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
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L'AFRIQUE FACE A L'IDEOLOGIE DE L'EURAFRIQUE: NEO-COLONIALISME OU PANAFRICANISME ?

Par

Guy MARTIN*

INTRODUCTION

Cet article s'interroge sur les causes profondes du sous-développement et de la dépendance persistantes et croissantes de l'Afrique en dépit de son énorme potentiel économique.

Une des raisons fondamentales de cette situation est à rechercher dans la nature des liens politiques, économiques et culturels qui n'ont cessé de lier l'Europe et l'Afrique depuis le 15^e siècle jusqu'à nos jours. Le commerce, fondé sur l'échange inégal, est l'élément central de cette relation : commerce des esclaves, du 15^e au 19^e siècles ; commerce de traite du «pacte colonial», de 1900 à 1960 ; commerce du «pacte néo-colonial» institutionnalisé par les Conventions de Yaoundé I (1963), Yaoundé II (1969), Lomé I (1975) et Lomé II (1979).

Nous essaierons de démontrer que tant que l'Afrique demeurera enserrée dans ce carcan de relations néo-coloniales sanctionnées par l'idéologie de l'Eurafrrique, l'Unité africaine, tant régionale que continentale, sera difficile, sinon impossible, à réaliser.

Nous concevons une idéologie comme étant

... un système (possédant sa logique et sa rigueur propres) de représentations (images, mythes, idées ou concepts selon les cas) doué d'une existence et d'un rôle historiques au sein d'une société donnée (1).

Deux aspects de l'idéologie ainsi définie méritent d'être soulignés. D'une part, l'idéologie est une justification, mais nullement une description d'une réalité socio-historique donnée. D'autre part, l'idéologie contient implicitement sa propre stratégie.

L'idéologie de l'Eurafrrique est un système d'idées qui a son origine à l'époque coloniale, et selon lequel le devenir des continents européen et africain est envisagé comme étant naturellement et indissolublement lié aux niveaux politique, économique, social et culturel. Les concepts clé de cette idéologie sont ceux de «complémentarité» et d'«interdépendance».

L'analyse historique des rapports entre les deux continents s'efforce de mettre en évidence cette complémentarité sur tous les plans: proximité géographique, interpénétration politique, économique, sociale et culturelle. Certains auteurs vont même jusqu'à souligner le caractère évident, naturel de cette complémentarité entre l'Europe et l'Afrique:

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L'Afrique est le seul espace remplissant les conditions naturelles et climatiques pour être complémentaire de l'Europe (2).

Une telle complémentarité aboutit inévitablement à l'«interdépendance», c'est-à-dire à la dépendance réciproque des deux partenaires l'un de l'autre dans tous les domaines du fait de ces «liens privilégiés» forgés par l'histoire. L'interdépendance, quant à elle, débouche logiquement sur l'idée de «métissage culturel» entre la «rationalité européenne» et l'«émotion nègre», selon une théorie chère au Président SENGHOR, le tout aboutissant à une vision idyllique de la fusion complète des deux continents.

Nous nous proposons de démontrer comment cette complémentarité «naturelle» a été en fait une complémentarité de contrainte, imposée dès l'origine à l'Afrique de l'extérieur, par la force. Nous verrons comment l'«interdépendance» n'est en fait qu'un euphémisme qui dissimule la dépendance accrue du continent africain de l'Europe. Nous pourrions ensuite brièvement analyser la stratégie néo-coloniale mise en place par les tenants de l'idéologie eurafricaine, de l'«Association» de Yaoundé I (1963) à la Convention de Lomé II (1979). Il conviendra enfin de s'interroger sur les alternatives à une telle association offertes à l'Afrique, tant au niveau non-européen qu'aux plans régional et continental.

I. L'IDEOLOGIE DE L'EURAFRIQUE : ANTECEDENTS HISTORIQUES

Il ne fait aucun doute que

Le commerce est ce qui a amené les Européens en Afrique pour la première fois au quinzième siècle, et le commerce n'a cessé de constituer le fondement des relations entre les deux continents depuis lors (3).

Du 15^e au 19^e siècles, ce commerce a été peu diversifié et n'a porté que sur un nombre limité de produits. Au commerce des épices, de l'or et de l'ivoire a succédé, à partir de 1442, celui des esclaves africains (4). Destiné au début à suppléer l'insuffisance de la main d'œuvre indienne dans les colonies européennes d'Amérique, ce commerce florissant devint l'un des éléments moteurs du développement économique de l'Europe et de l'Amérique du Nord. Si bien qu'il est légitime d'affirmer qu'

au cours de cette période l'Afrique a aidé au développement de l'Europe Occidentale au moins autant que l'Europe Occidentale a aidé au sous-développement de l'Afrique (5).

Il est important de remarquer ici que dès l'origine, la relation commerciale entre les deux continents est une relation imposée par le partenaire européen, inégalitaire et contraignante. Ce commerce bouleverse en outre tous les courants traditionnels d'échange qui existaient à l'intérieur du continent entre l'Afrique du Nord, l'Afrique «soudanaise» et l'Afrique côtière. C'est ainsi qu'à partir du 15^e siècle et pendant les quatre siècles qui suivirent,

L'Europe confina l'Afrique dans le rôle de fournisseur d'otages humains devant être utilisés comme esclaves dans les diverses parties du monde (6).

Selon les estimations les plus conservatrices, la ponction humaine subie de ce fait par l'Afrique fut considérable :

On peut... considérer qu'environ 100 millions d'hommes et de femmes ont été arrachés à l'Afrique depuis le XV^e siècle, 50 millions étant un minimum (7).

Le 19^e siècle marque l'avènement de l'ère de l'impérialisme, «stade suprême du capitalisme» selon LENINE, dont l'apogée se situe à la fin du siècle et au début du 20^e. Le Congrès de Berlin de 1885 qui sanctionnait la «ruée sur les colonies», manifestation extrême des rivalités de l'impérialisme européen, faisait la part belle aux colonialismes français et britannique qui à eux seuls s'adjugeaient les deux-tiers de la surface du continent africain, l'Allemagne, la Belgique et le Portugal se partageant le reste.

L'Afrique devenait ainsi la source principale d'approvisionnement en matières premières de l'Europe. Produits de l'arachide, produits du palmier à huile, coton, caoutchouc, café, cacao, bananes et bois constituèrent les principaux produits d'exportation de l'Afrique vers l'Europe au cours des périodes «impériale» et coloniale. Mais, en même temps, l'Afrique constituait un débouché «naturel» pour les produits excédentaires de l'industrie européenne, écoulés à des prix prohibitifs sur les marchés coloniaux «captifs».

Ainsi était mise en place l'économie de traite, caractérisée essentiellement par l'exportation par la colonie de produits primaires sous-évalués et l'importation de la métropole de produits manufacturés surtaxés. Telle est l'essence de l'«échange inégal», selon lequel

une certaine catégorie de pays, quoi qu'ils entreprennent et quoi qu'ils exportent, échangent toujours plus de travail national pour moins de travail étranger (8).

Cette inégalité fondamentale des échanges est à l'origine de la dépendance structurelle de la colonie à l'égard de la métropole comme l'a si bien démontré un observateur attentif de cette période :

L'économie de traite place le pays colonisé dans un état de dépendance totale à l'égard de la métropole. Le circuit économique est branché sur elle : le commerce n'achète que pour exporter et ne vend que des produits importés. La dépendance est d'autant plus totale que l'économie marchande est implantée en profondeur (9).

De cette époque date la pénétration progressive du mode de production capitaliste au sein des sociétés traditionnelles africaines, selon un lent processus qui n'est pas totalement achevé de nos jours.

Ce qui est notoire pendant cette période, c'est l'absence délibérée de toute tentative d'industrialisation qui serait venue porter atteinte aux intérêts des sociétés de traite métropolitaines. A tel point que

Chaque fois que des forces locales semblaient amorcer un début d'industrialisation africaine, elles étaient délibérément bloquées par les autorités coloniales, agissant pour le compte des industriels métropolitains (10).

Dès l'époque coloniale apparaît, au sein de certains groupes sociaux métropolitains (dirigeants politiques, fonctionnaires de l'administration coloniale, hommes d'affaires), un courant «Eurafricain» qui souligne la «complémentarité naturelle» existant entre l'Afrique et l'Europe : complémentarité des produits, complémentarité des marchés, mais aussi complémentarité des cultures et des civilisations, devant aboutir au «métissage culturel» et à la «fusion des continents» dont il a été précédemment question. C'est ainsi que d'aucuns n'hésitent pas à déclarer, à l'époque :

Si nous ne voulons pas perdre l'Afrique en tant que source précieuse de matières premières et comme débouché de nos produits, l'Europe doit participer à *l'absorption* du continent noir (11).

Ainsi sont jetées, dès le 15^e siècle, les bases de la dépendance permanente de l'Afrique à l'égard de l'Europe. A travers le commerce des esclaves d'abord, puis l'économie de traite ensuite, l'Europe organise et accroît progressivement le pillage (et donc le sous-développement) du continent africain.

A la suite de la «vague» des indépendances africaines des années soixante, il s'agit pour les ex-métropoles européennes de mettre en place un nouveau système de domination, moins ostensible mais non moins efficace : le néo-colonialisme et ses prolongements institutionnels, les Conventions de Yaoundé et de Lomé.

II. L'IDEOLOGIE DE L'EURAFRIQUE COMME JUSTIFICATION DU NEO-COLONIALISME

Le néo-colonialisme peut se définir comme étant

La survivance du système colonial, en dépit de la reconnaissance formelle de l'indépendance politique dans les pays neufs qui deviennent les victimes d'une domination indirecte, plus subtile, par des moyens politiques, économiques, sociaux, militaires ou techniques (12).

Le néo-colonialisme est fondé sur le principe «diviser pour régner»:

La Balkanisation est l'instrument majeur du néo-colonialisme ; elle peut être observée partout où le néo-colonialisme opère (13).

La plus éclatante illustration de cette stratégie est sans conteste la manière dont la France, dans les années soixante, est parvenue à manœuvrer de telle manière que les deux grandes entités coloniales pré-existantes, l'Afrique Occidentale Française et l'Afrique Equatoriale Française, soient fractionnées en quatorze unités territoriales économiquement non viables et dont la dépendance continue à l'égard de la France demeurera une constante pour de longues années (14).

1. — *Les Origines de l'Institutionnalisation du Néo-Colonialisme : du Traité de Rome à la Convention de Yaoundé II*

Pour de nombreux observateurs avertis de l'époque, l'association des ex-colonies françaises et belges d'Afrique au Traité de Rome de 1957 d'abord, puis à la Première Convention de Yaoundé de 1963 (renouvelée

en 1969) ensuite, (15) constituait un exemple typique de contrat néo-colonial liant un groupe de pays sous-développés à un groupe de pays industrialisés, à l'initiative et dans l'intérêt exclusif des seconds (16).

Il s'agissait, en quelque sorte, de «contractualiser» et d'institutionnaliser les «liens historiques» de solidarité et de complémentarité naturelle évoqués par les tenants de l'Eurafrique dans le but avoué de

rattacher pour l'avenir l'économie de l'Europe Occidentale à l'exploitation rapide des richesses naturelles du continent africain (17).

C'est ainsi qu'au colonialisme bi-latéral «classique» se substitue une domination néo-coloniale multilatérale par laquelle un groupe de pays développés européens en voie d'intégration s'adjoint un groupe de pays sous-développés «en voie de désintégration». Il s'agit véritablement du «stade suprême de l'impérialisme» selon NKRUMAH. A cet égard, la comparaison établie par ce dernier entre le Traité de Rome et le Congrès de Berlin semble tout à fait appropriée :

Le Traité de Rome, qui a donné naissance au Marché Commun européen, peut être comparé au Traité qui a émergé du Congrès de Berlin au 19^e siècle. Ce dernier a établi le règne incontestable du colonialisme en Afrique ; le premier marque l'avènement du néo-colonialisme en Afrique (18).

Ce contrat néo-colonial vise, en définitive, à empêcher les états africains de poursuivre une politique indépendante et de réaliser l'intégration africaine. Nul, mieux que NKRUMAH, n'a décrit le but implicite de l'association à la Communauté européenne :

Le Marché Commun est un plan européen destiné à rattacher les pays africains à l'impérialisme européen, à empêcher les pays africains de poursuivre une politique neutre et indépendante, à empêcher la constitution de liens économiques mutuellement bénéfiques entre ces pays et à maintenir les pays africains dans le rôle de fournisseurs de matières premières aux puissances impérialistes (19).

L'élément nouveau en ce qui concerne le développement de l'idéologie de l'Eurafrique est que l'Europe est, implicitement ou explicitement, présentée comme un «modèle de développement» (sinon «le» modèle de développement) que les pays africains se doivent d'imiter s'ils veulent pouvoir sortir un jour de leur état de sous-développement et de dépendance chroniques. Il s'agit, bien évidemment, de la stratégie libérale, ou capitaliste, de développement, hors de laquelle il n'y aurait point de salut.

Ainsi se poursuit et se parachève le processus d'intégration de l'Afrique au système capitaliste mondial, processus amorcé dès l'ère de l'impérialisme :

L'intégration impérialiste européenne rattache les pays en voie de développement africains à l'économie capitaliste mondiale (20).

Les Conventions de Lomé I (1975) et Lomé II (1979), ne feront que renforcer ce processus d'institutionnalisation du néo-colonialisme et d'intégration au marché mondial.

2. — *Le Renforcement de l'Institutionnalisation du Néo-Colonialisme, de Lomé I à Lomé II*

Au moment de sa signature le 28 février 1975 dans une certaine euphorie, la Première Convention de Lomé, conclue entre les «neuf» de la Communauté Economique Européenne (21) et 46 pays d'Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique, (22) fut présentée au monde par ses protagonistes comme un évènement «historique» d'une portée considérable. Lomé I était érigé en modèle du nouveau type de relations Nord-Sud préconisé dans le cadre du Nouvel Ordre Economique International récemment proclamé aux Nations-Unies.

On se plaisait par ailleurs à souligner le «front uni» présenté au cours de la négociation par les ACP, qui parvenaient ainsi pour la première fois à transcender les barrières continentales, politiques, linguistiques et culturelles. Ne trouvait-on pas, au sein des ACP, des états aussi éloignés géographiquement et culturellement, que le Nigéria et les Iles Fidji, anglophones et francophones, socialistes (Guinée, Tanzanie) et capitalistes (Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya) ? D'aucuns allèrent jusqu'à affirmer qu'

en rassemblant les deux groupes, francophones et anglophone, l'Association (à la CEE) a favorisé l'unité africaine (23).

Pourtant, en privilégiant les relations Nord-Sud au détriment d'une coopération Sud-Sud, la Convention de Lomé apparaît au contraire comme un sérieux obstacle à l'unité africaine et, singulièrement, à l'intégration continentale africaine.

A cet égard, il convient de remarquer que l'Europe entretient des rapports bi-latéraux, sanctionnés par des accords de coopération commerciale, avec quatre pays d'Afrique du Nord membres de l'O.U.A. : l'Algérie, le Maroc, la Tunisie et l'Egypte. Ces accords bi-latéraux s'inscrivent dans la logique de la stratégie néo-coloniale du «diviser pour régner».

Au-delà des discours pompeux et des auto-satisfecits que se décernèrent les signataires européens de la Convention de Lomé, il convient de voir si, au plan des principes, cette Convention modifie de manière substantielle le type de rapports de dépendance institutionnalisés et entretenus par les deux Conventions de Yaoundé.

En d'autres termes, il s'agit de s'interroger sur le point de savoir si la «philosophie de Lomé» se démarque de manière importante de l'idéologie de l'Eurafrrique telle qu'appliquée, dans sa stratégie néo-coloniale, aux Conventions de Yaoundé.

Il n'est pas dans nos intentions de procéder ici à une analyse économique exhaustive des diverses dispositions de la Convention, ainsi que de ses résultats concrets au moment où celle-ci, arrivée à expiration, est relayée par la Convention de Lomé II signée le 31 octobre 1979 entre les «neuf» de la C.E.E. et 58 ACP, (24) et entrée en vigueur le 1er janvier 1981.

En nous situant uniquement au niveau de la philosophie politique, nous nous contenterons d'évoquer certaines des idées-forces qui sous-tendent cette «philosophie de Lomé» en les confrontant avec celles qui sont au centre de l'idéologie de l'Eurafrrique : «complémentarité» et «interdépendance».

On retrouve effectivement ces deux concepts dans les déclarations de certains fonctionnaires européens célébrant l'avènement (ou l'«évènement») de Lomé I :

(Les innovations de Lomé démontrent)... le souci de l'Europe d'établir avec les pays en voie de développement des liens d'*interdépendance* économique à long terme capables d'assurer mieux que tout traité, le progrès et la *complémentarité* (25).

Claude CHEYSSON, actuel Ministre français des Relations Extérieures et avocat infatigable de la Convention de Lomé auprès des états membres du temps où il était Commissaire européen au développement, est encore plus explicite sur ce point :

Nous dépendons du Tiers Monde dans notre présent et notre avenir. Il dépend largement de nous. Nos intérêts sont liés. Alors cherchons à exprimer cette dépendance de manière sûre, irrévocable ; sortons de l'approximation arbitraire, annuelle et conjoncturelle, pour conclure des accords entre nous, contrats qui lieront nos entreprises, conventions qui expriment, de manière contraignante pour tous, les principes directeurs de nos politiques, les règles de nos jeux... (26).

L'intention est claire : contractualiser, de manière «contraignante» et «irrévocable», les relations de dépendance entretenues par les Conventions de Yaoundé, les européens conservant la maîtrise de la détermination des «règles du jeu».

Il s'agit, en définitive, pour les promoteurs de la Convention de Lomé, de perpétuer l'actuelle division internationale du Travail selon laquelle les pays du Tiers Monde continuent à se cantonner dans la fourniture de matières agricoles et minérales alors que les pays développés (et, singulièrement, l'Europe) conservent le monopole des industries (particulièrement de celles à haute technologie), ainsi que des réseaux de communication (transport maritime, en particulier) et des réseaux financiers (monnaie, crédit, assurances).

En d'autres termes il s'agit, selon l'expression imagée (mais réaliste) d'un haut fonctionnaire de la Commission de la C.E.E., d'associer la matière grise européenne à la main d'œuvre bon marché africaine», étant entendu que les activités de Recherche-Développement doivent continuer à être monopolisées par les pays développés occidentaux. Aux européens, les tâches nobles de l'industrie et de la recherche, aux africains les travaux ingrats nécessitant la manipulation de la pelle, de la pioche et de la houe (et, plus rarement, du tourne-vis). Tout serait ainsi pour le mieux dans le meilleur des mondes «interdépendants».

Ainsi passe-t-on du pacte colonial au «pacte néo-colonial» sans que la nature fondamentalement inégalitaire des échanges ne soit en rien modifiée. Telle est la signification profonde de la «complémentarité» si chère aux tenants de l'Eurafrrique :

Pendant un siècle, et plus d'un siècle dans certains cas, l'Afrique a précisément joué le rôle de *complément* de l'Europe — servant tant de source de matières premières que de marché pour les produits finis.

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Puisque durant les deux décennies d'indépendance, cette extraversion des économies africaines n'a guère changé, il est évident que, dans ce cas particulier, plus que toute autre économie en voie de développement, les économies africaines sont caractérisées par *des structures qui s'adaptent déjà aux besoins des économies européennes* (27).

Cette situation aboutit à accroître la dépendance de l'Afrique à l'égard de l'Europe. D'aucuns poussent le cynisme jusqu'à reconnaître ce fait en le justifiant, comme si cette dépendance était une nécessité, voire un phénomène «positif» pour les états qui y sont soumis :

certaines spécialisations internationales sont justifiées par les conditions naturelles, sociales ou historiques, et sont si manifestement avantageuses (pour qui ? G.M.) qu'elles doivent être favorisées *même créant, maintenant ou resserant des dépendances économiques* (28).

Cette situation permet en outre aux pays européens de contrôler le processus d'industrialisation dans les pays africains associés et, plus précisément, de limiter leur développement en fonction des intérêts et des besoins des industriels européens. D'où l'accent mis sur le développement en Afrique d'unités industrielles petites ou moyennes, en «joint venture» avec les entreprises européennes. Certains envisagent même l'institutionnalisation d'un «contrat de coopération industrielle» entre opérateurs industriels européens et promoteurs nationaux africains, les premiers ayant pour tâche d'amener les seconds au point du «décollage» industriel dans un délai, jugé «réaliste» (!) de vingt à trente ans (29) (probablement le temps nécessaire aux entreprises européennes pour asseoir définitivement leur suprématie !)

Ainsi est consacrée une nouvelle division internationale du travail visant à maintenir en Europe les industries «de pointe» à haute technologie et à forte intensité de capital (aéronautique de pointe, électronique, information), alors que les industries de «première génération» (transformation de matières premières, première ouvraison, substitution d'importation, montage), à forte intensité de main d'œuvre, seront réservées à l'Afrique. Dans cette perspective l'Afrique devient, tout naturellement, le champ d'expansion territoriale de l'espace économique européen. Une analyse pertinente de cet état de fait le souligne :

Ce moyen... permettra (à la Communauté)... de se lancer dans une spécialisation accrue qui entraînera une concentration des nouvelles industries à technologie avancée qui exigent une masse de main d'œuvre qualifiée dans l'espace central de la Communauté et le transfert des industries de types plus conventionnels à l'extérieur (30).

En définitive, ce que l'Europe recherche dans le cadre de la Convention de Lomé c'est, en priorité à assurer sa sécurité d'approvisionnement en matières premières «stratégiques» (pétrole, uranium, métaux d'alliage etc...) et, ensuite, à élargir son marché d'exportation pour les produits manufacturés excédentaires que ses propres marchés ne peuvent plus absorber.

Dans ce processus, le développement économique des pays africains n'est envisagé qu'incidemment, comme un sous-produit de cette «coopération» (31). L'économie «extravertie» reçoit ainsi ses impulsions principales de l'extérieur, le «centre» oriente l'économie de la «périphérie» par le canal des dispositions de la Convention.

Les premiers bilans partiels de la Convention de Lomé I, basés sur la structure, la composition et la destination des échanges commerciaux, tendent à démontrer que rien n'a fondamentalement changé en ce qui concerne la dépendance des états africains :

... la Convention de Lomé, à la suite des Conventions de Yaoundé, n'a pas modifié la structure coloniale et «traditionnelle» des échanges commerciaux entre la Communauté et les ACP (32).

Quant à la Deuxième Convention de Lomé (1er janvier 1981 – 28 février 1985), elle ne fait, au mieux, qu'actualiser la dépendance en reconduisant, pour l'essentiel, la plupart des dispositions de Lomé I sans en modifier la nature (33).

Au plan politique, l'institutionnalisation de l'Eurafrrique réalisée par Lomé permet de lier, de façon permanente, la plus grande partie du continent africain aux destinées de l'Europe.

Il s'agit en particulier pour l'Europe, appliquant sa propre «Doctrine Monroe», de maintenir les autres grandes puissances, notamment les Etats-Unis, l'Union Soviétique et le Japon, hors de sa traditionnelle «sphère d'influence», quitte à servir d'intermédiaire obligé dans les relations que les états africains entretiennent avec celles-ci.

La dépendance économique entraîne une dépendance politique chronique, notamment dans les pays francophones d'Afrique. A une dépendance monétaire permanente qui rend illusoire toute velléité de politique économique indépendante, s'ajoutent des «interventions» d'un autre âge visant à mettre en place, ici ou là, des potentats entièrement dévoués à la cause de la «métropole», dont ils constituent les dociles exécutants. Telle est bien l'essence du néo-colonialisme, selon lequel

l'état qui y est soumis est théoriquement indépendant et possède tous les signes extérieurs de la souveraineté nationale. En réalité, son système économique, et par conséquent sa politique même, sont dirigés de l'extérieure (34).

Au plan culturel, enfin, la Convention de Lomé permet, sous couvert de «multilatéralisation», la perpétuation des «liens privilégiés» forgés par l'«histoire» entre ex-métropoles et néo-colonies. Les «zones d'influence» (lisez : «chasses gardées») sont à cet égard soigneusement et jalousement préservées, et l'influence pernicieuse du culturel se fait sentir à travers l'éducation, les comportements (l'«effet de démonstration»), les habitudes et les modes de pensée des élites africaines qui, de ce point de vue, apparaissent comme totalement «extraverties» (35). Au néo-colonialisme économique et politique se superpose donc un néo-colonialisme culturel d'autant plus dangereux qu'il constitue un des éléments déterminants de la perpétuation de la dépendance. A cet égard, la «décolonisation des

mentalités» reste à faire, et sera certainement la tâche la plus urgente et la plus ardue des futures générations dirigeantes africaines. Comme l'a si bien dit FANON,

Nous pouvons tout faire aujourd'hui à condition de ne pas singer l'Europe, à condition de ne pas être obsédés par le désir de rattraper l'Europe (36).

Il convient maintenant de s'interroger sur les différentes alternatives offertes aux pays africains dans leurs tentatives de développement et leur quête de l'indépendance économique, dont la forme la plus achevée est l'intégration continentale africaine.

III. LES ALTERNATIVES A L'IDEOLOGIE DE L'EURAFRIQUE: PANAFRICANISME ET UNITE AFRICAINE

Les alternatives à l'idéologie de l'Eurafrrique sont de trois ordres : non européennes, tiers-mondistes et africaines.

1. — *Les Alternatives «Non-Communautaires» et Non-Européennes*

La première catégorie d'alternatives fait référence au fait que les «liens privilégiés» de l'Afrique avec l'Europe l'empêchent de nouer des liens politiques, économiques et culturels plus étroits avec d'autres pays développés, européens ou non, occidentaux ou socialistes, qui pourraient également contribuer positivement au développement économique des pays africains.

Ainsi en est-il des relations entre l'Afrique et les pays scandinaves, les pays de l'Europe de l'Est, l'Union Soviétique, les Etats-Unis, le Canada et le Japon, pour ne citer que ceux-ci. Cette alternative a été effectivement envisagée par les participants à un récent colloque sur l'avenir économique de l'Afrique :

Le Colloque a retenu la proposition faite par plusieurs participants de voir l'Afrique engager, par l'intermédiaire de l'OUA, des négociations dans le cadre du Tokyo Round, afin d'aboutir à une convention du type Convention de Lomé avec des pays comme les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, le Japon, les gouvernements scandinaves, les pays socialistes d'Europe orientale (37).

En introduisant une discrimination à l'égard des états-tiers en matière commerciale, la Convention de Lomé amène certains de ces états à prendre des mesures de rétorsion à l'égard des ACP. C'est ainsi que ces derniers ne peuvent pas bénéficier du système des Préférences Généralisées que les Etats-Unis accordent à la plupart de pays du Tiers-Monde.

Par ailleurs, le potentiel commercial existant entre les pays du bloc socialiste (notamment ceux du COMECON) et les pays africains est très important et encore largement inexploité.

La Convention de Lomé apparaît ainsi comme un obstacle important aux échanges, et donc au développement, des pays africains, par les nombreuses alternatives, tant européennes qu'extra-européennes, qu'elle ferme à ceux-ci.

2. — *Les Alternatives «Tiers-Mondistes»*

Les alternatives «tiers-mondistes» portent sur les nombreuses possibilités de relations politiques, économiques et culturelles entre pays du Tiers Monde qui sont bloquées par l'institutionnalisation des relations eurafricaines. Il est à noter ici que cette institutionnalisation ne concerne pas seulement les 63 états ACP, mais également 4 états du Moyen-Orient, 14 états asiatiques et 14 états latino-américains (outre les 4 états nord-africains sus-mentionnés), chacun étant séparément lié à la CEE par des accords commerciaux bi-latéraux (38). Ainsi sont privilégiés des liens verticaux au détriment de liens horizontaux, selon le principe néo-colonial du «diviser pour régner».

On pourrait aisément concevoir un développement sur une plus grande échelle de relations économiques (commerciales, en particulier) entre l'Afrique d'une part, et les pays du Moyen-Orient, d'Asie du Sud-Est (ASEAN) et d'Amérique Latine (Marché Commun Latino-Américain) d'autre part. Ces relations peuvent être envisagées soit au niveau bi-latéral (cas des relations entre le Brésil et la Côte d'Ivoire, par exemple), soit au niveau multilatéral, entre organisations régionales de différents continents.

Une voie particulièrement fructueuse de collaboration «tiers-mondiste» est constituée par les «cartels de producteurs» qui s'efforcent de rassembler en une seule organisation tous les producteurs et exportateurs mondiaux d'un même produit (matière première agricole ou minérale). Cette stratégie est particulièrement intéressante lorsque le produit considéré est réparti entre un nombre limité de pays du Tiers Monde. C'est le cas, par exemple, en ce qui concerne les minerais, pour :

- la bauxite (Association Internationale de la Bauxite, 1974) ;
- le cuivre (Conseil Intergouvernemental des Pays Exportateurs de Cuivre, 1967)
- le fer (Association Internationale des Pays Exportateurs de Minerai de Fer, 1975) ;

En ce qui concerne les produits agricoles, on peut mentionner :

- le cacao (Alliance des Producteurs de Cacao, 1962) ;
- le café (Organisation Mondiale du Café, 1973) ;
- le thé (Comité International du Thé, 1933).

Malgré les problèmes techniques, économiques et politiques assez délicats que pose la création de tels cartels, cette voie mérite d'être sérieusement explorée par les pays africains concernés.

L'inquiétude exprimée par certains milieux européens devant le potentiel politique d'une coalition «tiers-mondiste» de ce genre est révélatrice de l'importance d'une telle collaboration pour les pays du Tiers Monde:

Si l'Asie, l'Afrique et l'Amérique du Sud formaient un bloc politique et militaire hostile à notre manière de vivre et voulaient nous en imposer une de leur choix, la menace serait redoutable... (39)

3. — *Les Alternatives Africaines*

L'intégration africaine doit être envisagée à deux niveaux : au niveau régional et au niveau continental.

a./ Au niveau Régional

Au niveau régional, il convient de noter que la Convention de Lomé I avait introduit des dispositions particulières destinées à favoriser une telle intégration entre pays ACP – et, singulièrement, africains (Protocole No. 2, chapitre 4, articles 7 à 9), dispositions qui ont été reprises et développées dans la Convention de Lomé II (Titre VII, chapitre 8, articles 133 à 136).

Il est nécessaire de s'interroger un instant sur le type d'intégration régionale que la Convention de Lomé tend à favoriser et sur les bénéficiaires ultimes de ce type d'intégration.

On note par exemple que ce sont les organisations régionales africaines de type «néo-colonial» (comme la Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest : CEAO, qui regroupe depuis 1974 six pays africains francophones d'Afrique de l'Ouest) qui ont les faveurs de l'aide européenne.

Qui plus est, la Convention de Lomé tend à favoriser l'implantation de filiales d'entreprises multinationales européennes (françaises surtout) au sein de ces ensembles économiques où elles bénéficient des «économies d'échelle» offertes par un marché élargi et où elles peuvent opérer librement à l'intérieur des barrières douanières de l'organisation, le tarif extérieur commun de l'union douanière simplifiant par ailleurs leurs transactions commerciales.

L'avenir, en Afrique, semblerait plutôt appartenir à des organisations qui parviennent à transcender les traditionnelles barrières coloniales, linguistiques et culturelles. La Communauté économique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO), qui regroupe depuis 1975 seize états, tant francophones qu'anglophones, de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, semble porteuse de très grandes promesses à cet égard.

Pour le moment, ses réalisations ne sont pas à la hauteur de son potentiel et des espérances qui avaient été placées en elle à sa création en 1975. De ce point de vue, il ne fait pas de doute que la double (sinon la triple) appartenance de six de ses membres à la CEAO et de tous les seize à la Convention de Lomé constitue un sérieux obstacle à son développement (40). Les états africains concernés se trouvent ainsi confrontés à un choix clair entre une association de type néo-colonial et une intégration régionale réellement avantageuse pour l'Afrique.

b./ Au niveau Continental

Il faut en définitive revenir au projet de «Gouvernement Continental Africain» du Président Kwame NKRUMAH pour explorer la voie de l'unité continentale.

NKRUMAH préconisait la mise en place d'un «Marché Commun Africain», organisé sur la base d'une «planification continentale intégrée». «Le Panafricanisme, et non l'«Eurafrique», devrait être notre mot d'ordre et le guide de notre politique» (41), disait-il. Beaucoup d'observateurs et de leaders politiques condamnèrent à l'époque son projet comme étant l'utopie démente d'un mégalomane.

Pourtant, qui ne peut admettre qu'un coup d'œil rétrospectif sur les vingt années écoulées de l'histoire de l'Afrique indépendante donne

raison sur bien des points au visionnaire éclairé que fut NKRUMAH ? De ce point de vue ses analyses, comme ses prescriptions, demeurent d'une étonnante actualité.

C'est ainsi que le colloque de l'OUA pré-cité reconnaît, vingt ans après NKRUMAH, la nécessité de créer un Marché Commun Africain basé sur une coordination et une intégration progressive, et qui, se ferait par cercles concentriques en fonction des zones économiques existant actuellement sur le continent (42).

Certes, l'approche envisagée par les participants relève beaucoup plus de la stratégie «Senghorienne» que de celle de NKRUMAH. Ce dernier préconisait plutôt une unité continentale immédiate au plan politique comme préalable à l'intégration économique continentale.

D'autres auteurs, soulignant le fait que l'Afrique, de par ses ressources hydrauliques, est l'un des premiers pays énergétiques du monde, préconisent, dans l'esprit «Nkrumahiste», la mise en œuvre d'un plan compréhensif d'industrialisation fondé sur l'exploitation rationnelle de cet immense potentiel énergétique (43).

Beaucoup se plairont à souligner le caractère utopique de tels projets. D'autres préfèrent fixer des objectifs plus ou moins réalistes à l'horizon 2000.

Il n'en demeure pas moins qu'à notre avis, l'alternative de l'unité continentale, à plus ou moins longue échéance, constitue la seule réponse valable aux tentatives de recolonisation de l'Afrique entreprise sous le couvert de «coopération eurafricaine».

Ce n'est que lorsque les états africains (à travers leurs dirigeants) auront résolument décidé de prendre en main leur propre devenir sur les plans politique, économique et culturel que de telles tentatives échoueront, faute de trouver un écho favorable au niveau du continent.

CONCLUSION

Un rapide survol historique des premiers contacts entre l'Europe et l'Afrique du 15^e au 19^e siècles nous a permis de déterminer que ces contacts sont à l'origine du sous-développement et de la dépendance de l'Afrique, de la même manière qu'ils ont permis la croissance économique et le développement de l'Europe. Ce processus n'a fait que se poursuivre et s'accroître au cours de l'âge de l'impérialisme, de la période coloniale et de l'ère néo-coloniale.

Au cours de l'ère néo-coloniale, l'Europe a mis en place de nouveaux mécanismes (Convention de Yaoundé et de Lomé) destinés à institutionnaliser la dépendance de l'Afrique, afin d'en contrôler plus étroitement l'exploitation et l'évolution. Ces arrangements nous sont ainsi apparus comme étant typiques du néo-colonialisme, qui n'est autre que la perpétuation de la domination politique, économique et culturelle de l'ancienne métropole, par-delà une indépendance juridique purement formelle de l'état-satellite.

Dans ce contexte, la fonction historique de l'idéologie de l'Eurafrrique prend toute sa dimension. Par sa phraséologie délibérément vague et faussement égalitaire, elle constitue une rationalisation commode du néo-colonialisme, qu'elle justifie à l'aide de pseudo-arguments et de demi-vérités. Par là, l'idéologie de l'Eurafrrique apparaît comme l'antithèse, ou l'opposé dialectique, de l'idéal panafricain, auquel elle s'oppose et qu'elle combat avec acharnement.

En définitive, seule la mise en œuvre dans un proche avenir, par des dirigeants africains éclairés, d'une politique judicieuse d'intégration politique et économique continentale africaine pourrait permettre de reléguer l'idéologie pernicieuse de l'Eurafrrique

à la place qui doit être la sienne : au musée des antiquités, à côté du rouet et de la hache de bronze (44).

NOTES

1. Louis Althusser, *Pour Marx*. Paris : Maspéro, 1975, p. 238.
2. Anton Zischka, cité in Léopold S. Senghor, *Liberté II : Nation & Voie Africaine du Socialisme*. Paris : Éditions du Seuil, 1971, p. 90.
3. A.G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973, p. 164 (cette traduction, ainsi que toutes les traductions subséquentes, sont de l'auteur).
4. Sur ce point, voir : Benjamain Matip, *Heurts & Malheurs des Rapports Europe-Afrique Noire dans l'Histoire Moderne*. Paris : La Nef, 1959, p. 89.
5. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London: Bogle-L'Ouverture, 1972, p. 85.
6. W. Rodney, op. cit., p. 87.
7. Joseph Ki-Zerbo, *Histoire de l'Afrique Noire*. Paris : Hatier, 1978, p. 218.
8. A. Emmanuel, *L'Echange Inégal*. Paris: Maspéro, 1975, p. 50.
9. Jean Suret-Canale, *Afrique Noire: l'Ere Coloniale (1900-1945)*, t. II. Paris : Editions Sociales, 1964, p. 250.
0. W. Rodney, op. cit., p. 237.
11. Cité in Max Liniger-Goumaz, *L'Eurafrrique: Utopie ou Réalité ?* Yaoundé: Editions CLE, 1972, p. 28 (c'est nous qui soulignons).
12. All African Peoples Conference, Cairo (March 23-31, 1961), «Resolution on Neo-colonialism» in Collin Legum, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide*. London : Pall Mall, 1962, p. 254.
13. Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. London: Keinemann, 1965, p. 14.
14. Sur ce point, voir : Joseph-Roger de Benoist, *La Balkanisation de l'Afrique Occidentale Française*. Dakar: Les Nouvelles Editions Africaines, 1979 et : Guédel Ndiaye, *L'Echec de la Fédération du Mali*. Dakar: NEA, 1980.
15. L'Association entre les six de la C.E.E. et leurs colonies était régie par la IVe Partie du Traité de Rome de 1957. Les Conventions de Yaoundé I (effective du 1er juin 1964 au 31 mars 1969) et Yaoundé II (effective du 1er janvier 1971 au 1er mars 1975) liaient aux six de la C.E.E. les dix-huit ex-colonies françaises et belges d'Afrique (sauf la Guinée), auxquelles vint s'adjoindre en 1972 l'île Maurice comme 19e membre.

16. Pour de tels points de vue, voir, entre autres : Osendé Afana, *L'Economie de l'Ouest Africain*. Paris: Maspéro, 1977, pp. 189–193 ; Pathé Diagne, *Pour l'Unité Ouest-africaine*. Paris : Anthropos, 1972, pp. 269–274 ; Makhtar Diouf, *Economie Politique*, t. 1. Dakar: NEA, 1979, pp. 271–275 ; Pierre Jalée, *Le Pillage du Tiers Monde*. Paris : Maspéro, 1975, pp. 137–157 , et : Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*. London : Mercury Books, 1963, pp. 173–193.
17. E.A. Tarabrine (Dr. de Publication), *Le Néo-Colonialisme et l'Afrique dans les années 1970*. Moscou : Editions MISL, 1978, p. 274.
18. K. Nkrumah, «Address to the Ghana National Assembly», May 30, 1961, in C. Legum, op. cit., p. 119.
19. «Text of Joint Communiqué by President Nkrumah of Ghana and President Brejnev of the Soviet Union, July 24, 1964», in Arnold Rivkin, *Africa & the European Common Market : A Perspective*. Denver : University of Denver, 1964, p. 35.
20. E.A. Tarabrine, op. cit., p. 265.
21. L'accession, le 1er janvier 1973, de la Grande-Bretagne, de l'Irlande et du Danemark au rang de nouveaux états-membres de la CEE a posé de manière urgente le problème de l'«association» de la quasi-totalité des ex-colonies britanniques d'Afrique. La Convention de Lomé I constituait, entre autres, une réponse à cette situation. Il convient en outre de noter, bien que cela n'affecte pas notre étude, que la Grèce est devenue le dixième membre de la CEE le 1er janvier 1981.
22. La Convention de Lomé I (1975–1980) comptait à l'origine 46 pays ACP signataires, dont tous les pays africains, à l'exception des pays d'Afrique du Nord et de la plupart des pays d'Afrique australe. A la suite des adhésions ultérieures, et sous le régime de la Convention de Lomé II (entrée en vigueur pour cinq ans le 1er janvier 1981), les ACP comptent actuellement 63 états membres.
23. Jacqueline D. Matthews, *Association System of the European Community*. New York : Praeger, 1977, p. 41.
24. Ceci est l'objet d'une étude approfondie de l'auteur : Guy Martin, *The Political Economy of African-European Relations from Yaounde I to Lome II, 1963–1980 : A Case Study in Neo-Colonialism & Dependency*. Thèse de Doctorat (Ph. D.) en Science Politique, Indiana University (USA), mai 1982, 641 p. Pour une analyse critique de Lomé I, voir : Guy Martin, «Les Relations Economiques Europe-Afrique dans le cadre de la Convention de Lomé : Néo-Colonialisme ou Nouvel Ordre Economique International ?» *Afrique et Développement*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (1979), pp. 57–70.
25. François-Xavier Ortolí, «Allocution prononcée lors de la signature de Lomé I», in *Le Courrier CEE-ACP* No. 31 (mars 1975), p. 21 (c'est nous qui soulignons).
26. Claude Cheysson, «Préface», in : Michael Noelke, *Europe-Tiers Monde: le dossier de l'interdépendance*. Bruxelles : Commission des Communautés européennes, 1979, p. 7.
27. Ga-Kwame Amoa, «La Communauté Economique Européenne et l'Afrique», in Ga-Kwame Amoa & Oscar Braun, *Echanges Internationaux et Sous-Développement*. Paris : Anthropos, 1974, pp. 94–95 (c'est nous qui soulignons).

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28. Jean-Marcel Jeanneney (Rapporteur), *La Politique de Coopération avec les Pays en Voie de Développement* (Rapport remis au Gouvernement le 18 Juillet 1963). Paris: Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement, 1964, p. 28 (c'est nous qui soulignons).
29. Jean-Paul Gardinier, *Le Pari Industriel de l'Afrique*. Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1977, p. 141.
30. Ga-Kwame Amoa, *op. cit.*, pp. 92–93.
31. Il est significatif de noter à cet égard que le langage des fonctionnaires de la «Coopération» (tant bi-latérale que multilatérale) n'est pas encore tout à fait décolonisé. C'est ainsi que l'on parle plus volontiers, dans certains milieux, de la «mise en valeur» que du développement des pays en voie de développement associés ou «amis».
32. Jean-Pierre Dubois & Paul Ramdier, «Un bilan limité des relations entre la CEE et ses associés du tiers-monde». *Le Monde Diplomatique* No. 315 (Juin 1980), p. 27; voir également: Paule Bouvier, *L'Europe et la Coopération au Développement, Un Bilan: la Convention de Lomé*. Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1980.
33. Voir notamment à ce sujet: Xavier Bideli, «ACP-CEE: pourquoi l'impasse?» *Demain l'Afrique* Nos. 36/37, 24 Septembre & 8 Octobre 1979, John Madley, «Lomé II falls long way short». *Africa* No. 100 (December 1979); Cecil Rajana, «Lomé II & ACP-EEC Relations: A Preliminary Assessment.» *Africa Development*, Vol. V, No. 3 (1980), pp. 91–111.
34. Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism*, p. ix.
35. Voir à ce sujet le très intéressant ouvrage du sociologue Ivoirien Abdou Touré, *La Civilisation Quotidienne en Côte-d'Ivoire: Procès d'Occidentalisation*. Paris: Editions Karthala, 1981.
36. Frantz Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*. Paris: Maspéro, 1961, pp. 239–240.
37. O.U.A., *Quelle Afrique en l'an 2000?* Rapport final du Colloque de Monrovia sur les perspectives du développement de l'Afrique à l'horizon 2000, 12–16 Février 1979, p. 29, No. 9.
On notera au passage que les participants à ce Colloque érigent la Convention de Lomé en modèle pour d'éventuels accords similaires, ce que nous avons par ailleurs critiqué.
38. Pour les détails de ces accords commerciaux, voir: «Liste des accords signés par la Communauté européenne avec les pays tiers.» *Europe Information/Relations Extérieures* (Bruxelles: Commission des Communautés Européennes), Document 6/78, 1978.
39. J.M. Jeanneney, Rapport cité, p. 146.
40. Sur les conflits d'intérêt posés par la double appartenance à la Convention de Lomé et à la CEDEAO, voir l'intéressant article de Sam Olofin, «ECOWAS and the Lomé Convention: An Experiment in Complementary or Conflicting Customs Union Arrangements?» *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (September 1977), pp. 53–72.
41. Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, p. 187.
42. O.U.A., *Quelle Afrique en l'an 2000?*, p. 18.
43. Cheikh-Anta Diop, *Les Fondements Economiques & Culturels d'un Etat Fédéral d'Afrique Noire*. Paris: Présence Africaine, 2e Edition, 1974.
44. Friedrich Engels, «The Origin of the Family, Private Property & the State», in L-S. Feuer (ed.), *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy: Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels*. New York: Anchor Books, 1959, p. 394.

SUMMARY

This article is an inquiry into the major causes of the continued state of underdevelopment and dependency of Africa in spite of its enormous wealth and tremendous economic potential. It argues that one of the main reasons for this situation lies in the nature of the political, economic and cultural links which have tied Africa to Europe ever since the fifteenth century. Trade, based on unequal exchange and specialization, constitutes the mainstay of this relationship, be it the slave trade from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries, the «trade economy» of the «colonial pact» from 1900 to 1960, or the neo-colonial trade since then.

The ideology of Eurafrika, based on the two key concepts of «complementarity» and «interdependence», appears as a convenient justification for colonialism, and also helps to explain various contractual arrangements between Africa and Europe since independence, notably the Conventions of Yaoundé I (1964–69), Yaoundé II (1969–75), Lomé I (1975–80) and Lomé II (1980–85). In the final analysis, this ideology appears as nothing but the rationalization of the neo-classical theory of international development, and of the contemporary international division of labour.

