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# AFRICA

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*Phone No. – No. Tél.:*

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Issue No. 11

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# THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF AFRICA: A CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM

By

*Dr. Uka EZENWE\**

## I. -- INTRODUCTION

The growth record of the least developed countries (LDCs) of the world (1), especially those of Africa, during the past two decades, has been very disappointing. Their plight has become so serious that it now represents a challenge of unquestionable immediacy to the world. Between 1960 and 1979, per capita income in 19 African countries grew by less than 1% per year, while during the 1970s, the growth of per capita income in the low-income countries of sub-saharan Africa averaged only 0.2% annually compared with 1.1% in the low-income countries of Asia and 2.9% in the developing countries in general. Indeed, optimistic future projections are equally grim. For instance, per capita income in low-income Africa is expected to stagnate at only 0.1% annually between 1980 and 1985 and 1.1% between 1986 and 1990, compared with growth rates respectively of 2.0% and 2.6% in low-income Asia and of 2.6% and 3.3% in developing countries in general (2). The current dismal development outlook of the LDCs of Africa, though long recognised, has been blamed on a set of internal and external factors which militated against rapid economic growth. At the domestic front, structural problems associated with fundamental deficiency in physical infrastructure, lack of skilled manpower and administrative and managerial capabilities, the inadequate promotion of export industries, over-extension of the public sector and the continuing biases in the incentive systems against agriculture and faulty economic policies have combined to thwart recent efforts at modernization. In the same vein, a curious mix of unfortunate events in the external sector, such as the world-wide recession, inflation, sluggish inflow of foreign exchange attributable largely to the deteriorating terms of trade and discouraging growth of international aid resulted in financially weak economies in the LDCs at the eve of the 1980s. It is against this background that this paper examines the main features of the LDCs, the place of their domestic effort and the importance of external assistance in the global scenario for the development of the poorest countries of Africa with a view to making some policy recommendations.

## II. -- THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE LDCs

The LDCs of Africa share not only poverty but also certain basic economic disabilities which distinguish them from other more developed

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\* *Department of Economics, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria.*



## 6. *Africa Development*

countries and which severely limit their ability to establish a sound basis for growth. The least developed countries face serious economic constraints in four key areas: —

(i) They need to achieve a high rate of domestic savings to be able to meet their investment needs. Capital accumulation necessarily precedes growth and development. For, as Arthur LEWIS notes, any country which saves and invests 20% or more of its GNP annually will break the vicious circle of poverty within the shortest possible time, irrespective of its ideological framework (3). But, as Table I (Col.8) epitomises, only the Gambia and Lesotho out of the twenty countries under consideration maintained an annual average rate of investment of the order of 20% or more throughout the 1970s. Even so, to achieve a high level of investment is one thing and to invest in the right project at the right time and space is quite another. Aside from the fact that savings potentials are generally limited in the LDCs, the pursuit of wrong objectives and priorities would tend to reduce the impact of capital accumulation and investment. Indeed, the problem has not simply been under-investment in the aggregate sense per se but the productivity of investment. Conceivably, three factors tend to influence the impact of investments on growth more than other parameters. These are: unbridled population growth, political instability and infrastructural gaps.

Although low-income Africa has the highest death rates among major regions, its rate of population growth is higher than that of developing countries generally. This has immediate implications for increased productivity. Given that the traditional African agricultural systems involve extensive use of land, the increase in farm population without corresponding increase in arable land will lead to population pressures which now seem evident in Burundi, Rwanda, Lesotho, Niger and in the Mossi plateau of Upper Volta with its consequent decline in output. Also rapid population growth contributes to rural-urban migration, and to the increased demand for the provision of basic services, particularly schooling.

Since independence, most of the LDCs, including Benin, Burundi, CAR, Chad, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Upper Volta have experienced political and military turbulence of one kind or another which ultimately led to a change of government. This has in turn resulted in political instability which invariably affected the process of socio-economic development in several negative ways. For instance, it forced post-independence leadership to give high priority to short-term political objectives; it triggered large-scale displacement of people and induced a diversion of more resources to military spending.

Furthermore, the development of socio-economic infrastructures is necessary to realise external economies of scale and complementarities associated with investment of directly productive nature. In most of the LDCs, the transport and communications network and basic social services are generally inadequate. These infrastructural inadequacies erode their productivity and diminish the energy available for self-reliant local development.

(ii) The export-based capacity of these countries to import is highly limited. This group has been hit by a radical worsening of their balance of payments which, in part, is due to the fact that the growth of their export volumes slowed down or went into reverse during the 1970s (see Table 1, Cols. 11&12). But the bigger problem recently has been a jolting decline in their terms of trade due partly but not entirely to the oil, food and capital goods price increases which were the traumatic factor in 1979 and 1980. Oil imports alone, which absorbed 10% of low-income Africa's export earnings in 1970, are now claiming 22% (4). Even as a percentage of total imports, the figure for Uganda in 1978 stood at 30% (Table 1, col. 10). Similarly, food imports in the Gambia and Somalia during the same year amounted to 24% and 25% of their import bills respectively.

The consequence of this sad trend has been to force cutbacks in the quantities of total imports. They reduced their current account deficits by curbing imports (and hence growth in view of the small size of most of them) rather than by expanding exports. In spite of this, the combined current account deficits of the low-income African countries have risen from 1.8% of their combined GNPs in 1970 to 3% in 1977 and 5.4% in 1980 (5).

These countries have little temporary cushioning against such shortfalls left: the few who could do so have already extended their commercial borrowing, and virtually all have run down their foreign reserves. Given that the trend in prices of imports of these countries, particularly oil, is likely to remain upward, their balance-of-payments situation, if not seriously tackled, will continue to worsen with further depletion of their reserves, increased commercial borrowing and the rocketing of their debt-service ratio.

(iii) Associated with the problem of slow growth of exports in primary products is the issue of low productivity in the group's agriculture. Agriculture is at the heart of African economies. It employs as high as 80% of the workforce in most of these countries and accounts for a major portion of the GNP. The transport, industrial processing and trade sectors depend on the production of agricultural commodities, and incomes earned in this sector provide markets for domestically produced goods and services. Therefore, increased agricultural output is the single most important determinant of overall economic growth.

But, with the exception of Malawi and Rwanda (and to a lesser extent Benin, Burundi, CAR and Upper Volta) the average annual growth rate of agricultural production in the 1970s was less than the rate of population growth throughout the area (Table 2). Consequently, agricultural exports stagnated, food production per capita fell, commercial imports of food grains rose and more people shifted their consumption to wheat and rice thereby increasing their food dependency.

There are specific explanations for the poor agricultural record of the last decade. These include: disruptions caused by wars and civil strife, drought and poor rainfall patterns during the 1970s, neglect of agriculture

by government and development theorists and misallocation of investment through over-emphasis on large-scale government – operated schemes. Also agricultural and economic policies and institutional frameworks were not conducive to increasing output: official prices were often too low, marketing systems too uncertain, inefficient and uncompetitive; input supplies too irregular and participation of farmers in rural affairs too limited. The agricultural extension effort was weakened by unfavourable policies, deficiencies of the public sector agencies which were responsible for spear-heading rural development. Because of its critical role, growth-oriented policies are urgently needed in this sector.

(iv) The question of over-extension of the public sector in the face of acute shortage of skilled manpower and administrative and managerial capabilities is another common feature of the least developed countries of Africa. After independence, the LDCs inherited unevenly developed economies with rudimentary infrastructures. Markets often functioned imperfectly and foreigners dominated trade and most modern business. To capture the commanding heights of their economies and speed up development, post-independence governments expanded the public sector by moving into commercial and productive activities previously reserved for the private sector. Conceptually, this was a sound policy option but its implementation left much to be desired.

Although skilled and managerial labour force was in very short supply, policy makers proceeded to involve the public sector in almost all aspects of economic activity. It is now widely evident that most public enterprises in the area have been found to be corrupt, inefficient and heavily subsidized by the tax payer. To the extent that certain public enterprises, like airways, state trading companies, manufacturing enterprises, service and supply agencies, constitute a drain on their economies, growth must have been slower than it might have been with available resources. And this accounts in part for the comparatively poor record of the 1970s.

### III. – ACTION ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT

The problems facing the LDCs require a frontal attack on two major fronts: domestic and global. First, let us look at the domestic aspect of the question.

(i) To start with, it is important for the LDCs to realize that the responsibility for their development rests entirely on their own shoulders. Even with all the external assistance possible, there can be no substitute for domestic effort. Undoubtedly, there is evidence to believe that there is a considerable level of excess capacity and under-utilisation of productive resources in many parts of the LDCs due mainly to inappropriate methods of production, distribution and consumption. For example, borrowed automated technology has encouraged investments in capital-intensive projects, which in our African labour surplus economies, has in turn aggravated the unemployment problem.

Apart from the use of appropriate technology, there is an urgent need to determine how the resources and energies of all economic agents can be better mobilised for development. The efficient use of known natural resources – human and material – reduces wastes and facilitates the attainment of accelerated growth. Many of the LDCs have not been geologically surveyed, yet it is believed that there are traces of mineral deposits in some of them. Although some are less fortunate than others, governments of the LDCs should as a matter of deliberate policy encourage prospecting for minerals in their areas of jurisdiction.

(ii) The problem of neglect or inadequate promotion of export industries is another issue that deserves serious domestic attention. As noted earlier, the main cause of rising current account deficits and shortages of foreign exchange in the 1970s was partly the deterioration in terms of trade and partly the decline in aggregate volume of exports and the acceleration of imports. As a corollary, some combination of export expansion and import substitution might be the best policy option. Such a strategy would necessarily entail the increased production of exportable primary products and manufactured goods.

World trade in the 22 nonfuel commodities of greatest export interest to the group under review is projected to increase by 2.9% per annum during the 1980s as against an annual average increase of 1.5% in the same product group. Moreover, the weighted price of Africa's nonfuel commodity exports is expected to rise slightly so that the average value of world trade in these commodities will increase by 3.4% per year (6). There is no reason why the LDCs of Africa should not try to step up their domestic production of exportables to take advantage of these encouraging forecasts.

Increased productivity in the agricultural sector in the LDCs, of course, will require that certain basic structural difficulties be overcome. These include: climatic and physical conditions, deep-seated problems of production, infrastructure and incentive. Much more work is needed on local adaptation and delivery of appropriate new-varietal technologies. Irrigation must not be neglected but concentration on it to the detriment of dry land farming is equally inadvisable. Improved management of water resources, and a review of key elements of their agricultural policy, including food pricing and the role of small farmers would enhance positive results in the LDCs' agricultural productivity.

With respect to manufactures, increased output is one thing and market access is another. Surely, the key question of the decade is how to achieve easy access to markets (i.e. open world trading system) in the face of slow growth and mounting protectionist pressures in the industrial countries.

A set of promising trade negotiations was concluded in 1979 under the aegis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Three major results appear to have been achieved: a substantial reduction in tariffs; a refinement and improvement of international rules on non-tariff measures; and the adoption of a framework of procedural arrangements

on the part of signatory countries. On paper, these results look like major achievements but in practice, they have dismally failed to allay the fears of the third world as a whole as regards the current rising tide towards protectionism. The LDCs expressed keen disappointment with the results on three grounds: First, that the tariff reductions on products of special interest to them fell short of expectation; second, that the most-favoured-nation (MFN) reductions implied an erosion of the margins of preferences enjoyed by the developing countries under the general system of preferences (GSP); third, that tariffs are relatively of little importance compared with non-tariff barriers to trade (i.e. subsidies, technical regulations such as health, safety and protection, customs valuation, import licensing, quotas etc.). Taken together, these affect volume and value of trade more than mere tariff charges.

Despite these obstacles to trade, the LDCs can still increase their export of manufactures not only in their trade with the rest of the world but also among themselves. While the existence of trade barriers is recognised, it must be noted that a general lack of industrial skills and capacity still remains a problem.

(iii) The other item on the agenda for a push in the LDCs turns on the development of critical manpower. The skilled manpower bottleneck should be the chief medium and long-term target for domestic-centred acceleration programme. The impact of education extends beyond the traditional production sector into the household. Educated women, even if they do not participate in the labour force, can have a significant impact on the country's economy through lower fertility rates, health information and more efficient household management. Furthermore, education does not relate only to the modern wage sector. Farmers and self-employed people in the urban sector are now thought of as contributing more to the country's economy if they have a higher level of education. Nor is the impact of education on development limited to economic growth; its effect on distribution and social equity is increasingly being recognised.

(iv) Finally, the uneconomic size of many of the LDCs imposes severe constraints on their development. Of all the 20 countries of the group in Africa, only four (Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda) with a population of up to 13 million or more each, can set up any heavy industry (such as engineering and chemical plants) based on the home market. The technical and economic optima for many kinds of plants are necessarily large and the extent of individual national markets in the remaining 16 countries is generally too small to efficiently sustain such plants (7).

Similarly, there are certain economies of scale in government. Micro-states like Botswana, CAR, the Comoros, the Gambia, Lesotho and Seychelles cannot, for instance, by themselves, individually, support efficient economic and social services (like airways, universities and medical schools).

Political fragmentation creates an a priori case for a great deal of batching of industrial, commercial, training and other activities in contiguous sub-regions. It creates many landlocked countries with problems and insecurities vis-a-vis access outward. It also puts a premium on transnational transport and communication linkages. Indeed, small size increases the horizontal interdependence among African countries and this makes the formation of one kind of economic integration or the other an inescapable strategy of economic development. Fortunately, some of the LDCs of Africa already belong to one form of grouping or another (like ECOWAS for West Africa, UDEAC for Central Africa and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference for Southern Africa). These regional groupings should be consolidated and those not already associated with them should join one.

#### **IV. -- AGENDA FOR GLOBAL ACTION**

The international environment in which Africa's least developed countries are required to sustain their economies has been extremely oppressive and indeed exploitative. The LDCs neither get fair values for their products nor receive any protection for the accelerating cost of technology and essential imports, including the cost of importing oil.

Based on a report of experts appointed by the UNCTAD Secretariat in accordance with a decision taken in UNCTAD V, a Comprehensive New Programme of Action for the development of Africa's LDCs was hammered out and endorsed by the Assembly of African Heads of State and Government in 1980 (8). Among other things, it recommends:

- 1) that the volume of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to African Least Developed Countries should immediately increase substantially, in real terms, so that these countries can realize economic and social changes and make real progress in the present decade. In that context, donors should:
  - a) make commitments to give financial and technical assistance to individual Least Developed African Countries on a continuous and automatic basis and on highly concessional terms;
  - b) streamline procedures of aid in order to reduce delays in approving projects and in disbursing funds;
  - c) adopt criteria for project evaluation and selection based on the conditions and needs of African Least Developed Countries;
  - d) refrain from using non-economic criteria in the allocation of aid;
  - e) create mechanisms to control the implementation by donor countries of their aid commitments;
  - f) cancel all debts so far contracted by member states, without any discrimination; and
  - g) make greater efforts in granting aid in favour of the Least Developed member states;

2) that appropriate mechanisms be created urgently, at the international level, in order to finance the oil requirements of African Least Developed Countries and to reduce the existing heavy burden on their balance of payments and the uncertainty in oil supply.

The ECA was assigned the responsibility for monitoring, reviewing and evaluating the implementation of the new programme of action on behalf of the Least Developed African Countries.

The recommendations further emphasized the idea of world economic interdependence as a basis for supporting African development. The assertion that developing-country growth, through its spillover effects, can directly affect developed-country well-being is supported by a report prepared for the UNCTAD by economists at the University of Pennsylvania. The report concludes that a 3% increase in the growth rates of the non-oil-exporting developing countries could result in an annual increase of 1% in the growth rates of the OECD countries; and that this 1% increase would, for the industrialised countries, amount to the equivalent of about \$ 45 billion plus its job creation and other secondary effects (9).

To this end, the rich countries should see aid to the LDCs as an international responsibility. For, as Lester PEARSON succinctly put it, «international development is a great challenge of our time. Our response to it will show whether we understand the implication of interdependence or whether we prefer to delude ourselves that the poverty and deprivation of the great majority of mankind can be ignored without tragic consequences for all» (10).

It is too early to say anything about the success of the new programme of action but one thing is certain. The development of the LDCs requires something more than the provision of aid, which unfortunately has been declining. Effective aid programme would help in the short – and medium – run, but in the long-run, radical restructuring of the world ecosystem appears to us to be inevitable. Consider much fundamental issues like: access to knowledge and technology which is at present restricted by the establishment of patents; the control of the creation and distribution of international reserves by the advanced countries through the expansion of their own national reserve currencies; the distribution of the value added of the products traded between the developing and the developed countries which is heavily weighted in favour of the latter; the existence of a formidable protective wall around the economies of the rich through tariff and non-tariff barriers and restrictive immigration practices; the inability of LDCs to influence important international institutions like the World Bank, the IMF and the UN General Assembly and the overwhelming exploitative power of the multinationals. Surely, the solution to these problems requires the restructuring of the present world economic order (11).

The attainment of this goal calls for a gradual but determined approach in view of the existing lukewarm attitudes in the advanced countries. First, all countries have to accept the urgent need to restructure the present economic order and back it up with political commitment to the

idea. Second, a world summit at the highest economic decisions through existing international political level will be arranged to plan and identify the respective responsibilities of developing and developed countries in a joint endeavour to achieve the desired goal. Finally, a series of action-oriented decision-making conferences will be programmed to deal with various aspects of the entire gamut of international economic problems facing mankind.

One may enter a caveat here. Any new arrangements based firmly on the concept of equality of opportunities both within and among nations could involve certain short-run costs to some sections of society in the hope of realizing long-term key mutual benefits. Historically, acts of great politico-economic courage – like the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe or the New Deal for the United States – generally paid off, and the institution of a new international economic order will be in the long-term interest of all (12).

## V. -- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The development problems of the poverty belt of Africa are real. The first step towards the solution of these problems is for the LDCs themselves to realize that their development is first and foremost their primary responsibility. International assistance – though very important and needed – cannot be a substitute for domestic efforts. Although the cards are stacked against the LDCs, the nature of mutuality of interdependence between the North and South demands close co-operation between them. The development gap between the rich and poor, if left to widen, will some day bring the world to crisis. Fundamental structural changes rather than marginal adjustments are required to correct existing inequalities. The quest for a new international economic order, despite inevitable short-run costs, should mobilise politicians and awaken public across the globe to support the worthy goal.

## NOTES

1. Developing countries are generally classified under two broad categories: Middle-income and low-income countries. But within the latter group, a third category currently made up of thirty countries known as the least developed countries (LDCs) has been identified and recognised by the United Nations for the purpose of special development assistance. These countries are defined as «countries with severe long-term constraints on development assessed on three basic criteria: viz – per capita GDP of \$ 100 or less at 1970 prices, share of manufacturing of 10% or less of GDP, and 20% or less literate persons aged 15 or more». This paper focuses primarily on this group of countries in Africa which includes Benin, Botswana, Burundi, CAR, Chad, the Comores, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Upper Volta. The remaining ten others which are not specifically considered here are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Laos, Maldives, Nepal, the People's Republic of Yemen, Arab Republic of Yemen, Haiti and Western Samoa. All the LDCs are of course considered also by the UN to be among the 45 countries «most seriously affected» (MSA) by recent adverse world economic conditions.



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2. See *The OECD Observer*, No. 108, January, 1981, p. 22; and the World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*, 1981, p. 2.
3. W. Arthur Lewis, *Development Planning*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1966, pp. 115–120.
4. *The OECD Observer*, No. 108, January, 1981, p. 28.
5. *Ibid.*
6. See World Bank, *Op. cit.*, p. 23.
7. For the minimum market size for heavy industries see Uka Ezenwe, «The Rationale of Integration in West Africa» in *Intereconomics*, No. 4, April, 1975, Hamburg, p. 107.
8. *OAU, Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980–2000*, OAU, 1981, pp. 99–103.
9. See Uka Ezenwe for further details, «Trade and Growth in West Africa in the 1980s» in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 3, September, 1982 (forthcoming).
10. Lester Pearson (Co-ordinator), *Partners in Development*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1969, p. 11.
11. See Willy Brandt (Co-ordinator), *North-South: A Programme for survival*, Pan Books, London, 1980. This important report focuses principally on the inadequacies of the present system and how to effect changes. It is highly recommended for further reading.
12. See *Ibid.*

TABLE I - LDCs of Africa: Basic Economic and Social Indicators

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	Population in (millions) Mid-1979	Area in 1,000 sq kms	GNP per capita in US \$ 1979	GNP per capita Av. growth% 1960-79	Adult Literacy rate 1976	Life expectancy in 1979	Urbanisation 1980	Gross domestic investment (Av.) % 1970-79	Food as % of total imports 1978	Fuels as % of total imports 1978	Average growth in vol.% of exports 1970-79	Average growth in vol.% of imports 1970-79
Benin	3.4	113	250	0.6	n.a.	47	14	8.3	15	15	-11.4	6.3
Botswana	0.8	600	720	9.1	35	49	n.a.	5.6	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Burundi	4.0	28	180	2.1	25	42	2	16.5	23	11	n.a.	n.a.
CAR	2.0	623	290	0.7	n.a.	44	41	0.3	17	2	-0.5	-5.0
Chad	4.4	1,284	110	-1.4	15	41	18	-0.5	15	14	-3.4	-0.1
The Comoros	0.4	n.a.	230	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Ethiopia	30.9	1,222	130	1.3	15	40	15	-1.8	6	12	-2.7	0.4
The Gambia	0.6	11	250	2.6	10	42	n.a.	25.5	24	9	n.a.	n.a.
Guinea	5.3	246	280	0.3	n.a.	44	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Lesotho	1.3	30	340	6.0	52	51	5	24.4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Malawi	5.8	118	200	2.9	25	47	10	2.3	5	12	4.6	4.3
Mali	6.8	1,240	140	1.1	10	43	20	3.2	19	14	6.7	5.5
Niger	5.2	1,267	270	-1.3	8	43	13	6.8	10	12	11.7	6.5
Rwanda	4.9	26	200	1.5	n.a.	47	4	18.9	n.a.	n.a.	1.6	10.5
Seychelles	0.1	n.a.	1,300	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Somalia	3.8	638	n.a.	-0.5	60	44	30	8.5	25	7	5.6	7.7
Sudan	17.9	2,206	370	0.6	20	47	25	8.0	19	1	-4.4	4.5
Tanzania	18.0	945	260	2.3	15	52	12	3.0	11	19	-6.6	-0.5
Uganda	12.8	286	290	-0.2	n.a.	54	12	-13.1	8	30	-7.0	-10.5
Upper Volta	5.6	274	180	0.3	5	43	9	1.2	19	9	3.1	5.2
20	133.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Sources: The World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, 1981*; ECA, *Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa, Part II, April, 1981* and *The United States and World Development, Agenda 1979*.

TABLE 2 – LDCs of Africa: Growth Rate of Agricultural Production  
1969–71 to 1977–79  
(Average annual growth rate in volume %)

4 ÷	3–4	2–3	1–2	0–1	◀0
Malawi	Rwanda	Benin Burundi CAR Upper Volta	Botswana Chad Lesotho Mali Niger Sudan Tanzania	Ethiopia The Gambia Guinea Somalia	Uganda

Source: World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*, p. 50.

## RESUME

*Les problèmes de développement de la «ceinture de pauvreté» en Afrique sont des problèmes réels. La première étape vers la résolution de ces problèmes est la prise de conscience des pays les moins développés du fait qu'ils sont d'abord et avant tout responsables de leur propre développement – L'aide internationale – bien que très importante et nécessaire – ne peut pas se substituer aux efforts nationaux. Bien que les dés soient pipés en défaveur des pays les moins développés, la nature de la mutualité de l'indépendance entre le Nord et le Sud exige une étroite coopération entre ces deux factions. Le fossé en matière de développement qui sépare les riches des pauvres, et qui s'agrandit, entraînera un jour le monde vers une crise terrible. Plutôt que des réaménagements marginaux, des changements fondamentaux dans les structures sont nécessaires pour supprimer les inégalités existantes.*

*La recherche d'un nouvel ordre économique mondial, en dépit des coûts inévitables à court terme, devrait mobiliser les hommes politiques et secouer l'opinion public à travers le monde, pour soutenir les efforts visant à atteindre ce but méritoire.*

NOTE SUR LES IMPLICATIONS DU PLAN D'ACTION  
DE LAGOS (PAL) SUR LA PROBLEMATIQUE DE  
LA COOPERATION INTRA-AFRICAINE

Par

*Bernard FOUNOU-TCHUIGOUA\**

La décennie 1980 sera cruciale pour l'Afrique. Il est de plus en plus clair que l'Occident (en réalité le Nord-Ouest) s'opposera à l'émancipation des économies captives (1). Le langage arrogant qu'emploie la Banque Mondiale dans son fameux Rapport sur l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara en est la preuve. On sait que ce rapport ne propose pas moins que la poursuite du pacte colonial, dont l'essence est que les pays de la périphérie doivent servir économiquement les pays du Nord-Ouest en soutenant leur croissance et en leur permettant d'amortir les effets des crises. Pour sortir l'Afrique du sous-développement, la coopération économique apparaît comme une nécessité vitale. Pourtant elle piétine.

Force est de repenser les termes dans lesquels le problème de la coopération a été posé. Il me semble que le PAL nous donne cette occasion. C'est ce que nous allons essayer de faire en résumant dans un premier point le contenu de l'ancienne problématique. Dans un second point, nous montrerons l'originalité de la problématique implicite dans le PAL, avant, dans un dernier point, d'en dégager les implications fondamentales.

## I. — L'ANCIENNE PROBLEMATIQUE

Durant la colonisation, et malgré la balkanisation, la coopération intra-africaine n'était pas nécessaire, chaque colonie ou groupe de colonies étant directement intégré dans l'espace économique de la puissance colonisatrice.

Depuis l'indépendance, la coopération s'avère être une nécessité impérieuse à la fois pour le développement interne et pour la réduction des effets négatifs du fonctionnement du système mondial capitaliste divisé en centre et périphérie.

Pendant les vingt dernières années, on justifiait la coopération entre pays en voie de développement et notamment africains, par le fait qu'elle permettait, par le biais des économies d'échelle, un processus d'industrialisation basé sur l'expansion du marché régional ou sous-régional. D'où la tendance à la formation de zones de libre circulation des produits et notamment des produits industriels. L'accent était quasi exclusivement mis sur la contribution de la coopération à la résolution des problèmes de la croissance et éventuellement des problèmes sociaux. Sa fonction dans le processus du réajustement des relations économiques extérieures était négligée ; mieux, les « communautés » étaient conçues comme des espaces attractifs pour les sociétés transnationales. La question de savoir si celles-ci

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\* *Professeur à l'IDEP, Dakar, Senegal.*

*Les opinions exprimées dans cet article n'engagent que l'auteur et n'expriment pas nécessairement celles de l'IDEP.*

ne pouvaient pas compromettre le processus de développement n'était pas posée. Cette pratique reposait sur un autre postulat, à savoir que les économies africaines sont des «économies de marché». En effet, la formation des unions douanières et des marchés communs n'est pas compatible avec les économies planifiées, c'est-à-dire celles dans lesquelles le rôle du marché n'est plus déterminant dans l'allocation des ressources en vue de provoquer des mutations structurelles, nécessaires pour un développement auto-entretenu.

Donc, durant les vingt dernières années, la coopération économique intra-africaine présentait trois caractéristiques essentielles. Ses objectifs étaient strictement économiques au sens étroit ; la réduction des inégalités caractéristiques des relations Nord-Sud n'était pas prise expressément en compte. Cette coopération n'était pas et ne pouvait pas être planifiée.

## II. — L'EXIGENCE DE LA COOPERATION PLANIFIEE AU NIVEAU REGIONAL

Le Plan d'Action de Lagos met l'accent sur le développement autonome, «self-reliant». La planification nationale et sous-régionale lui est immanente. C'est ce qui est recommandé au chapitre XIII consacré à la planification du développement. Nous y lisons :

*«Les Etats membres doivent élaborer des plans nationaux de développement économique en tenant compte des priorités et objectifs des plans nationaux à court, moyen et long termes, bien définis et en accord avec les plans de développement économique aux niveaux sous-régional, régional et continental»* (version française, p. 129).

Donc, la mise en œuvre du Plan d'Action de Lagos serait très gravement compromise si les économies nationales et les relations de coopération qui les accompagnent ne sont planifiées. Quelle hiérarchie doit alors exister entre les organes régionaux de la planification et les organes nationaux ?

La citation ci-dessus semble indiquer à juste titre que les plans nationaux doivent être définis en accord avec les plans régionaux (2). Ce qui veut dire que la mise en œuvre du Plan d'Action implique la supranationalité des organes régionaux de planification. Ce sont ces organes, disposant de pouvoirs supranationaux, qui doivent d'une part élaborer les plans régionaux, et d'autre part éviter que les pays membres continuent d'entretenir avec les pays développés des relations incompatibles avec les objectifs de Lagos. C'est seulement à ce moment que nous pourrions parler de coopération planifiée.

Il s'agit ici d'une problématique tout à fait nouvelle. En effet, on aurait pu concevoir une coopération planifiée, sans institution supranationale disposant de pouvoirs hiérarchiques sur les institutions nationales, comme le suggère l'exemple du COMECON : le Conseil n'a pas de pouvoirs supranationaux et chaque pays membre est libre de signer des accords avec les tiers. Cet aspect formel ne doit cependant pas cacher la réalité, à savoir que la cohésion de l'édifice tient à la présence d'une grande puissance :

L'URSS. Pour l'Afrique, qui entend que les relations entre ses composantes soient des relations d'égalité, le modèle du COMECON est inapplicable. Le modèle africain est celui qui repose sur la supranationalité du processus de planification et donc des organismes qui en assument la conception et veillent à son exécution. Sans organismes à pouvoirs supranationaux, pas de réelle coopération comme soutien au développement self-reliant.

Est-ce possible ? ou plutôt, quelles en sont les conditions de possibilité ? Ceci nous paraît être une interrogation fondamentale.

### III. — L'EXIGENCE DE LA COOPERATION POLITIQUE

1. En supposant que chaque Etat africain ait une volonté réelle de mettre en œuvre les recommandations de Lagos, le problème le plus important est celui de l'attitude des pays développés, notamment capitalistes. En effet, la mise en œuvre du PAL a comme implication importante la planification du rythme d'exploitation des ressources naturelles en fonction des besoins d'un développement autonome, comptant sur ses propres forces. Or, l'Afrique est le continent réservoir des matières premières et des hydrocarbures par excellence. Les pays développés s'opposent et s'opposeront à la mise en pratique des principes de Lagos. En d'autres termes, ils s'opposent au processus de planification de la coopération planifiée, y compris *par le recours à la subversion*.

Ainsi, la coopération ne remplira les fonctions économiques qui lui sont assignées qu'en contribuant au renforcement politique, voire militaire, de l'Afrique. C'est pourquoi le processus de fusion politique à l'échelle régionale apparaît, dans la majorité des cas, comme une condition préalable au développement de la coopération intra-africaine et internationale. Il s'agit donc d'un modèle différent de celui du COMECON, qui repose en principe sur le respect de la souveraineté de chaque Etat, la cohésion d'ensemble étant en fait maintenue grâce au poids mondial de l'URSS et au pacte de Varsovie.

Bien évidemment, l'exigence en question n'est pas seulement économique. C'est une exigence générale qui part de la constatation que l'Afrique n'exerce pas aujourd'hui sa propre influence sur la marche du monde ; au contraire, elle subit. L'ambition sous-jacente à la coopération est qu'elle lui permet d'exercer son influence propre. C'est pourquoi, même si les recommandations du Rapport Berg pouvaient conduire au développement économique des micro-Etats, nous les récuserions tout de même, car les hommes et encore moins les nations ne vivent pas que de pain.

2. Si nous émettons l'hypothèse que certains pays seulement s'engagent à appliquer les principes de Lagos, alors évidemment la coopération ne pourra pas avoir un caractère général et planifié. La meilleure formule de coopération est dans ce cas celle qui est neutre par rapport aux expériences nationales. Ce sera la coopération sectorielle supportée par un appareil institutionnel léger. En tout état de cause, les modèles de coopération inspirés de la C.E.E. ne seront pas adaptés.

## CONCLUSION

Nous pensons avoir mis en évidence que le PAL appelle un renouvellement de la réflexion sur la coopération intra-africaine. Celle-ci doit aider au développement autonome collectif ; elle doit nécessairement être planifiée, les formules du passé inspirées, sinon copiées sur la Communauté Economique Européenne n'ayant pas été opératoires dans les économies extraverties des vingt dernières années. Ce serait faire fausse route que la continuer sur la même voie ; ce serait une erreur aussi de penser que le modèle du Conseil d'Assistance Economique Mutuel (CAEM du COMECON) sur le principe de la souveraineté des Etats, mais avec une grande puissance qui en assure la cohésion, pourrait servir directement à l'Afrique. Le modèle africain de coopération devra considérer comme condition nécessaire à son efficacité, la débalkanisation politique du continent.

