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Zenebeworke Tadesse

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State Regulation of Foreign Investment in Tanzania: An Assessment

*S. Rugumamu**

RÉSUMÉ. Depuis le début des années 1960, la plupart des pays en développement ont adopté de différentes mesures politiques pour attirer et réglementer le flux des investissements étrangers dans leurs économies. Ces mesures sont en général une combinaison de politiques et règles d'investissement globales et d'institutions de surveillance et de réglementations. Les mesures concernant les politiques d'investissement consistent souvent en des déclarations politiques et juridiques spécifiques sur l'investissement étranger. Les mesures concernant les institutions consistent en l'identification des institutions. De 1961 à 1985, la Tanzanie a mis en place diverses politiques ainsi que des institutions d'exécution. Le résultat obtenu montre, d'une manière générale, que les politiques d'investissement poursuivies pèchent en globalité et centre d'intérêt. Apparemment, les mesures de politiques de développement ont été arrêtées tout simplement en tant que réponses sporadiques à des circonstances du moment. Il n'y a pas eu de tentatives de penser en termes d'un plan de développement à long terme et d'élaborer des plans et stratégies complémentaires d'investissement. En outre, on se rendit compte que les devoirs et responsabilités des institutions de régulation n'étaient pas clairement définis. Ce n'était là que les symptômes de politiques de développement ad hoc. Le problème de la gestion de l'investissement était aggravé par une hiérarchie de prise de décision interne diffuse. L'instance suprême de prise de décision responsable du résultat politique global n'était pas clairement stipulée dans la structure de l'Etat. Il était par conséquent difficile de savoir qui devait véritablement prendre quelle décision et tenir responsable de ces décisions. Etant donné un environnement politique et administratif si fragile, les investisseurs étrangers ont eu le luxe de faire de bonnes affaires qui allaient trop dans le sens contraire des intérêts nationaux de la Tanzanie.

Introduction

The Bretton Woods system created and institutionalized international regimes for trade and monetary issues but deliberately ignored international investment¹. All attempts to establish a mandatory set of principles, rules

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1 A conference on trade and employment held in Havana, Cuba, from November 1947 to March 1948 which was to approve the charter to create the international Trade Organization (ITO) and included in its draft charter the right of nations to regulate foreign investment. Article 12 of the charter underscored four basic rights of the host country: (1) to take any appropriate safeguard necessary to ensure that foreign investment is not used as the basis for interference in its internal affairs or national policies; (2) to determine whether and to what extent and upon what terms it will allow future foreign investment; (3) to prescribe and give effect on just terms to requirements as to the ownership of the existing and future investments; and, (4) to prescribe and give effect to other reasonable requirements with respect to existing and future investment (Havana Charter 1948:35).

and norms to govern the behavior and activities of transnational corporations (TNCs) were initially blocked by the United States, and later, by other core countries². Fresh initiatives demanding increased national and international investment regulations began in earnest in the early 1960s. These efforts have been manifested in a plethora of regulatory policies, laws and institutions both in the core and periphery countries.

At the international level, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) since 1976 has adopted voluntary guidelines on the behavior and activities of the TNCs. The Andean Investment Code is another effort by a group of Latin American countries to implement common regional policies toward foreign investment. Finally, December 1974, Resolution 1913 (LVII) of the Economic and Social Council of the UN recognized the centrality of the TNCs in the international political economy by creating the Commission and the Centre on TNCs. Both bodies have since collaborated in the preparation of a "code of conduct" for the TNCs.

At the national level, a number of measures have been taken to regulate foreign investment. These measures are usually a combination of comprehensive investment policies and rules, and monitoring and regulating institutions. The former includes specific policy and legal statements on foreign investment such as identification of which economic sectors are open or closed to foreign investors, the application procedures, ownership structures, criteria necessary for approval, and the investment incentive schedule. The latter identifies the relevant institutions, their specific responsibilities and the channel of command.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate efforts made by post-colonial Tanzania in attracting and regulating foreign investment in the economy, particularly, the manufacturing sector. It is divided into two broad sections. The first section discusses how and why foreign investment is regulated. This provides the official rationale for the state's intervention in the economy. The second section explores different policy measures that have been adopted to attract and regulate foreign investment. Included in the section is an assessment of the capacity of the state's regulatory institutions and defensive responses of TNCs. The paper covers approximately twenty-five years from 1961 to 1985.

2 Mirrow and Maurer (1975: 93) maintain that the US Congress rejected the ITO Charter because it would have curtailed the international activities of the US transnational corporations. This was regarded as an incursion on the national sovereignty.

I - Why Regulate and How?³

In order to understand the nature of relations between the TNCs and the periphery countries, two caveats are in order. First, their objective function constitutes what may be described as the "unity and struggle of the opposite". Whereas host periphery states need TNCs to achieve their national policy goals in a national setting, TNCs need periphery countries to achieve their global corporate objectives (Hymer, 1979; Barrat-Brown, 1977). This fact by itself makes conflicts and tensions inevitable. Second, and as a result of the first point, periphery states have, since the 1960s, responded to this challenge by creating institutions and legal arrangements to regulate and control the behavior and activities of these international corporations.

At the national level, there are two broad levels of foreign investment regulations: the entry level and the operational level. Most periphery states have passed laws that stipulate application requirements, criteria for approval, incentives, dispute settlement procedures, and measures to ensure compliance. Additionally, some countries have established investment boards to screen and evaluate all foreign investment applications (UNCTC: 1978, 1983).

The second level of national regulation is concerned with operational controls once approvals are granted. There are many operational controls and they differ from country to country. The often-cited control mechanisms include: foreign exchange remittance provisions, information disclosure requirements, technology transfers, price controls, and performance evaluation procedures. The enforcement and monitoring of those regulations are done normally by one or several agencies. More often than not, those agencies usually have enough power to sanction foreign investors for non-compliance; the sanctions involved are expected to be sufficient to induce conformity in the future (Robinson, 1976; Lambard, 1978).

The above measures have been taken for at least four basic reasons. First, it is argued that increased ownership and control over the foreign-based economic entities would enhance the state's capacity to direct national economic development. Second, it is maintained that in order to coordinate, link and channel foreign investment to nationally identified priorities, direct state intervention in the economy is indispensable. Third, it is strongly believed that the institutionalization of regulatory control processes would strengthen the state's bargaining capabilities with the TNCs and would put the state in

3 In the subsequent discussion we borrowed Noll's (1985) definition of regulation which is understood as policies, laws and rules that impose obligations and provide punishment for non-compliance.

a better position to curb the TNCs business practices which are considered detrimental to national development efforts. Finally, the question of national security surfaces. It is argued that because TNCs do work at times as intelligence agents for their home governments, and because TNCs have occasionally colluded with governments to create political turmoil in periphery countries, that their international activities ought to be closely watched (Nye, 1974)⁴.

In the following pages an attempt is made to describe and evaluate Tanzania's efforts to attract and regulate foreign investment. Such an evaluation brings to light the capacity of the state to manage the national economy. Its capacity is examined against three related variables. First, attention is paid to the nature of policies initiated and the way they are implemented. The policy contents are discussed and the executing institutions evaluated. The ability to resist pressures from competing domestic interest is the second explanatory variable. Finally, the capacity of the state is gauged against its performance in directing, monitoring, and regulating investment activities of external economic actors.

II - Investment Policies and Regulation in Tanzania 1961-1985

Foreign investment policies in post-colonial Tanzania can be divided into three broad periods: phase one, 1961-1967, was characterized by liberal investment policies; phase two, 1967-1974, was a period strongly influenced by socialism and self-reliance; and, phase three, 1974-1985, policies were generally sporadic responses to the global economic down-turn and domestic economic mismanagement.

(a) Investment Policies, Phase I (1961-1967).

Just prior to independence, the British government invited the World Bank to send a mission to Tanzania "to assess the resources available for future development; to consider how best these might contribute to a balanced program of social and economic development; and, to make recommendations for practical measures to further such developments, and to indicate the financial implications of such recommendations" (World Bank, 1961: vii). The Bank mission advised the incoming government to create, among other things, more attractive incentives and to formulate liberal investment policies. It also called on the new government to establish a development corporation to participate in the promotional aspects of investment, provide loans to investors and to enter into partnership as a means of attracting them. These recommendations were later reinforced by the Arthur D. Little, Inc. consultancy report on industry in 1961. It advised the government to pub-

4 The intervention of International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation in Chilean domestic politics in the early 1970s and US government's collusion in the affair is one of the recent classic examples. For details see Spero (1981: 231-234).

licize the country's investment opportunities to potential foreign investors. The report observed that "most industrial opportunities in Tanganyika are neither so readily identifiable nor so clearly feasible and attractive as to ensure that they will be accomplished without encouragement". On making foreign investment climate attractive, the report recommended that:

For optimum progress in the country's industrial development, the government must maintain and enhance the presently favorable climate for private investment. This is necessary to encourage groups such as foreign investors, already established residents of European and Asian descent, and the indigenous African population (Arthur D. Little 1961:5).

The above two reports served as the basis for subsequent development policies and plans. Particularly in the industrial sector, large foreign investment outlays came to crystalize a new phase in the internationalization of capital. This was a radical shift from the colonial bias against manufacturing. This policy change was prompted by two related factors. First, political independence conferred on the state the power to diversify its international partners. The British monopoly gave way to an international open-door policy. Thus, in international economic relations, the state was free to pick and choose partners. Secondly, the state's preference for industrialization compelled former import suppliers either to embark on local manufacturing or get displaced by other competing investors. Most of them opted for the former. Official support for industrialization started here.

The data in Table 1 provide a clear picture of the structure of the manufacturing industry in 1961. About seventy percent of the manufacturing activities concentrated on processing agricultural commodities and minerals for export. Another fourteen percent was devoted to food processing and to other basic consumer items like clothing and footwear. In subsequent years, more and more of the same activities were introduced and expanded. The structure of the manufacturing industry remained unchanged for the whole decade.

A new wave of foreign investments in the manufacturing sector set in motion another phase in the internationalization of capital. It also gave rise to new forms of integration in the world capitalist system. Along with the traditional dependence on agricultural, mineral exports and finished consumer goods, a dependence on foreign machinery, equipment, management services, investment finance and production inputs was added. As expected, a development strategy propelled by import substituting industrialization of consumer goods, left key investment decision-making in the hands of foreign investors. Sensitive decisions like choices of technology and products, sectoral linkages and plant locations were made by foreign investors. As a result, studies of Tanzania's manufacturing industry in the 1960s and 1970s found very weak sectoral linkage, pervasive capital-intensive produc-

tion techniques, products biased in favor of high income groups, and industries concentrated in very few cities (Rweyemamu, 1973; Kim, 1976).

Table 1 - The Structure of industry in Tanzania in 1961

	N of Establishments	Net Output in 1961	
		Total in thousand British £	% of total
Agricultural processing mainly for export	245	12,020	49
Mining mainly for export	31	4,765	19
Basic food processing and manufacture	248	2,560	10
Consumer goods	225	893	4
Motor Vehicle Repairs	86	336	
Industrial Goods for services	87	876	1
Construction	104	1,954	4
Electricity and water supply	18	1,348	5
Total	1,044	24,756	100

Source : Säver, M. (1984: 81) Table 24

The above structural limitations were exacerbated by the state bureaucracy's concern for economic development with few qualifications. The good will of foreign investors was literally taken for granted. The President himself shared this view initially:

Private investors can provide this quantity of money. They will do so if they believe they can make a profit and that they will be allowed to export their profit if they wish to do so. These conditions we must accept; we can do nothing about them. The question we must ask ourselves in every separate case is whether we also benefit in proportion - by increasing employment opportunities, by increasing government revenue, by increased wealth produced locally and so on; then we should welcome the private enterprise... To be truly revolutionary, we must be absolutely realistic and use what opportunities the world provides (Nyerere, 1964:xiv).

His then Minister of Commerce and Industry had earlier echoed similar optimism to welcome private foreign capital

Tanzania welcomes foreign investment whether large or small, and the government will do all it can to give reasonable help to those who share confidence in the country. Bring your capital, enterprise and skill to Tanganyika in the knowledge that you will be sure of getting a fair play. This land is a land of opportunity for us, it is also a land of opportunity for you (Swai, 1961: 1).

Having embraced foreign investment as an indispensable development tool, the state proceeded to establish a legal and political framework to facilitate the inflow of investments. The Tanganyika Development Corporation (TDC) was created in July 1962. Its principal function (faithful to the two foreign consultancy reports) was to serve as the government arm for promoting economic development through joint venture activities with foreign

firms. In 1964, the assets and liabilities of the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation were transferred to the TDC and the latter's name was changed to the National Development Corporation (NDC)⁵. The functions of the NDC were broadened and focussed. The NDC continued serving as an investment promotional body and providing equity and loan capital to investors. It was also given a lot of freedom to raise money locally and internationally, allowed to enter into partnerships with any agency, and was free to dispose of the surpluses in a manner it deemed fit. The political importance of the NDC was underscored by the appointment of six sectoral ministers on its Board of Directors.

The efficiency criterion of the NDC was assessed by the annual profits and losses made. This strategic performance criterion was enjoined in its enabling Act which had stated that "in carrying on its business, the corporation shall have regard to economic and commercial merits of any undertaking it promotes, finances, develops, manages or assists, and the economic position and potentialities of Tanganyika as a whole and shall use its best endeavors to secure that its business as a whole is carried on at a net profit" (NDC Act 1964).

The Act that established the NDC also identified the Board of Directors as state representatives on all major policy issues. In theory, the Board of Directors had to operationalize the broad state policies into concrete strategic plans and specific performance targets. The Board also had to devise mechanisms and criteria for monitoring and evaluating the performance of the management and the corporation. Its performance record, however, fell far too short of that expectation. First of all, there existed a diffuse power hierarchy. The NDC's chief executive, like some Directors-cum-Ministers was a Presidential appointee. Apparently they enjoyed equal status. Thus, the Board of Directors could only advise the corporation's chief executive but had no power to fire or discipline him in any major way. Second, institutionally it was never quite clear to whom the "all-powerful" Board of Directors was directly accountable. I will argue this lack of an institutionalized control system made the NDC and future state enterprises vulnerable to domestic blackmail and foreign corporate manipulations. Third, the corporation and company Board of Directors did not create a system of evaluating the performance of state enterprises and joint ventures. Therefore one seriously questions the proficiency of the Board's oversight responsibility.

The NDC's original capital in the form of investments and loans was Shs. 34.9 million in 1965, a modest investment base. Precisely because of this,

5 The Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation was established in 1955 to take over the UK Overseas Food Corporation's three major development sectors of the ill-fated Groundnut Scheme. These were ranches, groundnut projects and flue-cured tobacco projects.

NDC favored joint ventures with foreign partners and preferred minimal equity participation (Seidman, 1972: 110-112). Its investment activities were supplemented by the Tanganyika Development Finance Company (TDFL) established in 1962. This was a multilateral joint venture between the governments of Tanzania through the NDC; the United Kingdom's Colonial (later Commonwealth) Development Corporation; Federal Republic of Germany's Deutsche Gessellschaft fur Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit; and, three years later, the Netherlands', Netherlands Overseas Financierings Mastchappy. Each contributed half a million pounds to the joint fund (Baker et al. 1986: 65). Together with the NDC, the TDFL stimulated private investments by providing equity capital, loans, debentures and managerial services. The company also carried out feasibility studies and post-investment consultancy services.

After creating the development and finance institutions, the government went forward to pass requisite investment codes. The Foreign Investment (Protection) Act of 1963 assured investors of full and fair compensation in the case of nationalization or any other compulsory forms of state expropriation. The investors could, on application, repatriate their investment profits, dividends, interests and royalties in accordance with current regulations under that law.

Additionally, a schedule of fiscal incentives to investors was drawn up by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. This consisted of generous income tax capital and handsome annual depreciation allowances on industrial machinery, equipment and buildings. Moreover, under the local industries (Refund of Custom Duties) Ordinance of 1967, refund of customs duties, excise and other taxes could be claimed, subject to the fulfillment of stipulated conditions. Finally, a variety of tariffs could be negotiated with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in order to protect the "infant industry". During the period under review, Rweyemamu's (1973: 134) calculations show that the effective rate of protection ranged from a low 95 percent on the radio assembly to a high of 528 percent on the tobacco industry. Between these two extremes were items such as match boxes, textiles, beer and footwear at 395, 265, 185 and 123 per cent, respectively.

The creation of conducive investment conditions climaxed with the legislation for strict labor control laws. The late 1950s and the early 1960s witnessed widespread labor unrest, strikes and division(s) within the labor movement in Tanzania. The causes of unrest ranged from low wages and union autonomy to the slow pace of the Africanization of top civil service positions (Jackson, 1979; Bienefeld, 1979, and Shivji, 1986). In 1962, for instance, 152 strikes involving 48,434 workers with the loss of 417,474 man-days were recorded (Shivji, 1986:227). Such kinds of behavior posed a threat not only to the government's stability and credibility, but also diminished the investment attractiveness of Tanzania. The state responded by passing the Trade Dispute Act of 1962 and the Permanent Labor Tribunal

Act of 1967, which made strikes virtually impossible. The first act instituted a lengthily negotiation process and prohibited strikes and lockouts "unless due process had been followed". The second Act set out to regulate collective disputes of the union and the employer. It also went further to provide for the regulation of wages. The international Labor Office study had earlier recommended a five percent annual raise in all income categories - a recommendation that was accepted and incorporated in the national wage policy.

It is abundantly clear from the above account that the state could hardly have done better to attract foreign investment. The first Minister of Labor and also the Secretary General of NUTA ('Workers' Organization) remarked in 1965 that "these developments... are a major guarantee of industrial peace and political stability which must be offered to attract the overseas investors" (Kamaliza, 1965: 204). The question that logically follows is what the state demanded as a pro quo and how was it to be evaluated. Initially, there was no public policy that addressed foreign investment performance. Nor was the behavior of the TNCs considered a problem of any sort. However, given the laissez-faire investment policy and given the absence of a comprehensive development program nationally and sectorally, foreign investment regulation would have been an uphill battle. This policy gap left planners and day-to-day decision-makers with no explicit criteria for screening and evaluating investment applications, unsure of what technologies to recommend, what products to approve, and the like.

In such a diffuse business atmosphere, foreign companies did what they do best - manipulate and cheat. Some capitalized on used machinery and equipment (Mwanza Textile Mill), other over-invoiced machinery and equipment (automated bread factory), and still others restricted exports (cigarettes) (Rweyemamu, Coulson, 1979; Rugumamu, 1983). It is little surprising therefore that by 1968. The capital outflow far exceeded the capital inflow. The data in Table 2 bear excellent witness.

The table only shows officially documented capital outflows which included dividends, profits, loan payments, salary transfers, insurance payments, management and consultancy fees to mention the most important ones. This is only part of the picture. As Van Hall (1979: 191-200) and Yaffey (1970: 186) empirically demonstrated, a sizeable amount of capital left the country through over-invoicing and under-invoicing practices by the TNCs' subsidiaries. The need to regulate the TNCs' activities became increasingly obvious and urgent.

The disappointing performance in the investment arena was also recorded in other sectors of the economy. The state Bureaucracy responded to this crisis by proposing an alternative development strategy of socialism and self-reliance. The fine details of this policy are contained in the TANU's *Arusha Declaration on Socialism and Self-Reliance* of 1967. The key rationale of the policy was that capitalism could not be adapted in Africa. It was argued that Africa did not have the necessary critical mass of capitalists in

order to initiate and sustain capitalism, and that independent capitalism in periphery countries like Tanzania was impossible. The Declaration asserted:

Table 2 - Gross Profit outflow and net inflow of private capital 1961-1968 (in mill. Shs.)

Year	Profit Outflow	Capital Inflow
1961	- 72.2	+ 50
1962	- 73.0	+ 58
1963	- 123.0	+ 155
1964	- 93.0	+ 79
1965	- 110.0	- 6
1966	- 114.0	+ 138
1967	- 159.0	- 66
1968	- 114.0	+ 76
Total	- 857.2	+ 484

Source: Rweyemamu (1971: 115) Table 1.

Third world capitalism would have no choice except to cooperate with external capitalism as a very junior partner... Development through capitalism therefore means that we third world nations have to meet conditions laid down by others - by capitalists of other countries. And if we agree to their conditions, we shall have to continue to be guided by them or face the threat of new enterprises running out of money and skills being withdrawn, and of other economic sanctions being applied against us (TANU, 1967).

The Arusha Declaration called for the nationalization of the major means of production, distribution and exchange; eliminating exploitation of man by man; and institutionalizing people's participation in all important decision-making processes. The policy strongly rejected the domination that usually accompanies foreign investment. It also laid down some broad policy conditions for allowing future participation of foreign private investment in the national economy. It added that:

We shall not depend upon overseas aid to the extent of bending our political, economic or social policies in the hope of getting it. But we shall try to get it in order that we may hasten our economic progress... Similarly with private enterprise, we have rejected the domination of private enterprise, but we shall continue to welcome private investment in all those areas not reserved for government (Arusha Declaration 1967:24).

Following the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration, the Party directed the government to nationalize what were considered the "commanding heights" of the economy, to acquire majority shares in major foreign-owned industrial enterprises and to create requisite institutions that would manage,

direct and regulate the national economy⁶. To effect nationalization measures, the Parliament passed several laws to formalize the takeover of banks, insurance companies, large import-export firms and major manufacturing industries. The National Bank of Commerce Act of 1967 formalized the takeover of all nine foreign commercial banks. The State Trading Corporation Act of the same year nationalized all assets of the major whole-sale import and export firms. The nationalized industries were placed under the aegis of the NDC. The initial political commitment to control the national economy was bogged down by the lack of sufficient managerial, technical and administrative expertise. Thus, it was agreed that the parent companies would continue supplying management services under management and consultancy agreements.

The initial absence of an investment policy in Tanzania provided investors with a wide bargaining advantage. Coulson (1976) and Penrose (1976) concluded that the management and technical consultancy agreements signed between 1967 and 1970 invariably displayed that bargaining edge. The TNCs wrote in most contracts, clauses that ensured commercial lock-ins for determining sources and destinations, magnitudes and prices of certain crucial imports and exports. Management fees were paid regardless of performance. Above all, no time-tables were drawn up for the localization of foreign management teams. "Blood-sucking contracts" truly, they were!

Shortly afterward, the Party issued additional directives on the policy implementation in the agricultural sector and in the education system. There were no directives concerning socialist industrial development or investment. The absence of a long-term national investment plan into which the NDC, local and foreign investors could fit and against which investment policies and performance could be evaluated, remained a worrisome policy gap. This basic policy shortcoming was responsible, in turn, for subsequent haphazard, costly and unwise investment ventures (Ghai, 1976; Loxley and Saul, 1976; and Barker *et al.*, 1986). Moreover, the Arusha Declaration broadened the responsibilities of the NDC without simultaneously stipulating to whom this "omnibus corporation" was accountable - to its Board of Directors? to the President? to the Parliament? or to all of the above?

Finally in the wake of socialism and self-reliance it was unclear what performance criteria were to be applied to nationalized enterprises, and which particular behavior of the foreign minority shareholders-cum-managers was

6 The rationale for public ownership was four-fold. First of all, it would enhance economic justice by controlling its principal means of production and by ensuring the well-being of all. Secondly, the exploitation of man by man or group by group would be prevented. Thirdly the accumulation of wealth by a few individuals would be arrested. Fourthly, it would correct the inherent imbalance by government initiatives through income distribution and regional equalization.

to be monitored for regulation and by whom. In a nutshell, as Hyden (1984: 107-108) correctly observed, policy-making in Tanzania has not usually been informed by full and detailed knowledge of possible consequences of the decisions made.

These important investment policy issues were left unresolved. The Second Five-Year Plan (1969-1974) picked up some of these issues, but not in a comprehensive and systematic fashion. The Plan document contained arguments explicitly in favor of the expansion of the public sector. Three major benefits from public ownership were identified:

- (1) It will be possible to create a genuine Tanzanian "know-how" faster than under conditions of unrestricted private investment;
- (2) It will be possible to pursue a more effective industrial strategy; and
- (3) The profits made in the industry will be reinvested in Tanzania.

(B) Investment Policies Phase II (1967-1974)

The Second Five-Year Plan which was launched two years after the Declaration contained further amplification of the socialist policy. First, it divided the national economy into four investment categories:

(1) Wholly State-Controlled Industries - These were strategic industries like banking, insurance, petroleum exploration and armaments, in which the government or its parastatal shareholding were 100 per cent.

(2) Partly Controlled Industries - Basic industries where government ownership amounted to more than 50 percent of the voting and participating shares.

(3) Joint Ventures - These were industries of paramount importance to the large sections of the population or to other industries. Here direct or indirect state involvement was prescribed though not necessarily a controlling share of ownership.

(4) Open Industries - All industries not falling under (1) to (3) were not liable to government entry restrictions.

Second, the Plan also clarified the hitherto ambiguous investment criteria. It provided four general criteria and left the specifics to be operationalized by sectoral ministries. The criteria were:

(1) Net Foreign Exchange Effect - specific projects had to contribute to a positive balance of payments after adding the cost of importing capital equipment as well as materials and supplies;

(2) Real Net Contribution to Domestic Product - projects selected had to contribute significantly to the national output by broadening the range of real local resource employment;

(3) Budgetary Impact - that account had to be taken of the fact that the substitution of domestic for imported manufactures might result in a loss of import duties usually not fully matched by direct taxes on domestic output; and,

(4) Social impact - factors such as greater balance and social benefits had to be considered (Government of Tanzania, 1969).

Besides those two policy "innovations", an industrial Licensing Board was created at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Its functions were to screen and evaluate all new investment proposals, promote orderly development of the manufacturing industry and to provide services for registration and licensing. Sometime later, a full-fledged directorate for investment and Project Implementation was established at the same ministry.

New foreign investments after the Arusha Declaration almost invariably took the form of joint venture. Particularly in the manufacturing sector, state majority ownership emerged as the standard practice. Examples include Tanzania Tanneries (25 percent Kloeckner of West Germany); Stell Rolling Mill (20 percent Danielli of Italy); and, General Tire (26 per cent General Tire International of the USA). With those changes in the investment pattern, TNCs' profit-making mechanisms gradually shifted from mere production and distribution to the sale of machinery and equipment, information and skills.

Despite the rhetoric of the Arusha Declaration and thereafter, foreign capital continued to dominate the national development budget. The data in Table 3 show that external contribution to development expenditure increased from 39 per cent in 1974 to 79 percent in 1983 - a very significant rise. As already observed, foreign investors were constrained by a handful of state regulations. Specific TNCs' behaviors for regulating had yet to be determined. This is obvious from the duties and responsibilities of major regulatory institutions. To them I now turn.

Table 3 - Share of external resources in Tanzania's Development Budgets 1974-1983 (Tshs. million)

Year	Total Dev. Expenditures (Tsh. 000)	External loans and grants	Loans and Grants as % of Total
1974	1,642	639	39
1975	2,225	1,198	54
1976	2,189	1,107	60
1977	2,731	1,510	55
1978	3,388	1,626	48
1979	4,758	2,559	54
1980	4,889	3,063	62
1981	4,807	2,721	57
1982	5,215	2,710	52
1983	4,405	3,480	79

Source : World Bank (1984: 57) Table 3.7

Key Ministries and Boards of Directors

In theory, the sectoral ministry and the ministry of Treasury and Planning must direct, coordinate and supervise the activities of state enterprises. This is usually through a variety of statutory provisions in the forms of approvals and sanctions of Board actions and decisions. To accomplish these tasks, ministries have to keep pace with the growing demand for technical and administrative expertise in the areas of investment policy planning, evaluation and implementation. There has been little conscious effort toward man-

power training and retention. By 1985, a little less than 50 percent of the established technical posts were unfilled at the Ministries of Commerce and Industry and at the Treasury and Planning Ministry (Rugumamu, 1987). This shortcoming alone made meaningful routine evaluations of new investment proposals and particularly on-going projects, very difficult. Above all, neither the parent ministries nor the Treasury devised general and specific guidelines for evaluating the company and managerial performance.

