

AFRIQUE

et développement

AFRICA

development

SERIALS

NOV 30 1982

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARIES

VOL. VII, No. 4, 1982



CODESRIA

EDITORIAL BOARD – COMITE DE REDACTION

Editor – Rédacteur en Chef
Abdalla S. Bujra

Assistant Editors – Rédacteurs en Chef Adjoints.
C. Atta-Mills, Thandika Mkandawire

Publication Assistant – Assistant de Publication
Abdoul A. Ly.

Book Review Editors – Responsables de critique des livres
A. Mohiddin (Anglophone Africa)
B. Founou Tchigoua (Francophone Africa)

Advisory Editorial Board

– Comité Consultatif de la Rédaction

Samir Amin
Mokhtar Diouf
Peter Anyang Nyong'o
Jacques Pegatienan Hiey
Fredj Stambouli

Abdellatif Benachenhou
Llunga Llunkamba
Claude Ake

Editorial Office – Bureau d'Édition.

COUNCIL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
RESEARCH IN AFRICA

CONSEIL POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA RECHERCHE ECONO-
MIQUE ET SOCIALE EN AFRIQUE

Adress – Adresse

B.P 3304
Rue F X Leon G. Damas
Fann Résidence
DAKAR – SENEGAL.

Phone No – No Tel.
Telex No – No Telex

23 - 02 - 11
3339 CODES SG

CODESRIA acknowledges the support of number of African Governments, the Friedrich – Ebert Stiftung, SAREC and IDRC in the publication of this journal.

Le CODESRIA exprime sa gratitude aux Gouvernements Africains, à la fondation Friedrich – Ebert, à la SAREC et au CRDI pour leur contribution à la publication de ce journal.

AFRICA DEVELOPMENT
AFRIQUE ET DEVELOPPEMENT

**A QUARTELY JOURNAL OF THE COUNCIL
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL RESEARCH IN AFRICA**

**REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DU CONSEIL POUR
LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA RECHERCHE
ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE EN AFRIQUE**

VOL. VII – No. 4

**Octobre – Décembre 1982
October – December 1982**

Edited by
**Abdalla S. BUJRA
C.O.D.E.S.R.I.A.**

CONTENTS – SOMMAIRE

Eme N. EKEKWE The Role of the State in the Economy: Nigeria, 1960/75	5
Fredj STAMBOULI Développement dépendant et Paupérisation de la Paysannerie : le cas de l'Afrique du Nord	23
H. Assisi ASOBIE Nigeria and the European Economic Community, 1970–1980: An Analysis of the Processes and Implications of Nigeria's Association with the EEC under the First Lome Convention	33
Makhtar DIOUF Eléments pour une Critique de la Planification Macro-Economique du Développement dans les Pays Africains	61
Anthony I. NWABUGHUOGU Oil Mill Riots in Eastern Nigeria 1948–51: A study in Indigenous Reaction to Technological Innovation.	66
Mwamba BAPUWA Approche Théorique des Valeurs et Anti-valeurs des Traditions Zaïroises: Contribution à la Recherche d'une Culture de Développement	85
<i>DOCUMENT</i>	
Julius K. NYERERE The Third World Lecture 1982 – South-South Option	96
<i>BOOK REVIEWS/REVUE DES LIVRES</i>	
M. Lamine GAKOU Fondements de l'Economie de Traite au Sénégal (la sur- exploitation d'une colonie de 1880 à 1960) de Bernard Founou-Tchuigoua	105
<i>FOCUS ON RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTES/ PLEINS FEUX SUR LES INSTITUTS DE RECHERCHE ET DE FORMATION</i>	
The Centre of African Studies	110
BOOKS RECEIVED	111

THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE ECONOMY: NIGERIA, 1960–1975

By

*Dr. Eme N. EKEKWE**

One of the distinctive characteristics of the post-colonial state is its important role in the economy. Of course all modern states play some role in the economy. But the particular role of the post-colonial state appears more crucial than that of the advanced capitalist state. Steven LANGDON summarised the situation thus:

«Certainly the state has a critical general function in all class societies – the maintaining of cohesion and domination; but it would appear to have a rather particular further function in periphery economies, that of managing and meshing of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production. And that further function makes the colonial and post-colonial state central in the direct process of surplus appropriation and capital accumulation than in advanced capitalist economies» (1).

This conception of the role of the post-colonial state may very well be what ALAVI and SAUL had in mind when they originally conceived of the post-colonial state as being «over developed» (2). Interesting as it may be to speculate on what, precisely, ALAVI and SAUL mean, I here adopt LANGDON's view. It is clear and leaves little room for speculation. It forms my point of departure.

In this article I attempt to look at some aspects of the role of the Nigerian post-colonial state (up to 1975) in the economy. In particular, I will try to show the state's role in meshing the internal, coexisting modes of production (the capitalist and the pre-capitalist) and how it tries to harmonize the domestic economy with the international economy. I have relied on material some of which is familiar, but I have tried to cast them in a different, critical perspective. The discussion is divided into two major sections. In the first I outline the policy and ideological perspective that informs the role of the state in the economy. I refer to that omnibus term, development. In the second I look at the concrete role of the state in the economy. To conclude I evaluate the implications of the state's role.

I. DEVELOPMENT AS POLICY AND IDEOLOGY

With the end of World War II and the important role of America's Marshall Plan in the reconstruction of Europe, a general phenomenon known as «development» took a grip on the World. In more than one way the Marshall Plan provided the model for development. The Plan involved the transfer of resources from the United States to war-ravaged Europe.

* *Lecturer, School of Social Sciences, University of Port Harcourt, Port Harcourt, Nigeria.*

6 Africa Development

So it was not by sheer coincidence that the assumption became widespread that for the underdeveloped countries to increase their Gross National Product (GNP), accelerate the growth in their literacy rates and improve their health and general living standards (i.e. to develop) a kind of osmotic process was imperative. In this process called development, resources (capital, technology and know-how) would be transferred from those countries which enjoyed them in relative abundance (i.e., the «developed» ones) to those in which they were relatively scarce (i.e., the «developing» ones). The transfer would take place through bilateral and / or multi-lateral institutions. The Marshall Plan facilitated the reconstruction of Europe; development was to foster rapid economic and political changes in developing countries. The Marshall Plan was American; America was the model of development. By subtle and not-so-subtle propaganda and enormous interest in development was aroused. The sixties were declared the First Development Decade by the United Nations. Businessmen and Politicians shuttled between capital cities negotiating deals. Experts in development and institutes of development mushroomed in universities and colleges. The businessman, the politician and the academic joined with missionary zeal the common cause of bringing about development and modernization.

Development has now come to be accepted virtually everywhere as desirable. In fact, the use of the term seems to span the two major ideological positions prevailing in the contemporary world — even if, in a predominant sense most African countries, Nigeria included, take the West as *the* model image of development. Because development has become the guiding principle of state programmes and policies, AKE's view that there now exists in Africa an ideology of development is easily supported (3). And since the West is the predominant image of development it is easy to see why development has frequently been taken to be synonymous with capitalism. In its essence, this development is primarily concerned with the need for, and the process of, enhancing the capitalist mode of production in the peripheral societies.

Those who subscribe to this predominant view of development tend to think of development as a series of technical problems which, given the «correct» policies, can easily be solved. From this perspective of the prevailing ideology of development, stability is most important; it is a vital prerequisite for achieving the expected result. Revolution, therefore, is not a viable process of change; classes and class struggles are denied. There exist only elite and ethnic groups. What is advocated is evolutionary change. This battle for development is very much part of the global struggle between capitalism and socialism. «This is precisely one of the major reasons why Western imperialism, which wants to insulate Africa against socialism is promoting (development) so zealously there» (4). Development is so presented as to counterpoise socialism which would support revolutionary change in Africa. And by positing the possibility and necessity of the flow of capital, technology and know-how from the advanced capitalist centres to the periphery, the ideology and policy of development «legitimize dependence, especially economic dependence» (5).

If one takes the present reality of most African countries and measures them against the promise of the development ideology a certain disjunction between the two is obvious. For example, the rates of growth in some of these countries have been poor. Agriculture is stagnant and industrialization has hardly gone beyond the import-substitution stage. Many are saddled with serious debt burdens. So bad has the problem become that the World Bank is considering paying Black Africa some special attention! However, notwithstanding its apparent shortcoming and contradictions, the ideology of development maintains a strong (stranglehold?) grip on our economic and political thought. National leaderships, Nigeria's included, have accepted at face value the ideology of development along with dependence on the West implicit in it. Through the ideology and policy of development many post-colonial states are able to play certain vital political and economic roles for foreign and local private capital. Such roles include protecting the existing property relations and facilitating for private capital, and at fairly low cost, the organization of the factors of production (6). The concrete mechanism by which these political and economic roles are played is the Development Plan. Through the provisions of the Plan the articulation of the domestic modes of production, and the articulation of the national and international economies are maintained. Importantly too, the ideology of development facilitates, or is congruent with, the creation of capitalist classes in the peripheral societies. If one is to enhance local capitalism one must, among other things, assist the process of evolution of a capitalist class if it did not already exist.

The acceptance of the ideology and policy of development in Nigeria dates back to colonial times. The ideology was the basis of the various attempts by the colonial state of development planning. It has continued to inform the successive National Development Plans drawn up under the post-colonial state. It may be easily understood why none of these Plans entails any serious and concerted effort to lessen Nigeria's dependence on foreign private investment. Instead the emphasis in them has been for the state to play a complementary and facilitating role for private capital accumulation. The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations which support such situations have been prominent in Nigeria's development planning at both the university and bureaucracy levels (7). To be sure, their quick profit, growth-now-distribution-later (if ever) mentality and their creed of centre-periphery integration were manifest among those persons who drew up Nigeria's First National Development Plan (8). This creed survives in a healthy state today, especially in American economic development thought. In Nigeria it finds current expression in the obsession with transfer of technology. I will return to some other aspects about the Plans later in the following section. With the foregoing as the basis, I look now at the role of the Nigerian post-colonial state in the economy.

II. THE STATE'S ROLE IN THE ECONOMY

Here, it is necessary to begin with a brief observation about the class that came to wield power in the post-colonial state. The Nigerian nationalist movement was largely a petty bourgeois affaire even though it

8 *Africa Development*

could hardly have succeeded without the support of the broad masses. In particular the strike in 1945 by workers, and the relative facility with which the party political leadership was able to mobilize traders and peasants during the fifties drove home the point to the British colonial lord that indeed Nigerian politicians must be taken more seriously than hitherto. Gone were the days when a Governor like Hugh CLIFFORD could tell Nigerian politicians that they were virtual nincompoops (9). It was to this largely petty bourgeois class that power was devolved upon at independence. They must properly be seen not as a ruling class but as a governing class. (A ruling class may be defined as that class in society in whose long run interests the state intervenes; the class whose dominant economic interests to a large extent determine the nature of state power and intervention) (10). The ruling class remained the foreign bourgeoisie whose continued dominance in the economy was virtually unchallenged. It was a foreign bourgeoisie that needed no longer to control state power directly, especially since the emergent petty bourgeoisie had come largely to define its own economic and political interests within the very parameters defined and determined by imperialism.

The petty bourgeoisie that appropriated the state system used state power, in part much as the colonialists did, to foster the articulation of the local economy with international economy. It is partly from this point of view, that Sayre SCHATZ has come to argue that the role of the post-colonial state in the economy has been quite comparable with that of the colonial state. He characterizes both forms of state as agents of what he calls, rather descriptively, «nature-capitalism» (11). By this, SCHATZ means that both the colonial and post-colonial states have purposefully left the mainly productive areas of the economy for private agents while primarily providing the infrastructure necessary for those agents to carry on their accumulation. In this the state attempts to support indigenous entrepreneurs at the same time as it welcomes foreign private interests (12). SCHATZ is no doubt correct in this view. What he should have recognized, in addition, is the fact that it was only from the period of colonial dyarchy that for several reasons which need not be discussed here, the nationalist element in the state's role in nature-capitalism became possible. Prior to this period local participation in the economy was greatly circumscribed and much less important than it became from 1957 onwards. This difference between the colonial and post-colonial state needs to be emphasized.

If the post-colonial state was to maintain the articulation of the national and international economies this required that it must maintain, in the first place, the articulation of modes of production in the national economy itself. The concrete manifestation of this important role of the state may be seen in the policy of development. The former Regional Governments played vital roles in the general accumulation process. Hence one may best show how the post-colonial state's approach to development was implemented by looking at the role of one of the regional state apparatuses. I examine principally the case of the former Eastern Region. It should suffice to use the example of the former Eastern Region, since the other two – later, three – Regions followed the same general trends and tendencies

The Role of the Eastern Nigeria Development Corporation

The Government in the East easily saw its role as that of «organising or re-organising the economy...» in partnership with private enterprise, domestic and foreign (13). What was really aimed at here was the transformation of peasant into capitalist agriculture, or, since this could not be achieved outright or in one fell swoop, the stimulation of peasant agriculture for increased surplus production. The surplus thus produced would be transferred into the capitalist sector of the economy. This policy stand is reflected in the Government's poser in the Official Document No.5 of 1962: «How can we industrialize without development of commercial crops to meet the requirements of both the proposed industries and exports?» (14) To increase production of export crops and also to better manage or control the social and political situation engendered by the juxtaposition of peasant and capitalist production, Government set itself the following priorities:

- (i) the establishment of farm settlements;
- (ii) the encouragement of plantation agriculture;
- (iii) the organisation of more effective extension services;
- (iv) the development of farmer's co-operation;
- (v) the development of research and irrigation (15).

The farm settlements were established obviously in an attempt to increase production. It appears, however, that another major stimulus for action here was the need to control and manage the growing percentage of the population drifting to the cities. It was hoped that the farm settlements would absorb this growing population of primary school leavers, unskilled in trade, but unwilling to embrace (peasant) agriculture as a life-long occupation. «These young men do not live in villages and are sources of irritation in the townships» (16). Such irritation had to be removed or contained by herding these people to the farms. Therefore the political purpose of the farm settlements cannot be separated from the purely economic purpose. The Region's Leaders of Thought were quick to urge that the farm settlements be run «by a limited liability company specially constituted for that purpose» in which individuals could invest (17).

Others have found that the development of co-operatives has not been the best method of making credit available to the small (subsistence) farmers since that process has been open to political manipulation. Nor have different credit schemes devised in the past been successful in meeting farmers' needs, what with the farmers ignorant of the means required to obtain the credit (18). These measures benefit mainly the large-scale farmers – it is they who are more inclined to export and capitalist production.

The general policy in Regional development was thus aimed at the gradual transformation of peasant production into capitalist production in agriculture; it was also aimed at extracting surplus from the peasant economy and using that surplus to bolster the capitalist enclave. The largest single Regional agency involved here was the Eastern Nigeria Development Corporation (ENDC).

The ENDC came into existence in February 1955, superseding the Eastern Region Development Planning Board (ERDPB) which was established in 1949 and also absorbing the functions of the Eastern Region Finance Corporation (ERFC). The ENDC was originally named the Eastern Region Development Corporation (ERDC). But in 1960 it became ENDC. This was simply a change in name; the functions of the agency were hardly affected. The Corporation was one major channel through which the state development strategy was implemented, especially in agriculture. However, its mandate was not limited to bringing greater capitalist production in agriculture, it was allowed to initiate or participate in production processes other than agriculture. It thus participated in some commercial and industrial ventures either alone or in partnership with private individuals, or loaned money to those undertaking such ventures. The funds which it expended in this process derived mainly from the Marketing Board (19). This latter Board was most directly involved in siphoning off surplus from the peasants.

One of the concomitants of the Region's development strategy was the alienation of peasant land and thus the partial proletarianization of the peasants thus affected. The ENDC's role in all this was remarkable. Together with the Region's Marketing Board it was instrumental in the surplus extraction process (by the Board paying peasants less than the sale price of their produce in the world market). Such surplus was then deployed in mainly capitalist production. For example, the surplus thus realized enabled the ENDC to be involved directly or indirectly in such ventures as cement production, banking, bottling and catering (20). To establish its plantations and estates the ENDC acquired land by displacing peasants, for there was little 'free' into which it could easily move. In 1962-63 the ENDC's agricultural and plantations divisions had about 8,435 daily paid workers on its staff (21). Acquisition of land by the ENDC sometimes brought the peasants in violent opposition to it. In one of its reports, for example, it noted that «in many places where the ENDC went to acquire lands for its plantations, the people had raised hue and cry, carried machets and cudgels to chase ENDC officials out» (22). Nevertheless, by 1964, the ENDC maintained about 22 plantations (mainly for oil palm) and 8 estates (mainly for cocoa and coconut trees), with about 150,000 acres it was yet to develop (23). Some element of force, then was involved in the process of alienation of this much land for peasant communities.

So engrossed was the Eastern Region's government in promoting cash crop production that it virtually neglected food production. In its 1962-1968 Development Plan it made capital investment of about ₦ 44 million in cash crop production as opposed to only a little over ₦ 5 million for food crops (24). Thirty-four per cent of the Plan's total outlay was devoted to agriculture which was expected to «lead to a substantial increase in export earnings and to an improvement in the nutritional standard of the population (25). The latter aim appears to be only secondary. The Leaders of Thought were concerned about this situation, for they urged more emphasis on food production and nutrition in the Plan (26).

In short, the Eastern Region's central role appeared to be in enhancing capitalist production and the further subordination of the peasant or rural economy to it. There does not appear to have been any successful attempt made to help the peasants to regain their independence in production, rather more surplus was being extracted from them through the Marketing Board. The emphasis on facilitating capitalist production in the Region appears clear, with the serious attempts at expanding or establishing industrial layouts in Port Harcourt, Enugu, Aba, Umuahia and Onitsha, the Region's major urban centres (27). In these too the ENDC had a major role to play. Consider also that in the 1962–1968 Plan period, Trade, Industry and Transportation claimed 21 per cent of the total outlay (28). These items had accounted for 37 per cent in the 1958–62 Plan period. The apparent decline of support for capitalist production between the two periods was largely illusory. This is so because much of the heavy outlay for agriculture (34 per cent) in the latter period was principally oriented toward encouraging capitalist production. In all, the trend to increase capitalist production was fairly clear. The more such production was increased, the more (presumably) development was seen to be taking place.

What trend we see here for the Eastern Region seems to apply with little or no difference to other Regions. Like the Eastern Region, the Western Region pursued a policy of transforming agriculture through the agency of farm settlements. The Western Nigeria Development Corporation (WNDC) played a similar role to the ENDC's. The policy was no more successful than in the Eastern Region. ADEGBOYE, BASU and OLATUNBOSUN have concluded that the farms did not have the desired effect...» it appears that the government has not in fact succeeded in making farmers out of the settlers themselves. This is made manifest by the fact that some of these settlers hire labour to do much of their farm operations while they themselves live and work in towns» (29). In the Mid-Western Region the government also, for similar reasons as in the East, embarked on the farm settlements route in agricultural production. It also placed great urgency on the establishment of infrastructural facilities such as industrial estates and hotels (30).

It would appear then that aside from pursuing its policy with great vigour, the post-colonial state followed more or less the same approach to development as did the colonial state. An important difference however was the more overt attempt made by the post-colonial state to help out local entrepreneurs. The latter demanded more direct assistance from the state in «personal, day-to-day, and immediately tangible ways and (in dealing) with the individual problems of each particular firm» (31). Politicians joined businessmen in pressing such demands. The example of the colonial state's support of the foreign firms was fresh in the minds of those making these demands of the post-colonial state. SCHATZ observed that «the view that government was an instrument for serving important business interests appeared to accord with Nigerian observations of colonial practice» (32). For the clamouring local entrepreneurs, the state provided loan programmes. Considerations of space preclude examination here of these loans activities.

The State and Foreign Capital

At the same time as the state was aiding the local entrepreneurs it continued to maintain the major thrust of the external linkages of the national economy. Foreign capital continued to dominate the economy. The possible contradiction between allowing the situation to continue virtually unchecked and at the same time aiding local entrepreneurs hardly seemed to have occurred to the managers of the state. Within this dominance of foreign capital, only slight shifts at the base were apparent if the measure of trade links between Nigeria and the world is used. After 1960 the European Economic Community (EEC) became Nigeria's major trading partner, replacing Britain. Whereas in 1960 Britain received about 46 per cent of Nigeria's exports and the EEC about 30 per cent, by 1973 the figures were about 18.6 per cent to Britain and about 33 per cent to the EEC. Trade was also shifting in favour of the United States. From taking in about 11 per cent of Nigeria's export in 1960, it received about 24 per cent in 1973 (33). Reasons cited by OJO for these shifts included a decline in Britain's total share of world trade from about 8 per cent in 1967 to about 7 per cent in 1970 and the incidence of tied aid which determined to some extent how Nigeria may order its external trade relations (34). The latter reason may be more appropriate with regard to imports rather than exports.

A similar trend is also observed in the pattern of Nigerian imports. In 1960 Nigeria's imports from Britain, the EEC and the US were about 43 per cent, about 19 per cent and 6 per cent respectively of total imports. By 1972 the figures had become, again respectively and of total imports, about 26 per cent, about 30 per cent and about 10 per cent (35). It again appears that the EEC and the US gained at the expense of Britain. The West remains however, the most important traders with Nigeria.

The dominance of the Nigerian economy by foreign capital has already been demonstrated by Teriba *et al.* Their study is revealing and noteworthy. In a survey of 1,320 firms they show that Nigerian participation in the economy up to 1969 was still very low, even after the state's attempts to encourage local entrepreneurs have been taken into account (36). According to their data Nigerians held a majority (56.4 per cent) of the shares of the value of ₦ 2. The higher the value of the shares, the less the percentage of Nigerians participating. Thus for the shares of the value of between ₦ 10,000 and ₦ 20,000, 33.3 per cent was in Nigerian hands while 66.7 per cent was in expatriate hands. Looking at shares valued at ₦ 200,000 and above they found that only 26.4 per cent was in the hands of Nigerians while 73.6 per cent was in expatriate hands.

In the same number of firms as above, it was also found that expatriates dominated the Boards. «Expatriate Board members own the total Board's holdings in 569 or 43 per cent of the firms, and have majority shareholding in 827 or 62.8 per cent of the firms» (37). Only in 25 per cent of the Boards studied were there no expatriates, and these were usually the small Boards of about 3–5 persons. On the other hand, on about 40 per cent of the Boards there were no Nigerians. These were usually the Boards of the largest firms where in many cases paid up capital was over ₦ 20,000. The study concludes that «... expatriates can thus be seen (sic) to control over 60 per cent of all the Boards studied» (38).

It appears to have been some recognition of the contradiction between encouraging local entrepreneurship and foreign interests simultaneously that inclined the state rather belatedly in 1972 to seek to rationalize the relationship between the two. Nationalist pressure too may in fact have forced the decision to bring in the 1972 Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree commonly called Indigenization Decree. This appears logical from the desire of the petty bourgeoisie to become a bourgeoisie, a desire which was evident from 1960. The Decree aimed not at only maximizing retention within the economy of profits and at helping Nigerian entrepreneurs, it also aimed at raising the level of capital and intermediate goods production within the national economy. Two schedules were proposed in the decree. Schedule I included such service sector activities as retail trade, dry cleaning, hair dressing and other things such as some road haulage, bottling, tyre trading, block, bricks and tiles production, bread and cake making etc. In all, this schedule comprised some twenty-two economic activities. Most of them, it has been argued, «are strategically unimportant in terms of the control which expatriates wield over the economy» (39). The decree provided for one hundred per cent Nigerian ownership in this schedule. Schedule II comprised 33 enterprises. These included beer brewing, manufacture of matches, furniture, cement and paint, ply-wood production, wholesale distribution, paper conversion, electronics assembly, clearing and forwarding, meat, fish and poultry processing, etc. The decree allowed 40 per cent participation in enterprises listed under this schedule by Nigerians.

To facilitate the entry of Nigerians into these enterprises the Federal Government acquired 40 per cent of the shares for foreign banks and now required that they make 40 per cent of their loans to Nigerian business. It also established in 1973 the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NDCI) which was «expected to play a more stimulating role, operating more as an industrial promoter rather than a bank» (40). Other agencies established to facilitate the process included the Capital Issues Commission and the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board, the latter agency was to oversee the implementation of the decree.

The consensus of opinion appears to be that the decree has achieved very little in terms of indigenizing any substantial part of Nigerian industry; it has perhaps succeeded in domesticating some foreign capital. The most affected single category of expatriate enterprises was that in which Lebanese predominated. Apparently they adapted very quickly by obtaining Nigerian citizenship or going into partnership with Nigerians (41). The decree did not aim at areas in local industry in which Nigerians were totally uninvolved. It is estimated that 56 per cent and about 32 per cent, respectively, of the enterprises under schedules I and II were already in Nigerian hands by 1967 (42). Control of many of the other enterprises still remained with the expatriates who have found Nigerians who, for lucrative rewards, co-operate in arranging transfers on terms favourable to these expatriates (43). The Nigerians who have benefited most from the whole exercise appear to be principally the «strategically placed or wealthy» ones (44).

Finally, the decree seemed to have been badly implemented. It is not clear that the Promotion Board was as vigilant as it could have been. What is clearer is that some of the agencies such as the NBCI performed poorly.

«In spite of the apparent link between the establishment of the NBCI and the indigenization policy, the NBCI has disappointingly not been of a great help in financing the purchase of the business or shares in alien companies affected by indigenization. It has given little or no money at all to individuals to buy shares... nor has it played any great role in the acquisition of businesses under Schedule I... For one thing, the NBCI opened its door for business only some six months before the D-Day for the completion of the first phase of indigenization exercise... For another thing, the NBCI does not normally grant applications for loans below ₦ 20.000» (45).

It may be said in summary that the 1972 decree has not done much towards a resolution of the contradiction between aiding local and foreign private capital simultaneously. What little it has done is in defining the areas of operation of local and foreign capital, thereby difusing any immediate conflict between them (46). We shall return to the further consequences of the decree below.

Perhaps the greatest irony of the whole exercise is that shortly after the Decree came into effect, sections of the Nigerian business community were urging that even more foreign investment be attracted into the economy. According to the late Chief FAJEMIROKUN then President of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce:

«In spite of... indigenization policy, Nigeria still needs foreign investment and rapid manpower development in managerial, technical and technological skills... Nigeria should not only be prepared to pay for such services but it must also be seen to be so prepared. This is why we would like the government to draw out specific guidelines promptly so as to facilitate the attraction of the much needed foreign private investment» (47).

It may be argued, however, that Chief FAJEMIROKUN was not really departing from the view of the government. He only painted afresh what had long been state posture. For, by the 1972 Decree the state was not aiming at curtailing the influence in the economy of foreign investment. After all the indigenization exercise hardly affected oil which even then had become the mainstay of the economy. In fact one can trace the state's attitude to foreign investment and the local private sector through successive Development Plans from the colonial period into the post-colonial era. In them the commitment to local capitalist development that is linked to the international system may be observed. In this evaluation of the two Development Plans drawn under the colonial state and the first Plan under the post-colonial state, NAFZIGER found that they had certain important points in common. They were all

«... drawn up primarily by foreign economists. They were in favour of 'automatic' decision-making by private units, a dismissal of major discrepancies between financial and social profitability, a stress on marginal adjustment rather than fundamental structural change, an accent on a high economic pay-off from directly productive investment (as opposed to an indirect return from social over-heads), the eschewal of increased tax rates at high income levels (for fear of dampening private incentive), a conservative monetary and fiscal policy with an emphasis upon a relatively small plan, an economy open to foreign trade and investment, and a substantial reliance on overseas assistance» (48).

What we see here is the same kind of continuity that SCHATZ observed between the colonial and post-colonial economic direction. This direction is not changed in either the Second or Third National Development Plans even though both were written by Nigerians. In the Second Plan, the highest priorities were accorded such infrastructural activities (49) as would favour great economic growth along the already pre-established orientation i.e. local capitalist development integrated with the international system.

It appears that once this observable foreign dominance of the economy is accepted and its continuation from the colonial era acknowledged, it may be seen that perhaps ALAVI had a good point in suggesting that the colonial and post-colonial states function «to preserve the social order in which the interests of foreign bourgeoisie and the locally dominant classes are embedded namely, the institution of private property and the capitalist mode as the dominant mode of production» (50). What ALAVI should perhaps have emphasized more is that the locally dominant class is most likely to be the junior partner to foreign capital and that even where the former class appropriates the state to aid its own economic purposes this situation hardly changes. This appears to be the case of the Nigerian post-colonial state and the governing class. It remains so because even the parameters, within which state power can operate in the service of the locally dominant class, are already determined by the international economy. The historical relation between the peripheral state's dominant class and some of the metropolitan bourgeoisies, and the dominance in the peripheral economy of capital from the metropole help to define the parameters. Short of incurring the loss of confidence of international capital and thus possibly causing an economic crisis, the state in the peripheral formation has to act within the parameters — which parameters are by no means static of course — in its service to the class which locally appropriates its apparatuses. In fact in the face of the dependence that characterized the Nigerian economy it may be argued that the foreign bourgeoisie was effectively represented (so to speak) even if only indirectly in the internal political process. The fact of the conservation of the colonial economic structure may be adduced to support such a point of view. Within such an economic structure foreign bourgeoisie remains the effective ruling class. The local class which controls the political apparatus has to be consistently mindful of the foreign bourgeoisie if its own interests are not to be jeopardized.

This has precisely been the case with the governing class in Nigeria. This class appears to have been in some fear that it cannot, on its own, effectively control and manage the economy. A reflection of this can be seen from Waziri IBRAHIM's fear that:

If we want to really set about improving the economy of our country in a particular way, they may say we are Communists. They can make our countrymen suspect our every move. If they do not succeed by false propaganda, by calling us all sorts of names, if they fail to make us unpopular in order to win their case, they can arrange assassination. They can do it against us. They can go to any extent without discrimination.

WAZIRI made this defence of the government's economic strategy in 1961 when he was Minister for Economic Development, a ministry which was very important for development planning and implementation. How strongly the Minister or the government believed this fear is difficult to ascertain. What is important is the appearance that for some reason or other the Nigerian governing class was then beholden to, and impotent vis-a-vis, the foreign bourgeoisie. With the foreign bourgeoisie determining the nature and direction of the economy and with this class appropriating a higher percentage of its surplus product than the governing class, the latter are forced to reply even more directly on the state and on means of accumulation other than the ordinary process of accumulation under capitalism. This appears to have been the case for much of the period between colonial dyarchy and the military interregnum.

To be sure, one of the important consequences of the Indigenization Decree has been the expansion of the ranks of the comprador bourgeoisie. They are those from among the hitherto impoverished petty bourgeoisie who, because of some wealth they had accumulated or through their access to the institutions established to facilitate the implementation of the Decree, were able to integrate themselves more with international capital. This process of integration of Nigerians with international capital took the forms of either buying shares in foreign enterprises or acting as fronts for such enterprises. The latter form appears to have been fairly blatant, for it drew a lot of both official and unofficial comment. It was carried on such a scale that General OBASANJO, in his address to the nation on June 29, 1979 noted that Nigerians were indeed helping foreign interests to circumvent the Decree and that the result of this was a «shocking performance» (52). Another observer noted: «In many cases Nigerian frontmen were given directorships. Some even condescended very low by buying shares on behalf of foreigners» (53). As with the Indigenization Decree, so it had been with attempts by government to help indigenous contracting firms. Many of them who secured large contracts from the state simply turned around and brought in foreign firms to do the jobs they contracted (54).

The conclusion appears inevitable that the Indigenization policy has not lessened but may in fact have enhanced Nigeria's dependence position. Perhaps by its very nature the policy could not have done much else.

For, while it better rationalized the relationship between Nigeria and foreign capital and provided the former greater room for capital accumulation, it left virtually untouched the big league players such as the United Africa Company, the Compagnie Française de l'Afrique Occidentale (CFAO) that have long been dominant (55). And since the Decree was promulgated Nigerian businessmen and the Federal Government have been at pains to assure foreign investment that it was still warmly welcome. Addressing Commercial and Merchant Banks' Chief Executives in November 1975, General OBASANJO said:

«I like to assure you that... you can count on the warm disposition of this administration towards private enterprise and endeavour. We have sought every opportunity to emphasize our intention to continue to collaborate with foreign investors in promoting joint ventures and in ensuring fair and equitable returns on investments. I like to assure you that investments, from external and internal sources, in the deserving areas of the Nigerian economy have our guarantee of safety... I hope that you will accept the assurances and re-assurances of our favourable disposition to private enterprise and initiative, and pass them on in all your business contacts» (56).

The effect of the Indigenization Decree and the open arms policy toward foreign investment is that Nigerians have been able to take over the low and medium levels in the economy (such as bottling, baking, entertainment, wholesale distribution and shipping) while the real commanding heights of the economy (such as in the oil industry and technology) will still remain foreign dominated. The U.A.C., John HOLT, LEVENTIS, G.E. OLIVANT and the CFAO who had had their tentacles in nearly every area of the economy now attempt to consolidate their resources in the higher grounds of the economy.

All this means that the Nigerian state and the governing class continue to play an intermediary role between the national economy and international capital. What accumulation of capital has taken place among the comprador bourgeoisie and elements of the petty bourgeoisie seems to have been turned into conspicuous consumption or invested in other quick-profit yielding endeavours. Doing this, they have become agents of, instead of a viable alternative to, international capital. Echoes of Frantz FANON come to mind at this point. He had written of the dominant class in most African states in the following perceptive, if caustic, terms:

Seen through its eyes, its mission has nothing to do with transforming the nation; it consists prosaically, of being the transmission line between the nation and a capitalism, rampant though camouflaged, which today puts on the mask of neo-colonialism... will be quite content with the role of the Western bourgeoisie's business agent, and it will play its part without any complexes in a most dignified manner (58).

II. CONCLUSION

What I have attempted to do in this paper is to bring together and analyse some of the existing evidence of the role in the economy of the Nigerian post-colonial state. I should hope that the above discussion places the evidence in its proper context for a more thorough appreciation of the role of the State. There is a need to understand in all its ramifications the roles of the state in the economy, roles which at first glance may appear unrelated and whose impact may go beyond their immediate justifications.