### *ANNEXE 1 : EXTRAITS DU PLAN D'ACTION DE LAGOS* *Les extraits suivants du PAL illustrent la thèse que nous soutenons*

#### *A – Préambule du PAL*

*A1 – P1* -- «Nous avons décidé d'adopter une approche régionale de grande portée, basée essentiellement sur l'autosuffisance collective».

*A2 – P5* – «Nous nous engageons individuellement et collectivement, au nom de nos gouvernements et de nos peuples, à approfondir le développement économique et social et l'intégration de nos économies en vue d'accroître l'autosuffisance et de favoriser un développement endogène et auto-entretenu».

*Plus loin* : «Il conviendrait que tous les efforts visant à l'intégration économique de l'Afrique soient poursuivis avec une détermination renouvelée afin de créer à l'échelle continentale un cadre pour la coopération économique si nécessaire à un développement reposant sur l'autosuffisance collective».

*A3 – P6* – «Nous nous engageons individuellement et collectivement, au nom de nos gouvernements et de nos peuples, à créer des institutions nationales, sous-régionales et régionales qui faciliteront la réalisation des objectifs d'autosuffisance dans le cadre d'un développement endogène».

#### *B – Extrait du CH. XIII*

##### *«Planification du développement, statistique et population»*

*P128* «Les Etats membres doivent élaborer des plans nationaux de développement économique en tenant compte des priorités et objectifs des plans de développement économique nationaux à court, moyen et long termes, bien définis et en accord avec les plans de développement économique aux niveaux sous-régional, régional et continental».

**EXTRAIT DE L'ACTE FINAL**

**C – L'Acte Final**

«Nous réaffirmons notre engagement de créer d'ici l'an 2000, sur la base d'un traité à conclure, une communauté économique africaine afin d'assurer l'intégration économique, culturelle et sociale du continent. Cette communauté a pour buts de promouvoir le développement collectif, accéléré, auto-dépendant et endogène des Etats membres, la coopération entre eux et leur intégration dans tous les domaines : économique, social, culturel».

**ANNEXE II : EXTRAITS D'UN TEXTE IMPORTANT**  
**de A. ADEDEJI sur la Coopération intra-africaine (1)**

- P7** – «The full implications of the effort to achieve economic cooperation in West Africa cannot be fully realized unless it is seen within the context of the struggle of the developing world to achieve a new world economic order. The adjustment of relations between the industrialised countries of the North and the developing countries of the South of this planet of ours is now the dominating issue that faces mankind».
- P9** – «Thus, economic cooperation must be given two dimensions: mutual support in the pursuit of national socio-economic objectives and mutual support (i.e. collective bargaining) in respect of relations with third parties».
- P11** – «In other words, economic cooperation must be seen not merely as a mean for market expansion but primarily as an instrument for the transformation of the structure of production and distribution».
- P15** – «It is concerned with the transformation of production and reorganisation of distribution for the purposes and in the manner African Governments have decided up».
- P15** – «Collective self-reliance is not wholly satisfied by socio-economic cooperation. It implies a capability of the group as a whole to respond to challenges to its survival and development and these challenges need not take an exclusively economic form though they may have an economic purpose».
- P16** – «Collective self-reliance need not, however, anticipate such dramatic challenges even though it implies capability for fending off aggressive invaders of the community or any of its members. It could include capability for handling natural disasters or for protecting the community as a whole against serious damage to eco-system. It could imply the readiness and the ability of other members to come to the aid of a member subject to serious economic stress generally or of specific kinds».

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(1) *Adebayo Adedeji: Collective self-reliance in developing Africa: Scope, prospects and problems, papers on ECOWAS prepared under the auspices of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1976.*



# THE POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH: HISTORICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES ON A MARXIAN LEGACY IN AFRICA

By

*Claude AKE\**

What is the political economy approach? As a methodology, the political economy approach is still in the process of formation. Its general thrust is clear enough, but the details are blurred and there are areas of considerable confusion and contradiction.

## HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT

It is best to begin with the concept of political economy. Political economy was the name of the social science now commonly called economics. The new nomenclature was firmly established at the beginning of the 19th century. This was more than a change of nomenclature; it entailed some change in the techniques and methodology and some value commitments of the science, changes of a magnitude as to raise some doubt whether political economy and economics could properly be regarded as different names for the same science.

As a discipline, political economy grew in step with the development of capitalism. In effect, it was the discipline for understanding capitalism and rationalizing it. It is not entirely clear how to date the beginning of classical political economy. Some may wish to date it from the mercantilist theories of the 16th and 17th centuries; we could date it from the age of the physiocrats, 17th and 18th centuries, especially QUESNAY's *Tableau Economique*, 1758. Or we may date it from Adam SMITH's *Wealth of Nations*. SMITH was definitely the first political economist of industrial capitalism, for he focussed political economy on the study of industrial capitalism, a legacy which endured. Another legacy which SMITH bequeathed to political economy was the comprehensiveness of view. Because he made the division of labour and exchange such an important organizing concept of his analysis, he took a total view of the social formation. This was reinforced by his interest in the social relations of production; it was he who correctly identified the emerging classes, capital, labour and land-owners. The range of SMITH's interests is impressive; his analysis touches on the nature of man, motivation, politics, culture, morality, international economic relations and the evolution of economic institutions.

After SMITH, the tendency to take a comprehensive view, that is, to place the issues of production and distribution of wealth in broad social context remained. John MILLER, a disciple of SMITH, was not merely interested in locating economic ideas in a social context but in the broader context of history. So did RICARDO. David RICARDO, perhaps the greatest of the classical political economists after SMITH, was concerned less with the production of wealth as with its distribution among social classes.

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\* *Professor AKE is Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria.*

He was concerned about the increasing tension between capitalists and wage labourers and he elaborated a theory concerning the tendency of wages to stabilize at the subsistence level. These concerns put him into the realms of history, politics and culture.

As industrial capitalism developed and its class contradictions deepened, political economy became less concerned with understanding capitalism and more engrossed in justifying it. Political economy entered what Isaac RUBIN has called a vulgar phase, restricting «its investigations to superficially studying phenomena as they might appear to the capitalist, instead of probing into the internal connection between them». (*A History of Economic Thought*, p. 381). The effect of this partisanship is well illustrated by the crude attempt of SAY and SENIOR to refute the labour theory of value.

By the middle of the 19th century, a new tendency was emerging in political economy: the concerns of the disciples were becoming narrower and emphasis was increasingly placed on techniques, particularly mathematical techniques. The protagonists of these developments were Herman GOSSEN (1810–1858); Leon WALRAS (1834–1910); William JEVONS (1835–1882); A. COURNOT (1801–1877) and J. DEPUIT (1804–1866). Among the works which epitomized these changes were COURNOT's *Recherches sur les Principes Mathématiques de la Théorie des Richesses* (1838) and JEVON's *Theory of Political Economy* (1871). Political economy became more and more engrossed in the refinement of techniques while the questions it posed got narrower and more specific and increasingly unhelpful for understanding the social system (as opposed to the manipulation of certain aspects of it to induce specific effects). As if to underline the fundamental character of these changes, it was in this period that the nomenclature economics displaced political economy. Of course, it was not simply a situation of one thing displacing another; classical political economy and the new economics had something in common, but they existed in deepening mutual contradiction.

The work of Karl MARX emerged in the midst of these contradictions. MARX relentlessly exposed the biases, misrepresentations and sterility of vulgar political economy and proceeded to develop, building on the achievements of the physiocrats, SMITH and RICARDO, the concepts and methodology for a scientific understanding of capitalism and society in general. MARX reached back to the legacy of these predecessors in another sense: he returned to the idea of political economy as a comprehensive social science, indeed he tended to treat political economy as the science for understanding society in its entirety. This is evident in all his major works especially *Grundrisse* and *Das Kapital*. The very first sentence of the Preface to *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* is typical of MARX's comprehensive perspective. «I examine the system of bourgeois economy in the following order: capital, landed property, wage-labour, the state, foreign trade, world market».

## MARX'S POLITICAL ECONOMY AND NON-INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIAL FORMATIONS

MARX's system of thought was very attractive for the colonized and exploited countries of the periphery. The centrepiece of MARX's system was the problem of oppression. In the *Theses on FEUERBACH*, MARX had noted that other philosophers had interpreted the world, but the thing however is to change it. Changing it meant liberating man from oppression which MARX considered corrupting and dehumanizing both for the oppressor and the oppressed. The central concern of MARX's system was epitomized in the concept of proletariat, a concept which allowed MARX to bridge the traditional philosophical dichotomy of «is» and «ought». For MARX, the proletariat expressed the most salient reality of existence but this reality was at once the corruption and degradation of man and at the same time the engine for propelling him into the ideal state of being.

The second attraction of Marxism to the periphery formations was its preoccupation with how to change social reality. MARX relied heavily on the concepts of classical political economy, particularly as they were developed by the physiocrats and David RICARDO. While they used these concepts for what was essentially a science of equilibrium, MARX used them to develop a science of change. In this MARX was helped by his ideological commitment to liberate man from oppression, his use of the dialectical method, his conception of reality as process, by his focus on the industrial revolution and his perception in seeing what he called 'modern industry' as its essence.

For all that, the relevance of MARX's work to the periphery, particularly Africa, was limited. He provided the outline of the appropriate social science; the general thrust of this science was equally appropriate. MARX's work was however a historical product, whose focus was also historically specific, despite its scientific validity. MARX was concerned with capitalism and the industrial revolution and, as a practical man, with the urgencies of bringing about revolution in Europe. His interest in the study of pre-capitalist formations was limited. Not surprisingly, he had very little to say about them. With exception of the odd piece such as the journalistic dispatches on India, his writings on pre-capitalist formations lack concreteness (certainly in comparison to his work on Industrial Europe).

MARX's interest in the industrialized capitalist Europe was highly focussed. What really captured his fancy was the relatively mature capitalism whose essence was «modern industry». MARX made a distinction between two aspects of the industrial revolution, manufacture and modern industry. At the stage of manufacture, «the revolution in the mode of production begins with labour-power». At this stage, the instruments of labour are still largely tools, whereas in modern industry the revolution begins with the instruments of labour which are now largely machines. It is with this transition that the industrial revolution really takes off and capitalism drives to maturity: it is now that science is systematically pressed into the service of capital.

*«Modern industry never looks upon and treats the existing form of a process as final. The technical basis of that industry is therefore revolutionary, while all earlier modes of production were essentially conservative. By means of machinery, chemical processes and other methods, it is continually causing changes not only in the technical basis of production, but also in the functions of the labour, and in the social combinations of the labour-process».*

MARX's treatment of modern industry underlines the fixity of his gaze on industrial capitalism. His concentration on this form of capitalism did not help his relevance to periphery formations. The relevance of his work was largely limited to those areas in which the necessities of industrial capitalism elicited attention to the periphery formations, for instance, the tendency of industrial capitalism to lead to imperialism.

*«... so soon, however, as the factory system has gained a certain breath of footing and a definite degree of maturity, and especially, so soon as its technical basis, machinery, is itself produced by machinery; so soon as coal mining and iron mining, the metal industries, and the means of transport have been revolutionized; so soon, in short, as the general conditions requisite for production by the modern industrial system have been established, this mode of production acquires an elasticity, a capacity for sudden extension by leaps and bounds that find no hindrance except in the supply of raw materials and in the disposal of the produce.*

*... By constantly making a part of the hands «supernumerary», modern industry, in all countries where it has taken root, gives a spur to emigration and to the colonization of foreign lands, which are thereby converted into settlements for growing the raw materials of the mother country; Just as Australia, for example, was converted into a colony for growing wool. A new and international division of labour, a division suited to the chief centres of modern industry springs up and converts one part of the globe into a chiefly agricultural field of production, for supplying the other part which remains a chiefly industrial field».* Capital, Vol. I, p. 424–5.

MARX foresaw the link between capitalism and colonialism, the emerging international division of labour and the globalization of capitalism. But he hardly worried sufficiently the question of the implications of this globalization. He continued to maintain a Eurocentric vision, and confined himself to analysing capitalism in the European context, as if the future of capitalism would be decided by the internal dynamics of the European capitalist system with little or no reference to what happens in other parts of the globe. This became a strong legacy of Marxist thought.

The major works of MARX's era beginning with KAUTSKY's *Agrarian Question* (1899) which sought to develop MARX's work failed to shake off this legacy. LENIN's *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*

(1899) gave useful insights into a rural economy and precapitalist formations, but was basically the application of capital to a European country with a mixture of modes of production. HILFERDING's *Finance Capital* (1904) and LUXEMBURG's *Accumulation of Capital* (1913) broke some new ground in the treatment of imperialism and the globalization of capitalism. So did BAUER's *The Nationalities Question and Social Democracy* (1907) and BUKHARIN's *Imperialism and the World Economy* (1915). But through all this we still had a very Eurocentric vision; there was still the basic commitment to the understanding of capitalism and its future possibilities in terms of the analysis of capital in the context of experience of the West. It is only with LENIN's *Imperialism: Highest Stage of Capitalism*, that we begin to see a major advance in dealing with capitalism as a global phenomenon. But even here, LENIN is really dealing with the changing nature of capitalism and using it to explain the World War I than on developing a theory about the world system that would pay close attention to the non-industrialized parts of the world. It is strange that even after the Russian revolution dramatically exposed the error of focussing narrowly on the industrialized countries, this was slow to register on Marxist theory: again it was LENIN who began to absorb the significance of this event as the last piece which he published showed «Better Fewer, But Better.» *Pravda* (March 2, 1923).

Besides such modest advances, there was very little progress towards the development of a theory of global capitalism with particular reference to the impact of imperialism on the periphery, the nature of capitalism and struggles within the periphery. But a significant advance came in the 50's, first with R.P. DUTT's *India Today*, (1950) and A. BARAN's *The Political Economy of Growth* (1957). BARAN's work which is concerned with economic development, analyzed capitalism with particular reference to transformation both in the industrialized countries and in the developing countries. His contemporary, a fellow American, Paul SWEEZY also made a useful contribution towards making Marxism less Eurocentric in his influential work, *The Theory of Capitalist Development* published in 1942. What was interesting about the contribution of SWEEZY in this respect was that he tried to show that the collapse of Western Capitalism would depend heavily on external factors such as the Soviet Union and the emergence and behaviour of socialist regimes elsewhere. In several occasional writings (see, *Modern Capitalism and Other Essays*), he shed light on the global character of capitalism and its manifestations in the non-industrialized world. Despite these promising developments and historical developments such as the spate of socialist revolutions in non-Western and non-industrialized countries, Marxist scholarship in the West has continued to be very Eurocentric and even introspective. Perry ANDERSON's survey of main developments in Western Marxist Scholarship, *Considerations on Western Marxisms*, shows the extent to which this is so. So does an analysis of the leading Western Marxist journals such as *New Left Review*

## THE POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH

It is against this background that the emergence of what we are calling the political economy approach to the study of social formations is to be seen. The roots of this approach reach back to classical political economy, especially the work of Karl MARX. The main inspiration of the approach is to develop the work of Marx with particular reference to the elucidation of the global character of capitalism and its application to the periphery. So the political economy approach has developed in the general context of Marxism and relies a great deal on the conceptual apparatus and analytic framework of Marxism. Indeed the influence of the theory and methodology of Karl MARX has been so pervasive that there is considerable confusion as to where Marxism stops and the political economy approach begins. And worse, whether there is even a political economy approach as distinct from Marxism. The confusion has been compounded by the continuing use of the term political economy to describe the economic writings of orthodox Marxism and in some cases to describe the discipline of economics, for instance, AFANASYEV, L. et al. *The Political Economy of Capitalism* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974) contains the following:

*«Political economy is the study of the system of social production at various development stages. The subject of this book is the capitalist mode of production».*

These and other passages in the book suggest that (a) political economy is a discipline (b) that the discipline is Marxist economics and (c) that in so far as political economy is an approach and not merely a discipline it is nothing other than Marxism. However, there is a political economy approach which is clearly distinguishable from Marxism despite its evident Marxist methodological thrust and in some respects its relation to Marxism is not without contradiction.

Following the pioneering work of LENIN, BARAN, SWEEZY and DUTT, the political economy approach got its main impetus from scholars working on the periphery especially in Africa and Latin America, from about the 60's when these parts of the world had at last begun to establish a strong presence in the international system. As was to be expected, the indigenous scholars from these parts of the world, especially in Latin America, played an important role in the development of the political economy approach because of their historical situation. They were progressive, invariably involved in struggles and under pressure to understand current reality for which Marxism provided a very rough guide which did not always fit or even direct attention to what seemed like the most critical questions. But there were also very significant contributors from Europeans who were working on the periphery formations; again these were often people very much committed to ongoing struggles for development and liberation in these parts of the world. Among the works which reflect or have contributed to the development of this approach are: A.G. FRANK,

*Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*; G. ARRIGHI and J. SAUL, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa*; I. WALLERSTEIN, *The Modern World System*; M. MAMDANI, *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda*, I. SHIVJI, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*; S. AMIN, *Accumulation on a World Scale; Unequal Development*; J. MITTLEMAN, *Underdevelopment and the Transition to Socialism: Mozambique and Tanzania*; G. KAY, *Development and Underdevelopment*; B. MAGUBANE, *The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa*; C. THOMAS, *Dependence and Transformation*; C. LEYS, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*; T. SZENTES, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment*; A. EMMANUEL, *Unequal Exchange*; J. RWEYEMAMU, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania*; R. PREBISCH, *Towards a Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America*; W. RODNEY, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*; E. A. BRETT, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa*; P. GUTKIND (ed.), *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa: Dos SANTOS Dependencia y Cambio Social*; G. WILLIAMS, *State and Society in Nigeria*; NABUDERE, *The Political Economy of Imperialism*, A. NNOLI, *Paths to Nigerian Development*; P. REY, *Colonialisme, Néo-colonialisme et Transition au Capitalisme*; T. Dos SANTOS, *La Crise de la Théorie de Développement et les Relations de Dépendance en Amérique Latine; L'homme et la Société*, No. 12, April-May-June, 1969; C. FURTADO, *Economic Development of Latin America*.

This is only a sample of the growing body of literature which either reflect the political economy approach or at any rate have contributed to aspects of the development or application of this methodology. These works are profoundly different in many respects and it will not be surprising in the least if some of the authors cited here are not self-conscious methodologically or if they feel little mutual affinity. They reflect the divergent and sometimes even contradictory trends and the fluidity of this still evolving methodology. Nonetheless there are common trends: affinity to Marxism and a general disposition to adopt (albeit critically) Marxist categories of analysis, rejection of Eurocentric Marxism, scepticism of the view that the possibilities of capitalism and socialism in the world will be determined in Europe; a special interest in the periphery and the global character of capitalism with particular reference to the impact of imperialism and colonialism on periphery formations, and the theory of capitalism and capitalist development in the periphery.

But it should be emphasized that there is also considerable disunity, contradiction and confusion in this body of literature. For one thing, the writings cover a wide range of themes; different writings concentrate on different combinations of themes, and some of the themes have been worked over with intensity and with similar conceptual tools so that they have acquired a self-definition and a unity that is also methodological. This is true particularly of underdevelopment theory, dependency theory and centre-periphery theory. These theories (they are really analytic perspectives rather than theories, proper) are very close, reflecting the

fact that they all belong to a larger whole, the political economy approach. They are all dealing with the nature of capitalism in the non-industrialized world and the possibilities or otherwise of development in the context of the dynamics of global capitalism. Underdevelopment theory taking its point of departure from Paul BARAN's *The Political Economy of Growth* is specially concerned with the problem of autonomous capitalist development in the non-industrialized world. Centre-periphery theory treats the problem of development and the syndrome of underdevelopment in the context of the relationship between centre and periphery capitalism, seeing this relationship as the salient focus of analysis. Dependency theory might almost be treated as a special type of centre-periphery theory (and indeed as a special type of underdevelopment theory). It singles out the fact of dependence as the salient feature of centre-periphery relations as well as of underdevelopment. Despite these affinities these theories have developed identities separate not only from one another but also from the political economy approach.

Why has this happened? These theories or perspectives offered the advantage of dealing with specifics, they brought down the political economy approach from the level of general consciousness of the limitations of the application of orthodox Marxism to the periphery, from the vague discomfort that the character of global capitalism or periphery capitalism were not specified or even theorized. They offered specific characterization of capitalism in the centre and the periphery. And so on. As so often happens in the preoccupation with these specifics, the general concerns of which they were particularizations have been shunted to the background. Also, there was no question that these theories developed around problems that were to all appearances considered absolutely fundamental by the articulate sections of society in the periphery, namely, the problem of underdevelopment and that of their weakness in relation to the industrialized and imperialist centre. Theories dealing with these realities could hardly fail to capture the imagination of scholars of the periphery anxious to translate the developmental aspirations of their people to reality. The general relation of the dominance of these theories to existential conditions is underlined by the case of dependency theory. The emergence and currency of this theory cannot be dissociated from the highly conspicuous overlordship of the United States.

Finally, we must also bring into the picture the enormous attention which these theories attracted. On both the left and the right, the theories were seen as dangerous scepters that had to be exorcised. Bourgeois social scientists criticized them for every conceivable fault from being too vague to being blood-thirsty, in admitting the necessity of revolution. Orthodox Marxists criticized them for de-emphasizing internal contradictions and class struggle, for wanting to remove the yoke of imperialism without revolution. These are some of the factors which have enabled these theories to acquire self-definition and prominence at the expense of the political economy approach.



## AFRICA AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH

But this was more true of Latin America than Africa. In Latin America, Marxist scholarship was well-established. This partly accounts for Latin America's immense contribution to underdevelopment theory, dependency and centre-periphery theories. These contributions arose mainly from Marxists trying to relate Marxism to the realities of Latin America. In Africa, Marxist scholarship was much less established. Radical consciousness among African social scientists appears to have gone hand in hand with the growth of nationalism, although Marxism also played a significant role. The radical consciousness in indigenous social science initially tended to take the form of a critique of Western social science and its ideological and value assumptions – the critique was in turn conceived as part of the ongoing struggle against imperialism. It was from such beginnings that some radical social scientists went into a serious study of Marxism and became also part of the movement for underdevelopment and dependency theories. African radical scholarship contributed rather little to these theories and analytic thrusts. But it was more methodologically self-conscious and contributed more to the development of the political economy approach in the way that it is now evolving as a methodology inspired by Marxism rather than as a shorthand for theoretical constructs remedying the deficiencies which limited the applicability of Marxism to the periphery.

Why was there more methodological consciousness in Africa? This had much to do with the nationalist and anti-imperialist beginnings of African radical scholarship, and its commitment to finding a way out of underdevelopment. Initially radicalism manifested itself not in the embracing of Marxism or in the quest for correcting Marxist theory and sensitizing it to African conditions, but rather in a painstaking critiques of Western social science to expose its values and ideological biases and interest disguised in seemingly value-free analytic tools and methodologies. These critiques also showed how the concepts and methodologies were part of the apparatus of imperialism and a hindrance to the pursuit of development. They posed the problem of finding an appropriate manner of proceeding. This search fostered by the Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa and by indigenous professional associations, such as the African Association of Political Science as well as UNESCO, became a very potent force in humanities and social science scholarship in the 70's. This is evident in books such as Samir AMIN's *Accumulation on a World Scale* and the present writer's, *Social Science as Imperialism and Revolutionary Pressures in Africa*. A look at some of the themes and papers of social science conferences held in Africa in the 70's indicates the anti-imperialist thrust, and the preoccupation with finding an appropriate method of proceeding especially in regard to the realization of development.

1. «Social Science and Development Planning in Sub-Sahara Africa», Nairobi, December 2–6, 1974.
2. «Social Research and National Development in Nigeria», Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research, Ibadan, Nigeria, September–October, 1975.

3. «State and Role of Social Sciences in Africa» (Centre de Coordination des Recherches et de la Documentation en Sciences Sociales Desservant l'Afrique Sub-Saharienne, CERDAS), Kinshasa, Zaïre, November 29–December 4, 1977.
4. «Social Science, Research and National Development in Africa», CODESRIA/DSRC, Khartoum, November 4–8, 1978.
5. «Social Science Research Methodologies and their Relevance to African Development, CERDAS, Douala, Cameroun, April 24–28, 1978.

The growing radicalism and methodological consciousness of social science scholarship in Africa which came together in the development of the political economy approach received considerable impetus from professional associations and journals in Africa. Among the international professional associations which made the most significant contributions are the African Association for Political Science, the Association of Third World Economists, the Southern African Universities Social Science Council. Some national professional associations in Africa are contributing to the development of the political economy approach or at any rate reflecting its currency. In 1981, the Nigerian Political Science Association had its annual conference on the theme 'Nigeria: the Political Economy of Development'. Judging by the proceedings of this conference and the conference of 1982, the Association appears to have moved decisively in the direction of the political economy approach. Even the notoriously conservative Nigerian Economic Association has not been unaffected by these developments. Its 1982 Port Harcourt Conference was on the theme 'Political Economy'. The first session looked at the political economy approach and its possibilities. The journals which have reflected and promoted the political economy approach are *African Review*, *Review of African Political Economy*, *The Journal of African Marxists and Africa Development*. The Nigerian Political Science Association is planning to produce a *Nigerian Journal of Political Economy*. These, then, are some of the circumstances which have fostered the development of the political economy approach in African social science and have made this approach African in much the same sense that dependency theory is Latin American.

What are the specific tenets of the political economy approach? Since I have already elaborated on the approach in a familiar work, *A Political Economy of Africa*, I will answer this question in a summary form here, with particular reference to its advantages:

1. The Political economy approach accepts the basic categories and basic methodological and theoretical commitments of Marxist thought, to this extent it may be construed as a variety of Marxism.
2. The approach is singularly interested in the nature of capitalism as a global phenomenon, the nature of the relation between centre and periphery, and the specificities of periphery capitalism especially as they illuminate the possibilities of the development of productive forces. Its development has been conditioned by the limitations of orthodox Marxism and Western social science methodology as a whole in providing these forms of understanding.

3. Tendency to assume that imperialism has been and remains a decisive influence on the nature and the possibilities of the periphery. This tendency has led orthodox Marxists to accuse the «political economists» of neglecting the class struggle.
4. Tendency to assume that the reality is characterized by dynamism arising from the pervasive contradictions of material existence. This is an element from the legacy of Marx which the approach has singled out for special attention.
5. Particular interest in the possibilities of development and associated with it, a preference for developmental analysis of phenomena; a tendency to see reality as a process.
6. A commitment to treat social life and material existence in their relatedness, and associated with this, a rejection of the discipline specialization and preference for the interdisciplinary approach; but an interdisciplinary approach which is conceived not as the simultaneous application of specialized disciplines but rather the forging of synthetic discipline, a social science (on materialistic foundations) to replace the social sciences.
7. Commitment to treating problems concretely rather than abstractly. This is often taken to the point of regarding scholarship as creative praxis, something to be guided by experience and reciprocally a guide to scholarship. It insists that the experience of periphery formations be taken seriously on their own terms, that they may be possibly new or unique realities not necessarily shadow imitations of things that have been elsewhere and which are to be understood by mechanically applying notions that might have illuminated other historical situations.

As is to be expected, the political economy approach is much criticized by orthodox Marxists. These critics do not often refer to the political economy approach as such. They are often directed as specific writings that use the approach or made in the context of discussions of underdevelopment theory or dependency theory or other «neo-Marxist» theories. Emile KATANA's comment on Samir AMIN (in *Studies of Developing Countries*, No. 101, Institute for World Economics, Budapest, 1979) is typical of orthodox Marxist critics of the political economy approach. KATANA calls the theoretical perspectives of the political economy approach in Samir AMIN's work too fatalistic, condemning the underdeveloped countries to unalterable, deteriorating position, almost irreversibly determined by neo-colonialism (p.24–25). According to KATANA, this fatalism cannot offer any tangible prospect of a quick escape from underdevelopment. This is all the more so because political economists remove «the possibility for socialist transformation from a national framework» and make it dependent «of a simultaneous revolutionary transformation all over the world». (p. 25). KATANA is disturbed that AMIN speaks of «the common interest of bourgeoisie and proletariat in the developed and underdeveloped countries respectively». According to KATANA, «this standpoint falsifies the international interests of the working classes inciting them – even if only implicitly – against each other in the backward

and developed countries» (p. 26). He concludes that «this is by no means the manifestation of Marxism not even in a new form. It does not promote the cause of the masses but it is rather in ideological alliance with capitalism itself» (p. 28).

The kinds of criticism also made against the underdevelopment and dependency theories and the political economy approach underline the Eurocentric tendencies against which these modes of analysis have found limiting to the development of a scientific understanding of society. The criticisms invariably boil down to the question of deviating from orthodoxies (for instance, moving from the notion of international division of labour to think of exploiter and exploited social formations) or failing to maximize certain values, for instance, proletarian internationalism, belief in the inevitable victory of a revolutionary struggle. The criticisms are phrased not so much in terms of whether what is being said by «political economists» is correct as whether it conforms to orthodoxy; they are very rarely made by testing them in a rigorous way against the actual historical experience of the situation whose illumination is at issue. Also the criticisms have tended to be of a negative kind, a tendency to condemn and reject rather than to correct and refine.

At the very least, the political economy approach has brought into clear relief the problems of the application of Marxism to the historical specificities of the periphery. Assuming indeed that everything that dependency and underdevelopment theorists and political economists say is wrong, it might have been expected that the new interest in the problems of application of Marxism to the periphery might have led to attempts by Western Marxists of a more orthodox bent to extend Marxist analysis in those areas where it falls short of illuminating significant aspects of the experiences of the periphery. But this expectation has not materialized, as a reading of Perry ANDERSON's *Considerations in Western Marxism* or an analysis of the concerns of the *New Left Review* will confirm. Western Marxism remains largely self-absorbed, little affected by the changes going on in the periphery, still posing and debating the same questions it has always posed only now with a touch of scholasticism. There is something strangely unMarxist about this intransigence of Western Marxism, the heresies from the periphery are dismissed formally, they are not treated as forms of consciousness emanating from actual conditions and so reflecting concrete contradictions which have to be resolved in a higher synthesis attesting to reality and its understanding as a process.

Not much is gained by arguing abstractly whether the tenets and manner of proceeding of the political economy approach are right or wrong, useful or useless. As a form of consciousness it can only be finally understood in the context of its «history», that is, by relating it to the contradictions of material life which it expresses. Placed in this context it is a reality whose very existence is interesting and instructive. It represents concrete aspirations and concrete struggles; it points to certain experiences and certain realities that are not sufficiently accounted for by existing forms of struggle and practice of science. Whether it sufficiently accounts for them or not, its dialectical engagement with other forms of consciousness (scientific) and struggle is likely to leave us clearer and more incisive in the end.

## RESUME

Comme son titre l'indique clairement, cet article traite des liens entre l'Approche de l'Economie Politique, le Marxisme, et la Science Sociale en Afrique. Il commence par une revue d'ensemble du développement historique de l'économie politique en tant que discipline en Europe, discipline atteignant son point culminant avec Marx et son œuvre. A travers l'œuvre de Marx, l'économie politique se retrouva à tel point imbriquée au Marxisme que plus tard, économie politique et marxisme devinrent synonymes dans l'esprit de bon nombre d'individus.

L'article s'attache ensuite aux rapports économie politique – groupes sociaux non-industrialisés.

Ici, le Professeur AKE soulève un point important : les études de Marx sont largement centrées sur l'Europe industrialisée et capitaliste et le rapport de ces mêmes études à l'Afrique en particulier est très limité. Des contemporains de Marx et des écrivains du début de ce siècle essayèrent de développer le marxisme par rapport à l'accumulation du capital et aussi par rapport à l'étude des sociétés non-industrialisées, la Russie des moujiks – paysans faisant l'objet d'une étude particulière.

Le Professeur AKE souligne le fait que tous ces travaux étaient Eurocentriques et très peu pertinents; seul Lénine se distingua des autres.

Le développement important suivant survint après la 2ème Guerre Mondiale, et plus spécialement dans les années cinquante, lorsqu'il y eut une sérieuse tentative de définition des liens entre l'accumulation du capital et les rapports périphéries – Europe et Amérique du Nord industrialisées et capitalistes. Dutt, Baran et Sweezy ouvrirent la voie.

