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# AFRICA

development

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# **AFRICA DEVELOPMENT**

# **AFRIQUE ET DEVELOPPEMENT**

**A QUARTELY JOURNAL OF THE COUNCIL  
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## DEVELOPPEMENT AGRICOLE ET INDEPENDANCE ALIMENTAIRE

Par

*Nacer BOURENANE\**

La dépendance alimentaire croissante des pays sous-développés vis-à-vis des principaux pays exportateurs de produits agricoles constitue depuis plusieurs années déjà une préoccupation pour tous ceux qui se sentent concernés par l'avenir du tiers-monde ; et son aggravation est à la base d'une inquiétude croissante des gouvernants dans ces Etats. Les pays du Maghreb, notamment l'Algérie, n'échappent pas à une telle situation. Les propositions faites par l'Algérie au sommet de CANCUN sont au moins pour partie l'expression d'une réelle anxiété avec la prise de conscience du danger que fait peser sur ce pays le recours croissant aux importations alimentaires (1).

L'intériorisation des risques potentiels que font courir ces importations alimentaires croissantes est telle aujourd'hui qu'une véritable psychose semble s'être emparée des pouvoirs en place dans les pays sous-développés. La toile de fond sur laquelle s'élaborent depuis quelques années les politiques économiques nationales et les programmes d'action proposés ou financés par les institutions internationales spécialisées (F.A.O./PNUD/Agences de développement, etc...) est constituée par la phobie d'une famine. Le désarroi semble si grand que les gouvernements ont tendance, soit à accepter sans étude ni analyse critique préalable des projets dits de développement agricole ou rural initiés par des organismes internationaux et étrangers (privés ou publics), soit à se lancer dans des politiques de développement agricole «tous azimuts» sans définir au préalable un ordre de priorités pour le moyen et le long terme. De nombreux pays africains semblent se situer dans la première perspective, l'Algérie dans la seconde.

Ce faisant, il est intéressant de noter que dans les deux cas, la croissance de la production agricole (qui est devenue de façon abusive l'indicateur et «l'objectif du développement agricole) est recherchée par le recours à des inputs largement importés et correspondant aux modèles techniques de production en usage dans les pays capitalistes développés. On importe de ces derniers, à la fois les moyens de production (semences, engrais, P.P.S., bétail, machines, équipements, etc...) et les «experts». Le développement agricole consiste alors à assurer grâce au concours de ces spécialistes l'adaptation des moyens aux conditions locales et l'initiation des producteurs à ces nouveaux procédés. C'est soit la révolution verte qui se met en place, soit un secteur de production pour l'exportation. Nous connaissons aujourd'hui les effets de la promotion de ce dernier dans des régions comme le Sahel. Il est possible également d'apprécier les résultats de la première, là où elle semble avoir bien réussi, en Amérique Latine et en Inde par exemple. Ce dernier pays (2) a certes aujourd'hui une balance céréalière excédentaire, mais les «mouroirs» continuent d'y exister et sont toujours aussi bien «alimentés».

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Bien que l'examen critique des expériences indienne et Latino-américaine puisse être instructif à plus d'un titre, nous nous proposons de placer la réflexion sur un autre plan. On essaiera de mesurer l'efficacité de ce modèle de production dans son cadre originel (les agricultures des pays capitalistes développés) pour tenter ensuite de situer les effets probables de sa généralisation dans nos pays.

## I. — EFFICACITE TECHNIQUE ET SOCIALE DU MODELE DE PRODUCTION PROPOSE

Le modèle technique de base en œuvre dans les agricultures occidentales, européennes ou nord-américaines, se fonde sur une forte mécanisation du procès de travail, sur une «chimisation» sans cesse croissante et sur une consommation élevée d'une énergie ayant pour origine les hydrocarbures.

Le résultat le plus spectaculaire atteint grâce à ce modèle est sans conteste l'accroissement sensible des niveaux de production. Les rendements ont ainsi pu faire en l'espace de deux décennies des bonds jusque-là inégaux, et les productions des principales denrées alimentaires ont atteint dans les pays capitalistes développés des seuils qui rendent nécessaire la mise en place de politiques visant à limiter toute élévation de la production. Les conflits ouverts ou larvés qui opposent les U.S.A. et les pays de la C.E.E., ces derniers entre eux et chacun d'eux avec certaines catégories de producteurs en sont des exemples.

Mais les autres résultats et les conditions dans lesquelles la généralisation du modèle a pu se faire dans les pays capitalistes développés amènent à relativiser ce «succès».

Plusieurs éléments portent à croire que ce modèle a atteint ses limites dans les pays où il s'est le plus systématiquement développé, notamment, aux U.S.A. Pour ce pays, la stagnation (si ce n'est la régression) probable du taux de croissance de la productivité globale entre 1980 et 2000 constitue un premier indicateur. Un second nous est fourni par l'examen de l'évolution des rendements. Ils ne se sont accrus entre 1965 et 1979 que de 1,2% par an contre 2,6% entre 1950 et 1965.

En fait, ce modèle a bénéficié au départ de conditions particulièrement favorables qui ne peuvent plus être réunies aujourd'hui : il a pu se généraliser grâce à l'existence d'importantes réserves foncières. Or l'extension des surfaces semble avoir atteint aux U.S.A. ses limites. Il a reposé sur une augmentation considérable des superficies irriguées — celles-ci ont pratiquement doublé depuis 1944. Mais là également les accroissements ne peuvent qu'être négligeables. En fait, l'abaissement des nappes (synonyme d'accroissement des coûts) et les remontées de sel sur 25 à 35% des terres irriguées de l'Ouest (zone qui compte plus de la moitié des superficies irriguées des U.S.A.) militent en faveur de l'hypothèse d'une régression des aires irriguées.

Mais ce ne sont pas là les seuls éléments agro-techniques qui poussent à une certaine réserve quant à la généralisation de ce modèle dans nos pays. Celle-là découle de la prise en compte d'autres aspects du même ordre.



— D'une part, il s'est accompagné d'une forte spécialisation régionale. Aujourd'hui, celle-ci s'avère difficile à remettre en cause car elle soulève des problèmes d'ordres technique, économique et socio-politique.

— Il s'est d'autre part développé grâce à un niveau bas des prix des inputs d'origine pétrochimique. Aujourd'hui la situation a largement changé et leurs coûts ne cessent d'augmenter (3).

— Sa mise en œuvre n'est pas par ailleurs sans effets sur les sols. La quantité et la composition des produits chimiques auxquels il faut avoir recours contribuent dans une large mesure à accroître la fragilité des sols, à les polluer et à rompre les équilibres écologiques, notamment par la destruction des prédateurs naturels.

— Les conséquences sont également graves au plan de l'alimentation et de la santé des populations dans les pays du tiers-monde où la quasi-totalité des paysans sont analphabètes et où il n'existe pas de structures de prévention sanitaire, ni de contrôle des pesticides importés. En fait, les dangers d'empoisonnement n'épargnent pas les populations des pays développés (cf. en annexe l'article intitulé «ces poisons que nous exportons»).

— Au plan de l'emploi, les effets ne doivent pas non plus être sous-estimés. Avec ce modèle technique, on n'assiste pas à une «industrialisation» du procès de travail agricole. Quand bien même il intègre une forte consommation de produits industriels, celui-ci demeure au plan de son organisation largement artisanal, se fondant sur une concentration de tâches au lieu de leur parcellisation, sur une réduction du nombre de travailleurs par exploitation et du nombre d'exploitations (phénomène de concentration foncière) (4). C'est ce qui confère aux agricultures capitalistes un caractère semi-paysan.

Nous nous sommes limités jusque-là à l'examen des effets techniques. Or les conséquences sociales sont bien plus graves dans les pays capitalistes. Dans ces derniers, le développement de l'agriculture n'est pas synonyme d'une amélioration de la situation des agriculteurs. En France, après 20 années de modernisation agricole, les 2/3 des paysans y ont un revenu équivalant au SMIG. Aux U.S.A., la montée des prix des produits agricoles n'a pas pour autant entraîné une élévation du niveau des revenus des producteurs. En 1980, malgré la hausse des prix, les revenus nets auraient diminué de 25%. En fait, comme l'ont souligné F. COLSON et B. WOLFER dans un article intitulé : «L'efficacité économique de l'intensification laitière et la nécessité des aides de l'Etat» (5), «L'accroissement du capital devient la raison de l'accroissement du revenu agricole». Celui-ci tend à être progressivement rogné au fur et à mesure que le processus de travail s'intensifie. En France, entre 1960 et 1978, le revenu agricole a été multiplié par 1,03 et l'investissement par 2,03. En 1966, la part du revenu dévolu à l'investissement était de 23%. Il atteignait déjà 45% en 1978. Ceci est indicateur du double fait que le processus d'intensification ne se fonde pas et n'assure pas une baisse des coûts de production, qu'il repose sur un processus de marginalisation et de soumission croissante du producteur au capital, d'où un endettement croissant des agriculteurs. En France (qui est avec l'Italie le pays de la C.E.E. où la part du revenu agricole

consacrée à l'investissement est en moyenne la plus faible) l'endettement a été multiplié par 4,3 entre 1960 et 1978 malgré des transferts (de toutes sortes) et une aide de l'Etat en faveur de l'agriculture en constante augmentation.

En fait, si ce modèle a pu acquérir une telle généralisation, c'est bien parce qu'il a été le moyen électif par lequel l'agriculture a pu être soumise au capital industriel. Aujourd'hui, l'agriculture apparaît dans les pays capitalistes développés comme un appendice à l'industrie. Sa fonction principale et quasi-unique a consisté à assurer la reproduction élargie du système productif industriel et à favoriser une accumulation élevée du capital industriel de deux manières : d'abord par une offre de denrées alimentaires à bas prix et ensuite par une demande croissante en produits industriels; tout cela se faisant au détriment des consommateurs (6) et des producteurs agricoles. Aujourd'hui, les problèmes de toutes sortes auxquels sont confrontés ces agricultures et les Etats qui y interviennent sont indicateurs du niveau atteint par la crise de ce modèle. Dès lors, on est en droit de se demander pourquoi on nous propose aujourd'hui cette forme d'intensification.

Pour répondre à une telle question, il y a lieu de situer les implications techniques, économiques et socio-politiques, dans le moyen terme, de l'adoption de ce modèle par nos pays.

## II. — LE PRIX DE L'INDEPENDANCE ALIMENTAIRE

On peut faire l'hypothèse selon laquelle l'adoption et la généralisation du modèle produiraient les effets escomptés au plan de l'élévation de la production, dans le court terme (7). On peut même supposer que le résultat le plus immédiat serait la réduction dans des proportions importantes de la dépendance alimentaire, que la production nationale couvrirait la quasi-totalité des besoins nutritionnels de la population (8).

Avec ou sans ces résultats, la mise en place à grande échelle de ce type de développement agricole aurait comme implications techniques :

- la modification du système de culture, la création de zones homogènes portant les mêmes variétés et la disparition des systèmes de productions actuels.

- la substitution aux semences locales de semences importées non reproductibles localement.

- un accroissement substantiel du recours aux engrais chimiques au détriment des autres formes de fertilisation.

- une élévation conséquente de l'emploi des pesticides et des herbicides au détriment des procédés jusque là utilisés.

- la substitution de moyens mécaniques importés à la force de travail peu rentable et inefficace. Celle-ci ne peut s'acquitter des opérations avec autant de précision (semis en ligne, etc...), ni dans les délais exigés (importance des récoltes et volume de travail disponible, etc...).

Les résultats seraient à moyen et à long terme la disparition du savoir faire local (notamment en matière de tri, de préparation et de conservation des semis ou de la production), du capital génétique (par la substitution des espèces hybrides aux semences en usage auparavant), et la

séparation d'activités jusque-là relativement bien intégrées (notamment des productions végétale et animale) ; autant d'éléments indicateurs du développement d'un processus de dépendance technologique difficilement réversible dans le domaine agro-alimentaire.

Ainsi, l'indépendance alimentaire obtenue dans le court ou le moyen terme se transformera-t-elle, avec la dépendance technologique, en une dépendance alimentaire à moyen et long terme qu'on ne pourra plus rompre pour deux ordres de raisons. D'une part parce qu'on ne contrôle pas les moyens de production des produits industriels destinés à l'agriculture, d'autre part parce que des modifications difficilement réversibles auront été introduites dans les formes de production et les habitudes de consommation alimentaires. Il suffira alors que l'un des inputs viennent à «manquer» pour qu'on soit obligé de recourir à l'importation de denrées de substitution (dont la distribution est souvent contrôlée par les mêmes multinationales et les mêmes puissances qui ont la main mise sur la production des inputs). Ainsi le cercle de la dépendance alimentaire se trouvera refermé.

A plus long terme encore, une fois que la généralisation du modèle aura produit des effets au moins aussi néfastes au plan technique que ceux observables ici et là (principalement dans les pays capitalistes développés), on sera obligé de recourir aux mêmes fournisseurs pour négocier — cette fois en position de plus grande faiblesse — La substitution d'autres modèles à celui devenu défaillant. C'est à nouveau le cercle de la dépendance technologique qui se referme.

Les implications socio-économiques et politiques de la généralisation du modèle ne doivent pas non plus être négligées. Sa mise en place et son extension impliquent une régression et une disparition de l'auto-consommation aussi bien productive qu'humaine; cela est inévitable avec la spécialisation et le recours aux produits intermédiaires d'origine industrielle. Elles sont également synonymes d'une baisse de la population active agricole occupée et d'un remembrement des exploitations.

Les conséquences de ce type de généralisation des rapports marchands sont multiples :

— Une prolétarianisation, un exode agricole et rural en accroissement rapide. Elle s'accompagnera inévitablement d'une augmentation de la demande en produits jusque-là auto-consommés et auto-produits (ce qui en soi peut être une source de tensions et de conflits sociaux au cas où la production agricole n'augmentait pas en conséquence). La pression sur le marché de travail non agricole connaîtra la même évolution, l'essentiel de la population jusque-là partiellement occupée se trouvant totalement libérée. Les phénomènes migratoires ne pourront que gagner en intensité et avec eux, ceux des bidonvilles, de la malnutrition, de la mortalité des populations urbaines, etc...

L'ensemble de ces caractères traduit une augmentation incontrôlée du volume des populations marginalisées par ce type de développement agricole. Celui-ci s'avère ainsi être une source d'aggravation des inégalités sociales existantes et de multiplication des conflits sociaux. Ces derniers ne pourront induire qu'une augmentation et un développement de la

répression, car les pouvoirs en place n'auront plus les moyens de remettre en cause le modèle de production agricole ainsi adopté. C'est ainsi que se met en place ou que s'élargit le cercle de la violence et que ce creuse le hiatus séparant les couches sociales les plus pauvres du pouvoir d'Etat.

— Une autre conséquence résidera dans la modification des modèles de consommation alimentaire des couches les plus aisées. Celle-ci attendront de ce type de développement, une amélioration qualitative de leur ration alimentaire. Elle ne pourra provenir — (le modèle de consommation inhérent au modèle de production y oblige) que d'une augmentation des viandes au détriment des céréales ; ce qui n'est pas sans effet sur la part de la production céréalière destinée jusque-là à la consommation humaine (compte tenu du caractère fini des augmentations des emblavures) du plus grand nombre, sur le rôle des autres productions agricoles et sur les importations de denrées alimentaires. A ce niveau également, tout pouvoir d'Etat se retrouvera pris dans un dilemme, celui de satisfaire les besoins du plus grand nombre (condition d'une «paix sociale») et de répondre aux attentes de minorités socialement et économiquement importantes. Dans cette perspective, les solutions envisageables conduisent (compte tenu des formes d'organisation politique en place actuellement et de leur faible efficacité dans la mobilisation sociale) à une aggravation et un aiguisement des contradictions sociales.

— Une augmentation du revenu brut des producteurs agricoles assortie d'une baisse tendancielle de la productivité des consommations intermédiaires en valeur et en volume (phénomène aujourd'hui persistant dans les agricultures européennes et nord-américaines) pourra être escomptée. Ceci aura pour conséquence la naissance d'un dilemme (qui ne fera que s'aggraver) au niveau des producteurs : satisfaire les besoins en biens de consommation croissants (notamment du fait d'une baisse de l'auto-consommation) ou augmenter la part dévolue aux investissements.

Si la première solution est retenue, compte tenu de l'élévation continue du prix des inputs agricoles (largement importés), c'est un processus de décapitalisation qui se met en place, c'est-à-dire une aggravation des inégalités sociales dans les campagnes, une accentuation du processus de prolétarianisation, et... une source supplémentaire de conflits et de «problèmes» sociaux que l'Etat devra gérer.

Si au contraire la part du revenu affectée aux investissements tend à croître au détriment de la consommation, des problèmes de reproduction de la force de travail agricole ne tarderont pas à se poser, celle-ci devenant de plus en plus fragile. Une telle évolution ne pourra se faire sans provoquer une réaction de plus en plus organisée des producteurs (ce qui se passe aujourd'hui dans des pays aussi différents que la France et l'Inde nous semble en être le reflet) pouvant aller jusqu'à menacer l'existence du pouvoir d'Etat.

Trois perspectives pourraient retarder une telle transformation sociale des producteurs : l'endettement, l'augmentation des ressources extérieures et leur transformation en exploitants à temps partiel ainsi que les transferts directs ou indirects opérés en leur faveur par l'Etat. Dans la réalité sociale des pays capitalistes développés, ces voies se sont combinées.

En France par exemple, l'accroissement de l'endettement (multiplié par 4,3 en l'espace de 16 ans) entraîna avec lui un renforcement du système de crédit au détriment des producteurs. Ces derniers n'ont d'autre choix que la soumission aux règles de gestion imposées et définies par les caisses de crédit. Au même moment, le nombre d'exploitants à temps complet a diminué de 3,6% par an (près de la moitié des exploitants étaient occupés à temps partiel en 1978) (9) ; en 1978 la part du revenu des ménages agricoles liée à des revenus extérieurs (hors transferts sociaux) a été de l'ordre de 28%. Toujours pour le même pays, 10% au moins du revenu agricole a pour origine un soutien des prix et la moitié du revenu agricole n'est pas fonction de la quantité de travail appliqué, mais des décisions de l'Etat en matière de dépenses au bénéfice de l'agriculture (10). Un tel système a pu fonctionner et se maintenir grâce à un ensemble de mécanismes de mobilisation du surplus produit dans les autres secteurs d'activités économiques et dans d'autres pays dépendants. Ceux-là n'existent pas dans le cadre de nos pays, et les ressources minières susceptibles de couvrir un tel développement ne sont pas indéfiniment renouvelables. Aussi, elles nous semblent à écarter. Mais quand bien-même l'une ou l'autre solution pourrait-être envisagée, sa mise en œuvre implique le recours à un endettement externe. Celui-ci ne pourra être contracté que sous certaines conditions, et la «vérité des prix» n'en est pas des moindres.

Au bout du compte et en simplifiant puisqu'on n'a même pas pris en compte la nature différenciée des composantes sociales agricoles et non agricoles de nos pays, on se rend compte que la généralisation — (déjà en cours) de ce modèle de production risque de produire des effets difficilement contrôlables aux plans technique, économique, social et politique, sans même assurer l'indépendance alimentaire.

### III. — LE FAUX CHANTAGE

Ceci nous amène au terme de cette brève analyse à nous demander si, à travers l'exportation en direction de nos pays de ce type de développement agricole, les pays capitalistes développés et les multinationales — l'agribusiness — ne cherchent pas à assurer (à notre détriment et avec notre collaboration) la réunion des conditions du maintien et de l'élargissement de leurs profits, de plus en plus menacés dans leur agriculture.

Dans ce cas, n'y a-t-il pas lieu de suspecter les pratiques qui tendent à accrédi-ter — grâce aux mass média notamment — la réalité du chantage alimentaire et à attribuer un pouvoir absolu au «pétrole vert»? Est-ce que leur développement ne vise pas justement à asseoir les conditions d'une soumission technologique au plan agro-industriel de nos pays?

Plusieurs indices portent à croire que si l'«arme alimentaire» existe, elle serait en fait au moins à «double tranchant», et qu'elle jouerait plus en notre faveur qu'au profit de ceux qui la brandissent. L'exemple des U.S.A. est de ce point de vue fort instructif :

Ce pays a une position dominante sur le marché mondial des céréales (11). Pourtant, il n'est pas arrivé à imposer en accord avec les autres grands exportateurs une augmentation des prix.

En 1980, les U.S.A. ont tenté d'imposer un embargo céréalier à l'URSS. Celui-ci a eu les effets inverses à ceux escomptés. D'une part, il a ouvert des possibilités aux autres concurrents, d'autre part il a provoqué un mécontentement au sein des producteurs américains.

Ainsi, l'usage de l'arme alimentaire paraît relativement limitée et de faible portée à la fois pour des considérations internes à chacun des pays exportateurs et pour des raisons qui tiennent à la nature des rapports économiques liant (ou opposant) ces pays entre eux.

Dans ce cas, ne vaut-il pas mieux songer à jeter, grâce à une politique de recherche agrotechnique soutenue prenant pour base de travail, les procédés culturaux, les techniques et les variétés de produits locaux ainsi que les premiers résultats des recherches en cours dans les pays capitalistes, les fondements d'une indépendance alimentaire réelle parce que reposant sur une indépendance technologique ?

Plusieurs éléments militent en faveur de cette perspective. Trois nous paraissent décisifs. Ils ont été en partie avancés par Alain REVEL et C. RIBOUD :

— D'une part le taux de croissance des rendements par hectare ne peut-être que faible. Il a à peine été de 1,6 % aux U.S.A. entre 1948 et 1973, malgré la réunion de conditions extrêmement favorables. On peut même dire que le recours croissant aux produits intermédiaires (engrais,...) tant souligné et répété par les promoteurs de la révolution verte ne peut déboucher que sur de piètres résultats. «Aux Etats-Unis l'output agricole par unité d'input variable a décliné de 113 à 103 (indice 100 = 1969) entre 1948 et 1973» (12).

De ce point de vue les objectifs retenus dans le cadre du plan quinquennal en Algérie paraissent irréalistes. Ils se fondent sur une croissance moyenne annuelle du rendement des céréales pour l'alimentation humaine de 2,2 % (13).

— D'autre part le succès de la révolution verte implique l'existence d'importantes ressources financières. Le remembrement des terres, la création ou le développement de structures de vulgarisation, l'acquisition des inputs mis à la disposition des producteurs à un prix bas (au moins les premiers temps) par l'Etat l'exigent.

— Donner la primauté à ce type de développement agricole suppose enfin que les pouvoirs publics mènent une politique encourageant l'investissement prioritaire dans ce secteur, notamment au détriment de l'industrie. Cette dernière étant bien plus productive et moins aléatoire il faudrait que l'Etat dispose de moyens considérables. Dans ce cas la comparaison du rapport coûts/avantages des investissements agricoles et non agricoles milite largement en faveur d'une application au moins restrictive de la révolution verte. Mais alors, la dépendance alimentaire restera importante et on n'aura créé ni les conditions d'une indépendance agro-alimentaire ni celles d'un développement agricole.

## ANNEXE – CES POISONS QUE NOUS EXPORTONS\*

Par ROWAN

En 1971 une nouvelle plaie s'abattait sur l'Égypte. D'innombrables paysans mouraient ; d'autres, plus nombreux encore, tombaient malades et plus de mille buffles périssaient. Le coupable était un pesticide, le leptophos, qui s'attaque au système nerveux.

A Sri Lanka, les pesticides ont causé plus de décès (938 pour l'année 1977) que la malaria, le tétanos, la diphtérie, la coqueluche et la poliomyélite réunis (646 pour la même année).

Le Comité sur les insecticides de l'Organisation Mondiale de la Santé estime que 500,000 personnes souffrent chaque année d'un empoisonnement par les insecticides. Bien que l'issue n'en soit pas toujours fatale, il est à l'origine de beaucoup de souffrances et d'infirmités qui pourraient être évitées.

Dans les pays en développement, cet empoisonnement atteint des taux alarmants. Les victimes sont le plus souvent des paysans pauvres. Leur inexpérience dans la manipulation des produits chimiques modernes et l'absence de modes d'emploi et d'avis de précautions rédigés dans leur dialecte ou dans une langue qu'ils puissent comprendre rend leur métier dangereux.

Circonstance aggravante : des produits interdits dans les nations industrialisées ou qui y sont sévèrement réglementés sont légalement exportés vers les pays en développement.

Une étude de la FAO révèle que la moitié des pesticides employés dans les pays en développement sont des composés organo-chlorés, tels que le DDT et l'aldrine. Le DDT a été banni de la plupart des pays industrialisés parce que la terre et l'eau en retiennent d'importantes quantités après son application et qu'on le retrouve ainsi en concentration dans la chaîne alimentaire où il aboutit finalement dans les tissus graisseux de l'homme.

Samuel GITONGA, agronome en chef à l'Office National de l'Irrigation du Kenya, explique : «L'interdiction du DDT dans la plupart des nations industrialisées a eu ses répercussions dans les pays les moins développés. En effet le produit s'y est trouvé soudainement beaucoup plus disponible et moins coûteux, en raison de la baisse de la demande ; il est ainsi devenu beaucoup plus concurrentiel que d'autres pesticides d'un usage pourtant moins dangereux».

«La philosophie traditionnelle du 'laissez-faire' en matière d'exportation est que tout pays souverain est libre de ses propres jugements dans le domaine de la sécurité et des risques sur l'environnement et de la façon dont il entend réglementer ses importations». Ainsi s'exprime Jacob SCHERR, juriste au Conseil de Défense des Ressources Naturelles des E.U. : «En pratique, le système incite aux abus. Comme pour d'autres techniques, l'usage des produits chimiques s'est répandu dans le Tiers-Monde beaucoup plus rapidement que ne se sont élaborées les réglementations sécuritaires. Même là où existent des lois sur le contrôle des produits, beaucoup de pays en développement manquent de ressources techniques qui leur permettraient de surveiller leurs importations et de vérifier les marchandises dangereuses. Devant cette carence, et imbus de l'esprit de concurrence, des fabricants de drogues, de pesticides et autres produits dangereux recourent à des méthodes de vente brutales, à de fausses représentations, quand ils ne corrompent pas tout simplement les fonctionnaires».

«En permettant l'exportation sans contrôle de marchandises dangereuses, les E.U. et d'autres pays industrialisés ont fait preuve de 'négligence préméditée'», conclut SCHERR.

Cette négligence préméditée est telle aux Etats-Unis que 25% des pesticides exportés sont des produits qui ont été ou proscrits, ou sévèrement réglementés ou n'ont jamais été autorisés pour utilisation dans ce pays. Beaucoup d'entre eux n'ont jamais été étudiés par des experts indépendants quant à leur incidence sur la santé humaine ou sur l'environnement, tandis que d'autres sont connus pour être cancérigènes ou pour causer des malformations congénitales ou des troubles du système nerveux. La législation américaine est explicite : les produits proscrits ou non autorisés peuvent être exportés légalement. Les Etats-Unis ne sont cependant qu'un des grands exportateurs de pesticides et, si l'on tient compte d'un règlement adopté en 1979 qui exige des exportateurs qu'ils informent leurs acheteurs étrangers des dangers connus des pesticides proscrits, il se pourrait bien que ce pays soit celui qui réglemente le plus consciencieusement les exportations dangereuses.

Même la plus consciencieuse des réglementations peut se révéler inutile. Ainsi, une firme commerciale chargée par les gouvernements américain et canadien d'évaluer les dangers éventuels de certains pesticides produisit des résultats d'expériences falsifiés. Les sociétés multinationales de produits chimiques peuvent aussi éviter la réglementation tout simplement en envoyant séparément les ingrédients d'un pesticide proscrit à un pays en développement, puis en faisant fabriquer ce pesticide sur place dans des usines dites «de préparations».

Écoutons maintenant Frederick RARIG, de Rohm & Haas, un fabricant de pesticides : «La sécurité n'est jamais un absolu. Elle ne signifie pas l'absence de tout risque, mais seulement un niveau acceptable de risque. Les gens n'iront pas jusqu'à se priver de nourriture parce qu'il pourrait être dangereux d'empoisonner les insectes».

Cette argumentation est contredite par David WEIR et Mark SCHAPIRO, qui se sont mis en tête de prouver les transgressions des fabricants de pesticides. «Nous sommes, disent-ils, arrivés à une conclusion étonnante : plus de 50%, et dans certains cas jusqu'à 70% des pesticides utilisés dans les pays en développement servent à des récoltes destinées aux consommateurs européens, japonais et américains. Les pauvres et les affamés peuvent bien peiner dans les champs, exposés quotidiennement à l'empoisonnement par les pesticides : ce ne sont pas eux qui mangeront ces produits de la terre que les pesticides auront protégés».

Ce sont en effet les cultures d'exportation qui consomment le gros des pesticides, notent WEIR et SCHAPIRO dans leur livre, *Circle of Poison*\*. «Les petits paysans qui pratiquent une agriculture de subsistance sont tout simplement trop pauvres pour acheter des pesticides», note Roger BENJAMAIN, ingénieur et agronome à la Division des ressources naturelles de l'Agence canadienne pour le développement international. «S'il leur arrive d'utiliser des pesticides, c'est qu'ils en auront reçu gratuitement dans le cadre de quelque programme gouvernemental. Le résultat final pour eux c'est que les pesticides leur rendront le travail de la terre deux à trois fois plus difficile en tuant les prédateurs naturels».

*Circle of Poison* met en lumière un autre effet boomerang des pesticides – insidieux celui-là – le «retour à l'expéditeur», si l'on peut dire, de résidus chimiques dangereux dans les produits alimentaires importés. Les autorités des E.U. ont découvert que 10% de ces produits était contaminés et contenaient des quantités illégales de pesticides, mais les méthodes analytiques employées ne permettent pas de vérifier les niveaux de résidus de 70% de près de 900 pesticides cancérigènes.

Le retour des pesticides peut d'ailleurs se faire par d'autres chemins. Par exemple, le transport atmosphérique de composés du DDT utilisés en dehors de l'Amérique du Nord continue de polluer les Grands Lacs, la plus grande étendue d'eau douce du monde, bien après que le DDT ait été proscrit aux Etats-Unis et au Canada.

\* *Circle of poison: Pesticides and People in a Hungry World*, par D. WEIR et M. SCHAPIRO; février 1981; Institute for Food and Development Policy, 2588 Mission St. San Francisco, Cal. 94110, U.S.A.



Si les gouvernements ont été longs à reconnaître les problèmes causés par l'utilisation massive des pesticides, ils l'ont été davantage encore à agir. Aux Etats-Unis, l'administration CARTER avait signé un décret créant un système plus rigoureux de notification des précautions à prendre et plaçant certaines substances particulièrement dangereuses sur une liste spéciale, mais le nouveau président l'a annulé au début de cette année.

C'est tout récemment que les pays membres de l'Organisation de coopération et de développement économique (OCDE) ont adopté des protocoles d'expérimentation des produits chimiques nouveaux et potentiellement toxiques et établi des directives assurant le sérieux des travaux de laboratoire, l'échange de renseignements confidentiels entre gouvernements et l'adoption de données minimales sur les nouveaux produits chimiques avant leur mise en marché. Le ministre canadien de l'Environnement, M. John ROBERTS, espère que la nouvelle approche de l'OCDE équivaudra à créer «un passeport chimique, en quelque sorte, préalable à l'exportation de ces substances d'un pays à un autre».

Réglementer l'usage des pesticides peut être un moyen de garder un contrôle sur des pratiques dangereuses, ou de tenter d'y parvenir. Interdire, ou tout au moins réduire sévèrement, l'emploi de ces substances pourrait être un moyen plus sûr et plus efficace. «Il faudra cependant beaucoup de temps avant que les pesticides puissent être remplacés, commente Roger BENJAMIN. Peut-être est-il impossible de les éliminer parce que, dans les cas d'urgence — quand vos cultures sont l'objet d'une attaque massive de ravageurs ou d'insectes porteurs de maladies — vous avez besoin d'une puissante arme chimique pour les détruire rapidement. Mais les produits chimiques, comme les armes elles-mêmes, peuvent se retourner contre leurs utilisateurs».

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## SUMMARY

*The major argument of this article is that the agricultural model propounded to the Third World countries had not been that successful when applied in the developed capitalist countries. In fact, that model even creates dangers for those Third World countries, among which these are the main ones:*

- *Dependency to foreign technology and capital,*
- *Risks on the environment.*

*The «psychosis» of the powers of the under-developed countries triggered by the fear of famine very often leads them to adopt one of these two lines of development without much reflection and critical analysis:*

- *To take for granted projects of «agrarian or rural development» launched by international and foreign institutions (public or private).*
- *To launch out agricultural development projects without first defining middle and long terms priorities.*

*In both cases, although the approach and results can be different, there is a constant: food self-sufficiency is not reached, and it is far from being reached (see the example of India).*

*But the author of this article prefers putting the emphasis of his study on the level of efficiency of the models propounded and their implications on the under-developed economies, taking as a starting-point the examples of the industrialised countries: technical effects, socio-political and economic consequences. The results are rather alarming: disappearance of traditional know-how and techniques, massive resort to chemical fertilizers, growing food dependency, decline of the active agricultural population, regrouping of exploitable land, proletarianization, rural exodus, bigger gap between the poorest social classes and the state power hence accrued violence from each fraction... etc... all this being of course «uneasily reversible».*

*The author goes on with an enumeration of the consequences of the adoption of that development model on the lifestyles and incomes of the concerned populations. With the help of statistics and short case studies, he analyses the prospects of these models to agricultural producers and concludes by posing: can't we consider the export of such a model of agricultural development from the developed capitalist countries towards the Third World countries just as a mere means of consolidating their grip on our economies and securing their profits?*

## CLASS, GENDER AND CAPITALIST TRANSFORMATION IN AFRICA

By

Janet M. BUJRA\*

Feminist theory has recently been accused (and with some justice) of being 'Eurocentric', of assuming, «that it is only through the development of a western-style industrial capitalism and the resultant entry of women into waged labour that the potential for the liberation of women can increase» (CARBY, 1983, p. 222). Certainly, it is true that many debates in modern feminism concern themselves with the dramatic transformations in women's lives which accompanied the emergence of capitalism in Western Europe. In this paper, I want to raise some issues about women and capitalist transformation in Africa, not with the intention of presenting capitalism as a means to women's liberation, but rather with the aim of showing that capitalism does not everywhere have the same effects for women.

A consideration of capitalist transformation inevitably raises the question of emerging class divisions and their implications for women. For capital, wherever it goes, requires exploitable labour power, to work machines, to pack goods, to file letters. This labour power has to be created and set to work. I want to look first, then, at the process of proletarianization in Africa, noting the limited extent to which women have been drawn into this process and why. In so far as women do become part of the wage labour force, I want to consider the extent to which their labour is differentiated from that of men – the forms in other words, in which capital specifically exploits female labour power.

In the process of proletarianization, labour is subordinated to capital. But capital does not always, or even usually, confront labour directly. This is especially the case in Africa where capitalist enterprise is dominated by foreign capital, and the indigenous capitalist class is small. Capital works through intermediaries, at the point of production or within state institutions, to ensure that labour is effectively controlled to produce profits. In Africa, as elsewhere, these intermediaries are generally male, so that when women workers begin to be aware of their common class interests, this does not oppose them directly to other women. This is not to say that women are not implicated in the political and ideological processes whereby labour is subordinated. In Tanzania, as BRYCESON and

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\* Lecturer, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, England. An earlier version of this paper was first presented to the British Sociological Association Annual Conference, Cardiff, 1983. I am grateful to those who offered constructive criticism of it there, also to Pat Caplan, Caroline Ramazanoglou, Annie Whitehead and Gavin Williams who made helpful comment. A variant of the paper is to be published in an American volume under the joint editorship of C. Robertson and I. Berger (forthcoming).

MBILINYI note (1978, p. 144): «Wives of men in government and parastatal posts [parastatals are economic enterprises run by the state], many who rose from the ranks of the peasantry, have new-found class interests...» I want to consider here what these class interests are and how they manifest themselves.

To discuss the implications for women of capitalist class formation is to consciously reject the simplistic notion, often found in the literature, of 'African women' as a homogeneous category. The condition of women in Africa has of course always been culturally diverse. My concern here, however, is with emergent class divisions between women consequent upon capitalist transformation. From this perspective, women cannot be thought of as a single category, even though there are important and occasionally unifying struggles in which they may engage. At the same time, women cannot be simply analysed 'as men': gender is almost invariably a relevant social category. The point is that gender differences find differential expression at different class levels – gender is qualified by the places which women occupy in newly emergent classes.

