

AFRIQUE ET DEVELOPPEMENT

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Le Système de Santé au Maroc entre les Contraintes Financières et les Exigences Sociales

Ahmed El Hariti*

ABSTRACT. The analysis of the health sector provides an understanding of the specificity of the social function of the state in the reproduction of the labour force as well as its ideological function in the legitimation of the established order. The contemporary crisis and the austerity measures imposed by the international financial institutions have deleterious impact on the health sector. In Morocco, the financial resources allocated to the public health sector are declining in real value and as a proportion of the overall budget of the state. Consequently, one witnesses a sharpening of the social and regional inequalities in the health delivery system. These budgetary cuts are introduced at a time of rapid population growth, accelerated urbanization, the introduction of new values and norms of consumption and production as well as a progressive awareness by the population of their rights to health. All these factors have increased and broadened the health needs and require the augmentation of resources allocated to the health sector. Caught under this double pressure of financial constraint and social exigency, the state ought to look for alternative possibilities of augmenting resources for the health sector.

1. Introduction/Méthodologie

Dans le cadre des contraintes financières qui compromettent actuellement le progrès dans le domaine sanitaire, l'analyse des modes de financement et des dépenses de santé attire la plus haute attention des décideurs en la matière. C'est que le financement des activités sanitaires constitue le pivot sur lequel repose la réalisation des objectifs de la politique nationale de santé et partant l'amélioration des conditions d'accès de la population aux soins médicaux. L'examen de la dimension financière de l'accès aux soins acquiert donc plus d'intérêt d'autant plus que la crise actuelle du secteur de la santé ne se contente pas d'aggraver les déséquilibres sociaux et régionaux, mais attise les conflits d'objectifs entre les différents promoteurs et prestataires de services de santé. C'est pourquoi la nécessité s'impose d'étudier la structure financière du système de santé dans le but de coordonner les activités des divers secteurs et de définir le rôle que doit jouer chacun d'eux pour l'amélioration de l'état de santé des populations.

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1.1 Eléments Méthodologiques

L'étude du système de financement de la santé doit faire face de prime abord à des problèmes d'ordre méthodologique. Outre ceux qui se rapportent à la collecte des données, les problèmes rencontrés ici concernent la délimitation de l'espace sanitaire et le degré de détails de l'analyse.

A/- La définition du Secteur de la Santé

Il est difficile de définir l'action sanitaire car elle couvre un domaine vaste, aux frontières floues et où se croisent les activités de différentes institutions. De manière générale, l'action sanitaire est considérée comme étant celle qui a pour but l'amélioration de l'état de santé de la population. Dans cette optique, le champ de la santé couvre les différents services de soins médicaux, la formation du personnel, la recherche et l'éducation sanitaire ainsi que la salubrité de l'environnement, le contrôle des aliments, l'habitat, l'assainissement des eaux, etc.

Pour ce qui concerne la présente étude, l'espace sanitaire a été défini selon une acception limitative qui le réduit aux seules activités ayant un rapport direct avec le système de "soins", y compris la formation et la recherche; Ont été ainsi exclus de cet espace les services d'hygiène et de contrôle des aliments, d'assainissement des eaux, etc...

B/- La localisation des sources de financement

L'analyse financière porte généralement sur le circuit des fonds monétaires à commencer par leur origine et jusqu'à leur destination finale. Dans le cadre de notre approche, il ne s'agira pas de remonter aux sources initiales de financement de la santé, c'est-à-dire essentiellement les contribuables. Cela suppose l'étude du système fiscal et para fiscal, ce qui constitue une tâche compliquée et sans grande utilité pour notre approche.

Ce dont il sera question ici c'est plutôt l'identification des flux financiers au niveau des sources secondaires de financement, c'est-à-dire en fonction des institutions d'où ils proviennent directement. Ces institutions sont : l'Etat, les intermédiaires financiers, les ménages et le concours extérieur. Cette méthode comporte certes la lacune de ne pas distinguer les sources de financement et les agents responsables des dépenses, d'où le risque de comptabiliser doublement les fonds. Toutefois, ces limites n'affectent pas de manière significative notre démarche dans la mesure où les principaux agents, mis à part les ménages et les mutuelles, sont à la fois financiers et prestataires. En outre, il s'est avéré que les transferts de fonds entre les différents acteurs du système de santé ne représentent pas un montant très important, au point de remettre en cause l'ordre de grandeur des dépenses sanitaires évaluées.

Par ailleurs, il convient de souligner que cette étude ne s'est pas penchée sur l'analyse du volume et de la structure de l'offre de soins de santé. Elle ne comporte pas non plus d'indications sur la destination finale des flux financiers, c'est-à-dire les revenus engendrés par l'activité sanitaire.

1.2 Difficultés D'accès aux Informations

L'analyse du financement de la santé bute aussi sur le problème délicat de la collecte des données nécessaires. En effet, l'accès à celles-ci est extrêmement difficile et exige des délais et des efforts coûteux. Cela tient non seulement à l'éparpillement et la désorganisation de l'information, mais aussi au comportement méfiant des organismes concernés qui refusent sa diffusion. De surcroît, les données disponibles sont souvent inexploitable ; ainsi la classification des dépenses et les méthodes de calcul appliquées n'obéissent pas à des critères uniformes et se prêtent difficilement à l'analyse.

Par conséquent, la présente étude trouve ses limites dans les faits suivants :

- la quantité et la qualité insuffisantes des informations disponibles ;
- L'absence de données concernant le secteur médical libéral, les organismes bénévoles (Croissant Rouge Marocain, etc), les cliniques mutualistes de la CNOPS et certains établissements publics ;
- L'absence de travaux de recherche théorique ou empiriques sérieux sur cet aspect de la question sanitaire.

2. Les Dépenses Nationales de Santé : Schéma Récapitulatif et Résultats d'Analyse

Il est question ici de procéder, à partir d'un tableau récapitulatif des données collectées auprès des institutions retenues dans le cadre de notre approche¹, à l'évaluation globale des dépenses nationales de santé. Il convient de présenter par la suite les principaux résultats qui

1 Ces institutions sont les suivantes : L'Etat, la Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (CNSS), la Caisse Nationale des Oeuvres de Prévoyance Sociale (CNOPS), les ménages, un échantillon de 8 entreprises publiques et la Coopération Financière Internationale.

se dégagent du diagnostic du système actuel de financement de la santé au Maroc.

Il va sans dire que ce diagnostic et ces résultats demeurent tributaires de la quantité et de la qualité des informations disponibles.

2.1 Schéma Récapitulatif

Sur la base des données recueillies auprès des institutions prises en compte dans le cadre de la présente étude, les dépenses nationales de santé ont été évaluées à un montant proche des 4,5 milliards de DH au titre de l'année 1985¹. Elles fournissent une dépense moyenne d'environ 203 DH par tête et par an (voir tableau 2.1.).

La consommation médicale finale (CMF)² absorbe, à elle seule, plus de 4 milliards de DH; elle constitue ainsi 3,9 % de la consommation finale de la nation et offre une dépense moyenne de 183 DH par habitant.

2.1.1. Les Dépenses Privées de Santé

Il s'agit en fait essentiellement des dépenses de consommation des ménages au titre de "soins médicaux", auxquelles ont été ajoutées les prestations en assurance groupe. L'ensemble de ces dépenses s'élève à 2,2 milliards de DH, ce qui représente 49 % du total des dépenses de santé et 54 % de la consommation médicale finale de la nation. Constituant 2,6 % de la consommation finale privée, ce montant fournit une dépense moyenne de 100 DH environ par personne et par an.

Grâce aux paiements directs des usagers, soit 2,1 milliards de DH, le secteur privé intervient ainsi en tant que principal financeur dans le système de santé au Maroc.

1 Non compris les dépenses d'équipement du secteur médical libéral et des entreprises publiques, ainsi que les dépenses des cliniques mutualistes de la CNOPS. Il n'a pas été tenu compte des transferts dans le calcul des dépenses nationales de santé. Le montant des transferts devrait osciller autour de 200 M DH environ, ce qui ne risque pas de bouleverser l'ordre de grandeur de cet agrégat.

2 La CMF totale = CMF privée + CMF collective = Dépenses Courantes de Santé.

2.1.2. Les Dépenses Publiques de Santé

Le secteur public¹ finance environ 51 % des dépenses nationales de santé, correspondant à une somme de 2,3 milliards de DH. Les dépenses de fonctionnement absorbent 80 % de cette enveloppe financière et entrent pour 45 % dans la composition de la consommation médicale finale totale.

Fournissant une bourse moyenne de 103 DH par personne et par an, les dépenses publiques de santé se répartissent comme suit par source de financement :

- le budget de l'Etat² prend en charge 61 % de ces dépenses ;
- la contribution de la CNSS est de 25,3 % et celle de la CNOPS 8 % ;
- la part des Entreprises Publiques représente 5,7 %.

Tableau 2.1 - Sources de financement des dépenses nationales de santé (1985) - En million DH

| Source de financement | Dépenses courantes | | Dépenses en capital | | Dépenses totales | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|------|---------------------|-----|------------------|------|
| | Montant | % | Montant | % | Montant | % |
| 1. Secteur Public | 1 840 | 45,4 | 445 | 100 | 2 285 | 50,8 |
| Etat (1) | 1 195 | 29,5 | 200 | 45 | 1 395 | 31,1 |
| CNSS (1986) | 335 | 8,3 | 245 | 55 | 580 | 12,8 |
| CNOPS | 180 | 4,4 | n.d. | - | 180 | 4 |
| Entreprises | 130 | 3,2 | n.d. | - | 130 | 2,9 |
| 2. Secteur privé | 2 215 | 54,6 | n.d. | - | 2 215 | 49,2 |
| Ménages | 2 115 | 52,1 | - | - | 2 115 | 47 |
| Assurances | 100 | 2,5 | - | - | 100 | 2,2 |
| Total | 4 055 | 100 | 445 | 100 | 4 500 | 100 |

(1) y.c. la recherche et la formation, la santé militaire et la coopération financière internationale.

2.2 - Résultats d'Analyse

Les investigations qui ont été menées en vue d'une première approche du système de financement de la santé au Maroc permettent de relever un certain nombre de constatations qui nous semblent revêtir une importance primordiale. De fait, il se dégage de ces investigations des résultats qui, par souci de méthode, peuvent être regroupés en deux catégories. La première catégorie se situe au niveau horizontal de

-
- 1 Ce secteur comprend l'Etat, l'aide financière des organismes internationaux la CNSS, la CNOPS et un échantillon d'entreprises publiques (OCP, ONCF, ONAREP, BRPM, ONT, ONE, RAM, Régie de Tabac).
 - 2 Y compris l'aide financière accordée au Ministère de la Santé Publique par les Organismes Internationaux suivants : OMS, UNICEF, FNUAP et USAID.

l'analyse des dépenses de santé, la seconde se rapporte à la structure verticale de ces dépenses.

Par ailleurs, il s'avère opportun de tenter une esquisse de caractérisation du système de santé marocain, en vue de déterminer sa nature et son mode de financement.

2.2.1 - Faiblesse du Niveau Global des Dépenses de Santé

Le niveau des ressources financières allouées au secteur de la santé demeure relativement faible au Maroc, eu égard tant aux exigences du développement socio-économique du pays qu'au seuil atteint en matière de financement de la santé dans des pays similaires.

2.2.1.1 - La Modicité des Dépenses Nationales de Santé

Les dépenses nationales de santé constituent 3,7% du PIB au titre de l'année 1985. En retenant uniquement les dépenses médicales des ménages et le budget du Ministère de la Santé Publique pour la même année, ce ratio se trouve réduit à 2,7% alors qu'il représentait 3% en 1971.

La dépense moyenne de santé par habitant et par an est de 203 DH au Maroc, soit 20 \$ U.S. (1985). Ce chiffre reste en dessous de la norme de 31 % observée dans les pays à revenu moyen parmi lesquels est classé le Maroc.

Dans une récente étude de la Banque Mondiale¹, cette dépense moyenne a été estimée à 23,53 \$ (= 135 DH) au Maroc (1982), à 59,34\$ en Jordanie (1982), 62,12 au Pérou et 32,24 en Zambie (1981), 61,93 en Jamaïque et 29,58 au Zimbabwe (1980). En 1982, elle a été évaluée à 301,34 \$ en Espagne, 935 en France, 1.010,82 au Canada, 1.172,74 en Suède et 1.402,65 aux USA ; la moyenne pour les pays avancés étant de 670 \$

2.2.1.2 - L'amaigrissement des Ressources Budgétaires de la Santé Publique

Les ressources financières allouées au secteur de la santé publique accusent une tendance à la baisse quant à leur niveau réel et quant à leur proportion dans le budget général de l'Etat.

-En valeurs constantes (voir Tableau 2.2), les dotations budgétaires du Ministère de la santé publique ont vu leur indice - base 100 en 1980 - descendre à 78 en 1985; elles ont ainsi enregistré une chute moyenne de 4,8 % par an durant cette période. De même, l'indice réel - base 100 en 1977 - des dépenses gouvernementales de santé par habitant est tombé à 97 en 1982 puis à 83 l'année suivante. En revanche, il s'est élevé à 519 au Yémen (République Arabe), 148 au Zimbabwe, 133 en

1 The World Bank, Financing Health services in Developing Countries: An Agenda for Reform. Washington, D.C. 1987.

Tunisie (1982) puis 154 au Malawi, 113 au Cameroun et 111 en Jordanie (1983).

-Quant à la part du budget du Ministère de la Santé Publique dans les dépenses globales du gouvernement, elle est passée de 3,4 à 2,6 % entre 1980 et 1985¹. Ce ratio est de 7,2 % en Tunisie et 5,4 en Algérie (1981), 8,4 % en Zambie, 7 au Kenya, 6,8 au Malawi (1983) puis 8,6 % au Ghana, 6,3 au Koweït et 4,4 au Cameroun (1984).

2.2.1.3 - La Stagnation de la Part du Budget des Ménages Allouée à la Santé

En valeur nominale, les dépenses de santé des ménages ont, certes, connu une progression notable entre 1971 et 1985 ; elles sont passées de 24 à 95 DH par personne et par an, soit un taux d'augmentation annuel de 10 %. Cette augmentation est entièrement redevable à la hausse générale des prix et à celle, plus que proportionnelle, du coût des biens et services sanitaires. Elle se trouve donc annulée sous l'effet de l'inflation.

En outre, la proportion des dépenses médicales dans la consommation finale des ménages a quasiment stagné entre 1971 et 1985. Le coefficient budgétaire du poste "soins médicaux" n'a en effet guère progressé durant une décennie et demie ; il représente toujours 2,6 %. Cette faible part des dépenses consacrées par les ménages aux soins de santé est à mettre en rapport avec les difficultés que traverse actuellement le secteur médical libéral.

2.2.1.4 - Le Marasme des Activités du Secteur Médical Libéral

Sous la mouvance des facteurs de crise financière actuelle, le marasme des affaires dans le secteur médical privé peut s'expliquer notamment par :

-Du côté de la demande, la faiblesse relative des dépenses de santé des usagers ainsi que l'étroitesse et la fermeture du système de couverture médicale de la population ;

-du côté de l'offre, l'escalade des différentes composantes du coût des biens et services sanitaires, l'inadéquation du système de tarification appliqué ainsi que l'augmentation du nombre des médecins.

En ce sens, la crise financière a mis un terme à la prospérité des affaires dans le monde médical et surtout à l'élan de la demande moyenne au milieu des années 1970, ébranlant les assises du marché médical libéral et réduisant les capacités et les objectifs du secteur de la santé publique.

1 La proportion du budget de l'Education Nationale oscille autour de 20 %.

Tableau 2.2 - Budget de la Santé Publique (1980-86) - Valeurs réelles et nominales en 1.000 Dh -

| Rubriques | Budget de fonctionnement (BF) | | | | Budget d'investissement (BI) | | | | Total B.F. + B.I. | |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|---------|----------|---------|------------------------------|---------|----------|---------|-------------------|---------|
| | Personnel | Variat. | Matériel | Variat. | Total | Variat. | Valeur | Variat. | Valeur | Variat. |
| 1980 | 424.080 | - | 206.101 | - | 630.181 | - | 129.304 | - | 759.485 | - |
| | DH courant | +12% | 226.161 | +10% | 701.182 | +11% | 237.710 | +84% | 938.892 | +24% |
| 1981 | 415.643 | -2% | 197.891 | -04% | 613.534 | -03% | 207.996 | +61% | 821.530 | +08% |
| | DH constant | +18% | 242.201 | +07% | 803.108 | +15% | 300.000 | +26% | 1.103.108 | +17% |
| 1982 | 431.898 | +04% | 186.495 | -06% | 618.393 | +01% | 231.000 | +11% | 849.393 | +03% |
| | DH courant | +13% | 270.833 | +12% | 904.755 | +13% | 244.405 | -19% | 1.149.160 | +4% |
| 1983 | 448.817 | +04% | 191.750 | +03% | 640.567 | +04% | 173.039 | -25% | 813.605 | -04% |
| | DH constant | +06% | 244.589 | -10% | 914.153 | +01% | 139.302 | -43% | 813.605 | -04% |
| 1984 | 669.564 | +06% | 244.589 | -10% | 914.153 | +01% | 139.302 | -43% | 813.605 | -04% |
| | DH courant | -13% | 142.595 | -27% | 532.951 | -17% | 81.213 | -53% | 614.164 | -25% |
| 1985 | 390.156 | -13% | 142.595 | -27% | 532.951 | -17% | 81.213 | -53% | 614.164 | -25% |
| | DH constant | +07% | 267.905 | +10% | 985.098 | +08% | 186.000 | +34% | 1.171.098 | +11% |
| 1986 | 717.193 | +07% | 267.905 | +10% | 985.098 | +08% | 186.000 | +34% | 1.171.098 | +11% |
| | DH courant | -07% | 135.560 | -05% | 498.460 | -06% | 94.116 | +16% | 592.576 | -04% |
| 1985 | 362.900 | -07% | 135.560 | -05% | 498.460 | -06% | 94.116 | +16% | 592.576 | -04% |
| | DH constant | +15% | 311.183 | +16% | 1.137.880 | +16% | 500.000 | +169% | 1.637.880 | +40% |
| 1986 | 826.696 | +15% | 311.183 | +16% | 1.137.880 | +16% | 500.000 | +169% | 1.637.880 | +40% |
| | DH courant | -02% | 130.074 | -04% | 475.634 | -05% | 209.000* | +122% | 684.434 | +16% |
| 1986 | 354.559 | -02% | 130.074 | -04% | 475.634 | -05% | 209.000* | +122% | 684.434 | +16% |
| | DH constant | +12% | - | +7,5% | - | +10,5% | - | +16% | - | +9,5% |
| Variation moyenne annuelle | Nominale | +12% | - | +7,5% | - | +10,5% | - | +16% | - | +9,5% |
| | Réelle | -3% | - | -7% | - | -4% | - | +2%* | - | -4,5% |

(*) Il s'agit des reports des années antérieures. Aussi, les variations moyennes annuelles du BI et du budget total du MSP concernant uniquement les années 80 à 85.

C'est alors que l'on assista à l'émergence et au développement des activités sanitaires des tiers-payants et des intermédiaires financiers (CNOPS, CNSS), des entreprises publiques (OCP, ONE, ONCF, etc) et des organismes bénévoles (CRM).

2.2.1.5 - La Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale: Aisance Financière et Vocation Sanitaire

Résultante des excédents dégagés par le régime des prestations familiales, l'aisance financière de la CNSS fût un stimulant de taille qui lui a permis d'étendre ses fonctions sociales et de s'ériger, de fait, en un véritable organisme à vocation sanitaire. Actuellement, cet organisme dispose de ses propres structures sanitaires dont le coût de fonctionnement avoisine le tiers de celui du Ministère de la santé publique. Il intervient pour environ 12 % dans le financement des dépenses nationales de santé, soit l'équivalent d'un montant qui excède le tiers des dotations budgétaires du Ministère de la Santé Publique. Rapporté au nombre total de la population, ce montant offre une dépense moyenne de 26 DH par an.

Outre l'importance des ressources financières mobilisées, ce qui frappe dans l'action sanitaire de la CNSS c'est le double déséquilibre au prix duquel elle s'opère :

-Un déséquilibre financier relatif à la gestion des unités médicales dont les recettes propres couvrent à peine 47 % des dépenses de fonctionnement. Ce déficit est probablement imputable au système de tarification en vigueur¹, mais il suscite des interrogations quant aux principes qui président à la gestion des structures sanitaires de la CNSS, d'autant plus que les acteurs qui sont à l'origine du financement de ces structures n'en sont pas pour autant les bénéficiaires.

-D'où un déséquilibre à caractère social se rapportant à l'utilisation des services de santé des unités médicales de la CNSS. En effet, les utilisateurs de ces services sont formés par les non-adhérents à la CNSS, c'est-à-dire tous ceux qui sont couverts ou en mesure de régler les tarifs fixés. Or, puisque ces tarifs se situent en dessous des coûts effectifs des services de soins fournis, cela signifie que la CNSS - et donc les adhérents à cet organisme - offre une subvention aux non-affiliés utilisateurs de ces services.

1 Il ne faut pas oublier non plus le niveau relativement élevé des traitements des cadres et des professionnels de la santé exerçant dans les polycliniques de la CNSS.

2.2.1.6 - La Caisse Nationale des Oeuvres de Prévoyance Sociale: Tiers-Payeur Principal et Prestataire de Services de Santé

Avec ses 600 milliers d'adhérents - soit 10 % de la population active totale du Maroc, le CNOPS représente le principal acteur dans le système de financement de la santé par tiers-payant. Elle finance plus de 4 % de la consommation médicale finale, ce qui correspond à 15 % du budget du MSP et à 3,8 % des dépenses nationales de santé.

Toutefois, cet établissement ne se contente pas d'être un simple intermédiaire financier ; il se présente aussi en tant qu'agent prestataire de services de santé. En effet, dans sa tentative de faire face aux contraintes financières actuelles, la CNOPS a adopté deux formules afin d'agir sur le coût des services médicaux demandés par ses membres :

-elle a procédé, au moyen de ses politiques de remboursement, à l'encouragement des bénéficiaires pour déplacer leur demande du secteur médical libéral vers les polycliniques de la CNSS. Celle-ci offre non seulement des services de santé bon marché par rapport au secteur privé, mais aussi des facilités quant au rééchelonnement des dettes de la CNOPS dues aux arriérés de l'Etat¹.

-Elle s'est engagée dans la création et le renforcement de ses propres structures sanitaires, à savoir les polycliniques mutualistes, tout en stimulant les adhérents à utiliser les services de soins qui y sont offerts, moyennant un ϕ -paiement.

2.2.2 - Mauvaise Affectation des Ressources Sanitaires

L'analyse détaillée des diverses destinations des ressources nationales de santé est une tâche extrêmement compliquée en raison non seulement de l'insuffisance des informations, mais aussi de la non-concordance et des écarts existants entre les catégories d'analyse et les catégories de dépenses. Elle revêt cependant une importance cruciale pour toute tentative d'évaluation des performances d'un système de santé. Cette dimension de l'analyse permet en effet de situer les points forts ou les défaillances de ce système, en déterminant notamment la mesure dans laquelle la gestion et la distribution des ressources sanitaires répondent aux exigences d'efficacité, d'efficience et d'équité.

A cet effet, il a été jugé utile de faire une approche des dépenses nationales de santé en fonction de leur affectation par catégorie de dépenses, par région économique et lieu de résidence (urbain/rural) ainsi que par niveau de service. Quoique cette approche puisse être approximative et comporter de nombreuses simplifications de calcul, elle permet néanmoins de fonder l'hypothèse d'une mauvaise affecta-

1 Il s'agit des subventions de l'Etat pour combler le déficit de la CNOPS. En principe, l'Etat - en tant qu'employeur - devrait régler une cotisation équivalente à celle de ses employés à la CNOPS.

tion des ressources sanitaires, du point de vue tant de la justice sociale que de la rationalité économique.

2.2.2.1 - La Structure Globale des Dépenses de Santé

Pour les organismes qui sont à la fois financiers et prestataires de services de santé, c'est-à-dire ceux qui agissent simultanément sur la structure de l'offre et de la demande de soins, les dépenses courantes absorbent environ 70 % des ressources totales. Le reste, soit 30 % est consacré aux dépenses d'équipement. Pour l'ensemble des secteurs de la santé, la structure globale des dépenses se présente comme suit :

A - Les dépenses de fonctionnement

Les dépenses de fonctionnement ont été estimées à un montant légèrement au-dessous des 4 milliards de DH au titre de l'année 1985, se répartissant ainsi par postes de dépenses :

-Les frais de personnel : absorbent presque 40 % du total. Cette proportion varie sensiblement d'un secteur à l'autre ; elle dépasse 60 % dans le secteur public (Etat et CNSS) et n'atteint guère les 22 % dans les dépenses de santé des ménages.

-Les médicaments : retiennent environ 37 % de l'ensemble, soit un montant proche de 1,5 milliards de DH¹. Cette part est seulement de 8 % pour ce qui est du secteur public, tandis qu'elle représente 61 % dans la consommation médicale finale privée.

-Les autres biens et services : il s'agit des fournitures et matériels médicaux et des frais divers, lesquels consomment environ 23 % de la valeur totale des dépenses courantes.

B - Les dépenses d'investissement²

L'analyse de la structure des dépenses d'équipement du Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la CNSS montre que :

-
- 1 En 1986, la consommation totale des médicaments a été évaluée à 1,7 milliards de DH environ.
 - 2 Il est question en fait des dépenses du MSP et de la CNSS pour l'année 1986; l'accès aux informations concernant le secteur médical privé, les cliniques mutualistes et les entreprises publiques n'ayant pas été possible.

-l'achat de terrains et de bâtiments, les constructions et aménagement représentent 64 % du total des immobilisations ;

-l'équipement médical intervient pour 30 % dans ce total;

-Les autres immobilisations attirent le reste des dépenses, soit 6 %.

En somme, il apparaît que les grands postes de dépenses sont par ordre d'importance les salaires des personnels de santé et les médicaments d'un côté ; les constructions, achat de terrains et équipement médical de l'autre côté. Néanmoins, cette constatation générale appelle des nuances en ce qui concerne le MSP et le CNSS. En effet, pour ces derniers les médicaments représentent respectivement moins de 8 % puis 4 % des dépenses courantes¹. En revanche, le poste "Achat de terrains, constructions et aménagement" enlève environ 75 % des dépenses d'investissement du MSP et 58 % de celles de la CNSS, tandis que le poste "Equipement médical" en absorbe 41 % pour le cas de la CNSS et à peine 18,6 % pour le cas du MSP²

2.2.2.2. - Iniquité dans la Répartition Spatiale des Ressources

La distribution territoriale des ressources nationales de santé souffre de sérieux déséquilibres au niveau tant des régions économiques que des espaces urbain et rural. Elle est, en effet, concentrée sur les régions économiques les plus développées et sur les centres urbains où le niveau de vie est relativement élevé.

A - Les dépenses de santé par région économique

La répartition régionale des dépenses de santé profite essentiellement aux zones qui sont déjà privilégiées sur le plan socio-économique. Ainsi, si l'on considère les dépenses de santé du secteur public³, il apparaît que les régions du Centre et du Nord-Ouest canalisent presque 80 % de ces dépenses, soit respectivement 53 % puis 26 %. Le reste, soit 21 %, est partagé par ordre d'importance entre les régions du Sud (6 %), du Centre-Nord (5 %), du Tensift (4 %), de l'oriental (4 %) et du Centre Sud (2 %). En rapportant le montant des dépenses de santé considérées ci-dessus au nombre d'habitants par région économique, la dépense moyenne par tête et par an a été approximative-

- 1 Si cette faible proportion semble être sans effets notables sur les activités sanitaires de la CNSS qui sont essentiellement orientées vers les soins curatifs de troisième niveau (tertiaire), elle est par contre significative de la dégradation de la situation au MSP lequel devrait en principe faire face aux besoins de la population en matière de soins de santé de base et donc disposer de moyens suffisants en médicaments.
- 2 En valeur absolue, les dotations budgétaires du MSP au poste "Equipement médical" représentent 83 % de celles de la CNSS.
- 3 Il est question uniquement des dépenses d'équipement du MSP et de la CNSS (1986), ainsi que des prestations des mutuelles civiles de la CNOPS (1985).

ment estimée à 70 DH au Centre et 46 DH au Nord-Ouest, 20 DH à l'oriental, 18 DH au Sud, 16 DH au Centre-Nord puis respectivement 10 DH au Tensift et au Centre-Sud.

B - Les dépenses de santé par lieu de résidence

La répartition inéquitable des dépenses de santé par région économique est traversée par une autre qui se situe, cette fois-ci, au niveau des zones urbaines et rurales. Sur ce dernier plan, il apparaît que des inégalités frappantes existent entre les citadins et les ruraux en matière d'accessibilité financière aux soins de santé. En effet, les résultats de l'enquête de consommation des ménages (voir tableau 2.3) font état d'une dépense moyenne en soins médicaux du citadin (144 DH par an) qui dépasse le triple de celle du paysan (58 DH par an). En ajoutant les dépenses de santé de la CNSS et de la CNOPS, lesquelles profitent quasi-exclusivement à la population urbaine, cette dépense moyenne devrait s'élever à 220 DH pour le citadin¹.

