

AFRIQUE ET DEVELOPPEMENT

AFRICA DEVELOPMENT

Vol. XIII, No.1 1988 - ISSN 0850 3907

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CODESRIA acknowledges the support of a number of African Governments, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, SAREC and IDRC in the publication of his journal.

Le CODESRIA exprime sa gratitude aux Gouvernements Africains, à la F.E.S, à la SAREC et au CRDI pour leur contribution à la publication de ce journal.

AFRICA DEVELOPMENT AFRIQUE & DEVELOPPEMENT

**A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THE COUNCIL
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL RESEARCH IN AFRICA**

**REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DU CONSEIL POUR
LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA RECHERCHE
ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE EN AFRIQUE**

Vol. XIII, No. 1, 1988

Editor

Zenebeworke Tadesse

(CODESRIA)

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Africa Development is published four times annually by CODESRIA. All editorial correspondence and manuscripts should be sent to:

The Editor,
Africa Development,
CODESRIA, B.P. 3304, Dakar, Senegal.
Phone Number 23-02-11 - Telex 613339 CODES SG - ISSN 0850 3907

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
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The Road to Crisis, Adjustment and De-Industrialisation: The African Case

Thandika Mkandawire*

RÉSUMÉ. - La crise mondiale actuelle a frappé l'industrie africaine d'une manière particulièrement dure, la bloquant pratiquement ou inversant les taux d'industrialisation déjà anémiques des pays africains après les indépendances. En réalité, dans certains pays africains, on assiste à un véritable processus de désindustrialisation puisque ces pays connaissent des taux de croissance négatifs dans leur industrialisation. Pour comprendre la crise actuelle de l'industrialisation en Afrique, il nous faut tenir compte de la place historique de l'Afrique dans la division internationale du travail. C'est cette place qui détermine quelques-uns des paramètres les plus importants de l'environnement dans lequel a lieu le processus d'industrialisation. Dans la mesure où le processus d'industrialisation de l'Afrique était axé sur des importations intensives et dépendait de l'importation de intrants, la chute des termes de l'échange et les difficultés des balances de paiement conduisirent à une sous-utilisation des capacités, une absence de maintenance des équipements existants et de nouveaux investissements dans l'industrie. Le processus de désindustrialisation qui s'en suivit eut des conséquences politiques et sociales dramatiques. Au plan social, cela s'est traduit par une chute réelle des salaires, la réduction des dépenses et le gonflement du secteur informel. En dernière analyse, la désindustrialisation est essentiellement politique et implique une perte de légitimité et de souveraineté de la part des pays africains. Pour ce qui est de l'avenir, la désintégration actuelle des structures qui soutenaient de beaucoup l'industrialisation ainsi que les structures sociales plus que volatiles de l'accumulation feront encore en sorte que l'Afrique ne sera pas prête à profiter de toute occasion qui s'offrirait à elle au cas où il y aurait une amélioration sensible dans l'économie mondiale.

The current world crisis has hit Africa's industry particularly harshly, bringing it to a virtual standstill or reversing the already anemic rates of industrialisation that African countries experienced following the attainment of independence. Indeed in some of the countries we are witnessing a veritable process of "de-industrialisation" as these countries experience negative rates of growth in their industrialisation.

To talk of "de-industrialisation" in a continent that is least industrialised in the world, may seem merely faddish. Indeed one may plausibly argue that Africa is so low down that its sinking further is ruled out *ex definicione*. And yet, since independence, some progress has been made in the industrialisation process, and it is the reversal of this process that constitutes the de-industrialisation now taking place in Africa.

Let us start off with a truism. To understand the present crisis of industrialisation in Africa, we have to take into account the historical position of Africa in the international division of labour for it is this position that

* CODESRIA, Dakar/Senegal.

defines some of the most important parameters of the environment within which the process of industrialisation unfolds. There is no intention here to underplay or ignore the domestic factors by treating the African experience as simply an inevitable outcome of the immanent logic of the world capitalist system. Our intention is to bring out the "international context for national strategies" within which national initiatives are successfully or abortively launched¹. Indeed as we shall argue below, management of the opportunities and obstacles generated by the world economy depends to a large extent on the national "social structure of accumulation" defined as the set of macro and micro class relationships and forms of pervasive state interventions underpinning capital accumulation². It is this social structure that mediates the country's link to the outside world by determining the capacity of the State and policy-makers to perceive and capture whatever opportunities the international context may provide and to shield, if only partially, their economies from the vagaries of the world capitalist system. It is also this that determines the incidence of costs and benefits of the process among various social groups.

We shall therefore try to identify crucial changes in the international division of labour and to see how Africa fared while at the same time examining the internal socio-economic structures underpinning the interaction with the outside world. More specifically, we shall try to address ourselves to the question: what were the structural constraints, internal and external, that impeded Africa from benefitting from changes in the world economy which other Third World countries, albeit not all, seem to have made use of? It is important to answer this question if only to caution against some of the hopes that with the global "recovery" Africa will escape the present crisis. For if most of the structural factors that have over decades prevented Africa from launching credible industrialisation strategies are present, then once again Africa will "miss" whatever opportunities the recovery may bring.

The Strange case of Africa

When one looks at such standard indices as rates of growth, capacity utilization, employment, export performance of Africa's industrialisation experience, one is struck by the rather peculiar behaviour of the African economies during various phases of capitalism's ineluctably cyclical life. Africa's performance through the various "booms and busts" of the global system is as if Africa was so structurally constructed as to be inherently out of phase with the global industrialisation process in the last 80 years or so. This

1 M.A. Bienefeld, "The International Context for National Development Strategies: Constraints and Opportunities in a Changing World" in M. Bienefeld and M. Godfrey (ed.) *The Struggle for Development: National Strategies in an International Context* (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1982).

2 David Evans and Parvin Alizadeh, "Trade, Industrialisation, and the Visible Hand" in Kaplinsky (ed.) *Third World Industrialization in the 1980s: Open Economies in a Closing World* (London: Frank Cass, 1984).

peculiar characteristic has persisted into the post-independence period despite some efforts at industrialisation.

To bring out this peculiarity, we shall periodise the capitalist penetration of Africa in light of major changes in the international division of labour. The advantage with this approach is that it is possible to substantiate the different stages of capitalist development and the mechanism that are peculiar to each stage. It also allows one to examine the social structures at the national level spawned by these global processes or contending with these same processes.¹

Looking at the last eighty or so years we can identify three distinct periods when there were spurts of industrialisation in the developing countries. Each of these periods was characterised by important changes in the international division of labour and flows in capital and trade. As would be expected the impact of these changed external circumstances on individual countries varied and the capacity to capture whatever opportunities or circumvent whatever obstacles such changes wrought depended to a large extent on the internal socio-political structures of individual countries. It should be noted that each of those periods bore within it a spectrum of "models" of industrialisation that were feasible. Changes in the logical imperative of the global context often manifested themselves in the intellectual sphere by changes in doctrine, albeit with a time lag. Although it is self-reassuring for academics to believe that changes from, say import substitution strategies to export-oriented strategies are evidence of the triumph of their theoretical models, it is more correct to view these changes as largely logical, although not inevitable, responses to a changing international context and to the domestic imperatives of accumulation and legitimation.

1914-45 Phase of Import Substitution by Default

The first of these periods was that of the First World War, through the Great Depression up to the end of the Second World War. During the first World War, the interruption of shipping routes and the decline in the production of non-military goods in Europe and the U.S. both created severe shortages in the world markets, raising prices of imported goods and thus improving the profitability of local industry. This provided stimulus and protection to industrial activities, especially in countries of Latin America². However, with the end of the war and given the prevailing view that the

¹ See, for example, James Petras, "Toward a Theory of Third World Industrialisation" in James Petras et al.; *Capitalist and Socialist Crises in the Late Twentieth Century* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowan and Allenheld Publishers, 1984); Berch Berberoglou, "The Controversy over Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialisation: Critical Notes on the dependency Theory", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 14 No. 1984.

² Werner Baer, "Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and Interpretations", *Latin American Research Review* Vol. 7 No. 1, 1972.; Albert Hirschman, "The Political Economy of Import Substitution In Latin America" in *Quarterly Journal of Economics* Vol. 82, No.1, 1968; Tom Kemp, *Industrialisation in the Non-Western World* (London: Longmans, 1983).

industrialisation that took place was an "aberration", local industry was immediately exposed to external competition and most stagnated:

"It was generally thought that WW1 had been an aberration from the natural order of things which was reflected in the world division of labour of the nineteenth century. Hence policy makers were reluctant to tamper with a movement back to normalcy"¹.

However this movement to laissez-faire normalcy was to be jolted by the Depression which was in its turn to provide a far-reaching impetus to import substitution. The depression led to the fall of the prices of agricultural commodities and raw materials by almost 60 per cent between 1929 and 1934 and the main industrial countries erected high tariff walls and other trade barriers in order to protect their own industries. The virtual breakdown of international trade during the Second World War was to further compound problems of trade for the periphery. For much of the non-colonial periphery, this phase led to significant changes. Denied the foreign exchange wherewithal to continue the importation of goods from Europe and the United States, the uncolonised countries of Latin America and Asia were compelled to set up industries to produce some of the hitherto imported goods. Indeed, the combined effects of the import substitution measures was to produce far reaching structural transformation which still characterises the economies of a number of these countries up to the present.

There were three salient features of this industrialisation: the "political regime" and the nature of the state and the relation of local capital to the state, the financial basis of this industrialisation, and the "trade regime" that prevailed. The state had to enjoy sufficient autonomy from external political domination and could thus respond to local pressure to begin to actively take measures which were in favour of industrialisation through import substitution. Some form of independence or self-government was necessary. Secondly, this was a relatively autonomous process in the sense that it was carried out under the aegis of local capital and the state, despite heavy borrowing in the international market, especially by Latin American countries. However, given the portfolio character of this finance and the prevailing chaos in international financial markets, such a strategy could not be but dependent upon local capital controlled by a nascent "national bourgeoisie" as capital previously controlled by comprador elements of landed aristocracies was shifted to local industry. It should be recalled that this was before Bretton Woods and there were no such financial watchdogs as the IMF.² Substantial amounts of the debts incurred were not to be repaid. Latin America started the defaults. Significantly, there were few defaults outside Latin America and Europe. Finally, the "trade regime" was characterised by high levels of protection through tariffs, import quotas etc.

¹ Werner Baer, *Ibid.*

² It should be recalled that this was before the Bretton Woods arrangement and the dominance of such financial watchdogs as IMF.

During this phase, much of Africa was under colonial rule and could therefore not avail itself of the opportunities provided by the "natural protection" of the Depression and the War and still less could the colonies introduce deliberate protection measures. *Ex deficiente*, colonial rule could not permit the establishment of a state autonomous enough to initiate and pursue a process of industrialisation that was typical of "late comers" - protectionist, inwardlooking and large scale industry based.¹ Colonialism did not simply allow for the emergence of the necessary "social structure of accumulation". It was, after all, imperial policy to treat colonies either as protected markets for its export industries or as monopsonised sources of raw material. The achievement of either goals was not likely to encourage any far reaching industrialisation. It discouraged local production for the domestic market of the colony while not encouraging exports of manufactured goods from the periphery². Only the relatively more autonomous "settler" economies of Kenya, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa managed to set up some industry during this period.

As far as access to foreign financial markets to finance industrialisation was concerned, this was foreclosed by colonialism. It was imperial practice and intention not to allow colonies to borrow on international markets. It was, after all "a traditional canon of belief in English colonial" policy that a budget surplus (as well as an export surplus) was a sign of good, benevolent administration³.

1 At a time when the the state is identified as the source of all evil, it is useful to recall Gershenkron's discussion of the activities that states in "late industrialisers" have generally assumed. Gershenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1952).

2 There is a current trend among historians to "revise" colonial history in such a way that colonial rule is only blamed for those activities where there was explicit policy statement while little is said about the structural outcomes of colonial rule itself, regardless of the subjective will of colonial officials. The argument is often directed at the presumably instrumentalist Marxist view of colonial rule. Thus Austen, while conceding that there is "clear evidence" in which colonial policy deliberately blocked industrialisation, argues that the colonial crime was more one of omission than commission: the "major shortcoming" of colonial regimes, he says, was their failure to "actively promote" industrialisation. The absense of pressure is attributed to the absense of a local class of merchants and artisans who identified their own interests with the development of internationally competitive industries". The absence of such classes is in turn attributed to the "structural barriers" between local enterprise and the dominant sectors with which they were supposed to compete. This was of course, the "logic" of colonial rule. Having blocked the emergence of such classes, colonial powers did not have to explicitly legislate or act against industrialization. Ralph Austen, *African Economic History*, (London: Jame Currey, 1987).

3 Not only did colonies have to pay their way; they also had to generate surpluses for export to the metropolitan countries. Early Grey's dictum succinctly summed up the conventional wisdom: "The surest test for the soundness of measures for the improvement of an uncivilised people is they should be self-sufficing". cited by Thomas R. De Gregori, *Technology and Economic Development of the tropical African Frontier* (London: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1969). De Gregori (Chapter 8) provides a very good account of the "financial transfers" from British Africa although his preoccupation is not so much with magnitudes involved (which he deems as "intrinsicantly..unimportant" without saying to whom) by the ideological un-

This belief remained gospel in British colonial Africa long after the Keynesian revolution in economics made it obsolete as a policy in the industrial countries¹.

Thus during the wave of default by underdeveloped countries during the Depression, African countries were not among the defaulters. There certainly were none among colonial governments in the British empire whose foreign liabilities carried a guarantee by the British government which required them to adopt a severe deflationary policy in order to ensure payment of their external obligations².

For much of Africa, whatever industry was set up depended more on the character of the product than on any deliberate policy of industrialisation or response to crises. Thus the few factories concentrated on articles that were highly perishable, or that cost too much to transport after assembly (furniture) or after the addition of a cheap local commodity (water for soft drinks). In short Africa did not start the process of industrialisation that for some countries such as South Africa, Rhodesia, India and Latin American countries was to lay the foundations for the post War industrialisation.

Era of Deliberate Import Substitution industrialisation: 1945-70

Following the end of the war, a number of countries immediately embarked on strategies of import substitution industrialisation or sought to deepen the process they had initiated in the previous period. In contrast to the preceding and more or less spontaneous process of import substitution industrialization was now a more deliberate strategy. The theoretical scaffolding for this new strategy was provided most notably by the "cepalistas" under the leadership of Prebisch. Although the "import substitution strategy" would be an *ex post* theoretisation of the preceding import substitution practice, it was to constitute a strategy adopted by spokesmen of the national bourgeoisie and populist movements in Latin America³.

Here again there were certain prerequisites for the pursuance of such a nationalist strategy which, perhaps contradictorily, also had attracting foreign investment through setting up high protective walls, low taxes and artificially low interest rates and other incentives as one of its major premises. First and foremost a country had to enjoy enough sovereignty to be able to make legislation that would effectively attract foreign capital or protect those producing for the domestic market. Second, within the global context, the strategy had to be complimentary to rather than competitive with the accumulation process in the Centre economies. In the conditions of reconstruction and the high rates of growth induced by Keynesian macroeconomics the industrialisation in the periphery posed no serious competition to the advanced countries emerging from the ravages of War.

1 De Gregori Op. Cit.p. 284.

2 George Abbot, International Indebtedness and the Developing Countries, (London: Croom Helm, 1979).

3 Tom Kemp, op. cit.

Indeed the import substitution strategy was in many ways complimentary to the accumulation and reconstruction process in the advanced capitalist countries. Since the strategy was capital and import intensive, it created important markets for the industries of the advanced countries and since it was based on earning much of the necessary foreign exchange through the continued production of traditional primary product exports, it did not threaten industry in the advanced countries and did not therefore immediately suffer from any protectionism. The global environment was made further favourable by the U.S. hegemony which insisted on a global open-door policy and, in its crusade against communism accepted "development" as a legitimate objective of the nationalist regimes as long as this still left them within the "free world".

Internally the strategy involved a "triple alliance" embracing the State, transnational corporations (TNCs) and national capital. It was this alliance, assuming different forms but consisting of basically the same ingredients) which managed whatever form of "dependent" or "associated" industrialisation that took place in some countries¹. Despite the many problems that the strategy was to later generate - high import intensity, low labour absorption, TNC dominance, extreme income inequality, low capacity utilisation - a number of countries that had pursued this strategy over both Depression and War period and the post-War period did set up a wide range of industries. This was particularly so in the larger economies which managed to deepen their industrialisation process so as to include intermediate and capital goods and for those countries which were able to attract foreign investment for the establishment of import substitution industry beyond the stage of light industry.

The Africa case

During the period 1945-60, African countries could not meet one of the preconditions of the new strategy of industrialisation since most of them were still part of the imperial economy and could not pursue independent policies of industrialisation as countries like India, Argentina and Brazil could. Although a number of African countries emerged from the war with substantial amounts of reserves accumulated in the metropolitan banks, they were not permitted to use these reserves for industrialisation of any kind.

Thus at independence, African countries were among the least industrialised. Table 1 gives a rough idea of Africa's position with respect to industrialisation. For sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, manufacturing accounted for 6.8 per cent of Gross Domestic Product.

¹ Peter Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979).

Even more relevant to our discussion was the "abnormality" of Africa's levels of industrialisation which were generally below the expected "historical norms"¹.

Table 1:

Selected Economic	Indicators of Selected African Countries at Independence				
	Popu- lation	GDP Gross Domestic Product (\$ m.)	Per Capita Income (\$)	Manu- facturing produc- tion (\$m.)	share of manufac- turing in GDP (%)
Benin	2.4	175	744.6	2.6	
Cameroon	4.7	511	109	30.6	6
Côte d'Ivoire	3.2	584	181	31	5.3
Ethiopia	20.7	1021	49	61.3	6
Gabon	0.4	131	294	8	6.1
Ghana	6.8	1503	222	94.7	6.3
Kenya	8.1	641	79	60.9	9.5
Nigeria	40.0	3500	88	157.5	4.5
Senegal	3.1	678	218	64.4	9.5
Sierra Leone	2.3	316	133	19.9	6.3
Soudan	11.8	909	77	43.6	4.8
Tanzania	9.6	671	67	20.1	3
Togo	1.6	150	92	6.2	4.1
Uganda	6.7	583	87	37.9	6.5
Zaire	14.1	910	58	127.4	14
Zambia	3.2	511	155	28.1	5.5
Zimbabwe	3.6	751	206	120.2	16

Note: Manufacturing excludes utilities and construction All values expressed in U.S. Dollars.

Source: P. Kilby, "Manufacturing in Colonial Africa" in Duigan and L.M. Gann Colonialism in Africa Vol. 4, The Economics of Colonialism (Cambridge, 1975), p. 472

All in all the historian Boahen's summary of the colonial experience with industrialisation is apt:

"All Africa's states were... in accordance with the workings of the capitalist colonial economy, turned into markets for the consumption of manufactured goods from the metropolitan countries and

1 On the basis of regression analysis linking manufacturing's share of GDP with GNP per capita and population, Gulahati and Sekkar found that the rates of industrialisation of Zambia, Kenya, and Tanzania were below the expected "Chenery norms". For Kenya, the observed share of value added in manufacturing to GDP was 45 per cent less than the expected one. Tanzania's shortfall was 80 per cent while Zambia's was 50 percent. Gulahati and Sekkar "Industrial Strategy for Late Starters: The Experience of Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia", Washington D.C. World Bank staff working paper No. 457, 1981.

*producers of raw materials for export. It is this total neglect of industrialisation by the colonial powers which should be chalked up as one of the most unpardonable indictments against colonialism. It also provides the strongest justification for the view that the colonial period was the era of colonial exploitation rather than the development of Africa*¹.

Independence and Industrialisation: The Nationalist Dream

"Economic development" was an important item in the nationalist programmes and since every known path of economic development has involved industrialisation and also partly because in no other sector was colonial blockage to accumulation so transparent, the struggle for independence closely linked nationalism with the "right to industrialise"². In no other policy pronouncement does nationalism assert itself so vociferously as in that towards industry.

It was only with the attainment of independence that Africa could initiate industrialization through import substitution by first removing some of the cruder colonial hindrances to industrialisation. During the first decade of Africa's independence - 1960-70 - the global conjuncture was relatively favourable for the kind of industrialisation the new states sought. This period was generally marked by rapid industrial growth throughout the world. During the first half of the decade the growth rate of the underdeveloped countries as a whole matched that of the developed market economies. In the second half the developing countries performed better.

Between 1960 and 1975, Africa's industry grew at the annual rate of 7.5% annually. This compared favourably with the 7.2% for Latin America, 7.5% for South East Asia. However three things should be borne in mind: First is that Africa starting point in terms of manufactured value added (MVA) was extremely low. Secondly, within Africa itself there are great disparities in the levels and rates of industrialisation. Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Morocco together account for about 53% of Africa's industrial production while 27 others have a share in regional MVA of less than 1%. Obviously performance by the four countries will tend to exaggerate Africa's overall performance. Thirdly, growth rates over the fifteen year period were far from steady. Much of the growth actually took place in the first decade of independence as the most rudimentary type of industrial establishments were set up to produce such things as beverages, matches, textile. The second decade saw Africa lagging behind the rest of the Third World as most countries registered much lower rates of industrialisation than those achieved in the first decade of independence. Between 1970 and 1976, out of forty three countries for which information was available, ten had negative growth rates in the manufacturing value added and another fourteen had less than 5% and of

1 A. Adu Boahen "Colonialism in Africa: Its Impact and significance" in A. Adu Boahen, Africa Under Colonial Domination: General History of Africa, Vol VII (Neineman and Unesco, 1985.

2 Samir Amin, Class and Nation, (New York: Monthly Review Press, New York).

the ten with more than 10%, seven based their high performance on petroleum (Nigeria, Gabon, Congo, Libya, Algeria), new mineral finds or investment (Botswana and Mauritania) Table 2 tells the story of uneven development quite clearly.

One should also add here that the qualitative aspects of this industrialisation left much to be desired. ECA's characterization of Africa's industrialisation achievements is definitely not flattering:

"As of now, the industrialisation process in Africa has relatively speaking failed to provide the dynamic forces for the structural transformation of the African economy to attain self-sustainment. The sector remains small and enclaved accounting for only 9.8% of the region's GDP. Relative to world manufacturing output, Africa had a share of manufacturing value added of only 0.9% in 1980 compared to a share of 2.7% and 6% for South and East Asia and Latin America respectively. Thus Africa was by 1980 still the least industrialised region in the world. The industrial sector is not only small but also characterised by an inflexible structure concentrated in a small number of countries and limited to only a few lines of production"¹.

The ECA goes on to list some of the characteristics of African industry and industrialisation. The region's industry is not only small but is characterised by an inflexible structure concentrated in a small number of countries and limited to only a few lines of production. There is hardly any production of capital goods and except for a "crude and relatively weak level of processing of mineral and agricultural raw materials" mainly for export, most of the industry is in light consumer goods. As a result of "overwhelming dependence" on imported capital goods the continent is saddled with all kinds of problems generated by such technological dependence: high cost of technological imports, inappropriate technology or scales of production, lack of convergence between the region's resource base and industrial structure, weak backward and forward linkages, indeed all the makings of serious structural crisis of industrialisation.

In addition industrialisation was characterised by a number of features that were pointed out in the dependency and "basic needs" critiques of the dominant strategies: skewed income distribution, inappropriate technologies etc.².

Nevertheless, with all these caveats in mind, the 1960-73 period witnessed some important first steps in the process of industrialisation in Africa. Most significantly wage employment in industry increased at rates that surpassed population growth although not as high as the highly accelerated rates of

1 UN Economic Commission for Africa, ECA and Africa's development 19832008: A Preliminary Perspective Study (Addis Ababa: UN ECA, 1983).

2 J. Rweyemamu(ed) Industrialisation and Income Distribution in Africa (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1978).

post-independence urbanisation. The period also witnessed significant gains in skills through the creation of institutions of higher learning and "learning-by-doing" within the new industrial structures.

Financing Industrialisation

We noted that for a number of countries the postwar import substitution strategy required attraction of foreign capital. Historically much of the foreign investment going to Africa had been directed towards the extractive industries. However since independence, with the possible exception of petroleum, investment in these industries has stagnated. Overall TNC direct investment to Africa has been "modest"¹. The annual flow of direct investment from OECD to Third World countries more than doubled from 1.2 billion in 1967 to \$ 4.3 billion in 1972. Direct investment to Africa did not keep up with worldwide increase and grew at less than a third (31%) of the worldwide rate. Thus, although Africa now had one of the preconditions for import substitution industrialisation - political independence - it failed to attract the foreign investment that often accompanied this type of industrialisation at least in Latin America, with TNCs directly investing in productive structures of highly protected markets.

It is often asserted that failure to attract foreign investment was due to the continent's ideological bent - nationalism, "African socialism" and etatist inclinations of the leadership. However, a close look at the first "National Development Plans" of most African countries shows that these were not their major characteristics. In general most of the plans were based on the assumption that while the State would provide the necessary social and economic infrastructure, private investment would be responsible for financing much of the industrialisation process. Nationalist leaders generally believed that the colonial regimes had blocked foreign investment or, at best, had encouraged only the capital from their mother countries. Independence was to mean opening the country to other capitalist countries. This was to be achieved through diversification of trade links and sources of foreign capital. However, despite the many incentives and overtures, the flow of investments to Africa was extremely low and in many cases was below the outflow of capital. In most cases, the "turn to the left" leading to nationalisation and a self-consciously interventionist posture of the state followed failure to induce private capital to reinvest profits let alone to bring in fresh capital from outside. The politics of Import Substitution industrialisation

¹ L. Rood, "Foreign Investment in African Manufacturing", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 13 No. 1, 1975.

Table 2 Growth of MVA in African countries 1963-81

	1963-73	1973-81
Angola	10.2	(10.0)
Benin	6.0	(4.2)
Botswana	6.2	17.3
Burkina Faso	18.3	4.1
Burundi	13.8	5.0
Cameroon	2.5	6.4
Cape Verde	9.0	3.2
CAR	6.6	1.5
Chad	5.4	(4.6)
Comoros	7.2	(5.1)
Congo	0.3	1.7
Ethiopia	8.2	3.6
Gabon	10.9	14.3
Gambia	3.5	(12.0)
Ghana	6.9	(0.5)
Guinea	3.3	2.6
Guinea Bissau	8.4	3.4
Ivory Coast	10.7	8.7
Kenya	8.6	6.8
Lesotho	34.3	3.8
Liberia	12.8	2.6
Madagascar	9.0	0.0
Malawi	14.9	6.4
Mali	4.8	3.8
Mauritania	5.1	6.8
Mauritius	2.8	9.5
Mozambique	13.6	(6.6)
Namibia	9.6	4.7
Niger	8.0	3.1
Nigeria	7.6	12.0
Rwanda	15.5	16.1
Senegal	4.2	0.9
Sierra Leone	4.5	0.2
Somalia	21.5	2.9
Sudan	5.6	(2.2)
Swaziland	18.1	11.5
Togo	14.0	(3.9)
Uganda	5.3	(5.8)
Tanzania	10.2	(2.8)
Zaire	12.5	(7.2)
Zambia	12.7	(0.7)
Zimbabwe	10.9	2.8
Average	9.2	2.0

Source: UNIDO, Africa in Figures, 1985

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This phase of industrialisation was characterised by active state participation in the accumulation process. Behind this etatism was the nationalist quest for greater control of the economy in the absence of national industrial capitalists classes and to ensure accumulation in light of the reticence of foreign capital.

For the currently dominant neoclassical view, both these reasons for active state participation are not convincing. Nationalism simply introduced "irrationality in economic policy" while the reticence of private capital was reflective of the nonprofitability of industrialisation in Africa whose comparative advantage lay in primary commodities.

To explain the industrialisation that took place, the neoclassical economist posit "rent-seeking" coalitions that have induced "market distortions" in order to reap "rents" through minimum wages, food subsidies, import licences etc. Others have blamed the "urban bias" which has pushed industrialisation at all cost and to the detriment of the rural population. Time and space does not permit a detailed comment to these positions. Suffice it to note that at least as far as Africa is concerned such "coalitions" are merely asserted or assumed to exist simply because certain people presumed to belong to the coalitions benefit from them. There is never concrete demonstration that in fact beneficiaries of these policies are organised nor is the assumption of a pruralistic state juxtaposed to the reality of extremely repressive regimes in Africa.

Discussion of effects of colonialism on industrialization tends to confine itself to levels of production, often taking for granted the existence of a national bourgeoisie that availed itself of the opportunities created by the international division of labour. Symptomatic though these material examples

of "colonial neglect" are, they do not touch upon the crucial social inheritance that left African countries singularly unprepared for industrialization. We are not referring here to the "poor human resources" constraint rightly brought out in many "manpower" and "human capital studies" of African countries but to the class and state structures that made industrialization, no matter how subjectively willed, so socially "rootless" in Africa. There was not, as in India, an incipient indigenous industrial capitalist class that was to ride on the national wave for its own further accumulation, free of the many colonial shackles that may have impeded its growth¹. There was no landed aristocracy that, as in Latin America, gradually transformed itself or was forcefully transformed into a capitalist class or, at least, provided the surpluses for industrialization. There was no merchant capital that would have been compelled by post-independence policies to enter into manufacturing.

Concurrent with this was one other more favourable outcome of this social heritage that has affected the "social structure of accumulation" in Africa, and that is that there was basically no domestic social class in Africa that was opposed to industrialisation, colonialism having seen to that by blocking the emergence of indigenous agrarian and merchant capital who might have opposed industrialisation especially of the import substitution type. With the exception of a few countries such as Ivory Coast, Malawi and Kenya where agrarian capitalist interests were strong, there were no organised agrarian interests or indigenous merchant capital that was strong enough to block industrialisation. The state was able to set up industries through wholly owned parastatals or joint ventures untrammelled by agrarian and merchant interests.

Consequently, the major form of national involvement in the process of industrialisation was to be through the state, in alliance with transnational corporations through joint ventures or management contracts. Industrialisation in Africa was strictly speaking not a "class project". It was essentially a nationalist programme and as such it lacked the sharpness and purposefulness of a class determined project. It was sustained by nationalist desires and bureaucratic experimentation. Its vehicle was the political party and the state and international bureaucracies. It was on the basis of this relationship between the political instance and the bureaucracy that some industrialisation was initiated. In this respect both avowedly capitalist and socialist states were to exhibit remarkable similarities in the degree of state involvement in industry, suggesting that the role of the state was more a response to a largely

¹ As Pranab Bardhan observes for India: "The industrial capitalist class, mainly under the leadership of some top business families from western India, was reasonably strong at the time of Independence. It supported the government policy of encouraging import-substituting industrialisation, quantitative trade restrictions providing automatically protected domestic markets, and running a large public sector providing capital goods, intermediate products and infrastructural facilities for private industry, often at artificially low prices", Pranab Bardhan, *The Political Economy of Development in India* (Dehli: Oxford University Press, 1984). Only the settler white economies and Egypt came anything close to this in the relationship between the state and the industrial classes.

nationalist quest for increased control and the need to assure accumulation in light of private capital's reticence than evidence of ideological idiosyncracies of African leaders. It is also important to note that to the extent that nationalism was still broad-based and populist in character, the industrialisation policies were anchored to a basically populist ideology which accommodated such things as minimum wages and other aspects of the modern welfare state in labour legislation.

It is this social character that explains the much lamented "irrationality" of the process because it entailed a multiplicity of "success indicators" - national integration, regional balance, employment, profitability, indigenisation, efficient resource allocation according to some "Plan", legitimacy, accumulation, national development, patrimonial obligations etc. - that were not always compatible and in some cases were mutually exclusive. It is probably this lack of "social constraint" and accountability (rather than "urban bias", patronage, prebendalism, and patrimonialism) that was to account for the apparent recklessness of the industrialisation process in Africa. - Wastefully inefficient fertilizer plants could be set up without fear of organised protests from the ultimate users - the farmers¹; contracts with foreign industrialists could be entered into without fear of protest from disadvantaged domestic industry or labour.

Debt-financed and Export-oriented Industrialisation: 1973-82

The falling rates of profit in the OECD countries partly due to discrepancy between the demands of labour and wage increases on the one hand, and lower productivity gains on the other hand began to undermine the prosperity in the capitalist countries². The resultant low levels of investment in the industrialized capitalist economies led to increased bank liquidity and negative real interest rates. It is important to note that this process begun some years before the "oil Crisis" which was to enormously increase financial resources in the hands of the international banking system. With the availability of alternative sources of finance from what Petras calls "fictitious capital" (i.e. the rentier incomes from land and especially oil), a new type of industrialization was stimulated in the Third World³. This was largely based on redeployment of labour intensive parts of the industrial production process financed increasingly with the relative more fungible forms of capital from the Euromarkets. It was during

1 It may be interesting to note here that it is often those countries with weak agrarian social groups that have tended to set up fertiliser and tractor assembly plants that produce costly inputs to be sold to a captive market.

2 For refreshing interpretations of this "Golden Age of Capitalism" and the inherent contradictions that were to undermine the system, see the work from the UNU World Institute of Development Economic Research (WIDER) in Helsinki. For a summary of the major findings of this project see Stephen Marglin, *Research for Action: Lesson of the Golden Age of Capitalism*. For a succinct theoretical statement on the profit squeeze" see Stephen Marglin and Amit Bhaduri, *Profit Squeeze and Keynesian Theory*, Working Paper 39. See also the Alain Lipietz, *Le Monde Enchanté* (Paris Editions La Découverte, 1983).