At the enterprise level, the Board of Directors assumes the role of shareholders. It has to operationalize the broad state policies into concrete strategic plans and operational targets. It also has to devise mechanisms and criteria to monitor and evaluate the corporate and managerial performance. As already noted, state enterprise management in Tanzania leaves a lot to be desired.

Until the beginning of the 1980s, the choice for chief executives of corporations and Boards of Directors was largely determined by individual's political closeness to top decision-makers. It was not uncommon to find Boards dominated by members of Parliament, pre-independence political activists, and senior civil servants. Important management attributes like expertise and professional experience were relegated to secondary positions. The *Daily News* of May 11, 1976 quoted the then Minister of Manpower's rationalization of the practice :

Those entrusted with leadership of government and economic institutions in countries like ours which are effecting a political and economic revolution must be part and parcel of the masses. Politically uncommitted managers in Africa are a threat and not an asset to national development.

Surely, the minister should have known better than that. Political commitment is a necessary but not sufficient condition for efficient socialist management. The quality of work performed by most Boards have impressed few outside observers. Board members have often been accused of being too busy with other affairs, of having too little technical knowledge of the enterprise they were directing, and of meeting too infrequently (Shivji, 1976; Mihyo, 1985; Loxley and Saul, 1975). The Tanzania Audit Corporation report of 1979 complained that:

Our experience, however, shows that very few parastatals acknowledge our reports and implement our suggestions. Out of 220 management audit reports issued during the year 1978-1979, only 91 reports were stated to have been tabled before the Board of Directors. Some 66 companies only acknowledged the receipt of our reports... In certain parastatals the Board of Directors do not seem to appreciate the significance of audit report... some Boards are inactive and do not hold formal meetings, sometimes over one year, to review and appraise the performance of their organizations (TCA 1970).

Such evaluations amply demonstrate the structural sloppiness of the monitoring and evaluating system in Tanzania. The system does not have built-in mechanisms of checks and balances. Nor is the final authority on state enterprise performance known. When the Board fails to meet as required by law, there is no one to wake them up. Thus, things tend to go on and on unchecked - a conducive environment for TNCs'!

The Bank of Tanzania

Until the mid-1960s, the East African Currency Board played the role of the Central Bank for three former British East African colonies. In December 1965, in an effort to increase state control of the economy, the Tanzanian Parliament passed an act to establish the Bank of Tanzania. Its existence before the Arusha Declaration made some of the subsequent control measures manageable.

In the wake of the Arusha Declaration, the Bank of Tanzania provides the government with advisory services on international payments and on agreements between the government, its agencies and foreign governments and institutions. Such agreements include management agreements, purchase agreements under supplier's credit, commodity credit, direct cash loans and other credits. In this respect, for every financial agreement reached, a separate agreement is worked out between this Bank and the Central Bank of the lending country or agency to ensure smooth payment under the credit agreement (Mushi, 1981: 210).

The Bank's Exchange Control Department plays a leading role in the regulatory domain. All transactions involving foreign exchange require the Bank's sanctions. Moreover, since 1972 this department and the Import Department have been assisted by an independent transnational, the General Superintendence Company Limited of Geneva. The Company is responsible for ensuring that goods authorized for importation are of acceptable quality and of competitive prices. The General Superintendence Company's success in exposing over-invoicing abuses has been phenomenal. Van Hall (1979) found that during the first three months in Tanzania, well over 400 import orders were cancelled by prospective importers because of such abuses. It should be quickly pointed out, however, that General Superintendent Company inspects only those goods exceeding Shs. 20,000 and it is paid 1 percent of the f.o.b. price of the goods inspected. Its usefulness, however, goes to a point. Only prices for commodities whose market prices are known or easily estimable can be verified. Unique commodities from a single supplier have proved, apparently, very difficult to assess.

(C) Investment Policies Phase III (1974-1984)

The global capitalist recession and oil price hikes of the 1970s played havoc on the fragile economy of Tanzania. This translated into severe shortage of foreign exchange and the contraction of the economy. Imports became more expensive while the volume and value of exports dwindled signi-

ificantly. At the same time, the capacity, of the state to manage the economy began to show serious and obvious strains. To cope with this crisis, for the first time, tougher measures were taken to control the activities of foreign investment.

The companies (Regulation of Dividends and Surplus and Misc.) Act of 1972 gave the Minister of the Treasury sweeping power over investment matters. He could hence limit dividends that companies could pay shareholders. Limits were defined either as a percent of profit (80 percent), by the average of the profit of the three previous years, or by the level of assets of the company after payment of the dividends (not less than 120 percent of the par value of the paid-up share capital). Moreover, the Minister could require a "specified company" to declare its dividends and specify the minimum rate if "in his opinion, it is in the national interests or in the interests of the shareholders desirable to do so"⁷.

To enable the Minister to do that, all specified companies were required by law to submit cash flow budgets, setting out their estimated income, sources of income, and particulars of estimated expenditures. Additionally, the Minister could require a scheduled company to invest a specified part of its estimated income in government securities or any other investment specified by the Minister. Two years later in 1974, this Act was strengthened by an amendment that prohibited the reduction of the share capital of a specified company without the consent of the Treasury Registrar.

In 1974, the Finance Act passed. It required all state enterprises to submit, over and above annual cash flows, their projected production and investment levels for each coming year to the Treasury Registrar. This kind of information became even more important, particularly with the introduction of the annual budget-and-planning exercise - yet another control instrument. As if that were not enough, the Parastatal Organizations (Financial Supervision and Control) Act of 1975 was added. It empowered the Minister of Treasury, with the consent of the President, to direct any state enterprise to pay the government dividends, loans, contributions, or portions of net profits or surplus as he would specify.

Such restrictive laws have given rise to new patterns of foreign investment in the country. Lately, there has been less direct foreign investment and joint ventures and more wholly state-owned enterprises, finances through direct loans or machinery supplier's credits. Turn-key contracts and licensing agreements have become particularly common in Tanzania. In the textile industry, for example, all six multi-million dollar complexes initiated between 1975-1985 are 100 percent state owned. Not surprisingly, all have

7. "Specified companies" are both private and public companies which constitute the "most important enterprises" in the economy. The list is, to say the least, arbitrary.

been financed either through direct loans or through machinery supplier's credits. These new textile industries, just as those before them are run by foreign firms through technical and management contracts (Rugumamu, 1987).

Additional Administrative Control Instruments

In theory, all government ministries and state enterprises must submit their tentative plans and the sources of investment finance to the Ministry of Treasury and Planning for overall planning purposes. After being scrutinized, modified, changed or dropped, those plans are later sent for discussion to the Parliament. Thus, in theory again, the government and Parliament are empowered to regulate and control all major investment activities of state enterprises through planning. In practice, however, the story as told by Coulson (1979), Wangwe (1984) and the World Bank (1977) is quite different.

It has been found that in the annual budget and planning sessions, the major government preoccupation has always been how best to allocate available resources to competing applicants. Should a Minister table proposals not part of the medium-term plan priorities, but should such proposals be backed by foreign funds, rarely would these projects be turned down. State enterprise managers have often shopped around the world for such investment finances. Unconstrained by rigid efficiency criteria or plan priorities, these managers have been keen and active showing their political masters new projects and building personal empires. Mihyo (1985:223) strongly suspected private accumulation motives by those engaged in foreign loan negotiations. He did not provide hard evidence (of kickbacks and bribes), but given pervasive corruption practices in state enterprises, his doubts are warranted.

Regulation and control through planning have also been weakened by aid negotiation practices. Some state enterprise managers and government bureaucrats have approached major donor agencies for project aid. Once the aid was promised, neither the Treasury nor the sectoral ministries were willing to turn down unplanned aid offers (World Bank, 1977: 123). What the Bank report fails to appreciate here is the obverse of the same coin. Some foreign governments, multilateral agencies (particularly the Bank itself) and TNCs proposed, supported and solicited government approval of several ill-conceived and poorly prepared investment projects⁸. Projects like these were

8 In the late 1970s the World Bank, IDA, SIDA KFW (A West German Aid Agency), Kuwait Fund, Commonwealth Development Fund and the OPEC Special Fund agreed to finance the Mufindi Paper Project at the cost of \$250 million. It was established that 40 percent of all running costs and 80 percent of all the capital costs were to be financed from foreign exchange. The plant closed down in its first year of operation because it was unable to pay its running costs.

accepted even when they had low strategic importance in medium-term plans, or when they showed a high degree of dependence on foreign resource inputs. In the final analysis, such practices left the government in terribly embarrassing situations. The Government's inability to control the reckless investment drive of state enterprise managers, foreign aid donors and international machinery and equipment merchants increasingly limited not only its capacity to manage the economy but also increased TNCs' degree of maneuverability.

Mytelka (1981) and Parker (1979) documented the pervasive practice of overbuilding plants by TNCs in turn-key projects. The practice is common in situations where a foreign firm is hired to serve both as a project engineering agency and project consulting agency. The higher the total value of the project, the higher the fee charged. Here they have the incentive to overbuild plants! The practice is even more common where one of the agencies is a manufacturer or connected in one way or another with manufacturing firms. This particular problem is bound to remain outstanding in Tanzania as long as project consulting firms are TNCs.

Moreover, there has been a strong tendency by planners to focus on the coming year and on new investments in the budget and planning sessions. Even worse, there has been gross inattention to future resource implications on the viability of approved investments. This has apparently resulted in chronic underutilization of capacity, low productivity, shortages of managerial and technical personnel and inflationary pressures due to massive government subsidies (Wangwe, 1984; Ndulu, 1984). The recurrent expenditure crisis of the 1970s and 1980s has been partly managed through bilateral and multilateral aid credits. However, as Table 4 shows, most aid was tied to imports and usually to the donor's on-going projects. Thus, there was noway such funds could have been diverted to other purposes. The World Bank (1984) has estimated that between 1975 and 1978 tied aid increased from about 25 percent to 40-50 percent⁹. Therefore, what appeared to be national economic projects were, in fact, either Swiss, German, or World Bank projects in conception, direction, and content. State control or regulation in these circumstances was, to say the least, illusory.

9 Helleiner (1967) estimated that goods bought by Tanzania under tied-aid agreements were at least 20 percent more expensive than they would have been on the world market. Later Bhagwati (1970: 17) and an independent Group on British Aid (1982) estimated that the purchase of goods in an aid-giving country was on average 20 percent above the free market prices. UNCTAD (1987: 97) reported that approximately two-thirds of the bilateral commitments, of which technical cooperation and food aid accounted for an important part, were tied. Such practices not only entail higher costs and less efficient procurement but also other disadvantages associated with the degree of complexity of the technologies purchased.

Table 4 - Foreign Aid as % of Total Import Value* - 1970-1981 (in Shs. million)

Year	Exports (Shs.mill.)	Imports	Exports as % of Imports	Total Aid	Aid as % of Imports
1970	1797	2774	79	-	-
1971	1913	2726	70	236	8.2
1972	2313	2883	80	468	19.7
1973	2581	3479	74	666	19.1
1974	2878	5377	54	1263	23.5
1975	2764	5709	48	2530	44.3
1976	4108	5350	77	1707	31.9
1977	4464	6181	72	2334	37.7
1978	3670	8798	42	2604	29.4
1979	4484	9073	49	3631	40.0
1980	4166	10,308	40	4365	42.4
1981	4807	10,047	48	4363	43.4

*Total Aid = Grants + Loans

Source: Bank of Tanzania, *Operations Reports*.

The second administrative instrument is the Special Committee on Parastatal Management Agreement created in 1971. The Special Committee's responsibility was to scrutinize, modify, or reject all proposed foreign investment agreements between Tanzania and outside agencies. Its recommendations are finally reviewed by the Economic Committee of the Cabinet. The establishment of this Special Committee was government's response to the devastating revelations that about all agreements signed in the wake of Arusha Declaration were against national economic interests (Penrose, 1976: 147-174). It was necessary for old agreements to be reviewed and approved by those two bodies. The participating members of the Special Committee have been drawn from the Bank of Tanzania, Treasury, Attorney General's Chambers, the sectoral ministry, Tanzania Audit Corporation and the Ministry of Economic Planning. Negotiators and drafters have been provided with specific terms of reference such as: a provision of training technical and managerial personnel; timetable for localizing all foreign management positions; a management fee depending on profitability to induce efficiency; and a bias for labor-intensive technologies.

Recent agreements have closely followed the above terms of reference. On the surface of things, Tanzania has moved up the learning curve. Some studies have shown, however, that the profitability criterion as a measure of efficiency and as a basis for calculating management fees, has been rendered inoperative by larger macro-economic problems (Ndulu, 1984). The choice of production techniques has been almost always left to foreign investors, project consultants or to TNCs selling machinery and equipment through supplier's credit arrangements. Finally, very few TNCs, if any, have fully complied with the training provision of the agreement. In a nutshell, the state's awareness of the predatory activities of the TNCs has not significantly led to an improved regulatory performance (Rugumamu, 1987).

The third administrative instrument is financial accountability through annual commercial audit and balance sheets. State enterprises in Tanzania are largely financed by public funds or state-guaranteed loans, and are therefore required by law to be audited by the Tanzania Audit Corporation (TAC). Reports of the audited accounts must be distributed to shareholders, the sectoral ministry, Treasury and Planning, the Party and the Parliamentary Sub-Committees on Parastatals and the State House. Corporations must also produce annual reports and accounts. These provide elaborate information, accounting for the corporation's or company's action during the year in question with necessary explanations to justify actions performed and ends pursued. Besides issuing certified financial statements, the TAC is also empowered to "review internal controls, operating procedures, adequacy of record-keeping, management practices resulting in any fractious or extravagant use of public funds".

A significant number of corporations have been submitting their annual accounts for auditing several years late. The TAC report of the financial year ending in June 1982, found that of the 376 audited state companies, 28.7 percent received clean reports; 33.5 percent received qualified reports; 30 percent received disclaimers of opinion; 5.6 percent received adverse opinion reports; and, 2 percent received no reports. It added that about 185 client companies did not submit their annual accounts for audit that financial year. During the first half of 1985, of the 205 state enterprises audited, only 39 percent received clean reports, 44 percent received qualified reports and 17 percent were given disclaimers or adverse opinions. Once again, a good proportion of them went unaudited (TAC, 1986) preference is often made to the insufficiency of qualified managerial and technical personnel. Even then there has been little conscious effort to train and retain such personnel. The same arguments falter when a foreign-hired team fails to submit books for audit.

It should be emphasized again that the Public Corporation Act of 1969 and the specific orders that established subsequent state corporations make no explicit mention of a performance evaluation requirements of the corporations, companies or management. Nor do they link incentives or sanctions to performance. This conspicuous policy gap has provided the management (local or foreign) with a wide latitude to do anything without fear of serious repercussions. Thus, company after company has accumulated huge losses, and neither the managers nor the directors have been fired or demoted. Part of these losses are a product of large-scale embezzlement in some corporations. Between 1979 and 1981, for example, more than Shs. 172 million was reported as stolen from state enterprises (*Daily News*, June 28, 1983). When caught, the most serious and common punitive measures these corrupt or inefficient senior managers would get is retirement in the public interest. Instances where top management was taken to court and prosecuted are very few and far apart. By the same token, some hard-working, dynamic and

innovative managers have produced wonderful results, but the system has no built-in mechanism or tradition of appreciating hard work.

Parliament is another monitoring and control organ of the state. There is a specialized parliamentary sub-committee on state enterprises. There are no explicit guidelines that stipulate when and under what circumstances this sub-committee meets. Equally important, it is not clear what particular policy areas it is supposed to evaluate and to whom it should finally report its findings for action. The exercise is even more complicated for the full parliamentary floor session. Given the number of corporations and the time allotted to parliamentary question sessions, it would be naive to expect the parliament to go through 400-plus reports. This is not all. Given also the "technical" nature of the audited statements of accounts and the average educational background of some of the honorable members of parliament with no specialized parliamentary staff, the corporations' financial accountability is left largely unattended by this important body.

What does this tell us? The regulatory system, though highly desirable, has not been thoroughly thought through. This is symptomatic of vague policies and plans, uncoordinated institutional goals and insufficient political commitment to the policy. Huntington (1968), Pozen (1976), and Teriba (1970) perceptively conclude that state corporations in periphery countries are largely created as a prime source for political patronage and class consolidation. They argued that the use of strong nationalist rhetoric, and at times the invocation of socialism are merely diversionary tactics. The basic purpose has been, in fact, to enrich the government and party bureaucracy, legitimize their rule, buy political support from different factions of society and consolidate their state power. Examples of presidents and ministers giving top state enterprise jobs to their relatives, friends, and political confidants are too many to list. Moreover, examples of the same bureaucrats using their positions to commit terrible economic scandals (but going unpunished) are just as frequent. In the final analysis, state enterprises in Tanzania have been driven by political rather than by economic rationale.

By the late 1970s, the state bureaucracy in Tanzania had grown both in size and power. The cream of the bureaucracy fell under three categories: top government bureaucrats, party bureaucrats, and state enterprise bureaucrats. Their lifestyles, habits and indeed their accessibility to state coffers bound them into a rather homogeneous non-productive, consuming class. Most of them do not own any private means of production of their own, but depend largely on corruption and embezzlement of public funds. Mukandara (1983:261) found that outstanding personal advances and travelling allowances of those senior bureaucrats went up from negligible amounts in 1967 to Shs. 48,946,267 in 1974/75, to Shs. 60 million in 1977/78, and to a staggering Shs. 221.78 million in 1980/81. These figures have over the years continued to rise!

The Tanzanian Controller and Auditor General reported that during 1985/86 over Shs. 1,000 million could not be accounted for by the government departments (Uhury, 1987). All this took place as the average economic conditions of the toiling masses were deteriorating year in and year out and political dissensions were tightly censored. The peasant producers' share of gross sale value of cash crops declined drastically from 70.3 percent in 1970 to 41.7 percent in 1980 (Ellis, 1982: 12). A freeze on the minimum wage since the mid-1970s, plus rising prices severely eroded purchasing power of wage earners. The real wage in 1981 was lower than it was in 1963 (World Bank, 1984: 3). The great promises of socialism and self-reliance were becoming illusory. If the guardians of socialism have failed to regulate their own conduct, how in the world would they monitor and control foreign agencies?

Conclusion

This paper has presented investment policies pursued by Tanzania the last thirty years. It was argued that, on the whole, various investment and policy packages lacked comprehensiveness. Different measures were initiated merely as sporadic responses to particular circumstances of the moment. Apparently no attempts were made to think through a long-term development program and to design complementary investment policies.

The experience of Tanzania has also demonstrated that whereas a plethora of incentives to foreign investment has been long instituted, general and specific regulatory control measures have yet to be clearly defined. The state is still uncertain as to what particular aspects of TNCs activities have to be earmarked for immediate monitoring and control. Several regulatory institutions have been created but their duties and responsibilities are poorly defined. Duplication of responsibilities among these institutions, therefore, is not uncommon. This problem has been exacerbated by a diffuse internal power hierarchy. The top decision-making body responsible for the overall policy outcome is not clearly stipulated in the governance structure. This has made it difficult to know who should make decisions and who should be held responsible for those decisions. Given such a fragile political and business environment, TNCs have had the luxury to strike bargains that were inordinately biased against national interests.

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Monetary Politics in Franc Zone Africa: The Wolf-Sheep Game

*Ngek Tatah Mentan**

RESUME. La politique monétaire française en zone franc africaine sert à la France d'instrument de contrôle et d'exploitation capitalistes des économies africaines. Ce contrôle et cette exploitation monétaires des pays de la zone par la France se poursuit plus de vingt-ans après "l'Indépendance" en raison de la communauté d'intérêts qui lie les capitalistes français à leurs commissionnaires africains - les classes dirigeantes locales. Avec le développement des forces révolutionnaires dans les enclaves qui aspirent au désengagement, la collusion des intérêts exploités franco-africains ne peut survivre longtemps aux agents locaux du gaullisme en Afrique. L'éviction de ces agents locaux et le désengagement consécutif vis-à-vis de l'impérialisme monétaire français peut préparer la voie à la création d'un système monétaire continental équitable, visant à l'épanouissement des masses africaines déshéritées.

Introduction

The rules and convention governing financial relations between states is a crucial component of international relations. Monetary relations tend to have a pervasive influence in international relations at both the domestic and international levels. When international monetary relations fare well other relations have better chances of faring well too. But when they fare badly, other areas are bound to suffer as well. Turmoils in international monetary relations inevitably lead to economic and political earthquakes. The dollar crisis in the early 1970s is a case in point.

The ghost of semantics haunts any analysis of international monetary relations as a result of the pervasive influence of monetary politics. Some analysts opt for the term "international order". But, any "system" is expected to be at least systematic. And, any "order" in itself is similarly expected to be orderly. These conventional words - "system" and "order" - are misleading in terms of international monetary arrangements. Since Bretton Woods, international monetary arrangements have proved to be all but systematic and orderly. This chaotic international monetary situation consequently focuses analytical attention on the semantic problem of choice of a conventional term.

The term *regime* is used here to represent any particular set of rules or conventions governing monetary and financial relations between states as actors in the international system. A monetary regime, therefore, specifies which instruments of policy may be used and which targets of policy are regarded as legitimate. This includes the militing cases in which there are no restrictions on either policy instruments or policy targets. In fact, each

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monetary regime has many variants that may either mitigate or aggravate the disadvantages¹ to its adherents.

This analysis is confined to three, though by no means exhaustive, broad dimensions of a monetary regime. The choice of these dimensions and possible stopping points along each dimension is influenced by their prominence in current discussions of reform of international monetary regimes. These dimensions are: the role of exchange rates (convertibilities) within the monetary regime; the nature of the reserve assets (liquidity); and, the degree of control of international capital movements.

The dimensions can be viewed as varying along a continuum. But, for analytical purposes, it is perhaps more useful to pin-point specific co-ordinates in each of these dimensions. The quest for these particular points of departure or co-ordinates in this study is obvious. It is a truism that every international monetary regime claims that its ultimate purpose is to improve the economic well-being and security of all mankind. Beset with these claims and counter-claims what criteria can therefore be used to judge the claims of any international monetary regimes. These dimensions are : the role of exchange rates (convertibility) within the monetary regime; the degree of control of international capital movements.

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Richard N. Cooper's four criteria readily come to mind². He theorizes in terms of: a) economic efficiency enhanced by the monetary regime; b) its scope for accommodating local diversity in objectives; c) its contribution to harmony in international relations beyond monetary relations; and, d) its ability to achieve a desired distribution of the gains, both between countries and within countries.

The choice of Cooper's criteria is intended to reinforce the argument of this paper which is that international monetary relations within the Franc Zone are politically calculated to maintain total French control, domination and exploitation of the economies of African members. And, no matter the

1 A. J. P. Taylor, *English History 1914-1945* (New York: Oxford.

2 Richard N. Cooper, "Prolegomena to the Choice of an International Monetary System", in C. Fred Bergstein and Lawrence B. Krause (eds.), *World Politics and International Economies*, (Washington D.C., 1975), p.68.

clothing put on the monetary regime, Franco-African monetary relations are like relations between a wolf and a sheep. Of course, relations between a wolf and a sheep are never those of the law of the jungle: eat or be eaten. Nor can the relations ever be those sweet-heartening types of husband and wife. They are always relations of the herbivorous sheep at the mercy of the carnivorous wolf. The wolf feasts on the sheep but never *vice-versa*. The sheep is therefore the condemned loser in the *wolf-sheep power relations*. To understand the operations of the Franco-African monetary relations, therefore, one must seek to understand the historical evolutions and calculations of those who conceive and operate the Franc Zone in terms of the **wolf-sheep power game**.

History of Franc Zone

The French Franc (FF) was created as a war weapon against German militarism in 1929. It was a measure of imposing exchange control on FF for any resident of France or of the French Empire. These regulations were maintained after World War II. By analogy with the franc area, a parallel currency was then established in 1948. This franc area was between France, its colonies and protectorates. The parallel currency in French Africa was the Colonies Françaises d'Afrique (CFA) franc. The CFA franc is, *sui generis*, a "rallonge" of the FF. That is, a "rallonge" can be taken to combine the meanings of the phrases "stretch out" and "add to", as when one puts another piece into a dining room table to accommodate more guests. The CFA Franc was thus established as a kind of walking stick of the FF.

There were three initial arrangements for consolidating the Franc Zone: a) there was singleness of treasury services. The French Treasury centralized all resources from zonal treasuries and met up with all treasury requirements; b) there was guaranteed inter-convertibility of currencies of the zone with fixed exchange rates. This currency inter-convertibility had to be free and without limit; and, c) there was singleness of system of exchange. The French exchange office administered all the currency resources in common circulation within the Franc Zone.

These three rules are rather confusing when passed under the heading of "rules" of an international monetary regime. In the case of the Franc Zone, experience shows that the rules are interpreted differently when discussed by different member governments. It may be analytically clarifying to bear in mind three different types of rules typified by the Franc Zone : 1) rules for making rules; 2) rules for behaviour; and, 3) rules for resolving disputes about the rules of behaviours. All three types of rules are under the tight control of France which has a veto-power in rule-making, rule-implementation and rule-adjudication in the monetary regime.

However, Franco-African monetary integration was shocked by African Independence. The independence of French Africa had repercussions on the monetary regulations. Some Afro-Gaullist states realized, on jumping onto the independence bandwagon, that economic decolonization was a much

harder process than political decolonization. They (especially Guinea) saw the Franc Zone, perhaps, as the monetary pillar on which France was to rest its political structure of economic neo-colonialism.

These states left the Franc Zone. But they still benefited from the monetary assistance of the Bank of France. This was typical of the Maghreb states. Mali was also out between 1962 and 1968. By means of a loan account the *defectors* could be indebted to France within previously defined limits. The administration of currency notes and the system of exchange rates became a business for each of the states.

The rest of French African states including Madagascar - all captive states with little respect for monetary initiatives at the time - remained in the Franc Zone to enjoy the grand privilege of protection by the Gaullist monetary umbrella. Their local currencies had a guaranteed "international support". And there were also monetary arrangements allowing for the "free" convertibility of their local currencies into the FF. The control regulations were gradually relaxed. By the French law of December 28, 1966, exchange control within the Franc Zone was abrogated. Mali reintegrated itself into the Zone in 1968, while Mauritania and Madagascar left it in 1973.

Toward the end of 1972, some Afro-Gaullist states started to agitate for a revision of Franco-African co-operation agreements signed shortly after independence. Once President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo broke ranks in 1972, it became *de rigueur* for all other captive Chiefs of State in the African periphery to claim equal political maturity by condemning the infamous agreements. From loyal Senghor of Senegal (at the time) to "rebellious" Eyadema of Togo, they tabled propositions to transform the agreements into instruments of development.

The Franco-African agreements laid down the monetary, trade and investment interests of French nationals, the safe-guarding of French culture in teaching and the maintenance of French strategic interests and military presence in several African states. The late President Pompidou confirmed French interests in Africa in a ministerial meeting shortly before his visit to Chad and Niger at the beginning of 1972. Pompidou said the maintenance of clear-cut bilateral policies with Francophones African states was because:

*France occupies in this part of the African continent a privileged position which has to be defended as a moral obligation, as its economic and political interests never to be allowed to be degraded*³.