Tableau 2.3 - Structure des dépenses de santé des ménages (1984-85) - En Dirhams

| Postes de Dépenses | Dépenses moyenne par tête et par an | | | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|----------|-------|
| | Urbain | % | Rural | % | Ensemble | % |
| Honoraires médecins | 31,91 | 22,03 | 12,74 | 21,66 | 21,04 | 21,95 |
| Analyse radiologie | 9,60 | 6,63 | 2,18 | 3,71 | 5,20 | 5,42 |
| Soins hospitaliers | 4,10 | 2,83 | 1,18 | 2 | 2,44 | 2,55 |
| Soins dentaires | 6,39 | 4,41 | 2,09 | 3,55 | 3,95 | 4,12 |
| Accouchements | 2,89 | 2 | 0,90 | 1,53 | 1,76 | 1,84 |
| Médicaments | 86,59 | 59,78 | 37,83 | 64,33 | 58,93 | 61,48 |
| Appareils médicaux | 2,09 | 1,44 | 0,20 | 0,34 | 1,02 | 1,06 |
| Médecine traditionnelle | 1,27 | 0,88 | 1,69 | 2,88 | 1,51 | 1,58 |
| Total | 144,84 | 100 | 58,81 | 100 | 95,85 | 100 |
| Coefficient budgétaire | | 2,9 % | | 2,2 % | | 2 % |

Source: Enquête de consommation des ménages (1984-1985) Direction de la Statistique.

Globalement, il demeure que l'allocation spatiale des ressources sanitaires dénote de graves déséquilibres qui affectent le degré d'équité du système de financement et de prestation des soins de santé au Maroc.

1 La prise en compte des dépenses du MSP - dont la structure ne se prête pas à une ventilation par lieu de résidence - n'atténuerait pas sensiblement un tel écart. L'examen de la distribution des dépenses totales de santé porte plutôt à croire que la consommation médicale en milieu urbain est environ trois fois plus élevée qu'en milieu rural.

2.2.2.3 - Inefficacité dans l'Utilisation des Ressources

Les ressources financières allouées au secteur de la santé sont aussi très mal utilisées du point de vue de la rationalité technico-économique. A ce propos, l'analyse de la ventilation fonctionnelle des dépenses de santé fait apparaître la proportion relativement importante qui revient aux dépenses d'équipement et de fonctionnement des services de soins hospitaliers et en particulier ceux qui se situent au niveau le plus élevé du système et à la pointe de la technologie hospitalière.

Ainsi, l'examen de la ventilation des dépenses de santé du secteur public (MSP, CNSS et CNOPS) par niveau de services permet d'avancer une première estimation selon laquelle 37 % de ces dépenses sont affectées au secteur tertiaire, c'est-à-dire à des services hospitaliers qui font appel à des équipements sophistiqués et très coûteux. Cette proportion est voisine de 64 % pour la CNSS¹, tandis qu'elle est de 23 % puis 20 % respectivement pour la CNOPS et le MSP².

En outre, quand on considère le réseau hospitalier dans son ensemble, sa part dans les dépenses de santé du secteur public s'élève à 76 % environ, étant convenu que l'action sanitaire de la CNSS demeure intégralement orientée vers les services hospitaliers. Concernant le MSP, il n'a été tenu compte que des seules dépenses d'équipement lesquelles ont profité pour plus de 61 % au secteur hospitalier (voir tableau 2.4).

Tableau 2.4 - Répartition des dépenses d'équipement du MSP par niveau de service (1981-1986) - En 1 000 DH

| Années | 1981 | % | 1982 | % | 1983 | % | 1984 | % | 1985 | % | 1986 | % |
|------------|---------|--------|------------|--------------|------------|------------|---------|---------|---------|-------|---------|-----|
| Ambu | 30 600 | 12,986 | 950 29 | 116 130 | 47,584 | 793 60,9 | 111 522 | 60 | 193 444 | 38,68 | | |
| Hospi | 207 110 | 87,121 | 3 050 71 | 128 274 | 52,554 | 509 39,174 | 478 40 | 306 556 | 61,31 | | | |
| dont : | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Tertiaire | 121 000 | 51 | 136 000 | 45,32 | 000 0,8 | - | 1 000 | 0,5 | 44 924 | 9 | | |
| Secondaire | 86 110 | 36,177 | 050 25,712 | 6 274 51,754 | 509 39,173 | 478 39,526 | 1 632 | 52,32 | | | | |
| Total | 237 710 | 100 | 300 000 | 100 | 244 404 | 100 | 139 302 | 100 | 186 000 | 100 | 500 000 | 100 |

Source : - Plan 1981-85 actualisé par les lois de finances - Budget du Ministère de la Santé Publique.

- 1 L'estimation de la part du secteur tertiaire dans les dépenses de santé de la CNSS repose sur l'hypothèse que ce secteur n'englobe que les plus importantes polycliniques implantées à Casablanca.
- 2 Faute d'informations détaillées, les dépenses du chapitre "Personnel" du MSP n'ont pas été prises en compte dans l'estimation.

Au total, les ressources des secteurs de la santé sont canalisées pour une large part vers les services de soins secondaires et tertiaires, pourtant coûteux et moins efficaces. En revanche, les soins de santé primaires, moins onéreux et destinés à la majorité de la population, souffrent d'insuffisance de ressources. Une pareille orientation ne répond guère aux critères d'équité, d'efficacité et d'efficience dans la mesure où elle se traduit par des déséquilibres considérables dus à l'utilisation de techniques coûteuses et complexes, à une gestion inefficace des ressources humaines et matérielles puis à une très mauvaise répartition régionale et sociale des fonds.

2.2.3 - Caractéristiques du Système de Financement de la Santé

Durant son évolution, le système de santé marocain est passé par trois phases :

-Au lendemain de l'indépendance, l'essentiel des efforts a été consacré à la formation des personnels de santé et à la promotion des services de soins essentiels, en vue de jeter les bases de l'instauration d'un système de santé publique.

- la décennie 1970 fût celle des grandes réalisations en matière d'infrastructure sanitaire (construction des grands hôpitaux publics et renforcement des capacités du secteur médical libéral).

-la décennie en cours est celle de la crise qui a atteint le niveau financier du système de santé et qui a entraîné le recul du secteur de la Santé Publique et le marasme des affaires dans le secteur médical privé. Parallèlement, on a assisté à l'émergence et à l'extension des activités sanitaires de certains établissements publics (CNSS, CNOPS, Entreprises) et des organismes bénévoles (CRM).

Dans le sillage de cette évolution historique, le système de financement de la santé se trouve caractérisé par les aspects suivants :

A - Un caractère composite et segmentaire

Ce caractère trouve sa traduction dans la multiplicité et la dispersion des modes de financement de la santé. En effet, le système de santé marocain est composé de plusieurs segments et d'une pluralité d'acteurs séparés les uns des autres. Il s'agit d'un système à plusieurs vitesses dont le fonctionnement s'opère sans aucune coordination entre ses éléments, ce qui rend difficile l'élaboration et la mise en oeuvre d'une véritable politique nationale de santé.

B - Une polarisation sur l'espace urbain et sur la médecine d'élite

La concentration disproportionnée des ressources sur les centres urbains et sur le secteur tertiaire constitue un trait saillant dans le mode de financement de la Santé au Maroc. Cette orientation signifie des déséquilibres criants en matière d'utilisation des ressources disponibles et d'accessibilité du système de soins de santé.

C - Une structure dualiste

Une telle structure s'exprime à travers la coexistence de deux sous-secteurs de la médecine : le secteur "moderne" organisé et dirigé par l'Etat et le secteur "traditionnel" pris en charge par les communautés. Le premier a connu un développement spectaculaire depuis l'indépendance, le second est tombé en crise et accuse un net recul.

Par ailleurs, le secteur moderne est lui-même partagé en deux sous-secteurs : l'un dispose de moyens techniques sophistiqués et de personnels spécialisés pour couvrir les zones "centrales", l'autre souffre d'insuffisance de moyens et se charge des zones "périphériques".

Certes, toutes ces caractéristiques, et notamment le manque de coordination entre les diverses activités sanitaires, constituent autant d'obstacles face à la mise en oeuvre d'une véritable politique nationale de santé. Mais ce qui importe le plus c'est la longue absence d'une telle politique qui devrait fixer les priorités et assigner à chaque secteur son rôle dans la promotion de la santé¹. Ceci suscite des interrogations quant au statut de la force de travail et quant au processus de sa reproduction.

En ce sens, l'analyse de l'espace sanitaire permet d'ouvrir une voie d'accès à l'appréhension de la spécificité de la fonction sociale de l'Etat dans la reproduction de la force de travail et partant de sa fonction idéologique dans la légitimation de l'ordre établi².

3 - Recommandations

Dans le contexte actuel de crise financière, caractérisé par le ralentissement de la croissance et l'aggravation des déficits budgétaires, les mesures d'austérité en matière de dépenses publiques affectent en premier lieu le secteur de la santé à un moment où il faut justement accroître les ressources allouées à ce secteur. En effet, les effets pervers de la démographie galopante, de l'urbanisation accélérée, de l'introduction de nouvelles valeurs et normes de consommation et de production, ainsi que la prise de conscience progressive des populations de leur droit à la santé, sont autant de facteurs ne cessent de créer et d'élargir la sphère des besoins sanitaires. Sous cette double pression des contraintes financières et des exigences sociales, les

- 1 Ce n'est en fait que récemment et de façon timide que l'on assiste à l'apparition, dans le document du budget du Ministère de la Santé Publique, d'une priorité délibérément adoptée. Il s'agit de celle-là même que s'était fixée la communauté mondiale dans le cadre de la Conférence de l'OMS à Alma-Ata en 1987, à savoir la priorité des "Soins de Santé de Base".
- 2 Sur cette question, cf. notre travail : "Essai d'approche de l'Etat dans les sociétés dépendantes ; cas du Maroc contemporain". Thèse de doctorat de 3ème cycle ès sciences économiques. Université de Poitiers, Septembre 1983.

pouvoirs publics doivent rechercher les possibilités alternatives d'augmenter les ressources du secteur de la santé. A cet égard, la rationalisation économique des services existants ne peut suffire pour satisfaire des besoins extensibles. Il est en outre nécessaire de mobiliser des ressources supplémentaires si l'on vise à se rapprocher de l'objectif "la santé pour tous d'ici l'an 2 000" que s'était fixée la communauté mondiale lors de la conférence de l'OMS à Alma-Ata en 1978.

Dans cette optique, des mesures sont à prendre dès à présent dans le but de remédier aux insuffisances et au dysfonctionnement du système de financement de la santé au Maroc. Sans prétendre fournir des recettes infaillibles, on se propose ici de présenter brièvement certaines des politiques à entreprendre, compte tenu de l'état actuel du système de santé, des contraintes financières et des exigences sociales. Ces politiques sont complémentaires et interdépendantes. Elles doivent par ailleurs faire l'objet d'études approfondies pour les développer et analyser leurs incidences sur le plan socio-économique.

3.1 - Rationalisation Economique des Services Existants

L'amélioration du financement des actions sanitaires peut être obtenue par le biais de la rentabilisation des services existants et la limitation des coûts engendrés par la mauvaise utilisation des fonds. Cela passe par l'introduction d'un système efficace de planification, de gestion et de contrôle financiers en vue d'assurer une meilleure réallocation des ressources disponibles. Corrélativement, il est impératif de mettre en place un dispositif institutionnel et des structures organisationnelles permettant la coordination des activités sanitaires et la promotion de la recherche et de la formation dans le domaine de la santé.

3.1.1 - Planification et Gestion des Ressources

Le fonctionnement des services de santé au Maroc s'opère en l'absence d'une planification et d'une gestion financière, ce qui donne lieu à des pertes importantes de ressources. Cette carence se reflète de manière apparente au niveau des hôpitaux publics où les méthodes de gestion et de contrôle appliquées sont rudimentaires. Il en découle des gaspillages nombreux : détournement de fournitures, détérioration de matériels, sous-utilisation des installations, allongement des séjours d'hospitalisation.

Or, la planification et la gestion financière constituent des préalables indispensables pour la mise en oeuvre d'une véritable politique nationale de santé. Elles permettent en effet d'assurer une meilleure utilisation des ressources mobilisables et une amélioration de l'efficacité, de l'efficience et de l'équité des services de santé. Dans le contexte actuel, l'impératif de planification se fait ressentir avec plus d'acuité et

répond à une situation réelle où le déséquilibre entre l'offre et la demande de soins risque de provoquer des goulots d'étranglement au niveau de l'ensemble du système de santé.

Les décisions en matière de politique sanitaire semblent d'ailleurs prendre conscience de la nécessité de mieux gérer et planifier les ressources. C'est dans ce sens que le Ministère de la Santé Publique a décidé de lancer deux importantes études, l'une sur la gestion hospitalière et l'autre sur le financement de la santé. Ces deux études devraient porter un éclairage sur l'état actuel du système et offrir une aide appréciable à la décision en matière de planification, de gestion et de redéploiement rationnels des ressources disponibles et mobilisables.

En ce sens, il faut procéder dès à présent à former les hommes nécessaires à la mise en oeuvre du processus de planification et l'exécution des programmes.

3.1.2 - Meilleure Réallocation des Ressources

Comme cela a été démontré auparavant, les ressources sanitaires sont très mal utilisées. En matière d'accès aux soins, des disparités inquiétantes existent entre les régions, entre les catégories sociales puis entre les zones urbaines et les zones rurales. Aussi, les dépenses de santé sont fortement concentrées sur les services tertiaires et secondaires au détriment des services primaires, pourtant plus efficaces.

Il est donc d'une extrême importance de prendre des mesures pour assurer une meilleure réallocation des ressources en fonction des critères d'équité et d'efficacité. De telles mesures doivent être orientées vers les objectifs suivants :

- La promotion des soins de santé de base et des services préventifs
- L'introduction d'une technologie appropriée dans les services tertiaires et secondaires.
- Le renforcement des ressources destinées aux régions et aux zones pauvres, particulièrement les campagnes.

Toutefois, la mise en oeuvre de ces politiques suppose l'existence d'un processus de planification et de gestion. Elle exige aussi la création d'un mécanisme central de coordination regroupant les hauts responsables des différents secteurs d'activité sanitaires ainsi que les représentants d'organismes politiques, sociaux et économiques.

3.1.3 - Création d'un Conseil National de Santé

La multiplicité des sources de financement de la santé rend difficile l'oeuvre de planification et de redéploiement équitable et efficace des fonds. Cette dispersion implique une pluralité d'objectifs et de programmes sanitaires sans aucune articulation entre eux, ce qui se traduit par un double emploi des services générateur de gaspillages et d'inefficacités. Cet état de fait trouve une expression éclatante dans les polycliniques de la CNSS et les CHU du Ministère de la Santé Publi-

que; lesquels s'adonnent à des activités de même nature, achètent des équipements identiques et s'adressent à des segments analogues de la population.

En conséquence, la situation présente du système de santé réclame la création d'un cadre institutionnel pour la coordination des activités des divers acteurs de ce système et la définition des responsabilités et des rôles assignés à chacun d'eux. L'institution d'un Conseil National de Santé semble être le cadre le plus propice à superviser l'action sanitaire, l'exécution des programmes prioritaires et la distribution efficace et équitable des ressources, à assurer la participation des principaux acteurs au processus de planification (usagers, professionnels de santé, représentants des populations et autres associations et organismes concernés). Cela suppose la mise sur pied d'un mécanisme intermédiaire de coordination (cadre institutionnel permanent attaché au Conseil National de Santé) ainsi que la réglementation de toutes les activités sanitaires afin d'éliminer la désorganisation et les facteurs de dysfonctionnement du système de santé.

Pour pouvoir s'acquitter convenablement de ses fonctions de coordination, d'orientation et de supervision, le Conseil National de Santé devrait réunir les Ministres et les Hauts responsables des Départements et Organismes impliqués dans l'action sanitaire ainsi que les forces représentatives de la population. A cet effet, un Comité Interministériel préparatoire peut être créé dans l'immédiat afin de débattre les questions urgentes, préparer un dossier sur la situation sanitaire et examiner les aspects institutionnels et techniques relatifs à la constitution du Conseil National de Santé et du Comité de Coordination qui lui serait lié.

Par ailleurs, en matière d'aide à la décision, ledit Conseil devrait être assisté par des équipes compétentes de recherches et disposer d'appuis technique et informationnel. Pour cela, il faudra mettre sur pied un système d'information sanitaire et promouvoir la recherche et la formation en gestion et en économie de la santé.

3.1.4 - Promotion de la Recherche et de la Formation

L'amélioration de la gestion des ressources existantes exige le développement des outils statistiques et comptables et le renforcement des capacités de traitement et d'analyse des données. En effet, pour obtenir une meilleure utilisation des ressources sanitaires, il faut disposer de personnels compétents qui puissent concrétiser un tel objectif et d'un système de calcul qui puisse faire apparaître l'affectation et la distribution des fonds.

C'est pourquoi il s'avère nécessaire de promouvoir la recherche et la formation dans le domaine de la santé et de renforcer les capacités techniques et administratives. Dans ce cadre, il faut préconiser

l'enseignement de l'économie de la santé dans les programmes de formation des médecins, des pharmaciens, des personnels paramédicaux et des administrateurs. Cet enseignement doit être dispensé en particulier aux médecins. En effet, ce sont ces derniers qui se trouvent à l'origine de la facturation des services de santé dans la mesure où ils détiennent le pouvoir de décision pour ce qui est de la nature des équipements médicaux utilisés et du déroulement du processus clinique, c'est-à-dire le diagnostic, la prescription du traitement, etc. Ils doivent alors être sensibilisés, dès le début de leur formation, aux notions de coûts pour pouvoir mesurer les conséquences économiques que comportent leurs décisions tant pour le patient que pour la nation.

3.2 Nécessite de Mobiliser des Ressources Supplémentaires

Outre la rationalisation économique et l'organisation des services existants, il est impératif de procéder à l'augmentation des ressources budgétaires du Ministère de la santé publique et à la mobilisation de nouvelles sources de financement de la santé. La gestion efficace des maigres ressources allouées au secteur de la santé ne peut suffire à assurer une couverture médicale convenable de la population.

3.2.1 - Renforcer les Ressources Budgétaires du Ministère de la Santé Publique

La part du budget de l'Etat allouée au secteur de la santé publique ne cesse de baisser ; elle est passée de 3,4 à 2,6 % entre 1980 et 1985. Il en est de même de l'évolution réelle (base 100 en 1980) du budget du Ministère de la Santé Publique qui a enregistré une régression moyenne de 4,8 % par an durant la même période. En 1985, ce budget a fourni à peine une dépense moyenne de 27 DH (DH constant de 1980) par tête et par an. Ce déclin a touché en particulier le Chapitre "Matériel", c'est-à-dire les fournitures et les médicaments essentiels, dont les dotations ont accusé une baisse moyenne de 8 % par an entre 1980 et 1985.

Cette situation, qui est significative du désengagement progressif de l'Etat en matière de Santé Publique, n'a pas manqué de se traduire par une dégradation de la quantité et de la qualité des services de soins dispensés à travers les différentes structures sanitaires publiques. Cela a eu pour corollaire l'engagement des usagers des services de santé

publique dans le financement des fournitures, médicaments et autres accessoires médicaux¹

Cette déviation qui contraint les usagers à participer de fait aux frais des fournitures médicales favorise l'exclusion des populations démunies, surtout les ruraux, de la sphère des soins et en premier lieu les soins de santé de base. Elle est significative du désengagement de l'Etat en matière de santé.

A partir de là, il est d'une extrême importance d'agir en faveur de l'élévation réelle des dotations budgétaires du Ministère de la Santé Publique. Pour cela, il faut que ce département puisse faire valoir les priorités sanitaires dans le cadre de projets et de programmes pertinents, faisant apparaître clairement les destinations des fonds en fonction des besoins pressants à satisfaire.

3.2.2 - Engager les Collectivités Locales

Un autre moyen pour accroître les ressources sanitaires consiste à engager davantage la contribution des Collectivités locales au financement des services de santé. Un tel engagement constitue aussi un moyen pour la décentralisation des décisions en matière de santé.

La mobilisation, au service de la santé, de fonds supplémentaires en provenance des Collectivités locales peut revêtir diverses formules. Dans le contexte actuel, l'attention portera ici sur les principales méthodes suivantes :

-Le renforcement et la rationalisation des ressources déjà engagées dans le domaine de la santé par les Collectivités locales (Bureaux Municipaux d'Hygiène, etc).

-La prise en charge des cas nécessiteux et des patients pauvres soignés dans les hôpitaux publics. En effet, les Collectivités locales peuvent être amenées à financer les services de soins dispensés aux populations pauvres.

-L'exploitation en commun de certaines unités sanitaires du Ministère de la Santé Publique. Cela peut prendre la forme d'une participation aux décisions et aux frais de fonctionnement de ces unités, le personnel étant à la charge du Ministère de la Santé Publique.

-La participation avec le Ministère de la Santé Publique à la mobilisation de ressources communautaires en vue de promouvoir les soins de santé de base. En ce sens, il serait possible d'encourager les communautés rurales à créer et prendre en charge elles-mêmes des

1 Selon une récente étude réalisée par le Ministère de la Santé Publique à l'Hôpital Hassan II d'Agadir, il apparaît qu'au titre de l'année 1986 les malades *hospitalisés ont financé eux-mêmes les achats de médicaments et fournitures médicales dans une proportion proche des 2/3, le reste ayant été prélevé sur le budget du Ministère. Cette participation financière des patients *hospitalisés se présente ainsi par poste des dépenses :

dispensaires ruraux, des maisons d'accouchement, des dépôts de médicaments, etc.

Le financement d'une telle opération peut être assuré par le travail bénévole, les dons en nature ou en espèce, l'aide de l'Etat et des Organismes internationaux, etc.

Si l'on excepte le système des mutuelles de la CNOPS, il apparaît que la quasi-totalité des forces de travail du pays ne bénéficie pas d'une couverture médicale collective. En tenant compte de la CNOPS et des plus importantes entreprises publiques qui disposent de leurs propres caisses médicales, il se dégage que l'assurance-maladie couvre environ 12 % de la population active globale. Autrement dit, les bénéficiaires de cette couverture (adhérents et ayant droit) représentent environ 10 % de la population totale du Pays.

Face à cette situation, l'introduction d'un système d'assurance maladie s'impose alors en tant qu'alternative permettant d'apporter des fonds additionnels, d'alléger les charges du Ministère de la Santé Publique et d'agir dans la régulation du marché médical libéral. De plus, ce système de socialisation des risques de maladies ne manquera pas d'entraîner une amélioration de l'état sanitaire de la population, à condition que des mesures concrètes soient prises préalablement en faveur des couches sociales démunies, car ce système s'adresse aux salariés réguliers et risque de ce fait de creuser l'écart en matière de soins entre ceux-ci et le reste de la population.

Certes, l'instauration d'un système d'assurance-maladie est une entreprise d'envergure. Néanmoins, il serait opportun d'examiner la possibilité de prendre les mesures suivantes :

- Introduire un système de couverture médicale à la CNSS tout en maîtrisant les services de soins à inclure dans ce système.

- Elargir le système des mutuelles de la CNOPS en rendant obligatoire l'adhésion des employés du secteur public.

- Créer d'autres systèmes collectifs de couverture médicale pour les travailleurs indépendants, les professions libérales, les exploitants agricoles, etc.

Toutefois, avant toute prise de décision, il faut examiner la faisabilité économique, la forme et la nature du (ou des) système(s) d'assurance-maladie à adopter.

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- Médicaments : 20 %
 - Pansement et accessoires médicaux et pharmaceutiques: 67 %
 - Produits de radiologie : 93 %.. 3.2.3 - Introduire un Système d'assurance Maladie

3.2.4 - Intégrer la Médecine Traditionnelle

La médecine traditionnelle joue encore un rôle non négligeable dans le système de prestation de service de soins. Il convient donc d'encourager les praticiens traditionnels en leur accordant des subventions et en les soumettant à une formation de courte durée et de coordonner leurs activités avec celles des services organisés. Ces praticiens (sages-femmes, herboristes, etc) peuvent notamment être associés à des programmes de soins de santé de base et éventuellement à la mise en place de services de santé communautaires.

3.2.5 - Renforcer la Coopération Financière Internationale

Face aux contraintes financières qui pèsent actuellement sur le budget social de l'Etat, la coopération extérieure est appelée à jouer un rôle actif dans la promotion du secteur de la santé dans les pays en voie de développement. Mais, en raison de la pesanteur de l'endettement extérieur, il incombe aux responsables dans ces pays de sensibiliser les milieux internationaux quant à la nécessité d'élever le niveau de l'aide extérieure, d'assouplir ses conditions et d'adapter ses modalités aux exigences spécifiques du progrès en matière de la santé.

Dans le cas du Maroc, le niveau de la coopération financière internationale demeure très modeste comparée à d'autres pays d'Afrique ou d'Amérique-Latine. L'opportunité existe donc de faire davantage recours à l'aide extérieure sous toutes ses formes en vue d'attirer des fonds supplémentaires au service de la santé. Pour cela, il faut que le Ministère de la Santé Publique puisse élaborer des projets pertinents, présenter des programmes prioritaires et faire preuve d'efficacité et d'équité dans l'utilisation des ressources sanitaires.

Indigenization, Class Formation and Class Struggle in Nigeria: An Analysis

Assisi Asobie*

RÉSUMÉ Au Nigéria, le processus de formation de classes s'est déclenché avec l'indigénisation, politique dont un des traits saillants a été la transformation qu'elle a occasionnée au niveau du mode d'accumulation privée de capital et d'appropriation du capital. Avec la nouvelle politique d'investissement, une petite classe de grand exploitants agricoles et de grands industriels capitalistes convaincus a vu le jour. Ce transfert accru des excédents vers les secteurs industriel et agricole a eu pour résultante une élévation du taux de croissance de la propriété et des revenus connexes et inversement une baisse du taux de croissance des revenus des travailleurs. Ainsi, en dépit de la prépondérance du capital étranger, la part du capital détenu par les nigériens s'est accrue par rapport à la part que représentait le capital étranger dans le capital global de ce pays. L'indigénisation, à ce niveau, consiste en une sorte d'arrangement entre le capital extérieur et le capital indigène, l'extériorisation de la base productive de l'économie tout en faisant jouer à la bourgeoisie indigène un rôle encore plus déterminant dans la mise en place et la préservation des conditions politiques nécessaires à l'accumulation. Compte tenu du rôle de premier plan joué par l'Etat dans le processus d'indigénisation, l'on s'est servi de plus en plus du pouvoir étatique pour l'accumulation primitive du capital au Nigéria. Cette tendance accrue a entraîné à son tour l'aggravation de la corruption officielle et une fuite considérable des capitaux vers l'étranger.

Introduction

The Focus of most of the previous studies on the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees has been on the impact of the indigenization policies on the pattern of ownership and control of the means of production, distribution and exchange in Nigeria. On this point, three main schools of thoughts have emerged. The first school argues that the indigenization policies have been a success, that they have gone a long way in transferring ownership and control of enterprises in Nigeria to Nigerians. The second school maintains that they have been only a partial success; that the overall effect has been to transfer fiscal ownership, but not actual (managerial, and technological) control, of enterprises based in Nigeria to Nigerians. The third school insists that, on the whole, the policies have been a failure: they have resulted in the transfer of neither ownership nor control of public and private enterprises in Nigeria to Nigerians. All that has happened, this school maintains, is

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that the financial participation of Nigerians, and therefore their stake in these enterprises have risen.

The second and third schools of thought have tried to offer explanations for the partial success or total failure of the indigenization programme. These explanations fall into three categories. The decision-making sub-school attributes the partial success to the fault in the initial conception of the policy and the lack of imagination and commitment in its implementation. The second sub-school, which may be designated the devil-theorist sub-school, attributes the failure of the policies to the activities of evil men, the unpatriotic manoeuvres of selfish and profligate Nigerians (public office holders and private businessmen alike) who have collaborated with foreign companies and entrepreneurs to frustrate what was otherwise a good programme. Then there is the explanation offered by class theorists - the third sub-school. They attribute the failure of indigenization to the same basic factors which undermine an escape from under-development. These are the character of the Nigerian ruling class (the indigenous bourgeoisie) and the nature of Nigeria's political economy, that is its neo-colonial character. According to this sub-school, the level of consciousness of the Nigerian bourgeoisie and the nature of their class interests makes them see economic transformation in trivial or superficial terms. To the Nigerian bourgeoisie indigenization was not conceptualized as a fundamental socio-economic transformation involving a relocation of the control over the Nigerian economy, or a liberation of the economy from foreign economic domination and the initiation of autocentric development. Rather, the Nigerian bourgeoisie saw indigenization as economic transformation in the trivial sense, that is, as involving "an increase of the participation in the ownership and control of the indigenous bourgeoisie".