3 James Petras, *op. cit.*

this period that the so-called "NICs" emerged. Two factors facilitated the process of industrialization in these countries. First was the dramatic rise in the availability of finance from the international financial markets funds which, because of their fungibility gave the borrower more room for manoeuvre than the direct foreign investment that had dominated the flow of capital in the previous period. Internally, the ruling classes could ensure political regimes that inspired the confidence of the banks and regimented the labour force towards the new industries.

Financial Flows

Griffith-Jones and Rodriques list the following salient characteristics of international flows during this period:¹

(a) sharp deterioration of terms of trade for most oil importing countries and at the same time a rapid build up of gross domestic capital formation which outstripped the increase in domestic savings; (b) Increased "privatisation" of credit flows to deficit developing countries; (c) slower growth of direct foreign investment than other forms of external financing; (d) dominance of the eurocurrency market in the form of syndicated loans in private bank lending; (e) tendency of OPEC countries to replace the industrial countries as the main suppliers of credit; (f) the relatively small quantitative role played by the IMF in financing oil-importing countries.

Latin American countries, with the experience from their earlier debt-financed industrialisation were better poised to exploit the new opportunities for financing industrialisation. By enhancing import capacity, international finance permitted high levels of industrialisation than would have been the case if countries had relied entirely on their export earnings.

As Table 3 shows, between 1970 and 1981 there was a dramatic increase in the role of long-term bank credit investment over direct foreign investment. The share of the former rose from a mere 17.6 per cent in 1970-72 to close to 22.2 per cent in 1979-80. The shift away from direct foreign investment towards credit is made even more dramatic if we include export credits. While together these were about twice the level of direct foreign investment in 1970-72, there were three times the level of direct foreign investment in the 1979-81 period.

It may be recalled that much of the characterization of imperialism and dependence in the 1960s centred around the decline of portfolio investment and finance and the rise of industrial capital which directly controlled the means of production. This was supposed to contradict Lenin's thesis on imperialism with its emphasis on the role of finance capital². The recent ascendance of finance capital has, however, brought usury to the centre stage as one major form of transfer of surplus from the periphery.

¹ Griffith Jones, Stephany and Rodriques, "Private International finance and Industrialisation of LDCs" in R. Kaplinsky, op. cit.

² Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism* (New York, Monthly Review, 1968).

Table 3 : Net Long-term Financial Flows to Developing Countries From all Sources: 1970-1981 (Billion of Dollars)

Type of Flow	1970-72	1973-74	1976-78	1979-81
Aid	27.5	49.0	67.2	105.5
Nonconcessional Flows				
Direct Investment	11.2	18.1	30.1	38.4
Bank Sector	11.1	31.7	53.4	63.7
Bond Lending	1.1	1.3	7.1	6.7
Export Credits	8.3	11.2	31.6	39.2
Other Bilateral	1.7	5.8	7.2	20.7
Multilateral	2.6	5.7	8.7	14.0
Total	63.5	122.8	205.3	285.2

Source : OECD (1982)

The importance of direct foreign investment in the movement of capital should not, of course, be underestimated. The sums indicated above are still substantial. By the late 1970, debt-financed industrialisation became increasingly problematic because of the absence of major lender of international finance. Once again there was renewed interest in direct foreign investment including conversion of debt into equity.

Another important feature of this phase was the move towards outward-looking "trade regime" of the industrialisation. Tendentious reading of experiences of the "success stories" identifies the "trade regime" as "market-oriented". The fact is that the state played a central role in this phase of industrialisation as it had done in the previous ones. A number of countries were to dramatically increase their exports of manufactured goods through a whole range of State incentives to exporters. The industries producing these export goods had either been established in the previous import substitution phase, or were new ones financed largely by massive external borrowing especially in the more flexible euromarkets, or were the newly redeployed branches of industries dominated by transnational corporations.

This industrialisation was facilitated by trends in the international market. On the demand side, the industrialized countries were relatively speaking open to industrial goods from the Third World. The proportion of imports in the visible consumption of manufactured goods in the industrial nations rose from 11 per cent in 1970 to 17 per cent in 1978. More significantly, these nations' imports of industrial goods from the developing world increased during the same period from 1.4 per cent to 3.4 per cent representing an average annual rate of growth of 8.1 per cent.

The political economy of debt-financed Industrialisation

The political regime required for the debt-financed accumulation has been a subject of intense debate. Argument has centred on whether such regimes were merely contingent or were essential to the particular model of

accumulation. There is however, persuasive evidence that the participation by TNCs in the strategy required not only cheap, docile and disciplined labour, but "political stability" as well¹. Most of the countries that benefitted from this process tended to be what O'Donnell characterised as Bureaucratic-Authoritarian regimes².

To summarise, during this phase only those strategies combining exploitation of the opportunities provided by the new sources of finance, the continued openness of the advanced capitalist countries and a political regime guaranteeing "disciplined labour" could achieve high rates of industrialisation.

Africa Misses Out Once Again

Once again Africa failed to benefit from these changes in the world economy. As for export orientation of its industrialisation, having had not experienced far reaching import substitution industrialization Africa simply had no industrial products to export. This is one point so often forgotten by those who harp on the need for African countries to change their trade policies. Part of the problem is the false dichotomy of import substitution versus export oriented industrialization. Except for the "City States" of Singapore and Hongkong virtually all the successful export-oriented strategies were preceded by import substitution industrialization. Primary import substitution is an important phase for a successful transition to the export-orientation sub-phases in that it provides physical infrastructure and expands entrepreneurial capacity³.

Foreign Finance

In addition to this lack of an industrial platform on which to base the export thrust, Africa did not attract much direct foreign investment nor did it make much use of the international financial markets to raise capital for its industries. Africa's share in the inflow of direct foreign investment from OECD countries which had averaged 19.2 per cent in the period 1970-72 fell to 12.1 per cent in the period 1978-80.

As far as other sources of finance from the international financial markets is concerned the same story is true. While a number of developing countries rushed to the new international financial markets to finance their industrialization, Africa proved too conservative or too uncreditworthy when it came to borrowing. Even those African countries that scored high marks in the international financial system (Kenya, Nigeria and Cote Ivoire) avoided the

1 R.W. Cox, "Labour and Multinationals" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 54 No. 2; D. Nayyar, "Transnational Corporations and Manufactured Exports from Poor Countries", *Economic Journal*, Vol. 88, 1978.

2 Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State", *Latin American Research Review* Vol. viii No. 1, 1978. See also the various articles in David Collier (ed.), *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979).

3 Carlos Diaz-Alexandro, "Trade Policies and Economic Development in Peter Kenen (ed.) *International Trade and Finance: Frontiers for Research* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

new sources of funds and in some cases were forced by the World Bank to turn to the low-interest financial markets that then prevailed.

In a comparison of actual debt ratios of Africa countries to the "normalised" ratios which would be expected from exogenous factors (level of per capita, GDP, population size and terms of trade), Mathonat demonstrates that sub-Saharan African countries are, in fact, in general less indebted than their "normalised" indebtedness both as far as debt ratio and debt service ratio are concerned. Their debt ratios are lower than would have been expected purely as a result of exogenous factors: the suggestion here is that:

"domestic policies can be considered to have had, on the average, a moderating influence on indebtedness, or in any case to have played a less important role in the increase of debt than in other developing countries"¹.

Much of the borrowing by African states occurred after the Second "oil crisis" of 1979 so that when African countries finally did enter the fray it was only under very harsh terms - high interest rates and rather short terms. More tellingly, Africa's borrowing was not related to any deliberate attempt to finance industrialisation but was "incurred in vain attempts to preserve investment in production in the face of falling earned import capacity"².

Sutcliffe succinctly states the African tragedy of the low level of indebtedness of African economies:

"For other countries, the "debt crisis" tends to mean that they are too much in debt to the banks. Africa's debt crisis is in a sense the opposite - it has been scarcely able to get into private debt". and It is a dubious advantage since it has meant that the adjustment to various external shocks of the last decade (such as the increase in oil price) has had to be met in many African countries, not through borrowing which, even if it creates long-term problems, at least cushions instant impact. In Africa the effect of such shocks has been transmitted much more directly and immediately to the people in the form of enforced declines in living standards. Many Africans have paid an awesome price for not living in "creditworthy" countries, for being inhabitants of countries which the world capitalist system in an era of crisis has been able to marginalise. on marginalisation of African countries"³.

There are at least two explanations to Africa's failure to borrow when money was cheap. One of these was historical inertia of the inherited state structures. Contrary to the view that driven by the "revolution of rising expectations", the euphoria of independence and the nationalist promise,

1 Jacky Mathomat, "The Impact of External Factors and Of Domestic Policies on External Debt", Tore Rose, Crisis and Recovery in Sub-Saharan Africa. op. cit..

2 R.H. Green and Stephany Griffith-Jones, "External Debt: Sub-Saharan Africa's Emerging Iceberg", Tore Rose(ed.), Crisis and Recovery in Sub-Saharan Africa. (Paris: OECD, 1985).

3 Sutcliffe, Bob, "Africa and the World Economic Crisis", in Peter Lawrence, ed. World Recession and the Food Crisis in Africa (London: James Currey, 1986).

African governments went on wild expenditure binges, is the fact that at least compared to their Latin American counterparts, African regimes were generally fiscally conservative. Rates of inflation were quite low. For Francophone Africa, adhesion to the French franc effectively blocked the possibilities of monetary profligacy. Indeed most African countries behaved as if they accepted their historical role to merely export capital to metropolitan countries and to finance their industrialisation either through domestically generated mineral rents or surpluses extracted from a docile peasantry. The surplus transmission belts that colonialism had set up continued to move in the same direction.

The other constraint on borrowing had to do with credibility to capital of the political regime in Africa. We noted that debt-financed, export-oriented industrialisation of the 70's was associated with bureaucratic-authoritarian rule. During the first two decades of independences, African regimes were not in the same league as Brazil, South Korea, Iran, Argentina in both bureaucratic capacity and authoritarian exercise of power. And, as Hutchful rightly observes, although the political and economic ideologies associated with import substitution industrialisation in Africa were "strongly interventionist and incipiently authoritarian", they emphasised a certain element of redistribution expressed in varieties of "socialist and noncapitalist" ideologies¹. Expenditure on social services, provision of subsidies, price controls were an important feature of state policy. These regimes could not gain the confidence of capital desirous of "law and order", cheap and docile labour etc.².

To be sure, by the 1970s the populist-nationalist coalition that may have sustained the immediate post-independence period had been undermined by the incapacity of the state to "deliver" and by the growing social differentiation in African society. And since then African regimes have become increasingly authoritarian. However, an interesting characteristic feature of African repression is that it has been generalised and unfocussed and in its nightmarish forms (Idi Amini, Nguema and Bokassa) assumed the character of generalised terror against civil society as a whole. More specifically, it was not structured around capital accumulation which would have demanded emphasis on control of labour and its cheap delivery to capital.

1 Eboe Hutchful, "The Crisis of the New International Division of Labour: Authoritarianism and the Transition to Free Market Economies in Africa" Africa Development, Vol. xii, No. 2, 1987.

2 The measure of Africa's "unattractiveness" is exemplified by a study by Root and Ahmed on the determinants of direct investment by transnational corporations in the nonextractive developing countries. Only Gabon, out of 19 African countries included in the study, was considered "highly attractive" by TNCs, followed by Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya and Malawi which were considered "moderately attractive". The rest were considered "unattractive". F.R. Root and A.A. Ahmed, "Empirical Determinants of Manufacturing Direct Investment in Developing Countries", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 27 no. 4, 1979).

Crisis, Adjustment and De-industrialisation

The full impact of the world crisis was to hit Africa's industrialisation efforts after the second "oil crisis" of 1979. For Africa the world crisis was channelled through declining terms of trade. Terms of trade of low income African countries declined by 1973-76 and by nearly 14 per cent during 1979-82¹. African economies being extremely open, were particularly sensitive to these adverse changes in the international context. The industrialisation process in Africa was import intensive and dependent on imported inputs. Ironically, the import substitution process, by reducing the relative weight of consumers goods and some "luxuries", meant that imports were increasingly of the "essential" type, thus reducing the room for manoeuvre as regards levels of imports. The Balance of payments crisis led to underutilised capacity, lack of maintenance of existing equipment and no new investments on industry. Faced with serious balance of payments disequilibria, many African countries were forced to contract debts, not to finance industrialisation but to solve their short-term balance of payments problems. Forays into financial market were therefore characteristically unsystematic and unfocused. Significantly, by the time African countries became heavy borrowers, interest rates had jumped up dramatically. This ineluctably pushed them into the hands of the World Bank and the IMF for structural adjustment loans and various standby arrangements.

The IMF-World Bank teams have attributed the Africa crisis to a number of "market distortions". Of greater policy significance is the view that the ensemble of policy "biases" and predilections has led to a set of macroeconomic policies that have stifled agriculture leading to serious balance of payments disequilibria as a result of declining exports on the one hand and souring food imports on the other, inefficient industrialisation and underutilisation of scarce resources etc. The argument is based on a too often tendentious deployment of neoclassical economic doctrine about the market, the economy and the state. The first major restatement of neoclassical argument for purpose of policy formulation in the poor countries were the OECD case studies summarised in the influential book by Little, Scitovsky and Scott². In the more strident formulations it is simply assumed that "good policy" for development is now well understood and involves decontrol, and favours a liberal trade regime and an outwardlooking frame of incentives³. The

1 Ajit Singh, "Exogenous shocks and de-Industrialisation in Africa: Prospects and Strategies for Sustained Development" in *Africa Economic Development: An Agenda for Future* (New Dehli: Reserach and information System for the Non-Aligned and other Developing Countries, 1987).

2 I. Little, T. Scitovsky, M. and Scott, *Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries: A Comparative Study* London: Oxford University Press, 1970.

3 Anne Krueger, "Loans to Assist the Transition to Outwardlooking policies", *World Economy*, Vol. 4 No. 3, 1981.

Localisation of these arguments to the African scene was made by Berg on behalf of the world Bank in a study that was to greatly influence the perceptions of state policies in Africa and the conceptualisation of what were to be the remedies¹.

In brief, the argument goes as follows: First, by sustaining overvalued exchange rates, the Import Substitution Strategies have encouraged inefficient and noncompetitive patterns of industrialisation. Unable to earn foreign exchange necessary for the importation of vital inputs, these industries have undermined the countries only source of foreign exchange by keeping returns to producers of agricultural export goods low in terms of domestic currency. In addition, forced to buy from highly protected and inefficient industry, agriculture has faced unfavourable terms of trade which have lowered returns on labour and therefore served as a disincentive to direct producers. In addition, in order to finance the process of industrialization, governments have heavily taxed the agriculture sector through the monopsonistic control by parastatals of virtually all export crops. This has led to the collapse of traditional sources of foreign exchange which has reverberated on the industrialisation process through the foreign exchange crunch.

With respect to the overall macroeconomic crisis of severe balance of payments problems and subsequent indebtedness, the new orthodoxy argues that the current accounts were mainly reflections of excess demand which can be removed by reducing expenditure without affecting the level of growth of real income, improving the competitiveness of the economy and by attracting foreign investment. As far as industrialisation process itself is concerned it is basically viewed as an unmitigated disaster. Because of state-induced "market distortions", it is too inefficient, having grown up under high protective tariffs; uses the wrong technology reflecting distortions in the capital and labour markets. Solutions include restructuring through privatisation, denationalisation and outright closure of a number of industries².

African countries have sought special arrangements with the international financial community. Currently 22 IDA eligible countries have major structural adjustments underway. In addition there are some of the "middle income" countries having similar arrangements. And with pressures from the IMF and the World Bank, "policy dialogues" with donors and internal changes in the configuration of state structures the orthodox prescription is being widely adopted in Africa. Overvalued currencies are being devalued, food subsidies removed, parastatal monopsonies dissolved as "Market forces" are unleashed.

1 World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action* (Washington D.C.: IBRD, 1981).

2 See for, instance *Privatisation and Public Enterprise*, Occasional Paper no. 56 (Washington, D.C. IMF, 1988).

Table 4 African Countries (a) with Major Structural Reform Programs Planned or Underway as of march 1987.

Burundi	Mali
Central African Republic	Mauritania
Chad	Niger
Equatorial Guinea	Rwanda
The Gambia	Senegal
Ghana	Sierra Leone
Guinea	Somalia
Guinea Bissau	Tanzania
Kenya	Togo
Madagascar	Zaire
Malawi	Zambia

(a) IDA-eligible SubSaharan African countries.

Sources: The World Bank and U.S. Treasury.

These arrangements with the IMF and World Bank are invariably accompanied by "conditionalities" which for African countries, at least, have become tougher in recent years as most countries have found themselves seeking loans with high conditionality. From 1973 to 1979 the increase in African states' borrowing occurred mainly under special credit lines designed to finance balance of payments deficits due to increased oil prices, temporary shortfalls in export receipts or to provide "soft" credit from the proceeds of the gold sales. But from 1979 African countries were prominent borrowers under the "regular" system for borrowing under "standby" or "extended" arrangements with higher conditionality. Of the total amount of IMF credit committed to all countries under such arrangements, African countries accounted for 30 per cent in 1979 and 1980 whereas they accounted for only 3 per cent over 1970 to 1980¹.

There are few studies on what the effects of these policies on industrialisation are. What one has had so far are either tendentiously positive accounts of the process by the IMF and World Bank or rather journalistic accounts of "successful" privatisation often based on briefings by these organizations. There is, however, growing evidence that in a number of cases the hope that liberalisation would lead to an inflow of direct foreign investment or the resurgence of the hitherto suppressed indigenous capitalist class has not materialized and so are there still have been no takers for privatised state firms largely because local capital does not have the means and foreign capital has viewed the proposition unattractive especially accompanied by removal of protection². The enervation and "crowding out of the state" has been combined

¹ Harris, Lawrence "Conceptions of the IMF's role in Africa" in Peter Lawrence (ed.).

² Jeune Afrique Economie, Mai, 1988.

with absence of entrepreneurs to rationalise the denationalised parastatals or to exploit the incentives to tradeables. And so African economies find themselves denied use of the state which has been the major source of dynamism in industrialisation while awaiting, in the absence of indigenous capital, the arrival of foreign investments that remains sceptical of export oriented industrialisation in Africa. The result has been stagnation and de-industrialisation.

During this phase of adjustment, the weighted average growth rate of industry has been 2.4 (see Table 3). The high performance of such countries Botswana, Congo and Gabon is largely due to fortunes in their mineral exports. This tragic reversal of a process that started too late anyway, is further widening the gap between Africa and the rest of the world.

Social Effects

The orthodox critique of state policies towards industrialisation has tended to confine itself to the "trade regimes" generated by import substitution packages. However, parallel to the "trade regime", there was the "sociopolitical regime" and its ideological underpinning and there was the role of the state in direct production and in income distribution. The social effects of this process of de-industrialisation have been dramatic. First to bare the brunt directly have been the wage earners largely through decreases in real wages. Available evidence suggests that in the initial phases at least, adjustment took place less through retrenchment than through dramatic declines in real wages which has been "one of the principal ways in which the labour market has adjusted to economic slowdown and decline since midseventies"¹. This was partly due to the significance of parastatals in industry and the political constraints imposed on their use of retrenchment of labour as an adjustment tool.

There is casual evidence that with the current wave of privatisation and general decline of parastatals, closure of private firms unable to deal with sudden opening up of the economy, retrenchment is now being increasingly resorted to. For neoclassical theory that informs the current policy initiatives of international financial organisations, the fact that excess supply exists in African urban markets, suggests that wages have not fallen low enough and so African governments are currently under pressure to further lower minimum wages, withdraw whatever subsidies enter the "social wage" and to generally let "market forces" find the equilibrium wage.

¹ Dharam Ghai, *Economic Growth, Structural Change and labour Absorption in Africa: 1960-85* UNRISD, Discussion Paper No.1 (Geneva, UNRISD, 1987. See also Vali Jamal and John Weeks, "The Vanishing Rural-Urban Gap in Sub-Saharan Africa", *International Labour Review*, Volume 127, No. 3, 1988.

Table 3 Average Annual Growth of Industry 1980-85

Benin	13.5
Botswana	21.1
Burkina Faso	2.1
Burundi	4.8
Cameroon	17.8
CAR	1
Congo	11.3
Ethiopia	2.8
Ghana	5.5
Guinea	0.1
Ivory Coast	1.5
Kenya	2
Liberia	6.7
Madagascar	6.8
Malawi	1.3
Mali	3.8
Mauritania	4.2
Mauritius	4.3
Mozambique	13.9
Niger	3.6
Nigeria	5.8
Rwanda	4.9
Senegal	4.5
Sierra Leone	2.5
Somalia	5.1
Sudan	4.3
Togo	2.8
Uganda	1.8
Tanzania	4.5
Zaire	2
Zambia	0.5
Zimbabwe	0.4
SubSaharan Africa*	2.4
Developing Countries*	3.5

*(weighted average)

Source: World Bank Report, 1987 (Table 2)

The retrenchment and the dramatic decline in real wages have had ramifications on the economy as a whole. In the urban areas, the fall of incomes of wage labours has not only added to the magnitudes of the population in the informal sector, but has, in addition lowered the demand for informal sector, forcing the sector to make costly adjustment. The situation in the rural areas is not clear.

The politics of de-industrialisation

Industrialisation and its reversal are quintessentially political. We have, albeit rather sketchily, tried to highlight the politics of the various phases of industrialisation or non-industrialisation in Africa.

Table 4: Trends in Real Official Minimum wages, 1980-86 (1980 = 100)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Burkina Faso	100	92	105	97	92	86	89
Burundi	100	90	148	136	119	115	
Cameroon	100	97	104	107	111	102	108
C. Af. R.	100	87	76	77	64	59	
Congo	100	85	76	70	67	64	61
Cote d'Ivoire	100	92	94	89	85	84	79
Ethiopia	100	94	89	89	82	73	77
Gabon	100	92	99	89	101	101	96
Gambia	100	94	98	89	73	65	
Ghana	100	105	86	80	80	133	150
Guinea	100	91	87	79	71	64	
Kenya	100	89	89	81	72	71	75
Liberia	100	93	88	85	84	85	83
Madagascar	100	90	81	68	68	65	64
Malawi	100	139	147	129	108	128	109
Mali	100	91	98	100	90	108	
Mauritius	100	89	84	81	79	77	76
Niger	100	87	78	80	74	75	77
Nigeria	100	148	138	115	81	79	
Rwanda	100	94	83	78	74	73	74
Senegal	100	99	91	94	84	78	16
Somalia	100	90	79	58	30	22	
Sudan	100	80	64	49	47	45	36
Tanzania	100	99	77	61	60	45	77
Togo	100	84	83	76	78	80	112
Zaire	100	76	64	91	163	164	
Zambia	100	88	93	88	81	75	

Source: World Bank (unpublished) cited by Dharam Ghai

The weak base of the industrialisation process is revealed by the fact that outside labour and a few nationalist groups, de-industrialisation has not received much resistance internally. The position of the emergent capitalist class has been ambiguous towards privatisation for a number of reasons. In most cases, privatisation means denationalisation and foreign control. Where there are no takers, privatisation simply means closure of enterprise. The ambiguity of the emergent capitalist interests is also a reflection of the fact the contradictory rationality of the state which on the one hand contributes to overall capital accumulation and opens opportunities to private capital both as

consumer and supplier of cheap inputs while, on the other hand, it is often engaged in activities which "crowd out" private capital. Conceptually one can expect "comprador" elements to rather opportunistically applaud not so much the de-industrialisation but the "trade liberalisation". The emergent agrarian capitalist interests may not, as importers of luxury goods and inputs, have much to say against the process but they may suffer from the loss of protected domestic "wage foods" markets due to falling wages, employment and liberalisation.

Given the social effects and the continued nationalist and populist view of industrialization as an item that must still remain on the "national agenda", the slowdown and reversal of the industrialization process causing urban unrest in a number of African countries has eroded the state's already low standing in African societies¹. In addition, to the extent that privatisation still means foreign control for a large number of industrial activities for which local private has neither the capital and the managerial skills, and to the extent that adjustment programmes have led to an unprecedented foreign presence in post-independence policy formation in Africa, the current process also leads to weakening of the state vis-a-vis external powers. Both these internal reaction and external presence have further undermined the legitimacy of the state.

What About The Next Time Around?

Only some few years ago, the question raised was whether "latecomer" countries such as those of Africa would be able to replicate the "miracle" of the "Four Tigers". This was before it became definitely clear that particular conjuncture of greater freedom of trade, easy availability of recycled petrodollars, and expansion of the developed countries had come to pass. So obviously whatever industrialisation "miracles" take place, or for that matter whatever reversal of the de-industrialization process Africa achieves it will be under radically different conditions. There can, however, be no doubt that the current process of de-industrialisation, the dismantling of structures that sustained much of the industrialisation, the institution of social structures of accumulation that are highly volatile will once again leave Africa unprepared to capture whatever new opportunities an upturn in the world economy may have.

¹ In the recent elections of Senegal, a major point made by the opposition was that the state had accepted a restructuring that was leading to closure of factories and retrenchment. It accused the ruling party for not been nationalistic enough by laying to waste this national patrimony.

The Crisis of Underdevelopment and the Transition to Civil Rule: Conceptualising the Question of Democracy in Nigeria

Yusuf Bangura*

RÉSUMÉ. - Cet article traite des problèmes de la démocratie en Afrique en mettant un accent tout particulier sur le programme de transition mis en oeuvre par le régime militaire actuel du Nigéria. Les différents modes d'accumulation entravent le développement de la politique démocratique dans la mesure où ils encouragent l'autoritarisme, les abus politiques, le clientélisme. L'Etat post-colonial a pour projet historique de créer dans le cadre du marché mondial une bourgeoisie nationale à partir de ces méthodes d'accumulation du capital qui sont limitatives sur le plan politique. Le programme d'ajustement structurel tente de mettre un frein à ces méthodes d'accumulation surannées et laisse les forces du marché régner sur l'économie politique. Par ailleurs cette mesure s'est accompagnée d'un programme de transition très compliqué sur le plan politique. Quant au programme d'ajustement structurel, il porte davantage sur le maintien de l'ordre politique et la construction d'une base politique pour assurer le succès de l'exécution de ce programme que sur la question démocratique. Pour l'auteur, il s'agit là d'un nouveau type d'autoritarisme puisqu'il combine les anciennes méthodes de contrôle et les nouvelles exigences d'un ordre social désormais chancelant sous-tendu par les forces du marché. Avec ce nouveau type d'autoritarisme la scène politique se retrécit, l'organisation des forces populaires susceptibles de contrecarrer le programme d'ajustement devient impuissante et une situation propice à l'émergence de nouvelles forces dans les rangs de la bourgeoisie et à l'apparition d'élites prêtes à soutenir le programme est créée. Il revient désormais aux forces populaires opprimées de lutter pour l'instauration de la démocratie. Or le traitement correct de la question démocratique passe nécessairement par l'intégration de la démocratie libérale au projet de démocratie populaire.

Introduction

Conceptualising the question of democracy has not been a serious academic practice in political science research in Africa. Political scientists have been more preoccupied with the problems of federalism, civil-military relations, party systems and the dynamics of underdevelopment. Even during debates on transition to civil rule the focus tends to be on the political engineering of stability, checking the intrusion of the military into politics and analysing the forms of liberal/authoritarian party systems. There is pessimism about the practicability of nurturing a democratic culture in peripheral social formations. Such pessimism is largely derived from the euro-centric standards of mainstream democratic theory and the mechanistic assumptions of the modernisation and dependency perspectives.

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I argue that the problematic of democracy has to be located within the broad framework of the specific, interlocking characteristic of business activities in the system of accumulation, and the modes of social and political behaviour such characteristics generate among the contending. Three of the four main characteristics (monopolistic production, the primitive accumulation of capital and petty commodity activities) encourage the growth of authoritarian values, political malpractices and patron-client relations. They also promote unequal development and the attendant problems of regionalism and nationality struggles which the national bourgeoisie coopts into its class project.

The primary objective of the post colonial State is the creation of a national bourgeoisie within the context of the world market, allowing the use of fundamentally corrupt and undemocratic practices in its evolution. The structural adjustment programme is attempting to check some of these methods of accumulation and enthroning market forces in the political economy. I argue that this project is premature. The advantages derived by the national bourgeoisie in the use of monopolistic and primitive methods of business activities have not yet been exhausted. The transition programme in Nigeria is, therefore, more concerned about political order and laying the political foundations - *a new authoritarianism* - for the successful implementation of the structural adjustment programme than with the development of democracy. The struggle for the construction of democracy has, instead, fallow on the shoulders of the oppressed, popular forces. But a correct handling of the democratic question requires the integration of liberal democracy into the popular democratic project.

Underdevelopment, Dictatorship and Democracy: Theoretical Issues

The substance of democracy, liberal or popular, has eluded most countries of the Third World. A dominant view is that a certain level of economic development is required before the question of democracy can be properly posed and resolved. Modernisation theorists relate the persistence of authoritarian behaviour with the resilience of traditional values¹. Instability, in the words of one of such theorists, becomes inevitable in the evolution of the modern African political systems. Not surprisingly, growth theorists in neoclassical development economics, following the footsteps of the former, place considerable emphasis on the technical issues of development as preconditions for democracy².

Such perspectives have largely informed the economic strategies of the western powers and their transnationals in the developing countries, even

1 See the reviews by Mamdani, M. et al, *Social Movements, Social Transformation and the struggles for Democracy in Africa: A research Proposal* (CODESRIA; Dakar) 1988; Ake, C., *Social Science as Imperialism* (Ibadan University Press) 1979.

2 Rostow, W.W., *The stages of economic growth: a non-communist manifesto* (OUP) 1971. (ed) *The economics of take off into sustained growth: Proceedings of a conference held by the I.E.A.*, (London, Macmillan 1964).

though the political underpinnings of the model negates the liberal democratic ideals of the advanced market economies. Although some success has been attained, in growth terms, in some developing countries - often under very authoritarian conditions - most of the other LDCs, especially those in Africa, have not experienced much development. And yet, the problems of dictatorship persist. It is, as some commentators put it, a double tragedy for African people.

If the modernisation theorists have not been effective in posing the question of democracy in the context of development, their strongest critics, underdevelopment and dependency theorists, have not performed better either. Dependency theorists are, by and large, the flip of the modernisation theorists on the question of democracy. Their main preoccupation has been to expose the pitfalls of modernisation theory by emphasising the external constraints on Third World development. They, like their opponents, are concerned about the structural-economic issues of development¹.

Stressing the case for the disengagement from the world market as a precondition for self-reliant growth, the dependency thesis calls for a strong and purposeful national leadership capable of exercising independent decisions in the international system. Even though it is sceptical about the role of the national bourgeoisie in promoting such development, and tends to support the opposing, popular, class forces, the theory provides very little scope for the analysis of such democratic popular participation. It relies, instead, on either some form of voluntarism towards socialism or on strengthening the existing ruling classes so that they can be made to be more honest, independent and patriotic. Advocates of the theory invariably end up as advisers to policy makers that pay lip service to self-reliant development. Left-wing military regimes turn out to be good platforms for such scholars and activists².

Some of the fundamental questions of democracy are often sacrificed on the altar of national self reliance. There is, in fact, a complete disdain for liberal democracy, seen primarily as a bourgeois project which socialists should have nothing to do with³, and a strong sympathy for the one party State, charismatic leadership and bureaucratism. Many of the progressive one party regimes in Africa such as those in Tanzania, Zambia and Ghana (under Nkrumah) draw part of their inspiration from this perspective.

1 See, for instance, Palmer, G., *Dependency: A formal theory of underdevelopment or a methodology for the analysis of concrete situations of underdevelopment*, *World Development*, Vol. 6, 1978; Phillips, A., *The Concept of Development*, *Review of African Political Economy*, N 8, Jan-Feb. 1977.

2 Beckmar, B., *The military as revolutionary vanguard; A critique*. *Review of African Political Economy*, N 37, 1986.

3 Ibrahim, J., *The struggle for democracy in Nigeria*, *Review of African Political Economy*, N 37, 1986.

Both the modernisation and dependency schools offer limited insights into the study of democracy in the developing countries. They do not account for the peculiarities of the modes of accumulation of the LDCs as determinants of the prevalence of the repressive/authoritarian culture and the character of the social forces that have the capacity to struggle for and introduce a new democratic political system.

Western theorists of democracy emphasise the role of the individual, an industrial bourgeoisie, a market economy and a culture of compromise and pluralism as prerequisites for the evolution of democracy¹. Some of the authors insist on an optimal level of popular participation, which does not require majority participation, if the system should not be overloaded and unstable². Dahl argues that the small group of individuals that takes decisions is relatively responsive to the apathetic majority through the electoral process³. Popper, in fact, is so worried about the rule of the majority that he believes the classical question on democratic theory ("Who Should ru-le?") should be substituted with a more practical question; "How is the State to be constituted so that bad rulers can be got rid off without bloodshed, without violence?" This, in practical terms, means enthroning the rule of law over the rule of the majority⁴.