At the theoretical level it is important to appreciate that if by definition the post-colonial state plays the further role of managing and meshing the modes of production, *the nature or direction of this further role depends very much on the nature of the class that controls the state apparatuses*. This point has only been implicit in the discussions of the post-colonial state. It needs to be stated explicitly. For the state is not a tangible thing; it does not itself as such play a role. Rather it is the class that controls the apparatuses of the state that plays a certain role in the name of the state. So, to speak of the role of the state is in fact to speak of the role of the class that controls it. This is why it is virtually imperative that in considering the role of the state we must know the nature of the class behind it.

To be sure, all post-colonial states play vital roles in the articulation of the international modes of production and in the relationship of the national economy to the international system. The crucial difference in how these roles are played will lie in the nature of the classes in charge. Thus in a social formation where a comprador bourgeoisie is dominant, the state will be used to enhance greater integration with international capital, for it is on this integration that the dominant comprador class will survive. In such a social formation the economy is heavily biased toward an import-export operation. There is evidence of this in the Nigerian economy. Where a national bourgeoisie is dominant there still may be integration with the international system but a greater, more conscious and serious effort is made to protect the national economy (i.e. the interests of the national bourgeoisie) from some of the effects of international capital. A national bourgeoisie is quick to recognize that at least contradictions exist between its proper interests and those of international capital.

Of course the question is not as clear-cut as it may appear here. For it does not necessarily follow that the interests of either the comprador or national bourgeoisie will be clearly dominant at any one time. There could always be struggles between these two and any other fractions of the bourgeoisie. The effect of these struggles will be reflected in state policy. Thus with the Nigerian example it appears that for much of the period under discussion the comprador elements of the dominant class had the upper hand. But also the 1972 Decree suggests the existence of a nationalist fraction of the dominant class, even if it is still weak.

Whether it is the national or comprador elements of the locally dominant class that prevails, state policies are still carried out within the 'development' perspective. However, where the class that comes to control the state gives up bourgeois pretensions and, according to CABRAL, commits class suicide by reincarnating «itself... in the conditions of workers or peasants» (59), state policies are carried out within a revolutionary, socialist perspective. And in this situation the further role of the post-colonial state in the economy may be in the direction of reorienting it from the dominant influence of foreign capital. Again, it may not be assumed that the trend will be clear and the goal necessarily achieved. The more important point to note is that it is the locally dominant class controlling the state apparatus that determines the nature of the state's roles in the economy. To speak of the state then is to speak of the class that controls it.

FOOTNOTES

1. Steven Langdon; «The State and Capitalism in Kenya», *Review of African Political Economy*, 8, 1977, p. 93; emphasis on original.
2. See Hamza Alavi, «The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh» *New Left Review*, No. 74, 1972 – pp. 59–81 and John Saul, «The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania» *Socialist Register* 1974, pp. 349–372.
3. Claude Ake, *Revolutionary Pressures in Africa* (London: Zed Press, 1978).
4. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Cf. Robin Murraray, «The Internationalization of Capital and the Nation State», in Hugo Radice, ed., *International Firms and Modern Imperialism*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 110–117.
7. Ikenna Nzimiro, *The Crisis in the Social Sciences: The Ngerian Situation*. Inaugural Lecture Delivered at the University of Nigeria, 15 October 1976, (Third World Forum: Occasional Paper No. 2, 1977), pp. 21–25.
8. See Wolfgang F. Stolper, *Planning Without Facts: Lessons in Resource Allocation from Nigeria's Development*, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1960). He argued for Nigeria's continued integration with foreign capital on the grounds that «the countries increasing their income as well as their standard of living at the most spectacular rate are also countries in which foreign integration has been substantial», (p.61). Nor did Stolper see much use in pursuing protectionist policies: such measures, to him, were tantamount to misallocation of resources (pp. 159–160). Profitability was his watch-word. Stolper was sent to Nigeria (to head the team that drew up the 1962–1968 Plan) under the auspices of the Ford Foundation. For some though not basic disagreement with Stolper by another American member of the planning team see Clive C. Gray, «Planning Without Facts – A Review Article», *Nigerian Journal of Economics and Social Studies*, Vo. 10, No. 1, 1968, pp. 3.31. More views about the Plan appeared in W. F. Stolper, «The Main Features of the 1962–68 National Plan», *Nigerian Journal of Economics and Social Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1962, pp. 85–91; L. M. Hansen, «Methods of Economic Programming and Analysis in the Plan», *Ibid.*, pp. 92–109 and O. Abayode, «A General Critique of the Plan», *Ibid.*, pp. 110–115.

20 *Africa Development*

9. See James Coleman, *Background to Nigerian Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), p. 158.
10. Cf. Goran Therborn, *What Does the Ruling Class Do When it Rules? State Apparatuses and State Power Under Feudalism, Capitalism and Socialism*, (London: New Left Books, 1978), pp. 1446–61; also Michaela von Freyhold, «The Post-Colonial State and Its Tanzanian Version», *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 8, 1977, pp. 75–77.
11. Sayre P. Schatz, *Nigerian Capitalism*, (Berkeley: University of California Press 1977), p. 3.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4.
13. Eastern Nigeria, *Report of the Economic Mission, 1961*, (Enugu: The Government Printer, 1962), p. 1.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
17. Eastern Nigeria, *Report on the Third Conference of Leading Personalities of Eastern Nigeria Origin*, (Enugu: The Government Printer, 1962), p. 22.
18. See for example H. A. Oluwasanmi and J. A. Alao, «The Role of Credit in the Transformation of Traditional Agriculture: The Nigerian Experience», *Nigerian Journal of Economics and Social Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1965, pp.31–50.
19. This discussion is based on Eastern Nigeria, *The ENDC in the First Decade 1955–1964* (Enugu: ENDC n.d.) and G. K. Helleiner, «The Eastern Nigeria Development Corporation: A Study in Sources and Uses of Public Development Funds 1949–1962», *Nigerian Journal of Economics and Social Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1964, pp. 98–123. See also O. Teriba, «Development Strategy, Investment Decision and Expenditure Patterns of a Public Development Institution: The Case of Western Nigeria Development Corporation, 1949–1962», *Nigerian Journal of Economics and Social Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1966, pp. 235–258.
20. See Eastern Nigeria, *Sixth Annual Report of the Eastern Nigeria Marketing Board*, (Port Harcourt: C.M.S. Press, n.d.) pp. 32–33 and the *Eighth Annual Report of the Eastern Nigeria Development Corporation 1962–63 and the Accounts Dated 31 March 1963*, (Enugu: Eastern Nigeria Printing Corporation, n.d.).
21. Eastern Nigeria, *Eighth Annual Report of the Eastern Nigeria Development Corporation*, p. 16.
22. Eastern Nigeria, *The ENDC in the First Decade 1955–1964* p. 25. It interpreted such incidents as merely cases of misunderstanding by the peasants.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
24. Eastern Nigeria, *Eastern Nigeria Development Plan 1962–1968*, (Enugu: Government Printer 1962), p. 7.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
26. *Report on the Conference of Leading Personalities*, p. 15 Professor Oluwanmi has drawn attention to this problem as it existed on a national scale: «It is not easy to obtain even an approximate idea of present food production for domestic consumption in Nigeria». See his «Agriculture and Rural Development» in A. A. Ayida and H. M. A. Onitiri, eds., *Reconstruction and Development in Nigeria: Proceedings of a National Conference*, (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 144.
27. *Eastern Nigeria Development Plan 1962–1968*, p. 37.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
29. R. O. Adegboye, A. C. Basu and Dupe Olatunbosun, «Impact of Western Nigeria Farm Settlements on Surrounding Farmers», *Nigerian Journal of Economics and Social Studies*, Vol. II, No. 2, 1969, p. 238.
30. Mid-Western Nigeria, *Mid-Western Nigeria Development Plan, 1964–1968*, (Benin City: Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1964), pp. 15 and 25.
31. Schatz, *op. cit.*, pp. 84–85.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
33. See O. Adewumi and S. O. Olayide, «Foreign Trade and Public Finances» in S. O. Olayide, *Economic Survey of Nigeria (1960–1975)*, (Ibadan: Aromolaran Publishing Co. Ltd., 1976), p. 127.
34. Folayan Ojo, «Economic Integration: The Nigerian Experience since Independence», *Nigerian Journal of Economics and Social Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1976, p. 291.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 290, table 2.
36. We are drawing here from O. Teriba, E. C. Edozien and M. O. Kayode, «Some Aspects of Ownership and Control of Business Enterprise in a Developing Economy: The Nigerian Experience», *Nigerian Journal of Economics and Social Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1972, pp. 3–26.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
40. See S. A. Oni, «Industry Including Indigenisation» in Olayide, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 66–67.
41. See Paul Collins, «Public Policy and the Development of Indigenous Capitalism: The Nigerian Experience», *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. XV, No. 2, 1977, p. 133.
42. Schatz *op. cit.*, p. 60.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Dr. A. O. Falusi, «Money, Banking and Insurance» in Olayide, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 165.
46. Ake, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
47. *Daily Times*, (Lagos) December 7, 1974, cited in Schatz *op. cit.*, p. 41.
48. W. Wayne Nafziger, *African Capitalism: A Case Study in Nigerian Entrepreneurship*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), p. 65.
49. Nigeria, *Second National Development Plan 1970–1974*, (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1970), p. 35.
50. Hamza Alavi, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
51. Quoted in Segun Osoba, «The Nigerian Power Elite, 1952–65» in Peter Gutkind and Peter Waterman eds., *African Social Studies: A Radical Reader*, (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1977), p. 380.
52. *In Call to Duty*, (Speeches by Brigadier, later General Olusegun Obasanjo), Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, n.d.), p. 63.
53. Babatunde Jose, Jr., *Daily Times*, (Lagos) 9 February, 1978.
54. Schatz, *op. cit.*, p. 195.
55. Ake, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–49.
56. *Call to Duty*, *op. cit.*, pp. 21.

RESUME

Dans cet article, l'auteur veut montrer le rôle de l'Etat nigérian dans l'économie de ce pays en insistant plus particulièrement sur sa capacité de faire coexister les modes de production internes (capitaliste et pré-capitaliste) et aussi sur la manière dont il arrive à harmoniser l'économie domestique et internationale. Il développe sa thèse en trois grandes parties : C'est ainsi qu'il expose successivement la perspective politique et idéologique qui sous-tend le rôle de l'Etat dans l'économie en général, le rôle concret de l'Etat nigérian dans l'économie et les implications de cette intervention de l'Etat dans l'économie. Parlant du Développement en tant que Politique ou Idéologie, l'auteur commence d'abord par faire un bref historique de ce concept. Il fait remarquer que ce concept de développement tel qu'il est compris actuellement, est intimement lié au comportement des Etats-Unis par rapport aux pays européens après la deuxième guerre mondiale. En effet le Plan Marshall qui après la deuxième guerre mondiale a permis aux Etats-Unis d'aider à la reconstruction de l'Europe, a aussi engendré un type de rapports entre les Etats-Unis et ces pays. Ce type de rapports qui faisait des USA l'exemple à imiter parce qu'étant le pays développé «par excellence», est le même que celui qui existe actuellement entre les pays développés et les pays sous-développés. C'est ce qui explique que souvent développement est synonyme de capitalisme car ces pays qu'on dit développés et que les autres pays essaient d'imiter se trouvent être en même temps les grands pays capitalistes.

Pour le cas concret du Nigéria, l'auteur estime que quand on considère la politique de développement adoptée jusque-là par les différents gouvernements, on se rend compte qu'en réalité il n'y a pas eu de changement du tout quant au comportement de l'Etat par rapport à l'économie du pays et qu'en fait l'Etat post-colonial s'est comporté d'une manière identique à l'Etat colonial. Pour justifier son affirmation, il étudie le rôle de l'Etat dans une des plus grandes entreprises : «le Eastern Nigerian Development Corporation». Tout dans l'implication de l'Etat dans cette entreprise a tendu à transformer l'agriculture paysanne en une agriculture de type capitaliste avec comme unique objectif la production d'un surplus qui servirait à financer l'industrialisation. Cette analyse lui a alors permis de considérer aussi les rapports entre l'Etat et le capital étranger. Ce rapport est un rapport de dominant à dominé caractérisé essentiellement par une contradiction flagrante de la part de l'Etat à savoir, aider à la fois le capital local et étranger.

L'auteur conclut son article en faisant remarquer que, en fait, parler du rôle de l'Etat dans l'économie d'un pays, c'est aussi et surtout parler du rôle de la classe qui contrôle cet Etat dans l'économie — C'est parce que la classe dirigeante a toujours été la bourgeoisie comprador que l'économie du Nigéria est actuellement ce qu'elle est.

DEVELOPPEMENT DEPENDANT ET PAUPERISATION DE LA PAYSANNERIE : LE CAS DE L'AFRIQUE DU NORD

Par

*Dr. Fredj STAMBOULI**

I. — INTRODUCTION

La pauvreté rurale au Maghreb est le résultat de la combinaison d'un long processus de stagnation historique interne, aggravée par la pénétration de l'économie capitaliste portée par l'impérialisme et la colonisation. Loin d'être une donnée naturelle, la pauvreté actuelle des populations rurales au sein des formations sociales de l'Afrique du Nord, apparaît au contraire comme un produit historique déterminé par des conditions politiques et économiques concrètes.

A l'origine déjà, les formations sociales maghrébines définies par un mode de production tributaire, étaient caractérisées par un surplus agricole faible et des communautés sociales instables et insuffisamment sédentarisées. La pénétration de cet espace par l'économie capitaliste occidentale a été de ce fait plus aisée qu'en Egypte ou en Asie par exemple (caractérisées par des communautés rurales relativement riches et résistantes), et sa destruction et son affaiblissement furent relativement plus graves.

Au fil de cette stratégie d'anéantissement des paysanneries locales, les liens de solidarité communautaires furent ébranlés et la symbolique collective dangereusement défiée et dévalorisée. L'écologie sociale même a été sérieusement endommagée donnant naissance à des formes spatiales pathologiques (groupements de refuge). Un exode rural de misère s'est déclenché dès la fin du XIXe siècle déversant un volume important de populations aux périphéries des villes inaptes à les intégrer.

Actuellement le mode de production capitaliste dépendant qui caractérise les formations sociales dans le Maghreb contemporain, semble impuissant à opérer une synthèse.

En effet la disjonction villes-campagne s'aggrave au profit de l'espace urbain. Une économie d'enclave généralisée affaiblit encore plus la campagne et y accentue les disparités socio-économiques en même temps qu'elle propulse des réseaux urbains « éclatés » et déconnectés de toute perspective d'intégration socio-économique générale.

Plusieurs recherches récentes conduites aussi bien au Maroc, en Algérie qu'en Tunisie révèlent l'écart grandissant entre les niveaux de vie de populations rurales et des populations urbaines au profit de ces dernières, en même temps qu'elles mettent en lumière les mécanismes politiques qui conduisent à une paupérisation rurale accentuée (structure rurale enclavée et exploitation du travail à bon marché sous forme domestique ou autre au profit du secteur capitaliste dominant).

A terme, une telle modalité de « développement » — induite par le système mondiale de l'échange inégal entre nations — si elle n'était sérieusement corrigée — conduirait inévitablement les formations sociales sous analyse, à une impasse généralisée.

* *Professeur — Université de Tunis.*

II. — UN SYSTEME SOCIAL INTEGRE

Les formations sociales maghrébines pré-coloniales se définissent schématiquement par un mode de production tributaire — marchand par lequel une classe — Etat contrôle le commerce et ponctionne un tribut sur une société bédouine fractionnée et hétérogène.

La société bédouine de type segmentaire n'a jamais été totalement dominée et asservie par le pouvoir central. Il s'agit d'une société caractérisée par un surplus agricole faible et des communautés sociales insuffisamment stables. Seules les communautés proches du centre politique étaient contrôlées et semi-asservies. Les grandes tribus nomades par contre échappaient complètement à l'hégémonie. Elles constituaient d'ailleurs un défi continu à la ville et à l'Etat selon un cycle politique caractéristique de cette région du monde si minutieusement décrit par l'historien Ibn KHALDOUN. Le trait caractéristique des communautés bédouines (sédentaires ou nomades) et qui explique leur grande capacité de résistance, réside dans leur solidarité (açabiya) fondée sur des structures de parenté consanguines (nasab, silat-errahim) et enracinée dans l'appropriation collective (familiale ou tribale) du sol.

En fait l'écologie sociale était de type bipolaire et opposait deux modes de sociabilité et d'économie: les sédentaires agriculteurs et les guerriers nomades.

a) Les premières communautés organisées en unités villageoises (montagnes ou plaines côtières proches des villes) sont caractéristiques par exemples du «sahel» Tunisien, du «dir» Marocain (autour de Fez, Meknès, Marrakech etc...) ou de la «kabylie» Algérienne. Le système socio-politique de ces communautés d'agriculteurs était fondé sur la propriété privée de la terre (Melk) ainsi que sur la propriété collective (villageoise) des terrains de pâturage et des forêts. Pendant longtemps l'équilibre démographique a freiné la différenciation de cet espace sociologique en classes sociales favorisant ainsi une vie politique égalitariste (Djemaâ) souvent notée par les observateurs qui ont qualifié ce système de «*démocratie rustique*».

b) Les communautés tribales par contre, nomades ou semi-nomades (Sahara et steppe) s'adonnaient à la guerre, au commerce et à l'élevage. La propriété est collective (Arch) et le système politique fondé sur une structure sociale hiérarchisée est de type inégalitaire, la substance du pouvoir étant concentrée entre les mains des grands chefs tribaux formant une espèce d'*«aristocratie tribale»*. Il s'agit de communautés organisées militairement et puissantes politiquement. Un système politique de type «*balancier*» fait que leur alliance avec les villes (donc avec l'Etat) marque toujours un moment de grande civilisation, tandis que l'hostilité et la lutte ouverte entre ces deux composantes du système social global annonce souvent un moment de déclin (cycle Khaldounien).

C'est cette société hétérogène mais intégrée, dotée de puissants mécanismes de solidarité et d'une propension à l'autonomie, capable pendant longtemps de contrôler la propriété de ses richesses (terre et bétail), qui devait se heurter à l'expansion impérialiste et au système colonial qui l'ont violemment affaiblie et appauvrie.

III. — LE DEFI COLONIAL ET SES CONSEQUENCES

Aussi bien par ses pratiques (la violence généralisée et la volonté assimilationniste) que par ses motivations explicites (provoquer une liquidation générale de la terre afin d'attirer et d'accueillir l'immigration Européenne) (1), la colonisation Française du Maghreb a constitué une manifestation éclatante de l'hégémonie impérialiste occidentale et un exemple d'une portée quasi-pédagogique pour l'étude des conduites du système capitaliste dans les sociétés périphériques. Ses résultats ne comportent aucune ambiguïté, ils furent résumés de façon prémonitoire par l'historien le plus lucide de l'époque en ces termes :

« Nous avons rendu la société musulmane beaucoup plus misérable, plus désordonnée, plus ignorante et plus barbare qu'elle n'était avant de nous connaître » (2).

A — LA DEPOSSESSION TERRIENNE

Un seul chiffre permet de mesurer l'ampleur de la dépossession terrienne : 5 millions d'hectares parmi les meilleures terres du Maghreb furent accaparées par le système colonial selon des modalités aussi nombreuses que complexes mais dominées constamment par la violence. Un tel chiffre représente nettement plus de la moitié des terres cultivées (63 %) au profit d'une population étrangère nettement minoritaire (3). Cette proportion est lisible au tableau No. 1 et représente 40 % pour l'Algérie, 12 % pour le Maroc et 11 % pour la Tunisie.

Tableau No. I
Répartition des terres cultivées en 1975 (millions d'ha).

	Algérie	Tunisie	Maroc
Région côtière			
. Terres colonisées	2,7	0,7	1
. Terres indigènes	2	2,1	6,6
Région steppique			
. Terres indigènes	2	1,2	0,9
. Total	6,7	4	8,5

Une dépossession terrienne d'une telle ampleur a profondément perturbé la société paysanne sans pour autant changer ses structures de base. La structure de classe surtout, a évolué vers un profil plus inégalitaire composé de la trilogie : masses pauvres, paysannerie moyenne et bourgeoisie terrienne. Le tableau No. 2 donne une idée d'un tel profil.

Le bilan des transformations de la société rurale opérées par le système colonial peut être résumé en quelques résultats saillants (4).

1- 30.000 grosses exploitations modernes étrangères employant un prolétariat agricole évalué à 500.000 hommes, dont 1/3 seulement ont un emploi permanent.

Tableau No. II
Effectifs et Revenus des Différentes Catégories de la Population
du Maghreb en 1955

	Effectifs (000)	Revenus (mld)
Terres de la colonisation		
. Exploitants européens	30	130
. Ouvriers agricoles	470	34
Total	500	164
Terres musulmanes		
. Travailleurs pauvres	1070	70
. Couches moyennes	765	144
. Couches aisées	180	125
Total	2015	339
Total Général :	2515	503

2- Sur un total de 2,5 millions de familles paysannes musulmanes, 2/3 (1,5 millions) s'insèrent dans la *paysannerie pauvre* dont le revenu moyen est de l'ordre de 150 dollars par an. Ce sont des ouvriers agricoles, des metayers ou des micro-exploitants possédant moins de 3 hectares sur la côte et 10 ha environ sur la steppe. La majorité d'entre eux n'ont que des micro-parcelles inférieures à 1 ha. D'ailleurs cette paysannerie pauvre aussi volumineuse soit elle ne possède que 6 % des terres (890.000 ha).

3- Environ 30 % de la paysannerie appartient aux couches moyennes dont la propriété varie entre 3 et 10 ha sur la côte et 10 à 50 ha en steppe. Cette paysannerie moyenne possède 41 % des terres (6.140.000 ha) avec un revenu moyen 3 fois supérieur à celui de la paysannerie pauvre.

4- Au grand morcellement et à la modestie de la propriété qui caractérisent les deux catégories précédentes vient contraster la concentration foncière des agriculteurs riches qui ne représentent que 7 % mais détiennent plus de la moitié de la terre musulmane (7.770.000 ha). Ceux d'entre eux qui possèdent plus de 100 ha ne sont que 1,4 % et totalisent le quart de la terre.

Notons aussi le contraste entre propriété islamique et propriété coloniale. La moyenne des exploitations de la première se situe autour de 12 ha alors que l'exploitation coloniale s'élève à 120 ha, soit 10 fois supérieure.

Cette catégorisation de l'espace sociologique rural par rapport à la propriété de la terre n'est pas suffisamment pertinente pour indiquer les bouleversements profonds qui ont affecté la *condition paysanne* (bédouine) au Maghreb. Non seulement la société bédouine s'est prolétarisée et appauvrie de manière spectaculaire, elle a été surtout profondément aliénée dans son identité primordiale, victime qu'elle fût d'une forme de développement sans perspective totalisatrice (le développement inégal).

La perte de son enracinement économique (propriété familiale et collective) jointe à une forme de développement historiquement aberrant (stagnation de l'agriculture indigène majoritaire et hostilité à l'industrialisation) ont provoqué une paupérisation relative et absolue de la paysannerie

maghrébine. La pression démographique n'a évidemment fait qu'aggraver un système qui était condamné d'avance. Deux tiers de la paysannerie est placée au seuil de la *pauvreté*. Partout la surface de la propriété a regressé et le nombre des propriétaires diminuait au moins de 20 %.

B – LA PAUPERISATION PAYSANNE

Cet «effroyable appauvrissement» (5) qui s'observait déjà à partir de la fin du XIXe siècle a été maintes fois décrit par des essayistes, des économistes, des sociologues, des géographes, des historiens et des philosophes.

Une revue même rapide de cette littérature est utile.

C'est d'abord la *dépossession terrienne* qui est perçue comme le facteur décisif qui devait induire un processus de paupérisation irréversible. L'exiguïté du patrimoine terrien laissé aux «indigènes» et l'apparition du «*problème démographique*» devaient précipiter un tel processus et lui donner la dimension du drame auquel même Albert CAMUS était sensible.

«La société musulmane ne résiste pas au développement de la colonisation : ses cadres brisés, elle s'effondre littéralement... Les grandes familles végètent et s'appauvrissent, l'aristocratie traditionnelle disparaît totalement vers 1900, l'infime bourgeoisie des cités disparaît elle aussi sous le choc colonial... Enfin la paysannerie arabe victime d'une dépossession foncière continue, encore accrue par les ventes des fellahs ruinés fut elle aussi durement touchée» (6).

Pour BOURDIEU l'aliénation paysanne ou ce qu'il appelle la «*dépaysanisation*» est liée essentiellement à l'ébranlement de l'ordre agraire maghrébin. *«Les bases mêmes de l'ordre agraire ayant été ébranlées et en certaines régions détruites (plaines côtières) a entraîné une baisse rapide des niveaux de vie... Car une population énormément accrue et obligée de survivre sur un patrimoine énormément réduit a conduit à une paupérisation relative et absolue de la paysannerie»* (7).

La maladie et la faim assombrissent davantage la scène.

«La dysenterie, l'entérite et la typhoïde décimaient les enfants et tuaient les pauvres... Les famines se suivent en 1921, 1937... L'homme alors, dans le sud surtout, meurt comme l'animal dont les ossements jonchent les pistes... Les vagabonds de la longue marche s'égaillent le long des routes en spectacle déchirant» (8).

CAMUS évoque pour l'Algérie la dimension tragique de «l'affreuse misère» d'un peuple :

«En Kabylie les paysans vivent dans un état de misère indicible. 50 % au moins de la population se nourrissent d'herbes et de racines. Et ce ne sont pas les seuls témoignages de cette affreuse misère... Par un petit matin j'ai vu à Tiziouzou des enfants en loques disputer à des chiens le contenu d'une poubelle» Et l'auteur de conclure : *«Cette promenade à travers la souffrance et la faim d'un peuple montre que la misère ici n'est pas une formule ou un thème de méditation. Elle est. Elle crie et elle désespère... Une misère qui met comme un interdit sur la beauté du monde»* (9).

Le résultat, c'est le grand historien Alexis De TOCQUEVILLE qui l'avait noté déjà dès les débuts de la Chevauchée coloniale :

«Nous avons rendu la société musulmane beaucoup plus misérable, plus ignorante et plus barbare qu'elle n'était avant de nous connaître» (10).

IV. – LA SURPRISE DES INDEPENDANCES

La surprise des indépendances nationales consiste dans le fait qu'après plus de deux décennies les sociétés du Maghreb n'ont pas connu une transformation radicale de leurs structures. La structure de classes en particulier a évolué tout en renforçant les caractéristiques de la période coloniale. La bourgeoisie s'est renforcée, les classes moyennes se sont élargies, la classe ouvrière s'est légèrement accrue mais la condition des masses populaires et surtout des masses rurales semble s'être détériorée davantage. Les recherches récentes sur l'urbanisation accélérée du Maghreb et sur la condition paysanne soulignent la détérioration des niveaux de vie à la campagne et la crise profonde de la paysannerie.

Il est significatif de noter que malgré la différence des régimes politiques, les trois pays du Maghreb connaissent des structures sociales similaires et sont confrontés aux conséquences de la même impasse, celle du développement capitaliste dépendant. Le capitalisme d'Etat pratiqué par l'Algérie ne lui a pas permis d'enregistrer de plus grandes performances concernant par exemple les problèmes de l'emploi ou de la pauvreté rurale. Et le caractère «sur-développementiste» de l'accumulation du capital par investissement intensif en Algérie a aggravé la situation du problème de l'emploi particulièrement dans les campagnes, ce qui confirme de manière éclatante l'affirmation de Samir AMIN : *«Dans le modèle périphérique l'industrie occupe moins d'ouvriers (que dans le modèle central) qu'elle ne ruine d'artisans et ne libère de paysans» (11).*

La situation de l'emploi rural demeure très préoccupante en Algérie où malgré les débuts de la «révolution rurale» le chômage dans les campagnes est très important. Il est significatif dans cette perspective que le «secteur autogéré» procure un taux d'emploi très faible (voir tableau No.3), d'où cette constatation tirée d'une recherche récente sur la stratégie algérienne de développement :

«A l'intérieur du monde rural, le schéma colonial de répartition de la main-d'œuvre n'a guère été modifié» (12).

D'ailleurs la situation globale de l'emploi n'est guère plus brillante puisque le nombre des chômeurs a triplé en six ans comme l'indique le tableau 4. L'inévitable issue devient évidemment l'exode rural et l'émigration à l'étranger. En effet les paysans algériens fuient massivement les campagnes. Entre 1966 et 1973 près de 850.000 personnes ont quitté la campagne ce qui donne un taux d'exode de 1,3 %. Et il est significatif que près de 20 % de la population active vit en France vers laquelle le rythme d'émigration ne cesse de s'accroître :

1948 – 58 (200.000 ouvriers) ; 1962 (500.000) , 1975 (850.000).

Tableau No. 3
Répartition de l'Emploi dans les Campagnes Algériennes (1976)
(Marc Ollivier)

Catégories Socio-Professionnelles	Secteur Privé	Secteur Public	Total
—Travailleurs permanents			580.000
. Secteur autogéré		190.000	
. Coopérateurs		110.000	
. Exploitants privés	280.000		
—Travailleurs saisonniers			
. Saisonniers			
. Secteur autogéré			
. Micro-exploitants privés	310.000		
. Paysans sans terre	630.000		
—Total	1.220.000	300.000	1.520.000

Tableau No. 4
La Population Active en Algérie (000)

	1960	1966	1973
Population totale	8.700	11.820	14.700
Population en âge actif	4.500	5.600	7.600
Population active	1.860	2.500	3.500
Population occupée	1.585	1.500	2.200
Chômeurs	281	900	820

* Tableau No. 4 : Tiré de : l'économie de l'Algérie par Tahar BENHOURIA. ed. Maspéro, Paris 1980.

Même type d'évolution en Tunisie, qui indique une stabilité structurelle agraire très grande. La même proportion de 2/3 (micro-exploitation des moins de 10 ha) si caractéristique du système colonial est reconduite comme l'indiquent les tableaux No. 5 et 5 bis (13).

Approximativement la même structure agraire au Maroc avec une accusation plus grande des deux extrémités de la pyramide.

C'est ainsi que les latifundiaires possèdent de 100 à 6000 ha, totalisent 30 % des terres mais ne représentent que 0,25 % de la population rurale. C'est un exemple de concentration agraire privée typique du système marocain.

Une espèce de bourgeoisie rurale nouvelle est entrain de se construire avec des propriétés qui varient de 20 à 30 ha. Elle ne représente encore que 0,5 %.

Une paysannerie moyenne possède 3 à 20 ha et vit souvent de son travail, représente 27 % et possède 30 % des terres. Cette classe moyenne semble avoir bénéficié récemment des encouragements des institutions financières internationales (BIRD) qui la considère comme un relais d'amortissement des conflits.

Tableau No. 5
Les structures actuelles de l'agriculture Tunisienne (1975)

Superficie moyenne en ha	Superficie globale en ha	%	Nombre des Exploitations	%	Part du revenu brut total. Estimation en millions de dinars	%
moins 1	6.560		16.500			
1 à 2	19.500	1,2	13.800	24	4,2	3,1
2 - 5	108.300		32.700			
5 - 10	186.200	13,6	27.000	46	26,3	19
10 - 20	275.000		19.000			
20 - 50	335.500	28	11.000	24	47	34
50 - 100	188.400		2.780			
100 - 200	246.000	30,7	1.790	4,2	37	27
200 - 500	229.000		790			
+ 500	569.000	26	630	0,5	22	16

Tableau No. 5 (bis)

	1962	1975
Moins de 10 ha	64.000 exploitants (65 %) sur 250.000 ha.	100.000 exploitants sur 320.000 ha.
de 10 à 50 ha	28.000 exploitants sur 600.000 ha	30.000 exploitants sur 600.000 ha.
+ de 50 ha	5.400 exploitants sur 1.100.000 ha.	6.000 exploitants sur 1.200.000 ha.

La paysannerie pauvre enfin représente 40 % de la population et possède 12 % des terres (0,1 à 3 ha par famille) comme indiqué dans le tableau No. 6.

V. — CONCLUSION : Une contradiction insurmontable ?

Les multiples tentatives de «modernisation» rurale sous toutes ses formes aussi bien que les réformes agraires de style divers se sont soldées le plus souvent par un échec évident. Elles n'ont pu ni accroître la production de façon décisive encore moins stopper l'exode rural massif. Elles ont par contre aggravé les dissymétries sociales dans un sens de plus grande iniquité et de plus grande paupérisation de la paysannerie. Et ceci quelle que soit la forme de régime politique : Capitalisme d'Etat (Algérie), capitalisme libéral modéré (Tunisie), capitalisme de libre entreprise (Maroc). Comme si le style technocratique des actions de l'Etat rebute le paysan qui craint la surexploitation sans le bénéfice des avantages de la ville. Le phénomène de «désistement» en Algérie et l'accélération de l'exode rural au lendemain de la

Tableau No. 6*
Stratification sociale rurale au Maroc (1970)

Exploitants	Nombres de familles	%	Superficie	%
Paysans sans terre	20.000	33		
Salariés agricoles	8.000	13		
Paysans possédant				
0,1 à 3 ha	24.000	40	35.000	11,7
3 à 8 ha	11.500	19	50.000	16,7
8 à 20 ha	4.500	7,5	40.000	13
20 à 100 ha	500	0,5	38.000	12
Grands propriétaires (+ de 100 ha)	250	0,25	90.000	30
Propriétaires étrangers	60		20.000	6,7
Total	60.000		2.750.000	

* Ce tableau est extrait de l'étude faite par Mohamed Benhial intitulée la modernisation rurale dans le Gharb Marocain et parue dans l'Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord 1975, p. 270. Notre interprétation dans la société marocaine est fondée sur cet échantillon.

politique de coopération rurale en Tunisie le prouvent amplement. L'aggravation de la dépendance, l'adoption d'un style d'action «développementiste», la propension des élites et des classes moyennes à la consommation, accentuent la rupture entre l'Etat et les masses au détriment de ces dernières.