Furthermore, according to the sub-school of class theorists, the character of the Nigerian political economy is such that while the indigenous bourgeoisie has legal-political power, the foreign firms have enormous economic power, that is power over capital and technological resources. In the struggle for ownership and control of the Nigerian economy, therefore, the balance of forces favours the latter. What has therefore happened is that the indigenous bourgeoisie has found itself powerless to carry out even the trivial and superficial economic transformation which the indigenization programme entails. In general then, it is the view of the class theorists that both the objective charac-

ter of the Nigerian bourgeoisie and the neo-colonial character of the Nigerian economy have rendered the implementation of indigenization under the auspice of the Nigerian bourgeoisie "quite impossible"¹.

A related factor, also touching on the character of the indigenous bourgeoisie, in the view of the class theorists, is the incoherence of the Nigerian capitalist class. Because of its tendency towards anarchy, the Nigerian capitalist class, has been unable to "exercise the collective (class) discipline which would have enabled it to get a greater share of ownership and control and a much greater share of the surplus in the longer run". Rather "particular capitalists went for immediate appropriation of surplus made available by foreign capital"; in the process, they defeated the purposes of indigenization².

Within one of the three schools of thought, a few writers have explored, albeit briefly, the impact of indigenization of intra-class relations in Nigeria: Among these writers, two distinct viewpoints have emerged. The first and the more common viewpoint, represented by Claude Ake, sees indigenization as part of the on-going intra-class struggle between the Nigerian bourgeoisie and foreign capitalists. According to this group of writers, indigenization represents an attempt by the Nigerian bourgeoisie to use its political power to reduce its marginalization in the Nigerian economy, or put differently, to improve its position in the economy *vis-à-vis* foreign capital. But, paradoxically, the effect of the failure of indigenization has been to authenticate and dramatize the dominance of foreign capital. The effect of the poorly implemented indigenization policies has been to reinforce the old division of labour between the Nigerian bourgeoisie (as specialists in maintaining the political conditions of accumulation) and foreign capital (as specialists in production). On the whole, indigenization has resulted in "an accommodation" that reflects or represents "acceptance of the division of labour" which existed before indigenization³.

Clearly, this group of class theorists is concerned with the impact of indigenization on intra-class struggles, that is on secondary contradictions. And its verdict is that indigenization has blunted the edges of intra-class struggles: it has brought about an "accommodation", a kind of peaceful coexistence between foreign capital and indigenous capital. Since before indigenization, foreign capital was dominant, the failure of

1 "Indigenization: problems of transformation in neo-colonial economy", in Claude Ake, ed. Political Economy of Nigeria. (London and Lagos: Longman, 1985), p. 197.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p. 196.

indigenization has meant a legitimation of the dominance of foreign capital over indigenous capital, of foreign capitalists over the Nigerian bourgeoisie.

The other group of class theorists agrees that the "policy of indigenization is an attempt to regulate competition between international firms and the rising Nigerian bourgeoisie". But it maintains that it has produced a more complex effect than the first group of writers seems to think. True, it has enhanced the national credentials of foreign companies, and by so doing, legitimated and strengthened foreign capital. However, simultaneously, it has contributed to the consolidation of the Nigerian ruling class. It has done so in two ways: first by propagating the national authenticity of the Nigerian state, in other words, by proclaiming the legitimacy of the political dominance of the domestic ruling class; and second, by encouraging closer partnership between Nigerian and foreign capital. On the whole, at the level of secondary contradictions, indigenization has served to strengthen the domestic social and political basis of international capital accumulation. It has helped to "domesticate" imperialist social relations, producing a new phase of imperialist domination, that is imperialist domination from within. Consequently, the scope for attacking capital on an anti-foreign platform has been considerably reduced. And the class character of the Nigerian state has changed. It is no longer a comprador state; it is now a state of "internationally subordinated state monopoly capitalism"¹.

According to this second view, indigenization has also had an impact on class struggles at the level of primary contradictions. By "Nigerianizing" foreign capital and domesticating imperialism, indigenization has also helped to weaken the links between anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist agitations in the working class. Moreover, it has, in addition, "diverted petty-bourgeois aspirations from potentially threatening link-ups with anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist social forces". In short, indigenization has, in the view of this school, had the effect of stemming the tide of revolutionary pressures in Nigeria. It has muffled inter-class as well as intra-class struggles.

Unlike the first group of class theorists, represented by Ake, the second group, represented by Beckman, does not base its conclusions on any detailed study of the impact of indigenization policies on class struggles and the character of the state. But the questions it raises are important and require further investigation.

1 Bjorn Beckman, "Whose State? State and Capitalist Development in Nigeria". *Review of African Political Economy* No.22 (1981), p.54.

The central aim of this paper, therefore, is to examine the impact of the indigenization policies on class formation and class struggles in Nigeria. The critical questions that will be addressed in the paper are: How have indigenization policies furthered or hindered the process of class formation in Nigeria? What have been the effects of indigenization policies on the dynamics of class struggles in Nigeria - have they resulted in a consolidation of the dominance of a pre-indigenization fraction of the ruling class; have they assisted or inhibited the intensification of revolutionary pressures on the ruling class by the dominated classes?

These questions require to be asked and answered at this stage in Nigerian political history for several reasons. First, there is the timeliness of the topic itself. The government is at the verge of inaugurating a new set of policies which will amount to a reversal of the indigenization policies. As President Ibrahim B. Babangida revealed in a recent interview, the Nigerian government will soon set up an institution similar to the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board (N.E.P.B.). Its task will be to go "into the whole subject with respect to the commercialization and privatization of government parastatals" And "once their job is completed, government will look at it and give final approval" *West Africa*. 28.9.87, p.1899.. It would seem that the main rationale for the review and reversal of indigenization is the view that the indigenization decrees have "helped stifle the flow of much needed foreign investment" in Nigeria¹. It will be interesting to examine this assertion in the context of both the initial objectives of the indigenization decrees and the impact of indigenization on the pattern of dominance in the Nigerian political economy.

Secondly, and more importantly, there is a need to explore the issue of indigenization from the perspective of politics. There is a need to know what indigenization has meant for the structure and dynamics of the struggle for state power in Nigeria. Such a survey is useful from both an academic and practical political point of view. The question is: should further indigenization be encouraged; should a reversal of indigenization be supported?

Indigenization Policies in Historical Perspective

To appreciate the significance of the policy contents, and the spirit of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees, it is necessary to trace the evolution of indigenization policies in Nigeria. The origins of what could broadly be called indigenization policies in Nigeria predate Nigeria's independence. Indeed, they could be seen as co-terminous with the beginnings of the struggle for Nigeria's political independence.

1 Newswatch (Lagos). 5.10.87, 41.

(a) The Colonial Situation

The control of state power in Nigeria by the British enabled them to centralise Nigeria's economic surplus in the hands of the British bourgeoisie. By the use of the colonial state apparatus, the British bourgeoisie in Nigeria established monopoly over financial and commercial activities; profits from these economic activities were also monopolized by British enterprises operating in Nigeria. Such surpluses or profits were systematically "transferred to Britain for capitalist accumulation there and de-capitalization of Nigeria".

Commercial banking, for instance, was monopolized by two British Banks. These were the Bank of British West Africa (B.B.W.A., now called the First Bank) and Barclays Bank, Dominion, Colonial and overseas (Barclays Bank, D.C.O., now known as the Union Bank). These banks, especially B.B.W.A., had as their directors and shareholders, leading politicians in the British Government and the Colonial Administration in Nigeria. They were highly favoured by the colonial administration. In particular, the B.B.W.A. was made the sole agent of the West African Currency Board and the sole depository of the funds of the Nigerian colonial administration and governmental agencies¹.

The oligopolistic position occupied by foreign banks in the Nigerian economy is shown by the fact that, on the eve of Nigeria's independence, they accounted for over 70% of total time and savings deposits in Nigeria. More important, they gave the bulk of their loans and advances to expatriates generally and foreign commercial firms in particular. They even discriminated against Nigerian businessmen by requiring greater collateral security from them².

Also, European commercial firms enjoyed oligopolistic position in the colonial economy of Nigeria. In 1949, for instance, six European commercial firms, grouped under the umbrella of the Association of West African Merchants (AWAM) handled about 66% of Nigeria's imports and nearly 70% of her exports. Of the six, the most influential and conspicuous was the United Africa Company (U.A.C.). It handled, in 1949, 34% of commercial imports into Nigeria and purchased,

1 Richard L. Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation*. (New York: NOK Publishers International/Princeton University Press - Paperback, 1983), p. 185.

2 Bade Onimode, "Imperialism and Nigerian Development", in Okwudiba Nnoli, ed., *Path to Nigerian Development*. (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1981), p.83.

on behalf of the Nigerian Marketing Boards, 43% of all Nigerian non-mineral exports. The other firms were: John Holt and Co. Ltd., Pater-son Zochonis and Co. Ltd. - like U.A.C., British Companies, two French firms - Compagnie Française de l'Afrique Occidentale (C.F.A.O.) and Société Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain (S.C.O.A.); and a Swiss firm - the Union Trading Company Ltd. (U.T.C.)¹.

The oligopolistic position of these firms was created and sustained by both the British colonial administration in Nigeria and the foreign banks. The latter saw their mission in Nigeria as "primarily to render services in connection with international trade" and therefore established relations "chiefly with the European trading companies maintaining very limited business contacts with Africans". For its part, the British colonial administration in Nigeria "dealt mostly with a few large firms in the allocation of trading licences, the administration of trade, and the formulation of tax policies" Coleman (1958), op. cit., p.81..

One result of this oligopoly was that Nigerian peasants were badly exploited. The Nigerian export commodity producers were paid low prices for their products. They and the Nigerian workers were charged high prices for the imported manufactured commodities. The profits made in the process by the marketing boards, for instance, were staggering. In 1946, for example, the profits ranged from 168.7 per cent to 633 per cent. (Palm oil was bought from the farmers at 33.5 Naira per ton and sold for 90 Naira; groundnuts were bought at 30 Naira and sold at 220 Naira per ton). It must be noted that the Marketing Boards acted as agents of the British colonial State; its members were appointed by the British Governors³.

As would be expected, this situation was unacceptable to Nigerian nationalists. Consequently, a number of organizations sprang up and began to make demands which amounted to a call for indigenization. They demanded a whittling down of the monopolistic position occupied by foreigners in the Nigerian economy. They called for an end to discrimination against Nigerian businessmen by European banks in the extension of credits. They demanded special assistance to indigenous traders and businessmen by the colonial administration in Nigeria. They called for an end to discrimination in the exploitation of minerals. They demanded an end to the low prices paid to export commodity

1 James Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), pp.82-83.

2 Sklar (1983), op. cit., p.175.

3 Eme Ekekwe, Class and State in Nigeria. (Harlow, Essex/Lagos: Longman Nigeria Ltd., 1986), pp.42-43.

producers and excessively high prices charged consumers by European and Asian middlemen on imported goods. They demanded the elevation of indigenous public servants to senior posts and executive position in the civil service. Some of the organizations, for instance, the labour unions, even demanded the nationalization of all natural resources and public utilities.

The British Colonial administration in Nigeria made only half-hearted efforts to meet these demands. For instance, it established the Nigeria Local Development Board (N.L.D.B.). Its function was to extend loans and grants to the government and government-controlled bodies as well as to private businessmen. The declared aim was to further the development of Nigerian business activities. The N.L.D.B. was later succeeded by the Colonial Development Board (C.D.B.). It was established to aid government and private economic activities. The C.D.B. was later replaced by the Federal Loans Board. The impact of these agencies, in terms of extending loans to indigenous enterprises was insignificant. Altogether the N.L.D.B. and C.D.B. extended loans amounting to 216,550 Naira to 31 enterprises in Nigeria during their existence. And the F.L.B. issued loans worth 387,880 to 30 indigenous businessmen.

Prominent among the economic activities which were financed with the loans were: saw milling, printing, tailoring, banking, hotel-keeping, and catering, wooden furniture and cabinet making. These petty economic enterprises were the only ones in which the Nigerian (indigenous) business class could engage. Foreign firms had superior access to technology, managerial skills and credit facilities. It was therefore easy for them to dominate investment opportunities in the capital-intensive and heavy goods industrial sector¹. More important, the colonial administration in Nigeria was not really genuinely keen on assisting Nigerian entrepreneurs.

It was the Nigerian nationalists themselves who initiated the moves that provided the catalyst for the indigenization process. One of the earliest moves was the establishment of indigenous banks to liberalize credit to African businessmen. One of the first banks to be established was the National Bank of Nigeria. It was established in 1933 by three Nigerian businessmen who later became leading members of the Action Group (A.G.). The men were Dr. T. Adebayo Dohety, Dr. Akinola Maja and Mr. M.A. Subair. The National Bank maintained a close relationship with the Action Group when it was formed and,

1 Ojoh Kris - Abba Obodoum, "Accumulation and Foreign Policy: A Case Study of Nigerian Foreign Policy, 1970-1983". (M. Sc. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria: April 1987) pp. 79-83.

later, with the Western regional government run by the Action Group. In addition to the National Bank, two smaller banking institutions were supported by the Action Group - controlled Western regional government. These were: the Agbo Magbe Bank Ltd., owned by a Lagos business man and leading member of the Action Group, and the Merchant Bank controlled by three businessmen who were closely associated with the Action Group¹.

The Action Group and its government, the Western Regional Government, had a policy of giving "financial assistance to indigenous banks so that they may be better able to provide credit facilities to Nigerian businessmen". In accordance with this policy, in 1952, the Western Regional Production Development Board and the Cocoa Marketing Board made deposits in the National Bank of Nigeria, of funds totalling 4 million Naira. In turn, the National Bank initiated a large-scale programme of loan to indigenous businessmen. In 1955, the Western Regional Government deposited 45% of its funds in the National Bank, thus ending the Bank of British West Africa's monopoly over government banking business in Western Nigeria. In the same year, the Western Regional Marketing Board invested 2 million Naira, in non-participating preference shares, in the National Bank. And in 1961, it converted its preference shares into equity shares. It also made an additional investment of 4 million Naira to save the National Bank from suspicion of insolvency. It then assumed total control of the Bank. On its part, the National Bank supported the Action Group by extending loans and credit facilities liberally to it and its members.

A similar relationship existed between the African Continental Bank (A.C.B.) and National Council of Nigeria and Carreroons (NCNC) which controlled the government of the Eastern Region. The A.C.B. had been founded in 1944 by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. Its establishment was motivated by the desire "to teach alien banks to respect African business on its own right"². It was further strengthened in 1951. This was also the year in which Dr. Azikiwe incorporated the policy of nationalizing all banks in Nigeria on independence in the N.C.N.C.'s party manifesto. In 1955, the A.C.B. ran into financial problems, and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe Premier of Eastern Nigeria, in collaboration with some of the Ministers in the Eastern Nigerian government and other leaders of the N.C.N.C., took steps to save the A.C.B. from collapse.

1 Sklar, *op. cit.*, p.177.

2 Ibid.

They established an Eastern Finance Corporation, and through it, the Regional Government bought 87.7% of shares in the A.C.B. This involved a transfer of 2 million Naira from the Eastern Regional Marketing Board to the Bank. A clause in the agreement between the A.C.B. and the Eastern Finance Corporation required the Corporation to "persuade its beneficiaries and customers to use the Bank as one of the main depositories of its funds"¹. The effect of the agreement was to break, in the Eastern Region, the monopoly enjoyed by the two British Banks, Barclays and B.N.W.A. The move was also specifically designed to assist Nigerian businessmen in their enterprises. As the Chairman of the Eastern Regional Marketing Board, Sir Louis Ojukwu explained, the Nigerian nationalists believed that an indigenous bank would be in a better position than a foreign bank, to appreciate the needs of indigenous businessmen.

Like the other regional governments, the Northern Regional Government, controlled by the Northern People's Congress (N.D.C.) found it necessary to establish a Bank. This was the Bank of the North set up in January 1960. Its initial, nominal share capital of 500,000 Naira was contributed by the Northern Regional Production Development Board, the Northern Regional Marketing Board (both, agents of the Northern Regional Government), and indigenous businessmen. The Bank of the North, however, had a foreign partner. This was the Intra - Bank of Lebanon which later collapsed. It was only after the indigenization decrees of the 1970s that the Bank became fully Nigerianized.

According to its founders, the Bank of the North was established primarily to quicken the pace of industrialization in Northern Nigeria. It had a policy of extending the bulk of its credits to Northern businessmen. This was a continuation of an earlier policy, pursued by the Northern Regional Government of extending loans mainly to Northerners. The hope was that the policy would result in the creation of a core of industrial and commercial capitalist class in Northern Nigeria. In October 1959 alone, the Government of Northern Regional approved loans totalling 1.1 million Naira to indigenous (i.e. Northern) businessmen and traders. The Lebanese and Syrian businessmen who, hitherto, had dominated the economic life of the North began to complain that the Northern Regional Government was trying to destroy them².

1 Ibid.

2 John Paden, Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto - Values and Leadership in Nigeria. (Zaria: Hadahuda Publishing Company, 1986), pp.265-266.

Another area that attracted the attention of Nigerian nationalists in this colonial area was the indigenization of roles or personnel. An Inquiry into the Nigerianization of the Civil Service, conducted by Simeon Adebo and Sidney Phillipson in 1954 had revealed overwhelming foreign domination of the roles in Nigeria's Civil Service. Out of a total of 559 "Senior Service" posts, 522 (or 93.4%) were occupied by expatriates. Only 37 (or 6.6%) were occupied by non-expatriates¹. At the Federal level, little was done to change the situation. Thus, by 1959, when a Committee of the Nigerian House of Representatives on Nigerianization published the report of an inquiry conducted in 1958, the situation had not shown any significant improvement. The Committee found, for instance, that of the 73 "super-scale" posts in the Federal Administrative Service, expatriates occupied 58 (i.e. 79.5%); only 8 Nigerians (i.e. 11%) were to be found in that category².

It was the Regional Governments that acted first to Nigerianize their civil service personnel. The Eastern Regional Government, for instance, "used all the available indigenous personnel to fill up most of the vacant senior administrative positions in its service". Expatriate heads of departments were replaced with Nigerian personnel whenever they were available. Similarly, the Western Regional Government insisted that non-Nigerians would not be appointed to vacant position by promotion if a suitable Nigerian was available. Moreover, it reserved certain key or strategic positions to Nigerians only; all posts in the recruitment branch of the Public Service Commission; all those in the office of the Commissioner of Western Nigeria in London; Secretary to the Western Cabinet and his staff; permanent Secretaries; all heads of professional divisions; the heads of the civil service, etc.³.

In the Northern Region, however, the position was slightly different. The policy followed was to "Northernise the Northern Region Public Service as soon as possible". In employing new personnel into the Northern Public Service, the policy was to give preference to persons of Northern origin. Where no suitable Northerners were available, the expatriates were appointed. It was only if expatriates could not be found that "local expatriates", that is non-Northern Nigerians, could be

1 Ekekwe (1986), op. cit., p. 46.

2 David Williams, President and Power in Nigeria: The Life of Shehu Shagari: (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1982), p. 59.

3 H. N. Nwosu, Political Authority and the Nigerian Civil Service (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1977), pp.51-52.

engaged on a one - year contract basis¹. This policy was adopted primarily to prevent the more educated Southern Nigerians from filling up, permanently, the top posts in the Northern Civil Service - to ensure that the educated Northerner of the future would have employment opportunities in the region. Hence the preference for foreigners over "local expatriates", for the former were engaged on short-term contract terms and could be dispensed with more easily. Ironically, the Northern Regional policy of indigenization of the personnel of the civil service had the opposite effect. Thus, in 1964 - four years after independence, - out of a total of 11,310 persons of non-Northern origin holding senior posts in the seven Ministries in Northern Nigerian Civil Service, 11,112 (or 98.2 per cent) were expatriates (i.e. non-Nigerians), only 198 (or 1.8 per cent) were Nigerians of non-Northern Origin².

From the above account, a number of facts emerge about the extent and character of indigenization in the colonial period. First, it is clear that the monopoly of foreign firms over financial activities and in particular, the extension of credit facilities in Nigerian was only slightly dented. Indigenous Banks and insurance companies were established to compete with expatriate ones. By 1958, there were six operating banking companies in Nigeria, four of which were indigenous banks. But, in the same year, a policy of encouraging the expansion of foreign participation in banking business was adopted by the Federal Government. The result was that, of the additional eleven banks which came into existence, between 1958 and 1962, six were expatriate, three were of mixed (Nigerian and foreign) ownership and only two were Nigerian owned. More important, although the indigenous banks did their best to extend credits to Nigerian businessmen, they could not expand credit facilities beyond the very restrictive limits imposed by the Federal Monetary and fiscal authorities.

Second, it is evident that in the colonial period, foreign monopoly over commercial activities in Nigeria was hardly dented. There was, in aggregate terms, increased participation of Nigerians in the commercial life of the country. But this was not the result of the policy of indigenization by the Nigerian governments. Rather, it was the direct outcome of the evolving strategies of domination by the foreign commercial firms, themselves reacting to the changing needs of international capital.

1 Paden (1986), *op.cit.*, pp.252-255.

2 Northern Nigeria House of Assembly Debates. The Daily Hansard. 12.3.64, pp.398-399.

The foreign commercial firms in Nigeria evolved a classic response to the anticipated rash of demands for, or growing tendency towards indigenization, by the regional governments and Nigerian nationalists. It was to transform themselves from general trading companies handling the full range of merchandise imports and exports into smaller, semi-autonomous specialized marketing and manufacturing units. Thus, instead of selling fully-assembled lorries and bicycles, for instance, they established subsidiaries assembling vehicles and cycles. Instead of importing and selling beer, they set up breweries in Nigeria, etc. Besides, the foreign commercial firms pandered to the perceived ambition of Nigerians to become "owners" of business by entering into business partnerships with many politically influential Nigerians. By giving them token or minor shares of capital and profits in the foreign companies, the foreign firms received the active support and protection of these Nigerians¹. These strategies helped to give political security to the foreign firms and even encouraged few foreign "manufacturing" companies to invest in the Nigerian economy. At the same time, they facilitated the growth of the Nigerian commercial capitalist class.

As noted earlier, this flexibility on the part of the foreign commercial firms was as much a response to anticipated nationalist demands for indigenization in Nigeria as to the changing needs of global capitalism. As Bangura has noted, as global capitalism moved from its restrictive regionalist character to multilateral system of production, commerce and finance under U.S. hegemony, there arose the need for foreign firms in colonial territories to be more flexible in their strategies in order to survive in the teeth of fierce competition².

The third point that emerges is that foreign control over the industrial sector of the Nigerian economy remained intact, at independence, despite the efforts of the Regional and Federal Governments. Indeed, as late as 1966, the proportion of foreign private ownership of industries in Nigeria remained quite high. It ranged from 41 percent (for paper products), through well over 60 per cent (for footwear, textile manufacturing and beer brewing) to over 90 per cent (for paints

1 Bertram Ugochukwu Uba, "The Political Economy of the Nigerian Oil Palm Industry: A Case Study of Eastern Nigeria". (Ph.D. Dissertation: Queen's University, Kingston, Canada, June 1981), pp.191-193.

2 Yusuf Bangura, Kauf Mustapha and Saidu Adamu. "The Deepening Economy Crisis and its Political Implications", in Siddique Mohammed and Tony Edoh eds. *Nigeria: A Republic in Ruins*. (Zaria Department of Political Science, 1986), p.175.

manufacture, miscellaneous chemical products, and vehicle and bicycle assembly plants¹).

Foreign monopoly over the economy continued because of the peculiarities of the indigenization policies. One of the peculiarities of indigenization policies in the colonial period was that they served as a means, not for wresting control of the economy from foreigners, but primarily for the consolidation of control over aspects of state power by the indigenous petty bourgeoisie and feudal oligarchy. The process of indigenization was essentially a process of extraction of surplus from the working class and peasants to finance the political parties and further the process of primitive capital accumulation through the manipulation of state power. Thus, all the regional Banks served as the financial allies of the regionally based parties: National Bank with the Action Group, A.C.B. with the N.C.N.C., and Bank of the North with the Northern People's Congress. It is significant that most of the indigenous businessmen who got the bulk of the loans were leading members of the regionally based political parties. In turn, they acted as the main financiers of the political parties.

Another peculiarity of the indigenization process in the colonial period, is that the emphasis was on the public sector; the Nigerianization of the administrative personnel for instance, was limited to the public sector. This is a further evidence that the motive was political, not economic; the objective was to secure and consolidate state power, rather than to wrest control over the economy from the foreign private monopolies.

The fourth point to note is that one of the effects of the weak efforts at indigenization in the colonial era was to expand the size of the petty - bourgeois class and to create a tiny class of dependent commercial capitalist class - the comprador bourgeoisie. Mainly as a result of the change of strategy by the foreign commercial firms and partly due to the indigenization policies, indigenous entrepreneurs became compradors i.e. intermediaries between expatriate and indigenous polity and economy) and/or turned to the state as a source of capital². On independence, in spite of the efforts at indigenization, the Nigerian political economy was controlled by the metropolitan bourgeoisie and its Nigerian adversary and ally, the Nigerian petty-bourgeoisie plus a tiny group of comprador bourgeoisie.

1 Obodomu (1987), *op. cit.*, p.84.

2 Mark Anikpo, "Nigeria's, evolving Class Structure", in Ake (1985), *op. cit.*, p.46.

(b) The Post-colonial development

The seeds of the indigenization policies of the 1970s were sown in the 1960s. One of the earliest steps towards indigenization was the inauguration of the *Company Act of 1961*. The Act, for the first time, formally made a distinction between two types of companies in Nigeria: a Nigerian company and a non - Nigerian company. A Nigerian company was defined as one whose control and management activities were exercised and carried out in Nigeria. All other companies were categorized as non-Nigerian.

The next important step was the legislation of *the Immigration Act of 1963*. This Act, which is essentially still in force, prescribed the quota of expatriates (as a proportion of total personnel) that could be employed by foreign entrepreneurs. More importantly, it stipulated that no foreigner might, either on his own account or in partnership with any person, including a Nigerian citizen, practice a "profession" without the prior written approval of the Minister of Internal Affairs. Such approval should be obtained before the entrepreneur himself could enter the country. And the word "profession" was understood to mean any kind of business in Nigeria. Before the Act came into force, the Federal Government, in its desire to attract foreign investors freely approved the employment of foreigners in all capacities. What happened then was that foreign companies felt free to employ those who, they claimed, could make quick profits for them. In practice, this resulted in discrimination against Nigerians who, though they might be qualified for the job, were not believed to be suitable for high managerial positions in profit - oriented enterprises¹.

Two other measures, taken by Gowon's military regime moved Nigeria further towards an explicit policy of indigenization. The military administration promulgated the *Companies Decree of 1968* and the *Petroleum Decree of 1969*. The Companies decree essentially compelled all alien enterprises to register as Nigerian entities. The purpose was to bring the local subsidiaries of multinational corporations under effective Nigerian direction². The Petroleum Decree of 1969 stipulated, among other things, that within ten years, petroleum exploration companies must Nigerianize their most senior positions up to 75 per cent

- 1 J. O. Osakwe, "Foreign Private Investment in Nigeria", in Central Bank of Nigeria, *Economic and Financial Review*. December 1981), p. 13.
- 2 Inyang Eteng, "Indigenization for Lumpen - Bourgeois Development in Nigeria", in Nnoli (1981), *op. cit.*, p. 219.

and 100 per cent for other cadres. It also reduced the length of concession periods given to oil exploration companies from 99 years to 20 years and set out clearly the period and stages for surrender of acreage granted under concessions¹

It was in 1969, too, at the National conference on Reconstruction and Development at Ibadan, that clear indications were given of the intention of the Federal Military Government to embark on an explicit and fairly comprehensive policy of indigenization and of what would be the nature of the policy. In a paper titled "Development Objectives", A. Akene Ayida, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Economic Development, explained why the Federal Military Government, or any "Nigerian government which has its objective and priorities right" would not embark on "large scale nationalization of the existing and prospective private enterprises". First, nationalization of foreign enterprises would involve the "*diversion*" of scarce foreign exchange resources to the payment of compensation, and in the absence of adequate number of skilled local management personnel, the payment of substantial management fees. Second, it would scare away foreign investors. He distinguished between "indiscriminate public ownership of enterprises based on ideological commitment" which he called nationalization and selective control by government "over a specific sector of the economy because of its strategic importance", coupled with bringing about, increased Nigerian participation in the ownership and management of the strategic, industrial and commercial enterprises in the private sector. He suggested that the latter policy, and not nationalization, should be adopted by the government. He maintained that "partial explanation" for the effectiveness and insignificance of Nigerian participation lay in the inadequate supply of indigenous capital, managerial talent and technical know-how". To remedy the situation, he proposed that "public policy" should aim at "releasing funds for further investment in industry" and "*promoting an indigenous capitalist class*"² (*emphasis added*).

The Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Industries, Philip Asiodu, in his paper titled "Planning for Further Development in Nigeria" also noted, like Ayida, that "in the industrial sector foreign enterprise (had) been dominant". But then, he argued that this was not "for want of local resources if the Government pursued a different

1 Cliff Edogun, "The Structure of State Capitalism in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry", in Ake (1985), *op. cit.*, p.92.

