

AFRIQUE ET DEVELOPPEMENT

AFRICA DEVELOPMENT

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COUNCIL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC AND
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CONSEIL POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA RECHERCHE
ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE EN AFRIQUE

Address - Adresse :

B.P. 3304

Rue F angle Léon G. Damas

Fann-Résidence,

Dakar/SENEGAL

Phone N° - N° Tél. :

23.02.11

Telex N° - N° Téléx :

3339 CODES SG

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AFRICA DEVELOPMENT AFRIQUE & DEVELOPPEMENT

**A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THE COUNCIL
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SOCIAL RESEARCH IN AFRICA**

**REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DU CONSEIL POUR
LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA RECHERCHE
ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE EN AFRIQUE**

Vol. XI, No.4, 1986

Editor
Zenebeworke Tadesse
(C.O.D.E.S.R.I.A.)

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NEW FROM THE CODESRIA BOOK SERIES

THE STATE AND THE WORKING PEOPLE IN TANZANIA

*Issa G. Shivji (Ed.)
(London, 1986)*

The book is the outcome of a National Working Group in Tanzania under the auspices of CODESRIA. The focus is on elucidating relations between the state and the working people in post-independence Tanzania. In addition to a powerful introduction by Issa Shivji, the rest of the six chapters tackle the parliament and the Electoral Process, the Party, Labour Legislation, the State and peasantry, cooperative societies and marketing boards and student struggles. As a recent review indicated...

to try and analyse the crisis in Africa is by no means an easy task. But what makes the present work even more interesting is that it focuses attention on Tanzania. As Issa Shivji puts it, "The Tanzanian state is among the few in Africa which has hitherto managed to sustain a liberal image while at the same time establish a virtual organizational hegemony over its working people and popular classes. **How did Tanzania achieve this enviable record?** This is one of the questions which this collection of essays seeks to answer.

On the whole the book makes a **very valid contribution to political debates going on in Africa**. It would be **compulsory reading** for anyone wishing to understand the nature of neo-colonial societies, the role of the state in destroying democratic organizations.

Africa Events

ZIMBABWE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSITION

*Ibbo Mandaza (Ed.)
(London, 1986)*

An unusual... and impressive text on post-colonial Zimbabwe with the editor presenting a **tour de force**, a forceful analysis of the struggle that led to independence and the nature of the post-white settler colonial state.

Mandaza's analysis of the post-colonial Zimbabwean State reveals several similarities with post-colonial experiences elsewhere in Africa: A state that progressively cuts itself off from popular participation by those who were mobilized to fight for independence while consolidating its role as a mediator between capital and labour and as a base for the accumulation and expansion of the African petit bourgeoisie.

The book comprises of thirteen chapters divided into sections on politics, the economy, the agrarian question, the labour movement and social development. It is a book on Zimbabwe written entirely by Zimbabweans.

The political economy on transition is an **essential purchase** not only for the sharp insights that it provides into post-independent Zimbabwe but also as an historical document of - to paraphrase Amilcar Cabral - the **struggles that mark Africans, return to their history...**

African Times

INTRODUCTION

The articles in this issue may appear too disparate to constitute a "special issue" of Africa Development since, at least judging from the titles, there is no apparent common theme. However, these articles have some important elements in common. The first is their origin. They are all products of a Rockefeller Foundation fellowship programme in which the authors participated and were all initially presented at a conference bringing together the African fellows and their Asian counterparts. The programme known as "Reflection on Development" Programme seeks to enable a small group of "mid-career" African and South East Asian Scholars to undertake basic social and historical analysis of the development experience of their respective regions. This programme of awards with its emphasis on relatively long term scholarship that concentrates on reading, reflection analysis and writing rather than the collection of new data is geared towards enriching a scholar's existing research material and thus avoids the constraints imposed on researches by the "Consultancy Syndrome". In the present conjuncture, where individual survival compels most researchers to seek "consultancies" which are often of limited scope and little analytical value, the opportunity provided by the fellowship can not be underestimated.

The second common thread, as it were, is their reflective character. Although each of the papers is based on some form of "case study" none of the authors shies away from drawing generalizations that are of theoretical import to the African experience as a whole.

The third is thematic and, We believe, symptomatic, of the general concerns of African scholarship. The questions that virtually all the authors touch upon, albeit from different theoretical and ideological perspectives, include power in the process of accumulation, the ubiquitous "crisis", the problems of democracy and peoples rights, the problems of ethnicity, clientalism and nepotism as these impinge or are sustained by the styles of accumulation and exercise of state power.

Fourth is the general awareness of the need to specify the characteristics of the particular context one is analysing in terms of theoretically relevant parameters and the need to avoid mechanical transpositions from other places and other times. Given the widespread tendency to discuss African specificities anecdotally within theoretical perspectives aimed at explaining other situations, this concern for the

specificities of the African experience is important especially if it does not treat the experience of Africa parochially and as sui generis but seeks to enrich and widen theory by locating it within the African context.

Fifth is the point implicit in others but explicitly stated in the paper by Anyang Nyong'o and Mamdani*, namely, the falsity of the approaches that attribute the authoritarianism of African regimes to vague cultural and historical determinations within African society - i.e. modernization theory and the current resurgence of cultural determinism which attribute contemporary socio-political structures to long-range socio-cultural determinism of pre-industrial tradition, pre-industrial ideological continuities, absence of a liberal political culture etc...

The papers show that in the presence of rapacious type of states there emerges a need for patrons who act as mediators between the community and the formal institutions (i.e. the legal and bureaucratic apparatus of the state) and argue that "patronage", "clientelism", that is the gamut of networks of clientelistic relationships and all the nuances of informal channels of political control are relationships between different classes and are based on economic exploitation and political domination. These relationships may be clad in traditional gear but their existence and content are responses to exigencies of contemporary society rather than simple and unfortunate remnants of Africa's past. Unlike the conventional view which overemphasizes patronage as an ideology based on elements of reciprocity - Mamdani and in passing Nyong'o show the character of moral and physical violence embedded within these relationships in situation where the process of social differentiation is underway.

The final element of commonality is the position that the authors assume with respect to "internal" versus "external" determinants of Africa's crisis. In the literature on African underdevelopment it is customary to group the various schools under the rubrics "externalists" and "internalist". While the former stress external causes of Africa's underdevelopment (the world system, dependency, imperialism) the latter lay emphasis on the internal determinants of underdevelopment (class, primordial relations, personal rule, policy blunders, corruption). The authors in this collection are not bound by this polarity. Instead each of them brings out both the internal and external factors as they impinge on the object of their analysis. Although the collection is not a sample of all research tendencies in Africa, it does point to the errors of such generalizations about

African scholarships as: "Indeed, external determination remains the dominant perspective among Africa's nationalist, radical and progressive theorists"¹.

Africa's Past and Governance

History weighs heavily on Africa's present. The roots of the present crisis stretch back into Africa's past. This much is widely accepted except by a rather strange ideological alliance of the right and "warrantee" radicals who consider reference to the past as either "blame-the-colonialist" escapism or as "chip-on-the-shoulder" nationalist reaction by Africans. Ekeh's reflection on the African predicament is a direct critique of the tendency to discuss Africa through highly generalized classificatory categories. The author argues that Africa has its unique development problems which can be better understood not by comparing the Africa experience with those of other underdeveloped regions but with those of Western Europe and other developed regions.

Ekeh advances a methodological approach which builds on the notion of "unit ideas" which include (i) epochs as benchmarks of development, (ii) threshold problems of development as growth crises, (iii) the environment and the historical moment of development, (iv) reciprocity and exploitation in the development process, and (v) the end product of development.

"Epochs" are benchmarks which emerge at points of time and history of nations and civilisations and which continue to influence thoughts and actions long after their occurrence. For Africa he identifies slavery and colonialism as backwash epochs which hinder development years after their formal abolition. In the process of development, an inherently crisis-ridden process, society must seek to resolve four "threshold problems": (a) the integration and differentiation of state and society; (b) the hegemonisation of society; (c) the development of the self and (d) the management of culture and civilisation. In Africa these problems remain unresolved.

Unlike Europe, Africa must resolve these problems within a short span of time. The current environment and the historical moment of development defines parameters of national development. Contrary to the past where nations would opt to remain isolated or insulated, the current environment of internationalization limits the options open to national economies. Such an internationalization negates the notion of mutual reciprocity between multinational units and chances

exploitative relationships, with serious consequences on development efforts. In this context Africa remains the most exposed of all regions to outside influences hence the need for regional cooperation.

Eke's preoccupation is with hegemonisation of society and with governance, or rather, the seeming ungovernability of African society and his quest for order and the need for a strong state and an appropriately structured civil society tailored to ensure "stability" are far from unproblematic. They bare the inherent danger of being anti-democratic. While for the other authors a "strong state" is problematic, for Eke it is simply desirable and the fundamental problem is then to identify both the historical and current hindrances for the emergence of such a strong state. It is in light of this preoccupation that the African civil society appears as a pathological case lacking in discipline and definitely not facilitating the exercise of state power.

The problem of governance is placed largely on the governed. From this perspective, Eke can, for instance, point to the failure of African intellectuals to serve the state and their maintenance of a critical distance from the state as one example of this pathology. For the other authors in this issue who touch upon the problems of the state and civil society, the main concern is with the democratization rather than the strengthening of state structures.

Presidentialism and the state

Although Anyang Nyongo's study addresses the question of governance and the state, his research problem is authoritarian "stability" and the socio-economic and political forces that go into creating such a state structure. Presidentialism is a dominant feature of African politics. In the immediate post-independence years such presidentialism was said to be essential to the charisma of the leadership which would steer the new nations towards development. Today, presidentialism is viewed as increasingly problematic. It is said to account for the sad state of affairs in most African countries by introducing elements of arbitrariness, patrimonialism and corruption.

The dominant explanatory framework for the rise of presidentialism is the personalist paradigm a mode of interpreting political change which reduces issues to personality and culture. Hence, accounts of one president being "prince", one "prophet" another "tyrant" etc to use Jackson's and Rosbergs subtitle to a book on personal rule in Africa². However, how one society is saddled with

one ideal type and not another remains a speculative exercise.

Anyang Nyong'o seeks to place presidentialism within a historically specific context in which presidentialism is associated with an increasingly problematic accumulation process, demobilisation of the masses and the ascendancy of the repressive apparatus of the state. The author underlines the sociological context of political leadership. Whatever the ambitions and political acumen of the individual, the eventual success of the individual depends on his/her ability to recognise, use, cajole or even manipulate social forces. Similarly, social forces, as concrete historical actors, organised or otherwise, seek to further their interests through the careers of individuals. In the final analysis, the changing fortunes of individuals are shaped by the changing balance of social forces.

In the specific case of Kenya, the authoritarian president merged and developed as an apparatus of state power and was reflective of the manner in which political power was evolving and being organised in society. Kenya became independent not with a dominant ruling party at the top but within a winning coalition of nationalist organisations forming a government. The lack of a hegemonic organisation of the ruling bourgeoisie which could control the destiny of the nationalist movement led to factional rivalries where each faction struggled to dominate the others through influence and organisations. Hence, the real political power of the bourgeoisie became directly associated by both imagery and actual deeds with the presidency. As the incumbent president daily arbitrated among feuding factions of the bourgeoisie and mediated between them and the masses, the presidency gained autonomy over almost all bourgeois factions within Kenya society and became the repository of power. One could not help wonder how would one explain the rise of presidentialism in other countries which became independent with a dominant ruling party at the top?

The particular model of accumulation generated tensions that could only lead to greater concentration of power. Throughout the 1960's the Kenyan economy expanded rapidly, enhancing the legitimacy of the Kenyatta regime, despite growing social inequities. At the same time autonomous popular movements such as trade unions and parties were banned or demobilised. Instead, the state relied on manipulative "mobilisation" of the masses through the ideology of "Harambee", which elicited popular contributions to national-building through voluntary labour for various social projects.

The economic crunch that came with the world crisis underscored

the the great social divide engendered by the chosen accumulation model. In the absence of a hegemonic political party, the state was the only organised force in society that the bourgeoisie could use when faced with crisis. As most powers of the state had been progressively concentrated in the office of the president, the response to the crisis a a further accrual of power to the presidential authority.

Agrarian crisis and democracy

Africa is under the throes of its worst agrarian crisis in years. While virtually all other continents have increased their per capita food availability and their shares in the world market for tropical crops, Africa has seen both its food and export production decline. Capitalist economies both in the developed and underdeveloped countries have increased their agriculture output through increased subsumption of the labour process by capital itself. Why has Africa not achieved similar results? Mamdani argues, the question productivity cannot be understood or solved through an approach that focuses on relations of exchange.

In Africa agricultural stagnation and involution continue to pose a major interpretative problem. Much of the current analysis of the agrarian crisis is by implicit or explicit analogy to experiences in other developing countries. In some cases it is simply stated that Africa has certain "advantages" over other areas (e.g. better man-land ratios than Asia, more equitable distribution of land than Latin America etc). In others the "advantages" are listed as disadvantages. Access to land by the peasantry blocks capitalism since an "uncaptured" peasantry wreaks havoc on all state endeavours to promote modern capitalist farming.

Mamdani's point of departure is that such analogies are misleading. This is particularly the case with the fixation on land ownership as the only major explanatory factor of forms of exploitation, a fixation which fails to explain why the peasantry enters into exploitative relations even in situation where access to land is not a problem. Mamdani argues that social differentiation proceeds by multiple routes that are historically and socially specific. That is, the differentiation of the peasantry develops as a result of differentiation in any of the elements of the labour process land, labor or its implement. In Africa, the peasantry is faced with two forms of exploitative relations. There are the "voluntary relations" entered into as a result of objective factors faced by different strata, underlining the difference internal to the peasantry either because of unequal access to land or to implements of

labour. This constitutes the stuff of petty exploitation. Mamdani stresses that for Africa at least access to land is not sufficient to shield the peasantry from relations of exploitation that are "voluntarily" entered into by the peasantry. The distribution of other means of production is uneven and therefore exerts pressures on the "implement poor" peasants to seek sources of livelihood by selling their labour.

The result of "voluntary" unequal relations is a path of accumulation "from below", through peasant differentiation as one stratum enriches itself at the expense of another, giving rise to a village bourgeoisie out of the ranks of the rich peasantry. In the African case, the process of accumulation is eclipsed by a path of accumulation from above which requires extra economic coercion. At the origin of this path is political connection. Surplus expropriation emerges not through direct control of the process of production but through political expropriation sustained by the extra-economic coercion of the peasantry.

In the case of labour, it could be extracted in multiple forms, openly as wage labour or disguised as communal labour and it is these sets of controls over labour which are key to understanding low productivity. In cases where these processes prevail, the state assumes entirely different roles from those paths of accumulation based on the internal dynamics of peasant differentiation. First, to the extent that political connection is the basis of surplus accumulation, political struggles assume a life and death character, blocking the emergence of even bourgeois democracy.

Clearly democratisation in Africa does not hinge on "land reform" measures to ensure access to land of the peasantry but demands the dismantling of the regime of extra economic coercion that weighs so heavily on the peasantry.

Gender and demographic change

The theoretically central issue of access, control and use of resources is also the focus of Milimo's study which provides an analysis of the relationship of women to productive resources from a historical perspective and underlines the impact of such relationship on demography. Taking issue with the view that sees women as the main cause of the population and food problem, the author argues that women are in fact the key to the solution of both the food and population problem. In the specific case of Africa, current efforts such as birth control measures per se neither guarantee the solution to

accelerated population growth nor that of the food crisis.

In the diagnosis of the current food crisis and so-called population crisis, social scientists have started looking at gender inequality as one of the key explanatory factors. Conventional development theory perceives population growth as the major obstacle to economic growth and relatedly the fundamental cause of the present food crisis. Critics of this approach have convincingly argued that over-population is not a matter of too many people but of unequal distribution of resources. To appreciate the real significance of this argument however, analysts have to examine gender stratification system with equal rigour as that of social differentiation. Similarly, the established practice where broad scale comparisons that spanned enormous variations in cultural traditions levels of development and type of kinship organization have been found to be hence, the need for studying concrete socio-historical situation.

Until recently demographic studies viewed women's role as an isolated topic rather than one which is central to the mainstream theories of reproductive change. Similarly, studies of food production, Milimo argues have suffered major drawbacks from the failure to recognize the actual and potential role of women in agricultural production.

Milimo points out that the historical roots of the food and population problem include the interrelated processes of women's loss of access to productive resources and the concomitant growth of patriarchy as a result of socio-economic transformations under colonialism. Of these, the most significant were changes in land tenure, introduction of cash crops and the migratory labour system. In turn, all of these brought about changes in the sexual division of labour and resulted in undermining the subsistence sector of which women were now in charge. These situations have only worsened in post colonial Africa.

Male migration and cash cropping transformed the labour needs and the allocation of household labour to these various tasks. Women's work load increased as they had to undertake both productive and reproductive tasks. Thus the need for child labour implying maintaining high fertility levels. Related factors contributing to high fertility rates include early marriage, polygamy, lack of education and the persistence of cultural and traditional practices which emphasize fecundity.

The failure to take account of the various implications of the gender division of labor is a major stumbling block in the current search for food self-sufficiency in Africa. The study concludes with a call for structural changes aimed at removing patriarchy and thereby ensuring egalitarian access to and control of productive resources as well as equal access to education and training. Such measures, it is argued would lower fertility rates and increase productivity by reducing women's workload and the importance of children's labour. However, contrary to the dichotomy presented in the study between feminists and marxist, the conceptualization of patriarchy, how it originates, is maintained and how it changes is much more complex and highly controversial even among feminists. The consensus among feminists is that any theoretical account of social relations that omits gender relations can only provide partial answers to fundamental problems like the food crisis or demographic change.

Migration and human rights

The extent of migration and the rapidity of migratory patterns in West Africa is probably most clearly demonstrated by the changing roles of Nigeria and Ghana in the last 15 years or so. In "rational choice" models such movements are a reflection of the individual's perception of the gap between their current incomes and their expected incomes (measured as product of real wages and the probability of obtaining gainful employment) in regions of emigration. Little is said about the structural forces that generate and sustain those income differentials and the expectations of the individual migrant. Yeboah's emphasis is on the structural-historical determinants of uneven spatial development within which the individual "choices" are made.

What emerges is a context in which the basis of individual migrant's choice is precarious being subject to uncertain economic and political conjunctures, the whims of unstable states and various forms of national chauvinism often whipped up by beleaguered states.

Large-scale migration has been based on an extremely fragile economic basis given the nature of labour markets in West Africa. With perhaps the exception of Ivory Coast in no country of the region does one find a ruling class that is structurally and functionally linked to the productive exigencies of the economy nor one whose relation to production is strong enough to persuade it to mobilise the state apparatus for direct access to cheap labour. In addition there is no regional project of accumulation which would provide regional rationale to the movement of labour. Consequently

and in contrast to the tightly managed migration patterns of Southern Africa, migration in West Africa is spontaneous and "illegal" from the point of view of virtually all sections of the population of the country of migration. It is not surprising that in a number of cases the expulsion of cheap labour is spearheaded by the state.

A second source of the fragility of the basis for migration is political. This is a result of the transformation of colonial space which was regional in character to a much narrower notion of national space. Under colonial rule it was the French, the British who determined the space over which migrants would travel "freely" (i.e. without passports and foreign currency restrictions). The particular chauvinistic responses of indigenous populations against migrant labour received little hearing from the colonial state except in so far as it was a useful tool in the "divide and rule" politics of colonial rule. With independence, nationhood has bred a plethora of restrictions on the legal movements of individuals and commodities.

Various attempts at regional cooperation have not replaced the regional colonial space with a pan-African one. This is partly because African efforts at integration have been highly depoliticised and reduced to state-centred integration efforts which go hand in hand with denial of legal, political and civil rights of citizens from other African countries. It is therefore not surprising to witness the expulsion of migrants from member states of ECOWAS in a manner that contracts the spirit if not the letter of ECOWAS. Millions of Africans are forced to move from one country to another under the most inhuman conditions while heads of state propound on African unity and regional integration.

Given the poor economic and political foundations for migration, any sign of crisis unleashes all kinds of chauvinistic responses from states which are anxious to find a scapegoat and to conceal the systemic origins of the crisis.

Creating writing and social change

African creative writing has focussed on the problems and prospects of change. And in this it has often demonstrated greater prescience in its diagnosis of societal problems. Indeed some of the most insightful analyses of African society is to be found in creative writing than in social analysis. It is also interesting to note that

themes which have currently become of great concern to African social scientists as exemplified by collection's of articles in this volume have been themes which African novelists and poets have been concerned with since the immediate post colonial period. Just to cite a handful, it was in African novels such as Sembène Ousmane's Novel, **Les bouts de bois de Dieu (1960)** that themes such as the plight of workers and solidarity among the appressed, were dealt with. As for the hardships and dilemma of urbanization these were covered in works such as Mongo Beti's **Ville cruelle** which appeared as far back as 1954. Similarly themes such as authoritarianism, corruption and bureaucratization were already the focus of novels such as Soyinka's **Kongi's Harvest**. It was also in the sixties and earlier that African novelists began to address the issue of gender conflicts and solidarity as exemplified by Okotop' Bitek's, **Song of Lawino**.

In this article, Mnthali traces portrayals of social change in African literature. Reflective of its central concern for social relevance, African literature has gone through a number of phases which closely parallel changes in political thought and concomitant economic concerns.

The phase of identity - this phase which included variants of negritude and its derivatives such as black power authenticity and black consciousness came to an end with Fanon's warning of the pernicious glorification of the African past as opposed to the challenge of "rehabilitation of a future national culture".

The phase of protest and conflict - with dominant themes such as heroism and solidarity, this phase dramatized moments in the struggle against colonialism with landscapes which were populated by traitors, cowards and the survivors of the struggle who were beset with numerous disappointments. What did change points Mnthali "is history as well as the parameters within which further changes could be realized". Not surprisingly, the third phase was,

The phase of disillusionment - It is here that we find dominant themes such as the corroding and corrupting effect of power and wealth among the elites in post independence Africa. These themes and the concomitant disillusionment were captured even in titles of monumental works such as Ayi Kwei Armah's **The Beautiful Ones are not Yet Born** and Ngugi's **Devil on the Cross** and **Petals of Blood**.

The phase of exhortation and satire - In terms of literary craftsmanship, this phase marks a shift from rhetoric to involvement with dominant themes focusing on revolution and/or satire which tend to combine a call to arms with "a devastating mockery of the present". This phase marks, the writer's active participation in and society's recognition of the writer's voice in the struggles and debates concerning change and development.

A careful analysis of this phases, underlines Mnthali, helps us unravel the unspoken paradigm and thus the formative value that literature embodies. Behind literature's apparent negation lie certain affirmation. What then are the "energising principle" of writers, that is the cluster of resources, skills and tensions from which creative energy radiates?

Through the use of "semiotic constants" to denote the recurrence of clusters of symbols, imagery, situations and tensions in the works of a single author Mnthali interpretes the social visions in the works of Chinua Achebe and Ngugi wa Thiong'o. Having isolated, the central concept utilized by each writer, he conveyes the collective impression left on the reader from the ensemble of metaphoric resources utilized by African writers . One of the distinct characteristics of African literature is its concealment of meaning beneath symbols and conveying a multiplicity of meaning through a single piece of imaginery reality.

For Achebe, the central concept is "wisdom" the underlying social dilemmas accompanying a changing world: bewilderment, cynisism resulting from the corruption and moral turpitude and lack of accountability. In the face of these changes, Achebe emphasize the need to balance between retaining the best of one's culture and the reception of a new age. Ngugi's central concept is "land" and traces the process of landlessness, the hopes of rebuilding, the use and abuses of the land symbolizing the use and abuse of capital and warns against perpetuating colonialism through alienation of land and accentuating social differentiation.

The current phase of African literature with its powerful and enigmatic metaphor would tend to indicate a shift towards the further development of critical aesthetics, the risks of which have meant repression and exile for many outstanding African creative writers. It

is to be hoped that African creative writers will continue to combine their literacy production with critical reflections on the significance and meaning of their work, a heritage which ought to be more widely practised by African social scientists.

The papers in this issue cover a wide range of issues from different perspectives. It would be surprising if such a collection of "reflective" papers did not provoke some reaction. Comments on these articles are welcome in the pages of **Africa Development**.

*T. Mkandawire
Zenebeworke Tadesse*

Dakar, June 1987.

Notes:

* This article was originally written in English. The English version has recently been published in the Journal of Peasant Studies Vol.14, N°2, January 1987. We will also be happy to send photocopies of the English version for readers who request for its.

1. Paul Lubeck "The African Bourgeoisie: Debates, Methods, and Units of Analysis", Paul Lubeck (ed.) The African Bourgeoisie: Capitalist development in Nigeria, Kenya and the Ivory Coast (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987).

2. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg Personal rule in Black Africa: (Los Angeles: University of California press, 1982).

DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND THE AFRICAN PREDICAMENT

Peter P. Ekeh*

The study of development on the African continent poses more hazards than the usual problem encountered in development studies elsewhere. This is partly due to the fact that development studies, particularly those involving regions outside western Europe, are inherently comparative. The recent wave of classifications of Africa, Latin America, and large parts of Asia as Third World countries, or into some other grouping of the poor nations of the world, may appear to offer one easy possibility for the comparative study of development in Africa. In fact, however, this mode of presentation poses serious shortcomings in attempts to assess the unique and important features which relevant for understanding Africa's development problem.

The dominant assumption in this paper is that the African region has its unique development problems which deserve separate attention. In one sense direct comparison with the rich development history of Western Europe, and of other developed regions, may in fact help to distinguish these problems much more starkly than would be the case if we were to assume that the African region is stalled in its development efforts by the same problems as in other Third World regions.

The geographical reference of the African region is usually defined with apologies. So that such apologies are not repeated all along this paper, I should delimit the area of application of this analysis of development as Africa minus the Arab North and South Africa. Even so certain caveats still need to be noted. First, although partially Arab, Sudan shares in most of the problems that confront development in the rest of Africa. Secondly, although Ethiopia should be included in the consideration of these development problem, it does not share fully in the discriminating historical characteristics which are central in the consideration of the argument here: these are experiences with the Slave Trade and colonialism. Needless to say, single nation studies

may be more empirically grounded than broad views, which sometimes border on speculative propositions on Africa-wide development. It seems to me, however, that the necessity to ferret out the African genre of development problems justifies such composite assessment as is attempted in this essay.

As protection against the possibility of the analysis of African development becoming idiosyncratic and of little relevance beyond Africa, it is important that the issues examined in studying Africa are embedded in a theoretical corpus of thought, which offers a generalized mode of comparison by introducing a standardized base-line for the consideration of developments in Africa and elsewhere whilst pointing to Africa's unique problem. Of course the aim in carrying out development studies may well be one of controlling and re-directing the programmes of development. Such efforts are usually handicapped because the problems that confront development in Africa are ill-understood. Studies that aim at increasing our understanding of our development problems therefore have an important place in African studies. Although this paper shares in the general objective of explaining Africa's backwardness, its more manifest aim is to isolate Africa's development problems in a broader effort of understanding such problems. In Part I, there is a broad review of the moods which have so far affected the study of African development. In Part II, I construct a methodology which I consider suitable for the study of African development, followed by an assessment of Africa's development problems on the basis of this methodology in Part III.

I. Moods of Development-Thinking on Africa

In a rare essay on the intellectual imagery of prospects for global development in economic thought up to the 1960's, Hans Singer (1964) shows that development theorizing since the Industrial Revolution - as reflected in the economic theories of such leading thinkers as Ricardo, Malthus, Marx, Keynes, and Schumpeter - has oscillated between optimism and pessimism, alternatively for developed economies and underdeveloped countries. These shifts in moods have been matched and sometimes preceded by changes in global economic situations before and after the Second World War.

Although Africa's encounter with development-thinking has been quite brief, really less than four decades, its moods and configurations have varied widely from indifference to optimism and pessimism - along Hans Singer's patterns of oscillation of intellectual moods. Before the fifties, the conception of development for Africa in global

terms, as the total transformation of a nation-state and as a phenomenon capable of being achieved through planned human intervention, was scanty. Africa was of course then enveloped in colonialism and its prospects were only considered in manifest association with the metropolitan and controlling nations of Europe. The arrogant (English) title of Mannoni's (1950) Prospero and Caliban sums up the prevalent notion of development for Africa before the fifties as a region with a limited possibility of followership and dependence on European models.

Indeed, in this period, before the wave of Independence in the 1960's, attention to wholesale issues of development was spotty. Academic interests were directed more to the search for involuntary and unplanned social change, and less to the prospects of full-scale development with state intervention. The emphasis was on the study of social change, understood as a response to opportunities provided in contacts with the West through colonialism. The prototype presentation in this regard in Ottenberg's (1959) famous paper: "Ibbo Receptivity to change". The social organization of the Ibbo was amenable to Western notions to progress, and their response was therefore in the direction of desired social change. Various groups, for a variety of anthropological depictions, were considered progressive on account of their traditional social organization. On the other hand, it was assumed that certain other types of traditional social organizations in Africa could not respond properly to opportunities for social change (cf. Herskovits, 1962). Robert LeVine's (1966) Dreams and Deeds provoked so much attention because it was based on this differential interpretation, even in the late sixties.

The compelling conclusion from these early studies of social changes in Africa was that development was a function, and eventually a responsibility, of society. The state, as colonial organization, was not assigned any major role in these considerations of social change in the colonial setting. A close evaluation of the two leading efforts to pool together studies of social change by van den Berghe (1965) and Wallerstein (1966) would reveal that a second major characteristic of these studies is that they were largely ahistorical and hardly went beyond the colonial period to the previous era of the Slave Trade that dominated the region for several centuries before colonization. All told, these early studies of social change and development in Africa up to the fifties had a cavalier aura about them and could hardly be described as optimistic or pessimistic in mood. Such studies on the prospects of social change in Africa were not executed with any degree of commitment and dedication that would compel a definite mood.

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They were carried out purely as academic exercises with the trappings of the curiosity of studying alien peoples.

It was on these limited definitions that the grander demands of modernization theory were imposed in the late fifties and early sixties, and were accompanied with total faith and commitment to the possibility of total transformation of whole states, not limited to some endowed societal aspects within them. In an important sense "modernization theory" was a policy and theory that declared faith in the capability of the newer nations of Asia and Africa to achieve, in the second half of the twentieth century, an idealized form of European attainments up to the first half of the century - always with the unspoken hope that the newer achievements would be without the moral scars of European civilization.

The unit of analysis of modernization theory was the state and any analysis of societal aspects of development was always undertaken with reference to the state. Unlike the study of the development of the West which is largely a post-factum exercise, a reconstruction of what happened in history to transform medieval society to modern nations and states, modernization theory is an ante-factum postulate of how a perfected form of nationhood would be attained through the intervention of the state, given the proper endowments. The mood of optimism which characterized modernization theory was predicated more on the strength of cold war rivalries and on the new hopes and rhetorics of Nationalism at Independence than on any thorough assessment of real possibilities. It was also helped by a general buoyancy in the world economic situation in the sixties (cf. Hyden, 1983:2).

The Africa, modernization theory was imperilled from its start. Its major problem area was the state. Africa's post-colonial states were not only frail but were threatened with disintegration by the divisions created and enacted by primordial societal forces (cf. Geertz, 1963). And yet the social and economic transformation necessary for modernization could only be achieved through the involvement of mature states. Thus, the first important problem of modernization theory in Africa was related to the understructuration of the state vis-a-vis society.

It is to the credit of modernization theorists of African development that the "Africanists" of the 1950's and 1960's saw this problem in its rightful context. But it is also a measure of the reigning optimism about the prospects of development in Africa in the

sixties that the "charismatic legitimation theorists" (including Apter, 1963; and Wallerstein, 1961) thought that the African states could be strengthened through the authoritarian assumptions and activities of one-party monopoly of power. Soon, however, by the middle sixties, with the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and the onset of the Nigerian civil war, the credibility of modernization theory (and of its subset charismatic legitimation theory) was forsaken and many of the Africanists of the 1950's turned away to other areas and other interests. As some of the remaining Africanists, like Rene Dumont (1966), Zolberg (1966), and Andreski (1968), began to sound notes of unease, the more cautious and sceptical theoretical views of Geertz (1963) and Runtington (1968) about hindrances to modernization drives came to be taken more seriously in the late sixties and seventies.

But it was not any internal adjustments that succeeded the failures of modernization theory. What captured new attention in Africa was the fancy of underdevelopment and dependency theory with its focus on the adverse effects of the biased relationships between Third World countries and the imperial and other Western nations. The shift from the dominance of modernization theory to the new emphasis on underdevelopment theory marked a new scepticism in African development efforts. Certain features of the reign of underdevelopment theory in the seventies and eighties in Africa are noteworthy. First, while modernization theory was sponsored - and received sympathetic attention from the West in the height of cold war politics - underdevelopment theory was hostile, in intent at least, to the former metropolitan nations and to capitalism generally and it encouraged thoughts of de-linking.

Secondly, although underdevelopment theory has its origins in Latin American experiences, its application and development by a number of African scholars differentiates it from modernization theory which was developed for Africa from the outside with very little input by African scholars. Apart from Samir Amin's (e.g. 1977) prolific writings on the subject, a number of Marxist-inclined African and black scholars, originally based in the liberal environment of Dar-es-Salaam, have for the first time raised issues on problems of development in Africa (cf. Rodney 1972; Ake 1978; Nabudere 1977; Shivji, 1975; Mamdani, 1976) (1).

Thirdly, these underdevelopment theorists have, by their attacks on government elites, for being exploiters, capitalists, and extensions of foreign capital, created some wedge between academic scholarship and government sponsorship of development programmes - at least outside

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Tanzania. Finally, while underdevelopment theory in Africa has laid a great deal of emphasis on the international component of dependency, the African structures conjoined into this invidious international network tended to remain largely uninvestigated. In other words, the possibility of the autonomy of African social, political, and economic structures has been denied a priori. As such it has largely remained a theory of criticism, not of substantive engagement with the issues of development.

In the mid-eighties, the fast-changing circumstances of Africa have transformed the realities which had encouraged the growth of underdevelopment theory in Africa. The menace of South Africa notwithstanding, deliberation struggles are becoming less important. As the economic situation worsens, the forces of capitalism seem to be withdrawing from its once-fertile territory of Africa. The Sahelian drought disaster, increasingly shows that the issues that confront Africa have been reduced to elementary ones of food and survival. With these developments in sight, the mood in the assessment of development prospects is fast slipping into one of despair. This shifts in moods from optimism in to scepticism and now to less than pessimism unto despair seems to have exacted a toll on development-thinking on Africa. More and more the new emphasis is away from overall assessments as consideration of development from below are enjoying a boom. Goran Hyden's "economy of affection" is a sign of the times because the promises and ambitions of higher development have suffered serious relapses.

Given these spectacular fluctuations in academic moods in a span of some three decades, it must be admitted that it is a treacherous exercise to theorize on the nature of African development. However, rather than abandon thinking on the nature of development in Africa entirely, what seems called for is a mode of conceptualizing these problems so that they are not weighted by prevailing moods - be these optimism, scepticism, or despair. I have chosen the methodology of what Lovejoy (1942) calls unit-ideas to deal with this problem. As formulated by Lovejoy, and as elaborated by Robert Nisbet (1966) in Sociology, unit-ideas are the constitutive constructs that resonate the essence of a discipline. In effect, unit-ideas jointly provide the platform and backcloth to the stage on which parade the essential ideas that measures the scope and depth of the discipline. As such, unit-ideas do offer standardized norms against which particularly variations in any regions of the discipline can be measured and compared. The assumption that underlies the following exercise is that development-thinking constitutes a disis an area of specialization. It

is hope that what follows will provide an objective evaluation of Africa's development problems.

II. Unit-Ideas of Development Theory

Development theory spans many academic disciplines and includes conceptions of transformations in units as diverse as the nation-state in the social sciences and the embryo in the biological sciences. The unit-ideas that are highlighted here do reflect this diversity. These are: (i) epochs as benchmarks of development; (ii) threshold problems of development as growth crises; (iii) the environment and the historical moment of development; (iv) reciprocity and exploitation in the development process; and (v) the end-product of development.

The unit-ideas of development-thinking are not without a pattern. They may be grouped into two type: (a) three basicelements intrinsic to any programme of development; and (b) two cybernetic elements which relate the developing unit to the wider environment.

The first basic unit-idea is the base-line, or the benchmark starting point, for the development process. Secondly, there is an intervention process, a series of events either consciously engineered or ineluctably provoked by unplanned societal processes, which lead to the desired end- state of the development process. In the listing of the unit- ideas presented above, the intervention process is represented by "threshold problems and growth crises", for reasons that will be specified later. The third basic unit-idea is the end- product of the development process (2).

Apart from these basic unit-ideas, the discussion of two cybernetics unit-ideas is important for a full understanding of the development process. These relate to the management of the relationships between the developing units and the wider context in which it is implicated. The first cybernetics unit-idea has been styled here as relationship of reciprocity and exploitation between the developing unit and the wider world in which it functions. Secondly, the development impulse is helped or retarded by the historical moment and the particular environment of the development process.

With these brief indications of what unit-ideas of development refer to, we may now attempt more extended definitions of each of these unit-ideas in development-thinking.

(i) Epochs as Benchmarks of Development

Epochs are enduring social formations which emerge at points of time and history of nations and civilizations and which continue to influence thoughts and actions long after their occurrence. As benchmarks, epochs mediate between the past and the future - standing out as watersheds and thus as the base-lines for further developments. They become the historical and sociological reference points for the analysis and synthesis of behaviours and actions of individuals and groups in areas subject to the influence of such epochs (cf. Ekeh, 1983).

The Industrial Revolution (with its associated formations of capitalism) and the French Revolution have usually been regarded as such landmarks in the introduction of modernity. We may regard both of those twin Revolutions as prototype epochs. Most other epochs in the history of modern nations are the outcomes and developments from these prototype beacons of modernity. We may thus define two other types of epochs. Secondly, then, in addition to prototype epochs, there are derived epochs which flow from the prototype epochs and serve as their elaborations in structure and functioning. Derived epochs are, in effect, elaborations and refinements of prototype epochs and eventually enhance the civilizational movements - in the control of natural forces and of achieving greater human equality and freedom within nations - which prototype epochs introduce into history. Indeed the continuity and enduring significance of the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution are predominantly due to the vitality of derived epochs outside England and France. Thirdly, and different from derived epochs, there are other epochal formations which in different forms flow from the prototype epochs but which harm their areas of impact and do not contribute to the appreciation of the movements introduced by the prototype epochs. Following a usage by Myrdal (1957), I shall label these as backwash epochs. Thus in Africa, both the Slave Trade era and colonialism are related to the Industrial Revolution and emerging capitalism, but their harmful and backwash effects have enduring significance in Africa.

(ii) Threshold Problems of Development as Growth Crises

For further forward thrust to be possible, development efforts which involve national transformations especially in their economic and political spheres, run against various problems which need successful resolution. These are threshold problems in the sense that they are problems that are encountered at some points in the histories of national developments and in the further sense that the outcomes of

attempts to resolve them determine the national capability to move forward or else to stagnate or even retreat. The resolution of such threshold problems is thus a necessary, although not a sufficient, condition for national transformations. These sets of problems may only be partially pictured in the same fashion as those of the "stages" theories of development. In "stage" theories of development, such as Karl Marx's and Walt Rostow's, threshold problems are also posed for the systems under the pressure of transformation and their resolutions are necessary for achieving the desired forward thrust. However, such historical stages of development - as it is also the case with psycho-biological stages of development posited by Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, and Erick Erichson - are sequential and follow one upon the other in a necessary fashion.

My use of threshold problems is different in this sense. Threshold problems may be seen as analytical non-sequential definitions of autonomous problem areas whose resolution will enable the developing entity to climb unto a higher level of existence. Such a postulate of threshold problems is premised on the assumption that development is crisis-ridden. Those perspectives on development processes that offer success in development programmes on the platter of gold as gradualist and painless substract from the realities of development history: every development effort is faced with growth crises and it is their resolution that provides the impulse for a forward thrust.

I identify four such threshold problems of development that require crisis resolution in programmes of national transformations as follows: (a) the integration and differentiation of state and society; (b) the hogemonization of society; (c) the development of the self; (d) and the management of culture and civilization. The threshold problems are liable to be confounded and shrouded in the long-drawn history of developments of the mature nations of, say, England, France, United States, Japan, and the Soviet Union. On the other hand the more elementary conditions in Africa will enable us to illustrate these problems in a clearer manner.

The Integration and Differentiation of State and Society

The relationship between state and society poses a major threshold problem in national development in at least four directions. First, development requires that each of these components of the nation be adequately developed to withstand the strains of national transformation. The defective structuring of any of them may retard development programmes. Secondly, national development requires that

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as either the state or society advances in structure, the other should grow in some proportion along with it. The stagnation of one and the growth of the other threatens the advance momentum. Thirdly, the growth of these two components of the nation should be integrated into the same moral givens. In other words, the growth of the state should be underlined by the moral of society. Fourthly, the growth of the two also requires that they be able to carry out their differentiated tasks with reference to the needs of each other and of their common goals.

Each of these requirements and elements in the relationship between state and society is a brittle one fraught with crises. National development proceeds, as it were, on the balanced twin shoulders of the state and society. It is a dynamic relationship which changes with growth and requires frequent adjustments.

The Hegemonization of Society

National development distinctively requires that the critical elites from various sectors of society and the masses of the people be subject to the imperatives of a common hegemonic order and that the relationships between the different strata of society be integrated into this hegemonic order, which is understood in its Gramscian rendering as:

an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connections (Williams, 1960).

In mature and old nations the hegemonic order emerged with national history. In newer nations the creation of such hegemonic order must be assumed to be the responsibility of a national power elite one of whose defining characteristics is the management of hegemonic bonds. When there is absence or severance of bonds between the elite and the masses; the rich and the poor; the old and the young; town dwellers and rural peasantry; then the impulse for development is weakened and the forward thrust is in danger.

The Development of the Self

A more subtle and even slippery threshold problem concerns the

way the changes in socio-economic and political sectors during periods of transformation are matched by changes in childhood socialization programmes and thus in the resulting social character of individuals in society. In order to be sustained national programmes must rest on some requisite personality attributes. Such personality attributes might have been developed unobstructively in the past when national transformations were unplanned (cf. McClelland, 1955, 1961; Hagen, 1962). But conscious national transformations in the modern situation require intervention in childhood socialization in order to elicit the requisite social character formations, as early experiences in the Soviet Union (cf. Brofenbrenner, 1962, 1970) and the kibbutz programmes of socialization (cf. Sprio, 1958) demonstrate. Lack of change in the right direction in socialization represents a crisis of major threshold proportions.

Management of Culture and Civilization

Economic transformations, particularly in the form of industrialization programmes, command their own trans-cultural correlates. Inexorably industrialization compels its own distinct value patterns which promote its sustenance irrespective of ideological patterns (cf. Inkeles; Inkeles and Smith, 1974). We may term this cluster of emergent value and trans-cultural traits that promote, uphold, and exist along with industrialization as industrial civilization. This strain of industrial civilization must be distinguished from national cultures which exist long before industrialization takes place in any region. The degree of compatibility between industrial civilization and national cultures determines to a large extent the political fortunes of nations. The sustenance of industrialization requires that the national culture be rationalized in the direction of industrial civilization. Such rationalization helps to energize the national culture in the service of maintaining the advance momentum.

In Great Britain where economic and industrial transformation began, such rationalization was prolonged and had its own natural history. Elsewhere it has come pre-packaged. As Veblen (1954: 85) puts it in the case of Germany:

the German people have been enabled to take up the technological heritage of the English without having paid for it in the habits of thought, the use and wont, included in the English community in achieving it. Modern technology has come to Germany ready-made, without the cultural consequences which its gradual development and

continued use has entailed upon the people whose experiences initiated it and determined the course of its development.

But as it was in the case of Germany, lack of cultural rationalization could lead to such reactions as engulfed Germany in the early decades of this century. (Also cf. Fromm, 1941). The need for harmonization between national cultures and industrial civilization may well be greater in other regions outside the cultural matrix of Europe and the social consequences may also be greater. This problem becomes even more challenging in regions where there is an amalgam of cultures rather than a single national culture. Very often the attempt to jump over the step of developing national cultures, by hooking up directly with an international culture of industrial civilization, provokes deep threshold crises in development periods.

(iii) The Environment and the Historical Moment of Development

A considerable amount of the impulse and strength of any development programme flows from the environment and the historical moment in which it takes place. The environment and the historical moment of development constitute what Wolfram Eberhard (1968) labelled the world-time of development. They are the world historical imperative which control and constrain development programmes. To cite Eberhard's own example, the post- World War II period is suffused with diluted Marxist and socialist ideals and so while developing countries in the nineteenth century could boast about their capability to exploit the countryside and the peasantry, twentieth-century national developments must accept a quasi-Marxist definition of the environment in terms of a doctrine of equality which regards as unacceptable and offensive the exploitation of sections of the community, even in the service of overall development.

Even more impelling are the changes in the international environments of development. These can be differentiated into three types: First, national developments can take place in isolation, as it was the case in the beginnings of modern USSR and China, by erecting barriers, with matching autarky, separating the developing countries from international economic systems. Secondly, national developments could also be carried out in insulation, as it was in the case of Japan and as is the case of current Indian efforts at development, by erecting not physical but cultural and symbolic barriers in such a manner as to enable development objectives and goals to be sieved through them. Thirdly, apart from these Asian and Eastern European examples, most of the national development programmes in the past-War II period have been carried out in the environment of

internationalization in which national developments are embedded in the growing internationalized world system. Along with the growth of this environment is the emergence of an international order which regulate national economies and which defines the directions and limits of national development efforts.

(iv) Reciprocity and Exploitation in Development

National development involves a variety of relationships between the developing units and other national and multi-national units in the international order, many of which are already well developed. In ideal terms, as in classical theory of international trade, these relationships are those of mutual reciprocity in which both sides bargain to benefit from the relationship. There is an assumption in such postulation that the relationship of reciprocity is between equal units, with balanced structures. Where, however, these relationships are not between equal units, exploitation creeps in, tilting the balance in favour of the stronger units.

Relationships of exploitation become much more strengthened and thorough-going when the parties do not maintain a mere mutual relationship between two units but are rather involved in larger multi-unit generalized relationships, because "exploitation in generalized exchange situation is attributable to the system rather than to individual" participating units (cf. Ekeh, 1974: 204-213). Thus, the emergence of an autonomous international order enhances exploitation by raising international relationship from mutual to generalized reciprocity. When developing nations are involved in these relationships, the development efforts are seriously affected.

(v) The End-Product of Development

As national and regional developments become less and less involuntary and more and more planned and programmed, and as state intervention in national development programmes expands, the end-product of development efforts are envisaged well ahead of realization. These end-products of national developments of course include the ultimate aim of upgrading the social welfare and the standards of living of citizens. But the two leading definitions of this ultimate aim of development, that is of capitalist and socialist national orders, have become dominant contenders as the anticipated end-products of national development. In the post World War II period, developments have been prosecuted in the face of full awareness of Marxist and other theories of the development process which have

served as warning mechanisms, influencing the end-results of national development.

What this points to is a change from an epigenetic model of development, in which the nature of the end-product is determined by the intrinsic routine of the development process, to an emphasis on preformationism, in which the end-result is presumed to be pre-determined and thus known well from the start. This posture has thus become an integral part of the problem-set in development-thinking.

These then are the unit-ideas of development-thinking that will help us to evaluate the African experience: epochs as bench-marks of development, four threshold problems of development as growth crises (state-society relationships; the hegemonization of society; development of the self; and the management of culture and civilization); the environment and the historical moment of development; reciprocity and exploitation in the development process; and the end-product of development. It is fair to add that the formulation of these unit-ideas has been influenced by the problem at hand, namely, an evaluation of the crisis on the African agenda of development which poses harsher and starker questions than experiences in other regions of the world.

III. Development Problems and Development Crisis in Africa

(i) The Slave Trade and Colonialism as Backwash Epochs for African Development

In terms of the time-span of their occurrence and their continuing significance in modern modes of thought and action, the era of the slave trade and colonialism occupy the most prominent places in the social and economic history of Africa. That this has not been the case with the Slave Trade probably points to a Freudian cover and an indication of the embarrassment and sensitivity with which these prolonged epochal events, particularly the Slave Trade, are viewed in Africa, Europe and America.

The African Slave Trade and the subsequent colonization of Africa were fully related to the central events that transformed Europe into the modern world. The Atlantic Slave Trade, which reinforced the Trans-Saharan Slave Trade, arose to service the needs of merchant capitalism in England and elsewhere. The Slave Trade was brought to an end, and followed by colonialism, because the economic needs of

England and Europe has shifted from merchant capitalism to industrial capitalism which required more settled conditions than the massive disruptions which characterized the Slave Trade. As Eric Williams (1944: 210) demonstrated more than forty years ago:

merchant capitalism ... developed the wealth of Europe by means of slavery and monopoly. But in so doing it helped to create the industrial capitalism of the nineteenth century, which turned round and destroyed the power of commercial capitalism, and all its works.

Although the African Slave Trade was related to domestic slavery in Africa and eventually linked to the end-points of the Trade in the Americas, it is important to distinguish between domestic servitude and the Slave Trade qua capitalist economic exchange in assessing the respective impacts. Domestic slavery, whether in its African or American form, did contribute to the stability of society, albeit an unjust society. On the other hand the trans-Atlantic and the Trans-Saharan Slave Trade not only foisted on Africa immediate destruction of the fabric of society but also sowed the seeds of continuing crisis and underdevelopment in Africa across several centuries of time well up to the present.

The Slave Trade, with varying degrees of intensity, spanned a period of at least eight centuries. The Nigerian economic historian Joseph Inikori's (1982: 22) overall estimate of the trade is as follows:

the total export of people from sub-Saharan Africa to the Muslim world and to the European colonies can be put at ... about 30 million. Taking only the period during which exports to the Muslim world and to the European colonies ran concurrently, that is from 1500 to 1890, the total comes to ... about 22 million.

In his overall assessment of the damage done to Africa through the Slave Trade, Inikori (1982: 59-60) points:

In the end, underpopulation and the political and social distortions arising from the slave trade created conditions entirely hostile to the process of economic transformation. To make matters worse, the stimulating influence of commodity export trade could not operate as the slave trade prevented development and growth of all other forms of trade. Sub-Saharan Africa thus developed over the slave trade era as a periphery of other economies in the Atlantic area. And once that position was firmly entrenched, it tended to be self-perpetuating (emphasis added).

Indeed, we must accept the Slave Trade as a backwash epoch for the important reason that, in addition to what Inikori says of its impact, it led to social formations and social processes which continue to hinder current efforts at Africa's development. First, the Slave Trade clearly led to the intensification of domestic slavery in pre-colonial Africa (cf. Rodney, 1966) and simultaneously, implanted a strain of violence and the devaluation of human worth in African societies. In this respect, the era of the Slave Trade casts a long shadow which today haunts the prospects of law and order and the prospects for settled conditions in which the required economic transformations could take place. At the very least it can be claimed that this strain of violence which emerged in the era of slavery has persisted all through the colonial period up to the present - up to a point where violence has become institutionalized and adopted by the state.

Secondly, it is postulated that kinship in Africa arose in conditions of the Slave Trade. Although social anthropologists, who dominated the African academic scene during colonial rule well up to the fifties, showed clearly that African politics and society were dominated by kinship behaviour (cf. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940). The functionalist assumptions which dominate the discipline and its anti-historical methodology precluded from searching for the origins of kinship. The social origins of the dominant kinship behaviour in Africa must be sought in the conditions of survival during centuries of the Slave Trade. In a situation of generalized violence and ravage, with no state structures to protect individuals and groups, it must be expected that some social structure would emerge to provide some degree of protection. It is the case that during this historical period, no other institution other than kinship has performed this role - at least not until Islam arrived in the nineteenth century in parts of the Western Sudan. In this context, kinship behaviour was therefore, a structure which emerged in reaction to the Slave Trade. Its role of offering protection for individuals and groups gives kinship an enduring characteristic which flows into its modern history.

In Africa kinship was never exclusively a domestic institution but was central to politics and therefore to the public realm. In this regard, it will be found that the greater the impact of the slave trade in any region of Africa, the bonds of kinship were liable to be stronger. Whatever pristine states were in existence during era of the Slave Trade rested on the pillars of kinship. Under colonialism, and with the expansion of kingroups and kinship systems into modern

ethnic groups and ethnicity (cf. Sklar, 1960; Wallerstein, 1960), this political character of kinship behaviour and ethnicity continues to ruin prospects for the development of modern "rational" states which are free from control by the primordial forces of kinship and ethnicity. Compared to other regions of the world, Africa stands out in the matter of the political salience of kinship behaviour and ethnicity (cf. Young, 1976, especially p. 512) - thanks to the historical legacy of the Slave Trade (3).

Thirdly, the Slave Trade era may be related to the counter-factual investigation of the absence of a feudal past from African history. In comparative world history the absence of feudal past in Africa with the probably exceptions like Ethiopia is remarkable (see Hyden 1983:10). Asia and Europe have their feudal past. If the Americas lack their own specific feudal past, they nevertheless share in the European feudal experience. Why did Africa fail to develop its own feudal past? The answer lies in the social disruptions of the Slave Trade which deprived Africa of the relative economic and cultural isolation required for the development of feudalism. The absence of a feudal past implies that Africa does not share with other regions which had histories of feudalism certain attributes of modernity that flow from well-established traditions of feudal relationships. Feudalism has been the most fertile ground for the growth of traditions of rulership. Relationships and bonds among rulers in a feudal order; the rights and obligations that define feudal relationships between lord and peasants; the discipline of office: all these elements of feudalism inform and shape the conduct of modern forms of leadership and rulership in Asia and Europe, and even in the Americas. In these areas, traditions of military prowess and decorum are transformed from their feudal origins into modern definitions of the role of the military. In sharp contrast to such regions with a feudal past, the poverty of modern African leadership is that it lacks these roots of feudal traineeship and thus cohesion in its national leaderships (Ekeh, 1985) - thanks again to the ravages of the slave Trade which prevented the emergence of any forms of feudalism in most of Africa (4).

Fourthly, and admittedly more speculatively, the Slave Trade engendered a world view and a distinct rationality that suited conditions of instability. The management of discontinuity seemed central to the proper conduct of affairs in the conditions of the Slave Trade in which whole families and villages were threatened with extinction (cf. Curtin, 1967). Such circumstances are different from those of stable conditions in which the management of continuous processes may engender the more conventional rationality which we

identify with industrial civilization. In circumstances based on the prospects of discontinuity, it may not be rational to save. On the contrary, it may be entirely rational to develop a spirit of work and consumption that is defined in terms of the here-and-now. Just as large families offered greater probability of ensuring that the kinship group would be sustained in the face of discontinuities induced by the Slave Trade and such other related natural disasters as plagues and famines, so fatalism in religious convictions offered a mode of rationality in communities with circumscribed world views (cf. Wiredu, 1980: 16-20) in an era dominated by a trade and violence whose end not even the most sophisticated ruler could understand.

In other words, they develop a rationality and a world view appropriate for conditions of violence and discontinuities during centuries of the Slave Trade. While the rationality of capitalism and industrialization deals with, and sustains, continuous processes, the rationality of the Slave Trade was fashioned to confront problems of discontinuities in social structures and social processes. Such rationality and world view and the conditions that encouraged them are hardly over two generations removed from the African present. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that in ways that could perhaps be described as sublime these realities persist and adversely affect modern development imperatives in Africa.

Compared to the long span of the Slave Trade, colonialism occupied a small layer of African history - in many cases less than seventy years. It is often imagined that colonialism is a reversal of the Slave Trade. True, colonialism sought to introduce settled order to a region virtually reduced to anarchy. It brought in its baggage of training, symbols and substantive crumbs of Western culture and industrial civilization and effectively transformed the continent as a periphery of the world system. In spite of these appearances, it was a historical impossibility for colonialism to reverse social formations and world views spanning centuries of experiences in a few decades and with minor efforts. Indeed, there is more of continuity between the Slave Trade era and colonialism than is often imagined. The sediment of the Slave Trade lies deep in the African soil, beneath the superstructural formations of colonialism.

As far as development possibilities are concerned, we may limit our assessment of the long-run significance of colonialism characterizing the development-bearing potentials of colonialism as a backwash epoch in Africa. Colonialism was from its beginnings fashioned to be, and so it remained, a recipient of industrial

civilization and not its creator or booster. The industrial and cultural artifacts of colonialism were dropped, as it were, from above and were never blended with our history and underlying world views. The result, for development, is one of social fixation, akin to the cultural fixation described for the European implantations outside Europe by Louis Hartz (1964). There is a manifest problem of immobility in technology, in industrial and bureaucratic models, in colonized Africa. Organizational and social fixation of colonialism means that "We treat with respect the organization that we inherited from colonization and we are stuck to it. There is an organizational immobility in Africa - largely because the morality and ethics that provide the stimulus for homegrown organizations in Europe for self-sustained refinement and expansion are absent from our migrated social structure" (Ekeh, 1983: 18) of colonialism as represented in the sprawling bureaucracies, hospitals, schools, railways, and industries. In other words, it is much easier to effect organizational changes in Europe, were these institutions imported from, than in their counterparts in colonized Africa.

Together, the Slave Trade and colonialism are compelling reference points in Africa's encounter with development prospects. Their continuing significance is highlighted in the fact that other unit-ideas of development-thinking on Africa gain their maximum interpretation and meaning only when considered in the context of the enduring backwash effects of the Slave Trade and colonialism. Their overall impact from the view that the Slave Trade and colonialism account for the rise of important social formations which have shaped the social, political, and economic structure of Africa. The key institutions of these social formations developed as reaction formations and have on the whole proved resistant to subsequent social and economic transformations of the African region.

(i) Threshold Problems and Growth Crises in African Development

The most distinctive and worrying attribute of development theory and practice in Africa is that as development units African nations are confronted with time-packed threshold problems and accompanying growth crises which took developed nations the leisure of centuries to resolve. While many European nations were faced with these problems in phases, usually one at a time, in the African experience all of them are conflated into one compound problem and cry for resolution under time-pressure.

The Poverty of State-Society Relationships in African Development

This crowded agenda of development in Africa is most pronounced in the consideration of the formation of the African state and of its relationship to society. As Charles Tilly (1975) and several other writers on the European state (e.g., Poggi, 1978) have shown, European nations faced these problems and had them resolved in a time spread of centuries and well before the modern age. The African experience is quite different. With incomplete and partial exceptions such as Northern Nigeria, colonialism did not incorporate pristine and indigenous state structures into the organization of the colonial state. Indeed, through various processes of demotion, incorporation, and reduction in the status of indigenous political systems. Colonialism represented the dismantling and sometimes the smashing of the indigenous state structures inherited from the slave trade era - where they existed. In other situations where state structures were not yet evident, colonialism was itself the beginning of state formation. By and large post-colonial states have emerged as extensions and expansions of the colonial state.

A few characteristics of this emergent African state may be noted as follows: First, the African state is understructured. Although the post-colonial state is relatively elaborate in its bureaucratic sphere and coercive elements of the military and police structures, it is weak in other respects, particularly in the area of legislative assemblies. Secondly, in its formation the modern African state was dissociated from the imperatives of society. As a colonial formation, the African state has hardly related its structure to the needs of society. Thirdly, although African states are, almost by definition, nation-states, there are no national societies to which they could relate. African states have had therefore to take upon themselves the hazardous task of building national societies by attacking the cultural pluralism of colonialism (cf. Zolberg, 1966; Saul, 1979; Ekeh, 1985).

These peculiar characteristics of African states have posed some critical threshold problems which are hurting Africa's development efforts seriously. These problems relate to the lack of integration and differentiation of state and society in Africa. As Smelser (1964:277) has written, "Development proceeds as a contrapuntal interplay between differentiation ... and integration". In the histories of the West, USSR, Japan and present day India, the development impulse owes a great deal to the fact that state and society are integrated into a common moral fount and therefore that public behaviours are informed by societal morality. In Africa the development impulse has been

weakened by the fact that such integration never took place. Instead the state operate outside the morality of society on the principle of amorality (Ekeh, 1975). Similarly, the functional differentiation of the state and society - that is, the differentiation of the functions which both of these arms of the nation perform in a common programme of facilitating their common ends and of aiding each other - has not taken place. In other words, as the state grows and as society proliferates in its own diversity the resulting elements are not linked together by any profounder bonds. On the contrary there is growing antagonism between state and society. And yet national development, in its various defining sectors, needs the bonded integration and differentiation of state and society to undertake the challenges of economic and social transformation.

Indeed, this threshold problem underlies various indicators of failure that observers of the African development scene have recently registered. Whether seen from the point of view of Robert Bates' (1981) negative evaluation of the role of the african state in agricultural expansion, or of Watts' (1983:23) views that the state "was incapable of regularizing the conditions of production in northern Nigeria and often contributed directly to the vulnerability of peasants upon whom it ultimately depended", or even of Hyden's (1983) reasons for recommending retreat to the economy of affection: these issues flow from the threshold problem of the growth crisis in the relationship between state and society in Africa.

The problem is complication by the fact that the amoral state is attempting in several nations to re-build society on new and firmer moral foundations, as in the case of the military campaign for a new moral society in Nigeria's WAR AGAINST INDISCIPLINE. So much energy is spent on correcting the consequences of this crisis - corruption, *coup d'états*, violence etc - that the more tangible and substantive and visible programmes of development are handicapped. Obviously, if time had allowed, this threshold problem ought to be solved by a process of prolonged domestication before economic and social transformations are attempted. But Africa's predicament lies in the fact that time is not on its side in these development decades.

Kinship and the Hegemonization Problem in Africa

One major consequence of the amorality of the state and of the difficulties in the relationships between state and society in Africa is the absence of any national hegemonic order, "an order in which a common moral language is spoken, in which one concept of reality is

dominant, informing with its spirit all modes of thought and behaviour" (Femia, 1981:24). A Gramscian hegemonic order requires that the different sectors of society, the various classes, be conjoined and integrated into a common underlying ideological pool of motivational tendencies. "It follows that hegemony is the predominance obtained by consent rather than force of one class or group over other classes" (Femia, 1981:24).