La troisième phase remonte aux années soixante et soixante-dix, quand l'Amérique Latine, l'Afrique et l'Asie firent leur entrée sur la scène mondiale pour y jouer un rôle décisif dans les domaines économique, politique et diplomatique. Les chercheurs en sciences sociales du Tiers-Monde, faisant face aux réalités de l'oppression, l'exploitation et même de la lutte politique commencèrent à écrire sur la situation dans la périphérie en utilisant en même temps l'Approche de l'Economie Politique et le Marxisme afin d'analyser plus complètement les groupes sociaux de la périphérie et l'impact de l'accumulation du capital sur ces groupes. L'auteur dresse une longue liste choisie des écrivains qui se sont fait connaître lors des années soixante et soixante-dix, dans le Tiers-Monde. Bien que différents en termes de choix des thèmes et même en termes méthodologiques, ces auteurs avaient néanmoins certaines affinités; le Professeur AKE les recense dans cet article. L'aspect le plus important de toute cette phase est la convergence sur l'analyse des spécificités de la périphérie dans le cadre global de l'Economie Politique et du Marxisme.

Le Professeur AKE démontre que bien que l'Economie Politique d'une part et le Marxisme d'autre part aient des liens étroits, il n'en est pas moins qu'il faut faire la distinction entre les deux.

Ensuite, il remarque que pour des raisons historiques et autres, les Latino-américains ont commencé à écrire beaucoup plus tôt, et qu'ils ont finalement mis sur pied diverses écoles de pensée, dont la plus remarquable est l'«Ecole de la Dépendance». Toujours pour des raisons historiques ou autres, les africains se sont fait connaître beaucoup plus tard et prirent une voie différente.

Premièrement, étant très engagés dans le mouvement nationaliste et le nationalisme «per se», ils commencèrent par la remise en question des sciences sociales émanant de l'Europe et d'Amérique du Nord avec la prétention d'être «impartiales et objectives». Ils remirent aussi en question leur pertinence par rapport à la situation africaine. Ainsi, progressivement, et par un processus de réaction, les chercheurs africains en sciences sociales retournèrent à l'approche de l'économie politique; ce faisant, ils cherchaient – et cherchent toujours – à tâtonner des outils conceptuels plus précis dans le cadre de l'Approche de l'Economie Politique, outils qui reflèteraient plus fidèlement la situation africaine spécifique.

Claude AKE décrit les nombreux journaux et institutions africains qui utilisent et préconisent l'Approche de l'Economie Politique. A ce stade, il énumère ce qu'il considère être les piliers essentiels de l'économie politique en Afrique et plus particulièrement en termes d'avantages de cette approche.

En fin de compte, il indique que l'Approche de l'Economie Politique en Afrique a aussi bien été critiquée par les chercheurs en sciences sociales bourgeois que par les marxistes orthodoxes, et il termine en disant : «... l'Approche de l'Economie Politique a pour le moins permis d'amener au grand jour les problèmes de l'application du marxisme aux spécificités historiques de la périphérie» – la périphérie étant dans ce cas l'Afrique.

# THEORIES, IDEOLOGIES ET STRATEGIES DE DEVELOPPEMENT EN AFRIQUE: VERS UNE VOIE AFRICAINE DE DEVELOPPEMENT

Par

*Guy MARTIN\**

## I. — INTRODUCTION

Le concept de «développement» est certainement l'un de ceux qui, avec des fortunes diverses, a été le plus usité dans le domaine des sciences sociales. Mille fois rebattu, galvaudé, trituré et dénaturé jusqu'à être méconnaissable, le terme a connu, depuis sa conception dans les années cinquante à l'aube des indépendances, un succès jamais démenti. Sujet de prédilection des historiens, anthropologues, sociologues, économistes et politologues provenant des horizons idéologiques, géographiques et culturels les plus divers, le «développement» a fait l'objet d'une littérature pléthorique, parfois excellente mais le plus souvent de qualité inégale. Il ne se passe guère de mois sans que de nouveaux éléments ne soient versés à ce dossier déjà fort volumineux; sans qu'un nouvel argument ne vienne relancer le débat permanent sur le sens et la finalité du «développement».

Pourtant, au bout du compte, le chercheur en sciences sociales soucieux de logique, de rigueur et d'efficacité se trouve quelque peu frustré, sinon désorienté, par la multiplicité et la variété des interprétations auxquelles ce concept a donné lieu. Pour répondre à la simple question : «qu'est-ce que le développement ?», il devient dès lors nécessaire de définir, de préciser et de clarifier un certain nombre de notions fondamentales, notamment celles de «théorie», «idéologie» et «stratégie» de développement. Cette entreprise de clarification méthodologique et épistémologique, qui fera l'objet de notre première partie, devrait permettre de jeter les bases d'un modèle de développement nouveau pour l'Afrique. Un tel modèle, dont les contours seront esquissés dans la deuxième partie de cette étude, doit offrir des solutions concrètes en vue de l'élimination du sous-développement et de la dépendance et de l'amorce d'un processus de transformation globale en Afrique.

## II. — THEORIES, IDEOLOGIES ET STRATEGIES DE DEVELOPPEMENT

Ces concepts ayant été préalablement définis, il s'agira, dans cette section, d'une part, de présenter brièvement les différentes théories et stratégies de développement ayant cours : Capitalisme et Socialisme ; d'autre part, d'explorer la notion d'«idéologie du développement» afin de déterminer si, et dans quelle mesure, il ne s'agit en définitive que d'un mythe, comme certains auteurs le prétendent.

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\* *Chargé de cours, Institut des Relations Internationales du Cameroun, Université de Yaoundé, Yaoundé/Cameroun.*

## **1./ DEFINITION DES CONCEPTS: THEORIE, IDEOLOGIE ET STRATEGIE**

### **A) Théorie**

D'une façon générale, on peut dire que la théorie est une expression systématique et cohérente de ce que nous nommons la réalité. Sa fonction essentielle est de «dire» ce que nous savons ou croyons savoir de cette réalité, et de réunir et systématiser divers éléments de notre connaissance. C'est donc une fonction d'explication de la réalité, à laquelle peut être rattachée une fonction de prévision de l'évolution future de cette réalité (1).

### **B) Idéologie**

Fondamentalement, une idéologie est un système d'idées, une philosophie du monde et de la vie. Plus précisément, il s'agit d'un ensemble d'idées, de croyances et de doctrines propres à une époque, à une société ou à une classe. Selon ALTHUSSER,

*«... une idéologie est un système (possédant sa logique et sa rigueur propres) de représentations (images, mythes, idées ou concepts selon le cas) doué d'une existence et d'un rôle historiques au sein d'une société donnée» (2).*

Il est à noter qu'à l'opposé de la théorie, l'idéologie justifie ou critique la réalité, mais ne l'explique pas.

### **C) Stratégie**

Le terme de «stratégie» fait référence aux objectifs et aux moyens à court et à moyen terme mis en œuvre en vue de la réalisation d'un but ultime, à long terme (tel que défini, par exemple, dans une idéologie).

Ces différentes définitions appellent deux remarques importantes. Primo, les idéologies sont à la base des théories et des stratégies. Secundo, l'idéologie implique nécessairement et inclut généralement une stratégie.

Ces précisions terminologiques nécessaires ayant été apportées, il convient à présent de passer en revue les différentes théories et stratégies de développement ayant cours : Capitalisme et Socialisme.

## **2./ LES THEORIES ET STRATEGIES DE DEVELOPPEMENT : CAPITALISME ET SOCIALISME**

### **A) La Théorie et la Stratégie Libérale / Capitaliste de Développement**

Cette théorie a son origine dans la tradition judéo-chrétienne occidentale. Elle est fondée sur le postulat de liberté des activités économiques (production, distribution, échange) à tous les niveaux (local, régional, national et international). Elle procède d'une foi inébranlable dans le progrès de l'humanité, issu d'un processus continu et cumulatif d'inno-



vation technique et scientifique appliqué à la production. La stratégie libérale met l'accent sur l'augmentation de la production dans le cadre de la libre entreprise et du libre jeu des forces du marché, l'intervention de l'état devant se limiter au minimum nécessaire pour assurer un fonctionnement harmonieux de l'économie et de la société. Cette priorité accordée à la croissance implique un certain automatisme de la redistribution du produit social, lequel parviendra finalement à toutes les couches de la société sous forme de «retombées», par «effet de ruissellement» de la croissance.

En outre, la croissance est censée évoluer selon un processus continu, linéaire, diachronique. De ce point de vue, toute société est supposée passer par certaines «étapes» pré-déterminées devant la conduire, selon le schéma ROSTOWIEN bien connu, de la société traditionnelle à l'ère de la consommation de masse en passant par diverses étapes intermédiaires (3). C'est, en fin de compte, une vision idyllique d'une société où règneraient la paix, l'équilibre et l'harmonie grâce à la liberté des activités économiques et aux vertus du progrès scientifique et technique, qui est ainsi offerte en modèle aux autres sociétés du monde.

### *B) La Théorie et la Stratégie Marxiste-Léniniste / Socialiste de Développement*

La théorie socialiste du développement a son origine dans la conception marxiste-léniniste de l'économie et de la société. L'idéologie marxiste-léniniste a comme point de départ une critique radicale du mode de production capitaliste (MPC). Selon MARX, celui-ci ne vise point à la satisfaction des besoins de l'Homme, mais a plutôt comme objectif essentiel l'extraction et la réalisation de la plus-value représentée par l'exploitation de la force de travail du prolétariat. Selon les théoriciens marxistes de l'impérialisme (LENINE, Rosa LUXEMBURG), c'est cette même nécessité vitale du MPC (la réalisation de la plus-value) qui l'amènera à s'étendre dans le monde entier et à soumettre les nations de la périphérie à son autorité afin de réaliser des profits substantiels par le contrôle des sources de matières premières, des marchés et des flux financiers (4).

Ainsi, selon les théoriciens néo-marxistes de la dépendance, c'est par ces diverses formes historiques de domination (colonialisme, impérialisme et néo-colonialisme) que les pays capitalistes développés ont, depuis le 15<sup>e</sup> siècle et jusqu'à nos jours, exploité de manière systématique et persistante les ressources naturelles et humaines des pays sous-développés afin de réaliser leur propre développement tout en engendrant une situation de sous-développement et de dépendance chronique dans ces pays. Selon ces auteurs, ces relations fondamentalement inégalitaires de domination et d'exploitation qui prévalent entre les pays du centre et ceux de la périphérie au sein du système capitaliste mondial sont inhérentes au système capitaliste lui-même. Il s'ensuit que la rupture (partielle ou totale) avec ce système est considérée comme un préalable à toute possibilité de développement socialiste autonome (5).

La stratégie socialiste de développement, ayant comme principe de base «à chacun selon ses besoins», met l'accent sur la distribution équitable du produit social entre toutes les classes de la société, l'objectif étant de relever le niveau de vie des classes les plus déshéritées (prolétariat, paysan-nat). Ceci doit être réalisé par un accroissement de la production et de la productivité dans les secteurs agricole et industriel. Dans ce processus, un rôle décisif d'initiative, d'impulsion, d'organisation et de coordination est dévolu à l'état qui, par le biais de la planification, oriente et régit l'ensemble des activités économiques et répartit ensuite équitablement le produit social entre les différentes classes sociales. Selon la doctrine marxiste-léniniste, l'état comme les classes sociales devront finalement disparaître lorsque le stade de la société sans classe, et donc sans état (Communisme) aura finalement été atteint. Tel est le second modèle de développement proposé à l'humanité.

Les pays du Tiers Monde, lors de leur accession à la souveraineté internationale dans les années cinquante et soixante, soudainement confrontés à des problèmes socio-économiques aigus et pressants, se sont trouvés en fait placés devant l'alternative suivante : Capitalisme ou Socialisme ? Après vingt ans et de nombreux échecs de part et d'autre, le dilemme demeure, doublé d'une nouvelle interrogation liée à la précédente : qu'est-ce que le développement ?

### *3./ L'IDEOLOGIE DU DEVELOPPEMENT: MYTHE OU REALITE ?*

L'idéologie du développement est fondée sur la doctrine de l'évolutionnisme unilinéaire qui est à la base de la théorie libérale/capitaliste de développement. Selon cette doctrine, dont les étapes Rostowiennes sont un exemple classique, toutes les sociétés doivent nécessairement suivre le même processus d'évolution historique qui, à l'instar des sociétés occidentales, les amènera progressivement de la «barbarie» (société «traditionnelle», «pré-industrielle» ou «pré-coloniale») à la «civilisation» (société «moderne», «industrielle» ou «ère de la consommation de masse») en passant par diverses étapes intermédiaires. Sur ce point d'ailleurs, le marxisme ne diffère guère du libéralisme dans la mesure où toutes les sociétés sont, selon cette doctrine, censées passer par une périodisation en «modes de production» successifs, allant de la société pré-capitaliste à la société communiste en passant par l'esclavage, le féodalisme, le mercantilisme, le capitalisme et le socialisme. Il n'est pas inutile à cet égard de rappeler la fameuse formule de Karl MARX: «Le pays le plus développé industriellement ne fait que montrer au moins développé l'image de son propre avenir» (6).

Ainsi, les sociétés aujourd'hui industrialisées, qu'elles soit capitalistes ou socialistes, se présentent comme des modèles inévitables, permanents et intrinsèquement parfaits que toutes les autres sociétés non-industrialisées doivent nécessairement émuler si elles veulent pouvoir un jour goûter aux fruits de la croissance et du progrès technologique et scientifique. Science et technique sont d'ailleurs, dans ce schéma, sacralisées et présentées

comme étant le produit exclusif de l'intelligence occidentale et donc l'apanage, pour ne pas dire le monopole des pays développés, qui en font bénéficier les pays sous-développés (PSD) selon leur bon vouloir. Les PSD se trouvent donc condamnés de facto à ce que Alf SCHWARZ a si justement appelé le «mythe du rattrapage» selon lequel hors de l'industrialisation et de la «modernisation» dans leurs versions capitaliste ou socialiste il n'y aurait point de salut (7). Rattrapage illusoire, parce que, impossible, et qui amène à se demander si, en fin de compte, le développement ne serait pas tout simplement un «mythe» (8), voire une «mystification» (9), d'autant plus qu'un tel développement apparaît, dans le contexte économique international actuel, comme «financièrement impossible» (10).

«Instrument privilégié de l'intégration économique néo-coloniale du tiers-monde industrialisé» (11), l'idéologie du développement est progressivement devenue une idéologie internationale autour de laquelle s'est cristallisée toute une intelligentsia du développement et de la coopération internationale et elle sert d'alibi à l'exploitation économique internationale à travers les mécanismes du commerce, de l'aide et des investissements privés étrangers. A l'intérieur même des PSD, l'idéologie du développement, unificatrice et mobilisatrice, permet aux classes bourgeoises dirigeantes de justifier, de masquer et de perpétuer leur domination politique et leur exploitation économique des classes sociales les plus déshéritées (paysannat, prolétariat, lumpen-prolétariat). L'effet le plus pernicieux et le plus néfaste de l'idéologie du développement est qu'elle aboutit en définitive à une aliénation et à une dépendance culturelles totales des élites dirigeantes (et, par l'«effet de démonstration», des masses) des pays du tiers monde, obnubilées par le mythe du rattrapage et de la rationalité technico-scientifique et imitatrices serviles des valeurs, des modes de pensée, des comportements et des habitudes de consommation des bourgeoisies des pays développés (12).

L'idéologie du développement apparaît donc en définitive comme une idéologie trompeuse et mystificatrice, fondée sur une conception fallacieuse du progrès de l'Homme et de la société, et aboutissant à l'élaboration de théories inadéquates et de stratégies inadaptées. C'est donc le concept même de «développement» qu'il convient de repenser, dans la perspective de l'élaboration d'une théorie et d'une stratégie répondant aux conditions, aux besoins et aux priorités des pays et des peuples africains.

### III. — QUELLE STRATEGIE DE DEVELOPPEMENT POUR L'AFRIQUE ?

#### 1./ LA NOTION DE DEVELOPPEMENT: DEFINITION

Dans l'optique d'une approche opérationnelle, on pourrait tout simplement définir le développement comme étant «la capacité d'une société à accroître les moyens lui permettant de maîtriser son environnement» (13). Plus précisément, on peut dire que le développement est la réalisation progressive du potentiel matériel, économique, social et culturel existant dans toute collectivité humaine socialement organisée. Ainsi, dans la mesure où l'on constate que :

*Pendant des millénaires, les sociétés humaines sont... parvenues à s'adapter à des milieux très différents... Avec une organisation socio-politique qui leur était propre, avec des moyens techniques plus ou moins élaborés, mais toujours adaptés au contexte qui était le leur, elles produisaient en vue de satisfaire des besoins qu'elles définissaient elles-mêmes... (14)*

il devient évident que toutes les sociétés ont été, à un moment ou à un autre de leur histoire, développées. Ainsi se trouve évacué l'aspect historiquement déterminé et contingent des notions de développement précédemment critiquées.

L'Afrique se trouve aujourd'hui confrontée à une question fondamentale qui est celle de savoir quel est le type de société qu'il s'agit de mettre en place. C'est tout le problème du choix d'une idéologie, d'une théorie et d'une stratégie de développement pour l'Afrique qui est ainsi posé.

## **2./ LES FONDEMENTS IDEOLOGIQUES ET THEORIQUES D'UNE STRATEGIE AFRICAINE DE DEVELOPPEMENT**

A ce niveau, la question qui se pose est celle du choix entre le Capitalisme, le Socialisme ou une possible «troisième voie». Le Capitalisme, de par les effets globalement négatifs qu'il a eus et qu'il continue d'avoir sur les économies et les sociétés des pays du tiers monde semble, historiquement et à terme, condamné. A la question de savoir «si le capitalisme peut promouvoir le développement, ou s'il engendre nécessairement le sous-développement» (15), on ne peut, selon les conclusions des nombreuses analyses sur ce sujet, que répondre par la négative.

Pour d'autres auteurs, le salut de l'Afrique ne peut provenir que d'une révolution socialiste s'appuyant sur les classes déshéritées et exploitées et aboutissant à une transformation radicale des structures socio-économiques et politiques des pays africains (16). Une telle voie, si elle apparaît à priori plus séduisante et mieux à même de répondre aux aspirations et aux objectifs des pays africains, n'est cependant pas exempte de dangers. Le danger le plus sérieux est celui du dogmatisme, c'est-à-dire de l'adoption inconditionnelle et sans adaptation des schémas marxistes-léninistes qui seraient appliqués d'une manière mécanique, sans tenir compte des conditions spécifiques de l'Afrique.

La solution résiderait-elle dans l'adoption d'une «troisième voie», d'un «Socialisme africain» qui serait, précisément, adapté aux conditions spécifiques de l'Afrique ? Beaucoup d'auteurs (dont nous sommes) penchent pour cette solution, qui présente l'avantage de partir des conditions économiques, politiques, sociales et culturelles prévalant aujourd'hui en Afrique pour élaborer un modèle mieux adapté à ces conditions. Il resterait donc à préciser le contenu d'une telle doctrine, ce à quoi nous allons nous attacher dans la section suivante.

### 3./ LE SOCIALISME AFRICAIN : CONTENU ET IMPLICATIONS

Il s'agit à ce niveau de retenir du Socialisme l'essentiel et l'utile, tout en l'adaptant aux conditions spécifiques de l'Afrique. En ce sens, notre approche est essentiellement éclectique, au sens le plus noble du terme. Le socialisme implique, par définition, la réalisation de la maxime «à chacun selon ses besoins». Il s'agit donc d'une idéologie fondamentalement égalitaire, basée sur la notion de justice sociale. De ce point de vue, il répond parfaitement à l'une des préoccupations majeures des gouvernants africains, à savoir, comment répartir équitablement le produit social de manière à améliorer le sort des classes sociales les plus défavorisées.

Du point de vue économique, il est nécessaire de partir du principe que n'importe quelle politique de développement est possible, quelles que soient les ressources d'un pays, l'importance de sa population et la dimension de son territoire (17). A partir de là, il convient de définir les bases d'un développement véritablement endogène, autonome et autocentré. Le concept de développement autonome («self-reliance») implique une réelle et complète autonomie de la part de l'état et de la société en ce qui concerne la définition de leurs objectifs de développement et la mise en œuvre de leurs ressources matérielles et humaines à cette fin (18). Ce concept est fondé sur le principe économique de l'utilisation maximale des facteurs de production locaux et d'une production orientée vers la satisfaction des besoins intérieurs. L'idée de développement autonome est donc étroitement associée à celle des «besoins fondamentaux», qui vise à la satisfaction prioritaire des besoins fondamentaux des classes les plus déshéritées de la population des pays du tiers monde, qu'il s'agisse des biens de consommation individuelle (alimentation, logement, habillement...) ou des services publics ou collectifs (eau potable, transports publics, éducation, santé...).

Le développement autonome peut être conçu à différents niveaux: local, national, régional et inter-régional. Ce dernier niveau renvoie à la stratégie d'«autonomie collective» par laquelle les PSD poursuivent une politique d'échanges et de coopération économiques afin de réduire leur dépendance vis-à-vis des pays développés.

Le concept de développement autonome implique que le modèle de développement soit redéfini en fonction des priorités, des besoins et des aspirations des masses déshéritées qui, en Afrique, sont essentiellement constituées par la classe paysanne. Il s'agira donc de rendre la parole aux paysans d'Afrique, de leur donner le pouvoir, de leur permettre de participer eux-mêmes au processus de changements nécessaires à l'amélioration de leurs conditions d'existence (19). Un tel processus suppose l'avènement d'une «contre-élite» acceptant de se «suicider» en tant que classe bourgeoise pour se fondre avec la masse paysanne afin de participer avec elle à la restructuration complète des rapports sociaux internes (20).

La notion de développement autonome suppose enfin une véritable «révolution culturelle» visant à libérer les élites et les masses africaines de l'impérialisme culturel occidental. Il s'agit à ce niveau pour celles-ci de se dégager de l'emprise intellectuelle de l'Occident, fondée sur le mythe du rattrapage et de la supériorité technico-scientifique. De ce point de vue,

la mise en garde de FANON reste toujours valable : « Nous pouvons tout faire aujourd'hui à condition de ne pas singer l'Europe, à condition de ne pas être obsédés par le désir de rattraper l'Europe » (21).

Enfin, au niveau continental, on ne peut mieux faire que de revenir au projet Panafricain de « Gouvernement continental africain » du Président Kwame NKRUMAH. Celui-ci préconisait une unité continentale immédiate au plan politique comme préalable à l'intégration économique continentale. Une telle intégration devrait, selon lui, prendre la forme d'un « Marché commun africain », organisé sur la base d'une « planification continentale intégrée » (22).

#### IV. — CONCLUSION

La présente étude a tenté d'apporter des éléments de réponse à une double interrogation : Qu'est-ce que le développement ? Quel développement pour l'Afrique ? La première question nous a amenés à nous interroger sur l'utilité des différentes théories et stratégies de développement existantes et sur la signification profonde du concept de « développement ». Nous sommes parvenus à la conclusion que ce concept n'était, en définitive, qu'un mythe. Ceci nous a conduit, en réponse à la deuxième question, à poser les fondements d'une définition épistémologiquement acceptable et méthodologiquement valable du développement. Sur cette base, les linéaments d'un modèle africain de développement ont pu être esquissés. Il est à souhaiter que les chercheurs africains et africanistes contribueront à parachever l'élaboration de ce modèle pour en faire un instrument efficace de transformation globale du continent africain.

Il importe toutefois que cet effort collectif parte des conditions historiques, sociales et culturelles spécifiques à l'Afrique, qu'il soit profondément enraciné dans l'histoire, la culture et les valeurs propres de l'Afrique traditionnelle. Nous ne pouvons mieux faire que de livrer à la réflexion du lecteur, en guise de conclusion, les remarques pertinentes d'Ahmed Baba MISKE à ce sujet :

*« Chaque société, chaque civilisation doit trouver en elle-même sa voie; chercher dans ses traditions, dans ses valeurs propres, dans ses expériences politiques concrètes d'avant la colonisation, ce qui peut revivre aujourd'hui et constituer le noyau à partir duquel peut s'élaborer un système cohérent, socio-politique, économique, culturel, spirituel... un système enraciné dans la vie même de cette société, dans ses réalités, et qui soit ressenti sien » (23).*

#### NOTES

1. Voir à ce sujet Philippe Braillard, *Théories des Relations Internationales*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1977, pp. 13-16.
2. Louis Althusser, *Pour Marx*. Paris: François Maspéro, 1975, p. 238.
3. W.W. Rostow, *Les Etapes de la Croissance Economique*. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1963.

4. V.I. Lénine, *L'Impérialisme, stade suprême du capitalisme*. Moscou: Editions du Progrès, 1968; Rosa Luxemburg, *L'Accumulation du capital*. Paris: Maspéro, 1976 (2 tomes).
5. Parmi la littérature pléthorique sur la dépendance par les auteurs néo-marxistes, on retiendra, à titre d'exemples notoires : Samir Amin, *L'Accumulation à l'échelle mondiale*. Paris: Anthropos, 2e édition, 1971; André Gunder Frank, *Capitalisme et sous-développement en Amérique Latine*. Paris: Maspéro, 1972; et: Immanuel Wallerstein, *The capitalist world-economy*. Cambridge & Paris: Cambridge University Press/Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1979.
6. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*. New York: International Publishers, 1967, volume I, pp. 8–9.
7. Alf Scharz, «La Sociologie en Afrique ou les enjeux véritables du paradigme du développement international», in Alf Schwarz (dir. Publ.), *Les Faux Prophètes de l'Afrique ou l'Afr(eu)canisme*. Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 1980, pp. 124–131.
8. Celso Furtado, *Le mythe du développement économique*. Paris: Anthropos, 1976, p. 96.
9. François Partant, *La fin du développement: Naissance d'une alternative ?* Paris: Maspéro, 1982, p. 27.
10. F. Partant, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
11. Georges Corm, «Saper l'idéologie du développement». *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Avril 1978), p. 1.
12. Voir à ce sujet le très intéressant ouvrage d'Abdou Touré, *La civilisation quotidienne en Côte d'Ivoire: Procès d'occidentalisation*. Paris: Karthala, 1981.
13. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London & Dar-es-Salaam: Bogle-L'Ouverture/Tanzania Publishing House, 1972, p. 10.
14. F. Partant, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
15. Anne Phillips, «The Concept of 'Development'». *Review of African Political Economy* No. 8 (1977), p. 9.
16. Telle est par exemple la position de Claude Ake, *Revolutionary Pressures in Africa*. London: Zed Press, 1978, et de A. Mohamed Babu, *African Socialism or Socialist Africa?* London: Zed Press, 1981.
17. Sur ce point, voir Clive Y. Thomas, *Dependence and Transformation: The Economics of the Transition to Socialism*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974; et: François Partant, *La Guérilla Économique: Les Conditions du Développement*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1976.
18. Sur le concept de «self-reliance», voir en particulier Johan Galtung, Peter O'Brien & Roy Preiswerk (eds.), *Self-Reliance: A Strategy for Development*. London & Geneva: Bogle-L'Ouverture/Institute for Development Studies, 1980.
19. Dans un récent ouvrage, l'auteur Camerounais Jean-Marc Ela a admirablement décrit la misérable condition des paysans d'Afrique et clairement posé les conditions de leur libération (*L'Afrique des villages*. Paris: Karthala, 1982).
20. Sur une telle alliance de classes, voir Amilcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969, p. 72; et: J.-M. Ela, *op. cit.*, pp. 211–216.
21. Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre*. Paris: Maspéro, 1961, pp. 239–240.

22. Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*. London: Heinemann, 1963.
23. Ahmed Baba Miské, *Lettre ouverte aux élites du Tiers-Monde*. Paris: Editions Le Sycamore, 1981, p. 87 (souligné dans le texte).

## SUMMARY

*This paper is an attempt to give some tentative and partial answers to the following two questions: What is the meaning of «development»? What strategy of development for Africa? In trying to answer the first question, we have been led, after the definition of concepts, to question the usefulness of the various existing theories and strategies of development (Capitalism and Socialism) and to explore the true meaning of the concept of «development», which appears as nothing but a myth. In an attempt to answer the second question we have, on the basis of an operational definition of «development», delineated the broad outlines of an African strategy of development based on the concepts of social justice, self-reliance, cultural liberation and continental integration. It is to be hoped that other African scholars will pick up the challenge and further contribute to the elaboration of this model so that it can become a useful means towards the global transformations of the African continent.*



## SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON A CRITICAL THEORY OF MODERNIZATION

By

H. C. F. MANSILLA\*

The aim of this paper is to set out some critical and perhaps unusual thoughts concerning the theoretical frameworks evolved so far on historical development in the Third World itself. I shall begin with some critical remarks on the African and Latin American dependency theories, which should be considered as the most important and original contributions by Third World intellectuals to contemporary thinking in the fields of social and economic history. These remarks include a critique of current collective conceptions about such fundamental issues as progress, final development goals, and historical models. These concepts appear very clearly in the writings of the dependency theory as intellectual versions of widespread social demands in almost all countries of the Third World.

Out of this critique, I shall evolve some theses of my own which may lead to a sober, sceptical but perhaps better understanding of historical development in the regions which are now considered to be the world peripheries. Any analysis aspiring to do more than simply furnish a scientific-sounding vindication of certain political programmes must re-examine precisely those assumptions which have acquired the quality of self-evident phenomena in the collective consciousness of this area, thus becoming unchallengeable premises for almost all theories on progress and development. Foremost among these is the assumption that zero-growth is an absolutely negative state and that economic advancement is *per se* (1) the most important aspect of progress and development. Striving towards technological-economic progress as the embodiment of positive orientation values is considered to be the appropriate and rational attitude, one which stands above all ideological and political differences. Material progress is regarded to be both the motor and the goal of any serious development. It is symptomatic that different political and ideological groupings in Africa, Asia and Latin America adhere to a combination – seen as a natural law, self-evident and ostensibly inevitable – between technological-economic progress on the one hand and social, political, and cultural development on the other. The historical optimism of Liberalism and Marxism – a genuine characteristic of the nineteenth century – has not yet become a controversial issue to the Third World collective consciousness. The view that the historical evolution confronts every society with problems which it can actually solve has become a common intellectual belief among African, Asian and Latin American political elites.

The most significant aspect of that collective consciousness may well be the substance of its development models and their relationship to the metropolitan guide-lines of evolution. It may be claimed with some degree of certainty that this consciousness has been decisively shaped by the *demonstration effects* (2) of metropolitan culture. This taking-over of

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\* Professor – University of LA PAZ, Bolivia.

external orientation values occurs, however, within a socio-cultural context which emphasizes the urgent necessity of finding one's own road to development; such acceptance of final normative goals is not always a fully rational and critical process, but rather a pre-logical and pre-conscious one. Similarly to the individual super-ego, the collective pre-consciousness is formed by orientation values and normative concepts which are inculcated into the subject from outside and internalized through a long pre-logical process (3). In the case of the collective pre-consciousness of Third World societies, one may assume that the current normative development goals are derived from the culture and tradition of the metropolitan centres, which makes a rational, socially relevant examination of their desirability, intensity and breadth very difficult in concrete cases, those goals having become a sort of inevitable natural law.

At the highest level of collective pre-consciousness, two major normative goals can be ascertained which, due to their generalized character, have become part of the common store of diverse political and ideological movements. They are: –

- 1) the attainment of the technological-economic level of the present-day advanced industrialized nations by means of a forced modernization and industrialization, and
- 2) the widening and consolidation of the national state.

When a society adopts normative goals from abroad, especially in the area of leading political and social values, it requires a vindicating ideology in order to make this adoption appear as a quite natural and legitimate fact. Two basic tendencies in contemporary Third World thought have been created to legitimize the pre-consciously determined development goals, tendencies which have, besides, a very effective function as instruments of social deceit:

a) the notion that technological-industrial progress is a universal process, immanent in all cultures and hence a kind of natural law. According to this, real barriers to development (for instance a lack of natural and energy resources) and questions concerning the origins of scientific and technological innovations are played down; at the same time, a somewhat naive belief in the omnipotence of «universal» technology becomes evident, presupposing that man can find technical solutions to all problems and difficulties (4). *Walter RODNEY*, for instance, has written that development differences on a world scale are due only to social and political issues and not to a totally different endowment with natural resources among nations. According to *RODNEY*, current African underdevelopment should exclusively be considered as a result of European domination due to military and political success. Western Europe induced a flourishing, technologically well-evolved continent into its contemporary backwardness because of a temporary supremacy in power politics (5).

b) There is a tendency towards a revival of allegedly progressive aspects of a country's own traditions, particularly in the sphere of political culture, social behaviour patterns and daily life. This suggests a genuine

development strategy stressing values of old traditions adapted to new situations. In Latin America, for instance, revolutionary movements are successfully trying to take advantage of authoritarian and centralist elements of the Iberian-Catholic heritage; a similar phenomenon can be perceived in the Islamic world. Many socialist groupings in the Third World postulate a development model which links the goal of rapid modernization and industrialization to traditional values of authoritarianism and collectivism, at the same time rejecting Liberal-democratic concepts (6).