2 A. A. Ayida and H. M. Onitiri, eds. Reconstruction and Development in Nigeria: Proceedings of a National Conference. (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp.9-10.

policy". And the different policy he suggested was that Nigerians must "own more of the equity of the manufacturing firms and retain more of the profits". More specifically, he proposed that:

"Apart from the few industries to be reserved for public sector control (i.e. over 55 per cent) all large-scale plants should give at least 35 per cent equity to Nigerians - Individuals and indigenous institutions... (Also), small-scale enterprises should be reserved exclusively, for training Nigerians... should (and)... A fund for industrial training... should be created... The fund (financed by Government appropriations and mandatory contributions from all large-scale enterprises) could establish targets of progressive Nigerianization in existing and planned enterprises and ensure that enough Nigerians are trained in the industries themselves or elsewhere to fulfill the targets"¹.

Asiodu argued that such a policy was imperative because, politically, the situation would be untenable "if within the next decade... when industry will become much more important, the bulk of the investments are held by foreign and largely absentee owners". The foreign investors, he implied, would not feel secure in such a situation. Besides, he maintained, it was to the advantage of the foreign investor to adopt this alternative approach, *so as to "foreclose the debate on nationalization and guarantee his expectations"*² (emphasis added).

Thus by 1969, the outlines of the indigenization policy had become fairly clear. What is meant was increased Nigerian participation in the ownership and management of enterprises in the country as well as control by the government of strategic sectors of the economy. It was a policy designed essentially to "promote an indigenous capitalist class" in Nigeria, to forestall nationalization of foreign and indigenous private enterprises in future; and to provide a sense of security for foreign private investors.

The Indigenization Decrees 1972-1981

The Objectives

Essentially, the indigenization decrees represented a plan by the Nigerian government to ensure direct involvement and an increasing share by Nigerians in the fields of commerce, industry and finance. The central objective of indigenization was, as General Gowon put it, to

1 *Ibid.*, p. 195.

2 *Ibid.*, p.196.

secure for Nigerians greater participation in the economic life of the country. It was to create and expand opportunities for Nigerian businessmen and entrepreneurs to participate directly in the commercial, industrial and financial activities and growth of Nigeria. Such increased participation, it was hoped, would produce a number of benefits both to the indigenous businessmen or entrepreneurs and the Nigerian economy; First, it would maximize local retention of profits in Nigeria, thereby increasing the rate of capital accumulation in Nigeria and by Nigerians. The argument there was that one of the factors which tended to reduce the benefits of growing industrialization in Nigeria was the employment of a large number of foreign nationals who received considerable sums in the forms of salaries and allowances. It was to stem these "earnings leakages" that the indigenization policy embodied measures which would ensure not only that high level Nigerian personnel were employed by private industry, but also that they were given responsibilities commensurate with their training. The hope was that the Nigerian personnel would help to control the repatriation of dividend and interests and encourage their investment in Nigeria. Thus a major aim of indigenization was to facilitate the process of private capital accumulation by Nigerians, in other words, to create or expand the size of a class of indigenous capitalists.

The second benefit expected from increased involvement of Nigerians in the economic life of the country through indigenization was that it would encourage them to cultivate "sound economic commercial principles in their business practices and to replace erstwhile business methods by sound planning, hard-work and dedication"¹. The whole idea of dividing the enterprises into schedules I and II at first, and then three schedules later, of having foreigners continue to handle the large-scale, more complex enterprises, of encouraging continued partnership between the new indigenous entrepreneurs and the foreign ones (of urging the "European directors" to remain so that they could be understudied by indigenous directors "in the intricacies of management"² was to ensure that Nigeria and Nigerians reaped this benefit of cultivating sound capitalist philosophy and orientation.

As a commentator in *Radio Nigeria* at the time saw it, the idea was to have Nigerians first have a go at handling small-scale enterprises so that "the experience they gained... would be invaluable when moved into the area of large-scale business" This is perhaps one reason why,

1 *Africa Research Bulletin*. Sept. 15, Oct. 14, 1972, p. 24-94

2 J. E. Adetoro, "The Indigenization of Foreign Enterprises". *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 1, No.1 (July 1975), P.39.

the scope of the policy of indigenization as initially announced by General Gowon, was rather limited. In November, 1970 while making public the government's plan on indigenization, he stated that within the next four years, the government was to indigenize completely the domestic trade, especially at the whole sale level. Eventually when the first (1972) decree was published, this limited scope of indigenization policy became even more obvious.

The third anticipated benefit was in the socio-political realm. It was hoped that indigenization would provide insurance against two inter-related kinds of danger to the Nigerian state. One was the danger posed to the Nigerian state by "unhampered foreign ownership" and control of the economy. The Government's fear was that unlimited foreign ownership and control of economic and commercial enterprises in Nigeria would "eventually lead to a situation where the economy (was) completely dominated by foreigners and (the nation) can no longer afford to resist foreign pressures even in formulating domestic policy"¹. It was realized that such a situation would be unacceptable to Nigerian nationalists, especially the radical elements and would therefore become a source of political instability. Put, differently, it was the Federal Military Government's conviction that if Nigeria was to be truly independent, stable and externally influential, "Nigerians would have to take an active part in the exploitation and utilization of the country's resources and Nigerians should build up a considerable reserve of self-reliance"².

The other anticipated danger which, it was hoped, indigenization would avert, was the possibility of whole - sale nationalization of the Nigerian economy. Nationalization or "socialization" of the means of production distribution and exchange, as Chief Obafemi Awolowo, at the time Nigeria's Federal Commissioner for finance, called it, was seen as posing serious difficulties for the Nigerian nation. The country would need 1,000 million Naira in foreign exchange to compensate foreigners whose investments would be taken over in the event of "socialization". Furthermore, the home countries of the owners of the companies nationalized might retaliate against Nigeria in various ways³. To forestall such a possibility, the Government decided that "indigenization" should

1 Second National Development Plan (of the Federal Republic of Nigeria), 1970-74: First Progress Report, p. 35.

2 Ibid.

3 Africa Research Bulletin in march 15, April 14, 1970, p.1649.

be pursued, instead of "socialization" or "nationalization". In practical terms, this meant, as the *First Progress Report of the Second National Development Plan*, put it, "that while foreign businessmen should be encouraged to invest in certain areas, other areas where domestic entrepreneurship (was) available should be reserved for Nigerians"¹.

The Government's fear of the danger of "socialization" or "nationalization" or whole - sale public ownership and control which smacked of socialism was potent. It was clearly reflected in the attempt of the Federal Government to discourage state Governments from buying the shares being sold by foreign businessmen. Indeed the Federal Government described the "tendency of state governments to purchase assets disposed of by foreign businessmen" as an "abuse of the indigenization policy"². It warned them to desist from this violation reminding them that "no provision for such purchase (was) made in any state (development) plans and the state governments that (made such purchases were) merely distorting their expenditure programmes". Foreign assets, the Federal Government stressed, were meant to be purchased by domestic private investors; where the private sector in a state was not capable of acquiring the foreign assets being sold, the state government should propose changes in its development plans and present for approval³.

It should be reiterated that, in essence, the central objective of the indigenization decrees was the creation of an indigenous capitalist class. The crucial elements of the policy were: increased participation of Nigerians in the economic life of the country; increased capital accumulation by Nigerian businessmen and retention of such capital in the country; the acquisition by Nigerians of private entrepreneurial skills and orientation and capitalist philosophy.

Thus, in assessing the impact of the indigenization decrees, the focus should be on how it has affected the pattern of private capital accumulation in Nigeria. A corollary will be what effect it has had on class formation and class struggle. And a related point is the impact of indigenization policy on the struggle for state power. We shall return to these points later. Meanwhile, it is necessary to examine the contents of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees.

1 Second National Development Plan, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 36.

3 *Ibid.*

(b) *The Division of Labour in the Nigerian Public Enterprises Promotion Decrees.*

The Nigerian Public Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1972 tried to meet the hopes raised in 1970 when there was an official and public mention of the indigenization policy. It sought to bring about a significant increase in the participation of Nigerians in the economic activities and development of the country. Nevertheless, it left Nigerians, in the end, occupying minority positions in certain areas of the national economy as they had done from colonial rule to the 1960s.

By 1966, ownership of, or participation in, industrial enterprises by Nigerians ranged from 2.0 per cent to 59.0 per cent, in a few cases, 89 per cent. The higher proportions of the Nigerian ownership or participation was recorded in low technology, low capital industries such as paper production and printing (59 per cent); bakery products (39.5 per cent); textile manufactures (34.3 per cent); furniture and fixtures (32 per cent), beer brewing (31 per cent), etc. The enterprises that has exceptionally high Nigerian ownership or participation were saw milling and other wood products (88.9 per cent). Enterprises that demanded either substantial capital or sophisticated technology had lower Nigerian participation: metal products (4.1 per cent); motor vehicle repairs (2.3 per cent); miscellaneous chemical products (2.0 per cent); motor vehicle and bicycle assembly (0. per cent)¹.

Hope was raised in 1979 that Nigerian participation in these industries would increase with the introduction of an indigenization policy. When he gave details of the Second National Development Plan, Major - General Gowon announced that his Government would insist on "at least 55 per cent" ownership of, or participation in strategic industries such as iron and steel, petro-chemical and petroleum exploration and production. He also stated that other medium or large-scale industries, "such as plantations, food and forest industries or building materials" would be run as "mixed ventures" with Government and private Nigerian participation of at least 35 per cent².

Nigerian Public Enterprises Decrees 1972/1974

When, the Nigerian Public Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1972 was published, its provisions came close to Gowon's declarations. The decree grouped commercial and industrial enterprises in Nigeria into two, placing one group under Schedule I and the other under Schedule

1 E.O. Akeredoulu - Ale, Industrial Survey of Nigeria: Cited in Obodoum, op.cit, p.84.

2 Africa Research Bulletin (Economic, Financial and Technical Services) October 15 - Nov. 14, 1970, p.1854.

2. The enterprises under schedule 1 were described as "Enterprises exclusively reserved for Nigerians". However, this was not exactly, the case. It must be stressed that enterprises under schedule 1 were not reserved fully and exclusively for Nigerian citizens. The decree, through its interpretation of "Nigerian citizen or association", extended the right to participate in or own enterprises in schedule 1 to *persons of African descent* who, not being Nigerian citizens, "are nationals of any country in Africa" which is a member country of the O.A.U and who reside and carry on business in Nigeria. The only qualification was that the home country of such a person also permitted citizens of Nigeria to establish and operate businesses or enterprises in that country on the basis of reciprocity¹. It could therefore be said that the enterprises under schedule 1 were reserved exclusively for citizens of Nigeria and indigenes of those member states of the O.A.U whose countries extended similar rights to Nigerians.

The enterprises grouped under schedule 1, exclusively reserved for Nigerian citizens (as well as Africans), companies and associations, were twenty two in number. They included: Assembly of radios, television sets, tape recorders and other electric domestic appliances not combined with manufacture of components; blending and bottling of alcoholic drinks; blocks, bricks, and ordinary tiles manufacture for building and construction works; bread and cake making; candle manufacture, manufacture of jewellery and related articles; ordinary garment manufacture not combined with production of textile materials; rice milling, singlet manufacture and tyre retreading. Others were: advertising agencies and public relations business; radio and television broadcasting; newspaper publishing and printing; municipal bus services and taxis; haulage of good by road; retail trade (except by or within the departmental stores and supermarkets); clearing and forwarding agencies; laundry and dry-cleaning; cinemas and other places of entertainment; casinos and gaming centers; and all aspects of pool betting business and lotteries.

These enterprises in schedule 1 had three characteristics in common. First they included quite a number of enterprises which, in practice, were already monopolized by Nigerians and persons of African descent. The enterprises in this category were retail trade, laundry and dry-cleaning; municipal bus services and taxis; bread and cake making; singlet manufacture; and ordinary garment manufacture not combined with production of textile materials. In this area, the decree merely recognized and gave legal cloak to the prevailing division of labour. Second, the enterprises under schedule 1 had prominent among them

1 Section 16, Subsection (b) of the Decree.

enterprises engaged in by Lebanese, and Asians of varying nationality. The Lebanese, for instance, virtually dominated such enterprises as transport; clearing and forwarding agencies, warehousing and other ports services; cinemas; casinos and gaming centers; night clubs and restaurants. At the time the Indigenization decree was promulgated, there were about 20,000 Lebanese engaged in these and other enterprises in Nigeria. The responses of the Lebanese to the decree were to take up Nigerian citizenship and enter into partnership with Nigerians (i.e. secure Nigerian fronts) while remaining in such enterprises as managers on the pretext that there were not enough experienced Nigerians qualified to manage such enterprises. It is said that about 60 per cent of the Lebanese adopted such strategies of beating the indigenization decrees. Only 40 per cent of them mostly the older ones sold their businesses outright and returned to Lebanon¹.

The third common property of the enterprises under schedule one is that they are commercial or industrial enterprises requiring low capital, little entrepreneurial skill and intermediate or low technology. It was, indeed, for this reason that they were reserved exclusively for Nigerians and persons of African nationality. The enterprises that required high capital, great entrepreneurial skill and sophisticated technology were placed under schedule 2. It is true that some enterprises in schedule 2 were also reserved exclusively for Nigerians and persons of African origin residing in Nigeria. But placed in such category were only those enterprises the paid-up share capital of which did not exceed 400,000 Naira or where the turnover did not exceed 1,000,000 Naira, whichever the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree considered appropriate and applicable in relation to such enterprise².

Where the paid-up share capital exceeded 400,000 Naira or the turnover was above 1,000,000 Naira, whichever was considered appropriate and applicable, it was required that equity participation of Nigerian citizens or associations in the enterprises must not be less than 40 per cent. Thus for enterprises under schedule 2, aliens were excluded from owning, wholly or in part, those with paid-up share capital of 0.4 million Naira and less or with turnover of 1 million Naira and less. And they were compelled to sell at least 40 percent of the shares in such enterprises, of higher value, to Nigerian citizens or associations. The enterprises under schedule 2 were 33 in number. They included some of the most important industrial enterprises in the country, such as:

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- 1 Embassy of Lebanon, "Lebanese and the Nigerian Economy: A Historical Cooperation". *NIGERIAN FORUM* March - April 1984, pp.76-78.
 - 2 Section 5, sub-section 1(b) of the Decree.

beer brewing, bicycles; manufacture of cement; manufacture of soap and detergents; cosmetics and perfumery manufacture, and construction industries. But it also included such relatively minor enterprises as: furniture; passenger bus services (inter-state); department stores and supermarkets as well as slaughtering, storage, distribution and processing of meat.

An amendment to the original decree was made in 1974. It transferred "haulage by road of petroleum products" as well as "clearing and forwarding agencies" to schedule 2¹. This meant that aliens could participate in them and own up to 60 per cent of the shares where the paid-up capital exceeded 0.4 million Naira or the turn-over was above 1 million Naira. This amendment drew protests from Nigerian businessmen. But the government justified the amendments on the ground that Nigerian businessmen might not be able to cope with these enterprises on their own. It feared that if they were left exclusively in the hands of Nigerians, ports might become congested, pilfering in ports heightened, and the shortage of petroleum products in some parts of the country might become greater².

Clearly then, the pattern of division of labour embodied in the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees (1972-74) left the Nigerian businessmen in the periphery of the economy. Foreign capitalists were left in control of the key sectors of the economy. And in mixed enterprises, Nigerians were made junior partners. In particular, the manufacturing sector of the economy seems to have been deliberately left mainly in the hands of foreign nationals and companies; so were other large-scale enterprises. Apparently, the idea was to make Nigerian businessmen first have a go at handling small-scale enterprises so that "the experience they gained... would be invaluable when they moved into the area of large-scale business"³. Whatever the explanation, such an arrangement could not have facilitated either the building up of an indigenous capitalist class or the private accumulation of capital in Nigeria at any appreciable rate.

1 Decree No 7 of 1974: "Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (Amendment) Decree 1974"; and Decree No 13 of 1974: "Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (Amendment) No. 2), Decree, 1974"

2 Africa Research Bulletin (E.F. AND T.) March 15 - April 14, 1974, p. 3073".

3 Ibid, Feb 15 - March 14, 1972, p. 2303.

The impact of the 1972 indigenization decree was further vitiated by the several qualifications made to its provisions and numerous exemptions granted before it came into force. By the time the decree came into effect in March 1974, fifteen foreign-owned companies, mostly British, had been granted exemptions. The most prominent of these companies was the U.A.C. which was granted extension of time, on the ground that there were "legal hitches" that needed to be smoothed out¹. Given the dominant position of the UAC in the industrial and commercial sectors of the Nigerian economy in the 1960s, which continued in the 1970s, to have granted it an extension of time was tantamount to postponing the coming into effect of the entire Public Enterprises Promotions Policy. To illustrate, between 1960 and 1965, U.A.C.'s equity shares in the industrial investments in Nigeria were substantial. It had 100 per cent equity share in each of the following: West African Cold Storage, producing meat products with a fixed capital of 500,000 Naira; A.J. Seward, manufactures of Perfumery and cosmetics, with capital of 400,000 Naira, and Bordpak, makers of fibre board cartons with fixed capital of 1,600,000 Naira. It had 80 per cent share in Kwara Tobacco Company, manufacturers of cigarettes, with 1 million Naira capital; 68 per cent share in Textile Printers, manufacturers of printed textiles, with capital of 5,500,00 Naira; and 33 per cent share in Guinness, brewers of stout with 4,000,000 Naira capital².

Some enterprises were even given total exemption from the decree. Such companies were Monotype Corporation, I.B.M., Avery Weighing Scale, and National Cash Register. Then there were some qualifications to or modifications in the Decree indicated by the Commissioner for Industries, Dr. J.E. Adetoro before the decree came into effect. For instance, the government allowed the new owners of an indigenized enterprise to employ the former proprietor for sometime "where this was found absolutely necessary"³.

Nevertheless, the Federal Government took several steps to effect the implementation of the decree. The decree itself established the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board with the power to advance the promotion of Nigerian enterprises. It also established Enterprises Promotion Committees in each state of the Federation with powers to assist and advise the Board on the implementation of the Decree and to ensure that the provisions of the Decree were complied with by foreign-

1 *Ibid.*, March 15 - April 14, 1974, p. 3073.

2 UBA (1981), *op. cit.*, p. 192.

3 Adetoro, *op. Cit.*, p.37.

ers resident in every state. It prescribed punishment (of a fine or imprisonment or both) for the contravention of any of the provisions of the Decree. And the Board was given power - too, to dispose of any enterprise where there had been a contravention and might distribute the proceeds in the manner provided by the Decree.

To provide the financial base for the implementation of the indigenization policy, the Nigerian civilian and military governments introduced a number of other measures. Earlier, in 1964, the civilian government had established an Industrial Development Bank. Now it (i.e. the military government) made additional fund available to the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank. In 1973, the government established the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry with an authorized capital of 50 million Naira. Its tasks were to grant medium and long-term loans to indigenous persons and institutions especially in furtherance of the provisions of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree; to underwrite the shares of viable companies which were offered for sale to the general public to acquire such shares that were not taken up by the general public and sell to the public, as appropriate, when the demand for them arose in future. It was also to assist indigenous entrepreneurs in other important areas such as identifying viable projects, preparing well-articulated feasibility surveys and providing guidance on the appropriate means of achieving reasonable returns on their investments, including advice on relevant technical and managerial matters¹. The Federal Government acquired 40 per cent shares in the three major foreign banks operating in Nigeria: Barclays Bank, United Bank for Africa and the Standard Bank of Nigeria, formerly B.B.W.A. A number of state banks were also established. Also the Federal Government established an Industrial Training Fund contributed to by private companies to support the training of the appropriate level of manpower in order to meet the manpower requirements under the indigenization programme².

Fifteen months after the coming into effect of the indigenization decrees of 1972/74, only a small proportion of the foreign enterprises had complied with the provisions of the decree. The Industrial Enterprises Panel appointed by the Federal Military Government in 1975 found that out of about 950 affected enterprises only 314 or 33 per cent were confirmed as having fully complied by 30th June 1975³.

1 n policy, the Nigerian civilian and m

2 Adetoro. op. cit, p. 34.

3 Nigeria Today, No. 69 (June 1976), p. 5

In spite of this very poor performance, Gowon's Government seemed satisfied with the rate of implementation of the policy. When presenting the third National Development Plan in March 1975, General Gowon said that "the plan period should be regarded as a period of consolidation so that the changes in the equity structure brought about by the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree can be reflected, not only in the board room but also in the top management and policy positions in industry". He claimed that his Government had "done a great deal already in recent years to free the Nigerian businessman from many of the difficulties which were put in his way by better organized foreign rivals"¹. He asserted that "not only has the implementation been successful but it has also revealed the investing capabilities and attitude of Nigerians". He even proposed to liberalize the expatriate quota allocation system, stressing that the intention of government was "to consolidate and not to advance compulsory ownership indigenization in this plan period"².

However, when Gowon's administration was toppled and replaced by a new military leadership, the implementation of the policy was adjudged a failure. Describing the slow rate of compliance with the provisions of the indigenization decrees by foreign companies as "shocking", the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime stated that it had decided that "all defaulting enterprises (were) to be sealed up and taken over with immediate effect and appropriate arrangements made to dispose of them speedily". It listed the main devices used to circumvent the decree, including "fronting, applications for naturalization and exemptions on flimsy grounds", and pledged to "confiscate" enterprises found to be using such devices and to punish the "misguided Nigerians" and foreigners involved³. It also promised to embark on a "mopping up operation" to ensure that the first phase of the indigenization policy was successfully concluded by 31 March 1977. Thereafter, it would embark on the second phase of the indigenization effort, based on the recommendations of the Industrial Enterprises Panel. One of the major differences between phase 1 and phase II of the indigenization effort, according to the Mohammed/Obasanjo administration, was that phase II would "ensure a wider and more equitable spread of enterprises ownership"⁴.

1 *Ibid.*, No. 56 (April 1975), p. 15.

2 *Ibid.*, No. 61 (October 1975), pp. 12-13.

3 *Ibid.*, No. 69 (June 1976), p. 5.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 6.

The Indigenization Decree of 1977

The Nigerian Public Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1977 introduced several important changes in the division of labour between the indigenous and foreign capitalists. First, indigenous capitalists were admitted into more important sectors of the Nigerian economy. They were allowed increased participation in, and majority ownership of such enterprises as: banking, beer brewing, base iron and steel manufacture, boat building, construction industry, manufacture of cement, manufacture of cosmetics and perfumery; manufacture of food products; manufacture of paints, varnishes or other similar articles; manufacture of tyres and tubes; mining and quarrying; petro-chemical feed stock industries; wholesale distribution of imported goods, etc. The decree grouped these enterprises under schedule two, that is those enterprises in respect of which Nigerians must have majority interest.

Second, the number of those enterprises exclusively reserved for Nigerians (i.e. those under schedule 1) was increased. The additions to schedule 1 included such important enterprises as: Departmental stores and super-markets having an annual turnover of less than 2 millions Naira; estate agency; manufacture of suitcases, briefcases, handbags, purses, wallets, portfolios and shopping bags; passenger bus services, travel agencies; as well as whole-sale distribution of local manufactures and other locally produced goods¹. Under the 1972/74 decrees, these enterprises had been placed under schedule 2. This means that aliens were excluded from owning enterprises only if their paid-up shares capital was below 4 million Naira or if the turnover was under 1 million Naira. Now under the 1977 Decree, aliens were totally and unconditionally (except in the case of departmental stores and supermarkets) barred from participating in, or owning, them wholly or in part.

The third new aspect of the 1977 decree was the introduction of a third schedule which grouped enterprises in which at least 40 per cent Nigerian equity participation or interest was guaranteed. The most significant feature of the new schedule was the broad range of manufacturing industries specifically designated as requiring joint indigenous and foreign participation and ownership. Among these were engineering industries, industries for the manufacture of basic industrial chemicals and major export industries². The aim was to encourage foreign private entrepreneurs to invest in these critical areas

1 *Ibid.*, No. 75 (January 1977), pp. 7-8.

2 See *Ibid.*, pp 6.8 for a complete list of the enterprises

without necessarily violating the letter and spirit of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees. By requiring at least 40 per cent Nigerian participation in these strategic enterprises under schedule III it was hoped that the foreign private entrepreneurs would be compelled, where they were not encouraged, to seek the participation of indigenous private or public interests. And if that happened, Nigerians would be exposed to advanced technology and would be in a position to take over the operation of these strategic enterprises in a reasonable period of time¹.

The machinery for the implementation of the 1977 Decree was, apparently, more effective than that set-up to oversee the enforcement of the 1972 decree. At any rate, the 1977 machinery was independent of the government. The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board was headed by a full time executive chairman appointed from outside the Federal or State Public Services. Also, the other four members were persons ("Nigerians of proven integrity") appointed from outside the public services. In addition, the Board had represented on it officials of Federal Ministries of Industries, Finance, Economic Development, Trade and Internal Affairs, the secretary of the capital issues Commission and the Director of each of the stock Exchanges in Nigeria. This secretary of the Board was appointed by the Commissioner for Industries on the recommendation of the Board². This was an improvement on the composition of the Board under the 1972 decree. The Chairman of the 1972 Board was the Permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Industries who was, *ipso facto*, a part-time chairman. The other members of the 1972 Board were representatives of the Federal Ministries of Trade, Finance, Economic Development and Internal Affairs, as well as three representatives of development or investment agencies incorporated in Nigeria. And its Secretary was an officer in the Federal Ministry of Industries³. The improvement in the machinery for implementation was also reflected in the fact that the power of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board was increased. So was the power of the Capital Issues Commission, the enterprises valuation unit of the government.

The 1977 indigenization decree was also an improvement on the 1972 law in another sense. As promised by the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime, steps were indeed taken to limit the concentration of the share

1 *Ibid.* No. 61. (October 1975), p. 8.

2 *Ibid.* No. 75 (January 1977).

3 Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (No 4) of 1972, section 1(3) and (4).

on sale in a few hands; efforts were made to ensure that the benefits of the indigenization programme were spread out to as many Nigerians as possible. The 1977 decree provided that in no case would one person own more than one enterprise affected by the decree. More importantly, enterprises under schedules 1 and 2 were obliged to reserve 10 per cent of their total equity share or of the fraction of the shares to be sold to their workers. At least 50 per cent of the 10 per cent was to be reserved for non-managerial staff. Finally, with the exception of owner-managers, the minimum interest that any Nigerian or association could acquire in any enterprise was limited to 50,000 Naira or 5 per cent of equity, whichever was higher¹.

The 1977 decree also provided for a shorter implementation period than that of 1972. The decree of 1972 was published on 28th February 1972 and was expected to come into force on March 31, 1974. It gave the foreign enterprises ample time (actually twenty-five months) to lobby government functionaries for extension and exemption and to approach politically influential Nigerians to serve as fronts for their enterprises. One contrast, the decree of 1977 was promulgated on January 17, 1977 and the deadline for compliance to its provisions was March 1978, leaving a grace period of thirteen months.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the rate of implementation was higher after 1977 than before. As of June 1975, only 58 per cent of the 357 enterprises (i.e. 207) under schedule 1 of the 1972 decree had provisionally complied with the decree. And 89 per cent of the 593 enterprises (i.e. 528) under schedule II had provisionally complied. Confirmed cases of actual compliance after proper inspection were smaller: they numbered 314 out of 950 or 33 per cent. Between 1977 and the early 1980s, however, the rate of provisional compliance improved. Of the 1,200 existing enterprises affected by the 1977 Act, 930 complied with the letter of the decree - that is 77.5 per cent and were issued with provisional letter of compliance. However, of the 700 new enterprises, all joint enterprises of Nigerians and foreigners which came into existence after 1977 and registered with the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board, only 80 (i.e. 11.4 per cent) complied, even provisionally with the stipulation of the Act².

In the 1980s, the civilian administration of Shagari reversed the 1977 Act in certain respects. It enacted the *Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (Alteration of list of scheduled enterprises) Order of 1981*. The order transferred certain items from Schedule 1 of the Nigerian Enterprises

1 Ake (1985), *op. cit.*, p. 179

2 *Ibid.*, p. 181.

Promotion Act of 1977 to Schedule 2 of the Act on the ground of lack of interest in such enterprises by Nigerians. The affected enterprises were repair and manufacture of clocks and jewelry, garment manufacture and rice milling. These enterprises ceased to be reserved exclusively for Nigerians and were enterprises in respect of which Nigerians must have 60 per cent majority interest. The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Order of 1981 also transferred some enterprises from schedule 2 to schedule 3. The argument was that this was necessary "mainly to attract further foreign investment in view of the huge capital expenditure not available locally and long gestation period for returns on investment to be forthcoming"¹. The enterprises which were shifted to schedule 3, making it possible for foreigners and foreign companies to have up to 60 per cent (i.e. controlling) interest in them were: manufacture of fertilizers, cement, metal containers as well as establishment and running of agricultural plantations for raising tree crops, grains and other cash crops. The increasing involvement of foreigners was justified by the Minister of Industries, Adamu Ciroma, on the ground that foreign investors were required to stimulate agro-based industries in Nigeria. Generally, it was evident that the new civilian administration was not very warm about indigenization. As Ciroma put it, "while no one can doubt the need for this law (the Indigenization Act of 1972 revised in 1977), on the other hand, it scarcely needs be said that *sharing of the available and existing equity in those enterprises was not a creative act*. We need more Enterprises in Order to expand our economy"². (Emphasis added). It was a statement reminiscent of the NPC position in the 1950s and 1960s. The attitude of the NPC, in contrast to that of the AG or N.C.N.C., was that capital and technology were scarce; therefore, every available source - foreign and domestic - had to be mobilized. It was lukewarm towards far-reaching indigenization of the economy.