Ultimately, of the various alternative strategies, it seems that continental economic and political integration offers the best prospects for extricating Africa from the neo-colonial predicament in which it presently finds itself, and for the attainment of genuine and complete economic independence.

VEHICLE ASSEMBLY PLANTS IN NIGERIA AS A MEANS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER/ACQUISITION: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

By

*Ikwuakam DIAKU **

This article is in the main concerned with the nature of economic co-operation, for purposes of technology transfer/acquisition, between foreign technical partners and the Nigerian government. The thrust of analysis is on the performance of the Peugeot and Volkswagen Assembly Plants of Nigeria in transferring technology to Nigerians by developing, through linkages, local parts and components manufacturing capacities and the integration of their products as local contents in the assembly operations.

For well over a decade and especially from the end of the Nigerian Civil War in 1970, Nigerian industrial development policies and strategies have been vigorously geared towards the realisation of import substituting industrialisation which would mitigate frequent balance of payment difficulties. In summary the broad policy objectives have been:

- (i) the promotion of even development of industries all over the country thus evenly spreading employment opportunities.
- (ii) the promotion of import substituting industries to raise the level of intermediate and capital goods production, and enhance the level of indigenous manpower development.
- (iii) to increase significantly the proportion of indigenous ownership in industrial investments (1).

Official policy presumption has since been that the goals of industrialisation were achievable within the shortest possible time and the current unprecedented increase in the number of imported commercial vehicles and private cars into the country seemed to lend superficial plausibility to the economic argument for the establishment of Peugeot and Volkswagen assembly plants. In official perception this approach represented the boldest and most viable of available policy options in the achievement of the goal of technology transfer/acquisition in our given sequence of circumstances.

There was, for example, a sizeable domestic market for this class of vehicles; there was the drain on foreign exchange resulting from car and machinery importations and the perceived prospects of reversing the trend to encourage local manufactures in a situation where the oil boom had generated increased incomes and expenditure.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE ASSEMBLY PLANTS

On the basis of feasibility studies conducted by United Nations experts and other consultants, the government in early 1970's decided to establish three car assembly plants in the country. To this effect an «Invitation for Proposals for the Establishment of Passenger car Assembly

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Industry in Nigeria» was published in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 53 of 9th October, 1969. Several companies responded to this invitation and on the basis of certain criteria Peugeot and Volkswagen were selected in May, 1971. The criteria for choice seemed to be namely, the relative strengths of the two companies in terms of market share in their country of origin and the relative importance of the Nigerian market to their total operations and their strategy for future growth.

Peugeot Automobile of France was a transnational family enterprise until 1975 when Peugeot S.A., the Holding company of the Peugeot Group merged with Citroen S.A. to form what is now P.S.A. Peugeot Citroen, with the Peugeot family still controlling with 41 per cent equity, and Michellin, an industrial ally, holding 7 per cent equity. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft (AG) of Germany is also a major multinational company in partnership with Audi Nsu Auto Union AC. It has manufacturing subsidiaries in Brasil, Yugoslavia, Mexico, U.S.A. and South Africa and so on. Both Peugeot and Volkswagen had the longer lists of export countries for their fully built up (FBU) cars. Peugeot Automobile of Nigeria (PAN) was established in Kaduna and Volkswagen of Nigeria (VWON) was established in Lagos, all in 1975.

TERMS OF THE COLLABORATION AGREEMENT

The ownership structures or equity participations in the two enterprises were as follows:

In PAN, the Federal Government held 35 per cent, Kaduna State government 10 per cent, Nigeria Industrial Development Bank 5 per cent; Automobiles Peugeot of France, 40 per cent.

In VWON, the Federal Government held 35 per cent equity, Lagos State government 4 per cent; local distributors 10 per cent; BHF (German Investment Bank) 11 per cent and Volkswagen AG 40 per cent. The equity distribution in PAN reflects the general government determination to leave a significant proportion of industrial ownership and control in the hands of Nigerians. Currently it has become mandatory for government to acquire 60 per cent equity holding in any foreign sponsored project in which it may have a financial interest.

The salient features in the collaboration agreement between the government and the two foreign partners are summarised as follows to clarify our analysis:

- (a) PAN and VWON are to procure their assembly equipment from Automobiles Peugeot of France and Volkswagen AG respectively.
- (b) A Standing Technical Committee to be established and given «the necessary powers to liaise with the assembly industry initiate, and supervise policies and programmes for locally manufactured parts incorporation, concessions, (and) protection required by the car assembly and local parts manufacturing industries, the development and expansion of the assembly plants generally, and other relevant matters, including pricing of local products;»

- (c) PAN and VWON are «to assemble/manufacture» the companies' makes of passenger cars under licence from completely knocked-down (CKD) components supplied by the foreign automobile companies, subject to the progressive replacement with such parts, components and elements made under licence in Nigeria or purchased from Nigerian suppliers».
- (d) the mix of models is to be determined by local market demand.
- (e) indigenous managerial and technical personnel are to be trained by foreign automobile companies locally, in activities such as «designing and procurement of equipment, planning, installing and maintaining assembly machinery, tools and jigs».
- (f) the foreign automobile companies are to «assist the local assembly plants in achieving substantial local parts incorporation, and in making use of locally manufactured parts when available, provided that the quality is acceptable to the former;
- (g) in the first three years of the plants' existence, there is to be 30 per cent local content by value of CKD; (15 per cent through in-plant manufacture, and 15 per cent through procurement from local manufacturers of parts and components), and in five years (that was 1980) there is to be 50 per cent local content, and in thirteen years, 100 per cent;
- (h) initially, the capacity of each plant was to be at least 10,000 vehicles per year in one shift;
- (i) the prices ex-factory at which CKD components are consigned, («that is, cost of production plus normal profit»), are to be the same as the prices at which identical components are exported to other parts of the world;
- (j) there should be duty concession of 10 percentage points on components of passenger cars to be imported by the assembly plants from the foreign automobile companies;
- (k) built-up passenger cars with less than 2000 c.c. engine capacity are to be placed under import licence upon the commencement of local assembly operations by either of the two plants, and imposition of progressive restrictions on the numbers of imported built-up cars under licence are to be in force, to ensure that the volume of imports do not exceed the shortfall between market demand and total local production by the assembly plants, and the assembly are also to have licensing option to import the shortfall of their production targets;
- (l) royalties/licence fees are to be payable to the foreign automobile companies only when «the deletion value or the CKD pack of a car exceeds 30 per cent of its ex-factory price, but subject to negotiation» in accordance with the prevailing laws and regulations in Nigeria (2).

It is evident that the dominant issue as reflected in terms (b), (f), (g) and (j) of the agreement relates to the achievement of a substantial integration of locally manufactured parts and components into the assembly operations.

LOCAL PRODUCTION OF PARTS AND COMPONENTS FIRST STAGE INVESTIGATIONS

Our investigation on the existence of spare parts and components manufacturing capacity was carried out in two stages because of the prevailing local impression about the quality and origins of some Peugeot and Volkswagen spare parts. The first stage involved the study of some selected Nigerian markets for car parts by means of interviews with the distributors or sellers. The second stage involved the study, through interviews, of the assemblies' officially recognised suppliers and manufacturers of Peugeot and Volkswagen spare parts and components.

The investigations were designed to give information on some of the following:

- (i) Location and size of markets for car parts and components, and the existence of manufacturing capacities in less organised forms.
- (ii) Sources and composition of raw materials input.
- (iii) Types of skills acquired by the work force and the nature of diffusion of such skills – a linkage or multiplier effect of technology acquisition.
- (iv) The degree of dependence by the plants on locally manufactured parts and on imported components.
- (v) Productivity and labour commitment in the units.

It needs to be stated that throughout our field enquiry, it was not possible to obtain information which could be lined up and analysed in the schematic way outlined above due to the suspicions of the distributors and their innate tendency to remain secretive. This tendency is usually based on fears that the responses to the enquiries might be used for arbitrary tax assessment. Nevertheless, we tried to extract information within the limits set by these constraints, on areas in which the suppliers felt freer to respond to our enquiries.

The original plan was to visit selected towns which are reputed for their large car parts markets. These are Nnewi, Onitsha and Enugu in Anambra State, Aba and Owerri in Imo State, Port Harcourt in Rivers State, Kaduna in Kaduna State, Ibadan and Oshogbo in Oyo State and Ilupeju and Apapa in Lagos State.

Nnewi is easily the largest vehicle spare parts market in West Africa followed by Onitsha. Two facts came to light from the investigations. First, no actual manufacturing units existed in any of the towns Nnewi and Aba which were thought, on the basis of general reports and belief, to be the centres for the fabrication of inferior but certainly serviceable car spare parts. What actually existed were hideouts where the filing, polishing and respraying of old parts and components took place and these parts were repackaged and displayed for sale as new «original» parts. A respondent who took us into confidence showed us two of these «workshops» and even informed us that much of their products were sold in more distant Nigerian markets where customers were less cautious about imitations.

Invariably most of the distributors marketed an assortment of car parts especially of Peugeot and Volkswagen, but there were significant locational differences for different car components and specialisation was clearly in evidence. There were, however, many instances of combined distribution or marketing of Peugeot and Volkswagen spare parts.

SOURCES OF THE SPARE PARTS MARKETED

There were wide variations in the sources or origins of the spare parts marketed. The dealers in Enugu claimed to have procured their parts mainly from Lagos and Onitsha. Others claimed to have got theirs, especially radiator and exhaust pipes, from Kaduna, the location of an approved company manufacturing these components for Peugeot Automobiles of Nigeria (PAN).

According to them, the main source of Peugeot and Volkswagen spare parts are France, Japan, Taiwan and Brasil. These parts are procured by open import licences. A dealer in Ibadan stated that his monthly expenditure on car parts importation ranged from ₦72,000 to ₦350,000, depending on demand conditions. Another distributor at Aka claimed that his monthly «profits» ranged from ₦2,000 to ₦3,000.

Although reliable figures on annual import bills of the distributors were hard to come by, on the basis of the submissions by the several distributors interviewed, the influence of the assembly plants on local components manufacturing is still insignificant and therefore unlikely to have any mitigating effects on aggregate foreign exchange expenditure. Indeed many of the large distributors expressed the wish to establish car spare parts factories if they received government support.

From this part of our field investigation it was not possible to find answers to the questions we had lined up above. Three rather surprising and significant facts, however, emerged from the enquiries.

1. The mistaken but firm belief that certain inferior but serviceable car parts were fabricated at Nnewi and Aba was conclusively disproved.
2. Apart from one dealer at Aba, no dealer mentioned as his source of supply any of the several manufacturing units registered with PAN and VWON as approved suppliers of parts and components.
3. By logical inference, this implies that no substantial linkages and multiplier effects have, as hitherto hoped, emerged from the operations of the existing manufacturing units, since they had transmitted no discernible impact on the activities of local car parts distributors.

SECOND STAGE INVESTIGATION ON LOCAL CONTENTS OF PAN AND VWON VEHICLES

At this stage of the investigation it became necessary to work through the assembly plants' management. On the basis of the lists of local suppliers obtained from PAN and VWON, field visits were made to a selected group. Visits to study some of the parts and components suppliers and

their workshops were beset by several difficulties similar to those outlined earlier about the small local spare parts suppliers. Information secured from this stage of our enquiry was fragmentary and inadequate for conducting our analysis along the lines we had proposed earlier. Many of the listed suppliers had not actually gone into production.

Several manufacturing units were visited and it will be convenient to report our findings or observations on a few of the approved components manufacturing firms.

1. Radiators Nigeria Ltd., Port Harcourt is situated at Plot 15, Trans Amadi Layout, wholly Nigerian owned, and has a share capital of ₦4 million. The company produces radiators for PAN under licence from a French Company. It began production in May 1979 and currently produces about 200 radiators per day, and plans to increase output to 300 a day in the near future. It also plans to produce bumpers; but currently produces as well water tubes from tinned brass sheets, and copper corrugates from copper sheets. Most components are imported from abroad and assembled locally.

The company is manned almost entirely by Nigerians, although there are few French personnel both in top management and in advisory capacities.

The product of this company is slightly more expensive than the imported counterpart. This was attributed largely to poor infrastructure, especially public utilities. The company unavoidably provides these services for its plants, thus raising the unit cost of its products. The quantity of local material input in these manufactures is relatively small, but it is important that a sizeable number of Nigerians is involved in production. It was gathered during our enquiry that the materials used were entirely imported and the iron panels already cut into shape. The technology transferred and acquired involved practically no complexity, consisting mainly of welding the panels together.

2. The Nigerian Automotive Components Ltd.; this is a joint venture between the Magneti Marelli, Milan, Italy, which is the major partner, and Bayajiba (Nig.) Ltd., Kano. It is a ₦5 million industrial project established in 1978 and with considerable scope for expansion. It has a well equipped factory for the manufacture of ignition coils but currently imports ignition coils and sells these to PAN under the trade name of «NIACO». The company has four technical officers, namely the Managing Director, Production Manager, Quality Controller and Materials Manager, all of whom, are expatriates. The Accounts and Personnel Departments are headed by Nigerians and the company plans to employ a Nigerian assistant Managing Director during 1981. The total work force is about 100.

Ignition coils are the main products of this company but it has plans to produce air brake equipments and other electrical components. It is difficult to see how the plans can be executed in future considering the engineering sophistication required in the production of these components.

The company has capability for the production of generators and alternators in the near future for PAN and VWON, and the Federal Ministry of Industries has given it approval to do so and to manufacture batteries as well. The company had a contract to supply NIACO ignition coils as original equipment according to the following monthly schedule for 1981: March, 5,000 units; April, May and June 3,000 per month; July and thereafter, 6,000 units per month.

The usual practice which PAN insists on is that NIACO produces a few units which PAN approves as having satisfied standard specification before it embarks on full production. The company also plans to commence the production of alternators from CKD units in the near future for local assembly plants with an initial annual output of 40,000 units. It is currently giving considerable emphasis to on-the-job training and its mechanics are grouped into two classes. There are those with a combination or primary school leaving certificate and trade test certificates, and those with practical experience as roadside mechanics.

Although the CKD prices of the electrical components the company plans to produce are considered low, the estimated cost of the finished products is unlikely to be competitive with imported ones. This possibility had been brought to the attention of the Standard Technical Committee of the Ministry of Industries with a suggestion about the need for adequate subsidy to make the prices of locally manufactured components relatively competitive. Available statistics make it difficult to give any meaningful estimate of value-added in this company.

3. Polyplast (Nig.) Ltd., Kano, produces seat covers and upholstery which are supplied to PAN. The company commenced production in 1980 and procures some of its inputs from abroad. Its plastic input is locally supplied. The workforce consists of two expatriates and fifty Nigerians and the company has recently added to its product lines silencers and exhaust pipes. This division has two expatriates and twenty-six Nigerians one of whom is a production manager.

The technology transferred and acquired here is the welding together of iron metals already cut to specifications in France. There are no local contents in terms of local raw material inputs in this activity in which 300 – 400 units are produced per day.

In all industries visited, the experiences were the same and, for the sake of completeness we may just mention the other enterprises interviewed. There are as follows:

4. Northern Cables Processing Company (NOCACO) – a joint venture between a Nigerian Investment Bank, private Nigerian investors, BEG – German Development Bank for producing cable harnesses. All its inputs are imported.

5. Berger Paints (Nigeria) Ltd., Apapa, produces paints, aquatic primer, top coating, degreasing and phosphating products. It is the primary supplier of PAN.

6. Michellin and Dunlop (Nig.) Ltd.: these supply PAN the full requirements in respect of tyres and tubes, but do not produce enough to meet

the total country's requirement and imports still filter in.

7. Silencer and Exhaust Pipe Company, Kano: This company supplies seat frames which are imported from France.

8. Total and Agip (Nig.) Ltd., are the suppliers of all the requirements of PAN in respect of oil, brakefluid, steering power oil, gear oil and high pressure oil. These products are wholly produced in Nigeria and a large number of Nigerians are employed, some in management posts.

9. General Appliance Company Ltd., Otta, is the primary supplier to PAN of air conditioning equipment including compressors. The units are assembled locally from semi-knocked down components.

10. Philips (Nig.) Ltd., Ojota, Lagos, is the supplier of all the radio cassette needs of PAN. The company employs a large number of Nigerians, but predates the establishment of PAN (3).

FINDINGS

With these reporting of the interviews in the second stage of our investigation it is easy to state in more specific terms, the extent of integration of local parts and components in the activities of the two assembly plants. Our findings reveal:

(i) that the manufacturing units of the approved suppliers are located mainly in Kaduna, Lagos, Kano, Port Harcourt and Ibadan. The unique thing about this locational pattern is that they are all based in the state capitals of the country, except Kano. This keeps them in touch with state governments and suitable utilities.

(ii) Most of the raw material inputs are imported and scarcely any case of local material input was reported. This implies that local content in the total assembly activities is insignificant.

(iii) That the technologies transferred and acquired are of rudimentary nature — lacking in complexity and having limited linkage effects. The limited scope for vertical and horizontal integration manifested in the plants operations was confirmed by PAN and VWON which claimed in 1981 to have achieved 12 % and 10 % of local content respectively.

(iv) The degree of dependence by the plants on locally manufactured parts and components is minimal and this accounts for the heavy expenditure on importation of car spare parts in the country.

(v) Employment generation of the units is modest.

(vi) Productivity and labour commitment in the units are poor. For example Northern Cables Processing Company (NOCACO) complained of the poor attitude to work of its workforce most of whom had to be chased around to do their work and most spend much time daily in prayers.

Indeed the local contents achieved by PAN and VWON vehicles are far behind the schedules outlined in the terms of agreement between the technical partners and the government, and both plants have failed to meet their own local content projections.

This was six years after the first passenger car was assembled in Nigeria. On the basis of existing local capabilities and available data, the extent of local content indicated by the plants over the past three years have tended to overstate, by 3 to 4 per cent, the extent of local content integration actually achieved. When the import contents of the locally produced parts and components are taken into account, the estimates are considerably lower.

Various projections on local contents have failed evidently because there is no national programme of local integration. In 1978 the Managing Director of PAN gave projections showing that by 1980 the plant would have achieved 30 per cent local content. The following table shows in summary, the composition and value of local contents for a popular model of Peugeot car. The table illustrates that for this model the plan is yet to attain 10 per cent.

*Table 1 – Local contents
Example of composition for Peugeot 504 GR*

Product	Supplier	Quantity/ Car	Unit Price	Price Per car
Battery filling	Pace Engineering Group, Kaduna	1	5.52	5.52
Rear Exhaust	Silencers & Exhaust	1	23.45	23.45
Frt pipe	Pipes, Kano	1	6.61	6.61
Intermediate muffler	Kano	1	15.52	15.52
Oil EP 90	Total Nig. Ltd.,	1.6 Lt.	.802	1.28
Oil GTS 20 W 50	Lagos	5.7 Lt.	.875	4.99
Brake Fluid		0.47 Lt.	1.959	0.92
RH seat Frame	Silencer & Exhaust	1	39.11	39.11
LH seat Frame	Pipe, Kano	1	39.11	39.11
Frt Plate lifting Jake Sale	Polyplast, Kano	1	.12	.12
RH wheel Arch Linning				
LH wheel Arch Linning		1	.21	.21
Dirt Profing sheet		1	.10	.10
Linnings LH Scuttle side		1	1.40	1.40
Linning RH Scuttle side		1	1.40	1.40
RH Lower linning		1	.08	.08
Joint/Fixing wedge Weather strip of Back Window Glass		1	9.29	9.29
Weather strip of Wind Screen Glass	S P N	1	11.70	11.70
Weather Strip of Doors Front		2	5.71	11.42

Product	Supplier	Quantity/ Car	Unit Price	Price Per car
Tyre & Tube	Michelin & Dunlop	5	35.44	177.20
Degreasers	1 Chemical & Allied			
Touch up thinner	Products, Ikeja		35.00	99.00
Enamel	2 Berger Paints			
Top coat, etc.	Ikeja			
Half shroud	Radiator Nig. Ltd.,	1	3.50	3.50
Half shroud		1	3.50	3.50
Radiator		1	77.00	77.00
Miscellaneous				103.70
		TOTAL		636.34

Source: Peugeot Automobiles Nig. Kaduna.

CAUSES OF THE POOR PERFORMANCE

It will be convenient to identify some of the principal causes of the poor performance of the plants in achieving the objectives of policy with regards to achievement of local content integration.

The pattern of development in the automotive industry which has emerged in most developing countries, such as Brasil and South Korea, has three phases as follows:

- (i) the importation of fully built-up (FBU) cars with sales and service outlets and the bulk of replacement parts imported;
- (ii) the development of repair shops and the manufacture of parts and components of low technological complexity, encouraged by the perceived opportunity for profits in the replacement market.
- (iii) importation of CKD components for local assembly encouraged by growth in the network of parts and components manufactures and opportunities for local integration.
- (iv) substantial local horizontal integration of vehicle production. A very instructive and interesting example of transition through these stages is the Chinese experience where motor-vehicle repair plants have been converted into assembly and manufacturing facilities.

In the Nigerian case we find a leap from phase (i) to phase (iii). This leap constitutes one of the most unimaginative actions of government in the total transaction. The successful development of the automotive industry in the countries mentioned above did not precede the development of a network of repair shops and parts manufacturing as has been the case in Nigeria. This explains why optimal internationalisation of imported technologies is impossible because there is a serious lack of the requisite local scientific and technical manpower with a consequent reliance on foreign personnel to operate imported plants.


The failure to achieve the various projections of local contents is primarily due to the absence of a national programme of local integration. Since there was already a large domestic demand for Peugeot and Volkswagen spare parts, a good starting point would have been to pursue vigorously a policy of establishing car spare parts manufacturing units all over the country as a prelude to establishing the assembly plants.

Part of the causes of the assemblies' poor performance lies also in terms of the agreement with the technical partners. The terms cover a wide range of policy goals but most of these terms lack operational content or appropriate instruments for their implementation.

Although the Ministry of Industries has a project Monitoring Section, there is no provision for any Unit to scrutinise the activities of the plants so as to ascertain whether or not technology is being effectively transferred and acquired.

Thus unlike the case of Brasil, South Korea and China one fails to find in the Nigerian situation an appreciation of the importance of political will and close working relationship between government and the plants. In particular no deliberate policies for generating effective linkages between the automotive industry, research and development existed. Such policies are particularly important because of the initially prohibitive cost of a systematic and rapidly expanding local content programme. The high initial cost to a country occurs for several reasons such as absence of comparative cost advantage, poor quality, absence of economics of scale and poor utility services.

At the early stages of the local parts manufacturing the relationship between the relative cost of local production and the percentage of local integration is illustrated by the following figure.



The three curves AD, BE, CF illustrate the behaviour of the relative costs of local production as local integration increases. At 30 % local integration

three levels of relative costs can be discerned. Curve AD indicates the very prohibitive cost level when there is no comparative cost advantage, no scale economies and poor utilities exist. Curve BE indicates the level of cost when some economies are reaped and curve CF indicates the optimum situation when relative cost is minimum and relative cost falls to GF. That is, the relative cost, at 30 % local integration begins from DG level and falls to EG and FG progressively as economies of scale increase. The point here is that it is an important function of policy to prescribe methods by which the cost must be pushed down from AD level to CF through BE over time. This effort must persist even when local integration has been pushed to the 100 level.

A final identifiable source of poor performance of the plants is the provision, in the agreement, to impose heavy tariffs on FBU cars while imported components and spare parts attract concessionary rates of duty. This provision tends to discourage any efforts in the local manufacture of parts and components and should have been seen as a strategy for long-term sales promotion of the imported parts. Thus either a deliberate effort should have been made to specify the terminal period for such importation or provision made for a time-phased programme of local parts integration in a way to permit the removal of tariff concessions on specific parts when they become due for integration as local components. The failure of the assembly plants to produce a far-reaching favourable impact through linkages and eventual integration of local parts and components is reflected by the increased import expenditure on motor vehicle spare parts and components. Table 2 illustrates this fact clearly.

CONCLUSION

A fact usually not always appreciated by developing countries trying to acquire foreign technology is that the background to the transfer/acquisition of technology is essentially oligopolistic; and in the ensuing game-theoretic situation each party to the collaboration agreement tries, over time, to maximise his payoff.

The foreign transferer of technology certainly does not wish to transfer it in such a way as to quickly terminate the long-term advantages that normally would accrue to him in his operations. For example, it would be to the advantage of the foreign partners to tactically delay transfer of technology so that the loopholes in the clause permitting continued importation of parts and components at concessionary rate may be exploited for long. Moreover, although the game is of a cooperative variety, the foreign partner is quite conscious of the fact that he is being invited to hasten the sharing of his production secrets and of his well-established markets.

This is borne out by the fact that nowhere in the agreement is it stated that Nigeria would export its cars to countries or markets served by the foreign assembly plants. We also see that the rate of annual production is undersubscribed to maintain the constant pressure of local demand as a

Table 2 – *Importation of Motor Parts into Nigeria by Country of Origin, 1978.*

Country of Origin	Bodies, Chassis Frames and other Motor Vehicle Parts (N'000)	Engines		Chassis of Trucks and Lorries, especially Vehicles etc.		Articles of Rubber (including outer covers and inner Tubes, etc. for Motor Cycles, Cars, Lorries Tractors etc.)* (N'000)	Total Value of Spare Parts Imported (1 + 5 + 6) (N'000)
		No.	Value (N'000)	No.	Value (N'000)		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	
U.K.	51,300	3,929	779	31	417	18,949	71,446
U.S.A. and Canada	6,297	537	138	5	176	2,993	9,605
Italy	11,457	164	122	38	585	11,254	23,419
Germany	64,629	1,287	988	118	504	11,900	78,022
France	106,752	2,669	1,023	1	4	16,120	123,901
Brasil	9,068	56	76			417	9,562
Japan	27,240	1,065	679	69	911	5,094	33,920
Other Countries	22,527	350	185	2	16	22,609	45,330
TOTAL	299,272	10,057	3,992	314	2,615	89,341	395,221

* Includes SITC 629 – 19: Rubber tyres, solid outer covers and inner tubes including Aircraft N.E.S. amounting to ₦ 3,504,234.00

Source: *Federal Office of Statistics, Digest of Statistics, 1980.*

way of diverting attention from considerations of outside markets for earning foreign exchange. The purpose of establishing the assembly plants is to reduce foreign exchange expenditure. Import bills on car components, however, have continued to escalate beyond expectation as table 2 illustrates.

Thus in the co-operative game confronting both parties the foreign partner is clearly seen to be maximising his payoff while the Nigerian government is not doing that. It has established neither a legal framework for enforcing the terms of the contract nor an efficient institutional mechanism for checking the performance of the plants against policy targets. The Nigerian experience represents perhaps the typical climax of a complicated, and sometimes bizarre, saga in the attempts of developing countries to acquire foreign technology without having accumulated a critical mass of technical manpower capable of absorbing and improving on acquired technology.

It needs to be stressed that the motivations for the sale of technology, euphemistically called the transfer of it, must be seen as part of the

normal commercial operations of multinational corporations or enterprises from which acceptable level of profits must be secured. Many of these enterprises use the transfer of technology as a cover to penetrate, conquer and preserve markets with high tariff protection in countries experiencing foreign exchange shortages or balance of payment difficulties. They try to maintain these markets also when they can no longer be exploited on monopolistic basis either because competition has increased or because the specific technology is getting assimilated into the «states of the art».

The best way to transfer/acquire a sophisticated technology is undeniably through joint enterprise in which the foreign technical collaborator participates through training, technical and administrative assistance, quality control and intervenes at its discretion in the production process. This power of intervention opens the flood gate for massive and growing penetration of the most dynamic sectors of the host country's economy. It should be noted also that many of the technology suppliers are often induced by unfavourable economic factors at home, such as high labour cost and tariff policies, to seek more profitable openings in developing countries. It would therefore be naive to imagine that they have come with a missionary spirit to transfer technology to a technologically needy people.

We suggest that in any programme of technology transfer, the Nigerian government should produce a time-bound schedule of target levels of achievement. The programme should clearly include plans for a Research and Development Unit, engineering design, training of human resources and other measures necessary for the absorption, adaptation and further development of the new technology. An agency fully manned by professionally qualified personnel rather than ministry administrators, should be established to monitor general performance and should have powers to inspect and assess the technological and local content of the output of the programme (4).

It is particularly important that the collaboration agreement contains a penalty clause which, for example, stipulates that in the event of a failure on the part of the foreign partner to transfer the technology to schedule, the equity contribution or part thereof the foreign company would revert to the host country. This could help matters if the multinational company accepts the term.

Generally, however, it needs always to be borne in mind that for any foreign multinational company the motivation behind all commercial negotiations consists of:

«... establishing subsidiaries abroad with explicit purpose of supplying the markets of the host country... Organizing veritable business empires with complex logistical networks among their affiliates... Decisions are made not in terms of what is best for the home country or any particular product group, but in terms of what is best for the corporation as a whole on international basis.» (5)

FOOTNOTES

- 1
1. See Federal Republic of Nigeria: National Development Plan, 1970–1974 and National Development Plan 1975–80.
2. I have relied entirely here on the contribution by Dr. D.B. Thomas who directed this study while we were on the staff of the university of Ife. He and other colleagues will see how much I have, with appreciation, borrowed from their work.
3. I am immensely grateful to Mr. Sanya Ewedemi for his assistance in these interviews.
4. For a more forceful statement of these views see Carlos Contrera Q., *The Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries*, Venezuela, Lithographia Melvin, 1978.
5. Gyorgy Adam, «Multinational Corporations Worldwide Sourcing», *International Firms and Modern Imperialism*. Penguin Modern Economics Readings, 1975, p. 90, quoted in Carlos Contrera Q., *op. cit.* pp. 157–158.

RESUME

En 1975, le gouvernement du Nigéria ouvrait en même les usines de montage Peugeot et Volkswagen. Le but de cette politique était de lancer une industrie de substitution d'importation capable d'assurer un transfert de la technologie étrangère appropriée aux Nigériens. Il était convenu que les matières premières locales seraient systématiquement incorporées dans le processus de production aux taux de 30 % d'intégration locale dans les trois premières années, de 50 % dans cinq ans et de 100 % dans treize ans. Les résultats de notre recherche ont montré qu'après plus de six ans de fonctionnement,

1. *pas un seul fournisseur des marchés locaux du nigéria que nous avons couverts n'a mentionné comme source d'approvisionnement en composants et pièces qu'ils vendaient un seul des fournisseurs agréés de ces pièces et composants pour la PAN et la VWON. Aussi les distributeurs locaux dépensent-ils de fortes sommes d'argent en devises étrangères pour importer du Japon, de la France et de Taïwan.*
2. *aucune technologie significative autre que celle qui est la plus rudimentaire n'a été transférée et le contenu des inputs en matériel local reste inférieur à 10 %.*
3. *l'importation des composants et pièces de rechange des voitures Peugeot et Volkswagen s'est accrue entraînant ainsi une forte saignée de devises étrangères ainsi qu'un élargissement du marché local de ces pièces.*
4. *Les termes de l'accord de collaboration ne prévoient aucune peine pour le non-transfert de technologie comme cela a été prévu permettant ainsi des manœuvres de tactiques relâchées qui ne s'intéressent qu'à la promotion de concurrences rentables.*

GHANA: THE FAILURE OF A PETTY-BOURGEOIS EXPERIMENT

By

*Kwame Akon NINSIN**

INTRODUCTION

In the early hours of December 31, 1981 Ghana's People's National Party (PNP) Government led by Dr. Hilla LIMANN was toppled in a coup d'état initiated by 'rebel' forces operating from outside the military itself. The regime had been in power for barely two and half years (i.e. since September 24, 1979). In its place a Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) led by Flt.Lt. J.J. RAWLINGS was set up. Developments following this latest overthrow of a constitutionally installed civilian government appear to suggest the end to attempts since 1966 to rebuild and consolidate the petty-bourgeois social order. Yet there is the likelihood that this event will be explained away as if it were the result merely of economic difficulties (1). While this sort of explanation is relevant it nonetheless has the weakness of ignoring the primary role which political (class) forces play in effecting such changes. That is, it fails to elucidate the interconnections between the production process, class relations and the political process, and thereby is unable to expose the implications for the major class forces and for political trends of disturbances in the process of production and exchange. By this weakness, the effects of economic disturbances on the political struggle, and vice-versa are lost. Similarly, the centrality of the state in the political struggles is not appreciated and critically analysed. Accordingly the historical affinity between the event of December 31 and its predecessors cannot be grasped and exposed, thereby presenting December 31 as if it were a historical aberration. In what follows, I will attempt to show that (1) the coup of December 31, 1981 was possible because by then the pettybourgeois state had been weakened by its own internal contradictions; and (2) these contradictions had been sharpened the more since 1966 through the persistent mediation of the petty-bourgeois state which is an affirmation of its historic role of facilitating the domination of the national economy by imperialism.

The ousted PNP government assumed the reigns of office from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) on September 24, 1979. At the time many world leaders congratulated the new leaders quite warmly. In fact, history seemed to be repeating itself within about one decade. In this the differences were slight indeed. In September 1979 a democratically elected civilian government has assumed office under a constitution that contained all the ingredients of liberal democracy. And in 1969 a party which derived its primary social support from the same class as did the PNP had also accepted power through the same electoral process and under an equally classical liberal democratic constitution. On that occasion

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also the out-going government was a military junta – the National Liberation Council (NLC). But there were quite important differences between the two epochs as well. (i) In 1979 the Constitution combined «democratic elitism» with welfarism; but the 1969 Constitution could best be epitomized in the phrase 'Platonic elitism' (2). (ii) The 1979 government inherited power after a traumatic three month-rule of the quasi-leftist AFRC. Its predecessor of 1969 on the other hand received its mantle of power after a three year conservative rule by the NLC.

These differences were however significant, and bore the seeds of future developments in themselves; for between 1969 and 1979 there had been a clear shift in the balance of class forces in the country in favour of the masses and progressive forces. It was this shift which had been reflected in the 1979 Constitution in the form of a commitment to avoid the exploitation of the working people, and promote policies which would enhance the attainment and enjoyment of basic social and economic rights. (Ghana; 1979: Chapter 4). These progressive provisions of the 1979 Constitution contrasted sharply with those of 1969 which considerably strengthened the forces of order against those of change. The import of this point needs further elaboration.

THE COMPRADORS RETURN

In February of 1966 the collectivist government of the Convention People's Party (CPP) was overthrown in a coup d'état which amounted to a rejection of the policy of building state capitalism and its consequent constriction of the private sector during the preceding fifteen years. (NINSIN, 1979) (3). In its place a massive programme of destatization of the economy, in the context of a so-called consolidation and stabilization plan, was initiated. During this period «public sector claims on resources were cut down» and «the centre of gravity (in the economy was shifted to the private sector (OFORI-ATTA, 1977)). Accordingly, several state enterprises of the early 1960's were either wholly or partially sold to the private sector, both Ghanaian and expatriate. Government expenditures were reduced by about one-third from their pre-1966 level; and development expenditure, which was particularly affected, dropped from C 859 million in 1966 to C 55 million in 1967 (1969 prices) – a decline of two-thirds (ibid:).

The immediate effects of these policies on wage and salary earners were the massive retrenchment, and rising cost of living that followed. For, as part of the usual IMF-World Bank prescription for deflating the economies of the developing countries, the public sector demand for labour was so drastically cut that by 1967 about 60,000 unemployed people had been returned to the labour market. Also the Ghanaian currency was devalued on July 8, 1967. And to crown it all, the new government decontrolled the prices of consumer items in the vain hope that the legendary discipline of the free market system would regulate prices for the mutual benefit of the producer, distributor and consumer. But the cumulative effect of these measures on workers was not beneficial: their purchasing power was considerably devalued.

In all this the thrust of the government economic policies was much less the promotion of an independent self-regulating and healthy national economy than strengthening the peripheral position of the economy in the international division of labour in which imperialism dominated. In other words the policy of destatization of the economy (internally) was also aimed at reversing that of state capitalism which had the potential of progressively reducing the country's dependence on imperialism and ushering in Socialism (4). As conceded by the Chairman of the NLC's Economic Committee, E.N. OMABOE who was also the Commissioner for Economic Affairs (5), the government's policy of substantially increasing the scope of import and exchange liberalisation meant, among others, putting a number of items on Open General Licence, and allowing foreign companies operating in the country to repatriate their profits and dividends without restraint. This, the Commissioner explained, was necessary to «re-establish our reputation among international capital markets» so as to attract foreign investments. In brief, the policy of promoting private enterprise at home (6) would proceed under the aegis of foreign capitalist interest.

This sudden reversal of public economic policy can be explained only in terms of the material interest of the fraction of the Ghanaian petty-bourgeois class that had taken control over the state apparatus. As I have stressed above the CPP government's policy of building state capitalism had checked the growth of the Ghanaian private capitalist class and threatened to reduce them to an appendage of the state capitalist class. The regime had done this by foreclosing all compradorial contacts with foreign private investors and further strengthening the control of the state in those sectors of the economy (e.g., commerce, construction, the timber industry) which are the traditional domain of the national petty-bourgeoisie (NINSIN, *op. cit.*). Thus by 1965 for instance, the share of the private sector in manufacturing enterprises had dwindled from 81.0 % in 1962 to 72.5 %. The remaining 26.5 % was shared by the state (17.2 %), joint-state-private (10.0 %) and the cooperative (0.3 %) sectors. At the same time though foreign private capital still dominated the economy generally with its fixed capital assets valued at 50.2 % in 1966, its share of manufacturing enterprises had shrank from 63.2 % in 1962 to 56.4 % in 1965. But for the Ghanaian petty-bourgeoisie the share of its commercial fraction in manufacturing had stagnated, and also its fixed capital assets dwindled to just 7.9 % by 1966 (7). It was therefore evident that the compradorial revenue which traditionally accrues to the petty-bourgeoisie was gradually drying up. It had been redirected for the benefit of the state capitalist class as the reports of the commissions of enquiry appointed after the 1966 coup amply document (8). That coup was an attempt to reverse this trend. But in all this it was just the form of the state that changed. The content remained the same: petty-bourgeois; and the economy, neo-colonialist. As such the post-1966 state of Ghana was simply continuing its historic role of guarding imperialist interest in classic style: that is, mediation with imperialism. The compradors had returned under protection by the military.

By 1969 the effect of these liberal economic policies were unmistakably clear: they had proved to be excessively inflationary and had accordingly intensified the crisis of the neo-colony. Contrary to official expectations, production had stagnated, and as such the private sector had not expanded to pick up retrenched labour from the public sector (AGAMA, 1966:5) L.O. Vol.3). Consequently, the unemployment problem not only persisted. It also got worse and the prospect for a political backlash became quite ominous.

These problems of economic stagnation, inflation and unemployment were compounded by recurring deficits in the country's external accounts. The gloom in official circles was revealed in a publication of the Ministry of Information, entitled «Ghana's Economic and Aid Requirements in 1967». In that document, it was revealed that the government's import programme for the ensuing fiscal year would yield an external deficit of N ¢ 95 or £ 48 (million) (1967 prices). This created the usual capitalist dilemma of how to stimulate economic growth without fueling inflation. In a periphery capitalist system where, above all, capital is very scarce this dilemma becomes almost insuperable without a massive infusion of foreign capital. The nature of the dilemma was that any further deflationary policies would be politically explosive as they would compound the already bad unemployment situation. Nor would any increase in public expenditure be compatible with the monetarist deflationary posture of the regime. The persistence of a massive external deficit was probably the major constraint. It was to escape this dilemma that the currency was devalued in July 1967. In fact, devaluation was regarded as the ultimate instrument for reactivating production and boosting export even though it has usually been ineffectual in this regard. The heart of the matter is however that in its blind adherence to its compradorial role, the petty-bourgeois class had mortgaged even its autonomy to take decisions beneficial to its long-term interest as a class: it had become captive of the capitalist ideology and puppets of the agents of capitalist interests, especially the IMF and the World Bank which in accordance with the norm had promised the regime stand-by credit in exchange for those politically suicidal policies.

This stagflation crisis of the economy was bound to exert a decisive impact on the internal class struggle, and vice-versa. In the first instance the cumulative effect of the government's liberalisation package on the bulk of the commercial stratum of the petty-bourgeoisie was not salutary. Members of this group found themselves unable to take advantage of the investment opportunities created through the government's destatization policy because they lacked the capital and other factors of production necessary for successful entrepreneurial activity of the magnitude which the state had undertaken during the past decade. In other words they were incapable of transforming themselves into an industrial class — the captains of industry. And even though they flocked in to take advantage of the government's trade liberalization policy by becoming petty importers, the devaluation of July 1967 and high custom's charges

sharply escalated the cedi value of most imports, and thereby threatened to annihilate a substantial number of them as members of the petty-bourgeois. Consequently they became increasingly vocal in their demand for a larger share of the commercial sector (JONAH, 1980:60). Such demands clearly contradicted the official policy of promoting the interest of foreign capital in the country. Yet it was such a mild anti-big capital, non-antagonistic contradiction that the government felt confident to resolve peacefully. The Ghanaian Enterprises Decree, 1968 (NLCD 323) was the government's response to those demands.

Workers were more active in their struggle against the government's anti-labour policies. For despite the increases in the minimum wage announced in July 1967 to mitigate the effect of the devaluation, and now salary awards effected under the Mills ODOI proposals, of 1968, the devaluation and continued inflation had wiped out these gains such that by the close of 1968 the real minimum wage for the Accra worker was 38.1 % less than its 1960 level (EWUSI, 1977 p. 35). It was under this sustained pressure of pauperisation that workers stepped up their agitation against the government. Accordingly between 1966 and 1969 there were not less than 100 recorded strikes. Some of these were quite violent. Such workers agitation so alarmed the government that in January of 1967 the second in command within the ruling junta had warned workers against further agitations in a specially organised radio and television broadcast.

The confidence and stability of the regime were visibly strained; and it attempted to cope with the situation through increased political repression of its opponents. For example, a special military court was established under the Armed Forces Act, 1962 (Amendment) Decree, 1967 (NLCD 131). Under it certain categories of subversion offences committed by non-military personnel were to be tried in these courts. And earlier on (in October 1966) the regime had found it imperative to protect itself by passing two decrees against rumour peddling (NLD Decrees 92 and 93). The repressive nature of those two laws had compelled the Legon Observer to describe them as «preventive detention without the Preventive Detention Act of 1958» (LO Vol. 1 (8) October 1966: 3). But perhaps the most eloquent testimony to the regime's sense of insecurity was the rise in defence spending – from 9.3 % (of current expenditure) in 1965 to 15.4 % by 1969. For, the regime had to be strengthened to deal more effectively with the enemies of order and stability at a time of rising opposition to its policies. This, rather than the claim by OFORI-ATTA (*op. cit.*: 28) that it merely reflected the recent change in the structure of power, is the true meaning of those increases in military expenditure.

On the whole, the petty-bourgeois state (now under the control of its military wing) was much stronger, and the masses still politically backward. Thus when the ban on party political activities was lifted early in 1969 the masses could not found their own political organization. Nor could any progressive popular organization emerge to express the discontent of the working people, except the People's Popular Party (PPP) which claimed the mantle of Nkrumahism. But even in this exceptional case of the PPP the fact that the successor civilian regime could legalise it without any protest from the masses in general and Nkrumahists in particular also

affirms the general political weakness of these groups. Therefore the successful organization of the 1969 parliamentary elections and the triumph of the Progress Party in it must be seen as the triumph for the petty-bourgeoisie generally. Even so the failure of the petty-bourgeois state to deal effectively with the growing crisis of the neo-colony once more underscored its inherent weakness. This would intensify the class struggle and finally bring the regime down after barely two years in office.

THE NEO-COLONY AT BAY

When the PP government assumed office in the latter part of 1969, the economic crisis had not subsided. Severe balance of payment difficulties, industrial stagnation, rising unemployment, acute shortage of essential consumer goods and rising prices were some of the key features of the economy. This level of deterioration in the economy had had a visible effect on the material conditions of both the petty-bourgeoisie and the masses. The euphoria of the time was therefore typical of the illusions of the class that it had finally got the opportunity to build a solid basis for social progress. But it still remained captive of the capitalist ideology and could merely delude itself about its capacity to pioneer progress — which is nothing but a glorified petty-bourgeois ideology (9). In this ideological frame the new regime could not blaze alternative solutions to the continuing economic crisis. Typically, it opted to follow the monetarist prescriptions which has been the bane of its predecessor. It accelerated the trade liberalization policy of the past three years and imposed extra monetarist measures at home. In its policy toward capitalist investors the regime had evolved plans to allow 100 % foreign ownership of all new industrial projects established in the country (10).

Meanwhile, the policy of trade liberalization had suddenly added to the commercial stratum of the petty-bourgeoisie a substantial number of new-owners the majority of whom engaged in petty import transactions without any concern for either the country's external account position or the effect their trading activities would have on the domestic inflationary situation. Considering the fact that since this period the industrialized economies have been exporting inflation to the backward ones at an alarming rate, the behaviour of the commercial stratum of the petty-bourgeoisie was certainly subversive of the economy. It was largely as a result of this uncontrolled economic behaviour of this stratum that the balance of payments position continued to deteriorate so much that by the end of the 1970/71 fiscal year the trade deficit had reached ₵ 180.5 million. This negative trend was exacerbated by a steep drop in the world market price for cocoa to \$ 194 per ton — the lowest level in 5 years. Domestic economic activity was immediately depressed. The Central Bureau of Statistics' Economic Survey of 1969–71 for instance, projected that in the economic conditions of the time growth in per caput domestic product would stagnate, and inflation would continue to grow. Thus it had become clear that the Ghanaian economy had entered a vicious circle of current account deficits, high inflation rates and depreciating exchange rates (11).

