AFRIQUE
et développement

AFRICA
development

Vol. X, No. 4, 1985

INDUSTRIALIZATION IN AFRICA

CODESRIA

ISSN 0850-3

Editorial Office – Bureau d'Edition
COUNCIL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH IN AFRICA

CONSEIL POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA RECHERCHE ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE EN AFRIQUE

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CODESRIA acknowledges the support of a number of African Governments, the Friedrich Ebert Stifung, SAREC, IDRC and Ford Foundation in the publication of this journal.

Le CODESRIA exprime sa gratitude aux Gouvernements Africains, à la Fondation Friedrich Ebert Stifung, à la SAREC, au CRDI et à la Fondation Ford pour leur contribution à la publication de ce journal.

AFRICA DEVELOPMENT

AFRIQUE ET DEVELOPPEMENT

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH IN AFRICA

REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DU CONSEIL POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA RECHERCHE ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE EN AFRIQUE

- Vol. X, No. 4, 1985

Oct. - Déc. 1985

Oct. - Dec. 1985

Edited by/Edité par

Abdalla S. BUJRA

C.O.D.E.S.R.I.A.

CONTENTS – SOMMAIRE

Economic cooperation among African countries remains one of the major items on the agenda for the development of Africa and the sovereignty of its people. Consequently, problems of regional cooperation and regional integration have always been one of the top areas of CODESRIA's research activities. This book, « *ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION IN AFRICA* », is a product of some of CODESRIA's activities in this field. It consists of papers presented at a conference convened by CODESRIA in Kinshasa, Zaire.

The book starts with a discussion of general problems of economic cooperation and integration. This is then followed by an examination by several contributors of the impact of external forces on regional economic integration. The third part takes up some concrete examples of attempts at regional economic cooperation. In the final section, the editor takes a critical look at the future of economic cooperation in Africa.

The editor, W. A. Ndongko, is Director of the Institute of Human Sciences, MESRES, Yaounde, Cameroon. He is also Professor of Economics at the University of Yaounde.

The Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA) is a non-governmental pan-African organisation based in Senegal. A creation of African social science research institutes, its main objective is the development and coordination of social science research in Africa in order to enable African social scientists to come up with theoretical contributions and research results relevant to Africa's development. CODESRIA has various publications, the major one being its bilingual quarterly journal, **Africa Development**.

Economic Cooperation and Integration in Africa

Edited by
Professor W.A. Ndongko

CODESRIA BOOK SERIES

ON INDUSTRIAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: A THEORETICAL CELEBRATION OF WALTER RODNEY

By

*Dr. Bright U. EKUERHARE**

Any intellectual celebration of Walter Rodney must recognise that he was a many-sided intellectual genius. In this respect, Dr. Swai's reasoned judgement is worth quoting: «For Rodney, it was not in his nature to separate theory from practice, scholarship from activism. For him the two kinds of activity were not dichotomous but dialectical. Theory for him, as for Cabral, informs practice, and out of practice theory emerges. Such are the qualities which made Rodney a revolutionary intellectual, and made him not only write history but also make it». (Swai, 1981, p. 35). It is, therefore, my considered view that Rodney's most enduring contribution towards social science scholarship and activism derives wholly from his thorough appreciation of the dialectical integration of the economic and political sciences. Throughout his scholarly and activistic existence, he demonstrated the truism that «hidden in every economist,... there is a politician struggling to be let out to remodel the world» (Hobsbawm, 1979, p. 305). Rodney's book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa,* which is now a world-famous treatise on development studies, testifies to this judgement: «just as given medical remedies are indicated or contra-indicated by a correct diagnosis of a patient's condition...» he writes in the preface to this book, «the facts and interpretation that follow will make a small contribution towards reinforcing the conclusion that African development is possible only on the basis of a radical break with the international capitalist system, which has been the principal agency of underdevelopment of Africa over the last five centuries»

We are therefore here to celebrate Walter Rodney's intellectual contribution within the framework of «classical political economy» towards the study and resolution of economic underdevelopment problems. For an exploration of some specific theoretical economic issues and their implications for political action, the celebration is focused on the processes which have been creating and strengthening the conditions of industrial underdevelopment in Nigeria. The theoretical exploration is underpinned by three interrelated propositions. First, the condition of industrial underdevelopment has not been the 'normal state' of the Nigerian economy. Second, the condition of industrial underdevelopment has not been a manifestation of a failure of the Nigerian economy to adopt and assimilate more advanced productive structures characteristic of the present-day more developed countries of the world. Third, industrial underdevelopment

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in Nigeria has largely been a product of the world capitalist expansion of «over the last five centuries» in general, and of the last century in particular. These propositions, taken together, imply that industrial underdevelopment in Nigeria has fundamentally been determined by the economic structures which have been created and strengthened by the dialectical interaction between world capitalist expansion and government actions and policies. This implies, in turn, that the economic structures, which were created by capitalist colonialism since the end of 19th century, and which were largely reinforced by the post-independence economic policies in the context of the dialectical interaction between domestic economic and political power structures and world capitalist expansion, have created and consolidated the conditions of industrial underdevelopment in Nigeria. It is against the appreciation of the emergence and persistence of these conditions that the search for the resolution of the industrial underdevelopment problem of the Nigerian economy must be conducted.

But, before we demonstrate these propositions and their implications for activism, we need to characterise the phenomenon of industrial underdevelopment in Nigeria. The phenomenon of industrial underdevelopment refers to the conditions of an economy which permit, given the productive capabilities of the economy, a wide gap to exist between the potential and the actual economic surplus. Thus, we may characterise industrial underdevelopment by analogy with its opposite – industrial development which refers to the conditions of the realization of the potential economic surplus in the economy. The realisation of the potential economic surplus together with its size, distribution and utilisation presupposes a drastic reorganisation of the production and distribution of the social product, and involves revolutionary changes in the socio-political class and power structures of a country.

In historical terms, industrial underdevelopment may be characterised by analogy with the experience of the present-day developed countries with «industrial revolutions». The industrial revolution is the historical manifestation of the realisation of the potential economic surplus in these countries. An «industrial revolution» engenders dramatic improvements in the material and welfare conditions of a country, and results in a country's acquisition and exercise of immense economic, technological, military and political power in world affairs. Indeed, the «poverty curtain» which divides the contemporary world into the developed countries and the underdeveloped countries has been engendered by the fact that the former have experienced «industrial revolutions», whilst the latter have not. An industrial revolution originates with and is maintained by the social, political and economic forces within the country experiencing it. It is characterised by the paramountcy of the basic needs of the majority of the country's population, by domestically owned, financed and managed industrial enterprises, and independent technological development which consists of the ability and opportunity to develop, adapt and copy, or at least to choose a technology reflecting the country's resource endowments and development objectives (Sutcliffe 1972). Thus, industrial underdevelopment in Nigeria implies conditions of poverty of the majority of the population, conditions of technological dependence and backwardness of the country, and conditions of the country's economic, technological, military and political insignificance in world affairs. Industrial underdevelopment also implies that foreign agencies and interests, through their control of capital, technology and markets, and through their interpenetration of the domestic class structure, dominate the industrial activities of the country. In short, industrial underdevelopment in Nigeria is a manifestation of the delay in the dawn of the epoch of industrial revolution in the country.

The delay in the dawn of the epoch of industrial revolution, and, therefore, the stubborn persistence of industrial underdevelopment in Nigeria derives largely from the world capitalist expansion «over the last five centuries», and, particularly from the capitalist colonialism forcibly instituted in the country during the last century. The conditions of industrial underdevelopment created by capitalist colonialism arise from the fact that the Nigerian economy was drastically reorganised and managed initially for the maximum economic advantages of foreign bourgeoisies. The colonially set objective for the economy was the achievement of maximum agricultural and mineral export production for – and maximum importation of manufactured consumer goods from – the metropolitan economy. The realisation of this objective induced a process of de-industrialisation of the economy. By de-industrialisation is meant a process of decline of the pre-colonial indigenous manufacturing industry without a replacement by modern manufacturing industry. The conditions of industrial underdevelopment, through the process of de-industrialisation, arose out of the realisation of the objective of maximum agricultural and mineral export production for the metropolitan economy. This is because the realisation of this objective implied that the production of export agricultural and mineral commodities was achieved by constraining the reallocation of resources from the primary producing sectors into the manufacturing sector. Similarly, the realisation of the objective of maximum importation of manufactures from the metropolitan economy meant that, in order to prevent competition with her own manufactured exports, the colonial power discouraged the development of manufacturing industries in Nigeria.

It is argued, in this context, that the de-industrialisation of the economy was largely engendered by unrestricted competition from the extremely cheap imported machine-made manufactures of the metropolitan countries. The imported machine-made manufactures were extremely cheap largely because they were being produced with advanced industrial factory system technologies. Consequently, «the cheap prices» of the imported manufactures became «the heavy artillery with which» the metropolitan bourgeoisie «battered down all... walls» (Marx and Engels, 1968, p. 39) of indigenous Nigerian manufacturing industry. But the indigenous manufacturing industry could be protected by the colonial state against the extremely cheap imported manufactures under the rubrics of infant-industry argument as other countries like Germany and United States of America did during the early stages of their industrial revolutions. This did not happen because, as argued above, the objective set for the Nigerian economy by the colonial state was different. The sole concern of the colonial state, which was the executive committee of the metropolitan bourgeoisie vertically integrated with the expatriate merchant firms operating in the colony, was the achievement of maximum extraction and repatriation of economic surplus from the colony through the monopolisation of merchandising activities. Thus, the oligopsonistic and oligopolistic behaviour of the expatriate merchant firms in the export and import merchandising activities contributed to the de-industrialisation of the economy. This is because the fact that the expatriate merchant firms were branches of parent manufacturing firms in the metropolitan countries rendered their engagement in manufacturing activities before the Second World War unprofitable and unfashionable (Ekuerhare, 1971, pp. 103–107).

The foregoing forms the essential part of the rationale for the de-industrialisation of the Nigerian economy under colonialism. What we need to demonstrate are the implications of the phenomenon of de-industrialisation for the industrial underdevelopment of the economy. The most obvious implication is that the establishment of modern manufacturing industries, and to this extent the dawn of the epoch of industrial revolution in the economy was delayed. It can be argued that the delay in the modern industrialisation of the economy has constituted a major set of forces engendering the conditions of industrial underdevelopment in Nigeria. Another associated implication was the destruction of the nascent indigenous industrial bourgeoisie and industrial skilled workers in the economy. A historical parallel may be in order to underscore the significance of this phenomenon for industrial underdevelopment. With the rise of the factory system at the early stages of industrial revolutions of the present-day developed countries, the industrial skilled workers were displaced from the existing domestic manufacturing sector and later re-absorbed into the modern factory industrial production system. Similarly, some elements of the nascent industrial bourgeoisie, incubated in the cottage production system, became the pioneering and mature industrial bourgeoisie in the era of the factory system, and other elements of the nascent industrial bourgeoisie of the cottage production system became captains of commerce and developers of infrastructural facilities of the industrial revolutions. But the modern industrial production system did not emerge in the Nigerian colonial economy before the second World War to warrant the re-integration of the displaced indigenous industrial skilled workers and the displaced nascent indigenous industrial bourgeoisie. At best, they were reallocated into the primary export producing and the commercial sectors of the economy. To this extent, such reallocation initiated not only the process of 'de-skilling' of the Nigerian labour force but also the process of 'disembourgeoisation' of the nascent Nigerian industrial bourgeoisie. As a consequence, the process of de-industrialisation foreclosed the possibility of autonomous industrialisation in Nigeria. This meant that the initiation and character of modern industrialisation had to depend on foreign industrial bourgeoisie and foreign industrial workers. The final noteworthy implication of the phenomenon of de-industrialisation is that it induced the process of truncation of the symmetrical relationship between the capital goods sector and the consumer goods sector which was developed during the precolonial period in the course of autonomous industrial expansion. This meant that the development of indigenous industrial technological capacity arising from this symmetrical relationship in the course of autonomous industrial production was arrested. This point shoud be appreciated against the historically validated proposition that the development of a capital goods sector forms an essential condition for independently generated technological development in an economy. Thus, it can be concluded that, as the process of de-industrialisation has given rise to the unimportance of a capital goods sector in the economy, not only linkage effects of industrial investment have been low in the economy but also the engines of technological development usually associated with industrialisation have been located outside the Nigerian economy.

The last decade and half of colonialism saw a change in the structure of the Nigerian economy in response to the changed requirements of the metropolitan capitalism as well as in response to the emergence of luxury consumption patterns associated with the colonially created new class structure in the economy. The initial objective of maximum agricultural and mineral export production and of maximum extraction and repatriation of economic surplus set for the economy, was to be supplemented by the objective of instituting a process of dependent capitalist industrialisation of the economy. This is because, unlike the historical experience of the developed countries, the agencies and mechanisms of modern industrialisation did not develop from the womb of indigenous Nigerian economy. Thus, industrial underdevelopment began to have new features in the economy. These features were associated with the emergence of transnational firms in the periphery of the capitalist world economy. The reorganisation of the capitalist world economy within transnational corporate structures provoked a profound change in the competitive relationships between the metropolitan bourgeoisie (the overseas manufacturing firms) and the expatriate merchant firms in the periphery. The heightened competition arising from such profoundly changing competitive relationships in the Nigerian import trade after 1945 induced, first, the expatriate merchant firms and, later, the overseas manufacturing firms to undertake import-substitutive manufacturing production activities in the economy to protect their real and imagined threatened Nigerian markets (Kilby, 1969, pp. 53–59).

It is worth stressing that the design and implementation by the colonial state of the programme of dependent capitalist industrialisation of the economy derived from two related sets of forces. First, as the United States of America assumed the leadership of the capitalist world economy after 1945, they began to pressurise Britain and France to open up their colonial economies for the penetration by their industrial capital and technology. It is not surprising, therefore, that the international Bank for Reconstruction and Development (a largely American institution) recommended an industrialisation programme for Nigeria to be sponsored by transnational firms in the 1950s. The second set of forces derives from the desire of the metropolitan country to create markets for her discarded old and second-hand industrial equipment in the Nigerian colonial economy as the metropolitan manufacturing industries began to be re-equiped with machinery of the latest technological vintage.

In the post-independence period, economic policies began to interact with the changing requirements of the capitalist world economy to accelerate the dependent capitalist industrialisation of Nigeria. To this extent, it can be argued that the post-independence period has been witnessing a consolidation of the conditions of industrial underdevelopment in the country. The first point to note here is that the economic forces driving the dependent capitalist industrialisation process arise from the triangular interactions among the changing investment strategies of transnational firms, the restrictive trade policies, and the dynamics and pattern of domestic demand determined by the dynamics and structure of national income. These economic forces derived from political forces which reflected the class character of the managers of the Nigerian economy and society. This is because «the economic motivations of the petty bourgeoisie and comprador bourgeoisie (the managers of the economy and society)... did not seek to make a break with the colonial production process. Members of these classes merely sought promotion within the hierarchical system of distributing the benefits of that process, particularly between them and the foreign bourgeoisie which controlled production. They had no objective interests in abandoning an economic system which guaranteed their economic privileges, social prestige, and political power» (Nnoli, 1981, p. 129). In general, the objective interests of the managers of the economy biased them against industrial investment and in favour of merchandising activities as a means of fostering their private accumulation. Nevertheless, they apparently encouraged industrialisation through the instrument of state capitalism. The state capitalism is fostered through the formation of state joint ventures with foreign bourgeoisie. It can be argued that whilst the instrument of state capitalism accelerates private accumulation for the dominant classes it reproduces the conditions of industrial underdevelopment in Nigeria.

The conclusion that can be drawn from the theoretical analysis in accordance with Walter Rodney's methodology, which consists of a combination of economic history and formal theorisation, is now obvious. The persistence of the conditions of industrial underdevelopment in Nigeria implies, dialectically, an acceleration of private accumulation and material prosperity for the dominant classes which constitute a tiny minority of the population, and a worsening of the material conditions for the dominated classes which form the majority of the population. The implication of this conclusion for activism is also obvious. The elimination of the conditions of industrial underdevelopment in Nigeria implies the elimination of the dominant classes by the dominated classes. An important ingredient of activism in Nigeria consists, therefore, in arousing the dominated classes to realise their revolutionary responsibility. Through his scholarship and activism Walter Rodney showed that he was a remarkable revolutionary intellectual. Let us celebrate him for the enduring revolutionary inspiration he has bestowed upon us.

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RESUME

Cet article se veut un hommage à Walter Rodney par suite de sa contribution décisive à l'analyse du problème du sous-développement économique et social de l'Afrique. L'essentiel de cette contribution peut se résumer par la thèse qu'il défend à savoir que les sciences économiques et politiques entretiennent un rapport dialectique entre elles ; ce qui fait qu'on ne peut pas séparer la théorie de la pratique, encore moins l'académique de l'activisme. C'est sous cet éclairage que l'auteur de cet article étudie le problème du sous-développement de l'industrie du Nigéria.

Il commence par faire remarquer que le phénomène du sous-développement de l'industrie du Nigéria n'est pas un phénomène naturel. Il n'est pas non plus dû à l'incapacité de l'économie du Nigéria à s'adapter et à assimiler les structures productives sophistiquées qui caractérisent l'économie des pays développés. Il est enfin le produit de l'expansion du capitalisme mondial. On admettra dès lors que l'état de sous-développement de cette industrie puisse impliquer une accélération de l'accumulation privée accompagnée d'une prospérité matérielle des classes dominantes (qui constituent une minorité) et d'une aggravation des conditions matérielles des classes dominées (qui constituent la grande majorité). A partir de ce moment, l'activisme, qui est inséparable de l'académique, rend obligatoire l'élimination de l'état de sous-développement de l'industrie au Nigéria par l'éliminatiion de la classe dominante. Cette élimination devra se faire par la mobilisation des classes dominées dans le cadre de la responsabilité qui est la leur dans la lutte révolutionnaire qu'elles doivent mener.

FIRMES TRANSNATIONALES, INSTITUTIONS FINANCIERES INTERNATIONALES ET LA CRISE ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE DE L'AFRIQUE

Par

*Abdoulaye DIAGNE**

Introduction

Il ne fait pas de doute que les sociétés et banques transnationales ainsi que les institutions financières internationales ont joué – et continuent de jouer – un rôle majeur dans la crise économique, sociale et politique que traverse l'Afrique depuis plus de deux décennies. La revendication par le continent africain de nouvelles règles devant régir les rapports économiques, commerciaux, monétaires et financiers internationaux – pour être pertinente, doit se fonder sur une identification des causes objectives de la crise qu'il traverse. C'est là un enjeu considérable du point de vue à la fois politique et de la réponse à la question «quelles nouvelles stratégies, globales et sectorielles, à mettre en œuvre pour renverser définitivement le cours des évènements». On veut accréditer l'idée qu'au plan politique la crise que connaît l'Afrique résulterait de ce que celle-ci serait devenue le terrain d'affrontements entre l'Est et l'Ouest ; et, au plan économique et social, qu'elle serait due à une ouverture insuffisante sur les marchés extérieurs, à une exploitation insuffisante des avantages comparatifs du continent sur le marché mondial *(1)*. On comprend dans ces conditions la nécessité d'insister sur le fait qu'incontestablement la crise économique, sociale et politique du continent est largement la conséquence de son mode d'insertion dans le système capitaliste mondial. Cette communication tentera donc de cerner la responsabilité particulière dans la crise actuelle des firmes transnationales (FTN) et des institutions financières internationales (IFI) qui ont toujours été les artisans de son extraversion économique.

Avant de présenter le plan d'attaque, quelques remarques sont nécessaires :

– On aurait une compréhension partielle de la crise économique sociale et politique en Afrique si l'on perd de vue la responsabilité spécifique de nombre d'Etats africains dans la situation qui prévaut chez eux. Car «exception faite des territoires où le mouvement nationaliste / ou révolutionnaire était trop fortement structuré pour se prêter aux visées de la métropole ou du colonat... on peut dire qu'en règle générale les Etats africains sont nés de la rencontre de deux choix : celui de la métropole fondé sur la recherche de partenaires «sûrs» partageant leurs options idéologiques et stratégiques, et celui des héritiers présomptifs, ces derniers ayant pour

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souci majeur de sceller et d'entretenir avec l'Etat métropolitain les alliances politiques, économiques et militaires destinées à affermir leur position par rapport à leurs rivaux» (René Lemarchand, 1983). Dans beaucoup de pays africains il n'a jamais existé de politiques nationales cherchant sérieusement à extraire de l'environnement le maximum de ressources financières, économiques et technologiques afin de développer les activités aptes à satisfaire les besoins les plus pressants de la grande masse. La crise qui sévit dans beaucoup de pays africains est en grande partie due au fait que les couches et classes sociales au pouvoir se font complices du pillage des richesses par les FTN et plus généralement, par le capital étranger. Cessant de «se présenter à visage découvert comme au temps du colonialisme cynique et conquérant, (le rapport des forces ne lui étant plus favorable), l'impérialisme n'exerce plus directement sa domination mais indirectement en utilisant dans les pays sur lesquels il veut maintenir ou étendre sa mainmise économique, des gouvernements, des polices et des armées autochtones qui, par corruption matérielle ou idéologique (ou les deux à la fois) acceptent de jouer le rôle que jouaient auparavant les gouverneurs, administrateurs et militaires venus des métropoles impérialistes» (Henri Claude, p. 127).

– La plupart des économies africaines demeurent des économies agricoles, avec un secteur capitaliste relativement faible. Mais dans ce secteur capitaliste comme dans le secteur non capitaliste les FTN comme les IFI ont un degré élevé de contrôle sur les décisions se rapportant à l'investissement, à la production, à la réalisation de la plus-value ou du surplus. Nonobstant la faiblesse de la part de l'Afrique (13%) dans l'ensemble des flux d'investissement des FTN en direction des pays sous-développés (PSD) et du nombre d'emplois que celles-ci ont directement créés dans le continent (0,5% du total de la force de travail) (CNTS-ICFTU, 1984, p. 55), les entreprises appartenant au capital étranger exercent une influence décisive sur le développement africain. Le poids des FTN et des IFI ne doit pas être apprécié à l'aide de ces seuls indicateurs.

– La détention à 100% du capital d'une filiale n'est plus la pratique dominante de la transnationale en Afrique. Beaucoup de FTN préfèrent prendre une participation minoritaire, opérer dans le cadre de joint-ventures ou sous des contrats de gestion et de cession de licence. Aussi le capital est-il fourni par d'autres sources de financement : le crédit international, les IFI et, de plus en plus, le système bancaire local. Tout en minimisant ses apports, donc ses risques, la transnationale, par le biais de ses équipes de gestion et d'assistance technique, réussit à conserver un haut degré de contrôle sur l'entreprise ou le projet d'investissement.

– Les rapports économiques tissés durant la période coloniale affectent encore fortement la stratégie des FTN en Afrique : ce sont les filiales des transnationales britanniques, françaises, belges qui possèdent respectivement 40,18 et 4% de toutes les entreprises étrangères en Afrique alors que les chiffres équivalents pour l'ensemble des PSD sont 25,5 et 1,5%.

Seulement 16% des entreprises étrangères en Afrique sont à base américaine, contre 31% pour tous les PSD, mais le rythme de leur implantation s'accélère chaque année (CNTS-ICFTU, 1984, p. 55). On peut donc dire que la continuité de la situation de la période coloniale est bien une réalité.

La crise du système capitaliste mondial a eu de profondes répercussions sur l'Afrique au moment où celle-ci entamait sa deuxième décennie de stagnation. La section I qui développera ce constat, essaiera donc de brosser un tableau synoptique des données économiques et sociales de l'Afrique des années 1970 et 1980. Ensuite on tentera de montrer pourquoi les FTN, plutôt que de contribuer au développement de l'Afrique, l'ont précipitée dans la crise. L'attention portera donc successivement sur leur rôle dans le recul de l'agriculture africaine (Section II), le blocage de l'industrialisation (Section III) et les relations de dépendance entre le continent et le système capitaliste mondial (Section IV). La dernière section montrera pourquoi la fonction dévolue par le capitalisme mondial à ses IFI est de «banaliser» l'espace économique africain, de le transformer en une zone de libre reproduction du capital international et donc d'empêcher la mise en œuvre d'une politique économique nationale auto-centrée conduisant à plus d'autonomie vis-à-vis du marché mondial.

Crise du Système Capitaliste Mondial et Régression Economique de l'Afrique

Les pays capitalistes avancés traversent depuis le début des années 1970 une crise qui s'aiguise de plus en plus. Leur taux de croissance qui a été de 3,2% entre 1970 et 1980 est retombé à 1,2% en 1980 et 1981 et à 0,5% en 1982. Il est plus sérieux de considérer le taux de 3,5% annoncé pour les USA, au cours des années 1980 comme une prévision trop optimiste (CNTS/CFTU, 1984, p. 1). Comment ne pas penser que ces pays vont continuer comme de par le passé à reporter au maximum les effets de cette crise ou le coût de sa résorption sur les PSD en général, et sur l'Afrique en particulier ? Les mesures prises par les pays de l'OCDE ne laissent aucun doute : renforcement du protectionnisme, diminution des importations, subvention des exportations, réduction des crédits de sources officielles, en particulier ce qu'on appelle l'aide, expulsion de travailleurs immigrés plus ou moins masquée, chute du prix des matières premières consécutive à la baisse de la demande et redistribution des richesses mondiales au profit des FTN grâce à la violence monétaire qui s'exprime à travers le dopage du dollar US et la hausse vertigineuse des taux d'intérêt réels.

Si la crise du système capitaliste mondial sévit dans les PSD, il semble que c'est en Afrique que ses effets sont les plus néfastes. En effet, l'Amérique Latine a malgré tout, enregistré au cours des 30 dernières années des taux de croissance élevés, une industrialisation rapide. Des forces sociales internes se sont constituées et ont su être influentes. Quant à l'Asie, elle a fait la preuve de sa capacité à accroître sa production agricole même si cela est allé de pair avec une exacerbation des inégalités sociales dans les pays capitalistes de ce continent (M. Verlet, 1983). Rien de tel en Afrique. Entre 1960 et 1973 l'Afrique a enregistré une croissance de sa production de 3,5% par an. De 1973 à 1979 ce taux n'a été que de 1,5% et il est tombé à 1,2%, 0,1%, 0,8% pour respectivement 1980, 1981, 1983 (tableau 1). Si l'on rapproche ces performances au taux de croissance démographique qui était de 2,7% durant les années 1970, c'est d'une véritable régression de la production qu'il faut parler. Encore que ces chiffres globaux cachent bien des différences entre les pays africains. Le tableau 2 indique que beaucoup de pays, la plupart dans la catégorie des faibles revenus selon la terminologie de la Banque Mondiale, ont connu entre 1960 et 1980 une baisse de leur produit par tête. Depuis 1960 la croissance de la production par tête est inférieure à la moyenne de l'ensemble des PSD (tableau 3).

Malgré leurs richesses tant humaines que matérielles, parmi les 36 pays considérés par l'ONU comme les plus pauvres du monde 26 sont africains. Le taux d'analphabétisme demeure très élevé, la malnutrition et les maladies sont largement répandues. Comme on le verra aussi, l'Afrique est le continent le plus dépendant sur les plans alimentaires, des capitaux et technologies. La régression de l'activité économique couplée avec une expansion rapide de la population, a produit une pression accrue sur l'emploi dans le continent, aussi bien dans les secteurs capitaliste que non capitaliste. D'après les estimations du BIT basées sur des données relatives à l'année 1977, et excessivement conservatrices, 12 millions de personnes ou 8% de la force de travail étaient sans emploi et 60 autres millions ou 40% de la force de travail étaient sous-employées. Le sous-emploi dans les zones urbaines atteignait déjà entre 30 et 40%, les jeunes étant les plus touchés. Les estimations du BIT toujours indiquent qu'en 1982, 200 millions de personnes en Afrique étaient dans une situation de pauvreté, c'est-à-dire n'avaient pas un revenu suffisant pour satisfaire leurs besoins fondamentaux en ce qui concerne l'alimentation, le logement, les soins médicaux, etc... (Rapport sixième conférence BIT, 1983).

Avant la crise des économies capitalistes développées, l'Afrique était déjà en proie à d'énormes difficultés. Celles-ci ont décuplé depuis les années 1970. Du fait de ses relations avec le système capitaliste mondial, ces difficultés risqueront fortement d'annihiler pour longtemps encore toute possibilité de progrès économique et social. L'Afrique est le continent où les effets de la crise actuelle ont été transmis avec le plus de brutalité, empirant une situation déjà précaire, caractérisée par un faible développement des forces productives et une déformation profonde des structures socio-économiques.

Les sections suivantes tenteront de mettre en exergue le rôle particulier joué par les FTN et les IFI impérialistes dans cette régression économique et sociale.

Les Firmes Agro-Alimentaires et le Recul de l'Agriculture Africaine

Pour maints pays du continent l'agriculture demeure le principal secteur productif. Elle apporte la plus forte contribution au PIB, fournit le gros des emplois et revenus, fait gagner une grande partie des devises. On comprend dès lors les effets sur la performance économique globale de mauvais résultats enregistrés dans ce secteur.

La structure de la production agricole africaine porte encore les empreintes du passé colonial, lorsque le processus de développement normal était désorganisé et que les économies africaines s'étaient vues assigner la fonction exclusive de satisfaire les intérêts du capital monopoliste étranger. La position dépendante des pays africains dans l'économie capitaliste mondiale était favorable à une conservation du retard technico-économique et social de la campagne africaine. Dans l'ensemble la productivité du travail dans l'agriculture est plus faible en Afrique que dans les autres PSD. Les méthodes culturales traditionnelles persistent. La fourniture de services de vulgarisation, d'une technologie plus productive, de facilités de crédit et de fertilisants est inadéquate par rapport aux besoins actuels, de même que la disponibilité de ces services aux différentes zones et couches sociales a été fortement inégale. En évaluant les conditions générales de développement de l'agriculture africaine dans les années 1970, on peut affirmer qu'elle a été affectée par des facteurs socio-économiques internes qui ont conduit à un retard dans la croissance de la production agricole et de la productivité du travail social. Le rôle des transnationales agro-alimentaires a été déterminant dans tous les cas cependant.

Les données de la Banque Mondiale et de la FAO montrent que pour tout le continent, la production agricole par tête, cultures et élevage y compris, a connu une chute d'environ 1% par an au cours des années 1970. Il en est résulté durant cette période un taux de croissance négatif. Sur 42 pays recensés par le BIT, 10 ont enregistré une baisse de leur production au cours de la période 1970–1980 (tableau 3).

Mais l'ampleur du recul de l'agriculture apparaît plus nettement lorsqu'on établit une différence entre cultures vivrières et cultures d'exportation. La baisse de la production alimentaire s'est poursuivie tout au long des années 1970, ainsi l'écart entre l'Afrique et les autres PSD n'a cessé de s'élargir. Selon les estimations de la FAO et la Banque Mondiale la production des principales cultures vivrières du continent n'a augmenté que de 1,5% par an en moyenne (au lieu de 2% par an durant la décennie précédente). Ce taux est inférieur à celui de la croissance démographique. Comme le montre le tableau 3, sur 42 pays recensés seuls 7 ont réussi à accroître la production alimentaire par tête de 5% ou plus, alors que 8 autres ont réussi à conserver les mêmes résultats qu'au début des années 1970.

La poursuite dans le domaine agricole de la mise en valeur coloniale fondée exclusivement sur les cultures d'exportation explique pour beaucoup la chute de la production vivrière et la détérioration de la situation alimentaire qui en résulte. Ainsi «à l'époque de la sécheresse au Sahel, l'agriculture n'a subi qu'un recul modeste (3%). Le coton a continué à progresser (+ 8%), il en fut de même de l'arachide. Mais les cultures vivrières ont été atteintes de plein fouet. La production de mil et sorgho a chuté de 33%, le riz bénéficie de la plus grande partie des surfaces cultivées lorsque celles-ci ne sont pas occupées par les cultures d'exportation, or le rendement du riz stagne à 2 tonnes à l'hectare» (M. Valet, 1983, p. 24).

C'est au cours des années 1970 marquées par une grande sécheresse que les pays sahéliens ont vu leurs exportations de légumes augmenter de plus de 100%. Le tableau ci-après donne les quantités exportées (en tonnes) par le Mali, le Niger et la Haute Volta pour la campagne 1978/1979.

Exportations de légumes vers la CEE de quelques pays du Sahel

Pays	Poivrons	Haricots Verts	Melon
Mali	800	20	
Haute Volta	–	2.200	
Niger	–	3.580	400
Total	800	5.800	400

Source: *Sophie Bessis. «Le Scandale des Cultures de Contre-saison». Tri-Continental, 1978, Paris.*

Deux ans après c'est une progression spectaculaire qui a été enregistrée pour les principaux pays exportateurs du Sahel. Ainsi pour les 5 premiers mois de 1980 on avait :

Période	Sénégal	Mali	Niger	Haute-Volta
5 premiers mois	2.430	1.272	552	1.026
Prévisions	6.000	2.600	490	2.085

Source: *Sophie Bessis, op. cit.*

On cherche ainsi à spécialiser progressivement l'Afrique dans l'approvisionnement de la CEE en légumes de «contre saison». Selon K. Vergopoulos, en Afrique, «les productions fourragères n'ont cessé de croître en volume très rapidement : le soja croît de 11,4% par an et le tournesol de 11,7% en moyenne annuelle» (K. Vergopoulos, 1984, p. 105). Dans l'ensemble, en Afrique, même si la production d'exportation a aussi enregistré un recul, elle s'est mieux maintenue que les cultures vivrières. D'une façon générale, la production alimentaire par tête a chuté en Afrique plus que partout ailleurs. En 1980 déjà son niveau était inférieur à celui de 1972 (tableau 5).

Les exportations absorbent une portion de plus en plus importante du produit agricole et des ressources internes mobilisées. D'où l'orientation actuelle des structures productives vers les besoins du marché international au détriment de la production pour la consommation nationale.

Une conséquence immédiate de ces tendances est l'accroissement des importations alimentaires. La facture a rapidement augmenté, atteignant un niveau sans précédent de 22 millions de tonnes en 1981 comparées aux 18,5 millions de tonnes en 1980. Les céréales comptent pour une large part dans la facture alimentaire alors que leurs prix montent en flèche contribuant ainsi à détériorer davantage la balance des paiements (BP) de la plupart des pays. L'Afrique dépend de plus en plus de l'extérieur pour son alimentation. Pourtant les déclarations tant d'hommes politiques que d'experts américains ne laissent guère place aux illusions : les aliments constituent des munitions. L'impérialisme n'a jamais fait mystère de sa volonté d'utiliser l'arme alimentaire contre les pays qui viendraient à s'opposer à sa politique. Si les tendances actuelles continuent, les importations alimentaires africaines tripleront de nouveau en 1990 comme elles ont triplé entre 1960 et 1978.

Une autre conséquence de la baisse dramatique de la production vivrière est le risque de famine qui plane en permanence sur un nombre de plus en plus important de pays. En 1983 le système d'alerte rapproché de la FAO a annoncé que 22 pays de l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara faisaient face à de sévères pénuries alimentaires, et que plus de 150 millions de personnes étaient menacées de la faim et de la malnutrition. Certes, dans maintes zones, la sécheresse a été la cause immédiate de cette détérioration grave. Mais la sécheresse résulte très souvent des ruptures des écosystèmes dues aux modes d'exploitation (systèmes de culture et d'élevage extensifs) poursuivis depuis la colonisation ou à une exploitation sauvage des ressources forestières par les FTN, comme en Côte d'Ivoire. Ces modes d'exploitation constituent le plus souvent la forme technologique la plus rentable pour le capital étranger qui préfère abandonner aux paysans le segment-production en raison des risques très élevés liés à la culture pluviale, et se positionner sur les segments pré et post-production pour capturer le surplus paysan. Les paysans, en raison d'une part de l'intense exploitation à laquelle ils sont soumis tant par les firmes agro-industrielles que par les bourgeoisies bureaucratiques ou compradores locales, et d'autre part du fait de la croissance démographique, ont été poussés à violer les contraintes écologiques qu'ils savaient si bien respecter jadis (la pratique de la jachère longue).

La question qu'il convient d'étudier maintenant est celle du rôle que les transnationales agro-alimentaires ont joué et continuent de jouer dans la dépendance alimentaire de l'Afrique et la famine qui y sévit.

Premièrement, comme on l'a souligné ci-dessus, ces transnationales ont poussé les pays africains à se spécialiser au maximum dans quelques cultures : café, thé, cacao, huile de palme, arachides, etc... Jusqu'à présent, nombre d'entre eux dépendent pour leurs exportations d'un ou de deux produits qui leur rapportent plus de 50 % de leurs devises. Certains produits comme le café, le cacao, peuvent être cultivés par les paysans, mais ils sont largement sous le contrôle des transnationales agro-alimentaires.

La colonisation a développé un type d'agriculture d'exportation qu'elles perpétuent maintenant, aux dépens d'une plus grande production vivrière pour la consommation nationale. Les pays africains sont précipités dans un système agricole mondial qu'ils ne peuvent contrôler. Occupant le segment pré et post-production (vente d'inputs, transformation, commercialisation sur les marchés mondiaux), les FTN accaparent la plus grande partie de la valeur ajoutée. Ce sont elles qui lancent toujours les plus grands projets agricoles en Afrique. Les mêmes noms reviennent toujours comme maîtres d'œuvre, financeurs ou associés: Kenana, Bura, Savannah, Bookers, Tate and Lyle, Lonrho, Mitchall, Cotts, Nestlé, Del Monte, The Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC).

Le déficit vivrier croissant de l'Afrique des années 1970 et 1980 apparaît incontestablement à la fois comme une conséquence de leurs activités dans le continent et une solution à leur besoin d'élargissement des marchés extérieurs pour leur production. Les marchés des pays capitalistes développés ont atteint un niveau de saturation de la demande solvable dès la fin des années 1960–1970, ce que reflète la tendance à la baisse au cours de cette période du taux de rentabilité du capital investi dans l'agro-alimentaire au centre (K. Vergopoulos, 1984, p. 102–103). L'aggravation du déficit vivrier dans les années 1970 et 1980 en Afrique est allée de pair avec un développement sans précédent de l'activité des FTN agro-alimentaires dans les pays africains.

Il peut paraître paradoxal que beaucoup de pays africains alors qu'ils font face à une crise alimentaire favorisent de plus de plus les activités de l'agro-business car dans la plupart des cas elles ne développent que les cultures d'exportation détournant des superficies, de l'eau et autres ressources des cultures vivrières. Même s'ils gagnent des devises supplémentaires, elles vont dans une proportion de plus en plus élevée à des importations alimentaires. Celles-ci portent souvent sur des denrées d'un nouveau genre auxquelles les transnationales et les pays capitalistes développés, grâce à «l'aide alimentaire», ont patiemment habitué les consommateurs africains, transformant ainsi les habitudes de consommation au détriment de l'indépendance alimentaire. Les chances d'une production locale suffisante de ces céréales sont souvent très maigres (exemple le blé, le riz) tandis que la production de céréales locales bien adaptées est progressivement détruite à cause de l'absence de tout effort de développement des cultures vivrières et de la concurrence qu'on instaure entre «le petit paysan de la Haute-Volta qui, sur un demi-hectare, produit 3 quintaux de céréales face à l'exploitation agricole du Corn-Belt américain qui met en valeur 200 hectares avec des rendements de l'ordre de 30 quintaux à l'hectare» (Marcel Mazoyer, 1983, p. 26) *(2)*.

Le développement d'une nouvelle économie agro-alimentaire transnationale avec les FTN comme principaux agents d'organisation constitue bien l'un des éléments essentiels des mécanismes socio-économiques permettant maintenant l'extension de la sous-alimentation qui frappe les masses en Afrique.

Deuxièmement, en Afrique comme partout ailleurs, lorsque les FTN se lancent dans la production alimentaire c'est pour ceux qui peuvent payer. L'accroissement de la production alimentaire sous l'impulsion des FTN ne signifie pas que la faim et la malnutrition sont écartées parce que la grande masse n'a pas un pouvoir d'achat suffisant pour acheter les produits de la transnationale. Lorsque les FTN sont impliquées dans la transformation de produits cultivés localement, leur intervention renforce la dépendance à l'égard des importations et empêche des améliorations dans le processus de production d'aliments locaux. De surcroît les industries alimentaires dépendant des grains importés tels que le blé tendent à se développer et cela empêche la croissance de l'industrie alimentaire locale fondée sur des productions locales.

Très peu de pays africains sont en mesure de se lancer dans une concurrence avec les FTN au plan international pour échapper à leur emprise. Aussi contrôlent-elles presque toujours les quelques produits qui constituent les principales exportations de tel ou tel pays. Bien que les plantations directement sous le contrôle d'une FTN soient de moins en moins nombreuses, il ne faudrait point en déduire que les pays africains exerceraient une plus grande maîtrise sur leurs cultures d'exportation. Les transnationales agro-industrielles ont étendu leurs activités dans plusieurs autres domaines pour compenser leur retrait de la production style-plantation.

En conclusion on peut dire que contrairement à leur affirmation, les transnationales agro-alimentaires ne contribuent nullement au développement des pays africains. Elles s'implantent dans ces derniers pour faire des profits. Elles prennent prétexte des besoins en matière de développement de ces pays pour justifier leur présence. Et dès qu'elles s'installent, elles commencent à exercer des pressions de tous genres sur les gouvernements pour qu'ils adoptent une politique favorable à leurs intérêts.

En réalité elles ajoutent aux problèmes des pays africains plutôt qu'elles n'aident à leur solution puisqu'elles ne font qu'accentuer l'intégration de l'agriculture africaine dans un système mondial qu'elles contrôlent de bout en bout. En développant les cultures d'exportation, en tuant les cultures vivrières locales, elles accentuent la dépendance de l'Afrique, détériorent les conditions de vie des paysans, rendent le continent plus vulnérable aux pressions de l'impérialisme.

Blocage de l'Industrialisation et FTN en Afrique

Aux premières heures de l'indépendance, les pays africains ont placé, avec raison, beaucoup d'espoir dans le processus d'industrialisation, entendu comme la diffusion de techniques d'organisation et de production pour une maîtrise de l'environnement physique dans l'intérêt de la grande majorité de la société (Rweyemamu, 1980, p. 1). A travers l'industrialisation, ils visaient plusieurs objectifs (Steel et Evans, 1984, p. 14–15 ; Rweyemamu, 1980, p. 1) :

– Un accroissement de la production par tête ainsi que celui de l'emploi afin d'absorber la force de travail urbaine et celle libérée des structures agraires traditionnelles, en un mot l'amélioration du niveau de vie de la grande masse ;

– une réduction de la dépendance extérieure grâce à une production sur place de biens initialement importés et une transformation locale poussée des matières premières avant l'exportation ;

– la construction d'économies nationalement intégrées, flexibles et capables d'une croissance endogène et auto-entretenue grâce à une diversification de la structure de production, une utilisation systématique des ressources locales.

La réalisation de tels objectifs supposait que les pays africains mettent en œuvre plusieurs mécanismes (Rweyemamu, 1980, p. 1; Steel et Evans, 1984, p. 14–15). D'abord une amélioration continue de la productivité industrielle pouvant être obtenue de diverses manières : un progrès technique incorporé dans les forces productives qui améliore leur efficacité ; un élargissement des débouchés qui procure des économies d'échelle et une augmentation constante du capital «réel» par travailleur. Ensuite l'augmentation de la productivité dans les autres secteurs grâce à la propagation des effets positifs de l'industrialisation : offre croissante d'inputs de base, amélioration de la qualification professionnelle de la population active, diffusion de nouvelles attitudes envers le travail, etc... Enfin une expansion continue de la production agricole. Elle est en effet un fondement nécessaire à une croissance industrielle durable dans des pays reposant principalement sur l'agriculture. On doit se demander si les performances industrielles de l'Afrique ont répondu aux espoirs et si les options suivies ont su mettre en œuvre de tels mécanismes.

En utilisant les données de la Banque Mondiale (Steel et Evans, 1984, p. 32 et suivantes) on peut parler d'un véritable désenchantement car les performances globales négatives indiquées dans la deuxième section ne pouvaient manquer d'avoir des répercussions défavorables. La production industrielle a enregistré une croissance déclinante dans les pays à faible revenu. Si entre 1960 et 1965 elle a été de 9,3%, elle a chuté régulièrement au cours de chacune des périodes de cinq ans qui ont suivi pour devenir négative entre 1975–1980. Quant aux pays importateurs de pétrole à revenu moyen, ils ont vu leur taux moyen décroître de 7,6% à 4,2%. Seuls les pays exportateurs de pétrole ont pu maintenir leur taux de croissance au cours des années 1970 (tableau 6).

Au cours des années 1960 la production industrielle a crû plus vite que le PIB, ce qui a fait de l'industrie un secteur moteur au cours de cette période – au total entre 1960 et 1980 la part de l'industrie à prix courants passe dans les pays à faible revenu de 6% à environ 10%, égalant ainsi le niveau atteint par l'ensemble des pays sous-développés. Cependant elle va très vite perdre sa place dans les années 1975–1980, surtout dans les pays à faible revenu (tableau 6).

En elles-mêmes les performances de l'industrialisation en Afrique sont médiocres. Elles le sont davantage comparées aux autres zones sous-développées. Ainsi la part du secteur industriel dans la force de travail totale a augmenté mais beaucoup moins que dans l'ensemble des pays sous-développés : 10% dans les pays à faible revenu contre 11% dans l'ensemble des pays sous-développés à faible revenu, 19% dans les pays exportateurs de pétrole contre 21% dans l'ensemble des pays exportateurs de pétrole. (Steel et Evans, 1984, p. 3). La croissance de la force de travail a été plus rapide que celle de la production industrielle. De même, de 1960 à 1975, la part de l'Afrique dans la valeur ajoutée industrielle mondiale passe de 0,7 à 0,8% alors que celle de l'Asie passe de 2,2 à 3% et celle de l'Amérique Latine de 4,1 à 4,8%. Si vers 1985 les pays africains ont atteint l'objectif de 1% de la production industrielle mondiale fixé par le Plan de Lagos et l'ONUDI, celui de l'an 2000, (2%) paraît hautement hypothétique au regard des tendances actuelles.

Enfin l'Afrique a enregistré une chute de ses exportations industrielles qui sont passées de 1,1% en 1970–1971 à 0,6% en 1975–1976 dans les exportations industrielles mondiales malgré la croissance enregistrée par ces dernières.

Les maigres performances de l'industrie africaine ne sont pas que d'ordre quantitatif. Si faible soit la croissance industrielle, elle a entraîné des conséquences socio-économiques néfastes : chômage urbain massif, migrations rurale-urbaine sans précédent, marginalisation des campagnes, disparités accrues dans la répartition des revenus et des richesses, etc... (Richard Sandbrook, 1982). Les raisons de l'échec de l'industrialisation commencent à apparaître dès que l'on étudie l'évolution de la structure industrielle, le type de politique industrielle suivi en Afrique et le rôle déterminant joué par les FTN dans le processus. Au début des indépendances, la structure de la production industrielle était caractérisée par un net biais en faveur des biens de consommation. Quelques industries (transformation de matières premières pour l'exportation, boissons et produits alimentaires) livraient la plus grande partie de la production. Plus de 40% de la production industrielle de 9 pays consistait (le textile exclu) en simples biens de consommation (Steel et Evans, 1984, p. 44).

La plupart des pays africains se sont lancés dans une politique de substitution aux importations. Ils pensaient arriver à une diversification et à une plus grande flexibilité de leurs économies en produisant localement d'abord les biens de consommation, ensuite les biens intermédiaires et enfin les biens de production. Certes les investissements réalisés dans les années

1960 ont touché des industries comme le ciment, le pétrole et les métaux de base. En réalité peu de changements sont intervenus dans l'orientation de départ en faveur des biens de consommation. Par exemple la remontée des filières ne s'est pas produite. Plus de 40% des industries des 9 pays cités au tableau 7 consistent encore en simples industries de biens de consommation. Pire, la tendance est à la hausse de ce pourcentage dans les pays qui ont enregistré la croissance industrielle la plus forte (Steel et Evans, 1984, p. 45).

En Afrique c'est une mauvaise stratégie de substitution aux importations qui a été suivie sous l'impulsion des FTN. Celles-ci intervenaient déjà pour la plupart durant la période coloniale. Pour conserver leurs marchés en s'abritant derrière de hautes barrières douanières, elles ont développé la production locale de biens qu'elles importaient auparavant et ont utilisé le mécanisme de protection pour éliminer toute concurrence extérieure. La substitution aux importations qu'elles ont impulsée n'a pas cherché à prendre en compte le contenu en importations des industries à mettre en place, à maximiser leurs liens en amont et en aval avec le reste de l'économie. Aussi s'il est vrai que la part des importations dans l'offre totale de biens de consommation a généralement baissé, la dépendance envers les inputs importés à augmenté non pas en raison d'une non disponibilité de ressources locales mais parce qu'il y a une préférence systématique pour ces derniers. Cette stratégie d'industrialisation a donné naissance à une structure bien particulière qui montre pourquoi le secteur industriel ne pouvait connaître une croissance durable, auto-entretenue. Les principaux traits de celui-ci peuvent être résumés de la façon suivante :

– un net biais contre les industries de moyens de production ; l'investissement concerne quelques étapes de la transformation des matières premières pour l'exportation et l'assemblage léger, surtout de biens de luxe.

– une technologie très intensive en capital «réel». En transférant des produits conçus dans un environnement caractérisé par une relative cherté du capital variable, les FTN ont utilisé les mêmes techniques de production que celles employées dans les pays capitalistes développés pour produire les mêmes biens. L'objectif des pays africains d'absorber au plus vite la main-d'œuvre urbaine en chômage ne pouvait être prise en compte. D'où la faible part de la force de travail industrielle dans la population active employée.

– une dépendance considérable envers les moyens de production importés (biens de capital, produits semi-finis et matières premières). Il n'existe pas assez de liens d'intégration dans les relations inter-sectorielles liant la transformation industrielle des matières premières avec les biens de consommation finale, les biens intermédiaires et les biens de capital.

– une industrie non compétitive. Plusieurs raisons peuvent être invoquées pour expliquer les coûts élevés ; le faible taux d'utilisation de la capacité de production, l'infrastructure inadéquate, la baisse de la productivité, l'utilisation de techniques intensives en capital réel, les stimulants offerts par les pays africains pour attirer les FTN (droits de douane élevés, prohibitions d'importations de produits concurrents, modalités de fixation des prix par les FTN, en un mot création de situation de monopole au profit de ces dernières).

Une telle structure industrielle n'est pas douée d'une grande capacité d'expansion. Sans une substitution substantielle portant sur les biens intermédiaires et les biens de capital, la croissance de la production de remplacement des importations ne pouvait dépendre que de la croissance de la demande nationale dès que les premiers stades de substitution ont été dépassés. En plus de la limitation imposée par la dimension du marché national , la demande nationale était handicapée par l'absence d'une croissance du produit par tête (voir section II). Seule une minorité a été en mesure d'accéder aux biens produits par l'industrie moderne et cela au prix d'une exacerbation des inégalités dans la répartition du produit national. Les industries installées en Afrique n'ont pas cherché à produire pour la grande masse des biens compatibles avec son pouvoir d'achat. Les biens qu'elles produisent n'assurent pas une reproduction économique et technologique et ne créent pas non plus une base pour un dynamisme interne. Ce sont des industries qui consomment des devises, débilitent la monnaie nationale, accroissent l'endettement national et le service de la dette, développent le chômage, la marginalisation sociale, la détérioration du niveau de vie, la dépendance étrangère.