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- 1 See "Explanatory Notes" to the Nigeria Enterprises Promotion (Alteration Lists of Scheduled Enterprises) Order, 1981.
 - 2 "Industrial Development in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects" Keynote Address of Mallam Adamu Ciroma, Minister of Industries, in Nigerian Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies. The Proceedings of the Concluding Seminars on Selected National Policy Matters of the Senior Executive Course, No.1, February 1980, p.20.

Indigenization, Class Formation and Class Struggle in Nigeria

It has been suggested that "indigenization was, perhaps, a means through which top bureaucrats or high-ranking public servants (the petty bourgeoisie) converted themselves into a bourgeoisie, a property - owning class". The point, in other words, is that indigenization served as a mechanism for class formation in Nigeria. According to Dudley, the major beneficiaries of the indigenization policies were "political office - holders - military and civilian - and members of the top ranks of the bureaucracy"¹. In this section, we shall probe this hypothesis. In doing so, there is need, first, to examine the impact of the indigenization policies on the pattern of capital accumulation in Nigeria.

The pattern of Accumulation

An important feature of the indigenization policy was the change it brought about in the pattern of private capital accumulation in Nigeria. The pattern altered in three main ways. First, the state played a prominent role in transferring capital to the petty-bourgeoisie and comprador bourgeoisie. Second, the pattern of ownership of capital changed: the proportion owned by Nigerians increased relative to the foreign capital component as a percentage of total capital. Third, there was a shift in the economic activities in which private capital investment was concentrated: the shift was from mining and quarrying to manufacturing.

The inauguration of indigenization policies in Nigeria accelerated the change from the classical capitalist model of accumulation to the state capitalist model. The former was characterized by minimum or lack of direct involvement of the state in the extraction of surplus and its mobilization and channelling to create and expand productive capacity. And the latter was distinguished by the predominance of the public sector in the generation of profits and determination of the structure of production in the economy. In the 1970s following the introduction of the indigenization decrees, the public sector came to dominate the accumulation process in Nigeria. The growth of gross investment by the public sector rose from 36 per cent in 1965 to 62 per cent in 1974 and to 68 per cent in 1977².

It was largely through the state institutions either created or mobilized for the advancement of the promotion of indigenous enterprises that the surpluses were extracted from the consumption sector and

1 Billy Duellely, *An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982), pp. 117-119.

2 Bright Ekhuehware, "Recent Pattern of Accumulation in Nigerian Economy", in Mohammed and Edho (1986), *op. cit.* p. 205.

channelled to the investment sector. One of these institutions was the Nigerian Bank of Commerce and Industry established in 1973 specifically to advance indigenization policies. Between 1973 and 1984 total loan and equity disbursements by N.B.C.I. increased from 41.2 million Naira to 157.8 million Naira, the bulk of it in the form of loans. Also Commercial Bank's loans and advances to industry increased from 276.1 million Naira in 1973 to 5,823.5 million Naira in 1984 an increase of 2009 per cent. Furthermore, *Merchant Bank's* loans and advances to industry, which stood at 7.4 million Naira or 40.6 per cent of total loans and advance outstanding in 1973/74 rose to 885.2 million Naira or 52.5 per cent of total loans at the end of 1984. The Nigerian Industrial Development Bank also played an active role in this process of capital accumulation. Between 1964 when it was established to 1982, the N.I.D.B. sanctioned 550 projects valued at 2,669 million Naira. Of this, the Bank's participation amounted to 536.1 million Naira, made up of 55.4 million Naira in equity participation and 480.7 million Naira in loan participation. Further, in 1983, the bank sanctioned 45 projects valued at 163.3 million Naira, with the Bank's total participation amounting to 357.7 million Naira, the bulk of it (35.0 million Naira) in loans; only a small part of it, 0.7 million Naira was in equity participation¹.

Agricultural enterprises equally received a lot of attention. Between 1973 and 1984 total credit to agriculture by commercial banks rose from 21.6 million Naira or 2.9 per cent of total loans to 1,052.1 million Naira or 9.2 per cent of total loans. In like manner, merchant banks credit to agriculture which was very low, at 0.5 million Naira in 1973/74 increased to 79.3 million Naira in 1984. As a proportion of total loans, this increase was from 2.5 per cent in 1973/74 to 4.7 per cent, in 1984, or total Merchant Banks' loans. The Agricultural and Cooperative Bank increased its total loans from 227.5 million Naira to 287.1 million Naira in 1984. And the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme expanded loans to agriculture rapidly, making credits available to farmers (usually large-scale farmers) to the tune of 204.2 million Naira between 1978 and 1984.

At the same time, direct expenditure by the Federal Government on industry and agriculture expanded significantly. The expenditure (recurrent and capital) in industry rose from 44.9 million Naira in

1 M.A. Uduebo, "The Role of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in Industrial and Agricultural Development in Nigeria", in C.B.N., Economic and Financial Review, December 1985), pp. 1172

1972/73 to a peak of 1,056.9 million Naira in 1980, declining thereafter to 178.9 million Naira in 1981. And the expenditure on agriculture rose from 107.5 million Naira in 1972/73 to a peak of 1,900 million Naira in 1979/80, declining to 955.6 million Naira in 1982¹. These were, evidently, very huge investment; and, as we shall see, they helped to create a small but committed class of large-scale capitalist farmers and industrialists in Nigeria.

As a result of the huge increases in the transfer of surplus to the industrial and agricultural investment sectors of the economy, the rate of growth of property and related incomes increased; conversely, the rate of growth of labour incomes declined. Thus, as a percentage of domestic factor incomes, national labour incomes declined from 27.2 per cent in 1973/74 to 22.1 per cent in 1982, while national property and related incomes increased from 63.4 per cent to 70.5 per cent in the same period². It is to be noted that in both periods, labour incomes (i.e. wages, salaries pensions and other labour benefits) were much lower than property and related incomes (i.e. entrepreneurial incomes, interests, dividends, rents and royalties). What the indigenization decree helped to achieve was to increase the gap between the two, with important implications for class formation and class struggle.

It is to be noted that in both periods, labour incomes (i.e. wages, salaries pensions and other labour benefits) were much lower than property and related incomes (i.e. entrepreneurial incomes, interests, dividends, rents and royalties). What the indigenization decree helped to achieve was to increase the gap between the two, with important implications for class formation and class struggle.

In this period, too, following the introduction of indigenization policies, the pattern of ownership of capital in Nigeria altered. The proportion owned by Nigerians increased relative to the foreign capital component as a percentage of total capital. In 1971, on the eve, so to speak, of the introduction of the indigenization decree (of 19.2) as a proportion to total capital, Nigerian capital ownership was 16.6 per cent (57,426,000 Naira) and foreign ownership accounted for 83.4 per cent (287,932,000 Naira). But in 1975, a year following the coming into effect of the indigenization decree, the ownership of capital by Nigerians increased remarkably while the foreign component declined. In that year ownership of capital by Nigerians amounted to 253,994,000 Naira or 43.4 per cent of the total, and foreign ownership was

1 Ibid.

2 Ekhuarhare, *op.cit.* p. 218

331,371,000 Naira or 56.6 per cent. However, as can be seen, foreign capital remained dominant.

The level of indigenous participation in foreign controlled enterprises increased differentially, depending on the type of economic activity. The highest increase occurred in mining and quarrying. In 1972, the share by Nigerians in the total paid-up capital of mining and quarrying enterprises was 1.7 per cent (1,934,000 Naira out of 112,660,000 Naira); by 1975, it had increased to 62.4 per cent (74, 660,000 Naira out of 119,666,000 Naira), putting the foreign participants in a clear minority position. It is interesting to note that this was the area in which direct state intervention and involvement was most significant and indigenous private involvement marginal. Significantly, in no other area, except transport and communication, was the foreign investor reduced to a minority position. But foreign capital interests declined significantly in all the sectors. In transport and communication foreigners held 68.2 per cent of the total capital in 1971, compared with 40 per cent in 1975, leaving Nigerians with 60 per cent in 1975 (compared with their share of 31.8 per cent in 1971). Nigerian capital interest in trading also increased considerably. It was 8.6 per cent in 1971; in 1975, it increased to 26.5 per cent. In manufacturing and processing, too, Nigerian capitalist interest increased from 47,710,000 Naira out of 139,024,000 Naira (34.3 per cent) in 1971 to 117,406,000 Naira out of 222,771,000 Naira (47.3 per cent) in 1975. And in agriculture, foreign capitalist interest declined from 81.6 per cent to 63.7 per cent while Nigerian share increased from 18.4 per cent to 34.6 per cent of total paid-up capital in all foreign owned companies in Nigeria¹.

An important development which came as an aftermath of the indigenization decrees was the shift in the area of concentration of foreign investment. Before indigenization, the bulk of foreign private investment had been concentrated in the mining and quarrying sector of the economy. In 1970, this sector accounted for 47.2 per cent of all foreign private investment while manufacturing accounted for 22.4 per cent. This situation was reversed following the implementation of the indigenization policies. For instance, in 1978, manufacturing and processing accounted for 44.1 per cent of all foreign private investment in Nigeria while mining and quarrying accounted for 14.7 per cent². In 1982, the position was as follows: manufacturing and processing, 35.7 per cent; mining and quarrying 18.1 per cent. But rather than decline,

1 Complied from Table 8, "Foreign Private Investment in Nigeria", C.B.N., *Economic and Financial Review*. Vol. 17, No. 1 (June 1979), p. 24

2 J.O. Osakwe (1981), *op. cit.*, p. 19

the cumulative foreign private investment in the following sectors showed a rise: agriculture, forestry and fishing - 0.4% (1973), 4.1% (1978) and 2.2% (1982); transport and communication - 0.66%, 1.9% and 1.3% respectively; trading and business services - 16.7%, 18.2% and 27.6 respectively.

Table 1: Changing Pattern of ownership of enterprises in Nigeria, 1971-1975

| Year | Nigerian | Foreign | Total | Percentages | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | | | | Nigeria share as % of Total | Foreign share as % of Total |
| All Enterprises | | | | | |
| 1970 | N60,108,000 | N259,736,000 | N319,844,000 | 18.8 | 81.2 |
| 1971 | N57,426,000 | N287,932,000 | N345,358,000 | 16.6 | 83.4 |
| 1975 | N253,994,000 | N331,371,000 | N585,305,000 | 43.4 | 56.6 |
| Trading and Business Services | | | | | |
| 1971 | 6,222,000 | 65,774,000 | 71,996,000 | 8.6 | 91.4 |
| 1975 | 46,551,000 | 129,438,000 | 1752,989,000 | 26.5 | 73.5 |
| Mining and Quarrying | | | | | |
| 1972 | 1,934,000 | 110,726,000 | 112,660,000 | 1.7 | 98.3 |
| 1975 | 74,660,000 | 45,006,000 | 119,866,000 | 62.4 | 37.6 |
| Manufacturing and Processing | | | | | |
| 1971 | 47,710,000 | 91,314,000 | 139,024,000 | 34.3 | 65.7 |
| 1975 | 5,365,000 | 117,406,000 | 222,771,000 | 47.3 | 52.7 |
| Transport and Communication | | | | | |
| 1971 | 1,750,000 | 3,756,000 | 5,506,000 | 31.8 | 68.2 |
| 1975 | 5,808,000 | 3,878,000 | 9,687,000 | 60.0 | 40.0 |
| Agriculture, Forestry Fishing | | | | | |
| 1971 | 1,516,000 | 6,724,000 | 8,240,000 | 18.4 | 81.6 |
| 1975 | 3,733,000 | 6,519,000 | 10,252,000 | 34.6 | 63.7 |
| Miscellaneous Activities | | | | | |
| 1971 | 10,000 | 7,706,000 | 7,716,000 | 0.1 | 99.9 |
| 1975 | 11,765,000 | 19,446,000 | 31,211,000 | 37.7 | 62.3 |

Source: Compiled from table 8, "Foreign Private Investment in Nigeria", in C.B.N., Economic and Financial Review (June 1979), p.24.

An important development which came as an aftermath of the indigenization decrees was the shift in the area of concentration of foreign investment. Before indigenization, the bulk of foreign private investment had been concentrated in the mining and quarrying sector of the economy. In 1970, this sector accounted for 47.2 per cent of all foreign private investment while manufacturing accounted for 22.4 per cent. This situation was reversed following the implementation of the indigenization policies. For instance, in 1978, manufacturing and processing accounted for 44.1 per cent of all foreign private investment in Nigeria while mining and quarrying accounted for 14.7 per cent¹. In 1982, the position was as follows: manufacturing and processing, 35.7 per cent; mining and quarrying 18.1 per cent. But rather than decline, the cumulative foreign private investment in the following sectors showed a rise: agriculture, forestry and fishing - 0.4% (1973), 4.1% (1978) and 2.2% (1982); transport and communication - 0.66%, 1.9% and 1.3% respectively; trading and business services - 16.7%, 18.2% and 27.6 respectively.

Because of the prominent role of the state in the process of indigenization, there has been an increased tendency to use state power for primitive capital accumulation in Nigeria. In turn, increased use of state power has meant a rise in official corruption. And, the process of primitive capital accumulation through corruption has resulted in a huge flight of capital from Nigeria. According to Muhammed Buhari, Nigerian Head of State 1984-1985, the Nigerian politicians stashed away, in foreign lands, an estimated sum of 12 billion Naira between 1979 and 1983².

From the above data we can see that, except in the areas of mining and quarrying, as well as transport and communication, foreign capital continued to play a dominant role in the Nigerian economy inspite of indigenization. Nevertheless, indigenization had a significant effect on the pattern of capital ownership in Nigeria. In some cases, it made Nigerians majority shareowners of the paid-up capital. The examples are mining and quarrying, transport and communications. In other sectors, it increased to a significant extent the proportion of shares of the paid up capital owned by Nigerians in those enterprises. Examples are manufacturing and processing, trading and business services, agriculture, forestry and fishing as well as miscellaneous activities.

1 J.O. Osakwe (1981), *op. cit.*, p. 19

2 Festus Iyayi, "The Primitive Accumulation of Capital in a Neo-Colony: the Nigerian Case". *Review of African Political Economy*, p. 37.

Indigenization and Class Formation in Nigeria

Increased indigenous ownership of the share of paid up capital of previously foreign-owned companies meant, in practical terms, the creation, or rather the expansion of an existing tiny pool, of an indigenous bourgeois class. It involved an increase in the number of the class of property owning bourgeoisie. In the 1970s, under the cover of the indigenization decrees, the property-less arm of the Nigerian petty-bourgeoisie used state power to create an economic base for itself. State officials - bureaucrats, ministers or commissioners and military governors - used their position to acquire shares in large private companies. The companies themselves are mere Nigerian subsidiaries of large multinational firms. Also, top Nigerian executives of large foreign-owned companies secured bank loans with the assistance of their employers and became share-holders in the very companies where they hold managerial posts. Others who joined the band of share-holders this period were professionals, big private businessmen, some members of the armed forces - retired and serving, members of the traditional ruling families, leading distributors of the companies selling the shares and former politicians. These persons developed a community of interests in latching themselves on to foreign capital. By so doing, they transformed themselves into the Nigerian bourgeoisie.

What emerged in the wake of indigenization was not, strictly speaking, a *national bourgeoisie* even though the interests of a fraction of this class became linked to the nation's Economic Development and were, therefore, in relative contradiction with the interests of big foreign capital. The bulk of the new class was comprador in character: it consisted of that fraction of the bourgeois class whose interests are constitutively linked to foreign (imperialist) capital, and which is bound politically and ideologically to foreign capital. With indigenization emerged an increased number of bourgeoisie with foreign and domestic components. The domestic component is essentially dependent on, and subordinate to, the foreign component. More importantly, the indigenous component has three major fractions: the production-oriented "national" bourgeoisie, the comprador bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie.

The petty - bourgeoisie was the largest in size before indigenization. It remains fairly large in size, but is now challenged in this respect by the comprador. It is also the most unreliable and unstable class. In Nigeria, in the post - indigenization era, the character of the petty-bourgeoisie has been altered. It is made up of those top executives of private firms who, though still employees, have acquired shares and some real estate property, their counterparts in the civil service who are both private property - owners and, at the same time, are involved

directly in the labour process and suffer from imperialist exploitation, as well as the intelligentsia including, especially, University teachers. The changes in the composition of this class was stimulated partly by the policies of Nigerianization/ indigenization over the years and partly by the rapid expansion of university opportunities in the 1970s. This class is generally unreliable in the sense that it can take the side of revolutionary forces or join the camp of counter - revolutionaries with equal ease. In post- indigenization Nigeria, it is essentially a counter - revolutionary class. However a tiny property - less fraction of the intelligentsia wing of this class plays a progressive role by serving as the leading force of progressive social development, and championing the causes of the working people and peasants. In contrast the property - owning wing of the petty bourgeoisie in Nigeria is essentially counter - revolutionary or down - right reactionary. But its representatives occupy leading positions in the economic and political levers of the country. It is this wing that attempts to cement all other groups of local exploiters and serves as a connecting link between them and foreign capital.

The comprador in Nigeria consists, first and foremost, of middlemen. These include businessmen who act as importers, exporters, representatives of foreign salesman, and marketing firms, representatives of foreign firms seeking contracts. They also include persons who serve as fronts for public servants, facilitators, intermediaries, brokers, agents, contact men and assistants of all varieties.¹ This class is in alliance with state officials whose position allow them to influence state spending and government policy and who use this position to assist foreign capital in its dealings with the state and indigenous society.

Another fraction of the domestic component of the ruling class in Nigeria is what may be described as the emergent "national" bourgeoisie. It is a class distinguished by its interest in promoting capitalist production in Nigeria's mining and quarrying, agricultural and industrial sectors. Prominent in this fraction is the group described by one author as the "gentlemen farmers". These are former top-ranking army officers and civil servants who were retired or who resigned their positions and embarked upon large - scale, capitalist farming, alongside private industrialists. It is a group whose emergence was stimulated by the so-called "Green Revolution" of Obasanjo, involving the allocation

1 Teresa Turner, "Commercial Capitalism and the 1975 Coup", in Keith Panter-Brick, Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1978), p. 168

of 16.6 billion Naira to large - scale farming, the establishment of an Agricultural Development Bank and the promulgation of Land Use Decree which vested land-ownership in the state military governors¹

An important characteristic of the indigenous bourgeoisie, including the emergent "national" bourgeoisie, in Nigeria is that it is dependent. Its dependence is a product of the process of its emergence. The comprador and emergent national fractions came into existence in the process of the Nigerian Petty-bourgeois class latching itself into foreign capital. And the petty-bourgeois fraction itself is a product of the capitalist penetration of Nigerian political economy; it was created to reproduce the dependent relationship between Nigerian and foreign capital. What, therefore, indigenization helped to create or expand is a dependent or an auxiliary bourgeoisie made up of three fractions: petty-bourgeois, comprador and national. The idea of a dependent or auxiliary *national* bourgeoisie should not be regarded as contradictory, nor as a peculiarly Nigerian phenomenon. Generally, in the world today, because of "the marked interpenetration of capitals under imperialism, the distinction between capitals "tied" to foreign bourgeoisie and "national capitals" has become "extremely vague and questionable"² For this reason, we can describe the fraction of capitalists committed to the nation's capitalist Economic Development as "national" even when we know that its interest does not stand in basic contradiction with the interests of big foreign capital.

This leads us to the second aspect of the character of Nigeria's indigenous bourgeoisie. Its interests are basically or essentially compatible with those of foreign capital, although there are, too, areas of contradictions between them. Foreign capital is essentially exploitative of the Nigerian peoples. The Nigerian Bourgeoisie are part of the structure of this exploitation. Here lies the fundamental convergence of interests. At the same time, Nigeria indigenous capital and foreign capital represent, respectively, a contradiction between the power of legal control over the machinery of the state and effective power conferred by control over technology and finance capital. This contradiction has been mitigated, but not resolved, by the process of indigenization. Indigenization represents the working out of an accommodation between foreign capital and indigenous capital, with the latter still in a

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- 1 Teresa Turner and Pade Badru, "Oil and Instability: Class contradictions and the 1983 Coup in Nigeria". *Journal of African Marxists*. March, 1985, p. 7.
 - 2 Nicos Poulantzas, "On Social Classes". *New Left Review*. No. 78 (March-April, 1973), p.39.

subordinate position. It is a division of labour which reinforces the externalization of the productive base of the economy while at the same time dramatizing the decisive role of the indigenous bourgeoisie in creating and maintaining the political conditions for accumulation. It does not represent an internalization of imperialism¹; it reflects its flexibility.

There is, however, a sense in which indigenization has, through its impact on class formation, made imperialism more secure in Nigeria. It has transformed the Nigerian traditional petty bourgeoisie into a comprador class and a sizeable proportion of the new petty bourgeoisie into the traditional archetype. By so doing, it has diverted petty bourgeois tendencies away from potentially threatening alliance with anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist social forces. Before indigenization, the bulk of the petty-bourgeoisie in Nigeria consisted of "non-productive" wage-earning workers, engineers, technicians, intellectuals, top civil servants and top and middle level military officers. It was predominantly the "new petty-bourgeoisie". But with indigenization many of these became transformed into the traditional petty bourgeoisie, made up of small-scale producers and small traders or small-propertied elements. Whereas the former is petty-bourgeois in the political and ideological sense, that is in the sense of aspiring to bourgeois status, the latter is petty-bourgeois in the more concrete, economic sense. While the former, the new petty-bourgeoisie tends, more often than not, especially in period of economic crisis, to take the side of the revolutionary or anti-imperialist forces, the latter, the traditional petty-bourgeoisie, tends to take the side of the counter-revolutionary forces more frequently, precisely because it owns some means of production. It is in this sense that it is true that the indigenization policies, by "Nigerianizing" foreign capital has weakened the links between anti-imperialist tendencies in the petty-bourgeoisie and anti-capitalist agitations in the working class.

Indigenization has also, paradoxically, highlighted the character of the Nigerian bourgeoisie as an incoherent class, while at the same time attenuating that incoherence. The indigenous bourgeoisie in Nigeria came into existence, in the first place, by the non-propertied groups latching themselves on to foreign capital. Not surprisingly, the nature of foreign capital in Nigeria has affected the character of Nigeria's indigenous bourgeois class. Foreign capital comes into Nigeria from different sources, in different forms and for various purposes. The

¹ See Beckman, *op. cit.*, for a contrary view on this point.

"heterogeneity and contradictions of foreign capital are reproduced in the social character of the Nigerian" dependent bourgeoisie¹. Besides, the indigenous bourgeoisie is, as a class, not coherent because it exists and functions against the background of low level of development of productive forces. This socio-economic fact means that what exists in Nigeria among the people is mechanical solidarity; in such a situation the bourgeoisie are obliged to appeal to ethnic consciousness in their attempts to acquire support and legitimacy.

Indigenization is, however, helping to attenuate the incoherence of the indigenous bourgeoisie in Nigeria. Several factors, associated with the indigenization policies, have helped to wield the fractions of the Nigerian bourgeoisie together. One of these factors is the common ownership of share capital in, or common directorship of, the indigenized companies. There are today several examples of Nigerian capitalists from different, ethnic groups, of various professional or occupational backgrounds (military, Financial, bureaucratic), and deriving part of their capital from different sources (Nigerian, British, French, etc.) cooperating in business, united by their common interest in the survival and growth of an indigenized company. A related factor is the need for the indigenous bourgeoisie to combine their capital in order to compete effectively with the subsidiaries of multinational corporations in Nigeria. Over all, there has been cooperation among the emergent bourgeoisie from different parts of Nigeria, in running and/or managing either indigenized or newly formed companies. The biola Yardua partnership in owning and operating a shipping company and a Bank is a case in point. Another example is the composition of the Board of Directors which was established by the National Party of Nigeria (N.P.N.) to serve as a cover for the receipt of "donations" by leading members of the party and the government in power at the Federal level. The company was Ajiye Investments Limited. And the four directors were: Alhaji Ibrahim Damida (former bureaucrat and Hausa - Fulani); Alhaji Aminu Dantata (Kano-based capitalist and Hausa - Fulani); Chief Bayo Kuku (businessmen, Yoruba); Chief M. Ugochukwu (big capitalist/industrialist and Igbo). Members of the indigenous bourgeoisie are also united by their shared desire to control state power and use it for capital accumulation. It was this common interest that provided the basis for their common membership of the leading political party - the National Party of Nigeria (N.P.N.) during the second Republic. The N.P.N. held under its umbrella different fractions of the indigenous bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes including the remnants of feudal elements. But as the fact of the exist-

1 Ake (1985), *op.cit.*, pp. 19-20.

ence of the Yoruba - dominated Unity Party of Nigeria shows, the incoherence of the bourgeoisie was merely attenuated; it was not actually eliminated. Its attenuation was further testified by the attempt, in 1982/83, by part of the Nather Northern fraction of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie - the "Kaduna Mafia" - to forge an alliance with the UPN against the NPN.

Perhaps far more important in the discussion of the impact of the policies of indigenization on class formation is its effect on the size and character of the exploited classes. When the indigenization decree of 1972 was promulgated, fear was expressed about "the future of the mass of workers under the employment of these foreign firms" when their ownership and management were transferred to Nigerians. It was particularly feared, that ethnicity and nepotism might replace "efficiency and honesty" as criteria for assessing and rewarding workers¹. The workers were afraid of redundancy, lower wages and loss of job security under Nigerian ownership of companies and enterprises previously owned and run by foreigners.

In pre-indigenization Nigeria, the size of the proletariat, like the size of the bourgeoisie was small. This was due to the limited penetration of the capitalist mode of production, and the underdevelopment of the productive forces. In the post - indigenization period, the size of the working class did not change remarkably. What changed was the size of the unemployed. Between 1982 and 1986, well over one million workers lost their jobs in the private and public sectors of the economy; and by 1986, about 300,000 secondary school leavers were without any jobs. In 1984, 12.3 per cent (approximately, 4.1 million) of the Nigerian labour force was unemployed. Indigenization did not, therefore, mean more work for Nigerians. Indeed, the increasing rate of unemployment started soon after the indigenization decrees came into effect. For instance, between 1970 and 1973 the average annual figure of persons registering with the employment exchange was 17,800. But between 1974 and 1975 the figure rose to 29,300. Also, the largest retrenchment in one single industry seemed to have taken place in the textile industry, one of the indigenized industries under schedule 1. Between 1978 and 1986, 25,000 members of the textile workers Union lost their jobs. Perhaps indigenization, *per se*, was not directly and solely responsible for either the reduction in the size of opportunities for gainful employment or the rise in the rate of unemployment in Nigeria.

The point is that it did nothing to improve the economic plight of the workers or the opportunities for employment.

1 Adetoro (1975), *op. cit.*, p.37.

Also, indigenization did not free a large proportion of the workers from straight and immediate subordination to that fraction of the bourgeoisie that controls or directly wields state power, namely the bureaucratic fraction. On the contrary, by tightening the nexus between government and foreign capital, by getting the state to protect even more the interests of foreign capital in which the indigenous bourgeoisie now has a stake, the indigenization policy reinforced the direct subordination of the workers to the bureaucratic fraction of the petty bourgeoisie. The effect was to weaken the working class further in terms of using industrial action to achieve its class interests. In relative terms, the indigenization policies resulted in a high proportion of the gainfully employed wage labour seeing in the public sector. In 1975, the proportion was about 65 per cent of all modern sector employment. The ability of the working class to struggle for its interest was limited by this fact, coupled with the attempts by the Federal government to curb the freedom of labour unions through a series of anti-democratic decrees.

Furthermore, the indigenization policies did not attenuate the incoherence of the dominated class. Ethnicity continued to have a firm hold on the consciousness of workers and urban dwellers generally, due to the inability of the state to fulfill its welfare functions. Moreover, the workers have been unable to forge alliances with the peasants partly because both classes have not perceived the commonality of their interests and partly because the workers that should initiate such alliance still have one foot in the peasant mode of production (e.g. small farms, self-owned and cultivated) and the other in the capitalist mode. Therefore, although they are workers, they, in fact, have peasant consciousness, rather than proletarian consciousness. As a result, they are unable to serve as a vanguard of the movement for the liberation of the dominated classes. This situation is created by the fact that in Nigeria, the development of the productive forces is still at a very low level; pre-capitalist relations still remain strong, in spite of indigenization.

Indigenization, Class Struggle and Politics

The effect of the indigenization policies generally on Nigerian politics has been to shift its focus. It has moved from a struggle among the petty-bourgeoisie for the acquisition or seizure, control and consolidation of state power achieved, in alliance with the metropolitan bourgeoisie, through the manipulation of the proletariat and the peasants. It is now essentially a struggle between two fractions of the bourgeoisie: the *comprador* and the emergent national bourgeoisie.