In what follows I am conscious of the dangers of appearing to generalise for Africa as a whole. It is evident that the processes of capitalist transformation at issue here are concretely manifested in a variety of national situations which require concrete investigation. In this paper, I put forward various hypotheses which gain some backing from available evidence, but they are intended as an agenda for research rather than as definitive statements.

Class is conceptualised here, not as occupational stratification or socio-economic differentiation, but as a set of historically determined relations forged in the sphere of production – relations which are essentially contradictory and potentially conflictual. This theoretical construction of class raises considerable difficulties, however, when applied to women. In studies of class in developed capitalist societies, women have often been invisible, or treated as members of a class only by extension: «the worker and his family». Class position, in other words, has usually been seen as deriving from the location of male heads of households in the ensemble of production relations. Feminist writings have questioned this view of the class system from two directions. On the one hand, they have pointed out ambiguities where husbands and wives are both employed but at different levels in the occupational hierarchy (see, e.g. OAKLEY, 1974, Ch. I, and discussion by GARNSEY, 1978). By 'class' however, such accounts have often meant no more than occupational status. Another view has focussed on the class relevance of the domestic labour usually performed by women in capitalist society. Whilst it has been suggested by some that domestic labourers occupy a distinctive (class) place in the structure of production (see e.g. Dalla COSTA and JAMES, 1972, p. 21), it is more frequently argued that women's experience of the class system (whether direct via their own employment, or indirect via the wage/income of the head of the household) is mediated by their location in the relations of reproduction in the home (see e.g. BARRETT, 1980, West 1978).

In Africa, where class differences are in the process of formation, and where capitalist enterprise coexists with non-capitalist forms of production, these ambiguities – both conceptual and real – are accentuated. One example is suggestive. REMY, describing the experience of a group of women in Zaria, Northern Nigeria, refers to them as «working class women» by virtue of their husbands' employment in the Nigerian Tobacco Company. Many of these women, however, were «active in Zaria's indigenous economy» as petty traders and craftswomen (1). Whilst often dependent on their husbands for the initial capital to buy stock or tools, a few were now economically independent (REMY, 1975, p. 361). This kind of combination, within a single household and with marked gender overtones, of persons with quite different (wage labour compared to petty commodity production and commerce) relations to the dominant form of production (capitalism) reappears again and again in Africa, as we shall see. The link between this pattern and women's role in the reproduction of labour power in Africa has hardly begun to be discussed.

### CLASS AND CAPITALIST PENETRATION IN AFRICA (2)

If capitalist penetration in Africa generates forms of women's oppression which are distinctively different from those which characterised the rise of capitalism in Europe and America, one reason for this is the limited nature of capitalist transformation in Africa.

African economies are not developed capitalist economies, even though capitalist relations of a sort have been established in certain strategic sectors. The introduction of sophisticated technologies, revolutionary methods of work organisation, and large-scale forms of enterprise hiring wage labour have not been accompanied by a general transformation of relations of production in society. Capitalist enterprise operates side by side with non-capitalist forms of production based on the household. Such non-capitalist forms are particularly likely to be found in the agricultural sector with peasant production persisting in most areas. The first concern of peasant cultivators is to secure their own subsistence, and they do this mainly by producing directly for use, but also by producing a surplus for the market to generate a cash income to satisfy additional subsistence requirements, and to pay taxes. Peasant agriculture relies first and foremost on family labour, though in certain areas differentiation amongst the peasantry has thrown up a category of kulaks, peasants whose scale of operations is large enough to require the hiring of labour. The other form of non-capitalist production which is still significant in African economies is the petty commodity production of non-agricultural goods and services. Artisans and purveyors of personal services scrape a living in urban areas alongside capitalist enterprises, and petty commodity production finds expression in extensive petty commerce.

In Africa, in other words, capitalism has implanted itself *without* the process of struggle which in Europe led to the effective dispossession of the means of production from the majority of the people – that struggle, in Africa, is only in its inception (3). Capitalist enterprise in Africa does

not represent a development out of indigenous forms of production and commerce, but is to be seen rather as one instance of the internationalisation of capital with its centres in Europe and America. The first phase in this process came with the intervention of European merchant capital later reinforced by colonial rule which entailed the more direct exploitation of a surplus from politically subordinated peoples. The post-colonial era has merely ended the monopoly of particular national capitals which characterised the colonial phase.

Capitalist enterprise in Africa today is still dominated by non-indigenous capital, whether in the form of foreign national or multinational private investment, or in the form of foreign aid or loans. One reason for the predominance of foreign capital is that most capitalist production is designed not, in the first place, to satisfy international demand, but to exploit African resources (raw materials and relatively cheap labour power) in such a way as to serve the expansion of capital in the imperialist centres. The home market in most African countries is in any case limited, this in itself being a reflection of the persistence of subsistence production. Whilst non-capitalist forms of production survive, they are put under sufficient political and economic pressure either to produce raw materials for capitalist production proper, or to offer up the labour to run such enterprises. Non-capitalist forms persist not only because they serve capital, but also because they are strongly defended by those who find in them alternative modes of survival which do not entail total subordination to capital. The significance of non-capitalist production as a form of resistance is particularly relevant to discussion of women.

All this means that in most African countries, there is only a very small indigenous capitalist bourgeoisie, and that proletarianization is of a limited and incomplete character. Workers are generally also members of peasant households. They rely on the land to feed and reproduce their families and they must return to the land in times of hardship, illness or old age. Capitalist relations of production counterpose this semi-proletariat against foreign rather than indigenous capital. The ruling classes of African social formations are not a capitalist bourgeoisie proper. They may be struggling to exert a more direct (though generally bureaucratic) control over the national economy, or they may be content to act as intermediaries for international capital. Such state or bureaucratic bourgeoisies have spawned an expanding category of bureaucratic functionaries whose rewards are many times greater than the incomes enjoyed by workers and peasants. Whilst they retain the security of salaried positions, they launch into entrepreneurial ventures 'on the side'. The success of such petty capitalist elements may create divisive tensions within the ruling class because they develop interests which are to a degree antithetical to those of foreign capital.

Capitalist penetration in Africa has, then, created class divisions which differ from those of developed capitalist countries precisely because the «pygmy property of the many» has not yet been transposed into... «the titan property of the few» (4). Capitalist production is parasitic on pre-capitalist forms which sustain and reproduce a labouring class as well as producing cheap raw materials for the use of capital.

## CLASS AND GENDER IN AFRICA

At what points does class formation in the underdeveloped capitalist economies of Africa intersect with gender? This is an area which needs a good deal more research, so any conclusions which I draw can only be tentative. I will argue here, however, that where proletarianization draws on *male* labour, it does not so much reconstitute women as privatised domestic labourers dependent on the male wage (often argued to be one of the effects of the rise of capitalism in the West) (5), but rather intensifies their activities in, and struggles over, petty commodity production and commerce. Where it is women themselves who are drawn into wage labour, it is thus not as part of a reserve army of labour 'hidden in the household' but more nearly on the same (miserable) terms as men. Secondly I shall argue that whilst foreign capital is often the carrier of cultural assumptions about appropriate work for women, the effects are sometimes unexpected. Finally I will suggest that women with petty bourgeois class interests are actively involved in redefining the role of women at lower class levels in ways which serve the interests of their class as much as their gender.

### (i) *WOMEN AND THE PROLETARIANIZATION OF MALE LABOUR*

It is now more than a decade since Ester BOSERUP commented that: «In Africa, the modern sector is virtually a male preserve» (1970, p. 190). Basing her conclusion on statistics gathered in the 1960s, she showed that women formed a very small proportion of the wage labour force in most African countries. Does this generalisation still hold true? Whilst overall statistics for Africa are not available (and even those statistics that are available are to be treated with extreme caution) (6) the following examples are suggestive (see table). In spite of rising levels of capitalist penetration in various parts of the continent, women's wage labour remains marginal. This pattern is the more marked when we consider manufacturing industry, the most dynamic sector of capitalist enterprise, where, with the exception of Tunisia and Swaziland, women's participation is in most cases less than ten per cent of the labour force in manufacturing. In this respect, Africa is to be contrasted not only with developed capitalist countries, but also with other parts of the Third World — particularly Asia and Latin America, where female labour power is increasingly sought out by local and international capital for its cheapness and assumed 'docility'.

In the most recent phase of global capitalist development, international companies have begun to establish what have become known as 'world market factories' in various parts of the Third World. Such factories produce goods, not for local consumption, but for export to the developed capitalist world — textiles, ready-made clothes, toys and electrical goods. Factories of this kind have been sited in countries all over Latin America and Asia, but to a much lesser extent in Africa. Tunisia, Swaziland, Mauritius and Morocco are, however, locations for such development (Tunisia being the most important in Africa in employment terms: FROBEL et al., 1980, Appendix).

TABLE I - African Women in wage labour

COUNTRY	Total: Economically Active Pop.*	% Women in Econ. Active Population	% Economically Active Pop. in Wage Labour	% Women amongst Wage Labourers	% of GDP in Manufacturing	% of Women amongst Employees in Manufacturing
Cameroon (1976)	2,757,899	40%	14.2%	9.8%	13% (1977)	6%
Mali (1976)	2,235,157	16.9%	4.1%	11.2%	11% (1977)	11.3%
Algeria (1977)	3,371,023	8.9%	47%	7.9%	11% (1977)	7.4%
Malawi (1977)	2,288,351	46%	17.7%	9.3%	12%	5.3%
Kenya (1979)	NA	NA	NA	16.9%	(1977)	
Gambia (1976)**	NA	NA	NA	9.4%	10% (1979) (all industry)	4%
Botswana (1979)	NA	NA	NA	22%	5% (all industry)	18%
Liberia (1979)	NA	NA	NA	31%	5% (all industry)	13.4%
Zimbabwe (1980)	NA	NA	NA	16.9%	17% (all industry)	7.2%
Tunisia (1975)	1,621,820	19.5%	53.6%	12.9%	11%	29%
Swaziland (1979)	258,511 (1976)	55%	NA	NA	9% (all industry)	23 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub> %

## NOTES:

Source of information for all except percentage of GDP in manufacturing: ILO *Year Book of Labour Statistics*, 1981, Tables 2A/2B, 3B, 5A.

For percentage of GDP in manufacturing: World Bank, *World Development Report*, 1979.

\* 'Economically active population' includes members of the armed forces, and the unemployed but excludes «housewives, students and economically inactive groups». Tends to underestimate female participation in labour force, see Benieria, 1981.



The major reason why foreign capital is interested in establishing such concerns is because it can thereby tap sources of cheap and compliant labour which will allow it to undercut its competitors operating from high-cost labour areas in Europe or America. In addition, the low price consumer goods which it generates help to keep down the wage costs of European and American labour. In world market factories women workers are employed in preference to men (70% of those employed are female: FROBEL et al., 1980, p. 344). This is because in many areas of the Third World women can be «forced to accept lower wages and a higher intensity of work than men» (*op. cit.*, p. 348). Such factories often capitalise on skills which women have already learnt in the domestic arena. This is true for Africa as well. In Morocco, for example, «in six weeks, girls (who may not be literate) are taught the assembly under magnification of memory planes for computers – this is virtually darning with copper wire, and sewing is a traditional Moroccan skill» (SHARPSTON, 1976, quoted in ELSON and PEARSON, 1981, p. 93).

In these terms the advantages of female labour seem self-evident, so we are left with the question as to why such 'development' has lagged behind in Africa. The answer suggests a more general understanding of why women's participation in the wage labour force in Africa is so low. There is nothing in fact *intrinsically* cheap (or docile or dextrous) about women's labour. It is cheap relative to men's labour only where it is readily available and politically weak, and where all or a part of its costs of reproduction are borne elsewhere – from the wages of other members of the family, generally husbands or fathers, or outside the capitalist sector altogether. FROBEL et al., note that the wages paid to workers in world market factories, «are often insufficient to cover the reproduction.. [and] the psychic recovery of workers exhausted by highly demanding work» (*op. cit.*, p. 353). High rates of labour turnover and the frequent relocation of industrial activity is one consequence of such low wages – exhausting the labour supply in a very real sense. Alternatively the reproduction of labour power can be assured by «the subsidising function of the rural sector» (353) whereby workers supplement their cash wages with food provided by peasant families. In Africa, however, the supply and cost of female labour power is determined to a large extent by the fact that it is women who perform this «subsidising function» for male labour. I shall argue here that this takes two forms, both entailing the intensification of women's labour in the non-capitalist sphere. The most significant of these is the pressure on women's labour in peasant agriculture, but a subsidiary form is found in women's activities in petty commodity production and commerce. The extension of capitalist relations of production has simultaneously reinforced and undermined these modes of survival adopted by women outside of capitalist production.

In most parts of Africa (the major exceptions being Muslim areas) capitalism confronted a pre-capitalist sexual division of labour in agricultural production for subsistence in which women played the major role (see BOSERUP, 1970, p. 16; also BUJRA, 1982, p.148–9). Any demand for *wage* labour thereby drew initially on male rather than female labour.

A symbiotic relationship was set up in some areas of Africa which became, in effect, labour reserves for capitalist or semi-capitalist production to draw on. Male labour was drawn off from the subsistence economy to work at low wages in urban areas, in mines or on plantations or settler farms. There was no question of a 'family wage' here, no question of capitalism absorbing the reproductive costs of the *class* of wage labourers. Wages were intended to cover only the day to day reproduction of labour power. Sicknes, unemployment, old age, the reproduction of the next generation of wage workers – all these burdens were borne by the rural subsistence sector. What this meant was that women's labour in agriculture and in domestic tasks – as well as the labour of children and less active men – effectively lowered the value of men's labour power in the capitalist sphere (DEERE, 1976). Examples of this pattern of male labour migration are found all over Africa, with particularly extreme examples in Southern Africa (See GREGORY and PICHE, 1982, pp. 27–30). Nearly forty per cent of the working-age male population of Lesotho, for example, are at any one time away working in South Africa. Their wives and families remain behind as subsistence farmers, on land whose fertility is declining year by year (MUELLER, 1977, pp. 157–8).

Thus, whereas in Europe capitalism drew its labour force from families already forcibly separated from land as a means of subsistence, and in the earlier years drew indiscriminately on the labour of men, women and children, in many parts of Africa capital confronted individual male wage labourers physically separated from their families. What effect has this had on the lives of women? Even though women had always played the major role in agricultural production, the departure of males has inevitably intensified their burden of work, without in most cases enlarging their freedom of manoeuvre to take decisions. Where cash remittances from absent males are minimal or irregular, they must generate cash incomes themselves, in addition to shouldering the major burden of cultivation. Unlike men, they turn in the first instance to petty commodity production or petty commerce to generate such income, precisely because such activities can the more easily be combined with responsibility for young children. Where this income too is inadequate, they may turn to casual labour on neighbouring farms. An example from Kenya illustrates this process. A study carried out by MONSTED in the Kakamega area of Kenya showed that 36 % of households were headed by women – women who were managing, as best they could, to support their families in the absence of husbands. Women here found themselves not only growing food crops but also harvesting the cash crop – tea. This is unusual, since in much of Africa it is men who grow crops for the market. Even in Kakamega, women had no rights over the income from selling tea from bushes planted by their husbands – they were expected to hand over the proceeds. A woman whose husband was away working might expect to receive twenty to twenty-five per cent of his wage in the form of remittances, but this was rarely enough to cover expenses such as school fees, taxes and so on. Hence women were forced to sell part of their precious food stocks, or illegally brew beer for sale. In the last resort they would hire themselves out as casual labourers to better-off farmers (MONSTED, 1976).

In Lesotho women sell fruit and vegetables from their gardens, rear pigs and chickens to sell, brew beer and produce handicrafts for the market, all to supplement their basic food supplies from cultivation with cash to buy extra sorghum and maize (MUELLER, 1977, p. 157-161). Lug women in Kenya have adapted to a striking absence of men by growing crops for the market as well as food for eating, making ropes, pots, pipes or mats for sale and by becoming actively involved in trading activities (HAY, 1976, p. 108).

The process whereby men become wage labourers leads therefore to the intensification of women's work in subsistence production, but women are also drawn into production for the market. Women's labour in production and in domestic tasks such as child care and cooking is vital to the process whereby a class of (male) wage labourers is reproduced over time. When GREGORY and PICHE refer to labour migration as «the proletarianization of African rural masses: they sell their labour to those who have capital, agricultural land, and mineral exploitation rights» (1982, p. 19), it is as well to remember that this process of class transformation involves men rather than women, individuals rather than families, whilst at the same time it depends on the intensification of female labour power expended in non-capitalist forms of production. Women are forced to work harder by virtue of the absence of men; conversely this non-capitalist sector continually reconstitutes a reserve army of labour for capital.

There are areas in Africa where men rather than women play the major role in agriculture, or where urban living excludes agriculture as a mode of life. In such areas craft production and petty commerce have always been at the centre of women's contribution to the subsistence of their families. An example will indicate the extent to which, here too, women's labour may come to subsidise the commoditization of male labour power. In central Accra, a cooperative division of labour used to operate between husbands and wives, with men farming and fishing, and women processing and selling the products. As urbanization progressed, men were forced out of farming and fishing and into self employment as artisans, or increasingly into wage labour. Women continued to be traders but the productive mutuality of the family was eroded. ROBERTSON (1976, p. 131) found that as a result of low pay and unemployment, «husbands are increasingly tending not to fulfil their support obligations», and «the burden of educating [as well as feeding and clothing] children has fallen heavily on the women». This is in spite of the fact that women's income from trade was «only enough to get by». This pattern led one woman to insist that since: «My children were educated through the sweat of my brow, the children are my assets» (ibid, p. 128). Part of the value of this asset is however transferred to the capitalist sector or its administrative infrastructure, as educated or willing labour power available for employment.

In petty commodity production and commerce then, as well as in subsistence cultivation, women's labour underwrites the reproduction of labour power for capitalist enterprises. On the other hand the extension of capitalist relations of production has in various ways eroded the viability of these modes of ensuring familial reproduction. REMY noted that

because the women in her study were the wives of migrant workers, they were cut off from the wider network of kin – and especially other women – whose cooperation made trading and craft work practicable. Young women learnt craft skills from older women in the household (1975, p.364). ROBERTSON points out that cooperation amongst female kin in a single compound in Accra was declining due to the education of young women and their entry into paid employment. The expansion of manufacturing may threaten the market for the craftswoman's products – in Zaria «the demand for factory-produced printed cotton cloth has drastically reduced the market for the cloth woven by Hausa women» (REMY, *op. cit.*, p.365). In commerce, as women's operations tend to be localised, and limited in their scope for capital accumulation, the more profitable ventures of wholesale trade and importation agencies are monopolised by large-scale capital (PINE, 1982, p.,398–9). Although petty commerce and craft production in Africa is by no means limited to women, in many areas it is women that are primarily involved, so that the dissolving influences of large-scale capital have a gender significance.

The same influences can be seen at work in subsistence agriculture. In areas where the colonial pattern of male migration continues to be the norm, there is considerable pressure on family life. The effects of this are worst in Southern Africa (MURRAY, 1982) where, in labour reserve areas family survival depends vitally on both the income from wage labour and on subsistence production. This perhaps explains a contrast noted by KIMBLE and UNTERHALTER: «Whereas women in the West have identified the family as a site of women's oppression, women in South Africa point to the destruction of 'normal family life' as one of the most grievous crimes of apartheid» (1982, p.13). There is evidence from elsewhere in Africa, however where these coercive forms of labour control do not apply, to suggest that given other alternatives, women will not endure such a familial division of labour for ever. OBBO describes how «Luo men [who] have been in Kampala for twenty years or more... only visited the villages when there was a marriage, death or major illness in the family. The responsibility of maintaining the rural base fell heavily upon the shoulders of women» (1980, p. 84). Husbands did not send money home; instead their wives went to town to claim it, fitting in their trips between work on the farm. OBBO reports that women in this situation became restless, «asserting that there was 'no free labour, even in the villages'». Rwandan women in similar circumstances were beginning to insist on accompanying their husbands to Kampala (*op. cit.*, p. 72).

There are other processes at work which simultaneously reinforce and undermine the rural subsidy which women contribute to male wage labour. In the agricultural sector, the hiring out of their labour by some women in response to inadequate remittances from absent husbands may mean the hiring in of labour by other women. KITCHING (1980, p. 106, 241, 338) has shown how in Kenya the labour migration of men can feed into the process of increasing social differentiation amongst peasant producers, and how this is manifested in women's labour. Where men are able to obtain high income jobs, they can send home money to purchase extra land

and to employ labour to work the expanded farm, thus leading to an increase in income from the sale of cash crops. On such farms, the migrant's wife is able to reduce her own labour input in cultivation and to concentrate on the management of the farm or on petty entrepreneurial activities. Conversely, where the male migrant is in low-paid employment, his wife is left to cultivate the farm alone and is unable to purchase extra land or to hire labour. On the smallest plots, she must concentrate all her energies on subsistence with no margin for sale, and therefore no cash income. Such women are often forced into part-time agricultural labour for others.

These then are the beginnings of women's wage labour, and they coincide with the emergence of capitalist relations of production out of what had previously been relatively egalitarian societies. «At a certain point, the voluntary and mutual help on the farm from neighbours, relatives or beer parties is subtly transposed into the hiring of casual labour» (CLIFFE, 1982, p. 263).

### *(ii) THE COMMODITIZATION OF FEMALE LABOUR POWER*

We do not know enough about the forces which propel women out of subsistence and into full-time wage labour. Under colonial rule, a wage labour force for plantations and settler farms was coerced into existence by exerting various forms of pressure on the subsistence sector to yield up surplus labour. In most cases, such enterprises drew on male migrant labour in the same way as did industrial establishments in the towns. But they also built up a resident 'tied' work force of families bonded to the farmer by their lack of land and dependent on him for housing. This form of bonded labour persists in some areas, though in its most extreme form in South Africa. In Zimbabwe, in 1980, a young woman described her life on a white-owned farm, where she worked a nine-hour day processing tobacco, in return for one room and a small wage (unlike male workers on the farm she received no 'rations' to supplement her wages): «...we are forced to work on the farm. If you refuse to work... the farmer sends you away from his farm. I cannot think of anywhere else I could go if I were driven away, so I must work on the farm. The farmer keeps records of all the people on his farm. He expects service from everybody...» (Zimbabwe Women's Bureau, nd., p. 23).

In post colonial Africa, capitalist relations in agriculture are being extended partly by indigenous enterprise, partly by the establishment of foreign-owned plantations. In some cases, women form a sizeable proportion of the work force. In Malawi for example, wage labour in agriculture is the largest single form of employment for women (29% of female workers: ILO, 1981). Whilst we know little about these processes whereby women become part of a rural proletariat, it is evident that they do not join the wage labour force on the same terms as men. It is women who face the problems inherent in combining domestic responsibilities with wage labour. In West Africa, women traders have for generations managed by way of mutual help amongst female relatives, and by carrying young children with them. The same kind of social arrangements have allowed women to

cultivate distant fields and to gather wild foods far away from home. MACKINTOSH (1979) describes how, in Senegal, the entry of women into wage work on plantations tested these time-honoured strategies to the limit. This example also illustrates the way in which capitalist transformation propels some women into wage labour, others into petty commodity production.

When, in 1973, foreign owned plantations were established in the area MACKINTOSH studied, women were drawn into the work force in almost the same numbers as men, but not on the same terms. Women «added their plantation work to their non-agricultural tasks which they undertake all the year round, thereby stretching their physical endurance almost to breaking point» (op. cit., p. 49). Women's performance as wage labourers is undermined by prior responsibilities in the domestic sphere, to the extent that they present themselves as a casual rather than a permanent work force, and are usually paid less. Women's domestic labour here consists not only in bearing and caring for children, but also spending hours every day fetching fuel and water, pounding millet and preparing food without benefit of labour-saving devices. The women best able to enter into paid labour are those who have daughters old enough to take care of younger children in their absence at the plantation. Otherwise they call on the help of elderly female relatives or neighbours. The process of proletarianization for women is thus dependent on the organisation of *other* unpaid female labour to shoulder domestic burdens. MACKINTOSH also describes how in more commercialised rural areas, certain tasks of food production and processing are becoming commoditized. Some women in need of cash become petty commodity producers of domestic products, whilst others purchase these commodities in order to 'buy time' to perform wage labour.

Women's entry into wage labour on farms, plantations, and food processing factories sited in rural areas, would seem to be motivated by the need to supplement *family* income. The exploitation of a supply of labour which has a pre-existing, if inadequate, source of income/subsistence, as well as domestic commitments, would seem to allow (as in the Senegalese example) for women's labour to be drawn on as a reserve of casual *cheap* labour. In Kenya, the Brooke Bond Liebig Tea Factory and Plantations at Kericho, amongst other companies quoted by FELDMAN (1981, p. 44), exploited female labour, but mostly on a casual or temporary basis: «the company's assumption was that women only worked on the plantation as wives of male employees who were the ones who were 'seriously' involved in employment. Nevertheless they conceded that some women came to work independently from neighbouring reserves, and did not live in the camps».

In these circumstances the cheapness of women's labour relative to men's would seem to depend partly on the degree to which whole families have become proletarianised (i.e. lost their precarious hold on land for subsistence). Where they retain this hold, then the cost of women's labour appears to relate to the sexual division of labour in agriculture. Evidence from Nigeria (WILLIAMS, nd., p. 26-27) seems to suggest that rural wage

levels for women are higher in the south eastern Igbo areas where women's labour is central to agricultural production, than in the north and west where women play a less important role in cultivation.

One might expect that in urban areas too, women would be drawn into wage labour as participants in a process of *familial* class transformation. But judging from existing studies, there are two features of women's lives in town that deserve emphasis. The first is that most women in towns get by in the same way as they get by in rural areas – in other words by generating incomes *outside* the sector where capitalist relations of production predominate. The second feature is that where women are found in wage labour they are more likely to be single than married, whether young women not yet married, or older women who are divorced, widowed or separated. Why should this be so?

If single women are found in town it is because they have put themselves outside the systems of familial reproduction we have been considering so far. When women migrate independently to town it is often because divorce or widowhood has disturbed a woman's rights to land (BRYCESON, and MBILINYI, 1978, p. 41; OBBO, 1980, p. 77; BUJRA, 1982, p. 126). Women who come to town with husbands may find themselves deserted. Such women are more likely to turn to petty commodity production than to wage work. This is not only because employers, accustomed to employing men, offer few opportunities. It is also because women actively choose to engage in work which will not stretch them beyond endurance, and which will allow them to combine domestic responsibilities with earning a cash income. Such petty commodity production often means capitalising on domestic skills in cooking, beer brewing or caring for children. It can also mean prostitution or petty commerce. In setting such skills to economic use women often serve the men who come to town as single migrants, cut off from the domestic labour they have taken for granted as part of family life in rural areas. Whilst these ways of making a living appear to be independent of capitalist relations of production they in fact constitute important ancillary services which assist in the process by which male wage labour in urban areas is cheaply reproduced.

Why do more women not find work as wage workers in the so-called 'formal' sector? One reason seems to be that the rewards from petty commodity production are often commensurate with wage work, at least for women who have nothing to offer but unskilled labour power. Conversely, wage work is difficult to combine with domestic responsibilities, which perhaps explains the preponderance of single women in such jobs. What BRYCESON and MBILINYI term 'husbandless women' are not, however, necessarily childless, and consequently they face the problem of combining the care of children with work. In Dar-es-Salaam, BRYCESON and MBILINYI found that women were resorting to various expedients to resolve this problem – reliance on relatives, and in some cases the employment of other women. «Thirty per cent of women workers hired an ayah [nursemaid]. Wages... ranged between Sh. 40 and Sh. 75 a month, a considerable amount of money for women themselves receiving only minimum wages of barely over Sh. 300» (1978, p. 45). Two points can be drawn out of this – responsibility for child care seems always to be seen as residing with women, so that men would not have to consider such costs in

out of this – responsibility for child care seems always to be seen as residing with women, so that men would not have to consider such costs in consuming their wage. Secondly, built into the wage labour of some women in capitalist production, there is entailed the wage labour of other women (paid even more miserably) in the 'unproductive' sphere. Women's wage work brings in its train a degree of commoditization of domestic labour.

A good deal more research is required into the wages and conditions of women wage workers in industry and infrastructural occupations in Africa. In particular it may be that women's labour power is here exploited more on a par with that of men, so that the gap between male and female average earnings may not be so great as it is in developed capitalist economies. One example of this is that in Kenya in 1977, women's average earnings were 89.8% of male average earnings and even unskilled women workers were earning 78% of male wages (FELDMAN, *op. cit.*, p. 39; compare U.K., 1980, where women's earnings average only 65% of men's: WEBB, 1982, p. 124).

Given the generally low level of male manual wages (predicated upon the maintenance of the single worker, and the 'subsidising function' of the rural sector) it would seem that women's wages could not be markedly lower. Where women's labour (as single persons and often with dependents) is not merely a supplement to male wages, and where women have alternative modes of economic survival, then wage rates for women cannot fall much below those for men. From the point of view of employers, even where women present themselves as potential wage workers there may be no marked cost advantage in employing them in preference to men.

### (iii) *SEXUAL STEREOTYPING IN WOMEN'S WAGE WORK*

I want to look next at the minority of women who are employed in industrial and infrastructural occupations. To what extent has capital reproduced in Africa forms of occupational stratification whose gender over-tones are familiar to us from developed capitalist society? The pattern which has developed in Europe and America is for female workers to be clustered together in certain occupational categories, characterised either by the lowest levels of skill and reward, or location in the routine white-collar sector of the economy. They are far less likely to be found amongst skilled manual workers or top professionals or in the higher reaches of management. And certain jobs – nursing, secretarial work, shop and 'domestic' work are heavily sex-stereotyped as 'women's work'.

Not surprisingly, this same occupational gender distribution reappears, with minor exceptions, in Africa; not because it is a 'natural' or obvious way for dividing up the work force, but because foreign employers carry their stereotypes with them. In the colonial period in Tanzania, an official statement declared that, «it is contrary to native custom and to general practice for native women to be employed at all, except in the transformation of domestic necessities and in employment in agricultural pursuits on tribal or on individual native lands... The native woman at her



present stage of mental development is totally unsuitable for partaking in any industrial undertaking involving mechanical knowledge...» (c. 1930, quoted in BRYCESON and MBILINYI, 1979, p. 17). Whilst this statement calls on 'native custom' for its ideological backing, it is clear that other ideologies defining women's place are lurking in the background – for most 'native men' would have been equally unfamiliar with mechanics at this period.

These attitudes persist in present-day Tanzania, so that factory managers «generally viewed women workers as incapable of handling machinery of any complexity» (BRYCESON and MBILINYI, 1978, p. 38). In Tanzania it is men whose labour is called upon to effect the shift from production by hand to production by machinery. In the late sixties and early seventies a match factory and a coffee curing factory were automated, with women losing their jobs to men. In general, labour intensive operations in industry are designated as 'unskilled', and are seen as the most suitable work for women. The ideological rather than objective construction of the concept 'skill' is evident here – compare the usual association in Europe of production by hand as the preserve of 'skilled *craftsmen*'; machine minding as merely a semi-skilled occupation, appropriate in many cases for women. In Kenya too, female manual workers are disproportionately employed on the most tedious and unmechanised operations, offered few opportunities to learn 'skills' and rarely taken on as supervisory staff. FELDMAN (1981) quotes a company executive at Kenya Cashew Nuts Co. explaining why women are employed on routine labour intensive work: «They are more careful and do the job quicker than men». When asked why there were so few women in more responsible positions the reply was that, «probably women don't have the qualifications. One has to show initiative for these positions» (*op. cit.*, p. 45).

Such attitudes are not limited to foreign companies. DENNIS (1982), describing a locally-owned textile factory in Nigeria (Odu'atex) which was established in an area with a tradition of making handwoven cloth in which both men and women were engaged, argues that its management, «have set aside an essentially repetitive low-paid job (sorting out the thread for the looms) with little prospect of promotion, as the 'women's work' of the factory. This is based on their stereotypes of women workers, and tends to reinforce those stereotypes... it is the kind of work which does not demand much concentration» (*op. cit.*, p. 7).

If these stereotypes of female manual work are common in Europe, there are other patterns which are not. Given the relative paucity of women in towns offering themselves for wage work, it was common in the colonial period for men to be employed as domestic servants (Kenya was a good example of this practice, though in South Africa domestic work seems always to have been 'women's work'; see BOSERUP, 1970, p. 102). Although women are now increasingly taking on this work, male domestic servants are found all over Africa (a vivid sense of this comes over in Ferdinand OYONO's novel, *Houseboy*).

Sexual stereotyping is more evident in jobs higher in the occupational hierarchy. This is indicated in the following table for Kenya where the proportion of female workers in each occupational category is set out.

Female Wage Workers in Kenya: 1978

Occupation	Females as percentage of workers in each category	Number
Medical Professions	44.3	940
Teachers	33.5	34,116
Other Professions	9.1	710
Managerial	5.9	1,808
Secretarial	90.4	11,347
Clerical, book-keeping etc.	11.7	7,515
Sales personnel	13.9	1,051
Skilled Workers	5.4	4,716
Unskilled workers (including agriculture)	13.4	58,742

Source: adapted from *Feldman, 1981, p. 38.*

It can be seen from this table that the vast majority of secretarial staff were female, and women constituted almost half of all medical functionaries and a third of all teachers. It is worth noting, however, that women form only a small proportion of clerical and sales staff – occupations which in the west are dominated by women. Clearly more research is required to uncover the reasons for this uneven application of Eurocentric stereotypes. It makes 'sense', in regard to medical personnel – where women are predominantly employed in nursing – to concur with SCHUSTER's view of similar patterns in Zambia: «in the post-independence era indigenous women become 'natural' recruits to systems in which colonial or other expatriate women were employed» (1981, p. 77). Similar reasoning might be applied to education, were it not that in the colonial period in most African countries, teachers were overwhelmingly male. In Senegal (and in Kenya too) the vast expansion in educational provision after independence led to a dire shortage of staff. Men with the requisite educational qualifications were now easily able to achieve more prestigious and better-paid occupations in government and administration, so female labour had to be drawn upon. In BARTHEL's study women often became teachers «because their parents had signed a statement on their daughter's entrance to school, committing her to the teaching profession for at least ten years following graduation» (1975, p. 8). But why is it that women predominate in secretarial work, men in clerical work?

In all African countries the first to be educated were boys, and clerical work for colonial officials was much sought after by young educated men. Women have not yet been able to break this male monopoly even after independence. Sales assistants, similarly, were originally male clerks of a kind. Secretarial work, however, is an occupation which has

expanded dramatically since Independence (7). It is a job where clerical skills come second and a certain sort of femininity is at a premium. In Senegal, secretarial work is regarded as a 'glamorous' job (BARTHEL) and in Kenya at least, it is more highly paid than male-dominated clerical jobs. Nairobi is full of 'commercial' colleges, catering overwhelmingly to female students. In the short term 'secretarial skills' are scarce, for in addition to good looks and typing qualifications, young women must know how to dress fashionably (usually in Western style), and to speak well (usually in the ex-colonial language). Becoming a secretary then, entails definitive cultural resocialisation, not simply in the skills of the job, but also in terms of *what it is to be a woman*. Such women are forced to create a model of womanhood which has no precedents in African society, but which is often culled from imported films and magazines. Carmel DINAN has argued that in Ghana, women with white-collar and professional jobs enjoy a freedom to forge new life styles, often actively choosing to remain single whilst enjoying boyfriends and an active sex and social life, restricting their relations with kin so as to cut down on onerous obligations, and thereby asserting a measure of independence unknown for women in traditional society. There are thus contradictions in these new roles for women. On the one hand they allow women more autonomy of action; on the other hand this autonomy is often cast in a narrowly individualistic mould militating against solidarity with other women.

Patterns of occupational distribution by gender in Africa thus expose in various ways the *unnaturalness* of stereotypes commonly imposed on women in Europe. On the one hand men are here found doing work which in Europe is thought of as 'women's work' (clerical and shop work, domestic service). On the other hand, where women are in occupations which in Europe are thought of as 'naturally' female, they are not in practice building on existing cultural stereotypes of women, but creating *new ones*.

The perpetuation, in many areas of Africa, of colonial salary scales based originally on racial privilege, has meant that inequalities of reward between workers at various levels in the occupation hierarchy are more marked than in developed capitalist societies. These patterns of inequality have been reinforced in the post colonial period by a general shortage of personnel with even minimal educational qualifications – and especially women. Hence skills such as nursing and typing are in short supply, so that even whilst the work itself may be routinised, the rewards are not. Thus in Kenya in 1976, whereas the average monthly wage of an unskilled female worker in the private sector was Sh. 304, the average wage of a secretary was almost *five times* as high (Sh. 1494), the wage of a teacher more than *three times* as high (sh. 1067), and the salary of female medical professionals averaged out at nearly *seven times* the unskilled wage (see FELDMAN, *op. cit.*, p. 40).