Le rôle dévolu aux FTN ne pouvait pas aller de pair avec une réussite du processus d'industrialisation. En effet, pour l'Afrique comme pour toute autre zone sous-développée il n'existe pas un seul chemin ou un seul modèle d'industrialisation dont les vertus sont universellement applicables. Il y a des problèmes dont les solutions sont dictées par le contexte historique, la géographie et l'environnement. On ne peut attendre des FTN qu'elles analysent et résolvent dans l'intérêt des pays africains des problèmes aussi cruciaux pour le procès d'industrialisation que le niveau optimal de la production en relation avec la faible dimension des marchés nationaux; la corrélation entre industrie lourde et industrie légère ; la commercialisation sur les marchés extérieurs de produits industriels ; la sélection de ce qu'on appelle les technologies appropriées ; et le rôle nouveau du secteur public maintenant qu'il n'est plus possible de concevoir un processus d'industrialisation basé sur des mécanismes spontanés du marché, à cause du gaspillage des ressources, des crises cycliques et des profonds traumatismes sociaux qui en résultent.

Les FTN dans la Dépendance Economique de l'Afrique

Les relations commerciales, financières et économiques entre l'Afrique et les pays capitalistes développés constituent un bon poste d'observation pour évaluer l'emprise des FTN sur les économies africaines. Elles ont joué un rôle de première importance dans le façonnement des rapports extérieurs économiques de l'Afrique.

La structure des exportations africaines a à peine changé depuis 1960. Les produits agricoles bruts ou semi-finis et les produits miniers occupent la plus grande place. Trente deux des principaux produits de base de l'Afrique, le pétrole non compris, comptent pour 70% de ses exportations alors qu'ils ne représentent que 35% pour tous les PSD et 10% pour le monde (tableau 8).

L'Afrique continue d'importer principalement des produits alimentaires, des produits industriels de consommation, des biens intermédiaires et de capital. Au cours des années 1970 il y eut d'énormes augmentations des prix des produits importés, surtout alimentaires, alors que les exportations tombaient à leur niveau le plus bas depuis 20 ans. En 1982 il y avait une baisse des exportations tandis que les importations ont continué à augmenter de 16% (Institut Nord-Sud, 1983, p. 5). Puisque le commerce mondial des produits primaires a augmenté plus lentement que celui des produits industriels, la part de l'Afrique dans le commerce mondial a régressé. Si l'on exclut le pétrole c'est de moitié qu'elle a chuté au cours des années 1970.

La hausse du prix du pétrole conjuguée avec l'effondrement des prix de base a eu des répercussions sévères sur les nombreux pays africains encore dépendants de l'exportation de produits primaires pour gagner des devises. Au cours des 10 dernières années, le prix «réel» (prix du produit de base rapporté au prix des produits industriels) – parfois même le prix courant – des principaux produits de la région a chuté sur le marché mondial (Institut Nord-Sud, 1983, p. 5). Une récente étude de la FAO (FAO, 1982) *(3)* a analysé les tendances des prix réels de 15 produits agricoles parmi lesquels les principaux produits d'origine végétale exportés par les pays africains. Elle a montré la tendance à long terme d'une baisse des prix réels couplée avec des fluctuations erratiques extrêmes.

Même si les pays africains exportent des produits industriels, cela s'est traduit par une nouvelle forme de dépendance puisqu'ils sont transformés en exportateurs de produits industriels simples et sont pris au piège des systèmes de production.

Les FTN exercent un contrôle presque total sur la commercialisation des produits de base. Actuellement tout le commerce international des produits primaires exportés par les pays africains est sous le contrôle des FTN (tableau 9).

De plus, ce contrôle absolu est exercé par quelques compagnies transnationales. Une étude de la CNUCED sur l'étendue du pouvoir des FTN affirme que «à présent, 15 grandes compagnies contrôlent 85–90% du commerce mondial de coton. Elles exercent un contrôle similaire sur les marchés de beaucoup d'autres produits primaires, tels que le marché des feuilles de tabac, où 85–90% du commerce international est directement contrôlé par 6 transnationales ; le marché de la banane, 70–75% contrôlé par 3 compagnies, et les graines de cacao, où 5 compagnies contrôlent plus de 75% du commerce mondial, pour ne mentionner que quatre des principaux produits (CNUCED TD/B/C1/219, 1981, p. 55) *(4)*. Le tableau 9 montre une telle emprise des FTN sur les exportations principales des pays africains.

Cette forte influence des FTN sur le commerce des produits de base a un impact profond sur la détermination des prix de ces derniers. Prenant le cas du coton, le rapport de la CNUCED précité note que «contrairement au mythe largement répandu d'une formation des prix sur un marché libre, un petit groupe de spéculateurs et de grandes compagnies faisant le commerce de multiples produits exercent une puissante et déterminante influence sur les mouvements de court terme des prix du coton. Des mouvements de long terme sont déterminés aussi par d'autres facteurs, incluant les prix et les activités d'affaires des grandes compagnies chimiques et pétrochimiques.

Donc les pays socialistes et les pays en développement, produisant plus de 80% du coton mondial jouent seulement un rôle marginal dans les mouvements de court et long terme et sont contraints d'accepter des fluctuations de prix et d'endurer ses potentiels effets négatifs, particulièrement pour les pays dépendant des exportations de coton comme source majeure de devises et de fonds pour le développement» (CNUCED, TD/B/C1/219, 1981, p. 92) *(5)*.

Ce sont ces FTN qui ont une mainmise totale sur la production et fixent des prix à des niveaux correspondant à la quantité maximale que le marché peut absorber. Il y a des «prix administrés», fixés par le vendeur pour maximiser ses profits de monopole et donc compenser, à travers des opérations de grande échelle, d'éventuelles baisses des profits dans un produit en accroissant ceux tirés des autres. Aussi la part du prix final revenant aux pays africains producteurs après la commercialisation est extrêmement faible (CNUCED, TD/184/Sup.3, 1976) *(6)*. Les parts sont inférieures à 10% pour le fer et la bauxite ; 20–40% pour le thé, le café, les graines de cacao, les citrons, les bananes et le jute, et environ 50% pour le sucre. On comprend dès lors à quel point les termes de l'échange reflètent très peu la baisse des revenus tirés de l'exportation des produits de base.

Au cours de la période 1970–1980 l'Afrique a reçu 10.341 millions de dollars US d'investissement direct. Mais dans le même temps elle a enregistré 23.916 millions de paiement sur les investissements directs (tableau 10). En d'autres termes, les profits, intérêts et autres rémunérations obtenus par les FTN étaient plus importants que les nouveaux investissements réalisés. Si les investissements directs des FTN peuvent générer des revenus en devises grâce aux exportations auxquelles ils donnent lieu, ils entraînent dans le même temps des sorties de devises plus importantes au titre de diverses rémunérations. A strictement parler, les pays africains payent quatre fois pour le capital qu'ils reçoivent : (1) pour les importations lorsque le capital entre sous la forme d'équipement, de machinerie ou de produits intermédiaires; (2) pour les profits transférés au pays où la FTN a son siège social; (3) pour la technologie; (4) pour l'amortissement et le service de la dette. On peut dire que ce sont là des opérations «normales» à côté de ce qu'on a été obligé d'appeler le «commerce captif» pour désigner le fait que les flux commerciaux se développent à l'intérieur d'un réseau de filiales de la FTN. Les transactions du commerce extérieur ne s'effectuent pas entre deux parties indépendantes mais entre des entreprises parentes. Les prix du marché sont alors remplacés par des prix de réglement intra-groupes (les prix de transfert). Ils sont fixés arbitrairement par la société-mère qui peut les utiliser à diverses fins : subventionner des filiales en difficulté, faire apparaître le profit dans les pays à faible taux d'imposition, etc ; d'où une hémorragie de devises du fait d'importations d'inputs sur-évalués et d'exportations sous-évaluées. C'est là un mécanisme complémentaire aux possibilités de manipulation du prix grâce à la position monopolistique que l'on occupe sur les marchés des matières premières.

Enfin l'évolution des conditions d'emprunts des pays africains est un indicateur de l'ampleur de l'exploitation dont ils sont victimes de la part des banques transnationales, des institutions financières internationales et des organismes financiers publics des pays capitalistes développés. Voici comment les secrétariats de l'OUA et de la Commission Economique pour l'Afrique, à partir des statistiques fournies par le rapport Berg, (tableau 21 de l'annexe au rapport), ont montré la détérioration grave des termes moyens d'endettement des pays africains au Sud du Sahara : «L'intérêt sur la dette publique totale a plus que doublé entre 1970 et 1979 (de 3,7% à 7,9%); il en va de même du taux d'intérêt sur la dette officielle totale, qui s'éleva de 2% en 1970 à 4,1% en 1979, une augmentation de plus de 300%. La plus faible augmentation de taux d'intérêt concernait la dette totale privée; le taux qui, comme d'habitude, était déjà très élevé, passa de 6,8% en 1970 à 11,4% en 1979, une augmentation de près de 70%. C'est seulement pour la dette multilatérale que le taux n'a pas augmenté durant cette période. En fait le taux monta en 1971 (5%) et en 1975 (5,2%) par rapport au taux de 4,3% de 1970. Pour toutes les autres années le taux tourna autour de 4% sauf en 1978 et 1979 lorsqu'il tomba à 3,3% et 3,4% respectivement.

La tendance dépressive observée ci-dessus était également vraie pour la maturité, la période de grâce et l'élément don. Les seules exceptions étaient l'élément don dans la dette multilatérale, qui passa de 46,3% à 48,9% et la période de grâce de la dette privée totale, qui de son bas niveau de 1,6 année passa à 3,2 années durant cette période.

Pour la dette publique totale, la maturité déclina de 24,4 années en 1970 à 16,7 années en 1979, alors que pour la dette officielle totale, la maturité diminuait de 31,9 années à 24,9 années entre 1970 et 1979. La maturité de l'aide bilatérale diminuera de 31,5 années à 20,7 années durant cette période, et celle de l'aide multilatérale de 32,2 années à 28,8 années.

La dette privée totale maintint son niveau général, fluctuant entre 10 années en 1970 et 8,1 en 1972; 8,5 en 1975 et 9 années en 1979 (Afrique et Développement 1982).

En 1981 le total de la dette publique externe des pays africains a atteint 80 milliards de dollars US (Banque Mondiale, 1983). L'Afrique reste pourtant la zone la moins endettée du monde sous-développé (11% du total de la dette des PSD). Cependant l'endettement est devenu un des problèmes les plus angoissants du continent. Il constitue en effet le Cheval de Troie du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale pour intervenir dans les structures économiques et sociales des pays africains. Il est aussi le phénomène qui a rendu plus manifeste la collusion entre ces IFI, les FTN et les pays capitalistes développés.

Le Role des IFI: Accentuer l'Integration des Economies Africaines au Système Capitaliste Mondial

La pénurie de devises a atteint dans beaucoup de pays africains des proportions telles qu'elle menace de paralyser un appareil économique qui fonctionne déjà à une très faible capacité. Elle risque de bloquer la valorisation du capital monopoliste international engagé dans le continent. Nombre de pays africains en sont venus à dépendre des créditsque veulent bien leur accorder les pays capitalistes développés ou les banques transnationales afin de rembourser des dettes venues à échéance ou pour obtenir les biens intermédiaires nécessaires au fonctionnement de l'appareil productif. Les transferts de valeur risquent à tout moment de se trouver bloqués en raison du manque de devises.

Le processus qui a provoqué la collusion entre les firmes et banques transnationales, les Etats des pays capitalistes développés et les IFI est bien connu : un pays endetté, incapable de faire face aux sorties de capitaux sollicite de nouveaux prêts et/ou un réaménagement de la charge de la dette. L'accord des créanciers est lié à un tirage dans les mécanismes à forte conditionnalité du FMI ou à un prêt à «ajustement structurel» de la Banque Mondiale. Ces IFI exigent à leur tour l'application d'une politique qu'elles ont élaborée. La conviction du Fonds que le pays appliquera ou est est en train d'appliquer cette politique emporte celle des FTN et des pays capitalistes créanciers. Le Fonds et la Banque Mondiale leur servent donc de caution. Ils jouent pour le capital monopoliste international le rôle de gendarme, de recouvreur de dettes. Ils comblent vis-à-vis des PSD en général l'inconvénient majeur du système monétaire international privé : il n'existe pas comme dans les systèmes monétaires nationaux, un prêteur en dernier ressort car les banques centrales ne sont pas obligées de venir en aide à des banques commerciales en difficulté du fait de leurs opérations en eurodevises. Ils cherchent en permanence à adapter les structures économiques et sociales des pays africains aux mutations de la division internationale capitaliste du travail, de faire d'eux un terrain de profit et d'investissement pour les transnationales. Leur rôle est de s'opposer aux ambitions de tout pays aspirant à un mieux-être social car une telle orientation implique au moins une réduction de la part des richesses accaparées par le capital transnational. En effet les politiques économiques dictées par la Banque Mondiale et le FMI ont des conséquences qu'on peut dire de 3 sortes : une réduction dramatique du pouvoir d'achat des travailleurs en même temps qu'une accélération du chômage; une privatisation à outrance de l'économie; et une intégration complète de celle-ci au système capitaliste mondial.

Des Politiques Economiques Dirigées contre le Niveau de Vie et l'Emploi

Les déficits des paiements extérieurs d'un pays viennent pour la Banque Mondiale et le FMI de ce qu'un pays essaie de vivre au-dessus de ses propres moyens. Il faut par conséquent réduire la demande globale de manière à la ramener au niveau de l'offre interne de ressources. En réalité tout cela n'est qu'une attaque systématique au pouvoir d'achat des travailleurs. Les moyens utilisés sont variés et convergents.

D'abord, sous prétexte de réduction du déficit budgétaire et de dégager une épargne publique positive, les IFI exigent une baisse des dépenses publiques par le blocage ou la réduction des salaires dans la fonction publique, l'arrêt de tout recrutement et surtout la diminution des effectifs dans la fonction publique, la révision en baisse du programme d'investissement public (construction de routes, d'écoles, d'hôpitaux, politique de «vérité des prix» qui signifie la suppression de toutes subventions accordées aux produits de première nécessité, à certains services publics comme la santé, les fournitures scolaires...) Par ailleurs il faut appliquer une politique fiscale «neutre» et qui permette en même temps un accroissement des recettes fiscales. En effet les IFI exigent l'élimination des impôts sur la fortune et les gains en capital et la réduction de l'impôt sur le profit (c'est un des axes centraux de la politique d'offre en vogue maintenant dans ces institutions). En revanche la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée doit être renforcée, l'impôt sur le revenu salarial ou de capitation augmenté.

Ensuite le salaire réel dans les secteurs public et privé est dramatiquement réduit grâce à un blocage des salaires nominaux au moment où tous les prix montent en flèche. Comme la production se distribue pour l'essentiel en salaires et en profits, une baisse en termes réels de ceux-là permet une augmentation de ceux-ci. On cherche à convaincre les travailleurs que c'est une bonne politique car cette redistribution encouragerait la production et fournirait les ressources nécessaires aux investissements : les profits font les investissements desquels dépendent la croissance et l'emploi.

Enfin la violence monétaire est systématiquement pratiquée. La dévaluation qui est presque toutjours exigée (toutes les monnaies africaines seraient surévaluées) entraîne directement une hausse des prix de tous les biens importables ou exportables. Elle provoque donc une hausse des prix qui ampute le pouvoir d'achat des revenus non indexés aux prix. Une fois encore la répartition des revenus est modifiée au profit principalement des FTN car ce sont elles qui contrôlent une bonne part des activités socio-économiques. La réduction du volume global de crédit alloué à l'économie fait baisser considérablement la production industrielle, surtout celle des entreprises locales.

Privatisation à Outrance de l'Economie

Les IFI demandent partout que libre cours soit donné aux forces du marché. L'Etat doit se désengager du secteur productif et de toutes activités tertiaires susceptibles d'être exercées par le privé. Il doit cesser de jouer un rôle direct dans le développement pour se contenter de politiques indirectes absolument «neutres». Il faut arriver à une «subsidiarisation» de l'Etat. Cela implique l'élimination des contrôles des prix et des subventions aux produits de base et services sociaux et une restriction de la propriété étatique.

Banalisation de l'Espace Economique National

Les programmes économiques des IFI œuvrent pour une économie mondiale capitaliste complètement dominée par les FTN. C'est pourquoi ils comportent toujours des mesures visant à ouvrir davantage les économies africaines, à en faire des espaces de reproduction libre du capital transnational, et à les «banaliser» en leur niant une quelconque autonomie vis-à-vis du marché mondial capitaliste. Lorsque ces IFI parlent de «marché» elles ne pensent pas simplement à l'étroit marché d'un seul pays, mais au monde entier. C'est pourquoi elles exigent la suppression des contrôles de capitaux et la réduction (voire la suppression) des restrictions commerciales à un niveau faible et uniforme. Les contingentements, les quotas doivent être abolis. En un mot chaque pays africain doit tendre vers une suppression des entraves au libre échangisme et au libre mouvement des capitaux. Les forces du marché doivent librement allouer les ressources, sélectionner les activités qui procurent le maximum d'avantages comparatifs au pays sur le marché mondial.

Il est clair qu'une telle philosophie signifie un renoncement pur et simple à toute tentative d'organisation des activités économiques pour satisfaire les besoins les plus pressants de la grande masse. L'indépendance économique que les pays africains affirment tous rechercher (Programme d'Action de Lagos) est aux antipodes de cette orientation des IFI comme le document des secrétariats de l'OUA et de la CEA l'a fortement souligné.

Conclusion

Il est impossible d'analyser la crise économique et sociale de l'Afrique sans trouver dans la ponction intense de son surplus économique par les FTN et les IFI, un des principaux facteurs explicatifs. Les mécanismes par lesquels s'opère cette extraction sont nombreux et complémentaires :

- détérioration des termes de l'échange;
- barrières commerciales défavorables à l'Afrique;
- expatriement des super profits sur le capital commercial, industriel et financier, échange inégal;
- contrôle des structures de production et d'échange internes, etc...

Si l'action de ces conglomérats est ignorée ou insuffisamment prise en compte on risque de suivre la philosophie de l'autruche. En effet sans une stratégie cohérente de désengagement de l'emprise des FTN et IFI, l'Afrique ne peut sortir de la profonde crise qu'elle traverse actuellement.

Cependant, comme on l'a souligné dans l'introduction, il faut prendre garde de considérer le capital étranger comme le seul facteur explicatif du sous-développement et de la crise actuelle du continent. La structure de classe interne qui secrète des politiques économiques favorables à l'action des FTN et IFI et bloque le développement des forces productives, doit être tenue au moins tout aussi responsable de l'implosion économique et sociale actuelle. Comment cette structure de classe interne reproduit l'extraversion et dissocie la croissance de la satisfaction des besoins des masses perpétuant ainsi le sous-développement et provoquant la crise, tel est le deuxième facteur explicatif à introduire pour parvenir à saisir les racines de l'évolution régressive du continent.

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Notes

1. C'est le diagnostic et la solution proposés par le rapport Berg sur le Développement en Afrique au Sud du Sahara, 1981.
2. Cité par M. Verlet dans «L'Afrique dans la Mouvance de la Crise», I.R.M. No. 8, 1983, Paris.
3. Cité par «The African Worker and the World Economic Crises», CNTS-ICFTU, Dakar 1984.
4. Cité par F. Castro (1983, p. 59).
5. Cité par F. Castro (1983, p. 64–65).
6. Cité par F. Castro (1983, p. 66).
7. *Ibidem* (1983, p. 64).

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Tableau 1: Stagnation Economique (croissance annuelle moyenne du PIB)

	1960–73	1973–79	1980	1981	1982
Afrique	3,5	1,5	1,2	0,1	0,8
Tous les pays en développement	6,0	5,1	3,0	2,0	1,9

Source: Rapport sur le Développement dans le Monde, 1983, Banque Mondiale.

Tableau 2: Croissance de la production et revenu par tête en Afrique 1970/1981

	Revenu par tête Croissance moyenne/an		Croissance de la Production
	1981	1960-1981	1970-1981
	$US	%	%
Pays à faible revenu			
Tchad	110	– 2.2	–
Ethiopie	140	1.4	2.2
Mali	190	1.3	4.6
Malawi	200	2.7	5.6
Zaire	210	–0.1	–0.2
Ouganda	220	–0.6	– 1.6
Burundi	230	2.4	3.2
Haute Volta	240	1.1	3.6
Rwanda	250	1.7	5.3
Somalie	280	–0.2	3.9
Tanzanie	280	1.9	5.1
Guinée	300	0.2	3.0
Bénin	320	0.6	3.3
Rép. Centrafricaine	320	0.4	1.6
Siérra Léone	320	0.4	1.9
Madagascar	330	–0.5	0.3
Niger	330	–1.6	3.1
Soudan	380	–0.3	4.1
Togo	380	2.5	3.2
Ghana	400	–1.1	– 0.2
Pays à revenu intermédiaire			
Kenya	420	2.9	5.8
Sénégal	430	–0.3	2.0
Mauritanie	460	1.5	1.7
Libéria	520	1.2	1.3
Lesotho	540	7.0	8.4

Tableau 2 (Suite)

	Revenu par tête	Cr. moy/an. Croissance de la Production	
Pays à revenu intermédiaire	**$** US	%	%
Zambie	600	0	0.4
Egypte	650	3.5	8.1
Maroc	860	2.4	5.2
Nigéria	870	3.5	4.5
Zimbabwé	870	1.0	1.8
Cameroun	880	2.8	6.3
Congo	1,100	1.0	5.1
Côte d'Ivoire	1,200	2.3	6.2
Tunisie	1,420	4.8	7.3
Algérie	2,140	3.2	6.9
Pays à revenu élevé			
Lybie	8,450	4.7	2.3

Source: *Rapport sur le Développement dans le Monde 1983.*

Tableau 3: Crise Alimentaire et Production Agricole en Afrique

Pays	1979	1960/70	1970/80	1977/79(1)
Algérie	32	0.1	3.1	75
Angola	60	4.0	–10.2	85
Bénin	46	–	–	97
Botswana	83	1.6	8.5	89
Burundi	84	–	1.8	105
Cameroun	83	–	3.8	110
Cap-Vert	–	6.5	2.9	–
Rép. Centrafricaine	88	0.8	2.3	102
Tchad	85	0.8	–0.3	91
Congo	35	1.0	1.7	81
Djibouti	–	–	–	–
Egypte	50	2.9	2.7	93
Guinée Equatoriale	–	2.6	–16.6	–
Ethiopie	80	2.2	0.7	84
Gabon	79	–	–	94
Gambie	79	4.6	7.0	77
Ghana	54	–	–1.2	82
Guinée	82	–	–	86
Guinée Bissau	93	3.4	0.1	94
Côte d'Ivoire	79	4.2	3.4	102
Kenya	78	–	5.4	92
Lesotho	87	–	2.9	100
Libéria	71	–	4.7	101

Tableau 3 . (Suite)

Pays	1979	1960/70	1970/80	1977/79(1)
Lybie	20	–	11.1	113
Madagascar	87	–	0.1	94
Malawi	86	–	4.1	100
Mali	88	–	4.4	88
Mauritanie	85	–	– 1.1	75
Ile Maurice	30	–	– 4.1	100
Maroc	53	4.7	0.8	83
Mozambique	67	2.1	– 1.8	75
Niger	91	3.3	– 3.7	89
Nigéria	55	– 0.4	0.8	87
Rwanda	91	–	–	107
Sénégal	76	2.9	3.7	88
Siérra Léone	66	–	2.2	87
Somalie	84	– 0.6	3.0	85
Soudan	78	–	2.6	105
Swaziland	52	7.5	3.7	109
Tanzanie	83	–	4.9	94
Togo	68	–	0.8	81
Tunisie	35	2.9	4.9	118
Ouganda	83	–	– 0.9	90
Haute Volta	83	–	1.2	93
Zaire	75	–	1.2	90
Zambie	68	–	1.8	99
Zimbabwé	60	–	– 0.5	100

(1) *1969–1971–100*
Source: *Sixième Conférence Régionale Africaine du BIT, Octobre 1983, Rapport 2.*

Tableau 4: Indice de la Production Alimentaire par Tête
(1969–1971 = 100)

	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980
Pays Capitalistes développés	101	105	107	111	111
Pays sous-développés	97	99	102	105	103
Afrique	97	96	94	90	89
Amérique Latine	98	101	105	107	108
Proche Orient	103	103	110	106	104
Asie	95	97	102	108	105

Source: *Basé sur l'Annuaire Statistique des Nations Unies – 1979–80, p. 15.*
Tableau tiré de F. Castro, 1983, p. 97.

Tableau 5: Croissance de la Production Industrielle et Rapport au Taux de Croissance du PIB, Périodes de cinq ans 1960–1980 (Pourcentage par année aux prix de 1970)

Groupe de pays	Croissance de la Production Industrielle				Rapport de la Croissance Industrielle au taux de Croissance du PIB			
	1960/65	1965/70	1970/75	1975/80	1960/65	1965/70	1970/75	1975/80
Pays au Sud du Sahara à faible revenu								
– Semi aride	4,8	9,7	1,8	0,4	1,5	4,0	1,1	0,1
– Autres	9,3	8,2	2,4	–0,2	2,7	2,2	1,4	nég.
Pays au Sud du Sahara à revenu moyen								
– Importateurs	7,5	7,6	7,7	4,2	1,6	1,7	1,5	1,2
– Exportateurs de pétrole	3,7	15,9	6,6	11,5	0,8	3,1	0,8	2,3
Afrique au Sud du Sahara, Total	7,3	9,3	5,3	4,4	1,7	2,1	1,0	1,2
Afrique du Nord	6,2	5,6	5,6	11,7	1,8	0,9	1,4	1,6

Source: *Steel et Evans (1984), p. 33.*

Tableau 6: Evolution de la Structure de la Production Industrielle dans Quelques Pays Africains
(Pourcentage total de la Production)

Pays (années entre parenthèses)	Début/milieu année 1960			Milieu/fin années 1970 ou 1980		
	Industries de biens de consommation	Intermédiaires	Biens de production	Industries de biens de consommation	Intermédiaires	Biens de production
Valeur ajoutée						
Ghana (1962, 1979)	50.0	42.5	7.5	53.0	41.2	5.8
Zambie (1965, 1980)	43.9	34.0	22.2	40.8	35.5	23.7
Tanzanie (1961, 1978)	74	23	3	57	35	8
Nigéria (1964, 1977/78)	54.5	36.3	9.4	42.6	34.4	18.1
Côte d'Ivoire (1960, 1974)	50.0	25.1	25.0	63.1	18.2	18.9
Kenya (1960, 1980)	55.2	30.6	14.2	51.1	29.9	18.9
Zaïre a) (1966, 1976)	67.5	20.6	11.9	70.4	19.6	10.0
PIB						
Zimbabwé b) (1965, 1978)	49.1	26.0	24.8	54.0	21.7	24.0
Ethiopie (1967, 1978/79)	79.4	19.5	1.1	67.7	30.0	2.3

a) Au prix de 1976
b) Au prix de 1964

Source: *Steel et Evans, 1984, p. 44.*

Tableau 7: Principales Exportations de l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara (Moyenne 1976–1978)

	Valeur (millions de dollars)	En % des exportations de l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara	Exportateur principal: Pays	Exportateur principal: En % des exportations de l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara
Combustibles				
Pétrole	11.502	43,5	Nigéria	95,5
Minéraux et métaux				
Cuivre	1.589	6,0	Zambie	54,0
Minerai de fer	432	1,6	Libéria	67,9
Bauxite	188	0,7	Guinée	95,1
Phosphate	140	0,5	Togo	58,6
Minerai de manganèse	120	0,5	Gabon	85,7
Zinc	79	0,3	Zaïre	57,7
Etain	59	0,2	Nigéria	43,8
Plomb	20	0,1	Namibie	63,9
Aliments et boissons				
Café	2.838	10,7	Côte d'Ivoire	22,5
Cacao	1.882	7,1	Ghana	34,5
Sucre	432	1,6	Maurice	48,5
Thé	245	0,9	Kenya	57,7
Arachides	194	0,7	Soudan	52,1
Huile d'arachide	177	0,7	Sénégal	80,8
Bœuf	78	0,3	Botswana	43,4
Huile de palme	58	0,8	Côte d'Ivoire	71,4
Bananes	45	0,2	Côte d'Ivoire	32,8
Maïs	30	..		
Exportations non alimentaires				
Bois	680	2,6	Côte d'Ivoire	47,4
Coton	651	2,5	Soudan	46,0
Tabac	290	1,1	Zimbabwé	47,8
Caoutchouc	128	0,5	Libéria	47,5
Sisal	50	0,9	Tanzanie	52,8
Toutes autres exportations	4.553	17,2		
Exportations totales de l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara	**26.458**	**100,0**	Nigéria	41,5

Source: *Développement Accéléré en Afrique au Sud du Sahara – Banque Mondiale, 1981 – p. 176.*

Tableau 8: Exportations des Pays sous-développés par les formes

	Total des exportations (en millions de dollars)	Pourcentage commercialisé par les transnationales
Aliments		
Graines de cacao	1 737	85
Bananes	793	70–75
Tabac	1 079	85–90
Thé	827	85
Café	7 831	85–90
Sucre	4 881	60
Riz	1 102	70
Blé	449	85–90
Matières premières agricoles		
Peaux et cuirs	29	2
Caoutchouc naturel	2 202	70–75
Coton	2 692	85–90
Jute	172	85–90
Produits forestiers	4 169	90
Minerais et métaux		
Pétrole	2 914	7
Cuivre	303	85–9
Minerai de fer	125	90–9
Bauxite	518	90–95
Etain	60	75
Phosphates	850	50–60

NB: *Les données relatives au pétrole, au minerai de fer, à l'étain et aux peaux et cuirs correspondent à l'année 1973.*

Source: *F. Castro, 1984, p. 65.*

Tableau 9: Flux d'investissements directs vers les pays sous-développés et profits tirés des investissements directs rapatriés vers les pays investisseurs. (montants cumulés 1970–1980 en millions de dollars).

	Flux net d'investissements directs vers les pays sous-développés	Profits sur les investissements directs rapatriés vers les pays investisseurs
Total des pays sous-développés	62 615	139 703
Amérique Latine	33 437	38 642
Afrique	10 341	23 916
Moyen Orient	57a	48 619
Asie Sud-Est	18 048	27 260
Océanie	732	1 266

Ce faible chiffre est dû à des désinvestissements au Moyen Orient durant cette période.

Source: *Basé sur des données de la CNUCED of International Trade and Development Statistics Supplement 1981, pp. 264–265.*

SUMMARY

In this paper, the author is looking at the role which Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and International Financial Institutions (IFI) played in the social and economic crisis Africa is facing. In his introduction, he already argues that, although external factors are said to be the major causes of the crisis, one should also consider the role played by internal factors. He also mentions that quantitative data are not enough to assess the role of these institutions.

He then gives an overview of the extent of the crisis in Africa before considering the importance of the crisis in some sectors such as agriculture, industry, external relations. This, he assumes, gives a clear picture of the specific roles the external factors played in the economic and social crisis of the continent. He finally argues that the major resultats of the involvement of the IFI in the economy of our countries are an accelerated pauperization, the violent introduction of savage liberalism and a tighter integration of our countries in the International Division of Labour.

SOME COMMENTS ON THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR IN SIERRA LEONE

By

*A. B. ZACK-WILLIAMS**

Introduction

With an area of 28,000 Sq. miles and population of 3.3 million in 1978 *(1)*, Sierra Leone is one of the smallest states of Africa. With GNP per capita of $ 210 in 1978 *(2)*, Sierra Leone is ranked as one of the twenty poorest nations in the world. Yet in several respects Sierra Leone shares a number of social, political and economic features with other African countries. The vast majority of the population (75%) consists of peasant producers, cultivating the soil for subsistence as well as for cash *(3)*. Since Independence (in 1961) Sierra Leone has been characterised by political instability (a series of coups and attempted coups) which has led to the corrupt and authoritarian one-party regime of Siaka Stevens' All Peoples Congress (A.P.C.) *(4)*.

The growth rate of the economy since Independence has not been high by international standards *(5)*. Between 1960–78, GNP per capita grew at an average rate of 0.5% annually *(6)*. Furthermore, in the period 1970–78 GDP grew at constant prices by 10% from Le 343.8 million** to Le 379.2 million, i.e. just over 1% annually *(7)*. However when population growth rate (of 2.6%) is taken into consideration, the net average income actually declined. In short the economy has stagnated in the last twenty-one years.

This stagnation is in part due to the decline of Sierra-Leone's traditional agricultural exports, – cocoa, coffee, ginger and piassava. Total volume of agricultural export dropped from 85,000 tons in 1950 to 67,000 tons in 1963. This decline meant that whilst agriculture accounted for 51.6% of the value of total exports, the figure for 1963 was only 16.4% *(8)*. On the other side of the balance sheet, mineral exports increased in both volume and value. Diamond export in 1950 stood at 638,000 carats valued at £1,566,000. This figure rose to 1,739,000 carats in 1963 valued at £16,165,000. Similarly, iron ore export rose from 1,143,000 tons valued at £1,276,000 to almost 2,000,000 valued at £5,228,000 during the same period *(9)*.

This decline in agricultural exports has not been adequately compensated for by the rise in mineral exports, and this resulted in a chronic balance of payment difficulties. For example in the period 1967 through 1973, the balance of payment was in deficit in all years except 1968 *(10)*.

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** *Le 1 = £ 0.47.*

In order to overcome this constant deficit it was felt a policy of establishing import substituting industries was crucial *(11)*. The government thus embarked upon the «Open-door» policy. This economic philosophy involved five important ingredients: (1) little or no obstacle on profit repatriation by expatriate enterprises; (2) declaration of a non-nationalisation intent; (3) the enactment of the Development Act in 1960, which offered a number of incentives to prospective investors; (4) the establishment of an industrial estate in Wellington on the outskirt of the Capital, Freetown; (5) increased governmental participation in industrial ventures.

Manufacturing Sector

In this paper I want to look at the nature of the manufacturing sector in Sierra Leone. We shall look at such questions as the origin (foreign or local) of the firms in the sector; geographical location; the market (luxury or mass consumption) at which the products are aimed; types of inputs (local or imported) and linkages – since the utilisation of local raw materials has been the major rationale for the import substituting industry. Also related to this last point, we shall look at the question of employment in this sector.

In Sierra Leone the capitalist mode(s) of production is found in large scale manufacturing and in mining *(12)*. We now want to examine the characteristics of this mode which render it capitalist. By designating the manufacturing and mining sectors as capitalist, this implies, (1) social production assumes commodity form; (2) labour power is a commodity (i.e. it can be bought and sold); (3) capital is embodied in capital goods *(13)*. In other words, within the Sierra Leone social formation there are sellers and buyers of labour power – proletariats and capitalists. The former having been divorced from the means of production, are now dependent on wages for their means of subsistence. Furthermore, the relationship between the «free» labourer (proletariat) and the capitalist is dictated by market forces; and not by extra-economic coercion, as is the case under the tributary mode *(14)*. Unlike under the pre-capitalist modes, the direct producer has no «legal» claim to the final product. Thus the final producer is both alienated from the means of production *(15)* and the product of his labour. Concerning social relations, the direct producer under the capitalist mode is not tied to his employer by any kinship network and feels quite distant from him. They only meet in the market as seller of labour power and buyer of labour power.

The exploitation of the direct producer under the capitalist mode of production assumes the form of the appropriation of surplus value. In other words, labour produces value («total value») from which it is rewarded wages. The remainder, surplus value, is the property of the owners of capital (the capitalist class) who can appropriate it as they wish. Thus the relations of production under the capitalist mode is defined by the direct producer being alienated from the means of production, and the surplus value which he produces.

We now turn to look at the capitalist mode as it is represented in manufacturing. According to the National Accounts, manufacturing and handicrafts contributed in 1970/71 nearly 6% of G.D.P. *(16)*, and provided employment to about 5% of the labour force. This represents a drop of 2.7% from the 1963 figure. In 1971, 12.1% of the labour force in this sector was employed in manufacturing establishments employing six or more workers, while the remaining 87.9% were artisans and craftmen. In 1974, 46,948 establishments (manufacturing and non-manufacturing) employed fewer than 50 workers; 28 establishments employed more than 50, of which 6 employed more than 100 workers *(17)*. Of the total value – added by manufacturing sector in 1974, 80.5% was derived from food, beverages and tobacco products; and 8.1% from the manufacturing of chemicals and related products *(18)*. The average growth rate of the sector during the 1963–64/1970–71 period was 3.0% per annum, and was lower than the growth rate of GDP (4.3%) or the average industrial growth rate of 7.6% per annum recorded by developing countries in the decade of the sixties *(19)*.

The earliest industries in the modern sector to be established in Sierra Leone were directed toward import substitution *(20)*. They include beverages *(21)*. accounting for 19.6% of total value added of the modern industrial sub-sector in 1973–74; food industries processing agricultural products such as wheat mills, palm kernel mills, bakeries and biscuits. This group accounted for 30.3% of the total value-added by the modern industrial sub-sector in 1973–74. Other items include, tobacco and cigarette manufacturing, accounting for 30.6% of total value-added, and chemicals, including petroleum refining, paints, oxygen, acetylene, carbon dioxide, soap and matches, accounting for 8.1% of total value-added. The output of small-scale industries (employing less than six) accounted for 57% of total industrial output *(22)*.

In another work, I have listed all the 61 manufacturing firms operating within Sierra Leone in April 1977 *(23)*. In what follows, I would like to summarise some of the findings from this list of firms. Before that, however, I would like to examine briefly the operations of four firms operating in this sector. These four firms could be said to be typical of the subgroups from which they are taken, and as such they tell us a lot about the nature of the manufacturing sector.

National Confectionery Company Limited (NATCO)

Natco is one of a number of subsidiaries within Sierra Leone owned by the U. K. based T. Choitram group of companies. Through the Sierra Leone Bottlers the group bottles cheap imported wines and cooking oil. Choitram has always been active in the wholesale and retail trade *(24)*. Together with Chanrai and Chellaram they represent the most important groups of Indian capital in Sierra Leone.

Natco began operating in Sierra Leone in 1969, and by 1976 had capital to the value of Le 1,000,000, with a labour force of 140. Its products include candies *(clearmint* and *Black-mint)* and biscuits. Natco like most firms in the manufacturing industry has a very high import to product ratio. Partly because of the narrowness of the Sierra Leone market and partly because of the existence of the Customs Union, the Mano River Union, exports are now made to Liberia. During the period 1969–75, Natco's output fluctuated, though the trend was towards increased production. For example, output of confectionery rose from 1,225,000lbs in 1969 to 2,528,000 in 1970, then fell continuously over the next five years to 2,178,000 in 1974, but rose to 3,110,200 in 1975 *(25)*. The same trend holds for its biscuit line. The reason for this state of affairs is not quite clear. However, we are told that the company often experiences difficulties in importing flour *(26)*. Again it is not quite clear why Natco could not obtain its wheat from *Seaboard Flour Mill,* a local mill. One reason could be the fact that Natco produces its products under licence from overseas manufacturers *(27),* who in their bid to protect their brand, may have insisted on certain quality, which could only be obtained from certain grades of wheat.

Aureol Tobacco Company (A.T.C.)

A.T.C. was one of the early entrants into the import substitution sector. It was established in 1960 as a private subsidiary of the British American Tobacco Company. Under the 1960 Development Ordinance, A.T.C. was granted a development certificate and this entitled the company to a tax-holiday of six years *(28)*. Production rose from 438 million sticks in 1964 to 732 million in 1971. The labour force in 1977 stood at 300, and a two-shift system was in operation. Initially, A.T.C. bought all its raw materials (tobacco and wrapping paper) from abroad. Today local tobacco is used in making some popular brands, such as *Tabacca, Triple 5* and *Hollywood*. A.T.C. also has a share in *Rokel Leaf Tobacco Company,* the remainder being held by the state-owned National Development Bank. Rokel Leaf grows tobacco in Makeni in the Northern Province from which the popular brands are made. About 90–95% of the tobacco marketed is controlled by A.T.C.

Unlike most of the other companies operating in this sector A.T.C. makes a very important contribution to Government revenue. This takes the form of import duties on raw materials, and imported cigarettes, as well as excise duties on its own products. The company's turnover in 1978 stood at Le 23.9 million and paid duty and excise levies to the Sierra Leone Government to the tune of Le 13 million *(29)*.

Sierra Leone Industrial Investment Company Limited (S.I.V.C.O.)

This is a unique example of non-Sierra Leonean African participation in this sector. Sivco is tied up with Senegalese capital, and is an example of the domination of industrial capital over petty producers. Sivco moved into the Sierra Leone manufacturing sector by employing tailors who were once self-employed. These are now put to work by industrial capital producing trousers and shirts, as well as *Safari suits*.

With a labour force of 85 in 1977, Sivco's productive capacity was 12,000 pairs of trousers, 12,000 shirts or 6,000 suits or uniforms per month. The sales figure for the financial year ending March 1976 was Le 244,853.20. Production is primarily for the domestic market. The company, we are told, is able to meet domestic demand provided restriction is imposed on imported garments *(30)*, either through tariffs, quota or outright banning of such imports. Sales are done through retail shops in Freetown and the major towns in the Provinces. In 1977, Sivco commenced export to Nigeria. Subject to negotiations being finalised with companies in the USA, Sivco expects orders from that country.

Sierra Leone Diamonds (S.L.D.)

S.L.D. represents a unique experience in Sierra Leone. The company purchases rough and uncut diamonds from abroad for cutting, polishing and more recently mounting them on jewelry. Sierra Leone has, since the 1930's been an important exporter of diamonds. Given the traditional capitalist road (of the now developed countries) to development one would expect certain linkages to the extent that when diamonds run out, there will for example exist a nucleus of a diamond cutting centre. The truth is that peripheral capitalism such as Sierra Leone's assumes a different path. Thus, the linkages or economies of scale that would be found in diamond or other primary industry of the metropolitan centre is absent in Sierra Leone *(31)*.

It was this fear, that when diamonds ran out eventually, Sierra Leone would be left with nothing to show but malarial infested pits, that led the country's first Prime Minister, Sir Milton Margai, to ask the companies with the largest stake in the industry to look into the possibility of setting up a diamond cutting factory from which young Sierra Leoneans could learn the skill of diamond cutting and polishing.

Shares in S.L.D. are divided between four parties: Leon Templesman and Son Inc. 35%; Diamond Corporation West Africa Limited (Dicorwaf) *(32)* 25%; Consolidated African Selection Trust (CAST) *(33)* 25%; and the Sierra Leone Government 15%. There is one aspect of S.L.D.'s operation which makes it even more peculiar. One would expect the company to purchase rough and uncut diamonds locally, since the country produces ample supply of both gem and industrial use. In its early years the company used some locally produced stones, and since the company is geared towards using small stones, this involved pre-sorting, since the local stones are on average larger than those found in many other parts of the world. Previously, a member of S.L.D. staff was employed in Kenema, in the south-east of the country for this purpose. Today, only pre-sorted diamonds are brought from abroad. Thus the foreign exchange contribution which the company's officials so proudly talk off must be quite small.

Between its establishment in 1965 and 1975, over Le 2.5 million had been invested in the company, and the company is yet to make a profit *(34)*. By 1977, the company employed some 80 Sierra Leoneans, at all levels of responsibility, and one expatriate – the Managing Director. In the period 1974–77 sales of polished diamonds have averaged more than Le 1,000,000 annually. Like the main stream of the industry itself, all sales are made overseas, but in December 1977, the company started marketing its jewellery in Freetown. More than Le 300,000 are spent locally on purchase of goods and services each year, «and wages earned by employees of Sierra Leone Diamonds are not surpassed in any industry» *(35)*.

The activity of this company at first sight seems like an act of capitalist benevolence. How could these three companies (Templesman, Dicorwaf and Cast) which moved into the Sierra Leone diamond industry with the sole objective of profit making decide to embark on a venture which can be justified only on the grounds of social accountability? Is this not the acceptable face of capitalism? In order to answer these questions we must look at the role these companies play within the Sierra Leone diamond industry.

Leon Templesman and Son is an important buyer of Sierra Leone's diamonds. Templesman, a small but independent (off De Beers' Diamond Corporation) cutter, was for a long time in the late 1950's and early 1960's looking for later – alternative sources of supplies in order to by-pass the quota system of the Central Selling Organisation (C.S.O.). The opportunity for such an expansion came in 1962 when a dispute between the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (S.L.S.T.) *(36)*, and De Beers' Diamond Corporation (which controls much of the world marketing of diamonds) over prices led to S.L.S.T. withholding sales to the corporation. Instead sales were made to Harry Winston Inc. of New York, another independent cutter. In the subsequent arrangement that followed the dispute, it was decided that at least 50% of S.L.S.T. sales was to be made to the Diamond Corporation and that the remainder was to be sold to independent buyers, including Leon Templesman. The company has shown much appreciation for this opportunity that was accorded to it by the Sierra Leone Government, as can be seen from the generosity it has shown Sierra Leone Government officials *(37)*. Thus the diamond cutting factory could be seen as part of this appreciation on the part of the company.

Dicorwaf has been in Sierra Leone since the inception of the Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme in 1956, and manages the Government Diamond Office (G.D.O.) on behalf of the Sierra-Leone Government for a fee of Le 500,000 per annum. Furthermore, Dicorwaf buys Sierra Leone diamonds at a discount, a privilege which is accorded only one other company.

In the case of C.A.S.T. what is surprising is its reluctance and eventual decision to withdraw from further investment. C.A.S.T. is the parent company of the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (S.L.S.T.) the company which for almost 30 years had a monopoly in the mining of Sierra Leone's diamonds. Even in 1956 when this monopoly was breached S.L.S.T. was paid a compensation. S.L.S.T. also controls 49% of N.D.M.C., as well as the day-to-day running of the company. Thus we can suggest a counter-thesis to the one of capitalist benevolence. These companies were prepared to operate Sierra Leone Diamonds Limited, because of the «good will» which this brings them in Sierra Leone. In addition, being trans-national corporations, a certain degree of «transfer-pricing» *(38)* might be practised, so that what is lost in one operation is gained in the other.

Summary of the Manufacturing Sector

We shall now try to summarise some of the more general features of the manufacturing sector. Tables 1 & 2 below point to the predominance of foreign interests within this sector in particular, Lebanese and Indian interests. Non Sierra Leonean interests in this sector account for 64% of the total number of firms. By far the most important ownership is that of Lebanese interests, which account for over 43% of total ownership. Next comes Sierra Leonean ownership with just under 20%. However, this does not tell us much since one-half of the total Sierra Leonean

Table 1: Ownership of Manufacturing Firms

Single ownership								Joint Ownership (Mixed)	
Sierra Leonean		Non-Sierra Leonean							
Private	Govt.	Lebanese	Indian	British	USA	Other Europeans	Other Africans	Mixed Sierra Leonean others	Non-Sierra Leonean others
6	6	26	5	2	1	4	1	9	1
12		26	5	2	1	4	1	9	1
51								10	
								Grand Total = 61	

Source: *Calculated from the Field.*

Table II: Ownership of Manufacturing Firms in %

Single Ownership									Joint Ownership (Mixed)	
Sierra Leonean		Non-Sierra Leonean								
Private	Govt.	Lebanese	Indian	British	USA	Other Europeans	Other Africans		Mixed Sierra Leonean others	Non-Sierra Leonean others
9.8	9.8	42.6	8.1	3.2	1.6	6.5	1.6		14.7	1.6
19.6		42.6	8.1	3.2	1.6	6.5	1.6		14.7	1.6
					83,2				16,3	
									Grand Total = 99,5	

ownership is government controlled. Furthermore, Sierra Leonean ownership tends to be concentrated in small scale activities such as timber and logs, furniture and printing. Joint ventures with foreign investors have provided avenues for private Sierra Leonean capital to enter the manufacturing sector. The single most important private partner Sierra-Leonean investors chose as partner seems to be the Lebanese investor – since two-fifths of all such partnership is with Lebanese. One reason for this situation could be the need for Lebanese investors to overcome some of the obstacles and restrictions placed on their activities *(39)*. The joint ventures could be seen as a way of by-passing these restrictions.

It is important to note that in terms of ownership of manufacturing firms, metropolitan interests seem to be quite modest – 13.0% for single ownership, compared to 42.6% for Lebanese participation. However the category, ownership of manufacturing firms, does not tell us much about the size of capital. This is particularly important when we consider that actual Sierra Leonean interests tend to concentrate on the small scale manufacturing sector, which needs a relatively small amount of capital outlay *(40)*, whilst metropolitan based companies are to be found in the large capital intensive sector, such as mining, brewing, distilling and cigarette manufacturing.

Tables 3 and 4 show market orientation and location of factories in Sierra Leone. In order to decide the market orientation of a particular product, i.e. to decide whether it is a «luxury» or «mass» product, the question is posed: production for whom? Where production is oriented towards a mass market (the lower income groups) as is the case with matches and salt, the product can be defined as a «mass consumption» product. Similarly, where the goods such as foam matresses, clay bricks and marble tiles are destined for a very small (elitist) sector of the population, it is defined as luxury. Certain goods that are impossible to classify are recorded as unspecified. This applies to such commodities as feed meal which is for export and commercial use by livestock breeders. The tables show that 41% of the firms in this sector are oriented towards the mass market as opposed to 34% in the luxury sector and 25% unspecified. This relatively high level of orientation towards the mass market and the fact that the average size of the industrial establishment is very small, *(41)* is also indicative of the penetration which the capitalist mode has made into the petty commodity mode of production.

This conclusion regarding the dominance of «mass consumption goods over «luxury» goods, tends to run counter to Amin's conclusion regarding the bias towards luxury goods within peripheral social formations. *(42)* In his theoretical model of reproduction (or accumulation) on a world scale Amin noted that the fundamental difference between a self-centred system (developed capitalist formations) and the periphery (under-developed formations) lies in the determining relationship which links the major sectors of the economies. In the case of the former the link is between the production of mass consumption goods and the production of capital goods.

Table III: Market Orientation (Luxury/Mass), and Location of Factory: Western Area, Southern, Eastern, and Northern Provinces

Market Orientation			Location of Factory			
Luxury	Mass	Unspecified	Western Area	Southern Province	Eastern Province	Northern Province
21	25	15	52	6	3	–
61			61			

Table IV: In Percentages

Market Orientation			Location of Factory			
Luxury	Mass	Unspecified	Western Area	Southern Province	Eastern Province	Northern Province
34.0	41.0	25	85.2	9.8	4.9	0
100			100			

Source: *The Field.*

In the case of the periphery the determining relationship is that which links production of luxury goods with exports. In his view this accounts for the distorted structure and poor economic prospects for the periphery. AMIN argued that the narrowness of the domestic market did not aid the import-substitution industries which followed in the wake of political independence. The situation was exacerbated due to the fact that the new strategy of import substitution was designed to service the luxury market. However, as we have seen our data do not tally with Amin's conclusion. This inconsistency could be due to the fact that Amin's model (inspite of the emphasis on peripheral mode of reproduction) concentrated on semi-peripheral formations, which have been selected by imperialism as «*sites* in the Third World for the purpose of relocation of industrial activity from the advanced countries». *(43)*

Tables III and IV also point to the location of industries in Sierra Leone. The data show that over 85% of the industrial firms were located in the Western Area, i.e. Freetown and its environs. Outside the Western Area, the Southern Province was the next popular area for industrial firms. This area accounts for 9.8% of all industrial establishments in the country. Next was the Eastern Province with 4.9%. The Northern Province had no import substitution industry.