The comprador bourgeoisie, in alliance with the property/share - owning petty bourgeoisie, is the dominant fraction in post-indigenization Nigerian political economy. The private Nigerian "businessman" is essentially a "middleman". He earns his living by serving as a link between foreign suppliers or contracting firms and the bureaucrats and policy-makers generally. This is one wing of the comprador. The other wing is the business of importing manufactured consumer goods and exporting primary products. The comprador, working in collaboration with a wing of the bureaucratic petty-bourgeoisie which favours privatization, commercialization and maximum cooperation with foreign capitalists, has become the dominant force in post-indigenization Nigerian politics. It constituted the hegemonic faction of the N.P.N., described by Teresa Turner as "the middlemen traders" and by Ake as "bucaneer capitalists". It formed the bulk of the leadership of the Nigeria People's Party, the N.P.P.: it is the group described by Ake as "the lower bourgeoisie", thriving on commerce, contracts and political access". Between 1979 and 1983, therefore it controlled both the Federal Government and well over 50 per cent of the State Governments.

The comprador bourgeoisie stands in secondary contradiction to, and struggles for state power with, a tiny group of Nigerian manufacturers, industrialists and capitalist farmers. This group of production - oriented capitalists - the emergent national bourgeoisie - in Nigeria, is weak, insecure and heavily import - and - foreign capital dependent. Its contradiction with the comprador lies in the fact that the latter favours massive importation of consumer products, manufactured in other countries. In contrast, the emergent national bourgeoisie favours encouraging indigenous manufacturers to produce these commodities in Nigeria. The national bourgeoisie is usually in alliance with the statist fraction of the bureaucratic petty-bourgeoisie, the technocrats, who also favour building up an independent technological and industrial base for Nigeria. This alliance also wants to build an independent pool of finance capital for Nigeria, hence its strong support for and commitment to indigenization and substantial state intervention in the national economy. Between 1979 and 1983, this group was concentrated mainly within the Unity Party of Nigeria (U.P.N.).

With respect to military regimes, it can be said that Gowon's regime represented a triumph of the comprador. Obasanjo's regime was a reflection of the rise of the production - oriented national bourgeoisie. Shagari's regime, created a conducive environment of the comprador to blossom. The Buhari regime represented a return to power of the national bourgeoisie. It was a re-enactment of the Mohammed/Obasanjo anti-comprador move, motivated by the desire to promote indigenous

capitalist production in Nigeria. It was a reaction against the discipline of the comprador class that took over Nigeria under Shagari. The Babangida administration reflects the resilience and greater influence of the comprador: it is a return, a resurgence, of the comprador class.

In the struggle for state power between the comprador and the emergent national bourgeoisie, the former invariably emerges victorious for several reasons. First, it is more unambiguously committed to the collaboration between foreign and indigenous capitalists and, therefore, more easily wins foreign support. Second, it has a wider base both in the state bureaucracy and the national economy. Third, it uses its base freely to build up an economic base: it favours more unabashedly, official corruption and uses the fruits of this corruption to secure itself in power. Fourth, the national bourgeoisie, because of lack of ideological clarity, is unable to perceive the convergence of interests between it, the intelligentsia fraction of the petty - bourgeoisie and the working class in fighting the metropolitan or foreign bourgeoisie. As a result, it has not tried to build up a popular base for itself. Indeed, it is contemptuous of both the intelligentsia and the working class. This is mainly because, it is still taken in by the illusory promise of transfer of technology by foreign capitalists and the hypocritical pledge of the inflow of foreign capital, in the form of foreign private investments and public loans. Fifth, the emergent national bourgeoisie is kept divided and incoherent by the intrusion of ethnicity and its manipulation by different, competing foreign capitals.

Conclusion

The indigenization policies as embodied in the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees (1972-1981) constitute the culmination of a historical movement dating back to the colonial period. It is a movement destined to continue in the future and whose course has been determined, and will continue to be determined, by the character of the ruling class in Nigeria. The more nationalistic the ruling class, the more committed it has been, and will be, to a policy of indigenization.

Indigenization is a progressive policy, although not a revolutionary one. As embodied in the Nigerian Public Enterprises Promotion Decrees, it was initially a tactical manoeuvre, designed to stave off a more revolutionary policy - nationalization. But in the mid-1970s, its character changed slightly: it emerged as a progressive policy.

In terms of its objectives, it has achieved a limited success. For instance, it has resulted in increased participation of Nigerians in the economic life of the country - especially in the commercial life of the country. The indigenous commercial capitalist class which was a tiny minority in the 1950s and 1960s grew into a large tribe in the 1970s and

1980s. Also, a tiny group of production oriented, nationalistic, industrial capitalists and "gentlemen" farmers have emerged in the Nigerian scene. Indigenization has therefore aided the process of creation of a Nigerian capitalist class as expected. Too, indigenization has aided the process of capital accumulation in Nigeria. In spite or perhaps, because of indigenization an increasing amount of private foreign investment has continued to flow in to the country. In 1973, the amount was 315.8 million Naira, in 1977 it was 392.5 million Naira. But indigenization has failed in the sense of preventing the flight of capital from Nigeria. While the outflow of investment income - profits and interest remittances - has either remained stable or declined, (from 554.6 million Naira in 1972 to 572.3 million Naira in 1977 and 328.9 million Naira in 1978), the out flow of contractors' fees and service charges has been on the increase (from 217.1 million Naira in 1972 to 898.6 million Naira in 1977 and 474.8 million Naira in 1978. This is an area where the decrees did not pay much attention in terms of providing measures. Also, although indigenization has not completely silenced the demand for nationalization, it has considerably weakened the classes which are most articulate in making the demand. Related to this, indigenization, in its hey day (1972 - 1982) temporarily stunted revolutionary pressures on the Nigerian and foreign bourgeoisie. The boldness which they have acquired has found expression in the new policy of privatization and commercialization which is tantamount to a resort to the initial, comprador version of indigenization in 1972 - 74, if not a reversal of the entire policy.

With respect to politics, the effect of indigenization policies has been to shift its focus. It has moved away from a struggle among the petty bourgeoisie for state power, achieved in collaboration with the metropolitan bourgeoisie, and through the manipulation of the proletariat and the peasants. It is now essentially a struggle between two fractions of the indigenous bourgeoisie: the comprador and the emergent national bourgeoisie, each also manipulating the proletariat and the peasants.

Furthermore, indigenization has enhanced the stake involved in acquiring or losing state power. In its national bourgeois version, it gave greater role to the state in the economy. By so doing, it made the state more desirable for the bourgeoisie. By the same token, it exposed the weaknesses of the dependent, peripheral capitalist (Nigerian) state, as an instrument of progressive policy, embroiled the state ever more in the intra-class struggle between the comprador and the emergent national bourgeoisie and, consequently, set in motion, the contradictions which have now, paradoxically, brought indigenization to a dead end.

Because of these contradictions of the indigenization policies, and also because indigenization weakens the dominated classes and strengthens the hands of the dominant classes in the inter-class struggle, the tendency is to suggest that indigenization should be scrapped. But because indigenization, as conceived by the "national", production - oriented fraction of the bourgeoisie is, in the context of inter-class politics and bourgeois development strategies, a progressive policy, particularly when compared with the pre-indigenization strategies and the proposed strategy of privatization and commercialization, it deserves support from all national democrats. The gaps in the policy should be closed to retain more profits in Nigeria and spread out to the workers the ownership of Nigerian industrial and commercial enterprises.

Les Déterminants de la Consommation Urbaine à Ouagadougou

Taladidia Thiombiano*

ABSTRACT. Why do African governments devote huge amounts of money to import rice or wheat? Why is the consumption of rice increasing and what strata of the population is the principal consumer of rice? The parameters which influence or determine food consumption are numerous and range from simple to complex considerations depending on the food items under discussion. Their degree of complexity also depends on whether the determinants are objective factors such as income, price or size of family or subjective ones such as taste and religion. In urban areas such as Ouagadougou, urbanization is an important variable in the choice of cereals. An empirical study on consumption patterns of households differentiated by strata and imported local cereals indicates that income is the determinant variable in the consumption of various food products. It was found that middle income households consume more local cereals whereas rich and poor households tend to consume more rice. However, in the case of poor households, it is not the price of rice which is the significant explanatory factor. The nature of urban employment and the time needed to prepare a given food item are important determinants. Processing and cooking local cereals is much more time consuming than the preparation of rice. Consequently, in urban areas, an increase in household income or a decrease in the price of traditional cereals will contribute, paradoxically, to increasing the requirements for imported cereals and a decrease in the consumption of local cereals. If the government were to increase rice prices, low income households will be penalized. An appropriate food policy will have to be based on a critical examination of the various determinants of urban food consumption patterns.

Introduction

Le présent article est le résultat de deux études¹ qui ont été menées au CEDRES sous notre direction. Ces deux travaux représentent les premières enquêtes les plus significatives réalisées à Ouagadougou et

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1 La première étude porte sur les systèmes alimentaires en milieu urbain. Elle a été réalisée en 1983 en collaboration avec l'UNRISD. La deuxième étude réalisée conjointement avec l'IFPRI s'est intéressée au phénomène de substitution des céréales traditionnelles par les céréales importées. Cette dernière étude a été faite en 1984-1985 à Ouagadougou. Les échantillons étaient de 130 et 125 ménages et ne portaient pas sur les mêmes ménages.

portant sur les systèmes alimentaires urbains dans son sens le plus total. Ils ont permis de donner des réponses à un certain nombre de questions entre autres : les stratégies urbaines en matière de consommation, la composition des revenus, les possibilités d'épargne, et surtout d'aborder une question longtemps débattue concernant le phénomène de substitution entre les différentes céréales en fonction du prix et du revenu. C'est justement l'un de ces points que nous abordons dans cet article.

L'objet de ce document est de tenter de donner quelques indications sur les motivations ou plus exactement les différents paramètres qui influent et/ou déterminent la consommation urbaine. De prime abord il n'existe pas une seule et unique indication. Tantôt elle est simple lorsqu'on fait intervenir un seul paramètre tel que le revenu ou le prix. Tantôt elle est complexe lorsqu'interviennent deux ou plusieurs paramètres : revenu, prix, taille du ménage etc. Il a aussi des notions non mesurables comme le goût, la religion etc. En limitant l'analyse aux céréales, certains de ces facteurs qualificatifs se trouvent atténués.

Les décideurs et experts posent souvent la question suivante: pourquoi les gouvernements africains consacrent-ils des sommes importantes aux importations de riz et de blé? La réponse à cette question appelle l'analyse de la structure de la consommation des ménages aussi bien en milieu urbain qu'en milieu rural. L'étude de 1983 porte aussi sur la consommation paysanne. Elle révèle qu'il n'existe pas une réponse unique à la question concernant la consommation de riz. Tantôt la consommation est liée à une tradition (cas de l'Ouest Burkina), tantôt elle est le reflet de l'aide alimentaire (cas des zones déficitaires du Nord Plateau mossi). Enfin elle peut être le résultat du travail d'une ONG ou d'un mouvement coopératif qui initie les paysans à la culture du riz et les incite à consommer ce qu'ils produisent. Nous n'avons pas l'impression que tout cela s'applique aussi à la ville de Ouagadougou.

Une seconde question que l'on se pose à propos des importations de riz par les gouvernements africains est : qui consomme réellement ces céréales ? L'opinion généralement admise est que ce sont les riches qui sont les principaux consommateurs.

Autant de questions et de réponses qui méritent d'être élucidées si nous voulons donner au planificateur les outils nécessaires pour prendre les mesures de politiques économiques qui conviennent en matière de production agricole et de commerce des céréales.

Notre objectif (comme l'ensemble des deux études) ne vise pas à faire des recommandations car le chercheur et le décideur n'ont pas souvent les mêmes motifs même s'ils appartiennent tous à la même

société mais à poser des hypothèses et à tenter de donner des réponses à celles-ci. Pour ce faire, le travail comprendra les points suivants :

I - Part de chaque catégorie de produits dans la consommation mensuelle moyenne par personne et par strate,

II - Part moyenne de chaque produit dans la consommation annuelle céréalière par personne et par strate,

III- Coût de préparation des céréales et choix de la céréale consommée.

I - Part de Chaque Catégorie de Produits dans la Consommation Mensuelle Moyenne par Personne et par Strate

Dans les deux études qui ont été faites, la consommation alimentaire a été regroupée en 5 rubriques.

Le but est de déterminer la proportion de dépenses alimentaires que chaque tercile affecte à chacune des rubriques. Notre préoccupation ne porte pas tant dans la comparaison des deux résultats d'enquêtes mais dans le classement des proportions de dépenses par strate de revenus.

Tableau 1 - Part de chaque catégorie de produit dans la consommation mensuelle moyenne par personne et par strate (%).

| Tercile | | | |
|----------------------------------|---------|--------|--------|
| Type de consommation | Pauvres | Moyens | Riches |
| 1 - Céréales | 49 | 40 | 34 |
| 2 - Légumineuses/racines | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| 3 - Produits élev. | 21 | 28 | 29 |
| 4 - Condiments | 27 | 27 | 31 |
| 5 - Autres produits alimentaires | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| niveau en F CFA par personne | 3 476 | 3 694 | 4 202 |

Source: Enquête CEDRES-UNRISD 1983

Tableau 2 - Part de chaque catégorie de produits dans la consommation mensuelle moyenne par personne et par strate (%).

| Tercile | | | |
|----------------------------------|---------|--------|--------|
| Type de consommation | Pauvres | Moyens | Riches |
| 1 - Céréales | 52 | 42 | 32 |
| 2 - Légumineuses/racines | 2 | 4 | 4 |
| 3 - Produits de l'élevage | 14 | 17 | 22 |
| 4 - Condiments | 22 | 26 | 28 |
| 5 - Autres produits alimentaires | 10 | 11 | 14 |
| Niveau en F CFA par personne | 2 951 | 4 859 | 7 647 |

Source: Enquête CEDRES/IFPRI 1985.

Les deux enquêtes donnent le même classement pour l'ensemble des consommations. Toutefois les écarts de pourcentage sont quelquefois assez importants. Ces écarts sont dus à la composition des rubriques. De plus l'enquête CEDRES/IFPRI porte sur une année et les résultats mensuels sont des moyennes alors que la première enquête ne porte que sur un mois allant du 10 novembre au 10 décembre 1983.

Le poids des céréales par strate

Chacun des deux tableaux montre que la part des dépenses consacrées à l'achat de céréales est en relation inverse avec le revenu. Dans l'une et l'autre enquête les pauvres consacrent environ la moitié des dépenses aux achats de céréales tandis que les riches en consacrent à peine le tiers de leurs dépenses. Pourquoi il est-il ainsi ?

Hypothèse 1 : Les ménages à revenus faibles ont des familles plus nombreuses. Pour vérifier cette hypothèse nous allons analyser les résultats du poids démographique de chaque strate de revenu.

Tableau 3 - Taille des ménages par tercile

| | Enquête | Enquête |
|---------|---------------|--------------|
| | CEDRES/UNRISD | CEDRES/IFPRI |
| Pauvres | 10 | 16 |
| Moyens | 11 | 14 |
| Riches | 12 | 9 |
| Moyenne | 11 | 13 |

Les deux enquêtes donnent des résultats contraires sauf pour les revenus moyens. C'est la deuxième enquête qui confirme notre hypothèse et qui justifie en même temps une des raisons pour lesquelles les ménages pauvres consacrent une part relativement plus importante de leurs dépenses aux achats de céréales.

Hypothèse 2 : Cette part relativement plus importante de dépenses signifie que les ménages pauvres consomment plus d'aliments à base de céréales.

Les résultats de l'enquête CEDRES/IFPRI qui couvre 12 mois donnent les informations suivantes :

Tableau 4 - Niveaux de consommation des céréales par personne (UEA) par mois.

| Tercile | Quantités de céréales (Kg) |
|---------|----------------------------|
| Pauvres | 9 |
| Moyens | 12,8 |
| Riches | 14,3 |
| Moyenne | 11,7 |

Cette hypothèse n'est pas confirmée. Les résultats traduisent l'importance démographique chez les pauvres d'une part ; et la faib-

lesse de la somme consacrée en valeur absolue par les pauvres par rapport aux riches.

Notons qu'il s'agit de toutes les céréales (mil, maïs, riz, blé), consommées dans les différentes formes.

La comparaison avec les résultats de la première enquête reste difficile en ce sens que les données se présentent pour l'essentiel sous forme monétaire. De ce fait la conclusion à laquelle nous aboutissons à partir des données d'une seule enquête méritent des travaux complémentaires.

Hypothèse 3 : si en valeur relative les pauvres consacrent plus d'argent à l'achat de céréales, cela signifie qu'ils consomment moins les autres aliments.

La part des autres aliments

Lorsque nous comptabilisons les rubriques "produits de l'élevage" et "condiments" nous observons que pour l'enquête de 1983, les pourcentages sont respectivement de 46,55 et 60 et pour l'enquête de 1985 ils sont de 36,43 et 50. Les pauvres dépensent moins pour ces deux chapitres. Les riches y consacrent au moins 50 % de leurs dépenses. C'est dire que la consommation des riches est plus importante en viande, légumes etc et donc plus riche en protéine. Dans l'étude CEDRES/UNRISD, les proportions en viande ont été les suivantes en pourcentage : 10,41, 11,80 et 16,40 % respectivement pour les pauvres, les moyens et les riches.

La théorie économique qui se vérifie dans ce cas est la loi d'Engel.

En conclusion, le revenu reste la variable qui détermine la part de chaque produit dans la consommation par personne et par strate. Toutefois dans les céréales il faut distinguer entre céréales locales et céréales importées. Cette dichotomie devrait permettre de tester l'hypothèse 4 selon laquelle le riz est un aliment de luxe réservé aux riches.

Part Moyenne de Chaque Produit dans la Consommation Annuelle Céréalière par Personne et par Strate

Les rubriques à retenir sont : le mil-maïs ; le riz et le blé.

Tableau 5 - Part moyenne de chaque produit dans la consommation annuelle céréalière par personne et par strate (%).

| Strates | Pauvres | Moyens | Riches |
|-------------------|---------|--------|--------|
| Types de céréales | | | |
| 1 - mil-maïs | 65 | 50 | 49 |
| 2 - riz | 33 | 46 | 43 |
| 3 - blé | 2 | 4 | 8 |

Source : Enquête CEDRES-UNRISD 1983.

Tableau 5 - Part moyenne de chaque produit dans la consommation annuelle céréalière par personne (UEA) et par strate

| Strates | Pauvres % | | Moyens % | | Riches % | |
|--------------|-----------|----|----------|----|----------|----|
| | F.CFA | Kg | F.CFA | Kg | F.CFA | Kg |
| 1 - mil-maïs | 47 | 59 | 43 | 55 | 33 | 40 |
| 2 - riz | 45 | 36 | 42 | 36 | 35 | 38 |
| 3 - blé | 9 | 5 | 15 | 9 | 32 | 22 |


Source: Enquête CEDRES/IFPRI 1985.

Bien que les rapports diffèrent entre les deux enquêtes, il se dégage néanmoins une tendance générale qui est l'ordre dans le type de céréales consommées par strate de revenus. Nous considérerons l'importance de chaque céréale par strate.

Part moyenne des céréales locales

Dans l'un et l'autre cas, les pauvres consacrent la plus grande partie de leurs dépenses en céréales aux achats de mil-maïs. De façon générale, on peut observer une baisse du pourcentage au fur et à mesure que le revenu augmente ou que l'on passe de la strate à revenu faible à la strate à revenu élevé. La seconde enquête qui est plus récente montre que cette forte dépense des pauvres ne se traduit pas toutefois par une absorption plus élevée de céréales. Cette absorption de céréales locales est respectivement : 5,31, 7,04 et 5,72 kg par unité équivalente d'adulte (UEA).

Graphique I - Représentation de la distribution (%) de la consommation de céréales en kg par strate.



C'est une courbe légèrement asymétrique qui traduit que les ménages à revenus moyens sont ceux qui consomment le plus de céréales locales.

L'hypothèse 5 qui sous tend cette conclusion est que nous devons observer une fréquence plus élevée de consommation de tô à midi et le soir dans cette strate.

L'hypothèse 6 est la matérialisation par une consommation beaucoup plus faible de riz pour les pauvres.

Part moyenne de riz

Les deux enquêtes ne révèlent pas la même place pour les revenus moyens dans la consommation de riz. L'enquête de 1983 pense que c'est la strate moyenne qui consomme plus de riz tandis que l'enquête de 1985 découvre que c'est la strate des riches qui en consomme le plus.

Considérons cette deuxième enquête comme étant la plus complète et exhaustive. Il en ressort respectivement des consommations moyennes mensuelles de : 3,24 ; 4, 61 et 5,43 kg pour chacun des terciles pauvre, moyen et riche. Ce résultat ne confirme pas l'hypothèse 6. Cette notion est à rejeter.

Sur le graphique 1, l'allure de la courbe montre que l'importance de la consommation du riz reste fonction du revenu. De là peut-on conclure que c'est un aliment de riche ? La part des revenus consacrés par les pauvres 33 % (1983) et 45 % (1985) montre bien que cette céréale est entrée dans les habitudes alimentaires de toute catégorie de revenu. L'hypothèse 4 n'est pas vérifiée entièrement. L'écart de consommation en pourcentage de kg reste encore important entre pauvres et riches soit 67 % mais nous ne devons pas oublier que les premiers dans l'enquête 1985 ont aussi plus de personnes à charge. Ceci nous amène à affecter un coefficient de pondération en fonction de la taille des ménages.

Tableau 7 - Consommation théorique de riz pour des tailles identiques de ménage entre les 3 strates

| Tercile | Taille des ménages | Coefficient de pondé- | Consommation réelle (kg) | Consommation théorique |
|---------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|
| Pauvres | 16 | 1,78 | 9 | 16,02 |
| Moyens | 14 | 1,55 | 12,8 | 19,84 |
| Riches | 9 | 1 | 14,3 | 14,30 |

Ramené au même nombre de personnes, la consommation théorique des pauvres devient plus importante que celle des riches, ceci confirme que l'hypothèse 4 n'est pas totalement vérifiée.

Par ailleurs si l'hypothèse 4 était vraie l'hypothèse 7 à savoir une diminution des prix des céréales locales, un accroissement de leur con-

sommation par les pauvres serait vérifiée. Nous l'analyserons dans les tests économétriques.

Part moyenne de blé

La consommation d'aliments à base de blé en particulier les pâtes alimentaires et le pain traduit une différence assez importante des proportions des sommes consacrées par chaque tercile, ce qui laisse penser que cette céréale est un produit de luxe. Les deux études montrent que le rapport est de 1/4 entre les pauvres et les riches dans les dépenses consacrées à cette rubrique.

Les résultats de 1985 établissent une consommation moyenne mensuelle de 0,45 ; 1,15 et 3,15 kg. En poids le rapport est de 1/7.

L'hypothèse principale de la place du riz selon le revenu n'est pas vérifiée. Les pauvres consacrent des parts relativement importantes aux achats de riz. Une étude de Thiombiano A. (1985) sur le motif du choix de préparation des céréales aboutit à la conclusion que selon le moment c'est le temps qui est la variable déterminante. C'est ce que nous allons examiner présentement.

Coût de Préparation des Céréales et Choix de la Céréale Consommée

La consommation se divise en deux temps. De prime abord chaque céréale a la même probabilité d'être consommée soit au déjeuner soit au dîner.

Dans l'échantillon enquêté de 1985 (122 ménages), nous avons retenu le mois de juillet pour tester certaines hypothèses. Ce choix reste limité puisqu'il ne fera pas apparaître les variations saisonnières de la consommation. Nous avons dans le document final (CF. Annexe 2) montré que la consommation entre les céréales locales et le riz variait très peu entre les saisons. L'effet de substitution se fait plutôt entre le petit mil, le sorgho et le maïs. En d'autres termes, la demande de riz ne fluctue pas beaucoup à travers les saisons, même lorsque les prix des céréales traditionnelles baissent de manière substantielle.

La sensibilité de la consommation des différentes céréales par rapport au prix, au revenu et autres facteurs.

L'objet ici est d'examiner la sensibilité de la consommation (en quantité) de riz, de maïs et de mil/sorgho selon les variations mensuelles des prix relatifs entre les différentes céréales, tout en prenant en compte les autres facteurs qui expliquent la consommation des ménages. Il sera analysé également cette sensibilité par rapport au changement de revenus à travers les ménages et les mois de l'année.

Pour en arriver à ces analyses il a été procédé à des régressions économétriques pour calculer les élasticités (mesure de sensibilité) qui sont estimées à l'aide de la variation entre ménages (une coupe transversale) et de la variation à travers les mois (séries chronologi-

ques). La méthode utilisée est celle des moindres carrés en deux étapes. Outre les variables prix et revenus¹ nous avons inclus les facteurs importants qui agissent sur la demande urbaine de céréales afin de procéder à un examen simultané de l'ensemble des paramètres².

Le tableau annexe 3 présente les résultats de ces régressions. Il est à noter que les R^2 ne sont pas élevés à l'exception de l'équation qui explique la consommation du riz par les pauvres et celle qui explique la consommation de mil/sorgho par la strate à revenu moyen.

Les R^2 ajustés des régressions ont été les suivants.

Tableau 8 - Résultat des R^2 ajustés par strate et par type de céréales

| Céréales | Riz | Maïs | Petit mil sorgho |
|----------|------|------|------------------|
| Strates | | | |
| Pauvres | 0,62 | 0,14 | 0,22 |
| Moyens | 0,30 | 0,17 | 0,44 |
| Riches | 0,19 | 0,13 | 0,17 |

Les trois équations de prix consistent pour chaque céréale, à une régression du prix de la céréale en question sur : une variable "dummy" pour la saison (un groupe de deux mois) ; l'aide alimentaire en riz, en maïs/sorgho rouge, et en petit mil/sorgho blanc, pour le mois actuel ; puis, les mêmes variables, avec un décalage d'un mois.

Les élasticités et autres coefficients indiquées sont significatifs à un niveau de 10 % ou mieux ; en fait celles indiquées ont été significatives à 1 % ou mieux.

Nous nous limiterons pour la discussion des résultats, aux coefficients "significatifs" dans le sens statistique.

Le premier résultat à remarquer est que le prix du riz n'explique pas de manière significative la consommation du riz. La consommation du riz par les ménages pauvres n'est pas élastique par rapport au revenu. Par conséquent, si le revenu d'un ménage pauvre s'accroît de 1 %, la quantité demandée de riz par ce ménage n'augmentera que de 0,8 %. Pourtant, l'élasticité par rapport au revenu est proche de l'unité dans chaque strate ; ainsi, le riz n'est pas un "bien de luxe".

Il y a un certain nombre de facteurs très significatifs dans l'explication de la variation des habitudes de consommer du riz par les ménages à travers les mois, qui ne relèvent ni du prix ni du revenu.

1 Le revenu est mesuré par les dépenses totales.

2 Toutes les variables prises en compte sont citées en début de l'annexe 3.

Observons d'abord qu'il est important d'éliminer l'élément non aléatoire de la méthode par laquelle nous avons mesuré la consommation mensuelle du riz. C'est-à-dire, nous avons transformé les observations sur le riz préparé, en termes de riz en graine. Ainsi, si deux ménages dépensent la même somme en franc (CFA) pour le riz, mais le deuxième a une proportion plus élevée de riz préparé, le deuxième ménage montrera une consommation en kilogramme plus basse. Pour éliminer ce biais, nous avons inclus la variable "pourcentage de riz préparé par rapport à la consommation totale de riz", et de même pour le mil. Pour le riz, le coefficient ainsi obtenu est négatif, comme prévu. L'explication relève du fait qu'à quantité égale, le prix du riz préparé est plus cher.

Il est intéressant de constater que le coefficient de la variable "la proportion d'enfants dans le ménage" est négatif. A facteurs égaux, ceci signifie que moins il y a d'enfants dans un ménage, plus on consomme de riz.

Ce phénomène peut être lié à la consommation assez importante de riz préparé par les ménages pauvres et généralement à famille nombreuse. En effet, nous avons remarqué qu'à dépenses égales en valeur pour le riz, le ménage qui a une proportion plus élevée de riz préparé consomme une quantité plus faible de riz. D'ailleurs le coefficient est négatif uniquement chez les pauvres. Il est positif et peu significatif dans les autres strates de revenus.

Remarquons que dans les équations du riz pour les ménages pauvres, la variable "le chef cultive" est un facteur significatif pour expliquer le mode de consommation. Ceci est dû en partie au fait que les ménages cultivateurs consomment des quantités importantes de leur production de petit mil et de sorgho blanc. La possibilité que ces ménages soient plus traditionnels, étant liés à la terre, peut être une cause à considérer.

Examinons maintenant les équations pour la demande du maïs. Nous constatons la confirmation d'un certain nombre d'éléments qui ont été soulevés dans l'annexe 3... La substitution des céréales traditionnelles (en particulier, le petit mil et le sorgho) par le maïs et vice-versa reste très facile à réaliser. Nous trouvons que la sensibilité de la consommation du maïs à son propre prix (notamment pour le cas de la strate moyenne), et au prix du petit mil/sorgho, est très forte. Cela confirme le point de vue exprimé précédemment à savoir que le phénomène de "substitution", durant la période de l'enquête, existe entre le mil/sorgho et le maïs, et non pas de manière significative entre le mil/sorgho d'un côté, et le prix de l'autre. Observons aussi que les élasticités de la demande par rapport au revenu sont élastiques dans le cas du maïs, mais de manière faible.

