboursement, c'est la crise de la dette. Une des fonctions des finances publiques du centre est ainsi d'endetter le Sud afin de s'assurer des marchés et

1 Amadou Tiegoue Ouatara - *Les Finances publiques du Mali et la Théorie générale des Finances*. Ed. Imprimerie du Mali.

des ressources naturelles à faible coût et, le cas échéant, intervenir dans la vie politique.

Comme les pays africains n'ont pas la maîtrise nationale sur leur économie, ils n'ont pas non plus celle de leurs finances publiques. Le budget ne remplit pas les trois fonctions de Musgrave puisque certains pays n'arrivent même pas à boucler leur budget de fonctionnement sans subvention extérieure - c'est le cas du Mali. Il serait donc illogique d'attribuer une fonction de régulation de l'économie nationale à leurs finances publiques. La fonction de régulation ne peut être exercée que si l'Etat peut déclencher dans certains cas un déficit volontaire pour faire jouer le multiplicateur par exemple, dans sa lutte contre le chômage.

La fonction de redistribution ne joue pas de la même manière. En effet à la périphérie, les finances publiques servent généralement à redistribuer au profit d'une minorité, des ressources prélevées en grande partie sur les pauvres et les couches moyennes, le système de sécurité sociale n'étant pas développé. Deux séries de mécanismes sont en présence dans cette redistribution perverse: l'accumulation privée et la création des emplois.

Dans nos sociétés les finances publiques jouent un autre rôle très important, dans l'accumulation privée réalisée par les hauts fonctionnaires et par des "hommes d'affaires". La haute administration², on le sait, est atteinte par la corruption et notamment par la corruption extérieure. Le produit est accumulé partie à l'extérieur, partie à l'intérieur dans des secteurs à rentabilité immédiate. Le livre de Pierre Pean, *L'argent Noir*, décrit parfaitement le mécanisme³.

Les finances publiques contribuent également à enrichir les bénéficiaires des marchés publics qui vendent en général leurs biens et services au-dessus du prix du "marché libre" alors que symétriquement, l'administration achète aux privés à des prix sur-facturés.

Outre cette fonction d'enrichissement de la haute administration et du commerce et des entreprises de bâtiments et travaux publics, les finances publiques africaines contribuent aussi à offrir des emplois aux jeunes sortis de l'enseignement secondaire et supérieur. Le plus souvent alors l'évaluation économique des projets part de considérations plus politiques qu'économiques. C'est par ce mécanisme que la classe du pouvoir, qui est essentiellement un pouvoir de fonctionnaires, se reproduit.

Ces différences entre fonctions des finances publiques des pays dominants et des pays africains fondent les différences dans les crises financières. En fait, au Centre, il n'y a plus de crise sauf celle de la sécurité sociale là où

2 Coiffé par le Gouvernement.

3 Pierre Pean - *L'argent Noir: la corruption et le sous-développement*. Fayard Paris 1988.

elle est très importante. On a pu alors parler de réformes pour équilibrer le budget de la sécurité sociale. Au centre, l'endettement, même extérieur, de l'Etat n'entraîne pas de crise financière et l'emprunt fait alors partie d'une politique économique globale. C'est pourquoi les rapprochements que l'on fait parfois entre la dette des USA exprimée dans leur propre monnaie d'ailleurs, et celle des pays de la périphérie est sans fondement⁴. Généralement dans le budget de l'administration centrale des pays africains, on distingue le budget de fonctionnement de celui de l'investissement, le premier comprenant deux chapitres, les dépenses en personnel et les dépenses en matériel. Cette distinction a en fait un caractère politique: les dépenses d'investissement peuvent être différées sans mettre en cause immédiatement l'ordre public ni réduire la marge de manoeuvre de l'Etat à l'égard des créanciers, alors que l'exécution du budget de fonctionnement est la condition du maintien de cet ordre. De même, si le matériel n'est pas disponible à temps, la qualité du service rendu en souffre, mais le désordre qui peut en résulter ne se manifeste que sous certaines conditions. Par contre si l'Etat ne peut pas honorer les engagements contractés à l'égard des salariés et des créanciers intérieurs - même étrangers - et extérieurs, c'est sa crédibilité qui est en jeu. Sa marge de manoeuvre de mener dans ce cadre sa politique budgétaire, diminue considérablement. On pourrait tirer de ce développement la conclusion qu'un pays peut éviter la crise aiguë des finances publiques, du moins de l'administration centrale, en veillant à la maîtrise de son budget de fonctionnement, comme s'il y avait un écran entre les différents chapitres du point de vue du créancier. C'est ainsi que l'on a vu des Etats donner des garanties aux emprunts ou emprunter directement sans poser le problème des échéances du service de la dette, alors qu'il est évident qu'en dynamique, le service de la dette des emprunts pour l'investissement doit être assuré par les recettes courantes. La distinction entre différents chapitres du budget relève plus de la gestion que de la politique budgétaire.

A la périphérie, il faut distinguer la crise ou le déficit tendanciel des finances publiques dont le cadre théorique général a été fourni par S. Amin⁵, des crises conjoncturelles, qui sont des crises dans la crise.

Pour nous la crise financière apparaît dès que l'Etat est contraint de bloquer le processus de reproduction élargie d'activités qu'il juge nécessaires à la croissance économique et au progrès social et technique parce qu'il n'arrive ni à augmenter ses recettes ordinaires, ni à emprunter et que le concours de la Banque Centrale pour couvrir les dépenses entraînerait une spirale in-

4 Entendons nous bien, les mécanismes de corruption et d'utilisation du secteur public pour l'accumulation individuelle sont courants dans les pays industriels, mais n'en sont pas une caractéristique de base.

5 S. Amin - *L'Accumulation à l'Echelle Mondiale*, Anthropos 1970.

flationniste. La crise est d'autant plus aiguë qu'il faut assurer un service de la dette auprès des créanciers puissants qui sont en mesure d'imposer la direction que doit prendre l'ajustement. Dans le cas des pays africains les créanciers de cette catégorie sont des Etats et des institutions financières multilatérales du centre, (prêteurs aux conditions de faveur), des sociétés transnationales et des banques dont le FMI (prêteurs aux conditions dures). Dans ceux de la zone du Franc, les crédits accordés par des entreprises financières peuvent être assimilés aux emprunts extérieurs, en raison de la possibilité de transferts sans limites vers la France.

Le problème de la marge de manoeuvre de l'Etat et de la société n'est pas le même dans un projet de développement qui donne la priorité à la construction nationale et donc à la révolution technologique avec plein emploi, que dans celui qui accordé la priorité à la compétitivité. Dans le premier, les principes de l'autonomie nationale de répartition équitable des revenus et des charges fiscales, et de la démocratie sont considérés comme des valeurs à défendre. Une coopération régionale peut en être une condition essentielle. Dans ces cas, la nécessité de maîtriser les finances publiques découle donc d'une analyse globale qui se résume en ceci: l'intérêt des peuples est de construire un monde multipolaire dans lequel les relations entre les pôles sont équilibrés et où la démocratie régit les relations entre chaque Etat et la société civile. Un Etat nationaliste conséquent dans ce sens est celui qui oeuvre dans cette perspective. En Afrique, partie du tiers monde la plus dominée et la plus surexploitée, cette perspective est une exigence. Ici la construction d'une capacité technique et politique de l'auto-ajustement au cours du processus des transformations que nécessite le passage d'une société agraire dépendante à une société industrielle est l'objectif que soutient la maîtrise des finances publiques.

Dans le second type de projet, l'ajustement aux contraintes extérieures de la compétitivité est l'objectif principal que vise la recherche de l'équilibre financier. La capacité de l'auto-ajustement faisant défaut, la recherche de l'équilibre n'est que l'un des moyens de réduire la rémunération du travail pour augmenter les profits potentiels des investisseurs (nationaux ou étrangers) qui visent le marché local ou le marché international. L'équilibre avec sous-emploi et appauvrissement des masses n'est pas alors un sous-produit dans ce projet mais bien l'objectif véritable. Là est le contenu essentiel de politiques d'ajustement dits structurels en cours en Afrique. A l'horizon de ces politiques, nous promet-on, se profilent des "Corées du Sud" africaines⁶, alors que c'est le néo-colonialisme qui se renforce!

L'inscription de l'analyse de la crise financière des Etats africains dans une

6 Le modèle coréen est idéalisé dans toute la littérature du néo-libéralisme.

perspective donnée est capitale. En effet, dans la perspective néo-coloniale, ni l'équilibre, ni la crise des finances publiques ne sont des moments dans le processus de la démocratisation et de la révolution économique et de l'autonomie; c'est pourquoi le soutien du Centre est acquis à tout gouvernement en place qui ne remet pas en cause la logique globale d'insertion dans le système. L'équipe au pouvoir cherche une marge de manoeuvre non pour transformer radicalement les rapports qui bloquent le développement, mais pour se maintenir en place.

Par contre lorsqu'il s'agit du Premier Projet, le Centre qui est un tout complexe formé d'Etats, de sociétés transnationales, d'agences multilatérales dont certains font partie du système des Nations Unies comme la Banque Mondiale, saisit toujours l'occasion d'un déséquilibre conjoncturel pour le déstabiliser. C'est pourquoi la maîtrise du déficit financier dans le cadre global de la maîtrise économique est capitale, car c'est la condition de l'élargissement de la marge de manoeuvre.

Le cas malien aurait pu servir à illustrer les deux alternatives, un gouvernement acceptant l'équilibre comme une condition d'insertion dans le système de la Zone Franc ayant succédé à un autre qui s'y était opposé. En fait l'opposition n'est pas si tranchée, les deux régimes étant des variantes du deuxième projet, sauf au niveau idéologique; ce qui n'est pas peu, mais pas suffisant.

La Crise malienne

Si c'est depuis le début des années 1980 que les finances publiques de certains Etats africains connaissent une phase de crise aiguë, celles du Mali l'ont connue depuis l'indépendance, mais dans deux contextes idéologiques différents.

C'est ce que nous allons rappeler brièvement avant de procéder à la description de la crise financière des années 1980. Ensuite nous mettrons en évidence les facteurs déterminants des dépenses, et ferons une analyse de la fiscalité qui permettra d'aborder le problème de la dette publique.

Stratégies maliennes de la Modernisation et Crises des Finances

L'économie malienne en elle-même est une économie à déficit tendanciel des finances publiques. Dans le livre *Afrique de l'Ouest bloquée*, S. Amin avait appliqué⁷ sa théorie des finances publiques à ce pays. Son analyse se résume ainsi: le Mali centre d'une des régions les plus développées de l'Afrique Occidentale jusqu'au 16ème siècle, avait été périphérisé au second degré par la traite négrière, puis par la colonisation. La traite portait un coup fatal au mode de production tributaire dont le système politique reposait sur

7 Samir Amin - *L'Afrique de l'Ouest Bloquée*, ed' Minit 1971, Paris p. 152-160 et p. 255-264.

la captation du surplus, dans lequel le commerce lointain jouait un rôle de premier plan. Les régions côtières, relativement arriérées puisque incapables de générer un volume de surplus suffisant pour fonder des Etats comparables, allaient "prosperer" avec la traite et être mises en valeur pendant la colonisation. Le Mali, à l'instar du Burkina et du Niger, allait rester jusqu'à l'indépendance une "réserve non exploitée directement, mais bien intégrée au système mondial par l'intermédiaire des colonies françaises de la côte. Le Mali indépendant allait hériter au plan économique d'un "cadeau empoisonné", l'Office du Niger, qui engloutit des milliards sans jamais atteindre, même avec retard, les objectifs fixés, tellement le projet avait été mal conçu"⁸.

Pour les différentes composantes de la direction du Mouvement anti-colonial, le modèle de nation à bâtir à partir du territoire légué par la colonisation et même les étapes étaient connus: c'était celui d'une nation européenne industrialisée. Dans une première étape, il fallait "rattraper les pays côtiers", (Côte d'Ivoire et Sénégal) aussi bien sur le plan du revenu, que des implantations industrielles, de l'urbanisation et de la construction des infrastructures.

Deux problèmes divisaient la couche dirigeante: 1. De l'Etat et des forces dites du marché, qui allait jouer le principal rôle? 2. Comment financer l'industrialisation et l'urbanisation en question? Opter pour l'étatisme, c'était opter pour l'accélération à la manière des pays socialistes d'Europe. Opter pour la soumission aux forces du marché, c'était en fait accepter le néo-colonialisme dans sa forme primaire. Mais les problèmes principaux, du modèle de développement rural et des relations villes-campagnes, n'étaient pas débattus. En fait, consciemment ou non, Dakar ou Abidjan était le futur de Bamako.

Le choix était entre deux variantes d'un développement capitaliste extraverti, qui, dans le cas du Mali, ne pouvait pas aller très loin. L'hypothèse fondamentale, la formation d'un surplus agricole ne pouvait pas être aussi facilement vérifiée que les protagonistes le pensaient.

Dans un premier temps, l'aile gauche, avec Modibo Keita en tête gagna la bataille: l'industrialisation et la modernisation se feraient sous la houlette de l'Etat. Une analyse sommaire amena à la conclusion que premièrement le surplus agricole extrait de la paysannerie pouvait augmenter par l'introduction de méthodes d'organisation "modernes", (comme les coopératives), l'investissement humain, l'émulation patriotique; que deuxièmement le surplus pouvait être capté directement par l'Etat, sans passer par l'intermédiation des commerçants traditionnels ou plutôt historiques. Alors que l'Etat avait l'am-

8 · Samir Amin, *op.cit.*

bition de se servir du système bancaire pour centraliser le surplus, le fonctionnement de la zone Franc auquel tenait tout le secteur privé était bien un obstacle insurmontable. La décision fut donc prise en 1962 d'en sortir.

Le régime fut renversé par un coup d'Etat en 1968. Le nouveau régime allait cependant connaître également les crises de finances publiques sur fond de déclin économique dont il importe de rappeler quelques traits.

Le Déclin économique et social depuis 1970

Le tableau ci-dessous met en évidence l'effondrement de l'économie mesuré par l'évolution du PIB et du PIB par tête. Il est dû essentiellement au déclin très marqué de l'agriculture, principale production du pays. L'économie repose sur l'agriculture et celle-ci sur la pluviométrie et sur le mouvement des prix notamment mondiaux. Sous l'action conjuguée de ces deux facteurs, la moyenne quinquennale de la production des céréales officiellement enregistrée était en général en 1981-85, inférieure à ce qu'elle était en 1961-65. En milliers de tonnes: mil-sorgho 867 et 702; maïs 86 et 77; riz paddy 177 et 140. Pour l'arachide, les chiffres étaient de 136.000 tonnes et 60.000 tonnes. Seule grande exception, le coton dont la production est passée de 18.000 tonnes à 125.000 tonnes. Le Plan de Développement 1987-1991 résume les effets de cette catastrophe agricole sur les revenus et les entreprises.

De 1983 à 1985, le chiffre d'affaires des entreprises privées et mixtes a diminué de 15%; "le revenu par tête dans le secteur primaire a chuté de 10% entre 1982 et 1985 et le pouvoir d'achat des fonctionnaires d'environ 25% entre 1980 et 1986"⁹. En 1986 une bonne récolte des produits alimentaires s'est traduite par l'effondrement des prix au producteur

Les aléas climatiques et les prix n'expliquent évidemment pas tout. L'inefficacité dans l'utilisation des moyens de production a joué aussi un rôle important puisque "entre 1975 et 1985, la production du riz a baissé, bien que pour cette céréale, l'essentiel des superficies soit dans les zones aménagées et encadrées et peu soumises aux aléas climatiques". L'efficacité de l'investissement est allée en déclinant, le rapport du taux de croissance du PIB par rapport à celui de l'investissement ayant évolué de la manière suivante (en %): 1960-1984: 20; 1969-1986: 18; 1976-1986: 12,3; 1980-1986

Le caractère aléatoire de l'épargne est manifeste. Il arrive fréquemment que la consommation globale dépasse la production. En onze ans, de 1976 à 1986, la propension à consommer n'est descendue au-dessous de 90% qu'une seule fois; elle a été sept fois supérieure à 95% et a dépassé la production 4 fois.

9 Op.cit.

Tableau 1 - Taux de croissance annuel moyen du PIB et du PIB/Hab 1980-1984

Pays	Population (en millions 86)	PIB										PIB/Hab.				
		70/80	80/84	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84	70/80	80/84	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84			
Mali	7,6	3,8	-0,1	-1,8	5,9	-4,1	-0,1	1,6	-2,9	-4,6	2,9	-6,8	-2,8			
Burkina	8,1	4,0	-1,4	3,5	0,0	-4,8	-3,9	2,0	-3,7	0,9	-2,4	-7,0	-6,1			
Niger	6,6	5,0	-2,0	-5,3	-2,7	7,2	-6,7	2,4	-4,8	-8,0	-5,5	4,2	-9,2			
P.M.A.*	-	3,9	2,4	3,5	2,5	1,8	1,7	1,2	-0,2	0,9	-0,2	-0,8	-0,8			
P.V.D.	-	5,8	1,0	1,3	0,9	-0,5	2,5	3,3	-1,3	-1,2	-1,5	-2,8	0,2			

Source: UNCTAD - The least developed countries 1986 report p. 3.

* Pays les moins avancés.

Tableau 2 - Education: Pourcentage du groupe d'âge pertinent dans les différents ordre d'enseignement

Année	Enseignement primaire			Enseignement secondaire			Enseignement supérieur
	Total	Garçons	Filles	Total	Garçons	Filles	Total 20-24 ans
1960	7		4	2			0
1965	24	32	16	4	5	2	
1975	22		16	3			1
1985	23	29	17	7	10	4	1

Source: Banque Mondiale - *Rapport sur le Développement dans le monde*, 1978, p. 120 et 1988, p. 314.

La crise de la balance des paiements dans ces conditions est inévitable. De 1969 à 1986, les exportations ont augmenté au rythme annuel de 3,6% et les importations de 3,6%. La propension à importer s'est envolée passant de 16% à 27,5%.

L'aide extérieure est aussi en crise depuis 1981 après une phase de grand essor au cours de la décennie 1970. En dollars courants, son montant qui était passé de 86 millions à 224 millions de 1976 à 1980, n'était que de 168 millions en 1983. La valeur réelle surtout par habitant n'a pas augmenté depuis lors.

Les conséquences sociales en sont dramatiques; il suffit de rappeler qu'en moyenne la quantité de calories consommées par jour, déjà très insuffisante, diminue: 1.860 calories en 1965, 1.810 en 1985¹⁰

Sur une population active de 2,2 millions environ, l'emploi salarié est estimé à 150.000 personnes dont 48.000 fonctionnaires. La structuration du secteur public a déjà entraîné la diminution de 25% d'emplois. Il n'existe pas de statistiques sur le taux de chômage. On sait cependant que l'office nationale de la main-d'oeuvre a enregistré entre 1976 et 1986 82.000 demandes d'emploi et n'a pu satisfaire que 20.780. En 1986, 1.000 diplômés sur 5.800 ont trouvé un emploi¹¹.

A la Recherche d'une Politique des Finances publiques

Alors qu'un siècle après la colonisation, la productivité du travailleur et le rendement de la terre baissaient dans la vallée du Niger au lieu d'augmenter, "la modernisation de l'Etat" et l'impératif de l'industrialisation entraînent la mise en place d'une bureaucratie politique et d'une bureaucratie économique par la création du secteur économique d'Etat. La jeunesse fut mobilisée dans un effort enthousiaste de scolarisation. L'agriculture n'étant pas à même de financer les dépenses, il fallut recourir à l'inflation et à l'aide

10 Banque Mondiale - *Rapport sur le Développement dans le Monde* 1988, p. 312.

11 *Plan de Développement* 1987-1991, p. 13.

extérieure; mais la pénurie et avec elle le marché parallèle se développèrent avec la complicité des intérêts lésés: l'Etat français à cause de la position stratégique du pays; les commerçants qui auraient voulu partager avec l'Etat la place occupée par le négoce coloniale; les petites féodalités rurales bousculées par les structures modernes; les propriétaires de comptoirs coloniaux nationalisés; les classes dirigeantes de pays "avancés" de la côte, qui craignaient la "contagion socialiste". La gauche de l'Union soudanaise RDA au pouvoir ne pouvait compter que sur l'aide de l'URSS et de la Chine (bien faible à l'époque), de l'Egypte de Nasser et du Ghana de Krumah. L'Algérie de Boumedienne voisine et sympatisante n'existait pas encore comme force économique et diplomatique.

Le régime de Modibo Keita n'était armé ni techniquement, ni politiquement pour maîtriser les finances publiques dans ces conditions.

Les dirigeants de la Première République (1960-1967) crurent possible de recourir au mécanisme inflationniste. C'est pourquoi le Mali sortit de la zone Franc en 1962 et tenta de mettre en place un système bancaire autonome pour financer son premier plan de développement quinquennal, très ambitieux puisqu'il prévoyait un taux de croissance moyen de 8,5% l'an. L'inflation permit de financer un Programme d'investissement tout aussi ambitieux: la formation de capital augmenta effectivement au taux annuel de 13% l'an entre 1959 et 1965 mais l'efficacité en fut très réduite: le P.I.B. stagna (1,8% par an) et le PIB par habitant régressa.

Au plan politique, le recours à l'autoritarisme à l'égard des paysans et le divorce politique entre les deux composantes du mouvement national, les fonctionnaires et les commerçants "traditionnels", avaient rétréci la base du pouvoir¹². Le régime n'était donc pas capable d'auto-ajustement en ce sens qu'il ne pouvait pas maîtriser l'inflation. C'est pourquoi la coalition des forces hostiles au nationalisme imposa facilement un ajustement de type néo-colonial, consistant principalement à stabiliser les dépenses publiques en faisant dépendre les investissements presque exclusivement des prêts et dons extérieurs. La pièce maîtresse fut la ré-intégration par le Mali à la zone franc en 1967 dont deux règles essentielles sont que la Banque Centrale ne peut pas refinancer les crédits d'investissement et qu'elle n'apporte son concours à l'Etat que jusqu'à l'équivalent de 20% des recettes courantes réelles de l'année précédente. Le franc malien fut dévalué de 50%.

L'ajustement politique parut être un préalable à l'ajustement financier; le premier fut facilement réalisé par le coup d'Etat militaire de 1969, mais le second ne l'est toujours pas, et le déclin économique continue.

4. Un certain nombre de crises partielles sont à l'origine de la crise des

12 Cl. Meillassoux - *Analyse de Classe du Processus de Bureaucratisation du Mali*. Ronéo 1972. IDEP, Dakar.

finances publiques ou bien entretiennent avec elle des relations dialectiques. Nous allons prendre les plus significatives.

(a) La Croissance démographique et l'Urbanisation

En 1960, le Mali avait une population de 3,8 millions d'habitants. En 1988, elle est de 8 millions et a augmenté à raison de 2,6% par an depuis 1980; contre 2,1% entre 1965 et 1980. En 1960, c'était un pays agricole non urbanisé avec seulement 7% de la population dans les agglomérations de 5.000 habitants ou plus. En 1980, ce taux était de 20%. L'urbanisation crée des besoins dont la satisfaction exige plus de moyens qu'en milieu rural. Plus précisément la minorité riche est concentrée dans la capitale. Son accès à l'affectation des ressources publiques lui permet d'imposer l'aménagement de quartiers dont les banlieues riches des pays développés sont les modèles, ainsi que des normes d'équipements collectifs sans tenir compte des difficultés financières, alors que pour l'essentiel elle échappe à l'impôt. Des recherches devraient être entreprises à ce sujet. Il est néanmoins très net qu'au Mali, comme dans les autres pays de la région, la partie proprement urbanisée des villes est très réduite, et est très dépendante des transferts de ressources pour son entretien. Le reste n'est qu'un "gros village", mais un gros village qui doit consommer des produits de base importés en raison des distorsions dans la répartition des revenus et l'archaïsme agricole.

Cette dépendance ne se justifie pas. En fait elle est entretenue par la politique de "l'aide" et pas seulement l'aide alimentaire. La suppression de celle-ci réduirait la base politique de la classe dirigeante, mais c'est un leurre de penser que la "vérité" des prix sera le moteur de l'expansion de la céréalisation, en dehors d'un projet cohérent de construction nationale.