The morbidity of the economy posed the most serious accumulation crisis for the Ghanaian petty-bourgeoisie as it continued to feel the predatory effect of the global economy. For the domestic economic depression had also contributed to the curtailment of the flow of foreign investments. The neo-colony under the leadership of the most liberal wing of the petty-bourgeoisie had ceased to be attractive to foreign investors. The government's policy of economic revival had proved futile, and the income of the petty-bourgeoisie continued to suffer. But unlike the bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeoisie is totally incapable of containing such economic crisis, even if such containment measures have only a temporary effect. In desperation it opens up to fresh external dictates and rather deepens its captivity to the capitalist system than liberates itself. Thus for instance, the Standard Bank (Ghana) Ltd.'s Review of economic trends issued in Accra in November of 1970 could only urge that the depressed commercial sector could be revived only through further trade liberalization. While this foreign-owned bank was making such a call a resident representative of the World Bank, Peter REITTER, would soon be stationed in Accra (in November 1, 1971) to tele-guide the government in formulating fresh policies that would push the Ghanaian economy further under the weight of imperialist interests – through another currency devaluation and other measures. Accordingly, under the pretext of restoring balance to the economy, stimulating new investments and domestic production, the Ghanaian currency was again devalued, but this time by a massive 44.0 % in December of 1971. The effect of devaluation on the economy was instant and damaging: the economy incurred an unprecedented deficit of ₵ 146.4 million on current account. For the polity, it meant the intensification of the class struggle.

Just as in developed capitalist economies bouts of economic depression manifest themselves in very high rates of bankruptcies among business enterprises (FYODOROV, 1977: 133–139) so do they in periphery capitalist economies which are mere appendages of the former. Therefore the December 1971 devaluation, which in reality is a symptom of a more profound economic malaise, immediately threatened a host of Ghanaian business enterprises with bankruptcy as they were instantly called upon to pay 75.0 % more (in the cedi) for every dollar value of their imports. The 1968 economic trauma was indeed repeating itself. Business confidence was badly shaken; and in particular the stratum of small business concerns appeared to have lost faith in the capacity of the political leadership of their class to save them from imminent proletarianization. It was however the wage workers on whom the economic crisis took its greatest toll.

THE CRISIS AND LABOUR

The economic crisis generated two distinct, and yet, contradictory developments. First, the state intervened increasingly to protect capital. This took the form of 'counter-insurgency' measures designed to weaken labour and strengthen capital. In concrete terms the state encouraged employers to lay-off more and more people so that unemployment stood

at about 20.0 % of the labour force at the end of 1971, and an unofficial wage freeze. Thus wages lagged behind inflation. For example, wage earnings went up by only 4.5 % on the 1970 level while the consumer price index shot up to over 90.0 % after a brief respite in 1970. And yet the government stubbornly refused to yield to labour demands for a wage increase from ₵ 0.75 to ₵ 1.50. Concurrently, commercial houses took advantage of the trade liberalization policy of the government to beat the effect of the crisis by charging more for their merchandise. Further to these the government removed subsidies on such social services as education and medical care so that they would no longer be offered free to the consumer. In a typical bourgeois conservative style the regime was saying 'far-well to welfare'.

Second, as the state imposed these and other harsh economic measures on the working peoples, the labour movement became increasingly militant and uncompromising in its opposition to the government. Thus, for example, the incidence of strikes rose and sharply assumed a violent character. Similarly the state hardened its attitude toward labour and responded to a very aggressive labour demand with a greater measure of repression. Examples of such confrontations were those of the African Timber and Polywood (Ghana) Ltd. (ATP) at Samreboi, and the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (AGC) mines at Obuasi. In other words, the class struggle intensified, and ineluctably divided labour from the ineffective and repressive petty-bourgeois state.

Meanwhile a shift in the political position of the labour movement was also occurring. Whereas in the preceding year the Trades Union Congress (TUC) leadership had even rebuked the workers of ATP (Samreboi) and AGC (Obuasi) for their militancy, thenceforth its public utterances and other activities appeared to encourage worker militancy. And ultimately, the TUC formed a Joint Consultative Council with the Nation Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), an implacable opponent of the PP government on both domestic and foreign policy, on May 22, 1971. The threat posed to stability by this alliance was so real that the pro-government newspaper, the *Daily Graphic*, in an editorial the following day, could not but warn «the nation of the potential power such a union would wield...». Following this, the TUC assumed a defiant posture. Against official displeasure, its leadership mounted a nation-wide campaign against the government for imposing the National Development Levy on Workers when they were already suffering untold deprivation. Furthermore, when the government passed the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1971, (Act. 383) to dissolve the TUC as the central organ of the labour movement, the seventeen unions comprising the TUC met on the same day as the act was enacted (September 10, 1971) to reconstitute the TUC under its old leadership. And on that same day the NUGS (allies of the TUC) issued a strongly worded statement condemning the government for its anti-labour policies, and declaring support for the TUC in its confrontation with the government. Earlier on *The Spokesman* (the only newspaper that inclined to protect workers' interest) had called on workers to dispel «... any illusions about

prospects of collaboration with this (Progress Party) regime... (whose aim is to milk the workers dry and to do this with impunity». The paper had concluded its editorial by urging workers to oppose «the anti-worker conspiracy» of the government. But the labour movement was still too weak to translate its growing class consciousness into political consciousness, and therefore the sharpening class struggle into an attack on the petty-bourgeois state. For them as for the petty-bourgeoisie itself, a 'master-saviour' was the only practical solution to the crises of the petty-bourgeois order.

THE CRISIS AND THE PETTY-BOURGEOISIE

For this class the deepening economic crisis was more than a crisis of accumulation. It was also a crisis of self-confidence as a ruling class; in other words, a political crisis as well. This in-built fear of an impending political suicide stemmed logically from the inability of the state to mediate effectively between national capital and imperialism. In particular, since 1966 this concern has been dressed in petty xenophobia (euphemistically called economic nationalism) which was directed at aliens engaged in petty commercial activities. And it had been concretized in a proliferation of new militant (i.e. nationalistic) business associations (JONAH, *op. cit.*: p. 60). The fruit of their agitations was the enactment of the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act., 1970, (Act 323).

But the deepening crisis thereafter had cleared the illusions about the efficacy of such neo-colonialist economic policies. It was this realization which impelled a generally conservative newspaper like *The Pioneer* to inveigh in its January 12, 1972 editorial as follows:

We refuse to accept any more temporisings about the needed action we should take on such debts to enable our economy to take off...

We must take quick action to save ourselves or whine, suffer and perish.

Earlier on (November 29, 1971), the same paper had warned the government that the country was «already getting to the brink of disappointment because we do not notice it clearly that the relevant practical plunge» was being taken to set the economy right. Under the pangs of the same economic crunch the Ghana National Chamber of Commerce had felt obliged to reject the main pillars of the economic policies of the government; namely, trade liberalization, devaluation, import surcharges, and so on (12). Yet barely two and half years ago it had commended the same Progress Party government for its liberal trade policies (13). Thus by the end of 1971 the petty-bourgeoisie had lost faith in its own political representatives for their inability to employ the power of the state effectively to secure for it unimpeachable positions within the production process. In particular, the drastic devaluation had undermined its material base so suddenly and to such an extent that it would need considerable state and foreign support to re-establish itself. Yet it did not abandon the state which had become a means of its rise and endurance as a class. MAMDANI (1976:244) explains: «... the ideological orientation of a class does not mechanically follow a shift in its material base. While it is true that a class produces its own

ideology, that this ideology changes over time, it is also true that the ideology can in turn capture the class, making it the victim of its own history». This was the condition of the Ghanaian ruling class in 1971; and it persisted in this bondage till 1981. In 1971 it expected and actually got a 'redeemer'. But in 1981 it could turn to no one: it had reached the end of its history.

EFFECTS OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS

The crisis that had afflicted the Ghanaian economy must be seen in the context of the specific historical situation of imperialism. During the 1970's imperialism was generally on the offensive again in its bid to strengthen its domination of the rest of the world. For the capitalist system has since the late 1960's been experiencing grave internal economic crises. Beginning with the collapse of the international monetary system and the resulting realignment of the world's major currencies, the leading industrialized nations of the world have been going through a period of recession which is generally believed to be the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930's. This current crises hit its peak in the 1974-75 period. The principal features of the crises have been spiralling inflation, steep price rises, stagnant industrial production and currency instability. As LENIN has pointed out these trends in capitalist reproduction accentuates the 'market question' for capitalist economies and thereby unleashes an acute competition among them for new markets, investment avenues and sources of raw materials. Thus while it is true that recent investment trends indicate that two-thirds of all capital exports is from developed countries to other developed countries (KOSTYUKHIN, 1979: 100), it is equally true that the volume of capital exports to African and other Third World Countries has been increasing both qualitatively and quantitatively. For African countries it has increased from 11.9 % in 1969 of total exports to developing countries generally to 49.0 % in 1975; and the emphasis has shifted rapidly from official to direct private investments (TARABIN (ed.), 1978: 154-63).

The same trend toward increased penetration of the economies of the developing world has characterized the economy of Ghana. Tables 1 and 2 below show an interesting pattern about foreign private capital investments during the 1969-72 period. For instance, while purely foreign private investments declined both in numbers and value, joint ventures between Ghanaian and foreign private capitalist interests increased (Table 1). It is true that the value of ventures in the purely foreign private as well as foreign-Ghanaian private sectors declined in absolute terms (Table 2). Yet the value of the aggregate share of foreign capital in the approved projects during the 3 years, though unavailable, must certainly be high; for even at the height of the statist economic policies of the CPP regime foreign private capitalist interest controlled 50.2 % of total fixed capital assets and 54.4 % of total manufacturing enterprises, both by 1965 (HAKAM, *op. cit.*).

Table I – Ownership/Partnership Structure of Approved Projects
Total Capital Involved (¢ m1.) % of Total

Ownership	1971/72	1970/71	1969/70	1973/72	1970/71	1969/70
100% Ghanaian (Private)	5.7	0.5	2.8	27.3	30.8	31.8
100% Foreign (Private)	2.0	0.5	8.5	13.6	15.4	31.8
Jt. Ghanaian/Foreign (Private)	12.2	8.0	5.3	45.5	46.1	18.2
Jt. State/Foreign	12.0	—	9.2	13.6	—	4.4
State	—	2.4	9.3	9.3	—	13.6
Total	32.0	11.4	35.1	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Table E (p.5), *The Capital Investment Board Annual Reports, 1971–72.*

Table II – Ownership/Partnership Structure of Projects

	Volume		Value ('000)	
	1970/71	1971/72	1970/71	1971/72
100% Foreign (Private)	10	9	15,000	3,000
100% Ghanaian (Private)	22	38	6,000	15,300
Jt. Foreign/Ghanaian (Private)	6	30	22,000	19,700
100% State	1	3	2,400	4,600
Jt. State/Foreign	2	1	2,500	1,000
Total	42	81	48,900	43,600

Source: *Ibid.*

But in terms of the dominant position of imperialism vis-à-vis the Ghanaian economy the size or value of capital exported cannot present a total picture of the reality. There are other factors such as the dependence on trade largely with the capitalist world for as much as one quarter of her gross national product, for over one quarter of the economy's absorptive capacity (AGOGO, 1975:62–73), and a heavy debt burden. The latter further obliges the country to commit a substantial fraction of her foreign exchange resources to debt servicing thereby imposing an inflexible constraint on the country's governments through the cooptation of her decision-making by imperialist powers as happened to the Progress Party government (LIBBY, 1976), and creating a critical shortage of convertible currency.

It is also important to note that Ghana's dependence on the capitalist world economy for over one quarter of her gross national product means that any economic crisis in these capitalist centres is bound to affect the country's production, employment, accumulation and national prosperity generally. Above all, this structure of dependence also ensures that an increase in the interest rate of any of the world's major currencies automatically deepens the crisis of the neo-colonial economy by multiplying her debt responsibilities. The foregoing simply affirms the claim that the growing crises of the capitalist world system has been exerting devastating effects on the Ghanaian economy.

As is the case with the capitalist system, the crisis of the Ghanaian system has generated grave political effects as well. However beyond the intensification of the class struggle, the economic crisis forged the formation of new alliance without corresponding modifications at the ideological level. Those changes emphasised two broad trends in the Ghanaian political economy: they (i) implied a further weakening of the petty-bourgeois state; and (ii) emphasized the need to reappraise the relationship between foreign capital and local capital with a view to increasing the material gains for the latter. In both instances however the solution lay in strengthening the petty-bourgeois state. The triumph of the Bonapartist state and the extreme economic nationalism of the post-1972 period were the direct result of this crisis.

THE BONAPARTIST STATE (14)

It would seem therefore that the 1972 coup d'état that brought to power the Bonapartist regime of Colonel ACHEAMPONG was a historical necessity because it was an attempt to respond to two complementary social imperatives. On the one hand it was «the political expression of the neo-colony in crisis», and on the other it was a concrete response to the repeated failure of the political representatives of the petty-bourgeoisie to successfully deal with the crisis (HUTCHFUL, 1979). But the 1972-79 regime must be distinguished from its 1966-69 predecessor if we are to grasp its import fully. The latter did not merely represent the failure of the preceding petty-bourgeois regime. It more significantly represented a conjuncture in which both the petty-bourgeoisie and the working classes had moved into a position of «relative stabilization» (p.60), following the recent crisis which threatened to undermine the stability and well-being of each of these two major social classes, and which thereby stressed the need for a «master/saviour» (Ibid) that will preserve the existing social order and promote national progress. For even though the petty-bourgeoisie had demonstrated its weakness as a ruling class, the working classes were themselves still too weak to take the political initiative and overthrow the former. Therefore their respective weakness, politically, stressed the mutually beneficial nature of a strategic alliance of the two classes in waiting for a saviour. The alliance through the Bonapartist regime of two historically antagonistic classes constituted the inner strength, the reality, of the «strong state» which HUTCHFUL identified but failed to expatiate.

To the extent that the rise of the Bonapartist regime expressed both the frustration, and determination of these two major social classes to deal with the economic and political crises of the moment, it must be understood as an advanced form of the petty-bourgeois state. And to the extent that solving the flaming economic crisis would require a new and stronger alliance with foreign capital (imperialism), Bonapartism further marked a new phase in the domination and exploitation of the local economy and the working classes, respectively. Accordingly, the failure of the Bonapartist regime by 1979 to deal with the crisis, and consequent collapse, must be understood to be the signal for the ultimate collapse of the petty-bourgeois state as a whole. For as I have pointed out (above) the economic crisis was a political crisis for the ruling class as a whole. Accordingly, the imminent fall of the reigning political stratum must mark the beginning of the end of the entire social formation.

The Bonapartist nature of the government of the National Redemption Council (NRC) (later Supreme Military Council – SMC) was quick to expose itself during the first few months of its coming into power. At his first press conference, the head of the new regime, Col. I.K. ACHEAMPONG, did not only deplore the previous regime's lack of «will to act decisively on this (economic) crisis». He further attacked «the system that exploited the ordinary people, the workers and the farmers on whose sweat and toil the wheel of the economy turns...» and also castigated multinational companies for subverting the economy. At a meeting with representatives of the business community, almost one year after being in office, he justified the intervention of the military as follows: «We acted in the name of the harrassed...»

In order however to give full expression to the representative role of the regime, Col. ACHEAMPONG met a cross section of the Ghanaian people: workers, farmers, students, chiefs, women traders, and the business community. To workers he affirmed that the armed forces had «taken upon themselves the responsibility to be the vanguard of the people...» in the crucial task of building an independent national economy. To the business community he promised that Ghanaian domination of the economy would replace foreign domination which had resulted in «drastic distortions» of the economy. And workers were as much the «greatest force for change» and capable of bringing «failure or victory to our Revolution» as much as businessmen and women did «represent a vital part» of the «grand democratic coalition between Government and private business, between workers and farmers» which would ensure that Ghanaian domination of the national economy would be achieved.

These attempts at consolidating the Bonapartist coalition of contradictory social forces transcended the limit of rhetoric. They were expressed in specific instances. For example, to save the commercial and industrial strata of the petty-bourgeoisie from economic collapse, the currency was immediately revalued by 43.0 %, surcharges on imports were removed, and the producer price of cocoa was increased from C 8.00 to C 10.000 per ton. Workers also had the benefit of the repeal of the controversial Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1971 (Act 383), the minimum

dialy wage increased from ₵ 0.75 to ₵ 1.00, and the National Development Levy abolished. Furthermore, all future redundancy exercises that had been planned against workers by private enterprises were stopped immediately. To win the support of the higher civil bureaucracy, their car maintenance allowance and other perquisites which had been either reduced or cancelled by the PP government were fully restored. And to cement it all, the regime assumed a significant anti-imperialist stand on the country's external debts. On February 5, 1972 the regime dramatically announced the repudiation of certain of the country's external debts and unilaterally rescheduled the repayment arrangements for others.

But as HUTCHFUL has observed the return of the armed forces into Ghanaian politics must be seen as the failure of the petty-bourgeois regime to mediate successfully with imperialism (*op. cit.*). The immediate task of the new regime was therefore to strengthen the state in order to enhance the effective performance of its mediatory role rather than to destroy the imperialist presence in the country. This task of the regime was succinctly stated in answer to a question by Anthony HUGHES (Editor of *Africa Magazine*, Paris) in April of 1972:

I am reluctant to talk in terms of labels, but I do believe that the state is bound to play a forceful role, a leadership role in the development of the economy. I have said that a country with our limited resources (sic) cannot leave everything to the market forces, and *I have said that we have to use state power to capture the commanding heights of the economy for Ghanaians*. We can do this without curbing the entrepreneurial spirit of Ghanaians. Our concern is to infuse a sense of economic patriotism under the direction of the state. (italics mine).

Essentially what this meant was the renegotiation of the terms of the unequal partnership that had bound local and foreign capitalist interest together in order to enhance the size of the material rewards accruing to the former. In the same breadth, the regime felt obliged to assure foreign investors that its policy of state control of the economy did not contradict private participation in the economy (15). The government's goal, it was explained later, was to forge an economic partnership between local and foreign capital based on the same mutual interests as those underpinning the political partnership concluded between Ghana and Britain in 1957. The Head of State had declared: «It has happened in the political arena... What we seek in 1972... is the extension of the same principle into the area of the economy». Thus even though the 1972 coup was a victory for the Ghanaian petty-bourgeoisie (as will be shown below) over its historic weakness vis-à-vis imperialism, that victory was very temporary. The renegotiation of the partnership with imperialism will eventually exacerbate the political crisis rather than help in transcending it.

The Investment Policy Decree, 1975, (NRCD 329) was in fact the highest point of expression of this renegotiated partnership. Under this law only manufacturing and commercial enterprises which involved very meagre capital outlay and in which Indian, Lebanese and Syrian nationals dominated as petty-commodity producers and distributors were reserved for Ghanaians. Big capitalists, which had dominated the commanding heights of

the economy all these years were either directed merely to sell a fraction of their shares to the Ghanaian public or made to sell majority shares of their capital to the government. In other words the decree left the dominant position of foreign capital in the economy unchallenged: it was rather strengthened (JONAH, 1980: Chapter 3). It is also noteworthy that the decree failed to achieve its goal of harmonising the interest of local and foreign capital through the partnership. The events following 1975, especially, showed clearly that the «encircling gloom» resulting from imperialist domination of the economy which the Head of State, Colonel ACHEAMPONG, had complained of earlier in the life of the regime, as threatening the socio-economic position of the petty-bourgeoisie, had not in fact been dispelled. The indications were that what appeared to be a reconciliation of local and foreign capitalist interest achieved under the economic partnership amounted to only a temporary containment of the contradiction between the two interests, rather than its resolution.

But perhaps the greatest significance of the Bonapartist regime was its mediation between capital and labour in attempting to contain the class struggle that had resulted from the intensified exploitation by the former under the guardianship of the Bonapartist state itself. It must be recalled that before the accession of the Bonapartist state workers' struggle against capital had attained its highest level ever – as symbolised by the bloody confrontations mounted by the workers of OBUASI and SAMREBOI. In the face of this mounting threat to the position of capital there was an urgent need for preemptive measures. The formula was found within the framework of the grand democratic coalition whose 'counter-insurgency' manifestation in so far as the struggle of the workers is concerned took the form of democratizing capital (which is currently in vogue in West Germany – ZAIKINA, 1981: Chapter 12). And the state became the leading proponent of the fraud, the illusion, that this policy amounted to the development of a people's capitalism. This is the form it assumed: In January 1973, Col. ACHEAMPONG had admonished the business community to sell token equity shares in their enterprises to their workers. This, he explained, «should create a greater sense of belonging and promote a higher sense of responsibility among the workers». In furtherance of this illusion Section 13 (5) of the Ghanaian Enterprises Development, 1975 (NRCD 330) provided for the participation of workers in enterprises which had been affected by NRCD 329.

Obviously the goal of this policy was not to destroy private ownership of the means of production – especially foreign capitalist interest – but to strengthen it in a manner consistent with the regime's posture of collaboration with imperialism. The implementation of NRCD 329 went in a direction that was supportive of the charge of fraudulence levelled against the policy of developing people's capitalism. Workers were not only sold very meagre shares in those enterprises which had been affected by the NRCD 329. They also experienced greater degrees of exploitation: reductions in salaries, job insecurity and loss of benefits (JONAH, *op. cit.*: 131–43).

The democratization of capital enhanced the interest of capital against that of labour in another respect. Under NRC 329 and 330 monopoly capitalist interests in the country could mobilize the meagre savings of the working peoples for further investments and thereby enlarge the scope of exploitation of the latter. For persuading workers to purchase shares in foreign enterprises means that they (the workers) had to reduce consumption in order to be able to buy those few shares. This meant extended destitution of the working peoples. Also, while it did not entail any improvements in the wage income of workers, it deprived them of access to their little savings thus invested in capitalist industry for a long time. The capitalist owners of such enterprises however still retained unlimited freedom of access and utilisation of such capital assets. Furthermore, it imposed additional fetters on the freedom of workers to fight for better conditions of work. This took the form not just, of the illusory belief by the worker of being part of the ownership structure of capitalist enterprise. But more significantly, even where and when they felt inclined to struggle against capital they were confronted by not just the power of monopoly capital but an alliance of this and the colossal power of the state. The policy of democratizing capital was therefore a major anti-labour instrument wielded by the state; the Bonapartist regime had betrayed one of its allies.

It appears however that the contradictions embodied in the Bonapartist regime were, from 1974, becoming increasingly obvious to the working class, both inside and outside the state bureaucracy. The statistics on workers' strikes in the state sector from 1974 to the early part of 1979 for instance, show a dramatic increase in frequency and also in militancy. In most cases workers' grievances centred around poor working conditions and certain management decisions as well as government decisions related to management and working conditions which the workers found unacceptable. On the whole, strikes escalated from a total of 8 (in 1974) to 11 (in 1976), 10 (1977), and 23 (1978). The lowest point in this frequency curve was 1975 when there were only 3 strikes in the public bureaucracy; that is, apart from the lone one recorded in January of 1979, just before these statistics were compiled.

The two years which recorded the lowest incidence of strikes are significant, and require some comment. On the one hand, the January 1979 strike occurred just before the new Head of State would announce a programme of returning the country to civilian rule; it lasted 11 days, and was one of the longest recorded for the period under consideration. Coming, as it did, from the labour union with the longest record of militancy (the Railway Workers Union) it would seem to be suggestive of the mood of the labour movement at the time — which may be described as one of determination to continue to struggle against the government until concrete results were achieved. And on the other, 1975 (with 3 strikes) was the year in which the government gave legal form to its new pact with imperialism (in the Investment Policy Decree). That would seem to suggest that after the 1974 upsurge in workers' agitation, it had become necessary, in view of government's assurances, to relent awhile in expectation that concrete

benefits would come out of them. It must be recalled that during the same period the state had intensified its campaign to sell the 'new economic partnership' with foreign capitalist interests to important socio-economic interests which had been brought together in the Bonapartist alliance. Thus inaugurating the Investment Policy Implementation Committee and the Ghanaian Enterprises Development Commission at a joint ceremony, Col. I. K. ACHEAMPONG had emphasized the point as follows:

It is the interest of the Ghanaian which we seek to promote... The Investment Policy Decree seeks to avail the Ghanaian, i.e. the worker, the farmer, the fisherman and the self-employed, the public officer, the opportunity to acquire shares in some of the large companies which operate in the country. Such participation will... enable Ghanaians to share in the prosperity of these foreign-owned companies...

The success of this policy of deception accounts for what appeared to be workers' docility in that year (1975).

Even so the economic partnership (despite the Investment Policy Decree) was by 1976, showing signs of failure. The economic crisis continued fiercely. Accordingly workers' strikes escalated not only in numbers but especially in duration which is a sign of militancy. For example, from the lowest of 4 days long (in 1974) and 3 days (1975) workers' strikes could last as long as 25 days (1978), 20 days (1977), 14 days (1976) and 11 days (1979). It is equally remarkable that these prolonged strikes involved workers in either strategic or sensitive sectors of the economy; namely, Ghana Rubber Estates (Bonsa-Abura): 14 days in 1976; Ghana National Manganese Corporation (Nsuta): 20 days in 1977; Electricity Corporation of Ghana (Nation-wide): 10 days in 1978; Ghana Oil Refinery Company (Tema): 11 days in 1978; Ghana Railways Corporation (Nation-wide): 11 days in 1979; and the Ghana Registered Nurses Association (Nation-wide): 25 days in 1978. It is also noteworthy that these were industrial action emanating from the public sector alone. Undoubtedly, if those from the private sector, which enjoys unbridled freedom in exploitation, are added to these the unmistakable conclusion will be that the knell of the Bonapartist regime was chiming audibly and surely.

But perhaps the most prophetic affirmation of this anti-climax for a regime, which had begun from a position of strength and inter-class solidarity, was that dangerous challenge to its legitimacy and moral strength posed by its most faithful servants, the salariat of the civil service (17) which apart from the police and the military constitutes a thoroughly socialized and dependable coercive arm of the state. Largely out of the political need to increase its fighting power against the state which since 1967 had disorganized (18) and systematically reduced it to penury (Ghana, 1978: 7-19), the Junior Civil Servants Association had dramatically transformed itself into the Association of Civil Servants of Ghana on March 1, 1977. «This change was primarily for the purpose of enabling the Association to retain its 'dynamic leaders' when they got promoted into the senior grades; and additionally 'to make it possible for senior officers to become members and join hands with us in achieving our goals'.» (Ghana, *ibid.*) Consequently after several fruitless negotiations with the government aimed at improving

their service conditions, the Association staged a successful 6 day strike in March of 1978 – probably the first in living memory to be organised by civil servants. The political significance of this lay in the fact that the strike action occurred just before the controversial referendum on the Union Government proposals came on, and 7 days after their representatives had met the Head of State, on March 1st. This was followed in November of the same year with a 5 day strike that crippled the regime so much that out of nervousness it terminated the appointments of the striking civil servants en masse and set up a recruitment bureau to recruit new personnel for the service – steps whose futility was exposed in their abandonment as unceremoniously as they had been announced. The November strike had followed the government's austerity 1978–79 budget (announced in September), and after the Association had presented a long list of demands from its Kumasi Conference of September 12–14. Some of the demands had totally rejected aspects of the regime's budget proposals – a clear case of political impudence to which the regime responded by merely counselling patience.

From the foregoing one could conclude that the level of political consciousness of workers had risen substantially, and that worker docility had become a thing of the past as during the 1966 – 79 period industrial strikes and disputes had become a major weapon of the labour movement in confronting the state and private employers. LENIN (19 Vol. 23: 241) was therefore right when he wrote: «Only struggle educates the exploited class. Only struggle discloses to it the magnitude of its own power, widens its horizon, enhances its abilities, clarifies its mind, forges its will». Despite these political advances the working class was still backward in terms of its awareness of the need to engage in independent political action for attaining the ultimate for itself as a class. In particular, the movement lacked coordination and central direction. This is not to argue that their agitations were aimless and apolitical. For not even those strikes which were staged with definite economic demands in view could be dismissed as such. As MARX has pointed out, all conflicts occurring at the level of production are political struggles as all class relations are political relations, relations of power (n.d. :166). But the inescapable fact is that quite a number of the strikes of the 1977–78 period bore an unmistakable political stamp as they attacked management and government for decisions and actions related to the management of enterprises and to worker's rights. Above all, the period marked a visible growth in workers' assertiveness and aggressiveness, as borne out in the frequency and duration of strikes, to back up their demands. This caveat should however not conceal the critical political weakness of the class. Hence the need for a 'political facilitator' in 1979 (the ARFC) and in 1981 (the PNDC) to prepare the way for the eventual exercise of political power by workers and other progressive forces of society.

THE KNEEL OF BONAPARTISM

In spite of the economic partnership, the neo-colony was unable to transcend its internal crisis. After a brief cooling off period during the

1973–74 fiscal year, the crisis picked up again. The budget deficit rose sharply from C 154.9 million in 1974 to C 1,141.6 million in 1979. Inflation reached 116.4 % per annum in 1977 and continued to rise. The country's external reserves also declined precipitously in 1978. By September of 1979 they stood at C 133.5 million. For a country whose manufacturing enterprises depend on external sources for 65.0 % of its inputs the situation was certainly precarious. Thus domestic output which had dropped by 13.0 % in 1975 continued to decline – by a further 4.7 % in 1976; and after a brief recovery thereafter, it fell again in 1979 by 8.0 %.

The persistence of the economic crisis entailed rapid devaluation of the incomes of a mass of small entrepreneurs and also of wage earners. Thus even though the grand democratic coalition had been forged not only at the level of specific enterprises but more especially at the level of classes, it soon began to break up under the weight of its own contradiction. First, the structure of ownership of capitalist enterprise had revealed the continued domination of the economy by foreign capitalist interests. Second, within the internal class structure the trend was clearly in the direction of concentration of capitalist property in the hands of fewer families (JONAH, *op. cit.* Chap. 4). This unevenness in the distribution of the means of production did not simply emphasize the familiar dictum that uneven development is a law of capitalist development. Rather, it emphasized another fact which is that the minority of owners of capitalist property (both foreign and local) who dominate the economy would appropriate a larger share of the national income. The economic law enunciated by Jesus CHRIST (LUKE 19: 26) that «... to every one who has will more be given; but from him who has not even what he has will be taken away» was being vindicated. Private property in the means of production indeed determines the distribution of incomes and leads further to the concentration of private property (ZAIKINA, *op. cit.* : 531). In other words, the economic partnership had worked against the interest not only of workers but also of the small entrepreneurial stratum of the petty-bourgeoisie.

By 1977 it had become evident that the true essence of the Bonapartist regime was the consolidation of imperialism in alliance with state capitalist and local big private capitalist interest for the super-exploitation of the country's human and natural resources. In the process the «small capitalists» stratum of the petty-bourgeoisie lost out despite the rapid rise of a handful of them up the capitalist ladder through various corrupt means. The Bonapartist state had betrayed yet another of its allies – the stratum of the petty-bourgeoisie which constitutes a majority, and among whom were most members of the professional elite.

These developments produced clear political effects. They took the form, initially, of violent student agitations. Then members of the Professional Bodies Association threw in their support behind the students in confronting the regime. They questioned its claim to continue to govern the country and rejected the regime's proposal for a Union (no-party) Government. The failure of The Ad Hoc Committee on Union Government (1977) to secure a nation-wide consensus on the proposal and the inconclusive (or rather controversial) Union Government Referendum underscored

the tension within the system. Similarly, the failure of the AKUFFO led SMC government (that had replaced the ACHEAMPONG phase) to deal effectively with the current economic and political crises exposed the decadence of the petty-bourgeois state generally.

The fact is that the sustained attacks on the regime had exacerbated the weakness of the state. That is, the defection of substantial sections of the petty-bourgeoisie, including even its technocratic stratum which is located primarily in the civil bureaucracy weakened the state while the class as a whole grew stronger in its struggle against the regime; for out of that struggle the class had forged considerable unity and strength (18). This growing strength of the petty-bourgeoisie generally was expressed first in its ability to engage in sustained acts of civil disobedience; strike action, issuing ultimatum to the regime, and negotiating with the regime from a position of demonstrated strength. Second, it was clearly articulated by the President of the Greater-Accra branch of the Ghana Bar Association when the parent body met in Accra in September, 1977. At that meeting he defended the Bar Association's strike action as the weapon of all civilized peoples against dictatorship and urged his professional colleagues to sustain the momentum of their struggles through unalloyed unity and commitment. Therefore, by the close of 1978, (the year that witnessed the two civil servants' strikes) the regime seemed to have lost the political initiative. It was obliged to give in, however reluctantly, to the demands of those forces which had organized in confrontation with it; and those were some of the regime's best allies — like students, workers, civil servants and members of the professions. Consequently, its freedom and ability to find a political solution to the crises had been restricted. Yet it had to persist as a force with a historic mission.

It was out of this imperative for survival that the regime took steps to deepen its dependence on imperialism. It is noteworthy that this effort to strengthen its political links with global capitalist interest came after the failure of internal mobilization (to rebuild the Bonapartist coalition) behind the Union Government proposals, and the fall of the epitome of Bonapartism, Col. ACHEAMPONG. The new leader, Gen. AKUFFO immediately turned to a consortium of international financial institutions led by the IMF, and on their advice implemented a package of austerity measures; namely, massive reduction in government expenditure, devaluation of the currency by a massive 58.0 % (in March 1978), relaxation of controls over the retail prices of consumer items, demonetisation of the economy to reduce excess liquidity in the system, and so on. In return the IMF had promised to give the government a standby loan of \$ 90.0 million. Despite these the economic crisis deepened further, and, the political crisis also continued; and so did the position of the regime and the state generally remain precarious.

It was in the midst of these crises that the regime hurriedly completed arrangements for holding parliamentary elections under a new constitution. That connoted immediately that all the seething contradictions: inefficiencies, corrupt practices, and injustices of the system would be plasted over in a typical bourgeois ritualistic fashion; that is, through the

agency of the ballot box and a constitution. It also meant that the regime was on the threshold of successfully reconstructing fresh alliances with leading strata of the petty-bourgeoisie in a manner that would confer constitutional respectability on those iniquities. In short the crises had so undermined the legality of the regime that it wanted to take refuge in the uniform of bourgeois constitutionalism.

It was this final act of deception that provoked the military uprising of June 4, 1979. While that event did not seek to overthrow the petty-bourgeois state it nonetheless gave ample indication of the growing crisis of the petty-bourgeois state: that the potential for organized opposition from the masses against the dominance of the petty-bourgeoisie was growing rapidly. The spontaneous and violent actions launched during those three and a half months against the beneficiaries of the economic partnership with imperialism marked the beginning of the final phase of the struggle against the petty-bourgeois order. In short the failure of the Bonapartist state made the failure of the petty-bourgeois state as a whole inevitable. For where its advanced type had failed its archetypal version cannot prevail.

THE AFRC AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE

The most significant gain of the AFRC period, in so far as the class struggle is concerned, was the opportunity it gave for the working class and progressive forces in the country to get organized and assert themselves once more against the rule of the petty-bourgeoisie. By the end of their three and a half months rule a number of progressive organizations, of which some were adherents of the proletarian line, had sprung up. They included the June Fourth Movement, the new Democratic Movement, the People's Revolutionary Youth League of Ghana, and the Movement on National Affairs. The NUGS which may be described as the hot bed for militant politics among students, also retained its militant posture. Within the labour movement itself several cadres of these progressive organizations who were also members of various workers organization – like the Public Utilities Workers Union (PUWU) had tried unsuccessfully to take over their branch unions. It is true that workers and progressive forces still remained divided organizationally and on petty ideological grounds. Yet the situation among them was one of growing confidence and strength as well as a sharpening political consciousness. It was in this highly turbulent political situation that the AFRC handed over the political administration of the country to the PNP in September of 1979. At the time the consensus among the 'Left' was: 'the masses were waking up, and bourgeois democracy was in crisis'. And there was also the constant reminder that any compromise with imperialism and the internal forces of reaction would certainly be met by the concerted action of all patriotic forces (19). These forces therefore expected that the PNP government would continue the 'revolutionary programme' of the AFRC.

The period was politically fluid also because the petty-bourgeoisie as a whole had consolidated its unity and determination to fight the «enemies of society» who had so suddenly threatened to undermine the foundations of the petty-bourgeois order. The brief period of the AFRC had made them acutely aware of the price of disunity and internal squabbling. The first sign of their determination to unite to defend the existing order was the formation of an All Party Consultative Committee which succeeded in putting pressure on the AFRC to hand-over political power to them without undue delay. On the other hand, the masses generally were still politically backward and so were unable to seize the political initiative from the advantages created by the coming into power of the AFRC; that is, in spite of the democratic gains of the period. Therefore the hand-over of power to the PNP symbolised the defeat of the June 4 insurgents and the masses, and a victory for the forces of law and order. The elections of the year, and that they were allowed at all, conferred enormous moral strength on the claim by the petty-bourgeoisie to govern. It must be emphasized however that while that defeat prepared the ground for the rebirth of the petty-bourgeois republic in a new constitutional uniform, the uprising had nonetheless established beyond doubt that the challenge facing the petty-bourgeoisie went beyond the consolidation of «flag independence»; and that it involved the translation of 'legal democracy' into social and economic democracy. However, the Ghanaian petty-bourgeoisie could not consolidate its hegemony: it had become victim of its own political weakness which was deeply rooted in its neo-colonial economic base.

THE LAST DAYS

The real index of a dependent economy's strength is its external financial position. Where this is according to President LIMANN himself «perilously close to bankruptcy» the state of the entire economy could be described simply as fragile. (The President, in his inaugural address, had described it as «abysmal»). This is the type of economy which the PNP government inherited. The success of the regime could therefore be measured only in terms of its ability to remove the sources of this fragility which lay in its continued dependence on imperialism. CABRAL has described imperialism as «a violent usurpation of the freedom of development of the national productive forces» (1972:102). The real challenge facing the government was therefore whether it could successfully negate this imperialist «usurpation» of the country's freedom to develop, or be chucked out of the stage of history together with its entire class base. And quite perceptively the President had himself described the state of the economy as putting «our very existence as a nation on trial». But as I have pointed out (*supra*) the true nature of the petty-bourgeois state is to mediate between imperialism and national capital (which is controlled partly by the state and partly by a fraction of the national petty-bourgeoisie) to entrench the domination and exploitation of the neo-colony. The PNP regime's policies would therefore seek rather to promote this than the liberation of the neo-colony; and this would intensify the contradictions of the system and sharpen the class struggle against the petty-bourgeoisie and the state.

Thus within barely one year of its assumption of office the regime had abandoned its undertaking to continue the quasi-revolutionary policies of the AFRC government, and also to protect the 'gains' won for the people during the tenure of that junta. Rather it had declared its commitment to a policy of building confidence in the country within international financial and investment circles in order to attract development aid. It is worth recalling that in 1967 the military junta had enunciated the same neo-colonialist economic policy. That policy was continued by the PNP government which thereby exacerbated the internal contradictions such that it prepared the ground for the victory of Bonapartism. In effect therefore the petty-bourgeois state had come full circle in its fruitless search for solutions to the crisis of the neo-colonial economy. The bankruptcy of bourgeois economic prescriptions which have been the Deity of successive regime of this country has been clearly stated by Paul SAMUELSON, a leading bourgeois economist: He said:

Whatever government policy does to help handle the 'flation' part of our stagflation inevitably worsens in the short run the stagnation part of the problem. That stubborn reality will not go away... Likewise, whatever government policy does to help handle the 'stag' part of stagflation will ineluctably worsen the inflation part of the stagflation (20).

Commenting on this futile policy circumgyration and the mobility it bred generally within the economy a certain Special Correspondent for the Legon Observer (LO, Vol. xii, 5 1980) felt the situation was rather «depressing». And yet from his numerous contributions to the Legon Observer this Special Correspondent seemed to be another trained disciple of liberal economics and therefore sympathetic to the broad outlines of the regime's economic philosophy and policy options.

But the petty-bourgeois regime of the PNP government had become captive of the ideology and history of its own class; and so when it found itself at the centre of a stormy economic crisis it could not muster the will to liberate itself and the rest of society. Accordingly the government's 1980/81 budget initiated a programme of trade liberalization which was finally embodied in the Imports and Exports Act, 1980 (Act 418) in August of 1980. It further abandoned price controls and reduced government spending. Finally, it effectively devalued the cedi (through the back door) by between 40 and 45 per cent. Again, this Special Correspondent (*supra*) lamented concerning this budget that the immediate effect on the unemployment situation would be deleterious while the short-term growth benefits would themselves be slight. On the whole he regarded that budget as being «highly monetarist (and) partially structuralist... largely inegalitarian (and hence politically explosive), and overwhelmingly anti-growth oriented» (pp. 102–3). Even so those monetarist-structuralist prescriptions could not cure the neo-colony of its accumulation crisis. The economy continued to perform so poorly that even the less satisfactory growth rate of 20 % in 1980 was expected to be followed by a decline in 1981 (EWUSI, 1981: 6). The inflationary spiral continued; and by June of 1981 the national consumer price index had risen by an average of 102.4 % from June of 1980 (according to the Central Bureau of Statistics Newsletter released in September 1981).

It soon became clear however that those liberalization policies favoured big and 'kalabule' commercial interests who saw in them an opportunity to neutralize somehow the effect of the economic crisis by increasing the market price of a wide range of consumer items including locally manufactured and agricultural commodities. The political representatives of the petty-bourgeoisie in Parliament also took advantage of the crisis to award themselves extraordinarily high emoluments – C 4,050.00 per month. Furthermore, Business houses began to retrench labour, and fight labour demands to negotiate new collective agreements which would have enabled them (workers) to secure improved working benefits. Obviously the aim of employers was to keep their profit levels from declining further; but the government, in a typical colonial style, assumed an impartial posture as if to say that a conflict between labour and capital is not political. But its weight was certainly behind employers, however circuitous that might have been; for the capitalist investment climate had to be favourable, i.e. conducive to high profit levels. Coupled with these anti-labour policies was a sustained campaign of villification, retrenchment, terror and imprisonment mounted against the leaders, cadres and other active persons (both civilian and military) of the June 4 – AFRC period. The result of these was the widening gap between the regime on one hand, and workers and the progressive organizations on the other. Thus in June of 1980 workers of the Ghana Industrial Holdings Corporation (GIHOC) could express their anger with the regime by invading Parliament House. Earlier on the People's Revolutionary Youth League of Ghana (PRYLOG) had also marched on the same House, the symbol of bourgeois democracy, and had issued a number of peremptory demands including asking for «blood to flow», that is, revolution. In the same anti-government mood, the usually conciliatory leadership of the TUC, had felt compelled to demand a C 30.00 minimum wage for workers – a figure which was later scaled down to the equally impressive level of C12.00. During the same year (1980) the NUGS had warned at its 16th Annual Congress that all those who were manoeuvring to subvert the sovereign rights of the people and trying to destroy the 'gains' of the June 4 – AFRC period would be «fiercely resisted». It was in this milieu of growing inter class suspicion, acrimony and confrontation that a correspondent of the Legon Observer (LO, Vol. xii, 2, 1980) could warn that the springing up of various radical movements some of which were openly calling for the overthrow of the government was destabilizing and therefore alarming (p. 34).

By the beginning of its second year in office therefore, the PNP regime was faced with a deepening crisis of confidence and survival. Obviously, the President's claim «that out of our present wreck we can build a new» made during his inauguration had not materialized. But this unfolding failure stressed the urgency of trying hard to save the tottering regime from the inevitable – that is collapse.

FRANK has argued that the «richer the reserves of raw materials, such as copper and particularly petroleum, and the more attractive the potential market, the greater the effort and the sooner the success in forming and stabilizing a dependent neo-colonial state that economically

organizes and politically guarantees metropolitan access to these resources and markets» (1981:237). It however seems from the recent Ghanaian political economy (and that of MOBUTU's Zaire) that the need to stabilize such states is not a condition for ensuring such access by multinational capital. Rather what is necessary is that the dependent state (that has abundant strategic resources and potential markets) should be internally weak in confronting internal opposition or ineffective in dealing with such enemies of law and order. This will immediately impel the direct involvement of external powers and economic interests with high stakes in maintaining the regime to attempt to re-establish stability. Again, this is imperative if the neo-colonial state is to perform its function of promoting imperialist interest in the neo-colony (FRANK, 1981: Chapter 7). It is also important if the petty-bourgeoisie which depends on state mediation to accumulate will be able to function productively.

By the middle of 1981 the main thrust of investment policy of the PNP Government was clearly toward collaboration with imperialism. An international seminar on «Ghana's Gold Endowment» has been held in Accra on January 6 of that year; and it had been followed by another seminar on bargaining with multinational firms which might be disposed toward investing in the extraction of gold and oil. At the first seminar a United Nation's Technical Adviser on minerals was quoted as saying: «The gold potential of Ghana is very good indeed and I can see a great future for the country». But he had also added: «However the existing investment code is the main problem. But I believe if the Government is able to come out with a new code then the sky will be the limit.» (Ghanaian Times January 7, 1981). Earlier, President LIMANN had passionately implored foreign investors to invest in the «geological miracle» (i.e. Ghana) without delay. That there was a community of interest between the current Ghanaian political leadership and foreign investors cannot therefore be doubted. The investment Code, 1981 (Act 437) gave legal expression to this. In a more general sense this Code also marked the culmination of efforts to consolidate (again) the historic links with imperialism after they had been disturbed by the AFRC government. In a memorandum accompanying the draft bill it was admitted that the purpose of the instrument was to attract large foreign investments for the mutual benefit of Ghanaians and the investors. In concrete terms foreign investors were granted super-liberal concessions. Thus for example, the Code reduced the share that the state could keep in each new investment in the vital sectors of the economy, like mining, to what the Investment Centre could agree upon with each prospective investor (2nd Schedule, Parr 1A). In addition to this, the Act conceded wide ranging exemptions to investors in the priority areas of agriculture and mining, as well as certain manufacturing areas (Third Schedule). These advantages included such confiscatory repatriation rights as those contained in Clause 16 and the 3rd Schedule, Part II. For example, Clause 16 provides as follow:

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other enactment —

(a) there shall be no restriction on —

(i) The remittance of capital, to the country of origin of an investment approved under this Code...

- (ii) the transfer of profits to the country of origin of the investment...
- (iii) the transfer of payment in respect of principal, interest and financial charges where a loan has been granted to an approved enterprise by a non-resident...
- (iv) the transfer out of Ghana of fees and charges prescribed by regulation...