Finalement, l'examen de l'équation de la demande de mil/sorgho montre que, comme dans le cas du riz, l'effet des prix reste très faible (et non pas significatif). Pourtant, les élasticités de la demande par rapport aux changements dans le revenu sont significatives au niveau des pauvres et de la strate moyenne.

L'image générale qui se présente est que la demande de riz de mil/sorgho n'est pas très sensible, ni au revenu, ni à son propre prix. Les autres variables, telles que l'urbanisation ou la structure démographique du ménage, sont des déterminants importants du mode de consommation. Par contre, la demande du maïs est très sensible aussi bien aux prix des autres céréales, qu'au revenu. La substitution existe donc principalement entre le maïs et le mil/sorgho. Ceci peut aboutir à la conséquence très importante, qu'une augmentation du prix du riz diminuerait aussi le revenu réel des pauvres, qui risqueraient de continuer à consommer cette denrée. Il est peu probable qu'ils abandonnent le riz malgré une augmentation de son prix, à moins qu'elle ne soit très élevée.

Par contre, la consommation de riz, par strate moyenne et riche, paraît être plus sensible au prix. Donc une telle politique pourrait, en effet, freiner la consommation totale urbaine du riz, et aurait moins d'effets a posteriori sur le revenu des moyens et des riches.

Si le phénomène d'urbanisation est une variable importante dans le mode ou le choix de la consommation des céréales doit-on lier ce facteur au coût de préparation et au temps qui y est consacré ?

Coûts de préparation des céréales et temps des ménages

Dans les deux enquêtes, nous avons remarqué que les ménages manifestaient leur préférence à consommer le riz au déjeuner et le tô au dîner. C'est du moins ce que l'analyse qualitative tendait à faire apparaître. Le but de ce chapitre est de tenter une quantification.

Il sera examiné successivement (1) la fréquence de la consommation du riz et du tô ; (2) le coût relatif de préparation (3) la préférence selon le moment de la journée pour chaque tercile.

III.2.1 - La probabilité¹ d'apparition de la consommation du riz et du tô ?

1 Nous préférons raisonner en termes probabilistes car le choix des types de repas est expliqué par un ensemble assez important de facteurs qui rend la distribution aléatoire.

Dans le sous échantillon des résultats pour le mois de juillet 1985, nous avons relevé la distribution aléatoire pour les prises de repas à midi.

Tableau 9 - Répartition du type de repas à midi

| Type de repas | Nombre de repas | Probabilité |
|---------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Riz | 211 | 0,73 |
| Tô | 57 | 0,20 |
| Autres | 20 | 0,07 |
| | 288 | 1,00 |

La distinction par strate, donne les probabilités suivantes.

Tableau 10 - Probabilité élémentaire de consommation des repas à midi par strate

| Strate | | | |
|---------------|---------|--------|--------|
| Type de repas | Pauvres | Moyens | Riches |
| Riz | 0,67 | 0,75 | 0,72 |
| Tô | 0,27 | 0,19 | 0,15 |
| Autres | 0,06 | 0,06 | 0,13 |
| | 1,00 | 1,00 | 1,00 |

Ces probabilités expriment le rapport entre la consommation effective de la céréale et tout ce qui a été consommé à midi par chaque tercio. Autrement dit il existe une forte probabilité dans chaque strate à consommer davantage le riz qu'un autre plat. Toutefois nous ne savons pas pour le moment les motifs d'un choix. Pour ce faire nous allons examiner le coût de préparation tant du point de vue monétaire que du temps.

Le coût relatif de préparation

Il sera tenu compte ici de trois éléments :

- l'équipement en matériel pour chaque céréale ;
- le temps de préparation ;
- le coût monétaire pour la céréale et sa sauce.

L'équipement en matériel pour chaque céréale

Thiombiano A. (1985) a comptabilisé qu'il fallait 17 instruments en moyenne pour les différentes phases de traitement du mil jusqu'au produit final le tô contre 9 pour le riz. Pour obtenir le tô à partir du mil il faut deux fois plus d'instruments que le riz. Les instruments supplémentaires sont : le moulin et/ou le mortier et le pilon, deuxalebasses, une bassine, un seau et une natte.

Le moulin n'exclut pas souvent l'usage du mortier notamment pour piler certains ingrédients de la sauce de tô (soumbala). Par contre la bassine et le seau ont plusieurs usages telle la blanchisserie alors que

la natte servira à dormir. L'évaluation monétaire reste assez difficile sauf pour le moulin. Quant aux calabasses, elles ont un coût assez faible. 500 F en moyenne pour les deux, amortissables en une année. Tout cet ensemble donne approximativement un coût supplémentaire de 50 F y compris le moulin pour 1 kg de mil/sorgho écrasé.

Cet arsenal pour le tô n'explique cependant pas qu'il faut plus de temps que le riz pour la préparation.


Le temps de préparation

Pour chacune des céréales il y a lieu de distinguer deux phases : l'une préliminaire ; l'autre de préparation effective ou cuisson.

(a) Temps préliminaire


Le mil, le sorgho et le maïs se présentent sous une forme brute et de ce fait nécessitent des traitements préalables. Selon A. Thiombiano il faudrait en moyenne un jour à 2,5 jours pour cette première phase. Il pense que pour le mil ou le sorgho, un seul jour est suffisant alors que pour le maïs il en faut un minimum de 2,5 jours.

Schéma : Passage du grain de céréales traditionnelles à la farine



Deux solutions s'offrent au ménage : la première c'est-à-dire après le trie aller directement au moulin pour faire enlever le son, cette opération dure une journée : la deuxième voie consiste à passer par le canal du lavage pour être sûr d'éliminer le maximum de déchets. Cette dernière opération est plus longue puisque les passages pour le séchage et le moulin se font deux fois. Au total la durée pour obtenir l'input est de 1 à 2,5 jours.

Schéma 2 Passage du grain de riz au riz pour la cuisson



L'avantage pour le riz, qu'il soit local ou importé, est qu'il se présente déjà étuvé. Le plus souvent dans le cas du riz importé et acheté en sacs, il n'existe même pas d'opération de trie, il n'y a que le lavage. Le temps de chronométrage relevé par A. Thiombiano pour apprêter le riz pour la cuisson est d'un maximum de 17 minutes.

En terme de temps de travail pour le mil, sorgho ou maïs, si toutes les opérations étaient continues, ce temps ne serait pas moins de 8 heures de travail pour une personne embauchée exclusivement pour ces tâches. Financièrement en comptabilisant l'usage de l'eau pour le lavage et le coût du travail, l'estimation serait de 40 F/kg. Pour le riz, le coût en travail et en eau est si faible que sa prise en compte n'est pas utile.

(B) Temps de cuisson et coût monétaire

Nous partirons des observations faites par A. Thiombiano sur 52 ménage. Il a relevé les temps suivants considérés comme un temps moyen de préparation dans cet échantillon.

Tableau 11 - Temps de cuisson du riz et du tô et la sauce correspondante en mn

| | Riz | Tô |
|--------------|------------|------------|
| Riz | 32 | - |
| Sauce | 96 | 66 |
| Tô | - | 36 |
| Total | 128 | 102 |

Ces résultats signifient qu'il faut 128 minutes pour obtenir à la fois le riz et sa sauce pour la consommation immédiate. Le temps d'obtention du tô du tamisage de la farine à la sauce est estimée à 102 minutes. Or, la quantité moyenne en Kg de chaque céréale pour ce temps et par ménage est de 2kg pour le riz et 2,37 kg pour le tô. Dans l'hypothèse où l'on admet que ce temps est proportionnel à la quantité il s'ensuit :

- 64 minutes pour 1 kg de riz,
- 43 minutes pour 1 kg de farine de mil/sorgho ou maïs

En termes de temps, l'indicateur de proportion du temps de préparation d'un repas pour 1 kg de farine (sauce comprise) par rapport au temps pour un repas pour 1 kg de riz avec sauce est de 0,67.

La conversion en quantité de combustible (bois, charbon ou gaz) pour une heure de temps équivaldrait à la consommation de moins d'un tas de bois vendu à 125 F. Il est attribué un coefficient de 0,60 soit l'équivalent monétaire de 75 F.

Le temps de cuisson ramené sous forme monétaire équivaut à :

- 80 F pour 1 kg de riz ;
- 54 F pour 1 kg de farine.

Des enquêtes effectuées sur un sous échantillon de 15 ménages ont permis de chiffrer le coût monétaire des ingrédients d'une sauce "type" pour le riz et d'une sauce "type" pour le tô. Le rapport de ces deux coûts est de 0,62, la sauce de tô coûtant moins chère. Quant au rapport du coût monétaire, du tô par rapport au riz il est de 0,54.

Si nous intégrons ces différents coûts monétaires tout en acceptant que certaines de nos évaluations reposent sur des hypothèses qui restent à confirmer, l'indicateur du coût monétaire du tô y compris la sauce par rapport au riz à la sauce est de 1,60.

C'est donc dire qu'un kilogramme de céréales traditionnelles transformées disponibles avec la sauce revient à 1,6 fois plus cher qu'un kg de riz préparé avec sauce. A quoi il faut ajouter la phase préliminaire de préparation bien que les calculs soient très approximatifs, il est néanmoins clair que le temps nécessaire à consacrer à la préparation du tô est long et encore plus long par rapport au riz si la phase préliminaire pour préparer la farine est comptabilisée.

Au regard de ces rapports comment les différentes strates réagissent par rapport au choix de la céréale à préparer pour la consommation ?

La préférence des plats selon le moment de la journée

Les probabilités calculées ont été obtenues à partir du sous échantillon du mois de juillet 1985.

Tableau 12 - Répartition des probabilités de consommation de riz et de tô selon le moment de la journée par strate.

| Rapports | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | tô nuit | riz nuit | riz midi | tô midi | riz midi | riz nuit |
| | tout re- | tout re- | tout re- | tout re- | tout re- | tout re- |
| Strate | pas nuit | pas nuit | pas midi | pas midi | pas riz | pas riz |
| Pauvres | 0,83 | 0,14 | 0,67 | 0,27 | 0,76 | 0,24 |
| Moyens | 0,79 | 0,17 | 0,75 | 0,19 | 0,84 | 0,16 |
| riches | 0,64 | 0,22 | 0,72 | 0,15 | 0,84 | 0,16 |

Le choix des ménages ne souffre d'aucune ambiguïté pour l'ensemble des strates. Les probabilités pour un ménage de préparer et de consommer le riz ou le tô à midi ou le soir sont de : 0,71 pour le riz à midi et de 0,75 pour le tô le soir. La probabilité pour un ménage quelconque de consommer le tô à midi est de 0,20 et le riz le soir de 0,18.

Au regard de ces résultats, nous pouvons dire que quelle que soit la strate de revenu, les ménages consomment davantage le riz à midi que le soir. Cette préférence semble être en relation avec le temps comme il a été démontré plus haut. En effet la plupart des femmes dans les ménages exercent une activité salariée ou de commerce. De telles activités ne leur donnent pas la possibilité de revenir préparer un repas

tel que le tô à midi. Le riz par contre peut même être fait par des boys cuisiniers ; tel n'est pas le cas pour le tô.

Tableau 13 - Structure de l'emploi des épouses et structure conjugale

| Strate revenus | Pauvres | Moyens | Riches | Echantillon entier |
|--|---------|--------|--------|--------------------|
| Nature emploi | | | | |
| I - Structure emploi épouses | | | | |
| 1.épouses travaillant | 64 | 53 | 41 | 53 |
| 2.ménages avec épouses travaillant | | | | |
| 3.épouses salariées | 74 | 62 | 47 | 61 |
| 4.épouses vendant du riz ou du mil préparé | 3 | 10 | 23 | 12 |
| II - Structures conjugales | | | | |
| 1.ménage monogame | 23 | 33 | 10 | 22 |
| 2. célibataires | 54 | 53 | 72 | 59 |
| | 3 | 8 | 13 | 8 |

Source : Enquête CEDRES/IPPRI

Officiellement il est établi que 61 % des ménages ont des épouses qui travaillent. Il est fort aisé dans ces conditions de comprendre les motifs d'une telle préférence des ménages. Le temps constituerait un paramètre important dans la prise de décision des ménages à consommer le riz et en particulier à midi.

Conclusion

Les observations empiriques de 1983 et de 1985 menées sur des échantillons différents permettent de conclure dans un premier moment à l'existence de la loi d'Engel entre la demande alimentaire et le revenu au sein des ménages à Ouagadougou.

A l'intérieur de la consommation alimentaire, une augmentation des revenus des riches tout comme une baisse des prix des céréales traditionnelles au lieu d'accroître la demande de ces produits entraînent plutôt une augmentation sensible de la demande de céréales importées.

En règle générale, si chaque strate modifie sa consommation à la suite d'un accroissement de son revenu dans le sens de la catégorie immédiatement supérieure (hypothèse dite du revenu relatif de J.S. Duesenberry) cela entraîne une baisse des proportions de céréales locales consommées. Cette hypothèse se vérifie ici dans le cas d'une modification des prix relatifs entre céréales locales et céréales importées (cf. Annexe 2).

De telle sorte qu'en milieu urbain, une augmentation des revenus des ménages ou une baisse relative des prix des céréales locales par rapport aux céréales importées entraîne une réduction de la demande et de la consommation de ces céréales traditionnelles.

Il existe cependant un paradoxe car comme il a été démontré, les pauvres consacrent une part assez importante de leurs dépenses alimentaires à l'achat de riz. Une augmentation par l'Etat du prix du riz au regard de la loi précédemment énoncée pénaliserait surtout les catégories à revenus faibles.

Tableau 14 - Répartition des probabilités selon le type de repas

| Rapports | Riz maison | Riz acheté déjà préparé | Total riz | Total T0 |
|----------|------------|----------------------------|------------|------------|
| Strates | tous repas | tous repas | tous repas | tous repas |
| Pauvres | 0,28 | 0,13 | 0,41 | 0,54 |
| Moyens | 0,46 | 0,03 | 0,49 | 0,46 |
| Riches | 0,41 | 0,06 | 0,47 | 0,40 |

L'importance du riz acheté déjà préparé chez les pauvres montrent également les contraintes d'emploi qui empêchent certains d'entre eux de pouvoir revenir à la maison à midi. S'il y a augmentation du prix du riz ces pauvres subiront doublement l'effet prix : au niveau du riz préparé à la maison ; ensuite les femmes des restaurants ou celles qui vendent sur les chantiers vont réduire les quantités vendues tout en gardant le même prix.

Un second résultat de cette recherche est l'inélasticité de la demande de riz par rapport au prix voire du revenu. L'explication de ce phénomène est due à deux facteurs : le temps et la nature de l'emploi des urbains à Ouagadougou. Cette inélasticité de la demande de riz au prix traduit l'inexistence d'un effet de substitution entre céréales traditionnelles (mil, sorgho, maïs) et les céréales importées (riz notamment).

Il se pose à long terme un problème de politique économique pour l'Etat qui se soucie d'augmenter la production céréalière traditionnelle et le pouvoir d'achat des paysans par un relèvement des prix desdites céréales.

Le phénomène d'urbanisation étant un phénomène irréversible dans tout pays, le Burkina Faso dans son processus de développement verra cet effet s'accroître. Ainsi cette politique économique orthodoxe ne pourra pas continuer car les déterminants de la consommation à Ouagadougou tout en dépendant des revenus et des prix intègrent la variable temps et la nature de l'emploi.

Annexe 1 - Coefficient de dépenses de consommation

| désignation | Coefficient de dépense de chaque strate de revenu par rapport à sa dépense alimentaire totale | | |
|---------------------------------|---|-------|-------|
| | Revenus | | |
| mil | 9,23 | 14,93 | 23,33 |
| maïs | 4,55 | 3,44 | 3,70 |
| riz | 12,47 | 16,84 | 9,52 |
| Sous total | 26,75 | 35,21 | 36,55 |
| Pâtes alimentaires | 1,21 | 0,70 | 0,28 |
| Couscous | 0,28 | 0,14 | 0 |
| tubercules | 2,15 | 2,38 | 1,99 |
| Sous total | 3,64 | 3,22 | 2,27 |
| viandes | 16,40 | 11,80 | 10,41 |
| poissons | 2,65 | 2,09 | 3 |
| oeufs | 0,06 | 0,12 | 0,04 |
| Sous total | 19,11 | 14,30 | 13,45 |
| légumes | 10,80 | 10,76 | 9,40 |
| épices | 6,11 | 6,48 | 6,12 |
| huiles et beurres | 5,14 | 4,16 | 3,56 |
| tomates concentrées | 2,30 | 1,06 | 1,35 |
| Sous total | 24,35 | 22,46 | 20,43 |
| Produits laitiers | 1,51 | 1,05 | 0,34 |
| Sucre et sucreries | 0,98 | 0,58 | 0,27 |
| pain | 1,00 | 0,80 | 0,20 |
| nescafé | 0,16 | 0,05 | 0,03 |
| poisson | 0,30 | 0,21 | 0,25 |
| fruits | 1,01 | 0,11 | 0,19 |
| Sous total | 5,02 | 2,80 | 1,28 |
| Aliments préparés à l'extérieur | 1,34 | 1 | 4,07 |
| autres | 1,50 | 2 | 1,81 |
| Sous total | 2,84 | 3 | 5,88 |

Consommation Urbaine à Ouagadougou

| | | | |
|------------|-------|-------|-------|
| eau | 5,97 | 5,95 | 6,62 |
| bois | 6,80 | 5,37 | 8,30 |
| charbon | 1,58 | 0,60 | 0,64 |
| gaz | 1,44 | 0,00 | 0,00 |
| moulin | 1,91 | 2,13 | 1,97 |
| Sous total | 17,70 | 17,95 | 17,53 |
| Divers | 0,59 | 1,06 | 2,61 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Source : T. Thiombiano, S. Soulama et C. Wetta : les systèmes alimentaires au Burkina Faso in les résultats de recherche du CEDRES N 001 Juin 1988.

Annexe 2 - Répartition par saison de la consommation de chaque céréale par personne (UEA) et par strate (en pourcentage de la consommation totale par strate et par saison)

| Cultures et saisons : | Pauvres | Moyens | Riches | Ensemble |
|-----------------------|---------|--------|--------|----------|
| Petit mil | | | | |
| Récolte 1984 | 16 | 11 | 11 | 14 |
| Froide 1985 | 17 | 12 | 09 | 13 |
| Chaude 1985 | 23 | 20 | 15 | 20 |
| Pluvieuse 1985 | 15 | 17 | 10 | 14 |
| Récolte 1985 | 18 | 23 | 12 | 18 |
| Sorgho blanc | | | | |
| Récolte 1984 | 06 | 08 | 07 | 07 |
| Froide 1985 | 18 | 09 | 11 | 13 |
| Chaude 1985 | 22 | 20 | 10 | 18 |
| Pluvieuse 1985 | 25 | 17 | 11 | 19 |
| Récolte 1985 | 19 | 10 | 09 | 13 |
| Maïs | | | | |
| Récolte 1984 | 36 | 41 | 32 | 37 |
| Froide 1985 | 24 | 33 | 16 | 25 |
| Chaude 1985 | 14 | 19 | 14 | 16 |
| Pluvieuse 1985 | 21 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
| Récolte 1985 | 15 | 12 | 17 | 14 |
| Riz | | | | |
| Récolte 1984 | 37 | 29 | 30 | 32 |
| Froide 1985 | 35 | 38 | 42 | 38 |
| Chaude 1985 | 36 | 32 | 38 | 35 |
| Pluvieuse 1985 | 35 | 40 | 39 | 38 |
| Récolte 1985 | 41 | 43 | 39 | 41 |
| Blé | | | | |
| Récolte 1984 | 04 | 08 | 21 | 10 |

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| | | | | |
|---|------|------|------|------|
| Froide 1985 | 06 | 07 | 22 | 11 |
| Chaude 1985 | 05 | 09 | 23 | 11 |
| Pluvieuse 1985 | 04 | 10 | 23 | 11 |
| Récolte 1985 | 07 | 12 | 22 | 13 |
| L'ensemble des céréales (ci-dessus) | | | | |
| Récolte 1984 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Froide 1985 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Chaude 1985 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Pluvieuse 1985 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Récolte 1985 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Niveaux en Kg. par personne (UEA) et par mois | | | | |
| Récolte 1984 | 10,2 | 14,5 | 14,2 | 12,8 |
| Froide 1985 | 8,3 | 13,7 | 16,7 | 12,4 |
| Chaude 1985 | 8,3 | 13,5 | 11,6 | 11,0 |
| Pluvieuse 1985 | 10,1 | 11,6 | 14,9 | 11,8 |
| Récolte 1985 | 7,4 | 9,6 | 13,7 | 09,8 |

Source : T. Reardon, T. Thiombiano - C. Delgado (1)

Notes: Les saisons sont définies selon la disponibilité des données comme :

Récolte 1984, Oct.-Nov. 1984

Froide 1985, Déc. 1984-Février 1985

Chaude 1985, Mars-Mai 1985

Pluvieuse 1985, Juin-Août 1985

Récolte 1985, Septembre 1985.

Annexe 3 :

Les trois équations de consommation de céréales (en kgs.) par ménage consistent, pour chaque céréale, à une régression de la consommation sur les variables suivantes : les trois prix de céréales (variables endogènes) ; la proportion de la valeur des achats de la céréale en question en forme préparée, divisée par la valeur totale d'achats de cette céréale dans toutes les formes ; la dépense mensuelle totale en F CFA du ménage ; la taille du ménage en personnes (non pondérées) ; le pourcentage d'enfants; une variable "dummy" indiquant que le chef a comme emploi principal le commerce : pourcentage de petits enfants par rapport au nombre total d'enfants ; une variable "dummy" pour la monogamie ; une variable "dummy" pour le niveau de formation du chef ; une variable "dummy" pour le chef de ménage salarié ; une variable "dummy" pour une épouse qui vend du petit mil ou du riz préparé; une variable "dummy" si le chef de ménage exerce une activité agricole; une variable "dummy" pour une épouse salariée.

L'équation de la demande du riz (en kilogrammes consommés par personnes

Les élasticités

| | | | |
|----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Prix du riz | 1,13 | -0,56 | -4,04 |
| Prix du maïs | -0,76 | 0,23 | -0,31 |
| Prix du mil/sorgho | 0,70 | -0,35 | -0,96 |
| Dépenses totales du ménage | 0,79* | 0,72* | 1,01* |

L'effet linéaire d'un changement dans la variable indiquée sur la consommation du riz

| | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| % riz préparé/riz total | -39,8* | -21,0* | -28,1* |
| % enfants/toutes personnes | -49,4* | 12,9 | 20,4 |
| <u>Variables "dummy"</u> | | | |
| Moins de 6 ans à Ouaga | 23,2* | 9,6 | -4,9 |
| Chef salarié | -26,9* | 6,4 | -6,8 |
| Chef exerçant une activité agricole | -28,1* | 6,0 | -3,1 |

L'équation de la demande du maïs (en kilogrammes consommés par personne).

Les élasticités :

| | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------|--------|-------|
| Prix du riz | -5,88 | 2,57 | -5,00 |
| Prix du maïs | -2,00 | -7,00 | -2,05 |
| Prix du mil/sorgho | 3,11* | 3,80* | 0,97 |
| Dépenses totales du ménage | 1,11* | 1,03* | 1,28* |
| <u>Variables "dummy"</u> | | | |
| Chef salarié | 14,7* | -22,2* | -9,5 |
| Chef employé dans le commerce : | 16,9* | -5 | -2,0 |

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L'équation de la demande du petit mil/sorgho blanc (en kilogrammes consommés par personne)

Les élasticités

| | | | |
|----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Prix du riz | -0,69 | 4,08 | 7,85 |
| Prix du maïs | 0,98 | 1,56 | 0,08 |
| Prix du mil/sorgho | -1,01 | 1,05 | -0,32 |
| Dépenses totales du ménage | 0,87* | 0,91* | 0,68 |

L'effet linéaire d'un changement dans la variable indiquée sur la consommation du petit mil et du sorgho blanc

| | | | |
|-------------------------------|---------|--------|--------|
| % mil préparé/mil total | -124,1* | -73,6* | -56,0* |
| <u>Variables "dummy"</u> | | | |
| Nombre d'années à Ouagadougou | -20,2* | -9,5 | -,7* |

Notes :

L'élasticité est le changement en pourcentage de la quantité demandée qui résulte d'un changement de 1 % pour la variable indiquée ; "l'effet linéaire du changement d'une variable" peut être interprété comme le changement observé pour la quantité consommée suite à un changement dans la variable indiquée ; le coefficient indiqué pour un "dummy" est le changement du niveau de base de la quantité demandée, causé par la présence du facteur indiqué.

Les élasticités sont des estimations correspondant aux valeurs moyennes de l'échantillon pour la période octobre 1984 à septembre 1985. Les élasticités sont estimées utilisant la méthode des moindres carrés en deux étapes sur une coupe transversale de séries chronologiques. Les données comprennent 17 variables et 400 observations par équation.

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Development, an Area of Multi-Disciplinary Junction

Habib El Malki*

RÉSUMÉ. Après quelques décades essentiellement caractérisées par une domination nette et un engouement pour les sciences économiques, les années soixante dix marquèrent le déclin progressif de ce qui constituait jusqu'à cette période la principale base de validation de l'économie: la croissance; les crises qui commencèrent à faire jour entamèrent sérieusement et même remirent en question la mystique de la croissance. Ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler l'économie du développement commença à rivaliser avec la science économique en particulier dans l'espace Tiers-Monde où il y eut une prolifération de travaux divers de qualité inégale. Ce nouveau venu dans le monde de l'économie se caractérise par une éclosion récente, une faible autonomisation ainsi que par des éléments constitutifs définissables et indéfinissables. Le paradigme du développement qui se soumettait ainsi à un nouveau développement se façonne progressivement sous l'action de deux courants : le courant de pensée dominant avec sa vision horlogère qui le sous-tend pose le problème du développement en termes de rattrapage alors que l'approche du courant de pensée critique se veut structurelle, dynamique et totalisante. Ces deux courants ont cependant en commun la prise en compte des facteurs économiques, la rupture avec le marché mondial et la conception de l'industrialisation de base en tant que phénomène de rupture. Cependant, un certain nombre de facteurs suscitent de nouvelles interrogations, de nouvelles inquiétudes à propos du Tiers-Monde des années 80 et imposent une nouvelle grille de lecture d'une réalité en complexification croissante. Le paradigme du développement est en crise de développement sur le triple plan idéologique, analytique et sur celui des finalités. Le discours sur le Développement se met à la recherche d'un nouveau développement qui ne peut en aucun cas rester confiné dans les limites étroites d'une seule et unique discipline. Le développement devient un espace de convergence multidisciplinaire. Il intègre désormais plusieurs autres dimensions : philosophique, culturelle avec au centre l'Homme.

Is Economics a Development Science?

This is not at all a new question and concerns all the social science disciplines. But, in light of the changes which are underway, it poses a challenge. In effect, the ability of economics to investigate, act and plan is seriously being challenged. It is faced with the difficulty of grasping the new crisis-generated situation and more serious problems of forecasting - indeed, its control over technical and economic parameters and their interrelations is getting weaker parallel to the increase in the number of these parameters.

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Apparently the waves of enthusiasm which maintained the domination and sovereignty of economics for long decades are subsiding, gradually giving way to concern, questions, even total confusion. What has gone awry? is it economics? is it the world economy? is it society? A kind of "shivering" economism has played a key role in this process: efforts had been made to turn economics into a fact producing apparatus, a supplier of key responses to questions affecting the destiny of the different regions of the world. Hence the prevalence of the instrumentalist view of economics. Economics was in command and everything else depended on the production of goods and services. The other dimensions including the human dimension and the biosphere or the environmental dimension¹ were not taken into account in the conventional perception of economics. One of the major limitations of economics resides in the weak if not the absence of articulation of the three dimensions. The process of growth which started in the post-World War II period and which ran out of steam toward the late '60s was the major factor that contributed to the validity of economics. The crisis brought the myth of growth to an end. And yet it is known that growth feeds off crises just as crises are products of growth. This is to underline that growth and crises are two aspects of the same process inherent in the evolution of economy and society. Consequently, one should look elsewhere for the validity of a social science. The major difference between the pre-crisis period and the present situation lies in the objectives - *How is growth to come about and for what?* Could a response to such questions accelerate the advent of the post-crisis period?

This challenge to economics is even more profound in the Third World, where the structural characteristics are different from industrialized countries. And yet the Third World has provided a new field of analysis and experimentation for economic theory during the last forty years. This space provided by the Third World has generated a new economics as a result of its specific social, cultural and economic dimension. In effect and especially since the 1950s, a variety of research of uneven quality have been

1 M. R. Passet used an image which is based on three distinct dimensions: the economic dimension, the human dimension and the biosphere. The first one is a sub-system of the second dimension which is itself incorporated into the third one. See "Quelques repères pour une ouverture de la science économique à l'environnement" cyclo-styled paper. International Symposium on Environment and Social Sciences within the framework of General Education. UNESCO, Paris, February 17-21, 1986.

accumulated progressively and constitute what is known as *Development economics*. How could it be defined? Is it an outgrowth, an extension or a break from academic political economy?