Two other features of the manufacturing sector are discernible. Firstly, the amount of jobs created is very small. We have already noted that almost 90% of people employed in manufacturing are artisans and craftsmen. The narrowness of the industrial wage labour force is due to the relative «technological over-kill» *(44)* of the manufacturing sector which has a negative effect on employment. Thus, unlike capitalism of the centre, the proletariat under peripheral capitalism tends to be small. This has far reaching political implications. The size of the proletariat coupled with the existence of non-capitalist modes of production, would indicate that the class struggle may assume a form other than that between capital and labour. There will be other variables, such as local (village) political issues that will take precedence over national issues. *(45)*

Secondly, if we look at the positive effects of import-substitution strategy on the balance of payment, we see that the effect is very minimal. One way of looking at this question is to try to see to what extent local raw materials are being used in the manufacturing process. Whilst it is easy to say that local raw materials are being used or not being used, it is not easy to quantify such statements. Tables V and VI try to come to grips with such a problem. Industries that are said to utilise local raw materials are those which use two or more raw materials or use one raw material which accounts for a *significant* proportion of raw material input; for example, A.T.C. uses only one local raw material (apart from fuel and power); i.e. tobacco from its subsidiary Rokel Leaf. But since this accounts for a third of its tobacco input, it is considered as using a significant proportion of local raw materials. Similarly, printing works which have to import all the papers needed are considered as not utilising any significant proportion of local raw materials.

Table V: Showing Degree of Utilisation of Local Raw Materials

Yes	No	Mass Industry Utilising	Mass Industry Not Utilising	Luxury Industry Utilising	Luxury Industry Not Utilising	Total
14	47	5	29	9	19	62*

* *One category being unspecified was counted as both mass and luxury.*

Table VI: Degree of Utilisation of Local Raw Material in Percentages

Yes	No	Mass Industry Utilising	Mass Industry Not Utilising	Luxury Industry Utilising	Luxury Industry Not Utilising	Total
22.9	77.0	8.1	46.8	14.5	30.6	100.0

Source: *The Field.*

Tables V and VI above show that 77% of the industries in this sector were not utilising any significant proportion of local raw materials, as opposed to just under 23% that utilised local raw materials. It is interesting to note that the industries which we have called luxury industries utilised a higher percentage of local raw materials (8.2%) than the mass consumption industry (6.5%). Some of the reasons for this high import – inputs have already been examined. These include: the fact that many of these firms are either subsidiaries of trans-national corporations or hold licence to produce the goods to specified standards. Thus, we saw that in case of Natco the need to maintain the quality meant that the company could not utilise the product from a local supplier, Seaboard Flour Mill. *(46)*

Conclusion

In this paper I have drawn attention to some of the major features of the manufacturing sector in Sierra Leone. I have noted that the import-substitution strategy was embarked upon largely in order to cure a perennial balance of payments problem.

In looking at the contribution to foreign exchange, we have noted that it is doubtful, to say the least, if any significant contribution was made by the import-substitution sector. Indeed, we have argued that because of the failure to utilise local raw materials, it is possible that the strategy may have increased the pressure on the balance of payments.

With regards to capital within this sector, we have noted the dominance of foreign capital, in particular Lebanese and Indian capital. Metropolitan capital is not as prevalent as Lebanese capital. There are two reasons for this situation: Firstly, Lebanese and Indian capital which once dominated merchant trading activities was able to make a transition to manufacturing. Indeed, it could be argued that the various indigenisation laws forced a number of Lebanese investors to move away from being merchant capitalist and to operate openly as industrial capitalists.

Secondly, it could be argued that Sierra Leone being a dependent peripheral formation (as opposed to semi-peripheral formations like Nigeria and Brazil), with small market potentials, carries less importance in the strategy of multinational corporations and other agencies of imperialism. Thus Sierra Leone does not offer the possibility of becoming an imperialist relay station, or a site for the purpose of production for the sub-region. Indeed, it is for this reason that the bias towards luxury goods production that Amin noted,tends not to be pronounced. The narrow nature of the Sierra Leone market is shown not only by her scanty population, but by the smallness of its «ruling» and «governing» classes. Frank Ly who has looked into this question in some depth has put the figure for the former at 5,000 people, and that of the latter at 1,000 families. *(47)* In short, the import substitution sector is geared towards the domestic market albeit a narrow one as such. The dominance of foreign capital has adversely affected the inflow of capital, and incomes distribution. For example, between 1963 and 1972, total direct foreign private investment was Le 71.2 million, whilst investment outflow (profits, dividends etc.) for the same period was Le 101.2 million, a net outflow of Le 30.0 million. *(48)* Furthermore, income distribution figures show that 1.1.% of national income is received by the lowest 20% of the population; whilst 36.2% of income is received by the top 5% of the population. *(49)* We can conclude by saying that industrialization in Sierra Leone is a classic example of peripheral industrialization generally, i.e. industrialization is merely a form of market access (demanded by nationalist development ideologies) which in fact valorises production in the centre.

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Footnotes

1. A.M.M. Hoogvelt, *The Third World in Global Development,* Macmillan, 1982, p. 18.
2. Ibid.
3. For a detailed analysis for the development of cash crop production in Sierra Leone see this author's «Merchant Capital and Underdevelopment in Sierra Leone», in *The Responsibility of Political Science in Africa* ABU Zaira., and «Forms of Capital and Underdevelopment in Sierra Leone», *Review of African Political Economy,* Forthcoming.
4. On the authoritarianism of the Sierra Leone policy, see Allen, *Sierra Leone,* in John Dunn (ed) *West African States: Failure and Promise,* Cambridge, 1978, p. 189–210.
5. A.B. Zack – Williams, *Underdevelopment and Economic Planning in West Africa* M. Sc. Salford University 1976, p. 129.
6. Hoogvelt, op. cit.
7. Frank Ly «Sierra Leone: The Paradox of Economic Decline and Political Stability», *Monthly Review,* June 1980 p. 10–26.
8. Figures from G. Saylor, *The Economic System of Sierra Leone,* Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 1967, p. 38.
9. Ibid, p. 128.
10. See «Sierra Leone», *Surveys of African Economies,I.M.F.,* Vol.6 p.441. According to R. A. Nickson, this fall in agricultural export could not be blamed on the adverse terms of trade. He suggests that «the principal cause probably lies with domestic factors». See R. A. Nickson, «The Terms of Trade of Sierra Leone», mimeo available at the Ministry of Development, Freetown.
11. This view of import substitution as a kind of panacea for economic backwardness (which was also related to the «Prebish thesis») was prevalent among third world nationalists. For example, in Latin America, it was referred to as development «towards the inside», as opposed to «outward-directed growth», see D. Booth, Andre Gunder Frank: An introduction and Appreciation», in I. Oxaal, T. Barnett, and D. Booth, *Beyond the Sociology of Development,* RKP, 1975, p. 50–85.
12. For a detailed analysis of the modes of production within Sierra Leone, see this author's *Underdevelopment and the Diamond Industry in Sierra Leone,* Unpublished Ph. D Thesis, Sheffield University 1980.
13. S. Amin, *Imperialism and Unequal Development,* Monthly Review, 1977, p. 38.
14. For detailed analysis of pre-capitalist modes see Amin op. cit., also his *Unequal Development* Harvester Press, 1976, and *Class and Nation Historically and in the Current Crisis,* Heinemann, 1980; and B. Hindess and P.Q. Hirst *Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production,* Macmillan, 1975.
15. It is true that a section of the «Proletariat» still has usufructuary right to land, but they do not own the tools with which they work, nor the factory in which they work.
16. The figure for 1974 was 5%, and the annual growth rate for 1970/74 was 2.7%. *See Encyclopedia of the Third World* 1978.
17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.
19. National Development Plan 1974/75 – 1978/79, Sierra Leone Government, Freetown, August, 1974.
20. *Encyclopeadia of the Third World* op. cit. See also Zack-Williams, 1976, op. cit., p. 131–2.
21. With regards to beer brewing, Walter Rodney has noted that: «looking at the development plans of every African Nation one finds that a beer factory will usually figure number one or number two on the list. Building a beer factory is considered as the first step towards industrialisation! Quite apart from the fact that I don't know of beer as having developed any nation, one has to realise the fallacy on which the claims are based». See his «Problems of Third World Development: A Discussion of Imperialism and Underdevelopment», Transcription of a discussion held at the African Studies Centre, U.C.L.A., on May 30th, 1972, p. 33.
22. Zack-Williams, 1976, op. cit., p. 132.
23. See Zack-Williams 1980, p. 338–344. These companies are divided by the Sierra Leone Government into 7 sub-groups: Food beverages and tobacco industries; wearing apparel, textiles and other articles made of textiles; wood and wood products; paper products printing and publishing industries; plastic, rubber and allied industries, chemical, mineral and petroleum products industries; metal products, furniture and fixture industries.
24. See H.L. Van der Laan, *The Lebanese Traders of Sierra Leone,* Mouton, The Hague/Paris, 1975.
25. Figures from Ministry of Development Freetown. See also Zack-Williams 1980, p. 126.
26. R.A. Jofre, *The Mining and Manufacturing Industries and its Potential in Sierra Leone,* (DU/SIL/70/510/11–01/12) U.N. Industrial Development Organisation N.D., at Ministry of Development Library Freetown.
27. Most of Natco's products are household brand names in Britain: *Nice, Ginger-Nut, Custard Cream, Cabin Biscuit, Clear Mint and Black Mint.*
28. F.A.N. Lisk, *The Political Economy of Sierra Leone,* Unpublished Ph. D Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1974, p. 324.
29. *West Africa,* 12 February 1979, p. 272.
30. *Multinationals or Transnational Corporations in Sierra Leone* Industrial Development Division, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Freetown, February 1977.
31. For a systematic analysis of the differences between centre and peripheral social formations see S. Amin, *Accumulation of a World Scale,* Vols. I & II Monthly Reviews, New York, 1975; «Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model», *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. I, No. 1, 1974, p. 9–26, see also Amin 1976, 1977; and 1980 fully referenced in footnotes 13 and 14.
32. A subsidiary of De Beers of South Africa.
33. Also a distant cousin of De Beers with 5% holding in the company.
34. Interview with Managing Director, April 1977.
35. *Sierra Leone Diamonds Limited* Published by the company N.D.

36. S.L.S.T. had a monopoly, to mine Sierra Leone's diamonds from 1933 until this was breached in 1956 with the inauguration of the Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme. The company is wholly owned by CAST, in which De Beers has 5% shares. In 1969, the Sierra Leone Government bought controlling shares (51%) in SLST to form the National Diamond Mining Company (S.L.) Ltd., with SLST controlling the day-to-day running of the new company.
37. Many Government officials have been entertained at the company's expense.
38. This refers to internally-determined pricing policy of transnational corporations, which does not necessarily reflect the world market price for the product concerned as would normally occur when the buyer and the seller are different companies. This means that even though loss is made at the diamond cutting end of the operation, this could be made good by the other operations of the company.
39. In a series of Acts passed after 1961, successive Sierra-Leonean Governments have tried to define areas which non-citizens could not participate. Under such threat of exclusion, Lebanese entrepreneurs have sought a timely alliance with prominent political figures.
40. N.C. Cox-George, *Report of African Participation in the Commerce of Sierra Leone,* Government Printers Freetown.
41. C. Ledholm and E. Chuta, *The Economics of Rural and Urban Small-scale Industries in Sierra Leone;* African Rural Economy, Paper, No. 14, 1976, Njala University, Sierra-Leone and Michigan State University, U.S.A., p. 12.
42. See Amin 1974; 1975, 1976, 1977 and 1980.
43. Hoogvelt, *The Third World in Global Development* p. 65.
44. This phrase belongs to Hoogvelt, «Indigenisation and Technological Dependency», *Development and Change,* Sage, London, and Beverly Hills, Vol. II (1980), p.271
45. V. Minikin, *Local Politics in Kano District Sierra Leone, 1945–70;* Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Birmingham University 1971. Minikin has argued that in Sierra Leone local political issues took precedence over national issues because of the nature of the brokerage system which developed in Sierra Leone to cope with problems resulting from the colonial power imposing the institution of an integrated nation state on a fragmented «plural» society.
46. Similarly, Hoogvelt found that in Kano the blanket factory could not utilise yarn spun by other local factories, and had to import its yarn. Also the match factory imported all its splints «despite the abundance of wood and pulp – processing industries that could easily supply the splints except, of course, that these local splints are not to the quality specification of the sensitive and sophisticated German match making machines». See «Indigenisation and Technological Dependency», op. cit., p. 265.
47. Frank Ly, «Sierra Leone—» op. cit. p. 13.
48. Zack-Williams, 1976, p. 140.
49. *Encyclopaedia of the Third World,* op. cit.

RESUME

Dans cet article, l'auteur étudie la nature de l'industrie manufacturière au Sierra Leone. Il s'intéresse particulièrement aux aspects suivants : les origines des firmes travaillant dans ce secteur, leur localisation, le marché pour lequel elles produisent, les types d'intrans ainsi que ses rapports avec les autres branches de l'économie sans oublier le problème de l'emploi dans ce secteur. Après avoir souligné ce qui caractérise ce secteur par rapport aux autres secteurs, il en arrive à la conclusion que la Sierra Léone qui s'était engagée dans la voie d'une industrialisation de substitution aux importations pour résoudre un problème de déficits chroniques de la balance des paiements n'a pas en réalité pu le résoudre parce que les matières premières locales n'ont pas été utilisées.

Pour ce qui est des capitaux, ils sont restés dominés par ceux des libanais et des indiens pour deux raisons essentielles : les capitaux libanais et indiens qui ont toujours dominé dans les activités commerciales ont pu faire la transition et passer au secteur de l'industrie manufacturière. L'autre raison est que des pays comme la Sierra Léone intéressent peu les multinationales et les autres agences de l'impérialisme à cause de la taille réduite de leur marché. Ainsi la tendance à la production de biens de luxe n'est pas très prononcée car le secteur de substitution à l'importation est orienté vers la satisfaction des besoins du marché intérieur, même s'il reste petit. En outre, la domination des capitaux étrangers a eu des effets néfastes sur l'entrée des capitaux ainsi que sur la distribution des revenus. Ainsi, si on considère la période comprise entre 1963 et 1972, les capitaux qui sont entrés en Sierra Léone ont été évalués à 71,2 millions de Leones alors que 101,2 millions en sont sortis au cours de la même période, soit une différence de 30 millions de Leones.

En ce qui concerne la distribution des revenus, seul 1,1% du revenu national va aux plus pauvres des 20% de la population tandis que 5% de la frange la plus aisée reçoivent 36,2%. Donc pour la Sierra Léone aussi, l'industrialisation est simplement une forme d'accès au marché qui profite plus au centre qu'à la périphérie.

THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN EASTERN AFRICA: SELECTED POLICY-RELATED ISSUES

By

Paul. B. VITTA *

Introduction

Increasingly large numbers of the people living in both the rural and urban Third World depend for their livelihood upon a class of activities known since the early 1970s as the *informal sector* (Sethuraman 1976, p. 96; 1977, p. 343). The class consists of activities in petty production and petty services that (unlike formal-sector activities) are not enumerated in official labour statistics, and that are small in scale. In this article, I have set for myself two tasks. *First,* I wish to describe some of the main features that the informal sector displays in Eastern Africa, particularly with regard to food-production activities and their energy requirements. I am especially interested in the type of policy measures these features imply on the part of the governments in the region. *Second,* therefore, I wish to suggest policy responses that these features call for in certain selected areas. The choice of Eastern Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia) as a theatre of the informal-sector activities to be described, and of food-production activities and their energy requirements as areas to be emphasized was determined by the purposes for which this article was written originally**. Beyond that the choice is arbitrary. Consequently many of the points raised are valid beyond the limits implied by that choice.

Features of the Informal Sector in Eastern Africa

1.1 Urban concentration

One of the features characteristic of informal-sector activities in Eastern Africa is their *urban concentration.* While a number of them are located in the countryside, the great majority of them are to be found in cities and towns – in Addis Ababa, Asmara, and Dire Dawa, in Ethiopia; in Nairobi, Nakuru, Mombasa and Kisumu, in Kenya; in Dar-es-Salaam, Mwanza, Moshi, Arusha and Tanga, in Tanzania; in Kampala and Jinja, in Uganda; and so on. This feature stems from a number of factors, chief among which is the manner in which Eastern Africa's urban population

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* *I.D.R.C. (International Development Research Center, Ottawa, Canada. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author; they do not necessarily reflect policies of the International Development Research Center.*

** *A revised version of a paper originally prepared for a workshop on Technology Policy and Planning for the Informal Sector in Eastern Africa (Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia – 28th January, 8th February 1985).*

have grown. As Table 1 shows, they have grown at rates (3 to 9% annually) which far exceed the corresponding total population growth rates (2 to 4% annually), reflecting net rural-urban migration. As a result, urban labour forces have swelled at rates that are greater than those at which formal-sector firms have expanded to provide additional employment. A rough indication of the magnitude of this disparity is provided by the following estimate: a manufacturing sector initially employing 20% of a labour force growing at 3% per annum would have to expand by 18% per year just to absorb the *new* entrants into the labour market (Sandbrook 1982, p. 57).

Table 1: Total and urban populations and their growth rates

Country	Total Population		Urban Population	
	Total, mid-1982 (millions)	Average annual growth, 1970-82 (%)	Total 1982 (% of total population)	Average annual growth, 1970-1982 (%)
Ethiopia	32.9	2.0	15	5.6
Kenya	18.1	4.0	15	7.3
Sudan	20.2	3.2	23	5.8
Tanzania	19.8	3.4	13	8.5
Uganda	13.5	3.0	9	3.4
Zambia	6.0	3.1	45	6.5

Source: *World Bank 1984*

But, as shown in Table 2, not even Kenya, industrially the most successful country in Eastern Africa, has registered a manufacturing growth rate (here approximated by the rate of growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)) anywhere near 18%. This disparity between the growth rates of urban labour forces and available formal-sector employment has then forced more and more people in urban areas to take up informal-sector activities as a means of earning their livehood, resulting in an urban concentration of informal-sector activities.

Table 2: Growth rates of labour forces and of the GDP

Country	Average Annual growth of total labour force, 1970–82 (%)	Average Annual growth of urban labour force, 1970–82 (%)	Average Annual growth rate of GDP, 1970/82 (%)
Ethiopia	1.7	4.8	2.2
Kenya	3.3	6.0	5.5
Sudan	2.8	5.1	6.3
Tanzania	2.6	6.5	4.0
Uganda	2.1	2.4	– 1.5
Zambia	2.3	4.8	0.9

Source: *World Bank 1984 for columns 1 and 3; column 2 is derived).*

1.2 Worker composition

A second feature of informal-sector activities in Eastern Africa has to do with *the composition* of those engaged in them. There have been occasions on which the informal sector has been romanticized wishfully, by those working in it being protrayed as independent souls who so value their freedom that they have eschewed employment in the formal sector in favour of work in the informal sector because of the prospects the latter offers of independence through self-employment. The truth of the matter, however, is that most of those working in the sector are there *not* because of their love of freedom; *they are there because they have failed to obtain formal-sector employment.* This is confirmed by the fact of informal-sector workers always keeping an eye on job opportunities in the formal sector and of their eagerly seizing the first such opportunities when they see them. It is confirmed also by the low esteem which others have of informal-sector workers. In Kenya, for example, informal-sector auto-mechanics are pejoratively referred to as «jua-kali» (literally, «hot-suns»), because they work in «open-air garages». One centre of informal-sector activities in Nairobi is derisively called «Machakos Airport», because of the hustle and bustle there. The name has little to do with the movement of aircraft or with the Kenyan town of Machakos. Nor is the use of pejorative expressions to refer to the informal-sector confined to Kenya alone; it exists in Tanzania, in Uganda, and so on. In Tanzania, for example, informal-sector activities are called «mango-tree» operations – even when there is no mango tree in sight.

The *ultimate* cause of the failure of informal-sector workers in their bids to obtain formal-sector employment, of course, is the shortfall of the number of available jobs below the number of those aspiring to them (sub-section 1.1 above). There are *immediate* causes also, however. Examples of such causes are the lack of required educational qualifications, the absence of timely intervention by an influential godfather, etc.. So important are the immediate causes, in fact, that the composition of informal-sector workers is determined largely by *them,* with the ultimate cause serving merely to determine the *number* of informal-sector workers. Because of these immediate causes, a vast majority of informal-sector workers in Eastern Africa are male (in Western Africa, a large fraction of them are female), relatively young, without much formal education or training, and generally with poor-family backgrounds.

But while this is a generally accurate profile of those engaged in informal-sector activities, in Eastern Africa recent economic and political changes have so acted as to modify that profile in certain significant ways. Declines in real incomes over the past and present decades, whether caused by inflation alone (Uganda, Kenya) or by inflation *and* new social policies

(Ethiopia, Tanzania) have forced many individuals in the formal sector to dabble in informal-sector activities (either directly or indirectly through proxies), in an attempt to shore up drops in their income. This phenomenon is changing the informal sector's make-up, by infusing into it some of the most highly educated individuals around. Because of their generally poor rates of remuneration, teachers, including university academics, may occupy the leading position among the new entrants into the sector.

In addition, the increasing use of proxies is reducing the degree of self-employment normally associated with the informal sector. Increasingly, the «owners» of shoe-shine stands, soft-drink kiosks, village butcheries, mangotree barbershops, tailoring marts, backyard poultry farms, roadside garages, wayside smithies, and other informal-sector enterprises are in fact only front men for, and therefore really under the employ of, university lecturers, government bureaucrats and formal-sector businessmen. This distortion, of course, has some disadvantages (it squeezes the *real* informal-sector workers out of their sector). But, as will be seen later, it also offers novel opportunities that should not be missed, notwithstanding the fact that they *are* being missed. The distortion represents, in any case, a phenomenon which deserves close investigation. Information is needed (but still missing) on the scale of this phenomenon and on the extent to which it is modifying the traditional dynamics of the informal sector.

1.3 Activities

The *nature* of informal-sector activities and the *manner* in which they are carried out form yet another feature. Both of these reflect certain Eastern African life styles. Typically, more than 80% of East Africans live in rural areas. Agriculture (maize, rice, sorghum and millet are the traditional crops) and animal husbandry (cattle, sheep and goats are the traditional livestock) form the dominant rural occupations, engaging, again, more than 80% of all people of working age (which begins in the early teens, compelling children to forsake their youth to help earn a living). The scale of production in both agriculture and animal husbandry is generally at the «subsistence level»: it is small, and there is little surplus left over after consumption at source. East Africans, like other Africans, live in extended families. Most of them have settled into fixed homesteads. A number of nomadic tribes (e.g., the Masai in Kenya and Tanzania) still remain, however. These tend to be pastoral. As many anthropological studies have consistently confirmed, they also tend to be the most resistant to technical change. Their animal wealth can be considerable, but inflexible rules governing its use or disposal make it inaccessible for purposes of improving living and working conditions; for many practical purposes it does not exist. Animals are a good source of proteins; further, they can be made to draw ploughs. But these are subjects that the Dinkas of Sudan (and other cattle-owning tribes elsewhere) will not even discuss. Their cattle herds exist, but conditions would be practically the same if they did not.

In urban areas, the home of 10 to 30% East Africans, matters are considerably different. Notwithstanding stated policies concerning rural development, urban areas are still the home also of most formal-sector industries. This circumstance has several effects on the nature of informal-sector activities in urban areas. Many of these activities appear as responses to, and are therefore linked to and dependent upon, opportunities offered (usually inadvertently) by formal-sector firms: industrial waste provides valuable raw materials for informal-sector activities; factory labourers are an unfailing clientele for roadside food and drink vendors, and their wives for home-based dress makers; tourists who roam in the towns and cities are reliably gullible buyers of the «native» art sold by street peddlers; and so on. For this reason urban informal-sector activities cover a considerably wider range than rural informal-sector activities. (Notwithstanding urban zoning regulations to the contrary, they even include backyard *farming!*). But while the links between urban informal-sector activities and the formal sector usually work in favour of those activities, they also make those activities susceptible to the rise and fall in the fortunes of the formal sector. When those fortunes rise, virtually all informal-sector workers flock into the relevant activities, but only to stampede out again when the fortunes fall. This contributes to the characteristically circuitous routes informal-sector workers normally take to reach the jobs they happen to be in, so that one of the distinguishing characteristics of informal-sector artisans is their having moved through a whole variety of other occupations before «settling» on what they happen to be engaged in currently (King 1977, p. 106).

1.4 Technologies

It is useful for the purposes of this article to distinguish three broad categories of technology (Girvan 1983, p. 15): (i) *production,* (ii) *consumption,* and (iii) *organizational technology. Production technology* (the commonest and most familiar) consists of: a) the physical and chemical *processes* of production (also called *process* technology; b) the *materials, tools, implements,* and *machines* that are associated with these processes and the *structures* in which those processes take place; c) the *knowledge* about, and the *skills* associated with, both the abstract and the material elements of production; and d) the *people* possessing the knowledge and skills, and the *institutions* within which they are organized. *Consumption technology* (much less frequently referred to in the literature) refers to the *characteristics* of the goods and services that create and/or satisfy requirements at the consumer level. A food product, for example, can have characteristics beyond its nutritional value and flavour; it can have additional characteristics arising from its presentation, packaging and advertising image, or from the status it confers upon those who eat it in relation to others who also do and even to the rest who do not. Consumption technology integrates these additional characteristics into products and services and subsequently promote those products and services. Finally, ***organizational*** technology refers to the organization of production and the structure of the social relations of production, associated with particular production and consumption technologies.

A fourth feature distinguishing the informal sector in Eastern Africa (and elsewhere) is the *low level of the technologies it employs.* Organizational technologies are rudimentary; often management and the technical relations of production all fall within a single family. Consumption technologies, too, are generally uninnovative; they are repetitive and invariable. In food- production actitivities, for example, they are rigidly tied to traditional eating habits which leave little room for experimentation with alternative ways of producing and processing food. Variations would require great promotional efforts and, for that reason, are rarely attempted.

On the other hand production technologies are easily the centre of the innovative activities of the informal sector. But even these are severely handicapped by the constraints (given below) to which the sector is subject. Further limits are imposed by the nature of the sources of the energy used to power these activities. In agriculture, in which rural activities are concentrated, for example, the bulk of activities are carried out by means of simple implements (hand hoes, adzes, etc..) moved by raw *human* muscle power. There is increasing use of technologies (such as ploughs, threshers, etc..) in which beasts of draught (oxen, donkeys, etc..) provide the power, but they are still widely considered to be curiosities. They are favourite spectacles especially for rural children, who congregate around them in snickering platoons.

After muscle power, fuelwood is the next most important energy form. In Ethiopia, it constitutes over 90% of all nonmuscular energy consumed (Ethiopia 1979, p. 12). It is used equally or nearly as predominantly in Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. While it is renewable, informal-sector technologies used to convert it into the desired forms (heat, charcoal, etc..) are usually so inefficient that they consume it at rates greater than those at which it is replenished. Informal-sector techniques for producing charcoal, for example, use *earth kilns,* with which it is estimated that it takes ten tons of wood to produce one ton of charcoal (NCST 1980, p. 94). Likewise, traditional cooking stoves have efficiencies of only about 10% (Nkonoki 1981, p. 71), owing to intakes of only small fractions of the total heat produced. Because of extensive but inefficient use of fuel wood, wood stocks are rapidly diminishing and forests steadily receding. Women have to walk farther and farther to reach the nearest sources of fuel wood. Afforestation is obviously the most logical and feasible answer. But even that is fraught with problems, for if it takes ten tons of wood to produce one ton of charcoal, it takes one acre of forest land to yield that amount of wood and therefore that quantity of charcoal (NCST 1980, p. 94). At these rates of conversion, afforestation soon begins to compete with other land uses (notably, agriculture and cattle grazing), and may eventually come to a halt. But even when afforestation does continue, informal-sector activities are likely to be conducted informally, and the disciplined restraint required to wait till a forest has matured is likely to give way to selfish impatience and premature plunder («A watched pot never boils»).

1.5 Default

A fifth feature of the informal sector in Eastern Africa lies in the manner in which informal-sector activities have supplemented formal-sector activities. It has not been a case of the informal sector merely filling a few old gaps overlooked by the formal-sector. On the contrary, often the role of the informal-sector has been more than supplementary. Not rarely, the role of informal-sector activities has been a major one. This has been the case particularly since the early 1970s. Since then Eastern Africa's economies have steadily performed poorly, resulting in lower and lower production by the formal-sector. This was especially the case in Uganda during Idi Amin's rule, but it was also true in varying degrees elsewhere in Eastern Africa. Some product lines (such as shoe-making in Tanzania) were even shut off completely. This development created scarcities, in response to which informal-sector activities then sprouted, almost spontaneously, in the relevant product lines. The precise nature and dynamics of the growth of informal-sector activities, of course, has differed from country to country. But nearly everywhere scarcity has fathered the relevant informal-sector activities and necessity has been the mother of invention in those activities. In a sense, therefore, a number of informal-sector activities have come into being by default. Had the formal-sector lived up to expectations, they would not have come into existence.

1.6 Past and Present Policy Initiatives

The last feature which will be considered here is the ***ambivalence*** of past and present policy initiatives with regard to informal-sector activities. Disenchantment with the sluggish growth of the formal economy has lead to some policy initiatives designed to accelerate growth of the informal sector. But, at the same time, a nagging feeling has persisted that informal-sector activities really are not so much alternatives to the ailing formal-sector activities as symptoms of the malaise of these activities. And if this is so, then «you could not exalt into national policy a sector that was the underbelly of the beast you wished to transform» (King 1977, p. 95). Is the informal-sector here to stay, or is it expected to «wither away» as more and more of its activities become formal-sector operations, through the infusion into them of newer and newer techniques? Again, the picture is ambivalent.

The ambivalence has not been caused only by the inability to decide whether the informal-sector is part of the solution or whether it is a symptom of the problem, or whether it is a permanent or transient sector. It has been caused also by a conflict in views about what policy measures are supportive of the sector. Thus while it is generally agreed that programmes aimed at bringing improvements into the sector by infusing more efficient technologies into it (sub-section 1.4) are necessary, a debate still rages over suitable *methods*. There is no controversy over *indirect* methods (*general* popularization of technology, *general* provision of physical infrastructure, etc...). There is disagreement, however, over *direct* methods (arrangements for supplies of inputs, credit, industrial extension service, marketing assistance). There are those who argue that direct methods are «the shot in the arm» that the informal-sector requires. However, others liken such methods to «artificial respiration», and consider them justified only in case of «emergency». When employed in normal circumstances, they argue, such methods, because their exorbitant costs preclude universal application, can result in a «pampering of a fortunate few», and, therefore, in ensuring that informal-sector enterprises are and remain few (Müller 1980, p. 148). One of the great advantages of the informal-sector is ease of entry, arising partly from the fact that little capital is required to launch an activity in the sector. Assistance to the sector can destroy this advantage by introducing costs which then serve as barriers against entry. Even when limited to regulation through government edicts, assistance could end in stifling informal-sector initiative.

Foremost among past and present policy initiatives taken in Eastern Africa to strengthen the informal sector have been the establishment and subsequent support of institutions to service the sector. Such institutions include the Handicrafts and Small-scale Industries Agency (HASIDA) in Ethiopia; the Kenya Industrial Estates Limited (KIE) in Kenya; the Small-scale Industrial Development Organization (SIDO) in Tanzania, the Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO) in Zambia, and so on. In this case, the ambivalence in official attitudes, towards the informal-sector is often reflected by fluctuations in annual government subventions to these and other similar institutions and in the priorities set for them from time to time.

One other class of past and present policy initiatives introduced in Eastern Africa consists of «campaigns» – i.e. bursts of activity the aim of which is to mobilize local masses and galvanize their attention toward some specific goal. They often go under catchy names and arresting slogans (usually in the local language): *Harambee!* (Let us pull together!) in Kenya; *Mtu ni afya* (Man's essence is his health); *Siasa ni kilimo* (The real politics is agriculture) in Tanzania; and so on. Because of their seasonal and *ad hoc* nature, campaigns, of course, should not be equated with policies. Moreover, not all campaigns are of relevance to the informal-sector. Nor do they always successfully transcend mere exhortation. Still, they are clearly more effective in bringing about change than many codified policies that are never enforced. This is especially so in the African context. But again, even campaigns have shown ambivalence towards the informal-sector. Occasionally, one campaign has set in motion what a subsequent campaign has been mounted to put out. (In response to food shortages in 1974, for example, Tanzania launched a food-producing campaign *(Kilimo cha kufa na kupona)* which spawned some innovative activities in urban backyards which, however, were snuffed out by subsequent «keep-our-cities-and-towns-clean» campaigns).

Selected Policy Considerations

The features of Eastern Africa's informal-sector described above, contain some indications as to the policy initiatives required to stimulate and guide the sector's future growth. In view of the increasingly important role that the informal sector seems likely to play in the future, these indications merit consideration.

1.1 Rural Development

So long as living and working conditions continue to be poorer in rural than in urban areas, rural-urban migration will not stop, and urban labour forces will continue to swell faster than the formal sector can generate employment for them (sub-section 1.1, p. 58). Thus while the need for informal-sector growth may be (and *is)* more urgent in urban than in rural areas, greater growth of the urban than the rural informal-sector is only likely to fuel further rural-urban migration and thus to intensify the initial problem. Rural development thus appears to be the only ultimate solution, notwithstanding the many and formidable difficulties it entails.

With the entry of greater and greater droves of school leavers in the labour market, rural-urban migration has recently taken an ominous turn. Nearly all school leavers aspire to urban jobs, because this is the surest way of putting maximum distance between themselves and the druggery of rural employment. Thus the attainment of universal primary education (UPE), though pursued assidiously as a success benchmark, in fact, also has disadvantages. As it universalises education, UPE also tends to universalise rural-urban migration. Nor can this tendency be reversed merely by doctoring the school curriculum (as seems to be indicated by Tanzania's gallant but seemingly ill-started attempt to turn education into training in self-reliance). School leavers' job aspirations are shaped less by what they have been taught than by what they perceive as the best opportunities available to them in the job market. In other words, teach a boy agriculture and he will still aspire to a clerical job if clerks earn more than farmers (which is certainly the case).

1.2 Technological Improvement

Great priority must be accorded to technological improvement. The technologies employed in the informal-sector are based largely on empirical knowledge, culled from previous struggles to survive and transmitted from one generation to the next by oral tradition. This knowledge is obviously useful. Its lack of a scientific base, however, makes the technologies it generates static and inefficient (sub-section 1.4, p. 62). There is a need consequently to inject into the sector *new* technologies that «sit well» in it, but which are nevertheless more efficient. Provided the points of entry are selected judiciously, such intervention can lead to dramatic improvements. Take food as an example. African food supplies can be raised either by increasing food production or by reducing food loss (or, of course, by a combination of the two). Post-harvest food losses in threshing, drying, transport and storage by traditional techniques range from 20 to 40%, with losses during storage alone amounting to about 5% (UNIDO 1979, p. 4). These losses could be *halved* with relative ease by making simple improvements upon existing informal-sector techniques, yielding a 10 to 20% rise in food supplies. In contrast, an increase of this magnitude would be far more difficult to realise through improvements in existing techniques used to *produce* food. In other words, entry at an early point in the postharvest phase is likely to be more effective than entry, say, at the cultivation stage. Quite apart from practical considerations, there is also a mathematical point. To compensate for a postharvest loss fraction f requires raising production by the *higher* fraction $f\,(1-f)$. To compensate for a postharvest loss of 30%, for example, would require a 43% rise in production; a postharvest loss of 50% would require a 100% rise; and so on. Again, the wisdom of early intervention in the postharvest phase is confirmed.

There is, of course, no easy and dramatic way of introducing technological improvements into the informal-sector. Instead, such improvements must be sought patiently on several fronts. These include the following.

a) Training: Training programmes aimed at upgrading the sector's technical skills are required. To be effective, such programmes must be organized in as a decentralized manner as possible. The initial effort can be multiplied and accelerated through the training of trainers to train those who will then actually be involved in training in the sector. Since such training is compatible with the existing activities of conventional «change agents» (agricultural extension workers, village development officers, public health workers, etc...), it can be added onto those activities.

b) Demonstration: Demonstration programmes offer another alternative. Conventional forms of such programmes include trade fairs and demonstration centres. Over the past two decades, however, a new form has emerged which offers new opportunities. More and more formal-sector employees are engaging in informal-sector activities (Sub-section 1.2, p. 60). Because of their better education, they are introducing better and better techniques into these activities. These new techniques eventually rub off also on the traditional informal-sector workers. Unfortunately, the opportunities this development offers can be eclipsed by other considerations. Fastidious enforcement of «one man – one job» policies, for example, would tend to foreclose those opportunities. This was the case, for example, in Tanzania, especially in the 1970s, when the country had sanctimoniously clamped on itself an austere leadership code which forbade sideline activities on the part of virtually everyone with an education, thereby sealing off the informal sector from much potential innovation.

c) Links: The infusion of new techniques into the informal sector could be accelerated further through direct links with the formal sector. Such links might involve temporary attachments of informal-sector workers in formal-sector firms, sub-contracting of formal-sector activities to informal-sector entreprises (Watanabe 1983, p. 80), and so on.

1.3 The Agricultural Imperative

Because of the preponderance of agriculture as an economic activity (sub-section 1.3, p. 61), technological improvement in this area is imperative. Contrary to earlier belief that Africa could meet its food requirements merely by *using* its existing agricultural resources more efficiently, it now appears that relatively little gain can be achieved by taking advantage of this slack – relatively, at least, to the alternative of doubling and quadrupling labour *productivity* in the area through technological improvement. Moreover, just as technological improvement is more important in agriculture than in any other areas during the early stages of development, it results in more employment and in a more equitable distribution of income if it occurs in agriculture than if it occurs in any other area. This latter effect is of utmost importance. The great importance of the employment and income-distribution effects is indicated by the extent of poverty usually found in agriculture; agriculture tends to be a «residual sector» that holds that portion of the population which has not been drawn into other activities by their greater income-generating capacities. It is indicated also by the fact that in developing (and therefore largely agricultural) economies, where the producer and the consumer are one and the same person, it is distributional effects on the producer's (in this case, the farmer's) side that are definitive (Berry 1980, p. 16). In that case, the equalization of consumers' wages is of relatively minor importance in distributing income, notwithstanding the fact that even in that case income distribution is quite often still construed in that narrow sense.

1.4 Incentives

Finally, incentives offer possibilities of innovative policy initiatives. There is no doubt that certain incentives are required to motivate innovative growth of the informal-sector. But what form should such incentives take? At the very least, they should take the form of a relaxation of the constraints which obstruct the growth of the informal sector while favouring that of the formal sector. These constraints include the following:

i) Credit: Informal-sector enterprises rarely qualify for credit from banks and other money lenders for lack of collateral. In contrast, firms in the formal-sector can borrow with ease owing to their «credit-worthiness».

ii) Infrastructure: Facilities and services provided by the State (water, transport, power, etc..) are usually designed to benefit the formal sector. Rarely do enterprises in the informal sector have access to them.

iii) Regulations: Regulations intended for formal-sector enterprises (such as those requiring registration, possession of trade licences, proper premising of business, maintenance of hygienic and safety standards, payment of income tax, etc..) are applied indiscriminately also to informal-sector entreprises. Harassment of those working in the sector then becomes a favourite sport for the local police, who become enamoured of conducting «swoops» aimed at «flushing our offenders and bringing them to book».

iv) Markets: Informal-sector entreprises are, as a rule, segregated not only from the markets on the inputs they need (capital, trained labour, raw materials, etc..) but also from markets of the products they make. In constrast, firms in the formal sector receive government assistance not only in procuring inputs but also in selling outputs.

These constraints combine to form a formidable obstacle against the success of informal-sector entreprises. Nor does the situation seem likely much to improve in the near future. Nevertheless, over the past two decades, there has been at least one encouraging sign. Since the early 1970s there has been a growing appreciation of the importance of the informal-sector. Far from being considered stagnant and unproductive, as it once was, the sector has since been regarded increasingly as being a potential source of dynamic growth, change, and productive employment for the rural and urban masses. While the sector is still far from coming into its own, this new development augurs well for its future and encourages consideration of ways in which its growth might further be quickened.

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RESUME

Bien que les activités du secteur informel présentent les mêmes caractéristiques en Afrique de l'Est qu'ailleurs, il existe en même temps certaines circonstances, spécifiques à la région, qui font prendre à ces caractéristiques des nuances particulières. Certaines de ces nuances sont dûes à des circonstances relatives aux modes de vie traditionnelles de la région. D'autres proviennent des conditions qui prévalent dans le secteur formel de l'économie de la région, notamment de l'incapacité de ce secteur à satisfaire les demandes qui lui sont soumises, non seulement pour les biens et services, mais aussi pour l'emploi. D'autres encore sont le résultat, volontaire ou involontaire, de certaines politiques générales ou «philosophies», favorisées par certains pays de la région. Cet article décrit ces nuances, ainsi que les circonstances qui les ont transmises dans les activités du secteur informel en Afrique de l'Est. Il essaie par la même occasion de déterminer les initiatives à prendre en matière de politique, en signalant les possibilités qui existent et qu'on pourrait saisir pour en tirer avantage pour le développement futur du secteur informel dans la région. Le secteur est encore loin de se suffire ; mais l'existence de telles possibilités, comme le souligne l'article, permet d'espérer un avenir meilleur.

LE MODE D'ACCUMULATION MIMETIQUE ET LA COHERENCE INTERNE DU SYSTEME ECONOMIQUE NATIONAL*

Par

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Le phénomène de la «mondialisation» est bien expliqué par l'approche impérialiste et dépendantiste et comme tel il est rarement contesté. La caractéristique essentielle du processus de l'intégration des pays en voie de développement (PVD) dans l'économie mondiale est l'asymétrie des relations avec comme résultat la position dominante des pays capitalistes développés (PCD) dans l'espace économique ainsi créé.

Les contraintes résultant de cette intégration ont été telles qu'on en arriva à poser deux postulats pour échapper à ces contraintes. Pour certains, une rupture complète avec ce système était nécessaire alors que pour d'autres un changement des rapports de force dans le cadre de l'économie mondiale était suffisant. Dans les deux cas, ces postulats nous paraissent irréalistes. L'échec de la construction d'un «marché socialiste» a démontré la difficulté de réaliser la première proposition. En ce qui concerne la deuxième, il nous paraît illusoire d'espérer le changement, dans un proche avenir, des règles gouvernant le fonctionnement du marché mondial. D'ailleurs l'impasse du dialogue Nord-Sud en constitue la preuve. Pour d'autres encore, il faut plutôt accroître le degré d'intégration des PVD dans l'économie mondiale.

En ce qui nous concerne, au lieu d'entrer dans la querelle autour du degré de participation dans la division internationale du travail, dont la coloration idéologique est évidente, il nous paraît plus intéressant, si nous voulons élaborer une stratégie qui pourrait en limiter les conséquences négatives, de concentrer l'analyse sur les formes que cette participation à la division internationale du travail peut prendre ainsi que leurs résultats.

Outre les contraintes résultant des dépendances technologique, financière et scientifique, nous voudrions aussi insister sur un aspect non moins important de ce problème et qui, dans les PVD, constitue une caractéristique essentielle des structures internes résultant de cette intégration. La faiblesse des structures internes découle du fait que les PVD «sont passés par un processus de modernisation des formes de consommation d'une partie de la population avant de s'engager de manière décisive dans le processus de l'industrialisation» *(1)*.

Les modèles de consommation imités des pays ayant le niveau d'accumulation de capital le plus élevé ont pour une large part, déterminé le sens du développement dans les PVD *(2)*. Ce phénomène n'était pas perceptible au moment de l'importation de ces biens de consommation ; mais

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* *Les vues exprimées dans cet article n'engagent que l'auteur et pas nécessairement l'Institution avec laquelle il collabore.*

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dans les phases ultérieures, il apparut nettement que la structure de production était liée à la technique à adopter, celle-ci reposant sur un coefficient élevé de capital par personne employée.

Or, le phénomène de comportement mimétique des PVD dépasse le domaine de consommation, (cf. le «démonstration effect» de Duesenberry) ; «il imprègne les conduites des producteurs, des gouvernements et de tous les agents dans leur vie quotidienne» *(3)*. Le processus d'industrialisation qui s'est effectué au cours des 30 dernières années un peu partout dans le Tiers Monde *(4)* était marqué par trois facteurs de déséquilibre : l'apparition des firmes multinationales (FMN) comme acteur important, l'influence des modèles de consommation mimétiques mentionnés et le comportement mimétique des agents nationaux de l'industrialisation.

Ce dernier aspect nous paraît extrêmement important, comme instrument assurant la position privilégiée des pays du «centre» dans la phase actuelle de l'évolution du système économique mondial. Au cours de cette phase, l'utilisation de forces extra-économiques a cédé la place à d'autres mécanismes de domination qui s'articulent par la «combinaison des facteurs internes et externes» *(5)* résultant de la rencontre de deux dynamiques de sociétés ayant des degrés différents d'accumulation du capital.

C'est cet aspect important qui détermine les efforts des pays du Tiers Monde pour rattraper l'écart par rapport aux PCD *(6)*. Les comportements mimétiques dans le domaine de la consommation d'une part et les choix des voies de développement *(7)* d'autre part sont tous les deux renforcés par l'action stimulante des PCD : les sociétés occidentales exportent dans les PVD non seulement des produits, des capitaux et des technologies, mais également leurs styles de vie, de consommation, leurs systèmes de valeurs, d'organisation, leurs institutions, etc... *(8)*.

En admettant qu'il n'y ait pas qu'une seule voie de développement – comme le suggère l'approche évolutionniste – on pourrait interpréter une partie du développement historique des PCD comme universelle et d'autres comme spécifiques. Ce caractère spécifique résulterait des conditions existantes lors du début du développement et de son déroulement.

Malgré de nombreuses déclarations et critiques adressées à W. W. Rostow, la vision évolutionniste du progrès linéaire et de la «maturation» constitue un paradigme dominant. Cela nous amène à cette idée prédominante que l'industrialisation capitaliste et par conséquent, le mode de croissance et d'accumulation capitalistes sont objectivement inévitables. On oublie que ce mode était le produit historique d'un développement spécifique de la formation capitaliste au cours d'une interaction du développement des forces productives et du sous-système socio-politique *(9)*.

Dans notre optique, les PCD constituent un seul groupement qui depuis 200 ans environ a eu l'opportunité de se développer d'une façon autonome. Ce fait a eu à notre sens une importance décisive dans sa relative réussite économique. Cela est dû principalement à la cohérence interne du processus de développement qui englobait l'ensemble de l'économique, du social, du politique et du culturel. Evidemment, nous ne prétendons pas prendre à la légère tous les défauts et contraintes qui sont inséparablement liés au mode de production capitaliste.

Pourtant cela ne change pas notre thèse qui est que les mécanismes propres à ce mode de production ont déterminé la voie de l'évolution de la formation capitaliste.

Les pays sous-industrialisés – soit du capitalisme périphérique soit socialistes – n'ont pas disposé de cette chance historique *(10)*. Par suite de ce manque de chance historique, le mode de croissance des sociétés à fort taux d'accumulation du capital prend une ampleur universelle *(11)*, soit directement par le biais du transfert de technologie, soit par l'intermédiaire de l'effet de démonstration à la Duesenberry, soit par les choix décisionnels des modalités de l'allocation du capital *(12)*, soit par tous ces éléments à la fois.

Cette localisation historique nous permet d'utiliser, dans cet article, les notions de «mode d'accumulation mimétique», «croissance mimétique» et «industrialisation mimétique» qui découlent du schéma qui représente le fonctionnement actuel des PCD *(13)*.

Ainsi nous appelerons «secteur mimétique» *(14)* celui où se concentrent les investissements qui ont fait la réussite des PCD et qui «s'imposent ex-post comme un modèle par définition» *(15)*. Il en résulte une densité de capital importante dans certains «pôles» qui ne correspond pas au niveau d'accumulation du capital dans l'ensemble de l'économie nationale d'un PVD *(16)*. En effet les structures productives *(17)* de l'ensemble du système économique d'un PVD sont déterminées par un mode d'accumulation caractérisé par la prédominance des élements des forces productives provenant des pays ayant un degré d'accumulation du capital plus élevé.

Le mode d'accumulation que nous venons d'introduire ne désigne pas seulement l'approvisionnement en matière de biens d'équipement importés *(18)* mais aussi le caractère mimétique de l'accumulation même si l'essentiel de ces biens provient des PVD. Ainsi la dimension des unités de production et leur concentration dans certains secteurs et régions, la structure sectorielle de la production globale et les techniques utilisées en dépassant la capacité du système économique du pays ne permettent pas la généralisation du progrès.

La réalité a démenti la thèse selon laquelle certains pays sont dits sous-développés parce qu'ils sont incapables de franchir un seuil donné de croissance – franchissement encore plus difficile aux «late comers» parce qu'il exige une accumulation initiale plus importante qu'auparavant. Sans prendre à la légère les difficultés de démarrage, il faut constater que la majorité des PVD ont réussi, malgré leur niveau de revenu national bas, à mobiliser une partie importante du produit global pour l'accumulation.

Tableau I. : L'Accumulation dans les PVD, 1960–1981 (%)

Indicateur (%)	1960–70	1970–78	1979	1981	1982*	1983*a
Part de l'investissement brut dans le PNB total	20.1	24.8	26.2	25.8	24.6	24.7
Part de l'épargne nationale brute dans le PNB	18.5	23.7	25.8	24.9	22.1	24.0
Taux de croissance réel de l'épargne nationale brute *(taux moyen annuel)*	7.2	10.2	2.7	2.9		

Source: *Banque Mondiale, Rapport Annuel, 1983.*
* *World Development Report 1985, Washington, World Bank, 1985, p. 151, Ces données concernent la part dans le PIB ;*
*a *estimation.*

De même, l'approche simpliste identifiant le sous-développement à la faiblesse de l'industrialisation dans le Tiers Monde a été désactualisée par l'effort considérable d'industrialisation dans les PVD. La part de l'industrie dans le PNB de ces pays est passée de 25.8% en 1960 à 35.5% en 1980 *(19)*. La part de l'industrie manufacturière était moins élevée mais a aussi enregistré un changement important : de 14.2% en 1960 à 20.1% en 1980 *(20)*. Le fait que la part de la production de biens d'équipement par rapport à l'ensemble de la production industrielle des PVD ait augmenté de 25% à 30% entre 1960 et 1980, (1977) *(21)* constitue une nette manifestation des changements structuraux dans l'économie des pays du tiers-monde. Au début des années 1980, cette évolution dans la production s'est manifestée par le fait que la part des articles manufacturés dans l'ensemble des exportations des pays du Tiers Monde, pétrole exclu, a atteint 50%.

Tableau 2 : Taux moyen annuel de la croissance industrielle des PVD, 1965–1982 (%)

Groupe de pays	1965–73	1973–80	1980–82
Pays en voie de développement	7,9	6,5	0,7
Pays à faible revenu	7,0	8,1	4,8
l'Asie	6,9	8,5	5,3
l'Afrique	7,8	1,0	-4,1
Pays à revenu intermédiaire	8,2	6,0	-0,6
– exportateurs de pétrole	8,3	5,2	-0,2
– importateurs de pétrole	8,2	6,5	-0,9

Source : *World Development Report 1985, World Bank, Washington 1985, p. 151.*

Pourtant ces chiffres, même accompagnés du taux de croissance impressionant *(22)* du PIB, ne cachent pas l'évidence de plus en plus consciente de la crise du développement dans le Tiers Monde.

Le sous-développement est lui-même une situation de la crise permanente, mais cela n'empêche pas son évolution. Or, aujourd'hui le sous développement, sans négliger le niveau bas du revenu national dans la majorité des pays du Tiers Monde, se manifeste nettement comme le mal-développement. Ce n'est pas seulement une question sémantique. Cela désigne un changement qualitatif. La marginalisation d'une partie importante de la population, les disparités régionales croissantes au sein des PVD, «... les déséquilibres profonds et croissants dans la répartition des coûts et des bénéfices du développement économique...» *(23)*, la concentration des revenus et des richesses par les minorités illustrent cette situation.

Cela veut dire que l'approche économiste qui insistait surtout sur la dynamique des macro-indicateurs – PNB, investissement national brut, épargne nationale brute etc... – n'est plus suffisante. Le problème essentiel se déplace et se situe maintenant au niveau des distorsions et des déséquilibres socio-économiques qui constituent des caractéristiques plus significatives du sous-développement que le bas niveau de revenu national. Ainsi chaque approche stratégique doit en tenir compte.