No such hegemony has been achieved in post-colonial Africa. Instead, kinship and ethnic groups have provided regional quasi-hegemonic orders which state forces are anxious to attack and destroy. The lack of a hegemonic order has led to the grave consequence that the elites in African nations lack common moral definitions and common moral basis for their existence. The tragic consequence is one in which the elites eliminate themselves in a war of one elite against all elites. Distrust among the elite is rife. Greater still is distrust among elites from different ethnic groups and kinship systems.

The consequences of the lack of an hegemonic order are far-reaching when considered in relation to development prospects. First, because it leads to the absence of national power-elites in African nations, the national interest is not promoted and protected from exploitation. Apart from such wasting conflicts such as the Nigerian civil war and Batusti-Hutsi conflicts in Rwanda, both of which were initially conflicts between ethnic elites, fundamental distrust among the elites often leads to distortions in economic policies. To cite one prominent example: the iron and steel industry in Nigeria has had to be spread across the expanse of the country, in spite of the obvious logic of a capital-intensive industry and the economies of scale, because the elite from various areas would prefer to have a piece of the industry in their regions. The growing tendency toward Caesarianism, with internecine conflicts among the elites, flows out of the absence of a common hegemonic order in African nations. Its opportunity costs in the matter of development possibilities must be reckoned to be quite high.

Childhood Socialization and Africa's Underdevelopment

The recognition of the salient role of childhood socialization in the transformation of nations varies enormously in different regions of the world. It is clearly given considerable recognition in every nation that is now developed. In a sense, the acceptance of the dramatic significance of child training is central to the cultivation of the potential for economic transformation. That this threshold problem

has been tucked away in the province of the authority of the family does not minimize its central importance in the West or elsewhere for achievements in development. Put differently, the transformation of the developed nations of the world would not have been possible without changes in childhood socialization within the authority of the family and the resulting emergence of an appropriate social character in these nations. This "intro- spective revolution" (Weinstein and Platt, 1969), to cite one interpretation of this process, is the silent revolution that underlies development - and is as much evident in Aton Makarenko's teachings in leading to the formation of the new Soviet man as in America's baby doctor's role in producing those personality attributes that have sustained capitalism in the US. Just as Marxism has gained a voice in the discussions of the superstructural problems of economic transformation in nations, so must the tenets of the Freudian Revolution of childhood training be taken into account in the substructural preparations for development.

It is the lack of recognition of the underlying necessity of appropriate changes in childhood socialization that poses one of the most intractable problem in Africa's development efforts. The nucleated self, whose essence is aligned with desired development goals, has simply not been shaped and is not forthcoming. The pace of changes required in the new modes of economic pursuits is not reflected in corresponding changes in childhood socialization. Childhood socialization in much of Africa is still kin-bound and unrelated to development programmes. As remedial measures, several African states now spend a great deal of scare resources in training young men and women to practice the virtue of patriotism - obviously outside the recognition that "the child is father of the man".

Understandably, the significance of childhood socialization is rarely grasped by political leaders and military rulers in African nations. Childhood is largely considered to be outside the framework of national considerations: individuals attain national attention only when they have survived the travails of childhood. Even more noteworthy is the position of African development theorists and practitioners on the significance of childhood training. Stretching back to Billy Dudley's (1973) derisive characterization of the emphasis on childhood training as "diaperology", many African scholars not only fail to appreciate the significance of childhood socialization for development prospects, but are likely to dismiss it as *passee*, as an argument already abandoned in the U.S. and Europe.

What is involved in such condemnation may be characterized as the

fallacy of dependency determinism and is manifest and widespread in African scholarship in various ideological hues. When a paradigm is prominent in the U.S. and Europe, or Latin America, usually because it addresses a pressing problem in the society of invention, it spreads rapidly to African scholarship, even if the problem that give rise to such a paradigm is of little importance to Africa. Conversely, when a prominent paradigm in the social sciences in the West goes into decline, usually because it is no longer able to cope with new realities, it also quickly suffers a relapse in Africa, even if the problem such a paradigm is designed to solve are still pressing in Africa.

Childhood socialization was a prominent subject in the U.S. up till the fifties and sixties, largely because it helped to explain important shifts and variations in American society (cf. Wolfenstein, 1951; Riesman, 1950; Miller and Swanson, 1958). But it has, particularly in the late seventies and eighties, received less academic attention because it has attained a settled pattern. For this reason it has also gone out of fashion in African scholarship even at a time when the problems related to childhood socialization, of the need for social control and the inculcation of new values, have become ever more pressing. Such fallacy of dependency determinism is particularly pervasive in the uncritical adoption of paradigms of development in economics and is equally prevalent among non-Marxist scholars as it is in the rote adoption of European definitions of Marxist problematics of development by Afro-Marxists.

African Culture as Antithesis of Industrial Civilization

The cultural scene in African nations is one of complex diversity. Crawford Young's (1976:511) overall assessment of this cultural scene is that there is widespread in African nations:

a shared normative perspective as to the cultural neutrality of the state. This partly derives from the complete artificiality of most states, joined to the awareness of the multicultural basis of society. The ideology of nation-building in this setting involves suffusing the state with non-specific African symbols, epitomized by Mobutu's "authenticity" campaign in Zaire, the negritude of Senghor, the utilization of Swahili as a non-ethnic national culture in Tanzania.

The character of these "nonspecific African symbols" does reflect an intellectual overlay in the phenomenological interpretation of African cultures as the antithesis of industrial civilization. From the point of view of African culture-makers, as most dramatically revealed in the

Nigeria- sponsored FESTAC (Festival of Arts and Culture) in the late 1970's, African culture is not only autonomous; it is also opposed to the strain of industrial civilization (which is collapsed with, and seen in terms of Western civilization) (5) from which it must be protected. In plainer language, African culture is increasingly being seen and defined as anti-modernity.

There are features of this quest for a different and distinct culture for Africa, and of the way it is pursued, which affect development prospects on the continent. First, the cultural energies of African nations have not been harnessed and released for development purposes, as say in Japan. Indeed, development seems to be seen as an alien enterprise, to the cultivation of which indigenous culture is not required to contribute. Secondly, the erection of this demarcation between African culture and industrial civilization deprives the African experience from attaining a measure of industrial discipline in sublimated cultural and value preferences in society. Indeed it allows the elite to live at once the double life of native chieftains and of industrial and modern mandarins: thus, academic African elites are allowed to resort to polygamy on the grounds that it is enjoined by African culture and at the same time to aspire to, say, the headship of a modern university without seeing any underlying conflict in so doing. Thirdly, African culture is actually retarded from this assumption of contre-position between African culture and industrial civilization. By being rendered as anti-modern, African culture is unable to go through the process of simplification and refinement, which Arnold Teynbee somewhere labels etherization, in which culture is transformed into sublime themes. For instance, traditional elitism in Africa (which defines the roles of kings and chiefs) is prevented from further development by the requirements of antimodernity of African culture. Fourthly, given their contra-positions the reconciliation of African culture with industrial civilization has become difficult. The danger in this is that African culture is forced to change by capture, as it were, by forces of modernity. Rather than being domesticated by traditional culture, industrial civilization with its enormous international strength displaces and captures indigenous culture particularly the youth (6).

One general remark may be made about the four threshold problems. Each of them requires considerable time since threshold problems pose strategies of domestication that need more than one generation for solving these problems and the growth crises that accompany them. Such time-evaluation of the threshold problems suggests that they are more critical for late starters whose development

efforts are compressed into a shortened time-frame.

(iii) Internationalized environment of Africa's Development and the Problems of Late Developers

From its history of the Slave Trade and of colonialism, both of which spanned over five centuries, and continuing unto its contemporary history, Africa remains the most exposed, of all regions of the world, to outside influences. No other region has the unmitigated experience of having its programmes of development wholly formed in an internationalized environment - with no shades of isolation or insulation. Isolation has rarely been practiced in the history of development elsewhere and appears in any case to be outside the reach of Africa: this is so not only because African nations are not in a political position to decide on an isolationist policy but also because they lack the broad market base that would make such policy of autarky realistic. Insulation requires a dominant core culture and the mobilization of the cultural energy of a nation for the required transformation by a committed national power elite. African countries are lacking in all these respects. African development is thus left exposed to an internationalized environment.

Such an unmitigated internationalized environment, as we have in Africa, weakens the development impulse because it lacks a home-grown cultural and value base for sustained and self-perpetuating growth. In the African case culture and history are being separated from development efforts which, to repeat a previous point, are increasingly seen and defined as an alien enterprise and abandoned to internationalism. The problem with internationalized environments of development is that the capability for national transformations is a function of fluctuations in the international economic and political mood which is controlled by events outside Africa.

The negative impact of this internationalized environment of development on Africa is reinforced by two elements in the historical moment of late development in the twentieth century. First, more than ever before the structure of international economy has grown into an independent force that influences the internal fortunes of nations. The fearsome power of the multi-national corporations to coerce is not a bogey of international Marxism but a stark reality and danger of the twentieth century from which earlier development efforts were shielded. In addition, the ability of such international institutions as the IMF and the World Bank to dictate the parameters of development, while sometimes beneficial in the short run, does mean that the

initiative for development slips from the control of the national leadership - with the associated possibility that the national interest in development is left unprotected and in fact that the perilous internationalized environment of development is widened. Indeed, in the African circumstances of development, the domestication of development programmes becomes ever more distant, with this widened internationalized environment.

The second problem element in the historical moment of late development in the twentieth century results from the fact that the weight of the international economy has grown so burdensome that even countries with developed economies can no longer act to protect their separate national interests. The emergence of two super-economies in the First World, those of the U.S. and Japan, and the growing power of multinationals have led to increased regroupings in regional economies, particularly in Western Europe. This development portends the emergence of new-style monopoly-economies.

The consolidation of the European Economic Community and the pressure for its political expansion into a "United States of Europe" must be interpreted in the light of this new twist in the world history in the twentieth century. In these circumstances weak African economies are infinitely disadvantaged. If the relatively powerful European economies must be pooled together to meet the new challenges, clearly rationally it seems imperative that African economies be combined in order for them to survive in the new international economic order.

This problem is apparently well understood by governments in Africa. But experience in attempts at combinations, or even associations, shows that it is difficult to bring together states that are ill-formed - even in the face of the recognition that each of them stands to benefit from the association. Neither the West African experience (cf. Robson, 1983) nor the East African efforts demonstrate that the African predicament in view of this imminent crushing international economic domination is closer to resolution. The prospects of development under the banner of single African national economies appear to be miserable in these circumstances.

(iv) Reciprocity and Exploitation in Africa's Relationship with the International Economic Community

Once the improbable development environments of isolation and of insulation are ruled out for, the prospects for national

transformation of African nations depend almost entirely on their establishment of international relations which developing countries have to maintain with other nations, particularly with developed ones. Such international relationships may be regarded as networks between structures where the participating nations are defined as structural components of the system. It should be further assumed that the character of the international relationships, and of the internal economic order on which it is premised, is informed by the principles of unregulated capitalism - whether the nations conjoined in them are capitalist or socialist economies. This means that the participating nations are solely motivated by what they would profit from such relationships, even if it is at the expense of others. Once these assumptions are presumed as valid, the consequences of such international economic relations may be envisaged to be those of reciprocity or exploitation.

Reciprocity subsists in any international network of transactions when participating parties benefit from them on terms that sustain the continuing dependence of all of them on the relationships. This means that the separate national structures, as parties to the transactions, are not only sustained but also strengthened in the process of participating in international economic relations. In other words, for a developing nation, relationships of reciprocity with other nations means that the resultant benefits are translated into the strengthening of their structures. Conversely, there is exploitation when the international economic relations result in the strengthening of some of the parties and the weakening of the structures of others - a result that then alters the terms of the international relationships by making the exploited parties more dependent on the relationships. A crisis develops when these terms are so disadvantageous and the internal national structure so weak that the developing nation is no longer able to engage in international transactions.

When these various pieces and definitions are brought together, we are led to the conclusion that the strength of internal structure of a nation determines the benefits and costs that flow from its participation in international economic relations. A strong national structure enhances the prospects for reciprocity in a nation's transactions with other strong national structures while it enables such a nation to exploit weaker nations. We may further ground these definitions by saying that in this conception the strength of the structure of a nation may be seen in: (a) its economic organization (including its service economic sector, its banking institutions and its money market as well as its "economy of affection"); (b) the cohesion

of its hegemonic order (including a consolidated power elite that protects the national interest, in its own greedy way, against outside interests); and (c) the maturity of the state and its institutions (including its relations with elements of society).

These extended definitions should indicate the problems that African nations face when their capabilities for economic development are placed in the context of the international economic relations, within the present internationalized environment. Because the internal structures of several African nations are weak, they face problems of exploitation in international economic relations. These weaknesses appear in fragile economic establishments; in the lack of cohesion and the absence of a credible national power elite which is able to protect the national interest against foreign predators; and in the chaotic organization of the state and its institutions. The dilemma of the African nations inheres in the fact that their internal structural weakness make dependence on international economic relations both imperative and vulnerable. As the World Bank noted in 1981:

During the past two decades economic development has been slow in most of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. When, in the mid-1970s, the world economy experienced inflation and recession, nowhere did the crisis hit with greater impact than in this region.

An inevitable vicious circle sets in as international economic relations lead to exploitation of the developing nations and such exploitation weakens further the internal structures of these nations.

(v) Ideology and the Preformationist Control of Development Prospects in Africa

It is an indication of the problems that late development induces that the outcomes of national development programmes in Africa have been consistently anticipated not only with respect to probable economic consequences but even more emphatically in terms of preferred political arrangements. The salient issue that flows from this fact is that these desired end-products of development tend to control the conduct and management of development programmes in a "preformationist mould".

The first signs of this aspect of development in Africa arose with Independence nationalism, as huge programmes that appeared to be token maturity of nationhood were embarked upon in Ghana and elsewhere. Their size obviously meant that Western capitalists outside

the continent actually controlled their fortunes - in spite of its immediate implication, such as the attainment of national pride. Such sporadic giant undertakings as Nigeria's expensive AFRICAN FESTIVAL OF ARTS AND CULTURE ("FESTAC") in the late 1970s, which could easily have been trimmed down without the loss of its essence of preservation of African culture, indicate how nationalist sentiments could misdirect development efforts. It is only fair to recognize along this propensity the dilemma that Africa is over-exposed to various cultural currents and that the preservation of African cultures is seen by knowledgeable Africans as a responsible commitment on the part of African national leaderships.

It has also been held that ideological preferences have in some ways determined the shabby outcomes of development efforts on the continent in the last two decades. In a comprehensive survey of this problem Grawford Young (1982), using six measures (of economic growth, individual equality, national autonomy, human dignity, mass participation, and state capacity and performance), could not reach uniform and firm conclusions about the impact of ideology on development performance - although on balance his evidence seemed tilted in favour of capitalist states over popular socialist and Marxist-Leninist states in Africa. Goran Hyden's (1983) views have been far more definite:

Experience of socialist states in Africa indicates that a centrally planned economy is a virtual impossibility at the present level of development of the productive forces. Because of the difficulty of making headway, the formal economy of these states has begun to crumble... This suggests that African states, irrespective of current political ideology, cannot really expect to jump the capitalist phase (Hyden, 1983:29).

Relying on the salience of the themes and unit-ideas analyzed in this paper, I suspect that the questions about the relationships between ideology and development are not as cogent as they appear to be in the on-going debate on the strength of African development. There is liable to be more truth in Hyden's (1983:5) other views:

The Marxist-Leninist approach is only a more complex version of capitalism. No approach to development has proved feasible without the subordination of individuals to a cultural superstructure in which the rules of science and technology reign. The debate about alternative life-styles that goes on in Western societies takes place within the confines of such a superstructure - It is a debate among people for whom science and technology are part and parcel of a daily existence.

Although it is possible to regard the premises of these views as ill-constructed - after all India is developing and advancing without a widespread Western superstructure of science - its central message with respect to Africa should be taken most seriously: there are development thresholds below which ideological debates become irrelevant. Put differently, contrary to assertions resulting from African debates on the ideological impact of development, capitalist US and socialist USSR are more alike in organizational attainment. To point to one leading sector, a committed national power elite is as much a sine qua non of development in socialist countries as it is in capitalist nations. In this view African development problems are less than ideological - at least in the limited sense of whether socialism or capitalism is an easier route to development. Our problems lie elsewhere.

There is indeed some danger in relying on a philosophical posture of performativism in dealing with the end-result of any development programmes: the envisaged end-result comes to be treated as the means. After all, socialism is the expected historical twilight of capitalist drudgery. My fear is that the ideological trees may successfully hide away the wood of development in Africa. To cite one example: in Africa capitalism is being defined as an open-day forum for international enterprise. The "openness" in Ivory Coast, as it is in the current IMF definition of capitalism in Africa, would have no historical parallel in the capitalist West. It seems to be the case that the problem that Africa faces here is one of an over-exposed internationalized environment of development rather than one of an ideological construct called capitalism.

(vi) Conclusions: Solving Africa's Development Problems

Outside the unusually liberal environments in Tanzania, it is rare for African governments to be concerned with the broad, non-economic, problems of development that confront their nations. In these circumstances solutions emerge which are not related to the fundamental problems that confront development prospects. Indeed, such "solutions without problems" are plentiful in Africa, as governments press for immediate "solutions", almost in the abstract.

In my view, the objectives of the academic study of development in Africa should be different and higher than those of governments besieged by immediate and urgent daily problems. It has been the aim of this paper to contribute to the understanding of the underlying and hence fundamental development problems that confront Africa. The

relevance of the unit-ideas examined in the paper for offering any solutions lies in the possibility that they could help to reshape the parameters of development-thinking on the continent. Any solutions to our problems may benefit by taking into account the division of the unit-ideas into two type: basic unit-ideas that are intrinsic to any programme of development; and what I have called cybernetic unit-ideas that tie particular development efforts to external sources.

With respect to the basic unit-ideas, what is needed is for Africans and African states to seek a mastery of these aspects of the development process. While the African past - that stretches beyond colonization to the uglier era of the Slave Trade - cannot be readjusted retrospectively, its lessons must be understood firmly as problematic for our efforts at development. But there are areas of these basic elements of the development process in which deliberate commitments to achieving progress can be more directly fruitful. The importance of the elements of the threshold problems need to be debated and examined with a view to incorporating them, even in their subtlety, in the development agenda of African nations. Their solution demands patience and time: the despair that flows from failure to attain the exaggerated definitions of our capabilities for development must be made lighter through more realistic understanding of the difficulties that Africa must surmount before it can catch up with the development train into a journey of self-sustained growth. Above all else, the responsibility of the state must be underlined in any renewed attempt at resurrecting programmes of development in Africa. all the various programmatic recommendations that are now being offered as a means of overcoming the present state of lethargy (e.g., by Hyden, 1985:207-212) must be underlined by the centrality of responsible and strong states, not irresponsible and arbitrary governments in the development process. The administration of any changes in development strategies - including revisions which would de-emphasize the direct involvement of the state in economic, agricultural, and industrial programmes and which would reverse "top-down" to "bottom-up" approaches to development - requires responsible state involvement as a necessity.

With respect to the cybernetic elements of the development process, Africans and African states can only offer a limited amount of redefinition of the internationalized environment of development into which we are forced and even less of the historical moment of late development which defines the scope and possibilities of our achievements in development. In my view solutions to the problems posed by these cybernetic elements of development cannot be solved

within the individual resources of single nations, but in the regrouping of several national economies into consolidated regional economies. To mention this of course is to resurrect the specter of divisions on the continent. In any case such possibility also presupposes the emergence of national power elites who can see beyond the present and their immediate national surroundings to recognize that development problems in Africa have their own gender.


Footnotes:

* University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

1. Ali Mazrui (1985: 295) sees two strands in the socialist intellectual movement based at Dar-es-Salaam: "By the middle of the 1970's the battle lines were basically drawn between anti-imperialists like Nabudere and Tandon, on one side, and anti-capitalists, like Shivji and Mamdani, on the other. The anti-imperialists defined the enemy as being basically external; the anti-capitalists allowed the African continent the dignity of producing its own indigenous capitalist devils, without necessarily reflecting the mechanisations of external imperialist forces".

2. The inter-relationships between these basic unit-ideas may be illustrated diagrammatically as in Figure I, with the arrows indicating the thrust of development pressure. The potential uses of this mode of analysis.

Figure I: Basic Elements of the Development Process



in gaining deeper interpretations of the development process may be imagined by considering three instances of theories of development as illustrated in Figures I.a, I.b, I.c, which are elaborations of Figure I.

Figures I.a-I.c: Basic Elements of Three Theoretical Models of Development

Figure I.a




Figure I.b





Figure I.c



Africa Development

First, the Marxist model of development takes as its base-line some historical epoch. For Marx's analysis of capitalism, this epoch was the medieval world which, following class struggles and the resolution of the ensuing societal contradictions, was transformed into capitalism. Marx of course foresaw socialism as the inevitable end-product of these ineluctable transformations. In modernization theory, the base-line is represented by tradition, with modernization strategies as the intervention process and modernity as the envisaged end-product. Finally, in Figure 1.c, is displayed the elements of personality theory. Personality is the end-product of an intervention process, called socialization, which starts with the neonatal child as the base- line of the development process.

3. The editors of an impressive compilation of essays on the subject of 'slavery' in Africa, Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff (1977), assume that kinship in Africa is given and that "slavery" is indeed reducible to kinship behaviour (p. 67). Since Miers and Kopytoff are sympathetic to Curtin's (1975) position on the relationship between the Slave Trade and domestic slavery and thus believe that "Given the possible volume of the internal African demand for people (i.e. domestic slaves), it may be more rewarding to begin (by) considering the external trade as an appendage of the internal 'market'", it must be assumed that they would also be predisposed to reduce the occurrence of the external Slave Trade to African kinship systems.

4. The failure of feudalism to develop in Africa is not unrelated to the exaggerated institutionalization of kinship behaviour in Africa. Feudalism by its nature is incompatible with kinship networks, particularly in the political domain. Thus, it is noteworthy that kinship behaviour is least developed in Ethiopia which is about the only important region of Africa in which feudalism did develop.

On this reasoning the claim that feudalism did develop in kinship-ridden Buganda (cf. Fallers, 1964; Mamdani, 1976) or Ashanti (cf. Rattray, 1923) may be seen as misplaced comparison with the history of other areas of the world where feudalism existed outside kinship networks. That left to its own internal and autonomous evolutionary developments - that is, without the outside encroachment of the Slave Trade and colonialism - Africa could have attained feudalism, may be inferred from the fact that a few societies were close to attaining kinship-free feudal status in pre-Slave Trade and pre-colonial Africa as, say, in Benin city-state (cf. Egherevba, 1934) and in Zululand (cf. Bryant, 1929).

5. In this respect, Leopold Senghor's major error in dealing with African culture flows from his failure to distinguish between Western culture and industrial civilization. This failure leads him to a false contrast between African culture, which he characterizes as emotion-ridden, and Western (European) culture, which he sees as an embodiment of rationality (See Senghor, 1967).

6. The Ghanaian philosopher Wiredu (1980) teaches the need to cleanse African culture of its "anachronisms" (that is, themes in the culture which have outlasted their suitability in our present social circumstances of development (1980:1)) through changes in African educational systems to achieve "a kind of training in method, the kind of training that will produce minds eager and able to test claims and theories against observed facts and adjust beliefs to the evidence, minds capable of logical analysis and fully aware of the nature and value of exact measurement" (p. 15). Among the anachronisms Wiredu is worried about is "the unlimited extension of the concept of the family" with accompanying moral fervour: "Here, then, in the kinship orientation of traditional morality, is a problem that we must recognize and face up to. It is one of the most subtle problems of anachronism in our present day society" (p. 24).

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RESUME

Les études de développement comparées réalisées en Afrique, en particulier celles qui essaient de classer les régions du Tiers-Monde dans la même catégorie accusent de sérieuses insuffisances lorsqu'elles tentent d'analyser les spécificités du problème du développement en Afrique. L'auteur affirme que l'Afrique vit des problèmes de développement qui lui sont propres et qu'il est plus facile

d'appréhender ces problèmes en comparant les expériences de la région africaine avec celles de l'Europe de l'Ouest et d'autres régions développées.

Dans un premier temps l'auteur passe en revue les différentes "tendances de la philosophie du développement en Afrique" au cours des quatre dernières décennies. Ces "tendances" sont passées d'une manière désordonnée de l'indifférence à l'optimisme puis au pessimisme comme c'est le cas pour la théorie de la modernisation des années 50 et 60. Dès le départ, la théorie de la modernisation fut confrontée en Afrique à des difficultés majeures dues essentiellement à la sous-structuration de l'État par rapport à la société civile.

L'échec de la théorie de la modernisation a engendré un nouveau scepticisme et orienté l'attention sur le sous-développement et la théorie de la dépendance qui souligne les effets néfastes des rapports entre les pays du Tiers-monde et l'Occident. L'apport des intellectuels africains dans la théorie du développement, l'hostilité de cette théorie vis-à-vis des anciennes nations métropolitaines et du capitalisme d'une manière générale, son incapacité à étudier les structures sociales africaines avec le même rigueur que pour examiner la composante internationale de la dépendance, et enfin sa critique des gouvernements africains et les interférences entre le monde académique et les efforts de développement des gouvernements africains, constituent les aspects intéressants de la théorie du sous-développement dans l'Afrique des années 1970 et 1980. A cet égard, la théorie du développement est restée dans une grande mesure une théorie de la critique qui n'intervenait pas d'une manière positive dans les questions de développement.

Au milieu des années 1980, les réalités qui ont encouragé le développement de la théorie du sous-développement en Afrique se sont transformées, donnant lieu au désespoir. Davantage préoccupée par des questions essentielles d'alimentation et de survie, cette théorie se détourne nettement aujourd'hui de l'évaluation globale du développement pour se pencher sur des questions de développement endogène. Compte tenu de ces problèmes engendrés par les fluctuations spectaculaires des tendances académiques, l'auteur s'attache à conceptualiser les problèmes de développement en faisant appel à des thèmes majeurs dans le cadre d'une approche méthodologique qui pourrait faciliter une évaluation objective des problèmes de développement de l'Afrique.

Les différents thèmes majeurs suivants sont soulignées dans le document (i) époques marquantes de développement, (ii) problèmes fondamentaux de développement tels les crises de croissance, (iii) environnement et moment historique de développement, (iv) réciprocité et exploitation dans le processus de développement, (v) produit final de développement. Les événements marquants servent de lien entre le passé et l'avenir et constituent donc la base d'un développement futur. En conséquence, il y a des événements historiques capitaux tels que la Révolution industrielle et la Révolution française. A l'inverse de ces derniers il existe des événements historiques qui entraînent des remous et entravent souvent l'évolution positive impulsée par les événements capitaux. En Afrique, la traite des nègres et le colonialisme entre dans cette catégorie et ont eu un impact durable qui continue à être une entrave aux efforts de développement

S'appuyant sur la thèse selon laquelle le développement est porteur de crise, l'auteur considère les problèmes fondamentaux comme une définition analytique, non séquentielle des domaines autonomes où se posent des problèmes dont la résolution permettra à l'entité en développement de s'élever à un degré d'existence supérieur. Dans ce contexte, quatre problèmes fondamentaux de développement requérant des solutions dans le cadre des programmes de transformation nationale sont identifiés : (a) intégration et différenciation de l'Etat et de la Société; (b) hégémonisation de la Société; (c) développement de soi; (d) administration de la culture et de la civilisation. Chacune de ces composantes devrait être cultivée à des fins de développement pour faire face aux contraintes de transformation nationale. Or en Afrique, l'on n'a pas encore trouvé une solution à ces problèmes. A l'inverse d'autres régions comme l'Europe où les problèmes de développement furent abordés et résolus par étapes et au fil des siècles, l'Afrique doit faire face, dans un laps de temps très court, à des problèmes fondamentaux d'une extrême urgence et aux crises de croissance qui en découlent et qui finissent par s'amalgamer avec eux en un seul problème.

EBAUCHE D'UNE ANALYSE DE LA QUESTION AGRAIRE EN OUGANDA

Mahmood Mamdani*

I. Introduction: Contexte Théorique

Le monde paysan n'est ni auto-suffisant ni figé. C'est pour cela qu'en faisant une analyse des relations agraires, l'on doit toujours commencer par en situer le thème empirique dans un contexte historique large, si étroit soit ce thème.

Pour arriver à comprendre ce contexte historique large dans le cas de l'Ouganda contemporaine, il importe de saisir deux traits de son économie politique. Ces deux traits ont évolué au cours de la période coloniale et dans les deux cas c'est l'Etat colonial qui a été le promoteur du changement. Ils traduisent l'un et l'autre la réalité de la domination impérialiste sur l'agriculture, et ont fait coulé beaucoup d'encre dans la littérature actuelle.

Le premier trait est la rupture entre l'agriculture et l'industrie nationales du fait de la création d'une agriculture et d'une industrie tributaires des exportations et des importations respectivement, pendant la période coloniale. Il ne faudrait cependant pas croire que l'essentiel de l'activité agricole était orientée alors vers la production à des fins d'exportation, mais il se trouve simplement que la production était devenue l'élément dynamique de l'agriculture locale. De plus, parallèlement à cette forme d'agriculture, se développa une industrie qui, tout en produisant pour le marché local, était presque exclusivement tributaire d'une technologie, de matières premières, de pièces détachées, de compétences techniques et de capitaux importés. Le commerce d'import-export par le biais duquel s'organisaient les relations agro-industrielles, était le pivot de cette économie à caractère impérialiste.

Alors que d'une manière générale, l'agriculture nationale est

orientée vers l'exportation, elle comporte divers mécanismes au niveau local. Dans le contexte ougandais, nous pouvons observer trois mécanismes différents, dont chacun représente une forme différente d'intégration régionale au sein de l'économie coloniale.

(a) Production de matières premières à faible coût

Dans ces régions les ménages paysans produisent soit des matières premières industrielles telles que, le coton, le café ou des denrées de base comme la banane ou le mil pour leur valeur d'échange, soit des vivres pour leur valeur d'usage. Etant donné que les ménages produisent les vivres destinés à l'auto- consommation, ce qui les incite à produire des produits de base, c'est le besoin de liquidités, liquidités devant leur permettre de payer leurs impôts, d'acheter quelques biens de première nécessité (sel, savon, paraffine, médicaments, vêtements, sucre etc.) et à long terme, de se reconstituer un stock d'instruments aratoires essentiels. La division du travail au sein de la famille vise également à la réalisation du plan de production en deux volets qui combine la production de matières premières avec la production vivrière.

(b) Production de travail bon marché

Plutôt que des matières premières, la famille produit la force de travail considérée comme une marchandise. La main- d'oeuvre migrante offre une réponse au besoin de liquidités engendré par les mêmes circonstances que celles énoncées antérieurement. Dans ce cas également l'on se trouve en présence d'un plan de production à deux volets selon lequel la main- d'oeuvre familiale doit se scinder en deux groupes se consacrant l'un à la production de matières premières et l'autre à la production vivrière.

La différence est que dans ce cas les deux mécanismes sont séparés dans l'espace : les travailleurs migrants s'éloignent de leur lieu de résidence, tandis que le reste de la famille continue à vivre dans le village et à produire des vivres pour l'auto-consommation.

(c) Production de bétail à peu de frais

Considérées traditionnellement comme une terre de transhumance, ces régions étaient soumises à la double pression de l'aliénation illégale des terres et de la transformation forcée du bétail en marchandise. Dans ce cas, un plan de production simple était maintenu car le bétail était considéré à la fois comme une marchandise et une denrée de consommation familiale.

Toutes ces trois formes d'intégration du fait qu'elles étaient aléatoires ne garantissaient pas la satisfaction des besoins alimentaires de la famille paysanne et ne couvraient pas par conséquent l'essentiel de ses coûts de reproduction. Elles avaient toutes en commun la production de travail à peu de frais, soit directement approprié (en tant que travail rétribué) ou indirectement (en tant que produits du travail). Cette deuxième caractéristique définit le contexte général de la question agraire en Ouganda.

La thèse selon laquelle la main-d'oeuvre paysanne est une main-d'oeuvre peu coûteuse a été assez bien comprise par les plus clairvoyants des membres de la bourgeoisie coloniale en Afrique. Par exemple, le Gouverneur Clifford (Buell, 1965-772) expliquait devant le Conseil législatif nigérien (colonial) qu'il préférerait la production paysanne aux plantations européennes parce que l'exploitation paysanne:

(a) est mieux implantée que ses homologues fondés et gérés par des Européens, car elle s'est développée naturellement et ne procède pas d'une création artificielle ; elle est en outre auto-suffisante en ce qui concerne la main-d'oeuvre, alors que les plantations européennes ne peuvent subsister qu'en s'appuyant sur un système quelconque d'immigration organisée ou sur le travail forcé;

(b) est sans conteste l'instrument de production agricole extensive le moins onéreux jamais conçu ; et,

(c) peut se développer rapidement et accroître progressivement son rendement, battant tous les records jamais atteints...

Il convient de préciser que si les exploitations paysannes sont "les instruments les moins onéreux", jamais conçus pour la production à grande échelle de produits agricoles, c'est précisément parce qu'elles sont auto-suffisantes du point de vue de la force de travail.

Cette même question de la main-d'oeuvre bon marché a été débattue en long et en large depuis le début du siècle, dans les écrits marxistes, bien qu'elle ait été formulée quelque peu différemment : comment les petites exploitations arrivent-elles à survivre, même face à la compétition capitaliste? En effet, Engels n'avait-il pas prédit dans la Question paysanne en France et en Allemagne que la concurrence des grandes exploitations capitalistes entraînerait rapidement la désintégration des petites et moyennes exploitations?

Kautsky et Lénine ont tous deux reconnu que cette prédiction ne s'est pas vérifiée et ont essayé d'expliquer ce fait, Kautsky dans la Question agraire et Lénine dans Le Développement du Capitalisme en Russie (Hussein and Tribe, 1981 : 26-28, 67, 108). Ils expliquaient en substance que les relations entre les petites et les grandes exploitations s'étaient finalement stabilisées par un jeu de complémentarité et de concurrence.

Dans le premier cas, ils arguaient que les petites et les grandes exploitations ne se font pas concurrence sur le marché des produits agricoles, mais se complètent, le dernier type d'exploitation fournissant du travail au premier. Alors que les grandes exploitations vendent des produits agricoles sur le marché, les petites exploitations y vendent la force de travail.

Dans le deuxième cas, les petites exploitations survivent face à la concurrence des grandes exploitations capitalistes, disait Kautsky, et ce en dépit des avantages techniques de ces dernières. Il expliquait, d'autre part, l'endurance des petites exploitations par le niveau de vie bas des paysans et leurs besoins urgents d'argent qui les obligeaient à accepter les prix qu'on leur proposait sur le marché.

Il importe de souligner le point suivant : que les rapports existant entre les petites et les grandes exploitations agricoles soient complémentaires ou compétitifs, la survie de l'exploitation paysanne tient au faible coût du travail, soit directement approprié (en tant que force de travail) soit indirectement (en tant que produits du travail).

L'on a beaucoup écrit au cours de ces trois dernières décennies sur les économies de réserve de main-d'oeuvre d'Afrique australe, en soulignant que la crise de la production paysanne s'explique essentiellement par le fait que les paysans n'ont cessé de vendre à faible coût leur force de travail aux entreprises capitalistes établies dans leur voisinage. Les essais écrits par Arrighi (1973) sur la Rhodésie du Sud, par Wolpe (1972) et Meillassoux (1971) sur l'Afrique du Sud sont particulièrement intéressants à cet égard.

L'on ne peut cependant pas en dire de même des débats actuels sur la crise agraire qui frappe le reste de l'Afrique, où les exploitations agricoles paysannes ne produisent pas de grosses quantités de denrées et ne sont pas des réserves de main- d'oeuvre. La plupart des écrits qui existent sur ce sujet reflètent l'une des deux tendances suivantes :

- La première illustre une désaffection, dans les ouvrages écrits, à l'égard de l'analyse des rapports de production, en faveur exclusivement des relations d'échange. Les thèmes de discussion abordés ont été tirés de ces propositions limitées mais partagées : la crise agricole est-elle le fait essentiellement des relations d'échanges avec l'étranger (détérioration des termes du commerce international entraînant un déséquilibre des échanges et un afflux des valeurs vers les centres impérialistes?) ou est-elle avant tout engendrée par des relations d'échanges "intérieures" (détérioration des termes de l'échange entre l'agriculture et l'industrie aggravée par des taux de changes majorés?) Nous avons d'une part les défenseurs de la théorie de la dépendance et d'autre part les technocrates de la Banque Mondiale et du FMI (1). Cet important débat est toutefois galvaudé du fait que les tenants de ces deux thèses ne savent pas réellement par où commencer leurs recherches qui portent sur une analyse des rapports de production dans l'agriculture paysanne. L'un des objectifs du présent document est de contribuer à un tel changement d'optique.

- En revanche, la deuxième tendance s'efforce de mettre l'accent sur les rapports de production, mais cette tentative n'est que de pure forme. Dans ce cas, l'étude de la question paysanne est envisagée dans l'optique des recherches antérieurement menées en Asie et en Amérique Latine, où les rapports agraires se résument à des relations de propriétaires à métayers et la question paysanne est synonyme de problème foncier. Sur le continent africain, quelques îlots seulement, dont le plus important est l'Ethiopie, présentent des similitudes avec la situation latino-asiatique.

Dans une grande partie de l'Afrique, les conditions sont tout à fait différentes : les terres sont relativement nombreuses, la densité de la population faible, et les paysans ne traitent pas directement avec un suzerain en la personne d'un propriétaire terrien. Plus d'un observateur a été amené à conclure devant cet état de choses qu'il n'existe pas vraiment de question sociale dans les campagnes africaines. Joran Hyden (1980 et 1983) (2) soutient une position extrême parmi les tenants de cette thèse, lorsqu'il déclare que le paysan africain n'est confronté à aucune force sociale, à l'exclusion de la nature, et qu'aussi longtemps qu'il restera "indompté" - c'est-à-dire inexploité - il n'y aura pas de développement économique possible sur le continent. Le problème qui se pose à ce niveau est celui de l'identification automatique de la question agraire avec la question foncière. Ceci tient au fait que l'on a essayé de trouver en Afrique la réplique des relations agraires qui prévalent dans d'autres parties du monde. C'est une erreur d'étudier

uniquement des relations historiquement concrètes qui prévalent dans l'Afrique contemporaine.

II. Introduction: Contexte Historique

Cette étude porte concrètement sur une enquête menée en 1983-84 dans deux villages de l'Ouganda. Kintende et Amwoma. Kitende, situé à une quinzaine de kilomètres sur la route de Kampala-Entebbe, est un village du Bouganda, région du centre de l'Ouganda. Amwoma, situé dans le nord du pays, à Lango, est distant de seize kilomètres du centre commercial le plus proche (Dokolo) et de soixante-quatre kilomètres environ de la ville la plus proche (Lira). Nous essaierons dans cette partie de souligner l'importance de ces deux villages en les plaçant dans leur contexte historique et social. Ce faisant, nous analyserons deux traits de ces localités, d'une part leur intégration dans l'économie coloniale et d'autre part, le mode de propriété foncière qui y a cours.

Nous avons déjà souligné que l'intégration de l'Ouganda rural dans l'économie coloniale ne s'est pas faite uniformément. L'on peut identifier en effet au moins trois formes différentes d'intégration : intégration en tant que réservoir de matières premières, en tant que réserve de main-d'oeuvre ou de bétail. Kitende est historiquement un réservoir de matières premières et Amwoma une réserve de main-d'oeuvre.

Dans les tous premiers temps de l'histoire du Bouganda, région où se trouve le village de Kitende, la production de produits de base (coton) par les paysans s'est développée parallèlement à la culture de l'hévéa dans les plantations des Britanniques. Alors que les ménages paysans étaient auto-suffisants pour ce qui concernait la main-d'oeuvre, les plantations ne devaient leur prospérité qu'à la main-d'oeuvre bon marché qu'elles recrutaient parmi les paysans. Pour cela il fallait faire usage du pouvoir répressif de l'Etat colonial, car les deux types de production ne pouvaient coexister en bonne intelligence.

Cette opposition devint apparente avec la crise de l'emploi que connurent les plantations lorsque les ménages paysans se mirent à cultiver le coton pour payer leurs impôts. Dans le même temps, l'effondrement des marchés mondiaux de produits de base, consécutivement à la Première Guerre mondiale impérialiste fit ressortir la situation particulièrement précaire des planteurs face à des conditions de marché défavorables. L'administration coloniale fit la sourde oreille aux prières que lui adressaient les planteurs pour qu'elle les cautionne. La production du coton, introduite par les missionnaires au tout début

du siècle, avait fait naître parmi les membres de l'Association impériale de culture de coton, le désir de développer d'autres sources de production de coton d'excellente qualité qui libéreraient Manchester de sa dépendance vis-à-vis du Sud des Etats-Unis. Le coton ougandais pouvait valablement soutenir la concurrence face aux variétés américaine et égyptienne. Quoi d'étonnant donc que l'administration coloniale ait embrassé vigoureusement la cause des paysans au détriment des intérêts des planteurs.

Après la guerre, la production du coton s'étendit aux provinces de l'Est et du Nord, en raison notamment des mutations que nous allons bientôt examiner. Dans ce contexte, et pour s'affranchir de sa dépendance vis-à-vis des marchés du café contrôlés par les Américains, l'Etat colonial encouragea vivement les paysans à cultiver le café dans des régions aux conditions écologiques favorables, en particulier le Bouganda. C'est ainsi que cette région devint la terre de prédilection pour la culture du café dans l'Ouganda indépendant.

L'histoire d'Amwoma (Lango, au nord de l'Ouganda) est encore plus complexe. A l'aube de l'administration coloniale, Amwoma fut organisée en réserves de main-d'oeuvre comme il y en avait tant d'autres, pour fournir de la main-d'oeuvre aussi bien aux plantations et aux organismes municipaux du sud qu'aux forces répressives de l'Etat colonial. Acholi (au nord de l'Ouganda), West Nile (au nord-ouest) et Kigezi (au sud-ouest) constituaient avec Lango les réserves de main-d'oeuvre. Lorsque des sources extérieures commencèrent à fournir de la main-d'oeuvre, par exemple, les travailleurs migrants en provenance du Rwanda voisin, ces réserves perdirent leur importance au cours des décennies suivantes.

La première grosse vague de travailleurs migrants déferla du Rwanda dans les années 1920, fuyant l'exploitation coloniale belge de type féodal qui s'intensifiait. Profitant de ces circonstances, l'Etat colonial en Ouganda introduisit la culture du coton à Lango et à Acholi. De même, une deuxième vague d'émigration du Rwanda dans les années 1950 incita l'administration coloniale à lancer la production du café dans le West Nile. A la veille de l'indépendance, Kigezi restait la seule réserve de main-d'oeuvre en Ouganda.

Ainsi, à partir des années 1920, Amwoma fit partie de la région cotonnière située au nord de l'Ouganda. Cependant l'on devait constater un changement d'orientation dans les années 1970 lorsque la crise agricole sévit dans le secteur des exportations. Voyant que l'Etat pratiquait des cours de plus en plus bas pour les produits de base qu'il

commercialisait, les producteurs paysans se reconvertirent à des cultures destinées aux marchés locaux. Le mil devient à la place du coton la principale culture de rapport.

Par ailleurs, l'accroissement de la production de produits de base par les ménages eut pour corollaire un ralentissement des courants de migrations de main-d'oeuvre en provenance d'Amwoma et des campagnes environnantes. Alors que pendant la période coloniale les immigrants rwandais ainsi que ceux en provenance de Kigezi, trouvaient du travail dans les caféières des riches paysans du sud du Bouganda, les migrants venant du nord se fixaient au nord de cette région. Compte tenu de la situation politique défavorable de la période de l'après-indépendance, et plus particulièrement de la guérilla qui fit rage en 1981-85 à Luwero (au nord de l'Ouganda), ces courants migratoires qui s'étaient déjà considérablement ralentis s'amenuisèrent davantage.

En somme, Kitende et Amwoma sont aujourd'hui des réservoirs de matières premières, pour ce qui concerne leur intégration dans l'ensemble de l'économie. Cependant, Amwoma à l'opposé de Kitende, est historiquement connu comme une réserve de main-d'oeuvre. L'importance de ce fait historique est qu'aujourd'hui les relations de production sont beaucoup plus diversifiées à Kitende qu'à Amwoma.

Ces deux villages présentent également de profondes disparités en ce qui concerne le régime foncier. En effet, Amwoma ne connaît pas les relations de propriétaire terrien à métayer à l'inverse de Kitende. La situation d'Amwoma est par conséquent plus représentative de celle de nombre de régions de l'Ouganda (et de l'Afrique) où la question foncière ne se pose pas encore en tant que telle.

C'est dans la campagne du Bouganda, région où est situé Kitende, que se pose avec acuité le problème de la propriété foncière dans l'Ouganda contemporain. Dans cette région, les relations précoloniales de type féodal existant entre le propriétaire terrien et le métayer ont été restructurées et renforcées en 1900 avec la cession de terres mesurées en miles (mailo land) à une classe d'environ 8000 propriétaires pour les récompenser de leur allégeance politique à l'Etat colonial. Nous avons fait l'historique de l'évolution de ces relations dans une autre étude (Mamdani, 1976 : chapitre 3). Nous nous contenterons de souligner ici les principaux événements qui jalonnent cette histoire.

La loi Busulu et Nvujjo de 1928, véritable concession au mouvement puissant des métayers qui prit de l'expansion dans les années 1920, constitua le premier frein majeur aux prérogatives

légalement illimitées des propriétaires terriens qui les autorisaient à prélever à volonté la main-d'oeuvre supplémentaire dont ils avaient besoin, parmi les paysans qui occupaient leurs terres. S'il est vrai que cette loi réduisit considérablement le loyer de la terre (obusulu) et la rente en nature (envujjo) que le propriétaire était en droit d'exiger du métayer, il n'en demeure pas moins qu'elle n'eut qu'une application temporaire. La raison en est qu'elle ne protégeait que les métayers d'alors. Avec le temps, la population s'accrut et avec elle, la demande de terres à broussailles et à forêts jusque là inexploitées et qui étaient gérées par les propriétaires terriens, libres désormais de vendre cette terre ouvertement.

En juin 1975, le régime d'Amin abrogea la loi Busulu et Nvujjo de 1928 et promulgua un Décret sur la réforme foncière qui précisait que toutes les terres seraient désormais données à bail par l'Etat pour une période de quatre-vingt dix-neuf ans. "Le droit de propriété absolu" et "le pouvoir qu'avait le métayer coutumier d'empêcher la mise en valeur de la terre furent abolis. Tout "métayer coutumier" (paysan) devint un métayer à la discrétion de l'Etat ; l'Administration des Domaines fut nantie de pouvoirs pour résilier tout bail sur une terre "non mise en valeur" et la céder à un "exploitant" potentiel. Dans ce contexte, le Décret sur la réforme foncière fut assimilé à un balai destiné à supprimer toutes les barrières médiévales qui entravaient la voie du développement capitaliste.

Cependant, sa signification réelle était différente. Dans des régions du pays telles que le Bouganda, où la propriété foncière existait, le propriétaire devint un preneur de l'Etat et le métayer un sous-locataire du propriétaire. En dehors de tout contrôle des loyers, le propriétaire était libre de louer à un métayer toute parcelle non cultivée et couverte de broussailles ou par la forêt et qu'il gérait. Le Décret de 1975 sur la réforme foncière introduisit donc un nouveau type de propriété au Bouganda.

L'histoire de la propriété foncière à Amwoma est tout à fait différente et reflète davantage la situation qui prévaut dans la plupart des villages ougandais. Amwoma n'a pas connu à l'époque précoloniale ou coloniale des relations de location de terres. Ceci est dû en partie au mouvement de métayers dans les années 1920 au Bouganda. C'est en effet pour éviter que ce mouvement ne s'étende que l'administration coloniale décida d'empêcher que le système de propriété foncière ne gagne le reste du pays, malgré le désir des chefs des autres régions de devenir des propriétaires fonciers à l'image de ceux du Bouganda. En revanche toutes les terres furent déclarées du Domaine de la couronne ;

le droit communal coutumier qui garantissait l'usufruit aux agriculteurs paysans, fut sanctionné par le droit colonial ; les chefs devinrent des agents salariés de l'Etat.

Cette situation prévalut jusqu'à la promulgation par le régime d'Amin du Décret de 1975 sur la réforme foncière. Dans des régions comme le Bouganda, ce décret renforça le système de propriété foncière par l'abrogation de la loi de 1928 sur le contrôle des loyers. Cependant, ailleurs, en annulant au nom de "la mise en valeur" les formes coutumières d'occupation des terres qui avaient jusque là protégé les droits de jouissance de la terre par usufruit des paysans, la loi favorisa l'entrée du capital dans la campagne "communale". Nous aurons ultérieurement l'occasion d'illustrer cette tendance.

Cependant, ces faits récents n'ont pas contribué à atténuer le contraste existant entre les deux villages en ce qui concerne la propriété foncière. A Kitende, les paysans sont directement sous la coupe d'un suzerain alors que ce n'est pas le cas à Amwoma. A Kitende, le monopole exercé par certains sur la terre a entraîné une situation de pénurie aiguë des terres au détriment des paysans démunis ; à Amwoma, l'on ne connaît pas de telles pénuries.

Je voudrais en m'appuyant sur l'analyse de la situation de ces deux villages en 1983-84, souligner deux propositions théoriques. La première étant que la transformation sociale de la classe paysanne ne doit pas se greffer sur une différenciation des régimes fonciers. Elle peut se greffer sur une différenciation de l'un quelconque des éléments du procès de travail : terre, travail ou objets du travail. La forme spécifique de différenciation reflète l'histoire des relations agraires dans une région donnée. La seconde étant que la faible productivité de la main-d'oeuvre se comprend aisément du fait des contrôles exercés sur la main-d'oeuvre, ce qui exige l'utilisation de pressions extra-économiques. Plutôt que de nous apesantir sur le faible coût de la main-d'oeuvre, nous soulignerons les mesures de contrôle exercées sur elle et qui freinent sa productivité. En effet dans une situation où la concurrence n'est pas généralisée et où il n'y a pas un nivellement des conditions de vie, toute tentative de discuter du faible coût de la main-d'oeuvre risque de donner lieu à des spéculations oiseuses. Un examen des types de contrôle exercés sur la main-d'oeuvre peut s'avérer plus concret. Ces contrôles peuvent s'exercer directement (sur la force de travail) ou indirectement (sur les produits du travail). Ce sont ces formes de contrôle qui expliquent l'organisation du pouvoir de l'Etat, en particulier par rapport à la paysannerie. Ainsi, tout programme démocratique populaire qui vise la transformation sociale dans le

contexte contemporain, doit avoir pour objectif essentiel la suppression de ces mesures de contrôle.

Chacune des parties suivantes s'articule autour d'une question centrale pour faciliter la compréhension progressive du thème principal. Premièrement, pourquoi les paysans établissent-ils des rapports dans le cadre desquels ils sont exploités et quels sont ces rapports? A quelles contraintes, objectives et subjectives sont-ils soumis? (Troisième partie). Deuxièmement, étant donné que l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme entraîne nécessairement des rapports conflictuels qui impliquent simultanément une perte et un profit, quelles sont les forces, endogènes ou exogènes à qui ces rapports profitent? Concrètement, quel cheminement le processus de l'accumulation capitaliste suit-il? (Quatrième partie). Troisièmement, ces rapports sont également conflictuels pour les paysans, mais ils dépendent dans chaque cas de la situation du ménage, et entraînent à long terme la stratification de la paysannerie en couches riche, moyenne et pauvre. Comment se caractérise donc cette stratification? (Cinquième partie). Quatrièmement, dans le contexte objectif de la division des classes en milieu rural, quel est le caractère de la crise agraire qui se profile? (Sixième partie). Cinquièmement, quel est le mode de reproduction de ce régime de contrôle de la main-d'œuvre? Singulièrement, quelles sont les dimensions politico-idéologiques de ce processus? (Septième partie). Enfin, quelles transformations agraires majeures sont nécessaires pour enrayer la crise agraire en faveur de la vaste majorité des producteurs indépendants? (Huitième partie).

III. Double Aspect de l'Exploitation des Paysans

L'exploitation des paysans présente un double aspect. C'est d'une part la conséquence du contexte objectif dans lequel les ménages paysans vivent. L'on comprend que ce contexte, cette "écrasante pression des lois du marché", pousse certains ménages paysans à établir, parfois à leur désavantage, des rapports déséquilibrés, en vue de leur reproduction, tandis qu'il permet à des ménages mieux nantis d'établir des relations tout aussi déséquilibrées à leur avantage. Cette contrainte est plutôt indirecte que directe. C'est le contexte économique et non une quelconque autorité politique qui l'impose. C'est dans ce sens et uniquement dans ce sens que nous pouvons dire que l'exploitation est le résultat de relations déséquilibrées établies volontairement.

Par ailleurs, l'exploitation des ménages paysans est également le résultat de pressions qui leur sont imposées directement et d'en haut. Cette contrainte est extra-économique et non économique. Les relations

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que les ménages paysans établissent de ce fait ont immédiatement un caractère involontaire. Essayons d'étudier tour à tour ces deux types d'exploitation.

Dans le cas de Kitende, le contexte réel dans lequel évoluent des ménages paysans est le résultat immédiat de la répartition de la propriété foncière. Ici, tout le village est sous la dépendance d'un seul propriétaire terrien dont le grand-père avait reçu une concession de plus de 2000 ha en 1900, qui regroupait Kitende et trois villages environnants. Le propriétaire actuel possède un peu plus de 1000 ha. Le tableau ci-dessous illustre le schéma d'occupation des terres par classe sociale à Kitende :

Propriétaire terrien	1000 ha
Paysan riche	0,868 ha
Paysan de classe moyenne	0,436 ha
Paysan pauvre	0,264 ha

Inutile d'en dire davantage. Les paysans de Kitende sont obligés d'entretenir avec le propriétaire des relations déséquilibrées, qui se résument pour eux à louer la terre ou à vendre leur force de travail ou les produits de leur travail, et ce, en raison d'un fait indiscutable : ils manquent de terre.

La situation d'Amwoma est différente. Il n'y existe pas de relations de propriétaire à métayer et le problème de pénurie de terres ne s'est jamais posé. Or, dans ce cas aussi les paysans démunis établissent "volontairement" des rapports à leur désavantage. Pourquoi ? La raison en est claire si nous dépassons la simple notion de propriété foncière pour considérer la superficie que chaque couche sociale a réellement la capacité de cultiver.

Tableau II: Accès des ménages paysans à la terre, force de travail et instruments aratoires par couches sociales à Amwona.

Couches de la classe paysanne	Terre (en ares)		Force de travail *	Instruments aratoires	
	Detenue en propriété	Cultivée		Houes	Charrues
Pauvres et petites bourgeoisie	172,40	77,8	2,59	1,74	-
Bourgeoisie (moyenne et haute)	170	121,50	3,90	2,40	0,4
Riches	759	246	4,50	2,50	2,0

* Pour calculer la force de travail d'un ménage, nous avons donné un point à toutes les personnes âgées d'au moins 12 ans, 0,5 point aux enfants de 8 à 12 ans et 0,25 à ceux de 5 à 8 ans.

Nous examinerons plus en détail dans la cinquième partie les critères appliqués pour différencier la paysannerie en couche aisée/moyenne/démunie et pour procéder à des divisions à l'intérieur de la bourgeoisie paysanne. La question importante que nous allons doré et déjà poser est de savoir pourquoi les paysans démunis ainsi que ceux de la petite bourgeoisie qui possèdent autant de terres que le reste de la bourgeoisie paysanne (172,40 ares contre 170 ares) n'arrivent à cultiver que les 65 p.100 (77,8 contre 121,50 ares) de la terre? La différence ne peut pas s'établir au niveau de la force de travail des différents ménages, étant donné que la capacité que possède une pauvre famille rurale d'user simultanément de la force de travail dont il dispose lui fait toujours défaut. En réalité, la principale différence réside dans leur accès respectifs aux outils de travail. Malgré une force de travail moyenne de 2,59, une famille paysanne démunie ne possède que 1,74 houes et pas de charrue. En d'autres termes, il n'y a jamais à aucun moment suffisamment de houes pour la main-d'oeuvre familiale. Ainsi, bien qu'elle ne manque pas de terre, la famille rurale démunie est obligée

d'établir des relations à son désavantage parce qu'elle ne dispose pas de moyens de travail suffisants.

Les conditions objectives précitées qui font que les paysans manquent de terres ou d'outils de travail, expliquent en partie qu'ils entretiennent des relations à leur désavantage avec la classe exploiteuse. Etant donné que ces relations constituent une réponse à la situation réelle des paysans imposée par les circonstances, on a l'impression que ceux-ci acceptent "volontairement" de les établir.

Par ailleurs, les pressions exercées d'en haut constituent une deuxième explication au type de rapports déséquilibrés qui s'instaurent parmi la paysannerie. Conséquence de la contrainte politique, cette pression extra-économique n'a pratiquement rien à voir avec la situation économique immédiate d'un ménage paysan. C'est l'immobilisme des paysans (car ils sont aussi profondément enracinés dans la terre que les produits qu'ils cultivent) qui les expose facilement à toutes sortes de pressions venues d'en haut. S'il est vrai que le marché est le pôle de rapports déséquilibrés "volontairement" entamés, l'Etat est la source de pratiques involontaires.

Les pressions extra-économiques émanent soit, de l'Etat lui-même, soit d'organismes ayant des relations privilégiées avec l'Etat (le parti, l'église) ou d'individus (fonctionnaires, chefs). Ces pressions se traduisent par une multitude de contraintes qui vont des cultures forcées aux ventes forcées, de l'aliénation forcée des terres aux contributions forcées en argent, et enfin aux travaux forcés. Leurs objectifs varient aussi de la force de travail elle-même (travail forcé) aux produits du travail (cultures, ventes et contributions forcées), aux conditions de travail (isolement forcé). Cependant, ces contraintes constituent ensemble, directement ou indirectement, un tissu intégré de mesures de contrôle exercées sur la main-d'oeuvre. Les demandes de travail forcé sont rarement présentées ouvertement comme telles. En réalité, elles sont toujours présentées comme une continuation des pratiques traditionnelles selon lesquelles chaque ménage est tenu de contribuer régulièrement par son travail aux corvées communautaires appelées "Bulungi bwansi" (pour le bien de la communauté). La différence est qu'aujourd'hui ce sont des organes ou des agents de l'Etat, ou des organismes entretenant des relations privilégiées avec l'Etat tel le parti ou l'église, qui extorquent cette force de travail.

A l'instar de leurs homologues urbains, les ménages paysans paient un impôt annuel à l'Etat. Or, contrairement à ceux-là, ils ne reçoivent guère de services en contrepartie. Toute entreprise locale doit être le

résultat d'un effort local, organisé et contrôlé par les autorités administratives locales. Lorsqu'il faut construire, réparer, nettoyer une école, un dispensaire, une route ou un puits, les chefs demandent aux ménages ruraux d'envoyer un membre de la famille pour exécuter le travail. Lorsque le moment arrive de labourer, sarcler ou moissonner le champ du chef de canton, l'on fait appel aux paysans des environs pour s'acquitter de cette corvée. Lorsque le parti au pouvoir doit organiser un rassemblement, les paysans doivent offrir gracieusement leurs services pour couper des piquets, débroussailler et construire un abri. Ils doivent donner des grains à l'occasion de cette fête obligatoire et sacrifier leur temps avant, pendant et après la réunion, car ils sont tenus d'y participer et de distraire les personnalités venues de la ville. Si le parti veut construire un bureau local, ou qu'une école a besoin d'acheter un camion, les paysans devront apporter des "contributions" en espèces. Toute personne qui se trouve dans l'impossibilité de se plier à ces ordres, ou refuse de le faire, reçoit sans délai une sanction sans appel. Généralement, les autorités confisquent un coq au ménage en faute, mais si le paysan est trop pauvre pour en posséder un, il est jeté en prison pour une durée fixée unilatéralement par le chef.

Les autorités ecclésiastiques ont des exigences similaires. Toute récolte donne lieu à une collecte active. Tout service religieux le dimanche est une occasion pour soutirer de l'argent aux fidèles. Des événements importants comme les baptêmes, les mariages, les décès, à l'occasion desquels la sanction de l'église est importante et urgente - sont mis à profit par les autorités religieuses pour discuter âprement avec les fidèles du montant du don à offrir à la "Maison de Dieu". L'église a en effet le pouvoir d'user de sanctions hautement "morales" telles que le refus de bénir les morts ou de baptiser des nouveaux-nés.

Les détails varient d'une région à l'autre. Dans certaines régions de l'ouest de l'Ouganda, l'église exige des fidèles un jour de travail par semaine. Dans d'autres, comme à Kitende, chaque ménage paysan est tenu de verser tous les ans à titre de "contributions" le denier du culte. Dans des régions comme Amwoma où l'église ne jouit pas d'un pouvoir aussi absolu, ce sont les autorités administratives locales qui exercent les plus fortes pressions. En 1984 par exemple, tout ménage était tenu de consacrer huit heures par semaine à la réparation des murs en terre battue et des toits de chaume constamment en mauvais état.

Il est très difficile à un chercheur isolé d'évaluer le temps qu'un ménage paysan consacre au total à ces travaux extra-économiques. J'ai cependant évalué grosso-modo le travail qui est extorqué aux ménages paysans obligés de se livrer aux travaux forcés et de payer des

cotisations forcées au village d'Amwoma en 1984. Pour obtenir une échelle unique, nous avons décidé que 100shs équivaldraient à quatre heures de travail, ce qui correspondait en fait au taux de rémunération en vigueur en 1984.