Differences in occupational status do not constitute class differences. Most of the privileged white-collar 'mental labourers' we have considered so far are engaged in reproducing the conditions – ideological and organisational – within which capitalist production may be profitable.

On the whole they do not exercise authority over other workers, or in other ways share in the control and surveillance of subordinated labour (CARCHEDI, 1975). Where income differentials are so marked however, and particularly where, as in Africa, the process of producing this 'superior' labour power entails such sweeping cultural resocialisation, there are very real effects at the level of subjective awareness which divide women one from another. As one Senegalese female social worker put it: «in so far as the women is educated and thinks herself superior, she becomes separated from her true self and from her Senegalese sisters». And indeed, a patronising attitude is often taken towards the poor. As a secretary said: «The women in the bush don't have the same problems [as we do]. In the bush the peasants are not forced to imitate fashion... The women of Dakar are obliged to follow present styles... Women in the bush are content with what they have. There the only problem is to grind the millet and make *couscous*» (quoted in BARTHEL, *op. cit.*, p. 12 and p. 13). Writing of political initiatives to 'emancipate women' in Mozambique after Independence, ISAACSON reported that: «Among the small number of women who had gained relatively prestigious jobs as civil servants, bank clerks, and secretaries, most opposed any alliance with illiterate peasants whom they considered to be distinctly inferior» (1982, p. 63). Such contemptuous attitudes may well be reciprocated. One woman, describing her move from a slum area to a 'middle class' housing estate in Nairobi expressed this feeling forcibly. There, «we used to help each other with things – salt, a cup of sugar and so on. But these *makarani* [literally 'clerks' – she meant educated men and women] here would give you nothing» (quoted BUJRA, 1973, p. 104).

#### (iv) CLASS PRIVILEGE AND THE CONTROL OF WOMEN

Here and there one finds women who are themselves members of the state ruling class, the occasional Minister in charge of social welfare or education (8). One also finds, though even more rarely perhaps, women who are themselves employers of labour in capitalist concerns. More commonly, though, when we talk of women with petty bourgeois class interests, we are speaking of women in social categories whose position is closely tied up with the fortunes of the ruling class – especially professional and commercial elements, and, equally significantly, the wives of men in these privileged strata.

In Africa, petty bourgeois wives seem rarely to be immersed in domestic concerns. To begin with, they almost universally employ domestic servants to carry out all the 'dirty work' of the household, and to nurse and tend young children. Such servants, who are amongst the worst-paid of workers, are today often women. To some extent this devolution of responsibility allows petty bourgeois wives more leisure to act as ornaments to their husbands' success: to engage in what Papanek has called 'family status production' (1979, p. 775). More often, though, such women utilise paid domestic help in order to free themselves to work in high income white-collar or professional jobs or to engage in petty entrepreneurial activities – trade, shopkeeping, the running of bars and so on. When

Ghanaian migrant workers were recently expelled en masse from Nigeria, some of the loudest complaints came from petty bourgeois women: «thousands of Nigerian women were only able to take up jobs because they could rely on their alien [i.e. Ghanaian, and in this case mostly male] house helps – often paid a meagre wage with most of the payment going to the middleman who imported them – to look after their young children and do other household chores», reported Esther OGUNMODEDE in *New African*. «The *Daily Times* ran a front page report claiming that, 'MP's wives still keep illegal aliens'. These women told the *Daily Times* that their house helps were 'indispensable', and that 'the government should have considered the hardship to millions [sic] of Nigerian women» (April, 1983).

During national liberation struggles in Africa it was petty bourgeois elements who articulated the grievances of colonised people as a whole. In the course of struggle, emerging class differences between African women were submerged in a common opposition to colonial domination. Some women became consciously aware of this process through their own experience of active involvement in the struggle. One Zimbabwean woman recalled that: «When you get to a [guerilla training] camp, everyone becomes the same... whatever the class one considered oneself to be before... they become the same» (Zimbabwe Women's Bureau, p. 13). This woman had enjoyed a good education and secretarial training abroad. But in most African countries such women were not actively involved in the liberation struggle, and their 'natural' assumption of leadership roles relative to other women after Independence is a function of their, or their husbands', superior place in society.

In the post colonial era national women's organisations have been set up in many African countries, purporting to speak for the interests of all women. To what extent do such organisations transcend the differences between rural peasant women, urban women in wage work or petty commodity production and petty bourgeois elements? What role do such organisations play in class terms?

The Kenyan women's association (Maendeleo ya Wanawake) studied by Audrey WIPPER (1975), is typical of many. On the surface it appears to be an organisation promoting 'women's role in development', and it has branches throughout the country, in both rural and urban areas. In practice, as WIPPER shows, its leadership is composed of women, «from the developing middle class – professional, commercial and civil service sectors» (*op. cit.*, p. 104), often related by marriage or kinship to influential members of the government. Such women organise fashion shows and craft and cookery exhibitions; they travel abroad, attend receptions and dispense charity. They are increasingly cut off from the rank and file membership amongst rural women, whom they address in contemptuous and anti-feminist tone. This is very evident in the following newspaper report of a Maendeleo leader's speech: «no husband would like a dirty and lazy wife not prepared to contribute to the betterment of the home [she said]. Urging women to redouble their efforts in building Kenya, she said while women in other countries helped to develop their countries, it was shameful to note that in Kenya there were still women who preferred to gossip instead of doing something useful» (quoted, *op. cit.*, p. 110).

Such views (applauded by government ministers – male) expose the true class purpose of this association, which is to press poor women to work harder and longer in order that they, the petty bourgeoisie, might live better. This intention is sometimes disguised by the philanthropic activities and ideology of concern for the poor—which characterises this organisation. 'Philanthropy' here involved well-publicised donations to Presidentially – sponsored charities (e.g. a hospital in the late President KENYATTA's home area) – it did not extend to effective or generous financing of activities to help women in its rural branches. Charity, as has been noted before (CAPLAN, 1978) is often but a means to keep the poor in their place, and to emphasize the social distance between them and the better-off. These associations thus play a role of social control or behalf of this class as a whole – they do almost nothing to transform the position of the majority of women.

Another example is provided by the Gambian Women's Federation which I investigated briefly in 1976. It was composed of several organisations, the most important of which were ex-pupils' associations of girls' secondary schools situated in the capital. Its representativeness is thus in doubt in a country where only 27% of the population of five to fourteen-year olds attended school, and where the proportion of girls was almost certainly much lower. In a country ninety per cent Muslim, its officers were, in 1976, one hundred per cent Christian. An interview with the President pinpointed the major concerns of the association. They were with charity work, reforming *Muslim* marriage law, finding employment for educated girls and preventing female juvenile delinquency (a euphemism for prostitution).

In Tanzania, the national women's organisation was again engaged in many activities designed to curb and control women and to remind them of their 'domestic duties'. It organised classes in sewing, knitting and cooking, and backed up the government's drive against 'provocative women's dress (mini-skirts, wigs, make-up). MBILINYI (1982, p. 9) argues that: «Underlying that campaign was an extreme reaction against the growing number of young, unmarried working women in towns who engaged in liberal sexual practices and were no longer under paternal control» The association also initiated petty entrepreneurial enterprise in the form of cooperatives, from which, however, most of the members were excluded in view of the fees charged for entry. MBILINYI's general characterisation of this association is an indictment of its class and political role. Whereas it presents itself, «as an organisation to unite all women, regardless of different class or other interests [it] is accountable to the party and functions to organise women in support of the party and the government. The possible conflict between this goal and that of women's liberation is obvious. Thus far, its political practices... speak the message: 'women, work harder and behave yourselves'» (*op. cit.*, p. 8).

The existence of *women's* organisations in Africa is not, in other words, unthinkingly to be equated with the existence of any specifically *feminist* consciousness, or any desire to transform the class or economic structures of post-colonial society. Women's liberation is *disruptive* in its

challenge of male prerogatives; organisations such as these reinforce the status quo. They serve petty bourgeois class interests more than they serve women. To dismiss them out of hand because of this would be short-sighted however. For despite their primary significance as institutions of class control (9), such organisations, in bringing women into communication with each other, can provide arenas of struggle within which women who are poor and subordinated can speak out and exert pressure on those who enjoy the rewards of post-colonial society.

## CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have shown that capitalist transformation in Africa has had only a limited effect in drawing women into wage labour. Rather than relegating them to an 'unproductive' and privatised sphere of domestic labour it has indirectly channeled their energies into petty commodity production and petty commerce. In the short run this is in line with women's interests, even whilst it also serves capital's needs (for cheap agricultural commodities, for cheap consumption goods for male wage worker, for new generations of cheap male labour power, and for the circulation of commodities produced in the capitalist sector). In the longer run, the fact that women have not been exploited by capital to the same degree as men, has limited their struggles to localised outbursts in defence of precapitalist forms of organization of production (10). In Nigeria the Igbo 'women's war' of 1929 followed rumours that women were to be taxed and seems to have been led by market women (Van ALLEN, 1976; also BUJRA, 1978, p. 36). In South Africa in 1959 women protested against a ban on African beer brewing at a shanty settlement in Durban: «2000 women gathered to tell their grievances to a local official; and the police... charged the women with batons, striking the women to the ground, often hitting the babies tied to their backs» (BERNSTEIN, 1975, p. 48). In Nairobi in 1969 prostitutes protested against attempts to 'repatriate' them to rural areas as vagrants (BUJRA, 1982b, p. 159–161). Such struggles are not to be explained away as merely the persistence of precapitalist relations of production (see CARBY's strictures, 1982, p. 227). They represent rather the struggles of women to survive and to retain control over the conditions of their production and reproduction at a time when the encroachment of capitalist relations threatens all such petty production, whether it be in peasant farming or in artisan activities. The success of such struggles depends on women's base in the community.

Levels of unionisation amongst women wage workers in Africa cannot be ascertained, but they often work in occupations which are not unionised. In South Africa for example (even though it is the most heavily industrialised of all African countries) the majority of women workers are domestic servants or agricultural labourers, and neither of these categories of workers is unionised. «Because of their comparatively small numbers in industry, black women in general lack the experience in work-solidarity relationships that have often provided a training ground for male political leaders. Domestic servants cannot join together to ask for high wages or

better conditions; each has, individually, to deal with an individual employer » (BERNSTEIN, *op. cit.*, p. 43). A female trade unionist in Zimbabwe (a worker in the textile industry) complained that: «Women are reluctant to go on strike because of fear of losing their jobs. They may be the sole breadwinners of their families with many children to support. Since jobs are scarce for women, it is lucky few who get them and so they must keep them at all costs» (Zimbabwe Women's Bureau, nd., p. 28).

The relative paucity of women in wage work, and the localization of women's struggles over petty commodity production has left the mass of women vulnerable to exploitation by petty bourgeois elements, amongst whom are other women eager to promote and preserve class privileges. But perhaps one of the most paradoxical features of class formation as it affects women in Africa is that two contradictory processes seem to be taking place. As the extension of capitalist relations of production renders non-capitalist forms less viable women are drawn into processes of capitalist class formation as members of *families* – some families which are partially proletarianised by male migrant labour or fully proletarianised by the loss of land, others which are establishing themselves as petty bourgeois. But as labour power becomes a commodity, women too become aware of the value of their labour power: there is «no free labour», some are beginning to assert, «even in the villages». And children 'produced' by women's labour are beginning to be seen as their «assets». And hence there is another process of transformation which is very often the outcome of struggles *within families* – between husbands and wives, fathers and daughters – whereby women, in asserting their autonomy and making a living, individually become members of emergent classes. Gender struggle and class formation may thereby go hand in hand.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Compare, however, the invisibility of women in Williams' account of the political consciousness of the poor in Ibadan, Nigeria. Although in Ibadan women's participation rate in trading and crafts is on a par with that of men (Mabogunje, 1968, p. 220–1), in Williams' account traders are, with one exception, referred to as 'men' or 'he' and artisans as 'craftsmen' (Williams, 1980, p. 110–135).
2. The following account draws on various sources: see e.g. Amin, S., 1976; Cliffe, L., 1982; Ake, C., 1978; Arrighi, G., and Saul, J., 1973; Sandbrook, R. and Cohen, R., 1975; World Bank 1981.
3. This is not to deny the many struggles which have taken place in Africa – both broad-based anti colonial uprisings, as well as resistance to, and in some areas protracted guerilla warfare over the alienation of land. My point is that whereas considerable pressure was brought to bear on the subsistence sector it was not totally destroyed.
4. Marx, K., p.835.
5. Michele Barrett, for example, argues that the transition to capitalism in Europe led to «a far greater degree of dependence of women on men within the household», and that capitalism «constructed a wage labour system in which



the relationship of women to the class structure came to be partially mediated by an assumed or actual dependence on a male wage» (1980, p. 254). See also the debate on domestic labour, and its role for capitalism, discussed by Barrett, also Fox, (ed.) 1980.

6. See Beneria in Nelson (ed.) 1981, and ch. 4 in Rogers (1980) on the biases in Statistics.
7. In South Africa, however, apartheid ensures that African women are hardly employed in clerical or secretarial work (less than 2 % of female African workers). Bernstein (1975) notes that «black office workers are seldom acceptable to their white colleagues» even though black nurses are employed in almost equal numbers with white female nurses (p. 37 and p. 67).
8. E.g. in Tanzania there are three women ministers (one of Education, one of State, one of Justice: Mbilinyi, 1982, p. 9); in Zimbabwe a woman is Minister of Youth, Sport and Recreation.
9. Such a view of national women's organisations in Africa may have to be qualified where socialist ideologies are being actively promoted (as in Mozambique or Guinea-Bissau: see Kimble and Unterhalter, 1982; Urdang, 1979), but as the example of Tanzania suggests, reality does not always match rhetoric.
10. For a discussion of the 'class' consciousness of petty commodity producers, see Bujra 1982b and 1978.

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## RESUME

*Dans ce document l'auteur affirme que l'introduction du système capitaliste en Afrique a très peu contribué à attirer les femmes vers le travail salarié. Au lieu de les reléguer au domaine 'improductif' et privé du travail servile, il les a amenées de façon indirecte à canaliser leurs énergies vers la petite production et le petit commerce. A court terme, cette tendance sert les intérêts des femmes bien qu'elle satisfasse en même temps les besoins du Capital (en produits agricoles bon marché, en produits de consommation à bon marché, en travailleurs salariés (hommes), en nouvelles générations de travailleurs (hommes) à bon marché, en circulation de biens produits dans le secteur capitaliste). A plus long terme, le fait que les femmes n'aient pas été exploitées de façon aussi intense que les hommes a confiné leur lutte à des explosions localisées pour défendre les formes pré-capitalistes de l'organisation de la production. Les femmes sont par conséquent à la merci de l'exploitation d'éléments petit-bourgeois au sein desquels l'on retrouve d'autres femmes qui désirent promouvoir et préserver leurs privilèges de classe.*

## THE IMF AND AFRICA IN THE 1980s

By

G. K. HELLEINER\*

The International Monetary Fund has never been popular in the developing countries. In Latin America, in particular, the IMF has for years been seen as the villain in innumerable disputes between nationalist or populist governments and the «forces of Western reaction». The stabilization programs associated with IMF lending impose real burdens on individuals and groups whose incomes or spending authorizations are curtailed. When harsh realities must be faced, there is always a temptation to blame the messenger, and the IMF has frequently played that role. Governments have often welcomed the opportunity to blame external influences when severe austerity is required, and the IMF has willingly served as a «lightning rod» for domestic political heat.

There have also been substantive and analytical reasons for concern about the role of the IMF in the developing countries, especially in Latin America. No matter how vigorously the IMF now defends its pragmatism and flexibility, its missions have not always been above analytical approach. Stabilization programs have been imposed on member countries with rather more confidence in their efficacy than subsequent events or the limitations of economic science could justify. The conditionality of much IMF lending has given the IMF an opportunity to promote its staff's own point of view. In particular, the IMF has been attacked for its overemphasis on demand management, blunt monetary-policy instruments and «shock» treatment to reduce or eliminate inflation and balance-of-payments disequilibria; its relative neglect of supply-side policies, longer-term development, and income distribution; and its traditional aversion to controls, selective policy instruments, and «gradualist» approaches (DELL, 1981; NOWZAD, 1981; WILLIAMSON, 1982). Moreover, «because the Fund's largest members provide the bulk of its resources and thus a majority of the voting power, there is no question that they exert considerable influence on the direction, policies, and practices of the Fund» (NOWZAD, 1981, p.9). In the 1970s the IMF's image and reputation were sufficiently daunting to lead many countries to seek credit from commercial sources when that option was available to them rather than submit to the IMF's expected terms.

Until quite recently, the IMF has been much less visible and controversial in sub-Saharan Africa. But times have changed. Anti-IMF demonstrations have taken place in Tanzania, and riots associated with IMF programs have occurred in the Sudan. Fear of similar popular reactions lies behind the frequent reluctance or inability of African governments to implement policies recommended by the IMF. In 1982, for the

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first time, the *New York Times* and the London *Financial Times* ran major articles on the tensions between Africa and the Fund. In a *New York Times* story on «The IMF's Imbroglia in Africa», the Fund's representatives at a seminar in Africa were reported to be «taken aback» by the degree of hostility they encountered» (March 14, 1982). The *Financial Times*, reporting a dramatic increase in the Fund's importance in Africa, commented that «African resentment of the Fund seems to have risen in proportion to its role» (April 1, 1982). A 1980 special issue of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation's widely circulated *Development Dialogue* contains vigorous attacks upon the IMF and the international monetary system, the product of an international conference on the subject held in Tanzania. «IMF prescriptions» are denounced from this African base as unscientific and lacking either objectivity as between members or neutrality as between alternative policy possibilities. «The IMF has proved to be a basically political institution... The Fund's policies, conceived to achieve 'stabilization', have in fact contributed to destabilization and to the limitation of democratic processes» (1980, p. 14).

The 1980s will inevitably see increasing friction between the IMF and African governments as both struggle with the problem of macroeconomic management in a much more unstable and uncertain global environment. This essay attempts to explain the reasons for this impending conflict and offers some modest suggestions for easing its pains.

#### AFRICAN MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND PROSPECTS

It is important, first of all, to recognize the macroeconomic context within which sub-Saharan African policy debates are now conducted. If over the last decade macroeconomic performance has been fairly generally disappointing, for the past four years it has been absolutely catastrophic. While some few sub-Saharan African countries had fairly good rates of economic growth until 1979 – the terminal years for the data recorded in the World Bank's much-quoted «Berg Report» (World Bank, 1981b) – all of them are now in very serious macroeconomic trouble.

The quality of macroeconomic data is notoriously poor in Africa. For what the data are worth, however, they indicate that 15 of the 45 sub-Saharan African countries experienced declining per capita income between 1970 and 1979. Another 19 registered per capita income growth of under 1 per cent per year during this period. On average, according to the World Bank (1981a, p. 3), per capita income in Africa declined by 0.4 per cent per year in the 1970s. The volume of agricultural exports fell over the decade by 20 per cent, and estimated food production per capita also fell. This weak performance was the result of varied influences, including governmental inefficiency, pervasive mismanagement, and difficult external circumstances. Even before the second oil price shock (1979–80) and the current recession, the problems in this laggard region of the world were already very great, great enough to have elicited widespread international concern and widespread suggestions for priority attention to Africa (see, e.g., OECD, 1980, pp. 29–50). The BERG Report was a product of this rising concern.

The terms-of-trade shock inflicted upon tropical Africa (and other parts of the developing world) since 1979 has been, in the words of the IMF itself, «brutal». In Africa, the damage to the terms of trade has been done not so much by increases in oil prices, since oil is not as important in the poorest countries, as by subsequent collapses in prices of primary commodities. The purchasing power of African primary exports, already weakened in 1978–80, fell sharply through 1981 and the first half of 1982 (IMF, 1982b, pp. 22–29). The terms of trade of African countries exporting primary products were worse in 1982 than at any time since their independence, or since the Second World War, or even since the Great Depression. These terms-of-trade data are *exclusive* of the substantially increased cost of borrowed capital in these years, not just capital borrowed from banks and suppliers, many of whom in recent years have added significant surcharges to payments that have lately fallen into arrears, but capital borrowed from the IMF and the World Bank as well. Surcharges have also been applied to the prices of goods sold to African countries on credit, and those are not included in these terms-of-trade data either. The dimensions of the export collapse may be gauged by the fact that the signatories to the Lomé Convention, who were mainly African, submitted claims for compensation – grants for the poorest and credit for the better-off – that were double the available budgeted resources in 1980 and four times these resources in 1981. The treaty's Stabex support scheme for export earnings was widely seen as imperfect and inadequate even before the current disaster because of the tightly limited conditions under which support would be provided and the fact that it offered no compensation for the effects of increases in import prices.

In consequence, average per capita income in tropical Africa fell even further in the past four years. The balance-of-payments situation is universally disastrous. In many countries, inflation is reaching Latin-American proportions. At the same time, official development assistance is being cut: it fell by 4 per cent in real terms overall in 1981. The International Development Association, which directs about 30 per cent of its credit to Africa, has been forced by U.S. cutbacks in contributions to reduce its activities significantly, though less in Africa so far than in Asia. While other countries debate whether they may go into a depression, tropical African states have already got one.

The World Bank's projections of macroeconomic performance for the 1980s do not offer much room for optimism about the immediate future. In its «high case», it projects per capita annual income growth in sub-Saharan Africa of 0.1 per cent. The «high case» assumes resumption of growth in world output in the second half of the 1980s at the 4 per cent rate enjoyed from 1960 to 1979 and a resumption of growth in world trade, rising from an assumed 5 per cent per year in 1980–85 to 5.7 per cent thereafter. It also assumes for Africa a higher domestic savings rate, a greater share of total official development assistance, a higher domestic value-added share of gross export value, and a higher return on investment. Readers may assess for themselves whether this «high-case» is very likely. The World Bank's scenario for an alternative «low case» forecasts per capita income growth of *minus* 1 per cent annually for the decade.

In sub-Saharan Africa, stagnation or decline over the medium run and immediate macroeconomic «crisis» have become the norms. The shocks of 1979–83 have brought the weakest to a state of near collapse and even the strongest into major economic and political difficulties.

## EXTERNAL FINANCE AND THE ROLE OF THE IMF

In the analysis of developing countries, macroeconomic and financial questions are usually separated into two categories. *Development finance* involves mobilizing capital for longer-term investment in projects and for overall progress. External sources of development finance include official development assistance from foreign governments and funds obtained from bond markets, transnational corporations, suppliers' credits, longer-term lending by commercial banks, and the World Bank. *Balance-of-payments finance*, by contrast, involves the provision of liquidity – short-run, temporary finance to «tide countries over» their temporary shortfalls in earnings and to permit them to maintain the flow of imports that would otherwise have to be temporarily interrupted. Liquidity of this kind is usually provided by a country's own gold or foreign-exchange reserves as well as by access to short-term and medium-term credit from foreign monetary authorities, commercial banks, sometimes official development assistance, and the IMF.

In the 1970s and early 1980s, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish the need for development finance from the need for balance-of-payments finance. Very large increases in prices for key imports, such as oil, and extended recessions are longer-term shocks to the balance-of-payments than were hitherto the norm. It is no longer entirely clear how much of the consequent financing requirements should be regarded as needed for long-term development and how much should be regarded as short-term. The longer the time horizon being considered, the greater the room for supply-side changes and therefore the greater the role for «development» finance. In any case, the most significant fact of the current difficult period is that the ability to pay for crucial imports has been severely interrupted. In the absence of adequate finance to maintain import flows at required levels, development itself must be interrupted, and it may even prove impossible to preserve previous levels of income and consumption. To hard-pressed African Ministries of Finance, it is of little consequence whether lenders regard their loans as developmental in character or of the shorter-term balance-of-payments variety; in either case, they must serve the same purpose of financing urgently required imports.

In the absence of the necessary finance, there have been massive cutbacks in the volume of imports. At a time of rising import prices, import values fell on average by 7 per cent in Africa in 1981. In Madagascar they fell by 40 per cent, in Sierra Leone by 36 per cent, in Ghana by 29 per cent, in Zambia by 20 per cent, and in Tanzania by 12 per cent (IMF, 1982a, p. 97). They continued to fall in 1982. Such belt tightening involves major reductions in both public and private consumption and investment and inevitable conflict over whose real income will be cut the



most or the least. The «import strangulation» associated with terms-of-trade deteriorations of 25 per cent and more in recent years has created substantial underutilization and depreciation in existing capacity. Without crucial imported inputs and spare parts, much of the capital stock – in transport, industry, agriculture, and even social infrastructure such as schools and hospitals – cannot function adequately. The result is often physical deterioration, which is accelerated in tropical conditions. In some instances, the unavailability of fuel, inputs, and spare parts has severely reduced the capacity to move export products to the ports.

Governments have typically been unable to cut expenditures as quickly as their revenues have fallen; this leads to unplanned and excessive monetary expansion. Monetary expansion in combination with scarcities inevitably breeds inflation. Attempts to deal with price increases by means of price controls have led to the spread of black markets and corruption, a retreat from legal activities, and a concomitant depressing effect on morale. Delays in required adjustments of exchange rates have led to further tightening of import and foreign-exchange controls and to the growth of smuggling. Real (inflation-adjusted) exchange rates in Africa have appreciated enormously in the past three years – the opposite of what was probably required for adjustment over the longer run (IMF, 1982a, p. 122; 1982b, p. 54). The longer the necessary exchange-rate changes are delayed, the greater the «shocks» eventually required to bring them back in line. Distorted incentive structures and a breakdown in the effectiveness of governmental controls and regulations have generated increasing political disaffection, even in countries where the regime has long enjoyed broad respect and support.

One way that external credit has been obtained is by running up arrears on external payments. These have been piling up as more and more countries have found themselves unable to pay their bills. Whereas in 1974 the IMF reported only 3 countries in arrears on external payments, by the end of 1981 there were a reported 32, of which the majority (20) were African (IMF, 1982c, p. 28). When suppliers are forced to extend credit, they charge high interest rates. And the next time, they demand payment in cash. There are therefore early limits to the amount that can be «borrowed» in this manner.

Debt rescheduling has also relieved some of the payments pressures on creditors. Though African reschedulings via the «Paris Club» of official creditors were not the biggest rescheduling operations of the past few years, they were the most numerous. In 1979, African countries accounted for 3 out of 4 official reschedulings (Togo, Sudan, Zaïre); in 1980, 2 out of 3 (Sierra Leone and Liberia); and in 1981, 6 out of 7 (Madagascar, Togo, Zaïre, Uganda, Senegal, Liberia). Since the Toronto meetings of the IMF, there have been 6 more African meetings of the Club, rescheduling the official debts of Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Sudan, Togo and Zambia.

Foreign-exchange reserves in Africa fell in 1982 to unprecedented levels, averaging 7.4 per cent of annual imports, or twenty-seven days worth of imports. Reserves were less than half their 1973–74 levels and less than half the estimated 1982 average for all oil-importing developing countries

(IMF, 1982a, p. 169). The IMF projects that by the end of 1983 reserves will average 5.3 per cent, or nineteen days worth, of still further reduced imports.

One of the purposes for which the IMF was created was to provide balance-of-payments finance for members experiencing temporary difficulties. The provision of such finance, it was assumed, would reduce the risk that imports would be cut in circumstances where they need not and should not be cut, and would thus contribute to the maintenance of both domestic and global employment and income. Although it was not seen as an important element in the Bretton Woods system at its inception, private banking has emerged as an important source of balance-of-payments financing today. Countries with established creditworthiness can meet unexpected balance-of-payments shocks by borrowing from commercial banks, which moved back into international lending in a major way in the 1970s and until recently usually imposed far less onerous conditions on their borrowers than did the IMF. But most African countries can qualify for only very limited finance from this source. The exceptions have been Zaïre, Gabon, and Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Sudan, Cameroun, and Malawi. African countries are therefore led at an early stage to seek credit from the IMF.

As a result, there has been a marked acceleration in IMF activity in Africa in the past three years. In 1978 the IMF signed 2 new conditional credit agreements with African countries, in 1979 it signed 9, in 1980 it signed 12, and in 1981 it signed 21. In 1978–79 the IMF took more in total repayments from Africa and other developing areas than it lent. But by 1981–82 it was generating an annual net flow of medium-term credit for sub-Saharan Africa that was much larger than that being supplied, albeit at somewhat longer term, by the World Bank and the IDA combined (see the table below). The 1.7 billion SDRs of credit supplied by the IMF in 1981–82 still fell far short of total official development assistance to Africa, which in 1980 made up \$ 9.9 billion (or 7.7 billion SDRs) from all sources, of which \$ 6.8 billion (or 5.3 billion SDRs) was from the OECD countries (OECD, 1981, pp. 207–209).

Net Flows of World Bank/IDA/IMF Credit to Sub-Saharan Africa,  
1978–79 to 1981–82  
(in millions of SDRs)

Source of Credit	1978–79	1979–80	1980–81	1981–82
World Bank*	355	285	-239	236
IDA*	230	304	227	614
IMF**	-131	350	591	1,667

\* Difference between disbursed loans outstanding at year-ends (June 30). The original source records these data in terms of U.S. dollars. The conversion to SDRs employed the average of the SDR/dollar exchange rates at the beginning and end of the financial year.

\*\* Purchases less repurchases from the IMF, excluding SDRs, at year-ends (April 30).

SOURCES: *Annual Reports of the World Bank and the IMF.*

The World Bank has also been taking a keen interest in the structural-adjustment needs of countries experiencing medium-term balance-of-payments difficulties. For this purpose, it has developed a new «structural adjustment loan» that involves IMF-style macroeconomic conditionality. In fact, these World Bank loans have involved more conditions than most IMF loans, because countries typically do not qualify for them until they have first come to an accommodation with the IMF. In Africa, the Bank has so far made such loans to Kenya, Malawi, Ivory Coast, and Senegal. It has also embarked upon far closer cooperation and coordination with the IMF in its approaches to member countries than was usual in earlier times.

With the few exceptions noted above, the IMF «seal of approval» on an African government's macroeconomic program cannot usually be expected to generate as much increased commercial-bank credit as it is said, not entirely accurately, to do in middle-income countries. The IMF's rôle may nevertheless be considerable among governments granting bilateral aid. Like the commercial banks, donor governments often lack the assessment capacity, the access, and the influence either to come to informed judgments on their own or to offer policy advice to individual developing countries. The continuation or expansion of bilateral official development assistance may thus become increasingly dependent, as World Bank/IDA lending and official debt rescheduling already are, upon countries working out agreements with the IMF as to the conduct of macroeconomic policy. As commercial banks reduce their lending in the 1980s to «marginally creditworthy» borrowers, some of which are in Africa, this IMF role vis-à-vis other sources of credit may become important to more African countries than it is today.

Unfortunately, the IMF is ill equipped at present to offer advice on adjustment and development programs to countries of the African type. Until recently, it has not been very active in Africa. Its professional staff in 1982 of 1,525, very few of whom live overseas, was far smaller than the World Bank's staff of 2,689 (IMF, 1982b, p. 97; World Bank, 1982, p. 10). Its experience with longer-term supply-side policies is so limited that members of its staff have admitted that they must rely upon the Bank for informed assessments of issues other than the short-term and aggregative fiscal-monetary ones in which they have traditionally specialized. Unfortunately, they do not always do so.

With the certainty of macroeconomic crisis conditions in the 1980s — rampant inflation, severe balance-of-payments difficulties, and slow (if any) growth — and an emerging heavy dependence upon the IMF not only for credit but also for assessments upon which other possible donors or lenders will rely, the stage is set for a decade full of battles between African governments and the IMF. There will undoubtedly be mutual exasperation and fatigue, with charges of foreign interference in domestic affairs on the one hand and counter-charges of policy «slippage», «indiscipline», and failure to abide by agreements on the other.

The literature on IMF struggles with local governments and on alternative approaches to macroeconomic stabilization has so far been overwhelmingly Latin-American in orientation and coverage. But there are many structural differences between African and Latin American economies.

The typical African economy is smaller, poorer, more trade-dependent, less urbanized, and less socially stratified than its Latin-American counterpart. Its agricultural sector weighs more heavily in overall output and is based much more upon small-holder production; the urban work force is not only relatively smaller and politically weaker but also usually enjoys closer links to rural families. Its financial institutions are weaker and more rudimentary. Despite the dramatic acceleration of education programs in the post-independence period, levels of literary and educational achievement are still relatively low in Africa. The ability to govern is limited by severe shortages of appropriate skills, not least in the area of economic analysis. These intercontinental differences play upon the politics and economics of alternative stabilization or adjustment programs in ways that are more complex than this essay can explore. It should suffice here simply to underline the fact of their existence.

In any case, much of the Latin-American literature relates to the experiences of the 1950s and 1960s. The external environment at that time was characterized by buoyant primary-export markets, rising flows of official development assistance, and reasonable prospects for increasing private direct foreign investment. That environment has been replaced by a much more somber and uncertain one. The prospect that «improved» policies will generate a rapid turnaround of balance-of-payments problems, through either increased export earnings or induced capital inflows, must now be shakier than it generally was in the 1950s and 1960s. It is certainly not obvious that the Latin experience of the 1950s and 1960s is entirely relevant to the African prospect for the 1980s.

#### ISSUES OF IMF POLICY: LIQUIDITY AND CONDITIONALITY

It is important to be clear as to what the fighting *is* and *is not* about. To the extent that the external circumstances are given — the worsened terms of trade, some part of which is permanent, not temporary, the prospect of reduced long-term capital flows, etc., circumstances that we should obviously seek to improve where possible — countries will somehow have to adjust to them. At the broadest level, the only choice is between planned adjustment and chaotic adjustment. The question is not *whether* there should be a difficult and painful adjustment, on both the demand and the supply side, but *how* it should be undertaken. With what assistance? Over what time horizon? With the burden distributed how? With what mix of policies and what sequencing? With what terms for foreign borrowing?

Nor does anyone question the right and the need of the IMF or the World Bank to place conditions upon their lending. These institutions must be assured of getting their money back when they lend, and they have a responsibility as well to pursue their members' financial interests, somehow defined, which is bound to lead them to condition *some* of their lending on their vision of «appropriate» remedies for members' problems. Rather, the questions are: What forms of conditionality are appropriate for what circumstances? How much low-conditionality finance is appropriate for particular circumstances? How much leverage is appropriate and effective? What rates of interest are to be paid by which types of borrower?

The charge against the IMF is not that it imposes conditionality *per se*. The charge is that it is either unfair in its application and imposition of cost, or faulty in its advice, or both.

### *INEQUITY IN THE EXPANSION OF LIQUIDITY*

The means by which the international monetary system has been expanding the liquidity of national governments are totally different from those envisaged by the founders of the Bretton Woods institutions. They differ as well, if one believes the pronouncements of the time, from those decided upon much later by the IMF member governments and embodied in the Jamaica Agreements of 1976, which led to the second amendment of the IMF's Articles of Agreement. One of the original purposes of the IMF was to provide short-term finance, or liquidity, for all its members, in order to allow them to ride out temporary balance-of-payments difficulties or to adjust more smoothly to permanent or fundamental changes. In the 1970s, however, the IMF became a relatively insignificant source of such short-term finance, even in the developing countries, as the commercial banks took over the bulk of this financing. At the same time, increases in the price of gold generated large increases in the value of the reserves of all the countries that still held gold, primarily the industrialized ones, in spite of the fact that the Jamaica Agreement called for phasing out gold as an international reserve asset. According to the Jamaica Agreement, the SDR was to become the principal reserve asset of the international monetary system. In fact, because of the vast expansion of liquidity created for some countries by the growth of international commercial-bank lending and the increase in the price of gold, it was possible for these countries to argue that there was little need for further SDR allocations and only limited need for increases in IMF quotas. Thus, the only countries which did not get adequately increasing access to low-conditionality/short-term finance were those which neither had access to the banks nor held gold. These «uncredit-worthy» poorest countries were fully dependent upon the IMF for their liquidity.

Despite some innovations, such as the liberalization of the compensatory financing facility, which has provided low-conditionality credit up to certain limits when export earnings fell below their trend, IMF low-conditionality finance has not grown nearly as quickly as has the value of these countries' trade. Between 1971 and 1981, imports grew by 341 per cent and exports by 183 per cent in the «least developed countries» (a UN category containing 32 countries, of which 20 are in tropical Africa), and imports grew by 426 per cent and exports by 399 per cent in countries with per capita income of under \$ 500. Since 1971, maximum annual access to low-conditionality IMF credit has grown by only about 120 per cent. To make matters even worse, in the 1970s the least developed countries also experienced higher levels of instability in the terms of trade, purchasing power of exports, and import volume than did other countries (HELLEINER, 1983). In fact, the IMF's compensatory financing facility supplied only about 4 per cent of the finance that would have been required to offset the impact of the deterioration of sub-Saharan African terms of trade in 1980–81 (WILLIAMSON, 1982, p. 14).