Can democracy be attained in the peripheral formations of Africa? What social forces can sustain such struggles for democracy? What type of democracy are popular forces, in fact, advocating? Under what conditions can their democratic objectives be achieved? What accounts for the persistence of dictatorship?

An analysis of the problems of democracy should take into account the inter-connections of the objective and subjective factors in development⁵. The objective factors - the structure of the economy - establish the parameters for what is possible at particular historical conjunctures; and the subjective factors - the forms and levels of organisations of the people, their values, culture and ideologies - provide the basis for altering the parameters and for posing new questions, strategies and solutions.

The structures of peripheral economies exhibit four important behavioural characteristics in the accumulation of capital viz, transnational and, to some extent, national monopolistic practices which developed in the colonial period through the imperial trading companies and were transformed into import substitution industrial activities in the post colonial period. Such companies extract surplus value from the exploitation of wage labour under monopolistic/oligopolistic conditions. The second characteristic is that of the primitive accumulation of capital. In the Marxian tradition, this is the process of transforming the precapitalist, small scale peasant/artisan economies into

1 Patemar, C., *Participation and Democratic Theory* (CUP) 1970.

2 Ibid. pp. 1-21.

3 Dahl, R. *Preface to Democratic Theory* (Univ. of Chicago Press) 1956.

4 Popper, K., On Democracy, *Democrat Weekly* 2nd and 3rd May 1988.

5 Mamdani, M. et al, "Social Movements..." *Op.cit.*

modern capitalist enterprises. This process involves the physical separation of the small scale producers from their means of production and their conversion into wage workers; the looting of State and church property by the rising industrial class; the conquest of foreign lands, particularly Africa, Australia, North and South America and the establishment of unequal exchange between these regions and western Europe. Toyo and Iyayi have reconceptualised the character of primitive accumulation of capital to take account of the contemporary Nigerian situation¹. These include the benefits of compradoring, State operations, unequal exchange, the appropriation and valorisation of land contract inflation and the use of bureaucratic positions for corrupt enrichment.

Ibrahim has shown how such methods were perfected by the National Party of Nigeria in the politics of the Second Republic².

The third characteristic of accumulation is that of simple commodity production - employed mainly by the peasantry, small scale artisans and craftsmen. It exhibits a strong dose of patron-client relations vis-à-vis the dominant socio-economic forces in the society. Extra-economic forms of control are common in such systems. Unlike in western Europe where the development of the capitalist mode of production was rapidly established, simple commodity producers have persisted in the evolution of the modern African economies.

Fourthly is the development of competitive industries, mainly local medium-scale manufacturing enterprises, nurtured from the wombs of party commodity production and the impact of the transnational monopolies on the indigeneous economy. The space for such market competition is, of course, quite limited, since such firms occupy a subordinate position to the industrial monopolies.

The major project of the post colonial State is the creation of a national bourgeoisie within the context of transnational capitalism. The evolution of such a class takes place within the broad parameters of the articulation of the four characteristics of capital accumulation outlined above. Undoubtedly, the first three are not conducive for the establishment of liberal democracy. Whereas the fourth is too weak to assert itself in the political economy. Monopolistic practices block new entrants into the market, withhold information and useful scientific knowledge to the public, create artificial scarcities and establish unreasonable profits. Non-democratic methods, usually bordering on mafia operations, are employed at the political level either to frighten and eliminate opponents or to get State functionaries to accede to the demands of the monopolies.

1 Toyo, E., Neocolonialism, primitive accumulation and third world orientations, *Nigerian Journal of Political Science* vol. 4, N 1 and 2 1985; Iyayi, F. The primitive accumulation of capital in a neocolony; Nigeria, *RONPE* 35, 1986.

2 Ibrahim, J., "From the primitive accumulation of capital to the primitive acquisition of power (mimeo) Zaria, 1988.

The methods of the primitive accumulation of capital are equally barbaric and authoritarian. There is no respect for rules and regulations, democratic procedures and the views and interests of opponents. Politics becomes a 'life and death' affair. Those engaged in it are not predisposed towards entrusting responsibility to other groups of individuals for the administration of State power, but are themselves interested in the administration of such power. Political power, its acquisition and the struggle for its control, is tied up with the primitive accumulation of capital¹. The methods of appropriation in the informal sector do not make for democracy either. There are all sorts of patron-client relations and coercive methods of work and social behaviour in this sector. The full weight of tradition hangs like an albatross on the necks of the social actors. Being subordinate to the other modes of surplus appropriation, the modern undemocratic methods of organizing business are brought to bear on the social and political practices of the actors in petty commodity production.

It should not be surprising, therefore, that the bourgeoisie emerging from such an environment, has not been able to put the question of democracy on the agenda of national politics. Its primary objective is to establish the conditions for its acquisition of property and evolution as a modern class. Liberal democracy respects the rule of law, democratic procedures and some level of accountability; it also concedes certain political rights to the oppressed social groups and classes. But the aspiring national bourgeoisie feels such groups and classes ought to be dispossessed, reconditioned and reoriented before the basis for order and democracy can be established. Fractions of the bourgeoisie can, of course, advocate for democracy if they are at a disadvantaged position; and there could even be attempts to control the predatory character of the politics of primitive accumulation in order to prevent a collapse of the political economy itself. The National Party of Nigeria's federal character principles on post charing should be seen in this light². At bottom, however, the national bourgeoisie is concerned with the economics of accumulation and the politics of control. This is the case whether we are dealing with a single or multi party system, civil or military rule, or presidential and parliamentary forms of government.

The character of the economies of the neocolonies and the post colonial project of the national leaders create further problems for democracy: that of the unequal development of regions, States, nationalities and religions. The race for accumulation is no respecter of poverty and inequalities. In fact, it recreates and deepens them. National inequalities mediate the class factor and blunt the exposure of the predatory values of the bourgeoisie. Since national inequalities and ethnic affinities tend to be quite strong and are easily

1 Ibrahim, J. *Ibid*; Bangura, Y. Crisis in Sierra Leone and Nigeria: A comparative study, conference paper, Nigeria: Economy and society since the Berlin conference; FASS, A.B.U. 1985.

2 Ibrahim, J., "From the primitive accumulation of capital..." *op.cit*; Mustapha, R., The National Question and Radical Politics in Nigeria, *Review of African Political Economy* N 37, 1986.

recognisable by the broad mass of the people, the dominant social classes incorporate these inequalities into their class projects, further worsening the culture of intolerance, authoritarianism and prejudices. Undemocratic practices by members of the upper strata of the various nationalities are either ignored or covered up by their respective nationalities. A network of patron-client relations is established by the leaders of the various nationalities with limited commitment to the problems of the poorer members of the group.

Instead the patronage structures are mainly used to strengthen the bargaining position of the elites in the "sharing of the national cake". It weakens the flowering of liberal democracy and the struggles of the popular forces for national democracy.

Democracy and Authoritarian Rule in Nigeria: Empirical Issues

The fundamental concerns of the elites during decolonisation were to step into the shoes of the colonialists. Although this group of people was clearly a minority, it was organised enough to play a leading role in the transition to independence. The colonial authorities recognise the group's weakness and, for a while, refused to relate with it, preferring instead the more traditional, conservative authorities¹. The petit-bourgeoisie had to widen its national constituency and political programme to include the interests of the working class, students, market women, peasants, small scale artisans and the unemployed². Such interests were to be guaranteed within a liberal democratic setting in countries where the colonial authorities were really to concede the principle of independence to the nationalists; and within a popular democratic platform in countries where the colonialists were intransigent and the nationalist had to wrest political power from them by means of armed struggle.

In the Nigerian case, the alliance between the colonialists and the leading nationalists, in 1952, for the ultimate transfer of power to the latter, soured the death knell of the liberal democratic experiment. The more power was transferred to the elites, the less prepared they were to uphold the liberal democracy they had advocated in the 1940s and early 1950s. The major project was the laying of the foundations for the emergence of a national bourgeoisie³.

The 'late colonial' State worked out several strategies for the realisation of this project: a) assisting the development of foreign capital and encouraging it to shift from commerce to import substitution industrialisation; b) promoting limited indigenisation in such companies, particularly in the employment of Nigerians; c) proclaiming an open door policy for the movement of goods, services and capital between Nigeria and the rest of the world; d) regionalising the key foreign exchange earning commodity boards which were ultimately used by the leading petit-bourgeoisie in the three regions in the accumulation

1 Nordman, C., 'Prelude to Decolonisation', (D. Phil, Oxford University Thesis, 1979).

2 Adebisi, N., Social groups in the National Colonial Movement in British West Africa, Research proposal for the project on Social Movements, CODESRIA, 1988.

3 Osoba, S., The deepening crisis of the Nigerian national bourgeoisie, *Review of African Political Economy* N 13, 1978.

of capital; e) the floating of parastatals to assist the development of the nascent entrepreneurs; f) promoting African commerce at the lower and middle levels of business.

The realisation of those strategies called for the regionalisation of the country, with the three dominant parties, the Northern Peoples Congress, Action group and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens having, or seeking to have complete control of their respective regions. Competing political parties were ruthlessly suppressed by the leading parties in their respective regions. There was fierce competition among the Big Three for the control of federal power and the subordination of the other social forces that had participated as partners in the decolonisation process. Even though the Richards and Littleton constitutions paid lip service to some form of liberal democracy, the State authorities and the petit-bourgeoisie failed to evolve sound structures for the practice of democratic politics at independence.

The struggle for the control of national resources and the ultimate development of a national bourgeoisie continued at independence, even though the independence constitution was well dressed with liberal-democratic values such as the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, human rights, free speech, free and fair elections and representative and responsible government. The seeds of the authoritarian culture, planted at decolonisation, matured at independence. The struggle for power intensified, often at the expense of the provisions of the liberal democratic ideals of the constitution. Left forces, unions and other popular organisations were incapable of checking the drift towards dictatorship¹. The various political parties coalesced into two factions, the United Progressive Grand Alliance and the Nigerian National Alliance, each preoccupied with the control of federal power to undo the activities of the others and to channel the benefits of accumulation to its principal supporters. The violence that attended the elections of 1964 and 1965, the acrimony over the census of 1963, the inability of the leading political parties to recognise the genuine rights of the minorities in their respective areas, (culminating, for instance, in the Tiv riots) made the military coup of January 1966 and the subsequent civil war somehow inevitable². The democratic question had ceased to be a dominant project of the national bourgeoisie.

The aborted birth of democracy at independence largely explains the similarity in outlook of military and civil regimes in Nigeria and, for that matter, Africa in general. It explains why military regimes acquire some legitimacy, even though military rule is, by definition, undemocratic. In the absence of a democratic culture, the question becomes which regime can

1 Abdul Raheem, T. and Olukoshi, A. *The left in Nigerian Politics and the struggle for socialism*, *ROAPE*, N 37, 1988; Cohen, H. *Labour and Politics in Nigeria 1945-1971*. (London, Heineman) 1974.

2 Anifowose, R., *Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba Experience*. (NOK Publishers) New York, 1982.

provide stability and economic development. Military regimes are then judged by the popular masses in terms of their success in those areas rather than on the question of democratic participation and liberal values.

The long period of military rule, 1966 to 1979, exposed the inability of the military to establish the structures for self-sustained economic development and the construction of democracy. The major project of the military was not fundamentally different from that of the civilian leadership it had sacked. In fact, the environment for the development of a national bourgeoisie improved in the 1970s with the oil boom. Public expenditure increased dramatically, various agricultural and industrial projects were launched and indigenisation decrees were passed in 1972 and 1977 aimed at transferring some capital to the national bourgeoisie and defining the areas of competence of both local and foreign capital.

The military, under Gowon, used the experience of the civil war as an excuse to clamp down on democratic demands and tried to impose a culture of obedience and regimentation in industrial relations¹. Considerable powers were given to the repressive sector of the State and employers. The government, of course, addressed some of the dysfunctional aspects of unequal development by creating more States, revising the revenue allocation formula in favour of the federal centre², reworking the federal character principle and carrying out land and local government reforms.

Military rule, however, experienced very serious problems analogous to those experienced by the previous civilian rulers. The attempt to control workers while allowing the national bourgeoisie to accumulate huge amounts of capital through several, sometimes unpalatable methods, met with serious opposition from the broad sections of the population and raised the consciousness and militancy of the trade union movement. The rate of inflation in food and rents escalated. The Adebo and Udoji awards failed to pacify the unions. There were generalised industrial relations disputes and sustained popular discontent with the government. The quest for civil rule intensified in the mid-1970s culminating in a military coup in July 1975 and the establishment of Murtala's regime which turned out to be more committed to the transfer of power to civilians. Gowon had reneged on this promise in October, 1974.

But the transition programme of the Murtala/Obasanjo administrations addressed only one aspect of the problematic of democracy, i.e. the forms of liberal democracy: parliamentary vs presidential government; types and number of parties; human rights, the rule of law etc.³. It failed to tackle the conditions for the realisation of liberal democracy, talkless of the questions of

1 Bangura, Y. "Nationalism, Accumulation and Labour Subordination in Nigeria", Conference Paper, Nigerian Political Science Association conference, Ilorin, 1985.

2 Oyovbaire, S., The politics of revenue allocation; in K. Panter-Brick (ed.) *Soldiers and Oil: The political transformation of Nigeria* (Frank Cass) 1973.

3 Panter-Brick, K., *Soldiers and Oil*...

popular democracy¹. Chapter two of the 1979 constitution which dealt with "fundamental objectives and directive principles of State policy" attempted to grapple with the problem of accumulation by upholding the ideals of egalitarianism, planned and balanced economic development and economic democracy² but that section did not occupy a strategic position in the overall package and logic of the constitution. The links between the modes of accumulation of capital and the liberal democratic ethos the constitution attempted to espouse were never seriously addressed or established.

Instead the Obasanjo regime preoccupied itself with the question of controlling the transition programme and ushering into government the forces that would uphold the historic project of the post colonial State. Apart from the Peoples' Redemption Party which had some promise, at the initial stage, in challenging the neocolonial project, no other political party, with solid roots in the working class movement, was registered. In fact, the military had in the mid-1970s tried to separate trade union work from national politics; and between 1975 and 1978 had carried out a major restructuring of the trade union movement.

The national Party of Nigeria, the Unity Party of Nigeria and the Nigerian Peoples Party upheld the traditions of their predecessors. The period, 1979 to 1983, witnessed an unprecedented looting of the treasury, the deepening of the forces of import-substitution industrialisation, an expansion of the State sector and a pathetic mismanagement of the national resources. Such activities translated themselves into thuggery, violence, intolerance and repression at the political level. The political strategy of the leading party, the NPN, as we have pointed out elsewhere³; was to organise the bourgeois forces on a national scale, thereby penetrating the stronghold of the UPN and NPP in Ondo, Oyo, Anambra and Bendel; weakening the PRP and GNPP in the north so that the chieftains of the northern faction of the NPN could present the north as a monolithic entity to their southern counterparts in the distribution of offices and contracts⁴; checking the militancy of the left forces and the trade unions by fuelling dissensions within the trade union movement and pressing for the recognition of more than one central labour organization.

The democratic ideals of the constitution could not be operationalised. It was a major contradiction between form and content. The predatory character of the ruling class, acting through the principal political parties, was too strong to be checked by constitutional niceties. The "democratic experiment"⁵ was aborted in December 1983.

1 The Usman - Osoba minority report attempted to address this issue.

2 *The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria* (a Daily Times publication. pp. 15-17.

3 Bangura, Y., Structural Adjustment and the political question. *ROAPE* 37, 1986.

4 Ibrahim has argued that it was largely the minorities that gave the presidency to the NPN. The politicians of the 'far north' were determined to improve and consolidate their influence in the party.

5 Oyovbaire, S., (ed.) *Democratic experiment in Nigeria: Interpretive Essays* (Berlin). 1987.

Crisis, Adjustment and Dictatorship: Extending the Frontiers of the Theory

The collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s exposed the structural deficiencies of the post colonial model of development; Radical reform measures were required to arrest the economic decline. State authorities were persuaded to accept the IFM/World Bank model of structural adjustment. The programme aims to roll back the State and give the market mechanism a free hand in the allocation of resources. It identifies what it calls distortions or rigidities in cost and price relationships. These are to be found in the exchange rate, tariff regime, the organisation of parastatals, interest rates, public expenditure and subsidies. It is a major challenge to the post colonial model of accumulation.

Capital accumulation revolves around the expansion of State activities as the basis for nurturing the national bourgeoisie. The economic crisis called into question the traditional methods of business organisation and the role of the State in such enterprises. The Buhari regime tried to tackle this problem through direct repression and fiscal discipline without adjusting the economic structures themselves. Babandiga's administration is attempting to address the problem through the market. It is believed, for instance, that the second tier foreign exchange market would eliminate import licences and the corruption associated with them; privatisation and balanced budgets would end subventions and inflated contracts; trade liberalisation would allow the law of comparative advantage to determine the type of goods to be produced and would check State support for inefficient firms.

In other words, the development of the national bourgeoisie should now be nurtured by market forces and not by the forces associated with State monopolies and the primitive accumulation of capital. Through this method, the bourgeoisie would rapidly transform the national economy along self sustained growth and check the resilience and expansion of the petty commodity sector. The liberation of the competitive market structures and values will provide the foundations for the construction of democracy.

Several questions arise in the analysis of the new policy thrust. Can market forces actually subdue the primitive accumulation of capital and monopolistic practices? Is it possible to identify the social forces that are wholly committed to the development of market forces? What are the implications of these for national development and the struggle for democracy?

The development of a pure market economy presupposes a certain level of development of the productive forces and of the mode of accumulation of the ruling classes in such formations. The relatively underdeveloped character of the Nigerian economy explains why the local entrepreneurs have not fully embraced the structural adjustment programme, with the exception of those with transnational ties; it has underlined the need for the close monitoring of the economy by the Fund and Bank, and has exposed the persistence of the so-called discredited methods of organising business, even with the regime's commitment to the success of SAP. The historical project for the creation of a

national bourgeoisie through State activities has not yet been completed. Market forces will, therefore, grow in a very stunted form, if they are to grow at all.

The adjustment programme itself seeks to devalue the living standards of the popular masses before the latter are allowed to regain them in the newly adjusted economy. Such a goal cannot be achieved under conditions of free political relations. It requires a certain level of coercion and authoritarianism for its success. Rather than adjustment promoting democracy, as claimed by its defenders, it, in fact, creates the conditions for a new form of authoritarianism which combines the old methods of control with the new demands of an enfeebled social order based on market forces. I have shown elsewhere the parameters of this new authoritarianism which restricts the political arena by promoting variants of military rule, limited political parties, diarchy, triarchy and corporate representation¹.

The new authoritarianism seeks to weaken the organised power of the popular forces that are likely to oppose the adjustment programme and prepare the basis for the emergence of new forces that are committed to the programme. It involves an assault on all classes, but with the working classes carrying the brunt of the repression. It is the modern-day version of the Bonapartist programme of nineteenth century France, which seeks to promote the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie by cleansing the latter of its old methods of organising itself and forcing it to assume new responsibilities and directions. The tragedy of the package is that it requires a high level of development for the bourgeoisie to play the role it is being called upon to assume.

The Politics of Transition

Several points have emerged in our analysis of the politics of structural adjustment. The first is the tendency of SAP to reinforce and deepen the authoritarian culture and the repressive apparatus of the State. The second is its attempts to purify the national bourgeoisie. And finally the third is its implacable opposition to the working classes. The transition programme has unmistakably mirrored these objectives. It does not seek to promote liberal or popular democracy per se, but to provide the political basis for the successful implementation of the adjustment programme. The political debate on the transition to civil rule betrayed the lack of commitment of the bourgeoisie and large sections of the élite to the ideals of liberal democracy. Ibrahim has

¹ Bangura, Y. ROAPE, 37.

observed that there was the point of view of upholding the liberal democratic ideals, when compared to that of the 1970s¹.

The political Bureau Report itself² came down strongly in support of socialism. Members of the Bureau, it would seem, tried to grapple with the specificities of the economy that act as fetters on the development of democracy. Thus their recommendation for a planned, self-reliant national economy³. They called for a two-party system⁴, some measure of corporate representation⁵ and a directorate for mass mobilisation (MAMSER)⁶ to usher in the new social and political order.

The report was strong on 'State/bureaucratic democracy' but weak on liberal democracy. It tried to resolve the complex issues of democracy administratively without resolving the antagonistic class interests in the field of struggle. It naively assumed that the forces that can implement the popular programme were already in control of political power. Conversely, it believed that a government that is rigorously advancing a thorough-going market-oriented adjustment programme would suddenly regret its chosen path of development and embrace the ideals of socialism.

The point ought to be made that the transition programme is, fundamentally, a government programme. It, probably, would have been more productive for "socialists" in the Bureau to have concentrated on the liberal content of the democratic struggles rather than attempting to construct socialism on a government platform. Such socialism, if implemented, would become a euphemism for bureaucratic/authoritarian controls.

What is the value of pushing for corporate democracy in a government document when the popular forces are not in control of State power? Isn't this a recipe for the cooptation of popular organisations into government and the destruction of their independent traditions? What is the point in restricting the political parties to two when the popular forces do not, as yet, have the power to ensure that they will control one of those parties? Doesn't this foreclose the development of a popular working class party? Why clamour for a single ideology when the contending interests in the country have not been resolved? Isn't this the surest path to totalitarianism and the breeding of false prophets of socialism? Why call for a directorate of social mobilisation in a government-controlled transition programme? Doesn't this lay the foundations for the creation of a vanguard for the enthronement of fascism?

1 Ibrahim, J., *ROAPE*, 37.

2 A substantial percentage of the 17-member bureau were political scientists with sympathies for radical populism.

3 *Report of the Political Bureau* (Federal Government, Printer) Lagos March 1987. p. 52-70.

4 *Ibid*, p. 126.

5 *Ibid* pp. 142-160.

6 *Ibid*, p.203-207

It is not surprising that the government rejected the core elements of the Bureau's Report which would have obstructed its march towards free wheeling capitalism; and insisted, correctly, that an ideology could not be imposed on the people. It clearly selected those aspects of the Report, such as the two party system, MAMSER, and the unstructured use of corporate representation, that are useful in establishing the political foundation for structural adjustment¹.

The core objective of the transition programme is the remoulding of the social forces in the country to correspond to the demands of the structural adjustment programme. The remoulding involves the creation of the environment for the emergence of social forces that will be committed to the defence of SAP, luring mild opponents of the programme over through various strategies and disorganising/repressing the social forces that are implacably opposed to the programme.

The debate on the country's relations with the IMF lucidly brought out the contending forces in the reform programme². The transnationals and their local allies were the strongest defenders of SAP. The national bourgeoisie was initially opposed to the programme since it posed a threat to its traditional methods of organising business. The programme had to be imposed on this class, but with several concessions in the 1988 Budget on the funding of SFEM, the tariff regime, interest rates, and the reflation of the economy³. At the political level, the transition programme aims to create a new set of people from among the ranks of the bourgeoisie and the elites who will carry the banner of SAP during civil rule. This explains the blanket banning of the old politicians, considered to be too committed to the old, discredited methods. The 'new political class' is expected to emerge from the newly constituted Local governments and the Constituent Assembly. This group should be strong enough to face the challenges posed by the banned politicians.

The rural and small scale producers did not feature prominently in the 'IMF Debate'. SAP is, however, expected to shift the balance of opportunities away from urban waged employees towards the rural producers. Devaluation promotes exports and increases the naira value of rural incomes. The dramatic rise in cocoa incomes in Ondo State is a case in point. The current shortages of locally produced food, even gari, and their astronomical price increases have been attributed to the export of these products.

The government recognises the potential support it can get from the rural sector for its reform programme. Thus, its decision to establish the Directorate

1 Government white paper on the Report of the Political Bureau (Government Printer) Lagos, 1987.

2 Bangura, Y., IMF/World Bank conditionality and Nigeria's Structural adjustment programme, in Havnevik, K., *The IMF and the World Bank in Africa: Conditionality and its impact* (SIAS) 1987.

3 Bangura, Y., "The 1988 budget: Adjusting the structural adjustment programme", Workshop paper, CSER, January 1988.

for Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructure; to start the transition programme at the local government area; and to insist that contestants would have to be resident in their respective local government areas to qualify for election¹. But, of course, SAP has not eliminated the obnoxious activities of the middlemen, who have actually cornered the booming export trade. All sorts of corrupt practices have also accompanied the implementation of the DFRRI, rendering it largely ineffective, in many areas, in providing facilities to the peasant farmers. The State seeks the cooperation of the peasantry in its reform programme, but seems to have more confidence in the large scale farmers and the rural power elite. No wonder, large scale rigging was witnessed during the local government elections. Peasant representatives, defending peasant interests, were few and far between in most of the local government councils. They hardly featured in the Constituent Assembly.

The debate on the IMF showed that the lower, urban petit-bourgeoisie of road transport drivers, traders and mechanics were opposed to the IMF loan and its conditionality. Transport operators and traders are central to the politics of adjustment. It is mainly through these two groups that the average consumer gets exposed to the adverse effects of the programme. The State has tried to neutralise the militancy of the transport operators - the National Union of Road Transport workers and the Nigerian Transport Owners Association - by entering into agreements with the leaders of these organisations and providing some of the inputs to the groups at controlled prices so that they will not feel compelled to raise transport fares and create mass instability. The other social group, the petty traders, has been held at arms-length. It cannot be cajoled by the government since there is really nothing to offer its members. This group, in any case, has a tradition of militancy². It has waged serious struggles against levies, the destruction of kiosks and other unpopular government measures. There is, in fact, a ban placed on the activities of this group in Bendel State following the crisis on gari, the staple food.

The backbone of the opposition to the reform measures are the working class movements, the radical intelligentsia and the students movement. The three social groups played a leading role in persuading the nation to reject the IMF loan, and have been at the forefront in the struggle for democracy. They have also suffered serious material reverses, following the implementation of the adjustment programme. The State has been unable to buy off the leadership of these groups; thus the policy of the big stick: the banning of the National Association of Nigerian Students; the control of students politics on the campuses; the making of the membership of students unions and the Academic Staff Union of Universities voluntary; the disaffiliation of the ASUU from the Nigeria Labour Congress and its ultimate proscription; the

1 Bangura, Y., "Crisis, adjustment and politics in Nigeria". A Research Proposal. November 1987.

2 Beckman, B., 'State, Class and Democracy, Nigeria, 1975-1992'. A Research proposal submitted to SAREC Jan. 1988.

dissolution of the NLC in February 1988; and the periodic arrest and intimidation of academic staff, student activists and workers' representatives.

The transition programme provides no role for these forces. Even the five per cent legislative representation given to workers and women by the Political Bureau has been nullified. Instead workers are selected by State functionaries to represent workers interests in the Constituent Assembly! The government seems to be determined to keep out of the transition programme what it calls extremists - a euphemism for the socialists. The recent elections of delegates to the Constituent Assembly by the local government councils were not only rushed but members were carefully screened to prevent radicals and banned politicians from scaling through. There is no activist socialist in the current Assembly of 563 members. The government, in fact, had to appoint 113 members to the C.A. just to be doubly assured of a block of loyal Assembly men and women. Guidelines were also provided prohibiting the debate on certain issue alleged to have been nationally resolved. Government functionaries are more concerned about the political engineering aspect of transition than with the question of democracy.

The Struggle for Democracy

The construction of liberal democracy demands a change in the modes of accumulation of the neocolony. The national bourgeoisie can play a leading role in this struggle only when it is sufficiently developed to make less use of primitive accumulation and become great masters of wage labour. Structural adjustment is trying to address this problem but, I think, rather prematurely. Extending Engels' observations on political power and class leadership, the worst thing that can happen to a class is to be compelled to change its mode of appropriation at a time when the class has not yet fully developed to dispense with the old methods of accumulation. What such a class ought to do cannot be done given the immaturity of the class forces for the new assignment; and yet what it ends up doing contradicts its own development, interest and principles¹.

If the bourgeoisie cannot be relied upon to defend democracy, the popular forces will have to impose their authority on the issue. The type of democracy that corresponds to the objective interests of these forces is one that transforms the neocolonial society and gives power to the popular forces in the administration of the political economy. Such a transformation also calls for the resolution of the problems of unequal development through an imaginative and democratic planning system that will involve the victims of unequal development themselves. The enthronement of these forces to position of power at the work-place and in the State structure will destroy the basis for private monopoly power; and will change the character of the transformation of the traditional sector into the modern economy through democratic means. This

¹ Mamdani, M., raised a similar question for the Uganda situation in *NRA/NRM: Two Years in Power* (Progress Publishing House) Kampala 1988. p. 23.

will minimize the appearance of primitive accumulation of a capital and its attendant authoritarian values and patron-client relations.

Several points follow from the analysis. First is that the struggle for democracy is not a once-and-for-all phenomena; the final product is likely to vary from one country to another, depending on the level of development of the productive forces and the organisational strength and consciousness of the forces committed to democracy. The level of conceptualisation of the democratic project and the capacity and willingness to fight for it can be quite decisive in the building of democratic structures.

Second, the struggle for popular democracy is linked with the struggle for liberal democracy. Liberal democracy is not just a bourgeoisie project¹; it is also the project of the popular forces. The European working classes, in most cases, had to compell their bourgeoisies to push the liberal democratic project further than the latter had wanted to go². This was necessary to defend such popular objectives as the right to free trade unions, independent labour parties funded by unions, the extension of the franchise to workers and women and the development of the welfare State. Liberal democracy is, therefore, part of the heritage of the popular forces. There is an added, fundamental, reason why the struggle for liberal democracy should be an integral part of the struggle for popular democracy; to promote a culture of tolerance, free debate, self criticism, accountability and broad internal democracy in the popular organisations themselves. Ignoring the centrality of liberal democracy in popular struggles can lead to small cliques within these organisations arrogating to themselves the responsibility for deciding the level of participation and freedom to be enjoyed by the rest of the society.

Thirdly, is the democratic resolution of the conflicting interests of the various social forces that are committed to democracy. Social groups may emphasise different aspects of the democratic project based on their objective class interests. Peasant interests may be different from working class interests and may even conflict on the question of the distribution of resources between the urban and rural sectors. Even within the ranks of the same class, say the petit-bourgeoisie, some groups may hold conflicting positions on specific issues on the democratic question, even if they remain committed to the general ideals of democracy. The national fuel crisis of April 10th 1988 and the role of specific groups in the strikes is a case in point. Various social groups ranging from students, workers, academics, butchers, the unemployed, lawyers, civil servants, nurses and doctors either took active parts in the demonstrations/strikes or sympathised with the popular resistance to the undemocratic manner fuel prices were raised.

The nurses decided also to demand the resolution of a specific, long standing industrial dispute bordering on democracy at the workplace, i.e. the

1 The Nigerian Political Science Association conference in its communique session in 1986 voted to delete a section in the communique which was calling for some liberal democracy.

2 Therban, G., The rule of capital and the rise of democracy, *The New Left Review* 103: 1977.

recognition of nursing as a profession, requiring no supervision from doctors; the establishment of a directorate of nursing; and the appointment of nurses into the highest decision making body of the health system. Even though doctors were sympathetic with the general opposition towards the fuel price increases and the hikes in food prices and transport fares¹ their association contested the democratic rights of the nurses to have their own independent profession. Their attitudes, betraying deep seated professional arrogance, assumed that nurses should be their apron-strings rather than their partners in the health care delivery system. Democratic practice requires the respect for the rights of others, irrespective of the positions they may occupy at the workplace and in the wider society.

¹ The Nigerian Medical Association did not take part in the strike, but doctors were, on the whole, sympathetic to the objectives of the popular protests.

Crise et Recul du Nationalisme Economique d'etat Collectif en Afrique

Bernard Founou-Tchuigoua*

RÉSUMÉ. When the OAU adopted the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980 it implicitly admitted that the nationalist movement was right in ascribing the under-development of the continent to imperialism and in advocating delinking as Samir Amin calls it - as a (necessary but of course insufficient) requirement for development; better still the OAU rejected the counter Plan (Berg Report) drafted by the World Bank. In 1986, however, with the adoption of Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER) the OAU shifted to the position imposed by the World Bank and the IMF. In effect APPER rejects the principle of self-centered development even that of food self sufficiency; advocates a tightening of relations between Africa and the Center and legitimizes structural adjustment. these policy changes mark an ideological shift from nationalism to neo-liberalism. The vulgar anti-socialism of political leaders including a few who claim to be Marxist is at the root of externally induced corruption and political oppression. In the main, African national liberation movements have failed to inculcate a democratic tradition. Thus democracy has to play a leading role in the search for alternatives. Marxism should be a component of such a democracy - a type of Marxism which must stop short of imposing one school of thought one which does not have claim to a monopoly of truth.