Nous avons donc démontré que le sous-développement n'est pas seulement dû à l'impossibilité de démarrage, à la faiblesse de l'industrialisation ou à la prédominance des articles primaires dans les exportations des PVD.

La période de la croissance accélérée après la deuxième guerre mondiale et les changements structuraux dans les économies des PVD mettent en évidence que le sous-développement est un processus dynamique dont les formes et mécanismes sont en transformation continue. En même temps apparaît avec une évidence croissante la caractéristique essentielle du sous-développement, à savoir l'hétérogénéité de l'espace économique et la désintégration des structures économiques dans les pays en question.

Les phénomènes de désarticulation, d'absence de complémentarité entre secteurs hétérogènes, non reliés entre eux ; et l'existence de rigidités technologiques, économiques et sociologiques *(24)* ont été pourtant mis à l'écart par le mythe de la modernisation accélérée et de la diffusion du progrès illustré dans la croissance et l'industrialisation.

Or, le système de l'économie nationale ne constitue pas seulement l'addition de deux ou plusieurs secteurs différents. Notons avec I. Sachs, concernant l'économie mixte que l'«... existence simultanée des secteurs traditionnel et moderne modifie l'activité de chacun d'eux» *(25)*. En effet le sous-développement consiste en la coéxistence de sous-systèmes économiques antagonistes mais non isolés.

Effectivement, les stratégies de l'industrialisation accélérée n'ont pas pris en considération l'articulation spécifique entre le secteur mimétique et le reste de l'économie nationale.

Le mode mimétique d'accumulation résulte de trois groupes de facteurs liés au comportement des acteurs principaux de l'industrialisation mimétique dans le Tiers Monde, à savoir : *L'Etat et les Firmes Multinationales (FMN) (26):*

1) L'extension de l'espace économique par les PCD est liée à la propagation de leur modèle de développement, leur style de consommation et leur mode de comportement. Dans le domaine technologique, les FMN installées dans le Tiers Monde utilisent les mêmes méthodes de production – souvent standardisées – que dans les maisons-mères. Ce fait est bien connu. Notons cependant, que comme les filiales des FMN entrent en concurrence avec les firmes locales, ces dernières se trouvent obligées d'appliquer les mêmes choix technologiques. Tel est aussi le rôle des normes et standards internationaux.

2) Ce type d'industrialisation-modernisation répond aux intérêts des minorités privilégiées du Tiers Monde. «Chaque groupe social tente de faire jouer les mécanismes économiques dans un sens favorable à ses intérêts» *(27).* Il existe une corrélation étroite entre les modèles de consommation et la dotation en capital par personne employée. Finalement nous nous retrouvons dans un sous-développement industrialisé qui se caractérise par l'utilisation de technologies à forte intensité de capital et par conséquent concentrées dans un nombre relativement limité de branches, produisant des articles qui ne peuvent être consommés que par la minorité de la population.

3) L'utilisation stratégique de ressources dont dispose l'Etat est en partie déterminée par deux groupes de facteurs déjà mentionnés. En outre, l'Etat obtient facilement un consensus général pour l'industrialisation qui constitue une partie indissociable de la croissance mimétique et de la modernisation. Cela permet à l'Etat de procéder à l'accumulation du capital, à l'extension du surplus, à la reproduction élargie des moyens de production et finalement à la reproduction des rapports sociaux. L'industrialisation de ce type s'impose par l'idéologie du progrès, la propagande et la publicité. L'industrialisation et les innovations techniques, la modernité et la sophistication deviennent ainsi une exigence.

Si cela répond aux intérêts des élites dirigeantes, tant mieux pour elles. L'Etat utilise les idéologies du progrès, du patriotisme, ainsi que la propagande et l'action des parties politiques pour dissimuler cette réalité. D'ailleurs «quand la population d'un PVD s'éveille à la liberté, ses chefs sont enclins à utiliser, contre la puissance autrefois coloniale les moyens dont celle-ci s'est servie pour asseoir sa domination...» *(28).*

Le modèle alternatif du développement limitant l'ampleur mimétique apparaît aux yeux des dirigeants du Tiers Monde comme retardataire ; d'autant plus que le concept de «développement», qui a fait une carrière internationale au cours des trois dernières décennies, était celui qui prônait une industrialisation modernisante, une croissance quantitative, un transfert de capitaux et de technologies.

Nous avons volontairement insisté beaucoup plus sur le troisième groupe de facteurs, car on reproche aux FMN d'utiliser des techniques et méthodes de production inapropriées et inadaptées, provenant des PCD, et en même temps, on se vante des modes d'accumulation et de croissance mimétiques, lorsqu'ils sont promus par un Etat du Tiers Monde. Or, dans les deux cas les conséquences pour l'ensemble de l'économie nationale sont exactement les mêmes à savoir la désintégration.

C'est pourquoi la proposition de C. Furtado de «...s'anticiper sur l'effort d'assimilation» à la civilisation industrielle *(29)*, nous paraît séduisante et idéologiquement efficace, mais pas conséquante, parce qu'elle nous oblige à nous situer toujours par rapport à un modèle de réussite, ce qui suggérerait une dépendance à «l'aval».

Les stratégies de développement mises en œuvre au cours des dernières décennies étaient explicitement ou implicitement fondées sur deux principes avec une coloration mythique :

1. la croissance et l'industrialisation accélérée et la modernisation comme remède universel permettant de diminuer l'écart par rapport aux PCD;
2. la conviction que la diffusion des impulsions modernisantes et des effets d'entraînement permettront de généraliser la modernisation et de construire une économie indépendante.

La discussion théorique très intéressante qui a eu lieu au cours des années 1950 et 1960 s'est achevée pratiquement en faveur de l'industrialisation fondée, dans la majorité de cas, sur le principe résultant du modèle de Dobb-Sen, à savoir la maximisation du surplus disponible pour accélérer les investissements dans le secteur moderne *(30)*.

L'indivisibilité de l'appareil productif provenant du système économique différent et l'étroitesse des débouchés dans les PVD ont favorisé l'approche de la croissance déséquilibrée qui «permet de profiter au maximum des économies d'échelle dans les branches en pointe ; d'autre part, elle fait bénéficier le reste de l'économie d'une gamme variée d'économies externes» *(31)*. Dans les conditions des pays sous-industrialisés «... seul le très grand complexe industriel, transportant pour ainsi dire son propre environnement et sa propre sous-traitance, peut s'installer sans crainte dans ces déserts technologiques» *(32)*.

L'option en faveur d'unités de production de grande dimension et de croissance mimétique exige dans une économie pauvre une très forte concentration de ressources dans les régions et branches privilégiées.

Comme les sciences économiques s'occupent de l'allocation des ressources rares, faisons le bilan de cette option. Notons avec F. Perroux : «le point n'est pas de savoir si en un premier temps des ressources sont prélevées quelque part pour constituer un ensemble dense, mais si, au bout d'une période (...) l'ensemble des zones ou espaces sur lesquels il exerce ses actions ne bénéficie pas d'avantages supérieurs à ceux que cet ensemble aurait obtenus par un développement décentré» *(33)*.

Résumons à présent les arguments soutenus en faveur de ce type de croissance – industrialisation, pour ensuite démontrer que dans sa nature propre il y a déjà des facteurs limitant ces avantages. Ces arguments sont les suivants :

– les effets d'entraînement, surtout la fourniture d'inputs à d'autres secteurs – «effets aval» – ici la supériorité de l'industrie sur l'agriculture du point de vue de «stimulation directe à l'établissement de nouvelles activités par des effets d'entraînement (...) est écrasante» *(34)* ;
– les économies d'échelle réalisées par les grandes firmes industrielles ;
– la disponibilité d'un surplus qui permet d'accroître le taux d'investissement et ainsi d'accélérer le développement.

On admet généralement le coût social de ce type d'industrialisation élevé, mais ceci devrait être compensé par les avantages ci-dessus mentionnés *(35)*.

Pourtant, l'articulation perverse du secteur mimétique avec le reste de l'économie nationale réside dans le caractère même de l'accumulation mimétique, qui compromet la réalisation des avantages préconisés, et aboutit au mal-développement *(36)*.

Le secteur mimétique, conçu comme secteur «moteur» qui doit se développer dans le cadre de l'économie pauvre, exige une concentration de ressources rares *(37)*. Autrement dit, ce développement doit se faire au détriment du reste du système économique national, soit d'une manière explicite au cours de l'accumulation primitive socialiste, ou d'une manière implicite par l'intermédiaire du marché.

En effet la production agricole augmentait dans le Tiers Monde beaucoup plus grâce à l'accroissement de la surface des terres cultivées qu'à l'augmentation de la productivité agricole. Là où l'extension de surfaces cultivées est impossible ou difficile, les modifications dans les techniques agricoles ne peuvent pas compenser la rareté croissante de la terre, et le taux de croissance de la production agricole baisse en conséquence.

Le rythme de l'accumulation du capital dans l'agriculture et dans d'autres secteurs non-prioritaires est contrôlé et orienté au nom de l'intérêt supérieur de l'accumulation générale, souvent par l'intermédiaire de l'Etat *(38)*. Les économies paysannes se sont ainsi trouvées «...condamnées à consacrer leurs moyens très limités aux cultures de rente et d'exportation afin d'alimenter le budget d'Etat et de financer l'importation d'une modernité coûteuse, mal adaptée et trop concentrée dans les villes» *(39)*. Nous pourrions multiplier des exemples de la détérioration des revenus des agriculteurs *(40)*.

Si c'est la loi de valeur qui détermine l'exploitation de l'agriculture par un secteur doté d'une composition organique du capital plus élevée, il ne faut pas oublier que l'allocation volontaire des ressources par les acteurs du développement – Etat, FMN – limite sa fiabilité à l'échelle nationale.

En dehors du secteur mimétique les effets d'entraînement ne peuvent pas se généraliser simultanément à cause d'une «...incompatibilité entre l'état des besoins existants et la réponse technologique occidentale (...) ceci peut être dû à une différence écologique, ou bien à une discontinuité entre le type de problème posé et le type de réponse suggérée» *(41)*.

Il est évident que dans ces conditions l'invention et l'innovation locales restent bloquées à mesure que celles-ci cherchent à changer les facteurs rares. Elles ne pourraient se développer que si elles étaient intégrées dans la capacité de production du système *(42)*.

Ce mode d'accumulation provoque la concurrence entre le secteur mimétique et le reste de l'économie, les petites entreprises et l'artisanat étant les plus touchés, non seulement pour les ressources rares, mais aussi pour les débouchés. Cela veut dire que la complémentarité au sein du système national reste relativement limitée. En effet les artisans et les salariés des industries locales traditionnelles, éliminés du marché, provoquent la baisse de la demande solvable. La demande ne retrouverait son niveau normal que si cette force de travail et les artisans avaient le même niveau de rémunération *(43)*.

Or, les effets de l'industrialisation mimétique sur l'emploi, quelque soit la dynamique de croissance, restent très limités. D'après la Banque Mondiale, le secteur industriel a absorbé, au cours des dernières décennies, moins de 30% de travailleurs supplémentaires dans les PVD à revenu intermédiaire et moins de 20% dans les PVD les plus pauvres *(44)*.

Ainsi, les économies d'échelle qui devraient être réalisées dans le secteur mimétique deviennent plus illusoires encore, et c'est que met en évidence l'UNIDO, estimant que la part du potentiel productif installé dans les PVD, et non-utilisé atteint 30% *(45)*.

Le manque de cohésion dans les activités économiques entre différents secteurs constitue un blocage considérable à la mobilité et à la mobilisation des facteurs de production et des produits. En effet «... l'accumulation et l'expansion du capital ne peuvent trouver l'essentiel de leurs composantes dynamiques qu'à l'intérieur même du système» *(46)*. Cette constatation – qui est aussi une définition de la «dépendance» – par Cardoso et Faletto, soutient notre thèse que les modes d'accumulation et de croissance, que nous nommons «mimétiques» constituent le mécanisme essentiel de dépendance à l'égard des pays capitalistes développés.

Nous constatons une contradiction dans le système économique créé au cours de l'accumulation mimétique. Cette contradiction se manifeste par l'articulation dialectique de l'ensemble de l'économie nationale avec le secteur mimétique. En somme ce secteur, pour se développer, doit détruire – au moins relativement – les conditions de la reproduction sociale dans le reste du système, qui devrait cependant constituer la base de son expansion ultérieure.

En admettant que cette phase de déséquilibre et de désintégration ait été indispensable pour créer un noyau industriel *(47)*, on a pourtant sur-estimé l'effet de diffusion du progrès, et sous-estimé les difficultés de sortir de «l'unilatéralité» du développement du secteur mimétique.

La disparition de cette contradiction constitue la condition sine qua non de la croissance à long terme. Cette disparition doit être accompagnée d'un mécanisme «positif», à savoir une certaine complémentarité entre les deux parties *(48)*; ou au moins que les effets favorables dépassent ceux de la contrainte. Dans le cas contraire, nous n'aurions qu'une juxtaposition de sous-ensembles différents.

En réalité, le problème qui se pose est non seulement celui de la faiblesse des échanges inter-sectoriels, mais aussi et surtout celui de la dialectique contradictoire de la croissance mimétique. A ce sujet, deux faits importants sont à signaler : le blocage de l'agriculture *(49)*, et la dette extérieure de 700 milliards de dollars environ *(50)*.

La situation de crise qui résulte de l'impossibilité d'intégrer l'ensemble de l'économie nationale autour du secteur mimétique inscite à une «fuite en avant». Cette «fuite en avant» consiste à rechercher la cohérence dans le cadre du secteur mimétique lui-même, ce qui suppose son élargissement continu. Or, l'accélération de la croissance du secteur mimétique ne constitue pas un changement qualitatif du fonctionnement de l'économie nationale des PVD.

La mise en place d'une «structure industrielle cohérente» *(51)* ainsi que le choix de la branche sur laquelle elle doit reposer ne constituent pas à nos yeux la solution du problème car au sein même du mode d'accumulation mimétique, les différents objectifs que s'étaient fixés les stratégies mises en œuvre ont abouti au même résultat à savoir un mal-développement. Ainsi, presque tous les PVD qui forment pourtant un groupe hétérogène ont abouti aux mêmes résultats.

Dans la stratégie d'accumulation mimétique, les facteurs externes et internes sont en interaction. Notons avec D. Streeten que «...L'inégalité internationale et l'inégalité interne dans les pays pauvres se consolident mutuellement» *(52)*. Notre approche nous permet de placer l'action des acteurs internes de développement dans un contexte global. L'état national est devenu l'acteur principal du processus de développement dans le Tiers Monde, et cela paraît être une tendance générale. Ainsi le problème des choix de stratégies de développement a une ampleur non seulement économique, mais aussi politique (la répartition de la plus-value en investissement et en consommation). Les stratégies actuelles ont eu une grande popularité parce qu'elles ont bien servi les intérêts des décideurs.

Or, la dynamique élevée de la croissance économique des PVD était en grande partie possible grâce aux conditions externes favorables, ce qui permettait de camoufler les contraintes des modes de croissance réalisés. Cependant, la crise actuelle du système économique mondial a nettement dévoilé la fragilité de cette croissance.

La «belle époque» finie, les PVD se retrouvent face à une situation marquée par la dette de 700 milliards de dollars environ *(53)* et par la chute brutale des investissements étrangers privés dans les pays endettés, qui vont de 71 milliards de dollars en 1981 à 20 milliards seulement en 1983 *(54)*. Quelque soit l'appréciation du rôle des capitaux étrangers, la diminution brutale de leur montant constitue en soi un facteur de déséquilibre aggravant la situation à court terme.

Parallèlement, la stagnation de l'agriculture et surtout de la production alimentaire, et l'augmentation permanente des importations pèsent de plus en plus sur les balances de paiement des PVD.

Tout cela nous autorise à spéculer sur les possibilités du changement de la «philosophie» du développement.

L'incapacité des systèmes économiques de la majorité des PVD d'assurer le fonctionnement du secteur mimétique sans aggraver la situation du reste de l'économie devient de plus en plus évidente. Le problème qui se pose donc concerne les capacités des systèmes économiques, à un niveau d'accumulation de capital relativement bas (en moyenne), de «supporter» à la fois des investissements et des productions d'articles exigeant l'utilisation de ressources considérables et surtout des productions à forte intensité de capital. Ce problème, qui a un caractère universel, est encore aggravé par la part élevée de l'élément «volonté personnelle» dans la prise des décisions économiques qui ont une valeur stratégique. Paradoxalement, le perfectionnement des techniques de planification rend plus subjectif l'exécution et l'élaboration du plan *(55)*.

Pourtant la rigidité des structures socio-économiques mises en place au cours de l'industrialisation mimétique rend difficile la reconversion du secteur mimétique en faveur de la mobilisation pour le compte des secteurs les moins développés, surtout celui de l'agriculture *(56)*.

L'agriculture doit non seulement produire un surplus commercialisable (ce qui est d'ailleurs une condition préalable de la reproduction élargie), mais elle doit aussi constituer un débouché pour l'industrie, car «...si l'agriculture ne suffit à justifier par elle seule aucun des grands projets industriels, elle fournit à la plupart d'entre eux un débouché d'appoint tel que sans le débouché agricole ces projets ne pourraient pas être entrepris» *(57)*.

L'importance du secteur agricole dans le Tiers Monde n'est pas dûe à sa part dans le PIB (inférieure à 17% à la fin des années 1970 *(58)*, mais au fait que ce secteur emploie plus de 50% de la population active (voire plus de 80% dans les pays les moins avancés *(59)*.

Or, la crise de l'agriculture que nous avons mentionnée et qui est liée à la diminution des terres cultivables disponibles et à des relations d'échange défavorables, accélère le processus de migrations vers les villes, contribue à la marginalisation d'une partie croissante de la population, et finalement accentue les disparités régionales *(60)*.

Dans ce contexte la comparaison entre le Brésil et le Mexique d'une part, et la Corée et le Taïwan d'autre part, nous aidera à mieux exposer le rôle de facteur d'intégration de l'agriculture dans le processus de développement *(61)*.

Les deux premiers pays constituent un exemple parfait de la croissance accélérée du secteur mimétique accompagnée d'une crise de l'agriculture paysanne et de tous les phénomènes liés au mal-développement *(62)*.

Le Taïwan et la Corée constituent un cas difffrent. Ces pays bien qu'engagés également dans les stratégies orientées à l'exportation, ont accompli, après la deuxième guerre mondiale, des réformes agraires (La Corée en 1974 et 1950), qui ont non seulement permis une croissance considérable de la production agricole mais aussi un maintien de la demande intérieure *(63)*.

Notons au passage que le phénomène déjà mentionné à propos du Japon se retrouve dans ces deux pays. Leur développement rapide est, dans la plupart des cas, expliqué par la réussite de l'industrialisation orientée vers l'exportation *(64)*.

Or, si cette stratégie a provoqué relativement peu de déséquilibres et s'est maintenue à long terme c'est, à notre avis, surtout grâce à l'attention portée par les gouvernements sur le secteur agricole. Ce qui nous paraît particulièrement original *(65)* est la création dans le secteur rural de «...petites industries destinées à fournir des biens de consommation aux ménages et des biens intermédiaires à l'agriculture. Ce développement, qui fut exeptionnellement rapide, à contribué de manière importante à l'industrialisation et à la création d'emploi ; dans les années soixante, l'emploi dans ces industries rurales a crû de quelques 6% par an» *(66)*.

De la même manière, au Taïwan, entre 1956 et 1966, cet emploi a crû de 7,4% par an, si bien qu'au début des années 1970, environ 70% des ménages employés dans l'agriculture tiraient une partie de leurs revenus d'emplois non-agricoles *(67)*.

En effet, dans ces deux pays, sans vouloir idéaliser les régimes autoritaires gouvernant, la répartition des revenus est une des moins inégalitaires du Tiers Monde *(68)*. C'est exactement le contraire qui se produit au Brésil et même au Mexique.

Cette attention portée sur le secteur rural a permis non seulement la croissance rapide de la production agricole, mais surtout celle de la demande intérieure qui restait relativement homogène et mieux répartie dans le cadre régional et sectoriel. C'est cet aspect de diffusion et de généralisation du processus d'industrialisation, qui à notre avis, semble particulièrement important pour la dynamique et la cohérence du fonctionnement de l'économie nationale *(69)*.

Le problème essentiel du choix d'une stratégie de développement et d'industrialisation ne réside donc pas dans la disponibilité d'une technique permettant d'accroître la production et la productivité ; il est dans la diffusion rapide et généralisée de cette technique, dans son adaptation aux conditions des PVD, et finalement dans la dynamisation des régions et secteurs jusque-là défavorisés *(70)*.

La diffusion des gains de productivité s'effectuera d'autant mieux que les techniques de l'industrie seront voisines de celles de l'agriculture. «...la prépondérance des firmes de dimension modeste, à localisation campagnarde est plus favorable à la diffusion que la présence d'un petit nombre de grandes firmes urbaines» *(71)*.

Dans le contexte mentionné ci-dessus, la situation de l'Afrique est très complexe. Le niveau d'industrialisation de l'Afrique est très bas et sa part dans la valeur ajoutée de l'industrie mondiale est médiocre. Pourtant vu les conditions socio-économiques et surtout le bas niveau de revenu national, le caractère mimétique de l'industrialisation africaine devient évident. Par conséquent le degré de concentration des ressources exigées par l'industrialisation mimétique est très accentué.

D'autre part, la fragilité du système économique national est relativement plus accentuée que dans d'autres PVD. Cela concerne surtout les secteurs que nous avons appelés secteurs non-privilégiés et qui deviennent ainsi les premières victimes de la répartition inégale des ressources productifs, sans oublier les autres conséquences de l'industrialisation mimétique.

Le paradigme dominant, basé sur les avantages fonctionnels des techniques modernes, fait que les tentatives alternatives sont traitées comme des «curiosités anthropologiques», ou alors étroitement identifiées à la voie chinoise. Nous avons déjà mentionné plusieurs facteurs jouant en faveur des choix mimétiques. Ajoutons ici que la puissance de l'appareil idéologique des masses dont disposent les FMN à l'échelle planétaire, leur permet de filtrer et de détourner l'information *(72)*. En l'occurence le principe de «marcher sur deux jambes», qui devrait être conçu comme une stratégie universelle, permettant l'allocation des investissements dans le domaine où se réalisera la plus grande augmentation nette de la capacité productive par unité du capital, est généralement associé à une collectivisation rigide, à un égalitarisme exagéré et à d'autres caractéristiques décourageantes pour les équipes dirigeantes actuelles du Tiers Monde. Cependant il est possible de reconnaître des éléments de stratégies de marcher sur deux jambes, dans la politique économique de pays si éloignés de la voie chinoise, tels que le Japon, le Taïwan et la Corée.

En dénonçant le mode d'accumulation mimétique, nous ne voulons pas dire que nous nous opposons aux techniques modernes ou à l'industrialisation. Nous désapprouvons seulement un certain type de raisonnement ethnocentrique, admettant la supériorité et l'universalité des «solutions» qui, implantées dans les pays du Tiers Monde, sont censées produire des effets favorables *(73)*. S'il n'en est pas ainsi, il revient alors aux sociologues d'examiner les «effets pervers».

Nous considérons les stratégies endogènes comme une «philosophie» de développement, ce qui suppose que le fond du problème ne se situe pas dans l'atteinte d'un objectif précis (comme par example l'objectif de Lima d'atteindre 25% de la VAM mondiale). Il réside à notre avis, dans le «guidage» du fonctionnement du système socio-économique national (compte tenu des blocages qui le paralysent), et dont les finalités se définissent au fur et à mesure que le système évolue *(74)*.

Quand on prend en considération les structures économiques mises en place au cours de l'industrialisation mimétique, une stratégie mixte s'impose. Elle doit consister en la recherche de complémentarité et de limitation des contraintes entre le secteur mimétique et le reste de l'économie nationale. C'est, alors, la seule issue que nous voyons pour faire valoir les avantages potentiels du secteur mimétique existant. C'est aussi une des conditions qui permettrait d'entraîner les secteurs défavorisés. Cela signifie qu'il faut aussi s'attaquer aux problèmes essentiels auxquels se heurtent les PVD, à savoir : le chômage déguisé, l'urbanisation perverse, la non-satisfaction des besoins essentiels, les disparités croissantes dans plusieurs domaines, etc. Ce qui nous paraît important, c'est l'incorporation de cette problématique dans les stratégies de développement en tant qu'éléments du fonctionnement du système socio-économique, et non seulement dans le cadre opérationnel qui a déjà démontré son inefficacité à plusieurs reprises.

A notre avis, le problème essentiel du développement consiste à inventer des formes de vie sociale appropriées à une société concrète. C'est cela qui garantit l'efficacité relative – possible à atteindre dans les conditions politiques et culturelles définies et avec un niveau réel d'accumulation du capital.

Il nous semble que la logique de l'approche que nous proposons serait utile dans l'analyse du concept du développement endogène. La problématique de la création de ses propres formes et méthodes de développement – par opposition à un suivisme mimétique actuellement observé – consiste à rechercher la façon optimale de concilier les «composantes» internes et externes du développement. Cette proposition permettrait d'intégrer d'une façon évolutive, l'aspect «auto-centré» des stratégies endogènes dans une «optique globale», conçue comme la recherche de la cohérence et de l'intégration des structures mises en place dans le Tiers Monde.

NOTES

1. C. Furtado, Le capitalisme post-colonial, in: Esprit, No. 4, 1975, p. 50.
2. Cette apparition et cette diffusion au sein d'une partie de la population illustre la répartition des revenus et les rapports de pouvoir ; elle est stimulée par tout un appareil de marketing et de distribution dont disposent les pays capitalistes développés.
3. F. Ferroux, Pour une philosophie du nouveau développement, UNESCO, Paris 1981, p. 190.
4. Nous montrerons plus loin la différence entre cette phase et la phase d'industrialisation par substitution des importations, qui s'effectuait surtout en Amérique Latine avant et au cours de la deuxième guerre mondiale, et qui était beaucoup plus «autonome».
5. «Impasse Nord-Sud : Quelles issues ?», Commissariat Général du Plan, Paris, 1984.
6. Le fait que le problème de développement soit posé en terme de «rattrapage» est lui-même une conséquence de l'appproche «mimétique».
7. Ici nous constatons seulement le fait d'existence d'un modèle de «réussite» qui s'impose aux autres «objectivement», comme modèle.
8. Surtout dans le monde actuel qui est devenu, pour la première fois dans l'histoire, un «village global», pour reprendre un terme de Melughan.
9. Nous avons remplacé ici la notion de «superstructure», pour y inclure les conditions spécifiques «internationales» qui ont permis l'accumulation accélérée par le biais extra-économique, à savoir le pillage de colonies et le fameux «pacte colonial». En s'interrogeant sur la prédominance des technologies dures, H. Lefebvre écrit : «En jetant un regard rétrospectif sur l'histoire du capitalisme européen/.../ on comprend qu'au début une soft technology était parfaitement concevable, le XIXe siècle aurait pu obtenir une croissance économique /.../ en utilisant les ressources naturelles» (renouvelables telles que le vent, l'énergie solaire etc). cf. H. Lefebvre, De l'Etat, t. I, Paris, 1976, p. 60 (?)
10. Nous supposons que les comportements mimétiques déterminent en grande partie des décisions concernant l'allocation des ressources d'une façon qui trouble la cohérence des structures internes. Le fait que le socialisme ait été introduit dans les pays qui étaient sous-industrialisés et non dans des pays où le mode capitaliste de production avait déjà développé toutes les forces productives que la formation capitaliste était assez large pour contenir, pose le même genre de problèmes aux pays socialistes. En effet les Pays Socialistes sont en train de construire une base matérielle des forces productives, que le mode capitaliste de production avait été historiquement incapable de créer. La tentative de rattraper et dépasser les PCD, dans le plus court délai, impose la tentation d'utiliser et de copier les solutions déjà existantes, entre autres la technologie «occidentale», et l'accumulation du capital dans la grande industrie. Ce problème est accentué par le fait que les facteurs institutionnels jouent un rôle important dans le choix des secteurs où se situera l'accumulation du capital. C'est pourquoi nous avons mentionné les Pays Socialistes ; pour dénoncer un mythe très répandu, surtout dans les PVD, que la condition nécessaire et suffisante de la réussite repose sur la souveraineté de l'Etat

national. Or dans les conditions que nous venons de décrire, cette souveraineté décisionnelle ne garantit pas que l'on va éviter un suivisme mimétique dont les conséquences économiques sont évoquées plus loin.

11. Nous signalons un problème théorique sous-estimé par l'approche marxiste, à savoir celui de la cohérence interne d'une formation socio-économique.

12. Si on mentionne souvent les comportements mimétiques dans le domaine de biens de consommation on prend à la légère «la violence symbolique» (terme de Bourdieu) exercée par l'outil.

13. Nous tenons compte du fait que la notion «mimétique» n'est pas tout à fait exhaustive mais nous l'utiliserons pour réduire au même dénominateur des stratégies ayant différentes finalités opérationnelles et réalisées au sein d'un groupement très hétérogène. En ce qui concerne l'interaction de modes de croissance et de modes d'accumulation particuliers, voir p. ex. W. Andreff, Structures de l'accumulation du capital et technologie en URSS, in: Revue d'Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest, Vol. 9, 1978, No. 1, pp. 48–56. Pourtant nous n'appliquons pas ici sa spécification/extensif, intensif, progressif/.

14. Pour notre article, cette notion nous paraît plus convenable que celle déjà un peu obsolète, liée aux premières approches dualistes qui opposent le secteur moderne/ capitaliste/ et le secteur traditionnel /pré-capitaliste/. Cette distinction n'a plus aujourd'hui l'importance qu'elle avait à cause de la pénétration générale des rapports capitalistes dans différents secteurs de l'économie des PVD. La notion de secteur mimétique doit être entendue comme plus restreinte que celle de secteur moderne.

15. M. Benitah, Besoins économiques et Pouvoir /un modèle psychoanalytique du développement/. Anthropos, Paris 1980, p. 110.

16. Un choix mimétique se base sur les résultats attirants-observables du système imité: unités de grande dimension, réalisation des économies d'échelle, etc. ensuite on adopte une évaluation «optimiste», à savoir l'effet de diffusion et les effets d'entraînement en négligeant les conditions de cohérence du système économique.

17. Les structures productives sont caractérisées par les rapports entre le capital et la force de travail. Les proportions sectorielles de la production, le spectre des techniques utilisées et la vitesse de rotation du capital. Cf. W. Andreff. op. cit. p. 48.

18. Ainsi en Argentine, au Brésil, au Méxique, en moyenne, la part de biens d'équipement importés dans l'ensemble des investissements a chuté de 85% en 1950 à 18% environ en 1970, cf. A. Wzilatek-Kubiak, in: Prace i Materialy IGKR-SGPiS, Warszawa 1981, p. 142.

19. Protectionnisme et aménagement de structures, Nations-Unies, New York, 1982, p. 3.

20. ibid p. 3. La signification de ces chiffres est pourtant limitée par le fait d'une très grande concentration de l'accroissement de la production de l'industrie manufacturière dans un nombre limité de pays: au cours des années 1965–75 presque 55% de l'accroissement de la valeur ajoutée de l'industrie manufacturière des PVD appartenait aux cinq pays /Mexique, Brésil, Hong-Kong, Corée du Sud, Argentine/, si on ajoute l'Inde, Indonésie et Tailande ce chiffre s'élève à 70%, cf. World Industry since 1960, Progress and Prospects, NY 1979, t. II, p. 42.

21. UNCTAD VI, A Strategy for the Technological Transformation, 1983, p. 5.
22. /.5.9% entre 1960 et 1978/ taux moyen annuel/ cf. Banque Mondiale, Rapport Annuel, 1983.
23. Impasse Nord–Sud : Quelles issues?, op. cit., p. 18.
24. On reconnaît la faiblesse des théories du dualisme, perçu comme la juxtaposition et/ou contraste : ville – campagne ; capitaliste – pré-capitaliste; industrie – agriculture ; secteur à force et à faible intensité du capital ; monétaire – non-monétaire. Si on avance en démontrant l'argument que ces sous-ensembles ne sont pas cependant séparés on touche l'essentiel de la problématique du sous-développement comme phénomène qualitatif. Notons avec J.P. Sartre que «... à l'intérieur d'une totalité les multiplicités ne se suppriment pas, mais s'intériorisent». c.f. Critique de la raison dialectique, t. I : Théorie des ensembles pratiques. Paris 1967, p.139.
25. I. Sachs, Pour une économie politique du développement, Paris 1977, p. 13
26. La participation active des firmes multinationales constitue la différence principale entre la phase actuelle des stratégies de substitution des importations et celles d'avant la guerre.
27. J.R. Boudeville, Cours d'économie politique, ronéo, 1954, t. I, p. 1–5, cité par O. Ceccioni, Croissance économique et sous-développement culturel, PUF/Paris 1975, p. 103.
28. F. Perroux, Pour une philosophie du nouveau développement, op. cit., p. 172–173. Ajoutons que les élites gouvernantes, malgré leurs déclarations, se sont laissées profondément impressionner par les modèles de développement occidentaux.
29. C. Furtado écrit :«Pour échapper à la domination extérieure il fut nécessaire de s'anticiper sur l'effort d'assimilation, encore que partiel, des techniques de la civilisation industrielle» in: Créativité et dépendance, I.E.D.E.S., Paris 1981, p. 31. Ainsi, quand S. Amin réclame la rupture avec le marché mondial et en même temps «l'implantation de technologies et d'industries de pointe», on voit que les extrêmes se touchent.
30. Nous n'entrerons pas, dans cet article, dans la discussion souvent passionante et acharnée, sur les choix des techniques productives.
31. J. Freyssinet, Le concept de sous-développement, Mouton, Editeur, Ve éd., 1980, p. 280.
32. Arghiri Emmanuel, Technologie appropriée ou technologie sous-développée ?, Paris 1981, p. 65.
33. F. Perroux, Pour une philosophie du nouveau développement, op. cit., p. 134.
34. A.O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, Yale University Press 1958; cité par J. Loup, Tiers-Monde peut-il survivre, Economica, Paris, 1980, p. 176.
35. Ainsi M. Ikonicoff dénomme des désavantages des industries de pointe, tout en se prononçant en leur faveur :

1/ très long décollage du temps entre investissement et l'apparition du produit ;
2/ coûts à l'origine relativement plus élevés que ceux des industries traditionnelles produisant des biens analogues;
3/ impossibilité d'anticiper sur le marché futur, car pour les produits nouveaux, le marché n'existe pas actuellement. cf. M. Ikonicoff, Les sources privilégiées de l'innovation et les nouvelles options industrielles du Tiers Monde, in: Revue Tiers Monde, No. 47, 1971, p. 578. Ajoutons à cela un «gaspillage» du point de vue d'un pays pauvre en ressources lié à la suraccumulation du capital dans les PCD.

36. Il nous semble que J. Galtung nous donne raison quand il parle du caractère général des inégalités, dont la compréhension est faussée par la dichotomie apparente entre PCD et PVD : «...nous devons parler d'un «mal-développement» global, avec des centres sur-développés dans tous les continents du monde et des périphéries sous-développées communes également à tous les pays, bien qu'à des niveaux d'inégalités différentes». cf. J. Galtung &..., Measuring World Development, Oslo University, 1974, Paper No. II.

37. Ainsi l'Inde consacre 40% de son budget de la science à la physique nucléaire et 8% seulement à l'agronomie. cf. J. Grinevald in: Cahiers de l'Institut d'Etudes du Développement, No. I, Genève 1975, p. 62.

38. Il n'est pas vrai que ce problème se pose seulement aux pays avec un niveau très bas de revenu, ne disposant pas d'autres sources de mobilisation de surplus. Même dans les pays pétroliers comme /L'Iran du Shah/ et l'Algérie, l'industrialisation accélérée s'accompagne d'une détérioration de termes de l'échange au détriment de l'agriculture paysanne, comme le montre pour l'Algérie R. Van Malder in: La Révolution agraire en Algérie: tournant politique ou infléchissement technique? in: Civilisation No. 3–4, Bruxelles 1975. Ajoutons qu'au cours du plan quinquennal algérien 1977–81 l'industrie recevait près de 40% des investissements, et l'agriculture et la pêche 6%, et l'hydraulique 5,7%. cf. M. Drach, le Monde Diplomatique, Nov. 1982.

39. M. Mazoyer, La crise de la paysannerie, in: Actuel Développement, No. 47, 1982, p. 37.

40. Voir par exemple Rural Poverty in the Third World, B.I.T. 1979.

41. M. Benitah, Besoins économiques et Pouvoir, op. cit., p. 105 ; A.K. Griffin présente plusieurs exemples dans le milieu agricole cf. The Political Economy of Agrarian Change, Mac Millan, 1974.

42. Voir aussi M. Benitah, op. cit. p. 103–105; En revenant encore au postulat d'introduire dans les PVD des technologies de pointe /voir note 29/, notons que dans le cadre d'un système économique l'innovation et dans ce cas l'invention technilogique devraient répondre aux besoins et difficultés que posaient les précédentes.

43. Nous n'entrerons pas dans les détails concernant les changements de la structure de consommation et les élasticités de demande.

44. Cité dans: J. Loup, Tiers Monde peut-il survivre ?, op.cit., p. 173–174.

45. On estime cette part dans les PCD à 10%, d'après A. Elianov, Razwiwajuszijesia strany, otraslewyje proporcji ekonomiskovo rosta, M.E.M.O., No. 8, Moscou 1981, p. 31.

46. F.H. Cardoso et E. Faletto, Dépendance et développement en Amérique Latine, PUF, Paris, 1978, p. 21.

47. A notre avis la lecture trop simpliste du concept des «pôles» de développement de F. Perroux n'a provoqué, que des déséquilibres une fois créés comme Deus ex machina entraînent la dynamisation du système. C'est pourquoi, ce concept, dans cette interprétation, joue le même rôle que l'axiome d'effets d'entraînement. Cependant il reste à préciser comment le jeu des déséquilibres influence les sous-ensembles particuliers, à partir de quel seuil les acteurs les plus faibles sont-ils écrasés etc.

48. Notons avec I. Sachs, concernant une politique agricole globale et l'intégration de l'agriculture : «Nous sommes persuadés que les avantages dont bénéficierait l'industrie à la suite d'une telle intégration intérieure excéderaient sensiblement tous les gains possibles que pourrait apporter l'intégration internationale...», I. Sachs, op. cit. p. 62.

49. Voir note 54.

50. Voir p.

51. Celle-ci peut-être définie comme «... une matrice inter-industrielle «noircie», c'est-à-dire dont les différents secteurs sont interreliés entre eux par leurs inputs et leurs outputs...». Une «industrie industrialisante» qui conditionne la mise en place d'une telle structure doit «... grâce à la disposition d'entière économie d'ensembles nouveaux de machines», faire accroître «la productivité de travail» et entraîner «la restructuration économique et sociale de l'ensemble considéré...». G. Destanne de Bernis, Les industries industrialisantes et les options algériennes, in: Revue Tiers Monde, Juillet-Septembre 1971, p. 547.

52. Cité dans : L.C. Bresser Pereira «Les entreprises multinationales et le sous-développement industrialisé»; Revue Tiers Monde, Avril Juin 1978, p. 320.

53. Ainsi, les PVD devaient en principe rembourser en intérêts et en capital 108 milliards de dollars en 1982 et 96 mds en 1983. Cette diminution illustre seulement un «rééchelonnement» mais en aucun cas la diminution de la dette. D'après le FMI et Libération du 14–15 Avril 1984, p. 14.

54. Au cours des années 1973–77, les importations moyennes annuelles de blé par les PVD s'élevaient à près de 50 millions de tonnes, ce qui constituait environ 10% de leur consommation. cf. The State of Food and Agriculture. FAO, Rome, 1978. La Banque Mondiale estime que le déficit alimentaire s'élèvera vers 1985 à 7% de la demande en Asie, près de 17% en Afrique Noire et près de 20% en Afrique du Nord et au Proche Orient. D'après Development Report, World Bank, Washington 1979.

55. D'ailleurs à l'occasion de la critique de l'allocation des capitaux privés du point de vue d'intérêt national, on a idéalisé l'allocation par le secteur public.

56. Il nous semble utile de mentionner ici l'exemple des pays socialistes, qui n'arrivent pas à reconvertir une partie de la production industrielle et des investissements pour satisfaire les besoins du secteur agricole en biens d'équipement. Cette situation n'est pas due, comme supposent certains, aux motivations idéologiques mais surtout à la domination d'une «logique industrialisante». Ainsi, les structures

décisionnelles et les institutions (ministères de branche), une fois installées au début d'industrialisation, déterminent des orientations «unilatérales» pour longtemps. D'ailleurs cette optique devient évidente quant on se rappelle des extravagances modernistes dans les fermes d'Etat aussi bien dans les pays socialistes que dans les PVD. Il est évident que même quand on consacre une partie considérable des investissements à l'agriculture (ce qui est rare) leur concentration dans quelques réalisations de prestige diminue les effets de généralisation du progrès. En l'occurrence nous considérons que l'idéologie politique joue un rôle secondaire vue l'optique des décideurs, d'après laquelle la collectivisation constitue la méthode la plus efficace pour «industrialiser» l'agriculture. L'exemple de l'agriculture des PCD, considérée comme modèle, est souvent mentionné.

57. G. Destanne de Bernis, Les industries industrialisantes et les options algériennes, op. cit., p. 558.

58. Rapport sur le commerce et le développement, F. 81, II. D. 9., tableau B. 9.

59. Basic Data on the Least Developed Countries, Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat, U.N., Genève, 1982, p. 4.

60. Il ne faut pas oublier, outre des coûts sociaux très élevés, que même du point de vue strictement économique, «...établir un migrant en ville coûte plus cher qu'améliorer ses conditions de vie à la campagne...» cf. CH. Gros, Y. Le Bot, «Sauver la paysannerie du Tiers Monde». D'autant plus que «l'évolution actuelle des sociétés paysannes du Tiers Monde se fait dans le sens d'une marginalisation croissante des paysans, puisqu'il ne leur reste qu'à aller grossir les bidonvilles des cités». cf. F.M. de Ravignon in: Le Monde Diplomatique, Juillet 1982.

61. Il existe en fait deux types de problèmes: i) la participation de l'agriculture au processus du développement global, ii) son adaptation à ce même problème; cf. R. Badoin, Economie rurale, Paris 1971, (surtout part II).

62. Voir par exemple R. Dumont et M.F. Mottin, Le mal-développement en Amérique Latine, Seuil 1980.

63. Voir par exemple Growth and Equity in Semi-industrialized Countries, World Bank, Staff Working Paper, July 1979.

64. Autour de la discussion sur les conditions de démarrage du Japon on lance différents arguments. A notre avis, il ne faut absolument pas négliger l'effort produit afin de dynamiser l'agriculture paysanne, sauver et intégrer la petite et moyenne industrie dans le processus du développement moderne. Notons avec R. Dumont: «Seul le Japon (...) a mis dès le départ de son renouveau, l'accent sur la modernisation rurale des petites exploitations, au moyen d'une intensification d'abord basée sur le travail et non sur du matériel importé». in: le mal-développement en Amérique Latine, op.cit., p. 42.

65. Malheureusement, quant on regarde le groupement des PVD ce phénomène est particulièrement original» parce que très rare.

66. J. Loup, Tiers-Monde peut-il survivre? op. cit. p. 167.

67. Cf. Growth and Equity in Semi-industrialized Countries, op.cit.

68. Par exemple en 1970 en Corée, les deux quintiles les plus pauvres recevaient 18% du revenu national; cf. Chenery et autres, Redistribution et croissance, PUF 1977.

69. Notons avec. F. Perroux: «Tout au long de l'histoire économique, on ne trouve pas un seul exemple de croissance homothétique, équilibrée et également distribuée, entre populations ou territoires... «in: Pour une philosophie du nouveau développement, op.cit., p. 181. Il nous semble pourtant, que le degré de disparités entre les «pôles surdéveloppés» et les économies pauvres a pris une dimension qualitativement différente de celle qui existait auparavant. Voir aussi notre note 47.

70. Ainsi apparaît un critère valable dans les choix stratégiques, jusque-là négligé.

71. R. Badouin, Economie rurale, op. cit. p. 223–224.

72. Par exemple A. Mottelard dénonce le monopole mondial de l'information dont les FMN; in: Multinationales et systèmes de communication. Anthropos, 1976. En commentant cet ouvrage H. Lefebvre écrit : «il montre (...) comment les oeuvres essentielles dérivent à partir de leur origine, de leur lieux et sens natif, la dérive – contournement et détournement s'organisant par les détenteurs de l'information; ni Marx, ni Lénine, ni Mao, ni personne n'échappent à ce procès». in: De l'Etat, t. 4, Les contraintes de l'Etat moderne, Paris 1978, p. 194.

73. Ainsi F. Perroux parle de «... la restructuration de tout un ensemble économique et social sous la pression d'un système cohérent de machines». cité par G. Destanne de Bernis in: Les industries industrialisantes et les options algériennes, op. cit., p. 547.
Nous nous rendons compte de l'importance de la sphère non-économique, ce qui nous conduit directement au problème de la cohérence d'une formation socio-économique. Nous ne développerons pas ici ce problème en se rapportant à l'approche «culturaliste». Voir les travaux de R. Preiswerk, P. Bungener, J. Grinevald.

74. Il faut éviter la logique de «one best way» vu l'hétérogénéité du Tiers Monde dans diverses dimensions socio-culturelles et économiques.

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SUMMARY

The idea of the world becoming more and more a «global village» is hardly questioned nowadays. Indeed, developing countries are being more and more integrated in the world economy with the major result of this integration being a disequilibrium in the relations between developped and developing countries. Various suggestions have been made as to how to solve this problem. Amongst these suggested solutions are : 1) a complete delinking from the world economy, 2) an attempt to change power relations between developped and developing countries, 3) a deeper integration in the world economy. It is the author's view that these solutions are not realistic at all and that what is really important to look at is the issue of the forms this integration has taken so far. To put it simply, the question to try and answer is how are developing countries participating in the international division of labour? For the author, the major obstacle to the industrialization process of developing countries is that these countries are trying to follow the path which developped countries have followed disregarding the fact that development is first and foremost an experience specific to each country. Therefore the strategies and other components of a development process are there not to reach pre-fixed targets such as the one defined at Lima Conference but to direct and harness the way the national economic system operates.

THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL LOCATION IN NIGERIA

By

*Chibuzo S. A. OGBUAGU**

Introduction

The location of industries in Nigeria constitutes one of the most critical decisions in its industrial process. It also provides one of the strongest evidences of political influence in the determination of economic development. In fact, nothing seems to demonstrate the political and economic rivalries or the heterogenous nature of the Nigerian society more clearly than the decisions that relate to industrial location.

The function of this study is to demonstrate how politics (especially ethnic regional and state politics), influence governmental economic decisions. This is because non-economic locational decisions among other things, tend to limit the impact of any strategy such as the diversification of the Nigerian economy via industrialisation. In effect, the strategy is affected by ethnic regional interests because productivity in industries seems to be limited by political and communal considerations in their location. Stated differently, the influence of politics sometimes leads to the establishment of many industries or projects in locations that may be politically expedient but not economically viable.

The Theory of Industrial Location

Industrial location theory has experienced significant evolution since the turn of the century *(1)*. As Stefan Valavanis aptly put it, «the economics of location belongs to that class of works, of which each generation produces very few, that both introduce a new subject and exhaust it » *(2)*. This means that the theory of industrial location falls within the realm of issues that scholars have hardly agreed among themselves on what constitutes optimum location for different types of industries. Without being embroiled in the seemingly unending debates on the factors that in reality influence the location of industries, this aspect needs a brief elaboration.

The pioneer work of Alfred Weber stressed the least cost theory which recognized transportation costs, labor and raw materials as the factors that influence the industries in a particular place *(3)*. Weber also viewed the «agglomeration factor» as another important economic factor in

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the consideration of an industrialist on where to locate an industry. He defined the agglomeration factor as the advantage in producing or marketing costs at a particular location *(4)*. Thus, according to Weber, the optimum location for an industry «is either one where total transport costs per unit of output are minimized or one where the agglomeration and/or labor economies per unit of output are sufficient to offset the transport diseconomies as a result of not operating at the point of lowest transport costs» *(5)*.

One of the major problems with the Weberian least cost conceptualization is that it views transportation cost as the primary factor that determines the location of industry or as Norcliffe put it, it «assumes, as given, demand and the location of raw materials and markets» *(6)*.

Using the Weberian least cost approach, Edgar Hoover elaborated on transportation costs. He maintained that where the cost of production is constant, «the best location for the production process is at the point of minimum transport costs» *(7)*. Hoover considered Weber's view on economies of concentration as unacceptable and argued instead that the concentration of industries «is not limited to locations of cheap labor but can also occur at a source of materials, at a strategic distribution point, or at a site of advantageous product costs» *(8)*.

August Losch added another dimension to the classical debate on industrial location. In his maximum profit theory, Losch stressed that the optimal location for an industry is at the point of greatest profit derived from the largest market *(9)*.

These writers (Weber, Hoover and Losch) belong to the classical school of thought and their theories followed the partial equilibrium approach which ignored a host of other factors such as the hidden interests of economic actors that influence industrial location. The classical theories were also flawed on the ground that they hardly approached reality or events in the real world.

In later years, critics of the classical location theory (such as Greenhut *(10)* and Isard *(11)*) made and effort to provide a general equilibrium approach to the theory of industrial location. Unlike the partial equilibrium theories, Isard in particular recognized the relationship that exists between all factors that influence industrial location. He thus maintained that a selective consideration of factors presents a limited understanding but that what is needed is an approach that «comprehends the economy in its totality» *(12)*. This approach will involve in the words of David Bramhall, a consideration of «an entire economic system which specifies the motivating principles of economic factors, the physical-technological conditions of economic activity, and the nature of markets in which participants interact» *(13)*. Thus according to Isard, «the problem of production becomes a problem of choosing the right combination of the various types of capital, labor, land, and transport inputs» *(14)*.

It must be stated that the general equilibrium theory is flawed on the ground that it assumes complete economic rationality. Furthermore, it sought to explain industrial location by abstract statistical models which hardly reflected the true situation in the real world.

The inability of the normative industrial location theories to adequately address locational issues in the real world gave rise to the behavioral school of thought. The primary focus of this school is the recognition that locational decisions are not made on grounds of complete economic rationality. This therefore creates the need for a better understanding of the actual behavior of industrialists and decision makers since for example, personal needs or other hidden interests of a decision maker may influence the location of an industry at a particular point. This may or may not necessarily reflect a primary consideration of the least cost or maximum profit conceptualization. Notable among the behavioral theorists are Alchian, March, Simon, and Tiebout, to mention but a few *(15)*.

The considerations of partial equilibrium, general equilibrium and behavioral theories not withstanding, there still exists a lack of conceptual framework that can adequately explain locational factors. Similarly, other recent viewpoints have produced an avalanche of literature geared towards providing models that can help understand the complex nature of factors that influence the location of industries. These contemporary approaches are based on the general systems, growth pole and growth center, and economic base theories *(16)*, which like the classical, neo-classical, and behavioral theories, have advanced our knowledge of the theory of industrial location but failed to evolve a real world model that can put an end to the enormously varying viewpoints among social scientists on what ought to be seen as the optimum industrial locational factors for all situations.

In all, what has so far emerged from discussions on the theory of industrial location since the turn of the century is the identification of a host of factors that in one way or the other influence the location of manufacturing facilities in a particular area. At a broad level, these can be conveniently categorized as primary and secondary factors. The primary influences consist of six factors which are: raw materials, energy resources, capital, labor, transportation and transfer cost, and market *(17)*. The secondary factors that economists have stressed are: physical environment, political, economic, cultural and personal considerations *(18)*.