In large parts of the Third World, there is today a unique historical constellation in which tradition-related values and patterns provide an effective short-term aid in order to carry out the normative goals of the collective pre-consciousness; the encouragement of accelerated population growth (as advocated by *Samir AMIN*) (7) and the playing down of ecological problems go hand-in-hand with some traditional orientation values and appear simultaneously instrumental in forcing material progress.

The retention of traditional values in the realm of politics and culture suggests the possession of an autochthonous development model and facilitates the adoption of non-autochthonous goals in the technological-economic fields. Refurbishing traditional values, precisely in the name of accelerated economic progress, complements very well the deep-rooted prejudices of collective pre-consciousness and contributes to preserving some fragments of national identity and of independent cultural creations, thus producing the illusion of a genuinely own path to historical development. In the field of political culture, the alleged rejection of «foreign» norms and models seems most credible, preserving in this way the idea of a non-Western structure of socio-political behaviour patterns. It is difficult to avoid the impression that right up to the present, socialist and nationalist movements have confined themselves to setting up a system of enhanced centralization and anti-pluralism which utilizes collectivist norms, authoritarian behaviour patterns and traditional values in order to increase social cohesion and strengthen loyalty to the state (8).

Under cover of political and cultural autochthonism, several ideological tendencies in the Third World are clearly striving towards a high degree of industrialization, a strong and expanding state, and a high level of mass consumption as indispensable collective desires — as if these desires were elements drawn from a genuinely indigenous tradition rather than factors derived from the demonstration effects emanating from the metropolitan centres. This general phenomenon, which is called the *revolution of rising expectations*, represents the endeavour to acquire the material fruits of an industrial revolution in as brief a time as possible. Here, economic growth and technological progress adopt the quality of unchallengeable and unyielding development criteria and goals. The results of the demonstration effects are far-reaching; nationalist, socialist and socio-democratic ideologies often spend themselves on legitimizing the accelerated imitation of industrial civilization in the name of social justice and political autonomy. For this reason, one cannot dismiss the thesis that almost all so-called progressive development models in the Third World, including of course the Cuban revolution, are negatively fixed upon the

orientation values of the advanced industrial societies, whether they be organized as market economies or as state-socialist systems. The psycho-analytical concept of «negative fixation» signifies the verbal, perhaps theoretically inflated, refusal of a given model but the factual acceptance of its leading values, which then constitutes the very stable, but preconscious basis of collective thinking and behaviour. (Metropolitan countries, for instance, are blamed for all evils now existing in Third World countries, but these same societies are nevertheless trying to imitate the main features of metropolitan life).

One very important point concerning the adoption of metropolitan standards is the limitation to their so-called instrumental rationality. The guiding values of most peripheral societies are devoid of deep critical insights related to the goals of historical evolution in long-term perspective. Their orientation values have an evident affinity with merely pragmatic and utilitarian thinking, which displays a particular inclination towards profitable and efficient means, instruments and roads to development on behalf of goals which, for their part, are at the arbitrary disposal of the current ruling political forces. In the case of the African and Latin American dependency theory, its merely instrumental concept of rationality can be established by analyzing its explicit socio-historical goals – growth, progress, industrialization – which are held to be self-evident and which are considered automatically to bring about an emancipated social order (9).

In this context, the task of the social scientist is restricted to providing a semblance of scholarly plausibility and fashionable ideological wrappings for the desires and prejudices of collective pre-consciousness. Almost all peripheral development ideologies, whose theoretical deficiencies are further enhanced by their being largely confined to legitimizing growth and progress, are imitative in character and assume consequently all the disadvantages and the intellectual poverty of the pragmatic utilitarian thought that is so widespread in the metropolitan centres. Thus, both current schools of thought – positivism in the North and developmentism in the South – tend to reject any questioning of economic-technological progress as being utopian and to concentrate their efforts on an efficient instrumentalism. This means that both conservative positions and socialist programmes commonly identify a successful social order with industrial-technological progress and that problems like genuine political participation, respect for human rights and cultural creation are reduced to the quality of subordinate factors. Similarly, every consideration related to ecology is labelled a luxury which developing countries cannot afford and any attempt at reducing the demographic growth rate is regarded as a precisely calculated act of aggression by the imperialists of the industrialized nations (10).

The question about the fate of Third World societies following the exhaustion of their natural resources or a continuation over many years of the current demographic growth rate has not been adequately answered by the intellectuals of those countries. If one soberly were to consider the normative force of development goals in connection with the pragmatic, utilitarian curtailment of social, political and economic thought in the

Third World, one could establish that the entire complex of ecological and demographic problems, including possible long-term alternative concepts of historical evolution, has been reduced to a residual quantity which is subordinated to the overriding exigences involved in the realization of the goals imposed by collective pre-consciousness.

The fact that development policy alternatives to the metropolitan models — whether these be of a private capitalist or state socialist nature — have not yet become relevant, can be traced to the instrumental reduction of intellectual consciousness in most countries of the Third World. The restriction of scholarly and political thought to a mere rationality of the means and to hastily conceived strategies has had serious effects upon the formulation of sociological and historical theories, upon the preparation of party programmes, government guide-lines and models of international co-operation and upon the awareness of the functional elites in the whole Third World. The most important contributions to the African and Latin American *Dependency Theories* (11) display a marked ideological tendency to legitimize the practice of achieving accelerated economic-technological development by means of forced industrialization. This theory has certainly made a significant contribution to political science, for it has brought out relevant aspects of the dominance/dependence relationships between the world's centres and peripheries. But at the same time the theory has tended to identify dependency situations exclusively with limitations on increased reproduction, industrialization and autarchy — limitations which are supposed to have been imposed only by the metropolitan centres (12). Dependency theorists thus attribute all deficient aspects of Third World development (external control of internal dynamics, foreign control of economic and fiscal policies, specialization in the export of raw materials, regional imbalances, lack of a technologically well-grounded industry) to imperialist penetration, which is blamed for preventing «continuous economic growth» as well as all-round, dynamic development in general. It is noteworthy that the most important authors of the dependency theory agree upon the general definition of what a «successful autonomous and non-deformed development» (13) ought to be — like most politicians and cultivated people in the Third World. What is hotly debated is firstly the problem of structuring and timing economic growth and secondly the problem of the ownership of the means of production. The ultimate normative goals, by contrast, have the character of a common basis of agreement for otherwise disparate political groupings. Although these goals are not always explicitly spelled out, they can be determined either *ex-negativo* or from the context of the current discussions. The desired alternative to the present situation of allegedly «growth without development» would lie in a combination of rapid economic growth with extensive diversification of the technological-economic structures. What is meant in general is the enlargement of the domestic market, industrialization including heavy industry, maintenance of national control over basic resources, dissemination of modern scientific knowledge and the establishment of social justice on a nation-wide scale (14).

Of these, the demand for comprehensive industrialization assumes a very prominent position. The process of national liberation and autonomous development is said to be connected to the growth of heavy industry. Only this form of industrialization (rather than the establishment of consumer-goods, light and manufacturing industries) deserves the appellation of «full and authentic development» (15). The central goal of a socialist development programme has usually been defined as «the energetic encouragement of industrialization up to the establishment of a heavy industry» (16). All advocates of the dependency theory implicitly start from the assumption that far-reaching industrialization, which should overcome the stage of «mere» import substitution, represents both the only desirable development norm and the true historical goal, because heavy industry alone is «in the present phase of civilization the basic pre-requisite for a country's progressive development» (17).

Non-Marxist dependency theorists also come out in favour of similarly structured models of full industrialization, stressing the creation of heavy and petro-chemical industries and claiming that they are a *condition sine qua non* of self-sustained growth (18). Similar ideologies of progress, fixed upon full industrialization, constitute the central aspect of non-Marxist political programmes all over the world. Only the creation of a heavy industry would provide the other sectors of the economy with the necessary impetus to reasonable development and would be synonymous with overcoming dependency, the Egyptian scholar *Sahua NOUR* writes (19). It may be assumed that the normative goals set by even the «non-capitalist» road to development are also forced industrialization with capital accumulation at the expense of agriculture, primarily in order to achieve the creation of heavy industry (20).

After full industrialization, the second most important goal of the collective consciousness in the Third World is the demand for far-reaching autarchy and the expansion of the nation-state power. The achievement of a strong, centralized state is postulated as the truly autonomous development model in order to overcome dependency. By means of extensive penetration of state agencies into all sectors of society, this vigorous state is supposed to guarantee «a fully efficient utilization of scarce resources». Take-over of most functions in the areas of production and administration, concentration of all power in the hands of the executive and the establishment of an emphatically anti-pluralist, authoritarian one-party system are the characteristic features of the dependency theory and of many political movements all over the Third World. In the many cases in which both politicians and scientists adhere verbally to pluralism and democratic procedures, the main drive consists in reality in strengthening state functions and collective institutions and in weakening individual rights and efforts.

In this paper, technocratic-conservative regimes and socialist-revolutionary systems and ideas have been intentionally assimilated to the general concept of modernizing models. This is, however, not an arbitrary statement. It is possible to ascertain a real plurality of models concerning the ways and means to achieve a modern society, but there is at the same

time an equally clear uniformity with regard to the aims and objectives pursued by all important development regimes. There is, of course, the controversial issue of the ownership of the means of production and the shaping of the political constitution, but there is unfortunately no serious debate in the Third World about the relationship between man and nature or about the orientation values of modernity, which are normally perceived through an uncritical and optimistic lens (21). All politically relevant tendencies hold the same naive opinion about the almost magic force of concepts like development, progress, growth, industrialization and opening up of unhabitated regions, partake of the same prejudices on ecological issues and consider nature as the silent, passive basis for human projects. The general inhibition to discuss the negative aspects of progress and modernity suggests the existence of a very broad consensus in the whole of the Third World about the final development goals as well as about their resource endowment – a consensus which is most probably based upon false presuppositions, but which embodies the core of collective identity for many political and ideological streams. Because of these two points, it seems unlikely that any important party or movement could recommend slower economic growth or the enforcement of ecological measures which would delay the modernization and industrialization efforts. The legitimacy of revolutionary programmes and ideals depends on their claim to be a better and faster instrument for the task of surmounting underdevelopment and subduing the traditional order. Since the October Revolution in 1917, Soviet-type socialism has been reduced to a remedy against backwardness, a method destined to overcome a pre-industrial system (22).

Industrialization, modernization and strengthening the national state have become the criteria against which the success or failure of all historical processes in the world's peripheries are judged, and this *before* the distinction between «capitalist» or «socialist» orientations has been made. The term «underdevelopment» is seen as basically identical with the *distance* separating actual Third World conditions from metropolitan standards. Backwardness is defined only in comparison with the achievements of the metropolitan centres (23), this allegedly critical concept of underdevelopment sets up metropolitan parameters as the norm to be attained. Thus, Latin American and African dependency theorists, which had set themselves the task of working out a truly *independent* development model, in the decisive and long-term components of their orientation values display an irrefutable *dependence* upon the metropolitan evolution paradigm. The criteria for defining a positive performance are, for instance, accelerated development, material progress, rapid growth, dynamic process and an homogeneous social body. The negative values are stagnant underdevelopment, material poverty, slow growth, static process and social heterogeneity. Those positive values did not originate in the peripheral societies but rather in the highly industrialized nations of the North, especially in Western Europe. Because of this, it is possible to assert that a successful strategy along the lines of the dependency theory would generate a loss of genuinely characteristic aspects and truly specific factors in the peripheral societies. Revolutionary ideologies and parties are more than eager to sacrifice

cultural, regional, political and institutional specificities for the achievement of accelerated modernization. Technocratic-conservative tendencies, but especially socialist regime, have proved to be the worst enemies of pluralism, diversity and heterogeneity.

Dependency theorists aspire to use full industrialization and an enlarged state machinery as the means to effect their own, allegedly independent, road to modern development; but this road has been rendered impassable not only by imperialist penetration but also by demographic pressures, a scarcity of natural and energy resources and a persistence of traditional behaviour patterns. Latin American and African dependency schools are devoted to the vindication of accelerated modernization, strategies and models, although they cannot display any sign of an original development strategy. However, they adhere to the notion that once the deformation and retardation due to imperialism have been removed, the «real» and «organic» road towards full modernization can be restored (24). This intended *regeneration* of an ancient heritage means in reality only the refurbishing of certain political and cultural issues; in the economic and technological fields, the restoration of the glorious past is identical with a very customary westernization (25).

Outside scholarly circles, there is a similar tendency to identify a positive evolution with the imitation of metropolitan standards. In the programmes of major political parties, the emphasis until about 1950 was upon political, ideological, educational and organizational aspects. Even in the case of reformist and socialist parties, alongside their demands for agrarian reform, social justice and national defence, there was a relatively greater emphasis upon political postulates. Of course, the achievement of material progress was an important part of these programmes, but it was rather generally and vaguely formulated. Whenever industrialization was expressly addressed, it was confined to the processing of raw materials. Promoting production and marketing of raw materials was the central concern of economic programmes put forward by political parties of the Third World. One would search in vain among these party programmes for any mention of ecological problems and very seldom did one find a positive reference to population growth as a prerequisite to full development.

In today's programmes and current government statements, however, specific industry-promoting slogans and demands for industrialization have acquired a dominant position. Both in the writings of neo-conservative parties and in those of a nationalist or socialist nature, there is an unambiguous shifting away from ideological and general political aspects in favour of those elements of economic policy that are conducive to accelerated modernization of society as a whole. Party programmes are increasingly assuming the character of a simplified and politically curtailed several-year economic plan, aimed at using industrialization to achieve genuine economic independence and political sovereignty for the country concerned.

Fascination with material progress and the notion that this is actually the goal of – rather than merely a means towards – human evolution also largely characterize the core of orthodox communist models in



the Third World, as clearly witnessed by the *Cuban revolution*. Cuban leaders have praised the Soviet model of forced accumulation under Stalin as a pattern worthy of imitation, emphasizing especially its material success. In accordance with this pragmatic thinking, the question of the human costs and the problem of the goals sought beyond the experiment are buried under an avalanche of statistics which announce the growth rates in productivity (26). Other contemporary, broader commitments to comprehensive development, too, like the *Monrovia Strategy* and the *Lagos Plan of Action* (27), display a similar uncritical adoption of metropolitan standards and utilitarian-technocratic restrictions. Accelerated growth in all fields, efficient utilization of natural resources and modernization of behaviour patterns constitute the only leading orientation values, with particular stress on diminishing the distance which still separates African reality from the metropolitan paradigm. The latter's goals, values and criteria are equally taken for granted as is the reiterative presupposition that natural resources in Africa are inexhaustible.

Against this background of theoretical illusions and practical mediocrity, I propose to set forth some thesis about a critical theory of modernization.

Instead of a differentiated and sober periodization of evolution stages, Marxist philosophy of history offers a rather simple method which has proved unable to explain not only the historical development of the Third World but also to provide an adequate, empirically sustained explanation of Western European evolution. Besides this basic failure, Marxist theory is pre-consciously fixed upon the Western-metropolitan scheme and goals of historical development, presupposing that the rest of the world should in the long term imitate the Western way from primitive community through several periods of class society till full socialism. This (Hegelian) prejudice is complemented by an overly optimistic and truly uncritical view concerning material progress and technological advancement. The mania of socialist governments to demonstrate their superiority over capitalist regimes by means of higher growth rates and production outputs can be traced back to the core of original Marxism. Finally, all streams of Marxist socialism have an anthropocentric bias; extending the Jewish-Christian heritage, they implicitly but firmly believe that man is the centre and the objective (*telos*) of the entire universe and that nature with all its realms should be subordinated to human projects. Within this framework, ecological considerations play a very secondary role, if any at all.

On the other hand, the classical theories of social change and modernization share a similar onesidedness about positive orientation values and normative models of a well-achieved evolution. They view genuine modernization as an acceptable reproduction of Western-metropolitan standards; they believe that true progress means surpassing old traditions and models on the way to full westernization. They also conceive rationality only as the efficient and rapid adequation of means to some given goals, which as such are never called into question. The preservation of nature and ecological issues have no important place within their theoretical framework.

The concepts of traditionality and modernity seem, however, to be a better explanation scheme than the Marxist periodization for the purpose of marking the poles of contemporary historical evolution in the Third World. This central thesis of the modernization theory should be adopted with some reservations. The drive towards a combined process of forced industrialization, urbanization and westernization of behaviour patterns should not be considered as a general law of history applicable to all times and countries, but rather as a temporary issue occurring in numerous Third World countries and mostly during the second half of the twentieth century. The imitation of metropolitan standards – either in their Western, capitalist version or in the Eastern system of state socialism – has as many negative as positive aspects. For instance, modernization currently embraces such unfortunate features as chaotic uncontrolled urbanization, the disruption of rural life, the destruction of very reasonable economic and cultural traditions, the loss of diversity and originality, the vanishing of a genuine collective identity and the accelerated devastation of nature in the name of necessary and indispensable progress. Individual life increasingly lacks any real sense in a society dominated only by utilitarian performance criteria. Because of these points, the critical theory of modernization accepts as a matter of fact that material progress along metropolitan lines is the main effort and the supreme goal in today's Third World, but it doubts very much that the actual implementation of these values could generate a truly emancipated and harmonious social order. The most probable result of contemporary evolution in the world peripheries is an inferior copy of metropolitan achievements, supplemented by the same subjection of reason and rationality to merely utilitarian, pragmatic and uncritical efficiency principles.

The two other basic assumptions of the critical theory of modernization are:

It has proved useless to establish general laws of historical development. The evolution of every society and the particular situation of every regime can, of course, be analyzed and interpreted according to various criteria and view points, but it is presumptuous to assume that we can ascertain rules, norms, concepts and regularities that would be valid for all times and nations. Therefore, it is irrational to suppose that all societies are, in the long term, advancing towards a common goal (socialism) and that this objective should have only a positive characteristic.

Historically, the period of time to be evaluated for the Third World is rather short and hence, any judgement as to the success or failure of the plurality of socio-economic experiments becomes premature. Above all, it is quite impossible to predict the specific political constitution which could be established in the phase following the completion of basic modernization against the background of an exponentially increasing rate of demographic growth, the destruction of world-wide ecological balances and a renewed struggle for very scarce resources.

Finally, we must recognize that man is not the centre of the universe, that he is by no means the objective (telos) of the world, and that he has no right to extinguish animal and vegetal life in order to accomplish

a very dubious development programme. Exactly in the same way as no political party or movement should have the pretension of imposing its dogmas and models upon other social groups, not a simple living species – even man – should have the right to impose its structures and options upon the whole of nature.

The spread of instrumental rationality does not always correspond to the evolution of a more comprehensive rationality, whose task would be to make critical judgement not only of the means but also of the goals of every political and economic process. Contemporary history is, of course, not wanting in examples of the utmost efficiency and most advanced technology being placed at the disposal of inhuman objectives. In many Third World countries the combination of a politically non-liberal tradition with the elements of technical-industrial civilization has produced a hybrid and eclectic order which, for the sake of successful imitation of the metropolitan models in a short-term perspective, runs the danger of jeopardizing its very material foundations in the long term. This confusion of means and goals and the exclusive identification of successful development with modernization and industrialization, represent the factors which mark the triumph of a merely instrumental rationality which places human beings – as quantifiable entities – at the service of economic development rather than vice-versa.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. two of the very few studies critically concerned with this problem: Yves Laulan, *Le Tiers Monde et la Crise de l'Environnement*. Paris: P.U.F. 1974; Edward J. Woodhouse, *Re-visioning the Future of the Third World: An Ecological Perspective on Development*, in: *World Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1972), p. 1 sqq.
2. It would be apt to speak of real «fascination effects». – Cf. Torcuato S. Di Tella, *Populism and Reform in Latin America*, in: Claudio Véliz (ed.), *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*, London/New York: Oxford University Press, p. 48.
3. On the existence of a «cultural super-ego» cf. Sigmund Freud, *Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psycho-analyse*, in: Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, Frankfurt: Fischer 1967, vol. XV, p. 194; Freud, *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*, in: *ibid.*, vol. XIV, p. 501.
4. Typical for this assumption: Ramon Losada Aldana, *Dialéctica del subdesarrollo*, México: Grijalbo 1969, p. 89.
5. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London: Bogle 1976, *passim*.
6. Cf. Eduardo Galeano, *Las venas abiertas de América Latina*, México/Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI 1972, pp. 293–306 – The former president of Argentina, Juan D. Peron, was one of the first politicians in Latin America who linked the goal of forced industrialization and modernization with a rejection of Liberal-democratic concepts and with a revival of Spanish-Catholic guiding social values. – Cf. Juan D. Peron, *Doctrina revolucionaria*, Buenos Aires. Freeland 1973, p. 295, Peron, *la hora de los pueblos*, Buenos Aires: Pleamar 1973, p. 11 sqq.

7. Samir Amin, *Le Développement Inégal. Essai sur les Formations Sociales du Capitalisme Périphérique*, Paris: Minuit 1973, p. 313–315. Amin goes so far as to see a «disclosure of social maturity» in the demographic explosion.
8. Cf. David E. Apter, *Ideology and Discontent*, New York/London: The Free Press 1964, p. 22 sqq.
9. Cf. Darcy Ribeiro, *El Dilema de América Latina*, México: Siglo XXI, 1973, pp. 55–57; Raul Prebisch, *Transformation y desarrollo. La Grantarea de América Latina*, México: P.C.E. 1970, p. 9 sqq.; Justinian Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania. A Study on Perverse Capitalist Industrial Development*, Nairobi/London: Oxford University Press 1973, pp. 105–180; Kalil Zamiti, *Système Impérialiste Contemporain. Phénomène de dépendance et Rôle de la Bourgeoisie Nationale en Tunisie*, In: Anouar Abdel-Makek (ed.), *Sociologie de l'Impérialisme*, Paris: Anthropos 1971, p. 540.
10. Angel Fucaraccio et al., *Imperialismo y control de la población*, Buenos Aires: Periferia 1973, p. 102, 107, 118; cf. an African Testimony: Maaza Bekele, *Against the False Prophets of Apocalypse*, in: UNESCO Courier, Vol. XXVII (July 1974), p. 44 sqq.
11. Cf. a general, critical review: David Ray, *The Dependency Model of Latin American Underdevelopment. Three Basic Fallacies*, in: Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. XV, No. 1 (February, 1973); Hans-Jürgen Puhle (ed.), *Lateinamerika – Historische Realität und Dependencia-Theorien*, Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe 1977.
12. Orlando Caputo/Robert Pizarro, *Dependencia y Relaciones Internacionales*, San José: EDUCA 1974, p. 50 s; Theotonio dos Santos *Über die Struktur der Abhängigkeit*, in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.), *Imperialismus und Strukturelle Gewalt. Analysen über Abhängige Reproduktion*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1972, p. 255; Samir Amin, *Zur Theorie von Akkumulation und Entwicklung in der gegenwärtigen Weltgesellschaft*, in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.), *Peripherer Kapitalismus. Analysen über Abhängigkeit und Unterentwicklung*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1974, p. 72 sqq.
13. Theotonio dos Santos, *ibid.*, 256; Vania Bambirra, *El Capitalismo Dependiente Latinoamericano*, México: Siglo XXI, 1974, p. 137 sqq.
14. Vania Bambirra, *ibid.*, pp. 137–180; Mohamed-Salah Sfia, *Le Système Mondial de l'Impérialisme*, in: A Abdel-Malek (ed.), *op. cit.* (note 9), pp. 571–580.
15. Arturo Urquidi, *Latinoamérica y el «Crecimiento Explosivo» de su Población*, in: PRAXIS (La Paz), Vol. I, No. 1 (May 1964), p. 18.
16. Jorge Abelardo Ramos, *De Octubre a Septiembre*, Buenos Aires: Pena-Lillo 1974, p. 321.
17. Luis Vitale, *Ist Lateinamerika Feudal oder Kapitalistisch?*, in: A.G. Frank et al., *Kritik des Bürgerlichen Antimperialismus*, Berlin/W: Wagenbach 1969, p. 10; J.A. Silva Michelena, *The Illusion of Democracy in Dependent Nations*, Cambridge/M; M.I.T. Press 1971, p. 259.
18. Osvaldo Sunkel, *El Subdesarrollo Dependiente en América Latina*, in: Carlos Naudon (ed.), *América 70. Servidumbre o Independencia en la presente Década*, Santiago de Chile 1970, pp. 68–71.
19. Salua Nour, *Die «Entwicklungshilfe»*, in: José Linhard/Klaus Voll (eds.), *Weltmarkt und Entwicklungsländer*, Rheinstetten: Schindele 1976, p. 194 sqq.
20. Salim Ibrahim/Verena Metzke-Mangold, *Nichtkapitalistischer Entwicklungsweg*, Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch 1976, pp. 103–112.

21. A Critical Voice out of the Third World: Ivan Illich, *Outwitting the «Developed» Countries*, in: Henry Bernstein (ed.), *Underdevelopment and Development. The Third World Today*, Harmondsworth: Penguin 1978, pp. 357–368.
22. Walter Rodney, op. cit. (note 5), *passim*; Darcy Ribeiro, *Der zivilisatorische Prozess*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1971, p. 174 sqq.; Dieter Senghaas, *Sozialismus. Eine Entwicklungsgeschichtliche und Entwicklungstheoretische Betrachtung*, in: *Leviathan*, Vol. 8 (1980), No. 1.
23. Theotonio dos Santos, op. cit. (note 12), p. 254; Samir Amin, *Zur Theorie von Akkumulation...*, op. cit. (note 12), p. 71–85.
24. Darcy Ribeiro, *El dilema de América Latina*, op. cit. (note 9), pp. 61–72; Caputo/Pizarro, op. cit. (note 12), p. 50; Samir Amin, *Zur Theorie von Akkumulation...*, op. cit. (note 12), p. 71.
25. Cf. Uwe Simson, *Typische Ideologische Reaktionen Arabischer Intellektueller auf das Entwicklungsgefälle*, in: René König (ed.), *Aspekte der Entwicklungssoziologie*, Cologne 1969, pp. 145–147.
26. Carmelo Mesa-Lago (ed.), *Cuba in Revolution*, Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press 1980; Nelson P. Valdés, *Cuba: Socialismo Democrático o Burocratismo Colectivista ?*, in: *APORTES*, No. 23, January 1972, p. 26 sqq.
27. Organisation de l'Unité Africaine/Conférence des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement, Deuxième Session Extraordinaire, Lagos 28/29 Avril 1980, *Plan d'Action de Lagos en vue de la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie de Monrovia pour le Développement Economique de l'Afrique*, ECM/ECO/9 (XIV) Rev.2.

## RESUME

Cet article essaie de présenter ce que MANSILLA appelle une «*Théorie Critique de la Modernisation*». L'auteur débute avec l'assertion suivante : bien que la théorie de la dépendance soit la contribution la plus importante et la plus originale des intellectuels du Tiers-Monde à l'ensemble du débat sur le développement, lorsqu'on l'examine de plus près, cette théorie de la dépendance elle-même est dépendante du courant principal des théories occidentales sur le développement, théories que critique manifestement la théorie de la dépendance.

Il cite les problèmes afférant à la croissance économique et au développement technologique, la réalisation des désirs de biens matériels et la création de conditions d'existence comparables à celles de l'Occident ; de même que la croyance solidement établie par ces théoriciens qui déclarent que toute société, partout dans le monde, devra s'adapter aux mêmes lois de développement que celles prévalant en Occident. Tout ceci pour donner des exemples de cette dépendance.

D'autre part, MANSILLA rejette la conception marxiste des processus de développement.

Il soutient et se plaint du fait que nulle part dans le monde, il existe des intellectuels engagés dans le «*Débat sérieux*» sur les rapports entre l'homme et la nature, ou sur les valeurs qui sous-tendent les théories de modernisation. Les intellectuels du Tiers-Monde ne semblent pas porter un grand intérêt aux problèmes écologiques.

En conséquence, MANSILLA affirme que le progrès matériel suivant les lignes directrices occidentales pourrait produire «*un ordre social véritablement émancipé et harmonieux*». Il indique plus loin que le laps de temps qui nous est alloué est historiquement trop court pour nous permettre de juger si la pluralité des expériences socio-économiques dans le Tiers-Monde peut réussir ou pas.

Finalement l'auteur soutient que l'homme n'est pas le centre de l'Univers, et que par conséquent, il n'a nul droit d'exterminer les animaux et les plantes pour que lui puisse accomplir son «*développement douteux*».

# LA CRISE ET LA THEORIE DU DEVELOPPEMENT: QUELLES FONCTIONS SOCIALES ?

Par

*Bourenane NACER\**

Chaque période historique dans l'évolution des sociétés humaines pourrait probablement se caractériser par la pré-dominance d'une ou de plusieurs conceptions de cette évolution et de ses effets sur les hommes. Elles donnent lieu à cette occasion à la production de notions et de termes dont l'usage est socialement évocateur de la réalité telle qu'elle est intériorisée par ceux-là même qui la vivent (1).

Ces notions ou symboles sociaux sont de plusieurs ordres. Parmi eux, il y a ceux qui s'attachent plutôt à la nature des rapports sociaux et l'état des connaissances que l'on a d'autrui. Les termes de sauvage, de nègre, d'homme de couleur ou de jaune dans les sociétés européennes du dix-huitième, du dix-neuvième et du début du vingtième siècle, celui de blanc en Afrique subsaharienne, ceux de «Guaouri»: (européen) et de colon dans les pays du Maghreb en sont quelques-uns. Ils sont chaque fois indicateurs d'une situation sociale particulière, d'un certain type de rapports des hommes entre eux, à la nature, à leur société ainsi qu'aux autres sociétés. Une seconde catégorie tend à rendre compte bien plus de l'état des rapports sociaux, de l'état de la société tel qu'il est intériorisé et interprété. Les notions de développement et surtout de crise en font partie.

Depuis quelques années, le terme de crise semble acquérir une portée universelle. Son usage tend à faire l'objet d'un consensus général. On ne peut presque plus énumérer les domaines de la vie sociale pour lesquels le qualificatif de crise n'est pas usité. Il y a la crise de jalousie chez l'enfant, celle de l'autorité chez l'adolescent, celle du troisième âge, etc... On parle de la crise de la famille, de la société, de l'économie, de la politique, des valeurs, etc...

Il n'est pas dans notre propos ici d'analyser cette notion et de voir ce que recouvre sa mise en œuvre systématique à des niveaux aussi différenciés que ceux que nous avons indiqués (2). Nous centrerons, pour notre part, notre attention sur ce qu'on qualifie aujourd'hui à l'échelle internationale de crise du développement. Que recouvre-t-elle comme réalité, à quelles finalités répond une utilisation aussi répandue de ce terme, que cache et que montre sa mise en œuvre ? Telles sont les questions auxquelles nous tenterons d'apporter quelques éléments de réponse.

## I. — LA FONCTION SOCIALE DE LA NOTION DE CRISE

### *1-1 La Crise = un Mythe ou une Réalité ?*

S'il y a un point qui semble donc faire l'unanimité des hommes de science, des hommes politiques et des opérateurs économiques, c'est celui de la gravité des problèmes auxquels sont confrontées l'ensemble des

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\* Enseignant de Sociologie — Institut des Sciences Sociales, Alger.

sociétés. L'inflation, le chômage en croissance rapide, les problèmes budgétaires, les surproductions en sont quelques-uns. Ils semblent constituer autant de sources de désarroi dans les pays capitalistes développés. Les faibles performances de l'appareil productif, les problèmes liés à la faible croissance économique, les pénuries et le blocage de la consommation depuis le milieu des années 1970, l'endettement vis-à-vis des pays occidentaux (il a plus que doublé entre 1975 et 1980) et la dépendance qui en découle (le tiers des importations provient des pays occidentaux), rendent, semble-t-il, la situation sociale explosive dans les pays à économie planifiée. Dans les pays sous-développés, l'endettement, le sous-emploi, la malnutrition, les famines, la pauvreté, les guerres, la généralisation des dictatures, l'institution de la violence comme méthode de gouvernement sont considérés comme autant de maux qui menacent la stabilité internationale. Les problèmes de la course aux armements, des rapports jugés tendus et quasi explosifs entre l'«Est» et l'«Ouest» sont tenus pour des indicateurs infaillibles d'une situation de crise à l'échelle du globe tout entier.