Nous avons ainsi pu aboutir à la conclusion qu'un ménage de petits paysans (démunis et de la petite bourgeoisie locale) est tenu de fournir gratuitement 491 heures par an, soit 9,42 heures par semaine. Si l'on considère que la force de travail d'une famille est de 2,59, qu'une famille travaille 62 heures - en supposant qu'un homme travaille en moyenne vingt heures dans les champs et une femme trente heures - nous constatons que 15% environ du temps de travail d'un ménage de paysans démunis est approprié en travaux forcés et en contributions forcées. Le chiffre correspondant pour un ménage paysan moyen (moyens et bourgeoisie) est approximativement de 10%. Les couches rurales de propriétaires terriens arrivent généralement à s'affranchir quelque peu de ces exigences, en particulier des travaux forcés. Les gros paysans aisés envoient normalement un manoeuvre pour les "représenter".

Un capitaliste rural déclarait qu'il ne se rend à l'école que lorsqu'il en a le temps, et encore pour "surveiller" les manoeuvres!

Le pouvoir politique est en outre utilisé pour jeter les bases d'un monopole foncier ou commercial. L'appropriation forcée des terres est le fondement du système de propriété foncière. L'exemple le plus frappant à l'époque coloniale est l'Acte de 1900 dont les effets sur la propriété foncière se font toujours sentir aujourd'hui à Kitende. Nous rappellerons à une époque plus récente la multiplication des clôtures autour des terres, dans de nombreuses régions du pays, consécutivement au Décret de 1975 portant réforme foncière. Ainsi, à Amwoma, alors que les gros paysans aisés possèdent en moyenne 7,50ha, les exploitants capitalistes eux détiennent en moyenne 136ha. Ces grandes étendues de terres sont attribuées à la suite de demandes approuvées par les Comités fonciers municipaux mis en place aux termes du Décret de 1975. Ces comités, organes du pouvoir central au niveau local, sont constitués de fonctionnaires et de notables locaux. Ce type d'occupation des terres est courant dans les zones rurales où n'existent pas les gros propriétaires terriens traditionnels, et où l'accès à la terre avait été déterminé jusqu'à présent en vertu du régime foncier coutumier. C'est pour cela que dans les régions où le droit coutumier primait, le Décret de 1975 portant réforme foncière a en réalité introduit le capital dans les campagnes "communales".

Les monopoles commerciaux émanent très souvent d'une combinaison de contraintes, contraintes du fait notamment des cultures forcées (coton, café, tabac, etc) et des ventes forcées, généralement au profit des offices parapublics de commercialisation. S'il est vrai que l'administration use généralement de ce type de contraintes pour la vente de cultures industrielles destinées à l'exportation, il arrive aussi qu'elle se serve de cette arme pour implanter un quasi-monopole dans le cadre du commerce intérieur. En Ouganda par exemple, toutes les opérations de gros touchant des denrées alimentaires essentielles sur le marché local (exemple : bétail, bananes, mil) doivent être autorisées par l'Office de commercialisation des produits agricoles. Ainsi, plus le monopole est lucratif, plus le service chargé de la délivrance des licences commerciales est haut placé et plus solide doit être l'appui dont on bénéficie au niveau gouvernemental pour obtenir cette licence. Dans tous ces cas, le recours au pouvoir politique facilite l'accès aux produits par les paysans.

En somme, l'exploitation du paysan présente alors une double facette dont l'une est économique et l'autre extra-économique ; l'une est la conséquence de relations "volontairement" entamées et l'autre le résultat de rapports que le paysan subit involontairement d'en haut ; l'une le corollaire de "la lourde contrainte des lois du marché", l'autre le fait de l'intervention active de l'Etat ou de ses agents.

IV. Double Aspect de l'Accumulation Capitaliste

L'exploitation à double facettes du paysan favorise deux types distincts, voire contradictoires, d'accumulation capitaliste qui entraînent chacun ses propres conséquences.

Le premier type est un processus relativement spontané par lequel se fait la stratification de la paysannerie à travers des rapports inégaux, résultant de la concurrence, fruit elle-même des rapports de production. Le partage et la location des outils de travail, les "emprunts" et le louage de terres à une petite échelle et les pratiques de "coopération" et de vente de la force de travail que j'examine plus loin d'une manière plus détaillée constituent la trame de ce processus. Nous définirons ce mode d'accumulation comme étant endogène.

Faisant pendant à ce type, nous avons l'accumulation exogène dans le cadre de laquelle les lois du marché sont secondées par des contraintes extra-économiques, émanant de l'Etat en tant que pouvoir organisé, des organismes entretenant des relations privilégiées avec l'Etat (parti, église) et d'agents de l'Etat agissant à titre individuel. La distinction

entre ces deux types d'accumulation réside dans le rôle du pouvoir de l'Etat. Il est évident que la reproduction des rapports de production - base de l'accumulation endogène - n'est possible que si elle est appuyée par le pouvoir de l'Etat qui garantit le fonctionnement de divers marchés de matières premières - par exemple dans le domaine du travail et de la terre. Ce qui fait la différence entre ce premier type et l'accumulation exogène, c'est que dans le dernier cas, la contrainte extra-économique est la clé de l'accumulation. Dans ce cas, le pouvoir de l'Etat constitue lui-même une force économique.

De plus en plus d'ouvrages sur les pays nouvellement indépendants démontrent que le pouvoir politique (de l'Etat) est la base de l'accumulation du capital (Thomas, 1984, Shivji, 1976). Ces écrits soulignent un processus distinctif de formation des classes, dans des cas où il n'existait pas de classe bourgeoise autochtone pendant la période coloniale. L'indépendance a donné le pouvoir politique à des mouvements nationalistes dirigés par la classe moyenne. Et c'est l'exercice de ce pouvoir - appuyé par de nombreux programmes d'aides élaborés par les impérialistes - qui a jeté les fondations d'une classe bourgeoise indigène. Le capital ainsi accumulé peut avoir une origine privée ou publique. Il a pour pendant la propriété foncière dans le cadre de laquelle l'accumulation est le résultat d'un monopole foncier, également obtenu grâce au soutien de l'Etat. Analysons maintenant dans le détail les deux types d'accumulation du capital: l'accumulation endogène et l'accumulation exogène.

Le développement endogène de relations capitalistes, axé sur des relations commerciales restreintes, se caractérise par le fait qu'il est davantage en harmonie avec les rapports de production existants. Très souvent les relations ainsi tissées s'avèrent équilibrées. Elles entraînent une forme d'exploitation déguisée du fait qu'elles apparaissent comme une perpétuation des pratiques coopératives d'antan. Les pratiques coopératives de forme cessent de l'être dans le fond dès l'instant où elles s'engagent entre des ménages de conditions inégales.

Prenez l'exemple suivant de trois ménages qui décident de rassembler leur bétail et de grouper leur main-d'oeuvre pour garder conjointement leurs bêtes. La seule différence par rapport au passé, c'est qu'ils n'ont plus des conditions économiques identiques : le ménage de petits paysans démunis possède deux vaches, celui de paysans moyens huit vaches et celui de gros paysans aisés vingt-quatre vaches. Ils rassemblent leurs troupeaux dans un enclos construit en commun à proximité de la maison du gros paysan aisé. Ils les gardent à tour de rôle, chaque propriétaire assurant la garde pendant dix jours. Bien que

le travail soit partagé équitablement, les différents ménages ne possèdent pas le même nombre de bêtes. Le tableau 3 est une illustration de ce qui précède.

Tableau III: Nombre de vaches possédées et part de travail de chacun dans un groupe de surveillance de bêtes

Ménages paysans par couches sociales	Nombre (%) de vaches à garder	Part (%) de travail contribué à tour de rôle
Petits paysan démuni	2 (5,9 %)	1/3 (33,3 %)
Paysan moyen	8 (23,5 %)	1/3 (33,3 %)
Gros paysan aisé	24 (70,6 %)	1/3 (33,3 %)

Non seulement les partenaires ne profitent pas équitablement des avantages de la coopération, mais en outre les risques sont inégalement partagés, à supposer que les bêtes s'égarer dans des exploitations voisines et y causent des dégâts aux cultures. Pour le petit paysan, ou le paysan moyen, il est évidemment préférable de garder 34 vaches pendant dix jours par mois que d'en garder deux ou trois tous les jours du mois ! Or, l'on oublie que le partage équitable du travail occulte et l'inégalité des avantages perçus par chaque ménage. En fait, cette forme de "coopération" est un transfert de travail non rétribué des ménages possédant moins de la moyenne des bêtes (paysans démunis et moyens) aux ménages détenant plus de la moyenne des vaches (gros paysans aisés).

Des relations déséquilibrées, claires ou déguisées, spontanément tissées, se développent par rapport aux principales forces productives : objets de travail, terre et force de travail. Il arrive parfois, comme c'est le cas à Amwoma, que les paysans louent ou utilisent à plusieurs un outil de travail aussi essentiel que la charrue. Lorsqu'on loue un outil de travail, le paiement se fait au vu et au su de tous: le montant versé par jour à un exploitant capitaliste ou à un gros paysan aisé pour la location d'une charrue de quatre boeufs et de deux à trois manoeuvres, s'élève à 1500 shillings. Cette pratique est toutefois rare, car seul un paysan aisé a la capacité financière suffisante pour effectuer un paiement de cette importance.

La pratique appelée "utilisation collective de charrue" entre un exploitant agricole capitaliste et un paysan démuni est une pratique plus courante. L'exploitant capitaliste fournit une charrue, le boeuf et parfois même un manoeuvre, et le ménage de petits paysans fournit deux personnes pour labourer la terre. L'équipe de laboureurs travaille les terres de l'exploitant capitaliste puis celles du petit paysan. Il convient de souligner deux aspects de cet échange. D'une part, la terre de l'exploitant capitaliste couvre généralement une superficie équivalant à six champs (d'un peu plus de 4000 m² chacun) alors que celle du petit paysan ne représente qu'un seul champ. Bien que le ménage de petits paysans ne possède qu'un septième de la terre cultivée, il ne fournit pas moins des deux-tiers de la main-d'oeuvre nécessaire. Par ailleurs, la terre de l'exploitant capitaliste est cultivée en premier pour que les travaux soient terminés avant l'arrivée des pluies, tandis que le petit paysan est obligé de cultiver tardivement son champ.

Il en va de même en cas de pénurie de terres. Comme l'illustre l'exemple suivant, se rapportant à Kitende, la terre peut être louée ou "empruntée". On parle de location lorsque le paiement se fait en numéraire et d'"emprunt" en cas de paiement en nature. La location d'une terre d'une superficie de 4046 m² revenait en 1983 de 1500 à 6000 shillings, selon (a) l'emplacement, (b) selon qu'elle était en friche ou sarclée, et (c) et selon qu'elle était cultivée depuis longtemps ou pas.

"L'emprunt" quant à lui comporte un large éventail de pratiques. Tous les cas d'emprunt ont en commun un minimum fixe considéré comme une location déguisée. La terre "empruntée" est nécessairement en friches. Elle doit être débroussaillée ; l'"emprunteur" ne peut en disposer que pendant une année à l'issue de laquelle il la rend à son propriétaire qui peut alors décider de l'utiliser lui-même ou de la louer pour de l'argent. Si le "fermier" souhaite continuer à "emprunter", il/elle est obligé(e) de se déplacer pour aller exploiter un autre lopin de terre en friches. Le taux officiellement admis pour débroussailler un lopin de terre en friches d'environ 4047 m² était de 2000 shillings en 1983. C'était alors le loyer minimum déguisé pour l'emprunt d'une terre de 4047 m².

Au dessus de ce seuil, il existait encore une autre formule de paiement en nature, sous forme de partage du fruit du travail du métayer. Bien que coutumièrement fixé, ce paiement variait cependant d'une couche de la paysannerie à l'autre ; il était le plus élevé pour les paysans pauvres. Nous avons calculé la valeur vénale de la part de récoltes ainsi payées par chacune des couches de la paysannerie, en prenant comme référence les prix appliqués alors et l'avons additionnée

à la valeur de la force de travail payée, et avons comparé le montant obtenu avec le loyer payé en numéraire dans le tableau suivant.

TABLEAU IV: louage de la terre dans le village de
Kitende en 1983

Type de métayer	Loyer pour 4847 m ²
Locataire "Emprunteur"	1500 - 6000 shs.
Paysans aisés	2000 shs.
Paysans bourgeois et moyens	6400 shs.
Paysans de la petite bourgeoisie et petit paysan	9600 shs.

Il convient de faire observer que dans les cas où le gros paysan aisé "emprunte" une terre, le propriétaire n'exige de lui rien d'autre que de défricher la terre. Ce traitement de faveur est une preuve de solidarité de classe. Il est en effet à peu près certain que ce service lui sera rendu ultérieurement, soit sous forme de don (par exemple : un cochon de lait) ou d'appui politique. Toutefois, cette façon de récompenser le service rendu n'a rien de régulier. Cette pratique a davantage le caractère d'un échange de bons procédés que d'un paiement, et tend à renforcer l'élément de solidarité.

Enfin, comme nous pouvons le constater avec l'exemple d'Amwoma, il y a diverses manières d'extorquer du travail, soit ouvertement dans le cadre du travail salarié, soit de façon déguisée sous forme de travail communal. Une analyse historique des changements survenus au cours de ce siècle dans le système coopératif communal de travail, en donne une claire illustration.

L'organisation du travail coopératif s'est développée grâce à une conjonction de conditions, notamment : l'abondance relative des terres, l'éparpillement de la population, l'inclémence générale de l'environnement, en somme, un sous-développement relatif des forces productives. Des groupes communaux organisés d'une manière plus ou moins durable, labouraient par rotation des lopins de terres appartenant aux uns ou aux autres. L'hôte du jour devait donner un gage au groupe, généralement une quantité spécifiée de bière de mil locale. C'était une manière symbolique d'exprimer la gratitude pour le service rendu. L'absence relative de différenciation au sein de la paysannerie est

une condition nécessaire pour le fonctionnement harmonieux d'un tel système. Pour que ce système puisse profiter à peu près équitablement à tous, il fallait que toutes les familles aient les moyens d'offrir la bière, gage de l'accès au travail communal.

Avec la stratification interne de la paysannerie, cette condition n'était plus remplie. Les ménages se divisaient entre ceux qui pouvaient donner le gage et ceux qui n'en avaient pas les moyens, entre ceux qui n'adhéraient à ce système qu'en tant que vendeurs de force de travail et ceux qui n'en faisaient partie qu'en tant que bénéficiaires. Ce système constituait un réservoir de main-d'oeuvre bon marché, d'autant plus que la prestation de services n'était rétribuée selon la coutume qu'avec un gage de bière traditionnelle.

Ce système fut frappé par la crise lors de la sécheresse de la fin des années 1960 : de plus en plus de paysans, manquant de mil, n'avaient plus les moyens d'offrir de la bière, gage de leur accès au travail communal. Le système fut réorganisé, à la suite de pressions exercées à la base. L'on abolit le gage. Tout le monde devait fournir le même travail, et tous devaient recevoir le groupe de laboureurs sur leur terre, à tour de rôle, après tirage au sort. N'y adhérèrent plus que des petits paysans ou des paysans moyens. Alors que le système de travail communal originel était organisé sur une base territoriale, et réunissait au sein d'un même groupe les ménages du même voisinage, l'organisation des nouvelles équipes s'appuya essentiellement sur la classe, le travail en équipe étant le ciment de cette forme de coopération.

Une réorganisation interne du groupe n'était toutefois pas une garantie que les membres de l'équipe, propriétaires de la force de travail, profiteraient du travail exécuté. Ce qui n'avait pas changé, c'était l'environnement général, les conditions réelles auxquelles devaient faire face les familles rurales démunies, et qui étaient telles que ces dernières se retrouvaient sans instruments de travail et par conséquent frappées par des pénuries de denrées alimentaires et sans argent. C'est en raison de ce dénuement que de plus en plus de membres de l'équipe attendaient le moment où ils devaient recevoir l'équipe de travail, pour échanger leur tour contre un emploi chez un employeur capitaliste et non pour travailler dans leur propre exploitation. Cette forme de travail qui revêt pourtant en apparence un aspect communal et coopératif, est en réalité une forme déguisée de travail salarié de groupe.

Revenons à notre examen général qui portait sur le premier type

d'accumulation à savoir l'accumulation endogène, favorisée par la stratification de la paysannerie. Il a pour point de départ la production réelle, un faible niveau d'accumulation par le biais de la petite exploitation. La maigre plus-value ainsi accumulée dans des activités du type de celles d'un paysan aisé, et combinant le travail familial avec la petite exploitation, grâce au lavage de manoeuvres agricoles, ou de terres ou à la location d'instruments de travail - est alors investie dans le commerce.

Un paysan peut sans la moindre difficulté se lancer dans une petite activité commerciale, telle que la vente de produits de base sur le marché local : vente de poulet à Amwoma, de charbon et de manioc à Kitende. Non seulement les frais de premier établissement sont peu élevés, mais il est possible d'obtenir à faible coût auprès des autorités locales, la licence autorisant l'exercice d'activités de cette nature.

L'étape suivante est généralement une activité de commerce de gros sur le marché intérieur. Le commerce de bétail constitue la meilleure illustration à cet égard. L'on achète généralement le bétail par tête, le plus souvent dans des familles paysannes en désarroi ; ces bêtes sont alors transportées sur les marchés urbains (Busia, Makono, Kampala) par camion. Bien que la marge bénéficiaire soit substantielle, elle va pour l'essentiel dans la poche du transporteur et non dans celle du commerçant. L'expérience aidant, la bourgeoisie villageoise a pris conscience de la nécessité d'être propriétaire d'un véhicule de transport ; mais l'expérience lui a également appris qu'il n'est pas possible d'obtenir un crédit bancaire suffisamment important pour acheter un camion (une Leyland "Land Train" par exemple) sans un appui dans le gouvernement. A ce stade, leur problème est politique. Nous y reviendrons plus tard.

Il suffit de souligner ici le caractère contradictoire du processus d'accumulation du capital, qui, exogène ou endogène, donne naissance à différentes couches de la bourgeoisie. Chronologiquement la première, la couche issue d'une stratification endogène de la paysannerie constitue la bourgeoisie villageoise. La couche "extérieure" de la bourgeoisie composée des personnes qui bénéficient du deuxième type - exogène - d'accumulation capitaliste en milieu rural, fait pendant à la première. Nous analyserons le rôle économique et politique que joue cette couche sociale avant de décrire comment elle se présente concrètement dans des villages tels Amwoma et Kitende.

En termes économiques, cette couche se définit essentiellement comme une bourgeoisie marchande. Elle reflète un processus global par

lequel l'exploitation capitaliste est imputée à des procès de travail précapitalistes (où la main-d'oeuvre et la propriété sont foncièrement imbriquées comme dans le cas des exploitations des petites et moyennes familles paysannes) ou semi-capitalistes (où l'unité organique est partiellement rompue comme dans le cas de l'exploitation d'une famille paysanne aisée qui emploie de la main-d'oeuvre). Ici, le surtravail extorqué aux petits producteurs de produits de base est immédiatement transformé en plus-value commerciale, ultérieurement répartie entre les différentes fractions du capital.

L'exemple de Kitende est une variante de ce thème de base. Dans ce cas, le surtravail est approprié sous deux formes, sous forme de plus-value commerciale et comme loyer payé au propriétaire terrien. Ces deux formes d'appropriation revêtent un caractère essentiellement improductif.

En termes politiques, le capital commercial a en même temps un caractère privé et étatique. A Amwoma, région produisant des vivres pour le marché intérieur, les capitalistes marchands sont des fonctionnaires en vue, qui se servent de leurs relations politiques pour démarrer des activités commerciales indépendantes en dehors de la fonction publique. A Kitende, région produisant une culture d'exportation, le principal négociant est l'Etat lui-même, représenté par un office parapublic de commercialisation. Deux, l'un étranger, l'autre étatique, sont la clé du développement exogène du capital commercial. Comme nous le verrons bientôt, même lorsque le point de départ du capital commercial est le commerce intérieur - c'est le cas du commerce des vivres à Amwoma - une nouvelle expansion l'amène à se tourner vers le commerce d'import-export, qui offre les possibilités d'investissement les plus attrayantes. Les activités des hommes d'affaires les plus éminents revêtent donc nécessairement un caractère comprador à l'instar du pouvoir étatique qui monopolise le commerce des produits agricoles d'exportation à Kitende.

En termes économiques, donc, la couche "externe" de la bourgeoisie est une bourgeoisie marchande. En termes politiques c'est une bourgeoisie comprador/bureaucrate. Contrairement à la bourgeoisie agraire des zones rurales, elle n'est pas fondée sur la production en tant que telle, mais sur une relation dans le gouvernement. Un agent de l'Etat travaillant pour son propre compte ou l'Etat lui-même en tant que pouvoir organisé, peut se servir du pouvoir politique pour réaliser des profits économiques. Le cas d'Amwoma est la meilleure illustration du premier cas : dans ce village les paysans ne produisent que des cultures vivrières pour le marché intérieur ; Kitende est quant à

lui une claire illustration du second cas ; en effet, le café y est à la fois une culture de rapport et un produit d'exportation.

A Amwoma, trois familles dont les membres ne participent plus au procès de travail et dont le revenu est plus ou moins exclusivement le résultat de l'exploitation, peuvent être qualifiées de capitalistes. L'une d'entre elles a connu la prospérité du fait de la différenciation endogène, les deux autres, les plus grandes, sont un exemple de développement exogène du capital comprador commercial. Les chefs de ces deux familles occupent des postes importants dans la fonction publique et vivent en ville. Dans les deux cas, c'est une de leurs femmes qui gère leurs activités rurales.

Nous pouvons identifier quatre étapes au moins dans la progression tentaculaire des capitaux individuels à la campagne. La première passe par la mainmise sur de vastes étendues de terre. S'il est vrai que l'Accord de 1900 au Bouganda constitue dans ce cas, le précédent historique, il n'en demeure pas moins qu'à l'époque contemporaine cette tendance a été renforcée par le Décret de 1975 sur la réforme foncière. Foulant aux pieds toutes formes d'occupation coutumière des terres, ce décret a introduit les baux emphytéotiques (99 ans) de type capitaliste au nom du développement.

En fait, les réformes capitalistes s'imbriquent cependant dans les traditions précapitalistes, mais d'une manière qui illustre bien comment le Capital peut modeler et plier la "tradition" pour ménager ses propres intérêts. A Amwoma, la vente de terrains est un phénomène récent ; d'une manière générale, la tradition paysanne veut que l'occupation des terres soit supervisée par le clan. Etant donné que les étrangers au clan n'ont pas accès aux terres du village, et qu'il ne sauraient se les approprier même en les achetant, tout fonctionnaire avide de se procurer des terres est obligé d'en chercher dans sa région et pas ailleurs. Cependant, un capitaliste, usant de cette pratique peut "réclamer" la terre gratuitement plutôt que d'avoir à l'acheter. Il peut simplement se rendre dans le village de ses ancêtres et réclamer des étendues de terres inexploitées - d'une superficie de 20 à 200 ha - arguant que ses ancêtres les avaient cultivées et les avaient abandonnées pour aller s'installer ailleurs, et que de ce fait, ces terres lui reviennent en héritage, comme s'il était leur seul descendant ! Or pour qu'une telle revendication soit entendue, elle n'a pas besoin d'être historiquement fondée ; il suffit que la personne jouisse d'un traitement de faveur auprès des chefs locaux et autres fonctionnaires, comme ceux du Comité foncier municipal.

Une fois implantée dans le village, le Capital peut désormais tourner à son avantage tout événement nouveau. Ceci est particulièrement vrai des crises qui ébranlent simultanément l'autonomie des formes d'activités précapitalistes et facilitent l'expansion rapide des formes de capitalisme les plus efficaces. Si l'on prend l'exemple de la terre et du bétail, que les paysans ne considèrent pas en temps normal comme des marchandises, ils le deviennent par la force des choses en temps de crise. Analysez par exemple la réponse du plus gros capitaliste du village lorsqu'on lui demande d'identifier la période la plus faste pour sa famille dans le processus d'accumulation : "La famine de 1980 nous a été d'un grand secours vous dira-t-il, car les gens affamés, nous vendaient leurs affaires à bon marché. Nous pouvions acheter 4000 m² de terre à 250 - 300 shs et un boeuf à 2000 sh. C'est alors que nous avons réellement commencé à acheter". En d'autres termes, la crise fait sortir les biens sociaux du domaine précapitaliste pour les faire pénétrer sur les marchés capitalistes des produits de base. Le mal est tellement profond que, pour une région à vocation pastorale, 82% des familles paysannes d'Amwoma ne possèdent même pas une vache aujourd'hui!

Or, en cherchant à acquérir une vaste étendue de terre, le capital ne vise pas à maîtriser et à transformer le processus de production de cette terre, bien au contraire. La terre ainsi appropriée, est arpentée et munie d'un titre foncier, qui peut être présenté à la banque en vue de l'obtention d'un crédit. L'objectif est l'acquisition d'un moyen de transport, généralement un camion. C'est la deuxième étape de la pénétration des capitaux individuels dans l'agriculture.

La troisième étape est franchie avec le lancement d'une activité commerciale, la plus lucrative étant le commerce de produits de première nécessité, tel le mil à Amwoma. Nous verrons ultérieurement les profits que l'on peut réaliser avec un tel investissement. Très souvent cependant, l'on n'a pas besoin de posséder un moyen de transport pour commencer à faire du commerce. En fait, un capitaliste prospère utilise pour son compte des véhicules appartenant à des organismes tels que: coopératives, ministères, organismes para-étatiques, église, prison, armée etc, avant d'acheter son propre véhicule.

Jusqu'à ce stade, les activités du Capital se limitaient au marché intérieur, l'on achetait à la campagne pour vendre en ville. Son objectif ultime est cependant de pénétrer le marché le plus lucratif, celui de l'import-export. Pour cela aussi, l'appui de l'Etat est essentiel, car une telle démarche ne peut être entreprise sans que l'on obtienne un crédit important en devises auprès d'une banque pour pouvoir se lancer soit dans le commerce d'importation (généralement de biens de

consommation courante tels les vêtements de seconde main ou du savon, articles très demandés en milieu rural), soit dans le commerce d'exportation (de céréales tels le simsim ou le maïs).

C'est cette dernière étape qui confère un caractère comprador à la fraction la plus florissante du Capital privé. Chaque étape du développement du Capital nous fait découvrir un nouveau maillon de la chaîne qui assujettit le producteur indépendant dans le système néo-colonial. De même que les fonctionnaires les plus en vue sont en même temps des capitalistes compradores, de même l'Etat, en tant que pouvoir organisé est un pouvoir comprador organisé.

L'exemple de Kitende en est une parfaite illustration, avec la commercialisation du café qui est un monopole détenu par l'Office de commercialisation du café, géré par l'Etat. Trois intermédiaires interviennent entre le paysan producteur de café et l'Office de commercialisation du café (C.M.B). Le commerçant à bicyclette, généralement un paysan aisé, va d'exploitation en exploitation pour acheter de petites quantités de café, qu'il va vendre à un magasin appartenant à un particulier ou à une coopérative. Le magasin, à son tour, vend le café à une personne qui le traite, généralement une coopérative qui se charge de transmettre le café nettoyé à la C.M.B en vue de l'exportation. Au début de chaque campagne caféière, c'est le gouvernement qui annonce les prix officiels pour chacune des opérations de la chaîne. L'intervention du commerçant à bicyclette entre le magasin et le paysan est le seul changement apporté à la pratique. Les profits réalisés par le commerçant à bicyclette constituent donc une ponction sur le prix du café à la production officiellement fixé par le gouvernement. Le tableau V indique la répartition réelle des recettes du café entre les divers intermédiaires pour la campagne 1982-83.

TABLEAU V: Répartition des recettes du café (Robusta) compte tenu des prix officiels au Kg de café nettoyé. Campagne 1982-83

	En shillings ougandais	% du prix à l'exportation
Au producteur	115,20	19,0
] 134,40 <1>] 22,2
Au commerçant à velo	19,20	3,2
Au magasin	19,20	3,2
A la personne qui le traite	39,50	6,5
A l'exportateur (C.M.B. + taxe d'exportation) <2>	414,46	68,1
Prix à l'exportation Total	609,86	100,0

1. Tel était le prix officiel à la production pour 1 kg de café nettoyé, d'où est déduite la marge bénéficiaire du commerçant à vélo. 1 kg de café nettoyé équivaut à 1,92kg de cerises de café. Le prix officiel à la production pour 1kg de cerises de café était de 70 shillings dont il fallait retrancher la marge du commerçant à bicyclette, soit 10 shillings.

2. Le coût du transport de Kampala à Mombasa additionné d'autres coûts (frais d'entreposage, dédouanement au Kenya etc.) était estimé à 18 shillings par kilo, soit 2,9% du prix à l'exportation, pour de petites expéditions confiées à G. Freightmasters de Kampala. Le coût réel supporté par le C.M.B devrait être inférieur à ce chiffre étant donné que le café est transporté en vrac.

Des deux types d'accumulation capitaliste étudiés dans le présent document, à savoir l'accumulation endogène et exogène - le type du capital comprador/bureaucrate, exogène, est le plus efficace et le plus agissant. C'est le type qui repose le plus sur la contrainte extra-économique exercée en milieu rural. Quoiqu'il n'est pas étonnant que la paysannerie, et en particulier les paysans moyens et démunis, lui soient spécialement hostiles. Pour eux, le Capital

comprador/bureaucrate constitue l'usurpation la plus patente du patrimoine communautaire, perpétrée de l'extérieur ; répandant une tactique politique de la terre brûlée assortie de pratiques d'accumulation telle que la vente forcée de terres, de récoltes et de bétail, pratiques absolument sans précédent qui sont une violation flagrante de l'intérêt de la communauté. Le Capital comprador/bureaucrate est en nette opposition avec les paysans riches et la bourgeoisie rurale, qui usent de procédés différents pour accumuler le capital ; ayant recours aux pratiques communales traditionnelles, ils les tournent à leur avantage, mais ce, sur une plus longue période, de telle manière que leur propriété apparaîtra davantage aux paysans comme le résultat de leur travail acharné, et non comme une appropriation étrangère.

V. Différenciation de la Paysannerie dans deux Villages

Nous entendons par différenciation sociale, un processus progressif qui stratifie la paysannerie en groupes dont les conditions d'existence se définissent par des rapports de production et des conditions matérielles qualitativement différents.

Notre analyse aura pour point de départ la famille paysanne moyenne. Historiquement l'âme de la paysannerie, elle cristallise un trait commun à toutes les couches de la paysannerie : l'unité organique de la main-d'oeuvre et de la propriété. Dans ce cas, nous avons une famille de petits propriétaires travaillant sur la terre de la famille avec des instruments appartenant à la famille. Sans d'autres relations économiques régulières que celles avec le marché, la famille paysanne moyenne est indépendante du point de vue de la main-d'oeuvre (3). A mesure que l'unité organique entre la main-d'oeuvre et la propriété familiale commence à se rompre, soit du fait de l'adversité ou de la prospérité, l'on assiste au début de la différenciation de la paysannerie moyenne.

La différenciation de la paysannerie moyenne favorise la création d'une paysannerie nantie d'une part et d'une paysannerie démunie, de l'autre ; la première par l'enrichissement et la dernière par la paupérisation. La famille paysanne aisée réalise régulièrement de la plus-value. Elle peut combiner régulièrement les recettes réalisées par la main-d'oeuvre familiale employée sur la terre familiale à celles provenant de la petite exploitation qui consiste par exemple, dans le louage de terres ou le recrutement de la main-d'oeuvre salariée.

Alors qu'une plus-value régulière permet au riche paysan d'accroître ses revenus grâce à une exploitation continue, un déficit constant

oblige le paysan démuné à entamer avec d'autres classes ou couches sociales rurales, des relations qui le dépouilleront dans le meilleur des cas d'une partie de son travail supplémentaire, tout en menaçant son autonomie dans le cadre du procès de travail.

Toutes ces trois couches - les riches, les moyens et les pauvres - font partie de la paysannerie car elles ont en commun une caractéristique. Toutes trois sont engagées dans le procès de travail de la terre, en tant que propriétaires de petites exploitations et d'instruments de travail avec lesquels ils cultivent la terre en faisant appel à la main-d'oeuvre familiale. D'autres classes, vivant en milieu rural - et que l'on ne saurait considérer comme faisant partie de la paysannerie - bien qu'elles tirent elles aussi leurs revenus de la terre, n'ont pas ce trait de caractère qui combine une participation au procès de travail avec la possession d'une propriété productive.

A un bout de l'échelle sociale, apparentés au paysan nanti, nous avons l'exploitant capitaliste et le propriétaire terrien. Ni petits propriétaires, ni participants directs au procès de travail, ils doivent leurs grandes propriétés au travail de quelqu'un d'autre qu'ils exploitent soit directement par l'emploi d'une main-d'oeuvre salariée (exploitant capitaliste) soit indirectement par le louage de terres (propriétaire terrien).

A l'autre bout, se rapprochant du paysan démuné, nous avons le manoeuvre agricole. Dans ce cas également, l'on observe une rupture de l'unité organique entre la main-d'oeuvre et la propriété. N'étant pas propriétaire d'une exploitation productive qui pourrait rendre efficace sa force de travail, le manoeuvre agricole doit chercher du travail auprès d'un membre de la classe des propriétaires, pour s'assurer ses moyens de consommation.

Si le mode de classification utilisé ci-dessus aide à expliciter les termes employés, il n'éclaire pas l'aspect dynamique du développement : quel est le point sensible de ce processus de différenciation ? Un rappel historique de la question aidera à clarifier davantage les choses. L'on constate en lisant Engles (1970) et Lénine (1967) que tous les deux ont mis l'accent sur le développement du travail salarié en milieu rural, qui a favorisé l'accumulation du capital par une couche, la paysannerie, (les riches) tout en entraînant la prolétarianisation de la couche des paysans démunés. Tous les deux ont écrit dans un contexte où le féodalisme s'était considérablement désintégré et où les rapports de production étaient en plein développement. Tous les deux comprenaient que leur contexte historique assurerait la transition de la

production de produits de base à petite échelle à la production agricole capitaliste ; d'où leur insistance sur le développement du travail salarié considéré comme un clair indicateur de la différenciation de la paysannerie.

Mao-tse-tung (1965) quant à lui, a écrit dans un autre contexte, celui d'une importante semi-colonie sous domination. La tendance principale qu'il a observée en milieu rural n'était pas celle d'une transition vers l'agriculture capitaliste, mais celle d'une relative stabilisation des relations entre le propriétaire terrien et le métayer ("semi-féodalisme"). Cette analyse mettait en lumière aussi bien le travail salarié que les relations de location considérées comme la voie empruntée par une couche de la paysannerie pour s'enrichir aux dépens d'une autre. Dans la campagne chinoise du temps de Mao, un riche paysan pouvait se passer d'employer de la main-d'oeuvre salariée, tout en louant une partie de sa terre, ce qui constituait une forme d'exploitation ; de même, un paysan démuné, pouvait, sans jamais entrer sur le marché du travail, être régulièrement exploité, obligé qu'il était de devenir locataire. En fait, dans le contexte chinois en particulier et asiatique en général, la question agraire se confondit avec la question foncière.

Maintenant il convient aussi d'analyser concrètement notre contexte. Il nous faut reconnaître que le processus de différenciation emprunte des voies multiples, qui sont toutes historiquement et socialement spécifiques. Ceci revient à prendre conscience du fait que l'ensemble des relations inégales qui différencient les familles paysannes les unes des autres peuvent se développer autour de l'un ou l'autre élément du procès de travail : la terre, le travail ou outils du travail. Ces relations peuvent être axées, en dehors du travail salarié et des rapports de louage, sur la location des principaux objets de travail. En d'autres termes, des familles propriétaires de terres de superficies sensiblement égales peuvent néanmoins appartenir à différentes couches sociales compte tenu de l'inégalité d'accès aux objets de travail, comme nous l'avons vu dans le cas d'Amwoma.

Nous allons essayer de préciser davantage notre pensée. En analysant les résultats des enquêtes expérimentales que nous avons menées à Amwoma et Kitende (4), nous avons procédé comme suit. Nous avons classé parmi la paysannerie moyenne les familles paysannes qui se reproduisent en employant la main-d'oeuvre familiale dans l'exploitation de la propriété familiale, sans s'engager dans des relations économiques régulières avec d'autres couches de la paysannerie. Parmi ces familles, celles qui arrivent à réaliser de temps en temps une plus-value

leur permettant d'entamer d'une manière irrégulière des rapports d'exploitation, soit en louant la terre ou les objets de travail, soit en employant de la main-d'oeuvre salariée - sont classées parmi la haute bourgeoisie paysanne. De même, les familles qui du fait de déficits occasionnels sont obligées d'entretenir, même irrégulièrement, des rapports de production à leur désavantage, ont été classées parmi la petite bourgeoisie paysanne.

Sur la base de ce critère, les familles paysannes riches se caractérisent par des excédents réguliers et par une capacité constante de combiner l'emploi de la main-d'oeuvre familiale sur la terre familiale, avec la petite exploitation. En revanche, des familles obligées du fait de déficits constants d'augmenter les revenus de l'exploitation familiale en louant des instruments de travail ou de la terre, ou en prenant des emplois salariés à mi-temps ont été classées parmi la paysannerie pauvre. Les conclusions de notre analyse figurent au tableau VI.

TABLEAU VI: Classes et couches sociales dans les villages d'Amwona et Kitende (en %)

	Amwona	Kitende
Propriétaires terriens	-	1,1
Capitalistes	0,4	-
Paysans aisés	2,7	9,8
Paysans moyens	12,0	37,0
Paysans démunis	83,1	26,1
Manoeuvres agricoles	1,7	26,1
Total	99,9	100,1

Il convient tout d'abord de faire une mise en garde avant que nous ne développons davantage notre analyse. Nous ne prétendons pas que les différentes classes et couches sociales de ces deux villages se perçoivent effectivement selon la division que nous avons établie ci-dessus. Nous essayons simplement de toucher du doigt le processus véritable d'exploitation qui prévaut dans ces villages et de montrer à travers une analyse de leurs conditions réelles d'existence, comment il différencie la paysannerie (et les autres classes).

Ceci ne revient pas à minimiser la question de la conscience

paysanne. Cette question sert assurément à comprendre la nature de l'action politique paysanne. Nous y reviendrons dans l'avant-dernière partie de notre document. Pour l'instant, nous pouvons développer l'analyse de la situation réelle des populations des deux villages, en mettant cette fois en relief les différences qui existent entre les deux cas. Trois remarques s'imposent ici.

Tout d'abord, le village de Kitende, à l'opposé d'Amwoma, se caractérise par des relations de propriétaires terriens à locataires. Kitende et quatre villages environnants ont un seul propriétaire terrien qui vit à Kitende. Cette personne tire essentiellement ses revenus de diverses formes de location : il loue la terre (19 familles), des coins de forêt pour la fabrication du charbon de bois (4 familles) et des marécages pour l'extraction de l'argile (4 familles), mais il loue également une propriété semi-urbaine dans un centre commercial voisin. Le commerce et la production à proprement parler, dans cet ordre, constituent ses sources secondaires de revenus.

Toutefois, la prédominance des relations de propriétaire terrien à locataire ne peut à elle seule expliquer le fait qu'il n'y ait pas de capitalistes à Kitende. Il est en outre intéressant de souligner le fait que le plus gros capitaliste de Kitende est l'Etat lui-même, en tant que pouvoir organisé, représenté par son office de commercialisation du café qui joue un rôle d'intermédiaire, alors qu'à Amwoma le commerce des céréales est contrôlé par des capitalistes privés, faisant des affaires à titre individuel et directement implantés dans le village.

Deuxièmement, la paysannerie moyenne est beaucoup plus développée à Kitende (37%) qu'à Amwoma. En effet, le petit commerce est de loin plus prospère à Kitende, qui est plus proche des grands marchés urbains, qu'à Amwoma. Le tableau suivant montre que le producteur indépendant perçoit une part beaucoup plus importante du prix de vente lorsque le commerce est compétitif (petit commerce) qu'en situation de monopole.

TABLEAU VII: Type de commerce et part du producteur indépendant dans le prix de vente final

Type de commerce	Produit	Part du prix de vente final revenant au producteur indépendant
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Africa Development

Petit commerce	Manioc (Kitonde)	66,6 %
	Charbon (Kitonde)	50,00 %
Monopoliste	Café (Kitonde)	18,96 %
	Mil (Amwona)	25,00 %

La proximité de Kitende des marchés urbains explique la facilité avec laquelle les paysans moyens s'engagent dans les affaires. Cela signifie que les paysans peuvent transporter leurs marchandises au marché à bicyclette et les vendre toutes en un jour. Plus le marché est loin, plus cher est le mode de transport, plus grande est l'échelle du commerce et plus il faut du temps pour écouler la marchandise - tous ces éléments permettent aux personnes nanties des ressources financières et des appuis politiques nécessaires de monopoliser le marché.

C'est pour cela que le petit négoce est plus développé à Kitende où, quatorze (82%) des dix-sept familles qui l'exercent appartiennent à la paysannerie moyenne. Le petit négoce offre aux paysans moyens deux avantages. Outre la source de revenus supplémentaires qu'il représente pour ceux qui l'exerce (14 familles sur 34), il apporte aussi au planteur des recettes plus importantes que ne le ferait un commerce de monopole.

La troisième grande différence entre les deux villages réside au bas de l'échelle sociale. Amwoma compte une imposante classe de paysans démunis (83,1%) et d'une classe insignifiante de manoeuvres agricoles (1,75%), tandis qu'à Kitende la paysannerie démunie s'équilibre entre ces deux couches (26,1%) chacune). En d'autres termes, la main-d'oeuvre salariée est plus prolétarisée à Kitende, alors qu'elle est d'une manière générale semi-prolétarienne à Amwoma. Ce phénomène est une fois de plus la conséquence directe d'un monopole de l'occupation des terres à Kitende, où la pénurie des terres est aiguë et la question foncière réelle, à l'inverse d'Amwoma où aucun des deux problèmes ne se pose avec acuité.

Les différences que nous avons soulignées ci-dessus traduisent une variété de conditions locales qui influent sur le processus de différenciation endogène. Toutefois, Kitende et Amwoma présentent également des similitudes, résultant d'un contexte général commun, de conditions communes qui encouragent le second type - exogène - d'accumulation capitaliste, qui est en fait prépondérant. Cette similitude se manifeste très clairement sur le terrain par un fait simple mais général, l'appauvrissement de l'ensemble de la paysannerie travailleuse et des manoeuvres agricoles.

Aux yeux d'un observateur, même novice, la situation sociale des couches rurales démunies - petite bourgeoisie, paysans pauvres et manoeuvres agricole - est des plus dramatiques. Ils vivent dans des cases en terre battue, recouvertes pour la plupart de toîts de chaume et pour une minorité de vieilles tôles demandant à être réparées ou remplacées. Ils dorment sur des nattes en papyrus ou sur des herbes ou à même le sol. Il est rare que ces paysans aient un second jeu de vêtements de rechange ou de quoi se couvrir la nuit. Très souvent, lorsque pendant l'hivernage les températures sont plus basses que la moyenne, le couple utilise en guise de drap pour se couvrir la nuit, le même pagne que l'épouse ceint autour des reins dans la journée. Ce sont des personnes qui s'adonnent souvent à l'alcool bon marché mais fort qui leur sert aussi de somnifère. La nécessité implacable forme des habitudes qui leur assurent le confort d'une béquille à court terme mais créent une dépendance qui mine l'individu à long terme.

Le régime alimentaire de ces couches rurales démunies se compose généralement de manioc légèrement salé. Des haricots peuvent compléter ce régime pendant les périodes fastes, et en périodes de vaches maigres l'on accompagne le manioc de légumes au goût légèrement amer, qui poussent généralement à l'état sauvage dans les environs du village. La viande ou le poulet est un met recherché. Pour reprendre les termes d'un observateur habitué depuis longtemps à la campagne (5) ougandaise : "Le paysan ne mange du poulet que lorsque lui-même ou son poulet est malade".

VI. Crise de Reproduction

Une situation aussi débilatante traduit un fait économique capital, à savoir que le surtravail approprié par la bourgeoisie comprador/bureaucrate et par les propriétaires fonciers est rarement réinvesti dans l'économie du village. Le caractère improductif de la classe dominante exploiteuse explique qu'aucun progrès notable ne soit observé en matière de technologie agricole. Mais alors, pour que la main-d'oeuvre bon marché continue de se reproduire ne faut-il pas que deux conditions soient réunies? D'une part que les producteurs paysans continuent de supporter une grande partie (nourriture) de leurs coûts de reproduction, et que le travail vivant reste l'élément le plus important du processus de production.

En d'autres termes, la production paysanne tend à se reproduire sur une base simple. Pour une famille paysanne prise individuellement, des trois éléments composant le procès de travail - terre, travail et outils

de travail - les moyens de travail représentent l'aspect le moins dynamique. L'on observe en effet que de plus en plus de familles paysannes d'Amwoma et Kitende manquent de moyens de travail.

Bien que la charrue tirée par des boeufs fût introduite à Amwoma dans les années 1920, ce sont exclusivement les capitalistes, les paysans riches et la haute bourgeoisie, représentant 5,8% de la population rurale qui en possèdent. La grande majorité de la paysannerie travaillent leurs terres à la houe à main. Dans ce cas aussi, comme nous l'avons vu, ce moyen de travail manque aux familles rurales démunies : une famille moyenne ayant une force de travail de 2,59 ne dispose que de 1,74 houes en moyenne (voir Tableau I).

Même les propriétaires ruraux n'utilisent la charrue tirée par des boeufs que pour retourner la terre. Toutes les autres opérations agricoles, comme le binage et le moissonnage font appel à une technologie qui était déjà utilisée au tournant du siècle, la traditionnelle houe à main pour désherber le mil et/ou l'antique sarcloir servant à moissonner le mil ou le simsim.

A Kitende, trois familles, dont une de propriétaires et deux de paysans riches, ont loué un tracteur pour déblayer leurs terres en 1983 alors que 95,6% des familles utilisaient la houe pour tous les travaux de la terre. Cependant, même la houe utilisée est rarement performante. Le tableau ci-dessous indique le temps qu'il faut à chacune des couches de la paysannerie pour acheter une nouvelle houe.

TABLEAU VIII:

Couche de la paysannerie	Temps nécessaire pour acheter une nouvelle houe
Paysan aise	0,45 an
Haute et moyenne bourgeoisie paysanne	1,85 ans
Petite bourgeoisie paysanne	3,45 ans
Paysan démuné	7,14 ans

D'après les calculs des paysans, et vu les conditions qui prévalent à Kitende, il faut changer une houe au bout de 18 à 24 mois pour qu'elle donne de bons résultats. Ceci revient à dire que même lorsque

les couches rurales de Kitende - 57% de la population du village - ont une houe pour travailler, celle-ci est trop vieille et trop usée pour faire du bon travail.

Dans ces conditions, les familles rurales pauvres, essayant d'améliorer leur niveau de vie ou simplement de préserver leur niveau de vie actuel, trouvent dynamiques certains éléments du procès de travail, - notamment la terre et le travail, - qu'ils essaient d'ailleurs de modeler à leur convenance. Or, les tentatives faites pour maximiser la terre ou le travail à des fins de production, tentatives considérées comme autant de solutions immédiates à la crise traversée depuis peu par une famille prise individuellement, ont un effet boomerang et deviennent des éléments d'une crise sociale globale de reproduction. Telle est la gènes de la crise écologique et de la crise de la surpopulation relative qui se font jour dans des néo- colonies telle que l'Ouganda.

Crise écologique : la crise écologique est très grave dans les cas où la propriété terrienne constitue une entrave directe au développement extensif de l'agriculture - c'est le cas à Kitende - et où la question foncière est problème réel. Alors que la population paysanne en pleine croissance est ensermée à l'intérieur de terres dont les frontières ne reculent presque pas, l'on s'efforce d'intensifier la production, mais sans développer parallèlement la technologie agricole. Les périodes de jachère raccourcissent. et la même terre est fouillée sans arrêt jusqu'à épuisement, produisant par conséquent de moins en moins à mesure qu'elle est retournée.

A mesure que la pratique d'enclorre les terres se développe - comme c'est le cas à Amwoma - les ressources qui appartenaient antérieurement à la communauté deviennent la propriété de certains individus. Des zones marécageuses sont asséchées et transformées en propriétés privées, comme ce fut le cas dans l'Ouest de l'Ouganda durant la dernière décennie. Des points d'eau (ruisseaux, mares), des sources d'énergie (buissons) et des pâturages sont appropriés par des particuliers. Avec la population qui s'accroît alors que les ressources s'amenuisent, les familles paysannes doivent chercher de nouvelles sources d'énergie et de nouveaux pâturages, ce qui entraîne inévitablement comme corrolaire le déboisement. De nouveaux auteurs ont souligné ce processus en Afrique de l'Ouest (Watts, 1983) et en Amérique Latine (de Janvry).

La crise écologique est cependant ressentie très intensément dans les régions essentiellement pastorales, car c'est là que la question foncière s'est posée avec le maximum d'acuité pendant la période coloniale. En

Ouganda, la crise est le plus durement ressentie à Karamoja. Comme nous l'avons souligné par ailleurs (Mamdani, 1982), les populations de Karamoja perdirent environ 20% de leurs terres à pâturage qui leur furent usurpées par les autorités coloniales et néo-coloniales sur une période de quarante ans, des années 1920 aux années 1960. L'on ne peut voir dans l'étendue du déboisement qui fut occasionné par ces événements qu'une recherche de nouveaux pâturages face à la croissance démographique et à l'agrandissement du cheptel.

Surpopulation relative: Le seul avantage que les exploitations paysannes aient sur des formes de production plus avancées est qu'elles n'ont pas de problème de main-d'oeuvre. Ceci est dû au fait que les ménages paysans sont en même temps des unités de production de valeurs matérielles et de reproduction de main-d'oeuvre - dans un contexte où le travail vivant reste l'élément essentiel du procès de travail.

La tendance qu'ont les couches rurales démunies à fonder de grandes familles leur est imposée par leur contexte socio-économique, qui comporte deux aspects. Premièrement, la nature du procès de travail prévoit l'emploi productif de la main-d'oeuvre enfantine. Les activités agricoles se divisent en travaux de force et tâches légères. Les premiers comprennent toutes les tâches qui font appel à la force musculaire adulte, comme l'abattage des arbres, l'essartage et le labour de la terre, réputées être des tâches "masculines". Le reste des activités - le gros en fait - sont harassantes, répétitives et prennent beaucoup de temps. Il s'agit de travaux tels le sarclage et la moisson, des tâches auxiliaires telles garder les animaux, aller puiser de l'eau et du bois et des travaux domestiques comme le séchage et le battage des céréales. Les enfants aussi bien que les adultes peuvent se charger de ces travaux. Ces travaux légers, à ne pas confondre avec le travail facile sont généralement réservés aux femmes. Etant donné que ce sont les tâches dont les enfants peuvent s'acquitter le plus aisément, les femmes des familles rurales ne sont pas insensibles à l'attrait des familles nombreuses qui sont considérées comme de grandes réserves de main-d'oeuvre.

Deuxièmement, la discipline qui regne au sein de la famille permet de surveiller davantage le travail des enfants que dans les autres classes sociales. Etant donné que la famille paysanne est aussi une réserve de main-d'oeuvre, la discipline en matière de travail est un reflet de la discipline interne à la famille. L'autorisation parentale est suprême. La vie d'un individu évolue au rythme des pressions qui sont exercées sur lui par la famille considérée comme une unité de travail. Dès que les enfants atteignent un âge où ils peuvent s'acquitter de petites tâches

simples, c'est-à-dire cinq ou six ans, ils commencent à travailler. Contrairement à ce qui se passe dans les familles de propriétaires, les enfants de la paysannerie laborieuse passent directement de l'enfance à l'âge adulte sans vivre leur adolescence. Cette généralisation est valable pour toute la paysannerie laborieuse, malgré les autres différences majeures qui peuvent distinguer les couches la composant.

A l'instar de l'effet boomerang provoqué par la recherche de terres supplémentaires - terres de cultures, de pacage ou sources d'énergie - la tentative de tirer le maximum de la main-d'oeuvre familiale produit aussi l'effet contraire à celui recherché. Ceci tient au fait qu'il y a parfois un décalage entre la logique de l'individu et celle de la société. Ce qui peut paraître une solution à court terme pour une famille prise individuellement peut s'avérer une crise sociale à long terme, car la contradiction entre une population en pleine croissance et des rapports de production anachroniques peut se traduire par une crise de surpopulation relative - relative aux ressources que l'on peut produire dans les limites des relations sociales existantes.

Intensification de la contrainte extra-économique : Alors que les deux types de crises décrites ci-dessus sont endogènes, provoquées qu'elles sont par les familles paysannes elles-mêmes qui recherchent des solutions à court terme à un problème structurel, le troisième type est dû à des causes externes, du fait de l'Etat et des classes dominantes qui recherchent leur propre solution au même problème.

La crise que connaît le pouvoir en place a une double origine. D'une part, la crise de la sous-production, endogène, qui absorbe le surtravail extorqué au paysan ; et d'autre part, exogène, entraînée par des pressions impérialistes, la crise de la surproduction et de la spéculation financière de l'économie capitaliste mondiale, qui se manifeste sous forme d'inflation, de détérioration des termes de l'échange et par un déséquilibre de plus en plus accentué de la balance des paiements.

La solution trouvée par les pouvoirs publics est d'extorquer davantage de surtravail aux producteurs paysans. Pour ce faire, ils usent de multiples formes de pressions : directes et indirectes. Les pressions directes sont multifformes. L'on exhorte les paysans à accroître la production agricole d'exportation. Selon que le dictateur au pouvoir est un civil ou un militaire, ces campagnes encourageant les paysans à "Produire Davantage de Coton" ou "Davantage de Café" sont organisées par les chefs locaux ou par des officiers de l'armée. Ces efforts visant à la production forcée de certains produits sont appuyés par l'usurpation

directe. L'on exige des paysans qu'ils collaborent à l'exécution de toute une série de projets communautaires, alors que leurs poches se vident dans leurs efforts de satisfaire à des demandes tout aussi pressantes qui leur sont adressées pour qu'ils apportent leurs "contributions" à la réalisation d'autres projets de "développement". De fréquents appels à "l'autosuffisance" sont lancés alors que se multiplient les campagnes de "collecte de fonds".

Tandis que les pressions directes exercées sur les paysans augmentent, un autre train de mesures indirectes réduit simultanément les revenus des paysans. Les prix réels des produits agricoles baissent, soit consécutivement à une réduction directe des prix fixés par le Gouvernement, soit du fait de manipulations inattendues des taux de change, dans le style du FMI. Parallèlement, l'on observe un net recul des services sociaux (médecine, éducation et transports) au fur et à mesure de leur privatisation, étant donné que leurs coûts sont directement supportés par les travailleurs.

Nous sommes convaincus, quelle que forme que revêtent ces exactions, qu'elles ne peuvent aucunement être commises sans que l'on recourt directement à la contrainte. Plus la crise de reproduction est grave, moins il est facile d'extorquer, à travers des relations de marché, des surplus aux familles paysannes qui produisent une grande partie des coûts de leur propre reproduction (vivres) ; et plus l'on a recours à des contraintes extra-économiques. De même, plus les formes de contraintes extra-économiques sont efficaces, plus la machine à produire les richesses, c'est-à-dire la paysannerie laborieuse est pressurée.

Il suffit d'analyser la crise qui n'a cessé de s'aggraver en Ouganda, depuis Amin jusqu'au second régime d'Obote, pour comprendre comment ces faits se produisent dans la réalité. Une série de "réformes" introduites par le régime d'Amin, ont en même temps facilité l'entrée du capital en milieu rural et son accès au dispositif de la coercition extra-économique. J'ai déjà souligné antérieurement que c'était là l'objet du Décret de 1975 portant réforme foncière. Les réformes administratives dont ce décret était assorti et qui, retraçant la carte administrative du pays plaçaient chaque province sous l'autorité d'un gouverneur militaire, devraient être vues comme un complément administratif de cette réforme légale. Plus la machine administrative est inefficace et décentralisée - dans le contexte d'une dictature - plus elle peut être utilisée arbitrairement pour servir les intérêts individuels.

D'autres faits nouveaux vinrent se greffer à cette situation, notamment la cessation des services sociaux en milieu rural au cours des

années 70, et le coup de grâce fut donné avec le programme 1981-1984 du FMI. De même, tous ces programmes appelés "services de vulgarisation", et qui ont pour objet de donner une formation technique aux paysans en matière de production, n'existent presque plus. Ceci encouragea un capitalisme pillard. Des capitalistes compradors/bureaucrates agissant pour leur compte personnel, se liguèrent à tour de rôle, pour s'enrichir aux dépens du peuple mais aussi au mépris de l'intérêt général de leur propre classe!

La crise fait apparaître, sous une forme plus aigüe que dans des conditions normales, les contradictions existant entre la logique de l'individu et celle de la classe, entre les intérêts particuliers et collectifs. Les efforts désordonnés de quelques représentants (ou factions) de la classe dirigeante, qui cherchent désespérément à trouver individuellement une solution à leur convenance, ne peuvent qu'aggraver cette tragique crise pour toutes les classes. Dans ce cas, l'exemple ougandais est peut-être extrême, mais il n'est pas unique.

VII. Perpétuation de la Crise

Pour parachever l'analyse des relations agraires qui prévalent dans le coin de campagne qui fait l'objet de la présente étude, il importe de compléter l'analyse des rapports de production en nous penchant sur l'organisation du pouvoir politique. Deux questions d'ordre politique se trouvent au centre de l'analyse des relations de classes en milieu rural. Premièrement, même lorsqu'elle atteint son degré de passivité le plus bas, comment se manifeste la résistance des opprimés contre les oppresseurs? Deuxièmement, comment cet antagonisme est-il canalisé dans les relations existantes et est-il converti en une force utilisée pour la reproduction de ces mêmes relations, et non pour leur transformation?

L'ordre social a beau régner dans la paix et la stabilité, à aucun moment les couches rurales démunies n'acceptent tout à fait l'oppression et l'exploitation comme si c'était chose naturelle. A aucun moment leur antagonisme vis-à-vis de l'opresseur n'est totalement latent.

Pour être à même de comprendre l'action des paysans, il importe de saisir de quelle manière les paysans perçoivent les différentes forces en présence en milieu rural. Comment les paysans voient-ils leur propre situation sociale et comment perçoivent-ils les autres classes rurales? Pour ce qui concerne ces dernières - propriétaires et capitalistes au haut de l'échelle et les manoeuvres agricoles en bas - leurs conditions sociales sont si profondément distinctes de celles des paysans (les uns se

distinguent de ces derniers du fait qu'ils ne mettent plus la main à l'oeuvre, et les autres du fait qu'ils ne possèdent pas de propriété productive), que tous les villageois ont plus ou moins clairement conscience de leur existence en tant que groupes sociaux distincts.

L'on ne saurait en dire de même de la reconnaissance sociale des différentes couches de la paysannerie, soit par les paysans eux-mêmes, soit par des représentants d'autres classes. Ce qui arrive en fait dans ce cas c'est une double prise de conscience, au point que les paysans perçoivent une différenciation au sein de leur classe, différenciation entre deux groupes : d'une part les paysans démunis (pauvres et petite bourgeoisie, mais aussi le reste de la couche moyenne pendant les périodes de vaches maigres) et d'autre part les paysans aisés (comprenant les paysans riches, mais aussi ceux de la haute bourgeoisie pendant les périodes d'abondance). C'est cependant chez les paysans que l'on note une prise de conscience très développée, conscience d'appartenir à une même communauté. Ceci ne peut être compris simplement comme un développement linéaire des traditions historiques du temps passé à ce jour. Cette prise de conscience s'est développée et renforcée du fait de la résistance opposée au caractère dominant du processus d'accumulation capitaliste dans les villages concernés. Dans ce sens, la tradition recréée, naît de la confrontation. Ce n'est pas un anachronisme historique.

Que la résistance au Capital soit individuelle ou collective, la communauté est inévitablement le point de référence de l'action paysanne. Etant donné que les usages communautaires subordonnent l'intérêt individuel à l'intérêt collectif, ils protègent les producteurs paysans contre les tactiques politiques de la terre brûlée adoptées par le Capital, en particulier sous sa forme comprador/bureaucrate. Ceci est très clair dans le cas d'Amwoma, où les rapports de production sont moins développés et les relations de famille/communautaires plus fortes qu'à Kitende.

Au nom de la communauté et de la tradition, les paysans s'opposent à ce que les terrains soient clôturés (sauf dans les cas des enclos à bestiaux) et à ce que l'on produise des cultures pérennes ; la tradition ne veut-elle pas que le bétail paisse librement sur les terres du village pendant la saison sèche? Dans le même ordre d'idées, les paysans exigent que les terres du village ne puissent être achetées que par des membres de la communauté, et que les pâturages, marais et forêts restent des terres communales, c'est-à-dire, appartenant à la communauté et gérées par elle. Lorsque les paysans se réfèrent à leurs "traditions", les capitalistes dénoncent leur attitude comme étant des "idées rétrogrades"

qui retardent le développement et le progrès du village.

Kitende résonne des échos de cette même lutte. Là aussi, les paysans combattent les propriétaires terriens au nom de la tradition, à propos des loyers. La fixation des loyers ne devrait-elle pas être assujettie à des limites "traditionnelles", indépendamment des droits que la loi peut conférer au seigneur de la terre ? L'on entend bien sûr ici par tradition non pas un quelconque usage précolonial, mais des habitudes données par la loi Busulu et Nvujjo de 1928.