The influence of all of the above factors does, however, differ from industry to industry, locality to locality, and in fact from polity to polity. As Ludwig Schatzl rightly put it, the factors that have the greatest pull to the siting of an industry will depend «not only upon specific branch conditions but also upon the stage of development reached in the ... economy» *(19)*.

Although the primary and secondary factors that are briefly mentioned above or other theoretical conceptualizations of economic factors or spatial models that can explain industrial location in the real world are yet considered inadequate, or at best still passing through an evolution, there seems to be a consensus among economists of different shades of opinion that economic factors ought not to be ignored in the location of industries. Similarly, most scholars will agree that economic factors ought not to be ignored in the location of industries. Similarly, most scholars will agree that even in situations where there exists a good case for some social costs to be borne by some carefully calculated departure from the dictates of conventional economic wisdom, such social costs should be minimized in order not to overshadow or ignore «rational» economic considerations. There is no gainsaying the fact that for all economies, be they developed or developing, an industrial policy that allows socio-political considerations to predominate over «rational» economic calculations may end up, *ceteris paribus*, promoting «white elephant» projects that may have a «drawing back effect» on the industrial sector and indeed other sectors of a given economy.

Industrial Location in Nigeria

Theoretical and empirical studies on industrial location in Nigeria carried out by some scholars such as Kilby, Schatzl, Berger, Aboyade, Hakam, and Usoro *(20)* have shown that like in most polities, the determinants of the siting of manufacturing facilities in any particular area in the country are not only the purely economic factors. Other non-economic factors such as geographical, social and political considerations in many cases become very critical in the location of industries.

In recent years, the Nigerian government has adduced several reasons (some of them disturbing) for departing from the widely held viewpoints of some influential scholars on industrial location. The main argument often made by the country's policy makers is that there is the need for government policy to be used in order to encourage the location or relocation of industries away from the already congested administrative, urban, and commercial centers to other less favored constituent parts of the federation. The primary objective is to distribute or redistribute industrial and other economic activities over a wider geographic area of the polity. In other words, the Nigerian policy makers are willing to forego some benefits that could result from adhering to economic location factors for «equity» and political considerations. But as Aboyade rightly pointed out, «...the main danger is that given the political character and administrative machinery of a country like Nigeria, the substance of a developmental strategy is likely to be missed by the rulers for the shadow of narrow self-interests. Social benefit – cost analysis is often only vaguely understood, badly applied and readily claimed as a cloak for more dishonest or incompetent decisions» *(21)*. These facts no doubt make a judicious balance between economic and non-economic considerations in decisions relating to the location of industries in Nigeria difficult.

Although the influence of non-economic factors in the location of manufacturing activities is not by any means peculiar to Nigeria, we shall observe in the latter part of this article that the country presents an example per excellence of a polity where in many cases, political and social considerations overshadow pure economic calculations in the siting of industries. Stated differently, there is a serious lack of the ability or of the will for a reasonable or judicious balance to be struck between economic and non-economic factors in the establishment and location of industries.

However, this should not be taken to mean that decisions on industrial location in Nigeria are in all cases primarily influenced by non-economic factors. Therefore, we will begin this examination by first distinguishing those industries that are probably inevitably rooted to the sources of raw materials; and those where the types of ownership and control may have been crucial on whether or not economic factors are given priority over political and social benefit costs. The latter part of this study will be devoted to providing specific examples of industrial locations that are overly or overwhelmingly influenced by political, regional/state interests. The main objective here is to show that in many cases excessive intrusion of politics in the location of industries in Nigeria has had adverse effects on its industrialization process.

Industries Rooted to Sources of Raw Materials

The following section deals with industries that are inevitably sited or are rooted to specific areas because of the availability of needed raw materials. These are mainly agro-allied and forestry industries which engage in the processing of primary products. The industries in this category include vegetable oil industries, cotton ginneries, palm oil mills, saw mills and rubber processing plants. To a large extent, sugar processing plants are also located in areas where the raw materials are produced. In all these industries, cost considerations and advantages for conducting the processings in the immediate vicinity of raw materials have been a major factor.

For example, cotton ginneries were located in the cotton belts of Northern Nigeria such as Zaria, Lokoja, Gusau, Funtua and Malumfashi, to mention but a few early ones. Most of these cotton ginneries were established prior to Nigerian independence by the British Cotton Growing Association (BCGA). The major consideration of the Association was private profitability derived mainly from reduction in transportation costs. Similarly, the saw-mill industries were inevitably located in the forest belts such as Benin, Calabar, Ibadan, Abeokuta and Ife because of high loss in weight in processing. It would otherwise have entailed greater transportation costs to locate lumbering industries in non-forest areas.

Another example is the rubber processing industries. These are also located in areas of raw materials for various reasons: immediate processing is required soon after tapping the hevea to prevent chemical and biological reactions which may reduce the quality of the product; furthermore, considerable weight is lost during the processing of liquid latex to dry rubber. Similarly, a fair number of agro-allied and forestry industries *(22)* are rooted to specific geographic areas because of their dependency on the production factors, land and raw materials *(23)*.

Location of Industries Based on Private-Profitability Motive

Prior to the Nigerian government's direct investment in the industrial sector or those established in partnership with private foreign investors, most manufacturing facilities that were not rooted to sources of raw materials were located in the large urban, commercial and administrative centers *(24)*. For the private foreign investors that owned most of the medium and large scale industries, profitability motives or economic considerations seem to have dominated their thinkings in the siting of manufacturing facilities in any particular Nigerian town, district, or region/state.

In addition, the government's industrial policy which up to early sixties was based on an «open-door strategy» encouraged foreign investors through the liberal use of incentives to venture into the country's industrial sector. This policy supported the establishment of any form of industries in the country in which the foreign entrepreneurs were interested or willing to invest in. In other words, the primary concern of the State at this stage seemed to have been based on promoting the growth of industries at all costs. It meant that the foreign businessmen had a freer hand to locate their industries in any site or place they deemed fit in the nation.

The reasons for the preference of the center areas of the country by foreign investors are not difficult to find. First, the large urban and administrative areas provide a ready source of market for manufactured goods and for skilled labor. Second, infrastructural facilities such as road network, railways, port facilities, power, water supply, etc... are fairly more developed in the centers than in the periphery of the country. In addition, the urban and port locations made it easier for industrialists to obtain production inputs from domestic and external sources. There were also other attractive agglomeration advantages which made the large population concentrations important.

Another important attraction of the large urban and administrative centers is that they enhanced the proximity of the industrialists to the country's bureaucrats and policy-makers. For example, it was easier for the private foreign investors or their local middlemen or agents to obtain prompt and favorable reaction on tenders or applications to benefit from the numerous government contracts and industrial incentives such as tax exemptions, aid to pioneer industries, import licenses and so on, which otherwise would have been difficult if the advantage of proximity to influential government officials were lacking.

The major centers that benefited from these locational considerations are Lagos and Greater Lagos (i.e., the Federal Capital Territory), Kaduna, Ibadan and Enugu (i.e., the Former Regional Capitals); Port-Harcourt, Kano, Jos, and Onitsha, to mention but a few, represent other important centers of industry. Lagos and the Greater Lagos area have the highest concentrations of industries. In specific terms, over 60 percent of industrial establishments in the country are located in the Lagos area. These industries as we pointed out earlier were largely owned and controlled by private foreign investors. This meant that (given the liberal economic policies of the Nigerian governments in order to promote rapid industrialization) it is possible for the foreign investors to choose location they considered economically important for their enterprises. The locations they most preferred were thus the large urban and administrative centers that offered advantages such as availability of skilled and semi-skilled labor force, economies of scale, relatively adequate infrastructural facilities, and more importantly access to influential politicians and policy makers. In these considerations therefore, economic factors seem to play a primary role in the decisions of foreign investors in the location of industries. Where political influences were exerted by politicians on the foreign entrepreneurs, they were minimal in effect since the latter had various leeways by which they could circumvent undesirable political pressures to locate their industries based on private profitability motives. Even in recent times when Nigeria seem to acquire through oil some significant financial resources to participate or «insist» on where some private industries should be located, it remained subject to manipulation by some foreign business investors. They could easily cite made-up feasibility studies, type of soil (even when it is not an agricultural venture or any other type of economic undertaking that might need a special soil), or other related reasons to sustain their argument. Short or at most medium-term calculations seem to dominate the thinkings of many foreign investors given the fact that even if investing in a rural setting might in the long-run prove more profitable, they often prefer quick returns. One of the foreign business managers of a well established Nigeria firm that we interviewed in an earlier study (1980) about his unwillingness to involve his company in investments that might require long period of maturation before making profits, had this to say: «To be honest, decades of political instability in many African countries do not encourage long-term planning and investment» *(25).*

Political Factors in Industrial Location

The Nigerian Development Plans of 1962–68 and 1970–74 expressed the need to carry out a programme of industrial dispersal in the federation in order to make for balanced development and equitable distribution of the country's wealth. At this period in the country's industrial development, equitable spatial distribution of activities rather than their viability and overall contribution to the economy was the primary consideration of policy makers. In other words, private benefit cost was placed in a secondary position or in many cases, gave way to social-benefit consideration.

As was pointed out earlier, the Nigerian Federal Government adopted the policy of spatial dispersal or balanced development and equitable distribution of industrial activities. This is not necessarily because it was the most realistic thing to do economically but because of the hidden narrow and parochial interests of some of its bureaucrats and political executives. In addition there were considerable political pressures from the regional/state governments for even development through the dispersal of industries. As Schatzl rightly observed, «Federal Government and State Policy was superimposed by the parochial location policy of individual politicians» *(26)*. These latter interest groups hardly relented in drawing the attention of the country's planners to the growth and congestion problems that characterize the Federal Capital because of the concentration of industries and other economic activities in the area. But as Aboyade argued, behind the fact of growth problems in Lagos lay the overwhelming political pressure from the regions or states to attract, as much as possible, any forms of industrial activities to their respective territories *(27)*.

Examples of industrial locations influenced largely by political considerations abound and deserve some detailed discussion. These examples are by no means exhaustive.

Iron and Steel Industry

Probably the most classic case of the misuse of politics in the location of industries in Nigeria is evident in the locational conflicts and political influences on the long proposed Iron and Steel industry. From the year 1959, the Federal Government considered the establishment of a steel industry as basic and pivotal in its program of rapid industrialization. It became a major preoccupation of the central and regional representatives at the National Economic Council (NEC) debates for over seven years before its dissolution by a military government. The bone of contention between the members of the NEC focused on the question of where in the former regions to locate the proposed Iron and Steel Industry.

At the invitation of the Nigerian Federal Government, the representatives of the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration had in its 1958 report suggested on grounds of economic viability the possible areas of the country where an iron and steel industry can best be located. They specifically recommended three possible alternative sites in the following order: Enugu in the former Eastern Region, Lokoja in the then Northern Region, and Onitsha as another location in the East. The Governments of the two regions obviously wanted the industry to be located in their areas of jurisdiction. The Federal Cabinet, the Legislatures, and the Planning Machinery notably the National Economic Council (NEC), Joint Planning Committee (JPC), and the Federal Ministry of Economic Development became arenas of conflicts and protracted debates between the competing political and bureaucratic narrow interests. Arguments and counter-arguments were advanced by each side on the merits of locating the proposed iron and steel industry in its region. Each side in the debate severally sought the advice of «experts» to buttress its claims. Several viewpoints were put forward. In each case the competing views were attributed to the findings of a «highly reputed and reliable» group of foreign experts. The long list of these conflicting findings and counter-viewpoints include, *inter alia*, those that maintain that: (a) the Enugu ores had undesirable high phosphorus content while the much needed ferrous content was low; (b) the cost of providing the infrastructural needs of the proposed iron and steel industry in Lokoja or an alternative location at Idah in the North was by far much higher than the cost of providing the same types of infrastructures at Onitsha; (c) that some expert reports exaggerated the costs of establishing the Steel Industry in a particular region; (d) that some expert reports show that the raw materials and the quality of it in some of the suggested locations were inappropriate and inadequate for the type and scale of steel-manufacturing activity under reference; (e) that the local manpower requirement was more easily available in Onitsha and its environs than in Lokoja; and (f) that some experts supported Lokoja because it is centrally located and for this locational advantage will be more accessible to the areas of anticipated demand.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to exhaust the flimsy and so-called expert reports, arguments and counter-arguments that each regional interest espoused to undermine and in fact to discredit the claims of its rivals. For example, the two competing regions (i.e., the North and East) in whose areas of jurisdiction the Steel Industry could possibly be located as suggested by the UN Technical Assistance Administration report, spent huge sums of money to fly in foreign «experts» from all over the world to support their lines of argument. Most of the reports of the so-called unbiased experts left much to be desired. This is because the foreign «experts» hardly disagreed with the political viewpoint of the particular region that had employed it. In other words, each group of «experts» supported the location interests of the region that had invited it and paid for its services and advice. For instance, all the expert reports that the then Northern region's representatives cited at the federal levels of decision making invariably supported the location of the proposed iron and steel manufacturing industry in Lokoja. Similarly, the Eastern region exhaustively produced experts' advice that favored Onitsha or Enugu in its territory.

The political locational conflict was further complicated when the former Western regional government no longer wanted to stay on the fence and accordingly threw in its weight in the struggle for the iron and steel industry. As it was expected, the latter regional government announced that high quality and extensive quantity of iron ore deposits had been found at Ikare in the West. It further buttressed the attractions of the purported findings made at Ikare by suggesting the possibility of linking «ancillary industries based on the deposits of limestone in Ukpilla and lignite in Asaba (both in the Mid-West) *(28)*. In additon, the Western regional government stressed that the feasibility study in support of its claim was carried out by a reputable group of international consultants.

On its part, the Mid-Western region (now Bendel State) joined in the race for the steel manufacturing industry. It justified its claim for the establishment of the proposed steel complex in its territory on the grounds that it has limestone and lignite deposits in commercial quantities at Ukpilla and Asaba respectively.

A further complication of the already bad situation arose when the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) suggested the location of the proposed iron and steel industry in Port-Harcourt, (a port city of the former Eastern region) in order that the West African region of the Continent could benefit from the huge steel investment *(29)*. Port-Harcourt proved attractive to the Commission because of the view that such a location can facilitate the export of steel products to the other West African countries where they may be demanded. This suggestion as was expected won the unqualified approval of the former East regional government.

Compromised «Solution» of the Rivalries Associated with the Siting of the Iron and Steel Industry

In 1964, the Nigerian leaders decided to beg the steel issue. They attempted a compromise between the conflicting regional interests. Initially, the Federal Government leaned towards the establishment of two steel mills (instead of one originally planned) to be located in different regions of the country. This inclination was given expression at the sixteenth meeting of the National Economic Council in May 1964 where it was decided that the two steel plants will be located at Idah (in the North) and Onitsha (in the East). This non-economic compromise was of concern to scholars interested in the economic development of the country largely because «for the same level of output, splitting the industry between two sites would cost an estimated additional sum of £2.3 (₦4.6) million in capital investment and the profit rate (after allowing for all the direct and indirect subsidies) would fall from 2.5 per cent to 0.17 percent» *(30)*.

As if enough economic damage had not been done on the proposed steel project, another decision to further proliferate the industry was reached by the policy makers in order to placate the West regional government. In this regard, the NEC raised the possibility of a third steel plant to be located at Ikare or any other location in the Western region. This proposal was «debated» and favorably adopted at the NEC meeting and later by the Federal Government. The compromised decision was said by the policy makers to have been made in the interest of national unity. This leaves no doubt that the decision to site the vital steel projects in different locations in the country were in the First Republic taken primarily on political grounds which by and large ignored or at best placed economic factors in a secondary position. Furthermore, given limited capital and skilled manpower vis-à-vis the country's decision to simultaneously establish three steel plants is very indicative of the extent to which the nation's policy makers were ready to go in order to accomodate narrow parochial interests and political influences in the process of industrial development.

However, it is of interest to note that the 1964 fragile political compromise on the locations of the proposed steel projects did not eventually lead to its implementation. This was largely because the internal political wranglings that continued well into the late seventies provided an alibi for some of the foreign investors notably American, British and German Steel interests *(31)* (that were already reluctant to establish the project in partnership with the Nigerian Steel Development Authority) to withdraw their support. This consortium of steel interests raised some doubt as to whether the proliferation of the industry by the Nigerian policy makers and the choice of locations that may not be complementary to each other or economically viable were steps taken in the right direction *(32)*. Of course, they were not.

Thus for nearly two decades, the Nigerian Governments were unable to submerge differing and seemingly irreconciliable political interests to arrive at firm decisions on the specific locations for the iron and steel manufacturing industries. The frustration of the Nigerian public over the steel issue was probably best given expression in the 1975–80 Guideline for (Nigeria's) Third National Development Plan, which stated that:

> *... nothing has been gained by the delay in implementing the Iron and Steel project. For this as well as for most major planned projects, the problem has been the shortfalls in the implementation of Federal Government Programmes... decisions on their location are heavily politically charged and this leads to [frustrating] delays (33).*

It took a military decree in the seventies to call off the nearly two decades of political rivalries and to announce Ajaokuta in Kwara State (in the former Northern region) as the country's site for the steel complex against the competing claims of several communal interests.

As events later showed, even the military rulers were not apolitical in their handling of the iron and steel issue. Under General Gowon's regime (1966–75), the political division of Nigeria was changed. The regime in 1967 carved out 12 states from the 4 former regions *(34)*. This change by the military regime had its political implication and impact on the final decision that was reached by the government on the Iron and Steel issue. This is because the creation of the 12-states structure by Gowon created new centers of power beyond those that existed in the former regions which the major ethnic groups – Hausa/Fulani, Ibo, and Yoruba – dominated. The minority groups which were originally part of the regions were granted states of their own and greater participation in the central policy making organs than was hitherto possible. In addition the then Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Yakubu Gowon, and many of his top subalterns were from the Middle Belt minority areas of the Northern part of the country. It was therefore not surprising that the decision was reached and made effective to site the iron and steel industry in Ajaokuta when the Middle Belt minority group of the former Northern region was well represented in the Federal Military Government. Because of continued political and bureaucratic interests and the ethinic loyalty of some of the non-Northern military and political leaders, efforts were made to accommodate the other special interests in the country that had over the years fought for the location of the project in their respective regions/states of origin. As a result, the originally planned single integrated steel project that was to be located at one site has been proliferated to smaller plants to be spread over many parts of the federation. These are the Ajaokuta Blast Furnace Plant in Kwara State, and the Aladja Direct Reduction Steel Plant at Warri in Bendel State. Three smaller Steel Rolling Mills were established at Oshogbo in Oyo State, Batagaruwa in Kaduna State, and Jos in Plateau State.

The regional distribution of the steel locations are as follows: the Ajaokuta, Batagaruwa and Jos steel complexes are in the former Northern region; the Delta steel plant at Ovwian-Aladja is in Bendel State in the former Mid-Western region; and the Oshogbo steel mill is located in Oyo State in the former Western region. The former Eastern region which between the period starting from July, 1966 to October 1979 (i.e. the period of the military governments when most of the steel decisions were reached) was not adequately represented in the government, did not benefit from the location of a steel plant. It is likely that the virtual absence of the military officers and political leaders of the latter region in the Federal Government during the long period of army rule may have accounted for the lack of a steel plant in the area or favorable consideration of the Eastern locations – Enugu and Onitsha – that were suggested in earlier debates. Perhaps to contain the dissatisfaction among the powerful political groups in the East and other areas of the country that so far have not benefited from the controversial steel industry, the post-military regime of President Shehu Shagari (1979–83), decided to set up two other steel rolling mills, one at Ikot Abasi in the Cross River State of the former Eastern Region, and the other at a location that was to be determined *(35)*. Probably, a ploy to keep some of the Ibos in Shagari's ruling political party at the national level, hoping that their favored location will soon get a steel project.

On the whole, the Nigerian Government will be committing a sizeable amount of its resources in the next decade to the development of the various steel industries in the country. For example, it is estimated that the Ajaokuta Blast Furnace Plant and the Aladja Direct Reduction Plant when fully in operation will cost well over ₦ 1.5 billion and ₦ 1 billion respectively *(36)*. The latter plant has since gone into operation and was formally commissioned in January 29, 1982. The former (the Ajaokuta steel industry) is expected to go into full production before the end of the eighties, about three decades after the initial decision to have a steel industry in Nigeria.

The Cement Industry

Another important example of the dominant influence of political factors in the location of industries in Nigeria can be found in the cement industry. The primary economic factor which the decision makers often referred to as essentially responsible or decisive for the location of cement industries is the existence of large deposits of limestone in any given area of the country. But as this work will show, there are many areas of the federation where there are vast limestone deposits which never attracted cement projects because of political considerations.

Limestone deposits occur at several locations in Nigeria. The important areas are: Nkalagu in Anambra State; North of Calabar in Cross River State; between Lagos and Abeokuta, especially at Ewekoro in Ogun State. Other areas include Jukura, Etobe, Igbo and Ajaokuta areas of Kwara State; at Ukpilla in Bendel State; Yandev in Benue State; Asaka in Bornu State, and near Sokoto the capital of Sokoto State. In effect, limestone deposits are scattered over many parts of the country. But contrary to the often stated government policy that only the most economically viable sites of limestone deposits will be developed as cement manufacturing centers, in actual practice political considerations and regional/state competitive rivalries proved instead to be the critical factors vis-à-vis the geographic-economic location factors. The result of the unhealthy competition between the constituent units of the federation thus led the more economically viable locations to be passed over for less attractive areas in the siting of cement projects.

The rush for this industry was started in December 1957 following the former Eastern region's establishment of Nigeria's pioneer cement project at Nkalagu. In the years that followed, the other regions hastily decided – for fear of being dependent on the Nkalagu cement industry – to set up similar cement projects in their respective areas.

In partnership with the British Associated Portland Cement Manufactures Limited (APCM), the Western region installed a cement industry at Ewekoro in December 1960. The Northern region for similar political reasons joined the race for cement industry. In the same year it rushed to establish a cement project in Sokoto (the hometown of the then Premier of Northern region). The Mid-West region also joined the regional competition and soon after 1963 established a cement industry at Ukpilla. The Eastern region was determined not to loose its lead in the domestic production of cement and as a result hastened to establish another cement plant at Calabar. Some other clinker plants were established by the nation's governments and foreign private investors in the capital area of Lagos, Port Harcourt (a port city in the former Eastern region), and at Koko in the former Mid-West State. Thus, as Schatzl pointed out, «cement plants became a fetish for economic progress for the regional government» *(37)*.

With the creation in 1967 of twelve States out of the four former regions of the federation, the new political power centers (i.e., the States) were equally anxious to join in the competitive political rivalries for cement industries and, of course, other manufacturing facilities that characterized inter-regional political and economic relations during the First Republic. The pressures by these state interests received expression in the Third National Development Plan of 1975–80. The document gave its support for the expansion of existing cement factories and the establishment of new ones *(38)*. Thus the Third Plan set aside an initial amount of about ₦85 million for new cement projects located at Ashaka in Bauchi State, Shagamu in Ogun State, and Yandev in Benue State. The Ashaka and Shagamu cement industries went into operation in 1978, followed by the Yandev plant in 1980. Although the demand for cement has sharply increased since 1973 *(39)* following an oil-induced upsurge in construction works in the country, probably a good economic argument for the proliferation of cement industries, there is little doubt that many of the projects have been designed and located primarily for political expediency rather than for economic reasons.

With the exception of the Nkalagu and the Ewekoro plants, most of the other cement industries experienced serious locational problems. The Sokoto cement factory was probably the worst hit project. Its poor location and debilitating transportation costs in conveying the finished products to the markets where they were demanded and also in bringing in imported inputs proved too much of a strain for the young import substitution industry. As a result of high losses, the Sokoto cement factory failed to be a viable economic undertaking. It needed government continued subsidization, especially in 1979, to keep the industry on its feet. In monetary terms, the reactivation of the Sokoto cement industry cost the government an additional ₦80 million. Perhaps this additional drain of funds by the non-viable cement factory as in some other pet industrial projects could have been avoided if vital and relevant economic factors were adequately taken into consideration in the decisions relating to the planning, selection of site, and in the implementation process. One therefore wonders if any feasibility survey was carried out on the Sokoto site prior to the establishment of a cement industry in that location.

The Sokoto project was not alone as a pet cement industry that suffered from locational constraints and debilitating operational costs. Political and geographical considerations in the siting of cement projects also took their toll on the four clinker plants located in Lagos, Port Harcourt and Koko. Two of the four clinker plants were located in Lagos.

The four clinker mills were established to fuse together clay and limestone as a first stage in the manufacture of cement. Little or no success was achieved in this direction. For example, the Koko clinker plant, after considerable losses and high operating costs, was forced to close down in 1964. A year later, the Port Harcourt clinker mill ground to a halt mainly because of the lack of raw materials and inability to compete with the viable Nkalagu cement industry located in the same region. Similarly, one of the two clinker plants located in Lagos could not benefit from agglomeration advantages because of the enormous costs involved in obtaining its inputs and was thus abandoned after causing considerable drain on the nation's resources. The second Lagos Plant, owned by the Lagos cement company is still in operation despite the high losses incurred in sustaining it. While it can be in part argued that the Port Harcourt and Lagos clinker plants were located in heavily industrialised port areas of the country in order to benefit from infrastructural and agglomeration advantages, hardly can a similar argument be advanced for the Koko mill.

In all, one observes an unhealthy competition between the regions/states *(40)* for cement industries which became one of the fetishes for economic development. Writing on the cement industry in the sixties S.U. Ugoh, had this to say:

> *Each regional government has gone about its business of establishing a cement plant in its own area, completely disregarding what exists in other places... The lack of federal coordination in the establishment and location of industries has led to gross misallocations and a waste of resources. And nowhere has this been more manifest than in the cement industry where each region has built or is building a cement plant which may be of inefficient size and/or poor location (41).*

The above observation on the Nigerian cement industries is still true today. Each of the nineteen states of the country still sees the cement industry as one of their industrial priorities. But unfortunately, their inefficient size and poor location have made it impossible for the various cement projects in the country to serve the quadrupled demand for cement since after the oil boom that has necessitated enormous construction works in the country. One finds that because of serious locational constraints, domestic production of cement lags very much behind local demands. Since 1977, Nigeria imports about two-thirds of its cement needs despite the proliferation of the cement industry under the import substitution strategy.

Industrial Estates

Other evidence of the politicization of industrial location by the constituent units of the Nigerian federation can be seen from the use of industrial estates *(42)* to attract manufacturing activities to sometimes submarginal or politically favored areas. According to Schatzl, «one of the most important instruments of public industrial location policy is the foundation of industrial estates. These industrial estates are used in Nigeria as instruments in inter-regional [or interstate] competition for industrial enterprises and for the intra-regional [or intrastate] distribution of industries» *(43)*. In other words, the establishment of industrial estates is part of the strategy employed by the regions/states to attract industries to their specific territories and to achieve the highest level of industrialization vis-à-vis the other constituent units of the nation. It is also used as a strategy to achieve other political motives that go beyond the rivalries associated with each region/state striving to obtain a larger share of the «national pie».

For example, beyond the fact that the Greater Lagos area had a special attraction for industrialists because of its large population concentration and other economic factors, there was an underlying political consideration by the then Western region and the federal government to vie for the concentration of industries in the area. On the one hand, the former Western region wanted to utilise the economic attractions of the Lagos area to promote rapid industrialization of its region. On the other hand, it wanted to check the «expansionist» tendencies of the federal capital and government. For the latter consideration, the former Western region concentrated most of its industries in estates established in Mushin/ Ikeja, Ilupeju and Oshodi areas of Greater Lagos. The Federal Government on its part established industrial estates in Apapa, Ijora and Iganmu, all in the capital area and was unquestionably interested in extending its industrial locations well beyond the Federal Capital area *(44)*. The political motivation by these two governments to lay claims on the territories around the Federal Capital in part resulted to over 50 percent of manufacturing activities in Nigeria being concentrated in the Lagos and Greater Lagos area.

While the political rivalries for the territories around Lagos were going on between the Western regional and the Federal Governments, the former Eastern region countered by establishing major and minor industrial estates in its area of jurisdiction. The major industrial estates in the Eastern region are located in Port Harcourt and Enugu, while the minor ones are at Aba, Onitsha, and Umuahia. In addition, the government of the former Eastern region offered special and liberal incentives to induce private and foreign industrialists to invest in its area. Like the other regions its primary objective was to achieve the greatest possible share in the country's industrialization program. The former Northern region as was expected, joined the race by establishing locations at Kano and Kaduna as its major industrial estates, and in Jos, Ilorin, Maiduguri, Gusau and Zaria as secondary areas.

In all, each of the regions sometimes offered differential and attractive incentives such as liberal rent policies, development of infrastructural facilities, etc..., to induce especially foreign investors and industrialists to set up manufacturing facilities in their respective territories. The importance of the industrial estates and government incentives (such as the provision of industrial land, liberal rent policies and the provision of necessary infrastructures) lie in the fact that «in a developing country such as Nigeria, in which the infrastructure is still insufficiently developed and where legislation largely prevents the acquisition of land by foreigners, the provision of developed industrial sites facilitates and accelerates the process of industrialization» *(45)*.

Although there exist economic justifications for establishing industrial estates in order to boost rapid industrial development, there is little doubt that in the case of Nigeria, the major and probably dominating factor is political and not economic consideration. As was said earlier, the primary concern of the governments of the federation was to achieve for themselves the largest share of industrial projects in the country through the use of industrial estates. Whether or not the industries located in the estates were to be economically viable seem not to be of primary concern to the competing narrow parochial interests of policy makers in the regional/state and Federal governments. There is no gainsaying the fact that the consequences of such acrimonious rivalries and competition between the governments vis-à-vis their efforts to attract industrial investments at all costs results in wasteful duplication and a lack of coordination of national industrial strategy. There is also no doubt that the excessive consideration of non-economic factors in the establishment of industrial estates in some non-viable and politically favored areas in turn hurts the imports substitution and the industrialization process.

Wasteful Duplication of Beer Brewing, Soft Drinks and Carbonated Water, and Ceramic Industries

In some other areas of industrial development excessive socio-political equity consideration, inter-state competition and unhealthy rivalries can be observed in the establishment and location of some manufacturing facilities. For example, it has become a fetish for virtually all of the nineteen state governments of the federation to establish beer brewing, soft drinks and carbonated water, cement and ceramic industries (to mention but a few) in their areas of authority. The competition-induced duplication of the above industries has greatly reduced the advantages that accrue to an economy through large-scale production. For some of these industries, such as breweries and cement manufacturing, which require high fixed costs to be established, it is important that they engage in a large-scale production in order to reduce production costs. But because of the obvious financial and skilled manpower constraints of many of the state governments, these industrial projects are usually of small sizes and are thus inevitably confined to the state markets. For instance the supply of beer by the «Umuahia Golden Guinea», «Jos International», or «Nigerian Breweries» located in various parts of Nigeria, hardly meets the growing demands outside their immediate locations. The same is true for the soft drinks and carbonated water, and ceramic industries.

This situation therefore raises some important questions: Should the states embark on some of the above high fixed cost industries alone? Will it not be more realistic for the states, particularly the poorer ones, to combine their resources and efforts to establish fewer but more viable and efficient industries? Obviously adopting this method (i.e., cooperative efforts by the states to establish large-scale manufacturing facilities) will raise the probability of the hitherto proliferated small-scale industries taking maximum advantage of economies of large-scale production. In this regard, even the quasi-autonomous nature of the state governments in the federal system should not prevent cooperative economic efforts between them in establishing industries if the Nigerian leaders at all levels of government are serious about economic growth and development.

Oil Refinery

Another very significant example of industrial location based primarily on political factors is the recent siting of Nigeria's third oil refinery in Kaduna. The Kaduna refinery (in the Northern part of the country) is one of the most ambitious industrial investments since Nigeria became an important world oil producer. The project, designed to refine a total of 100,000 barrels of crude oil per stream day has two major sections. One section with a capacity for 50,000 barrels per day refines only Nigerian light crude for fuels, viz, Automatic Gas Oil (AGO), Aviation Turbine Kerosine (ATK), Dual Purpose Kerosene (DPK), Low Pour Fuel Oil (LPFO), and Mixed Liquified Petroleum Gas (MLPG).

Since its completion in 1980, the Kaduna refinery has had considerable difficulties operating the second section which refines heavy crude oil that is not available in Nigeria. In specific terms, the second stream of the refinery requires 50,000 barrels of imported heavy crude oil per day for the production of asphalt, lubricating oils, sulphur, wax, etc... Because of the non availability of the imported heavy crude oil, the second arm of the refinery remained idle for about 3 years after its completion in 1980. Even since 1983, the second half of the project has hardly fully gone into operation given the constraints arising from the long and frustrating negotiations to obtain regular supply of heavy crude oil from external sources such as Kuwait and Venezuala.

Unlike the earlier Port Harcourt and Warri refineries which are located in the South of the country, near the sources of crude oil, the ₦502 million Kaduna refinery is about 650 kilometers from the nearest oil well *(46)*. Because of its obvious poor location, especially as regards transport diseconomies, the Federal Government invested an additional sum of over ₦ 200 million in the laying of pipelines linking the refinery with its distant sources of crude petroleum and distributing depots in the Bauchi, Borno, Plateau, Kano, and Sokoto States of Northern Nigeria. Yet there exists other equally challenging transportation problems. This as we stated earlier arises from the fact that one-half of the estimated 100,000 barrels of crude oil input per day is imported from foreign countries. This means that the evacuation of the imported input from the coastal ports to the refinery (a distance of about 650 kilometers) will no doubt contribute to higher production costs *(47)*.

The extraordinary rushed attention (probably on political grounds) that was given to the Kaduna project was rightly put in a 1983 National Concord write-up titled «Kaduna, (Man-made) Oil City». It pointed out, *inter alia* that:

> *Kaduna refinery has recorded a first in timely attention to, and execution of contracts that is yet to be paralleled anywhere in this country. The contract for the job was awarded in 1977, two years before the soldiers had to quit government... Construction commenced in Kaduna only 11 days after the former [sic] signing of the contract in 1977 [and was completed in early 1980] (48).*

Critics also pointed to the special status granted the largely politically motivated Kaduna refinery even at a time when the country was passing through a belt-tightening economic austerity and stabilization measures introduced by the Federal Military Government. This has to do with the special transportation facilities granted for the imports of construction materials for the project. For example, 'at the Tin Can Island Port [the country's largest port facility], special berthing spaces were reserved for the Refinery as long as construction lasted, and there was also a marshalling yard solely devoted for loading Kaduna Refinery bound goods' *(49)*.

Although cost and strategic rationalizations were adduced by the Government for the construction of this largest refinery in a location that is so far away from the country's oil wells and port facilities for imported crude petroleum inputs *(50)*, it is generally believed in the country that the influence of some well placed Northern elites, especially in the Federal Military Government, was responsible for bringing about the location of such a huge oil industry (even at a great cost to the economy) at Kaduna. Though it is difficult to provide empirical evidence on how and by what method some of the Northern elites brought political pressure to bear on policy makers to site the third and largest Nigerian oil refinery at Kaduna, it is important to note that Kaduna is the place from where the influential late Sarduana of Sokoto, and the premier of the former Northern region, Alhaji (Sir) Ahmadu Bello, exercised authority over the rest of the country during the First Republic (1960–66). The Sarduana was known to have boasted that Kaduna may indeed become Nigeria's future capital. A boast which has materialized by the planned transfer of Nigeria's capital from Lagos to Abuja, about 80 kilometers south of Kaduna. In a Northern dominated military government, there is little doubt that Kaduna continued, in some ways, to attract the loyalty of the influential Northern elites. In this regard, one cannot ignore the existence of what is often referred to in Nigeria as the «Kaduna Mafia» with very strong political influence in the country. It is reported that this «Kaduna Mafia» is a clandestine body with a sizeable membership drawn from influential Northern political and business elites, academics, top military officers, top civil servants, and other pressure groups whose primary objective is the maintenance of the status-quo that seems to favor the political domination or significance of the Northern part over the Southern part of the country.

Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and Petro-Chemical Projects

Another area of planned strategic project that had been delayed over the years largely because of political indecision and consideration than of financial problems is the location or locations of the LNG and petro-chemical projects. The projects had since Nigeria's Second National Development Plan (1970–74) and subsequent ones been receiving the attention of the country's economic planners as one of the most vital projects that should be given top priority in the nation's bid for rapid economic development. But it was not until 1980, probably after the Kaduna Refinery was in place, that the Shagari administration (1979–83) decided that the first phase of a 3-phased petro-chemical project was to be sited at Kaduna (in Kaduna State) and Warri (in Bendel State of Nigeria).

It was planned that the Kaduna project will convert kerosine extracts for the production of linear alkylbenzene, heavy alkylates and solvents. Part of the attraction of the project is that the linear alkylbenzene and heavy alkylates will have 'further end-uses, ranging from detergents, lube oil additives, transformer oil, thermal fluids to grease and special oils for the rubber industry *(51)*. The third product, solvents, would be utilized in the manufacture of paints, including insecticides, aerosols, and dry cleaning agents *(52)*. The petro-chemical project located at Warri is expected when it goes into operation to manufacture black carbon products and polymerized propylene used in packaging, coating pipes and tubes, etc...

The contract for the construction of the above projects was signed in 1982. The foundation stones of the Kaduna petro-chemical project (first of such a project in Nigeria) and that of two other plants at Ekpan, near Warri, were laid in March, 1984 by the Federal Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Professor Tam David-West. This completed the phase of Nigeria's petro-chemical programme.

The location of the second of the 3-phase project further created opportunities for intense political pressures, particularly since 1980 when the Shagari administration decided that Kaduna and Warri will benefit from the first-phase. The political pulls for the location of the project was credibly stated in the Sunday Concord report entitled, «Politics Starve Petro-Chemical Projects». This report, among other things, pointed out as follows:

> *Informed sources close to the Shagari administration said the plant was originally scheduled for the town of Onne in the Rivers State. But due to representations made by Igbo leaders in the proscribed NPN (National Party of Nigeria) who asked for the location of the project in Imo State, the Shagari administration, reportedly became indecisive on the matter... To protect the interest of his [political] party among the Igbos and the people of Rivers State in the last... [1983] general elections, Alhaji Shehu was said to have deliberately waved a decision on the location of the Olefin plant until after the polls. A decision had not been taken before the military seized power on December 31 [1983] (53).*

There is little doubt that both the Rivers and Imo States of Nigeria were «hungry» for and lobbied for the petro-chemical project. A Rivers State former Governor, Chief Melford Okilo, was very consistent in his argument that the petro-chemical industry could find no other natural «haven» than the rich oil producing area of his state. He did not mince words in reminding his «detractors» that this state was governed by the NPN, the political party in power at the center and therefore deserved a «handsome» Federal Government reward such as the petro-chemical industry for its support. Similarly, Chief Sam Mbakwe, ex-Governor of Imo State, made no secret of the fact that he was interested and was lobbying for the project. Although Chief Mbakwe and his state government did not belong to the ruling party at the national level, he believed he had a strong position if the Federal Government was keen on putting politics aside and base its decision on economic and equity reasons. His primary argument was that Imo State is one of the oil producing states which have not benefited from any oil project or any other significant «federal presence» in the state as a whole.

Even after the civilian governments in Nigeria were overthrown in a December 1983 military coup d'état, interest in the planned petro-chemical industry did not wane in Imo State. This was demonstrated by among others, the pressures on the Military Governor, Brigadier Ike Nwachukwu through public addresses, direct appeals, and newspaper publications and individual opinions often expressed in the state's daily newspaper, the *Nigerian Statesman*, severally asking the Governor to use his «good offices» to request the Federal Military Government to locate the oil industry in Imo State. For the Rivers State pressure groups in the post-civilian period, one can only speculate that their demands may not have been as manifest as that of Imo State probably because the former placed their hopes on the fact that the Federal Minister of Petroleum and Energy hails from Rivers.

The continued debates and pressures for the location of the LNG and petro-chemical projects in favoured or politically expidient areas, may have forced the National Concord to suggest in its editorial comment of August 23, 1984 that:

> *We must restate that the nation is tired of the promises and politics of the LNG project. In the present situation where this [military] administration should not be playing to satisfy more political interests, Nigeria look up to it to implement the LNG project (54).*

The political infighting and clashes of interests that characterized and delayed the much belaboured LNG projects seem to have been put to rest by the decision in late 1984 by the Federal Military Government under Major-General Muhammadu Buhari, to site the second of the 3-phase petrochemical industry near Port Harcourt in Rivers State. But this is not without costly politically – induced delays and its negative effects on the nation's programme of economic development.

Conclusion

It seems that political considerations in the location of many Nigerian industries emanate from the fact that communal loyalty is very strong in the society. It is a widespread national problem which poses a serious threat not only to the economic programmes for development, but also to the political system as a whole. This is largely because strong ethnic loyalty seems to have eaten deep into Nigerian political culture. Very often the success or popularity of any political figure is judged by the share of the «national pie» he is able to attract to his area of origin. These rewards of government or share of the «national pie» usually take the form of industrial establishments, provision of infrastructures (such as water supply, electricity, good roads, maternity and other medical services), educational institutions, etc... Although this phenomenon exists in all organized human societies, the high degree of its existence in the Nigerian society, we argue, makes it a deviant case.

It therefore may not be an exaggeration to state that narrow communal interests in the decisions relating to the location of industries probably place Nigeria as one of the best known examples of a developing country where excessive political factors impinge on its strategy of rapid industrial development.

In all, the geo-political character of industrial location is bound to continue for a very long time given the proliferation of States in the country and the associated expectations of the citizenry for the dispersal of manufacturing facilities *(55)*. In other words, the excessive weighting of socio-political «equity» in the distribution of industrial projects and, of course, the competition and rivalries between the States will without doubt continue to have adverse effects on the industrialization process. This therefore, creates an urgent need for Nigerian leaders to reverse this trend in order to minimize the distortions and politically induced waste in the country's industrial programmes.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a detailed review of the theory of industrial location see E. Willard Miller, *Manufacturing: A Study of Industrial Location,* University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977, pp. 1–79. See also Walter Isard, *Location and Space-Economy,* New York: M.I.T. Press and Wiley, 1956, Chap. 2, pp.24-54.
2. Stefan Valavanis, «Losch on Location: A Review Article», *American Economic Review,* Vol. XLV, No. 4, Sep. 1955, p. 637.
3. Alfred Weber, *Theory of the Location of Industries,* Trans. by C. J. Friedrich, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929, pp. 124–161.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Quoted from Miller (1977), *Op. cit.*, p. 51.
6. G. B. Norcliffe, «A Theory of Manufacturing Places», in Lyndhurst Collins and David F. Walker, eds., *Locational Dynamics of Manufacturing Activity,* London: John Wiley and Sons, 1975, p. 26.
7. Edgar M. Hoover, *Location Theory and the Shoe and Leather Industries,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937, p. 35.
8. See Miller, *Op. cit.*, p. 18.
9. August Losch, *The Economics of Location,* trans. by William H. Woglom with the assistance of Wolfgang F. Stolpher, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954, pp. 16–32.
10. Greenhut argues that several factors influence industrial location. His analysis was based on the integration of the Weberian least cost theory and the theories of locational interdependence of industries. See Melvin L. Greenhut, *Plant Location in Theory and Practice: The Economics of Space,* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956, pp. 103–176, and 273–286.
11. Walter Isard, *Location and Space Economy,* Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1956.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
13. David F. Bramhall, «An Introduction to Spatial General Equilibrium», in Gerald J. Karaska and D. F. Bramhall, eds., *Locational Analysis for Manufacturing: A Selection of Readings,* Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969, p. 468.
14. Isard, *Op. cit.*, p. 28n.
15. For the behaviourists approach to the theory of Industrial Location see A.A. Alchian, «Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory», *Journal of Political*

Economy, Vol. 58, pp. 211–221; J. G. March and H. A. Simon, *Organisations*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958; C.M. Tiebout, «Location Theory, Empirical Evidence and Economic Evolution», Paper and Proceedings of the Regional Science Association, 3, 1957, pp. 74–86.

16. Miller, *Op. cit.*, p. 75.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 81–82.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Ludwig Schatzl, *Industrialization in Nigeria: A Spatial Analysis*, Munchen: Weltforum Verlag, 1973, p. 75.
20. Peter Kilby, *«Industrialization in an Open Economy, 1945–1966*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. L. Schatzl, *Industrialization in Nigeria, Op. cit.*, Manfred Berger, *Industrialization Policies in Nigeria*, Munchen, Weltforum Verlag, 1975; O. Aboyade, «Industrial Location and Development Policy: The Nigerian Case», *The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 3, November 1968, pp. 275–302; Eno J. Usoro, «Government Policies, Politics and Industrial Development Strategy in Nigeria, 1947–1974», in O. Teriba and M. O. Kayode (eds.), *Industrial Development in Nigeria: Patterns, Problems and Prospects*, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1977, pp. 113–124.
21. Aboyade, *Op. cit.*
22. It is often argued that this category of economic activities should not be regarded as industries as such since they are merely engaged in the processing of primary goods for export without fundamentally changing the products from their original state.
23. For detailed elaboration of the industries that are in Nigeria rooted to sources of raw materials, see Schatzl, *Op. cit.*, pp. 78–88.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 90. This category excludes those industries that are wholly owned and controlled by the Nigerian governments or in which it owned commanding equity shares and subsequently a greater influence on the decision relating to location sites.
25. Interview, Ibadan, January, 1980.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
27. O. Aboyade, «Industrial Location and Development Policy: The Nigerian Case», *Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Op. cit.*, p. 294.
28. O. Aboyade, «The Relations between Central and Local Institutions in the Development Process, II», *Nigerian Opinion*, Vol. 4, Nos. 4/6, April-June, 1968, p.323.
29. *Ibid.*
30. Quoted from a detailed analysis of industrial location in Nigeria by one of the country's influential economists, O. Aboyade, «Towards a New Industrial Location Policy», in O. Teriba and M. O. Kayode, (eds.), *Industrial Development in Nigeria, Op. cit.*, pp. 368–369.
31. *Ibid.* The consortium of foreign steel interests include Demang, Didier-Werke, Ferrostaal-Mecco, General Electric, Koppers, Wellman Smith Owens, and Westinghouse. These were mainly American, British and German transnational corporations.
32. *Ibid.*

33. Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Guidelines for the Third National Development Plan, 1975–80,* Lagos: Central Planning Office, Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction, 1975, pp. 20–21.
34. In July, 1975, the Gowon regime was overthrown and replaced by the Generals Muhammed/Obasanjo regime which soon after (February 1976) created 7 new states bringing the total number of states in the Federation to 19.
35. Press statement by the former Nigerian Federal Minister for Steel Development under the Shagari administration. See *West Africa,* March 31, 1980.
36. *Nigerian Herald,* Ilorin, Friday, December 28, 1979, p. 7.
37. Schatzl, *Op. cit.,* p. 110.
38. Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Third National Development Plan, 1975–80,* Vol. I, *Op. cit.,* p. 157.
39. For example, the import of cement increased from 0.9 million tons in 1973 to 4.5 and 4.1 million tons in 1977 and 1978 respectively. The domestic production increased but very slightly from 1.2 million tons in 1973 to 1.5 million tons in 1978, an increase of only 0.3 million tons over the 5 year period. The total demand rose from 2.1 million tons in 1973 to 5.6 million tons in 1978, more than double the 1973 figures. See *African Research Bulletin,* September 15–October 14, 1979.
40. Economic competition is not of course unique or peculiar to the Nigerian political system. It can be said to exist in all organised human societies. But the long history of ethnic and communal rivalries in the Nigerian polity and its effect on the country's program of rapid industrialization is so significant during the period under consideration that it seems important to note it here.
41. S. U. Ugoh, «The Nigerian Cement Industry», in O. Teriba and M. O. Kayode (eds.), (1977), *Op. cit.,* p. 176.
42. The industrial estates are specially located areas with modern infrastructural facilities such as water supply, power, good roads and other communication networks. Ancillary services such as banking and financial institutions are also established in the areas declared industrial estates. The closeness of some of the estates to major urban areas made it possible for industries located in them to obtain the much-needed skilled and semi-skilled labor. In all, the estates are designed to reduce infrastructural costs, offer agglomeration advantages and other attractions to local and foreign investors in the industrial sector.
43. Schatzl, *op. cit.,* p. 103.
44. See Aboyade, *Op. cit.,* p. 373.
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Daily Times,* Lagos, Saturday, October 25, 1980, p. 3. See also, *New Nigeria,* Kaduna, Saturday, October 25, 1980, p. 1.
47. The rationale for the importation of crude oil to the oil rich Nigeria is based on the fact that the country's «sweet» or light crude petroleum is not very adequate for the manufacture of lubricants, for which the heavy type from Venezuela and Kuwait or other middle-East countries are preferable.
48. *National Concord,* Lagos, Tuesday, October 25, 1983, p. 5.
49. *National Concord,* Lagos, Wednesday, October 26, 1983, p. 5.
50. See *Daily Times,* Lagos, October 25, 1980, *Op. cit.*

RESUME

L'objet de cette étude est de montrer l'influence des questions politiques (d'ordre ethnique, régional ou autres) sur les choix relatifs à la localisation des industries au Nigéria. En d'autres termes, l'auteur cherche à démontrer que les questions politiques peuvent conduire les autorités à implanter des industries dans des endroits où une telle installation ne se justifie que politiquement.

Après avoir rappelé les idées-forces de la théorie de la localisation industrielle et la manière dont elles ont été appliquées au Nigéria, l'auteur passe en revue la localisation de plusieurs industries en particulier les industries du fer et de l'acier, celles du ciment, du pétrole, du gaz naturel et liquéfié et celles de la bière et des boissons sucrées. De l'analyse de la localisation de toutes ces industries, il tire la conclusion que les considérations politiques dans la localisation des industries sont dues au fait que le sentiment de loyauté au terroir est très fort dans la société au Nigéria. Ce sentiment est un problème qui touche toute la nation et constitue un danger sérieux non seulement aux programmes de développement économique mais aussi au système politique dans son ensemble.

L'auteur estime alors qu'il est temps que les autorités du Nigéria se penchent sur ce problème pour en renverser la tendance et ainsi réduire les disparités et les gaspillages qui en résultent dans les programmes d'industrialisation du pays.

INDUSTRIALISATION ET STRATEGIE DES BESOINS SOCIAUX EN ALGERIE

Par

*Abdelmadjid BOUZIDI**

Une base économique se matérialise chaque jour davantage en Algérie. Cependant et dans le même temps se posent des problèmes sérieux de satisfaction par les populations de ce qui peut être considéré comme leurs besoins essentiels. Et beaucoup de chercheurs s'accordent à dire que le premier phénomène explique le second : c'est parce que les planificateurs Algériens ont choisi de consacrer l'essentiel des ressources à l'investissement productif que l'insuffisante satisfaction des besoins essentiels a pu se développer. Il s'agit donc d'un choix de la stratégie de développement adoptée en 1966. Certains vont encore plus loin et affirment que la satisfaction des besoins essentiels des populations n'a jamais constitué une préoccupation des planificateurs Algériens ou en tout cas de la fraction dominante du pouvoir politique que représentaient les «industrialistes». Le souci était d'industrialiser le Pays, les autres problèmes se résolvent d'eux-mêmes grâce à la dynamique économique ainsi créée.

L'objet de notre communication est d'essayer de reconstituer le plus fidèlement possible l'approche Algérienne des besoins sociaux telle qu'elle a été retenue en 1966, d'en faire une évaluation après quinze ans d'application puis d'analyser les nouvelles orientations qui semblent se dessiner depuis le Plan Quinquennal 1980–1984.

I. – LES CHOIX DE LA PROJECTION A LONG TERME DE 1966 ET LES BESOINS SOCIAUX

En 1966 les planificateurs Algériens ont élaboré une projection à long terme devant répondre à trois (3) questions principales :

1 - Quels objectifs peuvent-être atteints en une génération?