In recent years, the IMF has been expanding its lending only through high-conditionality lending «windows» and credit tranches. Its reliance on borrowed resources and a policy of «enlarged access» rather than on quota expansion and SDR allocations generated the result, no doubt intentionally, that about 80 per cent of its lending in the 1981–82 period was accompanied by stringent conditions, because countries drawing on the Fund found themselves moving rapidly into the upper credit tranches, where stiff conditions must be met. By contrast, during 1974–75, the last period of major net lending activity, the IMF imposed a similar degree of conditionality on only one-third of its lending.

Furthermore, from late 1981, shortly after the REAGAN administration's arrival, the IMF significantly tightened the terms of its high-conditionality lending by reducing the number of loans, curtailing lending periods, and making tougher demands on its borrowers (WILLIAMSON, 1982). So «tough» did the IMF become that in the first six months of 1982 it canceled agreements, many of them in Africa, of greater value than its gross new commitments, on the grounds that members had failed to meet strict performance targets. In consequence, its net new commitments were actually negative (IMF, 1982d) – during the worst recession since the 1930s! Even its gross commitments during this period were only one-fifth the value of those in the equivalent period of the previous year.

There have been no SDR allocations since January 1, 1981, and there are few signs of further allocations in the near future. Even if they are made, they will be too late to be of maximum benefit to the countries that are experiencing the worst liquidity problems in 1982–83, and total allocations are likely to be small. Low-conditionality lending by the Trust Fund has stopped because the funds – the proceeds of the IMF's sale of about a third of its gold following the Jamaica Agreement – have now been exhausted. There is no IMF discussion of further sales of its remaining 100 million ounces of gold (worth about \$ 40 billion at current prices, and probably soon to be worth still more). Further IMF quota expansion will not take effect before 1984, and when it comes the increased low-conditionality credit that it brings will be less than is required to make up for the expansion in the value of trade in the poorest countries. In the meantime, the IMF's acknowledged need for more resources will be met by borrowing, and borrowing implies continued expansion of high-conditionality lending only.

The IMF's shift toward the imposition of more and tougher conditions upon its lending has been accompanied by a hardening of the terms. Interest rates charged on IMF credit have been rising relative to market rates. IMF lending that is financed by borrowing rather than by agreed quota expansion must earn interest rates adequate to service the IMF's resulting debt. The failure to increase IMF quotas rapidly enough to meet demands for IMF credit thus implied the imposition of commercial rates of interest on its loans. In the case of drawings of borrowed IMF resources by the poorest countries, these interest rates were only partially offset by interest subsidies financed by voluntary contributions. The interest rate levied on the use of SDRs' which was originally only a nominal 1 1/2

per cent, has also been raised to commercial levels in order to increase the attractiveness of the SDR as a reserve asset.

There is a clear case on equity grounds for changing lower interest rates on IMF credit to the poorest members. There are precedents for such reductions not only in the practices of the International Development Association, the Stabex scheme in the Lomé Convention, and bilateral suppliers of balance-of-payments assistance but even in those of the Trust Fund and «Subsidy Account» of the IMF itself. Interest-subsidy arrangements should be improved and systematized; they should not remain vulnerable to the whims of voluntary donors.

If the original aspirations for an efficient and equitable international monetary system are to begin to be realized, there must be increased provision of low-conditionality balance-of-payments finance by the IMF to the countries that have not benefited from liquidity expansion from other sources. Increased balance-of-payments instability, global inflation, and the expansion of trade volumes in the 1970s and 1980s all have increased liquidity requirements in the poorest countries well beyond currently available levels. There are many possible ways to provide more liquidity, such as adequate quota expansion, SDR allocations, or further liberalization of the compensatory financing facility. None of these need detract in the slightest from the continuing requirement that conditionality be attached to IMF credit when it rises beyond certain agreed limits that have been set in terms of basic need for liquidity. High-conditionality IMF finance, it must be recognized, does not provide true liquidity. The essence of liquidity is that it must be available quickly and relatively costlessly when the need arises. The haggling over preconditions and performance targets takes considerable time and energy, usually from the scarcest and most talented personnel. The opportunity cost of these inputs is probably a good deal higher in skill-scarce sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else in the world.

#### *ANALYTICAL INADEQUACIES IN THE APPLICATION OF CONDITIONALITY*

The current heavy reliance by the IMF on high-conditionality lending, however one views its appropriate role, demands a close assessment of the conditions themselves. Faulty or inadequate economic analysis can do very great damage when it generates actual policies for credit-hungry African governments.

One must tread very carefully when offering generalizations in this area, more carefully than do many IMF missions when they put their conditions to local policy-makers. The experience and sensitivity of an IMF mission chief may be the most crucial elements in the prospect for accommodation between a country and the IMF. The mission may have considerable freedom from managerial direction during the discussion of «preconditions» for IMF lending, and its report to the IMF Executive Board is likely to be highly influential. At a time when both professionals and policy-makers are experiencing difficulties in the analysis and management of macroeconomic issues even in their own countries, missions that arrive

with prejudged and seemingly doctrinaire positions based upon their experiences in other countries are likely to be counterproductive. Other things being equal, a mission is most likely to be successful when its leader is known and trusted within the policy-making circles of the country to which it is sent. Recently, the World Bank financed a small team of advisors, each of whom had considerable Tanzanian experience, to assist the Tanzanian government over a period of eight months in the preparation of its *own* adjustment program. (Accommodation with the IMF has not yet been reached). Happily, there are instances where IMF missions have also genuinely helped governments to develop stabilization programs that are then regarded as «their own». Unhappily, there are also many instances in which faulty analysis, inadequate experience or sensitivity, or arrogance on the part of IMF missions contributed to disagreements, both local and international, and actually delayed the stabilization or adjustment process.

It is fundamental to understand that balance-of-payments maladjustments can arise from various sources and are therefore likely to require different kinds of policy solutions. In the 1970s, the IMF began to recognize, at least in principle and in staff papers, the need for more emphasis on supply-side policies and for longer periods of adjustment. It began to see that adjustment policies did not necessarily have to depend so heavily on the rapid limitation of demand, which was usually achieved by means of restrictions on monetary and credit expansion.

The developing countries have strenuously argued that traditional «demand shock» policies and other conditions should not be imposed when their balance-of-payments difficulties are the product of external disturbances rather than domestic mismanagement. In a more decent world such arguments would be listened to, as they are within many national economies, and better insurance schemes would be created for the defense of the most vulnerable against shocks that are not of their own making. In the world we have, however, the IMF has labeled this distinction irrelevant to the «real» question: Are the external (or other) changes permanent, in which case the country must adjust, or are they only temporary, in which case the country is eligible for relatively liberal credit arrangements? This «real» distinction cannot explain IMF behavior in 1981–83 toward the developing countries that are exporting primary commodities. They did not obtain anything like the amount of low-conditionality finance to which the collapse of real commodity prices ought on this logic to have entitled them, since by far the largest proportion of this collapse was surely temporary. Rather, the IMF seems to have used the extreme pressures created by the temporary crisis to push on the reluctant low-income countries the same policies it and the World Bank (as summarized in the Berg Report, World Bank, 1981b) had recommended before. Even if it were good economics, which is at least arguable, this behavior has proven to be very bad politics.

When it comes to developing policies for balance-of-payments adjustment, the truth is that we have only a limited understanding of the links between monetary and real (i.e., supply-side) variables or of the dynamics of adjustment. Macroeconomic theorizing is adept at comparing



situations of equilibrium with one another, but it has always found it more difficult to model paths of adjustment between them. Where psychology, expectations, and the political power of various groups are all important in determining reactions to major policy changes, it becomes much more difficult to predict their eventual outcome. Cumulative processes can be set in motion that lead economic events in perverse and unexpected directions. There is also usually room for disagreement as to the values of even the more conventional key variables, notably elasticities of supply over various time periods. The only possible professional stance in these circumstances is one of considerable humility and caution in the dispensing of advice. At least one recently published IMF staff paper (KHAN and KNIGHT, 1981) has modeled adjustment paths in such a way as to generate results that call traditional IMF policy advice into serious question. The authors conclude that the relationship between domestic credit creation and external positions is extremely complex, and «policymakers cannot 'fine tune' domestic credit ceilings from quarter to quarter or even year to year without having much more comprehensive information about the structure of the economy than they can reasonably be expected to possess» (p. 43). When KHAN and KNIGHT compare simulations of a standard one-year adjustment program and an extended five-year program, the former is shown to have significant and undesirable effects upon output, employment, and factor incomes. The design of an effective stabilization or adjustment program in Africa — even more than elsewhere — requires «adjustment calls» rather than technical virtuosity.

As soon as the IMF enters the realm of supply-side policies, it is inevitably treading on the «development» turf of the World Bank. Similarly, as the World Bank began its program of «structural adjustment lending», its activities began to overlap with those of the IMF. Both institutions recognize this overlap. They now coordinate their policy advice to a greater degree than they used to and even send staff members on one another's country missions. Both the Bank and the Fund have a built-in preference for supply-side or development policies that utilize the market rather than the power and apparatus of the state. They also prefer open, liberal external exchange and trading systems over inward-oriented development strategies and controlled relations with the rest of the world. Where they have the opportunity, they will push these approaches — in the sincere belief, for which there is considerable Western professional support, that they are productive. (They do not always insist on them. The IMF, after all, includes many socialist states among its membership). Nevertheless, there are many examples of countries, though not in Africa, that have done well — at least in particular periods — with substantial state direction and with more inward-oriented and protectionist development strategies. And few would argue that state-directed credit or import controls are always deleterious in their effects. The «market bias» of the IMF and the Bank may therefore at particular times and places lead to mistaken, or at least questionable, policy advice.

The IMF has also consistently been accused of inadequate concern in its adjustment programs for questions of income distribution and allocation of burdens. In recent years, the IMF research staff has become interested

in distributional issues, as the World Bank staff had done much earlier (see for instance, JOHNSON and SALOP, 1980). But at the level of IMF - member relations and the provision of advice on stabilization and adjustment programs, sensitivity to questions of income distribution is still absent. For instance, for allocative and budgetary reasons, missions commonly insist on the abolition of food subsidies, apparently unconcerned with the judgment by Washington's own major food-policy research institution that such subsidies are an almost inevitable component of poverty-alleviation programs in low-income countries (IFPRI, 1981, pp. 9-11).

The allocation of adjustment burdens and income distributional issues are crucial components of any politically defensible and workable set of policies. Technically oriented IMF missions will only mislead or obfuscate if they pretend otherwise. At present, IMF advice purports to be distributionally neutral but it usually is not. There is a great need not only for careful analysis of the distributional implications of alternative programs but also for the designing of macroeconomic policies that take equity objectives explicitly into account. Such approaches are especially important for «populist» governments that are more sensitive to these issues. The abysmal record of such governments in macroeconomic management in recent years indicates the extent of the need. It is doubtful that the IMF will be the source of much analysis of this kind, given its traditions. Such analysis is more likely to come from academic and other sources, including, perhaps, the remnants of McNAMARA's distribution-oriented World Bank.

In stressing the importance of income-distributional considerations in the analysis and design of adjustment programs, I am not suggesting that the IMF should impose distributional conditions on its lending. Borrowing countries generally seek fewer rather than more conditions from external sources of finance. There has therefore not been much third-world enthusiasm, even on the part of governments that place heavy emphasis on equitable income distribution within their own countries, for proposals to encourage the IMF to insist upon stabilization policies that protect the poorest. Nevertheless, there is no reason for the IMF not to be more supportive of and responsive to alternative stabilization packages in which distribution is explicitly accorded an important weight. The IMF might even take a more activist role by explicitly analyzing the distributional effects of its own or alternative programs in the normal course of its missions' activities. No doubt some governments will welcome such efforts more than others!

But the most important limitation of IMF analytical approaches to African and other low-income countries' macroeconomic problems is probably neither its «market bias» nor its unconcern with the politically crucial distributional questions. Rather, it is its inadequate consideration of these countries' limited capacity to adjust. The traditional «blunt instruments» of IMF macroeconomic stabilization recommendations — money and credit restraint, devaluations, and liberalization, all pursued within a fairly short period — cannot be expected to be as effective in the typical African country as elsewhere. In Africa, capacity for short-term adjustment is constrained by:

- Limited economic flexibility and limited short-term responsiveness to price incentives.
- Low and—recently—falling levels of per capita income and urban real wages.
- Limited technical and administrative proficiency within governmental economic policy-making institutions.
- Fragile political support for many of today's governments.

With exports of a limited number of commodities, most of which are not consumed locally, very slim possibilities for deflecting articles of local consumption into exporting, and imports already pared well below «minimum essential» requirements, there is precious little room in Africa for either supply or demand adjustments in the short term. With real incomes, particularly urban ones, already low and having fallen so far, and with the political fragility characteristic of most African states, there is not much political room for further sharp cutbacks in levels of consumption, employment, or the provision of services. At the same time, data limitations and inadequate staffing usually mean longer lags between the arrival of problems and their recognition, and between recognition and the development of appropriate responses. The enormity of the maladjustments now facing some African countries, including their typically substantially overvalued currencies, is in large part the result of the inability of the policy-making machinery to respond quickly to unprecedented shocks in the external environment.

Rapid results are most likely to be achieved by offering special incentives to key economic actors and breaking specific bottlenecks rather than by applying fairly blunt instruments across the board to fairly rigid economic systems. In sub-Saharan Africa, the most effective way to achieve short-term improvements in the balance of payments is often to provide adequate transport, credit, and supplies of real inputs and consumer goods, as well as adequate prices, to producers in key parts of the agricultural sector. Where urban populations comprise a smaller share of the population and receive proportionately less income, such rural-oriented changes may demand larger short-term sacrifices on the part of urban dwellers. It is important to keep these sacrifices as low as possible by targeting the reallocation of scarce resources more selectively. In general, the more effective such «fine tuning» of incentive structure and bottleneck breaking, the less macroeconomic restraint is required for short-term adjustment.

Some of the adjustment problems peculiar to economies of the African type are recognized in the 1982 Annual Report of the IMF:

*For many countries, especially low-income countries with a narrow range of exportable products, the process of adjustment is a long and difficult one, requiring substantial external financing (p. 39).*

*Adjustment of the balance of payments of these countries is often not easy to achieve at the outset because price elasticities of demand for and supply of their export goods are generally quite low in the short run... (p. 55).*

Why are IMF lending conditions not adapted more to the structural adjustment capacities of the poorest countries? Why, at least, is there not more research on possible *alternative* stabilization and adjustment programs that would take structural and distributional problems more fully into account?

## PROSPECTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The stage is thus set in Africa in the 1980s for an internal struggle over macroeconomic management and an external struggle between local governments and the major international financial institutions. Yet the absence of preparation for these struggles is striking. There is very little African literature on such topics as macroeconomic management, the effects of different types of stabilization programs, or the effects of inflation and slowdown. Indeed, the data with which such analyses might be conducted are often limited and inadequate. Most of the literature on these matters relates to Latin America and, to a lesser degree, Asia. But one cannot simply transfer old monetarist *vs.* structuralist debates from other locations to the African scene without carefully considering the implications of the differences between Latin America and Africa in such factors as economic structure and political characteristics.

Nor has there yet developed the analytical capacity for the consideration of these questions within Africa. Governments and universities have typically had distressingly little experience in macroeconomic research. This can lend a comic-opera character to some of the «international» squabbling, wherein virtually all the local memoranda are in fact drafted by foreign advisors. This weakness has also generated lucrative business for foreign merchant banks offering advisory services to African governments. The best known of such private advisors are the «troika» of Lazard Frères (Paris), Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb (New York), and S. G. Warburg (London), which have been advising several francophone West African governments and their joint central bank, BCEAO, and Morgan Grenfell, which has been advising the governments of Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, among others. Are these commercial enterprises likely to be the best sources of sensitive and socially responsible advice on the complex problems of African macroeconomic management?

Unfortunately, when it comes to Africa, macroeconomic analytical skills within the IMF and the World Bank have not been too high either. Until quite recently, career prospects for those dealing with Africa were considered to be lower, as were the opportunities for demonstrating potential. As a result, not only did Africa receive relatively limited research attention but it also frequently had to depend upon multilateral-institution staff with less experience or ability. This is of no small consequence, because these institutions remain major sources of influence. Their technical assistance, the advice proffered by their missions, and their country studies and research activities often enter a virtual analytical vacuum. This may be starting to change, however, as members of the professional staff gravitate toward or are pushed into areas that are emerging as probable «hot spots».

Apart from a few such hopeful signs, the prospect is rather alarming: badly prepared antagonists of modest ability employing data of dubious quality and entering upon a series of battles over very complex policy questions. Both sides bring to these encounters a baggage of ideology and commitment from other places. Each is already «digging in» to entrenched positions on such matters as exchange-rate and interest-rate policies, while the necessary study, research, and technical development remain limited.

Although the data, the literature, and the experience in respect of African-IMF relationships and, more generally, African stabilization and adjustment are still woefully limited, certain conclusions can already be drawn:

1. There is a pressing need for more low-conditionality temporary balance-of-payments finance for the poorest countries in Africa and elsewhere. The system by which liquidity is now acquired by the member countries in the IMF is inadequate and inequitable. For the poorest, there should also be virtually automatic provision for interest subsidies on the use of SDRs and other IMF credit. The market rates now demanded on SDRs and some other IMF credit are higher than these countries should be made to pay for stabilization loans.

2. IMF conditional credit arrangements should be made more flexible in terms of both performance criteria and repayment obligations by appropriate adaptations and the introduction of contingency clauses to the relevant agreements. The need to take account clearly and openly of unexpected events like changes in world markets or accelerated inflation rates has been recognized by all shades of opinion. The introduction of such arrangements would increase the IMF's credibility and the respect accorded its agreements.

3. There is also now a pressing need for more flexibility on the part of aid donors in respect of the type of aid they are able to offer. Official development assistance could and should complement other sources of balance-of-payments financing when that is what is most required. To continue to supply only project finance at times of crisis like the present is not only unhelpful but can actually be counter-productive.

4. Some careful thought should be given to possible arrangements for arbitration and conflict resolution when a dispute between the IMF and an African government has become overwhelmingly costly to the welfare and development prospects of the people of that country. The «model» presented by the advisory group in Tanzania may offer some pointers, although that particular dispute is still far from resolved.

5. There is an enormous need in tropical Africa for expanded training and for research and data collection in the field of macroeconomic and financial analysis.

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## RESUME

Le rôle du Fonds Monétaire International dans le financement du développement des pays du Tiers-Monde a fait l'objet de plusieurs critiques, d'abord en Amérique Latine où les programmes de stabilisation du FMI ont entraîné plusieurs révoltes de la part des populations et récemment dans certains pays africains qui ont, à leur tour, connu des périodes de troubles sociaux, causés par des programmes similaires du FMI. Dans cet article, l'auteur cherche à trouver les causes des conflits qui opposent le FMI aux gouvernements africains. Ensuite il suggère quelques solutions qui pourraient faire baisser cette tension.

Il commence d'abord par placer l'intervention du FMI en Afrique dans le contexte global des performances et perspectives des pays africains au plan macro-économique. Il fait remarquer à ce sujet que dans leur ensemble, les pays africains ont accusé des performances faibles tant au niveau de la croissance des revenus per capita qu'à celui du volume des exportations agricoles et de la production alimentaire.

L'auteur aborde ensuite le problème du financement externe et du rôle du FMI dans ce secteur. Ce rôle consiste à mettre des liquidités à la disposition des Etats africains emprunteurs mais en assortissant ces prêts de conditions qui théoriquement, devraient rétablir l'équilibre économique. Pour l'auteur, le problème qui se pose n'est pas tant le principe des conditions qui accompagnent ces prêts mais plutôt leurs conditions, le degré de contrôle qu'il faut et les taux d'intérêt.

En effet, l'auteur pense que, du fait des caractéristiques de ces conditions, il est impossible aux Etats africains emprunteurs de générer suffisamment de liquidités à partir de ces prêts pour à la fois assurer une continuité du processus de développement et les remboursements de ces prêts. Les facteurs qui ont fait que les recommandations du FMI n'ont pas toujours produit les résultats escomptés sont :

- Une analyse économique fautive ou insuffisante.
- Une tentative de transfert «mécanique» de solutions qui n'ont d'ailleurs pas toujours résolu les problèmes ailleurs.
- Le caractère limité de la théorie macro-économique dans ce domaine.
- La non prise en compte de facteurs moins techniques comme la sensibilité des populations, le pouvoir politique, la psychologie etc...
- La négligence des problèmes de distribution des revenus et du partage des tributs.
- La fautive estimation de la capacité d'ajustement des pays africains.

En conclusion, l'auteur pense qu'en Afrique au Sud du Sahara, parmi les moyens les plus aptes à promouvoir un développement véritable dans le court terme figurent la mise en place d'une infrastructure de transport appropriée, des crédits et un approvisionnement suffisants en intrants et biens de consommation ainsi que des prix acceptables aux producteurs des produits agricoles les plus importants.

# NIGERIAN FOOD SHORTAGES: A STUDY OF IMPORT DEMAND FOR SELECTED CEREALS, 1950-79

By

A. A. ADESIMI\* and E. A. ADERINOLA\*\*

## INTRODUCTION

The diversified nature of agricultural production in Nigeria reflects the wide variety of ecological zones prevailing in the country. Starting with the rain forest zone in the South, the country stretches to the dry savannah belt in the North with intermediate vegetational zones lying between these two extremes. This diverse agro-climatic variation produces a beneficial complementarity in foodcrops production for the entire economy. Whilst the southern parts are suitable for the cultivation of rootcrops, fruits and cereals such as maize, the northern zone supports the raising of a variety of fruits and vegetables and especially cereal crops such as millet, sorghum, wheat, cowpeas, soybean, rice, etc...

When the output of these crops is low in some parts of the country due to adverse agro-climatic causes, it is often made up by output in some other parts of the country, except perhaps in the case of general drought like that of 1973 which affected many parts of the country simultaneously.

For several years now, the advantage derivable from the existing ecological diversity has gradually dwindled so much so that there have been national food shortages. This phenomenon occurs inspite of the abundance of land and labour resources. The Third National Development Plan, 1975-80, has aptly identified one of the problems by stating that not only is land under-utilised in the quantitative sense but the quality depreciation of most of the land under cultivation is also even more apparent.

Figure 1 gives a bird's-eye-view of the naira value imports of selected foods into Nigeria, 1960 to 1979, while Table I presents the growth in the quantity of imports of maize, rice and wheat for selected years.

Apart from the abundance of agricultural resources with which Nigeria is endowed, one other paradox about the food situation in the country has been the impressive list of programs, strategies and projects that have been formulated and executed to boost food production. Some of those contained in the Second National Development Plan, 1970-74, are the National Seed Multiplication Scheme, the National Agricultural Credit Bank, the Water Resources Division in the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources whose primary objectives are the promotion and coordination of water resources development for irrigation purposes (rice and wheat cultivation), and the Federal Participation in Special

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


Table I: Imports of Maize, Rice and Wheat in Nigeria (metric tonnes) for selected Years

Years	Maize	Rice	Wheat
1950	0.023	3.46	12,380
1955	0.860	647.00	29,415
1960	48.000	2,447.00	61,630
1965	145.000	1,420.00	55,842
1970	8,882.000	1,749.00	264,740
1975	2,211.000	6,652.00	407,734
1979	40,481.000	567,899.00	806,023

Source: *Nigeria Trade Summary*, December Issues of Selected Years.

#### Agricultural Development Schemes.

In the Third National Development Plan, 1975–80, there are the National Accelerated Food Production Program whose objectives was to bring improved practices such as high-yielding seed varieties, chemical fertilisers, pesticides, credit, etc. to the farming population; the Operation Feed the Nation by which an attempt was made to mobilise the entire population for food production; the establishment of nine additional River Basin Development Authorities in 1976 to exploit water resources for food production in virtually all the states; the strengthening of the Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank through the Federal grant of ₦ 150 million for on-lending to farmers; the establishment of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme and the related network of rural banking program; the program of research on foodcrops, notably rice, maize, wheat, beans, rootcrops; the fruit and vegetable research and demonstration; the South Chad Irrigation Project, the Bakolori Project, the Gombe Agricultural Development Project, the Funtua Agricultural Development Project; the establishment of the National Centre for Agricultural Mechanisation.

The current program, — the Green Revolution which seeks to make the country self-sufficient in food production, replaced the Operation Feed the Nation at the inception of civil rule in 1979. Its strategy is to use a package approach such as land clearing services, credit, the River Basin Development Authorities, massive fertilizer imports, Commodity Boards. Agricultural Insurance programs, etc., to boost food production.

The objective of this study is to attempt to explain the factors responsible for the phenomenal growth in the demand for major cereals imports, namely rice, maize and wheat during the period 1950–79. These three crops are selected for study for two major reasons: First, consideration was given to Nigeria's potentials to be self-sufficient in the production of these crops. Second, the choice of these crops was prompted by their importance in the overall food import list. The choice of maize was based largely on the first consideration while wheat and rice were selected on the basis of both of these considerations.

The objective may be spelt out as follows:

- (i) to develop a theoretical and empirical framework for analysing import demand for maize, wheat and rice in Nigeria between 1950 and 1979, and to estimate the quantifiable parameters of this model,
- (ii) to derive both the marginal propensity to import as well as the income elasticity of import demand for these commodities and
- (iii) to make tentative recommendations as regards policy control of the factors that have led to the growth in these imports.

## **THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING AND LITERATURE REVIEW**


### **THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING**

The basis for trade among international communities forms the subject matter of two important theories of international economics, namely, the «Principle of Comparative Cost Advantage» and the «Law of Reciprocal Demand» (KINDLEBERGER, 1973 and JOHNSON, 1958). The Principle of Comparative Cost Advantage is based on the premise that differences in factor endowments such as land, climate and technical «know-how» among nations cause differences in the comparative costs of producing a given commodity. Thus, a basis for trade arises among nations because no one nation is consistently more efficient than others as measured by factor inputs per unit of output of every possible commodity. As a result of this, the classical and neo-classical economists both agreed that a country would produce for export, a commodity in which it enjoys the highest comparative cost advantage and import the set of commodities in which it suffers the greatest cost disadvantage. In other words, a country will produce for exports, the commodities in which it has the least opportunity cost and import those for which it has the highest opportunity cost to produce. KINDLEBERGER *op. cit.* (Chap. I) has demonstrated that trade based on this principle confers mutual benefits (1) on the countries so involved in international trade.

The Law of Reciprocal Demand postulates that the price at which foreign trade will take place depends on the offer curves (2) of the countries concerned. The point of interception of the offer curves, say of two countries, A and B represents the equilibrium point whereby the terms of trade sufficiently clear the market as shown in figure 2. In the figure, p represents the point of equilibrium of the two offer curves for the two commodities traded by the two countries. The price, OP will prevail for both commodities in the two countries. At any other point different from P, say, t, w or u, equilibrium point will not be attained because the terms of trade are not sufficient to clear the market.

However, the theories of International Trade discussed in the foregoing paragraphs have generated a lot of criticisms, particularly in relation to its assumptions (3) which are believed to be unrealistic, static and partial (KINDLEBERGER, *op. cit.* p.49). Thus, modern international economists have introduced the concept of dynamic equilibrium to the Principle of

FIG. 2: LAW OF RECIPROCAL DEMAND: Intersection of two offer curves



Source: Kindleberger *op.cit.*, (p.40).

Comparative Cost Advantage to explain changes in tastes, factor endowments and level of technology. For example, changes in consumers' tastes and preferences can bestow advantages or disadvantages on a commodity which hitherto has suffered a disadvantage or vice versa. Similarly, advancement in technology does not only reduce costs of production by improving efficiency but does also lead to the utilization of cheaper factor endowments which at the lower level of technology were not utilizable. In this way, a country that used to suffer comparative cost disadvantage in the production of a commodity may come to enjoy considerable cost advantage over other countries in producing the same commodity.

It should be noted however that despite the criticisms of the theories of comparative cost advantage and reciprocal demand, they still tend to be useful in explaining a great deal of the trade between the Less Developed Countries (L.D.C.'s) and the Industrialized Countries today. The opening of trade between the L.D.C.'s and the Industrialized Nations had led to expansions in the demand for exports, the production of which was intensive in the use of the abundant land and labour resources of the former — leading to a fuller utilization of the previously underutilized land and labour — (MYINT, 1958). This resulted in cumulative growth in incomes, employment, government revenues as well as in investments in infrastructures such as roads, ports, railways and banking institutions which are essential to growth. According to ESSANG (1975), economic growth in Nigeria was closely associated with the expansion of agricultural exports until the mid-1960's when petroleum assumed a dominant role.

The principle of comparative cost advantage, however, has not been found adequate in explaining the broader issues relating to the political economy of a country and the related concept of «economic nationalism» which dominates the economic policies of many countries of the world today. For instance, country A may be comparatively disadvantaged cost-wise vis-a-vis other countries in producing commodity X. For political economy considerations country A may find it undesirable to prefer importing commodity X particularly if commodity X is a strategic item and/or if commodity X contributes much to the drain of the scarce foreign exchange reserves of country A. Thus, the theoretical tools of the economist may sometimes be inadequate in providing guidelines for public policy, especially where broader issues of political economy are involved. This study is undertaken within the broad framework of Nigeria's political economy.

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

Three empirical studies having relevance to this paper are available for review. OLAYIDE (1968) was concerned with the objective of estimating the parameters of the determinants of Nigeria's import trade for the period, 1948 to 1964. Fifteen items of import were included, six of which (sugar, salt, flour, biscuits, fish and milk) are food items. He postulated that food import demand is determined by the relative price, real disposable

income, custom duties and a trend factor. The results of the multiple regression analysis showed that the demand for sugar, flour and fish were price elastic while the demand for fish and flour were income elastic.

FAJANA (1977) set out to study import demand for a number of food items in Nigeria, namely, flour, biscuits, fish, milk, confectionery, salt and sugar, using data for the period 1960 to 1974. In a multiple regression model, he estimated the coefficients of real income, foreign reserves lagged one period, relative price and war dummy as explanatory variables. The evidence indicated that the demand for the first five items were price elastic while the demand for all except for fish was inelastic with respect to foreign reserves. The imports of milk, fish, biscuits and flour were all income elastic. With the different kinds of elasticities shown, he concluded that the same type of policy instruments would not have the same degree of impact in dealing with the problems of different types of food import items.

MABAWONKU (1980) examined the policies and regulations of food importation in Nigeria using 1966 to 1975 data. His hypothesis was that food imports in Nigeria were determined by the levels of external reserves, domestic price index for food, unit landing cost and a trend variable. The multiple regression analysis revealed that food import demand for the period was price inelastic for all food items while demand was foreign exchange elastic for fresh fish and meat only. Thus, it was recommended that the use of tariff measures would not be effective for controlling food import but that imports of meat and fresh fish only would be responsive to changes in the level of foreign reserves.

This paper while endeavouring to draw on the experiences of the previous work just reviewed, will also attempt to extend the frontiers of knowledge in the area of food import demand in Nigeria by (i) considering new set of commodities (maize, wheat and rice) (ii) postulating some new variables, (iii) using more recent data, thereby covering larger range of observations and (iv) deriving the marginal propensity to import the selected cereal crops, an effort which other studies have not given attention.

## DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND IMPORT OF MAJOR CEREALS

In spite of the efforts being made by the Nigerian governments to achieve self-sufficiency in food production, the imports of some food items have exhibited a discernible secular trend at least over the past one decade as can be observed in Table 2. Rice and wheat imports revealed a more remarkable increase than maize imports. Judging from Nigeria's agricultural endowments, there is no justified reason for it to import rice and maize. Even though Nigeria is relatively more self-sufficient in maize production, a 100 percent self-sufficiency and even production for export should have been more easily attained.

Up to 1976, Nigeria was almost self-sufficient in rice production with between 98.6 and 92.2 self-sufficiency ratio. But beginning from 1977, the ratio fell to 62 percent and thereafter has shown a downward trend.

Table 2: Nigeria's Imports of Major Cereal Foods, 1970-80

Year	Domestic Production (000 tons)		Imports (000 tons)			Self-sufficiency Ratio	
	Maize	Rice	Maize	Rice	Wheat	Maize	Rice
1970	2,201	345	9	1.7	225	99.6	99.5
1971	2,126	383	4	0.3	353	99.8	99.9
1972	715	447	2	5.9	292	99.7	98.6
1973	1,374	487	88	1.1	1,069	94.0	99.7
1974	591	525	124	4.8	313	82.6	99.1
1975	1,620	515	2	6.7	400	99.9	98.7
1976	1,814	534	10	45.4	720	99.4	92.2
1977	1,411	400	36	413	719	97.5	61.7
1978	2,010	695	65	770	863	96.9	47.4
1979	1,986	850	21	700	660	98.9	54.8
1980	1,330	925	75	650	615	94.7	58.7

Note: Data on domestic production of wheat are not available.

Sources: (i) National Cereals Research Institute, Badeggi.

(ii) Nigerian Trade Summary, December Issues.

As for wheat production, the data from domestic sources are not readily available; all that could be obtained are production figures for 1975 and 1980 which were 20,000 tons and 15,000 tons respectively. Wheat imports, however, have shown figures which are several times greater than the available figures on domestic production. Nigeria has been found to possess production potentials at least in four main areas of northern Nigeria, namely, (i) the Rima river valley near Sokoto, (ii) Hadejia on the River Hadejia, (iii) the Yo area near Lake Chad on the Kamadugu Yobe and (iv) Gambaru to the southwest of Lake Chad on the Ebedji river. These four areas have been selected for development under irrigation schemes and farmers in these areas are reported to have obtained yields of between 1,200 to 1,800 lb of grain per acre (1,345 to 2,018 kg per ha). Results of variety trials at the Ahmadu Bello University, Samaru, Zaria, indicate mean yield of between 3,032 and 6,971 kg per ha (ANDREWS, 1968).

### MAJOR SOURCES OF CEREALS IMPORTS, 1970-79

Nigeria has had its imports of maize, wheat and rice largely from Europe and America (Table 3). In actual fact, the USA remained the single largest supplier of these cereal crops to Nigeria, supplying 46.8 percent of maize, 48.6 percent of rice and 84.5 percent of wheat.

Table 3: Major Sources of Nigeria's Cereals Imports 1970-79

Sources	Maize (%)	Rice (%)	Wheat (%)
U.S.A.	46.8	48.6	84.5
U.K.	15.3	13.2	—
GDR	8.6	14.8	—
Netherlands	—	9.2	5.8
France	—	8.1	1.5
Canada	—	—	5.5
African countries*	16.8	2.3	—
Total supplied	87.5	96.2	97.3

Note: \*These include Cameroun, Benin Republic and Liberia.

Source: *Nigeria Trade Summary Dec. Issues, 1970-79.*

### MODEL SPECIFICATION AND REGRESSION RESULTS

Based upon the postulates of economic theory, data availability and the operation of the Nigerian economy, it is hypothesised that the Nigeria's import demand function for maize, wheat and rice may be characterised by equation d:

$$X_{it} = f(C_{it}, Y_t, E_{t-1}, D_{it-1}, P_t, U_{it}) \dots \dots (1)$$

where

$X_{it}$  = quantity in metric tonnes of the *i*th cereal food import in year *t*,

$C_{it}$  = unit landing cost of the *i*th cereal food import deflated by the corresponding consumer price index for food,

$Y_t$  = real national income (deflator was the food price index),

$E_{t-1}$  = Nigeria's external reserves (without gold) lagged one year,

$D_{it-1}$  = Index of domestic production of the *i*th cereal crop lagged one year,

$P_t$  = population estimates and,

$U_{it}$  = error term in respect of the *i*th cereal crop.

Positive signs are expected on the coefficients of  $Y_t$ ,  $E_{t-1}$  and  $P_t$  while the coefficients of  $C_{it}$  and  $D_{it-1}$  are expected to bear negative signs.

### EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The ordinary Least Squares was used to estimate the parameters of the above function and the results are presented in equations 2, 3 and 4 below. (The Standard errors are in the brackets).



$$\begin{aligned} \text{RICE } \text{Log}X_{1t} = & - 3.23 - 1.17\text{Log}C_{1t} + 1.04\text{Log}Y_t + 1.08\text{Log}E_{t-1} \\ & (0.59) \quad (0.47) \quad (0.27) \\ & + 0.56\text{Log}D_{1t-1} + 3.48\text{Log}P_t \dots\dots\dots (2) \\ & (0.24) \quad (1.64) \end{aligned}$$

$$R^2 = 0.74, F = 17.23, D.W. = 1.65$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{MAIZE } \text{Log}X_{2t} = & 86.78 - 1.24\text{Log}C_{2t} + 0.52\text{Log}Y_t + 0.21\text{Log}E_{t-1} \\ & (0.63) \quad (1.25) \quad (0.10) \\ & - 0.83\text{Log}D_{2t-1} + 12.10\text{Log}P_t \dots\dots\dots (3) \\ & (0.38) \quad (4.78) \end{aligned}$$

$$R^2 = 0.91, F = 56.76, D.W. = 1.66$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{WHEAT } \text{Log}X_{3t} = & 5.68 - 0.73\text{Log}C_{3t} + 0.87\text{Log}Y_t + 0.16\text{Log}E_{t-1} \\ & (0.43) \quad (0.40) \quad (0.05) \\ & + 2.03\text{Log}P_t \dots\dots\dots (4) \\ & (1.00) \end{aligned}$$

$$R^2 = 0.61, F = 9.57, D.W. = 2.20$$

The above results show that the postulated explanatory variables explain between 61 and 91 percent of the variations in the quantities of the cereal foods studied. The standard errors reveal that the coefficients of the unit landing cost are consistently non-significant at the 5 percent level for the three cereal foodstuffs. This evidence tends to suggest that although the variable might have some impact on the quantities of cereal imports, this influence is rather a weak one. The only other variable whose coefficient is not significant at the 5 percent level is  $\text{Log}Y_t$  in equation (3).

The Durbin-Watson (D.W.) statistic was subjected to the serial correlation test, and the test showed absence of auto-correlated residuals at the 5 percent level. The overall result as evaluated by the «F» statistic supported the theoretical construct at the 5 percent level for all the three commodities.

The sign on the coefficient of each of the variables is consistent with a priori expectation with the exception of the positive sign on the coefficient of  $D_{it-1}$  which suggests that an increase in the quantity of domestic rice production causes larger rice imports, other things being held constant. From the standpoint of logical reasoning, this seems to characterise perverse behaviour. However, when viewed from the Nigerian socio-economic context, this behaviour may be rationalised by the quality factor argument. It is common knowledge that the domestic rice production is poorer in quality relative to the imported rice varieties. As incomes increase over time, there seems to be a tendency for households to shift their preference to the imported rice varieties even in spite of increases in local production.

When step-wise regression was applied in the rice model, the result revealed that the national income variable accounted for 55.3 per cent of the change in  $R^2$ , followed by population (11.2 percent), external reserves (9.3 percent), unit landing cost (3 percent) and index of domestic production 0.10 percent. For maize, population variable contributed 90.4 percent to the change in  $R^2$  while the remaining variables together accounted for 2.1 percent. The step-wise regression for wheat also showed population variable as contributing 55.5 percent of the change in  $R^2$ , followed by the national income (6.4 percent), foreign exchange (4.4 percent) and the unit landing (0.08 percent).

To improve our economic understanding of the results, the income elasticity coefficients as well as the marginal propensities to import (MPI) the cereal commodities were computed and presented in table 4. The table reveals that Nigeria has a rather high MPI for cereal food commodities.

Table 4: Nigeria's estimated income elasticity of cereal imports and MPI

Commodity	MPI	Income Elasticity
Maize	0.0001	0.5200
Rice	0.0017	1.0410
Wheat	0.0054	0.8730

Source: *Computed from the results of the analysis.*

For example, an increase of one million naira in the national income, other things remaining fixed, will, on the average, encourage the import of 1,700 metric tonnes of rice, 5,400 metric tonnes of wheat and 100 metric tonnes of maize. These expenditures are surely an avoidable drain on the nation's scarce and dwindling foreign reserves as these commodities can be produced in sufficient quantities locally and the qualities improved so that they can be comparable in quality with the imported varieties.

The table also indicates that the import demand for rice is income elastic, suggesting that this commodity is regarded as a luxury item which must be highly income sensitive. As for the import demand for maize and wheat, the table reveals they are income inelastic, but their magnitudes are sufficiently large to give rise to some concern, especially from the political economy point of view. Nigeria can produce larger quantities of maize from domestic sources to meet national requirements and can possibly do so to a lesser extent with respect to wheat.

## POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The evidence of this analysis has shown that much of the imports of maize, wheat and rice in Nigeria between 1950 and 1979 were caused by factors such as increases in population, national income, foreign exchange reserves and shortages in domestic production. The effect of changes in unit landing costs was found to be significant statistically. Thus, raising import duties as a policy measure to control the import of these commodities may not have much of the desired result. In the alternative, however, the government may place these items on licence so as to regulate the amount that is imported. Thus, physical control measure will prove more effective than fiscal measures.

The crucial policy variables which should be manipulated are national income, population growth and shortages in domestic production. As regards the national income what needs be done is to affect redistribution in such a manner that favours the masses of the low-income class. It is a known fact that most of the imported foods in Nigeria are purchased by high income urban dwellers who have acquired strong tastes for foreign foods as revealed by ADESIMI and LADIPO (1979). A redistribution of income in favour of the low income group will tend to reduce the purchasing power of the relatively few powerful rich. It is, however, recognised that as income is more evenly distributed, the «demonstration effect» may cause the low-income class to consume more imported foodstuffs. This, of course, may not be true for all, particularly for the rural people.

The second policy measure of significance is the control of population growth. This is a long-term measure. In all the regression results, the population variable was found to be an important factor which contributed to the increase in the import demand. It should be pointed out that apart from the impact of population growth on food demand, population growth also affects food supply through its influence on the land-man ratio, household savings, dependency ratio, the capacity to invest in new high-yielding technical inputs and on farm structure and pattern of organisation. In the light of these disadvantages, it is suggested that a national population control policy be formulated which will be implemented by a National Population Control Board to be set up to assume responsibility for working out family planning and birth control programs all over the Federation.

It is admitted that a National Population Control Plan is a difficult program to execute within the framework of Nigeria's socio-political culture. The difficulties will arise because of the practice of polygamy, the preference for male or female children among the people depending on whether you are a southern or a northern Nigerian, the high rate of infant mortality which encourages having many children as an insurance to increase survivors, the ignorance of the majority of the educationally disadvantaged, the resistance of the church to such policies and the overt political advantage gained by states having large population. Despite these formidable forces, it is believed that Nigeria should seriously consider population control measures if food demand is to be kept in tune with domestic production.

On the supply side, the long-term solution inevitably rests on policy measures to effectively increase production and productivity. The various programs reviewed in preceding sections seem to be ineffective because of the lack of political will to execute these plans. Governments should separate politics from purely developmental programs if these are to have effective impact on the growth of the economy.

It is suggested that the strategy for raising food output and productivity should be based on the following two broad policies: (a) encouragement of small-holders to increase their productivity through the use of high-yielding seed varieties, the use of appropriate fertilizers, irrigation, the acquisition of technical skills by the farmers and availability of credit and subsidy.

(b) encouragement of large-scale mechanised farms to be set up by private individuals and private commercial institutions. The government should restrict its activities to demonstration and research and provision of infrastructures, and should relinquish the idea of direct participation in food production as this often leads to inefficiency and wasteful use of resources.

The idea that small-holders cannot promote innovation and productivity increases in agriculture is not supported by history. For example, experiences of Japan, Taiwan and Korea clearly demonstrated that small farmers could be highly productive and innovative. Coming home to Nigeria, the Nigerian agricultural history reveals that the small farmers substantially increased the production of cash crops to make Nigeria a major producer and exporter of groundnut, cocoa, palm produce and cotton in the early 1950 up to the mid 1960's. This great stride was achieved through the existence of guaranteed markets and payment of remunerative prices.

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RESUME

*La croissance phénoménale des importations nigérianes de céréales durant ces dix ou vingt dernières années a posé un sérieux problème aux planificateurs, aux hommes politiques et aux économistes spécialistes des problèmes liés à l'agriculture.*

*Cet article – à travers une analyse statistique, examine les facteurs qui ont joué des rôles importants dans cette poussée de la demande de maïs, de blé et de riz pendant la période couvrant les années 1950 à 1979. Des preuves ont révélé que la croissance des revenus, des populations, des réserves extérieures et la chute de la production intérieure en étaient responsables. La mauvaise qualité de la production nationale a contribué aux accroissements considérables de la demande pour un riz importé mieux traité.*

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## L'ETAT ET LA SOCIETE EN AFRIQUE

By

P. ANYANG'NYONG'O\*

Quels sont le caractère et la nature de l'Etat dans les sociétés post-coloniales ? Quelles relations existe-t-il entre l'Etat et la Société ? Y-a-t-il une classe spécifique dont les intérêts économiques prévalent sur ceux des autres classes, qui exerce un pouvoir politique sur la société et mérite donc l'appellation de : classe dirigeante dans ces sociétés ? Que fait cette classe lorsqu'elle est au pouvoir : gouverne-t-elle tout simplement par la force en s'alliant à d'autres ; ce qui lui confère un caractère légitime ? ou monopolise-t-elle tous les instruments du pouvoir et oblige-t-elle ainsi toutes les autres classes sociales à s'incliner devant elle par crainte et par respect ?

Les questions précédentes soulèvent des points autour desquels se sont articulées les discussions entre Marxistes sur la nature et le caractère de l'Etat en général. Cependant nous allons nous limiter aux aspects de ce débat qui concernent directement l'Etat moderne en Afrique au Sud du Sahara. Nous traiterons peut-être plus tard les questions posées par Perry ANDERSON (1) et d'autres auteurs qui ont récemment passé en revue les théories marxistes de l'Etat ; puis nous statuerons sur leur utilité dans l'analyse de la situation en Afrique (2).

### PROBLEMATIQUE DE L'ETAT DANS LES SOCIETES POST-COLONIALES

Dans une étude qui influe de plus en plus sur les discussions relatives à l'Etat en Afrique post-coloniale, Hamza ALAVI (3) avançait les hypothèses suivantes : 1) Lors de l'accession à l'indépendance, toute colonie dotée d'une bourgeoisie faible et sous développée sera incapable d'assurer le contrôle de l'appareil d'Etat colonial assez développé grâce auquel la puissance Métropolitaine avait exercé sa domination sur la colonie en question. Cependant, en raison de la nouvelle convergence d'intérêts des trois classes possédantes rivales, *sous le patronage de la Métropole*, une oligarchie de type bureaucratique-militaire parviendra à servir de médiateur entre ces intérêts et ces doléances compétitifs et non plus opposés. L'Etat acquerra ainsi une autonomie relative et ne sera plus un simple instrument au service d'une des classes (possédantes et rivalisantes) suivantes : la bourgeoisie locale, les bourgeoisies métropolitaines néo-coloniales et les classes terriennes. Cette autonomie relative de l'appareil d'Etat revêt une importance toute particulière pour les bourgeoisies néo-coloniales *qui grâce à ce fait* sont en mesure de poursuivre leurs intérêts de classe dans les sociétés post-coloniales.

En d'autres termes, (a) *la classe dirigeante* est en réalité une alliance de classes composée des trois classes possédantes ; (b) elle est cependant une classe *dépendante* car elle doit sa place au patronage de la bourgeoisie métropolitaine ; (c) les trois classes se font la concurrence, cependant leurs intérêts ne sont pas opposés ; (d) pour préserver cette « communauté

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d'intérêts», le maintien et la reproduction d'un ordre permettant à leurs intérêts d'être préservés et de se reproduire s'imposent. Ces intérêts sont : l'appropriation des surplus, l'exploitation de la main-d'œuvre, la vie dans l'aisance, l'exercice du pouvoir politique, un rang social élevé, etc... (e) mais c'est précisément cette *concurrence* entre les classes dirigeantes qui, en dernière analyse, offre la possibilité à l'Etat – en tant que forme organisée du pouvoir social au sein d'une société – de prendre des mesures pour reproduire les conditions nécessaires au maintien de l'autonomie relative des privilèges économiques et sociaux propres à chacune des classes au pouvoir. L'Etat est pour ainsi dire, selon les expressions de MARX et ENGELS, *Leur Etat*, – un comité exécutif chargé de gérer leurs *affaires communes* – sans pour autant être *un instrument à leur service*. La réalité de la concurrence procure à l'Etat une autonomie relative vis-à-vis de toutes les classes. 2) La seconde hypothèse avancée par ALAVI était la suivante : du point de vue marxiste classique, l'on ne peut considérer le pouvoir militaire et la bureaucratie dans les sociétés post-coloniales comme de simples instruments au service d'une *seule* classe. La particularité des alignements structurels tenant aux liens coloniaux et les réalignements apparus au cours de la période post-coloniale ont conféré une plus grande complexité aux relations entre l'Etat et les classes sociales. Il existe sur le plan historique une différence nette entre les deux modèles. Dans les sociétés occidentales, l'Etat-Nation a été instauré – bien que le processus ait varié selon qu'il s'agissait de l'Angleterre ou de la France, de l'Italie ou de l'Allemagne (4) – *par les bourgeoisies locales* une fois que leur autorité s'est affirmée ; et ce, en vue de mettre en place une législation et diverses institutions essentielles à l'établissement de rapports de production capitalistes. Dans les sociétés coloniales, le processus a été sensiblement différent. Comment ?

a) L'Etat bourgeois et les super-structures juridiques et institutionnelles dont il s'assortit sont créés dans le cadre de la «révolution bourgeoise» dans la colonie ; en d'autres termes une société civile est créée par la bourgeoisie métropolitaine qui impose ainsi ses intérêts aux formations sociales pré-capitalistes.

b) Il s'ensuit une reproduction de la super-structure de l'Etat métropolitain dans la colonie où il n'existe pas encore de fondement social pour un état capitaliste, c'est-à-dire, un contexte social favorable à l'évolution de ces super-structures.

c) L'Etat colonial exerce par conséquent son autorité sur toutes les classes sociales locales et constitue l'instrument de domination, *par excellence*, de la bourgeoisie métropolitaine.

d) Cet Etat très développé (bureaucratie, militaire, législation, idéologie, fonctionnaires) survit au colonialisme et devient l'instrument de domination des nouvelles classes locales au pouvoir. Dans la majorité des cas il continue à recevoir des subventions de la (des) puissance(s) Métropolitaine(s) pour ses activités ; ainsi la dépendance de cette classe dirigeante paraît à tous de manière évidente. Depuis l'indépendance, l'appareil d'Etat continue à être une charge extrêmement lourde pour la société : l'on équipe les armées d'avions mirages, les président de hordes d'informateurs secrets et les ministres de l'information de puissantes stations émettrices en vue de répandre leur propagande dans toutes les cases ; et l'entretien de ce monstre

l'extraction des surplus auprès des paysans pauvres dont la majorité vit au-dessous du seuil de pauvreté défini par la Banque Mondiale.

e) Les politiciens civils (nationalistes) qui ont lutté pour obtenir leur indépendance, se trouvent extrêmement limités dans leurs actions non pas seulement en raison du caractère néo-colonial de l'économie (qui entraîne la dépendance) mais également à cause de la nature néo-coloniale du gigantesque appareil d'Etat de type bureaucratie-militaire (structuré de façon à reproduire la dépendance). L'Etat est pour ainsi dire néo-colonial de par son évolution et de par sa structure. Cependant, quelle que soit la conjoncture, divers types de régimes peuvent s'instaurer dans un tel Etat en fonction du niveau atteint par les luttes de classes et du développement des contradictions sociales. ALAVI n'a fait référence qu'à «l'oligarchie bureaucratique-militaire» – type de régime qui se rapproche considérablement de celui des deux sociétés qu'il a citées en exemple : Le Pakistan et le Bangladesh. Nous estimons cependant qu'il convient de faire une distinction entre *l'Etat néo-colonial* et les divers *types de régimes* qui pourraient en être l'expression dans n'importe quelle conjoncture donnée. ALAVI a en quelque sorte fait une confusion entre la définition générale de l'Etat néo-colonial et les alliances de classes, et «les pactes de domination» qui caractérisent la politique de certains régimes néo-coloniaux.

C'est précisément parce que la (les) bourgeoisie (s) locale (s) accède (nt) au pouvoir politique avant de parvenir au pouvoir social qu'elle (s) se sert (servent) de l'Etat pour conquérir celui-ci. Dans ces sociétés, affirme Ralph MILIBAND, «l'Etat se représente lui-même en ce sens que les responsables de l'appareil d'Etat se servent en général de leur pouvoir pour, entre autres, promouvoir leurs propres intérêts économiques et ceux de leurs familles, de leurs amis et sympathisants, ou de leurs clients. Un processus d'enrichissement se déclenche sous des formes très variées...» – selon le type de régime en place –, qui débouche sur une prolifération d'entreprises et d'activités économiques (5) – variant également en fonction du type de régime. «Une véritable bourgeoisie locale naît *parfois* au cours de ce processus» ajoute MILIBAND «et s'affermi tout en maintenant des liens étroits avec l'Etat et ses responsables qui, eux-mêmes, appartiennent à la nouvelle bourgeoisie». (6)

Par conséquent, dans le contexte néo-colonial, il y a une intervention dans l'ordre des pouvoirs *économique* et *politique* : «ce n'est pas le pouvoir économique qui engendre le pouvoir et l'influence politiques. Ce n'est pas lui non plus qui guide la prise de décision politique. C'est plutôt à partir du pouvoir politique (qui, ici, prend également le sens de pouvoir administratif et militaire) que se forme une classe économique puissante qui, avec le temps, peut devenir une classe dominante. L'Etat apparaît donc ici comme la source et l'instrument du pouvoir économique : le pouvoir d'Etat est un moyen de production essentiel. (7) L'Etat maintient-il donc son «autonomie relative» par rapport aux classes dominantes qui rivalisent si, comme l'affirme MILIBAND, ceux qui occupent des postes gouvernementaux doivent en faire usage pour *s'enrichir directement*, et enrichir leurs amis, leurs parents et leurs partisans ?



MILIBAND, contrairement à ALAVI, nie l'existence d'une classe bourgeoise dominante dans une formation sociale néo-coloniale (au début des indépendances politiques officielles). « Cette classe est encore en pleine formation », d'après lui. Il est parfaitement possible, évidemment, de relever dans tous ces pays, outre les grandes industries étrangères qui y existent peut-être et qui forment des « poches de grandes entreprises », dans un contexte sous-développé, des entrepreneurs et des commerçants dispersés un peu partout. Mais l'on ne peut pas dire sérieusement de ceux-ci qu'ils constituent une classe dominante sur le plan économique (8).

A cet égard le point de vue de MILIBAND se rapproche beaucoup plus du nôtre. Nous avons avancé ailleurs (9), que l'existence de capitalistes dans une société (propriétaires de moyens de production, employeurs, usurpateurs de la plus-value et accumulateurs de capitaux — c'est le cas des 'capitalistes de la périphérie' dans une mesure très limitée) n'impliquait pas automatiquement celle d'une classe bourgeoise dominante dans cette société. D'après Samir AMIN (10), il est nécessaire de faire une distinction entre une bourgeoisie nationale et une bourgeoisie comprador (le terme comprador vient du verbe espagnol 'comprar' : acheter. Il s'agit donc d'une bourgeoisie que l'on rencontre beaucoup plus dans le monde du commerce que dans le secteur de l'industrie). La bourgeoisie nationale est une classe qui a su établir son hégémonie sur les autres classes et qui (1) *contrôle* donc la reproduction de la force de travail (d'où la stratégie de « développement » et notamment l'équilibre rural-urbain, la production alimentaire etc...); (2) *contrôle* l'extraction du surplus et sa répartition ; (3) *contrôle* le marché; (4) *contrôle* la technologie dans une certaine mesure. La bourgeoisie comprador est celle qui, ne *contrôlant pas dans des proportions raisonnables les domaines ci-dessus énumérés*, se voit forcée d'accepter une *position subalterne* dans le cadre de l'« interdépendance » qui caractérise le monde.

Il importe aussi d'employer le 'terme — concept' de 'bourgeoisie' avec ses connotations socio-politiques. Etre capitaliste ne veut pas nécessairement dire être un « bourgeois » à part entière : il existe de nombreux lumpen-capitalistes et de nombreux paysans capitalistes qui ne sont d'aucune utilité pour la bourgeoisie dans leurs luttes de classes. L'on rencontre parallèlement un grand nombre de 'gentlemen à l'esprit bourgeois' qui constituent ce que l'on pourrait appeler une 'classe Tampon' entre les exploiters de travailleurs salariés et une 'classe ouvrière dotée d'un potentiel latent de furie'. Nous estimons, quant à nous, qu'une bourgeoisie émerge d'un monde de capitalistes lorsque, sur le plan politique (luttes de classes), ceux-ci parviennent à imposer leurs « intérêts communs » et contrôlent en même temps la voie du progrès économique et social. Comme Kwame AMOA (11) l'a si bien relevé, ce progrès social n'a pas besoin d'avantager toutes les couches sociales : cela n'a jamais existé dans l'histoire du Capitalisme. La mission historique du Capital n'est pas de développer le milieu dans lequel il se trouve, mais plutôt de se développer lui-même sous l'impulsion de la maximisation du profit. Là où le milieu, c'est-à-dire les classes locales dominées, est inclus dans ce développement, c'est toujours par suite de contrainte — l'existence d'obstacles politiques dans le milieu ; entre autres, les syndicats et autres formes de pression politique contre l'exploitation capitaliste.

Mais la différence entre le capitalisme des pays industriels avancés et celui de la périphérie réside dans le fait que, sur le plan historique, la bourgeoisie des pays capitalistes développés était en mesure de faire face, aux niveaux politique et économique, à la pression exercée par les classes inférieures en associant en grande partie ces classes dominées aux «avantages» qu'apporte le progrès capitaliste. C'est précisément en raison du contrôle qu'elle exerçait sur les éléments énumérés ci-dessus, que la bourgeoisie comprador pouvait faire des concessions réformistes réduisant le paupérisme et la misère au lieu d'en faire les constantes du «progrès capitalistes» (appelé, à bon escient, sous-développement) tel que c'est le cas actuellement en Afrique au Sud du Sahara. Dans les situations où le développement capitaliste a tendance à réduire de plus en plus les hommes à une apuvreté abjecte, il est donc possible que les formes d'Etat et de régime qui voient le jour ne soient pas nécessairement marquées par les «compromis de classe» que l'on associe en général au développement du capitalisme occidental. Comment gouvernent donc les classes au pouvoir dans ces circonstances, par exemple dans les sociétés africaines post-coloniales ?

La classe dominante dans les sociétés africaines post-coloniales est la(les) bourgeoisie(s) métropolitaine(s) et c'est sa prédominance, sa suprématie sur le capitalisme mondial en général que l'Etat impose systématiquement (12). Ceci n'empêche pas cependant les classes locales dirigeantes (ou au pouvoir) d'essayer systématiquement de se servir de leur autorité au niveau de l'Etat (en tant que «pacte de domination» au sein de l'Etat-Nation) pour promouvoir leurs propres intérêts de classe.

L'Etat néo-colonial est une institution bien délimitée dans laquelle les capitalistes locaux en tant que classe dirigeante sont habilités à prendre des mesures allant dans le sens des intérêts du Capital, et ce faisant, dans leurs propres intérêts (13). Bien qu'il ne soit pas autonome, l'on se rend compte que grâce à sa souplesse il peut s'adapter à divers types de régimes et à toutes les mesures offrant aux compradors locaux la possibilité de devenir puissants et d'assurer une direction politique. C'est seulement dans les cas où les véritables intérêts du Capital sont menacés (soit par la négligence, l'inefficacité, la corruption ou le nationalisme économique agressif des compradors, ou par une tentative des masses populaires pour prendre le pouvoir — cf. les cas du Zaïre sous le régime de MOBUTU et le Ghana sous le second régime de RAWLINGS) que celui-ci intervient par le biais du F.M.I. ou des «greenboats» pour remettre de l'ordre. Ces limites assez souples facilitent les interventions du F.M.I. et de divers types de régimes dans la mesure où le système d'Etat néo-colonial est préservé.

Toutes sortes de conflits apparaissent alors en général d'une conjoncture à l'autre ou d'une néo-colonie donnée à l'autre, entre les capitalistes locaux et les bourgeoisies étrangères ; entre les capitalistes locaux et les masses ; entre les masses et leurs oppresseurs capitalistes. C'est à ce fait que nous devons la variété de régimes politiques que l'on rencontre en Afrique. Mais il convient de ne pas voir dans cette variété différentes formes d'Etat ; il y a des différences entre les types de régimes, ce qui ne change en rien le caractère néo-colonial des états dépendants (14).

Dans le contexte du néo-colonialisme un régime contribue parfois à une organisation de l'économie favorable au Capital étranger au détriment des intérêts du Capital local, selon le degré atteint par la lutte des classes et le régime politique en place; à d'autres moments il apporte son assistance aux capitalistes locaux, délaissant les capitalistes étrangers (15). Cependant jamais il n'abandonnerait sa mission de protecteur des intérêts capitalistes pour se mettre au service des masses populaires, des travailleurs et surtout des paysans. Lorsque les masses populaires menacent de détruire le Capital (de tous les Capitalistes) ou de se l'approprier, l'Etat est obligé de préserver, en dernière analyse, les intérêts du Capital étranger.

Après avoir traité quelques-uns des sujets à controverse relatifs à la nature et au caractère de l'Etat néo-colonial, nous allons faire une esquisse de l'Etat et une typologie des régimes politiques qui ont vu le jour en Afrique dans le cadre de cet Etat.

## TYPES D'ETATS ET DE REGIMES EN AFRIQUE

En résumé l'Etat moderne en Afrique est un Etat capitaliste à caractère néo-colonial : il est doté d'institutions, d'appareils, de méthodes et d'une idéologie qui soutiennent l'ordre social capitaliste. En tant que capitaliste, l'Etat est un phénomène ayant des incidences sur un territoire bien précis : l'Etat-Nation. Par exemple les gens se déplacent avec des passeports portant le nom d'un Etat spécifique ; ils appartiennent à cet Etat en qualité de *citoyens* ayant des droits et des devoirs qui les enchaînent à des lois particulières et qui les libèrent de certaines obligations essentielles. En théorie, l'Etat ne dépend des intérêts d'aucun individu et semble représenter ceux de la nation entière. En pratique, il protège les intérêts des classes dominantes sur le plan économique et capables de se servir du pouvoir d'Etat pour modifier l'ordre juridique et par la même occasion redéfinir les lois que l'Etat devrait soutenir. Lorsque des lois et des décrets adoptés par l'Etat semblent favoriser ouvertement les intérêts de certaines couches parmi les classes de domination, celles-ci s'efforcent de les justifier en disant qu'en dernière analyse, ils sont fonctionnels pour l'ensemble de la société. Il importe de justifier constamment les conséquences des mesures prises par l'Etat, dans le cadre de l'exercice du pouvoir politique – que ce soit en condamnant à mort des voleurs armés ou en déclarant un Président élu à l'unanimité sans avoir procédé à quelque élection que ce soit – par le fait qu'elles vont dans le sens des intérêts de la société en général.

A la différence de l'Etat dans les sociétés capitalistes avancées, l'Etat néo-colonial *n'a pas de classe locale dominante et indépendante jouissant d'une suprématie sur la société* ; et par conséquent il y a constamment rupture ou désarticulation entre l'Etat et la société civile. Cette désarticulation apparaît par exemple dans le fait que les images populaires proposées comme idéologies pour donner un caractère légitime à l'Etat ne sont pas renforcées par les politiques réellement pratiquées par l'Etat. Les idéologies qui dans la plupart des néo-colonies de l'Afrique donnent un caractère légitime à l'Etat sont en général enracinées dans la *tradition libérale-démocrate*. En raison de la politique de nationalisme fondée sur la mobilisation des masses, ces idéologies ont également tendance à être très imprégnées

de *populisme*. En pratique cependant, peu d'états ont la possibilité de poursuivre des politiques économiques populistes ou encore de maintenir des méthodes libérales – démocrates de gouvernement. Dans les pays occidentaux, la dynamique économique donne de la crédibilité à l'éthos libéral-démocrate ; en Afrique, par contre, l'incapacité de l'Etat à protéger même la vie de ses citoyens (les famines sont fréquentes, les guerres civiles menacent souvent la viabilité de l'Etat-Nation par suite de conjonctures économiques difficiles, etc...) sans oublier son incapacité à tempérer la gravité des conflits de classes par des programmes d'indemnités de chômage par exemple, constitue une entrave pour l'Etat dans sa recherche de légitimité par l'adoption d'une idéologie populiste ou libérale-démocrate. Face à la réalité socio-économique concrète, ce type d'idéologie ne fait que réduire la marge de crédibilité que les masses populaires accordent au régime. Les problèmes posés par le développement du capitalisme dans les néo-colonies au moment où le développement général du capitalisme était dans sa phase impérialiste expliquent en grande partie pourquoi ces idéologies «ne tiennent pas».

Le Développement Capitaliste implique une socialisation accrue du Travail et une augmentation constante de la production de biens pendant que les détenteurs du Capital veillent à accumuler celui-ci. Au cours de ce processus – *la plus grande partie de la population* (et non la population entière) est associée au rapport Capital – Travail sans pour autant être dans la misère ou la pauvreté totale. En tant que tel, bien que le développement du Capital assure tout d'abord le bien-être du capitaliste, il apporte également aux classes opprimées un nouveau mode de vie amélioré ; ce qui permet au message : 'régimes capitalistes pour le bien de tous', de bien pénétrer l'esprit de ceux qui suent quotidiennement pour l'accumulation du Capital par d'autres. Mais là où le règne du Capital n'aboutit ni à la socialisation accrue du Travail, ni à l'accroissement permanent de la production de biens, ni à l'amélioration des conditions de vie des classes dominées, il est difficile d'assurer la suprématie du Capital sur le Travail. C'est le cas de l'Afrique. Les capitalistes règnent en général mais dans une situation de «vide hégémonique». Les classes dominantes constituent des régimes de 'pactes de domination' divers dont certains sont des 'régimes présidentiels' puissants et d'autres des régimes civils et militaires peu confiants et semant la terreur. Nous allons procéder à l'analyse de ces 'pactes de domination', et voir comment ils naissent, en nous référant à une situation que nous connaissons particulièrement bien, celle du Kenya.

En raison des conflits sociaux entre les classes (difficultés à préserver la cohésion au sein du pacte de domination, et évolution constante de la conjoncture économique et politique internationale à cause de la crise que traverse l'impérialisme), ces pactes de domination ont tendance à se rompre de temps à autre ; ce qui a abouti à de fréquents changements de régimes par l'intermédiaire de *coups* d'état militaires, de coups d'état dans les palais présidentiels ; à l'auto-proclamation de révolutions et à l'effondrement quasi-total d'Etat-Nations. Il convient donc de chercher l'explication de si nombreux coups d'état militaires en Afrique non pas dans le postulat selon lequel la tendance des militaires à «intervenir dans la

politique» dans les pays en développement, serait la source de ces problèmes, mais plutôt en posant la question de savoir pourquoi les 'pactes de domination' — dans des situations de «vide hégémonique» marquées par un capitalisme rétrograde — ont tendance à engendrer souvent des changements de régimes politiques. Une distinction s'impose, à ce niveau, entre *hégémonie* et *pacte de domination*, deux notions clés permettant de faire la différence entre l'Etat dans les sociétés capitalistes néo-coloniales peu avancées et l'Etat dans les sociétés capitalistes développées.

## HEGEMONIE ET 'PACTE DE DOMINATION'

Dans les formations sociales des sociétés capitalistes avancées, la classe dominante pratique en général une *politique d'hégémonie*. Dans ces formations sociales, la domination d'une classe sur les autres ne peut être simplement réduite à un acte de *force*, de violence ou de répression. Le sens premier de domination et celui qu'il a retenu des traditions (passées) et de la culture politique qui s'est transmise d'une génération à l'autre est celui du 'consentement *actif*' (16) des classes dominées. Dans les formations sociales néo-coloniales, le consentement que la classe dominante obtient des classes dominées est toujours de nature conjoncturelle (exemple : pendant les brèves périodes de transition d'un gouvernement à un autre). Par contre les masses populaires, tenues à l'écart du processus politique et exhortées surtout à être loyales, sont en général indifférentes aux événements quotidiens lorsqu'elles ne sont pas engagées dans une lutte *active* contre le régime.

Dans les sociétés capitalistes avancées, la bourgeoisie en tant que classe organisée à l'échelle mondiale, impose sa vision du monde à la société et lui fait adopter par conséquent une conscience idéologique et une conception de la réalité particulièrement bourgeoises. Ainsi, les conceptions populaires de propriété privée, de succès, de justice, d'équité, de bon gouvernement, de légitimité, de démocratie, d'obligation sociale, de rébellion, de terrorisme, de révolution, de Marxisme, de socialisme, et de l'Homme sont essentiellement bourgeoises. C'est ce qu'ont démontré de façon plus que satisfaisante les études sur le comportement et les sondages d'opinion menés aux Etats-Unis (17). Ces *croyances communes*, ces différents degrés d'*intégration sociale* ou ce que l'on a appelé *culture politique* des sociétés capitalistes avancées forment ensemble l'idéologie hégémonique bourgeoise qui pousse les classes dominées à accorder leur consentement actif à la domination de la bourgeoisie.

Dans quelles conditions peut-on *implanter* dans la société ce type d'hégémonie bourgeoise ? Seule l'étude du processus d'émergence de cette hégémonie dans les pays capitalistes développés va nous permettre de répondre à cette question. L'examen de l'histoire des pays occidentaux nous conduit à avancer l'hypothèse suivante : dans les situations où le succès économique est greffé sur le pouvoir politique et où le fait d'occuper un poste gouvernemental est associé à des privilèges économiques (accumulation de capital, richesse, propriété), la classe dirigeante a des difficultés à mettre au point une idéologie qui pousserait les classes à donner leur consentement actif. En Tanzanie, par exemple, l'*Ujamaa*, en tant qu'idéologie

populiste parvint à obtenir effectivement le consentement actif des masses populaires pour le régime au pouvoir, pendant une brève période après la Déclaration d'Arusha en 1967. Mais une fois que les masses comprirent que leur situation économique n'avait pas vraiment changé depuis l'instauration de ce «socialisme», et que les postes gouvernementaux procuraient des avantages économiques à la classe au pouvoir, elles commencèrent à considérer ce «socialisme» sous un angle sceptique. L'indifférence s'installa alors et le régime devint de plus en plus intolérant envers ceux qui critiquaient son «socialisme» à cause de son illogisme interne et des contradictions entre les théories énoncées et la pratique.

Dans les sociétés néo-coloniales, les classes dirigeantes incapables d'assurer leur suprématie, ne peuvent diriger que par le truchement de pactes de domination. Le pacte de domination est une alliance – dont on ne connaît pas vraiment la force interne – d'individus représentant les forces sociales les plus importantes d'une société, telles qu'elles sont définies par la classe dominante elle-même. C'est à ces individus qu'incombe la tâche, en tant que représentants de la nation (quelle que soit la façon dont ils ont été sélectionnés), d'obtenir le consentement populaire (et par voie de conséquence, le soutien) pour le régime. C'est ainsi que des individus sont nommés à des postes gouvernementaux non pas en tant qu'individus, mais en qualité de représentants de divers groupes d'intérêts que le régime estime essentiels à la création d'un pacte solide de domination politique dans la société. Si dans cette équation, d'autres forces sociales qui se sentent ignorées parviennent à faire surface – comme c'est toujours le cas dans une conjoncture économique en mutation perpétuelle – le pacte de domination peut alors facilement perdre sa mainmise sur la société et l'effondrement ou de fréquentes périodes d'instabilité de régimes peuvent s'ensuivre. C'est dans le cadre de cette problématique qu'il nous est possible de mieux appréhender les instabilités de régimes en Afrique (et donc les fréquents changements de gouvernements tout en préservant l'Etat dans sa forme néo-coloniale).

## ETAT, TYPES DE REGIMES ET LUTTE DE CLASSES AU KENYA

Nous n'avons pas la prétention dans une étude de ce genre, de faire un compte-rendu adéquat de l'histoire du Kenya depuis son indépendance. Ce travail a déjà été accompli avec compétence par Colin LEYS dans un ouvrage qui reste parmi tant d'autres, le plus informatif sur l'économie politique du Kenya après la colonisation (18). Nous choisirons certains points importants relevés par LEYS, qui nous serviront d'illustrations à certains problèmes théoriques traités dans cette étude.