Cependant les loyers sont majorés et les terres clôturées. De plus, ces nouvelles mesures sont appliquées, respectées et protégées par l'Etat qui a mis en place une législation définissant désormais toute une série d'infractions qui n'existaient pas auparavant : amener ses bêtes paître sur des terres appartenant autrefois à la communauté ou y ramasser du bois de chauffage est aujourd'hui considéré comme une "violation de propriété" ou un "vol" ; chasser du gros gibier est un acte de "braconnage".

L'on assiste à un affrontement quotidien entre le Capital et la communauté paysanne. Les paysans, résistant au nom de la communauté doivent affronter l'Etat, qui est la communauté du Capital. Alors qu'ils dénoncent l'accumulation capitaliste comme étant une violation de la tradition, ces mêmes pratiques sont encouragées par ailleurs au nom de la loi. Dans cette partie de bras de fer, c'est une fois de plus la contrainte extra-économique qui l'emporte.

C'est ce genre d'expériences qui développe chez les paysans un sens moral totalement en contradiction avec les normes locales. En effet, dans ce contexte, ni la violation de propriété, ni le vol, ni la braconnage ne sont stigmatisés par la communauté paysanne. Au contraire, elle pardonne ces actes et les loue même, y voyant une défense de ses intérêts contre l'usurpation extérieure. La défense active des pratiques précapitalistes n'est pas dans ce contexte une manière anachronique de s'accrocher à des usages surannés. Elle ne s'explique que dans son contexte moderne comme une résistance active à l'accumulation capitaliste.

Cependant cette forme de résistance, si subtile soit-elle, est dans le meilleur des cas défensive. C'est un combat en retraite qui ne peut transformer l'ordre social, encore moins arrêter le processus d'accumulation capitaliste. Il joue un rôle secondaire dans la dialectique entre la résistance à l'ordre social et l'intégration dans cet ordre. La tendance première est l'intégration de la paysannerie dans l'ordre

existant.

Les questions qui mobilisent la paysannerie et favorisent son intégration ne lui sont pas artificiellement imposées ; elles traduisent les contradictions réellement ressenties au niveau du village. En fait, le point de départ de l'intégration de la paysannerie est le même que le point de référence de sa résistance - à savoir sa constitution en tant que communauté - mais avec toutefois une différence. La communauté ainsi constituée est organisée par le haut sous la houlette des couches rurales ayant accès à la propriété, que ce soit les bourgeois ou les riches paysans du village - tout à fait à l'opposé de la résistance paysanne qui a tendance à construire la communauté paysanne à la base. Cette organisation a maintenant pour objectif la fraction "externe" du Capital, et aboutit à deux conceptions contradictoires de la communauté : l'une née de la résistance paysanne à la base et l'autre un produit de l'organisation capitaliste par le haut.

Il convient de développer ce point. Historiquement, les deux fractions du Capital représentaient deux démarches différentes de l'accumulation capitaliste, l'accumulation exogène et endogène. Nous avons déjà souligné que du point de vue de la paysannerie, il y a une grande différence entre la richesse accumulée par le jeu de la concurrence commerciale et celle acquise grâce à des appuis politiques. Cette considération ne devrait toutefois pas masquer le fait que la distinction entre les deux fractions de Capital est relative. Il n'existe entre elles aucune barrière infranchissable. Soucieux d'étendre le champ de leurs activités, des membres de la bourgeoisie villageoise s'efforcent inévitablement d'emprunter la voie tracée par la fraction "extérieure" du Capital, à savoir : clôturer de vastes étendues de terre, en faire constater la propriété par des titres fonciers et obtenir sur présentation de ces actes juridiques d'importants crédits bancaires. Ils comprennent parfaitement que rien de tout ceci n'est possible sans appuis politiques. C'est en fait ce qui les pousse à s'engager activement dans la vie politique du village.

De même, la contradiction entre les deux fractions du Capital est elle - aussi relative. Elle ne se manifeste jamais violemment, même pas sous le forme d'incidents sopradiques, comme c'est le cas pour ce qui concerne l'opposition entre paysannerie laborieuse et Capital. Sa résolution même partielle exige avant tout des négociations. La bourgeoisie villageoise tire sa force de négociation du fait qu'elle peut faire de la paysannerie sa réserve, organisée sous la conduite d'institutions locales telles la section du parti et l'église. A Amwoma, le président de la section du parti est un représentant de la bourgeoisie

villageoise ; à Kitende, c'est un paysan aisé. Tous deux sont conscients du fait que leur position officielle et protocolaire sous d'autres rapports, peut se révéler un tremplin au moment des élections ou en temps de crise politique. Elle leur donne en effet la possibilité d'utiliser les suffrages et le soutien du village à des fins purement matérielles.

L'organisation de fractions concurrentes du Capital est un aspect du processus politique ; l'autre aspect étant en fait la désorganisation de la communauté paysanne par le biais de sa mobilisation régulière. Pour comprendre ce phénomène, ils nous faut nous pencher de près sur le processus de mobilisation exogène.

Pour commencer, c'est un processus très personnalisé. La personnalité d'un individu est plus importante que ses opinions. L'on s'alignera ainsi derrière un individu plutôt que de suivre son programme. Les couches rurales démunies emboîtent le pas aux "faiseurs d'opinions" locaux - un instituteur, un prêtre, un capitaliste en vue - comme des moutons derrière leur berger.

Ils lui apportent leur soutien dans l'espoir d'obtenir sa protection ou pour l'en remercier. Les élections sont ainsi l'occasion où s'échange un droit abstrait contre un avantage concret, par exemple, quelques kilos de sucre ou une couverture. Dans la pratique, la politique du patronage désintègre la communauté paysanne. Une nomination venue d'en haut remplace une élection à la base. Le petit peuple cherche des représentants de classes supérieures qui se disent de son côté, et met sa confiance en eux. Ils espèrent ainsi améliorer individuellement leur niveau de vie grâce à la charité de ces personnes en vue, sans chercher à mener collectivement un combat démocratique organisé à la base au sein de mouvements démocratiques.

Les pauvres sont réduits à néant, tout le monde cherchant à se procurer des avantages personnels au détriment des autres, et chacun s'efforçant de trouver une solution individuelle à un problème social. Ce type de politique organisée par la classe dirigeante ne favorise ni la cohésion ni le renforcement de la communauté, et ne lui permet pas de comprendre ce qu'est concrètement l'union des forces sociales, amies ou ennemies ; en revanche, elle lui fait adopter une attitude relativement passive et suiviste qui stimule sa désorganisation et sa désintégration.

Ceci est clair si nous portons notre attention sur la scène politique globale. En mettant uniquement en lumière la scène locale, nous avons fait ressortir la déchirure qui existe entre la bourgeoisie villageoise et

la bourgeoisie comprador/bureaucrate, première contradiction interne au Capital. Pourtant ceci n'est pas nécessairement vrai lorsque l'on considère le pays dans son ensemble. L'on devrait se rendre à l'évidence que la bourgeoisie villageoise, du simple fait de son existence fortement localisée, ne peut former une force cohésive au niveau national. Il en va de même de la bourgeoisie comprador/bureaucrate, malgré ses appuis politiques, qui font sa force cohésive. Ceci relève d'un fait essentiel. Compte tenu de l'historique du processus d'accumulation capitaliste, dès l'instant où ce processus gagne la campagne, chaque faction de la bourgeoisie comprador/bureaucrate se transforme inévitablement en prédateur qui se nourrit de "son propre groupe ethnique ("tribu)". Ce n'est qu'ainsi qu'elle peut espérer se défendre, contre les victimes paysannes et les concurrents bourgeois, en s'appuyant sur les traditions communautaires/précapitalistes. Ainsi, la bourgeoisie comprador/bureaucrate de chaque groupe ethnique a tendance à s'organiser comme une faction distincte, et ce n'est qu'alors qu'elle établit des relations de collaboration ou de contention avec d'autres factions similaires.

La constitution de ces organisations tribales passe par un processus de négociations entre la bourgeoisie comprador de ce groupe ethnique et une multitude d'organes politiques locaux dirigés par la bourgeoisie villageoise. L'existence d'organisations s'appuyant sur la tribu ne doit pas être comprise comme la négation d'une politique de classes. C'est en fait l'expression d'un autre type de politique de classes, un type bourgeois, dans un contexte historique particulier. En effet, chaque organisation tribale constitue en réalité un front uni de toutes les classes de cette tribu alignées derrière la bourgeoisie de cette tribu.

Il ne faudrait pas non plus voir dans ce phénomène une manœuvre habile, une stratégie consciente visant à diviser pour mieux régner, une conspiration de la classe dirigeante. C'est simplement le résultat objectif d'un processus à travers lequel des factions de la bourgeoisie, en lutte les unes contre les autres, essaient d'organiser le peuple, pour renforcer leurs positions respectives. Ceci traduit simplement la faiblesse de la paysannerie et le sens de l'initiative dont fait preuve la bourgeoisie dans le contexte social où elle évolue.

VIII. Conclusion

Nous avons décrit au début de notre analyse la nature dualiste de l'exploitation des paysans, fondement du processus double de l'accumulation capitaliste en milieu rural, endogène et exogène, dont l'un s'est développé d'une manière relativement spontanée à travers les

rapports de production existants, et l'autre est le fait d'appuis politiques organisés, qui nécessitent le renforcement des contraintes extra-économiques.

C'est ce dernier fait, cet élément de contrainte extra-économique, qui permet de comprendre les différentes formes de réglementation du travail. Les incidences économiques d'un tel régime sont évidentes : travail forcé, terres clôturées de force, contribution, cultures, ventes forcées, autant de facteurs qui dévaluent systématiquement le travail et ses produits. L'on ne peut comprendre ni la stagnation persistante du marché intérieur, ni l'essor du commerce d'import-export, axé du développement en cours, sans saisir ce fait essentiel.

Partant de là, l'on peut diviser en deux groupes les rapports de production inégaux en milieu rural. Ils sont devenus autant d'entraves à la productivité des paysans, dans la mesure où ils s'appuient sur la contrainte extra-économique pour leur reproduction, comme c'est le cas des pratiques associées à la bourgeoisie comprador/bureaucrate et à la propriété foncière. Lorsque leur reproduction est libre de toute forme de coercition extra-économique, tel dans le cas de l'exploitation des petits paysans par les paysans aisés et les capitalistes ruraux, ils peuvent encore promouvoir la productivité des paysans.

Il est bien clair que la distinction faite ci-dessus ne se vérifie pas toujours dans la pratique. Dans certains cas en effet, les rapports commerciaux sont étroitement liés à la coercition extra-économique. De même, l'on ne trouve pas une nette opposition entre les capitalistes ruraux et la bourgeoisie comprador/bureaucrate ; les rapports entre les deux classes dénotent davantage un mélange de coopération et de concurrence.

C'est pourquoi, il est très probable que des revendications visant à débarrasser les campagnes des méthodes de contrainte extra-économique contribueront à diviser les populations rurales en trois groupes et non en deux. Alors que les personnes - bourgeoisie comprador/bureaucrate et propriétaires - qui bénéficient de toute évidence du présent état des choses s'y opposeraient catégoriquement selon toute attente, les victimes de cette situation, à savoir l'ensemble de la paysannerie et les manoeuvres agricoles, soutiendraient tout aussi fermement à n'en pas douter ces revendications. En revanche, les capitalistes ruraux adopteraient une position intermédiaire et indécise, sans pencher résolument pour les uns ou les autres.

Ce régime qui s'appuie sur la réglementation du travail se

caractérise également par ses incidences politiques. Alors que les rapports commerciaux, si inégaux soient-ils, sont théoriquement parfaitement compatibles avec les libertés démocratiques de la paysannerie, l'on ne saurait en dire de même des méthodes de coercition extra-économique. Il n'est pas de véritable démocratie possible en ce qui concerne les affaires de l'Etat, lorsque la contrainte directe fait partie intégrante des rapports de production qui définissent l'activité principale de la vaste majorité. Dans ce contexte, la contrainte directe est étroitement liée aux rapports prévalant entre les exploiters et les exploités, et non seulement entre le pouvoir et les administrés. Le pouvoir politique n'intervient pas seulement pour reproduire des rapports de classes ; c'est un élément essentiel du processus d'extorsion de travail supplémentaire aux producteurs indépendants. C'est une force économique en soi. Il caractérise par conséquent le pouvoir de l'Etat qui stabilise les rapports sociaux de base.

C'est pour cela que dans pareilles situations, même si le pouvoir central peut être légitimé par des usages démocratiques officiels, comme la compétition entre plusieurs partis politiques par le biais d'élections régulières, les structures étatiques en milieu rural ne prévoient aucune forme de contrôle démocratique. Ni la hiérarchie administrative des chefs, ni la hiérarchie judiciaire des tribunaux, ni les différents comités fonciers municipaux, ne prévoient l'intervention du peuple dans leur fonctionnement. Ces institutions ne sauraient admettre pareille intrusion étant donné qu'elles sont les organes que l'Etat a chargés d'assurer la réglementation du travail usant de contraintes extra-économiques.

Si l'on ne s'en rend pas compte, l'on ne peut réellement comprendre la teneur exacte des revendications formulées dans le cadre du combat démocratique qui se livre dans notre contexte. Pour une fois que la lutte démocratique se circonscrit uniquement à une simple revendication pour l'instauration d'un système multipartiste et pour des élections libres et régulières, seules les classes déjà libres de toute contrainte extra-économique en saisissent immédiatement l'importance. C'est pour cela qu'une réforme démocratique libérale dans notre contexte ne peut toucher qu'une minorité ; elle ne peut en effet avoir de sens que pour la bourgeoisie et les classes moyennes et à la rigueur les travailleurs.

Il faudrait adopter une conception plus vaste et plus populaire de la démocratie, dont l'essentiel serait l'affranchissement de la paysannerie, groupe social majoritaire, de toutes formes de contraintes extra-économiques. Le préalable d'une telle réforme politique radicale n'est rien d'autre qu'un changement des rapports de production de la

société. Une transformation sociale doit en effet nécessairement passer par là.

Je ne prétends pas que la fin des pratiques de contraintes extra-économiques entraînera automatiquement l'épanouissement d'une démocratie populaire. S'il est vrai que l'avènement de la démocratie doit nécessairement emprunter cette voie, il n'en demeure pas moins que ce n'est pas une condition suffisante. Les libertés démocratiques n'arrivent jamais comme une conséquence logique de l'économie de marché, il faut toujours mener un combat populaire pour les obtenir.

L'initiative d'un tel combat populaire et démocratique ne vient pas non plus de la paysannerie elle-même. Dans la mesure où toutes les couches de la paysannerie sont de petits producteurs de produits de base, elles représentent différentes combinaisons contradictoires de la force de travail et de la propriété. Elles sont donc incapables de ce fait d'élaborer en toute autonomie un programme agraire cohérent du point de vue de la main-d'oeuvre ou du Capital. Un programme cohérent pour l'émancipation de la paysannerie, considérée comme une fraction des masses laborieuses, ne peut émaner que de la section de classe des travailleurs qui est elle-même libérée de la propriété privée au niveau de la production. La paysannerie est nécessairement menée par la bourgeoisie ou la classe des travailleurs. Faute de s'en rendre compte, l'on ne réussira pas à freiner la mobilisation actuelle de la paysannerie orchestrée d'en haut à l'initiative de la bourgeoisie, par un effort visant à reconstituer la communauté paysanne à la base.

Notes:

* Professeur Associé en Sciences Politiques à l'Université Makerere, Kampala, Ouaganda.

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1. Un article récent (Loichie, 1985) s'efforce de résumer ce débat, en donnant des citations détaillées sur les ouvrages intéressants. Il reste malheureusement lui aussi prisonnier de la même perspective étriquée.

2. Il ne faudrait pas confondre ceci avec l'autonomie vis-à-vis du processus de production. Aucun ménage paysan ne peut se prétendre indépendant du processus de production dans une économie de production.

3. J'ai mené une enquête globale portant sur les 92 ménages qui vivaient à Kitende en décembre 1983. A Amwoma, en revanche, l'enquête réalisée en juillet 1984 était en trois volets distincts : (a) de longues interviews détaillées de porte à porte, dans un Wang Tic (le village compte 8 Wang Tic d'importance inégale) comprenant 28 ménages ; (b) des interviews structurées d'un échantillon de ménages appartenant essentiellement à la couche des paysans propriétaires, c'est-à-dire 9 au total ; et (c) statistiques générales de

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l'occupation des terres par chacun des contribuables paysans, obtenues à la préfecture de Dokolo, mais vérifiées et revisées à partir des informations recueillies dans le village.

A la lumière des renseignements ainsi obtenus, j'ai établi des tableaux illustrant les différentes classes que comportent le village et le Wang Tic. Le tableau suivant indique les résultats obtenus :

	Village		Wang Tic	
	Nombre	%	Nombre	%
Capitalistes	3	0,4	1	3,6
Paysans aisés	19	2,7	-	-
Paysans de classe moyenne	85	12,0	4	14,3
(haute bourgeoisie) (19)		(2,7)	(2)	(7,1)
(moyenne bourgeoisie) (37)		(5,2)	(1)	(3,6)
(petite bourgeoisie) (29)		(4,1)	(1)	(3,6)
Paysans démunis	587	83,1	19	67,9
Manoeuvres agricoles	12	1,7	4	14,3

La différence entre les deux réside dans le fait que le Wang Tic est la maison du plus gros des trois capitalistes du village. Cet élément explique que le pourcentage de capitalistes et de manoeuvres agricoles soit élevé dans les résultats obtenus pour le Wang Tic que pour le village. L'autre aspect de la question, c'est le pourcentage inférieur de paysans riches et pauvres dans les résultats obtenus pour le Wang Tic. Les similitudes entre les deux résultats apparaissent clairement si nous combinons en un seul chiffre les chiffres se rapportant aux capitalistes/paysans riches ainsi que ceux se rapportant aux paysans démunis/manoeuvres agricoles pour également en faire un seul chiffre.

	Village		Wang Tic	
	Nombre	%	Nombre	%
Capitalistes/ Paysans aisés	22	3,1 %	1	3,6 %
Paysans de classe moyenne	85	12,0 %	4	14,3 %
Paysans démunis/ manoeuvres agricoles	599	84,8 %	23	82,2 %

4. Chango Machyo, au cours d'une conversation en 1984.

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SUMMARY

The paper provides an analysis of the agrarian question in Uganda. The starting point of the analysis is the two-fold character of peasant exploitation, the basis of a two-fold capital accumulation process in the countryside, from below and above, one developed relatively spontaneously through existing commodity relations, the other the result of an organised state connection, necessarily requiring a complement of extra-economic coercion, i.e. forced labour, forced land enclosures, forced contributions, forced crops, forced sales - all these amount to a systematic devaluation of labour and its products. Neither the persistently narrow home market, nor the continued function of export-import as the axis of the development that does take place, can be understood without grasping this elementary fact.

Unequal relations in the countryside can be divided into two. To the extent that they rely on extra-economic coercion for their reproduction, as is characteristic of practices associated with the comprador/bureaucrat bourgeoisie and landlordism, they have turned into so many shackles on peasant productivity. To the extent that their reproduction is free of extra-economic coercion, as is characteristic of rich peasant and village capitalist exploitation, they contain the potential of enhancing peasant productivity. In practice, market relations are intertwined with economic coercion and the relations between village capitalists and comprador/bureaucrat bourgeoisie reflect a mixture of cooperation and competition.

While market relations (though unequal) are in theory fully compatible with democratic freedoms for the peasantry, the same cannot be said of practices connected with extra-economic coercion. Where direct compulsion is an integral part of production relations that define the life activity of the vast majority, no consistent democracy is possible so far as state affairs are concerned. In such a situation, direct force becomes very much a part of relations between the exploiters and the exploited, and not simply between the rulers and the ruled. Political power is a part of the process of surplus labour extraction from direct producers. It is itself an economic force, and thus marks the character of the state power that stabilises basic relations in society.

In such situations, even if central state power may be legitimated through formal democratic practices like multi-party competition through regular elections, state structures in the countryside do not allow for any democratic forms of control. Neither the administrative

hierarchy of chiefs, nor the judicial hierarchy of courts, nor the various District Land Committees, allow for popular intervention in their functioning. These organs are tied up with the regime of labour controls and reproduced through extra-economic coercion.

In this context, the democratic struggle is confined to no more than a narrow demand for a multi-party system and free-and- fair elections. Hence, its significance is immediately confined to only those classes already free of extra-economic coercion. This is why a liberal democratic reform in the case of Uganda can only be a minority reform, of meaning to the bourgeoisie and the middle classes, and at most to the working class.

What is needed is a much broader and popular conception of democracy, whose kernel must be the emancipation of the peasantry, the majority of society, from all forms of extra- economic coercion. The pre-requisite for such a sweeping political reform is no less than a change in the production relations of society. It is tantamount to a social transformation.

It is not being suggested that an end to the practices of extra-economic coercion will automatically bring in its wake a flowering of popular democracy. While the former is a necessary condition for the latter, it is no way a sufficient condition. Democratic freedoms have never come about as a logical consequence of a free market, they have always had to be won through popular struggle.

As the peasantry embody various contradictory combination of labour and property, they are incapable of evolving autonomously a consistent agrarian program, either from the point of view of labour or of capital. A consistent program for the emancipation of the peasantry as part of the labouring masses can only come from that section of the labouring people - the working class - which is itself emancipated from private property in production. The peasantry is necessarily led by either the bourgeoisie or the working class. In the absence of this realisation, it is not possible to counter the present mobilization of the peasantry.

WOMEN, POPULATION AND FOOD IN AFRICA: The Zambian Case

Mabel C. Milimo*

I. Introduction

The rapid increase of population and the drastic decline of agricultural production are among Africa's greatest problems, problems which must be solved if overall development is to be achieved. The population of Africa has been expanding at an annual rate of around 3.0 percent. Africa has also the highest fertility rate in the world, with a total fertility rate per women of 6.4 compared with 3.8 for the world as a whole, 4.4 for all developing countries and 2.0 in the developed countries (1). In Zambia, our study area, the average number of total live births amongst Zambian women of reproductive age was 7.4 per women, in 1969 with some provinces such as the Eastern and Copperbelt, having higher fertility rates than others (2).

Over the last two decades, Africa as a whole has undergone a drastic deterioration in agricultural production, increasing its dependence on food imports. Population growth has outstripped increases in food production by nearly 2 to 1 in this period, with declines in average food production per person. Food self-sufficiency ratios dropped from 98 to 86 per cent implying that each African had around 12 percent less home-grown food than twenty years earlier (3).

The general demographic situation for Africa indicates that food production has not kept pace with the rapid increase in population resulting in wide-spread famines in various parts of the continent. The situation described above leads most observers to regard Africa as having a food and population problem. Although Africa, compared to Asia, is very sparsely populated, it is considered as being over populated because population growth, at least during the past two decades, has tended to outstrip the continent's ability to provide adequate food supplies and social and economic services.

The population problem is usually attributed to women as the main cause of the problem because they bear children. As the solution to the problem, two major proposals are propounded: the curtailment

of women's fertility by contraceptive devices and Family Planning Programmes.

In this Paper, we argue that the role of women in the population and food problem has been greatly misconceived. Rather than the cause of the problem, they are viewed in a different light as a key to the solution of the food and population problem. It is argued that although family planning and other measures can and do benefit women greatly, birth control measures per se neither guarantee the solution to the food Crisis nor that of accelerated population growth because of factors that are specific to the African situation. Birth control measures, particularly in rural Africa, are not likely to have the same dramatic results that occurred in Europe and other countries largely because women in Africa face a different situation to that of their counterparts in Europe. It is further argued that since women in Africa form the majority of those involved in agricultural production, they can help solve the food/population crisis if certain measures to improve their status as producers and reproducers of children could be taken. Such measures would also greatly help to combat most of the factors that contribute to high fertility rates in Africa, particularly in rural Africa.

In this study, rather than the current emphasis on controlling women's fertility to reduce the birth rate, we have adopted a two pronged approach which emphasizes the combating of the root causes of high fertility and improved productivity by those involved in food production, particularly the women. This is important in view of the fact that small populations per se are not necessarily the answer to population related problem. As already noted, a country with a small population and a large land mass can be considered as overpopulated if it has no adequate resources and services to cater to the people. In this connection, even if current measures were to succeed in reducing the current birth rate by 50 percent, the population related problems may not necessarily be solved.

The study outlined below is based on data collected predominantly on rural women engaged in peasant farming in rural Zambia. The samples were taken from Mumbwa and Mazabuka districts in the Central and Southern provinces respectively. These are among the most progressive cash crop farming areas in the country. They were deliberately selected with a view to determining the nature of participation by female farmers and the impact of their situation on demography.

The women interviewed are operating under different conditions. Approximately fifty per cent of the four hundred women interviewed, are involved in some kind of agricultural assistance or settlement scheme; the other fifty per cent are struggling on their own. We opted to work with a variety of women farmers, to see, in addition to the objectives outlined above, whether there are differences between unaided women and women receiving assistance and to assess the impact of such assistance on development.

The importance of macro-studies cannot be disputed. However, micro-studies of this nature have their own advantages. Although the issue of women and rural development has been widely researched on a macro level in Africa and the Third World in general, individual country case studies, at least for Zambia, are still lacking. In the case of Zambia, although there is a large volume of literature on the economic, political and social situations, much of it is silent on women's issues. The few recent studies which have been devoted to women's issues do not focus on the relationships between women, population and food production. The undertaking of this type of study is justified by the need for data on which to base development policy and plans. In this regard, the data must reflect the situation and needs of individual countries.

The Paper is divided into two main parts. The first is a brief analysis of the food and population problem in Africa. It tries to trace the root causes of the problem, both historical and in their present form. Emphasis is placed on the current involvement of women in food production in patriarchal structures and the resultant impact on fertility and food self-sufficiency. The second and final section discusses strategies to solve the food and population problem.

II. The Food and Population Problem: Some Roots of the Problem

1. Women and Food Production in Africa: Historical Perspectives

The role of women as food producers has been adequately treated in some recent literature (4). The intention of this section is to give a brief analysis of the relationship of women to productive resources from a historical perspective and the impact of such relationships on demographic and other factors.

(i) The Position of Women as Food producers in Pre-colonial Africa (5)

Women have always played an important role in food production in Africa. Traditionally, the basic Unit of production was the household. The household economy was usually based on male-headed units of extended families. Before the introduction of the money economy, men and women worked together, producing for the household's consumption with a clearly defined division of labour based on age and sex. In addition to joint household production, in the particular case of Zambia women generally had land of their own where they grew crops like vegetables to complement the family food supply. They had considerable control over produce from their own gardens and from the household fields. They could distribute such produce as they wished either through barter for other commodities or as gifts to needy relatives.

Although patriarchy in Africa has existed since Pre-Colonial times, women's position during that period, especially with regard to access to and control of productive resources would seem to have been somewhat different from what it is today.

In pre-colonial Africa, women's position was slightly different especially with regard to their access to such factors of production as land. Both men and women had access to and enjoyed considerable control over land and its resources. This was largely due to the fact that in pre-Colonial African societies, the concept of private ownership of land, especially uncultivated land was not known. Unused land was free and both men and women had access to such land in accordance with the prevailing land tenure system in each area. The right to acquire unused land was generally not determined by sex. Consequently, women played a very important role towards food self-sufficiency in their communities.

In Zambia, the majority of the ethnic groups are matrilineal societies where traditionally women enjoyed a high social, economic and political status. In these societies women could inherit land through their mothers, they could receive land from the village headman or as gifts from their parents. A good number of them such as the Bemba practised uxori-local residence whereby the husband moved to the wife's village at marriage. He received land through his wife and such land was normally regarded as belonging to both man and wife. The woman was also entitled to her own share from the communal land. If the couple divorced, the man went back to his village and left the property with the wife(6).

Among the Tonga of the Southern Province, both uxori-local

residence and virilocal residence were practised depending on the wishes of the couple. If a woman moved to her husband's village, the husband was obliged to give her land. In case of divorce or death of the husband, the woman could go back to her people where she was given land by her family or village head. Generally among the Tonga, as was the case among most other African societies, rights in land were defined chiefly with respect to arable land. Members of the community held rights only in cultivated land. Unused land was free and land ownership was mainly undefined. If there was unused land within a neighbourhood which had not been subject to cultivation, anyone, including strangers, could use it without consulting anyone and the right to receive land was not determined by sex (7). Men and women were therefore equally eligible and many women had considerable holdings.

A very striking situation regarding women's access to land existed among the Lozi of the Western Province of Zambia where the land tenure system seems to have favoured women more than the men. Among the Lozi, daughters were given land for their gardens by their parents. When a daughter got married and moved to the husband's village, she retained her rights to the land during her absence from the village. She also received land from the husband in his village and the produce from her fields were absolutely hers (8). If the husband died or they divorced and she went back to her village, she continued using land held before marriage in her village with full rights. This rule, however, did not apply to sons. If a man moved out of his village, he lost the rights in land and his land could be re-allocated to someone else. If he returned to the village at a later date, he had to apply to the village head for a new piece of land (9), a situation which did not apply to women. In this way, whether a woman was married, single, divorced or widowed, she had easier access to land than the men.

Even among the few patrilineal societies such as the Ngoni of the Eastern Province where the family system was highly patriarchal, women had access to land. Men had strong claim only to land which was already cultivated, and this was the land which they inherited from their fathers, uncles or brothers. Women, as in matrilineal societies had access to unused land which they received in their own right from their families.

These cases indicate that women had some control over land and its products, in traditional African societies. Evidence exists, for example, which shows women distributing their products through trade for their own benefit. Many early European accounts, for example, show

women exchange farm and other products for cloth, beads or copper bangles to decorate themselves. Indeed, women's agricultural produce virtually helped those early travellers in Africa to survive the hardships of hunger (10).

(ii) The Impact of Colonial Reforms and Migration on Female Producers: Socio-economic Transformations Under Colonialism.

Women's rights to productive resources were seriously affected under Colonialism. The Colonial governments introduced new concepts of property, land tenure and new legal systems which were detrimental to the Colonized peoples as a whole and to women in particular. Capitalist features of land tenure and property ownership were introduced to facilitate the governing of the Colonized peoples. The Colonial regimes introduced property laws which were rooted in rights of private ownership of land.

During this period, rights in land became more and more privatized and such land could only be inherited or utilized by direct descendants of the title holder. In countries like Kenya, Zimbabwe and Zambia, the settler system of agriculture was introduced. Through this system, large tracts of land were alienated and reserved for European settler farming. Africans were moved to less fertile areas where they were given new land. This process is often viewed as having adversely affected both men and women equally. This is true only to a limited degree. Whenever land was given out to the resettled families, the rules regulating traditional land tenure were replaced by the land tenure systems of the colonizers. Thus the new land was always assigned to men as heads of households, according to the patriarchal systems existing in the metropolises. Consequently, women generally became dispossessed and their economic position began to decline.

In countries like Zambia, certain areas were not affected by settler farming and resettlements. This was particularly the case in the Western Province (then Barotseland which was a Native reserve) the Northern, Luapula and North-Western Provinces. Women in these areas were affected by factors such as migration and the Colonial reforms in the land tenure system. During the Colonial period the British administration was anxious to secure Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) as a labour reserve for the mines and settler farms in Northern Rhodesia and countries south of the Zambezi. As in most other African countries, measures like the introduction of Hut Tax were introduced to force men to migrate from the rural areas in search of employment.

Prior to 1953, Women were not allowed to migrate to the mines either to accompany their husbands or in search of employment. During this period, the Colonial administration tried very hard to discourage female migration by enacting specific ordinances which restricted the movement of women and children. These ordinances were strictly enforced by the Native Authorities who were based in the rural areas. Among the Ngoni for instance, women were not allowed to go outside their tribal area without a special pass which was normally never granted to them. Similarly among the Chewa of Eastern Province, women going out of the province were expected to be in the company of husbands or to produce marriage certificates and single women were particularly affected (11). Women were generally not allowed to accompany their husbands to the Copper mines which were the largest employers of migratory labour.

As might be expected, the policy of internment and segregation of the local populations brought a lot of changes in the traditional African economy. It was earlier noted that traditionally, the household economy, was manely based on male-headed units of extended families producing for the household. Within the colonial economy, the new needs and demands for migratory labour undermined the traditional division of economic responsibilities within the family. Because of the massive migration of men from the rural areas, it was mainly the women who kept the fundamental sector of the village economy going. While the men were being absorbed in the new European economy, women were tied to farming and represented the core of the labour force engaged in subsistence farming in the various communities. Employment opportunities for women in the formal sector were virtually non-existent under colonialism.

Contraditions Under Colonialism

Because of the massive migration of men from the rural areas, many households became female-headed, and women formed the bulk of the food producers. However, owing to the patriarchal nature of the colonial regime, the special role that women were poised to play in agricultural production in the new situation, was not recognized and women's potential was never fully tapped - a legacy that was to be perpetuated by independent African governments.

Although peasant production generally suffered under the Colonial regimes, female producers faced a particularly hard time. We have already noted, for instance, that in areas where European settler farming was introduced, land was always allocated to men in the new

settlements. Later during the Colonial period, especially in the case of Zambia, when the regime started to encourage African farmers to produce, productive resources such as credit, agricultural services and other inputs were always directed at the few men remaining in the rural areas (12). In such cases men increasingly began to produce for the market while women continued to produce for the subsistence needs of the household. In areas which had suffered massive male migrations, the female-headed households were completely omitted from access to productive resources.

The rejection or neglect of female producers was a contradiction because, while female agricultural producers exceeded males in numbers, productive resources were directed at their male-counterparts who were in a minority. During this period most areas experienced serious shortages of "able-bodied young males". In the Western Province, for instance, particularly prior to and after the depression of the mid-thirties, "It was a common experience to find 40 to 50 per cent of the adult males absent from the villages at work at any one time" (13). In the Sesheke district, "approximately 60 percent of adult males (were) out of the district in 1938" (14). Areas like the Northern Province usually recorded much higher rates of migration of adult males.

Since women were not allowed to migrate to the towns, at least up to 1953 in the case of Zambia, this meant that almost 100% of the female population was available in the rural areas. Unfortunately, they were the most neglected and under productive among agricultural producers because such productive resources as were available for Africans were always aimed at male farmers who were in a minority. These factors - massive migration of adult males and the inability to recognize female producers' potential role in agricultural production, under the changed socio-economic conditions, was one of the main factors influencing population and food trends among African communities, and which was to continue after independence. Some studies during that period note for example that:

"The outflow of native labourers (mostly young males), from the tribal villages has had serious effects upon the economies of the home areas. The problem of raising sufficient food to support the population, at all times pressing, has been aggravated by this out-migration" (15).

One of the main reasons that was to perpetuate the food and population problem in Africa was the failure by both the Colonial and subsequent independent regimes, to recognize and tap the potential

role women were poised to play in the absence of the majority of men.

(iii) Patriarchy and the Current Situation of Female Producers: Effects on Fertility

Women continue to form the bulk of the food producers in independent Africa. In Zambia, although the numbers of women migrating to urban areas has increased since 1953 when the ban on the migration of women was lifted, the ratio of male migrants, especially those from remote rural areas, tends to be generally higher than that of female migrants. The number of women in wage employment continues to be low compared to men according to 1980 data, only about 7% of women are in wage employment (16). The situation has therefore changed very little since independence. The bulk of women workers are engaged in the informal sector, particularly the agricultural sector. In the informal agricultural sector, women account for some 60 to 80 percent of peasant farmers. In other African countries a much higher proportion compared to men, is involved in agricultural production. In a number of countries like Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar, Cameroun, Rwanda, and Chad, women in agriculture account for at least 90 per cent of all women workers (17).

Lack of Access to Factors of Production

Despite their important role in food production, women are the least productive in Africa's rural areas. This is largely due to the fact that although direct colonialism has disappeared from independent Africa patriarchy still persists. Patriarchy, as some observers have correctly pointed out, lies fundamentally in men's control over women's labour power. This control is maintained by excluding women from access to some essential productive resources (18). As in the Colonial period, women lack access to factors of production. Most productive resources continue to be male-oriented. Under the capitalist systems of production which most African states inherited from the Colonial past, access to factors of production largely determines the extent to which people control the fruits of their labour as well as their status in society.

1. Land

As already noted, one of the most important factors which affects productivity is land and control of its resources. In Africa today, Land is not only a means of production, it also serves as collateral for credit and as a criterion, for inputs such as agricultural extension,

irrigation, chemical inputs and so forth. In most independent African states, land continues to be assigned to husbands who are recognized as heads of households, so that most African women have limited or no access to land resources and other productive resources.

In the case of Zambia, this may seem as an unfounded allegation in view of the Land Reform that was introduced in 1975. Through the Land Act of 1975, the Zambian Government introduced changes that under certain circumstances would ensure equal access to factors of production like land, for both men and women. It introduced a land reform program that makes unoccupied land "free" for all Citizens of Zambia. But certain conditions persist which limit women's access to land and the extent of their participation in rural development. The main problem constraining women's access to land are the modes used in allocating such land. By the Land Convention Act No.20 of 1975, all land in Zambia is vested in the President, and land, can be obtained only with his consent (19).

Primarily, therefore, the President as owner of the land is the only person with the absolute power of disposition (20). The President, however, delegates his powers to other bodies such as district councils and the Ministry of lands to allocate land on his behalf. It is at these lower levels that problems arise. Some councils, for instance, require the consent of the husband if a married woman applies for land. In most cases husbands are reluctant to give such permission because they prefer the wife to work on their land which is normally dedicated to cash crops. The tendency to grant land title to males, therefore, continues. Consequently, most women work on land that they do not own and their control of such land and its resources is limited. In the sample area, although all the women interviewed regard themselves as farmers and are very heavily involved in agricultural activities, a substantial number of women have no land of their own (Table I).

The incidence of landlessness seems to be highest among women who are not being aided in anyway. In Mumbwa, among women who are not receiving Government or SIDA aid, 52.8 per cent have no land of their own; in Mazabuka, 36.7 per cent of the unaided women have no land. Among the women who are involved in farming schemes which are receiving some aid, the incidence of landlessness is low, but the majority of the women received the land from their husbands. Among the aided women in Mumbwa, 50 per cent got their land from spouses, in Mazabuka 56 percent of the women in aided settlement schemes obtained land from their husbands. The implication, is that even in aided schemes, the source of land for women is not of concern

to the donors except in a few instances (Table 2). As in the Colonial days, land title tends to be directed at the man. The needs of female farmers are rarely of concern.

The lack of access to and control of resources such as land, has contributed greatly to the problems of female producers and these problems have mainly contributed both to the food crisis and the high fertility trends. Lack of land for a substantial number of women who are the main food producers in Africa, is a major constraint on their productivity and their potential to contribute towards the food self-sufficiency of the continent.

Recent research has for instance indicated that there is a relationship between fertility and lack of control of productive resources such as land. Some data based on agricultural communities in Third World Countries indicated that women who have lost access to and control over the productive process tend to display higher fertility rates than women who have not experienced that kind of loss. The shift from communal ownership of land with usufruct to private ownership is regarded as having drastic effects on women. As land passes into private ownership it is argued, women are squeezed out of independent access to land and to the means of production. The marginalization of women as a result of this process, is associated with high fertility. The incentives for numerous children are said to be rooted in a woman's search to gain power in the domestic arena once she has lost her productive resource base in the economic sphere. Among strategies used by women to gain domestic power is "the control of men (through sex and children) and the direct control of children" (21).

2. Agricultural Technology and Labour

In rural Africa, both male and female peasants generally lack access to labour-saving technology. Most literature on farmers' access to technology, however, discloses that female peasant farmers are more seriously affected. The literature indicates that discrimination is practised in the farming technologies employed by men and women. In women's farm work, for instance, the hoe is still the dominant implement. Where draft animals have been introduced into farming, they are driven by men. There has been little mechanization of the work done by women. One study conducted in Botswana where draft animals are widely used, and where women are traditionally the major producers of food stuffs, showed that 59 percent of the households headed by women had no access to draught animals, as compared with

only 28 percent of the families headed by men (22).

In most countries where draft animals are widely used and are owned by men, the men hire them out to the women at ploughing time. As a result, the women suffer from loss of income. Primarily, because they often must pay rentals to the owner of the farm animals and secondly because they are not in a position to choose the most appropriate time for ploughing their own land.

The situation of women in the study area, compared to male-farmers, is not very different from that persisting in other parts of Africa. The Mazabuka and Mumbwa districts, are for example, among Zambia's most progressive farming areas. Mazabuka, in particular, is situated in the Southern Province which has a long and successful agricultural history. During the colonial era, the Southern Province was one of the first areas to experience large scale commercial farming and extensive innovations in agricultural technology. Of particular importance was the adoption of ox-drawn implements that enabled them to increase the acreage under cultivation and to transport their produce on ox-drawn scotch carts. In 1936, for example, a district officer estimated the total of African owned plows on the Tonga Plateau at 43,000 and by the early fifties, more than 50 percent of the African farmers had plows of their own (23). Today, the percentage is bound to be much higher since the area continues to be very progressive agriculturally.

The current situation of women farmers in the study areas, however, indicates that women have been left out insofar as access to technology is concerned. About 70 percent of the four hundred women interviewed reported that they must rent certain types of equipment in order to do their work (Tables 3). The equipment rented by women from farmers in the area consists mostly of tractors, ploughs, farm trucks, scotch carts, shelling machines, cultivators and planters.

The majority of the women (54.5 percent) have to pay fees for the equipment that they rent from other farmers. The women who do not pay for hired or borrowed equipment either are married to the owners or have close relatives, like fathers and uncles, from whom they can borrow free of charge.

Whether they pay for the borrowed equipment or not, women borrowers generally operate under constraining circumstances and are not able to plan for the major events of the agricultural calendar, such as plowing or general soil preparation. They can borrow or rent the

equipment only after its owner has finished using it.

The inadequacy of technology for female producers seems to have a positive effect on their fertility. Labour-saving tools are normally applied to tasks generally done by men, such as land clearing and ploughing. The tasks generally done by women, such as weeding are still labour intensive, yet certain technologies such as ploughs and cultivators tend to increase the acreage that larger labour force that could carry out these additional chores. In the areas surveyed for instance, household generally needed a large labour force. As a result, children are highly involved in farm activities. This is partly due to the fact that peasant households especially those headed by women, generally lack labour-saving equipment. The most reliable source of farm labour is, therefore, one's own family. This need is strengthened by the fact that most households in the area have their own plots of land, so that there is "no labour pool of landless peasants" available for hire (24). Most farmers in the area must therefore rely on their family for labour.

This dependency on family labour causes conflicts in the labour allocation of married women especially those who own their own plots of land or gardens. Whereas husbands mainly grow cash crops, such as cotton, sunflower and maize, women tend to concentrate on food crops in their gardens. Wives are expected to work on their own gardens as well as their husbands plots, in tasks such as weeding, sowing, harvesting etc. Because most men tend to cultivate more than one cash crop, they require substantial amounts of labour. The ability of Women to mobilize men's labour is limited to tasks such as ploughing. The only labour they are able to mobilize fully is that of children, particularly female children for female-related tasks. Many women in the sample claimed that they did all the tasks related to land-preparation (including ploughing in some cases). On the other hand, they were expected to help in weeding, planting and harvesting their husband's fields.

Even if hired labour were readily available, most women could not afford to hire workers since men dominate and control cash-crops while the women are engaged predominantly in subsistence farming. To a great extent, therefore, women can neither completely control their own labour nor mobilize additional labour for their own fields. This situation is made worse by the lack of labour-saving equipment, which helps to account for the fact that women barely produce above subsistence levels.

Lack of access to productive resources like labour-saving techniques and lack of control over one's own labour tends to have a positive effect on fertility in rural Africa.

Recent research has indicated, for example, that the high rate of fertility in agricultural communities is partly a response to women's workloads (25). Numerous children are perceived as lessening the burden of women's tasks in household enterprises domestic chores and productive activities (26). Some data on agricultural communities also indicates that high fertility among rural women results from the perceived economic value of children to the household (27).

The value of children may also be analyzed in terms of the mother's time cost. Older children offer low-cost substitutes for the mother's time. For the women in Mumwa and Mazabuka, the time-costs of child rearing are minimized by the availability of substitute labour from older children and kinfolk (28).

As already noted, many children are also needed for farm work and other essential services. Most women as we have seen, depend on labour intensive methods of production but cannot afford to hire labour. Hence, the need for sufficient household labour. Further, women tend to have a myriad and taxing work-loads, and children seem to feature prominently in the distribution of tasks (Table 4). In the sample areas, virtually all the women interviewed regard themselves as farmers; they are all heavily involved in agricultural activities at all levels, from soil preparation to food processing. Women appear to be very heavily engaged in seasonal activities such as soil preparation, hoeing, ploughing, ridging, stumping and logeburning. It is often stated in literature without any empirical evidence that men tend to be significantly more involved in heavy tasks such as ploughing and land clearing. This study indicates, however, that, at least in the Zambian sample areas, there is a high degree of participation by women in such tasks. Approximately 25.4 percent of the four hundred women interviewed claimed that they do the ploughing on their own fields without the assistance of the husband; 27.7 percent claimed to be doing the ploughing together with the husband; 21.8 percent said that household labour consisting of husband, children and the wife, was used, and only 1.7 percent said that the husband and children ploughed without the wife's participation. The majority of the farmers who own ploughs use Ox-drawn equipment such as ox-ploughs, ridgers and cultivators which women borrowed and which they can handle. Ploughing with powered equipment for the tiny number who own tractors (6 percent in the sample area) is done by men.

The women also seem to be much more involved than men in planting, weeding and applying fertilizers and pesticides as well as in the final stages of production, such as harvesting, shelling and storing of crops. Men's participation in food processing, such as pounding or grinding grain and cooking, is almost zero. Food processing, harvesting and storing are traditionally considered to be "women's work," which probably explains the high degree of women's participation in these areas. But women seem to be participating extensively in activities such as stumping and ploughing, which traditionally have been done by men (Table 4).

In addition to their agricultural activities, women must perform other functions such as fetching water and fuel wood for energy. Traditionally, women are the drawers of water, and they perform the majority of the tasks which require the use of water, such as watering gardens, washing clothes, bathing children, house cleaning and cooking. Women also spend a lot of time fetching wood or other fuel and hauling it over long distances.

In most of these activities, child labor plays an important role either directly or indirectly. As already noted elsewhere, older children provide low-cost substitutes for their mother's time. They help to look after the younger children and perform some household chores while the mother is out in the fields or fetching water and fuel for cooking. Child labor is also directly involved in a number of agricultural and other activities, such as herding cattle, milking cows, cooking, weeding and kraal building. Children are highly valued, partly because of their contribution to household labor, and a woman's desire for a large family is partly tied to the important role that children play in the economic activities of the household, particularly those for which the mother is responsible. Men on the other hand normally prefer large numbers of boys for male-related tasks such as herding, milking and the building of shelters or kraals for animals. In a number of instances, a woman may be required to go on reproducing until the desired number of male and female children has been reached.

The situation of women in rural Africa today, gives a very different picture from that existing in the industrialized countries where fertility rates are very low. In these countries the economic value of children in the homes is minimal. Most household chores like washing clothes, sweeping etc. have been mechanized, while farming activities are the domain of men. The women do not have to walk long distances for water and energy while they have increasingly

participated in gainful employment in which the contribution of children is not required. These and a combination of other factors have contributed to the low-levels of fertility in the developed countries.

The problem of labor in rural Africa is intensified by the high rate of migration to the urban areas or other parts of the province. In both Mumwa and Mazabuka, a high percentage of young men and women are away from home, working in the towns. In the sampled households 61.7 percent of the sons were away from the villages during the 1983-84 period; 67.9 percent of the daughters were also away from home. Most of the young men leave home in order to seek employment or education elsewhere; most of the absent girls are accompanying their spouses who are working away from home.

The absence of large numbers of sons and daughters tends to make older women seek more children to make up the labor force. Women therefore tend to reproduce as much as is biologically possible. The desire for more children is strengthened by a lack of labor-saving technologies which make women's work easier and quicker. In the sampled area 70.4 percent of the women over the age of 49 desired more children, while 77.2 percent desired between six and eleven children. Most women are also married in polygamous unions - another factor causing high fertility rates and which is partly related to labour needs. Although it is sometimes argued that polygamy lowers fertility, in the sample areas at least, families in polygamous unions were found to be just as prolific as the monogamous unions. The incidence of polygamy is very high in these areas. At least 43 percent of the four hundred women interviewed, are polygamous and about 10% are married to husbands with three or more other women (Table 5).

In most cases, one man may have as many babies as the wives in his homestead. One of the main reasons that motivates men to enter into polygamous unions is the need for a large labour force to work on their farms. Most husbands grow labour intensive cash crops such as cotton, sunflower and maize. In the absence of labour-saving tools, the tendency is to engage as much female and child labour, as possible. Most women who enter polygamous marriages are still of child-bearing age; because the tendency in polygamy is to marry new wives who are younger than the existing ones, most new wives are very young - many still in their teens. The incidence of early marriages for women is therefore quite high. As in most Third World Countries early marriages in the area, are, in fact, a major factor contributing to high fertility rates, since women start producing

children at a very early age and continue until menopause. In our study, about 71 percent of the respondents had married between the ages of 14-20 years, and only 29% were married after the age of 20 years.

3. Education and Cultural Factors

Other factors, such as cultural and traditional practices also contribute greatly to fertility trends and pose a big problem to population control in Africa. Lack of education for the rural masses in Africa is one of the main contributory factors in this regard. In Africa, as in most Third World Countries, illiteracy is highest among women. Because of the high rate of illiteracy in the rural areas, couples tend to perpetuate cultural and traditional practices and beliefs towards fertility. Lack of Education denies men and women access to new sources and kinds of information which help to change certain attitudes and beliefs towards fertility.

The impact of education on fertility in Africa has not been closely studied. It is, however, generally feared and assumed that the economic and cultural factors which give great emphasis to fecundity and to the extended family, may negate the expected effects of education on family size. This fear would seem to be confirmed by the fact that urban educated women in Africa tend to register much higher rates of fertility than their counterparts in other parts of the world.

However, although education per se does not necessarily produce a drop in the birth rate, education, like a number of other factors, can play an important role in changing attitude towards fertility, by exposing the people to new sources of information, new ideas and values towards fertility.

It is important, however, to emphasize at this point that it is not necessarily any type or level of education that can result in low fertility. Available data, for instance, indicates that there is little or no correlation between education and fertility when the groups compared are people with no schooling and those who have up to 4 to 6 years of primary education. This may explain the current situation among so called educated urban African women. The majority rarely attain more than 4-8 years of study. The level of education which probably has to be reached to reduce fertility sharply, may be as high as 10 to 14 years of schooling (29). A number of studies indicate that there is a relatively high correlation between high literacy rates and low birth-rates.

The majority of these studies show that in almost every country, the more education women have, the fewer children they bear. For example in a 1972 study from Jordan of women aged 30- 34, illiterate women were found to have an average of 6.4 children while those with a primary school education averaged 5.9. For secondary school graduates, the average was 4.0; and for University degree holders, only 2.7 children. Studies in Turkey and Egypt showed the same pattern. In Turkey, the average number of children ranged from 1.4 for college graduates to 4.2 for unschooled women. In the Egyptian survey, women who had finished university averaged less than four children compared with more than seven for illiterate women (30). Evidence also exists showing that the countries with the lowest birth-rates in the world also have levels of female education. In Eastern Europe and Scandinavia, the Soviet Union, Germany, Britain, Japan, Canada and the United states all have almost equal numbers of boys and girls enrolled in school at least up to Secondary level. Some of these countries e.g. Denmark, Finland, Russia etc, graduate more girls than boys from high schools (31). In Africa, particularly in rural Africa, lack of education contributes to high rates of fertility.

In rural Africa, high fertility among other factors, is still largely anchored in the traditional value system, which socializes women as bearers of children and to favour having large numbers of children. Lack of education is a big factor in perpetuating such value systems. These values and systems are still being passed on to present and future generations. Among the Akan of Ghana, for example, there are fertility rites involving blessings and protection for women so that they may be abundantly fertile (32). One of the prayers in girls' puberty rites goes like this: "May the elephant give you her womb, so that you may bear ten children" (33). Further, because most African traditional societies believe that their dead ancestors still exist and influence life on earth, they hold that reproduction as a means of replacing the ancestors, is a person's primary function; there is a taboo on a person who dies without issue. A case in point is the Bemba of Zambia. Women who died without issue were traditionally buried in a special way (34) which brought embarrassment to the family. The family, therefore, anxiously awaits the birth of the first child as soon as a couple is married and they become more satisfied if the woman proves to be very prolific thereafter. In most African societies, there is also a great attachment to and zeal for many children, not necessarily because of the "human capital" factor but because children bring status. Fatherhood, particularly, is a source of social and political power. Motherhood is also important in many African societies, a woman has

no social status until she becomes a mother and in some traditions a woman ceases to be a "girl" only after she has produced at least four children (35). A childless couple will explore every avenue to discover the causes of their sterility and find a remedy (36).

Traditional practices are still very strong, particularly in the rural areas, where life-styles have not been so drastically altered as in urban areas. Many Africans still live and behave in ways that are greatly affected by their culture or social class. The attitudes of the younger generation toward fertility are still strongly influenced by those of the older generation. Epstein, has shown, for example, how women's attitudes toward fertility may be conditioned along certain lines in different cultural contexts in rural African and Asian societies. She demonstrates how a woman's position in society changes as she passes through different phases of the life cycle.

Her role differs in each succeeding phase: early in life she is trained by older women to accept the social and cultural norms of behavior; at marriage, she must adapt to the role of young wife and mother; as her children begin to leave home and she grows older, the constraints on her behavior lessen and she begins to influence the training of succeeding generations; in the final phase, when a woman's children are married and have children of their own, she perpetuates the cultural traditions and norms (37) including the traditions that advocate high fertility.

This situation persists in rural Africa today. In our study area of Mumbwa and Mazabuka in rural Zambia, only 5.4 percent of the four hundred respondents have more than seven years education most of the women interviewed came from household of ten or more people, and households range from one to thirty members. A recent study on the Mumbwa area showed the average size of households to be 9.5 members (38). More than 70 percent of the women in the study areas desired many children. Among the women receiving aid from SIDA in the Mumbwa area, 56 percent of the women desired at least nine children. Another study based on the Mumbwa area has found that, among women who have had many children, there is still a strong desire for more children. The desire to have more children was held almost equally strongly by all women below the age of 40 years and was the strongest among women aged 15-29 years (39).

Lack of education also adversely affects the productivity of rural women. Agricultural training, like all the other productive resources, is male-oriented. In our study area, for instance, the large majority of

women (73.5 percent) have never attended a formal agricultural training course. The few who have received some training consist mainly of those women who are receiving some kind of aid from donor agencies like SIDA in the Mumbwa district. The SIDA aided Schemes in Mumbwa provide some training and extension for participants in improved crop management. The majority of the women, as already noted, have never attended any training and they depend on outdated production methods.

The result of the lack of access to productive factors is that, although women put in enormous amounts of time and work, their labour is not very productive and this factor greatly contributes to the food crisis in Africa since women are the Chief food producers. In the study area, almost all women (96.2 percent) grow maize, which is the staple food crop. A substantial number also grow other food crops like beans and groundnuts. Although crops like maize, beans and groundnuts can also be grown as cash crops, the great majority of women do not produce enough surplus for sale. The inability of most women to produce a saleable surplus is largely caused by the lack of access to productive resources. These give rise to a number of problems such as the small sizes of the land cultivated by women because of insufficient labour and lack of labour-saving techniques.

Other factors, like lack of credit for desirable inputs, also greatly limit the amount of surplus women can produce (40). The inability to produce a surplus limits women's contribution to food self-sufficiency of the African Continent. This is a serious problem in view of the fact that women constitute the majority of those engaged in food production in rural Africa.

In view of the constraints outlined above, current approaches to population related problems face formidable obstacles and are most likely to have very slim chances of success. There is great need, therefore, to work out new approaches and strategies to solve the population and food problem in Africa.

III. The Need for New Approaches and Strategies

In the fore-going sections, we have argued that several factors including, mainly, unequal access to productive resources contribute to the food and population problem in Africa. Rural women who are the principal food producers are also those who are most negatively affected from their unequal access to factors of production. Most women, as we have seen, have no land of their own and instead work

on land provided by their husband who consequently maintains control over the final product. Additionally, women still depend on inefficient tools of production and most labor-saving techniques are controlled by men, while credit for inputs and agricultural training are male-oriented. As a result, women do not produce enough to feed their families and rarely produce a surplus for the market. Under such circumstances, the food problem is bound to continue amidst a growing population and in spite of large number of women who are already mobilized to contribute to agricultural production but are unable to do so because of the constraints described above.

The important question, then, is what should be done to improve the situation of the rural masses, particularly the women so as to end the food problem and to achieve the desired population trends?

1. Some Current Strategies

Several approaches and strategies to the food and population problem have emerged especially since the World Conference on Population (1974) and the United Nations (FAO) World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (1979). These include the "neo-Malthusian", the "Integrationists" and the "radical" approaches, to name only a few.

The "neo-Malthusian" approach views the fundamental problems as a race between population growth and increased agricultural production. The basic solution, according to this view, is population control and the improvement of agricultural technologies (41). In the ensuing population control programs, women are the main targets and are subjected to birth control measures which usually pay little or no attention to the effect of such measures on the women's health. As already noted, this approach to the food and population problem is inadequate for reasons that are partly rooted in the cultural practices of the people and partly tied to women's needs which necessitate large numbers of children. The approach is particularly inadequate because there is often too much emphasis on controlling or reducing numbers while it fails to recognize and eradicate the root-causes of high fertility rates and of the deteriorating food situation.

Since the publication of Ester Boserup's pioneer work (42), there has been an upsurge of literature on "the Integration of women in development", as a strategy. These advocate the integration of women into the current development process generally, and into rural development in particular, in order to boost agricultural production

by giving women equal access to productive resources. The integrationist approach was widely acclaimed by International bodies such as the United Nations and donor agencies (43).

Recently, however, the "Integration of women in Development", approach has been questioned by radical feminists, particularly from the Third World (44). This group of writers argue that currently, Africa is experiencing the type of development known as dependent development, in which the men are not doing very well either. Africa, they point out, is dependent the West for food and other imports; it experiences unequal terms of trade with these countries. Consequently, the situation is deteriorating instead of improving because of these dependent relationships. It would, therefore, be futile for Africa to try and integrate women into a dependent structure which has failed to work. In any case, it is argued, women are already integrated into these structures and special programmes designed for women by aid agencies usually worsen the situation. Since African women are already integrated into the dependent structures (albeit unequally so), what is needed is a radical restructuring of the whole system in order to end neo-Colonialism and the dependent relations which persist between developed and developing nations, as well as patriarchal attitudes and structures.

2. The Problem of Patriarchy

The latter issue, patriarchy, as a problem in the African Crisis should be given more serious consideration than has hitherto been the case. It is possible, for instance, that should radical structural changes manage to remove neo-Colonialism, imperialism and dependency in Africa, the women question and related problems would persist due to patriarchy. It is useful, in this connection to draw lessons from the past. African men and women, jointly fought colonialism and imperialism together. After independence the position of women barely changed while the majority of their male counterparts moved into the positions of the former dominating and oppressive class - the Colonial masters. The subordination of women persists because while direct imperialism and colonialism disappeared, patriarchy, which is the main basis of sexual discrimination, remained. Women are, therefore, faced with the problem of patriarchy as well as that of dependency and neo-colonialism in Africa.

It may be possible, for example, to end the current dependent neo-Colonial structures in Africa through radical changes, but the problems of women would persist even if the current capitalist

structures were to be transformed into socialist ones, because of patriarchy. Patriarchy can, and operates in all forms of social systems. It has been usefully defined as:

"a set of social relations between men, which have a material base, and which though hierarchical, establish or create interdependence and solidarity among men that enable them to dominate women. Though patriarchy is hierarchical and men of different classes, races, or ethnic groups have different places in the hierarchy, they also are united in their shared relationship of dominance over their women; they are dependent on each other to maintain that domination. Hierarchies "work" at least in part because they create vested interests in the status quo. Those at the higher levels can "buy off" those at the lower levels by offering them power over those still lower. In the hierarchy of patriarchy, all men, whatever their rank in the patriarchy, are bought off by being able to control at least some women" (45).

Patriarchy, as the main source of sex discrimination, transcends all other criteria, such as race and class, on which discrimination against women is based. Only some women, in a particular setting, are discriminated against on the lines of race and class. A good example is South Africa where all non-whites, men and women are discriminated against on the basis of race and class. However, Apartheid is so organized that there is systematic domination of women by men in all racial groups and classes as demonstrated in the following table showing teachers' salaries:

	White	Coloured/Asian	African
Men	R322	R235	R132
Women	R288	R212	R123 (1)

The worst affected are black African women, and the picture might re-emerge after Independence. Progressively men are more highly paid in all the racial groups and class categories. All women are discriminated against on the basis of sex. African men held a slightly higher status than their female counterparts. They are discriminated against mainly on the basis of race and class, while the African women suffer all the three main forms of discrimination based on race, class and sex.

This reveals a different situation from that emphasized by Marxist and neo-Marxist analyses which put emphasis on class as the main basis of oppression of both men and women in the oppressed working class. Men and women in this class are viewed as having a similar or equal status. This is the main issue on which Marxism and Feminism, in fact, differ (47). Feminism insists that women are the most oppressed and discriminated against in all classes. Because of the failure to recognize this, Marxism has been labelled as "sex-blind" (48).

Patriarchy penetrates all known Ideologies (49). It persists in radical socialist structures of the World as well as in capitalist systems. Although socialism has done a lot for women, for example, the social structure is pervaded by patriarchy whereby men dominate the positions of power and the subordination of women persists in a number of spheres. A female Russian critic of the prevailing situation in Communist Russia, for example, refutes the allegation that women have achieved equality with men under Communism in Russia:

"Since childhood, the idea that we Russian women are the most fortunate women on earth has been drummed into us: "You have been provided with everything. The Revolution has eliminated all forms of oppression. Equality between the sexes has been achieved". I was quite young when I understood all these claims to be false... The Revolution had not managed to eradicate patriarchy. In some ways women in the Soviet Union are plagued by the same problems which plague women everywhere. We get little or no help from men with house work and children. We are not adequately represented in the political arena (women comprise 25% of party membership; there are no women in the Politburo). Another problem is KGB harassment of women working in the feminist movement. Methods range from interception of mail and interruption of telephone calls or surveillance of apartments... interrogations, threats, arrests, prison sentences and exile..." (50).