Tout se passe comme si une contradiction insurmontable domine toutes ces formes de développement : celle qui existe entre la centralisation inévitable de l'Etat induite par la technologie avancée (sous toutes ses formes) et l'autonomie communautaire, seul paravent contre l'exploitation du paysan. Une telle contradiction ne semble pas pouvoir être résolue de sitôt.

Entre temps le processus de dépaysonisation amorcé pendant la période coloniale se poursuit et les discours idéologiques sur le thème de l'authenticité ne semblent pas pouvoir l'arrêter. Même les courants de «retraditionnalisation» qui traversent de part en part le monde islamique aujourd'hui sont récupérés finalement par l'Etat au détriment du paysan. L'issue de la bataille contre la paupérisation rurale demeure encore incertaine.

NOTES

1. A. De Broglie : Une réforme administrative en Algérie, Paris 1860.
2. A. De Tocqueville : Rapport de la grande Commission parlementaire Française. 1847.
3. Samir Amin : L'Economie du Maghreb. ed. Minuit, Paris 1966 – T.1, p. 119.
4. Samir Amin, idem – Djilali Sari : la dépossession des fellahs, SMED 1978 – confirme pour l'Algérie les chiffres de Samir Amin.
5. A. Laroui : Les Origines Sociales et Culturelles du Nationalisme Marocain. ed. Paspéro, Paris. 1980. cf. p. 43).

6. Charles. Robert Ageron : Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine PUF 1964. cf. p. 58 et 83. Le diagnostic est spécifique de l'Algérie. Les situations sont très différentes dans le cas du Maroc et de la Tunisie même si le sens de l'évolution générale est parfois semblable.
7. R. Bourdieu : Sociologie de l'Algérie. PUF 1958, p. 120.
8. Jacques Berque : Le Maghreb entre 2 guerres. Seuil 1962 – p. 318.
9. Albert Camus : Actuelles III. Chronique algérienne 1939–1958. Ed. Gallimard 1958. cf. pp. 33–41.
10. Alexis de Tocqueville : Rapport de la grande commission parlementaire Française (1847) – rédigé par l'historien.
11. Samir Amin : Le développement inégal. p. 213.
12. Marc Olivier : La place de la révolution agraire dans la stratégie algérienne du développement. Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord. 1975. cf. p. 110.
13. Jean Poncet : Les structures actuelles de l'agriculture tunisienne. In Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 1975.

SUMMARY

Rural poverty in Maghreb is not a natural phenomenon at all. It is not only the outcome of a long historical process characterized by stagnation but also that of the entry of colonial powers into this already weak area. Drawing a general picture of this part of Africa, the author stresses the weakness of its structure (low agricultural surplus, unstable, not quite settled social communities) which puts it at the mercy of the imperialistic cultures. The resultant capitalistic mode of dependence widened the gap between urban and rural areas and generated a rural impoverishment (locked-in rural structures and exploitation of cheap labour – in the form domestic services and in other sectors of employment – to the advantage of the dominant capitalistic sector). In his description of the social system which was confronted with the imperialistic expansion and colonization, the author states that it was a heterogeneous but integrated society – with a strong solidarity system and a capacity for self-sufficiency – i.e. able to control its own wealth for a long time. The impacts of the penetration of imperialism and colonialism in this society were:

- *a large scale alienation of land which deeply affected the peasantry*
- *an impoverishment aggravated by a strong demographic pressure.*

After independence the situation hardly improved. There were no radical changes in the existing structures. Today there is what the author calls an insurmountable contradiction between the unavoidable centralization of the state – caused by an advanced technology – and a self-sufficient community.

**NIGERIA AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY,
1970–1980: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESSES AND
IMPLICATIONS OF NIGERIA'S ASSOCIATION WITH
THE E.E.C. UNDER THE FIRST LOME CONVENTION**

By

Dr. H. Assisi ASOBIE*

«As an African country, we consider that the common market is essentially a European Affair and has political overtones which cannot appeal to Africans... We are distrustful of any institutions which operate in a way to keep Africans perpetually as primary producers... We are... anxious to expand our trade outside traditional markets; for so long as the trade and industry of Africa are conducted with only one area of the world, so long will a feeling of dependency persist...»

- Sir Abubakar TAFAWA BALEWA, Nigeria's Prime Minister (1962).

«Nigeria cannot and will not contemplate any form of agreement or association with the Community which in any way savours of colonial or neo-colonial relationship».

- General Yakubu GOWON, Nigerian Head of State (1973).

«Despite (the benefits which Africa has derived from association with the E.E.C.), the Lome Convention remains basically a neo-colonial association which is nothing less than a partnership of unequals... The main fear one has is that the convention, if prolonged unduly, will constitute Africa into a permanent appendage of Europe...»

- Ambassador Olu SANU, Nigeria's former Ambassador to the E.E.C. (1978).

«After the implementation of the Lome Convention for a period of three years, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Convention was established primarily to serve the neo-colonial interest of certain European powers. It is an agreement between two very unequal partners – the A.C.P. on the one hand and E.E.C. on the other. It probably serves the interest of very poor countries willing to sacrifice their independence for economic concessions of doubtful value».

- Ambassador G. O. IJEWERE, Ministry of External Affairs, Lagos (1978).

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1960's, Nigeria's attitude towards association with the European Economic Community has been ambivalent. Every Federal Government, Civilian or Military, has first opposed formal association and then, eventually, concluded an association agreement of one kind or another with the E.E.C. In September 1962, Sir Abubakar TAFAWA BALEWA, the Nigerian Prime Minister and his government rejected association

* Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome, insisting that the E.E.C. was «essentially a European affair which cannot appeal to Africans» and that to associate would be inconsistent with Nigeria's policy of non-alignment (1). But, in February, 1963, the Federal Government appointed an ambassador to Brussels, Dr. Pius N. OKIGBO, and mandated him to explore the «possibilities, and the nature of the most suitable form of relations for Nigeria to enter into the Community» (2). Dr. OKIGBO later secured from Europe an agreement on what he described as 'association *sui generis*'. (3) This association agreement was signed in Lagos in 1966 and ratified by the Federal Military Government of Nigeria in January 1968. But it never came into force until it lapsed because France and Luxembourg failed to ratify it (4).

Similarly, in 1972, General Yakubu GOWON's government rejected association with the E.E.C. under Protocol 22 of the Treaty of Rome, on the ground that it savoured of neo-colonial relationship. Yet, by late 1973, Nigeria had, along with other African, Caribbean and Pacific states, begun negotiations with the E.E.C., which eventually led to the conclusion of the first Lome Convention in 1975.

This paper has two main objectives. The first is to explain this ambivalence in Nigeria's attitude and show how and why the initial policy of rejection of association was reversed. The second is to examine the extent to which the provisions of the agreement which was eventually concluded were satisfactory in the light of Nigeria's initial objections, and how far the operation of the Lome Convention either served or negated Nigeria's national interests.

The central argument of the paper is that while the initial rejection of association with the E.E.C. was based on the careful calculation of Nigeria's national interest, the reversal of the earlier decision represented a gradual surrender to external pressure as well as the working out of the dynamics of Nigeria's political economy. Nigeria's conclusion of an association agreement with the E.E.C. in 1975 was the end result of Nigeria's reluctant participation in the process of negotiations with the E.E.C. Not surprisingly, the Lome Convention did not and could not serve Nigeria's national interest. Indeed the provisions of the Lome Convention were harmful to Nigeria's national interests. Nigeria's continued association with the E.E.C. is best explained in terms of the inability of Nigerian rulers to consistently pursue and achieve the nation's interests by developing the appropriate strategies and mustering the necessary and adequate resources. In turn, this inability is the result of constraints constituted by the structure of Nigeria's economic relationship with the external (capitalist) world and the related capitalist and external orientation of the Nigerian leadership.

WHY NIGERIA REJECTED ASSOCIATION WITH THE E.E.C. 1970-1972

The decision of the military government under GOWON to reject associate status with the E.E.C. was made against the background of

strained political relations with several Western European countries. Its beginnings could be traced to that time in Nigeria's history when the pressure of national survival forced Nigerian leaders to put national interest above all other considerations. As the memories of some of the events of the civil war receded and the pressure of survival became less potent, the pursuit of national interest tended to lose its urgency. Subsequently, Nigerian leaders became at once less conscious of the need to protect the national interest and more prone to the habit of merely responding to external stimuli and accepting policies which tend to perpetuate the *status quo* as long as they do not seriously threaten the interests of the ruling class.

The decision not to associate with the E.E.C. was first taken in the midst of the Nigerian civil war. Before the Lagos treaty lapsed, the Nigerian government indicated that it would not negotiate another association agreement with the E.E.C. Early in 1968, the Nigerian government had made futile efforts to get all the six member states of the Community to ratify the Lagos treaty. But France and Luxembourg did not co-operate (5). So, in October 1968, as the second Yaounde Convention was being negotiated, the Nigerian Ministry of Trade announced that Nigeria would not enter into negotiations for a new agreement because she could not benefit from association. But by this time, the government was not in a position to consider the matter thoroughly as it was pre-occupied with the political and military problems of the civil war.

Three months following the end of the civil war the E.E.C. indicated its readiness to negotiate a new agreement with Nigeria, similar to that of 1966. It also offered associate status to the other Commonwealth African States (6). Britain too, which was in the process of renewed negotiations for its own membership of the E.E.C. indicated that it would like Commonwealth African states to seek associate status with the E.E.C. Then, late in 1970, the Nigerian government set up an inter-Ministerial Committee on Nigeria's relations with the E.E.C. composed of permanent secretaries and other senior officials drawn from the Federal Ministries of Finance, Trade, Economic Development, and the Cabinet Office. The Economic Department of the Ministry of External Affairs was also represented. The committee was asked to study the implications for Nigeria of the United Kingdom's entry into the E.E.C. In its report, the committee noted that the effect, on the Nigerian economy, of Britain's entry would be minimal (7). It added that, in any case, the Nigerian economy could not have its requirements satisfied by associating with the E.E.C. under any of the existing options. It therefore recommended that the government should conclude a simple commercial agreement with the Community (8).

The Committee's view was shared by influential publics in Nigeria. For instance, the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, Mines and Industry which, along with the Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria (M.A.N.), had been invited to participate in the discussions of the interministerial committee (9), opposed Nigeria's association with the E.E.C. Its president, Chief Henry FAJEMIROKUN, suggested that, as an alternative policy, Nigeria should sponsor a regional economic grouping in Africa (10). In 1971, the *New Nigerian* whose views were respected in government circles, also opposed association: it urged the Government not to associate with the

E.E.C., especially under the Yaounde type of convention. It argued that such association would perpetuate the 'scarcely veiled neo-colonialist division of labour between Europe and Africa' (11). The Western-state-government owned *Daily Sketch* also advised against association (12).

By the end of 1971, the Nigerian government had, through the aid of experts and senior officials in the relevant ministries, made a careful examination of the issues involved. It had considered especially, 'the dimensions, content and prospects of Nigeria's trade with the enlarged European Economic Community and the merits and demerits of the various options in relation to both Nigeria's national economic interests and as they would affect economic co-operation in Africa' (13). It had also consulted the relevant interest groups or otherwise known their views. It therefore took a decision.

The decision was made public at the end of 1971, by Alhaji Shehu SHAGARI, then the Federal Minister for Economic Development and Reconstruction. In spite of Britain's accession to the Treaty of Rome, he declared, Nigeria would not associate with the Community on the basis of the Yaounde Convention or the Arusha or even the Lagos type of agreement (14). Rather, it would explore 'the possibility of a trade agreement on specific commodities' with the E.E.C. (15). As an alternative to association, the Nigerian government urged other African countries to 'come together to form... regional common markets similar to the E.E.C.' (16). Indeed, as time went on, the Federal Military Government came to see the establishment of a West African Economic Community as both an alternative to, and a pre-requisite for, any relationship of equality with the E.E.C. (17).

It is necessary to appreciate the political and economic background against which this decision was taken. Among the political developments were: the attempts by certain E.E.C. member countries to use the opportunity provided by the negotiations for the Lagos Treaty to extract diplomatic concessions from Nigeria – attempts which the Nigerian government found objectionable; the unhelpful role of certain E.E.C. member countries in the Nigerian civil war; and Nigeria's commitment to the establishment of an economic community that would cut across the linguistic barrier in West Africa.

When Nigeria was negotiating the Lagos Treaty in the 1960's, both France and the Federal Republic of Germany had used the opportunity to put pressure on Nigeria to change its policy in certain directions. Right from the time the Eighteen African and Malagasy associates were negotiating for the first Yaounde convention, the Federal Republic of Germany had suggested that a clause should be included in the Convention which would give West Germany and the other Five the right to refuse signature or ratification of the treaty if any of the African states adopted unfriendly policies, including the recognition of the German Democratic Republic. Although this was rejected at the time by the other members, yet when Nigeria's agreement reached drafting stage, West Germany insisted on incorporating a clause in article 1 which would permit each contracting party to break the agreement if the associated

state pursued unfriendly policies (18). Eventually, however, the clause was not incorporated in the Lagos Treaty for the other E.E.C. member states did not support it.

Another attempt to extract a diplomatic concession from Nigeria, in the course of the negotiations, was made by France. France used the opportunity to put Nigeria in a position where she had to take the first steps towards the normalization of relations with France.

Right from the time Nigeria broke diplomatic relations with France and hustled M. Raymond OFFROY, the French Ambassador, out of Nigeria, the problem of normalizing relations apparently hinged on which country should take the first step. It seems that Nigeria was expected by the French President, Charles de Gaulle, to apologize for treating the representative of a great power in such a brusque manner. Nigeria did indeed begin to mollify France once she knew that she might have to seek some accommodation with the E.E.C. Thus, in 1962, tentative approaches were made by Nigeria to France and preliminary talks were held on the resumption of diplomatic relations. Subsequently, the Nigerian government hesitated before confronting France. Thus, in 1963, when France made another nuclear bomb test in the Sahara, Nigeria's reaction was subdued: the Federal Government excused itself by noting that the test was done in the territory of another independent African country, and that Nigeria should not infringe upon the right of another sovereign state which itself ought, more properly, to make the protest. Then when negotiations for association actually began, and France continued to frustrate Nigeria's bargaining with the E.E.C. by the application of delaying tactics, the Federal Government worked hard through the French-speaking African states to normalize relations. On its part, France, too, at this stage desired resumption of relations with Nigeria. Thus, normal relations were restored between Nigeria and France in 1965. Soon after, the Nigerian government accredited one of its most senior ambassadors, Alhaji Abdul MALIKI, to Paris.

These attempts were resented by the civilian administration. And the military regime under GOWON was further irked by the refusal of France and little Luxembourg to ratify the treaty, thus putting Nigeria in the awkward position of having to appeal for the ratification of a treaty which was never manifestly in her interests.

Nigeria's dissatisfaction with the role of some E.E.C. member states in the Nigerian civil war was another political factor which shaped Nigeria's desire to reject associate status. By the time Nigeria declared that it would not negotiate a new agreement, the civil war was fifteen months old, and several Western powers had taken positions on the crisis.

Most members of the E.E.C. were either on the side of the secessionist region, Biafra, or wavered between neutrality and a pro-Federal stance (19). France, for instance, had in July 1968, declared support for Biafra. The Dutch took a position, at first, which pleased the Biafrans: the Dutch government imposed a total ban on all arms shipments to Nigeria, implying neutrality. But, later, in October 1968, it reversed its stand and pledged support for the pro-Federal position adopted by the O.A.U.

Belgium at first supplied arms freely and openly to the Federal side; then, in response to pro-Biafran public opinion in the country, it denied supplying arms to either side, although it continued to do so surreptitiously. The attitude of Luxembourg was equally ambivalent. Italy and West Germany declined at first to sell arms to either side. But later, the Italian government managed to maintain good relations with Lagos, supported the Federal cause, and yet 'manœvered to identify with the humanitarian aspirations espoused by the Vatican of supporting the sending of relief aid direct to Biafra'. The behaviour of the West German government was similar: while endorsing the O.A.U. position, it was also prepared to go out of its way to get relief aid to Biafra.

These unsalutary experiences caused Nigeria to become particularly sensitive to neo-colonialist designs in Africa, and determined to defeat all neo-colonialist forces in the continent (20).

The possible adverse effect of association under the Yaounde type conventions on the establishment of a regional economic community, was another important consideration which led the Nigerian government to reject associate status. Nigeria was, by this time, committed to the formation of an all-embracing West African Economic Community. And her fear was that association by some West African states, principally, the ex-British and ex-French colonies, to the exclusion of others, would, by creating discriminatory trade preferential areas in favour of Europe inhibit intra-West African trade and, ultimately, frustrate regional integration (21).

On the economic level too, there were developments which pushed into insignificance any short term benefits that might accrue from association. First, there was the oil factor: the fact that crude oil which had a ready market formed the bulk of Nigeria's export and yielded enough revenue to drastically reduce Nigeria's dependence on external aid. Second, the volume of primary commodities available for export after the civil war was not much higher (and in some cases was less) than it was before the civil war; thus the need for external market for the primary products was considerably reduced. Third, at any rate, Nigeria's trade with the E.E.C. did not show any marked decline even without an association agreement.

By 1970, Nigeria's crude oil which could not be affected by either association or non-association had assumed a predominant position in the country's total export trade, making Nigeria less dependent on the export of her agricultural commodities to the E.E.C. In that year, crude oil export accounted for 57.5 per cent of the value of Nigeria's overall exports. By 1972, the proportion had risen to 82.7 per cent (22). The market for oil in the 1970's was assured; and in any case, the E.E.C. member states were becoming increasingly less important as consumers of Nigeria's crude oil. In 1971, the U.K. and four major E.E.C. member states were the principal consumers of Nigeria's oil; they took between them 59.0 per cent of Nigeria's oil. But by 1974, their share of Nigeria's crude oil export had decreased to 48.9 per cent. In 1978, it was as low as 27.1 per cent. In contrast, the share of Nigeria's crude oil consumed by the U.S. rose rapidly from 20 per cent in 1971 to 28.8 per cent in 1974 and 46.1 per cent in 1978 (23).

More important, crude oil was fetching huge sums of foreign exchange reserves for Nigeria and contributing increasingly to government revenue, thus making the government less dependent on external financial aid from organizations like the E.E.C. The value of crude oil exports rose from a mere N 509.8 million in 1970 to N 1,976.2 million in 1972, a rise of 130.7 per cent. The contribution of crude oil to government revenue also increased tremendously, rising by 234 per cent, from N 236.2 million in 1970-71 to N 789.6 million in 1972-73 (24).

In recognition of the changed financial situation of the country, the Federal government downgraded the role of external financial aid in national development, from 50 per cent in the first national development plan to 20 per cent under the second national development plan.

As oil dominated Nigeria's export trade, the importance of agricultural export products declined correspondingly, and finding markets for them ceased to be a matter of life and death for the Nigerian economy. The volume of these products, processed and unprocessed, available for export either declined or remained constant. And the amount of foreign exchange they earned did not show any appreciable increase either (25).

Apart from cocoa beans and cocoa butter, no other commodity recorded an increase in the quantity exported in 1973, as compared with the quantity exported in 1966. Indeed, by 1973, the exports of most of the agricultural products (e.g. cocoa, groundnuts, cotton, and palm produce) had become negligible. The decline in the quantity of agricultural exports was partly due to falling output. The quantity of cocoa produced declined from 259,000 tonnes in 1970 to 197,000 tonnes in 1973. Similarly, the production of cotton seeds declined from 272,000 tonnes to 113,000; groundnuts from 510,000 to 270,000; palm kernels from 299,000 to 231,000; and palm oil from 28,000 to 14,000 (26). In part, too, the decline in exports was due to the diversion of agricultural products to home markets where the local consumption of these products had increased and agricultural land was increasingly being devoted to the production of staple foods (27).

In consequence, in the 1970's agricultural exports and non-oil exports in general contributed only a negligible proportion of Nigeria's export earnings. In 1970, the proportions of the contributions were: crude petroleum - N 510 million or 57.6 per cent of the total; non-oil sector - N 375.4 million or 42.2 per cent; and agricultural exports N 222 million or 25.1 per cent. By 1973, the insignificance of the contribution of agricultural products to export earnings had become quite outstanding: in that year, crude petroleum contributed 83.1 per cent of export earnings, while agricultural products contributed a meagre 8.7 per cent (28).

Clearly then, by 1973, the prospects of restricted entry of Nigeria's exports into the markets of the E.E.C. had ceased to cause concern in Nigerian Government circles because of the radically changed structure of the export trade. Even the prospects and later the reality of British entry did not cause any alarm in Nigeria for several reasons. First, it had by then been realized that the much talked about Commonwealth preferences meant little in practice to African countries. Although, in general, most

Commonwealth products entered Britain duty-free it was really such products in large supply by many countries as sugar, wheat, butter, wine and fruits that enjoyed a clear preferential margin or a system of high and guaranteed quotas in the British market (29). A study carried out in 1966 concluded that the ending of Commonwealth preference 'would have little effect on the national incomes of the (Commonwealth) members' (30).

Nevertheless, British entry into the E.E.C. still posed a problem for Nigeria: it meant that Britain would be obliged to apply fairly high tariffs to especially two of Nigeria's primary products, namely, cocoa butter (E.E.C. tariff, 6-5 %), and lower tariffs on cocoa beans (4 %) and unprocessed groundnut (4-12 %) (31). Theoretically, these tariffs could inhibit the development of cocoa and groundnut processing in Nigeria. Also E.E.C. tariffs could stunt the development of export of textiles of which Nigeria had by this time become a major producer (32).

But then, secondly, the adverse effects of E.E.C. tariffs on the export trade of Nigeria and other developing countries had by this time also been diminished by the tariff reduction negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.) and the institution of a general system of preferences following negotiations under UNCTAD II. By 1975, 'all developed countries had instituted preferential schemes' under which tariff preferences were granted, on a temporary basis, to a limited range and quantity of industrial products from underdeveloped countries (33).

Moreover, it had also become clear to Nigeria and other African states that the greatest problem which their export products faced in European markets was not necessarily the tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade but the deterioration of their terms of trade. In 1973, Robert GARDINER, then the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa estimated that as a result of the weakening of the world prices of primary products in the face of rising cost of manufactured consumer and capital goods imported by African countries they had lost the equivalent of \$ 6,000 million within the decade; in 1970 alone, Africa's loss from deteriorating terms of trade had amounted to \$ 700 million (34). The increased output and export of crude petroleum, the rising price of which was determined by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, helped to reduce the impact of this loss on the Nigerian Economy. Nevertheless the Nigerian leaders were fully aware of this exploitative relationship between Africa and Europe and strongly condemned it. Indeed, GOWON called upon all African States to co-operate to 'reverse the present system of trade and aid' between Africa and Europe which makes Africa a net 'exporter of capital... to the developed, industrialized countries that often falsely claim to be aiding us' (35).

Nigeria's determination to reject association with the E.E.C. was further strengthened by the empirical evidence available. By 1972, it was becoming clear, that the loss of Commonwealth preferences and the imposition of tariffs by the E.E.C. would have only a marginal impact on Nigeria's external trade. This was shown by the little change in Nigeria's export trade with both Britain and the E.E.C. after Britain had joined the Common Market and before the Lome Convention was signed. In 1971, a year

before Britain acceded to the Treaty of Rome, Nigeria's export of non-oil products to Britain amounted to 30.6 per cent of her total non-oil exports to all countries; by 1974, the figure had fallen by only 2.6 per cent to 28.0 per cent. Similarly, in 1971, Nigeria's export of non-oil commodities to Western Europe (including, predominantly, E.E.C. member states) amounted to 36.0 per cent; by 1974, it had fallen by only 1.7 per cent to 34.3 per cent. But this little and temporary (apparent) loss of market was adequately made up for by the increased sales of non-oil commodities to the Soviet Bloc which took 19.6 per cent of Nigeria's products in 1974 as contrasted with their share of 13.2 per cent in 1971 (36). Confident that Britain's entry would have little adverse impact on Nigeria's external trade, the then Commissioner for Trade and Industry, Alhaji Ali MUNGUNO, stated that as a response to Britain's entry into the E.E.C. Nigeria would simply intensify her efforts at export promotion to overcome the impact of non-association (37).

Much more worrying to Nigeria than either the loss of Commonwealth preferences or the effects of the Community's tariffs was the possible impact of reverse preferences on intra-African trade, and consequently, on regional integration. The African countries — The Eighteen which were already associated with the E.E.C. had erected a tariff against non-associated countries the same tariffs as the E.E.C. member states themselves. If Nigeria rejected association, it would hinder trade between West African states (38) and the basis of West African economic integration might be further undermined.

These then were the general considerations and the political and economic developments which led the Nigerian government to reject association with the E.E.C. We shall now consider Nigeria's specific objections to association.

These objections were clearly set out at the time by the successor to Alhaji MUNGUNO in the Ministry of Trade, Mr. Wenikè BRIGGS. The first objection was, as under BALEWA, against the granting of reverse preferences. The Nigerian government argued that it was unfair to require underdeveloped African countries to grant reverse preferences to the advanced countries of Europe. By granting tariff preferences to the industrialized states, the African countries made greater sacrifices than their trading partners in Europe since the finances accruing from tariffs constituted a higher proportion of the budget of the former than of the latter (39). More important, the Nigerian government believed that 'reverse preferences represented an obstacle to economic co-operation between neighbouring African countries' and especially to 'the formation of regional economic communities' (40).

The second criticism was directed against the community's aid programme which the Nigerian government claimed had failed, after fourteen years of association, to transform the associated states from one-crop economies to more diversified and developed economies as expected (41).

Indeed, the Nigerian government argued that the aid programme of the E.E.C., when put against the background of the deteriorating terms of Africa's trade with the E.E.C., was a veneer to mask the continued exploitation of Africa by Europe. As GOWON put it, the 'present system of trade and aid' (between Africa and the E.E.C.)... in the end, makes Africa an exporter of capital so desperately required for local development, to the developed, industrialized countries that often falsely claim to be aiding us' (42).

The third reason for rejecting association under the prevailing terms was that it was neo-colonial – in Johan GALTUNG's sense – in character. The existing association arrangement, the Nigerian Minister for Trade maintained, 'was a subtle and clever device to ensure supply of raw materials for European factories while it provided virtually guaranteed markets in the Associated countries for European manufactures' (43).

As an alternative to association, the Nigerian government decided: first, in the short term, to negotiate 'a purely trade agreement or commercial treaty with the E.E.C. that is compatible with her economic interest and in no way derogatory to her sovereignty' (44), and secondly, in the long run, to initiate, sponsor and sustain efforts towards the establishment of a West African Economic Community.

It should be noted that when the decision to reject association was taken, not only was the formation of a West African Economic Community seen as an alternative to association with the E.E.C., but the latter was viewed as inherently antithetical to the former. Moreover, any suggestion that association with the community might aid the process of regional integration in West Africa or Africa was spurned because it hurt the pride of Nigerians. The statement made by the Federal Minister of Finance then, Alhaji Shehu SHAGARI, reflected this pride: 'African countries should come together and unite in spite of well-known obstacles. We do not have to do this under the umbrella of the enlarged E.E.C., but on our own' (45).

When, therefore, Nigeria negotiated, signed and ratified an association agreement with the E.E.C., it was a change of its original policy. It is necessary to understand why this change occurred.

WHY NIGERIA EVENTUALLY CONCLUDED AN ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT WITH THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, 1973–1975

On March 21, 1975, Nigeria became the first signatory state to ratify the Lome Convention. This *volte face* is attributable to a series of developments which generated tremendous pressure that came to bear on the Nigerian government. First, there was external pressure for a joint approach to the E.E.C. from the Commonwealth African and Caribbean countries. Secondly, this was reinforced by pressure for a joint continental approach from the O.A.U. Nigeria was vulnerable to these pressures for several reasons. The continental approach was in line with the role which the Nigerian government had mapped out for itself at the end of the Nigerian civil war. To lead a continental team in negotiations with

Europe seemed to provide Nigeria with an opportunity to either forge or demonstrate the emergence of African solidarity in the face of several divisive forces. More importantly, because of the integration of Nigeria into the world capitalist economy and the capitalist oriented development strategies which the Nigerian leaders favoured and which were predicated on continued dependence on the industrialized capitalist states, seeking some kind of accommodation with the E.E.C. was never completely ruled out. For some reasons, the conception of a West African Economic Community as an alternative to association was never seen in strategic terms; it was a mere tactical manoeuvre, for the new community was to be developed, not outside, but within the world capitalist economic system. Hence, Nigeria's commitment to the establishment of a West African economic community became paradoxically one of the reasons for deciding to associate when that project seemed threatened by the potential polarization of West Africa into associates and non-associates.

From early 1972, the Nigerian Government became involved in a series of international consultations which ultimately resulted in Nigeria's participation in the negotiations for the Lome Convention. The first set of consultations took place close on the heels of Britain's accession to the Treaty of Rome. In January, 1972, representatives of Commonwealth High Commissioners in London met to discuss the effect of British entry on their economies and future relationship between them and the E.E.C. Then in April 1972, a meeting of Commonwealth officials was held to discuss the issue further. This was followed three months later (July) by a second meeting of Commonwealth officials. No consensus emerged at these meetings regarding the nature of the relationship which the Commonwealth countries should establish with the E.E.C. (46).

Two months later, a delegation from the Caribbeans arrived in Lagos to hold discussions with Nigerian officials on the issue. In February, 1973, a delegation from the East African Community also came to discuss the same issue with the Nigerian authorities. The East African delegates strongly urged that all 'associables' should adopt a common approach to the problem. They also indicated that they expected Nigeria to play a leading role in the process of evolving this common stand (47). From Nigeria, they went to canvass other Commonwealth African countries to support the adoption of a common position in dealing with the E.E.C.

As a result of these consultations, a meeting of African Trade Ministers was held in Lagos on 16 February, 1973. At the Conference, the Nigerian representative made the government's position clear. It was against association because the existing arrangement was exploitative and neo-colonial (48). Nigeria would, therefore, not seek associate status; she would only negotiate 'a purely trade agreement or commercial treaty...' The Nigerian spokesman then made a passionate plea to the other Commonwealth African countries: instead of thinking of association, they should 'take a cue from Europe which had (realized) that her interest lay in European economic integration (and establish) a strong and prosperous regional economic grouping in Africa' (50).

Despite Nigeria's passionate appeal to the Commonwealth Trade Ministers, they took a decision to seek a relationship that could include association. The only concession they made to the Nigerian view point was that they would 'not be bound by the E.E.C.'s three point options to associables': the type of agreement they would enter into would be determined by their own needs (51). They also decided to work out a common position with both the Commonwealth Caribbean associables and the Yaounde associates and then 'negotiate with the E.E.C. ... as a group' (52).

Consultations were held with the African associates and Caribbean associables in March, 1973. In April, a second meeting of Commonwealth African Trade Ministers was held in Nairobi, Kenya. To the satisfaction of Nigeria, they agreed that any future relationship with the E.E.C. must exclude the principle of reciprocity or reverse preferences. Nevertheless, the idea of association itself was not rejected. The conference agreed to negotiate with the E.E.C., on a collective basis, a 'general agreement on trade, economic and technical co-operation' that would give African commodities 'free and assured access' to E.E.C. markets (53).

Thus by mid-1973, Nigeria had been manoeuvred into a position where she accepted a policy of seeking a relationship with the E.E.C. that did not entirely rule out associate status. It had become clear, too, that Nigeria could not sell to the Commonwealth African group the idea of viewing and seriously pursuing sub-regional economic integration as a viable alternative to association with the E.E.C. Nigeria's original policy was therefore in crisis; it was put under further pressure by developments at the level of the O.A.U.

Between June 1972 and May 1973, a series of consultations were held under the auspices of the O.A.U. and with the support of both the Economic Commission for Africa and the African Development Bank on the issue of Africa's future relationship with the Community. In May 1973, the O.A.U. Assembly adopted the following principles to guide negotiations between all African states and the E.E.C.: non-reciprocity in trade and tariff concessions; extension of trade concessions to other countries, on a non-discriminatory basis as desired by the African states; free and assured access to E.E.C. markets for all African products; revision of E.E.C.'s rules of origin to facilitate the entry of African manufactures into European markets; guaranteeing stable and remunerative prices for the main products of African states; assurances that no agreement with the E.E.C. would adversely affect inter-African co-operation; revision of the provisions relating to movement of payments and capital to reflect the need for monetary integration among African states; and dissociating E.E.C. financial and technical aid from any particular form of relationship with the E.E.C. (54).

Clearly, most of Nigeria's objections to association would be taken care of if all these principles were fully reflected in any agreement between Africa and the E.E.C. But there was no way of knowing in advance if this would be the case. Hence, in 1973, Nigeria still reserved her position: whether she would associate or not would depend on the outcome of the negotiations.

However, Nigeria's reservations were further weakened by moves from the E.E.C. itself. By the end of 1973, the combined pressure of the globalists within the E.E.C. — Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Ireland and Britain — and the United States operating from outside the E.E.C. had made the Community more flexible in its attitude towards association. This change was heralded by a special report prepared for discussion in the E.E.C. Commission in the first quarter of 1973. The report which came to be known as the *Deniau Memorandum* had five aspects which sought to make association more acceptable to Commonwealth African and Caribbean states. First, it showed that the E.E.C. might be prepared to drop its rigid insistence on negotiations with third world countries taking place within the framework of the three alternative forms of association, viz: full association; association *sui generis*; or special trade agreement. Instead it was stated that a decision on the part of the «associable» states who would participate from the beginning in negotiations aimed at full association «will not constitute an undertaking to conclude an agreement on this basis». This opened the way for even those states like Nigeria that had not quite made up their minds on what form of relationship they desired to establish with the community to participate with the others who wanted full association, in the negotiation.