Has it got a specific objective? If the idea of capitalism was conceived by political economy whose present preoccupation is the future of this very capitalism as the dominant socio-economic system, can one then say that the vocation of development economics is one of "conceiving" the Third World as well as its development? If so, with what types of instruments of analysis and theoretical framework?¹? Is this a dividing line that is sharp enough for development economics to claim a specific epistemological status?

Development economics has the following three outstanding characteristics:

(a) its recent development - Dating back to the late 1940's development economics reached its peak in the 1960's following the attainment of political independence in Africa, the support of the Vietnam War and the enthusiastic support for the Chinese and Cuban revolutions;

(b) a weak autonomy - Development economics appears more like a branch of political economy and bears a strong theoretical imprint of the latter. This explains why attempts to develop new categories of analysis and more relevant frameworks of interpretation have been submerged under borrowed categories and frameworks. Nevertheless, under the weight of the reality of the Third World and the new problems it engendered there emerged a number of studies which focus on the non-economic dimension by integrating the contributions made by the other disciplines such as anthropology, history, sociology, philosophy, etc. The complex of reality could thus be better expressed from such a new multi-faceted perspective. This multi-disciplinary breakthrough has been made possible taken up later². The decompartmentalization of the different disciplines has always been a powerful tool in the advance of social knowledge. In this context one of the most significant lessons to be drawn is that focussing on the economic dimension alone is inadequate. Such an approach has often been glossed over in the past.

1 As W. Arthur Lewis sees it, "development economic deals with the structure and operation of economics with a per capita production reaching at most \$2000 in 1980". *American Economic Review* (March 1984). Title of translated paper "Où en est l'économie du développement"? Problèmes économiques N 1877, 6 Juin 1984, Documentation Française, Paris.

2 largely as a result of extensive debates on development this point will be.

(c) Non-definable and definable element of development economics. This aspect can be adequately illustrated by the opacity of the subject of development economics - the Third World. Where does it start? Where does it end? A number of factors widen the gap and intensify the contrast between whatever "constitutes" the Third World; these include: areas, populations, resources, levels of economic development, forms of integration into the World Market, the nature and forms of state organization, the colonial legacy, culture and beliefs. The extreme diversity of the situation reminds us once again of how the concept Third World is "a Vague, inconsistent non definable and a catch-all"¹. How could the same expression include countries as different as Brazil, the Central African Republic, South Korea, Haiti, Taiwan to name just a few. The imprecision and ambiguity surrounding the terminology raises serious problems as to the definition of this concept. And the exuberant vocabulary cannot conceal the inconsistency of the notions utilized - poor countries, backward countries, dependent countries, developing countries, proletarian nations.

The non-definable element of the concept Third World seems to be rather significant. Limiting its boundaries in order to delineate its field of analysis underlines the vast task expected from both development economics and social scientists as a whole.

Development, a Developing Paradigm

The recent origin of Development economics, its weak autonomy and the opacity of its subject of analysis, in sum, does its fragile status not constitute an obstacle towards its advancement or, on the contrary does it generate very useful tools for advancing specific areas of analysis? In this context, a quick evaluation of the two major schools of thought which moulded the development paradigm - the dominant school and the critical school of thought - may contribute towards a clearer idea.

From a "one way" reading of the history of development - it appears that one feature that stands out in the dominant school of thought is reductionism. The *time-bound vision* which underlies this reductionism is mechanical and static by definition and poses the problem of development in terms of catching-up. In this scenario, development is a long-distance race the end of which is nothing but a mirage, a horizon which seems to be moving further away. Hence any attempt at following the same circuit and adopting a referential model which was imposed will be tantamount to entering a game of fools with rigged rules right from the beginning. It is in this context, that Rostow's Notion of backwardness, of Nurkse's vicious circles Nurkse's and Hirschman's disequilibria and Hecksher-Ohlin's com-

1 See "Une bête à abattre, le Tiers-mondisme". *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Mai 1985.

parative advantage, as the basis of international specialization take their significance.

Of course one should not reject all these analytical categories (backwardness, vicious circles equilibrium, comparative advantage). Varying in their degree of relevance, they have helped in the understanding of the functions and dysfunction of a number of local and international mechanisms. But are they capable of promoting new structures which would be conducive to a new departure for the Third World? In general, the approach of the dominant school of thought provides support in the rationalization of the system to which it belongs and which it pretends to analyze. Thus it sees the concepts which it uses as being naturally the best, first class notions. It advocates gradual steps without upheavals but those which are capable of leading to breaks. It also champions harmony and non-antagonism, so as to reduce uncertainties. Although this approach does recognize conflicts of interest between different groups of people, it rejects any possibility of a correspondence, i.e. of a dialectics, between such a fact and the possible attendant structural disruptions. Within the system itself a dynamic develops which gradually transforms the system leading to a new harmonious equilibrium. Furthermore, the mainstream approach has led to the establishment of an empirical criteria for the definition of underdevelopment¹ which is considered from this point of view as being the negation of development. The display of a series of indices and characteristics - which may or may not co-exist and which manifest themselves with more or less acuity depending on each country cannot replace an approach which goes beyond the surface of things. Any criteria is first and foremost instrumental, it helps illustrate but not explain; it describes but cannot analyze. Having privileged that which is measurable, assuming that this is possible in the Third World, it relegates all the essential variables as secondary.

The mainstream approach which is supported by rationalist empiricism does not take into consideration the non-measurable dimension. And yet the reality of the Third World is largely defined by non-measurable variables. However this aspect is not seen merely as a qualitative dimension but encompasses all that which does not fall under the economic sphere - *stricto sensu* - that is, the non-mercantile space, the informal space which either as a rule elude observation or are overlooked. In reality, this approach is not adequately equipped to break new ground; it is imprisoned within the confines of a narrow conception of economics. In this respect, the problems posed by the development of the Third World reveal the intrinsic limits of the conventional approach. When development is per-

1 The most commonly used indicator is the average per capita income.

ceived as an *innovative paradigm*, it challenges both established rules and exaggerated ideas. It is constantly creative.

Does the critical school of thought meet this requirement?

Contrary to the former approach which is characterized by rationalistic, empiricist atomization, the *critical school of thought* has a structural, dynamic, and global approach. It perceives development as a synthesis of several objective and subjective determinations. This approach is supposed to knock down the boundaries of orthodoxy, penetrate the non-measurable sphere and go beyond appearances. To this end, many concepts have developed and include dis-articulation, dualism, developmental poles, human capital, dependency, unequal trade, economic surplus, dilinking. In spite of differences between the supporters of the various theories, many of them contributed to the materialization of this critical school of thought, from the pioneers of the latter all the way to those who maintain it including on the one hand, Perroux, Sauvy, Myrdal, Boeke, Prebish, Furtado¹ and on the other hand Baran, Sweezy, Bettelheim, A.G. Frank, S. Amin, Wallerstein, Belal².

Both variants of this school of thought share a number of features:

(a) *They take non-economic factors into account*-institutions, cultures, value systems, beliefs - so as to understand the reality of the Third World better and devise operational development policies. One can see from this perspective that the combination of capital, technology and market is not the only determinant in economic performances. Education, training, action-oriented research, participation, communication are qualitative factors which play a significant role in the growth of the capacity to innovate in a society.

As a matter of fact, the distinction between economic and non-economic variables is misleading. Whereas such a distinction can be pedagogically useful, at the practical level it leads to an impasse. The critical approach has therefore enlarged the research area of conventional economics. Once again the economic dimension in isolation does not express the complexity of reality. All the more so as in the social sciences reality cannot be placed in vitro for purposes of laboratory experiments.

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- 1 This first variant of the critical school of thought is non-Marxist. It is responsible for an outstanding theoretical and conceptual leap in the study of development. CEPAL, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America has played a key role in breaking new ground in this area.
 - 2 The second variant which claims to support Marx, Lenin and Mao Tse-Toung is an attempt to update the theory of imperialism through an analysis of under development/development.

Breaking away from the world market, constitutes a strong theme in the Marxist variant of development economics. Contrary to the gradual process advocated by the mainstream approach, the Marxist-inspired variant upholds dilinking. Similarly, contrary to **grabbing** the possibilities created by the dynamic nature of the international division of labour advocated by the mainstream economics, the Marxist variants advocate a break as maintaining the framework and the rules of procedure of the present international order can but intensify the existing "asymmetry" and thereby the impact of domination.

Even a good specialization - if it exists - cannot really change the picture. The surplus generated by the Third World continues to be systematically extracted through unequal exchange. As a result the South can only get rid of foreign domination by rejecting international specialization¹. Given the stagnation of the North-South dialogue and the modesty of the concrete results obtained from the various UNCTAD meetings, the defenders of this theory are encouraged to maintain their position.

Moreover during the current crisis, many socialist countries including USSR and China are opening up to the world market. True, it is a controlled opening. It is part of series of reforms destined at supporting the modernization and competitiveness of socialist economies, accelerating the process of transformation and maintaining the level of development already attained by these countries. Does such an opening herald a greater integration of socialist countries into the world market? There is nothing to reproach about such an opening per se. Global integration does not necessarily become the origin of dependance. The relation of development - external relations takes on different significance depending on the level and type of development. In sum, it is governed by the logic of development which is being implemented here and there.

1 In "Le défi du développement indépendant", Editions Rochevignes, 1983, Paris, Ch. A. Michalet underlines that the critics of international specialization are caught in its conceptual framework - and goes on to add that all the different facets of North-South integration are not adequately taken into account... these same critics still give preference to the international market and to the exchange relations that it creates. They gloss over other aspects which in the past fifteen years have been taking increasing significance notably the technico-financial dimension, generated by the impulse of new strategies of transnational corporations.

Basic industrialization: A Source of a break off? - The need for basic industrialization has turned into a dogma as a result of a particular interpretation of a number of development experiences¹. This has given rise to an industry-centered model. Its justification is to be found in the origin of under-development which is portrayed as being the result of the offensive launched by European industrialization against structures that were considered as static. Such a model found its legitimacy in the Stalinian experience of industrial development². This explains why emphasis is placed on industrialization which is defined as being a "process of restructuration of the ensemble of economic and social relations under the pressure of a coherent complex of apparatuses". Theoretically, such an industrialization is supposed to bring about a modernized agriculture, a higher consumption of manufactured goods by the population, and to solve both the "disguised unemployment"³ and the whole problem of unemployment.

This analysis is based on the systematic use of industrialization effects - directly deduced from F. Perroux's spread effects - which are opposed to backwash immiseralisation effects. The issue at stake is that the action of the former effects should outweigh that of the latter.

In this process of restructuration, planning is considered as essential.

The present crisis has shaken the dogma on basic industries. Certainly, one should not underestimate the accomplishments of the industry based model of development. However, it has been noted that "industrializing industries" are not without problems. They have had numerous perverse effects:

-Impoverishment of the rural areas as a result of the marginalization of agriculture; and the dis-articulation of the sectors in order to promote industry has brought about the stagnation if not the decline in the rhythm of economic growth.

-As a disorganized industrial network due to the weakness of small and medium size enterprises.

-Accompanying measures which were inefficient or non existent turning of big industrial ventures into prestigious enterprises.

The examples of the "newly industrialized countries" show that development cannot be achieved through such magical formulas as "turnkey plants". They also indicate that industrial development is a complex

1 These experiences concern the history of developed capitalism and especially the Stalinian development strategy.

2 This was true for India in the '50s when the five year plans were launched, for Egypt in the '60s and for Algeria up to the late '70s.

3 The "disguised unemployment" notion was developed by Gannage' and Leibenstein.

process whose success is conditioned by an agrarian reform (Taiwan - the cyclical rise and descent of the South Korean development experience. In the absence of such efforts, development takes a perverted course which generates new forms of dependence (technological, financial and food).

Paradoxically and through the interaction between facts and ideas, it appears that the development paradigm is developing. It has given rise to polemics and debates, upset excessive patterns of thinking and shaken a number of certitudes. It has generated new concepts or renovated into usage obsolete categories of analysis e.g. dualism, growth/development, structural inflation, disguised unemployment, unequal exchange, appropriate technology, generation/absorption of economic surplus... The development paradigm has made a double contribution, re-inventing the discourse on development and bringing back the *multi-disciplinary practice. In this way it allowed economics to advance both in terms of research and action by the Third World. Furthermore the development paradigm has allowed a dewesternization of reflections on the Third World. More and more this reflection is being undertaken by generations of social scientists that are based in the Third World.

In the meantime, the Third World of the 80's is not that of the 1950's. The globalization of the economic space, the impetus resulting from new forms of industrialization, the emergence of new forms of dependence in the domain of technology, food and finance, the failure of the various United Nations Development Decades, the break in the demographic and environmental equilibria, the ruralisation of big Third World cities as a result of internal migration, all these factors trigger new questions, new concerns and impose a new reading of a growing and complex reality.

Development, a Paradigm Undergoing a Developmental Crisis

The on-going changes have seriously challenged the final goals of development, its validity as an analytical concept, and as a vehicle for the mobilization of populations. The economic, social, cultural profile of the Third World has been profoundly transformed. Given the magnitude of the destructurement which is underway a greater number of people are disappointed and frustrated. This signals the impasse in which we presently find ourselves.

The expanding "circle of the crisis" is surrounding a reality, the theoretical and conceptual grasp of which raises multiple problems. Why is development having more and more difficulties fulfilling its traditional functions; that is, its analytical, mobilizational and its goal-oriented functions?

At the Ideological Level

As a rule, development and social progress are supposed to go hand in hand; It is perceived as such in the collective imagination. In the Third

World this has become quasi mystical, for it has murdered expectations and paved the way for new perspectives. Yet the development policies implemented so far have intensified social inequalities - concentration of urban and rural incomes -, regional disparities - every form of dualism - and cultural discrepancies - as a rule the dominant culture introduced from the outside has turned the local cultures into mere sub-cultures. The successive migrations of the population have exacerbated this process.

The above mentioned policies have also proved incapable of meeting the aspirations of the great majority of people especially the youth who are undoubtedly significant in the Third World in terms of their number. One understands therefore the sharper and sharper discrepancies between policies that are adopted and the principal content of the new social demands.

This impasse is a result of the implementation of the dominant development model with its transposed modalities and all its variants - the liberal and socialist inspired variant. These two variants beyond the difference in the style of development convey one and the same rationality, that of modernization. This has ideologized development - the major target becomes making the South look like the North and hence its failure! Mimetic development is nothing else but a dramatic quest for the impossible, a process which has destroyed the profound resilience of the society in the Third World. For a very long time this "adventure" has produced and strengthened authoritarian political structures on the three continents: Asia, Latin America and Africa. It is to be noted that political authoritarianism and - mimetic - development make a good partnership. The former has used the latter as a mobilizational force to create and expand its social base. The landed oligarchy, the techno-bureaucracy, the urban middle-classes are involved in such a social re-structuring process. On the other hand mimetic development is a type of development that excludes and marginalizes large sectors of the population. Thus one witnesses a proliferation of outcasts the membership of which includes mostly the youth as well as an expansion of a series of legal and illegal informal activities that are however condoned as they stabilize the "formal economic sector". Through activities such as smuggling, door-to-door sales, home made clothing, leatherworks, caretaking, micro-sales, a *survival economy* is developing outside of the official economic sector and whose regulation is not directly affected by the market.

Gone is the belief that development is only possible through the top, that is through the State. Henceforth the State is bypassed; its regulations are changed and its own sector is semi abandoned. Is development in the process of going "underground"? While the modernist "adventure" triggered a profound identity crisis, it has also engendered other adventures. Thus the double movement of a number of people going along with the

new changes and the others going back to what existed is maintained by and in this autonomy. In this dynamics, benchmarks are no longer the same. In the past dichotomies used to be determined on the basis of the nature of models of development adopted - liberalism/planned economy, agriculture/basic industry, public sector/private sector.... Today, the cultural and spiritual criteria - especially in a number of Islamic countries - are replacing the economic and becoming a criteria of identification as well as sources of conflicts, especially with the West. Thus, the cultural and spiritual dimensions are used as a means of re-organization and self-definition vis-à-vis others.

At the Analytical level

The development paradigm has popularized two approaches in the study of the Third World on the basis of hierarchization of internal and external factors. The first approach is rooted in a determinism which gives primacy to internal factors. It considers that structural blockages essentially originate from internal causes. This is illustrated by the dichotomic view which perceives reality as a combination of isolated units than a dynamic totality. In this dichotomic vision of society a distinction is made between a static primitive society and a dynamic modern society. Traditional society is seen as a hindrance to the evolution of the whole, that is, society at large. Development considered from this perspective is reduced to the absorption of the primitive society through the expansion of modernization.

The second approach is founded on an exogenous type of determinism which privileges external factors. This is exemplified by theories of imperialism and dependence. These theories trace historical breaks and discontinuities in the inner dynamics of Third World Societies in the context of the Constitution of Europe as a world economy. This process which took multiple centuries underscores the fact that the present Third World does not resemble the past and that it is not a historical accident. Nevertheless, giving too much weight to external factors induces a truncated view of reality. It is misleading to use imperialist penetration and colonial violence as the only factors that are responsible for the present situation. Repetitively resorting to a certain past event becomes a search for an alibi.

Mono Causal Analysis are usually unsubstantial, incomplete and inadequate. There exists a constant interaction between internal and external factors which are all part of one and the same dynamics. Evidently, a specific type of factor may, of course, prevail in a particular historical situation, thereby acting as a determinant in the acceleration and completion of a process. Let us take two examples. The New International Economic Order that is being advocated will only be wishful thinking unless structural reforms are introduced in Third World countries. This new order can only become a reality if it is supported by new local and regional

bases. On the other hand, in the present conjuncture the external constraints weigh heavily on the Third World. The debt burden and protectionist measures enforced by the major industrialized countries have seriously reduced their margin of manoeuvre. The outcome may be represented by a three storey building with each storey representing successively the local level, the regional level and the international level. We see once again from these two examples how closely related internal and external factors can be. They have a dynamic mode of operation, interacting with one another in a continuous movement.

Objectives: Debt versus Development

Mimetic development has necessitated foreign financial assistance and international bank loans, especially as of 1975. This resulted in a very serious debt burden in excess of US\$ 1000 billion which challenges the very bases of the initial development. Moreover, excessive expenditures for modernization, military and prestigious project have aggravated the problem. Thus, the debt situation has become a major phenomenon of the '80s and will determine the 1990s in the Third World.

What should be done by way of increasing the reimbursement capacity of indebted countries? This is the primary objective of economic policies recommended by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The answer is to be found in the *structural adjustment* and in the restoration of *equilibrium*; two key words which determine the policies being followed by the state, experts and planners. The path toward competitiveness and the re-establishment of solvency, it is said, is through liberalization, privatization and rationalization in keeping with the rationale of the market. This is what is recommended; but such a policy often has a high social cost. It leads to a series of urban violence, which is indicative of a profound social crisis in many Afro-Arab and Latin-American countries. The economic adjustment has detonated such a crisis. Cost pricing - a principle that supports economic adjustment - cannot be applied selectively only to the sensitive area of prices, for instance; it should instead be extended to other areas including wages - generally kept very low - which tend to block any development of the internal market.

The rationality of a system cannot operate in a fragmented, isolated manner; It rejects any fragmentation of reality. This is why economic liberalism pre-supposes the implementation of a genuine political liberalism if all its advantages are to be enhanced. Economic and political liberalism have to act in unison. In the absence of such a unity one ends up with truncated, practically inefficient reforms which often boil down to mere expedients.

In this context, what does it mean to the Third World to hold a series of fashionable debates on things like: should the State play a greater or a lesser role? Public sector versus private sector and vice versa¹?

A new debt/development relation has developed in countries badly in need of money, and thus implement adjustment policies. A relation of subordination relegates development concerns to a secondary preoccupation. Thus the financial variable, which, to date has acted as an auxiliary is henceforth dominant. In actual fact, far from being a development policy, the adjustment policy is a strategy for the restoration of equilibrium (balance of payments, public finance). Everything is seen in terms of equilibrium, an abstract concept. Yet the economic and social history of industrialized countries teaches us that "although it is imperative to put a number of things in order", development cannot be achieved through and by equilibrium or in such a context.

Both crisis and the outcome of crisis impact on each other. So, when the former is visualized in terms of monetary and financial disorders and budgetary imbalances, the latter automatically promotes equilibrium and harmony, two analytical categories that have no base whatsoever in reality. On this basis the solution that is advocated to put an end to the financial crisis is evidently financial: conditionalities are attached to the implementation of debt rescheduling, new loans are extended etc. This produces a new vicious circle, that of indebtedness: one needs to run into debt to reimburse one's debts.

In this period of crisis in which the mercantile and financial rationale governs economic and social re-structuring measures, there is a need to set development back into its *heterodox tradition*; in other words into its Anti-Conventional and critical tradition.

The Discourse on Development In Search of a New Development

Every crisis has its own virtues. The contemporary crisis provides the possibility to challenge existing approaches and tools of analysis. As an element that contributes to new perspectives which are favorable to a new reflection on *being and having*, that is, a new debate on development, taking into account the interaction of its major two dimensions.

It looks like development has turned into a "catch all" concept which is much abused by quite distinct schools of thought. But given that it covers realities which are difficult to compare, it does not convey the same meaning to its users. In some cases it is used within a context of dependence and extroversion, in others in a context of inter-dependence and endogeny. All

1 See Habib El-Malki - "Le discours économique critique face à la crise". Revue LAMALIF, N 163, février 1985, Casablanca.

the same, the concept of development keeps losing its value - given the present impasse - to the extent of losing its real meaning.

The concept of development has been defined by François Perroux in terms of a comparison with growth. Although it has been described on the one hand as a qualitative, structural, complex notion and on the other hand as a measurable, descriptive, quantitative concept, both notions are part of the same movement which expresses the evolutionary pattern of economy and society.

The distinction growth/development which was pertinent in the 1960's has become imprecise with the "new industrial factor" in the international division of labour. The type of industrialization process which is going on in many Third World regions - especially Latin America and South East Asia - heralds very serious *structural changes*¹. Questions such as Who is growing? Who is developing? are being posed. Nevertheless, the problematic of development cannot be reduced to this mere dichotomy without running the risk of getting even more ambiguous and confusing.

A whole range of formulations have proliferated in an attempt to give a better description of the contents of development, which have ended up creating new divisions. However, one should bear in mind two categories of such formulations. On the one hand, we have negative ways of describing development in terms of what it is not on the basis of past experiences. For example development is defined as: the development of underdevelopment by André Gunder Frank; "mis-development" by René Dumont; dependent development by Cardoso. On the other hand we have positive formulations which are normative and futurist: new development (François Perroux), self-centered development (Samir Amin), eco-development (Ignacy Sachs), co-development (Michel Beaud, Jean-Pierre Cot).

Both types of formulations of development share one point. They are critical and they convey a new image of economy, environment, society and international relations. In that sense they raise four major issues, at different levels of analysis:

(a) Who makes decisions? This is a question of power, its nature, its organisation and its relation with economy and "civil society";

(b) Who are the beneficiaries of production and what is produced and how? In other words what are the types of production, with what technique and for whose benefit?

(c) How should one undertake a dynamic, progressive re-appropriation of the cultural heritage in its broad sense?

1 Wages, productivity and competitiveness are three criteria which, besides the fact that they are increasing, significantly express on-going socio-economic changes in these different regions.

(d) What type of external relations is called for to promote effective interdependence?

One sees from the above major questions the range of issues that are raised by development. Given that the answers cannot be found in one specific discipline, development is therefore above all a space of *multidisciplinary* convergence par excellence.

Within this context, the debate on development has been infused with new life in the past decade as a result of the integration of the philosophic dimension - initiated by UNESCO¹

(a) Research on the concept of an integrated development, Quito, Ecuador, August 27-31, 1979;

(b) Philosophic debate on the basic issues of endogenous development, Libreville, Gabon - December 18-22, 1983;

(c) Discrepancies between the objectives and Finalities of development; implementation and the means at its disposal. Praglia, Italy, February 3-7, 1986;

(d) Development Finalities. Budapest, Hungary, Oct. 13-17, 1986.

François Perroux - "Pour une philosophie du nouveau développement", the preface of which was written by M.M.A. Sinaceur. (Ed. Aubier, Presses de l'UNESCO, 1981, constitutes a major phase in renewing the thinking on development.. Having abandoned the beaten track, a fresh start has been made towards a better definition of questions raised and a better evaluation of the contributions made by the different disciplines. No discipline is unwelcome as there can not be a prioritization of disciplines into primary and secondary disciplines. If multidisciplinary rigor is a must to advance social knowledge, it is even more so in the Third World. Such multidisciplinary should not be confounded with a mere juxtaposition of each discipline which disregard one another; nor should it be mistaken for the confused thinking that "everything is included in the whole and vice versa". It requires a firm footing in one's own discipline as well as a controlled opening to the other disciplines. In this domain, philosophy is a very useful link between disciplines. Is the major preoccupation of social sciences - all social sciences - not man as well as development and its relation to man? It is not surprising that anthropological research - of a philosophical and economic nature - has especially developed in such a period of interrogations and confusion. It does offer a number of answers to man's position in the social dynamics and to the place of society in man's future. Man, it has been proven, is more than a simple economic

1 The Philosophy and Humanities Division played a dynamic role in this as can be seen from the four expert meetings held between 1979 and 1986 on:

agent - in the accounting sense of this word. Besides his role as a producer and consumer, that is, as a generator and destructor of wealth, he is also the ultimate reality of development. Through such a multi-faceted approach, not only has development expanded as a field of thinking and action but it has re-discovered several categories of analysis: the State, time (its social/monetary value), the mercantile/non mercantile dimension, the formal/informal aspect.

A *new culture* is emerging on this basis, which places *man at the center* of everything. It is a new culture which is meant to transcend misleading dichotomies and evolve in the "dialectics of having and being". Profitability, efficiency and competitiveness which are viewed by the almost universal new mystique as the ultimate goals of development cannot, on their own, fill the vacuum which has been created in the past few years. This vacuum has robotized both behavioural patterns and ideas, just as it has restored *free market* as the only way of getting out of the crisis.

But in actual fact this new culture is a counter-culture. By taking its distance from the mainstream it fulfills the missions of a critique. It restores, readjusts, integrates and innovates within a comprehensive, historical view. It carries along the idea of a *new development* which is defined by three types of factors:

(a) The fulfillment of the basic needs of the majority of people with the ultimate goal of eradicating extreme poverty. Such needs are both physical necessities - food, housing, clothing, health - and non physical requirements - education, participation in decision - making process.

(b) *The establishment of an integrated economic block* which can ensure a self-centered process of capital accumulation. Such an integration should be conducted between sectorial activities - agriculture, industry - and between urban and rural areas. Indeed opposition to extroversion and to external dependence generally leads to emphasizing on the one hand the interdependence between economic activities - a necessity to create an internal market - and on the other hand the efficient use of national production capacities in order to strengthen internal relations detrimentally to external ones.

The economic integration process raises the primary issue of the size of the economic space, an indispensable basis for accumulation: one wonders whether it should be a national space in certain cases given the size and population or a regional one in other cases. Such a question leads to the idea of collective self-reliance and to the creation of a South-South co-operation.

(c) The new development concept cannot be reduced solely to its economic dimension. As a more comprehensive and broader concept, it incorporates non-economic factors. Consequently it is defined as a process which necessarily leads to the emergence of an autonomous national project which guarantees the cultural identity and specificity of the national community.

With what means will the new development be implemented? Given the great diversity of Third World realities, one cannot and should be excluded from recommending the adoption of a universal strategy.

Nonetheless, the following broad issues should be considered:

(a) An inter-sectorial integrated development with:

on the one hand, the development of agriculture and of activities generating goods that meet basic needs as priority. The objective is to reduce food dependence on the outside world as a result of improvements in local agricultural resources including forestry and fishing;

on the other hand an integrated industrial development centered on the internal market. Industry should promote an increased agricultural output and the development of activities that meet basic needs;

(b) *An income distribution that is congruent with social justice.* This calls for political action on wage structure and on landed property for a more egalitarian distribution of income with a view to meeting the needs of the poorest social strata.

(c) The use of a technology that is designed for and germane to local demands;

(d) A flexible decentralized planning that makes up for the weaknesses of the market;

(e) As for external relations there is a need to plan for two types of complementary actions:

the search for a better equilibrium and for more control in order to curb any external dependence;

the consolidation of South-South relations which would allow a regional integration conducive to collective autonomy.

Although the new development, a global notion, is a *normative model*, its priorities are not applicable to all the Third World countries. There exists a tremendous diversity as a result of history, of specific characteristics of countries and of their political options. Hence the multiplicity of patterns of development which are followed

In the final analysis is it not possible that the new development also covers the idea of a new modernity which could be defined as a synthesis of the spiritual, the cultural and the economic dimensions? Source of creativity and innovation and not conformism and conservatism, this modernity in formation will turn towards the future. It will be liberating and will help remould social relations based on equity, democracy and tolerance.

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