2 - Quelles sont les conditions à réunir pour assurer la réussite du programme ?

3 - Quels objectifs ne pourront-être visés que pendant la génération future ?

A. Quels Objectifs Peuvent Etre Atteints en une Génération ?

Bien évidemment pour les planificateurs Algériens l'ensemble des efforts devaient s'inscrire dans la recherche de l'objectif central de maximisation du taux de croissance. Ceci signifiait une nette priorité dans l'affectation des ressources en faveur de l'investissement et au détriment de la

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* *I.S.E. – ALGER.*

consommation. Mieux encore la politique économique devait accorder la première place aux investissements directement productifs et plus précisément aux investissements industriels. Le Secrétariat d'Etat au Plan de l'époque affirmait : «... le mot d'ordre principal des plans de développement durant cette période (1966–1980) est de ce fait le maximum d'investissements. C'est pour cela que dans les premiers plans de développement la part réservée à l'investissement sur l'ensemble des richesses nationales s'est élevée à plus de 35 %. Au cours du prochain Plan l'objectif d'investissement retenu comme orientation d'ensemble représente 40% de toutes ces richesses... Cet effort est dicté par l'impérieuse nécessité de rattraper des décennies de stagnation, de regression et d'arriération économique...». *(1)*

Il y a donc choix pour un très gros effort d'investissement qui devait impliquer une très grande rigueur dans leur sélection, une élimination des investissements non prioritaires et surtout une efficacité aussi grande que possible dans les actions engagées.

Tout surcoût, tout gaspillage constituera autant de pressions et de prélèvement sur une consommation déjà maintenue à un niveau bas.

Tout cela est maintenant largement connu ou en tout cas facilement répétable dans la réalité économique Algérienne. Ce qui semble avoir été oublié, par contre, par les divers analystes de l'expérience Algérienne de développement, c'est que la projection à long terme adoptée en 1966 a retenu d'autres objectifs auxquels elle a accordé le statut de *revendications populaires à satisfaire* dès la première décennie du développement.

Et ces autres objectifs n'étaient pas forcément compatibles avec la recherche d'un taux maximum de croissance économique. Il s'agissait là, pour les planificateurs Algériens de *besoins prioritaires* dont le degré de satisfaction ne pouvait être une simple résultante des ressources disponibles.

La prise en charge de ces besoins prioritaires devait faire appel à des critères particuliers et non plus à ceux de la cadence de la croissance économique générale.

Ainsi, Monsieur Ourabah (ancien responsable jusqu'en 1980 dans les diverses structures centrales de planification) écrit-il :

> *«Si à terme la solution pour satisfaire... les besoins premiers était conditionnée et devait s'articuler avec l'objectif de croissance élevée de l'économie, le planificateur était conscient que «les effets automatiques» d'une telle politique étaient insuffisants et pourraient même, sans précaution, aller à l'encontre de sa propre finalité». (2)*

Quels étaient ces autres objectifs à atteindre en une génération ? *(3)*

1 – L'Emploi

Il s'agissait là d'une revendication fondamentale et «du premier besoin social à satisfaire» – Dans un système économique dominé par les rapports marchands, la revendication particulièrement forte d'amélioration du niveau de vie supposait une distribution de revenus à tous ceux qui n'en avaient pas – La stratégie devait ainsi rechercher avant toute chose la création massive d'emplois permanents de façon à éliminer durablement le chômage et garantir au moins à chaque famille Algérienne un revenu.

Dans les conclusions de leurs délibérations, le Conseil de la Révolution et le Gouvernement rappellaient à la veille du lancement du second Plan Quadriennal : «Parmi les grands buts poursuivis, le Conseil de la Révolution et le Gouvernement *réaffirment* que le problème de l'emploi et de l'amélioration du niveau de vie de l'ensemble des populations demeure l'objectif essentiel de cette première grande étape de l'Algérie indépendante – L'élargissement des postes de travail demeure le moyen le plus sûr de garantir à chaque Algérien un revenu stable et un niveau de vie digne et décent». *(4)*

Le second besoin prioriotaire était celui de :

2 — L'Education

La colonisation a généralisé en Algérie l'analphabétisme. L'une des attentes les plus pressantes du peuple Algérien que le planificateur ne pouvait ignorer, était ce désir de satisfaire le besoin d'éducation.

Le 1er Plan Quadriennal 1970–1973 réaffirme ce principe en ces termes : «La Révolution Algérienne doit également garantir le droit de l'éducation... à tous les Algériens...».

Cet objectif, bien que contribuant à long terme à la croissance économique, était contradictoire à court terme avec l'objectif central de maximisation du taux de croissance.

Contradiction d'autant plus forte que les planificateurs Algériens semblent avoir privilégié dans le système éducatif national la fonction amélioration du niveau culturel des populations par rapport à celle de pourvoyeur en cadres et main-d'œuvre qualifiée de l'économie. Or nous savons les problèmes qui peuvent surgir du fait de l'avance trop forte de la scolarisation par rapport aux possibilités d'emploi et de production sociale. Nous y reviendrons.

3 — Le troisième objectif à atteindre dès la première grande étape de la stratégie et qui correspond à un troisième besoin prioritaire concernait l'atténuation jusqu'à leur liquidation des inégalités sociales en commençant par résorber les disparités régionales.

L'économie Algérienne de 1962 était caractérisée par de très fortes disparités régionales qui accentuaient les distorsions sociales. Les planificateurs Algériens reconnaissaient la nécessité d'une politique rigoureuse de redistribution des revenus et allaient la concrétiser dans une première étape par les programmes spéciaux auxquels ils assignaient la double fonction d'assurer «l'équilibre régional» et «la justice sociale» – Par ce biais ils comptaient améliorer le revenu consommé des populations les plus déshéritées.

Le rapport général du premier Plan Quadriennal 1970–1973 explicite en ces termes cet objectif : «La politique économique veillera... par la redistribution équitable des revenus à assurer aux populations les plus déshéritées des conditions de vie améliorées permettant... de réduire l'écart qui les sépare de celles qui ont la chance de bénéficier de conditions économiques plus favorables.

La société juste que la Révolution Algérienne veut bâtir exige... de donner à toutes les régions du Pays des chances de développement et de faire disparaître les profondes inégalités dont le Pays souffre de ce point de vue».

Ainsi lors de l'élaboration de la projection-objectif de 1966, les planificateurs Algériens ont-ils retenu les grandes orientations suivantes :

1. Maximiser le taux de croissance économique.

2. L'essentiel des richesses nationales devront être consacrées à l'investissement.

3. L'investissement directement productif et notamment industriel (industries lourdes et d'exportation) devra être favorisée.

4. Certains besoins prioritaires devront être satisfaits grâce à une action systématique de l'Etat.

– L'emploi.
– L'éducation,
– L'équilibre régional et la justice sociale.

B. Quel Statut les Planificateurs Algériens Reconnaissaient-ils aux autres Besoins Sociaux que Pouvaient exprimer les Populations ?

Il s'agissait, semble-t-il, de besoins nécessaires mais non prioritaires dans la première étape de construction de l'économie.

La «Révolution ALgérienne» se devait bien de :

– «Garantir une large protection sanitaire...».
– «Garantir à chaque Algérien un Logement décent...».
– «Mettre à la disposition de toutes les villes et tous les villages l'eau l'électricité, le gaz». *(5)*

Mais la nécessaire mobilisation des moyens au profit de l'investissement productif a entraîné une sélection des objectifs sociaux en fonction de leur degré d'urgence.

Le Besoin de Santé

Lors de l'élaboration de la stratégie de développement, le besoin de santé devait être progressivement pris en charge au rythme de production de l'encadrement médical et para-médical par le système d'éducation et de formation, au rythme de réalisation des équipements médico-sociaux nécessaires. Dans la première étape du développement «la politique sanitaire s'appuiera sur la promotion de la médecine préventive et l'hygiène sociale qui exigeront du point de vue des charges de l'investissement des équipements plus légers et moins coûteux». *(6)*

De plus l'adoption du principe de la gratuité des soins était présentée comme suffisante en elle-même pour assurer la «médecine pour tous». Tout au plus posera-t-elle le problème des disponibilités financières à mobiliser et du programme d'équipement. Le second Plan Quadriennal 1974–1977 rappelait ainsi «... le droit à la santé pour tous qui est considéré comme un des droits essentiels à garantir par la Révolution se concrétise *déjà* par la gratuité des soins. Il se consolidera et s'élargira par l'extension qui sera donnée à la couverture sanitaire du Pays en équipements et surtout en moyens humains». *(7)*

L'essentiel était donc, à cette étape, de préparer les conditions pour banaliser le besoin de santé à partir de la décennie 1980–1990.

L'Habitat

En ce qui concerne l'habitat et plus précisément le besoin de logement, l'hypothèse retenue considérait le parc de logements hérité de la colonisation comme suffisant notamment en matière d'habitat urbain. Il s'agissait surtout d'améliorer les conditions de logement des citadins dont le besoin en la matière était nettement moins satisfait que les autres. Le parc de logements en zone urbaine était considéré comme jeune et moderne dans son ensemble. Seule une fraction assez faible devrait être remplacée dans cette première grande étape de construction de l'économie. Il fallait par contre améliorer nettement la situation de l'habitat rural en commençant par regrouper les populations éparses autour de l'école, des services médicaux et en leur fournissant les éléments de base d'une vie décente : eau, électricité et gaz.

Une telle mesure, tout en résorbant progressivement les disparités entre la ville et la campagne allait contribuer à maintenir un taux d'urbanisation faible en freinant l'exode rural. C'est à partir de la décennie 1980–1990 que le rythme de réalisation de logements devra s'accélérer pour faire face à l'augmentation du taux d'urbanisation et aux demandes faisant suite à la croissance démographique. D'ici là il faillait réunir les conditions pour réussir une réalisation de 100.000 à 150.000 logements/an. Le 1er Plan Quadriennal 1970–1973 est clair à ce sujet : «Dans la phase actuelle de développement, le programme arrêté de construction de logements urbains reste faible... L'objectif le plus important est la mise en place de structures indispensables au lancement d'un vaste programme de l'habitat à partir de la première année du 3ème Plan». *(8)*

Il faut cependant noter que dès le IIe Plan Quadriennal 1974–1977, les planificateurs Algériens commencent à douter de leurs hypothèses sur l'évaluation des besoins en habitat tant urbain que rural. Ils parlent en effet, déjà à cette époque, de retard. Ils écrivent : «Le droit à un logement décent pour chaque famille correspondant à un besoin également fondamental... Aussi d'ici 1980 le surpeuplement des logements ***résultant du retard de la construction sur la croissance démographique*** devra être grandement atténué...» *(9)* ou encore un peu plus loin... «Dans ce domaine où les besoins considérables ne peuvent que s'accroître et où les tensions enregistrées sont désormais difficilement supportables, l'effort à entreprendre doit s'intensifier rapidement...» *(9).*

Les autres besoins sociaux qui n'ont pas été inscrits parmi les objectifs à atteindre en une génération et qui donc semblent avoir été reportés à la génération future concernent la Culture, les Sports et Loisirs. Dans ce domaine aucune approche claire n'a été retenue et peu de ressources y ont été consacrées.

Voilà donc reconstituée rapidement la stratégie Algérienne des besoins sociaux telle qu'elle a été retenue en 1966. Elle se caractérise par deux principes complémentaires qui constituent deux priorités dans les actions à engager :

1. Il s'agit de résorber progressivement les disparités sociales et régionales en favorisant la prise en charge des besoins des plus déshérités.

2. Malgré l'impératif d'affectation du maximum de ressources à la croissance matérielle, il s'agissait aussi de réaliser la satisfaction des besoins sociaux les plus urgents, prioritaires, et de rattraper les retards hérités dans ce domaine. On remarquera avant de terminer ce point que pour les planificateurs Algériens, la contrainte démographique ne constituait pas un obstacle insurmontable. A aucun moment, ni la stratégie de 1966 ni le Plan Triennal, ni les deux Plans Quadriennaux n'ont envisagé une politique démographique comme action de soutien. Dans un article intitulé «La réponse Algérienne au défi démographique», la revue scientifique du S.E.P. de l'époque écrivait :

> *«La réponse Algérienne au défi démographique s'est traduite par l'adoption d'une stratégie de développement et l'application de plans ambitieux». (10)*

Quelles sont les Conditions qui Devaient Etre Réunies pour Réussir la Concrétisation de cette Projection-Objectif ?

On peut rappeler rapidement que la position de départ de l'Algérie par rapport à d'autres pays était avantageuse à deux égards :

- Il y avait des richesses minières qu'il fallait valoriser, donc pas de contrainte financière serrée.
- Il y avait un bon réseau d'infrastructures.

Il fallait par contre :

– Veiller à élargir sans cesse le marché intérieur.

– Veiller à créer le maximum d'emplois par un choix rigoureux d'investissements.

– Veiller à maîtriser la demande sociale.

Or pour la réalisation de chacune de ces conditions, des difficultés réelles existaient :

1. La nature des exportations algériennes ne favorisait pas le développement du marché intérieur. *(11)*

2. L'industrie lourde et l'industrie d'exportation retenues étaient peu créatrices d'emplois dans la première grande étape de construction de l'économie.

3. La demande sociale en Algérie, héritée de la période coloniale, reposait sur une répartition très inégalitaire du revenu et était de ce fait très diversifiée avec une forte influence du modèle de consommation des pays riches.

Sur un autre plan l'exode rural devait être freiné et le taux d'urbanisation maintenu dans des limites réduites du moins jusqu'en 1980.

Enfin l'une des conditions les plus importantes à assurer, mais que les planificateurs Algériens ont délaissée comme nous venons de le rappeler, avait trait à la contrainte démographique. Le taux élevé d'accroissement naturel (3,2%) qui caractérise l'Algérie aurait dû retenir plus l'attention.

Un tel taux devait exercer des pressions très fortes non seulement sur le taux d'investissement mais aussi sur les besoins sociaux y compris prioritaires que l'on devait satisfaire. Comme de plus, c'est seulement à très long terme que les résultats tangibles d'une politique démographique basée sur le contrôle de naissances apparaissent, il fallait la lancer dès 1970 (1er Plan Quadriennal). Le Professeur Bobrowsky avait alors calculé que vers 1990 (donc vingt ans après) des conséquences appréciables sur le niveau de vie des populations auraient pu apparaître :

> « – les investissements directement liés à l'importance quantitative de la population pourraient être diminués de 10 % ; ceux liés au nombre d'enfants d'un quart (25 %) , la meme masse de biens de consommation serait à répartir sur un nombre d'habitants inférieur de 10 %». *(12)*

Quelle Etait l'Image Attendue à l'Epoque de l'Algérie de 1980 ?

Avant de procéder à une rapide évaluation des résultats obtenus après quinze années d'application de la stratégie retenue, il est intéressant de rappeler comment les planificateurs Algériens se représentaient l'Algérie de 1980. Ce travail est possible grâce à l'analyse d'un document émanant de l'organe central de planification de l'époque (S.E.P.) et intitulé : «Perspectives 1980» – Le dernier chapitre de ce document s'intitule «Image 1980». On peut y lire :

- *Dans le domaine de l'emploi* : «...si on réussit à freiner l'exode rural prématuré grâce à l'amélioration du cadre et des niveaux de vie... le chômage urbain disparaîtra complètement...» (p. 83).
- *Dans le domaine de la consommation :* «...un taux d'accroissement des investissements de l'ordre de 6% par an (contre plus de 10% par an durant la décennie 1970–1980) sera parfaitement compatible avec un taux d'accroissement de la consommation de 9 à 10%» (p. 84).
- *Dans le domaine de l'éducation* : «...dans le domaine de l'enseignement primaire grâce à l'effort exceptionnel accompli durant les premiers plans, la scolarisation totale pourra être considérée comme une tâche achevée. Le nombre d'élèves dans le secondaire par 1.000 habitants atteindra le niveau des Pays Socialistes pour le général,... un niveau moindre pour le technique... Le nombre des étudiants atteindra le minimum nécessaire pour un pays développé...» (p. 86).
  Et plus loin... «Dans quelques domaines la «densité» des cadres permettra de viser à l'indépendance technologique».
- *Dans le domaine de l'habitat :* «...le surpeuplement des logements résultant du retard de la construction sur la croissance démographique sera grandement atténué. La situation sera meilleure à cet égard qu'en 1966 et plus particulièrement seront relogés les plus mal logés... Le nombre de logements construits pour 1.000 habitants atteindra en 1980 le niveau de plusieurs pays développés...» (p. 85–86).
- *Dans le domaine des conditions de vie :* «...l'ensemble du pays sera recouvert par un réseau d'alimentation en gaz assurant la desserte de tous les besoins industriels et domestiques tandis que l'électrification des campagnes aura couvert toutes les bourgades dans les zones de population dense. Le gaz, grâce à l'utilisation de la bouteille, devra être entré dans tous les foyes» (p. 92)... «...la production de biens industriels de consommation sera au niveau de l'ensemble des besoins en produits courants, alimentaires, textiles mais aussi d'économie domestique...» (p. 90).

Qu'en est-il dans les faits ?

Evaluation des Résultats de la Politique Sociale *(13)*

En admettant la pertinence de la démarche adoptée en matière de prise en charge des besoins sociaux des populations, nous pouvons tenter une évaluation de l'état de leur satisfaction dans l'Algérie de 1980.

A. Le besoin d'Emploi

Quelques chiffres :

- en 1966... : 1.720.000 personnes avaient un emploi
- en 1978... : 2.830.000 personnes
- en 1980–1981... : un peu de 3 millions de personnes.

. Le taux d'occupation *(14)* masculine est passé de :

- 65 % en 1966 à
- 77 % en 1980.

. La proportion des femmes actives demeure par contre très réduite:

- 4,5 % en 1967
- 6,7 % en 1978
- 7,2 % en 1980.

. Le taux d'activité *(15)* (proportion des actifs dans la population totale) est passé de :

- 18,1 % en 1967
- 19,8 % en 1979.

(il varie dans les pays développés entre 40 et 50%).

En 1978, on dénombrait 545.000 demandeurs d'emploi de 18 à 59 ans dont les deux tiers (2/3) résidaient en zones rurales – Près de la moitié des chômeurs sont âgés entre 18 et 25 ans.

On peut néanmoins dire qu'en matière de création d'emplois non agricoles (qui a été surtout le fait de l'Industrie et du B.T.P.) les prévisions globales du 1er et du 2ème Plan Quadriennal ont été réalisées et même dépassées :

1er Plan 1970–1973 :		
prévus	= +	265.000
réalisés	= +	329.000
2ème Plan 1974–1977 :		
prévus	= +	458.000
réalisés	= +	521.000

Trois remarques cependant :

1. Un nombre important d'emplois a été créé en dehors des activités productives.
2. Le phénomène de «suremploi» est important : il se manifeste par le gonflement des effectifs sans qualification.
3. La répartition géographique de ces nouveaux emplois créés a été inégale : près de 40% des nouveaux postes de travail créés l'ont été dans les quatres grandes concentrations économiques du Pays *(16)*.

B. *L'Education et la Formation*

Quelques chiffres :

1) Enseignement élémentaire

Le taux de scolarisation des classes d'âge 6–13 ans est passé de :
31% en 1962–1963 à
72,5 % en 1979–1980.
Plus de 90% des enfants de 6 ans sont actuellement scolarisés.

Il faut cependant noter que :

a) la généralisation de l'enseignement élémentaire n'est pas encore réalisée.
b) de grandes disparités existent à un double plan :
   * entre le milieu rural et le milieu urbain,
   * entre les filles et les garçons.

2) Pour la classe d'âge 6–14 ans

En 1978 = taux de scolarisation
en milieu rural . . . . 51,1 %
= taux de scolarisation
en milieu urbain . . . . 88,5 %

Taux National = filles = 59,6 % — en milieu rural : filles = 41,5%
Taux National = garçons = 80,8 % — en milieu rural : garçons = 72,6%

3) Enseignement secondaire et moyen

En 1963–1964 = 107.649 élèves
En 1978–1980 = 909.000 élèves dont 37 % de filles.

4) Enseignement supérieur

Le nombre d'étudiants est passé de :
– 3.718 à la rentrée 1962–1963 à
– 73.500 à la rentrée 1980–1981 (23,3% de filles).

Alger n'est plus la seule ville universitaire importante. Elle n'accueille plus que 40% des effectifs.

En résumé on peut synthétiser le taux de scolarisation globale par les chiffres suivants :

1962–1963	1967	1978–1979
31%	47,8%	72,5%

Le taux d'analphabétisme est passé quant à lui de :

1962	1966	1970	1977
80 %	74,2%	66,6%	59,9 %

1) On remarquera que le taux d'analphabétisme reste élevé puisque ce fléau touche 1 Algérien sur 2 !!
2) Le recul de l'analphabétisme est dû surtout à l'effort de scolarisation plutôt qu'à l'alphabétisation des adultes. En 1977–1978 seulement 84.800 citoyens ont suivi des cours d'alphabétisation au lieu de 300.000 prévus – (2.700 femmes).
3) La qualité de l'enseignement de manière générale reste relativement basse comme peuvent le montrer les ratios suivants :

RATIO	1966–1967	1978–1979
. Elèves/Salles de Classe	52	55
. Elèves/Maîtres	44,7	36,8
. Cours Pédagogiques/Maîtres	1,2	1
. Cours Pédagogiques/Salle de Classe	1,3	1,6

– Le rapport élève/Maître reste donc élevé. Il est aggravé par le système de la double vacation qui surcharge l'enseignant et l'épuise.

– Le niveau de l'encadrement est de plus relativement bas : à la rentrée scolaire 1978–1979 on dénombrait dans l'enseignement élémentaire 65,7 % d'instructeurs et 11,8 % de moniteurs.

– L'option scientifique et technique n'a pas été concrétisée : en 1978 il y a eu 645 bacheliers techniques pour 8.813 bacheliers de l'enseignement général.
Les collèges d'enseignement technique ont été supprimés et sur les 35 Technicums programmés pour la décennie 1967–1978 aucun n'a été réalisé.

5) Enfin les déperditions, pour ne pas dire les rejets du système éducatif sont importants. Le dernier recensement de la population (1978) donnait déjà 240.000 jeunes âgés de 15 à 17 ans exclus du système éducatif et totalement inactifs.

En 1979 on dénombrait 1.100.000 jeunes des deux sexes dont 702.000 âgés de 15 à 17 ans soit 55 % et 395.000 âgés de 18 à 20 ans soit 37 % qui n'étaient intégrés ni au système éducatif ni au monde de l'emploi.

On terminera cette rapide évaluation des actions dans le domaine de l'éducation par un chiffre sur les enfants de moins de 5 ans.

Seulement 10 % de ces enfants sont dans le pré-scolaire (crèches et maternelles).

C. *L'Habitat*

S'il y a un domaine où les hypothèses de départ se sont avérées les plus irréalistes, c'est bien celui de l'habitat. La situation est aujourd'hui largement détériorée comme peuvent le montrer les quelques chiffres suivants :

– En 1966 on comptait : 1.800.000 logements
– En 1978 on comptait : 2.450.000 logements

Et encore devra-t-on préciser qu'en 1978, 17,6 % de ces logements sont des habitations précaires (contre 14 % en 1966).

Le taux de croissance a été ainsi de 18 % pour la période alors que la population a augmenté quant à elle de 40 % durant la même période.

. Le taux d'occupation par logement était de :
  – 6,1 personnes en 1966,
  – 7,1 personnes en 1978.
. Le taux d'occupation par pièces :
  – 2,6 personnes en 1966,
  – 3,2 personnes en 1978.

Et il s'agit là de moyennes pondérées qui cachent des situations plus détériorées encore : les moyennes les plus fréquentes sont de 9 personnes par logement et 4 personnes par pièce.

De plus :

. 39 % des logements ont 45 ans d'âge,
. 11 % des logements ont 30 ans d'âge.
. 33 % des logements ont 20 ans d'âge.

Enfin la comparaison des taux d'accroissement annuel du parc de logements et de la population donne une idée de l'ampleur des déficits :

. taux d'accroissement du parc = 1 %
. taux d'accroissement de la population = 3,3 %

Pour maintenir les conditions actuelles de logement (7,3 personnes par logement) il sera nécessaire de réaliser 1.200.000 logements. Et pour revenir aux conditions d'habitation de 1966 il faut construire plus de deux millions de logements.

D) L'Eau, l'Electricité et le Gaz

Si l'on se rappelle l'image de l'Algérie de 1980 que se représentaient les planificateurs, la disponibilité de ces biens à cette date devait être réglée. Mieux encore ces biens devaient être un véritable service public accessible à toutes les familles indépendamment de leurs pouvoirs d'achat.

Qu'en est-il aujourd'hui :

. 35 % seulement des logements disposent de l'électricité, l'eau courante, le gaz (de ville ou en bouteille) et d'un réseau d'assainissement.

En 1967 ce pourcentage était de 18 %. Mais lorsqu'on examine de plus près cette moyenne on a les chiffres suivants :

Zones \ Utilités		Electicité	Eau Courante	Gaz de Ville	Egout
Urbain	1977	84	82	37	77
Rural	1977	2,5	21	–	14
Total	1977	49	46	113	40
Total	1966	31	39	–	–

Les grandes inégalités entre les zones urbaines et les zones rurales nous laissent déjà entrevoir quelques unes des raisons explicatives de l'important exode rural qui a eu lieu durant la décennie écoulée. On estime à 1.300.000 le nombre de personnes qui sont passées du milieu rural en milieu urbain depuis 1967. L'accroissement annuel moyen de la population urbaine a été quant à lui évalué à 5,1 %.

La population urbaine est passée de 31 % de la population totale en 1966 à 43 % en 1980 et le nombre d'agglomérations urbaines de 96 à 211 durant la même période.

Deux (2) dernières remarques à propos de l'évolution de cette urbanisation qui a démenti les hypothèses de la projection de 1966 :

1) Ce sont les périphéries des grandes villes qui ont connu le plus fort mouvement d'urbanisation.

2) La moitié de la population urbaine est concentrée dans huit (8) grandes villes de plus de 100.000 habitants. Oran, Alger, Constantine et Annaba regroupent à elles seules 40 % de la population urbaine.

E) La Santé

En 1967, au plan infrastructures sanitaires disponibles les chiffres étaient les suivants :

– Lit d'hopital/habitant : moyenne nationale = 1 lit/300 habitants.

Mais il y avait de grandes inégalités régionales puisque :

– Alger comptait.... 1 Lit/160 habitants
– La Saoura comptait..... 1 lit/594 habitants
– Sétif comptait............ 1 lit/719 habitants.

En matière d'encadrement médical il y avait en 1967 1 médecin Algérien / 30.000 habitants.

En 1980, les taux de couverture sanitaire sont les suivants :

. 1 médecin Algérien/4.000 habitants mais avec de très fortes inégalités régionales puisque la Wilaya d'Alger dispose de 1 médecin/ 1.100 habitants alors que la Wilaya de Jijel dispose de 1 médecin/ 7.800 habitants (la moyenne nationale prévue pour 1980 était de 1 médecin/2.000 habitants.

. En matière de personnel para-médical, de très fortes inégalités régionales subsistent :

– 1 pour 430 habitants dans les Wilate : d'Oran, Alger, Annaba et Constantine.
– 1 pour 2.350 habitants dans la Wilaya de Jijel.

Pour les sage-femmes par exemple le taux de couverture est le suivant : 1/13.800 femmes en âge de procréer dans la Wilaya de Djelfa, 1 pour 920 dans la Wilaya de Annaba.

. En matière d'infrastructures sanitaires, la situation dans certaines Wilayates s'est détériorée par rapport à celle de 1967.
Dans les grandes agglomérations urbaines le chiffre de 1 lit d'hopital pour 250 habitants est fréquent. Dans les Wilayates de l'intérieur du pays par contre les chiffres sont de : 1 lit/530 habitants.

. En matière de polyclinique il y a actuellement en Algérie une moyenne de : 1 polyclinique pour 100.000 habitants.
Comme on peut le constater l'objectif du IIème Plan Quadriennal 1974–1977 d'une équipe médicale par commune rurale est loin d'être atteint.

. Enfin en matière de médicaments il nous faut signaler que la production nationale ne couvre en 1980 que 8 % de la consommation nationale.

La rapide évaluation chiffrée que nous venons de faire sur l'état de satisfaction des besoins sociaux fondamentaux des populations qui a caractérisé la décennie écoulée, sans être un véritable bilan social, nous éclaire tout de même à la fois sur l'important retard accumulé et sur l'échec des actions engagées pour assurer l'équilibre régional et la justice sociale. En effet les programmes spéciaux puis les plans communaux de développement se fixaient comme objectif de résorber progressivement les inégalités régionales et les distorsions sociales qui en résultaient.

Si au plan infrastructures économiques ces programmes ont permis à certaines régions d'étendre leur base économique (notamment industrielles), au plan social force est de constater le manque d'efficacité qui a caractérisé ce type d'action. L'organisation sectorielle de la décision éconmique et les autorités locales n'ont pu participer de manière toujours efficace à la définition des besoins premiers de leurs populations.

Quelle est la Nouvelle Approche de la Question des Besoins Sociaux ?

A la fin de l'année 1979 le Comité Central du Parti du F.L.N. a défini, lors de sa deuxième session, des «Orientations à long terme du développement économique et social». Ce sont ces orientations qui vont présider à l'élaboration du Plan Quinquennal 1980–1984.

Ce document insiste surtout sur deux grands aspects :

1) Une plus grande efficacité dans la gestion de l'économie.
2) Une réelle prise en charge des besoins sociaux des populations en vue de rattraper les retards et d'améliorer leurs conditions de vie.

Dès la page 38 de ce document on peut lire :

«Le travail de définition... de la prochaine étape devra s'articuler autour de deux grands axes :

- Le 1er passe par l'organisation et la maîtrise de l'économie.
- Le second axe devra passer par l'allocation des ressources qui privilégient en permanence la mise en œuvre des objectifs sociaux fondamentaux. Aussi la structure de l'emploi, le niveau et la structure de consommation individuelle et collective, l'élimination des inégalités sociales devront constituer les critères de choix à moyen et long terme de l'ensemble de l'activité économique et sociale». *(17)*

Cette nouvelle approche est justifiée par les planificateurs Algériens par le fait que la politique d'austérité qui a prévalu jusqu'à maintenant et qui «était relativement aisée à appliquer dans les faits puisque la satisfaction de la demande de travail constituait au lendemain de l'indépendance déjà une amélioration importante du niveau de vie», ne peut plus continuer à la fois parce que les facteurs favorables à la compression de la consommation s'amenuisent de plus en plus (beaucoup de créations d'emplois sont prévues et une nette amélioration des salaires) mais aussi parce que les projets fortement capitalistiques n'occuperont plus une place aussi importante que par le passé.

– Il s'agit donc de reconsidérer l'équilibre entre accumulation et consommation qui a prévalu jusqu'à maintenant.

Notons que tout se passe comme si la base industrielle nécessaire à la reproduction économique du système a été définitivement mise en place !

– La seconde orientation découle de la première : on peut lire dans le document adopté par le Comité Central : «Ces évolutions (attendues de l'emploi, donc du revenu individuel, donc de la consom mation) induisent des rythmes de croissance rapides de la production dans les domaines de l'industrie de consommation et des services», et plus loin ce passage encore plus significatif : «L'adaptation des productions existantes ainsi que celles des futurs programmes aux objectifs prioritaires de couverture des besoins les plus fondamentaux devra être organisée afin d'éliminer au maximum les tensions sur la satisfaction des consommations des plus défavorisés.

Ce qui explique tout d'abord des préférences poliliques marquées concernant la nature et le niveau des consommations à privilégier. Les programmes de production et de consommation devront dans ce cadre assez rapidement s'articuler autour de modèles de consommation significatifs des besoins premiers des populations». *(18)*

On semble privilégier la contrainte consommation et donc rechercher la stisfaction immédiate des besoins sociaux (à redéfinir) par la mise en place rapidement d'industries de consommation correspondantes. Il y a là incontestablement une nouvelle approche par rapport à celle de 1966.

En tout cas le segment biens d'équipement n'apparaît plus comme la priorité de la décennie à venir. Tout au moins le nombre de contraintes se démultiplie-t-il pour la projection – objectif future.

Les erreurs de prévision incontestables des planificateurs Algériens lors de leurs travaux de 1966 semblent avoir entraîné une reconsidération de l'approche qui risque, si on n'y prend garde, d'alourdir encore plus le coût social futur du développement.

Autre chose est de vouloir combler les retards notamment en matière de satisfaction des besoins prioritaires et même encore de vouloir élargir quelque peu cette liste de besoins prioritaires, et autre chose est de revoir les articulations profondes de la projection de 1966. Le premier problème suppose une plus grande maîtrise dans les actions de développement, des gains importants en efficacité dans la gestion, des améliorations de productivité et bien évidemment une meilleure répartition des charges du développement. La seconde approche suppose la première étape de construction de l'économie achevée et par conséquent les conditions d'une plus grande satisfaction des besoins réunis.

Il est vrai que la nécessité d'un modèle de consommation démocratiquement défini s'impose plus que jamais. Il est cependant aussi vrai qu'un tel modèle de consommation ne pourra dès à présent être appliqué alors même que les conditions technico-économiques de sa réussite ne sont pas encore réunies. *(19)*

3) La troisième orientation adaptée par les Instances Politiques et qui a guidé les travaux du Plan Quiquennal 1980–1984 est relative à la liste des besoins prioritaires à satisfaire. Cette liste s'allonge puisque la nouvelle projection reconnaît : «La satisfaction des besoins d'habitat et d'équipements collectifs constitue sans conteste avec l'emploi et l'éducation l'un des axes essentiels autour desquels devra s'articuler la politique de développement de la prochaine décennie» *(20)*. Ainsi à côté des trois revendications que la stratégie de 1966 était sensée satisfaire en 1980, apparaissent d'autres urgences dans le domaine social : la liste actuel actualisée des besoins prioritaires regroupe dorénavant :

– l'Emploi, l'Education, l'Equilibre Régional, l'Habitat, la Santé, avec, comme nous avions essayé de le rappeler des améliorations des niveaux individuel et collectif de consommation. *(21)*

On semble ainsi reconnaître que l'austérité ne peut plus être «facilement appliquée dans les faits» et que l'approche par la hiérarchisation des besoins a épuisé ses limites.

Bien évidemment il se posera dans les décennies à venir le problème des disponibilités financières. Continuer le processus d'accumulation et en même temps prendre en charge la satisfaction d'une liste des besoins sociaux qui s'allonge, supposent une grande aisance financière.

Cela suppose aussi que l'arbitrage à opérer entre accumulation et consommation ne constitue plus un problème soit parce qu'on peut réaliser les deux, soit parce qu'on est décidé à réorienter l'équilibre en faveur de la consommation.

L'approche retenue, dans sa formulation actuelle, pour la décennie à venir n'est pas claire et mérite une plus grande attention.

4) Nous terminons cet exposé par une dernière orientation adoptée par le Comité Central : celle relative à la question démographique.

Pour la première fois en ALgérie on se penche sur la contrainte démographique pour reconnaître ses effets pervers et ne plus se suffire des seules actions de développement pour la résorber.

«L'évolution des paramètres démographiques (population active, population des jeunes, nombre de ménages...) aura un impact déterminant sur l'ampleur des efforts à entreprendre pour satisfaire les besoins fondamentaux de la population que sont l'éducation, l'emploi, la consommation, la santé, l'habitat...» *(22)*, et plus loin : «... aussi une politique démographique conséquente avec les besoins et les aspirations au bien-être de la population et qui en discipline l'évolution constitue... un puissant facteur d'amélioration des chances de construction d'économie solide et indépendante...». *(22)*

Ainsi la fameuse «course contre la montre» ne doit plus dépendre du seul effort d'accumulation. Freiner l'exploitation démographique devient une nécessité si on veut améliorer l'efficacité des actions engagées ou à entreprendre. Mais est-ce que les conditions de réussite d'une telle politique démographique, toujours difficile à appliquer dans les Pays du Tiers-Monde, existent ?

En tout cas on ne peut attendre d'une telle politique des résultats immédiats. Son impact sur les besoins à satisfaire ne peut se faire sentir qu'à très long terme et les pressions sur les ressources disponibles qu'exercera la contrainte démographique ne peuvent disparaître dans la décennie à venir.

La difficile question de la comibnaison optimale entre accumulation et consommation reste entière.

NOTES

1. Cf. K.A. Khodia in «Algérie et Développement» No. 12.
2. M. Ourabah – in «Les Transformations économiques de l'Algérie au XXe anniversaire de l'Indépendance». Publisud, Paris, 1982, p. 75.
3. Nous ne reprenons pas ici l'objectif d'élimination totale de la sous-alimentation qui correspond donc à la prise en charge de la satisfaction d'un besoin fondamental, le besoin alimentaire. L'Etat comptait y arriver en adoptant un programme agricole ambitieux – En 1980 l'échec relatif de ce programme explique le recours de plus en plus important aux importations de produits alimentaires – L'essentiel est qu'à cette date il n'y a pas eu de cas notable de sous-alimentation des populations.
4. Cf. Rapport Général du IIème Plan Quadriennal 1974–1977 S.E.P. on remarquera ici que la distribution d'un emploi et donc d'un revenu à chaque Algérien semble être considéré comme pouvant assurer un niveau de vie «digne et décent». – La disponibilité des biens et services nécessaires posera pourtant de sérieux problèmes quant à la satisfaction des besoins sociaux élémentaires des populations – Nous y reviendrons plus loin.
5. Cf. 1er Plan Quadriennal 1970–1973 – Rapport Général.
6. 1er Plan Quadriennal 1970–1973 – op. cit.
7. Cf. IIème Plan Quadriennal 1974–1977 – Rapport Général, p. 27.
8. 1er Plan Quadriennal 1970–1973 -- Rapport Général, p. 126.
9. 2ème Plan Quadriennal 1974–1977 – Rapport Général, p. 15 et p. 27.
10. In «Algérie et Développement» No. 11 – p. 18.

11. Le Professeur Bobrowsky montre par exemple qu'en Roumanie les exportations ont été le fait d'industries manufacturières qui ont en même temps joué un rôle stratégique dans l'extension du marché intérieur.
12. Cf. Bobrowsky : «Perspectives à long terme de l'économie Algérienne». Direction Générale du Plan et des Etudes Economiques – Alger, Août 1969. Document ronéotypé.
13. L'ensemble des chiffres qui nous ont servi à établir cette évaluation sont tirés des Bilans Sectoriels et du Bilan National établi par le Ministère de la Planification et de l'Aménagement du Territoire et qui ont servi à l'élaboration du Plan Quinquennal 1980–1984.
14. Il est entendu par taux d'occupation, dans la terminologie utilisée par les planificateurs Algériens, le rapport : Population occupée/Population active x 100.
15. Par taux d'activité les planificateurs Algériens entendent le rapport : Population active/Population totale x 100.
16. Cf. Monsieur Ourabah – op. cit., p. 120 – il s'agit d'Alger, Oran, Constantine, Annaba.
17. «Projet d'orientation à long terme du développement économique et social». Ministère de la Planification et de l'Aménagement du Territoire – p. 38 - document ronéotypé – 229 p., op. cit., p. 58.
18. Op. cit., p. 92.
19. On peut citer en premier lieu une infrastructure industrielle complète, autocentrée ; un système adéquat et performant de distribution interne des biens et services ; une agriculture résolument orientée sur la satisfaction des besoins alimentaires des populations.
20. Op. cit. p. 107.
21. Qui se sont déjà traduites par l'application (encore en cours) d'un important programme d'importation de produits de consommation (notamment industriel) et qu'on dénomme P.A.P. (Programme Anti-Pénurie) (près de 5 Milliards de Dinars y ont été consacrés).
22. Document Op. cit., p. 46 et p. 50.

SUMMARY

Meeting the basic needs of the Algerian people has never been seriously considered as a major objective by Algerian planners. It has been and still is the planners argument that the basic needs could be met by investing more in productive sectors of the economy, mainly in industry. In this paper, the author tries to look into the Algerian approach to meeting the basic needs of the people as it was spelt out in 1966. He then evaluates it after 15 years of implementation and finally studies the new orientations that the approach seems to take since the 1980–1984 five year plan.

On the first point, the author argues that the 1966 plan was basically a long-term one which tried to select the projects that could be implemented within a generation from those that could not be implemented within this period. The Algerian planners therefore decided on the following orientations:

1. *To maximize the rate of economic growth;*
2. *to devote the bulk of national wealth to investment;*
3. *to give priority to investments which are immediately productive, i.e. in industry.*
4. *to meet some priority basic needs through a systematic action by the state.*

These priority basic needs relate to employment, education, régional equilibrium and social justice. For the Algerian planners all the other basic needs such as those related to health, housing, water, electricity and gaz are necessary but not of priority. Evaluating the implementation of the basic needs strategy in Algerian, the author concludes that the strategy failed to reach the goals which the planners set. Because of that failure, new goals were set in 1979 for the 1980–1984 five year plan. The new priority goals are to improve the management of the economy and also to seriously cater for the basic needs of the Algerian people in order to make-up for the delay and improve their life conditions.

THE MINING INDUSTRY IN ZIMBABWE: LABOUR, CAPITAL AND THE STATE

By

*John BRADBURY & Eric WORBY**

Introduction

In April 1980, the new nation of Zimbabwe received its independence ending some 90 years of colonial rule. Given this new status there were high expectations for the possibility of the generation of independent industrial policies under the rubric of a socialist model (*Mining Journal*, #300, 1983, p. 260). Our paper focuses on the question of the role of the State, its changing relationships with capital and labour and the constraints which have been placed upon it during the first few years of independence. We are especially concerned with the manner in which emerging class forces have moulded the state and the way in which the pre-1980 economic substructure has been transferred almost untouched into the post-independence period. In essence the role of the state has become subordinate to the forces of capital and the government's policies have become articulated with the needs of capital reshaping the socialist programme and modifying any attempts to promote worker control and ownership of the means of production. Today, nearly five years after Independence, the state reflects the needs of big business and transnational capital, to a large degree adopting a social democratic economic, social and labour model to work within the interstices of capital.

Our paper seeks to explain the particular mode of the Zimbabwe state through the medium of industry, especially mining, and its articulation with state policy and transnational policy. We have chosen this sector because it represents a vital part of the indigenous economy in which there are significant levels of foreign ownership. Similarly, there are high levels of government input into the industry both in terms of policies and finances and, perhaps more than any other sector in the economy it reflects the transitional form of the state in which policies have become subordinate to rather than dominant over foreign capital. We have utilized a number of sources in Zimbabwe including government documents, newspapers, interviews and field work surveys conducted in the mining sector in 1984.

The question of the role of the state in post-independent African countries has been approached by several authors. But the case of Zimbabwe is an interesting one because given the long history of infrastructural development, skills, industrial growth, banking and a high level od diversification, we might have expected a higher rate of growth and a more independent role for the state in Zimbabwe. However there were a number of

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constraints placed upon the restructuring of the state in 1980 which militated against the integration of a socialist model at a very early stage in Zimbabwe's birth (Mining in Zimbabwe, 1981, p. 25). The nation's independence was won through popular struggle but the transformation of the state mechanism into a socialist structure was significantly weakened by the conjuncture of class forces an political structures evident at the Lancaster House conference in London in 1980 (Leys, 1981, p. 28). Here it was noticeable that any endeavours to promote indigenous ownership of industry or to transform the conditions of work and production were militated against by the interests of capital. It is interesting to note as well that the political alliances formed within Zimbabwe at that time were favorable toward a status quo economic model which later emerged as a social democratic structure in the 1980's. This was paralleled by frequent excursions into socialist rhetoric by ministers of state and by members of the intelligentsia. But instead of a workers' party transformed by new political alliances, state ownership of industry and worker control and responsibility in the work place, we have seen the emergence of policies designed to accommodate and reinforce the same local capital and foreign transnational companies which existed in the pre-1980 period. This does not lessen the drive toward a socialist model in the long-run ; it does, however indicate that the apparent contradictions evident in the role of the state and in the economy will remain for at least the next five to ten years (Ware, 1984, 46–48).

The state nowadays, like its predecessor, is concerned with limiting labour costs, maximizing efficiency, maintaining labour laws to control unions and adopting managerial policies to appease and accommodate foreign investors. It is not difficult to see the external constraints which have been placed upon the Zimbabwe state in these circumstances which have been partially responsible for this reinforcement of status quo policy. To whit: the depression of the global capitalist system in the late 1970s created a whiplash effect in Zimbabwe's industries that in turn created a sense of urgency felt not only in mining but also in the faltering agricultural and manufacturing sectors (*Mining Journal*, # 301, 1983, p. 262). The strictures of the international funding agencies such as the IMF and World Bank have also been felt as conditions were placed on the sources, locations and uses of international funds and aid. Similarly, the transnational companies operating in the country have been forced to retrench labour, restructure their industries, and find ways of dealing with the recession. In the case of the mining industry this has meant some significant financial losses which the state has attempted to cover by offering soft loans to the companies. In effect, the most recent relationships between state and capital demonstrate quite clearly the growing accommodation between the two arenas.

Yet it would be too simple to allow our analysis to end at such compartmentalization of sub-categories and class interests. The acting out of political exigencies and the interface of economic power and decision makers within a constantly changing fiscal crisis in Zimbabwe suggest that a fluid rather than a static model is required for explanation of the post-1980's situation. Indeed, crisis theory as presently espoused in western economies is probably a more appropriate area to search for explanatory frameworks rather than from strictly within theories of the state (Aglietta, 1979; Wright, 1978). If we accept the parameters of crisis theory it is then possible to recognize the effects of economic, political and military trauma which both the population and the state in Zimbabwe have been subjected to. Given such constraints, it is likely that the state will continue to adopt ad hoc facilitative positions and policies in response to the massive and sometimes overwhelming conditions related to a long list of problem areas including: the internal fiscal crisis; the trauma of deep cyclical events, the restrictions of the IMF; drought conditions; pressures from South Africa, Britain and the United States; the everpresent gaps in external funds and currency traps; and, last but probably not least, the nation's own internal convulsions and upheavals derived from the moves to create a one-party system.

Critics of governmental industrial policy suggest that 65% to 75% of the country's capital assets are still held by foreigners (Ndhela, 1983, p.4). Indeed much of this foreign capital is still concentrated in the primary sector. Companies such as the British South African Company; Anglo-American (SA); the Rhodesian Selection Trust (UK); and Union Carbide (USA) are all in the primary sector but they have also become diversified into finance, agriculture and distribution. Outside this initial participation in the primary sector, foreign companies have also concentrated in import substitution known locally as ISI (Import Substitution Industrialization) aimed at increasing the indigenous content of manufactured goods for the Zimbabwe market. Government policy in this area is aimed at reducing non-essential imports by encouraging the establishment of enterprises able to increase local content in manufacturing with the end result of replacing the input of imported items.

The ISI policy no doubt has good intentions but the industrial profile which has taken shape in the post-1980 period has been a disappointment. The predominance of luxury goods and non-essential items undermines the development of a satisfactory producer goods sector. The production of luxury goods ranging from food items, some textiles, electrical goods and cars was actually intensified in the 1980's after UDI. In an economy with narrow margins for expansion, competition for investment is high and side-tracking of capital into luxuries, especially with high levels of unemployment and continuing rural-urban dependence, saps the energy of growth. However, it is also true that Zimbabwe has a relatively broad manufacturing sector overall compared with other SADCC countries. By 1965, for instance, manufacturing formed 18.9% of GDP compared with 18.7% for agriculture. During the period of UDI a high proportion of investment was channelled into metal products and the light industrial sector increased substantially (Zinyama, 1978). By 1980–81 when economic sanctions were dropped, Zimbabwe had a markedly increased locally manufactured content in imported machinery, equipment and domestic products. Evidence now suggests that some but not all of this industry has been substituted by imports as the need for manufacturing plants collapsed after 1980.

Indeed it now seems that foreign ownership and foreign capital may be on the increase in the wake of this collapse. While there are new guidelines for foreign companies, welcoming investments in rural areas, joint ventures and technology, the pattern of takeovers continues. In October 1982, the Heinz Food Company, based in the United States, purchased 51% of Olivine Industries, a Zimbabwe food producer. The German Company Siemans set up a joint venture with the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC-State Corporation). They plan to start the local manufacture of electrical goods. The Danish Dandy Chewing Gum Company has also recently set up a joint venture for a chewing gum plant ($ 2.30m). Moves such as these serve to consolidate external control in the consumer goods sector (Ndhela, 1983).

There has been little attempt to date to channel foreign investments into the capital goods and producer goods sectors. Nor is there evidence of a satisfactory resolution of the problem of ownership and control of industry in the face of foreign investment entries; whether such solutions match those of the espousal of a socialist model of economic development must remain for future judgement. Whether the private sector with foreign investors will be left to complete the capitalist transition of the consumer goods industries also remains to be seen (Government of Zimbabwe, 1982 B). What is clear, however, is that a mixed formulation of state and private capital, and a restructured form of state industries have become part of the ZANU-PF plan for coping with growth problems. Critics have suggested, however, that there is little sign of concrete development planning whether socialist or otherwise. To quote one source, «the government does not seem to have any notion of what its priorities are if industry should be the lynch pin of a transformation toward socialism» (Ndhela, 1983, p. 5).

In all fairness, there is some evidence of strategy per se but not necessarily towards a socialist model or at least not at this time. What is clear is that the economy is going through a problematic period and the choice of coping mechanisms is limited, namely at the moment the minister of finance is keeping with the requirements of the international financial community. The state in a broad sense is also attempting to cope through cooperation with big foreign firms and through the structuring of state enterprises and facilitative state organs and legislation. A look at the position of both labour and capital in the mining industry should illustrate this point.

Mine Labour in Zimbabwe: Historical and Structural Perspectives

While the overthrow of minority rule in Zimbabwe has changed the lives of some workers more than others, the dispensations of the new government have been disappointing for most. Changes in the national and regional political economy have, moreover, forced virtually all workers to illustrate both general trends in the position of labour in Zimbabwe and the need for specificity in assessing such trends. The mining sector is particularly suited to a study of changing relations of power between labour, capital, and the state in Zimbabwe. The fate of the mining industry exemplifies the way in which the contradictory role of the state is expressed in government policy. It starkly poses the problems of how to bring about the transition to state ownership and of how to increase workers' control over industrial enterprise. Most importantly, the case of the mining industry suggests the extent to which both labour and the state are paralyzed by multinational capital in their efforts to bring about structural change.

Our presentation will attempt to link recent changes in the character of mineworkers' struggles to historical changes in the political economy of mining in Zimbabwe. The central thesis here is that while the political overturning of settler rule is undoubtedly altering the skill structure of the labour force, the fundamentally exploitative relationship established by mining capital over labour is not, and perhaps cannot be changed in the near future.

In reviewing changes in that relationship over the last century, we pay close attention to four aspects of the mining economy in particular: the structure of labour supply; the labour process; the nature of mining products as commodities traded in world markets; and the forms of ownership that predominate in the mining industry. The forms of labour organization and resistance in the mines have been partially determined by each of these aspects of production, circulation and ownership. The changing structural and political position of mine labour will be analyzed as an integral part of the history of colonial domination and capitalist expansion. As a dynamic force in fundamental conflict with capital, labour has dialectically determined the structure of the mining industry in Zimbabwe at every point in time. The capacity of labour to resist exploitation by capital has forced mine owners, often in direct collaboration with the state, to evolve a wide range of strategies and techniques to maintain and increase rates of profit.

Mine Labour in Zimbabwean History

Mining occupies a central place in the historiography of southern African economic development. Many of the structural characteristics of mine production in Zimbabwe today can be traced to mundane peculiarities of geology and geography, as well as to the pattern of imperialist expansion in the sub-continent over the last century.