The franc Zone in this context was to be one of the instruments of the Franco-African dominance-dependence relations. As an act of French "mag-

3 *Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines*, No.90, Juin, 1973, p.98. "Franc Zone Africa" refers to African states which are members of the Franc Zone dominated by France.

nanimity" he announced the cancellation of debts" owed by the former federated African states totalling 50,000 CFA francs (about U.S. \$200m). In his address to the Ouagadougou, Niger, National Assembly on November 22, Pompidou said the cancellation of the "debts" was in order to relieve the burden of debts incurred by the countries with which France was linked by co-operation agreements. He claimed that the decision to forgo recovery of yearly repayments of capital and interest on the loans granted by the French Fund for Investment and Economic and Social Development showed that co-operation offered by France was "straight-forward and uncalculating".

This debt corresponds in fact to money owed by colonies before independence. In this way, France wanted to recover some of its expenses (incurred 30 years before African independence) for providing its former colonies - which it milked mindlessly - with railways, roads, hospitals, schools, etc.⁴. In effect, African states were using all their foreign exchange in repaying "loans" at the expense of the required rate at which their development plans ought to proceed. The Ghanaian *Daily Graphic* insisted rightly that:

So far the logic of the French action is concerned it is only part of the truth.... the other part of the truth is that in varying degrees all nations that once scrambled for Africa have honest debts to pay to their former colonial rule⁵.

The *Daily Graphic* editorial fingered two things. First, France felt a sense of guilt for its exploitation without redress of Francophone states in the past. Pompidou's cancellation of "debts" was an admonition of this sense of guilt. Secondly, France was intent on continuing its exploitation on a more extensive scale in Africa. This intent was later confirmed by Pompidou during his press conference. He said that relaxation in Franc Zone regulations should be aimed at encouraging trade between Francophone and Anglophone African states. The President, however, warned that any changes should not affect the parity or strength of the CFA franc⁶. This statement announced long-range French intentions to sink deep roots into Anglophone Africa while maintaining structures in Francophone African for raw materials and markets. The Franc Zone then underwent deconcentration as one of the deceitful French calculations to grab wealth and markets in Anglophone Africa which the "scramble" had deprived her of. France's frantic but futile moves to dismember Nigeria and share Biafra's wealth left her unrepentant.

4 *Le Monde*, 26-27, November, 1972.

5 Radio Accra 23/11/72 quoted in *Africa Research Bulletin*, November 15 - December 14, 1972, p.2551.

6 *The Times* (London), 23/11/72.

Liberalization of African trade between French and English-speaking states was judged in Paris to be a better strategy than guns and men.

Monetary Deconcentration

The Franco-African co-operation agreements signed on the verge of independence were renewed in 1972 for Central Africa and in 1973 for West Africa. The hot potato in the negotiations was the future of the Franc Zone. African states wanted the monetary regime to become an instrument of their economic development rather than one of decapitalization, exploitation, underdevelopment, dependence and denationalization.

In *tune* with this newly found spirit of economic nationalism, the bargaining position and capacity of members could constitute the crucial factor in an integrative scheme's ability to achieve a linked expansive-distributive monetary strategy. The concerned African states have shown neither the capacity nor the necessary strong common front in negotiations with France. These centrifugal tendencies are due to the lack of commitment to regional integration to overcome splintered nationalistic and personal interests. These interests tempt each member government to pursue the lower risk cost-free "opting out" or acquiescent strategies rather than bargaining as a single unit compensatory and corrective mechanisms in exchange for continuation in the Franc Zone. In the face of feeble and splintered African efforts to win any substantive monetary concessions, the French argument weighed in quite in step with the mottoes of vintage Gaullism:

*Swim with us or sink! Moi ou le chaos! take it or leave it*⁷.

The Gaullist stand-point won out. And, the Franc Zone in Africa - Communauté Financière Africaine - is based on several institution. At the pinnacle of which is the Bank of France. The Bank of France accepts the responsibility for the free convertibility to FF of the CFA franc and that of Mali (since 1968) issued by three African subsidiaries of the French Bank, namely: BEAC, and BCEAO⁸. This exchange guarantee followed the mechanism of operational accounts, which these states had to have at the French Treasury.

Each African state had to deposit 100% of its foreign currency earnings with the French Treasury before the 1972/73 agreements. After the renewal of the Franco-African agreements, each African state within BEAC and BCEAO had to deposit 80% and 65% respectively of its foreign currency earnings with French Treasury which had to supply the depositor's oper-

7 For details of President Pompidou's verbal tussle with Eyadema, see "La Crise de la Coopération Franco-africaine", in *Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines*, op.cit., p.106.

8 BEAC represents "Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale et du Cameroun"; BCEAO represents "Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest"; and, UMOA represents "Union Monétaire Ouest-africaine".

ational account with money in case of a deficit. As a *quid pro quo*, France guaranteed the value of the CFA and Malian franc using the fixed exchange rates in relation to the FF of 1CFA = 0.02FF and 1 Malian franc = 0.01FF.

Besides control over exchange rates, French control over the monetary policies of Afro-Gaullist states is supervised by its official representatives. For instance, a third of the members of the board of directors of the BCEAO and half of those of the BEAC and of the Institut d'Emission Malgache are French government officials. France, therefore, shoulders the responsibility for monetary decisions by ensuring currency stability, support for the African franc sub-regime and prevention of imbalances in external finances.

Despite this deconcentration of financial institutions since 1972 and 1973, control financial agencies in Paris maintain final authority and veto-power in the hands of its own personnel⁹. The bureaucratic control from Paris is complemented by the high-level French advisers in the financial ministries of the African client states. In effect, the deconcentration of financial institutions within the Franc Zone presents no substantive economic salvation to Afro-Gaullist states.

First of all, there is the requirement that a certain percentage of foreign currency earning, loans, aid, etc., of dependent African states must be converted into FF and deposited into the French Treasury. This gives enough scope for France to use them effectively as its own foreign currency reserves. Hypothetically, France could give Gabon's earnings, for instance, as loans to Gabon or to another African state.

Secondly, the fact that Central Banks in the African states are always in credit in the "fonds de stabilisation" (stabilization fund) in the French Treasury either limits or prevents France's global deficit. This is one aspect of the colonial hang-over of regarding France and Africa as integral parts of a single economy¹⁰.

Finally, France's control of management and exclusive *information* on monetary *issues* enables it to be always ahead of balance-of-payments difficulties in African appendages of the France Zone. As a measure of control, France corners the Afro-Gaullist states into re-orienting their import programmes to avoid entering into deficit with countries outside the Zone. Yet, France, by depriving African states from importing from the cheapest markets, presents these archaic and uneconomic fiscal policies to its client states as an act of national "magnanimity".

9 "Les Relations Monétaires Franco-africaines", in *Révolution Africaine*, No.478, 13-19 Avril, 1973, p.27.

10 J. F. Spero, "Dominance-Dependence Relationships: The Case of France and Gabon", quoted in J. F. Spero, *The Politics of International Economic Relations* (London. George Allen and Unwin, 1978), pp.144-150.

This tripod of control, dominance and exploitation brought the French monetary regime in Africa to its severest test in terms of economic independence. Former Mauritanian President Maitre Ould Daddah saw Franco-African monetary relations as a ruse to circumvent African independence.

*Our obsession is that of independence. We want to regain our total sovereignty and we are ready to pay the price. Gamal Abdel Nasser said the only condition to be attached to aid was that there was no string attached to it... We do not accept the idea that France, because she feels that we need her imposes her views on us*¹¹.

This declaration is a fairly accurate measure of the range of feeling and thinking between France and some African states. Madagascar, while pointing out to France that it wanted to pilot its affairs without foreign interference, went ahead to control movements of capital within its territory as of November 1972¹². Whether by way of reasoned argument or actual practice, the sudden rebellion against French monetary hegemony emanated from two sources: the too much rigidity in the functioning of the regime; and the inconsequential rump for any independent national monetary policy in Africa.

The resentment of French monetary hegemony came at a period when France was in an economic crisis. The United States had floated its dollar which was the pillar of the international monetary regime. This "clean floating" of the dollar threw the economies of capitalist Europe into disarray. The founding members of the European Economic Community decided in March 1973 to maintain among themselves the grouping of currencies known as the "snake". It was agreed that fluctuations of these currencies with respect to each other would be kept within fixed limits by means of concerted interventions in the market, while, with respect to the dollar, they would move as a group.

From the autumn of 1973 onward, the problems between the parity of the German *mark* and the French franc was *aggravated* owing to the fact that the French balance of payments was severely damaged by the repercussions of the oil crisis than that of Germany. In the event, up to the summer of 1976 the destiny of the FF lay between that of the *mark* and that of the floating currencies. France left the "snake" in February 1974, returned in July, and got out again in March 1976. After July 1976 the FF began to depreciate vis-a-vis both the "snake" and the dollar. France was thus incapable of preserving the internal purchasing power of its currency. And its client economies in Africa were hit hard by the fall in the value of the FF.

11 *Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines*, op.cit., p.99.

12 *Ibid.*

This phenomenon had to be reflected automatically in the prices of their imports - mainly from France - which stimulated the general rise in prices.

France was incensed by the new wave of anti-French thinking in Africa. President Pompidou's reply to the Africans was that France

*was open to all possible developments and facilities, but with one reservation, namely: that the independence, the sovereignty that some may claim, limit the guarantee that the French state can give. The one is linked to the other. There is a necessary link between personal freedom and the guarantee to this effect, far from what you say, it is obvious that the CFA franc would collapse within twenty four-hours if it did not have the guarantee of the French State*¹³

Pompidou's statement totally ignored the fact that stability and rigidity are two different economic concepts. His argument thus lends weight to the feeling that the provisions for the regulation of exchange rates within the monetary regime were intended to impose, in the name of stability, exchange rates that have lost touch with economic realities in Africa. However, the trading of hot air between the center and periphery raised serious questions on the apparent crack on Franco-African monetary relations

How could deficits arising from capital exports be handled? Could exchange controls eliminate such deficits? Once it was "accepted" that the French Treasury should be discouraged from allowing its resources to be substantially diverted from their fundamental objective in order to cover capital movements, would it not be desirable to find other methods for equilibrating the capital element in Franco-African balances of payments? What methods could these be? Would it not be necessary to organize *compensatory* credit operations? In what form and in what framework could they best be arranged? French finance experts certainly had answers to these questions, most of which played down on African economic interests. The answers to these questions were based on the principles of convertibility, capital movements and reserve assets within the Franc Zone.

Parity and Convertibility

The coherence of the Franc regime is based on some principles. Firstly, the currencies within the Zone are convertible among themselves according to the 1948 parity. It is noteworthy that any currency zone ruled by fixed parities can only be viable if it is under international authority. This authority, in the Franc Zone, has always been guaranteed by France *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world. The bulk of the criticism is never on the guarantee of the FF but on the parity between all the currencies within the regime.

13 *Le Monde*, 24-25 November, 1972.

Relations between industrialized France and over-exploited African economies are unequal and asymmetrical. And France's international trade with Africa must witness a remarkable growth, encouraged, no doubt, by a large reduction in tariff barriers, and also by a structure of stable and, on the whole, French-controlled exchange rates. Exports of Franc Zone African states to France since 1960 on the average cover 3.7% of French imports, but account for 38.7% of African exports. African imports from France cover 7.1% of French exports, but account for 52.2% of their total imports. From this import-export asymmetry, a rise in price in FF is dangerous to African economies in view of the unequal trade relations. This phenomenon arises from the fact that the operational accounts of African states, when running at a deficit, are pressured down to restrain credit facilities to limit their imports so that currency should not go out. That it, the concerned African states are henceforth condemned to import only from France. And, therefore, considering the wide inequality between France and African member states and the restrictions imposed by the French Treasury, it is doubtful that an equal division of power on currency matters would be possible without giving up the rigid principle of parities.

Furthermore, the devaluation of the FF in 1969 by 12.5% automatically meant the devaluation of the CFA and Malagasy francs vis-à-vis foreign currencies without the consent of the Africans. The fact that the bulk of their imports comes from France has meant the automatic importation of French inflation due to the devaluations¹⁴. This French imposition of inflation on its African partners can be identified in two types of causal explanations of inflation that do not fit well with the categories of analysis used by economists and sociologists¹⁵. These causes are a deliberate centralized decision to trigger off inflation in pursuit of some high priority political objective. This is exemplified by the fact that while France can devalue its currency at will it cannot tolerate any step by African states to devalue their own currencies to reverse large deficits in their balances of trade.

There is also the imposition of inflation by France on African states by a weakening of the power structure underpinning the Franco-African market, so that sectional conflicts of interest in Africa can no longer be peacefully resolved except by tolerating inflation. The lengthy speeches by French African Chiefs of State on the "conjuncture internationale" bear witness to their inability to evolve any self-reliant policies against French-generated inflation. These two causes of inflation (centralized decision-making and subordination of peripheral structures) are so highly political in character that the

14 J. Suret-Canale, "Difficultés de Néo-colonialisme français en Afrique Tropicale", *Révolution Africaine*, op. cit., p.29.

15 Laurence Whitehead, "The Political Causes of Inflation", in *Political Studies*, Oxford, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, Dec. 1979.

political and institutional bases of marked relationships are shifting and insecure for captive African states. Both causes of inflation estrange economists and sociologists.

In addition, the principle of currency convertibility is a farce. From an external viewpoint of the Franc Zone, there seem to be a common currency - the Franc. From within the Franc Zone, the autonomy of the national financial policy of African states is restrained, because of the way in which France uses its veto-power on financial policy and on the organization of the French Central Bank and Treasury. The fact that operational accounts of the African Central Banks must be credited constitutes an enormous advantage for France.

The international liquidities of Franc Zone members contribute to the maintenance of the parity of the FF and swell France's capacity to intervene into the exchange markets. Whenever France has an unfavourable balance of payments, the liquidities from African Franc Zone states are automatically used to reverse the deficits. These African liquidities give resources to the French Treasury for financing its public debts. The African resources are obtained at cheap rates since the interest rate paid to the creditor's operational account, if any, is usually inferior to that of current bonds of the French Treasury. The painful case for Africa was put forth by Togo's General Eyadema to Pompidou in Lome in 1972. His opinion is worth quoting in its entirety:

Within the Franc Zone, we do not feel that this parity, which is currently two old French Francs to 1 CFA franc, is any longer realistic... We feel that the CFA franc must acquire more personality in the Franc Zone in order to inspire confidence abroad.

Even within our currency zone, the convertibility of the CFA franc is not fully assured.

Finally, more serious and still more embarrassing is the fact that despite the French Treasury guarantee of the CFA franc, it is not accepted in Europe - not to mention America - on an equal footing with the French franc. The traveller or the businessman going to Brussels, the Hague, Luxembourg, Bonn, or Rome must, before he leaves, (buy) French francs or other foreign currencies. As a result, most operations of state or individuals undertaken outside the Franc Zone, are affected in foreign currency, and we have the right to know where is the guarantee of convertibility¹⁶

Put differently, African members have a highly restricted right to other markets in the international system.

Reserves and Capital Movements

¹⁶ *Le Monde*, 24-25 Novembre 1972 (my emphasis).

The legacy of Gaullist economic policy in Africa has been in three main areas, namely: that Franco-African trade should be controlled and monopolized by Paris; that African states should specialize in primary production; and, that all shipping with Africa should be under the French flag. Consequent to this legacy, French firms are vehemently opposed to African primary production on any lines in which their interests might be endangered by competition.

This behaviour of French firms is better explained as a by-product of a policy of economic production in the hands of a few French firms. Thus, the few French firms in Africa benefit from the absolutely free transfer of capital. This is a great economic asset for French private interests because incomes and surpluses can be transferred and capital shifted at will. The total freedom of capital transfers, promotes French incentives for private capital to take investment risks in African economies. In compliance with Franco-African co-operation agreements, the CFA Zone cannot dictate investment terms to French firms. In effect, the African economies are at the mercy of French entrepreneurs.

One of the first steps taken by the dependent regimes of the African and Malagasy states in their campaign against the Franco-African co-operation agreements was to control capital movements between France and Africa¹⁷. It is estimated that these capital transfers back to France exceeded French public and private investments in its African peripheries. The reason for these massive transfers is that the freedom of exchange and capital flows have benefitted French firms enormously. This licence to repatriate their local profits is compounded with the "elites africains françaises" (Frenchified African elites) chuttling between Paris and their African capitals transferring their dubiously acquired wealth. Hence, the Franco-African trade union of shifter of capital from Africa to France is a negation of all the sonorous creeds for self-reliant development in the African periphery.

The impact of this free circulation of capital within the Franc Zone is most conspicuous in the unhealthy African economies. Savings in Africa are low and transfers of important sums of money diminish investment possibilities. Within the first ten years of independence, all revenue transferred out of Africa by French and African Chiefs of state and their lieutenants was estimated to be much larger than the value of investments¹⁸. Yet the so-called industrialization programmes of African countries envisage: increasing the GNP as a whole and on a per capita basis; increasing consumption; ensuring a more just distribution of incomes and *total* employment (or at least consid-

17 "La crise...", op. cit., pp.100-112.

18 *Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines*, op. cit., p.106.

erably augmenting employment); improving living conditions; ending inflation and improving the balance of payments¹⁹.

These lofty objectives can be no better than mere pipe-dreams in economies battered to the ground by unchallenged decapitalization. For example, branches of multinationals operating in Franc Zone client states occupy a special place. They, in effect, are components of the industrial structure of the industrialized capitalist nations. And they must hinder substantive industrialization in the periphery.

For one thing, the profits of the multinationals must be transmitted to the metropole under an official inflated rate of exchange. This decapitalization strikes a body blow at African economies. French entrepreneurs use imported raw materials, since they are little interested in native resources except those serving as the mainstay of their capital industries in France. Oil, uranium, etc., are some of these native resources. Rather, the purchases which the entrepreneurs make locally constitute a sort of internal export for African states although French firms do not bring convertible currency to Africa.

On the other hand, multinationals drive a wedge under the development of national industry which must be too weak to compete with them. That is, the French firms cannot play the role of an active factor fostering the development of local production through investment. This is because the French multinationals sell their products in the local market and only manufacture goods for export in exceptional cases. They thus further reduce the small reserves of convertible currency available to the underdeveloped African periphery.

In view of capital shortages for development, African states are forced to resort to international investment capital to supplement national savings which are mainly in the French Treasury. Thus, the Franc Zone demonstrates that foreign capital can take more assured risks in a country which has a guaranteed fixed parity rate within that international monetary regime. This is more the reason why 85% of investments and about 85% of trade in Malagasy was in the hands of French and Lebanese entrepreneurs by 1973²⁰.

The situation was not brighter in other Afro-Gaullist states. In the case of Mali, its currency would have been devalued since 1968 were it not for the operational account which it had with the French Treasury. This was due to the bankruptcy of the Malian Central Bank to the French Treasury as a result of low savings and control of the economy by French entrepreneurs with

19 U.N. *Summaries of the Industrial Development Plans of Thirty Countries*, New York, 1970.
20 *Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines*, op.cit., p.106.

its attendant massive decapitalization. Thus, France gave Mali some stabilization loans with which to settle its balance of payments deficits²¹. This stabilization of Malian deficits is a rare example. And, it goes without saying that France cannot readily afford the luxury of stabilizing interventions in other states merely because they belong to the Franc Zone. At least, capitalism thrives on exploitation and not on "humanitarian assistance" to the needy.

It is within the logic of capitalist exploitation that the Franco-African monetary regime has a toe-hold on African client economies. The French state has succeeded immensely in mediating its citizens' capitalist interests in Africa. This mediation effort is by way of ensuring minimum domestic causes of inflation in Africa. With its financial experts strewn around all financial institutions in the African Franc Zone, the French state makes sure that the currency issuing Central Banks of the CFA and Malagasy franc areas show exemplary rigour in creating money.

The ratio of projected foreign earnings is maintained at about 40%. Otherwise, according to Article 16 of the Statute of the African Central Banks, advances to national treasuries in member states must not exceed 20% of national resources in the previous fiscal year. The strictness with which this monetary policy is pursued reduces domestic causes of inflation. The main causes of inflation become external - those imposed from Paris as a tactical political decision to give loans and grants to African states in the name of French "magnanimity" in saving their economies. Gabon, for instance, encountered serious inflation due to excessive external debts during the 1976-77 fiscal year because of its 300% expenditure on investment. This large-scale borrowing for investment was contracted with France which controls 80% of Gabon's trade. And what is meant by large-scale investment was mainly the construction of infrastructure enabling foreign investors (surely French) to cart away Gabon's oil, manganese, timber, etc., etc., at paltry prices.

Conclusion

This analysis demonstrates that the Franc Zone as an international monetary regime is not a neutral factor in client clusters. To state it more succinctly, the economic efficiency enhanced by the Franc Zone benefits French entrepreneurs and its African accessories to the detriment of decapitalized African masses; the regimentation of the dominance-dependence structures undercut all efforts toward local diversity and industrialization in denationalized and dependent African economies; the Franc Zone is a pillar of disharmony in African international economic relations since intra-Afri-

21 *Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines*, Nos. 170-171, Février-Mars, 1980, p.27.

can trade even within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is 2.5% for Senegal, 4.5% for Ivory Coast, 4% for Togo and only 1% for Nigeria²² because it is sealed off from other African states by the French monetary Berlin wall; and, the Franc Zone is the corner-stone of internationally structured Franco-African wolf-sheep system of interactions instead of being an instrument for smashing economic inequalities among members.

Unfortunately, there is, as yet, no international monetary regime that is neutral. But, events have shown that the Franc Zone, as the monetary pillar of France's neo-colonial politics in Africa, is tenuous in the eyes of most informed African member states. What prevents the monetary regime from crumbling is perhaps the Franco-African trade union of financial wolves. In France, the capitalist sharks are prisoners of this international robbery. But, since the basic feature of the world community is currently the struggle of the oppressed and exploited against this burden, it is likely that the Franc Zone may not long outlive the generation of its commission agents and profiteers - Senghors, Ahidjos, Dioufs, Kolingbas, Bongos, Houphouet-Boigny and the like - all of whom are African replicas of Gaullism. Once this generation of the Franco-African trade union of looters and oppressors is gone, merely to reorganize, deconcentrate, change the names of institutions and shunt in African will not suffice.

Efforts should therefore be directed towards evolving an African international monetary regime that at a minimum is development-oriented as regards the domestic objectives of macro-economic policy and preferably provides some help in reconciling these continental objectives. In other words, a monetary regime for African states must reduce the following extant controversies: (a) different preferences over the various distributional implications, actual or perceived, of alternative monetary regimes; (b) different weights attached to various criteria when necessary compromises must be made between them; (c) different national economic circumstances, even when preferences regarding the criteria are similar; and (d) disagreement over the effectiveness of alternative trustworthiness of other African countries with regard to their behaviour within any chosen monetary regime.

22 *Ibid.*, p.34.

Ajustement structurel et désengagement de l'Etat en Côte d'Ivoire

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SUMMARY. Structural Adjustment programmes devised by the IMF and World Bank and implemented in developing countries have failed because the major theoretical assumptions informing these programmes are false. In general, they have resulted in the deterioration of the standard of living of the population, regression of economic activities, social upheavals and an unbearable debt burden. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the IMF notion of disequilibria does not reflect the nature of the existing supply and demand. The prescribed restrictive monetary and budgetary measures tend to aggravate the crisis. Contrary to the IMF solutions, alternative measures can be adopted to solve the problem in the balance of payment and budget deficit i.e. cutting imports of inessential products, equal resource inputs to the food and export sector in agriculture. Disengagement of the state from the economy, privatization and an open market will not eliminate the existing disequilibrium. On the contrary, the economic role of the state needs to be reinforced and public enterprises must be reformed. Economic development should be primarily based on the mobilization of internal resources. The restructuring of the economy of developing countries will be of little use without a concomitant opening and favorable restructuring of the developed countries.

Introduction

La crise économique qui sévit depuis plusieurs années n'épargne aucun pays. Pour sortir de cette crise, des programmes de redressement sont prescrits par le Fonds Monétaire International (FMI) et la Banque Mondiale, tant aux pays développés que sous-développés. Ces programmes qui sont plus ou moins appliqués ont donné quelque fois des résultats positifs ou mitigés. Cependant ils sont le plus souvent catastrophiques, lorsqu'ils ne provoquent pas des troubles¹.

La Côte d'Ivoire est l'un des pays en voie de développement auquel le FMI a décerné un satisfecit pour avoir appliqué avec succès la thérapeutique prescrite. Nous allons voir si cette thérapeutique d'ajustement structurel et de désengagement de l'Etat a permis réellement d'extirper le mal dont souff-

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1 Cf. la révolte du pain en Tunisie.

fre l'économie ou, en d'autre termes, si elle a permis l'assainissement et le redressement économique souhaités.

Les difficultés que connaissent surtout les pays en voie de développement expliquent-ils l'intérêt que les deux organismes internationaux attachent aux politiques d'ajustement structurel et au désengagement de l'Etat? Quel peut-être la nature du lien entre les deux aspects de ces mesures? Et quelle est la réalité de ces mesures dans leurs applications? Ce sont là autant de questions qui viennent à l'esprit à l'évocation du programme d'ajustement structurel.

Notre travail va s'articuler autour des deux axes suivants:

I - Ajustement structurel, fondement du désengagement de l'Etat.

II - Politique d'ajustement structurel et désengagement de l'Etat: une analyse critique.

Ajustement structurel, Fondement du Désengagement de l'Etat

Que renferment les notions d'ajustement structurel et de désengagement de l'Etat, et quelles sont les causes de l'adoption de ces mesures.

A - Concepts d'ajustement structurel et de désengagement de l'Etat

1) Concept d'ajustement structurel

La notion d'ajustement structurel sur le plan international a vu le jour avec les déséquilibres des balances des paiements des pays membres du FMI. Ce qui fait dire à Dominique Carreau qu'en général les crises monétaires trouvent leurs origines dans les déséquilibres des balances des paiements qui affectent les pays²

Selon les statuts du FMI, "si un déséquilibre important, fondamental, survient dans l'économie d'un pays et qu'il se traduit, entre autre, par un large déficit dans sa balance des paiements, il convient alors de recourir au processus d'ajustement"³. Des mesures internes et externes s'imposent alors pour éviter l'aggravation et le prolongement d'un tel déséquilibre.

Sur le plan interne, cela se résoud le plus souvent par l'adoption d'un programme de stabilisation, et sur le double plan interne et externe, par des modifications du taux de change, voire la dévaluation de la monnaie nationale. Aujourd'hui, la communauté économique internationale ne peut rester indifférente aux déséquilibres d'un pays ou d'un groupe de pays au risque de mettre en péril le bon fonctionnement du système monétaire international; aussi le Fonds, chargé de veiller à son bon fonctionnement, propose-t-il aux pays en difficulté de balance des paiements des mesures types pour rétablir l'équilibre et assainir leurs économies. Ces mesures prennent le nom de programme de stabilisation ou d'ajustement structurel. Pourquoi "ajustement structurel"? C'est que, le FMI distingue deux types de déséquilibres de la

2 Dominique Carreau: *Le système monétaire international.- Aspects juridiques.* - Armand Colin, Paris, 1972, p. 171.

3 Dominique Carreau: op. cit. page 172.

balance des paiements: un déséquilibre temporaire et un déséquilibre fondamental.

Est considéré comme temporaire, un déséquilibre dû à la conjoncture interne ou internationale de sorte que des situations telles que les mouvements des capitaux, la réduction du volume des réserves soient temporaires.

En revanche, "un déséquilibre est dit fondamental si celui-ci ne peut être résorbé que par des mesures déflationnistes, à moins qu'on ne procède à un ajustement au pair"⁴. Ou encore pour être plus proche de la conception classique et empirique de Mikessel, est "fondamental, un déséquilibre tel qu'aucune mesure satisfaisante autre que l'ajustement du taux de change, ne puisse être prise pour restaurer l'équilibre"⁵. Situer exactement la limite entre le temporaire et le fondamental n'est pas une tâche aisée. Des situations de déséquilibres aussi diverses que possibles peuvent être qualifiées de temporaires ou de fondamentales selon la seule appréciation du FMI qui prescrit alors le remède "adéquat".