En partant du point de vue de Kwame NKRUH sur le néo-colonialisme, LEYS préfère traiter le néo-colonialisme «non pas tout simplement comme une politique impérialiste de forme particulière, applicable aux ex-colonies... mais aussi comme une forme particulière de vie politique, sociale et économique – ou de lutte de classes – propre à certaines anciennes colonies. Dans ces colonies nous classons celles où la transition entre le colonialisme et l'indépendance (ou indépendance politique formelle) a permis au pouvoir politique d'être *transféré* assez efficacement

à un régime fondé sur le soutien de classes sociales ayant des liens très étroits avec les intérêts étrangers représentés antérieurement par l'Etat colonial» (20). Le néo-colonialisme est ainsi perçu par NKRUMAH comme une 'étape' de l'histoire de l'impérialisme mais ce n'est pas 'la dernière étape de l'impérialisme' selon LEYS. «Le néo-colonialisme est, à mon sens, une étape qui, de par sa nature interne, va probablement engendrer d'autres formes d'impérialisme par suite de l'inter-action des deux processus suivants. Premièrement, le néo-colonialisme *reproduit et aggrave le sous-développement*; il donne lieu par conséquent à de nouvelles formes de luttes de classes qu'une domination indirecte et subtile peut ne pas juguler de façon adéquate ; des formes de domination plus directes et plus évidentes la remplacent alors. Deuxièmement, le processus du sous-développement néo-colonial ne peut que modifier, semble-t-il, et perturber les relations étroites au départ entre les classes dirigeantes locales et les classes dirigeantes étrangères ; relations qui en font le *trait essentiel*. Dans la plupart des cas cela veut dire que le néo-colonialisme peut engendrer des formes de 'développement capitaliste dépendant' qui s'écartent de plus en plus de l'ancien 'système colonial' (21).

Ainsi, l'indépendance avait-elle pour ainsi dire placé les nationalistes africains devant un *fait accompli*: un lien structurel avec l'impérialisme qu'ils ne pouvaient rompre qu'en dénonçant toutes les conditions dans lesquelles l'indépendance formelle avait été «accordée efficacement». L'on peut dire brièvement, de cette relation structurelle, qu'elle se compose des éléments suivants :

1) l'intégration économique de la colonie à l'économie impérialiste en qualité de *dépendance*, alimentant les marchés de la Métropole en matières premières et consommant les produits manufacturés en provenance des industries métropolitaines. Ce rapport a été sensiblement modifié après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, comme Geoffrey KAY l'a démontré avec les pays sous-développés (22) et comme Nicolas SWAINSON l'a fait en se référant spécialement au Kenya (23). Dès lors, il allait de l'intérêt de l'impérialisme de mettre au point des «industries de substitution à l'importation» dans les colonies. Le développement de ces industries a introduit évidemment de nouveaux éléments dans l'économie politique des colonies : l'expansion d'une classe ouvrière et la nécessité d'améliorer les «revenus ruraux» de façon à créer des marchés tout faits aux industries de substitution à l'importation dans les colonies mêmes. Une grande partie des bureaucrates éclairés des agences coloniales et les hommes d'affaires eux-mêmes se rendirent compte assez rapidement que le «progrès colonial» ne s'opposait pas aux intérêts impérialistes. Lord HAILEY avait déjà esquissé, dès 1939, les aspects du colonialisme qui étaient incompatibles avec «le développement de l'impérialisme» (24).

2) le second élément de ce lien structurel, qui découle logiquement du premier est la *liaison* des processus de formation de classes dans les colonies à l'histoire ou aux vicissitudes de l'impérialisme. Si par exemple les paysans dépendent du marché mondial pour la vente de leurs produits, le niveau de leurs revenus sera directement fonction des vicissitudes de ce marché. Si par ailleurs l'Etat dépend de l'imposition de la production paysanne pour financer ses propres affaires, il est lui-même limité par les

hauts et les bas de ce marché en fixant l'assiette fiscale. Compte tenu de l'absence de toute autre ressource à imposer, en raison de l'évolution de la structure de l'économie sur le plan interne, l'assiette fiscale sera largement liée aux ressources des paysans pauvres sur lesquels l'Etat exerce sa domination politique. Depuis la période coloniale jusqu'à nos jours de nombreuses études ont montré, notamment dans le cas du Kenya, comment la classe paysanne est celle qui a porté le fardeau du financement des dépenses effectuées par l'Etat, et par conséquent supporté le bien-être d'autres classes sociales qui ont eu plus de pouvoir ou plus d'emprise sur l'Etat (25).

3) Les sociétés néo-coloniales sont donc en grande partie des sociétés paysannes sur lesquelles s'est greffé le développement industriel sous l'impulsion de l'impérialisme. Après cette intégration sous forme de dépendances indispensables au système mondial du capitalisme, ces colonies font l'objet d'un grave blocage structurel lorsqu'elles essaient de créer des systèmes économiques satisfaisant plus les besoins des classes sociales locales que l'accumulation du Capital à l'échelle mondiale. Ainsi la naissance d'une bourgeoisie nationale engendre-t-elle comme pour un enfantement difficile autant de douleurs que les tentatives menées par une organisation révolutionnaire pour établir des « racines » qui lui permettront « d'échapper » au néo-colonialisme.

A l'époque où le nationalisme africain acquérait de la vigueur au Kenya vers la fin des années 40, les colons anglais avaient déjà pris une décision concernant la colonie : ils allaient organiser la passation du pouvoir aux indigènes, population majoritaire. Cependant les colons blancs constituaient un obstacle majeur. Cette 'tribu blanche du Kenya' craignait de perdre ses privilèges si les africains acquéraient une plus grande autorité politique dans l'administration de la colonie. Leur position de caste privilégiée avait été favorisée par leur influence sur l'administration coloniale. L'Etat colonial vota des lois permettant aux colons blancs d'acquérir le monopole de la partie la plus riche de la région agricole du Kenya. Après s'être appropriés cette terre appartenant aux paysans Kikuyu et Masaï qui y vivaient, les colons comptaient sur l'Etat colonial pour l'adoption de lois obligeant ces paysans à travailler pour eux en qualité de 'squatters' ou d'ouvriers avec un salaire très faible. Le système de l'imposition obligea la plupart des paysans, propriétaires fonciers ou non, qui ne cultivaient pas de produits commercialisables, de travailler pour les colons (26). Lorsque les paysans parvenaient à cultiver des produits agricoles tels que le maïs, ce sont ceux qui subventionnaient en réalité l'agriculture du colon car les offices de commercialisation étaient dirigés par les colons, et les différences de prix favorisaient les produits des colons. Ce sont ces colons qui ont vraiment tiré profit des recettes fiscales perçues par l'Etat colonial puisque les infrastructures physiques et sociales ont été créées en leur faveur. L'on peut dire finalement que l'exploitation des africains au Kenya pendant la période coloniale visait à préserver l'extravagance du mode de vie des colons (27) et à rémunérer le Capital commercial britannique qui dominait l'économie de cette époque (28).



Après la seconde Guerre Mondiale, le Capital commercial et colon fut supplanté dans sa suprématie sur la colonie par le Capital industriel et étranger, comme les nouvelles stratégies de l'impérialisme l'exigeaient (29). La révolte des Mau Mau contre le colonialisme fournit un prétexte à l'impérialisme britannique pour intervenir au Kenya, mettre en place un régime militaire, évincer les colons sur la scène politique, trouver les moyens de parvenir à un accord politique avec les nationalistes africains et préparer la transition au néo-colonialisme. Un grand nombre de commissions furent créées aux fins d'examiner les divers aspects de cette transition, et de recommander des 'programmes d'action' (30). Ces programmes furent exécutés avec rigueur ; et parmi ceux-ci l'africanisation de l'économie des colons et du système politique colonial (31) remporta le plus de succès.

Deux partis politiques africains majeurs virent le jour à la veille de l'indépendance : le Kenya African National Union (KANU) – l'union nationale africaine du Kenya, et le Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) – l'union démocratique africaine du Kenya. Il s'agissait d'alliances de leaders politiques régionaux et ethniques qui avaient formé des mouvements politiques où ils avaient mobilisé les masses en vue de conquérir l'indépendance (36). Ce n'était pas la structure de la société coloniale qu'ils remettaient en question ; leur principal désaccord avec le colonialisme tenait en fait à la discrimination exercée aux niveaux politique, économique et social contre les africains. Si les africains pouvaient avoir voix au chapitre dans l'exercice du pouvoir, la majorité des responsables de partis du KANU et du KADU seraient satisfaits, comme les colons les plus éclairés l'avaient également prédit (33).

La KANU différait cependant de la KADU par sa composition interne. En effet elle était formée, entre autres, d'éléments appartenant aux mouvements de classe ouvrière indépendants des années quarante, et de nationalistes radicaux ayant participé à la révolte Mau Mau et ayant fait autrefois partie du Kenya African Union (KAU), qui avaient tous beaucoup plus de raisons d'en vouloir au colonialisme que les autres responsables de partis de classe moyenne ayant des aspirations bourgeoises compradors. Ces syndicalistes et nationalistes radicaux préconisaient par exemple l'adoption après l'indépendance d'une nouvelle politique, selon laquelle la terre serait distribuée gratuitement à ceux qui n'en avaient pas. Les compradors-enformation soutenaient, par contre, une distribution de la terre uniquement à ceux qui avaient les moyens de l'acquérir. Cette politique qui avait déjà été prônée par le Swynnerton Plan de 1954 et la East African Royal Commission de 1955 (34), fut agréée par le Capital financier international qui accorda des prêts à l'Etat néo-colonial en vue du rachat des terres aux colons blancs. Celles-ci devaient être morcelées puis vendues aux familles paysannes s'étant organisées en agglomérations après l'indépendance. Le succès de ce programme dans les années 60 a sérieusement entravé les nationalistes radicaux dans leurs tentatives de consolidation de leur assise dans le milieu paysan, ce qu'ils auraient pu faire en d'autres circonstances.

La politique étrangère constituait un autre domaine de la politique post-coloniale où des divergences apparaissaient entre les nationalistes radicaux et les compradors. Après avoir été une colonie britannique et avoir

accédé à l'indépendance, le Kenya désirait manifester plus ouvertement son indépendance en adoptant une politique de non-alignement plus agressive caractérisée par l'établissement de nombreux contacts économiques, politiques, culturels et sociaux tant avec les pays socialistes qu'avec les pays capitalistes. Du point de vue du développement économique, cette politique devrait être perçue comme une stratégie de diversification de sources extérieures d'investissement (au Kenya) et de renforcement de l'intervention de l'Etat dans le secteur économique. La nationalisation d'industries clés et de services d'action sociale fut également recommandée. En d'autres termes moins nuancés, les nationalistes radicaux soutenaient qu'un Gouvernement Kenyan post-colonial ne saurait servir les intérêts des masses Kenyannes s'il adoptait un système de développement capitaliste à part entière ; «il nous faut apprendre à nager dans les eaux socialistes» (35).

Les cris de socialisme et sa popularité en Afrique, à cette époque, offrirent aux compradors l'occasion de prendre les devants par rapport aux nationalistes radicaux et de déclarer dans un document gouvernemental intitulé le *Socialisme Africain et son application à la Planification au Kenya* (36), qui avait fait l'objet de beaucoup de publicité, que les politiques du KANU s'appuient sur le «Socialisme Africain». D'après la teneur de ce document, il était tout à fait évident que le KANU n'allait appliquer que les politiques économiques néo-coloniales se conformant aux accords passés dans le cadre de l'indépendance ; et rien d'autre. «L'ambassadeur américain avait parfaitement saisi la substance de ce Document de Conférence No. 10, dans son ensemble, et il l'avait résumé en déclarant que le document encourageait l'investissement privé et rejetait explicitement le Marxisme (37). Selon lui, l'américain Roscoe DRUMOND (qui avait visité le Kenya à l'époque) aurait écrit dans sa chronique que ce document se situait à mi-chemin entre la Great Society (Grande Société) de Lyndon Johnson et l'aile conservatrice du Socialisme Britannique» (38).

Mais cette 'néo-colonisation du socialisme' n'allait pouvoir se réaliser qu'une fois l'intégration des notables de partis du KADU aux rangs des compradors du KANU assurée ; ainsi l'influence des radicaux au niveau du parti et du gouvernement allait s'en trouver réduite. Rappelons que le KADU était formé de notables politiques originaires des prétendues 'tribus minoritaires' du Kenya. Ceux-ci craignaient surtout que la politique agraire du KANU n'aboutisse à la nationalisation des terres. Une telle politique avantagerait notamment les Kenyans des autres régions où le développement inégal, pendant l'ère coloniale, avait déjà créé des problèmes suite à la dépossession d'un grand nombre de Kenyans de leurs terres. Soutenus alors par les colons blancs qui désiraient affaiblir le pouvoir de négociation des nationalistes africains, ils parvinrent à former un front commun avec les colons à Lancaster et à faire voter une politique et un système régionaux de gouvernement, qui allaient protéger leurs intérêts fonciers et instituer le système de transmission de propriétés foncières entre individus, par les forces du marché. Dès que les compradors du KANU eurent manifesté leur soutien pour cette politique agraire, après l'indépendance, les notables du KADU prirent conscience de la communauté d'intérêts les liant aux compradors du KANU et de 'l'ennemi interne' contre lequel il fallait lutter : les radicaux.

En 1966, les radicaux furent expulsés de la coalition au pouvoir après une série de manœuvres politiques. Ils formèrent alors un parti d'opposition : le Kenya People's Union (KPU). Celui-ci tenta de mobiliser les masses populaires contre les politiques flagrantes de néo-colonialisme appliquées par le régime de KENYATTA, en s'appuyant surtout sur le processus électoral. Cependant, compte-tenu du fait que le régime était parvenu au pouvoir politique en adoptant la même stratégie, il n'allait pas rester inactif et se voir arracher le pouvoir par le KPU. Divers obstacles juridiques et constitutionnels furent placés sur le chemin du KPU pour empêcher la cristallisation du soutien politique, dont il jouissait auprès des masses populaires, en pouvoir politique au niveau des Conseils Locaux (Conseils Territoriaux et Municipaux) ou de l'Assemblée Nationale (39). Finalement, le parti fut banni et ses leaders incarcérés en 1969 (40).

De 1970 à 1978 (date à laquelle KENYATTA mourut) le régime de KENYATTA fut de plus en plus répressif. Après l'interdiction du KPU, les débats parlementaires constituèrent la seule voie d'expression de désaccord avec les politiques pratiquées par le régime. Un groupe de députés sans portefeuille essayèrent d'exploiter la situation au maximum, mais très souvent, leurs tentatives furent réduits à néant par les manœuvres secrètes du régime (41). J.M. KARIUKI, un Ministre Adjoint ayant des visées sur la présidence essaya également de faire du parlement une plateforme pour mobiliser les masses populaires opprimées contre les politiques agraires et autres politiques économiques du régime. Le populisme de KARIUKI provoqua l'acte le plus répressif du régime KENYATTA : KARIUKI fut mystérieusement assassiné en Mars 1975. Malgré la participation de certaines autorités gouvernementales à cet assassinat et l'enquête menée par le Parlement, personne ne fut traduit en justice. Au contraire les membres de la commission d'enquête nommée par le Parlement furent par la suite harcelés par le régime. Deux d'entre eux furent incarcérés sans procès alors qu'un autre était emprisonné pour avoir battu sa femme deux ans plus tôt (42). Après 1975, KENYATTA régna beaucoup plus par la terreur que son régime inspirait aux masses populaires, que par son autorité sur la société ou par l'hégémonie de son régime. L'espoir subsistait cependant chez les paysans que la situation allait changer après la mort du *Mzee* (vieux) ; alors pourquoi se presser pour un renversement de la situation !

Colin LEYS a tenté dans une analyse, d'établir une analogie entre le régime de KENYATTA et celui de BONAPARTE. Du point de vue de MARX, écrit Colin LEYS (43), la contradiction fondamentale dans la situation de Louis NAPOLEON «résidait dans le fait que le gouvernement, appareil d'Etat, ne dépendait théoriquement d'aucune classe, mais en pratique il ne pouvait se passer de l'appui des classes et ne pouvait, même s'il le désirait, empêcher ses politiques de promouvoir les intérêts de certaines classes. Le pouvoir politique de ces classes s'en trouvait renforcé et par voie de conséquence la liberté d'action de l'Etat était sapée. L'Etat devait donc constamment chercher à neutraliser le pouvoir politique des classes auxquelles il donnait de plus en plus de pouvoir économique».

La classe capitaliste Agikuyu représentée par le GEMA (44) était celle dont le régime de KENYATTA désirait promouvoir les intérêts plus que toute autre — du moins pendant l'existence du GEMA (1972—1978).

Cependant, la réalisation de cet objectif passait par un sérieux piétinement de la bourgeoisie internationale pour pouvoir se faire une place dans l'arène du Capital industriel et financier. Les tentatives entreprises à cet effet eurent peu de succès ; le régime de KENYATTA dut par conséquent se rabattre sur une «humiliation rituelle» du Capital étranger, dans ses déclarations, alors que dans ses actes (45), «il lui faisait pratiquement la cour». Naturellement le GEMA fut amené à favoriser ses intérêts en exploitant la seule classe sur laquelle il avait une autorité : le paysannat (46).

Le Bonapartisme, à mon avis, ne s'applique qu'à la première partie du règne de KENYATTA, c'est-à-dire de 1964 à 1970. Les actions de KENYATTA firent de lui un Napoléon Bonaparte. En effet, il sut opposer les fractions entre elles, faire croire à toutes les fractions formant la coalition au pouvoir que 'le vieux était capable de démêler toute situation complexe' (47) et il régna à une époque où la propriété privée continuait à s'étendre, tant au profit des classes moyennes que des paysans (48). Cependant, après 1970, le GEMA même fut la preuve tangible que des éléments du Capital national désiraient exercer *un contrôle beaucoup plus direct sur l'Etat* que le Bonapartisme de KENYATTA ne l'aurait permis. Désormais le phénomène décrit par FANON et désapprouvé par LEYS allait se déclencher (49). Il s'agissait, à mon avis, de l'édification d'un régime politique à partir d'un «pacte de domination», et non de Bonapartisme que LEYS estime être une notion beaucoup plus utile dans l'analyse des différentes phases du règne de KENYATTA. Par ailleurs, après 1970, le Kenya connut une évolution socio-économique très rapide, quasi-contraire au rythme de la montée des classes moyennes et des masses populaires dans les années 60. L'équipe spéciale d'experts de l'OIT taxa le développement économique du Kenya de «croissance non-assortie de redistribution» et requit l'adoption d'une autre politique qui favoriserait «la croissance accompagnée de redistribution» ; ce qui éviterait les conséquences socio-politiques des disparités de plus en plus flagrantes (50). Comme Colin LEYS lui-même l'exprime si bien (51), une amorce de redistribution du surplus social en lieu et place d'une accumulation de ce Capital nuirait, évidemment, aux intérêts des classes dominantes — et plus encore aux forces du GEMA. Mais le GEMA apprit la leçon que lui donnait l'OIT. Il lui fallait resserrer ses rangs davantage et se forger une protection hermétique contre toute dissension à l'endroit du régime.

Dans les années 70 le régime de KENYATTA prit donc l'allure d'un régime de conspirateurs et d'alliances par le sang, d'un régime gravitant autour de «Gatundu Court» (Cour du Roi) et de ses satellites : des membres de tribus, de représentants du pouvoir ethnique, des loyalistes de la bureaucratie étatique ; et dès que sa stabilité était menacée, le régime se livrait ouvertement au terrorisme (52). Le tribalisme mobilisé sous le leadership du GEMA devint un moyen efficace de créer un pacte de domination sous le régime de KENYATTA et les notables politiques ne jouèrent plus qu'un rôle secondaire dans les cercles concentriques du GEMA. Le premier élément de désordre offrant des possibilités de désintégration après la mort de KENYATTA était ainsi semé.

Au Parlement, un processus avait été déjà engagé pour substituer au GEMA dominant, une autre coalition qui dirigerait le pays après la mort de KENYATTA. En tête de ce mouvement se trouvaient quelques notables politiques faisant partie des capitalistes Agikuyu placés désormais au dernier rang des cercles concentriques dont le GEMA constituait le noyau. L'objectif visé était de jouer sur le tribalisme aux fins d'acquiescer le soutien de notables politiques appartenant aux autres régions et «nationalités» du Kenya ; il fut atteint. Le Vice-Président était un non-Kikuyu et la Loi en faisait le successeur légitime de KENYATTA. Cependant les forces du GEMA lui avaient prouvé leur antipathie en introduisant, les premiers, une demande «d'amendement à la constitution» pour empêcher le Vice-Président d'être le successeur automatique du Président. Une ligue de forces non-GEMA dirigée par le Procureur Général Charles NJONJO fit obstruction à cette requête à l'Assemblée Nationale. Une coalition se forma par conséquent autour de Daniel Arap MOI en vue de le soutenir si KENYATTA venait à mourir.

Comme je l'ai déjà soutenu ailleurs (53), KENYATTA mourut à une époque où toutes ces forces sociales luttant pour la présidence étaient frappées en quelque sorte de paralysie. La crainte d'émeutes et de désordre au cas où l'Etat se montrerait faible les conduisit à ne compter que sur le *Droit pour décider de la succession de KENYATTA*. MOI succéda donc à KENYATTA non pas tant à cause du profond respect éprouvé par la bourgeoisie comprador Kenyane pour le Droit et le Constitutionnalisme mais surtout parce que ces éléments (le Droit et le Constitutionnalisme) constituent les seules «forces sociales» – aussi impersonnelles qu'elles puissent paraître – à pouvoir protéger leurs intérêts collectifs bien que contradictoires. MOI était à peine devenu Président que ces forces sociales luttaient farouchement pour la Présidence et le GEMA affirmait maintenant qu'il ne fallait pas permettre à MOI «Président temporaire» de rester au pouvoir en permanence.

Le régime de MOI n'est donc pas devenu un régime Bonapartiste comme le prédisait LEYS ; au contraire. En vue d'étayer sa thèse bonapartiste, LEYS faisait l'affirmation suivante : «Ce que MARX considérait comme un phénomène purement passager et relativement bref peut, *dans certaines circonstances*, devenir une forme de gouvernement générique à la Périphérie capitaliste ; et un gouvernement bonapartiste reflète aussi bien la complexité des conflits en jeu que la difficulté croissante à les intégrer et à compter sur la suprématie des classes et non sur la force» (54). Compte tenu de la vacuité hégémonique des néo-colonies africaines et de la fin des «années d'expansion» (les années 60) où il était possible dans les limites du néo-colonialisme de satisfaire divers intérêts de classes, les «certaines circonstances» que LEYS mentionnait pourraient ne plus s'appliquer à la majorité des néo-colonies de l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara, je le crains.

Le flirt de MOI avec le populisme – sa tentative de satisfaire «le peuple» – ne fit pas long feu. Il enragea en fait les agents, c'est-à-dire les fonctionnaires, qui devaient traduire en actions les paroles de MOI. MOI crut voir dans la réserve des fonctionnaires à agir un signe de sabotage. En fait l'état néo-colonial était tout simplement essoufflé, comme la Banque Mondiale en a fait l'observation à tous les pays africains ; une réduction de

la majorité de ses engagements publics s'imposait (55). Après avoir traité les agents de la fonction publique de saboteurs, MOI alla jusqu'à empêcher le «peuple» même qu'il essayait de servir, de se poser des questions sur les échecs de ses promesses et de son régime. L'interdiction des syndicats et les contraintes imposées à la politique des groupes de pression freinèrent encore plus les travailleurs dans leur poursuite d'intérêts syndicalistes. En fin de compte tout dissentiment était interprété comme étant de la sédition ou de la trahison ; ce qui aboutit à la détention de politiciens populistes et au procès pour sédition de professeurs d'université qui avaient eu à émettre des points de vue critiques (56). La tentative de coup d'état de l'armée eut lieu à une époque où les conflits internes du pacte de domination de MOI brisaient manifestement ce pacte. Je ne sais, quant à moi, si une réconciliation a été effectuée au niveau du pacte ou si les événements actuels ne sont qu'une répétition de la farce antérieure, qui pourraient mener cette fois les *dramatis personae* à on ne sait encore quel drame.

## NOTES

1. Voir Perry Anderson, *Considerations on Western Marxism* (London, 1976).
2. Voir, par exemple, Umberto Cerroni, Valentino Gerratana, Pietro Ingrao, Giuseppe Vacca, *et al.* dans *Il Marxismo et lo Stato (Mondoperaio, 1976)*. Je remercie Flavio Saraiva de m'avoir fait cette observation et d'avoir relevé les points pertinents.
3. H. Alavi, «The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh», *New Left Review*, (July–August 1972), 59–82.
4. Voir, par exemple, B. Moore, *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (London, 1967).
5. R. Miliband, *Marxism and Politics* (London, 1977), 108.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, voir aussi Anyang' Nyong'o 'Introduction' to «Kenya: The Agrarian Question», *Review of African Political Economy* (January–April 1981).
8. Miliband, *op. cit.*  
Kwame Amoa ajoute cependant que : «Les considérations d'ordre géo-politique doivent intervenir à ce niveau car ce qui est vrai de l'Afrique de l'Est, de l'Afrique Australe et de l'Afrique Centrale ne l'est pas nécessairement de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Nord. Il existe, j'en suis convaincu, plus de «grandes entreprises étrangères» dans tous les secteurs d'activité de l'Afrique Centrale et Australe que dans ceux de l'Afrique de l'Ouest où l'on peut trouver des classes sociales dominantes indigènes (observations relatives au document).
9. Anyang' Nyong'o *op. cit.*
10. Tiré de commentaires de Samir Amin sur une version antérieure de ce document. Les observations faites dans ce paragraphe résument en fait les points saillants d'une lettre que Samir Amin m'a adressée.
11. Tiré d'observations faites par Kwame Amoa sur une des premières versions de ce document. J'ai retenu un grand nombre de ses remarques. Toute autre référence ultérieure à Amoa paraîtra sous la forme suivante : «Amoa: Observations».
12. Voir Colin Leys, «The 'Overdeveloped' Post Colonial State: A Re-Evaluation», *5 Review of African Political Economy* (January–April 1976), 39–48.

13. Ces Capitalistes locaux ont la possibilité, par exemple, de lancer unilatéralement des projets en vue de s'enrichir, d'accumuler du Capital, de préserver leur pouvoir politique, et ils essaient même parfois de saper l'influence de la (des) bourgeoisie(s) étrangère(s) lorsqu'ils en ont l'occasion. C'est la thèse soutenue en fait par Steven Langdon dans «The State and Capitalism in Kenya», 8 *Review of African Political Economy* (January–April 1977), 90–98. Cependant, note Kwame Amoa (Voir «Comments»), cette 'autonomie relative' offre une échappatoire – dans le contexte néo-colonial – permettant à des différences de se glisser entre les bourgeoisies périphériques du Brésil, de l'Argentine et du Mexique. En Afrique l'on peut également noter ces différences. Cependant, les limites imposées ici par l'histoire du néo-colonialisme réduisent ces différences à tel point que leur importance n'apparaît qu'au niveau de l'ampleur des fonds étrangers qui y sont investis et de l'importance que les bourgeoisies métropolitaines attachent à chaque néo-colonie. En Afrique très peu de «bourgeoisies nationales» naissent par rapport aux «bourgeoisies compradors». Seule une rupture totale avec le néo-colonialisme peut faire avancer davantage le progrès social ; ce qui implique une révolution socialiste. Mais affirme Amoa, «les sciences sociales progressistes doivent viser la rupture totale tout en reconnaissant que les bourgeoisies nationales sont préférables aux bourgeoisies locales. Au cas où la rupture totale serait impossible à court terme il nous faudrait envisager des moyens pour exploiter les contradictions entre le Capital et les bourgeoisies locales de façon à transformer celles-ci en bourgeoisies nationales. La possibilité ou l'impossibilité d'engager un tel processus pourrait faire l'objet de débats.
14. Voir par exemple, J. Saul, «The Unsteady State: Uganda, Obote and General Amin», 4 *Review of African Political Economy* (January–April, 1975), 12–38; J. Marshall, «The State of Ambivalence : Right and Left Options in Ghana», *Ibid.*; M. Von Freyhold, «The Post-Colonial State and Its Tanzanian Version», 8 *Review of African Political Economy* (January–April 1977), 75–89.
15. Langdom, *op. cit.*
16. N. Poulantzas, *Pouvoir Politique et Classes Sociales* (Paris, 1975), 145.
17. Voir par exemple, R. Lane, *Political Ideology : Why the American Man Believes What He Does* (New York, 1961).
18. Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-colonialism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974).
19. Voir Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (London, 1965). Voir aussi Jack Wodis, *An Introduction to Neo-Colonialism*, (New York, 1967).
20. Leys, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
21. *Ibid.*
22. G. Kay, *Development and Underdevelopment : A Marxist Analysis*, (London, 1975).
23. Nicola Swainson, «Company Formation in Kenya Before 1945 with Particular Reference to the Role of Foreign Capital», dans R. Kaplinsky (ed.), *Readings on the Multinational Corporation in Kenya*, (Nairobi, New York and Oxford, 1978), 22–95.
24. Lord Hailey, *An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara* (London, 1939). Voir aussi M. P. Cowen, «The British State, State Enterprise and an Indigenous Bourgeoisie in Kenya after 1945», in P. Lubeck (ed.), *The African Bourgeoisie: Kenya, Nigeria and Ivory Coast* (forthcoming).

25. Voir par exemple, Leys, *op. cit.* ; E. A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, the Politics of Economic Change, 1919-1939* (Nairobi, 1973).
26. Voir par exemple, R. Van Zwanenberg, *Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya, 1919-1939*, (Nairobi, 1975).
27. Voir par exemple, James Fox, *White Mischief: the Murder of Lord Erroll*, (New York, 1982).
28. Voir Nicola Swainson, *The Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya, 1918-1977*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1980).
29. Swainson, «Company Formation».
30. Voir par exemple, *Inquiry into the General Economy of Farming in the Highlands* (The Troup Report), 1953 ; «The Beecher Report» – An inquiry into the Conditions of African Education in Kenya – 1954 ; 'The Swynnerton Report', *A Plan to intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya, 1955* ; *The East African Royal Commission, 1953-55* ; Voir aussi la discussion de l' «East African Royal Commission, 1953-55 Report» dans *The East African Economics Review*, (January 1956), 94-152.
31. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*.
32. T.J. Mboya dans son autobiographie, *Freedom and After*, (London, 1964) fait une description très précise de leur objectif majeur dans KANU lorsqu'ils avaient mobilisé des populations appartenant à diverses classes sociales aux fins de «conquérir Uhuru – la liberté».
33. Derek Erskine, un colon blanc, travailla en collaboration étroite avec Kenyatta. Un parti «libéral» de colons appelé : The New Kenya Party, dirigé par Michael Blundell recommanda la «collaboration avec les africains modérés». Colin Leys s'appesantit sur le fait que les colons cherchaient surtout à obtenir un bon prix pour leurs fermes ; dès qu'ils parvenaient à leurs fins, ils étaient prêts à quitter le Kenya ou à re-placer leur capital dans le secteur industriel à condition que le nouveau gouvernement respecte la propriété privée ; ce que Kenyatta fit religieusement.
34. Voir la note 30.
35. Tiré d'un discours prononcé en 1965 par le Vice-Président du Kenya de cette époque, en présence des élèves du Alliance High School. Jaramogi Oginga Odinga le Vice-Président démissionna de son poste pour prendre la tête du parti d'opposition, le Kenya People's Union en 1966. Les points soulevés par les nationalistes radicaux contre le régime de Kenyatta se retrouvent, pour la plupart, dans son autobiographie : *Not Yet Uhuru* (London, 1967).
36. Government Printer, Nairobi, 1965.
37. Leys, *op. cit.*, p. 223.
38. W. Attwood, *The Reds and the Blacks* (London, 1967), 247. Quoted in Leys, *op. cit.*
39. Leys, Ch. 7 ; Voir aussi Odinga, *Not Yet Uhuru* and S. Mueller, «Political Parties in Kenya; Patterns of Opposition and Dissent, 1919-1979», (Princeton University, 1972).
40. Oginga Odinga et ses collègues furent incarcérés, suite aux émeutes ayant éclaté au cours de la visite de Kenyatta à Kisumu où il s'était rendu pour inaugurer le New Nyanga General Hospital. L'organisation des émeutes fut imputée aux leaders du KPU. Mais en fait des témoins dignes de foi auraient constaté qu'à son arrivée à Kisumu, Kenyatta était «d'humeur agressive». Son discours provocateur lors de la cérémonie d'ouverture créa sans doute de 'l'excitation' dans la foule. Ce n'était pourtant pas une raison valable pour ouvrir le feu et tuer près de 9 personnes sans oublier 70 autres blessées.



41. Le régime recourait à divers stratagèmes. Soit il annulait les crédits déjà accordés par l'Etat aux députés sans portefeuille ne mâchant pas leurs mots, soit il ne leur accordait plus d'autorisation pour tenir des réunions dans leurs circonscriptions électorales et, ils se voyaient par conséquent retirer l'autorisation de se présenter aux Elections Générales en qualité de candidats de partis.
42. Les deux députés emprisonnés furent : Martin Shikuku et le feu J.M. Seroney. Celui qui fut incarcéré pour avoir porté des coups à sa femme deux ans plus tôt est Mark Mwithaga de Nakuru.
43. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, p. 207.
44. GEMA = Gikuyu Embu and Meru Association.
45. Leys, *op. cit.*, p. 208.
46. Voir par exemple, Ngugi wa Thiong'o *Detained: A Writer's Prison Diaries* (Nairobi, 1981) and *Devil on the Cross* (London and Nairobi, 1982).
47. Voir par exemple Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, p. 57.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-169.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 209-210.
50. International Labour Organization, *Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya*, (Geneva, 1972).
51. Leys, *op. cit.*, pp. 258-271.
52. 'La Prestation de Serment', pratique courante, après l'assassinat de Tom Mboya en Juillet 1969, et qui connut l'échec après l'assassinat de J.M. Kariuku en 1975 doit être perçue comme technique d'intimidation par la peur'. L'on força les Kikuyus à se rendre chez (Gatundu) Kenyatta pour prêter serment - par le sang. Ils étaient donc obligés de protéger le drapeau du Kenya contre toute tentative de l'enlever à la 'House of Mumbi'; Mumbi étant la première mère mythologique ou réelle de tous les Agikuyus. Les masses populaires Agikuyu résistèrent à cette prestation de serment ; cependant Kenyatta et sa Cour disposaient de l'Appareil d'Etat dont ils pouvaient faire usage contre eux. Après la prestation, la honte et la peur empêchaient les individus d'entreprendre des actions nuisibles aux politiques de Kenyatta. Ceci ne paraît pas être, à mon sens, une technique dont un Bonaparte «relativement indépendant» se servirait pour 'équilibrer les forces sociales'. La comparaison et l'image sont un peu trop poussées ici par Colin Leys.
53. Voir Anyang' Nyong'o, «Succession et Héritage politiques : Le Président, l'Etat et le Capital après la mort de Jomo Kenyatta», *Politique Africaine I* (3) (Septembre 1981), p. 7-25.
54. Leys, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
55. Voir par exemple, World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action* (Washington, 1981).
56. Pour une étude beaucoup plus récente de la nature de la répression politique au Kenya, voir : «Kenya: The Politics of Repression», *Race and Class XXIV*, 3 (Winter 1983).

## SUMMARY

*Marxist literature on theories of the state has been in resurgence since the early seventies. With regard to Africa, a great deal of attention has been focused on «the post-colonial state» ever since the publication of Hamza ALAVI's essay in the New Left Review (July/August 1972) on «The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh». ALAVI focused on the character of ruling classes in post-colonial societies, their historical evolution, their relationship to the metropolitan bourgeoisie and their interactions with the state. The weak and underdeveloped bourgeoisie finds itself unable to use the overdeveloped colonial state apparatus in its own interests or in the national interest. Instead, it must content itself with governing under the hegemony of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. This is a structural and historical limitation to the actions of the bourgeoisie in post-colonial societies; it says nothing about its incredulity, lack of vision, corruptness, etc., which FANON heaped on it.*

*While ALAVI's hypotheses have been useful in analysing post-colonial states in various African situations, we find it more perceptive to conceptualize the state in post-colonial societies as a variant of the capitalist state. The modern state in Africa, it is argued in this paper, is a capitalist state of a neo-colonial variety. It has institutions, apparatuses, processes and ideology that defend and reproduce the capitalist social order under its neo-colonial conditions. As a capitalist state, it is a phenomenon that has its effects within a specific territory called the nation-state. In theory, the state is independent of the interests of any particular individual and appears to represent the interest of the nation as a whole. In practice, it protects the interests of the economically dominant classes who are capable of using state power to change the legal order and, hence, redefine what the state should defend as a law.*

*The manner in which a particular ruling class forms its own domination and rules politically defines the kind of regime that exists in a particular post-colonial society. Thus, while the very structure of the neo-colonial state will put limits to the actions of the ruling classes as laid out by ALAVI, the specificity of every historical situation and the class struggles going on in such situations will define the kinds of regimes that may emerge from time to time. The general weakness of the bourgeoisies in post-colonial societies makes it difficult for them, however, to develop hegemonic ideologies for their rule in such societies. The general tendency, therefore, is the development of disjunctures between the supposedly legitimating ideologies and the concrete socio-economic realities in Africa's post-colonies. The end result is a general gap between the ruling class and the masses, a gap generally filled by dictatorships of various sorts or regimes of pacts of domination.*

*This essay is essentially exploratory. The author is conscious of the fact that several ideas here are still «primitive»; they may need to be developed as a result of feedbacks from readers. That kind of interaction and exchange of ideas is, in the final analysis, the aim of Africa Development.*

# THE DEEPENING ECONOMIC CRISIS AND ITS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

By

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## THE CRISIS OF NIGERIA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY

The current crisis of Nigeria's political economy, which was officially acknowledged in 1982, has become very severe and problematic, defying the diagnosis and most of the solutions contained in the government's austerity package of April 1982. It has threatened not only the standards of living of most Nigerians by way of non-payment of salaries, loss of jobs, high levels of inflation and the non-availability of some basic services and commodities, but also their political liberty and democratic rights.