The greatest attack on the sovereignty of the people of this country was however embodied in Clause 14 which forbade the nationalisation of enterprises established under the Code: «no enterprise approved under this Code shall be subject to expropriation by the Government» (Clause 14 (1a)). This clause immediately deprived the people of this country the right to determine the manner in which their resources are exploited. It nonetheless conformed with the regime's commitment (as declared in the preamble to the Investment Code, paragraph 3) «to operate a policy of liberalization and an open economy and assure to the Foreign and Ghanaian investor protection of his investment and a fair return». As Ghanaian investors in these high technology areas are extremely rare this Code was nothing but an instrument for promoting the further penetration of the Ghanaian economy by foreign capital. The petty-bourgeois state was indeed performing its historic role; that is, mediating with imperialism, and doing it best at a time when the global economy was going through another grave crisis. (FRANK, 1981: *ibid*). Internally the sharpening class struggle (*supra*) had also rendered this race to give imperialism such a fatal embrace quite inevitable.

But rather than silence or contain internal opposition to the regime, the regime's policies gave new impetus to them. The Left and other progressive groups stepped up their anti-government activities, including grassroot organization. For instance, when the Investment Code Bill was gazetted some of these groups organized public platforms from which they denounced it. Meanwhile the petty-bourgeoisie as a whole had lost its sense of unity as a result of the continuing economic crisis and was becoming increasingly divided, an indication of a general state of decadence, and of the loss of moral strength within its ranks, because at the same time the state was not getting stronger either. For instance, on 23rd of July, 1981 the government's budget statement was defeated, after an acrimonious debate, by a Parliamentary vote of 54 to 51 in spite of the regime's continued majority in that House. Furthermore, charges and counter-charges of corruption were being thrown at each other by members of both government and opposition parties; e.g., concerning the distribution of imported farm tractors, the importation of Tata Buses from India, and the award of currency printing contracts to a United Kingdom firm. Getting to the end of the lunar year the general thrust of dissensions bickering and confusion had become centred in the PNP itself. Its leaders struggled to out-shine each other in accusations of corruption, and the leadership of the party itself became enmeshed in a quagmire of power struggles. In all of this the President who was also leader of his party (the PNP) remained almost lethargic, and ineffective even when he finally acted. Thus encircled

by its own contradictions and yet impotent to liberate itself from these contradictions the regime and its class base were, on December 31, surprised in a dawn attack by 'rebel' anti-government forces numbering less than 20. But as MARX did observe in connection with the French coup of December 2, 1851. «A nation and a woman are not forgiven the unguarded hour in which the first adventurer that came along could violate them» (MARX and ENGELS, 1968: 100). It had become evident that the petty-bourgeoisie and their political representatives had reached the limit of their ingenuity (or rather capacity). Beyond that they could not proceed any further. Nor could they turn back; for that would have been unhistorical. Trapped by its own mistakes (which were political) in rejecting the quasi-revolutionary policies of the AFRC regime, and abandoning NKRUMAH's populism for a so-called pragmatism, it had deprived itself of a political solution to the crisis whereby it could have remobilized the people to confront the «enemies of society» in a manner that the ACHEAMPONG SMC regime had sought vainly to do. And so it is that Ghana's ruling class, with its dependent state, now finds itself being gradually swept off the stage of history; and being supplanted as the maker of history by the People. Its impending decapitation as a dominant class was heralded not by the suspension of its Constitution (of 1979). The real harbingers of doom have been the Chairman of the PNDC's call to the People for «a revolution to end all revolutions», the directive that People's Defence Committees be set up to serve as the vehicles for the democratization of political power, and the disclosure that People's Courts would be set up to oppose bourgeois legality with popular justice and thereby establish the institutional framework for the development of popular law and morality.

In brief, the petty-bourgeoisie seem to have failed to consolidate its hegemony by the end of 1981. The latest indications of this failure were (i) the persistent inability of the petty-bourgeois state to negate the imperialist domination of the economy which would have led to the construction of an internal capacity to cope with and finally transcend the instability which inhere in its present state; and (ii) the increasing fragmentation of the ruling class itself which is in fact its weakness, and stems directly from the weakness of its material base. In other words, the retention of the colonial political and economic structures has been a source of unsurmountable weakness. For a neo-colonial economy is by nature a weak economy, and is prone to severe crises. Each bout of the crises jeopardizes the dominant position of the ruling class economically and politically. In the first instance, it becomes weaker as its material base contracts progressively and becomes increasingly unstable; and in the second, it becomes more and more fragmented as the dwindling economic base seems to return it ineluctably to a Hobbesian state of nature. As an Akan (Ghanaian) proverb puts it, when the elephants fight among themselves, it is the ants (that suffer). And so the lower classes have continued to suffer immeasurably as the crises of the economy burst out of manageable limits and factions within the ruling class struggled with the support of foreign interests to grab as much as each of them could get. In the event of this conjuncture the ruling class had to be led off the centre of the stage of history.

The December 31 action which toppled the PNP regime seems to mark the beginning of this exit, a process which is expected to prepare the ground for the birth of a new society. In the words of a correspondent to the Legon Observer (Vol. XIV, 5, May 1982):

Now the tempestuous wind has blown sweeping away corruption and ignominy. The blackboard is being renovated for new writings to appear. Happiness is our aim. Although we have only just begun the omens foretell a promising future, a future of harmony and natural freedom... (p.115).

NOTES

1. For a typical example, see Ola (1973: 233–54).
2. Note the dedication in this 1969 Constitution which reads: «The punishment which the wise suffer who refuse to take part in the Government is to live under the Government of worse men. — Plato».
3. The class nature of the CPP regime and its policies is also discussed in Ninsin (*Ibid*).
4. According to Lenin (1964, Vol. 25: 363) «... state monopoly capitalism is a complete *material* preparation for socialism, the *threshold* of socialism, a rung on the ladder of history between which and the rung called socialism *there are no intermediary rungs.*» (emphasis, original). See also Nkrumah (1964:73) for a similar formulation.
5. See his Press Statement of July 8, 1967.
6. See the Government's Policy Statement on the matter broadcast by Lt. Gen. J.A. Ankrah on Radio & T.V. on March 2, 1966.
7. The foregoing figures have been extracted from Hakam (1972).
8. See the Reports of the following Committees and Commissions of Enquiry: Jiage Commission (Ghana: 1968); Blay Commission (Ghana, 1968b); Abraham Commission (Ghana, 1965); Ollenu Commission (Ghana, 1967).
9. See Poulantzas (1979, 237–246) for a discussion of the class character and ideology of the petty-bourgeoisie.
10. Announced by Dr. Kwame Fordwor, then Executive Chairman of the Capital Investment Board, during a visit to India, Quoted in *West Africa*, Nov. 15, 1971.
11. Marian Bond (1980: 27–31) discusses this problem basing her conclusions on a theoretical and empirical analysis of why vicious circles occur and whether some economies are more prone to it than others.
12. Refer to the Chamber's Memo to the government of the Supreme Military Council and the Economic Advisory Committee of the same government in February of 1972.
13. Speech by the President of the Chamber at the Chamber's 8th Annual General Meeting, December 4, 1971.
14. The theoretical observations in this section are based on Poulantzas (*op.cit*: 57–78) unless otherwise stated.
15. Acheampong (n.d.: 314–320).
16. Based on information provided in Ghana (1978).
17. Civil Servants Act, 1960 (Amendment) Decree, 1967 (NLCD 134) which removed the service personnel out of the umbrella of the TUC.

18. Frank (1981: 232–234) sees the strength (that is, autonomy) or weakness of the state in the third world primarily as a function of their dependence on the capitalist centre. This it seems to me, ignores the dynamic internal relationship between the petty-bourgeoisie and its dependent state. Hence I incline (*mutatis mutandis*) toward Marini whose position is: «due to a general law of capitalist society, according to which the relative autonomy of the state is in inverse relation to the capacity of the bourgeoisie to exercise its domination... a strong capitalist state is always the counter part of a weak bourgeoisie». Quoted in Frank (*ibid.*:232). This formulation, I think, applies more to the relation of the petty-bourgeoisie to their state than to the relation of the dependent state to the metropolitan state. The latter relationship is never inversed however dynamic it is. Here the changes are such that they only give the dependent economy a temporary autonomy to develop, as Frank himself (1967) recognises in the case of Latin America. It may be best described as a *dynamic equilibrium* with its centre in the metropolitan capitalist economies.
19. See for example Kpetekple (Central Organ of the Revolutionary Youth League of Ghana). Accra, Vol. 1 (3) 1979.
20. Quoted in Frank (1980: 56).

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RESUME

Dans cet article, l'auteur cherche à expliquer les raisons de l'échec des différents gouvernements à créer et maintenir au Ghana un ordre social petit-bourgeois depuis 1966, date de la mort de Kwame NKRUMAH. Il estime qu'il faut chercher les raisons de cet échec non seulement dans les difficultés économiques qu'a connues le pays pendant la période 1966-1981, mais aussi dans les changements intervenus entre les rapports de forces politiques en présence ainsi que dans le rôle fondamental qu'a joué l'Etat dans les luttes politiques. L'auteur se fixe deux objectifs principaux: il veut montrer d'abord que le Coup d'Etat du 31 Décembre 1981 était bien prévisible parce qu'à ce moment l'Etat petit-bourgeois d'alors était miné par ses propres contradictions internes et qu'ensuite ces contradictions ont été rendues plus aiguës depuis 1966 par l'Etat petit-bourgeois qui, conformément à sa vocation historique, a toujours facilité la domination de l'économie nationale par l'impérialisme. C'est ainsi que l'auteur a étudié l'évolution de cette expérience petite-bourgeoise depuis le retour de la bourgeoisie comprador de l'après-NKRUMAH jusqu'aux derniers jours de cet ordre social en analysant tour à tour les derniers soubresauts de la «néo-colonie», les rapports crise-main d'œuvre, crise-petite-bourgeoisie, l'Etat Bonapartiste, le glas de cet état Bonapartiste, et le CRFA et la lutte des classes. A chacun de ces points l'auteur a noté les éléments nouveaux qui ont marqué la période dans le cadre de la déchéance de l'état petit-bourgeois. Parmi ces éléments, les plus récents et les plus décisifs ont été :

- le refus catégorique de l'Etat petit-bourgeois à reconnaître la domination de l'économie du Ghana par l'impérialisme. Cette reconnaissance aurait permis la mobilisation de capacité interne susceptible de s'accommoder de cette situation et de finalement transcender l'instabilité qui la caractérise ;
- la dislocation progressive de la classe dirigeante qui constitue d'ailleurs sa faiblesse et qui est le produit direct de la faiblesse de sa base matérielle.

JULIUS NYERERE ET LA REVOLUTION AFRICAINE

Par

*Harry GOULBOURNE**

INTRODUCTION

La place de choix qu'occupe Julius Kamgarage NYERERE parmi les plus grands leaders de la révolution africaine est à la fois incontestable et unique. Leader du mouvement nationaliste «Tanganika African National Union» (TANU) (Union Nationale Africaine de Tanganika) depuis sa création, en 1954 et Chef de l'Etat depuis l'accession de son pays à l'indépendance en 1961, NYERERE est, aujourd'hui, au premier rang des hommes d'Etat africains. Il se distingue également par le fait qu'il est de toute sa génération le plus éminent pan-africaniste qui ait été depuis si longtemps à la tête des affaires de son pays. D'ailleurs, il n'a jamais trahi ses convictions pan-africanistes primitives, au contraire, il a toujours cherché à les développer. A la différence de NKRUMAH, NYERERE a été capable de mettre sur pied ce qui peut être considéré, à juste titre comme le plus stable et probablement le plus viable système politique d'Afrique, tout en fournissant une assistance considérable aux nationalistes et mouvements de libération d'autres pays africains. Sa façon d'énoncer l'idéologie sociopolitique du socialisme et du «self-reliance» (compter sur ses propres forces) a forcé à la Tanzanie, l'admiration aussi bien du bloc de l'Est que des pays occidentaux. En même temps la Chine et les pays non-alignés considèrent la Tanzanie comme un champion des problèmes du Tiers-Monde. Du reste, sous la direction de NYERERE, la Tanzanie a été en mesure de poursuivre une politique qui prouve un degré d'indépendance considérable même si elle continue à dépendre des prêts et de l'aide extérieure pour une part considérable du financement de son plan quinquennal en cours (1).

Cependant ce ne sera pas seulement pour ces considérations générales qu'on se souviendra avec éclat de NYERERE dans les annales de la libération noire. On se rappellera plutôt de Julius NYERERE principalement pour son profond engagement personnel à la libération du continent Africain du Colonialisme et pour les sacrifices qu'il a voulu faire faire à son pays (un des 25 les plus pauvres du monde) afin que soient opérés des changements dans un continent dont il considère que le peuple a été trop longtemps «exploité, opprimé et humilié» (2) par des forces étrangères à l'Afrique.

Le but principal de cet essai est de souligner, en termes généraux, la contribution de NYERERE à la lutte perpétuelle pour la libération de l'Afrique. Je trouve qu'il y a eu une logique remarquable entre ses idées et

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ses efforts pour soutenir le processus de libération comme il le définit lui-même. Pour des raisons de commodité, cet essai est divisé en trois parties qui sont encore plus étroitement imbriquées que ne l'indique la façon dont elles sont traitées ici : premièrement, le concept de libération dans la conception générale qu'a NYERERE de la condition africaine, deuxièmement, les efforts de NYERERE visant à donner un caractère pratique à ses convictions ; et, troisièmement, le rapport entre le socialisme tanzanien et la révolution africaine en général.

CONCEPTION DE LA LIBERATION CHEZ NYERERE

NYERERE n'est pas seulement un homme d'action. Ses écrits et ses discours renferment tous les principaux problèmes auxquels il a dû faire face en tant que leader de la TANU (devenue CCP) et en tant que président de la République Unie de Tanzanie. NYERERE est revenu à plusieurs reprises sur le problème de la libération, du fait que c'est là l'un des aspects persistants de la politique du continent, mais plus particulièrement en Afrique Australe durant les deux dernières décades. En exposant dans ses grandes lignes la pensée de NYERERE sur la libération, je me dois d'évoquer un discours peu connu qu'il prononça à l'Université d'Ibadan, au Nigéria, à l'occasion de la visite officielle qu'il y effectua en 1976 ; ce discours étant celui qui éclaire le plus sa position sur ce problème (3).

La libération, soutient NYERERE, est « un processus historique et non une action unique dont l'achèvement sera célébré chaque année » (4). Il identifie quatre aspects dans ce processus : se libérer de l'autorité coloniale et de celle de la minorité raciale ; se libérer de la domination économique extérieure ; se libérer de la pauvreté, de l'injustice et de l'oppression « imposées à des Africains par des Africains » (5) et se libérer mentalement — « mettre un terme à la subjugation mentale qui fait croire aux Africains que les autres peuples et les autres nations leur sont, par inhérence, supérieurs et que leurs expériences peuvent automatiquement être transférées aux besoins et aspirations de l'Afrique » (6).

NYERERE fait la distinction entre la liberté « personnelle » de la dernière catégorie et les autres qu'il appelle aspects « sociaux et communautaires » de la libération. La liberté personnelle est perçue comme une réalisation individuelle mais il est évident qu'elle comporte d'importantes implications pour des processus sociaux de libération plus élargis. La liberté personnelle, en Afrique, est également un reflet de la condition des autres aspects de la libération ébauchés par NYERERE.

Le premier aspect de la libération, ou la première étape de ce processus en Afrique est l'indépendance politique. C'est l'aspect le plus crucial du fait qu'elle est le « fondement de toutes les autres formes de libération pour l'Afrique » (7). Avant toute autre forme de libération pour l'Afrique, l'indépendance politique nationale vis-à-vis des régimes coloniaux et des minorités raciales doit être acquise. Cette forme de libération implique également la liberté d'agir ; c'est-à-dire, la liberté de décider de la voie qu'une nation souhaite prendre au lieu de permettre aux autres de prendre les décisions à sa place. Dans ce discours d'Ibadan, NYERERE revient sur

son optique proche du néo-Rousseau selon laquelle en dépit de «toutes» les horreurs que nous avons vécues dans l'Afrique indépendante, je continue à affirmer qu'il est préférable de subir une oppression dans une nation libre plutôt que d'être dans un empire colonial, quelle que puisse être la douceur de sa loi» (8).

Ainsi, même s'il n'exprime pas l'angoisse personnelle comme le fit par exemple Franz FANON, NYERERE est néanmoins profondément conscient de la dégradation et de l'humiliation de l'individu que le colonialisme a apportées à l'Afrique. Cependant à partir de ses premières années de politique il essaya de formuler cela en termes de communauté — le ravage, la dégradation qu'une autorité coloniale apporte à la communauté. Donc, dans sa pensée, il n'y a pas eu cette notion, si fréquente dans l'esprit politique antillais des décennies avant ou immédiatement après la dernière guerre, qu'un peuple doit *être préparé* pour l'indépendance politique. Le colonialisme engendre l'irresponsabilité et sape le moral d'un peuple à un point tel que le colonisé perd tout respect de soi-même.

C'est à partir de cette perspective que nous devons comprendre la colère qu'a éprouvée NYERERE en 1966, lorsque des étudiants de l'université de Dar-es-Salam protestèrent contre l'instauration du service national qui allait les toucher. Ils allèrent voir le Président à sa résidence à Dar-es-Salam et, au cours de la discussion quelques étudiants lui auraient fait la remarque que les choses allaient mieux durant l'époque coloniale que sous le gouvernement national. Ceci mit NYERERE tellement en colère qu'il décida non seulement de faire fouetter quelques étudiants, mais également de les renvoyer temporairement de l'université pour une période qui leur permettrait de s'apaiser.

Un gouvernement africain, indépendamment du degré de l'oppression qu'il exerce doit être préférable à un régime colonial bienveillant car avec l'indépendance, un préalable existe pour un développement plus poussé. Le colonialisme a non seulement mis l'Afrique dans sa triste situation actuelle ; mais, encore plus grave, il est moralement indéfendable. L'indépendance politique est la première étape fondamentale dans la libération du continent.

Mais le fait que l'indépendance politique ne soit que la première étape fondamentale dans le processus de libération n'a pas toujours fait partie de la conception politique de NYERERE. Comme la plupart des dirigeants africains de l'après-guerre jusque dans les années 60, NYERERE a cru qu'avec l'indépendance politique, le contrôle de l'économie allait également être transféré aux nationalistes par le pouvoir colonial battant en retraite. NKRUMAH a exprimé ce point de vue de façon dramatique lorsqu'il a exhorté ses compatriotes à «chercher d'abord le pouvoir politique et tout suivra». En Tanzanie comme partout ailleurs dans le continent, et certainement dans l'ensemble du monde décolonisé, on a cru qu'avec la combinaison d'un tel dur labeur à l'intérieur, de capitaux étrangers et d'un gouvernement national favorable agissant en honnête courtier, «les fruits de l'indépendance» comprendraient la croissance et le développement pour le peuple tout entier. Le premier Plan quinquennal Tanzanien, encore une fois comme presque partout ailleurs, était basé sur ces hypothèses.

Heureusement, NYERERE, à la différence de beaucoup d'autres dirigeants nationalistes, croyait également que l'indépendance politique devrait signifier la participation démocratique, le contrôle sur les activités économiques, la productivité croissante ainsi qu'un partage plus équitable des richesses, et il s'était préparé à mener ces convictions plus loin que tout. Son erreur, ou son innocence, a été de croire qu'il pouvait arriver à tout cela aussitôt après le remplacement à Dar-es-Salam — du pavillon britannique par le drapeau national tanzanien. NYERERE — toujours sincère quant à ses efforts et à son pays — le reconnut dans un discours qu'il prononça à l'université des Antilles, à Mona, en Jamaïque en 1975. Il admit que :

« Nous avons été très naïfs. Nous avons cru qu'elles (les attentes de l'indépendance politique) pourraient être réalisées sans des changements fondamentaux dans les systèmes social, politique et économique que nous avons hérités de nos maîtres coloniaux. Nous avons pensé que notre problème allait être résolu en développant les structures existantes et en remplaçant les fonctionnaires coloniaux par des fonctionnaires locaux » (9).

Mais NYERERE et ses proches lieutenants apprirent bientôt que l'indépendance politique — « l'indépendance du drapeau » comme il le reproche souvent n'était que le début d'une longue route vers la libération totale vis-à-vis des forces étrangères. La *Déclaration d'Arusha* de 1966, qui a placé la Tanzanie dans le camp des pays radicaux du Tiers Monde, a été l'expression la plus dramatique de la réalité du fait que l'indépendance politique n'entraîne pas automatiquement l'indépendance économique, mais peut en constituer la base.

En Tanzanie, la mise en relief de l'argent — sous forme d'aide, de prêts et d'investissement privé — ne peut être la base de son développement. Comme le souligne NYERERE, un homme pauvre ne peut espérer utiliser l'argent comme une arme. Il fit appel aux Tanzaniens pour qu'ils comptent sur leurs propres efforts comme base du développement. Dans le contexte de l'Afrique et de la place qu'elle occupe dans le monde contemporain, la dépendance vis-à-vis des capitaux étrangers — qu'elle que soit sa forme — ne peut que conduire à l'érosion de la souveraineté nationale.

En exprimant cette prise de conscience, NYERERE fait une distinction sensible entre les « symboles » et la « réalité » du pouvoir — distinction confirmée par l'expérience et qui ne devait être à la mode dans les cercles marxistes que dans les années 1970 à la suite de l'œuvre de Nicos POULANTZAS. NYERERE soutint qu'avec des activités économiques contrôlées par des capitaux privés — qui selon lui ne peuvent être en Tanzanie que des capitaux étrangers et une lourde dépendance vis-à-vis des prêts et aides extérieurs, il est possible pour la Tanzanie et les autres Etats africains de se trouver démunis de tout contrôle de leur destin. Cela vaut la peine de citer NYERERE *in extenso* :

« Si un pays comme la Tanzanie adopte un système capitaliste, le résultat sera inévitable. En pratique des étrangers détermineront les priorités économiques, les politiques fiscales et la structure sociale du pays. Et tout cela, tour à tour, aura une influence de taille sur les relations

extérieures et les politiques internationales en général. Il n'y a nullement besoin d'être xénophobe pour se demander ce qui va rester de l'indépendance nationale après cela. Les appareils resteront ; le drapeau national flottera ; le chef de l'Etat sera toujours reçu par la salve des 21 coups de canon ; le siège aux Nations Unies sera toujours là, ainsi de suite. *Il y aura une apparence de contrôle gouvernemental dans la vie quotidienne* du pays – et même sur les firmes appartenant à des étrangers. Vraiment du point de vue du citoyen, le gouvernement semblera contrôler le pays, et sera blâmé quand les choses iront mal. *Mais la réalité du pouvoir sera toute autre.* (souligné par moi). (10).

Le nationalisme politique de NYERERE s'est épanoui dans un nationalisme économique corroboré par sa propre expérience. La libération de la domination coloniale n'a pas réalisé les belles espérances qu'elle avait suscitées dans les années 50. La domination extérieure basée sur des facteurs économiques fut une réalité à laquelle l'expérience nationaliste n'a pas appris aux dirigeants tanzaniens à faire face. Sa perception intense de cette question et des problèmes connexes place NYERERE au milieu des années 60 loin devant les autres dirigeants du Tiers-Monde qui n'ont commencé à prendre pleinement conscience des menaces que faisait peser le néo-colonialisme sur la souveraineté de leurs pays qu'au cours de la décade qui a suivi les années 1970 ; et comme NYERERE le pose, dans certains cas, on ne peut même pas parler d'économie nationale.

C'est sans surprise que NYERERE et les dirigeants politiques tanzaniens devaient tirer des enseignements surtout à partir des empiètements des sources extérieures de financement sur la politique étrangère tanzanienne. Depuis longtemps NYERERE a précisé que l'un des principaux aspects de la politique extérieure de la Tanzanie était un engagement total au mouvement des non-alignés. Cependant, en 1964, lorsque la révolution éclata dans l'île Zanzibar et que le Tanganika et Zanzibar fusionnèrent pour former la République Unie de Tanzanie, ce principe fut mis à l'épreuve. La révolution, de Zanzibar – qui a renversé l'ancien régime féodal et raciste – a été reconnue, en premier lieu, par la République Démocratique Allemande pendant que la Tanzanie continentale, depuis longtemps, entretenait d'étroites relations avec la République Fédérale d'Allemagne et bénéficiait d'elle une aide substantielle. Les Allemands de l'Ouest se froissèrent de la décision de Dar-es-Salam de reconnaître les Allemands de l'Est. Lorsque NYERERE et Abeid KARUME, le Vice-Président et chef du Conseil de la Révolution de Zanzibar, arrivèrent à un compromis par lequel il y avait un ambassadeur de la R.F.A. à Dar-es-Salam et un consul général à Zanzibar, les Allemands de l'Ouest réagirent en retirant leur aide des projets qu'ils finançaient en Tanzanie continentale et dont le pays avait réellement besoin. NYERERE répliqua en demandant que toute aide de la RFA fut retirée pendant qu'il continuait de reconnaître ce pays à Dar-es-Salam et que les Allemands de l'Est maintenaient un bureau à Zanzibar. Ainsi fut vigoureusement réaffirmé son principe selon lequel l'aide ne doit pas être liée à la politique extérieure ; il a également démontré que la Tanzanie accepterait de se passer d'aide indispensable pourvu que son indépendance demeure intacte (11).

La seconde expérience eut lieu avec le Gouvernement travailliste l'Harold WILSON en Grande Bretagne à propos du problème de la déclaration unilatérale d'indépendance d'Ian SMITH dans la colonie britannique de la Rhodésie du Sud d'alors. Le mépris complet de WILSON vis-à-vis de l'opinion africaine à propos de cette situation amèna l'O.U.A. à voter une résolution demandant à la Grande Bretagne d'écraser la rébellion au plus tard le 15-12-1965, sinon les différents Etats africains, signataires de la déclaration, rompraient leurs relations avec la Grande Bretagne (12). A la mi-décembre, rien n'avait été fait : WILSON relevait le défi. Des huit Etats qui ont respecté la résolution seuls deux étaient membres du Commonwealth : le Ghana de NKRUH et, bien entendu, la Tanzanie. En réalité, NYERERE ne fit que réaffirmer son point de vue selon lequel l'aide ne doit pas être liée de façon à permettre que l'on tourne au ridicule la souveraineté du pays bénéficiaire de cette aide. Mais en agissant ainsi il sacrifie plus de 7 millions de livres sterling qui arrivaient de Grande Bretagne pour financer quelques uns des projets inscrits au plan quinquennal.

Ces deux expériences de la Tanzanie prouvèrent à NYERERE, de façon dramatique, l'absurdité de la planification dans une économie dépendant entièrement de sources extérieures de financement, notamment lorsque le but premier d'une telle planification est de répondre aux besoins des masses pauvres d'un pays sous-développés comme la Tanzanie, au lieu de maximiser les profits au bénéfice des investisseurs privés. En février 1967, donc, NYERERE prit la décision capitale de mettre son pays sur la voie d'un développement auto-orienté qui implique une plus grande dépendance vis-à-vis des ressources nationales. En agissant ainsi, NYERERE s'est rangé du côté des forces les plus progressistes de la politique tanzanienne qui sont arrivées à la même conclusion en ce qui concerne leur pays.

Durant la décade des années 1970 NYERERE était devenu un champion de la cause du Tiers-Monde dans l'appel général pour un nouvel ordre économique international. Au début de l'année 1977 NYERERE fit une visite officielle aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique (la raison principale fut qu'il avait été enthousiasmé par l'élection de Jimmy CARTER à la présidence) et, dans un discours à l'université de Howard, il fit un «plaidoyer» au nom du Tiers-Monde. Le «Plaidoyer pour les pauvres» (13) – titre qu'il a donné à son discours – concerne non seulement la Tanzanie, mais également le Tiers-Monde car NYERERE est arrivé au constat que la pauvreté de la Tanzanie ou celle de l'Afrique ne sont pas les seules au monde. Comme d'autres dirigeants radicaux du Tiers-Monde NYERERE a fini par accepter les vues de théoriciens du sous-développement tels que Gunder FRANK et Samir AMIN en ce qui concerne les causes de leur sous-développement. Ainsi les dirigeants radicaux du Tiers-Monde pensent qu'il n'y a pas à avoir honte de demander aux pays industrialisés l'aide dont on a besoin ; les dirigeants n'ont pas besoin de s'abaisser autant que Kofi BUSIA du Ghana qui, un jour, déclara à l'aéroport de Heathrow qu'il était venu «en mendiant spécial». La pauvreté du Tiers-Monde est la conséquence directe de la richesse du Monde capitaliste développé. L'appel à la réforme n'a donc pas seulement pour but d'instaurer une prospérité de manière bienveillante, mais il vise également un réajustement des prix des matières premières par

rapport à ceux des produits manufacturés venant des pays développés. Si des réformes n'interviennent pas à brève échéance, alors l'ensemble du système capitaliste de production et d'échange pourrait se trouver menacé.

La Tanzanie a été ainsi au premier plan dans la confrontation qui eut lieu entre les institutions financières internationales qui perpétuent la dépendance et les pays radicaux du Tiers-Monde. Cette confrontation s'est trouvée mise en vedette par les conditions drastiques offertes par le FMI aussi bien à la Tanzanie qu'à la Jamaïque sous le gouvernement radical de Michael MANLEY. La prescription générale de cette institution pour les pays du Tiers-Monde — réductions des dépenses publiques, des dépenses sociales notamment, dévaluation de la monnaie nationale, diminution des salaires accompagnée d'augmentation des prix — fut proposée à NYERERE au début de 1979 lorsqu'il demanda un prêt. Ceci arriva aussitôt après le renversement par la Tanzanie du régime barbare d'Idi AMIN, en Ouganda ; et la presse mondiale hostile se mit à attaquer la Tanzanie pour cet acte et signala que son économie avait été ruinée par la guerre. Bien entendu cette guerre, qui a dû coûter, à la Tanzanie, un montant estimé à US \$ 3000 m, précipita la crise que traversait le pays en 1979, causant de graves pénuries des biens importés et arrêtant presque l'industrie. Mais les besoins de la Tanzanie en 1979 ne furent pas uniquement la conséquence de la guerre avec AMIN : la sécheresse grave et les conditions atmosphériques irrégulières en fin 1978 et début 1979 causa des ravages dans l'agriculture qui est la principale ressource de l'économie tanzanienne. Egalement, comme NYERERE, irrité, le fit remarquer dans une riposte à ses détracteurs, l'économie tanzanienne a toujours été attardée et avait besoin de sources extérieures de financement. Ce qu'il demande c'est que de tels prêts, etc. ne soient pas octroyés à la condition que le bailleur de fonds ou le donateur dicte la politique à suivre pour le reste de l'économie tanzanienne. Comme il le dit avec justesse, le FMI n'a pas reçu mandat général pour être le ministre international des finances pour les économies du Tiers-Monde comme ses représentants semblent le penser. En fin de compte NYERERE l'emporta le jour où le FMI fut sévèrement critiqué pour son anti-radicalisme bien établi dans les pays du Tiers-Monde. Néanmoins, l'expérience a été humiliante pour la Tanzanie car elle lui a rappelé brusquement que le néo-colonialisme opérant à travers les institutions financières internationales est prêt à griffer au visage les pays du Tiers-Monde lorsqu'ils ont le plus besoin d'assistance.

Ainsi, à la fin des années 1970, NYERERE semble avoir une perception plus générale des forces auxquelles il doit faire face et de leur nature universelle. Ceci influe sur le processus de la libération de l'Afrique, car, alors que dans la lutte pour l'indépendance politique les nationalistes pouvaient le plus souvent se baser sur une grande unité au niveau nationale, ceci n'est vraisemblablement pas le cas dans la lutte contre le néo-colonialisme. Si la lutte nationaliste pour l'indépendance fut relativement franche, dans laquelle le «future tyran et le démocrate (pouvaient) travailler ensemble contre l'autorité étrangère» (14), il en va tout autrement dans la lutte pour l'indépendance économique. Voilà une admission pertinente d'un homme qui, au début des années 1960, soutint qu'il n'y a pas, en Afrique, de divisions profondes basées sur des intérêts de classes antagonistes (15).

Le refus de l'existence d'antagonisme social est l'une des faiblesses essentielles de la perception qu'a NYERERE du processus de libération. Même s'il a pu reconnaître que la lutte contre le néo-colonialisme en Afrique ne trouvera pas le même degré d'unité que la lutte pour l'indépendance, NYERERE n'a pas voulu ou n'a pas été en mesure d'en trouver la raison. Lorsqu'il parle d'intérêts, il ne semble pas comprendre que ce terme implique des différences de classes qui doivent être définies dans des termes autres que nations «riches» et «pauvres», populations urbaine et rurale, ainsi de suite. L'intérêt n'est, en aucune façon liée à l'existence de classes sociales. Ceux qui ont des liens étroits avec les forces du néo-colonialisme sont vus comme des gens ou des frères malchanceux qui n'ont pas compris où se trouvait la bonne voie. Ceci est, en général, considéré comme un phénomène individuel plutôt qu'un facteur social d'importance primordiale. En cela, le nationalisme et les convictions pan-africanistes de NYERERE sont claires mais il obscurcit sa perception de beaucoup de réalités autour de lui.

Ensuite, découlant de son défaut de perception claire du rattachement de l'intérêt aux classes, la conception de libération, chez NYERERE, souffre de ses hypothèses fondées sur l'humanisme. Pour lui, la libération est à mener avec la communauté sans plus de façons. Le fait que la libération d'une partie de la communauté puisse signifier l'oppression d'une autre partie n'existe pas dans sa perception de la société.

Ces remarques sont, bien entendu, des commentaires généraux sur sa conception sociale et politique plus étendue : NYERERE, d'une part, croit en l'unité des systèmes socio-politique et économique mais, en même temps il est intellectuellement attiré vers certaines notions de liberté qui proviennent aussi bien de traditions libérales, chrétiennes et de socialisme humaniste d'Europe Occidentale que du communalisme africain pré-colonial. Le système politique qu'il a cherché à ériger en Tanzanie reflète quelques-unes des tensions entre ces éléments souvent contradictoires dans sa pensée.

La forte influence qu'il a eue sur les mouvements de libération en Afrique Australe et sur le système politique tanzanien signifie qu'il a parfois eu un effet contradictoire semblable sur le processus de libération dans cette partie du continent.

NYERERE ET LA LUTTE DE LIBERATION EN AFRIQUE AUSTRALE

Que ce soit vis-à-vis du colonialisme ou du néo-colonialisme, l'anti-impérialisme logique de NYERERE est depuis longtemps une constante de la politique extérieure de la Tanzanie. Même avant l'indépendance politique obtenue de la Grande Bretagne en 1961, NYERERE et la TANU avaient défini la voie que le jeune Etat devait suivre. Il indique clairement que si l'Afrique du Sud devait être de nouveau admise au sein du Commonwealth, le Tanganyika ne chercherait pas à être membre de cette organisation après l'indépendance. Cette adhésion devant être avantageuse pour le Tanganyika, le vote pour la réadmission de l'Afrique du Sud signifierait que le Tanganyika devait rester en dehors de cette organisation. Dans un article paru à

l'Observer de Londres, au moment de la réunion des chefs d'Etat du Commonwealth, qui devait examiner l'adhésion de l'Afrique du Sud, NYERERE déclarait :

Si le Commonwealth est comme nous le croyons, une association volontaire d'amis, un «Club», nous ne voyons pas comment des pays comme les nôtres, engagés dans des politiques basées sur la dignité humaine pourraient être membres en même temps que l'Afrique du Sud (16).

Les quatre aspects majeurs de la politique extérieure de la Tanzanie ont toujours consisté à apporter un soutien au mouvement non-aligné, un soutien aux Nations Unies en tant qu'espoir pour les nations pauvres et faibles, l'unité africaine et un soutien actif au «mouvement pour la libération de l'indépendance de l'Afrique vis-à-vis de l'oppression raciale» (17) en Afrique Australe. Cependant, la politique non alignée que mène la Tanzanie n'a jamais été un obstacle à sa position assurément alignée avec les forces progressistes pour le changement en Afrique. NYERERE s'exprima franchement lorsqu'il déclara que les peuples africains veulent leur indépendance et si l'aide leur vient de l'Est, ils s'y accrocheront. Il a souvent fait ressortir l'argument si caractéristique de feu Kwame NKRUMAH selon lequel «la libération totale de l'Afrique et l'unité totale de l'Afrique sont des objectifs primordiaux de notre parti et de notre Gouvernement» (18) ; et il a grandement insisté sur le fait que les Tanzaniens «ne seront jamais vraiment libres et en sérénité tant que certaines parties de notre continent seront toujours réduites à l'esclavage» (19).

Le Tanganyika est le premier territoire politiquement indépendant proche de l'Afrique du Sud, à prendre cette position progressiste visant à apporter son appui aux combattants de la libération en Afrique Asustrale et à tous ceux qui fuient le barbarisme du régime raciste sévissant dans la région. Ainsi la Tanzanie devint le centre des combattants pour la libération de l'Afrique du Sud, de ceux de la colonie de la Rhodésie du Sud d'alors (actuellement Zimbabwe) et de ceux des colonies portugaises qu'étaient le Mozambique et l'Angola aussi bien que de la Namibie. Aussi bien l'African National Congress (Congrès National Africain) d'Afrique du Sud, le plus ancien mouvement de libération du Continent — et qui pour certains, a obtenu le moins de succès — que son rival le Pan African Congress (le Congrès Pan-africain) maintiennent des bureaux à Dar-es-Salam. Le FRELIMO, le Mouvement de Libération du Mozambique fut fondée à Dar-es-Salam et c'est à partir du territoire tanzanien qu'il lançait la plupart de ses raids en territoire occupé par les Portugais. Il n'est donc pas surprenant que les premières parties du pays libérées par le FRELIMO fussent limitrophes du Sud de la Tanzanie. Bien entendu, la Tanzanie a dû payer le prix de cet appui : les Portugais usant des armes de l'OTAN bombardèrent souvent des villes tanzaniennes et posèrent des mines sur une grande partie de la frontière.

Dar-es-Salam prit encore plus d'importance en tant que lieu central de discussion lorsque fut libéré le Zimbabwe à la fin des années 1970. D'abord les initiatives de KISINGER et des britanniques pour le compte de la minorité blanche de Salisbury durant les derniers jours de l'Administration

FORD, se déroulèrent à Dar-es-Salam. Ceci est également vrai pour l'initiative prise par Andrew YOUNG au début de la présidence de CARTER et plus tard encore, pour la tentative du Gouvernement THATCHER en Grande-Bretagne tendant à prévenir la victoire militaire totale des forces de libération. Au cours des discussions sur la Rhodésie qui se sont déroulées l'année dernière à Lancaster House, les chefs des mouvements de libération sont retournés à plusieurs reprises à Dar-es-Salam pour des consultations avec NYERERE et ses camarades des pays de la ligne de front (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzanie et Zambie) dont il est le président.

Au cours des années 1970, Dar-es-Salam était devenu non seulement un foyer pour les combattants des mouvements de libération d'Afrique mais il servait également de centre pour plusieurs groupes progressistes non-Africains. Par exemple l'O.L.P. a installé un bureau à Dar-es-Salam parce que, au sujet de la Palestine, la Tanzanie a adopté une position progressiste. Au cours de la dernière décennie, les péronistes Monténaros d'Argentine avaient également un bureau à Dar-es-Salam ; plus tard ils le déplacèrent à Maputo.

Par ailleurs, NYERERE a considérablement contribué à l'émergence d'une stratégie pour la libération du continent. Pour ce qui concerne la lutte, NYERERE a mis un accent particulier sur l'importance de l'unité entre les Etats africains mais spécialement entre les forces de libération. Comme déjà mentionné plus haut, l'unité africaine constitue une des pierres angulaires de la politique extérieure tanzanienne et NYERERE s'est toujours engagé vis-à-vis de la Charte de l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine (O.U.A.). La Tanzanie fait partie de la poignée d'Etats fidèles à l'engagement fait lors de la création de l'O.U.A. en 1963. Cet engagement comporta pour les membres de l'organisation, le boycott des articles en provenance de l'Afrique du Sud et du Portugal ; la contribution de un pour cent de leurs budgets nationaux à un fonds spécial pour la libération et, lorsque c'est demandé, être prêt à envoyer des troupes volontaires dans les zones de combat. Lors de disputes entre Etats africains, NYERERE a toujours pris la position selon laquelle les Etats doivent continuer à soutenir et à respecter la Charte de l'O.U.A. qui accepte les frontières arbitraires tracées sous les différents régimes européens à la fin du 19e siècle et du début du 20e siècle. Cependant, ceci ne signifie guère que les entités nationales actuelles découpées du corps de l'Afrique aient une signification durable pour les peuples du continent ou que ces états-nations soient des entités suffisantes pour la libération de l'Afrique. Comme NKRUH et les pan-africanistes de la période remontant jusqu'en 1945, NYERERE s'accroche au rêve qu'un jour l'Afrique devra s'unir si elle doit sérieusement faire face à ses problèmes. Dans sa perception, ceci peut voir le jour sur une base régionale ou continentale mais les actuels états-nations nés du colonialisme ne constituent pas des fondements adéquats permettant aux peuples africains de surmonter la pauvreté, l'ignorance, l'oppression extérieure, la maladie et les conditions actuelles généralement déplorables de l'Afrique.

En attendant, les Etats africains devront, cependant, respecter les frontières séparant les uns des autres. La guerre victorieuse contre le régime d'Idi AMIN en Ouganda en 1978-79 peut sembler en contradiction avec ce principe. Les censeurs de la conduite de NYERERE au sein de l'O.U.A.

(par exemple le Président NIMERI du Soudan qui fut un supporter acharné d'Amin et les dirigeants nigériens avant le régime civil) et d'autres hors du continent ont certainement souligné le fait que la Tanzanie de NYERERE fut le premier Etat africain à renverser un autre état africain par la force des armes, violant ainsi la Charte de l'O.U.A. La réalité, cependant est que AMIN a, à plusieurs reprises menacé la sécurité et la souveraineté de la Tanzanie en réclamant des parties de ce pays. La rivière Kagera, criait AMIN, devrait être la frontière naturelle entre les deux pays. Et ce cri devenait plus fort chaque fois qu'il faisait face à un sérieux défi de ses lieutenants directs. La bataille s'est poursuivie parce que les efforts de la Tanzanie pour aider dans la guerre de l'Afrique Australe se trouvaient contrecarrés par les provocations constantes d'AMIN.

L'engagement à l'unité africaine s'est également poursuivi à un niveau régional. NYERERE était prêt à retarder l'indépendance du Tanganyika si Jomo KENYATTA acceptait l'union entre le Kenya et la Tanzanie ; NYERERE était également prêt à abandonner la présidence de cette union à KENYATTA. Dans l'union entre le Tanganyika et Zanzibar, NYERERE et ses compatriotes étaient prêts à faire toutes les concessions voulues par Zanzibar — bien que cette île représentât, en surface, moins qu'un large parc en Tanzanie continentale — afin de montrer leur bonne volonté. Cependant l'expérience vécue avec la communauté des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Est, (groupant la Tanzanie, le Kenya et l'Ouganda), qui éclata en 1976, a rendu les Tanzaniens prudents pour le moment, quant à des liens régionaux étroits. Pour Dar-es-Salam la Communauté a, presque exclusivement profité au Kenya et l'on y éprouve une répugnance à tout engagement qui pourrait avoir le même résultat. Ainsi la Tanzanie a cherché à s'assurer des accords bilatéraux dans le domaine du commerce, des transports, et des changes etc... avec le Mozambique, la Zambie, le Burundi et s'est engagé dans des négociations dans ces domaines avec le nouvel état indépendant de Zimbabwé.

En ce qui concerne la lutte de libération, NYERERE a senti qu'elle ne peut être poursuivie efficacement sans une unité véritable entre les différents mouvements de libération. Par conséquent, en tout temps, il a cherché à unir ces mouvements : l'ANC et le PAC de l'Afrique du Sud ; le ZANU et la ZAPU du Zimbabwé ; la SWAPO et le SWANU de la Namibie ainsi de suite. Il peut être important de noter que le Mozambique, le voisin au Sud de la Tanzanie le plus immédiat, qui s'est battu pour son indépendance durant les années 1960 et 1970 et dont le mouvement de libération a été créé en Tanzanie n'a jamais souffert du même manque d'unité comme cela a été et est encore le cas aussi bien pour l'Angola que pour le Zimbabwé. Lorsque les racistes de Salisbury et leurs supporters de Washington et de Londres tentèrent d'exploiter les divisions au sein des mouvements de libération, NYERERE était au premier plan travaillant à l'unité sur deux fronts : les pays les plus engagés dans l'appui à la lutte de libération, non seulement se groupèrent en Etats de la Ligne de front, mais s'assurèrent qu'aucune décision majeure concernant l'issue de la lutte ne serait prise sans des consultations adéquates avec les guerilleros sur le terrain et leurs dirigeants politiques. A un autre niveau, l'unité des mouvements de libération

eux-mêmes fut encouragée. Lorsqu'il apparut que les pays occidentaux se préparaient à faire pression sur SMITH pour arriver à un accord acceptable au Zimbabwe, la ZANU, la ZAPU et le FROLIZI furent incités à se grouper eux-mêmes sous une entité de coordination appelée l'UANC sous la direction de celui qui était alors le respectable Evêque Abel MUZOREWA. Lorsque cette entité éclata et que la lutte prit une autre tournure, NYERERE et ses collègues des Etats de la Ligne de Front incitèrent la formation du Front Patriotique entre la ZAPU dirigée par Joshua NKOMO et la ZANU dirigée par Robert MUGABE. Cette union dura jusqu'à la veille de l'indépendance du Zimbabwe mais il est important de noter que les Britanniques et les racistes rhodésiens n'aient pu traiter avec ces groupes séparément lors des discussions de Lancaster House et l'unité s'avéra d'un grand profit. (La récente visite de NYERERE à Salisbury devait avoir un effet unificateur sur les deux parties). Néanmoins, il est important de noter que l'insistance de NYERERE sur l'unité assombrit presque la situation au Zimbabwe et c'est un exemple de l'inconvenient de sa perception du processus de libération. Il essaya de convaincre MUGABE de se battre aux élections avec NKOMO, mais MUGABE s'y opposa arguant le fait que la ZANU pouvait les gagner sans l'aide de la ZAPU et que ceci éclaircirait le problème de la conduite des affaires au Zimbabwe. Cependant, ceci ne doit diminuer en rien sa contribution dans cette région vitale de la lutte de libération.