Patriarchy, therefore, pervades the major Ideologies of the world - capitalism, socialism and apartheid, to name a few. It can and does operate in all kinds of social systems. It exists in Africa in the current neo-colonial and dependent structures and is bound to continue thereafter. It is therefore important, when working out strategies to solve the problems under consideration, to isolate the real enemy, in order to eradicate the root causes of the problem.

3. Women, Population and Food: Status of Women as a Determinant of Fertility and a Factor of Productivity in Rural Africa.

We have argued in this paper that due to patriarchal structures and attitudes in the distribution of productive resources, the productivity of rural women has deteriorated. This situation is a major contributory factor to the root-causes of the food and population problem.

It has also been stressed that patriarchy, is primarily, the root cause of women's subordination and low status. It is, for example, not neo-Colonialism or Imperialism, that denies women access to land, agricultural services and inputs in independent Africa today, but patriarchal control and attitudes. Whether such resources are provided by local African institutions or foreign sources, they are nearly always directed to men. Such action overlooks the important role that women have the potential to play towards self-sustained development, in particular, towards food self-sufficiency and the desired population trends.

Measures must therefore be found which will attack the root causes of high fertility and low productivity in rural Africa. Such measures will have to take the status of the producers of children and of food, in rural Africa, into very serious consideration. This is important since the status of women is generally considered as a major determinant of fertility (51). The literature on the causes of low fertility, for example indicates that fertility tends to be lowest mostly in those countries where levels of living are highest and where the economic value of children has declined (52). Among the main reasons advanced for the decline in fertility and family size in these regions are changes in the status and role of women. This is true of women from both socialist and capitalist countries. Regions now characterized by low fertility rates formerly had much higher rates. In European countries such as Britain, children were once of high economic value. They participated in farming activities at an early age, and were extensively employed in handicraft and mechanical industries during their early development. But partly due to the general improvement in the situation of the people and particularly of the women, attitudes towards high fertility began to change. One of the main reasons advanced for this change of attitude was the greater degree of participation of women in gainful employment and increased education (53).

In the case of rural Africa, the chief occupation of women is agricultural production. This, as already noted, is still labour intensive and demands a lot of participation by children largely due to lack of labour-saving techniques. Agricultural production can become "gainful" employment for rural women if they had access to the productive resources (54) that are being directed mostly to production of export.

There is great potential for agricultural production to serve as gainful employment for rural women in Africa if patriarchal control of productive resources were eradicated. This would play a big role in enhancing the status of women.

Rural women are already highly involved in agricultural production and, they could help to solve the food and population problem if their work became more productive. Women constitute slightly more than 50 percent of the total population, with a female/male ration of 1.2/1. A very positive aspect of women's situation in Africa today is that while their counterparts in the Western industrialized countries have been booted out of agricultural production, a very high proportion of Africa's women are still involved. As a percentage of women workers, for example, the rate of women working in agriculture is more than 90 percent in Madagascar, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania; in Rwanda, Chad, the Central African Republic and Cameroon, women in agriculture account for 96 percent of all women workers (55). In Zambia, some 60-80% of women workers are involved in agricultural production (56). Women also spend enormous amounts of time on agricultural work. According to some estimates, rural women work from 15-16 hours per day, especially during harvest time when they spend long hours in farming(57).

Moreover unlike most male farmers, the majority of women concentrate on the production of food crops while men tend to concentrate on cash crops such as cotton, sunflower, tea, coffee, cocoa, palm oil etc. The concentration on cash crops has generally contributed to the food crisis in Africa today, as the continent tends to give priority to the export market while neglecting food production for home consumption. Production for the export market has other detrimental effects on food production for domestic consumption. Export crops absorb the best and most productive resources such as land, water, modern technology and know-how, scientific knowledge and skills. They also have priority influence on imported inputs like

pesticides and fertilizers. Consequently, food for domestic consumption has a secondary role.

The general indication, therefore, is that a substantial portion of the labour force in the rural sector in Africa consists of women. Since women's contribution to food production is so vital, structural changes are urgently needed to eradicate the root causes of low productivity. We have already noted that the subordination of women and the problems that stem from that situation would continue even if neo-colonial and dependent structures in Africa were to be replaced by radical socialist structures, because of patriarchy.

Genuine structural changes would only result if, in addition to the eradication of neo-colonialism, imperialism and dependency, democratic structures are worked out to end patriarchal control. The aim of such structures should be to ensure women's equality with men within the non-dependent structures. Such structures should ensure the equal participation of women in all spheres of social and economic life particularly in decision-making.

This is important since decisions generally influence the trend of change in any society. We have noted for instance, that lack of labour saving devices for women's work is partly contributory to the food problem and to the high fertility trends in the continent. This is partly due to the fact that the available labour saving techniques, often referred to as Appropriate Technology, are male-dominated and male-oriented. This situation largely stems from the fact that the research and policy-making regarding such technologies is mostly done by men from industrialized countries. Such men also bring with them the prejudices about women and technology found in their own societies. Consequently, because of the patriarchal attitudes and control, most of the material on appropriate technology does not deal with women's needs.

This situation is bound to repeat itself when the determination of research priorities and policy-making in this regard, is predominantly done by Africans themselves, and women's needs will continue to be neglected. It is argued, in the case of industrialized countries for instance, that despite the relative advance in the design and provision of labour-saving equipment for women in the home "the appropriate technology movement demonstrates its prejudices about women's capabilities and roles; neglects women's needs and desires, and excludes women from power, decision making and control". Most of the attention is focussed on the traditionally male technologies of energy

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and transportation, while the research and decision-making is under men's control (59). It is felt that if the patriarchal structures were to go and women were equally involved in setting the priorities and making decisions, the needs of both men and women would be addressed and the variety of labour-saving techniques for all sections of society would improve.

Similarly in the case of Africa, if patriarchal structures and control persisted in a new self-sustained independent Africa, population related problems, including that of food, might continue because the root causes of the problem will not have been addressed.

Structural changes aimed at removing patriarchy in all spheres are therefore very crucial. Such structures should ensure egalitarian access to and control of productive resources. This would help to boost the productivity of both men and women. Increasing the productivity of women, in particular, would greatly contribute to the food-self-sufficiency of the continent. Increased productivity and reduced workloads could eventually lead to lower fertility rates as the importance of children in women's economic roles begin to drop. Equal access to such factors as education, will expose both men and women to new production methods in agriculture, as well as to new information regarding fertility. This would help to reduce the cultural barriers and beliefs which emphasize fecundity. Above all, an end to patriarchal structures would contribute greatly towards enhancing women's status, which as we have seen, is a factor in productivity and a determinant of fertility.

Notes:

* University of Zambia, School of Humanities and Social Sciences - Department of African Development Studies - Lusaka/Zambia.

1. United Nations Economic and Social Council: Economic Commission for Africa: E/ECA/ECIWD/OAU/10: "Women in Africa to the Year 2000", Paper presented at the Regional Inter- governmental Preparatory Meeting for the World Conference to Review and Appraise the achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace; Third Regional Conference on the Integration of Women in Development, Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, 8th - 12th October, 1984.

2. ZARD, Annotated Bibliography on Zambian Women, (Lusaka, 1985).

3. U.N. Economic and Social Council, op.cit.

4. Notably S. Muntemba: "Women as Food Producers and suppliers in the 20th Century: The Case of Zambia", Development Dialogue, 1982: 1 - 2.

5. This section relies predominantly on oral information; it also draws on some studies on Zambia and other parts of Africa in particular: S. Muntemba, op.cit.; J. Bukh, The Village

Woman in Ghana, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1979; E. Colson, Land Rights and Land use among Valley Tonga of the Rhodesian Federation: The Background to the Kariba Resettlement Programme; M. Gluckman, Essays on Lozi Land and Royal Property Rhodes, Livingstone Institute Papers, "Land Usage In Barotseland". Rhodes - Livingstone. Communications N°. 19 (Lusaka, 1960), A.R. Richards, Land, Diet and Labour among the Bemba.

6. A.I. Richards, Land, Diet and Labour among the Bemba of Northern Rhodesia.

7. E Colson: Land Rights and Land use Among the Valley Tonga of the Rhodesian Federation.

8. D.U. Peters, "Land Usage In Barotseland, in Rhodes- Livingstone Communication, N°.19, (Lusaka, 1960).

9. D.U. Peters, "Land Usage In Barotseland Rhodes Livingstone Communication,N°.19. (Lusaka, 1960).

10. The work of early travellers' like George Westbeeck, Trade and Travel in early Barotseland and David Livingstone's accounts, make very interesting reading in this connection.

11. Maria Rosa Cutrufelli, Women of Africa: The Roots of Oppression, (Zed press, London 1983).

12. I.S. Munkmba, op.cit.

13. Northern Rhodesia Annual Report Upon Native Affairs, 1932 (Livingstone, 1933).

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15. United Nations, Department of Social Affairs, Population Division: The Determinants And consequences of Population Trends: A summary of the Findings of Studies on the Relationships between Population changes and Economic and Social Conditions.Population Studies N°. 17, New York, 1953.

16. ZARD, op. cit.

17. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, op.cit.

18. H. Hartman, "The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards A More Progressive Union, in Lydia Sargent, ed. Women and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism,(South End Press, Boston, 1981).

19. M.P. MVUNGA, "Land Law and Policy in Zambia" African Social Research, Institute For African Studies, Zambia Papers N°17 (Mambo Press, Gweru, Zimbabwe, 1982).

20. Ibid.

21. N.H. Youssef, "The Interrelationship Between the Division of Labour in the Household, Women's Roles and their impact on fertility." in R. Anker, (ed.) Women's Role and Population Trends in the Third World, (au I.L.O. Publication, 1983).

22. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, "The Role of Women In the solution of the Food Crisis in Africa", Paper Presented at the U.N. Decade For women Regional Intergovernmental Preparatory meeting, Arusha, Tanzania, October, 1984.

23. T.S. Trent, "Colonial Social Accounting: An Appreciation of Phyllis Dean's Colonial Social Accounting, Part I, The Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, N°18, (1955).

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24. A. Chilivumbo et Al. "Demographic Impact of Agricultural Modernization", (I.D.R.C. Report, 1983).
25. Eva Mueller "The Allocation of Women's Time and Its Relation to fertility", in Women's Role and Population Trends in the Third World, edited by Richard Anker et.al., eds, op.cit.
26. N.H. Yousef, "The Interrelationship between the Division of Labour in the household, Women's Role and their impact on Fertility", in Richard Anker, et.al. eds., op.cit.
27. Ibid.
28. A. Chilivumbo, et.al., The Demographic Impact of Agricultural Modernization In the Mumbwa District, (IDRC Report,1983).
29. UNESCO, Population and Education, (Paper prepared for World Population Conference, :974, UNESCO, Paris 1973).
30. Kathleen Newland, Women and Population Growth: Choice Beyond Childbearing, World Watch Paper 16. December, 1977.
31. Ibid.
32. Maria Rosa Cutrufelli, Women of Africa: Roots of oppression (Zed Press London, 1983).
33. Ibid.
34. A childless woman was buried with a piece of charcoal inserted into her anus.
35. Cutrufelli op. cit.
36. Cutrufelli, op. cit.
37. T.S. Epstein, "A Social Anthropological Approach to Women's Roles and Status in Developing Countries: The Domestic Cycle ", in R. Anker, et.al. Women's Roles and Population Trends in the Third World, (an I.L.O. publication, 1983).
38. A. Chilivumbo, et.al. "The Demographic Impact of Agricultural Modernization: A pilot study in the Mumbwa District, (Report Submitted to the IDRC, 1983).
39. Ibid.
40. Drought was also a contributing factor during the 1983/4 season. The dry spell that has been affecting Africa for the past few years has spread to Southern Africa by that year.
41. In UNRISD, Food systems and Society (Geneva, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1978), p.5., cited in Marilee Karl, "Women and Rural Development: An Overview". in ISIS, Women In Development: A Resource Guide for Organization and Action, (Geneva, 1983). Some of the studies which represent the neo-Malthusian view include: Lester Brown, By Bread Alone, (New k: Praeger, 1974 and headows, et.al.), The limits of Growth, (Club of Rome, 1970).
42. Esther Boserup, Women's Role In Economic Development, (New York, St. Martins Press, 1970).
43. UNDP (Written by E. Boserup and Christina Liljenacrantz), Integrating Women in Development: FAO, The Hissing Half-Women 1975; FAO, The Report of the World

44. Achola Pala, "Definitions of Women and Development: an African Perspectives," in Women and National Development: The Complexities of change; O. Mascarenhas and M. Mbilinyi, "Struggles on the Question of Women in Tanzania," in Women in Tanzania, an Analytical Bibliography, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, (Uppsala SIDA, 1983).
45. H. Hartman: "The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards A more Progressive Union," in Lydia Sargent, (ed.) Women and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism, (South End Press, Boston, 1981).
46. Source: Women's International Democratic Federation, "Appraisal by the Women's International Democratic Federation of Progress Achieved and Obstacles encountered in attaining the Goals of and objectives of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace in Africa," Paper presented at the Regional Intergovernmental Preparatory Meeting for the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women Equality, Development and Peace; Third Regional Conference on the Integration of women in Development. (Arusha, Tanzania, 8-12th October, 1984).
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48. Ibid.
49. See for example: Azizah Al-Hibri, "Capitalism is an advanced stage of Patriarchy: But Marxism is not Feminism", Sandra Harding, "What is the Real Base of Patriarchy and Capital? in Lydia Sargent, (ed.) op. cit.; Hilda Scott, Does socialism Liberate Women: Experiences from Eastern Europe, (Beacon Press, Boston, 1974).
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53. Ibid.
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55. U.N. Economic Commission For Africa, op.cit.
56. A. Chilivumbo, and J. Kanyangwa, "women's participation in the Rural Development Programmes: The case of SIDA-LINA Programme, (RDSB Report, 1984).
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58. Marilee Karl. "Appropriate Technology" in ISIS, Women and Development: A Resources Guide for Organization and Action, Geneva, 1983), p. 91.
59. Ibid.

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APPENDICES:

Table 1 - Whether Earning is Done on Own Land

	Total	Mumbwa		Mazabuka	
		Aided	Unaided	Aided	Unaided
Yes	69.4	100.0	40.6	89.0	63.3
No	28.9	0.0	52.8	11.0	36.7
No Response	1.7	0.0	6.6	0.0	0.0

Table 2 - Sources of Land

	Total	Mumbwa		Masabuka	
		Aided	Unaided	Aided	Unaided
- Given by Husband	37.0	50.0	10.4	56.0	37.2
- Given by Father	17.5	21.2	12.3	8.0	26.0
- Given by Headmen/chief	21.1	16.7	47.2	12.0	10.7
- Bought	0.7	0.0	0.9	1.0	0.7
- Inherited	7.1	3.0	9.4	3.0	10.0
- SIDA provided land	2.6	7.6	3.8	1.0	0.7
- Other	7.1		3.8	19.0	4.0
- No response	6.9		12.3	0.0	10.7
- Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 3 - Number Borrowing Farm Equipment

	Total	Mumbwa		Mazabuka	
		Aided	Unaided	Aided	Unaided
Yes	70.4	70.8	71.7	72.0	64.7
No	28.4	16.7	28.3	27.0	34.7
No Answer	1.2	4.5	-	1.0	0.6
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 4:

Type of Stumping & respon- sibility	Burning logs	Hoeling	Ploughing, Ridging & Harrowing	Planting	Weeding	Ferti- lizers	Applying Pes- ticides	Harves- ting	Storage	Shelling	Bagging	Trans- portation to markets	Pounding/ Grinding grain	Cooking	Milking	Herd- ing Cattle & Goats	Kraal Building
Husband	6.4	1.2	2.1	1.4	8.5	8.7	1.9	8.5	8.7	8.7	8.7	6.4	8.8	8.2	16.4	16.1	19.4
Wife	28.6	29.9	25.1	28.4	29.9	28.4	16.1	26.3	26.5	25.8	24.2	14.7	56.2	58.3	2.6	2.1	1.9
Husband & wife	25.8	27.5	27.7	28.8	28.8	25.4	21.1	28.9	28.7	28.9	28.2	17.5	1.2	8.5	4.8	4.3	3.4
Husband & children	1.9	9.8	1.7	8.9	8.5	8.2	8.5	8.5	8.7	8.7	8.2	6.6	8.5	8.5	15.6	16.4	16.1
Children	3.3	9.8	1.2	1.2	8.9	1.2	1.7	8.9	8.7	8.7	8.7	3.1	1.9	2.1	15.2	16.4	11.6
Wife & children	8.5	18.9	18.2	11.4	12.3	12.3	7.6	11.8	12.6	11.6	11.6	6.6	35.5	35.1	1.4	1.2	1.7
Husband, wife & children	15.2	21.8	21.1	22.3	22.7	28.1	16.4	22.8	22.8	22.8	28.9	13.3	8.8	8.2	1.7	1.4	1.7
Relatives	6.4	3.1	3.6	1.4	8.9	8.9	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	4.8	2.4	2.6	7.6	8.3	8.5
Hired Labour	5.7	2.8	5.9	4.8	2.8	2.6	3.1	4.3	4.8	4.8	4.7	11.4	8.2	8.2	8.5	8.7	1.7
No Response	6.2	8.9	1.2	8.9	1.7	16.1	38.6	3.3	2.6	4.8	7.3	16.4	2.1	8.2	35.1*	33.2	33.6

* Mostly those not using fertilizers and pesticides.

Table 5 - Number of Other Wives in Polygamous Marriages

Number of Wives	Percentages
No other wife	55.9
One other wife	5.5
Two other wives	16.5
Three other wives	6.2
Four other wives	2.7
Five other wives	0.5
Six other wives	0.5
Seven other wives	0.2
Eight other wives	0.2
No response	11.8

RESUME

l'étude analyse d'un point de vue historique le rapport femme/moyens de production et souligne l'effet sur la démographie. Remettant en question l'opinion qui fait de la femme la principale cause du problème démographique, l'auteur affirme que l'on a très mal compris l'incidence de la femme sur la situation en matière de problèmes démographiques et alimentaires. Elle est la solution aux problèmes démographique et alimentaire et non leur cause. L'auteur soutient en outre que dans le cas particulier de l'Afrique, des efforts, tels que les mesures de contrôle des naissances, déployés actuellement, ne constituent pas nécessairement une solution à la croissance démographique galopante, ni à la crise alimentaire. Deux processus connexes, la privation de l'accès aux ressources productives pour les femmes et le développement concomitant du patriarcat consécutivement aux mutations socio-économiques survenues sous la colonisation, constituent, entre autres, les origines historiques du problème alimentaire et démographique. Les changements apportés au régime foncier, l'introduction des cultures de rapport et le système des migrations de travailleurs sont les plus importantes de ces mutations. Toutes ont apporté à leur tour des changements dans la division sexuelle du travail et ont fini par saper le secteur de la production vivrière qui incombait désormais aux femmes. Ces différentes situations n'ont cessé de se dégrader en Afrique après l'indépendance. La migration masculine et l'agriculture commerciale a modifié les besoins en main-d'oeuvre, et l'affectation de la main-d'oeuvre familiale à ces différentes tâches. Le volume de travail revenant aux femmes s'accrut car elles devaient à la fois se charger des tâches productives et assurer la reproduction. Par conséquent, pour satisfaire à la demande en

main-d'oeuvre infantine il fallait maintenir les niveaux de fécondité élevés. Les facteurs connexes contribuant à maintenir hauts les taux de fécondité sont le mariage précoce, la polygamie, l'analphabétisme et la perpétuation de pratiques culturelles et traditionnelles qui mettent l'accent sur la fécondité.

S'appuyant sur des études de cas portant sur deux provinces de Zambie, toutes les deux spécialisées dans l'agriculture commerciale, et exploitant des données relatives à d'autres régions d'Afrique, l'article démontre que le problème alimentaire et démographique en Afrique tient essentiellement au fait que l'on n'a pas reconnu les potentialités de la femme en matière de production agricole. Cette lacune, qui émane d'une conception patriarcale est la plus grosse pierre d'achoppement sur la voie de l'auto-suffisance alimentaire en Afrique.

En conclusion l'auteur de l'article réclame des changements structurels qui entraîneraient la suppression du patriarcat et favoriseraient par conséquent l'accès en toute égalité aux ressources productives, et leur maîtrise, ainsi qu'une égalité d'accès à l'éducation et à la formation. Une telle mesure, affirme l'auteur, réduirait les taux de fertilité et accroîtrait la productivité en réduisant l'ampleur des tâches imparties aux femmes ainsi que l'importance du travail confié aux enfants.

SEMIOTIC CONSTANTS AND PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE : A study of the Symbolism and Imagery of Change and Development in African Literature.

Felix Mnthali*

AFRICAN LITERATURE has always enjoyed an active symbiosis with the social, political and economic milieux out of which it grows. When griots and praise-singers extol the glories of their empire as in Sundiata they invariably hint at what might have been done and at what remains to be done. Their "songs" are always contextual. The audience is led to an increased understanding of its history and of its destiny which in turn becomes the focal point of every performance and the mnemonic ladder to the otherwise inaccessible mists of antiquity. We see this kind of performance in Roots when Alex Haley finally traces the clan and the original village of his African ancestor Kunta Kinte. This poignant and dramatic discovery which is in every way closer to fiction than to fact is made possible by the vast theatrical and mnemonic resources of oral literature.

We can learn from proverbs, riddles, fireside and "animal" trickster tales a great deal about the physical and social environment with which a group of people have had to contend with. Oral traditions carry with them a people's collective wisdom as well as its deepest beliefs and values.

In written African literature the best works usually dramatize a similarly active symbiosis between the matter and the manner of literature with the stuff and stresses of everyday existence. Understanding literature becomes one important way of understanding the stuff and stresses of everyday existence and it is in everyday existence that the deep-seated forces out of which literature grows can be best understood.

In this respect African literature differs significantly from other modern literatures such as, say American literature. In Saul Bellow's Herzog, for example, the central figure is pitted against a world which makes his ideas and his attempts to cope with life irrelevant. He is not even playing on the side-lines of change. He has an entirely different game somewhere on the verge of insanity. It is in a way to avoid that kind of irrelevance and possible insanity that in Henderson the Rain King the central figure seeks rebirth and rejuvenation away from his usual habitat. He goes to Africa to find and understand himself. America has rendered him superfluous and irrelevant.

The best that has been written in Africa focuses on the problems and possibilities of change and these in turn have given us a number of phases through which Africa's written literature has passed. Four phases come readily to mind. These are:

(a) *The phase of IDENTITY.*

The works dominating this phase of African literature try to recapture and reinstate Africa's perceived identity in matters of culture, politics, law, economics and education. The reinstatement is often pursued as a hopeless task and a tragic realization that things can never be the same any more. At times, as in Bound to Violence by Yambo Oulogwem the writer lampoons all the efforts by both Africans and non-Africans to reinstate Africa's cultural heritage. The works which come readily to mind as prominent in the phase of identity are The African Child by Camara Laye, Things Fall Apart by Chinua Achebe, The River Between by Ngugi wa Thiang'o, The African by William Conton and the long poem Song of Lawino by Okot p'Bitek.

During the phase of identity the debate which dominates African literature is that concerning "negritude". This debate is to be found in most of the pages of literary and cultural journals such as Transition and Présence Africaine. The classical achievements of the "négritude" school of writing include Rene Maran's novel Batoula, Aimé Césaire's long poem, Return To My Native Land, as well as the poetry and prose of Leopold Sédar Senghor who stands out as the chief "theoretician" of this school. The poetry of David and Birago Diop belongs to this school as does the novels Climbie by Bernard Dadie and, The Ambiguous Adventure by Cheikh Hamidou Kane. The latter novel carries the distinction of a deep reflective (some would say "philosophical") ambience which pits the Moslem and animist traditions of Africa against the hyperactive materialist ways of the West.

During the literary phase of identity the parallel development in political thinking is that of "the African personality" with the supposed concomitant economic concept of "African Socialism". Across the Atlantic came the concept of "black power". Later derivations of similar concepts in Africa include "authenticity", in Zaire and "black consciousness" in South Africa.

Undoubtedly the most perceptive critique of ideas on identity remains that of Frantz Fanon in The Wretched Of The Earth and in Black Skins White Masks. By linking perceptions of the self to the psychological scars of the oppressed and the material conditions of former colonies Fanon shows how theories on identity and artistic attempts at recapturing and reinstating Africa's lost glories are continually undermined by the deep-seated yearning of some members of the elite to assume and flaunt the mantle of Africa's former oppressors.

(b) The phase of PROTEST and CONFLICT

During this phase literature dramatises moments in the struggle against colonialism. The writer rekindles in his readers that fire of solidarity and single-minded devotion to a cause which characterised most of the struggles against colonialism. Here the modern African Writer is like the ancient griots who sang of the rise and fall of empires such as Mali and Songhai. The epic glories of ancient heroes is now to be seen in the heroism and solidarity of the characters in God's Bits Of Wood by Sembene Ousmane, Weep Not Child and A Grain Of Wheat by Ngugi wa Thiong'o and In The Fog of the Season's End by Alex la Guma. The writer does not create only heroes. He creates traitors and cowards also. More than that he does not show heroism and solidarity instantly leading Africa to a new Jerusalem. He shows survivors of the struggle beset by numerous personal disappointments and in some cases emotional and spiritual emptiness. What does change is history and the parameters within which further changes may be realised "The emergency destroyed us", says a character in Ngugi's novel A Grain Of Wheat. It is not surprising that after the phase of Protest And Conflict came the third phase, that of:

(c) Disillusionment

Here the writer musters his metaphorical resources to dramatise the corroding and corrupting effect of power and wealth among the elites. The most telling image used by a number of writers at this point is

that of excrement. The Anglo-Irish satirist Jonathan Swift has been associated by critics with an "excremental vision". In Africa that vision has found its way into Ayi Kwei Armah's novel The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born, Wole Soyinka's The Interpreters and Nuruddin Farah's, A Naked Needle. Lesser achievements with a similar vision include Faustus Iyayi's Violence and The Contract. The world of these novels turns corruption into a kind of weird game of theft and robbing, a dance macabre where those who can as in Ngugi's Devil On The Cross will try to steal even the air we breathe. Chinua Achebe's A Man Of The People comes within this phase as does Ngugi's monumental work, Petals Of Blood.

(d) Phase of Exhortation and Satire

There is no way out of disillusionment except either revolution or satire. In a serious vein the writer is likely to point towards an alliance of workers and peasants as Ngugi does in Petals Of Blood. In a mixture of seriousness and light-hearted mockery a writer may dramatise an individual's exit from society through inner rebellion and madness. This is what Ayi Kwei Armah in Fragments and Kofi Awoonor in This Earth My Brother attempt to do. Most of the poetry of Southern Africa today combines elements of this call to arms and a devastating mockery of the present dispensation. In a less serious mood but with similarly devastating effect Sembene Ousmane's novel, The Last Of The Empire acts out the present phase of African literature which for want of a better term we may call the phase of Exhortation And Satire. We recognise by this term the writer's active participation in the surging tide of change and society's growing recognition of the writer's voice in the debates concerning change and development. We also recognise by this term "the cutting edge" which a writer's voice is likely to possess.

In the attempt to trace the phases through which modern African literature is passing, we become aware of the unspoken paradigms which literature embodies. We become aware of sophisticated critiques of change which are at the back of a writer's mind even if, as is usually the case, the writer does not consciously set out to give us such critiques. It is clear from all this that the phases we have been attempting to identify tend to overlap and interlock. What needs to be gained from their study is the formative value of literature, a value which even the Greek philosopher Plato recognised by banning literature from his ideal, proto-socialist republic. Behind literature's apparent negation lie certain affirmations. If "the beautiful ones are not yet born" we may reasonably look forward to the day when they will

be born and "petals of blood" which were once healthy and green may be rid of insidious worms and regain their previous vitality provided that certain conditions are met.

A quarter of a century of modern African writing is probably not long enough to justify the phases through which it has passed. It seems to resemble the modern African state as seen by one of Ayi Kwei Armah's characters in The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born. It resembles a "man-child" who at a very tender age exhibits all the symptoms of old age. This closeness of modern African literature to contemporary social, political and economic realities on the continent means that critics have tended to be acutely aware of the dichotomy between recurrent themes and characteristic aesthetic forms.

Recurrent themes and characteristic techniques present the least problematic exercises in the study of African literature. They also yield the lowest number of insights into the relationship between creative writers and their societies. What needs to be carefully studied is our writers' "energising principle" as opposed to their "organising principles". We need to study that cluster of resources skills and tensions from which creative energy radiates. We need to find the top of the iceberg, the energy source from which creativity erupts into a multiplicity of themes and permutations of techniques. There is a "semiotic cluster" which enables a writer to perceive his/her surroundings in the way he/she does.

We speak of a "semiotic cluster" to denote the multiplicity of "signs" which are linked to build up one over-riding reality. Thus the symbolic burden of a novel could be "land" or it could be an abstract reality such as "wisdom" it could also be a measure of change such as "progress" or a state of existence such as "oppression". This paper speaks of "semiotic constants" to denote the recurrence of clusters of symbols, imagery, situations and tensions in the works of a single author. Such a recurrence is also linked to the author's perceptions. It has a great deal to do with the author's point of view. We will see in the following pages that point of view is also the author's perception of change. It is a view of history.

Consider the works of Chinua Achebe, especially those novels set in the past, viz, Things Fall Apart (1) and Arrow of God (2). Here a cultural dispensation which is on its way to disintegration is presented as being rich and self-contained. This cultural dispensation is neither glorified nor denigrated. it is there in all its strength and weaknesses. In its uses of leisure, its marriage customs, its exaltation

how a game like wrestling links different communities in the land. When Okonkwo marries his third wife, a lady who deserts her first husband to follow Okonkwo's wrestling matches we see yet another aspect of life among the people of Umuofia. Valour and military prowess are also highly valued among these people and the glory of an Okonkwo who brings home five enemy heads before he reaches the age of twenty-one is only matched by his vanity as he drinks his palm-wine from the skull of one of his victims.

This is a culture in which strength and masculinity are admired. It is also one in which wisdom demands that those qualities be recognised as favours from divine benevolence. "When a man says, 'Yes', his Chi says 'Yes' also". Although Okonkwo has sweated to fill two barns with yams and has capped this achievement with marrying three wives and taking two titles, he is firmly reminded by one of the elders of his village that these achievements are favours from an indulgent personal god and that they should give Okonkwo no reason to look down on those who are less favoured than himself. It is true that a certain idyllic atmosphere surrounds Okonkwo's village but Achebe does not leave us with the impression that Umuofia is another Garden of Eden. What he does emphasise is the fullness of life within the confines of certain norms and values which guide the individual from the cradle to the grave. Achebe uses the strong points of this cultural dispensation as well as its weaknesses and the fissiparous tendencies within it to show us the internal agents of change within the land of the Igbos. It is these internal agents of change which will facilitate the disintegration brought about by Christianity and colonialism.

Consider the horror which the missionary Smith brings upon Umuofia when he unmasks the egwugwu or spirits of the ancestors. That horror from an outsider can be compared and contrasted with the horror brought about by Okonkwo when he disturbs the peace during a week of special religious observance. Then there is the prophecy which demands that a boy-hostage by the name of Ikemefuna be killed. Ikemefuna calls Okonkwo 'father' and has for all practical purposes come to be identified as Okonkwo's son. The scene in which Ikemefuna is killed becomes a further revelation of the very difficult demands made by culture on its adherents. Okonkwo has to stifle his humanity in order to take part in the killing of Ikemefuna. Wisdom had demanded that he finds a way of accepting the oracles' dictates without violating the bond of fatherhood which has grown up between him and Ikemefuna.

of valour and military prowess, its admiration of the wealth that comes from hard work, this cultural dispensation is shown to have its own rigidity and flexibility. This dispensation serves society well until the arrival of Christianity and colonialism. It has room for a personal god, chi, for a number of less important gods and their sacred icons as well as for an all-powerful and all-embracing god, Chukwu. In its cosmology, the physical and social worlds are both governed by male and female principles. Men and women can seek redress and/or reconciliation in civil cases, punishment for certain crimes and retribution for crimes that offend the recognised divinities of the land. Above all, this cultural dispensation has evolved not only its own philosophy or world-view but also a linguistic medium in which that world-view or collective wisdom of the group is conveyed. One of the lingering assertions in Achebe's first novel Things Fall Apart is that "proverbs are the palm oil with which words are eaten" (3). A look at the extensive use made of proverbs in Arrow of God would seem to indicate that even their analysis by Bernth Lindfors (4) and later Emmanuel Ngara (5) has not fully unearthed their significance in the world created by Chinua Achebe.

What the richness of the world Achebe has created does is that it provides us with a cluster of "signs" through which we are to follow the destiny of the central figure. Symbolism, imagery, idiom, and dramatic tensions are grouped around a concept with which the central figure must come to terms or be crushed by change. It is the concept of "wisdom". Men like Okonkwo in Things Fall Apart or Ezeulu in Arrow of God are called upon to so fully understand the strengths and weaknesses of their world that they can survive not only the inherent divisions and internal contradictions of that world but also its relentless assault by alien agents of change. Men like Okonkwo and Ezeulu must meet the new dispensation of missionaries and British colonial administrators without sacrificing the rich traditions of Umuaro. Achebe's heroes are pitted against a changing world and the extent to which they can influence or direct this change is the measure of their tragic stature. As Professor Abiola Irele puts it,

This use of an individual character as a symbolic receptacle, the living theatre of a social dilemma, is what gives Achebe's novels their real measure of strength... (6).

In Things Fall Apart the attributes of a culture which is complete and self-contained are to be seen in the achievements and tribulations of the novel's main character, Okonkwo. We see the value attached to sportsmanship in Okonkwo's defeat of "Amalinze the Car". We also see

Achebe continually creates an environment with possibilities for individual fulfilment and social responsibility. His semiotic constants underpin the centrality of wisdom. Okonkwo falls short of this wisdom because he relies solely on physical prowess:

"Let us not reason like cowards", said Okonkwo, "If man comes into my hut and defaecates on the floor, what do I do? Do I shut my eyes? No, I take a stick and break his head. That is what a man does..." (7).

True enough, that is what a man does but Okonkwo forgets or does not see that his world may sometimes require that a man who disfigures a people's way of life as the missionaries and colonialists do be handled with care. Okonkwo does not see that his universe does, indeed, value masculinity but does not regard masculinity as the be-all and end-all of life. Okonkwo's world is run on both male and female principles. When, for example, Okonkwo accidentally kills a man during the funeral celebrations for Ezeudu, that crime is regarded as a female crime. It is also an offense against the earth goddess - and it is punishable by seven years of exile. Okonkwo does not seek refuge among his paternal relations. He seeks refuge with his maternal uncle "for mother is supreme". The tragedy of Okonkwo continually brings home to the reader the importance of "balance" as a hallmark of wisdom. A wise man balances his attachment to both strength and weakness, and to the male principle as well as the female principle along which his universe is governed. Chinua Achebe's perception of change hangs on this balance.

The demand for balance as a mark of wisdom is made also on those who find themselves in a more chaotic and more confusing age of transition than that of Okonkwo. Obi Okonkwo of No Longer at Ease, is called upon to display such a balance. The title of Chinua Achebe's second novel compares and contrasts Obi Okonkwo its central character with the unnamed speaker in T.S. Eliot's poem, "The Journey of the Magi" who has taken part in a momentous journey which has changed his whole outlook on life:

"We returned to our places, these Kingdoms. But no longer at ease here in the old dispensation. With an alien people clutching their gods I should be glad of another death" (8).

When Obi Okonkwo returns from his studies in England he finds crass materialism and corruption engulfing his country. The Okonkwo of Things Fall Apart fails to maintain a balance between the opposing forces governing the cultural well-springs of his society. Obi

Okonkwo in No Longer at Ease fails to maintain a balance between his commitment to modernisation and to kinship. Modernisation comes with the dislocation of kinship structures and village taboos while kinship loyalties and family commitments tend to pave the way for corruption and moral turpitude. Obi despises and at the same time acquiesces in the new dispensation around him. As Nadine Gordimer says we see Obi Okonkwo "extending himself docilely on the rack of bourgeois values taken over from the white man; values totally unreal in the economic and social conditions of that society"(9).

It is to underline the importance of wisdom in the new dispensation surrounding his hero that Achebe refers to Obi's simplicity in attire and speech as a mistake. What the mistake really stands for is Obi's failure to take into account to whom he is speaking and under what circumstances. To appear in one's shirt-sleeves when everyone else is sweating it out in three-piece suits or formal agbada should normally be applauded but Obi Okonkwo is being honoured by the Umuofia Progressive Union which financed his studies in England. For members of his Union the occasion is formal and deserves formal attire especially by the guest of honour. Misplaced simplicity becomes irreverence and lack of gratitude. Achebe is hinting at this ingratitude when he refers to Obi Okonkwo's attire as "Mistake Number One" (10). The address of welcome from the same Umuofia Progressive Union seems florid and convoluted Obi Okonkwo is probably not required to reply in the same convoluted and florid manner but he is expected to "rise up to the occasion", that is, treat the speech with the seriousness it deserves. His plain English is a kind of anti-climax:

"Education for service and not for white-collar jobs and comfortable salaries. With our great country on the threshold of independence, we need men who are prepared to serve her well and truly" (11).

This simple speech becomes "Mistake Number Two" (12). The irony against Obi Okonkwo is that although he returns from England with such confidence and courage he soon gets caught up in the mire of corruption and moral turpitude. He fails to stand up for the Nigeria of his original beliefs. He accepts bribes, cancels his engagement to the girl of his choice on the grounds that she is descended from a village outcast or Osu and frantically looks for an abortionist to undo the result of his love for this girl. There is a deeper irony in the fact that members of the Umuofia Progressive Union understand his problems better than Obi himself does. They rally around him and decide to engage a second lawyer to launch an appeal against Obi Okonkwo's

conviction.

Obi Okonkwo falls short of the wisdom he needs to leave a mark on his country's history. He leaves no positive contribution to change. When he is interviewed for the post he later occupies at the Scholarships Office we are made to see a kind of premonition of things to come. The interviewers probe Obi Okonkwo's knowledge of English literature, in particular his knowledge of Graham Green's novel, The Heart of the Matter. There is a hint in Obi Okonkwo's contribution to this debate that his approach to change is too subjective, too personal to be meaningful to his society. He seems to have gone too deep into the existentialist thrust of Graham Green's novel to come up with something more public and more objective than the tangled passions and redeeming suicide which Graham Green's novel exalts. In practical everyday life Obi Okonkwo lacks real convictions. Unlike the Okonkwo of Things Fall Apart who commits suicide because the men of Umuofia will not fight for their gods and for their way of life, the Okonkwo of No Longer at Ease has no such values and no such way of life to fight for. It is only in a deeply ironical sense that his "uneasiness" with the old dispensation is compared with that of Eliot's wise men in The Journey of the Magi. Although Obi no longer accepts his people's taboos (and his people's formality in dress and language!) he has seen nothing in the new dispensation for which he is ready to die. Even his love for the Osu Clara is expendable. The lines of William Butler Yeats come readily to mind:

"The best lack all convictions while the worst are full of passionate intensity" (13).

We have in Obi Okonkwo a kind of rebel seeking to influence change but lacking the inner resources of character to do so. Perhaps a Cambridge degree in English literature cannot provide its holder with the necessary wisdom to influence change. Perhaps such a qualification can only succeed in defining Obi Okonkwo's social class and in ensuring for him a place among the elite in the Nigerian civil service.

It is an interesting coincidence that the next intellectual Achebe associates with present-day Nigeria is as devoid of convictions as Obi Okonkwo. In Achebe's fourth novel, A Man of the People, the teacher Odili Samaru does not in the final analysis, differ from the corrupt and cynical Chief Nanga. The latter does flaunt his cynicism and his ill-gotten wealth and influence. Odili Samaru silently envies Nanga's comfort and is ready to throw in his lot with Chief Nanga:

"When I lay down in the double-bed that seemed to ride on a cushion of air, and switched on that reading lamp and saw all the beautiful furniture anew from the lying down position and looked beyond the door to the gleaming bathroom and the towels as large as lappa I had to confess that if I were made a minister at that moment I would be most anxious to remain one forever" (14).

We may read this as the exaggeration of a man laughing at himself in a moment of enlightenment. We also need to remember that Odili Samaru has at that point already entrusted himself to the Byzantine ways of corruption by accepting Chief Nanga's intercession in the matter of his scholarship abroad. It is also remarkable that Odili Samaru does not break with Chief Nanga until the latter seduces his girl-friend in his presence and his hearing!

Odili Samaru's brief flirtation with political organisation is characterised by a similar lack of conviction and a naive approach to national issues. He is more interested in avenging a personal humiliation than in dealing with national problems. When he is appointed organising Secretary of a newly - formed party he devotes the best part of his time to courting Edna, Chief Nanga's fiancée and not to party programmes. When government falls to a military take-over Odili Samaru uses party funds to pay for the bride-price and educational expenses of the girl he snatches from Chief Nanga. In settling personal scores in this manner Odili Samaru is playing the same game of corruption which the deposed government was playing. Odili Samaru's convictions do not go beyond private and personal loyalties. His admiration for his friend Max stems less from that friend's political position than from the fact that Max had "inspired someone to come forward and shoot (his) murderer in the chest - without asking to be paid". The heroism being singled out for praise here has nothing to do with politics as such. Max is avenged by his girl-friend.

The complexity of contemporary Africa makes it difficult for the kind of heroism found in Things Fall Apart and Arrow of God. We have in these two novels semiotic clusters pointing to a world of clear norms and values which everyone understands. In No Longer at Ease and A Man of the People the dominant signs point towards bewilderment and cynicism. Lagos is vibrant and chaotic; sacred associations in the countryside such as the hunters' guild in Chief Nanga's constituency no longer reserve their appearances for solemn religious rituals. They are now used for sychophantic praise - songs and praise-rituals for the new elite. Political debates become

personality parades and competitions in mutual name-calling. The allocation of scarce national resources is reduced to a series of auctions for votes. Cynicism grips all sections of society and probity in public life becomes something altogether too refined and too ephemeral to be taken seriously. Perhaps new norms and new values are in the making. Perhaps ... As W.B. Yeats wrote:

"And what rough beast its hour come round at last Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born" (17).

Wisdom then demands that whoever is to influence change have the strength of character of the Okonkwo of Things Fall Apart as well as the intellectual clarity of Ezeulu in Arrow of God. Confused and weak intellectuals such as Obi Okonkwo in No Longer at Ease and Odili Samaru in A Man of the People will not do. The world of these two novels lacks abiding guidelines although in No Longer at Ease remnants of tradition do form a cohesive force among the members of the Umuofia Progressive Union. It would be idle to see in the creation of such a fictional world Achebe's abandonment of all criticism of society. Achebe is, above all, a moralist. His most quoted pronouncements on his own work do seem to bear this out:

Here then is an adequate revolution for me to espouse - to help my society regain belief in itself and put away the complexes of the years of denigration and self-abasement... I would be quite satisfied if my novels (especially the ones I set in the past) did no more than teach my readers that their past - with all its imperfections - was not one long night of savagery from which the first Europeans acting on God's behalf delivered them (18).

Achebe is an advocate of our trying to understand the past before we can really build on the present:

The worst thing that can happen to any people is the loss of their dignity and self-respect. The writer's duty is to help them regain it by showing them in human terms what happened to them, what they lost. There is a saying in Ibbo that a man who can't tell where the rain began to beat him cannot know where he dried his body. The writer can tell the people where the rain begin to beat them. After all the writer's duty is not to beat this morning's headline in topicality, it is to explore in depth the human condition. In Africa he cannot perform this task unless he has a proper sense of history (19).

This would explain why Things Fall Apart and Arrow of God are

more accomplished novels than No Longer at Ease and A Man of the People. The metaphoric resources and dramatic skills building up the polity of Arrow of God show that the leadership is subject to a strenuous accountability and that the society as a whole enjoys freedom of expression and impressive public debates on all issues confronting it. We are left with the feeling that the quality of leadership and the level of civic responsibility shown in Arrow of God surpasses anything to be seen in No Longer at Ease and A Man of the People. Twenty years ago Achebe wrote,

"The village code of conduct has been violated but a more embracing and bigger one has not been found" (20).

Achebe's third novel, Arrow of God goes deeper than showing a village code of conduct at work. It examines a particular model of leadership against the background of the gathering forces of disintegration brought about by internal and external agents of change. The particular model of leadership we are referring to is embodied in Ezeulu or Chief Priest of Ulu the god of Umuaro.

Ezeulu is far more subtle, far more intelligent than any other character in Arrow of God. In fact, he is the most intelligent and most engaging character in Chinua Achebe's novels. Ezeulu is endowed with an unusual foresight and an unassuming intellectual pride. While the Okonkwo of Things Fall Apart comes to a tragic end because he has followed only the dictates of physical strength and the fear of being thought weak, Ezeulu's "tragic flaw" is the dread of being ignored or being treated as unintelligent. When we first meet him Ezeulu is lonely. He is troubled by the divisions which have entered his society. When we last see him he is again lonely because the disintegration which has visited his society and especially his own family is way beyond his comprehension. We see him in his last days living "in the haughty splendour of a demented high priest" (21). When we first meet him, Ezeulu is ahead of his community. He understands what change really means and how it has to be handled. He sends one of his sons to the white man's church with the hope of capturing some of the white man's wisdom and magic:

It was five years since Ezeulu promised the white man that he would send one of his sons to church. But it was only two years ago that he fulfilled the promise. He wanted to satisfy himself that the white man had not come for a short visit but to build a house and live.

At first Oduche did not want to go to church. But Ezeulu called him

to his Obi and spoke to him as a man would speak to his best friend and the boy went forth with pride in his heart. He had never heard his father speak to anyone as an equal.

'The world is changing', he had told him. 'I do not like it. But I am like the bird Eneke-nti-oba. When his friends asked him why he was always on the wing he replied: "Men of today have learnt to shoot without missing and so I have learnt to fly without perching". I want one of my sons to join these people and be my eye there. If there is nothing in it you will come back. But if there is something there you will bring home my share. The world is like a Mask dancing. If you want to see it well you do not stand in one place. My spirit tells me that those who do not befriend the white man today will be saying had we known tomorrow' (22).

When his son shows signs of being over-zealous about the white man's religion Ezeulu brings out an appropriate proverb of caution:

"When a handshake goes beyond the elbow we know that it has become something else" (23).

What we see in Ezeulu's wisdom is the ability not only to change with the times but also to detect the weaknesses and strengths of every prevailing wind.

Ezeulu serves a god who has been created in man's own image, a god who is set up by the six villages of Umuaro to protect them against the warriors of Abame. This god is in many ways the voice of the clan. Vox populi, vox dei, as they used to say in Rome. The saying which continually reminds us of this relationship between the priest as an individual and the priest as a spokesman of the clan is that "no man, however great can win judgment against a clan" (24) and that "no man however great was greater than his people" (25). Ezeulu is also seen as "half-man and half-spirit" (26). This definition recognises his individual will as well as his responsibility to the society of Umuaro as a whole. There is a rule of law under which he must exercise his power and the margin of discretion which that rule of law allows is ultimately dependent on the general feeling of the clan. To a man of Ezeulu's intellect and foresight this "constitutional" point is a continual source of tension. It appears at the opening of the novel and returns with every major crisis. At the opening of the novel, this tension is seen in terms of "power":

Whenever Ezeulu considered the immensity of his power over the year

and the crops and, therefore, over the people he wondered if it was real. It was true he named the day for the feast of the Pumpkin leaves and for the New Yam feast; but he did not choose it. He was merely watchman. His power was no more than the power of a child over a goat that was said to be his as long as the goat was alive it could be his; he would find it food and take care of it. But the day it was slaughtered he would know soon enough who the real owner was. No! the Chief Priest of Ulu was more than that, must be more than that. If he should refuse to name the day there would be no festival - no planting and no reaping. But could he refuse? No Chief Priest had ever refused. So it could not be done. He would not dare.

Ezeulu was stung to anger by this as though his enemy had spoken it.

'Take away that word dare', he replied to this enemy. 'Yes I say take it away. No man in all Umuaro can stand up and say that I dare not. The woman who will bear the man who will say it has not been born yet'.

But this rebuke brought only momentary satisfaction. His mind never contents with shallow satisfactions crept again to the brinks of knowing. What kind of power was it if it would never be used? Better to say that it was not there, that it was no more than the power in the anus of the proud dog who sought to put out a furnace with his puny fart... (27).

The cumulative effect of the symbols, images, and dramatic tensions surrounding Ezeulu is the inevitable collision between his pride and his persistent doubts about the nature of his power. Ezeulu's intelligence and foresight are beyond doubt, but they also go hand in hand with an intellectual pride, a haughty and sarcastic manner and an unbridled vanity. Ezeulu enjoys showing off his physical strength especially to young men:

"There was one game Ezeulu never tired of playing on them. When they shook hands with him he tensed his arm and put all his power into the grip, and being unprepared for it they winced and recoiled with pain" (28).

In the discussion in which he reveals to his friend Akuebue the fact that he has sent his own son to the white man as sacrifice for the good of the clan, Ezeulu also refers to himself as "Known and... Unknowable, "a man ordained to advise and lead his clan:

"I can see tomorrow; that is why I can tell Umuaro: come out from

this because there is death there or do this because there is profit in it. If thereby listen to me, o-o; if they refuse to listen, o-o. I have passed the stage of dancing to receive presents" (29).

When pushed into a corner, especially by the kind of rumours spread about him and his household following his son's imprisonment of a sacred python, Ezeulu is apt to hurl defiance and abuses at his opponents. The following altercation will give us a clearer picture of the kind of abuse Ezeulu can throw at his enemies:

It was a day of annoyance for the Chief Priest - one of those days when it seemed he had woken up on the left side. As if he had not borne enough vexation already he was now visited, at sunset, by a young man from Umunneora. Because of the hostility between Ezeulu's village and Umunneora he did not offer the man kola nut lest he should have a belly-ache later and attribute it to Ezeulu's hospitality. The man did not waste much time before he gave his message.

'I am sent by Ezidemili'.

'True? I trust he is well'.

'He is well', replied the messenger. 'But at the same time he is not'.

'I do not understand you'. Ezeulu was now very alert. 'If you have a message, deliver it because I have no time to listen to a boy learning to speak in riddles'.

The young man ignored the insult. 'Ezidemili wants to know what you are going to do about the abomination which has been committed in your house'.

'That what happened?' asked the Chief Priest, holding his rage firmly with two hands.

'Should I repeat what I have just said?'

'Yes'.

'All right. Ezidemili wants to know how you intend to purify your house of the abomination that your son committed'.

'Go back and tell Ezidemili to eat shit. Do you hear me? Tell Ezidemili that Ezeulu says he should go and fill his mouth with shit. As for you, young man, you may go in peace because the world is no longer what it was. If the world had been what it was I would have given you something to remind you always of the day you put your

head into the mouth of a leopard'. The young man wanted to say something but Ezeulu did not allow him.

'If you want to do something with your life, take my advice and say not another word here'. Ezeulu rose threateningly to his full height; the young man decided to heed his advice and rose to go (29).

Ezeulu's arch - enemy, Nwaka is boastful in a crude way and his intellectual contribution to the challenges facing his society does not bear too much scrutiny:

"Wisdom is like a goat skin bag. Every man carries his own" (30).

Ezeulu's mind is sharp, alert. All the proverbs associated with him are richly metaphorical and invariably deep and witty.

Unfortunately Ezeulu fails his society in the hour of its greatest need. His intellect and his pride lead him astray from the wisdom we have all along associated with him. That wisdom would have shown him that his arrest and the events leading up to it meant that the times are unusual and that such times demand unusual decisions. After all, "a disease that has not been seen before cannot be cured with everyday herbs" (31). It is one of Achebe's most dramatic ironies that soon after Ezeulu has stubbornly insisted on consulting his god before acceding to the suggestion of the elders sent to him that he accommodates his priestly practices to the changing times one of the elders "deftly steered the conversation to the subject of change".

He gave numerous examples of customs that had been altered in the past when they began to work hardship on the people. They all talked at length about these customs which had either died in full bloom or had been still-born. Nnanyelugo reminded them that even in the matter of taking titles there had been a change. Long, long ago there had been a fifth title in Umuaro - the title of king. But the conditions for its attainment had been so severe that no man had ever taken it, one of the conditions being that the man aspiring to be king must first pay the debts of every man and every woman in Umuaro. Ezeulu said nothing throughout this discussion (32).

The Ezeulu we see at the beginning of the novel would have risen to the occasion and accepted their elders' counsel. The one we see later is an embittered man who confuses his own thirst for vengeance with the will of his god which; as all the "songs" of the novel indicate is the will of the people of Umuaro.

Achebe shows how a brilliant but headstrong leadership comes unstuck by that elusive but all - important discretion which the polity of Umuaro allows it. The opportunity for influencing change is missed - as the leadership is isolated and left behind by the surging tide of change. In Things Fall Apart, the man who lags behind his time commits suicide and becomes a footnote in a District Officer's intended book, ironically called, The Pacification of the Lower Niger (33). Such an ending is quite in keeping with the complete trust Okonkwo places on physical prowess. In Arrow of God the man who is overtaken by change ends in keeping with his greatest gift and his characteristic weakness. He is a proud intellectual whom we leave "in the haughty of splendour of a demented priest" (34). He is ignored by the followers of his god as they flock to join his adversaries, the Christians. A god who is created in man has no business inflicting inhuman sufferings on his followers.

Ezeulu's interpretation of his god's will bring the people of Umuaro to the verge of dire famine and the way Ezeulu is quickly transformed into "an enemy of the people" is one of the dramatic high points of Arrow of God. The people of Umuaro are concerned with the immediate issues of an impending famine. Chinua Achebe allows us his readers to be more concerned with a deeper problem surrounding Ezeulu, whose religion treats him as "half-man and half-spirit" (35). In such a religion spiritual exercises are of necessity the dramatic or "liturgical" expressions of the material needs of society. Heaven and earth become two faces of one and the same coin. An organic unity runs through all the activities of society and a festival such as, "The Feast of the Pumpkin Leaves" or "The Festival of New Yam" are both spiritual, agricultural, economic and political. When he insists on regarding the "New Yam Festival" as a purely spiritual function to be decided between the god Ulu and his priest, Ezeulu breaks the organic unity that governs life in Umuaro. He divorces a dramatic expression of the people's needs from the needs themselves. He is unwittingly embracing the dichotomy which governs the lives of his religious adversaries, the Christians. It is the dichotomy of body and soul. He allows the white man's handshake to become an embrace. This is the same Ezeulu who earlier on warns the son he has sent to the white man's religion, "when a handshake goes beyond the elbow we know that it has become something else" (36).

In looking at the failure of Ezeulu's model of leadership we are also looking at the multi-faceted debate going on in Arrow of God. It is the debate concerning change. We have already noted how

intelligent Ezeulu is. We may add at this point that Ezeulu's contribution to the debate about change makes everyone else's contribution look like gropings in the dark. The central structure of this novel is that of a debate. We keep shifting from one point of view to another. The people of Umuaro are concerned not only with the land-hunger which leads to the fight against Okperi but also and especially with the activities of the Christians and the colonial administrators. How are these people to be handled? How do we deal with change?

The Christians are holding their own debate within the great debate about change. Here the position of Moses Unachunkwu who pleads for as little interference as possible with local customs is opposed to that of Good country and Ezeulu's zealous son, Oduche, who wants to confront local culture head-on and, if possible, uproot it. A similar debate goes on among the colonial administrators who have been asked to implement the policy of indirect rule by appointing "warrant chiefs". Ezeulu loses this debate because he abandons his original contribution, that of adapting to change wisely and intelligently.

We are back to our original premise. The "energising principle" in Achebe's novels is his concept of wisdom. It is what all the semiotic clusters and the idiom of works such as Arrow of God overwhelmingly enhance.

The idiom of Arrow of God is a complex interplay of the English of colonial administrators such as Winterbottom, the narrative simplicity of the omniscient narrator with the proverbs and truisms of the people of Umuaro (37). More work remains to be done on proverbs and it is not necessary to share the view of both Herskovits and Bernth Lindfors who see proverbs as "the grammar of values" of the African people (38). In Arrow of God the validity of these proverbs is tested against the ravages of time and against their ability to guide their users in the age of transition from one socio-political dispensation to another. How meaningful are proverbs in dealing with change? Before Ezeulu's son Obika collapses to his death in a marathon which forms part of the rites of a funeral of one of the elders of Umuaro, his mind moves from one proverb to another. For a stretch of close to three pages the novel rings with proverbs (39). Achebe's scrupulous concern with "wisdom" comes into its own here. We are indirectly taken back to the debate running through the novel and are reminded of the fact that the ambience of Arrow of God is a deeply intellectual one.

Achebe himself has said that Arrow of God is the one novel which he is most likely "to be caught sitting down to read again" (40). In the view of this paper Achebe may well have sensed that in Arrow of God he has given us something worth treasuring. He has a towering contribution to the many ideas on change and development. He has fully substantiated his contention that "it would be futile to try and take off before we have repaired our foundations" (41). The strides made by peoples who have retained the best in their cultures would also seem to bear out Achebe's saying that, "Sophistication is no substitute for a spiritual search for one's roots" (42).

When we move from Chinua Achebe to Ngugi wa Thiong'o we again find a writer who is greatly concerned with change but whose semiotic constants are centred not on "wisdom" as such but on the material basis of wisdom, which in the Kenyan context and in the perception of Ngugi means land. It is interesting to note that although in Achebe's novels land is important and causes the war which gives us some of the dramatic tension in Arrow of God, land as such does not form the basis of the conflict between the indigenous people of Umuaro and the external agents of change, the missionaries and colonial administrators. The difference in the use made of land by Achebe and Ngugi may be ascribed to the differences in the mode and aims of colonisation between Kenya and Nigeria. Permanent settlement does not feature in the brief of the colonisers in Nigeria, while in Kenya it formed an integral part of colonial policy. Ime Ikiddeh has outlined the major landmarks in the alienation of peasant land which forms the background to Ngugi's work (43). We will now explore the way in which Ngugi clusters his symbols, images, and dramatic tensions around this very issue of land.

In the works of Ngugi wa Thiong'o land is presented as the concrete origin of creation myths. It is also the pivot of history. In The River Between (44) the people of Makuyu are united in a secret society which is ultimately dedicated to the recovery of lands taken over by missionaries and colonial settlers. It is this same alienation of their lands by colonial settlers which leads to the Mau Mau war in Weep Not Child (45) and A Grain of Wheat (46). In Petals of Blood (47) land is the concrete sign of the inequalities and lop-sided development plaguing Kenya. The play I Will Marry When I Want (48) is built around the exploitation of poor peasants by a land-owning class which uses sanctimonious wiles to take away from the poor peasant even that little which he thinks he has. The robber-barons of Devil on the Cross (49) have mortgaged virtually

whatever the land has or can produce, including air and water for the small profit margin they receive from their international business associates. In Detained: A Writer's Prison Diary (50), Ngugi links what he sees as the malaise of present-day Kenya to the colonial "culture of legalised brutality, a ruling-class culture of fear, the culture of an oppressing minority desperately trying to impose total silence on a restive oppressed majority" (51). That colonial culture was based on the possession of vast areas of Kenyan real estate by a few colonists who might otherwise have remained nonentities in their own country. In the Kenya of 1920-30's Margery Perham saw ordinary Britons who could "live in sunlight... and have the intoxicating sense of belonging to a small ruling aristocracy..."(52).

In The River Between land is the issue on which Waiyaki's leadership is tested and found wanting. Waiyaki has rallied the people of Makuyu and Kameno around his enthusiasm for education. This enthusiasm for education binds Waiyaki from the realisation that education needs a material purpose which in the context of Makuyu and Kameno means the recovery by Waiyaki's followers of the lands lost to missionaries, colonial settlers and the colonial government. That is why the reconciliation which Waiyaki preaches, that between Makuyu who accepts Christianity and Kameno who does not, is understood by Waiyaki's enemies as an accommodation with the forces which are alienating the land from the people of Makuyu and Kameno. Instead of the reconciliation which Waiyaki preaches, "a Kiama" or secret society is formed to work "for the purity of the tribe" and the recovery of lost lands. Ironically this secret society uses Waiyaki's name and oaths are taken "in the name of the Teacher". It is Waiyaki's politically astute friend Kinuthia who brings home to Waiyaki the anomaly in which Waiyaki finds himself:

"You are the symbol of the tribe, born again with all its purity. They adore you. They worship you. You do not know about the oath. You have been too busy. But they are taking the new oath in your name. In the name of the Teacher and the purity of the tribe" (53).

There would have been no anomaly in Waiyaki's position had he been clear on the purpose of the education around which he has rallied his followers. We have here a case of the leadership having to be led by the followers. The organisers of the Kiama knew what they want:

"At home the Kiama was getting more and more power over the people. The cry that started the new schools was again taken up. Keep the tribe pure. And people listened to them because they did not want the tribe

to die. And the Kiama wanted to fight for the land which had now been taken by the settler, the missionary and the government" (54).

Waiyaki attempts to reconcile people on a spiritual basis only. We see the development of his understanding of the essence of both Christianity and Kikuyu culture. The Christianity preached by the missionaries of his day is found wanting because it does not take into account what the people already have as values. It ignores "spots of beauty and truths in their way of life" (55). Such a religion "would only maim a man's soul making him fanatically cling to whatever promised security, otherwise he would be lost" (56). On the question of circumcision he recognises the importance of image and fulfilment which aspects of culture, however cruel they may appear, bring to the individual:

"Circumcision of women was not important as a physical operation. It was what it did inside a person... If the white man's religion made you abandon a custom and then did not give you something else of equal value, you became lost..." (57).