(b) En apparence l'observation courante selon laquelle l'**agriculture africaine** ne bénéficie pas de **subventions nettes**, doit être nuancée dans le cas du Mali, où trois cas doivent être distingués: l'agriculture capitaliste mécanisée de la région de Bamako, qui fournit des produits de luxe: légumes et fruits. Elle est en fait exempte d'impôt et bénéficie d'exonérations de toutes sortes. De plus l'Etat y développe les infrastructures. Le système bancaire a accordé des prêts pour sa mise en valeur. L'office du Niger constitue le deuxième secteur. Ce cadeau empoisonné de la colonisation a englouti des milliards pour des résultats très médiocres. C'est un cas de subvention nette, mais sans amélioration sensible du revenu des producteurs, tellement le rapport capital/produit est élevé. Le troisième cas est celui du périmètre cotonnier mis en place depuis une douzaine d'années, comme culture sous pluie à faible coefficient de capital et susceptible de se développer sans subventions. La Banque Mondiale a écrit un rapport extrêmement élogieux sur ce pro-

jet¹³. Il faut dire qu'il est antérieur à la dégradation du prix du coton sur le marché mondial. En fait, c'était un projet idéal pour illustrer le bien-fondé de la politique d'ajustement structurel qui consiste à diminuer les déficits intérieurs et extérieurs par la réduction des importations et des subventions et l'augmentation des exportations, mais depuis la publication du rapport, les cours du coton sur le marché mondial se sont effondrés!

Dans la problématique du renforcement de l'Etat et de la Nation qui est la nôtre, nous distinguons d'un côté le problème technique (développer des cultures sous pluies parallèlement à la recherche de formules d'irrigations adaptées), et de l'autre celui le plus important du choix en faveur de la construction nationale qui implique le développement du marché intérieur. Dans cette optique la subvention nette à la céréaliculture serait une nécessité comme dans tous les pays qui ont réussi leur révolution agricole. Mais les cultures "tropicales" d'exportation n'en bénéficieraient pas nécessairement

(c) la Crise de l'Education et les Finances publiques

La crise de la scolarisation est l'une des plus dramatiques d'Afrique; en 1985, le taux de scolarisation était de 23% contre 24 en 1965. Les déperditions scolaires se multiplient. Les diplômés de l'enseignement supérieur qui bénéficiaient au départ de salaires "internationaux", sont condamnés d'abord à exercer un travail à productivité marginale nulle (voire négative) dans la fonction publique et ensuite au chômage avant le glissement dans le secteur "informel". La crise financière frappe de plein fouet le budget de l'éducation nationale (cf. Tableau 3).

Résultats très éloignés de ceux auxquels s'attendaient les Mouvements de libération et même les Etats conservateurs qui prenaient l'engagement à Addis Abeba en 1963, d'assurer la scolarisation à 100% en moins d'une décennie et d'éliminer rapidement l'analphabétisme! C'est que les dépenses pour l'éducation étaient comptabilisées en investissements - qu'il s'agisse des dépenses pour les bâtiments ou plus subjectivement des dépenses de fonctionnement. Les Etats ne considéraient-ils pas qu'ils contribueraient à préparer l'avenir d'autant mieux qu'ils consacraient une part élevée du budget à l'éducation?

Le constat est aujourd'hui accablant: le système éducatif d'ajustement que l'Afrique a adopté est facteur important de crise financière et non l'instrument privilégié dans la lutte pour la maîtrise de ces finances. La compréhension de cette évolution passe par un détour théorique.

13 World Bank - Project completion Report. *Mali Sud Agricultural Development Project*. June 1988. Africa Regional Office.

Tableau 3 - Dépenses de l'administration centrale

	1971	1975	1981	1982	1986
A - Pourcentage des dépenses totales			100	100	100
- Défense	16	11.1	08.4	08.1	
- Education	13	20.6	15.7	09.0	09.0
- Santé	04.80	01.3	03.1	02.8	01.7
- Logement et équipement collectif sécurité sociale et aide sociale			03.0	05.0	06.2
- Services économiques	12.39	11.2	11.4	08.1	07.7
- Divers (dont investissement)	66.20	66.9	55.6	65.3	67.3
B - Dépenses totales (% PNB)			25.9	33.7	34.0
C - Déficit global (% PNB)			- 05.6	- 09.3	- 09.6

Source: Drissa Lamine Diallo: *les Causes et les Conséquences de l'Accroissement des Dépenses publiques au Mali depuis l'Indépendance*. Messons ENA juin 1986 p.46.

Les systèmes éducatifs africains font partis depuis la colonisation d'un système global où le centre est à la fois le lieu de la production des techniques, et celui des normes culturelles et éducatives. Les finalités en sont le maintien de l'autonomie et de la cohérence nationale dans l'interdépendance, mais aussi de la domination et de l'exploitation (de la périphérie). Elles déterminent en dernier ressort les contenus et les coûts sociaux des divers degrés de l'éducation et de la formation qui se propagent dans le système global, entraînant la structuration au centre pour les uns et l'ajustement désordonné à la périphérie. Les différences des salaires entre les pays développés ne sont pas des contraintes à ce niveau, puisqu'il n'y a pas un marché international du travail. Elles le sont entre chaque grande zone du Centre et sa périphérie, la similitude des structures de formation entraînant la "fuite des capitaux". Parallèlement "l'assistance technique", très coûteuse et susceptible de renforcer la dépendance, permet de pallier les incohérences du système.

En raison du caractère autocentré des sociétés centrales

- (a) le système éducatif s'auto-ajuste par le moyen de l'Etat, pour fournir les qualifications toujours plus performantes au plan de la productivité et de l'inventivité de nouveaux outils et de nouvelles méthodes d'organisations;
- (b) les différences de revenus et de statut liées à l'éducation reflètent les différences de productivité et d'inventivité, d'aptitude au commandement etc. qui reflètent à leur tour les différences dans la durée (et les difficultés) des études.

Le système forme des spécialités pour les trois grands secteurs de la production: le primaire, le secondaire et le tertiaire, le secondaire étant le cœur du système économique. Une des fonctions essentielles des spécialistes de ce secteur est de concevoir et de produire des outils qui sont nécessaires au changement des techniques et à l'augmentation de la productivité du travail. Il n'y a pas d'économie centrale si ce secteur n'est pas très actif.

Le système central qui s'auto-ajuste pour assurer les fonctions que nous avons énumérées, ne connaît pas de crise de financement du système éducatif qui ne soit pas économiquement soluble. Souvent le problème se résume aux luttes entre les progressistes qui veulent un financement public élevé et les conservateurs qui insistent sur les "responsabilités individuelles". D'un côté comme de l'autre, le principe de l'utilisation du système éducatif pour assurer la mobilité sociale et obtenir qu'il s'ajuste quand c'est nécessaire, est accepté. La raison fondamentale est que l'emploi dans le secteur public n'est qu'une possibilité entre autres.

En Afrique les relations entre les finances publiques et l'éducation se posent différemment. Comme les Etats n'ont pas adopté le principe de la maîtrise budgétaire, qui accompagne l'option pour la construction nationale autonome, ils n'ont pas pu mettre sur pied un système éducatif à la fois efficace et peu coûteux; l'efficacité se mesurant à la capacité du système de fournir des compétences (cadres capables de maîtriser les changements au niveau macro-social, ouvriers qualifiés, chefs d'entreprises agricoles et industriels, concepteurs des changements techniques etc.) nécessaires à la révolution économique et à la généralisation de l'éducation de base pour toute la population en une dizaine d'années. Un système peu coûteux refuserait la soumission aux normes de salaires élaborées au centre.

Or l'Afrique a bâti un système éducatif inefficace et trop coûteux pour les finances publiques car l'Etat doit importer le matériel et les techniques de l'éducation, employer seul les diplômés et payer à ceux qui sortent de l'enseignement supérieur des salaires relativement élevés, même s'ils sont inefficaces du point de vue du développement. Ces salaires permettent le modèle de consommation du centre; le système éducatif fonctionne donc comme une courroie de la reproduction de la dépendance et de l'arriération économique. La relation salaire-formation favorise les classes et les individus et non la construction nationale.

En raison de la différence très grande entre les salaires des fonctionnaires maliens et ceux de leurs collègues sénégalais ou ivoiriens par exemple, on pourrait penser que ce schéma ne s'applique pas au Mali. En fait, les différenciations internes des salaires entre diplômés et non diplômés sont du même ordre. Comme l'économie malienne est déclinante, la crise est apparue plus tôt.

La Banque Mondiale recommande de ne budgétiser que l'enseignement de base et de copier le système américain pour l'enseignement supérieur et te-

chnique, c'est-à-dire de faire payer celui-ci par les parents ou par le recours au système du crédit-formation. En attendant, deux séries de mesures ont été prises: on a arrêté pratiquement le recrutement des étudiants en fin d'études, par le système généralisé de concours avec des recrutements à caractère plutôt symbolique; et on a réduit la part du budget consacré à la formation (cf. Tableau 4).

En raison de la disparition quasi totale des dépenses, même l'enseignement manque des matériels¹⁴.

La solution néo-libérale n'en est pas une. L'économie pour ne pas dire la société est trop extravertie pour qu'une réforme qui se contente pour l'essentiel de réduire les dépenses publiques donne les résultats escomptés. Le problème des finalités doit être débattu. Si le principe de la construction nationale qui implique la multiplication rapide des emplois productifs et l'abandon du concept de salaire international est adopté, trois principes pourraient guider les réflexions et les recherches:

- (1) fixer clairement les grandes lignes des changements techniques à opérer par étapes pour arriver au stade de la mise en place d'une industrie des biens outils nationaux, dominés sans doute dans une première phase par des petites machines agricoles et non agricoles;
- (2) pouvoir se passer assez rapidement de l'assistance technique étrangère;
- (3) créer un système peu coûteux, mais efficace.

Tant que la deuxième condition n'est pas réalisée, le système est toujours en crise; or, actuellement au Mali, comme ailleurs en Afrique surtout francophone, le système éducatif n'a pas formé des compétences suffisantes pour remettre en question ce système. C'est sans doute pourquoi le gouvernement croit résoudre la crise de financement en laissant les sources arabes développer un enseignement parallèle en arabe. De plus, ce sont les institutions internationales et nationales du centre qui, derrière la Banque Mondiale (et non l'UNESCO!) sont entrain de préparer les rapports sur les réformes du système éducatif. Là aussi, la "dénationalisation de l'Etat" est à l'oeuvre.

(d) *Le secteur privé* qui se veut nationaliste, revendique aussi l'approvisionnement de l'administration en matériels et services locaux: il est en relations étroites avec le "secteur informel". Les relations de parenté et de clientélisme politique jouent évidemment ici des rôles importants pour inciter l'Etat à dépenser. En somme l'activité du secteur informel dépend en grande partie du déficit du secteur public.

14 A la Bibliothèque de l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration, un des établissements les mieux dotés de Bamako, les étudiants n'ont à leur disposition que de vieux manuels français et les mémoires de fin d'études des promotions antérieures.

Tableau 4 - Dette publique ou garantie par l'Etat. Encours de la dette extérieure à long terme contractée ou garantie par le secteur public (millions de dollars)

Années	Taux nominal de croissance annuelle (%)												
	70	73	75	78	80	81	82	83	84	70/75	75/80	80/84	70/84
Mali	238	282	332	509	667	729	805	906	960	7,5	14,8	9,9	11,4
Mauritanie	27	106	188	593	731	848	1029	1176	1171	51,8	27,3	13,5	31,5
Niger	32	64	112	197	399	605	603	633	678	28,8	29,3	11,7	26,3
Burkina Faso	21	31	63	186	301	313	344	393	407	26,0	38,5	8,7	28,5
Sénégal	100	179	304	640	926	989	1236	1498	1555	25,4	27,4	15,6	23,3
Tchad	32	39	67	194	202	156	123	115	109	16,0	26,9	- 14,2	13,2

Sources: Banque Mondiale - *les Besoins financiers de l'ajustement dans la Croissance en Afrique subsaharienne* 1986-1990 p. 66.

Mais l'entreprise privée étrangère, du secteur des bâtiments et travaux publics notamment, joue un rôle plus important dans la mesure où une grande partie des dépenses dans ces secteurs, appelées prestigieusement "investissement", est financée de l'extérieur. La filiale locale de la grande entreprise française le plus souvent, doit convaincre l'administration de lancer de grands travaux. L'incitation est d'autant plus efficace qu'une solidarité fonctionnaire entre l'Etat français, fournisseur du crédit à l'Etat malien, les industriels exportateurs et les intérêts proprement néo-coloniaux des bâtiments et travaux publics, le commerce et la banque.

Evidemment, ces sollicitations n'aboutissent que si l'Etat malien exprime de son côté, même si c'est à posteriori, les demandes d'investissement, dont une partie est parfaitement justifiée du point de vue de la construction nationale, au plan de la communication comme de la production. Ainsi l'endettement pour la construction de certaines installations hydro-électriques est justifié et la construction du barrage de Manantali était sans doute nécessaire. Mais ce qui est en cause, c'est la cohérence du projet de développement d'un côté et la capacité de la société de le réaliser sous l'impulsion principale de l'Etat de l'autre.

Le secteur privé national et étranger contribuent à la formation du déficit. Nous n'envisageons ici que l'influence sur les dépenses. Il incite l'Etat par des moyens multiples, y compris par la corruption, à acheter, emprunter, construire.

Au Mali, l'Etat est l'acheteur le plus important du matériel importé ou fabriqué sur place (ce qui est rare). Evidemment l'armée et la police forment des débouchés que les fabricants d'armements ne peuvent pas ignorer. Or nous savons que dans l'administration, la tendance en cas de crise financière est de réduire les dépenses du matériel au profit des dépenses en personnel, à l'exception peut être des ministères stratégiques comme ceux de la défense, de la sécurité et des finances. Une idée en est donnée par le tableau 3, d'où se dégage que la diminution des dépenses qu'impose l'ajustement affecte davantage le secteur social (éducation et santé) que l'armée. L'armée est-elle utile?

Dans l'optique d'une construction de l'Afrique de l'Ouest autonome, il faudrait que dès à présent, les patriotes de cette région, à commencer par ceux du Mali, engagent la lutte pour une neutralité de la région, donc pour le démantèlement des bases militaires étrangères, et pour la signature et le respect de traités de non agression, afin que les ressources déjà médiocres ne soient pas consacrées à l'armement, mais à la réduction des liens de dépendance.

(e) Crise de la dette.

C'est cette coïncidence entre les intérêts du groupe dirigeant et ceux du complexe du centre qui est à l'origine du processus de l'endettement précoce du pays. Deux caractéristiques fondamentales de l'endettement malien se dé-

gagent des tableaux 4 et 5. Premièrement, il était précoce puisque déjà en 1970, l'encours de la dette était supérieur à celui de la Mauritanie, du Burkina, du Niger et du Sénégal réunis. Au cours de la décennie 1970 considérée généralement comme celle de l'endettement, la dette malienne a augmenté moins rapidement que celle du Sénégal par exemple. De 1970 à 1984, elle a quadruplé, tandis que celle du Sénégal a augmenté de plus de 15 fois. Deuxièmement la ventilation par sources (tableau 5) fait apparaître la place limitée de l'Occident et du Japon: 24% en 1970 et 46% en 1984 (sans la dette FMI). C'est la conséquence des relations établies avec les pays de l'Est dès les années 1960.

Du point de vue de l'analyse de la crise financière de l'Etat et de l'approfondissement de sa compradorisation, c'est l'évolution du service de la dette qui doit retenir d'abord l'attention. De 0,8% du PNB en 1970, il était passé à 1,2% en 1980; et à 2,1% en 1986, soit environ 6% des dépenses de l'administration centrale et 14,2% des exportations. Ces taux sont parmi les plus modestes du monde, mais n'oublions pas que l'économie est en déclin; en sorte que le pays doit demander des rééchelonnements et des annulations.

L'effet le plus important de cette endettement est la "dénationalisation de l'Etat", dans la mesure où, ouvertement le système bancaire international avec la Banque Mondiale et le FMI, en tête, partage le pouvoir de détermination de la politique économique avec l'Etat malien. Il nous suffit de citer à cet effet trois faits d'importance: l'adhésion à l'UMOA.

Crise fiscale

Dans les régimes autoritaires africains, les producteurs ne constituent pas une force politique, l'équité fiscale n'existe donc pas. Le Mali n'échappe pas à la règle.

La structure des recettes ordinaires de l'administration centrale met en évidence la prédominance des impôts indirects, phénomène classique dans la fiscalité africaine pour ne pas dire périphérique. En effet, même si le voeu du gouvernement qui voulait diminuer la part relative de ces impôts et augmenter celle des recettes non fiscales, assises sur les bénéfices des entreprises publiques notamment, avait été réalisé, les impôts sur la consommation auraient continué à procurer plus de la moitié des recettes ordinaires. Or, comme nous le verrons plus loin, le secteur public était déjà globalement déficitaire au début de la décennie 1980.

Pourtant d'après le code fiscal, les **impôts directs** sont nombreux et comportent des taux élevés. Ainsi, le taux d'imposition est de 10% sur les bénéfices réalisés par les exploitations agricoles, de 5% sur les revenus provenant d'immeubles d'habitation occupés par leurs propriétaires et enfin de 30% sur les revenus des autres immeubles. Le taux de l'impôt sur les bénéfices industriels et commerciaux (BIC) est de 30% pour les sociétés en nom collectif, les sociétés anonymes, les particuliers et membres de sociétés de caution mutuelle de commerçants reconnus par les administrations.

Tableau 5 - Dette extérieure à long terme contractée ou garantie par l'Etat à la fin de 1984, selon les sources (\$ millions)

	Dette Totale y compris achat FMI	Sources publiques						Sources privées			Total FMI		
		Bilatérale		Multilatérale		Total	Cr. four.	Inst.	F.				
		CAD	OPEP	BIRD	AID					Autres		Total	
Mali	1095	47	145	387	579	0	191	160	351	19	11	960	64
Mauritanie	1327	68	569	82	720	57	56	215	328	62	61	1171	30
Niger*	947	194	72	16	282	0	119	121	240	12	144	678	44
Burkina	437	80	17	14	110	0	124	136	260	7	30	407	
Sénégal*	2026	439	280	121	860	91	199	208	498	10	187	1555	201
Tchad	115	3	7	4	13	0	57	34	72	14	10	109	4

Source: Banque Mondiale - *Les Besoins financiers de l'Ajustement dans la Croissance en Afrique subsaharienne 1986-1990*, p. 67.

* Dette extérieure prévue à long terme garantie par l'Etat: Niger 162; Sénégal 10.

Malgré ces taux progressifs, l'essentiel de l'impôt direct est payé par le petit salarié (celui qui vit seulement eson salaire) et le petit paysan. C'est en effet le salarié qui supporte une grande partie de l'impôt général sur le revenu, le taux étant fixé généralement à 17% du salaire de base des agents de la fonction publique. Quant au paysan, il est astreint à la "taxe de développement" et au "minimum fiscal", nouveau nom de l'impôt de capitation de la période coloniale, puisque comme lui, il frappe toutes les ressources physiques âgées de 15 à 60 ans à l'exception des assujetés à d'autres impôts directs, des militaires et des étudiants et élèves. Au total, en 1975, moins du cinquième des recettes ordinaires était couvert par des impôts directs (cf. tableau 6).

Tableau 6 - Structure des recettes ordinaires de l'administration centrale

	1975	1981	1982	1986
A/ Recettes fiscales (% des recettes ordinaires)				
- Impôts sur le revenu, les bénéfiques et plus value	21	18,8	15,4	9,2
- Côtisations sécurité sociale	3,8	4,3	3,6	
- Taxes intérieures sur biens et services	57,5	39,7	38,9	31,2
- Taxes sur les échanges internationaux	20,7	18,7	21,7	
- Autres taxes	17,7	13,2	14,5	19,6
B/ Recettes non fiscales (% recettes ordinaires totales)		7,6	8,2	14,7
C/ Recettes ordinaires totales (% PNB)		14,4	15,5	16,3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: Banque Mondiale - *Développement accéléré en Afrique au Sud du Sahara*, p. 101; *les besoins financiers de l'ajustement dans la croissance en Afrique subsaharienne 1986-1990* p. 112; *le rapport sur le développement dans le Monde 1988* p. 302

Comme il fallait s'y attendre, la structure des **impôts indirects** est dominée par les recettes douanières (60 et 80% respectivement selon que l'on inclut ou non les comptes hors budget).

Les recettes extraordinaires provenant pour l'essentiel d'emprunts surtout extérieurs, ou intérieurs (auprès de filiales de banques étrangères), avaient couvert plus du quart des recettes totales.

Les impôts indirects constituent, nous l'avons vu, plus de 50% des ressources ordinaires de l'administration centrale. Les taxes intérieures sur les transactions, les biens et services sont dominés par la taxe sur l'essence, qui fournit 50% de l'ensemble. Il s'agit là d'un impôt qui devrait frapper surtout les propriétaires des véhicules particuliers considérés comme consommateurs d'un bien de luxe. Mais il faut prendre en considération, d'une part que c'est l'administration qui paie la plus grande partie des factures d'essence automobile et d'autre part que le système de transport urbain public est inexi-

stant, ce qui permet aux transporteurs de répercuter la taxe sur les usagers.

Depuis le début des programmes de stabilisation des dépenses publiques c'est-à-dire en fait l'élimination du déficit budgétaire, la part des "impôts sur le revenu et les plus-value" dans les recettes ont diminué de 50%, passant de 19% en 1981 à 9% en 1986.

Trois observations s'imposent. La première est qu'au Mali, encore peut-être plus qu'ailleurs dans le capitalisme périphérique, le poids de l'impôt n'est pas supporté par les riches, mais par les pauvres et les "classes moyennes". La deuxième est que cette absence d'équité ne s'explique pas principalement par des raisons techniques, la procédure étant plus simple pour les impôts indirects que pour les impôts directs; mais par la structure du pouvoir, qui ne permet pas aux petits contribuables de s'exprimer ouvertement sur les évasions fiscales évidentes. La troisième est que pour avoir un système fiscal équitable, un projet de construction nationale est nécessaire.

Les données fiscales du Mali peuvent être bouleversées par la découverte et la mise en exploitation de ressources minières et/ou pétrolières, en raison des royalties qui peuvent en provenir; Ce ne serait pas sans danger pour l'agriculture comme l'ont montré tant d'exemples dans le domaine pétrolier. S'il s'agit de l'or, les risques de fuites du circuit officiel et d'évasion fiscale sont énormes. C'est la leçon que l'on peut tirer d'une étude du PMA qui montre qu'en 1985, les exportations d'or du Mali avaient atteint environ 22 milliards de francs CFA, soit autant que l'élevage, deuxième production d'exportation officielle après le coton¹⁵, sans que les retombées fiscales soutiennent la comparaison.

Conclusion

Considérant que la révolution économique et technologique est une nécessité incontournable pour les peuples africains, et que sans Etat fort parce que populaire et démocratique, elle n'est pas possible, nous avons choisi d'examiner l'impact de la crise sur l'évolution de la marge dont dispose l'Etat du Mali, Etat autoritaire et faible ou plutôt affaibli. L'objectif majeur était de contribuer dans ce cadre à montrer l'intérêt de l'intégration de l'analyse économique et politique des finances publiques dans la théorie de l'Etat africain. Une question essentielle nous a préoccupée: "la dénationalisation de l'Etat africain" ou l'aggravation de la réduction de sa marge de manoeuvre est-elle entrée dans une nouvelle phase avec la crise?

Dans un premier temps, une relecture critique des théories des finances publiques a permis de faire des propositions théoriques et méthodologiques nouvelles (système mondial des finances publiques¹⁶); dans un second temps

15 Ministère du Plan PNUD-MLI/82/002 - "Assistance à la Planification" - "Perspectives de l'Economie malienne 1985-1986.

16 Dans le cadre de la théorie de la dépendance et de la construction nationale.

la crise financière de l'Etat a été mise en relation avec la stratégie de la modernisation, le déclin économique et les formes particulières de crise (celles de l'urbanisation, de l'éducation du secteur privé de la dette et de la fiscalité). Nous avons établi que la "dénationalisation de l'Etat" prend une forme nouvelle. En effet, à présent, les Etats du centre et les institutions financières dominées par eux, ne se contentent plus de partager avec l'Etat local le pouvoir, mais aussi le droit de déterminer ouvertement la politique budgétaire.