La détérioration des conditions de vie déjà précaires des peuples africains s'accélère sous l'effet de la crise, notamment de la crise de la solvabilité des Etats. Pour y faire face, ceux-ci adoptent les politiques néo-libérales préconisées par les forces dominantes du Centre. Le débat sur les problèmes de développement est occulté par celui des mécanismes du fonctionnement du système et celui de la dette. C'est la confusion. Nous avons le devoir de recentrer nos débats sur les problèmes de développement. Est-ce dans le cadre du nationalisme économique radical ou dans celui du néo-libéralisme que les problèmes économiques fondamentaux seront résolus ? Pour nous, le nationalisme économique est une condition indispensable du développement. Les problèmes de la solvabilité des Etats doivent être inscrits dans cette perspective. Or, les Etats africains sont en train d'abandonner non pas le nationalisme économique comme action, que la plupart n'ont jamais pratiqué, mais comme doctrine. Ils renoncent à l'idée même de nationalisme économique, qui, auparavant, n'avait été rejeté ouvertement que par quelques-uns (puisque tous ont adopté le plan d'action de Lagos) et qui progressivement l'a été au niveau collectif depuis 1981, date de la publication d'un contre-plan de Lagos par la Banque Mondiale.

* From du Tiers Monde..

Ce papier examine la façon dont cette évolution s'est produite, les facteurs fondamentaux qui l'ont déterminée et ce que nous pouvons faire pour redresser la situation. Il ne traite donc pas des bilans des stratégies, mais des idéologies qui les sous-tendent.

Un accent particulier sera mis sur la nécessité de la révolution agro-alimentaire en raison de son importance dans tout processus de développement et du fait que bien qu'amplement pourvue en ressources naturelles (sols, climats, possibilités d'irrigation), l'Afrique reste un continent qui voit environ le quart de sa population souffrir de malnutrition ou de famine; un continent qui, avec 70% de sa population active engagée dans l'agriculture doit recevoir l'aide de pays dont 7% seulement de la population travaille dans le secteur agricole. Les exportations agricoles couvrent de moins en moins les importations alimentaires et les cas de liaisons significatives entre l'agriculture et l'industrie y sont exceptionnels. C'est pourquoi chaque pays du continent a besoin d'une révolution agricole et rurale.

Du nationalisme économique d'Etat du PAL¹ au néo-libéralisme du PPREA²

1. Le nationalisme économique d'Etat en Afrique est né avec les indépendances. Comme ailleurs dans le Tiers Monde, après avoir connu son âge d'or au milieu des années 1960, puis un certain déclin, il a retrouvé un regain. Cependant ce regain est caractérisé par un contenu très économiste réducteur, pendant les discussions sur la possibilité de réaménager les relations entre le Centre et la périphérie (Nouvel Ordre Economique International). Mais dès le début des années 1970, l'observation courante et l'analyse statistique mettaient en évidence la détérioration continue des conditions économiques et sociales, voire politiques en Afrique. Le renversement de cette tendance doit commencer par la déconnexion et la formation d'Etats-nations démocratiques, démontraient des intellectuels de l'école de l'économie mondiale. Ils proposaient un nationalisme économique différent de celui des nationalistes des années 1960. Ces derniers préconisaient et tentaient de mettre en oeuvre (naïvement?) des stratégies de développement autonome, à travers l'étatisation de l'économie. Par conséquent ils refusaient d'admettre que la maîtrise des conditions de l'accumulation suppose au niveau économique la déconnexion par rapport au système des prix mondiaux et au plan politique la soumission de l'Etat au contrôle de la société organisée comportant une composante socialiste marxienne importante.

Selon cette critique du nationalisme économique de la première vague, la révolution agricole et rurale joue un rôle de premier plan, puisqu'elle conditionne le développement économique. Il s'agit d'une révolution qui libère politiquement les ruraux en leur offrant les moyens de contrôler l'Etat et de maîtriser les relations de production, révolutionne la base technique de l'agriculture, et assure l'autosuffisance alimentaire et l'autonomie au niveau

1 Plan d'Action de Lagos.

2 Programme Prioritaire de Redressement Economique de l'Afrique.

national des moyens techniques, financiers et commerciaux de la reproduction. Cette conception de la révolution agricole est inspirée plus par l'expérience de type chinois qu'euro-américain, soviétique ou indien dont les aspects ne peuvent pas être écartés. Ce qui attire dans l'expérience chinoise, c'est qu'au-delà des conditions spécifiques à ce pays, elle a pu très largement amorcé sa révolution agricole et rurale, en maîtrisant ses relations extérieures. Ainsi elle n'a ni eu recours à l'aide financière et technique massive, ni mis sur une rente minière ou énergétique pour les devises. Elle a considéré le plein emploi et l'amélioration des conditions de vie des agriculteurs comme des objectifs prioritaires, d'où le rôle capital joué par la coopération agricole et rurale.

Sans être aussi explicite, cette conception influence le projet de développement agricole en Afrique contenu dans le Plan d'Action de Lagos qui, malgré ses incohérences et contradictions, marque un moment important du nationalisme économique d'Etat en Afrique. A la différence du nationalisme économique des années 1960, le Plan prend en considération le fait que "l'étatisation des hauteurs" de l'économie est une illusion car elle n'empêche nullement les processus de domination économique et de l'exploitation de continuer à jouer.

Du plan d'Action de Lagos au Programme Prioritaire de Redressement Economique de l'Afrique.

Pour présenter les étapes de la doctrine collective des Etats africains sur les relations entre le développement du continent et la forme d'insertion dans l'économie mondiale, nous allons analyser trois textes que l'OUA a adoptés ou approuvés. Nous pensons qu'au-delà de la diversité, ces textes reflètent, au moment où ils sont adoptés, les rapports de force réels et théorico-idéologiques. Les trois textes sont: le Plan d'Action de Lagos (PAL) adopté en 1980 au Sommet de l'OUA de Lagos; le Programme d'Action pour le Développement Accéléré en Afrique au Sud du Sahara en 1981 (Plan Berg): ce programme, présenté aux Etats Africains lors de la réunion annuelle conjointe du Conseil d'Administration. FMI/Banque Mondiale en 1981, n'a pas été officiellement adopté par les Etats Africains. Cependant il est devenu en fait une référence doctrinale implicite surtout aux plans de "réajustements structurels" que les pays africains appliquent les uns après les autres, au fur et à mesure que dure la crise de la balance des paiements; enfin le Programme Prioritaire de Redressement Economique de l'Afrique (PPREA) adopté par le Sommet de l'OUA de juillet 1986 après son adoption par l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies en avril 1986.

a) Il y a plusieurs lectures possibles du PAL. Nous en citerons trois:

- La première considère qu'il s'agit d'un document à contenu essentiellement idéologique, ou du résultat d'un exercice rhétorique. Il faudrait donc lui opposer un document plus "scientifiquement" élaboré, c'est-à-dire, sans contenu politique ou idéologique apparent. Mieux, le langage utilisé serait

trop tiers-mondiste. C'est le point de vue occidental exprimé dans le rapport de la Banque Mondiale, pour qui la recherche de l'autonomie du système agro-alimentaire n'est pas un facteur de développement, mais au contraire un frein, car elle oblige à affecter des ressources qui ne maximisent pas le "bien être mondial";

- la deuxième lecture considère le PAL comme un document intéressant, mais à mettre aux archives, puisqu'il n'y a pas de forces sociales pour en exiger l'application. Au contraire, la crise pousse les gouvernements, sous l'effet de l'endettement, à appliquer plutôt le programme de la Banque Mondiale ;

- notre lecture examine le plan de manière critique et le considère comme une étape sur la voie de la formulation d'objectifs et de stratégies répondant aux besoins de l'Afrique. Dans le Plan d'Action de Lagos, la réalisation de l'autosuffisance alimentaire (ASA) est présentée comme un aspect d'une stratégie globale de développement autocentré. Le préambule rappelle en effet, que c'est l'intégration dans le système capitaliste comme périphérie depuis plusieurs siècles qui constitue en Afrique le facteur principal de la crise de développement économique (et pas seulement de la croissance). La priorité donnée au développement agricole est largement justifiée par l'expérience historique et la théorie. Ce point est important. C'est lui qui a fait fonder tant d'espoirs sur le PAL, malgré ses lacunes et ses contradictions. Dans la mesure où il est pratiquement abandonné maintenant, il faut se demander s'il n'a pas été victime de ses propres faiblesses. Les rédacteurs ont utilisé le concept de la stratégie de l'ASA dans un sens très restrictif, puisqu'il n'intègre pas la maîtrise du système agro-alimentaire ; les problèmes de l'autonomie du financement, de l'industrialisation et du développement accéléré d'une base technologique nécessaire à l'agro-vivrier n'ont pas été pris en compte. De plus, le diagnostic n'a fait aucune place au problème de la répartition du produit aussi bien pendant la période coloniale que post-coloniale. En particulier ne sont pas explicités les rapports économiques et politiques qui permettent la surexploitation des paysans et des ruraux en général au profit d'une petite minorité intérieure (urbaine et rurale) et des nations du Centre, et non au profit de l'industrialisation ou des villes en général. Par conséquent, les moyens de redressement préconisés sont restés très vagues. Dans ces conditions, il était facile de prévoir la réalisation de l'autosuffisance entre 1980 et 1985. Cet objectif, pourtant limité, n'a pas été atteint. Au contraire, on s'en est éloigné. Car outre les faiblesses techniques, le PAL supposait remplir une autre condition, à savoir que tout Etat Africain a la capacité sociale (légitimité historique) et technique (institutions, intelligentsia bien formée, nationaliste et critique) de mener à bien une politique d'autosuffisance alimentaire inspirée soit du modèle chinois, soit du modèle indien. Or même les Etats dont les leaders jouissaient effectivement de la légitimité historique ne déconnectèrent pas suffisamment pour déclencher des révolutions agricoles véritables.

b) Malgré ses lacunes, le PAL a marqué une date importante dans la lutte des idées en Afrique. La théorie du développement autocentré qui suppose la

maîtrise nationale sur l'économie y remportait une grande victoire sur l'ultra-libéralisme. C'est pourquoi, dès 1981, la Banque Mondiale publia une sorte de contre-plan. Evidemment derrière la Banque, il faut voir les principaux pays du Centre et notamment les Etats-Unis d'Amérique qui tracent la voie. Selon la thèse défendue dans le document, l'autosuffisance alimentaire n'est pas un concept scientifique, mais politico-idéologique; il relève du nationalisme et non de l'analyse économique qui enseigne que la loi des avantages comparatifs est le meilleur guide en matière d'alimentation comme dans d'autres domaines d'activité économique.

Dans son rapport sur le développement dans le monde (1986), la Banque fait le procès des stratégies qui prennent l'autosuffisance alimentaire comme objectif. On y lit "la question fondamentale n'est pas celle de l'autosuffisance mais celle de l'avantage comparatif. On voit mal pourquoi un pays devrait se soustraire, sous prétexte d'une politique d'autosuffisance alimentaire, des ressources qu'il peut utiliser avec plus de profit à des activités - agricole ou autres - à vocation exportatrice"¹. La Banque n'arrive pas à comprendre pourquoi "l'autosuffisance qui n'est pas un objectif non économique" conserve de nombreux partisans "et que" certains pays sont prêts à de gros sacrifices pour y parvenir"¹ibid..

Remarquons bien qu'au-delà de l'autosuffisance alimentaire, c'est toute politique d'autonomie économique nationale qui est dénoncée par la Banque. Ce faisant elle fait semblant d'ignorer que les lois économiques n'opèrent qu'à travers des systèmes de rapports de force et en général au détriment des plus faibles; elle fait ainsi semblant d'ignorer que le principe de l'avantage comparatif n'est invoqué que par ceux qui n'ont rien à y perdre; elle fait enfin semblant d'ignorer les concepts de base comme ceux de dignité nationale. Mais surtout, elle tente de présenter la recherche d'une stratégie d'autosuffisance alimentaire comme spécifique aux pays de la périphérie. Car, tous les pays développés ont toujours cherché et réalisé l'autosuffisance, tant qu'ils n'exercent pas par leurs firmes, leurs armées ou leurs administrations le contrôle sur les approvisionnements nécessaires à la reproduction de la force de travail.

Est-ce un hasard si la mise en oeuvre de politiques d'autosuffisance alimentaire systématiques en Europe et aux Etats-Unis a coïncidé avec le moment où l'accession des pays africains à l'indépendance a créé les conditions d'une réorientation de l'agriculture en priorité vers la satisfaction des besoins des peuples locaux? Contrairement à ce que fait croire la Banque, la politique d'autosuffisance des grands pays industriels ne va pas être remise en cause de sitôt. Au contraire, elle va se renforcer, car elle ne se justifie pas seulement par des impératifs de sécurité, mais aussi par les enjeux technologiques qu'elle implique. La "high technology" n'est pas absente de l'agro-alimentaire.

¹ Banque Mondiale, rapport sur le développement dans le monde, 1986, p. 86.

c) Le PREA est un programme quinquennal (1986-1990). Comme il est moins diffusé que le PAL et le Programme de la Banque Mondiale, nous allons en rappeler la structure. C'est un texte en deux volumes, l'un de synthèse et l'autre consacré aux programmes nationaux. Le PREA proprement dit forme la deuxième partie de la synthèse qui est le programme d'action; ainsi, à la différence du PAL et du Programme de la Banque Mondiale, il a des composantes qui ont permis de confectionner la synthèse.

Pour l'ampleur des informations statistiques qu'il contient, le PPREA se veut plus "scientifique" que le PAL, sans cependant pouvoir rivaliser avec le Plan de la Banque.

3. D'après le résumé officiel du document de synthèse, le seul qui nous intéresse ici, le PPREA s'articule autour des cinq mesures suivantes:

1) La mise en oeuvre du Plan d'Action et de l'Acte Final de Lagos réactualisés.

2) L'amélioration de la situation alimentaire et la réhabilitation de l'agriculture.

3) L'allègement du fardeau de la dette.

4) La lutte contre les effets de la politique systématique de destabilisation de l'Afrique du Sud sur les économies des États de l'Afrique Australe.

5) L'élaboration d'une plate-forme d'actions communes aux niveaux sous-régional, régional, continental et international.

Il serait donc une étape dans la mise en oeuvre du PAL. Le doute est permis. On peut penser qu'il est plus proche de la problématique de la Banque Mondiale. D'une part, l'industrialisation n'est plus considérée comme une priorité et d'autre part une solennité spéciale est donnée au recours à l'aide extérieure. Il s'agit en fait d'un programme de réhabilitation et de développement de l'agriculture africaine et non de *l'agro-alimentaire*. Il propose la priorité à l'agriculture et non aux cultures vivrières. Il propose d'élever la productivité sans industrialisation; ainsi la presque totalité des ressources financières prévues (116 milliards sur 120) devraient aller à l'agriculture proprement dite (47,2% du total), à l'infrastructure de soutien à l'agriculture (44,1%) et enfin à la lutte contre la désertification (5%).

Cette répartition des ressources ne manque pas de surprendre dans un plan dont formellement la réalisation dépend à 30% de ressources extérieures (et surtout d'aide publique extérieure); formellement car parmi les ressources propres (70%), le plan compte les aides déjà obtenues et les engagements ultérieurs. Elle surprend, car 5% seulement sont affectés à la lutte contre la désertification alors qu'à notre avis (c'est vers elle que devrait être canalisé l'essentiel des ressources extérieures, la plupart des autres programmes pouvant être exécutés avec la mobilisation de ressources intérieures humaines notamment.

Les positions du PPREA se sont considérablement éloignées de celles du PAL sur trois problèmes importants. Le principe du développement autocentré est remis en cause y compris au niveau de la stratégie alimentaire.

Le renforcement de l'institutionnalisation des relations entre le centre et l'Afrique est demandé; les mesures d'ajustement imposées par le centre sont légitimées.

A l'approche des problèmes alimentaires en termes de priorité à l'autosuffisance alimentaire, nationale ou régionale, se substitue subrepticement celle de l'avantage comparatif. Pour le PPREA, en effet, le producteur africain peut se trouver devant le dilemme de produire moins en autosuffisance ou plus en acceptant la division internationale du travail: "A certains moments, les producteurs africains des denrées de première nécessité se sont posés la question de savoir si les recettes supplémentaires provenant de l'accroissement des exportations suffiraient à couvrir ne serait-ce que les coûts de production des produits d'exportation supplémentaire"¹.

Cette formulation montre une sorte d'adhésion honteuse au principe de l'avantage comparatif. En effet, nul n'a jamais prétendu que l'autosuffisance alimentaire implique l'autarcie économique, encore moins l'autarcie alimentaire. Ce qui est en jeu, c'est le système de relations qui favorise la dignité et le développement.

La position du PPREA sur la souveraineté des Etats africains nous paraît également ambiguë. Ils proposent la création d'institutions de concertation et de suivi entre "l'Afrique et la communauté internationale"; "Nous proposons qu'un nouvel ensemble de relations - un engagement - s'établisse entre l'Afrique et la communauté internationale qui reposerait sur le principe de la co-responsabilité, selon lequel le soutien massif qui sera apporté à l'Afrique viendrait renforcer la détermination croissante des peuples africains et de leurs gouvernements d'opérer un redressement grâce aux sacrifices exceptionnels qu'ils accompliraient pour mobiliser des ressources au niveau national, rentabiliser au maximum l'utilisation de ces ressources et les appuyer par des réformes et ajustements appropriés. Pour sa part, la communauté internationale s'engage à adopter une nouvelle attitude dans le domaine de la coopération avec l'Afrique"².

Cet engagement des pays du centre à changer d'attitude, devait se traduire, selon les propositions africaines, par un accroissement important de l'aide dont un organe de suivi veillerait à la bonne utilisation. "Chacun s'accorde sur l'absolue nécessité d'instituer un mécanisme permanent de surveillance de l'application du programme prioritaire de façon à définir au plus tôt les problèmes et goulots d'étranglement, et de prendre sans tarder des mesures correctives"³.

Certes, il était prévisible que les Etats du centre n'accepteraient pas de souscrire de nouveaux engagements susceptibles de se traduire par des augmentations importantes de transferts de ressources. Par contre, ils peuvent

1 OUA, propositions par les pays africains à la session spéciale extraordinaire de l'assemblée générale consacrée à la crise économique et sociale en Afrique, vol I, 1986, p.7.

2 ibid. p. 21.

3 Ibid. p. 27.

accepter dans le but de diviser les pays du Tiers Monde, de financer le fonctionnement d'une structure bureaucratique supplémentaire qui n'aurait pas d'effet positif sur le développement du continent. Finalement, le PPREA assume aussi une fonction de légitimation des problèmes de stabilisation et "d'ajustement structurel" qui transfèrent le poids des effets des politiques anti-crise au centre sur les peuples du Tiers Monde.

Dans les passages consacrés à l'analyse des effets des "mesures de stabilisation et de réformes économiques générales", il est reconnu qu'aucun des pays où elles ont été appliquées, n'a retrouvé le chemin de la croissance. Pour le PPREA, cet échec est dû au fait que les programmes n'étaient pas adaptés au contexte africain et n'avaient pas bénéficié de l'effet de durée. Les Etats africains souscrivent ainsi à la thèse du centre selon laquelle l'objectif premier des mesures de réajustement est la création des conditions de relance de la croissance économique. Cependant elles ont des objectifs plus vastes dont, par exemple celui d'affaiblir les bourgeoisies locales et simultanément d'éviter que les peuples ne s'organisent en ce dotant d'Etats qui leur permettraient de vaincre les causes structurelles (cest-à-dire du sous-développement) dont il est si souvent question dans le PPREA¹.

En résumé, tout se passe comme si le principe de ne compter que sur ses propres forces qui voisinait avec celui de la demande d'aide dans le PAL, faisait place au principe du "partenariat".

Dans ces conditions, le fait que le programme place en tête des mesures à prendre la mise en oeuvre accélérée du Plan d'Action de Lagos réactualisé ne doit pas faire illusion. On est passé d'un stade caractérisé par une doctrine cohérente et volontariste de développement à un autre caractérisé par la cohérence imposée par les prétendues lois économiques qui opèreraient sans l'intervention des Etats nationaux dotés de pouvoirs inégaux dont les plus puissants s'opposent au jeu de lois économiques, notamment dans les relations extérieures.

De plus, le PPREA des Nations-Unies ne risque-t-il pas de fonctionner comme un mécanisme de division du Tiers Monde, dans la mesure où, venant après le programme de développement accéléré de la Banque Mondiale, il peut être récupéré par les forces qui cherchent à isoler l'Afrique du reste du Tiers Monde ? A notre sens, des actions spéciales en faveur d'Etats africains et notamment les plus démunis peuvent être prises dans le cadre des structures existantes au sein du système des Nations Unies les moins avancés. Il faut remarquer en effet que si le PPREA concerne formellement tous les Etats membres de l'OUA, en réalité, il traite surtout des problèmes de l'Afrique sub-saharienne dont 25 d'entre eux sont parmi les 36 "pays les moins avancés" (PMA). Or, une structure existe déjà pour traiter les problèmes de ces pays.

¹ B. Founou - Reflection on the utilisation of the monetary and financial system for weakening the peripheral bourgeoisies and stalling the delinking process, T.W.F., Bulletin N 6, 1986, Dakar.

C'est en 1968 que la "Communauté internationale" reconnût que des mesures internationales spéciales étaient nécessaires pour faire face aux vraies difficultés économiques et sociales des pays les moins développés et pour améliorer le niveau de vie extrêmement faible de leurs peuples.

En 1972, la troisième conférence de la CNUCED adopta la première résolution comprenant l'ensemble des mesures spéciales en faveur de ces pays. Plusieurs réunions de l'UNCTAD eurent lieu à cet effet. "En dépit de ces efforts, au cours des années 1970, les pays les moins développés traînaient de plus en plus derrière et dans bien des cas, régressaient".

La conférence des Nations Unies de Paris (1981) adopta "le nouveau programme d'action substantiel (NPAS) en faveur des PMA pour les années 1980. Les objectifs essentiels étaient les suivants: 1) permettre la transformation de ces économies pour les mettre sur la voie d'un développement auto-entretenu; 2) leur permettre de satisfaire au moins les normes internationales minima en matière de nutrition, de santé, d'éducation, de transport, de commercialisation, de logement ainsi que des opportunités d'emploi pour tous les citoyens et en particulier pour les paysans pauvres; 3) inciter la "communauté internationale" à considérer comme un devoir de fournir une assistance substantielle dans la réalisation de ces objectifs, et ce, pour compléter l'effort national"¹. Démarche dans le cadre de cette conférence de Paris ou de toute autre organisation qui n'aurait pas eu à singulariser l'Afrique et aurait été plus intéressante au plan psychologique².

En résumé, nous avons assisté à un glissement idéologique certain du nationalisme au néo-libéralisme en quelques années, entraînant le risque d'affaiblissement du front sud à partir de l'Afrique. Il nous faut en présenter les facteurs essentiels.

Les facteurs

Le recul de l'idéologie nationaliste de développement des Etats africains résulte d'une série de facteurs structurels et conjoncturels que l'on peut résumer en disant que les Etats perdent la marge de manoeuvre dont ils disposaient ou croyaient disposer. Ces facteurs sont d'ordre économique, politique, culturel et historique. Mais nous pensons qu'il faut accorder la plus grande importance à la base économique et notamment aux finances publiques de l'Etat. Sans autonomie en matière de finances publiques, ni le nationalisme de droite (qui ne remet pas en cause l'investissement des sociétés transnationales), ni celui de gauche (qui contrôle étroitement et limite l'investissement des STN), n'est possible. Nous examinerons aussi les facteurs d'ordre politico-sociologique car le nationalisme économique ne peut s'affirmer durablement tant que l'Etat méprise le peuple, l'opprime au lieu de

1 UNCTAD - The least developed countries 1984 & 1985 - Introductions to the Reports.

2 C'est une démarche courante au plan diplomatique. Ainsi on sait que pour l'essentiel, les ACP sont formés de pays de l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara. Malgré cela, la CEE a préféré une appellation plus neutre.

le servir et participe à la surexploitation des travailleurs et des autres ressources du pays.

Dans un premier point, nous montrerons comment les facteurs économiques ont précipité la crise du nationalisme économique. Dans un deuxième, nous mettrons l'accent sur les facteurs d'ordre socio-politique.

a) Facteurs économiques

1. Si l'on prend une formation périphérique particulière, on s'aperçoit qu'elle connaît des cycles de nationalisme économique. En général, l'affirmation de ce nationalisme coïncide avec une période d'autonomie financière de l'Etat, ce qui signifie que ses dépenses de fonctionnement et d'investissement sont pour l'essentiel couvertes par ses recettes fiscales, le déficit étant financé par un emprunt extérieur restant dans des limites maîtrisables dans le court et long terme.

Dans le cas des pays africains où les dépenses de fonctionnement comme d'investissement nécessitent des importations de produits, de techniques et de personnel jouant des rôles cruciaux, l'autonomie des finances publiques dépend non pas directement du produit intérieur mais de l'évolution de la balance des opérations courantes.

Si pour une raison quelconque cette balance se détériore structurellement, les finances publiques entrent en crise et le nationalisme économique tend à reculer car sa base économique disparaît.

Mais le nationalisme économique d'Etat peut être lié aussi à une conjoncture théorico-idéologique, c'est-à-dire à une doctrine dominante en matière de régulation économique. C'est ainsi que jusqu'en 1980, les idées selon lesquelles il ne fallait pas lutter contre la baisse des taux de croissance par la baisse de la demande de consommation de masse (publique déflationniste) étaient partagées par tous les grands des pays capitalistes, certains allant jusqu'à recourir à la planification (souple évidemment). Dans la mesure où la planification est une des composantes du nationalisme économique opérationnel, le nationalisme économique africain de la décennie 1955-1965 n'allait pas nécessairement à contre courant de l'idéologie des politiques économiques dominantes.

L'idée que la politique économique anti-crise, d'inspiration pré-keynésienne pouvait encore s'imposer n'était pas encore admise en 1980. Justinian Rweyemamu n'a-t-il pas été membre de la commission Brandt qui préconisait l'application du néo-keynésianisme à l'échelle de la planète? D'autres intellectuels renommés dans le Tiers Monde n'ont-ils pas soutenu les revendications des bourgeoisies du Sud pour le réaménagement en sa faveur des relations Nord-Sud? Dans cette euphorie, quoi de plus normal que les Etats africains n'apercevant pas les changements des politiques anti-cycliques au centre, adoptent le principe du développement autocentré d'interdépendance? Ce n'était pas en contradiction avec les idées dominantes des années 1974-1976. Mais ce n'était pas réaliste.

Incontestablement cette domination du néo-keynésianisme allait durer jusqu'en 1980, année à partir de laquelle l'hégémonie du néo-libéralisme va trouver un grand défenseur en la personne de Ronald Reagan, devenu Président des Etats Unis. Il met l'accent sur la déflation (diminution du pouvoir d'achat des masses de la périphérie et du centre) pour augmenter les taux de profit jugés trop bas dans l'industrie, en comparaison de ceux qui sont réalisés dans les circuits bancaires.

Le nationalisme économique déclenche dans la population et notamment dans la petite bourgeoisie urbaine, une forte aspiration à la dignité et à l'accélération du processus de construction de la nation par la réduction des inégalités, non par la diminution de son revenu mais par l'augmentation des dépenses publiques pour créer des emplois, développer des infrastructures sociales (de formation, de santé, etc.). Ces aspirations ne peuvent être satisfaites que par plus d'investissement et un accroissement de la production: autrement dit, le nationalisme économique ne peut pas durer sans croissance basée sur des investissements financés à titre principal par des ressources autonomes.

En vertu de cette thèse, le recul du nationalisme économique africain entre 1980 et 1986 s'explique pour l'essentiel par la fragilisation des finances publiques pendant la crise et par la crise concomitante de la balance des opérations courantes. L'idéologie néo-libérale de la déflation justifie l'abandon du PAL, qui mettait l'accent sur la nécessité d'augmenter les investissements publics alors qu'une observation objective de la situation (faite d'ailleurs par la Banque Mondiale) aurait montré aux Etats que les conditions socio-économiques minimales du nationalisme d'Etat avaient été érodées par la crise. Même les pays exportateurs de pétrole commençaient à avoir des difficultés. Ainsi pour le Nigéria, le déficit de sa balance des opérations courantes qui représentait 6% du PIB en 1960 était tombé à 2% en 1977 et 1978, et remontait à 6% en 1981¹.

C'est en même temps, il faut le remarquer, l'âge d'or du nationalisme africain. Mais il s'agissait d'un nationalisme avec une base des finances publiques fragiles. Les taux d'investissement intérieur brut étaient en 1965 de 18% en Egypte et au Ghana; de 10% au Maroc; 23% au Mali, principaux indépendants du groupe de Casablanca qui allait se dissoudre en 1963. Mais ces taux d'investissement élevés n'étaient pas basés sur une forte croissance des exportations. De sorte que ces pays devaient nécessairement connaître des crises de la balance des paiements qui allaient se répercuter sur leur capacité de financer les dépenses de l'Etat et donc d'affirmer le nationalisme économique. Ainsi, en 1965, parmi les pays du groupe de Casablanca, seul le Maroc dégageait un excédent de ressources au niveau de la balance courante de 1% du PIB. Les déficits ghanéen et marocain étaient respectivement de 70% et 11%; celui de l'Egypte de 4%.

¹ Banque Mondiale - Rapports sur le Développement dans le monde. 1980 et 1983.

La timidité du nationalisme économique de bien des Etats pendant cette période s'explique par la crise des finances publiques. Rappelons qu'à cet effet, dans la plupart des cas, les anciennes métropoles ont pris en charge, non seulement le financement (sur prêt) du budget d'investissement des Etats, mais souvent les dépenses de fonctionnement. Dans ces circonstances, le nationalisme économique ne peut pas s'affirmer dans les faits durablement. Comment le Mali du début des années 1960 pouvait-il concilier le nationalisme économique avec une aide budgétaire massive de la France même si celle-ci était comptabilisée hors budget. "Le montant de l'aide que reçoivent les pays francophones des deux sources étrangères principales, à savoir du Fonds d'aide et de coopération (FAC) et du Fonds européen de développement de la Communauté économique européenne. Ces fonds, qui ne figurent pas au budget et sont surtout affectés aux investissements, représentaient en 1961 et 1962 plus de 50% des ressources budgétaires totales en Haute Volta et un tiers au Mali. En Côte d'Ivoire et au Sénégal, les proportions étaient plus faibles mais nullement négligeables"¹.

A partir de 1973, la situation allait empirer. On assistait à une diminution importante du rythme de croissance des dépenses publiques et à une augmentation du déficit de la balance courante faisant suite non seulement à la détérioration des termes de l'échange, mais aussi à une chute absolue de la valeur des exportations pour un grand nombre de pays non exportateurs de pétrole (en fait le nationalisme économique des années 1970 avant tout celui des pays exportateurs de pétrole). C'est que la crise des exportations touchaient avant tout les exportations agricoles et minières. A partir de 1980, même les 7 pays exportateurs de pétrole connaissaient les difficultés de la balance des paiements et une diminution importante de leurs réserves de change.

Les exportations de l'ensemble du continent africain (Afrique du Sud et Namibie exclues) ont augmenté au taux de 5% entre 1975 et 1986, quoique très irrégulièrement. Mais en raison de la détérioration des termes de l'échange et du recul de la production, les recettes d'exportation des pays exportateurs et non importateurs de pétrole pour 1984 se sont situées respectivement à 65 et 77% de leur niveau de 1980².

2. Les informations dont nous disposons pour étayer les relations entre nationalisme économique et état des finances publiques sont doublement insuffisantes. D'abord, elles ne concernent que les finances des administrations centrales (fonctionnement et investissement) à l'exclusion des finances régionales et locales. Il y a donc sous-estimation des excédents comme des déficits. Ensuite, elles ne sont disponibles que pour vingt-neuf des 40 pays du continent qui ont plus d'un million d'habitants en 1984. La prudence s'impose donc.

1 CEA, ONU, Etude sur les conditions économiques de l'Afrique, Vol. I, 1966, p. 112..

2 OUA, CEA, PPREA, Vol I, p. 68.

Dans six pays, les finances publiques sont en équilibre ou excédentaires. Les informations sont disponibles pour trois seulement (Botswana, Cameroun, Burkina Faso) mais même si l'Algérie, la Lybie et le Nigeria n'ont pas communiqué d'information à la Banque Mondiale, on sait qu'ils n'ont pas de difficultés budgétaires.

Le nationalisme économique algérien a été le plus fort du continent, pour ne pas dire du Tiers Monde, au cours de la décennie 1970. Sans accorder à l'autonomie budgétaire un rôle prépondérant dans le comportement de l'Etat à l'égard des S.T.N., il est évident que sans elle, l'idéologie n'aurait pas pu se traduire en actes durables (comme le montre le cas tanzanien). Il est probable par contre que l'aisance budgétaire soit à base des nationalismes économiques libyens de gauche, et nigérian, plutôt conservateur. Le nationalisme économique timide du Cameroun a certes des racines historiques profondes, mais il est indéniable que l'aisance financière donne une marge de manoeuvre à l'Etat tant vis-à-vis de l'extérieur que des forces internes. Le Botswana malgré une très forte dépendance à l'égard de l'Afrique du Sud au plan de l'économie et des communications a pu se montrer assez ferme dans son attitude anti-apartheid, en partie grâce à l'équilibre de son budget. Le Burkina semble avoir établi une tradition d'équilibre budgétaire. Sur les 29 pays, il est le seul qui avait un budget en équilibre en 1972 déjà.

Cela peut expliquer en partie la stabilité dont le pays a joui malgré plusieurs coups d'Etat dont le dernier a un projet de nationalisme de gauche.