All this understanding of religion is quite correct as far as it goes but as a leader Waiyaki is called upon to understand religion in an even wider context than he does. He needs to understand it in relation to the burning question of the lands lost to government, to missionaries and to the settlers. That understanding demands political action. It is only at the last minute when he is about to be tried for breaking his oath with the Kiama" that he realises the essence of what his followers really want. They want unity and the unity should be for political action:

"May be one day he would join forces with the men from Muranga, Kiamba and Myeri and with one voice tell the white man "Go!" And all at once Waiyaki realised what the ridges wanted. All at once he felt more forcefully than he had ever felt before the shame of a people's land being taken away, the shame of being forced to work on those same lands, the humiliation of paying taxes for a government that you knew nothing about" (58).

The River Between has been interpreted by most critics as the story of the clash between Christianity and traditional religion as represented by the two villages of Makuyu and Kameno. If we study the novel along the lines of semiotic clusters and semiotic constants it is not enough to see what individual symbols or images or dramatic tensions represent. We will need to go beyond individual images to

the collective impression which all the metaphoric resources or "signs" of the novel leave on the reader. The novel is set in a clearly defined area which has ridges, valleys, and a "river of life", called Honia. Boys and girls are growing up in the ways of their tribe. They look after cattle, play, wrestle, fight, draw water from the river and generally follow the self-contained life of their culture. Divisions come with foreign agents of change of whose arrival the prophet Mufo spoke. There are sacred groves and some points where the land can be seen in its totality. The heart of the indigenous culture is the prophecy which gives the land of the Gikuyu people to the first man (Gikuyu) and the first woman (Mumbi). God takes these two to the highest point in the land and says to them:

"This land I give to you, O man and woman. It is yours to rule and till, you and your posterity" (59).

At the heart of the semiotic cluster of man set in a fertile land is this god-given bond between man and his land. The prophecies of Mugo the seer are all related to this bond. Mugo prophecies that:

'There shall come a people with clothes like butterflies' (60).

Waiyaki's father who sees himself as a successor to Mugo but who does not consider himself a saviour whispers Mugo's prophecy to his son:

"Salvation shall come from the hills" (61).

We therefore see that the rivalry between Christianity and traditional religion which the ridges of Makuyu and Kamenno represent ultimately takes second place to Ngugi's recurrent concern, that is, the bond between man and his land which the colonial government, the settlers and the missionaries break. On this point the most perceptive observation is that of Professor D.G. Killam who says that Ngugi's fiction is "a systematic fictional examination of the consequences of the alienation of the people from their land, thus effectively from life" (62).

In Weep Not Child the importance of this dehumanisation by means of removal of people from their land is voiced by the peasant Ngotho:

And yet he felt the loss of the land even more keenly than Boro, for to him it was a spiritual loss. When a man was severed from the land of his ancestors where would he sacrifice to the Creator? How could he

come into contact with the founder of the tribe, Gikuyu and Mumbi? (63).

The words of Ngotho here echo those of Kenyatta in his book, Facing Mount Kenya:

Communion with the ancestral spirits is perpetuated through contact with the soil in which the ancestors of the tribe lie buried. The Gikuyu consider the earth as the 'mother' of the tribe, for the reason that the mother bears her burden for about eight or nine moons while the child is in her womb, and then for a short period of suckling. But it is the soil that feeds the child through a lifetime; and again after death it is the soil that nurses the spirit of the dead for eternity. Thus the earth is the most sacred thing above all that dwell in or on it. Among the Gikuyu the soil is especially honoured, and an everlasting oath is to swear by the earth (64).

Kenyatta goes further. He sees the alienation of a people's land as an agent of family and tribal disintegration:

When the European comes to the Gikuyu country and robs the people of their land, he is taking away not only their livelihood, but the material symbol that holds family and tribe together (65).

Weep Not Child puts the issue of land at the heart of war, class, and childhood. Land is the central figure of this novel. Every cluster of metaphoric resources ultimately leads us to the question of land. Every character is defined and defines himself/herself in relation to land. That accumulation of property by a few people which enters its flowering stage in Petals of Blood begins in Weep Not Child where we see a few Africans who have been allowed to grow cash crops like pyrethrum.

In the very first chapter of Weep Not Child land is used to indicate the inequalities 'separating black people from white people:

You could tell the land of black people because it was red, rough and sickly, while the land of the white settlers was green and was not lacerated into small strips (66).

In later works Ngugi still uses the land in this manner but it no longer separates white people from black people but rich people from poor people, exploiters from the exploited. In later novels land becomes one gigantic symbol of the uneven development taking place

in Kenya. In Weep Not Child we are still looking at how the colonial government and colonial settlers use land to reward their supporters such as Jacob who then enters a certain class of Africans who are allowed to grow cash crops such as pyrethrum and are thereby given a start on the "rat-race" of capital accumulation which we find in Petals of Blood and Devil on the Cross. Land in Weep Not Child also becomes a symbol of the unequal treatment given to those white men and black men who fought for the British during the First and Second World Wars. Black people return to Kenya to find that their lands have been taken by the colonial government and given to British settlers returning from the same wars in which blacks fought on the side of the British. The experience of the peasant Ngotho is as painful as that of his son Boro. Ngotho is conscripted by the British when he is very young:

'Then came the war. It was the first big war. I was then young, a mere boy, although circumcised. All of us were taken by the force. We made roads and cleared the forest to make it possible for the warring white men to move more quickly. The war ended. We were all tired. We came home worn out but very ready for whatever the British might give us as a reward. But more than this, we wanted to go back to the soil and court it to yield, to create, not to destroy. But Ng'o! The land was gone. My father and many others had been moved from our ancestral lands. He died lonely, a poor man waiting for the white man to go. Mugo had said this would come to be. The white man did not go and he died a Muhoi on this very land' (67).

The disillusionment which befalls Ngotho is the same as that which befalls his son Boro. Ngotho works for a white farmer because the white farmer occupies Ngotho's ancestral lands and for Ngotho it is just possible that Mugo's prophecy of "salvation coming from the ridges" might be fulfilled and the ancestral lands might return to their rightful owners. For Boro there is no such hope. His is one of the bitterest experiences we see in Weep Not Child:

Boro thought of his father who had fought in the war only to be dispossessed. He too had gone to war, against Hitler. He had gone to Egypt, Jerusalem and Burma. He had seen things. He had often escaped death narrowly. But the thing he could not forget was the death of his step-brother, Mwangi. For whom or for what had he died?

When the war had come to an end, Boro had come home, no longer a boy but a man with experience and ideas, only to find that for him there was to be no employment. There was no land on which he could

settle, even if he had been able to do so. As he listened to this story, all these things came into his mind with a growing anger.

How could these people have let the white man occupy the land without acting? And what was all this superstitious belief in a prophecy?

In a whisper that sounded like a shout, he said, 'To hell with prophecy'.

Yes, this was nothing more than a whisper. To his father, he said, 'How can you continue working for a man who has taken your land? How can you go on serving him?'

He walked out, without waiting for an answer (68).

Ngugi shows through Boro's experiences the way in which a bitter landless proletariat is being created in Kenya and how such a "proletarianisation" creates dedicated warriors for the Mau Mau movement. The irony which Ngugi builds into his later works particularly into Petals of Blood is that independent Kenya now dominated by businessmen and party stalwarts treats former Mau Mau fighters in much the same way as the colonial government and the colonial settlers treated the black soldiers who fought for them in the two World Wars. In Petals of Blood we see one such former Mau Mau fighter now a cripple who is callously treated by the new dispensation:

'I waited for land reforms and redistribution.

'I waited for a job.

'I waited for a statue to Kimathi as a memorial to the fallen.

'I waited...

'Still I waited.

'I heard that they were giving out loans for people to buy out European farms. I did not see why I should buy lands already bought by the blood of the people. Still I went there. They told me: this is new Kenya. No free things. Without money you cannot buy land: and without land and property you cannot get a bank loan to start business or buy land. It did not make sense. For when we were fighting, did we ask that only those with property should fight? (69).

In Weep Not Child Ngugi has made land the point of reference of every character's hopes and fears. Land has become "the be-all and end-all" of human existence. Land fuels the antagonisms between black and white and between those black who own land and those who own nothing.

Ironically land generates an intense and passionate attachment to itself in people on both sides of the colour line as well as on both sides of the economic divide. To the colonial settler Howlands land has become a kind of god taking precedence over wife and children :

"He seemed to worship the soil. At times he went on for days with nothing but a few cups of tea. His one pleasure was in contemplating and planning the land to which he had now given all his life" (70).

Land enables Howlands to forget his terrible experiences in the First World War. Land gives him a sense of fulfilment, of having done something with his life. But this is the very land on which Ngotho works hoping for the fulfilment of Mugo's prophecy. Ngotho is therefore as intensely and passionately attached to the same lands as Howlands. That is the irony Ngugi achieves by showing us Howlands and Ngotho together inspecting the land they love so much:

They went from place to place, a white man and a black man. Now and then they would stop here and there, examine a luxuriant green tea plant, or pull out a weed. Both men admired this shamba. For Ngotho felt responsible for whatever happened to this land. He owed it to the dead, the living and the unborn of his line, to keep guard over this shamba. Mr Howlands always felt a certain amount of victory whenever he walked through it all. He alone was responsible for taming this unoccupied wildness. They came to a raised piece of ground and stopped. The land sloped gently to rise again into the next ridge and the next. Beyond Ngotho could see the African Reserve.

'You like all this? Mr Howlands asked absent-mindedly. He was absorbed in admiring the land before him'.

'It is the best land in all the country', Ngotho said emphatically. He meant it. Mr Howlands sighed. He was wondering if Stephen would ever manage it after him.

'I don't know who will manage it after me...'

Ngotho's heart jumped. He too was thinking of his children. Would

the prophecy be fulfilled soon?

'Kwa nini Bwana. Are you going back to-?'

'No', Mr. Howlands said, unnecessarily loudly.

'... Your home, home...'

My home is here!'

Ngotho was puzzled. Would these people never go? But had not the old Gikuyu seer said that they would eventually return the way they had come? And Mr Howlands was thinking, would Stephen really do? He was not like the other one. He felt the hurt and the pain of loss.

'The war took him away'.

Ngotho had never known where the other son had gone to. Now he understood. He wanted to tell of his own son: he longed to say, 'you took him away from me'. But he kept quiet. Only he thought Mr. Howlands should not complain. It had had been his war (71).

We are shown Ngotho's attachment to the lands of his ancestors quite early on in the novel when Ngugi uses a fireside story-telling session to introduce the creation myth which we heard of in The River Between. In Weep Not Child the dramatic tension with which the myth is revealed shows that we are coming to grips with one of the central themes of the novel:

'...There was wind and rain. And there was also thunder and terrible lightning. The earth and the forest around Kerinyaga shook. The animals of the forest whom the Creator had recently put there were afraid. There was no sunlight. This went on for many days so that the whole land was in darkness. Because the animals could not move, they just sat and moaned with wind. The plants and trees remained dumb. It was, our elders tell us, all dead except for the thunder, a violence that seemed to strangle life. It was this dark night whose depth you could not measure, not you or I can conceive of its solid blackness, which would not let the sun pierce through it.

'But in this darkness, at the foot of Kerinyaga, a tree rose. At first it was a small tree and grew up, finding a way even through the darkness. It wanted to reach the light, and the sun. This tree had Life. It went up, up, sending forth the rich warmth of a blossoming tree - you know a holy tree in the dark night of thunder and moaning. This was Mukuyu, God's tree. Now, you know that at the beginning of things there was only one man (Gikuyu) and one woman (Mumbi). It

was under this Mukuyu that he first put them. And immediately the sun rose, and the dark night melted away. The sun shone with a warmth that gave life and activity to all things. The wind and lightning and thunder stopped. The animals stopped wondering and moved. They no longer moaned but gave homage to the Creator and Gikuyu and Mumbi. And the Creator who is also called Murungu took Gikuyu and Mumbi from his holy mountain. He took them to the country of ridges near Siriana and there stood them on a big ridge before he finally took them to Mukuruwe wa Gathanga about which you have heard so much. But he had shown them all the land - yes, children, God showed Gikuyu and Mumbi all the land and told them:

"This land I hand over to you. O Man and Woman It's yours to rule and till in serenity sacrificing Only to me, your God, under my sacred tree..."

new Kingdom with Murungu. He wished he had been there to stand near Him in His holy place and survey all the land. Njoroge could not help exclaiming.

'Where did the land go?'

Everyone looked at him.

'... I am old now, But I too have asked that question in waking and sleeping. I've said, "What happened, O Murungu, to the land which you gave to us? Where, O Creator, went our promised land?". At times I've wanted to cry or harm my body to drive away the curse that removed us from the ancestral lands. I ask, "Have you left your children naked, O Murungu" (72).

The passion which Ngotho puts into the telling of this story explains the hope that keeps him working as a sharecropper. He sincerely believes that his ancestral lands will revert to him or his heirs. When that hope seems to be thwarted by the repression that follows the strike he enters the Mau Mau war. Ironically Howlands joins the colonial government to punish Mau Mau for standing between him and the land he loves. His one hope is that during his work as a District Officer he will come into contact with Ngotho and really punish him for joining forces with those who want to take the land away from Howlands:

Mr Howlands felt that soon he would come to grips with Ngotho. Ngotho was his foe. But Mr Howlands could not explain to himself why he always waived plans to bring Ngotho to a submissive

humiliation yet this was what he wanted. This would be the crowning glory of his career before his triumphal return to farming life. Meanwhile he would resist all Jacob's moves to have Ngotho arrested just now... (73).

Howlands savours his expected revenge against Ngotho who in Howlands' mind had now betrayed an unspoken but sacred bond between himself, Howlands and the soil. Ngotho, as far as Howlands is concerned should have been content to remain a part of Howlands' farm like the vegetation, the weather, the farm animals who no doubt matter but whom no settler in his right mind would care to regard as human:

He had been called upon to take up a temporary appointment as a District Officer. He had agreed. But only because this meant defending his god. If Mau Mau claimed the only thing he believed in, they would see! Did they want to drive him back to England, the forgotten land? They were mistaken. Who were black men and Mau Mau anyway, he asked for the thousandth time? Mere savages! A nice word-savages. Previously he had not thought of them as savages or otherwise, simply because he had not thought of them at all, except as a part of the farm - the way one thought of donkeys or horses in his farm except that in the case of donkeys and horses one had to think of their food and a place for them to sleep. The strike which had made him lose Ngotho and now brought about the emergency had forced him to think, to move out of his shell. But they all would pay for this! Yes, he would wring from every single man the last man the last drop till they had all been reduced to nothingness, till he had won a victory for his god. The Mau Mau had come to symbolize all that which he had tried to put aside in life. To conquer it would give him a spiritual satisfaction, the same sort of satisfaction he had got from the conquest of his land. He was like a lion that was suddenly woken from his liar (74).

In Weep Not Child man's attachment to the land helps us to understand some of the ferocity with which the Mau Mau war was fought. It also helps us to understand some of the residual elements of colonialism as well as the inequalities and lopsided development which Ngugi attacks in Petals of Blood, Detained: A Writer's Prison Diary Devil on the Cross and I Will Marry When I Want. The Trial of Dedan Kimathi opens with peasants being forced to work on colonial settlers' farms and among "the tempters" who want to lure away Dedan Kimathi from his goal of genuine independence are bankers whose real power resides in the ownership of vast acres of land.

A Grain of Wheat would appear to be the one novel where Ngugi does not group his "signs" around the land. Such a reading would need to explain quite a few things in the novel. This writer has already had occasion to disagree with this kind of reading in a comparative study of Ngugi and Joseph Conrad (75). The time has now come for a more extended discussion of the reading being followed in this paper.

The title of the novel comes from the biblical quotation:

"Thou fool that which thou sawest is not quickened, except it die. And that which thou sawest not that body that shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain" (76).

In the context of A Grain of Wheat this quotation refers to the suffering and martyrdom of many Kenyans who fought for independence. The emergency destroyed us "says one of the minor characters, Githua, to Mugo, the centre of the novel's action" (77). Clearly suffering and destruction are implied in the title. Clearly also fermentation and germination are equally implied and the base of this germination is the soil. We first see Mugo wrestling with the soil. We last see him being taken away for trial by those who fought for the land.

The author's note to A Grain of Wheat is important in this regard. Besides carrying the conventional disclaimer concerning the identity of characters and places the note says:

Names like that of Jomo Kenyatta and Waiyaki are unavoidably mentioned as part of the history and institutions of our country. But the situation and the problems are real - sometimes too painfully real for the peasants who now see all that they fought for being put on one side (78).

Basic to "all that they fought for" is the question of land. Land burns in the background of all the sufferings and brutalities of the Mau Mau war. In chapter 2 of A Grain of Wheat Ngugi traces the history of the Party: from the arrival of the first missionaries to the day of independence:

Nearly everybody was a member of the Party, but nobody could say with any accuracy when the Party was born: to most people, especially those in the younger generation, the Party had always been there, a

rallying centre for action. It changed names, leaders came and went, but the Party remained, opening new visions, gathering greater and greater strength, till on the eve of Uhuru, its influence stretched from one horizon touching the sea to the other resting on the great Lake (79).

The popularity of the party is linked to the alienation of the land both by the missionaries and the colonial settlers. The Waiyaku who takes up arms against colonialism is different from Ngugi's hero in The River Between. We are here introduced to the historical Waiyaki who is alarmed by both the zeal of the newly converted Christians and the expansion of missionary work which involves the alienation of more land and the coming of more colonial settlers:

The few who were converted, started speaking a faith foreign to the ways of land. They trod on sacred places to show that no harm could reach those protected by the hand of the Lord. Soon people saw the whiteman had imperceptibly acquired more land to meet the growing needs of his position. He had already pulled down the grass-thatched hut and erected a more permanent building. Elders of the land protested. They looked beyond the laughing face of the whiteman and suddenly saw a long line of other red strangers who carried, not the Bible, but the sword.

Waiyaki and other warrior-leaders took arms. The iron snake spoken of by Mugo wa Kibiro was quickly wriggling towards Nairobi for a thorough exploitation of the hinterland. Could they move it? The snake held on to the ground, laughing their efforts to scorn. The whiteman with bamboo poles that vomited fire and smoke, hit black; his menacing laughter remained echoing in the hearts of the people, long after Waiyaki had been arrested and taken to the coast, bound hands and feet. Later so it is said, Waiyaki was buried alive at Kibwezi with his head facing into the centre of the earth, a living warning to those, who, in after years, might challenge the hand of the Christian woman whose protecting shadow now bestrode both land and sea.

Then nobody noticed it; but looking back we can see that Waiyaki's blood contained within it a seed, a grain, which gave birth to a political party whose main strength thereafter sprang from a bond with the soil (80).

The bond between the party and the soil explains many of the anomalies which Ngugi explores in his later works. In A Grain of Wheat this bond between the party and the soil is used by some leaders

to acquire land at the expense of their followers. The memorable case is that of the Honourable Member of Parliament for Rung'ei who is asked by his constituents to help them acquire a farm from a European settler who is leaving for England. The next thing they see on the entrance to the farm is the name of their MP. He has used his constituents to acquire the farm which his constituents were in the process of buying.

The land motif runs throughout A Grain of Wheat. The pre-Mau Mau days during which some of the characters grow in the ways of their culture are suffused with a certain joy that springs from living and working on the land. Among the most memorable scenes from this period is the courtship between Gikonyo and Mumbi. This courtship turns into that "impasse" of a marriage that is like so many things ruined by the Mau Mau war. "The emergency destroyed us". The hopes of rebuilding are there and they are all ultimately dependent on the use and abuse of the land.

In Petals of Blood, Devil on the Cross and in the play I will Marry When I Want the use and abuse of the land becomes the use and abuse of capital. The alliance between indigenous entrepreneurs and foreign business interests especially multinationals is based on the power of capital. Multinationals have the money to buy up anybody in Kenya. They have the standing and backing to borrow any amount of the money they need to buy up any promising business such as theng'etha brewing in Petals of Blood. Representatives of multinationals have only their political standing to sell. They may or may not own vast acres of land but they have a political standing which they exchange for cooptation by multinationals. Such cooptation plays a dramatic role in the lives of Chui, Mzigo and Kimeria in Petals of Blood.

It is in Petals of Blood that Ngugi explicitly shows what went wrong with the bond between the party and the soil. The Ilmorog which is the centre of the action of the novel and which is slowly dying in the sun when the school-teacher who is the narrative voice of Petals of Blood first visits it becomes a symbol of the changes which have taken place in an independent Kenya. Through Ilmorog we are able to seek Kenya's transition from a subsistence economy to large-scale farming, enclosures, small-scale industries and the strangle-hold of money-men from Nairobi and overseas. Nairobi grows in direct proportion to the wasting - away (and, possible, "withering - away" of places like Ilmorog:

'In my mind I now put this wretched corner beside our cities:

skycrapers versus mud-walls and thatch; tarmac highways, international airports and gambling casinos versus cattle-paths and gossip before sunset. Our erstwhile masters had left us a very unevenly cultivated land: the centre was swollen with fruit and water sucked from the rest, while the outer parts were progressively weaker and scaggier as one moved away from the centre' (81).

When such "progress" manages to come to Ilmorog, peasants are forced to exchange their tiny holdings of land for loans that will tie them firmly to the world of finance and international capital:

Progress! Yes, development did come to Ilmorog. Plots were carved out of the various farms to make a shopping centre. Shops planned and people were asked to send in applications for building plots to the County Council. A mobile van - African Economic Bank - came to Ilmorog and explained to the peasant farmers and the herdsmen how they could get loans. They crowded around the man fascinated as much by the up-and-down motion of his adam's apple as by the rounded voice coming out of the loudspeaker. Demarcation. Title deeds. Loans. Fencing the land. Barbed wire. One or two grade cows. Kill or sell or cross-breed the others. A Farmers' Marketing Cooperative in other Districts? African Economic Bank would do similar things here. Milk. KCC. Wealth. From this one would pay back the loans at a small interest. Not in one lump sum. Oh no. Paying back would also be spread over a number of years. No steady farmer need ever feel the pinch. Only one condition: payment had to be regular. Easy. It was a year of hope. Mzigo came to the area. The school, being now more accessible, would expand. New buildings. New classes. New staff houses. More trained staff. Really, it was another year of hope in Ilmorog, except for Njuguna, who was almost ruined. His four sons had suddenly returned and they all demanded their share of the ten-acre farm. What could he do with the two acres that remained to him? The younger son used the title deeds as security for a loan to start a kiosk in Nairobi. Later he returned to Ilmorog once again and set up the old man in a kiosk business and later in a shop. But in the year of demarcation, with the sons almost coming to blow with one another, Njuguna was a sad man. The road. Trade. Progress. We saw the new owners of plots bring stones and concrete. We watched the trenches being dug and we were glad that at least two of us from Ilmorog, Wanja and Abdulla, had secured a plot and so would show these outsiders that even Ilmorog had people who could put up stone buildings. Flowers for our land. Long live Nderi wa Riera. We gave him our votes: we waited for flowers to bloom (82).

Petals of Blood stands on an intricate web of stories within the main story, narrative suspense and flash-back reminiscences which owe a great deal to Ngugi's interest in oral literature as well as to his exposure to modern cinematography. When we encounter "progress" at Ilmorog again, the narrative has moved seven pages and an old woman's land is being sold by auction. The old woman Nyakinyua becomes only one of the many victims across the land who are now at the mercy of auctioneers, bankers and lawyers – that priestly caste of parasites in Nairobi:

'She was not alone: a whole lot of peasants and herdsmen of Old Ilmorog who had been lured into loans and into fencing off their land and buying imported fertilizer and were unable to pay back were similarly affected. Without much labour, without machinery, without breaking with old habits and outlook, and without much advice they had not been able to make their land yield enough to meet their food needs and pay back the loans. Some had used the money to pay school fees. Now the inexorable law of the metal was driving them from the land (83).

The old woman's efforts to regain her land is reminiscent of the desperate attempts by Chinua Achebe's Okonkwo (Things Fall Apart) to persuade his countrymen to stand up to the new dispensation:

She tramped from hut to hut calling upon the peasants of Ilmorog to get together and fight it out. They looked at her and shook their heads: whom would they fight now? The Party? Nderi? Nderi? yes, who would they really fight? But she tried to convince them that all these were one and that she would fight them... I'll go alone... My man fought the white man. He paid for it with his blood... I'll struggle against these black oppressors... alone...(84).

The old woman is right in seeing bankers and politicians as one. They all live off the fruits of the land. It is their way of distributing and using the land which has created the Kenya of Petals of Blood. It is their action which forces the old woman's grand-daughter back into prostitution after she has redeemed her grand-mother's land. That act by the old woman's grand-daughter results in the founding of a famous brothel, "Sunshine Lodge" which becomes the pivot of the novels closing action. It is in this brothel that three representatives of finance capital are killed and burnt to death, an event which enables Ngugi to open the novel with the arrest of three of the four main characters. The land gives and land takes away. Long live the land.

This paper has attempted to explore the "semiotic constants" of Achebe and Ngugi. In the process of this exploration we have examined the attitude to change dramatised in a number of novels. It becomes clear that Achebe emphasises a kind of wise balance between the defence of known and tried values and the reception of a new age. The odds are weighted against rigidity and insensitivity to the weak points in what is passing and the strong points of what is to come. Ngugi brings us "down to mother earth" as it were and warns us against perpetuating the cruel and heartless tradition of colonialism. That is a tradition by which land is alienated from its peasant owners and the "landlessness" so caused is used to enrich the already rich at the expense of the poor. These are fundamental issues which theories of development must always take into account if they are not to bring only a superficial "progress" as opposed to "serious" development. It is as if these two great writers, Achebe and Ngugi were positing instances of change in which certain disparities and contradictions are bound to be like the biblical poor always with us as long as we ignore certain fundamentals.

The paper has not gone beyond two writers. It is hoped that other chapters of this study will touch on more writers in different contexts. The approach taken in this paper might have shown, for example, that Ayi Kwei Armah sees decay at the heart of the present-day body - politic in Africa, a decay which in his novel, Fragments he attributes to "the cargo mentality", a concept derived from the Polynesian myth of return, by which education and learning are only the means for the acquisition of property, no matter how. Nuruddin Farah sees a similar kind of decay though in political rather than economic terms. It is a decay born of hypocrisy and self-deception, of signalling left when moving right. Wole Soyinka sees decay in soulless and meaningless "progression" which maims, kills and destroys.

We might have gone on exploring the many varied viewpoints which emerge out of every writer's semiotic constants. We remain content with the knowledge that creative writers in Africa have something deep to say about change and development.

Notes:

* University of Botswana.

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31. Ibid., p.133.
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RESUME

La littérature africaine a toujours vécu en étroite symbiose avec les milieux sociaux, politiques et économiques dont elle est issue. Les proverbes, énigmes, contes au coin du feu et fables mettant en scène des animaux en disent long sur l'environnement physique et social dans lequel une communauté évolue, tandis que les traditions orales sont une expression de la sagesse populaire, des voyances et des valeurs profondes d'un peuple. La littérature, affirme l'auteur, met en lumière les événements et les contraintes de la vie quotidienne. La littérature africaine s'illustre par l'éclairage sous lequel elle peint les problèmes et les perspectives de changement. En conséquence, la littérature africaine a progressé par étapes, plus ou moins parallèlement aux changements intervenus dans la pensée politique et dans les théories économiques de l'heure. (a) L'étape de l'identité décrit les efforts faits pour recouvrer et restaurer le patrimoine africain... Cette étape prit fin lorsque Fanon rappela que les classes dirigeantes africaines savaient, par leur tendance à se pavaner dans les atours du colonisateur, ces initiatives visant à faire renaître de leurs cendres les gloires passées de l'Afrique. (b) Etape de la protestation et du conflit. L'héroïsme et la solidarité, thèmes dominants de cette période, font ressortir les temps forts de la lutte contre le colonialisme. Les protagonistes de cette étape sont des traîtres et des lâches, et les survivants à la lutte sont profondément déçus. Une page de l'histoire était tournée et le cadre dans lequel de nouveaux changements pouvaient être apportés avait changé. Quoi de surprenant qu'à cette deuxième période succéda. (c) L'étape de la désillusion - l'effet corrodant et corrompeur du pouvoir et de l'argent sur les élites africaines après l'indépendance constitue le thème dominant de cette étape. Ces thèmes sont développés dans des ouvrages de grande portée comme *"The Beautiful Ones are not yet born"* de Ayi Kwei Armah, *Devil on the Cross* et *Petals of Blood* de Ngugi, dont les titres traduisent bien cette désillusion. (d) L'étape de l'exhortation et de la satire - la révolution et/ou la satire sont les thèmes dominants de cette période, qui combine l'appel aux armes avec une décision dévastatrice du présent. Cette étape marque la participation active de l'écrivain dans les conflits et les débats relatifs au changement et au développement et la reconnaissance par la société que l'écrivain a droit au chapitre.

Ces différentes étapes tendent à se chevaucher et à s'interpénétrer. L'étude de ces différentes périodes, nous permet de dévoiler le

paradigme non exprimé et portant la valeur formative qu'incarne la littérature. L'apparente négation de la littérature masque une certaine affirmation. Pour le comprendre, l'on devrait essayer de déterminer ce qui pousse les écrivains à écrire, c'est-à-dire le faisceau de ressources, de talent et de tensions d'où émane le génie créateur. Un "système sémiotique" dénote la multiplicité des signes" qui sont liés à une réalité dominante telle que la terre, la "sagesse", le "progrès" ou l'"oppression", ou reposent sur elle. L'auteur utilise des "constantes sémiotiques" pour dénoter la récurrence de systèmes de symboles, d'images, de situations et de tensions dans les oeuvres d'un même écrivain. Citant en exemple les oeuvres de Chinua Achebe et de Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, l'étude met en exergue l'ensemble des ressources métaphoriques utilisées, les "constantes sémiotiques" et souligne l'impression générale faite sur le lecteur.

La notion de "sagesse" est le "principe stimulant" dans les oeuvres de Chinua Achebe. Les protagonistes de ses principaux ouvrages tels que Le Monde s'effondre et Arrow of God sont aux prises avec le monde en mutation et leur stature tragique est à la mesure de l'autorité dont ils peuvent user pour influencer ou orienter ce changement. En cette période de transition i.e. pré-coloniale, coloniale, et des indépendances, le cimat est à la confusion, au cynisme, à la corruption, à la turpitude morale. Un modèle particulier de dirigeants s'impose; ils n'ont à répondre devant personne et leur responsabilité civile n'est jamais engagée, ce qui conduit à un détournement des maigres ressources nationales. Confronté à ces changements, Achebe souligne la nécessité de trouver un juste équilibre entre le meilleur de notre culture et les apports d'une ère nouvelle.

Chez Ngugi le thème central est la "terre", la signification de l'aliénation des terres dans le contexte kényan. Face au problème de la pénurie des terres, Ngugi souligne les différentes formes d'exploitation, les abus et les litiges fonciers ainsi que les espoirs de reconstruction. Dans le contexte actuel, la terre symbolise les différentes formes d'utilisation du capital par les multinationales et leurs représentants, ainsi que la différenciation sociale en expansion. La souffrance, la destruction ainsi que l'agitation et les germes de crise sont les thèmes dominants dans les oeuvres de Ngugi. Les auteurs, souligne l'article en conclusion, peuvent parler en profondeur du changement et du développement.

STATE AND SOCIETY IN KENYA: THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE NATIONALIST COALITIONS AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITARIANISM 1963-78

Peter Anyang 'Nyong'o*

I. Introduction

Why should political leaders play such dominant roles in the political processes in Africa to the extent that their disappearance from the public scene creates such tremendous problems to society as a whole? Is it because African societies lack effective and hegemonic ruling classes or is it because the whole matrix of social conflict just lends itself to the domination by strong men?

We cannot answer these questions without going into the sociology of political leadership in Africa, the history behind the coming into power of such individuals and the interests of social forces which seek to benefit by their being in or out of power. We cannot also ignore the fact that the extent to which an individual plays a dominant role once he acquires a presidential position is also a function of his own personal qualities. It is like the old question regarding why king Richard the Second lost power in Shakespeare's Richard the Second: was it because, as king, he could not manage the political crises with which he was faced due to his lack of wisdom in dealing with them or due to earlier events and a changing environment which made it difficult for the institution of kingship to manage such crises? Or was it because Richard failed to realize, due either to his own personal weakness or the advice he received, that the location of power had shifted and he needed to reconcile with Bolingbroke much earlier? Did Bolingbroke succeed because he was more astute in mastering the political crisis and putting together a winning coalition? Is Richard the Second a play about how power is won by expertise and lost by stupidity or is it a play about how the changing fortunes of individual leaders are shaped more by the changing balance

of social forces than by their own individual capacities?

In trying to answer these questions, we realize we are not simply dealing with the ambition and skills of individuals, but also the environment in which certain personal qualities triumph as expertise or lose as stupidity. In the case of Richard the Second's time, i.e. the sixteenth century, kingship was a central factor in feudal society which had a long history and whose existence depended on the relationships among various social forces in society. We will also note that feudal society was already in a state of significant flux by this time, hence certain assumptions that Richard might have about his real power (as handed down by tradition) might already have been undermined by these shifting relationships he might not have clearly understood.

We might therefore argue, quite justifiably, that leaders and great political actors are by and large personifications of the social forces they represent in society. Individuals, no doubt, have ambitions to be this or that in society. But they can only fulfil these ambitions if they recognise, use, cajole, or even manipulate these social forces as vehicles for the fulfillment of their ambitions in life. As individuals strive to satisfy their ambitions, so do social forces themselves - as concrete historical actors, organized or otherwise - also seek to further their interests through the careers of such individuals. This is the dialectic that must be clearly understood in trying to understand the problem of leadership and political succession in Africa. Strong presidents have not imposed themselves on society simply by individual cunning and expertise; social forces in society - and the conflicts among such forces - provide the context in which such presidents acquire and retain power and, in certain cases, even end up using this power against the very social forces that propelled them into power.

We might further argue that there have been two transfers of power in Africa since colonial times: one from the colonialists to the nationalists, and the second from the nationalists to authoritarian and even dictatorial presidents. One might argue that the latter is not really transfer but a usurpation, but that would assume that the nationalists actually resisted the rise of such strong presidencies, which was not always the case. Almost in every African country, we notice that there was a tendency for the nationalist political parties to concede significant political power to the leader over the party, and subsequently over the state. Reasons given for this phenomenon have varied: on the one hand there are those who argue, like Ali Mazrui, that there was a tendency in African nationalism to worship freedom

fighters as heroes (1). Coupled with this is the "monarchical tendency in African politics", where the leader wants to be treated as a chief or a monarch and the people also relish in seeing power exercised in a monarchical way (2). But that is to describe a phenomenon, not to explain it. On the other hand, there is the school of thought which contends that the rise of the strong presidents in post-colonial Africa is really the result of the fragmentation of the petty bourgeoisie, struggling among themselves for political power, and, not being able to produce any dominant tendency among them, are finally compelled to settle for the mediation of one man, the leader, who eventually grows into a strong president depending on the historical circumstances.

But the strong man can either be a dictator or an authoritarian president. Presidential authoritarianism is born when political power is so concentrated in the office of the president that no major decision is taken within the bureaucratic or political process without reference to this office, or when the legitimacy of bureaucratic decisions is derived from their claim of having the blessing or backing of the president. The presidency becomes the biggest bureau in terms of administration and policy-making; all other organs of government gradually begin to bend to it and politicians stand in awe to the power of the president. The weaker the incumbent feels, the more likely it is that he will try to exercise presidential powers personally and not entrust them to his bureaucrats.

In the case of Kenya, it will be the contention of this paper that it was largely as a result of the disintegration of the nationalist coalition that a strong authoritarian presidency emerged. To begin with, a section of the nationalist coalition favoured this rise, seeing in it an opportunity to have access to state apparatuses and thereby acquire avenues for capital accumulation and personal enrichment. In this manner, this section did develop as the core of the indigenous bourgeoisie, but by neglecting political organization in preference for direct control of state apparatuses, it jeopardised its control of the presidency as well. Subsequently, it even lost it, and realised only too late how, in the process of creating a strong executive president, they had undermined other popular organizations in society which were party to the coalition that brought this rising bourgeoisie to political power.

The events of the early sixties in Kenya, and the internal struggle in which the nationalist coalition was engaged, led this coalition to believe that it would solve its many political problems by instituting

a one-party state. Within this one-party state, little attempt was made by the dominant faction within this coalition to keep the party alive; if anything, the party was only reinvigorated when its form was functionally needed to achieve certain conjunctural objectives in the interest of the dominant faction. Not sure of dominating the political process outside the state apparatus where it could use law and coercion to its advantage, this dominant faction had a double relationship to the party: one of keeping it alive and using it legally when it suited its objectives; the other of letting it atrophy to deny any other organized faction of the bourgeoisie from using it politically to attain its objectives within the bounds of law. But by this process of political demobilization, the ruling bourgeoisie found it was rapidly losing the art of organization, and any other organized social force in society seemed a threat to its rule.

It therefore adopted two strategies: one of coopting autonomous popular organizations to its patronage and leadership; the other of banning them altogether from the public sphere. Either way, the ruling and dominant faction found the executive power of the state most convenient and most useful. By using it directly or hiding behind that office while it threw its darts at such organizations, this bourgeoisie progressively found it could not act but by invoking the name of the president. In as much as it succeeded in its objectives, so did it also lose its own political muscle to the executive branch of the state, making it more and more difficult for it to have any hegemony in the political process. The final result was that the real political power of the bourgeoisie became directly associated, both by imagery and actual deeds, with the presidency. And as the incumbent in that office acted every day to arbitrate directly among feuding factions of the bourgeoisie, and as these factions appealed to him directly to mediate between them and the masses, the presidency rapidly gained autonomy of almost all bourgeois factions within the Kenyan society, benefitting, no doubt, by the growing inability of the bourgeoisie to organize themselves politically outside the state apparatus. Factions of the bourgeoisie, especially the dominant and ruling faction (dominant in so far as it had direct access to the presidency), could not see their political and economic fortunes outside the halo of presidential power. The lynchpin of politics to them became the "succession issue"; bourgeois politics therefore became the "politics of succession", and it was no wonder that their attempts at reviving mass politics was around this very issue. Having abdicated from political organization by dismantling their nationalist coalition, they could only ensure their class rule by perpetuating the authoritarian presidency.

This paper argues that this authoritarian presidency, though viewed initially as a stabilizing factor for bourgeois rule, increasingly became a share to this rule, and finally stood as a wall between the bourgeoisie and the popular masses, almost foredooming any hopes of the former taking the initiative of organizing the latter on their own political terrain. The political implications of this state of affairs are far-reaching, one of them obviously being the brittleness of the political process, and the almost perpetual possibility that intra-bourgeois struggles may be settled by appealing to the politics of command, i.e. a coup d'état. Thus, whereas the authoritarian presidency may be said to have ensured reasonably stable periods of accumulation evidenced by high growth rates almost throughout the sixties and seventies, this has not necessarily been accompanied by a stable political process. Intra-bourgeois conflicts have, as a result of the brittleness of the authoritarian presidential system, been settled very violently; and although such violence have not led to a complete rupture of the system, there is no guarantee that they may not lead to such a rupture in the future if the system does not change. Without trying to predict the future, this paper will mainly seek to trace the historical evolution of this authoritarian presidency, analysing carefully the social context in which it has evolved, and hoping that the picture painted may help in arriving at comparative explanations of political processes in other African countries.

II. The Colonial Legacy

In Africa, as in Latin America and certain parts of Asia, the historical formation of the contemporary state is closely associated with the expansion of European capitalism which manifested itself in these three continents as colonialism. The colonization of Africa is the most recent and whose duration was perhaps the shortest. With regard to state formation, colonialism is still a contemporary phenomenon since the post-colonial state still bears a lot of semblance to its colonial predecessor.

First, the territories within which state power is exercised in Africa today were deliberately created by colonialism; this is a rather simple and obvious fact but its endurance in history makes it worth repeating. The sovereign state, in territorial and juridical terms, and in terms of international relations is a "hand-me-down" phenomenon.

Secondly, societies enclosed within such territories were quite often highly heterogeneous; to begin with, the only thing they shared in common was the political domination by the colonial state. But

this domination was not static; it created its own internal dynamism, contradictions, conflicts and processes of social transformation over time.

Hence, thirdly, as a result of this domination, such societies started sharing certain common attributes which, wittingly or unwittingly, contributed to the process of integrating them into "new nations". The manner in which they were initiated into processes of integration depended on many factors; the extent to which the societies were integrated into the world capitalist system or the economy of the colonizing power; types of political changes created by the colonizing power; types of economic changes created by the colonial economy, types of social and cultural institutions introduced by colonial education, religion, languages etc. to "civilize the native", make them more governable or more easily predisposed towards participating in the colonial political economy and so on.

After fifty or so years of colonial rule, Africans were no longer simply tribes and ethnic groups bound together within common colonial borders, they were also farmers, merchants, school teachers, clergymen, workers in towns, workers in plantations, workers in mines, soldiers in the army, policemen, prostitutes and so on. In other words, new roles, groups and social classes had emerged in society that transcended and cut across pre-colonial social relations as outcomes of, and responses to, the colonial political economy. In the midst of all these changes, intense struggles emerged against colonialism and for national independence.

The history of post-colonial politics in Africa begins with this struggle for independence; it begins with African nationalism. At independence, the colonialists transferred political power to these nationalists in a process that was a mixture of struggle, compromise, concessions, blind faith and even outright gambling. The nationalists were a mixed bag of interests and social forces, often stereotyped, at times misunderstood, in many cases romanticised and, in the final analysis, still in need of careful analysis if we are to understand what happened to them and the political power they were supposed to wield after independence.

The British government, in 1936, appointed a Commission under Lord Hailey to look into the conditions prevailing in the African colonial territories and recommend what needed to be done regarding their future and that of the Empire. Hailey's report is too voluminous to be summarized here (3), but suffice it to say that it underscored the

need for more investments in the colonies and a greater speed in preparing the more advanced ones for self-rule. Hailey was, after all, conducting his inquiry in the backdrop of Gandhi's activities in South Africa and then India, the impending world war and increasing pressure by Africans themselves in "some of the more advanced" British colonies for greater civil rights (4). There did not seem to be any contradiction, from Hailey's point of view, in preparing the Africans for self-rule as well as maintaining a strong imperial hold in their economies through increased capital investment. If that was the rational opinion of the British state, it was not necessarily shared by all colonial officials let alone colonial social forces such as the settlers in Kenya and the Rhodesias. Independence would therefore not come to the Africans on a silver platter; struggle was to be involved and the British state was not always rational regarding the decisions it made from one year to the other (5).

The Second World War speeded up things; the colonizers realized just how valuable their colonies were and how irrational the continuation of some of their policies could be. The Africans who served in the army, fighting as far away from home as Burma, could not understand why they had to defend freedom and independence of the Empire while at home they were slaves of the same creature (6). On getting back home after the war, they became ardent nationalists. What were generally called "grievances against the colonial system" became the currency with which middle class nationalists mobilized diverse sectors of society against colonialism. The nationalist movement became a coalition of diverse social forces among the colonized Africans under the political entrepreneurship of middle class militants and activists (7). Take, for example, the case of the Ivory Coast.

The Ivory Coast was a French colony. As part of the quasi-federated colonies of French West Africa (FWA), she was not very significant either economically or strategically. The center of action was Senegal and her capital city Dakar, which was also the administrative center of FWA. The Ivory Coast therefore developed, for most of the colonial period, as a backyard of Senegal. Within the French colonial economy, she was assigned to be the producer of coffee and cocoa, and the supplier of wood. A few French colons migrated there to introduce commercial coffee and cocoa growing. In search of labour, they compelled the colonial state to pass laws requiring every ivorian to render forced labour both to them and to the state. They could not, however, successfully prevent enterprising Ivorians from growing the two commercial crops as their supply was not enough to satisfy the demands of the coffee/cocoa merchants - also from the

metropole. In the post-war period, the shortage of labour and the increased demand for coffee and cocoa heightened the struggle over the labour question.

Moreover, during the war, native Ivorians had contributed to the defence of France on an equal footing with their french compatriots. Coming back from the war, they could not reconcile the inequality they faced vis-à-vis the colons, nor could the colonial state continue to successfully rationalize this inequality. The war had also changed the politics of metropolitan France herself; the role played by the socialists and the communists, giving support to the nationalist sentiments of the Africans who were members of the French Parliament, made France to begin to reconsider her colonial policies. The pressure by native Ivorians for the abolition of forced labour gathered momentum with supportive voices from the metropole but amidst very recalcitrant forces among the colons. With regard to the rationality and long term interests of the metropolitan state, the colons could not expect to be defended for much longer. In any case, they were insignificant in both numbers and their contribution to the export economy of the colony. Once labour was free to the native planter bourgeoisie and all the peasantry, the export economy would flourish with little expense to the colonial state.

The planter bourgeoisie, moreover, had already demonstrated its ability to organize the flow of labour from the Upper Volta to the Ivory Coast, making it available to a wide array of the peasantry under diverse arrangements patronized by the Syndicat Agricole Africain (SAA) dominated by the planter bourgeoisie (8). The nationalist coalition, during the transition of the Ivory Coast from a colony to an independent state, was organized around this labour issue, and although other elements of the middle class did join the Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), the hegemony of the SAA could not be easily challenged. In reality, the transfer of political power was not so much to the PDCI but to the SAA, and as the Ivorian economy changed rapidly during the post-colonial period, this SAA domination of the PDCI became an incumbrance to the ruling party's ability in transforming itself from being a party of the 'planter bourgeoisie' to a wider coalition taking into account the more diverse popular forces within the modern Ivorian society.

Moreover, unlike Kenya and Senegal, both the middle and the working classes were not very big in the Ivory Coast; the Ivory Coast was, at the time of independence, a society of peasant coffee and cocoa farmers and their immigrant workers from the north. There were really

no significant popular organizations to mobilize people politically; the SAA was the first and the most dynamic. Regional and ethnic political parties that came later were scattered and ineffective; moreover, they could not deliver to the peasantry what the SAA had delivered to them: labour. The peasantry accepted the patronage of the SAA, and the SAA institutionalized and bureaucratized this patronage both in the PDCI and the independent post-colonial state with rapidity and skill under the presidency of Houphouet Boigny. As the economy grew and society changed in post-colonial times, new social classes emerged which the PDCI found difficult to accommodate without loosening the grip the SAA old quartz had in the party. The latter have, in turn, increasingly become uneasy about opening up the party to new entrants outside their patronage, and have sought to protect their tight control of the political process by hiding behind a strong authoritarian presidency.

In the case of the Ivory Coast a single bourgeoisie with the ownerwhelming support of the peasantry was dominant right from beginning, whereas in Kenya the nationalist movement was an amalgamation of very diverse social forces stratified along regional, nationality, class and trade lines. Colonial capitalism was much more developed in Kenya than in the Ivory Coast. Founded as a settler colony during the first decade of the century, Kenya received immigrant populations from both Asia and Europe. The European settlers dominated commercial agriculture through the control of the colonial state which assured them cheap access to both land and labour. Asian immigrants, in spite of very concerted efforts to enter plantation agriculture, were successfully kept out by the settlers, confining themselves largely to commerce and trade. Through the educational system, which was very limited in scope, Africans were provided with just enough skills to serve in the colonial society as low level civil servants, policemen and askaris, primary school teachers, health assistants and sanitation workers, factory workers etc. Beginning with the forties, some Africans started entering professional fields such as law and medicine; there was only one African practising barrister in Nairobi during the Mau Mau rebellion, and that was in the early fifties. Otherwise, the majority of the African population were subsistent peasant farmers only marginally integrated into the colonial market economy.

It must be emphasized, however, that in at least three regions of Kenya, the impact of the colonial economy was much more profound than in the rest of the country. These regions are now known as Nyanza, Western and Central Provinces. It was in the Central Province

where the greatest land alienation had occurred, with Agikuyu peasants being turned into either landless peasants or semi-proletarianised peasants called squatters as white settlers took this land for commercial farming.

The landless peasants sought to become wage workers in the farms or migrated to the urban centers "looking for work". Not all peasants lost their lands to the settlers even in the Central Province: in areas which white settlers considered unsuitable, the peasants continued to own their patches of the earth. There were also chiefs and their families who were deliberately favoured by the colonialists and who continued to own, and even accumulate, land assets. By 1930, the land question was so serious in Kikuyu country that the colonial government was compelled to appoint a special Commission, the Carter Land Commission, to look into it. What comes out of the Commission report is not simply the Kikuyu grievances against land alienation to the settlers, but also the already deep class divisions among the Kikuyu peasantry with regard to land ownership.

Both Nyanza and Western provinces were used in the colonial economy mainly as labour reserves. Here no land alienation had taken place for white settlement. Nonetheless, missionary activities in terms of opening schools and hospitals had been early and considerably wide spread. Population density was also considerably high and, subjected to the need to pay colonial taxes in money, and not having developed commercial agriculture, the people of Nyanza and Western region started moving to the towns as well as to the settler plantations in Central Province and the Rift Valley "looking for work". A culture of an urbanized and migrant labour force from these two areas was later to play a very important role in the trade union movement as well as the nationalist movement. During the Mau Mau emergency, the colonial government deliberately exploited this factor to fill civil service positions vacated by the detained or dismissed Kikuyu with people from these two provinces - a deliberate attempt to "divide and rule".

Most societies in the Rift Valley, the Coast and Eastern Province remained relatively undisturbed by the colonial economy either by land alienation or labour migration. This is not to say that they were totally left out of the economy; they were not. They were only more marginally integrated, with their precapitalist social relations of production remaining much more intact. In certain parts of the Rift Valley, the so-called "closed districts", communication with the outside world was even deliberately restricted.

In short, it would be correct to say that there was a very uneven development of colonial capitalism in Kenya, with three regions being more integrated into the economy while the rest were relatively marginalized. This had a significant impact on the nature and geography of class formation: Central Province peasants were proletarianised as a result of land alienation; Western and Nyanza peasants were proletarianized as a result of labour migration but the peasant economy remaining largely that of petty commodity production; relatively small middle and working classes emerging in the other regions as a result of education, colonial employment opportunities and pockets of labour migration. This, indeed, is a very general picture, but one that gives the essence of the reality.

If the Carter Land Commission had recognized a growing land problem in the Kikuyu countryside and called upon the colonial government to do something urgently about it, the Second World War complicated matters further by bringing demobilized soldiers to the scene who now understood the iniquities of colonialism and settlerdom even much better. This was at a time when historians report a rapid growth of rural population in Kenya - especially in Central Province - and an influx of more people into Nairobi. Nationalists also report in their biographies that they had heard about what was happening in India, and how the Chinese had been fighting imperialism. Both the land and the colonial issues became a problem to the colonial regime as middle class agitation around them started in earnest soon after the War.

Settler reaction was to ban African political activity altogether. The colonial office, however, knew better; efforts were made to co-opt middle class Africans into the colonial government and to prepare them slowly for eventual self-rule. A conscious effort was therefore made to study the situation and recommend gradualist programmes which would diffuse "violent and irresponsible nationalism", and create an environment in which the natives would finally be admitted into the civilized community of self-governing societies.

But since history is not like a computer programme, events between 1945 and 1950 forced the British government to speed up its solution to what Tom Mboya later called "the Kenya Question" (10). First, the emergence of African nationalism in the form of an organized political party led by people who were not directly patronized by the colonial regime did not nearly cohere with the latter's "political husbandry" of African demands. The Kenya African Union (KAU), formed in 1947, started making such radical demands

regarding political representation and the land issue that white settlers were significantly agitated in return. But while KAU sought to pursue its goals legally and constitutionally, the Kenya Land Freedom Army - or what became known as the Mau Mau - was much more militant and radical in its approach (11). Organized as a secret society whose members were under oath to observe codes of loyalty and solidarity, the Mau Mau was convinced that the land issue could not be settled around conference tables arguing with those who had stolen it from them: the settlers.

Nor did the Mau Mau have faith in the KAU as an organization which could pursue the land issue to its logical conclusion; Kenyatta himself was on record, as early as 1923, as having said that land could only be transferred from one individual to the other through the normal mechanisms of market forces. That was also the attitude of a good number of the African landed bourgeoisie in the Kikuyu countryside, those who were to form the bulk of loyalists in support of the colonial regime against the Mau Mau insurgents. Thus, when Mau Mau broke out in full swing in 1951, the issue was no longer simply politically husbanding Africans for eventual self-rule, but providing a political solution to the agrarian question in Kenya. Thus, although the British government imposed a military regime in Kenya from 1952 to 1956, and although the Mau Mau was, for all intents and purposes, militarily defeated by 1953, the real solution to the Mau Mau problem came when, between 1953 and 1957, the British government launched programmes of the "neo-colonization" of Kenya which sought to diffuse the land issue in a much wider political context (12). The wider political context assumed transition to self-rule as a given, but it was self-rule that was to take place within very carefully worked out perimeters required to guarantee long term British interests.

The East African Royal Commission (1953-55) outlined the basic political, social and economic programme that needed to be undertaken during the transition to independence. It recommended, among other things, more foreign capital investment in East Africa deliberately encouraged by the colonial state whose aim should be to create a stable and growing market for manufactured goods from the west. The logic of the growth of such a market was to be found in the recommendations of the Swynnerton Plan (1954) which tightly argued for projects to intensify agricultural production among the African peasant households, advancing the thesis that capitalist agriculture based on individual land-tenure system had to be encouraged if men with the kinds of attitudes that were valued in the western

civilization were to emerge in all sectors of Kenyan society. No doubt peasants with higher incomes from marketed produce would provide the kind of market that the Royal Commission had spoken of. The Becher Report (1954) outlined measures to liberalize the education system so as to give Africans more opportunities for higher education. An educated elite, it was argued, would provide an essential part of the responsible middle class to which political power was eventually to be transferred. Finally, in 1957, following constitutional reforms already initiated by the Colonial Secretary, Olivier Lyttleton, in 1954, and concretized in the Coutts Report of 1956, eight Africans were elected to the Legislative Council on a limited franchise heavily based on property qualifications. But the election of these men legitimized whitehall's strategy of leading Africans to self-rule through step-by-step reforms carefully orchestrated by the Colonial Office.

During these critical years, i.e. 1953 to 1960, two things happened which were to have long term effects in the politics of post-colonial Kenya. One was the intensification of uneven development between regions and among Kenyan nationalities as a result of the programmes referred to above. The other was the deliberate fractionalisation of the political process which led to an in-built weakness within the nationalist movement. Eventually, the Kenyan bourgeoisie was to emerge as a very fractionalized bourgeoisie, unable to forge a national political movement which it effectively dominated as a result of a shared community of interest as we saw earlier in the case of the Ivory Coast.

For example, the intensification of commodity production led mainly to the entrenchment of the loyalists as a kulak and middle peasantry in the Central Province during the Mau Mau emergency. Those who were detained during the Mau Mau, or who were collectivized into hamlets, were to be set free at the end of the fifties only to find that the process of land consolidation was complete in their area. The land question became an important political issue for the nationalist movement, but it was a question that divided the Kikuyu peasantry neatly into class lines: the loyalists on the one side and the landless former Mau Mau fighters on the other. But the land issue was not that important in the rest of Kenya except the Rift Valley. Here the threat of Kikuyu immigration led to a defensive politics on the part of the Kalenjin middle class. The white settlers, in particular, played on this issue in their attempts to divide the nationalist movement and render it less effective. The task the settlers set for themselves was not very difficult; material and cultural

conditions already existed that concretely differentiated the various regions of Kenya.

To further entrench this differentiation, the Coutts Report recommended the lifting of the ban on political activities by the Africans but confining such organizations to the district level. In the colonial administrative context, district boundaries neatly coincided with ethnic or nationality boundaries. Thus, in Central Nyanza District, the residents were overwhelmingly Luo; in North Nyanza, they were predominantly Luhya, and so on. The first political parties to be formed in the post-Emergency period were therefore district organizations. Subsequently, it was the leaders of these district organizations who sought and won the 1957 elections, emerging as the first representatives of the African people. They were, in reality, political bosses of district party machines who, even in their attempts to form national political parties - such as the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) - saw themselves not as dissolving their own organizations but as entering into national coalitions. Within the two nationalist parties, there was not to be found, as was the case in the Ivory Coast, a dominant organization of the rising bourgeoisie which could hegemonically control the destiny of the nationalist movement.

It was perhaps not surprising, faced with this fractionalization and the lack of a center around which things could cohere, that Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, a nationalist stalwart from Central Nyanza and former official of the proscribed KAU, called for the release of Jomo Kenyatta in a speech he gave in the Legislative Council in 1958 (13). Odinga called Kenyatta, and all those behind bars allegedly for their Mau Mau activities, as "the natural leaders of the African people". The white settlers were, of course, up in arms against Odinga. Similarly the representatives of the rising Agikuyu bourgeoisie who had stood beside the colonial government as loyalists during the emergency were also visibly shaken by this statement and quick to denounce it as irresponsible and dangerous. The real leaders, argued Julius Gikonyo Kiano in the same Legislative chambers, were those like him, the products of Lyttleton and not of peasant rebellions in his native Central Province.

But Kenyatta had always, in his political career, achieved positions of leadership not so much because of his personal efforts to get to the top, but more as a result of the qualities contending social forces saw in him as an appropriate leader, a compromiser (14). As such, he systematically cultivated the ability to compromise, to appear good to

all sides and only to take sides when it was quite clear which way the wind was blowing. This had happened in the days of the Kikuyu Central Association in the twenties, it had happened with KAU and it was now to repeat itself once Kenyatta was released and became the President of the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Beginning from a position of weakness as a more-or-less compromise candidate for the presidency of the ruling party and then the state, Kenyatta used the fractionalization of the bourgeoisie to build a strong presidency. In that process, he presided over the disintegration of the nationalist coalition, seemingly in the interest of consolidating political power in the hands of a section of this coalition but, in the long run, undermining the hegemony of the bourgeoisie as a whole.

That, however, is only one plausible explanation of what happened. The other equally plausible explanation is that, soon after independence, with the tremendous mobilization of popular forces that accompanied the campaign for independence, and given the rather loose character of the nationalist parties, the grand bourgeoisies - of the western imperialist countries, particularly the USA and Great Britain - feared that certain populist and radical tendencies could dominate the parties and gain political power. This fear was also shared by the white settlers. The first US ambassador to Kenya, Mr. W. Attwood, brought out this feeling very clearly in his book, The Reds and the Blacks. To avoid the possibility of the radical populists turning the political muscle of the mobilized masses into the raw material for revolution, it would be necessary either to make it impossible for them to gain control of the ruling political party, or to strengthen the executive arm of government altogether, rendering the party insignificant in the real exercise of political power. In reality, Attwood pursued both options, but Kenyatta himself preferred the latter option since he had never, at any time, been in a position to control the party he presided over; if anything, Tom Mboya and Odinga Odinga were the real party barons. The weaker elements within the nationalist coalition, especially some of those who came from Kikuyu land, found a strong presidency and a weak political party in their favour. But this was to be so only in the short run.

Politics in capitalist society is not really about the accumulation of wealth; it is more about ensuring that conditions under which capital accumulation takes place are maintained and reproduced; this is what the bourgeoisie is objectively driven to strive for. There must be a reproduction of the whole society, not just of the capitalist and those he exploits. Moreover,, the capital-labour relation is objectively an antagonistic relationship: capital being built through unpaid

labour and labour' always struggling against this iniquity and yet compelled to survive only within the capital/labour relationship. Capitalists, among themselves, also compete both for labour and for the market, yet they must agree on certain minimum rules and regulations, external to each one of them, which keep this competition within the bounds of order. The agreement is not a historical contract, traceable to a date and time as may seem from the writings of the "social contract theorists" such as Thomas hobbes, John Locke and J.J. Rousseau, but a historical process through which the bourgeoisie go in establishing their political hegemony in society to the extent that everybody begins to live as if capitalist relations of production are a normal thing. But this "attitude of mind" cannot be taken for granted; it must be created and then reinforced daily by state control, through law, culture and ideology, all of which presuppose a conscious political organization of society by the bourgeoisie.

Thomas Hobbes, for example, visualized a society in which self-seeking men were threatened with perpetual chaos and they were hence compelled, out of God-given reason, to accept authority over them so as to guarantee their own survival. But Hobbes was careful to remind his readers that this was only possible because no man was strong enough (physically, since man was still pre-social) to subjugate the others in the service of his own will. The state, or public power, from the point of view of Hobbes, was necessarily a benevolent dictator.

But Hobbes was writing at a time when the feudal social order was crumbling in his native England and capitalist society was beginning to emerge. It was not quite clear where the locus of social power resided in society, and there was a tendency for political power to be very fluid. Hobbes was essentially appealing for order in the interest of everybody against chaos which would be the ruination of all. He was appealing to the rising bourgeoisie to individually concentrate on capital accumulation and leave the exercise of political power in the hands of the benevolent dictator - the state. To ensure capitalist development, Hobbes argued for the absolute autonomy of the state.

By the time John Locke appeared on the scene, capitalist society was already much more developed in England. Private property was no longer purely an individual thing; its defence had already created social bonds among its owners. Social power, argued Locked, lay in property, and it is the propertied classes that really mattered in society. Having fought the aristocracy from holding political power on the basis of their birth-rights, the bourgeoisie were now to rule

society politically on the basis of their property rights. The non propertied classes were not going to take this lying down. Revolutions, and threats of revolutions, throughout the nineteenth century and during this century as well, taught the bourgeoisie that a political order had to be created in which, while they held their property rights to accumulate capital, they had to concede to some of the pressing demands of the subaltern classes to prevent society from being blown to pieces by frustrated and oppressed social forces. This is how bourgeois democracy was won: out of intense struggle, it led to the birth of the modern bourgeois state as the committee for managing the common affairs of the whole of the bourgeoisie.