Dans tous les cas c'est à partir des interventions du Fonds qu'on pourra savoir la nature de l'ajustement⁶. Mais au vu de ce qui précède, on peut se rendre compte qu'il y a deux types d'interventions. Lorsqu'il s'agit d'un déséquilibre temporaire, l'apport d'un financement temporaire adéquat suffit à rétablir l'équilibre. Ainsi avant 1980, on pourrait dire que les déséquilibres des paiements des pays en développement étaient "temporaires", car l'intervention du FMI se limitait à un apport financier pour stabiliser les paiements extérieurs. Les mesures appliquées sont dites de stabilisation. Elles consistent à "geler" les salaires, à diminuer le déficit budgétaire, à supprimer les subventions sur les produits de première nécessité etc., en vue de réduire la demande intérieure.

Dans le cas d'un déséquilibre estimé irréversible, le Fonds applique aux pays un programme d'ajustement structurel. L'ajustement structurel représente en quelque sorte l'effort que le FMI demande aux pays en difficulté pour permettre la résorption du déséquilibre, en contre partie de sa contribu-

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- 4 Bruno Bekelo-Ebe, les mesures de "stabilisation" du FMI et le déséquilibre extérieur dans les pays en voie de développement in *Problèmes Economiques* No 1652 déc. 1979, p. 7.
 - 5 Mikessel, R.F.; Foreign exchange in the Post world war. New York 20th, New York 20th Century Fund, 1959. Cité par Bekoko-Ebe in article cité p. 7.
 - 6 Maktar Diouf fait une analyse remarquable des fondements théoriques qui sous-tendent la politique d'Ajustement Structurel du FMI, à savoir: - l'approche par les prix qui repose sur la théorie quantitative de la monnaie et l'approche revenu, faisant intervenir le multiplicateur du crédit. Maktar Diouf: Fondements théoriques des politiques d'ajustement du FMI dans les pays sous-développés. in *Afrique et Développement CODESRIA* Vol, X, No 1/2, 1985.

tion financière (et de celle de la Banque Mondiale) sous forme de prêts d'ajustement structurel.

Cet appui financier du FMI est soumis à la "conditionnalité". En d'autres termes, le Fonds doit s'assurer que la politique suivie par le pays est conforme à ses statuts. En vertu de ce principe, le Fonds subordonne l'octroi de prêts à l'application d'un programme qui permettrait de parvenir à une position viable de la balance des paiements.

Ce principe de "position viable" de la balance des paiements correspond à un déficit des paiements courants, compatible avec le service de la dette du pays et qui peut être corrigé par des entrées normales de capitaux dans un délai raisonnable, sans recours à des formes spéciales de financement et sans mesures administratives de restriction en matière de commerce et de paiements⁷.

Bien que le Fonds se défende d'appliquer des mesures standards à tous les pays membres en difficulté de paiements, l'essentiel du programme d'ajustement se ramène à un arsenal de politiques de restriction budgétaire et monétaire, d'encadrement du crédit (toutes, des mesures déflationnistes), le tout combiné à une dévaluation, et enfin à des mesures de libéralisation économiques avec une ouverture du pays sur l'extérieur.

Pour le FMI, les déséquilibres sont imputables en grande partie aux dépenses de l'Etat (dépenses budgétaires) et à l'omniprésence de celui-ci dans l'activité économique. Aussi préconise-t-il comme deuxième volet des mesures à rétablir l'équilibre: le désengagement de l'Etat.

2) Concept de Désengagement de l'Etat

Avec la crise économique, la thèse de désengagement de l'Etat surgit dans les débats. Adversaires et partisans de l'interventionnisme étatique ne tarissent point d'arguments. On assisterait à l'inverse d'une situation qui a prédominé pendant plusieurs décennies aussi bien dans les pays à économie de marché développés et sous-développés que dans les pays à économie dirigée.

Dans la plupart des pays développés, la présence de l'Etat dans l'activité économique était considérée comme un moteur de la croissance en ce sens qu'il supplée à l'insuffisance du marché. La poursuite des objectifs de croissance dans la stabilité et le plein-emploi, conduit Keynes à proposer l'intervention de l'Etat pour la relance de l'activité économique et la résorption du chômage.

Dans les pays sous-développés, cette présence de l'Etat s'explique surtout par la faiblesse voire l'inexistence du secteur privé.

L'intervention de plus en plus croissante de l'Etat dans l'activité économique a permis dans certains cas, grâce aux dépenses budgétaires, une cer-

⁷ Cf. Veronica Buttner: *Le FMI et les difficultés des pays du Tiers Monde une critique du concept d'ajustement* in *Problèmes Economiques* No 1958 18 décembre 1985 p. 13.

taine prospérité. Mais elle est qualifiée par les économistes libéraux d'en-trave au bon fonctionnement des mécanismes du marché. Ils expliquent les difficultés que connaissent les pays développés et sous-développés, par l'omniprésence de l'Etat dans l'activité économique. L'Etat, selon eux, devrait veiller au libre jeu des mécanismes du marché sans intervenir directement. Par ses énormes dépenses publiques d'infrastructures économiques et sociales, d'investissements directs, de subventions, etc., l'Etat occasionne des déficits budgétaires qui sont à la base des dysfonctionnements de l'appareil économique et qui seraient l'une des causes majeures de la crise. Aussi préconisent-ils le désengagement de l'Etat comme l'une des solutions à la crise.

Désengagement, signifie que l'Etat doit réduire le secteur public par des transferts d'activités au profit du secteur privé réputé productif et rentable par excellence. Il s'agit donc de privatiser les activités rentables de ce secteur, de supprimer les entreprises publiques non rentables et de céder au privé les parts détenues par l'Etat dans le capital des sociétés, de sous-traiter des services publics et spécialisés tels les travaux publics, la police, la justice, l'éclairage public, etc.⁸.

Ce désengagement, prôné par les libéraux et encouragé par les organismes financiers internationaux (FMI, Banque Mondiale etc.), a pour objectifs de diminuer les dépenses de l'Etat, de rétablir le bon fonctionnement du marché et de renforcer le libéralisme économique. Ces mesures, de par leur nature, posent le problème de la nécessité de l'ajustement structurel.

B - Nécessité de l'ajustement structurel

Nous pouvons distinguer deux genres de causes de l'ajustement structurel. Une cause d'ordre général: la crise économique mondiale, et des causes spécifiques au niveau de chaque pays tenant à des facteurs exogènes et endogènes.

1) La crise a rendu nécessaire l'ajustement structurel

Au-delà des facteurs économiques qui expliquent les difficultés actuelles, de profondes mutations sont en train de s'opérer.

Les rapports de forces internationaux, les relations sociales et leurs fondements sont remis en cause. La théorie économique n'arrive pas à appréhender dans sa globalité la crise, ni à en donner une explication satisfaisante. Crise des concepts, crise économique, en somme crise de la société dans ses valeurs fondamentales, voilà un tableau du monde assez alarmiste.

⁸ Cf. S. Paul: "Privatisation et secteur public" in *Finance et Développement*, déc. 1985. Cf. aussi: "Désengagement de l'Etat" in *Le Monde Dossier et Documents*, oct. 1986.

La fin du 19e siècle et le début du 20e siècle ont vu se développer de nouvelles formes d'organisation du travail à travers le taylorisme et ensuite le fordisme. La mise en place de nouvelles conditions de travail, marquée par la recherche systématique des gains de temps, s'est accompagnée d'une élévation des salaires et d'avantages sociaux importants. Comme l'ont bien montré Denis Clerc et Joël Sartre-Buisson⁹, le taylorisme tout en permettant des gains dans la productivité du travail a favorisé une hausse des salaires et permis d'atteindre une période de prospérité marquée par une ère de consommation de masse. La deuxième moitié des années 60 et le début des années 70 seront marqués par une crise de productivité: les gains de productivité vont décroître; le rythme de croissance annuel de 3 à 4% ne sera pas suffisant pour maintenir l'accumulation du capital et le niveau de vie en évolution. De plus la production s'accompagne de coûts annexes élevés (coûts de pollution, de publicité, de conditionnement, de transport, etc.).

Cette crise de productivité va être en conflit avec l'efficacité de la production qui à son tour va conduire à une crise de rentabilité. Nous pouvons donc dire, qu'avant que n'intervienne la flambée des prix du pétrole (1973-74), tous les éléments de la crise étaient en place. La hausse du prix du pétrole n'a fait qu'amplifier le phénomène. De même l'inflation préexistait à la crise. En résumé nous pouvons dire qu'il y a eu une crise de productivité, une crise d'efficacité, une crise de rentabilité, mais aussi une crise d'identité à travers le rejet du productivisme, ("l'idéologie fordiste se lézarde") et crise d'équilibre au niveau international¹⁰.

L'apparition sur la scène internationale de nouveaux pays industriels comme le Brésil, la Corée du Sud, le Mexique etc., qui seraient les concurrents des pays industrialisés, est une réponse à la crise internationale. Dans ces pays, l'organisation de la production ne repose pas sur le fordisme, mais sur une exploitation caractérisée de la force du travail; les salaires versés sont très bas. "La production s'est internationalisée mais pas les conventions collectives"¹¹, font remarquer D. Clerc et Joël Sartre-Buisson. Mais il faut voir que cette tentative de rejeter la cause de la crise sur les nouveaux pays industriels (NPI) repose sur des arguments insuffisants. D'abord la part de ces NPI dans la production manufacturière et celle de leurs exportations

9 Denis Clerc et Joël Sartre-Buisson: - *La crise des politiques de crise*. in *Problèmes économiques* No 1828 du 15 juin 1985.

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11 Denis Clerc et Joël Sartre-Buisson: art. cité page 19.

mondiales sont très faibles. D'autre part il est de plus en plus délicat de parler de production nationale. Un système productif national comme le souligne De Bernis¹², n'est pas un système qui fonctionne exclusivement à l'intérieur des frontières nationales. Le caractère national vient du fait que les capitalistes qui commandent et organisent le procès du travail et la production appartiennent à tel ou tel pays. Les systèmes productifs fonctionnent au-delà des frontières nationales; c'est pourquoi l'émergence des NPI n'est qu'un des aspects de l'internationalisation de la production initiée par les sociétés multinationales¹³.

Dans ses manifestations, la crise apparaît comme un phénomène complexe et multiforme. Mise à part la théorie schumpéterienne de l'Ecole de Maturité qui fait de la crise la suite logique de l'expansion par référence au cycle de Juglar, et celle liée au cycle de Kondratieff, l'école libérale classique et néo-classique de même que l'école marxiste, chacune suivant sa doctrine, a expliqué la crise.

Mais ce qu'il faut retenir c'est que la crise se manifeste comme une "rupture d'équilibre entre l'offre et la demande de biens et services entraînant un processus dépressif de la conjoncture économique"¹⁴. C'est un retournement plus ou moins brutal de la conjoncture qui s'est traduit par des fermetures d'usines, (ce qui a entraîné le chômage), une baisse de la production, une inflation aggravée par la hausse du prix du pétrole, alors que les cours des autres matières premières baissent, le service de la dette des pays en développement s'alourdit, tout ceci sur un fond de crise financière avec des taux d'intérêt élevés et un dollar des plus instables. D'une façon générale et surtout pour les pays en voie de développement, la chute de leurs recettes d'exportation provoque inexorablement de nombreuses difficultés financières se traduisant par des déficits de la balance des paiements, des déficits budgétaires (car les recettes d'exportation contribuent dans certains pays jusqu'à 50 ou 70% des recettes budgétaires).

Si au niveau général, la cause est la crise, au niveau de chaque pays, des facteurs exogènes et endogènes ont contribué à l'adoption des programmes d'ajustement. Quels sont pour la Côte d'Ivoire, les facteurs déterminants dans l'adoption d'un programme d'ajustement structurel?

12 G. de Bernis: *La crise économique contemporaine : de quelques questions concernant la crise* - Cahiers ISMEA Hors série No 25. - *Economie et Société* - Tome XVII No 9-10-11, septembre-octobre-novembre 1983, pp.1277 et s.

13 Il est vrai que des filiales de sociétés multinationales ont acquis une certaine autonomie d'organisation compte tenu des conditions locales, mais elles restent toujours tributaires des maisons mères.

14 *Crise ou Récession? Le grand tournant de 1974*, in les cahiers français No 170 mars-avril 1975, p. 3

2) - Les causes spécifiques de l'ajustement structurel en Côte d'Ivoire

L'économie ivoirienne qui a connu une croissance remarquable durant les deux premières décennies d'indépendance, (avec un taux de croissance annuel de l'ordre de 7 à 12%), va connaître à la fin des années 70 et au cours des années 80, de sérieuses difficultés. Cela pour plusieurs raisons. On évoque des raisons d'ordre interne, auxquelles s'ajoutent des raisons d'ordre externe.

(a) Au niveau interne

Il faut souligner que l'économie ivoirienne est une économie essentiellement agricole qui est beaucoup soumise aux aléas climatiques. C'est dire que les bonnes récoltes sont liées à une bonne pluviométrie. La production agricole a été sévèrement affectée par la sécheresse des années récentes (1981-1983). On enregistre une baisse des principales productions.

De 1980 à 1985 la production d'huile de palme baisse sans pouvoir retrouver son niveau de 1980.

Tableau A - Taux de variation de la production d'huile de palme

Huile de palme	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Taux de variation de la production		- 14%	0,3%	- 7%	+ 17%	- 13%

Source: Notes d'information BCEAO No 354 novembre 1986, p. 14

Tableau B - Evolution de la production exportable de bananes et d'ananas

Unité (milliers de tonnes)	Années					
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Ananas frais	82,9	91,3	82,4	80,4	115,0	139,1
Bananes fraîches	115,6	101,3	84,6	80,4	97,3	105

Source : Annuaire de statistiques agricoles 1983-1984.

Les deux principales productions agricoles, le café et le cacao ont aussi fléchi. C'est ainsi que la production commercialisée de café durant la campagne 1983-84 ne représente que 23% de celle de la campagne 1980-81 et que celle de 1984-85 n'a pu atteindre le niveau de 1980-81 (366.800t). Quant à la production de cacao, la campagne la plus catastrophique est celle de 1982-83 avec 365.900t contre 418.700t en 1980-81. A la faveur d'une bonne pluviométrie, à partir de 1984 elle va se ressaisir et la campagne 1984-85 sera très bonne avec 570.900t.

Consécutifs à la sécheresse, on peut signaler les dégâts causés par les feux de brousse, dégâts au cours desquels des hectares de plantations partent chaque année en fumée. Au total, la sécheresse de l'année 1983 a provoqué la chute de la production agricole de 13% et par contre coup, celle de la

production industrielle de 9% suite à la baisse de production des barrages hydroélectriques.

A côté de ce facteur purement exogène qu'est la climatologie, il existe des tares propres à cette économie. Les méthodes culturales qui restent rudimentaires, privilégient l'exploitation extensive où la pratique du brûlis a encore cours par rapport à l'exploitation intensive; la mécanisation est insignifiante sinon nulle. Seul le secteur agricole moderne quelque peu mécanisé, utilise de l'engrais et des produits phytosanitaires, et même dans ce secteur la productivité du travail est faible.

Par ailleurs, il existe un véritable obstacle au financement de ce secteur, compte tenu de la rigidité du système financier et bancaire à financer l'agriculture¹⁵. Cette faiblesse structurelle du secteur agricole n'est pas compensée par un tissu industriel étoffé et performant.

(b) Au niveau externe

Le pays, indépendamment de la volonté des autorités nationales, subit l'environnement international. En effet, la Côte d'Ivoire comme bon nombre de producteurs de matière premières agricoles, est affectée par la détérioration constante des termes de l'échange.

La baisse des cours des matières premières a non seulement réduit les recettes d'exportation du pays, mais la récession de l'activité économique dans les pays industrialisés a réduit la demande de ces produits altérant sensiblement l'une des principales sources de devises du pays. Ainsi la balance des opérations courantes de la Côte d'Ivoire est-elle chroniquement déficitaire comme on le voit au tableau D.

De plus, la hausse du dollar en novembre 1986 et la hausse des taux d'intérêt font peser sur la Côte d'Ivoire un poids énorme quant au service de la dette. Celui-ci représente en pourcentage des exportations respectivement pour les années 1980, 1983 et 1984, 25%, 37% et 21,3%¹⁶.

Pour avoir une idée du service de cette dette, reportons-nous au tableau E alinéa d.

Le poids de cette dette est tel que la Côte d'Ivoire ne pouvant plus faire face à ses engagements va accumuler des arriérés de paiement. Au risque de se déclarer insolvable, elle a demandé et obtenu de ses créanciers le rééchelonnement de sa dette. Le premier rééchelonnement, portant sur un montant de 275 millions de dollars a été négocié auprès du Club de Paris et du Club de Londres en 1984, avec un délai de remboursement de 9 ans et 4 ans de différé. Ces difficultés financières auxquelles s'ajoute une facture pétrolière particulièrement lourde, montrent bien que la Côte d'Ivoire est frappée de

15 Cf. Echimane, M.V. - La création d'une nouvelle monnaie. Thèse Sces. Eco. 3e cycle Grenoble 1980.

16 Comité Monétaire de la zone franc: La zone francs en 1985 p. 36.

plein fouet par la crise. Quelle que soit la nature des chocs qui affectent l'économie ivoirienne, celle-ci doit s'ajuster à l'évolution de l'environnement international. Se soustraire à un tel impératif la condamnerait à de lourdes pertes et à une régression plus grande de ses activités. Voilà pourquoi l'ajustement structurel est nécessaire pour permettre à l'économie de retrouver une croissance sinon un "développement" équilibré.

Certes l'ajustement est nécessaire, mais quel ajustement? Pour plus de précision, portons un regard critique sur les programmes d'ajustement structurel préconisés par la Banque Mondiale et le FMI pour permettre à la Côte d'Ivoire de surmonter la crise, et sur le deuxième volet de relance de l'activité économique, qu'est le désengagement de l'Etat.

II. Ajustement structurel et désengagement de l'Etat ivoirienne analyse critique

A - Analyse du programme d'ajustement structurel

La Côte d'Ivoire a appliqué plusieurs programmes d'ajustement structurel. Le premier de 1981 à 1983, le second 1984-1985 et enfin le troisième en cours 1986-1988.

1) Le premier programme d'ajustement structurel 1981-1983.

Suscité par les difficultés économiques et financières de la Côte d'Ivoire, ce programme vise principalement deux objectifs: redresser la situation financière extérieure et jeter les bases d'une reprise de la croissance économique. Ce programme comprend donc toute une série de mesures pouvant permettre d'atteindre ces objectifs.

Pour le premier objectif, celui de redressement de la situation financière, les mesures envisagées doivent permettre de réduire le déficit des opérations courantes, tout en stabilisant le service de la dette extérieure d'une part et de réduire le déficit du secteur public d'autre part. Les mesures qui ont été appliquées procédaient du diagnostic du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale et de leurs interprétations de la situation. Ainsi selon ces deux organismes, le déséquilibre extérieur était le fait du désajustement entre l'offre et la demande des biens et services (demande/offre). Pour le réajuster, une action devait être exercée sur la demande et sur l'offre. Du côté de la demande, on assista à une réduction très importante des dépenses publiques.

Au titre du budget général de fonctionnement, la diminution a été sensible en matériel. D'un montant de 7,83 milliards de FCFA en 1980, il baissa en 1983 jusqu'à 3,51 milliards soit une réduction de près de 55% sur les 3 années¹⁷.

17 Sources des chiffres: La Côte d'Ivoire en chiffres éd. 1986-87, p. 62.

Tableau C - Détérioration des termes de l'échange

Années	Années									
	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984		
Pourcentage	48,6	-17,7	-5,4	-2,8	-27,7	-11,1	4,1	20,7		

Tableau C bis - Evolution des cours mondiaux des principaux produits Ivoiriens FCFA/kg

Produits	Années									
	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984		
Café	1 222,7	739,7	776	689,8	603,3	555	1122,5	935		
Cacao	988,8	773,5	868	472,2	527,8	980	1175	930		
Coton	367,8	328	336,5	338,4	446,8	512,5	807,5	387,5		

Sources : IFS, annuaire 1986 - Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens.

Tableau D - Evolution de la balance des opérations courantes

Années	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Milliards FCFA	-59,0	-43,2	-189,7	-293,3	-385,7	-383,0	-333,9	-355,6	-48,9	-11,5	-178,3
En % du PIB		2,8	10,6	15	17,9	16,7	13,4	14,2	1,7	0,3	5,5

Source: BCEAO: Notes et Statistiques documentaires NO 354, nov. 1986 p. 37. - Rapport annuel 1985, 1986.

Tableau E - Agrégats d'équilibre interne et externe

Année	Années											
	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	
(a)												
PIB	1539,3	1783,0	1944,7	2149,9	2291,4	2484,0	2497,7	2858	3138	3210		
(b)												
Saldes budgétaires (BGF+BSIE +B Annexes)				-65,85	-27,368	-40,589	-124,07	-113,661	+30,861	+12,826		
Saldes budgétaires en % du PIB				3%	1,1%	1,6%	4,96%	3,9%	0,98	0,39		
(c)												
Saldes des balances de paiements				-172,553	-119,14	-38,01	-206,225	149,768	+152	+116		
Saldes des B.P. en % du PIB				8%	4,3%	1,5%	8,2%	5,2%	4,8%	3,6%		
(d)												
Exportations	663,920	689,298	747,452	796,774	1184,347	1318,060						
Service de la dette extérieure	189,784	248,446	312,330	344,915	257,108	377,223						
Service de la dette en % PIB	8,8%	10,8%	12,5%	13,8%	8,9%	12%						
Service de la dette en % des exportations	28,59%	36,04%	42,49%	43,29%	21,71%	26,82%						

Source principale : La Côte d'Ivoire en chiffres éd. 1986-87; La zone franc rapport 1986.

Au titre du budget spécial d'investissement et d'équipement (BSIE) la réduction des dépenses d'investissement a été plus nette en 1981 et 1983. En 1981 la réduction a été de 12% et en 1983 de 20% soit 2,2% du PIB. D'autres mesures visant à réduire la consommation intérieure se traduisirent par: un blocage des salaires, une contribution financière de tous les travailleurs au titre de la solidarité nationale, le réalignement des salaires du secteur paraétatique sur ceux de la Fonction Publique, une politique monétaire encore plus restrictive (encadrement plus sévère du crédit dont le taux d'accroissement passa de 54% en 1982 et à 7% en 1983), et enfin une limitation des importations.

Toutes ces mesures restrictives visaient à réduire le pouvoir d'achat des consommateurs afin de réduire la demande et dégager des ressources pour faire face aux engagements extérieurs.

Pour réduire la demande il fallait selon la FMI et la Banque Mondiale, réduire le déficit budgétaire. On assista alors à des coupes drastiques dans le budget. Les postes visés étaient principalement ceux afférant aux dépenses de l'enseignement, aux dépenses sociales et particulièrement la ligne budgétaire de la santé publique. A ces mesures viennent s'ajouter celles relevant du désengagement à proprement parlé que nous verrons plus loin.

Du côté de l'offre, il s'agissait d'augmenter l'offre des produits primaires d'exportation, pour augmenter les recettes en devises. L'action allait donc viser la promotion des exportations des produits agricoles par des subventions à l'exportation (une forme déguisée de dévaluation), le relèvement des prix d'achat aux producteurs de produits de base d'une part, et d'autre part l'incitation à la production vivrière (pour économiser les devises servant à l'importation alimentaire). On redécouvrait comme par enchantement la nécessité de l'autosuffisance alimentaire, qui allait être menée à grand renfort de publicité.

Le tableau F donne une idée de l'action sur l'offre par le relèvement des prix officiels d'achat aux producteurs des principaux produits concernés.

Tableau F - Côte d'Ivoire - Prix officiels d'achat au producteur Francs C.F.A. le Kg

Campagnes	Cacao (a)	Café vert (b)	Coton graine Francs C.F.A. le kg	Régime de palme	Tabac (c)
1978-1979	250	250	80	10,00	200
1979-1980	300	300	80	10,00	200
1980-1981	300	300	80	10,00	230
1981-1982	300	300	80	15,00	230
1982-1983	300	300	80	15,00	230
1983-1984	350	350	100	15,00	250
1984-1985	375	380	115	15,00	230
1985-1986	400	400	115	19,00	250

(a) Stade nu-bascule tout point d'achat.

(b) Depuis 1981-1982 le prix officiel concerne le café cérisés et correspond à la moitié du prix indiqué

(c) 1ère catégorie.

Source: Statistiques économiques et monétaires. BCEAO No 354 novembre 1986, p. 14.

L'application de ce premier programme axé sur un effort budgétaire rigoureux et des mesures d'accompagnement destinées à accroître les recettes du budget, n'ont pas été sans conséquences économiques et sociales.

Sur le plan social, les premières victimes des mesures dites d'austérité, ont été les catégories sociales les plus défavorisées, vivant à la limite du minimum vital, et dont les services publics à caractère social constituaient un appoint dans leur existence. La réduction du niveau de vie déjà très bas, a porté gravement atteinte au niveau sanitaire et nutritionnel surtout de ces catégories sociales. La remise en cause de certains acquis sociaux, telle la gratuité du logement pour les enseignants allait provoquer une des grèves ayant ébranlé sérieusement le pouvoir.

La classe moyenne s'accrochait désespérément, dans l'attente de lendemains meilleurs. Le chômage s'aggravait suite aux licenciements et à l'arrivée sur le marché du travail des nouveaux diplômés.

Sur le plan économique, le redressement financier attendu s'était-il réalisé?

Après trois années d'application du programme d'ajustement structurel les résultats suivants pouvaient être constatés:

- une baisse de la production agricole de 30%¹⁸ sous l'effet de la sécheresse. Le fléchissement de la production industrielle s'explique par les délestages électriques dûs au faible niveau d'eau dans les barrages hydro-électriques (effet sécheresse).

- le déficit budgétaire s'était aggravé passant de 27,36 milliards de FCFA en 1981 à 124 milliards en 1983 comme l'indique le tableau E, alinéa b.

- le déséquilibre de la balance des paiements n'a pas été résorbé: de 119.148 milliards de FCFA soit 5% du PIB en 1981, il passe à 206.225 milliards soit 8 % du PIB¹⁹.

Sur le plan extérieur, le service de la dette s'était alourdi; il représentait en 1981, 36,04% des exportations, en 1982, 42,29% et atteignit le chiffre record de 43,29% en 1983²⁰

Pour faire face aux échéances du service de la dette, la Côte d'Ivoire obtint du FMI un crédit de 165 milliards de francs CFA. Quant à la Banque Mondiale elle accorda un prêt d'ajustement structurel (aide à la balance des paiements) de 45 milliards. Les mains liées, le pays "est financièrement en liberté surveillée"²¹.

18 Les tableaux A et B nous donnent les chiffres de cette évolution à la baisse des productions agricoles.

19 Voir tableau E, alinéa c.

20 Voir tableau E: Agrégats d'équilibre ext. et int., alinéa d.

21 Ph. Malvé. La Côte d'Ivoire à la recherche d'un second souffle in *Actuel Développement* No 56/57, 1983, p. 25.

En conclusion nous pouvons dire que toutes ces mesures ont entraîné une action fortement dépressive sur l'économie.