Secondly, in the report, the Commission indicated the community's readiness to accept, as associates, countries which were not former colonies of any of the E.E.C. member states. The effect of this was dual: it not only extended the offer of association virtually to all sub-Saharan African States thus pre-empting allegation of divide-and-rule tactics, but it also removed some of the stigma attached to association as a continuation, by other means, of the colonial pattern of relations.

Thirdly, the Commission showed its willingness to drop the vexed question of reverse preferences or at any rate to neutralize the effects. It suggested that preferences granted to the member states might be extended to as many third world countries as the African states wished. This made the idea of reverse preferences meaningless.

Fourthly, it became apparent, that the community was no longer insisting that aid should be given only to those who sought full association. Moreover, the commission was, by this time, known to be seeking forms of aid that would be more flexible and substantially greater in quantity than the aid given under the Yaounde Conventions.

Fifthly, it became clear, too, that linked to both aid and trade, a commodity stabilization agreement was envisaged by the Commission to cover a number of agricultural products. It was to be a financial compensatory scheme aimed at stabilizing the commodity earnings of associated states. This was a major innovation in the Commission's report.

These features of the *Deniau Memorandum*, heralding salutary changes in the community's attitude, served as attractions to Nigeria and other Commonwealth African Countries. They went a long way to reduce the strength of Nigeria's objection to seeking associate status with the E.E.C.

Two other considerations caused Nigeria to abandon her opposition to association. One was her overall African diplomacy. When Nigeria emerged from the civil war, the central theme of her African diplomacy was reconciliation and solidarity among African states. Yet there were several forces which threatened to keep Africa divided; and Nigeria believed that some of these divisive issues were deliberately introduced by external powers in order to split the ranks of African states. The issue of dialogue with South Africa had threatened the unity of Africa. But Nigeria led the campaign to defeat what the O.A.U. Assembly, following Nigeria's cue, viewed as a 'manœuvre by South Africa and its allies to divide African states' (55). Then there was the issue of the legitimacy of the new regime of General AMIN in Uganda. Nigeria played the role of a conciliator between the new regime in Uganda and those African states that refused to recognize it because she believed that disagreement over the issue could divert Africa's attention from the more pressing issues like those of ending colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa. In the end she was able to resolve the issue (56).

Nigeria's policy of achieving unity and harmony among African states was also threatened by the issue of association with the E.E.C. There were signs that an extra-African power was exploiting the issue to sow discord among African states. During a visit to West Africa in 1971, the French President, Georges POMPIDOU had urged the French-speaking African states to resist the attempts by their English-speaking counter-parts to become associated with the E.E.C. on the ground that they were richer and more efficient producers and as such would dilute the trade preferences the former French colonies... enjoyed with the E.E.C. Subsequently, the associates insisted that what they wanted was a 'stronger and closer association with the E.E.C. than was provided under the Yaounde conventions, rather than one that was 'diluted and weakened in a wider scheme of things' (58). Their insistence on the maintenance of reciprocity and the rejection of the concept by the Anglophones reflected the cleavage between the two groups which threatened the emergent African unity to which Nigeria was committed. Nigeria's determination to end this cleavage lay behind her decision to join and then lead the collective group of African associates and associates in joint negotiations with the E.E.C. even though it had earlier tried to sabotage attempts by the Commonwealth Secretariat to forge a common Commonwealth stand on the same issue (59).

The other consideration that weighed strongly with Nigeria was the need to bring to fruition its plan of establishing an all-embracing economic community in West Africa. The project was threatened by several obstacles. The first problem was how to allay the fears of French-speaking West African states of Nigeria's economic and political domination. The second difficulty concerned the attempt by France backed by the E.E.C. to consolidate the solidarity of, and anti-Nigerianism among, the Francophone states in West Africa. To this end France sponsored the formation of a Francophone-exclusive West African economic community, and the E.E.C. made grants of various sums: ₦ 86,000 in 1971, ₦ 220,000 in 1972, and ₦ 143,000 in 1973 (60).

To overcome the first problem Nigeria launched a skilful diplomatic offensive aimed at creating an image for Nigeria of a benevolent sister state ready to make sacrifices for the welfare of other states. To this end, the Nigerian government spent large sums of money as aid – mostly in the form of grants – to West African states. To overcome the second difficulty, Nigeria tried at first to insulate West Africa from getting more intimately involved in institutional ties with Europe through the E.E.C.; hence the initial opposition to association. But she soon recognized that she could not counter France's franc diplomacy in the sub-region; she therefore gave up, noting that she would not ask the French-speaking African countries 'to commit economic suicide in the face of known realities' (61). And since she also realized that exclusive association of some West African states with E.E.C., involving both preferential trade concession in favour of Europe and external trade barriers against non-associated West African countries, would hinder regional integration, Nigeria decided to join the negotiations: it seemed the only practicable way of avoiding polarization of West Africa into associates and non-associates.

The choice of this generally less beneficial alternative was hardly surprising. The decision was in line with the Federal Military Government's national economic development strategy which, like its pet project ECO-WAS, was predicated on the premise of continued dependence on Western Private and public capital.

Under GOWON, as under Sir ABUBAKAR, the economic development strategy centred around import substitution type of industrialization. For this, great reliance was placed on external inputs. The idea was that Nigeria's raw material – minerals and agricultural products – would be exported to Europe and America where they would earn the necessary foreign exchange with which to buy capital equipment to support local industrialization efforts. The gap between export earnings and cost of imports would, it was expected, be filled by foreign public loans and private investment capital. Such a development strategy made association or at least some kind of relationship with the capitalist countries of Europe virtually inevitable.

As for ECOWAS, it was also to be built up through continued reliance on foreign capital. Indeed one of its most important institutions was to rely on foreign capital for its operation. The fund for co-operation, compensation and development was expected to obtain financial resources from both African and foreign sources. The fund would even guarantee foreign investments made in member states of ECOWAS provided such investments were in line with the harmonization of the industrial policies of member states – (ECOWAS Treaty, article 52d). On a more general level, no fundamental contradictions were envisaged between the operation of ECOWAS and continued extensive dependence on Europe which the Lome Convention symbolized. Like Lome, the ECOWAS Treaty envisaged continued reliance on foreign capital from Europe and America, including the continued penetration of West Africa by foreign private investment. Like Lome, the ECOWAS Treaty did not see as a basic and immediate problem the political and monetary balkanization of West Africa. And like Lome, the ECOWAS Treaty did not envisage a radical change of economic

development strategy (62). No wonder then that the decision to associate with the E.E.C. under the first Lome Convention was never considered as incompatible with the goals of regional economic integration in West Africa. Given the orientation of Nigerian and other West African leaders at the time – the leadership was predominantly neo-colonial and national-bourgeois – it was not surprising first that economic development was conceived in superficial terms as static growth; second that strategies were adopted which would perpetuate West Africa's neo-colonial ties; and third that no contradictions were perceived between seeking associate status with the E.E.C. and working towards industrialization in West Africa through regional economic integration.

We shall now turn to examine the provisions and operation of the first Lome Convention in the light of Nigeria's earlier objections and her national interest.

THE FIRST LOME CONVENTION: WHAT BENEFITS OR COSTS TO NIGERIA?

Of the provisions of the first Lome Convention the most important to Nigeria were those regarding trade co-operation, industrial and technical co-operation and, to a less extent financial co-operation.

TRADE CO-OPERATION:

The Convention granted free entry to all African, Caribbean and Pacific (A.C.P.) state's products into the markets of the E.E.C. member states. This meant that no customs duties or charges having equivalent effect, and no quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent effect might be imposed on A.C.P. export products except where there were specific rules and measures introduced in pursuance of either the E.E.C.'s common agricultural policy or public policy, public security and public morality, or in order to correct disturbances in the economy (63). In such cases, however, the contracting parties would be duly informed or consulted.

Of particular interest to Nigeria was article 7.1 which ruled out the granting of reverse preferences by A.C.P. states to the E.E.C. member states. The article stated that, on the part of the A.C.P. states, there were no specific 'obligations corresponding to the commitments entered into by the Community in respect of imports of the products originating in the A.C.P. states' (64). However, the A.C.P. states undertook not to grant more favourable access to imports from certain E.E.C. states than was granted to others and not to grant less favourable trade terms to E.E.C. states than was granted under the most favoured nation principle to other states unless the most favoured nation treatment was extended 'in respect of trade or economic relations between A.C.P. states or between one or more A.C.P. states and other developing countries' (65).

These provisions raised the hopes of the A.C.P. states that their products, especially manufactures as well as processed and semi-processed goods would, under the Lome Convention, enter the markets of the E.E.C.

states freely. It was further hoped that this would stimulate the production of these goods and thereby lead to a faster rate of industrialization than would otherwise be the case.

In evaluating the impact of the trade provisions on Nigeria's economy and external trade, we must distinguish between different categories of products. These are: those commodities which enter the E.E.C. free, whether or not the producer has trade concession agreement with the E.E.C. (e.g. oil); those whose access to E.E.C. is restricted for non-associates but free for associates, but for which the A.C.P. states are not able to take full advantage of free entry (e.g. manufactured products); those on which A.C.P. countries are granted preferential access to E.E.C. markets which they can exploit (e.g. cocoa and banana); and those that fall within the common agricultural policy and for which, therefore the A.C.P. states would not have had access to the E.E.C. markets but for the Convention (e.g. sugar and meat) (66).

During the life of the first Lome Convention, the bulk of Nigeria's export to the E.E.C. was made up of petroleum products. Generally, just over twenty-five per cent of A.C.P. exports were accounted for by petroleum. But in the case of Nigeria, the figure was much higher. In 1975, 94.7 per cent of Nigeria's exports to the E.E.C. consisted of crude oil exports. In 1978, the figure remained high at 81.9 per cent (67). Since this is a commodity that the E.E.C. members would not normally like to restrict, whether its sales to the E.E.C. increased or diminished had nothing to do with whether or not Nigeria was deriving any benefit from the Lome Convention.

With respect to manufactured products, the Lome Convention did not seem to have any favourable impact on their export either to the world in general or to the E.E.C. states in particular. In 1970 and 1972, when Nigeria was not associated with the E.E.C., manufactured and semi-manufactured commodities accounted for 18.0 and 15.3 per cent, respectively, of Nigeria's total non-oil products to all countries. By 1975, the figure had fallen slightly to 15.2 per cent; in 1977 it fell further to 14.0 per cent (68). During the life of the convention, there was a decrease in the sale of Nigeria's manufactures to the E.E.C. in both absolute and relative terms. In 1975, the value of Nigeria's exports of manufactures to the world was N 27.457 million; in 1978, it remained about the same at N 27.538 million. But the E.E.C.'s share of these exports declined from 96.7 per cent (N 26.554 m.) in 1975 to 83.6 per cent (N 23.028 m.) in 1978 (69).

There were several reasons for the decline and stagnation in the sale of Nigeria's manufactures to the E.E.C. and the world. The first was the increased domestic consumption of these products. Between 1975 and 1977, the production of manufactured goods in Nigeria increased by 31.7 per cent, from 147.7 units to 194.5. But much of the increase was in those products like soap and detergents (83.6 %), roofing sheets (45.4 %) paints and allied products (61.6 %) which Nigeria's expanded domestic market took up. Secondly, the clause relating to the origin of products discouraged the expansion of the export of manufactured goods from all A.C.P. countries to the E.E.C. As a rule products imported without tariffs by the

E.E.C. from the A.C.P. had to have 50–60 per cent value added, and this requirement was difficult to meet by Nigeria and other A.C.P. countries which have very low industrial capacity especially as it was inflexibly applied. Thirdly, through administrative restrictions, the E.E.C. member states, acting under the safeguard clauses of the Convention, were able to restrict those materials they did not want. For instance the Community 'leaned' on Ivory Coast to discourage it from developing an export capacity in cotton textiles. Similarly, Mauritius was prevailed upon to impose restraints on its exports of textile. The Community's excuse was that European textile industries were under threat of closure due to declining demands for textile in Europe (71). But, then, A.C.P.'s exports of textiles to the E.E.C. represented only 1.8 per cent of total community imports of textiles. Indeed, as the A.C.P. Ministers meeting in Brussels in 1980 noted, A.C.P. states imported more textiles from the Community than they exported to it (72).

Significantly, during this period, E.E.C.'s share of Nigeria's total non-oil exports showed an appreciable increase. It rose from 57.1 per cent in 1975 to 80.6 per cent in 1978 (73). In 1975, the export of Nigeria's non-oil products, other than manufactures, to the E.E.C. accounted for 86 per cent (i.e. N 162.2 million out of N 188.4 million) of Nigeria's total exports of non-oil commodities, other than manufactures, to the world. By 1978, E.E.C.'s share had risen to 95.4 per cent. E.E.C. was, thus, taking almost all of Nigeria's exports of non-oil exports, other than manufactures, to the world: E.E.C.'s share was N 475.7 million out of a total of N 498.7 million (74). Since it was in the export of non-oil products, other than manufactures, to the E.E.C. that the provisions of the Lome Convention seem to have had the greatest impact, we can only conclude that the E.E.C. was much more interested in obtaining from Nigeria such raw materials as crude non-fuel minerals as well as agricultural products, than in buying manufactured goods.

Further analysis reveals that the increased value of exports of agricultural products was not due to increased exports of those commodities either to the world at large or to the E.E.C. in particular. This suggests that the only other area where there could have been a rise in the quantity exported to the E.E.C. must have been the non-fuel raw materials. With respect to unprocessed agricultural products, the quantity to the world generally declined; stated in thousand tonnes, the pattern was as follows: raw cocoa, 202 in 1975 and 165 in 1977; palm kernels, 173 in 1975 and 169 in 1977; rubber, 57 in 1975 and 18 in 1977. The reason for this was that for most of the agricultural products, there was a sharp decline in the quantity produced. For instance, the quantity of raw cocoa fell from 258.6 thousand tonnes in 1970 to 196.8 in 1973 and to 165.0 in 1977. Similarly, the production of cotton fell from 271.7 thousand tonnes in 1970 to 181.1 in 1977; and groundnuts from 509.9 thousands tonnes in 1970 to 140.0 in 1977. Only palm produce showed a slight increase: the quantity of palm kernels produced increased from 299.3 thousand tonnes in 1970 to 301.9 in 1977. Also the production of palm oil increased from 28.2 thousand in 1970 to 60.0 in 1975, falling to 47.0 in 1977 (75).

As a result of this general decline in volume of production, by the 1976–1978 period, exports of Nigeria's major agricultural commodities had become generally negligible. The increase in earnings from agricultural exports, from ₦ 265.2 million in 1970 to ₦ 393.7 million in 1977 was due mainly to the rise in the unit price of these products. For example, between 1975 and 1977, the average weekly prices (c.i.f.) in London of agricultural products rose as follows: cocoa, from 76.7 to 255.6; groundnuts, 68.1 to 94.5; palm kernels, 45.2 to 74.7; and palm oil, 63.7 to 78.9 (76).

Nigeria did not also benefit in any significant way from the concessions granted to A.C.P. states covering the products that fall within the purview of the common agricultural policy. Nigeria produced very little of such products as sugar (53.2 thousand tonnes in 1977) and beef the bulk of which is consumed internally any way.

As for imports, the Lome Convention also seems to have had no significant impact on Nigeria's purchases from abroad. The value of Nigeria's imports from the E.E.C. rose by 116.2 per cent, from ₦ 2,208.3 million in 1975 to ₦ 4,775.4 million in 1978. But then, Nigeria's total imports from all countries rose by even a higher percentage – 118.8, from ₦ 3,721.5 million in 1975 to ₦ 8,140.8 million in 1978. Thus, while E.E.C.'s share of Nigeria's total imports was 59.3 per cent in 1975, by 1978, it had fallen to 58.7 per cent (77). This is not surprising considering that the Lome Convention did not provide for the granting of reverse preferences by the A.C.P. states in favour of products imported from the E.E.C. states.

A point worth reiterating is that it is on the export to the E.E.C. of non-oil products, other than manufactures, that is raw materials, that the provisions of the Lome Convention seem to have had the greatest, or rather any impact at all. By encouraging the production and export to Europe of raw materials, association under the Lome Convention, has in practice, despite its noble intentions, tended to have the effect of keeping Nigeria as a perpetual primary producer.

INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

One of the major attractions of the first Lome Convention to Nigeria was its provisions on industrial and technical co-operation. The Convention had, as one of its objectives, the promotion of the establishment and development of small and medium sized industrial estates and the creation of the appropriate economic infrastructure in the African Caribbean and Pacific states. To this end, the E.E.C. states undertook to work in co-operation with the A.C.P. states in order to, among other things: facilitate the transfer of technology to the A.C.P. states, as well as promote the adaptation of technology to their specific conditions and needs; provide vocational and advanced training to nationals of A.C.P. states; to set up advisory services and institutions that could create credit facilities in these states, and provide directly financial and technical assistance to them (78).

For the period of the Convention, a total sum of 3,390 million European units of account (e.u.a.) or ₦ 2,321.0 million was allocated to provide financial and technical aid to A.C.P. countries. It was stressed that the primary object of this assistance would be to 'correct the structural imbalances in the various sectors of the A.C.P. economies' (79). The implication is that they would be assisted to overcome their heavy dependence on the export of raw materials.

Of this sum, ₦ 2,054.9 million or 88.5 per cent was to be managed under the European Development Fund (E.D.F.). The bulk of this, ₦ 1,798.0 million or 87 per cent of the sum to be administered under the E.D.F. would be paid out in the form of grants, soft loans and 'risk capital'. And the remainder, (i.e., 12.5 per cent of E.D.F. or ₦ 256.9 million) would be paid out in the form of transfers for the stabilization of export earnings (stabex). The rest of the Community's aid, that is 390 million e.u.a. or ₦ 267.1 million (i.e., 11.5 % of total E.E.C. financial allocation under Lome 1) would be managed by the European Investment Bank, and paid out as loans under more stringent conditions (80).

Nigeria did not derive any substantial benefits from these provisions of the First Lome Convention. To begin with, the Federal Military Government under GOWON decided not to benefit fully from the financial aid provisions in order not to deplete, by taking its due, the amount that could be shared to the rest of the A.C.P. states. As a result, only a small sum of 10 million e.u.a. or ₦ 7.8 million was allocated to Nigeria under the Fourth E.D.F. Even then, the disbursement of this sum was very slow. By February, 1980 not more than 30 per cent of it had been disbursed, although 80 per cent had been committed (81). From the E.I.B., Nigeria had an allocation of 50 million e.u.a. or ₦ 34.2 million or 12.8 per cent of total allocation to A.C.P. states. 50 per cent of this sum was given to the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank to lend to private investors for medium scale industrial projects in the country. The other 50 per cent was given to the National Electric Power Authority for the strengthening of the power supply system in Nigeria. The amount is to be repaid over a period of 11 years at an interest rate of 5.75 per cent. The loan has been described as the 'largest yet made under the Lome Convention' (82). But in reality it did not represent any special benefits to Nigeria under the Lome Convention. The E.I.B. is after all a project-financing bank which does not restrict its loans to either E.E.C. states or their associates. Since the bank does not lend to countries but for public and private investment, it is not the nationality of borrower, but the nature of the investment and the chances of success of the projects for which the loan is sought that matter (83). Thus Algeria, though not a signatory to the Lome Convention secured bigger loan (114 million e.u.a.) than Nigeria from the E.I.B. (84).

Also, Nigeria did not benefit at all from the STABEX provisions. The major reason for this was that owing to the dominant position of crude oil in Nigeria's export trade, no other single commodity satisfied the 7.5 per cent ceiling threshold which a country's export commodity earning must reach to qualify for STABEX. Thus although certain commodities, for instance groundnut and cotton, might have satisfied the floor trigger

level – that is, the minimum level of export earnings short fall – of 7.5 per cent, they did not qualify to receive STABEX.

As for the benefits from the Centre for Industrial Development, Nigeria has derived little from Lome I: expert missions to assist existing industries, training a few technicians, co-operation between Nigerian and European universities; information about available Western technology, etc. At best these advantages are marginal. And, in any case, if the provisions on industrial co-operation were fully implemented, the effect would be increased penetration of Nigeria by European private investment to the net disadvantage of Nigeria.

EFFECTS OF THE LOME CONVENTION ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA

Another benefit which was perhaps anticipated by the Nigerian government when negotiations were going on for the Lome Convention was that it would help the process of regional economic integration in West Africa. It was indeed argued subsequently by Federal Government official representatives that Nigeria's gains from Lome should be evaluated not merely in financial terms, but rather in the context of the overall political and diplomatic importance of the Convention to Nigeria. According to Chief Peter AFOLABI, the most important considerations in this respect are: the substantial though unquantifiable political gains Nigeria derived from leading the A.C.P. group during the negotiations; and 'the geopolitical importance of the Convention... in the context of Nigeria's commitment and association in the sub-regional organization, the ECO-WAS' (85). It has even been suggested that the Lome Convention has, in the end proved, 'the unanticipated vehicle for the promotion of African economic integration' (86), thus unintentionally helping Nigeria to further its goal of economic integration of West Africa.

It is probable that, the momentum generated by the process of negotiating for Lome I robbed off on the process leading to the formation of ECOWAS. The successful conclusion of the Lome I negotiations also strengthened the argument of Nigerian leaders and other strong proponents of West African integration that ECOWAS could be established (87), and generally 'produced an air of compromise, optimism and self-confidence' (88) which helped the process of establishment of ECOWAS. Too, it must be noted that the First Lome Convention itself contained several provisions supportive of regional integration, and in this respect, the first Lome Convention was a marked improvement on the previous association treaties linking African states with the E.E.C. The operational performance of the E.E.C. within the purview of the Lome Convention seems, on the face of it, to support the view that the Lome Convention is compatible with the move towards regional integration in West Africa. For instance, since ECOWAS was established, the E.E.C. has rendered a variety of technical and financial assistance, including financial allocation of 590,000 e.u.a. or N 404,110 out of a total of 110 million e.u.a. or N 82.8 million allocated to regional projects in West Africa (89). It has also committed a sum of 44 million e.u.a. or N 30.1 million as special loan from the E.I.B.

for the West African Cement Company (C.I.M.A.O.), a joint venture undertaken by Ghana, Ivory Coast and Togo (90).

A closer look at the attitude of the E.E.C. to regional integration in West Africa or the provisions and operation of the Lome Convention *vis-a-vis* the conditions for regional integration in West Africa will however reveal that they are incompatible. The ultimate effects of the provisions and operation of Lome I will be to intensify those aspects of West Africa's relations with Europe which will eventually frustrate economic integration of the sub-region. There are certain aspects of West Africa's relationship with Europe which are, in the long term, harmful to regional economic integration and development but which, apparently for tactical reasons, even the ECOWAS treaty left untampered with. The effect of the successful operation of Lome I would be to strengthen these anti-integrationist aspects thereby increasing the problems which ECOWAS will face as an instrument of economic integration.

The Lome Convention, by encouraging an increase in economic transactions between West African states and Europe, discourages, by the same token and to the same extent, the growth of horizontal economic links among the states of West Africa. As vertical trade links between the West African associates and the E.E.C. member states increase, horizontal links among the West African states themselves will either correspondingly decrease or grow at a much slower rate. Nigeria's experience amply illustrates this phenomenon. Between 1975 and 1978, E.E.C.'s share of Nigeria's total non-oil exports to the world showed an appreciable increase, rising from 57.1 per cent to 80.6 per cent. Correspondingly, West Africa's share of Nigeria's total non-oil exports fell from 0.36 per cent in 1975 to 0.26 per cent in 1978 (91). The trend in the pattern of trade relations is reinforced by the effect of aid. The manner of E.E.C. aid is such that it encourages increased economic transaction between Africa and Europe generally. The extension of financial credits and grants by the E.E.C. sets off local demands in the recipient African states for capital equipment and their components or spare parts which can only be supplied by the donor country. Even STABEX is designed to discourage the diversification of economic links away from the E.E.C. members states. Payment of STABEX is confined to earnings from exports to E.E.C.

The result of increased transaction flow between West Africa and Europe will be that greater importance will be attached to relations with Europe than to intra-West African relations. By freezing or weakening the existing level of horizontal transnational transactions in West Africa, and encouraging greater interaction with Europe, the association transmits a message of low salience in intra-West African relations to African leaders, thereby undermining the basis of regional integration.

Furthermore, the pattern of E.E.C. aid to regional organizations in West Africa is such that it tends to encourage the simultaneous development of competitive regional groupings thus pre-empting the consolidation of an all-embracing economic grouping. Under Lome I, the pattern of distribution of E.E.C. aid to regional projects in West Africa was as follows: ₦ 3.42 million to the Mano River Union; ₦ 68,438.00 to the Communaute

Economique de l'Afrique Occidentale (C.E.A.O.); and N 404,110 to ECOWAS (92). By encouraging, through financial support, the existence of rival regional economic groupings in West Africa, the Lome Convention will have the effect of delaying the growth of a comprehensive regional economic grouping, like ECOWAS.

Perhaps, the most important point here is that the Lome Convention encourages the penetration of West Africa economies by foreign investment. This is harmful to regional integration for several reasons. To start with, it will perpetuate the control of the economies of West African states by European based multinational corporations. This seems, in fact, to be the *raison d'être* of the Centre for Industrial Development. Such foreign monopolies will use their vantage positions in the economies of West African states to frustrate integration if they consider it harmful to their interests or they may seek to become prominent in intra-West African economic transactions in order to have a veto power over both the pace and direction of economic integration and development (93). If regional integration takes place in a situation where the national economies are dominated by foreign monopolies, it is to these firms that the benefits of a large market will accrue. Economies of scale arising from a larger market may be achieved, but the real benefits will be transferred to the home countries of the foreign monopolies; the West African states themselves will gain little. Indeed, whether or not they are in control of the national economies of West African states, the effect of increased role of foreign monopolies in West Africa will be to undermine regional integration. This is because, by their *modus operandi*, they create socio-economic imbalance in those areas where they operate. In their search for maximum profits, foreign firms invest mainly in areas of gainful exploitation of labour and resources (94). This will compound the difficulties of the institutions and procedures established to correct the existing socio-economic imbalance and so will help to increase the disenchantment of the underprivileged members of the community with those common institutions. In this way, the activities of foreign monopolies work to strengthen the forces of polarization instead of consolidating those of integration.

In sum, the Lome Convention reinforces those aspects of Africa-Europe relations which are potentially harmful to economic integration in West Africa. It encourages trade with Europe and, by the same token, discourages the growth of intra-West African trade; it encourages reliance on foreign capital for economic development thereby increasing the opportunities for foreign monopolies to control African economies and dictate the pace of development and integration; it intensifies the economic exploitation of African states and perpetuates the existence of unviable competitive regional groupings. The ECOWAS treaty does not make provisions for dealing with these fundamental problems, but it will confront them in future. The Lome Convention compounds these difficulties and ensures that by the time ECOWAS comes round to them they have become intractable.

Nigeria's association with the E.E.C. is also harmful to her interest in several other ways. It facilitates the consolidation of cultural and

ideological penetration of Nigeria by Europeans. Participation in joint A.C.P. — E.E.C. consultative or deliberative institutions provides extra opportunities for conveying to Africans in subtle ways the presumed superiority of certain political institutions and decision-making procedures with ideologically biased implications. Moreover, the political goodwill and intimate relationship flowing from the association provides a congenial atmosphere under which Nigeria and other African states become more susceptible to suggestions of co-operation in such non-economic fields as cultural affairs, thus further complicating Nigeria's and Africa's task of becoming culturally and ideologically independent of Europe.

Again, the association affords the E.E.C. member states a useful opportunity to impose their own conception of the relationship between the individual and the state on the associates and to get them to adopt Western European standards of political behaviour. The Human Rights issue which the E.E.C. member states have persistently raised is a case in point. The point is not really whether those standards of political behaviour are the best or the worst, the highest or the lowest. The point is that unless African states themselves either evolve or voluntarily adopt certain standards of political behaviour in the light of their individual experiences and circumstances, they are not likely to understand, appreciate and sustain them.

Finally, the association tends to increase the avenues through which the European powers apply pressure on Nigeria and other associates to modify those policies which they do not like. For instance, it was reported in 1979, that Britain sought the backing of the E.E.C. to persuade Nigeria to relax rules pertaining to pre-shipment inspection of imports on the ground that they were discriminatory in application and could develop into a non-tariff barrier to trade (95). Of course, theoretically, Nigeria and other A.C.P. states could also use A.C.P. — E.E.C. fora to apply pressure on the European powers. But in practice, such pressure would have much less effect given the weaker bargaining position of African states under the Lome Convention.

CONCLUSION

Nigeria became associated with the E.E.C. under the first Lome Convention primarily for political rather than economic reasons. Economically, the Convention has not been of any significant benefit to the country. Politically and diplomatically too, its effects are at best of doubtful value: Nigeria's leadership of the Third World is best exercised outside the watchful eye and beyond the interfering reach of European powers; indeed the leadership of A.C.P. is harmful to a vanguard role in the process of creating solidarity among the Third World Countries for A.C.P. solidarity will detract from wider Third World solidarity; and the process of regional integration in West Africa will not, in the long run, benefit from Nigeria's or West Africa's continued association with the E.E.C. because the association will consolidate Africa's vertical integration with Europe. Nigeria should therefore not negotiate for a third Lome Convention: she should rather

persuade other West African states to sign only simple commercial agreements with the E.E.C. and concentrate, instead, on building up ECOWAS as an instrument of economic integration in West Africa. However, given the present political leadership in West Africa and the prevalent pattern of external economic ties, it is safe to predict that this advice will be followed neither by Nigeria nor any other West African states in the foreseeable future.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Ibrahim A. Gambari, *Party Politics and Foreign Policy: Nigeria under the First Republic*. (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1980) pp. 115 and 120.
2. P.N.C. Okigbo, *Africa and the Common Market* (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1967) p. vii.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
4. Olajide Aluko, *Ghana and Nigeria 1957-1970: A Study in Inter-African Discord*. (London: Rox Collings, 1976). p. 214.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Aluko, *Essays on Nigeria's Foreign Policy*. (London: George Allen & Unwin 1981) P. 8.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
9. Interview: Mr. Idikogi, Federal Ministry of Trade, Lagos – 24 March, 1976.
10. Aluko, *op. cit.*, (1981) pp. 77 and 188.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. Wenike Briggs 'Negotiations Between the Enlarged European Economic Community and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (A.C.P.) Countries'. *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 1 No. 1 (July 1975) p. 16.
14. Aluko, *op. cit.*, (1977) p. 215.
15. Briggs, *loc. cit.*
16. Aluko, *op. cit.* (1981) p. 78.
17. *Africa Diary*, April 9-15, 1973 – p. 6425.
18. Douglas Anglin, 'Nigeria: Political non-alignment and Economic Alignment'. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 2, 2 (1964).
19. For a detailed discussion, see John J. Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977) pp. 224-233; 294-297.
20. Aluko, *op. cit.*, (1977) p. 105.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 216.
22. *Ibid.*, (1981) p. 75.
23. Central Bank, *Annual Reports*; cited in A.H.M. Kirk-Greene and Douglas Rimmer, *Nigeria Since 1970* p. 136.
24. Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Second National Development Plan, 1970-1974: Second Progress Report*. (Central Planning Office, Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction, Lagos, 1974).

25. See table in *Ibid.* pp. 15–16.
26. Central Bank of Nigeria, *Nigeria's Principal Economic and Financial Indicators, 1970–1977* (Pamphlet, n.d.) p. 2.
27. Kirk-Greene and Rimmer, *op. cit.*, p. 76–77.
28. *Nigeria's Principal Economic and Financial Indicators* (g.v.) p. 6.
29. J.D.B. Miller, *Survey of Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Expansion and Attrition 1953–1969*. London: Oxford.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 288.
31. David William's 'West Africa and the European Community: Towards Association'. *The Round Table* No. 250 (April, 1973) pp. 217 – 219. See also Aluko, *op. cit.*, (1981) p. 876.
32. Williams, *loc. cit.*
33. Joan Edelman Spero, *The Politics of International Economic Relations*. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977), p. 175.
34. *Africa Research Bulletin* (Econ. and Tech. Series) Vol. 10, No. 2, March 31, 1973 – p. 2643.
35. Aluko, *op. cit.*, (1981) p. 73.
36. Kirk-Greene and Rimmer, *op. cit.*, p. 136.
37. Aluko *op. cit.*, (1977) p. 215.
38. Williams, *loc. cit.*, p. 220.
39. Briggs, *loc. cit.*, p. 17.
40. *Ibid.*,
41. *Ibid.*
42. cited in Aluko, *op. cit.*
43. Briggs, *loc. cit.*, p. 17.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
45. Aluko, *loc. cit.*, (1981) p. 78.
46. Briggs, *loc. cit.*, p. 16.
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Ibid.* p. 19
54. Ruth Weiss, 'Africa and the E.E.C.' in Colin Legum, ed., *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1974–1975*. (London: Rex Collings, 1975) – p. 17.
55. Zdenek Cervenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the O.A.U.* (London: Julian Friedmann Publishers, Ltd., 1977), pp. 118.
56. Aluko, *op. cit.*, (1981) pp. 25.
57. Okwudiba Nnoli, «Trade and Politics in the West African Region, 1966–1976». A paper sponsored by the Nigerian Army Headquarters presented at the Senior Army Officers Conference, Jos, May 2–6, 1977 (unpublished) pp. 10.