The form of early colonial development of the mining industry varied, however, in accordance with the production and marketing problems associated with each mineral. Gold, usually found in scattered surface or alluvial deposits, was profitably exploited by a single owner with limited capital and a gang of labourers. It could, moreover, be sold directly to banks. Base minerals such as chrome and asbestos, on the other hand, were found in extensive deposits of low-grade ores. These characteristics, together with their high bulk and isolation from overseas buyers, limited investment to highly capitalized producers. Large enterprises were able to accept delayed payment after production, and could absorb cyclical downswings in base mineral prices. They benefitted as well from linkages with leading producers and traders in foreign markets (Phimister 1975, p. 80). Concentration in the base metal industry was achieved through price-cutting, securing monopoly control over trade, and through vertical integration with manufacturing and marketing operations overseas. Foreign capital was particularly suited to adopt these strategies, and invested heavily in base minerals during and after the Second World War.

Gold outweighed the value of all other minerals combined until 1948 (Zimbabwe Agricultural and Economic Review 1982, p. 55). Thereafter the large-scale production of asbestos, chrome, coal, copper, and, in the late-1960s, nickel, began to rival gold in national economic importance. Foreign capital was attracted not only by increasing demand in world markets, but by the role of the state in guaranteeing the supply of cheap labour, and in stymying the development of a viable African trade union movement (Clarke 1975, p. 177).

What did these variations in scale and in ownership imply for the labour force? In general, one can identify a post-war shift in the structure of labour utilization from a reliance on ephemeral, unskilled, migrant labour of largely foreign origin in relatively small-scale operations, toward a more highly skilled and stable labour force in larger enterprises owned by foreign multinationals. By world standards, however, Zimbabwean mining operations remain highly labour intensive. The reasons for this must be sought in the legacy of cheap labour acquisition that was the hallmark of mine development at the turn of the century (See Van Onselen 1976; Perrings 1979).

Because mining operations in Southern Rhodesia tended to operate on a narrower profit margin than those further south, the viability of the industry depended from the start on the regular supply of cheap African labour. The way in which cheap labour was obtained and utilized, and the possibilities open to workers to subvert the process of exploitation. cannot be separated from the production process itself. Because labour had to be recruited by deception, force, and contract, it was inherently unstable and unskilled. This meant that tasks had to be organized so as to maximize the efficiency of supervision, and to minimize the degree of specialization and the concomitant need for training and experience.

Close cooperation between mining companies and the agencies of state power was maintained in order to recruit workers and in order to maintain discipline within the mine compound. The infamous compound system, comprising methods of surveillance and social control, became a standard feature of mines throughout the colony. Such a system was the direct counterpart of a strategy to minimize labour costs not only through low wages, but through the provision of abysmally poor rations, housing and health care.

Such skilled labour as was required was drawn from experienced European miners who initially had to be attracted by relatively high wages and benefits. This form of segmenting the labour market, so that colour was made to coincide with an ascribed skill-level, set the pattern for working class disunity that was to characterize mining trade-unionism until independence. Yet white working class interests were never quite so well represented in the Rhodesian state as in South Africa, nor were white workers continually in a strong bargaining position. Mine owners were able to sustain divisions within the labour force, while keeping the aggregate cost of labour as low as possible (Phimister 1977).

Labour Organization and Labour Division

The creation of oppressive conditions to ensure the *viability* of mines early in the colony's history was soon used to maximize the *profitability* of mines as they increased in scale and technical sophistication during and after the Second World War. Wages actually declined in real terms between 1901 and 1940, rising only when the markets and profit margins of multinational investors increased in response to war-time demand. But measures of average gains made by African workers disguise the wage stagnation endured by unskilled underground and surface workers, who probably earned the same real wage in 1974 as they had at the turn of the century. A stratum of semi-skilled African workers, paid marginally better wages, was gradually introduced as the industry moved toward more capital intensive techniques in order to remain competitive internationally. Skilled white workers, accustomed to earning wages at least ten times unskilled rates, opposed the fragmentation of skilled jobs and the promotion of blacks. The mineowners responded by shifting the colour bar upward during the 1950s and 1960s. A wide range of new tasks were classified as 'semi-skilled', enabling the companies to hire black labour and keep labour costs low (Clarke 1975, p. 179).

After the war, rising unemployment, the decreasing productivity of agriculture on the reserves, and increasing worker militancy induced the state to pressure mineowners to improve wages and working conditions.

Measures to increase the national component of the labour force, increase post-employment benefits, and remove measures of social control, were an outcome of the changing structure of production on larger, foreign owned mines. These mines tended to require a higher complement of labour experienced in the operation of machinery and complex plant equipment. The choice between importing European workers and training African workers to fill this requirement, was not only determined by the wage differential and the cost of training, but also by the costs of stabilization that attended to training labour in the long-term. In making such a choice, mining capital had to assess the long-term demand for particular categories of labour, to see if the costs of training would indeed be repaid. (Perrings, 1979, pp. 238–242). The option to train black labour was, of course, assessed under the assumption that their acquired skills would be both undervalued and underpaid. (Mandaza, 1983).

On balance, this would account for the ambivalent position of multinational capital with respect to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. The Smith regime's commitment to maintain the colour bar limited the freedom of companies to determine the composition of the labour force, and hence to minimize the aggregate cost of labour. In 1973, forty-five per cent of the total wage bill in the mining industry accrued to skilled (i.e. white) labouring grades representing only five per cent of the total labour force (Clarke, 1975, p. 209). It thus appears that the state was sufficiently influenced by white working class interests to limit the restructuring process that the mining companies would have liked to see take place. UDI was a thorn in the side of multinational capital. Independence, on the other hand has provided the catalyst for the kind of restructuring envisioned long ago. Given an adequate supply of labour from a low cost market, skills can now be upgraded while increasing the ratio of profits to labour costs, even though costs per man-hour may increase. From the point of view of mining capital, increasing the productivity of labour may take on greater real significance than holding down wages.

Protest and Unionization.

Prior to the development of a good road network in the 1930s, communication between workers at isolated enterprises was difficult. Hence strike action in the early part of the century was confined to individual mines, and whenever labour supplies were sufficient, strikes could usually be resolved through the replacement of unrepentent workers. While organized labour protest was rare under repressive conditions, less obvious forms of labour protest were endemic. Desertions, slow-downs, and company-store boycotts, time and again forced owners to solicit the aid of the state in bringing black workers to heel (Van Onselen, 1976).

The history of unionized labour in Southern Rhodesian mines dates back to the period immediately following the First World War, when skilled white labour was short and hence in a strong position to press its demands. It wasn't until after the passage of the Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) of 1934, by which white workers gained collective bargaining rights. however, that state-sanctioned unionization efforts could take effect. The recognition of the Associated Mineworkers' Union (now the Associated Mine Workers of Zimbabwe – AMWZ) in 1938 as the industry-wide representative of mine employees (black workers were still not defined as such), initiated a period of close collaboration between the state, employers, and unionized white artisans and staff workers. While the amendments to the ICA in 1959 provided for the recruitment of black workers into the union, provision was made for the control of the union executive by skilled grades.

The 1959 amendments represented an effort by the state to coopt organized labour and nationalist movements in the black working class, and became a vehicle for the incorporation of a stratum of black semi-skilled workers into the conservative bargaining apparatus. (CLARKE 1975, p. 207). The union explicitly pledged its cooperation in diffusing strikes on behalf of management and bargained actively for improvements in wages and benefits for the skilled and semi-skilled grades, often at the expense of labourers. As a result, union membership varied directly with skill level. Moreover, membership was highly concentrated among a few of the larger mines under foreign ownership or control. These were precisely the mines that were willing to engage in an industrial bargaining process while advancing the process of mechanization and altering the distribution of skills in the labour force.

The Position of Mineworkers since Independence

While many substantive elements of the miner's employment contract have been altered since Independence, the basic negotiating framework laid down by the Industrial Conciliation Act remains in force today despite widespread dissatisfaction with many of its provisions by employers and workers alike (Government of Zimbabwe 1981 B). Under the terms of the ICA, labour relations in the mining industry are governed by a National Industrial Council composed of equal numbers of employer and worker representatives selected respectively by the Chamber of Mines and the AMWZ. The parties negotiate a National Industrial Agreement, and after receiving the imprimatur of the Minister of Labour, Manpower Planning, and Social Welfare, the agreement becomes binding on all mining enterprises. The National Industrial Council has a staff supported by union and employer levies whose task it is to ensure the enforcement of the agreement (AMWZ and Commonwealth Trade Union Council 1984). In practice this is difficult to do, especially in the smaller mines, some of which are fly-by-night operations in inaccessible areas of the country.

While minimum wage legislation introduced after Independence temporarily brought the lowest paid mineworkers above the Poverty Datum Line, wages were frozen in the 1982 national budget, and inflation continues to erode gains that have been made. The wage structure itself has been altered to increase cash payments rather than make implicit deductions for rations and accommodation. In 1981, the Government permitted the mine employers to deduct Z$27 from the wage minimum of Z$85/month for unskilled workers in compensation for housing and other social facilities they claimed to provide. In fact many of the smallworkings provide none of these amenities, and the Chamber of Mines itself argued that the deduction was never intended to represent the value of such benefits, but rather the lower cost of living of mineworkers in comparison to those employed in commerce and industry in towns (Government of Zimbabwe 1981 B p. 15). Subsequent negotiation has eliminated the housing deduction and the 1983 Industrial Agreement has established a base rental rate of 12.5 cents/square meter. Electricity, fuel, and above-standard fixtures are charged extra and deductions are made for older units *(National Industrial Council for the Mining Industry, 1983).* The minimum wage rate for the lowest grade workers was increased from Z$105 to Z$110/month in September, 1983, and increased again to Z$120 as of June 30, 1984. Although the larger mines tend to pay above the minimum, on the whole mineworkers remain the most poorly paid industrial employees. The most recent Industrial Agreement (of March, 1983) has not yet been signed, pending the resolutionn of dispute over job classification and housing rentals.

The union is relatively content with the industrial council system and has further benefitted from representation on the Minerals Marketing Board. As a forum where world markets are discussed and the production figures of individual producers revealed, such representation provides vital access to industry data that can be used in bargaining. AMWZ membership has increased rapidly since its first black president was elected in 1981 and the union now boasts a paid up membership of 24,000 out of roughly 60,000 workers, making it the largest single union in Zimbabwe today. Union finance has been strengthened by the adoption of the check-off system, and assistance from the Miners International Federation and the Commonwealth Trade Union Council has enabled the AMWZ to undertake an ambitious workers' education programme (AMWZ and MIF, 1983).

The first year of Independence brought work stoppages at the nation's major nickel, copper, and gold mines, and two strikes at Hwange colliery alone (Astrow, 1983, pp. 178–9). The issues ranged from wage demands to the reinstatement of dismissed workers. Since then, relations between the union and the Chamber of Mines have been described by both sides as workable. The chief executive at Anglo-American Zimbabwe recently lauded his company's «remarkable» record in maintaining industrial harmony during 1983. Commenting on the Bindura

Nickel Corporation, an Anglo subsidiary operating four mines and a smelting-refining complex, he said that, «It is pleasing to report that there were no work stoppages or industrial relations problems, other than of a minor nature, and the various channels of communication between management and workers operated smoothly» *(Anglo News May, 1984, pp. 1–2).* The government has contributed to the control of labour insofar as it has time and again appealed to the workers to maintain «discipline», threatening harsh measures to counter sloth or «irresponsible» forms of collective action.

The growth in the size and maturity of the union may bring with it a tendency toward conservatism in both its strategy and in its demands. As the union acquires a more experienced and professionalized bureaucracy, as labourers compete for training opportunities to upgrade their skill classification, and as the mine companies blackmail the government into bailing them out with loans and setting wage minima at levels they find tolerable, the chances for industry-wide militancy seem more remote. Restrictions on retrenching workers have constrained the flexibility of companies to close up shop at a moment's notice, and worker security has correspondingly increased. But mining houses have responded by inducing the government to subsidize the wage bill with loans, and by making new operations, such as the open cast coal mine at Hwange, more capital intensive.

The long-term strategy of the union is in some ways determined by the severe constraints placed on their ability to negotiate with the Chamber of Mines inbetween Industrial Agreements. The new Labour Bill, when finally approved, is not likely to alleviate these constraints significantly. Workers militancy, where it exists, seems to percolate up from workers' committees, the new democratically constituted bodies introduced to settle shop floor grievance. While at least one observer flatly calls them «organs of class collaboration (Astrow, 1983, p. 176)», this judgement may be premature. Tools were downed at the Kamativi tin mine in March 1984, for example, when the workers' committee demanded the resignation of senior management, accusing them of disloyalty *(Joint Worker's Committee 1984).* The apparent irony is explained by the fact that the government had acquired an 80 per cent shareholding in the company but left the old company management in place. In at least one instance then, a workers' committee has taken the government's socialist rhetoric to heart and acted as if their enterprise ought indeed to be run on behalf of a worker's state. Both management and the union seem to be battling for the allegiance and control of the workers' committees. Given the existence of a history of union representation and shop floor organization, the committees were thought by some to be redundant in the mining industry. Instead, it seems that they benefit from union support, and that union branch representatives often double as workers' committee members.

In the short term, the union is currently battling over substantive issues: health and safety, abolishment of housing rentals, wage parity with other industries, and fair job evaluation and classification. Most of these are issues that the Chamber of Mines is well equipped, and often more than willing to negotiate. The question of job grading, however, may prove more contentious. Ever since blacks were first entitled to recognized semi-skilled jobs after the War, the Chamber of Mines has attempted to circumvent the rate-for-the-job guarantee that served as the cornerstone of racially determined wage differentials. Their tactic has apparently been to create and recreate a bewildering variety of job classifications within the lower-paid, intermediate skill grades, especially as new technologies require the performance of novel tasks. The Patterson grading system adopted in 1975, specifies that grades be established according to the degree of decision-making of the worker; the opportunities for gerrymandering the lines of job demarcation on this basis are obvious enough. The extent to which it will serve as a source of worker frustration and discontent remains to be seen. Government pressure on companies to provide skill-testing and upgrade qualified workers may not, by itself, guarantee significant gains. In the longer-term, the mineworkers are concerned with the precedent set by capital intensive investments in the industry being made by the state, and are anxious to see greater investment in developing internal markets and industrial linkages that will stabilize the volatile demand for the minerals they produce.

Less obvious, but more significant, is the fact that the position of working class (as represented in the mining sector) vis-a-vis capital is in no way being strengthened. While it may be that wages now represent a higher proportion of operating costs than before independence, it is probable that the rate of appropriation of surplus value will only increase as new skills and new technology are applied to new investments.

The possibility of introducing direct workers' control of mining enterprises, even through the 'medium' of the state seems far off on the horizon. State or worker management will undoubtedly require another generation of experience before becoming a viable option. Meanwhile, the multinational mining houses are more than happy to encourage limited state participation in their own operations. This strategy serves to dampen the enthusiasm for legislating in favour of workers, subsidizes investment costs, and reduces company liability for layoffs during periods of crisis. The mining industry strives to establish wage rates and obligations for the provision of amenities during periods of crisis when the quantity of employment maintained, rather than quality of working life, is seen to take precedence. A cost structure biased against labour is thus sustained by the treat of the withdrawal of capital investments. The provision of housing, facilities, and benefits acquired by workers in the industrialized world decades ago are selectively utilized to buy off militancy, and to divide the labour force. The fundamental relations of exploitation that the socialist state is supposed to bring into question are once again being mystified by the beneficient face of multinational capital.

The Captive State: Policy Orientations in Zimbabwe's Mining Industry

In the Zimbabwean mining industry, as elsewhere, the basic conflict is still between capital and labour. Despite some attempts to ameliorate the position of labour, as we have noted, this contradiction still remains. As we have seen, the state's actions toward capital have been generous, while policies toward labour have at times been harsh.

As far as industry is concerned, it was evident by 1981 that the state would be forced into a facilitative role within the interstices of mining and not vice-versa. In a major economic policy statement published in the first year of independence, the government's role vis-a-vis mining was made clear *(Government of Zimbabwe, 1981, C p. 7).* While the general rules laid out were apparently aimed at exploiting the mineral base for the maximum economic and social benefit of the country, the realities of the situation were such that in the early halcyon days of new nation-hood the transfer of social value by mining companies outside the country continued unabated *(Government of Zimbabwe 1982 E).* It was with such a drain-off dilemma in mind that the state instituted plans to create a Minerals Marketing Corporation (MMC) in 1982 *(Government of Zimbabwe 1982 D).* And again in May 1983 the state sought to deepen its influence in this largely private enterprise sector by establishing a Mining Development Corporation *(Government of Zimbabwe, 1983, C Vol. 2, p. 7).*

However, the Minerals Marketing Board has had the most significant impact in the mining industry. Designed primarily as a parastatal to act as a conduit for minerals, it has been able to exercise a degree of control over access to markets and the selling of Zimbabwe's minerals. In performing this action it extracts a small levy on the net value of all exports of just under 1%. Its powers are broad in nature but limited in stature; the sole purpose is to act as the only marketing and selling agent for all minerals produced in the country (Lander, 1984). For the most part this function is fulfilled with the exception of some limited sale and purchases of small quantities of alluvial gold collected by small operators throughout the country. In performing this major buying and selling role, the Mineral Marketing Corporation must carefully investigate both the condition and costs of production within the country and the status of the global market. With both its own levy interests in mind and its caretaker role within the industry, it must seek the best prices for all minerals sold outside the country. Its finances are covered by the purchase of minerals for its own account and the sale or disposal of them in the market place. In this role the corporation is preceded and paralleled by such government marketing agencies as the grain marketing board which for the last 20 years has bought, sold and distributed all grain produced for the market. Indeed the grain agency has provided much of the impetus and ideological structure for a minerals agency *(Government of Rhodesia 1963).*

Within the broad mandate of a marketing function the MMC also seeks to facilitate the beneficiation, utilization and further processing of minerals inside Zimbabwe. This later purpose is limited by the mandate given to the Corporation which is only to encourage and not to require the further processing of minerals inside the national boundaries. It does, however, have teeth which may be utilized to stimulate and control some internal conditions within the mining industry. Any person or company, for instance, who sells or exports any mineral in contravention of the regulations is liable to a fine of $20,000 or x squared the value of the mineral itself, whichever is the greatest *(Government of Zimbabwe 1982 D).* Another more strategic role is performed by the corporation in the prohibition of the stockpiling of minerals. The corporation can, for instance, fix the quantity of any mineral or the size of a stockpile which a company has in its possession or under its control at any one time.

Where it considers it appropriate, the Minerals Marketing Corporation can order any mining company to reduce the quantity of any mineral it posesses to a quantity fixed by the corporation. Furthermore, it can require the company to provide written details of the quantity, type, grade, price, location and sales details of any mineral owned or controlled by the mining company. While such demands may appear perfectly normal to the non-mining community, they do reflect a deep intrusion into what is generally considered as private company information. With such secrecy companies have previously used it as one of a number of strategies to gain control over access to resources, new sites of ore and monopolization of ore regions. However, with the entry of such information into the public arena, under the rubric of the minerals marketing board, the control over such information has become part of a regulated situation; or at least superficially this is so but may not be so in the harsh reality of the minerals extraction and marketing world *(Government of Zimbabwe, 1982 D).*

Similarly, the «opening up» of information on ore bodies also brings to light the pattern of decision making over closures and winding down of operations when ore bodies are depleted to near to it, as appears to be the case in the nickel mines in the Bindura area of N E. Zimbabwe owned and operated by the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa. This type of closure information has traditionallly been guarded quite jealously, but with the information in the public areas, the domain of decision making takes on an air of state and corporate responsibility. Indeed this is one area in which the state in Zimbabwe has had some degree of success, with several companies forced to disclose information and required to accept some degree of responsability for ley offs and the costs of winding-down mining operations. In reality, however, while the policy of disclosures has operated effectively, some of the costs of maintaining «artificial» levels of employment, as the mining companies are wont to call it, are being borne by the state through the medium of soft loans to the mining company «in distress». While there is some indication of the effectiveness of the closure and disclosure legislation, there is little evidence of the viability of the remaining teeth in the mineral board's repertoire of legislation.

Indeed the evidence suggests that the government is not willing or able to alter the relationships with the foreign mining houses. Statements have been made by government leaders to reassure the companies that no nationalization will take place in the forseeable future (*Sunday Mail 1982).* Furthermore, the government has intimated that state involvement is most likely to be in the form of joint ventures and the provision of loans to companies in financial difficulty. However, what the actual equity and control relationships will be in proposed joint ventures, or indeed the extent to which such activities will intrude upon the domain of private corporations in the production sector, still remains to be seen. To date, most activity has been in a facilitative role rather than in direct state ownership, management and control in productive mines. With global demand for most minerals in decline and production as well as labour costs increasing, the government has indulged in soft loans to tide the companies over and for the most part there is little indication of any suggestion of direct takeovers. The best example of this strategy to date is the Empress Nickel Mine, which, after some six to eight months of negotiation between the owners, Rio Tinto (Zimbabwe) and the government, with loans and assistance amounting to $Z2.7 million, was finally closed down by the company in December 1982 *(Mining Journal April 22, 1983, p. 262).* Evidence suggested at the time that the mine was near the end of active life and the loans really served to soften the blow for the company.

In 1982, MTD (Mangula) Ltd., the country's biggest copper producer, also went to the government for assistance and received $26.0 millions in backed loans. In October of the same year, the government also purchased some 40% of the shares of Mwange Colliery as a form of aid assistance to the company (co-owned by the Anglo-American Corporation). And again in 1983, the government provided soft loans to the Bindura Nickel Company for a total of $Z6.0 million repayable over a five year period *(Mining Journal, June 3, 1983, p. 382).* All this was accomplished in order to bolster the flagging mining industry to preserve jobs and prevent retrenchment or closure. The only failure of this holding policy to date was the closure of the Empress Mine, already noted, in 1982. And while there were some «fears» initially on the part of the mining houses that the wave of «assistance» could turn to nationalization, by 1984 these had been allayed by further assurance from the government and the apparently convival and comfortable arrangement which existed between the two *(Lander 1984, Interview).*

There was a suggestion in 1984, however, that the mandate of the Minerals Marketing Corporation could be expanded in the future to commence its own operations in mining, minerals research, refining, beneficiation and manufacturing. Indeed there is a precedent for this type of operation in the national steel industry which is a joint venture operation between the government and private companies including the Anglo-American Corporation *(Financial Gazette, March 19, 1984, (Special Supplement, ZISCO Steel); Government of Zimbabwe, 1982 D, No. 2: 29, Sec. 21, Sub. Sec. 24).* This suggested procedure for the mining industry was initiated first in an early planning document prepared by the government. To whit: that the government desired foreign investors take on local equity partners to achieve the maximum possible Zimbabwean managerial and technical personnel in all spheres of the mining industry. To date, however, there is little evidence of any widespread joint ventures, the exception being the Hwange Coal fields. And while this is a massive undertaking, it is not a new venture in itself but rather a revamping of the ownership structure of a long established coal mining operation *(Growth With Equity, 1981, p.7).*

Overall, the state operations in the mining sector, mostly through the medium of the MMC, have experienced difficult times since independence in April 1980. The general world recession, for instance, has depressed prices and reduced demands for metals and this was reflected in declining mineral export earnings in 1982 and 1983; prices and incomes rose minimally again in 1984 however *(Harare Herald, April 6, 1984; Financial Gazette, April 6, 1984, p. 24).* Similarly competition from other producers in a period of general recession has placed pressure on the supporting capacities of the state in Zimbabwe: several of the country's most important mineral products, such as chrome and asbestos, compete directly with South Africa in the export market. In the area of wages too the state's activities have, in the terms of the language of the mining companies, complicated the competitive issue: minimum wages, for instance, have more than doubled since independence at a time when prices and demand were falling. This situation, according to the industry, has directly related their falling rate of profit to the increasing marginality of their operations and forced the state to compensate them for losses at a time when both the state and the companies were experiencing declining net incomes *(Mining Journal, April 22, 1983, p. 262).*

For the most part, government aid has been directed toward the large scale mining operations in the country, but recently some attempts to promote and aid small-scale operations have been made. It was incumbent upon the state to support small-scale operations because while they do not account for any large proportion of the GNP, they supply an important although small source of employment. Newer and small mining operations in Zimbabwe suffer from a lack of experience, and finance. Government policy has therefore been aimed at producing basic information on methods of issuing licenses, pegging claims, techniques of mining and ore processing, increasing efficiently, and retention of ownership in small-scale hands preventing the forced sale to large-scale owners (IDRC 1982 pp. 4–6). In addition, the state mining department offers loans to purchase mines to a maximum of $225,000, loans to purchase equipment, marketing assistance, and cheap loans for construction and/or establishment of water or electricity supplies to the mines. Similarly, loans can be obtained for the erection of a plant and bringing a mine into production. In exceptional circumstances, the government will also hire out plant and equipment such as compressors, hoists and mills to enable small-scale operators to become established on a firm footing *(Government of Zimbabwe, 1982 C).*

The state has also attempted to assist small holder workings by installing mining cooperatives specifically to overcome skill and managerial gaps. Some cooperatives now function in panning for alluvial gold. One cooperative is currently working a chromite deposit in the Ngezi area where an older mining operation was taken over by workers after its financial collapses. The mine foreman is now the manager and Chairman of the cooperative. This particular operation was given equipment by the government, and assistance by engineers and state technical experts. The extent to which cooperatives are working in comparison with the large-scale capital intensive sector is, however, quite miniscule (Usheworkunze, 1983, p. 3). And as we will see in the following discussion, there are still substantive economic and political reasons for the mainline direction of state policy toward foreign owned transnationals in Zimbabwe's mining sector *(Government of Zimbabwe, 1982 B).*

Transnational Linkages in the Zimbabwe Mining Industry.

The objective of the transnationals in the mining sector in Zimbabwe is still the process of capital accumulation and the inter-regional transfer of value out of Zimbabwe mostly into South Africa, the UK and the USA, the host sites of the major mining transnationals. This transfer process is still aided and abetted by the specific functions and role of the state largely because no alternative appears possible given the immediate post-independence scenario of fiscal crises and dependence on external sources of capital for investment and survival. Thus the state is faced with a dilemma. It must preserve the «goose that lays the golden egg». At the same time it must pursue a policy of nationalization or less «severe» strategies, in order to retain value generated by mining and to channel this capital into upstream manufacturing to be syphoned into the net social product of Zimbabwe rather than into that of neighboring South Africa *(Harare Herald, April 5, 1984).*

The mining sector as a whole shows a high degree of dependence in the form of market concentration of the sources of external financing and the sources and financing of the means of production in the form of machines, chemicals and technology. The sector as a whole has always been, and still is dependent upon the capitalist world market and as such is subject to the vagaries of cyclical behavior and whiplash effects on external inputs and outputs. For the most part, there is still a low level of consumption and utlization of the minerals mined in the country in indigenously based industries, largely because of a poorly developed capital goods sector. The exception is the ZISCO state/private owned steel company, but even here some 75–80% of all steel produced is designated for export in a semi-finished state *(Financial Gazette March 9, 1984).* The dependence of the mining sector and its ownership by foreign transnationals also played a major role in making the sanctions against Rhodesia ineffective during the period of UDI up to 1980. Indeed evidence suggests that their hold on the mining sector and the increases in investments during the latter period of UDI may have entrenched them even further prior to the date of independence in April, 1980.

Although the degree of concentration of production in general manufacturing is not significant in Zimbabwe, the level of concentration in mining is still quite high. In manufacturing in 1975, for instance, the largest 125 production units with a workforce of more than 300, produced 75% of the total gross output *(Stoneman, 1981, p. 161).* There is no reason to suspect that this basic structure has changed although after the cessation of sanctions and UDI, a number of firms were closed or consolidated. The mining sector, however, appears to have remained unscathed although the recession in the post-1980 period has taken its toll on some large as well as small mines –– especially gold in the small size firm. The great majority of the 52 registered 'large scale' mines in 1984 were owned by British, American or South African interests. The 14 largest mines still operating with a workforce over 800 had a total number of 27,450 workers which was 61% of the total number employed in mining per se. These 14 mines along with several other smaller subsidiaries were owned and operated by the big eight foreign corporations, namely: Anglo-American Corporation (SA); Lonhro (UK); Messina Transval (SA); Rio Tinto (UK), Falcon Mines (UK; Johannesburg Cons. Inv. (SA); Turner & Newall (UK); and Union Carbide(USA) *(National Industrial Council for the Mining Industry, January, 1984).* Operating through a complicated network of South African and Zimbabwean subsidiaries, the UK compagny Lonrho controls ten mines, mostly in copper and gold. Anglo-American, a South African-Oppenheimer family transnational is now the most important and powerful conglomerate operating in Zimbabwe; effectively, it is a finance capital structure with industrial and financial arms in mining, agriculture, banking, food and manufacturing (see table 1). The Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation (UK), like Anglo-American, is a major transnational but in Zimbabwe its practice are restricted to mining mostly in gold and chrome. The Union Carbide Corporation represents the most important American investments in Zimbabwe. The interest here is in chrome and nickel. Falcon mines are owned jointly by British based investments with interests in gold and precious metals. Asbestos holdings are concentrated in a minor way in a South African Company (Asbestos Investments Pty. Ltd.) and in a major way by the British giant Turner and Newall whose mines are responsible for some 90% of the asbestos produced in Zimbabwe.

In general terms, the large foreign owned firms are measurably more productive than smaller and locally owned firms. They have a greater capital intensity than do smaller mines but in comparison with other firms and transnationals operating elsewhere outside of Zimbabwe, they are relatively labour intensive. Indeed the greater relative capital intensity of the foreign owned mines in Zimbabwe is illustrated by a lower wages/ net output ratio compared with smaller mines. The large mines are also still marked by their intensive managerial and contractual linkages with their parent firms through traditional transnational ownership and share structures *(Clarke 1980).*

While estimates vary of the degree to which foreign companies still control mining in Zimbabwe, the most accurate measures based on extrapolations from pre-independence data suggest that most foreign mining investments still derive from the UK or South Africa. Increasingly, however, American firms have shown interest in chromite and rare earth minerals, especially those used in electronics and space technology. Nowadays, approximately 50% of foreign mining capital investment originates from the UK, 40% in South Africa, and 10% in the USA. Overall, the foreign owned companies account for between 73% and 95% of the total output of the industry. The broad picture of mining is thus one in which both the sources of investment, decision making, production and export of minerals are controlled by foreign owned transnationals, most of whom have mining operations, as well as expanded financial activities in a number of other countries, including several in the developing world. As such, the mining scenario in Zimbabwe is exposed to competition from other countries whose commodities can be produced at comparable cost using various mixes of cheap(er) labour and higher or lower grade of minerals. Whichever mix of capital/labour and mineral bases the transnationals choose can serve to undermine the basis and stability of nations like Zimbabwe where, with a newly emerging nation status, the state is susceptible to both internal and external pressures to provide subsidies for companies.

The basis of the linkage between the foreign owned companies and the Zimbabwean mining industry lies in the structural transference of value across national boundaries and in the lack of control over such transfers by the Zimbabwe state. Coupled with this, the companies still find they can carry on operations paying low wages to workers despite the passage of legislation raising the wage level to heights unforeseen in the pre-1980 period.

In Zimbabwe, as we discussed earlier, the mining sector has traditionally been permitted to operate on the basis of low wages and a high rate of exploitation which have been translated into a high rate of profits. The high rate of exploitation here generates high rates of surplus value which is the source of capital accumulation in the home site of each transnational company (Nyathi, 1977). Thus, part of the explanation of profitability for foreign firms in Zimbabwe comes from variations in labour costs, but there are also further levels of abstraction to be considered in this explanation. The differences in labour costs leading to a higher rate of profit are posited as transfers of value; or the transfer of purchasing power over the net social product of one region versus another, in our present case, Zimbabwe versus South Africa, UK, and USA. Whichever way we analyse it, the result is that there is an uneven appropriation of net social product and surplus value by one class over another, represented here by the ownership and control of foreign transnationals aided by the functional, if not structural, role of the state.

However, given our previous analysis of the internal and external constraints placed upon the Zimbabwe state and the structural transfer of class alliances and interests in the early phases of independence, it is probably not suprising to see a continuation of the problem of high rates of exploitation and transfer of value outside of Zimbabwe. Indeed, it seems the concretization of the foreign ownership structure and its apparent infallibility in the face of a changing economic and political climate, supports our earlier contention that the government policy per se has become articulated with and subordinate to the needs of capital, and that various constraints have been placed upon the state which have militated against deeper structural transformations. The weakness of 'captive' state in these circumstances leads to a continuation of previous capital/labour relations. We are faced with a weakened working class and increased antagonism between (mine) workers in developed and developing countries because of the increased pressure placed on 'cheap labour' markets and the increasing tendency for transnationals to rely upon intensified value discrepencies between points of production and consumption and the transfer of purchasing power and control over the net social product from host to home sites.

With the transnational linkages too, we can observe an intensification of the fiscal relationships between the institutional sources of foreign capital and the cyclical nature of the mining industry. And while transnational linkages are currently in vogue in Zimbabwe and providing some jobs and income, these advantages are counterbalanced by the repatriation of profits and the continuation of expatriate control, and ownership. However in early 1984, the government attempted to impose some fiscal controls on investments and repatriation of profits *(Financial Gazette, April, 1984)*, but the success of such controls remains to be seen. Furthermore the structural relations which embrace the global mining system impinge upon the Zimbabwean minerals sector, a factor which is out of the hands of the Zimbabwean people and for the moment beyond the control of the Zimbabwean state. Thus by simply being a member of the international community and being involved in single enterprise extractive industries, the Zimbabwe economy as a whole is subjected to economic whiplash and trauma of global fluctuations in prices, production and consumption.

Production Changes in Mining and Manufacturing: Value Increases and Volume Declines in the Post-1980 Period

The tenor of our comments thus far indicates that the mining industry is in the throes of a recession in Zimbabwe. As we have noted there still is considerable pressure on the working class and on the state to provide corporate as well as social welfare support. It is clear now that during the period of UDI, the mining industry proceeded apace despite United Nations sanctions; and that in the immediate post-independence period some significant restructuring of the industry took place. This was largely due to falling prices and falling demand in the global sphere and not to any overt action on the part of the state. During UDI up to 1980, the status of both mining and manufacturing were concealed by a lack of data and public information. Firms operated in a covert manner in terms of their exports and production figures. Nevertheless, it is evident during the period that manufacturing industry expanded in accordance with internal demand and the external constraints placed upon it by international economic sanctions. Between 1964 and 1980, the net output of value in mining increased six-fold (see Table 2). During that same period employment increased in both the mining and manufacturing sectors. The biggest leaps occured between 1978 and 1981 curing the heights of the war within the country *(Government of Zimbabwe, 1981 A; 1981 D; 1982 A; 1982 F; 1983 B)*. Manufacturing in particular took a great leap in numbers employed immediately following the cessation of military activities. However, this initial expansion then slowed down near the end of 1981 because of foreign currency problems and «transportation difficulties» on the railway between Zimbabwe and the port city of Maputo in Mozambique.

Mining, as we have noted, also continued during the war and into its immediate aftermath. As world prices for most minerals plummeted in the global recession, mining in Zimbabwe and in developing countries like it, became exposed to the cyclical and whiplash effect so common to such dependent industrial systems. By mid-1984, the mood in the industry was one of cautious optimism *(Harare Herald, April 6, 1984)*; all it seems was dependent upon the recovery of economic momentum in the USA and Europe and how the industry located there would be able to consume stockpiles already accumulated during the recession. But in the lead up to this heightening of the economic picture, there were some dark moments for the industry *(Zimbabwe Agricultural and Economic Review, 1982:*

181–2). In August, 1983, for instance, the government reported that the value of mineral production in Zimbabwe dollars had declined from a record high of $Z414.8 million in 1980 to $Z393.5 million in 1981 and to $Z383.0 million in 1982. A comparison between the first six months of 1982 and the first half year of 1983 showed that the decline in value of mineral production had been reversed largely because of a devaluation in the Zimbabwe dollar followed by significant currency adjustements. However, in the course of devaluation a number of mining operations were able ro report a «profit» in the latter half of 1983 despite a 2.5% decline in volume *(Mining and Engineering Journal October, 1983, p. 17).* Indeed, while there was a gratifying increase in the value of production it was measured in Zimbabwe dollars, which having been floated at the end of 1982, had declined by more than 27% against the US dollar and even more in real currency terms. Thus while the «value» of most minerals increased, especially quoted at their «at mine» value, the actual volume of production continued a slow decline. The only exceptions to this general rule were demonstrated by the Hwange Colliery which started some small exports to Tanzania *(Chamber of Mines Journal, Feb. 1984, p. 15).* In addition, there were some hopes that gold prices would continue to stabilize and that the income of $Z192 million, representing 41.2% of the country's total mineral earnings in 1982, would continue to hold and improve *(Harare Herald, April 6, 1984).* Similarly, there was hope that prices would improve and stabilize for hard-hit nicke industry.

CONCLUSION

The tenacity and strength of multinational capital, the weakness of organized labour, and the ambiguous position of the state, are all features that Zimbabwe shares with other African nations, particularly those that depend upon export enclaves to generate public revenue. Mineral production in Zimbabwe is heavily influenced by international markets, and subject to the rules governing production and trade in a global capitalist system. Any form of integrated industrial development in which minerals might play a part, is limited by the availability of capital, manpower, and markets. These factors are in turn stretched and pressured by exogenous forces: recurrent fiscal crises; the trauma of cyclical recessions; the restrictions imposed by the IMF and foreign donors on fiscal and monetary policy and on planning strategy; and natural hazards such as the current drought. No sector of Zimbabwe's economy is independent of these forces and any one of them is able to precipitate an industrial crisis.

Nevertheless, the immediate factors constraining the transformation of relations of production in mining, as well as other sectors of Zimbabwe's economy, arise out of a specific history of settler colonialism, internal class formation, and regional economic articulation. The Lancaster House constitution constrains the ability of the state to acquire private assets;

skill deficits and organization inexperience retard working class unity; and South Africa, through its control of transport linkages, markets, and capital, and through its constant support of dissident activity, exerts enormous economic and political leverage.

In the long term, socialist transformation in Zimbabwe will depend upon the re-structuring of the state and the re-definition of its functions. At present, however, while the ruling party attempts to alter the logic of the very state structure it controls, the state itself remains «captive» — paralyzed by the need to appease foreign capital, in mining and commercial agriculture. These are the sectors where workers confront the daunting strength of multinationals directly. These may also be the sectors where the patience of workers with the old, but enduring, legal and economic order may soon wear thin.

Table I : *Principal Operating Companies under the Umbrella of the Anglo-American Corporation Services: Zimbabwe, 1980*

Companies	% AAC Group Shareholding	Number Employed
Bindura Nickel & subsidiaries	79.4	3,800
Border Timber Ltd.	81.0	4,200
Hippo Vallev Estates Ltd.	40.2	8,000
Rhodall Ltd.	64.0	3,400
Shangani Mining Corp. Ltd.	29.7	1,200
Hwange Colliery Ltd.	33.5	5,700
Employment Total by Companies		26,300
Others		2,600
TOTAL		28,900

Source: *Anglo-American Corp. Services Ltd, Submission to the Commission of Inquiry into Incomes, Prices and Conditions of Services, Zimbabwe, 12 December, 1980.*

Table 2 :

Derivation of Gross output Zimbabwe Mining Industry	Sales of goods not produced on premises	Sales from own production	Charges for repairs and services	Charges for work on customers materials	Turnover	Capital works by own staff	Changes in stocks of own produced goods	Gross output excluding sales oof goods not produced on ppremises
	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000
1972	364	121298	4123	5489	131274	4027	-340	210865
1973	566	143845	4124	6180	154720	4167	5280	259248
1974	564	195889	3384	5554	205392	6934	-384	275514
1975	763	189863	2719	8991	202032	7357	1913	274312
1976	964	227753	3782	14336	257947	17029	1347	259248
1977	500	238989	2737	16228	258474	6376	1015	275514
1978	468	241534	3234	16217	261451	4029	9305	274312
1979	285	311616	1639	16497	330040	3310	2919	336697
1980	477	419147	4231	17157	441010	3130	778	444436
1981	7746	371926	7696	15480	402850	4262	31325	430693

Source: *The Census of Production, 1980–82: Mining, Manufacturing, Construction, Electricity and Water Supply. CSO, Zimbabwe.*

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RESUME

Dans cet article, l'auteur s'est fixé comme objectif d'étudier l'état ainsi que les changements intervenus dans l'industrie minière du Zimbabwé après l'indépendance. L'auteur estime que le rôle que l'Etat y a joué est important et conclut que, dans ce secteur, l'Etat est resté en fin de compte prisonnier du capital. L'Etat s'est efforcé d'attirer le capital en donnant des prêts à des conditions douces aux entreprises minières pendant la crise au début des années 80. Vers le milieu de 1984, il y eut des tentatives de la part de l'Etat de consolider son influence en mettant en place des structures parapubliques, en augmentant la part du gouvernement et en augmentant l'aide financière et technique aux petites entreprises minières locales. D'une manière générale, la main-d'œuvre dans le secteur minier est resté toujours faible dans l'économie régionale et a toujours subi des pressions politiques l'obligeant à se conformer au statu quo de la part à la fois de l'Etat et du capital. La gestion, le contrôle et la structure de la propriété sont restées inchangées par rapport à ce qu'ils étaient avant 1980 sauf pour quelques rares exceptions ; il y eut plusieurs tentatives d'encouragement au contrôle et à la coopération entre ouvriers du secteur minier. Cependant il semble que toutes tentatives de changement vers une voie socialiste de développement dépendra de la restructuration de l'Etat et de la redéfinition de ses fondements de classes ainsi que de la fonction de ces classes – Pour leur part, les ouvriers des mines mènent une lutte difficile pour obtenir la redéfinition de la phase actuelle de contrôle et de propriété par les multinationales travaillant dans le secteur minier.

La tenacité et la force du capital d'origine multinationale, la faiblesse de la structure organisationnelle des travailleurs et la position plutôt ambigüe de l'Etat, ce sont là des caractéristiques que le Zimbabwé partage avec les autres pays africains, plus particulièrement avec ceux d'entre eux qui, pour générer des fonds publics, dépendent de l'exportation de quelques produits seulement. La production minière du Zimbabwé comme la production dans les autres secteurs de l'économie, est tributaire de facteurs à la fois internes et externes, facteurs qui peuvent d'ailleurs à tout moment la précipiter dans une crise.

«CONVERTING CRISIS TO BOOM FOR KENYAN FOUNDRIES AND METAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES: TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES VERSUS POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC OBSTACLES»

By

*Peter E. COUGHLIN**

Introduction

The present foreign exchange crisis in Kenya could occasion a boom in our foundries and metal engineering workshops if the government adopts policies to vigorously encourage – instead of hampering – these key industries. Their plant and equipment, skilled workers, and supervisors are massively underutilized principally due to a lack of planned development for these industries. But now, given the existing capacity, these industries could produce very many products that are currently imported. To achieve this, strong new policies are needed concerning the unavailability and high cost of inputs, foreign exchange allocations, quality controls, selective improvements in capacities, the gross underutilization of the government's huge railway workshops, the rationalization of product lines, patent protection, and the over-reliance on foreign licensing agreements. But the adoption and implementation of these policies to increase domestic production in these industries would encounter strong opposition from importers and multinational assemblers of imported components.

These conclusions were drawn from visits to 91 metal engineering workshops and 19 foundries in Nairobi, Kisumu, Thika, Magadi, Mombasa and elsewhere between August, 1981 – and January, 1983 (the bulk between December, 1981, and July, 1982). Nearly all the large and most of the small workshops in these cities were visited. The author and his assistant visited both commercial metal engineering workshops (66) and those attached to factories (22) or the Railways (3). Multinational corporations owned five of the commercial metal engineering workshops with one in Nairobi and four in Mombasa; Africans owned only one commercial workshop; Kenyan residents or citizens of Asian ancestry owned the rest. One foundry was at the Railway's Nairobi workshop and four others were attached to factories, the rest were commercial. The author visited the railways' workshops on ten occasions often spending a whole or half day making detailed observations and enquiries. When visiting repair workshops attached to factories, the author first toured the entire factory and then often examined the spares in the storeroom to determine whether some items could be made in Kenya. Afterwards plant managers and/or workshops supervisors were interviewed, an inventory of the metal engineering machinery was taken, and work samples were observed. The study focused on metal engineering excluding metal fabrication (e.g. bending and welding).

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Massive Underutilization of Men and Machines

1.1 The Present Situation

With the presently underutilized machinery, workers, supervisors and space, these industries could greatly expand output with only minimal additional investment. The foundries use only 23% of their capacity and metal engineering workshops use only 34% (see appendix tables 1A and 1B) *(1)*. Output could be expanded by 42% in machine shops and 106% in foundries just by more intensively using the existing labor force *without any additional hours!* In the short-term, machine shops could expand their workforce by a weighted average of 62% without needing more supervisors (see Appendix table 2). Virtually all respondents also claimed that if needed they could promote foremen from among present employees. The workforce could also increase rapidly because even with only on-the-job training new foundry workers can become semi-skilled in less than 12 months and machine shop workers in less than two and half years especially if they are keen (see Appendix 3A and Chart. 3B*). Present workers can be upgraded in as much time. Hence these industries can meet their needs for most supervisors and artisans in both the short and medium term.

Space is also underutilized in many machine shops though this varied: on the average shops in Nairobi could expand their equipment by 28% in the same space, those in Mombasa by 3% and in Kisumu by 84%. All except the two big well equiped foundries at the Railways workshop and at the E.A. Foundries are cramped for space. But it is exactly in these two big well equipped foundries that any expansion would best occur.

1.2 The Causes of Excess Capacity

The perceptions of why so much excess capacity exists differ from the viewpoints of a single shop and of the entire sector. From the shop, the principal causes appear as a lack of demand (26%) and the failure by many machine shops attached to factories to accept outside orders (29%) (see Appendix Table 4; multiple answers were allowed) *(2)*. This failure is sometimes not necessary. For instance, foremen of some very nicely equipped workshops attached to factories argued that given more men they could cope with outside work especially if it were to make products rather than to do miscellaneous repair jobs *(3)*. The shortages of inputs (35%) and of trained technicians (36%) also hindered expansion though these difficulties were often seen as surmountable by the interviewees, whereas the lack of demand was not.

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* *This appendix together with the other mentioned in this paper can be obtained from the author on request.*

From a sectoral viewpoint the underutilization of capacity appears to result principally from the lack of planning of both investments and demand though the shortage of proper materials, and border difficulties with Tanzania and Uganda also affect the industry. On the supply side, an anarchistic series of small investments and the uncontrolled importation of machinery caused the over capitalization of these industries while still leaving important deficiencies (e.g. in high precision and stainless steel casting, and in tool and die making). This over capitalization is manifested by the nearly universal use of only one shift *(4)*. On the demand side, the failure to insist on the local manufacture of many spare parts and diverse consumer products (e.g. umbrellas, electric irons, cutlery) and to control strictly their importation has limited domestic growth. Only the recent foreign exchange crisis and the reversal of the policy allowing easy importation of any spares for factories has forced some to seriously review what can be made in their own workshops *(5)*. And though the capacity exists to make certain products, the anticipated inability to get governmental cooperation and protection against well positioned importers dissuades some potential producers from pursuing these possibilities or makes them to be satisfied with small market shares e.g. pumps, ox driven sugar cane crushers (see the section on political/economic and bureaucratic obstacles).

Another reason for the underutilization of capacity particularly in the Kisumu area is the decrease in demand due to border difficulties with Tanzania and internal strife in Uganda.

What Prevents a Surge in Domestic Production?

Though output could expand rapidly in these industries, supply, demand, and political/economic reasons are preventing it. These obstacles will be examined below together with policy recommendations.

1.1 Supply Problems

(a) High cost and unavailability of materials and tools

i) Situation

Seventy one percent (71%) of the respondents vigorously complained about the near impossibility or expensiveness of obtaining essential materials (e.g. gear quality steels, heat resistant steels, stainless steels, other speciality steels, special grinding stones, coke, certain chemicals). For instance, the machine shop foreman of one large factory stated, «If we could get these quality steels we could produce many more items which are now imported». Elsewhere another foreman stated that given proper steels he could make 15–20% of the spares currently imported by his very large company.

Due to the unavailability of correct materials, unsuitable ones are often substituted but they break of wear quickly. This increases costs and reinforces preferences for imported spares. For instance, Magadi Soda obtained a large gear made of mild steel for one of its cranes; that gear lasted three hours. Later an imported gear was flown in.

When available, speciality steels usually have extremely high prices. The local importers/wholesalers add 100–400% to the C.I.F. Mombasa port price. And yet when small commercial machine shops want to import these steels at much lower prices they usually cannot get a license though some multinational corporate subsidiaries can order through their international supplies departments. These high wholesale margins increase the cost of domestically made spares and also lead to a preference for imported spares.

The delays (3–12 months) and frequent rejections of license applications often force the importation of spares that could be made here if the proper materials were available (e.g. gears for cranes and automobile transmissions). Besides, companies often obviate the delays and unpredictability of the government's import licensing by overstocking materials by a weighted average of 57% (see Appendix 7) *(6)*. Or, instead of overstocking, some firms bring in packages valuing less than 4000 KShs by air freight. This increases transport costs by perhaps half. By either tactic, foreign exchange costs are increased.

The structure of import duties often creates negative protection for these industries. The most usual duty on imported spares is 33% and then 15% sales tax if the item is not exempted from sales tax (e.g.spares for agricultural or diary equipment). Speciality steels attract a higher duty (tool steels 44%, stainless steel rounds and flats 55%) and then on top, the sales tax. Or, worse yet, many classes of spares are exempted from sales taxes while the materials needed to make the spares are not exempted if imported by a commercial machine shop or wholesaler/importer instead of the exempted firm. Two examples illustrate these problems.

(1) Current tariffs discriminate against reconditioning the stainless steel heat exchangers used by many industries. New imported heat exchangers pay 33% duty and then, on top, sales tax, whereas the seamless stainless steel tubes needed for reconditioning pay 77% duty and then sales tax.

(2) Brooke Bond can recondition its tea rollers either with finished imported segments or by redressing them using stainless steel automatic welding wire. It now appears to be about KShs. 2,500 cheaper per roller to import finished segments than refurbishing them only because the automatic welding wire pays KSh. 6,000 more in duty and sales tax than the imported segments. However, Brook Bond still is preferring the later, costlier alternative.

If Brooke Bond reverted to the previous practice of importing segments, it would be cheaper for Brooke Bond, but Kenya would pay about Ksh. 4,000 more per roller in foreign exchange. Since about 75 rollers are reconditioned yearly the loss in foreign exchange would be about Ksh. 300,000 (see Appendix table 8).

Allegedly corruption among import licensing officials, the Mombasa post's and Nairobi Airport's customs officers and Central Bank employees, who deal with foreign exchange allocations, also causes delays and increased costs which hinder Kenyan industrialization. Complaints about the need to bribe officials dealing with imports were so frequent that the practice must be widespread. As the purchases manager for a large commercial metal engineering workshop stated, «you can't get things out unless you give a backhand. It happens everyday». For instance, one factory flew in a desperately needed spare part but could not get it released from the airport until a top official of the company made a trip to Nairobi and bribed the customs authorities.

ii) Recommendations

1. Foundries and metal engineering workshops are pivotal to the smooth running of all Kenyan Industries. Foundries and metal engineering workshops are qualitatively different from most other industries in that their products are used almost entirely by other industries. Any additional production would mostly be to replace imports. Thus, if foundries and metal engineering workshops were allowed to import their materials easily, they could make domestically many spares that are currently imported. Furthermore, the materials needed by these industries are so elemental that they could not be diverted for improper usage. Hence the government should issue permanent import licenses for the elemental materials used by machine shops and foundries (some metals e.g. pig iron, zinc, tools e.g. certain grinding stones, cutting tips; chemicals e.g. ferrosilicon, resins for molds; coke) *(7)*. After mere verification of their documents requesting funds to import any of these materials, the companies in these industries should be permitted to go directly to the Central Bank for an allocation of foreign exchange. Thus the government should be liberal in allocating foreign exchange to these industries. This policy of preferential allocation of foreign exchange to foundries and metal engineering workshops would, on net, *save* foreign exchange by encouraging the domestic manufacture of currently imported spares and industrial equipment. This would *loosen* – not tighten – the foreign exchange constraints on other industries.