Le revenu des ménages avait fortement baissé. L'épargne des ménages passa de 53 milliards FCFA en 1982 à 14,50 milliards en 1983 soit une baisse de 72% par rapport à 1982. L'investissement aussi chuta de 17% entre 1981 et 1983, le crédit se ralentit²². C'est sur une base d'échec de ce premier programme, que va se greffer le second programme d'ajustement structurel.

2 - Le deuxième programme d'ajustement structurel (1984-1985).

Ce deuxième programme se caractérisa par des mesures plus rigoureuses que le premier. Ici, les deux objectifs prioritaires étant la réduction du déficit budgétaire et l'augmentation des recettes publiques, le gouvernement pratiqua de nouvelles coupes sombres dans les dépenses publiques. Le crédit allait être davantage resserré. Des mesures comportant de fortes hausses des prix des services publics, des compressions salariales, la suppression d'unités productives non rentables (deux complexes sucriers), accompagnèrent ce deuxième programme. Désormais, le Trésor allait gérer directement les excédents de la Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Prix des Produits Agricoles. Plus programme de stabilisation que d'ajustement structurel, ce deuxième programme bénéficia d'un accord de confirmation d'un an auprès du FMI de 82 millions de DTS²³, et s'accompagna d'un rééchelonnement de la dette extérieure ivoirienne d'un montant de 275 millions de dollars sur une période de 9 ans avec 4 ans de différé comme le montre le tableau H.

Tableau H - Dette: montant rééchelonnés

Milliards F.C.F.A.	1984			1985		
	Capital	Intérêts	Total	Capital	Intérêts	Total
Club de Paris	77,4	23,2	100,6	73,4	20,8	94,2
Club de Londres	113,9	-	113,9	106,3	-	106,3
Club d'Abidjan	2,9	-	2,9	34,1	-	34,1
Total	194,2	23,2	217,4	213,8	20,8	234,6

Source: La Côte d'Ivoire en chiffres édition 1986-1987 - page 84.

Comparé au premier programme, celui-ci fut un succès. En effet le déficit budgétaire se réduisit en 1984; en 1985 le budget dégagait même un excé-

22 Voir tableau G; Evolution de l'épargne et de FBCF.

23 J.P. Foirry - "L'évolution conjoncturelle de la Côte d'Ivoire en 1960 à 1985: quelques facteurs explicatifs de la crise actuelle" in *Le Mois en Afrique* NO 243-244 Avril-Mai 1986 p. 75.

dent de 30,861 milliards de francs CFA. (Tableau E al. b). Le déficit de la balance des paiements fut plus que résorbé, puisque la balance des paiements dégagait des excédents représentant 5,2% du PIB en 1984 et 4,8% en 1985 (voir tableau des agrégats d'équilibre al. c). L'année 1985 fut donc exceptionnelle; la production industrielle s'accrut de 7%. En termes réels la croissance économique du pays fut d'environ 5%, ce qui pouvait être considéré comme une légère reprise. Ce "succès" s'expliquait certes par les mesures elles-mêmes, mais aussi par les conditions climatiques extrêmement favorables que connut le pays. L'amélioration de la situation budgétaire résulta en partie de l'augmentation des recettes fiscales surtout par le biais des surtaxes à l'importation.

L'accroissement de la masse monétaire ne fut pas l'effet d'un assouplissement de la politique monétaire, mais celui d'une balance des paiements favorable qui s'expliquait par une augmentation des exportations de 48,6% en 1984 et de 11,2% en 1985. Le tableau I suivant nous donne une idée de l'évolution de la masse monétaire et du taux d'inflation.

Tableau I - Evolution de la masse monétaire et taux d'inflation

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Masse monétaire en milliards FCFA fin de période	639651	660358	691921	829650	939411	964918
Taux d'accroissement		3,2%	4,7%	19,9%	13,2%	
Taux d'inflation		7,3%	5,9%	4,3%	1,9%	6,6%

Source: Zone franc rapport 1986.

Si les organisations internationales qualifièrent ce programme de succès, c'est que les résultats dépassèrent les prévisions. En contre-partie, les conditions de vie sociale de la population se dégradèrent fortement, le niveau de vie baissa encore. Le ralentissement de l'inflation²⁴ qu'on observe au tableau I était moins le résultat d'une politique volontariste de lutte anti-inflationniste du gouvernement; c'était la suite logique de la baisse du pouvoir d'achat des populations, et du ralentissement de l'activité économique. C'est à un véritable phénomène de déflation qu'on assistait (Ex. la baisse de la demande de logements de moyen standing, a entraîné une évolution à la baisse des loyers). Le chômage s'accrut de nouveau. C'est donc dans un climat social morose que la Côte d'Ivoire allait appliquer le troisième programme d'ajustement structurel.

3 - Le troisième programme d'ajustement structurel 1986-1988

Quoi que nous ne disposions pas du catalogue des mesures du troisième programme d'ajustement structurel, par recoupement des écrits de presse

24 Voir tableau I de l'évolution des taux d'inflation.

nous avons pu en saisir l'essentiel. Au vu des mesures dictées par le gouvernement ivoirien en début de l'année 1988, sur la TVA et son nouveau mode de calcul, il semble que l'accent ait été mis dans ce programme sur un accroissement des recettes fiscales. En attendant la publication promise de la liste complète des biens qui en seront frappés, il paraît que le pain, le riz, et la viande, biens de première nécessité ne sont pas frappés du nouveau taux de la TVA.

La vignette auto augmente de 50% alors que les salaires sont toujours bloqués; le tarif social du m³ d'eau (qui se situe à 30m³) passe de 99 F à 159 F et le tarif normal baisse, passant de 162 F à 109 F. Cette technique a pour but de faire payer les petits consommateurs c'est-à-dire les ménages et en même temps de favoriser les gros consommateurs c'est-à-dire les entreprises.

Qu'est-ce qui explique ces mesures considérées comme une nouvelle dose d'asphyxie pour une population laborieuse qui déjà se sacrifie un peu trop pour "l'intérêt supérieur de la Nation" et pour "la solidarité nationale"?

Manifestement la Côte d'Ivoire s'enfonce de plus en plus dans la crise. Avec un dollar en chute - un dollar qui est la monnaie de facturation des produits de base - et un marché des matières premières toujours à la déprime, la chute des recettes d'exportation du pays (café, cacao) atteint déjà dès le mois de mai 1987, 13 milliards de francs, alors que le service de la dette pour cette même année est de 435,3 milliards. Malgré l'accord plurianuel, unique en Afrique, signé pour rééchelonner la dette de 1986 jusqu'en 1990, la Côte d'Ivoire, en mai 1987, s'est déclarée dans l'impossibilité de payer les intérêts des emprunts étrangers²⁵.

Cette déclaration d'insolvabilité, émanant surtout d'un bon élève du FMI ne peut qu'inquiéter au plus haut niveau. La France va voler au secours de la Côte d'Ivoire par une aide de 1,6 milliards de francs supplémentaires pour soutenir le programme d'ajustement structurel.

L'année 1988 s'annonce encore plus dure que la précédente, du moins beaucoup plus pour les couches sociales les plus démunies qui auront à subir plus que les autres comme par le passé les frais de cet ajustement structurel. On oublie souvent qu'une frange des victimes de ces mesures d'austérité sont les enfants. Rappelons qu'au dernier trimestre de l'année 1987, la Banque Mondiale a financé une campagne de vaccination infantile à travers tout le pays. On peut se demander s'il n'y a pas contradiction entre le souci affiché de protection de l'enfance et les mesures des programmes d'ajuste-

²⁵ Le bilan économique et social 1987. in *le Monde Dossier et Document*. numéro spécial, janvier 1988. cf. aussi *Jeune Afrique* No 1379 du 10 juin 1987, pp. 28-31.

ment qui portent atteinte au niveau nutritionnel et sanitaire des enfants surtout ceux du Tiers Monde²⁶.

Cette hausse de la TVA ne manquera pas de relancer l'inflation. Envisager l'inflation comme un moyen de financement des déficits dans une phase de récession économique telle que celle que connaît la Côte d'Ivoire serait pousser l'économie dans une véritable impasse. Il est inévitable que cette hausse de la fiscalité en général, de la TVA en particulier ne développe une propension plus élevée à la fraude, à la contrebande et au marché noir. Beaucoup d'activités économiques surtout commerciales risquent de passer du secteur formel au secteur informel, échappant ainsi au contrôle de la puissance publique. Dans l'ensemble, les mesures d'ajustement structurels ont pesé lourdement sur la vie de la nation. Loin de contribuer au redressement économique, elles ont plutôt aggravé la récession, avec toutes les conséquences sociales et humaines que cela comporte²⁷.

Après avoir analysé les mesures d'ajustement structurel examinons le deuxième volet du programme qu'est le désengagement de l'Etat ivoirien

B - Analyse du désengagement de l'Etat ivoirien

L'économie ivoirienne se caractérise par l'intervention très poussée de la puissance publique. En effet, l'Etat est l'agent économique principal qui organise, oriente et anime l'activité économique. L'option libérale de cette économie est marquée par une forte présence étatique où les entreprises privées côtoient les sociétés d'Etat et les sociétés à capitaux mixtes. L'importance du secteur public apparaît clairement à travers le tableau G.

Demander à l'Etat ivoirien de reculer ou de réduire son poids excessif dans l'économie comme l'exige le FMI, voilà qui constitue une véritable contrainte. Le poids de l'Etat serait-il la cause de la crise? En quoi consiste exactement ce désengagement et quels sont les problèmes qu'il soulève?

Par désengagement, il faut entendre le retrait de l'Etat de la plupart des activités économiques pour laisser la place à l'initiative privée et aux mécanismes du marché. Pour les organismes internationaux en l'occurrence le FMI, la Banque Mondiale et l'USAID, si l'économie ivoirienne est en crise, c'est en partie la faute de l'Etat qui, par ses dépenses d'investissements pub-

26 UNICEF: L'ajustement à visage humain. éd. Economica, Paris, 1987.

27 Notons que dans ce troisième programme, le FMI table ces mesures sur l'approche de la balance des paiements par la méthode d'absorption, particulièrement sur le volet fiscalité de la politique budgétaire pour rétablir la "vérité des prix". Méthode bien analysée par Diouf, M.: op. cit. D'ailleurs le FMI confond allègrement "dépense" et "absorption". Du point de vue conceptuel, l'absorption se réfère à la dépense productive; ce qui est restrictif par rapport à la dépense globale dans une économie. De là découle la notion de capacité d'absorption du capital.

lics (d'infrastructure, d'entreprises industrielles), ses dépenses sociales, sanitaires et d'éducation, et par ses dépenses de fonctionnement, provoque le déficit budgétaire; ce qui ne permet donc pas de dégager suffisamment de ressources pour payer le service de la dette extérieure. Il faut donc que l'Etat se désengage. Ainsi des propos aussi naïfs que celui-ci ont pu être émis: "l'Etat ivoirien ne veut plus faire le commerce"²⁸?

La Côte d'Ivoire redécouvre-t-elle subitement les vertus du libéralisme? Assurément pas! Le modèle de développement économique ivoirien depuis l'indépendance est un modèle de "capitalisme d'Etat". Pour comprendre ce capitalisme d'Etat, il faut recourir à la nature de l'Etat²⁹.

La stratégie de développement menée par la Côte d'Ivoire s'inscrit dans une certaine logique de formation d'un capitalisme privé national. Dans cette stratégie, la phase d'intervention de l'Etat devrait constituer le relais à la privatisation des secteurs économiques où il intervient³⁰. De manière plus précise, les sociétés d'Etat, les entreprises publiques ou celles à participation majoritaire de l'Etat, devraient permettre à ceux qui les dirigent et à la classe politique au pouvoir de s'enrichir, afin de se voir "rétrocéder", le moment venu, les parts ou la propriété du capital détenues par l'Etat. Malheureusement cette nouvelle race de bourgeois capitalistes nationaux n'a pas pu voir le jour.

La privatisation n'a donc jamais été absente des préoccupations des autorités nationales qui estiment (à raison d'ailleurs), que le privé national ne remplit pas suffisamment encore les conditions pour prendre la relève³¹. Les injonctions du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale répondent elles-aussi à d'autres préoccupations. Nous en retenons trois:

- Le pays doit dégager suffisamment de ressources budgétaires pour payer ses dettes; il faut éviter que les banques privées commerciales qui ont pris le relais des institutions publiques comme principaux bailleurs de fonds du pays comme la Côte d'Ivoire, ne connaissent des difficultés par l'insolvabilité du pays. Tant que, malgré le déficit budgétaire ou celui de la balance des opérations courantes, le pays a fait face sans difficulté à ses engagements (même en empruntant pour rembourser les dettes), personne ne s'est alarmée outre mesure. La perspective d'une insolvabilité des pays débiteurs dont la Côte d'Ivoire pourrait déclencher la faillite des banques qui, cher-

28 Propos d'un ancien responsable du Ministère du Commerce.

29 Cf. Echimane, M.V.: La création d'une nouvelle monnaie. Thèse de 3ème cycle, Grenoble, 1980.

30 Cf. Ikonikoff, M. - *Rôle de l'Etat dans le Tiers Monde*, in *Revue du Tiers Monde* No 93, janvier-mars 1983, T. 24 - *L'Etat relais: un modèle de développement pour les sociétés périphériques*, in *Revue Tiers Monde*, No 76, octobre-décembre 1978.

31 Par ailleurs il n'est pas évident que la réduction des dépenses de l'Etat puisse entraîner une augmentation des dépenses du secteur privé. Etant donné que l'Etat n'est pas en concurrence avec le secteur privé, il est peu probable que puisse jouer l'effet d'éviction.

chant à faire fructifier leurs excédents de liquidité à une certaine période, ont conseillé voir incité certains pays à s'endetter au-delà de leur capacité.

- La deuxième préoccupation est celle de la régulation de la crise dans les pays industrialisés. En effet, les pays industrialisés sont à la recherche de solutions pour sortir de la crise. Les capitalistes désinvestissent au centre car les coûts de production sont si élevés que leurs profits ont tendance à baisser. Or l'espace de leur système s'étend à la périphérie, et il faut aussi l'utiliser pour réguler la crise. Ainsi sous peine de se voir refuser les prêts d'ajustement, l'Etat ivoirien doit céder aux capitaux privés les secteurs économiques rentables qu'il gère. Cependant, nous savons, et le FMI aussi, que le privé national ivoirien est très faible pour être capable de remplacer l'Etat. Il n'y a donc plus que le privé étranger pour prendre cette place. Tel est le sens de la recommandation d'ouverture du pays aux capitaux étrangers dans les mesures d'ajustement. C'est là une manière détournée de donner une bouffée d'oxygène à la gestion de la crise au Centre.

- La troisième préoccupation et non la moindre, est d'ordre idéologique. Les études anthropologiques semblent indiquer qu'en Afrique en général et en Côte d'Ivoire en particulier, les comportements des peuples sont moins des comportements individualistes que des comportements communautaires; et que la plupart des régimes capitalistes installés sont à la marge des peuples. Les difficultés à former une bourgeoisie nationale tiennent certainement à des blocages structurelles modernes, mais aussi relèvent en partie de la culture, sinon des fondements philosophiques des peuples. Dans ses fondements, le capitalisme obéit à certaines valeurs, privilégie les lois du marché, la recherche du profit, s'embarrasse très peu des lois morales, glorifie l'individualisme. Or ces valeurs, si elles ne sont pas absentes, ne constituent pas des idéaux fondamentaux chez les peuples africains qui privilégient davantage les valeurs spirituelles et morales dans une certaine éthique d'équilibre sociétale. Le profit est moins affecté à l'accumulation du capital productif; il est plutôt socialement détruit. Autrement comment pourrait-on expliquer que la classe dirigeante bureaucratique d'une part et les grands planteurs de cacao de l'Etat possédant des excédents de revenus d'autre part, puissent "gaspiller" énormément d'argent dans les cérémonies et festivités traditionnelles (mariages - funérailles - fêtes de génération etc.) alors qu'ils pourraient utilement investir dans des activités industrielles? Signalons qu'une part importante du surplus de revenu est stérilisé dans les pagnes et objets en or.

En demandant à l'Etat ivoirien de privatiser, on cherche non seulement à renforcer les structures capitalistes de l'économie ivoirienne, mais aussi à éliminer les quelques vestiges de comportements à tendance communautaire qui pourraient y persister, car la plupart des sociétés ivoiriennes à quelques exceptions près fonctionnaient au départ sur cette base. Le FMI agit véritablement en défenseur de l'idéologie capitaliste.

A la lumière des expériences d'ajustement des années 80, dans divers pays du tiers monde, la remarque suivante peut-être faite: la préférence des Institutions Internationales va à la liberté de marché, au laisser-faire. Comme le dit Tchungdjang Pouémi, les accords du FMI comportent toujours, "... un cadre standard, un plan presque préfabriqué: dévaluer la monnaie, éliminer les subventions pour les aliments et autres biens de base, libérer les marchés et rendre le climat de l'investissement meilleur pour les sociétés étrangères"³².

Les politiques d'ajustement structurel appliquées dans bon nombre de pays en voie de développement se sont soldées par des échecs. Elles se sont traduites en général par une baisse du niveau de vie des populations, une régression de l'activité économique et a entraîné dans certains cas des troubles sociaux (Egypte, Tunisie).

Mise à part les conditions exogènes qui expliquent les résultats des programmes d'ajustement structurels, on peut se poser la question de la validité intrinsèque de ces programmes. En d'autres termes ces mesures en soi peuvent-elles permettre le redressement économique?

Comme le dit l'UNICEF,

...Il existe une nette distinction entre la "stabilisation" et l'"ajustement". La réduction des déséquilibre - extérieur et intérieur - ... a été obtenue grâce à la réduction des dépenses, de la production et des importations, ce qui a permis d'établir un équilibre à un bas niveau, associé à la chute du PIB, des investissements et de l'emploi et, à une moindre utilisation de la capacité de production. Mais bien que les déséquilibres aient été ainsi éliminés, la situation économique qui en est résulté n'est nullement satisfaisante. C'est la stabilisation et non... l'ajustement, qui s'est produite. L'ajustement implique la restructuration de l'économie de façon que les principaux déséquilibres soient éliminés à un niveau satisfaisant de production, d'investissement et de protection des besoins humains, l'économie étant ainsi à mesure d'assurer la croissance future et le développement soutenu³³.

A propos de la validité intrinsèque des programmes il faut d'abord constater que le présupposé théorique du déséquilibre ne semble pas cadrer avec la réalité ivoirienne. En effet pour le FMI le déséquilibre est dû à un excès de la demande par rapport à l'offre. Or en Côte d'Ivoire le déséquilibre semble provenir plus du côté de l'offre et se manifeste du fait de la chute des recettes d'exportation. Par ailleurs l'hypothèse que, trop de dépenses entraîne l'inflation et que cela est néfaste à la compétitivité du pays semble


32 Tchungdjang Pouémi: *Monnaie, servitude et liberté* - édition Jeune Afrique 1980 page 196.

33 UNICEF - *L'ajustement à visage humain - Protéger les groupes vulnérables et favoriser la croissance*. Economica, Paris, 1987 page 159.

aussi insoutenable dans la mesure où les produits qu'exporte la Côte d'Ivoire sont des produits primaires dont les prix fixés sur les bourses de matière premières sont moins des prix de compétitivité, que des prix d'oligopsonne. L'inflation ne peut-être invoquée que si nous sommes en situation de plein-emploi. Or le pays se trouve en deçà de la limite des possibilités de production. C'est dire qu'il existe un excès de la capacité de production.

Ce n'est donc pas la demande qu'il faut réduire; il faut plutôt trouver les moyens d'augmenter la production (en valeur).

Supposons les courbes IS - LM données, les règles de politiques économiques pour atteindre l'équilibre interne et externe, dans un système de taux de change fixes, se présentent ainsi sur la figure.



Sur la figure, situons la Côte d'Ivoire dans la région I où la politique monétaire à appliquer doit être restrictive et la politique budgétaire expansionniste, comme le propose Munell³⁴. Or précisément la politique monétaire en Côte d'Ivoire est restrictive, il faut donc que la politique budgétaire contrairement à celle que préconise le FMI, soit expansionniste pour pouvoir rétablir l'équilibre interne (la politique monétaire étant affectée à l'équilibre externe, et la politique budgétaire à l'équilibre interne. Le FMI en proposant un politique monétaire et budgétaire à la fois restrictive ne peut qu'aggraver la situation déjà très récessionniste.

34 Cf. Charles P. Kindleberger - *Economie Internationale*; Ed. Economica, 1978, Paris. p. 436.

L'ajustement qu'il faut à l'économie ivoirienne doit répondre à un souci précis d'efficacité pour la reprise économique.

Avant d'appliquer les mesures nécessaires, il convient d'étudier et d'analyser non seulement les causes (pour s'y attaquer) mais surtout les effets de la crise au niveau de chaque catégorie socio-professionnelle; de même il convient d'étudier les effets éventuels des remèdes, pour en déterminer les coûts. On pourrait ainsi dans un esprit de justice sociale, éviter que les catégories sociales à faible revenu, aient à payer plus que les autres, les frais de l'ajustement. Le vrai problème est comment gérer au mieux la crise?

Les politiques d'ajustement appliquées en Côte d'Ivoire visent au premier chef, à rétablir l'équilibre de la balance des paiements. Elles encouragent donc l'exportation des produits de base. Nous pensons qu'une amélioration de la balance des paiements peut être obtenue, en supprimant l'importation de produits non absolument nécessaires tels d'alcool, le tabac... qui peuvent être produits dans l'optique de la politique d'import-substitution. De même on peut réduire l'importation des produits alimentaires en augmentant la production vivrière (riz, maïs, banane plantain, fruits et légumes etc...). Dans le cadre de l'autosuffisance alimentaire, le secteur vivrier devrait bénéficier d'un financement comparable à celui de l'exportation et être soutenu par la même infrastructure et les mêmes services techniques d'appui³⁵.

En second lieu ces politiques visent à rétablir l'équilibre interne. La réduction du déficit budgétaire peut être obtenu sans toucher aux dépenses sociales et sanitaires. On peut réduire le nombre de représentations diplomatiques dans le monde, une représentation par groupe de pays; exemple une seule représentation pour l'Afrique Centrale, une seule pour le Maghreb, une pour les pays d'Amérique Central, une ou deux pour le Moyen Orient etc... On peut aussi faire de petites économies en supprimant le bon d'essence aux usagers des véhicules administratifs à usage personnel; interdire la circulation de ces véhicules les week-ends et jours fériés, cela les amortirait moins vite. Certes ces mesures sont insignifiantes au regard de l'ampleur du problème, mais elles auront le mérite d'éveiller une certaine prise de conscience, un respect du bien public. Les petites économies ont aussi leur importance. Comme le disait Kim Il Sung:

Il faut nous habituer à utiliser efficacement et à économiser toute chose, aussi petite soit-elle, si non nous ne pourrons pas gérer convenablement l'économie du pays³⁶. On pourrait aussi augmenter les recettes fiscales sans forcément augmenter les taxes. Pour cela il faut recouvrer les impayés d'impôt. Veiller à ce que les contribuables s'acquittent effectivement de

35 Cf. UNICEF: op. cit. p. 221.

36 Kim Il Sung; *oeuvres choisies* Tome I éditions en langues étrangères Pyonyang Corée 1976, p. 488.

leurs obligations (impôt sur la propriété bâtie et non bâtie). Par ailleurs une révision des conditions d'exonération des entreprises dite "prioritaires", permettrait à l'Etat de récupérer une bonne partie du manque à gagner fiscal.

A côté de ces mesures superficielles de correction des déséquilibres, il convient d'envisager une modification en profondeur des structures, si l'on veut réduire les méfaits de la crise, et remettre l'économie ivoirienne sur le chemin de la croissance³⁷.

Pour cela le rôle économique de l'Etat (Etat en tant qu'entrepreneur) doit être renforcé. L'Etat constitue en Côte d'Ivoire le garant aux yeux des bailleurs de fonds et des organismes internationaux, qui, pour accorder des prêts même au secteur privé exigent son aval par le biais de la Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement. Il n'y a pas de doute, au stade actuel du développement du pays, et plus encore en cette période de crise, que le rôle de l'Etat soit déterminant. Comme le fait remarquer Ricardo French-Davis,

*la libération des marchés et la privatisation encouragées par le plan Baker ne sont pas de nature à éliminer les déséquilibres*³⁸.

Plutôt que de privatiser, il faut reformer les entreprises publiques à caractère industriel et commercial et les sociétés d'Etat, dans leur gestion, en restructurant le secteur productif. La gestion de ces entreprises doit obéir à des critères de rentabilité. La gestion des fonds publics doit être rigoureuse et soumise au contrôle afin d'éviter les "erreurs de gestion"³⁹.

Il faut éviter le dénigrement insidieux et systématique du secteur public, qui décourage toute action visant à améliorer son efficacité⁴⁰.

Identifier l'entreprise publique au déficit, au gouffre financier, est une grave erreur conceptuelle. Dans les pays européens, notamment en France, des entreprises publiques ou nationalisées (SNCF, Renault, etc.) dégagent en fin d'exercice des excédents, pourquoi nos entreprises n'en feraient-elles pas autant?

La stratégie de financement de l'économie a été jusqu'à présent de compter presque exclusivement sur l'extérieur. Aussi pensons-nous qu'il faut recentrer l'économie par la recherche de sources internes de financement. A cet effet, il faut créer et mobiliser l'épargne intérieure par une politique d'incitation morale, civique et économique. Compte tenu de la faiblesse du privé, l'Etat peut encourager d'avantage l'organisation des coopératives de production du

37 Ricardo French-Davis; "Dette extérieure - ajustement et développement en Amérique Latine" *Revue Tiers Monde*, Tome XXVIII No 109, janvier-mars 1987, p. 92.

38 Ricardo French-Davis - "Dette extérieure, ajustement et développement en Amérique Latine". *Revue Tiers Monde*, tome XXVIII No 109, janvier-mars 1987, p. 92.

39 Les erreurs de gestions sont ici une manière élégante de qualifier les détournements de denier publics.

40 R. French-Davis: *Ibid.* p. 93.

genre des Groupements à Vocation Coopératives (G.V.C.) renouvés pour soutenir l'activité économique.

On peut valoriser la force du travail et l'utiliser abondamment pour créer le capital comme l'indique Nurkse⁴¹. En effet des programmes de travaux publics à forte intensité de travail peuvent permettre d'utiliser la main-d'oeuvre abondante pour la mise en place d'infrastructures économiques et sociales et élever ainsi la productivité à long terme. Une participation communautaire peut apporter une aide à la formulation des programmes de redressement et fournir les ressources humaines à leurs applications. L'apport extérieur doit être conçu comme un appoint et non plus comme l'essentiel dans le long terme.

Une autre source de financement interne est le financement monétaire du déficit budgétaire. Si la Côte d'Ivoire a beaucoup recours à l'emprunt extérieur, c'est parce que les institutions bancaires et monétaires de l'UMOA l'y contraignent. En effet, la Banque Centrale de l'UMOA l'y contraignent. En effet, la Banque Centrale ne peut consentir que 20% des recettes budgétaires comme avance au Trésor Public; ce qui apparaît dérisoire, quand on sait que dans de nombreux pays le concours de la Banque Centrale au Trésor Public est très important. Nous estimons que sans faire de politique trop laxiste on pourrait utiliser la création monétaire dans le financement du déficit intérieur, augmenter le crédit à l'économie, l'orienter dans les secteurs de production dans un premier temps, et ensuite augmenter le crédit à la consommation, enfin débloquer progressivement les salaires.

Au niveau international certaines propositions méritent une attention particulière. Le FMI qui demande aux pays en développement de s'ouvrir sans réserve, devrait exiger des pays développés l'ouverture également de leurs marchés aux produits de base et produits manufacturés des pays en développement. La restructuration de l'économie ivoirienne comme celles des autres pays en développement, serait de peu d'efficacité sans une restructuration des pays développés qui accroîtrait leur demande d'exportation de produit de base.