58. James Mayall, «The Implication of the Enlarged EEC for Africa: Exploitation or Partnership» (Draft) pp. 5.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 5.
60. See O.J.N. Ojo, «Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS». *International Organization* 34, 4 (Autumn, 1980) pp. 596; and *Africa Dairy*, December 3–9, 1971.
61. Briggs, *loc. cit.*, pp. 22.
62. Ayaovi Mensah, 'ECOWAS — Salvation or Neo-Colonialism Intensified' *Nsukkascopie* No. 6 (June 1978) pp. 35–46.
63. *Lome Convention*, Articles 1–6, 10.
64. *Ibid.*, Article 11.
65. *Ibid.*, Article 7,2 (a) and (b).
66. See Adrian Hewitt and Christopher Stenvens, «The Second Lome Convention» in Christopher Stevens, ed., *E.E.C. and the Third World: A Survey 1*. (London: Holder and Stoughton, 1981) pp. 35–37.
67. *Nigeria Trade Summary*, 1975 and 1978.
68. Central Bank of Nigeria, *Economic and Financial Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2. December 1978, p. 15.
69. *Nigeria Trade Summary*, 1975 and 1978.
70. Central Bank of Nigeria, *Principal Economic and Financial Indicators* (n.d.) p. 10.
71. Stevens, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 37.
72. *West Africa*. 5th January, 1981, p. 28.
73. *Nigeria Trade Summary*, 1975 and 1978.
74. *Ibid.*
75. *Nigeria's Principal Economic and Financial Indicators* (g.v.), pp. 2.
76. *Ibid.*, pp. 9.
77. *Nigeria Trade Summary*, 1975 and 1978.
78. *The Lome Convention 1*, Articles 31 and 50.
79. See *Ibid.*, Articles 40 and 42.
80. *The Courier* (May-June, 1980), pp. 43.
81. *Ibid.*
82. *West Africa*, 9th November, 1981, pp. 2627.
83. *The Courier*, No. 64 (Nov.–Dec., 1980) pp. 45 and 46.
84. Quarterly Economic Review of Nigeria (2nd Quarter), 1981, pp. 18–19.
85. Chief Peter Afolabi, Nigeria's Ambassador to Brussels, *The New ACP–EEC Convention: Lecture series No. 32*. (Monograph published by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1981) p. 64.
86. Dr. F. Aribisala, 'The Lome Convention and African Economic Integration': Paper presented at the Conference on the Lome Convention (Lagos: N.I.I.A., June 14–16, 1982), p. 4.
87. See Gowon's view on this point in *West Africa* 24th May 1982, p. 1367.
88. Isebill Gruhn, «The Lome Convention: Including Towards Interdependence» cited in Aribisala, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
89. *West Africa* 2.3.81, p. 452.
90. Aribisala, *op. cit.*, pp. 10–11.
91. *Nigeria Trade Summary 1975 and 1978* (December issues).

RESUME

Depuis 1960, le Nigéria a toujours observé une attitude très méfiante quant à son association avec la Communauté Economique Européenne. C'est ainsi que les différents gouvernements nigériens qui se sont succédés de 1960 à 1980 ont toujours d'abord refusé de s'associer à la C.E.E. dans un premier temps pour finalement l'accepter. Ce sont ces hésitations des gouvernements nigériens que l'auteur cherche à expliquer. Il veut aussi voir dans quelle mesure les dispositions de l'accord qui a été signé ont été satisfaisantes à la lumière des objections fondamentales du Nigéria et aussi dans quelle mesure la mise en œuvre de la Convention de Lomé a ou n'a pas servi les intérêts nationaux du Nigéria.

En ce qui concerne le premier point, l'auteur fait remarquer que bien que le refus initial du Nigéria de s'associer à la C.E.E. ait été toujours motivé par des calculs d'intérêt national, les changements de décision qui suivirent étaient toujours le résultat d'une soumission progressive aux pressions externes mais aussi de la dynamique de l'économie politique du Nigéria. A l'origine de ce refus se trouvait la nécessité de préserver l'intérêt national surtout pendant la guerre civile parce qu'il fallait obligatoirement assurer la survie de la nation. Mais après les contraintes imposées par cette guerre, les dirigeants nigériens ne sentant plus la nation menacée, perdirent de vue le caractère urgent de la préservation des intérêts nationaux et acceptèrent les politiques qui tendaient à maintenir le statu-quo. C'est ce qui, entre autres raisons, a facilité l'acceptation du Nigéria d'intégrer l'association à la C.E.E.

Dans les deux dernières parties de son article, l'auteur montre que, tant sur le plan de la coopération en matière commerciale que sur celui de la coopération industrielle, technique et financière, le Nigéria n'a pas tiré de bénéfices économiques substantiels. Au contraire, le rôle de leader qu'il devrait jouer dans le contexte africain s'est considérablement affaibli et la solidarité entre les pays du tiers-monde en général et ceux de l'Afrique en particulier a été sérieusement affectée.

Le point de vue de l'auteur est donc que le Nigéria ne doit pas entrer dans les négociations pour Lomé III. Il devrait au contraire persuader les pays de l'Afrique Occidentale de ne signer que des accords commerciaux avec la C.E.E. pour concentrer la plus grande partie de leurs efforts à la construction de la C.E.D.E.A.O. comme instrument d'une intégration économique véritable en Afrique Occidentale.

ELEMENTS POUR UNE CRITIQUE DE LA PLANIFICATION MACRO-ECONOMIQUE DU DEVELOPPEMENT DANS LES PAYS AFRICAINS

Par

*Makhtar DIOUF**

A l'heure actuelle, le désenchantement est presque total un peu partout en Afrique, à l'égard des stratégies de développement économiques mises en place depuis une vingtaine d'années. Et comme ces stratégies ont fonctionné dans le cadre des Plans nationaux de développement, c'est tout le principe de la planification du développement qui se trouve mis en cause.

C'est dans ce contexte que le «Institute of Development Studies» avait tenu du 29 Juin au 10 Juillet 1969 à l'Université de Sussex (England) une conférence sur *la Crise de la Planification*. En fait, en parlant de crise, on pouvait laisser entendre que la planification dans les pays sous-développés avait réussi dans un premier temps, avant de connaître quelques difficultés par la suite; ce qui n'a pas été le cas. En réalité, la planification, en Afrique surtout, n'a jamais réellement fonctionné dans le sens de la promotion du développement. Si bien que cette Conférence traduisait surtout un certain scepticisme sur l'utilité de ce qu'on appelle la «Planification du développement», qui s'est soldée incontestablement par un échec surtout en Afrique.

Cet échec de la planification du développement nous paraît provenir de deux sources :

- une approche erronée du développement économique.
- une méthodologie erronée de la planification.

En premier lieu, pour bien des dirigeants politiques en Afrique, le développement économique est synonyme de croissance économique, et s'identifie dès lors à un simple accroissement du revenu par tête d'habitant. On sent là, l'influence des experts et autres conseillers en provenance de certains organismes de financement (Banque Mondiale, Fonds Monétaire International...) qui ont été formés dans le sérail de la pensée néo-classique. Il est significatif que dès le premier plan du Sénégal en 1961, les Autorités de ce pays aient fixé comme objectif de doubler le revenu par tête en 25 ans. Fort de cette démarche, on aboutit à certaines absurdités du genre : au-delà du seuil fatidique de 300 dollars par tête d'habitant, un pays a décollé. Ce qui autorise naturellement certains dirigeants (Côte d'Ivoire, Sénégal...) à une auto-satisfaction qui contraste nettement avec la situation réelle que vivent leurs populations. Le taux de croissance par tête, à supposer qu'ils soient correctement calculés, — ce qui n'est guère évident dans les pays africains, compte tenu de l'importance du secteur non marchand et de l'imprécision des statistiques démographiques — n'ont aucune signification concrète du point de vue du niveau de vie des masses rurales, qui y constituent près de 80 % de l'ensemble de la population.

* *Faculté des Sciences Juridiques et Economiques, Université de Dakar, Sénégal.*

En second lieu, la planification du développement telle qu'elle est mise en œuvre du point de vue de sa méthodologie réunit toutes les chances de s'écarter de l'objectif d'un développement économique réel ; cela pour un certain nombre de raisons :

1.) Les Plans qui sont confectionnés en Afrique au début des années 60 trouvent leurs origines dans les plans coloniaux des années 50, ceci particulièrement pour les anciennes colonies françaises. Ces plans coloniaux, réduits à de simples programmes d'investissement n'étaient que les tranches régionales-africaines des premiers plans français d'après-guerre. Ceux-ci conçus dans une perspective de modernisation et d'équipement d'un vieux pays européen développé ravagé par la guerre, ne pouvaient correspondre aux impératifs de développement des colonies. Or après les Indépendances, rien n'a été fait dans les pays africains, pour s'écarter de ce modèle de planification, pour concevoir une planification conforme aux besoins réels. Ainsi les programmes d'investissement des territoires coloniaux d'outre-mer sont devenus dans les Etats africains indépendants des catalogues de projets pompeusement appelés «plan de développement économique et social».

2.) Les plans africains sont toujours confectionnés par des assistants techniques européens ou américains ; ce qu'ils ne peuvent faire que selon leurs propres normes, et leurs propres conceptions du développement, lesquelles correspondent pour l'essentiel à l'idée que l'on se fait de la poursuite de la croissance économique dans un pays industrialisé.

3.) Là où les données statistiques le permettent, la planification macro-économique accorde une large place aux techniques de prévision économique (modèles économétriques, système input — output), ces techniques bien que très sophistiquées ne sont rien d'autres que des méthodes d'extrapolation dans le futur, de tendances passées, ce qui peut donner des estimations assez faibles dans un environnement économique relativement stable. Mais les perturbations qui affectent l'Economie mondiale depuis bientôt une dizaine d'années altèrent beaucoup la fiabilité de ces techniques de prévision et par la même, celle de la planification macro-économique.

Ces plans conçus selon les canons de la théorie économique néo-classique, accordent le primat à l'Investissement-Immobilisation comme facteur de croissance-développement. Réduit à des catalogues de projets d'investissement souvent ambitieux, ils se heurtent alors à la contrainte du fameux cercle vicieux (on ne peut investir faute de revenu, on ne peut disposer de revenu faute d'investissement) qui ne peut être brisé que par le recours au financement extérieur. Ainsi les «Plans de développement économique et social» sont financés presque entièrement sur fonds d'emprunts extérieurs encore appelés «ressources extraordinaires». les «ressources ordinaires» c'est-à-dire les ressources propres d'origine fiscale locale étant appelées à financer les dépenses ordinaires, c'est-à-dire la rémunération des fonctionnaires et les caprices des couches dirigeantes (voyages, réceptions...).

A cet effet, il convient d'ailleurs de relever le suivisme des Etats africains qui se sont contentés de reprendre telle quelle, la nomenclature budgétaire française qui repose sur la distinction entre budget de fonctionnement (ressources et dépenses ordinaires) et budget d'équipement (ressources et dépenses extraordinaires), ce dernier correspondant au plan. Le résultat est que le budget de l'Etat africain n'est appelé à jouer pratiquement aucun rôle dans la réalisation de l'objectif de développement économique tel qu'il est établi dans le Plan. Les bailleurs de fonds étrangers se trouvent dès lors amenés à contrôler tout l'appareil de planification, n'acceptant de financer que les projets qui leur «conviennent», pour les avoir eux-mêmes inspirés par le biais de leurs experts envoyés comme assistants techniques.

Ainsi au Sénégal, il est significatif que l'organisme chargé de la planification s'appelle «Ministère du Plan et de la Coopération» et que le texte du Plan (Ve Plan) soit traduit en Anglais, ce qui en fait un document à usage «externe».

Le drame est que les fonds extérieurs reçus dans le cadre des différents Plans à titre de prêts ou de dons gratuits ont été depuis une vingtaine d'années engloutis dans des opérations de grande envergure, mais de peu d'efficacité.

4.) Le plan lui-même tel qu'il est confectionné, n'est rien d'autre qu'un document volumineux à caractère universitaire, portant pour l'essentiel sur la description détaillée de l'Economie nationale, le reste étant consacré à la présentation des projets par Ministère. Le plan remplit ainsi sa vocation de fait : une vaste étude de marché pour les investisseurs extérieurs potentiels.

Dans son élaboration, on insiste beaucoup plus sur sa forme, sa présentation extérieure (1) que sur son contenu et sa cohérence. Ce qui est d'autant plus aberrant que ces plans ne sont jamais entièrement réalisés dans leurs objectifs pour des raisons variables selon les pays : guerres civiles, changement de régimes, sécheresse non prévue, défection du financement extérieur. Ainsi au Sénégal, le IVe Plan (1969-73) n'a été réalisé qu'à moitié, et pour les deux premières années, le taux de réalisation du Ve Plan (1974-80) n'a été que de 36 %. Il semble que peu importe tout cela pour les Pouvoirs Publics, qui estiment que leur mission est accomplie dès lors que le document du Plan a été adopté et voté sans discussion, par une Assemblée nationale sur mesure.

Ce qui fait que le Plan, par delà sa vocation économique d'étude de marché pour l'extérieur, remplit aussi une fonction politique interne de mystification populaire.

(1) *Le Ve Plan Sénégalais a été imprimé en Suisse pour pas moins de 5.000 exemplaires, la traduction en Anglais a été faite à Londres ; argument officiellement avancé : les imprimeries locales ne sont pas techniquement équipées pour mettre au point un document «aussi beau». Toujours est-il que cela coûte cher au budget national, sans compter toutes les pertes d'emplois locaux ainsi occasionnés.*

5.) Pour curieux que cela puisse paraître, on ne trouve pratiquement jamais de définition de la planification dans ces documents. Cette critique que nous faisons ne procède nullement d'un formalisme universitaire. Elle nous paraît avoir son importance, du point de vue de la méthodologie même de la planification.

Nous définissons ici la planification comme une démarche (processus) volontariste d'allocation optimale de ressources rares en vue de la satisfaction de besoins humains illimités. Cette définition — qui rappelle la définition que les Economistes néo-classiques donnent de l'Economie Politique — n'est pas très différente de celles qu'on trouve chez certains spécialistes (1). Il s'agit pour l'essentiel de résoudre le problème économique entre *l'homme* et la *nature*, de résoudre la contradiction entre des *besoins et des ressources*. Dans la planification du développement, l'accent est largement mis sur la rareté des ressources, surtout financières, ce qui justifie la nécessité de recours aux capitaux extérieurs. Mais le problème des besoins est souvent escamoté. Et pourtant, il suffit d'établir correctement les besoins prioritaires (basic needs) des masses populaires, pour avoir une vision correcte de l'impératif du développement économique et social, et ainsi une méthodologie correcte de la planification, comme moyens de promouvoir le développement économique et social.

Les exigences de nourriture, de santé, d'emploi, de formation et d'éducation, nous paraissent sans conteste correspondre aux aspirations de la grande majorité des populations africaines, surtout rurales (en milieu rural africain il ne se pose guère de problème de logement). Toute stratégie de développement économique devrait chercher à satisfaire ces besoins de façon immédiate et concrète.

La réalisation de taux de croissance élevés peut dans certains cas contribuer à satisfaire indirectement ces besoins ; mais ce n'est pas toujours le cas, et cela n'a jamais été le cas en Afrique. Par contre on peut se demander s'il n'est pas possible de satisfaire ces besoins populaires prioritaires tout en se passant de tout l'arsenal des modèles de croissance et autres modèles économétriques de planification macro-économique ; en opérant de façon terre à terre et concrète par une démarche de *planification régionale locale*.

C'est là une idée qui fait de plus en plus son chemin chez la plupart de ceux qui réfléchissent sur la problématique du développement, et qui ont été déçus par les stratégies jusque la mise en œuvre au niveau macro-économique.

Il convient d'ajouter que les performances de croissance économique dans les pays où elles ont été réalisées n'ont concerné qu'une minorité de la seule population urbaine ; ceci dans la mesure où les taux de croissance

(1) A. WATERSTON — *Development Planning* (John HOPKINS Press Baltimore) 1965 — p. 8.

R. ACKOFF — *A Concept of Corporate Planning* (Wiley Inter-Science, New York) 1970 — p.1).

globaux masquent en réalité de grandes disparités sociales et régionales. Les populations rurales, par leur position sociale et leur localisation géographique, ont été les «laissés pour compte» de la croissance économique. C'est donc à elles surtout que doit s'adresser la planification régionale locale par petits projets (forages, salles de classes, dispensaires, maternités rurales etc...).

C'est une telle expérience qui est actuellement menée au Sénégal dans le cadre d'une réforme administrative de 1972, qui a créé les Communes rurales en milieu paysan.

SUMMARY

Makhtar DIOUF's paper deals with a criticism of the Macroeconomic Planning of Development in African countries. According to the author this type of planning – perceived as a «Voluntarist approach to supply scant resources as much as possible to meet ever – arising needs» – has failed in African experiences of development. He argues that this failure stems from an inappropriate approach to economic development and an erroneous planning development as synonymous with economic growth and as a result, as a mere increase of per capita income; and from the methodological point of view, development as it was planned did not bring about any real economic development because not only did the plans worked out heretofore in Africa stem from the colonial plans of the 1950s, but they were always drawn up by European or American technical assistants whose standards and concepts of development were different from the concerns of African masses. Moreover, the statistical data used was collected through very unreliable techniques of economic projections. In addition to these technical reasons, there are political ones which give the plan not only an economic objective – that of supplying a market study to foreign interests – but also an internal political function – that of mystifying populations in so far as African public authorities consider it essential that national Assemblies accept the text of the plan and pass it without any discussions. The author finally concludes that what is needed in Africa is regional and local planning through small projects (wells, classrooms, dispensaries and maternities, etc.) such as the one currently being experimented in Senegal.

OIL MILL RIOTS IN EASTERN NIGERIA 1948/51:
A STUDY IN INDIGENOUS REACTION TO
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION*

By

*Anthony I. NWABUGHUGU***

How do peasants respond to technological innovation which threatens to undermine their economic autonomy? Why do they react the way they do? What effect do such responses have on the success or failure of development programmes in Africa; and what are the implications of these for future policy?

These questions are relevant in today's Africa where national governments, aid donor countries and development agencies are increasingly advocating the application of modern technology to agricultural and industrial production. In a recent article, Jonathan BARKER sums up this orientation among «donor and development agencies» in this way:

«Briefly, the idea is that if technology, credit, and markets can be channeled to small-scale agriculture and manufacturing units, these units can respond by making efficient use of capital, creating new jobs, and supplying basic consumption needs of the masses. On this analysis, growth can continue while its benefits are redistributed to lessen the incidence of poverty» (1).

Nigerian government's thinking along these lines is reflected in the emphasis it has placed on the mechanization of agricultural production in the Third and Fourth National Development Plans. In the Third Plan, a National Centre for Agricultural Mechanization was founded with an estimated capital expenditure of 4,000,000 naira (2). The Centre was to:

- i. undertake adaptive research studies into the mechanization problems of Nigerian Agriculture.
- ii. undertake the evaluation of various forms of mechanization for wider adoption in different farming systems in Nigeria.
- iii. make systematic improvement in hand tools and equipment, co-ordinate mechanization trials and facilitate the mass production of tested farm implements that are consistent with the country's factor endowments (3).

In the Fourth Plan, the Centre is to be strengthened because «a considerable amount of mechanization is now obviously required in order to reduce the tedium of farm operations and the unattractiveness of farming as an occupation» (4). A corollary of the intensification of mechanization is that the Land Use Decree will be reviewed with a view to making

* *The earlier version of this article was presented at the African and Imperial History Seminar, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada on the 21st of January, 1981.*

** *Department of History – University of Calabar, Calabar/Nigeria.*


it easier for «private sector involvement in large scale agricultural activities». It should also be «easier to attract foreign entrepreneurs and foreign capital into agricultural production» (5).

In their election manifesto in 1979, the National Party of Nigeria (the ruling party) followed the same line of thought. While agreeing that peasant production deserved encouragement, the Party nevertheless stressed that «an enduring solution to food scarcity will be sought through mechanized agriculture by encouraging individuals and organizations to establish large scale farms, providing them with credit facilities, subsidies and other incentives» (6).

Planners of such programmes seem to assume that peasant reactions will be favourable. The assumption seems to be that when the machines start rolling the abundant food and cash crops which they will produce will overwhelm peasants into accepting State policy. Studies in peasant response to state intrusion into other areas of their lives do not support such an assumption. In Western Nigeria, for example, peasants resisted government co-operative ventures in the 1930s and 1940s, which they felt lowered the price for their commodity, by «selling to smugglers, by reducing production even to the point of not harvesting cocoa beans already on the trees, and by direct confrontation in the *Agbekoya* rebellion» (7). In the Transkei region of South Africa, peasants reacted violently when their rural resources of land and livestock were threatened by state intervention (8). Will the mass-productive capacity of machinery silence the Nigerian peasants into acquiescing to the type of agricultural mechanization contemplated in the Fourth Development Plan? The experience of the colonial government in Eastern Nigeria between 1948 and 1951, when it tried to mechanize the oil palm production, seems to suggest that much more than the mass-productive capacity of machines will be needed to convert the peasants into accepting mechanization as a means of agricultural production.

LOCATION

The territory of Eastern Nigeria (see map) today comprises four of Nigeria's nineteen states – Anambara, Cross River, Imo and Rivers. It lies in the oil palm belt, upon which its economy was almost entirely dependent until the post-independence development of the petroleum industry. Its colonial history was characterized by persistent resistance to the colonial state, sometimes leading to violent riots. Two of these – the Aba Women's Riots of 1929 and the Enugu Colliery Riots of 1949, well documented in literature – led to the setting up of Commissions of Inquiry by the colonial government (9). Whereas these two riots arose essentially from the frustrations of unfulfilled expectations from the colonial government (10), the riots described here are peculiar in the sense that they arose mainly from an attempt by the colonial state to initiate some form of rudimentary industrialization.



BACKGROUND TO THE RIOTS: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OIL MILLS

Attempt by the colonial government to mechanize oil palm production in Nigeria began in the 1920s. During that time, British commercial interests operating in Nigeria, who controlled the export trade in palm produce, felt that their interest was threatened by the output of plantation economies in the East Indies. The British merchants then pressed the Colonial Office to act, and succeeded in getting the Secretary of State for the Colonies to appoint a joint Colonial Office and Merchants Committee in 1923. The Committee was charged with the responsibility of recommending the «best means of securing improved and increased production» of palm produce in West Africa.

In its report submitted to the Secretary of State in 1924, the Committee came to the conclusion that:

«Without the introduction of modern machinery for removing the oil and kernels from the fruit, it will not be possible for the oil palm industry in British West Africa to increase to any extent or in the near future to compare with plantation products from the East» (11).

This report marked a turning point in British colonial attitudes towards the oil palm industry in West Africa, and in Nigeria in particular. Although the Nigerian Government refused to accept openly the verdict of the Committee for a few years after the publication of the Report in 1925 (12), the verdict nevertheless influenced official policy from then on.

The preoccupation of the Nigerian Government after 1926 became one of finding ways and means of improving the quantity and quality of palm produce. Hitherto, the Government had been content to encourage native method of extraction. This method was essentially women's affair though the men owned the oil produced. The method of preparation has been discussed in many works (13) and need not detain us here. But it is important to state that it was generally believed that this method was inefficient. It was wasteful in that it extracted only «55%» of the oil from the fruit. Besides, because of the delay inherent in the preparation, the oil was usually of poor quality, containing high free fatty acid (14).

But this method fulfilled an important function in the operation of the peasant economy of Eastern Nigeria. Among the Ibo and the Ibibio, women had property rights (15) and the preparation of palm oil was one sure way of getting money to provide their needs. There were various ways through which the women made money through the preparation of palm oil. First, all kernels belonged to them. When dried, these were cracked in small quantities and sold to the produce traders. Second, the women owned the unrefined part of the oil (16). This was usually refined later and the oil sold by the women. Third, a woman whose husband was generous could expect to receive some cash gifts from him after the oil has been sold. But this was not always guaranteed and so, some women who knew that they would get nothing from their husbands, took some quantity of oil before handing over to their husbands the oil produced. Such women later sold the oil taken in this way and converted the money realized to their

own use (17). Preparation of palm oil was therefore, a major source by which the women found money to buy their kitchen needs, and provide themselves with clothing and ornaments. There were other non-monetary benefits that the women enjoyed. They took enough quantity of oil for domestic consumption. They also accumulated fuel from the fibre and kernel shells (18).

By 1928 however, the Nigerian Government, preoccupied with finding a method of increasing and improving production, came to the conclusion that the use of modern machinery was the best means of attaining this goal. The arguments in favour of the modern machinery was that:

- (a) «much larger proportion of oil in the fruit can be recovered by this than by any other means;
- (b) «the mill can produce oil of the highest quality... and
- (c) «that oil of superior quality offered in a large bulk of uniform and guaranteed quality is now, or will in the near future be much more valuable commercially than oil produced at present... (and) that the time will come when such oil as is exported now will be practically unsaleable» (19).

Thus, in that year, the Government began to induce European firms to establish oil mills promising subsidies for such projects (20).

No firm took advantage of this offer throughout 1928 and 1929. The United Africa Company (U.A.C.), the only company which gave a reply, did not commit itself to establishing a mill. It asked instead, that Government subsidize it for the existing oil mill at Ibeagwa, which it had taken over from the Nigerian Products Company, an offshoot of the Niger Company; that the Government should erect two mills, one to be equipped with «centrifugal machinery» and the other by «hydraulic pressure» at a cost of £ 50,000 to be run on behalf of the Government by the company, with a proviso that the company might buy them from the Government after five years operation» (21). The Government took this as a vote of no confidence by the firms on the viability of oil mills in Nigeria, and decided therefore, that it should withdraw the subsidy offer (22). This was however, turned down by the Colonial Office (23), and so the offer was allowed to remain open for some years.

Between 1930 and the outbreak of World War II in 1939, the Government concerned itself more with encouraging the use of hand presses (24) by the African producers than in subsidizing the firms for the establishment of the oil mills. And despite the low prices paid for palm oil in the 1930s (25), the number of hand presses in Eastern Nigeria jumped from 63 in 1933 (26) to 800 in 1938 (27). The outbreak of the war in 1939 once again reopened the issue of the oil mills. During the war, the Government discovered that many of the oil producers in Eastern Nigeria had turned to the production of gari for trade with the North because of the greater income which gari could earn the producer as compared with palm produce (28). As this trend continued throughout the war there was fear that it might continue after the war. This would have become a serious threat to the Government's source of revenue. Closely tied to this was the

problem of raising money for post-war development. Both the resident Minister in British West Africa, Lord SWINTON, and the British officials in Eastern Nigeria believed that the revenue must come from the oil palm industry (29). Finally, the old threat from the East Indies had not been forgotten. It was feared that at the end of the war, when conditions returned to normal, the Nigerian producer might find himself in greater competition with the output of the plantations using modern methods, and that he would be at «an impossible disadvantage unless improved methods of production could be introduced and the grade of oil available for export thereby improved» (30). In 1944, the U.A.C. lent its weight to this argument. In an article entitled «The future of the Nigerian oil industry», the Company stressed the need for mechanization of the oil industry if it was to survive the competition from the East Indies (31).

The end of the war in 1945, and the availability of funds through the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, created a favourable environment for active discussion of the oil mills. But no action was taken until 1946, when as a result of a tour of Eastern Nigeria by A.H. YOUNG, Deputy Director of Commerce and Industries, Lagos and J. W. WALLACE, Acting Assistant Director of Agriculture, Umuahia, sites were selected for the establishment of the oil mills (32). Construction work began that year and one, that at Amuro, was opened before the end of the year (33). By 1951, there were eleven oil mills operating in Eastern Nigeria (34).

THE RIOTS

Right from their inception the oil mills met with opposition from the women whose interests were threatened by the mills. In 1946, the women of Nnewi District in Onitsha Province demonstrated in «protest against the proposal to erect oil mills» in the area (35). In Owerri, Aba Division, Owerri Province, local opposition against the mill about being erected there, led to a halt in the work. The mill was then transferred to Nsulu (some 10 miles north of Owerri) (36). When, in 1948, construction was proceeding at the Nsulu site, a significant riot broke out against its establishment (37).

The Nsulu oil mill riots were the most serious of all anti-oil mill riots which took place in Eastern Nigeria. It broke out on the 5th of January, 1948 and has some parallels with the «Aba Women's Riots» of 1929 (38). The temporary stores at the mill site were burned down by «a mob of approximately 100 women», mainly from Ubaha village but assisted by women from the neighbouring villages of Mbubo, Umuosu and Oloko (Bende Division). Thirteen permanent labourers employed by the Department of Commerce and Industries were driven off the site. A number of pick axes, shovels and hand pans in the store, as well as a certain amount of personal property belonging to the labourers, were also damaged or destroyed in the fire. The women also made unsuccessful attempts to burn some of the sawn timber on the site. They then marched up to the Nsulu Native Court, about two miles away, «singing and dancing in an attempt to enlist the support from the women of other villages to whom they sent messages asking for assistance».

The report of the outbreak of the riots did not reach the District Officer, Aba, until 7.45 p.m. that day. So it was not until the 6th, that he acted. On that day he took his assistant, W. J. GRIFFITH with an «armed party of one Lance-Corporal and four constables» to the oil mill site but found no sign of trouble. Meanwhile, however, the women were busy driving away those whom they had thought had any connection with the oil mill from Ubaha village. Among these were one Okorie, their member in the group council at Nsulu. The other was the «Ubaha man who signed the temporary agreement» for the establishment of the pioneer oil mill. The District Officer then instructed the police Corporal to proceed with investigations, in conjunction with a representative of the group council «with the object of arresting the ringleaders» (39).

Police investigations proceeded on the 6th with assistance of the Clan Council Member, Josiah NWACHUKWU, described as «the most outstanding personality in the group». Other members who promised assistance were «too frightened to render active aid». Police and NWACHUKWU proceeded to Ubaha where they arrested elder NWAGBO and two women alleged to be ringleaders. They were unable to find elder AGOMUO said to be the «principal initiator of the trouble». They were brought to Nsulu Native Court and locked up.

- Late in the afternoon, a crowd of women numbering «400 from Ubaha, Umuode, Mbudo and Umuosu villages... demonstrated at the court premises demanding the release of the prisoners». The police refused, and so the women attempted to assault Josiah NWACHUKWU. He was escorted to safety. The women then turned on the police but were successfully driven off after a scuffle. Three of them were arrested.

By 9.30 p.m., the court premises in which the prisoners were kept was attacked, presumably by the women. The corporal and five constables on duty were overpowered in the dark; the prisoners were released and the roof of the main Native Court was set on fire. Then armed reinforcements of 29 policemen was sent to the scene followed by the District Officer. Meanwhile, the Ubaha women had called in assistance from «as far a place as Ikot Ekpene and Bende Divisions». Messengers sent out in plain clothes by the Government squad found that «the men and women of Ubaha, Umuode, Umuosu and Mbudo villages were waiting armed at the bridge near the oil mill site on the Umuahia road to offer resistance». The mob was estimated to number 500.

Fearing that he had no adequate force to meet the challenge, the District Officer decided to proceed to Ubaha without escort, but accompanied by the interpreter, AZUBIKE, Court member ABENGOWE, described as «an influential oil trader at Nbawsi», and an orderly.

They met the women who were singing and dancing with slogans such as «'we are as strong as iron' and 'we cannot be bent'». They dispersed after the District Officer had promised to discuss their grievances at a full meeting of the group council on the 12th at which the women would be represented (40). When the meeting did convene on the 12th, «almost the entire adult population turned out both men and women» numbering «approximately 4,000 people». And «90 % of those present were flatly opposed to the erection of the mill». The project was therefore abandoned at least for Nsulu (41).

Things quietened down during the remaining part of 1948 and the whole of 1949. With increased propaganda, particularly by the educated elite and the progressive unions, the popular attitude began to change. Demands were made on Government for the establishment of oil mills even from hitherto most hostile areas. A number of mills were established between 1949 and early part of 1950 (42).

But in the later part of 1950, anti-mill riots flared up again, this time in the Ibibio area of Calabar Province. At Ibiono in the Itu District, for example, women rioted in November against the establishment of the oil mills in their area. They beat up the President of their Native Council, the Revered Utit, and he had to be rushed to hospital for treatment (43). Reports of similar riots at Uyo, Ikop-Ekpene and Abak were also made (44). While in Owerri Province, where the mills appeared to have been accepted in 1949, protest letters from the Ngwa Women Organization were received by the District Officer for Aba (45). Protest against the establishment of the oil mills continued in scattered form in Eastern Nigeria throughout 1951. And by 1952, the District Officer for Aba confessed that:

«Mills have not yet fitted themselves into the social fabric and I imagine they will always be suspected until such a time as they are regarded as an institution (if ever). In the meantime, we can only keep up patient propaganda» (46).

CAUSES OF THE RIOTS

Various reasons were given for the outbreak of the riots. Official explanations were divergent. The District Officer for Aba blamed the outbreak of the Nsulu riots on «a few local agitators working on the women» and on «intrigue by interested oil middlemen» (47). But the Assistant Superintendent of Police, who investigated the riots, blamed them on the following factors:

(a) That the mill was sited on a land whose ownership was in dispute between two villages, Umnala and Ubaha. Consequently one group felt that the other had tried to deprive it of the land by leasing it out for the establishment of the oil mill;

(b) inadequate information had been given to the local women about the oil mill. «The Ubaha women said that they had not been told of the project and hearing a rumour that the Government was going to take their land, they thought that this was the thin edge of the wedge»;

(c) fallacious propaganda by some people that «the mill would be the ruination of the palm oil trade in the area»; and

(d) «that the site for the mill was brushed and the cassava uprooted without the question of compensation being fully discussed» (48).

The President of the Ibesikpo Convention, Uyo, E.O. EYO, took the line of the District Officer for Aba in explaining the outbreak of the riots in Ibibioland. In an article in the *Eastern States Express* in 1950 he claimed that:

«They (the women) were instigated by some produce buyers who have reasonable grounds to believe that they will lose their monopoly of the palm oil trade, if all palm fruits would go to feed the mills and then some favoured 'contractors' would be privileged to buy up all the products from the mills, and sell over to the European firms, thus making all the profit which the produce buyers should make» (49).

Isaac Uzoije NWORU, who took part in the erection of the oil mills from 1950 as a fitter/plumber and who witnessed some of the riots, confirmed that inadequate information was a major cause of the riots in Ibibioland.