Cette analyse politique s'impose au moment où précisément une réforme des finances publiques est en cours avec une assistance technique extérieure massive. La priorité est accordée à la dimension technique: disposer d'un budget qui fournit des informations complètes et cohérentes sur l'ensemble des dépenses et des recettes. Cette approche technocratique voile pour l'instant la dimension politique et même stratégique des problèmes.

The Human Rights of Africans

Joy Mukubwa Hendrickson*

RÉSUMÉ. Les écrivains africains modernes ont utilisé le concept des droits de l'homme pour condamner le traitement des Africains par des non-Africains. Ces idées doivent être étudiées en tant que telles et non pas simplement considérées comme des versions secondaires des concepts "empruntés à l'Occident". Une recherche préliminaire sur les idées modernes Africaines montre que les Africains considèrent les droits d'abord en termes collectifs. Au lieu d'être pour l'essentiel une doctrine qui restreint le pouvoir d'un Etat, comme c'est le cas en Occident, en protégeant les vies, libertés et propriétés des individus, les droits de l'homme ont été dans le contexte africain une déclaration de guerre contre l'esclavage, le racisme, le colonialisme et le sous-développement. La conception africaine des droits de l'homme s'est voulue une réaction à ces injustices collectives et cherche à restreindre le pouvoir des non-Africains par rapport aux Africains. Que cette conception des droits de l'homme soit une bonne conception ou non pour traiter les problèmes de l'Afrique post-coloniale doit faire l'objet d'une recherche plus poussée. L'important est que les africains doivent avoir le droit à interpréter les droits universels de l'homme à leur manière et que l'accent sur les droits collectifs au lieu des droits individuels n'invalide pas leur point de vue. Les discussions autour des mérites relatifs des droits individuels par rapport aux droits collectifs restent ouvertes. Cependant l'accent mis sur les droits collectifs n'implique pas le rejet des libertés individuelles. Les contradictions entre les droits individuels et collectifs ne sont plus irréconciliables.

Introduction

Human rights are generally accepted nowadays as a universal moral standard. If this is the case, then we ought not to speak of the rights *of* Africans, but only of human rights *in* Africa. However, if we examine the idea of human rights, leaving aside the practice or non-practice for a moment, we can see that there exists a profusion of varying interpretations of the doctrine. The East and West wage a cold war over the fundamental meaning of human rights concepts¹. Third World scholars claim that their own version of human rights has more to do with collective human dignity than with individual rights. The West is accused of imposing Western values on non-western cultures when it attempts to insist that such deviations from the "true" meaning of human rights are perversions of the doctrine². How then do we deal with the myriad contradictions and general confusion about the meaning of "universal" human rights? If we distance ourselves from the ideological aspects of the debate and concentrate on what human rights have

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1 See Louis Henkin, "Economic-Social Rights as "Rights": A US Perspective", 2 *HRLJ* (1981), pp. 223-236 and F. Medvedev and G. Kulikov, *Human Rights and Freedom in the USSR* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981).

2 See Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, eds. *Human Rights; Cultural and Ideological Perspectives*, (NY: Praeger, 1979).

meant and not on what they should mean, we can see that the idea of human rights has varied throughout history, even in the West³. Modern day conceptions of human rights are broader than the original seventeenth century ideas of natural rights which are different again from earlier formulations of natural law. The concept of human rights has never been universal in the sense of an idea that is timeless and absolute. There is not one single, final true version of the doctrine. Therefore, to avoid charges of cultural imperialism, when one talks of "universal" human rights, the discussion must include the ideas of non-western peoples. Only a conglomeration of views from different segments of humanity add up to a truly universal perspective on human rights. African ideas of human rights are one neglected aspect of the total composite picture.

Modern African writers have used the concept of human rights to express their condemnation of the treatment of Africans by non-Africans. These ideas should be examined in their own right and not considered as mere second class versions of concepts "borrowed from the West". In fact, to suggest that an idea is borrowed means that it is merely on loan and must ultimately be returned. To imply that the West "owns" the concept of human rights is just as unacceptable as the claim that the concept of human rights is a "western inspired idea" or that it "originated in the West". Paulin J. Hountondji, echoing the sentiments of many contemporary African scholars, declares that, "Europe certainly did not invent human rights..."⁴. Ideas of human rights arise at particular historical time periods when the social and economic conditions are ripe enough for their articulation and dissemination. These ideas flourish everywhere and cannot be considered the private property of the West.

Once it is considered that all concepts of human rights are historical products of particular circumstances, or more specifically, the reactions to certain injustices experienced by a people, then it can be seen that African ideas of human rights are equivalent to similar statements made by Americans or Frenchmen. While equal merit may be posited, equal attention has not been given to African ideas. This article begins to redress this imbalance

3 For a brief overview of the history of the Western concept of rights see Richard P. Claude, "The Classical Model of Human Rights Development", in *Comparative Human Rights*, Richard P. Claude, ed. (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins U. Press, 1976). For a more detailed discussion on the idea of Natural Rights in the West, See David D. Ritchie, *Natural Rights. A Criticism of Some Political and Ethical Conceptions*, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1894) and Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

4 Paulin Hountondji - "The Master's Voice - Remarks on the Problem of Human Rights in Africa", in Paul Ricœur, ed. *Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights*, (Paris: Unesco, 1986) pp. 319-332.

with a brief examination of some of the historical documents in which Africans have declared their human rights.

Adherents of the view that Africans have an idea of human rights which is different from the dominant western version have indicated that the source of this vision lies in Africa's pre-colonial communal past⁵.

But, Rhoda Howard wonders how much of Africa's communal values still persist to warrant the claim of an African approach to human rights that is rooted in the pre-colonial period⁶. Osita Eze draws attention to the feudal character of many of the early African societies and advocates a more realistic and less romantic view of Africa's past when searching for evidence of human rights⁷. A more fundamental criticism, like that of Jack Donnelly, denies the existence of ideas of human rights in traditional or pre-modern societies both in the Third World generally and in the West as well⁸.

Given the difficulties of proving conclusively whether or not early African societies had concepts of human rights, this article restricts itself to modern African political thought where there is clear evidence of a particular interpretation of human rights. The article deals specifically with those writings of Africans which are in English and does not discuss the various strands of African political thought which are in French, Portuguese or stem from the Islamic tradition. African social and political thought, as it is used here, refers to the writings of Africans or those with African ancestry. Therefore, it includes important American and West Indian writers who have had a great influence on the subsequent writings of native born Africans. This article attempts to make an examination of African ideas by analyzing the concept of human rights as it appears in selected documents of modern African social and political thought, beginning with the reminiscences of ex-slaves written in the eighteenth century up to the OAU's 1981 "African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights".

An overview of the development of the human rights of Africans can be seen as a battle which necessarily began as a legal struggle to free the

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- 5 Keba M'Baye - "Human Rights in Africa, *The International Dimension of Human Rights*. Karl Vasak, general editor (Paris: Unesco, 1982) pp. 583-602. Dunstan M. Wai, "Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa" in Pollis and Schwab op. cit. pp. 115-144. Asmaron Legesse, "Human Rights in African Political Culture" *The Moral Imperatives of Human Rights: A World Survey*. Kenneth Thompson, ed. (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America for the Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1980) pp. 123-138.
 - 6 Rhoda Howard - "Is There an African Concept of Human Rights?" Working Paper No A:8, Development Studies Programme, University of Toronto (November 1983).
 - 7 Osita C. Eze - *Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problems* (Lagos, Macmillan, 1984) p. 13.
 - 8 Jack Donnelly - "Human Rights and Human Dignity: an Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights", *APSR* Vol 76, No 2, June 1982.

slaves. After emancipation, African demands for rights endured on a social or cultural level as the cry against racial discrimination, then moved to a political sphere in the fight against colonialism and foreign domination and continues in the economic realm with a call for a new International Economic Order.

From this preliminary investigation of modern ideas, it can be seen that Africans do view rights in collective terms. Rather than being fundamentally a doctrine which restricts the power of a state, as it does in the West by protecting the lives, liberties and property of individuals, human rights in the African context has been a declaration of war against slavery, racism, colonialism and underdevelopment. The African idea of human rights developed as a response to these collective injustices and seeks to restrict the power of non-African over Africans.

Whether or not this idea of human rights is adequate to deal with the problem of post-colonial Africa is a subject that needs to be more thoroughly investigated. In this article, however, it is argued that Africans do have a right to their own interpretation of universal human rights and that the emphasis on collective rights over individual rights⁹ does not invalidate their point of view. The examination of the African ideas is concluded with some general remarks regarding the still open debate on the relative merits of individual versus collective rights.

Early African Ideas of Human Rights

The first mention of human rights in modern African political thought is found in abolitionist literature. *Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evils of Slavery* by Ottobah Cugoano and the autobiographical *Life of Oualadaj Equiano or Gustavus Vassa, the African* are two texts written by Africans in the eighteenth century which provide us with an interpretation of human rights which means nothing less and at this stage nothing more, than the abolition of the inhuman traffic in slaves. The personal experiences of Vassa coupled with the learned biblical arguments of Cugoano make a convincing case against the continuation of the immoral institution of slavery, as a violation of man's most fundamental human rights.

The claim to "natural rights and common liberties of man", is made repeatedly in Cugoano's book¹⁰, to prove that no man should enslave another. All arguments made to justify slavery and the slave trade by excluding Africans from the category of holders of natural rights to life and liberty are refuted.

9 See Ekwueme Okoli - "Towards a Human Rights Framework in Nigeria", in Pollis and Schwab, eds. *Toward a Human Rights Framework* (N.Y.; Praeger, 1982) pp. 203-222.

10 Ottobah Cugoano - *Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evils of Slavery*, 1987 with an introduction by Paul Edwards, (London, Dawson of Pall Mail, 1969) Passim.

Cugoano states that, God "gave to all equally a natural right to liberty". Africans are "born as free" as Englishmen. Yet, we have been "robbed of our natural rights as men and treated as beasts". This was no exaggeration. Referring to the infamous Zong case of 1790, Cugoano tells us that, "slaves were to be considered the same as horses" and it was therefore legitimate to throw sick ones overboard in an attempt to recover their value from the insurers¹¹.

Equiano's book¹² is more of a narrative than Cugoano's work and contains less on the abstract concept of natural or human rights. However, he does give references to rights, or violations of rights, from his personal experience. While still a slave, he despaired of ever attaining his rights among men and suspected that he needed, to wait till he got to heaven¹³. Although he had the good fortune to be able to purchase his freedom, he soon recognized that this was no guarantee of his rights. After witnessing the seizure by "these infernal invaders of human rights" of a free born young mulatto, Equiano exclaimed, "Hitherto, I had thought only slavery dreadful but the fate of a free negro appeared... in some respects even worse"¹⁴. To Equiano, a free negro was only "nominally free". Since his evidence was inadmissible in a West Indian court of law, he could be "universally insulted and plundered without the possibility of redress"¹⁵. Until not only the slave trade, but also the institution of slavery and the laws which supported the institution were all abolished, no single individual African could enjoy his human rights because his life and liberty were constantly threatened.

Cugoano shared this necessarily collective perspective on the issue of the human rights of Africans. He said, "The emancipation of a few, while ever that evil business of slavery is continued cannot make that horrible traffic one bit less criminal"¹⁶.

While non-African abolitionists shared the conviction that natural rights meant the elimination of the slave trade, not all who accepted the doctrine, at the time, saw this as the primary interpretation. The American revolutionaries of 1776 understood it in terms of the right to independence. They used the concept of natural rights to fight against tyrannical rule and to institute their own government.

There is no evidence to show that either Cugoano or Eguiano agreed with this interpretation. Just like the Americans and later the French, these two

11 Cugoano, *op. cit.* p. 111.

12 *Life of Olaudah Equiano or Gustave Vassa The African 1789*, 2 Vols. (London: Davidsons of Pall Mall, 1969.

13 Equiano, *op. cit.* Vol I, p. 178.

14 *Ibid.* Vol. 1, p. 249.

15 *Ibid.*

16 Cugoano, *op. cit.* p. 97.

African writers understood "universal" human rights in terms of the particular grievances of their own people. At the time Cugoano and Equiano wrote, Africans were still sovereign in Africa. The West had not yet started to scramble for African soil, only for the bodies of its fair sons and daughters. Once captured or purchased, Africans, unlike the white undentured servants, were declared slaves in perpetuity. Generations unborn were condemned to bondage. Natural rights, therefore, meant the claim to freedom for all those members of the Negro race who were unfortunate enough to be forcibly torn from their homeland and hence treated in a manner which was unnatural, cruel and inhuman.

For while both Cugoano and Equiano admit that their freedom was first violated by fellow Africans, (Equiano calls them those "sable invaders of human rights")¹⁷, they both appear lenient in their condemnation of these acts. Their true rancor is reserved for the Europeans who stripped the African of all semblance of human dignity and forced him to ask, "Am I not a man, and a brother?"¹⁸.

It was the peculiarly cruel nature of the trans-Atlantic slave trade that forced the conscience of the world to begin to question the time honoured institution of slavery. Edward Blyden, a prominent spokesman for his race in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, asserts that, "the right to hold slaves was deeply rooted in the minds of men... until the Negro emancipation first established the principle that no circumstances justify the making or holding of slaves"¹⁹.

However, once emancipated, the former slaves were still not free to enjoy the natural rights and privileges of men. Blyden repeatedly warns Afro-Americans: "I am aware that some, against all experience, are hoping for the day when they shall enjoy social and political rights in this land"²⁰. He claimed that the effect of Abraham Lincoln's 1863 emancipation proclamation was only to set the body free, "but the soul remained in bondage, (and) the intellectual, social and religious freedom of the American ex-slave has yet to be achieved"²¹.

Blyden strongly believed that Africans would eventually attain this degree of freedom and hence enjoy their total human rights only if they returned to

17 Equiano, op. cit. p. 60.

18 This was the inscription on the seal of the British Abolitionist Society.

19 Edward Blyden, *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race 1887*, (Edinburgh University Press, 1967) p. 355.

20 Edward Blyden - "The Call of Providence to the Descendants of Africa in America", in Lynch, ed., *Selected Published Writings of Edward Wilmot Blyden: Black Spokesman*. (London, Frank Cass & Co., Ltd, 1971) p. 25.

21 Blyden - "The Three Needs of Liberia" in Lynch, op. cit., p. 120.

their original homeland. He urged Afro-Americans to join him and build a modern African nation in Liberia.

Blyden stressed the importance of a separate racial identity and declared openly that Liberia should not be a replica of the US: "We do not want the same thing in Africa that we left in America"²². Instead, as perhaps the greatest of Africa's "cultural nationalists", Blyden was determined to assert the rights of the race to develop its own character, soul, personality, individuality and even nationality. He loudly proclaimed, "We have as much right as any other people to strive to rise to the very zenith of national glory"²³.

In the 1900's, other notable Pan-Africanists of the Diaspora also spoke of the Rights of Africans. The identity of the group demanding its rights continued to be based on a racial rather than a geographical limitation. This can be seen as an outgrowth not only of common ancestry but also the shared experience of racial degradation.

All rights listed in Marcus Garvey's, "Declaration of the Rights of the Negro Peoples of the World"²⁴, drafted and adopted at a Convention of the United Negro Improvement Association held in New York in 1920, were attacks against the dehumanizing segregation against people of colour. In the preamble to the declaration, the first point made is the complaint that "nowhere in the world, with few exceptions, are black men accorded equal treatment with white men"²⁵. The third right listed serves to sum up the meaning of every one of the rest of the rights, fifty-four(54) in all. It states: "That we believe the Negro, like any other race, should be governed by these rights and privileges common to other human beings"²⁶. According to the declaration, racial discrimination and the parcelling out of the continent of Africa among the European nations have caused the denial of all rights and freedoms which ought to be accorded to Negroes.

In this document, the Negro race demands a right to their history, a right to dignity, a right to respect. They want only what is denied them because of their colour, i.e. unhindered access to public places, to employment and to equal education, as well as equal protection under the law. They condemn the uncivilized and barbaric behaviour of whites toward the Negro peoples. The declaration makes it clear that violence is justified in the attempt to eliminate the infringement of the rights of Negro peoples. Africa belongs to Africans and the "Solemn determination to reclaim the treasures and posses-

22 Ibid, p. 123.

23 Blyden - "A Vindication of the African Race", in Lynch, op. cit., p. 133.

24 Reproduced in V.B. Thompson - *Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-Africanism* (London: Longman, 1969), pp. 324-330.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

sions of the vast continent of our forefathers²⁷ is recorded in the document.

Fundamentally, the declaration protests against the idea that human rights are reserved for the white man. Negroes must be recognized as fellow members of the *human race*.

W.E.B. Dubois also fought for the rights of Africans as a racial group. He claimed that the drawing of lines on the basis of colour and race was not his own idea but could be attributed to the behaviour of whites throughout the world who displayed a "disposition not to treat civilized Negroes as civilized, (and) to consider that the Negro races existed in the world chiefly for the benefit of white races"²⁸. But he sometimes identified similarities with other groups and advocated, in 1915, an alliance between white and black labour²⁹. At the Pan African Congress held in Paris in 1919, the first resolution arrived at was that the "Allied and Associated Powers establish a code of law for the international protection of the natives of Africa similar to the proposed international code for labour"³⁰.

The rights of Africans at the 1919 Congress were identified primarily in social and economic terms. Freedoms and political control took a back seat to demands for capital to be regulated and profits to be taxed for the social and material benefits of the natives. These benefits were clearly stated: education and medical services should be provided by the state³¹. Labour was also to be strictly regulated so that abuses were curtailed.

The Land was to be held in trust for the natives. It seems that the state was also to be "held in trust", for "the right to participation is limited by the development of the natives" with the view toward a future where "Africa is ruled by Africans"³².

Right to Independence

However, in the near future, (1945 at the Pan African Congress in Manchester) rule by consent was no longer the ultimate goal. Constitutional reforms which allowed for greater participation were considered as "spurious attempts to continue the political enslavement of the peoples"³³. Indirect rule was seen as an "encroachment on the right of the... African natural rulers". Africans and all colonial peoples had a "right to control their own destinies"

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ayedele Langley - *Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa 1900-1945*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) p. 60.

30 Colin Legum - *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide* (N.Y.: Praeger, 1965) pp. 151-152.

31 Langley, op. cit. p. 66 Langley points out that neither Padmore nor Legum include the section on health in the resolutions of the Pan Africa Congress of 1919.

32 Legum, op. cit., pp. 151-152.

33 Ibid, pp. 153-155.

and this meant a "right to govern themselves". Self-government was the only way to defeat the exploitative intentions of the imperialist powers. Colonial workers and farmers were called to join the struggle for emancipation. Intellectuals and professional classes were told that the winning of their own liberties depended upon fighting for "trade union rights, the right to form co-operatives, freedom of the press, assembly, demonstration and strike, freedom to print and read the literature which is necessary for the education of the masses..."³⁴. These rights were needed to organize the masses as the only road to effective action. These rights were *instrumental* in the gaining of the single most important right; the right to *freedom*, not for individuals, but for a national group.

Besides being primarily moral and legal limitations on existing governments, the Western doctrine of the rights of man contains revolutionary elements. The doctrine sees rights as natural and prior to government. Government was instituted among men to protect these rights. If any government failed to carry out the purposes for which it was created by the people, these same people had a right to abolish it. It was this aspect of the doctrine which appealed most to Africans at this stage in history.

Human rights became the platform on which the struggle for independence was fought. The doctrine was used not to restrict the power of the state over individuals but to overthrow existing foreign control over peoples of a different race and eliminate discrimination on the basis of colour. Africans argued that they had a right to overturn colonial government because its politics of racial discrimination and economic exploitation denied Africans their rights. The logical conclusion was that a new government must be formed which would protect and ensure these rights. However, the emphasis was placed on the right to self-determination as a right in itself and not as a means to the realization of other rights.

If a government is not only based on the consent of a people but also created by the people themselves, then Europe was to be reminded that the Africans did not create the colonial governments. Racism, created by the whites, clearly separated the two groups: Africans and Europeans. The rule of one over the other is alien rule and must come to an end. Africans can never be Europeans because of the colour of their skins, therefore Africa can never be part of Europe. A distinct people must rule themselves. They must be able to determine their own destiny as well as to define their own identity. This is the only way to end the discrimination and exploitation which denied Africans not only their rights but even their humanity.

34 Ibid.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Once the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the Security Council of the UNO in December 1948, Africans constantly referred to this document in their struggle for independent status. The Final Communiqué of the Conference of Independent States held at Accra in April 1958 proclaims and reaffirms unswerving loyalty to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reiterates the deeply held conviction that "racialism is a negation of the basic principles of human rights"³⁵. However, when the Conference recognizes "the right of African peoples to independence and self-determination"³⁶, it is not referring to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The United Nation's document does not include a right to self-determination. It is a declaration of "individual" rights. Individuals are considered to be "born free and equal in dignity and rights", but the acceptance of "limitations of sovereignty" found in the Declaration means the acceptance of the unequal status of certain territories. Of course, this need not or even must not excuse denials of rights to *individuals* in dependent areas. Discrimination against individuals on any basis, including the "political, jurisdictional or international status of the country to which a person belongs"³⁷ is condemned by the declaration.

However, Africans refused to accept the claim that individual rights could be observed under conditions of servitude of a people. The colonial powers did not treat Africans as individuals but as a single racial category to be dominated and exploited indiscriminately. Oppression and subjection of one race by another is clearly a denial of all human rights.

At the All African People's Conference in Accra in December 1958, the resolutions on Imperialism and Colonialism, and on Racialism are rife with references to human rights. The emphasis, in this document, is on political rights as distinct from fundamental human rights in general. Alongside a right to self-determination and independence is a right to participate in the government of your country. This last right *is* included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and is clearly violated by the colonial policy of denying universal suffrage to Africans. This denial of fundamental *political* rights to Africans gives the imperialists a free rein to continue their nefarious activities which deprive Africans of "fundamental human rights, freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of movement, freedom of

35 Legum, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-166.

36 *Ibid.*

37 *Ibid.*

worship, freedom to live a full and abundant life"³⁸.

Under such circumstances, there can be no other choice but to condemn colonialism and imperialism and to insist upon the right to self-determination for the entire continent and all colonial peoples.

On the 14th of December, 1960, the omission of a right to self-determination in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was corrected by the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. This declaration stated as its first principle: "The subjection of people to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental Human Rights"³⁹. Article two of this declaration later becomes the first article in the two International Covenants formulated in 1966 to give effect to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Both the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights begin with the words: "All peoples have a right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development"⁴⁰.

African Constitutional Rights

African and colonial peoples won their battle for the acceptance of the right to self-determination as a universal right and in the years that followed many African states gained independence as well. The stage was set for the realization of the rights of Africans free from foreign domination and the pernicious effects of racism. Most of Africa was now in control of the governmental apparatus which could deny a people civil and political freedoms.

Nearly all the constitutions of the newly independent states declared allegiance to the principles of human rights. Often these declarations of rights were found in the preamble (i.e. Tanganyika) or in some other non-enforceable form as in the President's oath of office in Ghana's republican Constitution of 1960. Nigeria, however, was the first African nation to include a bill of rights as a substantive provision in its constitution. Rather than the absolute declarations of rights found in many of the former French colonies' independence constitutions, Nigeria had a more modern "bill of exceptions", where numerous limitations on the rights guaranteed by the constitution were spelled out in detail⁴¹.

38 Ian Brownlie, ed., *Basic Documents on Human Rights*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 108.

39 Legum, op. cit., pp. 241-254.

40 Brownlie, op. cit., p. 115.

41 See B.O. Nwabueze - *Constitutionalism in the Emergent States*, (N.J.: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1973) and "Redrafting Human Rights" in *Nigeria 1965 Crisis and Criticism: Selections from Nigerian Opinion* (Ibadan University Press, 1966), pp. 52-53.