A l'autre extrême, il y a des Etats à déficit budgétaire immense: le Maroc, l'Egypte, la Zambie, la Sierra Leone, etc. Même si des militaires progressistes arrivaient au pouvoir dans ces pays, il leur serait très difficile de faire mieux que leurs collègues du Libéria et du Mali.

A vrai dire, les Etats qui sont en équilibre budgétaire aujourd'hui peuvent se trouver en situation de déficit demain.

1) Cet équilibre peut avoir été obtenu aux dépens de certaines dépenses destinées à satisfaire des besoins fondamentaux notamment de formation et de santé. Devant la demande croissante des populations et de l'opinion internationale, l'Etat finira par augmenter ces dépenses. Au Cameroun, par exemple, jusqu'en 1983, les dépenses à caractère social étaient très limitées; elles devront nécessairement augmenter. La défense absorbait en 1983 18,3% du budget, l'éducation nationale seulement 13,2% et la santé, 3,2% alors qu'au Kenya, les chiffres étaient respectivement de 13,8%, 20% et 7%: au Botswana, de 7%, 19,4% et 5,6%.

2) Le niveau des recettes de l'Etat est lui-même fonction du volume et des termes de l'échange à l'exportation, variables que les pays ne maîtrisent pas.

Par conséquent, la probabilité pour qu'un pays africain ait des finances équilibrées qui puissent soutenir une économie en expansion est très faible s'il ne transforme pas en même temps les relations entre l'Etat et la paysannerie et s'il ne favorise pas une industrialisation liée à l'agriculture.

b) *Facteurs politiques*

La réduction de la marge de manoeuvre dans le domaine économique (finance et endettement) s'explique en grande partie par la nature des relations que les Etats entretiennent d'une part avec les forces qui sont opposées au processus de construction nationale et d'autre part avec le peuple. A l'égard des forces opposées qui sont extérieures ou intérieures (mais souvent étrangères), l'Etat est en position de subordination, principalement en raison de la corruption¹. A l'égard du peuple, l'Etat pratique l'oppression en recourant souvent à la violence pour extraire le surplus qu'il partage avec les SNT et les Etats-nations du centre.

Prenons d'abord le problème de l'oppression. En général le pouvoir de résistance à l'oppression est le produit d'une tradition culturelle et du développement des forces productives. Lorsque cette tradition et ce développement n'ont pas pu s'épanouir comme ce fut le cas en Afrique avant et depuis la colonisation, ils doivent être initiés soit par les mouvements de libération nationale, soit par les Etats post-coloniaux. Dans l'ensemble, les mouvements de libération nationale africains n'ont pas pu inculquer la tradition démocratique - peu d'Etats post-coloniaux s'y sont consacrés systématiquement - au contraire, le plus souvent, les systèmes oppressifs de la période coloniale ont été renforcés sans qu'au moins en compensation, la base économique n'ait été révolutionnée². En particulier, l'agriculture est restée archaïque. Le taux de surplus par travailleur ou par unité de surface n'augmente point. Or, les besoins financiers de l'Etat et le surplus des STN ne cessent d'augmenter. Laisée au libre jeu des lois de marchés, l'agriculture africaine tend à l'autosuffisance locale et à fuir les circuits officiels. C'est

¹ La corruption a deux sens, l'un légal, l'autre fondamental. Au sens légal, la corruption est l'infraction commise par ceux qui trafiquent leur autorité ou par ceux qui corrompent. C'est une pratique répandue. Dans un Etat qui respecte les citoyens, elle doit être réprimée sévèrement. Mais cette répression n'est possible, que si les responsables les plus élevés peuvent être punis très sévèrement aussi. Dans le texte, c'est à ce sens légal que nous nous référons mais il ne faut pas oublier que la corruption sans infraction existe aussi en Afrique. L'Etat peut en effet légaliser des systèmes de répartition des revenus, de richesses et de pouvoir qui bloquent le processus de la formation d'une nation de citoyens responsables donnant aux plus faibles les moyens de se défendre politiquement, économiquement, idéologiquement.

² Comme en Corée du Sud ou au Brésil.

pourquoi l'Etat intervient tant au niveau de l'allocation des ressources que de la commercialisation.

Dans certains cas, l'Etat interdit la conversion de cultures d'exportation vers des cultures vivrières jugées plus rentables par les intéressés. Dans d'autres, il fixe des prix agricoles non incitatifs que la Banque Mondiale dénonce sans en montrer la logique économique profonde et surtout sans analyser les relations politiques qui accompagnent la surexploitation de la paysannerie.

Mais nous avons vu à propos des finances publiques que le surplus que l'Etat tire du partage du produit intérieur brut entre lui et les STN ne lui permet pas d'assurer sa reproduction. Il a donc recours à une pléthore d'institutions et de personnel d'assistance technique très influente¹ qu'il justifie fondamentalement par l'insuffisance de moyens financiers et de compétences techniques nationales et par l'absence d'un secteur de biens de production.

Or les besoins en aide extérieure ne disparaissent pas (du moins pour l'Afrique dite à faibles revenus), ce qui signifie en clair qu'elle ne concour pas pour l'essentiel à réduire la dépendance technologique et financière qui est l'objectif proclamé par les "donateurs" et les Etats africains. L'aide non maîtrisée renforcerait plutôt cette dépendance et n'entraînerait même pas la croissance. Ce que la Banque Mondiale elle-même constate dans son fameux rapport sur l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara². L'aide augmente et son efficacité diminue. C'est que cette "aide publique au développement" vue du centre a aussi des fonctions politiques; elle maintient au pouvoir des gouvernements à base sociale étroite et évite en même temps les processus conduisant à la déconnexion. Le centre ne s'oppose donc pas à ce qu'une partie de l'aide soit détournée et lui revienne dans des comptes bancaires anonymes (pour le peuple) aux fins d'enrichissement privé. N'est-il pas de notoriété publique que

1 "Les donateurs jouent un rôle considérable dans la prise de décision relative à la politique alimentaire, étant donné leur large participation aux programmes agricoles. Ils se sont multipliés également: un calcul récent sur les organisations autorisées à travailler dans les pays en développement a relevé 33 organismes d'aide bilatérale, 60 institutions ou fonds de développement multinationaux, et, aux Etats Unis seulement, un total de 366 organismes privés. En outre, le FMI intervient le plus souvent dans la prise de décision concernant les politiques économiques surtout à mesure que la gestion des devises devient importante. Par conséquent, il existe maintenant de nombreux intérêts en concurrence dans ce processus". John Thomas, la prise de décision à l'échelle nationale et la gestion de l'aide et de la politique alimentaires: quelques suggestions tirées de l'expérience acquise en Afrique de l'Est in L'impact de l'aide alimentaire sur le développement en Afrique, Agricultural Development Council, 1290 av. of Americas, New York 10104, 1982 (ouvrage collectif), p. 130.

2 Banque Mondiale: Développement accéléré en Afrique au Sud du Sahara. Un Programme d'Action.

les fortunes personnelles de certains chefs d'Etat africains dépassent les dettes de leurs pays.

Au moment de l'adoption du PAL, tous les processus de corruption étaient déjà en cours, minant ainsi les finances publiques mais incontestablement la crise a aggravé la situation, d'autant qu'elle a coïncidé avec le cycle de sécheresse qui a précipité la famine, notamment dans les régions sèches (Sahel et autres). On se souvient que le recyclage des pétrodollars à la suite des augmentations des prix du pétrole de 1973-74, avait mis à la disposition du système bancaire occidental d'énormes masses de liquidité, qu'il leur fallait valoriser et utiliser aux fins de contrôle des évolutions économiques et politiques dans le Tiers Monde¹. L'Afrique en reçut une part modeste par rapport à la masse globale, mais substantielle par rapport aux "besoins" (cf. tableaux en annexes sur l'endettement de l'Afrique).

L'aide et les prêts aux conditions du marché furent en fait l'occasion de vastes opérations de corruption. Pour gagner les marchés, Etats et SNT y ont eu recours. La reconnaissance de cette pratique par des responsables politiques du Nord est devenue une banalité².

A la période de prêts tous azimuts, succède, on le sait, à partir de 1981-82, un reflux net vers le centre. Même l'Afrique connaît cette inversion puisqu'en 1984, le montant du service extérieur du Zaïre a été supérieur à celui de l'aide de cette année. Dans ces conditions, le souci de veiller au maintien du courant d'aide peut inciter à l'abandon des déclarations sur le développement autocentré (version PAL) au profit de l'adhésion au néo-libéralisme (version PPREA).

La conséquence de ce glissement est précisément visible sur le problème de la dette. Il n'y a pas d'initiative sur le continent pour une approche globale. Par exemple, les Etats ne réagissent pas à la proposition de Fidel Castro, selon laquelle il faudrait, tenant compte du fait que le prêteur a besoin aussi de l'emprunteur, constituer un front pour opposer un front des débiteurs à celui des créanciers. Il est vrai que peu d'Etats se sentent à même de remplir une des préconditions de cette démarche que Fidel Castro énonce ainsi "réaliser l'unité intérieure d'abord", tant il est vrai qu'elle demande un changement important dans les relations entre gouvernés et gouvernants.

Nous arrivons ainsi à la conclusion que facteurs économiques et facteurs politiques jouent en faveur des propositions de politiques économiques qui éloignent de l'objectif le développement autocentré dont la validité avait été reconnue par le PAL. Ces facteurs affaiblissent les positions des Etats face au Centre et aux peuples. Mais adhérer au principe du néo-libéralisme est une

1 En février 1987, le Président SANKARA déclarait avoir reçu en cadeaux l'équivalent de 800 millions de francs CFA depuis son arrivée au pouvoir en 1982.

2 éConcernant la dette africaine et du Tiers Monde, Monsieur CHIRAC a estimé "que la responsabilité de la dette incombe pour une grande partie aux prêteurs des organismes financiers qui par leur propension à prêter facilement et à des forts taux d'intérêt, poussent les pays en voie de développement à s'endetter lourdement". Le Soleil, 16/03/87, p. 4.

chose et en pratiquer réellement la politique est une autre. Au centre, deux pays seulement, les Etats Unis et la Grande Bretagne, s'en sont servis pour démanteler les services sociaux et permettre la concentration accrue du capital. Ailleurs, il rencontre des résistances sérieuses. Le gouvernement français n'a pas encore osé remettre en cause par exemple le salaire minimum garanti. En Afrique aussi, la politique dite de stabilisation et d'ajustement structurel (déflation au détriment de l'industrie et des salaires) rencontre des résistances vives même au sein de l'Etat le moins nationaliste. Deux groupes s'opposent en effet à ces politiques: les agents de l'Etat et les "hommes d'affaires" et certaines STN dont la prospérité était liée au secteur para-étatique générateur de corruption en raison des structures socio-politiques dans lesquelles il est inséré. Ces oppositions peuvent parfois conduire à des modifications violentes du personnel politique, mais pour quelle alternative?

Alternatives

Compter sur ses propres forces dans la perspective socialiste et démocratique. L'Etat moderne est l'agent du développement principal et agent régulateur économique et social du premier ordre. De sa capacité sociale et technique à assurer ces fonctions dépend notre avenir.

Au XVIème siècle, l'Etat-nation moderne, naît en Europe sur les ruines de la féodalité culturellement homogène. Cet Etat n'accepte la constitution d'autres Etats-nations qu'en Amérique du Nord, en Australie et en Nouvelle Zélande. Partout ailleurs, il les détruit là où ils existent et réussit à bloquer (sauf au Japon), les processus économiques et politiques d'imitation. En Afrique, il procède au démantèlement de l'Empire Ottoman de l'Algérie à l'Egypte, à la traite négrière en Afrique au Sud du Sahara et finalement à la colonisation de l'ensemble du continent. Or la colonisation est négation de la nation colonisée si elle existait auparavant. Mais comme l'aspiration à la dignité et l'identité est une qualité humaine par excellence, les peuples vont lutter pour l'indépendance dans le cadre des nouvelles entités politiques. Il s'agissait pour eux de reconquérir la capacité de décider de leur destin et de participer au façonnement du monde. Tout au long de la colonisation, les aspirations des peuples à former leur propre Etat-nation ou des ensembles d'Etats-nations, capables de résoudre les contradictions politiques internes et régionales sans ingérence étrangère ne cessent de se manifester. Elles culminent dans les mouvements de libération qui ont conduit en moins d'une décennie (1956-1963) à l'indépendance politique de la quasi-totalité du continent. Cette dépendance a donné lieu à une première vague de nationalisme économique que nous qualifierons de centre gauche en raison de son opposition au développement d'une culture marxienne dans les sociétés.

C'est sans doute à cause de cette opposition que dans aucun pays, il n'a survécu à son fondateur¹. Or l'histoire montre qu'un projet de construction nationale sur des bases démocratiques est incompatible avec le monopole idéologique et en particulier avec l'anti-marxisme et l'anti-communisme. Pourquoi?

Le marxisme est à la fois idéologie et méthode. Comme idéologie, il propose de lutter pour l'avènement de sociétés sans classes et donc sans Etat (selon la définition de l'Etat par le marxisme classique). Cette proposition est une sorte de croyance ayant à peu près la même structure qu'une religion ou une morale. Il n'y a pas de preuve incontestable qu'une société sans classe arrivera. Mais nous pensons que ceux qui oeuvrent pour un tel projet ont parfaitement leur place, et même une place privilégiée dans la construction nationale. C'est l'arme par excellence des faibles.

Le marxisme est aussi une méthode d'investigation et de connaissance des sociétés et de l'histoire. Les marxistes ne devraient pas, compte tenu de l'expérience, prétendre qu'ils ont l'exclusivité de la méthode qui conduit à la découverte de la vérité: sa force réside dans son potentiel de critique sociale et politique globale, avec un accent particulier sur la pauvreté et son envers, l'accumulation des richesses au moyen de contrôle sur les moyens de production privés ou étatisés.

En ce sens, le socialiste-marxiste ne se confond pas nécessairement avec le socialiste-marxiste-léniniste. Oubliant les circonstances que Lénine considérait comme conjoncturelles et spécifiques à l'Union Soviétique, certains en sont venus à confondre socialisme marxiste avec la reconnaissance du seul courant officiel. En Afrique, le socialisme, tel que nous le préconisons devra être pluraliste: il aura des spécificités nationales et régionales. Il devra être intraverti, tout en collaborant avec d'autres marxismes nationaux et régionaux. Il prônera le nationalisme de gauche, celui pour qui le plein emploi et la démocratie sont des objectifs essentiels et à réaliser dans un avenir raisonnable.

C'est pourquoi notre conviction est que là où l'approche marxiste ne fait pas partie de la culture populaire, le processus de construction nationale ne se fera pas. D'un autre côté, là où les dirigeants veulent imposer une certaine conception du marxisme, non seulement aux marxistes, mais aux non marxistes, le socialisme ne peut pas se développer.

Il en découle que la responsabilité des leaders progressistes mais pas nécessairement marxistes de notre époque est immense. Ils doivent se débarrasser de l'anti-communisme et l'anti-marxisme qui a caractérisé les leaders de la première génération et se convaincre que le marxisme est nécessaire à la construction nationale.

¹ Parmi les Etats de la Conférence de Bandung, il n'y a que l'Inde dont le projet de développement national (non marxiste-léniniste) ait survécu à son fondateur. Il faut sans doute y voir le fait que malgré ses défauts, le système politique laisse se diffuser librement la pensée marxiste et les organisations qui s'en réclament.

L'impérialisme l'a bien compris. C'est pourquoi il veut toujours acculer les Etats qui se réclament de l'idéologie du socialisme-marxiste-léniniste, soit à s'en tenir à une simple rhétorique, soit à imposer la conception staliniste (une seule idéologie : le marxisme et une seule version, l'officielle version du marxisme dans un pays). C'est ainsi que les expériences éthiopiennes et angolaises risquent de perdre leur potentiel car l'impérialisme peut réussir à réduire le développement d'une culture marxiste ouverte dans ces pays.

Il est permis par contre de penser que malgré les apparences, l'expérience ghanéenne d'aujourd'hui se déroule dans un contexte plus favorable que dans les années 1960. La pensée marxiste semble avoir pris racine dans la jeunesse urbaine. Au Burkina Faso et au Cap Vert aussi, des signes d'espoir existent.

Certains auteurs comme Ergas soutiennent que les centres capitalistes devraient introduire dans leur aide à l'Afrique, la conditionnalité politique¹ moins de corruption et plus de démocratie². Ce point de vue suppose que la démocratie au Sud est compatible avec la polarisation du système capitaliste mondial. Nous ne sommes pas de cet avis. Les centres sont certainement pour une alternance des cycles de démocratie parlementaire et de dictature militaire ou civile dans le Tiers Monde: en effet, ils sont conscients que de véritables régimes démocratiques auraient comme conséquence la remise en cause fondamentale des relations qui induisent constamment la reproduction du transfert du surplus vers les centres. Ce qu'il faut, c'est l'enracinement d'une culture de contestation.

Si une culture de contestation gagne les campagnes, la démocratie locale pourra fonctionner et sera combinée à la démocratie parlementaire. Ainsi, les pays pourront à la fois compter réellement (et pas réthoriquement seulement), sur leurs propres forces, et simultanément éviter la corruption extérieure, ce chancre qui mine l'Afrique. Ce pas franchi, d'autres obstacles pourront être surmontés. Comment l'amorcer?

Les voies sont diverses. Dans un avenir prévisible, les coups d'Etat contre la "corruption et la mauvaise gestion" continueront mais ne déboucheront pas nécessairement sur l'amorce des processus démocratiques. C'est pourquoi, dans les cadres existants, il faut exiger des espaces pour l'expression, même limitée d'une pensée contestatrice. Dans beaucoup de cas, la démocratie parlementaire pluraliste sera le préalable à l'acheminement vers des démocraties globales (parlementaires et locales), gage du nationalisme économique conséquent.

1 Zaki Ergas - In search of development: some directions for further investigations. The journal of modern African studies. 24/02/86.

2 Nous parlons seulement de la corruption des hommes d'Etat par des agents extérieurs, étant entendu que la corruption intérieure fait partie pratiquement de tous les systèmes sociaux. Sans le fonctionnement effectif d'un système de détection et de sanction de la corruption extérieure des responsables politiques, aucun pays ne peut se développer.

Dans un texte remarquable, Mahmood Mamdani¹ soutient à juste titre que la démocratie parlementaire et pluraliste est d'un intérêt limité dans les conditions africaines si elle n'est pas accompagnée du démantèlement des structures d'oppression au niveau local. Le parlementarisme est une revendication de la petite bourgeoisie urbaine. La dictature sur la paysannerie est parfaitement compatible avec le pluralisme politique et l'organisation d'élections libres. C'est donc pour une démocratie parlementaire et locale qu'il faut lutter. Sur ce plan, les structures politiques des pays où la paysannerie est déjà politiquement émancipée ne peuvent pas nous servir d'exemples. D'un autre côté, prétendre appliquer seulement la démocratie locale ne peut conduire qu'à la dictature puisque les grandes décisions économiques ou politiques se prennent en dernière instance au niveau supérieur. Or il n'y aura pas de nationalisme économique digne de ce nom, si le peuple est opprimé par l'Etat.

¹ Mahmood Mamdani - The Agrarian Question and the Democratic Struggle (with specific reference to Uganda), Third World Forum African Office, Dakar, Bulletin N 6, April 1986).

Political Instability and the Prospects for Democracy in Africa

P. Anyang Nyong'o*

RÉSUMÉ. - La démocratie revêt en elle-même et par elle-même un caractère important pour le développement de l'Afrique. Au centre de l'échec des pays africains à tracer des voies viables pour le développement (ou l'industrialisation) se trouve le problème de l'absence de personnes envers qui on est responsable, d'où celui de démocratie aussi. Depuis l'indépendance, le rôle du citoyen dans la conduite des affaires du gouvernement a été systématiquement réduit. La scène politique s'est retrécie. La démobilisation politique est devenue plutôt la règle que l'exception dans le comportement du régime. La manipulation sociale pour expliquer et entretenir la répression politique a été la préoccupation de la plupart des gouvernements : tout cela a contribué à consolider un aspect notoire mais commun à presque tous les gouvernements africains : la mauvaise utilisation des ressources publiques ainsi que leur canalisation vers des gains privés pendant que les chances d'exploiter les procédures viables pour un développement local sont négligées ou délibérément détruites. Ainsi s'est-il établi une corrélation nette entre l'absence de démocratie dans la politique africaine et la détérioration des conditions socio-économiques. Par le truchement de la politique de contrôle, les conflits sociaux n'avaient fait que passer au second plan et pouvaient éclater de façons incontrôlables et désorganisées à n'importe quel moment. Ces systèmes de gouvernement non participatif à parti unique ou sans parti étaient donc, de par leur nature, instables. Ces contradictions internes sont aggravées par les puissances étrangères qui interviennent pour modeler le processus politique en leur faveur.

Introduction

There is no doubt that there is a resurgence of interest in the study of democracy and the prospects for democratic politics in Africa. This time the initiative has not been taken by expatriate academics looking for "fresh pastures" to try out their research problems, but by African scholars themselves seeking solutions to the current crisis¹.

Democracy, it is contended in one study that is already published², is important to Africa's development in and of itself. At the center of the failure

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¹ See, for example, P. Anyang' Nyong'o (ed.) *Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa* (London: ZED Books, 1987). This book was the outcome of a research project undertaken by one of the working groups in the United Nations University (UNU) African Regional Perspectives programme and conducted by the African Bureau of the Third World Forum. Much more recently, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) has initiated a similar working group on Social Movements, Social Transformation and the Struggle for Democracy in Africa.

² Anyang' Nyong'o, *Ibid.*

of African states to chart viable paths for development (or industrialization) is the issue of lack of accountability, hence of democracy as well. Since independence, the role of the citizen in the affairs of government has systematically been reduced. The political arena has shrunk, political demobilization has become more the norm than the exception in regime behaviour and social engineering to rationalize and sustain political repression has been the preoccupation of most governments. All this has come about to cement one notorious but common aspect of almost all African governments: the misuse of public resources and their being channeled into private gains as possibilities for viable processes of indigenous development are neglected or deliberately destroyed. There has thus emerged a definite correlation between the lack of democracy in African politics and the deterioration in socio-economic conditions¹.

From time to time, either as a result of competition for state positions or popular pressure from below for some kind of change, the military has intervened in African politics to try and do something better in governing these societies². Almost in every case, the military has not done anything better. On the contrary, military coups have only succeeded in making changes in government more frequent and unpredictable while, at the same time, making more complicated the accountability problem³. In the last analysis, the ordinary citizens, discontented though they may be with the status quo, rarely have the chance to decide whether or not they need a military government to save them from the mess. Thus the instability brought about by frequent military coups d'état are but an outcome of the undemocratic political system and not a popular attempt to deal with this situation and correct it.

Yet the control of the state is very important in Africa, for on state action and public policy depend many things that affect people's lives to-day and in the future. In developing countries, more so than in the industrialized countries, the role of the state in socio-economic development as well as the day-to-day life of society is critical. Since the private sector is so weak, and since there are so many modern amenities that society, in general, is in need of, only the state, acting on behalf of society, can provide these. If the state cannot do so, then foreign investors may. But there are certain forms of investment that foreign capital is not likely to be enthusiastic about in Africa. For example, the building and maintenance of roads can only be undertaken by the state. The state, in turn, has to raise the resources necessary for this from taxes. It therefore follows that the people must not only be in a position to pay these taxes, they must also be able to know and ensure that their meagre resources

1 Ibid., Introduction, p. 19.

2 See also Anyang' Nyong'o, *Military Intervention in African Politics*, *Third World Affairs*, 1986 (London: Third World Foundation, 1986).

3 See, in particular, Emmanuel Hansen, *The State and Popular Struggles in Ghana, 1982-86*, in Anyang' Nyong'o (ed.) *Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa*.

are properly and effectively used by the state. *This they cannot do if there is no culture of participation and accountability in the political process.* In other words, the issue of democracy is not only at the center of the daily affairs of governance, it also influences the extent to which surpluses can be generated in the sphere of public ventures to ensure some accumulation.

The Misplaced Optimism of Modernization Theories

Right from the time of independence, the issue of democracy, development and political stability was not seen from this perspective if ever it was posed at all. During the first decade of independence, there was more-or-less an academic as well as a political consensus that the new nations in Africa needed to be modern. Edward Shils was even more categorical in his assertions: the new African elites, he contended, want modernization¹. According to Shils, this meant that they wanted modern things like were found in the west. Modernization, as it were, was the same as westernization.

The idea of modernization, by itself, was not new; even the missionaries had had it in their agenda. The idea that this modernization needed modernizing elites and states in Africa was, of course, the brain child of both the behavioural sciences and post-independence ideology of developmentalism. States were seen to be beneficial and necessary for the collective good: they were not viewed as institutions of political power that could be captured by certain social forces to pursue their own sectarian interests as the literature of the 1970s in the social sciences later tried to point out. Nations, it was argued, certainly by contrast to colonies, are the most efficient and effective way to mobilize human resources in a social unit large enough to permit the benefits deriving from an extensive division of labour combined with a universalistic-achievement orientation².

Nation-building therefore became the watchword for both the politician and the scholar. The politician sought to practise it through policies and ideologies of national unity while the scholar was engaged in generating models and structural-functional prerequisites for national integration. Modernization, as a social process of change, encapsulated the parameters for model-building by the social scientists and the goal-achievements by the nationalists now in state power. If the goals were not being realized, analysis always ended up looking for the missing variables: it was assumed that some correct arrangement would produce the intended results. Distinctions were therefore made between states that had capacities to undertake modernization tasks (e.g. those endowed with capital and modernizing elites) and states that lacked such capacities. Where such capacities were lacking, then appropriate programmes

¹ Edward Shils, *Political Development in New States* (The Hague: Morton and Co., 1960).

² See, for example, I. Wallerstein, *The Road to Independence: Ghana and the Ivory Coast* (Paris: Mouton, 1964); C.C. Wrigley, Historicism in Africa: Slavery and State Formation, *African Affairs* 70, 279 (1971): 113-124. Both referred to in J. Lonsdale, States and Social Processes, *The African Studies Review*, 24 2/3 (1981).

could be initiated to help create them. At the level of state apparatuses, manpower training programmes were recommended for administrators and a strong political order as the appropriate context in which administration would itself become effective in undertaking modernization tasks.

If government was to be judged by what it did, then it had to have the capacity for performing the tasks necessary for attaining certain set goals. In *Political Order in Changing Societies*¹, Samuel Huntington put a case against democracy in these societies. If their governments were committed to attaining certain developmental goals, then they could not afford to be stable as well as democratic. Democracy requires that people participate openly in the process of government, that their preferences for public policies be taken into account by those who govern, that those who govern derive their power from the governed, that they maintain a system of communication with the governed and that they be periodically ready to account for their activities and either be recalled from office or be returned depending on the verdict of the governed. This implies that the governors have the authority and capacity to transform the preferences of the governed into policies which will satisfy these preferences. Where this is not possible, it further implies that the governors can explain and justify their decisions, and such explanations and justifications will be accepted by the governed.

Huntington, however, argued that in developing societies, political systems operate in very fragile environments where the legitimacy of governmental decisions and non-decisions are seen in zero-sum ways. Thus, when a certain demand is made and it is not met, it does not matter what explanation the government makes: those affected will not just be satisfied. Moreover, given that major developmental goals require substantial resources and that these resources are themselves scarce, the government must limit the kinds of demands made on it so as to avoid the risk of losing legitimacy by failing to meet too many demands. The more it loses authority and legitimacy, the more likely that its power may be challenged by rival elites within the societal environment. Given that the goal of every government is to survive before meeting any societal demands, it follows that governments in developing countries need to shun democracy; under conditions of a changing society, democracy is a source of political decay rather than political development.

It is within this kind of framework of argument that states in developing countries have preferred to be preoccupied with the politics of control rather than with the promotion of political participation. By perfecting the instruments of control, governments find that they do not only carefully select the kinds of demands made on them, but they can also establish the criteria of legitimation without running the risk of an open public challenge. Thus any form of popular participation in the process of government is usually in the

¹ S. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

form of approval of governmental actions and programmes rather than expression of diverse interests expecting governmental decisions and actions.

It has, however, been argued that this kind of political culture develops not because governing elites want to satisfy certain developmental goals; on the contrary, such a culture of preferring control over participation becomes prevalent because governing elites have chosen to privatize the state and personalize political power so as to meet their very narrow and private needs over and above any public good. If this were not the case, then the balance sheet of development in Africa would not be so miserable after a quarter of a century of independence. The premises on which Huntington seemed to justify the shunning of democracy in developing countries are therefore found wanting.

Frantz Fanon¹ was the first to make this observation. In his view, African governments started to sideline democracy soon after independence because the governing elites could not afford to be accountable as well as do what they were doing with state power. The state, as it were, became a means for private accumulation of both wealth and power, and this was quite often done irrespective of how much it hurt the public good. In his famous chapter on *The Pitfalls of National Consciousness*, Fanon gave a detailed political sociology of this new ruling class in Africa, and damned it for being selfish, anti-people, unimaginative, unfit to rule and part of the problem of underdevelopment and not its solution. Thus, by state institutions - including the monolithic political parties - keeping the people away from the political arena, there was no service done to political development, i.e. the institutionalization of processes of government that would competently manage and resolve social conflicts. If anything, by the politics of control, such conflicts were merely buried underground and had the potential of bursting out in anomic and uncontrollable fashions. These non-participatory single-party or no-party systems of government were, therefore, by their very nature, unstable.

Another interesting thesis was later advanced by Abdulrahman Mohammed Babu in a postscript to Walter Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*². Babu observed that the politics of control leads many African civilian governments to be commandist, i.e. to prefer issuing commands so as to be obeyed rather than engaging in discussions so as to convince. Very soon, a culture of fear becomes prevalent in the political system such that, even when things are going wrong, nobody dares point it out since only the commander has the right and the knowledge to know what is wrong. In this regard, the commander is usually the Head of State. A point comes, however, when those who are more qualified to command - the army - find that they can no longer allow their role to be usurped by the Head of State, and

¹ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963).

² W. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972).

they hence decide to step in his shoes. To Babu, the politics of control - or command - more than anything else was the root cause of military coups d'etat in Africa. Once more, the lack of a participatory political culture, rather than nurture political stability, is here argued to be the source of political instability.

We ourselves have argued that one of the prime causes of military coups d'etat in Africa is political discontent in an atmosphere of political repression¹. When the popular masses, after having been highly mobilized during the period of the struggle for political independence are suddenly demobilized as channels of participation are closed on them; when, as a result of this demobilization, public accountability becomes more and more difficult to sustain and power-holders profit from the situation by flagrantly continuing to use their public offices for private gain; when all this happens, sooner or later a part of the elite, which feels left out from political power and hence from personal enrichment, is bound to exploit the discontent in society and precipitate a military coup. This is particularly easy since the backbone of government, i.e. the instruments of control, lie, in the final analysis, with the military.

Men in uniform, like civilians who occupy state bureaucracies, are part and parcel of the modern political elite in an African state. When politics becomes organized along ethnic lines as part and parcel of the control mechanisms, they cannot help but be drawn into the ethnic conflicts that follow. When an incumbent regime begins rigidly to control the entry into positions of power as part of the control mechanism, men in uniform will be equally affected or they may begin to sympathize and empathize with their cohorts who are adversely affected. When a President begins to trust only his family, clan or tribe with responsibility as a way of maintaining tight control of the system, this is bound, at one time or another, to anger certain sections of the army and to alienate them from the system. When, finally, there no longer exists legal ways of entering into positions of power and seeking changes in government, and the army is itself mistrusted by the regime, then men in uniform are very likely to band together in defence of their corporate interests and bid for political power themselves. But such a takeover in the interest of the army 'as a caste' can only be successful if it is synchronized with popular demand or potential popular support for a military coup.

We may therefore postulate that, whenever a regime has alienated popular support and has closed legal channels for a change of government, and if the army has corporate interest to take over power or part of it entertains such interest, a coup will be precipitated whenever the army senses that the constituency of discontent is big enough to give it immediate and spontaneous support. If this support is forthcoming, it will give the army the assurance to broaden its governing coalition and reach out to the civilian population. But if, after taking over, the army notices that popular support is not forthcoming and

¹ Anyang' Nyong'o Military Intervention.

there are differences within the army regarding their corporate interest, the coup makers are very likely to withdraw into themselves, become military oriented and seek to solve their problems by force and the institution of a praetorian and personal dictatorship. Again control, rather than participation, becomes the dominant political culture of military rule. And, once more, the system becomes brittle and inherently unstable.

Whether a coup is popular or not, once it occurs, it has the tendency to create a political culture whereby elites competing for positions of political power always see the coup as a means of resolving their conflicts. Even when civilian rule is restored, as has happened in Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda, political crises are likely to be solved more by the coup d'état than by rational-legal methods. The blame should not, however, be put at the doorstep of coup makers: the blame must go primarily to the first governments which instituted non-participatory systems of government and thus destroyed the culture of pluralist political participation, i.e. democracy.