L'instabilité du dollar a créé une certaine incertitude qui entraîne la spéculation au détriment de l'investissement et des gains de productivité; aussi convient-il de stabiliser le dollar⁴². Par ailleurs il faut bien sûr stabiliser son service en le plafonnant. On pourrait aussi indexer le service de la dette sur les recettes d'exportation. Pour éviter que les fluctuations du dollar n'influence la dette, il serait judicieux de conclure les emprunts en monnaie constante.

41 Nurkse, cité par l'UNICEF op. cit. page 234.

42 Cf. Ricardo French-Davis op. cit. p. 90.

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Conflict among the Nigerian Bourgeoisie and the Demise of the Second Republic

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RÉSUMÉ. L'une des principales causes de la chute de la Deuxième République Nigériane réside dans la contradiction profonde entre la Constitution de 1979 et le caractère de la classe qui devait veiller à son application. L'indépendance et le patriotisme de la bourgeoisie sont une condition *sine qua non* pour une bonne application de la Constitution. Or, la bourgeoisie nigériane n'est pas indépendante, et la politique de la République était dominée par la bourgeoisie des affaires qui a un penchant marqué pour le capitalisme improductif. L'administration du pouvoir central par des membres de cette clique entraîna une grave crise économique du fait qu'ils cherchaient à s'approprier la plus-value qui revenait à l'Etat, d'où le conflit qui éclata entre eux. De plus, l'aggravation de la crise économique exacerba le conflit qui opposait la bourgeoisie des affaires aux producteurs capitalistes, au point que la bourgeoisie nigériane frisa l'auto-destruction. C'est le coup-d'Etat militaire du 31 Décembre 1983 qui l'en épargna. Cependant, les militaires, auteurs du coup-d'Etat, prirent parti pour les producteurs capitalistes. Néanmoins, une crise intra-bourgeoise persiste. La solution à la crise économique du Nigéria réside dans la réforme du système suivant les principes socialistes.

Introduction

On the 1st of October, 1979 when the military oligarchic faction of the Nigerian bourgeoisie handed over power to the civilian factions, there were self-congratulations, euphoria and optimism among this class. It was believed that bourgeois democracy had at last come to stay. But within a period of four years, the oppressed classes (proletariats, Lumpen proletariats, market women, peasants, the unemployed and students) as well as the faction of the domestic bourgeoisie that believes in productive capitalism were dissatisfied with the civilian regime and desired its collapse. The crucial question that should be asked is, what went wrong? This paper is an attempt to answer the question. The thrust of our analysis is that in accounting for the collapse of the Second Republic, we should look at the nature of the 1979 constitution and the character of the class, that it was meant to serve.

It is argued that the dominance of the faction of the domestic bourgeoisie that believes in unproductive or commercial capitalism, worsened Nigeria's economic crisis. This resulted in the intensification of the intra-bourgeois crisis that plagued the Second Republic, so much so that the class almost destroyed itself. The coup of December 31, 1983 was therefore an attempt to save it from self destruction. But in carrying out the coup, the military sided

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with the faction of the bourgeoisie that believes in productive capitalism. However, the inability of this faction to replace the influence of the other faction, resulted in the overthrow of the Buhari regime in August 1985. Although the Babangida regime which succeeded it is trying to satisfy the competing factions of the Nigerian bourgeoisie, its advent again marks the relative ascendancy of the commercial capitalist. Given the limitations of the domestic bourgeoisie, it is posited that the credible way out of the country's economic quagmire is the marginalization of the bourgeoisie by fundamentally restructuring Nigerian society along socialist lines.

The 1979 Constitution as a Bourgeois Constitution

The 1979 constitution was a product of the Draft by the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), which was subsequently deliberated upon by the Constituent Assembly (CA). Essentially, the CA agreed with the main provisions of the Draft. In discussing the features of the constitution, therefore, one has to take note of the composition of the two bodies. Members of the CDC were not elected, but merely nominated by the military. All the fifty members belonged to sections of the domestic bourgeoisie. In fact about 80 per cent of the members belonged to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, while the remaining 20 per cent was made up of the business - commercial bourgeoisie.

Members of the CA, were elected indirectly through their local government councils. This method of election made the body to be dominated by people from the propertied class. About three quarter of the total membership of the CA belonged to the business-commercial bourgeoisie, (Dudley; 1982). Given the composition of the CDC and CA, the 1979 constitution was logically a constitution drawn up by the bourgeoisie. Thus, the constitution was a product of a consensus between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the business-commercial bourgeoisie. It should also be noted that Murtala Mohammed (the then Head of State) while inaugurating the CDC in October 1975, virtually prescribed the Presidential variant of bourgeois-democratic government for Nigeria. Hence a minority report by Yusuf Bala Usman and Segun Osoba which recommended a socialist constitution for Nigeria was not brought before the CA for discussion.

The institutional structure of the Second Republic was therefore biased in favour of the bourgeoisie and thus against the interest of the peasants, proletariats, lumpen-proletariats, market women, the unemployed and students who in fact constituted the overwhelming majority of the population. A few examples can be used to substantiate this assertion. It was provided that before political parties could be registered, they must be 'broad based' in the form of having functioning, well staffed and furnished offices in at least thirteen states of the federation. Also, before contesting an election, a worker had to resign his job. Moreover, some election deposits were to be paid. The result was that of the over fifty political associations that applied

for registration as political parties in 1979, only five were approved by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO).

All the five parties were led by frontline members of the domestic bourgeoisie. It is also significant to note that apart from the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the other registered political Parties had their genesis in the CA. Dudley equally noted that of the nine members (excluding the President of the Republic and the nine Vice-Chairmen) who were the initial national officers of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), no fewer than seven were members of the CA, and of the seven, four became Federal Ministers, one the Political Adviser to the President and the other two members of the National Assembly. As Ake (1984) rightly observed, the constitution effectively disenfranchised the subordinate classes, discouraging the political involvement of organized labour, and including conditions which ensured that only the wealthy or their surrogates could form political parties and contest elections. The only concession to democracy was the periodic ritual of voting.

Perhaps this bourgeois consensus can better be demonstrated by the use of the expression 'the federal character of Nigeria' which was defined as 'the distinctive desire of the people of Nigeria to promote national unity, foster national loyalty and give every citizen of Nigeria a sense of belonging to the nation, (Adamolekun, 1983). Thus 'federal character' was to be reflected in the appointment of:

Federal Ministers, Nigeria's permanent representatives overseas, chairmanship and membership of the boards of parastatals and public bodies set up under the constitution, judicial offices, commissioned and non-commissioned personnel of the armed forces, federal permanent secretaries and Presidential advisers (Dudly; 1982).

The above provisions which were clearly meant to satisfy the political and material interests of the bourgeoisie were seen as helping «to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies». Bourgeois unity was taken to be synonymous to national unity. This 'federal character' concept turned out to be one of the greatest sources of intra-bourgeois crisis in the Second Republic.

Implicit in the consensus over 'federal character' is the competition for offices, and therefore the resources controlled by incumbents. It is little wonder then that Adamolekun observed that the fundamental contradiction in the 1979 constitution, was the juxtaposition of consensual and competitive orientations as norms of political behaviour. This was further highlighted by the provision for multi-party system. Given the historical origin and character of the Nigerian bourgeoisie, it was inevitable that the competition over spoils of office should assume precedence over consensus. In fact the division and contradiction within the class made this a logical outcome. To a

very great extent, the amount of consensus exhibited during the process of constitution making was an attempt to convince the military that the civilian wing of the domestic bourgeoisie was matured enough to take over power. The most important consideration at that stage was the grabbing of power. It can then be argued that the consensus was at best a tenuous compromise that helped to conceal the division and conflict among the Nigerian bourgeoisie. To be able to appreciate this claim it is necessary to examine the historical development and nature of the class.

The Historical Development and Character of the Nigerian Bourgeoisie

The Nigerian bourgeoisies are products of colonialism. The colonial state required the services of Nigerians as clerks, teachers, interpreters, etc. It was therefore forced in its own interest to transfer certain skills and resources to these people. During the inter-war years when the colonial master relied more on the chiefs in colonial administration, this newly emergent class was trying to consolidate its position in order to be able to challenge the influence of the chiefs. But the conditions in Nigeria after the second imperialist war of 1939-1945 made the colonial government to ditch the chiefs and rely more on this set of people. Having been uprooted from their communities, these people came to live in urban centers. Since they were products of the colonial structure, they depended on the manipulation of that structure for survival. Yet their access to opportunities was on very unequal terms. This class as a result, perceived reality in terms of inherited inequality, blocked economic opportunities and social discrimination. It led to the desire to replace the colonial structure and fortunately, the new skills gave them some of the resources with which to attempt this.

Given the above situation, their 'nationalism' was opportunistic and petty bourgeois in nature. For one thing, the colonial state was in control of the economic surplus which was progressively enhanced by the exploitative activities of the marketing boards. In order to have access to the wealth of the state, one had to be in control of state power. The opposition of this class to colonialism, thus stemmed from the limits which it sought to impose upon their ability to acquire more of the available resources, (Brett; 1973).

Owing to the differential impact of colonialism on different sections of the country, and the weak material base of this class, the process of political decolonization witnessed a struggle among members for the control of state power. In this struggle, ethnicity and regionalism were brought into play so that the colonial power became the umpire and ensured that only political independence was achieved. The competition witnessed the manipulation of particularistic interests and sentiments among the poor, for self-aggrandizement. Thus political independence was negotiated in stages, with the least possible disruption of colonial institutions. It has therefore been observed that Nigeria produced no political martyrs, but successors. (D. Graf; 1983).

By 1960, the domestic bourgeoisie was predominantly composed of the business-commercial and the bureaucratic factions; with the former as the

most influential faction. Members of this faction, used their privileged position to accumulate the economic surplus that accrued to the state. They had allies in the bureaucratic bourgeoisie who nevertheless played subordinate role. It was the competition among them for the control of state power and hence for the resources available to the state that largely contributed to the demise of the First Republic.

The military rule gave opportunity to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie to accumulate surplus. Since the military was not experienced in the act of administration, they relied on these people for advice. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie used their newly acquired status to strengthen their own position. The incipient alliance that had been formed between the bureaucratic and the business-commercial bourgeoisie up to the eve of the civil war was strengthened by the civil war conditions. The exploitation of the civil war profiteering conditions united them in their common aspirations of appropriating the surplus that accrued to the state from the petroleum industry. But it should be noted that the power of formulating and implementing policies laid with the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and they only co-opted the business-commercial bourgeoisie in so far as the latter were prepared to accept their terms. Military intervention therefore resulted in a 'fractional shift' in the intra-bourgeois balance of power in favour of the bureaucratic faction, so that the business-commercial bourgeoisie became junior partners in the bourgeois coalition rather than co-determining principals.

The domestic bourgeoisie sought to establish areas of economic activity in which they would be protected from foreign competition, or in which foreign companies would have to operate through them. This was done through the 1972 Indigenization Decree which transferred ownership of some foreign enterprises to the indigenous bourgeoisie. The enterprises affected were in the sphere of small scale production and distribution, in which mainly the Lebanese had interest. Only a certain percentage of participation was required for large-scale enterprises which were mainly under the control of multinational corporations. The finance for either the takeover or for indigenous participation in these enterprises were provided by banks, now 40 per cent government-owned, by illegally gained wealth of the state-sponsored bourgeoisie and by employers of foreign companies who have been lent money by these firms to buy their shares at favourable prices. Civil servants were said to be among the main recipient of the bank loans. The military nursed and concretized the domestic bourgeoisie through the Indigenization Decree and by creating financial institutions that helped them to advance their economic interests. Ekuhware (1984) has observed that the indigenization policy did not only promote the ownership and control by the domestic bourgeoisie of the merchandising and small scale industrial enterprises but also promoted the ownership and control by the foreign bourgeoisie of highly state protected and subsidized and high-technology enter-

prises. Thus the dependence of the domestic bourgeoisie on foreign capitalists was further enhanced.

As was demonstrated by the Murtala Mohammed coup of July 1975, the accumulation of wealth was in the main restricted to the top echelon of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and their allies among the business-commercial bourgeoisie. The Murtala Mohammed purge provided an opportunity for the younger elements of the domestic bourgeoisie to settle scores with the older generations that had largely benefitted from the previous accumulation of surplus. Thus former Federal and State Commissioners, Permanent Secretaries, Chief Executives and older Military Officers were publicly discredited and disgraced. The younger generation now proceeded to use their privileged position to accumulate wealth. One can therefore say that there was division and in-fighting among the domestic bourgeoisie which was a product of the relative access of the different factions and groups to the surplus that accrued to the state.

The military regime therefore brought power and influence to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. They did not only replace politicians in government but also assumed public posture which presented them as the legitimate representatives of their localities. They spoke and acted on behalf of the areas they came from on vital political, economic and educational issues such as regional interests, state creation, revenue allocation, industrial location and the quota system into government offices. Having built for themselves secure economic base, they proceeded to the local level to buy traditional titles, and build political bases through patronage and personal promotions of individuals, (Yahaya; 1985). The military therefore continued and in fact encouraged the process of primitive accumulation. It is hardly surprising that corruption which is an integral part of a dependent and decadent capitalism became the order of the day. It can be argued that the military failed to provide the conditions necessary for the establishment of a bourgeois democratic rule which was supposedly inaugurated in 1979.

Intra-Bourgeois Conflict and the Demise of the Second Republic

As a result of the prominent role of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie under the military, they inevitably had to constitute the majority in the CDC. But when it came to indirect election into the CA, they were out-done by the older generation of business-commercial bourgeoisie. It has been argued earlier on that the 1979 constitution was a product of a consensus between factions of the Nigerian bourgeoisie and that within this consensus was a latent conflict. This will become apparent when we discuss the role of the domestic bourgeoisie in the Second Republic. It suffices here for one to reiterate the fact that the constitution was a bourgeois one.

For a bourgeois democracy to be successful, an independent and nationalistic bourgeoisie is a necessity. But as we have seen, this was not the case in Nigeria. The bourgeois class did not only have a weak material base but was also dependent and parasitic. This was the major contradiction in the Nige-

rian State system - a contradiction which contributed in no small measure to the collapse of the Second Republic. To make up for the situation, members embarked on primitive accumulation, that is, «the use of legal and physical coercion to accumulate surplus and to institutionalize capitalism», (Ake; 1982). However, most of the accumulated surplus was not translated into productive ventures which would have gone a long way to establish a sound material base for the domestic bourgeoisie. This fundamental contradiction which played a great role in the collapse of the First Republic, is equally crucial in understanding the demise of the Second Republic.

In the formation of political parties in 1978/79, the different factions of the domestic bourgeoisie found themselves coming together in the different parties. The contradiction inherent in such a situation was largely responsible for the series of intra-class feuds that bedeviled the Second Republic. It is necessary here to examine the composition of the political parties. The NPN was made up of feudal elements, business-commercial bourgeoisie, and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The struggle in the party was one between a coalition of the feudal elements and the business-commercial bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie on the other hand. The former had the advantage of experience and time in which they did grassroot campaigns. The nomination of Shagari as Presidential candidate gave them an ascendancy. Their position was reinforced by gaining more gubernatorial and senatorial nominations. Thus a coalition that was strongly disposed towards unproductive capitalism became dominant. For them capital came «less from productive activity than the manipulation of social status and political power», (Ake; 1982).

A group of younger elements of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie who were dissatisfied with the ascendancy of the other faction within the NPN, and some young radicals, rallied round Aminu Kano to form the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP). An alliance was formed with remnants of Aminu Kano's old Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) supporters who could not fit into the new political arrangement where wealth and western educational achievements were the major criteria, (Yahaya; 1985). The marriage was therefore that of convenience and turned out to be uneasy. The composition of the PRP was predominantly petty bourgeois even though it contained a significant group of young radicals.

The Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) was made up mainly of the petty bourgeoisie. Ake (1982) described them as the 'lower bourgeoisie', that thrived on commerce, contracts and political access. As a result it is not noted for strong passions or ideological purity, and its loyalty is fitful. The Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP) revolved round a leader, Ibrahim Waziri, who is a strong member of the business-commercial bourgeoisie. But the majority of the members belonged to the petty bourgeois class.

The core leadership of the UPN were strong members of the business-commercial bourgeoisie. The leadership in fact came close to being a bour-

geoisie in the orthodox sense for it had a fairly well established base in commerce and industry. By its economic nature, it was more disposed to discipline, efficiency and productive capitalism (orthodox accumulation). Even though the majority of the members belonged to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the efficiency of the organization of the party and the fact that most of them had strong loyalty to Obafemi Awolowo helped to minimize internal dissensions.

One significant development in the Second Republic is that the political parties that experienced the greatest amount of internal crises which were mostly caused by disagreement over co-operation with the NPN and therefore access to political power and wealth were those in which the petty bourgeoisie were predominant. Hence the NPP quickly reached an accord with the NPN after agreement had been reached on how to share offices, which resulted in the appointment of NPP members as Federal Ministers, and to positions in Federal Government's corporations and parastatals.

The breakdown of the accord in 1981 was as a result of what the NPP saw as discrimination in the award of contracts, import licences and the distribution of offices, while the NPN accused the NPP of ingratitude, deceit, greed and blackmail.

It is equally significant to observe that even when the accord came to an end, two NPP Ministers and some of its federal legislators did not agree with the decision. Subsequently, Senator Anah formed a break-away faction of the NPP. In fact Ishaya Audu, then Minister for External Affairs, argued that it would be suicidal for him to resign his appointment since he had no other job to fall back to. He, therefore, resigned from the NPP after expressing displeasure with the party for breaking the accord. His acceptance of NPN's offer to continue as Minister suggests that what was more important to him was the material benefits that accrued to him as a result of the ministerial appointment. Even before the break-down of the accord, some prominent NPP members like retired Brigadier Benjamin Adekunle and Chief Okoi-Obuli a Federal Minister, had decamped to the NPN. It should also be noted that the group that championed the breakdown of the accord were led by the three NPP Governors whose access to wealth and patronage was guaranteed by the control of state power.

Even then it has to be pointed out that the NPP leadership was not originally genuinely interested in breaking the NPN/NPP accord. The six months notice that was served by NPP in July 1981 was meant to serve as a threat for getting more material benefits from the NPN. One of the terms of the accord was that any of the party that intended to terminate it had to give the other party a six-month notice. The NPP leadership calculated that the period would be used to secure more benefits from the NPN. To their chagrin, the NPN chairman, A. M. A. Akinloye called off the NPP's bluff by waiving the notice and terminating the accord with immediate effect. This prompted Nnamdi Azikiwe the Presidential candidate of the NPP in the

1979 election, to accuse Akinloye of lacking the political acumen to interpret the six-month notice as a cooling device that was to enable both parties to re-determine the need for fence mending. He added that the notice was open to «conditional negotiated settlement». (Okpu; 1985).

There were similar occurrences in the PRP and the GNPP: The PRP did not enter into an accord with the NPN in 1979 largely because of the influence of the young radicals who incidentally were led by Balarabe Musa the Governor of Kaduna State and Abubaka Rimi the Governor of Kano State. But with time, a group of PRP legislators led by Sarbo Bakin Zuwo together with Sam Ikoku the Secretary-General of the party, started advocating for cooperation with the NPN. This was strongly opposed by Musa and Rimi who on the other hand favoured the coming together of the other four political parties to form the Progressive Parties Alliance (PPA). This alliance was to oppose the NPN. But Aminu Kano who was against the formation of political alliances, was opposed to the PPA. Okpu has advanced two other reasons for Aminu Kano's attitude. The first is that he was influenced by the experience of his former party, NEPU, with the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) during the First Republic. Between 1954 and 1964, NEPU formed an alliance with the NCNC, yet when after the 1959 election the NCNC decided to form an alliance with the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), it did not consult NEPU thereby leaving its leadership in the cold. He saw this same opportunistic traits with the NPP (generally regarded as the offspring of the NCNC) and so was not prepared to join any alliance that included the party. Secondly, that Aminu Kano's earlier association with the NPN probably made him more disposed to the party than the PPA. Nevertheless, Zuwo and Ikoku managed to secure his support and this resulted in a split in the PRP into the Michael Imoudu faction and the Aminu Kano faction.

The strong influence of Wiziri Ibrahim initially prevented the GNPP from forming an alliance with the NPN. As happened in the PRP it was a group of federal legislators led by Mahmud Waziri that championed the cause of cooperation with the NPN. This again resulted in a split in the party.

A pattern that can be deciphered from these intra-party conflicts is that the anti accord group were usually led by State Governors who had access to state power and therefore patronage, while the pro accord group were usually led by Federal Legislators, who wanted patronage from the NPN federal government. No thanks to the revenue allocation formula which gave a greater chunk of the country's revenue to the federal government. The important consideration was therefore the material gain of the individuals involved. Closely related to the above is the fact that many states and even the Federal Government witnessed controversies and disagreement between legislators and members of the executive, with the former claiming that the latter was using the control of state power to amass wealth. It was particular-

ly more pronounced in states like Bendel, Kwara and Kaduna where the governors did not command overwhelming majority in the legislature.

Even the legislators saw their position as a source of primitive accumulation. The first thing they did was to vote lucrative salaries for themselves - ranging from 25,000.00 Naira for the President of the Senate to 14,000.00 Naira for a member of the House of Representatives. This in a country where the highest paid person in public sector earned 15,000.00 Naira. Moreover, they lucrative fantastic amount for themselves as car loans. It is significant to note that legislators from all the political parties agreed with these decisions. Even though the contract board of the National Assembly was empowered to award contracts not exceeding 150,000.00 Naira within a period of four years, it had awarded contracts totalling 20 Millions Naira. When the board sat for contract awards, its Secretary was barred from attending.

Given the dominance of the business-commercial faction of the domestic bourgeoisie, emphasis was laid on the award of contracts and the issuing of import-licences. The 'Green Revolution' and the housing policy of the NPN Federal Government became a veritable gold mine for members of this parasitic class. The masses for whose benefit they were supposedly meant only read about them in the papers. Corruption became the order of the day. The struggle for contracts was such that it even resulted in division within the NPN. The main reason why a group of Yoruba politicians opposed the re-election of Adisa Akinloye as the chairman of the NPN in 1982, was that he did not use his position to influence the award of contracts to them. This made Akinloye to publish a list of multi-million Naira contract awards given to those who were seeking to depose him for 'relegating Yorubas to the background'. Moreover, the resentment of this group was alleged to have had its foundation in the 1981 cabinet reshuffle in which Yoruba Ministers were dropped from what were seen as more lucrative ministries. Closely related to this is the fact that an important source of intra-bourgeois dispute was over the interpretation and implementation of the term 'federal character'. Some politicians argued that their ethnic groups did not get their fair share in the distribution of offices.

It is within the context of this commercial or unproductive capitalism, that the economic crisis which the State faced can be appreciated. The situation becomes clearer when it is realized that in 1979 when the civilian regime came to power, the nation's external reserve stood at about 5 billion Naira, but by the end of 1983 when the regime was overthrown, it had fallen to a mere 0.9 billion Naira. Also while the total crude oil sale in Nigeria between 1959 and 1983 was 79 billion Naira, the period between 1979 and 1983 accounted for 43.6 billion Naira, that is 55.2 per cent of the total amount from oil. Yet by the end of 1983, Nigeria's external debt stood at about 20 billion Naira.

As the economic crisis deepened, there was a struggle between the business-commercial faction and the capitalist producers faction of the domestic bourgeoisie. While the capitalist producers which included retired army Generals who had become capitalist farmers, like Olusegun Obasanjo (Head of State between February, 1976 and October, 1979) and Shehu Yar'Adua (his Second in Command for the same period), called for austerity measures and the ban on the importation of certain items like fresh and frozen chicken as a way of solving the economic crisis, the comprador elements were opposed to these measures which would make it difficult for them to accumulate wealth. On the contrary, they urged Nigeria to leave OPEC so that the country would be able to increase oil exports, (Turner and Badru; 1985). The business-commercial bourgeoisie therefore resorted to the use of coercion as a means of retaining itself in power. By using force, it could no longer disguise exploitation as fair exchange but rather exposed it as naked coercion. The result was that legitimacy receded to the background thereby making way for relations of raw power and the perception of right to be co-extensive with might (Ake; 1982).

The increasing delegitimization of the NPN Federal Government made the comprador elements undermine the formality of voting that had, in the first place, been grudgingly granted the masses. This was demonstrated by the 'electoral coup' of 1983. In frustration, sections of the Nigerian populace particularly in Ondo and Oyo States resorted to acts of arson and rebellion which were forcefully suppressed. This meant that the government had virtually abdicated power to its coercive arm. In relying heavily on force, the regime initiated its own displacement by its coercive institutions. The military coup was therefore a defensive one which saved the Nigerian bourgeoisie from self destruction. In carrying out the coup the military sided with the section of the bourgeoisie that sought to promote capitalist production in Nigeria. Thus the collapse of the Second Republic was principally caused by a realignment of the power structure within the domestic bourgeoisie in favour of the capitalist producers.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have sought to demonstrate that the crucial factor in explaining the collapse of the Second Republic was the fundamental contradiction between the 1979 constitution and the character of the class that operated it. The primitive accumulation tendency that was displayed by majority of the Nigerian bourgeoisie did not only unleash unhealthy rivalry for the control of state power, but also plunged the state into economic crisis. A crisis which threatened to destroy the domestic bourgeoisie. The intervention of the military wing of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie has for now prevented this class from self-destruction.

But the intra-bourgeois crisis was shifted to the military. The Muhammadu Buhari regime which was installed in January 1984, sought to promote productive capitalist relations in Nigeria. This could not be, given the dominant

position of the business-commercial bourgeoisie. The outcome was a realignment within the military oligarchy which resulted in the Ibrahim Babangida coup of August 1985.

Although Babangida's regime is trying to maintain a delicate balance between the competing factions of the domestic bourgeoisie by granting them access to state power and hence, resources, the ascendancy of market forces in Nigeria's political economy, marks the dominance of the business-commercial bourgeoisie. The contradiction inherent in such a situation, is bound to set in motion some other forces that would affect the tenure of the regime.

However, given the dominance of the business-commercial faction of the domestic bourgeoisie, the only way the capitalist producers can gain ascendancy is to form an alliance with the oppressed classes of peasants, workers, lumpen proletariats, market women, the unemployed and students. But as have been observed by Turner and Badru, the fact that such an alliance constitutes a threat to the dominance of the bourgeois class would likely prevent its emergence. The alternative therefore, is to marginalize the bourgeoisie by effecting a fundamental restructuring of the society along socialist lines. The worsening economic crisis is bound to resolve the situation in favour of the oppressed classes.

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Social Revolutions - The Preconditions for sustainable Development and People's Democracies in Africa: A Contribution to the Anyang' Nyong'o /Mkandawire Debate

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The debate between Anyang' Nyong'o and Mkandawire in "*Africa Development*"¹ is too serious to be left to the two "generals" alone. Both deal with issues which are central in assessing the overall economic development in independent African countries since the 1950s. They also discuss the democratic and/or non-democratic nature of political organization and rule in these countries which have led to the different levels and speed of economic development among independent African countries. As in most analysis of this nature, prognosis, and even "prescriptions", are given on what can be done in the future to strengthen development and democracy. Anyang' Nyong'o is more responsible for the latter, albeit implicitly, than Mkandawire.