«Two days of propaganda was mounted by the construction workers. Usually they were driven off on the first day. On the second day they would employ the services of the chief or any other respected individual from the locality to help in the propaganda. These men would help in explaining to the women the benefits of the mills. But construction workers made sure they did not enter any village on its market day».

He also gave other reasons, among which were the mode of recruitment of labour for an award of contracts by the mills. The villages in which the mills were located wanted to benefit from these as much as possible. They always reacted angrily if they felt they were cut off from labour contracts (50).

There can be no doubt that some of these factors contributed to the women's anger, but they do not satisfactorily explain the outbreak of the riots. Instigation by «produce middlemen» or any other local agitators may have played a part, it could not of itself have caused the women to riot if they did not feel their own interests affected by the establishment of the oil mills. For in the society of Eastern Nigeria, the women were not mere pawns in the hands of men or particular interest groups but were active participants in the day to day affairs of the communities in which they lived (51). Quarrel over ownership of land on which a mill was built did not occur in all the areas in which oil mills were built. Rumour about the disadvantages of the mills, like the theory of instigation by local agitators could only have stimulated women into action if their interests were involved. One factor which could have had a shocking effect on the women was lack of adequate information. The appearance of construction workers in a woman's farm with axes and shovels, uprooting cassava and cutting down economic trees, could cause the owner of the farm to revolt, but it could not cause a riot of over «100 women». This is not, however, to deny that inadequate information played a major part in the riots that took place, but as we shall see, its role was dependent on other variables to be discussed presently.

The real cause of the riots must be sought in two factors: either ignorance or neglect of the operation of the peasant economy by the planners of the mills, and the apparent inconsistency in government policy.

In planning the establishment of the oil mills, the Government's main concern was to increase the quantity and improve the quality of oil. Very little attempt was made to investigate the workings of the peasant economy in the area and consider how mechanization might dislocate it, or how it would affect the social structure. The only thing which the planners seem to have appreciated was that women controlled the palm kernel production. And right from the time when the idea of establishing oil mills was conceived, the belief had been that once the women were assured that they could buy back the palm kernel from the mills, all problems would be avoided. Thus the Secretary, Eastern Provinces, giving information to all residents on the procedure to be followed in establishing oil mills in Eastern Nigeria, categorically stated that the installation of nut crackers alongside the oil mills had been deliberately avoided «even though it was clear that the nut cracker makes the mill more profitable». The fear was that installation of the nut crackers would stir «local prejudice». Instead provision was «made for buying kernel shell for fuel and selling nuts to the women after extraction of the oil from the fruit». It was even decided to employ labour to pick the fibre from the nuts even though the nuts would be sold to the women (52).

But as we have seen, women's share in palm produce in traditional society was not limited to the palm kernels. The preparation of palm oil offered most women a sure means of getting money and thereby maintaining their financial independence. It was a source of income which they were not prepared to lose. The main cause of the women's riots must therefore be seen against this background. The women saw the establishment of the oil mills as threatening their economic survival and financial independence as a group. A protest letter to the District Officer for Aba by the *Ogbako Umunwanyi Ngwa* (The Ngwa Women's Association) in 1950 attests to the fact that this fear was the fundamental reason for their protest. The women said they were protesting against the installation of the oil mills for two reasons:

1. The preparation of palm fruits and extraction of oil therefrom has by custom been the duty of the women and their means of gaining a living and any attempt to deprive them of this right will be visited with anger.
2. The deprivation of any woman of the right of preparing oil for a husband and taking her shares which consist of the palm kernels and the unrefined portion of the oil is a good ground for divorce.

They argued that if the men insisted on having the oil mills installed, it meant that they had «indirectly asked their wives to leave them, and if the wives remain at all with them there will be no peace» (53). In rioting against the establishment of the oil mills, therefore, the women were simply behaving like economic beings.

The fears of the women may well have been mitigated by a well-organized propaganda campaign before the installation of the oil mills. Perhaps, this is where the importance of inadequate information as a factor in the outbreak of the riots lies. But as we have seen adequate information

was not given to the women; in fact it was only after the women had rioted that the District Officer for Aba made efforts to explain to the women the benefits of the mills and Government's future intentions towards them (54). The acceptance of the mills after the intervention of the indigenous educated elite and the progressive unions, clearly illustrates the role which adequate propaganda could have played.

But if fear of group security was responsible for the outbreak of the riots in 1948, it cannot alone explain their continuation and spread from 1950 – a year and half after the first riots were brought under control. The first riots stirred up sustained activity by the colonial administrative and technical officers, educated elite and progressive unions, each group explaining the benefits of the oil mills. The result of this combined propaganda, as we have seen, was to increase the demand for an actual establishment of oil mills. Why then did anti-oil mill riots break out again in 1950?

The riots recommenced and spread from 1950 because of a sudden change in government policy which appeared to the people as pure deception. One of the promises made by the Government, when the erection of the oil mills was being considered, was that «as soon as the mill has been put into operation, it should be handed over to either the Native Administration or a suitable local organization in the form of a loan to be repaid over a period of ten to twelve years, while the Government retained the power to examine the accounts of the mill (55). The short campaign before the mills were constructed, was mounted on this promise. In 1949, the Department of Commerce and Industry took definite steps to fulfil this promise. Of the completed mills, it sold the one at Amuro, Okigwe to the Okigwe Industrial Company – an indigenous commercial organization. That at Amansi Awka was sold to the Ibey Trading Company Limited, another indigenous trading company. And of those under construction, that at Nbwasi in Aba Division was being erected with a view to handing it over to the Nigerian Eastern Wealth Company, while the one at Ndizuogu in Orlu Division was to be handed over to L.O. Okoro and Company Limited. Both were indigenous companies. There were also several other projected sites with prospective owners lining up to take them over (56).

But in 1950, the policy of selling completed oil mills either to private Nigerian enterprise or to the Native Administrations was revoked. On the 4th of May, 1949 as a sequel to the political developments which had seen to the growth in Nigeria of regional governments (57) Regional Development Boards were created in Eastern, Northern and Western Regions, under Ordinance No. 14 of 1949. These Regional Boards were to be joint successors to the Nigerian Local Development Board which was wound up on the 31st of March that year (58). Until that date, the Nigerian Local Development Board was directly responsible for financing the Pioneer Oil Mills while the administration was carried out by the Department of Commerce and Industry. Section 22 (1) of the 1949 Ordinance which established the Regional Boards gave them powers to take over control and supervision of development projects hitherto carried on in their respective areas by the now defunct Nigerian Local Development Board (59). Pioneer Oil Mill matters now came under the purview of the Regional Boards.

One of the early actions taken by the Eastern Regional Production Development Board (E.R.P.D.B.) was to review the policy of selling off the completed oil mills. The Board came to the conclusion in 1950 that although «some of the mills completed or begun when the scheme was financed by the Nigerian Local Development Board have been sold to private African enterprise», it was no longer feasible to continue the practice. The Board had instead «decided it is not justified in selling any more of the mills for sometime» but to guide them «towards more efficient production and also for the benefit of the entire society» (60).

But in doing this, it had alienated both the would-be buyers of the mills and the producers in general. This is where it appears the work of instigators could play a part. Those who lost the opportunity of buying the mills, it could be argued, instigated the women to riot. But this is an argument which ignores the role of women in traditional society, sketched above. Women could not have rioted if their interests were not directly threatened. The fact is that after two years of operation, the mills had begun to undermine the social fabrics which held society together. Martin ANENE observed with respect to the Ibibio, that by 1950, men were «entering the kernel trade for the first time, buying from the mills and reselling in the local market» (61). This was a view with which my informer, Isaac U. NWORU agreed (62). To the women these developments were nothing but deception. It did not require the work of «instigators» to make the women believe that they would one day lose all the benefits which the preparation of palm oil gave to them. The work of instigators could only have increased not caused the women's anger against the oil mills. For a people, the majority of whom depended on this crop for their cash income, the mills therefore represented a definite threat to their very existence. Hence the recommencement and spread of the riots.

THE EFFECTS OF THE RIOTS

One effect of the riots was to strengthen the influence of the women and their organizations – an influence which had been growing since the outbreak of the «Aba Women's Riots» in 1929 (63). Thus, while the riots were still raging, the Assistant District Officer for Aba, P. HOLLAND minuted «It is becoming increasingly obvious that with projects such as Pioneer Oil Mills etc..., the women must be consulted. They are the greatest potential source of trouble in the village and are well organized» (64).⁹ This concern was already affecting official policy since 1948. The Secretary, Eastern Provinces, in a memo to the Resident Owerri Province that year wrote:

«I am... to request you to direct your administrative officers that particular attention should be paid in future discussions regarding the establishment of oil mills to the possibility of unfavourable reactions on the part of the women and that women, in addition to the Native Administrations and the men, should be fully consulted» (65).

The other effect of the riots was that they shattered the hope placed on the oil mills as the best means of increasing production while maintaining high grade oil. It had been argued in 1946, when costing for the mills was being done, that the capacity of a mill would be «12 cwt. of fruit per hour», and that each mill would handle «2,000 tons per year which with an extraction of 20.7 % oil to fruit (mill efficiency assumed to be 85 %) should give an oil output somewhat in excess of 400 tons per year (66). But the table below shows that this dream was far from realized.

Table showing the Quantity of Fruit milled and oil produced by Oil Mills in Eastern Nigeria 1950/1951

Mill	Fruit milled in tons	Oil Produced in tons
Azumini	865.27	137.54
Umuchima	968.82	165.27
Umuduru	674.87	122.35
Ahoda	1,757.47	269.24
Akpabuyo	1,720.22	312.19
Usung Inyang	588.87	91.18
Ikot Akpabong	276.61	36.84
Oyubia	613.41	114.08
Ikot Ama	104.85	14.74
Oraifite	11.59	2.50

Source: Second Annual Report of the Eastern Region Production Development Board, 1950–1951. (Enugu: Government Printer, 1952), p. 7.

From this table, it is easy to see that none of the mills reached the target figure of 2,000 tons of fruit and 400 tons of oil per year. The decrease in the expected oil output had nothing to do with the riots directly. It can be explained by two factors: the inability of the mills to get the estimated quantity of fruit and the fact that instead of the estimated 20.7% extraction rate to fruit, the mills were producing at an extraction rate of 16.69 % (67). But the failure of the mills to get an adequate supply of fruit had some connection with the outbreak of riots. For instance, the mill at Azumini was said to have «shown very poor returns, largely owing to a certain amount of resentment from local farmers who had asked that the mill be handed over to them» (68). And of the Ikot Akpabong mill, the report was that:

This mill has not been successful since it was opened last September... owing to the opposition from the women who have boycotted the mill since inauguration and who have also prevented fruit supplies from being sold to those who support the mills (69).

The producers preferred to sell their fruit (when they chose to sell rather than preparing it themselves) to the oil presses. These were machines which did not threaten the economic security and financial independence

of the women. Hence, the «growing competition from the hand press owners» which the Chairman of the E.R.P.D.B. bitterly complained about in 1953 – a competition which he believed «the Pioneer Oil Mills cannot win... and never will» (70).

The non-cooperative attitude of the producers continued after the riots, preventing an adequate flow of fruit to the mills, thereby rendering them economically non-viable. For instance, in the year ending 31 March 1953, the forty-one mills in Eastern Nigeria, handled only 33,609 tons of fruit producing 5,716 tons of oil. This worked out «at an average of 819 tons of fruit or 2 tons per working day against the 4 considered necessary for economic operation» (71). In 1953, the Chairman of the E.R.P.D.B. proposed to sell the mills to the councils or co-operative societies on «deferred payment terms» (72).

The mills never won the confidence of the producers. In a short time many of them fell into disuse, leaving the traditional method of extraction and the hand presses dominant in the oil production in Eastern Nigeria.

In conclusion, the riots and their subsequent effect on the oil mills teach some lessons which are relevant in today's development planning in peasant societies. Firstly, they expose the weakness of inconsistency in the execution of government development programmes in peasant societies. Unfortunately, this seems to be the rule in many developing countries. It appears more reasonable to be as open and consistent as possible in dealing with peasants on such issues. Secondly and more importantly, they undermine the assumptions of many national governments, international development agencies, and even some governments of developed countries who advocate agricultural mechanization and rapid industrialization as the solution to the economic problems of the third world, without a corresponding advocacy of ways to mitigate the social dislocation such machinery might cause in these societies. It is contended here that for the mechanization of agricultural production in peasant societies to be successful, alternative domestic occupations must first be provided for those likely to be squeezed out of their occupation by the introduction of machinery. The non-adherence to this principle will, most probably, cause riots today as it did in Eastern Nigeria between 1948 and 1951. It might also make the role of such machinery in agricultural development counter-productive.

FOOTNOTES

1. Jonathan Barker, «Can the Poor in Africa Fight Poverty»? *Journal of African Studies*, 7,3 (Fall, 1980), p. 161.
2. Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Third National Development Plan, II: Project Summary*. (Lagos: Federal Ministry of National Planning, n.d.) p. 18.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Guidelines for the Fourth National Development Plan 1981/85*. (Lagos: Federal Ministry of National Planning, n.d.), p. 28.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Africa Currents*, No. 15/16 (Summer/Autum, 1979), pp. 42/43.

7. Gavin Williams, «Taking the Path of Peasants: Rural Development in Nigeria and Tanzania», in Peter Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein eds., *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*. (Beverly Hills & London: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 133.
8. William Beinart and Colin Bundy, «State Intervention and Rural Resistance: The Transkei 1900–1965», in Martin Klein ed. *Peasants in Africa*. (Beverly Hills & London: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 271–316.
9. See Margery Perham, *Native Administration in Nigeria*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), Chap. xiv; A.E. Afiglo, *The Warrant Chiefs*. (London: Longmans, 1972), chap. 6; Agwu Akpata, «The Background of the Enugu Colliery Shooting Incident in 1949», *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, III, 2 (December 1965), pp. 335–363.
10. For the role of frustration in the Aba Women's Riots, See Anthony I. Nwabughogu, «Political Change, Social Response and Economic Development: The Dynamics of Change in Eastern Nigeria 1930–1950». (Ph.D. Thesis., Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada, 1981), chap. 3. Agwu Akpata's analysis in the article cited above shows that worker frustration was a significant cause of the colliery riots in Enugu in 1949.
11. Colonial No. 10, 1925, *Report of the Colonial and Merchants Joint Committee on Palm Oils and Kernels in West Africa* (London HMSO, 1929), par.8.
12. It was not the establishment of the mills that the Government opposed; it was its implications for the Government's land policy. The Committee had recommended that in order to make the mills viable, land had to be leased to a firm intending to establish a mill, to plant oil palm. This was against established policy. See W. K. Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, II, Problems of Economic Policy 1918–1939*, (London, New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1942), pp. 191 ff.
13. See Martin Anene, *The Oil Palm Economy of the Ibibio Farmer* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1956), pp. 11–12; Richenda Scott, «Palm Products and Groundnuts: Production for Trade» Margery Perham ed. *The Economics of a Tropical Dependency, Vol. I. The Native Economies of Nigeria* (London, Faber and Faber, MCMXLVI), pp. 217–242.
14. This was estimated to be in the range of from 6 % to over 25 % f.f.a. See United Africa Company, «The Future of the Nigeria Oil Industry» *African Affairs*, 47 (1948), pp. 42–43.
15. For Women's property rights in Eastern Nigeria, see C.K. Meek, *Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe* (New York, Barnes and Noble, 1970), pp.202–203. See also Daryll Forde and G.I. Jones, *The Ibo and Ibibio – Speaking Peoples of South-Eastern Nigeria* (London: International African Institute, 1950) pp. 13 and 70.
16. This depends on the method of production adopted by a particular locality. The unrefined part called *Ogiri* in Igboland is a mixture of oil and water. This is obtained by putting oily fibre in water. Then the water is stirred with a fork-like stick which makes a foamy substance to rise to the top. This is skimmed off. Women later boil this so that real oil is separated from ordinary water. The oil so produced belongs to the women.
17. Society does not frown at this if it is known that the man does not contribute substantially in the maintenance of the household.
18. Interview with Isaac U. Nworu aged 52, dated 28/1/80. The District Officer for Nsukka found that the people of the area ignored the use of hand presses

- in the 1930s because the women objected to their husbands. See National Archives, Enugu (hereafter cited as NAE) OP 1649; On prof 8/1/4779. Annual Report Onitsha Province 1937, p. 34.
19. Great Britain, Public Record Office, Colonial Office Papers (hereafter cited as C.O.) 583/168/682. See Governor Thomson to Alex Cowan (United Africa Company), dated 25/10/29. Enclosure No. 4 in Thomson to Colonial Office (hereafter cited as C.O.) conf. dated 25/10/29.
 20. *Ibid.*, Thomson to C.O. dated 25/10/29. Contains details of attempts made by Nigerian Government to improve the oil palm industry in general.
 21. *Ibid.*, Cowan to Governor of Nigeria dated 13/8/29. Encl. No. 3 in Thomson to C.O. dated 25/10/29.
 22. *Ibid.*, Thomson to Cowan dated 25/10/29. Encl. No. 4 in Thomson to C.O. dated 25/10/29.
 23. *Ibid.*, Passfield to Governor of Nigeria dated 13/2/30.
 24. The hand presses were intermediate technology. The distinction between them and the other means of extraction is seen by the fact that Ordinary native method extracted 55 % of the oil from the fruit, Hand press method 65 %, and Pioneer mill method 85 %, Factory mill method 93 %. See U.A.C., «The Future of Nigerian Oil Industry», p. 44. Although there were initial opposition to the hand presses, these did not last long. The women soon found that they could either sell their fruit to press owners or have the fruit extracted for themselves by paying a small sum of money to the press owner. In 1934, the price was as low as one penny a tin of fruit. See NAE, EP.10645 Vol. 1, CSE 1/85/5258 Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture, 1934, p. 122.
 25. Lagos prices for palm oil fluctuated from £ 13.15s.1d. per ton in 1930–31, to £ 6.7s.10d. in 1934–34 and to £ 5.18s.9d. in 1938–39. See *Report of the Mission Appointed to Enquire into the production and Transport of vegetable oil and oil seeds produced in West African Colonies* (London: HMSO, 1947), Appendix XI, p. 70.
 26. CO 583/220/30188 Annual Report, Agriculture Department 1935, p. 19.
 27. *Annual Report on the Southern Provinces of Nigeria 1938*. (Lagos: Government Printer, 1940), p. 10.
 28. NAE, 1642, Abadist 1/26/907. Palm Produce Production. See Agriculture Officer, Umahia to Resident Owerri dated 14/5/43.
 29. *Ibid.*, McCall to all D.Os. Owerri Province dated 3/2/44. «We are all thinking of post-war development... I can see no way in which this part of the country is economically to develop except through a more efficient oil palm industry». For Lord Swinton's view, see NAE, 1642/Vol. II, Abadist 1/26/908, Palm Produce Production, p. 217. Lord Swinton toured Eastern Nigeria during the war to whip up enthusiasm for oil and kernel production.
 30. *Second Annual Report of the Eastern Regional Production Development Board 1950/51* (Enugu: Government Printer, 1952), p. 7.
 31. United Africa Company, «The Future of the Nigerian Oil Industry» *African Affairs* 47 (1948) pp. 41–51.
 32. NAE, 1847, Abadist 1/26/1022. Pioneer Oil Mills General. See Secretary, Eastern Provinces to Residents Calabar, Onitsha and Owerri Provinces dated 13/3/46.
 33. *Ibid.*, Development Officer, Okigwe to Director, Department of Commerce and Industries Lagos dated 10/11/46.

34. *Second Annual Report of the Eastern Regional Production Development Board 1950/51*, p. 7.
35. NAE, OP 1865 Vol. IX, Onprof 1/4904. Annual Report Onitsha Province 1946, p. 85.
36. NAE OW 6019/5, Abadist 1/7/1286 Oil Mills, p. 9.
37. NAE OW 6019/7, Abadist 1/7/1287 Nsulu Mill Disturbances.
38. The «Aba Women's Riots» of 1929 was also a revolt of the women against established authority in Eastern Nigeria. For details see Afigbo, *The Warrant Chiefs* Chap. 6 and Perham, *Native Administration in Nigeria chap. XIV*.
39. NAE OW 6019/7, Abadist 1/7/1287 District Officer (D.O.) Aba to Resident Owerri Province dated 7/1/48.
40. *Ibid.*, D.O. Aba to Resident Owerri Province dated 8/1/48.
41. *Ibid.*, D.O. Aba to Resident Owerri Province dated 14/1/48.
42. NAE File 1847/Vol. II, Abadist 1/26/1023. Minute by D.O. Aba p. 356. Demands were received from all Divisions in Owerri Province except Bende.
43. *The Eastern States Express Aba*, 20/11/50.
44. *Ibid.*, 3/1/51.
45. See below.
46. NAE 1847/Vol. II, Abadist 1/26/1023. See minute by D.O. Aba pp. 356 in reply to Resident Owerri. to D.O. Aba dated 26/4/52.
47. NAE, OW 6019/7, Abadist 1/7/1287. D.O. Aba to Resident Owerri Province dated 8/1/48.
48. *Ibid.*, Assistant Superintendent of Police Aba Detachment, A. Cooper to Acting Deputy Commissioner, The Nigerian Police, Enugu dated 11/1/48.
49. E.O. Eyo, «Pioneer Oil Mill Bogey», *The Eastern States Express*, Aba 13/12/50.
50. Isaac Uzoije Nworu, interview dated 28/1/80. Isaac U. Nworu joined the construction firm of Costain which built some of the mills. He began to work on the oil mill construction sites from 1950; he later transferred to the Eastern Regional Production Development Board which ran the oil mills and remained attached to the oil mills until 1975, when he joined the Institute of Management and Technology Enugu where he works at present. He saw the rise and fall of the oil mills and witnessed some of the riots.
51. See S. Leith-Ross, *African Women: A Study of the Ibo of Nigeria* (London: Faber and Faber, 1939); M.M. Green, *Ibo Village Affairs* (New York: Praeger 1964); See also *Report of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed to inquire into the Disturbances in Calabar and Owerri Provinces, 1929*. Memo by C.T. Lawrence p. 13, par.73, «the Resident interviewed the Obon and chiefs together with the women whose leader, Mrs. Adam Archibong, stated in the course of a lengthy speech that the women shared equally with the men matters that concerned the welfare of the country».
52. NAE, File 1947, Abadist 1/26/1022. Secretary, Eastern Provinces to Residents dated 20/6/46.
53. NAE, File 1847/Vol. II, Abadist 1/26/1023. Petition by Oyidie Ohiaogu, Woto Eronwu, Hannah Uruakpa, Oyidie Ahuruonye and Mary Agbawo for *Ogbako Umanwanyi Ngwa* to D.O. Aba dated 3/10/50. See also their letter to D.O. dated 20/10/50 in *Ibid.*
54. This was done during the deliberations of the joint Native Administration and Women's meeting with the D.O. on 12/1/48. See NAE OW6019/7, p.18, Abadist 1/7/1287.

55. NAE, File 1847, Abadist 1/26/1022. Memo by S. Philipson for Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos to the Oil Mills Finance Committee, June 1946, p. 43.
56. *Ibid.*, See minutes of the Residents Conference held at Enugu on 14 and 15 June 1949.
57. This was the introduction of Richards Construction in 1946. For details see Lord Hailey, *Native Administration in British African Territories, Part III*, (London: HMSO, 1951), pp. 3–6.
58. *Third Annual Report of the Eastern Regional Production Development Board, 1951–52*. (Enugu: Government Printer, 1953), pp. 1–2.
59. *Ibid.*
60. *First Annual Report of the Eastern Regional Production Development Board 1949–50*. (Enugu: Government Printer, 1951), par. 15.
61. Anene, *The Oil Palm Economy of the Ibibio Farmer*, p. 13.
62. Nworu, interview dated 28/1/80. Nworu also claimed that most fruit buyers cheated the producers by paying them less than the stipulated price.
63. Judith Van Allen, in two articles «Sitting on a man, Colonialism and the lost political institutions of the Igbo women» *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, VI, 2 (1972), and «'Aba Riots' or Igbo Women's War? Ideology, stratification, and the Invisibility of women» in N.J. Hafkin and E.J. Bay eds. *Women in Africa* (California, 1978), has argued that the political power which Igbo women exercised in traditional society through their associations was lost under colonial rule. I propose to take issues with these articles in future.
64. NAE File 1847/Vol.II, Abadist 1/26/1023, p. 279. See minute by P. Holland dated 6/11/50, commenting on riots then going on at Ikot-Ekpené.
65. NAE, File 1847, Abadist 1/26/1022, Secretary, Eastern Provinces to Resident Owerri Province, Jan. 1948.
66. *Ibid.*, Secretary, Eastern Provinces to Residents dated 20/6/46.
67. *Second Annual Report of the Eastern Regional Production Development Board 1950–1951*, p. 7.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
69. *Ibid.*
70. NAE File 1847/Vol.III, Abadist 1/26/1023, C.A.L. Guise to Resident Owerri Province dated 3/9/53.
71. Anene, *The Oil Palm Economy of the Ibibio Farmer*, p. 13.
72. NAE, File 1847/Vol.II, Abadist 1/26/1023. C.A.L. Guise to Resident Owerri Province dated 3/9/53.

RESUME

L'euphorie actuelle créée autour de la mécanisation de l'agriculture africaine semble ignorer une variable importante et nécessaire pour sa réussite : à savoir, la prise en compte des craintes qu'un tel processus peut créer chez les paysans. Si la mécanisation de la production agricole doit être une réussite dans les sociétés paysannes, d'autres formes d'occupation devront d'abord être trouvées au niveau du monde rural pour qu'il soit plus facile d'introduire la machine dans ce milieu. Les paysans réagiront probablement avec violence à toute innovation technologique qui met leur autonomie économique en danger. Cela a été le cas dans le Nigéria de l'Est avec les révoltes qui ont eu lieu entre 1948 et 1951 quand le gouvernement colonial, désireux d'augmenter la production et d'améliorer la qualité de l'huile de palme exportée du Nigéria, décida de mécaniser la production de l'huile de palme. Les paysannes s'opposèrent à l'installation des huileries qui, pensaient-elles, menaçaient leurs intérêts économiques. Elles arrêtèrent le travail à plusieurs endroits où on construisait ces huileries et refusèrent de les ravitailler en noix de palme. A la suite de l'insuffisance du ravitaillement de ces huileries en noix de palme, leur viabilité économique fut sérieusement affectée. Par la suite, la plupart de ces machines furent abandonnées et ainsi la méthode traditionnelle d'extraction de l'huile de palme continua à dominer.

**APPROCHE THEORIQUE DES VALEURS ET ANTI-
VALEURS DES TRADITIONS ZAÏROISES :
CONTRIBUTION A LA RECHERCHE D'UNE
CULTURE DE DEVELOPPEMENT**

Par

*Mwamba BAPUWA**

INTRODUCTION

La «culture zaïroise»** est un thème qui était au centre des débats du Colloque d'Avril 1980. Cet exposé peut en conséquence paraître faire marche arrière pour ceux qui avaient pris part à ce Colloque du CRPA consacré à l'Enseignement national intégré. Il importe donc de préciser au départ les raisons qui m'amènent à revenir sur ce chantier et d'indiquer l'importance de ce retour apparent pour le présent Colloque.

Dans une critique du Colloque d'Avril (culture zaïroise à l'école) qui paraîtra prochainement, j'ai estimé que les efforts déployés sur «la problématique de la culture zaïroise» (1) étaient insuffisants et superficiels. Les trois exposés consacrés à ce thème sont demeurés livresques et normatifs, et ont failli enfermer la discussion dans un thème secondaire à mon avis de l'unicité et de la multiplicité culturelle. La deuxième raison qui milite pour le retour à ce thème et son approfondissement est la raison même de tous ces Colloques. Le but de toutes ces réflexions est à mon avis de libérer l'avenir du passé et du présent. Ma préoccupation consiste justement à tenter de dire ce que sera la culture de développement ou, tout au moins, d'indiquer la tendance des forces qui la préparent. La troisième et dernière raison qui m'a amené à traiter ce thème est le sujet même de ce colloque. J'ai senti pour le traiter, sous quelque aspect que ce soit, le besoin d'une approche qui permette de saisir la structure, le fonctionnement de la société traditionnelle, de la présente et de celle de demain. Le passage d'une société à l'autre impose une dimension historique à cette approche. La recherche de cette approche m'a conduit à traiter de l'objet de ce Colloque, mais de manière globale.

Pour ces trois raisons, j'ai choisi de vous faire un exposé d'ordre théorique, qui embrasse à la fois le Colloque d'Avril et celui d'aujourd'hui, mais qui ne satisfait pas moins aux exigences empiriques de vos espoirs dans la mesure où il débouche sur les valeurs essentielles que nous devons emprunter aux traditions zaïroises.

* *Chercheur à l'I.R.S. — BP. 1638, Kinshasa I, République du Zaïre.*

** *Allusion est faite ici au titre initial de cet exposé, qui était : «culture zaïroise: problèmes et perspectives».*

C.R.P.A. : Centre de Recherche en Pédagogie Appliquée, de l'Institut Pédagogique National (Institut d'enseignement supérieur) de Kinshasa.

Cet exposé peut aussi s'intituler : Approche Théorique des Valeurs et Anti-valeurs des traditions zaïroises.

Si les «problématiques de la culture zaïroise» du Colloque d'avril avaient mis un doute sur l'existence d'une culture zaïroise du fait de sa pluralité ou, pour des raisons éthiques, de sa non réponse aux normes d'une culture, les résolutions avaient cependant davantage souligné l'oppression qu'elles subissent collectivement face à la culture étrangère dominante servie par sa sous-culture locale constituée par l'ensemble d'anti-valeurs.

Il est fondé de penser que le problème actuel de la culture zaïroise est moins les contradictions qui opposent entre elles les différentes cultures tribales que la domination que ces dernières subissent collectivement de la part de la culture étrangère et sa variante locale constituée par un système d'anti-valeurs. Cette problématique transparait ces derniers temps dans les différents Colloques qui se tiennent sur l'histoire, la langue, le capital, l'enseignement etc...

En ce qui concerne les rapports entre les différentes cultures tribales le professeur VANSINA dit justement : «...l'unité culturelle du Congo vers 1900 était bien plus forte que ne le laissent présager la plupart des études ethnologiques spécialisées, travaux qui d'ailleurs, par leur nature même, soulignent plus les différences que les ressemblances» (2).

On mettait l'accent sur les différences pour des raisons idéologiques, il fallait diviser les sauvages pour mieux les dominer. Ce travail a été fait tout au long de la colonisation. L'exploitation économique coloniale qui était à la base de cette division créait, malgré les colonialistes un nouveau type d'unité de caractère d'abord économique, puis politique des colonisés contre les exploitateurs colonialistes. Le prolongement de cette situation a abouti à ce que nous appelons aujourd'hui sur le plan culturel: les anti-valeurs.

Après vingt ans d'indépendance, il est surprenant de constater les angoisses et les inquiétudes qui caractérisent la jeunesse africaine, particulièrement la jeunesse zaïroise sur le plan culturel. Nous avons en effet, au cours de ces vingt ans, vécu dans une ambiance des nationalismes africains couronnés par l'élaboration des systèmes idéologico-politiques se réclamant des valeurs culturelles africaines. Sur le plan national des réflexions ont été consacrées à l'héritage culturel ancestral qui ont abouti à la «doctrine», à la «théorie» et à la «méthode» d'Authenticité. C'est là, sur le plan africain et national, un climat on ne peut plus favorable à l'émancipation culturelle.

Il n'est pas trop tôt de jeter un coup d'œil rétrospectif, pour se rendre compte du chemin parcouru et qui reste à parcourir et pour, si nécessaire, opérer un changement porteur de nouvelles promesses, plus consistantes. Et pour un pays sous-développé, cette réflexion est capitale. Capitale parce qu'elle est une condition du développement. On ne peut aller au développement sans conscience, de manière spontanée.

OBJET DU COLLOQUE

Le document de présentation du thème de ce Colloque sur «les valeurs et anti-valeurs des traditions zaïroises» dit : «Tout fait de culture traditionnelle susceptible de favoriser le développement sera appelé Valeur.

Tout fait de culture traditionnelle susceptible de gêner le développement sera appelé «anti-valeur».

Cette présentation nous donne déjà une série de concepts-clés : «culture», «culture traditionnelle», «développement», «valeur», «anti-valeur». A ces concepts s'ajoutent deux verbes d'action : gêner ou favoriser.

Nous cherchons une culture du développement et nous interpellons à cet effet la culture traditionnelle pour voir si elle peut d'une manière ou d'une autre contribuer à la promotion de la société que nous voulons bâtir.

Cette recherche pose un certain nombre de problèmes théoriques dont les principaux sont : critères d'appréciation des valeurs traditionnelles, conditions de transfert bénéfique, connaissance de la société à développer, connaissance de la société traditionnelle et enfin lois de la transition de la société présente à la société future — la société développée.

L'HISTORIQUE DE CE THEME

Sur le plan africain de nombreux efforts ont déjà été tentés qui ont abouti au socialisme africain de SENGHOR, au consciencisme de Kwame NKRUMAH, à l'ujamaa du président NYERERE etc... De manière concrète le développement semble toujours loin du compte dans nos pays. Sur le plan national il importe de noter que le principe de réhabilitation culturelle de notre peuple a été lancé par LUMUMBA en 1960. Cinq ans plus tard le Citoyen Mabika KALANDA essaie d'approfondir la question dans son célèbre livre le «remise en question» ; et cette réflexion a été suivie quelques années plus tard par le mouvement idéologico-politique d'Authenticité. Kamitatu MASSAMBA (3) tentera plus tard de dégager hâtivement quelques principes — clés sur lesquels il estime fonder d'instaurer la nouvelle société. Nous disons hâtivement parce que l'essentiel de son livre pose des problèmes de gestion économique du pays.