When we talk of the state in capitalist society, therefore, we talk of it in two senses: first, as a social relationship - a political medium through which a system of social domination is articulated; and second, as concretely manifested in an independent group of institutions that form the apparatus in which the power and resources of political domination are concentrated.

Very often, it is easier for us to understand what is meant by state apparatuses and how, in capitalist society, power is exercised within these apparatuses to guard and defend capitalist society as a whole. But when we talk of the state as a system of social relations, we become fussy in our minds, the problem all of a sudden becomes too abstract. Yet we must unravel the riddle: apparatuses are concrete objects created by men under very specific historical conditions to serve certain purposes. In order to understand what they really are, it is necessary to know the reasons for which they exist, the purposes which they serve. Thus state apparatuses in capitalist society are the institutional framework within which organized political power is exercised. Power is organized politically to reproduce capitalist relations of production and to ensure that conditions exist which will guarantee this reproduction. As such, the state is a guarantor of capitalist relations of production.

A guarantor is needed, as we have seen above, because the relation in itself carries conflict; capital may destroy labour through over-exploitation to increase accumulation if left to its own micro-rationality. Labour, too, may destroy capital if not kept in check by laws and regulations external to every capital/labour relation and enforced by a whole array of cultural, ideological, political and even coercive institutions that are historically evolved as classes struggle under capitalism. Furthermore, the state may historically be a force to produce these relations where they did not previously exist.

(i.e. through extra-economic coercion), especially in colonial and neo-colonial conditions.

This, then, brings us to the Kenyan situation, where the evolution of capitalist relations of production was carefully husbanded by the colonial state. The use of extra-economic force to promote capitalist development meant that the colonial state apparatuses were endowed with immense coercive power. Labour was, no doubt, over-exploited and extensively oppressed, to the extent that it was difficult to guarantee peaceful conditions for capital accumulation. It would be quite fair to argue that the settler/squatter relationship in the Kikuyu countryside was a much more inherently violent form of capitalist development in agriculture than the peasant contract farming that succeeded it in post-colonial times.

In the 1950s, the whole purpose behind the various "reform commissions" that were referred to earlier was to produce conditions under which a much more "normal" process of capitalist development would take place. As such, there had to be a system of organized political power that could guarantee such development.

In the post Mau Mau era, Britain faced this problem of consciously creating a political system which would guarantee a "normal" process of capitalist development as Swynnerton called it. It was not in the interest of British imperialism to keep on financing repression in Kenya simply to keep the white settlers happy; Britain was much more interested in securing Kenya as an avenue for capital accumulation and not a fortress of war.

The careful way in which Britain went about preparing Kenya for independence was to give an opportunity for all social forces to contend for power on a democratic platform. To begin with, there was an obvious bias towards protecting settler interests, but this was subsequently couched in terms of "protecting minority interests" and carefully fused with the strategies of the nationalists representing minority nationalities. Further, the constitution that was agreed upon as a result of the Lancaster House conferences was basically a democratic constitution, ensuring that a bourgeois democratic political system would be established in Kenya and leaving the responsibility to sustain this system to the emerging African bourgeoisie.

But this bourgeoisie, as we have rightly observed, was still emerging; it was not yet fully born. And in its painful birth pangs, it found itself thrust, by the violent tides of history, into the reins

of power in the post-colonial state. It inherited the apparatuses developed by the colonial state under settler hegemony; it need not have preserved these apparatuses as they were; indeed, they were modified, some even abolished. But it also created apparatuses of its own, in keeping with the kinds of social conflicts that needed to be regulated and the level of development of social forces. The development - or emergence - of the authoritarian president must be seen in this context. It did not exist from the word go, but it developed as an apparatus of state power reflecting the manner in which political power was evolving and being organized in society.

III. Competition, United front, Disintegration: 1963-66

It has been popularly believed that the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the two major political parties that fought the uhuru elections in 1963, were ideologically different political parties (15). Although they did, in actual fact, differ on certain policy issues regarding land and the structure of government, for example, they were not in any way polarized ideologically. If anything, within each party, there were diverse ideological tendencies which banded together mainly as a result of wanting to stay within a winning or a defensive coalition. The genesis of the formation of the two parties shows quite clearly that they were the outcome of intra-bourgeois struggles for gaining political power through coalition building.

KANU was the first to be formed in early 1960 at a conference held in Limuru, a few miles outside Nairobi. The first list of office bearers revealed an attempt to include representatives of all regions and social forces within the African nationalist movement. But the politicians who gathered in Limuru went there as petty bourgeois organizer of their own followers, be they unions, nationalities or urbanities. They could only feel part of the new party if they felt there was something in it for them. At that point in time, KANU seems to have put premium on putting together a winning coalition, and there is no record anywhere which shows that the Limuru meeting was called to discuss the kinds of policies which would bind these people together in a party; what they were party to were not policies but a strategy to win independence. As Tom Mboya later put it in his autobiography, they tried as much as possible to simplify things and limit ideological debates so as to maximize the unity needed for winning independence.

It is no wonder therefore that KADU was formed as a reaction to

the formation of KANU by men who felt that they were being manipulated out of power by those who held important positions within KANU. KADU, like KANU, was formed for purely strategic reasons; policies and ideological postures followed later. Many in KADU's leadership felt that the Secretary General of KANU, Tom Mboya, was too much of a manipulator; they could not trust their political future in his hands (16). Moreover, since they came largely from the less advanced parts of Kenya, the fear of domination by representatives of the larger nationalities suddenly seemed a possible reality in the post-independence era. But the argument that KADU was formed simply and purely by the "minor tribes" coming from the "backward parts of Kenya" does not really hold water; it cannot explain why Masinde Muliro, representing the Abalunyahia people, chose to join KADU. The Abalunyahia were neither a backward nationality nor could they count themselves minor. Ronald Ngala, coming from among the Majikenda at the Coast, grew up in an area first to be penetrated by the missionaries; by the Kenyan development "standards" of early 1960s, the Rabai area where Ngala's home was to be found was obviously pretty well integrated into the rest of Kenya. KADU, in reality, was a defensive coalition of regional party bosses who felt threatened by KANU and had to take a defensive posture as a bargaining point in sharing political power after independence. In that process of creating a defensive mechanism, the KADU politicians soon found allies among the white settlers who proceeded to provide the party with funds, ideology and policies.

Land had always been a thorny issue in Kenyan politics; the land issue was behind the Devonshire White Paper of 1923; the Carter Land Commission elaborated on it in the thirties; Mau Mau broke out on the issue of land; and many of those who were now in the forefront of the nationalist movement represented constituencies in which land questions dominated the political agents. As the two political parties started to mobilize the masses looking for votes to gain a majority and form a government, they had to define their policy on land. On both scores, the policy was vague except on the issue of land purchases and transfer and who was to oversee such action. KADU favoured first and foremost a quasi-federal system of government in which the central government would "devolve" certain powers to the regions.

One such power was related to land transactions: regional authorities retained powers to authorize such transactions within their borders. At the same time, a Central Land Board was created in which national land policy would be co-ordinated. In this board, representation was by region, again giving primacy to regional

influence and control of land issues. KANU, however, opposed this arrangement, and wanted land to be released to market forces within the nation as a whole. There was, of course, a populist streak in KANU land policy which promised to ascertain that the landless were given land "in an orderly fashion". The independence settlement, to which all parties were agreed, stipulated that landlessness would be solved through the settlement scheme approach. This approach ensured that the independent state would receive foreign loans with which to buy unproductive white farms; these farms would then be parcelled out to small holders who would then pay back the loan over a long period of time.

But on both sides there were those who represented very poor constituencies, very land hungry constituencies, who felt that neither the KADU approach nor the settlement scheme approach would satisfy their supporters. There were also those who, for ideological reasons, believed that a land policy based on the regulation by market forces was unjust to the poor and landless; that government had to take a much more radical posture after independence in acquiring land and distributing it free to the landless. But such divisions did not emerge until after independence when the nationalists were actually faced with the question of what to do with power that was already acquired.

Thus it may be argued that, before the General Elections of 1963, both KANU and KADU tailored their policies mainly to maximize support from the electorate. More than that, the articulation of clear policy lines was secondary to the near- demagogic appeal to the masses to support the coalition that could either govern them best or best defend their interests after independence. Personalities became an important factor; heroism in fighting the colonialists was usually an added advantage. In this regard KANU, identifying itself with the most heroic struggles against the colonialists, won the hearts of the most urbanized and proletarianised sections of the Kenyan society. It so happened that these sections also historically coincided with the two dominant nationalities in Kenya: the Kikuyu and Luo. But it was also a fact that KANU did better in urban areas than did KADU.

But the real political machines that mobilized the votes for the KANU coalition was not KANU, the party, but the organizations within KANU, the coalition. The same could also be said of KADU. Thus Kenya became independent, not with a dominant ruling party at the top, but with a winning coalition of nationalist organizations forming a government. Kenya became independent, not with a ruling party that was a victor because its policies won it popular support,

but with a party that had gathered superior organizational capability and put together a winning coalition. KANU won the competition to form the independence government; after independence, it was faced with the difficult task of transforming a strategic coalition into a ruling party, a challenge that was to force onto the agenda the problem of what the members of the coalition were really "party to".

It was at this point that it became very clear to KANU that it was not really a party, that factions within it remained factions, each struggling to dominate the others through influence and organization. Resources to successfully undertake such projects of influence and organization became important; to acquire such resources, including popular following, ideology was also invoked. It is in this process that there started to coalesce, within KANU, two competing tendencies which were levelled as progressive and reactionary, nationalist and anti-nationalist at a later period in time. But, to begin with, in struggling for dominance within the party, the two tendencies decided to court KADU (and the more minor African People's Party led by Paul Ngei) back to KANU, each tendency pinning its faith on getting more supporters crossing over from KADU. Once KADU was dissolved, then the factional fights broke out in the open; one was identified with the leadership of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, then Vice President; the other was identified with the leadership of Tom Boya, then Secretary General of KANU and Minister for Economic Planning and Development. Odinga's faction was labelled as nationalist and progressive (even communist); Mboya's faction was identified as pro-west, conservative and even reactionary.

Odinga Odinga insists, in his autobiography Not Yet Uhuru, that these divisions were indeed ideological. He even goes further to argue that these ideological and policy rifts became more and more pronounced after KANU and KADU had been joined to enhance national unity because there were those within KANU who saw this unity more as a camouflage for consolidating right-wing and anti-democratic forces. Collin Leys argues, in his book Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism, that the point of separation between KANU (A) and KADU (B) - one progressive and one reactionary - was ideological: one right-wing, led by Mboya and Kenyatta, and the other left-wing led by Odinga and Bildad Kaggia. Apart from the land issue over which they differed radically, they also differed on their attitudes towards the state, the working class movement, and foreign policy. Was the state to be used by the nationalists now in power to create a capitalist class and various classes of property among the Africans or

was the state itself to be the capitalist, preventing the accumulation of capital in private hands but encouraging it in the public sphere? Leys suggest that the pro-west, conservative Mboya-led group was much more for a free-market society in which the state superintended over laissez faire capital accumulation while the progressive and nationalist Odinga-led group was much more circumspect regarding the merits of capitalism in a developing country like Kenya.

But while these ideological differences existed in rhetoric, and while they found more concrete expression in the Trade Union movement where Mboya's leadership was first to be openly challenged, they served more as "mobilizing agents" for the opposed factions rather than explanatory variables for any real ideological differences. There was, of course, a much more apparent fact which Attwood admits in his book The Reds and the Blacks. This was the fact that there was a significant presence of the Cold War in these factional struggles. The United States of America feared the radical rhetoric of the Odinga group and the undeniable patronage it had received from the Eastern block countries; Attwood's partisanship for the Mboya group grew by the day as he tried to undermine the progressives in government and within the party. The progressives, too, were suspicious of Mboya's closeness with the West and interpreted it as a saleout to western imperialism so soon after independence; whether this was true or not, it served to whip up nationalistic sentiments against Mboya in the Trade Union movement. Goldsworthy, in a recent biography of Mboya entitled Tom Mboya: the Man Kenya Wanted to Forget, insists that Mboya was never, at any time apologetic about his western connections and friendships; if anything, he was proud of them. But he was, at the same time, not a tool of the west either; he used his connections to further his political ambitions and the aims of the nationalist movement. He had a clear ideological line, that of a social democrat, and he believed in a capitalist development in Kenya in which the state would play a leading role in accumulation, manned by competent civil servants. He could not, however, tolerate "socialist adventurers" who did not know what they were talking about; men who wanted to build socialism by redistributing the poverty of the country.

It must also be realized that, in the mid sixties, there was a more or less blanket popular sentiment in independent Africa that the independent regimes had to define themselves to the populace the type of society they were aiming to build. By the very nature of the nationalist movements, this was to be expected: nationalism had moved the masses to independence, beyond that, people were not clear what

was to happen. A call for some blue print, some guideline regarding what was to be done was necessary. Nkrumah had already given the lead by speaking of socialism, so had Julius Nyerere. Kenya could not escape the ideological pressure to define itself vis-à-vis socialism. Socialist rhetoric was already present in the language of the nationalists themselves, and now each faction wanted to use it as a mobilizing tool, as something which put it much closer to the impulse of the masses.

In early 1965, Mboya took the initiative and introduced in Parliament a document which was to serve as KANU's policy on socialism; this was Sessional Paper N°10 on African Socialism and its application to planning in Kenya. The document had very little to do with socialism as such. Its objective was to score a political point, i.e. to take the initiative away from the radical group and make the discussion of socialism coterminous with discussing on-going government policy within the framework and goals set by the government and not within the framework and goals of some ideal aspirations. Once Parliament had passed the Sessional Paper as the Kenyan policy on socialism, criticism of it would easily be dismissed as indulging in "foreign ideology".

The political battles that Mboya was winning against the radicals pleased Ambassador Attwood but they no doubt worried the men around Kenyatta, especially Mbiyu Koinange, Charles Njonjo and Njoroge Mungai. There is no doubt that, at this point in time, there were more currents in the political arena other than just the apparently ideological rivalries. Attwood reports a scene where he had gone to see Kenyatta and they both talked about Odinga and Mboya. While they both relished in the fact that the radicals were rapidly losing ground, and Odinga could eventually be forced to resign his post as Vice President, Kenyatta expressed his concern over American financial support of Mboya. "I want you to see to it that the flow of these funds is stopped", Attwood reports Kenyatta to have told him. Obviously the old man was worried about the organizational acumen of young Mboya, and knowing that he had depended on both Mboya and Odinga to get where he was, he would be still a prisoner of one when the other was vanquished.

IV. The Formation of the Kenya People's Union

The Wananchi Declaration, the Programme of the KPU published in 1966, explained the birth of the party as having come about as a result of policy differences within KANU. These were itemized as

follows; grip of foreigners on the economy which KANU continued to tolerate but "the true nationalists" opposed; social stratification which was emerging, with some of the KANU leaders beginning to enjoy pomp, splendour and wealth formerly reserved for the colonial masters and not caring to improve the lot of the man in the street and on the shamba; the land issue which KANU systematically explained in terms of market mechanism and rational development while problems of equity regarding ownership were neglected; and party democracy which was ignored in preference for settling factional competition and ideological differences through intrigues and "stagemanaged elections".

Although the KPU tried to explain its ideological differences with KANU in terms of socialism, this was not where the big divide lay. KPU was obviously a much more populist party, and a party which was forced, by the very fact that it had gone into opposition against KANU, to define its policies more systematically and to appeal to the popular masses more directly than KANU. KANU, in government, was saddled with the responsibility of governing, of justifying the social differences that were emerging in society. KPU, in opposition, could exploit the social contradictions to its advantage, and in this the masses were its laboratory. The politics of mobilisation and populist rhetoric favoured the KPU in expanding its constituency; KANU, now forced by the KPU's existence to be more explicit in its policies, found mobilizational politics a menace to its rule. Moreover, the ruling party remained unorganized from within, and this was no accident; the expulsion of the radical elements, or their being forced to resign and form an opposition party did not eliminate the remaining factional rivalries with KANU, least of all that between the president's men and the Secretary General of the party.

V. Strengthening the Presidency: The Conservative Mood, 1963-72

The Kenyan economy registered a very high rate of growth during the first decade of independence. Real average per capita incomes increased by about 36.8 % between 1964 and 1978. Most of this growth was accounted for by the agricultural sector in which large scale unproductive white-owned farms were broken into more productive small-holding farms and given to African peasants through settlement programmes organized as part of the independence package. The best known of these was the Million Acre Settlement Scheme introduced in 1961 and completed in 1971. This and other minor settlement schemes settled over 34,000 families on 430,000 hectares. The average size of settlement was considerably larger than the average small-holding in the rest of Kenya, even on the high density

settlement schemes. Thus, given the objective conditions, there was no reason why the opening of the frontier of private property in land to poor and landless peasants should not have cemented an alliance between the bourgeoisie and the peasantry. For, while peasant settlement was expanding, the concentration of land assets in the hands of the nationalist bourgeoisie was also going on. The KPU thought that this created an obvious contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the peasantry. What the party did not appreciate was that the land being acquired by both the bourgeoisie and the peasantry was that land originally alienated to the white settlers. The KPU therefore changed its tone: from advocating free land to the landless it started emphasizing a policy to put a ceiling on the size of land holdings. But this shift of emphasis was probably too late to save Bildad Kaggia. Geoff Lamb, in his book Peasant Politics: Conflict and Development in Maurangia (17), narrates how attempts by Kaggia to mobilize the peasants of Murang'a into the KPU on the issue of landlessness failed when Kenyatta suddenly distributed tiny pieces of land to the Murang'a peasants as Kaggia was unleashing his onslaught. Apparently Kaggia had not been privileged to learn from what Lenin had said of the Stolpyn reforms, and continued fruitlessly on his populist binge until his party was proscribed in 1969.

Success of the land reform programmes had obviously, at least in the early and mid sixties, bred a conservative mood among the peasantry in one of the regions where the land issue was most sensitive; the Central Province. Framing the land question in terms of putting a ceiling on the size of land- holdings was not therefore meant to appeal to the peasantry but to the petty bourgeoisie some of whom might have rightly felt that if size was limitless, it would not be long before the good land was all taken by those who had political power.

But the early and mid sixties was also a time when the petty bourgeoisie was in expansion. As the state became an active participant in capital accumulation through the setting up of various parastatal organizations, it also became the biggest employer and the provider of loans and credit facilities for the middle class to facilitate property ownership. Among those employed in state apparatuses, a new class was emerging, what Issa Shivji has referred to as the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (18) and what Mahmood Mamdani has recently referred to, in the case of Uganda, as a class of bureaucrat capital (19). In essence, these are people who, occupying important positions in the state apparatus, can use their political power to gather revenues for private accumulation and personal enrichment. Thus, apart from performing

their duties as servants of the state, they are constantly engaged in the act of straddling, i.e. running businesses and enterprises for purposes of accumulation.

In Kenya, while Tom Mboya was alive, he seemed to have been singularity against straddling. Once a civil servant saw he could accumulate capital and wealth by dint of his office, there was no telling where this could end. Moreover, argued Mboya, this would be the beginning of corruption and inefficiency in the civil service, let alone an increase in clanism, favouratism and tribalism in granting jobs within the service (21).

Even without legally sanctioning straddling, clanism, tribalism and nepotism were already becoming a problem by the mid sixties. The Kikuyu, in particular, felt that they had been discriminated against during the emergency; now that independence had been won, they needed to be given extra advantage in getting public service jobs. Moreover, with the establishment of new parastatals, there was a tendency for the president to staff top posts predominantly with people of Kikuyu nationality. This led this new faction of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie to owe direct loyalty to the president (22). The critics of this practice except for Mboya, also tended to condemn it as a presidential iniquity, not as a phenomenon which was dysfunctional, in the long run, to political stability and capitalist development. The more Kenyatta came under attack because of the favours he was seen to be granting to his clansmen, the more the Agikuyu bourgeoisie as a whole, whipping up popular support within the nationality, banded together in defence of his presidency. In this atmosphere, the ideological issues that the KPU was raising obviously became secondary in the daily political battles of many members of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. Even among the working class, a conservative mood was prevalent.

The increase in foreign investment and the deliberate emphasis by the government on expanding the manufacturing sector led to the rise of the share of the GDP of this sector from 10.4 % in 1964 to 12.6 % in 1971. Between 1971 and 1977, the manufacturing sector did not at all increase its share of the GDP. The share of services rose from 39.9 % in 1964 to 44.7 % in 1971; this increase was given by large public investments in education soon after independence. Given the primacy the popular masses put on education before independence, this was the kind of expenditure that generated a lot of support for government policy. With the establishment of new parastatals and expansion of old ones, the state became the largest employer of labour. In 1963, public

sector employment accounted for 30 % of all "formally" employed persons; in 1971, this had risen to 40 % and this figure did not change much subsequently. By 1977 it still stood at 41.7 %, indicating quite clearly that 1963-71 was when public sector employment expanded most, and quite understandably so.

Under this atmosphere of expansion in employment opportunities, the executive branch took steps to gain control of the working class organization and the trade union movement without much resistance. The creation of the Central Organization of Trade Unions in 1966 as an umbrella organization of workers whose leaders were effectively presidential appointees was, at that point in time, seen mainly in terms of the Kenyatta-Odinga- Mboya struggle. There were two umbrella organizations of unions already: the Kenya Federation of Labour, grouping unions whose leaders were overwhelmingly Mboya supporters right from his days as the leader of the Nairobi Convention People's Party; and the Kenya Federation of Progressive trade Unions, whose leaders were Odinga loyalists. By statutorily dissolving these two groupings and bringing them under COTU with Kenyatta's patronage at the top, it was Odinga and Mboya who were seen to have lost. The real losers, however, were the workers; for the creation of COTU did not only eliminate more pluralism in trade union organization, it also drastically reduced their autonomy vis-à-vis the executive branch of government, effectively strengthening the hands of the president in controlling union activities (23).

In the immediate, this presidential control did not alienate workers from the government as the marriage between unions and the state actually produced results with regard to several union demands, most of all with regard to employment. There were, for example, the Tripartite Agreement of 1964 requiring all private sector employers to increase their labour force by 10% and central and local government employers to increase their labour force by 15%. This agreement created at least 40,000 new jobs, thereby taking care of 50% of the then unemployed labour force. In return, the unions agreed to abide by a 12 month wage freeze and a total ban on strikes. After the formation of COTU, even without signing new Tripartite Agreements, the spirit of the 1964 Agreement was adhered to by the three parties, and an intricate formula was devised curtailing strikes as a weapon for making working class demands by giving immense latitude to the Minister for Labour in declaring strikes illegal which were taken without exhausting the machinery for negotiations. The government, therefore, reserved the right to use the stick where and whenever the carrot was not available.

VI. The Assassination of Tom Mboya and the Banning of the KPU

Goldsworthy has now come out with documented evidence, from interviews and other primary sources, that the assassination of Tom Mboya in July 1969, was the result of a conspiracy involving people who were very close to the president. In spite of several constitutional manoeuvres undertaken between 1965 and 1968 to limit the possibilities of a Mboya accession to the presidency, he still remained a threat given his position as Secretary General of the ruling party KANU. This point needs careful explanation.

The independence constitution stipulated the position of the president and the procedures regarding succession in the event of disability, resignation or death. These stipulations went through some amendments between 1965 and 1968. The 1968 amendment is perhaps the most important for our analysis. It stipulated that a presidential candidate had to be at least 40 years of age, that, in the event of death, the Vice President would succeed the president for 90 days and exercise very limited powers. After those 90 days, there would be a general election at which the president would be elected.

Just before the formation of the KPU in 1966, under the initiative of Mboya, KANU organised an impromptu party Conference at Limuru at which the party constitution was radically revised. The post of Deputy President of the party, then held by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, was abolished and seven new Vice Presidents created, each for every province. This effectively diluted this post and made the secretary General the single most powerful post after the President. Mboya remained the Secretary General of the party and hence the man next to Kenyatta in party hierarchy. The move was meant to neutralize Odinga within the party, but once he left and formed the KPU, the move made Mboya the center of envy of those party barons or factional bosses within KANU who thought they were also qualified to succeed Kenyatta.

Moreover, Mboya's politics and organisational capability was also a threat to them; having known how to summon the otherwise moribund party into action when he needed it, he would not hesitate to use it effectively in settling the succession issue on his favour in the event of Kenyatta's death. Things were made worse for Mboya by the attention the western press gave him as the man "most likely to succeed Kenyatta". It is quite clear that this "grooming" by the western mass media served western economic interests in Kenya; Mboya was the

single most powerful man in government capable of explaining and rationalising Kenya's economic policies and the "happy partnership" between imperialism and the rising bourgeoisie. But a faction of this rising bourgeoisie which was bent on straddling found Mboya's rather rigid attitude towards a professional civil service a menace to their interests.

When Kenyatta had a heart attack in August 1968 and there were rumours that he almost died, the factional struggles within KANU over the succession issue intensified. Soon after that, there was even an assassination attempt on Mboya. The man charged of having fired at Mboya did not say much at his trial except to plead drunkardness; Mboya, on his part, gave evidence which betrayed his desire not to let the public know too much; he was obviously buying time. Goldsworthy reports that, from then on, he was definitely worried about his life, and he seems to have been under very strict surveillance from somewhere.

The mass reaction after Mboya's assassination was spontaneous: the Kenyatta Government stood accused of complicity. People of Luo nationality suddenly felt a bond of unity among themselves in the tragedy; for them, their son had been killed to stop him getting what he rightfully deserved given his contribution to the nationalist movement. Elsewhere in the country, the sense of injustice was deeply felt. Without any other weapon to marshal public support behind them, the Agikuyu bourgeoisie banded behind Kenyatta to summon tradition so as to create unity with their peasantry and face the outside world in a united front. At the moment of crisis, the weaknesses within the bourgeoisie came out in the open; lacking an organized community of interest at the national level, natural bonds and ties were the only organizational structures they could resort to so as to solve their contradictions or defend themselves when these contradictions bursted assunder into acute conflict. Obviously Kenyatta lost face nationally; there was no way he could pose as the national hero after the assassination and the subsequent oathing of the Agikuyu people to give him support for riding over the crisis. But the events following the assassination also produced other unintended results: no longer was there any illusion that the nationalist coalition had any real unity within it; factionalism and sheer pragmatic compromise of the bourgeoisie in politics became the general norm. With the banning of the KPU in October 1969, party politics subsequently became almost nonexistent, and the office of the president as the repository of real power was substantially enhanced.

VII. The Presidency and the Crises of Legitimacy: 1970-78

The ILO Report of 1972 on Employment, incomes and equality: A strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya (24), underscored the political dangers of the pattern of social transformation that had taken place in Kenya since independence. This "growth without redistribution", the report argued in a populist tone, could only alienate the underprivileged sectors of society from the state. In order to avoid such inequalities among the social classes breaking into irreconcilable conflicts, a belief system must be created that harmonizes the different interests, that keeps them within the bounds of order and that represents the given social order as serving the interests of all social forces. This is the role that a dominant ideology plays in a class divided society. But in order to succeed, ideology must somehow approximate reality; in order for an ideology to provide grounds for state legitimacy, state action must in turn somehow approximate ideological promises or ideals. Once there is a wide gap between the two, a regime loses not only the capacity to rule authoritatively but also its claims to legitimacy. Under such conditions, a tendency to rule through the heavy hand of repression sets in, making the affair of governing uncertain, unpredictable, unstable and even expensive.

Tom Mboya's assassination substantially eroded the legitimacy of the Kenyatta regime. The ideology of Harambee was a laissez faire ideology which called on the people, in spite of their social differences and positions in society, to pull together for purposes of nation-building. Kenyatta, in actual fact, openly acknowledged the inevitability of social stratification in building a capitalist society, and explained them in terms of individuals not being able to use the opportunities put before them to their best advantage (25). In the 1960s, when the economy was expanding and the property frontier was widely open, Harambee needed not to have justified itself: individuals who rose from rags to riches were plenty. From 1970, however, Kenyatta could no longer effortlessly preside over a society whose social contradictions were no longer smothered by the actual possibilities of progress. Thus, apart from having to contend with the crisis of legitimacy in the aftermath of Mboya's assassination, the banning of the KPU and the detention of its leaders, the economic crunch also set in to further strain relationship between the state and the popular masses.

1972-76 was a period when both the internal and the international environment proved extremely difficult for capitalist development in

Kenya. Internationally, oil prices went up suddenly following OPEC actions in 1973; the import bill went up creating a sharp deterioration on the balance of payments position. The import substitution industries that had been established with heavy dependence on imported raw materials and technology soon found the changed circumstances uncondusive to further expansion or production for export. Inflation went up, and real wages plunged considerably. If we can take an index of real wages as 100 in 1967, in 1971 it stood at 103 only to drop to 83 in 1974. While real wages were systematically going down, the rate of profit for both local and foreign firms was systematically rising. The rate of profit for local firms went from 93 % in 1967 to 95 % in 1971 and 97 % in 1974. The increase for foreign subsidiaries was even sharper: from 110 % in 1967, the rate plunged to 97 % in 1971 only to shoot up every year reaching 118 % in 1975 (26).

To further compromise the state,* the Ndegwa Commission in 1972 legalized straddling once Mboya was out of the way (27). Mboya had argued that the state should superintend over capital accumulation but not be used as an avenue for private accumulation by those who occupy state institutions. But his argument went contrary to those members of the ruling class and the emerging bureaucratic bourgeoisie precisely because, not having a capital base of their own, they could only create it through using state power as an avenue for primitive accumulation. Competition for occupying state positions became even more acute once Ndegwa legalised the involvement of civil servants in business. At the same time, this competition sharpened the contradictions among the competitors. It is this scenario that explains the rise of J.M. Kariuki in Kenyan politics.

Kariuki was a veteran Mau Mau detainee. He became Jomo Kenyatta's private secretary some time after coming out of detention and was subsequently elected to parliament for the Nyandarua North seat. In parliament, he served as an Assistant Minister between 1964 and 1969. Following the General Election of that year, Kariuku had hoped that Kenyatta would make him the Minister for Agriculture, where he was then Assistant Minister, replacing the then only white member of the cabinet, Bruce Mackenzie. But Kenyatta did not; instead, Kariuki was switched over to be an Assistant Minister for Wild Life and Tourism--an obvious demotion.

Kariuki was a prosperous businessman and farmer. He had built a substantial capital base and was perhaps one of the richest among the indigenous bourgeoisie. Coming from Murang'a, he was not close to Kenyatta in terms of ethnic ties, and seems to have interpreted his non

appointment to a full cabinet post as the machination of a group then referred to as "the Gatundu Courtiers" (29). Kariuki therefore decided to launch a full scale campaign against this group, making it quite clear that he had set his eyes on the presidency. He adopted a populist stance, appealing directly to the popular masses and directing the nation's attention to various aspects of growing social inequalities and inequities in the political process.

The fact that social inequalities were increasing in society was difficult to deny during the seventies. Land ownership was becoming more and more concentrated. According to the ILO study, the largest 4% of farms took up 47% of all farm land; whereas the smallest 70% of farms took up only 13.3 of the total. These aggregate figures were not as important as when they were reduced to local-level social relationships, especially with regard to Central Province where Kenyatta expected to get his primary base of support. In 1976, in Murang'a, Nairobi and Kiambu Districts, three districts which accounted for 80% of all large-scale coffee output - the smallest 70% farms owned 14.3% of the total land area while the largest 10% owned 70%. In other words, it is where the majority of the bourgeoisie came from, it is where bureaucrat capital was most concentrated that there was the largest and widest polarization in land ownership. It was also within this region that the ruling class expected all members of that particular nationality to be loyal to the regime on the basis of primordial ties rather than democratic principles, political party affiliation and mores of social justice. The people were expected to be content, not because of what they were concretely getting from the regime, but because the presidency "was theirs".

But nowhere was the fusing of landed property, industrial property and state power more prominent than in the Central and Rift Valley Provinces where the regime was urging the popular masses to be loyal to it since the presidency "was theirs". Kedong Ranch which alone owned 46.3 % of all ranchland in Nakuru District had 28 owners. Of these, 8 were Members of Parliament and Cabinet Ministers; 3 were executives of parastatals; 2 were local government employees and 1 was a company executive. 50 % of all Africanised land in Kiambu was owned by 183 individuals, 44 of whom owned about 70 % of this land. These 44 comprised 5 MPs, 3 ambassadors, 4 senior civil servants, 4 other government officials, 7 executives of parastatals, 2 church officials and the remaining 19 were listed as farmers, traders and professionals. Thus, when J.M. Kariuki shouted: "we do not want a Kenya with 10 millionaires and 10 million beggars", the ruling class knew exactly where this message could strike the first most responsive

cord: in Central Province. And Kariuki was not to be allowed to disturb the hornets' nest for too long lest the hornets learn how to sting through sustained political organization. He was assassinated on March 2, 1975, and a Parliamentary Committee set up to inquire into the death revealed the complicity of people very high up in government and quite close to the presidency. But the committee could only go so far, nobody dared bring the president or his men to book. If anything, presidential powers were used even in a more authoritarian manner to wash the committee's report and to detain some of its leading members.

VIII. The Bourgeoisie Regroups but Contradictions Abound

In a country like Tanzania where the bourgeoisie has developed a political organization of its own, the ruling party, and has managed, through social engineering and political control to bring the masses into politics through the medium of the party, the latter can be effectively utilized to overcome or deal with certain intro-bourgeois contradictions whenever necessary (30). In Kenya, however, where, following the history already recounted, the bourgeoisie did not manage to organize a national political party in which it was effectively hegemonic, crises met the bourgeoisie with only one organized force in society that it could use: the state. And with most powers of the state progressively concentrated in the office of the president as years went by, struggle to control the presidency by determining who actually became the president became even more acute, leading to quite a few assassinations and some unexplained deaths of prominent politicians.

Attempts by the dominant faction of the bourgeoisie to regroup itself outside the state apparatus so as to control the political process occurred in two phases, both of them equally feeble and ineffective. The first one, in 1973, was the formation of the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association (GEMA) and the second was when the forces behind GEMA tried to expand their constituency in 1976 by appealing for the revival of the old nationalist coalition going back to the KAU days. GEMA was the organization of the Kikuyu bourgeoisie. It brought together a number of individual Kikuyu capitalists who had an interest in common, i.e. that of influencing and controlling the political process through a conscious organization of their class outside the state apparatus. They also sought to control, through GEMA, the succession to the presidency. GEMA expected to appeal to the people of Gikuyu, Meru and Embu for their "natural" political support in any conflict in which this bourgeoisie was involved. But

in identifying their primary constituency so narrowly, they isolated themselves from the rest of the nation and could not expect much support from either the bourgeoisie or other popular classes of other nationalities.

Even as a political strategy within their so-called primary constituency, GEMA was undermined by the intense social stratification that had occurred in these areas and that did not easily lend the class of capital such ready-made support of other subaltern classes. Further, the competition between the capitalist class and other non-capitalist classes of property was most acute in Central Province where the closure of the property frontier - especially in land-heightened this contradiction. If any conflict dominated the latter years of the Kenyatta regime it was between the indigenous class of capital (rooted in Central Province) and non-capitalist propertied classes. The Kariuki crisis showed how tenuous was the political alliance between the indigenous bourgeoisie and non-capitalist classes.

In 1976, the forces within GEMA went out of their way to revive the old nationalist alliance that linked KAU to KANU. A point of unity was again over the succession issue. It was argued that since the then Vice President, Daniel Arap Moi, was originally a KADU leader, KANU could not risk his taking the Presidency in the event of Kenyatta's death. There followed an appeal to the original nationalist leaders within the KANU coalition to give their weight to this new move, and the campaign against Moi temporarily was baptised as "the Change the Constitution Movement". The constitution was now to be changed making it impossible for the Vice President to automatically succeed the president; the new proposals that this movement had were not, however, revealed to the public.

For these forces attempting to change the constitution to succeed, they needed a majority in Parliament. But they apparently made their designs public without first of all ascertaining whether or not they could marshal the required parliamentary majority. In the meantime, there were forces within parliament that did not owe their political rise to the old nationalist coalitions. There were men who had risen within the political process of elections over which KANU superintended as a matter of procedure but did not really control either in terms of party discipline or concrete party support. The hollowness of the party now came alive and clear to the "change the constitution group", as it tried, almost helplessly, to find a method of gaining a parliamentary majority to accomplish its task. Lacking in organization and political loyalty, intimidation and bribery seemed the only

option open to the "change the constitution" group in trying to recruit support in parliament. But, with regard to intimidation and bribery, their opponents, now grouped in yet another defensive alliance around the Vice President and the Attorney General, had more than enough in supply. After all, in politics you either win support or you eliminate opposition.

Those who had skeletons in their cupboards feared to tread on the toes of the Attorney General who then had effective power to bring them to book. Those in Parliament who could do with a few coins in their pockets or some largesse extended to them were not averse to supporting the Vice President's course who was more than ready to oblige their appetites. Thus, this game was played on both sides of the divide. It so happened that, at that point in time, the Vice President's defensive alliance marshalled the majority, no doubt also playing on the ethnic sentiments of Members of Parliament. And that is how Moi finally succeeded Kenyatta: no constitution was changed. But why should the feuding bourgeoisie have stuck so faithfully to legal procedure?

IX. Constitutionalism and Presidential Authoritarianism

A phenomenon that needs explanation is why there has been such cretenism with the law in post-colonial Kenya, that even when it is obvious that the faction of the bourgeoisie which dominates the political process simply wants to get things done in its own interest it must somehow reduce it to law, or to act arbitrarily and then retroactively legalize such action. Why is this?

Part of the explanation is to be found in the colonial inheritance that dominates state action and processes of state legitimation. Things have been done legally from colonial times and they are only accepted or tolerated as legitimate if they pass through legal channels. It is also a way by which bourgeois interests are hidden behind the "neutrality" of the law so that the bourgeoisie is not held responsible for making the state pursue its class interests but the state itself, as if it were neutral, is held responsible. Further, the process of law-making is believed to be by the representatives of the people, i.e. parliamentarians. Once certain interests pass through parliamentary validation as legitimate laws, they acquire a universal appeal beyond the particularistic social forces behind them. In this way, even when the interests of the bourgeoisie were being pursued much more directly through executive action, the need to stick to the law for purposes of legitimation was always there.

At the particular time when Kenyatta died, law, and not force, prevailed in the process of succession for both conjunctural and historical reasons. The historical reasons are the ones referred to above. The conjunctural reasons are those to do with the paralysing among the various contending factions which had resulted in the constitution not being changed while some Members of Parliament also remained quite autonomous of the contending factions. It was quite possible that, given another round and a new possibility of re-bribery, the balance of forces could have changed quite considerably. There was also the fact that Kenyatta was expected to die but nobody knew just when and where. The week that he died, there were no obvious signs that he would. Those who were around him simply seem to have made the kinds of decisions that favoured a smooth constitutional succession.

Moreover, there were no immediate social tensions in society which could have prompted some dissatisfied elements in the armed forces to intervene. The country had just come out of the coffee boom during which property acquisition had been the order of the day. Business had been great for both petty trade and the grand commercants; the middle class had also revelled in the temporary opening of the property frontier. While real per capita incomes had been more or less stagnant since 1971, between 1976 and 1978 when the boom lasted, real per capita incomes went up by almost 10 %. It was, in general, a brief period of recovery and prosperity. There was little sign of a constituency of discontent that an army colonel or captain could appeal to for support in undertaking a coup in opposition to the smooth succession.

X. Conclusion

A rigid presidential authoritarian system does not allow for much political discourse even for the bourgeoisie; if anything, it tends to narrow the avenues of political participation and encourage intrigues and plots with the ruling class. Intra- bourgeois conflicts may be violently settled as competition for the presidency stiffens, further alienating the political base of the regime. That the regime may weather such storms is quite often a function of favourable economic conditions, effective repression or the successful manipulation of the political process by the authoritarian president. But since all these largely depend on conjunctural circumstance they are no guarantee to ascertaining stable bourgeois rule. Such a rule can only be accomplished if the bourgeoisie can effectively organize its political control of society outside the state apparatus. In the case of Kenya,

attempts by the bourgeoisie to do this systematically failed first, because of the internal fractionalization of the bourgeoisie itself, and second, because when it tried it society had already changed so much that the nationalist alliance of the old days no longer had a corresponding social basis. Thus, in order to guarantee its political dominance of society, the bourgeoisie was once again compelled to prostrate itself before the executive branch of government, the authoritarian president.

Notes:

* ASAMI - Arusha, Tanzania.

1. See A. Mazrui, On Heroes and Uhuru Workshop (London: Longmans, 1967).

2. The phenomenon that Mazrui describes as "monarchical tendency in African politics" is aptly illustrated by P. Short in his biography of Banda (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974). On page 281, Short comments:

"Within the 'Malawi tribe' the position Banda had come to hold was like that of the old Maravi kings, complete with divine right and absolute authority. So, at least, he saw himself, and so he wanted to be seen. At first, unlike a monarch, he was not Head of State for life. Nor, indeed, was this necessary, for Banda held the presidency of the Republic by being President of the Party, and he was President of the Party for life".

3. W.M. Hailey, An African Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1937).

4. These demands for "civil rights", couched very much in bourgeois-democratic language, are vividly recounted in the numerous biographies and autobiographies of African nationalists. See, for example, K. Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiographie of Kwame Nkrumah (London: Nelson, 1957).

Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru (London: Heinemann, 1967);

Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Awo: The Autobiography of chief Obaremi Awolowo (London: Oxford University Press, 1966);

Nandi Azikiwe, My Odussey: An Autobiography (New York: Praeger, 1970).

5. See, for example, M.P. Cowen, "The British State and Agrarian Accumulation in Kenya", in M. Fransman (ed.), Industry and Accumulation in Africa (London Heinemann, 1982).

6. For an account of a soldier's experience who also became a nationalist in Kenya, see the autobiography of Bildad Kaggia, Roots of Freedom (Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1980).

7. The putting together of such a coalition under the conscious political entrepreneurship of middle class nationalists is well described by Tom Mboya in his autobiography Freedom and after (New York: Andre Deutsch, 1963). For a more recent appraisal of Tom Mboya's role in the nationalist movement, see David Goldsworthy, Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1982).

8. For a detailed account of this, see A. Zolberg, One- Party Government in the Ivory Coast (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

9. For more discussions on land ownership and social transformation in Kenya, see the Review of African Political Economy, N°20, (1981), special issue on "Kenya: the Agrarian Question". See also C. Leo, Land and Class in Kenya (Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press, 1984); M.P. Cowen, "Commodity Production in Kenya's Central Province", in J. Heyer et.al (ed.), Rural Development in Tropical Africa (London: Macmillan, 1981); J.W. Harbeson, Nation-Building in Kenya: The Role of Land Reform (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973); M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in Kikuyu Country (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968) and Origins of European Settlement in Kenya (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968).
10. Tom Boya, The Kenya Question: An African Answer with a forward by Dame Mergery Perham, Fabian Tract N°302, (London Fabian Colonial Bureau, 1956).
11. For details, see Kaggia, Roots of Freedom.
12. See, for example, Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism (London: Heinemann, 1975).
13. See Oginga Odinga, "Bombshell in Legco", in *Not Yet Uhuru*.
14. Kaggia, among others, have given personal witness to this.
15. Colin Leys lays undue emphasis on the ideological difference between KADU and KANU. He characterizes KANU as radical and KADU as conservative. It is much more likely that there were elements of radicalism and conservatism on both sides.
16. This view was strongly held by Masinde Muliro, one of the leading founders of KADU.
17. G. Lamb, Peasant Politics: Conflict and Development in Murang's (Sussex: Julian Friedman, 1974).
18. See Issa Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1976).
19. M. Mamdani, "forms of Labour and Accumulation of Capital: Analysis of a Village in Lango, Uganda", Mawazo, Vol. 5, N°4, (December 1984): 44-65.
20. M.P. Cowen and K. Kinyanjui, Some Problems of Capital and Class in Kenya, Discussion Paper, IDS, Nairobi (1977).
21. These views were expressed by Tom Mboya at a panel discussion at the University of Nairobi in July, 1968. The other members of the panel were Dr. J.J. Okumu, then Head of the Department of Government at the University, and Mr. Ciira Cerere, then an undergraduate student in political science. The topic was "African Socialism".
22. See, for example, John Nellis, "Is the Kenyan Bureaucracy Developmental?" IDS, University of Nairobi, 1971.
23. It is unfortunate that the only authoritative account of the history of the Trade Union Movement in Kenya ends in 1952. The late Makhan Singh's History of Kenya's Trade Union Movement to 1952 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969) needs to be complemented by a similar study of the period since then.
24. ILO, Employment, Income and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya (ILO, 1972).
25. This was demonstrated very vividly by Kenyatta during the Little General Elections campaign in 1966 when, in addressing a public rally in Kandara where the KPU's Vice

President, Bildad Kaggia, was defending his seat, Kenyatta accused him of having done "nothing for himself". This was unlike his other colleagues with whom he was detained like Kenyatta himself and Paul Ngei. They, unlike Kaggia, Kenyatta pointed out, now had property in land and other things. Kaggia, however, was waiting for "free things", to be handed to him, like manna, from heaven!

26. Figures here are quoted from Kaplinsky, "Repression and Development", Sussex, IDS, 1982.

27. Kenya Government, Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Public Service Structure and Remuneration Commission) - Known as "The Ndegwa Commission" - (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1971).

28. See, for example, Tom Mboya, "The Role of the Civil Service in Developing Countries", in Challenge of Nationhood (London: Heinemann, 1969).

29. The "inner cabinet" of the courtiers comprised Mbiyu Koinange, Charles Njonjo and Njoroge Mungai. As court politics always go, even within the inner cabinet there were factions one - man factions: The drama of this factionalism was to unfold as the succession struggle became more intense in the seventies.

30. For an apt analysis of this phenomenon in Tanzania, see Issa Shivji, "The Re-Organization of the State in Tanzania", in P. Anyang' Nyong'o (ed.), Authority and Capacity to Rule: The State and Social Transformation in Africa - forthcoming - (Trenton: Africa World Press).

RESUME

Pourquoi faut-il que les dirigeants politiques jouent un rôle aussi prépondérant dans la vie politique en Afrique, au point que leur départ de la scène publique crée de sérieux problèmes sociaux? Est-ce à dire que des classes dirigeantes efficaces et hégémoniques, font défaut en Afrique ou que l'ensemble des contradictions sociales favorisent la domination des hommes forts?

Il faut, affirme l'auteur, chercher la réponse à ces questions dans la sociologie de la conduite des affaires politiques en Afrique, dans l'histoire de l'accession au pouvoir de ces individus et dans les intérêts des forces sociales qui cherchent à profiter du pouvoir, de l'intérieur comme de l'extérieur. Les qualités personnelles sont également un atout qui permet à un individu de jouer un rôle prépondérant une fois qu'il assume des fonctions présidentielles. En d'autres termes, des qualités personnelles telles que l'ambition et la compétence triomphent ou échouent, selon que les individus savent ou non reconnaître, utiliser, persuader ou même manipuler les forces sociales, et s'en servir comme tremplin pour assouvir leurs ambitions profondes. De même, les forces sociales en tant qu'acteurs historiques concrets, organisés ou non, cherchent également à ménager leurs intérêts en soutenant la carrière de ces individus. En dernière analyse, les revers de fortune de l'un ou

l'autre de ces dirigeants sont davantage le fait de changements intervenant dans l'équilibre des forces sociales.

Depuis l'époque coloniale, il y a eu deux transferts de pouvoir en Afrique: d'une part, des colons aux nationalistes et d'autre part des colons à des présidents autocrates et même dictatoriaux. L'autoritarisme présidentiel naît lorsque le pouvoir politique est tellement concentré entre les mains du président que des décisions administratives ne sont légitimées que si l'on peut se prévaloir de la bénédiction ou de l'aval du président. Il est vrai que l'article décrit l'évolution historique de l'autoritarisme présidentiel au Kenya, mais il faut espérer que ses conclusions permettront d'établir un parallèle avec des processus politiques d'autres pays africains.

Dans le cas du Kenya, l'autoritarisme présidentiel est né et s'est développé comme un appareil du pouvoir étatique et témoignait de l'évolution et de l'organisation sociale du pouvoir politique. Le Kenya est devenu indépendant non sous la houlette d'un parti dominant mais sous la direction d'une coalition d'organisations nationalistes. L'absence d'une organisation hégémonique de la bourgeoisie au pouvoir, susceptible de présider à la destinée du mouvement nationaliste donna lieu à des rivalités entre factions, chaque faction essayant d'user de son influence et de se servir des organisations pour dominer les autres. Il arriva donc que le pouvoir politique réel de la bourgeoisie fut directement associé aux sens propre et figuré à la présidence. Comme le président en fonction était obligé d'arbitrer quotidiennement les différends opposant des factions rivales de la bourgeoisie et de servir de médiateur entre elles et les masses la présidence acquit une autonomie chaque fois plus grande vis-à-vis de la majorité des factions bourgeoises et devint le dépositaire du véritable pouvoir politique.

L'Etat post-colonial participa activement au processus d'accumulation capitaliste. Par la mise en place de plusieurs organismes para-publics, l'Etat devint le plus gros employeur, facilitant l'accès des classes moyennes à la propriété par l'octroi de crédits et grâce à des facilités de crédits. Dans ce contexte, une bourgeoisie bureaucratique vit le jour; cette nouvelle classe composée de grands commis de l'Etat, et utilisant leur pouvoir politique pour accumuler le capital à des fins personnelles, refusait de se compromettre.

L'esprit de discorde qui régnait et l'autoritarisme présidentiel émergent exacerbèrent les cōteries, le tribalisme et le népotisme. Les emplois de la fonction publique et en particulier les postes de

responsabilité étaient attribués sur une base ethnique, et cette situation s'aggrava du point que la bourgeoisie bureaucratique faisait directement acte d'allégeance au président. Autrement dit, une communauté d'intérêts organisée au niveau national faisait défaut à cette bourgeoisie, car, leur loyauté se fondait sur des liens primitifs plutôt que sur des principes démocratiques, l'affiliation à un parti politique et la justice sociale.

Tout au long des années 1960, le Kenya connut une certaine expansion économique, bien que ce fût "une croissance réelle sans redistribution", qui contribua à asseoir la légitimité du régime de Kenyatta, fondée, sur l'idéologie du laissez-faire d'Harambee. L'on exhorta les masses à s'unir dans le cadre de l'effort d'édification nationale, en dépit de leurs différences sociales. C'est également au cours de cette période de croissance qu'eut lieu la démobilisation du mouvement syndical, l'assassinat ou la détention de chefs de l'opposition et l'instauration d'un système à parti unique qui engendra une crise de légitimité exacerbée par la crise économique mondiale des années 1970.

La crise économique fit ressortir les inégalités sociales croissantes ainsi que les injustices du régime politique. Faute d'un parti politique hégémonique, l'Etat était la seule force sociale organisée que la bourgeoisie pouvait utiliser en cas de crise. A mesure que le cabinet présidentiel centralisait la plupart des pouvoirs, un système présidentiel autoritaire et rigide se renforçait face à la crise.

THE CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN AN INTEGRATING WEST AFRICA: A Case Study of Nigeria and Ghana

Yaa Frempomaa Yeboah*

1. Introduction

In November 1969 an estimated three hundred thousand immigrants were given fourteen days by the newly elected government of Dr. Busia within which to regularize their residence in Ghana or leave the country. The large majority were Voltaics (now Burkinabe), Nigerians, Togolese and Liberians. Many were long-term immigrants, among them the farm labourers who had helped create the cocoa boom of the 1950s, and other labourers and petty-traders who had been attracted to Ghana by that boom. Others had responded to the promise and romance of Ghana's independence in 1957, and to the hand of friendship extended by the Nkrumah government to Africans everywhere. The wretched drama of the trekking thousands during the weeks that followed may also have been a signal of the severe crisis already beginning to develop in Ghana's economy and its post-colonial state.

In January 1983 the world's media made spectacle out of a human tragedy, as an estimated two million West Africans hurried to beat a two-week deadline given to illegal immigrants to leave Nigeria. Drawn to Nigeria by a demand for their labour during the oil boom of the mid-1970s, they were expelled amidst accusations of being criminals, prostitutes and unemployed vagrants. While philanthropic Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) rushed to their rescue with emergency aid and agencies of the United Nations debated which of them had mandated responsibility of alleviating the suffering of this human tide, the secretariat of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) looked on helplessly. The Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Dr. Aboubakar Diaby-Ouattara declared that

the expulsion order was not a violation of the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Free Movement of Persons. President Mathieu Kerekou of Benin, in his capacity as chairman of the Economic Community, made a visit to Lagos to discuss the disquietude of his colleagues with the Nigerian government, at the end of which, however, a joint statement was issued by Presidents Kerekou and Shagari to assure West Africans that the expulsions would have no adverse effect on the development of ECOWAS. Apart from strong condemnation by the governments whose nationals were most affected, most notably the Ghanaian, Togolese and Liberian governments, the reaction of most other West African governments, though disapproving, was muted.

The unanimity with which the popular press in Nigeria supported the Shagari government's expulsion order and attacked hostile foreign press coverage of the exodus seemed complete. Yet within Nigeria itself there were significant dissident voices. Notable among these were Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, both old-time politicians and leaders of the major opposition parties, the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), who warned of the damage it would do to Nigeria's continental image and role. And throughout this period and especially more recently during April 1985 when the military government of General Buhari again expelled an estimated 700,000 illegal immigrants, a steady but little publicised minority body of opinion which recognises the futility and crudeness of these sudden mass expulsions has emerged, particularly among the intelligentsia. Often citing the Ghanaian example, this body of opinion has emphasized the total failure of mass expulsions to achieve any of the objectives for which they are intended. (2)

The above were only the more spectacular of the episodes of mass expulsions of immigrants within the subregion. My concern in this paper is not confined to them. I will consider the context within which they have taken place, including some of the long term causes, and the systematic nature of the migrations which preceded them; the ways in which these have been handled by the states concerned; and their implications for the rights and status of migrants as a particular form of exploited labour within the development process in the subregion. Although occasional references will be made to other situations. Ghanaian migration to Nigeria will provide the main source of empirical data for the paper. It is often pointed out in studies of contemporary African migrations that they have historical antecedents which go far back into pre-colonial times. Yet although a historical perspective is necessary, the implicit suggestion that modern migrations are simply more of the same must be guarded against. For

contemporary cross-border migrations in West Africa are distinct in origin and character from traditional migration. They have been rooted in the integration of the region into the global economy and in the policies of economic expansion of the colonial era; and continue to be propelled by the structural imbalances created by these policies which are still maintained by independent governments. They are, more often than not migrations of seekers of jobs rather than the traditional migrations of whole communities known to the pre-colonial period. As Zachariah and Condé (1981) have shown, a substantial floating population of job-seekers has existed in West Africa since the early part of this century. In 1975, 2.5 million West Africans lived in eight countries not their own (excluding Nigeria).

Of these, 1.3 million were workers. These figures would have been significantly larger if Nigeria had been taken into account Nor are they refugees in the classic African sense, in flight from famine, political strife and war, as have become endemic in other regions of the continent, particularly the Horn and Southern Africa. Twenty five per cent of the world's refugees are estimated to live in Africa. In numbers this ran into some six millions, even before the current Ethiopian famine broke in 1984. Surprisingly few of these live in West Africa. According to the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) in Lagos, Nigeria, by far the largest and strongest economy, with close proximity to some of the subregion's trouble spots, in May 1985 was offering asylum to only 5,000 registered refugees, mostly fugitives from the drought in Niger; and there had been no group determinations of asylum since the major Chad flare-up of 1979-80.

Labour migration then, is a longstanding feature of contemporary economic life in West Africa. Yet it is clear that there has been a quantitative and qualitative change in the momentum and consequences of this migration over the past decade; a change which is symptomatic of the crisis in development brought about by global economic recession, shifts in the international division of labour and the distortions which have emerged within the post-colonial state and its economic policies.

Over the past three decades a substantial body of literature on labour migration in West Africa has been accumulated. Much of this research has come from demographers, anthropologists, sociologists and geographers, and to a lesser extent, from economists. Most of these studies have been on internal migration and thus jurisdictional questions and questions of protection, or of inter-state-relations have

not been at issue; they have tended to be discipline bound; and many of them have been descriptive accounts, and therefore static in nature. Thus, their findings have become rapidly overtaken by events in a constantly changing socio-economic environment. Zachariah and Condé's above mentioned and otherwise excellent demographic study of internal and international migration in West Africa, suffers from false predictions regarding the future of migration partly due to these reasons. Writing about Ghana the authors state that until the 1960s Ghana was the principal recipient of immigrants in West Africa, with 12.5 % of her population in 1960 made up of immigrants. They further state:

In 1970, 1% of Ghanaians were living outside their own country... The Ghanaians were, and still are, non-migratory; very few have migrated to other countries in the region for economic reasons, though some live in neighbouring countries for family reasons, such as marriage to a foreign national (3)... A cursory comparison of its economic situation with those of her neighbours (however) makes it unreasonable to assume that many immigrants will select Ghana as their destination. Nor is there much evidence that Ghanaians will emigrate to other countries in the region in large numbers. A constant number of just enough immigrants to replace returning emigrants is perhaps the best guess than can be made for Ghana in the 1980s (4).

Amin (1974) was one of the first to draw attention to the need to move beyond conventional economic explanations in the analysis of the migration phenomenon in Africa. Amin takes issue with the functional individualist approach which ascribes particular centrality to the individual migrant's rational calculations of his likely economic gains in the place of destination. While Amin does not dispute the assertion of the economic rationality of the individual migrant, he calls for more structuralist analyses which recognize that individual motivations and the rational assessment by migrants of their objective material circumstances are merely an intervening variable which must not be allowed to mask the real determinants of modern migrations in Africa - the overall strategy of development, the failure of which the migrants' so-called choice to migrate is merely a manifestation.

In particular Amin questions attempts by some economists (eg. Berg, 1965) to support the contention that migration is in the interest both of the region of emigration and that of immigration by adopting a cost-benefit analysis that tries to quantify the value of remittances and emphasize the relief of pressure on national resources by departing emigrants. The causes of large-scale migration cannot be separated from

their consequences, in Amin's view, for:

migration is not just the consequence of unequal development due to the natural potentialities of differing regions. Migration is also an element in unequal development, reproducing the same conditions and contributing in this manner to their aggravation. Hence, evaluation of the effect of migration in terms of 'cost- benefit' analysis is equally deceptive (5).

The structuralist or neo-marxist framework of analysis suggested by Amin has been taken up more recently by a number of researchers. Oberai and Bilsbarrow (1984) have called for an integrated theory of the determinants of migration which places the "partial theory" of the migration decisions of individuals within the framework of the underlying structural-historical forces which create those conditions. Standing and Peek (1982) have also emphasized the continuing shifts in the social relations of production which generate migration in a study of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Such an analysis would call for a detailed study both of specific migration situations and of the economic policies of West African governments, including the historical antecedents to those policies. In the following section I briefly describe the major economic dislocations in both Ghana and Nigeria which brought about large-scale population movements and at the same time impelled the respective governments of the two countries to suddenly expel large numbers of migrant workers. However, it would be beyond the scope of this paper to provide the detailed analysis of the political economy of these countries which a full explanation of these dislocations would require.

Among the factors which such an analysis would have to consider are the integration of the economies of the regions into the international economy and the effects upon them of the global recession. It is within this context that we can consider attempts made by West African governments to collectively regulate migration through the process of regional economic integration initiated by ECOWAS. The ECOWAS model of regional economic integration is a market based model which assumes that the region's economy can be developed most effectively by dismantling all barriers to the free mobility of the factors of production, including labour. A parallel exists between this model and the functionalist approach to the determinants of labour migration in that both assume that economic efficiency will be maximized by leaving individuals free to make their

own rational economic choices. Such market-based models, however, do not take sufficient account of the fact of the unevenness of development within the subregion and the frequent shifts in the poles of economic prosperity which have made large scale labour migration endemic to the contemporary situation.

These shifts cannot be examined in isolation from the role of the state in the development process and in creating and maintaining the framework within which immigrant labour is employed. Behind the state are shifting amalgams of social classes and political interests. The accumulation strategies pursued by the state, and the social groups which control it, shape its need for foreign capital and immigrant labour. A market based policy of economic integration, (unlike the project based cooperation of the Southern African Development Cooperation Conference (SADCC) for example), is likely to reinforce existing imbalances, as Nigeria's immigration crisis has already shown.

2. Large Scale Population Movements and the Crisis in Development

The external orientation of the economies of the West African subregion has made them more vulnerable and sharpened their sensitivity to the current recession in the global economy. This has resulted in a generalised crisis in the labour market, with massive increases in the region's reserve army of unemployed and the underemployed. I shall maintain that large scale migration out of Ghana over the past decade epitomises this situation. However I shall also argue that the mass expulsions from Nigeria have also to be seen in the context of a crisis in Nigeria's development of which the "problem" of immigrant labour is only a symptom. This crisis in turn arose from longer term structural patterns in her economy which were coming to a head with the collapse of the oil boom at the beginning of the 1980s.

The main feature of the Ghanaian economy since the 1960s has been the persistent downward spiral in which it has been caught for more than two decades. The beginning of the decline can be traced back to the Nkrumah period. Nkrumah's development strategy was based on large scale, largely foreign funded, public investment in industrialization and mechanised agriculture. It failed on the one hand because of difficulties endemic in the policy itself, and on the other hand because of a number of international factors, including a drastic fall in cocoa revenues in the mid 1960s. Nkrumah's overthrow occurred in that context.

The subsequent attempts to restructure the economy on orthodox free market lines by the first military government of the National Liberation Council and by the civilian Busia government which succeeded it, were associated politically with a resurgence of the Ghanaian petty bourgeoisie. The leading demand of this sector was an active policy of promoting indigenous business and the elimination of its foreign competitors which in this context was not foreign capital, but mainly middle level Lebanese and Yoruba traders. This occurred in a context in which economic decline had led to a reduction in the need for labour, and soon degenerated into a much broader demand which found "illegal" immigrants to be its easiest target. This was the background of the Aliens Compliance Order of 1969 under which, as we have seen, an estimated 300,000 West African immigrants were expelled from Ghana (6).