This crisis ought to be located at the structure of the economy in order to be able to understand its character, general tendency towards recurrence and the class-logic of the specific policies which have been implemented to contain it. The various structural contradictions of the world capitalist economy have been woven into the fabric of the Nigerian economy through the operations of the transnational corporations, the local business companies, international banks and the *Nigerian state* itself which has become a powerful agency for the capitalist penetration of the economy. The various activities of these business agencies transmit, and sometimes generate, within the Nigerian economy, the contradictions and crises of the global economy.

Capitalist production, the highest form of commodity production, contains within it the possibilities for over/underproduction which essentially stem from the difficulties of reconciling social production with consumption; because of the existence of market relations which are established to satisfy production for profit as opposed to needs, structural crises of over/under production arise (1). Capitalist production, by subjecting mercantile activities and pre-existing semi-autonomous producers to the dictates of industrial accumulation further generates crises which are rooted in the system of production itself – the tendency for the rate of profit to fall (2); the latter acts upon the other forms of crises, and produces a *general crisis* of world capitalism on a cyclical basis.

Crises of over/under production were, of course, already present in many parts of pre-colonial Nigeria where the system of simple commodity production had reached a fairly advanced state, with the emergence of a local merchant class and some form of guild system of production – the forerunner to industrial capitalism (3). It was, however, colonial capitalism that integrated Nigeria into the general crisis of capitalist development as more extensive market relations were established after the destruction of the pre-existing relatively autonomous political economies and their penetration by European companies like UAC, John HOLT, SCOA, and CFAO

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to produce and export cocoa, groundnuts, cotton and later tin to the expanding industries of Europe. These companies also acted as the pioneers of Euro-American capitalism in Nigeria by enabling industrial companies which were facing profit realisation problems to export their commodities to Nigeria (4).

The effect of this imperialist onslaught and domination of the Nigerian economy was to subject the colonial economy to the dictates of the general world-wide capitalist system of development and crises ; the economy lost its autonomous capacity to generate its own internal structural dynamic. But the degree of foreign exchange crisis in the colonial economy was different from the one currently experienced. This is because the expansion of the domestic money supply was tied up with the ability of the Nigerian economy to earn foreign exchange. This was done through the West African Currency Board (the monetary authority of the Nigerian economy) whose currency, the West African pound, was not only tied to the British pound on a one-to-one basis, but had also an automatic convertibility relationship with the British pound. Thus the expansion of the money supply and economic activity in the Nigerian economy depended upon the export performance of the economy (whose prices were controlled by the European trading and industrial companies) and the extent of foreign investments and development finance (mainly through the Colonial Development Fund) received from the British government. Since colonial capitalism was not interested in developing the productive forces in Nigeria but in providing primary commodities and a market for the goods of British and European companies, the colonial state and local European companies were quite comfortable with these ultra-conservative monetary arrangements. Their investments and commercial activities were adequately protected by the backing of the British pound sterling as they could transfer money to and from Nigeria without fear of a depreciation in the rate of exchange (5). This mechanical and externally-oriented monetary system was supported by conservative budgetary policies which always aimed at a surplus.

The devastating global economic crisis of 1929 exposed the fragility of the Nigerian economy and the debilitating effects of its total dependence on foreign trading financial and manufacturing companies. The prices of Nigeria's principal commodities collapsed rapidly thus affecting the fortunes of some of the colonial trading companies, the incomes of the Nigerian farmers and middlemen and the social expenditure of the state. Farmers were forced to increase production to meet the State's pre-crisis level of income for the purchase of highly priced manufactured commodities (6).

The tight budgetary policies and conservative monetary policies were partially liberalised in the 1950s as nationalists joined the colonial officials in administering the state; the former advocated for an expansion of public expenditure and a revision of the monetary system to provide for a fiduciary element in the currency (7). This attack on the colonial budgetary and monetary system coincided with the realignment of class forces.

specifically the emergence of import-substitution industrialisation, supported by the creation of the Marketing Boards, which transformed some of the trading companies into semi-manufacturing companies (UAC, John HOLT, PZ), encouraged new foreign industrial companies to penetrate the economy and facilitated the emergence of African and levantine small-scale manufacturers and financiers from the small band of the petit-bourgeoisie that was tied with the production and marketing of the agricultural commodities (8). These developments took place against the backdrop of the changing character of global capitalism with its movement from the restrictive, colonialist and regionalist currency and trade blocs to a multilateral system of production, commerce, finance and monetary cooperation under U.S. hegemony (9).

The relative freeing of the economy from tight budgetary surpluses and conservative monetary systems and the emergence of a nascent African comprador bourgeoisie linked to the Nigerian nationalists that now collectively, with imperialism, administer the state, created the foundations for the Nigerian bourgeoisie to share with imperialism the responsibilities for future crises. The first of such crises occurred in 1955/56 following the Korean War boom in which prices of key Nigerian commodities experienced a slump leading to a reduction in revenue which was not enough to meet the expanding cost of government expenditure, the high cost of the import bill and the foreign exchange requirements of the local and foreign companies.

This was the period when capitalist accumulation was fuelled by agricultural production, with the economy depending on agriculture for about 70% for its foreign exchange and 66% for its gross domestic product (10). With the constitutional changes providing for self government to the three regions between 1957 and 1959, greater fiscal spending powers were conferred on the regional governments. The federal commodity boards were regionalized in 1954, setting the stage for massive funds, derived from the exploitation of the peasantry, to be transferred to the regional governments.

Table I  
Total Accumulation by Nigerian Marketing Boards  
1954-1961 (£'000).

Item	Eastern Region	Northern Region	Western Region	Total
Transfer from commodity board	11,464.1	32,651.8	42,897.2	87,013.1
Net trading surplus	10,736.2	3,202.7	14,303.9	21,837.1
Excess of income over expenditure	1,718.9	2,451.2	5,349.1	9,519.2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>23,919.2</b>	<b>38,305.7</b>	<b>62,550.2</b>	<b>118,369.4</b>

Source: G.K. Heillener, «the fiscal role of the Marketing Boards in Nigerian Economic Development» in C.K. Eicher and C. Liedholm (eds.) *Growth and Development of the Nigerian Economy* (Michigan State University Press), 1970, p. 125.

As YAHAYA Abdullahi puts it «British control over public investment funds, tariff, industrial and fiscal policies and allocation of foreign exchange was transferred to the indigenous bourgeoisie»(11). This indigenised administrative state system became an important vehicle for capital accumulation with agriculture serving as the material basis for this process and for the financing of government projects, political parties, the private appropriation of public funds, and the development of conspicuous consumption (12).

The crisis of 1955/56, however, had deeper structural roots, with the secular collapse of the agrarian basis of capital accumulation as witnessed by the gradual drop in earnings from agriculture in the gross domestic product from 61% in 1964 to 18% in 1982 (13). This produced a series of crises in the 1960s (1962–1964 and 1966–1970) exposing the structural fragility and instability of the political economy, a situation which remained unchanged until the oil price revolution of 1973.

The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 not only changed the agrarian basis of capital accumulation to that of crude-petroleum but also reinforced and expanded the structure of capitalist import – substitution industrialisation that was started in the immediate post second world war period.

Industrial Composition of Gross Domestic Products:

	1950*	1958-59**	1966-67**	1971-72**	1974-75***	Mean percentage 1950-75
Agriculture	67.5	65.9	53.8	41.8	23.4	50.5
Industry ††	8.2	9.2	19.8	32.4	56.3	25.1
Transp. & Communication	4.5	4.1	4.0	3.7	2.3	3.7
Distribution	6.2	12.5	12.4	11.5	6.7	9.9
General Govt.	2.2	3.1	3.2	5.3	6.3	4.0
Social Services ††	1.6	3.0	4.2	3.2	3.5	3.1
Others	9.7	2.1	2.6	2.1	1.5	3.6
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

\* At constant 1957 (factor cost) prices

\*\* At constant 1962–63 (factor cost) prices

\*\*\* At constant 1974–75 (factor cost) prices

Mining and quarrying, manufacturing and craft, electricity and water supply, building & construction; it also includes, for 1950 alone, public utilities.

†† Includes education, health.

Source: O. Teriba, E.C. Ediozien, M.O. Kayode, the structure of manufacturing industry in Nigeria (Ibadan) 1981.

In 1962, agricultural products accounted for about 70% of the total value of exports. By 1974, however, agriculture's share of total export earnings had dropped to less than 20%. By comparison, petroleum's share of the total earnings which accounted for only 10% of export earnings in 1962 rose to 82.7% in 1973. The price of crude oil which «nearly tripled between 1973 and 1974, jumped from \$ 11.7 per barrel in 1974 to \$ 40 per barrel in 1980» and the production of crude oil reached 2.05 million barrels per day by 1980 (15). Thus the revenue accruing from the crude petroleum industry jumped from ₦ 4.733 b in 1975 to ₦ 9.825 b in 1981 (16).

This unprecedented increase in foreign exchange earnings from the oil industry led to a massive expansion of planned capital expenditure under the second National Development Plan: «1970/71 – 1973/74 was ₦ 3b compared with a total expenditure of ₦ 30b for the Third National Development Plan: 1975/76 – 1979/80, and ₦ 82.5 b for the Fourth National Development Plan: 1981–85» (17). The availability of such massive financial resources to the state acted as a fillip for the formulation and execution of the Indigenisation Decrees of 1972 and 1977 which attempted to create a three-tier industrial and commercial ownership structure in which commercial and low level capital intensive industries would be preserved for Nigerian businessmen or would have a Nigerian majority shareholding. In practice these decrees fostered foreign control of the economy and transformed the fortunes of some of the Nigerian businessmen, politicians and civil servants by raising their ownership of the economy from a meagre 7% in 1966 to 39.5% and then 42% in 1976 (18).

Although capital expenditure increased concurrently with the expansion of infrastructural facilities, signifying an expansion of industrial activities to the tune of a 15% rate of growth for the manufacturing industry in the 1970s (19), the contribution of the manufacturing sector to the gross domestic product remained very small. Its current share of just about 8% of G.D.P. does not justify the amount of foreign exchange tax relief and state support that it has received in recent times, and the high profit level it has made from the exploitation of the working class. For one thing, most of the industries are simple assembly and packaging enterprises that contribute very little to local value added. Most of the industries cited in the Third National Development Plan have a value added of less than 15% with animal feed (13.9%), spirits, distilleries and beer (14.6%) textiles (10.9%) and transport equipment (9.7%) occupying the top category (20). The Nigerian Industry is dominated by light industries that manufacture such items as food, beverages and tobacco using simple technology; these three industries contribute about «a third of the value added in manufacturing » (21). As TERIBA et. al. put it, «when it is realised that textiles and wearing apparel contributed about 17% of the value added in 1972, for example, it is clear that, for Nigeria, the two most elementary sub-sectors in manufacturing easily contributed more than 51% of the value added. The engineering section of industry, in spite of the average of 16.4% of value added in manufacturing attributed to it, is dominated by

three very elementary sub-groups – namely, metal, furniture and fixtures, structural metal products and fabricated metal. The real engineering sub-sectors – the manufacturing of agricultural and special industrial machinery and equipment, household electrical apparatus, and transport equipment – account only for 2.3% of value added in manufacturing» (22).

It is this situation, we believe, which forced the NEC Expert Committee on the *State of the Economy* to remark that «the money that was put into the hands of the members of the public (viz – the Nigerian and foreign capitalists) was not invested in the production of goods and services in Nigeria» (23). A high proportion of this money was spent abroad. As the committee observed, «food import more than doubled between 1976 and 1978/79 and more than doubled again by 1981 when it exceeded ₦ 2 billion. The importation of manufactured goods increased by nearly 50% between 1976 and 1978/79 and nearly doubled again by 1981, that is, within two years, when it was as much as ₦ 2.6 billion. The importation of machinery and transport equipment increased by 121% between 1976 and 1981» (24). Thus for every one naira spent in the economy, 60k of it found its way outside of the economy (25).

Added to this was the substantial increase in the importation of capital equipment and raw materials. Capital imports increased by about 156% between 1974 and 1979 and by 28% between 1978/79 and 1981 and raw material imports increased by 110% and 100% respectively. By 1981 both capital and raw material imports, which are necessary for the type of industrialization that was being pursued, had reached a level of ₦ 5.7 billion.

A substantial percentage of the drain on the foreign exchange should of course be attributed to the fraudulent way in which: a) contracts have been inflated to the tune of «three times the cost of executing similar projects in East and North Africa and four times of the cost in Asia»; b) the fraudulent transactions in the foreign exchange system and c) the corrupt practices of imperialist companies and their Nigerian collaborators in using import licences as a cover for transferring large sums of money abroad. For instance, the *Sunday Telegraph* (London) of 28th August published a story of how £ 5,000 million (₦ 5,357.14 million) was fraudulently drained from Nigeria's economy by import-export firms, evading the exchange control regulations. The paper claimed that 29 forged clean reports used to obtain authorisation of payment from the central bank of Nigeria and were subsequently exposed by a City of London Bank. Goods valued at £ 7 million (₦ 7.3 million) were said to have been exported by a company which controlled both ends of the import-export operation. Several other forged clean certificates were used to inflate the quantity and value of goods shipped out of Nigeria (27).

Just recently also, the Managing Director of the International Bank of West Africa, Mr. Oladele OLASHORE, in the September issue of the *IBWA Quarterly Economic Review* stated that «Nigeria does not get more than 25% value for her huge expenditure on imports». An estimated expenditure of about ₦ 11.9 billion in 1981 would have brought in ₦ 2.97 billion «because of various built-in margins of fraud and other exorbitant finance charges on such imports» (28).



## Import by End-use at Current Prices

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
1. Consumer goods								
a) Non durable:								
– Food	166.4	353.7	526.7	912.6	1004.1	1040.1	1416.8	2198.3
– Textile	31.5	81.3	65.0	38.9	41.9	73.2	92.4	202.6
– Others	173.6	353.5	476.7	612.1	720.5	705.8	567.4	822.0
b) Durable	68.5	191.3	282.0	421.7	370.2	380.7	473.7	674.1
Total:	440.0	979.8	1350.4	1985.3	2136.7	2199.8	2550.3	3897.0
2. Capital goods								
– Capital	490.1	1136.6	1515.0	2129.8	2595.5	1576.9	2228.7	2661.3
– Transp. equip.	124.9	371.1	729.6	1012.5	1233.8	988.7	1770.2	1818.7
– Raw material	519.3	903.0	1094.0	1543.0	1880.1	1115.7	2166.9	3038.5
– Fuel	55.4	100.2	175.0	128.6	156.7	116.4	173.4	187.2
Total:	1189.7	2510.9	3513.6	4813.9	5866.1	3797.7	6339.2	7705.7
Passenger cars:	97.0	220.3	261.0	297.4	350.1	169.7	206.1	1316.9
Grand Total	1786.7	3711.0	5125.0	7096.6	8352.9	6167.2	9095.6	12919.6

Source: Federal Office of Statistics in National Economic Council Expert Committee Report on *the State of the Nation* (1983).

By 1978, mild strains started to appear in the economy partly as a result of the 2% increase in Nigeria's oil prices in April 1977 which led to a tumbling of oil exports by 16%, thereby reducing the oil revenue from ₦ 7 billion in 1977 to ₦ 5.9 billion in 1978. This happened at a time when imports were accelerating at a rate of 40%. It led to mild deflationary measures by the OBASANJO administration in 1978 before power was transferred to the civilian administrators in 1979 (29). With the partial success of those measures, the SHAGARI administration set in motion, in its March 1980 budget, an import liberalisation process and an unprecedented expanded public expenditure programme (30); imports, for instance, «rose substantially in 1981 and reached the monthly average of ₦ 1.2 billion by late 1981 and 1982» (31). When between 1981 and 1982 the world price for oil fell dramatically, affecting also the quantity being produced, the revenue accruing from the sale of crude oil, on which so much of economic activity in Nigeria depends, fell from ₦ 10,100 million in 1979 to ₦ 5,161 million in 1982. It was clear that the bizarre structure of imports and pattern of industrial and economic development could no longer be sustained. But, the crisis in Nigeria's political economy was happening at a time when the value of revenues still surpassed the oil revenues of the 1975 boom period; a situation which has forced some commentators to assert that the crisis was not that of an oil glut (32).

## Development in Prices and Government Revenue from Crude Oil

Year	Production (million barrels per day)	Export (million barrels per day)	Posted Price (\$/bbl)	Revenue to Go- vernment
1975	1.785	1.713	13.7	4,733 (1975-76)
1976	2.067	2.013	14.0	5,498 (1976-77)
1977	2.085	2.030	15.5	6,177 (1977-78)
1978	1.897	1.827	14.9	4,809 (1978-79)
1979	2.302	2.210	33.0	1 0,100 (1979-80)
1980	2.054	1.940	44.4	9,489 (Apr.-Dec.)
1981	1.440	1.227	42.5	9,825***
1982	1.294	0.991*	39.0**	5,161***

\* For the first nine months

\*\* For the first eight months

\*\*\* Estimates only

**Source:** Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and Federal Government Budget Estimates in National Economic Council Expert Committee Report on *the State of the Nigerian Economy* (Lagos, 1983).

## GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE EFFECT OF THE CRISIS ON THE NIGERIAN SOCIETY

The economic crisis and the austerity measures that accompanied it in April 1982 have had a tremendous effect on the various classes and sectors of the Nigerian economy. Although the government had through its economic advisers, denied the existence of a crisis in 1981, the deepening contradictions of the economy forced the President and his advisers to recognise the existence of one in April 1982, when the President introduced the Economic Stabilisation Act to contain the crisis. The measures in the austerity package included the imposition of, or increase, in customs and excise duties and the regulation of imports. For instance, all unused import licences were recalled for review; capital projects not yet started were deferred; issues of licences to import vehicles including passenger cars and trucks were suspended; basic travel allowances were reduced from ₦ 800 to ₦ 500 and business travel allowances reduced from ₦ 3,000 to ₦ 2,500; compulsory advance deposits were imposed on all imports as follows: foods with the exception of rice, 50%; medicaments, 50%; capital goods, 50%; raw materials and spare parts, 25%; motor vehicles and trucks, 200%; motor cars, 25% and other goods 250%; an increase in government decreed interests by 2%; reduction of government expenditure; and restrictions on the external borrowing under federal government guarantee by the 19 states.

These measures were reviewed and made more comprehensive in January 1983. For instance, an additional 152 items were placed under license. Tariff charges were raised on a whole range of commodities, including starch, 33% – 100%; toilet soap and detergents, 100%; paper and paper labels, 100%; cotton yarns 100%; blankets 100% and fabricated structural steel, 60%. In addition the compulsory advanced deposit scheme was revised, particularly after the complaints from industry (34); the deposits on raw materials and spare parts were reduced from 25% to 10% for raw materials and 15% for spare parts; monetary and credit guidelines were also established for industries, development finance institutions and general commerce (35).

In addition, the National Executive Council on January 31st 1983, set up a committee of experts composed of the Special Advisers to the government in the Vice-President's office, Dr. J.S. ODAMA, the Special Advisers or the Chief Economic Advisers to the State Governors, and a representative from the Central Bank to review the economic crisis and recommend immediate and long term solutions to the problems (36). The report of this committee, which was submitted to the NEC in February 1983, led to the government white paper which endorsed most of the recommendations of the Report (37).

The crisis of the economy and the specific policies of the government have had a devastating effect on the subordinate classes and various sectors of the economy. Industry, for instance, has suffered a very serious blow, particularly with respect to its complete dependence on foreign capital and raw material inputs. The classical import substitution industrialization programme is actually on the verge of collapse. A large number of factories have virtually closed down. A poll conducted by the Manufacturing Association of Nigeria (MAN) showed that by July 31st 1983, a total of 101 companies had within the preceding 12 months closed for a period of between seven and twelve weeks, involving a labour force of 20,000 workers (38). Another nation-wide survey carried out by the *National Concord* paints a similar picture. In Borno State, for instance, it was discovered that most of the factories «have been forced to ask their workers to stand-by pending the arrival of essential raw materials in the country» (39). The major companies said to be affected in this state include the Nguru Oil Mills, Ice Cream makers, Neital Shoes, Wire and Nails company. In Ondo State, the Odu'a Textile Mill now operates with only a skeletal staff; another case is the Burnt Brick industry, opened in 1981 with about 200 workers and which has been forced to close down. It is reported that the problem of raw materials which is tied up to the levels of advanced deposits for imports and the non-availability of import-licenses have affected not only the existing industries but also «those industries that have just left the drawing boards» (40). In Imo State, the survey maintains that many completed factories couldn't take off because of the uncertainty of raw materials. For instance none of the 13 industries established by the state government since 1979 is functioning. The industries include «the paint

and resin factories at Ngu-Mbaise, the aluminium extrusion Plant at Liyisihi-Ikeduru, and the cardboard and packaging factories at Owerri-Ebri». The Honda Motorcycles Assembly Plant at the Naze Industrial area has almost closed down for lack of materials (41). The Standard Shoe Company at Owerri-Orlu road and the GCM Electrical, NAZE, (the only electrical manufacturing industry in the state) have closed down. In Oyo state four main companies, viz., Sanyo Electrical Company, Pepsi Cola Bottling Company, Eagle Flour Company and R.T. Briscoe (Nigeria) Limited have closed down. Other companies like J. ALLEN, WAATECO, ADONIS and John HOLT are reported to be running only skeleton services with a few staff (42). Similar trends can certainly be observed for other states of the federation.

Most of these companies have been hit by the very structure of their production which requires high levels of importation of raw materials. With the squeeze in foreign exchange, supported by the government's policy on advanced deposits covering a whole range of commodities, the availability of foreign exchange has become politicised with import licenses going to party stalwarts or their agents who in many cases have no connections with industry (43). Many companies are being forced to buy import-licenses on the streets (44) defeating the declaratory policy of giving preference to manufacturers.

These developments have had a crippling effect on workers employment, incomes and prices. The textile industry, for instance, has lost about 35,000 of its workers within the past three years. The National Secretary of the National Union of Textile Garment and Tailoring Workers of Nigeria maintained that the membership of the union which stood at 75,000 in December 1980 fell to 63,000 in December 1981; this was further reduced to 50,303 in December 1982 and 48,000 in August 1983 (45). Ten thousand workers (10,000) of the Metal Products Workers Union have also lost their jobs in 1983 alone. Apart from those who have been dismissed, thousands more have been forced by their various managements to either go on compulsory leave without pay, or have their hours of work reduced to three days per week (46). 500 workers of the Aeromaritime (Nigeria) Ltd., in Lagos were sacked in November (47) and 700 SCOA workers were sent on compulsory leave at the SCOA Assembly Plant at Apapa (48); and 15,000 workers in the country's printing industry have been threatened with retrenchment if the industry which depends on importation of raw materials to the tune of 95% is not granted import licenses to import newsprint (49).

Of course a lot of companies that are making massive profits are jumping on the bandwagon of austerity to reduce their labour cost by sacking workers at will (50). Some of these companies even default at the payment of compensation to dismissed workers, or as is now very common with many enterprises, particularly the parastatals, workers wages are irregularly paid. The federal government, following a threat of a national

strike action from the NLC, had to extend a loan of about ₦ 537 million to the 19 state governments and the Federal Capital Territory – Abuja, before the August 1983 elections, to enable the various state governments to pay arrears of salaries, wages and allowances to workers (51).

Many public services have suffered irreparable damage. For instance, the school system in many states of the federation faces imminent collapse with the non-payment of teachers salaries, the protracted strikes by the teachers unions and closure of schools by the authorities; hospitals have also been facing acute drugs shortages stemming mainly from the raw material import dependence of the local pharmaceutical industry and the rationing of foreign exchange to import other drugs not produced in the country. Health standards have certainly declined in the past 15 months of austerity rule.

The economic crisis has drastically reduced the standard of living of ordinary Nigerians. Incomes of wage and salary workers and poor peasants have been hit by the skyrocketing inflation which has literally placed millions of Nigerians on the starvation line. Many of the prices of essential commodities have increased by more than 100%. These astonishing increases of commodity prices in Lagos can also be observed in other parts of the country. In Maiduguri, it was reported that cooking oil which sold at ₦ 8.25 per 3 litres in June was selling at between ₦ 13 and ₦ 15 in September. A year ago, the same commodity sold at ₦ 7.00. In Owerri 1/2 a kilo of bread went up from 50k to 70k in September and 200 grams of elephant blue detergent went up from 50k to ₦ 1.00. In Benin a tuber yam which was bought for ₦ 5 in June sold at ₦ 12 in September while a tin of palm oil which sold between ₦ 12 and ₦ 15 in 1982 sold at ₦ 50 in September. In Jos, a tin of palm oil which sold at ₦ 15 twelve months ago rose to ₦ 46 in September. Similar trends were discerned by the *Sunday Concord* national survey in other parts of the country (52). As our own experiences in Zaria have shown over the last couple of months, most of the prices quoted by the survey have either doubled or trebled. Eating habits and calorie/protein intake have really been dealt a serious blow in most homes of the federation!

(Lagos) Comparative increase in the prices of some essential Commodities between February and October 1983.

Items	February	August	October
A tin of Palm Oil	₦ 45.00	₦ 52.00	₦ 79.00
A gallon of Vegetable Oil	5.00	7.00	15.00
Average size of Tuber Yam	4.00	7.00	10.00
A Tin of Beans	56.00	60.00	78.00
A Tin of Gari	30.00	35.00	47.00
Medium size of Omo	0.55	0.80	1.50
A Tin of Peak Milk	0.25	0.40	0.70
Medium size Maclean Toothpaste	1.00	1.40	2.00
A Tin of medium size Nescafe	0.75	1.00	1.70

Source: *National Concord*, 20th October, 1983.

## THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISIS

The crisis which we have just outlined has specific political implications for the state and society. Our objective is to map out the most salient political implications and then draw conclusions from them. These, in our view, fall under three broad areas, viz – a) the increasing concentration of political power in the governing strata of the Nigerian bourgeoisie at the expense of other social classes, with a tendency towards the use of political repression as an instrument for curbing the crisis; b) the increasing irrelevance or marginalisation of the social-democratic option as a strategy for defending and pursuing popular welfare and democratic rights; c) the intensification of imperialist penetration of the decision-making apparatus of the state leading to increasing subservience to western imperialist interests. These three political implications derive their dynamic from the general lopsided political system that is specific to Nigeria's underdeveloped capitalist economy.

### *A./ THE CONCENTRATION OF POLITICAL POWER IN THE HANDS OF THE LEADING STRATA OF THE BOURGEOISIE*

Every ruling class, by controlling the productive activities of society, imposes its general will and interests on the subordinate classes of that society (53). In the course of the unfolding of the political process, a faction (or factions) of the bourgeoisie may come to have greater control over the state apparatus than other factions even though this faction (or factions) in the long run must defend the general interests of all sections of the ruling class (54). The emergence of such a dominant faction is, within the context of modern political struggles, institutionalised in a political party which contests for power and organises politics around its interests.

In advanced capitalist political systems, such pursuit of hegemonic factional interests is conducted within a liberal democratic framework which recognises the interests of other sections of the bourgeoisie even if not always pursued. In such systems, administrative political power usually changes hands at the polls and other factions are either brought to the centre of power or allowed to enjoy the benefits of the policies of the new administration. This political arrangement generally reflects the cohesion and consolidation of the bourgeoisie as a whole, reflecting the increasing concentration and centralisation of capital which is manifested in the interlocking directorates of banks and other business organisations. Such a cohesion of the bourgeoisie puts it in a formidable position to resolve its petty differences and to effectively take on the challenge of the working class.

In contrast to its more advanced counterparts in Europe and North America, the Nigerian bourgeoisie for a long time since the decolonisation period has not been able to consolidate its power into a cohesive force and settle its differences outside of violent political struggles. In the

1960's, the first two attempts of unifying the bourgeoisie, viz – the Northern factions (through the NPC) incursions into the Western region between 1962 and 1965 and the Eastern factions attempt through IRONSI's unitary military government ended in a national tragedy – military rule and civil war (55).

The victory of the federal government over the Biafran secessionist attempts represented a decisive turning point in the consolidation of the unity of the bourgeoisie; it also afforded the bourgeoisie the opportunity to work together as a group to manage the affairs of the state (56).

But, of course, the lifting of the political ban on party activities opened up the old rifts within the bourgeoisie, culminating in a spate of political parties which tended to reflect the pre-military political alignments, with the National Party of Nigeria gaining control of the federal government and the Unity Party of Nigeria and the Nigerian People's Party consolidating their positions in their respective regions. The NPN's control of the National Assembly (Senate and House of Representatives) (57) was very tenuous and its power could not penetrate most of the states of the federation (having won only seven of the nineteen state governments). This, in fact, necessitate the political alliance with the NPP which came to be called the NPN – NPP accord.

The 1983 elections, coming in the midst of an economic crisis, created a fresh opportunity for the governing section of the bourgeoisie to attempt a further consolidation and unification of bourgeois political forces under the umbrella of the National Party of Nigeria. This was achieved with the active support of the Federal Electoral Commission and the law enforcement agencies as the NPN was returned to power with an overwhelming and decisive majority in the House of Assembly and the state governments, with the massive penetration of UPN and NPP strongholds in Oyo (even Ondo until the courts ruled otherwise) and Anambra, the flushing out of the Great Nigerian Peoples Party from Borno and Gongola, the capture of Kaduna from the People's Redemption Party and the conversion of the leading section of the PRP in Kano into an NPN satellite. The NPN may well have set in motion the process for the unification of the disparate forces of the bourgeoisie. When one considers the zoning policy of the party which seems to rotate political office around the multifarious ethnic groups within the party, the picture of apparent unity of the bourgeoisie begins to emerge (57b).

The implications of these developments are quite obvious; it is just the kind of concentrated political power needed by the state to introduce draconian political and economic policies to curb the depression. Already serious doubts have been raised about the impartiality or independence of the judiciary, especially after its contradictory positions on many of its electoral decisions and the manner in which the police and FEDECO were used to conduct the elections (58).

The concentration of political power in a bourgeoisie caught in the quagmire of economic crises would force this class to resort to repressive rule, such as the sabotage of democratic rights (a process which has already started to unfold), the political intimidation and harrassment of

workers and other groups and the implementation of unpopular economic measures which would have a devastating effect on the welfare of the ordinary people. This is what James PETRAS calls «the neo-fascist state» which: —

*«... in the initial period is essentially a repressive state: an apparatus geared towards destroying the organisations of mass mobilisation, annihilating militants... systematic mass demobilisation. But this initial function does not exhaust the historic characteristics of the neo-fascist state. Rather, this... is the basis for 'reconstruction' — that is the creation of policies, institutions and conditions for a particular type of socio-economic condition. The neo-fascist state hence has the second essential function of creating the conditions of large-scale long-term economic expansion based on the promotion of multinational capital» (59).*

### B./ THE MARGINALISATION OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC OPTION

The second major political implication of the current economic crisis is the marginalisation of the social democratic option as a strategy for pursuing and defending the welfare and democratic rights of workers. All capitalist states, developed and under-developed, must provide some minimum welfare to their citizens (60); these include free education, free health care, unemployment benefits (mainly for the advanced capitalist states), food subsidies and student grants. In the more advanced capitalist economies, particularly in Western Europe, social democratic parties have emerged to champion these rights within the capitalist framework. A fundamental characteristic of these parties is their opposition to political struggles aimed at changing capitalist property relations. Their objective is to make capitalism serve not just the capitalist class but also the workers. This they do by advocating for, and when in office, implementing policies of expanded public expenditure in education, health and subsidies, raising taxes mainly from the rich to build structures that will provide employment, income and general welfare to poor people.

In the course of time, all political parties pursue some welfare policies, especially as even the establishment parties depend upon a large section of the working class for their votes. It is not surprising, therefore, that even parts of the Nigerian constitution tend to espouse some of these objectives; all the registered political parties had advocated in their manifestoes one form of welfare or the other, with, of course, the UPN and PRP gaining more recognition for their stand on these issues.

The political history of social democracy rests, however, very tenuously on the state of the economy, experiencing a good record in periods of economic expansion and facing a crisis in periods of economic recession. Thus, in periods of crises, even social democratic parties are forced to pursue non-welfarist programmes, or to limit the expansion of such programmes, when they are in government. Thus the British Labour



Party both in 1964–70 and 1974–79 initiated the programmes of public expenditure cuts which later Conservative governments intensified. Barbara CASTLE's *In Place of Strife* policy in the Wilson government of 1964–70 and CALLAGHAN's Social Contract Policy of 1974–79 were aimed at imposing industrial discipline on the working class.

Very often, in periods of economic crisis, because social democratic parties betray their original intentions, they get booted out of office by more reactionary and repressive regimes, such as the Labour Party's defeat by the Conservative Party in the 1979 British elections, REAGAN's defeat of CARTER's Democratic Party in the 1980 US presidential elections, the collapse of the Social Democratic alliance government in Germany in 1983 and the defeat of MANLEY's «socialist» government by the right wing government of SHEAGA in Jamaica in 1980..

Such developments should not be surprising because, as we have said, the triumph of social democracy rests on the ability of capitalism to maintain uninterrupted growth. Since social democrats rely on the ability of the capitalist class to provide part of the surplus that will be used to mount the welfare programmes, every inducement is given to this class to enable it overcome the economic crisis so that social welfare would be re-activated. It follows, therefore, that in periods of acute economic crisis, there is not much to choose between a social democratic party and an established right wing party as the policies of both tend to converge at the point where they recognise the need for capital to survive by giving it inducements, imposing wages freeze, reducing subsidies and curtailing public expenditure generally.

In Nigeria, as we explained in previous sections, the government's free education policy has all but collapsed, with teachers not being paid at times for 6 months in many states of the federation, and the threat to re-introduce fees at the universities; wages, allowances and bonuses have been frozen for large categories of workers, drugs are not available in most government hospitals; and workers loose their jobs in their thousands without adequate compensation or unemployment benefits; there is also a threat to reduce subsidies from food and fuel thus worsening the cost of living of the ordinary people. This is happening at a time when massive tax inducements and other credits and subsidies are being given to companies to invest, expand production and reap large profits.

The interesting point about these developments is that none of the registered opposition political parties has successfully made these issues an integral part of their programmes and activities for they have also been guilty of the same practices in the various states where they govern. What is more, their official representatives took part in drawing up the National Economic Council Report on *The State of the Nigerian Economy* which recommended a ruthless confrontation with the labour unions: –

1. «There should be a wage freeze for both public and private sectors throughout the 1983 fiscal year...
2. «Strikes should be suspended for a period of one year.
3. «Employees who are on strike should receive no pay for the duration of the strike. Sympathy strikes should be banned completely.

- 4.«Strikes should be made illegal for essential services, and security forces should be organised and equipped to step in, in case of emergency» (61).

The struggle for democratic and welfare rights has fallen, therefore, on the shoulders of the affected groups themselves, the workers through the agitation of the NLC and its sub-groups, the ASUU, student's unions and other left organisations. These groups have been quite active recently in warning the nation of the political consequences of the economic crisis, and in their opposition to moves which they consider to be encroaching on their democratic rights. The point should be made that since the registered political parties have accepted the centrality of the capitalist system of production as a strategy for solving the crisis, no amount of preaching will force the government to maintain current welfare and democratic rights except by the vigilance of the oppressed majority of the people themselves acting in a general organisational framework that understands the limits of social democratic politics and the need to transcend them.