Democracy and Stability

We see, therefore, that the arguments that were given against participatory democracy have not been born out by history. It was assumed that, with less stress on the political system as a result of less demands on it, more developmental goals would be achieved. But the history of Africa over the last twenty five years show more and more underdevelopment especially in political systems which are least participatory. A quick casual look will reveal that the more participatory political systems have done much better in terms of economic growth than the less participatory ones: Kenya under Kenyatta as compared to Sudan under Nimeiri: Côte d'Ivoire under Houphouët Boigny as compared to Zaire under Mobutu. The comparison is not altogether perfect: one does not know, for example, what to do with Malawi in this scheme of comparisons. That notwithstanding, there is very little evidence that Africa has been better off in terms of economic growth and development because governments have no had to be bothered by popular pressures. It is more the case that governments have done whatever they wanted to do and ruined economies precisely because they have not been held accountable for their actions by those they govern.

Mahmood Mamdani¹ has recently argued that even when the bourgeoisie put the question of democracy on the agenda of African politics an assert that a democratic political culture is the only sure source of political stability, they do so in very narrow terms. Democracy is seen purely and simply in terms of bourgeois competitive politics: free and fair elections. But who, in Africa, can participate freely and fairly in electoral politics? Are we not here talking mainly of those social classes which are free from the extra-economic coercion

¹ Mahmood Mamdani, *Contradictory Class Perspectives on the Question of Democracy: the Case of Uganda*, in Anyang' Nyong'o, (ed.) *Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa*.

that the state puts on them so as to perpetuate certain forms of exploitation not necessarily affected by free and fair elections?

If Democracy is to be an activity of meaning to all classes in society, argues Mamdani, and in particular to the popular classes, then its form and scope must indeed be meaningfully related to the living conditions of these same classes¹. What, in effect, does Mamdani mean?

It is a self-evident fact that the majority of people in Africa are peasants that derive their livelihood from small-holding agriculture in the countryside. Very often, the prices of both the agricultural produce marketed locally and those sold abroad as exports are set by the state. If the state does not buy these produce from the peasants directly through marketing boards, then it does so through the aegis of traders who are usually part and parcel of the bourgeoisie. Further, the trade in other commodities, e.g. wage goods, which are sold in the rural areas to the peasantry, are handled by this bourgeoisie given state licenses to do so. Again it is the state which controls prices and which determines the exchange relations between consumers and the traders. But the issue of prices is secondary to a much more fundamental issue: that of production and the conditions under which the peasants reproduce their lives. Very rarely would one expect that the issues, very crucial to the interests of the popular masses, would provide the subject-matter of democratic debate. If anything, the bourgeoisie, *imposing politics from above*, see democracy merely in terms of its *form* as intra-bourgeois competition for political power. That is why multi-party politics - the form - and not popular policies - the content - is usually the view of democracy that the bourgeoisie adopts in challenging military rule. In Latin America, the bourgeoisie prefers to adopt the strategy of 'pactology' or 'concertation'. This is a process whereby the bourgeoisie negotiates with the military to give up power and accept a democratic process of electing a government. Pactology, in essence, is simply a restoration of the political unity of the bourgeoisie previously disrupted by the coup. It is also aimed at limiting the political agenda through consensus bargaining and isolating those who are regarded by the bourgeoisie as a threat to the rules of the game. The consequence, of course, is that once the bourgeoisie forms a government and continues using state power to carry out the same types of policies as it has previously done - as happened under Obote II in Uganda - the popular masses soon begin to express discontent with it precisely because such changes do not affect the relations of production in society, and once more a rival faction may precipitate a coup exploiting this same constituency of discontent.

Democracy, viewed as free and fair elections in strictly bourgeois terms, is not therefore an answer to Africa's problems of political instability. The history of Nigeria since independence clearly attests to this. At no time, following the several changes that have occurred from military rule to civilian and back to

¹ Mamdani, *Ibid.*

military again, have the Nigerian bourgeoisie thought it necessary to give more content to the democratic process and involve the popular masses in politics from below.

Following from Mamdani's arguments, Samir Amin¹ notes that it is perhaps impossible to expect contemporary ruling classes in Africa to open themselves up to democratic politics. The absence of any economic life autonomous in relation to state power, and the concomitant absence of any autonomy of expression on the part of social forces in relation to this power, renders any talk of democracy meaningless, for democracy is truly impossible in these conditions². Again Fanon keeps asserting himself: if the state is seen mainly in terms of access to power and wealth, and if occupying any state position guarantees this access, and if there is intense competition among the elite for access to these positions, then it follows that a democratic process will jeopardize the security of those already in political power. Those who have the means to challenge this power, e.g. through private business, will also not be tolerated by the power-wielders. If any individual has to be successful in business, then he must do so under the patronage, or in alliance with, those in positions of political power. Governments in Africa are hence not at all tolerant of national 'private enterprise': they see in enrichment outside their control a threat to their own stability³.

Yet the frustration of private initiatives among nationals does not really lead to the stability of these regimes. If anything, it leads to a false sense of security among those who govern. They begin to create space in business for immigrant business communities' and foreign capital in an atmosphere where indigenous businessmen are very much aware of what they can achieve and hence what they are missing. In Senegal and Sierra Leone, the immigrant business communities would be Lebanese: in East Africa they would be Asian. In either case such immigrant business communities, though they be given space in the private sector by the government because they pose no political threat, very soon realize that their investments might not be safe in the event of a political change which brings into power that faction of the bourgeoisie whose interests have been hurt by their presence in the economy. The tendency among such immigrant businessmen is therefore to invest abroad or to enter into business ventures which do not really tie them down. The end result is that they are always vulnerable to being accused of exploitation, mercenary behaviour, etc. They are thus a source of diverting the popular masses from the real issues of underdevelopment and the major political contradictions in society. And when crises occur, the state often finds itself unable to solve such crises in favour of the bourgeoisie as a whole since the bourgeoisie is so

1 Samir Amin, Preface: The State and the Question of 'Development' in Anyang' Nyong'o, Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa.

2 Amin, Preface, p.3.

3 Ibid.

fractionalized, and so divided in their relationship to the state that it is not inconceivable that some factions quite often favour the falling apart of the state as a condition of their own re-emergence into a state they themselves will dominate.

Popular Movements and the State: The Future of Democracy in Africa

Whatever is going on in Africa at the level of the politics of the bourgeoisie, one other tendency can be observed: the various attempts by the popular masses to challenge the post-colonial states from below. Both Nzongola-Ntalaja¹ and Wamba-dia-Wamba² characterize these challenges as movements for a second independence in Africa. The popular masses, having realized that independence has not brought much change to their lives, and noting that political power is a daily menace in their lives, have, in certain societies, taken the initiative into their own hands and sought to establish their own independence. Perhaps the most dramatic case where people have taken such initiatives on a popular basis and gotten rid of a repressive regime is the recent triumph of the National Resistance Movement in Uganda³. But even here, though the NRA succeeded in forming a government and started to organize society politically in a new way, certain cautionary remarks that we get from both Wamba and Nzongola in their analysis of movements for a second independence are necessary here if we are to be in a position to predict what might happen in Uganda and to other movements with less glamorous histories.

First, such movements usually begin in areas that are isolated from the centers of power and where access by government forces is difficult. They are usually led by educated people who can articulate the grievances of the masses into political programmes that they can communicate to the outside world. Because the masses are so alienated from the government, and since they are, in reality, looking for an alternative social setting to feel at home, they will very readily begin to follow the ideas, principles and myths of such leaders. Quite often, if such leaders are not themselves sincerely committed to democratic politics, or are, in the process of struggle, not ready to allow a democratic culture to develop from below, such movements may end up being merely popular in form and not popular in content. Commitment to the cult of the leader may easily replace the development of a democratic culture of struggle among the people. It is this culture which, if fully developed, would make a difference to the form of government that the movement would put into place when it eventually captures state power.

1 Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Second Independence Movement in Congo-Kinshasa*, in Anyang' Nyong'o (ed.) *Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa*.

2 E. Wamba-dia-Wamba, *The Experience of Struggle in the People's Republic of Congo*, in Anyang' Nyong'o, *Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa*.

3 See, for example Mahmood Mamdani, *NRA/NRM: Two Years in Power* (Kampala: Progressive Publishing House, 1988).

Second, such movements may quite often be faced with hazards and tasks they cannot really perform or overcome. Yet, in order to survive as movements, they must try to create and perpetuate the myth of invincibility. Very often such myths may lead to tremendous losses of lives in battle against more superior forces of the state. The fact of defending a popular cause among the people is no substitute for real preparedness to go to war against an army that is armed to the teeth. Yet very often lives are lost by such popular movements and state armies are blamed for it when it is quite clear that the popular movements had also been engaged in some kind of adventurism.

Thirdly, there does seem to emerge the veneration of armed struggle as an equivalent of liberation. When people are genuinely dissatisfied with their governments, it is becoming popular within the left in Africa that taking up arms and waging and armed struggle (or simply fighting in the bush) is the most progressive stand to take. It is quite clear, given the experience under Ronald Reagan, that even the right can arm and finance their own liberators: armed struggle is no longer a monopoly of the left. The essence of this argument is that the mere taking up of arms is no indication that a movement is either popular or that it is fighting to advance a more superior moral cause than those who govern. It is not the act of armed struggle which is important; much more vital to the interests of the popular masses and the cause of democracy in Africa is the politics of armed struggle.

Finally, as the political crisis becomes even more acute in Africa, we must expect popular rebellion against incumbent regimes to take many forms. Thus popular movements or alliances for democracy will appear in a variety of organizational forms: student movements, trade unions, churches, burial societies, etc¹. Attention to these popular movements is critical in trying to understand the struggle for democracy in Africa and the strategies the popular masses are adopting, in different circumstances, to challenge the post-colonial state from below. And since these movements come from below, from the belly of society as it were, their goals and demands must necessarily spell the content of democracy from the point of view of the popular masses. That is the future as they see it: and that is the future that the state as it is constituted will either try to avoid or somehow give way to.

State, Democracy and Foreign Powers

We cannot conclude our discussion of the prospects for democracy in Africa if we do not mention something about foreign powers and the prospects for democracy in Africa. We are not doing this simply as a matter of ritual, we are doing it primarily because Africa's current predicament is intricately intertwined with the interests and machinations of foreign powers. Sometimes it is argued that the independent states have a lot of room for manoeuvre vis-a-vis foreign powers, and that on many domestic issues, such as how to

¹ CODESRIA research project on Social Movements, Social Transformation and the Struggle for Democracy in Africa, (Dakar, Senegal).

organize their domestic politics, foreign powers have very little say. It is equally forcefully argued that, by their very nature as dependent societies, governments or states in the African setting cannot be that independent of their foreign master. On many important domestic issues, such as what type of political system to nurture, they are very directly dependent on what the foreign powers they depend on prefer.

The pros and cons of these two schools of thought need not detain us here for too long. Let us accept, as a matter of common sense, that both sides are right in their general observations but wrong if these statements are taken to be categoric and zero-sum assertions. Over the day-to-day running of political affairs, independent states in Africa, including the Republic of South Africa, have a certain amount of autonomy from foreign powers. But in matters that concern the long-term interests of these powers, these states are highly dependent on, and subordinate to, foreign powers. The case of Nicaragua illustrates this point very clearly, so does the case of Chile in 1970-73 and Zimbabwe just before the independence settlement. We shall briefly analyze what happened in these countries so as to lay the ground for what is happening in Africa with regard to the struggles for democracy and the various interests of foreign powers.

(i) *Chile*

When the Popular Unity Government took over power in Chile in 1970 under its socialist President, Salvador Allende, Washington was not pleased. The government of the United States of America immediately went into action to try and destabilise Allende's regime. Allende's biggest challenge to Washington was that he was trying, and perhaps succeeding, to implement a socialist revolution through the democratic process¹. His policies, given time, were likely to build a solid popular support for the regime, thus giving Allende the power and the legitimacy to expropriate U.S. multinationals in Chile². The U.S. government therefore decided to plant seeds of discord in the Chilean political process so as to create opposition to Allende before he could entrench the Popular Unity policies into the fabrics of society. When using the normal political process failed, the CIA resorted to sabotage activities and the coup d'etat, finally intervened to crush the Popular Unity Movement.

1 See Philip J. O'Brien, *Chile: Protest and Repression*, in *Third World Affairs*, 1986.

2 These MNGs, R. Jenkins has argued, developed over time their internal support classes in Latin America which changed the morphology of Latin American politics. The internationalization of productive capital and penetration of the Latin American market by Mngs, produced a series of strains not only at the level of the economy but also politically, as both populist and old conservative alliances began to crumble. In Chile, the growing power of the working class organized into trade unions threatened the hold that bourgeois democracy had had in society. When Allende put together a broad alliance of popular democratic forces, the old conservative bourgeois alliances refused to accept the new democracy and appealed to the soldiers for salvation. See also R. Jenkins, *Transnational Corporations and Industrial Transformation in Latin America*, (London: Macmillan, 1984).

Prior to the coup, the CIA had formed two types of opposition to Allende: ideological propaganda from the opposition parties calling for the eradication of Marxism as something alien to Chile and strike activities either by certain trade unions or special interest groups. When the CIA saw that the ideological propaganda was not getting very far, it intensified its efforts to bribe unions to strike so as to precipitate an economic crisis. Just before the army struck, truck drivers, paid to do so by the CIA, staged a general strike which paralyzed internal trade, particularly the transportation of commodities into Santiago, the major city. This was enough to heighten the demand by opposition parties that Allende could not govern, hence needed to resign. The military quickly moved in despite the tremendous opposition from Allende's supporters. The period following the coup d'état saw stiff opposition from the Popular Unity forces meet intense repression by the military in its attempt to establish itself in power.

Thousands and thousands of lives have been lost in Chile since then. What comes out very clearly is that, though more and more Chileans have come to oppose Pinochet's government - including the Christian Democrats who gave him tactical support originally - the US government has not done anything serious to overthrow Pinochet. The struggle to restore democracy in Chile has been left purely to the Chileans while the support to the regime that did away with democracy still continues to come from Washington.

(ii) *Nicaragua*

The overthrow of the old dictatorship in Nicaragua by the Sandinistas in 1980 was expected in Washington. But the US government also expected to influence the trend of events and to ascertain that it had a hold on the new government. When the Sandinista Directorate veered away from Washington and declared its intention to move towards socialism in Nicaragua, Washington felt that it had to take the offensive and bring the Sandinista government down, much in the same way by which Allende had been brought down. Perhaps as a result of the Chilean lesson, the Sandinista regime took much better precautions than the Popular Unity government had. Moreover, Nicaragua was much more of a political nuisance to Washington than an economic prize, hence the stakes were not as high for the US as they had been in Chile.

But Ronald Reagan, following what he did in Grenada, had made it a burning mission to bring the Sandinistas to their heels. The states in Central America, led by Mexico and Costa Rica, have striven to stop the US from militarily intervening in Nicaragua while pressurizing Nicaragua to eliminate some of the major contradictions in its own political process that have been giving the US the excuse to intervene. Thus, as a result of these pressures from without - one domestic to Central American politics and the other coming from the US - Nicaragua has had to move towards a much more pluralistic political system by making a rapprochement with the contras.

(iii) *Zimbabwe*

During the discussions for Zimbabwean independence in Lancaster House in London in 1980, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) - Patriotic Front led by Robert Gabriel Mugabe was refusing to concede to some of the major clauses in the independence constitution favouring British and white settler (Rhodesian) interests. At one point, it looked as if the talks were going to break down, and no independence settlement would be arrived at. This could only mean that the guerrillas would continue fighting, Britain would still be faced with the difficult task of governing a colony militarily and nobody would tell how far the fighting would continue to escalate in the volatile region of Southern Africa. Having been shown that their opponents were eager for a settlement, the guerrilla forces were in an optimistic mood, and Britain was not just about to let them exploit this mood militarily by returning to the bush because the talks had broken down¹.

Mozambique, having had the responsibility of giving sanctuary to the ZANU freedom fighters, had received quite a bashing from the Rhodesian and South African forces. As a result, Mozambique's economy was in tatters. South African went further to foment an internal rebellion against the FRELIMO government using the Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO - its acronym in Portuguese). FRELIMO calculated that, with an independence settlement in Zimbabwe, less military pressure would come from that front, and Mozambique would have a better chance to sort out the RENAMO menace.

When ZANU-PF was becoming difficult, Britain thought of no better stick to use against Mugabe than his friend Samora Michel, the Mozambican President. The British delegation therefore put it to Mozambique that pressure was needed on Mugabe to agree to the independence accords. In return, Britain would not only give Mozambique the necessary aid in the post-settlement period, but she would also effectively contribute towards a peace process within the region. Samora Michel obliged and, rather than board the plane back to Maputo with no independence settlement in his pocket and ready to fight further, Mugabe went back to the conference hall and signed the accords.

Role of Foreign Powers in the Democratization Process

We have told the above three stories to illustrate one important point: the importance of foreign powers which have interests in particular third world countries in determining or shaping the political processes in these societies. At very crucial moments, using the internal contradictions or the regional geopolitics in these countries, these foreign powers can intervene to significantly shape the political future of these countries. It does not follow, however, that the political forces in these societies must always give themselves

¹ See Ibbo Mandaza, (ed.), *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition* (Dakar: CODES-RIA Book Series, 1987).

up to be manipulated, threatened and successfully forced to adopt certain political initiatives favouring the interests of foreign powers and going against their own. In the case of Chile, it can be said that the Popular Unity government did its best to organize a popular democratic force in defence of its policies for transition to socialism. It was the sheer might of the dollar, the gullibility of the Chilean military and the opportunism of the opposition parties which let Allende down. At the same time, Allende has been accused of not having taken heed to change the military leadership to make sure that the armed apparatuses of the state were supportive of his policies. This, perhaps, is a fair critique; it also points to the very vital fact that any move to democratize society that does not involve the democratization of the organs of state power jeopardizes the success of such a move.

The difference between Nicaragua and Chile is therefore obvious. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas took over power after vanquishing the National Guard and completely getting rid of the armed apparatus of the state of the ancien regime. The Sandinista state was, for all intents and purposes, from Masaya to Monagua and other principal centers of government, a Sandinista state. Allende was attempting a much more difficult task: the task of trying to democratize a state that was, by its very nature, still very much part, and supportive of, the ancien regime and its foreign backers.

But the Sandinistas had another problem which, somehow, they share with the ZANU-PF. This is the problem of a popular movement taking over state power in an environment where diverse sections of the popular masses have not yet, for various historical reasons, become part of the movement. And precisely because they are not part of the movement, they can be mobilized by opposing social forces to resist integration into the movement. In the case of Nicaragua the Miscito Indians fell into this category; in Zimbabwean case the Ndebele of Matabeleland are a case in point. In both cases, neither the Sandinistas nor ZANU-PF had a clear and constructive democratic line in dealing with the Miscito and Ndebele resistance to their rule. Rather than seek to understand the points of view of both groups from within, both the Sandinistas and the ZANU-PF adopted the attitude that revolutionary leadership is like missionary work: the leaders are correct and those who do not follow must be converted into believers by being compelled - with the threat of going to hell if they do not convert - to abandon their sinful ways. A much more constructive approach would have been that of building a broad democratic front among the popular masses. The front would, no doubt, accept and tolerate political differences without sacrificing commitment to democracy and delinking from the old society. It is this approach, more difficult to pursue than is the case with missionary - like revolution, which has eluded most so-called progressive political movements in Africa and Latin America - quite often turning them into 'left wing' dictatorships and anti-democratic regimes.

Conclusion

Any foreign power, bent on frustrating a progressive movement which has taken over state power so as to undertake a thoroughgoing revolutionary change in society, would find it much easier to exploit internal contradictions than to nakedly impose its will on such a movement. Non-democratic politics are sure ways of creating pockets of discontent and temptations to ally with external forces by such constituencies of discontent so as to subvert attempts to build a new democratic social order. It is therefore antithetical to the goals of a progressive movement to advocate the politics of control rather than the politics of participation. A movement cannot fight to build a democratic society when, in its own politics, it does not practise democracy. Democracy cannot, in other words, be brewed like a cup of instant coffee: it has to be built by social practice and traditions that run deep into the like of civil society.

Réflexion sur la Fonction Objectifs de L'entreprise

Amadou Lamine DIA*

SUMMARY - Business enterprises have various objectives. As a rule these are of two types: economic and social. Economic objectives cover profit - making, growth, business flexibility and autonomy. Contrary to these, the achievement of social objectives requires that a number of other needs are met: salary increase, better working conditions and necessitates external inputs from public authorities, banks, consumers. However a firm - and especially African firms - can only survive when a consensus is reached on the basis of an adequate proportion of economic profits and adequate social gains. In fact the equilibrium of companies depends on whether they are sufficiently efficient at the economic level to both maintain their competitive capacity and to satisfy the personal claims of the different partners. In this regard, it is easier for medium-size businesses to make profits from consensus-based objectives than bigger enterprises which instead make more competitive profits from centralized strategies that are directly applied to production units. Yet a consensus never has a final character. Off and on it is challenged by any of the partners who strives to maximize the gains in accordance with the prevailing balance of forces. The survival of the firm results from the opposition and negotiation processes as they lead to a compromise. However, such a compromise is constantly challenged; it is not static.

Le terme "objectifs" désigne les visées explicites qui conditionnent l'organisation dans son ensemble. Le plus souvent formulés par la Direction Générale, ils traduisent une "volonté de la firme". Le contenu de ce concept n'est pas défini de façon univoque. Selon certains¹, les entreprises et, plus largement, l'ensemble des organisations, n'ont pas de volonté propre. La (ou les) volonté(s) exprimées le sont par les hommes qui les composent, en particulier par ceux qui détiennent le pouvoir de décision. Selon d'autres², au contraire, la firme, constituant une réalité socio-économique distincte, formule une volonté propre et, par là-même des objectifs différents de ceux de ses membres.

Quelle que soit, cependant, l'interprétation adoptée, la fonction d'objectifs d'une entreprise est, dans le cadre général de sa mission de production et de

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1 cf. R.M. Cyert, J.G. March, A behavioral theory of the firm. Printic Hall inc., Englewoods Cliffs, 1963 (traduction française sous le titre Processus de décision dans l'entreprise, Paris, Dunod, 1970).

2 Cf. I. Ansoff, Corporate strategy. An analytical approach to business policy for growth and expansion, Pelican Library of Business and Management Penguin Books, 1968, copyright M. Graw Hill, USA, 1965 (traduction française sous le titre Stratégie du développement de l'entreprise, Paris, Hommes et Techniques, 1968).

commercialisation, le niveau des performances économiques et/ou sociales destinées à être réalisées dans un avenir donné.

Toutes les organisations, et notamment les entreprises, doivent pour éviter le risque d'une gestion au jour le jour, exprimer dans une fonction cohérente d'objectifs un projet de développement, à long terme. C'est à partir de cette volonté projetée dans le futur qu'elles recherchent les moyens concrets d'atteindre les buts ainsi fixés. La démarche qui conduit la firme à la réalisation de ses objectifs n'est autre que le plan de développement à long terme ou plan stratégique¹.

Si l'ensemble des objectifs traditionnellement formulés (profit, croissance, autonomie) ne peut, de toute évidence, être remis en cause, il se révèle cependant nécessaire de réexaminer afin d'aboutir à une formulation nouvelle, la fonction objectifs de l'entreprise à la lumière d'un autre facteur : les antagonismes entre les participants de la firme.

La fonction objectifs classique

Deux catégories d'objectifs sont généralement distinguées : ceux qui ont un caractère économique et correspondant aux soucis traditionnels de bénéfice et de risque ; ceux qui, de nature non économique, reflètent des aspirations individuelles ou des préoccupations sociales.

A notre sens, cependant, les objectifs se différencient avant tout par la durée nécessaire à leur réalisation, les objectifs à court terme s'opposant aux objectifs à long terme.

L'objectif à court terme : le profit

Engagée dans une compétition économique avec des firmes concurrentes, une entreprise doit, pour se développer ou seulement survivre, viser un but unique : maximiser la rentabilité du capital investi, atteindre le niveau de profit le plus élevé possible.

Cet objectif constitue le postulat de tout un ensemble de recherches, menées surtout aux Etats-Unis, relevant de la théorie financière²

1 Voir notamment, sur ce point, I. Asnoff, *op. cit.* (supra N 2).

2 F. Modigliani, M.H. Miller, The cost of capital: corporation finance and the theory of investment, *American Economic review*, XLVIII (Juin 1958); T. Scitovsky, A note on profit maximisation and its implications, *Review of Economic studies*, XI (hiver 1943); O.E. Williamson, Managerial discretion and business behavior, *American Economic Review*, LIII (décembre 1953).

L'ambiguïté du concept

Les nombreuses définitions données de la notion de profit¹ peuvent être regroupées en deux catégories principales : les définitions économiques et les définitions comptables².

Dans les premières, sont dégagés trois concepts différents : le profit brut, le profit net et le profit pur. Abstraction faite des détails et des variantes, la théorie économique peut être ainsi résumée : le profit brut est égal à la différence entre la recette globale provenant des ventes et les coûts des facteurs variables ; le profit net se déduit du profit brut par soustraction du coût des facteurs fixes ; le profit pur est obtenu en retranchant au profit net les sommes correspondant aux salaires de direction, aux intérêts du capital de l'entrepreneur et aux coûts d'opportunité.

La pratique comptable est également fondée sur trois notions: le bénéfice brut, le bénéfice net avant dotations et le bénéfice net distribué. Le bénéfice brut résulte de la différence entre les recettes globales et les frais de fabrication ; déduction faite des frais de vente et des frais généraux, on obtient le bénéfice net avant dotations, auquel il convient de retrancher les amortissements et les diverses dotations, afin de déterminer le bénéfice net distribuable.

Les deux séries de concepts sont essentiellement différentes et irréductibles l'un à l'autre. Alors que, dans l'optique économique, sont considérés des "coûts implicites" (coûts virtuels n'entraînant pas de débours effectifs³, l'optique comptable ne fait intervenir que les coûts explicites" (dépenses comptabilisées qui sont dues en vertu d'engagements contractuels)."

De plus, les divers concepts de profit ne reçoivent pas toujours le même contenu. Selon le statut juridique des entreprises, en effet, certains éléments se trouvent dans l'une ou l'autre série. Ainsi, le salaire de direction, coût implicite pour une entreprise individuelle, devient explicite dans une société anonyme. La notion de profit recouvre des réalités très diverses et ne peut, en conséquence, apparaître comme le critère fondamental dans la fonction objectifs de l'entreprise.

On préfère donc parler de rentabilité des investissements, ou encore de profitabilité⁴. Les ressources financières et humaines de l'entreprise ne pouvant en effet être ajustées à volonté, il s'agit moins de chercher à maximiser le profit que d'obtenir des ressources disponibles, le rendement maximal.

1 Cf. F. Weston, *The profit concept and theory: a restatement* Journal of Political Economy, LXII, 1964, p. 152. B. Biet, *Theories contemporaines du profit*, Paris, Génin, Librairies de Médecis, 1956; R.M. Davis, *The current state of profit theory*, American Economic Review, XLI (Juin 1951), pp. 245-264; M. Bronfenbrenner, *A reformulation of naive profit theory*, Southern Economic Journal, avril 1960, pp.300-309; A. Babeau, *Le profit*, Paris, PUF., 1969.

2 A. Murad, *Questions for profit theory*, American Journal of Economics and sociology, XIII, octobre 1953, p. 13; G. Hosmalin, *Investissements, rentabilités et progrès techniques*, Paris, Génin, 1956, tableau N 1, p. 73.

3 A. Murad, *op.cit.*

4 I. Asnoff, *op.cit.*

Le problème est alors de déterminer les critères d'appréciation de la rentabilité.

La mesure de la rentabilité

La profitabilité d'une entreprise se mesure en unités monétaires. La rentabilité, elle, est un ratio comparant le profit à une mise de fonds et s'exprime par un pourcentage.

Elle revêt trois aspects fondamentaux:

- la rentabilité des ventes,*
- la rentabilité économique,*
- la rentabilité financière.*

(a) la rentabilité des ventes

Elle est indiquée par la marge bénéficiaire ou "marge commerciale" (rapport du bénéfice net au chiffre d'affaires hors taxe).

$$\text{marge bénéficiaire} : mb = \frac{II}{C}$$

II = bénéfice net (après paiement des frais financiers et de l'impôt)

C = ventes hors taxe et net d'escompte

La rentabilité des ventes est la principale source de la rentabilité totale de l'entreprise. Si la rentabilité des ventes est nulle, la rentabilité économique et la rentabilité financière de l'entreprise le sont également.

Elle permet également de comparer le rendement de plusieurs entreprises d'un même secteur, abstraction faite de leurs différences de taille ou de structure financière.

Le tableau 1 illustre quelque actions¹ visant à améliorer la marge bénéficiaire de l'entreprise

Il serait cependant dangereux d'évaluer la performance globale d'une entreprise à partir de la seule rentabilité des ventes. Certaines stratégies peuvent, en effet, à court terme résoudre un problème mais, à long terme, en créer d'autres. L'abaissement de la garantie et du service par exemple, améliore la rentabilité des ventes... mais, risque de conduire à une diminution du chiffre d'affaires et à l'appauvrissement de l'image de marque.

La marge bénéficiaire ne peut non plus constituer un critère unique de comparaison entre des entreprises appartenant à des secteurs différents, dans la mesure où les marges bénéficiaires dans certains domaines, tels que la distribution alimentaire, sont généralement très faibles.

Enfin, le calcul de la marge bénéficiaire n'inclut ni l'importance ni l'âge des capitaux utilisés. Une entreprise qui réalise une marge bénéficiaire inférieure à une autre mais en utilisant beaucoup moins de capitaux peut être considérée comme la plus rentable.

¹ M. Shubik, *Stratégie et structure des marchés*, Paris, Dunod, 1976; J.J. Lambin, R. Peeters, *La question marketing des entreprises*, Paris, PUF, 1977, pp. 271-292.

Table I - Comment améliorer la rentabilité des ventes

objectifs	stratégies
Augmentation du prix moyen $mb = \frac{p}{c}$	Différenciation du produit Segmentation du marché changement du prix de vente resserrement des conditions de paiement.
diminution de coût moyen	analyse de la valeur nouveau circuits de distribution abaisssement de la garantie et du service innovation technologique révision des approvisionnements- économies d'échelle

Il serait cependant dangereux d'évaluer la performance globale d'une entreprise à partir de la seule rentabilité des ventes. Certaines stratégies peuvent, en effet, à court terme résoudre un problème mais, à long terme, en créer d'autres. L'abaissement de la garantie et du service par exemple, améliore la rentabilité des ventes... mais, risque de conduire à une diminution du chiffre d'affaires et à l'appauvrissement de l'image de marque.

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La rentabilité des capitaux doit donc être également prise en considération.

(b) La rentabilité économique.

Le chef d'entreprise est le fiduciaire des sommes qui sont confiées à sa garde et à sa bonne gestion par les actionnaires, détenteurs des capitaux propres de l'entreprise, et par les bailleurs de fonds. L'ensemble de ces fonds est investi, c'est-à-dire que de "passifs", ils deviennent "actifs" dans le processus d'entreprise. Le chef d'entreprise doit donc avant tout veiller à ce que les actifs engendrent suffisamment de bénéfices pour rémunérer les actionnaires par les dividendes et les gains du capital et les banquiers par les intérêts. Son premier devoir est de maintenir la rentabilité économique de son entreprise, c'est-à-dire d'assurer aux capitaux engagés un taux de rentabilité supérieur à

leur coût. Le bénéfice net et l'amortissement doivent être supérieurs aux coûts du capital¹.

La rentabilité économique de l'entreprise se mesure donc par le taux de rentabilité de l'actif, c'est-à-dire le rapport du bénéfice net à l'actif total (ou au passif total).

$$\text{Rentabilité économique (re)} = \frac{\text{II}}{\text{A}} \frac{\text{II}}{\text{D} + \text{E}}$$

II = bénéfice net

A = actif total

D = fonds empruntés

E = fonds propres

Elle est aussi égale au produit de la rentabilité des ventes par le taux de rotation de l'actif.

$$\frac{\text{II}}{\text{A}} = \frac{\text{II}}{\text{C}} \times \frac{\text{C}}{\text{A}}$$

rentabilité économique rentabilité des ventes rotation de l'actif

La principale stratégie² susceptible d'influer sur la rentabilité économique d'une entreprise est, outre l'amélioration, déjà envisagée, de la marge bénéficiaire, celle du taux de rotation de l'actif.

Plusieurs techniques peuvent être mises en oeuvre. Elles sont récapitulées dans le tableau II.

Tableau II : Comment améliorer le taux de rotation de l'actif

diminution du fonds de roulement brut	Amélioration de la gestion des stocks réduction des délais de livraison meilleure gestion des liquidités
$\frac{\text{C}}{\text{A}}$	sous-traitance franchising
réduction des immobilisations	
Objectifs	Stratégie

* fonds de roulement brut = actif circulant = stock + réalisable + disponible.

Toutefois, la comparaison entre les taux de rotation de l'actif de plusieurs entreprises appartenant à des industries différentes ne permet pas, à elle seule,

1 J.C. Horne, *Gestion et politique financière*, Paris, Dunod, 1981, tome I, pp. 111-178.

2 H. de Bodinat, *Stratégie et Politique Financière*, Banque N 374, juin 78.

de porter un jugement sur l'efficacité économique de ces entreprises. Dans les industries intensives en capital (industrie lourde), les taux de rotation de l'actif sont faibles, mais les marges bénéficiaires élevées ; dans l'industrie légère et les services, au contraire, la situation est inverse.