Outre sa recherche de l'unité entre les forces progressistes, NYERERE contribua à une stratégie globale pour la libération de l'Afrique par le rappel constant aux forces de libération elles-mêmes aussi bien qu'aux ennemis et à leurs supporters occidentaux que les Africains ne se battent pas pour qu'une forme de domination raciale soit remplacée par une autre. Le racisme ne doit pas remplacer le racisme. Tous ceux qui souhaitent s'installer en Afrique et voir l'Afrique devenir leurs foyers doivent être libres de le faire mais en tant que citoyens individuels et non en groupes privilégiés — privilège basé sur la race. Un des aspects les plus remarquables du nationalisme africain fut l'absence relative de racisme étant donné l'injustice raciale que les Africains ont été forcés de subir et cette absence n'est nulle part plus prononcée que dans la perception, chez NYERERE, de la société africaine de Demain : «les ennemis et les amis dans la lutte de libération ne peuvent être identifiés par leur couleur, leur origine nationale et leur étiquette politique» (20), déclare-t-il. L'importance de la guerre ou des négociations pacifiques constitue un autre aspect de la contribution de NYERERE à la lutte de libération en Afrique. Il a toujours clairement montré qu'il préférerait les négociations pacifiques aux armes pour réaliser l'indépendance politique et arrêter la répression et l'oppression de la minorité raciste. Le recours à la guerre a toujours été la dernière ressource après tous les autres échecs. Même là où il y a une guerre, NYERERE insistera pour que des moyens de pression pacifiques, diplomatiques et politiques soient dirigés simultanément vers les mêmes points. NYERERE (et Kenneth KAUNDA de Zambie) fit en sorte que ce point fut mentionné avec force dans le manifeste de Lusaka de 1969 qui fut signé par quatorze Etats de l'Afrique de l'Est, Centrale et Australe, afin de rendre leur position

claire aussi bien pour les ennemis que pour leurs supporters occidentaux. Le document fut, pour les mouvements de libération, trop conciliant et trop modéré, mais comme l'indiqua Nathan SHAMUYARIRA, (21) au pire les Etats passifs continueront à l'être et les actifs continueront à donner une assistance active aux mouvements de libération. L'importance d'une paix négociée fut uniquement testée dans le cas du Zimbabwe et NYERERE, KAUNDA et MACHELL du Mozambique placèrent leurs réputations personnelles considérables avec les forces de libération concernées. Le peuple du Zimbabwe s'est avéré digne de leur confiance.

LE SOCIALISME TANZANIEN ET LA REVOLUTION AFRICAINE

Les Tanzaniens considèrent comme évident et généralement compris que l'effort tendant à construire le socialisme dans leur pays est perçu comme partie intégrante du processus de la révolution générale africaine. En tant que pan-africaniste, NYERERE a, avec logique, insisté sur le fait que les efforts de la Tanzanie visant à améliorer le sort de son peuple seront dénués de sens aussi longtemps que d'autres pays africains resteront sous autorité étrangère. Ceci n'est pas seulement le reflet des sentiments d'un pan-africaniste engagé. Comme déjà mentionné plus haut, la présence de colonialistes portugais dans certaines parties d'Afrique Australe, de régimes racistes en Afrique du Sud et, jusqu'à l'année dernière le Zimbabwe, fait courir des risques bien déterminés à la sécurité de la Tanzanie. La présence continue d'une minorité raciste au pouvoir en Afrique du Sud est une menace actuelle à la sécurité de tous les Etats africains mais plus particulièrement du Zimbabwe, du Botswana, de la Zambie, du Mozambique, de l'Angola et de la Tanzanie. La situation de l'Afrique du Sud lui donne les énormes potentialités pour occuper le premier plan dans une confrontation majeure dans la politique de guerre froide mettant en danger la sécurité de ces états.

Cependant, en dehors de la sécurité, il y a d'autres raisons dont les développements en Tanzanie sont perçus par NYERERE comme faisant partie du processus de libération du continent. Du fait que le Tanganyika fut un protectorat de la Ligue des Nations, et aussi à cause de l'irrésistible appui que la population du pays donna à NYERERE et à la TANU, la Tanzanie continentale n'eut pas à mener une longue lutte pour avoir l'indépendance. Du reste, comme NYERERE le déclare souvent, la Tanzanie n'a ni une position stratégique, que ce soit pour le bloc soviétique ou les pays occidentaux, ni des investissements privés considérables. Ainsi, l'indépendance politique fait depuis longtemps partie de l'expérience tanzanienne, mais ce n'est pas nécessairement le cas pour les autres aspects de la libération que NYERERE a fait ressortir à Ibadan. Il est donc logique de voir jusqu'à quel point, pour la Tanzanie de NYERERE, la tentative d'édification du socialisme s'est avérée pertinente au processus de libération tel qu'il le définit lui-même.

La Déclaration d'Arusha de 1967 affirme que :

La TANU est engagée dans une guerre contre la pauvreté et l'oppression dans notre pays ; cette lutte vise à faire passer le peuple tanzanien (et le peuple africain dans son ensemble) d'un état de pauvreté à un état de prospérité (22).

La première étape de cette bataille serait de mettre en œuvre l'engagement du parti au socialisme ; une partie des buts et objectifs de la constitution de la TANU en 1961 consistait à « veiller à ce que le Gouvernement mobilise toutes les ressources du pays vers l'élimination de la pauvreté, de l'ignorance et de la maladie » (23). En plus des leçons tirées par NYERERE dans ses rapports avec la Grande Bretagne et l'Allemagne de l'Ouest, les années 1965–66 furent celles d'un débat intense en Tanzanie quant à la future voie du pays et particulièrement en ce qui concerne la disposition du parti engageant le gouvernement vers le socialisme. A la fin de 1966, NYERERE lui-même fit une tournée dans le pays pour s'enquérir des sentiments de la population face aux événements depuis l'indépendance. Le résultat en fut l'appui qu'il donna à ceux qui souhaitaient voir le gouvernement mettre en œuvre cette disposition de la constitution du parti. L'Union Nationale des Travailleurs du Tanganyika (NUTA), dans un document distribué à la conférence demanda au gouvernement de poursuivre dans cette direction en nationalisant les principaux moyens de production et de change. C'est NYERERE lui-même qui fut chargé de la rédaction du document final et il porte son empreinte ; c'est également lui qui, tout seul, persuada la majorité écrasante des délégués d'adopter la résolution. Ceci apparut avec force dans les discussions que j'ai eues avec des participants à cette conférence (24).

Dans les semaines qui suivirent la publication de la *Déclaration*, le gouvernement prit une législation pour rendre cette politique effective. Les banques, les forêts, les compagnies d'assurance, les communications, les grandes plantations etc. furent nationalisées ; la terre avait déjà été nationalisée à l'indépendance. Après avoir payé les indemnités, il restait au gouvernement suffisamment de ressources pour s'engager dans une politique radicale de construction de l'économie plus bénéfique à la population dans son ensemble. Dans les années qui ont suivi la *Déclaration d'Arusha*, le parti a pris des mesures supplémentaires dans des domaines particuliers pour renforcer la politique du socialisme et du « self-reliance » (compter sur ses propres forces) : *L'Éducation pour le « Self-reliance »* (mars 1967) ; le Socialisme et le Développement Rural (septembre 1967) ; la *Décentralisation* (1971) ; *Muwongozo* (lignes directives du Parti) (1971) ; la *Déclaration de Musoma* (1974) , *La Résolution de Lindi* (1976). Chacune de ces mesures poussa plus loin la politique générale du socialisme et du « Self-reliance » dans des domaines spécifiques : l'éducation, le développement rural, la décentralisation administrative dans un effort d'impliquer plus de personnes à la prise de décision et une plus grande clarté du rôle du parti dans le système politique global.

Ceci ne veut pas dire que le socialisme est fermement établi en Tanzanie même selon la perception humaniste de NYERERE du socialisme en tant qu'attitude de l'esprit. Récemment, la Tanzanie a été l'objet d'attaques répétées aussi bien de la gauche que de la droite pour son échec dans sa politique de self-reliance. Loin d'être moins dépendante du capital étranger — aides, prêts, investissements privés — La Tanzanie l'est devenue plus depuis 1967. En effet la Tanzanie est devenue plus intégrée qu'avant au

système capitaliste de production. La Banque Mondiale et les autres institutions financières internationales sont couramment attirées vers la Tanzanie à cause de son système politique stable et du contrôle effectif que l'Etat exerce sur le travail. Même si la productivité est faible, la participation de l'Etat dans la propriété des moyens de production procure une assurance confortable.

En particulier, l'échec de l'expérience des villages ujamaa a été relevé comme exemple de l'échec total du socialisme tanzanien. Le programme engageait le gouvernement, le parti et leurs représentants à inciter la population vivant dans des villages ou des hameaux dispersés à s'installer dans des unités plus grandes sur une base coopérative. Ainsi les maigres ressources du gouvernement pourraient servir plus en étant concentrées dans des centres de population spécifiques. Au départ cela devait se faire volontairement, mais au début des années 70 les responsables régionaux devinrent trop enthousiasmés et commencèrent à forcer des villages entiers à déménager et à détruire leurs récoltes. Très souvent, les nouveaux villages sont situés sur des sols totalement improductifs et, dans tous les cas, ils ont tendance à ne pas suivre la rotation traditionnelle des cultures détruisant ainsi tous les sols quelle que soit leur qualité.

L'inefficacité des entreprises publiques (appelées para-publiques), l'émergence d'une petite bourgeoisie basée sur le capitalisme étatique, l'échec de l'idéologie d'égalitarisme de NYERERE à s'étendre à tous les échelons dirigeants du pays se combinent pour signifier que les promesses du socialisme en Tanzanie continuent à être loin des performances.

La Tanzanie a toujours été très sensible aux critiques de l'extérieur et c'est tout à l'honneur de NYERERE et des dirigeants tanzaniens aussi bien de défendre les réalisations de leur pays que de déclarer sans ménagement les échecs qu'ils constatent. Par exemple, dans l'évaluation générale des progrès réalisés au cours des dix premières années après la *Déclaration d'Arusha*, NYERERE montra qu'il était peut-être, le meilleur critiqueur pour ses propres actions. Il admit que « nous n'avons pas atteint notre objectif : nous ne sommes même pas en vue de l'atteindre » (25). Dans son ouvrage *« La Déclaration d'Arusha: Dix ans après, NYERERE est revenu sur ce point :*

Dix ans après la Déclaration d'Arusha, la Tanzanie n'est certainement ni socialiste ni self-reliant. La nature de l'exploitation a changé, mais elle n'a pas encore été tout à fait éliminée. Il existe toujours de grandes inégalités entre les citoyens. Notre démocratie est imparfaite. La pauvreté continue à être le lot de la majorité de nos compatriotes. Une trop grande partie de notre peuple continue encore à souffrir de l'indignité que procurent la maladie qu'on peut prévenir — et l'ignorance ; et les personnes âgées et les handicapés ne vivent pas tous dans la décence ou même dans la sécurité en dépit de l'énoncé clair de la Déclaration selon laquelle ils ont droit à l'assistance... La Tanzanie est toujours une nation dépendante, non interdépendante (27).

Le fait qu'en 1977 quelques-uns ne pouvaient obtenir certains articles « de luxes » dans les magasins de Dar-es-Salam n'inquiéta point

NYERERE du fait que la majorité du peuple n'était pas concernée. Les Tanzaniens devenaient véritablement plus conscients des problèmes quotidiens de la vie et cela, pour NYERERE signifiait que la Tanzanie faisait face à quelques-uns de ses problèmes majeurs. L'acceptation générale de la politique de socialisme et de «self-reliance», la mise sur pied de quelques institutions pour rendre cette politique effective, les expériences et les erreurs de la période suivant la Déclaration, tout cela veut dire, chez NYERERE, que la Tanzanie est bien sur la voie d'un progrès futur pour la majorité de son peuple. Certes, comparée à la plupart des pays africains (et sûrement à n'importe quel autre pays dans le monde), la Tanzanie a été capable de réduire la fourchette des salaires ; elle a procuré un niveau raisonnable de soins de santé à ses habitants étant donné ses maigres ressources ; l'enseignement est sous la responsabilité totale de l'Etat ; et un cadre de justice sociale a été mis en place. La responsabilité sociale de l'Etat pour le bien-être de la population est une réalisation que les futurs dirigeants auront du mal à détruire s'ils souhaitaient s'éloigner de la voie tracée par NYERERE.

A la base de cette longue vue des réalisations de NYERERE est le succès enregistré dans l'établissement du système de parti unique en tant que forum de discussions. La perception de la démocratie chez NYERERE est que, en Afrique, avant le colonialisme, les Africains discutaient «jusqu'à ce qu'ils tombent d'accord».

Pour lui il ne devrait y avoir aucune division formelle entre le pour et le contre comme dans les perceptions contradictoires de la politique qui prévalent en Occident. Ainsi, en termes de structure, il a cherché à ériger un système de parti unique à travers lequel la population peut toujours poser des questions et participer à la prise de décisions. L'harmonie qu'il perçoit entre l'intérêt de l'individu et la société trouve son expression sous l'égide du parti. A la différence de la plupart des Etats africains, sur le plan organisationnel, le parti politique, en Tanzanie est présent du village jusqu'au niveau national et ceci lui donne une présence considérable.

Ainsi, la question de savoir si «des Africains oppriment des Africains» en Tanzanie dans le sens voulu par NYERERE, se traduit ainsi : dans le pays des différences d'opinions peuvent-elles s'exprimer au sein du parti unique ? A ce sujet deux observations peuvent être faites : d'abord la fusion du Parti Afro-Shirazi (ASP) de Zanzibar et de la TANU en 1977 pour former le «Chama Cha Mapinduzi» (le Parti Révolutionnaire) a jusqu'à présent conduit à une accentuation des qualités techniques à l'intérieur de l'appareil du parti à l'opposé de la vieille fidélité qui a toujours présidé à l'ancienne TANU. Cette promotion des techniciens sur les vieux fidèles rendra, sans doute, l'appareil du parti beaucoup plus efficace, mais fera courir le risque de détruire le lien vital entre l'administration du parti et ses militants à la base. Par conséquent, le processus de consolidation peut également aller à l'encontre des sentiments démocratiques des dirigeants tanzaniens. Ensuite, ce fait coïncide avec une tendance générale en Tanzanie de considérer tous les problèmes comme des problèmes d'administration ; les solutions ont tendance à être trouvées de manière bureaucratique. Ces développements peuvent très bien détruire l'équilibre délicat entre le contrôle strict dans le système de parti unique et la participation à l'intérieur de cette structure.

NYERERE a une fois admis que le système socio-politique qu'il mettait en place en Tanzanie pourrait se transformer facilement en système ressemblant au fascisme c'est-à-dire non pas le fascisme comme l'ont connu l'Europe et le Japon entre les deux guerres, mais un totalitarisme puissant. Le contrôle exercé par l'Etat sur la vie du pays exige que la participation et la libre discussion s'installent si l'on ne veut pas que les choses dégèrent. Si à l'avenir «des Africains ne doivent pas opprimer des Africains» en Tanzanie, alors les sentiments démocratiques ainsi que les institutions démocratiques doivent être protégés contre un esprit bureaucratique bien intentionné.

CONCLUSION

J'ai commencé cet exposé en déclarant que la contribution de NYERERE à la lutte de libération en Afrique était unique. Il en est ainsi parce qu'il a vécu en mettant ses idées en pratique et, en cela, il a été chanceux comparé à Amilcar CABRAL, ou Patrice LUMUMBA, par exemple. Il a eu plus de succès comme symbole et réalité que le grand pan-africaniste Kwame NKRUMAH ; pour NYERERE, les intérêts nationaux ne sont pas séparés de la cause pan-africaniste générale. Il a démontré une profonde perception du lien existant entre la réalité tanzanienne et la libération du continent ; ainsi, bien qu'il ait toujours préféré s'engager dans la politique étrangère plutôt que dans les problèmes nationaux, il n'a jamais pour autant perdu de vue les intérêts de son pays. Pour NYERERE, le processus de libération a été un mouvement complexe, un processus historique, qui demeure un processus continu. Dans ce processus il s'est avéré capable d'identifier les domaines dans lesquels il pourrait et peut contribuer à la cause plus grande et, avec une grande modestie il a donné une contribution durable non seulement en tant que Baba Za TAIFA (père de la nation, Tanzanie) mais en tant que véritable fils de l'Afrique. Un des faits remarquables à propos de sa longue carrière est qu'il a été en mesure de fournir une telle contribution malgré ses possibilités limitées.

NOTES

1. République Unie de Tanzanie, *Third Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1976-1981*, (Dar-es-Salam, 1976).
2. J.K. Nyerere, «The Arusha Declaration», *Freedom & Socialisme* (Londres : Oxford University Press, 1974) p. 235.
3. Nyerere, «The Process of Liberation», H. Goulbourne (ed.) *Politics and States in the Third World* (Londres : Macmillan, 1979).
4. *Ibid.* p. 249.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.* p. 250.
9. Nyerere «Speech at the University of the West Indies, Mona Campus, September 16, 1974», *University of Dar-es-Salam Newsletter*. Vol. 3, No. 3 Février 1975, p. 19.

10. *Ibid.*
11. Voir Cranford Pratt, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-68* (Oxford University Press, 1978) notamment le chapitre 6.
12. *Ibid.*; également Pratt, «African Reactions to the Rhodesian Crisis», *International Journal* (Printemps 1966) pp. 186-98.
13. Nyerere, «The Plea of the Poor», Discours à l'Université de Howard, 5 Août 1977.
14. Goulbourne, op. 241.
15. Voir, par exemple, Nyerere, «The African and Democracy» «Ujamaa ; the Basis for African Socialism» et «Democracy and the One-Party System», in *Freedom and Unity* (Oxford University Press, 1967).
16. *Ibid.* p. 109.
17. Nyerere, *Tanzania's Policy on Foreign Affairs* (Dar-es-Salam : Ministère de l'information et du Tourisme), 1967.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Goulbourne, *op. cit.* p. 258.
21. Voir Nathan Shamuyarira, «The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa, Lusaka 14th - 16th April, 1969, Full Text Commentary on the Lusaka Manifesto», *The African Review*, Vol. No. 1, mars 1971.
22. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism*, p. 235.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 232.
24. Une grande partie de ce passage est tirée de la Recherche que Patrick Masanja (Département de Sociologie à l'Université de Dar-es-Salam) et moi-même avons mené sur le thème général de Parti, Travail et Idéologie dans la Construction Socialiste de la Tanzanie, entre 1979-81.
25. Nyerere, *The Arusha Declaration : Ten Years After*. (Dar-es-Salam, Government Printer, 1977), p. 2.
26. Nyerere, «Speech at the University of the West Indies,» *op. cit.*, p. 26.
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BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Afin de ne pas surcharger le texte, j'ai délibérément limité au minimum les notes de renvoi. Par conséquent, en plus des références données dans le texte, le lecteur peut trouver utile de consulter les ouvrages suivants :

B. V. Mwansasu et C. Pratt (eds.) *Towards Socialism in Tanzania* (University of Toronto Press, 1979) ; G. Ruhumbika (ed.), *Towards Ujamaa: Twenty Years of Tanu Leadership* (Dar-es-Salam : East African Literature Bureau, 1974) ; Issa Shvji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania* (Dar-es-Salam; Tanzania Publishing House, 1975) ; R. Martin, *Personal Freedom and the Law in Tanzania* (Nairobi : Oxford University Press, 1974) ; J. Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania*, (Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1974) ; W. Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania* (Nairobi : East African Publishing House, 1975); L. Cliffe et J. Saul (eds.) *Socialism in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972) deux volumes; M. Von Freyhold, *Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania: Analysis of a Social Experiment*

SUMMARY

In this article the author looks into NYERERE's contribution to the liberation of Africa. According to the author, NYERERE contributed not only as a Leader of a political party and a Head of State but also as a result of his strong commitment to the cause of panafricanism. The author analyses NYERERE's conception of liberation, his involvement in the liberation struggle of South Africa and his conception of socialism vis-à-vis the African Revolution.

Concerning NYERERE's conception of Liberation, the author quotes his definition which says that «liberation is a historical process but not a unique action whose achievement is celebrated every year». Four steps characterize this process: liberation from the colonial power and from racial minority; liberation from the domination of the economy by foreign powers; liberation from poverty, injustice and oppression imposed on Africans by Africans; liberation from the spiritual principle which makes Africans think that they are inherently inferior to other peoples.

This conception of liberation continuously permeates his political actions especially when it comes to getting Tanzania and himself involved in the liberation of South Africa. This is perhaps the area in which he differs significantly from most other African Leaders because he never separated the Tanzanian reality as a dominated country from the liberation of the continent. As a result of this relationship, the author says, NYERERE's conception of socialism vis-à-vis the African Revolution is one that advocates a necessary relation between these two concepts. Ample evidence of that can be found in almost all his writings.

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ON BOURGEOIS DEVELOPMENT THEORY (1) A CRITIQUE OF BEHRENDT

By

*Ansa ASAMOA**

INTRODUCTION

Lewis MORGAN's theory of evolution and Karl MARX's Historical Materialism, most powerful tools of sociological analyses, emerged in the transitional stage of capitalism from free competition to monopoly capitalism, also termed imperialism in the 19th century. The social conflicts and tensions generated by the rapid concentration of capital in industry and banking, in agriculture, coupled with unscrupulous land grabbing and calculated elimination of the weak and small-scale entrepreneurs, constituted the fertile socio-economic soil from which both progressive theories shot up (2).

Seeing in the contradictions between the forces and relations of production (usually generated by private ownership of means of production) the root of the qualitative transformation of past human class societies, evolutionism (MORGAN's) and historical materialism predicted an eventual negation of the bourgeois capitalist system by a qualitatively higher form of socio-economic formation. Bourgeois sociology was quick to react and has ever since been bitterly opposed to both theories.

Several bourgeois theories aimed at combating the growing power of Morganian evolutionism and marxism mushroomed — Ward's utopian sociocracy, German culture-Historical school with its racist under-tone, Anglo-American diffusionism, Parsonian action theory, different brands of positivism, a hotchpotch of psychological schools of thought initiated by people like Ruth BENEDICT, HERSKOVITZ, MEAD etc.

Functionalism, nick-named «the synchronic revolt», was and has been most prominent and dedicated in the anti-marxist, anti-evolutionist vanguard of international bourgeois sociology. Overzealous to provide the best therapy for social conflicts in many parts of the world and thereby check the spread of marxism functionalism especially the Malinoswkian brand, extended its activities to many a colony in the service of colonialism and imperialism. The most prominent of functionalist vehicles used by colonialism were B. MALINOWSKI, Evans PRITCHARD, FORTES, Radcliffe BROWN (3), anthropologists who are still worshipped today in neo-colonial circles in African sociology.

In spite of the concerted effort by bourgeois sociologists all over the world to stop or at least undermine the spread and effects of the progressive dynamic scientific ideas of MARX, ENGELS and MORGAN — later on developed by younger generations of marxists — I stand to be corrected on the fact that marxism has been the agent of change in those Third World countries that have undergone qualitative social transformations.

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The spread of marxist ideas, accelerated by national and international events such as the people's revolutions in the Soviet Union, E. European countries, Cuba, China, Vietnam, North Korea etc., by the liberation of almost all colonized peoples, by the armed struggle in racist southern Africa, by periodical inflations and other general crises of capitalism, has been weakening steadily and making obsolete several bourgeois sociological theories of societal development.

Prominent among the reactionary sociological theories that have been more or less brought to the end of their resources by historical events is functionalism, whose usefulness nearly ended with the death of colonialism in many parts of the world.

The inhuman colonial economic and social legacy inherited by the newly independent countries; the continuation and intensification of exploitation of the so-called Third World by the multi-national corporations in collaboration with their national states and the comprador bourgeoisies in the developing nations; reactionary coups d'état, usually staged by incompetent, greedy and corrupt army and police officers who see in the seizure of political power the quickest way of enriching themselves at the expense of the mass of the people; the subsequent stagnation of the forces of production coupled with mass abject poverty, starvation, undernourishment etc. etc. — all create serious social conflicts and tensions in many a developing country, conflicts which now and then culminate in armed clashes between the popular classes and their bourgeois oppressors. Haunted by the possibility of marxist led people's revolutions eventually resulting from this bitter class struggle in the developing countries (as it has been the case in North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Angola etc.) bourgeois sociology has been quick to manufacture a reactionary, neo-functional middle range theory of modernization. The theory, loaded with procapitalist principles of functionalism, is intended to guide the developing countries in planning and executing their socio-economic development strategies.

This paper is a contribution to the efforts by marxists to expose the reactionary nature of the theory; the exposure would, among other things, make it extremely difficult for our tightly cornered African palaeo-functionalists (4) to eventually hide unnoticed under the umbrella of the new theory using the latter as a cover for the continuation of their palaeo-functional operations. The paper will thus help further the course of the anti-neo-colonial struggle in the social sciences not only in Africa but also in other parts of the developing world.

While casual references will be made here and there to different theoretical modes and trends represented by bourgeois modernization theorists, Richard BEHRENDT's «Soziale Strategie fuer Entwicklungslaender» (1968) will constitute the basis of the critical discussions in this paper for the following reasons:

1. At the request of the neo-colonial government of the Second Republic of Ghana headed by the late Dr. K. A. BUSIA, a puppet of imperialism, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany dispatched a delegation of highly qualified technocrats and experts to Ghana in 1971. Their terms of reference: To study and assess the general economic situation in Ghana and advise the West German Government on how best it could «aid» Ghana in her development efforts.

The German delegation prepared a 100-page confidential report on their findings in Ghana. The report clearly shows that the delegation was allowed access to very important confidential documents on the Ghanaian economy. According to my investigations «Das Ministerium fuer wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit» (5) of the West German Government had been asked to have similar reports prepared on Senegal, Guinea and other African countries.

The report on Ghana attributes the economic problems of Ghana in the late 60's and early 70's to the so-called economic mismanagement by the nationalist government of the First Republic headed by Dr. NKRUMAH. NKRUMAN's development strategy, especially his emphasis on the need to develop rapidly the reproduction sector of the economy, is described in the report as prestigious, if not wasteful. The state-owned enterprises are regarded as a serious negative factor in the economy.

The secret report carefully dissects the Ghanaian economy identifying areas of possible limited investment and where «aid» could be given – and, of course, with quick returns to West Germany. To forestal any losses on investments and «aid» by any other western country in Ghana it is proposed in the report that the west German Government communicate the findings of the delegation to other members of the western imperialist camp (6).

The report asks the West German Government to advise Ghana to decentralize the economy and its management, encourage private small scale enterprises, reduce public expenditure, give priority to the provision of good drinking water to the rural areas, etc.

Apparently basing obediently their economic policies on earlier imperialist expert advice (IMF – World Bank) and on West Germany's pre-conditions for its «aid» to Ghana the ultrarightist military junta (7), which preceded the Second Republic, and the Busia Government of the Second Republic stopped and paralysed enterprises in the reproduction sector of the economy; state-owned enterprises were sold to Ghanaian and foreign entrepreneurs and multi-national corporations while viable projects were abandoned; Ghana's promising steel Industry, the Atomic Research Centre, the Fishing Industry, the State Housing Corporation, the State Rubber and Tyre Manufacturing Industry (now Fire Stone Ltd.) and several other state enterprises have been adversely affected by the new economic policy. Busia's policies boomeranged, culminating in his overthrow in January 1972. And since this time Ghana's economy and social services have been systematically disintegrating.

2. The West German Secret Report radiates an ideological flavour symptomatic of Richard BEHRENDT's much publicised blue-print for socio-economic development for the developing countries (8). BEHRENDT, a West German bourgeois sociologist, worked several years in Panama, Peru, Guatamala, Puerto Rico, Paraguay and Uruguay where he industriously propagated neo-colonial strategies of social development.

The special attention paid to BEHRENDT's strategy in this paper could thus expose crucial aspects of the ideological framework of West Germany's neo-colonial offensive in the Third World.

3. BEHRENDT's approach to the study of problems of development in the developing nations synthesises the three main trends in the methodology of bourgeois sociology of development. The trends, according to NASH, are: The ideal typical index Mode, the Acculturation Mode and the Psychological Approach (9).

NASH outlines the three modes as follows:

1. *The Ideal Typical Index Mode:*

«... the general features of a developed economy are abstracted as an ideal type and then contrasted with the equally ideal typical features of a poor economy and society. In this mode, development is viewed as the transformation of one type into the other... (10) NASH refers to works by PARSONS, HOSELITZ and LEVY as «developed examples of this mode (11).

2. *The Acculturation View:*

«The West (taken here as the Atlantic community of developed nations and their overseas outliers) diffuses knowledge, skills, organization, values, technology and capital to a poor nation, until over time its society, culture and personnel become variants of that which made the Atlantic community economically successful... (12). W. MOORE, D. FELDMAN and D. LERNER are portrayed as typical exponents of this approach.

3. *The Psychological Mode:*

«... is the analysis of the process as it is now going on in the so-called underdevelopment nations. This approach leads to a smaller scale hypothesis, to a prospective rather than a retrospective view of social change, to a full accounting of the political and cultural context of development» (13). NASH claims that it is the «most profitably pursued» (14).

It should be stressed that psychological factors like McCLELAND's n-Achievement drive, a notion, criticised by FRANK are regarded here as decisive in development efforts. Synthesizing these three modes Richard BEHRENDT identifies the following features which he claims are typical of a developing country (15).

(a) Social groups hierarchically structured, i.e. caste – or classwise organized and undermined by religion and tradition; while group membership is determined by birth and destiny, privileges and obligations, way of life, level of income and education are normally dictated by membership of a particular group (16). Total submissiveness vis-à-vis problems, deprivations, need, distress and to misery – scepticism about the capability of man to solve such problems (17); continuous practice of out-moded traditions (18); occupational orientation determined by taboos and not by economic rationality (19). As a result little or no vertical mobility because the latter, usually based on birth and not on individual achievement, always involves whole families or kin groups.

(b) Kinship loyalty and solidarity as opposed to weak relation to larger social units such as the nation or empire.

- (c) Patriarchal structure of primary groups characterized by men's domination and gerontocratic authority.
- (d) Stagnation in technique and economic activity.
- (e) Considerable importance of subsistence economic undertakings.
- (f) Authoritarian monarchical absolute forms of government or oligarchic feudal types of hegemony, all divinely justified.
- (g) An insignificant, culturally or racially heterogeneous middle class, i.e., urban property owners and intelligentsia closely linked in diverse ways with West and Middle Europe.

Essential features which, according to BEHRENDT, characterize a relatively developed society «from a relatively undeveloped one» are as follows:

- (a) Elastic stratified structures (20), mostly based on differences in education and occupation (21), with considerable social mobility, advanced social division of labour and money economy; individual achievement as an important criterion for vertical or downward social mobility (22); occupational specialization, secular instead of divine in character, with individual interests and capabilities as the decisive factors.
- (b) Reduced importance of kinship relations; decline of primary groups territorially based and rooted in common tradition and religious belief.
- (c) Tendency to equality of rights and of general social and economic functions between the sexes (23); greater juvenile autonomy.
- (d) Dynamic experiments in technique and economy coupled with the development of more accurate methods of information and calculation, by means of modern machines, especially the automatic ones.
- (e) Dominance of money economy, universally oriented through trade.
- (f) Decentralization tendencies in state administration and economic planning, impersonal social control based on rational sanctions, laws and rules whose application is in the hands of well trained efficient technocrats.
- (g) Secularization and concentration of the legal system and administration of justice (24).

BEHRENDT'S CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT AS A SOCIAL PHILOSOPHICAL CATEGORY

Sure and satisfied to have been thus able to grasp the essence of the so-called dynamic Western culture and that of the so-called static cultures of the developing countries by formally contrasting arbitrarily selected traits from both camps, bourgeois modernization theorists work out general development strategies (25) which should help the «relatively undeveloped» parts of the world to harmoniously synthesise borrowed western culture categories with carefully chosen indigenous ones. The various strategies, more or less identical in essence, seem to be based on a general nebulous concept of the philosophical category of development, which is given an elaborate treatment by BEHRENDT (26).

Social Development, Richard BEHRENDT argues, is a guided dynamic culture transformation within a social set-up with growing participation of ever greater numbers of members of that society in the promotion and control as well as in the share of the fruits of the transformation process. Social Development means «resolute determined spread of human energy in all areas of man's social life: spiritual, mental, intellectual, technical, economic, physical» (also in terms of overcoming natural environments and geographical distances, not to mention the need to prolong life), and finally social i.e., with regard to active involvement of ever-growing numbers of people in dynamic social activities such as deliberations and decision-making on aims and enjoyment of development-oriented precautions, functions which are more than a mere execution and fulfilment of orders and normative obligations respectively (27).

It would be wrong, BEHRENDT continues, to identify Social Development simply with economic growth; the former includes general cultural transformations. Economic growth and development are, however, interdependent and in the long run economic growth without change in terms of basic democratization of social structure is impossible.

Richard BEHRENDT develops a strange thesis out of this development concept:

«It cannot be overemphasised that development as a conception of (in subjective terms) a better and realizable future and as a program of concrete social actions – is relatively something new, a phenomenon which for the first time manifested itself in the dynamic phase of culture, while earlier it was nothing but utopia and a religious type of eschatological promise in the minds of people» (28).

The static nature of the so-called pre-dynamic cultures, BEHRENDT says, is relative, that is, culture transformation occurs but does not manifest itself in the consciousness of most people – if at all, not clearly – in the direction of cultural growth. He defines culture transformation as every change in cultural conditions so far as it influences the structure of the functioning of the social set-up concerned. BEHRENDT thus differentiates between culture transformation and what he terms limited or superficial changes of material or personal nature without structural effects. Culture transformation, BEHRENDT concludes, affects the following social categories which always inter-relate with one another:

1. Moral values, intellectual interests, religious views, methods and institutions of education.
2. Technical and economic proceedings and production ability.
3. Manifestations of pictorial or graphic art, of music, poetry and of dance.
4. Dimension and intensity of human relations, demographic structure, especially the distribution of population between rural and urban settlements; degree and forms of division of labour; occupation structure, the various economic sectors and finally the whole social order with a special emphasis on social stratification; the relevance of the basic social units such as the family, sib, community, state etc.

BEHRENDT'S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

BEHRENDT's elaborate development strategy for the developing countries is based on this philosophical concept of development. We shall now discuss the outline of this development model.

1. Development as controlled culture transformation should proceed within the framework of a social development strategy. Capital and technical know-how is scarce, but more scarce is the readiness and institutional ability to employ the latter productively (29). An equally intensive social-cultural infrastructural work should augment achievements in technico-economic infrastructure.

2. The western powers must participate in the working out of a development strategy aimed at eliminating differences in methods and orientations between indigenous and foreign private economic interests, between international and national authorities, between intellectuals and the military on the one hand and the organized labour force and the mass of the people, especially the rural population, more or less destitute as regards development impulses, on the other hand (30).

3. This (i.e. point 2) should mean: Democratization of the development strategy by limiting the increased duties and functions of the state — BEHRENDT regards these duties and functions as the weakest point in the development strategies of the Third World countries; reproduction of cells of development (31); decentralization of the development efforts; more pronounced encouragement of individual and small group initiatives as well as those of co-operatives, communities, trade unions and small scale enterprises (32). All these small groups would not only be economically effective; they would also create the conditions for the development of rational methods in economic activity and administration, for independent participation in discussions and decision making not to mention the implementation of decisions within the democratically structured social set-up. Development must be regarded as the responsibility of everybody and not as a natural law imposed from above and outside. Planning, advice and action on local levels should be emphasized instead of being monopolized by international organizations and national state authorities. For the local development strategy to be effective a greater number of the best indigenous and foreign manpower must be trained for direct engagement in the development programme (33).

4. There is no other way to overcome apathy and irrationality which dominate life in the majority of the developing countries, today, a situation which, in BEHRENDT's view, has resulted from centuries of authoritarian rule and exploitation (34). It is irrationality and apathy, BEHRENDT claims, that make peoples of the developing nations shun responsibility for the solution of problems which very often are pushed to international organizations and the developed countries to shoulder (35).

5. Superstition must stop. Waste of money and manpower, disregard for good-will—all usually products of clumsiness, irrationality, politicization and inability (they all characterise international organizations and

national political leaderships) must be eradicated. A bitter struggle should be waged against the formidable forces of conservatism, usually bred by intellectual immobility, ideologies (36), and by particular political individual interests.

6. An extensive reduction of red-tapism and «depoliticization» as regards development policies or programmes must be propagated and carried out in favour of decentralization. Without these precautions it would be impossible (a) to realistically organize and accomplish development blue-prints and prevent their fruits being appropriated by oligarchies (37) and (b) to solve one of the biggest problems facing the developing nations today namely lack of responsible and efficient partners (38). Several possibilities for what BEHRENDT calls experimental learning of the correct disposition and behaviour towards cultural change on all social levels could further result from the decentralization strategy.

7. The strategy (being discussed), BEHRENDT boasts, would liberalize and accelerate the development of the Third World societies and their economies. It would be the only effective alternative to what he jargonizes as «totalitarian state socialist development methods of communism».

8. The role of social science, i.e. sociology, psychology, socio-metry, group dynamics is more than vital. Research results and other scientific findings should be utilized in the development strategy; pragmatically oriented field studies and experiments with new methods as regards cultural change should be intensified while regular participation (on interdisciplinary basis) of social scientists in the planning and execution of development projects must be pursued.

9. Social Development strategy should include ways and means of improving relations between the developed and developing nations. The developed nations should, in addition to their economic and technical know-how develop understanding towards the static cultures of the Third World; they must regard development aid policies as a humanistic political venture and not as a tactical foreign policy (39). More effective methods of discussions, deliberations and decision making should be adopted by the rich developed countries with the aim of creating the basis for mutual confidence between them and the developing countries. Concepts of dynamic economic and social policies as regards concrete projects could then be worked out on this basis by exports from the rich giver countries and their partners in the poor receiver nations.

10. The gradual development of the democratic state (40) in materially undeveloped countries depends on how far creative development policies succeed in institutionalizing and rooting democratic thought (41) and behaviour in all aspects of daily life in small social units. The entrenchment of this democratic thought and behaviour would not only relieve the state of its ambitious economic managerial aspirations that finally lead to totalitarianism; it would also minimize the extreme contrasts in income and status. Only a social development strategy of this nature, BEHRENDT claims, can help create a free social order to replace the existing popular parliamentary or feint plebiscitary façade that covers the alienated and unrepresentative character of most governments in the Third World.

11. The concept of functional democratization as an inevitable long process, BEHRENDT concludes, would contribute to the solution of a big dilemma that plagues the western countries (BEHRENDT calls them «representatives of ideals of freedom») in their relations to dictatorially governed developing nations. The criterion of the ability of a government is not the existence of a quasi-democratic façade of objectively powerless parliaments and manipulated elections, but rather the realization of development policies based on fundamental principles of democracy. It is only on the basis of this pre-condition that one could expect the just utilization of international aids. Every development aid from the West, BEHRENDT advocates, must be given on the condition that the recipients, in accordance with pluralistic principles (42), co-operate with voluntary groups and politically independent organizations on all levels of the social structure without pressure and check from the political organs or the indigenous government or a united party. Failure to heed his social development blueprint for the Third World, would open the door to authoritarian fascist and «state-socialist communist» takeover.

CRITIQUE OF THE STRATEGY

The different modes of bourgeois modernization theory mentioned have been severely criticised by several marxist social scientists: WERTHEIM's critique of the theory (43), GRIENIG's attack on Ghausy (44), MAFEJE's illuminating refutation of bourgeois dualist theoretical interpretation of social economic relations in East and Central Africa, in Rhodesia and Apartheid South Africa (45); ARRHIGI's «Labour supplies in Historical Perspective – A study of Proletarianization of the African Peasantry» (46) which crashes William BARBER's dualist explanation of underdevelopment of the African population in Rhodesia; G. HAUCK's «Das Elend der Bürgerlichen Entwicklungs-theorie» (47) etc. are a few examples of marxist scientific contributions to the general debate on modernization in the developing countries.

But it is Andre Gunar FRANK, greatly influenced by Paul BARAN (48), who has delivered the most devastating blow to bourgeois modernization theory so far. In his «Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology» he examines penetratingly the «empirical validity», «theoretical adequacy» and «policy effectiveness» of the three modes of bourgeois development theory using NASH's classification schema as a starting point.

FRANK's brilliant critique of bourgeois modernization theory eclipses Richard BEHRENDT's social development strategy, which, as pointed out earlier, tries to synthesise the index, acculturation and the psychological models (49). The same empirical and theoretical inadequacies (pointed out by FRANK) which permeate the three models are clearly discernible in BEHRENDT's strategy, which in spite of its eclectic undertones, is structural functionalism. BEHRENDT's clumsy attempt to flavour it with diachronic ingredients as expressed in his definition of development could not camouflage the synchronic integrationist overtones of the development strategy. BEHRENDT's dualist classification schema, rooted in

the Index Model, cannot escape FRANK's main criticism of those bourgeois modernization theorists who «associate particularism, ascription, and diffuseness in underdevelopment with the extended family, the primitive tribe, the folk community, the traditional sector of a dual society, and with the underdeveloped countries and part of the world in general» without making the connection with «the developed part of the world nor with the contemporarily dominant social organization in the world taken as a whole (50).

In other words, by metaphysically detaching those symptoms of underdevelopment allegedly characteristic only of the developing countries from the overdevelopment of the so-called modern capitalist countries, Richard BEHRENDT, like his bourgeois colleagues criticized by FRANK, establishes in his fantasy an absolute distinction between the Third World and the highly developed capitalist world; his conceptualized dichotomies are thus nothing but an attempt to define the essential elements of that utopian distinction. BEHRENDT's argument that diffused technology and capital wrapped in bourgeois liberal thought is the key to development in the developing nations is also diluted by FRANK's contentions, supported by very revealing data, (1) that «the developed countries have always diffused out to their satellite colonial dependencies the technology whose enjoyment in the colonial and now underdeveloped countries has served the interests of the metropolis ; and the metropolis has always suppressed the technology in the new underdeveloped countries which conflicted with the interests of the metropolis and its own development» (51). FRANK cites as an example the destruction of agricultural technology and installations in India, the Middle East and Latin America «by Europeans or as the English did with industrial technology in India, Spain and Portugal» (52), (2) that «the metropolitan investment in... underdeveloped countries... has notably failed to develop the underdeveloped countries, but has instead interposed a whole series of obstacles to their development...» (53).

FRANK's critique of bourgeois modernization theory, though generally accepted by social scientists with marxist orientation, has been criticized by scholars of the marxist camp, and correctly too, for placing too much emphasis on market relations at the expense of an analysis of class relations, especially of the internal social structure. This is a fair criticism of FRANK's work including his «metropolitain-satellite» model, which suffers equally from this serious weakness» (54). MANGHEZI accuses FRANK of having failed «to recognize and deal appropriately with the role played by internal factors in the process of underdevelopment», a weakness which «will make it very difficult if not impossible to devise and formulate more appropriate and effective policy measures for the eradication of the problems with which the underdeveloped countries are beset» (55). MANGHEZI refers to the following text from MAFEJE's «The Fallacy of Dual Economies Revisited» as the summary of «this fundamental question» — «... our unit of analysis is the national socio-economic system and the internal and external moment of the same dialectic or contradiction. For a proper allocation of instances, it is well to remember that from the point of view of underdeveloped countries the international

system in historically and analytically prior but not procedually and strategically ultimate, i.e. for the comprehension of underdevelopment as dynamic process, it is necessary to understand the former; but for its liquidation, a firm grasp of the internal system is indispensable (56).

Much as I agree that FRANK has under-emphasized the internal class relations, especially in terms of his agitation for cataclysmic revolutions as the only solution to the problem of underdevelopment, I would have thought that the suggestion that he has «failed to recognize the role played by internal factors in the process of underdevelopment» is far-fetched. In fact, in his studies of underdevelopment in Chile and Brazil, let alone his «Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology» FRANK depicts or identifies capitalism as the principal contradiction responsible for underdevelopment (57). He dissects the diachronic and synchronic dimensions of capitalism in its international and *national* contexts and comes to the conclusion that *without its negation in the developing nations through revolutions there could not be any socio-economic emancipation for that part of the world*. Now, is FRANK's successful identification of the principal contradiction of underdevelopment seperable from a firm understanding of the internal situations in the developing countries plagued by underdevelopment? Perhaps it is the following specific weaknesses of FRANK's critique of bourgeois modernization theory that have invited MANGHEZI's observation which unfortunately leaves much to implication or speculation.

1. While FRANK rules out, and rightly so, the possibility of the developing countries taking off economically because of the domination of their economies by foreign capital and the restriction of the weaker indigenous capital to commerce, he is silent over what would happen if, say within a nationalist political framework, anchored essentially in a capitalist economy, the indigenous and foreign bourgeoisies and forced by *extra-economic pressures* like trade union agitation, unemployment and its attendant social unrest, leftist rebellions, political pressures from a neighbouring progressive country etc. to divert capital to industrial production in addition to massive state investments especially in the reproduction sector. The forces of production could develop rapidly and even at an astronomic rate if these economic precautions are backed by a well planned mobilization of human and natural resources and by a stubborn protectionist policy. FRANK, like BARAN, dismisses the possibility that a Third World country could today modernize its economy, technology and social life within the capitalist *status quo* no matter how rich that country is (58). But as a matter of fact, internal forces of capitalist reaction in developing nations have realised the need to divert part of imperialist surplus capital and local state, and private commercial capital to production in order not only to establish a solid basis for a long term profit maximization but also to dilute the internal contradictions which potentially threaten the capitalist *status quo*. While poor developing countries experimenting with this strategy are bound to fail, the rich ones are scoring successes in their modernization offensive within the capitalist framework (59). This is exactly what the bourgeois modernization... theorists are advocating. Our awareness of this subtle strategy

by the international bourgeoisie is vital in our attempt to conceptualize a general anti-capitalist revolutionary development strategy and tactics. FRANK has ruled out this possible bourgeois offensive in the production sector of a developing economy apparently because of his over-emphasis on, as his critics rightly point out, the marketing spheres of the developing economies.