A considérer ces divers indicateurs, on serait dans une situation apocalyptique, la disparition du monde pouvant intervenir à n'importe quel moment, tant la «crise» est forte. L'utilisation faite de ces indicateurs mérite cependant qu'on s'y arrête et qu'on les examine. Leur utilisation pose un double problème. Le premier est celui de la validité des chiffres souvent avancés, notamment ceux confectionnés par les institutions internationales et qui concernent les pays «sous-développés». Prenons à titre d'exemple le nombre d'individus qui meurent annuellement de faim dans le monde. Il serait de 50 millions, nous dit-on. Or le nombre total de décès dans le monde a été évalué à 48 millions en 1981; ceci constitue de toute évidence le cas le plus aberrant de la manipulation du chiffre.

Le second a trait à l'interprétation des chiffres déjà établis. Un exemple nous est fourni par les taux de chômage en Europe Occidentale et en Amérique du Nord. Ils sont considérés comme étant très élevés. Certaines analyses vont jusqu'à qualifier la situation d'insupportable. Pourtant ces taux ne sont pas toujours les plus élevés dans l'histoire du capitalisme. De plus, à les comparer à ceux, caractéristiques, des pays sous-développés, ils paraîtraient ridicules. Ils ne reflètent pas dans tous les pays et pour toutes les périodes une même réalité sociale. Le chômeur de 1982 ne vit pas avec les mêmes moyens dans tous les Etats capitalistes (dans les pays scandinaves, en Belgique, aux Etats-Unis et en Espagne par exemple); il ne pourrait être assimilé à celui de l'entre-deux guerres. D'autres exemples pourraient être fournis pour des domaines aussi différents que ceux de l'alimentation, de la formation, de la santé, de l'habitat ou des loisirs. Ceci permet en fait aux opérateurs sociaux de disposer d'un large champ de manœuvre dans les conclusions à tirer. Peut-être que la preuve la plus tangible du caractère «versatile» des interprétations se trouve dans la presse. Celle-ci fournit dans bien des cas une analyse totalement contradictoire, en un laps de temps relativement court, d'une réalité qui a subi peu de modifications structurelles. Ainsi, en fonction de la conjoncture, un même Etat, une même société peuvent se retrouver décrits de façon totalement différente voire opposée.



Dans ce cas, on est en droit de se demander si la crise tient plutôt du mythe ou de la réalité ou si elle n'est pas à la fois l'un et l'autre.

### 1.2 *La Crise et son référent*

Lorsqu'on parle de crise, cela signifie que l'on est en train de désigner une situation se caractérisant par une carence qualitative et quantitative. Elle rend compte d'une rupture intervenue dans l'équilibre initial.

Dans toute théorie de la crise, la notion d'équilibre apparaît comme primordiale : sortir de la crise revient à retrouver une situation se caractérisant par une certaine symbiose entre les éléments composant l'ensemble. Il s'agit dans tous les cas d'aboutir à un état où le poids de chacune des forces pourrait changer, mais où le résultat de leur interaction demeure similaire (à savoir la stabilité). Ce qui est déterminant ici, c'est l'«harmonie sociale». Par exemple, il est admis que la démission d'un gouvernement ouvre dans certains systèmes politiques une «phase» de «crise». Celle-ci sera considérée comme «résolue» dès l'instant où un nouveau gouvernement se met en place. De même, lorsqu'une offre de marchandises ne trouve pas à se placer d'une façon durable, on a tendance à parler de «crise», cela vaut également pour l'emploi, pour l'habitat («crise du logement» et «crise du bâtiment»), etc... Dans tous ces exemples, dès que l'offre tend à égaler la demande, on considère que la crise est résolue.

Dans chacun de ces cas, l'action entreprise pour sortir de la crise s'appuie sur un modèle d'équilibre de référence postulé réel. Ainsi, dans le cadre du développement du capitalisme, l'ensemble des politiques économiques d'inspiration classique ou néo-classique, keynésienne ou post-keynésienne tend à retrouver une certaine forme d'équilibre de référence.

Plusieurs questions pourraient être soulevées à ce niveau : ces modèles de référence reflètent-ils la réalité ou en sont-ils l'abstraction ; de quelle réalité rendent-ils compte et comment le font-ils ; du point de vue de quels ensembles ou groupes sociaux et quand émergent-ils ?

Un retour à l'histoire du capitalisme serait édifiant à ce niveau. Il montrerait en effet que les théories sociales et économiques articulées implicitement ou non autour de la crise tendent à vider la réalité de ses complexités, la réduisant à une mécanique simple, à une liaison entre quelques variables. Considérées au moins comme essentielles en début d'analyse, celles-ci deviennent dans le champ de l'action quasi exclusives. C'est le cas des théories classique et keynésienne qui en constituent jusqu'à présent la pierre angulaire dans le domaine économique (3). La théorie des groupes en est le pendant au plan psycho-social. L'ensemble de ces théories intègre une fraction de la réalité sociale et tend à nier les autres composantes de celle-ci. Ainsi, les théories économiques n'intègrent pas les lois socio-économiques fondamentales qui commandent la reproduction du capital, le caractère de la propriété des moyens de production et de la plus-value par exemple, la nature différenciée et sélective (pour ne pas dire ségrégationniste) du marché etc...

Les réalités dont rendent compte ces théories ne sont pas quelconques; elles correspondent aux besoins exprimés formellement ou non par les groupes sociaux dominants. Elles visent à solutionner les problèmes auxquels sont confrontés ces derniers à un moment précis de leur existence. Dans le domaine de l'économie, la théorie de Keynes a été élaborée en réponse aux problèmes nouveaux engendrés par le développement du capitalisme, à savoir, le chômage chronique massif, l'aggravation du problème des marchés etc... C'est notamment parce que la loi des débouchés de J.B. SAY s'avèrait inopérante que le problème de la «demande effective» et de ses composantes a été envisagé. Après Keynes, les néo-classiques (tels que J. MEADE et R. SOLOW) développent à la fin des années 50 des points de vue différents et s'attachent à régler des problèmes nouveaux-nés cette fois-ci non plus du ralentissement du rythme de la croissance mais de son accélération (stimulée par les dépenses publiques, notamment militaires). Dans le domaine de la sociologie, la tradition anglo-saxonne pourrait être très largement analysée dans la même perspective.

Dans tous les cas — on peut le voir très nettement — les problèmes posés tendent à prouver que s'il y a «crise de la société» ou du système économique, s'il y a rupture d'équilibre, c'est en premier lieu et pour l'essentiel du point de vue des groupes dominants ; et les modèles théoriques de référence à la crise sont des modèles qui reflètent et qui sont porteurs des problèmes des groupes sociaux dominants et non de toute la société. Dans ce cadre, lorsque la reproduction sociale à l'identique se trouve menacée, l'usage généralisé de la notion de crise nous semble socialement indispensable pour assurer le renforcement et l'intériorisation des rapports de domination. Si en effet les groupes dominés au sein du système capitaliste admettent et intériorisent le fait que la dégradation des conditions de leur reproduction est au premier chef liée à la déliquescence et à la régression du système et non à la nature des contradictions internes qui l'animent (et dont ils sont l'un des éléments), ils ne peuvent que se montrer solidaires des groupes dominants. Ils peuvent accepter dans cette perspective de «payer la facture la plus lourde» de la «crise», renforçant ainsi l'exploitation dont ils sont l'objet, allant par exemple jusqu'à admettre une compression des salaires réels, des dépenses publiques à caractère social ou une augmentation des «efforts de guerre».

Cela constitue, nous semble-t-il, l'une des principales finalités assignées au plan social à la notion de crise. Son usage (du reste intériorisé, même par les critiques marxistes) ne nous semble pas toujours se justifier. Si on admet en effet que la notion de crise suppose celle de l'équilibre, elle ne peut s'appliquer de façon aussi systématique et aussi mécanique au système capitaliste dans lequel les mouvements d'expansion et de récession sont une donnée structurelle. Cette notion aurait un sens si la période actuelle n'était pas suivie d'une reprise, si on se trouvait historiquement à un moment décisif du processus social qui va produire une modification essentielle du système, ou si on se trouvait dans une phase aigüe et finale au-delà de laquelle le système ne serait plus. Mais est-ce le cas ?

Ces remarques ne semblent pas valoir seulement pour le système capitaliste en tant que tout, mais également pour certaines de ses formes historiques. Il est à se demander lorsqu'on parle depuis deux ou trois décennies de crise du système colonial, si les groupes d'intérêts tirant avantage de l'existence de ce système ne cherchent pas à faire interioriser par ceux-là même qui le subissent (sous des formes multiples et pas toujours visibles) l'idée que le « colonialisme en crise » n'est plus ; qu'ils sont libres, totalement libres et qu'ils sont les maîtres de leurs destinées. De même lorsqu'on invoque la dette extérieure ou la faible efficacité des investissements dans les pays sous-développés en terme de crise, ne cherche-t-on pas à accréditer l'idée selon laquelle les peuples et les Etats de ces pays sont directement responsables de la « crise » du sous-développement ?

## II. — CRISE, THEORIE ET MODELES DU DEVELOPPEMENT

L'usage de la notion de crise ne répond pas seulement à une « demande » émanant des groupes sociaux et économiques dominant et conditionnant en partie la reproduction du système qui leur permet d'être hégémoniques. Il semble remplir une seconde fonction. Celle-ci se situe au niveau des théoriciens du développement et des institutions nationales et internationales, universitaires ou non, privées ou publiques, spécialisées dans le domaine (4). La notion de crise ressemble dans ce cadre à un mot magique, une potion dont l'usage permet après l'échec de chaque expérience et la faillite de tout modèle d'absoudre le passé et de faire admettre l'inanité des positions jusque-là défendues ; de justifier la production de nouveaux schémas et de nouvelles stratégies de développement. Le rapport entre l'évolution de la théorie du développement et sa mise en œuvre semble conforter une telle hypothèse.

### 2.1 *Les «Echecs» du Développement et l'Evolution de la Théorie du Développement*

Les deux dernières décennies ont été placées par la plus haute instance internationale, les Nations-Unies, sous le signe du développement de l'humanité. Deux stratégies internationales de développement ont été successivement élaborées et mises en œuvre.

La première, celle des années 60, repose sur quelques postulats implicites qu'il ne sera pas inutile de rappeler, tant leurs conséquences ont été graves.

Le premier postulat est celui du primat et du caractère exclusif de l'économie. Durant cette période, c'est la croissance économique (réduite à l'élévation de la production) qui est recherchée. L'élément financier constitue dans ce cadre le principal critère d'appréciation. Le Social, le Culturel, le Politique et l'Historique sont tenus pour négligeables voire inutiles. C'est l'âge des théories qui voient dans le sous-développement une situation se caractérisant et ayant pour causes une pléthore de main-d'œuvre et l'inexistence de capitaux. L'argent se présente alors comme le remède au sous-développement.

Le second postulat est celui qui assigne à la liaison entre l'économique et le non-économique un caractère mécanique. L'évolution du premier ne pouvant avoir que des effets positifs sur le second ; l'«Homme» étant inévitablement le bénéficiaire.

Le troisième consiste à considérer la situation et l'organisation des pays à économie de marché comme l'aboutissement normal et logique de l'évolution de l'humanité, tout au moins des pays sous-développés. Dans cette perspective même la science économique – tout au moins l'économie de développement – s'est trouvée réduite à une simple technique d'imitation fondée sur la manipulation de certains agrégats (consommation, investissement, revenu, épargne etc...).

Le quatrième définit le développement comme un mouvement uniforme et «paisible» qui n'entraîne ni «tensions», ni problèmes. La théorie affirmait alors sous ses multiples variantes quatre principes :

1) l'investissement de capitaux étrangers et l'aide étrangère d'une façon générale constituent la condition nécessaire et suffisante pour toute élévation du taux d'accumulation, synonyme de développement.

2) la croissance est une fonction principale et quasi exclusive de la formation du capital. Autrement dit, l'augmentation du taux de croissance est une fonction de l'augmentation du ratio capital / travail. Il fallait donc comprimer et réduire la consommation au profit de l'épargne et de l'investissement. Des politiques d'austérité s'imposaient.

3) la moteur de la croissance est l'industrie.

4) le développement est une affaire de spécialistes, de technocrates. La masse populaire ne peut être associée à l'élaboration de la stratégie. Elle peut à la rigueur prétendre en tirer parti à plus ou moins long terme.

A partir des années 70, cette problématique subit des modifications sous de multiples effets, notamment ceux de l'évolution politique dangereuse de nombreux pays sous-développés (avec l'institution dans plusieurs d'entre eux de la violence comme forme de gouvernement) et les révolutions qui s'ensuivent (l'Iran, le Nicaragua en sont les plus typiques parmi les plus récents) et l'aggravation continue des inégalités entre les pays et au sein d'un même pays, malgré des taux de croissance sans précédent. La stratégie internationale du développement de la seconde décennie abandonne en partie le thème de la croissance au profit de ceux de la pauvreté, de l'emploi, de la répartition des revenus et de la «participation» des «masses» aux processus décisionnels. Le développement n'est plus conçu à partir de la croissance des investissements en soi, mais à partir de la «satisfaction des besoins fondamentaux de l'Homme». On aboutit ainsi à une inversion partielle de la problématique du développement, l'amélioration du niveau de l'emploi et la résorption des inégalités les plus saillantes en matière de répartition de revenu devenant les conditions et non le résultat de la croissance économique.

Au plan théorique, l'approche ainsi renouvelée abandonne la thèse sur la nécessité et les bienfaits de l'aide étrangère. Elle tend à privilégier l'«auto-suffisance» nationale pour le financement du développement. L'accent est mis en même temps sur l'efficacité des investissements matériels au détriment de leur volume. C'est le pendant de la thèse qui lie l'aggravation des problèmes du sous-développement à la «mauvaise» allocation

des ressources et au «mauvais» choix technologique. Parallèlement, la mobilisation des ressources humaines dans le développement est considérée comme aussi fondamentale sinon plus essentielle que la mobilisation des capitaux. Du coup, la primauté est accordée au développement rural, principalement agricole avec une conception décentralisée en matière d'élaboration et d'exécution des programmes d'action. C'est notamment le mythe de la révolution verte.

Ces modifications intervenues dans la stratégie du développement entre la première et la seconde décennie ne résultent pas seulement des échecs enregistrés à la fin des années 60. Il est également lié à une évolution parallèle de la théorie du développement et au déclin de l'économie du développement. Celui-ci n'est, du reste, dû uniquement ni à «l'hétérogénéité croissante des pays en développement» ni à son «incapacité à faire face à l'évolution néfaste de la situation politique dans de nombreux pays en développement» comme le pense HIRSCHMANN (5). Il est également lié à l'existence d'un modèle alternatif potentiel, au modèle libéral proposé par cette théorie. Il s'agit de celui qui est en vigueur dans les pays à économie planifiée.

## *2.2 Éléments critiques des fondements de la Théorie et des modèles de Développement*

Une analyse critique de la théorie et des modèles de développement qui y sont liés pourrait être située à plusieurs niveaux. Trois au moins méritent d'être succinctement présentés, car ils témoignent du caractère superficiel et commun des analyses.

Le premier est celui de la terminologie utilisée. Elle exprime une incapacité à appréhender les complexités constitutives de la réalité. Ainsi celle-ci se trouve réduite à une série de «facteurs» simplés à «recenser» pour l'action et à enfermer le plus souvent dans des formules de type paramétrique. Cette réalité serait du reste «désarticulée» comme s'il s'agissait (d'un clown ou d'un pantin dont les membres sont pliés en tous sens) d'un être contorsionné (6). Elle est à «harmoniser» et à «intégrer» en levant les «obstacles», les «contraintes», les «blocages» au développement. Autant de termes qui font ressembler l'action à une course de haies ou aux combats épiques rapportés par les anthologies des contes du moyen âge. En fait ces notions semblent traduire la «résistance» des faits. Il y a en effet un «blocage», mais c'est celui du développement méthodique de la pensée s'inscrivant dans une problématique abusant de la réalité.

Le second niveau concerne les présupposés ou les hypothèses à partir desquels se construisent ces modèles. Ils sont pour une bonne part contestables ou tout au moins discutables. C'est le cas notamment des hypothèses sur la relation entre épargne et profit, entre épargne et investissement, sur la «substituabilité» entre les facteurs de production ainsi que sur la neutralité des rapports internationaux, du marché mondial, des institutions et des sociétés transnationales.

Le troisième niveau concerne les modèles. Outre leur caractère réducteur de la réalité, ils sont mécanicistes. Ainsi les rapports entre les grands économes auraient partout la même signification, la diversité des structures socio-économiques n'aurait sur elles aucune incidence. Dans ce cadre, le développement se trouve réduit à une «mécanique d'inter-relations technico-économiques entre diverses quantités globales» (7). Aussi, il n'est pas étonnant que des modèles aussi célèbres que celui d'HARROD – DOMAR privilégient l'investissement matériel et négligent l'élément social.

En fait le mécanisme de la démarche ne se trouve pas exprimé à ce niveau seulement, il apparaît lors du passage de l'analyse statique à l'analyse dynamique. Dans ce cadre, la dimension historique du temps n'est pas intégrée. Ceci permet l'élaboration d'un modèle de croissance unique pour des sociétés fonctionnant et se reproduisant dans des conditions historiques différentes. Il transparait également dans leur caractère irréaliste. Celui-ci est exprimé notamment par le fait qu'on suppose que les comportements sociaux obéissent à la «logique» et que chaque catégorie d'agents cherche à maximiser ses entrées. L'entrepreneur ne pouvant être mû que par la volonté de maximaliser (et non d'optimiser par exemple) son profit.

### *2.3 Les Tendances récentes*

Malgré leur diversité et leur plus ou moins grande complexité, ces modèles et les théories auxquelles ils renvoient, semblent de plus en plus en crise. Leur incapacité à rendre compte des problèmes à partir desquels ils ont été élaborés et à les prendre en charge amène un nombre de plus en plus grand de «théoriciens», d'experts internationaux et de politiques au renouvellement de l'approche par l'adjonction d'une nouvelle dimension à celles déjà introduites (institutionnelle et sociale) durant la dernière décennie, la dimension culturelle.

Depuis quelques années déjà, la culture semble faire l'objet d'une plus grande attention au plan international, à tel point que le centre de développement de l'OCDE (qui a pour objectif de promouvoir des politiques visant en premier lieu «à réaliser la plus forte expansion possible de l'économie et de l'emploi et une progression du niveau de vie dans les pays membres...») (8) a décidé en 1980 de faire de la culture un «point focal d'un regard sur les cinq prochaines années de son activité» (9) en y associant des chercheurs et des spécialistes originaires des pays sous-développés.

De ce fait si on continue d'insister sur le fait que le développement doit commencer par les besoins de base, on ajoute à présent l'idée selon laquelle ces derniers sont inséparables de la culture qui les sous-tend.

Ce renouvellement, du reste, bien plus formel que réel de l'approche (car venant se surajouter à celle déjà existante) s'accompagne d'un confusionnisme ayant un relent fortement humaniste et moralisateur. Selon les «nouveaux théoriciens», il n'y aurait aujourd'hui ni «sur-développé», ni «sous-développé»; il n'existerait que des «mal-développés», des «mal-développés par excès ou par défaut», des pathologies de développement (10).

Du coup le développement cesse d'être social pour devenir le «développement de l'être humain», le «développement intégral» (4).

Cette problématique est intéressante à plus d'un titre :

— d'une part, elle est en conformité avec les réactions parfois violentes qu'on a observées dans de nombreux pays contre les tendances à l'homogénéisation et à la domination Culturelles. Elle intègre les dénonciations énergiques des «agressions culturelles» notamment en provenance de l'Occident. Ceci la rend plus acceptable dans les pays sous-développés.

— d'autre part, elle tend à faire des problèmes dans les sociétés du centre et de la périphérie un tout homogène, de même nature. Aussi, s'il y a crise, ne peut-elle qu'être identique, les différences étant secondaires.

— elle justifie par ailleurs l'introduction des technologies «douces» et rend acceptables des thèses comme celles développées par A. EMMANUEL, sur les rapports avec les multinationales.

— l'«Etre humain» et non l'«Etre social» étant au cœur de la problématique, elle rend valide toute intervention directe d'institutions étrangères auprès de populations jugées en danger.

— elle ôte enfin aux rapports économiques internationaux, notamment aux liens entre le centre et la périphérie tout caractère conflictuel, les fondant sur la «solidarité internationale», sur la «fraternité de tous les hommes».

Cet extrait de la communication de R. HABACHI (12) au séminaire sur les «points critiques du développement» nous paraît de ce point de vue fort suggestif :

*«l'interdépendance des hommes et des nations va croissant ; les preuves en sont administrées. La productivité des privilégiés ne peut se poursuivre sans tenir compte des faiblesses et des besoins des moins privilégiés, jusqu'à prendre ceux-ci provisoirement en charge si nécessaire. Il ne peut s'agir d'un échange comportant des avantages, mais d'un don désintéressé dont cependant la survie est l'enjeu.»*

*«Cette interdépendance de la civilisation implique un pluralisme des cultures. L'entraide est incompatible avec la méconnaissance de certaines cultures et avec la chosification de l'homme que cette méconnaissance suppose.»*

*On tourne le dos au développement en entourant un homme d'un manchon de vide pour lui demander de sauter dans l'univers d'autrui.»*

Cette problématique du «développement intégral de l'être humain» est également intéressante parce qu'elle amène à envisager dans leurs interrelations divers problèmes jusqu'à présent traités séparément. Ainsi, l'action en matière de nutrition s'articulera autour de la production agricole, de la commercialisation, de la santé, de l'éducation, des habitudes sociales, etc... Elle donnera lieu chaque fois à l'élaboration d'une «stratégie alimentaire» (13). Il reste à savoir où et qui est susceptible de la produire, avec quels moyens et qui pourra assurer sa mise en œuvre et au profit de quelles catégories ?

Parallèlement, on observe une évolution de la terminologie utilisée pour qualifier les pays capitalistes de la périphérie. Le plus intéressant peut-être, réside dans le mal que se donnent certaines institutions internationales pour «découper» ces pays en «tranches» plus ou moins «pauvres», plus ou moins «avancés». Une telle pratique signifie que l'on cherche bien plus à abstraire des réalités devenues «gênantes» pour les gouvernements des sociétés du centre et les classes dirigeantes des sociétés de la périphérie, qu'à rendre compte de leurs spécificités. Après les sociétés «sauvages» du 18ème siècle, les «races inférieures» (J. FERRY), les «arriérés», les «sous-développés» du lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale, on en est aux sociétés «moins développés», «moins avancées», celles de la «pauvreté absolue» (14). Par ce biais le sous-développement apparaît comme une «aberration», une «erreur du progrès de l'humanité» et l'impérialisme, une simple bévue de l'histoire.

Une question mérite d'être posée à ce niveau. Elle consiste à s'interroger sur la fonction sociale assignée à la théorie du développement et à la problématique de la crise qui assure sa reproduction. Pourquoi et pour quoi une théorie du développement articulée autour de la crise ?

### III. — LA FONCTION SOCIALE DE LA THEORIE DU DEVELOPPEMENT

L'actuelle théorie du développement reproduit pour une large part des conceptions surannées souvent héritées du siècle précédent. Un certain scientisme et une confiance aveugle dans le «progrès» posé comme infini et linéaire s'y retrouvent. Elle tend de ce fait à stériliser toute recherche — principalement dans les pays sous-développés — non inféodée à la logique du capital ou à la logique mercantile et susceptible d'éclairer sur la nature réelle du processus du sous-développement, qui chercherait à faire ressortir les caractéristiques des groupes qui «sous-développent» et les procédés qu'ils mettent au œuvre. Le résultat est comme le définit J. KI-ZERBO «l'Homo-cocacoleus», le «mimétisme dépendant» de l'Occident.

La théorie du développement apparaît de ce point de vue comme le prolongement historique de l'éthnocentrisme occidental. Le développement vise en effet à doter l'autre de ce qui lui manque pour ressembler au Moi (Européen) Nord Américain ou Japonais. Aussi les modèles de développement s'élaborent-ils toujours en référence explicite ou implicite à un système ou ensemble de besoins hiérarchisés et jugés universellement partagés et ressentis. C'était le besoin en capital, en technologie, etc... Il a évolué depuis. Il intègre à présent toute une série de «besoins» dits fondamentaux, essentiels et vitaux. L'ensemble est évidemment défini en dehors des premiers concernés (au plan de la consommation). Il sert de cadre à la catégorisation des pays : c'est le niveau de «satisfaction» de ces «besoins» qui permet de séparer les «développés», des «moins développés», ..., de ceux qui sont dans la «pauvreté absolue».

Une telle conception n'est évidemment pas neutre. Elle a une fonction économique et sociale fondamentale dans les pays capitalistes du Centre. Le mouvement (15) de développement ainsi conçu devrait permettre



un redéploiement économique, social, culturel et politique des sociétés du Centre, par l'ouverture de nouveaux horizons, de nouveaux marchés (économiques, sociaux...). L'existence de ces marchés constitue en effet une condition essentielle à leur survie (16).

En attendant la réalisation totale de ces objectifs, la théorie du développement doit permettre de «gagner du temps». Comme l'affirme ROSTOW à propos de la Corée du Sud, «acheter du temps est une des choses les plus coûteuses et ingrates que nous fassions avec notre argent» (17). Mais cela est nécessaire tant qu'il s'agit de penser et de mettre en place un nouveau type de rapport colonial pour remplacer l'ancien qui est aujourd'hui périmé.

## NOTES

1. Le style retenu dans ce texte peut paraître quelquefois violent et à la limite caricatural. Nous l'avons volontairement adopté afin de susciter le maximum de débats.
2. Un tel travail serait du reste fort instructif dans le cadre d'une approche critique des problématiques de la crise.
3. La première s'articule autour de deux concepts. Le concept de facteurs de production et le concept d'équilibre stable, (grâce à la mobilité des prix, il exclut les écarts de longue ou de courte durée par rapport à l'état d'équilibre) qui reposent sur l'hypothèse d'une auto-régulation possible du système économique. La seconde théorie qui se fonde sur une hypothèse inverse (d'où le rôle différent assigné à l'Etat) s'articule autour des problèmes de la «demande effective», des facteurs qui en déterminent le volume et la croissance. C'est une théorie de la rareté (quasi-rentes). De ce point de vue, les Keynésiens (tels que Harrod ou Wells), les néo-keynésiens (comme Mrs. Robinson ou Kregel), les néo-classiques proches des Keynésiens (Solow, Tobin) ou les monétaristes (Friedman, Patinkin...) récents n'apportent pas de changement de fond aux démarches classiques.
4. Peut-on les ranger automatiquement dans la catégorie des groupes dominants?
5. Point de vue avancé par A. Hirschmann et C. Furtado au séminaire «Points critiques du développement dans les années 80», organisé par l'OCDE à Paris du 1er au 3 Décembre 1980.
6. La définition donnée par le Robert est de ce point de vue fort intéressante.
7. G. Myrdal, cité par A. Bellal dans «Développement et facteurs non économiques» (édité en 1981 au Maroc).
8. Cf. les textes régissant l'OCDE.
9. Extrait du discours d'ouverture du Président du Centre de l'OCDE lors du séminaire sur les «Points Critiques du Développement dans les années 1980».
10. Cf. R. Habachi dans «Points Critiques du Développement».
11. Cf. discours de Mc Namara aux gouverneurs de la Banque Mondiale le 30.9. 1980. Cf. également les écrits les plus récents d'universitaires comme F. Panoux.
12. Ancien Directeur de la division philosophie à l'UNESCO.
13. Cf. Communication de P. Vidal Nacquet au séminaire international organisé par le BNEDER en 1981 autour du thème «Planification et Modélisation dans l'Agriculture», à Alger.

14. Terme si cher à Mc NAMARA.
15. Il est plus difficile pour un Africain de disposer d'un pécule pour étudier méthodiquement une localité, une région ou une population qu'à un bureau d'études de réunir des moyens financiers énormes en vue de produire des rapports volumineux et inutilisables, qui masquent la réalité plus qu'ils ne la dévoilent.
16. Rôle que cherche à faire tenir actuellement la France à l'Algérie et à d'autres pays du tiers-monde (notamment pour les P.M.E.).
17. US Nemo report 7/5/1982.

## RESUME

*In the years, the term «crisis» seems to have acquired a universal dimension. One can hardly enumerate the social domains in which the term is not frequently used. In this paper, we propose to examine what is today referred to, at the international level, as the «crisis of development».*

*One point on which there seems to be unanimous agreement among social scientists, politicians and economic agents is the fact of the unhealthy state of the world economic system. The malaise affects developed capitalist countries, planned economies as well as underdeveloped economies with the problem of unemployment, underemployment, weak performance of the productive sectors and low rates of growth. In the underdeveloped countries, indebtedness, poverty, famines, the generalization of dictatorships and the institution of violence as a method of government, are considered by all as a menace to international stability. Taking these indicators at their face value, it is difficult to resist the temptation of characterizing the situation as apocalyptic.*

*A closer examination of these indicators, however, reveals two problems: a) the validity of the figures, usually furnished by international organizations, concerning the socio-economic situation especially in the underdeveloped countries, eg. the number of inhabitants who annually die of hunger, and b) the interpretation of the figures, once they are established as being more or less valid. For example, the rates of unemployment in Western Europe and North America currently are often considered abnormally high. Some analysts even go as far as characterizing the situation as being insupportable. Yet these rates are not anywhere near the highest ever recorded in the history of capitalism. Furthermore, compared to the situation in the underdeveloped countries, unemployment figures in the West appear ridiculously low.*

*To use social indicators indiscriminately to characterize all parts of the international economic system as being in crisis leads us to legitimately question whether the crisis is a myth or a reality and, if a reality, what are its true dimensions. In any case, it is difficult for us to accept the notion*

of crisis being applied systematically and mechanically to the world capitalist system where expansionary and recessionary movements are structural. The notion could be applied to the current situation only under the assumption that we are witnessing the final phase of capitalism, which is clearly hard to accept.

To overcome a crisis means to return to a situation characterized by harmonious relations between the various elements that constitute a totality; in short, to return to a situation of equilibrium deemed desirable. Inevitably, therefore, the indicators used to demonstrate «a crisis of society», of the economic system, as well as the vision of the desirable equilibrium situation, are first and foremost from the point of view of the dominant social groups and not those of the whole society. The generalized use of the notion of crisis, presumably affecting all the components of a system in a similar manner, therefore, serves to divert attention from the internal contradictions within the system. Its social role is to ensure the reinforcement and the internationalization of relations of domination.

The notion of crisis also serves very well the theoreticians of development, national and international institutions and universities, specialized in the domain of development studies. In this context, «crisis» becomes a magic word, a potion whose usage permits them to gloss over the failure of development strategies based on absurd models, and to justify the production of «new» schemas and development strategies.

The last two decades have witnessed at the highest instance of the international community – the United Nations – the elaboration and pursuit of two international strategies of development. The first strategy – that of the sixties – was based on an implicit postulate that development has an exclusively economic character, and that primacy belongs to economic growth, reduced to increases in production. Development was viewed as a uniform and non-conflictual process and the following principles were accepted unchallenged: Foreign investment and international aid constitute a necessary condition for increasing the rate of accumulation, growth is an exclusive function of capital formation, industry is the motor of growth, and development planning is better left to specialists and technocrats.

The second development decade abandons growth in favour of elimination of poverty, employment, income distribution and the participation of the «masses» in the decision – making process. Development is no longer conceived as growth and capital formation but as the satisfaction of basic human needs. But the modifications in the strategy of development which we witness between the sixties and the seventies were not solely due to the failures of the first development decade. These modifications coincide with the parallel evolution of the theory of development, as opposed to the economies of development, as well as the coming into being of a potential alternative model to the liberal model; namely, the model of a planned economy.

A critical analysis of the theory and models of development of the past two development decades, can be situated at many levels. Three, at least, merit to be presented because they demonstrate the superficial character underlying the analysis. The first level relates to the terminology utilized. It demonstrates the incapacity of the theory to cope with complex social reality. The reality is reduced to a series of simple factors which constitute «obstacles» or necessary conditions for development.

The second level concerns the hypotheses on which the models are based. These are for the most part contestable or debatable. This is especially the case with the assumed relationships between savings and profit, savings and investment, the substitutability between factors of production as well as the neutrality of international relations, the world market, of institutions and transnational corporations. The third level concerns the models themselves. Aside from their abstraction from reality, they are mechanistic. Thus, relations between economic aggregates have the same significance in all societies, regardless of the diversities in economic and social structures.