Pour que soit améliorée la rentabilité économique de l'entreprise la diminution des actifs ne doit pas entraîner à terme une diminution proportionnelle des ventes et des profits.

Enfin, à toute baisse de l'actif correspondant une baisse du passif, il convient de vérifier que l'actif circulant et le passif à court terme baissent dans la même proportion. Si tel n'est pas le cas, la structure du capital¹ de l'entreprise, et donc sa rentabilité financière se trouvent modifiées et les risques accrus.

c) la rentabilité financière

A la différence du directeur des ventes et du directeur général, l'actionnaire cherche avant tout la rentabilité de son capital. Celle-ci se définit comme le rapport du bénéfice net aux fonds propres. Ce ratio mesure la rentabilité financière de l'entreprise.

$$\text{rentabilité financière (rf)} = \frac{\text{II}}{\text{E}}$$

II = bénéfice net

E = fonds propres

La formule $re = \frac{\text{II}}{\text{A}}$ (re désignant la rentabilité économique

de l'entreprise), peut être tirée cette autre formule: $= re \cdot A$.

Le total de l'actif étant égal au total du passif: $A = D + E$ et $= re (D + E)$.

En remplaçant () par cette valeur dans l'expression initiale de la rentabilité économique, on obtient :

$$rf = \frac{\text{II}}{\text{E}}$$

$$rf = re \frac{(D + E)}{\text{E}} \quad rf = re \left(1 + \frac{D}{\text{E}}\right)$$

$$rf = re \left(1 + \frac{D}{\text{E}}\right)$$

rf = rentabilité financière

re = rentabilité économique

D = total des fonds empruntés

E = total des fonds propres

$\frac{D}{\text{E}}$ exprime le taux d'endettement de l'entreprise.

E

$\left(1 + \frac{D}{\text{E}}\right)$ est le rapport du passif total aux fonds propres,

¹ J.C. Van Home, *op.cit.* pp. 147-171.

appelé aussi "levier financier".

La rentabilité financière de l'entreprise est égale au produit de sa rentabilité économique par son levier financier.

La rentabilité financière peut être améliorée soit par l'augmentation de la rentabilité économique, soit par l'allongement du levier financier c'est-à-dire par un recours croissant à l'endettement.

Tableau III : comment améliorer le levier financier

augmentation de l'endettement	allongement du crédit fournisseurs nouveaux emprunts report d'échéances
$1 + \frac{D}{E}$	
diminution des capitaux	distribution de dividendes élevés
Objectifs	Stratégies

La première solution est à la fois la plus saine et la plus durable. La seconde apparaît comme une arme à double tranchant dans la mesure où elle comporte également des limites¹ : sa première conséquence est une augmentation du risque financier. Les fournisseurs, par exemple, accepteront-ils d'être payés dans un délai de 90 jours au lieu de 50 et de quel escompte la firme sera-t-elle ainsi privée ? Les banquiers accepteront-ils d'augmenter la ligne de crédit fixée et à quel taux ? En outre, si le coût de l'endettement supplémentaire est supérieur au taux de la rentabilité économique de l'entreprise, celle-ci empruntera pour investir avec un rendement inférieur au coût de l'argent et sa rentabilité s'en trouvera non pas augmentée mais diminuée.

L'objectif fondamental de la firme doit donc être l'efficacité fondée sur la rentabilité. De sa réalisation dépend celle d'objectifs complémentaires : la croissance, l'autonomie et la flexibilité².

B - Les objectifs à long terme

La croissance, la flexibilité et l'autonomie conditionnent cependant le succès à long terme de la firme.

1) La croissance

De même que l'individu cherche à améliorer sa carrière, son revenu, son rang social, la firme cherche à dominer les marchés, à accroître son chiffre d'affaire, à acquérir une dimension régionale, puis nationale ou internationale.

1 J.C. Van Horne, op. cit., tome II, pp. G. Hirogoyen, Rentabilité et solvabilité, Revue Direction et Gestion, N 3 (mai-juin 1985).

2 I. Ansoff, op. cit. : P. Tabatoni, O. Thomas, M. de Mongolfier, J. Borel, R. Sautreau, Analyse empirique des contraintes stratégiques de l'entreprise, Economie et Sociétés, tome II, N 3 (mars 1968) ; J. Meyer : Objectifs et stratégies de l'entreprise, Paris, DUNOD, 1972.

a) signification

La signification du concept est double. La croissance peut en effet apparaître comme un indicateur purement quantitatif ou comme le résultat d'un processus de développement.

Dans le premier cas, la croissance n'est que l'augmentation quantitative d'un phénomène entre deux moments différents du temps.

Dans le second cas, la croissance est considérée comme le résultat normal d'un processus de développement caractérisé par l'action complexe de modifications internes qui entraînent des transformations d'ordre quantitatif mais aussi d'ordre qualitatif.

Dans une entreprises, la croissance ne se produit qu'au prix de modifications qualitatives ou structurelles, même sur une période de temps limitée. Elle se manifeste de façons diverses et peut être soit interne (accroissement des quantités produites et vendues) soit externe (diversification, absorption, fusion...).

b) mesure

La réalisation d'objectifs de croissance et le succès de ceux-ci se mesure habituellement par l'évolution du chiffre d'affaires. Cet indicateur, cependant, ne doit pas être unique. La progression du chiffre d'affaires peut en effet avoir pour conséquence une diminution de la rentabilité. Si dans une perspective à court terme, celle-ci peut être tolérée, il doit, à plus long terme, y avoir coïncidence entre croissance et rentabilité.

La croissance n'est pas une fin en soi et doit être considérée comme le moyen, pour la firme :

- d'atteindre une masse critique ou taille minimale diminuant sa vulnérabilité face à la concurrence.

- de réaliser des économies d'échelle permettant une amélioration de la rentabilité.

- de mettre en oeuvre tout son potentiel de synergie en utilisant de façon optimale les ressources dont elle dispose actuellement, sans investissements majeurs supplémentaires.

La croissance, toutefois, ne doit pas être tenue pour une panacée. Faute d'avoir déterminé un vecteur de croissance précis¹, l'entreprise risque de faire des objectifs de croissance qu'elle s'est fixée les instruments de son déclin.

2) La flexibilité

a) Signification

La flexibilité² ou souplesse, permet à l'entreprise de s'adapter aux circonstances difficiles (flexibilité défensive) ou de saisir les opportunités de

¹ E.T. Penrose, Facteurs, conditions et mécanismes de la croissance de l'entreprise, Paris, Hommes et Techniques, 1963; A. Bienayme, la croissance des entreprises, Paris, Bordas, 1971, tome II.

² I. Ansoff, op. cit.: p. 56; R. Reix, Principe d'une politique de flexibilité dans l'entreprise, Revue Française de Gestion, N 11, septembre octobre 1977; id., la flexibilité de l'entreprise, Paris, Ed. Cujas, 1979.

profit ou de croissance qui s'offrent à elle (flexibilité offensive). Pour atteindre cet objectif de flexibilité, le chef d'entreprise peut, par exemple, à un moment précis, n'utiliser qu'incomplètement les capacités financières (d'autofinancement, d'endettement...) de la firme dans l'attente d'opportunités d'investissements plus rentables.

b) mesure

La flexibilité défensive se mesure de diverses manières:

- sur le plan financier, la mesure traditionnelle est le ratio suivant : emprunts à terme. Un faible taux

Situation nette

d'endettement assure une certaine sécurité. En contrepartie, il réduit le jeu de l'effet de levier. Une autre manoeuvre courante consiste à améliorer la liquidité des actifs.

- interviennent également des critères commerciaux. L'entreprise essaiera de vendre des produits d'âge différent et fixera leur part relative. Elle veillera à avoir un grand nombre de client indépendants, de façon à ne pas être tributaire de l'un d'entre eux.

La flexibilité offensive est plus subtile et plus difficile à saisir ; il s'agit surtout de ne pas laisser échapper des occasions qui pourraient être plus rentables.

3) L'autonomie

a) signification

L'objectif d'autonomie revêt deux sens :

- D'un point de vue strictement financier, une entreprise conserve son autonomie dans la mesure où son contrôle reste entre les mains des propriétaires et des dirigeants en place et où la détermination de la politique générale de la firme relève de leur seule autorité.

- Plus largement, l'autonomie traduit le degré d'indépendance de la firme à l'égard de tout ce qui lui est extérieur et son aptitude à maîtriser la totalité de l'environnement (tentative de prise de contrôle mais aussi concurrence, innovation, marchés, contraintes institutionnelles).

b) mesure

La mesure classique de l'autonomie de la propriété est le ratio suivant :

capitaux propres Tout affaiblissement de ce rapport risque de conduire
capitaux empruntés

à des difficultés (mainmise par une banque, refus de prêt sans conditions particulières..)

Il convient également de suivre l'évolution du chapitre "Dettes à court terme", dont le gonflement peut mettre l'entreprise en difficulté. On obtient donc le ratio suivant:

réalisable + disponible
dettes à court terme

L'autonomie d'une entreprise peut être à chaque instant menacée. Face à ce danger, deux attitudes sont possibles : résister à l'assaut ou essayer de l'éviter par la négociation.

C - La logique de la fonction objectifs classique

1) Les objectifs économiques

Les objectifs de croissance, de flexibilité et d'autonomie se caractérisent, au même titre que l'objectif de rentabilité, par leur aspect économique. Toutefois, il s'agit bien d'objectifs dérivés car c'est du niveau de profit que dépendront au premier chef les politiques de croissance, de flexibilité et d'autonomie.

2) la réalisation d'objectifs sociaux

Le niveau d'efficacité économique atteint grâce à la réalisation de l'objectif principal et des objectifs complémentaires permettra ensuite la satisfaction d'autres objectifs, revendiqués par les divers groupes à l'intérieur de l'entreprise (cadres, salariés ordinaires) tels que la hausse des salaires, l'amélioration des conditions de travail.

C'est aussi grâce à l'optimisation de l'efficacité économique de l'entreprise que les participants externes (pouvoirs publics, banquiers) satisfont le mieux leurs revendications personnelles à l'égard de l'entreprise. En effet, plus celle-ci est prospère, plus elle est pour eux un partenaire digne d'intérêt.

Il existe, enfin, une dernière catégorie de participants, les consommateurs de produits ou de services. Ce sont eux qui, en définitive, permettent ou interdisent la réalisation de l'objectif unique d'efficacité économique, puisqu'ils détiennent le pouvoir ultime d'acheter ou de ne pas acheter ce que produit une entreprise. Leur intérêt rejoint ainsi nécessairement celui de la firme.

La théorie classique se révèle pourtant insuffisante pour expliquer de nos jours le mécanisme de détermination de la fonction objectifs de l'entreprise. Elle suppose en effet que le pouvoir stratégique appartienne en totalité aux propriétaires du capital, à l'exclusion de leurs partenaires, tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur de l'entreprise. Or, tel n'est évidemment pas le cas dans la réalité vécue des entreprises.

II : Réexamen de la fonction objectifs

Tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur de l'entreprise moderne (société anonyme), existent des groupes organisés¹, qui, chacun pour son propre compte, recherchent avant tout la satisfaction de leurs propres objectifs.

Si celui du producteur (la maximisation de la rentabilité) demeure essentiel, ceux des autres participants (dirigeants, salariés ordinaires banque...) sont également indispensables à la survie de l'entreprise. Il apparaît donc nécessaire d'opérer un nouvel examen de la fonction objectifs de la firme à la lumière d'un facteur jusqu'ici négligé : les intérêts de ses différents participants.

¹ A. Cotta, *le pouvoir dans l'organisation*, Revue Française de Gestion janvier-février 1976, pp. 25-35; H. Minisberg, *Structure et dynamique des organisations*, Paris, Les Editions d'Organisation, 1982 ; S. Blind, *Les relations de l'entreprise avec ses parties prenantes*, Revue Française de Gestion, novembre - décembre 1977, pp.30-31.

A - Les objectifs des participants internes

Les participants internes de l'entreprise sont essentiellement les apporteurs de capitaux (les propriétaires), les dirigeants (les hauts salariés) et les apporteurs de travaux (les salariés ordinaires).

1) les propriétaires du capital

Exception faite du cas des sociétés individuelles, dans lesquelles dirigeant et apporteur de capitaux sont confondus, le but premier des propriétaires reste le profit, qu'il s'exprime par la dividende versée ou, lorsque l'entreprise est cotée en bourse, par la plus-value des actions.

2) Les dirigeants

Les dirigeants ou "managers"¹ recherchent à travers l'entreprise à laquelle ils s'identifient les instruments de leur épanouissement personnel et de leur rayonnement social. Désir d'importants gains financiers, volonté d'affirmer leur puissance, de prouver leurs qualités d'organiseurs, leur aptitude à commander, à innover, leur goût du risque constituent leur principales motivations. L'entreprise demeure parfois à leurs yeux le moyen de mettre en pratique une éthique personnelle de justice, d'équité, de charité.

Ces diverses motivations peuvent être déduites du modèle de O.E. Williamson². Les dirigeants d'entreprises s'efforcent, selon cet auteur de maximiser une fonction d'utilité comprenant les variables suivantes : le montant de leurs appointements, le volume des investissements qu'ils peuvent choisir de façon discrétionnaire, le montant des coûts qui leur assurent une marge de manoeuvre. Toutefois, la maximisation de cette fonction d'utilité suppose la réalisation d'un profit minimal³. Les dirigeants recherchent donc essentiellement la croissance et/ou l'équilibre.

Exprimé par le total des actifs ou le niveau des ventes, la croissance peut en effet à la fois apparaître comme une manifestation de leur qualité et de leur compétence et justifier une augmentation de leurs appointements. De plus, par sa dynamique euphorisante, elle autorise un certain nombre de choix discrétionnaires, en particulier dans le domaine des investissements.

Enfin, les dirigeants, soucieux de leur sécurité personnelle craignent, de toute évidence, une cessation de paiements, qui les mettrait eux-mêmes en péril. Ils sont ainsi conduits à rechercher l'équilibre financier - démarche qui peut permettre une justification des coûts engendrés par la détention de liquidités pléthoriques.

1 Si l'origine du terme "manager" semble se trouver chez J. Burnham, *The managerial revolution*, New York, John Day, 1941, la réalité qu'il recouvre a été perçue et décrite avant cette date par d'autres auteurs en particulier : T. Veblen, *Absent ownership*, Londres, Beacon Press, 1923 ; A. Berle et G. Means, *The modern corporation and private property*, New-York, 1932.

2 O.E. Williamson, *A model of rational managerial behavior*, in R.M. Cyert et J.G. March, *op. cit.*

3 A propos des problèmes d'optimisation de la fonction économique sous contrainte, on consultera surtout : J.P. Védrine, *Analyse marginale, programmation linéaire et théorie de la firme*, Annales Economiques, N 1, 1971, Paris, Editions Cujas, J.M. Henderson et R.E. Quandt, *microeconomic theory a mathematical approach*, New York, inc. Graw Hill, 1971.

Les objectifs des dirigeants se traduisent donc par l'émergence des buts de croissance et d'équilibre financier, aux dépens, même, de la recherche de la rentabilité, bien que celle-ci demeure une contrainte. La fonction objectifs, de la firme se trouve nécessairement influencée par le caractère et la volonté personnelle de ceux qui la dirigent.

3) Les salariés ordinaires

Les salariés ordinaires sont liés à l'entreprise par un contrat de location de services. Celui-ci suppose que, pendant le travail, l'assujéti aliène partiellement sa liberté individuelle en contrepartie du versement d'un salaire, le plus souvent forfaitaire puisqu'il est déterminé à priori par l'employeur, détenteur du pouvoir stratégique, avant même que soit connue la part de recette inhérente au facteur travail dans le produit ou le service vendu.

A la différence des propriétaires et des dirigeants, les salariés ordinaires ont un rôle d'exécutants passifs et sont privés de tout pouvoir au sein de la firme. Leurs objectifs ne peuvent donc que revêtir un caractère social. Ils concernent, d'une façon générale, toutes les décisions qui n'ont pas d'influence directe et immédiate sur le choix des produits et des marchés mais contribuent à améliorer, à l'intérieur de l'entreprise, la situation des salariés : stabilité de l'emploi, relations humaines, progression du niveau de vie, amélioration des conditions de travail, participation et augmentation des loisirs¹. Ils contribuent également, à l'extérieur de l'entreprise, au service de la collectivité (développement régional, création d'emplois).

La poursuite de ces objectifs est en contradiction avec le désir de profit à court terme qui anime les propriétaires. A plus longue échéance, cependant, ils peuvent contribuer à améliorer la rentabilité de l'entreprise. Les motivations des salariés ordinaires doivent, en conséquence, être prises en compte dans l'élaboration de la fonction objectifs de la firme.

B - Les objectifs des participants externes

Les participants externes sont tous les individus, groupes d'individus ou organisations concernés, de près ou de loin, par la firme et son fonctionnement, sans toutefois entretenir avec elle des relations d'interdépendance, c'est-à-dire principalement : les pouvoirs publics, les banques et les consommateurs.

&) Les pouvoirs publics

Les pouvoirs publics sont constitués par l'Etat et les administrations (départementale, régionale et nationale).

L'entreprise étant, à leurs yeux, un des agents essentiels de la politique économique et sociale, ils seront portés à utiliser l'arme législative, réglementaire ou incitative, pour imposer des décisions destinées à favoriser des objectifs divers, tels que le développement régional et l'aménagement du territoire, le niveau de l'emploi, la formation professionnelle, l'investissement,

¹ J.Igalens et J.M. Peretti, *Le bilan social de l'entreprise*, Paris, PUF, 1980 ; J.M. Peretti, *Gestion du personnel*, collection Vuibert Gestion, Paris, 1981.

la distribution des revenus, les relations professionnelles, la croissance économique, le commerce extérieur, la lutte contre l'inflation.

Ceux-ci constituent donc des contraintes qui s'imposent à la firme, sans toutefois que le rapport des forces soit nécessairement défavorable à cette dernière¹.

- D'une part, en effet, l'entreprise peut trouver, dans les contraintes de l'environnement (pouvoirs publics) des vecteurs de développement. Ainsi, un investissement de formation ou de perfectionnement se révèle, à terme, profitable, des mesures incitant à l'exportation favorisent la croissance, l'encadrement du crédit oblige à sélectionner les investissements les plus rentables.

- Elle peut, d'autre part, échapper, totalement ou partiellement à ces contraintes externes, par une application restrictive de la loi et, à la limite, par fraude, malgré les risques que cette pratique comporte.

- Elle peut, enfin, directement ou par personnes interposées, agir sur les centres de décision des pouvoirs publics pour que les mesures prises lui soient favorables.

Se dessine la nécessité d'un dialogue permanent entre les pouvoirs publics et la firme par une insertion optimale de celle-ci dans son environnement.

2) Les banquiers

Les banques sont les pourvoyeurs de capitaux de l'entreprise. Elles ont donc le pouvoir, en accordant ou en refusant les fonds nécessaires à la réalisation d'une option stratégique, d'en modifier les objectifs.

Les difficultés de fonctionnement se traduisent le plus souvent par une détérioration de la situation financière. Selon la qualité de sa structure, la firme pourra y faire face soit seule soit avec l'aide des banquiers. La sécurité financière lui assurera la marge de manoeuvre nécessaire pour redresser une situation compromise.

En effet, lors d'un déséquilibre financier passager, occasionné par l'expression ou par des aléas, l'entreprise peut s'adresser à des organismes de crédit qui mettront à sa disposition les fonds nécessaires moyennant un intérêt convenable, sous certaines conditions :

- que le bénéfice de l'entreprise soit suffisamment important pour lui permettre de procéder aux remboursements de l'emprunt contracté et des intérêts correspondants sans lui causer des préjudices.

- que les biens composant l'actif de l'entreprise aient une valeur suffisante pour permettre au prêteur, de récupérer le montant de son prêt même si l'emprunteur se heurte à de graves difficultés. Le plus souvent, en effet, les fonds mis à la disposition de la firme n'appartenant pas aux banques mais à leurs clients, aucun risque ne peut être pris par les banquiers.

¹ Au sujet du rapport entre environnement et stratégie voir A.L. Dia, *Choix stratégique de l'entreprise privée sénégalaise*, Revue Afrique et Développement, Volume X N 1, 1985, plus particulièrement les pages 34 à 48.

Ceux-ci constituent donc des groupes de pression externes dont la décision influe sur la survie et/ou le développement de l'entreprise. Leurs motivations (désir de récupérer les capitaux prêtés, participation et/ou prise de contrôle) doivent également être intégrées dans la fonction objectifs.

3) Les consommateurs

Les consommateurs sont des interlocuteurs privilégiés de la firme puisqu'ils en acquièrent les produits ou les services.

Leurs motivations semblent a priori identiques à celles de l'entreprise. C'est en effet de la satisfaction des consommateurs que résulte une progression du chiffre d'affaires et donc de la rentabilité. Dans la réalité, cependant, producteurs et consommateurs s'opposent le plus souvent.

Les motivations du consommateur sont en général peu précises mais peuvent être réparties en trois catégories principales: le prix, la qualité et l'utilité du produit acheté¹.

- au niveau du prix, la divergence d'intérêts entre la firme et les consommateurs est évidente : l'entreprise préférera vendre plus cher et le consommateur acheter moins cher.

- en ce qui concerne la qualité, l'opposition est moins profonde. En effet, l'entreprise compromettrait gravement et durablement son image de marque si elle commercialisait un produit ne présentant pas des caractéristiques suffisantes de solidité, de sécurité, d'efficacité.

- sur l'utilité d'un produit (réelle ou perçue comme telle par le consommateur), la possibilité d'un conflit entre l'entreprise et l'utilisateur est supprimée à partir du moment où ce dernier achète. Pour provoquer l'achat, cependant, l'entreprise tente de susciter chez le consommateur des besoins souvent plus imaginaires que véritables. Publicité et promotion des ventes peuvent inciter à la fausse innovation et à un certain gaspillage. L'opposition d'intérêt est alors, sinon apparente, du moins latente.

Les avantages de l'entreprise ne sont pas négligeables par rapport aux consommateurs : manque d'information et isolement du client, réaction quasi mécanique à certains stimuli face à une organisation cohérente qui le traite comme une "cible". Mais les consommateurs détiennent le pouvoir de décision ultime puisqu'ils peuvent refuser d'acheter. Aujourd'hui, de plus, ils se regroupent en associations contestataires pour éviter d'être trompés ou manipulés. Ces mouvements de défense, plus connus sous le terme générique de "consuérisme"² se trouvent ainsi en mesure d'exercer des pressions, de contribuer à l'échec de produits nouveaux et même à la faillite d'entreprises.

Les consommateurs sont devenus un important contre-pouvoir capable de faire peser sur les positions des entreprises, de graves menaces.

1 A.L. Dia, Le comportement du consommateur : de l'approche concept à l'approche action, Annales Africaines (Faculté de Droit et d'Economie de l'Université de Dakar), 1985.

2 Le consuérisme est défini par Ph. Kotler comme un mouvement social visant à accroître les droits et le pouvoir des consommateurs dans leurs rapports avec les producteurs (voir Ph. Kotler, Marketing management, Paris Publi-Union 1973).

Une nouvelle détermination de la fonction objectifs de l'entreprise doit donc tenir compte non seulement de l'existence, au sein de la firme, de différents groupes (actionnaires, dirigeants et salariés) ayant chacun des motivations spécifiques, mais encore de participants externes (pouvoirs publics, banquiers, consommateurs) qui détiennent un pouvoir de contrainte inflexible par là même les décisions stratégiques.

C - La fonction objectifs, résultat d'un consensus

Des affrontements et des négociations entre les différents participants (internes et externes) résulte une fonction objectifs, savant dosage d'économicité et d'équilibrage social, sans lequel l'entreprise moderne ne saurait survivre.

1) La survie de l'entreprise

La survie de l'entreprise est en général considérée comme un objectif beaucoup trop vague pour avoir une valeur opérationnelle.

Deux questions peuvent néanmoins être posées : la firme a-t-elle réellement un objectif de survie ? Dans quelle limite cet objectif peut-il recevoir une formulation précise ?

a) L'objectif de survie

L'idée que l'entreprise mettra tout en oeuvre pour sa survie procède d'une assimilation de l'entreprise à l'esprit humain. L'homme n'acceptera pas que son oeuvre disparaisse. Cette conception correspond à une image traditionnelle, où l'entrepreneur individuel prend sa retraite en transmettant son entreprise à son successeur.

Dans une firme qui a diversifié ses activités, multiplié ses filiales, que signifie le terme de "pérénité" ? Recouvre-t-il la pérénité des postes de direction, de la forme d'activité, du capital investi par les actionnaires ? Les postes de direction sont occupés par des cadres, tout à fait remplaçables. Les formes d'activités peuvent être abandonnées dès qu'elles ne sont plus rentables. Seul le capital n'est pas censé disparaître. Mais la firme est alors réduite à un système de rémunération du capital, la manière dont elle réagira au progrès technique est ignorée.

S'il y a volonté constante de la firme, c'est celle d'assurer l'exploitation la meilleure et la plus durable de ses capacités particulières. Comment cette volonté peut-elle se traduire ?

c) Formulation de l'objectif à long terme de la firme

Une fois écartée l'idée de pérennité familiale de la firme, reste celle d'une utilisation à long terme du "savoir-faire" dont elle dispose et qui peut être, entre autres, une technique, une équipe de personnes formée à un type de gestion donné, des disponibilités financières instantanées... Cette nouvelle idée ne se fonde pas sur une conception de l'homme, mais sur la conviction de posséder un avantage de structure qui doit être exploité.

Elle suppose cependant une tension excessive des volontés, que la firme ne peut pas exiger. La préoccupation à long terme de l'entreprise sera donc l'utilisation des activités dans lesquelles elle sait posséder une capacité

particulière pour réaliser un profit¹ par l'évaluation des rapports entre les opportunités existantes et de ses moyens de placement.

2) L'optimisation des objectifs contradictoires

Les participants sont, à l'unanimité, d'accord sur la survie de l'entreprise. Mais, au-delà de ce consensus minimum et latent, les propriétaires s'efforcent de défendre la priorité de l'objectif d'efficacité économique tandis que les autres partenaires, essentiellement les salariés, réclament avant tout la satisfaction d'objectifs à caractère social².

Les différents participants de l'entreprise recherchent, en définitive, des satisfactions variables, voire contradictoires.

a) L'équilibre de la firme

L'équilibre de la firme peut être défini, comme un état tel qu'à un moment donné les antagonistes entre les divers participants ne compromettent pas sa survie. En d'autres termes, on est parvenu d'une part à obtenir une efficacité économique suffisante pour préserver la capacité concurrentielle de l'entreprise et d'autre part à satisfaire les revendications personnelles des différents groupes de participants.

L'atteinte d'un équilibre suppose que l'organisation assure à tous les membres des avantages afin d'obtenir d'eux, en contrepartie, des contributions.

L'entreprise sera donc équilibrée aussi longtemps que :

- les avantages paraîtront suffisants aux participants pour qu'ils continuent d'apporter leurs contributions à l'entreprise. L'avantage peut être considéré comme une sorte de rente. On peut, par exemple, considérer que les actionnaires d'une entreprise ne lui restent fidèle que tant qu'ils bénéficient d'un "slack de dividendes", ou encore que les dirigeants cherchent un "slack de liquidités" en plus du montant qu'ils jugent nécessaire à leur sécurité³.

Il se révèle donc logiquement impossible d'envisager un objectif unique (la maximisation de la rentabilité du capital investi), mais nécessaire de rechercher l'optimisation d'objectifs contradictoires.

La fonction objectifs de la firme est, en définitive, liée au degré de pouvoir et de contre-pouvoir de chaque groupe de participants ; elle est le résultat d'un perpétuel marchandage qui débouche sur des modifications opportunistes de l'équilibre entre avantages et contributions.

b) La fonction objectifs et les types d'entreprises

1 Les études sur les stratégies de l'entreprise s'emploient à dégager les méthodes permettant de faire apparaître la correspondance opportunités "savoir-faire" voir : I. Ansoff, Stratégie de développement de l'entreprise, Paris, Hommes et Techniques, 1968.

2 Sur l'efficacité sociale, voir : R. Lavernhe et J. Pierre, L'Efficacité sociale : une nouvelle stratégie des entreprises Toulouse, Editions E. Privat, 1977.

3 Cyert et March (op.cit.) ont introduit dans la théorie behavioriste la notion "d'organizational slack", difficilement traduisible en français mais que l'on peut définir comme l'excédent de récompenses effectivement reçues par les différentes parties prenantes sur ce qu'elles souhaitent pour rester dans l'entreprise.

Tirer partie de la fonction objectifs fondés sur le consensus (dosage d'économicité et d'équilibrage social) est évidemment plus aisé pour les moyennes entreprises. Proximité du centre de décision par rapport à la base, taille humaine, relations personnalisées... sont autant de facteurs qui permettent de comprendre que la plupart des expériences novatrices aient été réalisées par des entreprises de cette catégorie. Leurs avantages ont pour contrepartie deux handicaps liés aux problèmes de pérennité de ces entreprises : les aléas dans la succession du capital et dans la capacité des nouveaux dirigeants, une certaine fragilité due à la contradiction entre une politique de double lien formel et relationnel et l'éventualité de faillite.

Excellente pour les moyennes entreprises bien gérées, la fonction objectifs définie plus haut aggraverait peut-être les problèmes de celles qui ne le sont pas. C'est donc un défi qui leur est lancé, une invitation à surmonter certains blocages traditionnels et à s'organiser pour une pérennité productive.

Mais le problème essentiel est sans doute de concilier cette nouvelle organisation avec la logique de gestion des grandes entreprises. C'est dans ces dernières, en effet, que l'éloignement entre décision et exécution est le plus grand et que l'on tire le plus d'avantages concurrentiels de stratégies centralisées s'imposant sans délai aux unités d'exploitation. Plus le groupe acquiert des dimensions et une complexité croissantes, plus il devient difficile de communiquer et de négocier sur tous les fronts pour maintenir un minimum de consensus

3) La dynamique du consensus

L'entreprise survit et même se développe lorsque, à la suite de négociations, les participants parviennent à un consensus¹. Un consensus n'est pourtant jamais définitif. Il sera périodiquement remis en cause par tel ou tel partenaire qui, estimant le rapport de forces favorable, essaiera d'optimiser ses propres satisfactions.

La notion d'équilibre stationnaire doit donc être remplacée par celle d'équilibres successifs. La fonction objectifs, c'est-à-dire les projets essentiels que l'entreprise veut réaliser dans un horizon stratégique donné, reflétant assez bien la répartition des pouvoirs au sein de la firme, est en effet en perpétuelle évolution.

Dans la fonction objectifs classique, tout est certain et défini mais rien n'est totalement vrai. La fonction objectifs de l'entreprise doit être déterminée et formulée de façon réaliste. Le postulat fondamental est que la firme constitue une organisation, c'est-à-dire un rassemblement structuré de participants internes et externes qui poursuivent des objectifs égoïstes et cherchent dans la firme le moyen de les atteindre aisément. La présence de composants divers,

¹ Sur le climat social dans l'entreprise, voir surtout : J. Pench-Lestrade, Vers un consensus social, Revue Française de Gestion, N 12-13, 1977 ; O. Gelinier, Une nouvelle stratégie sociale de l'entreprise, Revue Française de Gestion, 1976 ; H. Mintzberg, Structure et dynamique des organisations, Paris, Editions d'organisation, 1980, Y. Rajaud, L'appropriation psychologique de la stratégie, Revue Française de Gestion, 1984.

conduit nécessairement à une confrontation d'intérêts le plus souvent contradictoires. La volonté de l'entreprise ne peut être que la résultante de cette confrontation. La fonction objectifs doit traduire le souci de satisfaire les aspirations opposées. Les processus d'affrontements et de négociations permettent la survie de l'organisation en conduisant à un compromis. Mais celui-ci, influencé par l'expérience acquise et les schémas de pensée des participants, se trouve perpétuellement remise en question.

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Coping with the effects of the 1982-83 drought in Ghana The view from the village

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RÉSUMÉ. Le présent article étudie les réactions d'une communauté rurale ghanéenne face aux effets de la sécheresse de 1982-83 sur l'économie locale. L'auteur a amplement puisé dans la période de 1982-83 pour documenter sa recherche sur les différents mécanismes mis en place par les agriculteurs de la ville d'Ayirebi, près d'Akyem Oda dans l'Est du Ghana pour faire face à ces effets. L'article souligne les facteurs qui ont permis aux populations de contrer les effets de la sécheresse sur l'économie nationale; il s'agit notamment de la souplesse de l'économie de subsistance, du développement des activités de cueillette et de chasse et de la solidité des relations sociales qui prévalent entre les membres de la communauté d'une part et entre la communauté et les groupes voisins d'autre part. Cette étude met en lumière le retour à l'exploitation des ressources forestières considérée comme une stratégie de lutte importante.