2. FRANK does not take seriously the subjective factor, usually a chain of secondary contradictions, like nepotism, superstition, tribal dissensions and solidarity, out-moded customs in rural peasant socio-economic life in the Third World – all products of the existing pre-capitalist mode of production, i.e. of the incompleteness of capitalism – which have been obstructing development and which could still seriously frustrate development efforts within a revolutionary socialist political framework (60). FRANK may have correctly assumed that with the negation of capitalism as the principal contradiction the above-mentioned secondary contradictions will eventually disappear (61). But the mere fact that bourgeois modernization theorists notoriously regard them as the principal stumbling block in the development process should not allow their omission in our critical analysis of bourgeois development theory. Put differently, the so-called ascriptive, diffuse, particularistic, affective and collective orientational values and norms, though also observable in the advanced countries as FRANK rightly points out, are likely to be more pronounced in the developing countries, a contradiction rooted in imperialism's conscious underdevelopment of capitalism in the Third World.

3. Though FRANK has not worked out any comprehensive development blue-print for the developing nations he however has repeatedly argued that only radical socialist revolutions will end global underdevelopment. The role of the anti-capitalist forces in the pre-revolutionary period, FRANK seems to argue, should be abandonment «of bourgeois ideology and theory, of reformist and revisionist policy and opportunism, and adoption of revolutionary Marxist strategy and tactics in the popular leadership of... the underdeveloped countries, the socialist countries, and among the colonized and exploited people in the heart of the imperialist metropolis itself, ...» (62). This, FRANK claims, will deepen the contradictions of capitalism and finally negate it.

This propositions, though basically accepted, leaves a chain of theoretical and practical questions unanswered e.g. are the anti-capitalist forces in the Third World guilty of opportunism and reformism, if they contribute to the material development of the productive forces in the pre-revolutionary period? Could that role, coupled with politicization, ideological education and participation generate a gradual *qualitative* transformation of the capitalist *status quo* culminating in its peaceful negation? (63). The possible success of this strategy in circumstances where there are obstacles to the organization and realization of a violent revolution has led to the emergence of the theory of «Non-capitalist Way of Development» (64). With the experience of Ghana, Chile, Brazil, Indonesia still fresh in our memory, we could be easily inclined to dismiss the strategy and tactics of the «Non-capitalist Way of Development» where specific, local historical conditions are potentially favourable to its success. But

could we not improve on the peaceful, piecemeal theoretical strategy by identifying and avoiding the mistakes of Chile, Ghana, Indonesia, Brazil?

The strategy of «Non-capitalist Way of Development» is tricky ; and much as I remain suspicious of it, I regard its total rejection by any serious marxist contribution to the modernization debate as unfortunate.

Marxist theory regards development, a social philosophical category, as «the process of self-motion from the lower (simple) to the higher (complex), revealing the internal tendencies and the essence of phenomena, and leading to the appearance of the new...» (65). The development of every society is thus the process of self-motion of that society, the process being governed by general internal laws of dialectical development. To simplify it: the development of a culture must be regarded as a coherent manifestation of internal single dialectical processes each «having a beginning, and the completion of one cycle of development marking the beginning of a new one, in which some elements of the first may be repeated» (66). Development for the marxist, is therefore an immanent process in which symptoms of the higher, partly immanent in the lower, reveal themselves at a sufficiently higher stage of development. Development cannot therefore be limited to only a historical period in the development of a culture as BEHRENDT and others want us to believe. Marxism recognizes evolution as an aspect of development, as accumulated quantitative changes in the development of society. The quantitative changes that take place in society and finally change its quality result from the interactions of opposites immanent in the evolutionary processes taking place within the society. The newly generated qualitative change is identical with the revolution of the social set-up. Evolutionary and revolutionary processes are thus inseparably connected constituents of development. Human cultural development has always obeyed these laws of development. But there have been stagnant and dynamic moments in the development of society everywhere, with the level of development usually determined by the level of the forces of production and its relation to the relations of production.

The up-and-down development processes experienced in every human society are dialectically determined; development proceeds in the form of a spiral, with the spiral form always reflecting the essence of the relation between the forces and relations of production and its impact on superstructural phenomena at a given time.

There are laws, very often effects of human actions, which operate within, and therefore in the development of society, independent of our will. Not seldom do we stand bewildered and helpless vis-a-vis these laws. But mankind has succeeded at various historical stages, at different levels of cultural development in identifying and controlling social and natural laws using them whenever and wherever possible for its own benefit and advancement. The degree of success in this human endeavour has varied from culture to culture. But however primitive a society is, i.e. in terms of its ability to exploit and control its social and environmental forces, the cultural transformations it undertakes can be said to manifest themselves without the awareness of the human beings (constituting that society) only if one denies the latter human intelligence and places them in the category of wild animals obeying only the laws of instinct.

The development of a phenomenon, whether social or natural may not hinge solely on internal factors; external forces and influence can play a decisive role. Their effectiveness in the development process depends, however, on the extent to which they can manifest themselves through internal factors constituting the essence of the phenomenon undergoing change. The interplay of the external and internal forces in this drama, if seen only in its quantitative dimension, i.e. if the qualitative seeds inherent in the cumulative quantitative changes resulting from the interaction of the internal and external forces are lost sight of, then it becomes impossible to identify the most important laws behind the whole process of development.

Access to these objective laws, with regard to society, can only be gained through a clear understanding of the essence of the socio-economic formation of the society concerned. The category of socio-economic formation embraces the totality and interaction of economic, ideological, legal and political relations with the essence of the relationship between the forces and relations of production decisively moulding the course of development of the whole society.

What I have been trying to point out is that Richard BEHRENDT's strategy, like several other bourgeois development strategies, is nothing but a monstrous mosaic of repeated jargons rooted in a scientifically invalid concept of development. By seeing development as a phenomenon characteristic only of the Western world; by regarding cultural transformations in the developing countries as a process occurring without the knowledge of the producers of those cultures; by disregarding the category of socio-economic formation as the basis of his development strategy, BEHRENDT mystifies the social category of development. The logical consequences: he overlooks basic important internal laws of development and principal contradictions in the developing nations and arrogantly over-emphasizes the role of external forces (western, of course) in the development of those countries.

BEHRENDT eliminates the category of socio-economic formation from his theoretical concept by formally contrasting the so-called dynamic, modern industrial societies with the so-called static ones. Stagnation, traditionalism and agriculture are too ambiguous and general for any meaningful scientific classification of human societies; the same applies to the features dynamism, industrialization and modernity. Any classification attempt of human societies not based on the social category of socio-economic formation is bound to be misleading.

For example there exist several societies based mainly on primitive agriculture and are feudal, in terms of socio-economic formation, with the stagnation of the forces of production featuring prominently. There are others which are non-feudal but also based on agriculture with a similar or lower level of technological development. Today there exist only capitalist and socialist industrial countries, that is, industrial societies having qualitatively different forms of production relations.

Certainly because of their similar levels of agricultural technology, pre-capitalist peasant societies show some common features such as virtues, values, behaviour patterns, some of which may be identical in form but diverse in content with the content diversity often closely linked with the

different forms of production relations dominant in the various societies. The same could be said of the capitalist and socialist industrial societies which have similar technology but different production relations.

As a tool of imperialist neo-colonial exploitation bourgeois modernization theory ignores these basic scientific facts and regards social conflicts and tensions, i.e. the various forms of the class struggle in the developing countries as contradictions caused by the inability of the «static» cultures to cope with «dynamic» imported foreign culture traits in the process of acculturation or culture diffusion. It thereby tries to subtly camouflage the true objective cause of the class struggle in the developing nations. It further under-rates and vulgarizes the struggle between the exploiter and exploited in the capitalist countries and in the so-called Third World (67). The basic objective laws and the principal contradictions inherent in the developing nations since colonialism are consequently ignored by the bourgeois modernization strategists.

Colonialism certainly contributed to the development of the forces of production in all areas of its hegemony – for example modern infrastructure, education, new occupational avenues, new methods in agriculture and animal husbandry, expansion of internal markets, integration of the colonial economies into the world imperialist dominated economy, etc... (68). But it is the same colonialism propelled by its own laws of capitalism that brutally blocked further development of the colonial forces of production by robbing the colonies of their potential sources of capital accumulation, thus making it impossible for the colonized to develop their own modern industries with their so-called attendant normative variables of universalism, achievement orientation, functional specificity etc. Colonialism by this strategy, coupled with wilful destruction of traditional industries of the colonies, turned the latter into the dumping grounds for manufactured goods from the metropolis. The reduction of the colonies to mere suppliers of raw materials and agrarian stuff; the strengthening of the indigenous exploiter classes especially in the commercial sphere, (who were checked at the same time from developing into serious competitors for the metropolitan monopolists); the continuation of these policies in the neo-colonial era by the multinational corporations through subtle and brute channels of neo-colonialism (69); the choice and practice of capitalism in most cases protected by imperialist supported reactionary coups – all these testimonies of recent and current history are wickedly covered with empty glorification of colonialism and capitalism.

As Horst GRIENING rightly points out, bourgeois development sociology sees in the imperialist West the producer of the so-called dynamic culture, which they must make accessible to the developing countries by means of acculturation or/and diffusion. Dynamic development of society is thus identified with occidentalization which in the final analysis equals the imposition of capitalism as the only and best development model on the so-called Third World (70).

The pro-capitalist development model for the developing nations, accompanied by emotionally charged, malicious anti-communist propa-

ganda, is accordingly supposed to take the form of social evolution. In other words, the bogus development blue-print should be an improved capitalism which must be accomplished by means of reform. The broad capitalist framework should remain intact while changes here and there, especially as regards the relation between the haves and have-nots, must take place. These changes, BEHRENDT and others argue, would prevent the development of proletarian class consciousness and therefore socialist revolutionary situation (71). They thus advocate the reorientation of the neo-colonial expansionist strategy of international imperialism, seeing in reform inclined bourgeois, petty-bourgeois and comprador elements in the developing nations better stabilizers of capitalism than traditional conservative aristocracies whose activities could only breed the forces of socialist revolutions.

Stabilization of capitalism in the developing nations implicitly advocated is not to be equated with economic independence for them. The doors of the Third World economies should be opened widely to monopoly capitalism. Only in this light could the co-operation between the Third World and the West be understood.

The main objective of bourgeois modernization theory is to protect the capitalist *status quo* in the developing nations against the on-going struggle which increasingly arms itself with the marxist world outlook. In the light of this danger marxists should not only intensify their ideological war against bourgeois social scientists, but must also be constantly reappraising their own theoretical and strategic positions.

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FOOTNOTES

1. A paper presented at the 11th Annual Conference of the Ghana Sociological Association in April 1977 at the University of Cape Coast.
2. For details on monopoly development in the U.S. in the 40's and 50's of the 19th century see, Mandel E., Guerin D., 1972, pp. 28–331.
3. Wertheim depicts him as «the devil's advocate» while he sees in Durkheim's «Reification of geographically circumscribed societies... the original sin of western sociology»; (Wertheim F., 1974, p. 319).
4. That is, apologists of colonial functionalism in neo-colonial Departements of Sociology in African Universities.
5. Ministry of Economic Cooperation.
6. Their attention is to be drawn to the areas of the economy which are particularly weak and where investment would be a liability.
7. Dr. K. A. Busia was its principal adviser.
8. Behrendt's book has been recommended in various issues of the Federal Government periodical «Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit» by the Federal Ministry of Economic Co-operation to all West German specialists sent to the developing countries.
9. Nash M., 1963 p. 5 (cited in Frank, A., *Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology, Afrographika, Yaba, Lagos* pp. 1–3).
10. op. cit.
11. op. cit. The variables attributed to the developed countries are regarded as symptomatic of the so-called instrumental values and therefore as the main force behind development in the industrialized societies while those attributed to the developing ones are said to be characteristic of expressive values. Put differently: Rationality in terms of task accomplishment is regarded as the basic value system of a modern society with its sophisticated bureaucracy while irrationality in terms of emotional satisfaction is supposed to permeate the fundamental value system of a developing nation.
12. op. cit.
13. op. cit.
14. op. cit.
15. See Behrendt H., 1968, pp. 144–146 (original German text translated by me) See also Parson T. and Shils, E. 1951; Ghassy G., 1966. *Elisenstandt* S. 1973.

16. Behrendt seems to suggest here that social stratification in the developing countries is determined by religion and tradition, a factor which obstructs social mobility. With this notion Behrendt tries to subtly divert attention from the principal capitalist contradictions which fetter development in the developing countries. Even in the handful of Third World countries where the traditional aristocratic element is active in political decision making the indigenous commercial and industrial bourgeoisie are largely nonaristocratic let alone the influential intelligentsia and bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Behrendt has probably never heard of the British House of Lords, of the privileges, way of life of its members and of the members of the European and Japanese Royal families.
17. That is, the urge to improve is non-existent. One sees clearly here the influence of McClelland's reactionary n-Achievement theory on Behrendt. (See McClelland, D.; and Winter, D., 1976, pp. 548 ff).
18. For example, like the feudal institution of Monarchy in present-day Britain, Japan, Sweden, Belgium, Spain, Holland and elsewhere in Europe.
19. What about the pro-imperialist bourgeoisies and the personnel of the state organs, of the social services, of the educational and medical establishments in the developing countries – their occupational orientations dictated by taboos?
20. It is not unusual to expect a protagonist of the capitalist imperialist system, in the person of Behrendt, to regard Western societies, dominated by the giant multinational corporations as elastic structures.
21. For Behrendt, naturally, ownership and domination of means of production by the minority in the West is not an important agent of social stratification.
22. Frank who comments on a similar argument by Hoselitz draws attention to the «ascription of roles, and the consequent reward to the American Negro» which «speaks silently and eloquently for itself through his contemporary Freedom Movement» (Frank, A., *Afro graphika*, p. 6).
23. In the Federal Republic of Germany, home country of Richard Behrendt, pay discrimination against women, a common phenomenon in the «free» western world, is a good example of «equality of rights between the sexes».
24. Behrendt, R., 1968, pp. 147–149; see also works mentioned under footnote 1 below (p. 15).
25. See for example (a) More, W., 1961, pp. 57–87; (b) Rostow, W., 1961 (c) Ghaussy, G., 1966; (d) Parsons, T., and Shils, E., 1951; (e) Eisentadt, S., 1973; (f) Malinowski, B., 1961.
26. Behrendt, R., 1968, p. 130 ff.
27. Behrendt, R., *op. cit.*, p. 130.
28. *Op. cit.*, p. 131 (my own translation).
29. One sees clearly here again the influence of McClelland on Behrendt. «Readiness» here implies the right disposition of the individual to the employment of capital and modern technology. Behrendt thus seems to agree with McClelland that it is the so-called n-Achievement drive which is the decisive factor in any development efforts, an eclectic element in Behrendt's general functionalist structuralist theoretical framework.
30. Behrendt implicitly means the class struggle in the Third World should be eliminated by the implementation of a development strategy to be worked out by the multinational corporations and their henchmen and class allies in that part of the world.

31. Richard Behrendt's «cells of development» are what he calls old and new elites, the new entrepreneurs, students, women, the military, urban and rural workers and peasant co-operatives. In short, everybody.
32. In other words, capitalist mode of production should be encouraged. But again the impact of the psychological model is clearly discernible here. Summarizing his so-called blue-print for economic growth in the developing countries McClelland writes: «So we end on a practical note: a plan for accelerating economic growth through mobilizing more effectively the high n—Achievement resources of a developed country to select and work directly with the scarcer high n—Achievement resources in underdeveloped countries particularly in small and medium scale businesses located in provincial areas». (McClelland, D., *The Achieving Society* — pp. 391—437 — cited in: Frank, A., *op. cit.* p. 47). The emphasis on the need to concentrate on small-scale industries should be regarded as a calculated attempt to dissuade the developing countries from developing the reproductive sectors of their economies, which produce means of production and therefore constitute the bedrock of the economic emancipation of a country.
33. The implication here is that both foreign and indigenous technocrats should be most instrumental in the neo-colonialist oriented development programme. The diffusionist element is clearly discernible here.
34. The subject of authoritarian rule and exploitation being referred to by Behrendt here is the indigenous feudal aristocracies in the developing countries (Behrendt emphasizes this point over and over again, see Behrendt, R. 1968), the forces of colonialism and imperialism which have been draining the human and natural resources of the developing countries for decades are not regarded as exploiters.
35. Of course, the countless social upheavals, sporadic uprisings, armed clashes that occur in the developing countries as a result of social injustice are all signs of «irrationality and apathy», attention is again here drawn to Behrendt's emphasis on the psychological element.
36. Marxism — Leninism is implied here.
37. Behrendt's sermon here means: any extra-economic measures which might obstruct rapid development of capitalism and the dominant role of foreign capital in the developing countries must be prevented. These certainly must include protectionist policies that might curb the domination of foreign capital.
38. A clear reference to the Third World comprador partners of the multinational corporations, who according to Behrendt, are most effective in culture transformation. (See Behrendt, R. 1968, p. 222).
39. This moral advice by Behrendt to the monopolist controlled imperialist states will not work because of the capitalist laws of surplus appropriation which dictate the essence of the development aid policies of imperialism.
40. Behrendt certainly means the bourgeoisie controlled state.
41. That is, bourgeois social liberalism.
42. Capitalist principles are implied here. Andre Gunar Frank rightly depicts the diffusion of western institutions and their attendant values advocated by diffusionists as nothing but «old fashioned or new fangled» political liberalism which should protect the capitalist status quo in the developing countries. (Frank, A. *op. cit.*, p. 34).
43. Wertheim, W., 1974.

44. Griening, H., 1972.
45. Mafeje, A., 1973
46. Arrhigi, G., 1969.
47. Hauck, G., 1975.
48. Baran, P. 1957.
49. See Frank, A., op. cit.
50. Frank, A. Lagos pp. 12–13.
51. Frank, A., op. cit. p. 32.
52. Op. cit. See also (a) Baran, P., p. 144 ff. – (b) Rodney, W. 1973, p. 112 ff.
53. Frank, A., op. cit., see also below, p. 30 – footnote No. 1.
54. Manghezi, A., 1976, p. 30.
55. Op. cit.
56. Manghezi does not specify the internal factors though he implicitly regards social consequences of forced proletarianization in South, East and Central Africa as examples.
57. See, for example, Frank, A., 1969, pp. 140–141. In fact this work shows that he has a deep analytical insight into the capitalist mode of production in the Third World.
58. Frank, A., 1969, p. 177; Baran, P., 1968, pp. 211–215.
59. Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Iran, Nigeria and other developing nations rich in capital generating export raw materials like oil are examples. Even rich ultra-reactionary conservative nations like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates threatened by Social progress in progressive Arab countries are modernizing fast. It should be emphasized that these countries regard fully developed modern capitalism as their final goal and not as a means to ushering in a qualitatively more advanced socio-economic formation. Peru's attempt to take off industrially within the capitalist status quo, an effort precipitated by social tensions culminating in periodic left wing armed rebellions, has failed because she lacks rich natural resources. On the other hand, Venezuela, with her rich oil wealth and also plagued with unemployment and its attendant social vices, marxist led armed rebellions etc. seems to be making a head-way contrary to Paul Baran's pessimism.
60. Lenin was aware of this. That is why he, in his teaching on labour ethic in socialism does not only condemn «slovenliness, carelessness, untidiness, unpunctuality, nervous haste, the inclination to substitute discussion for action and talk for work» but also «the rich, the swindlers, the idlers and the rowdies» as «the dregs of humanity... (like) an ulcer inherited from capitalism». (S.W. 2515) cited in Lane, D., 1976, p. 29.
61. While Lenin foresees the quick disappearance of such factors in the socialist political framework, he stresses the need to incorporate the most advanced forms of capitalist managerial technique, labour discipline etc. into the socialist economy. He even goes to the extent to advocate the utilization of certain principles of Taylorism (which for him, «is the last word of capitalism») because «its greatest – scientific achievements (lie) in the field of analysing mechanical motions during work, in the elimination of superfluous and awkward motions, in the working out of correct methods of work, and in the introduction of the best system of accounting and control etc.» (C.W.27:259) – cited in Lane, op. cit.
This is what imperialism and its intellectual coolies fear mostly, since they see in the rapid development of the forces of production in socialism a serious threat to the global influence of capitalism.

62. Frank, A., 1969, p. 145.
63. Especially if progressive forces occupy key positions in government but do not control state power.
64. See, for example, Gerbard, H., and L., Rathman (ed.) 1972. Peaceful and piecemeal elimination of capitalism, not its reformation, is the final goal of this strategy. Marxism – Leninism is expected to be the ideological guideline of the progressive forces involved in the exercise.
65. Rosenthal M., and Judin, p. 119.
66. Op. cit.
67. For example while Behrendt advocates a better pattern of Wealth distribution in the developing countries through the elimination of conservative feudal exploiters, he expects the better wealth distribution to be realized in a capitalist framework. (Behrendt, R. 1968, pp. 623–626). See also Ghassy, G. 1966, p. 819, quoted by Griening H. 1972, p. 345.
68. Make no mistake! Colonialism needed this basic development to be able to exploit the colonies effectively.
69. Frank regards foreign capital in the Third World as a major neo-colonial channel of brute exploitation. Frank refers, for example to conservative estimates of the U.S. Department of Commerce which show: (a) That «between 1950 and 1965 the total flow of capital on investment account from the United States to the rest of the world was \$ 23.9 billion, while the corresponding capital inflow from profits was \$ 37.0 billion, for a net inflow into the United States of \$ 13.1 billion. Of this total, \$ 14.9 billion flowed from the United States to Europe and Canada while \$ 11.4 billion flowed in the opposite direction, for a net outflow from the United States of \$ 3.5 billion. Yet between the United States and all other countries that is mainly the poor underdeveloped ones, the situation is reversed \$ 9.0 billion of investment flowed to these countries while \$ 25.6 billion profit capital flowed out of them, for a net inflow from the poor to the rich of \$ 16.6 billion» (Frank, A. op. cit., pp. 27–28). (b) That of the total capital obtained and employed from all sources by United States operations in Brazil in 1957, 26 per cent came from the United States and the remainder was raised in Brazil, including 36 per cent from Brazilian sources outside the American firms. (Frank, A., op. cit).
70. Griening H., 1972, p. 346.
71. See Behrendt's strategy point 11 discussed above; see further Behrendt, R., 1968, p. 535.

RESUME

L'auteur situe son article dans le cadre de lutte continue que doivent mener les spécialistes africains en sciences sociales marxistes contre la prolifération des théories bourgeoises de développement qui sont souvent proposées aux pays du Tiers-Monde. Il consacre l'essentiel de son article à une critique fine de la thèse de BEHRENDT, un théoricien allemand dont les principes ont été recommandés à plusieurs états africains qui avaient demandé des conseils au gouvernement allemand en ce qui concerne leurs stratégies de développement. Cette même thèse a plus tard été épousée par les organismes internationaux de financement tels que la Banque Mondiale et le F.M.I. Cette thèse qui, selon l'auteur, contient une forte dose de principes fonctionnalistes pro-capitalistes, repose sur trois paramètres, définis par ailleurs par NASH et qui sont :

- le «*Ideal Typical Index Mode*» qui définit ce que doivent être les caractéristiques d'un pays développé
- le «*Acculturation View*» qui fait des pays développés des communautés dont la mission est de propager les connaissances, les aptitudes, l'organisation, les valeurs, la technologie et le capital.
- le «*Psychological Mode*» que constitue l'analyse du processus comme il se déroule actuellement dans les pays dits sous-développés.

Sur la base de ces principes BEHRENDT dresse la liste des traits qui caractérisent les pays en développement qu'il oppose d'une manière arbitraire et sélective à ceux caractérisant les pays développés. De cette opposition il élabore sa conception du développement qu'il identifie à une «*catégorie philosophique sociale*». Selon BEHRENDT, dit l'auteur, le développement social est une transformation culturelle guidée, à l'intérieur d'une société donnée, avec une participation de plus en plus importante des membres de cette société à la promotion, le contrôle et la répartition des fruits du processus de transformation. A partir de cette conception du développement il définit sa stratégie du développement dont la critique constitue l'essentiel de cet article. Dans cette partie, l'auteur rappelle les points de vue de différents critiques qui ont eu par le passé à analyser les différentes thèses de la théorie bourgeoise de modernisation. Il insiste plus particulièrement sur l'importante contribution de Andre Gunnar FRANK qui, selon l'auteur, a porté le coup le plus sévère à cette théorie.

Cependant les points de vue de FRANK, bien que partagés par la plupart des spécialistes africains en sciences sociales d'obédience marxiste, ont fait l'objet de certaines critiques. Certains spécialistes lui reprochent notamment d'avoir mis l'accent beaucoup plus sur les rapports commerciaux que sur l'analyse des rapports de classes, plus particulièrement sur la structure sociale interne.

DOCUMENTS

ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN ASSESSMENT BY THE OAU, ECA AND ADB SECRETARIATS (ECA Edited Version)

I INTRODUCTION

In July 1979, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity adopted the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa, on the recommendations of African Ministers responsible for economic development and planning. The recommendations of the Ministers were themselves based on proposals already worked out by sectoral conferences such as the Conference of African Ministers of Industry, the Conference of African Ministers of Trade and the Conference of African Ministers of Transport, Communications and Planning.

In order to devise a plan of action for the implementation of that Strategy, the Heads of State and Government held an extraordinary summit in Lagos, Nigeria, in April 1980, devoted exclusively to economic development problems of Africa and adopted the Lagos Plan of Action (1) for the Economic Development of Africa. The Plan was presented to the United Nations General Assembly at its eleventh special session in September 1980 and is now an integral part of the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade.

Concerned about the dim prospects projected for Sub-Saharan African countries in the 1980s and beyond, as presented in the World Development Report, 1979 (2), the African Governors of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in September 1979 requested the World Bank to prepare «a special paper on the economic development problems of these countries and an appropriate programme for helping them». The response to that request is the report entitled «Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action», (3) which was published in 1981.

Following the publications of the World Bank Report, a joint staff working group of the OAU, ECA and ADB secretariats, set up for the purpose of reviewing the report, prepared, in September 1981, a paper containing some preliminary reflections. The paper was presented to the meeting of the African Governors of the Bank. At that meeting, the Governors decided that further discussion of the report should be held in Africa and that a special meeting should be organized by ADB, ECA and OAU for that purpose.

The aim of this paper, which has been prepared by the resumed meeting of the joint secretariat working group in Addis Ababa in January 1982, is to assist in a better understanding of the goals, objectives and characteristics of the report in the light of the requirements of the Lagos Plan of Action.

Accordingly, the paper discusses the contrasting goals, objectives and characteristics of the two documents; examines the broad economic policy issues raised by the report, reviews the report's treatment of sectors; and concludes with a highlight of the findings of the group.

II. GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND CHARACTERISTICS

A./ THE LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION

The Lagos Plan of Action was adopted by African Heads of State and Government against the background of two decades of stagnation in output; worsening balance of payments brought about by deteriorating terms of trade; increasing payments for the import of high-level skills, capital goods, spare parts and equipment, raw material inputs, marketing, shipping and insurance services; widespread unemployment and mass poverty; and a painful realization that past policies are not viable and sustainable if the objectives of self-reliance, eradication of mass poverty, reduction of widespread unemployment, equitable distribution of the benefits of development and economic growth, sovereignty over natural resources and equitable participation in international decision-making processes are to be pursued and achieved.

The Plan is designed to restructure the economy of Africa, based on the twin principles of national and collective self-reliance and self-reliant and self-sustaining development. Restructuring implies not only the necessary change in the composition of goods and services by gradually increasing the shares of industrial products in the national and regional basket of goods and services but also internalizing the sources of the supply of producer goods (capital equipment, spare parts and machines and raw material inputs), high-level skills for natural resources exploration, evaluation and extraction, products and process design, industrial and other production organization and management, project identification, analysis and implementation, research and development, education and training, marketing, banking, shipping and financial services; changing the pattern of external trade, and changing the ownership of enterprises not only between the public and private sectors but also between indigenous and foreign ownership.

The principles of self-reliance and self-sustainment imply the increasing dependence of economic growth and development on internal demand stimuli and the gradual substitution of domestic for imported factor inputs. Collective self-reliance implies the pooling of resources — manpower, markets, institutions, finance etc. — at the sub-regional, regional and other multinational levels for the purpose of effectively achieving those objectives enumerated above.

Within this framework, the Plan emphasizes the imperative need for the countries of the region individually and collectively to have a thorough knowledge of the natural resource base of their economies not only for the purpose of determining the industrial products which they can produce but also for designing appropriate strategies for the types of high-level skills which they can import in the short-run and must produce in the long run.

The Plan is based on an integrated approach which covers different economic and social activities and takes into account the interdependence of these activities. In this connexion, the Plan recognizes two leading

production sectors – food and agriculture and industry. The industrial sector is designed to make possible the supply of the bulk of industrial inputs required for agricultural production, processing, storage and transportation. The food and agriculture programme (which includes forest products and industrial fibres) is designed to provide not only inputs into the processing industries but also markets for industrial products. And the industrial programme goes much further; it is intended to cover building materials and metal and engineering products which make heavy use of capital goods. Emphasis is also laid on the need to attack the present paradox of the African region with its enormous energy resources and its heavy dependence on energy imports, by developing science and technology and human resources relevant not only to the development of industry, agriculture, transport and communications but to the local evaluation, extraction and refining of natural resources which constitute the base of all production.

The Plan underscores the importance of involving all agents of development and change : private enterprises, public enterprises; trade unions; chambers of commerce, agriculture, industry and mines, etc.; universities and other institutions of learning and research in the process of development and growth.

The Plan recognizes the importance of regional economic co-operation and integration as necessary instruments for pursuing the objectives of national and collective self-reliance and accordingly spells out clearly the steps to be taken for strengthening economic co-operation and integration efforts.

While the importance of external assistance is recognized, the Heads of State and Government were convinced that «... outside contributions should only supplement our own efforts, they should not be the mainstay of our development» (4).

In outlining and adopting the Lagos Plan of Action, member States were fortified by one important fact; that not one of today's developed countries developed by depending excessively on external sources for the supply of the strategic inputs into their processes of generating and sustaining development and economic growth. Indeed, the development and economic growth of these countries were based on the development of their national markets for the supply of factor inputs and production of final goods and services. The decision to export usually came later on. This approach has been adopted irrespective of political and ideological orientation.

B./ ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION

The authors of the World Bank Report recognize the existence of the Lagos Plan of Action and claim to build on it. According to them the report «deals with short – to medium-term responses to Africa's current economic difficulties. It focusses on how growth can be accelerated and how the resources to achieve the longer-term objectives set by the African Governments can be generated, with the support of the international

community» (5). In short, the main objective of the report is to design a short – to medium-term strategy that will assist member States to generate the resources necessary to implement the goals and objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action.

The Strategy proposed is based on a diagnosis of the economic situation of sub-Saharan Africa as it has evolved over the past two decades. Basically, the findings are the following: slow over-all economic growth; sluggish agricultural performance coupled with rapid rates of population increase; balance of payments and fiscal crises, overextended public sector and scarcities of financial resources, skilled manpower and organizational capacities.

However, according to the World Bank, the picture is not uniformly bleak: vastly more Africans are in schools and most are living longer, roads, ports and new cities have been built and new industries developed; technical and managerial positions, formerly occupied by foreigners, are now held by Africans. In general, the authors agree that «for most African countries, and for a majority of the African population, the record is grim and it is no exaggeration to talk of crisis» (6). Indeed, as they put it, «slow over-all economic growth, sluggish agricultural performance coupled with rapid rates of population increase, and balance of payments and fiscal crises – these are dramatic indicators of economic trouble» (7).

As far as the causes of the present crises are concerned, the report identifies internal and external factors. Internal factors comprise constraints based on «structural» factors that evolved from historical circumstances or from the physical environment and they include underdeveloped human resources, the economic disruption that accompanied decolonization and post-colonial consolidation, climatic and geographic factors hostile to development and rapidly growing population. External factors consist of adverse trends in the international economy which include, particularly since 1974, «stagflation» in the industrialized countries, higher energy prices, the relatively slow growth of trade in primary products and adverse terms of trade especially for copper and iron ore. The authors conclude their analysis of sources of lagging growth by asserting that the internal «structural» problems and the external factors have been exacerbated by domestic policy inadequacies comprising trade and exchange-rate policies which have over-protected industry, held back agriculture and absorbed much administrative capacity; too little attention being paid to administrative constraints in mobilizing and managing resources for development, particularly since planning, decision-making and management capacities were weak; and a consistent bias against agriculture in price, tax, and exchange-rate policies.

Since the majority of Africans are engaged in agriculture and this sector has performed badly during the past two decades, the solution to African problems lies in prosperous agriculture. Therefore, the report contends that sub-Saharan Africa now needs to concentrate on agriculture with a view to increasing exports so as to earn the foreign exchange required for the implementation of the Lagos Plan of Action. Furthermore, the report offers a prescription: if sub-Saharan Africa is to change the present economic situation, it must concentrate on production, and agriculture is necessarily the centrepiece of any production – oriented strategy. The main

elements of such a strategy are: concentration of resources on small holders; reform of incentive structures to ensure better prices; more open and competitive marketing system; and greater availability of consumer goods in some instances; a focus in the medium term on making existing programmes work better and on rehabilitation of existing infrastructure, small-scale irrigation, and rural roads; a major effort in research on crops and livestock; and expansion of pest control and related activities to reduce post-harvest losses.

The report also acknowledges that productive activities can take place in other sectors as well. Thus, the authors discuss energy, industry (manufacturing, utilities, construction), non-fuel minerals, and transport and communications. The importance of human resources is also discussed. However, they maintain that most of the activities in the other sectors are to be supportive of agriculture.

To implement the agriculture-based and export-oriented strategy, three major policy actions are recommended: more suitable trade and exchange-rate policies, increased efficiency of resources use in the public sector; and improvement in agricultural policies. Other aspects of the strategy include the reduction of size of the public sector and the encouragement of small-scale enterprises, co-operatives, and the promotion of the participation of foreign private capital.

Finally, the report maintains that the agricultural-based and export-oriented development strategy is an essential beginning to a process of long-term transformation, a prelude to industrialization, which in addition to rapid population, expanding urbanization, soil conservation, reforestation, fuelwood consumption and regional co-operation and integration is regarded as a longer-term issue.

C./ SOMME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

In their diagnostic analyses of the economic problems of Africa, there is no doubt that the two documents have a lot in common. However, while the Lagos Plan of Action sees external factors as having played a major role in producing the present unsatisfactory situation, the World Bank Report gives internal factors a greater role.

The World Bank claims that its strategy is designed to deal with short – to medium-term economic problems of sub-Saharan Africa as well as assist in generating resources Africa needs. It gives the impression that the Lagos Plan of Action is only a long-term strategy whose main objective is to create an African Economic Community by the year 2000. It is important to stress that, although the Lagos Plan of Action has as its ultimate aim the creation of an African Economic Community, such ultimate objective is based on a series of short – to medium-term activities.

The emphasis of the World Bank Report is on Africa continuing to feed external markets. As far as the Lagos Plan of Action is concerned, national and collective self-reliance and self-reliant and self-sustaining development and economic growth imply the development of national, sub-regional and regional markets.

While the World Bank Report identifies agriculture as the motor of all African countries, the Lagos Plan of Action recognizes that the motor of any country will depend on the content and nature of its natural resource endowment.

III. BROAD DEVELOPMENT ISSUES

A./ STRATEGIES OF GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

Two distinct strategies of growth and development seem to be outlined in the two documents under discussion. On the one hand is the agriculture-based and export-oriented strategy of the report of the World Bank, on the other is the internally-oriented and inter-sector-based strategy of development and economic growth which underlies the Lagos Plan of Action. The purpose of this part of the paper is to examine the assumptions, prescriptions and other characteristics of the two strategies in the light of the development problems which now confront African countries. And in this examination, of particular concern will be the capacity of the strategy proposed by the World Bank to assist in the implementation of the goals and objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action.

1. — Generation of Resources

To buttress their arguments and recommendations for an agriculture-based and export-oriented strategy, the authors of the World Bank report claim that the strategy «will help generate the resources Africa needs to consolidate its political and administrative forces, educate and improve the health of its people, and find out what will work and what will not. It will bring forth human talent now neglected and uncover physical resources not yet imagined. And it will open the way to a future whose shape we cannot yet see» (8). Since one of the problems that have continued to preoccupy member States since the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action is how to find 'resources' with which to implement it, this is a claim whose justification needs to be examined.

While the authors have talked a lot about the need to increase the efficiency of resource use in the public sector and the need to increase substantially external assistance to Africa with a view to implementing the strategy they have recommended, there is no place in the report where they have undertaken an explicit discussion of the direct relationship between the results of the proposed strategy if implemented and the achievement of the goals and objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action. The claim seems to be an assumption, but the basis of this assumption needs to be examined.

As a basis for this examination, it is important to discuss the concept of resources in the framework of the customary division into financial and non-financial resources. Financial resources comprise both foreign and domestic financial resources. Non-financial resources concern skilled manpower, entre-preneurial and organizational capability, institutions comprising enterprises (private and public), co-operatives, research institutions

(research institutes, universities, etc.), support institutions such as agricultural extension and industrial estate services, and capital assets, spare parts and equipment as recognized also in the report.

a) Foreign exchange

In recommending that African countries should increase agricultural and primary commodity exports in order to earn foreign exchange, the authors of the World Bank Report worked on certain assumptions, which included the following:

- (a) The markets for such commodities will always be available; and
- (b) The prices to be paid for such commodities will increase to compensate for the inflation of the prices which they pay for manufactured goods, high-level skills, shipping, insurance, banking and consultancy services.

Assuming that the required increased productivity will be forthcoming (which is doubtful in view of the fact that what is recommended strongly is rain-fed agriculture and it is clear that very few results can be achieved through the application of technology particularly in the area of inputs), to assume that the markets will always be available is to ignore the low income elasticity of demand for primary commodities, the fact that developing countries have a falling share of slow-growing international trade in primary commodities (9), the protective agricultural policies in the industrial countries and the competition of the countries of other developing areas and of Eastern Europe.

Similarly, to assume that the prices to be paid will always be rising to compensate for the inflationary tendencies of manufactured goods and labour services, especially when they are supplied under the imperfect market conditions which now prevail in the world, is to ignore the influence of substitutes through the production of synthetics and the occasional sale of stockpiles.

The upshot of the foregoing is that the expected foreign exchange earnings cannot be guaranteed unless assurances are obtained from the industrial countries and/or stabilization schemes are agreed and made more effective. However, in view of the problems with such schemes, notwithstanding the STABEX (10) and SYSMIN (11) schemes, it is difficult to see how such assurances can be obtained.

b) Domestic financial resources

In proposing all the measures enumerated in the report, the authors believe that financial resources can be released particularly from the public sector for use in the development of the other sectors. However, such a belief assumes that such savings can be converted into real resources which are probably to be imported. But as has already been said above, the agriculture-based and export-oriented strategy proposed cannot generate sufficient foreign exchange. And since the development of high-level skills and industrial capital and intermediate inputs is an issue for the future, there are no counterpart resources to be purchased with such savings.

c) Non-financial resources

The most intricate issue as far as the claim made for an agriculture-based and export-oriented strategy is concerned is the generation of non-financial resources. If the capital assets, spare parts and equipment are removed from the list of real resources mentioned above, it is clear that real resources mean high level skills. And to develop high-level skills, it is an elementary fact that specific tasks and products must be identified. In terms of the requirements of the Lagos Plan of Action, those tasks and products are not only to be found in the food and agriculture and public administration sectors, they are also to be found in the natural resources, industry, transport and communications, distribution, insurance and banking sectors.

The pertinent question is to what extent can an agriculture-based and export-oriented strategy release the relevant human talent and assist in the generation of such a range of skills? Similarly, to what extent can an agriculture-based and export-oriented strategy assist in developing the technology or technologies required for the different industrial products and processes which are required albeit over time if a country or group of countries are to achieve self-reliance and self-sustaining development? It is a well-known fact that agricultural commodities have a limited capacity to generate technologies and require little if any high-level skills. Moreover, since the strategy proposed is concerned only with the export of non-fuel minerals and small-scale enterprises, it is also clear that all these high-level skills and the technologies which the Lagos Plan of Action stress will not be generated during the period covered by the strategy.

Yet, the report stresses the need for human resources development. Hence, if a serious human resources development programme is mounted without identified links with the other sectors and their products and process, then there is likely to be a continuation of the present brain drain!

There is no doubt that the authors of the report are aware that the strategy they recommend would not generate the required resources and that is why they have strongly recommended increased external assistance. In the circumstances, the question is to what extent can the pursuit of this approach assist in solving the present problems of balance of payments, which have been brought about both by adverse terms of trade and by an import substitution strategy that depended on the importation of almost all the inputs required for the production of the goods being import-substituted? The simple answer to the foregoing questions is that the proposed strategy cannot assist African countries to implement the goals and objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action.

2./ OTHER ISSUES RELATED TO EXTERNAL ORIENTATION

a) Export-orientation and markets

In the foregoing it has been argued that external markets are not going to be available for the products of African countries. However, the issue should be pushed further. Assuming the markets were available, is a strategy encouraging external orientation and neglect of the domestic and

regional markets by African countries not encouraging the mortgaging of Africa's future? In the world that is full of uncertainties and threats of various action, pursuing such a strategy could be suicidal.

The external orientation of the World Bank's strategy assumes that Africa's production should continue to be exchanged in the industrial countries of the North. It is in recognition of the uncertain situation in such markets that the Lagos Plan prescribes that African countries themselves should become users of their primary commodities for their own industrialization. Through the production of intermediate and finished capital and consumer goods, Africa hopes to make internal demand the principal stimuli for its outputs. In the World Bank Strategy, the markets of the North remain economically separated from Africa while in the strategy of the Lagos Plan, African markets are to be integrated. Another problem with the World Bank Strategy is that reforms for domestic policies are recommended to improve the individual export market in African countries, whereas no policy reforms are recommended for the overprotected external marketing process.

The discussion of export growth is limited by the assumption that greater export growth is desirable (based partly on the fact of rising current account deficits). But African countries at independence placed high priority on reducing the high dependence of their GDP on exports — 22 per cent in 1960, as against 7 per cent in low-income countries as a whole; 16 per cent in middle-income countries, and 12 per cent in industrialized countries — (Statistical annex to the report, table 5). In order to reduce the exposure of their economies to the vagaries of international markets for raw materials, African countries attempted to diversify into other export crops and into processing of raw materials. The emphasis of the report on the failure of Africa to expand exports along with the expansion in world trade ignores these objectives and therefore does not attempt to reconcile them with the proposed solution of trying to increase export earnings. The report is probably correct that if African countries wish to expand export earnings, they can do so most efficiently (or least inefficiently) by concentrating on their traditional comparative advantage in raw materials — but it cannot be assumed that expansion of exports is a desired objective. In spite of the poor performance of African exports in the 1970s and rapid expansion elsewhere, the export share of GDP remains over twice as high (23 per cent) in Africa as in low-income countries as a whole (11 per cent) and higher than in middle-income and industrialized countries (20 per cent and 19 per cent, respectively). Thus, the old arguments about dependence on mono-crop, fluctuations in prices and declining long-run terms of trade come into play. In ignoring these, the emphasis of the report on stimulating export growth to lead GDP is disquietening.

The figures in the preceding paragraph show that African exports did grow as fast as GDP over the period 1960–1979, and that a substantial increase in the export share of GDP can hardly be expected given the already high ratio in the base year. Contrary to the report's conclusion that low growth in export volume is to blame for rising current account deficits, the failure to control import growth seems to be a more appropriate culprit in view of the desire to reduce foreign dependence and the high export/GDP ratio.

b) External resources and national income

While GNP figures have been used throughout the Report and the impression is given that reactivation of growth means increase in GNP, the strong recommendation for an increased inflow of expatriate personnel belies this impression. Thus, implicitly, the authors of the report are encouraging increases in GDP. On the other hand, the Lagos Plan is designed to increase the GNP of African countries through the development of scientific and technological and other manpower at all African levels.

c) Openness of the African economy

In their diagnosis of African economies, the authors describe them as extremely open. Yet, they have recommended intensified exports. Contrary to the report's implications of an export lag in the 1970s, the figures given in the statistical annex to the report, table 5, show that Africa is more dependent on exports of primary products than any other region and is «uncommonly open», as the report says.

In the conclusion, the implementation of either strategy requires a heavy cost in terms of money and human sacrifices. And the fate of Africa depends on which set of sacrifices Africa chooses. The Lagos Plan of Action, while appreciating the importance of foreign trade, foreign exchanges and foreign aid, recognizes the primacy of the substitution of internal for external stimuli to economic growth and development, and of the substitution of intra-African for extra-African supplies of raw materials and factor inputs. Accordingly, it calls for very high priority to be given to the development at the national, multinational and regional levels of know-how and institutional capabilities for the exploration, evaluation and management of natural resources, for the extraction of raw materials therefrom, and then for their combination and conversion into semi-finished and finished products to meet the needs of the African people. This order of priorities reflects the view that no implementation of the Lagos Plan of Action is possible without a considerable extension in the range as well as the quality of the present materials base of production designed for extra-Africa exports and without the vigorous promotion of intra-African trade in industrial raw materials. It goes further to stress the importance of establishing intersectoral and intrasectoral linkages at the national and multinational levels so that sectors and subsectors can exert mutually growth promoting pressures on each other.

**B./ THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS
IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

One of the striking features of the report is its advocacy of improvements in economic management policies with a view to increasing the tempo of economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. This focus is quite understandable. So is its concern implicit in many remarks and conclusions to ensure that resources for the public sector do not have an unacceptably

severe adverse impact on development. However, there are several basic questions with respect to which the report's treatment is less than wholly satisfactory. They could be conveniently raised under the following headings.