While Tafewa Balewa remarked, at the Lagos Conference on the rule of Law in 1961, that, "We felt that (human rights) was a subject of such tremendous importance that (they) should not be left hidden here and there in a legal maze and we insisted on having a special chapter of our constitution devoted to the exposition of those fundamental human rights"⁴² most sources cite the origin of Nigeria's bill of rights as the Willink Commission (commonly referred to as the Minorities Commission).

On the verge of independence based on majority rule, fears for the rights of minorities surfaced. Nigeria's bill of rights was included in its constitution and came into force prior to independence in order to be used for the elections in 1959. Africans were quick to realize that a people can be denied rights by members of their own race and not only through subjection to alien rule. The struggle for rights was still conceived of in terms of groups rather than individuals but with the imminent departure of the colonialists, the boundaries of the group to which one belonged had to be redrawn. In Nigeria, this redefinition of boundaries took the form of a request for new states within the federal structure.

In 1958, a commission of inquiry headed by Henry Willink was set up to investigate the fears of minorities and to suggest ways of allaying such fears. Representations were made to the commission requesting the formation of additional states to safeguard the liberties of minorities who feared discrimination after independence once the indigenous majorities gained control over each of the regional governments. The commission concluded that the balance between regional and federal institutions should be adequate to deal with this problem. National leaders would be forced to represent the interests of minorities in order to gain enough votes for election to federal institutions. The police would also be an arm of the federal government and this would help minimize possible infringement of minorities' rights. The commission refused to recommend the creation of new states.

Religious delegations were also given a hearing. It was these groups only that suggested the inclusion of a bill of rights to safeguard their rights to worship and to proselytize. The commission seized this opportunity to recommend the bill of rights and suggested a textual borrowing from the European Convention on Human Rights⁴³.

The example of the origin of Nigeria's Fundamental Human Rights provision in its constitution confirms the idea that Africans were still fighting for collective group rights even on the advent of colonial withdrawal. The minorities were demanding their right to self-determination, albeit on a lesser

42 Kéba Mbaye, "Human Rights in Africa" in Karel Vasak, ed., *The International Dimensions of Human Rights*. (Paris: UNESCO, 1982), p. 583.

43 Cmnd. 505 (1958).

scale than independent status at the international level. The fact is that their fears of discrimination took the expression of a request for autonomy of the group and not the protection of individual rights. Even the religious delegations were more interested in the right to establish religious institutions than in personal religious freedom.

Minority Rights

Minority rights are collective rights. They are the right to full equality with the majority and the preservation of the separate identity of the minority. They give rise to the right to establish, manage, and control charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other establishments using the language of the minority and freely exercising religious precepts of the group⁴⁴.

The right of an individual to be free from discrimination or to be treated equally is not the same as the right of a group to equal status with the dominant group. The idea of equality of the *individual* whitewashes differences. It is an equality which requires everyone to become like the dominant group by disassociating himself from the inferior minority. The individual is expected to melt into the larger whole. During the colonial period this could only be attempted but not accomplished, by the schizophrenic act described by Frantz Fanon as the wearing of white masks over black faces. This experience taught Africans to be wary of an individual freedom and equality which can only be purchased at the price of repudiation of one's past and one's culture.

To consider rights in collective terms means to fight for the continued existence of the group. The group asserts its right to remain a distinct and separate entity and to preserve its identity as such.

But the Willink Commission was convinced that to allow states to be created on the basis of ethnicity would be to perpetuate differences destined to wither away⁴⁵. This is an odd comment from a people who believe that democracy means tolerance of diversity and competition in a pluralistic society. It is also a turn about on earlier colonial policy which encouraged the development of ethnic differences and tribal institutions because they were the "natural expressions of a people's innate genius"⁴⁶. Nevertheless, the British gave Nigeria its substantive bill of rights on *an individual basis* by copying it from the European Convention on Human Rights with minute changes of wording.

Hindsight helps to deepen the impression that the Willink Commission was

44 Yoram Dinstein - "Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities" - *ICLQ* Vol. 26 (1976).

45 Cmnd. 505 (1958), p. 88.

46 Sir Hugh Clifford, quoted by V.B. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

exceedingly unresponsive to the desires of the Africans who testified before them in 1958. The difference between collective group rights and individual rights is more fundamental than any possible legal distinction between the phrases "justifiable" and "necessarily justifiable" in a democratic society⁴⁷.

Collective Rights

While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights lists nearly 30 individual rights, modern law vouchsafes *three* collective human rights to peoples. These are: the right to physical existence, to self-determination and to utilize natural resource⁴⁸.

The fight for the rights of Africans can be seen as a struggle for these three collective rights. The right to physical existence, besides being a prohibition against genocide, entails the right to a separate identity. This expresses the social and cultural aspects of the fight against racism. Racism denies black men respect and dignity by denying them a positive identity of their own making. Once slavery was abolished Africans demanded a right to practice their culture, to learn their history, a right to be black and still be considered as equal members of the human race. Then the struggle progressed to the political stage where Africans demanded not only the right to define themselves but to rule themselves as well. Eventually the colonialists were forced to concede the right to self-determination to nearly all of the African peoples. The third right (to utilize your natural resources) appears to originate from the demands of colonial peoples⁴⁹. It is an expression of the collective social and economic rights of a people which are being fought for today under the banner of the New International Economic Order.

Right to Development

When Africans demanded the right to political control over their nations, they expected to gain economic control as well. Independence had been sought as a road to the end of foreign exploitation and the beginning of national development. However, after the initial euphoria created by the winning of independence died down, it soon became apparent that civil, and political freedoms were not sufficient to bring about the desired transformation of the continent and its peoples. Economic ties still constituted a bondage to the interest of the ex-colonial powers. A right to development for the African people was seen as being sabotaged by continued economic dependence upon the international economic order which maintained low prices for raw materials and high prices for manufactured goods. Unequal exchange resulted in unequal development and the social and economic rights of Africans were still being denied even after political independence had been

47 De Smith - "Fundamental Rights in the Commonwealth" *ICLO*, 10 (1961).

48 Dinstein, *op. cit.*.

49 *Ibid.*

granted. What is needed now is a New International Economic Order to redress the imbalance caused by years of exploitation and drain on the economies of the Third World.

Through their involvement in the Non-aligned Movement, Africans took part in the formulation of the demand for a New International Economic Order. Protests against the stark inequalities that exist between rich and poor nations began at Bandung and crystallized at the 1973 Algiers summit of the Non-aligned Heads of State and Governments where a specific call was voiced for a New International Economic Order with concrete suggestions regarding implementation.

Africans recognized the connection between the need for a change in the world economic system and the possibility of the realization of fundamental human rights for people of the Third World. At the Butare Colloquium on Human Rights and Economic Development in Francophone Africa held in Rwanda in July 1978, Africans made an explicit call for a New International Economic Order, which would mean a more equitable distribution of the world's economic power, as an essential precondition for economic development and the guarantee of human rights. The Colloquium asserted that fundamental human rights include social and economic rights and these cannot be realized without a prior right to development for people in the Third World. Therefore, a right to development must be held to be a fundamental human right in itself⁵⁰.

Given the conditions in the Third World, to deny a collective right to development of a nation based on the unhampered utilization of its natural resources would be to deny individuals' social and economic rights. The realization of social and economic rights of Africans necessitates not only the recognition of a right to development but the realization of the fact of development and this cannot be accomplished without the emergence of a New International Economic Order.

African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights

The battle for the rights of Africans is still being fought. Elements of the early stages of the struggle are still apparent in more recent documents. The African Charters on Human and Peoples' Rights adopted by the OAU Council of Ministers and Assembly of Heads of States and Governments in Nairobi in June 1981 contains elements from the stages of the struggle for the collective rights of Africans. The title alone demonstrates the emphasis not on individuals but groups or peoples. The desire to maintain a separate cultural identity and to fight against racist ideas of the inferiority of the

50 Mbaye, *op. cit.*

African are to be found in statements made in the preamble referring to the need for Africans to "inspire and characterize their reflections on the concept of human and peoples' rights" by "taking into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition and the values of African civilization"⁵¹.

Article 1 of the Charter merely calls members to recognize and undertake to adopt legislation which will guarantee the following list of rights. Articles 2 and 3, which we can assume are of primary interest since they are the first rights listed, are the right to freedom from discrimination in terms of rights and before the law. The emphasis is still on the elimination of racial inferiority as a precondition to the realization of rights. This point appears to be so important that it necessitates repetition in the Charter. Article 19 states "all peoples shall be equal".

Article 20 is "the right to freedom from colonial domination"⁵². While this article also repeats the formula used in the two UNO Covenants of 1966 for the right to self-determination, two adjectives, "unquestionable" and "inalienable", have been added as a means to give additional emphasis to this declaration of freedom from alien rule.

Earlier OAU documents give an even clearer indication of the supreme importance of this right to the Organization and to the African peoples. Birame Ndiaye argues that in the founding Charter of the OAU there is a dichotomy between the right of peoples to self-determination and all other human rights⁵³. The right to self-determination is not primarily an instrumental right, a prerequisite for the protection of human rights. Rather, it is the only right that is assigned importance by the founding charter. Human rights in this document are merely listed under the heading of purposes and member states are under no obligation to implement them. However, member states are obliged to respect the right of a people to self-determination, by recognizing sovereignty and independence of all member states.

The omission of a commission on human rights from the list of five specialized commissions set up by the original charter is rectified by the 1981 Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights but this does not upset the balance in favour of collective political freedom or self-determination over all other human rights.

The 1981 Charter lists social and economic rights alongside civil and political liberties as is found in the United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights but is seldom found in constitutional declarations of rights, including

51 *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights*, ICJ *The Review*, Dec. 1981.

52 *Ibid.*

53 Birame Ndiaye - "The Place of Human Rights in the Charter of the OAU", *Vasak*, op. cit., p. 602.

those in African constitutions. The preamble to the 1981 Charter asserts that economic, social and cultural rights cannot be disassociated from and are a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights. This emphasis on economic and social foundations leads to a conviction that it is "essential to pay particular attention to the collective rights of development"⁵⁴. Article 21 states that peoples freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources and asserts that states must endeavour to eliminate all forms of foreign economic exploitation. Article 22 specifically and unequivocally claims a right to development.

Collective Rights versus Individual Rights

While individual rights and collective rights are found side by side in the 1981 Charter of the OAU, this fact does not detract from the importance of collective rights in African political thought. Proponents of collective rights often include individual rights in their understanding of freedoms. Usually, it is the western advocates of individual rights who exclude collective rights and often social and economic rights as well, from their conception of rights. They claim that rights can only be individual in nature. What is important is that Africans do not accept this exclusive view of rights as pertaining to individuals alone. Instead, they predominantly see rights in terms of the rights of collectivities.

This is actually a more realistic appraisal of the idea of rights. Individuals exist not in abstract but as members of particular groups. One cannot meaningfully discuss an individual outside the context of the group to which he or she belongs. Individual rights are always accorded to individuals belonging to particular groups. The origin of western individual rights can be traced to the theory of natural rights which spoke of rights which were supposedly innate and universal but were applicable only to men of property⁵⁵; Constitutional rights in the US were originally the "rights of gentlemen"⁵⁶ and not of all Americans or mankind generally. The European Convention on Human Rights was called "a declaration of the rights of the European man" by Leopold Senghor because it specifically excluded the non-metropolitan territories from its field of operation⁵⁷. Struggles had to be waged throughout history to expand the boundaries of those considered eligible to demand rights.

Rights are more of an honour to be earned or a status to be achieved than an innate characteristic present at birth. The prize is admittance into the

54 1981 Charter, *op. cit.*

55 J.M. Hendrickson, "Human Rights: Fundamentally for Whom? *Nigerian Journal of Political Science* Vol. IV Nos 1&2, pp. 134-147.

56 Henkin, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

57 Mbaye, *op. cit.*

group of rights-holders and the conferring of the title of individual to those who merit it. But to speak of a universal individual is to expand the boundaries of the once exclusive group to include all of mankind. If this is done without redefining the perimeters of the group, so that others are actually included, it is merely an exercise in intellectual arrogance or cultural imperialism.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights claims to be the highest aspiration of mankind. However, if mankind is understood as male, white, western and of a certain class, the inclusion of individuals who fall outside this category is problematic. Unless a redefinition takes place, a woman, a colored person or a poor person can only gain entrance to the exclusive club of mankind by ceasing to be what he or she is. While it is possible to change one's religion, political beliefs or nationality, the issues of race and sex are immutable.

The problem is not the failure of those who already enjoy rights to live up to the ideal of treating everyone as an individual disregarding the alien shell and concentrating on the inner similarities. This type of criticism can easily be dismissed by arguing that ideals are unattainable aspirations and rights holders are only human. The end result of this line of attack is the continuation of the *status quo*. The real problem is that particular groups are not accepted for what they are or recognized as containing individuals within the separate and distinct group. Therefore, the only way to effectively fight for inclusion in the category of rights-holders is to fight for the rights of a group. Peace and harmony both within and between nations depend not on equal individual rights but on equal collective rights. If Africans were ever to have right, in any meaningful sense of the term, it was and is imperative to fight first against slavery and racism, to fight for self-determination and for a New International Economic Order.

Rights of Africans

The fight against racism and particularly the apartheid regime in South Africa continues to be part of the struggle for the recognition of the human rights of Africans. One wonders how the extension of rights to people of colour can be questioned by societies which are now considering the possibility of extending rights to animals and fetuses.

It is also surprising to read Louis Henkin's argument that Americans did not use and abuse human rights to justify a prior right to self-determination as Africans did. Rather, framers of the US Constitution were expressing what was real or "in the air" at the time of the American Revolution when they set out a bill of rights⁵⁸. This argument uses the erroneous idea that

58 Henkin, *op. cit.*

individual rights are morally superior to collective rights in order to promote the position that "Universal" rights are only found in the air one breathes in America, and not in Africa.

The tendency to look skyward and the failure to look at the ground could also explain why Americans generally fail to see social and economic rights. Individual rights exist as castles in the air and the social and economic foundation necessary for the full enjoyment of such rights for all is neglected. Certain social and economic changes must take place before individual human rights can be applied to everyone and will cease to be a category which always excludes some groups, i.e. blacks, women and the poor. Africans are more aware of the conditions necessary for the realization of rights and know from experience that poverty as well as racism is a negation of all human rights. According to Julius Nyerere, poverty must be abolished before the peasants' *right* to dignity becomes a *fact* of human dignity⁵⁹.

But even those theorists in the West who recognize social and economic rights are reluctant to apply the idea on an international scale. D.D. Raphael argues that social and economic rights, while worthy of the label rights, can be distinguished from earlier ideas of liberties because they can only be demanded from your own nation. They are the rights of a citizen rather than the rights of man⁶⁰. Apparently to see social and economic rights in collective terms as a demand for redistribution of wealth through a New International Economic Order, one needs to be a member of a nation which cannot, at present, satisfy the social and economic needs of all of its peoples, whether it is their right or not.

Conclusion

The idea of rights found in the declarations and writings of African peoples is fundamentally expressed in collective terms. However, the difficulties experienced by Africans in realizing individual rights within the framework of the independent nation states of Africa should not be attributed to the theoretical predominance of collective rights over individual rights. To assume that the emphasis on collective rights causes the denial of individual freedoms is to accept an irreconcilable contradiction between collective rights and individual rights. This approach is consistent with the Western idea of individual rights which sets the individual above the society and against the state in an adversary relationship. Africans are less likely to view an individual in such an isolated manner. The OAU Charter on Human and Peoples Rights contains a separate listing of duties which are more than the observance of the rights of others. Africans have an obligation to the group, the community and the nation which is different from an obligation to other

59 Quoted in ICJ *Human Rights in a One Party State*, (London Search Press, 1978), p. 23.
60 D.D. Raphael, *op. cit.* p. 6.

individuals within the nation. Westerners would do well to aspire to an idea of rights which eliminates the stark dichotomy or at least minimizes the antagonism between the individual and the larger group.

Surely, violations of individual rights to freedom in Africa cannot be explained by the so-called alien nature of the idea of rights of the individual, because an idea or lack of it cannot be the *cause* of a phenomenon. Ideas are reflections of experience and the emphasis on collective rights can be understood as a reaction to slavery, racism, colonialism and underdevelopment. Rather, gross violations of individual rights must be blamed on the unjust structures existing both within a society and at the international level and not on the legitimate values and aspirations of the peoples of Africa and the Third World.

Les Limites sectorielles de l'Expérience togolaise de vingt ans de "Planification": l'Agriculture (1966-1985)

Ewihn-Liba Pana*

SUMMARY. In Togo, planning of national development on a long term basis spans over a period of 20 years ending in 1985 when faced with economic crisis, the country adopted a structural adjustment programme. A retrospective assessment of planification of the agriculture sector, the sector which was considered "the priority of priorities" by successive plans since independence tends to indicate a big gap between policy proclamations, investments and the outcome. The slow progress of agriculture and even the drastic regression can be explained by the marginalisation of the peasantry. In the 1970's the Agricultural sector witnessed profound changes such as limits in access to land by the peasantry following rapid population growth and those that resulted from types of development strategies adopted which conceived agriculture as a source of foreign exchange and not a sector meant to feed the nation. With the exception of the consumption by industrial enclaves and urban centers, all production destined to the local market and to meet the local needs was considered a waste. Commercial crops were privileged and benefitted from most of the foreign investment in the sector. Contrary to proclamations of achieving food self-sufficiency by 1980, the food sub-sector has undergone a decline. A thorough assessment of these trends is rendered difficult by the lack of reliable quantitative data on Togolese agriculture. Besides production of provisional statistics in the cosy atmosphere of ministerial offices neglects the human factor in rural development. Without the know-how and the consent of the peasantry, nothing can be achieved in the rural areas.

On ne peut pas planifier un développement qui dépend intégralement des conditions de la demande extérieure et du capital étranger. On peut certes tenter de mettre un ordre dans les investissements publics qui accompagnent cette mise en valeur extravertie dont on n'est pas maître, mais on n'a pas le droit d'appeler cela planification, et encore moins politique de développement.

Samir Amin¹.

Introduction: Quelques remarques théoriques

Avant d'aborder le problème que je pose, il me faut rappeler que dans l'histoire et dans la théorie économique, le terme "Planification" est consubstantielle à l'économie socialiste planifiée par opposition à l'économie de

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1 Samir Amin, "L'Afrique de l'Ouest bloquée: L'Economie Politique de la Décolonisation 1880-1970", Paris, Edition de Minuit, 1978, 304.

marché.

En dépit des attributs introduits par la suite pour marquer la différence entre les deux formes d'intervention en économie - on parlera désormais de planification "dirigiste" dans le contexte socialiste et de planification "indicative" ou "incitative" ou "souple" dans le cadre de l'économie de marché - la confusion demeure et:

*"Vient du fait que le terme de planification a été employé par certains pour désigner à la fois la planification proprement dite, c'est-à-dire la **planification socialiste**, et les **techniques d'élaboration de programmes économiques**, qui viennent se surajouter à une économie capitaliste sans être capables de modifier les lois fondamentales de cette économie...².(souligné par nous).*

Le plan adopté par les hauts responsables de l'Economie togolaise depuis 1966 est "d'inspiration libérale" aussi bien dans sa conception que dans sa pratique³. Il constitue, comme tel, un instrument de travail. Elaboré pour cinq ans (plan quinquennal), il consiste à déterminer des objectifs précis et à mettre en oeuvre les moyens propres à les atteindre dans les délais prévus. Par exemple, le troisième plan quinquennal (1976-1980), qui précède la crise économique des années 80, prévoyait un taux de croissance annuel moyen de 12% en termes réels. Pour atteindre un tel objectif, l'effort global prévu au niveau de l'Etat s'élevait à 250,6 milliards de FCFA⁴. Ce plan de développement était en cours d'achèvement (puisque après trois années de réalisation, le plan a donné lieu à la mise en oeuvre de plus de 191 milliards d'investissement 1976/1978 quand survinrent malheureusement des chocs à la fois d'origine interne qu'externe et un contexte dit d'ajustement structurel.

Les différents plans conçus depuis 1966 devaient "amener le Togo au seuil du décollage économique à l'horizon 1985" avec, parmi les quatre orientations retenues, la possibilité (je cite) "d'accroître la capacité productive de tous les facteurs de production et de leurs moyens pour une autosuffisance alimentaire"⁵.

La programmation du développement national sur le long terme couvre une période de vingt ans, de 1966 à 1985. L'année 1985 constitue une année charnière puisque, sur fond de crise économique, le Togo, confronté à des difficultés financières dès 1981, sera contraint de mettre en place un programme d'ajustement structurel visant à redéfinir les orientations de déve-

2 Charles Bettelheim: *Planification et croissance accélérée*. FM/PCM, Paris, 1975, p. 7.

3 Ministère du Plan et de l'Industrie *20 ans de Planification pour le Développement du Togo*, p. 2.

4 1 F. CFA = 2 centimes français.

5 Revue "Europe Outre-Mer", No 502. Paris p. 34.

loppement économique. Elle marque ainsi une étape importante d'où l'on doit jeter un regard en arrière pour faire un bilan et l'apprécier. Nous le ferons, dans le cadre de cette étude, essentiellement pour le secteur agricole dont la priorité dans le développement du pays a été sans cesse affirmée. L'étude portera successivement sur: les fondements historiques de la politique agricole à travers les différents plans (I), les structures institutionnelles et organisationnelles de développement agricole (II), le financement de l'agriculture (III) et enfin le bilan critique des résultats obtenus (IV).

Les Fondements historiques

A la décolonisation en 1960, le Togo hérite d'un secteur agricole qui est à l'image de l'économie territoriale de l'époque. Celle-ci reste fondamentalement une économie de traite caractérisée par l'introduction de cultures commerciales en tête de rotation à la place des productions vivrières. Certaines d'entre elles, le coton par exemple, ont de plus concurrencé directement les productions vivrières. La culture du coton s'inscrivant aux mêmes dates que le sorgho, le mil et le maïs dans le calendrier agricole, le paysan a souvent dû à contrecœur donner la priorité aux semis et aux désherbages du champ de coton, en négligeant, sous la pression constante de l'Administration coloniale, ses champs de cultures vivrières.

Pour une large part, l'agriculture est constituée de petites exploitations familiales gérées d'une manière extensive, utilisant une main-d'oeuvre familiale et dont la production est destinée à la subsistance. L'indépendance n'a pas arrangé les choses: le coton, le café et le cacao, toutes cultures "coloniale"s sont devenues cultures "nationales" pour les différents gouvernements qui se sont succédés et qui s'employaient à reconduire l'économie héritée d'un passé récent.

Ce qui est recherché avant tout au travers des politiques économiques c'est la croissance du produit national brut (PNB) par le biais de l'**industrialisation** et de l'**intensification** de l'agriculture ainsi que sa **modernisation** au moyen de stratégies du type **Révolution verte**. Dans les pays sous-développés et d'Afrique, les "locomotives du développement" sont en villes et dans les campagnes, les couches sociales chez qui, on peut sans difficulté, susciter l'esprit d'entreprise ou développer la **rationalité capitaliste**.

Au lendemain des indépendances formelles des pays d'Afrique Noire en 1960 pour la plupart d'entre eux, ce sont, parmi les intellectuels africains, les "cosmopolites - scientifiques - modernisants" qui investissent, à des titres divers et partout les appareils d'Etat en constitution, par delà l'opposition entre partisans et non partisans de l'indépendance. Ils rejetaient du coup les thèses antéennes sur la nécessité et l'urgence pour les "africains de se pencher sur leur propre histoire et leur civilisation et étudient celles-ci pour

mieux se connaître⁶.

Depuis, quelque soit leur niveau de responsabilité, les acteurs en pays sous-développés et au Togo sont devenus "modernistes" avant la lettre. Voilà à quel niveau se situent les racines du mal.