Pour Mabika KALANDA, la société traditionnelle produit un type d'homme dont la mentalité ne peut que perpétuer la dépendance du pays dans le contexte mondial actuel. La société traditionnelle lui paraît constituer un frein sérieux au développement. Laissons parler KALANDA (4) : «Sa philosophie érige en loi sacrée la dépendance, la soumission, l'effacement, la dégénérescence mentale et donc physique de l'homme. Un tel milieu prédispose à l'esclavage. La personne humaine n'y a pas l'occasion de s'épanouir consciemment, systématiquement et pleinement».

Toute autre est la position de NGUVULU (5) qui en 1971 fera une apologie de l'humanisme negro-africain en demandant aux pouvoirs publics d'apporter un soutien logistique (technique) à ceux qu'il appelle les ruraux-traditionnalistes.

Face à la société capitaliste, l'homme du monde traditionnel ne peut rivaliser en initiatives avec l'entrepreneur capitaliste SCHUMPETERIEN. Il paraît tout à fait inadapté et négatif comme le montre bien le tableau comparatif de M. T. KNAPEN repris par Mabika KALANDA (6).

De même l'homme de la société capitaliste apparaîtrait inhumain aux yeux du négro-africain, et donc un homme hostile au bien-être de la société traditionnelle.

Chaque société a son système de valeurs auquel il est impossible de se référer pour juger le système de valeurs d'une autre. Il en va de même pour la rationalité des systèmes comme pour la rationalité de leurs agents. On ne peut transférer des facteurs importants d'un système à un autre de rationalité différente sans risque d'une perturbation de l'équilibre de ce dernier système.

A cet égard, les conclusions auxquelles aboutissent MABIKA et NGUVULU deviennent normales et inévitables tant qu'il y a absence d'une analyse historico-structurale.

LA CULTURE EST SYSTEME DE VALEURS

La culture a été définie au premier Colloque du C.R.P.A. comme «l'ensemble des solutions qu'une communauté humaine apporte aux problèmes posés par sa condition historique. Elle a un aspect matériel, un aspect philosophique et un aspect social» (7). En tant que telle la culture est un ensemble de résultats — fixés dans la conscience sociale — de la lutte menée contre les contraintes de la nature et les contraintes sociales. Faits, idées, comportements, attitudes, opinions, objets, bref les valeurs d'usage matériel et immatériel ainsi que leur mode d'organisation et d'utilisation (8) sont des produits d'une culture. Le phénomène culturel est un produit de l'activité sociale ainsi que des rapports à l'intérieur desquels et grâce auxquels se déroule cette activité. Il y a des productions culturelles matérielles et des productions culturelles spirituelles et des rapports de dépendance réciproque. En dernière instance les productions culturelles matérielles déterminent les spirituelles. La culture est la synthèse dynamique du système social tout entier. Elle est constituée de valeurs pour ce système.

CONCEPT DE BESOIN, CRITERE DE VALEURS

Occupés à chercher un système de valeurs d'une société nouvelle à bâtir et qui n'est pas encore là, nous ne pouvons faire le choix des valeurs traditionnelles susceptibles de favoriser le développement à l'aide d'un étalon qui serait lui-même la valeur. L'instrument de mesure doit être différent de l'objet à mesurer.

En tant que système, la société traditionnelle contient en elle-même des valeurs et des anti-valeurs. Le critère de progrès ici — critère interne — serait le progrès social de cette même société. Les valeurs d'une société traditionnelle ne sont pas forcément des valeurs de la société de Développement. De même des anti-valeurs de cette société ne sont pas forcément des anti-valeurs de la société de Développement. Toute valeur culturelle est donc relative à son système social de référence et à un stade déterminé de développement de ce dernier. Les valeurs du système traditionnel ne sont plus valables pour la société zaïroise actuelle et ne peuvent y être transférées sans risque d'être en définitive dénuées de leur substance.

Les différents éléments qui constituent la culture d'une société sont des valeurs parce qu'ils satisfont chacun à un besoin, peu importe que ce besoin soit matériel ou immatériel. L'ensemble des valeurs d'une société répondent à l'ensemble de ses besoins. Ces besoins sont aussi structurés comme les valeurs et différenciés dans la mesure où la société elle-même connaît une certaine stratification sociale. La position socio-économique détermine aussi les besoins auxquels on a accès. Cette différenciation accuse l'appropriation inégale des valeurs d'usage (qui) favorise une minorité de gens qui cultivent, comme le dit Samir AMIN, leur humanité sur les cendres de l'humanité de la majorité. Les besoins du système tout entier sont des besoins essentiels, valables pour la majorité de la population et dont la satisfaction conditionne le progrès social du système concerné. D'où la nécessité de se référer aux besoins non pas individuels, mais aux besoins sociaux, aux besoins des masses qui sont créatrices de la culture. Il n'existe pas de types isolés de besoins en ce qui concerne la société humaine, nous ne pouvons donc pas analyser les besoins concrets de manière isolée. L'analyse des besoins doit tenir compte du système social de référence et de la différenciation économique. Parlant de la bourgeoisie africaine Jean Pierre NDIAYE dit : «...elle se réfugie dans la valorisation de la culture africaine, dont elle ne partage pourtant plus le support économique. Elle s'y réfugie jusqu'à en devenir le défenseur officiel parce qu'il lui faut bien se donner une identité. Mais ce faisant elle révendique des valeurs qu'elle ne vit plus et dont elle s'éloigne de plus en plus» (10).

Considérées du point de vue de leur système de référence et de la couche sociale à laquelle elles profitent, les anti-valeurs sont des valeurs dans la mesure où elles contribuent justement à promouvoir l'humanité d'une minorité de gens. Les antinomies du système capitaliste, liées à la nature du système ne sont pas des anti-valeurs pour la couche dirigeante du système. L'exploitation de l'homme n'est pas une anti-valeur pour un régime capitaliste, encore moins pour la bourgeoisie dirigeante.

LE SOUS-DEVELOPPEMENT: UN ACTE DE CULTURE

Le sous-développement est d'abord essentiellement lié à la domination économique et à l'exploitation de nos pays par les pays développés (11). Cet état de choses se trouve inscrit dans un rapport qui lie nos pays à ceux du centre. L'agriculture et l'industrie étant essentiellement et structurellement tournées vers la satisfaction des besoins des pays développés, il n'est que normal que nous dépendions pour le commerce et pour les capitaux de ces mêmes pays. Et cette dépendance est couronnée par un échange inégal, résultat de la sous-évaluation des produits en provenance de nos pays et du transfert total des profits réalisés par «leurs» capitaux dans les pays dominés : Sous-évaluation de notre travail, détournement de nos forces de travail et privation des profits réalisés par notre travail.

Le sous-développement est ensuite un acte de culture. Sur le plan économique déjà la forme principale de domination et d'exploitation de nos pays est d'ordre technologique et scientifique. L'achat de la technologie,

son utilisation et les conditions qui y sont liées — paiement de brevet, redevances de toutes sortes — font de nos pays de véritables serfs. L'importance décisive du secteur de production pour le développement et l'aliénation de la division du travail internationale fondée sur le mythe du transfert de technologie me permettent d'affirmer que le sous-développement ira croissant tant que nous nous adressons aux pays développés pour résoudre nos problèmes techniques. La stratégie de la domination économique est fondée sur l'arme de la technologie.

Non seulement cette arme véhicule une certaine conception sociale qui contribue à notre aliénation, mais son imposition passe par un mécanisme de corruption de l'élite bureaucratique du pays composée de responsables politico-administratifs et de leurs collaborateurs intellectuels conseillers et techniciens de haut niveau. Ce processus amène les élites autochtones à s'éloigner de leur peuple et à assimiler la mentalité du colonisateur.

A côté de cette arme technologique les pays développés disposent sur le plan interne de tout un arsenal institutionnel composé de l'école, des mass media et même de l'appareil politico-administratif de la culture.

Le rôle de l'école dans l'aliénation du pays est connu. Il a fait l'objet de nos précédentes rencontres. Il faudrait relire à cette fin les actes du Colloque d'avril et du Symposium de janvier dernier. C'est cette aliénation qui a inspiré le programme du C.R.P.A. : l'Enseignement National Intégré.

Les travaux de la commission sur les mass media ainsi que les résolutions du premier Colloque ont montré également la contribution des mass media à l'aliénation.

Les exposés consacrés à la politique culturelle du pays ont souligné le fait que non seulement le Département concerné n'avait pas de politique culturelle mais qu'il était arrivé à faire de la culture une marchandise comme une autre dont s'approprient les plus forts sur le marché. Les besoins culturels du pays étaient finalement réduits aux besoins solvables. Alors que dans les pays développés l'Etat intervient pour aider les hommes de culture il semblait que dans notre pays la nécessité de subventionner la culture, justifiée par les réalités économiques et même idéologiques — nous sommes au pays de l'Authenticité — était officiellement rejetée au nom de la fin de l'Etat — providence (12). La domination et l'exploitation du pays sont intériorisées au niveau social et au niveau des institutions de l'appareil d'Etat. Ces supports internes sont décisifs pour la reproduction, la perpétuation et le développement du sous-développement. Sans ces supports superstructurels le sous-développement est un processus sans avenir. Même la colonisation a attaché, en dépit de la contrainte dont elle avait le privilège, un prix très élevé à la culture. L'appropriation de nos forces productives à elle seule ne suffit pas. L'élément culturel est celui qui oppose le plus de résistance à la colonisation et à la néo-colonisation. C'est ce qui explique la répression et l'assimilation culturelle du temps de la colonisation et l'expression populaire des idéologies des bourgeoisies africaines.

Le sous-développement entraîne en conséquence la non satisfaction des besoins essentiels pour la majorité de la population, particulièrement pour les couches laborieuses. Ces besoins sont les besoins de nourriture.

de logement, d'habillement, d'éducation et de santé. La richesse matérielle n'a pas pour objectif de satisfaire les besoins sociaux des gens mais plutôt de répondre aux besoins qui apparaissent sur le marché. On ne peut parler d'autres besoins dérivés quand les fondamentaux ne sont pas satisfaits.

Pour satisfaire ces besoins essentiels et d'autres qui apparaîtront, le processus de développement consiste essentiellement à lutter contre la dépendance, l'exploitation, l'échange inégal et l'aliénation culturelle qui en est le support interne. Cette lutte ne peut être efficace que si l'on acquiert l'auto-détermination effective sur les plans économique, social et surtout culturel. C'est à cette condition que l'égalité peut être instaurée sur le plan externe et interne et que l'individu peut non seulement servir la société mais aussi s'épanouir au sein de cette dernière. Sur le plan culturel il faut générer et développer notre propre technologie en comptant sur nos propres forces et faire en sorte que des individus ne détournent pas à leur profit les bénéfices du travail de la majorité sous une forme ou une autre.

La société développée a besoin d'un enseignement nouveau, intégré et désaliéné. Ses formes concrètes apparaîtront avec l'avancement des efforts collectifs que nous déployons.

Les mass media et le département de la culture d'une société développée devront se mettre au service des masses créatrices de la culture et non plus au service des besoins culturels solvables c'est-à-dire ceux des nouveaux riches.

En fait une société culturellement libérée est une société engagée sur les chemins ascendants de l'émancipation et de l'épanouissement collectifs et individuels. De même que l'appropriation de nos forces productives ne suffisait aux colonialistes pour nous maintenir dans la dépendance, de même l'émancipation politique ne peut être maintenue et consolidée que si notre société s'engage sur la voie de l'émancipation culturelle. Celle-ci précède et suit l'émancipation politique. En effet, l'unité morale des peuples du Zaïre est indispensable pour amorcer le processus d'indépendance politique. La recherche sur les points de ressemblance et de convergence est indispensable. L'auto-détermination politique consolide à son tour l'unité culturelle du pays, la renforce et trouve dans cette dernière un support pour sa propre consolidation.

Il faut une pulsion culturelle pour résister efficacement à la domination politique extérieure ; il faut ensuite une pulsion culturelle pour mettre à profit l'indépendance indispensable à un processus de développement.

LE DEVELOPPEMENT EST EN FIN DE COMPTE AUSSI UN ACTE DE CULTURE

Pour répondre aux besoins culturels de cette société, le Colloque nous a demandé d'interpeler le système culturel traditionnel. Il nous faut donc aussi saisir sa logique interne, découvrir le secret de son histoire et voir dans quelle mesure et en quoi elle peut nous être utile. C'est à cette condition que nous pouvons faire efficacement des emprunts.

LA SOCIÉTÉ TRADITIONNELLE

L'approche de la société traditionnelle en tant que réalité sociale vivante c'est-à-dire maîtrisant sa propre reproduction nous oblige à rejeter le critère d'affinité bio-culturelle généralement utilisée par l'Anthropologie culturelle au profit d'un concept qui intégrait l'unité géographique à l'unité socio-économique politique, c'est le concept de communauté villageoise lancée par le professeur Kabeya TSHIKUKU dans sa thèse de doctorat sur : «Structure sociale et Développement économique du Zaïre, contribution à la problématique de la transition». Nous sommes d'accord avec lui en effet qu'il ne peut exister aucune problématique autour de la parenté biologique à l'exception de sa preuve en biologie et du *contenu du rapport social* qui s'exprime à travers elle, en sociologie». (13).

Il est heureux de constater que la mise sur pied de ce concept consacre sur le plan socio-économique l'unité de nos peuples dont on ne souligne que la diversité. Bien sûr dit Jan VANSINA, il existait deux cent cinquante cultures, mais toutes et même en partie celles du Kivu et celles du Nord-Est, appartenaient à un seul type (14).

Les sociétés précoloniales relèvent historiquement d'une même civilisation matérielle et d'un même mode de reproduction économique. N'utilisant pour force motrice que l'énergie humaine, elles sont demeurées des sociétés essentiellement agricoles pratiquant subsidiairement une économie de ponction : chasse, pêche, élevage domestique et cueillette. L'agriculture pratiquée devait être une agriculture de mouvement à cause des qualités naturelles du sol et du niveau bas de développement des instruments de travail dont l'utilisation est individuelle et la fabrication à la portée de tous. L'unité de production est le ménage ou un individu. Il n'y a pas de spécialisation et le chiffre de la population est important à la fois pour supporter collectivement les risques qui dépassent la résistance individuelle et pour réaliser un surplus économique ; d'où l'existence du principe de solidarité, basée sur la possession commune de la terre, *plus distributive que productive*. Communauté de sort, réciprocité entre individus et entre générations, la solidarité répond aux exigences des besoins fixés au niveau de la consommation à laquelle est subordonnée la production.

«La société est divisée en aînés et cadets», les premiers contrôlent la reproduction et la circulation des cadets ainsi que l'affectation du surplus de leur activité productive, tandis que les cadets ont le contrôle du processus de production directe. Les rapports sociaux sont hiérarchiques et asymétriques : l'autorité fonctionnelle de l'aîné est doublée du pouvoir politique» (15).

Nous dirions pour conclure notre approche de la communauté villageoise que la satisfaction des besoins existentiels de tous les membres de la communauté est le facteur déterminant de la production, «la mesure de la rationalité, le fondement de la solidarité viagère et l'alibi idéologique de la domination de classe des «aînés» (16).

Cette société que d'autres appellent la vieille Afrique peut-elle tant soit peu contribuer au développement ?

DE LA COMMUNAUTE VILLAGEOISE AU SOUS-DEVELOPPEMENT

Avant d'indiquer les valeurs et anti-valeurs des traditions zaïroises, il importe de connaître le rapport qui existe entre les deux sociétés. Ces deux sociétés sont historiquement et socio-économiquement en rapport de contradiction dialectique.

Le sous-développement est l'aboutissement normal d'un processus d'appropriation étrangère de nos structures sociales et donc le résultat de l'appropriation coloniale de notre histoire. La société sous-développée s'est donc constituée sur les cendres de la communauté villageoise. Celle-ci cependant n'a pas totalement disparu, elle est sur la défensive, acculée à un statut de dominé.

L'asservissement étranger des forces productives de la communauté villageoise est une audacieuse tentative historique de nier l'histoire et la culture d'un peuple. Le colonisateur ne s'est pas contenté d'instaurer la contrainte physique, il a systématiquement procédé à la répression et à l'assimilation. Toutes les forces coloniales, y compris les institutions ecclésiastiques avaient déclaré la guerre contre notre culture et notre histoire.

La structure capitaliste n'a cependant pas achevé de détruire la communauté villageoise. Se nourrissant de son travail pour presque rien — échange inégal ville/campagne — le capitalisme périphérique s'est contenté de la dominer. Ce qui entretient sur le plan idéologique une ceinture périphérique d'îlots de culture traditionnelle.

Historiquement, le Zaïre n'a pas connu une assimilation culturelle qu'on a connue ailleurs en Afrique. Sans doute parce que le mouvement d'indépendance a pris les colonialistes de court. L'intelligentsia acquise culturellement à la colonisation n'était pas encore là. On essayait de la faire naître précipitamment pour parer au plus pressé.

Le type de questionnement de ce jour montre que nous n'avons pas été complètement absorbés. Les réalités mêmes du sous-développement nous obligent à interpeller les cultures pré-coloniales afin de tirer les leçons sur leur expérience historique.

Ce Colloque en fait met en doute la supériorité de la rationalité capitaliste sur celle de la communauté villageoise, doute devenu aujourd'hui nécessaire surtout sur le plan humain.

VALEURS ET ANTI-VALEURS DE LA COMMUNAUTE VILLAGEOISE

La première valeur à constater c'est *l'intégration de la communauté villageoise*. Dans une approche bio-culturelle, Jan VANSINA la découvre aussi : «Chaque culture formait une unité et tout se tenait peut-être pas d'une façon nécessaire a priori, mais certainement d'une façon a posteriori puisque chaque aspect de la culture influençait tous les autres. Le caractère intégré des cultures traditionnelles a été suffisamment souligné au cours du Colloque d'avril (17). Il correspondrait pour la société sous-développée qui est la nôtre à une exigence d'intraversion et d'une existence auto-centrée et auto-déterminée.

Le deuxième principe, dont découle d'ailleurs tous les autres c'est le *primat de la satisfaction des besoins existentiels de tous les membres de la communauté*, principe qui conditionne la production dans la communauté villageoise. Tel est le fondement de l'égalité et de la solidarité africaine, exigence politique dictée par le primat de l'existence sociale. Si hier les conditions naturelles insuffisamment maîtrisées commandaient la réciprocité entre individus et entre générations face à la communauté de sort, aujourd'hui le caractère social de la production industrielle s'oppose à l'appropriation privative des richesses du pays au profit d'une minorité de gens. La fabrication des moyens de travail ne pouvant plus être banalisée aujourd'hui seule l'appropriation collective de ces moyens peut permettre l'accès de tous aux moyens de production et à la répartition équitable des fruits du travail. Au niveau des rapports de production, la division de la société en groupe d'aînés et de cadets me paraît pour la société de développement une anti-valeur dans la mesure où cette différenciation et les prérogatives qui s'y attachent — le contrôle de la circulation des produits notamment — sont susceptibles de favoriser l'inégalité socio-économique.

Le principe de la satisfaction des besoins existentiels des membres de la communauté a été traduit par le président NYERERE dans les quatre principes qui fondent aujourd'hui l'idéologie et la politique tanzanienne et qui sont :

- 1) Communauté de richesse et absence d'inégalité dans la répartition.
- 2) Travail de tous au profit de tous.
- 3) Sécurité et hospitalité pour tous.
- 4) Pas de propriété terrienne si ce n'est l'usage.

Une fois reconnues ces valeurs et leur importance, d'autres questions se soulèvent qui méritent une profonde réflexion. Il y a notamment la question de savoir comment passer d'un système à l'autre et quelle est la nature de ce passage. Pour répondre à cette question il importerait d'examiner concrètement les différentes transformations qui ont marqué le passage d'un état à l'autre c'est-à-dire de la communauté villageoise à la société développée. Cet examen nous indiquerait les déterminants sociaux du changement qui s'impose et qui porte les forces d'avenir d'un nouveau système dont les principaux traits apparaîtront dès lors. Nous ne pouvons épuiser cette réflexion dans le cadre assez limité de ce Colloque.

NOTES

1. Thème auquel trois exposés ont été consacrés au Colloque du C.R.P.A. sur «la Culture Zaïroise à l'École».
2. Lire la conclusion de Jan Vasina, Introduction à l'ethnographie du Congo, Edition Univ. du Congo.
3. Kamitatu Massamba, le pouvoir à la portée du peuple, l'harmattan Paris 77.
4. Mabika Kalanda, remise en question, p. 163.
5. Nguvulu A., l'humanisme négro-africain face au développement éd. Okap./Kin.
6. Mabika Kalanda, *op. cit.*, p. 147.
7. Lokwa Ilwaloma, Problématique de la culture, in actes du Colloque sur la culture zaïroise à l'École, Ed. du C.R.P.A. — Coll. MASC., 1980.

SUMMARY

In this paper the author tries to conceptualize a development promoting culture. He does this with regard to pre-colonial culture(s) on the one hand and post-colonial culture(s) on the other. He takes a purely theoretical approach to the topic, analysing culture as being a system of values which must be identified by referring first to a specific social system and then to a specific stage in the development of that system. He then argues that under-development is an «act of culture» for it maintains us in «serfdom» through a technological and scientific dependency, thus causing a cultural alienation of which the bureaucratic elite and the politico-administrative leaders are victims. This cultural alienation was introduced and is maintained by institutions set up in Africa by developed countries: schools and the media. In the author's opinion a development promoting culture has to establish, first and foremost, a new, integrated, liberated system of education; and through this culture the media and cultural institutions should be able to serve the masses who create culture rather than the marketable cultural needs of the «nouveaux riches». It is only under such conditions that the political liberation of our populations can be maintained and consolidated, for just as the exploitation of our labour force was not enough for the imperialists to keep us under a yoke, we are also going to need the support of the values in our culture to help our society start a real development... These values are the integrated nature of the Village Community and the priority of meeting the existential needs of all the community members.

DOCUMENTS

THIRD WORLD LECTURE 1982 SOUTH-SOUTH OPTION

By Julius K. NYERERE

Madame Prime Minister; Your Excellencies; Friends.

The establishment and annual award of the Third World Prize does, by implication, make a number of controversial statements. First, it asserts that there is such a thing as a Third World. Secondly, it asserts that the Third World is conscious of its existence as a diverse unity, and of its condition as a victim of exploitation. And, thirdly, this Prize is an assertion that the Third World is involved in the affairs of mankind, and has rights within the larger community. The Third World Prize is thus a declaration of pride in ourselves, and gives notice of our intention to become controllers of our own destiny.

On this basis of belief about the significance of the Third World Prize, I can only pay tribute to those individuals who established it, and those who have accepted the onerous responsibility of deciding who shall receive it year by year. I accept it today with feelings of humility, and, indeed, some inadequacy.

If countries were like companies, a number of the poor — and even the ambitious but not so poor — would by now be declared bankrupt. Within the poor states millions of people face the risk of starvation; even where health and educational services existed for the masses there is a shortage of drugs and books, and their transport and distributive systems are in danger of grinding to a halt. In the developed industrialised states on the other hand, there is mass unemployment, public services are being cut and reinvestment has been drastically reduced. All nations are experiencing severe economic problems, but the gap between the rich and the poor is wider than ever before.

World inequalities are nothing new; they have been increasing steadily for most of the twentieth century. But there has been a change. The complaint of the poor countries up to the early 1970s was that the international economic system resulted in nearly all their advance being appropriated by the rich. The reply of the rich countries was that growth was taking place everywhere, albeit slowly, and that this world growth showed that the international system was in the interests of all. That reply can no longer be made. Since about 1972 the poorest have become, and are daily becoming, poorer — absolutely as well as relatively. More recently the rich countries have seen their own growth rate decline while they face increasing uncertainty about the repayment of their past overseas loans. It is in fact becoming increasingly clear that an unjust and exploitative international economic system is in the process of falling apart, and no arrangements for its orderly replacement are in sight. The Law of the Jungle is returning.

In the face of these events there have been very many conferences and reports. The main result is vague promises, the calling of new meetings and mounting resentment. We in the Third World complain most, for we

are the ones who are suffering the most extremely, and whose need for relief is greatest and most urgent. There are many countries in the Third World for which disaster is imminent.

But what is this 'Third World', this 'South', (for I am using the words interchangeably), about which we talk so much?

Various definitions can be – and are – given of the 'Third World'; even those who agree that there is such a thing do not always agree about which countries belong to it. By any definition, however, the term 'Third World' is synonymous with underdevelopment and technical backwardness; it almost always means poverty also. As a result of history its membership virtually covers the geographic South excluding Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Yet there is an important sense in which a country has to decide for itself that it is a member of the Third World. For some Third World countries are richer, or more industrialized, than others; and in segregated societies a man who is trying to 'pass' into the dominant community distances himself as much as possible from his relatives and traditional friends.

Whatever marginal countries are included or excluded, however, the Third World consists of the victims and the powerless in the international economy. Consequently, although we Third World nations have united in calling for a New International Economic Order we have not been able to force any noticeable progress towards it. We are not able to ensure that serious attention is given to the restructuring of the existing system, or of its major international institutions. Together we constitute a majority of the world's population, and possess the largest part of certain important raw materials; but we have no control and hardly any influence over the manner in which the nations of the world arrange their economic affairs. In international rule-making we are recipients not participants.

It is, of course, true that the oil-exporting countries, grouped in OPEC, have been able to affect the world economy. But I suggest that what they have really achieved is to show the basic instability and injustice of the present arrangements. In the process they have demonstrated their power, temporarily, to intensify world economic disorder, but their lack of power to cause any constructive change in the system itself. Thus, world inflation was well under way before the end of 1973; the oil price rises then merely gave a further sharp twist to an existing spiral, and the present world recession has damaged the development plans of almost all oil producers, regardless of OPEC. Thus, OPEC membership does not disqualify a country from membership of a group designated by its powerlessness in relation to the institutions of world economic management. It merely means that, by living upon their non-renewable resources, the countries concerned can for a time redistribute world income in their own favour.

It has been on the basis of their separate powerlessness, and in the belief that by speaking together they can reduce it, that the Third World countries have come together and entered hopefully into a series of North-South discussions and negotiations. We have achieved some positive results; in historical terms these are not insignificant. In particular, world poverty is now on the agenda; everyone at least finds it expedient to pay lip-service to ending it.

Unfortunately, the achievements are not enough even to protect the poor from a worsening both of their terms of trade with the developed North and their already appalling conditions. It is not only that the changes leave the basic structures of the world intact – which they do. It is also that the ameliorations conceded to the South have not been put into practice. Thus, only four countries – and these among the smallest – now devote at least 0.7 per cent of their GNP to Official Development Assistance. The average level is about 0.37 per cent, and two major powers have given notice that they intend to cut their contributions still further. There has recently been a growth in protectionism directed against the processed and manufactured goods of the Third World, and there are still barriers against the free entry into developed countries of some agricultural primary commodities. The Common Fund, established after years of negotiations, threatens to become a ghost of the original concept. The international financial institutions are no longer even talking about making their 'loan conditionality' terms more appropriate to developing countries. The long-awaited Cancun Conference concluded by – most probably – having some educational value, but without any commitment even to constructive Global Negotiations through the medium of the United Nations.

In his Inaugural Third World Lecture. 'The Politics of Affirmation', Michael MANLEY talked about the problems of development and concluded 'The developed world has the resources to make a serious start possible. What is needed is a great act of collective imagination, a quantum leap in statesmanship'. The Brandt Commission Report, published about one year later, made a series of practical proposals about how progress could be made towards the 'One World' which it demonstrated is in the interests of both rich and poor.

However, there is – to say the least – no evidence of any imminent 'quantum leap in statesmanship' by the world community. The major industrial powers of both the Eastern and the Western blocs have made clear their lack of practical interest in an organised attack on world poverty, and their imperviousness – for the present – to any rational arguments for international economic change. Smaller members of their alliances do not necessarily share their lack of concern, or their ideological hostility to discussion aimed at constructive change in international institutions. But few, if any, of these other states are likely to find it appropriate – or perhaps possible – to go forward with us alone; they feel constrained to limit their activities to bilateral trade and aid arrangements. Progress in the North-South dialogue is going to be minimal in the desperate years ahead.

This does not mean that the Third World should stop arguing, discussing, and educating. Pressure on the North must be maintained. We are part of the world, and are locked into the economies of the North and into the maze of international economic relationships which are controlled by the North. Our whole economies, and especially our urban areas, depend upon the continued working of imported technology and require continued importation of the spare parts, machines, fuel etc., which that technology implies.

The attempt to improve the terms of North-South trade and economic relationships must continue if our economies are to keep running.

To that end the continued unity of the Third World is vital. For it is only that unity, and the power of a united South to make the maintenance of Northern control over the world economy increasingly costly, which causes the North to negotiate at all. If we allow ourselves to be divided from one another, or one group from another, then we shall all be weakened and the present injustices will continue unchecked.

But unity is strength only when it is organized. If, in the present hostile atmosphere, we are to be able to maintain the pressures for a New International Economic Order, and meanwhile to gain marginal improvements in our economic relationships with the North, then we have to organize ourselves. For if genuine negotiations do become possible at all, they will be about highly complex and detailed questions, with larger implications. For dealing with these, rhetoric is not going to be sufficient.

We want justice in international economic affairs; but what justice consists of will sometimes be different for different circumstances, different times, and different types of economies in the Third World. Thus there are certain ingredients of a New International Economic Order in which the whole Third World has a common interest; a change in the governing structure of the international financial institutions is a case in point. But the priority which countries give to other ingredients will vary in a manner which reflects the different sub-groupings of the South – that is, the newly-industrialized countries (NIC); the landlocked or the island nations; the least developed countries; and so on. Our purpose in the immediate and middle-future must be to secure whatever advance is possible on any of these fronts, whether or not the major Third World demands are blocked for the time being.

No such advances will now be secured by a statement of demands collated at a Group of 77 meeting. Such a joint meeting, and the preparation of an overall position, is an essential beginning. But it is not enough. On the basis, and within the framework of, these defined Third World objectives, our negotiators have to be technically equipped to deal with detailed problems, and to do this in many different fora at the same or different times. When doing so, each one of them needs to be supported by the strength of the whole Third World, and to act in a manner which contributes to that total strength. Liaison and coordination between different negotiating groups and individuals is therefore essential. My conclusion is that there is no longer any alternative to a technically efficient and highly dedicated Permanent Secretariat – a Technical Support Group – for the Group of 77.

The Third World, in its relations with the North, is like a trade union in its relations with employers. It is trying to make unity serve as a compensating strength so as to create a greater balance in negotiations. And every trade union sooner or later discovers that both before and during any discussions with the other side, its skilled negotiators need the support of relevant research done by experienced technicians.

The North is strong and powerful. But it is not omnipotent. If we want our negotiations with the North to succeed we shall benefit greatly by having a Technical Support Group, staffed by highly-qualified and dedica-

ted personnel who will – over time – accumulate experience in the necessary fields. One of the jobs of that Secretariat will be to seek out areas of possible negotiation for the attainment of greater justice, and always to service our negotiators. Such a Support Group will have to be small, and managed on the [principle] of maximum cost-effectiveness. For it will have to be financed by the Third World it is intended to serve. He who pays the piper calls the tune !

Facilitating North-South negotiations, however, is not the sole task of a Third World Secretariat. It has another of equal importance.

Negotiators are ultimately as strong as the group on whose behalf they are working. North-South negotiations are possible because the dependence is not entirely one-sided. But the slow progress which the Third World makes in them reflects the existing adverse balance of our dependence. The obvious Third World task, therefore, is for us to reduce our dependence on the North as much as possible, and, in particular, to see that it does not increase as we develop our economies. The Third World and its individual members need to look at present development strategies to see how far they are leading to a worsening of our dependence balance, and, if so, how they can be changed.

Nearly all Third World countries have at one time or another declared their national objective to be the elimination of destitution, hunger, ignorance, and preventable disease in their state. We have said – almost all of us – that we want all our people to be able to live in dignity, with adequate food, clothing, and shelter available to them in return for their daily work. Those are very simple and basic objectives. Fulfilling them should be what we mean by development.

Development in this sense requires increased consumption – therefore, necessarily increased production – of food, clothing, and shelter. It requires the public availability of clean water, of basic knowledge, and basic health services. And it means that all resources are devoted to expenditure or investment which can be shown to contribute – directly or indirectly – to the provision of these basic needs of everyone.

In practice, however, it appears that the Third World has been thinking of development in very different terms. Judging by our actions, our national objective seems to be to 'catch up with the North', and development seems to mean buying the most elaborate building and the latest invention in every field, regardless of our capacity to pay for it – even to maintain it. Thus we have created a continuing dependency on the importation of technology and spare parts, which then requires us to produce for export regardless of our people's present hunger and present needs. All too frequently an adverse turn in the terms of trade, or a drought, or a simple miscalculation, then causes a major balance of payments crisis. This we try to deal with by urging our people to work harder for the same return, and by borrowing from the North (if we can) in order to invest in the production of greater exports which we hope will pay the old and the new debt! Thus we further increase our dependence and our weakness. In the process we create a so-called 'modern sector' which we point to as a sign of development. But it exists in a sea of poverty, ignorance and disease. Even-

tually we are unable to provide even this modern sector with its ever-increasing need for imports from the North, and much less to assuage the demand which its example has created among the surrounding masses. Our economy – modern and traditional sector alike – becomes less and less efficient. Our final position is worse than the first.

Defining development to mean catching up with the North means that development is impossible for the countries of the Third World. The United States of America, with about 6 per cent of the world's population is now said to use 40 per cent of the world's raw material and energy output. Between 1959–68 America used more of the world's resources than all the earth's people consumed in all previous history. Western Europe and the USSR both have a similar population, and both have the declared or implicit objective of 'overtaking America'.

Three times 40 per cent is 120 per cent, before Japan or any Third World country is considered! Two problems arise – quite apart from the obvious risk of war as the competition for resources gets intense. First, the world's resources are finite; the faster the rate of depletion, the quicker the end is reached. Secondly, the Northern levels of consumption are based on the use of an unfairly high proportion of the world's resources. Yet a world in which every nation gets an unfairly high proportion of its resources is an impossibility.