1. — *The Public Sector*

There are a number of historical and practical reasons why the public sector is large (and most probably will continue to be large) in Africa. Historically, and especially during the post-War period, most developing countries (and African countries were no exception) have had the perception that rapid economic development could come only through a very strong intervention and leadership of the public sector. The indigenous private sector was rarely ever in a position to play an active role in development, especially in the modern sector. Skilled manpower was concentrated in the public sector, resources (meagre as they were) for projects were directly or indirectly dependent on government initiative; information (on technology, on markets, on financing, etc.) was largely more accessible to the government; and, finally the government was organized, but the indigenous private sector was not.

Resulting from this historical fact, and because of the paternalistic perception of government and leaders which tradition encouraged, the ordinary person looked to government to take initiative, to lead the way, to influence and sometimes even to act forcefully in the process. Therefore, the public sector was far ahead of the indigenous private sector in bringing about development, almost the reverse of the situation in many advanced market economies where the private sector set the pace for development.

Although changes have taken place in Africa over the last two decades, the situation portrayed above has not altered substantially, and for some time to come the public sector would probably remain large. If this assessment is accepted, it follows that a more practical goal of policy should aim at making public sector more efficient and more development-oriented rather than attempting to reduce its size.

Seen in this perspective, it is not at all certain that the report has approached the problem pragmatically. The focus is on the shortcomings of the public sector. No doubt many of these are valid, and no doubt some of the suggestions are well taken. But there is another side to the question. There are and have been, for example, cases where parastatal bodies have been efficiently managed and have made a meaningful contribution to development. The report should have given extensive treatment of these examples to provide a more pragmatic and balanced analysis of both successes and failures of such bodies.

The crux of the question is therefore not the problem of size, it is rather how efficiently public bodies are managed.

2. — *The Private Sector*

It may be true that the private sector in much of sub-Saharan Africa does not play as active a role as it could, even if one were to recognize its many problems. And to the extent that it could, development activity would no doubt proceed at a faster rate.

Once again, the treatment of the report on this issue is not balanced. References made in the report to the private sector extol its merits and its potentialities and the contribution it could make to growth.

In addition to the constraints on the private sector cited earlier, there are reasons why Governments in general are less fully supportive of private initiatives in many areas of development. In the context of development, the «profit motive» often tends not only to ignore but to go directly against the competition, there is the urge to capitalize on a «race opportunity» in an uncertain socio-political climate, and the feeling that this could be done without running the risk of sanctions or public knowledge as long as the necessary precautions are taken, etc.. Whatever the reasons, the damage (actual or potential) to wider socio-economic interests is often considerable.

Clearly, both the nature and size of private initiative are relevant fields of enquiry before advocating policies to encourage the private sector. This is a delicate area of public policy which a report like that of the World Bank should have covered. At any rate, ignoring it as the report had done can only lead to a false appreciation of the problem, or give rise to the feeling (however faint) that ideological inclinations might have inadvertently slipped through.

3. — *The Role of Co-operatives*

A major lacuna in the report is the role that co-operatives could play in accelerating the process of development. The extensive critique of the public sector and the lengthy analysis of the potential benefits that would result from a more active participation by the private sector should have suggested some degree of treatment of this important question. There have been marginal references made here and there but no suggestion is offered as to the potential results which could be obtained from a policy of encouraging co-operative activities in accelerating development.

C. TRADE AND EXCHANGE-RATE POLICY

The World Bank Report contends that «Trade and exchange-rate policy is at the heart of the failure to provide adequate incentives for agricultural production and for exports in much of Africa». (12) The argument is further reinforced by the seeming tendency of the policies to let «real official exchange rates become overvalued because of higher inflation at home than abroad» (13).

In analysing the deterioration in the balance of payments deficits in Africa during the 1970s, the report makes a point that «external factors certainly played a part in this deterioration...» but that they «were not the chief factor behind the growing deficits» (14). It goes on to suggest that «poor export performance was more significant» (15) in contributing to the slower growth.

The Report concludes that more and more African countries have moved towards a trade and exchange regime which, *inter alia*, accepts licensing of most imports, adoption of quotas against imports which compete with local production, protection for import substitution industry and

priority allocation of essential imports. This form of trade and exchange regime is described by the report as being in danger of biasing the incentive system against agriculture and industrial development.

Export performance is, of course, itself dependent upon «external factors», and there are two crucial ways in which this dependence is manifested.

First, production for export, especially of agricultural commodities, very much depends on imported inputs, fertilizers, pesticides, fuel, spare parts for machinery and equipment and even occasionally improved seed varieties. To the extent that manufactured commodities are exported, they too would be affected by imports of semi-finished goods (e.g. cotton, chemicals fuel, machinery and equipment).

In addition to direct imports, exports very much depend on the availability of reasonable transport services in terms of capacity, cost, etc. These, in turn, affect the rate of return of the commodities traded and the effective rate of exchange of the domestic currency involved. The report does not demonstrate that these factors have played a major role in inhibiting the growth of African exports.

Second, world demand is one of the determinant factors for export performance. The report takes up this point under «*Export-production*» and, itself, demonstrates how important world demand has been for performances. It states, for example, that «sisal suffered a marked drop in response to shrinking world demand» (16). For other commodities, the report suggests that relative prices during the period fell. If that is so, it follows that export performance was affected not only by domestic factors but also by an unfavourable external environment. Yet, this point seems not to have been observed in the earlier analysis of the external sector.

The crucial nature of the external sector has been the subject of debates and negotiations at many international meetings (17). It is also a subject of the World Bank report as has been referred to above. However, by providing a catalogue of recommendations on the shortcomings of domestic policy management alone, the report fails to recognize the dependency element of trade and exchange-rate regimes adopted by African Governments. The report makes a valid observation that there is a common pattern of African currencies being overvalued (18). But then, in accepting the cause and effect relationship of external factors, it avoids emphasizing the need for concerted international action to control and maintain as far as possible reasonable lower rates of inflation both at home and abroad. It is precisely (and probably this is the most important factor), the point that, unless global inflationary pressures are brought to a control, it would be practically difficult for African Governments, acting alone, to reduce substantially the effect of inflation on domestic currencies. Consequently, the most often recommended monetary measure of currency devaluation, which the report also makes, may not necessarily be the sufficient condition for supporting a sound trade and exchange-rate policy.

At the centre of the argument provided by the report is the concern that the creation of effective structures of incentives on the one hand, and of efficient domestic markets on the other will promote exports. Both

aspects are of course very important in the general framework of promoting rapid growth in agricultural production and industrial development as clearly stressed by the Lagos Plan of Action. What is rather surprising is the exclusive orientation of both aspects towards export production and external markets.

The general strategy for development and growth in Africa contained in the Lagos Plan of Action recognizes the importance of linking agriculture and industry for self-reliant requirements of the countries in the region. Governments, therefore, would adopt price and other incentive measures to reduce dependence on imports and encourage efficient production at home. In the short-run, the use of traditional measures of protection (such as import quotas, subsidies, export taxes etc.) may be effectively promoted. The effects of exchange-rate fluctuation could be minimized by reducing the dependence elements of the imported inputs.

The development of domestic markets will depend on the nature and scope of the regional integration process. By expanding the size of markets, production costs should be economized through large-scale operations. Given efficient transport and distribution outlets, market efficiencies should be greatly improved. In other words, potentials exist for both use of production incentives and the development of efficient markets in Africa – during the 1980s – without too much dependence on external markets. Agricultural production and others (mining, etc.) would form the basic source of raw materials to support industrial development and growth of the African region. The report could have looked into this strategy more carefully to bring out useful recommendations on how African trade and exchange-rate policy management could have been improved.

D./ LONGER-TERM ISSUES

The authors of the World Bank Report have selected as longer-term issues certain fundamental development issues such as population, urban growth, forest and soil conservation, land use and planning and regional economic co-operation and integration, which are also effectively dealt with in the Lagos Plan of Action. It is difficult to understand why these issues are regarded as longer-term. Since all development problems, like all human problems, require time to solve, it is wise to start planning for their solution now. This is why these issues are included in the Lagos Plan of Action and recommendations made for short-, medium- and long-term action.

1. – Population

The recommendations made by the authors about family planning and the need to aim at quality rather than quantity population are commendable but raise some questions. There are problems of low fertility in some parts of Africa and one would have expected the authors to review this type of situation and make appropriate recommendations. There are also problems of efficient use of human resources where minimum population considerations are concerned.

In connexion with population problems and the role of family planning, the authors recommend that «Governments should encourage widespread family-planning services and supplies, including availability of contraceptives at a very low price, *perhaps even free*» (19) (emphasis added). Comparing this with the strictures on the use of subsidies in the report, one must genuinely question the impression given in the report that efficiency must be interpreted in terms of revenue always covering costs. However, before resource use can be judged as efficient or not, consideration must be given to the objectives being pursued, whether they are economic, political or social.

2. — *Urban Growth*

If the number of African cities with over 500,000 population grew from 3 to 28 in two decades, then the problems of urban growth cannot be regarded as a longer-term issue. Indeed, all the accompanying problems of urban growth — excess demand on infrastructural facilities, transport congestion, shanty-towns, etc., are already here with us and action has to be initiated to deal with them. In this context, there is not much to disagree with the recommendations made by the authors. What is important is that town planning, including for satellite towns or what the authors call secondary centres, must be given the attention it deserves.

3. — *Resource Planning (Soil Conservation, Reforestation and Fuel Wood)*

In the context of resource planning, restricted in the report to soil conservation, reforestation and fuelwood supply, there is much to commend in what the authors of the report have recommended. There is no doubt that lack of attention to soil degradation and the wanton manner in which African forests are exploited represent consumption of capital and endanger future development potentials. The authors' recommendations on land-use planning, soil and water conservation, control of erosion, etc. are worth serious consideration by member States. The only problem with the report here, is that it regards these problems as of a longer-term nature. They are not.

4. — *Regionalism*

As far as this subject is concerned, there is no doubt that there is some ambivalence on the part of the report. Despite its explicit recognition of the importance of regional economic co-operation and ultimate integration to small States which have limited developmental alternatives and to the land-locked States for whose special problems they constitute long-run solutions, the report still regards these as belonging to the future. This is because the record thus far shows few successes.

Undoubtedly, the path to regional economic co-operation and ultimate integration is strewn with a lot of problems, obstacles and pitfalls. However, such problems, obstacles and pitfalls are not insuperable. As the authors are aware, regional economic co-operation and ultimate integration are the main instruments for achieving collective self-reliance, which the Heads of State and Government have identified in the Lagos Plan of Action.

Moreover, the Heads of State and Government recognized the problems involved and that was why they laid down the procedures to be adopted so that the objective of having an African Economic Community by the year 2000 can be achieved.

To say that member States should turn to regional economic co-operation only after they have established effective administrative machinery, developed a more productive monetized agriculture, created physical and social infrastructure, spread suitable education and accomplished other similar tasks at the national level is to ignore the fact that lack of economic co-operation activities particularly in the field of industry may delay and in some cases render impossible the attainment of such objectives at the national level. The fact that the authors have recommended intensification of efforts in joint planning and use of transport and communication links, energy resources and training institutions particularly in the fields of public administration and financial management and have deferred co-operation in the field of industries to the future can only be interpreted to mean that they deliberately want African countries to continue to pursue the bankrupt policies of exporting primary commodities. This cannot be. The necessary measures must be taken to push ahead with co-operation at the sub-regional, regional and other multinational levels and in all fields — industry, agriculture, transport and communications, etc. — in accordance with the goals, objectives and philosophy of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos.

The authors say that regional economic co-operation will require changes of substance, including strengthening transport links, reduction of monetary and commercial policies that inhibit and distort intra-regional trade, promotion of joint projects in industry, education, and research and regional institutions with adequate staff and budgets. These changes are already being made. No doubt there are problems such as inadequate staff and budgets for regional institutions, but such problems should not impede the move towards economic integration on the continent.

E./ THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE

The World Bank Report treats the subject of external assistance extensively, placing the reform of domestic policies in Africa at the heart of its consideration, and reiterates that with such reform the international community would commit itself to provide assistance «in ways more suitable to Africa's needs than in the past and in support of reform programmes defined by African Governments» (20).

The report is encouraging in its call for increased aid to Africa, the commitment of the World Bank to accord priority in fund allocation to Africa (via IDA), and in its call for policy reforms on the part of donors. Given the preference for project lending (which the report considers to be «particularly relevant to Africa's needs»), there are useful suggestions in the report on flexibility in the design of these projects in response to Africa's realities. Some of these suggestions such as the financing of pilot projects, local costs, structural adjustment lending and lending for research are already being implemented.

Useful suggestions are also presented in the report on debt management, project design and management training and technical assistance.

However, between 1970 and 1979 average terms of borrowing for sub-Saharan Africa as shown in table 21 of the statistical annex to the report have been deteriorating.

The interest on total public debt more than doubled between 1970 and 1979 (from 3.7 per cent to 7.9 per cent), the same was true for the interest rate on total official debt, which rose from 2 per cent in 1970 to 4.1 per cent in 1979. On bilateral loans to sub-Saharan Africa, the rate rose from 1.3 per cent in 1970 to 4.8 per cent in 1979, an increase of more than 300 per cent. The lowest increase in interest rate was on total private debt; the rate which, as usual, was already very high, rose from 6.8 per cent in 1970 to 11.4 per cent in 1979, an increase of nearly 70 per cent. It was only on multilateral debt that there was an unsteady decrease in the rate of interest during the period. In fact, the rate actually rose in 1971 (5 per cent) and in 1975 (5.2 per cent) over the 1970 figure of 4.3 per cent. For all other years the rate wavered around 4 per cent other than in 1978 and 1979 when it dropped to 3.3 per cent and 3.4 per cent respectively.

The depressing trend observed above, taken from table 21 of the annex to the report, was equally true for maturity, grace period and grant element. The only exceptions were the grant element in multilateral debt, which rose marginally from 46.3 per cent to 48.9 per cent and the grace period on total private debt, which rose from its low figure of 1.6 to 3.2 years during the period.

On total public debt, maturity declined from 24.4 years in 1970 to 16.7 years in 1979, while on total official debt, the maturity dropped from 31.9 years to 24.9 years between 1970 and 1979. The drop in maturity on bilateral aid was 31.5 to 20.7 years during this period, and on multilateral aid, from 32.2 years to 28.8 years. On total private debt, maturity maintained its general level, swinging from 10 years in 1970 to 8.1 in 1972, 8.5 in 1975 and 9 years in 1979.

The principal conclusion to be drawn from these hardened terms of borrowing for sub-Saharan Africa is that they are a reflection of the scarcity of real resources, a fact which is supported by slow growth in gross disbursements of external loans to sub-Saharan Africa.

The Lagos Plan of Action recognizes the important contribution that external assistance can make towards Africa's socio-economic development, but states that as long as external aid is beyond the control of the beneficiaries, its long-term benefits would be limited. Furthermore, the Plan states that «these outside contributions should only supplement our own efforts; they should not be the mainstay of our development» (21).

The report fails to recognize that a greater part of external assistance must be repaid, in foreign exchange, and that the cost of such repayment increases year after year, leading to debt accumulation. Table 18 of the annex to the report shows that total debt for sub-Saharan Africa increased substantially from 5,136.4 million dollars to 32,156.2 million between 1970 and 1979, while debt service increased from 447.9 million to 3,488.8 million dollars during the same period.

The reforms which are recommended in the report amount to a considerable pressure on recipients with too much emphasis on what they should do, in comparison with those addressed to donors. For instance, the problems of tied aid have not been examined in the report. Moreover, the effects which the recommended increases in external assistance will have on debt accumulation, have not been adequately addressed and there is no guarantee that the mechanical relationship between reform and increased assistance indicated in the report will work. In fact, it seems that a new conditionality is being introduced — «no reform, no aid increase». Even if there were an assurance of increased aid when reforms are effected, the combined impact of the cost of aid and such reforms would have adverse effects on African economies.

In addition, the causal link between aid increase and increase in *per capita* income has not been fully established in the report.

There is a contradiction between the report's recommendation that donors have special priority-setting responsibility in Africa (22) and the recognition that «the level and pattern of donor assistance to a country must be determined in the framework of programmes of action prepared by individual Governments» (23). Obviously, it must be recognized that effective assistance will only be that which is based on the priorities set by the recipients. Furthermore, the implication that African countries will *a priori* need more expatriate personnel also contradicts the idea that individual Governments have the right to determine their programmes.

In view of the points made above, it is quite clear that the total effect of the recommendations addressed to African Governments could very well make Africa more dependent and less self-reliant.

IV. SECTORAL REVIEW

A./ AGRICULTURE

Like in most other chapters of the World Bank Report, the chapter on policies and priorities in agriculture is treated in isolation and is loosely linked to the simultaneous integrated development of other sectors. The report acknowledges that «agriculture is at the heart of African economies» and «is the single most important determinant of over-all economic growth». It goes on to acknowledge that «growth-oriented policies for this sector are crucial for improving over-all economic performance» (24).

In the Lagos Plan of Action, African Governments have decided that their most immediate objective is an improvement in the food situation and laying of the foundation for the eventual achievement of self-sufficiency in food. They also recognize that «the development of agriculture, however, should not be considered in isolation, but integrated within the economic and social development processes» (25).

The World Bank Report focusses on smallholder production; changing incentive structures; expanding agricultural research; and irrigated agriculture. This action agenda is meant to be the basis for success of the proposed export-oriented strategy. While the report does not underrate

the importance of food production, it clearly advocates that «even if export crop output were to grow at the expense of food crop production, it is not necessarily bad (26). The main argument in the report for an export-oriented agricultural policy is that it will generate resource, namely the badly needed foreign exchange. The problem with this kind of argument is that it presupposes the availability of markets for the export products and the capability of developing countries to compete with developed ones. Neither of these assumptions can be taken for granted.

The other issue related to producing for export at the expense of food crop production is that this is likely to perpetuate the situation in which African countries will continue to depend on 'food aid'. Interestingly enough, the report treats the subject of 'food aid' very lightly although it points out that «it now accounts for more than 20 per cent of total net cereals imports» (27). It is indeed because Africa does not want to depend on external sources for its food supply that it has decided that the immediate objective should be to bring about quantitative and qualitative improvements in food production, with a view to replacing a sizable proportion of the products imported now.

Another problem with export-oriented strategy is that it discourages the effective development of food and agro-industries for domestic and regional markets.

The report further outlines the basic requirements for improvement of agricultural production in the region, by arguing strongly in favour of the smallholder sector. It bases its argument on the view that large-scale, government-operated estates «were beset with problems of management, over-employment of staff, underutilization of expensive machinery, and maintenance of equipment and infrastructure» (28). The basic question here is whether one is to find a solution to these problems or simply give up and turn to the extreme alternative.

In order to assure markets for products of smallholders, the report also recommends that «Governments should also consider giving more room to agro-industrial enterprises (perhaps through concessions) whose external capital and technical know-how could be applied to plantations or irrigation crops as well as used in industrial processing» (29). Nothing could be more at variance with the aspirations of African countries to make agriculture productive than to suggest that such aspirations should be based on the good-will of foreign capital and entrepreneurial resources.

The report elaborates on suggestions aimed at improving production and incentive structures, and makes some commendable recommendations in this regard. One glaring criticism that the report makes about African Governments is that they «have dual policy objectives in setting and regulating their prices. They want to provide adequate incentives for increasing food production, and they seek to protect the interests of consumers at the same time» (30). The adoption of such a policy is not necessarily irrational because any developing country would be interested in both mechanisms to an appreciable degree.

The other aspect of this sector that the report treats quite extensively is that of research. The report analyses the present situation quite

accurately and spells out a number of priorities that are to be undertaken in this sphere. It quite rightly underlines the need for testing and validating, under individual conditions, the improved technology developed by the existing regional and international research organizations. However, by the very nature of their differences in approach to priorities, the report is at variance with the Lagos Plan of Action when it comes to the short-term objectives. While the Lagos Plan of Action states that «agricultural research work should be geared to supporting the objective of food-self-sufficiency» and therefore intensified «in improvement of production and nutritional values of all food crops (31), the World Bank Report asserts that «until results of intensified agricultural research are forthcoming», emphasis should be on a commercial lead crop while «projects based entirely on food crops should, during this interim period, be smaller and of a pilot nature» (32).

B./ INDUSTRY

The Lagos Plan of Action recognizes that in order to attain self-sufficiency in food, building materials, clothing and energy, it is essential that a solid basis be established for self-reliant and self-sustained industrialization at the national, sub-regional and regional levels. Self-reliant industrialization consists of a pattern of industrial development that is consistent with Africa's natural resources, human needs and socio-economic potential. In the circumstances, emphasis is put on the on-the-spot processing of an increasingly large portion of the continent's raw materials and the development of intermediate and capital goods industries particularly those intended for use by other sectors and industries and infrastructure building, e.g. the production of machinery and equipment for agricultural development, transport and communications, energy generation and transmission. The Plan also recognizes the need to develop human and institutional capabilities and capacities to determine the transfer adaptation and development of technologies.

The World Bank Report gives a marginal role to industrial development and discusses it under «other productive sectors». It argues that industry has tended to be a burden on agriculture, making large claims on scarce foreign exchange and not generating the anticipated domestic savings and government revenue. It asserts that trade and exchange-rate policies have been biased against exports in favour of industries producing consumer goods for domestic markets and identifies certain constraints namely market size, population density, wages and productivity, management costs, and capital and infrastructure costs. It finally proposes some strategy options such as processing of raw materials for export, import substitution and manufacturing for export.

In assessing the recommendations contained in the World Bank Report, it is necessary to examine (i) the marginal role accorded to industry; (ii) the constraints on industry; and (iii) the relevance of the industrial options proposed. By according a marginal role to industry, the authors of the World Bank Report discuss this vital sector lightly. Their message to Africa is: industry has been burdensome; there are problems

that cannot be overcome in the near future, and the best course of action open is to base the development strategy on a continued over-dependence on the export of basic raw materials.

The way the report overemphasizes what it identifies as 'constraints' can only be justified if one were to contend that African countries are to remain small fragmented units that lack an integrated and co-ordinated development plan. In discussing the market size 'constraint', for example, the report deliberately ignores the possibilities of regional integration as well as the integration of urban and rural markets, which would bring about greater utilization of indigenous raw materials. It further treats the population density 'constraint' in a generalized manner. The concern should rather be that of linking isolated and low density regions to the very high density populated area. As for the capital and infrastructure costs 'constraint', this is indeed what the African Governments are trying to fight through the utilization of raw material resources and the improvement of supporting infrastructure. Interestingly enough the report raises the issue of management costs as a constraint and recognizes that African industry relies heavily on expatriate management. Yet the report makes no provision for the systematic development of industrial manpower.

It is quite clear that the 'constraints' identified by the report are not insuperable and cannot prevent industrial development. They are among the issues Africa is determined to solve through the promotion of integrated economic and social development.

The report offers strategy options that advocate a type of industrialization whose pace would be determined by external factors, with the traditional international division of labour of exporting low-value added products and determined primarily by considerations of economy. The authors argue that most industrialization started on import substitution and Africa should set up many import substitution industries with a view to becoming exporters of manufactured products. The major weakness in this proposal is its failure to state what is to be substituted, in terms of required factor inputs and products, taking into account the failures of earlier attempts at import substitution, owing to that high import content in production which resulted in big claims on scarce foreign exchange.

In its treatment of the important subject of regional integration, the report attempts to highlight such 'obstacles' as transport and other links, distribution of industries, inability to compete and political disputes. Surely these are the 'obstacles' that by their very adoption of and commitment to the Lagos Plan of Action, African Governments are determined to remove.

A glaring omission on the part of the authors of the report is that no mention is made of the Industrial Development Decade for Africa, in spite of the fact that the entire international community has endorsed it by United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/35/66 (B).

C./ NON-FUEL MINERALS

The concern of the authors of the World Bank Report as far as non-fuel minerals are concerned is the exploitation of minerals for export. In this connexion, they have recommended that attention should focus on:

- (a) Rehabilitation of existing projects;
- (b) Increase in new investment;
- (c) Increased activities in exploration.

In order not to raise the issue of deteriorating terms of trade, the authors have assured the reader that the mineral market will revive during the mid-1980s. Such an assurance is in sharp contrast to the fact that «although cyclical factors may push prices of some African exports up from their low levels of the recent past, mounting energy costs, slow growth in the industrial countries (which translates into diminished markets for the developing world), and reduced growth of international trade (factors that have plagued the global economy for the last half decade) will make renewed African growth difficult» (33). Hence, there is still the problem of improving the external environment even if African countries are prepared to accept the harsh terms of the international mining companies which possess technical and marketing expertise and bear high risks.

The authors of the World Bank Report have paid little or no attention to Africa's quest for self-reliance and self-sustainment, and the use of national resources to develop basic industries as an important instrument for achieving such objectives is of little if any significance to them. In effect, what is being recommended is a continuation of past policies that have led Africa into a very serious dependent situation. The problem was and still is that the export of primary commodities to a geographically-confined area will eventually make their prices low and fluctuate, apart from the effect of the sale of stockpiles and of the availability of substitutes in terms of synthetics. There is no doubt that an acceptance of this strategy will worsen the present situation.

In order to begin the process of changing the present situation, the Lagos Plan of Action lays emphasis on industrialization based on the use of the abundant raw materials available on the continent for the production of fixed capital assets, spare parts and equipment, the costs of which, in addition to those of experts for the establishment and management of industrial enterprises, in the past have been in part responsible for Africa's balance-of-payments problems. The authors should have devoted an appreciable portion of their report to the possibilities of using some of the mineral wealth in the continent to produce at least some of the capital and intermediate goods which are now imported at exorbitant costs. Instead of doing this, they have chosen to highlight what they call obstacles to industrialization and integration, the two main instruments which African States have chosen to overcome some of these so-called obstacles or constraints.

D./ ENERGY

The report cites the growing scarcity of fuelwood as the major energy of most of Africa. To realize the potential of Africa's energy resources, it recommends investment in reforestation, and exploration and development of other forms of energy. Given the strong adverse impact of soaring energy costs on African economies, the report proposes economic and engineering studies of small-scale, regional hydro-electric projects. Coal is

considered as an item for export. Cost-effective technologies for exploiting solar and wind energy resources, it states, have not been developed sufficiently for economic use by African countries. Energy policy analysis and planning are deemed essential. Local planning units and regional planning measures are suggested to co-ordinate pricing, manufacturing, exploration and conservation goals.

The report explicitly recognizes the value of regional economic cooperation in this sector as perceived by the Lagos Plan of Action, but it confines energy planning responsibilities to individual countries without giving specific consideration to a regional planning and co-ordination unit as envisaged in the decision to create an Energy Commission. In respect of Africa's abundant coal reserves located in the southern African sub-region, the report refers to on-going exploration campaigns and anticipated exports to European markets, but gives no consideration to the processing of coal in Africa either as a substitute for fuelwood or as inputs into fledgling African industries.

The importance of the impending fuelwood crisis for the African population cannot be overemphasized. Nevertheless, coping with the budgetary and foreign exchange effects of rising commercial energy costs is an immediate priority for African Governments. The Report is inexplicably silent on the proposal for an energy affiliate to assist countries in developing national energy resources that are too modest to attract international private capital. Guidelines should have been given on how to initiate the eventual development of sun, wind, oil shale, tar sands and geothermal energy sources, all of which are abundant in Africa.

The important linkage between energy development and agricultural productivity is inadequately discussed in the report. Raising agricultural productivity requires increasing application of energy inputs, whether directly to fuel irrigation pumps and agricultural machinery or indirectly in the form of fertilizers. In addition, agricultural land will face increasing competition from fuelwood planted in response to the growing scarcity of wood and charcoal. National agricultural and energy planning must therefore be closely integrated, with special attention to adoption of technologies that are consistent with the objectives for both sectors and with national resource availability.

E./ TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

There is no doubt that the authors of the World Bank Report have made use of the document on the United Nations Transport and Communications Decade in Africa, which has been incorporated in the Lagos Plan of Action. However, they have been very selective in doing so in order to stress their points of interest, namely efficient use of resources, agriculture, exports and small-scale enterprises. It might be that if the African Regional Food Plan had stressed export of cash crops and the programme for the Industrial Development Decade had been prepared before the World Bank Report was written, they would have received more favourable consideration.

The report fails to follow the ordering of priorities as provided for in the Global Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action.

As far as emphasis on maintenance and the building up of capacity and capability not only for maintenance but also for project selection, analysis and implementation and management of transport and communications establishments are concerned, the views of the authors are in consonance with the requirements of the Lagos Plan of Action.

With respect to telecommunications, the report says that «highest priority should go to expanding domestic local and long-distance telecommunications networks, *to be complemented as soon as possible* by the upgrading and the expansion of intercountry facilities» (34) (emphasis added). It must be admitted that the phrase «long-distance telecommunications network» here is somewhat ambiguous since intra-African telecommunications networks can definitely be regarded as long-distance networks. However, in view of the orientation of the recommendations of the authors of the report towards exports, and the serious omission to discuss the importance of the Pan-African Telecommunications Network project, it is correct to assume that the authors are interested only in improvements in South-North long-distance telecommunications networks. In other words, the authors of the reports are not concerned that when people in neighbouring African countries want to talk to each other over the telephone, such calls have got to be routed through either Rome, Paris, London or Brussels. Such a recommendation ignores the burning desire of member States to break the colonial heritage of being near each other yet far away! It does not conform to the idea of creating economic communities, an important pillar of the objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action. The same attitude is reflected in the recommendation that the most urgently needed steps to improve intercountry transport are the wide range of «facilitation» measures and in the relish with which they approve that «the Global Strategy justifiably urges that higher priority be given to roads linking land-locked countries with the sea than to the designated Trans-African Highways» (35)

The report says that «transport costs weigh very heavily on the one-third of African countries which are land-locked» (36). The main problem here is that the land-locked countries in common with other African countries still believe that markets mean overseas markets with the result that the greater part of the price paid for primary commodities is taken up by transport costs, middleman's income, shipping and insurance costs to the detriment of the farmer-producer. A new orientation is needed so that the land-locked countries can exploit the advantages of economic co-operation with their neighbours.

The report also gives the impression that African countries should not invest much in international air transport even though the authors have identified aviation and telecommunications as less capital-intensive modes of communication. Just as in the case of long-distance telecommunications networks, there is some ambiguity here in the use of the phrase «international air transport». But even if it has been used in respect of extra-African international air transport, the recommendation should be further examined. The fact is that the establishment of intercontinental air transport is one of the means of achieving self-reliance and of relieving African

countries of some of their balance of payments problems especially if African countries pool their resources in this important sub-sector which provides great opportunities for joint project implementation.

While road networks, telecommunications, urban transport, railways, ports and shipping, intercountry transport and air transport are covered in the report, inland waterways and lakes are conspicuous by their absence. In view of the different capacities of the different modes of transport for transporting goods and people efficiently, one would have expected more emphasis on multimodal transport advantages and disadvantages, including those of inland waterways.

Over all, one should endorse the report's emphasis on institution building, infrastructural development and related training.

F./ HUMAN RESOURCES

Under the broad title of human resources, the report discusses three related subjects – education, training and health. In view of the importance of entrepreneurship as a human resource, in the present paper it is discussed in connexion with human resources development instead of under industrialization as in the World Bank Report.

1. – Education and Training

Because of the emphasis in the report on efficient use of resources in general and agriculture and exports in particular, the emphasis on education has been on cost reduction, especially in primary, secondary and university education, and training in certain key areas such as policy analysis, financial management and public administration.

In general, there is not much to disagree with in the recommendations. Indeed, one of the weaknesses of African economies is lack of management capability. Excessive costs also constitute a big constraint. However, when one realizes that the World Bank Report recommends an agriculture-based and export-oriented strategy with small-scale activities in the other productive sectors as supportive activities, one is bound to underscore the limited approach of the report to manpower development in Africa. In this connexion, it is important to note that the report stresses the need to avoid mismatches between the type of education offered and social demand.

As far as the Lagos Plan of Action is concerned, social demand in terms of skills covers the whole area of high-level skills not only in agriculture and exports but also in public administration, industry, research and development, natural resources, transport and communications, banking and insurance, etc., project identification, analysis, design and implementation; and design and management of production. Therefore, one would have expected concern to go beyond the problems of public administration and financial management, important as they are, and a serious discussion of the methods for imparting at very reasonable costs the skills for identifying, evaluating, extracting and developing natural resources for use in the industrial sector as well as the need to improve the content of the required education and the arrangements for imparting such skills just as the authors have proposed in the case of training public administration specialists, policy-oriented economists, accountants, budget analysts and auditors.

But apart from the omission of the discussion of the problems of high level manpower generally, one is particularly surprised that the authors have suggested concentration on general secondary school education instead of technical education on the ground that there is a greater demand for general secondary education than for technical education. In view of the bottleneck which intermediate level manpower has constituted for African development particularly in the critical area of maintenance of works and equipment (which the report recognizes in many places), one would have expected a very thorough treatment of the subject with appropriate recommendations. Moreover, the information given on the benefits from primary, secondary and university education in the report could have been extended into the area of technical education. In a developing economy, technical education, if given the right weight in a cost – benefit analysis, is likely to show more benefits than general education.

The report has recommended the use of external institutions as instruments for managerial and technical training. This recommendation ought to be carefully examined by member States. Otherwise the existing brain drain may get worse. In this connexion, the report's statement that «of course, much remains to be spelled out in this proposal, which has some obvious pitfalls but merits further exploration» (37) needs to be borne in mind whenever any project on training is discussed with the Bank and other donor agencies. In any case, the Lagos Plan of Action lays stress on training in Africa where the environment provides opportunities to see the main problems at first hand.

2. – *Entrepreneurial Resources*

In terms of shortage of skills, entrepreneurial ability is probably the scarcest as far as sub-Saharan African countries are concerned. Indeed, the scarcity of entrepreneurial ability has been the most single factor responsible for the domination of African economies by foreigners and this shortage is a common problem in all the sectors. Yet the authors of the World Bank Report were interested only in the need to encourage small-scale entrepreneurs in industry. Indigenous entrepreneurial ability must be developed in African countries.

3. – *Health*

In general, the report's concern with health as a component of human resources development is welcome. It is a well-known fact that the health facilities are still inadequate and are heavily concentrated in the urban areas. Hence, the need for efficiency in the use of resources and arrangements for making those that are well off to pay for some of the health services they get. The recommendations for a strategy for increasing access to primary health care, consolidating and upgrading health systems, research needs and water and sanitation are worth serious consideration by member States.

However, in view of the increasing awareness that so-called traditional medicine has a role to play in improving the health of Africans, one would have expected the authors of the report to discuss the place of traditional medicine and the role of the traditional doctor in the drive not

only to make medical services available to an increasing portion of the population but also to reduce the costs of medical services. Similarly, in view of the importance of the programme of basic health for all by the year 2000, it would have been good if the authors had discussed the programme, its place and chances of success in the framework of health services in sub-Saharan Africa in the remaining part of this century.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The World Bank Report has undertaken an analysis of the current economic crisis in sub-Saharan Africa and made some recommendations for accelerating growth. It has identified areas for action some of which are well taken and others which have raised major issues of concern.

The following issues are important and merit attention: capacity to formulate and implement development policies, analyses and decision making; the generation and effective utilization of resources — human and capital domestic and foreign, the need for a realistic assessment of the role of the public sector in general and public enterprises, in particular, in the development process; rehabilitation of existing projects; and the development of capacity to maintain existing facilities and equipment. These suggestions are important not only in relation to the strategy recommended in the report but also in the context of achieving efficiency in resource allocation faster growth and accelerated development.

From the observations made in the preceding pages, it is clear that the goals, objectives and characteristics of the strategy contained in the report are in many ways inconsistent with those of the Lagos Plan of Action. The Lagos Plan of Action attaches importance to increases in production from *all* economic sectors, as well as the interrelationships among these sectors as a means of achieving faster growth and accelerated development. Such increases are to come about by the greater utilization of domestic factor inputs, with the objective of satisfying internal demand. This further means that unlike the World Bank Report, the concept of market in the Lagos Plan of Action focuses on the national, sub-regional and regional markets, not only the external markets.

In identifying slow export growth performance as being the principal source of poor economic performance in Africa, the authors of the Report grossly discount the controlling influence of unpredictable external factors.

It is uncertain that export proceeds from agricultural and mineral exports will be enough to cover current account deficits and external factor inputs needed in sub-Saharan African development process.

The author's view that *per capita* income will increase through expanded agricultural production and export is doubtful since a mere growth in GDP will not necessarily lead to increase in *per capita* income given the report's recognition that essential factor inputs are not developed in sub-Saharan Africa, and its failure to attach priority to their development.

The implication of the recommended approach is to make Africa more dependent on external markets for its agricultural and mineral products and for its essential factor inputs. This is contrary to the principles of self-reliant and self-sustaining development of the Lagos Plan of Action.

External assistance without reform, or vice versa, will naturally not be in the best interest of sub-Saharan Africa. Yet such assistance should not and could not be made conditional upon a specific set of reforms. It should be seen in the context of a general commitment by the sub-Saharan African countries to introduce relevant, practical, and effective measures to accelerate the pace of growth and development. It is very doubtful that even if African countries implement the recommended reforms and external aid and assistance are increased the combined effects will lead to accelerated development in these countries.

FOOTNOTES

1. Organization of African Unity, Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980–2000.
2. World Bank, World Development Report, 1979 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1979).
3. Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, the World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1981.
4. *Op. cit.*, para. 14 (iii).
5. *Op. cit.*, page 1.
6. *Ibid.*, page 2.
7. *Ibid.*, page 2.
8. *Ibid.*, page 7.
9. Although the authors have attributed the falling share of Africa in trade in primary commodity to inability of African countries to produce, at least in other places in the report, they have also admitted that demand in the industrial countries was also responsible.
10. System for the Stabilization of Export Earnings (introduced in Lome I and continued in Lome II).
11. System of Rehabilitation of Mineral Resources (introduced in Lome II convention).
12. *Op. cit.*, page 24.
13. *Ibid.*, page 24.
14. *Ibid.*, page 17.
15. *Ibid.*, page 17.
16. *Ibid.*, page 46.
17. UNCTAD, fifth session (Manila), Ottawa (1981), Cancun, 1981.
18. The report illustrates this view with results of a study carried out by the African Centre for Monetary Studies (Dakar, Senegal, 1979).
19. *Op. cit.*, page 14.
20. *Ibid.*, page 121.
21. *Op. cit.*, paragraph 14.
22. *Op. cit.*, page 34.
23. *Ibid.*, page 124–125.

24. *Ibid.*, page 45.
25. *Op. cit.*, paragraph 18.
26. *Op. cit.*, page 62.
27. *Ibid.*, page 48.
28. *Ibid.*, page 51.
29. *Ibid.*, page 52.
30. *Ibid.*, page 56.
31. *Op. cit.*, paragraph 37.
32. *Op. cit.*, page 75.
33. *Ibid.*, page 4.
34. *Ibid.*, page 108.
35. *Ibid.*, page 110. Although the report recommends immediate attention to be paid to facilitation measures, the development of the road and rail networks should be undertaken simultaneously with the implementation of these measures.
36. *Ibid.*, page 105.
37. *Ibid.*, page 87.

**DECLARATION OF TRIPOLI ON THE WORLD BANK REPORT
ENTITLED «ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION»**

We, the African Ministers responsible for economic development and planning, assembled in Tripoli for the eighth meeting of the Conference of Ministers of the Economic Commission for Africa and the seventeenth session of the Commission, having carefully examined the World Bank report entitled «Accelerated development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action» in the light of the basic guidelines for the achievement of the objectives of self-reliant and self-sustaining development in our respective countries and in the African continent as a whole, conscious of the imperative need to reduce the present extreme dependence of our countries on the export of primary commodities and the import of almost all the strategic inputs required for promoting development and economic growth; and convinced that externally-oriented and primary-commodity-based strategies of development have hitherto not helped and cannot be expected to help our countries in the restructuring of their economies, in initiating the processes of internally-generated self-sustaining and reliant development and economic growth and in reducing progressively and finally eliminating the present burden of external debts.

We declare that the strategy recommended in the World Bank report, which emphasizes export orientation in general and primary commodity export in particular, regards industrialization and economic cooperation and integration in Africa as longer-term issues and completely disregards external factors as being major constraints on Africa's development and economic growth, and which adopts approaches, concepts and

24. *Ibid.*, page 45.
25. *Op. cit.*, paragraph 18.
26. *Op. cit.*, page 62.
27. *Ibid.*, page 48.
28. *Ibid.*, page 51.
29. *Ibid.*, page 52.
30. *Ibid.*, page 56.
31. *Op. cit.*, paragraph 37.
32. *Op. cit.*, page 75.
33. *Ibid.*, page 4.
34. *Ibid.*, page 108.
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objectives which are divergent from those of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos is in fundamental contradiction with the political, economic and social aspirations of Africa;

We further declare our firm commitment to the promotion of multinational, sub-regional and regional economic co-operation as a major instrument for re-structuring the economies of our countries and for the economic integration of our continent;

We accordingly affirm that the goals and objectives defined by African countries for themselves in the Monrovia Strategy, the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos remain the authentic and authoritative goals and objectives for Africa;

We therefore call upon all States members of the Economic Commission for Africa to continue with the full and effective implementation of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos at the national, sub-regional and regional levels;

We hereby urge the international community to provide aid and technical assistance to African countries within the framework of the goals, objectives and philosophy of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos,

We mandate the Executive Secretary of the Commission to transmit this Declaration to the President of the African Development Bank for presentation to the Lusaka meeting of the Board of the African Development Bank and to the African Governors of the World Bank before the meeting of the Development Committee of the Bank in Helsinki in May 1982;

Finally, We further mandate the Executive Secretary of the Commission to transmit this Declaration to the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity for presentation to the forthcoming meeting of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization for necessary action.

Done at TRIPOLI this 30th day of April 1982.

BOOK REVIEWS – REVUE DES LIVRES

L'Anthropologie et l'Avenir des Sociétés Pastorales – à propos de: *The Future of Pastoral Peoples* – Proceedings of a conference held in Nairobi 4–8 August 1980 edited by: John G. Galaty, Dan Aronson, Philip Carl Salzman and Amy Chouinard, International Development Centre – Ottawa, Canada, 1981, 396 p. (illustrations, bibliographie).

Critique de Abdel Wedoud Ould CHEIKH *

Voici dans une présentation agréable, illustrés de quelques belles photos, les actes du colloque tenu à Nairobi en Août 1980 autour du thème: «L'avenir des populations pastorales».

L'effort de synthèse réalisé par les éditeurs – avec la part inévitable d'arbitraire que comportent les regroupements de textes aux orientations et aux préoccupations manifestement très diverses – les a conduit à répartir les quarante communications du colloque en six rubriques successivement intitulées:

- «Research priorities and pastoralist development: what is to be done?»
- «The role of anthropology in pastoral development»
- «The political economy of pastoralism»
- «The role of government in pastoral development»
- «The research process: strategies, goals and methods».

Plutôt que de rendre compte systématiquement du contenu de chacune de ces subdivisions, ce qui amènerait pratiquement à refaire le travail, au demeurant très bien fait par les éditeurs, de présentation des différentes communications, nous avons choisi de limiter notre propos à quelques unes des questions débattues au cours de la réunion de Nairobi. La sélection ainsi effectuée prétend partiellement échapper à l'arbitraire dans la mesure où les problèmes retenus nous paraissent refléter à un titre ou à un autre, de manière frontale ou par quelque implication, des préoccupations qui traversent toutes les contributions soumises au débat.

Les questions que nous examinerons sont :

- le rôle de l'anthropologie dans le développement des sociétés de pasteurs
- la «rationalité» du comportement économique des pasteurs
- le rôle des gouvernements dans le devenir des sociétés pastorales.

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I. – PRODUCTION PASTORALE ET REPRODUCTION
DES «PASTORALISTES»

Si les sociologues et les anthropologues subissent comme tout le monde les effets des règles qu'ils prétendent appliquer au fonctionnement des sociétés humaines on ne saurait leur tenir rigueur de manquer quelquefois de cette distance critique appelée par la mise à jour de lois dont ils se plaisent par ailleurs – d'Ibn KHALDUN et MARX à Durkheim et à Levi-Strauss (1) – à souligner le caractère coercitif et largement inconscient.

Mais comment alors conjurer la tentation de se faire sociologue de la sociologie, c'est-à-dire surtout sociologue des autres sociologues et prévenir un processus regressif dans lequel, idéologue de soi-même autant que sociologue des autres, on s'expose à son tour à une réduction «sociologiste», conformément à cette «loi des cécités et des lucidités croisées qui règle toutes les luttes sociales pour la vérité» dont parle Pierre BOURDIEU? (1 bis).

On peut en tout cas soupçonner la présentation constamment et globalement positive de l'anthropologie qui ressort de ce colloque de concourir à accréditer l'idée d'une unité et d'une *innocence* de cette discipline que l'on ne se soucie guère d'établir, comme si les anthropologues eux-mêmes échappaient aux déterminations sociales (nationalité, appartenance de classe, âge, sexe, parenté, revenus, stratégies de carrière et autres «rites de passage» etc...) qui structurent la perception de leur objet.

Faut-il voir dans le déplacement qui conduit de l'épistemologie à la morale un effet nécessaire de cet «oubli», inextricablement lié à l'inévitable ambiguïté qui caractérise le rapport de l'ethnologue à son objet ?

Le dilemme formulé par SALZMAN à travers le paradigme poétique du renard et du hérisson («The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing» p. 35) figurant respectivement l'anthropologue et le pasteur et les rapports entre leurs compétences et leurs responsabilités respectives résume à cet égard les doutes et les questions que se posent probablement nombre d'anthropologues:

What right have we to act, even given the best of intentions and profoundest of knowledge when we are not subject to the consequences of our acts?» (p.33).

Dans le champ des rapports entre l'ethnologue et son objet, et pour autant que ce dernier doit être «développé» une réponse positive à cette question appelle, semble-t-il, une double justification : pour que moralement l'anthropologue soit fondé à développer les populations pastorales il faut d'une part qu'il ait sur ces populations des connaissances plus efficaces que celles que détiennent les spécialistes d'autres disciplines (planificateurs, démographes, économistes...) et que, d'autre part, il ait avec ces dernières une proximité – j'allais dire une parenté –, une familiarité, une contiguïté physique et morale qui justifie (et qui est justifiée par) la prise en charge de leurs problèmes. L'enquête de terrain et «l'observation participante», promues par le fonctionnalisme au rang de méthode officielle de l'anthropologie fourniraient ici une double raison scientifique et morale

à la spécificité de l'intérêt porté par les anthropologues aux populations qu'ils étudient et à la tentation récurrente – doublée de dénégations tenaces – de confondre leurs intérêts avec les intérêts des populations étudiées.