S'agissant de l'agriculture togolaise, le modèle hérité de l'époque coloniale ne sera pas remis en cause; Il sera au contraire préservé voir renforcé au travers des mécanismes de domination politique et économique mis en place depuis l'époque coloniale. Il n'est dès lors pas surprenant que nos planificateurs, consciemment ou non, militent pour la promotion au Togo de grandes exploitations "modernes" partant du principe que le secteur dit traditionnel est incapable d'augmenter sa productivité dans un délai acceptable: sans pour autant définir de façon systématique au niveau national, encore moins au niveau sectoriel une politique économique. Il serait même à l'origine de tous les problèmes que rencontre l'agriculture dans son ensemble. Comme nous le verrons plus loin, c'est la marginalisation du secteur traditionnel qui explique au contraire la lente progression de la production agricole, voire sa forte regression après vingt ans de planification.

Le fondement de l'orientation de la politique de développement agricole au Togo s'explique ainsi par les quelques éléments non exhaustifs que nous venons de présenter à grands traits. Ils vont déterminer par la suite tous les ressorts de cette politique. C'est le cas des structures institutionnelles et organisationnelles.

Les Structures institutionnelles et organisationnelles

Pour promouvoir le secteur agricole, l'Etat a créé des structures d'ordre institutionnel, administrative et technique dans le cadre des plans successifs pour lui servir d'appui technique et de logistique. Dans le même temps différentes campagnes agricoles sont entreprises ainsi que des manifestations périodiques destinées à mobiliser l'opinion publique en faveur de la production agricole et de son accroissement. Il en est ainsi de l'année 1975, proclamée "année paysanne" ou encore des foires agricoles périodiques nationales ou régionales avec des prix de récompense. Mais beaucoup plus significative est la pléthore de structures institutionnelles et organisationnelles. On distingue classiquement cinq types de structures: étatiques, para-étatiques, mixtes, des projets de développement, des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG). Toutefois ce sont surtout les structures étatiques et paraétatiques qui ont eu des conséquences néfastes sur le secteur rural du point de vue de la baisse de la production. Elles forment à elles seules l'armature de tout l'édifice.

6 Michel Ndoh - in, Revue *Nomade*: Le nègre, la civilisation, le combat de Cheikh Anta Diop, No spécial. Paris 1989, pp. 140-153.

Elles se composent de l'ensemble des directions et services techniques (une quinzaine) des Ministères du Développement et de l'Aménagement Rural (nés de l'éclatement en 1975 du Ministère de l'Economie Rurale), le premier plus particulièrement chargé de la production et le second de la mise en place des infrastructures. Elles emploient en 1981 quelques 3800 personnes des 8200 salariés de l'ensemble des institutions étatiques toutes à des titres divers au service du développement rural, allant du cadre de bureau jusqu'à l'*encadreur* agricole. Ce dernier, de formation élémentaire et médiocre, est le maillon de la chaîne le plus en contact avec le paysan.

Des organismes et des offices vont être créés dans le cadre de ces structures pour prendre en charge l'organisation et la gestion du secteur rural. A la tête des cinq régions économiques nouvellement créées se trouvent placées en 1978 les Directions Régionales de l'Animation Rurale et de l'Action Coopérative (DRARAC) en remplacement des anciennes structures régionales d'encadrement et de vulgarisation de l'agriculture: les Sociétés Régionales d'Aménagement et de développement (SORAD) nées en 1965⁷. Les dernières structures en date (1980) et encore en vigueur sont les Directions Régionales du Développement Rural (DRDR) nouvelle appellation des "Organismes Régionaux de Promotion et de Production des Cultures Vivrières (ORPV) mises en place en octobre 1977. Il importe de noter que si ces organismes changent dans le temps du point de vue forme, le contenu, lui, ne se modifie guère: ni le personnel d'encadrement, ni les méthodes d'intervention en milieu rural ne changent. Tous ces organismes constituent, aux mains de l'Etat, un instrument de quadrillage de l'espace géographique à l'échelle de la Région Economique. Celle-ci est découpée selon un schéma pyramidal en secteurs, sous-secteurs, zones, la zone étant ici considérée comme l'unité de base à partir de laquelle opère le personnage clé de la structure: l'encadreur.

A côté des structures étatiques existent les structures para-étatiques composées d'un ensemble de sociétés "verticales" appartenant à l'Etat et dont le rôle spécifique est de favoriser la promotion d'une culture précise ou d'un ensemble de cultures de même type. La plupart de ces sociétés ont vu le jour entre 1968 et 1974. C'est le cas de la Société Nationale pour le Développement de la Palmeraie et des Huileries (SONAPH), de la Société Nationale pour la Renovation et le Développement de la Cacaoyère et de la Cafetière Togolaise (SRCC), de la Société Nationale pour le Développement de la

7 Jusqu'en 1965, les structures de bases dans le domaine du développement rural sont constituées par les *Sociétés Publiques d'Action Rurale* (SPAR); elles remplaçaient ainsi les *Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance* (SIP) de l'époque coloniale, l'échelle d'intervention des unes et des autres étant alors le cercle.

Culture Fruitière (Togo Fruit)⁸, de l'Office National de Développement et d'Exploitation des Forêts (ODEF), de la Société Togolaise du Coton (SO-TOCO) pour ne citer que quelques exemples significatifs.

Ces sociétés, pour leurs activités, bénéficieront largement d'un financement extérieur (BM., FED, FAC, CCCE)⁹. En 1981, le personnel permanent de ces sociétés se chiffrait à plus de 2000 salariés.

Pour terminer ce dénombrement rapide des structures participant à une stratégie de développement rural, il nous reste à mentionner spécialement la Réforme Agro-Foncière promulguée par l'ordonnance du 6 février 1974¹⁰ et qui a débouché sur la création de la Direction Technique de la Législation Agro-Foncière entre 1976 et 1978 au sein de l'ancien Ministère de l'Economie Rurale. Cette réforme dont il est trop tôt pour apprécier les effets sur le terrain pourrait bouleverser dans un sens ou dans un autre le rapport entre la terre et les paysans: le revenu du travail pourrait en être profondément modifié. Un certain nombre de choses doivent être précisées à propos d'une telle réforme au moment où il a été décidé de la suspendre. Nous savons maintenant que sa suspension est consécutive à son échec qui était prévisible. Quelles sont les causes lointaines de son échec?

Les années 1970 sont une période de remise en cause profonde des rapports fonciers. De nombreuses motivations y concourent; entre autres: "l'explosion" démographique qui devient une contrainte à l'accès des paysans au sol. Mais dans le cas d'une économie sous-développée et extravertie comme c'est l'exemple du Togo, la motivation essentielle imposée de l'extérieur, qui se traduit dans la nature des rapports des forces entre nations, est conforme dans sa définition à la domination qui s'exerce sur la nation faible. Tout se passe comme si l'agriculture des pays sous-développés ne devrait pas servir à nourrir leurs populations mais à procurer des devises. A l'exception de la consommation des poches industrielles ou des agglomérations urbaines où afflue la plus grande partie des biens disponibles, tout ce qui reste destiné au marché intérieur, à satisfaire les besoins locaux, est considéré comme une perte.

A ce titre, le professeur Berthelot¹¹ nous éclaire sur les raisons de l'échec, qui était prévisible, de la législation agro-foncière togolaise.. Rappelons (et

8 L'une des 6 sociétés d'Etat dissoutes par décision du Conseil National du Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT) des 3 et 4 Décembre 1982, pour cause de non rentabilité.

9 Banque Mondiale (BM), Fonds Européen au Développement (FED), Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération (FAC), Caisse Centrale et Coopération Economique (CCCE).

10 On trouvera les grandes lignes de la Réforme dans la Revue *Europe Outre-Mer* du mois de juillet 1979, pp. 37-38.

11 Jacques Berthelot - "Au Togo, une soit-disant réforme agraire veut dépouiller les paysans" in, *les Sillons de la Faim*. L'harmattan, Paris 1980.

c'est là un des mérites d'un spécialiste lucide) que la suite lui a donné raison (voir infra).

Nous savons que c'est à un expert de la FAO qu'est revenu l'élaboration de cette législation. Elle s'inscrivait alors dans le cadre de la mise en oeuvre du deuxième plan juste un an avant le lancement de "la Révolution Verte".

Lorsqu'on connaît *l'identité*, la *structure* et les fonctions de la FAO - cette institution fait partie des instruments onusiens du "pouvoir multilatéral" - lorsqu'on admet que ses formes d'intervention l'amènent, tout comme les autres organismes spécialisés de l'ONU, à atteindre des objectifs plus fonctionnels que politiques (mais toujours dans le sens des intérêts qu'elle défend qui sont ceux du grand capital international) et ceci du haut du Ministère des colonies construit par Mussolini qu'elle occupe (tout un symbole mais aussi tout un programme), on comprend alors pourquoi la législation ne pouvait pas correspondre aux intérêts du monde paysan rural togolais¹².

Les raisons avancées pour justifier la suspension sont quelque peu ubuesques dans le style.

D'abord à propos de la copie d'examen de l'expert de la FAO en matière de la législation foncière. L'étude a été menée avec, semble-t-il, beaucoup de légèreté pour qu'il soit redevenu nécessaire "de lancer une étude exhaustive sur ces problèmes fonciers en zones de cultures pérennes"¹³. Auparavant, le Ministre du Développement Rural aura fait un constat assez sévère à propos de la législation élaborée par l'expert: "*Malheureusement*" (dit le Ministre) *l'application de décrets ou textes réglementaires déjà parus est gênée par la méconnaissance des conditions dans lesquelles s'effectuent. en milieu rural l'accession à la propriété et la transmission tant des droits de propriété que de ceux d'exploitation dans les cas nombreux de ferme et métayage*¹⁴ (souligné par nous).

On peut donc conclure que cette législation n'a été que le fruit de l'imagination de son auteur dès lors qu'elle n'est pas fondée sur une "bonne

12 Jacques Berthelot résume pour nous les objectifs visés par la FAO tout comme la plupart des organismes internationaux ayant rapport avec le monde rural: "intégrer au marché international les paysans, en utilisant au besoin pour cela l'aide des pays mandataires" (nous soulignons) in, *Les Sillons de la Faim*, Ibidem La Banque Mondiale, elle ne fait pas de nuance: "Le développement rural, c'est la modernisation de la Société Rurale, avec l'introduction des pratiques monétaires et son passage de l'isolement traditionnel à l'intégration à l'économie nationale (...) La Banque continuera à soutenir les projets en tant qu'instruments pouvant faire passer les agriculteurs de l'agriculture de subsistance à l'agriculture commerciale" (souligné par nous) in, Banque Mondiale, *"Rural Development: Sector Policy Paper and Agricultural Credit: Sector Policy Paper 1975*.

13 Koffi Walla - Intervention du Ministre du Développement Rural à la Conférence des Bailleurs de Fonds. Réunion sectorielle sur le Développement Rural. Kara. 24-25-26 mars 1986.

14 Koffi Walla - Ministre du Développement Rural, idem.

connaissance du terrain". Et nous voilà ainsi revenus à la case départ puisque, après y avoir consacré des sommes importantes d'argent, il faut tout recommencer.

Nous pensons que s'il est légitime, face aux performances très limitées du secteur agricole, de penser et de rechercher un nouveau statut du rapport du paysan et du sol, celui-ci devra consister à définir un compromis juridique entre une notion de possession du sol qui relève, à l'origine, du seul droit coutumier et une notion d'accès à la propriété civile individuelle ou collective, qui résulte de la vocation nationale du pays en tant que nation indépendante.

Ainsi se présentent les principales structures qui ont servi de base d'appui au déploiement de la nouvelle stratégie agricole pendant la durée de vingt ans de planification. Leur mise en oeuvre est justifiée, dans le discours politique, par la nécessité d'assurer à tous la sécurité alimentaire.

Avant d'analyser les résultats de production atteints au regard de l'ensemble du dispositif déployé pour l'accroissement de la production en vue de l'autosuffisance alimentaire, il nous reste à examiner les problèmes du financement hautement importants pour une politique agricole qui se cherche.

Le financement de l'agriculture

Les plans économiques, les projets de développement agricole nécessitent toujours des flux importants de capitaux c'est-à-dire des opérations d'investissement en fonction des objectifs fixés.

Pourtant, au niveau des différents plans qui se sont succédés, on peut constater que la volonté affirmée de faire du secteur rural la "priorité des priorités" n'a pas été suivie d'effet du point de vue de l'effort de financement. En effet, la part des investissements consacrés au développement rural, dans le total des investissements réalisés se monte respectivement à 13,6% pour la période couverte par le premier plan, 14,4% pour celle couverte par le deuxième plan, 11,9% pour celle couverte par le troisième plan¹⁵; la différence étant allée aux autres secteurs.

Il faut attendre le quatrième plan pour que la part affectée au secteur agricole au titre du programme prioritaire minimal s'élève à 26,5% comme le montre le tableau en annexe. Mais le doute subsiste puisque pour la période des trois premiers plans, l'effort d'investissement est, grosso modo, trois fois inférieur à celui consenti au titre du développement industriel soit 41.563.465 de F CFA pour le développement rural, contre 128.271.942 pour le développement industriel pour être précis. Si on considère les quatre plans quinquennaux, la répartition des crédits effectivement dégagés et dépensés laisse mieux apparaître les limites de cet effort financier en direction du

15 Ministère du Plan et de l'Industrie, op. cit..

secteur agricole. Sur la masse globale de 326 milliards, 12,75% seulement sont allés à ce secteur, soit 2,5 fois moins que la somme des ressources affectées aux infrastructures pour le soutien du secteur industriel et des services et autres équipements (32%), et finalement 3 fois moins que ce qui est investi dans le secteur industriel.

En considérant le secteur rural en particulier, il est frappant de constater là aussi que le développement des cultures commerciales est privilégié; ces dernières occupent les terres les plus fertiles et l'utilisation des moyens modernes y est largement répandue, l'emploi des engrais chimiques courant, la mécanisation et la modernisation encouragées. L'Etat a fait bénéficier ce sous-secteur de la plus grande partie des investissements réservés à l'agriculture dans les différents plans; Certains programmes réalisés à travers des fermes pilotes à Avétonou par exemple et dans la Région des Plateaux (en passe de devenir le poumon économique du pays) sont une source d'enrichissement pour une certaine catégorie sociale qui accapare aux paysans les terres les plus fertiles au nom du "retour à la terre" lancé par le Parti. Ce qui n'a pas manqué d'inquiéter le premier Magistrat du pays¹⁶.

Les investissements réalisés ont, largement, porté sur le matériel dans la perspective d'une mutation technique de même que sur la rénovation des plantations de cultures commerciales, la construction d'infrastructures rurales etc. L'objectif général recherché à terme par l'investissement dans ces rubriques étant l'augmentation des moyens de production. L'agrandissement du parc matériel permettrait par exemple une grande capacité de travail. Au début de l'année 1977, le Togo disposait d'un parc matériel de 435 tracteurs acquis, si l'on prend en compte leur équipement (accessoires composés de véhicules lourds), à plus de 4 milliards de F CFA. Pour mémoire il faut rappeler que ces tracteurs, fournis par l'Espagne, n'ont jamais pu servir à cause du coût relativement élevé des équipements accessoires. Parallèlement, le Plan 1976-1980 s'était fixé pour objectif de cultiver, en 1985, 435.000 hectares au sein du sous-secteur "moderne", et notamment de "complexes agro-industriels", soit une superficie supérieure aux 402.000 hectares des exploitations paysannes, ce qui en soit paraît irréaliste.

Sur ce point, le gigantisme projeté est en contradiction avec les remises en cause, au plan international, du principe des grandes superficies dont les

16 L'attention toute particulière accordée au développement des cultures d'exportation a comme conséquence une marginalisation de l'agriculture paysanne qui supporte le poids d'une urbanisation croissante liée à l'émergence d'une "classe de citoyens privilégiés... qui se servent de leur titre ou de leur uniforme pour s'enrichir aux dépens de la masse paysanne" (souligné par nous). Discours du Chef de l'Etat, le Général Gnassingbé Eyadéma, le 6 Novembre 1978, au Conseil National du Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (Parti Unique).

avantages ont été débattus et critiqués¹⁷. L'expérience montre en revanche que un tel projet débouche nécessairement sur le phénomène bien connu de marginalisation des masses paysannes.

Pour en assurer le financement, l'Etat s'est vu obligé de s'adresser ou de s'associer aux capitaux étrangers. Les cultures commerciales bénéficieront aussi de la plus grande partie des investissements étrangers. Le bilan du premier Plan montre que 85,2% du financement total du secteur agricole est d'origine externe. Le fonds Européen de Développement (FED) et le Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération (FAC) participent ensemble pour 74,45% soit près des 3/4 du financement total. La RFA (République Fédérale d'Allemagne) contribue pour 18,6% et enfin le Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement (PNUD). Face à cet apport externe, l'apport du Togo dans le même secteur s'est limité à 8,14%. Les deuxième et troisième Plans n'apportent aucune modification dans les sources de financement. On peut conclure du poids important de l'extérieur dans le financement en agriculture et dans l'orientation de cette dernière.

En revanche le soutien de l'Etat aux petites exploitations familiales qui produisent l'essentiel des cultures vivrières dans le cadre d'une agriculture qui en est encore à la phase de production de subsistance est limité dans le temps et l'espace et ne concernera que "10 à 12 % de la masse paysanne". L'examen attentif du troisième plan ne laisse aucun doute là-dessus.

A ce niveau de nos développements, il ressort que l'agriculture togolaise présente les deux caractéristiques d'une agriculture de pays à économie extravertie:

- la production vivrière n'a pas connu d'augmentation permettant de mettre l'économie à l'abri de crises alimentaires. Elle est sacrifiée au profit de:
- l'essor très net des cultures commerciales grâce à d'importants investissements étrangers. Mais la production des cultures commerciales a augmenté tout en demeurant basse. Ces deux points seront développés dans la quatrième et dernière partie suivante.

Bilan critique des résultats en agriculture après 20 ans de Planification

*Il est essentiel que, dans un avenir proche, tous les togolais mangent à leur faim... Nous voulons entendre par là que dans cinq ans, tous les togolais puissent disposer, en quantité et en qualité, des biens alimentaires produits par eux-mêmes et pour eux-mêmes*¹⁸.

17 Cette critique a été établie sur la base des expériences des pays de l'Est. Voir, à ce sujet, Pouliquen, dans *le Monde* des 9, 10 et 11 avril 1981, dans l'article "les agriculteurs des pays de l'Est à la recherche d'un nouveau modèle".

18 *Togo Dialogue*, Mars 1980.

Dans le secteur de la *production vivrière* les autorités togolaises, mêmes si elles restent assez prudentes dans leur présentation du bilan, affirment avoir atteint dans ce domaine l'objectif de l'autosuffisance alimentaire en 1980¹⁹. Encore que dans ce domaine il convient d'être prudent pour plusieurs raisons:

les aliments disponibles pour l'alimentation humaine constitue un régime moyen représentatif du pays pour la période considérée, mais qui n'est en réalité consommé par personne. En effet, le bilan ne fournit aucune indication sur les différences qui peuvent exister entre les régimes alimentaires des différents groupes socio-économiques de la population, des divers secteurs géographiques du pays considéré. En outre, le travail sur lequel ils sont fondés n'est pas exempt de faiblesses, car les données recueillies valent ce que valent les statistiques des services techniques qui les fournissent. Ces statistiques sont une source d'information pour avoir un aperçu approximatif de la situation globale de l'alimentation comparée à la croissance démographique et au développement économique du pays considéré.

Cette réserve faite, la production agricole du sous secteur du vivrier a, bien au contraire, enregistré globalement un échec au cours de la période comme le souligne ce tableau dressé à partir des estimations officielles.

Le taux d'accroissement de la population à l'aube de la décennie 1980 était estimé à 2,6% par an:

Produit	Production estimée 1970	Production estimée 1975	Objectif 80	Accroissement annuel 1975-1980
Maïs grain	80.000 t	120.000 t	160.000 t	5,9%
Mil, Sorgho	96.000 t	110.000 t	129.000 t	3,3%
Riz paddy	18.000 t	16.000 t	47.000 t	25,5%
Manioc	585.000 t	400.000 t	448.000 t	2,3%
Igname	585.000 t	398.000 t	440.000 t	2,0%

Si nous considérons que la population augmente avec un indice démographique d'environ 2,6%, nous pouvons conclure que le sous-secteur du vivrier n'a pas donné les résultats escomptés. Il aurait fallu alors pratiquement doubler la surface des terres cultivées de 79/80-85 pour que le sous-secteur atteigne une production satisfaisante.

19 Koudjolou Dogo, Ministre du Plan affirmait que dans notre région, "le Togo, malgré les mauvaises conditions climatiques passées et actuelles est l'un des pays qui s'autosuffit sur le plan alimentaire et même arrive à exporter". (souligné par nous). in *Togo - Dialogue* N 73 décembre 82/janvier 1983.

Cette stagnation de la production a freiné la programmation de la promotion d'agro-industries: conserveries, fabrication de jus de fruit, raffinerie de sucre. Au même moment, on va assister à un développement paradoxale de certaines industries de substitution aux importations ainsi que des industries de transformation (industries de pâtes alimentaires, la SGMAT). En 1976, 25 sociétés industrielles fonctionnaient normalement, 5 étaient en cours de démarrage et 7 venaient d'être créées dans le cadre de "la promotion des petites et moyennes entreprises".

Devant la réalité des faits, le Ministre du Développement reconnaîtra, au terme de la campagne agricole 1983 que la production pourrait à nouveau être inférieure aux besoins de la population à la suite du déficit pluviométrique lié à la sécheresse des deux dernières années:

"De pays excédentaire en produits alimentaires, le Togo est aujourd'hui, malgré les efforts que déploient les paysans, le Parti et le Gouvernement, arrivé (...) à un point où la production est inférieure aux besoins alimentaires ou à peine équilibrée"²⁰.

Cette situation ainsi présentée par le Ministre est corroborée par l'évolution de l'importation de certaines denrées alimentaires par certaines sociétés spécialisées. Celles-ci ont vu leurs chiffres augmenter considérablement dans le même temps. C'est le cas de la Société Nationale de Commerce (SONACOM) qui enregistre, pour l'importation de riz, les quantités suivantes: 11.129 tonnes en 1980, 11.680 tonnes en 1981, 14.565 tonnes en 1982, 26.618 tonnes en 1983 soit une progression de 39% en 4 ans. Dans le même temps la Société Générale des Moulins du Togo (SGMAT) importait une quantité annuelle de blé se situant entre 20.000 et 30.000 tonnes soit une progression de 50%.

Quoi qu'il en soit et au-delà des données chiffrées, soulignons avec force que l'auto-suffisance alimentaire n'est pas un état auquel on accède une fois pour toutes, mais une situation qui doit se reproduire de façon cumulative chaque année. Pour atteindre un tel objectif, un plan de production agricole devra être le résultat de la combinaison, la plus optimale possible, de l'ensemble des moyens d'un pays. Il est tenu compte notamment du matériel technique disponible, de la possibilité naturelle du sol, du facteur climatique²¹ du niveau du développement des forces productives etc.

Dans le domaine de la production des cultures commerciales les résultats ne sont guère concluant même si l'on doit reconnaître que le taux annuel de

20 Bilan de la campagne agricole 1983, interview du Ministre du Développement Rural, *la Nouvelle Marche*, 6 janvier 1984.

21 L'influence du climat peut modifier, d'une année à l'autre, les résultats de l'agriculture. Il faut toutefois ne pas surestimer ce facteur. Toute analyse doit se faire sur une longue période, de façon à décélérer l'impact de ce facteur sur l'agriculture.

croissance de celles-ci est supérieure à celui des cultures vivrières au cours du troisième plan: coton-graine 28%, environ 14% pour le café et 6% pour le cacao.

Les données dont nous disposons sont ceux de l'Office Togolais des Produits Agricoles (OPAT). Il est doté, dès le début de sa création, du monopole d'achat à la production et de retrocession pour le marché intérieur et surtout pour les marchés extérieurs.