More and more, it becomes obvious that it is these theories that are facing a crisis, and it explains the proliferation of new theories (often accompanied by a great deal of confusion); the most notable of which is the approach which seeks to add a new dimension – the cultural dimension – to discussions on development issues. Henceforth, development is not viewed as social and economic but evolves from «human development» to «integral development». Countries are no longer underdeveloped or overdeveloped but simply mal-developed due to insufficiency or excess of the development potion.

This new approach is interesting from many angles: First, it attempts to respond to reactions (often violent) against the tendency towards homogenization and cultural domination. Secondly, it puts the problems of the centre and the periphery of the world capitalist system on the same footing. If there is a crisis, it is a crisis of mal-development which affects both the centre and the periphery. Thus international relations, and in particular, the relations between the centre and the periphery cease to be conflictual. Rather, it is «international solidarity» that is called for in order to overcome the «crisis of the international system. Finally, the «human being» and not the «social being» being at the heart of this approach, all direct intervention (by international institutions), in the affairs of populations deemed to be in danger can be justified.

It is this approach that has given rise to global strategies in the areas of food, health, education, culture etc. Thus for example, in the area of food, we have a world «food plan». We are only left with the question as to who is to handle the production, with what means, and to whose benefit.

# ATTITUDES OF TANZANIAN HUSBANDS TOWARDS THE EMPLOYMENT OF THEIR WIVES

By

*Beat J. CHIJUMBA\**

## INTRODUCTION

This article provides a summary (1) and implications of a study of the personal attitudes of over 2,000 husbands and/or husbands-to-be towards the employment of their wives and/or wives-to-be in Tanzania. It stems from a long term research project conducted between 1975–1979 aimed at the description and understanding of the personal attitudes of husbands and their impact on female employment opportunities.

The choice for the study of husbands' attitudes as a factor in the employment opportunities of women, was made because of our belief that, in the face of government policy and/or legislation (2) against barring women to take up wage employment, there can be no general male antipathy towards it that could openly be shown; or even if it were, have an adverse influence on their actual engagement in paid jobs.

On the other hand, it was believed that, even if a general male support existed for female employment, it would still need the 'ratification' of it by each individual man when it comes to his own wife's employment, if such a support is to have an effective positive influence. This is because traditionally, the status of a woman in Tanzania vis-a-vis her husband is that of a minor person, (3) and as such, she may neither be able without the consent of her husband to engage in an independent profession or occupation, nor refuse if told by him to do so (4).

Thus, indeed, the only source area of such opposition and/or support if it is to have an effective adverse or positive influence respectively, on the actual engagement of women in paid jobs, has to be that which involves a private life and relationship, that is, in marriage, in which a man has some 'sovereignty' over his wife and discretion on the issue of her economic activities.

It was therefore thought that the only male attitude that will or can have an appreciable positive or negative influence on female employment opportunities is that of husbands rather than that of the male population in general. As a result, it was decided that this study rather than discuss the general male attitude towards female employment, would be far better to confine itself to that which matters more, i.e. the attitude of husbands and/or husbands-to-be.

Indeed, this reasoning led to the hypothesis proposed here and which underlie this study that: «Since one of the social activities which both parents and girls in Tanzania value most is Marriage and the consequent activities of reproduction (5); and since the majority of Tanzanian women are married, or intend to get married (6); the poor representation

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\* *Senior Lecturer, Institute of Development Management Mzumbe, Morogoro, Tanzania.*

of women in the labour force (7) in general, and certain occupation in particular, is mainly due to the unfavourable attitude of husbands and/or husbands-to-be towards their wives' employment outside their homes and/or those types of occupations. The argument being advanced here is that the attitude of husbands and/or husbands-to-be tends to dampen the wives' and/or wives'-to-be enthusiasm to take up wage employment and/or join certain occupations when and if these are not viewed favourably by their husbands and/or husbands-to-be, lest they break their marriages or lose their chances of contracting marriages respectively.

## THE SAMPLE POPULATION

Our starting point is the individual employed husband and/or husband-to-be. Our interest is his personal values and opinions and what they tell us about his attitude towards the employment of his wife and/or the type of occupation that he can allow her to take.

The sample selection procedure was designed to obtain a diverse group of husbands and/or husbands-to-be, in terms of socio-economic and cultural variables (age, income, ethnicity and geographical location). The sample came from more than fifty districts of mainland Tanzania. These were grouped into three income categories. The number of husbands and/or husbands-to-be in each income category were as follows:

Low income (i.e. shillings/8)	380-510	800
Middle income (i.e. shillings/8)	511-1000	800
High income (i.e. shillings/8)	over 1000	800
Total		2,400

In summary we are therefore dealing with over 2000 husbands and/or husbands-to-be from a variety of districts and ethnic groups. The men come from different socio-economic and cultural groups and represent the major groups of men in the country. They are an experienced group; the average number of years spent in wage employment is about ten, while the average age in our total sample is about thirty years. For those married, the average number of years spent in marriage is about fourteen.

It should, however, be noted that not all the variables and/or factors mentioned will be used in the analysis presented in this article. This is due as earlier stated to space limitations. They will, however, be fully used in the comprehensive study report now in preparation.

## METHODS OF STUDY

The main method used in data collection was a questionnaire comprising both closed and open questions which the respondents had to answer in our presence. (Some of these questions and their responses have been tabulated here in tables one and two). The questionnaire was presented to the respondents in Swahili, a language widely spoken and understood by every one in Tanzania.

In addition to the questionnaire, we also conducted some informal interviews and/or conversations, again in Swahili with some of the respondents. This method proved very fruitful for it helped in eliciting some informations, attitude and/or opinions which could not have been obtained from the responses to the questionnaire. These were in fact used as a means of cross checking the validity of these responses.

Finally, a bit of observation was also made when we paid visits to twenty-nine dual worker families and thirty-two of those families in which only the men worked. This was an attempt to learn something on how the partners in these two types of families interact and relate to each other in the home. Although we were aware that whatever findings that we would make from these observations could not easily be used in the analysis of this study due to difficulties of quantifying such findings, we believed that they would, nevertheless, provide us with some insight in our attempt to understand the attitudes and opinions of husbands on the question of their wives' employment.

## SUMMARY OF STUDY RESULTS

Table one shows that although the feeling that a wife should seek and get the permission of her husband before she takes up wage employment is still very strong among Tanzanian husbands and husbands-to-be; the traditional male objection to their employment is becoming increasingly less and less strong compared to the pre-independence era. This may be due to the socio-cultural changes in the society that came with increased western education among both men and women (10) and the emergence of socialist ideology in the country which emphasized the equality of all human beings irrespective of sex, race, colour or religion (11). This ideology also extolled the value and need for every able bodied person to work. Thus mere 'housewifing' of the traditional type was not only seen as unsocialistic but also as outmoded and old fashioned by both men and women themselves (12).

This is exhibited by the fact that more than half of the husbands and/or husbands-to-be, do not or would not openly oppose the employment of their wives provided that:

(i) they are not taking up jobs that would require them to travel many times away from home/their station, and/or stay late at the place of work, or take some of their work home;

(ii) their positions are lower than their husbands' in the occupational hierarchy;

(iii) their jobs yield a smaller portion of the family exchequer and do not claim control over it (13). Thus logically very few (less than one third) of them have, or would be prepared to take for wives women who are academically/professionally better qualified or earn more, or are more highly placed, than themselves.

Indeed, it is possible that because men look for all these conditions before they decide to marry a working girl; or allow their wives to look for a job, only two fifths (43.4%) of them are actually having working

wives. This is despite the desire of many of them both married (56.7%) and those who aspire to marry (62.8%) to have their wives or future wives working respectively. Indeed, it is most likely therefore that girls and parents who (as stated earlier) value marriage and the consequent activities of reproduction much more than any other socio-economic activity, will shun those occupations and/or qualifications which will make the former less acceptable in the marriage market. Such occupations and/or qualifications will be unpopular among girls and their parents because they are unpopular to men as female occupation and/or qualifications. The result of such attitude and values system of both men and women, will obviously be a limitation in the employment opportunities of the latter.

Thus Tanzanian women if they want to expand and/or improve their employment and advancement opportunities have yet to change such attitude and social value system with regards to matrimony and child-bearing and heed Guinean President Sekou TOURE's advice that:

*«... the woman's first husband must be her work, since work never fails to give her both responsibility and economic security» (14).*

Unless this is done, it is obvious that female employment opportunities will be dictated by male tastes and values; and unless these change from the present stance which is largely conservative to a more liberal and/or progressive one, female employment opportunities will remain limited both in structure and scope.

It is, however, interesting to note that, apart from the restrictive conditions men demand for the employment of their wives, some of their attitudes are facilitative to female employment. For instance, nearly half of them do or would regard their wives as 'workers first and wives second' (15) (48.4%), and would not oppose 'their bringing some of their work home' (49.3%). These attitudes will inevitably lead to a relaxation of some of the restrictive conditions, thereby opening further the opportunities of employment hitherto closed to them.

Perhaps the most important of all these facilitative male attitudes, and the finding of which is contrary to our expectation, is their increasing willingness to help their wives in the house chores e.g. cooking, cleaning, laundry, child care etc... (16). Indeed, such increased participation of husbands in routine household tasks will inevitably make the wives' employment outside their homes more feasible by lessening the demands of their conventional home makings.

On the question of what occupations are suitable for women, the attitude of men is generally a reflection of the existing sex role stereotype. More than four fifths of them gave the traditional female occupations of clerical/quasi clerical; medical/quasi medical and teaching/quasi teaching (in short those jobs which involve human contact and/or service to others), as the most suitable for women with any amount of education.

Only less than two percent gave technical and/or related occupations as being suitable for women of whatever academic qualifications. Even for women with only primary education, only 1.3 per cent of the



Table One — Men's Attitude Toward the Employment of their Wives

	Yes	No	Total	N(a)
Are you married?	48.5	51.5	100.0	2400
If 'yes', is your wife working?	43.4	56.6	100.0	1152
If 'no., are you prepared to let her look for a job?	56.7	43.3	100.0	652
If not married, are you planning to marry a worker?	62.8	37.2	100.0	1248
If you are married to a worker, was she before you married her?	76.4	23.6	100.0	500
Do you generally support the idea of women working?	56.2	43.8	100.0	2410
If you are married or plan to get married to a worker:				
a) do/will you regard her as a worker first and a wife second?	48.4	51.6	100.0	2324
Did/does/will your wife need to ask for your permission to take up a job or continue working?	67.4	32.6	100.0	2400
Does/will your wife if working have control over her earnings?	51.7	48.3	100.0	2318
Would you allow your wife to take up a job that needs:				
a) to stay late at the place of work?	40.0	60.0	100.0	2360
b) a lot of travelling away from her station?	38.9	61.1	100.0	2356
c) to take some of her work home?	49.3	50.7	100.0	2384
Would you tolerate for the sake of boosting up family income to let your wife take up a job that fits her low education but not your status?	18.6	81.4	100.0	2400
If your wife is/were a worker do/would you help her in her household duties e.g. laundry, cooking, child care, dish-washing, sweeping the house etc. in order to lessen her over load resulting out of her dual role?	52.5	47.5	100.0	2186
Would you be happy if your wife is/were:				
a) more highly placed than you?	22.8	77.2	100.0	2098
b) earning more than you?	30.6	69.4	100.0	2196
c) better qualified than you?	16.4	83.6	100.0	2010

(a) Only those to whom the question applied and/or answered it have been recorded here.

men gave domestic science oriented jobs as suitable for them. It is thus obvious that, with this attitude of men towards occupations for which women have a natural inclination and in which they would have a big advantage over men, their occupational opportunities will further be limited, since these will not take them up since men do not want them to.

An attempt was also made to find out the reasons why men favour or oppose female employment, so that the future employment opportunities of women may be placed on focus. To the questions: 'Why do/would you allow your wife to take up wage employment?'; the majority (51.2%) of the respondents gave 'the need to lessen leisure and idleness which might breed prostitution among housewives in towns', and 'money or money related reasons' as the answer (17).

These men believe that, when a woman is kept busy earning money, or producing crops for the family, in the case of rural areas, then she has very little time if any, to be tempted; and in addition to that, the responsibility to cater for the family is also shared between the two partners. Money and the need to share the responsibility to feed the family is apparently one of the greatest motivations for those urban men who encourage their wives to work. It is a way of lessening the contradiction and tension in the family which normally develops after migration in the towns where one spouse — the wife — acquires much more leisure and the other — the husband, much more work than they were accustomed to, in the villages, where the latter were idle and the former busy for most of the time as President NYERERE once observed:

*«It would be appropriate to ask our farmers, especially the men, how many hours a week and how many weeks a year they work. Many do not even work for half as many hours as the wage earner does. The truth is that in the villages the women work very hard. At times they work for twelve or fourteen hours a day. They even work on Sundays and public holidays. Women who live in the villages work harder than anybody else in Tanzania. The men who live in villages and some of the women in towns are on leave for half of their lives. The energies of the millions of men in villages and thousands of women in towns which are at present wasted in gossiping, dancing and drinking are a great treasure which could contribute more towards the development of our country than anything we could get from rich nations» (18).*

Thus tension builds up in the family when the man finds himself in an unaccustomed role of being not only the bread winner but the sole family bread winner. Quite a good number of men are therefore, other conditions permitting, very likely to welcome the opportunity of having their wives working, not only as a means of curbing the possibility of prostitution but as a way of lessening their own burden by enabling them to contribute to the family income.

The relationship of socio-economic status of the husband to the employment of the wife is, however, not entirely clear from the findings. For if economics were the main point at issue, as the replies would suggest,

the men in the low income group followed by those in the middle income brackets, should respectively show the greatest and greater willingness for their wives to work. On the contrary, it was men in the high income group who overwhelmingly (68.5%) said they supported their wives to be employed. These were followed by those in the middle income group (58.2%). The poorest (low income) men were the least (40.7%) interested in a working wife. They seem prepared to go short rather than allow it (19).

The difference in attitude towards the employment of wives appears to stem from the absence of what would be regarded by the low and middle income men as suitable employment openings for their wives. The latter will always look for jobs for their wives that would favourably reflect on their middle socio-economic status. But with men's preference of marrying women with lower qualifications than themselves, most of these in the middle income group marry women with primary rather than secondary education (20). As a result, the better acceptable employment openings for them are not many. The majority of the occupations which are accessible to them will not be acceptable to their husbands e.g. domestic service and other related or similar jobs; factory hand; cleaner; messenger; hotel/bar waitress; chamber maid etc. The middle income man is then 'forced' to leave his wife home rather than let her have any job that fits her education but not his status.

The same applies for the men in low income group. Most of the wives of these men are illiterates or have education below that of primary school. The job opportunities for such calibre of women are almost nil (21) and the few that are, like cleaning/sweeping streets and public conveniences, ayah and other domestic chores in private households are again objectionable to most husbands, who would rather leave the wives at home than allow them to take up such jobs.

The high income men on the other hand with wives fairly educated are very likely to find them jobs or in jobs that are acceptable to them.

Since only slightly less than half of men in the sample oppose the employment of women outright, we thought it is important to find out why they do so, in order to know what has to be done to change such a male attitude and in order to improve employment opportunities for them. In response to an open ended question: 'If you are against the employment of wives, give one main reason why you are against it', the reasons listed in table two (22) were given.

The majority and most common reasons relate very specifically to the issue of possessiveness, suspicion and over protectiveness of men over females, and their general desire for the perpetuation of their dependence on, and inferiority vis-a-vis men and male chauvinism in general. The general male attitude towards women thus seems to be derived from the sex-role stereotype and male chauvinism, themselves being the result of traditional servile identity relationship between the two sexes. This is exemplified by MBWALE's comment which he once made that: —

*«Some weeks ago, one woman... came up with the idea that the society should now consider as to how many days in a week a husband must do the washing, cooking, sweeping etc... This is completely unacceptable. From days immemorial, the kitchen has been part and parcel of a woman's life. This story will be valid up to doomsday. Another old story, is that of weapons being part and parcel of men's life. Whenever something dangerous invades a village, it is expected without questions, that men are to take up their weapons and combat the intruder» (23).*

Most husbands, however, who opposed their wives working, explain that working 'spoils' a woman; but they tend to see this in either two different senses. Some meant a moral spoiling: 'If my wife earns money she becomes too independent and does what she likes. I cannot control her; for example she drinks and goes to a bar alone, and I think it is because she is employed' (low income man). 'A married woman who takes up employment of any kind, becomes cheeky and disobedient to her husband' (middle income man). 'The problem of a working wife is that she will need someone else to cook for her and look after her children; she meets too many men; also may admire her boss who might be more highly placed than her husband and so may easily be tempted by him (24); she is also very likely to demand equality at home' (high income man).

Other husbands, particularly those in the low income group, meant physical spoiling with implied fears for fertility: 'My wife' (said one low income man) 'is not to work because I cannot get any suitable employment for her; that is light work that would not ruin her health and thus ruin the chances of expected off-spring'. Other major fears are concerned with their getting expensive tastes which the husbands may not be able to satisfy, and the possibility of their acquiring higher status and salaries than that of their husbands which might later result in their looking down upon them.

Thus, indeed, it can in short be said that on top of other bad behaviours which may develop in working women, the neglect of the home and children as a result of the involvement of housewives in wage employment or the harmful effect on the balance of family relationship are the biggest fears harboured by most husbands (25).

## CONCLUSION

Four major points can be raised from the findings made in this article. The first is that the two reasons – money and prevention of prostitution given by the supporters of married females' employment as the main motives, cannot be characterised as objective determinants. For, each one seems to motivate different individuals in different directions. For example, supporters of female employment say that they would like their wives 'to earn money in order to contribute to the family income'. Those who oppose it cite exactly the same earning power as the reason which

'compel' them to prevent their wives to take up wage employment lest they get spoilt by it by making them 'cheeky', too independent and disobedient.

Again, while supporters explain that 'employment keeps wives busy and they are left with no time for temptation'; the opponents of female employment bar their wives from it on the ground that 'it exposes them to too many men, thereby making them too loose and spoilt generally'.

Thus it is obvious that the factors which motivate men to allow or prevent their wives to take up wage employment are complex and should not be taken in a simplistic way. To a certain extent, perhaps, the various 'reasons' are invoked simply as rationalizations for preferences which may purely be personal and beyond the reach of statistical analysis.

The second point is that, though mentioned by many supporters of female employment, 'money' is not the decisive factor in the decision of husbands to allow their wives to take up wage employment. This is because it does not follow the expected logic, that the low income husbands would be the most permissive in so far as the opportunity of their wives to earn money is concerned.

The third point is that, since the majority get married; and are not prepared to jeopardize such a chance, to expand and/or improve future employment opportunities will depend on the change of attitude of: (i) men towards certain occupations with working conditions which they now oppose being taken up by their wives and/or wives-to-be; (ii) women themselves towards the whole question of marriage as advised by President Sekou TOURE that: «... the woman's first husband must be her work...»

The last point is that since men have some superiority complex in their relationship with women, the latter's employment opportunities will again depend on the change of attitudes of men, this time against marrying women with higher qualifications and income than themselves. Otherwise female education and so their employment will always have (as it is now or had been in the past) to be at lower levels than that of men if they are to preserve their marketability in the matrimonial market, unless, as suggested above, women themselves change their stand over the question of marriage.

In short therefore, it can rightly be argued that the present and future employment opportunities of women, as had been in the past, heavily depend on the attitudes and perception of men towards it and the expected consequent behaviour of employed women. Thus, indeed, the hypothesis we proposed at the beginning of this paper has largely been upheld.

## FOOTNOTES

1. Space limitations make it impossible to present here detailed results of all our work. This will, however, be made in a comprehensive study report that is being prepared for other purposes.
2. The Law in Tanzania forbids discrimination in matters of employment based on sex, race, religion etc.. See for official stand on the issue Nyerere, J. K., *Freedom and Socialism*, Oxford University Press, Dar-es-Salaam, 1978, p. 5.

3. Jaribu, Pilli, 'Women in Thralldom', *Sunday News* (Tanzania) 16.10.77.
4. Ibid.; Although there is no law in Tanzania requiring a woman to have her husband's permission before she can take up wage earning employment, ethnic custom sometimes requires that the husband's permission should be sought and obtained before a woman can take up employment; but even if there is no such requirement in certain ethnic groups, in practice the husband's consent or agreement is sought; See ILO, *The Employment and Conditions of Work of African Women*, African Regional Conference. Report II Addis Ababa, 1964, p. 142, Table 8.
5. Chijumba, B.J., *Women in Wage Employment: A Study of their Opportunities, Needs and Problems in Tanzania*, Ph. D. Thesis in preparation to be submitted to the University of Dar-es-Salaam in 1980, ch. 2.
6. Ibid. ch. IV.
7. In 1974, women comprised only about 10% of the entire labour-force in Tanzania; see United Republic of Tanzania, *Survey of Employment and Earnings 1973-1974*, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Bureau of Statistics, Dar-es-Salaam, 1977, App. V(a) and V (b) pp. 51-52.
8. \$ 1 is roughly equivalent to shillings eight.
9. Chijumba, B.J., op. cit. ch. 2.
10. Ibid., ch. 3.
11. Ibid.
12. TANU, *The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy of Socialism and Self Reliance*, Published by the Publicity Section, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1967, p. 3; *Sunday News* (Tanzania) 8.8.76; see also Necylucumay Mubeya's letter to the Readers' Forum *Sunday News* (Tanzania) 27.8.78; Ngatara, Ludovic, 'Urban Women should Work' *Sunday News* (Tanzania) 4.12.77.
13. ILO, *ibid.*; In Tanzania, as the findings show, a woman is sometimes free to spend her earnings according to her wishes. But this as the ILO findings state depends mostly on family arrangements and agreements. It is therefore difficult to generalize. See also Pangani, Angelina, 'Wanawake Wapewe Haki Kazini', *Uhuru* (Tanzania) 18.2.77, for a report of cases in which husbands confiscate their wives' salaries. Such an act may to some degree act as a demotivator for a housewife to look for or remain in wage employment.
14. Quoted by Martin Cisse, Jeanne, Guinea's Extraordinary Ambassador in *Africa Woman*, No. 1 October/November, 1975 p. 34.
15. Despite this fact, it is still true that quite a good number (more than 50%) of husbands still regard their spouses as 'wives first and workers second' and reserve the right to stop them from work for any reason. See for examples of these A Special Correspondent, 'Pangs of Labour Among Women' *Sunday News* (Tanzania) 5.2.78; and Pangani, Angelina op. cit.
16. This finding is surprising for Tanzania whose society is more heavily based on sex role stereotype compared to those societies in the West whose findings are in direct contrast to this. See ILO, *International Comparative Research on Time Budgets - Report to the VIth World Congress of Sociology*, Evian, September 1966. An analysis of the findings of the country research is included in Govaerts, F., *Loisir des Femmes et Temps Libre*, (Editions de l'Institut de Sociologie, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1969); and in *A Report to the XXIII International Congress of Sociology*, Caracas, 1972. See also ILO, *Equality of Opportunity and Treatment for Women Workers*, International Labour Conference, 60th Session, Report VIII. Geneva, 1975 pp. 63-64.

17. Similar reasons were also given by men in Uganda, one of the East African Countries which is culturally very close to Tanzania. See Sofer, C., 'Urban African Social Structure and Working Group Behaviour at Jinja Uganda' in International African Institute, *Social Implications of Industrialization in Africa South of the Sahara* UNESCO, 1956, P. 619.
18. Nyerere, J. K., *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*, Oxford University Press, Dar-es-Salaam, 1968, pp. 30-31. See also Ngatara, Ludovic op. cit. For further discussion of this point in other countries, see Forthome, Georges, *Mariage et Industrialisation*, Liège, 1957, pp. 43-5.
19. This is contrary to 'a general international findings that other things being equal, the proportion of working wives falls off the higher the husbands come on their country's income scale'. See for example Forgarty, Michael et al., *Sex, Career and Family*, George & Unwin (London) 1965 p. 28; Aregger, C.E. (ed.) *Graduate Women at Work*, Oriel (for British Federation of University Women) 1966, p. 33.
20. The men were asked: 'If you are married or plan to get married, what is or will be the educational level of your wife or wife-to-be?' Four levels of: (i) below primary; (ii) primary (I-VII or VIII); (iii) secondary (form I-VI) and (iv) over secondary, were suggested and the respondents were asked to tick off one of them as their choice. Out of the men who answered the question, the following are the statistics: *High income*: 5.8% over secondary; 53.2% secondary; 38.6% primary; none below primary education. *Middle income*: None above secondary; 34.4% secondary; 62.7% primary; none below primary education. *Low income*: None above secondary or secondary; 39.6% primary; 59.8% below primary education.
21. Some organizations now require primary education even for those jobs which were formerly offered to illiterates. See for example Swantz, Marja-Lisa et al., *Women Workers In Dar-es-Salaam*, University of Dar-es-Salaam, Research Paper No. 43, 1974, p. 8.
22. This list is shortened with the combination of those responses which were seen to be close to one another by putting a stroke between them.
23. Mbawale, Joachim, 'Women Must be Serious', *Sunday News* (Tanzania) 24.6.79; For similar views see also Makus, George J., 'Women's Motherly Obligations' *Sunday News* (Tanzania) 30.10.77.
24. This seems to be no idle fear in Tanzania. See for example of this: Mdoe, M.S. 'This Manager Makes Love in His Office', *Daily News* (Tanzania) 2.3.79; and Makus, George J., 'Women's Motherly Obligations', *Sunday News* (Tanzania) 30.10.77, who complained of married women who after sexual contact with their bosses, «identify themselves with the superior positions of the bosses at their places of work, so that back home their begin to look down upon their fellow workers - their husbands as inferior».
25. For similar findings elsewhere, see UN, 'The Participation of Women in Community Development', *International Social Service Review*, (United Nations Publication, Sales-No. 60.IV.11), p. 53.

## RESUME

Cet article qui se fonde essentiellement sur le dépouillement d'un questionnaire adressé à quelques 2000 Tanzaniens mariés et célibataires à propos de l'emploi des femmes mariées ou destinées au mariage, a pour but de regrouper les différentes opinions se rapportant à ce fait social et leur impact sur les chances réelles des tanzaniennes de trouver un emploi.

L'urbanisation et les difficultés financières et économiques résultant de la crise que traverse actuellement bon nombre d'économies poussent certains époux à accepter le travail salarié de leurs conjointes :

- a) pour éviter l'oisiveté, mère de tous les vices, et plus particulièrement, de la prostitution urbaine.
- b) pour constituer un apport financier appréciable au ménage.

Cependant, Beat J. CHIJUMBA précise que ces deux raisons ne peuvent pas être caractérisées comme des «déterminants objectifs», et ceci parce qu'elles semblent être le fer de lance des partisans aussi bien que des opposants au travail féminin en Tanzanie. En effet, pour ces derniers, la femme travailleuse et salariée a tendance à négliger ses tâches domestiques et à acquérir une certaine indépendance qui la rend «effrontée et désobéissante»; ils pensent encore que les tentations s'offrant à elles sont beaucoup plus nombreuses, tentations d'infidélité conjugale et tentations de complexe de supériorité vis-à-vis de leur conjoint. Ainsi, l'auteur lui-même reconnaît que dans ce cadre sociologique, la rationalisation est difficile, car les préférences sont tout à fait personnelles et les analyses statistiques n'y trouvent pas un terrain privilégié. En fait le mariage étant l'une des valeurs-clé de la Femme et de la Société tanzaniennes, et la Femme tanzanienne étant toujours considérée comme inférieure à son époux, son emploi et son statut social dépendent effectivement de l'attitude des hommes, qui se répartissent selon trois échelons dans cet article :

- les bas revenus qui sont les plus réticents; leurs épouses sont les plus souvent illettrées et les seuls emplois qui s'offrent à elles sont ceux de bonnes à tout faire, nourrices, balayeuses de rues... etc., ce que la plupart des maris refusent catégoriquement.
- les revenus moyens qui épousent des femmes ayant une instruction primaire et qui refusent que leurs partenaires acceptent des emplois pouvant dégrader leur statut socio-économique. Partant, les possibilités d'emploi pour ces femmes sont très limitées.
- les revenus élevés dont les femmes — le plus souvent des intellectuelles — ont un niveau d'instruction supérieur et peuvent trouver des emplois adéquats et satisfaisants.

Beat J. CHIJUMBA essaie alors de délimiter les raisons pro ou contre le travail des femmes en Tanzanie, en vue de déterminer «ce qui doit être fait pour changer l'attitude des hommes et pour améliorer les possibilités d'emploi des femmes».



## ADDIS ABABA DECLARATION ON THE OCCASION OF THE SILVER JUBILEE ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

We, the representatives of the States members of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, acting for and on behalf of all the peoples of Africa, assembled at the headquarters of the Commission from 27 April to 2 May 1983 on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee Anniversary of the establishment of the Commission, now solemnly declare on this day, 29 April 1983, as follows:

We reaffirm our faith in and total commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as enshrined in Chapter I, Article I, of its Charter, namely, to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; and to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.

We also reaffirm our faith in the purposes of the Organization of African Unity as enshrined in Article II of its Charter in particular to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence; and to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa.

We dedicate ourselves and our peoples to the pursuit of the total liberation of our continent and in this regard, uphold the inalienable right of the Namibian people to immediate nationhood and abhor the obstinate refusal of the racist regime in South Africa to withdraw its unlawful presence from the Territory and abide by the resolutions, decisions and opinions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice. We denounce the introduction of the linkage proposal which has become the obstacle to the solution of the Namibian problem. We equally denounce the inhuman oppression of the South African people by the Pretoria regime, manifested in its obnoxious policy of *apartheid* and resolve severally and collectively on behalf of our peoples and ourselves to continue to mobilize all resources at our disposal so that the people of Namibia may be free and majority rule may be established in South Africa.

We recall General Assembly resolution 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974 containing the Declaration and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of the New International Economic Order.

We also recall the Economic Declaration of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-aligned Countries at New Delhi, India, in March 1983.

We reaffirm our commitment to the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa including the Final Act of Lagos adopted by our Heads of State and Government at their Economic Summit held in Lagos, Nigeria, on 28 and 29 April 1980.

We pledge to continue to pursue the objectives of international co-operation enumerated in Chapter I, Article I, and Chapter IX of the Charter of the United Nations which are reflected and amplified in the terms of reference of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (1), and reaffirm our support for General Assembly resolutions 32/197 (2) of 20 December 1977 and 33/202 of 29 January 1979 (3) on the restructuring of the economic and social sectors of the United Nations system.

We note with satisfaction that, Africa has, during the past twenty-five years, made noteworthy progress in various aspects of economic and social development, despite all forms of exploitation and domination of which it has been a victim.

We fully appreciate in this context the role of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa which continues to conduct in-depth social and economic analyses of the conditions in the continent with a view to highlighting achievements and problems and proposing policies for dealing with them. It has also provided a vigorous forum for the exchange of ideas on the international economic and social situation and for pronouncing common statements on international issues in the interest of the continent as well as for formulating regional development strategies and plans of action for their implementation. As a catalyst for developing awareness of the important role of regional co-operation and integration as an imperative means of fostering development and economic growth in the region, it has spared no effort to foster the creation of multinational co-operation groupings at the sub-regional and regional levels and the establishment of regional and sub-regional institutions to promote economic and technical co-operation at the sectoral level.

We fully appreciate also the role played over the years by the international community which, through bilateral and multilateral co-operation arrangements, particularly among developing countries, and the United Nations system activities, has increasingly expressed its support for African countries in their quest for self-reliant and self-sustaining development and provided financial and technical assistance in various forms.

We note with serious concern that, in spite of the achievements, there have been adverse trends and disturbing setbacks manifested in devastating crises which are now afflicting our continent, namely, chronic food deficits, pernicious drought which is now spreading throughout many countries of the continent, natural disasters, high costs of imports, particularly manufactured goods, capital goods and energy, deteriorating terms of trade with the consequential chronic balance-of-payments deficits, mounting external debts and problems of economic management.

We also note with concern that these disturbing features of our economies derive from several factors; namely, the erroneous belief that development and economic growth depended mostly on external demand

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(1) *E/CN.14/111/Rev. 8.*

(2) *General Assembly, Official Records: Thirty-second session, Supplement No. 45 (A/32/45).*

(3) *General Assembly, Official Records: Thirty-third session, Supplement*

and supply factors; the consequent neglect of the development of adequate indigenous entrepreneurs, high-level manpower, and national, sub-regional and regional markets; and inappropriate agricultural and industrial policies.