It is recognition of these two problems which is causing some people in the North to question the rationality of the consumerist philosophy, even for the North. It is that same recognition, combined with a desire to continue along the present path, which causes other Northern people to urge the integration into their world system of selected individual countries from the South, so that these can be tied more securely to the periphery of the existing economic centres and the unity of the South be broken.

But aiming to catch up with the North has more serious consequences than failure to arrive at the goal. It means that we will not abolish poverty in our countries, and that we will remain dependent and therefore weak in our relations with the dominant North. It also means that there will be very little South-South cooperation, because we shall all be trying to get entry into the rich man's club, if necessary at the cost of each other.

Defining development as the provision of basic needs for all our people has very different implications. First, it provides us with an objective which can be reached – in the future if not immediately. Secondly, as we pursue this kind of development we shall be gradually reducing the misery of our people's lives at the same time as reducing our dependence on the North. For we shall be concentrating on the kind of economic production and investments which can be sustained by our own resources and our own capacity. And thirdly, we shall be able to increase South-South cooperation to our mutual benefit and with consequential strengthening of the Third World as a whole.

Working towards the goal of 'people-oriented development' means adopting a more self-reliant approach than we have been doing. It does not mean ignoring human knowledge and the advances of modern science. But

it means looking at the whole of world knowledge and not just its latest caprice; it means allowing our national objectives to determine what type of technology we adopt or adapt from the North. Of necessity, we shall have to look at the experience, the productive capacity, and the knowledge of other Third World countries. For the technology needed for the purpose of eliminating poverty will not necessarily be the same as that which would be required if development meant catching up with the North.

Let me repeat: moving towards the self-reliance of the South, or of any member of it, does not mean pretending that the North is not there, or ignoring the harsh facts of our present dependence on it. We have to face the consequences of our past. That past has tied us to the North with strong ropes. Our urban areas exist; our so-called modern sectors exist. We cannot abandon them. What we can do is deliberately and carefully to re-direct our future development activities so that they lead us toward ever-greater Third World self-reliance, based on the culture and the real needs of our own peoples — our own masses. This requires that we shift the emphasis of our development plans, and in future decide to base them on our own roots and our own resources. In doing so we can benefit by cooperating on the basis of equality with others similarly engaged in the struggle against poverty. For the self-reliance of any member of the Third World can only be made really effective in the struggle against poverty when it is being carried out within the context of the wider collective self-reliance of the Third World as a whole.

Some South-South cooperation already exists. It has grown up even while most of our attention was directed at North-South relationships. Indeed its quantity and its quality should not be under-estimated, for it provides a solid foundation on which we can build. But we cannot continue to rely upon chance knowledge about each other, or upon the initiatives of transnational corporations, for there is no guarantee that this kind of knowledge and action will serve our people's needs. South-South trade and cooperation must be quite deliberately promoted, with the purpose of overcoming weakness and poverty. That is the second task of the Third World Technical Support Group.

The mutual advantage, and the feasibility, of such deliberately organized South-South cooperation cannot be doubted. But it will require from us — from the Third World — that kind of 'great act of collective imagination, a quantum leap in statesmanship' which Michael MANLEY called for from the developed world. For it needs confidence in ourselves and our own abilities, as well as a definite commitment to go ahead, on our own, in areas where the North is now unready or unwilling to work with us in the attack on world poverty. It requires, in other words, an act of political will. We have to make a deliberate commitment to development directed at meeting the needs of the people, and based on our own, Third World, resources and capacity. Without such an act of political will, every effort at cooperation, and every joint undertaking, will collapse when difficulties — occur as they always have done, and always will do.

Further, South-South cooperation cannot be developed along the pattern of past North-South interactions. Within the Third World there are the poor and the less-poor; there are the large and the small; the land-locked and the littoral states. If, within the Third World, those with advantages seek to exploit the weaker ones, then we shall simply repeat, among ourselves and at a lower level, the kind of dependency imbalance which now exists between the South and the North. And if we try to establish systems of Third World cooperation which would produce reasonably balanced results only on condition that all started equal, then we shall intensify the inequalities which now exist between us. The result of such practices would be the gradual build up of mutual resentments and a further division — perhaps between the Third World and a Fourth World — to the disadvantage of us all.

Political will for a positive South-South economic orientation is essential. But it must be married with realism. The individual states of the Third World, and the Third World as a whole, must only undertake what they believe they can actually do — and must then do it. A country's failure to fulfil a commitment is just as devastating to a joint undertaking, whether the failure comes from a lack of foresight about its capacity, or from a lack of will. Care, and thorough preparation, before undertaking commitments is not the same as a refusal to go forward with South-South cooperation: on the contrary, it is essential. We have to be like a tight-rope walker, who undertakes a high-wire walk only after assessing it in the light of his skill, and continues to ensure his balance at every step along the rope.

The benefit of Third World cooperation is likely to be greater the larger the number of countries involved. Yet if we wait for all the 120 members of the Group 77 to go forward together, then we shall not move at all. Our capacity varies; our political commitment to the well-being of our people and to the concept of self-reliance will also vary. South-South cooperation has therefore to be organized in a manner which will accommodate and encourage the participation of the less committed while allowing the more committed to proceed together as their capacity allows. It therefore means not one Third World plan, but many; not one agreement, but a multitude; not one Third World organization, but as many as are necessary to fulfil the functions any of us undertake together. South-South cooperation can involve bilateral agreements, regional agreements, or agreements involving all those Third World countries which are ready and able to move in a particular direction. The important thing is that we should take the deliberate decision to move in this direction of 'South-South', and that our internal as well as external policies should reflect this new emphasis in our international economic relations.

The problem is not that we lack any knowledge of what has to be done. In May 1981 we had the Caracas Conference on the subject of South-South cooperation. That Conference was a new departure, it was serious, and it made a great number of positive suggestions. But little progress has been made since. This was, I believe, partly because our different countries have still not faced up to the need to change the emphasis of our development planning. It may also have been partly because we are not organized to implement the resolutions we pass about South-South cooperation. So many aspects of cooperation are interlinked that there is a lack of clarity about where and how to start.

Perhaps we should learn from our experience on North-South matters. In the 1960s we had the Pearce Commission, and in the 1970s we had the Brandt Commission. Both of these commissions moved the world some way forward; it was not their fault if their constructive and clear proposals were not implemented by the world's political leaders. Indeed, the Cancun Conference did provide an opportunity for the crystallisation of that political will which would have enabled progress to be made on the Brandt proposals. Even now, some political leaders in both North and South are still trying to find a way to convert those proposals into action.

A South-South Commission, with the same kind of broadly-based, high-calibre membership and technical staff, could provide a similar service for Third World cooperation. It could examine the many different ideas which have been discussed over the years, the current and probable future organisational needs, and the priorities of intra-Third World action which are appropriate to a serious attack on world poverty. I would hope that it could, in the end, come up with a definite programme of action, with the question of 'how to move' given emphasis.

Let me try to sum up what I have been saying. I have claimed that the Third World does exist, and has a meaning which can be used for the betterment of the masses of poor people in the world. I have suggested that we need to reject the notion that the world's goals, or our goals, have inevitably been set by the technological and social patterns of the North. Indeed I have argued that only disaster can befall the Third World if it continues to try to 'catch up with the North'. Instead, I have urged that through self-reliance, and organised cooperation on a South-South basis, we can – even in the existing adverse economic circumstances – promote our own declared national objectives.

The war against poverty has still to be won. Let us re-engage ourselves, armed with the experience of our past endeavours.

New Delhi, Monday 22 February, 1982.

BOOK REVIEWS – REVUE DES LIVRES

Fondements de l'Economie de l'Agriculture au Sénégal (La Surexploitation d'une Colonie de 1880 à 1960) – de Bernard Founou-Tchuigoua, Editions Silex 1981, Paris – 173 pages.

Critique de M. L. GAKOU*

Le livre de Bernard Founou s'ouvre sur une préface de Samir Amin. Dans cette préface Amin précise la préoccupation qui est l'objet de l'ouvrage à savoir reexaminer le phénomène de l'exploitation capitaliste qui ne devrait pas être limité aux seules formes classiques opposant l'ouvrier vendeur de sa force de travail au capitaliste détenteur des moyens de production et acheteurs de cette force. Samir cherche à montrer brièvement que même dans le cadre de la production paysanne, l'encadrement politique administratif et technique entraîne une vente de force de travail voilée par une vente de produits. Ensuite Amin pose le problème de la crise de l'agriculture que personne ne peut nier concernant l'Afrique. Il montre que la révolution verte qui est proposée comme remède l'est «dans un système global déjà dominé par l'industrie». Ainsi pose-t-il la question de savoir quelle entité socio-économique dominera cette intégration agro-industrielle. De son point de vue la position classique du capitalisme serait d'assumer cette domination par l'agro-business. Cela aurait pour conséquence une plus sûre exploitation de la paysannerie du Tiers-Monde par les monopoles et une plus grande dépendance.

La seconde solution qu'il entrevoit serait de soumettre l'agriculture à l'état afin de prélever le surtravail paysan au profit de l'industrialisation.

La troisième solution consisterait à étendre le contrôle paysan sur les industries se situant en amont et en aval de l'agriculture.

Enfin la préface se termine par la mise en relief de certains aspects de l'exploitation paysanne qui ne seraient pas examinés dans l'ouvrage, notamment le travail domestique effectué par le paysan et particulièrement la paysanne pour la reproduction de la famille.

* *Stratégie pour le Future de l'Afrique, UNITAR, BP. 3501, Dakar.*

Le livre de Bernard Founou comprend une brève introduction où l'auteur définit son objectif en trois parties.

Dans l'introduction, il précise que le projet visé dans le cadre de cette étude n'est pas de faire une monographie de l'économie sénégalaise mais de contribuer à un approfondissement des connaissances que l'on a de l'économie de traite et des mécanismes d'exploitation qui lui sont liés. L'axe de travail est la production d'arachide mais la mesure de la plus-value prélevée est effectuée à travers la production d'arachide et la transformation de l'arachide en huile.

La période d'étude se situe entre 1880 et 1960 pour la raison que cette période correspond à celle des plus grands bouleversements subis au Sénégal. Enfin dans cette introduction il est précisé que les informations sont tirées des documents d'archives, des enquêtes sur le terrain et des entretiens avec des témoins.

Après cette introduction qui est essentielle — bien que brève — parce que l'auteur y précise ses objectifs il aborde dans la première partie le problème de l'insertion du Sénégal dans la division internationale inégale du travail.

Cette première partie est consacrée à l'analyse des intérêts poursuivis par la France en soumettant le Sénégal au système colonial. Ces intérêts correspondaient :

- «1. à la satisfaction des besoins généraux en huile alimentaire bon marché».
- «2. à la valorisation de l'arachide au Sénégal dans le cadre du pacte colonial».

Dans le premier chapitre Bernard Founou montre par des données bien fournies que les besoins de la France en huiles alimentaires étaient réelles et pressantes au cours de la période étudiée et particulièrement de la fin du 19^{ème} siècle à la période d'après-guerre (la deuxième). C'est ainsi que la culture des oléagineux fut rendue obligatoire à cette époque aussi bien en France que dans les colonies.

En Afrique et plus particulièrement au Sénégal la politique de développement des oléagineux a consisté à substituer l'arachide aux huiles traditionnelles locales. L'auteur insiste à juste raison sur le rôle essentiel du Sénégal dans la fourniture de la France en arachide en considérant l'ensemble de l'A.O.F.

En effet sur 149.000 tonnes d'arachides exportées par l'A.O.F. en 1909—1913, le Sénégal contribuait pour 144.000 tonnes. Jusqu'à la veille des indépendances la part du Sénégal restait déterminante. En 1957 sur 357.000 tonnes exportées le Sénégal contribuait pour 276.000. Cinq ans plus tard la France exportait du Sénégal 84 % de sa consommation d'huile». Ainsi est mis en relief toute l'importance à accorder aux rapports entre la paysannerie sénégalaise et l'économie française.

Ce premier chapitre se termine en montrant que l'huile d'arachide s'était généralisée comme huile de table dans toute l'Europe Occidentale d'où l'intérêt attaché au développement de la production d'arachide avec de plus en plus l'Afrique Occidentale comme source essentielle.

Le chapitre II de la première partie porte sur «la valorisation de l'arachide du Sénégal dans le cadre du pacte colonial».

Le pacte colonial est défini comme l'ensemble des dispositions tendant à maintenir l'extraversion de la périphérie. Son objectif essentiel est perçu comme étant la lutte contre le chômage au centre et sa conséquence logique est le refus par le centre de l'industrialisation de la périphérie.

Ainsi il faudra attendre 1945 pour que le Sénégal ait le droit de triturer sur place ses arachides et mener «dix ans de bataille encore pour que la trituration soit entièrement faite sur place quoique dans le cadre de la dépendance technologique et commerciale».

Par ailleurs au moment des indépendances, la production d'huile reste le seul débouché des arachides aussi bien dans les colonies anglaises que françaises alors qu'un pays comme le Sénégal aurait pu se suffire en consommation de savon, voire en être exportateur en orientant une partie de sa production d'arachide vers la transformation en savon et mettre fin à ses importations coûteuses dans ce domaine.

Pour cette première partie, ce qui frappe le lecteur c'est la quantité d'informations historiques rassemblées par l'auteur et minutieusement analysées. Cela fait du livre un véritable document de travail pour chercheurs et autres universitaires.

La deuxième partie du livre plus théorique est consacrée à «la sur-exploitation des hommes». Dans cette partie sont étudiés les points suivants :

1. «Les rapports sociaux de production dans le Bassin arachidier »,
2. «la plus-value dégagée»,
3. «le procès de minimisation de la rémunération de la force de travail».

Dans le premier chapitre les différentes formes sous lesquelles les rapports de production ont existé, sont examinées depuis la période pré-coloniale vers le 13^e siècle pour en arriver à une tentative de compréhension de l'impact du système colonial sur ces rapports et leurs conséquences sur la paysannerie.

Pendant la période précoloniale, si les redevances versées à ceux qui contrôlaient l'accès à la terre avaient un caractère symbolique, sous le lamanat, qui atteint son apogée au 13^e siècle, ces redevances prendront un autre caractère aux époques suivantes où l'on verra apparaître des modes de production qui ne sont en fait pas clairement définis. Dans ce passage du livre on note la difficulté à définir ces modes de production, esclavagiste ou de type féodal ? La seule donnée sûre est que le surplus était accaparé souvent non sans violence par les maîtres.

Avec l'apparition du système colonial l'auteur note «la pénétration du capital à la campagne» dont l'une des conséquences au moins est l'apparition d'une «faim de la terre». Ici ce qui est le plus intéressant sur le plan théorique c'est l'ensemble des observations qui amènent l'auteur à dire que le petit paysan est en fait transformé en prolétaire quand bien à même «les rapports capitalistes spécifiques étaient pratiquement inexistants».

D'abord la rareté du salariat et la prédominance de la petite paysannerie sont constatées.

Mais l'utilisation des intrants et l'affectation de la terre entre arachide et culture vivrière déterminée en dernier ressort par les besoins de la France et conduisant à une spécialisation du paysan en producteur d'arachide font de celui-ci un prolétaire de fait produisant de la plus value. Il faut dire que la démonstration faite ici aussi bien d'ailleurs que dans la préface présentée par Samir Amin laissent quelque peu sur sa faim.

Il est vrai que le capital extorque un surtravail important au petit paysan, mais il n'est pas démontré que ce surtravail est conceptuellement de la même nature que la plus-value et que le petit paysan peut être de fait confondu avec le prolétaire qui n'a exclusivement que sa force de travail à vendre. Notamment il n'est pas démontré que si ses conditions d'existence se dégradent du fait de la production d'arachide et de l'utilisation des intrants le paysan ne puisse changer ses conditions de production en renonçant aux intrants et en modifiant l'affectation de la terre en faveur des cultures vivrières, toutes choses qui entraîneraient son dégageant partiel du système capitaliste. Et force est de constater que cette autonomie relative qu'a le petit paysan, le prolétaire ne l'a pas. Aussi les arguments apportés dans le livre paraissent insuffisants pour pouvoir confondre même de fait le petit paysan et le prolétaire.

Il faudra vraiment se référer à une étude du même auteur parue dans la pensée d'août–septembre, 1974 étude à laquelle l'auteur renvoie, pour voir les arguments mieux développés. Dans cette étude intitulée «Marché réel et marché formel de la force de travail» l'auteur précise les conditions pour que le paysan puisse être considéré comme un producteur de plus-value.

1. «Economiquement le producteur doit avoir perdu la capacité d'affecter les moyens de production»,
2. «il doit être lié par contrat à une fraction de capital...».

Effectivement ces conditions rappellent celles des zones encadrées où le paysan se voit alloué une parcelle de terre, est tenu d'utiliser certains moyens de production, est obligé de pratiquer une culture déterminée en respectant un calendrier agricole etc... Cet ensemble de conditions font du paysan un pur et simple vendeur de force de travail puisqu'il ne dispose que de celle-là, l'ensemble du procès de production lui échappant totalement.

Les rapports entre marabout et talibés sont examinés et rapprochés au prélèvement de la rente foncière, les marabouts jouant les rôles d'alliés subordonnés dans le système d'exploitation des paysans par le capital.

Dans le deuxième chapitre, l'auteur propose une méthode de calcul de la plus-value dégagée. Il considère pour cela que la différence entre le prix de gros de l'huile d'arachide en France et le prix au producteur représente le mieux la plus-value. Des graphes et des données chiffrées illustrent abondamment cette partie.

Dans le chapitre III de la deuxième partie B. Founou aborde le «Processus de minimisation de la rémunération de la force de travail».

Il explique comment la surexploitation qui en découle suppose que le producteur ne se reproduise pas normalement soit de façon absolue soit de façon relative. Le rôle de l'autoconsommation apparaît comme

essentiel dans le phénomène de surexploitation de la force de travail du prolétariat de fait. La thèse centrale est que le salaire de fait ne permet pas l'acquisition de tous les biens dont le producteur a besoin pour se reproduire normalement.

Le Capital cherche à faire en sorte que la paysannerie pourvoie elle-même à sa subsistance alors que la production de cette subsistance (cultures vivrières) a tendance à baisser sensiblement au profit des produits agricoles (arachides) offerts sur le marché capitaliste à des conditions de prix dérisoires pour les producteurs.

Ensuite pour exploiter la surexploitation du manœuvre sénégalais travaillant dans les huileries, l'auteur compare son salaire au SMIG en France et constate des écarts extrêmement importants qui ne peuvent pas être justifiés par des différences de productivités proportionnelles. Ce phénomène de surexploitation se généralise même aux ouvriers qualifiés et spécialisés sénégalais dont les salaires sont nettement plus bas que ceux des manœuvres français du niveau du SMIG. Pour maintenir ce bas niveau des salaires et assurer l'approvisionnement en vivres des ouvriers et autres salariés urbains, la solution adoptée par le système colonial est «l'importation massive de riz à bon marché de l'Indochine» conduisant à la surexploitation des riziculteurs indochinois.

Des données bien fournies et très utiles sur les productions, les rendements comparés, les conditions des importations etc, achèvent ce chapitre d'une grande richesse.

La troisième partie du livre est consacrée aux conséquences d'une exploitation irrationnelle de la nature.

Alors que le modèle intensif d'exploitation des terres pratiqué chez les sèrères avant même le système colonial pouvait être étendu de façon à éviter une dégradation rapide des sols, le modèle colonial optera pour l'agriculture extensive de façon à minimiser les investissements en capital.

Cette partie aussi est suffisamment illustrée par des tableaux et des graphiques pour que l'on se fasse une idée claire de la manière dont l'économie coloniale était peu soucieuse de préserver le capital naturel comme il l'était vis-à-vis du capital humain.

En définitive le livre de B. Founou est très riche en informations, données, illustrations et certains problèmes théoriques sont sérieusement posés même s'ils n'ont parfois pas été très approfondis. Aussi l'ouvrage peut-il servir chercheurs, universitaires et personnes désireux de bien s'imprégner de la nature de l'économie de traite. En prenant l'exemple de l'une des premières colonies d'Afrique dont il a étudié en profondeur l'économie, il a apporté une importante contribution à la connaissance des structures de l'économie de traite.

FOCUS ON RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTES PLEINS FEUX SUR LES INSTITUTS DE RECHERCHE ET DE FORMATION

THE CENTRE OF AFRICAN STUDIES

The Centre of African Studies of the Universidade Eduardo Mondlane is a research institute and has two principal area-subject specialisations: the study of the socio-economic conditions of Mozambique in its transition from colonial-capitalism to socialism. and the study of Mozambique within the Southern African region.

Building a strong base for a socialist society means essentially transforming the system of production inherited from the colonial economy. This is why in the choice of issues for research, the CEA focusses on problems of transforming production. These studies are important not only for the issues of transformation which they pose, but also for the ways in which they help in the construction of a stronger historical understanding of the patterns of colonial exploitation from which transformation begins.

Studies of production are not seen merely at the level of raising productivity, as though production and politics are separate. FRELIMO's tradition and leadership enforce the insistence that the mobilisation of productivity is a political act, and needs political organisation, and the raising of productivity is inextricably bound up with the need to reorganise the labour process so that the worker-peasant alliance wields the power of the state. Thus studies of the rural economy for the process of socialisation involve not only the enlargement of the economic productive base, but equally the reordering of social relations. The research results of the Centro's projects are published in monograph form and are generally directed towards organized structures within FRELIMO and the government; MOZAMBICAN STUDIES (in its Mozambican edition ESTUDOS MOÇAMBICANOS) is addressed to a more general audience.

Address

Editorial Board,
Centro de Estudos Africanos,
C.P. 257, Maputo, Mozambique

BOOKS RECEIVED

*Inclusion on this list does not exclude future review of the publication.
L'apparition d'un titre dans cette liste n'exclut pas sa future critique.*

1. **Ferdinand E. Banks**
The Political Economy of Oil Lexington Books 1980.
2. **Dr. Jack Baranson**
North-South Technology Transfer: Financing & Institution Building (Lomond Publications, Inc. Mt. Airy, Paryland 21771 – 1981).
3. **S. Bedrani, B. Radji (ed.)**
L'Evolution de la Consommation Alimentaire en Afrique: le cas de l'Algérie (Centre de recherche en économie appliquée (CREA) – Institut International d'études sociales (IIES), 1982).
4. **Udo Bude**
Curriculum Development in Africa (ACO/DSE Review Conference and Study Tour, November 1982).
5. **Jurge D. Buzaglo**
Planning Alternative Development Strategies: Experiments on the Mexican Economy (Institut of Latin American Studies – Monographs No. 7, Stockholm 1982).
6. **Maurice Marek**
Production de Lait Frais au Cameroun (Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique 1980).
7. **Peter Nobel**
Refugee Law in the Sudan (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, UPPSALA, 1982 – Research Report No. 64).
8. **O.C.D.E.**
Coopération pour le Développement (O.C.D.E., 1982).
9. **Lars Rudebeck**
Problèmes de Pouvoir Populaire et de Développement : Transition difficile en Guinée-Bissau.

TRAINING WORKSHOPS ON TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER

1. BACKGROUND

The African Regional Centre for Technology (ARCT) is an inter-governmental institution established to promote technology and its use for development in the African Region. Its activities include training. In this connection, the Centre has organized a training programme consisting of six workshops, to be held over a four-year period (1983 to 1986), with *technology development and transfer* as the overall theme of the programme. Two of the workshops will be aimed at policy-makers. These will deal with the principles fundamental to, and the basic skills required for, formulation and implementation of technology-related policies. The remaining four workshops are designed for «*technology practitioners*» (that is, individuals working *directly* in technology development and transfer). These will be devoted to the following subjects as they relate to the African scene:

- . Upgrading of traditional technologies.
- . Development of new technologies from endogenous R and D;
- . Contract negotiation in technology purchases;
- . Adaptation of exogenous technologies to local conditions;
- . Diffusion of technologies.

2. OBJECTIVES

In all of the six workshops, the primary objective will be to transmit needed skills in the subjects covered. Possibilities of «breaking new ground» in problem areas are also envisaged, however, especially in the technology-practioners' workshop. A second objective, consequently, will be to reach new conclusions concerning issues in technology development and transfer in the African Region.

3. TENTATIVE SCHEDULE

Each workshop will last two weeks. The precise dates and venues will be announced later. Meanwhile approximate dates and venues are as follows:

WORKSHOP A

Participants : Policy-makers
Language: English
Date: August 1983
Venue: Eastern Africa

WORKSHOP B

Participants: Policy-makers
Language: French
Date: April 1984
Venue: Western Africa

WORKSHOP C

Participants: Technology practitioners
Language: English
Date: November 1983
Venue: Northern Africa

WORKSHOP D

Participants: Technology practitioners
Language: English
Date: March 1983
Venue: Southern Africa

WORKSHOP E

Participants : Technology
Language: French
Date: February 1985
Venue: Central Africa

WORKSHOP F

Participants: Technology practitioners
Language: French
Date: May 1986
Venue: Sahelian Africa

3. APPLICATIONS

Applications for participation are invited from individuals having qualifications and experience relevant to the subjects to be covered at the workshop. Applicants should have *at least* a university first degree, or its equivalent, and several years of working experience. Applications must be made on forms available from and to be mailed, through the applicant's employer, to

The Director of Training,
African Regional Centre for Technology,
B.P. 2435 Dakar/Senegal

Applications must reach Dakar at least three months before the relevant workshop.

4. TRAINEESHIP AWARDS

Successful applicants (20 to 30 in each case) will be awarded traineeships covering their travel, room and board. In addition an allowance to meet sundry expenses will be paid.

5. CURRICULUM

The teaching staff for the workshop will consist of selected experts in the subjects to be covered. The workshops will be based on reading and other materials prepared in advance. In addition each participant is expected to bring to the workshop relevant studies and data about his/her own country. Workshops will draw from both of these two sources in an attempt at concreteness and novel conclusions. Special emphasis will be laid on issues relating to food and energy technologies.

ATELIERS DE FORMATION SUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LE TRANSFERT DE LA TECHNOLOGIE

1. GENESE

Le Centre régional africain de technologie (CRAT) est un organisme intergouvernemental créé pour promouvoir la technologie et son utilisation pour le développement de la région Afrique. La formation figure au nombre de ses activités. A cet égard, le Centre a mis au point un programme de formation de six ateliers répartis sur une période de quatre ans (1983 à 1986), dont le thème général est : *développement et transfert de la technologie*. Deux de ces ateliers s'adressent aux personnes ayant le pouvoir de décision et traiteront des principes et aptitudes fondamentaux nécessaires à la formation et la mise en œuvre de politiques relatives à la technologie. Les autres quatre ateliers s'adressent aux « *praticiens de la technologie* », c'est-à-dire des personnes s'occupant *directement* du développement et du transfert de la technologie. Ces ateliers seront consacrés aux sujets suivants en mettant un accent particulier sur les réalités africaines :

- . Amélioration des techniques traditionnelles ;
- . Développement de nouvelles techniques à partir de la recherche et du développement endogènes ;
- . Négociation de contrats en matière d'achat de technologie ;
- . Adaptation de techniques exogènes aux conditions locales ;
- . Diffusion de techniques.

2. OBJECTIFS

Les six ateliers ont pour principal objectif de faire acquérir les aptitudes requises dans les sujets traités. Toutefois, on envisage d'approfondir davantage les domaines à problèmes, notamment pour les ateliers destinés aux praticiens de la technologie. Le second objectif sera naturellement d'aboutir à de nouvelles conclusions intéressantes les questions de développement et de transfert de la technologie dans la région Afrique.

3. CALENDRIER PROVISOIRE

Chaque atelier durera deux semaines. Les dates et lieux exacts seront communiqués ultérieurement. Pour l'instant, les dates et lieux approximatifs sont les suivants :

ATELIER A

Participants : Personnes ayant le pouvoir de décision
Langue : Anglais
Date : Août 1983
Lieu : Afrique de l'Est

ATELIER B

Participants : Personnes ayant le pouvoir de décision
Langue : Français
Date : Avril 1984
Lieu : Afrique de l'Ouest

ATELIER C

Participants : Praticiens de la technologie
Langue : Anglais
Date : Novembre 1983
Lieu : Afrique du Nord

ATELIER D

Participants : Praticiens de la technologie
Langue : Anglais
Date : Mars 1983
Lieu : Afrique Australe

ATELIER E

Participants : Praticiens de la technologie
Langue : Français
Date : Février 1985
Lieu : Afrique Centrale

ATELIER F

Participants : Praticiens de la technologie
Langue : Français
Date : Mai 1986
Lieu : Afrique Sahélienne

3. CANDIDATURES

Les personnes possédant les qualifications et une expérience liées aux sujets traités sont invitées à présenter des candidatures. Les requérants doivent être titulaires *au moins* d'un premier diplôme universitaire ou l'équivalent, et réunir plusieurs années d'expérience pratique. Les candidatures doivent être présentées sur le formulaire à retirer et à adresser par voie hiérarchique au moins trois mois avant le début de l'atelier considéré à :

Monsieur le Directeur de la Formation
Centre Régional Africain de Technologie
B.P. 2435 – Dakar (Sénégal)

4. ALLOCATION DE FORMATION

Il sera accordé aux candidats retenus (20 à 30 dans chaque cas) une allocation de formation couvrant les frais de voyage, la chambre et la pension. Il y aura en outre une indemnité pour faux frais.

5. PROGRAMME DE COURS

Le personnel enseignant des ateliers comprendra des spécialistes choisis dans les divers sujets traités. Les ateliers seront axés sur la lecture et le matériel préparé à l'avance. On s'attend en outre à ce que chaque participant apporte à titre de contribution des études et données pertinentes sur son pays. Les ateliers examineront ces deux sources de renseignements dans le but de tirer des conclusions concrètes. Un accent particulier sera mis sur les questions de techniques alimentaires et énergétiques.

NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS

All manuscripts should be in duplicate and in a form suitable for sending to the printer. Both copies must be typed in double spacing. Articles should be accompanied by a record of the authors name and affiliation, and by a résumé of 500 words (for translation purposes) giving a clear indication of the nature and range of the results in the paper.

Citations in the text should read thus: (Amin, 1975) or, for specific quotations, (Amin, 1975 pp. 61-62). The convention (Amin, 1975 A), (Amin, 1975 B) should be used if more than one publication by the same author (s) in a particular year is cited. References should be listed in full, alphabetically at the end of the paper in the following style:

Nabudere, D.W. (1978) *Essays in the Theory and Practice of Imperialism*, London, Onyx.

Yachir, F. (1978) «Recherche Economique et Système Mondial Capitaliste : Le Tiers Monde et l'Instrumentalisation de Recherche» *AFRICA DEVELOPMENT* Vol III No. 4.

NOTES AUX AUTEURS

Les manuscrits doivent nous parvenir en deux exemplaires et prêts à être imprimés. Les deux exemplaires doivent être écrits à interligne double. Doivent être joints à l'article :

- des détails concernant l'auteur : le nom et l'affiliation
- et un résumé de 500 mots (pour traduction éventuelle) donnant une indication précise de la nature de l'article et une vue d'ensemble des résultats atteints.

Les citations à l'intérieur du texte doivent être libellées comme suit : (Amin 1975) ou, dans le cas des citations particulières (Amin, 1975 pp. 61-62). La convention (Amin, 1975 A), (Amin, 1975 B) doit être employée si plus d'une publication du (es) même (s) auteur (s) est citée. La Bibliographie doit être donnée en entier et par ordre alphabétique à la fin de l'article sous la forme ci-dessous :

Nabudere, D.W. (1978) *Essays in the Theory and Practice of Imperialism*, London, Onyx.

Yachir, F. (1978) «Recherche Economique et Système Mondial Capitaliste : Le Tiers Monde et l'Instrumentalisation de la Recherche» *AFRICA DEVELOPMENT* Vol III No. 4.

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION/ABONNEMENT ANNUEL

African Institutes/Instituts Africains dollars 20 US/20 dollars US – 102 FF
Other Institutes/Autres Instituts dollars 25 US/25 dollars US – 127 FF
Individuals/Individuels dollars 15 US/15 dollars US – 76 FF

Postage/Expédition:

African Institutes/Instituts Africains – by Air Mail/par Avion
Rest/Reste – by Surface Mail/par Voie Ordinaire

Current Individual Copy – dollars 7 US – 35 FF
Exemplaire en cours – 7 US dollars – 35 FF

Back Issues/Numéros précédents – dollars 10 US/10 dollars US – 51 FF

Subscription should be sent to:

The Editor,
CODESRIA,
B.P. 3304,
Dakar/SENEGAL.

CONTENTS – SOMMAIRE

Ume N. EKEKWE

The Role of the State in the Economy:
Nigeria, 1960/75

Fredj STAMBOULI

Développement dépendant et Paupérisation de la Paysannerie :
le Cas de l'Afrique du Nord

H. Assisi ASOBIE

Nigeria and the European Economic Community, 1970/80: An Analysis
of the Processes and Implications of Nigeria's Association with the EEC
under the First Lome Convention

Makhtar DIOUF

Eléments pour une Critique de la Planification Macro-Economique du
Développement dans les Pays Africains

Anthony I. NWABUGHUOGU

Oil Mill Riots in Eastern Nigeria 1948/51 :
A study in Indigenous Reaction to Technological Innovation

Mwamba BAPUWA

Approche Théorique des Valeurs et Anti-valeurs des Tra-
ditions Zairoises : Contribution à la Recherche d'une
Culture de Développement

DOCUMENT

Julius K. NYERERE

The Third World Lecture 1982 – South-
South Option

BOOK REVIEWS

M. Lamine GAKOU

Fondements de l'Economie de Traite au
Sénégal (la surexploitation d'une colonie
de 1880 à 1960) de Bernard Founou-
Tchuigoua

**FOCUS ON RESEARCH &
TRAINING INSTITUTES**

The Centre of African Studies

BOOKS RECEIVED

1686-79
LW