Si l'on considère les données de la production commercialisée par l'OPAT et que l'on compare, pour les 9 produits que contrôle cet organisme, sur la base de la production annuelle moyenne de trois campagnes agricoles les résultats des campagnes 1964/65, 1965/66, 1966/67 (aube du premier plan) à ceux des campagnes 1980/81, 1981/82, 1982/83 (aube du quatrième plan) - ce qui permet de calculer l'évolution de la production d'exportation du milieu de la décennie 1960 au début de la décennie 1980 - le bilan s'établit comme suit:

Produit	Mi-décennie	Début décennie		Evolution	
	1960 bases campagnes 1964/65 1965/66 1966/67	1980 bases 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83	en tonnes	en %	
Cacao	16,237	12,385	- 3,852	- 23,7	
Café	9,213	7,854	- 1,359	- 14,8	
Arachides	3,094	184	- 2,910	- 94,1	
Palmistes	15,042	8,513	- 6,529	- 43,4	
Coprah	846	0	- 0,846	- 100,0	
Ricin	318	77	- 0,241	- 75,8	
Karité	910	6,672	+ 5,762	+ 633,2	
Coton graine	7,961	23,422	+ 15,461	+ 194,2	
Kapock	442	177	- 0,265	- 60,0	

Sur le tableau on peut voir que 7 des 9 produits concernés accusent une évolution à la baisse (dont le cacao et le café, cultures qui ont fait pourtant, ainsi que nous l'avons montré plus haut, l'objet de soins tout particulièrement par le niveau important des investissements depuis 10 ans). Il est aussi vrai que les deux dernières années ont été néfastes du point de vue du climat. Deux produits ont connu une évolution à la hausse: le karité qui est beaucoup plus un produit de cueillette que de culture donc ne nécessitant aucun soin particulier; le coton-graine pour lequel la production a progressé de façon spectaculaire; mais on sait aussi que la Banque Mondiale et le Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération, principaux bailleurs de fonds, n'ont pas lésiné sur les moyens. En effet, les superficies plantées sont passées de 8.351 à 26.045 hectares de 1976 à 1982 et la production du coton-graine de 6.000 à 20.600. Le nombre de paysans encadrés par la SOTOCO passant, lui, de 17.226 à 46.285 personnes. Tous ces résultats enregistrés sont dans la réalité

beaucoup plus bas lorsqu'on sait que la longue crise économique que le Ghana a traversé depuis 1977 et même avant, a entraîné une perte en valeur du cédi (monnaie ghanéenne) et favorisé le développement du commerce de contrebande du café et du cacao entre le Ghana et le Togo. Il est certain que cette contrebande a pu influencer sur nos stocks commercialisables à la hausse dans la mesure où les producteurs ghanéens préféreraient, par n'importe quel moyen, écouler leur production sur le marché togolais en échange d'un F CFA plus solide.

Voilà exposées les raisons multiples (historiques, institutionnelles, organisationnelles ou tout simplement de politique économique à travers plans) qui n'ont pas permis au secteur rural au Togo de donner les résultats attendus et ceci en dépit de l'effort considérable d'investissement réalisé ou prévu par l'Etat au titre des quatre premiers plans quinquennaux. En effet, pour la période couverte par les trois premiers plans (1966-1980) qui ont été conduits à leur terme, les ressources effectivement allouées sont de l'ordre de quelques 326 milliards de F CFA avec le concours financier très important de l'extérieur.

On peut rappeler ces raisons: les choix économiques n'ont pas été judicieusement faits. En particulier le secteur rural n'a pas bénéficié des mêmes avantages en matière de crédits que les autres secteurs de l'économie; alors que les crédits accordés à l'ensemble de l'économie ont substantiellement augmenté, à considérer la structure et l'évolution des crédits à l'économie telles qu'on peut les suivre dans les publications de la Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO). En 1975, ils ont augmenté d'un taux supérieur de deux fois et demi à celui de 1974: 41% contre 16%²².

Un rapport de la Banque Mondiale note en 1979: "La négligence de l'agriculture a été pendant longtemps une caractéristique défavorable du programme d'investissement du Togo"²³.

Dans la logique de la Banque Mondiale (ne nous y trompons pas) il s'agit de la partie de l'agriculture qui est capable de générer des profits c'est-à-dire le sous-secteur des cultures commerciales.

C'est par conséquent le sous-secteur du vivrier qui est délaissé par l'Etat et qui se verra de toute aide significative au profit du sous secteur des cultures commerciales.

Plus généralement nous ferons observer que les objectifs de production n'ont jamais été déterminés, avec une expression quantitative au secteur rural dans son ensemble, par l'Administration du développement rural qui arrête quand les conditions l'exigent, les superficies à ensemercer ou à plan-

22 Rapport annuel de la BCEAO, 1975, p. 122.

23 Banque Mondiale: second cocoa, coffee development project, rapport No 2408-TO du 4 juin 1979.

ter, sans mettre l'accent sur la production à atteindre. Faute de plan de production avec des objectifs précis à atteindre, on se limite, dans le confort de bureaux ministériels, à l'élaboration de statistiques de production agricole prévisionnelles.

Or, dans ce domaine le facteur humain est déterminant. Rien ne pourra se faire contre la volonté et le savoir faire du paysan en milieu rural. Les transformations positives et notables souhaitées dans le secteur rural supposent, au préalable, qu'on se mette à l'écoute des paysans pour les aider à définir eux-mêmes les voies qu'ils entendent suivre pour le bien-être social de tous.

Ceux-ci doivent être mis à contribution dans la mise en oeuvre d'un développement au "à la base", authentique et démocratiquement coopératif.

Annexe

Plans quinquennaux 1966-1985 - Investissements prévus et investissements réalisés

Investissements en millions CFA	1er Plan 1966/1970		2ème Plan 1971/1975		3ème Plan 1976/1980		4ème Plan 1981/1985	
	Prévus ¹	Réalisés	Prévus*	Réalisés	Prévus*	Réalisés	Prévus ²	Réalisés ³
1. Développement rural	5.233.306 (13.1%)	4.478.418 (13.6%)	12.497.180 (09.2 %)	12.468.177 (14.4%)	80.293.450 (28.4%)	24.616.870 (11.9%)	66.559.051 (26,5%)	
2. Développement industriel dont	3.828.579	5.474.532	25.671.984	21.868.532	75.890.000	109.870.020	73.395.000	
- industrie proprement dite	3.767.579 (09,4%)	4.703.532 (14,3%)	23.638.620 (17,4%)	18.860.230 (21,8%)	70.716.000 (25,0%)	104.708.180 (50,7%)	63.960.000 (25,5%)	
- artisanat, commerce	61.000	771.000	2.033.364	3.008.302	5.175.000	5.161.840	9.435.000	

3. Développement des infrastructures et des services	30.986.479	22.942.002	97.307.401	52.157.330	126.152.716	72.085.630	110.997.995
dont - organisation administrative et équipement des services publics	1.283.048	1.572.530	8.565.717	4.244.099	16.799.100	19.164.510	11.986.000
- infrastructures de communication	26.544.492	19.087.990	76.368.256	36.280.632	64.322.320	50.047.350	74.115.000
- équipements urbains et touristiques	(66.3%)	(58.0%)	(56.4%)	(42.0%)	(22.8%)	(24.2%)	(29.5%)
développement socio-culturel	3.158.939	2.281.482	12.373.428	11.632.599	43.896.296	6.626.770	23.646.995
- emploi					1.135.000	247.000	1.250.000
Total	40.048.364	32.894.952	135.476.565	86.494.039	282.336.166	206.572.520	250.952.046

Sources: Bilan d'exécution des 1er, 2ème et 3ème Plans; 4ème Plan. - N.B./ Les pourcentages se rapportent au total de chaque colonne.

1 Après réajustement -

2 Programme prioritaire minimal, à l'exclusion du programme complémentaire optionnel portant sur 117 538,212 millions.

3 Chiffres non encore disponibles, plan étant en cours de réalisation.

Women's Movement and Visions: the Nigeria Labour Congress Women's Wing ¹

Kole Ahmed Shettima*

RÉSUMÉ. Dans les travaux de recherche, le rôle de la nigériane dans le développement économique, politique et social du pays est négligé. La lacune est encore plus évidente dans le cas de l'histoire du syndicalisme qui insiste surtout sur le syndicat des hommes au détriment des ouvrières. Cela ne fait que refléter l'idéologie patriarcale concernant la place de l'homme et de la femme dans la société. Le secteur public qui est le plus gros employeur des hommes au Nigéria l'est aussi pour les femmes. La plupart des nigérianes se sont auto-employées ou sont employées dans le secteur informel. Dans ce secteur les salaires sont bas et elles ne disposent pas de syndicats pour s'occuper des problèmes spécifiques auxquelles elles ont à faire face et mobiliser les femmes dans le syndicalisme. La création de l'aide pour les femmes de la *Nigerian Labour Congress* (NLCWA) cherche à s'attaquer aux problèmes spécifiques auxquels les ouvrières doivent faire face ainsi qu'à d'autres problèmes d'envergure nationale comme la privatisation et les programmes d'ajustements structurels. La discrimination dans le travail, l'éducation, les bourses, les tracasseries sexuelles, la discrimination sexuelle dans le ménage, l'absence ou l'insuffisance de congés de maternité, la discrimination dans la distribution des compléments de salaire, des pensions, avancement et formation sont autant de problèmes qui se posent aux femmes. Les responsabilités familiales, les temps de réunions, les attitudes négatives des collègues hommes et les traditions sociales plus larges empêchent les femmes d'assister régulièrement aux activités syndicales. Cependant, actuellement, le NLCWA n'a ni protection constitutionnelle ni autonomie financière.

Introduction

The role of Nigerian women in the economic, political and social development of the country is often relegated to the background. Scholars tend not to focus on the specific role of women in the country and even when an effort is made, it is limited to praising of elite women. One would have thought that labour scholars for example², would have been able to transcend the class and gender bias of many contemporary writers on women but alas women labourers receive very little attention, if at all.

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- 1 This paper would not have been possible without the assistance of the Nigeria Labour Congress Education Secretary, and Organization secretary, who enabled me to attend a one week workshop on "Trade Unionism and the Women Workforce" August 31, and September 4, 1987. I am also indebted to Yusuf Tofa who made possible my trip to Kano.
- 2 Otobo, D., *Foreign Interests and Nigerian Trade Unions*, Heinemann Educational Books, Ibadan, 1986. Anaba, W., *The Trade Union Movement in Nigeria*, Ethiope, Benin City, 1969. Cohen, E.R., *Labour and Politics in Nigeria*, Heinemann, London, 1974.

The history of trade unionism in Nigeria concentrates mostly on male trade unionists as if women have not played any significant role in trade unionism. This is a reflection of the patriarchal ideology of women's place is in the home and man's place is in the street, and, the extreme class ideology which considers a woman worker just as any other worker. This preliminary investigation is an attempt to bridge the gap of 'woman's place is in the union', and a 'woman worker is a woman' from the perspective of the Nigeria Labour Congress Women's Wing (NLCWW). Towards that end, the paper is divided into the following namely: a discussion on women in the labour force, the development of the NLCWW, the condition of women in the work-place and the society as the bases of understanding the visions of NLCWW, the strategies adopted and envisaged and a concluding remark. However, the compartmentalization of the subsections is not all that rigid.

Women in the Labour force

According to the 1962-63 census, of the labour force of 18 million persons registered, 4.4m were women i.e. about 24.4%³. The number of women in the labour force increased slightly to 35% of the total labour force surveyed in 1983⁴. The figure of women in wage and salaried employment increased from 5.1% in 1960 to 6.9% in 1965 of the total number of employed persons. Of this figure of women employed about 7%, 14% and 65% were employed in manufacture, agriculture and service subsections⁵ respectively. The public sector is the largest employer of labour in Nigeria and it is also the largest employer of women. In 1977, about 68% and 32% of women were employed in the public and private sectors respectively⁶. This is not only because the former developed much earlier, but also because the latter discriminated against women's employment⁷. The number of women employed in the Federal Civil Service increased from 4,715 to 11,447 between 1967⁸.

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- 3 Federal Ministry of Social Development, Youth, Sports and Culture, "Nigeria Country Statement to Second Regional Conference on the Integration of Women in Development", Lusaka, December, 3rd - 7th, 1974, p. 10.
 - 4 Bello, V. M. "Women and Labour", Paper presented at the 31st Anniversary of Women in South Africa Day Organized by the Nigeria African National Congress Friendship and Cultural Association and Nigeria Labour Congress, Kano State Council Women's Wing, March 15, 1987, p. 1.
 - 5 Federal Ministry of Social Development, Youth, Sports and Culture, op. cit, p. 10.
 - 6 Fapohunda, E.R., "Economic Recession and Employment Patterns among Women in the Modern Sector" in Fashoyin, T. et al *Women in the Modern Sector Labour Force in Nigeria: Issues and Prospects*, Department of Industrial Relations and Personal Management, University of Lagos, 1985, p. 39.
 - 7 Group Discussion Workshop on "Trade Unionism and the Women Work-force", op. cit.
 - 8 Federal Ministry of Social Development, Youth, Sports and Culture, op. cit., p. 10.

By 1981 the picture was as shown in Table 1.

Most women employed are in professions like nursing, teaching, secretarship and banking⁹. However, even in those professions men occupy the leadership positions.

Until recently women were discouraged from being employed in the immigration police and prison services. In the prison and police services, only unmarried women are employed and they are not expected to marry until after about 3 years. This portrays the gender bias of the socialization process in the society - there are certain jobs which require 'a feminine temperament' and 'caring' as against 'masculine' jobs like construction. This is also an extension of women's role in the family to the outside world. For example in the city of Kano there are about 500 women employed in the banks, insurance and other financial institution. Perhaps because of the numerical strength of women in that sub-sector and the ideological posture of the National President of the Union of that sub-sector, it is one of the two unions with a strong women's wing (WW). There are about 50 women trade union activists and 4 fully paid trade unionists¹⁰. The immediate past President of the National Association of Nigerian Nurses and Midwives (NANNM) is a woman. This too might perhaps, be a reflection of the numerical strength of women in that profession.

The above situation is in contrast to construction, railway and other supposedly 'masculine' jobs. Although women are employed in these areas, they are mostly at the clerical and non-skilled levels.

For example, the highest concentration of women in the Nigerian Railway Corporation is in the administration department and even there, women are telephone operators, clerks, secretaries and cleaners¹¹. This is also the case in the military where most women are in medical care and administration.

A study by Dennis¹² of the Odu'Atex textile industry has shown that most of the women were employed as cleaners and clerks and carry out, low paid, and respective tasks, the type of work that is not considered as requiring physical strength and those without prospects for promotion and training. This is despite the fact that some of the women had better educational quali-

9 Workshop on "Trade Unionism and the Women Work-force", op. cit. Discussions with Mairo, V. Bello, Chairperson NLCWW Kano State and NUBIFIE Kano State, Kano, September 1987. F.C. Sanni, Chairperson NLCWW Oyo State, Ibadan, March 1987.

10 Discussion with Mairo V. Bello, Kano, September 1987.

11 Discussion with Asabe Malgwi, Nigerian Union of Railways National Executive Council Member, Bauchi, April 19, 1987.

12 Dennis, C., "Capitalist Development and Women's Work: A Nigerian Case Study", *ROAPE* No 27/28, 1984 See also Pitun, "R. Gender and Class in Nigeria", *ROAPE* No. 31 1984.

fications than their male counterparts. This is a case of discrimination in employment which sometimes reflects as wage discrimination. Men were employed in relatively better paid positions and move from one department to another to gain experience and therefore better their prospects for promotion and training. In the food and beverage sub-sector, women employees are at the lower level without prospects for training¹³.

Table 1: Distribution of total employees by type of employer and by sex.

Type of employer	Male	Female	Total employees female. 9% of total employment	%share of total emplo- yment
Federal Government (Civil Service)	101,764	21,558	17.0	11.2
Federal Government (Corporation)	154,352	19,427	11.2	15.8
State government (Civil Service)	199,583	48,398	19.5	22.6
State Government (Corporation)	55,199	10,385	15.8	6.0
Local Govt.	92,628	14,171	13.3	9.6
Voluntary Agencies	10,844	4,251	28.1	1.4
Joint ownership by Government & Private	62,450	4,088	6.1	6.1
Private enterprises	266,602	21,452	7.4	26.2
Others	9,738	1,818	16.5	1.1
Total	953,160	145,648		100.0

Source: Adapted from Ojo, F. "The Prospects for Modern Sector Employment Generation for Women" in Fashoyin, T. (ed.) et al *Women in the Modern Sector Labour Force in Nigeria: Issues and Prospects*, p. 217, 1985.

Table 2 - Percentage of women workers in traditional (Men's) jobs

Occupation	Female Percentage
Architects	5.0%
Surveyor	4.0%
Chemists	3.8%
Engineers	2.7%
Construction	0.4%
Mining and quarrying	1.4%
Total	17.3%

* Figure given is for 1983.

Source: Fashoyin, T. and Idowu, T. "Women in the Modern Sector Labour Force: A Preview" in Fashoyin T. (ed) et al *Women in the Modern Sector Labour Force in Nigeria: Issues and Prospects*, p. 19, 1985.

13 Discussion with Muibat Adejunjwo, Treasure NLCWW Lagos State Council, Lagos, September, 1987.

Even in the public sector women are mostly employed in the non-technical sub-sector. For example Cecilia Onyeka, the NLCWN Chairperson in Anambra State is a Cartographer but faced a lot of hurdles before she could transfer her service from the Federal to the State Civil Service because women were then not employed as Cartographers¹⁴. Despite the relatively small number of women employed as technical staff, the Civil Service Technical Workers Union of Nigeria (CSTWUN) is one of the few unions which actively encourages women's participation in trade unions¹⁵. This is not surprising given the radical tradition of the Union since colonial times.

As already mentioned, even where women are employed they are mostly in the lower echelons in repetitive jobs with no prospects and with disastrous consequences for health and job satisfaction. This is the case also in the public sector. For example, an analysis of women employed in the public sector in 1979 showed that about 5,436 were employed in grade level 03, and 4,997 in grade level 06. That of Women employed between levels 10-15 "shows a down ward trend and by the time the graph is traced to levels 16 and 17, it simply vanishes to 1"¹⁶. The differential between 'masculine' and 'feminine' jobs is reflected in the difference of salary grades between women and men.

While the increase of women in the labour force from about 24.4% to 35% in 1962-63 and 1983 is appreciated. Some qualifications will have to be made. The 1970s was the period of the oil boom and therefore one would have expected a much higher expansion than that which was recorded. Although statistical data on production fails to indicate a comprehensive picture of employment trends, most Nigerian women are self-employed or in the informal sector of the economy. In the 1963 figures above, for example 70.2% of women in Lagos were street and market vendors, 6.3% were domestic workers and 6.4% were sewing mistresses¹⁷. In the recent past, there has been a massive increase of women as hawkers, in the service sector such as restaurants and hotels, petroleum attendants, nannies, maids and domestic servants as well as in small scale food processing. This is as a result of the economic crunch which has endangered women's employment and access to education and other facilities. Women are forced to the informal sector where the competition is steep amongst women and where it does not require formal training and skill. However, women bring skills which they

14 Discussion with Cecilia Onyeka, Chairperson NLCWW Anambra State, Lagos, September 3, 1987.

15 Ibid.

16 Federal Ministry of Social Development, Youth, Sports and Culture, op. cit., p. 11.

17 Bello, "Women and Labour", op. cit., p. 2.

have learnt as part of their "domestic training" and other forms of informal apprenticeships.

The informal sector has very low remuneration and no trade unions. Women have to spend the whole day in the market or in the street or as nannies and maids and yet earn a token amount. Domestic workers are paid in the median Naira 60 per month i.e. about 9 US\$ at the official rate of 1 US\$ to Naira 7.14 (13/7/1989) or 5 US\$ in the parallel market at the rate of 1 dollar to Naira 12 (13/7/1989). Where women are employed as in construction¹⁸ and agriculture, they are not paid on the basis of the national minimum wage nor are there any conditions of service. It is important to point that the (grossly inadequate) national minimum wage is Naira 125.00. Agriculture which was said to constitute about 14% of the organized labour force in 1963 is a sub-sector where workers are not paid the minimum wage under the guise of attracting foreign investment. The work of Jackson has shown that Hausa women workers were paid 1 kobo to 36 kobo per day compared to Naira 2.20 per day earned by males¹⁹.

The official figures on women labourers is also suspect because they do not take into consideration and recognition other "feminine" jobs like housewifisation (child bearing, and rearing and other family chores) as productive labour nor is it a true reflection of the participation of women in agriculture²⁰, Fourth National Annual Conference of Women in Nigeria, Ilorin, May 1983).

To illustrate the point related to the underestimation of domestic work, it is worth recalling the experience of Domitila Barrios de la Chongara. Her husband objected to her attending Union meetings an hour weekly and refused to give her money. He accused her of wasting time doing nothing and suggested that she ask the Union to give her money. In order to make her husband realize that she was doing something, Domitila Barrios de la Chongara quantified the domestic work she was doing for a month. It amounted to 240 pesos per month against her husband's approximately 80 pesos monthly wage i.e. three times more than the wage of her husband. Thus at the end of the month she confronted her husband with the productive labour not recognized by society. She said "*well, Don Rene, now we must sort out the money. I have washed and ironed so many clothes, and cooked for so many days, and I've been working out, and the total is such and such*"²¹. If the

18 Zack-Williams, A.B., "Female Urban Employment: The case of the Construction Workers in Jos".

19 Jackson, S., "Hausa Women on Strike". *ROAPE* No 13, 1977.

20 See for example Shettima, K et al. "Women's participation in agriculture in Borno, Bauchi and Gongola States: A Pilot Study".

21 Davies, Miranda, 1983 *Third World Second Sex Women's struggles and National Liberation* Zed Press p. 48.

Islamic position that women are not under obligation to cook for their husbands is followed to the letter, the productive work done by women would have been much better appreciated in the Islamic world.

The unequal development of the country, as well as cultural, religious and societal differences are also reflected in the different levels of women's participation in the labour force. The concentration of women in domestic labour and lack of access to the formal sector is higher in the northern part of Nigeria than the South. For example, in 1976 and 1980, women from the north and the south constituted 3.6%, 11.2%, 4.6% and 10.2% of Federal employees²². This however does not preclude the participation of women in the informal sector in the north²³.

The development of the Nigeria Labour Congress Women's Wing

As mentioned earlier, there is a dearth of literature on women's participation in trade unions. For example, although there were no less than six women during the Apena Century Declaration in 1974, there was no mention of women's participation in any of the existing literature²⁴. Even with the development of the NLCWW, the situation is only slightly better.

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) Charter, all regional and national trade unions are supposed to have a department of women in recognition of the rights of women workers. This is also reflected in the provision of the Organization of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU). The Third Congress of OATUU in Mogadishu resolved that:

- Aware of the immense contributions of women in general and the African working women in particular could make in the development of their countries;
- Conscious of the seriousness of the conditions of the working women in Africa;
- Considering Resolutions No.9 and GL/79/14/19 adopted by the Third and Fourth General Council meeting of the Organization of African Trade Unions Unity in fulfillment of the Charter on the Economic, Social, Political and Trade Union Rights adopted by the First Conference of the African Women held under its auspices in Accra in October 1976.

Reiterates its appeal to all national trade unions to:

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- 22 Ogbuagu, S. *"The Place of women in the Nigerian Economy. A look at the Federal Civil Service*, a Paper presented at the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Seminar on Women's Studies: The State of the Art in Nigeria, Ibadan, November 1987, p. 6.
- 23 See for example Pitin, R., "The Documentation and analysis of the invisible work of invisible women". *ILO Review* 1984.
- 24 Group Discussion Workshop on *"Trade Unionism and the Women Work-force"*, op. cit.

(a) seriously study the best ways and means of encouraging the effective implementation of the charter within the framework of socioeconomic realities and to keep the OATUU Secretariat informed of the steps taken on the implementation of the Charters;

(b) encourage women trade union activists to leadership positions within the trade union structure;

(c) establish women sections within their national trade union centres for those who have not yet done so²⁵.

OATUU has now established a Pan African Women Trade Union. The NLC in 1983 resolved to establish the NLCWW (Ibid.). The first branch was set up in Lagos. So far only eight states have done so viz: Lagos, Oyo, Anambra, Imo, Bendel, Rivers, Benue and Kano²⁶. Although the NLC has no provision for a women's wing in its constitution, at the 1981 congress convention, a proposal for a women's Department was unanimously adopted. The department was charged with the following responsibilities:

(a) to ensure equal pay for work of equal value;

(b) to ensure non-discrimination in job opportunities based on sex;

(c) to ensure observance of ILO convention on women labour;

(d) to create recreational, and domestic centres;

(e) to set-up sewing institutions including home economics centres²⁷.