The liberalisation of the economy, the promotion of Ghanaian business and the expulsion of illegal immigrants ultimately did not yield the expected results and, in the long run the decline of the economy continued and generated the conditions under which Ghana became a labour exporter. During the 1970s and early 1980s Ghana's economic performance compared unfavourably with that of virtually every other economy in low-income sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1970 and 1982, while the rest of sub-Saharan Africa recorded a positive if low average GDP growth rate Ghana's economy experienced negative growth, an average decline of 0.5 per cent per annum (at constant prices). The decline in per capita food production and per capita income for a population that continued to grow at a rate of 2.6 per annum was even more severe. The reduction in Ghana's gross domestic investment which had been taking place steadily since the 1960s, accelerated in the 1970s, causing investment as a proportion of GDP to fall from 24 per cent in 1960 to a minimal 1.0 per cent in 1982. Government revenues declined from 15 per cent of GNP in 1972 to 4 per cent in 1981, a sharper fall than in all other low income countries. Inflation averaged 40 per cent between 1970 and 1982 (in 1983 it was 123 per cent) as against an average of 10-11 per cent for other African countries; and Ghana's terms of trade declined by 39 per cent between 1980 and 1982, as against 13 per cent for all low income countries.

The need to support what continued to be (in spite of a fall in revenue) a large public sector created large budgetary deficits. At the same time, a prolonged decline in the real purchasing power of cocoa farmers and other export producers reduced incentives and brought about a decline in exports and a further erosion of the base of

government revenue. A fixed nominal exchange rate became grossly over-valued, while the demand for foreign exchange grew. The result was a flourishing parallel market in foreign exchange and the smuggling of both cocoa and other local produce, and of price-controlled imports to neighbouring countries. The shortage of goods and rampant inflation led to a situation in which the major focus of government economic policy became, in effect, distribution. Extensive price controls and state-supervised distributive outlets were erected, placing further stress on the public sector and creating bureaucratic avenues for corruption and tax evasion. And the decline in public expenditure meant that there was less to spend on sharply deteriorating economic and social infrastructure.

For Ghanaians at all levels, this meant reduced economic opportunities and an erosion of real wages which made life, even for the middle classes, a perpetual act of juggling. Many left, from all sectors of the economy, in search of better opportunities abroad, a never ending stream of professionals, the intelligentsia, skilled and unskilled workers, thus draining Ghana of badly needed manpower. The great majority went to Nigeria, where the petroleum boom coincided with the decline in Ghana.

It is the impact of this economic deterioration which is reflected in the responses of a sample of 136 immigrants, mostly Ghanaians, who were interviewed in Lagos in 1984 (8). Relatively few of them stated their main motivation for migrating to be a desire to maximise their individual economic advantage at the margin, in response to the market. Rather they perceived themselves as being driven by the collapse of Ghana's economy and labour market. A few had become unemployed, but the majority had left Ghana because it had become literally impossible to feed themselves and their families, i.e. reproduce the cost of their own labour, with meagre salaries and wages.

Asked the open-ended question "why did you come to Nigeria?", 60 per cent of the respondents said that they had been driven out of Ghana (and in a few cases Togo) by harsh economic conditions. Comments such as "it was no longer possible to make ends meet in Ghana", "the economic situation in Ghana was unbearable", "basic needs were unobtainable in Ghana on one's salary", "things were hard at home" or "the construction industry was crumbling in Togo" were not untypical (less specific responses that could have meant the same thing, such as "for better conditions" are not included in the above figure). To be sure, a minority among the sample (14 per cent) gave replies suggesting a straightforward response to economic incentives, such as

"for money", "in search of greener pastures", "attracted by the oil boom"; but often their responses to other parts of the questionnaire made it clear that economic conditions in Ghana were also major influence on their behaviour. A few other respondents (7 per cent), most of whom were professionals, said they went to Nigeria for adventure, for a change of environment or "cultural interest in Nigeria"; no doubt some of these did not, for reasons of personal self esteem, wish to admit to economic motives.

Reliable estimates of the numbers involved in this exodus are hard to come by, although it is talked about in terms of millions. Current controversy over Ghana's 1984 census figures may, however, be an indication. A population of 14 million Ghanaians in 1984 had been projected on the basis of previous census and population growth figures. The resulting headcount of 12 million therefore took the government by surprise. Accusations of inefficiency were levelled against the census department. Yet the discrepancy between projections and actual results of the census is virtually the only indication to date of the possible size of the Ghanaian population now living abroad.

The Nigerian figures are equally imprecise. In January 1981 a press release from the immigration department put the number of "aliens" registered with them at 44,733. These, according to the release, included a mere 8,000 ECOWAS nationals. At about the same time the Ghana High Commission in Lagos was reporting 133,000 Ghanaians alone on its register (9a). Nigerian official labour statistics do not itemise immigrant workers, and labour department statisticians say they have no future plans to compile them, claiming that it is within the area of responsibility of the immigration department. In an interview with a spokesman for the department in 1984 he estimated an illegal immigrant population of between 3 and 4 million at the time of the mass expulsion in 1983. The Nigerian Labour Congress estimate for the same period was "more than 2 million"(9). Were one to accept the probably inflated estimate of 3 - 4 million illegal immigrants, that would make the total number of recorded and unrecorded immigrants at the time of the expulsion, at the very maximum, between 3,5 and 4 million, although the likelihood is that they were less.

Although these numbers seem large, they must be evaluated relative to Nigeria's own population, much the largest in the continent. Against an official guesstimate of 88.75 million, immigrants were at most 5 per cent of the total and probably less if we accept the more realistic estimate by the Nigerian Labour Congress. Although such a proportion was reaching what Nigerians regarded as a critical level, it

was nevertheless far less than the estimate of close to 35 per cent for the Ivory Coast by den Tuinder (1978) (10).

Any attempt to estimate the number of immigrants, the bulk of whom are unrecorded, as they are in West Africa, is at best a difficult task anywhere. In Nigeria it is daunting and not purely for technical reasons. The lack of reliable immigrant statistics must be seen in the context of the general absence of any reliable national population figures. This is primarily due to the fact that since independence questions of political power and the allocation of national resources have been closely linked with the size of regional populations, thus giving the question of population a peculiarly political character. Any statistics which might upset the precarious regional and ethnic balance that exists could, it is generally believed, throw Nigeria into another severe internal conflict.

The economic environment in Nigeria which attracted the substantial part of the drift from Ghana is well known. The transformation of Nigeria's economy from its essentially peasant agricultural base to a capital intensive petroleum economy in the 1970s was spectacular. The exporting of oil which had been disrupted by the civil war in the 1960s was showing dramatic effects by the end of the decade. Between 1969 and 1974 oil production quadrupled to a level of 2.5 million barrels a day and the price of crude oil tripled to \$11,7 between 1973 and 1974. By 1975, petroleum's share of Federal government revenue had risen to 86 per cent from 17 per cent in 1971. The Federal government which, prior to the civil war, had been relatively weak, acquired a new self-assurance, bolstered by periodic increases in the price of crude oil which reached \$40 per barrel in 1980. Revenue from petroleum rose correspondingly from its already high 1975 level of 4.733 billion naira to 9.825 billion naira in 1980. The result was a phenomenal state-funded expansion. The Second National Development Plan (NDP) of 1970-74 had been estimated at 3 billion naira. The Third NDP was costed at 30 billion naira and the Fourth, for 1981-85, was estimated at a massive 82 billion naira (11).

Thus from the early seventies until the turn of the eighties there was a monumental infusion of capital into the Nigerian economy by both federal state (now numbering 19) governments, and an impressive number of infrastructural projects were undertaken. The construction industry was a major beneficiary of this expansion, with investments in this sector spanning communication networks, transport, housing, water supply and other public utilities and the construction of a new

federal capital at Abuja. Petroleum mining inspired other heavy industries such as oil refining, vehicle assembly, manufacture of petro-chemicals, liquified natural gas, cement and steel. The production and importation of consumer goods were expanded and there were significant increases in private consumption and spending, accompanied by a high level of ostentation and corruption. The expansion was not limited to commerce and industry. The federal government bureaucracy swelled and the creation of new states also meant the multiplication of state bureaucracies and their paraphernalia, including a rapid inflation in the number of educational institutions.

This surge in the Nigerian economy was to create a massive demand for labour in all sectors and there seemed no limit to the size of skilled manpower which could be absorbed by the formal sector and the informal sector provided a broad range of openings for unskilled workers.

As we have seen, it was precisely during this period of buoyancy in Nigeria's economy that many of her neighbours, particularly Ghana, but also Burkina Faso (Upper Volta), Togo, Benin and Niger suffered their worst setbacks. Large numbers of workers from these countries, especially Ghana, flocked to Nigeria in search of jobs and a better standard of living. There were professionals such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, architects, university lecturers, teachers and nurses; there were middle level skilled workers especially technicians and artisans for the building industry; and there were thousands of unskilled labourers to fill the gaps shunned by Nigerians, such as domestic servants, construction labourers, conservancy workers, casual dockworkers and hawkers for the food and beverage industry. Many of these were in an irregular immigration situation.

With the oil glut of the early 1980s, however, came a drastic reduction in the volume of oil production - from 2.054 million barrels per day in 1980 to 1.294 million barrels per day in 1982. Government revenue dropped correspondingly from 9.825 billion naira in 1979 to 5.161 billion naira in 1982. The weaknesses of the petroleum economy and the inequalities within Nigerian society with which it was identified suddenly became clearer. The fact that the agricultural sector had been allowed to stagnate because of the lack of producer incentives became more glaring - export production had dwindled and Nigeria had become dependent on imports for her staples. The illusion of an autonomous Nigerian state able to accumulate and allocate limitless oil surpluses was debunked.

Government expenditure necessarily had to be reduced, and other official policies adopted to manage the crisis. These included some fairly orthodox monetarist measures, including a wage freeze and a general reduction in the money supply. The Economic Stabilization Act of 1982 was promulgated; and this introduced a combination of import controls and fiscal policies. For example, all unused import licenses were recalled for review, capital projects not yet started were deferred and the issue of licenses for the importation of vehicles was suspended. Government-decreed interest rates were increased by 2 per cent and restrictions were placed on external borrowing of state governments. A programme of massive retrenchments in most sections of the public sector was begun and a temporary embargo was placed on hiring by government institutions. Negotiations begun with the IMF for a standby credit, but apprehensions concerning the possible outcome of these negotiations was among the stated reasons for which the military overthrew the Shagari government (12).

The enormous debts incurred by the Shagari administration at a time when the world recession had already reduced Nigeria's earnings from oil necessitated further drastic measures by the military governments of General Buhari and Babaguinda. These in many ways coincided with elements of an IMF package even though the government, for political reasons, balked at reaching an agreement with the IMF itself. A substantial reduction of liquidity in the economy was achieved through a currency change in May 1984. Almost 50 per cent of Nigeria's foreign earnings in 1985 was spent on debt servicing (13); other monetarist measures have been stepped up, including further retrenchments in the public sector, some of which have been specifically aimed at immigrant workers; and there has been protracted government-sanctioned public debate on the question of devaluation.

There are no reliable figures of the numbers laid off in the public and private sectors since the Economic Stabilization Act of 1982, although a figure of 30 per cent for the private sector has been attributed to the National Manpower Board. Trade Union sources have placed the numbers purged as a result of government ordered retrenchments during the twelve months ending January 1985 at 266,000, although a spokesman for the National Manpower Board who was interviewed in May 1985 said that this could not be verified from government sources, as the figures are jealously guarded by a government which refuses to admit formally that workers are being laid off.

In these circumstances it is not difficult to understand the complex of factors that came into play to cause the mass expulsion of illegal immigrants in January 1983; including the growing insecurity of the federal government and the NPN party, with the national elections imminent; widespread resentment of people and workers against aliens who were perceived to be part of the cause of Nigeria's economic predicament; and the enduring ethnic plurality of Nigerian society with its resultant parochialism. Nor was the rapid return to Nigeria of previously expelled illegal immigrants, particularly Ghanaians, which "necessitated" General Buhari's government's expulsion order of April 1985 unexpected.

Yet somewhat paradoxically, while all these shifts and dislocations in the economies and labour market of the region were taking place, the process of regional economic integration was apparently proceeding smoothly. Nigeria had emerged from the civil war with a new dynamism, to pursue an active foreign policy which saw Africa as its centerpiece. One of the earliest manifestation of that policy was her revival, jointly with Togo, of negotiations for the establishment of an Economic Community in West African States (ECOWAS) which had been initiated in 1964 by Liberia, but had previously foundered. The period up till the signature of the ECOWAS Treaty in May 1975 was a period of relative prosperity for the subregion as a whole, and for Nigeria in particular. Since then economic disequilibria have become heightened. Yet the process of ECOWAS institution building and further formal acts of liberalisation have continued to be negotiated between governments with apparently little disruption. The Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment was signed in May 1975 and became operative a year later (14). In November 1984 the community's summit rejected a proposal by its secretariat that consideration of the transition to the second stage of free mobility - that of residence - due to take place in May 1985 be postponed for two years. Yet in April 1985 the Nigerian government ordered a second mass expulsion of illegal immigrants, with little obvious effect on the community. Indeed it may perhaps be precisely because of the lack of relationship between the community's processes and actual internal government policies and socio-economic realities inside member states, that the structure of the community has remained intact through such a turbulent period.

3. Nationalism and Class as a Factor

One salient feature of large-scale cross-border migration is its singular tendency to evoke strong outpourings of nationalism, in positive sense of the affirmation of national identity, but also in the

negative sense of targeting alien groups, so clearly reflected in the popular use of abusive language in Ghana and in Nigeria during the critical periods of immigration in these countries. "God is not a Lagosian", denoting popular sentiments about the scruples of Yoruba traders in Ghana, has become a standard idiom (15). The use of "Zamrama" (the Zarma are a Burkina group) as a term of abuse is not uncommon in Ghana and "Omu Ghana" is shouted out with contempt in the shanties of Lagos. The word "alien" itself has assumed derogatory connotations in popular usage particularly in contemporary Nigeria and is often to be distinguished from "expatriate". The launching of the "War Against Indiscipline" (WAI) by the military successors to the Shagari administration in 1984, although not directly inspired by illegal immigration, provides one of the most superb examples of the jingoistic fervour which has characterized the campaign against illegal immigrants. A WAI poster issued by the Customs and Excise and Immigration Staff Union in 1984 read:

"Support War Against Indiscipline: Be Firm and Courteous. Smugglers Must Be Arrested, Illegal Aliens Must Be Deported. Make Nigeria Proud".

Much of contemporary debate about international migration in West Africa has focused on the critical floating mass of illegal immigrants who have been the butt of repeated mass expulsion orders. The predominant point of view is couched in terms of the artificiality of colonial boundaries. The argument is that national boundaries drawn by European powers at the Berlin conference in 1885 paid little regard to socio-cultural realities of the African continent, with the result that many traditional nations were bisected by international boundaries. Ethnic groups living on either side of international boundaries, as in the cases of the Brong of Ivory Coast and Ghana, the Yoruba of Benin and Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulani of Nigeria and Niger and the Ewe of Ghana and Togo, tend to regard movement within their cultural orbit as part of the routine of their lives and are not hindered by the lack of travel documents or any other restrictions. The implication is that a significant proportion of the so-called illegal immigration within the sub-region is the result of this state of affairs.

This argument represents a theme which was recently celebrated throughout Africa and in the liberal West, to commemorate the centenary of the Berlin Conference. Asiwaju (1984) rightly points out that "the fact of artificial boundaries is one shared by nation-states all over the world" and is not peculiarly African. Nevertheless, it is

unquestionable that important difficulties do arise from this lack of fit between the nation-state framework and pre-colonial social formations; although perhaps not from the lack of fit per se, but from the century of alien domination that has reinforced it.

This lack of fit may have exacerbated the universal problem of the frontier communities in West Africa's particular situation. But it is insufficient as a major explanation of the high level of illegal immigration that takes place in West Africa today. First of all, to take the Nigerian example, much of the illegal immigration is longer-range and not from adjacent countries. As we have seen, the highest concentration of immigrants in Nigeria during the critical period have come from Ghana, a country which shares neither a border nor same nationality with Nigeria. Moreover the "artificial borders" argument does not help to explain the way in which powerful national sentiments have developed around the existing so-called artificial West African state framework. The popular conception of the definition of an "alien" in Nigeria, as elsewhere, is the fact that he is non-Nigerian, a significant fact.

Indeed it appears as if population movements within national boundaries and restrictions on population movement across national boundaries have become crucial factors in the construction of national consciousness. Anderson (1983) argues convincingly in his appropriately entitled book Imagined Communities that modern nationalism is learned and socially constructed, and not intrinsic; that it first emerged as a modern phenomenon not in Western Europe, but in Latin America and in the American colonies in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, in reaction to economic restrictions and to the barriers of social and career mobility exerted by the metropolis. This reaction was quickly transmitted because of the emergence of print capitalism. Further dimensions were added in the nineteenth century on the one hand by the construction of vernacular nationalisms in Europe around linguistic and cultural groupings challenging the existing state framework; on the other hand by the mobilisation of national sentiments to secure popular support for European imperialism. Anderson also suggests that restrictions on the mobility of indigenous elites were crucial in the emergence of nationalist independence movements in the Third World.

However, in West Africa - as elsewhere in the Third World - the social construction of a sense of nation has been modified by three particular factors. First was the fact that nationalism was anti-colonial in its *raison d'être*, and only later become associated with the

boundaries of particular states. This means that the task of crystallising state nationalism has been largely left to the post-colonial state. The latter has used elite patronage to reinforce bureaucratic loyalties and to construct political coalitions between different "sub-national" groupings. At the same time it has also used restrictions on large-scale population movements across state boundaries to reinforce a state-centred model of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, in line with international legal orthodoxy. Such measures have included the frequent closures of borders, mass expulsions of non-nationals in the economy. These have been important not only as assertions of state sovereignty; but also because of the way these have been used to mobilise resentment against aliens and thus to sharpen a popular sense of belonging to one nation.

This janus-faced aspect of nationalism as a pan-African and anti-imperial movement which nevertheless led to the establishment of a series of fragmented nation-states is clearly demonstrated in relation to the Economic Community of West African States. On the one hand there is an agreed recognition by the member states of ECOWAS of the need for combination in handling common predicaments, both economic and political, in relation to the outside world. On the other hand attempts to achieve this objective are constantly being obstructed by the ECOWAS member states' own nationalistic intransigence.

A second source of contradiction is between state nationalism and sub-nationalisms, a factor which, as we have already seen, is complicated by the fact that artificial national boundaries cut across pre-colonial political communities. In many West African states and especially Nigeria, ethnicity, region and religion are important factors in the arena of political power brokerage, in which too often non-nationals have become pawns.

Thirdly, both nationalism and sub-nationalism are inseparable from the process of class formation. Firstly, because in the absence of well developed social classes the bureaucratic interests which crystallise around the nation-state have been crucial in the process of class formation; and secondly, and this is more crucial for the analysis at hand, because ruling classes have tended to manipulate both nationalism and sub-nationalism to conceal their own failure to organise the process of development.

A comparison between Ghana's Aliens Compliance Order of 1969 and Nigeria's expulsion of illegal immigrants in 1983 is useful here, because the two episodes illustrate in some respects similar, in others

different, relationships between nationalism and class formation. While the former was patently related to an attempt by the newly elected Busia government to satisfy the interests of a fraction of the emerging bourgeoisie, the latter can probably best be interpreted as a political tactic to conceal the Shagari governments' corruption and mismanagement of the economy.

Dr. Busia's inauguration as Prime Minister took place on the first of October 1969. Could it have been coincidental that the next days "Daily Graphic" which covered the inauguration also carried a report about the launching of a National Crusade for the Protection of Ghanaian Enterprises by a group of Ghanaian businessmen? The declared aims of the crusade were to promote the enforcement of the Ghanaian Business Promotion Decree of 1969, to educate Ghanaians on how to run their businesses, to advise the government on conducting periodic checks on residence permits and to ensure the regular payment of income tax by non-nationals. The Business Promotion Decree promulgated by Busia's predecessors, had so far existed only on paper (16). However there was a concurrence between the decree and the Busia government's commitment to private enterprise expressed in the Progress Party's election manifesto, which also declared a concern to "give Ghanaians" a greater stake in the economy of their own country" (17).

There was also the concern of the popularly elected government of Dr. Busia to reward an important constituency on which it depended for the orchestration of much of its popular support. This political pressure took the form of a clearly defined and articulate lobby of Ghanaian business interests which sought to eliminate foreign competition, personified by the efficient Lebanese business and the ubiquitous Yoruba trader. Their blueprint was the Business Promotion Decree, a statute which reserved the middle sectors of the economy for Ghanaians, without in any way challenging the dominance of foreign capital. Its target groups were middle level business entrepreneurs, petty traders, market women, itinerant traders. And the campaign found natural allies among the mass of Ghanaians who welcomed the possibilities it seemed to offer them to participate in the opening up of the Ghanaian economy and the temporary consumer boom it stimulated.

Within a few weeks of the announcement of the National Crusade for the Protection of Ghanaian Enterprises letters began to appear in daily newspapers complaining about the activities of alien traders and criminals. The Minister of Interior announced a reorganisation of the

Immigration Department in order to control the influx of foreign nationals into Ghana and to revoke the permits of those whose activities were inimical to national security. A Daily Graphic editorial commended the Ghanaian business crusaders for their vigilance and exhorted Ghanaians to inform the police about the criminal activities of aliens in order to help curb the crime wave (18). Soon the substantial West African immigrant population in Ghana was being linked with unemployment and crime within the country and parliamentary debate on the question of the influx of aliens was being planned.

When suddenly on November 19 the expulsion order was published giving all foreigners without the requisite residence permit two weeks within which to regularise their stay or to leave the country, the government defended it both in legalistic terms and on the basis of social and public order. In a briefing statement to the press, the Minister of Interior said the government's action was "a matter of national policy vital to the success of the government's programme for national reconstruction" (19). But perhaps it was Dr. Busia himself who most clearly articulated his government's broader perspective on the aliens issue:

Let me briefly give you the background: as you know, we inherited a debt - one billion dollars. Our gross national product has been increasing by only 0.8 per cent over the past four years, while our population has been growing at the rate of 2.6 - that creates problems.

Added to this, of course, is the fact that of the people who are registered for work, one in every four is unemployed; rising prices and pressures: what were we to do?

Then as you know our estimated population is 8 million. The aliens number 1,5 million. We know that many of them are inside the country without residence permits because of the policies of the Nkrumah regime which liked to invite anybody at all who liked to come and stay in Ghana. Some of them were even being kept here, housed and fed by the government, to further his imperialist policies. There is one other thing too that I must add - our prison records show that 90% of those on the books for the last year for which we have complete statistics (1968) - 90% of those in prison, especially for criminal things like robbery with violence and so on were aliens (20).

Thus a gesture which started as a particular attempt to rid commerce in Ghana of middle-level foreign domination seemed to

assume the character of a broader campaign to rid Ghanaian society of all "problematic" foreign elements.

Similarly, the background to Nigeria's expulsion of illegal immigrants in 1983 was multifaceted. The aliens issue in Nigeria has not been dealt with purely on its own merits but has been manipulated to manage political dissent, popular unrest and emerging labour conflict in the Nigerian labour force itself, especially as the unemployment situation has worsened. It was already becoming apparent well before January 1983 that immigration had become a major political issue, linked to the crises in the economy described above, and expressed among other things, in criticism of the structure of ECOWAS which was popularly blamed for the large numbers of alien workers who were illegally in Nigeria.

Two events in 1980 were to bring the aliens issue to the fore. The first was the Black Maria episode in which fifty suspects in a Nigerian Police Force vehicle were suffocated to death while being conveyed from a Lagos magistrate court to Ikoyi prison, after having been charged with being "suspected persons and reputed thieves unable to give proper account of themselves". Thirty two among the dead were Niger nationals, six were Ghanaians and twelve were Nigerians. The aliens were found to have had no residence permits. The other, and perhaps more important in this context, was the Maitatsine riots which shook Kano in December causing hundreds of deaths, and re-erupted in Borno, Bauchi, Sokoto and Kaduna states over the next two years. Muhammed Marwe, alias Maitatsine, an illegal immigrant from Cameroon, led a fanatical Islamic movement whose doctrine was founded on the belief that Maitatsine was the true prophet of Allah and committed them to the elimination of those who believed in the Prophet Mohammed. The conflict with civil and religious authority which ensued took the military to crush and the hundreds who died included some 60 policemen. The Aniagolu inquiry into the unrest found that 6,000 Nigerian followers of Maitatsine had been joined by 185 illegal immigrants made up of 162 from Niger, 16 from Chad, 4 from Cameroon, 2 from Mali and 1 from Burkina Faso (21). It was the 185 aliens however who captures popular imagination and this episode was later to be used by the Nigerian government as a major justification for the expulsion of January 1983.

The aliens question was one of the most vexed public political media issue in 1981. Letters from readers, articles and editorials frequently appeared in all of the daily newspapers, particularly the Daily Times and the Nigerian Tribune (22). The general drift of these

was that most of the immigrants from ECOWAS countries, particularly the Ghanaians among them were a social and economic menace Nigeria could do without. Some even suggested that Nigeria withdraw from ECOWAS if all it could do was to turn Nigeria into a no-man's land. The pressure of public opinion was to continue mounting throughout the months that followed. Within the National Assembly the debate cut across party lines. Remarkably, the ruling NPN maintained a public aloofness from the debate, on occasion taking a firm public stand in support of the ECOWAS treaty and its implications.

In December 1982 the Internal Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives presented its report on the influx of aliens into Nigeria. Among its recommendations which were accepted were some tough measures, for example, the training of immigration officers to use firearms and the creation of special immigration tribunals to try immigration offences (23). Although the report did not recommend mass expulsion, by this time frequent calls in the press were being made on the government to deport illegal immigrants. It had become clear that the immigration issue was going to be a crucial one in the election campaign which was already under way.

Among the official reasons given for the expulsion order, the involvement of aliens in crime was very prominent. The Police Force swiftly emerged with a myriad of statistical variables intended to establish the fact that foreigners were responsible for the alarmingly high level of crimes in Nigeria. Alhaji Ali Baba announced in a press statement that between January 1980 and January 1983 courts in Lagos convicted 163 Ghanaians, 51 Niger nationals, 30 Beninoise, 30 Chadians, 29 Togolese, 16 Indians and 9 Malians for criminal offences, adding that the total figures were even more alarming (24). To represent a total figure of 328 criminal convictions of foreigners over a period of 3 years as the substantial majority in a major city such as Lagos with an estimated population of between 4 and 6 million and a notorious reputation for crime and violence seemed laughable! President Shagari himself had earlier assured leading states-men attending the conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in New Delhi that most of the expelled aliens were criminals and unemployed (25).

Nevertheless there were also more substantial complaints against illegal immigrant workers from the labour unions. Nigerian workers saw their status being eroded by immigrant workers who because they were in an irregular situation, did not join the unions and could be used by employers to undermine them. A variant of this argument

formed the basis of a statement issued by the executive of the Dockworkers Union of Nigeria in 1982 in which they warned two stevedoring companies against the continued violation of a collective agreement which stipulated that immigrant labour would be employed for mid-stream operations only in the absence of Nigerian labour, and required the companies to replace all aliens within their establishments with some of the many unemployed Nigerian dockworkers (26a). Trade union officials who were interviewed spoke of bitter experiences with illegal immigrant workers and of mounting threat of massive labour unrest towards the end of 1982, which may have been averted by the expulsion.

Thus real grievances were also at stake. But in the event it was the immigrant who were to bear the brunt; rather than those who employed them or public officials who colluded in many cases to make their entry into and continued stay in Nigeria possible.

Rumours were also rife, linked with the campaign for the 1983 general elections. Ghanaian teachers in the Yoruba states were alleged to have been placed on the electoral register by agents of the opposition Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), in order to boost their votes (26b). And interviews with some Ghanaian teachers in Lagos suggest that in the very least, attempts were made by some Lagos landlords to persuade Ghanaians through threats of eviction, to register as voters. Yet if the purpose of the UPN government was to prevent its opponents from reaping the benefits of their alleged fraud, then the exemption granted all employees of both Federal and State governments from expulsion would seem to have defeated that purpose. There were also reports of an audacious armed robbery at the residence of Dr. Alex Ekueme, Nigeria's Vice - President, on January 3, 1983. The apprehended robbers, as alleged, included Ghanaians, conveniently carrying their national identity cards.

But perhaps the more persuasive explanation would be that the Shagari government's expulsion order was a move to pre-empt opposition parties turning the immigration "crisis" into a major campaign issue, the government's disadvantage. In the light of the foregoing, the situation which arose in January 1983, or some variant of it, ought to have been foreseen. Immigrant communities as well as their embassies were aware of the rising public tension surrounding the large immigrant presence in Nigeria, and of the increasing isolated incidents of arrest and prosecution of their nationals for immigration offences. Without doubt, the immigration department itself foresaw that there would be a major political crisis over immigration as a

chorus of criticisms rose from several quarters, some attributing the problem of illegal immigration to the corruption and inefficiency of immigration officers. In 1982, the department reportedly presented the government with an integrated plan for the phased management of illegal immigration at an estimated cost of some 9 million naira. The plan was rejected by the government, apparently because of the high costs involved. Thus when Nigeria's immigration officials were overtaken by the radio announcement of the expulsion on the 17 January 1983 they may well have been as startled and as unprepared as the rest of the region. And while Nigeria's image as the protector of African interests and leading protagonist of the ECOWAS venture crumbled, the Shagari government could at least count on the total support of the Nigerian press (27).

4. The State and Legal Regulation of Immigration.

I now turn to an analysis of how Nigeria has attempted to regulate the flow of labour into its territory, setting it in the context of debates about the role of the state and its effectiveness in organizing the development process. In the Nigerian context Ohiorhenuan argues, as does Beckman (1981), against the simplistic neo-colonial model that has characterized much radical analysis of the Nigerian state. They advocate a reconsideration in the light of the broader debate on the nature of the post-colonial state which has emerged in the writings of theorists like Alavi (1972) and Saul (1979) and has been widely debated in the East African context. This emphasizes two central features which arise from the historical specificity of the post-colonial state, and distinguish it from the classical theories of the state: its "overdeveloped" nature and its relative autonomy. The notion of an overdeveloped state inherited from colonialism has been severely criticised by Leys (1976) among others. What in Leys's view is peculiar about the state in Africa is not that it is quantitatively too large in its scale and share of the national product, so much as its tendency to be pervasive in all aspects of the development process and its striking ineffectiveness in that role.

The concept of the "relative autonomy" of the state is more useful but only if one can move beyond generalized controversies over the nature of the state to more specific analysis of the conditions which increase its room for manoeuvre in particular historical circumstances. Ohiorhenuan points out the importance of windfall rents from oil in giving Nigeria's military governments a more autonomous role than they might have had if they had depended solely on foreign capital to initiate the process of accumulation. Transient oil wealth also

permitted the granting of wage rises to the industrial labour force, and the maintenance of a reasonable level of employment, including the importation of immigrant labour to perform the functions Nigerians either found unattractive or for which local manpower was unavailable.

Since the turn of the 1980s, however, the conditions of accumulation have drastically changed because of the recession. The room for manoeuvre of the state in Nigeria has been much narrowed by the disappearance of oil surpluses. It is consequently much more exposed to direct pressure from foreign capital and the major international financial institutions. At the same time it is having to face a sharpening of internal social conflict arising from the fact that real wages are declining, employment is falling, and the government is being forced to implement redundancies on a large scale. One of the ways in which it has handled this is to put part of the burden of readjustment on immigrant workers.

Such an analysis can be directly linked to the role of the state in regulating population movements across its borders. As argued earlier, oil surpluses were crucial in the inflow of foreign labour which occurred during the oil boom without restraint on the part of government or its agencies. Yet subsequently immigrant workers were used by those who control the state as a convenient scapegoat, in choosing to enforce laws which they had previously found convenient to ignore. As we have already seen, this scapegoating was also related to the way in which the government manipulated nationalistic feelings, in order to divert attention from the real problems facing the Nigerian economy, portraying the economic crisis as a nationalist rather than a class issue.

Conversely, large-scale emigration of labour from Ghana illustrates some of the limitations of relative autonomy - exposing the potential consequences of failure to manage the economy for the state and for those who control it. When during the latter part of the 1970s and early 1980s thousands of Ghanaians opted out of the framework of their own state by migrating elsewhere, those left behind aptly characterized the exodus by saying "they have voted with their feet" - referring to the demonstrated inability of successive governments to provide the barest of material needs for their people.

A second set of issues which has emerged in debates concerning the state relates to the efficiency of state regulation, particularly of the economy. This has emerged both in recent radical literature and in the new development orthodoxy emerging in current debate within the

policy circles of international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank and informed by neo-classical economic theory. The Berg report on Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 1981) and the Bank's 1983 World Development Report maintain that the state apparatus tends to be both too large and inefficient; and suggest that economic efficiency can be increased by making more use of the mechanisms of the market. There is some resemblance here to the radicals' concept of the overdeveloped nature of the state already discussed, although the Bank's position is arrived at from different premises. Questions of efficiency are addressed more explicitly by Marxists influenced by Warren (1973) who believe capitalist development possible in Africa, for example Smith and Sender (1984), who reject many of the standard left-wing criticisms of the Berg report.

In reality what is at stake is not the efficiency of the state per se, but its effectiveness in organizing particular patterns of accumulation. As White (1984) suggests:

In a capitalist context, the state may strive to establish (28) a social structure of accumulation by nurturing the emergence of financial and industrial bourgeoisie and collaborating with capital in establishing the subordination of labour so crucial for sustained capitalist accumulation.

Collusion to subordinate is no where more clearly demonstrated than in the situation of immigrant labour and particularly in that of the illegal among them. The way they were exploited, then discarded in Nigeria is a manifestation of the fact that in the predatory arena of labour exploitation, their place is at the very bottom of the pecking order.

In talking about the organization of accumulation by the state, one is also talking about particular modes of state intervention and the legal forms they take. As the Bolshevik jurist Eugeny Pashukanis (1924, trans. 1978) argued, legal forms have their own specificity; but yet are at the same time a manifestation of the fundamental relations of production, particularly within capitalist societies. Some attention therefore needs to be paid to the different forms of state intervention. White, for instance, draws a distinction between "parametric" and "pervasive" intervention. The former include measures limited to providing a framework of institutions and resources conducive to development, while leaving considerable amount of autonomy to economic actors and processes. The latter involves direct

managerial and legal controls of investment, production and exchange (White deals primarily with socialist systems; in non-socialist systems, "pervasive" is hardly appropriate terminology and "regulatory" intervention seems a more apt term to use).

A further issue is the fact that states operate in a context of international as well as national regulation. In particular recent attempts by the Nigerian government to manage the flow of immigrants into its territory have taken place in the context of regional economic integration. A parametric framework for labour mobility is outlined in the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment. As argued below this framework has thus far had very little to do with the way the Nigerian or any other ECOWAS government actually regulate the flow of immigrants. The latter still takes place within the framework of statutory regulatory controls, involving in theory direct restrictions on the flow of immigrants by administrative means, rather than by manipulating incentives.

The juridical basis for immigration administration within all sovereign states is the doctrine of territorial sovereignty, a fundamental principle of customary international law which recognises and asserts the rights of states to exercise control over their own particular tracts of the earth's surface. This right is conventionally expressed through statutory laws which prescribe the conditions and procedures under which non-nationals will be admitted into territorial domain. Nigeria's primary statute for the regulation of immigration into its territory is the Immigration Act of 1963, supplemented by regulations, orders and immigration rules. This act proclaims the duty of all persons entering or leaving Nigeria to present themselves to an immigration officer for examination, and to furnish such information in their possession as that officer may reasonably require for the purposes of the act. In any case they must satisfy the immigration officer that they are in possession of a valid travel document. It also affirms the power of an immigration officer to refuse entry into Nigeria or to admit subject to conditions, while admitting the necessary exceptions in the case of those who satisfy the officer that they are citizens of Nigeria.

Section 8 of the act prohibits the employment of non-Nigerians without the written consent of the Chief Federal Immigration Officer; and requires non-Nigerians who wish to establish themselves in a profession or trade to obtain the written consent of the Minister of Internal Affairs. Entry into Nigeria for the purpose of residence shall

only be on the production of a residence permit or, in the case of Commonwealth citizens entering to take up government employment, on the production of any evidence which an immigration officer may reasonably require (section 9). In addition the act gives the Minister of Internal Affairs discretionary powers to abolish or extend visa and other entry conditions, to prohibit entry, to deport in certain broadly defined circumstances and to expand the established categories of "prohibited immigrants" outlined in section 17. Much of the foregoing encapsulation of the Nigerian Immigration Act portrays fairly standard international practice. At different times during the turbulent history of the Federal Republic the act has been enforced with varying degrees of rigour.

Nigeria's ratification of the ECOWAS treaty in 1975, along with fourteen other states including Ghana, had potentially profound implications for the immigration laws broadly outlined above. The ultimate objective of the community, as stated in the preamble to the treaty, is the creation of a homogeneous society in which all obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital and persons will be eliminated and a union of the countries achieved. This by definition implies a significant cession of sovereignty by member states of the community in the organisation of their economic affairs. The treaty has created a framework of community law in the sense not only of institutions which have a separate legal personality in international law, but also a system of law within which those institutions, the member states and their nationals will have rights and duties. Yet although the treaty and its legal regime in theory restricts the sovereignty of members states, the community cannot be regarded as a supra-national entity and its subsistence depends on the continued contractual will of member states.

Inter-regional institutions of this nature are now no longer a novelty in international law. Yet unresolved doctrinal and theoretical disputes still surround the nature of the relationship between national law and community law. The debate, commonly framed in terms of the supremacy of one system over the other, is identical in character with certain aspects of the question of the relationship between customary international law and national law. This dispute however, has little or no practical significance in the present context; for from the point of view of the Nigerian Constitution (1979 article 12, as well as constitutional practice since independence), and indeed the practice of most member states, the express incorporation of treaty provisions into municipal law is necessary if they are to affect private rights. In other words, treaties are not self-executing in Nigerian law; and the

question of the extent to which Nigeria must give effect to community law is simply a question of her treaty obligation. Thus although Nigeria assumed a major international obligation when it ratifies the community's treaty in 1975, the provisions of the treaty became applicable within Nigeria only after it was statutorily so declared. Subsequent ECOWAS protocols and supplementary regulations, as is the practice, have been given effect through publication in the official gazette.

The principle of free mobility of persons was institutionalized by the Residence and Establishment in 1979. The only one of the community's protocols to have been unanimously ratified by all member States, Nigeria's ratification and official publication took place in 1980.

Briefly, article 27 of the treaty creates the concept of community citizen and requires member states, progressively and through agreements with each other, to exempt community citizens from holding visitors's visa and residence permits and to allow them to work and undertake commercial and industrial activities within their territories (29).

The main feature of this Protocol is the provision of a timetable for the implementation of this principle of free movement. Free mobility is to be achieved over a minimum transitional period of fifteen years and in three stages, each lasting five years (30). During the first phase, community citizens have a right of entry into the territory of member states provided their stay does not exceed a maximum period of ninety days, and visa requirements hitherto applicable to them are abolished. During the second quinquennium, residence permit requirements are to be abolished in respect of community citizens and during the final phase they will have the right to freely establish themselves in professions and businesses within the region without restriction.

For present purposes attention will be limited to phase one of the transition. During this period which was to turn tentatively from May 1980 to 1985, the right of entry which is conferred on community citizens would seem, *prima facie*, to make profound inroads into the pre-existing immigration law. A closer examination of the modifications introduced by the Protocol at the present stage of implementation would however suggest a much greater scope, for the Nigerian immigration administration to curtail the so-called right to little money and no more than hazy ideas of where to find relatives

and friends.

Secondly, the notion of entry for a limited stay of ninety days contains an implicit circumscription of the right entry. Total liberty of movement entails an inviolable right to enter, for the exercise of which the simple presentation of a valid travel document should suffice (32). The right should be available to all nationals of all member states without discrimination on the basis of purpose for entry, professional qualifications, employment status or on any other grounds. But a requirement that the right to enter should be limited by a maximum stay of ninety days creates a need to establish that the entrant in fact does not intend to stay for a longer period (without seeking the necessary extensions as provided by law). This of course raises formidable administrative problems for immigration officials in member states, particularly in view of the limitations of resources and bureaucracy of countries in the community.

Thus the right to enter is far from being an absolute right and while it is limited by the concept of the inadmissible alien and by restrictions on the duration of stay, there is yet a third limitation, which though not implicit in the concept, is endemic in the conditions of poverty and illiteracy under which the mass of the inhabitants of the community live. This is the documentary pre-requisite of the right of entry specified by the protocol and which seems to make free movement the privilege of the middle classes (33). Article 3 of the Protocol provides that a community citizen seeking entry into the territory of another must possess a valid travel document. He or she must also be in possession of a health certificate. Yet for the vast majority of West Africans, obtaining these documents is virtually impossible, at least at the present time in the region. Nor is the law relevant to those whose entry and continued illegal stay in Nigeria is made possible only through the systematic way in which immigration and other law enforcement officers bend the rules, demanding bribes from immigrants, in some cases with hardly any distinction between those who fulfill the immigration requirements and those who do not (34).

Data from interviews with the Lagos sample of 136 immigrant workers, already described showed that 77, slightly more than 50 per cent did not possess residence permits as required by law. Several among these volunteered the information that they had no travel documents whatever, and this only a few months after memories of the 1983 mass expulsion had been revived with a briskly carried out swoop on and deportation of some 5,000 illegal immigrants in April

1984. The default rate among dockworkers, domestic servants and self-employed petty-traders was, as could be expected, 100 per cent: for by Nigerian immigration rules the possession of skills is a prerequisite for residence permits. Among construction workers (including electricians, carpenters, bricklayers, tractor drivers and manual labourers), the rate of default was 95 per cent. Out of 55 teachers interviewed, 10 did not have residence permits, while some of those who did, had obtained them after the January 1983 expulsion.

Excluding teachers, 30 per cent of the remainder of the sample (25) had been affected by that expulsion, but had soon returned, in some cases at the invitation of their former employers. Many had negotiated their entry at officially guarded border posts at fees ranging between 2 and 20 naira, although others had travelled by "cassava airways", as unguarded bush paths are now popularly known in Ghana. It is almost impossible to determine how far these figures are representative of the general situation. However they tend to lend some credence to the claims by The Nigerian authorities that the majority of immigrants in Nigeria were there illegally, an assertion which may be formally correct but has little practical meaning.

The reason for the ineffectiveness of immigration controls are systemic in a way that extends beyond the failure to enforce regulations. Indeed it should not be assumed that governments always wish to enforce their own rules, as Power (1979) and others suggest with regard to illegal immigration into Europe and the United States. Such ambiguity has also characterized the approach of the Nigerian authorities to the immigration question. The initial announcement of the expulsion order in January 1983 caused as much panic among government institutions as it did in the private sector. The Lagos state government alone employed some 2,600 illegal immigrant teachers in its schools, a situation not uncommon in other Yoruba states where the institution of free universal primary education had dramatically raised the demand for teachers (35). In the Northern states, Ghanaian teachers were often preferred to southern Nigerians as a result of ethnic politics. Thus schools, hospitals and vital government industrial projects joined the chorus of protests which resulted in the amendment of the order to permit professional and skilled workers to regularise their status (36). And when the Nigerian press decided to police Alhaji Ali Baba's exhortation to the whole nation to help "crackdown" on illegal immigrants, they knowingly chose to investigate the "one thousand and four" flats, the plush complex on Victoria Island which housed Nigeria's legislators. There they found "about 200" illegal immigrants blithely going about their chores as domestic servants

(37a).

This failure of government and its agencies to implement its own laws should be seen not only in the context of the corruption and ineptitude among customs and immigration agencies at Nigeria's borders and at the borders of other countries in the sub-region, but also within the context of economic decline, in which unofficial sources of rent have become an indispensable supplement to official salaries. There are also other contributory factors. There is, for example, the lack of social acceptance of modern state boundaries already referred to. I have argued that the latter is a marginal problem as far as the volume of illegal immigration into Nigeria is concerned. Nevertheless the wider social issue it raises is important and must be seen as linked with the broader dilemmas presented by the structure of the post-colonial state.

5. Toward a Framework for the Protection of Migrant Workers.

The critical issue of international migration in West Africa, however, is not the efficiency with which immigration laws and structures are erected and maintained. Rather, it is the realism with which migration policies are formulated and administered. The nature of the regional market for labour within the framework of differing relative national patterns of development as they relate to the global economy, has set in motion powerful currents of migration which no amount of regimentation will stem. In this sense the adoption of a sub-regional policy which aims at liberalising migration may be viewed as an attempt to formalize a longstanding *de facto* situation. The circumstances of the two mass expulsions by Nigeria, both occurring since the erection of the ECOWAS structures, have reinforced the fact that the mechanisms for coping with the crises which will continue to arise from these large-scale migrations of labour within the community still function very imperfectly. In neither of the two episodes, for example, did Nigeria forewarn her neighbours about the momentous measures it was about to introduce.

The problems of protecting the rights of migrant workers in routine situations are difficult enough even without crises of the kind which prompted these expulsions. Any framework for the protection of migrant workers which does not take account of the socio-economic realities of the region is bound to fail. Such factors, as already discussed, include the dynamics of the economy, the force of nationalism, the state and the interest which develop around it and the intrinsic logic of regional economic integration.

These socio-economic forces do not necessarily mean that migrant workers cannot be given more effective protection. From the purely economic point of view, commerce and industry require a relatively free access to a wider labour market during periods of economic buoyancy. Over the longer run some way should be found of ensuring that these sectors also absorb the costs when the economy is in recession; or in the very least, that the migrant labour force is protected from the kind of cavalier treatment which finds justification in the fact of their so-called clandestine presence.

All migrant workers, the legal as well as the illegal, deserve more recognition and protection than has been hitherto provided by governments. Political rights are linked exclusively to citizenship or nationality; and political pressure is often crucial in the struggle for greater equality. Yet immigrant workers are often completely disenfranchised. Because they lack the political rights enjoyed by citizens and are unable to organise politically and bring pressure to bear on government, they are the most down-trodden group in society and work under terms unacceptable to nationals. Nearly 90 per cent of the Lagos sample recognized this with a fatalistic resignation. Asked whether they thought being ECOWAS nationals made any difference to their position as foreigners in Nigeria, they said it did not, and many added that they felt maltreated and discriminated against in their work places because they are non-Nigerian.

Proposals to protect migrant workers in the maze that exists in West Africa, must secure two objectives. First, they must aim to clarify rights which already exist. Second, they can attempt to establish new rights. An appropriate starting point might be the United Nations Draft Convention for the Protection of All Migrant Workers and their Families which was completed in 1984. This recognises three main principles from which the rights of migrants workers can be derived. These are: fundamental human rights, labour rights and the obligation of governments to give special protection to those who are in a defenseless position. Of these three sources of rights, the area of fundamental human rights is the most highly developed in international law.

Founded on the Universal declaration of Human rights (1948), which proclaims such basic rights as the right to be free from torture, the right to equal treatment by the courts, the right to security of the person and to human dignity, the fundamental human rights of individuals have been incorporated into a host of international

instruments and made applicable to all without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, birth of other status, national or social origin. Thus it is already well acknowledged in general international law that non-nationals, whatever their legal status, are entitled to the protection of their basic rights, by virtue of being individuals. Over the years more specific assertions of these rights for migrant workers have been scattered through international labour conventions, which have now been consolidated and expanded into a single Draft convention for the Protection of All Migrant Workers.

In the regional context in Africa, the African Charter on Human and People's Rights was adopted by the heads of state of the Organization of African Unity in 1981. Though the charter has not yet received the number of ratifications required to make it operative, its importance in laying the foundation for a regional regime of human rights standards cannot be overrated. Article 2 of the charter contains a non-discrimination clause guaranteeing the rights it sets out for all without distinction on the basis of "national and social" origin etc. Article 5 provides:

Every individual shall have the right to respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man, particularly, slavery, slave trade torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment shall be prohibited.

In addition to international standards, it is now customary for national constitution to guarantee the basic rights of all persons within the territorial domain of the state. For example chapter 5 of the 1979 constitution of Nigeria guaranteed the fundamental human rights of "every individual" including the right of everyone to respect for the dignity of his person and protection from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. While acknowledging the exclusive prerogative in international law of all sovereign state to determine who to admit and who to exclude from their territory, and the difficulties which unregulated large-scale migration may pose for some governments within the region, the legitimacy of measures such as sudden mass expulsions may still be questioned.

Such measures may amount to an infringement of basic rights because they generate conditions which are inhuman, degrading and cruel. For example the forced exodus in 1983 of more than one million ECOWAS nationals from Nigeria over a period of no more

than four weeks was accompanied by appalling but predictable human sufferings (37b). These again recurred in May 1985 (38). And this was in spite of the fact that the question of basic rights in such situations had been taken up between the governments of Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria, being incorporated in the Agreement on Mutual Administrative Assistance on Matters relating to Customs, Trade and Immigration in December 1984. Article 14 of this Agreement provides, in substance, that when it becomes necessary for one of the signatories to expel nationals of another from their territory, whether such nationals are involved in illegal activities or not, necessary steps will be taken to guarantee the safety of the persons involved and to safeguard their property. Unfortunately, however, the provisions of this article may be construed as implicitly accepting the principle of mass expulsion; and they were indeed invoked by Ghana during the 1985 mass expulsions by Nigeria.

These developments suggest that the states of the region will be obliged to rethink the ECOWAS concept of freedom of movement of persons on a narrower basis - probably by means of detailed bilateral negotiations within a general ECOWAS framework. But even if the attainment of the ECOWAS goals renders the distinction between illegal and legal immigrants largely obsolete, the problem of the vulnerability of a large non-national labour force in a volatile economic environment will still remain.

Footnotes:

* Visiting Fellow Institute of development Studies, University of Sussex Brighton, England, October, 1985.

1. The order which was announced by Ali Baba, the Minister of Internal Affairs on 18 January, was modified on 25 January as follows:

(a) that all aliens who are unemployed, as well as those employed in unskilled labour, such as cooks and stewards (including those employed by hotels and catering establishments) drivers, watchmen (including those employed in security services firms), gardeners, nannies etc. must leave within the period of 14 days as allowed in my earlier announcement. Those who are self-employed in petty trading, tailoring, hair-dressing and similar traders, must also leave within the same period;

(b) that an extension of a period of four weeks to terminate on 20th February, 1983 is granted to all those employed in skilled work such as carpenters, masons, factory workers, fitters, blacksmiths, welders, typists, nurses etc. This extension of time will allow them a sufficient period within which to tidy up their personal affairs and leave in an orderly manner, as well as for their erstwhile employers to engage the services of Nigerians so as to continue with their respective business without due disruption;

(c) that those employed in the professional and technical grades will have their stay in Nigeria regularized provided their employers are able to make adequate representation for

expatriate quota slots to be granted for the positions they occupy; and

(d) that having regard to Nigeria's posture in African affairs and taking into account the spirit of the OAU and ECOWAS, the Federal Government has agreed that all citizens of ECOWAS member- states, as well as Cameroon and Chad, who have been living in the country prior to the coming into force of the 1963 Immigration Act may remain in Nigeria irrespective of what they do. It is the view of the Federal Government that such people have already settled down to some gainful employment, assimilated with the Nigerian population, intermarried, developed roots and generally lived amongst us in peace and harmony. People in this category can easily be identified by local Government Authorities, Village and Ward Heads, who are in a position to establish their antecedents. Ministry of Information, Lagos, January 25, 1983.

2. See for example, Aribisala, "The Aliens Expulsion Order Revisited - A Minority Viewpoint", Spectrum, Nov./Dec. 1983; "Aliens made scapegoat - Tai Solarin", Satellite, 11 February 1983; Opoola, "Thoughts on the Aliens Exodus", New Nigerian, 21 February 1983; interview with Professor Bolaji Akinoyemi, then Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Sunday Concord, 14 April, 1985.

3. Zachariah and Conde, p. 53.

4. *Ibid.*, p.53.

5. Amin, p. 93.

6. illick, 1978, on which this section draws, presents a detailed analysis of economic change in Ghana up to this point.

7. These figures are taken from World Bank Special Report on Ghana, 1984.

8. Van Hear, N., "Organised Labour and the Recession in Nigeria, 1979-1984", Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE) Conference paper, 1984.

9a. Business Times, 6 January and 13 January 1981.

9. Interview with NLC officials.

10. den Tuinder, p. 205.

11. From NNPC and F.G budget Estimates in National Economic Council Expert Committee Report on the State of the Nigerian Economy, (Lagos, 1985), as reproduced by Bangara, Y., "The Nigerian Economic Crisis", ROAPE, 1984.

12. For a more focused discussion of the situation of labour in Nigeria during this period, see Van Hear, *op. cit.*

13. Suzanne Cronje, New Statesman, 22 February 1985.

14. The provisions of the protocol, in particular its timetable for the graduated implementation of freedom of movement, is discussed in a later section of this paper.

15. Also referred to in Brydon, L., "The Long Frontier: Implications of Population Movement in West Africa", working paper of the University of Liverpool, 1984.

16. N.L.C.D. 328 constituted one of the economic measures adopted by the military government to stabilize the Ghanaian economy after the overthrow of Nkrumah. While aiming at more or less liberalising the economy, significant emphasis was placed on the role of private enterprise, particularly Ghanaian entrepreneurs; and measures were introduced to patronise Ghanaian businessmen and to wrest control of certain sectors of the

economy from foreign traders and entrepreneurs. Killick, on which much of this discussion is based, treats this in some detail.

17. Progress Party Manifesto, August 1969, page 5, as quoted in Killick T. Development Economics in Action, London. (1978).

18. 27 October 1969.

19. Kwaku Baak, 19 December 1969.

20. Interview published in Daily Graphic, 19 January 1970.

21. The Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry on the Kano Disturbances, (under the chairmanship of Justice ANTHONY N. Aniagolu), Lagos, 1981.

22. See for example ..."Menace of Aliens" Sunday Times, 12 September 1982; Check Alien Intruders", Nigerian Observer, 3 July 1982; "Aliens Worsen Robbery - Magistrate", Punch, 17 September, 1982; "Aliens Within Our Borders", Weekly Eagle, 24 October, 1982.

23. The report itself has not been available, but there is a short summary in the Federal Republic of Nigeria National Assembly Debates, Vol.1 N°. 28, Thursday 2 December.1982.

24. Daily Times, 15 February 1983.

25. New Nigerian, 31 January, 1983, p.3; also Daily Sketch, 16 February 1983, p. 16; New Nigerian, p.20; Daily Sketch, 12 February 1983, p.40

26a. New Nigerian, 29 October 1982, p. 2.

26b. This was also reported in Nigerian Newspapers, for example National Concord, 2 March 1983, p.2.

27. With the possible exception of the Guardian. See for example, National Concord, 14 February 1983, p.4; Daily Time, 5 February 1983 p.3 and 27 March 1983, p. 18; Punch, 17 February 1983, p. 5; Satellite, 22 January 1983, p.3.

28. White, G., The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 21 N°1 p. 100.

29. o be read in the context of article 2 (2) which provides that this will be done "progressively".

30. Progress from one stage to the next shall depend upon the determination of the authority of the heads of state that the previous stage has been successfully completed.

31. As one senior official of immigration department told me "The determination of admissibility into the country is in the long run, at the discretion of the immigration officer.... The rules are at this point in time the same for non-ECOWAS nationals. On the whole the immigration officer has a lot of discretion - and I believe this should be used to the advantage of the country".

32. Subject only to considerations of national security and public health.

33. Though it is not maintained that a similar and more responsive alternative is easily available, the point is an important one. Democratisation of access to freedom of mobility will require a massive and expensive operation by governments to make travel documents available to all, or a substantial relaxation of bureaucratic rigidities at frontiers.

34. This indictment against immigration officials in particular, has been well documented. The Aniagolu Tribunal of Inquiry into the Maitatsine riots accepted evidence from one of

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the followers from Niger that "if you had no card, you just paid... the equivalent of 20 Naira and was allowed in." The Tribunal also found that this state of affairs was applicable in all parts of the country". See Punch, 12 November 1981, p.2, and 25 November p.2; Nigerian tide, 20 February 1982 p.16.

35. New Nigerian, 25 January 1983, p.1.

36. See New Nigerian, 10 March for an example of the chaos which resulted: several nurses employed by Ahmadu Bello University's Institute of Health were apparently refused registration by the Immigration Department despite the modification of the expulsion order to make the regularisation of the status of professional and technical grades of workers possible.

37a. The National Concord, 6 May 1983, p.1; Daily Times, 29 January 1983, p. 1.

37b. The chaos and suffering, including some deaths from hunger and drowning, were widely reported in Nigeria, eg. "4 Ghanaians die of hunger", New Nigeria, 31 January p. 1.

38. Some of this was witnessed by the author at the Apapa wharf. The debacle at the Hajj Transit Camp - where tens of thousands of departing aliens were herded from the Seme and Idioroko border posts when Nigeria closes its borders on May 10, after opening them for only 7 days for the exit of the aliens, was reported by all Nigerian news papers and television. See for example, The Guardian, May 14 and 15; "The Aliens Bungle", National Concord, Nigerian Statesman, May 11 and Daily Sketch, May 13. And it should be added that Hajj Camp situation was deplored by many among the Nigerian public, some of who made individual humanitarian gestures in donating food, water and first aid.

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RESUME

L'étude met en lumière les causes structurelles et la nature systématique des migrations dans la sous-région d'Afrique de l'Ouest et indique les remèdes que les Etats concernés y ont apportés et leurs effets sur les droits et les statuts des migrants, considérés comme une classe

particulière de main- d'oeuvre exploitée dans le processus de développement de la sous- région. Les migrations de Ghanéens vers le Nigéria offrent de nombreux exemples concrets à cet égard.

Les migrations contemporaines de frontière à frontière ont une origine et un caractère distincts des courants précédents; déclenchées par l'expansion coloniale et les modèles ultérieurs d'intégration de la région au sein de l'économie mondiale, elles sont toujours favorisées par les déséquilibres structurels qui découlent de ces processus. La création d'un marché régional du travail qui a mis en branle d'importants courants migratoires en est un résultat patent. Ces migrants ne sont pas des réfugiés chassés par la famine, par des conflits politiques et/ou la guerre. Le thème examiné est celui d'"une population nombreuse et mobile de demandeurs d'emplois".

Les migrations de travailleurs, une réalité de notre siècle, ont néanmoins connu un changement quantitatif et qualitatif, en ce qui concerne leur rythme et leurs conséquences, au cours de la dernière décennie. Ce changement est une cristallisation de la crise de développement engendrée par la récession économique mondiale, par les modifications survenues dans la division internationale du travail et par les mutations intervenues dans l'Etat post-colonial et dans sa politique économique.

La récession que connaît actuellement l'économie mondiale a déclenché une crise générale du marché du travail qui a considérablement accru le nombre de chômeurs et de sous-employés de la région. Il convient de situer dans le contexte de cette crise les vagues de migrations en provenance du Ghana au cours de la dernière décennie et les expulsions massives des travailleurs immigrés du Nigéria. Face à la crise économique et au fléchissement consécutif de la demande en main-d'oeuvre, les immigrés clandestins, sont les premiers visés. Compte-tenu de la nature artificielle des frontières qui partagent des communautés politiques pré-coloniales en Afrique, l'éthnicité, la région et la religion sont des facteurs importants dans l'arène politique où les étrangers subissent trop souvent les conséquences de situations fâcheuses. Ils se heurtent à un appareil politico- juridique dans le cadre duquel les droits juridiques, politiques et civils leur sont niés. Les forts courants migratoires de frontière à frontière ont ceci de remarquable qu'ils tendent singulièrement à susciter de fortes effusions de nationalisme, encourageant l'affirmation de l'identité nationale, dans le meilleur des cas, mais désignant également les étrangers à la vindicte populaire lorsque la situation s'envenime comme il ressort clairement de

l'emploi de certaines insultes courantes. Le mot "étranger" lui-même acquiert une connotation péjorative dans le langage populaire et a des relents de chauvinisme en temps de crise. A cet égard, les mouvements de population à l'intérieur des frontières nationales et les limitations de l'émigration sont devenus des facteurs éminemment importants dans le cadre de l'édification d'une conscience nationale. Dans l'Afrique post-coloniale, des mesures telles la fermeture des frontières, les expulsions massives d'étrangers et la réglementation limitant la participation des étrangers à la vie économique du pays ont renforcé un modèle de souveraineté nationale et d'intégrité territoriale centré sur l'Etat. Ces mêmes mesures servent à mobiliser le ressentiment contre les étrangers et partant à développer le sentiment populaire d'appartenance à une nation. De même, faute de classes sociales bien structurées, les intérêts bureaucratiques qui se cristallisent autour de l'Etat-nation ont grandement contribué au processus de formation des classes. Ainsi les classes dirigeantes ont tendance à se servir du nationalisme et de l'ethnicité pour masquer la structure profonde des classes et leur incapacité à élaborer une stratégie de développement viable.

Après avoir analysé les tentatives faites par les gouvernements ouest-africains pour réglementer de concert les migrations, par le biais du processus d'intégration économique régionale mis en place par la CEDEAO, l'article établit un parallèle entre le modèle de la CEDEAO et l'école fonctionnaliste en ce qui concerne les facteurs déterminants des migrations de travailleurs. Tous les deux sont en effet des modèles axés sur le marché et ne tiennent pas compte du développement inégal de la sous-région ni des revirements fréquents de l'activité économique, qui ont fait des forts courants migratoires un mal endémique de l'ère contemporaine. Compte tenu de cette réalité, l'auteur souligne la nécessité d'une politique sous-régionale qui viserait à libéraliser les migrations et à protéger les travailleurs migrants.

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