We are gravely concerned that if past and present domestic and external trends and policies continue, our continent in the year 2008, when the Commission would be celebrating its Golden Jubilee, would, as reported in the study entitled «ECA and Africa's development, 1983-2008» (4) have worse crises of food and energy shortages and of balance-of-payments deficits; and most of the factor inputs of the region would be coming from abroad, implying that our continent by the year 2008 would be highly marginalized.

We solemnly resolve to implement the goals, objectives and philosophy of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final act of Lagos, in the full understanding that the burden of developing our economies for the purpose of continuously raising the standards of living of our peoples rest on our Governments and our peoples.

We however call upon the international community, through the United Nations General Assembly, to support this endeavour by providing the necessary moral, technical and financial support to the efforts of African countries in their faithful implementation of the goals and objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final act of Lagos, in accordance with the provisions of the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade. In this context, we make an urgent appeal for the immediate initiation of the proposed global negotiations as part of the continuing efforts to restructure the international economic and social system and establish an equitable new international economic and social order. We also urge that, in any such restructuring exercise, full account should be taken of the special circumstances of the African continent and in particular the fact that twenty-six of the fifty independent African countries are classified as least developed, and, together with others, are also classified as food-deficit and most seriously affected countries.

We similarly appeal to the developed countries to increase their official development assistance to the developing countries to the target of 0.7 per cent of their gross national product and more specifically to earmark 0.15 per cent of their gross national product for aid to the least developed countries and urge the developed countries, multinational agencies and other concerned bodies to implement the measures adopted in the Substantial New Programme of Action in favour of the least developed countries.

We call upon the United Nations specialized agencies and African inter-governmental organizations at all levels to take into account, when reordering their priorities and redesigning their programme of work, the goals, objectives and principles of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final act of Lagos and to provide technical back-stopping and, where appropriate, increased financial assistance to member States in their efforts

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(4) E/ECA/CM.9/23.

to implement the goals and objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final act of Lagos and in this context to co-operate closely with the Economic Commission for Africa and the Organization of African Unity in the areas of:

- Food and agriculture with a view to achieving food self-sufficiency and security in the region;
- Transport and communications with a view to achieving the objective of a physically integrated continent;
- Human resources development and utilization leading to self-sufficiency in the supply of middle and high-level manpower;
- Industry with the objective of achieving the goals and objectives of the Industrial Development Decade for Africa;
- Trade and finance in the framework of increasing intra-African trade and finance co-operation;
- Science and technology in order to reinforce the transfer, development and adaptation of appropriate technologies for development in the region;
- Natural resources within the objective of full knowledge and better exploration, development and utilization of natural resources;
- Economic co-operation and integration for collective self-reliance.

We appeal to all the groups concerned, to ensure the success of the forthcoming sixth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development bearing in mind that no single country or group of countries, however powerful, is in a position to pull out single-handedly the world economy from the present crisis and put it on a healthy course of recovery of growth and development.

We call upon the Executive Secretary of the Commission, in collaboration with the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, to intensify his efforts to popularize the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final act of Lagos, to monitor and evaluate systematically progress in the implementation of the Plan and the Act.

Finally, we hereby affirm our confidence in the Economic Commission for Africa, resolve to increase our support to it and pledge anew our commitment to make fuller use of it in our economic negotiations with the international community, as one of our principal organs for research, data collection and dissemination of information, for promoting economic and technical co-operation within Africa and between Africa and the other regions of the world, and as our regional think-tank in mapping African economic and social development. We also call upon the United Nations General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations to give adequate material and financial resources to the Commission.

We make this solemn Declaration in the belief that, when our Governments and peoples, in full partnership with the international community, assemble to celebrate the Commission's Golden Jubilee in the year 2008, we would have succeeded in establishing at the national level, sub-regional and regional levels in Africa truly dynamic, prosperous, self-reliant and interdependent economies capable of functioning as true and reliable partners in the international economic system within the context of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final act of Lagos.

Done at Addis Ababa this twenty-ninth day of April 1983

# DOCUMENTS

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## DECLARATION D'ADDIS-ABEBA A L'OCCASION DU VINGT-CINQUIEME ANNIVERSAIRE DE LA COMMISSION ECONOMIQUE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'AFRIQUE

1. Nous, les représentants des Etats membres de la Commission Economique des Nations Unies pour l'Afrique, agissant dans l'intérêt et au nom de tous les peuples africains, réunis du 27 avril au 2 mai 1983 au siège de la Commission à l'occasion du vingt-cinquième anniversaire de la Commission, déclarons solennellement, ce 29 avril 1983, ce qui suit :

2. Nous réaffirmons notre attachement total aux buts et principes de l'Organisation des Nations Unies qui figurent à l'article 1 du chapitre I de la Charte, à savoir, maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales et à cette fin : prendre des mesures collectives efficaces en vue de prévenir et d'écartier les menaces à la paix et de réprimer tout acte d'agression ou autre rupture de la paix, et réaliser, par des moyens pacifiques, conformément aux principes de la justice et du droit international, l'ajustement ou le règlement de différends ou de situations, de caractère international, susceptibles de mener à une rupture de la paix, développer entre les nations des relations amicales fondées sur le respect du principe de l'égalité de droits des peuples et de leur droit à disposer d'eux-mêmes, et prendre toutes autres mesures propres à consolider la paix du monde.

Nous réaffirmons également notre attachement aux objectifs de l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine qui figurent à l'article II de sa Charte, à savoir, en particulier, renforcer l'unité et la solidarité des Etats africains, défendre leur souveraineté, leur intégrité territoriale et leur indépendance, éliminer sous toutes ses formes le colonialisme de l'Afrique.

Nous nous consacrons, ainsi que nos peuples, à la poursuite de la libération totale de notre continent et, à cet égard, nous confirmons le droit inaliénable du peuple namibien à l'édification immédiate de la nation namibienne et notre indignation devant le refus persistant du régime raciste d'Afrique du Sud de mettre un terme à sa présence illégale dans le Territoire et de se conformer aux résolutions et décisions du Conseil de sécurité et de l'Assemblée générale ainsi qu'aux avis consultatifs rendus par la Cour internationale de Justice. Nous dénonçons la proposition de lien qui est devenue le principal obstacle à la solution du problème namibien. Nous dénonçons également la répression brutale du peuple sud-africain par le régime de Prétoria, répression qui trouve son expression dans la politique odieuse d'*apartheid*, et exprimons, en notre nom et au nom de nos peuples, notre détermination à continuer, individuellement et collectivement, de mobiliser toutes les ressources dont nous disposons afin que le peuple namibien conquière sa liberté et que soit établi, en Afrique du Sud, le Gouvernement par la majorité.

Nous rappelons les résolutions 3201 (S-VI) et 3202 (S-VI) de l'Assemblée générale, en date du 1er mai 1974, qui contiennent la Déclaration et le Programme d'action concernant l'instauration d'un nouvel ordre économique international.

Nous rappelons également la Déclaration de la septième Conférence des chefs d'Etat ou de gouvernement des pays non alignés tenue en mars 1983 à New Delhi (Inde).

Nous réitérons notre attachement au Plan d'Action de Lagos pour le développement économique de l'Afrique, y compris l'Acte final de Lagos, adoptés les 28 et 29 avril 1980 par nos chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement à leur Sommet économique tenu à Lagos (Nigéria).

Nous nous engageons à poursuivre la réalisation des objectifs de coopération internationale énumérés à l'article 1 du chapitre I et au chapitre IX de la Charte des Nations Unies, lesquels sont repris de façon détaillée dans le mandat de la Commission économique pour l'Afrique (1), et renouvelons notre soutien aux résolutions 32/197 (2), et 33/202 (3) de l'Assemblée générale, en date, respectivement, du 20 décembre 1977 et du 29 janvier 1979, relatives à la restructuration des secteurs économique et social du système des Nations Unies.

Nous notons avec satisfaction qu'au cours des vingt-cinq dernières années, l'Afrique a fait des progrès considérables dans différents domaines du développement économique et social, malgré toutes les formes de domination et d'exploitation dont elle a été victime.

Nous apprécions le rôle joué, dans ce contexte, par la Commission économique des Nations Unies pour l'Afrique qui continue de faire des analyses approfondies de la situation économique et sociale du continent afin de mettre en relief les résultats obtenus, d'identifier les problèmes rencontrés et de proposer les politiques permettant de les résoudre. La Commission a également été un excellent forum favorisant l'échange d'idées sur la situation économique et sociale internationale, ainsi que l'adoption de positions communes sur les questions internationales intéressant le continent et la formulation de stratégies régionales de développement et l'élaboration de plans d'action en vue de leur mise en œuvre. En tant que catalyseur, la Commission a fait prendre à la région conscience de l'importance du rôle que doivent jouer la coopération et l'intégration, instrument indispensable de promotion du développement et de la croissance économique. A ce titre, elle n'a ménagé aucun effort pour encourager la création, aux niveaux sous-régional et régional, de groupements de coopération multinationale, ainsi que d'autres institutions chargées de promouvoir la coopération économique et technique au niveau sectoriel.

Nous apprécions également le rôle joué au fil des années par la communauté internationale qui, dans le cadre d'accords de coopération bilatérale et multilatérale, entre pays en développement surtout, et des activités du système des Nations Unies, s'est de plus en plus prononcée en faveur des efforts faits par les pays africains en vue de leur développement autonome et auto-entretenu, et a fourni, sous différentes formes, une aide financière et une assistance technique.

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(1) *E/CN.14/111/Rev. 8.*

(2) *Assemblée générale, Documents officiels : Trente-deuxième session, supplément No. 45 (A/32/45).*

(3) *Assemblée générale, Documents officiels : Trente-troisième session, supplément No. 45 (A/32/45).*

Nous constatons avec une vive préoccupation que malgré ces réalisations, notre continent souffre aujourd'hui des conséquences de tendances défavorables et de graves difficultés que traduisent des crises dévastatrices, à savoir : un déficit alimentaire chronique, une sécheresse meurtrière qui s'étend actuellement à de nombreux pays du continent, des catastrophes naturelles, le coût élevé des importations, notamment d'articles manufacturés, de biens d'équipement et d'énergie, la détérioration des termes de l'échange se soldant par un déficit chronique de la balance des paiements, l'alourdissement de la dette extérieure et des problèmes de gestion économique.

Nous constatons également avec préoccupation que ces faits alarmants sont dus à plusieurs facteurs, à savoir l'assertion erronée que le développement et la croissance économique étaient essentiellement fonction de la demande et de l'offre extérieures ; le peu d'importance accordée à la formation de chefs d'entreprise et de cadres supérieurs autochtones compétents, ainsi qu'à la création de marchés nationaux, sous-régionaux et régionaux, l'inadéquation, enfin, des politiques agricoles et industrielles.

Nous redoutons très sérieusement que, si les tendances et politiques intérieures et extérieures, passées et présentes, devaient se perpétuer, notre continent ne souffre, en l'an 2008, année où la Commission célébrera son cinquantième anniversaire, d'une crise alimentaire, d'une pénurie d'énergie et d'un déficit de balancés des paiements plus graves qu'aujourd'hui comme le signale l'étude intitulée «La CEA et le développement de l'Afrique, 1983–2008» (1). Dans ces conditions, la plupart des facteurs de production de la région proviendraient de l'étranger, ce qui signifie qu'en l'an 2008 notre continent se retrouverait complètement en marge des autres régions du globe.

Nous nous engageons solennellement à réaliser les buts, objectifs et principes du Plan d'Action de Lagos et l'Acte Final de Lagos, étant pleinement conscients qu'il incombe à nos gouvernements et à nos peuples d'assurer le développement de nos économies en vue de relever constamment le niveau de vie de nos populations.

Nous invitons néanmoins la communauté internationale, par l'intermédiaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, à fournir aux pays africains le soutien moral, technique et financier nécessaire pour les aider dans leurs efforts tendant à réaliser intégralement les buts et objectifs du Plan d'Action de Lagos et de l'Acte Final de Lagos, conformément aux dispositions de la Stratégie internationale du développement pour la troisième Décennie des Nations Unies pour le développement. A ce propos, nous lançons un appel pressant pour l'ouverture immédiate des négociations globales proposées qui constituent une partie intégrante des efforts constamment déployés en vue de la restructuration du système économique et social international et de l'instauration d'un nouvel ordre économique et social international équitable. Nous demandons aussi instamment que, dans toute restructuration, soient dûment pris en compte les conditions particulières du continent africain et, surtout, le fait que 26 des 50 pays

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(1) E/ECA/CM.9/23.

africains indépendants font partie du groupe des pays les moins avancés et figurent, en outre, parmi les pays qui connaissent un déficit alimentaire et qui sont les plus gravement touchés par la crise.

De même, nous lançons un appel aux pays développés pour qu'ils portent à 0,7% de leur produit national brut l'aide publique au développement qu'ils accordent aux pays en développement et, plus concrètement, pour qu'ils allouent 0,15% de leur produit national brut aux pays les moins avancés, et nous prions instamment les pays développés, les institutions multinationales et autres organismes intéressés d'appliquer les mesures adoptées dans le nouveau Programme substantiel d'action en faveur des pays les moins avancés.

Nous invitons les institutions spécialisées des Nations Unies et l'ensemble des organisations africaines intergouvernementales à prendre en considération, lors de la révision de leur ordre de priorité et de leurs programmes de travail, les buts, objectifs et principes énoncés dans le Plan d'Action de Lagos et l'Acte final de Lagos et à fournir un appui technique et, le cas échéant, une assistance financière accrue aux Etats membres afin de les aider à réaliser les buts et objectifs du Plan d'Action de Lagos et de l'Acte final de Lagos et, notamment, de coopérer étroitement avec la Commission économique pour l'Afrique et l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine dans les secteurs ci-après :

- Alimentation et agriculture, en vue d'assurer l'autosuffisance et la sécurité alimentaires de la région ;
- Transports et communications, en vue d'assurer l'intégration du continent ;
- Mise en valeur et utilisation des ressources humaines, en vue d'assurer l'autosuffisance en matière de cadres moyens et supérieurs ;
- Industrie, en vue de réaliser les buts et objectifs de la Décennie du développement industriel de l'Afrique ;
- Questions commerciales et financières, en vue de renforcer la coopération commerciale et financière intra-africaine ;
- Science et technique, en vue de renforcer le transfert, la mise au point et l'adaptation de techniques propres à faciliter le développement de la région ;
- Ressources naturelles, en vue non seulement d'identifier pleinement le patrimoine de ressources naturelles, mais encore de mieux pouvoir l'explorer, le mettre en valeur et l'utiliser ;
- Coopération et intégration économiques, en vue d'assurer l'autonomie collective.

Nous lançons un appel à tous les groupes intéressés pour qu'ils veillent au succès de la sixième session de la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le commerce et le développement, conscients du fait qu'aucun pays ou groupe de pays, aussi puissant soit-il, n'est en mesure de tirer à lui seul l'économie mondiale de la crise actuelle et de la remettre sur la trajectoire d'une croissance et d'un développement sains.



Nous invitons le Secrétaire Exécutif de la Commission, en collaboration avec le Secrétaire Général de l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine, à intensifier ses efforts en vue de populariser le Plan d'Action de Lagos et l'Acte final de Lagos, d'en assurer le suivi et d'évaluer systématiquement les progrès réalisés en ce qui concerne leur exécution.

Enfin, nous affirmons par la présente notre confiance dans la Commission Economique pour l'Afrique et nous exprimons notre volonté de lui fournir notre appui en renouvelant notre engagement d'avoir, plus que jamais, recours à elle dans nos négociations économiques avec la communauté internationale, en tant que l'un de nos principaux centres de recherche, de collecte de données et de diffusion d'informations pour promouvoir la coopération économique et technique régionale et inter-régionale, et en tant que centre de réflexion permettant de définir, au niveau régional, les modalités du développement économique et social. Nous invitons également l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies et le Secrétaire Général de l'Organisation à fournir à la Commission les ressources matérielles et financières nécessaires.

Nous faisons cette Déclaration solennelle dans la ferme conviction que lorsque nos gouvernements et nos peuples, en association étroite avec la communauté internationale, se réuniront pour célébrer le cinquantième anniversaire de la Commission en l'an 2008, nous serons parvenus, dans le cadre du Plan d'Action et de l'Acte final de Lagos, à créer, aux niveaux national, sous-régional et régional, des économies véritablement dynamiques, prospères, autonomes et interdépendantes, pouvant faire partie, au même titre que les autres économies, du système économique international.

Fait à Addis-Abéba, le vingt-neuf avril de l'an mil neuf cent quatre-vingt trois.

## KUALA LUMPUR DECLARATION

Representatives of the five ICCDA Regional Associations gathered in Kuala Lumpur from June 7–9, 1983, to deliberate on the major issues of Development in the world. These Associations which are Non-Governmental Organizations representing more than 600 Social Science Research and Training Institutes have agreed to make the following declaration: –

1) Convinced that world peace is impossible without development, social scientists express their deep concern about the present evolution of the world economy which has seriously affected the economies in the North and has worsened the economic and social situation of the populations in the Third World, clearly revealing how dependent their economies are.

2) They are extremely worried to witness that economic policies dating from another age have, in the name of fighting inflation, accelerated the unfolding of the crisis. They demand that an end be put to such narrow policies and that a component of the expansionist policies be geared towards development and be adopted for the world economy.

3) Convinced that the crisis of transmitted growth is mainly linked to the structures of the world economy and not to its cycles, they do believe that the restructuring and the democratization of international and domestic economic relations are the only solutions conducive to new forms of development. They express their belief that stimulation policies, necessary in the short term, can in no way be substituted for the imperative need of building a New International Economic Order which would bring about development and benefit the people.

4) The analysis of the present crisis shows that the important peace factor of putting a limit to the arms race is one of the conditions necessary for development. Peace allows the mobilisation of financial and human, national and international resources in favour of development.

5) Emphasise their unshakeable commitment to world peace and human rights and their willingness to contribute to the progress of humanity.

6) Declare that the contribution of the social sciences to the above objectives can only be achieved under complete intellectual freedom, and urge all States and other Institutions to respect and enforce freedom of thought and intellectual creativity.

7) The social scientists here gathered thus express their commitment to the study not only of the past and the present but also of the configuration of the future societies.

8) Believe that the analysis of the emerging World System should be undertaken with ample intellectual exchange between researchers from different regions bridging the cultural gaps and preparing the ground for a better understanding of development processes.

Signed by: ADIPA – CLACSO – EADI  
AICARDES – CODESRIA.

## DECLARATION DE KUALA LUMPUR

Les représentants des cinq Associations régionales de Développement se sont réunies à Kuala Lumpur du 7 au 9 Juin 1983 pour débattre des sujets les plus importants concernant le Développement dans le Monde. Les Associations, qui sont des Organisations Non Gouvernementales représentant plus de 600 Instituts de Recherche en Sciences Sociales se sont mises d'accord pour faire la déclaration suivante :

1) Convaincus que la paix mondiale est impossible sans développement, les chercheurs en sciences sociales se déclarent particulièrement inquiets face à l'évolution actuelle de l'économie mondiale, qui tout en affectant sérieusement les économies du Nord, a aggravé le sort économique et social des populations du Tiers-Monde et clairement révélé le caractère dépendant de leurs économies.

2) Constatent avec consternation que des politiques économiques d'un autre âge ont, au nom de la lutte contre l'inflation, accéléré le développement de la crise et demandent qu'il soit mis fin à ces politiques par une relance de l'économie mondiale orientée vers le développement.

3) Convaincus que la crise de la croissance transmise est principalement liée aux structures de l'économie mondiale et pas seulement à ses rythmes, estiment que seules une restructuration et une démocratisation des relations économiques internationales et internes sont susceptibles de conduire à des formes nouvelles de développement et affirment que les politiques de relance, nécessaires à court terme, ne peuvent en aucun cas servir de substitut aux impératifs de construction d'un nouvel ordre économique mondial porteur de développement au profit des peuples.

4) L'analyse de la crise actuelle montre que la limitation de la course aux armements, facteur important de la paix, est une des conditions nécessaires au développement. La paix permet la mobilisation de ressources financières et humaines, nationales et internationales, en faveur du développement.

5) Ils affirment leur engagement déterminé à œuvrer pour la Paix Mondiale et pour les droits de l'Homme, et leur volonté de contribuer au progrès de l'humanité.

6) Ils déclarent que la contribution des Sciences Sociales à la réalisation des objectifs décrits ci-dessus ne peut s'accomplir que dans des conditions de complète liberté, et demandent instamment aux Etats ainsi qu'à toutes les autres institutions de respecter et de renforcer la liberté de pensée et l'épanouissement de la créativité intellectuelle.

7) Les chercheurs en sciences sociales ici réunis expriment leur engagement aussi bien à l'étude du présent et du passé qu'à celle de la configuration des futures sociétés.

8) Ils croient fermement que les analyses du système mondial naissant doivent être amorcées par des échanges intellectuels à grande échelle entre les chercheurs de différentes régions. Ils franchiront ainsi les barrières culturelles et prépareront l'avenir pour une meilleure compréhension des processus de Développement.

Signé par : L'ADIPA – le CLACSO – l'EADI  
l'AICARDES – le CODESRIA.

**THIRD WORLD LECTURE  
AGRICULTURAL PROGRESS – KEY TO THIRD  
WORLD PROSPERITY**

By : M. S. SWAMINATHAN

On behalf of the Board of Trustees and staff of the International Rice Research Institute may I express our sincere gratitude to the Third World Foundation for Social and Economic Studies. You have recognized the role of agricultural science as a catalyst for agrarian prosperity through the selection of IRRI for the 1982 Third World Prize. We accept the Third World Award on behalf of the global family of farm scientists.

Agriculture began in what is now called the Third World. The ancestral homes of the world's most important crops are in Third World countries: rice, wheat, maize, potato, cassava, sweet potato, sugarcane, soybean, pulses, numerous vegetables, most fruit trees, cotton and other fibers, many forage grasses and legumes, and numerous forest trees including most hardwood species.

This is not surprising because agriculture revolves around the harvest of solar energy, and abundant, year-round sunshine is the Third World's greatest asset.

Culture was cradled by the prehistoric shift from food-gathering to food-growing in the Third World. Domestication of crop plants and farm animals and the development of water conservation and irrigation systems led to the civilizations of the Nile Valley, Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley, the Andean highlands and Central America, and, of course, China. No wonder the Chinese peasants are known as «farmers of 50 centuries». Their development of efficient methods of restoring soil fertility has enabled them to continuously and intensively harvest crops from limited land for more than 7,000 years.

Thus, the world's most experienced farmers are found in the Third World.

Asia is today the home of more than half of the world's people. But some 500 million Asians live in absolute poverty and go to bed hungry each night. About 10 million or more children die every year from causes associated with hunger and malnutrition.

We thus live in an unequal and paradoxical world. It is an irony that «God continues to be bread» (to quote Mahatma Gandhi) to children, women, and men in many parts of the «South», while the prayer «God give us today our daily bread...» has lost historical relevance in many countries of the «North». On one hand, mountains of grain are rising in highly developed countries. Some governments are giving farmers incentives to leave land fallow. On the other hand, many Third World countries lead a «ship to mouth» existence because they are increasingly dependent on grain imports. It is a paradox that many Third World countries – who must balance their food budgets by accepting free grain or purchasing it on concessional or commercial terms – are the countries with the largest reservoirs of untapped agricultural resources.

Why should an abundance of natural resources coexist with low farm productivity and consequent hunger? Can't we take steps to convert the natural blessings of the Third World – its basic life support systems of land, water, sunshine, flora and fauna – into wealth that is vital to its people? Why are many developing countries still giving low priority to agriculture?

In response to this paradox, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, in cooperation with the Republic of the Philippines, established the International Rice Research Institute in 1960 on the beautiful campus of the University of the Philippines at Los Banos. IRRI's objective is to increase the production of rice and of food from rice-based farming systems through applied agricultural science.

The choice of rice as the focus of an international research initiative and the choice of the Philippines as its location were appropriate. More than 95% of the world's rice area is in the Third World. For more than 1.5 billion low-income people in Asia, and hundreds of millions in Africa and Latin America, rice is the major source of calories and protein. Rice comprises a third of the area planted to cereals in developing countries. In 36 countries where more than 100,000 hectares are planted to rice, the annual per-capita income is less than US \$ 300. They are the lowest income group in the world.

The history of IRRI – appropriately titled *An adventure in applied science* – was recently written by its first director, Dr. R.F. CHANDLER Jr. Therefore, I shall not give you detailed background on the Institute and its accomplishments. I am content to say that IRRI was blessed with the able guidance of scientists of eminence and vision such as late Dr. Sterling WORTMAN of Rockefeller Foundation; the earlier directors, Dr. CHANDLER and Dr. Nyle C. BRADY; and of Boards of Trustees formerly headed by the late Dr. George HARRAR and by Dr. Forrest F. HILL, and now, Dr. Clarence C. GRAY III. Above all, the staff of the Institute, drawn from more than 20 countries, has worked with single-minded devotion to achieve a scientific elimination of barriers to high and stable yields.

IRRI's success is due to the cooperation of nation governments in many developing nations. Not only did the Philippine Government provide the land for IRRI's research center and experiment farms, it also allowed freedom for IRRI scientists to travel to observe rice problems first hand, and freedom for rice workers everywhere to come to the Philippines to participate in IRRI training programs.

The neighbouring University of the Philippines at Los Banos awarded affiliate graduate faculty status to IRRI scientists, which gave scholars an opportunity to study for advanced degrees at UPLB and conduct their thesis research at IRRI.

Without such international cooperation, IRRI could have become another «ivory tower». Instead IRRI became the hub of an international endeavour to assure food security in countries where rice is the staple. The research investment grew rapidly in both national and international research

systems in Asia. The return on international research in Asia was estimated at from 76 to 102% per year during 1966 to 1975. An eminent group of scientists that examined the work of IRRI in 1981 reported that the variety IR36 alone is helping to add US \$ 1.5 billion worth of additional income to farmers each year.

In 1971, IRRI, the first of the International Agricultural Research Centers, became part of a global family of IARCs funded through the newly established Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), jointly sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Development Programme, and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). In 1983, 36 countries and donor organizations will contribute an estimated US \$ 164 million to support the core research programs of 13 International Centers through the CGIAR. Donor members now include Third World countries such as Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Saudi Arabia. The crops and livestock on which the International Centers focus provide 75% of the food for the Third World. The 600 senior scientists who work at these Centers are drawn from 40 nations.

In a world beleaguered by negation, despair and conflict, the CGIAR stands out as a meaningful, affirming flame. Mr. Warren C. BAUM, Chairman, CGIAR and Members of this Group and past and present chairmen and members of the Technical Advisory Committee deserve our gratitude for nursing this flame which strives to bring cheer and light to homes engulfed by the degrading darkness of hunger.

IRRI today is more than a research institute. It is also a coordinating body for international networks such as the International Rice Testing Program, through which global teams of capable, highly dedicated scientists and scholars work to improve and stabilize rice yields under diverse, and often harsh, growing conditions. More than 800 rice scientists in 75 countries on 5 continents work together in experiments and testing programs catalyzed and coordinated by IRRI. The strengths of individual scientists and countries may vary, but the collective strength of this worldwide rice research community is mighty.

We are honored that the award ceremony for the Third World Prize is being held in the People's Republic of China, the world's oldest and largest producer and consumer of rice. China grows about 35% of the world's rice and almost half of China's total grain production is rice.

Some of the most important scientific ingredients of modern rice technology originated in China. Chinese scientists were among the original IRRI staff. The semidwarfing gene that was essential to the development of high-yielding rice varieties – and most semidwarfs bred by national rice improvement programs – came from Dee-geo-woo-gen, a short statured rice variety of Chinese origin.

IRRI is privileged to have strong cooperative links with China through the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Mechanization Sciences, Academia Sinica, and other organizations. This award ceremony gives us an opportunity to salute both farmers and scientific colleagues in China for their contributions to raising the yield ceiling in rice.

Farmers are believed to have domesticated semiaquatic rice varieties shortly after the Neo-thermal Age (12.000 to 14.000 years ago). Some say rice farming began in China, others say India or Thailand. Recent archeological findings show that farmers cultivated rice in China and India at least 7.000 years ago. The civilizations that developed around major Asian river systems – the Ganges, Yangtze, Brahmaputra, Irrawaddy, Mekong – thrived on rice culture.

Yet rice yields were almost stagnant for centuries, leveling at a yield plateau of less than 2 tons per hectare – the level that basic soil fertility could sustain because rice needs about 1 kilogram of nitrogen to yield 15 kilograms of grain.

From 1960 to 1980, average rice yields in Asia rose by 40% and production more than 60%, although we must also consider that Asia's population rose to 55% in the same 20 years.

How did the farmers of Bangladesh, Burma, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, and other Asian countries raise rice production more in the past 20 years than in the preceding 7.000 years? Five major advances led to the doubling and tripling of rice production:

1. *The modern semidwarf plant type that increases the efficiency of nutrient, water, and sunshine use.* The traditional varieties «lodged», or fell over when soil fertility exceeded the capacity to produce more than 2 or 3 tons of rice per hectare. Grain rotted in the water or was eaten by rats. Photosynthesis ceased.

Modern semidwarf rice varieties yield 5 tons or more because their strong stems – inherited from Chinese parents – enable them to stand erect and convert nutrients, water, and sunshine into grain more efficiently. Many of the newer varieties carry built-in genetic resistance to a host of insects and diseases.

2. *Short growth duration and insensitivity to a daylength.* Teams of researchers selectively bred these traits into the modern rice varieties to make it possible for farmers to grow two or three crops where they previously grew only one crop, and to grow superior varieties at different latitudes.

3. *Cultivation of F1 hybrid rice.* China is the world's pioneer in hybrid rice production. China now grows more than 6 million hectares of hybrid rice, yields are about 30% higher than those of ordinary semidwarfs.

4. *Improved irrigation and water management.* Better availability of water gives farmers yet another opportunity to grow two or more crops per year in the same field.

An old Chinese saying vividly portrays the *green power* of tropical rice land: «a field can look gold, black, and green on the same day». The *gold* represents the mature rice crop, which the farmer and his family harvest early in the morning. The same rice field looks *black* around noon because the family has already plowed the field in preparation for the next crop. Late that afternoon the field looks *green* because the farm family has transplanted a new rice crop!

In the IRRI Rice Garden, a crop is harvested every Monday and another planted every Friday. Good water management and early maturing varieties allow the planting and harvesting to be staggered throughout the year. The system spreads labor, cash inputs, and risk – and enhances both income and food production for the family. And the intensive production more fully exploits human inputs, water, sunshine, and soil.

5. *Introduction of new farm management techniques.* Yields are higher and farm incomes more secure because farmers now have improved implements, mineral fertilizers and better methods to apply them, integrated procedures for pest control, and improved postharvest technology.

Most Asian countries have assisted farmers to derive benefits from these technological advances by introducing yield-oriented production programs such as Masagana 99 in the Philippines, BIMAS (Mass Guidance Toward Self-sufficiency in Food Production) in Indonesia, the Whole Township Program in Burma, and the High-Yielding Varieties and Small Farmers Development Programs in India.

These factors now enable farmers to exploit the yield potential of management responsive crop varieties, multiple cropping, and improved preharvest and postharvest operations. Each development can be traced to the application of science to agriculture.

Mr. Lu Shen RONG, and old rice farmer in a production brigade in Lu Jha Chun, Hangzhou Province, recently described the impact that these advances have made in China. Mr. LU has grown rice for almost 50 years; hence his deep insight was born from vast experience. I asked Mr. LU «What are the most important farm problems today, and in what areas do you feel we should focus research in the future?» The farmer's immediate reply was «*The care of the soil and the health of the plant*».

I have worked in agricultural research for almost 35 years, but I could not have better summarized the most urgent challenges for the future.

Asia has little unused land, and agricultural land is a shrinking resource as population multiples and urbanization forces its way into the countryside. Asia's ratio of land to people – 0.21 hectares per person – is the lowest in the world. Future increases in agricultural production must come mainly from higher productivity and cropping intensity per unit of land, time, water, energy, and labor. The Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that rice production must increase by more than 3% per year during the remainder of the 20th century. This will require a continuous improvement in productivity – and it must be done without harming the long-term production potential of the soil. This challenge requires the intensification of research on all aspects of plant and soil care.

The improvement of soil and plant health motivated IRRI and the International Fertilizer Development Center to organize a network of cooperative experiments under the International Network on Soil Fertility and Fertilizer Evaluation for Rice (INSFFER).

Proper attention to plant health not only prevents crop damage from the unholy triple alliance of insects, diseases, and weeds but also reduces risk and uncertainty in agriculture. Institutes such as IRRI offer unusual opportunities to develop varieties with multiple pest resistance.