Why NLCWW? In the words of Ali Chiroma, the President of the NLC, the NLCWW:

are expected to act as specialized Congress Committees on women affairs that will discuss problems of working women generally and married women in particular and bring them to the attention of the NLC. They are equally to work towards the effective integration and participation of women in trade union work²⁸.

According to Rebecca Oliseh, the Chairperson of Lagos State Council of NLCWW, women were formerly excluded in trade unionism. The NLCWW is to fill the gap.

Women are now very much aware of their rights and wrongs as far as Trade Unionism is concerned. They now want to be represented at all levels of negotiations so that they will negotiate better what they think is

25 *New Horizon*, Vol. VI, No 8, September 1986, p. 9.

26 Chiroma, A. "Address at the opening ceremony of the NLC Women Education Workshop (Batch II)", August 31 - September 4, 1987, Lagos, p. 2.

27 Okoronwko, A.O., "Women's Participation in Trade Unions", in Fashoyin et al, *Women in The Modern*, 1985, p. 85.

28 Chiroma, "Address at the Opening" 1987.

good for them. Men can negotiate on our behalf, but there are certain aspects of it which I think women will do better... We want to be at the forefront to fight for ourselves. For example, when we talk of creches for working mothers, men may support it but they do not know the impact it will make because we women know what it is to have creches in our working places... A woman will definitely tackle her own matters better than a man²⁹. (sic)

Women in trade union also want to be recognized as human beings with rights and obligations, who can make positive contributions to society and not be viewed negatively as parasites and lazy housewives, as well as speak with one voice as women workers. The development of the NLCWW will also build up the self-confidence and organizational ability of women and enable them to participate effectively in trade unions. Prior to this women have not been active in trade unions³⁰.

After the directive to state congresses of the NLC to set up their women's wings, the NLC also directed that individual trade unions should set up women's wing. So far only 2 of the approximately 42 industrial unions have strong women's wing. These are the Nigeria Union of Banks, Insurance, and Financial Institutions Employees (NUBIFIE) and Nigeria Union of Food Beverages and Tobacco Employees (NUFBTE)³¹.

Although there are misgivings about women's wing and the notion of - "go and do your thing outside" - there is a strong justification for working women to form their unions, if it is properly handled. As the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions Charter pointed out:

Women whether organized or not, will judge whether union Organization adequately considers the question of women of equal rights, opportunities, and treatment by the way equality is practised in their own ranks i.e. the extent to which the participation of women in trade union decision making and responsibilities correspond to the number of women members³².

Very few of the Nigerian industrial unions actually make specific recommendations on women or involve women in their activities. One exception is the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) which in 1983 negotiated with the federal Government to pay its members Naira 200.00 as

29 *New Horizon*, Vol. VI, No 8, September 1986, p. 14.

30 Discussion with Muibat Adejunjwo, Cecelia Onyeka, F.C. Sanni, Mairo V. Bello, op. cit.

31 Group Discussion Workshop of "Trade Union and the Women Work-force", op. cit.

32 West, J. (ed) *Work, Women and the Labour Market*, Routledge and Kegan, London 1982, p. 167.

vacation allowance in lieu of leave bonus as against the former practice of Naira 196 for married men and single members respectively - married females could not claim allowance for their husbands and it is much easier for male workers to pretend that they are married than their women colleagues.

The NLC itself has not been making specific recommendations on women in its major policy demands. For example in the NLC's *Workers Charter of Demand*, there was not a single mention of the condition of women workers. Even where a case was made against "State Citizenship", the example given did not refer to the situation of many working women and other women who marry outside their state and which affect their access to employment, education, health facilities, etc. Women who marry outside their state of "Origin" are discriminated against in employment, education, scholarship, etc., both in their state of "origin" and the "husband state". While in the woman's state of origin, she is asked to go to her husband's state, in the husband's state, she is asked to go to her state of origin. In both cases, the woman is the loser. Paradoxically Inter-state marriage is encouraged by the state for contributing to national unity e.g. under the National Youth Service Corporation couples who marry indigenes of the state where they serve are given monetary incentive. Similarly the NLC position on the political future of Nigeria made only passing comments on recognizing the importance of women to participate effectively "in all organs of Government and mass Organization" and stressing "the equality of all people without discrimination as to sex and place of origin"³³.

Likewise, very few of the trade unions have women in their leadership. In Rivers State, the State Secretary of NUBIFIE is a woman, in Anambra State, the State Secretary of NUT (the National Union of Teachers) is a woman, the Assistant General Secretary of NUBIFIE is a woman, and in Oyo State the Organizing Secretary of CSTWUN is a woman. In Lagos State, the State Secretary of the NLC is a woman and the immediate past President of NANNM is a woman³⁴. In the Bauchi branch of the Nigerian Union of Railways (NUR) there are two women at chapter and branch leadership. From Bauchi comes also the only woman member of the NUR National Executive Council³⁵. Of the 150 delegates to the NUR Triennial Delegate Conference in 1984 only two were women and both were from Lagos District Council³⁶. During the NLC national convention in 1984, the only post

33 Nigeria Labour Congress, *The Workers' Charter of Demands*, Lagos February 1980, Nigeria Labour Congress, *Towards a Viable and Genuinely Democratic Political Future: Nigerian Working Class Position*, Lagos, p. 10.

34 Discussion with Cecelia Onyeka and Mairo V. Bello, op. cit.

35 Asabe Malgwi, op. cit.

36 Nigeria Union of Railways, *Minutes of Second Triennial Delegate Conference*, Ibadan, October 1984, Ibadan, October 1984.

contested by a woman, the National Trustees, was lost to a man. Although the Nigerian Civil service Union, which is the oldest union in Nigeria, has a female membership of about 40%, "only about 8% of the officers at the national and state levels are women"³⁷. Most of the elective posts occupied by women are welfare and treasury - an extension of women family roles. Women workers employed by trade unions are mostly clerks and cleaners and where women take up positions of responsibilities in their unions, they are sometimes subjected to ridicule by their male colleagues. An example is the case of Asabe Malgwi who is the only female member of the NUR NEC. She has always ridiculed and called names by her male colleagues during meetings. During the 1986 NUR strike, she was assaulted by a police officer for daring to enforce the strike called by her Union³⁸.

Attempts at understanding why women are not involved or participated in trade union activities are often limited to psychological constraints and fail to examine the material conditions blocking women's participation. It is often argued that women do not want to participate in trade unions because it is a 'masculine' role or it does not interest women or that they are not supposed to lead. Scholars have to look at the family responsibilities of women, timing of union meetings, attitude of male colleagues and wider societal customs and traditions in order to understand the low level of participation of women in trade unions. For example, it will be helpful to trade unionists to understand why most of the active women trade unionists are advanced in age³⁹.

Nigeria Labour Congress Women's wing Views on the work place

In order to appreciate the NLCWW's views on the work-place, it is necessary to highlight the condition under which women work.

Sexual Harassment

This is defined by the British Trade Union Congress as:

"Repeated and unwanted verbal or sexual advances, sexually explicit, derogatory statement or sexual discriminatory remarks made by someone in the work-place which are offensive to the worker involved, which cause the worker to feel threatened, humiliated, patronized or harassed, or which interfere with the worker's job performance, undermine job security or create a threatening or intimidating work environ-

37 Okoronkwo, A.O., "Women participation in Trade Unions" in Fashoyin et al, 1985, p. 86.

38 Discussion Asabe Malgwi Bauchi, April 19, 1987.

39 Field Notes, Ibadan, Lagos, Kano and Bauchi, March - September, 1987.

ment⁴⁰.

It is very common to regard women as objects for exploitation in many work-places. Women are to be "used" by their male bosses and if they resist any such attempts it affects their promotion and career. There are many instances where women who refuse to respond positively to the sexual advances of their male bosses have been victimized. The problem is more compounded for unmarried women workers who are seen as objects of pleasure. This also restricts the movement of this category of workers for fear of being scorned. Likewise in many instances women applicants are tempted to succumb to the sexual advances of prospective employers. Sexual harassment is often not recognized as a problem in Nigeria. One of the aims of the NLCWW is to make society and trade unions recognize sexual harassment as a crime and fight against it⁴¹.

Sexual and Marital Discrimination

It is a common tendency among employers of labour to refuse to employ women because they are women or to provide different conditions of service based on sex and marital status. In the private sector and especially among multinational corporations, they do not encourage the employment of women because women are most likely to go on maternity to look after their husbands when they are sick or seek leave of absence to attend to other family problems. As a result, some women who are employed by private firms abort their pregnancy in order not to lose their jobs thereby risking their lives. In some cases the women take only two weeks maternity leave in order to maintain their jobs which is also risky to their life and that of the child. This is especially the case for single mothers⁴².

Even in the public sector, mothers are only entitled to 12 weeks maternity leave. Single mothers are officially discriminated against in terms of leave payment. However many of them can avoid this penalty because of the ineffectiveness of the Civil Service. Pregnancy and childbirth are considered as a holiday and a woman who takes maternity leave has to forego her vacation leave for that year (or the following one if she has already had it). All these are reflections of the patriarchal and undemocratic structures of society where reproduction - which should have been valued and considered as social production - is considered a liability and counts against women. Moreover, 12 weeks with or without pay runs contrary to the cultural prac-

40 Onyeka, C.A. "Problems of Women in the Work-force and the Condition of the Nigerian Working Women", Workshop on Trade Unionism and the Women Work-force, August 31 - September 4, 1987, Lagos, pp. 2-3.

41 Nigeria Labour Congress, "Communique at the end of the Week Long Workshop on Trade Unionism and the Women Work-force", Lagos, August 17-21, 1987.

42 Group Discussion Workshop on "Trade Unionism and the Women Work-force", op. cit.

tices of many a Nigerian family. In many families women breast-feed for about one year. This cultural practice has inherent advantages in terms of balanced diet and spacing of the family. The current economic situation in the country which makes it impossible for many families to buy baby food supplements further reinforces the need for a longer period for breast feeding. In Nigeria there is no obligation on employers to provide child care centres or creches. There are also very few private day care centres and nurseries to which working class women can afford to send their children. For example, in some schools like Corona School, parents are asked to pay as high as Naira 450.00 per term per child for nursery⁴³.

In terms of leave and housing policies there is a clear gender bias. According to the current government policy, except in a very few places, husbands are allowed to receive wives' leave allowances but not vice versa even if wives are responsible for the transportation and other expenses of the leave. In housing also, couples are paired together if they are working together or in the same town. This saves some amount of money for the Government and could be justified if agreed to by the couples, but it loses sight of the fact that some families are polygamous and therefore, working women may not feel comfortable sharing a house with co-wives. However, these women are forced to accept such a condition. In addition, the lack of housing may force women to stay in marriages that they do not want given the relative scarcity of rented accommodation and its expense, especially as women are not entitled to rent subsidy, as well as the tendency of many landlords to refuse to rent a house to single women on the allegation of their being "loose".

In view of the demands of the family e.g. taking children to the hospital, women workers are not promoted as regularly as their male counterparts because absenteeism from work under whatever circumstances for women are counted against them. Many a Nigerian father considers family responsibilities as that of the woman. Thus, when it is time for retrenchment, women are most likely to go first after all "they are unproductive workers in perpetual absenteeism". However, it should be noted that the accusations of absenteeism is belied by official records of attendance.

Examples of discrimination against women workers include a German firm in metal production that retrenches its women workers when they are about to go on maternity leave without any bonus or without taking into consideration the number of years they have been in the service of the firm. Another case is that of food and beverage companies like United African Company (UAC), G.B. Ollivant and John Holt where male and female workers are

43 *The African Guardian* July 17, 1989.

employed on the same scale but the former have the possibility of becoming supervisors while the latter remain on at the same level. One of the participants at the workshop on Trade Unionism and the Women Work Force narrated how she spent 21 years with UAC without promotion. This was partly because of her trade union activities which was considered by the Management as 'odd' for a woman⁴⁴. This is indicative of an institutionalized labour segregation inspite of the supposedly non-discriminatory wage system in Nigeria.

Another interesting case is that of about 5 firms in Lagos which treat their workers like "17th century slave labour". One of these firms is a Lebanese-owned, Nigerians Branching Manufacturing Company limited, which employs about 300 women producing shoe laces. The women workers are not free to receive visitors or speak to any body; they may not be seen sitting down during work hours (6am.-2pm. for the morning shift); Trade unionis are not allowed. Workers refrain from going to the ladies room as they might end up being fired, etc. According to a woman worker "we are treated as slaves. There was a day I was eating a loaf of bread, an expatriate walked up to me and slapped me. And of course I could not protest because my children would suffer if they throw me out of job". Another woman, Patience, was beaten and later sacked for her inability to explain why a machine she was operating stopped and for daring to report the matter to her husband. The terms of employment are terrible in that company. There are no letters of appointment, conditions of service or pay slip. A Ms Pat Bassey who worked for that company for three years earned Naira 54.00 per month. According to the Deputy Secretary General of the National Union of Textile Garments and Tailoring Workers in Nigeria, Alhaji O. Shittu, the Nigerian Branching Manufacturing Company Limited, attempts by the Union to organize the workers were thwarted by the management. In 1981, nine workers who were members of the committee set up to organize the workers in the company were immediately fired by the management. In the words of A. Shittu "The slavery that is being perpetuated there is worse than that which is practised in South Africa"⁴⁵.

In terms of fringe benefits and allowances women are also discriminated against. As mentioned earlier single mothers are discriminated against in terms of their maternity leave. Children and dependant allowances which are supposed to be claimed by all workers irrespective of sex are not uniformly implemented. In some sections like banking and insurance⁴⁶ workers are paid uniformly irrespective of marital status and sex, perhaps because of the

44 Ibid.

45 *Sunday Times*, November, 1, 1987).

46 Discussion with Mairo V. Bello.

strength of their union and the active role of women in that union. However, most women workers cannot claim child allowance because it is assumed that women do not take care of their children. Husbands are supposedly the breadwinners and not women. Even where documentary evidence to the contrary is submitted by women, it is often neglected. The same is the case with dependants. This can be faulted given the lingering extended family system in Nigeria. Likewise wives are not entitled to husbands tax relief although husbands are entitled to wife tax relief. There are many cases of retrenched or retired husbands who are taken care of by their wives but these are disregarded under the patriarchal ideology of domesticity of women. Thus "women earn as a child and pay as a man". Apart from the problem of fringe benefits is also the discriminatory practice of not allowing women worker's children, relatives, husbands and other dependants to have access to medical and educational facilities and other benefits as it is the case for their men counterparts. It is assumed that women workers should have no liability, responsibility or obligation to any person.

Alternative measures have been proposed by the NLCWW in order to combat the above discriminatory practices.

(a) Fringe, benefits, allowances, tax relief, promotion, training and all other facilities should be based on individual rights and competence and not sex or marital status.

(b) Annual and maternity leaves should be separated and workers should be given the right to go on maternity leave for up to two years without pay and the current period of maternity leave should be extended to 18 weeks.

(c) Domestic work and child bearing and rearing should be recognized as social service and be remunerated and should not be a liability to women.

(d) Creches and nurseries should be provided by employers in work places to lessen the burden of working mothers.

(e) Positive discrimination should be introduced to reserve 55% of vacancies in all establishments to women⁴⁷.

Nigeria Labour Congress Women's Wing Visions on the Wider Society

Some of the alternative visions on problems of the larger society include:

(a) The Federal Government should introduce socialism as popularly demanded by the Nigerian people, stop the current trend of privatization of public properties, allocate specific seats to women and labour in all elective posts and introduce positive discrimination in other facets of life for the next one or two generations.

(b) Rural women and peasant farmers should be granted agricultural loans in order to enhance their productivity and self-reliance.

47 Nigeria Labour Congress, "Communique at the end", op. cit.

(c) Introduce free and compulsory schooling for all children and provide equipment and maintenance of health facilities. Privileged individuals should not be sponsored to go overseas on medical treatment.

(d) Women should have similar rights with men in terms of inheritance.

(e) Workers should determine the introduction of technology in their workplace.

(f) Rank and file workers should be involved in the affairs of their union.

(g) Cultural practice like wife battering and seclusion and disfiguring of women when their husbands die should be stopped

(h) Nigerian women should identify positively with the liberation struggle in Southern Africa⁴⁸.

Strategy

With the formation of the NLCWW, efforts are made to ensure the realization of its visions through various strategies including:

(a) The expansion of the NLCWW to other parts of the country;

(b) Formation of each industrial union's women's wing;

(c) Recognition of the NLCWW by the congress constitution and giving it specific seats in important organs like the Central Working Committee and NEC;

(d) Launching of Women Workers Charter of demands;

(e) Marking of important days like the May Day⁴⁹.

Conclusion

The development of the NLCWW should be seen within the context of the new demands at the time of its emergence - new conditions give rise to new demands and new solutions. As pointed out earlier, the trade unions as well as the central labour union - the NLC has done little to incorporate gender issues in their demands and visions. Of course there are a lot of socialist pretences and exhortations. The NLCWW transcends this obvious limitations of the trade unions. Despite the charge by the former President of the NLC, Ali Chiroma, that the NLCWW should be concerned with problems which affect working women in general and that of married women in particular - it incorporates both class and gender issues and to that extent it is more radical than the NLC, the trade unions and all other women's organization except perhaps WIN⁵⁰. For example, when the NLC withdraw the permission to use its premises as the venue of the discussion on an alterna-

48 Ibid.

49 Group discussion at workshop on "Trade Unionism and the Women Work-force", op. cit.

50 *Women and the Family in Nigeria*, (WIN) CODESRIA Book Series, 1985.

tive to the current structural Adjustment Programme by radical and left scholars and patriots apparently on the orders of the Government, the NLCWW said "it would be in the best interest of the people of this country that the government should allow people to suggest alternatives to SAP". Likewise while the NLC is not against the SAP and refused to condemn the detention of some participants at the *alternative to SAP seminar*, the NLCWW challenged both⁵¹.

The NLCWW, unlike the situation in other countries, developed first at an upper level before attempting to reach the grass-root level⁵². In some other countries women workers at the shopfloor level formed their unions before attempting to unionize at national level. The bottom-up approach to trade union organization is most likely to be better than the top-down. The former has the potential of creating effective organization and consciousness-raising. Women at the grass-root level who have a better knowledge of their immediate environment and problem will most likely have a better organized and effective organization. Likewise, since it is the local condition that necessitates their unionization, the tendency to have a higher degree of consciousness-raising is brighter. This will also enable the unions to maintain their autonomy and develop local organizational skills.

There are obvious limitations of the bottom-up approach which include the difficulty of unionizing at the upper level because of possible internal bickering and too narrowly focused at the local level. Localized activities may not get the attention it deserves because of inaccessibility.

The top-down approach may bring wider experience to bear on local conditions as well as create networks for the purpose of bringing local issues to the local issues to the national levels. However this approach does not have the advantages of the bottom-up approach. In addition, the top-down approach could be presented as 'a messiah that has come to solve the problems of the ignorant'.

The NLCWW is in an antagonistic relationship with the State Council of the NLC in some states. This is because "there cannot be two captains in a ship". There is a deep suspicion of the women's wing. This is compounded by the fact that the NLCWW has no constitutional protection and no finan-

51 *Vanguard* July 13, 1989.

52 See for example, Ahmed, Zubeida, *Women Workers in Rural Areas: Their Struggle to Organize*, ILO Asian and Pacific Regional Workshop on Strategies for Improving Employment Condition of Rural Women, Kuala Lumpur Malaysia November 14-18, 1983. Middleton Lucy (ed) *Women in the Labour Movement* Croom Helm Ltd, London 1977. Lowenhak, S., *Women and Trade Union Movement*, Ernest Benn Ltd., London 1977. Canfor, M. and Laurie, B. (ed) *Class, sex and the Woman Worker*, Greenwood Press, London 1977, Ormvedt, G. *We Will Smash this Prison Indian Women in Struggle*, Zed Press London, (1980).

cial autonomy. The NLCWW depends on the NLC for its survival. This lack of autonomy and independence is a great handicap and it obstructs the development of a well organized body. Perhaps this explains why the NLCWW does not have a well established office in any state of the federation, a hindrance to its activities.

Review Article

The Icons of Urban and Regional Crisis in South Africa

Fassil Demissie*

Richard Tomlinson and Mark Addleson (eds) *Regional Restructuring under Apartheid: Urban and Regional Policies in Contemporary South Africa*, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1987, pp. 317.

The system of apartheid represents a particular form of state intervention to secure and maintain racial domination and capital accumulation in South Africa. But the relation between racial domination and capitalism has not been always a simple one. Ever since apartheid was institutionalized in 1948 by the Purified National Party to regulate all social life, various elements of its structure have been modified to accommodate the requirement of capital accumulation and racial domination at different historical conjectures. A major theme running throughout South African history has been the ever increasing need to maintain a high level of capital accumulation and a simultaneous imposition of rigid social control institutions to maximize the exploitation of African labor.

Since the SOWETO uprising in 1976 and the general restructuring of the global economy between labor and capital, the South African state has undertaken a number of initiatives to diffuse the popular struggle as well as to redefine a new spatial boundary for capital accumulation and racial domination by restructuring the geographical bases of apartheid. The book under review takes up as its starting point, the urban and regional restructuring of the political economy of South Africa and the specific role of the state in the process. The book is divided into four parts each dealing with a specific problematic of the restructuring process. Part one sets the general context of the state's regional strategy and includes three articles on South Africa regional political economy, on the state's industrial dispersal policies and on

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the relationship between the state's regional policy and capital. Part two takes up decentralization policies especially those that have to do with urbanization and urban social movements. This section includes four articles on influx control, the urban foundation, local governments as well as the East London bus boycott of 1983. Part three focuses upon industrial decentralization policy and provides a current appraisal of the policy. Four articles are devoted to assessing the industrial decentralization program. The articles included in this section center on industrial decentralization as a regional development tool, industrialization under apartheid, and the responses of the manufacturing sector to incentives for decentralization. Part four is devoted to a number of "case studies" which highlight and evaluate specific facets of the state's urban and regional policies. Four articles are devoted to this subject. They include discussion on the emergence of a regional labor market, the industrialization of Dimbaza, and the export processing and free enterprise zone in Ciskei as well as location behavior of foreign manufacturing firms in South Africa.

A major theme that runs throughout the selections is the central role of the state in the restructuring process. Although different emphasis is given, the collection contextualises the restructuring process within the wider ambit of state policy.

The restructuring of the urban and regional structures of South Africa emerged from two conjunctural crises. First, the accumulation strategy which brought sustained economic growth and generous rate of profit during the 1950's and 1960's came to a halt by the mid 1970's as galloping inflation and balance of payment difficulties began to squeeze the economy. This regime of accumulation strategy depended upon a high level of state intervention and regulation through extensive import substitution, state protected industries and a highly controlled and racially segmented labor market. By the 1970's, the predominance of inexpensive and unskilled African labor went hand-in-hand with a depressed consumer market for manufacturing goods and periodic production bottlenecks caused by skilled labor shortages. The rising pressure on wages and social expenditure as well as cost of maintaining apartheid has caused severe dislocation. The economic, political and ideological conditions that had sustained the regime of accumulation during the apartheid era's "long boom" began to show advanced signs of decay. The second impetus for the restructuring process was accelerated by the popular struggle of the African people. The Soweto uprising in 1976 rocked South Africa and the white minority regime off balance for almost a decade. The dominant classes were thus confronted with a crisis of grave proportion. The combination of heightened popular struggle, the worsening economic recession as well as the growing regional instability following the collapse

of Portuguese colonialism marked the fusion of structural and conjunctural dimensions culminating in what Saul and Gebl termed "organic crisis"¹.