Introduction: The crisis within the Ghanaian National Economy

Ghana has been described as an economic basket case due to the magnitude of her national problems¹. Indeed, part of the country's problems can be attributed to such internal problems as political instability over the past two decades, corruption, mismanagement and smuggling. To a great extent, however, the prolonged crises within the economy can be blamed on the nature of the country's articulation with the world capitalist economy. The chronic problems of import-export deficit, acute foreign exchange, rising national debts and a decline in over-all production, are both directly and indirectly linked to the unfavorable terms of international trade and division of labour.

As far as the period between 1982-83 is concerned, the fundamental economic problem that faced the nation and in fact most Third World countries was the lack of customers for their products following the decline in economic activity in the industrialized countries. To a great extent, the major contributory factor underlying the world recession was the massive increases in OPEC oil prices, particularly in late 1979, which initially redirected available funds into paying for oil instead of paying for durable consumer goods. It was also increases in oil prices that helped raise inflation levels worldwide. In their attempts to curb this rise, major industrial countries such as the United States

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¹ See 'Globe and Mail' (a Canadian national newspaper) issue of March 17, 1983 p. S8. See also Barker (1984: 11-31; 1985: 59) for similar observations of other countries in tropical Africa.

and Britain raised interest rates. The chain reaction was felt all over the world, and had tremendous impact on the developing countries.

In Ghana, the fall in the demand for most of the country's products, particularly cocoa, coupled with the declining world prices, meant that the nation was unable to pay for the products and industrial raw materials of the developed world. In a country dependent upon foreign imports, the effects of the global recession have had serious repercussions on national economic development.

In early 1983, the sudden expulsion of over 1.2 million ghanaians from Nigeria added to Ghana's problems. The impact of this massive and sudden influx of people on a country whose economy was already in a crisis was severe. Food and other basic requirements needed to rehabilitate the returnees were not readily available¹ (see also Brydon 1985).

Nature, also, did indeed exacerbate the ghanaiian economic crisis with the worst drought in 48 years, which resulted in "... a devastation of farm lands, and a fall in the water level at the Akosombo dam to the extent that [beginning in late 1983] electricity supply has had to be rationed' (see Ugochukwu 1984: 9). The stark reality of the persistent poor rainfall recorded in the country's history during this period can be measured by the fact that the dam lost nearly two-thirds of its water supply, hindering the hydroelectric generators that supply 65 per cent of the power for Ghana, Benin, and Upper Volta². The drought of 1982-83 was the severest in a hundred years, and was preceded by a ten-year drought period. The general water scarcity forced people in towns

1 For example, it was estimated that the nation's cereal needs between January and the next harvest in August/September, 1983, stood at approximately 400,000 tonnes prior to the arrival of the deportees. Their sudden presence in the country in February-March, 1983, raised this requirement by 100,000 tonnes (see Bentsi-Enchill 1983: 463). Although international and local responses to the crisis were remarkable, the problems of limited storage capacity, transportation, and distribution served to hinder achievement of the desired full benefits for the suffering population.

2 In 1983, it was established that the Volta Lake averaged 3 metres below the minimum 87 m operating level needed for the hydroelectric station at Akosombo. Power supply for most parts of the country during the last quarter of the year had to be cut 40 per cent.

and villages to walk long distances in search of good drinking water. Even more devastating was the extremely low humidity figures that stayed below ten per cent during the prolonged dry season, and reaching as far south as the coastal areas of the country. Thus, 1982-83 has been recorded as the period during which the country witnessed one of the severest harmattan in its history.

The prolonged drought (August, 1982 - May, 1983) and the lengthy and unusually strong spell of harmattan dryness encouraged a series of bush fires that swept across the country, destroying field crops such as plaintains, yams, cocoyams, and cassava, as well as cocoa farms¹. The extent of the damage caused by the bush fires has not been accurately assessed. National dailies throughout 1983 (and in fact, 1984) continued to carry numerous reports of raging bush fires that had caused extensive damage and destruction to property, farmlands, and human life across the length and breadth of the country². One rough estimate is that hundreds of thousands of hectares (out of a total of 1.8 million hectares of cultivated land) had been affected by bush fires (see Doyle 1983: 821). Another unofficial estimate asserted that about 40 per cent of Ghana's food and cash crop output had been devastated; and, specifically for cocoa, the figure was put at over 300,000 acres of farmland destroyed³.

ii. Manifestation of the National Stress Conditions at the Rural Village Level

The national conditions were reflected at the Ayirebi rural level to a degree. Ayirebi is a food farming forest community of about 4,300 people⁴ in the Eastern region of Ghana, about 45 kilometres from the major urban centre of Akyem Oda, and nearly 180 kilometres north of the Ghanaian capital, Accra. The town occupies an area of approximately one and three-quarter

1 Others have also pointed to the practice of indiscriminate bush burning by traditional farmers preparing for the planting season; and also to the activities of palmwine tappers and, particularly, hunters who set fire to forest every year in order to hunt giant rats, porcupine, and other rodents for food. Certain individuals too, have attributed the bush fires to the work of "anti-revolutionaries" who, it is alleged, were bent on sabotaging the Ghanaian revolution, hoping that the resulting economic hardships will cause disaffection among the population and lead to the downfall of the PNDC government. The truth of the matter, however, is that the incidence of bush fires accelerated in the country due to the environmental stresses of drought and the harmattan. During this period of extreme dryness, the traditional use of fire whether to clear land or hunt led to widespread burning.

2 See 'Ghanaian Times, (a Ghanaian national daily newspaper, Accra, issue of February 23, 1984, p. 4 for a catalogue of the most devastating facts on the bush fires.

3 See "Ghana: Crisis Hardly Begun", *West Africa*, April 25, 1984, p. 985; and also *Ghana News*, 12 (7): 9. (A news bulletin issued monthly by the Ghanaian High Commission in Ottawa, Canada).

4 This figure is based on projections of Ghana's population growth for the 1980's from the 1970 census data of 3,450 for the Ayirebi town (see Central Bureau of Statistics, Census Office Report, 1982, available at the Institute of Scientific, Social, and Economic Research, Legon). It should be mentioned that the official report of a late 1984 population census carried out in the country is not yet available to this researcher.

square kilometres, and its inhabitants are predominantly Twi-speaking, belonging to the Akan sub-group known as the Akyem.

In 1982-83, the people of Ayirebi experienced their share of the national economic and environmental stresses, which had repercussions on the nature of their contemporary subsistence adaptation. In the past, rainfall in this community had averaged over 1,650 mm annually. In the 1980's, however, there has been a gradual decline in the amount of rainfall. In 1982-83, the town recorded its poorest rainfall ever as reflected both in the total amounts and number of days of rainfall. Between October 1982 and September 1983, for example, the total annual rainfall had dropped from the 1970's¹ average of 1,686 mm to 933 mm. A careful study of the local rainfall data reveals that despite the reduction of the amount of rainfall in 1982-83, rainfed cultivation was not severely hampered. There was an appreciable amount of rainfall in the crucial food-planting months of April through June and between September and October. However, because of the overall reduction in the amount of rainfall and its erratic distribution, water supply for household use and consumption was reduced, particularly in the dry months of November to March. During these months, local streams and rivulets dried up forcing the inhabitants into extensive search for good drinking water. The fear of unclean drinking water causing Guinea worms and other intestinal diseases was prevalent in the community.

The harmattan of this period also affected the local farming. Some farmers had difficulty in getting the agricultural season started. The chilly mornings of January and February not only made an early rise from bed difficult, it also affected the farmers' ability to clear the forest. Because the afternoons were extremely hot and dry, farmers were again restricted in the farming activities particularly when the hot conditions extended through the months of February to April, the period of intense farming activities. Mean monthly maximum and minimum temperatures were 31.4c and 22c respectively, and relative humidity dropped from 95 to 61 per cent.

Although there has been an occasional incidence of bush fires in the past due to the activities of hunters and palm wine tappers, the picture in the dry months of 1983 was by far the worst in the town's recorded history. For example, in 1981 the records of the Town Development Committee show that six farmers reported a total of 7.5 hectares of farmland either partially or fully destroyed by bush fires. But in 1982, twelve farmers (six of them in december alone) reported a total of 21 hectares burned, and 59 hectares were recorded among thirty-four farmers between January and May, 1983². The breakdown of the 1983 figures is as follows: i) in January, six farmers reported an

1 See Ghana Meteorological Services, Annual Rainfall Reports, Headquarters, Accra.

2 Although it is possible that a few farmers might have failed to report the incidence of bush fires to the Town Development Committee, these are more likely to be those who suffered minimally. The incidence of bush fires became a major public concern, and gossip in the community was such that major disasters would have all come to this reseracher's attention.

estimated total of 8 hectares as partially or fully destroyed by bush fires; ii) February, seven farmers reported 17 hectares; iii) in March, nine farmers reported 25 hectares; iv) In April, seven farmers, 7 hectares; and finally v), in May, five farmers, 2 hectares. Among the food and cash crops destroyed by the fire were cocoyams, cassava, plantains, cocoa, and oil palm. The figure of 59 hectares for 1983 is out of an estimated total of about 450 hectares of cultivated land in Ayirebi.

There was also the stress on the local food economy during this period with the return of 298 Ayirebi town residents who had been deported from Nigeria in the early months of 1983¹. As far as the rural socioeconomic life is concerned, the attendant consequences of the crisis in the national economy arising from the global recession were manifested in the areas of transportation and fuel and in the provision of basic medicines, as well as in the failure of the government to provide certain essential socioeconomic services to the people. The government's decision in the 1983 budget to increase the price of petrol resulted in the tripling of the transportation fare from the town to the nearest urban centre, Akyem Oda. This increase from the pre-budget fare of cedi 5 to cedi 15² also resulted in a series of price hikes for basic goods and services in the community. Not only did the prices of basic food items on the local market go up, but so did the cost of hired seasonal or wage labor on the farms³. When the total research study sample of 412 household heads⁴ were asked to identify the single most essential group of basic items they missed most as a result of the national economic depression, their responses were: i) Fuel - kerosene, batteries, and matches (104 household heads, 25.2%); ii) Textile and clothing - children's school outfit, wax prints (99 household heads; 24%); iii) Stationery and toiletries - soap, school textbooks, pens, pencils, and writing paper (91, 22.1%); iv) Building materials - cement, tin roofing sheets (63, 15.3%); v) Medicines, (30, 7.3%); vi) Farming tools (21, 5.1%); and finally, miscellaneous items, such as sugar and milk (4,1%).

In specific reference to imported food items, most household heads expressed the view that although they miss these items they can do without them permanently if they are compelled to. It should be pointed out here that

1 Out of this figure of 298 returnees, 210 were males and 88 females. Their ages ranged from a three month old baby to a forty nine year old adult. The period between January and April, 1983, saw 217 of the returnees resettling in the village, and between May and October, 1983, an additional 81 people arrived.

2 During the research period, the exchange rate of the local currency, cedi, to the U.S. dollar was cedi 2.75 to US \$ 1.

3 Prior to 1980, a hired farm labourer was paid roughly cedi 4 a day. In 1982, it had risen to between cedi 30 - cedi 40, and after the national budget of April, 1983, the wage had doubled to between cedi 70 - cedi 100 a day when the national inflation rate was over 350%.

4 The household as used in this research refers to a group of people usually (but not necessarily) living in a house or compound who have a common food supply, pool their incomes for common support and who regularly use and share the contents of a cooking pot. [For the kin composition of the household, see Dei 1986].

the taste for imported foreign foods (milk and milk products, tinned meat and fish, beverages, cooking fat, flour, oats, and sugar) have been acquired by individuals in the community ever since the penetration of the cash economy into the rural sector in pre-colonial times. When compared to locally produced foods, the contribution of these foreign foods appears to be relatively small; but what is relevant to note is that local diet in previous years reflected varying degrees of acculturation to external influences. In the prevailing national economic situation, these foreign foods have been remarkably absent from the local stores, shops, and market. In view of the prevailing economic and environmental stresses, one would expect that the ability of some farming households to produce enough foodstuffs to feed themselves and to meet the subsistence requirements of parasitic urban population would be impaired. It is necessary therefore to investigate the Ayrebi households' methods of coping with or surviving these stresses, focusing on drought coping mechanisms.

As the national economy collapsed around them, the people of Ayireby survived and flourished. The success of their village adaptation can be attributed to such factors as: the resilience and adaptability of the peasant economy; the people's ability to supplement agricultural production with wild food resources from the forest; and, the rebuilding and maintaining of strong social relations among village members (i.e., the importance of kinbased institutions of sharing, reciprocity, and other redistributive mechanisms in the community - see Dei 1986). The examination of the specific drought coping mechanisms or strategies shows that the exploitation of forest resources in particular was a popular economic activity among the village households during stress period.

Drought coping mechanisms

Expansion of Collecting Activity:

During the research period, Ayirebi households were observed to have reverted to traditional dietary patterns. In the process, the surrounding environment was heavily exploited to supply almost all the daily subsistence requirements of the average household. The ability to fall back on wild forest products is an important asset of the rural community. Women, the aged, children, and young adults of both sexes are generally responsible for the gathering of wild products, while adult males hunt and trap game (see Scudder 1971).

Some of the aged expressed profound knowledge of the numerous plants and animals which have been collected during the course of the town's history to be used either as food, beverages, condiments, or for medicinal purposes. It was observed that some of these forest plants and animals were still being exploited for similar purposes today. They include both edible and non-edible wild products such as roots, fibres, leaves, bark, fruits, seeds, nuts, insects, molluscs, honey, sap, and syrup. Honey collection is on a noticeable scale in this community. Other collected wild forest products were snails, crabs, mushrooms, and kola nuts (see Appendix 1, and also Dei 1986, 1988).

Of the various wild foods exploited bush animal protein is the most highly valued. Although as a result of deforestation, wildlife is said to be less plentiful now than in former times, game is not rare in the diet of the average household. Within the community, hunting and trapping activities are conducted mainly for food, and bush meat accounts for a substantial portion of all animal protein consumed in households. Generally, most game animals are available in the dry months of December through March when the bush is being prepared for cultivation. However, hunting and trapping by farmers and professional hunters, assumes special significance during the lean season (i.e., between May and August). The chief prey among the hunting and trapping population are grasscutter, "akrantee", (*Thymomys swinderianus*) (which can yield as much as four kilos of smoked meat per animal), giant rat, "okisi" (*Crietomys gambianus*), antelope "adowa", (*Neotragus pygamaeus*), and the brush-tailed porcupine "apese", (*Atherurus africanus*). All of these are rapidly renewable protein unlike most of the big game (see Posnansky 1980: 2149).

Financial and logistical constraints did not permit an accurate assessment of the amount of bush animal protein consumed in domestic households. However, rough estimates indicate that every household adult consumes not less than 250 grams of bush animal protein per week. Together with other animal products such as crabs, snails, and oil palm grubs, bush animal protein constitutes an important substitute for fish and beef in the household diet. Occasionally, households may depend on small amounts of poultry and livestock (sheep and goats) slaughtered for ritual purposes for protein in their diets. On the whole, the presence of a large number and variety of cultivated, wild, and semi-domesticated food plants and animals serve to produce a more varied and nutritious diet for the rural households than is available to their urban counterparts.

Experimentation with Marginal Varieties of Plants:

Four new varieties of plants were observed to be experimented upon for cultivation purposes. The plants were: i) *Dioscorea praehensilis* (bush or forest yam) a root crop locally referred to as "ahabayere" and normally classified as a semi-domesticated yam; ii) *Azelia bella*, a wild plant whose leaves are used as vegetables in soup making, and referred to locally as "papaonua"; iii) *Napoleona vogelii*, known as "obua" whose fruits are eaten as a delicacy; and iv) *Blighia welwitschii* known locally as "akyekobiri" whose leaves are also used to flavor soup.

Diversification of Crops or Mixed Cropping, and Planting of Drought Resistant Crops:

It was also observed that farm plots that normally were cultivated with a sole foodcrop (e.g., yams) were now being planted with multiple crops at the same time. Such farming strategy not only provided safeguards against crop failure, but also, was ecologically sound for the prevention of soil erosion. Also, more and more farming households turned their attention to the planting of drought-resistant crops such as cassava and cocoyam.

Table 1 summarizes the farming activities and food supplies in Ayireby households in relation to the seasons. As part of the indigenous safeguards against food scarcity and prolonged hunger periods, the farmers have devised additional growing seasons for the major staple crops of maize, cassava, and cocoyam. In the case of maize, there is a main planting season in April with crop reaching maturity in August and, a second crop planted in early September to be harvested in March of the farming year. Such steps are aimed at extending household food supply with the different harvest periods.

iv. Additional Processing of the Food Crops:

During this stress period, cassava and cocoyam in particular assumed additional importance in the local economy as valuable reserve crops and as reliable year-round source of calories. By their ability to increase the caloric yield and extend the harvest season, both crops served to lessen the full impact of the lean season on most households (see also Annegers 1973: 256). Equally significant is the fact that some households were observed to have devised additional processing methods for the two crops to make them edible irrespective of their natural state. For example, the skins of cocoyams which under favourable conditions would be discarded were dried and later milled into a flour before being prepared at extremely hot temperatures for consumption. Other food processing strategies included the making of a local soap from the mixture of oil palm and wood ash, and also finding natural substitutes for sugar in honey (nectar).

v. Population dispersion:

Population dispersion to relieve pressure on scarce resources took several forms. Some migrants from Northern Ghana employed in the Ayirebi community as wage labourers went back to their homeland when their services were not needed during the stress period. Also, a few local farmers migrated into the forest to live in their village huts set up close to their cultivated farmlands. A few individuals went to reside for a while with close relatives in other villages where conditions were perceived to be more favourable.

vi. Expansion of village Exchange Networks:

Exchange networks both at the individual household and the wider community levels intensified during the research period, as people purchased or traded crafts and other procured food items with neighbouring groups, communities and households. As certain redistributive mechanisms in the community intensified in their operation through the community ethic of sharing, gift giving and reciprocity, some households used up their stored resources of food and money to combat the economic and ecological hardships they were confronted with.

Table 1: Seasonal economic cycle of Ayirebi¹

Period	Ecological Conditions	Productive (farming activity)	Food Cycle (Food supply)
A. January/March	<u>Main dry season</u> Harmattan characterize by a dry parching land wind ching land wind	Beginning of the agricultural season preparation of fields, cutting, burning & tilling of farm land of farm land	Farm food supplies partially available from previous harvest season. Cassava and Cocoyams that were left in the fields may be harvested at this time. A Second maize crop planted in early September is harvested in Feb./March
B. April/June	<u>Main rainy season</u> season with peak of rains in June in June	Farming activities continue with the sowing of seeds & crops at the onset of the first rains	With planting; food supplies in some households may be near exhaustion. This causes episodic food shortages beginning in late May. The relatively bean season for cultivated food-stuffs continues to August, resulting in a marked dependence on forest plants and game. Early maize pay be ready for harvest towards the end of August & helps to alleviate food shortage. Individuals may also make arts & crafts to obtain additional income for food purchases (from the relatively better-off farmers) at the local market.
C. July/August	<u>Preharvest season</u> Season Low rainfall in July-August and a second rainy season in Sept.-October	Farm labour increases including weeding of fields and tending to crops begins, thus increasing the expenditures of labour on the season in farms.	
D. Oct./December	<u>Main harvest season</u> Rains that began in Sept. continue into Oct.. However Nov. sees the beginning of the main dry season, continuing through December-March	Oct.-Nov. is a period of intense harvesting of foodstuffs, while the second half of the season is a period of leisure from farm work. Social gatherings and other community festivities peak. Crafts and the collection of some forest products are undertaken but their contribution to household Income and food supply is not particularly significant.	A season of relative plenty and abundance of food supplies for the community at large. The harvest permits the lavish consumption of food that accompanies the celebration of socio-religious activities. Brisk market activity as "Bedford" articulator trucks converge on the town to cart food-stuffs away to urban centers.

¹ See also Hunter (1967) and Fortes (1936).

vii. *Other.*

Generally, the emphasis was on communal rather than individual recoupment efforts. Additional communal responses to the stress on the local food situation arising from the drought and other ecological crises included: landlords and other wealthy creditors granting cash loans to affected farming households; remittances and welfare received from relatives living in other areas¹, establishment of a series of communal farms; formation of labour partnerships (that helped each other in farming duties); pooling of capital for joint ventures among some farmers; and finally, the resurrection of the village co-operative.

Discussion

This study shows that the adaptive responses of the Ayirebi farming community to drought are influenced by a set of indigenous and exogenous factors. Economic strategies involving multiple resource exploitation, alterations in established dietary patterns, and intensification of other economic or occupational activities (e.g., trade and exchange) helped households cope with the hardships associated with the impact of drought on a village economy.

A noted feature of the Ayirebi food economy is the ecology of local crop production, i.e., the production and consumption of specific ecologically-suited food crops. The increased importance of cassava and cocoyams in the research community during the stress period can be attributed to a number of factors, some of which have already been pointed out. Both crops are relatively easy and inexpensive to produce, and they serve as reliable year-round sources of calories. They grow and yield well on relatively low fertility soils. They also store well underground on farm plots. With their ability to extend the harvest season, cocoyams and cassava are largely seen as famine reserve crops. The tubers can lie dormant for several years, and, particularly cocoyams can be gathered from fallow fields, as well as springing up (naturally) underneath burnt cocoa farms. Cassava, too, can be processed into a variety of staple foods. All of the above helped make these two crops the most common staple foods in the community. Together with maize, these crops among the local

¹ The specific nature of the contribution and/or remittances of the non-resident relatives to their rural kin usually takes the following forms: i) clothing - (including footwear, textiles, as well as new and used clothes); ii) money - (remittances to help kinsmen in their farm work or as kin contribution towards a family house, funeral celebration or maintenance); iii) food and health drugs - medicine, or provisions such as sugar, milk, and other imported consumer goods that may be available in the urban centres). Cash remittances, in particular, are crucial in the household farming economy because the cash so obtained can be used to hire seasonal or casual wage labourers on the farms. Most of the wage earners living outside the community, in order to make sure that their future food requests to rural kinsmen will be heeded try to remit some money to the farmers at the onset of the farming season, and also, during the harvest season. Other wage earners also provide some of their income to their rural kinsmen so that the latter can employ farm labourers to set up local farms on behalf of the urban workers.

staples were valuable in helping to minimize the full impact of the economic and ecological stresses on most Ayirebi households.

Most households were observed to alter their dietary patterns in response to changing economic and ecological conditions. When favourite or preferred foods were scarce, people tended to eat whatever was more readily available (Atsu 1984: 10). Where a farming household's food supplies were adversely affected by the drought, other avenues were open for action: the household could turn to the wild forest for supplements; make purchases from the local market; obtain additional supplies from kin relatives and friends; and/or make certain changes in the household diet to emphasize other home grown crops that are drought resistant. Also, periodic shortage or scarcity of economic goods stimulated trade and exchange as was evident by the intensive economic ties both within the community and between it and other surrounding communities.

This paper is perhaps relevant not only for the data on how the research community responds to stress, but also, for the light it may throw on past adaptations and thereby help us to interpret cultural history. The research information is probably useful in the quest for more substantive findings concerning the regularities in the relationships between environment, subsistence, and society. And, such studies of sequences of human-culture-environment relations in special economic contexts can provide us with knowledge about human adaptational options which may help illuminate the past.

Before concluding this discussion, I would like to suggest a few possible areas for future study. The Ayirebi community is not unique (see Posnansky 1980, 1984). However, the nature of the contemporary adaptation of rural communities, especially in tropical Africa, in the face of adversity remains to be demonstrated through further comparative studies of other regions. Our current ecological knowledge on tropical ecosystems and how they respond to stress is limited. There is the need to expand research for more detailed ecologically sound information on constraints to development (see Timberlake 1986). This will require the use of ecological concepts, principles and ideas to examine human activities, and to determine ways by which local populations can best meet their needs from their ecosystems (deshmukh 1987, NRC 1982).

The implications and relevance of such studies in helping to formulate a comprehensive program of self-reliance as an alternative development strategy cannot be overemphasized. As Feachem (1977: 9-10) long pointed out micro-level studies focusing on socio-environmental problems and how people respond to them are relevant for economic development in tropical Africa. Where possible, research data must be secured on the processes of adaptive solutions to the many and varied problems of fulfilling human needs and objectives within similar and dissimilar environments. The research may cover an analysis of contemporary variation and contrast in adaptive strategies, and

how such variation correlates with environmental, economic, social or political factors.

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APPENDIX I

List of Wild and Semi-domesticated Food Plants and Animals Exploited in the Ayirebi Community*

A. Food Plants:¹

Class of food	Scientific name	Local name	Consumption
1. Roots, Stems, (including bark, young shoots, gum, and pith)	<i>Calamus deeratus</i>	mfia	Buds eaten either raw or cooked as vegetables
	<i>Cocus nucifera</i>	kube	"
	<i>Dioscorea praehensilis</i>	ahabayere	Bush or forest yam cooked before eaten <i>Elaeis guineensis</i> abe Buds eaten raw or cooked as vegetables. Has a mucilaginous bark which is widely used in making soup.
Leaves	<i>Grewia mollis</i> kyapotoro		
	<i>manihot esculenta</i>	bankye	Roots eaten either raw or cooked
	<i>Afzelia bella</i>	papaonua	Leaves used as vegetables in soup
	<i>Albizia zygia</i>	okro	Leaves cooked and used in stew making
	<i>Blighia sapida</i> akye		Provides edible oil.
	<i>Bombax buonopozense</i>	akonkodie	Leaves eaten as vegetable
	<i>Carica papaya</i>	brofre	Contains sweet juice
	<i>Carissa edulis</i>	akokobesa	Leaves used in making soup & flavoring
	<i>Ceiba petandra</i>	onyina	Calyxes are mucilaginous and are eaten as part of soup or sauce. Also provides nectar
	<i>Chlorophora excelsa</i>	odum	Leaves occasionally eaten
	<i>Colocasia esculenta</i>	kontomire	Leaves served as vegetables
	<i>Manihot esculenta</i>	bankye	Leaves cooked and eaten
		ahaban	
	<i>Myrianthus arboreus</i>	nyankuma	Leaves for soup
	<i>Myrianthus libericus</i>	nyankumanini	"
<i>Sterculia tragacantha</i>	sofo	"	
3. Fruits and seeds	<i>afzelia bella</i> papaonua		Seeds are eaten
	<i>Blighia sapida</i> akye		Seeds provide edible oil
	<i>Blighia unijugatus</i>	akyebiri	Seeds also provide nectar
	<i>Bombax buonopozense</i>	akonkodie	Fruits eaten
	<i>Ceiba petandra</i>	onyina	Young fruits contain nectar
	<i>Chrysophyllum albidum</i>	adosoa	Pulp is eaten fresh.
	<i>Chrysophyllum perpulchrum</i>		atabene "
	<i>Cocus nucifera</i>	kube	Seeds eaten for nectar. A milk substitute (beverage) & also used as spice or condiment
	<i>Cola gigantea</i>	watapuo	Seeds/fruit eaten

¹ See also Irvine (1961)

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	<i>Cola lateritia</i>	watapuobene	"
	<i>Cola nitida</i>	bese	Seeds eaten as a stimulant
	<i>Dialium guineensis</i>	asенаа	Pulp of fruit may be eaten fresh. Also served as a sweet beverage
	<i>Diospyros heudelotii</i>	omenawabene	Fruits/seeds eaten
	<i>Diospyros kamerunensis</i>	omenewa	"
	<i>Drypetes gilgiana</i>	adwea/katrikanini	"
	<i>Elaeis guineensis</i>	abe	Pericarp and kernel provide oil
	<i>Euclina longiflora</i>	gyaneya	Fruits eaten
	<i>Klainedoxa gabonensis</i>	kroma	Seeds eaten as condiment
	<i>Landolphia owariensis</i>	abontere	Fruit eaten
	<i>Lannea welwitschii</i>	kumanini	"
	<i>Monodora tenuifolia</i>	motokuradua	"
	<i>Myrianthus arboreus</i>	nyankuma	Served as beverage
	<i>Myrianthus libericus</i>	nyankumanini*	"
	<i>Napoleonaea vogelii</i>	obua	Fruits eaten
	<i>Raphia hookeri</i>	adobe	Fruits eaten occasionally, Pericarp and kernel provide oil
	<i>Sterculia tenuifolia</i>	ohaa	Seeds eaten
	<i>Vitex micrantha</i>	otwentorowanini	Fruits eaten
4. Local Drink/ Beverage	<i>Bombax buonopezense</i>	akonkodie	Fruit - a sweet beverage
	<i>Chrysophyllum albidum</i>	adosoa	Pulp eaten fresh or raw
	<i>Cleistopholis patens</i>	ngonenkyene	Water-substitute
	<i>Cnestis ferruginea</i>	apoose	"
	<i>Cocos nificera</i>	kube	Serves as a sweet beverage, milk-substitute (coconut milk) also used as stimulant
	<i>Dialium guineensis</i>	asенаа	Fruit drink. Pulp eaten as sweet beverage and stimulant
	<i>Elaeis guineensis</i>	abe	Palm wine
	<i>Landolphia owariensis</i>	abontere	A fermented drink
	<i>Myrianthus arboreus</i>	nyankuma	Sweet beverage
	<i>Raphia hookeri</i>	adobe	An alcoholic beverage; can be used together with bitters as a stimulant
	<i>Rothmannia whitfeldi</i>	sabode	Charred fruits used as stimulant in alcoholic beverage
	<i>Tetrapleur tetraptera</i>	prekese	Serve as stimulant. Also used in soups
5. Condiments, spices and flavor	<i>Blighia welwitschii</i>	akyekobiri	Leaves used to flavor soup
	<i>Bussea occidentalis</i>	kotoprepre	Flavoring agent
	<i>Carrisa edulis akokobesa</i>		Leaves used as flavoring agent in soup
	<i>Ceiba pentandra</i>	onyina	Leaves, seeds - condiment or spice
	<i>Klainedoxa gabonensis</i>	kroma	Seeds also provide fats and oil
	<i>Monodora myristics</i>	wedeaba	Used as flavor in soup as well as pomade for hair
	<i>Raphia hookeri</i>	adobe	Pericarp serves as bitter flavoring
	<i>Sterculia rhinopetala</i>	wawabima	Condiment/spice
	<i>Tetrapleura tetraptera</i>	prekese	Fruits as flavor in soup.

B. Forest Animals Exploited as Game:¹

Series	Scientific name	Local name	Comment
I. Mammals			
A. Primata			
1. Mona monkey	<i>Cercopithecus mona</i>	okwakuo	
B. Carnivora			
1. Dwarf mongoose	<i>Herpestes sanguineus</i>	kokobo	
2. Marsh mongoose	<i>Atilax paludinosus</i>	odompo	
C. Rodentia			
1. Crested porcupine	<i>Hystrix</i> spp.	kotoko	
2. Brush-tailed porcupine	<i>Atherurus africanus</i>	apese	
3 Ground Squirrels	<i>Xerus</i> spp	amoakua	
4. Giant rat (Pouched rat)	<i>Cricetomys gambianus</i>	okisi	
5. Grasscutter	<i>Thryonomys swinderianus</i>	akrantee	
D. Artiodacyla			
1. Roan antelope	<i>Hippotragus equinus</i>	okoo	
2. Giant forest hog	<i>Hylochoerus meinertzhageni</i>	ebie	
3. Bushbuk	<i>Tragelaphus scriptus</i>	owansan	
4. Kob	<i>Kobus kob</i>	ofrotie	
5. Royal antelope	<i>Neotragus pygamaeus</i>	adowa	
6. Yellow-backed duiker	<i>Cephalophus silvicultor</i>	okwanduo	
7. Blake duiker	<i>Cephalophus niger</i>	ewio	
8. Bay duiker	<i>Cephalophus dorsalis</i>	odabo	
9. Maxwell duiker	<i>Cephalophus maxwelli</i>	otwe	
10. Grey duiker	<i>Sylvicapra grimmia</i>	saratwe	
E. Hydracoidea			
1. Grey bear	<i>Dendrohyrax arboreus</i>	owea	
F. Lagomorpha			
1. Togo hare	<i>Lepus capensis</i>	adanko	now mostly domesticated

¹ See Department of Game and Wild Life Bulletin, Act 1962. Accra, Ghana.

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Series	Scientific name	Local name	Comment
II. Reptiles			
<i>A. Lacertilla</i>			
1. Nile monitor	<i>Veranus niloticus</i>	Omampam	
2. Bosc's monitor	<i>Veranus exantheticus</i>	omampamtia	
<i>B. Chelonia</i>			
1. Bell's hinged tortoise	<i>Kinixys belliana</i>	akyekyere	May be found domesticated in some homes
2. Common hinged tortoise	<i>Kinixys spp</i>	akyekyere	
III. Birds			
<i>A. Psittacidae</i>			
1. All parrots		akoo/ekoo	Were commonly exploited in the past. A few are domesticated now
<i>B. Phasianidae</i>			
1. Bush fowl	<i>Francolinus Spp</i>	Akokohwedee	
2. Guinea fowl	<i>Numida meleagris</i>	Guthera akomfem	
<i>C: Columbidae</i>			
1. Doves and pigeons		aburoburo	Scarce now but were commonly hunted in the past
<i>D. Ploceidae</i>			
1. Mannikins, bishop birds, fire finches, whydah, canaries		akasonoma	Scarce today

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