My contribution will deal with the contributions of both Anyang' Nyong'o and Mkandawire, but more with the former because his original piece and the rejoinder touch on many controversial aspects of theory and practice which Mkandawire has not dealt with in his critique. I shall hereinafter refer

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1 P. Anyang' Nyong'o "Political Instability and the Prospects for Democracy in Africa", *Africa Development*, vol. XIII No.1, 1988, p.71-86; Thandika Mkandawire, "Comments on Democracy and Political Instability", *Africa Development*, Vol.XIII No.3, 1988, p.77-82; P. Anyang' Nyong'o, Democracy and Political Instability: A Rejoinder to the Comments by Thandika Mkandawire", *Africa Development*, Vol.XIII No.3, 1988, p.83-87.

to the pieces in the debate as Anyang's original, Mkandawire's comments and Anyang's rejoinder.

In what follows, I attempt to contribute to the whole debate which is centered on Anyang's controversial thesis that Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire and Malawi have experienced reasonable levels of democratic practices and that it is such relative democracy that has been responsible for what Anyang alleges to be exceptional levels of development. In my contribution I isolate and comment on five interrelated central and secondary conclusions or observations made by Anyang and Mkandawire within the debate over the former's thesis. The five issues I have looked at are:

(a) whether in Africa in general there has been a reduction in citizen participation in government since the attainment of independence;

(b) whether Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire and Malawi are or are not the models of democratic states in Africa and whether or not democracy is related to development;

(c) what I consider to be Anyang's rather simplistic dismissal of the institution of free and fair elections as an independent attribute of democracy;

(d) what I consider to be Anyang's selective attack of immigrant business communities in Africa for undermining democracy and development in Africa instead of focussing on the whole imperialist finance capital;

(e) what I regard as Anyang's idealist hope that political power can be handed over to popular democratic groups voluntarily without political, including military struggle by politically organized groups.

Reducing the Political Arena of Citizen Participation in Government

In both the original and the rejoinder Anyang laments the "disintegration of the national coalitions" a term he uses to describe the alleged apparent unity achieved during the phase of national struggle for independence. In his words:

*"Since independence, the role of the citizen in the affairs of government has systematically been reduced. The political arena has shrunk, political demobilization has become more the norm than the exception in regime behaviour and social engineering to rationalize and sustain political repression has been the preoccupation of most governments"*².

2 Anyang Nyong'o, "Political Instability and the Prospects for Democracy in Africa" *ibid.*, p.72.

He follows this up in the rejoinder by making reference to an article he published in 1986 on Kenya³ where the thesis was more fully developed. I have read the version of the latter article published in 1989 in "Africa Affairs"⁴ and will make my observation based on this latter version.

I find Anyang's "disintegration of the national coalitions" laced with idealism. Whereas it is true that in African countries which have followed the capitalist path of development, neo-colonial states, popular political participation in government and in sharing national wealth is not permitted, it is only important to view this as a *historical and class phenomena*. Viewed as such it becomes apparent that curtailing political participation of the citizenry in government and politics was inherited from the colonial era and what is being observed now is a continuation with that tradition. The broad-based popular mobilization in the struggle for independence was realized not as a means of governing but rather for the purpose of removing the foreign colonial rule. Whether or not such an alliance was to be carried out and maintained in the next phase of building a new independent society could not and cannot be assumed as Anyang' appears to do. Besides, in most African countries the "unity" that was achieved in driving out the colonial dictators was more of an alliance, a broad national united front, than a solid unity. What real unity could have been expected in a situation where people divided into different social classes, some representing *antagonistic class* interests, were forced by the historical circumstances of foreign rule to forge a common front to do away with the then main contradiction in their lives? The "unity" was destined to breakdown sooner or later after the direct colonial-rule contradiction was resolved.

It is also important in analyzing what I consider to be the natural breakdown of the "nationalist coalitions" to have a time perspective. Most independent African states are now nearing or are over twenty years old. The democratic dynamics are entirely different from those of the pre-independence era. For example more than one half of Kenya's population today, twenty six years after independence, was born after independence. They were not part of the "national coalitions" against colonial rule. They are ready and struggling for new alliances and coalitions that will help them get rid of the neo-colonial political and economic system which they have lived under all their lives.

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- 3 Anyang' Nyong'o, "State and Society in Kenya: The Disintegration of the Nationalist Coalitions and the Rise of Presidential Authoritarianism, 1963-1978", *Africa Development* Vol.XI, No.4, 1986, p.175-216.
- 4 Anyang' Nyong'o, "State and Society in Kenya: The Disintegration of the Nationalist Coalitions and the Rise of Presidential Authoritarianism, 1963-1978", *African Affairs* vol.88, No.351, April 1989, p.229-251.

Without belabouring the point too much, I also consider it important that in discussing the historical forces responsible for the breakdown of "nationalist coalitions" one needs to pay particular attention to the fact that independence leads to opening-up of the former closed colonies to the entire world imperialist forces. These imperialist forces naturally rush to the former colonies from all corners of the globe: from the European Economic Community (and not just the former "colonial master" only), Japan, the United States of America, the Scandinavian countries and so on. The dynamics of class formation and class struggle in the independent African states naturally feed on and are at the same time affected by such dominating and hegemonistic imperialist forces. It was inconceivable in the 1950s and 1960s that the imperialist economic crisis, the general crisis of capitalism of the 1970s and 1980s could find expression in the structural adjustment programmes of the IMF and World Bank that today terrorize the lives of virtually every African worker, peasant, lower middle-class, and intellectual.

New alliances or "nationalist coalitions" which are qualitatively different from those of pre-independence period such as what we recently (in June/July 1989) witnessed in the struggle of popular forces in Nigeria for the "Socialist Alternative to the Structural Adjustment Programme"⁵ are what to be expected and encouraged. In other words the death of the "nationalist coalitions" that had successfully completed their historical tasks should not be mourned but instead accorded heroes' burial.

More Political Accountability and Citizen Participation in Politics in Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire and Malawi: the Economic Growth and Accumulation Problematic

It is imperative that we quote Anyang's own words here in detail in order to avoid the likely response that he was misinterpreted or misunderstood. In the original, Anyang' avers:

A quick casual look will reveal that the more participatory political systems have done much better in terms of economic growth than the less participatory ones: Kenya under Kenyatta as compared to Sudan under Nimeiri; Cote d'Ivoire under Houphouet Boigny as compared to Zaire under Mobutu. The comparison is not altogether perfect: One does not know, for example, what to do with Malawi in this scheme of comparisons⁶.

And in the rejoinder, Anyang' repeats his central thesis more definitively having resolved the confusion over Malawi:

5 See the rich record of these struggles in, among other sources, *African Concord Weekly* issue from June 12 up to the beginning of August 1989, particularly the July 3 issue; *West Africa weekly* (the same period); *Newswatch Weekly* (the same period) and numerous dailies, weeklies and monthlies that cover Nigerian news.

6 Anyang' Original. *ibid.* p.77.

*The countries which have had high growth rates in Sub-Sahara Africa since independence are Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire and Malawi (of the non-oil producing countries). These also happen to be countries where there have been more accountability of the state to its social base - however narrow this is - when compared to the other military dictatorships and non-party regimes. There is therefore a prima-facie case, in the context of Africa of the post independence period, to argue that where there has been respect for democratic practices (however minimal) higher rates of growth and more successful models of accumulation have been ensured".*⁷

In the original contribution Anyang' asserts that countries with more participatory political systems have done much better in terms of economic growth. This is the correlation that Mkandawire disputes. Mkandawire uses Malawi as an example of a country with high economic growth but with a very repressive non-participatory political system - at least as far as the majority of the popular masses are concerned. Anyang' in the rejoinder readily concedes the point, although grudgingly. That is why in the rejoinder Anyang' includes Malawi among his earlier models of "participatory political systems" of Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire. More important however, is Anyang' Nyong'o insistence on his pre-determined models in the rejoinder. He claims to see exceptional "growth rates" and "higher rates of growth and more successful models of accumulation" - at least in post-independence Africa - only in countries where there exist "more accountability of the state to its social base - however narrow this is" - and also "more respect for democratic practices (however minimal)".

Indeed throughout his contributions, Anyang' deals with "growth rates" or "higher rates of growth and more successful models of accumulation" in the very narrow bourgeois economic sense although he accuses Mkandawire of being "a good product of bourgeois economics". Even assuming that the whole problematic of development can be reduced narrowly to "growth rates" and models of "accumulation" as bourgeois economism does, Anyang''s choice of countries where this has occurred with minimal democracy is unfortunate and misleading. Perhaps he could, if one is forced into empiricist arguments, have used countries such as Botswana or Senegal and not Kenya, Malawi and Côte d'Ivoire. But such empiricist approaches to analysis of historical processes is dangerous. Even for Botswana one cannot prove that it is relative political democracy that has led to reasonable levels of economic growth. What is the *structure* of the Botswana economy? What is its natural resources, levels of penetration of capital and its comparative advantages to any other country one would like to compare it with? What

7 Anyang''s Rejoinder, *ibid.*

time frame are we dealing with? What was the level of Botswana's economic development at the time of independence compared with whatever country or countries one compares it with? What has been the social cost in class terms of the growth or accumulation that has gone on? These are some of the fundamental questions that should be dealt with in any comparisons of "rates of growth" or "models of accumulation".

Anyang' does not concern himself with these at all and in fact Mkandawire is right when he accuses Anyang' of ignoring the "structural constraints" that need to be considered in assessing the development rates of countries.

The ahistorical nature of Anyang''s analysis as shown by his choice of examples to illustrate the empiricist bent of his argument lies in his inability to benefit from the law of uneven development of capitalism. Had he addressed his mind sufficiently to this he could have understood that Kenya was, since the early 20th century, a leader among most colonies in Africa in terms of the level of material development as well as capitalist accumulation. It is not the alleged democracy under the rule of the two dictators, Kenyatta and Moi, which suddenly pushed Kenya's "models of accumulation" ahead of most non-oil producing Sub-Sahara African countries.

Thandika is right when he asserts that "the struggle for democracy must be for democracy in its own right". A democratic political atmosphere that allows for choice of the right path of development as well as the organization of human material resources to pursue that path is better than one that does not permit of such choices. But this is not the correlation between democracy and development that Anyang' seems to be discussing. Instead Anyang' is concerned with a democracy that whatever the means or cost, leads to "stability". "Accountability" is then used in a very narrow sense to mean "accountability" not to the entire citizenry but to whatever narrow social base the government works for. From this model one can easily say that all governments are democratic because there cannot exist a government without some kind of narrow social base - this includes military dictatorships and the governments such as those run by Mobutu, the Amin Dada and Obote, governments, the Bokassa "Empire" or "Kingdom", the Sergeant Doe government and even the authoritarian Moi regime in Kenya today.

If we are serious about democracy and not merely in its usefulness for accumulation and growth rates even if the social beneficiaries are foreign monopoly capitalists and their local partners, then we must define democracy from a broad popular perspective. While on this point it is necessary to point out that Nigeria's economy underwent a high level of accumulation or growth in the 1970s precisely when the military dictators were in power, although it had oil, Latin American countries like Brazil had high growth rates in the 1960s under military dictatorships without much oil. Anyang''s discounting of military dictatorships from a model which he has constructed himself and one which includes all governments with reasonable "accumula-

tion" or "growth rates" with social bases "however minimal" is not consistent.

Perhaps of equal importance here is the *political implications* of Anyang's praise that is on all fours with those given by the leading servants and state persons of big monopoly capitalism such as Margaret Thatcher. For example, in the widely publicized controversial tour by Margaret Thatcher to Kenya in January 1988, Thatcher told Moi that Kenya has:

*"A strong and decisive leadership within a constitutional framework... where others have faltered, Kenya has continued to grow strong and more prosperous. We admire your country's peace and stability and policies which recognize the worth of the individual effort and personal endeavour and economy in which private industry has been encouraged..."*⁸.

At least Margaret Thatcher was specific in her praise of "stability" for the gain of the capitalists. She was not concerned with how that apparent "stability" has been fashioned and maintained. It is surprising that Anyang' Nyong'o who lives under the naked terror of the Kenyan state can actually cloth the *apparent* stability with "democracy". Is it that Anyang' possesses some special knowledge or yardstick for democracy which he has not disclosed that makes him talk of "democratic practices (however minimal)"?

Who says that the Kenyan, Malawian, Zairean and the masses of other fascist African states want to live under "minimal democracy" and not real democracy? Wasn't it the lack of democracy in Kenya, which is internationally known, that led to the mass protest in the Scandinavian countries in 1987, a fact which then led Mr. Moi to cancel his scheduled official visits to Norway and Sweden? When a section of the Kenyan people wanted to register a legal Kenya Socialist Party in May-June 1982 what did the government do to allow this expression of open democratic participation? University Staff Union asked in 1978-1981 to be recognized as a union and to express its right to demonstrate together with the students against imperialist monopolies that support *apartheid* in South Africa as well as continuing to enjoy peaceful exploitation of the Kenyan masses. What did the state do to the union? For those who do not know, the government changed the national constitution to declare Kenya a one-party dictatorship; the government also arrested and detained the Academic Staff Union members and banned the union. One can go on and on in providing evidence of the authoritarian nature of the Kenyan government since 1963 in order to show that it is factually incorrect to talk of democracy which led to capitalist accumulation in Kenya. Growth and accumulation for the capitalists had occurred in

8 Sunday Mail (Harare) Jan. 10 1988, p.11.

Kenya over a lot of blood and sweat of the Kenyan people. The people of Kenya do not want the rest of Africa to emulate Kenya's example so far.

Indeed, if one wanted to illustrate further how democracy is lacking in Kenya one could add that even academic inquiry today is heavily conditioned by the nature of the state terror. Anyang's writing on authoritarian presidentialism in Kenya conveniently cuts off at 1978 when the current dictator, Moi took over power⁹. Under a "minimal democratic" atmosphere I think that Anyang' could have ventured to discuss also the continuity and deepening of the dictatorship under Moi's regime.

To any casual observer, Anyang' also comes out rather confused on how he can characterize the Kenyan ruling regimes since 1963. On the one hand the article he published in 1986 and 1989 deals with "presidential authoritarianism" during Kenyatta's reign (1963-1978)¹⁰. But, on the other hand he clothes that "authoritarianism" with "democratic practices". Is this the natural eclecticism of idealism or is it something else? In the same article, one finds that Mr. Tom Mboya, an Agent of the CIA, the person who was responsible for infiltrating and destroying the militant forces in the Kenyan Trade Union Movement is treated very liberally by Anyang'. Mboya is depicted as an anti-feudalist (which is true) and progressive bourgeois (perhaps also true). But he is also said to have been above corruption! A paid agent of the CIA to destroy the progress of the working class movement, to allow the USA to fully penetrate the Kenyan economy and politics was not *corrupted*? I again find the error of eclecticism here, particularly given the present debate in which Anyang' comes out as supporting the demonstrations by militant students, trade unions and religious organizations and personalities¹¹. More about these social groupings later.

"Free and Fair Elections": A Historical political right or "a Bourgeois right"

Closely related to the question of participatory democracy and indeed an aspect of participatory democracy is the whole issue of whether or not free and fair elections are in themselves "an answer" (not "the answer") to Africa's problems of political instability. Anyang' avers that "democracy, viewed as free and fair elections in strictly bourgeois term, is not therefore an answer to Africa's problems of political instability" (p.78 of the Original). Although Anyang' ties this categorical conclusion to his review of some works by Mahmood Mamdani, it is clear that Anyang' is convinced by the statement he makes.

9 See materials cited in footnotes 3 and 4, above.

10 Ibid.

11 Anyang's Original, Ibid., pp.81-82.

To be fair to him, Anyang' does not really define in clear terms what he regards as "free and fair" elections in strictly bourgeois terms. However, since he is making reference to past elections in Uganda and Nigeria, he must be taken to mean multi-party elections. It is a popular past-time of radical populist political propaganda in Africa to discuss "free and fair elections" as a mere bourgeois trick. Military dictators and their civilian counterparts also appeal to the historically determined hatred that the African masses have against the bourgeoisie (who they rightfully associate with colonialism) by denouncing all and every political practice or idea as "bourgeois".

In the context of political elections, it is important to point out that, in modern society, having representatives to most social and political organizations and institutions is a necessary universal practice. If this is so, then how to appoint or elect the representatives, particularly to organs of state and the economy becomes a matter of life and death. It is for this reason that we must fight against any ideas that try to suggest that elections are not important, particularly when they are "free and fair". All sorts of anti-democratic forces, including the bourgeoisie, manipulate and play all sorts of tricks to ensure that the outcome of free and fair elections are in their *class interests*. When Nicaragua held free and fair elections in 1984, much freer and fairer than those that returned Reagan into the White House in 1984, the U.S. imperialists denounced the Nicaraguan elections. Imperialism spends millions and millions to try and determine the outcome of elections all over the world. In other words, free and fair elections are very important and must be pursued resolutely as part and parcel of the overall struggle for political rights. There is nothing bourgeois about free and fair elections. In fact the bourgeois fear free and fair elections at least in the Third World and Africa in particular.

It is the fear of changing governments through free and fair elections that even within the Kenyan one-party state that the ruling agents of imperialism had to introduce the undemocratic, primitive and unpopular queue-voting since early 1988. The widespread popular mass boycott of the queue-voting in Kenya is a clear evidence that the people want free and fair elections through the secret ballot. But, there is more to the democratic institution of free and fair elections. In a place like Kenya, Malawi, Zaire, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Senegal and practically all the neo-colonial dictatorships in Africa, the concept of free and fair elections would imply creating necessary conditions to allow the exercise of freedoms of thought and speech, freedom to form political parties including religious, socialist, communist ones, and to allow free and equal political campaigns to be carried out. This is *politically educational* to the masses and leaders.

It should be clear that in the Kenyan context, a lot of authoritarian laws and state practices would have to be removed as a precondition for free and fair elections. It is the democratic implications of free and fair elections that

make those who are politically involved in Africa fight so hard to win them. Free and fair elections are part of our democratic struggles, whether the bourgeois value the same rights or not.

Immigrant Business Communities or Imperialism as a Whole: Who is our Real Enemy?

It is most important that when analyzing the root causes and the continuing dynamics of Africa's non-democratic political practices and the economic stagnation and crisis, we identify scientifically who the main and secondary forces are in the arena. Anyang' has identified some of these forces comprising of the "immigrant business communities" who he asserts continue to export the surplus produced in Africa to foreign lands as well as "foreign powers who he sees as unwelcome political intervernors in Africa"¹². Anyang' is quite right.

However, there is need for clearer identification of who the enemies to popular democracy and overall social and economic development in Africa are. On the question of the flight of surpluses that could be re-invested and some used to raise the material and cultural living conditions of the people, it is true that immigrant business communities are partly responsible whether they have their origins in Lebanon, as in the case with those in West African states, or in Asia, as in the case with those to be found in East, Central and Southern Africa. But here we should also point out that most of these communities particularly those of Asian origin, have legitimately become citizens of the states in which they live. If they are capitalists, they have a right like all local and foreign capitalists doing their business, to ensure that they expand, they expand their capitalist ventures. To that extent they should not be singled out merely because of their countries of origin or business practices for special chastisement. This would amount to reactionary nationalism on our part. The main question then is what is the capitalist class as a class engaged in both collectively and in terms of the various factions of capital? Are what they are doing leading to overall balanced social and economic development of the people or not? If the answer is "no" then given the right political conditions they must be confronted and areas of their operations brought into line with the national objectives.

If this were to be done, one would not end up singling out the "immigrants business communities" for chastisement as Anyang' does but rather one would look at the total picture and assess what the real giants of industry, mainly transnational corporations and their local allies and partners are doing as well. These are the main exporters of Africa's surplus product. These are the main bribe-givers to state bureaucrats, politicians, reactionary religious groups and even leading intellectuals so that these local groups can

12 Anyang''s Original, *Ibid.*, pp.81-85.

help to ensure continued imperialist dominance and exploitation. These are the owners and managers of our economies, particularly in Kenya and Zimbabwe which I am more familiar with. These are the forces that dominate in politics to ensure that no ideas opposed to big foreign capital are discussed openly or disseminated. They limit freedom of thought and speech. These are the institutions that collaborate with our anti-people governments to make and enforce laws that curtail the freedom of labour to strike under the pretext that those areas of the economy in which they are involved are "essential" to society and that strikes in a developing economy are harmful to "national-building"¹³ and so on.

Of the foreign powers, meaning foreign governments that intervene in Africa's politics to the detriment of people's popular democracy, they do not just intervene at independence conferences or by toppling popular governments, as Anyang' correctly puts it, but they intervene *continuously* in all spheres of political, social, intellectual and cultural lives. The point is not to stop intervention altogether; this is not possible and is not good for Africa. The point is that African people should democratically exercise their sovereignty to choose who their friends and who their enemies are; what sort of intervention is good for the people with the people participating in making such decisions and how it is to be controlled by the people. In other words, we cannot afford autarky in the modern world but neither should we permit adventurers who have made self proclamations that they have a destiny to lead or that they know what forms of democracy and economic systems are good for us.

"Movements (that) come from below, from the Belly of Society" Versus organized Political and Armed Struggle

In the section in his original piece where he deals with "Popular Movements and the State: the future of Democracy in Africa" Anyang' attempts very bravely to come to terms with four main forces in the battle for democracy in Africa: the incumbent state armies that are "armed to the teeth"; counter-revolutionary armed struggle; revolutionary armed political movements; and the "popular movements or alliances for democracy" comprising "student movements, trade unions, churches, burial societies, etc". that "come from below, from the belly of society as it were"¹⁴.

Anyang' identifies the four forces and makes the argument that it is becoming popular for the left in Africa to take up arms in fighting the neo-colonial states, sometimes without much preparation or genuine popular demo-

13 Zimbabwe's *Labour Relations Act of 1986* is a classic example of such legislations made for big monopoly capital, although naturally mixed with some provisions which can be used by the workers to promote progressive forms of organization and mobilization.

14 Anyang''s Original, *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

cratic programmes, and that this leads to a lot of bloodshed since the state armies are "armed to the teeth". Further, he warns that the left should avoid such adventure because even Ronald Reagan sponsors armed groups to protect the bourgeoisie. Lastly, he argues that the student movements, trade unions, churches and burial societies are the truly popular movements that hold the key to the future of democratic changes in Africa. A casual reading of Anyang's characterization of the forces struggling for control of the political leadership in post-independence, neo-colonial Africa may lead one to conclude that the picture he draws is fairly accurate and theoretically sound. Indeed, his cautionary remarks to those who may hurriedly rush into adopting armed struggle as an ideal end in itself is to be well taken. Beyond that however, it must be pointed out that he may spread unnecessary fear and despondency among the people and potential revolutionary fighters by depicting the enemy of the people as invincible. The neo-colonial state that is apparently "armed to the teeth" is in fact a very weak state with a very weak army. A state that is alienated from the people because of its undemocratic practices and its demonstrated irresponsibility in the supervision of the organization of economic production, distribution and consumption is not a strong state with a strong army. Such a state with all its armed forces, including the police and intelligence services, is in fact very weak when confronted by a popular well organized political and military offensive based among the people. When faced with real fire, few of its soldiers are willing to die in defense of their own exploitation and oppression as well as that of their parents, relations and friends. Uganda has provided two examples: the fall of Amin and the prolonged fall of Obote II and Okello's make-shift outfit. But even assuming that they are capable of fighting, what are the lessons we learn from North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua and the like? No popular state, however armed, is capable of defeating a combined guerilla and people's war.

Yes there is bound to be some bloodshed, although this can be minimized depending on the ideological development, strength and discipline of the revolutionary forces. If the workers, peasants, and some intellectuals and sections of the petty-bourgeoisie did not sacrifice their blood for freedom in the early 1950s Kenya's independence could most likely have been delayed. Indeed when you reach a point of struggle where you take up arms you are quite aware and prepared that you are just as likely to die as the enemy is. This reality provides a natural check against romantic adventures. But more importantly, it is necessary to underline the theoretical foundation for political and military struggle for liberation. In 1917, on the eve of the socialist revolution in what is today the Soviet Union, the leader of that historical revolution V. Lenin, wrote in "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution" that:

Socialists cannot, without ceasing to be socialists, be opposed to all war. Firstly, socialists have never been, nor can they ever be, opposed

to revolutionary wars... Secondly, civil war is just as much a war as any other. He who accepts the class struggle cannot fail to accept civil wars, which in every class society are natural, and under certain conditions inevitable, continuation, development and intensification of the class struggle...

An oppressed class which does not strive to learn to use arms, to acquire arms, only deserves to be treated like slaves... A bourgeoisie armed against the proletariat is one of the biggest, fundamental and cardinal facts of modern capitalist society.

In the oppressed and super-exploited societies of the peripheries of modern international capitalism i.e. most African countries, the above observations remain as true as ever. In assessing the conditions that produce revolutionaries and revolutionary mood among the masses "from the belly of society", to use Anyang's formulation, it is important to avoid being legalistic. Oppression and suppression of the working people is to be viewed not only by looking at the suffering meted out by the state on behalf of the ruling classes under the guise of maintaining "law and order" - breaking strikes and peaceful associations, detaining and incarcerating those who demand democracy and respect for human rights etc. - but also by the hundreds of deaths caused daily by the structural violence of the neo-colonial, dependent and subordinated capitalist system. This latter aspect is sometimes forgotten by the intellectual petty-bourgeoisie because in their stratum and among the bourgeois class no one dies of lack of proper medical care, lack of adequate or nutritionally balanced food, suffers from ignorance, confronts high infant mortality rates, lacks housing, has no means of transport. etc. The real question is whether the objective conditions and subjective factors, both internal and external, are such that the launching of a revolutionary political and military struggle is appropriate at the given time and place. The overall need for preparing for both political and military struggles is not questionable.

To use a practical example to illustrate; the Programme of one of the Kenya underground democratic anti-imperialist movements, the Kenya Anti-Imperialist Front, which I belong to, states very clearly that "Armed struggle will be imperative in the event of the neo-fascist rulers refusing to dismantle the current undemocratic social system, laws and practices which restrict the right of the people of Kenya to participate fully in politics and other areas of our socio-economic life"¹⁵. This makes armed struggle, revolutionary violence, conditional and not as an absolute goal in itself.

If indeed it is accepted, as Anyang' does, that political power, state control is central to any form of organization and reorganization of society, then those who declare that they wish real changes to take place must be willing

15 Kenya Anti-Imperialist Front Programme (1986).

to adopt all necessary means and methods of struggle to ensure that the popular masses and their movements do actually seize or assume control of state power. To wish, as Anyang' does, that "the state as it is constituted will either try to avoid or somehow give way to "students organizations, trade unions, churches and burial societies"¹⁶ is tantamount to dreaming. Will such state power be given to the popular mass organizations as rewards for their moral argumentation or the loudness of their prayers or the shrilling voices of their mourning for the dead?

Of course, there is no denying that these are the popular democratic voices and mass organizations which must form part and parcel of the new revolutionary alliance. But they need to be armed with revolutionary ideas so that the process of political organization can take place among them. Simply to hope that a coalition of these groups is capable of seizing political power and establishing genuine popular democracies is ridiculous and is not born out in any example of struggles against imperialism.

Anyang' points out an undeniable factor today: the managers of the imperialist world have learnt the art and science of guerilla armed struggle and that they use this to protect the interests of imperialism. Because of this, he warns, one should not necessarily consider any and all armed struggles as popular and democratic. This is true. But it needs to be pointed out that guerilla war is an art and scientific method of struggle used by the weak non-state groups against state armies.