A cela s'ajoutent les conduites ambiguës que le passé de l'anthropologie (rêve romantique d'évasion vers des rivages où règne une harmonie perpétuelle et étroitesse des liens avec l'expansion et l'administration coloniale (2) induit aussi bien chez les anthropologues «indigènes» que chez les moins cyniques de leurs collègues américano-européens.

Aux premiers ce passé offre les alibis d'un ressentiment retrospectif dans lequel la tentation de recourir au discours militant et aux glissements démagogiques qu'il autorise est d'autant plus grande que leurs intérêts matériels et professionnels – occasionnellement élargis à ceux de leur ethnie, de leur pays, du Tiers Monde ou de la Révolution (3) – se heurtent à la situation oligopolistique établie à l'échelle planétaire en faveur des ethnologues du «Nord».

Il induira parfois chez les seconds une mauvaise conscience génératrice de culpabilité, de contrition, de pénitence et de misérabilisme autopunitif aboutissant ici et là à une idéalisation excessive des sociétés étudiées.

Je grossis ici à dessein – et non peut-être sans quelque mauvaise foi – des traits qui n'excluent ni la bonne conscience, ni la bonne volonté et qui ne sont, faut-il le rappeler, que des composantes d'une configuration théorique et idéologique complexe, surdéterminée elle-même par une conjoncture économique et sociale locale et internationale marquée par les inégalités, les tensions et les conflits que l'on sait.

Il s'agit de faire apparaître les difficultés auxquelles se heurtent des anthropologues – ils ne sont pas les seuls – dans l'évaluation des changements, et en particulier des changements positifs identifiés au «développement» que traversent les sociétés «sous-développées», en l'espèce, les sociétés pastorales.

En posant (p. 42) la question: «Développement for nomadic pastoralists: who benefits?» Dan ARONSON lève un coin du voile qui assombrit cette question. Mais l'opposition d'un «resource-based development» et d'un «people-based development» si elle éclaire les résultats douteux, la nature hégémonique et quasi-militaire du premier (un indice, la terminologie polémologique des «développeurs», «target», «opération», «campaign», «encadreur»... p. 45) ramène par contre, dans le cas du «people-based development» vers des suspensions et des interrogations que les anthropologues se renvoient quand elles n'ont pas pour origine les disciplines concurrentes (et les spécialistes concurrents).

Le «people-based development» veut-il dire laisser les pasteurs décider eux-mêmes et faire ce que bon leur semble? Pourquoi ne pas les laisser refuser le «développement» et au besoin les aider à survivre hors de ses promesses fallacieuses?

Mais alors n'y a-t-il pas derrière cette option la représentation suspecte d'une prétendue auto-suffisance économique et morale des pasteurs? Une volonté perverse de perpétuer, au nom d'on ne sait quel penchant muséographique la marginalité misérable des populations pastorales?

Si aucun des participants au colloque n'opte de manière tranchée pour une position aussi littéralement conservatrice – il est manifestement trop tard pour préserver les populations pastorales du «développement» – ils insistent tous sur la nécessité d'envisager les pasteurs comme des partenaires à part entière, doués de responsabilité et de liberté.

«... pastoralists are hardly competent to be collaborators, consultants and decision-makers... these pastoralists, I would argue are well-suited to involvement in planning and decisions about their future and the fate of their children.» écrit SALZMAN (p. 36–37). Même souci chez Dan ARONSON: «Whatever the variety (d'obédience théorique: «structural fonctionnalists», «cultural ecologists», «historical materialists») all agree that men and women make themselves, that is to say, that people recreate and reproduce their social arrangements (even if they just happen to conform to systematic demands in their choice-making), and are therefore the best judges of what works for them.» (p. 46).

L'insistance que les anthropologues mettent ainsi à investir les populations pastorales de libre arbitre et de rationalité, trahit l'existence d'une opposition *qui unit dans une même suspicion, sinon dans un même mépris les ethnologues et leur objet*. Parlant de l'échec du Développement Régional Intégré et d'une manière générale de tous les projets de développement et de leurs promoteurs – W. GOLDSCHMIDT écrit: «They do not learn from their mistakes. Programs that have been roundly condemned by planners themselves will be blindly introduced elsewhere because there has been no systematic evaluation of what has gone before, *and anthropologists criticisms of their efforts are brushed aside as a merely reflecting the vagaries of the natives*». (p. 53. souligné par nous O.C., le même thème revient p. 117).

Nous voici ramenés à la défense conjointe des anthropologues et des indigènes liée à la dialectique de la proximité («humaine») et de la distance («rationnelle») qui passe pour caractériser en propre l'approche anthropologique depuis l'avènement triomphant du fonctionnalisme et la substitution des monographies de terrain aux reconstructions hasardeuses des évolutionnistes.

Notons au passage que le reproche adressé à la censure des anthropologues, ce qui frappe d'inanité leur discours et grève radicalement la *rationalité* de leur propos, c'est le fait qu'ils prolongent et reflètent «the vagaries of the natives».

Rançon d'une trop grande proximité, l'interférence des discours de l'indigène et de l'anthropologue – revendiquée et refusée – appelle de la part de ce dernier une démarcation qui doit fonder la rationalité de l'anthropologie – elle n'est pas le discours de l'indigène – et légitimer la rationalité dont elle investit «par délégation» des indigènes qu'elle est seule habilitée à *représenter* (au double sens de fournir un concept et d'exécuter un mandat) puisqu'elle est précisément la seule à défendre leur «rationalité».

On voit ici la question du rôle de l'anthropologie dans le «développement» des sociétés pastorales, et au-delà, celle plus générale du «développement» de ces sociétés se nouer avec celle de leur «rationalité» indissolublement liée à celle de l'anthropologie elle-même qui voudrait en quelque sorte en assurer l'exploitation exclusive.

II. — RATIONALITE DES PASTEURS ET RATIONALITE DES ANTHROPOLOGUES

Il apparaît en effet que pour résoudre les problèmes de «développement» (concept qui se meut dans le même champ sémantique que celui «d'efficace technique», de «gestion cohérente», de «planification», «d'intégration», de «prévision», de «rationalité»...) qui se posent aux sociétés pastorales les anthropologues, en tant que spécialistes de ces sociétés doivent rendre compte du comportement économique effectif des éleveurs et montrer au besoin ce qu'il y a lieu de faire pour les amener à adopter une attitude jugée économiquement plus efficace. Il faut en particulier qu'ils rendent compte des aspects réputés les plus «irrationnels» de leur conduite, au premier rang desquels figure cette accumulation pléthorique de bétail naguère identifiée par HERSKOVITS à un «cattle complex».

Qu'on la cherche avec le fonctionnalisme dans le cadre d'une douteuse théorie des besoins (4) ou avec les écologistes dans des considérations d'ordre bio-climatique ; qu'on se la figure comme expression idéologique d'un «stade» ou d'un «mode de production» *sui generis* ou qu'on veuille y voir avec SCHNEIDER (p. 210 sq) l'expression... d'un monétarisme précoce, la rationalité de ce qui peut apparaître comme un culte du nombre chez les éleveurs se montre en fait inséparable des *rationalisations* auxquelles elle a donné lieu, c'est-à-dire inséparable de la rationalité de la théorie anthropologique elle-même (5).

Il faut ici nuancer la schématisation par trop «sociologiste» à laquelle nos remarques initiales concernant les rapports de l'anthropologie à son objet ont paru vouloir réduire une diversité d'interprétations largement illustrée par la richesse des communications soumises au colloque de Nairobi.

A s'en tenir à titre d'exemple à ce seul problème de la «rationalité» des éleveurs, centré sur leur comportement à l'égard du bétail, aux raisons qu'on lui donne et aux conséquences qu'on lui prête, on voit apparaître des nuances et des divergences qui illustrent la complexité d'une question qui touche tous les aspects de la vie des pasteurs.

Citant les travaux de BROWN et de LEWIS, HOROWITZ souligne la fonctionnalité de l'accumulation de bétail par les nomades dont la raison première est d'ordre alimentaire. Il faudrait en effet d'après les calculs de BROWN 30 à 35 bovins adultes en zone aride et semi-aride pour couvrir les besoins en produits animaux (lait, viande...) d'une famille de huit personnes (p. 83). La place importante accordée dans certains troupeaux aux mâles castrés se justifierait quant à elle par l'intérêt qu'elle présente pour la garde des animaux :

«The stock owners like to keep up the proportion of male castrates to females as a way of maintaining the stability, unity and tranquility of the herd thereby increasing milk production and reducing labour» écrit HOROWITZ (p. 82).

Anders HJORT (p. 135 sq) qui insiste sur la nécessaire complémentarité entre production pastorale et production agricole et sur la dimension régionale qu'elle confère à la spécialisation pastorale voit lui aussi, dans les limites biologiques des capacités productives des animaux et leur rôle de moyen d'échange, la raison majeure d'extension du volume des troupeaux même si des phénomènes de notabilisme politique plus récents ont pu contribuer à lui donner des dimensions inhabituelles.

D'après les estimations qu'il donne, le nombre de 64 bovins ou de 28 chameaux nécessaire à la couverture des besoins énergétiques (13.800 Kcal par jour) et en protéine (318 g par jour) d'une famille comportant l'équivalent de 4,9 adultes est rarement atteint.

Evocant les estimations de HJORT, SCHNEIDER écrit :

«By my calculations, only the Masai, Samburu, and Barabaig of Tanzania and the Somalis could accomplish the required ratio (10 cattle/person) in the wet season, and probably none could reach the 60: 1 ratio needed in the dry season». (p. 211).

SCHNEIDER n'a guère de mal à montrer à partir d'études effectuées au Kenya par ADLINGTON et WILSON, l'insuffisance de «l'explication alimentaire». Ces études effectuées en 1968 sur 39 groupes de nomades font ressortir une consommation annuelle en viande par tête de 10 kg. Les Turkana chez lesquels on observe une moyenne de plus de 10 têtes de bétail par personne ont une consommation annuelle individuelle qui tourne autour de 5 kgs. Alors qu'ils disposent d'une disponibilité théorique en viande cinq fois inférieure à celle des Turkana, les Turu pourraient avoir une consommation voisine de 20 kg/an/individu (p. 212).

Davantage que pour sa valeur immédiatement alimentaire manifestement très faible c'est, conclut SCHNEIDER citant les travaux des monétaristes (Radford, Einzig...), pour sa signification en tant qu'outil d'échange, en tant qu'équivalent monétaire que le bétail est thésaurisé.

Résumant des remarques qu'on retrouve dans de nombreuses communications, Gudrun DAHL affirme pour sa part que la maximisation du troupeau doit être interprétée comme composante d'un ensemble de «stratégies de sécurité» destinées à limiter les risques (razzias, epizooties, sécheresses...) auxquels sont confrontés les éleveurs. «What are the most important ways that herders can limit their risks? Or what are the main strategies in herding and husbandry practices? I believe they are the mobility of stock, species diversifications, herd dispersion and herd maximization». (p. 204).

Le caractère «fonctionnel» de ces stratégies — l'auteur hésite à admettre la «fonctionnalité» des moyens brutaux de réajustement de la capacité de charge aux ressources du milieu: famines, epizooties, épidémies, razzias — s'accompagne d'une gestion des ressources du milieu (eau, pâturages...), d'une organisation de l'espace pastoral, obéissant comme le montre la communication de BOURGÉOT, à propos des Touareg et des Peul du

Gourma malien, à des règles fort précises conduisant notamment à une séparation institutionnalisée «between the sojourn pastures, constituting a reserve and the transit pastures, controlled by the production units» (p. 168).

Alors le «fétichisme» du bétail, la «boolâtries», le «cattle complex», tout cela serait-il à ranger au musée des antiquités théoriques de l'anthropologie ? A suivre l'intervention de Peter RIGBY (pp. 157–163) centrée sur l'Afrique de l'Est, on dirait que la reconnaissance d'une certaine «fonctionnalité» du comportement des éleveurs à l'égard du «développement» – le refus de la scolarisation des jeunes trouve par exemple sa raison d'être dans la productivité supérieure du travail pastoral par rapport au travail agricole et la volonté de maintenir les jeunes derrière leurs troupeaux – que cette fonctionnalité donc n'exclut pas une forme de mystification dans la mesure où, contrairement à ce qui se passe dans le mode de production capitaliste où «l'instance économique» est dominante, nous sommes ici en présence d'une variante du «mode de production germanique» «which admirably characterizes the basic articulation of forces and relation of production in East African pastoral (as well as agricultural) social formations (et où) the ideological instance is dominant» (p. 160).

Formulé dans le langage de la «rectification» opérée par le philosophe français L. ALTHUSSER (6) sur les schémas traditionnels du matérialisme historique – il faut, dit celui-ci, dans tout mode de production, distinguer *instance déterminante et instance dominante*. l'économique, instance déterminante en dernière instance n'est dominante que dans le capitalisme – l'analyse de Peter RIGBY ouvre des perspectives intéressantes pour l'interprétation de la «rationalité» des pasteurs et de leur «fétichisme du bétail» à condition de ne pas oublier que la dominance de l'instance économique, ici opposée à celle de l'instance idéologique, n'est pas synonyme de l'avènement d'une clarté sans tâche (le «fétichisme de la marchandise» et la «réification» des rapports humains sont des phénomènes du capitalisme) qui s'apposeraient aux brumes idéologiques enserrant le cerveau des pasteurs (rôle de la parenté et du bétail dans l'interprétation, le maintien et la reproduction d'un bon ordre du monde).

Sauf à considérer avec les tenants de la prophétie marxienne, que les «modes de production», en nombre fini, mais variable selon les hérésies – ils sont alors très voisins des fameux «stades» de Morgan – s'ordonnent en un processus parousique aboutissant inéluctablement à l'instauration universelle de la vérité et de l'harmonie après des périodes plus ou moins brèves de «dictature du prolétariat»...

Comme RIGBY le souligne lui-même, à l'instar de nombreux autres intervenants, ce n'est d'ailleurs pas vers la clôture d'un système auto-suffisant et auto-subsistant exclusivement fondé sur le bétail – système qui n'a probablement jamais existé – qu'il faut chercher à interpréter la «rationalité» ou l'absence de rationalité des populations pastorales dont tout le monde s'accorde à reconnaître l'insertion dans des ensembles plus vastes qui évoluent et se transforment.

III. — LE RÔLE DES GOUVERNEMENTS DANS LE DEVELOPPEMENT DES SOCIÉTÉS PASTORALES

Je serai beaucoup plus bref dans ce troisième point de mon compte rendu pour simplement faire remarquer, avec les intervenants qui se sont penchés sur ces questions, que si le rôle des facteurs politiques mérite largement d'être souligné, l'action planifiée et systématique des gouvernements concernés par de telles populations en direction des éleveurs demeure quant à elle essentiellement limitée et sensible surtout semble-t-il par ses effets indirects.

A propos de la sédentarisation des nomades au Soudan, en faveur de laquelle il plaide, Mustafa Mohamed KHOGALI constate (p. 311) l'échec des tentatives de fixation par le ranching, opposée à l'ampleur de la sédentarisation spontanée. Le refus des éleveurs de se transformer en paysans sur des espaces aménagés s'explique selon lui par la supériorité des revenus procurés par l'élevage (entre 30 à 50 % de plus selon les régions).

En Jordanie, d'après Abu JABÈR et GHARAIBEH «the settlement was self-generated rather than enforced by government». (294), le rôle des recrutements dans l'armée (la garde d'origine bedouine jouit d'une confiance particulière de la part du pouvoir monarchique), les revenus et les égards qu'il procure, les contacts qu'il occasionne avec le monde des villes ayant affecté progressivement la mobilité des pasteurs.

Il se pourrait bien en fait que dans de nombreux pays à population pastorale — je songe en particulier à ceux du Sahel — l'option plus ou moins clairement affirmée de sédentarisation dans le but de faire bénéficier les nomades des services sociaux (éducation, santé...), de les «intégrer à la communauté nationale», etc... se heurte seulement à la faiblesse des moyens dont disposent les pays en question. Il ne faut pas oublier que ce qu'on y appelle souvent pompeusement des «plans de développement» se réduit en fait à un mélange de recueil de statistiques (plus ou moins faible) et de catalogue de vente par correspondance (le financement des projets est attendu à plus de 90 % de l'extérieur...).

La Mauritanie, par exemple, pays dont la population était à plus de 60 % nomade, il a à peine une quinzaine d'années, ne compte plus aujourd'hui que 35 % de ses habitants qui se déplacent avec leurs troupeaux. Ce ne sont pas les autorités qui ont planifié cette sédentarisation même si les «choix» économiques sectoriels et régionaux de l'Etat (le développement des extractions minières du Nord-Ouest du pays, la route Nouakchott-Néma, etc...) ont pu contribuer à orienter des mouvements migratoires qui ont connu avec la sécheresse des années 70 un rythme explosif.

Faut-il tout de même distinguer avec SALZMAN un «indigenous pastoral politics» («basically decentralized segmentary politics involving autonomous, contingent groupings») et une «politics of encapsulation» (qui est «a struggle for control, for domination on one side and autonomy on the other, between a vast, supraregional, centralized entity and smaller, local and regional population» p. 131) ?

Ce que semble surtout observer Anders HJORT quant il examine le rôle des «notables dans les sociétés pastorales c'est l'interférence et la profonde imbrication entre ces deux ordres de «politique» :

«The emerging leaders spread their risks by diversifying their economic undertakings. Of particular importance is their mediating place between the general pastoral population and the administration and national bureaucracy».

Many are wealthy, controlling labour through an extension of traditional forms of paternalistic protection, elderhood status, and food redistribution. Their followings become large and their households influential in the pastoral community. The internal power structure of the community can be fundamentally altered, and yet, seen from the outside, the system appears unchanged. Inside, established principles for redistribution of capital may have largely ceased because of the new links between pastoralism and modern capitalism. Individualist forms of «insurance» against drought replace traditional institutions, such as stock friendship and clan solidarity, worsening the position of the less fortunate members of the group. Many poor pastoralists turn to employment for extremely low wages. To support their families, low-wage labourers need the backing of kin of friends who are food producers. Thus the pastoral sector supports the modern sector by providing subsistence for the families of wage labourers and, at the same time, loses members of its own labour force who may be vital to the maintenance of proper husbandry practices.» (p. 140–141).

Dans le cadre esquissé par cette longue citation, l'intervention de la bureaucratie nationale constituée de (et relayée par) des notables, n'offre guère, semble-t-il, aux pasteurs, d'alternative à un «développement».

S'il fallait conclure cette présentation des actes du colloque de Nairobi, nous dirions, faisant retour à nos remarques initiales, que l'analyse du «développement», qu'il s'agisse de celui des sociétés pastorales ou d'autres sociétés ne peut faire l'économie d'un examen critique des «développeurs» eux-mêmes. Les éditeurs ne disent pas autre chose lorsqu'ils affirment: «One is reminded that the anthropologists and development planners are part of the wider political setting and belong within a framework for an analysis of the «ethnography of planners» (p. 129).

NOTES:

1. Ibn Khaldun, dès les premières lignes de sa *Muqaddima* oppose ce qui est «manifeste» dans la science de l'histoire (*dhahirihi*) de ce qui est «implicite», caché (*batinihi*) (Al Muqaddima, Dar al-shab, le Caire, sans date, p. 7, en arabe). Citons encore Durkheim parlant des conduites matrimoniales, religieuses, politiques : «Non seulement ces types de conduite ou de pensée sont extérieurs à l'individu, mais ils sont doués d'une puissance impérative et coercitive en vertu de laquelle ils s'imposent à lui». *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, Paris, P.U.F. 1973, p. 4.
- 1bis). Pierre Bourdieu. Leçon inaugurale au Collège de France. «Le Monde» 25–16 avril 1982, p. 6.
2. Un aperçu synthétique des rapports entre l'anthropologie et le colonialisme figure dans : Gérard Leclerc. *Anthropologie et Colonialisme*. Fayard, Paris, 1972. Sur la tenacité du mythe du «bon sauvage» on pourra voir l'article J. Derrida. «Levi-Strauss dans le 18e s.» dans *Cahiers pour l'Analyse* No. 4 Sept.–Oct. 1966.

3. Un exemple assez représentatif de ce genre d'attitude : L'ouvrage de Stanislas S. Adotevi.
(*Négritude et Négrologues*, Paris, U.G.E., 1972) qui voit dans l'ethnologie «un produit des démangeaisons cérébrales de l'homme blanc» (p. 174).
4. «On pourra nous soupçonner d'avoir introduit subrepticement le besoin à satisfaire pour satisfaire le besoin de satisfaire une fonction.» (B. Malinowski, *A scientific theory of culture*, trad; française, Maspero, Paris, 1968, p. 142).
5. Dans le champ de la pensée économique Maurice Godelier écrit : «La rationalité économique ne se montre donc qu'à travers la rationalité épistémologique de la science économique, c'est-à-dire à travers la vérité des explications théoriques construites par cette science. Nous avons ainsi démontré que la rationalité économique et la rationalité de la Science Economique sont *une seule et même question* (soulignée par l'auteur) et que le connaissance de la rationalité économique *dépend entièrement* (idem) de la vérité des hypothèses élaborées par les économistes (et les autres spécialistes des sciences sociales)» M. Godelier «*Rationalité et Irrationalité en Economie*», F. Maspero, Paris, 1974, I, p. 32.
6. Voir notamment :
Pour Marx, Maspero, Paris 1964
et *Lire le Capital*, Paris, Maspero, 1968.
7. Sous Staline, on le sait, l'histoire de l'humanité se résumait à cinq «stades-modes de production» : le communisme primitif, l'esclavage, le féodalisme, le capitalisme, le communisme. Depuis que Wittfogel a exhumé le «mode de production asiatique», on a vu apparaître un «mode de production domestique» (Meillassoux), un «mode de production tributaire» (S. Amin), un «mode de production lignager» (P.P. Rey)... Fossaerts (*La Société*, Seuil, Paris, 1982, V) en a récemment compté onze (!) dont le (provisoirement) dernier est «le mode de production terroriste – concentrationnaire» qui caractériserait les formations sociales de type soviétique.

Seeds of Famine: Ecological Destruction and the Development Dilemma in the West African Sahel – by Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin, Montclair, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun, 1980.

Reviewed by Thomas M. PAINTER*

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The subtitle of Franke and Chasin's book, *Ecological Destruction and the Development Dilemma in the West African Sahel*, may lead some prospective readers to expect yet another technicist treatment of development problems in West Africa. In this respect the book's title is a bit misleading, for Franke and Chasin place the 1968/69–75 famine in Sahelian West Africa – its preconditions, consequences, and the response of international development assistance organizations to it – squarely within the

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context of larger processes of historical change. Specifically, the authors situate the events leading to the famine and its aftermath in relation to the gradual incorporation of Sahelian social formations within a capitalist world economy.

The consequences of incorporation – an ongoing process – are multiple. Among these has been the continued undermining of productive strategies developed over many generations by Sahelian cultivators and herders. These strategies have in the past enabled Sahelian peasantries to produce the means for biological and social reproduction without undue abuse of the environment in which they lived. The most recent period of drought in the Sahel provided poignant evidence of the extent to which these productive strategies had been undermined and the balance between humans and their habitat upset. Franke and Chasin chronicle the events that contributed to the political economy of disaster in the Sahel, or, in their words, «the making of the famine».

The continuing search by Sahelian peasants for money – a quest whose crudely forced beginnings are to be found in the labor and fiscal policies of the French colonial state and the capitalist interests it so effectively promoted – in a world where more and more of the necessities for «subsistence» could be secured only through monetary transactions contributed to a marked increase in the production of «cash crops (principally groundnuts and cotton). Depending on the specific area of Sahelian West Africa in question, these changes gained momentum from the mid-nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century. The increased production of cash crops – for consumption in Europe, not the Sahel – occurred at the expense of a variety of staple crops (e.g., millets, sorghums) *and* contributed to a breakdown of the techniques (interplanting, rotations, bush-fallows) devised by Sahelian producers in order to maintain a modicum of the sandy soil's already limited fertility. This led in turn to declining yields, to a gradual reduction of staple crop reserves for emergencies and the «hungry months» preceding harvest time, the transformation of staple into cash crops, and a decline in the effectiveness of anti-erosion measures. (For valuable details on the basis of case studies in Niger, see Raynaut, 1980).

In order to compensate for declining yields, insure that domestic consumption needs were at least in part satisfied, and secure the money needed for taxes and a variety of household expenditures, peasant cultivators were obliged to plant in more marginal areas long-used with considerable effectiveness by pastoral groups. In addition, increasing numbers of Sahelian peasants migrated yearly to the coastal countries to work and ply petty commerce in order to secure the cash needed to purchase staples and pay taxes. This northward movement of cultivated zones, encouraged by the policies of colonial and post-colonial governments in which the interests of cultivators were promoted at the expense of herders, contributed to a further marginalization of pastoral peoples. The situation continues (Swift, 1977). While the squeeze on herders was more severe, *both* peasant cultivators and pastoralists became extremely vulnerable to accentuations of the most predictable feature of the Sahel's climate – its capriciousness.

Franke and Chasin offer what they term a «radical approach» to an understanding of the Sahel famine and the continuing plight of Sahelian peasantries. Their approach integrates perspectives from several disciplines (climatology, demography, ecology), some of which have contributed to a veritable explosion of uni-causal hence partial explanations of the most recent Sahelian disaster.

«A full understanding of the forces that led to the dramatic crisis of 1968–74 takes one far beyond climate, desertification, overgrazing, mismanagement, population growth and the like and compels one to study the colonial and post-colonial international economic and political system» (130).

The authors' perspective on the making of the famine is also characterized by the extent to which they draw upon the pathbreaking critical studies of the famine developed initially by radical social scientists in France (e.g., Comité d'Information Sahel, 1975 ; Copans, ed., 1975, Derriennic, 1975; Egg, Lerin and Vernin, 1975). In addition to the analytical perspective they promote in *Seeds of Famine*, Franke and Chasin provide a valuable service to the extent that they make the French critiques available in a coherent manner, for much of this useful literature remains available only in French (but cf. Meillassoux, 1974).

Once having described the historical development of the peasantry's plight in relation to the gradual reorientation of a «subsistence» economy due to capitalist penetration in the Sahel (Amin, 1972, Suret-Canale, 1971 and Wallerstein, 1976 are recommended for the general reader in search of perspectives on the regional specificity of these changes), Franke and Chasin examine the response of Sahelian governments and the rush of international aid organizations into the region in the famine's wake. This response, particularly but by no means solely by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and on a scale heretofore unknown in West Africa, was linked as much to political considerations (revolutionary forces were gaining strength elsewhere in Africa) as to humanitarian purpose. It has been concretely manifested in the creation of interstate policy-making and coordination bodies (the Comité Inter-états de Lutte Contre la Sécheresse – CILSS – and the Club of Friends of the Sahel). In addition, the Sahel has since been invaded by swarms of development «experts» and there has occurred a proliferation of development programs along dimensions set forth in the «three generation» (1977–82, 1982–90; 1990–2000) Sahelian Development Program. The Program is the result of numerous CILSS and Club meetings and was drafted in 1977 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The 1969–74 famine has passed but the Sahelian Development boom continues.

Seeds of Famine provides an extensive critique of the Sahel Development Program, and gives particular attention to programs in Mali, Senegal, and Niger. Finally, Franke and Chasin examine possible alternative approaches to development in the Sahel. Chief among these in their view are the programs of non-governmental assistance organizations (NGOs,

or les ONG). Because of their small-scale, the constant give and take (at least in principle) between planners and the rural populations involved, these programs are considered with particular favor. From the perspective of Franke and Chasin, they offer the greatest promise for the promotion of active participation of Sahelian peasants in efforts of their own making to improve their lot, defend their «political space,» and, as the authors suggest, introduce viable institutional reforms. Unfortunately these non-government programs are treated rather superficially as the book rushes to a close, and the reader is left with little more than a hint of how they are better. Franke and Chasin's preferences notwithstanding, smallness in itself is not sufficient to guarantee success.

The need for a critical reconceptualization of development «problems» and their «solutions» extends beyond the consideration of specific programs and projects. «Institutional structure», too often accepted by planners as givens must also be treated as problematic. It no longer suffices, for example, to look at post-colonial governments in the Sahel as undifferentiated monoliths whose planning priorities vis-à-vis rural populations simply reflect the motives of a particular leader, much less the desires of the masses for whom any given leader, party, or junta pretends to speak. Rather, the state must be approached as a structure which differentially promotes the interests and access of some groups — elites and classes — while repressing those of others. All this occurs, of course, despite a great deal of promotional ideology to the contrary. The oppositional and allied interests of elements within the state must be recognized *in relation to* the peasantries who make up the supposed «beneficiary populations» of rural development projects. Indeed, it is the members of the rapidly growing, manifestly favored and prosperous bureaucratic bourgeoisie of the Sahelian states who administer these projects. And what, we might ask, are *their* priorities in the final analysis? The answer to this question is not difficult — nor is it popular in official circles (Amselle, 1981).

By the same token, the post-colonial states in the Sahel are no more isolated and autonomous than they are monolithic. They remain to a great extent dependent upon and dominated by the core states of Western Europe and North America, and the capitalist interests these states promote vis-à-vis the periphery. This relatively powerless position of Sahelian states within interstate systems dominated by interests which promote the global reorganization of production and distribution on the basis of profit rather than use *cannot help* but influence the planning and consequences of development programs. Thus the situation of Sahelian states relative to other «institutional structures» must also be examined and not taken as given.

Rather than considering Sahelian social formations in terms of the oft-used «democracy of poverty» model, it is also necessary to recognize that despite their vulnerable position in relation to core states, processes of differentiation are alive and healthy. The impoverishment of rural populations is directly linked to growing prosperity (often very showy at that : the Mercedes sedan, the villa, etc..) «private» (e.g. mercantile and service)

and «public» (State and parastatal) «sectors», both of which, it should be clear are *very much* interlinked despite occasional conflicts of interest. Development programs are an integral part of these processes, and the benefits are easily and regularly siphoned off by elements not described in any development project document.

Franke and Chasin convincingly argue against the view that seems to be shared and promoted by any development planners, that their task is strictly technical in nature, and not political, and that while their projects may not accomplish much, «they don't do much harm». We are obliged to consider the real possibility that throughout the Sahel well-intentioned planners and experts are contributing to an absolute worsening of the peasantry's situation. The irony is that this occurs in the name of «enhanced quality of life», «development with equity», and the like.

Also to their credit, Franke and Chasin's book is very readable, hence easily accessible to a more general readership than many of the more specialized sources they employ. The potential contribution of *Seeds of Famine* to development education is considerable. This is an area whose neglect, particularly in the United States, is recognized by the authors.

Students of the development process are well-advised to consider Franke and Chasin's book. They make an important contribution to the demystification of development «problems» and their current «solutions». It would be a mistake, however, to unconditionally promote *Seeds of Famine* as a model for further analysis. Instead, Franke and Chasin's work should be considered as a potential reference point – one with strengths and weaknesses – for the promotion of further critical study.

There is always room for improvement. In several instances (e.g., their treatment of alternative approaches to development, discussed above), issues raised in the book are not treated with the thoroughness we would expect from a critique of this kind, particularly one which claims to be original in its perspective (p. 129). We will see this again shortly. Elsewhere, relevant and important sources are not cited and useful illustrative materials are ignored. This serves to detract from the authors' argument in an otherwise useful work. The following instances, neither exhausting the possibilities nor necessarily representative, are noteworthy.

Concerning resistance to French penetration in Niger, neither the (albeit biased) chronicle by Périé and Sellier (1950) nor Fuglestad's work (1973) on the Tuareg revolts are mentioned. Nor, for that matter, is Rolland's important study (1976) of early resistance cited by Franke and Chasin. The contributions of Gregory and colleagues (Gregory and Piché, 1976 and 1979) to the literature on the «demand-for labor» analysis of Sahelian population growth go unmentioned. The Volta Valley Authority, of particular importance to any discussion of river basin development in the Sahel, remains unexamined. C.A.R.E.'s windbreak program in the Majya Valley of Niger, started in 1975 and of particular interest from participatory and ecological perspectives, is not mentioned in the discussion of non-governmental programs.

Quite aside from its use as an industrial lubricant, and more importantly for the fate of Sahelian peasant cultivator, groundnut oil took on growing importance in the eating habits of larger and larger numbers of Europeans from the early decades of this century on. With introduction of hydrogenation groundnut oil was increasingly used as an ingredient in European margarine whose consumption was rapidly growing. More and more groundnut oil replaced other cooking oils in European, and particularly French, kitchens. Last and not least, there was a marked increase in the use of groundnut oil in the manufacture of bar soap – once again in France. Developments such as these led to an increased demand for groundnuts from West Africa and redoubled promotional efforts by administrators to increase production in the Sahel.

Franke and Chasin describe a millet-groundnut rotation as being a major pre-cash production system in the Sahel. In so doing, they characterize Sahelian agriculture (just when was the «pre-cash crop» era?) in a manner which is not only incorrect, but ignores the substantial variation to be found in the agrarian techniques of Sahelian producers. If the «pre-cash crop» period is roughly co-incidental with the period prior to colonial consolidation (once again, it is not clear), one might wonder just how important groundnuts, to take an example, were. Judging from the energetic – to the point of using coercion – efforts of colonial administrations to promote groundnut production in the Sahel, not very.

While it is true that sandy soils are not appropriate for cotton cultivation, heavier – and suitable – soils *are* found in the Sahel, and in substantial quantities. In numerous instances these were singled out by French cotton interests (e.g., CFDT) for the promotion of cotton production during the colonial and post-colonial periods. There can be no doubt that colonial administrations and post-colonial governments have acted to promote these efforts all along.

Finally, the «radical approach» presented in *Seeds of Famine* is something less than we would hope for. It simply leaves the burden of change to the peoples of the Sahel. Experts, in Franke and Chasin's view, have the role of encouraging support «for the Sahelians' efforts among the people of our own country (i.e., the U.S.A.)». This important educational role of experts is mentioned several times in the book, but Franke and Chasin fail to expand upon the theme sufficiently. Nor is their prescription particularly satisfying as it stands. What of possible contributions to be made by non-African students of development – and yes, even a few «experts» – in Africa to the formulation of strategies for social change in the Sahel and elsewhere? This important issue too remains unclear. Admittedly the issues are complex, the situation delicate, and possibly conflicting interests must – once again – be considered, but retrenchement is not the answer after all that has been done and undone. Indeed, we might ask ourselves if it *is* an option. Clearly the conditions under which such contributions are possible and even desirable must be explored and clarified, and here the voices of the Sahelian people must be listened to with great care. Here we are once again faced with the need to recognize that the «Sahelian people» are *not* an undifferentiated mass. They include peasants and

planners, military, students, merchants, a wide variety of bureaucratic types, artisans and laborers of varying degrees of skill. To whom will we listen and with whom will we work when assistance and expertise are solicited? The choices are thoroughly political and in a real sense, constrained. As for the current situation in the Sahel, Franke and Chasin stress what we should already realize – the articulate voices are those in power. It is they who prescribe development priorities, negotiate international development agreements, and implement them. The question becomes, for those of us who feel, unlike Franke and Chasin, that useful work *can* be done with Sahelians *in the Sahel as well as* promoting their interests in our home countries (the core: in this respect, their perspective is rather limited), how best to promote these modes of cooperation, assistance, and study. If not through the pervasive, often one-shot «project approach» – governmental or non-governmental – then in spite of it?

Seeds of Famine is a welcome addition to the groundwork for an ongoing, critically engaged, and accessible analysis of development strategies in West Africa.

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**FOCUS ON RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTES
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2. To assist instructional personnel, research scholars and students with the formulation, conduct and publishing of research studies.
3. To organize seminars and Workshops for faculty and students.
4. To solicit and assist in the administration of funds from local, national and international sources for research.
5. To coordinate and publish, under covers of the University Journal, research at the University and encourage the colleges/schools to publish occasional papers and monographs.

6. To act as a repository and data collecting bank for research in Liberia.
7. To initiate and support research projects that are relevant to national or University needs.

ADDITIONAL FACILITATIVE FUNCTIONS

1. – General Facilitation

- a. Help and encourage Liberians abroad to do their masters and especially doctoral dissertation research on and in Liberia.
- b. Organize workshop relationships with the Liberian Research Association, all professional associations in and on Liberia, and other institutions, ministries, bureaus, etc. engage in research in and on Liberia, and, with them facilitate the work of foreign scholars doing research in Liberia; for example reading and listing research proposals, helping to obtain entry visas, and providing office space and field supervision, where possible, at a modest fee.
- c. Develop national research priorities during the second year of the establishment of the Institute and update some every year thereafter.
- d. Set up effective working relations with College Deans.
- e. Seek funds, research projects and materials and bring them to the attention of faculty members.
- f. Encourage faculty, on an individual basis, to engage in research.
- g. Seek to provide an atmosphere that is conducive to combining research with instruction.
- h. Develop and execute at least one significant research project every year.
- i. Conduct other research projects in conjunction with Research Associates and priorities.
- j. Co-opt personnel, as it deems necessary and within its financial limits, to help to conduct its own research.
- k. Collect oral traditions and compile private papers of historical significance.

2. – Nurture Operations of Faculty Research

- a. Contact faculty members to develop profiles on research interests and continue to update some.
- b. Provide each year an intensive seminar at different levels for faculty including the conceptual formulation of research, the administration, analysis and the writing up of the result.
- c. Help faculty to acquire computer skills to analyze their own data or develop greater sophistication in this area.
- d. Conduct regular seminars to update faculty research skills.
- e. Identify students in research methods courses, supplement their skills where necessary and use their service and involve them in ongoing research.

f. Conduct regular colloquia on ongoing research by inviting field researchers to present their materials and/or findings to faculty and students and wherever possible to encourage such researchers to share their skills with faculty and students.

g. Assist faculty and student researchers, in collaboration with the Director of Libraries and the Library Staff, with bibliographic and other materials and help ensure that the Library has adequate materials for research.

h. Serve as a resource and support center for faculty research.

ACTIVITIES UNDER THE INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH

Rural Transport and Market Conditions in Liberia

In collaboration with the Institute of Regional Science, University of Karlsruhe, Federal Republic of West Germany, the Institute of Research, University of Liberia is undertaking an interdisciplinary research on «Rural Transport and Market Conditions in Liberia». The study grew out of the desire of two Liberian postgraduate students at the University of Karlsruhe and two of their German Colleagues to undertake field research in Liberia. The objectives of the research are:

- (1) to analyze the present transportation and market situation in rural Liberia; and
- (2) to involve and formulate a method for the improvement of the transportation system which will facilitate the farmer-market interaction pattern.

A Study of Monrovia Markets

In an attempt to improve the market situation in Monrovia, the Monrovia City Corporation requested the Institute of Research, University of Liberia to undertake a pilot study of three markets within the city which are directly controlled by the Corporation.

The main objective of the study is to investigate the present organizational, managerial and financial structures of the markets and suggest ways of improving them. A secondary objective is to determine the need for additional markets and/or expansion of existing ones and the feasibility of consolidating all the other markets in the city under a single management.

PROFILE OF LIBERIAN WOMEN & DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH

This project, jointly sponsored by the Government of Liberia and the USAID/Liberia, is being undertaken by a full-time research team at the University of Liberia.

The main objective of this study is to investigate the ways in and conditions under which Liberia women participate in productive activities. In doing so, women's role in such critical areas of development as agriculture, marketing, education, etc. will be analyzed to a better understanding of the impact of development on their lives.

In addition to these special projects by the IRUL, the various faculties of the University are undertaking a number of studies specific to their disciplines, such as:

1. A study on Solar Energy utilization by the College of Science and Technology.
2. A study of the Ecology and Epidemiology of Leaf Scald Disease, of Rice Stalk and Cot Rot Diseases in Maize under Liberian conditions by the College of Agriculture and Forestry.
3. Problems connected with the Teaching of English in Secondary Schools of Liberia, by the College of Education.
4. Patterns of Migrant adjustment in Monrovia, by the Demographic Unit.
5. Liberia's Urban System 1980, by the Geography Department to list only a few.

COLLOQUIA

The Institute also conducts periodic colloquia by faculty members and outstanding scholars, as a means of stimulating professional exchange of views on important research issues relevant to national development. The papers presented are also used for publication in the University Journal, where pertinent.

BOOKS RECEIVED

*Inclusion on this list does not exclude future review of the publication
L'apparition d'un titre dans cette liste n'exclut pas sa future critique.*

1. **Bela Belassa, André Barsony, Anne Richards**
Les effets exercés sur la balance des paiements par les chocs extérieurs et les mesures prises pour y répondre dans les pays en Développement non membres de l'OPEP – (OCDE, 1981).
2. **Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein (ed.)**
The African Liberation Reader: Documents of the National Liberation Movements – Vol. 2: The National Liberation Movements, Vol. 1: The Anatomy of Colonialism Vol. 3: The Strategy of Liberation. (ZED Press, November 1st, 1982)
3. **John Cathie**
The Political Economy of Food Aid – (Gower Publishing Company Ltd., 1982).
4. **Elisabeth Croll**
The Family Rice Bowl: Food and the Domestic Economy in China (UNRISD, 1982).
5. **E. G. Erikson, G. Melander, P. Nobel (ed.)**
An Analysing Account of the Conference on the African Refugee Problem (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1981).
6. **Jozef Goldbat**
The Political Economy of International Finance (Gower Publishing Company, 1981).
7. **Bachir Hamdouch, Tajeddine Baddou, Abdalla Berrada, Louise Lassonde**
Migration Internationale au Maroc (I.N.S.E.A., Rabat-Maroc).
8. **Evens Hamrell (ed.)**
Refugee Problems in Africa (Nordiska Afrikains-titutet, 1967).
9. **International Commission of Jurists**
Development, Human Rights and the Rule of Law (Pergamon Press, 1981).
10. **International Commission of Jurists**
Human Rights in a One-Party State (Search Press)
11. **International Commission of Jurists & Consumers' Association of Penang**
Rural Development and Human Rights in South East Asia (ICJ/ Consumers' Association of Penang, 1982).
12. **International Commission of Jurists, Kuwait University, Union of Arab Lawyers**
Human Rights in Islam (ICJ, 1982).
13. **International Commission of Jurists & the Organization of Commonwealth Caribbean Association**
Human Rights and Development (The CEDAR Press, 1978).

14. **François Lery**
L'Agriculture au Maghreb: Techniques Agricoles et Productions Méditerranéennes (GP. Maisonneuve & Larose, 1982).
15. **Göran Melander**
Refugees in Somalia (The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1980).
16. **Göran Melander, Peter Nobel (ed.)**
African Refugees and the Law (Nordiska afrikainstitutet, 1978).
17. **N. S. McBain, S. J Uhlig**
Choice of Technique in Bolt and Nut Manufacture (David Livingstone Institute, 1982).
18. **Göran Melander, Peter Nobel (ed.)**
International Legal Instruments on Refugees in Africa (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1979).
19. **M. M. Hug, H. Aragaw**
Choice of Technique in Leather Manufacture (David Livingstone Institute, 1981).
20. **Georges Parry**
Le Cotonier et ses Produits (G.P. Maisonneuve & Larose, 1982).
21. **Yusufu Bala Usman (ed.)**
Political Repression in Nigeria (Bala Mohammed Memorial Committee, 1982).
22. **Eugene L. Versluysen**
The Political Economy of International Finance (Gower Publishing Company, 1981).
23. **Willem F. Wertheim, Mathias Stiefel**
Production, Equality and Participation in Rural China: Reflections on a Field Trip in September/October 1979 (UNRISD 1982).

NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS

All manuscripts should be in duplicate and in a form suitable for sending to the printer. Both copies must be typed in double spacing. Articles should be accompanied by a record of the authors name and affiliation, and by a summary of 500 words (for translation purposes) giving a clear indication of the nature and range of the results in the paper.

Citations in the text should read thus: (Amin 1975) or, for specific quotations, (Amin, 1975 pp. 61–62). The convention (Amin, 1975 A), (Amin, 1975 B), should be used if more than one publication by the same author(s) in a particular year is cited. References should be listed in full, alphabetically at the end of the paper in the following style:

- Nabudere, D.W. (1978) *Essays in the Theory and Practice of Imperialism*. London, Onyx.
- Yachir, F. (1978) «Recherche Economique et Système Mondial Capitaliste: Le Tiers-Monde et l'Instrumentalisation de Recherche» *AFRICA DEVELOPMENT* Vol. III No. 4.

NOTES AUX AUTEURS

Les manuscrits doivent nous parvenir en deux exemplaires et prêts à être imprimés. Les deux exemplaires doivent être écrits à interligne double. Doivent être joints à l'article : des détails concernant l'auteur, le nom et l'affiliation et un résumé de 500 mots (pour traduction éventuelle) donnant une indication précise de la nature de l'article et une vue d'ensemble des résultats atteints.

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- Nabudere, D.W. (1978) *Essays in the Theory and Practice of Imperialism*. London, Onyx.
- Yachir, F. (1978) «Recherche Economique et Système Mondial Capitaliste : Le Tiers-Monde et l'Instrumentalisation de la Recherche» *AFRICA DEVELOPMENT* Vol. III No. 4.

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Julius Nyerere et la Révolution Africaine.

Ansa Asamoah

On Bourgeois Development Theory – A Critique of Behrendt.

DOCUMENTS

– Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Assessment by the OAU, ECA & ADB Secretariats (ECA edited version).

– Declaration of Tripoli on the World Bank Report entitled «Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action».

BOOK REVIEWS/REVUE DES LIVRES

Abdel Wedoul Ould Cheikh

– L'Anthropologie et l'Avenir des Sociétés Pastorales.

Thomas M. Painter

– Seeds of Famine: Ecological Destruction and the Development Dilemma in the West African Sahel.

FOCUS ON RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTES

The Institute of Research of the University of Liberia (IRUL).

BOOKS RECEIVED