In response to the "organic crisis", reformist elements of the National Party succeeded in 1978 in putting P.W. Botha at the helm of the state and party under the slogan "adopt-or-die". This slogan was later incorporated into an all-encompassing rubric of the Total Strategy Doctrine. A major element of this doctrine was to chart out a strategic offense aimed at diffusing political conflict by offering significant concessions to channel African political and economic aspirations in a manageable way and simultaneously accelerating the restructuring of the economy in South Africa. The package of reforms which were initiated since 1979 includes the Wiehan and Riekert Commissions reports, the Koornhof Bills, the Constitution and the confederal ethnic states. These and other reforms introduced since are based on economic liberalization, the abrogation of certain racially discriminatory practices, and the introduction of experimental forms of political representation designated to further entrench racial domination. As Greenberg (1964) suggested, the aim of the reform process has been to construct a more "incorporative ideology", that is, "to universalize the scope of hegemony by negating the racial character of the state, and by reducing the direct and visible role of the state in the economy"². The so-called reforms of the National Party appear to be significant departure from Verwoerdian apartheid but as Wolpe has warned, "while it is important to expose the shallowness of the so-called reforms, these policies have opened new spaces of contestation". What need to be investigated, he added, is the extent to which these "reforms" have transformed the political terrain, set up new bases of conflict and contradictions and paved the way for a possible new alignment³.

The political terrain of South Africa and indeed that of Southern Africa has been transformed by the geographic restructuring of capital and labor. The first article by Cobbett & al. focus on the broader issue of regional political economy and provides a critical analysis of the reform strategy of the South African state in the 1980's. Three major component of the strategy are outlined in greater detail: new controls on labor movements and settlement, regional development policies (especially industrial decentralization), local and second tier government reforms and the corresponding constitutional

1 For an interesting exposition of the concept as it relates to South Africa see Saul, J. and Gelb, S. (1981) *The Crisis of South Africa: Class Defence and Class Revolution*, New York, Monthly Review.

2 Greenburg, S. B. (1984) "Ideological Struggle with the South African State" Paper presented at the Conference on Economic Development and Racial Domination. University of Western Cape.

3 Wolpe, H. "Strategic Issues in the Struggle for National Liberation in South Africa" memo, 1983, p.2.

changes. As Cobbett & al. note, the Reikert Commission which was created to develop an urbanization strategy following the township crisis, recognized the permanent settlement of the urban African working class and sought to secure their economic welfare by tightening the pass laws to protect them against competition for urban jobs from the relatively impoverished and less skilled work-force. Such a strategy Cobbett & al. and Hindson argue exacerbated the difference between those referred as "insiders" with residence rights under Section 10 of the Urban Area Act and Africans from the Bantustans with temporary employment contracts in white South African cities. The Commission also sought the creation of centralized labor bureaux near Bantustan borders to regulate and control the movement and settlement of African workers subject to availability of housing and employment in urban centers.

The Riekert Commission envisaged a process whereby the central state control of the townships by the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards would gradually give way to decentralized structures under the control of black local authorities. To achieve this, the Commission called for the rigid enforcement of the pass laws for Africans without Section 10 (a), (b) and (c) exemption in the cities.

The traditional labor control mechanisms broke down due to the rapid incorporation of the Bantustan into metropolitan centers resulting in a massive increase in the size of cross-border commuter labor force and the relative decline in long distance labor migration. The rise of this class of commuter workers or regional proletariat as Cobbett & al. prefer to call them in and around major industrial centers close to the Bantustans suggest a major locational restructuring of capital and labor.

Part of the problems with the Riekert strategy which Hudson correctly points out was the attempt to solve the crisis of townships in white South Africa without seriously addressing the question of growth of urban populations within the Bantustans and their dependence on employment within the metropolitan centers (Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereening - PWV, Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage and Capetown).

The unveiling in 1981 of nine development regions by Prime Minister Botha underlines the restructuring process and serves to underscore the state's attempt to respond to the new geographical patterns of capital and labor location which has been developing since the late 1960's.

As Cobbett & al. and later Glaser demonstrated, the geographical patterns of capital and labor location materialized from the state's industrial decentralization strategy which sought to stop and if possible, reverse the migration of African to "white" urban centers as well as promoting the growth of towns behind Bantustan boundaries.

A range of incentives was offered for industrialists to invest in growth points located in the Bantustans. Such incentives encouraged a limited geo-

graphical dispersion of capital from metropolitan centers to outlining peripheral areas within the Bantustans. Despite the marginal contribution of industrialization in the Bantustans, the scheme played, in Southall's words, a decisive role in the creation of a "set of political structures allowing for wider incorporation of an emerging African petty-bourgeoisie into the various homeland governments"⁴.

The generous state subsidies in transportation rates, access to power and water resources as well as allowances to offset the cost of African housing was not sufficient enough to attract capital to growth centers within the Bantustans. With the establishment of the Permanent Committee for Location of Industry and the Development of Border Areas, the state extended additional tax concessions, low interest loans for factory relocation to growth points situated close to metropolitan complexes and large towns that simultaneously qualifies as border industrial areas. The concession proved to be inadequate and were increased in 1964, in 1968 and again 1972. Although great hope was placed on border industrialization, it failed to produce significant results. As Glaser noted, the "87,000 jobs created in the border areas with lesser or greater assistance from the first decade of the border industry program fell glaringly short of the 50,000 a year envisaged by the Tomlinson Commission" (p. 36). It is important to stress that the jobs created within the Bantustans as a result of industrial decentralization are characterized by very low wages, poor health and safety conditions and without the protection of trade unions.

The inability of border industrialization to absorb African work-seekers in significant numbers necessitated the state to change its strategy and by 1967 it had revised two policy approaches which governed the initial phase of the industrial dispersion program. The Physical Planning Act of 1971 placed tighter control on African work-seekers entry to the metropolitan areas and discouraged businesses that already employed large numbers of African workers from expanding their operation in the PWV region and the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage region. Part of the logic for this emphasis is to be found in the political project of the apartheid state. As Glaser has argued, if the Bantustans were to play a strategic role in the political project of the state, they would have to be economically revitalized and the legitimacy of their elite would have to be enhanced. By the end of the 1970's the Bantustans have failed to develop as autonomous economic and political entities.

The attempts to revitalize Bantustan industrial development was not confined only to South African, American or European capital. Increasingly,

4 Southall, Roger (1983) *South Africa's Transki: The Political Economy of an "Independent" Bantustans*, New York, Monthly Review Press, p.40.

Taiwan and Israel based companies investors have established their plants in growth point in the Bantustans to take advantage of the vast pool of cheap labor. For example Rogerson points out of the 60 new factories planned by foreign enterprises 35% were from Taiwan with an average capital investment of R. 1,185,000 and are engaged in textile manufacturing⁵. Much of this investment took place in Ciskei. As it turned out, the generous tax policy offered by Ciskei has been accompanied by a significant decline in multinational investment.

The current regional planning strategy was officially announced in 1981 at the Good Hope Conference. A major component was the division of the South African surface land into eight (later nine) regions which cut across both the so called "self-governing" and "independent" Bantustans whose borders are considered "soft" for the purposes of economic planning. The eight development regions were established and their "actual development needs, development potentials, functional relations and physical characteristics"⁶ were determined on the basis of three criteria - the need for employment creation as measured by employment figures and the estimated number of people entering the labor market in the next decade; average income and its distribution in each region; and the future labor market potential of each region. Four types of industrial development were established; metropolitan areas, deconcentration points, industrial development points and other industrial points. Each was to be treated under a different incentive programme, and incentives were to apply only to secondary industries: manufacturing, processing and assembly. These development regions as Cobble & al. argued "correspond to the geographical patterns of capital location and labor settlement".

The new regional planning emphasized industrial development in a number of small deconcentration points on the outskirts of metropolitan centers with private capital whether these centers fall within or outside the Bantustans borders. This strategy is a reverse of the previous regional planning and underscores the importance attached by the state to deconcentration points adjacent to metropolitan centers. The new regional planning program also recognizes the importance of metropolitan areas not only for the purposes of planning but also in the state's political project in making metropolitan and development regions as the most appropriate geographic foundation for the evolving confederal system. This project rests on the one hand by coopting urban Africans who qualify for residency in urban areas under Section 10 into local government structures, and on the other by insisting that Africans

5 Rogerson, op.cit., p.303.

6 Supplement on Regional Development Strategy, *South Africa Digest* February 4, 1982.

(unlike Coloreds and Indians) exercise their political rights in the Bantustans.

The functional role of decentralization and regional development was clearly stated by Chris Heunis, Minister of Constitutional Affairs, when he said: "a more balanced development action in a regional context is necessary in order to carry out a policy separate development to its logical conclusions"⁷. The "logical conclusion" he was referring was formulated in 1978 by Dr. Mulder who stated that:

*"If our policy is taken to its logical conclusion as far as black people are concerned, there will be not one black man with South African citizenship... Every black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated in some independent new state in this honorable way and there will no longer be a moral obligation in the parliament to accommodate these people politically"*⁸.

Since the early 1980's, the state has put into legislative action the Passage of Local Governments Affairs in 1983, the Local Government Bodies of Franchise Act in 1984 and the Regional Service Council Act of 1985 to restructure the country's system of local government resulting in the establishment of third and second tier form of local government. The third tier is composed of local authorities which deal with "owns affairs" for each racial group, and the Regional Service Council (RSC) which cater for "general affairs" on a metropolitan region in 1985, the state announced that provincial councils would be replaced by a strong executive and administrative committee appointed by the state president to deal primarily with "general affairs". Although the scope and powers of these committees is in the process of being outlined, it has been suggested that they will be based on the nine development regions. Beyond the first and second tiers, the state has also realized that the Verwordian form of total racial segregation was unrealistic. Instead, the National Party envisages the creation of a federal form of government linking the development regions and the "independent" Bantustans. A new multilateral structure consisting of Council of Ministers, a secretariat, various technical bodies and the Regional Liaison Council, to coordinate the planning priorities of South Africa and its "independent" Bantustans states.

This political project rested on African local government, the tricameral parliament and ethnic confederation. As Todes & al. have argued, the new local governments have come under considerable attack from the disenfranchised African population. The legitimacy of the Black Local Authorities as

7 Quoted in Davis, R. "Capital Restructuring and the Modification of the Racial Division of Labor", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 5 (2) 1979, p. 184.

8 *Benson Report*, 1980, p. 432.

an appendage of the apartheid state was shattered as the popular upsurge reached its peak in 1985.

Unlike Verwoerdian apartheid, the state has adopted reformist policies in initiating housing and township upgrading schemes and overseeing the location of industrial sites in the Bantustans. Free enterprise became the National Party's new found creed as it sought the virtues of a robust capitalism to provide the Bantustans and Border Areas with sustained economic growth. The National Party's emphasis on free enterprise and its desire to work in close collaboration with private capital brought many businessmen and industrialists to participate in the National Party's political and economic project. A clear example of this relationship is the increasingly important role being played by the urban Foundation which was formed with the purpose of "improving the quality of life in urban communities in the Republic". The Foundation initiatives and the individuals who control it (Oppenheimer, Rupert, Barlow, Mennell & al.) represent South Africa's monopoly interest. As the spokes-person suggested, the Foundation "Should be perceived as what it is - an extension of commerce and industry, expressing the considered opinion of the nation's leading businessmen and industrialists"⁹.

The role of the urban Foundation in securing and improving the condition of labor reproduction has not been a subject of systematic study. However, Bernstein from the urban Foundation suggested that "incremental changes through sustained pressure to push the government to move decisively for fundamental reform" (p. 108) would result in significant political and social change. The areas in which the Urban Foundation works particularly in housing, health and education, are central to the reproduction of labor. This intervention in the sphere of reproduction despite the philanthropic guises of the Foundation intended to shift the cost of the reproduction of labor (housing, education and health) onto the African working class.

9 *The Sowetan*, May 22, 1981.

Book Reviews

Culture in Another South Africa - Willem Campschreur and Joost Divendal (eds.), Published by ZED Books Ltd, 1989.

Amandina Lihamba*

For ten days in December 1987, Amsterdam was host to a unique cultural event - Culture in Another South Africa (CASA). CASA was both a conference and a festival of South African artists living inside and outside of that country. Amongst those present were world renown musicians and musical directors Jonas Gwangwa, Abdulla Ibrahim (Dolar Brand); Poets Kerapetse Willi Kgositsile, Cosmo Pieterse, Dennis Brutus, Breyten Breytenbach, Gladys Thomas; novelist Nadine Gordimer and short story writer Njabulo Ndebele, to name just a few. For ten days, these and other artists, journalists and cultural activists read poems, performed musical theatrical pieces, displayed photographic and fine art exhibitions, presented papers and exchanged views.

The events of CASA 1987 Amsterdam have been captured and are reflected in a recently published book, *Culture in Another South Africa*, Published by Zed Books Ltd. The book provides a collage of the events and the experiences of the participants individually and collectively. The book, however, is not only about CASA, the event in Amsterdam. It presents and exposes what South Africa's alternative culture is all about and the visions its activists have for the future. It is a documentation of a culture historically informed by oppression and the apartheid regime as well as an account of the emergence of a non-racial democratic culture hoped for the future.

The major part of the written contributions for the book are articles in forms of reflections by different authors. There are reflections on prose by Njabulo Ndebele, poetry by Cosmos Pieterse, theater by Akerman and others on fine art, journalism, photography, music, ruling class culture and the issue of the cultural boycott movement. Each of the articles gives a historical testimony of the struggles to inform, create, record and affirm human existence against what one of the contributors has called the re-arranged 'political landscape' of the apartheid political structure.

* University of Dar-es-Salaam.

Apartheid is in its death throes but the arrival at this phase has been a process which started with the colonization of the African peoples in South Africa. The institutionalization of apartheid as not only a racial ideology but also as a medium of economic and political system has dictated every aspect of peoples lives and the manner through which they create and express themselves. The book provides a popular history of the various arts and artists within the apartheid landscape. Invariably the articles pay tribute to those artists whose very work has been statements of defiance and opposition to the debilitating political and legal system they have had to contend with. Most importantly, however, the tribute is extended to the people who have throughout displayed a stubborn hope to survive and carve different directions for a future South Africa.

The three other major parts of the book are the selected poems, the reproduction of photographs and other works of art, the CASA resolution and documents. The poems and photographs, like the articles, speak of both the present and the future. But more than the articles, the poems and photographs express vividly the pain, anger, and contradictions engendered by an inhumane system. "*The storm-troopers are in the Street*" for example, captures the heightened tide against apartheid and its inevitable demise.

the writers die in exile
the preachers call to their gods in vain
the raped prime their barrels with thunder
the storm-troopers are in the streets
the youths carry spears
the strom-troppers are in the streets
the girls carry spears
the storm-stroopers are walled in
the children are in the streets¹.

The triumph of the oppressed over their oppressors is quite obvious in this poem. Quite obvious also are the factors which have necessitated the reversal of positions between the oppressors and the oppressed. Some of these factors are captured and exposed through the photographs. The contradictions which are part of South African life are underscored through such images as Gideon Mendel's photograph of white children in their well kept and properly equipped park mounted above a picture of black children in a community part dominated by an effigy made out of scraps and rags. S. Sack's, Gilbey's Gin advertisement (A taste for life) surrounded by debris portrays a Landmark in SOWETO. Larry Scully shows the appallingly overcrowded compounds of mine workers in several photographs. These are visual images provoking similar responses as Dennis Brutus poems 'stop'.

1 *Culture in Another South Africa*, p. 188.

Stop
I ask you to think for a moment to think of pain
Of hunger
to think of people who are not free
to think of death...

The images, however, are not only of death and pain. Joy, hope, solidarity and the affirmation of existence shine through the faces of the children of SOWETO, the grouping of ANC's Amadla and other performing groups on and off stage. In trying to highlight the directions of alternative culture in South Africa, the book also calls attention to the issue of the role of culture in a revolutionary struggle. In 1968, Joe Slovo of the African National Congress was quoted as saying "The radicalizing role of drama or any other art in society is negligible. Change comes through human action informed by political awareness and exacerbated by intolerable humiliation, suppression and depression". In 1989 Nadine Gordimer concludes her introduction in *Culture in Another South Africa* by saying, "Art is at the heart of liberation". The contributions in this book tend to negate Slovo's sentiments of 20 years ago as time and again the contributors emphasize the combative as well as the reflective role of the arts in revolutionary change.

While such issues as the role of art in the struggle for liberation might have been put to rest in this book, other issues will continue to be debated.

One such issue which will engender further discussion is the notion of ruling-class culture in South Africa. Patrick Fitzgerald tackles the issues taking into consideration major trends of thoughts on the subject within the last decade. He dismisses and opposes approaches which tend to adapt caricatured perspectives in analyzing South African culture. These include what he calls ultra-leftist and extreme nationalist tendencies. As he sees them, both tend to oversimplify cultural processes. While the one puts emphasis on ruling-class culture as the international capitalist culture of the non-racial bourgeoisie, the other views ruling-class culture as an alien imposition on the authentic culture of the people which is romanticized in the process. Instead, Fitzgerald supports an analysis which regards the South African situation as one of internal colonialism with the majority black oppressed on one side and the white minority ruling bloc on the other. Whether one agrees with Fitzgerald's notions or not, his most valuable contribution within the South African context is his bringing attention once more to the complicated interplay of class, race and nationality in any analysis of culture generally and that of the ruling-class specifically. It is because of the peculiar conjunctures and the dynamic, dialectical relationship of these factors of class, race and nationality that Fitzgerald gropes about to untangle the theoretical issue of ruling-class culture. Rather than being definitive, his views should provoke further discussions.

Culture in Another South Africa is undoubtedly an important addition to

cultural studies generally and on South Africa specifically. It is highly readable and should interest the general public, cultural and political activists and academics. As the South African apartheid system moves towards its inevitable demise, the seeds for an alternative culture in a democratic South Africa have already germinated. This book bears witness to the determination of progressive South Africans to make the envisioned vibrant, humane and democratic culture a reality. Towards this end, theater, poetry, film, music, fine art and photography have been given a crucial function and central role.



Djillali Liabes, *Capital Privé et Patrons d'Industries en Algérie 1962-1982: Propositions pour l'Analyse de Couches sociales en Formation* - CREA, Alger.

Mohamed Lamine Gakou*

Djillali aborde un thème important, le rôle du capital privé et ses relations avec le secteur public dans une économie où l'idéologie d'abord populiste sera érodée et débouchera sur l'idéologie et l'hégémonie libérale après de longues luttes souterraines.

Le projet de l'auteur est donc d'essayer de dégager les contradictions que recèlent les orientations et les choix ayant cours dans le processus de développement en Algérie.

L'auteur montre dans l'introduction que le capital privé, qu'il soit commercial ou industriel, se nourrit et se consolide à partir du secteur public. Il insiste sur le jeu des relations parentales dans la réussite de ce phénomène.

"Ne peut donc réussir que celui qui aura été préparé à l'entreprise en gérant au mieux de ses intérêts le capital de relations, en mariant ses enfants à des hauts-fonctionnaires ou à leur enfants, en cherchant des protecteurs, des porte-paroles ou des alliés auprès des appareils de l'Etat".

* Dakar/Sénégal

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Dans la première partie du livre, l'auteur examine les conditions du développement national et celles du développement du marché pour mettre en lumière les ambiguïtés constitutives du projet social populiste qui sera le premier projet de société du FLN après l'indépendance.

Djillali établit un rapprochement entre l'expérience égyptienne et l'expérience algérienne. D'une part, le Nassérisme qui a signifié: nationalisations, développement du secteur public, réforme agraire etc. Puis, après la disparition de Nasser, ce fut l'ouverture libérale. L'Algérie aurait connu une expérience à peu près semblable: la politique de développement mise en oeuvre sous Boumedienne et celle qui suivra sa mort. Il cite d'ailleurs le Secrétaire général de la Centrale Syndicale, qui, dès le décès de Boumedienne, voyait dans ce revirement le principal danger.

L'auteur pense que ces changements étaient déjà en chantier sous Nasser comme sous Boumedienne. Il en trouve l'explication dans le projet social populiste avec "les alliances qu'il constitua, les contradictions qu'il porte et les perspectives qu'il ouvre".

Djillali définit ensuite le projet social populiste. Il aboutit à la conclusion qu'il s'agit d'un projet de nature productiviste, éclectique qui évacue "implicitement ou explicitement les effets proprement sociaux d'une accumulation et de la formation d'un marché national".

Selon lui, les discours sur l'articulation privé/public en vue d'un développement harmonieux et autocentré cachaient mal les luttes intenses entre pouvoir d'Etat et capital privé pour "l'hégémonie et la récupération du projet de société, ce qui ferait passer les éléments du procès de production lui-même au second plan".

L'auteur décrit les assauts du capital privé pour renforcer ses positions et amener l'Etat à prendre en charge des dépenses que le capital privé lui-même devait supporter comme certains éléments du coût de la force de travail.

La deuxième partie du livre porte sur le capital privé dans son histoire, les stratégies d'accumulation et la logique de la reproduction entre 1962 et 1980. Pour la période coloniale, il montre l'impact des capitaux coloniaux sur le type d'industrialisation de la période d'après-guerre. L'existence du mouvement nationaliste va accélérer l'industrialisation entre 1954 et 1958 sous la houlette du capital français.

Après 1958, la production pétrolière va transformer considérablement l'économie algérienne en la mettant davantage au service de la métropole.

Après l'indépendance, l'auteur relève plusieurs sous-périodes. Sur le plan économique, 1962-1969 est la période de consolidation du capital commercial qui est la principale source nationale d'accumulation et intervient pour 2/3 des investissements dans l'industrie.

Sur le plan politique, il y aurait la période de légitimation 1967-1971 du populisme et qui, matérialisée par le code des investissements de 1966, défi-

nit les nouveaux rapports entre Etat et capital privé. Une division du travail s'instaure où le secteur public domine largement le domaine des investissements industriels et le capital privé, la production et la distribution des biens de consommation.

La période 1972-1980 qui voit le capital privé atteindre sa maturité correspond aussi à celle des revendications libérales. Dès la mort de Boumedienne, le débat est ouvert sur la voie algérienne qui débouche sur un bilan très dur pour le secteur d'Etat et notamment le secteur d'Etat industriel.

La troisième partie du livre intitulée "Capital privé et propriété exploiteuse dans le discours de l'Etat; les conditions d'une lecture plurielle" commence par une étude minutieuse du populisme. La définition léniniste est retenue: "critique petite bourgeoisie de l'impérialisme". Il caractériserait ainsi et en général des mouvements de libération nationale à l'époque de l'impérialisme.

Après avoir évoqué les formes particulières du populisme, l'auteur s'attache à examiner les contradictions du populisme algérien lié à son contexte historique. Le FLN dans sa composition de classes était plutôt un front anti-colonial qu'une organisation révolutionnaire démocratique anti-féodale et anti-impérialiste.

L'auteur insiste sur deux pôles du populisme algérien qui sont l'islam et le socialisme qui s'entrechoquent. Le socialisme est vidé de sa base idéologique matérialiste pour servir d'instrument d'expansion des valeurs de l'islam.

Après l'étude du populisme algérien, l'auteur se penche sur le discours de la bourgeoisie qui prend "les formes de l'apolitisme, du patriotisme et de l'utilité sociale".

Pour terminer, nous dirons que le livre de LIABES est très riche en informations, en documentation et en essais théoriques. Toutefois, on peut faire quelques remarques rapides.

D'abord, nous n'avons pas vu d'explication de la période Ben Bella - aussi brève fut-elle - au coup d'état qui amena Boumedienne au pouvoir. Le clientélisme dont il fait cas pour la consolidation de la bourgeoisie ne paraît pas spécifique à l'Algérie mais général aux pays nouvellement indépendants où la faiblesse du capital national privé fait qu'il tisse toutes sortes de relations au niveau de l'Etat pour pouvoir se développer. Mais peut-être l'auteur a-t-il voulu mettre un accent particulier sur le cas algérien. L'étude qu'il fait du populisme et de son application en Algérie nous semble être la partie la plus intéressante du livre.

On ne peut que le recommander à tous ceux qui s'intéressent aux problèmes des pays nouvellement indépendants, à leurs oscillations doctrinales, à leurs pratiques contradictoires et surtout à tous ceux qui s'intéressent à la voie dite populiste de développement pour sortir du sous-développement.

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