### SUBSERVIENT TO IMPERIALISM

The third major factor we would want to consider is the intensification of imperialist penetration of the decision-making apparatus of the state. Most Third World states that face economic crises often turn to the public institutions of the Western economies, the IMF and IBRD, for salvation. This is usually supported by direct pleas to the Western governments themselves for economic aid and the rescheduling of debts owed to international banks and multinational trade organisations through short-term contractor finance loans. Added to this, private foreign business organisations are invited with lucrative offers to exploit the material and human resources of the society. These developments lead to the pursuit of repressive domestic policies and a foreign policy that is sympathetic to imperialism.

Much, of course, has been written on the ~~the~~ \$1.8 billion loan which the federal government is negotiating with the IMF. The opposition to the loan from the press, labour unions, student and academic unions and the general public has been so concerted and persistent that even some government officials and senators have begun to express doubts about the wisdom of accepting the loan. The popular opposition is anchored on the belief that such loans are given to control the economies of the recipients by imposing harsh conditions on the underprivileged sections of the society. The objective is usually to cut public expenditure, remove subsidies and restrictions from the external economic transactions of the economy, freeze wages and devalue the currency. As the president of Tanzania put it in 1980:—

*«The IMF has proved to be a basically political institution. It tends to reproduce colonial relationships by constraining national efforts which promote basic structural transformations in favour of the majorities» (62).*

The significance of the IMF as a leading force of imperialism should be grasped. It emerged out of the Second World War as a sister organisation to the IBRD and GATT which were established by the Western policy-makers to manage the inevitable crises of the capitalist world economy. It was agreed that all economies should be made multilateral, with no discrimination or restrictions in trade, foreign exchange transactions and capital movements. This decision was taken against the background of the depression of the 1930s which almost destroyed capitalism. But the implementation of these objectives suited mostly the leading imperialist power in the world, the U.S., which explains why even though Western Europe was a signatory to the IMF and GATT treaties, its governments were unable to implement the provisions of the agreements until 1958/1959 (63).

Since 1959, when Western Europe succeeded in putting their currencies on a convertible basis and ended their discriminatory trade policies towards the US, the IMF has set itself up as the national executive committee of the bourgeoisie of the Western capitalist economies with the authority to impose stringent rules on its members (64). Its high points, of course, are periods of acute economic crisis when, because of its possession of huge financial resources, it can control the economic policies of most Third World states. Just in the last three years alone many African economies have fallen prey to this international octopus, viz., Uganda which had to devalue its currency by 90 % in 1981, Ghana which devalued by 99 % in November 1983, Sierra Leone which devalued by 100 % in the early part of 1983 and currently Nigeria which has already devalued the Naira by 12 % with speculations of further devaluation.

The IMF measures have brought misery and deprivation to the majority of the workers in the countries where these measures have been implemented. For instance, when the IMF measures were implemented in Jamaica in 1977, «real wages fell by an estimated 35 %, the share of labour in the national income fell from 55.3 % to 55.2 % and average per capita consumption declined by 13 %» (65). The Turkish government's devaluation, under the auspices of the IMF, coupled with the imposition of a wage freeze led to a 100 % inflation rate, a rapid decline in real wages and shortages of basic commodities (66). To prevent what one IMF official described as «either the death of democracy or the overthrow of the government» (67), the Brazilian government, an outpost of US imperialism, which has a debt of about \$ 87 billion, on the 20th October 1983, rejected an IMF-inspired proposal for a law limiting wage increases. This decision was taken after thousands of people had converged on the state capital, Brasilia, to protest against the government's hard-hitting austerity programme (68).

In many Third World states where IMF measures have been implemented, the entire decision-making apparatus of the state has been penetrated and IMF/US officials put in charge of key sectors of the economy. The situation in Zaïre is a classic case of an attempt by the Western powers to recolonise the economy. With its huge debt of well over \$ 5 billion, and the inability of MOBUTU's regime to safeguard the massive investments of foreign companies, private money markets and the World Bank, the IMF,

US, French and Belgian officials have been put in charge of key areas of the Central Bank, the Ministry of Trade and Finance and other strategic sectors of the Civil Service. This has been supported by the American Rapid Deployment Force and the Franco-Belgian military presence.

Similar developments took place also in Ghana during the reign of BUSIA. His regime had incurred a huge debt from previous administrations. The military National Liberation Council had instituted debtor loan re-scheduling meetings with the Western governments in which the IMF and IBRD played supporting roles. Debt repayment was running at an intolerable rate of about £ 45m a year; the problem was further compounded by the additional interest at market rate which had to be met on the deferred payments (69). BUSIA had to invite the IMF and the monetarist disciples of Milton FRIEDMAN from Chicago University to run Ghana's economy (70). The Cedi was devalued beyond recognition, the public corporations were denationalised, foreign trade and monetary transactions were liberalised and fees were reintroduced in schools and universities. This set the stage for the prolonged depression from which the economy has never recovered.

Here in Nigeria, recent calculations by the Central Bank put the public overseas debt of the Federal and State governments at around ₦ 8.5 billion (71) and the short-term trade debt at about \$ 5 billion (72). It was recently calculated that the interests accruing to the short-term debts would be running to the tune ₦ 599.8 m yearly as from January 1984 when the grace periods and refinancing loans would be over (73). The latter trade debts forced the federal government to refinance \$ 1.4 billion of these debts in July and another \$ 400 – \$ 500m in September. Both agreements stipulated that the federal government should start repayment in January 1984. The agreement in September involved some 40 international banks. As we have already pointed out, the government has also been negotiating a ₦ 1.8 billion loan from the IMF to correct its persistent balance of payment deficits.

Already most of the economic measures recommended by the IMF are being implemented, viz. wage freeze, curtailment of public expenditure, devaluation (the currency depreciated by 12 % recently) and the removal of subsidies which many suspect would soon be implemented; this demonstrates a coincidence of interests between imperialism and the Nigerian state. The current economic crisis and the state's increasing dependence on foreign loans has certainly intensified the state's subservience to imperialism.

This subservience has begun to be translated into the area of foreign policy, viz., the recent shocking revelation that the present administration had advocated an acceptance of the American *linkage policy* (74) of removing Cuban troops from Angola as a condition for Namibian independence (75); and the strange silence displayed by the administration over the barbaric violation of the freedom, independence and security of the Grenadian people when, in October 1983, American marines invaded that country. When one considers that these events took place just at the time when the administration was receiving an American loan of ₦ 135 million, there is grounds to believe that the state is rapidly losing its initiative in foreign policy to imperialism. The domestic political implications of this subservience to imperialism are ominous if Brazil's experience is anything to go by.

## CONCLUSION

We have been trying to establish that:—

1. Economic crises are permanent features of all capitalist political economies; these, we have seen, are connected with the problem of reconciling social production with consumption, a problem which is a characteristic feature of the fundamental contradiction between the social organisation of production and the private appropriation of social surplus;

2. These permanent cyclical crises of capitalist development manifest themselves in the Nigerian formation through the specific operations of the transnational corporations and the local Nigerian enterprises in terms of the way they dominate the banking, commercial, manufacturing and agricultural sectors of the economy and appropriate surplus to themselves at the expense of the general working population;

3. More specifically, the current crisis has been accentuated by the character of industrial and commercial activities in the country; industries, as we saw, depend on foreign capital and raw material inputs for a substantial part of their operations, and companies use all sorts of fraudulent practices to transfer money abroad and import consumer goods that strain the foreign exchange of the state; it was clear that when the revenue accruing from the oil industry dropped, these unrealistic commercial and manufacturing practices could no longer be sustained; a crisis was bound to set in;

4. This crisis has far reaching political implications, viz., the imperialist penetration of the decision-making apparatus of the state, the marginalisation of the social democratic option and the increasing concentration of political power in the hands of the leading section of the bourgeoisie which provides the basis for the further pursuit of repressive policies as an excuse for solving the crisis;

5. Such repressive policies are bound to be directed mainly at the working people whom, as we have seen, are already bearing the brunt of these policies, through mass retrenchments, non-payment of salaries, skyrocketing inflation, curtailment of public expenditure on basic services and the attempt to penetrate and disorganise their political organisation;

6. It is therefore clear that the solutions to the problems of the crisis and the lopsided political economy of Nigeria lies in the hands of the struggling and affected people themselves; only they can seize the initiative to challenge and reverse the exploitative property relations that are responsible for their present day sufferings; appeals to the ruling class to be merciful are a mere waste of time.

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16. *Ibid.*, Table 3 (Appendix).
17. *Ibid.*, chapt. one, p. 1.
18. *Nigeria: Twenty Years of Independence: A Financial Times Survey* (Spectrum Books Ibadan) – 1980, p. 51.
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## RESUME

*Les auteurs de cette communication ont tenté de démontrer que :*

1. *Les économies politiques de type capitaliste sont toujours marquées par des crises économiques ; comme ces auteurs ont pu le constater, celles-ci sont liées à la difficulté à concilier la production et la consommation sociales, problème qui reste le trait saillant de la contradiction fondamentale entre l'organisation sociale de la production et le prélèvement du surplus social par les privés ;*

2. *Ces crises cycliques à caractère permanent du développement capitaliste se manifestent au Nigeria sous forme de domination des secteurs bancaire, commercial, industriel et agricole de l'économie par les activités spéciales des firmes transnationales et des entreprises locales nigérianes et sous forme de prélèvement des surplus par ces deux groupes au détriment de l'ensemble de la population actives ;*



3. *La nature des activités commerciales et industrielles du pays est à la base même de l'aggravation de la crise actuelle. Comme les auteurs ont pu le noter, les activités industrielles sont largement tributaires du Capital étranger et des apports en produits de base ; d'autre part les sociétés pratiquent toutes sortes de politiques frauduleuses pour transférer des fonds à l'étranger et importer des produits de consommation, qui grèvent les devises de l'Etat. De toute évidence, avec la chute des revenus perçus sur l'industrie pétrolière, il fut impossible de poursuivre ces pratiques commerciales et industrielles peu réalistes ; une crise était inévitable ;*

4. *La crise a des conséquences politiques considérables telles que : l'infiltration de l'appareil décisionnel de l'Etat par l'Impérialisme, la marginalisation de l'option socio-démocrate et la concentration plus forte du pouvoir politique entre les mains des classes dominantes de la bourgeoisie. Cette concentration sous-tend la recrudescence de la politique répressive pratiquée, soi-disant, pour trouver une solution à la crise ;*

5. *La cible principale de ces politiques répressives est indubitablement la population active qui, les auteurs l'ont vu, en subit déjà le poids. En effet ces politiques se manifestent par des compressions massives, des refus de paiement de salaires, la montée en flèche de l'inflation, la réduction des dépenses étatiques au profit des services publics fondamentaux et par des tentatives d'infiltration et de désorganisation des groupements politiques de ces travailleurs ;*

6. *Il est donc manifeste que ce sont les populations éprouvées et en lutte qui détiennent la clé des problèmes de cette crise et du déséquilibre de l'économie politique nigériane. C'est à elles seules qu'il appartient de défier et de changer complètement les relations de propriété, caractérisées par l'exploitation, qui sont à la base de leurs souffrances actuelles. Ce serait une perte de temps que de faire appel à la pitié de la classe au pouvoir.*

# **BOOK REVIEWS – REVUE DES LIVRES**

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*South Africa – A Model Capitalist State ?*

David Yudelman: *The Emergence of Modern South Africa – State, Capital, and the Incorporation of Organized Labour on the South African Gold Fields, 1902–1939*, Greenwood Press.

Dan O'Meara: *Volkskapitalisme – Class, capital and ideology in the development of Afrikaner nationalism, 1934–1948*. Cambridge University Press and Ravan Press.

**Reviewed by Fil. Dr. Howard SIMSON**

Apartheid is rapidly decaying and visions of a new democratic South Africa are once again appearing on the political horizon. In such times of crisis in the life of a society the historical myths which sustained the old order are usually swept aside by new «liberating» interpretations of the past.

While Marxism is on the wane in Europe today, in South Africa leftist ideas are setting fire to the minds of some white and an increasing number of black students and lecturers at the English universities. Until the middle of the 1970s a liberal version of the history of South Africa dominated the English-speaking universities and a nationalist version the Afrikaans-speaking universities ones. The renaissance in Marxist thought in post-1968 Europe and Latin America captured the minds of young white South African scholars studying abroad. The current diffusion of ideas is reminiscent of the inter-war period when young Afrikaner academics studying in Europe were deeply influenced by fascist ideology.

The decisive feature of the political economy of apartheid is that black labour is directly under the control of the state, rather than the market. An eminent liberal economist, Ralph Horwitz, described this exercise of bureaucratic authority over the utilization of African labour as «the most extraordinary legislative immobilization of a labour market known to economic history». In a recent article intended for a sober bourgeois audience he commented that:

*No doubt the reader will regard it as non-academic hyperbole and most white South Africans as «Marixst propaganda». It is literally accurate, however, that the ultimate minutiae of this combined industrial-urban areas legislation gives such bureaucratic discretion over the labour market that no black African has a legal right to choose for whom he works, what he works at or where he works in the whole sovereign territory of the Republic of South Africa – except with a bureaucrat's imprimatur.*

Liberal and Marxist social scientists do not contest this reality of apartheid, rather it is the explanation of the origins and determinants of the system which sharply divides old-time liberals from neo-Marxists. Some liberals tend to explain apartheid as a product of Afrikaner nationalism's

enforcement of its claim to self-determination. Others explain apartheid as simply the result of an unchanging irrational factor – white racism which is assumed to be dysfunctional to the capitalist system. Marxists argue that racism and national consciousness are not static phenomena in South African history, and hence, they are themselves in need of an explanation which takes into account materialistic, as well as idealistic forces. The apartheid policy is shown to be highly functional to capital accumulation. Class struggle is considered to have been the motor-force of South African society from 1652 to the present day.

Yudelman contends that the racial factor has blinded observers to the way South Africa fits into an international comparative perspective. «South Africa exhibits in almost caricatured form the ugly face of most developing industrial states. The concentration of a disproportionate amount of growing wealth in the hands of a minority, the decline in civil and human rights, the centralization of power, and the systematic exploitation of the powerless». Rather than being a deviant society outside the normal process of capitalist industrialization, the history of the relationship between mining capital and the modern South African state reveals that in many ways South Africa was a precursor and a model of development in the advanced industrial societies. Since the first decade of this century the gold mining industry, which has always been the backbone of the economy, has been «married» to the young state. Yudelman vividly illustrates his central theme with a quote from Henry Fielding's Jonathan Wild:

*he in a few minutes ravished this fair creature, or at least would have ravished her, if she had not, by a timely compliance, prevented him.*

This study of the way an alliance of state and capital subjugated co-opted organized (white) labour in the early decades of this century is meant as a lesson for the 1980s when the most crucial problem shared by the South African state and big business is how to defuse the revolutionary potential of the black workforce. Until the 1970s, Gold mining had been an extremely cost sensitive industry because the price of gold was fixed by forces outside the control of the producers. When faced with by periodical cost crises in the first decades of the century, the mine owners did everything in their power to lower costs. Between 1904 to 1907 they went as far as importing 50,000 indentured Chinese labourers (with the backing of government) which helped them break the resistance of the white trade unions and enabled them to lower black wages in a period of labour shortage. At other times they tried to save on wages by increasing the number of cheap black workers supervised by white (mainly Afrikaner) overseers. Yudelman shows that in most of the confrontations between capital and white labour the state intervened on the side of capital in order to protect «the goose that laid the golden egg». After the Rand Rebellion in 1922, in which the Smuts government had used a force of 20,000 men supported by aircraft, artillery tanks to defeat 10,000 rebels at a cost of 250 lives, a bill for the formal co-option of organized labour was drawn up. The white

workers surrendered their effective right to strike and in return for institutionalized collective bargaining. Today a similar struggle is going on between the state and black labour. Monopoly capital and the state appear to be encouraging the organization and registration of black industrial and mining labour in the hope of containing its growing militancy. On the subject of apartheid, Yudelman's is less illuminating. Since his main concern is to show that South Africa represents a rather typical example of a newly industrialized country like Brazil or The Phillipines, he is insensitive to the political character of the developmental dictatorship. It is a common place to point out that growing state intervention is a key feature of monopoly capitalist society, whatever the character of the regime. But it is surely of vital importance to the members of society whether the regime in power is fascistic or social democratic. Yudelman is right to point out the continuity of symbiotic relationship between big capital and the South African state over the past 80 years. The same is true of Germany and Italy. But in order to understand the specific character of apartheid it is necessary to examine the Afrikaner nationalist movement/regime which conceived and implemented it.

O'Meara analyses Afrikaner nationalism from the early 1930s to the white electoral victory in 1948. In opposition to the dominant view of Afrikaner nationalism as an irrational monolithic mass movement, he conceives of it as «a historically specific, often surprisingly flexible, always highly fractured and differentiated response of various identifiable and changing class forces – in alliance – to the contradictions and struggles generated by the development of capitalism in South Africa». The Great Depression, 1929-1933, led to realignment of political forces in South Africa and a fundamental break in the development of Afrikaner nationalism. A new «purified» Nationalist Party was formed to oppose the United Party led by the Boer-War Generals Hertzog and Smuts. The dominant force behind the new party was the secret Afrikaner Broederbond, an order led by the urban petty bourgeoisie elite. These highly educated and dedicated young men, many of whom had received doctorates from German and Dutch universities, believed that it was the historical mission of the united Afrikaner volk to rule South Africa. (Afrikaners represented 60% of the white population, 12% of the total population of South Africa). In the Mid-1930s the Broederbond began to mobilize Afrikaners politically on the basis of a new concept of the volk as a race-conscious organic national community.

Volkskapitalisme represented the economic dimension of the new «Christian-Nationalist» Weltanschauung. Its goal was to mobilize the volk to capture the «British-Jewish» capitalist system and to adapt it to a model of national socialism based on the organic community of Afrikaner businessmen, farmers and workers. The «socialist» character of Volkskapitalisme referred to giving back the services of the Afrikaner worker to his volk, and thereby saving him from the delusion of solidarity with internationalist working class parties. It also involved saving the volk from social distress, for many Afrikaners were extremely poor in the 1930s. O'Meara analyses the tension between the petty bourgeoisie ideal of benefitting every member of the volk and the promotion of Afrikaner capitalism. The ideology claimed that it was necessary for Afrikaner workers to be employed by Afrikaner capitalists, in order to prevent the «exploitation» of Afrikaner «labour power» by «foreign» capitalists.

It was not until the mid-1940s that the Broederbond ideologues turned their attention to the «native question». In the previous decade, South Africa had experienced rapid economic growth, the war stimulated industrialization and urbanization of Africans. In the 1940s the African intelligentsia, organized in the African National Congress (ANC), was demanding the extension of political rights to blacks and the African workers were rapidly forming trade unions with the assistance of white left-wing radicals. The policy of apartheid was designed to counter the threat that black claims for social equality in the post-World War II era of democratization and decolonization posed to the Afrikaner volk's racial purity and political and economic interests.\* In theory apartheid is just the extension of the Volkskapitalisme concept to other ethnic groups in South Africa. Ideally every volk/race group was to have what the Afrikaner volk demanded for itself – a separate socio-economic system in which the volk would receive the fruits of its own labour. In practice the apartheid policy has meant the tyranny of the Afrikaner volk over the «non-white» people of South Africa. O'Meara mainly attributes this bitter reality to the fact that the «anti-capitalist» volks ideology of Broederbond *was a mask* for the capitalist aspirations of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie. In supplying cheap and controlled labour to the mines, industries, and farms, and protecting white workers from competition with black workers, the apartheid system has acted as a spur to rapid industrialization. In the period 1948 to 1970, of all the capitalist economies only that of Japan expanded faster than apartheid South Africa.

These two path-breaking studies place South Africa squarely in the framework of twentieth century Western capitalism and imperialism. Unfortunately, O'Meara found little value in comparing the «Christian Nationalist» Afrikaner movement which arose in the 1930s with European fascist movements. He also failed to analyse Afrikaner antisemitism, which was a key element in the strategy for the political and economic mobilization of the volk. My own research reveals that «purified» Afrikaner nationalism is a variety of classical fascism.\* By taking *Mein Kampf* or Rumanian fascism with its «National Christian Socialist» ideology into account, O'Meara would have enriched his presentation of this decisive chapter in modern South African history. In conclusion, I should point out that both books contain interesting epilogues analysing the current situation in South Africa. Today the Afrikaner elite has emerged as a full partner in the country's highly internationalized capitalist class. The nouveau riche leaders of the Nationalist Party now require a more flexible ideology to meet both the skilled labour shortage and the growing threat posed by the liberation movement and the working class. It is no surprise to learn that the counter-revolutionary «Total Strategy», adopted after the Soweto uprisings in 1976, is a variation of the anti-communist «National Security Doctrine» embraced by so many military dictators in the newly industrialized states of the Third World. South Africa's leaders hope that by modifying the racist policy of apartheid, which has led to international ostracization, they may yet retain their position behind the Western defences and thereby stave off a revolution.

\* See Howard Simson «*The Social Origins of Afrikaner Fascism and its Apartheid Policy*», Uppsala Studies in Economic History, 21 Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm

# **FOCUS ON RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTES PLEINS FEUX SUR LES INSTITUTS DE RECHERCHE ET DE FORMATION**

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## **THE RESEARCH UNIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ZAMBIA**

1. The Research Unit was established in 1971. It is located along Government Road opposite the Ridgeway Post Office in Lusaka, the Capital city of Zambia. It is not an autonomous institution but part of the Department of Town and Country Planning. Thus it is under the direct control of the Headquarters of the Department. When this Unit was created it was then called the Development Planning and Research Unit.

### **STAFF**

2. The staff situation in the Unit has fluctuated over the years. Although the post of a Regional Research Officer was in existence in the Department for more than 10 years, this officer mostly worked single handed. The Unit had its peak staff strength in the middle of 1972 when there was one Regional Research Officer, 7 Planning Officers and 3 supporting staff, while at the present moment there is one Acting Regional Research Officer, 3 Planning Officers and 3 supporting staff. This, however, is expected to change in the near future when 7 students undergoing training abroad return home.

### **FUNCTIONS**

3. Mostly, in the beginning, the Unit was involved more in the preparation of development plans than on research. However, at the moment the Unit performs the following functions:—

- (a) To review the consultant's works and reports as and when required by the Headquarters,
- (b) To provide research services to other sections of the Department and indeed to many other institutions, organizations and agencies both local and foreign who request for a variety of information;
- (c) To conduct research on all crucial aspects of physical planning e.g. planning standards, site and service schemes, village regrouping etc;
- (d) To undertake if necessary, regional studies and prepare regional plans for selected areas and provinces;
- (e) To conduct studies leading to the formulation of a national settlement or national physical plan;

- (f) To liaise with other Government Ministries, Departments and Para-statal bodies on all aspects of physical planning;
- (g) To advise the Headquarters on training of planners and planning assistants.

### RESEARCH POLICY

4. The Research policy of the Department, although not specifically laid down, can be broadly noted as follows:—

- (a) To undertake research into all aspects of urban, rural, regional and national physical planning in Zambia, with particular emphasis on problem and growth areas;
- (b) To formulate (through knowledge gained in (a) above) better development strategies and policies for integrated urban – rural regional development and especially on the development of human settlements in the country.

### PUBLICATIONS

5. As stated earlier on, the Unit was mainly involved in the preparation of development plans. The Unit has since produced the following development plans:—

- (a) *Development Plans:*
  - (i) *Copperbelt Development Plan:* This is one of the major research contributions by the single Regional Research Officer prepared in 1962–64.
  - (ii) *Development Plans for Western Province:* The Unit prepared development plans for Kalabo, Sesheke and Senanga in the Western Province and a layout plan for Mpika in connection with the Tazara development.
  - (iii) *Kapiri-Mposhi and Choma Development Plans:* The Unit prepared physical development plans for Kapiri-Mposhi and Choma and they were completed in 1978.

### REPORTS

6. The Unit also produced the following research reports, for the benefit of the Department and other Ministries;

- (i) Notes on the provision of services and social facilities and Design Standards in Zambia.
- (ii) Basic issues of village Regrouping in Zambia.
- (iii) Human Settlements Policies in Zambia Post Habitat 1976.
- (iv) Some Aspects of Integrated Housing in Tanzania and its relevance to Zambia.

- (v) Some Aspects of Urban Planning in Zambia.
- (vi) Open Space in Urban Areas of Zambia.
- (vii) An In-Service Training Scheme for Planning Assistants in Zambia.
- (viii) An Estimation of future needs and strategy for Training of Physical Planners in Zambia.

### BOOKS

7. The major contribution of the Unit came out since 1972 and they are as follows: –

- (i) *Low Cost Residential Development in Lusaka:*  
This book published in 1972, briefly explains the stages and patterns of development of low cost residential areas in Lusaka, the policy decisions which have influenced their developments and the physical and human characteristics of particular areas;
- (ii) *Mwaziona – A Study of an unofficial Housing Area:*  
A survey of Mwaziona (George) of Lusaka was undertaken by the Unit in early 1973. The aim was to provide basic information on the area as a preliminary to upgrade it. A report on the findings was published in the middle of 1973.
- (iii) *Population Projections for Zambia:*  
To provide a base for future planning at the level of provinces, population projections were attempted in 1973, for the eight provinces of Zambia, up to the year 2000. The projections were made at the intervals of 5 years from 1975 to 2000 for every age groups of population using eight assumptions.
- (iv) *Central Province of Zambia – A Regional Study*  
*Study and an outline Development Plan:*  
The Study was undertaken with a view to provide a framework for the planned development of the Central Province, up to the year 1981. Special emphasis was laid on suggesting measures for a balanced population distribution settlement pattern and creation of hierarchy of service centres with adequate community facilities and infrastructure for integrated development of rural and urban areas. This study which started in late 1971 took more than two years to complete.
- (v) *Luangwa Valley: A Proposed New Settlement at Kakumbi:*  
As early as June 1971, the Unit was involved in this SNDP Project. A number of Government Ministries and Para-statal bodies were also involved in this project. The role of the Unit was mainly (a) to carry out a sub-regional study which involved the collection and analysis of data relevant to existing conditions (b) to select sites for settlements to accommodate the supporting staff for the proposed game lodges (c) to carry out a detailed design of Kakumbi – One of the support settlements and (d) to play a liaising role in the project.



(vi) *Integrated Housing in Zambia:*

A study was initiated in early 1977 to evaluate the policy and actual attempts of housing integration in selected urban areas of Zambia. The study mainly emphasized the social and psychological aspects of segregation and integration. It was however, decided not to publish the report.

## ACTIVITIES

8. During the past few years the Unit was involved in the following activities: —

(i) *TNDP Committees:*

During 1976 and 1977, the Research Unit was actively involved in the deliberations of the four Third National Development Plan (TNDP) committees namely, Housing and Construction, Urban Development, Regional Development and Water. Discussion papers were prepared and submitted to the Committees for inclusion in the chapters of the TNDP draft document.

(ii) *Scrutiny of Consultant's Work:*

Since 1973, the Unit was involved in scrutinizing Consultant's works connected with the SNDP Housing Programme and preparation of Development Plans for the nine large urban areas of Zambia. This was to make sure that the consultant's work were of adequate and acceptable standards.

(iii) *Preparatory Work in the Establishment of School of Environmental Studies.*

The Unit made some important deliberations to the meetings of the University of Zambia Planning Committee which dealt with the matter of the establishment of a Department of Urban and Regional Planning at the proposed School of Environmental Studies at UNZA, Ndola Campus.

## 9. RESEARCH CURRENTLY BEING UNDERTAKEN

(i) *A National Settlement Strategy for Zambia:*

This is a research project of major significance to the Department. The main aim of the project is to provide a long term strategy for the Government to rationalise the human settlement pattern of the country as a whole. Special emphasis is given to the formulation of an effective settlement network to serve the needs of integrated urban — rural — regional development in the future. It is hoped that this strategy should help in the formulation and co-ordination of appropriate urban, rural and regional development policies in the national five year plans of the future.

A brief outline paper on this subject was presented by two officers of the Unit at a seminar on Human settlements held in Lusaka in September, 1976. Following up the resolutions of that seminar, work on the above project was started earnestly in 1977.

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(ii) *Public Transportation in Lusaka:*

The aim of the research project is to identify the journey to work pattern of the people in the low-income residential areas and assess the adequacy and inadequacies of the present modes of transportation systems. Suggestions will be made to rationalise the public transportation system to cater adequately for the present and future demand of journey to work.

(iii) *School Busing Transportation Study:*

The aim of this research project is to identify the transportation needs of school children with a view to establishing a comprehensive school bus system encompassing all schools in Lusaka.

(iv) *The Concept of Two-Stage Migration:*

It is hypothesised that migrants from the peripheral regions first use the small urban areas as staging posts before they end up in the urbanised regions of Lusaka and the Copperbelt. The aim of this research project is to check the validity of this hypothesis.

(v) *The SNDP Site and Service Housing Programme:*

Zambia's site and service housing programme is considered by the IBRD as the largest in Africa. 70,000 serviced plots were to be provided throughout the country during the 5 year plan period (1972-1976). The aim of this research project is to find out what has happened since the programme was launched in 1972.

(vi) *Rural Settlement Planning Attempts in Zambia:*

Though much has been done in the field of agricultural planning, not much is available in a document form on the planning and development of all forms of rural settlements such as agricultural settlement schemes, traditional nucleated villages and organised village regrouping schemes. It is intended to make a sample survey of these various types in order to obtain a more authentic picture of these settlement forms.

### FUTURE RESEARCH TOPICS

10. The following are other research topics which have much relevance to this country and are planned to be undertaken within the next five years:

- (i) A Study of environmental pollution and its control in Zambia;
- (ii) A Study of the plan implementation capability of the local authorities in Zambia;
- (iii) Revision of the Town and Country Planning Act (Cap 475) of Zambia;
- (iv) A National Physical Development Plan for Zambia;
- (v) Evaluation of existing planning standards and formulation of appropriate planning standards for different types and sizes of human settlements in Zambia;
- (vi) A Study of Kafue New Town with Special emphasis on its planning concept and its development.

## ANNOUNCEMENT

### JUSTINIAN F. RWEYEMAMU MEMORIAL AWARD

The Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA), the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, the International Foundation for Development Alternatives (IFDA) and the Third World Forum (TWF) announce the Justinian F. RWEYEMAMU Memorial Award for 1985.

Justinian F. RWEYEMAMU (1942–1982), scholar and practitioner of development, was professor of economics at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, Dean of its Faculty of Social Sciences, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Planning and Personal Assistant to President Julius K. NYERERE. Internationally recognized, he was successively a member of the United Nations Committee for Development Planning and of the Secretariat of the Brandt Commission and worked for the last two years of his life in the office of the United Nations Director General for Development and International Economic Cooperation. His books include: — *Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania, a Study of perverse capitalist development, Socialist planning in Tanzania, and Industrialization and income distribution*. He contributed many articles to *Africa Development, the Journal of Modern African Studies, Development Dialogue* and other periodicals. He was also the Chairman of CODESRIA and member of the Executive Committee of IFDA and the TWF.

With a view to perpetuating his memory and encouraging African students to follow his example, the four international institutions with which he was closely associated have established a Justinian F. RWEYEMAMU Memorial Fund to which a number of his friends and colleagues have already made donations. The Award will be financed by the interests accruing to the Fund.

The Award will be attributed to an African post-graduate student or a researcher for a significant contribution to enlarging the endogenous knowledge base needed for Africa's local and national development. Development will be understood in a broad sense, that is encompassing its cultural, political, social, technological as well as economic dimensions. Papers should be based on personal research and may consist of general or case studies contributing empirically and/or theoretically to development studies.

The Award is intended to enable the winner to continue his/her research on a comparative basis in an African society other than her/his own. Students presenting papers should be willing and prepared to travel to another African country to continue their work on a comparative basis.

Papers may be written in Arabic, English, French or Portuguese. They must not exceed 100 clearly typed pages of approximately 250 words each. Three copies must reach the Executive Secretary of CODESRIA (Po.Box 3304, Dakar, Senegal) by 30 November 1984 at the latest.

Papers will be submitted to a jury chaired by Ismail-Sabri ABDALLA, Chairman, Third World Forum, and including Claude AKE, Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Port-Harcourt, Nigeria; Simon MBILINYI, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture, Dar-es-Salam, Tanzania; Marie-Angélique SAVANE, President, Association of African Women for Research and Development; Teresinha LOPES, Organizacao da Mulher Angolana, as well as Abdalla S. BUJRA, Executive Secretary of CODESRIA, who will act as the secretary of the Award.

The Award will consist of an airticket and a stipend facilitating the winner to travel to and spend 2/3 months in an African university or research centre. The paper receiving the Award will be published by CODESRIA.

The first (1985) Justinian F. RWEYEMAMU Award will be presented to the winner on the occasion of the CODESRIA Conference scheduled to take place in Addis Ababa in the Spring of 1985.

## ANNONCE

### PRIX JUSTINIAN F. RWEYEMAMU

Le Conseil pour le Développement de la Recherche Economique et Sociale en Afrique (CODESRIA), la Fondation Dag Hammarskjöld, la Fondation Internationale pour un Autre Développement et le Forum du Tiers-Monde annoncent le Prix Justinian F. RWEYEMAMU pour 1985.

Justinian F. RWEYEMAMU (1942–1982), théoricien et praticien du développement, était Professeur d'Economie à l'Université de Dar-es-Salaam, Doyen de sa Faculté de Sciences Economiques, Secrétaire Permanent au Ministère du Plan et Conseiller personnel du Président Julius K. NYERERE. Quant à son envergure internationale, il était successivement membre du Comité des Nations Unies pour la planification du développement et du Secrétariat de la Commission Brandt. Pendant les deux dernières années de sa vie, il a travaillé au Bureau du Directeur des Nations-Unies chargé du Développement et de la Coopération Economique Internationale. Parmi ses livres on peut citer : *Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania, a Study of perverse capitalist development, Socialist planning in Tanzania*, et *Industrialization and Income Distribution*. Il a aussi publié plusieurs articles dans *Afrique et Développement, the Journal of Modern African Studies, Development Dialogue*, et dans d'autres périodiques. Il a aussi été Président du CODESRIA et membre du Comité Exécutif de IFDA et de TWF.

Dans le but de perpétuer son souvenir et d'encourager les étudiants africains à suivre son exemple, les quatre institutions internationales avec lesquelles il collaborait étroitement ont mis en place un fonds à la mémoire de Justinian F. RWEYEMAMU, fonds auquel certains de ses amis ont contribué par des dons. Le Prix sera financé par les intérêts produits par ce Fonds.

Le Prix sera décerné à un étudiant ou chercheur africain de niveau post-universitaire qui aura contribué d'une manière significative à l'élargissement de la base des connaissances requises pour le développement local et national de l'Afrique. Le Développement sera compris dans son sens général qui englobe ses dimensions culturelles, politiques, sociales, technologiques et économiques. Les contributions devront être le résultat d'une recherche personnelle et pourront être soit des études générales, soit des études de cas qui contribueront d'une manière empirique ou théorique aux études sur le développement.

Le Prix est destiné à permettre au lauréat de continuer sa recherche sur une base comparative dans un pays africain autre que le sien. Les étudiants qui soumettront des contributions devront être prêts à effectuer un séjour dans un autre pays africain pour continuer leur travail sur une base comparative. Les contributions pourront être réalisées en arabe, en anglais, en français ou en portugais. Elles ne devront pas dépasser 100 pages à la frappe lisible contenant environ 250 mots chacune. Trois (3) exemplaires devront être envoyés au Secrétaire Exécutif du CODESRIA (B.P. 3304, Dakar – SENEGAL) au plus tard le 30 Novembre 1984.

Les contributions seront soumises à un jury présidé par Ismail-Sabri ABDALLA, Président du Forum du Tiers-Monde, et comprenant : Claude AKE, Doyen de la Faculté des Sciences Sociales de l'Université de Port Harcourt au Nigéria ; Simon MBILINYI, Secrétaire Permanent au Ministère de l'Agriculture, à Dar-es-Salaam en Tanzanie ; Marie-Angélique SAVANE, Présidente de l'Association des Femmes Africaines pour la Recherche et le Développement ; Teresinha LOPES de l'Organisation des Femmes Angolaises ; ainsi que Abdalla S. BUJRA, Secrétaire Exécutif du CODESRIA, qui fera office de Secrétaire Administratif du Prix.

Le Prix Consistera en un billet d'avion et un pécule qui aideront le lauréat à se rendre dans une Université ou un Centre de Recherche Africain où il séjournera pendant 2 à 3 mois. La contribution qui remportera le Prix sera publiée par le CODESRIA.

Le premier PRIX JUSTINIAN F. RWEYEMAMU (1985) sera remis au lauréat à l'occasion de la Conférence du CODESRIA prévue à Addis Abéba en Mars-Avril 1985.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

*Inclusion on this list does not exclude future review of the publication  
L'apparition d'un titre dans cette liste n'exclut pas sa future critique.*

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