Moreover this policy would fit within a general policy to stimulate deeper industrialization by preferentially allocating foreign exchange to those basic industries such as cement which have strong backward and/or forward linkages. Under such a policy the government should: (1) squeeze selected consumer oriented industries that rely heavily upon imported inputs; and (2) further limit imports of consumer goods. However, since the recommended policy for the foundry and metal engineering industries would save foreign exchange it is also justifiable on that ground alone and without reference to a broader policy of sectoral priorities for foreign exchange allocations.

2. The government should encourage and through selective credit priorities help the foundries and machine shops to obtain finance to establish an import cooperative. It should be controlled by the plants in the industries to guarantee a keen concern for speed and efficiency and to prevent arbitrary changes in materials specifications. The cooperative would import centrally the industries' principal materials and more common spares. It need not import the entire range of materials and spares; it should focus its finances and efforts to achieve large savings in foreign exchange. This cooperative would enable the industry to: (i) obtain price and freight discounts for bulk purchases *(8)*; (ii) reduce overall stock levels in the industry by centralizing these wholesale stocks; (iii) eliminate profit gouging by wholesalers who happen to possess a material in short supply; (iv) eliminate overinvoicing of these materials by wholesalers and by firms ordering directly from their mother companies' purchasing departments; and (v) rapidly identify when the Kenyan demand for an item was sufficient to justify its production here.

3. The proposed import cooperative could also specialize in importing used gasoline and diesel motors for sale to transporters and machine shops which renovate motors. This would create employment and save much foreign exchange since currently only new motors are allowed to be imported.

4. The combined tariffs and sales taxes for metals should be set lower than those for imported finished spares. This would encourage the local production of spares.

5. The government should initiate a major and ongoing probe of corruption by import licensing, customs and Central Bank employees and officers.

(b) Poor Quality Control in Foundries and Metal Engineering Workshops

i) <u>Situation</u>

Only one foundry had facilities to test the composition of sample casts. One other foundry was installing laboratory equipment. None had spectrometers to read the content of carbon, sulphur and other elements in the hot melt and thus be able immediately to add measured amounts of alloys to improve quality of the metal *(9)*. Hence casts are frequently too hard, brittle, or soft or have bubbles and so cannot be used. Unfortunately, this is often discovered only after an attempt is made to machine them. Many industries cannot risk such costly delays and so prefer to import spares by air freight.

ii) Recommendations

1. This problem of inadequate quality controls in the foundries is *urgent*. It stimulates imports and retards the growth of metal engineering. Hence, the government should: (i) declare that investments to improve the laboratory equipment in foundries are a selective credit priority in order to make loans readily available for that purpose, and (ii) insist that the Bureau of Standards *energetically* scrutinize the quality control procedures used by foundries.

2. Last May or so the Railway's workshops which include the only Kenyan foundry with scientific quality control, began to refuse to do most commercial jobs even though it has much excess capacity. This decision was taken to stop corruption and the preferential treatment given to commercial work to the detriment of jobs for railways. Through collusion, jobs were underpriced e.g. a forging die and thousands of mattocks might be ordered but billed minimally or a large sugar roller made while payment was for a small one. But that decision to stop commercial work may also increase dependence upon imports *(10)*. The workshops' manager does state that he refuses only jobs which can be done elsewhere in Kenya, but in practice that distinction may be difficult to apply. Moreover if corruption was the problem, a frontal assault is needed rather than the bureaucratically easy solution of stopping commercial work. Also the Railways might consider eliminating the nuisance of low value – small volume repair jobs, but accept bigger orders. Big jobs are easier to supervise and to guard against corruption.

(c) Need for Selective Investments to improve the Scope of Metal Casting and Engineering

i) Situation

Kenyan foundries have only a limited capacity for high precision casting. They have resin and sand and shell-mould casting and some iron moulds for mass production of non-ferrous castings *(11)*. There is only one hot metal injection mold machine in the country and no foundry does investment and centrifugal casting. The Railway's workshop will soon receive a small, 1.2 tonne, induction furnace able to make stainless and other steels if the proper laboratory equipment is obtained.

The metal engineering industry needs to considerably strengthen its capacity to make sophisticated tools for industrial use. For instance, heat treatment equipment is often inadequate and/or improperly controlled and monitored. This detracts from the industry's ability to make items such as gears which must sustain strong stresses. Also the industry needs to upgrade its capacity to make dies, especially for the plastics; rubber, and glass industries. Many tools and dies are now imported.

ii) Recommendations

1. To encourage the few existing Kenyan tool and die makers to increase their capabilities substantially, such investments should be designated a selective credit priority. The government should stringently control the importation of tools and dies and insist on their domestic manufacture whenever possible *(12)*. Also some experienced expatriate tool and die makers (who speak English or Kiswahili so that they can train Kenyans) should be allowed into the country to strengthen this capacity. In fact, there are immediate possibilities to export tools for aluminium spinning and to make locally many of the currently imported dies if more skilled tool and die makers were available.
2. The Railways should be requested to assess quickly the economics of installing a very large forge in their workshops. The railways uses many large forged items (e.g. wagon axles, axle frames and 5000–6000 metal rail tyres per year) and there are other potential customers especially if the vehicle assembly industry were rationalized.

(d) Railways Workshop – A Bound Giant

The Railways Workshops is grossly underutilized. It could for example produce most of the currently imported sugar crusher rollers.

i) Situation: underutilized capacity

The Railways' Workshop with some 2600 employees is the largest workshop in the country; yet its facilities are grossly underutilized. It has about 9% of the centre lathes in the country and 68% of the turret lathes which are designed specifically for mass producing items. The tool and machine rooms have 233 employees, run one-shift and have a capacity utilization rate of 28%. According to the workshops' manager, the tool and machine shops could produce two-thirds more with the *same* men, *same* hours, and *same* machines if they had additional jobs to do and had better supervision and production planning. For instance, he agreed that the Railways could machine 4000 centrifugal water pumps (all currently imported) for near *zero* marginal costs.

The foundry has 127 employees and a capacity utilization rate of 25%. The blacksmiths workshop has 60 employees and A. K. Mitra of UNIDO *(13)* estimated that it uses a mere 5–10% of its large capacity.

There is no technical reason why these shops could not run up to three shifts. Also the workshops' manager and his assistant both claimed that with proper production planning the workshops could make commercial products *without interferring with service to the Railways.* Unfortunately the Railways Act., by omission, does not allow the workshops to engage in commercial production unless specifically directed to do so by the government.

ii) Recommendation

The government should immediately direct the Railways to identify needed products such as pumps and to begin commercial production. A directive could be quick and would avoid legal difficulties. Distribution, sales, spare parts supplies, and servicing should be set up as a separate organization or perhaps sub-contracted temporarily to an existing distributor (e.g. of pumps). Once the Railways commits itself to making a particular item the government should monitor and limit permits to import competing items. By the time the Railways begins production, most of the stocks of competing items should have been sold. Afterwards their importation should be stopped.

Later, the government could widen the scope of the Railway's Act to explicitly, allow the workshops to do commercial work.

1) Situation: – Sugar crusher rollers

The Railways workshops' production of sugar crusher-rollers deserves special mention. The workshops have the capacity to cast and shape all but the largest sugar crusher-rollers, but a major complaint by Railway's customers for sugar rollers is slowness of delivery. However, millions of shillings are spent on imported sugar crusher-rollers! *(14)*.

2) Recommendation

Since these rollers have standard sizes, the Railways should carry a ready inventory of rough castings and machined rollers for quick delivery to customers *(15)*. To assist the Railways, the sugar factories should be required to submit a yearly plan of their anticipated requirements. With these measures a ban should be placed on imported sugar rollers that can be made here.

2. As with many items produced by the Railways, sugar rollers are sold to intermediaries. These middlemen merely increase the price and resell the rollers to the sugar companies. The Railways should obtain the full profit by insisting on dealing directly with the sugar companies! In fact, the Railways' dubious practice of selling many products through intermediaries should be severely limited *(16)*.

1.2 Demand Problems

(a) Too many Makes and Models

i) Situation

Too many makes and models of trucks, cars, tractors, pumps, stoves, and other machinery and equipment are imported or assembled in Kenya. For example, India with perhaps 60 times Kenya's population produces only two makes of cars in three models, but Kenya actually assembles more than 90 models of trucks and buses and has at least 60 makes of sedan cars in about 200 models on the streets. Kenya also imports more than 260 models of water pumps and obtains tractors from at least 15 countries *(17)*. The existence of so many models inhibits the local manufacture of components and spares, increases inventory costs and encumbers labour training.

So few spares and original equipment components are needed for the local repair or assembly of any particular model that the costs for their local production would be very high. This is especially true if expensive metal stamping dies are required. Such short production-runs and high costs stymie the local manufacture of most spares and original equipment components. In fact, *so long as the chaos of so many models is allowed, Kenya's foundries and metal engineering industries will be crippled.*

The stocks of spare parts are immense yet insufficient. A limitation in models would enable a more complete range of spares to be stocked and thus lessen prolonged breakdowns of equipment due to an unavailability of spares.

Even the training of mechanics and the maintenance of our vehicles, motors, and pumps are handicapped by the multitude of makes and models. As some countries have discovered, mechanics would learn better and quicker with, say, 2 models of cars, 7–8 models of trucks and fewer models of motors and pumps.

The Kenyan foundries and metal engineering industries have the capacity to begin rapidly to make spare parts or even entire products if policies were initiated to limit seriously the number of makes and models. But without the government's cooperation and prohibitive tariffs against imports, corporations prefer not to hazard their money in such small and sliced-up markets. Consider the following examples where, if the models were limited and imports restricted, Kenya could produce for much of its own needs:

(1) Kenya could produce all its needs for small or medium sized single stage centrifugal water pumps at substantial savings of foreign exchange. G. Begumisa costed the production of 1500 pumps (20 meter head and 50m^3/hr capacity) at less than half the cost including freight at Mombasa of imports! And only 4.5% of the total cost would be for imported finished components (i.e. just the bearings) *(18)*.

Chemelil Sugar Factory has also made a few large pumps cheaper than the imported ones even on a one-off basis. Probably half the 10,000 pumps that Kenya now imports yearly could be made here just by using a small portion of the foundries and metal engineering industries' current excess capacity.

The Railways workshop also occasionally makes large water pumps for its own use. So, there is no question that the necessary skills do exist in Kenya. Kenya spent KShs 21,000,000 on imported pumps for use in Kenya in 1980.

(2) Kenya could cast, machine, assemble, and distribute its own small (less than 10 horsepower) electrical motors. By using the prices which the Railways workshop charges commercial customers for casting and machining and adding other costs including those for assembly and distribution by a separate corporation, Josphert Konzolo estimated that a Kenyan-made 3 horsepower a.c. electrical motor could retail for KShs. 3200.00 or about equal to average retail price for which imported motors are currently being sold here. But since the Railways workshops are so underutilized, the casting and machining could be done with the same men, same hours and same machinery as the workshops now use. Thus the opportunity costs to the nation would be about KShs. 1915.00 which is less than the cheapest 3 horsepower motor being sold here. The foreign exchange cost would be only KShs. 835.00. Konzolo concludes that: «These motors can be manufactured in this country without the need for any form of reliance on multinational companies and at low foreign exchange costs» *(19)*. Of course, a competent engineer would need to strictly supervise the assembly and quality control.

(3) Kenya also has the proper equipment to manufacture gas and electric stoves and refrigerator boxes. Nevertheless, all the stoves except the small table top version and about half the refrigerators are imported as semi – or completely – knocked – down kits and subjected to «screw driver» assembly. Refrigerator boxes need metal cutting and bending, but stoves need metal stamping. The Railways workshops have two usually idle 150–200 tonne sheet metal stamping presses (the large one can stamp 5 ft square sheets). The enameling for the stoves could be done in Kaluwork's very large continuous process oven. If organized this way, then any large sheets which Kaluworks is unable to stamp could be done by the Railways workshop and then transported to Mombasa for enameling *(20)*. Many companies have the capacity to make the small metal and plastic parts for stoves.

(4) Virtually all the required plant and equipment now exists in Kenya to make the major parts for small, one and two cylinder compressors and diesel or gasoline internal combustion engines. Kenya would only need to import the valves, bearings, and some small components plus the metal ingots for the castings. The E.A. Foundries has brand new continuous process and selection and no – bake mold making equipment that is exactly what is required to cast pistons, heads, blocks, and cam – shafts for internal combustion engines and compressors. This equipment at E. A. Foundries is unscratched and has been idde for two years! The Railways' Blacksmith shop has the proper equipment to forge connecting rods and crankshafts. The pattern dies for the castings and forgings would have to be imported. Several machine shops have the boring machines and surface grinders to machine the rough castings and forgings though better heat treatment equipment might be needed.

A separate corporation should be established to subcontract out the local manufacture of parts, arrange for necessary imports, assemble the motors and compressors and arrange for their distribution and sale. Close supervision by competent engineers would be necessary to maintain quality during the manufacture and assembly.

ii) Recommendations

To industrialize, Kenya must limit the number of models of transport vehicles! There is no escape from that conclusion. Already, 35% of Kenya's imported spares are for motor vehicles and tractors. And without fewer models, increased local production of these spares and components is unlikely. So, the sooner this issue is confronted the better for the nation.

To tackle this task, the government should decide to allow only one model in each size class of commercial vehicle and tractor and at most two models (but one make) of sedan car *(21)*. Then competitors would bid to make each vehicle. The bids would be compared for price, suitability of the vehicle, commitment to increasing domestic content over time, speed of Kenyanization, etc... Once a bid were accepted the government would have to enforce severe penalties for non-obedience as the vehicle distributors and assemblers have strong financial incentives to procrastinate and thwart the local manufacture of parts *(22)*.

For domestically producible items such as the foregoing examples, the government should apply three measures:

i) designate one or at most two producers/assemblers;
ii) drastically limit the number of available models;
iii) restrict imports.

The designated producer(s)/assembler(s) should be instructed to subcontract the production of components whenever possible in order to use the existing capacity better. The Kenyan price controller and Bureau of Standards should also be provided the staff and legal authority to intervene quickly and effectively in disputes between a producer/assembler and any subcontractor. This is especially necessary when a subcontractor is the only firm possessing the ability to make a certain component.

Combined, the above three measures would greatly lower market penetration costs, enable economies of scale, and overcome consumers' aversion to domestically made products. Without this, a potential domestic producer, who could efficiently produce an item if he captured most of its Kenyan market, would often refrain from investing. This leaves Kenya in a low level production trap: costs would be high because of little production; there would be little production because costs would be high. For instance, as we have shown, Kenya could cheaply produce single stage centrifugal water pumps, but she does not. Why not? All the large workshops possessing an adequate foundry and machine shop to produce pumps were asked this question. They cited as reasons: the low number of pumps that they could sell given continued imports (100 was an often cited number); the consequently high production costs; and the large market penetration costs for sales, advertising, gaining consumer confidence, and establishing a pump repair service. They also anticipated an inability to gain governmental protection and cooperation. So, each concluded that it was not worth the time and effort. But it is not a mere 100 pumps, it is at least 4000 yearly, and most costs to penetrate the market and gain consumer acceptance could be eliminated through governmental protection against similar imports. These large shops often cited products that they could make (e.g. internal combustion engines, cabins and jibs for cranes, automobile and transport vehicle components) or actually were making in small quantities (e.g. pumps, ox driven sugar crushers, and even 50–70 foot long steel fishing trawlers). Again their frustration was the lack of governmental support and protection. Whence comes this recommendation.

But that is not to ignore its difficulties. A private monopoly may well attempt to afflict consumers with high prices and shoddy products. Hence the need to honestly regulate prices and quality or to allow a parastatal to produce the item and then confront the problems of efficiency. But, we argue, to produce these items and to tackle the consequent problems is better than not producing for fear of them.

Incidentally, if Kenya did begin to produce pumps, electrical motors and small internal combustion engines, she would have the ability to launch a massive campaign for irrigation at a low cost in foreign exchange. Of course, that irrigation could begin faster and at less cost where people already live and the infrastructure exists.

(3) The government should also commission a study by engineers and economists to identify electrical and mechanical products which if the number of models were limited, could be produced partially or wholly in Kenya. The study should not cover transport vehicles as that case is obvious.

(b) Kenya's Acceptance of British Patent Law

i) Situation

Kenya's Patent Registration Act was passed under the colonialists in 1933 and has not been substantively amended since then. Under it, only patents registered in England «shall» be registered here and, in fact, Kenya does not have its own patenting procedure. Kenya's then Attorney General stated that the law «should be enacted throughout the empire in the interests of British industry and the British Commerce as a whole» *(23a)*.

The continuing subservience to England's Patent law makes Kenya pay royalties or licensing fees to produce patented items even when the designs are simple and sufficient technical capacity exists to produce these items here without dependence upon foreign «know how». And Keyans still get almost no benefit from this law. Between 1970 and 1978, 1025 patents were registered in Kenya. only five of these were by «Kenyans» and three of those were subsidiaries of multinational companies *(23b)*. Indeed Kenya benefits little and pays much for its adherence to this patent system. In a study of multinational corporations in Kenya, Kaplinsky found that:

> *«For all the firms in the sample the patents obtain the property rights over new technologies generated by the Kenya subsidiaries and take responsibility for the registration of patents and brand names» (23c).*

ii) Recommandations

(1) Kenya should modify its law to exclude patent rights for products of and processes in industries which Kenya would like to develop (e.g. motors, agricultural equipment, electrical goods) *(24)*. This would be a nationalist – not a radical measure. For instance, when Italy wanted to develop its chemical industry it exempted chemicals from patent protection and later, after the industry was large. reimposed patent coverage.

Also the production of spare parts for use by Kenyan industries should be completely exempted from patent protection. This is necessary because some firms feel morally obliged to purchase imported patented spares even though these could be produced in their own workshops. For instance, the machine shop foreman of one large manufacturer figured that his shop could produce one-third more spares than currently if patent restrictions did not apply. He claimed that his company conscientiously avoided violating patent rights. Admittedly this case was atypical, most manufacturers ignore patent rights when making spares for their machinery.

(2) Kenya law should also oblige the patent holder to locally produce satisfactory quantities of patented items or to lose his patent protection after three years *(25)*.

(c) Overreliance on Licensing Agreements

i) Situation

Some items (e.g. fire extinguishers, pumps, stoves, safes) are assembled or partially manufactured here under license with foreign firms even though adequate local capacity exists to make nearly all their components and then to assemble them. Often capable, potential producers of an item are forced into a licensing agreement just to obtain a foreign label needed to penetrate the local market due to purchasers' biases favoring foreign labels.

The excessive use of licensing agreements leads to (i) remittals abroad of licensing fees, (ii) more than necessary imported components, and, (iii) illegal transfer pricing of purchased components which are required to be obtained from the licensor. Consider three examples:

(1) A local manufacturer showed the author many large safes (40" x 27" x 27" outside dimensions) made under an international licensing agreement. Only the door and its built-in lock were imported. The manager states that, of course, they could make the door too, but the licensor insists on supplying it in exchange for allowing use of its brand name. The manager argued that the brand name was necessary to gain acceptance of the product in the local market. Besides steel sheets, only the lock really needs to be imported and it could be purchased from many suppliers in Germany, Switzerland, Japan, etc...

(2) A domestic assembler/manufacturer of fire extinguishers said that most of the imported components in it could be produced here though nearly all were imported from the licensor. Furthermore, only about one-third of these simple devices are even assembled here; the rest are imported already made. He also stated he pays more for these imported components than locally produced ones would cost – «since we don't pay a licensing fee» – i.e. in lieu of the licensing fee. Incidentally the licensor thus avoids paying Kenyan taxes on licensing fees.

(3) The local manager of an Indian multinational corporation recently licensed to assemble completely – knocked – down (CKD) imported pumps stated that his firm «hoped» to eventually use 20% domestically made components. Whereas, for about half the pumps that Kenya uses, the only directly imported components should be the bearings costing a fraction of the pumps' value *(26)*.

ii) Recommendations

(1) The government should vigorously review the terms of many licensing agreements and their usefulness. Payments for labels – except perhaps if the item is being exported – should stop. Also contracts should provide for (i) the complete transfer of designs for use at least in the Kenyan market; and, (ii) the elimination of the licensing fee after a stipulated number of years with a legal maximum of five years.

(2) Kenya should not allow imports that can be made locally. If so, then local labels would suffice for the domestic market. However, the price controller and the Bureau of Standards must prevent exorbitant prices and poor quality. Take the above case of fire extinguishers, Kenya should not allow this abuse! The solution is simple: designate one or two domestic producers; stop the imports; use as many domestically produced components as possible ; use a local label and pay no licensing fee or inflated prices for inputs.

1.3 Political/Economic and Bureaucratic Obstacles to a Boom in Domestic Production

Strong opposition and some support would arise if measures to limit the number of makes and models, restrict imports, and domestically produce various items and components are seriously supported by elements inside the government. A strong pressure group would oppose the adoption of the policies, or attempt delays and impose detrimental compromises. Finally, an often corrupt and sometimes incompetent bureaucracy might undermine the implementation of policies by still allowing imports or by failing to properly enforce price and quality controls.

In the past, the Kenyan strategy for agricultural exports together with shallow import substitution created a political dilemma. That very strategy slowed the growth of a stratum of entrepreneurs with strong financial interests in the country's deeper industrialization. Meanwhile numerous people arose whose incomes and lifestyles depended upon continued imports of finished goods and components for assembly (e.g. transport vehicles, electrical apparatus, pumps, various machinery, stoves). For instance, there are 27 distributors of imported pumps and Associated Vehicle Assemblers assembles vehicles for 21 distributors, Leyland for 4, and General Motors for 20. These importers/distributors and local assemblers of foreign products do not want to be displaced or have their profits squeezed by protection to domestic producers of similar products, components or spares. Also the local subsidiaries of multinational corporations prefer not to invest to make items here if the mother company has sufficient capacity elsewhere *(27)*. Thus the very way Kenya approached import substitution ensured the growth of a strong group which would oppose or stall deeper import substitution.

These importers/distributors and subsidiaries of multinational companies also cultivate economic and political alliances with influential Kenyans. These then sit on the Boards of Directors, become shareholders or develop other lucrative relations with these companies *(28)*. Thus some policy makers are seriously compromised with groups having financial interests contrary to the fast industrialization of Kenya. For instance, many vehicle distributors are associated with powerful politicians. It is also widely alleged that small importers/distributors often subvert policy by bribing clerks and lower echelon officials in the ministries and Central Bank to permit unnecessary imports. In addition, external lending and aid agencies sometimes even explicitly oppose deeper import substitution by Kenya *(29)*. This coalition of interests and politicians, abetted by corruptible bureaucrats jeopardizes Kenya's ability to embark on the strong nationalist policy needed for rapid industrialization to be able to maintain 30,000,000 Kenyans by the turn of the century.

Potentially arrayed against this coalition are various nationalist elements inside the government, the commercial metal engineering workshops and foundries, certain labor unions, and some enlightened industrialists who identify with the country's long term economic prospects. But this is a dispersed and only potential alliance. Furthermore, most entrepreneurs owning commercial foundries and metal engineering workshops are small. And – as revealed by the surveys – though the few larger ones may have sufficient connections to overcome difficulties with an occasional import license, they do not feel that alone they have enough political clout to win in a clash against importers.

But Kenya suffers a foreign exchange crisis. The continued imports of luxurious consumer goods (e.g. wines and liquors, passenger cars, fancy clothing, television sets) and the unrationed use of gasoline by the upper and middle income strata have already caused factories to lack inputs and lay off men. Luxuries for layoffs – a volatile exchange? Thus the imperatives at this juncture bolster those insisting on rapidly deepening Kenya's industrial base. So, with no more avenues for shallow import-substitution and meagre prospects for increased exports, many in the government are looking for a new strategy to create jobs and ward off an economic breakdown and political instability.

To provide jobs in Kenya, a significant policy would be to limit the number of makes and models – especially of transport vehicles – and to insist on the domestic manufacture of components and entire products whenever large amounts of foreign exchange would be saved. But a sharp political conflict would ensue especially if the government adopted the suggested proposal for bidding to make a limited number of models of vehicles and then stopped almost all imports including Mercedes cars. Confronted with a serious stance by the government, the assemblers and distributors would definitely attempt to persuade the government to increase the number of acceptable models to, say, two or three for each size category of trucks and buses and to four to six sedan cars. This would ensure each company some share of the market. But, it would deprive the country of big savings from economies of scale and ruin the chance to streamline the production and administration of this industry which is mostly government owned. To properly defend Kenya's interests the government would need to firmly resist this tactic of the assemblers and distributors!

Conclusions

Many people with high income or secure well paying jobs or import businesses may be better off if Kenya continues to import a wide variety of goods, even those that could be made here. But it would be in the interests of most Kenyans to work and make useful products whether or not they do it as efficiently as the developed industrial countries. Too often the arguments for obeying «comparative advantages» are but apologies for continued dependence and failure to industrialize. If Kenya has sufficient underutilized equipment and skilled and unskilled labor to make certain products and by doing so can save much foreign exchange, it should do it and put Kenyans to work!

Indeed the equipment and skills do exist in Kenya to make very many items that are imported currently. A boom in the foundries and engineering industries could be created by: rationalizing the number of

FOOTNOTES

1. The weighted average capacity utilization (C_2)

$$U_2 = \left\{ \frac{1}{\sum\limits_i \sum\limits_s (L_{is})} \right\} \left\{ \frac{\sum\limits_i \left[\left(\sum\limits_s L_{is} \right) \left(\sum\limits_s \frac{L_{is}\ H_{is}}{L_{is\,max}} \right) | 1 + A_1 \right]}{120} \right\}$$

Where L_{is} = labourers in the machine shop at plant i during shift s

$L_{is_{max}}$ = the number of labourers in the biggest shift at plant i

H_{is} = average hours worked per week at plant i during shift s

A_i = percentage of additional work that could be done at plant i without any additional employees, work hours, or plant and equipment. This is a measure of slack during the current shifts.

Seventy-seven per cent of respondents indicated a willingness to run a second shift if work were to permanently increase. Fourty Four percent thought that productivity on the second shift would be at least as good as on the first shift. Hence, two shifts of 60 hours per week (120 hours) were deemed a reasonable maximum for small workshops. Though larger workshops could possibly run continuously, the same measure for capacity utilization was used for all.

2. Five workshops attached to major enterprises quite eagerly accepted outside work and a few other such workshops would occasionally accept outside work if the customer had no altemative repair shop to go to.
3. One excellent workshop attached to a factory in Mombasa had extensive gear making equipment but did not seek outside orders even though the factory had been closed for six months.
4. Some small entrepreneurs prefer having one shift. This reduces their managerial difficulties and eliminates any risk from allowing significant control to leave family hands. But still, three quarters of the respondents were willing to start a second shift if a prolonged increase in demand occured. Furthermore, almost half the respondents anticipated that labour productivity on a second shift would be equal to or better (e.g. less interruptions) than that for the first shift (see Appendix table 5).
5. A huge factory in Nairobi recently assigned a man full-time to assess the possibilities for and to arrange the local manufacture of spares. But even yet, most of the factories visited are not this serious and based on visits to their stock rooms and inquiries about the origins of specific spares, it is clear that very many spares that could be made here are still imported. For example, the repair workshop foreman in a large factory in Mombasa stated that, if management wanted the engineering machine shop could even begin a second shift to produce for inventory many currently imported spares. He said that on net, after purchasing materials, foreign exchange would be saved though the total costs including for local labour on some of these spares might be higher than for the imports. Indeed only recently have many factories begun to use their repair workshops to make spares for stock in anticipation of needs.

6. For instance, one foundry owner claimed he stocks 18 months supply of coke but he could stock just 6 months supply if licensing were reliable. A large machine shop owner figured he could cut his stocks of materials by 70% if licensing were more predictable.
7. An elemental rule of business management states that any bureaucratic procedure, which – regardless of circumstances – always produces the same decision, can be eliminated. Applications for import licenses for elemental materials are almost always approved eventually. And the delays are costly. Hence, should the bureaucrats handling such applications be given other duties?
8. Most coke comes from Germany because delivery times are more reliable though it costs twice that of Indian coke. A centralized purchaser could order some coke from India and compensate for the unreliability of the delivery dates by shipment from Germany. This would decrease the average cost of coke. (Note: some use Indian coke without complaint, others complain both about the unreliability of its delivery and its high sulphur content. Before ordering from India the quality of that coke would need to be guaranteed).
9. For instance, the Kikuyu steel rolling mills has a huge and idle machine that cost K.Shs. 1,500,000 and could machine many of the brake drums used on cars and trucks in Kenya. But because of poor quality control of the drum castings and because of anticipated resistance by the multinational corporations involved in vehicle assembly and spare parts supplies, all the brake drums used in Kenya are imported.
10. For example, the Railway workshop has occasionally cast cylinder linings for internal combustion engines. Instead of going fully into this and properly controlling quality to replace imported cylinder linings, now the workshops does not cast them. So the country is 100% import dependent for these.
11. The Ministry of Industry is collaborating with a Yugoslav consulting firm, Gostol, to assess the economics of establishing a high precision foundry in Kenya. In various conversations I have suggested that perhaps expanding and improving the E.A. Foundry or the Railway's Foundry would be a quicker and cheaper alternative to implement than a separate new plant. Though it is anticipated that improvement via expansion is likely to be technically possible some view it skeptically due to what they perceive as negative attitudes by management and the unlikehood that the government would exert strong influences to remedy those perceived administrative efficiencies. But the trade-off might be between: (1) using domestic resources to rectify whatever administrative deficiencies exist, and, (2) using more and very scarce foreign exchange to sidestep those problems. This prejudice in favour of separate new facilities and against using and improving existing capacity should be overcome. All options should be evaluated! If Gostol does not, then the Ministry of Industry should evaluate this option too.
12. A manufacturer of rubber boots admitted that he refused to use a locally made aluminium die because of very small and technically insignificant differences in the ripples around the heel when compared to the original worn out die. He said the consumers want to continue to receive identical products. So he ordered an imported die.
13. A. K. Mitra, «Report of the Field Mission in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, and Mauritius for upgrading existing foundry, forging, heat treatment, machine shop, tool room and identification of the manufacture of selected agricultural

machinery, capital goods, and spare parts», UN Economic Commission for Africa, Joint ECA/UNIDO Division, Addis Ababa, July, 1980.

14. For instance, the E.A. Sugar Factory imports nine out of the twelve or so sugar crusher-rollers it uses yearly. The c.i.f. Mombasa price was about KShs. 50,000.00 each before duties.
15. The Railways' only boring machine which is large enough to handle these rollers appears to be the bottleneck for speedier delivery. It should be run two or three shifts when necessary especially since the alternative is to waste foreign exchange on imported sugar rollers. The acting workshops' manager said that running the boring machine for multiple shifts could eliminate that bottleneck.
16. Examples were cited to the author where government agencies (e.g. Post Office) would order thousands of machined castings through a middleman who would merely order these from the Railways and resell them to the government at a large profit. To stop this the Railways should be required to know the ultimate user of its products. Except for small amounts, if the user is the government itself, then the order should be placed by that governmental body, not by a middleman.
17. G. Begumisa found that 33 firms sold 4,582 pumps in 116 makes and 263 models during 1980. «The worst redundant differentiation is concentrated around low capacity water pumps». This is exactly the range of pumps that Kenya should and could begin quickly to make. This abundance of models is indisputably beyond mere technical requirements and could be decreased radically. Gregory Begumise, *Machine Goods Spare-parts Industries: A Case Study of the Water Pumps Industry in Kenya,* University of Nairobi, Unpublished M.A. Research Paper, 1982, pp.63, 64, and 101.
18. G. Begumisa, *Machine Goods and Spareparts Industries: A Case Study of the Water Pumps Industry in Kenya.* University of Nairobi, M.A. Research Paper, Department of Economics, 1982, pp. 63, 64 and 101.
19. Josphert Konzolo, *Machine Goods and Spare-parts Industries: A Case Study of the Electrical Motor/Generator Rewinding Industry,* Economics Department, University of Nairobi, Unpublished M.A. Research Paper, 1982, p. 64.
20. When these possibilities were mentioned to the expatriate manager of a large assembler of (completely knocked down) refrigerators and stoves he argued that the local enameling was not up to international standards and «we must maintain international standards». He assembles under license agreements with international firms but these stoves and refrigerators are sold only on the domestic markets. The need for both the «standards» and the licensing agreements are dubious.
21. Kenya imports tractors from at least 15 countries «with the result that hardly 40–50% are operational». S. S. Gill, *Development of Agricultural Machinery in Kenya,* Industrial Survey and Promotion Centre, Kenya Ministry of Industry, 29 July 1980, p. 7.
22. Locally made products often cost more than the deletion allowance (refund) given by the supplier for an item not imported in the completely knocked down (CKD) kit. But these allowances are usually less than the production costs in the mother country. Hence it is very difficult for the local vehicle component to ever be cheaper than the imported one. For instance, the production manager for a large Kenyan vehicle assembly plant figured that the deletion allowance for wire harnesses is about 70% of the production cost in the mother country.

23a. cited in Okech Owiti, *The Transnational Corporation and Development of Technology: The Kenyan Case*, University of Nairobi, M.A. of Law thesis, 9/80, p.30.

23b. *Ibid.*, p. 84 and 87.

23c. Raphael Kaplinsky, «Technical change and the multinational corporation: some British Multinationals in Kenya», in *Readings on Multinational Corporations in Kenya*, Oxford University Press, 1978). p. 239.

24. The Andean group excludes drugs, beverages and foods, India excludes drugs, other chemicals and foods: Mexico excludes alloys, chemicals, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, fungicides and their manufacturing processes, and computer programs. See UNCTAD, «Annual Report 1981 on Legislative and other developments in developed and developing countries in the control of restrictive business practices: Review of recent trends in patents in developing countries». 24/Nov./81, TD/B/C.6/AC.5/3.

25. For instance, Atlas Copco sells a brass cylinder and piston pump with a patented ball bearing valve. The very sturdy upper wooden drive is entirely made in Kenya. The cylinder and piston pump is imported and accounts for 60% of the total value. But the pump is simple and could without doubt be made here. With a domestic production requirement to sustain patent rights someone could make these here if Atlas Copco refused.

26. Begumisa. *op. cit.*, pp. 63, 64 and 101.

27. For instance, the Kenyan vehicle assembly industry has been slow to increase domestic content and, as one managing director admitted, «undynamic» in searching for and stimulating the domestic manufacture of original equipment components. Artificial standards are sometimes used as an excuse to refuse to produce domestically. The general manager of a local vehicle assembly plant, himself, made this point and cited the case where locally made leaf springs were sent for «testing» by the mother company's supplier. Predictably, they failed the «test». See the forthcoming (1983), University of Nairobi, Economics Department, M. A. Research Paper by Z. N. Murage on the Kenyan Vehicle Assembly Industry.

28. Nicola Swainson, *The Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya, 1918–77*, University of California Press, 1980), Ch. 5 and 6. Also see Raphie Kaplinsky, «Capitalist Accumulation in the Periphery: Kenya», in Martin Fransman (ed.), *Industry and Accumulation in Africa*, (Heineman, 1982). See especially the lists of major Kenyan African capitalists and their ownings and directorships on pp. 204–6.

29. The World Bank argued «.. it is most desirable for Kenya to avoid going through the second stage of import substitution (protection of intermediate goods) with the additional taxation of the rest of the economy that this brings in train». (p. 40).. *Kenya Into the Second Decade*, World Bank Country Economic Report (John Hopkins University Press, 1975.

RESUME

La crise actuelle des devises du Kenya pourrait être à la base d'un boom dans le secteur de la Fondererie et des ateliers de confection métallique si le gouvernement acceptait d'appliquer des politiques hardies au lieu de constituer un blocage au développement de ces importantes industries. Leurs installations, ouvriers qualifiés et contre-maîtres sont sous-utilisés par suite de l'absence d'un plan de développement correct de ces industries. Mais, compte tenu de la capacité actuelle, il serait possible de créer un boom dans ce secteur en prenant les décisions suivantes : limiter le nombre de marques de voitures, de camions et d'autres produits faits au Kenya, arrêter l'importation d'articles qu'on peut confectionner sur place, améliorer progressivement la capacité et les contrôles de qualité dans ces industries, diminuer les prix gonflés que les grossistes fixent pour l'acier de qualité, compter moins sur et même baisser le prix des accords de licence, diminuer la protection accordée aux licences et enfin favoriser l'allocation de devises aux fonderies et ateliers de construction mécanique. D'autre part. l'important atelier de construction mécanique des chemins de fer doit être utilisé pour fabriquer des pièces pour les autres industries. La mise en application de ces politiques devrait créer des milliers d'emploi en amont et en aval (comme pour les composantes en matière plastique ; l'assemblage des produits ainsi que pour l'usage dans le secteur agricole) et diminuer la dépendance sur l'importation. Mais la mise en application de ces politiques tendant à augmenter la production locale dans ces industries devra aussi faire face à une forte opposition de la part des importateurs et des assembleurs multinationaux des pièces importées. Tels sont les résultats de visites effectuées dans 91 ateliers de construction mécanique et 19 fonderies situées à Nairobi, Kisumu, Thika, Magadi, Mombassa et ailleurs.

BOOK REVIEWS-REVUE DES LIVRES

Crise de l'Agriculture Africaine de Lamine Gakou, (193 p. Ed. SILEX, Novembre 1984 – Belgique)

Revue par Naceur BOURENANE

Le livre s'ouvre par un bref avant propos de l'auteur dans lequel il précise son projet. Gakou se veut modeste quant à son apport: «Nous n'avons pas cherché à faire dans ce travail une œuvre de spécialiste mais à dire des choses simples et simplement, à rappeler des vérités qui peuvent paraître évidentes mais qui sont de plus en plus évacuées, rejetées aux oubliettes en raison même de leur simplicité. Ces vérités n'en restent pas moins d'actualités et fondamentales». Cet essai est malgré tout fort ambitieux, essayer de «comprendre en profondeur les causes de cette crise» en remontant jusqu'à la période précoloniale et en esquissant les conditions indispensables pour en sortir. C'est ce que tente de faire l'auteur en sept chapitres.

Ce livre est introduit par une note de présentation de Samir Amin dans laquelle il situe la portée et la signification de cette contribution au regard du contexte international actuel pour conclure que «le défi ne sera [donc] relevé que par les peuples africains, le jour où les alliances populaires nécessaires leur permettront de déconnecter leur développement des exigences de la transnationalisation».

Dans son premier chapitre, l'auteur entreprend de faire «Le point sur» les performances de l'agriculture de 1950 à 1980» à partir d'une analyse des statistiques internationales en comparant les potentialités et les niveaux de leur valorisation en Afrique à celles des autres ensembles régionaux et en rappelant les types de mesures engagés dans chacun d'eux. Après un examen de la situation des différentes sous-régions du continent, l'auteur conclut au «retard important de l'agriculture africaine par rapport à celle des autres régions du monde et surtout la difficulté croissante que cette agriculture éprouve pour pouvoir nourrir les populations du Continent». Le second chapitre reprend de manière synthétique les hypothèses et les débats qui ont eu cours durant les deux décennies écoulées parmi les marxistes d'expression française autour de la caractérisation des sociétés précoloniales. L'auteur conclut au caractère «rigide» des structures communautaires qui ont pu fonder des Etats parfois politiquement bien organisées mais à base économique fragile, pouvant difficilement résister ou contre-carrer la pénétration coloniale.

Le troisième chapitre traite de la soumission des modes de production caractéristiques de l'Afrique précoloniale, de leurs formes et de leur évolution historique jusqu'à l'avènement des indépendances. En une dizaine de pages Gakou traite des types d'appropriation du surtravail paysan pendant l'ère coloniale. Il en retire deux faits. D'une part «le capitalisme colonial s'est accommodé des formes socio-économiques africaines quand elles le servaient bien ainsi», les modifiant «sensiblement lorsque ses intérêts l'exigeaient». D'autre part les indépendances ne sont autres que l'expression d'un approfondissement de la crise, du triomphe de l'impérialisme «moderne» sur le système colonial devenu désuet et d'une plus grande exploitation des masses paysannes par les «classes» dominantes, «bourgeoisies et petites bourgeoisies» locales pour leur propre compte et celui des monopoles impérialistes.

Les chapitres 4 et 5 traitent de la 1ère et de la 2ème décennie post-indépendance, du développement du système d'extraversion à la recherche de palliatifs à la crise vivrière engendré pas par ce processus. Si le chapitre 4 ne fait que rappeler très brièvement la façon dont les nouveaux Etats ont reconduit la politique d'exploitation coloniale et les effets induits par une telle pratique, le chapitre 5 s'attache à partir d'études de cas précis à démonter les deux axes autour desquels s'est articulée l'action dans les années 70, la politique de développement des petites exploitations agricoles et la stratégie des besoins essentiels. La méthode qui y est suivie est fort intéressante. Elle se fonde sur la prise en compte simultanée de différents niveaux de la réalité. Celà confère du coup à l'analyse plus de richesse et aux conclusions d'avantage de poids, notamment pour ce qui concerne la Banque Mondiale et dans une certaine mesure le BIT et leur rôle dans la tentative de dépassement des contradictions, somme toute «insurmon tables», auxquelles le système capitaliste mondial est confronté. Le 6e chapitre se propose d'établir une synthèse théorique de l'ensemble des développements précédents quant aux formes de contrôle du système productif et du statut du producteur direct en son sein.

Dans son dernier chapitre 7, l'auteur tente de tirer des conclusions pratiques de son analyse, en proposant des solutions alternatives à la crise et en situant clairement la problématique sous-tendant celles-ci: «On ne peut que se situer sur le terrain de la lutte des classes au niveau national et international qui détermine les politiques ainsi suivies». Après avoir proposé sa lecture de la nature des classes sociales en Afrique, de leur évolution et de leur poids respectif depuis les indépendances, l'auteur définit ce que recouvre pour lui l'alternative en termes «d'alliances populaires», de programmes d'actions concrets.

Le livre se conclut sur une note pessimiste : «Le système capitaliste repose sur des rapports de classe donc sur des rapports de force. Tant que les peuples dominés ne constitueront pas une véritable force par leur unité, ils ne seront écoutés que par simple belle manière. Quant aux peuples africains, ils ne trouveront le salut que le jour où ils construiront l'Afrique des peuples. Malheureusement, il ne semble pas que nous nous en approchions beaucoup».

On y trouve en annexe un document fort intéressant reprenant les doléances de riziculteurs parti-prenante à l'opération Riz de SAN Mali, une série de tableaux statistiques principalement sur l'évolution de la situation agricole et alimentaire dans les différentes sous-régions constitutives du continent.

Rédigé dans un style simple, ce qui rend sa lecture fort aisée, cet ouvrage constituera certainement un document de référence pour le grand public, notamment pour les étudiants. Cependant il pourrait laisser quelque peu le lecteur averti sur sa faim et susciter des interrogations voire une certaine gêne. Celle-ci pourrait s'exprimer à plusieurs niveaux.

D'une part à un niveau que l'on pourrait qualifier faute de mieux de «technique». Dans les chapitres 1 et 4 principalement, l'auteur s'appuie sur des chiffres communément utilisés dans les comparaisons internationales (dont certains sont du reste anciens). Ils résultent le plus souvent des rapports établis par les Etats, revus par les institutions qui ont la charge de les publier (FAO, etc...). Lorsqu'on connaît le niveau de développement des structures de collecte des données dans les différents pays du continent et les conditions socio-politiques dans lesquelles elles sont produites, on ne peut qu'être sceptique quant à leur fidélité et validité (tout au plus peut-on accepter des données du type de celles portant sur les exploitations et les importations, encore que les gaspillages liées au stockage, au transport, etc.. réduisent sensiblement leur portée). Celà nous conduit ici à la critique de la thèse communément admise de la baisse tendancielle de la production alimentaire qui s'appuie entre autres sur l'augmentation des importations. Il n'est peut-être pas inutile de rappeler que des calculs effectués par les services de la C.E.A. ont montré qu'il n'y avait pratiquement aucune corrélation statistique entre l'évolution du volume des importations, du niveau de la production et du taux d'urbanisation dans bon nombre de pays africains.

Celà vaut encore pour le rapport susceptible de s'établir entre l'évolution officielle des disponibilités alimentaires et celle de la mortalité (qu'il s'agisse de la mortalité générale ou infantile). Mais au-delà des chiffres eux-mêmes, les ratios usités sont pour le moins inopérants. En dehors d'un modèle technologique précis, de conditions naturelles similaires et d'activités productives proches, on ne voit pas ce qui pourrait autoriser les comparaisons de quantités d'engrais ou d'énergie à l'hectare (réduite elle-même à la seule mécanisation). Pire encore ce raccourci dans la comparaison revient de fait (probablement à l'insu même de l'auteur) à postuler que le processus technologique dominant dans les pays occidentaux est celui qui conviendrait dans les différentes sous-régions de l'Afrique indépendamment des potentialités physiques et socio-scientifiques (ce dernier aspect pourtant capital n'est pas du tout pris en ligne de compte) qui les caractérisent, thèse probablement étrangère à la pensée de l'auteur. Le dernier élément technique de moindre importance porte sur les calculs eux-mêmes, mais qui amène par exemple à nuancer l'échec des projets de développement des petites exploitations en matière de santé. Les résultats avancés, rapportés aux sous-populations concernées dans l'opération Riz Ségou (Mali) sont loin d'être minces. Reste cependant à savoir si l'inéxistence de ces informations pour les autres projets exprime (comme le soutient l'auteur) l'absence de ces préoccupations.

Le second niveau auquel se situeront ces remarques concerne les «non-dits», sur des aspects de la question qu'il ne nous semble pas utile de taire tant ils corroborent ou nuancent l'analyse à ses différents moments. On se contentera simplement d'en énumérer quelqu'uns parmi les plus importants. Ainsi Gakou ne rend pas compte des luttes qui opposent les pays de la CEE aux USA (et aux nouveaux grands producteurs mondiaux) sur le marché des produits alimentaires et qui ne peuvent être tenues pour négligeables ni dans l'analyse, ni dans la définition de stratégies alternatives. Il passe également sous silence les problèmes techniques auxquels tendent à être confrontés les agricultures des pays capitalistes développés (pollution, montée des sels, etc...) – chapitre 1 -. Il ne dit pas non plus grand chose sur les bénéficiaires des opérations de développement (origine sociale, éthnique, géographique, mode de sélection, etc...). D'autres questions se posent. Par exemple y-a-t-il un rapport à établir en Afrique entre tentative de promotion du secteur vivrier et délocalisation industrielle (chapitre 5), compte tenu de la nature des produits agricoles africains d'exportation, de leur poids sur le marché mondial (importance d'autres zones de production, existence de produits de substitution, etc...) à quelles conditions l'unité des producteurs africains pourra peser sur les cours des choses (chapitre 7), n'y-a-t-il pas également une certaine contradiction entre la constitution de grands espaces socio-économiques et les petites réalisations industrielles ?

Enfin, son bilan de débats autour de l'approche marxiste de la caractérisation de la situation précoloniale et coloniale ne réfléchit que partiellement la richesse et les apports multiples des différents chercheurs (tant francophone qu'anglophone). Ils ne sont guère réductibles aux trois thèses «principales» (en fonction de quels critères). Il est difficile ainsi de passer sous silence les points de vue de Meillassoux, de Terray ou de Copans pour ne pas citer d'autres plus récents tel que J.L. Amselle ou ne référer qu'à l'école française. De plus il aurait été intéressant d'aborder les débats qui ont entouré d'autres concepts ou notions telles que celle de communauté, tant leur poids dans la caractérisation de la situation précoloniale a été grand.

Le troisième niveau est d'ordre théorique. Ici aussi, on se contentera de soulever quelques unes des questions suscitées par la lecture du livre de Gakou. La première porte sur la définition de la notion d'Etat. Selon l'auteur, elle renverrait à une «forme d'organisation sociale où une classe sociale domine et exploite le reste de la société organisée ou non en classes distinctes». Quel statut théorique et opératoire faut-il accorder à une telle définition? Est-elle spécifique et particulière à l'Afrique précoloniale ou au contraire représente-t-elle une utilité pour la période présente ? La seconde porte sur la structure de classes des sociétés africaines – n'y'-a-t-il pas eu ici une certaine «translocation» théorique par la translation de catégories opératoires (dans des milieux historiques précis vers d'autres différents) ? En quoi les notions d'esclaves, de petite bourgeoisie, etc... recouvrent et réfèrent des logiques, des finalités, des pratiques sociales similaires et réductibles. Ces «raccourcis» conceptuels peuvent être néfastes au double plan de la connaissance et de l'action. La troisième concerne la périodisation faite du processus colonial et la manière dont il a été traité. Peut-on le considérer à l'instar de la littérature classique – comme un processus unique ayant subi peu de modifications au niveau d'une même sous-région ? Ne s'agit-il pas de mouvements historiques fort enchevêtrés et complexes qui ont pris au même moment des formes différentes et complémentaires pour constituer quelquefois des espaces socio-économiques et politiques intégrés et engendrés par moment des entités sociales, économiques et politiques hétérogènes. Est-ce que ces processus n'ont pas varié selon les rapports de forces au sein des métropoles, entre elles, celles-ci et leurs colonies respectives? A-t-on le droit dans ce type de travail (compte tenu du type de lecteur potentiel) de lisser ces complexités ?

La quatrième porte sur le problème de l'accommodation du système colonial puis néo-colonial avec les modes de production anciens. En quoi consiste-t-elle, comment a-t-elle évolué, etc... S'agit-il d'une simple «accommodation» ou au contraire de la nécessité pour les capitalistes de composer avec des sujets historiques non passifs, selon des formes imposées par les rapports de force à l'échelon local, sous-régional et mondial. Comment faut-il considérer cette lecture par rapport à d'autres comme celle globalisante proposée par Wallerstein par exemple (qui avance le concept d'économie-monde).

La cinquième porte sur les distinctions faites entre soumission informelle, formelle et réelle. Qu'apporte-t-elle de nouveau dans le champ de l'analyse marxiste? Ne risque-t-elle pas d'opacifier le concret et d'accroître la confusion ?

Est-ce que la définition de l'exploitation agricole telle que reprise par l'auteur relève d'une approche marxiste? N'est-ce pas le mode de combinaison technique et sociale des éléments constitutifs du procès de production qui devrait primer sur la qualité et la nature apparente des relations sociales dans la considération des situations concrètes? C'est peut-être ici que l'usage du concept de soumission formelle et réelle aurait été la plus fructueuse. Notons au passage la contradiction dans les termes entre la grande diversité des structures agraires qui interdit selon l'auteur toute généralisation, et une description qui se voudrait représentative de la «majorité des cas» en Afrique au Sud du Sahara.

Quel statut théorique enfin accorder aux solutions envisagées pour sortir de la crise? n'y-a-t-il pas en œuvre une vision idyllique du pouvoir populaire, articulé autour d'une sorte de fédération de producteurs associés ?

L'ensemble de ces éléments parmi d'autres encore amène à se demander si en cherchant à énoncer simplement des vérités évidentes, l'ouvrage ne tend pas à émasculer la réalité, ce qui d'ailleurs transparaît déjà au niveau du titre. Peut-on parler de la Crise de l'Agriculture Africaine ou doit-on traiter des Crises des Agricultures Africaines.

Tous ces développements rendent compte de l'utilité et de la richesse de cet ouvrage qui vient à point nommé pour servir de référent à des débats dont certains sont encore ouverts et d'autres à peine esquissés.

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