In the IRRI Genetic Resource Center, more than 65,000 varieties of rice are preserved for the use of today's rice scientists and farmers, and for generations yet unborn.

But the IRRI collection probably includes little more than half of the world's genetic variability in rice. With the cooperation of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences and other national research systems, we propose to develop a global strategy to collect the remaining genetic strains as rapidly as possible. Many irreplaceable rice strains – the fruits of thousands of years of natural and human selection – grow in endangered habitats and face the threat of extinction. Agricultural organizations everywhere must join forces to collect and preserve this invaluable germplasm for posterity.

But preserving the world's rice germplasm is not enough. More important, we must know the diversity of genetic traits these strains possess so that we can put those traits to work for the benefit of rice farmers everywhere.

Through the multidisciplinary Genetic Evaluation and Utilization (GEU) program, IRRI and worldwide cooperators carefully test this vast seed collection for the expression of more than 50 inherited characteristics, such as resistance to the diseases and insects that ravage farmers' crops and tie them to costly chemical protection, and tolerance of adverse soils.

Armed with such information, scientists from many countries withdraw parents from the Genetic Resources Laboratory to crossbreed with rices that have still other traits needed by the small-scale farmer. Such a strategy has led to a worldwide genetic pipeline from which flows a stream of high-yielding rice varieties with the built-in ability to tolerate not only pests but also salinity, alkalinity, or other adverse soil conditions; drought, deep water and floods; or cold temperature.

The best rices from all nations are selected under adverse environments through the International Rice Testing Program – a worldwide cooperative network. The power that such global cooperation gives all scientists is illustrated by the success of IR36, a rice variety now grown on almost 11 million hectares in Asia. IR36 is probably the most widely grown variety – of any food crop – the world has ever known. To develop IR36, IRRI scientists crossed 13 parents, including a wild species, from 6 countries. Scientists in the Philippines, Indonesia, and India cooperated in the selection of IR36.

When tungro virus disease reached an epidemic level in South Sulawesi, IRRI rushed a set of genetic material to Indonesia. Indonesian scientists planted the rices in «hot spots» where the disease was rampant. The survivors included the line that became IR36. Another set of materials was sent to Orissa, where Indian scientists selected plants for resistance to gall midge, a serious pest in much of Asia that was not present in the Philippines.

The insect resistance alone of IR36 saves rice farmers in the Third World untold millions per year – money that would otherwise have been spent on petroleum based insecticides.

One moral stands clear in a world divided by discord and distrust. International cooperation leads to universal prosperity.

We have no time to relax. Eternal vigilance is the price of a stable, prosperous, and productive agriculture. A new biotype of brown planthopper recently attacked IR36 in North Sumatra. Fortunately, Indonesian scientists were prepared and immediately arranged a new «genetic barrier». In February 1982 IRRI airlifted more than 20 tons of seeds of a newer variety, IR56 – which is resistant to the new biotype – to Indonesia for multiplication and distribution to farmers.

Most experts agree that fighting the famine of jobs is as important as fighting the food famine during the remainder of the 20th Century. The nutrition problem in many parts of the Third World can be improved even more by an increase in person-years of employment than by an increase in grain production. Rapid agricultural development is important to generate the employment necessary to purchase food and increase its availability. In fact, rural development in Asia implies largely the development of land and water-based occupations such as crop and animal husbandry, horticulture, fisheries, and forestry.

Asia is a continent of small-scale farmers; more than 75% of its farmers cultivate less than 2 hectares of land. Earlier I mentioned that recent scientific advances have enhanced the production potential of small farms in the Third World. But we should recognize that although new technologies have in many cases been used economically by all farmers, regardless of their farm size, the technologies themselves are not «resource neutral». Farmers need cash inputs to enhance agricultural output. Modernization of agriculture involves the increased use of purchased inputs and a greater dependence on marketing opportunities. Public policies that simultaneously help small farmers raise production and help poor consumers increase consumption are vital to advancing agricultural well-being in the Third World.

Because of risks, farmers largely base their decisions to adopt new technology on the likely net returns per hectare as well as on security of income. In many Southeast Asian countries, an increase of 1 million tons in rice production requires the active participation of about 2 million farming families. Hence, attention to their problems is vital for success in increasing production.

Inadequate attention to small farm management has increased production costs and risk. Agricultural scientists must find more ways to enhance the resource neutrality of technology by substituting nonmonetary or inexpensive inputs for high-cost inputs and minimizing yield fluctuations caused by weather aberrations and pest epidemics. New technologies must ensure that labor demand increases faster than its supply and that food supply increases faster than its demand. These objectives require that social, biological, and physical scientists work as teams.

New systems of small farm management must marry individual initiative and group endeavour. Japan has pioneered yield increases in agriculture through integrated systems of research, extension, input supply

(including credit) and remunerative pricing. In China, a household responsibility system of crop production has been superimposed over social land ownership. This provides a mechanism for blending collective management of farm operations such as irrigation, plant protection, and postharvest operations with individual enterprise and incentive.

In countries where land is individually owned, can social or group management of key farm operations be superimposed on individual initiative and ownership rights? Obviously, farmers have often done this themselves. Agricultural research organizations can help by demonstrating how enlightened self-interest demands that farmers living in a watershed or a village participate in the management of farm operations that elevate and stabilize yield per unit of cash input. In particular, there is immediate need for increasing returns from irrigated agriculture through equitable systems of water distribution and better on-farm management of water. The major irrigation systems of the world are in Asia, but there is considerable scope for improving productivity per unit of water.

Farmers live in a world of action, not of words, so personal experience is the only meaningful source of conviction. Therefore, they must be shown how blending of individual ownership and group action can better serve the interests of the individual and the community in the same manner that China is demonstrating how social ownership and individual initiative can be combined in a meaningful way.

Third World countries should lose no further time in developing strong *national food security systems* with the following major components:

1. Ecological security to protect basic life support systems such as land, water, flora, fauna, and the atmosphere;
2. Technological security at both the production and postharvest phases, which can help to promote accelerated growth coupled with production stability;
3. Social security to provide the needed purchasing power to the rural and urban poor through greater opportunities for gainful employment;
4. Water security, both for drinking and irrigation;
5. Nutrition education; and
6. Population stabilization.

The most precious resources of the Third World are its intelligent and hardworking rural populations and its abundant sunlight. These assets can be purposefully married through a photosynthetic pathway of development that gives greater attention to green plants. Poverty persists when human resources are undervalued and land and other physical and material resources are overvalued. Human resource development holds the key to national prosperity as well as to peace and progress.

IRRI emphasizes manpower development through its education and training program in which about 3,000 rice scientists, extension specialists, and educators from more than 50 countries have participated; 95% have been from the Third World. Sixty per cent remain active in rice research.

During the next few decades rapidly rising income in many developing countries is likely to fuel a tremendous growth in the demand for food, which can only be met by increased food imports. Continued food imports in countries with untapped agricultural resources will be equivalent to the importation of unemployment.

From 1970 to 1977, 20 developing countries with some 700 million people had an average growth rate of 4% or more in per capita income. Eight of these countries, all major oil exporters, had an average per capita income growth rate of 5.6%: Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. Such income increases sparked an extraordinary rise in the demand for food in those countries, a demand that their still-immature agricultural sectors were unable to meet. Thus, food imports to those countries grew at an unprecedented rate of 19% per year in real terms.

Other rapid-growth countries such as Brazil, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, and Turkey had an average growth rate of 5.6% in per-capita income during the same period. In those countries, the demand for food rose by more than 5% per year.

Some of the countries with rapid growth of income may well be able to achieve the high rates of growth in domestic food production needed to satiate demand. But research carried out by the International Food Policy Research Institute indicates that developing countries with the fastest growth rates in food staple production from 1961 to 1976 collectively more than doubled their net food imports during the same period. From 1961 to 1976 the average growth rate for basic food staple production in those countries was 3.9% — but their increases in food imports meant that their self-sufficiency ratio actually declined by 2%. These data show that while it is possible for developing countries with rapid income growth to achieve impressive increases in basic food production, it is still quite difficult for such production to keep pace with the rate of growth in demand for food caused by increases in population and income.

Stagnation in social and economic evolution has resulted in inadequate progress in achieving self-reliance in food production in many Third World countries. Such stagnation was caused by colonialism before World War II. Population explosion facilitated by advances in preventive and curative medicine after World War II, as well as continued low priority to agricultural and rural development after independence aggravated the problems. Neglect of agriculture also led to the continued nonutilization or underutilization of the national blessings of these countries for generating more jobs and income. The economic problems of Third World countries are well articulated, but the potentials for overcoming major problems through a careful blend of brain (technology), brawn (hard and dedicated work), and bank (cash inputs) continue to remain neglected or underestimated. It is in this context that the role of accelerated agricultural growth as a trigger of Third World Prosperity must be appreciated.

Priority to the farm sector does not imply neglect of industry. In fact, there are several major linkages between agriculture and industry. Agriculture supplies the raw materials for employment-intensive industries. Agriculture stimulates and sustains industrial output through rural household demands for consumer goods and services. Agriculture influences industry through government savings and public investment. Agricultural growth requires fertilizer, machinery, tools, and energy.

The International Food Policy Research Institute has attempted to quantify the impact of such linkages. Using a macroeconomic model, it has been estimated that from 1961 to 1972, a 1% increase in agriculture in India generated a 0.5% increase in industrial growth. Agriculture increased national income by 0.7%.

Poor people spend most of any additional income on food. In India, studies show that the poor spend 60% of increments to income on grain and almost 80% on total food products. Food and employment are intimately related through the multiplier effects of agricultural growth and development.

Technological change in agriculture can stimulate growth in income and employment in many sectors of the economy. It raises the incomes of farmers, who devote a large share of their additional income to locally produced goods and services. IFPRI research in Malaysia, Bangladesh, and India has shown that from 40 to 80% of increments to farmers' income is spent on such local «tertiaries» as housing, entertainment, and services. Such tertiary activities create more employment.

In a recent study in Malaysia, it was found that each additional dollar of value an irrigation project created in the paddy rice sector indirectly generated an additional \$ 0.83 of value in the non-rice economy. Of this \$ 0.83, about two-thirds was attributable to final household demand linkages and only one-third to increased demands for paddy intermediaries. Thus there are symbiotic linkages in the growth of all the three major factors of an economy — agriculture, industry, and services. Agricultural growth necessitates better rural communication and better communication helps to minimize the gap between the city and the village in technological evolution.

Science and technology are important components of the wall dividing poverty and prosperity. Today there are unusual opportunities for developing countries to improve the quality of life of their people and to reduce drudgery in rural areas, particularly in women specific occupations, through an integration of traditional and emerging technologies. Recent advances in microelectronics and microprocessors, biotechnology, satellite communication and imagery, and solar and renewable energy technology can be harnessed to upgrade traditional skills and occupations. In the past, industrialization was synonymous with urbanization, centralization, automation, and pollution. Today it is possible to promote in rural areas sophisticated agroindustrial complexes based on decentralized infrastructure and production techniques. That will help marry the techniques of

science with the culture and skills of the people. With financial support from the Asian Development Bank, IRRI and the University of the Philippines at Los Banos this year intend to initiate a pioneer project to show how productivity can be maximized and income enhanced through the scientific utilization of every part of the rice biomass.

History shows us that man causes civilizations to blossom... and to decay. Some historic centers of agriculture are useless deserts today. In contrast, some areas that were considered hopeless wastelands in the early 20th Century are now fertile farming areas. A proper combination of political will, professionalism, and people's action is essential to harness the power that science gives us for increasing human happiness and welfare.

During the 1980s, the scientists and scholars of IRRI, and of the world's rice research family, will continue their relentless struggle for higher and more stable income for farmers through a multipronged research strategy that consists of:

1. Sustaining and expanding production gains in irrigated areas;
2. Extending frontiers of high-yield technology to areas of moisture stress and/or excess;
3. Increasing productivity in problem-soil areas;
4. Improving the income and employment potential of rice farming systems;
5. Adding a dimension of resource neutrality to scale neutrality in technology development;
6. Improving methods of manpower development, information dissemination, technology transfer;
7. Identifying and helping to remove the constraints responsible for the gap between potential and actual yields at the farm level; and
8. Monitoring the consequences of new technology.

We live in this world as guests of green plants and of the farmers and fishermen who cultivate them and harvest their products. Today an eminent group dedicated to Third World development has recognized the pivotal role of science in agricultural progress by choosing an agricultural research center for a distinguished award. I assure you, on behalf of my colleagues in national agricultural improvement programs and at IRRI and other CGIAR institutions, that we shall do everything possible to help farmers — who will in turn help humankind make hunger a problem of the past.

Beijing, China  
4 April 1983.

**CITATION — *The International Rice Research Institute***

The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) was established in 1960 in the Philippines as an international scientific research center. Over the last two decades when so much else faltered in the struggle against hunger and poverty, IRRI's quiet, persistent highly professional and wholly dedicated work touched the lives of millions in the Third World, improving the human condition in truly practical and lasting ways. That such a contribution should have been the result of fruitful cooperation between scientists and food technology experts from developed and developing countries alike is in itself a cause of satisfaction and encouragement.

During these years of steady efforts, IRRI has developed a series of rice varieties with yield potential double or triple that of the varieties previously available to Third World rice farmers. It introduced «modern varieties», beginning with IR8 (belonging to the *indica* rice group), characterized by potential for high yield, capacity to grow well during any season of the year and genetic capacity to resist major insects and diseases. More recent varieties such as IR36 have early maturity and multiple pest resistance, use much less water, are exposed to field hazards for a much shorter time, and, most important of all, make double cropping possible for millions of rice farmers. The acceptance of IR36 has been so widespread that more than 10 million hectares are now being planted annually in Asia.

In economic terms IRRI's work generates an added value of about \$ 1.5 billion per year of increased rice production. Its «modern varieties» have been adopted by the eleven most populous countries of South and South East Asia, planting them in about 40% of the rice area in these countries. This has alleviated the plight of the millions of the Third World rice farmers and their families who in the past practiced only subsistence farming and whose rice yields were among the lowest in the world.

The social impact of this major advance in food production technology has meant the promotion of on-farm employment, increase in hired labour on farms; increase in job opportunities in the villages; reduction of drudgery, and improvement of living conditions in such areas as housing, health and education.

And IRRI has made other contributions. Its scientific advances with respect to rice genetics, rice physiology, and rice soil science are systematically disseminated in Third World countries through strengthening national research capabilities and offering educational and training opportunities at IRRI. During 1962–81 over 2,800 persons from 50 Third World rice-growing countries were trained there, returning to their home countries to become active participants in the international research networks catalyzed by IRRI.

A further lasting contribution of IRRI in sustaining global rice production at the desired levels is the conservation of rice genetic resources for posterity. To meet the challenges of the 21st century over 60,000 strains of rice have been collected from all parts of the world and stored for future use in the IRRI Gene Bank; undergoing through an interdisciplinary «genetic Evaluation and Utilization» Programme, continuous evaluation and improvement. Through all these efforts IRRI has evolved an institutional

pattern for the organization of scientific resources capable of being replicated for a wide variety of crops and localities with high probability of success.

IRRI's work has been widely recognised within the scientific community and especially by those concerned with food security, including the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. That work continues under the distinguished guidance of its Director General, Dr. M. S. SWAMINATHAN, whose personal contributions in the field of agricultural development have been in the highest traditions of IRRI itself.

While the war on hunger is yet to be won, the contribution which IRRI developed and stimulated rice technology has made in ensuring that no child, woman or man goes to bed hungry is a vital element in the battle against poverty, hunger, disease and early death.

IRRI has by the excellence and relevance of its scientific contribution to improving the productivity and production of rice and rice-based cropping systems, made a truly out-standing contribution to Third World development.

The Third World Prize Selection Committee is proud to award to the International Rice Research Institute the Third World Prize for 1982.



# **BOOK REVIEWS – REVUE DES LIVRES**

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*The Third World in Global Perspective*, A. M. Hoogvelt, Macmillan, 1982, P. XII, 260.

A Review by A. B. ZACK-WILLIAMS\*

This work which is a follow-up to the author's, *The Sociology of Developing Societies*, Macmillan, 1976, is a welcome text on the current situation in the Third World. Whilst the work is not based on any original (empirical) research, yet it is rich both in secondary materials and also contains an updated theoretical discussion on the nature of Third World social formations.

The work is mainly concerned with the empirical and theoretical changes which have occurred in the last decade in analysing Third World societies. The major theme of the text is that in the period of the Second U.N. Development Decade (1970–80), the Third World has experienced such differentiation that the generic use of the term «Third World» is now misleading. Furthermore, both Marxist and bourgeois liberal theorists have failed to address themselves to these differences. The reason for this, «is that bourgeois and Marxist writers have been constrained by the limits posed by their past theoretical heritage, in particular the generalised category of 'Third World'» (p. 213). This differentiation has produced three categories of «developing» countries:

- 1) The nouveaux riches Middle East oil producers, who in terms of GNP are now richer than the developed countries.
- 2) The «newly industrialising countries» (NIC), some with structure of production equally or even more industrialised than those of some countries conventionally classed as 'developed'» (p.2).
- 3) Those still dependent on agriculture, and who have remained poorer than they were before 1970, the so called Fourth World.

After a lucid introduction, in Part I of the book, the author goes on to discuss the major global structural changes which have occurred in the world capitalist economy and their effects on the Third World. She notes three important changes:

- 1) The differentiation of the Third World;
- 2) the accumulation of vast financial surpluses by a handful of Arab OPEC countries;
- 3) the changing organisation of world production.

With regards to the last point, HOOGVELT notes that this is symptomatic of the growing internationalisation of production, and the emergence of a new international division of labour. This qualitative change in the world economy is being effected by the multinational corporations (MNCs).

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\* *Department of Sociology, University of Jos, P.M.B. 2084, Jos Plateau State, Nigeria.*

The period also witnessed a shift away from international trade to international production, and it is the rapidly developing countries which have been closely associated with the process of world production under the aegis of MNCs.

HOOGVELT unveiled a paradox: whilst the relative share of foreign direct investment in the Third World has declined over the last two decades (33% in 1966 and 25% in 1974), yet there are certain NICs where production by multinationals is concentrated. Thus she observes: «One may well conclude that what we are witnessing is not so much the rapid industrialisation of certain successful developing countries, but rather the selection of certain *sites* in the Third World for the purpose of relocation of industrial activity from the advanced countries» (p. 65).

The forging of these «world market factories» in a number of underdeveloped countries is designed not only to take advantage of relatively cheap and skilled labour, but some of the repressive regimes in these rapidly growing NICs provide political cover against sweeping nationalisation or labour unrest. The problem of safeguarding against nationalisation of foreign investment is ameliorated by the emergence of non-equity, or part-equity arrangements. This new set-up was good for investors who wanted to reduce their equity exposure and for the developing countries who wanted a larger share of resource rents. As HOOGVELT observes: «Instead of viewing Third World governments' nationalisation programmes with dismay, the MNCs were smart enough to realise that local participation in their overseas affiliates opened up still greater opportunities for making super-profit» (p. 72).

Another theme developed in this work is the political responses of Third World countries to the changing nature of the global economy. Here the reader is presented with a very interesting discussion of the rise and fall of Third World solidarity. She traces the roots of Third World solidarity to two sources which ran parallel, but reached a target in 1974 with the UN Declaration of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The first source was originally a political one, in the form of the non-aligned movement, and the second was originally an economic one, namely the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). The creation of UNCTAD as a specialised agency of the UN was the first major victory for Third World solidarity. Though UNCTAD provided a forum where both developed and developing countries confront each other, yet its success was limited. Even where gains were registered, «this may well be put down to the changing needs of the world capitalist economy itself» (p. 77).

The zenith of Third World solidarity was reached with the unilateral price rise of OPEC. Paradoxically as it may sound, the success of OPEC also marked the end of confrontation, and the beginning of the decline of Third World solidarity. This premature decline was due to four factors:

Firstly, certain inherent contradictions in the NIEO agenda, in particular the demand for collective self-support, «greater inter-dependence between rich and poor world, (yet) independence from the rich world, and delinking from it» (p. 86). Secondly, the NIEO demands were reformist: «(they) concentrate exclusively on the *exchange* relations of the world capitalist system and ignore totally the *production* relations of that system» (p. 87). It soon became clear to the developed nations that the NIEO, far from threatening the world economic order, could in fact be accommodated to strengthen the world capitalist system. Thirdly, it is for this reason that the developed world, and the US in particular, through Secretary of State KISSINGER, became conciliatory. Thus, in his «community of interest» speech, KISSINGER assured the Third World, «We have heard your voices. We embrace your hopes. We will join your efforts» (p.92). This attitude tantamount to stealing the thunder of the hawks in the Third World. Finally, what HOOGVELT calls the «new middle class nations» (i.e. the NICs and Arab OPEC countries) were not prepared to share their newly found wealth with their less fortunate brethren in the Fourth World.

Part II of the book deals with the theoretical issues arising out of the development experiences. Here HOOGVELT strives for a middle line (objectivity?) between the Marxist and the bourgeois liberal positions, even though her conclusion seems to be a syncretic fusion of the progressive liberal (world futures) position and that of the Marxist world-system theorists. This part of the work is well ordered, stating the themes and assumptions underlying the various theoretical perspectives.

There are two major criticisms I have with regards to this work. The first relates to HOOGVELT's conclusion. Even though she claims a preference for the «Marxist perspective» (p.11), yet she is «reasonably optimistic that the progressive liberal views will yet win the day» (p. 210). This naive (al-be-it) humanitarian position is premised on the belief that the same international capitalist forces (i.e. MNCs) which allowed OPEC to get away with the oil price increase of the 1970's will, also impose a moderating influence on «recalcitrant, Northern Governments to toe the line of 'global redistribution'» (p. 211).

The second criticism relates to a theoretical omission. Whilst HOOGVELT's work is perhaps one of the most comprehensive review of both bourgeois and Marxist theories of development and underdevelopment in the market to date, yet her failure to discuss the role of merchant capital in the development of underdevelopment represents a serious omission. The recent debate of merchant capital and underdevelopment has been triggered off by the work of Geoffrey KAY, *The Development of Underdevelopment*:

*A Marxist Analysis.* In this work, KAY argues among other things that the explanation of capitalist underdevelopment is really historical and structural, and could be found in the special characteristics of merchant capital. Furthermore, KAY drew attention to one important paradox of

merchant capital: whilst it encouraged the dissolution of pre-existing social relations, yet merchant capital in its role as agent of industrial capital tended to maintain the forms of pre-capitalist production and social relations in order to maximise the production of commodities for metropolitan markets. It is through this process of maintaining pre-capitalist structures that value is drained from the periphery to the centre, hence the development of underdevelopment.

In spite of these criticisms, it is clear that this book will plug a gap which has existed for many years; namely: to provide a general text for students of developing societies.

*Agribusiness in Africa* by Barbara Dinham & Colin Hines – *Earth Resources Research (Ltd.)*, £ 4.95 paper back.

A Review by L. M. SACHIKONYE\*

*Agribusiness in Africa* is a well-researched and concise report by DINHAM and HINES on the role of transnational corporations (TNCs) in capitalist agriculture, the food-processing industry and the international trade in agricultural commodities. Agribusiness is defined as TNCs that increasingly dominate agricultural production; the agricultural inputs sector, the transportation and distribution of food, and management and consultancy relating to estate enterprises and agro-allied industry. The authors set out as the aims of their study:

- (1) The analysis of the implications of the increasing role of TNCs in African domestic production, particularly with regard to the current trend towards investment in large-scale food production schemes;
- (2) The role of the TNCs in cash crop production and the consequences of their involvement in food processing for domestic consumption; and
- (3) the possibility of conflicts arising between the TNCs and governments; and between governments and peasant producers.

These are very specific aims that cover a very broad terrain of extremely pertinent issues with regard to the agrarian question in Africa. Their attempt to discuss these issues in their highly readable report is therefore a laudable one.

In the historical background to their study, DINHAM and HINES trace the capitalist penetration into agriculture on a sizable scale to the beginning of the colonial era. Such giants as Unilever, Firestone and Brooke Bond are viewed as catalysts in colonial capitalist agriculture. The accumulation process required the extraction, division and migration of labour to sustain farm and plantation production in such commodities as tea, coffee, cotton, palm oil and rubber. This process simultaneously affected levels of food production amongst peasants who were forced to partake in the reproduction of the labour deployed on the farms and plantations. Plantations, in particular, required less new investment than manufacturing and distribution and generally had a high profit to turn-over ratio.

The advent of self-rule did not increase the options open to most governments of comprehensive agrarian and economic reforms: the post-colonial period actually witnessed new patterns of TNC penetration, consolidation and investment. The TNCs were able to easily adjust to certain nationalistic controls such as regarded foreign ownership of agricultural land and policy emphasis on the encouragement of small-holders to produce export crops. Indeed such TNCs as Tate and Lyle among others acknowledge that given the risks and varies of weather and governments, it is

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\* *Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies.*

more profitable to trade in commodities than to grow them. The overall control of the production process is nevertheless retained in their technical service, consultancy and management agreements with governments. The vertical integration of the TNCs facilitates their control of the production, processing and marketing processes of their products. TNCs operating in Africa endeavour wherever possible to minimise their profits and to transform surpluses into remittable fees to avoid taxation and exchange controls. Management, service and technical charges also result in the shipment of surpluses thereby prolonging dependence on foreign inputs, expertise and markets; and through management and consultancies provided by subsidiaries of TNCs, agribusiness retains monopoly of their technological capabilities making it difficult for governments to plan and control their own industrial strategies and technology policies.

It is implicit in the analysis of DINHAM and HINES of the rôle and effects of TNCs that they have utilized some of the formulations of the dependence school. TNCs are viewed as external rapacious forces depleting resources, increasing external dependence and inhibiting and distorting domestic growth and development in Africa. It is noted that TNCs build very few links with local agriculture; frequently mobilize inappropriate and expensive technology; distribute foodstuffs such as breakfast cereals which are of dubious nutritional benefit in comparison with the locally grown staples which they tend to replace; and undermine and eliminate local enterprise through monopoly and expensive advertising and price wars. Yet if TNCs tend to have few backward and forward linkages with domestic economies, they maintain close working relationships with such international institutions as United Nations' agencies, the World Bank and Western donor agencies. Indeed, one of the conclusions of the study by DINHAM and HINES is that TNCs benefit enormously from aid: roughly 75 per cent of USAID assistance funds are actually spent in the United States with US-based companies doing even better with multi-lateral development banks. For instance, every dollar the American taxpayers deposit into the World Bank generates about 10 dollars in procurement contracts for United States companies.

The dominance of TNCs in the coffee and sugar growing and processing industries and their market control is then discussed. General Foods and Nestlé possess a monopoly in coffee; both conglomerates control an extensive number of processing plants world-wide, the marketing and distribution of their products. They have made it particularly difficult for African producers to increase the value of their cash crop by nurturing a domestic processing industry. At the same time, the TNCs have maximised surpluses in the coffee business by setting up purchasing centres in those countries which offer the most favourable tax incentives.

In the sugar industry, conglomerates such as Lonrho, Tate and Lyle, Sorex, Booker McConnell among others play a similar rôle to that of conglomerates in the coffee industry. But the fluctuations in prices in both commodities have dented the economies of the producing nations. This has been particularly so given that during the post-war period, there has been a

long-term tendency for primary commodity prices to fall and the prices of industrial goods to rise. Fluctuations in prices have not, however, seriously deterred the TNCs from demonstrating a bias for such gigantic sugar complexes as the Kenana in the Sudan and the Ferkessedongou in the Ivory Coast. The role of the TNCs in such complexes includes feasibility studies, site surveys, pilot projects, provision of advice on the purchase and quality of equipment for irrigation and other agriculture-related purposes and processing. Their subsidiaries and consultancies demonstrate a marked preference for capital-intensive techniques of production, foreign sources of supply, management and expertise.

In their elaboration on the distorted patterns of development which result from TNC penetration and domination, DINHAM and HINES compare and contrast the Kenyan and Tanzanian experiences. Formulations reminiscent of the dependence theory describe the Kenyan State's inability to control its economy and the world market of its commodities. Inappropriate technology in the tea industry and the bias towards such export commodities as pineapples, vegetables and flowers as against food-crops are discussed and judged to increase dependence. So is Kenya's liberal posture with regard to conditions of entry and repatriation of foreign capital. Although Tanzania's strategy of self-reliance was based on the phasing out of private foreign capital and on development goals centered on peasant producers to a much greater extent than in Kenya, the problems of dependence, inequality and low productivity persist. The communalisation of peasant agriculture was not tactfully undertaken; bureaucratic mistakes and misdirection of funds revealed strong bias towards large-scale farming projects to the detriment of peasant producers.

From their study, DINHAM and HINES draw these overall conclusions:

- (1) governments must now deal with the TNC's changing role in agrarian capitalism, the shift from direct investment in plantations to consultancy, management and surveying of capital – intensive technology, and their frenetic drive of market expansion to promote the growth of industries capable of absorbing their own productions;
- (2) there is an excessive and unnecessary dependence on foreign sources of supplies, technology, management and expertise on TNC schemes when simpler technology which could process food at a lower cost to good and acceptable standards is available.
- (3) large-scale food-production schemes, modelled on the capitalist production methods of industrialized countries have become the accepted means of 'solving' the food crisis and increasing agricultural exports although it is questionable whether these hugely expensive and technologically sophisticated schemes will lead to increased productivity and alleviate poverty.
- (4) the reluctance to develop peasant – based agriculture and make it a priority suggests that some form of political struggle is essential before any real changes are achieved. And governments have yet to seek radical solutions structured on peasant organization in an attempt to seek longer-term solution to the crisis in African agriculture.

The profiles of the major TNCs, Unilever, Tate and Lyle, Booker McConnell and Lonrho provided at the end of the book contain vital information on the range of their holdings, diverse operations, turn-over, profits and directorships. There are also informative appendixes consisting of tables with useful data on the significance of the major cash crops to national economies.

*Agribusiness in Africa* as a source of empirical material on the scale of operations of TNCs and the effects of those global operations is an important contribution to the understanding of the problems of stagnation in agriculture and the food crisis in Africa. As an analytical study of the role of Western capital in penetrating and its linkages with local capital, class formation and the resultant class struggles, the work has some limitations. TNCs as institutions of advanced monopoly capitalism operative in both industrialised and developing nations are crucial elements in the dynamics and recurrent readjustments of world capitalism. They exploit and perpetrate dependence at several levels both at the centre and in the developing countries. Forces of monopoly both in the industrialized and developing nations, these characteristics do not emerge nor are they defined analytically in the report. Similarly such concepts as dependence, inequality, underdevelopment and poverty are neither explicitly defined nor rooted in a specific theoretical framework. Although it emerges from the study that TNCs can mobilize massive productive forces at their disposal — capital, technology, labour, land etc. — there is no analysis of the social relations of production that characterise the deployment of these forces in African agriculture. Analysis rooted in the concept of mode of production would be less likely to lead to the conclusion that governments should seek radical solutions structured on peasant organization to solve problems of stagnation and dependence that the somewhat eclectic and the economic perspective that seems to inform the study. The role of the domestic bourgeoisie, the nature of their relations with the TNCs, and conflicts with labour is central to an enquiry into the evolving patterns of agrarian capitalism in Africa.

The theory of imperialism suggests itself as a more analytical framework in which to examine the role of TNCs in Africa. Lenin many years ago wrote: that «when a big enterprise assumes gigantic proportions, and on the basis of exact computation of mass data, organizes according to plan the supply of raw materials to the extent of two-thirds, or three-fourths of all that is necessary for tens of millions of people; when the raw materials are transported to the most suitable place of production, sometimes hundreds or thousands of miles, in a systematic and organized manner; when a single centre directs all the successive stages of work right up to the manufacture of numerous varieties of finished articles; when the products are distributed according to a single plan among tens or hundreds of millions of consumers... then it became evident that we have socialisation of production, and not mere «interlocking», that private economic relations and private property relations constitute a shell which is no longer



suitable for its contents, a shell which must inevitably begin to decay if its destruction be delayed by artificial means; a shell which may continue in a state of decay for a fairly long period (particularly if the cure of the opportunist abscess is protracted), but which will inevitably be removed» (1).

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(1) *LENIN, V. Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism/International Publishers: New York, 1939 – p. 127.*

## ANNOUNCEMENT

### WOMEN AND DEVELOPMENT

#### **The Sexual Division of Labor in Rural Societies**

*A Study prepared for the International Labour Office  
within the framework of the World Employment  
Programme*

Edited by  
Lourdes Beneria

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*Inclusion on this list does not exclude future review of the publication.  
L'apparition d'un titre dans cette liste n'exclut pas sa future critique.*

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