Since it is a scientific method, any one can use it for good or for bad. Imperialism uses it against popular people's democracies while revolutionaries use it against repressive rule of the minority classes in order to establish popular people's democracies. In the law of revolutions there cannot be a real genuine social revolution, the toppling of one form of class rule and its replacement with another form of class rule antagonistic to the previous one without a serious counter-revolution being waged. To avoid going into too much detail, it suffices to point out that the concept and historical meaning of a people's revolution is *qualitatively* different from a counter-revolution waged to restore dethroned exploiters. The one is popular in that it expresses the people's will and lasts, although temporary reverses may occur, while the other, the reactionary counter-revolution, is only expressing the interests of a minority exploiting class and is therefore unpopular. The fact that the counter-revolutionary organizers may be able to use money to buy a few oppressed people to fight for them as the United States of America's leaders and leaders of the *apartheid* regime of South Africa have been able to do in Mozambique, Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Cambodia, etc., and were able to do in Paris (1871), the Soviet Union (1917 to the early

16 Anyang''s Original, *Ibid.*, p.81.

1920s), Korea (1950-53), Cuba (1960 up to now!), Vietnam (1954-1970s) etc. should not lead us to abandon the necessity of organizing armed struggle against fascist dictators who are enemies of democracy. In fact imperialism even resorts to more desperate and open wars against people's revolutions as the Korean, Vietnamese, Grenadan and Angolan examples demonstrate.

The lessons to be learnt from all this is that when making a genuine popular revolution, simultaneously prepare for fierce counter-revolutionary pressures. Revolutions must be defended with arms. If the bourgeoisie are busy hunting down those who merely hold revolutionary ideas, even if they don't translate these into action, what would restrain them from unleashing real terror when their power, their rights and privileges to exploit the people and to live as parasites on the sweat of the toiling masses is destroyed?

Words of Conclusion

Peter Anyang' Nyong'o has done well to put his thoughts on paper and to try to defend them. This has provided us the opportunity to contribute to this urgent search for a better immediate and long term future for the African working people. Mkandawire did well to begin taking Anyang' up on some of these issues that are controversial and should not be treated as lightly as Anyang' attempted to do. Ultimately, I see real social revolutions, the movement from the present stagnant dictatorships to national democratic revolutions and then to real socialism, as the path Africa seems headed for. This is a historical phase in the progression of social struggles in the former colonies of the imperialist phase of capitalist development and is not merely unfortunate circumstances Africa has found itself in by accident. There is no running away from it. It is unavoidable. Journeying on this path is, however, not automatic nor is it easy. It demands resolute revolutionary commitment in *ideas* and *action*. The revolutionary African intellectual has a responsibility to join and struggle on the side of the oppressed masses. In other words, I do not see a way out of Africa's current political and overall development crisis in some ideally concocted adjustments to the existing order in order to satisfy some minimal goals of "growth" and "accumulation" by the capitalist class.

Histoire et Conscience Historique: de la Philosophie de l'Histoire dans l'Oeuvre de Cheikh Anta Diop

Babacar Sall*

Parler des rapports entre l'histoire et la conscience en général, la conscience historique en particulier, permet de déterminer, de cerner, d'isoler ce qui, dans l'oeuvre du professeur Cheikh Anta Diop, apparaît, de manière explicite et/ou implicite, comme l'expression de la ou d'une philosophie de l'histoire, plutôt, d'une Ecole africaine d'histoire. Pour cela, il s'agit de voir dans la production intellectuelle de Diop:

- 1 - ce qu'est la nature de l'histoire;
- 2 - ce qu'est la ou sont les finalités de l'histoire.

La recherche de la réponse à cette double interrogation devra prendre en compte le contexte dans lequel Diop a été formé, celui de sa vie, de son combat. Je commencerai par rappeler quelques propos de l'homme.

Quand je découvris que les anciens Egyptiens étaient des Noirs et fus convaincu de l'appartenance négro-africaine de la civilisation pharaonique égyptienne et kouchite, cela m'a d'abord ébloui. Je me mis à l'oeuvre pour en savoir plus et parvins à la claire conscience que cette appartenance pouvait être historiquement prouvée¹.

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1 Il dira plus tard "Donc pour nous, le fait nouveau important, c'est moins d'avoir dit que les Egyptiens étaient des Noirs à la suite des auteurs anciens, l'une de nos principales sources, que d'avoir contribué à faire de cette idée un fait de conscience historique africaine et mondiale et surtout, un concept scientifique opératoire. C'est ce que n'avaient pas réussi à faire nos prédécesseurs (Diop, C.A. - *Civilisation ou Barbarie*, Présence africaine, Paris, 1981, p. 10).

Les premiers résultats auxquels je parvins constituent la* substance de mon étude intitulée: "*Nations Nègres et Culture*"².

Voilà ce que me disait Cheikh Anta Diop quand en septembre 1979, je l'interrogeais sur son cheminement intellectuel. Cette première véritable discussion que je venais d'avoir avec lui me semblait nécessaire pour mettre en contexte son oeuvre, pour tenter de mieux la comprendre; la mise en contexte devant permettre d'isoler la dimension scientifique des éléments idéologiques et des propos qui n'ont de sens dans l'oeuvre que pour des finalités de polémique. Alors*seulement je repris la lecture véritable des livres de Diop et par le commencement donc par *Nations nègres et culture*. L'auteur y développe trois thèses principales.

a) *La civilisation pharaonique égyptienne était negro-africaine*,
- parce que les anciens Egyptiens se sont perçus et représentés comme Noirs;

- parce que les sources gréco-latines le disent sans ambages;
- parce que la Bible l'atteste;
- parce que le débat entre anthropologue (Massoulard, Fawcett, Thompson, Randall Mc Iver, Kieth, Fulkenburger, Petrie etc.) pour brouillé qu'il soit, n'en atteste pas moins l'appartenance nègre des squelettes et momies d'anciens égyptiens;

- parce que tous les aspects culturels pharaoniques se retrouvent chez les peuples négro-africains de l'antiquité jusqu'aux temps modernes avec une similitude qui frise parfois l'identité. Citons le totémisme, la structure sociale et politique, la circoncision, la cosmogonie, etc.

b) *La civilisation pharaonique égyptienne avait ses origines dans le sud-égyptien et au Sud de l'Egypte, c'est-à-dire en Nubie-Soudan*

- parce que les anciens Egyptiens disaient que le Delta (la Basse-Egypte) n'était qu'une mer quand ils essaïmaient en Haute Egypte³,

- parce que l'évolution technologique et le raffinement progressif de la culture qui accouchèrent de la civilisation pharaonique égyptienne peuvent être suivis sans discontinuité en Haute Egypte (et là seulement) de la Préhistoire à l'avènement de la monarchie, un peu avant - 3.000,

- parce que l'archéologie nubio-thébaïque pré et protodynastique atteste l'unité culturelle entre la Haute Egypte et la Nubie-Soudan nilotique⁴,

- parce que les cultures nubio-soudanaises sont antérieures dans leur élaboration à celles de l'Egypte.

2 Diop, C.A. Nations nègres et culture: de l'Antiquité nègre égyptienne aux problèmes culturels de l'Afrique égyptienne aux problèmes culturels de l'Afrique Noire d'aujourd'hui, Présence Africaine, Paris, 1954.

3 Herodote, II, 15: Diodore de Sicile, I, 10 et III, 3.

4 *Africa in Antiquity: the arts of ancient Nibia and the Sudan*. Exposition du Brooklyn Museum, New York, September 30 December 31, 1978. Catalogue, en 2 volumes.

c) *La Nubie-Soudan, carrefour entre l'Afrique australe (zone des Grands Lacs), centrale (cuvette nilo-tchadienne), occidentale (Soudan-Sahel Ouest), le pourtour méditerranéen et l'Arabie constitue le berceau de la civilisation qui de là, a irradié à travers l'Afrique entière, et par l'Egypte, vers la Méditerranée septentrionale, le Proche-Orient asiatique.*

Voilà ce qui permet de comprendre les apports nègres pharaoniques aux civilisations gréco-latine, canaéennes, et arabes et les similitudes entre les civilisations pharaoniques égypto-kouchites et les civilisations qui se sont épanouies en Afrique Noire de l'antiquité à la naissance des Etats modernes (soit au 16ème siècle après Jésus-Christ).

De ces thèses, se dégagent un certain nombre de conclusions:

1 - L'Egypte pharaonique, première grande réussite culturelle de l'humanité aux temps historiques, était une civilisation négro-africaine. Elle a fortement marqué les civilisations postérieures d'Afrique, d'Europe méridionale, du Proche-Orient asiatique. Elle a modelé le visage culturel du reste de l'Afrique entière à tel point que les civilisations et cultures négro-africaines post-pharaoniques jusqu'au 16ème siècle après J.C. étaient néopharaoniques.

2 - Les haute et moyenne vallées du Nil, centre de diffusion des techniques et des hommes, expliquent l'Egypte, l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara et leurs rapports; Les populations noires de l'Afrique actuelle viennent de la vallée du Nil tant aux époques préhistoriques qu'historiques.

3 - Le monde noir a civilisé l'humanité antique. L'apport de l'Afrique à l'humanité est inestimable de la Préhistoire au début des temps modernes. L'Afrique a joué un rôle encore non évalué dans le décollage de la presque île ibérique au début des temps modernes.

Elle a joué une fonction non moins importante dans l'expansion du christianisme, de l'islam et du judaïsme⁵. On peut multiplier les exemples à toutes les époques, jusqu'à celle de l'accumulation primitive du capital. Mieux, du néolithique au 16ème siècle après J.C., l'Afrique était en avance sur les plans socio-politique et technologique sur le reste du monde.

Insatisfait de cette démonstration qui n'est appuyée que sur des témoignages littéraires, Diop se forme à d'autres disciplines pour revenir aux thèses énoncées. Dans *"Antériorité des civilisations nègres: Mythe ou vérité his-*

5 "Par conséquent, aucune pensée, aucune idéologie n'est, par essence, étrangère à l'Afrique..." écrit Diop, C.A. dans *Civilisation ou Barbarie*, p. 12. "Il s'agit seulement de soigner sa formation" avait-il dit dans l'introduction de *Nations nègres et culture*.

torique", Diop recourt à la paléontologie, à l'anthropologie physique et culturelle, à la chimie, à l'archéologie et tient des propos qui émanent de la péléoclimatologie et de la péléobotanique. Cet ouvrage est donc un approfondissement et un raffinement de l'argumentation en faveur des thèses contenues dans "*Nations nègres et culture*", par un recours à diverses disciplines mises au service de la perspective historique dans l'approche de la connaissance. Les dimensions paléontologique et anthropologique de l'argumentation ajoutent au raffinement de la perspective et parachèvent la rupture épistémologique⁶. L'auteur milite en faveur du monogénitisme et du monocentrisme, passe au crible le polygénitisme et le polycentrisme en s'appuyant sur les découvertes du professeur Leakey⁷. Il suit l'humanité depuis son apparition dans la région des Grands Lacs, ses évolutions buissonnantes jusqu'à l'homo erectus qui, en migrateur, va à la conquête de l'Europe occidentale et centrale par Gibraltar et l'Italie via la Sicile, de l'Asie par le Sinaï via la zone de Suez. Diop y démontre l'antériorité et de la sapientisation chez les hominiens d'Afrique, et de la néolithisation en Afrique pour dégager le rôle des communautés négro-africaines dans l'avènement de la civilisation dont le premier flambeau s'est implanté en Egypte. C'était un peu avant - 3.000⁸.

Dans *l'Afrique noire précoloniale et l'Unité culturelle de l'Afrique noire* (1960), qui sont les éditions de la thèse principale (Etude comparée des systèmes politiques et sociaux de l'Europe et de l'Afrique de l'antiquité à la formation des Etats modernes et de la thèse complémentaire (Domaines du patriarcat et du matriarcat dans l'antiquité classique) de la thèse de Doctorat d'Etat de C.A. Diop, l'auteur montre les fondements des différences entre l'Europe et l'Afrique dans leurs réalisations culturelles. Il démontre l'influence très forte de l'Afrique nègre et des Nègres (qui étaient en Grèce avant que les Grecs ne mettent les pieds en Afrique⁹ sur les espaces gréco-hittite et sémitique, sur les civilisations de la Méditerranée septentrionale. Il analyse la continuité historique des sociétés africaines et de leurs créations culturelles depuis les civilisations négro-africaines égypto-kouchites jusqu'à la fin des grands empires¹⁰, met en exergue les permanences et les récurrences. Dans ces deux ouvrages, Diop rompt d'avec le marxisme. Manifeste-

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- 6 La première partie de *Civilisation ou Barbarie*, intitulée "Approche paléontologique" est une synthèse des idées émises dans *Nations nègres et culture* et dans *Antériorité des civilisations nègres...* (1967). Aussi, ce sont des passages de ces ouvrages que Mercer Cook a publiés en version anglaise dans "African origin of civilization, Myth or reality, Lawrence Hill and Co, Westport, 1974.
 - 7 Diop, C.A. - *Civilisation ou Barbarie*, première partie, approche paléontologique. - Id., *L'origine des anciens Egyptiens*, in G. Mokhtar (Directeur) *Histoire Générale de l'Afrique*, Tome II: Afrique ancienne, Paris 1980, chap. 1, p. 39-72.
 - 8 Diop, C.A. - *Histoire primitive de l'humanité: évolution du monde noir*, BIFAN, série B, Tome XXIV, No 3-4, Dakar, 1962, p. 449-541.
 - 9 Bourgeois, A. - *La Grèce antique devant la négritude*, Présence Africaine, Paris, 1970.
 - 10 Diop, C.A. - *L'unité culturelle de l'Afrique Noire*. Présence Africaine, Paris, 1960

ment il n'est pas marxiste. Mais il n'est pas anti-marxiste non plus. Il puise à pleines mains dans l'appareil conceptuel et l'esprit même du matérialisme historique. C'est plutôt Engels qu'il critique pour la vision donnée dans *l'Origine de la Famille, de la Propriété privée et de l'Etat*, car son "Informateur" Morgan l'a induit en erreur.

L'insistance sur les permanences et la continuité historique constitue la trame des deux dernières études de C.A. Diop à savoir *Parenté génétique de l'égyptien pharaonique et des langues négro-africaines* (1977), *Civilisation ou Barbarie* (1981). L'idée de base est que les civilisations négro-africaines post-pharaoniques s'expliquent par l'Égypte en cela qu'elles étaient néopharaoniques. Il y a une profonde unité culturelle en Afrique Noire en relation avec l'Égypte. Cette unité existe *en soi*, rarement *pour soi*. Diop peut alors lancer son avertissement "l'histoire africaine restera comme quelque chose suspendue en l'air tant que les historiens africains ne la rattacheront pas à l'Égypte pharaonique"¹¹. Ce rattachement est un *critère classificatoire pertinent* qui réconcilie les civilisations africaines avec l'histoire et une exigence. Exigence parce qu'il permet de rétablir la continuité historique des créations culturelles des sociétés négro-africaines et l'unité des peuples et civilisations nègres. Il est exigence parce qu'il permet d'asseoir une finalité à l'histoire en tant que discipline, science, réflexion, produit, discours et discours idéologique; exigence pour parachever la rupture épistémologique qui nous est vitale. Ainsi, se dégage la finalité que Diop assigne à l'histoire en Afrique, la *restauration et la fortification de la conscience historique*. L'histoire pour Diop sert à restaurer, à structurer, à dynamiser la conscience historique des peuples. La conscience historique est le rempart contre l'aliénation, l'acculturation, le fatalisme, et la soumission. Mais qu'est-ce qu'est l'histoire chez Diop, C.A.?

A travers son oeuvre, l'histoire est l'étude des règles et lois générales de l'évolution des sociétés, du mouvement social. Le passé est son champ dans lequel elle côtoie le mythe et la mémoire collective. Chez Diop, la longue durée est privilégiée dans l'étude du mouvement social à travers le passé, c'est-à-dire la partie solidifiée du temps. C'était un historien des civilisations. Les phases d'accélération ne l'ont intéressé que très peu, bien qu'il essaie une théorisation de la révolution dans *Civilisation ou Barbarie*¹². Ce qui l'intéressait, c'est l'histoire comparée des institutions socio-politiques, leurs formes successives, plus les facteurs générateurs que les facteurs d'évolution. Ceci s'explique sans doute par la portion du champ historique dans laquelle il s'était spécialisé et qu'on appelle Antiquité, période de la

11 Diop, C.A. - *African origin of civilization*, trad/Mercer Cook, p. XIV. - Id., *Civilisation ou Barbarie*, p. 12, "Hegel et Marx n'ont pas fait une "querelle d'allemand" à Saint Thomas ou à Héraclite l'obscur, car, sans les balbutiements de ce dernier (Héraclite), ils n'auraient jamais bâti leurs systèmes philosophiques", id., *Ibid.*, p. 13.

12 Diop, C.A. - *Civilisation ou Barbarie*, ch.12.

genèse des institutions. Ainsi il a pu cerner selon les régions et les époques les institutions qui sont le fait d'une invasion, celles qui résultent d'un phénomène de diffusion, celles qui sont le fruit d'une évolution interne. La dimension diffusion semble être pour Diop très explicative de l'histoire des institutions en Afrique, de l'antiquité au début des temps modernes.

Pour Diop, C.A., l'histoire ne vise pas seulement à structurer le temps. Elle vise cela, elle ne vise pas seulement cela. L'histoire ne vise pas seulement à relativiser le jugement. Elle est un humanisme, elle n'est pas seulement un humanisme. L'histoire pour Diop cherche à asseoir, à restaurer la connaissance d'un rapport privilégié avec le mouvement social et cela à des fins d'actions immédiates, de dynamisation, de réorientation de l'évolution sociale. L'histoire est conscience. Conscience de ce qu'on a été, est, et appelé à être dans le mouvement et l'évolution en tant qu'individu, classe, catégorie socio-juridique, nation, race. L'histoire à travers l'oeuvre de C.A. Diop est un niveau de la connaissance, celle de l'étape actuelle pour appuyer parmi les virtualités d'évolution présentes, celle qui est la plus bénéfique. Quelles sont les virtualités sur lesquelles l'Afrique doit s'engager? Il y a, dit Diop, l'exigence fédéraliste qu'il a exposé dans "*Les fondements économiques et culturels d'un Etat Fédéral d'Afrique Noire*"¹³. Il y a aussi l'exigence de la promotion des langues négro-africaines, théorisée dans "*Comment enraciner la science en Afrique*"¹⁴.

Mais, pour que les peuples négro-africains puissent appuyer sur les commandes de leurs sociétés afin de les amener à subir des mutations fondamentales, il faut que ces peuples aient confiance en eux-mêmes, qu'ils soient convaincus de leurs capacités de créer, d'innover, d'assimiler. Il faut que leur conscience soit libérée par la conscience historique. Cette confiance, cette conviction dépendent du rapport qu'ils ont avec leur histoire, l'histoire des autres, l'histoire de l'humanité à toutes les époques du mouvement social. La réflexion et la production historiques doivent en Afrique remplir ces missions. L'école africaine doit faire de ces exigences sa philosophie. D'ailleurs, l'histoire joue ces rôles chez les peuples libérés d'Europe, et d'Amérique. Elle montre à ces peuples qu'ils ont créé des valeurs et outils de libération et de vie dans le passé, que l'histoire n'est pas linéaire, que les peuples les plus arriérés d'une époque ont pu être de grands créateurs en d'autres temps, que leur retard s'explique et que par conséquent, ils sont appelés à redevenir des créateurs de premier rang, des innovateurs de premier ordre. C'est lorsque l'histoire d'un peuple dominé est produite par celui qui le domine que tout ceci est caché ou falsifié pour perpétuer la domination¹⁵.

13 Présence Africaine, Paris, 1960.

14 BIFAN, série B. T. XXXVII, No 1, 1975, p. 154-233.

15 Diop, C.A. - *Nation nègres et cultures*, Paris, 1979, T. I, Ch. II et III, p.49-203.

En montrant aux Africains que les noirs ont créé la première grande réussite culturelle de l'humanité aux temps historiques, que cette civilisation nègre a inspiré celles (postérieures quant à leurs élaborations et épanouissement) des peuples d'Europe et du Proche-Orient, on leur donne ce rapport privilégié d'avec le mouvement social, c'est-à-dire qu'on leur restaure la conscience historique. Celle-ci libère les consciences, les galvanise, rend ces peuples créateurs. Et, remarque Cheikh Anta Diop, tous les peuples libérés attendent à promouvoir leur culture nationale en s'appropriant, en se ré-appropriant la réflexion et la production historique *selon des critères classificatoires pertinents qui émanent de leur vécu quotidien, de leurs ambitions, de leurs rêves, de leurs utopies, voire de leurs fantasmes mêmes*. Or, remarque encore Cheikh Anta Diop, pour les peuples d'Afrique en particulier, c'est l'Occident qui jusque là écrit pour l'essentiel leur histoire, c'est l'africanisme. Ces réflexions et productions sont orientées de sorte qu'elles servent la conscience historique de l'Occident, qui voit l'Afrique comme un musée, image de ce que fut l'humanité à l'époque primitive, qui lui permet de mesurer l'espace qu'il a parcouru, qui lui permet d'être plus que fier, plus que convaincu que la création de valeurs, d'instruments et d'outils de vie est comme son apanage, qui l'incline à penser qu'il est appelé *naturellement* à dominer le monde.

C'est dire que fondamentalement, l'africanisme n'est pas en faveur des Africains, l'adage étant "ce qui se fait pour vous et sans vous, se fait contre vous". La preuve est que dès qu'un africain parle de l'histoire africaine pour la restauration d'une conscience historique des Africains, tous les occidentaux, des ultra-royalistes aux marxistes purs et durs se liguent pour tenter de banaliser et de marginaliser ses idées, généralement de manière délibérée, parfois de façon inconsciente. On voit que "les conditions d'un véritable dialogue entre l'Occident et l'Afrique n'existent pas encore". Alors, poursuit Diop, prenons des mesures conservatoires. Il ne faut ignorer aucun domaine de la connaissance, il faut assimiler toutes les techniques d'acquisition de la connaissance. Il faut assurer son autonomie scientifique en se passant de l'approbation de l'autre¹⁶. Il faut rattacher cette attitude de Diop au fait que de son point de vue, l'africanisme participe de près ou de loin de cette logique qui tend à diluer la conscience historique des Africains et à fortifier celle des occidentaux. N'est-ce pas l'africanisme qui enseigne aux Africains

- 1 - qu'ils ont toujours été en dehors du mouvement historique,
- 2 - qu'ils sont depuis toujours prédestinés à avoir des tuteurs
- 3 - qu'ils ne savent que chanter et danser,
- 4 - qu'ils n'avaient rien inventé dans l'histoire

16 Id., préface de "l'Afrique dans l'antiquité" de Th. Obenga, Paris, 1973.

5 - qu'ils n'ont rien apporté à l'humanité et qu'ils doivent tout de l'occident qui s'est assigné en Afrique une mission civilisatrice¹⁷.

Le drame, souligne Diop, c'est que des noirs d'Afrique et de la diaspora ont assimilé ces thèses de l'Africanisme, c'est-à-dire ces productions faites par des écoles extra-africaines d'histoire, d'ethnologie, d'anthropologie et de philosophie même, sur l'évolution, la structure et la vie des sociétés nègres. Voilà que l'un écrit à propos des noirs, "ceux qui n'ont inventé ni la boussole, ni le gouvernail, ni la poudre à canon" (A. Césaire). Cet autre surenchérit "l'émotion est nègre, la raison est hellène" (L.S. Senghor). Tout cela leur a été inculqué par une production d'Africanistes, et on voit où cela mène.

Ces études, ces façons de penser - souligne Diop - n'ont été possibles que parce que l'Occident a détruit la conscience historique nègre en falsifiant l'histoire, c'est-à-dire toutes les occurrences qui se sont accomplies dans le temps. Qu'on le sache donc, l'histoire n'est pas neutre. Elle est un outil, une arme, un moyen pour vivre, pour dominer, pour subjuguier, pour libérer, pour créer, pour innover, pour assimiler.

Il faut savoir que la nature et la finalité que l'on donne à la réflexion et à la production historique dépendent du vécu quotidien et des utopies de la société d'où elles émanent, des hommes qui les formalisent, les produisent, les diffusent par des vecteurs divers. Il faut savoir que la conscience n'est pas un reflet objectif du milieu (K. Marx) mais qu'elle est l'expression des rapports entre le milieu et les hommes, une perception de ces rapports réels et virtuels, avec pour déterminateur, les exigences des hommes. Parlant de la crise de la raison, Diop fait remarquer que toute conscience est selon les conditions de l'agent, l'expression de l'importance que tel ou tel objet revêt pour l'agent. Aussi, l'histoire établit un rapport avec le mouvement social, détermine l'importance que ce mouvement a pour ceux qui produisent ou pour ceux qui ont produit un discours historique. Ainsi, ceux qu'on appelle les africanistes objectifs sont à quelques exceptions, ceux qui font de la perspective descriptive une finalité à la réflexion historique.

Ces africanistes ont formé une masse d'Africains qui passent l'essentiel de leur temps à couper les cheveux en quatre. Ils ont "fabriqué" des structuralistes conscients ou inconscients. Il faut donc rompre avec cette tradition¹⁸, (se passer de l'approbation de l'autre) et restaurer la conscience historique nègre pour libérer l'Afrique en s'appropriant la production historique, une fois assise l'aptitude à découvrir une vérité scientifique.

L'homme doté de la conscience historique est un homme libéré. Il cherchera à vivre, luttera pour vivre selon des déterminations diverses parmi lesquelles la conscience de classe. Cet homme libéré est créateur de civilisa-

17 Hegel, G.W.F. - *La raison dans l'histoire*, trad/Kostas Papaïoannov, 1979.

18 DIOP, C.A. - *Civilisation ou Barbarie*, p. 13.

tions. Et Diop d'ajouter à l'endroit des jeunes africains qu'en chacun d'eux dort un bâtisseur d'empire de la trempe de Thoutmosis-III, de Samori Touré, de Chaka, d'Abdel Kader. Il s'agit de réveiller cette force créatrice en restaurant la conscience historique. Il faut qu'en s'appropriant la production historique, les Africains (historiens, philosophes, etc) mettent l'accent sur la continuité historique en Afrique, sur l'unité culturelle de l'Afrique pour que celle-ci passe de l'existence en soi à l'existence pour soi.

Conclusion

Telle est, aujourd'hui, ma lecture des pré-supposés et implications théoriques de la production scientifique du professeur Cheikh Anta Diop auprès de qui j'ai commencé à apprendre la fonctionnalisation de la réflexion, de la production et de l'enseignement de l'histoire. Telle apparaît la philosophie de l'histoire de Diop, l'esprit qu'il a voulu donner à l'Ecole Africaine d'Histoire. Il a voulu que cette école qu'il n'a pas eu le temps de fonder mais dont il a élaboré et jeté les bases, s'armât de cette philosophie pour le plus grand bien des peuples noirs d'Afrique et de la diaspora noire.

Pour cela, il faut que les historiens africains cessent de croire (sans l'écrire, ni le dire) qu'antérieurement au 16ème siècle après J.C., ce sont les siècles obscurs en Afrique¹⁹. Tant qu'ils croiront à cela, ils ne procéderont pas au rattachement des civilisations négro-africaines post-pharaoniques à leurs ancêtres égypto-kouchites; ils ne pourront ni rétablir la continuité historique des civilisations africaines, ni donner à l'unité culturelle de l'Afrique noire une existence pour soi. La renaissance culturelle en Afrique suppose entre autres préalables que les civilisations pharaoniques égypto-kouchites soient élevées au rang d'humanités négro-africaines comme les civilisations classiques constituent les humanités gréco-romaines en Occident. C'est cette dernière exigence qui explique le fait que la démonstration de l'appartenance négro-africaine de la civilisation pharaonique égyptienne soit l'objet d'un chapitre dans presque chaque grande étude de Diop, alors que la perspective néopharaonique est en sourdine dans presque chaque page des ouvrages de Diop.

19 C'est le titre d'un ouvrage de R. Mauny, publié en 1975.

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edited by
A. Fadahunsi
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
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